THE RELATION BETWEEN UNCREATED AND CREATED GRACE
IN THE HALESIAN SUMMA: A LONERGAN READING

by

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A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Theology of the University of St. Michael’s College and the Department of Theology of the Toronto School of Theology in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology awarded by the University of St. Michael’s College

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ABSTRACT

The Relation between Uncreated and Created Grace in the Halesian Summa:
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The terms, gratia increata and gratia creata, emerged in theological reflection in the West in the early thirteenth century as the expression of an understanding that for the first time attempted to relate systematically the indwelling of the Divine Persons in human hearts and the new life in God that characterizes those who embrace God’s saving action in their lives. This dissertation attempts to outline the movement in theological reflection that led to the introduction of the terms, to clarify how the relation between the realities to which the terms are meant to refer was initially understood, and to indicate briefly what in that initial understanding is of permanent theological validity.

Initially, the dissertation focuses on methodological considerations. Drawing on Bernard Lonergan’s exposition of transcendental method and the concrete generality of its heuristic function, I attempt to specify a set of ideal-types that will be employed in the subsequent historical discussion. Thus, I treat briefly the elements and functions of meaning and the pivotal role these play in constituting the history that is written about, the various differentiations of consciousness and the various correlative Realms and Worlds of meaning, the genetic sequence in which at least some of the differentiations of consciousness are realized in a culture and the consequent stages of meaning of a culture, symbolic apprehension, and continuing contexts and the various kinds of relationship that can exist between continuing contexts.

The discussion then turns to an examination of the first extended treatment of the terms gratia increata and gratia creata in theological literature, found in a set of questions in the Summa attributed to Alexander of Hales. The goal here is to provide a preliminary clarification of the meaning of the terms that can serve as an anchor and preparation for the subsequent discussion. Little explicit reference is made in this preliminary clarification to the philosophical and theological contexts out of which the terms emerged.

An explicit consideration of context, however, does follow in the next two chapters. I distinguish a general philosophical context and a more specific theological context for the emergence of the terms. The general philosophical context concerns the systematic substructure that facilitated the compounding of the manner in which theological reflection was conducted and the establishment of a new systematic ideal in theological reflection. This compounding of the manner of theological reflection was precipitated in large part by the writings of Aristotle that had become newly available in the West during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Next, in the specifically theological context I distinguish and trace two movements in theological reflection. The first concerns developments in the theology of grace and the pivotal role Philip the Chancellor played in that development, in particular his articulation of what Lonergan call the theorem of the supernatural and his forging of the notion of the supernatural entitative habitus. The second concerns the doctrine of divine
inhabitation as it developed in the West from its affirmation in the New Testament, through Augustine, and up to its articulation in Peter Lombard.

With the preliminary clarification of the meaning of the terms *gratia increata* and *gratia creata* now enhanced and consolidated by an examination of the contexts out of which the terms emerged, the discussion turns in Chapter 5 to a more intensive examination of the relationships between the realities referred to by the terms. In an extended exploration of the issues, I argue that all the elements in the Halesian *Summa*'s position can be brought together coherently if one understands it as moving toward the affirmation that the bestowal of *gratia gratum faciens* is the necessary and sufficient proportionate preparation for human beings to enter into the special presence of the already wholly present three-personed God, and indeed for a presential union with the three-personed God, because from *gratia gratum faciens* originates the operative *habitus* and operations of charity, the supernatural, reposeful love of God, the *complacentia* in the *summa Bonitas*, which as love involves intrinsically the presence of the beloved within the lover, and therefore enables the lover to *attain* the three-personed God in direct proportion to the depth of his or her love.

Finally, drawing on Lonergan's discussion of the ways of considering truths concerning God, I attempt briefly to indicate some structural elements in the theological position of the Halesian *Summa* on this issue that may be of permanent theological validity.
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To the memory of my brother
Maurice John (Tofe) Monsour,
who died during the early days of writing the dissertation
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1

1 Methodological Considerations 21
   1 Transcendental Method 22
   2 The Heuristic Function of Transcendental Method 35
   3 Heuristic Structures and Historical Studies of Doctrinal Development in Theology 38
      3.1 History and the Elements and Functions of Meaning 43
      3.2 Differentiations of Consciousness 59
      3.3 Stages of Meaning of a Culture 62
      3.4 Symbolic Apprehension 74
      3.5 Continuing Contexts 79
   4 Résumé 84

2 Gratia Increata et Creata in the Halesian Summa 86
   1 Origin of the Terms Gratia Increata and Gratia Creata 86
   2 Quid sit gratia secundum nominis rationem 90
   3 Quid sit gratia secundum definitionem 91
   4 Utrum gratia ponat aliquid secundum rem in gratificato 94
   5 Utrum gratia sit res creata vel increata 98
   6 Gratia creata et increata and the grace of union 106
3 The General Philosophical Context: Emergence of the Systematic Ideal in Theology

1 Theological Reflection and Dialectic in the Twelfth Century

2 Opposition from the Claustrales

3 The "Entries" of Aristotle and the Systematic Ideal

4 The More Specific Theological Context for the Emergence of the Notions of Gratia Increata et Creata

1 The Emergence of the Notion of the Supernatural Habitus

   1.1 The Psychological Interpretation of Grace

   1.2 Difficulties with the Psychological Interpretation of Grace

   1.3 Moving Towards a Solution

   1.4 Breakthrough: The Theorem of the Supernatural

   1.5 Philip the Chancellor and the Notion of the Supernatural Habitus

2 The Special Presence of the Holy Spirit

   2.1 The Witness of the New Testament

   2.2 Augustine’s Contribution

      2.2.1 The Letter to Dardanus

      2.2.2 De Trinitate

   2.3 Peter Lombard’s Sententiae
5 The Halesian *Summa* 196

1 A Preliminary Clarification of the Issue 196

2 A Triangle of Relationships 203

2. 1 *The Relationship between Gratia Gratum Faciens and the Special Presence of the Holy Spirit: The Precise Question* 204

2. 2 *The Relationship between Gratia Gratum Faciens and the Representatio of the Procession of the Holy Spirit* 207

2. 2. 1 Final Causality 211

2. 2. 2 God as Final Cause of Gratia Gratum Faciens 214

2. 2. 3 The Image of *Fructus* 216

2. 2. 4 The Image of Light and Rays of Light 223

2. 3 *The Relationship between the Special Presence of the Holy Spirit and the Representatio of the Procession of the Holy Spirit* 229

2. 3. 1 Cunningham's Criticism of the Halesian Position 230

2. 3. 2 A Response to Cunningham's Criticism 232

2. 3. 3 Love and the Special Presence of the Holy Spirit 245

Conclusion 254

Bibliography 283
For there that love is ledere, ne lakked nevere grace

William Langland, *Piers Plowman*

...grace is tied up with God’s loving gift of himself to us....

Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*
INTRODUCTION

The study of history has as its primary goal reasonably grounded affirmations of the perspectival reconstructions of intelligence concerning what was going forward in the field of human affairs, that is, in the field constituted by the meaningful speech and action of successive members of the various kinds of human communities or groups, at particular times and places.

One can distinguish different kinds of historical studies. Thus, in Method in Theology Bernard Lonergan distinguishes basic historical studies, special historical studies and general historical studies.¹

As the name suggests, basic historical studies have a certain priority in relation to special and general historical studies. As a first approximation, one may say that basic historical studies are concerned with the deeds of ordinary human living in the past, with the twisting and turning ways in which groups of individuals continued to adapt to their particular geographical and biological habitat.

The groups that basic historical studies consider can range from spontaneously emerging regional cultures, the simplest way of life for human beings, the simplest kind of continuous human adaptation to a particular geographical and biological habitat, to civilizations, extended areas of social communication permeated with a dominant super-culture and characterized in their mode of living by complex networks of interdependent

and increasingly differentiated "roles to be fulfilled" and "tasks to be performed," and "ever more elaborate organization and regulation to ensure fulfilment and performance." Further, each of these groups can be considered in itself or in its interaction with other groups. Irrespective of the kind of group being considered, however, every basic historical study considers it as a unit, an organic whole. For informing each group's way of life, giving it its distinctive identity and its members their sense of belonging, are its living traditions, its distinctive core of dramatic artistry, handed down to successive generations and embodied in the shared memories formative of its members.

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2 Lonergan, _Method in Theology_, p. 257. I borrow the term 'super-culture' and the notion that a civilization is an extended area of social communication from Christopher Dawson: "No doubt it [civilization] is always based on a particular original process of cultural creativity which is the work of a particular people. But at the same time it always tends to become a super-culture—an extended area of social communication which dominates and absorbs other less advanced or less powerful cultures and unites them in an 'oecumene,' an international and intercultural society; and it is this extension of the area of communication that is the essential characteristic of civilization as distinguished from lower forms of culture." Christopher Dawson, "Arnold Toynbee and the Study of History," in _The Dynamics of World History_, ed. John J. Mulloy (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), p. 402.

3 Even if regional cultures are the simplest kind of continuous human adaptation to a particular geographical and biological habitat, it does not follow that regional cultures are simple. Thus, regarding regional cultures Lonergan writes: "The influence of geography provides one great determinant of what the mode of living [of a group] will be. There is also the technological and economic determinant: the way they work, the tasks they have to perform in their way of life. Finally, there is the influence of heredity and historical memories, their culture, their religion. These three elements—the external determinants of nature, the determinants that come from the mode of subsistence, and the determinants that come from the memories of the past and the tradition, the expressions of values in a religion and in stories—are realized in a single whole, in an organic way of living. It is this regional culture that provides the basic unit in thinking about history." Bernard Lonergan, _Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education_, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe, revising and augmenting the unpublished text prepared by James Quinn and John Quinn, vol. 10 of _Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan_ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 252. On the dramatic artistry involved in ordinary human living, Lonergan remarks: "...man [is] capable of aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity, but the first work of art is his own living. The fair, the beautiful, the admirable is embodied by man in his own body and actions before it is given a still freer realization in painting and sculpture, in music and poetry. Style is the man before it appears in the artistic product...The biological [exigence of human nature] cannot be ignored, and yet in man it can be transformed. The transformation varies with the locality, the period, the social milieu.... "Such artistry is dramatic. It is in the presence of others, and the others too are also actors in the primordial drama that the theatre only imitates. If aesthetic values, realized in one's living, yield one the satisfaction of good performance, still it is well to have the objectivity of that satisfaction confirmed by the admiration of others; it is better to be united with others by winning their approval; it is best to be bound to
As a second, more specific approximation, one may say that basic historical studies are directly concerned with publicly significant human activities, that is, with the kinds of speech and action of members of a group that in some measure have a bearing or implication for the ordinary living of the group as a whole. Thus, to take some examples, such studies are especially concerned with the impact of the mechanical arts and technological innovation on a group's way of life and on the ways in which its members interact with one another; with civil society and publicly significant cooperation among the members of the group; with public discord and hostility and with military conflict, within groups and between groups; and finally with the widespread breakdown

2(...continued)

them by deserving and obtaining their respect and even their affection. For man is a social animal. He is born in one family only to found another of his own. His artistry and his knowledge accumulate over the centuries because he imitates and learns from others. The execution of his practical schemes requires the collaboration of others. Still, the network of man's social relationships has not the fixity of organization of the hive or the anthill; nor again is it primarily the product of pure intelligence devising blueprints for human behavior. Its ground is aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity, where the artistry is limited by biological exigence, inspired by example and emulation, confirmed by admiration and approval, sustained by respect and affection." Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, 5th ed. revised and augmented, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, vol 3 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 211. (For the extended discussion in *Insight* of the artistic, dramatic and practical dimensions of ordinary human living, see pp. 210-214, 232-244.) In *Topics of Education* (p. 252), Lonergan repeats some of what is said in *Insight*, but he emphasizes that a distinct dramatic artistry can characterize a group as well as an individual: "There is an old saying that style is the man. That is fundamentally true. Living is an art.... Now this artistic living is simple living. It is not a purely individual affair. The individual grows up and develops under the influence of the example of others, under the influence of admiration and ridicule, of precepts and prohibitions, of praise and blame. And the individual is extremely sensitive to all this. His living takes its inspiration, its guidance, and its justification from the opinions of others. Consequently, the style that is the man is not something individual; it belongs to the group. There will be individual variations, but there is something common to all. There is something similar in the tone, the color, the way of doing things, the attitudes that are said to be characteristic of the regional group." Further, note that in the initial quotation, Lonergan mentions religion as part of the third element constitutive of regional cultures. For an indication of the manner in which the transcendental tendency of the human spirit, its native orientation to the divine (even apart from any consideration of God's universal offer of salvation effective throughout human history) impinges on human dramatic artistry and precludes ordinary human living from being confined just to mundane concerns, and, indeed, gives rise at the psychic level, in "feelings, emotions, sentiments," to "some intimation of unplumbed depths," and to attempts to express that intimation in "exclamations and bodily movements, in rites and ceremonies, in song and speech," see *Insight*, pp. 554-572. Finally, for Lonergan's explicit use of the term 'living traditions,' and for the sense in which he connects living traditions with what is meant by 'human historicity,' by 'being historical,' and by 'existential history,' see *Method in Theology*, p. 182.
in the arrangements of public cooperation and the general decline and decay of groups—of regional cultures, of city-states and nations, and even of entire civilizations. 4

As a final and still more specific statement, one may say that basic historical studies are concerned with the concrete determinations and accurate narration of what was going forward in a group’s public life as a result of the publicly significant activities of members of the group—with who said and did what in the group’s public life, where and when, and with what concrete consequences. 5

Every reconstruction of intelligence concerning what was going forward in the field of human affairs is inevitably perspectival. In the broad sense, Lonergan remarks, the term, ‘perspectivism,’ refers “...to any case in which different historians treat the same matter differently.” 6 The proper or more specific sense of the term, however, refers to

4 “...the practicality of common sense engenders and maintains enormous structures of technology, economics, politics, and culture, that not only separate man from nature but also add a series of new levels or dimensions in the network of human relationships.” Lonergan, Insight, p. 232. “The discoveries of practical intelligence, which once were an incidental addition to the spontaneous fabric of human living, now [with the growth of civil community] penetrate and overwhelm its every aspect. For just as technology and capital formation interpose their schemes of recurrence between man and the rhythms of nature, so economics and politics are vast structures of interdependence invented by practical intelligence for the mastery not of nature but of man.” Lonergan, Insight, p. 238. “...as long as there will be practical intelligence, there will be technology and capital, economy and polity. There will be the adaptation of human intersubjectivity to that division and differentiation. There will be common decisions to be reached and implemented. Practical intelligence necessitates classes and states, and no dialectic can promise their permanent disappearance.” Lonergan, Insight, pp. 262-263. For Lonergan’s discussion of civil society, see Insight, pp. 238-239. For his discussion of the factors that obstruct the smooth functioning of public cooperation, and of the cycles of decline, see Insight, pp. 244-261.

5 “Basic history tells where (places, territories) and when (dates, periods) who (persons, peoples) did what (public life, external acts) to enjoy what success, suffer what reverses, exert what influences. So it makes as specific and precise as possible the more easily recognized and acknowledged features of human activities in their geographic distribution and temporal succession.” Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 128. Regarding the historian’s precise object, Lonergan writes: “He [the historian] wants to grasp what was going forward in particular groups at particular places and times. By ‘going forward’ I mean to exclude the mere repetition of a routine. I mean the changes that originated the routine and its dissemination.” Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 178.

those different treatments of the same matter by different historians that are neither contradictory nor the consequence of ineptitude or bias, but a function of the individuality of the historian.7

7 For Lonergan’s express discussion of perspectivism and its inevitability in historical investigations, see Method in Theology, pp. 214-220. To summarize, any historical reality that an historian or group of historians investigate, if it were fully resolved into a set of particular, intelligibly connected events within a particular time-span, would be enormously complex—so complex, in fact, that no historian can rightly claim to be in possession of complete information on that reality or pretend to offer an exhaustively complete narrative portrayal of all the intelligible connections among the particular events. Still, historians are not simply helpless in the face of such complexity. Historical knowing is a specifically different kind of knowing from mathematical, scientific and philosophical knowing. It is, Lonergan says, “a sophisticated extension of common-sense understanding,” an adaptation of the procedures of common-sense knowing to apply to the human past. (See Method in Theology, p. 230; cf. pp. 197, 216, 305 and Insight, p. 587.) Like common-sense knowing, historical knowing is spontaneously selective; and all other things being equal, this process of selection is at the service of the desire to know. It occurs, Lonergan says, “...in virtue of some mysterious capacity that can determine what is to be expected, that groups and constructs, that possesses the tact needed to evaluate and refine, that proceeds as though in one’s mind there were some governing and controlling law of perspective so that, granted the historian’s standpoint, his milieu, his presuppositions, his training, there must result just the structures and the emphases and the selection that do result.” (Method in Theology, p. 215.) It follows that historical studies speak not only of the past; they are also indicative of the present. In particular, they are indicative of the historian’s own existential history and habitual intellectual development. In addition to being at the service of the desire to know, then, the process of selection in the development of historical understanding has its point of departure in the historian’s existential history and habitual intellectual development and is invariably conditioned by it. Now, bias aside, points of departure among historians investigating the same historical reality can vary considerably. And as every historical investigation proceeds according to a process of selection that is conditioned by the historian’s point of departure, the results of the investigations of different historians will likewise be conditioned by their points of departure, and exhibit considerable differences. So, for example, one can say that “[t]he more intelligent and the more cultivated he [an historian] is, the broader his experience, the more open he is to all human values, the more competent and rigorous his training, the greater his capacity to discover the past.” (Method in Theology, p. 216). Now, just as one’s common-sense formation does not admit of systematic objectification (see Insight, pp. 198-203), so neither does one’s own existential history and habitual intellectual development, nor the development of historical understanding that has as its point of departure one’s existential history and habitual intellectual development, nor the process of selection as it functions in the development of historical understanding (see Method in Theology, pp. 216-218, 223). Historical method, then, does not possess the kinds of control operative in mathematics, science or philosophy. It does not follow, however, that faced with the aforementioned differences in the results of historical investigations, one must affirm some form of historical relativism. For historical method has its own controls. Just as with common-sense knowing regarding some concrete situation in which the self-correcting process of learning tends to a limit of invulnerability, where there are no further pertinent questions to be asked, and thus issues, reasonably, in a common-sense judgment of fact (see Insight, pp. 308-312), so in an historical investigation regarding some historical reality, one’s surmises concerning that reality, which one represents imaginatively, can multiply, combine, cluster and coalesce in such a manner that they begin to coincide or approximate to further data connected with that historical reality. Then, Lonergan remarks, “there occurs a shift in the manner of one’s questioning for, more and more, the further questions come from the data rather than from images based on surmises.” (Method in Theology, p. 187). He calls this the ecstatic moment in the process of developing historical understanding. It is the moment at which the data are ceasing to be merely potential...
Besides basic historical studies, there are special and general historical studies. In addition to the spontaneous perspectivism that inevitably characterizes all historical studies, there is the deliberate perspectivism of special historical studies. Their focus is not on the organic whole of meaningful speech and action that one refers to in using the term 'ordinary human living,' but on deliberately restricted fields of meaningful speech and action, which may or may not be a part of ordinary human living, and on what was going forward within those restricted fields as a result of that speech and action. In this sense, one may speak of specific movements within a restricted field as the object of special historical studies. More precisely, special historical studies are considerations of the field of meaningful speech and action in so far as it is a repository of data pertaining

(continued)

evidence for historical intelligence and are becoming formal evidence, that is, evidence significant for determining what was actually going forward. One is beginning to move out of one's original perspective and into a perspective proper to the historical reality under investigation. One is beginning to set aside one's earlier assumptions concerning that reality and bringing to light the network of intelligible connections among the events proper to the reality. A more sure-footed self-correcting process of learning can then ensue. And like the self-correcting process of learning of common-sense knowing, it can tend to a limit of invulnerability, at which there are no further pertinent questions to be asked. Now historical intelligence may only rarely, if ever, reach this limit. Still, as it approaches the limit, the cumulative process of developing understanding increasingly acquires a reflective significance. That is, with respect to the historical reality under investigation, increasingly one is able to understand the historical data with which one is working not simply as formal evidence, but as actual evidence, from which one is able to make probable historical judgments concerning what was going forward or some aspect of what was going forward in that historical reality. There is, then, a criterion and operative control for sound historical judgments. However, the criterion and control are not such as to remove all differences among different historians in the historical judgments they are likely to make concerning the same historical reality. For those judgments still remain conditioned by each historian's existential history and habitual intellectual development, by the process of developing historical understanding that has its point of departure in each historian's existential history and habitual intellectual development, and by the process of selection as it functions spontaneously in that developing understanding; and none of these admit of systematic objectification. "In brief," Lonergan remarks, "the historical process itself, and within it, the personal development of the historian give rise to a series of different standpoints. The different standpoints give rise to different selective processes. The different selective processes give rise to different histories that are (1) not contradictory, (2) not complete information and not complete explanation, but (3) incomplete and approximate portrayals of an enormously complex reality" (Method in Theology, pp. 218-219). Such is what is meant by perspectivism in historical studies, and it applies to every historical study, whether it be basic, special or general.
to the various kinds of cultural, institutional and doctrinal movements. To write such histories adequately, one frequently requires specialized knowledge as a precondition. Indeed, in some instances, to write special historical studies adequately, historians must themselves have been formed by the movement about which they write. Thus only a mathematician can write an adequate history of mathematics or a history of some part of mathematics, and only a theologian can write an adequate history of theology or a history of some doctrinal or speculative development in theology.

General historical studies, finally, attempt to integrate basic and special historical studies. Where special historical studies tend not to focus directly or especially on the concrete setting of movements within ordinary human living, their concrete connections with ordinary human living and their connections with other movements, general historical studies seek to restore that concrete setting and to display the connections between the sum of cultural, institutional and doctrinal movements and their concrete setting. Thus, they seek a total view of what was going forward at particular times and places, or some approximation to such a total view. Recognizing their immense difficulty, Lonergan speaks of general historical studies as "perhaps, just an ideal."9

Given this division, the major portion of the discussion to follow falls within the category of special doctrinal history. Doctrinal histories, as instances of special historical studies, are concerned with tracing the movement in some body of teaching within some limited field or, even more specifically, with tracing the movement on some particular topic

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8 "Special histories tell of movements whether cultural (language, art, literature, religion), institutional (family, mores, society, education, state, law, church, sect, economy, technology), or doctrinal (mathematical, natural science, philosophy, history, theology)." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 128.

9 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 128.
within that field. The major portion of the discussion to follow is concerned with one aspect of the speculative development in the theology of grace in the West up to a certain point. It attempts to outline the movement in theological reflection that led to the emergence of the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*, and to clarify how the relation between the realities to which the terms are meant to refer was initially understood. As an outline of a movement, the discussion makes no pretence to be exhaustive. At the same time, there is no sound reason for excluding historical outlines from falling within Lonergan’s threefold division of historical studies. The major portion of the discussion to follow, then, can rightly be said to fall within the category of special doctrinal history.

One can distinguish between the *meaning* and the *significance* of terms. With sufficient accuracy for present purposes, one might say that, beyond the specified meaning of a term, its significance includes the bearing or application of that meaning, its use, role or function as part of human discourse.

Significance can be of many kinds. One kind may be termed primordial significance. Karl Rahner remarks that there are certain words in a language which, if they retain their vitality for the speakers of the language, function in such a way as to warrant one describing them as primordial words (*Unworte*). Typically, they are words that refer in a concrete way to the elemental things of human life. They may each have a distinct literal meaning, but none of these meanings is neatly circumscribed; for these words are especially adept in evoking and opening up for one the mystery of the whole of reality. With every primordial word, Rahner writes, “...there is signified a piece of reality in which a door is mysteriously opened for us into the unfathomable depths of true reality in general.” In this sense, the whole of reality can be said to be *quietly* present with each
use of the word. Accordingly, one may speak of such words as possessing primordial significance.

In a similar way, 'grace' functions in Christian discourse as a kind of primordial word, a compendious utterance whose meaning gathers to itself the many-faceted mystery of God's self-communication with humankind in its original unity and totality. Expressing "...the generous love of God to man by which salvation is constituted and the era of redemption opened," the word represents, William Manson remarks, "...the central and fundamental conception of the Christian religion of the New Testament" and the "...undifferentiated...presupposition of Christian life, from which everything in that life flows, and by which everything in that life is inspired." Again, Cornelius Ernst concludes his analysis of the use of 'grace' in the New Testament with the remark that 'grace' is an "...open concept capable of embracing the whole of God's gift of himself to man, and so capable of indefinitely various further particularization." For Christians, then, 'grace' is a word especially adept in evoking and opening up the whole of the mystery of their life.

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10 Karl Rahner, "Priest and Poet," in *Theological Investigations*, vol. III: *The Theology of the Spiritual Life*, tr. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon Press and London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1967), p. 298. On the previous page, Rahner remarks that no matter what primordial words speak of, "they always whisper something about everything." Words can function in this manner, we may suppose, first, because they possess associations with feelings, images and memories, and, second, because human psychic development stands in some dynamic correspondence and harmonious orientation with the openness of our intelligent, reasonable and responsible intending, permanently and unrestrainedly orientated towards the known unknown. Primordial words are those associated with the feelings, emotions and sentiments that bear the mark of this correspondence and orientation in their incorporation of "...some cosmic dimension,...some intimation of unplumbed depths." (See Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 555.) And laden with such feelings, images and memories possess a dynamism that renders them symbolic of the known unknown.


in God. In Christian discourse, 'grace' is a word possessing a kind of primordial significance.

From this one can argue that if they are taken together, the terms, gratia increata and gratia creata, provide an especially suitable framework for fruitful theological reflection on the unity and totality of the mystery of God's self-communication with humankind and humankind's consequent life in God. For, given that gratia is a kind of primordial word for Christians, the qualifications, increata and creata, do not so much narrow down theological reflection to this or that kind of grace, and so distract one from the primordial significance of the word, as simply focus attention on the intrinsic relationship between God's self-communication with humankind and humankind's consequent life in God. Accordingly, one might say that part of their significance is their inherent aptitude for bringing to the focal foreground for theologians to reflect upon none other than the primordial significance of the term, gratia, as it functions vitally in Christian discourse.

Recognition of significance, however, frequently lags behind recognition of meaning. More particularly, the full integrating or unifying potential of a term or set of terms, the possibility, for example, that they may express in inchoate form a root or leading idea, from which can flow a whole series of cumulatively integrating or unifying developments, may not be evident at the time of their introduction, and may continue to languish in unrecognized dormancy for some shorter or longer period after their introduction. Alternatively, and perhaps more frequently, some inkling of unexplored significance may be present at the time of introduction or shortly after; but the twists and turns of historical circumstances may consign that inkling to a forgotten past. The end-
result, then, would be the same as non-recognition.

The terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*, emerged in theological reflection, in part, as the expression of an understanding that for the first time related *systematically* the indwelling of the Divine Persons in human hearts and the new life in God that characterizes those who embrace God's saving action in their lives. The period in which the terms emerged was one of ferment and creativity in theological reflection—indeed, it was a period in which, amidst considerable opposition, a new manner of theological reflection was gradually becoming established. Even if the understanding just mentioned can rightly be considered as one example of the theological creativity of the period, and one result of the new manner of theological reflection, there is little evidence to suggest that it was accorded special significance. And, certainly, it was not exploited as a fruitful framework for subsequent reflecting on the unity and totality of the mystery of God's self-communication with humankind and humankind's consequent life in God.¹⁴

¹⁴ Henri Rondet summarizes some of the factors in the history of theological reflection on grace, both prior and subsequent to the introduction of the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*, that effectively distracted attention away from the unity and totality of the mystery of God's self-communication with humankind and humankind's consequent life in God (what I have called the primordial significance of *gratia*) and directed it toward narrower concerns: "A backward glance over the history of the theology of grace reveals that Western thought was for a long time obsessed with the problems raised by the genius of Saint Augustine. Grace and freedom, grace and merit, justification and predestination—all these themes occupied the attention of theologians for long periods of time. Dogma itself was strongly marked by these preoccupations, and it is unfortunate that Trent's magnificent decree on justification gives little more than passing mention to the mystery of the divinization of the Christian.

"This rather unilateral development of theological thought plus the demands of controversy forced into the shadows a doctrine which lay at the very heart of Catholic thought, a doctrine whose importance both Augustine and the great scholastics had recognized. But ever since the close of the Middle Ages, there had been a split between the tract on grace and the treatise on the Trinity, which discusses the mission of the Holy Spirit. Created grace moved to the foreground, and although theologians continued to affirm the gift of the Holy Spirit, it was no longer highlighted.

"...[T]he Greek Fathers spoke of created grace only incidentally and in a vocabulary which was as yet quite inexact. For post-Tridentine theology, on the other hand, the gift of grace was foremost, and the divine presence was only one of the numerous effects of this gift. There were lengthy discussions on the nature of the distinction between grace and charity, on the relationship between mortal sin and the loss of (continued...)
I hope to return briefly to the issue of significance in the conclusion. For now, let me make just one point. I have said that in the bulk of the discussion to follow I shall simply attempt to outline the movement in theological reflection that led to the emergence of the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia createa*, and clarify how the relation between the realities to which the terms are meant to refer was initially understood. The goal of the discussion, however, is theological as well as historical. If the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia createa*, are expressive of a genuine, though perhaps inchoate achievement in systematic theological understanding, that achievement would possess a kind of permanent validity.\(^{15}\)

Outlining the movement in theological reflection that led to their emergence, and clarifying how the relation between the realities to which the terms are meant to refer was initially understood, then, may indeed fall within the category of special doctrinal history; but it would also enable one to identify the main features of a permanently valid achievement in theological reflection. I regard the terms as expressive of a genuine achievement in theological understanding. Accordingly, I cannot but consider the goal of the discussion to be theological as well as historical.

The discussion is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is methodological. 'Method' is perhaps best understood as an analogous term. Lonergan expresses its

\(^{14}\) (...continued)


\(^{15}\) The permanence is real, but flexible. Thus, Lonergan remarks: "Such [genuine] achievement can be improved upon. It can be inserted in larger and richer contexts. But unless its substance is incorporated in subsequent work, the subsequent work will be a substantially poorer affair." Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 352.
primary meaning thus: "A method is a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations yielding cumulative and progressive results."\textsuperscript{16} Method in this sense is not confined to any particular field or subject; for the radical intending that summons forth the related and recurrent operations in the appropriate pattern and yields cumulative and progressive results is unrestricted. Method in its primary sense, then, is more suitably named 'transcendental method.'

Besides transcendental method, there are special methods, appropriately implemented in some restricted field of data according to some limited perspective, and thus a corresponding set of diversified secondary meanings of 'method'. These special methods, Lonergan remarks, "...derive their proper norms from the accumulated experience of investigators in their several fields."\textsuperscript{17} But transcendental method, understood as "...the concrete and [materially and formally] dynamic unfolding of human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility,"\textsuperscript{18} underpins and penetrates all such special methods and proper norms and, indeed, constitutes them as methods. In this sense, transcendental method is general without being abstract.

It follows that transcendental method is relevant to the special method we name theological method. "To put method in theology," Lonergan writes, "is to conceive theology as a set of related and recurrent operations cumulatively advancing towards an ideal goal." To this initial statement he adds a further clarification, namely, that since contemporary theology is already specialized, with each of the specialties having its proper procedures

\textsuperscript{16} Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, pp. 4, 5.
\textsuperscript{17} Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 22
and norms, method in theology should be considered not as a single set of related operations, but as a series of interdependent sets. They are functionally related special methods, functional specialties, one of which is history.\textsuperscript{19}

Transcendental method is the core anthropological component in theological method. It does not provide the specifically religious component that constitutes theological method as \textit{theological}. But it does provide the component that underpins, penetrates and constitutes theological method as \textit{method}. The religious component, then, does not abrogate the anthropological component. And for this reason, neither transcendental method nor the categories derived from transcendental method are alien intruders into theological method. Accordingly, theological method can with propriety draw upon and include within theology itself categories derived from transcendental method. And, what is important for present purposes, theological method can do so not only as theology seeks to mediate the Christian message to the present; it can do so not only in all future theological investigations similarly concerned with mediating the Christian message to their time; it can do so also in investigations concerned with doctrinal developments in the history of theology.

The expression 'what was going forward', used in the first paragraph as part of a brief characterization of historical studies, excludes from consideration that part of human activity that merely repeats routines (unless, of course, that repetition itself should figure in eventually shifting the routine). The expression itself, however, merely utters an heuristic concept. In this respect, it is similar, say, to the expression 'undetermined

\textsuperscript{19} See Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 125.
function to be determined'. And just as there are procedures that assist the natural scientist in moving toward the determination of an undetermined function, so there are procedures that assist the historian in moving toward the intelligent reconstruction of what was going forward in some field of meaningful human speech and action. Such procedures are the concern of method.

One procedure of particular importance in historical studies is the employment of ideal-types. Lonergan remarks that the ideal-type "...is a theoretical construct in which possible events are intelligibly related to constitute an internally coherent system." Ideal-types, then, are not simply descriptions of reality or hypotheses regarding reality, but "...intelligible, interlocking set[s] of terms and relations that it may be well to have about when it comes to describing reality or to forming hypotheses." Their use in historical investigations is improper if they are imposed on an historical situation in a freewheeling and indiscriminate manner that will brook no recalcitrance from the historical data. Lonergan mentions three uses, two of which are heuristic and one expository. First, ideal-types facilitate the framing of hypotheses regarding what was going forward with respect to some set of historical data by "...direct[ing] the attention of an investigator in a determinate direction...." Once framed, an hypothesis or set of hypotheses can guide

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20 Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 227. Lonergan credits the notion and use of ideal-types to the German sociologist, Max Weber, and he refers to the discussion of them in a strictly historical context in Henri-Iréné Marrou's book, *The Meaning of History*, tr. Robert J. Olsen (Montreal: Palm Publishers, 1966). Let us not misinterpret the word 'system' here, as if by using it Lonergan meant to imply that the course of historical events is some coherent system waiting to be discovered through some elaborate application of ideal-types.


subsequent investigation. On occasion, perhaps, such subsequent investigation may reveal the hypothesis or set of hypotheses as unsuccessful or, at best, just minimally successful in illuminating the historical data under consideration. As a consequence, the ideal-type or set of ideal-types that directed the investigator's attention in a determinate direction, and facilitated the framing of the hypothesis or set of hypotheses, is deemed largely irrelevant; or, at best, incidentally relevant insofar as failure in one direction may suggest questions along more fruitful lines. On other occasions, an hypothesis or set of hypotheses may succeed in illuminating some aspects of the historical data by enabling an investigator to offer some plausible or even probable perspectival account of what was going forward in some historical situation, even if the account is incomplete and further questions abound. The ideal-type or set or ideal-types that facilitated the framing of the hypothesis or set of hypothesis is then able to perform its proper heuristic function of guiding and carrying forward subsequent historical investigations along increasingly fruitful lines. Deficiencies in the hypothesis or set of hypotheses that come to light in the course of such investigations call for adjustments in the ideal-type or set of ideal-types, and perhaps even the introduction of more adequate or complementary ideal-types. These, in turn, facilitate the framing of more adequate or complementary hypotheses able to offer a more satisfying account of what was going forward. Ideally, in historical investigations this circuit of interaction between ideal-types and hypotheses, on the one hand, and recalcitrant historical data, on the other, ought to continue until such time as relevant
questions concerning the historical situation begin to dry up. It is at this point that the proper expository function of ideal-types comes into play. Historians, writing their historical studies, rarely rehearse for their readers all the twists and turns of their investigations. They rarely mention all their false starts and dead ends, the perspectives they once enthusiastically entertained and later deemed to be of minor moment, the clue or set of clues, perhaps barely noticed at first, that initiated a line of questions, the answers to which eventually led to a probable, perspectival reconstruction of what was going forward in an historical situation. Typically, all that historians offer their readers is a narrative account of what they consider to be their successful intelligible reconstruction of what was going forward in the situation. The ideal-types that guided the investigation and facilitated the successful intelligible reconstruction of what was going forward are woven unobtrusively into such accounts, so as to enable the historian to express in the narrative his or her understanding of what was going forward in the situation. The ideal-types, then, prevent the account from being simply a report of events ordered spatially and temporally but otherwise disconnected. And, accordingly, they possess an expository function in that they facilitate and promote the communication of the historian's understanding of what was going forward in the situation to his or her readers.

The ideal-types delineated in the first chapter are applied in the subsequent

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23 "If, in fact, there are no further relevant questions then, in fact, a certain judgment would be true. If, in the light of the historian's knowledge, there are no further relevant questions, then the historian can say that, as far as he knows, the question is closed." Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 191. See footnote 7 above for my attempt to summarize Lonergan's account of the process of historical knowing and why such knowing is inherently perspectival. On the use of ideal-types in historical investigations, see Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 227-229. Note, as an indication of the potential misuse of ideal-types in such investigations, Lonergan's quotation from Marrou's book (*Method in Theology*, p. 229) that sometimes ideal-types can become "big anti-comprehension machines."
chapters. The second chapter examines in some detail what would seem to be the first extended discussion in theological literature in which the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*, feature. That discussion is found in the first two members of Question 61 of Book III of a work commonly attributed to Alexander of Hales (ca. 1186-1245), *Summa Fratris Alexandri*. The terms also feature in some parts of Question 11 of Book I of the same work, and this discussion will also be examined in the second chapter, though to a lesser extent and only for the sake of completeness, for it deals with another issue. Neither the second chapter nor the subsequent discussion in the remaining chapters attempts a detailed and comprehensive presentation of the theology of grace in the Halesian *Summa*; it considers that theology just in so far as it is necessary to determine accurately the initial meaning of the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*.

Such an examination, however, can only be the first step. For terms typically have determinate meaning within contexts, and cannot be understood accurately or with sufficient completeness apart from their contexts. The second chapter provides an anchor for the subsequent discussion, but the attainment of the goal of the discussion necessitates the first step be followed by a second, namely, an examination of the context within which the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*, emerged.

This second step has two phases. For one can distinguish the *general* philosophical context and the more *specific* theological context within which the terms emerged. The general philosophical context regards the systematic substructure for a new manner of meaning in theological reflection. It resulted in a monumental *compounding* of the manner in which theological reflection was conducted, and the gradual emergence of a new ideal
of systematic, analogical understanding in such reflection. Accordingly, neither the meaning nor the initial significance of the terms can be fully or accurately understood apart from some consideration of the systematic substructure, the new manner of meaning and the new ideal. The attainment of the goal of the present discussion, then, necessitates at least a brief discussion and clarification of this systematic substructure and its implications.

When theological reflection meshed with the systematic substructure, it gave rise to what is here named the more specific theological context. Only within this latter context do the terms, gratia increata and gratia creat, actually emerge. Obviously, then, to attain the goal of the present discussion, consideration of the general philosophical context is insufficient by itself and must be complemented with an attempt to indicate more specifically, within the general philosophical context and the new manner of meaning in theological reflection that resulted from it, at least some of the properly theological factors that led to the emergence of these terms, and some of the stages in that emergence. This will be the focus of a third set of considerations.

The procedure followed in this third set of considerations will be to distinguish two streams within the more specific continuing context of theological reflection, and then to indicate some of the key moments of advance within each stream, and some of the factors that led to those moments. No attempt will be made to include or mention each and every advance within each continuing stream, or to include or mention each and every writer who may have contributed to an advance. All that is attempted is an adumbration of such a presentation—no more than sondages really. I hope, however, the discussion is sufficiently strategic in its selection and representative of what was going forward to enable the present goal to be attained.
The first stream concerns grace understood very generally as divine help necessary for salvation; or, slightly more specifically, as *fides quae per dilectionem operatur*, faith operating through charity;\(^\text{24}\) and eventually, and even more specifically, as an entitative, supernatural *habitus*. The second stream concerns the special presence, indwelling or inhabitation of the Holy Spirit, and of the Father and Son through the Spirit, in the just soul. An attempt will be made to indicate the way in which this special presence, indwelling or inhabitation, so clearly affirmed in the New Testament, was understood by Augustine, by Peter Lombard, and in the Halesian *Summa*

Now, it would seem that the discussion of the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*, in the Halesian *Summa*, after their passing mention in two of the earlier works of Alexander of Hales, is the point at which the two streams connect, and the relation between the special presence, indwelling or inhabitation of the Holy Spirit and grace, in what came to be the proper and especial sense of the term, becomes an explicit object for theological reflection. It seems quite appropriate, then, given the aforementioned goal, that the third set of considerations conclude with a more intensive and detailed attempt to specify how this relation was initially understood. It does so by bringing together in an intelligibly unified perspective some of the results obtained in the first step, now perhaps better understood for having been placed within their context, and the teaching of the Halesian *Summa* regarding the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit. In this way, I hope, the relation will be specified and the limited goal of the present discussion attained.

\(^\text{24}\) See Rom. 3:24, 28; 4:5; Gal. 5:6; 1 Cor. 13:2.
CHAPTER I

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the chapter on "History and Historians" in *Method in Theology*, in the section titled, "Heuristic Structures," Bernard Lonergan follows the lead of the French historian Henri-Irénée Marrou and gives qualified approval to the use of ideal-types in historical studies."1

As mentioned in the introduction, ideal-types in historical studies are theoretical constructs that facilitate an historian's understanding of the course of historical events. Carefully formulated ideal-types suggest hypotheses regarding what was going forward with respect to sets of historical data, and assist and guide historians in the formulation of such hypotheses. Again, the application of ideal-types to some set of historical data may bring to light aspects of the data that the ideal-types cannot accommodate, and so precipitate the further questions that lead to modifications of those ideal-types, or perhaps even to the introduction of new ideal-types.

Lonergan's work, *Method in Theology*, provides a valuable source for basic ideal-types in historical studies. In this chapter I propose to draw upon this source. Accordingly, I shall discuss briefly transcendental method, the heuristic function of transcendental method, meaning and the elements and functions of meaning, differentiations of consciousness, stages of meaning in a culture, symbolic apprehension, and continuing contexts. I am not attempting here to give an exhaustive exposition of the development

of Lonergan's thought on any of these topics. I am merely attempting to draw them
together in a manner that will display their role and significance for the various kinds of
historical studies, and, more particularly, for special doctrinal historical studies. I give only
as much detail on each topic as I think necessary to achieve this goal.

1 Transcendental Method

As also mentioned in the introduction, Lonergan understands method primarily as a
normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive
results. Accordingly, he does not understand method primarily as a set of directives or
rules.

There are various particular methods, each with a normative pattern of recurrent
and related operations; and each with a typical manner in which acts of understanding
accumulate that does not coincide precisely with the typical manner of any other method.²

However, again as mentioned in the introduction, for Lonergan none of these particular
methods stands in pristine isolation. Each developed particular method, one might say,

² "There are the particular methods adapted to the needs and opportunities of particular fields. As
such needs and opportunities come to light, methods themselves undergo further adaptation. They become
more specialized. They develop new techniques and refine old ones. They incorporate fresh stratagems,
models, mappings, seriations." Bernard Lonergan, "The Ongoing Genesis of Methods," in A Third Collection:
London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985), p. 150. Giving a general indication of the different manners in which acts
of understanding accumulate in some of the different fields, Lonergan remarks: "...the mathematician
advances from images through insights and formulations to symbols that stimulate further insights,...the
scientist advances from data through insights and formulations to experiments that stimulate further
insights,...so [in the development of common-sense understanding]...the spontaneous and self-correcting
process of learning is a circuit in which insights reveal their shortcomings by putting forth deeds or words
or thoughts, and through that revelation prompt the further questions that lead to complementary insights." 
Lonergan, Insight, p.197. Later in Insight (p. 589), Lonergan remarks: "Our distinctions between
mathematics, science, common sense, and philosophy are based upon the different manners in which
insights can be accumulated."
differs from every other particular method by weaving its own gradually generated procedural norms and precepts into an already spontaneously functioning core pattern of recurrent and related operations. Each is particular in that it specializes the core pattern, renders the core pattern specifically suitable for investigating some restricted domain, and indicates the typical manner, within the core pattern, in which acts of understanding pertinent to that domain will accumulate. On this showing, then, one can say that the core pattern of operations is engaged in the functioning of each and every particular method.³

In Method in Theology, Lonergan names this core pattern of operations transcendental method. The term 'transcendental' here can be understood in at least two ways. First, 'transcendental' is opposed to 'categorial' or 'predicamental'. Accordingly, speaking of method as transcendental is a way of highlighting the claim that the core pattern of related and recurrent operations is concretely general; that it underpins and penetrates every particular method; that it is engaged in the functioning of each and every particular method; and that, therefore, its significance and relevance is not confined to this or that particular method or to the categorial objects one comes to know through the

³ "All special methods consist in making specific the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. But before they are formulated in concepts and expressed in words, those precepts have a prior existence and reality in the spontaneous, structured dynamism of human consciousness. Moreover, just as the transcendental precepts rest simply on a study of the operations themselves, so specific categorial precepts rest on a study of the mind operating in a given field." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 20. "Special methods derive their proper norms from the accumulated experience of investigators in their various fields. But besides the proper norms there are the common norms." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 22. "...transcendental method offers a key to unified science... In unity with all fields, however disparate, is...the human mind that operates in all fields and in radically the same fashion in each." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 24; cf. p. 316. The basis for this claim will be presented in the course of the discussion.
exercise of this or that particular method. Second, the term is meant to refer to the procedure by which one attends to one's own cognitional operations and brings to light in objectification the operative a priori conditions of possibility of coming to know any categorial object.

Now, it is in such a procedure that one also brings to light the reason why cognitional operations are recurrent; why the recurrent operations come forth as patterned, as internally related one to the other; and why a concrete generality accrues to the pattern. Underpinning the operations is the conscious, unrestricted, dynamic orientation or drive in human beings, the intending of an objective that is not limited to this

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4 "...transcendental method is a constituent part of the special method proper to theology, just as it is a constituent part of the special methods proper to the natural and to the human sciences." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 23.

5 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 13-14, footnote 4. In the footnote Lonergan speaks of the first sense of 'transcendental' as being "analogous to Scholastic usage." He says 'analogous' because in Scholastic usage, the transcendental notion (intentio intendens) is not clearly distinguished from the transcendental concept (intentio intenta). (See Lonergan, Insight, pp. 393-94; what he means by 'transcendental notion' and 'transcendental concept' will, I hope, become clear in the course of the present discussion.) In the "Institute on Theological Method" that he gave at Boston College in June of 1970, in response to a question, Lonergan relates the two senses distinguished in the footnote and mentioned in the paragraph above: "[In the lecture on Method] I spoke of two meanings of the word 'transcendental'. The Scholastic meaning: ens, unum, verum, bonum, in which the transcendental notion is not distinguished from the transcendental concept. And the Kantian meaning: the condition of the possibility of... And the transcendental notion is: the condition of the possibility of...; the transcendental concept is not—it is just transcendental in the Scholastic sense." Bernard Lonergan, "Theological Method," Institute at Boston College, June 15-26, 1970, p. 470. (Transcript by Nicholas Graham, available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Regis College, Toronto, listed as file 591.) Some fourteen months later, Lonergan returned to the same topic: "For me, transcendental method is transcendental in both the Scholastic sense and the Kantian sense. It is transcendental in the Scholastic sense because it is not confined to some one category of objects. It is a matter of exploiting the resources and opportunities of the human mind as distinct from exploiting the opportunities and resources of a given particular field of study. They are categorial methods, particular methods. Transcendental method is the method that is not confined to a certain limited field of objects. That is one sense.

"Another sense [the Kantian sense], of course, is transcendental method as the condition of the possibility of any other method because it includes all the main features of any other method." Bernard Lonergan, "Method in Theology," Institute at Milltown Park, Dublin, August 2-13, 1971, p. 481 (Transcript by N. W. Graham, available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Regis College, Toronto, listed as file 641.)
or that categorial object, or even to any restricted set of categorial objects, but is nothing less than everything about everything, nothing less than absolute universality and absolute concreteness. It is this unrestricted intending that accounts for the recurrence of the operations, for the fact that the recurrent operations come forth as patterned, and for the concrete generality of the pattern.

Thus, in the first place, this unrestricted intending having its corresponding unrestricted objective unfolds in a human subject as an upward dynamism, as an ordered succession of distinct and ever fuller phases or modes. It is conscious intelligently as inquiring intelligence unrestrictedly intending an unrestricted objective as intelligible, conscious rationally or critically as reflecting reasonableness unrestrictedly intending an unrestricted objective as true and real, and conscious responsibly as deliberating, self-determining freedom unrestrictedly intending an unrestricted objective as good.

Second, with respect to categorial objects, the intending is neither utter ignorance nor actual knowledge, but, rather, occupies an intermediary position between ignorance and knowledge. It is not utter ignorance. For if one's intending is unrestricted and reaches out to everything about everything, and if it does so consciously as inquiring intelligence, reflecting reasonableness and deliberating, self-determining freedom, then there is not anything that falls outside the range of one's conscious intending as inquiring intelligence, reflecting reasonableness and deliberating freedom. And if there is not anything that falls outside the range of one's conscious intending as inquiring intelligence, reflecting reasonableness and deliberating freedom, if, in other words, one's conscious intending is all-inclusive, then there is not anything of which one is or can be utterly ignorant. Still, this exclusion of utter ignorance does not of itself constitute actual knowledge of any
categorial object. And the clear indication of this is questioning. One's unrestricted intelligent intending is manifested with a provisionally restricted focus in one's formulated questions for intelligence that ask, for example, “What is...?” or “Why is...?” or “How often is...?” One's rational intending is manifested with a provisionally restricted focus in one's formulated questions for reflection that ask, for example, “Is it so?” or “Whether this is that?” or “Are you certain that...?” And these questions, unlike questions for intelligence, can be answered positively or negatively, with a qualified or unqualified “Yes” or “No”, or responded to with a non-committal “I do not know.” One's responsible intending, finally, is manifested with a provisionally restricted focus in one's formulated questions for deliberation that ask, for example, “Is it worthwhile or truly good or truly better?” Now, one questions because one is seeking the answers that one does not as yet possess. To have answers would be to possess actual knowledge of a categorial object and to cease questioning. Accordingly, if the various modes or phases of unrestricted intending are each manifested with a provisionally restricted focus in the various kinds of formulated questions, then, even though intending is sufficient to exclude utter ignorance of any object, it does not of itself imply actual knowledge of any categorial object. Intending, then, occupies an intermediary position between ignorance and knowledge. In this sense, it is a knowing unknowing; and its immediate unrestricted objective, already and always, is a known unknown.

Third, although intending occupies an intermediary position between ignorance and knowledge, nevertheless it is through one's unrestricted intending as active principle of inquiry, given as part of one's natural endowment but actually engaged only when provided with objects through sensibilia, that one attains actual knowledge of a categorial
object. One's unrestricted intending is a dynamic intermediary in that it is the fundamental principle of discovery—it initiates and sustains an effective conscious movement away from ignorance toward knowledge.\(^6\) In virtue of one's capacity to intend unrestrictedly, one is able to refer whatever is given through sensibilia to the unrestricted objective as pertaining to the known unknown.\(^7\) In that sense what is given through sensibilia is said to be potentially intelligible.\(^8\) Any datum of sense, any word, symbol or sign, or any datum connected with a datum of sense, such as what is represented in a free image, can be a focus for inquiring intelligence, a point of application for one's unrestricted intending.\(^9\)


\(^7\) "...it is not true that it is from sense that our cognitional activities derive their immediate relationship to real objects; that relationship is immediate in the intention of being; it is mediate in the data of sense...inasmuch as the intention of being makes use of data in promoting cognitional process to knowledge of being...." Bernard Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," in Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), p. 218. "Intending...is comprehensive. Though human achievement is limited, still the root dynamism is unrestricted. We would know everything about everything, the whole universe in all its multiplicity and concreteness, omnia, to pan, and, in that concrete and comprehensive sense, being. To that object our cognitional operations are related immediately, not by sensitive intuition, but by questioning." Lonergan, "Natural Knowledge of God," in A Second Collection, p. 124. "...human cognitional activities have as their object being...the activity immediately related to this object is questioning...other activities such as sense and consciousness, understanding and judgments, are related mediately to the object, being, inasmuch as they are the means of answering questions, of reaching the goal intended by questioning." Bernard Lonergan, "The Subject," in A Second Collection, pp.78-79. "...[the various modes of radical intending] refer to objects immediately and directly, while answers refer to objects only mediately, only because they are answers to the questions that intend the objects." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 35; cf. pp. 262-263.

\(^8\) "The imagined object as merely imagined and as present to a merely sensitive consciousness (subject) is not, properly speaking, intelligible in potency; but the same object present to a subject that is intelligent as well as sensitive may fairly be described as intelligible in potency." Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, vol. 2 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), pp. 184-185.

\(^9\) "The data of sense provoke inquiry.... Without the data there would be nothing for us to inquire about...." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 10; cf. Lonergan, Verbum, pp. 41-42 and Insight, pp. 33-34, 298, 300, 407, 524, 541. "Insight is into presentations, and because it is into presentations it is limited. You (continued...)"
As such, the datum is promoted from the status of potential intelligibility to that of being actually intelligible. In this way, one's unrestricted intending is engaged when it takes on a provisionally restricted focus, and the datum becomes the object of a formulated question for intelligence and a point of departure for the movement from ignorance to knowledge.

The proper and adequate response to a question of intelligence, the response that satisfies the question, is an act of direct understanding or, more typically, a cumulative series of such acts. The datum that is actually intelligible is then promoted to the datum that is actually understood. And the typical expression of this understanding is the concept, the compound object in which are combined the content of understanding (the idea) and as much of the datum as is essential to that content.

Once actual understanding is reached, a fuller phase or mode of unrestricted intending comes to the fore. In its first phase or mode, one's unrestricted intending, given as part of one's natural endowment, is actually engaged only when provided with a focal object through sensibilia. However, once one has expressed one's understanding in a

9(...continued)
understand geometry, physics, chemistry, biology, and so on. Our understanding is always limited understanding, an understanding restricted to a particular field, because insight is into these presentations."

"When insight is into data, it is understanding of the other, and it is limited by the other...." Bernard Lonergan, Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on INSIGHT, ed. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli, revised and augmented by Frederick E. Crowe with the collaboration of Elizabeth A. Morelli, Mark D. Morelli, Robert M. Doran, and Thomas V. Daly, vol. 5 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 238.

10 "...let active intelligence intervene: there is a care for the why and wherefore; there is wonder and inquiry; there is the alertness of the scientist or technician, the mathematician or philosopher, for whom the imagined object no longer is merely given but also a something-to-be-understood. It is the imagined object as present to intelligent consciousness as something-to-be-understood that constitutes the intelligible in act.” Lonergan, Verbum, p.185.

11 "...inquiry and wonder give place to actual understanding; the imagined object no longer is something-to-be-understood but something actually understood." Lonergan, Verbum, p. 185.
compound object, one's unrestricted intending is able to refer *that* object to the unrestricted objective as pertaining to the known unknown—but now with respect not to formal intelligibility, but with respect to actuality or actualized intelligibility.\(^\text{12}\) Now, the compound object provides the point of application and provisionally restricted focus for this further phase or mode of one's unrestricted intending. That further phase or mode of intending is no longer to be characterized as inquiring intelligence, but as reflecting reasonableness. Reflecting reasonableness is a further phase and fuller mode of intending because it presupposes the actual engagement of intelligent intending, incorporates the result of that engagement, the compound object, and goes beyond it. Incorporating the compound object enables one's reflecting reasonableness to come to the fore with a provisionally restricted focus in formulated question for reflection.\(^\text{13}\)

Such questions are met with an affirmation or a denial. Affirmations and denials are judgements, and reflecting reasonableness demands that a judgement be reasonable. But the only reasonable judgement is the grounded judgement. And, if we may simplify somewhat by leaving aside the role of belief, a judgement is grounded if the evidence for it, which in reflecting reasonableness one spontaneously marshals and weighs, is understood precisely as sufficient. A reasonable judgement of fact is the

\(^{12}\) The term 'formal intelligibility' is taken from *Insight*, pp. 524-526. The term 'actualized intelligibility' is derived from the same pages. However, Lonergan speaks there not of 'actualized intelligibility' but of 'the actually intelligible' or 'actual intelligibility'. In *Verbum*, 'actually intelligible' is used in a different sense than it is here in *Insight*. Having already referred to his use of the term in *Verbum*, I have thought it best to avoid confusion in terminology by changing 'actually intelligible' to 'actualized intelligibility'.

\(^{13}\) "Not only are our insights limited by sensibility to being of this kind, or limited by experience more generally insofar as they are into this and then that, but also, of themselves, our insights are just bright ideas. We have to ask the further question whether they are correct. Insight is limited not only in the understanding of presentations, but also on the side of judgment, which completes it." Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, p. 239.
rationally demanded expression of that understanding; and in making such a judgement, one posits the formal intelligibility as an actualized intelligibility, as a restricted or categorial determination within the unrestricted objective one unrestrictedly intends—as a categorial object that is true and real.

Judgements of fact, in turn, provide a backdrop for a further and even fuller phase or mode of intending to come to the fore. Inquiry is not confined simply to determining what is so. It is concerned also with what could be so, with courses of action by individuals or groups of individuals that would bring about what could be so, and with why what could be so ought to be brought about.14

Acts of understanding, then, can be practically oriented. Such acts envisage concretely possible courses of action whose implementation would confer or bestow actuality on some possible state of affairs; and invariably these acts of understanding are heavily informed by prior judgements of fact. The envisaging, however, is not tantamount to implementation; a course of action does not follow automatically just because it is understood as concretely possible. Courses of action, one's acting in the world, can regard one's natural environment; they can pertain to one's personal and interpersonal living, or to some engagement with others at some lesser depth, typically within some

14 "The detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know grasps intelligently and affirms reasonably not only the facts of the universe of being but also its practical possibilities. Such practical possibilities include intelligent transformations not only of the environment in which man lives but also of man's own spontaneous living. For that living exhibits an otherwise coincidental manifold into which man can introduce a higher system by his own understanding of himself and his own deliberate choices. So it is that the detached and disinterested desire extends its sphere of influence from the field of cognitional activities through the field of knowledge into the field of deliberate human acts. So it is that the empirically, intelligently, rationally conscious subject of self-affirmation becomes a morally self-conscious subject. Man is not only a knower but also a doer; the same intelligent and rational consciousness grounds the doing as well as the knowing...." Lonergan, Insight, p. 622.
institutional framework. Operational development puts courses of action within one's range. They have their motives and purposes. And by choosing them and implementing one's choices, one effectively makes oneself what one eventually becomes.

Now, intervening between one's practical understanding proposing alternative courses of action and one's choice and implementation of one or other of them, in one's natural environment, or in one's personal and interpersonal living, or in one's institutional engagement with others, is one's practical reflection concerning the courses of action and one's deliberation and evaluation of them. And, operative within such reflection and deliberation concerning one's action is a further phase and fuller mode of one's unrestricted intending of an unrestricted objective. For now one is intending the unrestricted objective not just as intelligible, or as true and real, but as good. Thus, one refers the course of action to the unrestricted objective as good when one asks whether it is worthwhile or truly good or better than some other course of action.

Further, to the extent that one's intentional affectivity has in its development not succumbed and become subject to a dramatic or an egoistic or a group or a general bias, and so become habitually expressive of one or more of these, to that extent it can, within the limits proper to it, reflect in its responsiveness one's unrestricted intending of the good.¹⁵ Thus, Lonergan speaks of the "response of feelings to values," to limited goods, in accord with some scale of preference, and, again, of the "apprehension of value" that

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¹⁵ This kind of reflection is not unique. In Insight (p. 299), Lonergan remarks that in cognitional inquiry, free images can be under the influence of higher levels. Later (see, for example, pp. 555, 648, 710-11), he speaks of the concrete being of man as involving a principle of dynamic correspondence or harmonious orientation between the operators on the psychic and intellectual levels. The reflection of responsible intending in one's affectivity is, I suggest, just one expression of this dynamic correspondence or harmonious orientation.
is given in intentional feelings. This affective reaching or striving for value informs and cooperates with one's responsible deliberation to issue in a judgement of value and then, perhaps, in decisions and the implementation of courses of action consistent with that judgement of value.

In light of what has been said in these three points, one can now introduce some further terminology derived from Lonergan's writings, and then clarify in a concise way why these operations are recurrent, why the recurrent operations come forth as patterned, and why the pattern is concretely general.

Thus, it was argued that unrestricted intending is a dynamically conscious intermediary between ignorance and knowledge. Not inappropriately, Lonergan names it a notion. Further, because the intending is consciously unrestricted, consciously intending everything about everything, we may speak of it as the notion of being. The notion of being is said to be comprehensive in connotation and unrestricted in denotation. It is comprehensive in connotation: it intends everything about everything. It is

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17 In *Verbum* (see pp. 90-99), it is spoken of as "intellectual light."

18 "...intelligence as obverse looks for the intelligible as reverse. Reasonableness as obverse looks for the grounded as reverse. More fundamentally, the looking for, the desiring, the inquiring-and-reflecting is an obverse that intelligently and rationally heads for an unrestricted objective named being. Were that heading unconscious, there would be an orientation towards being but there would be no desire to know being and no notion of being. Were that heading empirically conscious, there would be an orientation towards being and a felt desire to know being, but there would be no notion of being. In fact, the heading is intelligent and rational, and so there is not only an orientation towards being, not only a pure desire to know being, but also a notion of being." Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 379. "The cognitional name for the object that includes absolutely everything, every aspect of everything, is being. When St. Thomas wants to prove that the object of our intellect is *ens*, he adduces the Aristotelian account of intellect, the *potens omnia facere et fieri*, able to make and become all things, a potential omnipotence, and he says that because it is *omnia*, it is *ens*, being. Being does not lie within any restricted genus. While it can be divided up into beings of different kinds, being itself is not some limited kind. It corresponds to the negation of a finite limit, to everything about everything." Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, p. 148.
unrestricted in denotation: it intends everything about everything, and so is not limited or confined to any category or to any set of categories. Again, one's unrestricted intending can be named in relation to its unfolding in a human subject in ordered and ever fuller phases or modes. Then one can speak of intelligent intending as the transcendental notion of being as intelligible; of reasonable intending as the transcendental notion of being as truth and reality;\textsuperscript{19} and of responsible intending as the transcendental notion of being as good.\textsuperscript{20}

Now, the various operations that have been mentioned are not a mere assemblage. For the notion of being is the one active principle that, on the one hand, underpins and penetrates each operation and constitutes it as part of a functional unity, and on the other, underpins and penetrates each partial content of each operation and constitutes those partial contents as a compound object. The notion of being orders each and every operation and its content towards an unrestricted objective named being.\textsuperscript{21} It attains its objective always in some limited manner, as something about something and never as everything about everything, and then only by unfolding in the ordered and ever

\textsuperscript{19}"The true and the real are distinct as transcendental concepts. It is through truth that we know the reality of a world mediated by meaning. So truth is a property of judgment. Reality is what is known in a true judgment. On the other hand, you have the transcendental notion implicit in the question, Is that so? "Is that so?" is a question, and since it is a question it has got to be met by an answer. And the answer can be true or false. But the answer will tell you what you know, i.e., whether it is so or not. Consequently, there is, as it were, a double objective. There is knowing being through the true: '\textit{ens per verum cognoscitur},' they used to say." Lonergan, "Method in Theology," Dublin Institute, 1971, p. 459.

\textsuperscript{20}The \textit{transcendental concepts} are objectifications of the transcendental notions: "...if we objectify the content of intelligent intending, we form the transcendental concept of the intelligible. If we objectify the content of reasonable intending, we form the transcendental concept of the true and the real. If we objectify the content of responsible intending, we get the transcendental concept of value, of the truly good." Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, pp. 11-12.

\textsuperscript{21}"Experience is for inquiring into being. Intelligence is for thinking out being. But by judgment being is known, and in judgment what is known is known as being." Lonergan, \textit{Insight}, p. 381.
fuller phases or modes that ground the various kinds of questioning, and by calling forth those operations that respond to the various kinds of questioning. Thus, the operations are called forth in accordance with the unfolding of the notion of being, and are constituted by the notion of being as internally and functionally related operations, as possessing an immanent order by which they are bound together, as a pattern of operations. Moreover, the operations, and so the pattern, recur. For, in any particular instance, one may attain a knowing of being, a knowing of something about something. But unless one can provide the complete set of answers to the complete set of questions, unless, that is, one knows everything about everything, one has not attained the objective of the notion of being; one has not attained knowledge of being.\textsuperscript{22} So the notion of being continues to ground the emergence of the various kinds of questions, and the patterned process of operations continues to recur. Finally, the notion of being is unrestricted: comprehensive in connotation and unrestricted in denotation. It follows that neither the operations that are called forth in accordance with the proper unfolding of the notion of being in ordered phases or modes, nor the pattern in which the operations are called forth, is confined to some field or some set of fields such that they would not extend to some other field or some other set of fields. In other words, the pattern of operations that is constituted by the proper unfolding of the notion of being in ordered phases or modes is concretely general.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{22} "Judging is a complete increment in knowing; if correct, it is a knowing of being; but it is not yet knowing being, for that is attained only through the totality of correct judgments." Lonergan, \textit{Insight}, p. 378.}
2 The Heuristic Function of Transcendental Method

A procedure is heuristic, let us say, if it anticipates the transformation of some unknown into a known by providing the field within which such a transformation can occur, and if it is inherently facilitative of that transformation. Transcendental method, it may be argued, functions heuristically.

Let us first distinguish transcendental method in actu exercito and transcendental method in actu reflexo et signato. Transcendental method in actu exercito is "the spontaneous, structured dynamism of human consciousness," the "concrete and dynamic unfolding of human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility." Transcendental method in actu reflexo et signato is the objectification, the bringing to light of the normative pattern of our conscious and intentional operations.

Transcendental method in actu exercito functions heuristically. Indeed, as Lonergan remarks, transcendental method [in actu reflexo et signato] "reveals the very nature of that function by bringing to light the activity of intending and its correlative, the intended that, though unknown, at least is intended." The notion of being is, he says,

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23 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 20.

24 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 24. Compare this with the remark on p. 14 of the same work: "...in a sense everyone knows and observes transcendental method. Everyone does so, precisely in the measure that he is attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible."

25 For Lonergan's specification of what exactly is involved in the objectification, see Method in Theology, pp. 14-15.

26 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 22. "...the basis of this heuristic business is precisely our transcendental notions. They are the most fundamental heuristic devices." Lonergan, "Method in Theology," Dublin Institute, 1971, p. 33. Transcendental method in actu reflexo et signato brings to light and reveals the inherent heuristic function of transcendental method in actu exercito, but it does not constitute that function. Presently, only the inherent heuristic function of transcendental method in actu exercito is being considered.
"the supreme heuristic notion."27 Prior to any instance of actual knowing, it is the intermediary between ignorance and knowledge that is given as part of one's natural endowment. The unknown, therefore, is not and cannot be *utterly* unknown. For given the notion of being, the unknown already falls within the range of one's intending. In a certain sense, then, the unknown is already known—at least in anticipation. One is already in possession of the field within which the unknown will become known.28 But this is not all. For the notion of being is not just some dormant intermediary between ignorance and knowledge—it is the *dynamic* intermediary, a kind of cutting edge. It is the active principle that calls forth the operations that transform some unknown into a known; and, given free reign, it would do so repeatedly and unceasingly. Not only, then, does the notion of being anticipate in a fundamental manner the transformation of any and every unknown into a known. As the active, normative principle that calls forth all questions, all acts of understanding, all formulations, all reflections, all judgments, all decisions and human actions it is also the *fundamental* principle that facilitates such a transformation. It is the *core* heuristic notion, the radical condition of possibility for every other heuristic procedure and device.

Transcendental method *in actu reflexo et signato* also functions heuristically. Transcendental method *in actu reflexo et signato* succeeds in some measure in objectifying or bringing to light the concrete dynamic unfolding of human attentiveness,


28 "The child has to learn to distinguish sharply between fact and fiction; the young man has not yet acquired a sufficiently nuanced grasp of human living for the study of ethics to be profitable; each of us, confronted with something outside the beaten track of our experience, turns to the expert to be taught just what it is. Still, in all this progress we are but discriminating, differentiating, categorizing the details of a scheme that somehow we possessed from the start." Lonergan, *Verbum*, p. 98.
intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. Part of the objectification will consist in exhibiting and making explicit the heuristic function inherent in that unfolding. Now, all other things being equal, the objectification will enhance the effectiveness of the heuristic function of transcendental method in actu exercito. For the clarified self-understanding that comes with transcendental method in actu reflexo et signato opens the way for one to cooperate with the heuristic function of transcendental method in actu exercito in a manner that is clear-witted and deliberate. For included in that self-understanding is a clearer recognition of the normative exigencies inherent in transcendental method in actu exercito. And from that recognition there flows quite naturally, as part of the normative exigencies of transcendental method in actu exercito, an invitation to orient oneself firmly in accordance with the norms of transcendental method in actu exercito that the recognition brings to light. And if one does so orient oneself, one is better positioned to avoid many of the pitfalls that obstruct the creativity of cognitional process, as it functions to yield cumulative and progressive results, and better able to identify and reverse the consequences that become established if those pitfalls are not avoided. Accordingly, one is justified in claiming that, all other things being equal, transcendental method in actu reflexo et signato enhances the effectiveness of the primordial heuristic function of

29 Note the role Lonergan assigns to the systematic function of transcendental method (in actu exercito) in effecting this objectification. See Method in Theology, pp. 21-22.

30 Lonergan is referring to this when he speaks in Method in Theology (p. 15) of “deciding to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one’s experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.” For a discussion by Lonergan of some of the problems connected with accepting the invitation and orienting oneself firmly and effectively in accordance with the normative exigencies of transcendental method in actu exercito, see Insight, pp. 582-585.
transcendental method in *actu exercitio*.

3 Heuristic Structures and Historical Studies of Doctrinal Development in Theology

Perhaps now we can move closer to the main topic of the chapter. If transcendental method *in actu exercitio* functions heuristically, if the notion of being constitutes that function as an intrinsic feature of transcendental method *in actu exercitio*, if transcendental method *in actu exercitio* underpins, penetrates and is engaged in the functioning of each and every particular method, again in virtue of the notion of being, then the heuristic function of transcendental method *in actu exercitio* also underpins, penetrates and is engaged in the functioning of each and every particular method. Further, just as each developed particular method specializes transcendental method *in actu exercitio*, and renders transcendental method *in actu exercitio* specifically suitable for investigating some restricted domain, so, with each developed particular method, the heuristic function of transcendental method *in actu exercitio* is also specialized and rendered specifically suitable for functioning as the principle of discovery in the domain proper to the particular method.

This specialization of the heuristic function of transcendental method *in actu exercitio*, the procedures and devices that are derived from a study of the mind operating...

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31 I have no wish to overstate the point. For frequently all other things are not equal. As Lonergan remarks (see *Insight*, p. 550), an understanding of method and its accurate formulation is not automatically efficacious. Its power, he adds, "is no more than the power of intelligence and reasonableness"; and such power, while "great indeed," is "not exercised after the fashion of the steamroller."

32 Already quoted (see footnote 3 on p. 23) is the following: "All special methods consist in making specific the transcendental precepts. Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 20.
in a given field,\textsuperscript{33} is frequently what Lonergan is referring to when he speak of the function of the “upper blade” in any investigation conducted according to a developed method. The image is of the action of a pair of scissors, with the upper-blade action moving downward towards the lower blade, and the lower-blade action moving upward towards the upper blade. The upper-blade action moving downwards towards the lower blade is the heuristic function \textit{functioning} to transform the actually intelligible data given by the lower blade into the actually understood data. The lower-blade action moving upwards towards the upper blade is the actually intelligible data provoking heuristically informed inquiry and gradually becoming suitably constellated for an act of understanding to leap forth.\textsuperscript{34} The coming together of the upper and lower blade, the closure of the scissors, is the moment when the act of understanding “leaps forth” from the interaction, and the actually intelligible data become the actually understood data.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33} “...just as the transcendental precepts rest simply on a study of the operations themselves [i.e., ‘the original normative pattern of recurrent and related operations that yield cumulative and progressive results’], so specific categorial precepts rest on a study of the mind operating in a given field.” Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 20. Already quoted (see footnote 2 on p. 22) is the following: “Special methods derive their proper norms from the accumulated experience of investigators in their given field.” Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{34} “The act of understanding leaps forth when the sensible data are in a suitable constellation.” Lonergan, \textit{Verbum}, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{35} For examples of Lonergan’s use of the scissors image, see \textit{Insight}, pp. 337-338, 486, 546, 554, 600-601, 603, 609, and \textit{Understanding and Being}, pp. 67-69, 83, 222-224, 343-344, 368-369. I say “frequently” in the first sentence of the paragraph because in Lonergan’s application of the image, while the \textit{kind} of interaction between the upper and lower blade remains constant, the elements that interact (the upper and lower blade) can vary. Thus, in \textit{Insight} (p. 546), Lonergan speaks of the “pure form” of the scissors-like action that is employed “in reaching the self-affirmation of the knower, when the inevitability of experience, of intelligent inquiry of critical reflection, and of their unity combined with the subject’s awareness of his own subjection to such inevitability, to issue into his affirmation of himself as an individual existing unity differentiated by capacities to experience, to inquire, and to reflect.” Again, in \textit{Understanding and Being} (p. 344), in response to a question, Lonergan remarks that “...just as there’s a scissors-like action within any science in its explanatory stage, so if you think of the totality of the sciences, each with its own pair of scissors, you can conceive all the sciences as a lower blade in a single bigger pair of scissors, where you have determinations coming up from the sciences, especially from the methods of the sciences, and (continued...)
Historical inquiry proceeds according to a method. That is, it proceeds according to a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations that yield cumulative and progressive results. The method is particular: it specializes transcendental method. And, as a consequence, it also specializes the heuristic function of transcendental method. There is, then, a specialized, heuristically functioning upper-blade action involved in historical inquiry. Employing this upper-blade action, an historian is able to specify quite generally, but quite concretely, the anticipated goal of historical inquiry as the determination of what was going forward in the field of human affairs. In addition, the historian is able to make use of general structures, procedures and devices that facilitate the determination of what was going forward. Further, in reciprocal response to this heuristically functioning upper-blade action, there is the lower-blade action in historical inquiry moving towards the upper blade. Informed by the heuristic anticipations of the upper-blade, the lower-blade action rises from the data of historical inquiry—that is, from every vestige of the past that is perceptible here and now and can contribute to the determination of what was going forward in the field of human affairs—through the implementation of the array of techniques that practising historians have gradually developed to promote potential evidence into formal and actual evidence, and so actually

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(...continued) determinations coming down from the self-appropriation of the empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious subject." But whatever the variation, the data of the lower blade continually provoke inquiry, the upper-blade action continually functions heuristically in relation to those data, and under its action, the data, in a reciprocal action, continually adjust, until such point as they are suitably constellated for a cumulative series of acts of understanding to issue forth.
determine what was going forward with respect to some set of historical data.\textsuperscript{36}

The present task is concerned to throw light on the heuristically functioning upper blade of historical method—but only from a limited perspective. In the introduction, I mentioned Lonergan's distinction between basic, special and general historical studies; and I indicated that, since I would be attempting to outline the course of development of a body of teaching on a particular topic, up to a certain point, the bulk of the discussion to follow would fall within the category of special doctrinal history. To be more specific, I said that the goal of the discussion is to outline the movement in theological reflection that led to the emergence of the terms, \textit{gratia increata} and \textit{gratia creata}, and to clarify how the relation between the realities to which the terms refer was initially understood. That goal dictates the perspective from which I shall consider the heuristically functioning upper blade of historical method. I am not attempting to discuss the upper blade of historical method in all its features. I am concerned with it just in so far as it bears directly on the task at hand. Now, Lonergan, I believe, would include as part of the upper blade in historical studies elements from such human sciences as psychology, sociology and economics—provided, of course, that they are of a variety that "recognize meaning as a constitutive and normally controlling element in human action."\textsuperscript{37} For although such sciences are concerned with "the repetition of routine in human speech and action and all that is universal in the genesis, development, [and] breakdown of routines," still a

\textsuperscript{36} "Potential evidence is any datum, here and now perceptible. Formal evidence is such a datum in so far as it is used in asking and answering a question for historical intelligence. Actual evidence is a formal evidence invoked in arriving at a historical judgment. In other words, data as perceptible are potential evidence; data as perceptible and understood are formal evidence; data as perceptible, as understood, and as grounding a reasonable judgment are actual evidence." Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 186.

knowledge of them increases greatly the "interpretative powers" of the historian.  

However, I am concerned not with those features of the heuristically functioning upper blade of historical method, but only with those features of it that stick close to the inner core of transcendental method.  

Again, for the same reason I shall not be including any specific considerations of theological knowledge in the present discussion, even though, as I mentioned in the introduction, to write special doctrinal historical studies adequately, one frequently requires specialized knowledge as a precondition. One cannot give an adequate account of the history of some doctrinal or speculative development in theology without some knowledge of theology, anymore than one could give an adequate account of some part of the history of mathematics without some knowledge of mathematics. Such specialized knowledge would certainly be part of the heuristically functioning upper blade in such investigations. But such specialized knowledge does not belong near the inner core.

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39 If one were concerned with the heuristically functioning upper blade of historical studies, but not from any limited perspective, and if one were following Lonergan's lead, a basic consideration, I suggest, would be the structure of the human good. Thus, Lonergan remarks in *Topics in Education* (p. 24): "...my notion of the human good is interconvertible with my notion of the structure of history...." And to this basic consideration one would add what in *Topics in Education* (see pp. 49-70) Lonergan calls the differentials of the human good: intellectual development that accounts for human progress; the negation of sin that is the basis of decline in human society; and redemption that restores the order destroyed by sin. These are the constant, fundamental and intertwining vectors operative in human history; they set the structure of the human good in motion. As further evidence that for Lonergan the structure of the human good functions as a basic part of the upper blade in historical studies, one could cite the following text from *Method in Theology* (p. 184): "While in biography the 'times' are a subordinate clarification of the 'life,' in history the perspective is reversed. Attention is centered on the common field that, in part, is explored in each of the biographies that are or might be written. Still, this common field is not just an area in which biographies might overlap. There is social and cultural process. It is not just a sum of individual words and deeds. There exists a developing and/or deteriorating unity constituted by cooperation, by institutions, by personal relations, by a functioning and/or malfunctioning good of order, by a communal realization of originating and terminal values and disvalues. Within such processes we live out our lives. About them each of us ordinarily is content to learn enough to attend to his own affairs and perform his public duties. To seek a view of the actual functioning of the whole or of a notable part over a significant period of time is the task of the historian." For Lonergan's concise statement of the structure of the human good, see *Method in Theology*, pp. 47-52. For his reference in the same work to the vectors, see pp. 52-55.
core of transcendental method. Accordingly, it falls outside the limited perspective from which I intend to consider the heuristically functioning upper blade of historical method. To that consideration I now turn.

3.1 History and the Elements and Functions of Meaning

In *Insight*, and again in *Method in Theology*, Lonergan distinguishes: (1) sources of meaning; (2) acts of meaning; and (3) terms of meaning. In *Insight*, he also refers to the core of meaning.\(^{40}\)

In *Insight*, sources of meaning are variously characterized as any cognitional activity, any element of knowledge, including data and images, ideas and concepts, grasps of the unconditioned and judgement, and the detached, disinterested desire to know. Again, sources of meaning are said to lie on the experiential, intellectual and rational levels of knowing. In *Method in Theology*, sources of meaning are all conscious acts and all intended contents, whether in the dream state or on any of the four levels of waking consciousness. Further, they are distinguished as either transcendental or categorial sources. In the language of *Insight*, the transcendental source of meaning, the *core of meaning*, is the intention of being, the detached and unrestricted desire to know that underpins and penetrates every (categorial) source of meaning and constitutes it as a (categorial) source of meaning. In the language of *Method in Theology*, the

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\(^{40}\) Rather than cluttering the present discussion with footnotes, I shall simply indicate here the pages in Lonergan's writings I am drawing upon. In *Insight*, there are three main discussions of meaning. They occur on pp. 329-331, 381-383, 592-595. In *Method in Theology*, there is the chapter on Meaning on pp. 57-99 and the discussion of the elements of meaning on pp. 73-76. In the present discussion I attempt in a somewhat brusque manner to integrate what Lonergan says in these pages.
transcendental sources of meaning are the transcendental notions, "the very dynamism of intentional consciousness," that grounds and underpins all questioning.\(^{41}\)

In *Insight*, acts of meaning are distinguished as principal and instrumental, and principal acts of meaning are further distinguished as formal and full. Formal acts of meaning are such acts as conceiving, considering, defining, supposing, formulating. They are formal in the sense that with such acts there is some kind of distinction between meaning and meant, some kind of distinction between conceiving, considering, defining, supposing or formulating, on the one hand, and what is conceived, considered, defined, supposed or formulated, on the other, but the acts do not of themselves determine whether the meant is more than just an object of thought. Full acts of meaning are acts of judging, of assenting or dissenting. They are called full because it is with these acts that a determination regarding the status of objects of thought is made.

\(^{41}\) The earlier discussion of the notion of being and of the transcendental notions of being as intelligible, as truth and reality, and as good (see pp. 32-33 above), helps clarify, I believe, the terminological differences here between *Insight* and *Method in Theology*. Aside from terminological differences, the one significant difference in *Method in Theology* is that in that work Lonergan no longer identifies the intention of being just with the detached, unrestricted desire to know. In addition to this, there is a further issue to take note of here. Immediately after he distinguished sources of meaning from acts and terms of meaning, Lonergan proceeds to identify them. Thus, to take one example, in *Method in Theology*, p. 73, he writes, "Distinguish (1) sources, (2) acts, and (3) terms of meaning." Then, in the following sentence, he writes, "Sources of meaning are all conscious acts and all intended contents, whether in the dream state or on any of the four levels of waking consciousness." Accordingly, one must ask: what kind of distinction does Lonergan have in mind when he distinguishes between sources, acts and terms of meaning? Now, a real distinction is suggested, at least between sources and acts of meaning, by his remark in *Insight* (p.329): "...as sources lead to acts, so acts refer to terms of meaning, to what is meant." Without attempting to settle the issue in a footnote, I think it is clear from Lonergan's repeated statements on the elements of meaning that, for the most part, the distinction is not a real distinction. Sources of meaning are acts and contents of meaning considered as contribution to a compound or full term of meaning; they are each a source for the compound or full term of meaning which, in turn is a source for other compound or full terms of meaning. The sentence just quoted from *Insight* is best handled, I suggest, by arguing that there Lonergan has in mind a real distinction, but it is a distinction between the core of meaning and the various categorial acts of meaning. In that case, one could truly say that the core of meaning, considered as the transcendental source of meaning, leads to (categorial) acts of meaning. Or, in the language of *Method in Theology*, one can say that the transcendental sources of meaning (the transcendental notions) are really distinct from the categorial sources of meaning, which are only notionally distinct from the acts of meaning. Of course, I cannot but admit that this issue needs to be probed more carefully.
Instrumental acts of meaning are expressions or utterances. They manifest meaning sensibly “through gestures, speech, and writing.” In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan distinguishes instrumental acts of meaning as the various carriers of meaning: spontaneous or calculated bodily expression, through which the intersubjective communication of meaning spontaneously takes place; artistic creating, through which there occurs an objectification of the purely experiential pattern; affect-laden imagining of real or imaginary objects (symbolizing), through which the internal communication between body and mind and heart takes place; linguistic expression, speaking or writing, through which meaning “finds its greatest liberation” and where especially, “by the use of words or symbols in a spoken, written, or merely imagined utterance,” an instrumental act of meaning is able to implement a formal or a full act of meaning; and, finally, incarnate meaning, the meaning expressed in the life lived by a person.

In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan proposes a fuller set of distinctions for acts of meaning. In addition to the already mentioned formal, full and instrumental acts of meaning, he mentions two more, namely, potential acts of meaning, and active effective and active constitutive acts of meaning.

Potential acts of meaning are acts of meaning in which there is as yet no differentiation, no psychic distance between the act of meaning and what is meant. It is elemental meaning, the moment, prior to expression, in which meaning and meant are “folded up” within one’s non-intentional self-presence to oneself in a kind of unexpressed identity. The smile “that acts simply as an intersubjective determinant,” the purely

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experiential patterns of human subjects that works of art attempt to express, affect-laden images (symbols) spontaneously performing their function of internal communication, are examples of potential or elemental acts of meaning. Again, on another level, acts of direct and reflective understanding, considered just in themselves and not in their expression, are further examples of potential acts of meaning.

Active acts of meaning are best treated with functions of meaning. From Lonergan’s basic threefold distinction with regard to meaning, then, terms of meaning remain to be considered.

Terms of meaning are what is meant. In Insight, Lonergan distinguishes incomplete partial terms of meaning, complete formal terms of meaning, complete full terms of meaning, and the all-inclusive term of meaning. The all-inclusive term of meaning is being. Being is correlative to the core of meaning, the intention of being. Full terms of meaning are what is affirmed or denied within the intention of being. Formal terms of meaning are what could be affirmed or denied, but which are merely considered. Partial incomplete terms of meaning are the partial elements of either formal or full terms of meaning, the elements of meaning that just of themselves could not be either affirmed or denied, but which in certain combinations with other partial terms of meaning could be

43 For Lonergan’s discussion of the purely experiential pattern and art, see Method in Theology, pp. 61-64. Cf. Topics in Education, pp. 208-232, which is the most extended discussion of art in the Lonergan corpus. For Lonergan’s earlier discussion of the aesthetic pattern of experience, see Insight, pp. 207-209.

44 For Lonergan’s brief remarks on internal communication, see Method in Theology, pp. 66-67. 74.

45 “Acts...of understanding of themselves have only potential meaning.” Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 74. As far as I am aware, the most extensive discussion of potential or elemental acts of meaning in the Lonergan corpus occurs in Topics of Education, pp. 215-217. In that discussion, as in the brief discussion in Method in Theology (see p.74), potential meaning is linked to the Aristotelian doctrine of knowledge by identity. For Lonergan’s express discussion of that doctrine, see Verbum, pp. 83-85, 196-197.
either affirmed or denied. In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan adds to this set of distinctions a reference to "different spheres of being," and in particular he mentions distinctions between the sphere of "real [proportionate] being," various other restricted spheres of being, and the transcendent sphere of being. There are formal and full terms of meaning within each of the various spheres.

Now, meaning can not only be analysed into its elements, it can also be analysed according to its various functions, that is, according to what it does or brings about or makes possible in human existence. Lonergan distinguishes four basic functions: a cognitive function; an effective or efficient function; a constitutive function; and a communicative function.46

Meaning has a cognitive function. It enables one to move gradually out of the world of immediate experience, proper to the time of one's infancy, into a much larger world, the world that meaning itself mediates and reveals. With the acquisition of language—that is, with one's gradually acquired competence in the use of the instrumental acts in which meaning "finds its greatest liberation"47—one is gradually ushered into the world mediated by meaning, and one begins to share in some portion of the available common meanings of one's community. No longer is one's world the world bounded by one's infant experience. Rather, it is the much larger world that is known through a process of questions and answers to questions, a world that is known by the conjunction of experiencing, understanding and judging. And when one speak of "the real world," one

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46 For Lonergan's discussion of the functions of meaning, see *Method in Theology*, pp. 76-81.

47 "...as the command and use of language develop, one's world expands enormously." Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 76. The reference to meaning finding its greatest liberation in language can be found on p. 70 of the same work. The issue will come up again later in the chapter.
is speaking typically not of the world of immediate experience, but of this world mediated by experiencing, understanding and judging.

Next, meaning has an effective or efficient function. Some acts of human beings are effective in transforming the natural environment. That transformation may or may not be intended. If it is intended, then the acts are informed by meaning, and so, to borrow a distinction from Thomas Aquinas, are more properly spoken of as human acts. For it is only through acts of meaning that one can intend a transformation and execute it. Further, the execution frequently involves at least some de facto cooperation among human beings, in which human acts direct and are being directed by other human acts. Therefore, those acts of human beings that transform the natural environment intentionally, and direct and are directed by other human acts, are informed by meaning. In this sense, one may speak of meaning as having an effective or efficient function.

Third, closely connected with the effective or efficient function of meaning is its constitutive function. This function is perhaps most easily understood if one thinks of human institutions. The "real world," the human world, known intelligently and rationally, is not simply mediated by meaning. In part, it is constituted by acts of meaning. Quite spontaneously people enter not simply into ad hoc cooperative ventures. With the idea in mind of procuring certain ends repeatedly, they enter into more or less settled patterns of cooperation in which there are more or less settled roles to be fulfilled and tasks to be

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48 "Of actions done by man those alone are properly called human, which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; when, too, the free will is defined as the faculty of will and of reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions of a man, but not properly human actions, since they are not proper to man as man." Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1-2, q. 1, a. 1, c.
performed. The human acts that direct and are directed by other human acts become part of an intelligible framework or order whose origin and functioning is a reality in human life that comes about only through acts of meaning. Thus, we speak of marriage and the family, of the state and the laws of the state, of the economy and the educational system, and so forth. None of these is a mere product of nature. All are real, the objects that pertain to each are real. But none of it is brought about apart from human acts of meaning. And a change in any of them results from a change in meaning.\textsuperscript{49} Meaning, then, is constitutive of these realities. They are what we speak of when we refer to realities in the human world. And, as these realities tend to change over time, changes and transformations in human life are not limited just to human acts transforming the natural environment.\textsuperscript{50}

Finally, meaning has a communicative function. Meaning is expressed in instrumental acts. As already mentioned, we may distinguish intersubjective expression, symbolic expression, artistic expression, linguistic expression and incarnate expression.\textsuperscript{51} Such acts “exhibit for interpretation by others the potential, formal, full, constitutive, or effective acts of meaning of the subject.”\textsuperscript{52} They enable other subjects to share in the


\textsuperscript{50} "...besides the transformation of nature, there is man's transformation of man himself; and in this second transformation the role of meaning is not merely directive but also constitutive." Bernard Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," in \textit{Collection}, pp. 234-235.

\textsuperscript{51} For Lonergan's discussion of the carriers of meaning, see \textit{Method in Theology}, pp. 57-73.

\textsuperscript{52} Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, pp. 74-75.
subject's meaning. But meaning does not have a communicative function because it happens to be expressed. Expression is not an optional adjunct to acts of meaning. Rather, as Lonergan says, expression is "intrinsic to the pattern of our conscious and intentional operations." And this is evident not only as regards the habitual production of expressed meaning, but also as regards the active, meaning-seeking way in which expressed meanings are initially received. Accordingly, whatever difficulties attend the adequate expression of meaning and its successful communication, it remains true that meaning is intrinsically communicative.

"The conjunction of...the constitutive and communicative functions of meaning," Lonergan writes, "yield the three key notions of community, existence [in the sense of

53 "...some sensible expression is intrinsic to the pattern of our conscious and intentional operations. Just as inquiry supposes sensible data, just as insight occurs with respect to some schematic image, just as the reflective act of understanding occurs with respect to a convincing summation of the relevant evidence, so inversely the interior acts of conceiving, of judging, and of deciding demand the sensible and proportionate substrate we call expression." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 86. "...I do not believe that mental acts occur without a sustaining flow of expression. The expression may not be linguistic. It may not be adequate. It may not be presented to the attention of others. But it occurs." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 255. "...human knowing and feeling are incomplete without expression." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 303. "Human communication is not the work of a soul hidden in some unlocated recess of a body and emitting signals in some Morse code. Soul and body are not two things but coprinciples in the constitution of a single thing. The bodily presence of another is the presence of the incarnate spirit of the other; and that incarnate spirit reveals itself to me by every shift of eyes, countenance, color, lips, voice, tone, fingers, hands, arms, stance." Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning," in Collection, p. 242.

54 This is perhaps most evident in intersubjective expression and the intersubjective communication of meaning, but it is no less true for the other carriers of meaning. Whatever the details involved in its occurrence, a normal child in a normal environment does not just happen to come to understand and speak the language(s) spoken in its environment. Referring to the discussion by Gibson Winter in Elements for a Social Ethics: Scientific Perspectives on Social Process (New York and London: The Macmillan Company, 1966), pp. 99-118, Lonergan writes: "On the elementary level this process [that is, the process involved in the genesis of common meaning] has been described as arising between the self and the other when, on the basis of already existing intersubjectivity, the self makes a gesture, the other makes an interpretative response, and the self discovers in the response the effective meaning of his gesture. So from intersubjectivity through gesture and interpretation there arises common understanding. On that spontaneous basis there can be built a common language...." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 357. In Winter's own presentation, (see p. 101) the infant's receptivity is certainly not a passive affair. It involves a dynamic gesturing that "expresses the impulse to actualization of pregiven sociality through eliciting [the] response of the other." The child's receptivity to expressions, one might say, is its pregiven sociality.
Existenz], and history.\footnote{Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 79.} Common meaning is the formal constituent of community, and community is achieved according to the degree and the kind of common meaning present. Common meaning is predicated on the basis of a common field of experience, common or complementary ways of understanding, common judgements, and common commitment and dedication to certain values, goals and policies. To these correspond, respectively, common meaning as potential, formal, actual and realized. And to the extent that common meaning is realized, it is realized in large measure in conjunction with a process of continuous communication. Further, as common meaning can be of many kinds, so too communities can be of many kinds.\footnote{See Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, pp. 79, 356-357.}

If it is communication in general, and linguistic communication in particular, that provides the avenue for one to participate to some degree in the different kinds of available common meanings of a community, at some stage that participation itself can evoke concerns in one regarding the further unfolding of one’s life. One may be content to drift along, absorbed in an attitude of compliant complacency in relation to the common meanings and traditions that have formed and nourished one. One may participate unquestioningly in the established routines and fail to recognize, even dimly, that even though one is formed by the hap and mishap of one’s life, over which one has little or no control, it still falls upon one, at least in some measure, to decide freely what one is to make of oneself. Alternatively, if one does come to this moment of recognition, even if
only dimly, there is then a demand that one act upon the recognition. And invariably this will involve one relating to the common meanings and traditions that have nourished and formed one, not with compliant complacency, but in some way that is deliberate and personal.

It is here that Lonergan distinguishes a minor authenticity and inauthenticity, and a major authenticity. Some degree of inauthenticity is, so to speak, the permanent default mode of human living. For each one has his or her quota of complacent obtuseness; and no one is purely and simply immune from dramatic or individual or group or general bias. Authenticity, never a serene or secure possession, is ever a precarious partial withdrawal from inauthenticity. Minor authenticity occurs when subjects deliberately and truly embody in their lives the demands inherent in the common meanings and traditions that have nourished and formed them. Minor inauthenticity occurs when there exists some degree of divergence between the demands inherent in the common meanings and traditions that have nourished and formed subjects and the manner in which those subjects deliberately embody the common meanings and

57 “There are, from the very nature of the case, two periods in human life. In the first period one is concerned with objects, with coming to do things for oneself, to decide for oneself, to find out for oneself. This is all about objects. But this process of dealing with objects makes one what one is. One develops habits, becomes a certain kind of man or woman by one’s actions. But there is that reflective moment in which one discovers that one is not merely dealing with objects but also making oneself. There arises the question of finding out for oneself what one is to make of oneself, of deciding for oneself what one is to be, and of living in fidelity to one’s decisions. Such existential commitment is a disposal of oneself.” Lonergan, “The Mediation of Christ in Prayer,” in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964, p. 171.

58 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 79-80.

59 For Lonergan’s discussion of the various kinds of bias, see Insight, pp. 214-227, 244-267.

60 “...human authenticity is never some pure and serene and secure possession. It is ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity, and every successful withdrawal only brings to light the need for still further withdrawals.” Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 110; cf. pp. 252, 284.
traditions in their lives. Typically, the divergences are screened from them through selective inattention or repeated failures to understand, or through undetected rationalizations. A distortion of the language of the tradition results. For, to the extent that subjects embody inauthentically the common meanings and traditions that have nourished and formed them, to that extent they cannot mean what their tradition means—even though they use the language of their tradition. And if inauthentic embodiment of common meanings and traditions shifts from being incidental to being widespread, and if, as almost inevitably happens, the points of divergence begin to multiply, then the tradition itself becomes increasingly distorted. For subjects who embody the tradition inauthentically can only communicate it inauthentically. Thus, even minor authenticity becomes an unwitting accomplice in the continuing perpetuation of the ever-expanding distortion of the tradition. For such subjects are confined to embodying authentically the inauthentic common meanings and traditions that have been communicated to them, and communicating them to others.

History, in the sense of the history that is written about, emerges on the basis of continuous communication; it is the unfolding expression of common meanings. A human community, Lonergan remarks, “mediates itself in its history.”

The community is constituted by its common sense, its common meaning, its common commitment, its common apprehension of what the community is and what being a member of the community implies. That idea may be full or vague and sketchy; it may be satisfactory or unsatisfactory. But living that idea gives rise to situations; and if the situations that arise are deplorable, unsatisfactory, either that common sense of community is corrected or it is not, and then there arises the course of the history of that idea of the community. The community reveals itself to itself by its living, by the way it meets its problems, by its

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revisions of its common sense, its common meaning, its common commitment, by the way things work out in development and breakdown, by growth and disintegration. By their fruits you shall know them. The history that is written about is the mediation, the revelation, of the common sense of the community.  

The mediation occurs; but what actually unfolds and goes forward when a community mediates itself in its history is not under the complete control of any one member of the community, or of any group of members. Thus, one may speak of destiny; and destiny has a way of outsmarting its prophets. Lonergan remarks that ordinary human living is the primordial drama that the theatre only imitates. Theatrical drama represents the primordial drama in which the exercise of human freedom contributes to what concretely is going forward. But in its representation of the interplay of purposes and cross-purposes, it also displays the limitation of human freedom in determining with complete control what actually does go forward:

There is an initial situation from which the drama proceeds through the decisions of the participants. The decisions of individuals will be interdependent, and one will foresee what others might decide and use his foreseeing to guide his present decision. But quite apart from all the characters' thinking, foreseeing, and understanding of one another in the drama, the set of decisions of the participants is not the decision of any one of them. It is a set of decisions that leads from one situation to the next. Destiny is that linking of successive situations. There is something in the succession of human choices that is outside the range of human choice. Though everything in the drama is a product of the decisions, and though the decisions can be made with full consciousness of what the other characters are likely to do in response, still there cannot be any individual decision that constitutes the situation and the way one situation heads into the next. That logic between the situations is one way of conceiving destiny, one way of conceiving the manner in which God moves man's will even though man's will is free. This is expressed in the drama. Through the drama man can apprehend concretely his freedom, his capacity to decide, and the limitations upon his freedom. He cannot make other people's decisions for them, nor can he control his situation.

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64 See Lonergan, Insight, pp. 210-212.

65 Lonergan, Topics in Education, pp. 231-232.
Major authenticity "justifies or condemns the tradition itself." Common meanings and traditions are authentic to the extent that they are the cumulative result of implementing the transcendental precepts, and inauthentic to the extent that they are the cumulative result of a failure to do so. Typically, then, common meanings and traditions exhibit both authenticity and inauthenticity. If one's authenticity is just a faithfulness to the demands inherent in the common meanings and traditions that have nourished and formed one, one's authenticity is not up to the task of discriminating from among those common meanings and traditions what is genuine and what is not. Indeed, as already mentioned, one's very faithfulness and sincerity make one an unwitting accomplice in maintaining and perpetuating a heritage that, for all the genuine features it may contain, remains in need of reform. Such authenticity is named minor by Lonergan because subjects who embody it take the common meanings and traditions that have nourished and formed them, as they exist, as their standard. The standard for major authenticity, on the other hand, is not any set of common meanings and traditions, but the transcendental precepts, against which common meanings and traditions are to be judged. Still, I do not think one should push the distinction between minor and major authenticity to extremes. For if minor authenticity is not just another name for the group bias of subjects, then at least in intention the minor authenticity of subjects is allied with the transcendental

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67 "...from an empirical point of view culture has come to be conceived as a set of meanings and values that inform a common way of life.

"Such meanings and values may be authentic or unauthentic. They are authentic in the measure that cumulatively they are the result of the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. They are unauthentic in the measure that they are the product of cumulative inattention, obtuseness, unreasonableness, irresponsibility." Bernard Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority," in *A Third Collection*, p. 7.
precepts. For, however inchoate its state, and however faltering its exercise, there is a
dynamism in such subjects, that is not totally ignored or brushed aside, to be faithful to
the transcendental precept before being faithful to the common meanings and traditions
that have nourished and formed them.

Lonergan seems reluctant to attribute major authenticity to individual subjects. He
speaks, rather, of "history and, ultimately, divine providence" as passing judgement on
traditions. This is understandable if authenticity remains always a precarious withdrawal
from inauthenticity. But if, as I have suggested, there is a dynamism in subjects who truly
exhibit minor authenticity to be faithful to the transcendental precepts, and if in such
subjects the dynamism is not simply ignored or brushed aside, then at least some limited,

68 See Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 80. There is a question as to whether by 'history' here
Lonergan means the history that is written or the history that is written about. In the first case, individual
historians would stand in judgement on traditions and exercise major authenticity in so doing. While this
interpretation cannot simply be excluded, I think it is more probable, in view of Lonergan's reference to
divine providence, and in view of the fact that historians have not distinguished themselves noticeably from
the rest of humanity by their faithful adherence to the transcendental precepts, that he means the history that
is written about. There are in-built consequences for violating the transcendental precepts. In human history,
such consequences are writ large in the objective absurdity of situations and in the fact of decline. If one
thinks of the objectively absurd consequences as the judgement, one can speak of history passing judgement on history. Finally, as regards the difficulty (I do not say the impossibility) of ascribing the exercise of major authenticity to individual agents, note that Lonergan excludes one from bestowing such an accolade on oneself or another on the strength of the claim—which may perhaps be true—that oneself or another is in alignment, not with the idiosyncrasies of this or that group and its traditions, but with the common consent of humanity. For that common consent, Lonergan points out, may itself be a combination of authenticity and inauthenticity: "If one must suspect the collaboration of groups and classes, of tribes and nations, it does not follow that one cannot suspect the collaboration of mankind. Error is not primarily a class product or a national product. It is human. The group or class, the tribe or nation only gives a more specific twist to the mixed motives of human effort. Undertake to select the judgments on which all men agree, and you have no guarantee either that when all men agree they will do so from the pure and detached motives of intelligence and reason, or indeed that you yourself in your investigation and selection have operated exclusively from that unmixed drive." Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 316. Note also that in the paragraph that follows immediately on the text just quoted, Lonergan remarks that we have little initial choice in participating in the common meanings of the community or group into which we were born and raised, whatever its deviations and aberrations, and that we can no more blot out our past intellectual development, with all its shortcomings, deviations and aberrations, than we can the past growth of our bodies. As a concrete example of the difficulty individuals have in breaking away from commonly accepted meanings and values, think of how long it took humanity to recognize that slavery is an aberration.
intermittent exercise of major authenticity by subjects is not to be excluded absolutely.

Be that as it may, in the present section I have sought to indicate how Lonergan understands the precise object of historical inquiry—history in the sense of the history that is written about—to be constituted. Meaning is the pivotal notion in this constitution, for history can be thought of as a modality of meaning. One begins with the elements of meaning. Then, one turns to the functions of meaning, and in particular to the constitutive function of meaning in combination with the communicative function of meaning. The combination of these two functions yields an understanding of the origin and constitution of common meaning and community. Now, the common meanings and traditions form and nourish the members of a community. Existenz is the mode of human living in which one is concerned with one’s making of oneself and with relating to those common meanings and traditions in some way that is deliberate and personal. Such relating can be authentic or inauthentic. Either way, there is an unfolding expression of the common meanings and traditions of a community and a mediation of a community to itself. Either way, the precise object of historical inquiry is constituted:

History . . . differs radically from nature. Nature unfolds in accord with law. But the shape and form of human knowledge, work, social organization, cultural achievement, communication, community, personal development, are involved in meaning. Meaning has its invariant structures and elements but the contents in the structures are subject to cumulative development and cumulative decline. So it is that man stands outside the rest of nature, that he is a historical being, that each man shapes his own life but does so only in interaction with the traditions of the communities in which he happens to have been born and, in turn, these traditions themselves are but the deposit left him by the lives of his predecessors.59

Finally, I would add the following clarification to what has already been said in the present section. If one recalls the distinction mentioned in the introduction between basic,
special and general historical studies, I would suggest that, in so far as the discussion in *Method in Theology* I have been drawing upon is concerned with the constitution of history, it is concerned with the constitution of the precise object of *basic* historical studies. What would have to be added, one might ask, if the focus of consideration were not the constitution of the object of basic historical studies, but the constitution of the object of special doctrinal historical studies? That question cannot properly be avoided here. For, as also mentioned in the introduction, given Lonergan’s distinction between basic, special and general historical studies, as the discussion to follow attempts to outline what was going forward in a body of teaching, it falls within the category of special doctrinal history.

Let me offer the further, quite simple suggestion, then, that the object of special doctrinal historical studies is constituted if one compounds the combination of the constitutive and communicative functions of meaning with the additional combination of the cognitive and communicative functions of meaning. Everything Lonergan has to say on the constitution of the object of basic historical studies would still apply, for movements in a body of teaching do not occur independent of a basic historical context. The communicative function of meaning, however, would be operative not only with respect to those realities *constituted* by acts of meaning, but also with respect to those realities *discovered* by acts of meaning. These discoveries become the teachings handed down from generation to generation. And the cognitive function of meaning, in operation, would ensure that what is handed down is not the same body of teaching continually repeated. Over time, there is not mere repetition, but shifts and movements and perhaps even genuine developments in the body of teaching. And it is these shifts and movements and
developments that are the object of special doctrinal historical studies.

3. 2 Differentiations of Consciousness

The cognitive function of meaning can operate in different ways. "The human mind," Lonergan remarks, "is ever the same, but the techniques it employs develop over time."70

In The Way to Nicea, he writes:

Conscious human acts emerge...within different patterns of experience, patterns that can be identified and described, distinguished from and related to each other. But the basic distinction to be made is between undifferentiated and differentiated consciousness. Consciousness is undifferentiated where the whole person is involved, operating simultaneously and equally with all his powers. Differentiated consciousness, on the other hand, is capable of operating exclusively, or at least principally, on a single level, while the other levels are either entirely subordinated to the attainment of the goal of that level, or at least are held in check, so that they do not hinder its attainment.71

The notion of distinct patterns of experience is introduced and developed in Insight. One's sensitivity does not simply serve to secure the biological ends of intussusception, reproduction and self-preservation; it is not locked in "the drag of biological purposiveness."72 Rather, it stands open to serving a diversity of goals that go beyond the merely biological; for it can be organized or patterned so as to converge upon those diverse goals. Lonergan indicates something of the range of flexibility of human sensitivity when he distinguishes and discusses briefly the biological, aesthetic, dramatic, practical and intellectual patterns of experience, and alludes to the mystical pattern of


72 Lonergan, Insight, p. 208.
experience.

Differentiations of consciousness are the various procedures, gradually generated and initially intermittent, but later habitual and settled, that in one way or another effectively specialize transcendental method *in actu exercito*, in order to attain a diverse set of limited goals. Lonergan distinguishes a common-sense differentiation of consciousness, according to which every normal adult operates, a theoretical differentiation of consciousness, a religious differentiation of consciousness, an artistic differentiation of consciousness, a scholarly differentiation of consciousness, and a differentiation of consciousness that results from one bringing to light one's conscious and intentional acts and the dynamic relations between them. Moreover, just as differentiations of consciousness are gradually generated, initially intermittent, and only subsequently habitual and settled, so even when habitual and settled, they may yet begin to falter. Thus, Lonergan speaks of the various differentiations of consciousness being either in an incipient or a mature or a receding state.

Now, if the various patterns of experience Lonergan mentions indicate the range of responsive flexibility native to human sensitivity, the various differentiations of consciousness he mentions can be thought of, at least in some instances, as building upon the potentialities inherent in each of the distinct patterns of experience. Thus, to take two examples, the artistic differentiation of consciousness builds upon the

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73 Most of the discussion can be found on pp. 204-214 and 232-234 of *Insight*. For his allusions to the mystical pattern of experience, see *Insight*, pp. 410, 495, 758, 763. Perhaps in light of the reference in *Method in Theology* (see p. 286) to the worshipful pattern of experience, it would be better to speak of the worshipful or mystical pattern of experience, rather than simply of the mystical pattern of experience.

potentialities inherent in the aesthetic pattern of experience, and the theoretical
differentiation of consciousness builds upon the potentialities inherent in the intellectual
pattern of experience.

Correlative with the distinct differentiations of consciousness are the distinct realms
of meaning. Any realm becomes differentiated from the others, Lonergan remarks, when
there develops a distinct language, a distinct mode of apprehension, and a distinct
cultural, social, or professional group speaking in that fashion and apprehending in that
manner. Now, a formal object is an object considered precisely as attained by an
operation. If, instead of a single operation, one thinks of distinct sets of operations
specialized in order to attain distinct goals, then one approximates to the notion of
differentiations of consciousness. And then the realms of meaning can be considered to
be the corresponding complex formal objects.

Lonergan mentions six realms of meaning. Correlative with the common-sense
differentiation of consciousness and its distinct mode of apprehension is the realm of
common sense. Correlative with the theoretically differentiated consciousness and its
distinct mode of apprehension is the realm of theory. Correlative with interiorly
differentiated consciousness and its distinct mode of apprehension is the realm of
interiority. Correlative with religiously differentiated consciousness and its distinct mode
of apprehension is the realm of transcendence. Correlative with artistically differentiated

75 "The realms of meaning arise because there are entirely different ways of going about knowing." Lonergan, "Theological Method," Boston, 1970, p. 139.

76 Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 272. I have altered Lonergan's wording slightly here, for while his meaning is plain, in the statement, "Any realm becomes differentiated from the other when it develops its own language..." the 'it' refers back to 'realm,' and it is somewhat odd to say that a realm, and not a differentiation of consciousness, develops its own language, etc.
consciousness and its distinct mode of apprehension is the realm of art. And, finally, correlative with scholarly differentiated consciousness and its distinct mode of apprehension is the realm of scholarship.

In addition to distinct realms of meaning, Lonergan speak of distinct worlds mediated by meaning. The two notions are closely connected. Like distinct realms of meaning, distinct worlds mediated by meaning are correlated with corresponding differentiations of consciousness. The difference, I suggest, is that if one speaks of a differentiation of consciousness and a corresponding Realm of Meaning, one is speaking of a relational structure, a subjective pole of related operations specialized in some manner and its corresponding objective pole or section of the universe of being, and one is prescinding from whether or not the differentiation of consciousness is actually functioning. On the other hand, a World mediated by Meaning, say, the world of common sense or the world of theory, correlates with a differentiation of consciousness as actually functioning or as actually having functioned. And the cumulative and progressive results of such functioning are extant terms of meaning pertaining to this world. Worlds mediated by meaning, I suggest, are realms of meaning with extant terms of meaning.77

3. 3 Stages of Meaning of a Culture

In Method in Theology, Lonergan remarks that if one supposes that every normal adult operates according to a common-sense differentiation of consciousness, then at least

77 I do not wish to suggest that Lonergan’s usage of ‘Realm(s) of meaning’ and ‘World(s) mediated by meaning’ always conforms to my suggestion. My suggestion is offered as a way of systematizing Lonergan’s usage of these terms, in a manner that is completely in line with the thrust of his thought.
mathematically there are thirty-one different ways in which the various differentiations of consciousness can be combined, and any one of the combinations may be present in an individual at any one time.\textsuperscript{78} In addition to these, there are the various adaptations that occur in the common-sense differentiation of consciousness as a result of the presence in a culture of the other types of differentiations of consciousness.\textsuperscript{79} For present purposes, however, the significant point is that at least with some of the differentiations of consciousness, and with all of the common-sense adaptations, there is a certain order, a genetic sequence in which they are realized in a culture, and that this fact enables one to speak of the "stages of meaning" of a culture.\textsuperscript{80}

From this fact of genetic sequence it follows that stages of meaning are, as Lonergan once remarked in response to a question, "constructs useful for the study of history":

...it is not historical study, it is just constructs. They are things that are not hypotheses nor descriptions; we can use the word 'model' if it helps one. They are useful in an investigation to suggest questions and even to notice differences that otherwise one would not notice. They help one to develop hypotheses or make descriptions. The main feature of it is that it is closely knit together, that it is explanatory.\textsuperscript{81}

In \textit{Method in Theology}, Lonergan refers to stages of meaning as "ideal constructs"; and he adds that "the key to the constructing is undifferentiation or differentiation of

\textsuperscript{78} See Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 272.

\textsuperscript{79} "...each differentiation of consciousness involves a certain remodeling of common sense." Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 328.

\textsuperscript{80} The order involved with the common-sense adaptation is that a corresponding remodeling of common sense follows on the emergence of each of the other types of differentiation of consciousness. On this issue, see especially Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, pp. 97-99.

\textsuperscript{81} Bernard Lonergan, "Method in Theology," Institute at Regis College, July 7-18, 1969, p. 578. (Transcript from tape-recordings by N[icholas] Graham, available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, listed as file 515.) The question asked was simply: "What are the stages of meaning?"
Again for present purposes, it is sufficient to focus on the sequential relation within a culture between the common-sense and theoretical differentiations of consciousness.

The common-sense differentiation of consciousness is prior to every other differentiation. It is an intellectual development that begins to occur and becomes established in virtue of a naturally active inquisitiveness, a natural capacity to accumulate, combine and cluster related acts of understanding and their contents, and a naturally active communication and reception among individuals of the contents of acts of understanding already arrived at and found to be practically useful. Normally, the development goes forward quite spontaneously, as an individual moves from infancy and childhood to adolescence and adulthood. And as the differentiation is gradually established, the individual moves from the world of immediacy proper to infancy to a

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83 On common sense as intellectual development, see especially Lonergan, *Insight*, pp. 196-199. In *Understanding and Being* (pp. 88-89), Lonergan writes: "In commonsense understanding there is, first of all, a flow of questions, and secondly, a clustering of insights. People catch on to one thing and then another, building up habitual clusters of insights into the problems of their concrete living....The cluster is aimed at guiding concrete action, and it is expressed, not in rigorous fashion, but by communication." On communication, he writes: "Human communication is a process that stands on a series of levels....There is an intersubjectivity that is basically on the sensitive level, and it is perhaps most intense in mother and child. There is a sensitive basis for communication by the mere fact of the presence of another, and still more so by the presence of another who is known and is the object of affection, and so on. The communication that arises on that basis takes place through signs, through the human body. The cluster of insights is not any disembodied thing that rests upon technical language aiming at universality.... It is immanent in this sensitive living. Man is an animal who also understands, and his understanding is the accidental form, as it were, of his physical appearance.... In other words, one communicates, one is already in communication, by virtue of the fact that one is understanding; and what communication aims at is the communication of that understanding." On p. 198 of *Insight*, Lonergan refers to the contents of acts of understanding already arrived at as "a common fund of tested answers." In the previous section, this common fund was spoken of as common meaning.
world mediated by meaning and motivated by value.  

As a spontaneously established procedure, the common-sense differentiation of consciousness is a specialization of intelligence in the particular, as opposed to the universal, and in the concrete, as opposed to the abstract. Again, it is a specialization of intelligence whose successful functioning is not generally enhanced by an articulation of its method. For it is concerned with particular, concrete things in their relation to us and with negotiating each new particular, concrete, personal and material situation as it arises, and such concerns are within the native range of insight into sensible presentations. Still, its distinct procedure can be characterized, at least in part. Lonergan speaks of that procedure as "a self-correcting process of learning...in which insights reveal their shortcomings by putting forth deeds or words or thoughts, and through that revelation prompt the further questions that lead to complementary insights." The result is an acquired store, a common, habitual fund of tried and true insights and judgements, complementing, qualifying and correcting one another; and called upon and brought to bear selectively, so as to enable one to act intelligently and

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84 A first differentiation arises in the process of growing up. The infant lives in a world of immediacy. The child moves exultingly into a world mediated by meaning. The commonsense adult never doubts that the real world is the world mediated by meaning. But he may not be too aware that it is mediated by meaning....

[There is not just one world mediated by meaning for, as human intelligence develops, it can discover new techniques in knowing. There is, however, a fundamental procedure that is practised spontaneously. I refer to it as common sense." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 303.

85 See Lonergan, Insight, pp. 198-199. In Understanding and Being (p. 86), Lonergan remarks that "[c]ommon sense can be described negatively by noting that [with it] there is no methodical exploitation of universality."

86 "When they [scientists] reach the universal relations of things to one another, they are straining beyond the native range of insight into sensible presentations, and they need the crutches of method to fix their gaze on things as neither sensibly given nor concrete nor particular." Lonergan, Insight, p. 202.

87 Lonergan, Insight, p. 197.
appropriately as personal and material situations arise. And this bringing to bear will involve the addition of one or more insights into the situation at hand.

The carrier of meaning that typically is associated with the common-sense differentiation of consciousness is ordinary language. This is not to say, however, that ordinary language functions in common-sense communication in isolation from the other carriers of meaning. Ordinary language is elliptical. For in ordinary communication among those who share the same brand of common sense, there is no need for it to be otherwise. Indeed, any attempt at exhaustive expression would only impede communication and single one out as a pedant. For common-sense communication has other resources besides linguistic utterance to call upon. Lonergan describes effective common-sense communication as “a work of art” in which one incarnate intelligence

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68 For Lonergan’s discussion of what makes common-sense insights and judgments tried and true (invulnerable), see Insight, pp. 306-318.

69 “[Common sense] is common without being general, for it consists in a set of insights that remain incomplete until there is added at least one further insight into the situation in hand; and once that situation has passed, the added insight is no longer relevant, so that common sense at once reverts to its normal state of incompleteness.” Lonergan, Insight, p. 199. “[The function of common sense] is to master each situation as it arises. Its procedure is to reach an incomplete set of insights that is to be completed only by adding on each occasion the further insights that scrutiny of the occasion reveals.” Lonergan, Insight, p. 200. “...the central notion of [common sense] is an habitual but incomplete set of insights that was completed with appropriate variations in each concrete set of circumstances that called for speech and action.” Lonergan, Insight, pp. 203-204. “We come to know it [the realm of common sense]...by a self-correcting process of learning, in which insights gradually accumulate, coalesce, qualify and correct one another, until a point is reached where we are able to meet situations as they arise, size them up by adding a few more insights to the acquired store and so deal with them in an appropriate fashion.” Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 81.

69 “...common sense has no use for a technical language and no tendency towards a formal mode of speech.” Lonergan, Insight, p. 200. “Of the objects in this realm [of common sense] we speak in everyday language, in which words have the function, not of naming the intrinsic properties of things, but of completing the focusing of our conscious intentionality on the things, of crystallizing our attitudes, expectations, intentions, of guiding all our actions.” Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 81-82. “...we have all to begin from undifferentiated consciousness, from commonsense cognitional procedures, from some one of the multitudinous ‘ordinary languages’ in which the endless varieties of common sense express themselves.” Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 85. “...ordinary language is just the language of common sense....” Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 230. “There is the realm of common sense with its meanings expressed in everyday or ordinary language.” Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 257.
communicates with another:

As the proverb has it, a wink is as good as a nod. For common sense not merely says what it means; it says it to someone; it begins by exploring the other fellow’s intelligence; it advances by determining what further insights have to be communicated to him; it undertakes the communication, not as an exercise in formal logic, but as a work of art; and it has at its disposal not merely all the resources of language but also the support of modulated tone and changing volume, the eloquence of facial expression, the emphasis of gestures, the effectiveness of pauses, the suggestiveness of questions, the significance of omissions.91

However, even if other carriers of meaning add flexibility and fluidity, subtlety and delicacy, and so enrich the capabilities of ordinary language for effective common-sense communication, language still remains the carrier of meaning in which meaning “finds its greatest liberation.”

Now, let us attempt to characterize the transition in a culture from a common-sense differentiation of consciousness to a theoretical differentiation of consciousness. In this transition, language and the liberation of meaning associated with it play a decisive role.

Lonergan speaks of the supreme canon of common sense as being the restriction of questions “to the realm of the concrete and particular, the immediate and practical”:92

Common sense...has no theoretical inclinations. It remains completely in the familiar world of things for us. The further questions by which it accumulates insights are bounded by the interests and concerns of human living, by the successful performance of daily tasks, by the discovery of immediate solutions that will work.93

Again, in the section in Insight on the object of common-sense judgements, Lonergan remarks that “the human collaboration that results in a common sense is under the

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91 Lonergan, Insight, p. 200.
92 Lonergan, Insight, p. 201.
93 Lonergan, Insight, p. 201.
dominance of practical considerations and pragmatic sanctions." Indeed, to advance in common sense, he writes, one must "restrain the omnivorous drive of inquiring intelligence and...brush aside as irrelevant, if not silly, any question whose answer would not make an immediately palpable difference."

Now, of course, brushed aside or not, the omnivorous drive of inquiring intelligence remains. Earlier, I spoke of one's unrestricted intending as an active principle, given as part of one's natural endowment, but actually engaged only when provided with objects through sensibilia. The omnivorous drive of inquiring intelligence is the unrestricted intending. And one of its manifestations is what Lonergan calls the systematic exigence. The systematic exigence comes into its own when the theoretical differentiation of consciousness is firmly established in a culture. For the systematic exigence to come to the fore, however, requires more conditions to be fulfilled than just objects being given through sensibilia. In Insight, Lonergan speaks of the interpenetration of knowledge and expression, of expression entering into the very process of learning and the attainment of knowledge, of a solidarity and fusion of the development of knowledge and the development of language. For

coming to know is a process; it advances by stages in which inquiry yields insights only to give rise to further questions that lead to further insights and still further questions. At each stage of the process it is helpful to fix what has been reached and to formulate in some fashion what remains to be sought. So expression enters into the very process of learning, and the attainment of knowledge tends to coincide with the attainment of the ability to

94 Lonergan, Insight, p. 318; cf. p. 320-321: "Because the layman aims at knowing things as related to us, as entering into the domain of human concerns, his questioning ceases as soon as further inquiry would lead to no immediate appreciable difference in the daily life of man."

95 Lonergan, Insight, p. 201.

96 See Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 81-83, 96.
express it.  

The development in knowledge Lonergan is speaking of here includes, I suggest, the development associated with the transition from a common-sense to a theoretical differentiation of consciousness. Language, a set of conventional signs, is said to be the carrier of meaning in which meaning finds its greatest liberation because, as an instrumental act of meaning, conventional signs can be multiplied almost indefinitely. They can be differentiated and specialized to the utmost refinement. They can be used reflexively in the analysis and control of linguistic meaning itself.  

Unlike the other instrumental acts of meaning, then, language has a flexibility that enables it not just to keep expressive pace with developments in knowledge. In addition, it provides an especially suitable sensible peg for facilitating and promoting that very development. For conventional signs are data that can be used reflexively; and it is this openness to reflexive use, most particularly, that enables conventional signs to be constellated in an especially suitable way for facilitating and promoting developments in knowledge, including the development associated with the transition from a common-sense to a theoretical differentiation of consciousness. Not surprisingly, then, in *Method in Theology*, Lonergan remarks that it was on the rising tide of linguistic feed-back that there emerged in Greek culture instances of systematic meaning and some of the typical products of theoretically differentiated consciousness, namely, logic and philosophy and

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early science.99

But even if language enters into the development of knowledge, even if it has a central facilitative role in carrying through and firmly establishing the transition in a culture from a common-sense to a theoretical differentiation of consciousness, it does not explain why it is that the systematic exigence and the questions it gives rise to begin effectively to come to the fore in culture, why it is that a culture begins to move beyond a pervasive adherence to "the supreme canon of common sense."

Lonergan remarks that the theoretical differentiation of consciousness emerges out of developments in the common-sense differentiation of consciousness.100 Now, like all the patterns of experience, the intellectual pattern of experience, at least in incipient form, is natural for human beings.101 Of course, this in no way denies that "...the frequency, intensity, duration, and purity of the intellectual pattern of experience are

99 Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 97. The other reference to linguistic feed-back in *Method in Theology* occurs in a footnote on p. 87, where the possibility of insight into subjective experience, at a certain level of linguistic development, is said to be "achieved by linguistic feed-back." On a later page (p. 92) there is a fuller statement of the process, though the word 'feed-back' is not used: "...linguistic explanations and statements provide the sensible presentations for the insights that effect further development of thought and language. Moreover, such advances for a time can occur exponentially: the more language develops, the more it can develop still more. Eventually, there begins the reflex movement in which language comes to mediate and objectify and examine the linguistic process itself."

100 "...the second stage [of meaning] comes out of developments occurring in the first...." Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 94. Later (p. 259), he remarks that the world of theory "...is constructed only through a manifold use of commonsense knowledge and ordinary language...," and that "...the world of common sense and its language provide the scaffolding for entering into the world of theory...."

101 "When an animal has nothing to do it goes to sleep. When a man has nothing to do he may ask questions." Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 34. "Thales was so intent upon the stars that he did not see the well into which he tumbled. The milkmaid was so indifferent to the stars that she could not overlook the well. Still, Thales could have seen the well, for he was not blind; and perhaps the milkmaid could have been interested in the stars, for she was human." Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 205.
subject to great variation." Now, one kind of development in the common-sense differentiation of consciousness is connected especially with the effective or efficient function of meaning. In large part, Lonergan is referring to this kind of development in the following text:

...it is the development of practical understanding that takes man beyond fruit-collecting, hunting, fishing, gardening, to large-scale agriculture with the social organization of the temple states and later of the empires of the ancient high civilization in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Crete, the valleys of the Indus and the Hoang-ho, Mexico and Peru. There there emerged great works of irrigation, vast structures of stone or brick, armies and navies, complicated processes of book-keeping, the beginnings of geometry, arithmetic, astronomy.

Another kind of development of the common-sense differentiation of consciousness is connected especially with the constitutive function of meaning. In part, the text above also refers to this when it speaks of the social organizations of the temple states and of the empires of the ancient high civilizations. But perhaps a slightly more focused reference is found in the following text:

The advent of civilization means an increasing differentiation of roles to be fulfilled and of tasks to be performed, an ever more elaborate organization and regulation to ensure fulfilment and performance, an ever denser population, and greater and greater abundance.

Inevitably, both kinds of development in practical understanding give rise to various series of questions and problems in a culture, the effective, efficient and continuous solution of which requires a shift in the style of thinking conducted in the culture, from a universal adherence to the supreme canon of common sense and an exclusive concern with the particular and concrete, to include some consideration of the

102 Lonergan, Insight, p. 209.
103 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 89.
104 Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 257-258.
general and the abstract. This shift comes easier for those with a native aptitude for the intellectual pattern of experience. For even though the questions and problems emerge out of developments in practical understanding, those with a native aptitude for the intellectual pattern of experience can more easily detach the questions and problems from their roots in practicality, consider them for their own sake, and develop solutions that not only solve the practical problem efficiently, but that also possess a significance and relevance that leaves behind as incidental the initial situations and circumstances that presented the problems. They can then begin to entertain the further questions that those solutions suggest, and so begin to follow a line of development that is not directly and immediately tied to practicality, that involves a shift away from understanding things in relation to us to understanding them in relation to each other, and, concomitantly, the gradual development of a technical language to express that understanding. Various developments in common-sense understanding, then, bring the systematic exigence to the fore in a culture, and initiate a line of development that expands the cognitive function of meaning and leads to the gradual emergence of the theoretical differentiation of consciousness in that culture. Thus it is that in the text above Lonergan places the beginnings of geometry, arithmetic and astronomy in the context of developments in the common-sense differentiation of consciousness.

A final point concerns the effective establishment of the theoretical differentiation of consciousness in a culture. In the early Platonic dialogues, Plato portrays Socrates as labouring to explain to his interlocutors that he is seeking definitions, *omni et soli*, of courage, temperance, justice, and so forth, and not a recitation of instances that common-sense understanding would readily identify as instances of courage,
temperance, justice, and so forth. The kind of question Socrates is raising is an initial expression of the systematic exigence; and it becomes rather obvious, rather quickly, that this kind of question is beyond the capacity of common-sense understanding to answer. And although Socrates is clear regarding what he is seeking, typically he is portrayed as failing in the end to hit upon a satisfactory definition. Lonergan connects Socrates' failure with the fact that "[t]he systematic exigence not merely raises questions that common sense cannot answer but also demands a context for its answers, a context that common sense cannot supply or comprehend." That context, he says, is theory. And he clarifies what he means by contrasting Socrates' investigations with Aristotle's:

...in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics we find not only general definitions of virtue and vice but also definitions of an array of specific virtues each one flanked by a pair of vices that sin by either excess or by defect. But Aristotle was not content merely to answer Socrates' question. By his example he showed how it can be done; he scrutinized linguistic usage; selected the precise meanings that suited his purpose; constructed sets of interrelated terms; and employed such sets to systematize whole regions of inquiry. In this fashion was effected the differentiation of commonsense meaning and scientific meaning.

From this, I suggest, we can infer that the theoretical differentiation of consciousness is not fully or properly established in a culture unless there has developed what Lonergan here calls the context of theory. Without the context of theory demanded by the systematic exigence, there can be tentative attempts at systematic meaning in a culture. There can even be successful instances of systematic meaning. But they will only occur in fits and starts; they will be at best occasional forays into a culture in which the common-sense differentiation of consciousness is pervasive. Both the tentative first steps

105 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 82.

106 Bernard Lonergan, "Unity and Plurality: The Coherence of Christian Truth," in A Third Collection, pp. 240-241. I quote this text here, rather than what appears in Method in Theology (p. 82), because I think it makes the point clearer. The notion of a context will be discussed below.
and the successful instances are preparatory for the successful achievement of the context of theory. And once that context has been achieved, and for as long as it lasts, the theoretical differentiation of consciousness can be said to be fully and properly established in a culture.\textsuperscript{107}

3. 4 \textit{Symbolic Apprehension}

Now, let us complicate matters a little further. Commonly, at least for much of the history of humanity, the common-sense differentiation of consciousness is combined with the religious differentiation of consciousness.\textsuperscript{106} Drawing on the discussion in \textit{Insight} on mystery and myth, I mentioned in the introduction that the transcendental tendency of the human spirit, its native orientation to the divine, impinges on the dramatic pattern of experience and precludes ordinary human living from being confined just to mundane concerns. And I quoted Lonergan to the effect that the transcendental tendency registers in human living at the psychic level—in feelings, emotions and sentiments—as an intimation of unplumbed depths, which itself is played out in exclamations and bodily

\textsuperscript{107} An earlier example of Lonergan making much the same point regarding the need for context to establish a theoretical differentiation of consciousness fully and properly, but this time in the field of natural science, can be found on p. 52 of \textit{Understanding and Being}: "The difference between stray insights and clusters of related insights may be discovered through a consideration of what occurred prior to and with Newton. Prior to Newton, Archimedes studied floating bodies, Galileo worked out the free fall of a body, and Kepler worked out the laws of planetary motion. But Newton set down laws of motion and procedures to demonstrate that if a body moves in a field of central force its trajectory is a conic section. He set out with a minimal cluster of insights, definitions, postulates, and axioms, and proceeded to account for the laws that had previously been empirically established, bringing them into a single explanatory unity."

\textsuperscript{106} "...the most common differentiation of consciousness is...common sense and transcendence."
movements, in rites and ceremonies, in song and speech.\textsuperscript{109} The combination of the common-sense and the religious differentiations of consciousness gives rise to what Lonergan refers to as symbolic apprehension. Symbolic apprehension, he writes, is the "apprehension of man and his world that is expressed in myth, saga, legend, magic, cosmogony, apocalypse, typology."\textsuperscript{110} Despite the negative sound of this description, and despite Lonergan's earlier remark that, as part of pre-philosophical and pre-scientific thought, symbolic apprehension "cannot evolve and express an adequate account of verbal, notional, and real distinctions," and "cannot distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate uses of the constitutive and effective functions of meaning,"\textsuperscript{111} symbolic apprehension, I suggest, remains for him a permanent and permanently valid mode of apprehension in human life. For "[b]esides being governed by the laws of the mind, thought and speech are governed also by the laws of the psyche."\textsuperscript{112} The difficulty is not with symbolic apprehension per se. The difficulty is that "[w]hen the symbolic mode alone exists and is operative, it tends to take over the whole cognitive function and so it easily goes astray, with the resulting aberrations of the mythical, the magical, and the

\textsuperscript{109} See footnote 3 of the introduction. Lonergan's discussion, it may be recalled, occurs on pp. 554-572 of \textit{Insight}.

\textsuperscript{110} Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 306.

\textsuperscript{111} Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 306; cf. pp. 89, 93.

\textsuperscript{112} Bernard Lonergan, "Exegesis and Dogma," in \textit{Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964}, p. 144. "The symbolic mode [of thought] is natural, and it is naturally the most necessary, universal, and temporally prior." Bernard Lonergan, "Understanding and Method," tr. by Michael G. Shields of \textit{De Intellectu et Methodo}, p. 40. (Available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Regis College, Toronto.) Symbolic apprehension, then, does not pertain just to pre-philosophic and pre-scientific thought if that is taken to mean that once philosophy or science has been introduced into a culture, symbolic apprehension is thereby superseded.
superstitious mentality.”

In this context, Lonergan distinguishes two basic kinds of symbolic narrative: mysteries and myths. Myths are instances of symbolic apprehension gone astray. But even allowing for its waywardness, an intention to truth remains operative in symbolic apprehension gone astray. And in the measure that the intention to truth begins effectively to make itself felt, myth begins to acquire an allegorical significance:

...the parables of the Gospel recall the experiences and propound the images that lead to insights into what is meant by the kingdom of God.... Plato in his dialogues introduces myths to convey insights and judgments and evaluations that would seem strange and novel. But the same technique can be employed for the same purpose without the technique itself becoming an object of investigation and analysis, of reflection and evaluation, and then its use is unaccompanied by the announcement that what is said is merely a parable or merely a myth, because it cannot be accompanied by an explanation of what is meant by the mere parable or the mere myth. Then the wise man speaks his riddles, and thoughtful listeners are left to wonder and ponder what he means.

Again, Lonergan remarks that

even in an age confined to symbolic apprehension, there was the possibility of rejecting the false and approximating to what is true. This consisted in reinterpreting the symbolic construct. Approximately the same materials would be employed and the same questions answered. But there would be additions, eliminations, rearrangements that gave a new answer to the old question.

Symbolic apprehension, then, is not an inherently distortive mode of apprehension in human living. Indeed, in the context of this discussion, mysteries are precisely those narratives in which symbolic apprehension functions properly, and symbolize in a dynamic manner the native human orientation into the known unknown, without

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115 Lonergan, Insight, p. 569.

succumbing to the kinds of major distortion that one finds, say, in speculative gnosticism and magic.117

Now, some pages back I quoted Lonergan’s remark that common-sense communication is “a work of art” in which one incarnate intelligence communicates with another. In the other’s absence, however, one can no longer employ modulated tone and changing volume, facial expressions, gestures, and so forth. If one wishes still to retain something of the liveliness and effectiveness of face-to-face common-sense communication, and speak to and move not just the mind but the heart as well, one has no recourse except to depend largely on written language and to work from one’s instinctive grasp of the associations words have with images, memories and feelings. And if the intention of such communication is not to manipulate the other, but to explore the potentiality inherent in human living and to suggest, indirectly but persuasively, through the skilful use of affect-laden images, insights into that potentiality, then a literary language, possessing features that distinguish it from the ordinary language of ordinary common-sense communication, will begin to emerge in a culture, to complement the ordinary language of ordinary common-sense communication:

While ordinary language is transient, literary is permanent: it is the vehicle of a work, a poiēma, to be learnt by heart or to be written out. While ordinary language is elliptical, content to supplement the common understanding and common feeling already guiding common living, literary language not only aims at fuller statement but also attempts to make up for the lack of mutual presence. It would have the listener or reader not only understand but also feel. So where the technical treatise aims at conforming to the laws of logic and the precepts of method, literary language tends to float somewhere in between logic and symbol. When it is analyzed by a logical mind, it is found to be full of what are termed

117 On speculative gnosticism, see Insight, pp. 565-566, 571. On magic, there is the brief but effective remark on p. 89 of Method in Theology: “As the constitutive function of meaning intrudes into the field of ‘speculative’ knowledge, so the efficient intrudes into that of ‘practical’ knowledge. The result is magic. Words bring about results not only by directing human action but also by a power of their own which myth explains.”
figures of speech. But it is only the intrusion of non-literary criteria into the study of literature that makes figures of speech smack of artifice. For the expression of feeling is symbolic and if words owe a debt to logic, feelings follow the laws of image and affect.\textsuperscript{118}

Literary language, then, may be thought of in one sense as a common-sense solution to a common-sense problem. But it carries with it a significance beyond common-sense concerns. It is a work of art not just in the sense that it is a craft that one has mastered to achieve certain practical ends, as is the case with effective common-sense communication. For its effective use involves skills whose significance goes beyond immediate practicality to the exploration of human potentiality.\textsuperscript{119} And just as the combination of the common-sense and religious differentiations of consciousness can be thought of as giving rise to symbolic apprehension, so as literary language emerges in a culture as a way of approximating to effective face-to-face communication and of speaking to the heart as well as to the head, even in the other's absence, literary language participates in the combination and becomes one of the prominent vehicles of

\textsuperscript{118} Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, pp. 72-73. “Advertisers and propaganda ministries aim at psychological conditioning; they desire neither adequate insight nor detached reflection nor rational choices but simply the establishment of types of habituation, familiarity, association, automatism, that will dispense with further questions. In contrast, literary writing would convey insights and stimulate reflection, but its mode of operation is indirect. Words are sensible entities; they possess associations with images, memories, and feelings; and the skilful writer is engaged in exploiting the resources of language to attract, hold, and absorb attention. But if there is no frontal attack on the reader's intelligence, there is the insinuation of insights through the images from which they subtly emerge. If there is no methodical summing up of the pros and cons of a judgment, there is an unhurried, almost incidental, display of the evidence without, perhaps, even a suggested question.” Lonergan, \textit{Insight}, pp. 592-593.

\textsuperscript{119} Prior to the neatly formulated questions for systematizing intelligence, there is the deep-set wonder in which all questions have their source and ground. As an expression of the subject, art would show forth that wonder in its elemental sweep… [T]he animals, safely sheathed in biological routines, are not questions to themselves. But man’s artistry testifies to his freedom. As he can do, so he can be what he pleases. What is he to be? Why? Art may offer attractive or repellent answers to these questions, but in its subtler forms it is content to communicate any of the moods in which such questions arise, to convey any of the tones in which they may be answered or ignored.” Lonergan, \textit{Insight}, pp. 208-209. “Just as on the intellectual level the operator is wonder, the pure desire to know, so on the sensitive level there is a corresponding operator. With it are associated feelings of awe, fascination, the uncanny. It is an openness to the world, to adventure, to greatness, to goodness, to majesty.” Lonergan, \textit{Topics in Education}, p. 214. Great, good, mediocre, or bad, literary language is one form of art.
expression for symbolic apprehension.\textsuperscript{120}

3. 5 Continuing Contexts

As a final contribution to the upper blade of special doctrinal historical studies, let us introduce the notion of a continuing context. For this notion not only provides another way of characterizing the transition in a culture from a common-sense differentiation of consciousness to a theoretical differentiation of consciousness. More importantly, it adds a dynamism to the notion of a world mediated by meaning, prevents a world mediated by meaning from being conceived as if it were some unchanging noetic heaven, and offers some clarification of the relationships that can obtain between one dynamic world mediated by meaning and another.

Now, one may understand what a context is in a merely nominal way. And on that basis one is able to acknowledge that the context of some $X$ refers to some tacit remainder deemed to be somehow connected with and relevant to $X$:

A context is a remainder concept[,] it is the rest. The rest is not very well defined when people are ready to say 'your interpretation is all out of context,' or 'the objection disregards the context of the remark.' If you ask them what is the context, they are inevitably going to be at a loss. So context is not something that is sharply defined. It is all the rest that is relevant to understanding correctly what I am saying.\textsuperscript{121}

I would distinguish two questions here. First, what constitutes a context? Second, what constitutes the content of a context? The first question seeks to specify a general

\textsuperscript{120} Thus, in The Way to Nicea (p. 1), Lonergan writes: "The gospels, and the apostolic writings generally, are not just a collection of true propositions, addressed only to the mind of the reader; they teach the truth, but in such a way that they penetrate the sensibility, fire the imagination, engage the affections, touch the heart, open the eyes, attract and impel the will of the reader."

\textsuperscript{121} Bernard Lonergan, "The Method of Theology," Institute at Regis College, Toronto, July 9-20, 1962, p. 29. (Transcript by Nicholas Graham, 1984, available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Regis College, Toronto.)
structure that, as such, is an intelligible content that is open to further, distinct determinate content conforming to the general structure; the second supposes the general structure and seeks to determine, in a particular instance, some of the determinate intelligible content that conforms to the general structure. One may be unable to answer both questions. Again, one may be clear on the structure of contexts but vague on the content in a particular instance. Alternatively, one may be able to specify, to some extent, the content of a context in a particular instance, but still be unclear about the general structure to which the content conforms—beyond saying that it is the “rest that is relevant”. If that is the case, one has a nominal understanding of what constitutes a context; one knows enough about the structure of contexts to use ‘context’ more or less competently. But this is as far as a nominal understanding of what constitutes a context can go. And it is insufficient for the effective use of the notion of context as an ideal-type in special doctrinal historical studies.

Lonergan goes beyond a merely nominal understanding of ‘context’ by proposing an understanding of the general structure that constitutes a context and is open to further determinations conforming to that general structure. Etymologically, ‘context’ conveys the idea of weaving together. For Lonergan, what are woven together, when one speaks of a context, are questions and answers:

...[C]ontext is the interweaving of questions and answers in limited groups. To answer any one question will give rise to further questions. To answer them will give rise to still more. But, while this process can recur a number of times, while it might go on indefinitely if one keeps changing the topic, still it does not go on indefinitely on one and the same topic. So context is a nest of interlocking or interwoven questions and answers; it is limited inasmuch as all the questions and answers have a bearing, direct or indirect, on a single topic; and because it is limited, there comes a point in an investigation when no further relevant questions arise, and then the possibility of judgment has emerged. When there are no further relevant questions, there are no further insights to complement, correct, qualify those
that have been reached.\textsuperscript{122}

Contexts, then, are a consequence of the fact that human knowing is cyclic in the manner of its operation, incremental or cumulative in the manner of its progress, and, one might add, irretrievably habitual in the manner of its existence.\textsuperscript{123} Contexts are the "limited nests of questions and answers, each bearing [directly or indirectly] on some multi-faceted but determinate topic."\textsuperscript{124} Again, to attempt a more complete formulation, a context is constituted by a set of insights whose contents cluster and coalesce, complement, qualify and correct each other and head towards the closure of invulnerability in which all relevant questions are answered with respect to an adjusting and broadening field of data.\textsuperscript{125} Within this process, a single topic is discovered and...
emerges to the extent that the adjusting and broadening field of data is understood is such a way that it ceases to evoke further relevant questions and begins to yield diminishing returns.\textsuperscript{126} ‘The topic of …’ is the expeditious and economic way to refer to the content of different closures of questions and answers.\textsuperscript{127} And such closures function contextually when they are brought to bear in an inquiry.

A more than nominal understanding of the general structure of contexts is highly useful in special doctrinal historical studies. For in the history that is written about, contexts are realities that can be continuous over time. Just as questions and answers can nest to form limited contexts, so limited contexts can themselves nest to form larger contexts. And these larger contexts can retain their unity and distinctive identity over time and be brought to bear on additional limited contexts, as these come to nest within the unity of the larger context. Thus, in special doctrinal historical studies one can come to distinguish the intelligibly interconnected prior and subsequent stages in a continuing context, and so come to “…a grasp of this array of interconnections and interdependences constitutive of a single development.”\textsuperscript{128}

As an example of a continuing context, Lonergan mentions “…the ongoing context

\textsuperscript{125}(…continued)

action—responding to the upper-blade action moving downward—moving upward towards the upper blade. In that action, the data of the lower blade are gradually suitably constellated for an act of understanding to leap forth.


\textsuperscript{127} “The single topic…is something that can be indicated generally in a phrase or two yet unfolded in an often enormously complex set of subordinate and interconnected questions and answers.” Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 164. “…we speak of Platonism and Aristotelianism, of Christianity and Islam, of Renaissance and Reformation, of Enlightenment and Revolution, of Science and Faith, but to say what we mean by such words would call for volumes of other words.” Lonergan, \textit{Insight}, p. 578.

\textsuperscript{128} Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 165.
of church doctrines that did not exist prior to Nicea but, bit by bit, came into existence subsequently to Nicea."^129 The bearer of such a continuing context is an historical community, a community mediating itself in its history, rather than an individual or some arbitrarily selected group of individuals.^130 Now, among a creative minority within a community, a continuing context may give rise to, or, at least, occasion a limited context, a nest of questions and answers, that does not neatly nest within that larger continuing context. This limited context may itself initiate a line of development; and as it does, the development begins itself to acquire the characteristics of a continuing context, and the differences between it and the prior continuing context begins to become more pronounced. Lonergan names this kind of relationship between continuing contexts derivation. And he offers the following examples of the relationship:

The ongoing context that runs from Nicea to the third council of Constantinople derives from the doctrines of the first three centuries of Christianity but differs from them inasmuch as it employs a post-systematic mode of thought and expression. Again, the ongoing context of conciliar doctrines gave rise to a distinct but dependent context of theological doctrines. This presupposed the councils, distinguished Christ as God and Christ as man, and raised such questions as follows. Could Christ as man sin? Did he feel concupiscence? Was he in any way ignorant? Did he have sanctifying grace? To what extent? Did he have immediate knowledge of God? Did he know everything pertaining to his mission? Did he have freedom of choice?

Again, the theological context derived from the Greek councils expanded in the medieval schools to envisage the whole of scripture and tradition. It was not only ongoing, collaborative, and methodical but also dialectical. It was a context that embraced mutually

^129 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 313.

^130 "Ongoing contexts arise when a succession of texts express the mind of a single historical community." Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 313. This should cause no surprise: "Not only are men born with a native drive to inquire and understand; they are born into a community that possesses a common fund of tested answers, and from that fund each may draw his variable share, measured by his capacity, his interests, and his energy. Not only does the self-correcting process of learning unfold within the private consciousness of the individual; for by speech, and still more by example, there is effected a sustained communication that at once disseminates and tests and improves every advance, to make the achievement of each successive generation the starting point of the next." Lonergan, Insight, p. 198. "Modern mathematics, modern physics, modern chemistry are just too vast for any of them to be mastered entirely by a single mind. What holds of them, also holds to a greater or less extent in other fields." Bernard Lonergan, "Belief: Today's Issue," in A Second Collection, pp. 91-92.
opposed schools of thought, that came to distinguish between opposition in theological doctrine and opposition in church doctrine, that agreed to differ on the former and declined to differ on the latter.\textsuperscript{131}

On occasion, the effective emergence of a derived continuing context signals the not too distant demise of the continuing context from which it derived. This, however, is by no means always the case. When there is no demise of the earlier context, there is likely to be interaction between the two continuing contexts. \textit{Interaction} is the second kind of common relationship between continuing contexts that Lonergan mentions. And, again, he provides an example of the relationship:

\begin{quote}
...interacting contexts are represented by the context of theological doctrines and the context of church doctrines from the medieval period up to Vatican II. The theologians were under the influence of the church doctrines on which they reflected. Inversely, without the theologians, the church doctrines would not have had their post-systematic precision, conciseness, and organization.\textsuperscript{132}
\end{quote}

One should perhaps add as a final word that interactions between continuing contexts are frequently tinged with tension and conflict.

\section*{4 Résumé}

Acknowledged or not, ideal-types play an inevitable and highly significant heuristic role in historical studies. In this chapter I have sought to provide a methodological preparation for the discussion to follow by highlighting a set of categories from \textit{Method in Theology} that Bernard Lonergan has developed in conjunction with his attempt in \textit{Insight} and in some of his other writings to bring to light in objectification the normative pattern of our conscious and intentional operations. That normative pattern, transcendental method in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 314.
\item Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, p. 314.
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actu exercito, is the condition of possibility for all heuristic functioning. For the transcendental notions, the dynamic intermediaries between ignorance and knowledge, are the basis for the heuristic function; and they are operative in every developed particular method that specializes the normative pattern of our conscious and intentional operations and renders it specifically suitable for investigating some restricted domain. Thus, if one allows that all historical studies proceed according to a developed method capable of yielding cumulative and progressive results, then the heuristic function of transcendental method in actu exercito is operative and specialized in all historical studies. More particularly, then, the heuristic function of transcendental method in actu exercito is operative in special doctrinal historical studies.

The categories I have sought especially to highlight, namely, meaning and the elements and functions of meaning, differentiations of consciousness, the different realms of meaning and the different worlds mediated by meaning, stages of meaning in a culture, symbolic apprehension, continuing contexts and the relations between distinct continuing contexts, once they are understood and articulated in transcendental method in actu reflexo et signato, can then be applied in historical studies in a way that contributes not a little to the attempts of historians to determine concretely what was going forward with respect to some set of historical data. In other words, the categories can function as basic ideal-types in historical studies.

The discussion to follow will, I hope, lend some added credence to this claim—at least as regards special doctrinal historical studies.
CHAPTER II

GRATIA INCREASE ET CREATA IN THE HALESIAN SUMMA

1 Origin of the Terms Gratia Increata and Gratia Creata

According to Gérard Philips, there is no evidence that the term, gratia creata, was part of written theological discourse before the first half of the thirteenth century. It occurs for the first time, it seems, in the body of writing the manuscript tradition attributes to Alexander of Hales (ca.1186-1245).¹

Thus, grace is spoken of as created, and also as uncreated, in the reportatio, Quaestiones Disputatae 'Antequam Esset Frater', dated by its modern editors between 1220 and 1236.² Again, the two terms, gratia creata and gratia increata, occur in the reportatio, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, identified as Halesian in 1946, and dated by its modern editors between 1222 and 1229.³ In each of these works, however, the distinction receives little more than passing mention. The most


² Alexander of Hales, Quaestiones Disputatae 'Antequam Esset Frater' nunc primum editae, edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 19-21, 3 vols. (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1960). The occurrences of the terms can be located by consulting the index. For the editors' dating of the work, see Pro/Quaest I. 36°.

³ Alexander of Hales, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi nunc demum reperta atque primum edita, edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12-15, 4 vols. (Quaracchi, Florentiae: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1951-57). Again, the index is useful for locating occurrences of the terms. For the editors' discussion of the work's date, see Prol/Glossa IV, 18°-44°. For an account of the identification of the work as Halesian, see Victorin Doucet, O.F.M., "A New Source of the 'Summa Fratris Alexandri': The Commentary on the Sentences of Alexander of Hales," Franciscan Studies 6 (1946): 403-417.
extensive and probing discussion in the Halesian corpus of grace as created and uncreated occurs in a later work, *Summa Fratris Alexandri*—in one instance, within a wide-ranging inquiry concerning grace in general; and in an earlier instance, within an inquiry concerning the grace of union.⁴

Unlike the two earlier works, which scholars generally accept as faithful presentations of Alexander's own teaching, *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, in its present form, is a compilation, the product of a collaborative effort of theologians who garnered and adapted material from a variety of sources. The project commenced under Alexander's direction probably sometime after 1240; it remained unfinished at the time of his death in 1245; and was completed by his collaborators and disciples, at the express behest of Pope Alexander IV, during the following fifteen to twenty years.

Since the bulk of Books I, II and III were in existence by 1245, one may reasonably presume that Alexander's direction of the project played at least some part in determining the content of those Books and the arrangement of their content. Furthermore, it is evident that Alexander's two earlier works, and probably his own later oral teaching, provided a considerable amount of source-material for the compilers. Finally, the disciples who completed the work within the two decades after Alexander's death in 1245

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⁴ [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica* ([Vol. IV adds]: *seu Sic ab Origine dicta “Summa Fratris Alexandri”*), edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 4 vols. (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924-48.) The general inquiry concerning grace occurs in Book III of this work under the title, "De Gratia". It has two parts. The first has the sub-title, "De Gratia Gratum Faciente," and is comprised of all the articles which make up Questions 61 and 62. The second part has the sub-title, "De Gratia Gratis Data", and is comprised of all the articles which make up Questions 63 through 67. The distinction between grace as created and uncreated is expressly discussed in Question 61, *Membrum* 2, Article 2.

The inquiry concerning the grace of Christ also occurs in Book III, beginning at Question 11. One focus of consideration under this heading is the grace of union (gratia unionis); in relation to that grace, Question 12, *Membrum* 1, Article 1, inquires whether the grace of union, absolutely considered, is created or uncreated.
probably did so, at least in some instances, by drawing on the remembered oral teaching of the Master. In one way or another, it seems, Alexander’s influence over the entire work is pervasive.⁵

One can accept, then, that the whole of Summa Fratris Alexandri cannot truly be said to originate from Alexander of Hales in the same, straightforward sense as the two earlier works attributed to him. But one can also agree with the work’s modern editors in considering it faithful to Alexander’s teaching, if not without qualification, at least in a certain measure.⁶ And in that same “certain measure,” consequently, one can accept the accuracy of the manuscript tradition in attributing Summa Fratris Alexandri to Alexander himself.⁷

Accordingly, if Philips has not missed some piece of evidence, and if the

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⁵ Etienne Gilson sums up the scholarly consensus regarding the likely influence of Alexander in the production of the Halesian Summa and his influence generally this way: “His [Alexander’s] first disciples probably knew, between the years 1220 and 1245, a more mature Alexander, whose teaching they incorporated into the Summa fratris Alexandri and into their own works. This supposition agrees better...with the repeatedly made statement of his immediate successors, including Saint Bonaventure himself, that they felt indebted to him for their whole theological teaching.” Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 329. Again, speaking generally, the Catholic Encyclopedia, perhaps with some exaggeration in view of the compilatory nature of the Halesian Summa, identifies Alexander’s “importance for the history of theology and philosophy...in the fact, that he was the first to attempt a systematic exposition of Catholic doctrine, after the metaphysical and physical works of Aristotle had become known to the schoolmen.” (See The Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “Alexander of Hales.”) For a recent discussion of Alexander’s life, the works attributed to him and their authenticity, and his influence and contribution to theology, see Kenan B. Osborne, O.F.M., “Alexander of Hales,” in The History of Franciscan Theology, ed. Kenan B. Osborne, O.F.M. (New York: The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University, 1994), pp. 1-38.

⁶ “Ipse Alexander quodammodo Summam fecit....sed collaborantibus aliis.... Quare et authentica et halesiana quodammodo Summa dici potest, non autem simpliciter.” P. Victorinus Doucet, O.F.M., Prolegomena to [Alexander of Hales (?)]. Summa Theologica IV, p. cccxix. If one cannot speak without qualification of Alexander as the work’s author, then, one can still justifiably refer to it as the “Halesian Summa”.

aforementioned dating of these works within a limited time-span is accurate, one can conclude that the term, *gratia creat{{a}}*, and presumably also the term, *gratia increata*, were introduced into written theological discourse by Alexander of Hales sometime between 1220 and 1229. Under the influence of Alexander's earlier writings, and possibly of his later oral teaching, his collaborators and disciples adopted the terms and further elaborated their meaning in some of their own written discussions concerning grace, its necessity, kinds, functions and effects. It is virtually impossible to say with surety now what in the elaboration originated from Alexander himself and what from his collaborators and disciples. In any event, some of these writings were eventually collected, along with some texts from earlier, contemporary and later authors, and these writings were woven together to form a single work that came to be attributed to Alexander himself in the manuscript tradition. And so, not unnaturally, it became known as *Summa Fratris Alexandri*. Today, it is commonly referred to simply as the Halesian *Summa*, to distinguish it from the more illustrious *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas.

A preliminary examination of the contents of the Halesian *Summa* that deal with the distinction between *gratia increata* and *gratia creat{{a}}* can provide a useful initial framework for the entire discussion. So to that I turn for the remainder of this chapter. Then, in the

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8 Among Alexander's disciples and collaborators, John de la Rochelle (de Repulla) (1190/1200-1245), who in 1241 succeeded Alexander as Master of Theology in Paris, deserves special mention. Doucet says, very generally, that John's writings are among the "principal sources" of Books I, II and III of *Summa Fratris Alexandri*. (See Doucet, "History," p. 310). Philips has a more detailed statement concerning the authorship of the two parts of the discussion of grace in Book III: "La première moitié de la dissertation provient...de Jean de la Rochelle et étudie la grâce que les scolastiques appellent gratum faciens. Au contraire la seconde section...expose la gratia gratis data et se présente comme un amalgame de textes de Philippe le Chancelier, Guillaume d'Auxerre, Alexander lui-même et Pierre Lombard." (Philips, *L'Union Personnelle*, p. 79). I would simply add that Philips' remarks here concerning John de la Rochelle, even if correct, do not preclude the possibility that John may have been largely or, at least, significantly dependent on Alexander for the content of the first part of *De Gratia*. 
two chapters that follow, I attempt to enrich the framework by examining both the general philosophical context and the more specific theological context out of which the theological doctrine of created and uncreated grace first emerged. I hope then to be better positioned to attempt in the fifth chapter a more intensive examination of the doctrine itself, as it is presented in the Halesian Summa.

2 Quid sit gratia secundum nominis rationem

'Grace'('gratia'), the Halesian Summa says, can be used, improperly, to refer to the act of gratuitous giving, or, generally, to whatever is given gratuitously, or, properly and especially, to that which, given gratuitously, renders the recipient pleasing or acceptable to the giver.

This can be applied to God's communication with humanity. Thus, in the first use, grace is identified with God or the (gracious) divine will. In the second, general use, and with a sidelong bow to 1 Cor. 12:4, grace is identified with any gift from God, that is, with any unmerited bestowal by God upon human beings. Eight kinds of gifts are mentioned. Of these, the third, namely, the healing gift from God that delivers or liberates human beings and renders them pleasing or acceptable to God, coincides with what is said to be the proper and especial use of 'grace'.

But the author considers this proper and especial use merely a nominal specification of what grace is. It tidies and delimits the field of discussion; it indicates

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9 [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 5; cf. q. 61, m. 1, c. 1.

10 This is evident from the title of the article: "Quid sit gratia secundum nominis rationem."
what flows from this gift; but of itself it does not specify the nature of the gift; it does not attempt to specify what exactly it is that is given without being merited by the recipient, and is such that it is able to render the recipient pleasing and acceptable to God. For the author does not simply identify the gift with God’s gracious regard and acceptance of the human being; he does not understand it simply as a reckoning or imputing on God’s part, to which there corresponds no reverberation of “some good thing” (“aliquod bonum”) that is truly bestowed and truly possessed within the created reality of the human being and is consequent to and commensurate with God’s gracious regard. As Philips notes, the author rejects a prevalent opinion among canonists of the time, and earlier, that grace posits nothing in the soul. The gift, whatever it is, is truly a gift; it is something truly bestowed upon the recipient and truly received and possessed by the recipient. And coincident with that gift, the recipient is rendered pleasing and acceptable to God.

3 Quid sit gratia secundum definitionem

In the next article, there is an attempt to advance beyond a merely nominal understanding of grace by utilizing the Aristotelian list of categories.

An earlier article had argued that grace is not a substance. For if grace is “some good thing” truly received and laid down in those who have been rendered pleasing to God by its presence, they must each be already complete as far as their first being (esse

11 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 1, c.

12 See Philips, L’Union Personnelle, p. 81. Perhaps one should add that even if canonists were particularly prone to holding this opinion, it was not confined to them. For the Halesian Summa’s rejection of the opinion, see [Alexander of Hales (?)]. Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 1. It will be discussed in more detail shortly.
primum), their natural being (esse naturae), is concerned. For only then can there be a complete subject, a complete that in which (illud in quo) to receive grace. For each recipient of grace, their soul, as substantial form, is that in virtue of which they are complete in their first being, and that in which grace can be received. Accordingly, grace is not a substance, though, the author says, with respect to second being (esse secundum), which is ordered being (esse ordinis) or well-being (bene esse) and perfection in having attained one's end, grace can be compared to a substantial principle.

If not a substance, then in terms of the Aristotelian list of categories, the gift of grace can be understood as a quality belonging to the recipient, something on account of which the recipient is said to be such-and-such. More specifically, the gift can be understood as a habitus, the first subdivision in the category of quality, something one has as an essentially steady or stable further determination of one's nature, grafted onto one's nature as a kind of second nature.

13 See [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 3.

14 Bernard Lonergan has remarked that (good) habits (habitus) are to be understood as determinations of undetermined potencies that "make the standard and rule of rectitude an inherent form of the faculty to be ruled." (Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., "Gratia Operans: A Study of the Speculative Development in the Writings of St. Thomas of Aquin" [S.T.D. Dissertation, Gregorian University, 1940]. p. 258; cf. Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. J. Patout Burns, S.J. [New York: Herder & Herder, 1971], p. 43.) Keeping this in mind, and recognizing that medieval writers did not restrict the rule of rectitude just to the moral order, one is better placed to appreciate Yves Simon's argument that, given current usage, translating 'habitus' as 'habit' invites misunderstanding. "The usage of Hume," he writes, "constantly followed by British and American philosophers and psychologists, has forever obliterated the possibility that habit would take on the meaning of habitus." For Aristotle and the medieval theologians influenced by him, he explains, a habitus is a quality characterized by essential steadiness, and that steadiness is guaranteed by objective necessity in the object, or as one might say, a quasi-permanent internalization proportionate to an objective structure: "In Aristotelianism, science, art, and moral virtues are habitus; their steadiness is guaranteed by objective necessity." For Hume and those influenced by him, on the other hand, necessity results simply from repetition of acts and so is merely subjective. In the current climate, then, to translate 'habitus' as 'habit' invites the reader to misunderstand the reason for the steadiness of the quality in question. Simon's argument is sufficiently persuasive for me to follow his example and leave 'habitus' untranslated. For his discussion, see Yves R. (continued...)
Further clarifications, however, need to be added. If the gift of grace can be understood as a *habitus*, it has as its subject neither the body, nor even some faculty or power of the soul, but the soul itself. To be more specific, the subject of grace is the soul as rational: grace is a *habitus* of the mind. Further, grace is a *habitus* of the mind in relation to the mind's functioning as ordinative of human life, not in relation to its purely speculative or theoretical functioning. But some orderings of human life can be confined or particularized to different regions; such is the case, for example, with local customs or regional laws. The ordination effected by the *habitus* of grace is not to be understood on the model of particularity as regards place or, presumably, time; grace is not bound by this kind of particularity. It is unlike every confined or particularized ordering, for it orders human life universally.

But even this clarification is deemed insufficient. For it is further claimed that this characterization does not enable one to distinguish grace from charity or the virtues informed by charity. They too are not bound by particularity of this or these places or times. They are, however, bound in another way in that each is ordinative of human life in relation to one line of activity, one (kind of) act—believing, say, or loving. Grace, on the other hand, is ordinative of *all* the kinds of acts which make up one's life and so is

14(...continued)

15 The author does say that grace is a *habitus* of the soul as rational. However, in the article he speaks more frequently of grace as a *habitus* of the mind (*habitus mentis*). There is, I think, no significant difference here. For it is an example of the common practice whereby the name of the power proper to the essence is used to denote the essence.

ordinative of the whole or the entirety of human life. Thus, with this final distinguishing feature specified, the article concludes that grace is a habitus of the mind universally ordinating the whole or entirety of one’s life.¹⁷

4 Utrum gratia ponat aliquid secundum rem in gratificato

If one can now combine the results drawn thus far from the two articles and say that grace is a habitus of the mind, bestowed by God without being merited by the recipient, that renders the recipient pleasing to God and results in the universal ordination of the whole of the recipient’s life, it seems one is still not able to say what the gift is in itself or, for that matter, what the end is to which the whole of the recipient’s living is now ordered.

Actually, the two articles focused on thus far, both of which are said to consider grace according to meaning or reason (secundum rationem), hark back to four prior

¹⁷ "... gratia est habitus mentis universaliter vitae totius ordinativus." [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 6. A similar statement can be found in Philip the Chancellor (1160/1185-1236): "... gratia est habitus universaliter vitae totius ordinativus, et h[a]ec est magistralis et determinatur comparatione ad actum." Philip the Chancellor, Philippi Cancellarii Summa de Bono: ad fidem codicis primum edita, ed. Nicolai Wicki, 2 vols. (Bernae: Francke, 1985), de bono grat[i]a[je], de gratia in generali, q. 1, de diversis acceptionibus grat[i]a[je] et eius rationibus, 60-61. The work is dated between 1230 and 1236. An editorial footnote refers the reader back to Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153). In his work, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, VI, 17, Bernard distinguishes willing and willing the good. Creation gives us the first; the latter requires grace. For grace sets in proper order what creation gives, particularly as regards the affectiones, such as love and fear. There is some affinity, then, between what Bernard says and the definition, but as far as this reference goes, it would seem he can hardly be credited with originating the definition. Commenting on Peter Lombard’s Sententiae, Albert the Great tentatively credits Augustine with the definition: "...Augustinus, ut quidam dicunt, <<Gratia est habitus totius vitae universaliter ordinativus>>." (Commentarii in Secundum Librum Sententiarum, in Opera Omnia, ed. S. Borgnet, 38 vol.[Parisii: apud Ludovivum Vivès, 1890-1899], vol. 27, dist. XXVI, a.4). In his Summa, he is more definite: "...Augustinus in libro de Correptione et Gratia: <<Gratia est habitus totius vitae universaliter ordinativus>>." (Summa Theologiae, in Opera Omnia, vol. 33, II, tr. XVI, q.98, m.3). But he seems to be mistaken in this; for though Augustine repeatedly discusses perseverance in the good to the end of life with the assistance of grace in this work, the definition, in so many words, is not to be found there. Finally, when Remec mentions the definition, he remarks: "Ex variis definitionibus gratiae auctor Summae Alexandri p.III, q.61. suam fecit illam a Petro Lombardo traditam..." (Remec, De Sanctitate, p. 20). But again, the definition in so many words does not seem to originate from Peter Lombard.
articles in which an attempt is made to consider the gift of grace in itself (*secundum rem*). In relation to these four articles, the last two consider what accrues to human beings intrinsically but secondarily as a result of grace having been offered to them, insofar as that can be elucidated through natural analogies and by applying the discovered techniques of philosophical analysis. With that perspective, and bound by it, the last two articles draw from the Aristotelian list of categories and from the Aristotelian technique for arriving at a definition to understand the meaning of 'grace'.

The first of the articles which consider what grace is *secundum rem* raises an issue already mentioned, namely, whether grace posits something in those whom God regards as pleasing and acceptable. And within the stated reason for an affirmative answer to this question, there is a corollary concerning the nature of grace, which can easily be teased into open display if the text is probed slightly.

First, the text:

_Dicendum quod gratia, qua aliquis dicitur esse gratus Deo, necessario ponit aliquod bonum in gratificato quo est gratus Deo; illud enim, quo est gratus Deo, est illud quo est deiformis vel assimilatus Deo. Unde tunc dicatur gratus Deo, quando est ei similis; odiosus vero dicitur Deo, quando est dissimilis, sicut peccator, quia peccatum est dissimilitudo ad ipsam Bonitatem summam. Sicut ergo odiosum Deo ponit dissimilitudinem ad divinam bonitatem et ponit aliquid per modum defectus et privationis, quo fit illa dissimilitudo, sicut peccatum, ita gratia ponit similitudinem gratificati ad Deum et ponit aliquid in ipso, quo dicitur assimilatus Deo; per quam assimilationem dignus est vita aeterna, quae est in plena assimilatone rationalis creaturae ad Deum..._ 

Now the probing. In a manner which seems almost question-begging, given the...

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18 Thus Albert the Great remarks concerning this characterization of grace: "...illa datur per proprium effectum." Albert the Great, _Summa Theologiae_, II, t. XVI, q. 98, m. 3.

19 I have reversed the order of the discussion in the Halesian _Summa_, treating first grace *secundum rationem* and then grace *secundum rem*, because I have found it better facilitates an ordered exposition.

20 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. _Summa Theologica_, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 1, sol.
point at issue, the first half of the text links being pleasing to God with being like God or assimilated to God. For the (one and only) illud quo for the former is said to be (identical with) the (one and only) illud quo for the latter. Given that illud quo, then, both the former and the latter are likewise given. Accordingly, there is a link between being pleasing to God and being like God or assimilated to God such that one is pleasing to God if and only if one is like God or assimilated to God. Contrapositively, one is displeasing or hateful to God if and only if one is unlike God or not assimilated to God. Now the point at issue arises, it seems, because saying that one comes to be regarded as pleasing and acceptable to God does not obviously imply that one is intrinsically changed thereby. Thus the objection is put: “...gratia, qua aliquis dicitur esse gratus homini, nihil ponit in gratificato; ergo nec gratia, qua aliquis dicitur esse gratus Deo.” On the other hand, to say that one comes to be like God or assimilated to God seems to imply that one is intrinsically changed thereby. But since one comes to be pleasing to God if and only if one comes to be like God or assimilated to God, if one comes to be pleasing to God, one is changed intrinsically thereby. Accordingly, grace posits something in accordance with itself in the one who has been made pleasing to God.

Whatever its weakness, such, I take it, is the underlying argument of the text. There are, however, some other features to notice. First, the similarity or dissimilarity in question is with respect to divine goodness. So one's being pleasing to God is linked to one's being like God and assimilated to God with respect to God's goodness. Second, this likeness and assimilation is such that in virtue of it, one is worthy of eternal life, that

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21 [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 1, obj. 1.
is, worthy of the full likeness and sharing of divine goodness, the full assimilation to God.

Third, the manner in which the conclusion is established and, more particularly, the use of the word 'quando' in the text suggests there is a particular order to be taken into account, namely, that one is or comes to be pleasing and acceptable to God because one is or comes to be like God or assimilated to God. And if this is the case, one can distil from the text the corollary that being graced is not just actually sharing or participating in something good. Rather, it is to be identified with an actual sharing or participating in God's goodness, so that one can truly be said to be assimilated to God and like God, and worthy of the fullness of assimilation which is eternal life, and ordered to eternal life as end and perfection.22

22 This is accurate as far as it goes, for statements made in some later articles verify it. But it is incomplete. For those same statements speak of grace involving a threefold likeness to God in rational creatures: the first, secundum virtutem or secundum potentiam; the second, secundum expressionem; the third, secundum inclinationem: "Gratia... est Dei similitudo in creatura istis tribus modis, scilicet secundum virtutem et expressionem et inclinationem." ([Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 4, a. 2, § 1, sol.) God is the cause of grace in rational creatures: grace is an effect of God. But one can consider God as efficient cause, as exemplary or (external) formal cause, and as final cause of grace in rational creatures. If one considers God as efficient cause of grace in rational creatures, the likeness to God in rational creatures that results is secundum virtutem or secundum potentiam. If one considers God as exemplary or (external) formal cause of grace in rational creatures, the likeness to God in rational creatures that results is secundum expressionem or, more clearly, a likeness to divine Wisdom in rational creatures. Finally, if one considers God as final cause of grace in rational creatures, the likeness to God in rational creatures that results is secundum inclinationem, an effected goodness in rational creatures from which springs an ordination to the summa Bonitas as end, and a concomitant movement away from sin: "...similitudo rationalis creaturae ad Deum potest esse vel quod sit ei similis secundum rationem efficientis, et sic dicitur similitudo virtutis, quia virtus vel potentia debetur ei secundum rationem efficientis. Aut est similitudo secundum rationem qua Deus est causa exemplaris sive formalis, et sic dicitur similitudo expressionis sive secundum expressionem, quo modo dicitur esse similitudo inter sigillum et ceram impressam in sigillo, similiter ipsa Dei sapientia est quasi sigillum, et eius similitudo expressa est in rationali creatura. Aut est similitudo secundum rationem qua Deus est causa finalis, et sic dicitur similitudo inclinationis vel ordinis, quia ex hoc quod rationalis creatura est propter finem, qui est summa Bonitas, ex hoc inclinatur ad illam tamquam ad finem, tamen hanc inclinationem tollit peccatum". ([Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 4, a. 2, § 1, sol.) Now it is further claimed that this threefold likeness enables one to speak not simply of a likeness to God or the divine nature, but, by appropriation, of a likeness to the Persons of the Trinity. Grace brings the soul into a condition of life, of light and of power for action. Grace brings the soul into a condition of life because in the likeness secundum inclinationem there is a likeness to the highest goodness. Grace brings the soul into a condition of light because in the likeness (continued...)
5 *Utrum gratia sit res creata vel increata*

The second article attempts to clarify further the results of the first, in effect, by exploring the manner in which this likeness and assimilation to God is posited in us, and the reason for its conditional necessity. Now 'gratia' taken generally, it may be recalled, can be applied to whatever is given gratuitously by God, to any gift from God. And as the corollary I have suggested is not drawn explicitly in the first article, there is little temptation in the second article to absorb prematurely the latitude afforded by the general use of 'gratia' into the proper and especial use of the word. Thus the latitude allows for

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\[22\text{(...continued)}\]

*secundum expressionem*, there is a likeness to the highest truth. Grace brings the soul into a condition of power for action because in the likeness *secundum virtutem* or *secundum potentiam*, there is a likeness to divine power, to the origin of all power for action. But, by appropriation, the highest goodness is attributed to the Holy Spirit, the highest truth to the Son, and the origin of all power for action to the Father. Taken together, then, this threefold likeness is a likeness to the Persons of the Trinity. And as this threefold likeness is posited in the soul of rational creatures by God, the soul of rational creatures can be said to be like the Persons of the Trinity, and is assimilated to them: "Intelligendum est quod gratia comparatur ad animam ut vita et ut motor et ut lux, quia gratia est similitudo summæ Veritatis, et sic comparatur ut lux; etiam similitudo summæ Bonitatis, et sic comparatur ut vita; etiam similitudo potestatis et virtutis, et sic comparatur ut motor arbitrii ad animam. Potentia autem attribuitur Patri, veritas Filio, bonitas Spiritui Sancto, et ideo gratia similitudo est totius Trinitatis et assimilat nos toti Trinitati." ([Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, III. q. 61, m. 6, a. 3, res.) In so far as goodness is attributed to the Holy Spirit, truth or wisdom to the Son, and power to the Father, then, the threefold likeness and assimilation is a likeness and assimilation to the Persons of the Trinity. Moreover, it is further claimed that there is an order involved in the positing of this threefold likeness in the soul. First in the order is the likeness *secundum inclinationem*, the soul being brought into a condition of life by being formed in the likeness of the *summa Bonitas* or the Holy Spirit who is Love. On this basis which, the author notes, we call grace, we are in communion with the Trinity and conformed to the first Truth, which is the Son, and then to the source of all power for action, which is the Father: "...dicendum quod prior est comparatio gratiae ad animam ut vita quam aliae comparisones, quia prior est configuratio sive conformatio animae ad summam Bonitatem, quae est Spiritus Sanctus; unde primo configurat nos sibi Spiritus Sanctus, deinde ex illa configuratione est nobis communio totius Trinitatis; sed ex illa conformatione ad Bonitatem vel ad Spiritum Sanctum, qui est amor, sumitur vita; unde per illam configurationem et configurationem, quam dicimus gratiam, vivit anima Deo... Consequens vero comparatio vel configuratio est ad Veritatem primam, et secundum hoc comparatur gratia ut lux. Ultima configuratio est ad ipsam potentiam Patris vel virtutem, et secundum hoc comparatur ut motor." ([Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, III. q. 61, m. 6, a. 6, res.) In light of this order, the corollary gleaned from the quoted text concerning the understanding of grace in the Halesian *Summa* is, I suggest, fundamentally accurate, even if incomplete, and the emphasis on it justified.
the issue explored in the second article to be framed in the precise way it is.

One way to introduce the issue the second article raises is to note that in the first article’s argument, ‘likeness or assimilation to God’ functions as the middle term for establishing the conclusion that grace posits “something good” in one who is pleasing and acceptable to God. The middle term is effective in the argument, it may be recalled, because one’s being made like God or assimilated to God seems necessarily to imply an intrinsic change in one’s reality; whereas, prima facie, one’s coming to be pleasing and acceptable to God does not seem necessarily to imply such a change. Suppose, however, that someone objects to the argument by granting that one’s being made like God or assimilated to God does necessarily imply a change in one’s situation, but not an intrinsic change in one’s reality. The change in one’s situation, it might be further urged, is precisely that the Holy Spirit is given by God to dwell in one’s heart. And since ‘gratia’ in its general use can be applied to any unmerited bestowal by God upon human beings, on this hypothesis, it can be applied to the Holy Spirit. Grace would then be an uncreated reality, and one would be like God or assimilated to God in the sense that the Holy Spirit dwells within one, without one being intrinsically changed thereby. Grace, then, would indeed posit something or, rather, someone within, namely, the Holy Spirit. But attributing likeness or assimilation to God of one, on account of it, would simply be an instance of extrinsic denomination, like ‘pleasing and acceptable to God’ seems to be at first glance. Alternatively, if one’s coming to be like God or assimilated to God is true not just because the Holy Spirit dwells in one, but implies something further, something given to be received and possessed as part of one’s own reality, and in such a way that it modifies one’s reality intrinsically, then attributing likeness or assimilation to God of one would be
attributing an additional, created reality of one. It would not then be an instance of extrinsic denomination. Stated more simply, then, the issue is: "Utrum gratia sit res creata vel increata." 23

Not at issue in the article is whether, over and above their presence in everything per substantiam, prae sentiam et potentiam, 24 the Holy Spirit, and the Son and Father through the Spirit, dwell in a special manner in the hearts of those whom God regards as pleasing and acceptable. For that special presence is affirmed with such abundance in Scripture and Tradition as to be accepted as common doctrine. 25

If the general use of 'grace' applies to any gift from God, any unmerited bestowal by God upon human beings, and if the Holy Spirit is sent and given to dwell in a special manner in the hearts of those whom God regards as pleasing and acceptable, then one

23 The title of the article now to be discussed: [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2.

24 This expression, taken from the Glossa ordinaria's clarification of The Song of Songs 5:16-17, became the standard way to referring to God's general presence in creation in virtue of his divinity. God is present: per substantiam or essentiam, because God is the sustaining originator of all created things; per prae sentiam, because all created things lie completely open and transparent to God's knowledge; per potentiam, because all created things are subject to God's bidding.

25 Hence the repeated reference in the discussion to Augustine's Epistola 187, ad Dardanum de Praesentia Dei. (English translation, Letter 187, "On the Presence of God," in Saint Augustine: Letters, Vol. IV: Letters 165-203, tr. Sister Wilfrid Parsons, S.N.D., The Fathers of the Church Series (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1955), pp. 221-255. In this work, Augustine is but the authoritative spokesman in the West for this common doctrine. For a brief discussion of the sources for this common doctrine, with abundant references to more detailed discussions, see Francis L. B. Cunningham, The Indwelling of the Trinity: A Historical-Doctrinal Study of the Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas (Dubuque: The Priory Press, 1955), pp. 34-69. On page 36 of this work, Cunningham summarizes the common doctrine in four propositions: 1) The Three divine Persons really, personally and substantially dwell in man; 2) This special presence of the Trinity is entirely distinct from the common presence of God in all things; 3) It is realized only in the just, and therefore in some way by means of grace; 4) It is not exclusive to the Holy Ghost, but because of His personal property it is appropriated to Him. For completeness, it should be noted that following Peter Lombard, three modes of God's presence were commonly distinguished: 1) God's presence in all creatures; 2) God's presence in angels and souls through the gratia inhabitationis; 3) God's presence in Christ "non per gratiam adoptionis, sed per gratiam unionis." (Peter Lombard, I Sententiae, d. 37.) William of Auxerre (ca.1150-1231) has a similar list, though for angels and beatified souls he makes a distinction and speaks of God's presence through glory.
can speak not merely obliquely of the *gratia inhabitationis*, but, more directly, of the Holy Spirit himself as *gratia*, indeed, as *gratia increata*:

Gratia...dicitur donum gratis datum, id est sine merito datum.... Donum...increatum est Spiritus Sanctus, qui dicitur gratia eo modo quo est gratis datum....

Now, because of who the Holy Spirit is personally, in relation to the Father and Son, the application of 'gratia' to him directs our attention to the recognition that here is a radical, focally significant use of the term, such that every other use can then be understood as derivative and secondary.

Perhaps the following will clarify this claim. Giving, one might say, is bringing it about that another may come to possess something one possesses. If the other cannot claim what is given as his due, as somehow owed to him, and if one gives not out of fear or hope of gain, but freely, and for no motive save that the other's happiness will be promoted and his well-being enhanced, then what is given may properly be called a gift. But to give to another in this manner is, in some measure, to love the other. Indeed, the love for the other is borne along with the gift inextricably. And if the other is able to receive properly, the love so borne is of more significance than the gift; the gift merely betokens the love. With any gift, then, love for the recipient is always the primary gift:

...si aliquid detur ex timore, non est donum proprium...; similia, si detur ex cupiditate, non est donum, sed quaestus; sed donum proprium est ex amore et liberalitate et sine coactione; unde in omni dono primo donatur amor....

God sends the Holy Spirit to us; God gives us the Holy Spirit to dwell in our hearts. Because we can lay no claim to the one who is given by God, and because the one who

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26 [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 61, m. 1, c. 1, sol.

27 [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2, sol.
is given that we might share in God's own life, the Holy Spirit is both gift and grace. But since with any gift, the giver's love is always the primary gift, in the gift of the Holy Spirit, God's love for us is the primary gift.

Now notice the difference. The Holy Spirit as gift given is grace. But the Holy Spirit is not gift primarily because he is given to us, because God brings it about that we somehow come to possess him. Even apart from being given to us, the Holy Spirit is eternally Gift because he is proceeding Love, the one who is breathed forth from the Father and Son as principle:

...ipse...Spiritus Sanctus secundum suam proprietatem amor est, et ut amor procedit a Patre et Filio... 28

...Spiritus Sanctus dicitur gratia, quia donum, et dicitur donum, quia amor. 29

Thus the Holy Spirit's proper and personal name is Gift of the Father and Son. As such, the Holy Spirit is primary, eternal Gift whence all other gifts are to be given. 30 If the Holy Spirit is given to us, the one who is primary, eternal Gift is given; the "virtus prima amoris" 31 is given; God's love for us is given in the person of proceeding Love so that we become sharers in that Love. From being given, the Holy Spirit can be called grace. But

28 [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2, sol. The distinction between a gift giveable (donum) and a gift given (donatum) was familiar to medieval writers: "There is a difference between calling something a gift, and calling it a donation; it can be a gift even before it is given, but it cannot be called in any way a donation unless it has been given." Augustine of Hippo, The Trinity, introd., tr., and notes, Edmund Hill, O.P., ed. John E. Rostelle, O.S.A. (Brooklyn, New York: New City Press, 1991), V, 16.

29 [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2, sol. For the Halesian Summa's express discussion of the Holy Spirit as Gift (Donum), see I, q. 64, m. 1, cc. 1-3.

30 "Ipse...Spiritus Sanctus non solum per appropriationem est donum, sed etiam per suam proprietatem est amor procedens a Patre et Filio, et quia amor est per proprietatem ideo est donum per proprietatem, quia id, quo proprie datur aliquid alii, est amor." [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 12, m. 1, a. 1, sol.

31 For the use of this term, see [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2, sol.
because the Holy Spirit is primary, eternal Gift, proceeding Love and the "virtus prima amoris," as Gift given, he cannot be simply numbered among the many gifts of God and designated as the highest gift. In the Person of the Holy Spirit, Love and Gift coincide. The Holy Spirit is the one who is at the heart of every gift given by the three-personed God that we might share in God's own life. He underpins every such gift, penetrates them with their true significance; and in so doing invites us to move beyond them to embrace in grateful response the loving source of every gift. Accordingly, applying 'gratia' to the Holy Spirit directs our attention to the term in its radical and focal meaning. It facilitates our understanding of grace in its radical and focal meaning as the eternal Gift bestowed in time, as the "gloriosum donum".32

Thus far in the article's response, grace has been considered an uncreated reality. For insofar as the Holy Spirit is given to us unmeritedly, and so is called grace, grace is uncreated. But as one might anticipate, since that is not the typical use of 'grace', the article does not rest content with this position.

The Holy Spirit is truly a gift, God's Gift given to us, God bringing it about that somehow we may come to receive and possess the one who is proceeding Love. Now receiving and possessing the Holy Spirit supposes the possibility or potency on the part of human nature for that reception and possession.33 But the actuation of this possibility or potency itself supposes not just a human nature, but a necessary preparation of

32 Again, for the use of this term, see [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2, sol.

33 Thus, in an earlier article in Book I, concerned with the existence of God in things "...per inhabitantem gratiam," we read: "...dico quod in natura rationali est possibilitas ad hoc ut sit templum...." [Alexander of Hales (?)]. Summa Theologica, I, q. 11, m. 6, c. 6, sol.
human nature to receive and possess, that is somehow proportionate to the one who is to be received and possessed. And that necessary, proportionate preparation is absolutely beyond the range of human nature to initiate or complete. For even apart from considerations of human sinfulness, the disproportion between the infinite Gift of divine Goodness and finite human nature is such that the rational soul

...non potest se habere per immediationem ad gratiam increatam nisi disponatur prius, et hoc est defectus ipsius....

Accordingly, for human beings actually to receive and possess God's Gift of the Holy Spirit, they also *must* be given a prior, proportionate preparation to receive and possess God's Gift. As given by God, the Holy Spirit is said to be a transforming form (*forma transformans*), bequeathing to the rational soul in his transforming action a transformed form (*forma transformata*) whereby the soul is assimilated to God, rendered pleasing and acceptable to God, and enabled to receive and possess the Holy Spirit, and through the Spirit, the Son and the Father. And since the Holy Spirit is the highest Goodness, this transformed form, radicated in the rational soul of those in whom the Spirit is to be received and possessed, will be in accordance with that Goodness; it will be a likeness to the Holy Spirit as divine Goodness, in virtue of which one may be said to be like God and assimilated to God in one's own reality, and not by extrinsic denomination.

But this likeness and assimilation is precisely what was previously identified with grace. And as this likeness and assimilation is given so that the rational soul may receive and

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34 This preparation is the "...dispositio quae est necessitas ad quam necessario sequitur quod anima sit templum in quo habitat Deus..." [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q.11, m.6, c.6, sol. Besides this, the article mentions other preparatory dispositions collected under the rubric, 'gratia gratis data'.

35 [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2, sol.
possess the Holy Spirit, it cannot be identical with the Holy Spirit, and therefore is a created reality. Accordingly, in its relation to *gratia increata* we may describe it accurately as *gratia creata*.36

There is a grace, then, that is uncreated, the Holy Spirit poured into our hearts, and a distinct grace that is created, the prior, necessary, proportionate preparation that enables us to receive and possess the Spirit who is given. The necessity of the latter is not on account of any insufficiency on the part of uncreated grace to make the soul pleasing and acceptable to God and worthy of eternal life. Rather, it is on account of the deficiency in the rational soul to be made actually pleasing to God without a prior preparation.37 The deficiency is removed if the Spirit is sent to dwell within human hearts. Then, under God’s bidding, the soul is actually given the necessary, proportionate likeness to the highest Goodness; it is clasped fast and lifted, beyond itself and its kindred perfectibility, into a special kinship with God, in order that God may dwell there with a special presence:

...'Deum esse per gratiam' ponit necessario gratiam creatam in creatura, quae quidem gratia est similitudo, qua anima est imago actu, id est in imitatione actuali; et cum se habet anima per conformitatem ad Deum in similitudine expressa, dicitur Deus inhabitare in ipsa per gratiam.38

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36 *Quia...Spiritus Sanctus amor est, immo et virtus prima amoris, inde est, cum datur nobis, transformat nos in divinam speciem, ut sit ipsa anima assimilata Deo. Ex alia parte debemus intelligere gratiam creatam velut similitudinem et dispositionem ex parte animae rationalis, ex qua habet quod sit accepta Deo et assimilata, quia ibi est forma transformans, et haec est gratia increata; similiter ibi est forma transformata, quae dereliquitur in transformato, scilicet in anima, ex transformatione, et haec est gratia creata." [Alexander of Hales (?)]. *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2, sol.

37 "...ex parte gratiae increatae est sufficientia ad facere animam gratam sine gratia creata, tamen insufficiens est ex parte fieri gratum, et haec est insufficientia ex parte animae." [Alexander of Hales (?)]. *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2, sol.

38 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 11, m. 1, c. 1, sol.
6 Gratia creata et increata and the grace of union

Finally, although it will not feature in subsequent discussion, for completeness one should at least note that the Halesian Summa speaks of gratia increata and gratia creata not only in the context of the grace that renders one pleasing and acceptable to God, but also in relation to the grace of union (gratia unionis). According to Walter Principe, this term was introduced by Peter Lombard in the twelfth century, although the doctrine itself was taught earlier by Abelard, Gilbert of Poitiers and their schools. Among authors of that century, 'gratia unionis' commonly referred to God's activity in effecting the union of divinity and humanity in the person of the Son of God. But probably after William of Auxerre's example, the term began to be used more and more to refer to the union so effected.39

39 "This concept [of the grace of union] entered discussions about whether Christ was predestined to be Son of God, whether, as man, he was the natural or adopted Son of God, whether he was impeccable, and whether the union was indissoluble. Certain texts of St. Augustine were influential in introducing the concept, especially those incorporated into the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Among these a particularly important text was one attributed now to St. Ambrose and now to St. Augustine which said: 'Quicquid habet Filii Dei per naturam, habet Filii Hominis per gratiam.'

"Abelard and his school developed the doctrine that Christ as man was the Son of God neither by adoption nor by nature: as man he was Son of God through grace. The school of Gilbert of Poitiers held the same teaching and distinguished even more sharply between the concepts of sonship by adoption and sonship through grace. The Summa Sententiarum introduces a new term: Christ as man is Son of God neither through nature nor through adoption, but rather 'through union.' The term gratia unionis itself seems to have been first used by Peter Lombard.

"In the twelfth century the exact meaning of the grace of union, or of texts saying that the union was through grace, was not developed so explicitly as it was to be in the thirteenth century. On reading the texts one has the impression that in most cases the authors think exclusively of God's gratuitous operation of effecting this union, which is above the power of nature to attain. Among the effects of the union most discussed is the impeccability of Christ.

In the Halesian *Summa*, the grace of union is the medium between divinity and humanity, given for the purpose of uniting divinity and humanity in the person of the Son of God. It is a two-fold medium: a grace of union that is disposing; a grace of union that is completing and perfecting.\(^{40}\) Both are required because of the gulf separating divinity and humanity.

To begin with the latter, the grace of union as completing and perfecting the union of divinity and humanity to the highest degree is the Holy Spirit. The role is suitably appropriated to the Holy Spirit rather than to the Father or Son because the Spirit is proceeding Love and Gift. Just as the Spirit is the uniting power (*vis unitiva*), the bond, tie and communion between Father and Son because he is proceeding Love, so because he is proceeding Love and Gift, the Spirit, when compared to the Father and Son, is the one who can be suitably thought of as nearest to humanity. For as proceeding Love and Gift, he is the personal dynamism in the divine nature, going forth in order to communicate divinity to humanity; he is the personal dynamism going forth to bind, tie and unite divinity and humanity. Thus, because the grace of union as completing and perfecting the union of divinity and humanity in the person of the Incarnate Word is suitably appropriated to the Holy Spirit, the grace of union as completing and perfecting the union of divinity and humanity is uncreated.

Next, the grace of union as disposing is the created, disposing form toward the perfection and excellence and most complete assimilation in personal union of the rational creature with God. Thus it is not, as in our case, just a created disposition toward

\(^{40}\) See [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 12, m. 1, a. 1. What follows is a summary of this article.
the knowledge and love of God.

Now this disposing form, requiring the Holy Spirit to render the union to which it tends actual, complete and perfect, pertains to the humanity of Christ by being superadded \((\textit{superadditur})\) to that humanity. It is nothing other than the utmost likeness and most perfect assimilation to God, borne by Christ’s humanity as it draws near to divinity, and left behind \((\textit{relinquitur})\), so to speak, by the Holy Spirit in his action of bringing the union of divinity and humanity to completion and perfection. Thus, as a disposing form pertaining to the humanity of Christ, and “left behind” by the Holy Spirit for the purpose of bringing the union of divinity and humanity of Christ to completion and perfection, the grace of union is a created grace.

Accordingly, the Halesian \textit{Summa} affirms that in the two-fold medium which together constitute the grace of union, one must distinguish an uncreated grace and a created grace: uncreated as regards completing and perfecting; created as regards disposing.
CHAPTER III

THE GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT

Emergence of the Systematic Ideal in Theology

If the two partial terms of meaning, \textit{gratia increata} and \textit{gratia creat}, were new with Alexander of Hales, the realities to which they refer were, of course, neither unknown nor unmentioned in the Christian tradition he inherited. It does not follow, however, that there was nothing new here apart from new terms, or that terms were being multiplied for no good reason apart from considerations of style. For one can distinguish the realities referred to by the terms from the \textit{manner} in which those realities are referred to; and one can argue that the general context within which the terms emerged was a new method of consideration in theological reflection. Then, after one gives a general characterization of this new method of consideration, one can get down to details and argue that the manner in which the terms functioned in relation to each other, once they had emerged, provides one concrete example of the results of this new method of consideration in theological reflection: a new manner of understanding and conceiving already well-known and abundantly discussed Christian realities; and, as a consequence of this new manner of understanding and conceiving, a new manner of referring in affirmation to those already well-known and abundantly discussed Christian realities.

In the main, the theological sources of the doctrine of grace for Alexander and his disciples were: first, Scripture, especially John and the Pauline epistles; second, the
writings of Augustine; third, the writings of their predecessors in the twelfth century. The beginnings of a new method of consideration and a new manner of referring to Christian realities, which was sustained in the subsequent history of theological reflection, can be traced to the last-mentioned source.

I propose now to discuss briefly this new method of consideration and new manner of referring to Christian realities, and to indicate some of the factors that led to its emergence. The other two sources will be discussed in the following chapter.

1 Theological Reflection and Dialectic in the Twelfth Century

Amid considerable opposition from the *clastra*les, the development of theological reflection in the West in the course of the twelfth century can be broadly characterized as involving an increasing use of dialectic or logic, and the emergence of a professional grouping among its ever more numerous practitioners. Dialectic, of course, was not new. It was one member of the *trivium*, along with the other two members, grammar and rhetoric. Taken together with the *quadrivium* of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy, they made up the seven liberal arts. The *trivium* and *quadrivium* were introduced into the Christian West largely through the educational endeavours of Alcuin of York (ca. 730-804) in his capacity as *magister* of the palace school founded by Charlemagne at Aachen. However, even though dialectic was studied, its use in theological thought, it seems, was not widespread. Thus, in his *History of Theology*, Yves Congar remarks that “theological thought of the Carolingian epoch is indisputably characterized not so much by dialectics as by grammar.” And he adds that between
Alcuin and the time of Peter Abelard (1079-1142), the use of dialectic in theological thought was at best sporadic and occasional.¹

In general histories of the period, Abelard is commonly considered the key figure in the introduction that led to the subsequent, sustained use of dialectical techniques in theological reflection.² Earlier, in the eleventh century, Anselm of Canterbury (1033/4-1109) had, in the words of M.-D. Chenu, combined a "dialectical virtuosity with perfect contemplative control," as he attempted to discover the rationes necessariae for the mysteries affirmed by faith.³ Ideally, these would have afforded a more regulated and systematically articulate understanding of those mysteries than that afforded by the prevailing methods. For, typically, the prevailing methods sought to apprehend the


² To understand better what is meant by 'dialectic' in the present context, the following description is useful: "More often than not, Abelard uses 'dialectic' as synonymous with 'logic'. He is of course aware of the narrow use of the term 'dialectic' when it refers to merely probable arguments; when he comments on the Topics he follows Boethius in likening the dialectician in the narrow sense to the rhetor or orator. In its broad sense, when dialectic is logic, it is a science. These two meanings of the term, the broad and the narrow, reflect Stoic and Aristotelian usage, respectively. When Abelard discusses the nature of logic, he appeals to the Stoic tripartite division of philosophy. Physics, or speculative philosophy is concerned with the nature and causes of things; moral philosophy, or ethics, gives norms for the conduct of life. What does logic do? It treats of the way to construct arguments (de ratione argumentorum compenenda). It may be defined as ratio disserendi, that is, the science of discourse. Its task is to establish the truth or falsity of discourse. Its task is to establish the truth or falsity of discourse. Abelard accepts from Boethius the notion that logic comprises both the art of discovering arguments and the art of confirming them, of judging their truth or falsity according to certain rules. These are constitutive parts of logic and not subdivisions of it, he says. What makes an argument true? Two things: the disposition of terms and the nature of things. If the goal of logic is the construction of true or scientific discourse, it is possible to see the task of logic subdivide into a study of names, propositions, the discovery of arguments, and, finally, their confirmation. Abelard goes to the trouble to distinguish logic from metaphysics, from psychology, from grammar and rhetoric, and from the mere ability to formulate arguments without knowing what it is that makes an argument valid or invalid." Ralph M. McInerny, A History of Western Philosophy, vol. 2. Philosophy from St. Augustine to Ockham (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970), p. 145.

invisible mysteries of faith symbolically by carrying forward or lifting out into explicit differentiation the tacit, undifferentiated, discoverable semblances of those mysteries that lie implicit, embedded and condensed in visible forms and structures: in natural objects, both living and non-living, and in the rhythms of nature; in the palpable structures and rhythms of human existence; in colours and in the play of associations that results from numbering and the symbolic use of numbers; in human artifacts, institutions and significant places; in authoritative texts, and in the characters and events related in historical narrative, particularly in biblical narrative; in liturgical action and in the materials used in such action. The prevailing methods of theological reflection, then, sought above all to open hearts and minds, so that the anagogic significance of visible forms and structures could shine forth. It is quite true, therefore, that Anselm's contemplatively controlled innovativeness would have gone beyond the prevailing methods of theological reflection. But it suffered from two shortcomings. First, the search for rationes necessariae, as faith sought understanding, proved to be a mistake. Second, his speculative efforts had, as Lonergan says, "aimed at comprehension before a sufficiently

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4 For an enlightening discussion of the "symbolist mentality" that pervaded theological thought in the twelfth century, see Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society, pp. 99-145. In one place in this work (p. 138), Chenu remarks that the mental operation proper to symbolic apprehension is captured by the word, 'translatio': "...a transference or elevation from the visible sphere to the invisible through the mediating agency of an image borrowed from sense-perceptible reality." Chenu had remarked earlier (p. 123) that for the symbolist mentality anagoge or the upward reference of things was constituted precisely by their natural dynamism; their intrinsic upward dynamism made them symbolic. For "[t]he image of the transcendent was not some pleasant addition to their natures; rather, rooted in the 'dissimilar similitudes' of the hierarchical ladder, it was their very reality and reason for being. The symbol was the means by which one could approach reality; it was homogeneous with mystery and not a simple epistemological sign more or less conventional in character." Later in the book (p. 238), he notes an equivalence between 'translatio' and 'anagoge': "Twelfth-century masters made ready use of the term translatio; but its inadequacy led them to transliterate its Greek equivalent into anagoge...."
broad basis of information had been obtained.”5 This second shortcoming, especially, meant that although Anselm can be considered a pioneer who anticipated what was to come, his efforts lacked the kind of unbroken continuity with the subsequent, successful introduction of dialectical techniques into theological reflection that belongs to Abelard’s efforts.

Abelard attended the school of Laon where the composition of Sententiae began, and so he was in the middle of the new line of development virtually from the beginning. Within the limits possible for the age, the Sententiae were providing a catalogue of scriptural passages, traditional views, and more notable contemporary opinion bearing on Christian doctrine—the broad basis of information Lonergan mentions. Concomitant with this assembling of data in a more accessible form, and quite naturally, there was also occurring at Laon, in the context of reading and textual explanations of authoritative texts, the tendency to digress occasionally to pose a question suggested by the text. This tendency opened the way for the application of dialectical techniques to resolve the issue, and for the later development of the quaestio—the systematic posing of questions outside of the context of the lectio.6 Now, as a technique applied to a particular field, dialectic or logic is an instrument directed towards achieving in the field clarity of terms, coherence of statement, and rigour in inferences. To one sensitive to the values of clarity, coherence and rigour, and adroit in pursuing such values, their perceived lack in a field almost irresistibly invites and even goads one to display the lack vividly, and to apply this array


6 On the development of the quaestio, see Congar, History of Theology, pp. 80-84.
of powerful instruments to implant and foster those values whenever and wherever they are considered to be absent. Not only was Abelard sensitive to such values and an accomplished logician well-equipped to apply dialectical techniques to a field of study. Chenu describes him as "the knight of the dialectics [who] exercised his lucid intellect not in order to possess his faith more serenely but to clarify its intellectual apparatus, to attain coherence of formulas, of terminology, of conceptual systematization."7

Thus, Abelard sought expressly to display the need for dialectical techniques to be applied to the affirmations of faith, and to the various traditional opinions associated with the affirmations of faith, and to apply them methodically. The striking example of his attempt to display the need for dialectical techniques to be applied to the affirmations of faith and opinions associated with the affirmations of faith is his work, *Sic et non*. The work dates from either 1121 or 1122. In it, Abelard took 158 propositions, and by drawing on Scripture, patristic writings, church councils and reason, he showed that, seemingly, there were good reasons both to affirm and deny each proposition. His intention was not to sow the seeds of doubt, but to challenge his readers to discover the truth through dialectical inquiry. And without attempting to resolve any of the issues himself, he at least offered a number of rules of interpretation to guide his readers. Notable among them was one, namely, the rule to pay close attention to the meaning of words—which later developed into the ubiquitous strategy of resolving an issue by making a distinction.8 He

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believed that clarity, coherence and rigour, even regarding the mysteries of faith, was to be achieved through the application of "the analogies of human reason to the fundamentals of the faith." And it was after him, and probably under his influence, that such application became more and more prevalent, and the quaestio gradually became one of the stylized forms in which theological discourse was conducted. It is no wonder, then, that Congar remarks that under Abelard’s aegis, theological elaboration was moving “from the Sacra Pagina to Theologia.” And perhaps it is also not too surprising that he, rather than Anselm, is commonly considered to be the key figure in the introduction of dialectical techniques into theological thought.

2 Opposition from the Claustrales

Earlier, I mentioned in passing that the development of this new method of consideration in theological reflection emerged in the face of opposition from the claustrales. A little later, I drew upon Chenu’s work and offered a brief, general description of their manner of theological reflection. Chenu also provides us with a good description of the horizon within which their manner of theological reflection was conducted. Characterizing

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9 Chenu quotes these words, taken from Abelard’s Historia calamitatum, as partly explaining what Abelard understood by ‘dialectic’. Whatever else it might come to include, for Abelard ‘analogies from human reason’, at a bare minimum, referred to the application of dialectical techniques to the fundamental propositions of the faith. See Chenu, Nature, Man, and Society, p. 290.

10 Congar, History of Theology, p. 73. Note that, as Congar reminds us (pp.32-33), Abelard was the first to use ‘theology’ in the currently accepted sense.

11 Gilson sums up Abelard’s significance in the history of theology in this way: “Abélard’s influence was momentous...[T]he end of the twelfth century is indebted to him for an ideal of technical strictness and exhaustive justification, even in theology, which was to find its complete expression in the doctrinal syntheses of the thirteenth century. Abélard imposed...an intellectual standard which no one thenceforth cared to lower.” Gilson, History, p. 163.
monastic theology, he remarks that it

found a...source of growth within the sacralized world fashioned by the forms of monastic worship. Cosmic realities were transformed through liturgical symbolism just as historical realities were transformed by liturgical allegory. In each case, the prime matter, nature or history, was transfigured into something sacred by a mental transport free of the constraint imposed by the objective laws of the physical universe. The world in which the monks lived was nothing but a symbolic cosmos; scripture entered into theology only as interpreted in the liturgy. The **collatio** remained always an element in the machinery of the divine office.\(^{12}\)

A little later, he adds:

The **claustrales** were not obliged to formulate and use an analogical method in order to appreciate the transcendence of mystery. They thought and lived at once in mystery, within the framework of biblical images and on their various tropological levels, just as while still on earth they lived the monastic life within the foreimage of the celestial city. This was admirable theophany,... It was the theophany indeed of scripture and of its divine events, by which God displayed his will to men in human history. The monks had no desire to transform this theophany into a rational theodicy sorting out the divine attributes.\(^{13}\)

Not surprisingly, then, for men like Rupert of Deutz (1075-1129/30), William of Saint-Thierry (ca. 1085-1148) and Bernard of Clairvaux (ca. 1090-1153), whose writings epitomized monastic theology, the kind of procedure advocated by Abelard, when compared with the monastic **collatio**, could not be seen as anything other than a blatant and disrespectful disregard of the God who has spoken once and for all. They considered it a subordination of the sacred mysteries of faith hidden in God to human logic, an indiscreet and profane curiosity intruding where loving adoration should be. Accordingly, its practitioners were deemed to deserve the reward they so frequently reaped, namely, blindness to the sacred mysteries.


\(^{13}\) Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society*, p. 307. Congar’s description of “monastic theology” is very close to Chenu’s. Monastic theology, Congar writes, is “...a nondialectical type of reflection, contemplative, nurtured in prayer based on communion with the celebrated mysteries which have become a part of one’s life. There is no purely intellectual or reasoning collaboration....” Moreover, he adds, this type of reflection “...spontaneously develops into a symbolic expression favourable to a total but simple perception.” Congar, *History of Theology*, p. 75.
In their opposition to the introduction of dialectical techniques into theological reflection, the *claustrales* could not envisage that the exigence for such an introduction might possibly spring from, and be informed by, the same underpinning source that gave rise to their own typical manner of expressing and expounding the sacred mysteries hidden in God. They spoke *out of* their participation in the sacred mysteries; and insofar as expository language is involved in witnessing to and communicating those mysteries, they believed, in effect, that literary speech and writing were the only appropriate means. For with literary speech and writing, communication is a work of art in which heart would speak to heart. All the evocative potential of image and affect is in operation, all the capacities of figure and symbol are available to suggest what cannot adequately be said, and to enthuse the hearts of people with love, with devotion, with the desire to participate in the sacred mysteries, or to do so more fully.\(^{14}\)

Now one need not deny that there were real dangers associated with the application of dialectical techniques to theological reflection; most particularly, a tendency to reduce mystery to the level of natural truth. The tendency was especially pronounced if the touchstone of contemplative control, evident in Anselm’s use of dialectic, was

\(^{14}\) It would be a mistake to suppose that literary speech and writing is merely exhortative and unconcerned with understanding or truth. I have already quoted Lonergan’s characterization of the manner in which literary writing seeks to communicate (see above, p. 78, footnote 118): "...literary writing would convey insights and stimulate reflection, but its mode of operation is indirect. Words are sensible entities; they possess associations with images, memories, and feelings; and the skilful writer is engaged in exploiting the resources of language to attract, hold, and absorb attention. But if there is no frontal attack on the reader’s intelligence, there is the insinuation of insights through the images from which they subtly emerge. If there is no methodical summing up of the pros and cons of a judgment, there is an unhurried, almost incidental, display of the evidence without, perhaps, even a suggested question." Lonergan, *Insight*, pp. 592-593. Elsewhere, again as already mentioned (see above, pp. 77-78), Lonergan characterizes literary meaning and expression as floating in between logic and symbol. Thus, in *Method in Theology*, he writes regarding literary language: "It would have the listener or reader not only understand but also feel. So where the technical treatise aims at conforming to the laws of logic and the precepts of method, literary language tends to float somewhere in between logic and symbol." Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 72.
overshadowed by unmeasured enthusiasm for the novel application of a powerful intellectual instrument within the theological field. For under the enchantment of such enthusiasm, the limitations of dialectic when applied to the mysteries of faith tended to go unnoticed. Unnoticed limitations were easily equated with the absence of limitations. And if the absence of limitations was supposed, or was simply functionally operative, the constant tendency would be to reduce the mysteries of faith to the level of natural truth.

To the extent that they could readily point to examples of such excess, the opposition of the *claustrales* to the intrusion of dialectic into theological reflection was justified. But to the extent that they could not envisage that the exigence for such an introduction could be informed by the same underpinning source that gave rise to their own manner of expressing and expounding the sacred mysteries, and that the informing source would itself moderate and guide the first flush of enthusiasm for dialectic toward an effective recognition of its limitation before the sacred mysteries, their vision was shortsighted. And however one accounts for it historically, they were unsuccessful in dislodging dialectics from the study of *sacra doctrina*. Indeed, by 1200, it seems, and so certainly by the time Alexander began to write, the application of dialectical techniques to *sacra doctrina* was a firmly established and widely accepted procedure.\footnote{See P. Michaud-Quantin and J.A. Weisheipl, *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, s.v. "Dialectics in the Middle Ages."}

3 The "Entries" of Aristotle and the Systematic Ideal

Towards the end of the twelfth century, and continuing into the early thirteenth, the "analogies from human reason" applicable to the fundamentals of the faith, of which
Abelard had spoken, were enriched well beyond the assemblage of largely formal instruments and techniques that make up the dialectician's repertoire. The source of this enrichment was the newly available translations of Aristotle's works on first philosophy or metaphysics, physics, metaphysical psychology and ethics.

Congar distinguishes three "entries" of Aristotle to the Christian West.16 Before the twelfth century the *Categories* and *De Interpretatione* were available in Boethius' translation. This was the first "entry". In the second, roughly between 1120 and 1160, translations of the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics* and *De Sophisticis Elenchis* were completed. These became known collectively as the *Logica Nova*, to distinguish the newly available works from the logical works which had previously been known. Only with the third "entry", roughly from the middle of the twelfth century to the first decades of the thirteenth, did many of Aristotle's works, other than those belonging to the *Organon*, become available in translation.

Congar mentions three principal contributions Aristotle's writings made to theology: first, they provided principles of rational interpretation and elaboration of the theological datum, a ready-made source of interrelated ideas for theological thought to exploit; second, they facilitated rational systematic organization; third, they provided a scientific structure for the sacred sciences.17

Prior to the Middle Ages, Christian theologians did not seriously aspire to sustained systematic reflection regarding their Christian inheritance. In the twelfth

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century, dialectic was the preliminary, incomplete release of an incipient systematic exigence. As translations of ancient non-Christian writings were gradually becoming available, the systematic exigence tended to bubble to the surface and break here and there upon the unsettled seas of theological reflection. It gained adherents the more perplexity multiplied as a result of unclarity or discrepancies in what had been handed down; the more the Christian inheritance itself evoked new questions for those who faced an influx of new knowledge, but did not provide ready-made answers; and the more it became evident that symbolic apprehension and literary expression could not adequately clarify the Christian inheritance in the manner needed, nor resolve the discrepancies, nor answer satisfactorily the new questions.

There was implicit in the systematic exigence a new ideal regarding theological reflection; but it only became explicit as the systematic exigence gradually unfolded and found more adequate expression than that provided by mere dialectic. The ideal was not limited just to operations on propositions and the achievement of clarity, coherence and rigour. As a first approximation, the ideal was to advance beyond an understanding and conception of the divinely revealed mysteries according to what is prior, better known and more manifest *quoad nos*, and attain some ordered, analogous, integrated understanding and systematic conception of those mysteries according to what is prior *quoad se*. This distinction, which is derived from Aristotle, contrasts two orderings. First, there is the ordering of objects according to the ordered pattern in which we come to know, in particular the priority of empirical knowing and the corresponding priority, as one might say now, of perceptible individuals with their perceptible properties in concrete situations. Second, there is the ordering of objects in their intelligible relations to each other, as
principle and what depends intelligibly on the principle. The first ordering orders according to the order of cognitional reasons; the second, according to the order of ontological causes.

The more familiar name for knowledge of what is prior quoad se is ‘theory’. The ordering of a field according to theory, the integrated understanding and systematic conception of objects in the field according to their intelligible relations to each other, is the ideal goal of the systematic exigence.

It remains, however, that theory, so understood, could not be incorporated within theological reflection without appropriate adaptation and adjustment; and this precisely because of the recognition of the limitation of human knowing as it seeks to understand God and the mysteries revealed by God. God is the principle from which all else derives. We are oriented to God. But in this life, we do not attain a proper understanding of what God is, or a proper understanding of the divine attributes. We are oriented to transcendent mystery. Nor are we able, as Anselm mistakenly believed, to discover the rationes necessariae for the revealed mysteries of faith hidden in God and affirmed by faith: the necessity of the Trinity in which, incidentally, there is nothing causally prior or subsequent; the rationes necessariae for the Incarnation, the redemption; and all else that pertains to the economy of salvation. As Lonergan remarks, “the truths of faith have the

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18 “Things may be prior and better known in two ways: for what is prior in nature and what is prior in relation to us are not the same, nor what is better known and what is better known to us. I call prior and better known in relation to us the things that are nearer to perception, and prior and better known without qualification the things that are farther. The things that are farthest [from perception] are those that are most universal and those that are nearest are the particulars; and these are opposed to one another.” Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, i.2, 71b 33-72a 5. This very careful translation is taken from Richard D. McKiraham, Jr., *Principles and Proofs: Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstrative Science* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 30. His discussion of the text can be found on pp. 30-33.
apex of their intelligibility hidden in the transcendence of God."¹⁵ That apex can never be surmounted or comprehended.

Still, if the goal of the systematic exigence were suitably adapted and adjusted, it could still have fruitful application in theological reflection. For the exclusion of proper understanding of what God is, and of the rationes necessariae for the other mysteries revealed by God, is not tantamount to the exclusion of some imperfect, progressive, analogous, ordered and integrated understanding and systematic conception of God, and of the mysteries of salvation revealed by God. Thus, moved by divine revelation, we can continually reflect on our orientation to transcendent mystery and on the mysteries of salvation in which, by God’s grace, we participate. Indeed, were we not able to reflect on the mysteries of salvation, the mysteries themselves could not even be revealed. Moreover, we can "[find] in the natural order, as philosophically analyzed, the analogies necessary for the scientific conception for purely theological data."²⁰ Under the influence of the systematic exigence, whereby faith seeks some further understanding of the mysteries revealed by God, these analogies, drawn from the results of theoretical understanding, bring about a differentiation in ordering that is similar in pattern to the ordering alluded to by Aristotle when he initially introduced the distinction between the priora quoad nos and the priora quoad se.

In this adapted and adjusted application of the distinction, the priora quoad nos, the things that are prior, better known and more familiar, considered broadly and flexibly,

²⁰ Lonergan, Gratia Operans, p. 27.
are the mysteries revealed by God, accepted and affirmed in faith, and understood in a manner at least sufficient to secure assent to those mysteries. Concerning these, some more penetrating understanding and conception is sought.

The *priora quoad se* is the sought after more penetrating understanding and conception of the same mysteries revealed by God. Intelligence, illumined by faith, attains this more penetrating understanding and conception by means of created analogies, especially, as was gradually discovered in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century, the created analogies drawn from the achievements of theoretical understanding. For these are structured such that one element is understood by reason of another, and all the elements can be understood as part of a unified whole. Applied to the mysteries revealed by God, such analogies, in their progressive unfolding by intelligence enlightened by faith, enable theologians to attain two ends. First, they enable theologians to attain the negative coherence of non-contradiction such that any argument brought against the affirmations of faith on the grounds of contradiction can be definitively refuted. Second, although the analogies do not enable theologians to attain the positive coherence that is a feature of complete understanding, the partial, obscure but real understanding of the mysteries of faith that theologians do attain by employing the analogies includes *some* elaboration of the coherence of the mysteries, *some* integrated understanding of their interconnectedness and unity, and *some* systematic conception of that understood interconnectedness and unity.

In the following two chapters I shall return to the discussion of *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*. And I shall argue that the movement of theological reflection that culminated
in the emergence of the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia creat*ata, provides one concrete example of theological reflection in which theologians of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, influenced by the ideal of systematic understanding, drew on analogies from the natural order and attempted to relate and understand systematically what heretofore in the Christian tradition they inherited had been accepted but understood and conceived separately.
CHAPTER IV

THE MORE SPECIFIC THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT FOR THE EMERGENCE OF THE NOTIONS OF GRATIA INCREATA ET CREAT A

The emergence of the two partial terms of meaning, gratia creata and gratia increata, was one, seemingly incidental or peripheral, result of the movement of theological reflection regarding grace, in the twelfth and thirteenth century, as it responded to the systematic exigence. The terms were one expression of the attempt to achieve a more penetrating and integrated understanding of the faith by utilizing philosophical analogies to enrich and order scriptural and dogmatic affirmations regarding grace according to what is prior quoad se.

However, it is one thing merely to claim this; it is another to enter into sufficient detail regarding this movement of theological reflection, its operative factors and the key moments in its unfolding, to render the claim plausible. This latter course is attempted below.

1 The Emergence of the Notion of the Supernatural Habitus

One stream in the movement of theological reflection regarding grace involved the emergence of the notion of the supernatural habitus.

1.1 The Psychological Interpretation of Grace

Philips characterizes the prescholastics’ understanding of grace as actualist: they
understood grace as "une disposition permanente, mais non inerte de la personne humaine." Clarifying his meaning further, he adds:

En d'autres termes les auteurs [les théologiens de l'âge préscolastique] conçoivent la grâce dans un sens personnaliste et actualiste: ils la recherchent dans l'exercice des vertus plutôt que dans la présence d'un principe vital supérieur, ou du moins, ils s'occupent plus de pastorale que de psychologie, et ils insistent sur les applications actuelle de la nouvelle vie chrétienne. Leur ascèse est peu théorique mais franchement pratique.¹

Lonergan adopts Artur Landgraf's characterization and speaks of the prevailing "psychological interpretation" of grace during the period, with its focus on the intellect and will. In addition, he quotes Landgraf as claiming that the early scholastics connected grace with justifying faith in Christ, and sought to combine in the idea of grace-as-faith-in-Christ the permanence of a virtue and the causation of an activity.² This last-mentioned feature is in all probability the source of Philips' characterization. However, the advantage of the characterization adopted by Lonergan is that it facilitates, first, an understanding of the manner in which the prescholastics sought to explain the need and necessity of grace; second, an understanding of some of the consequent speculative difficulties to

¹ Philips, L'Union Personnelle, p. 48. Regarding the origin of this understanding, Moeller and Philips write: "St Augustine is still very close to the Fathers of the Eastern Churches: for example, in his De Trinitate he often speaks of the image of God in man, of regeneration and the indwelling of God in us. One particular nuance, however, is distinctive. He often stresses the necessity of proving by works that one is a child of God, especially in his sermons, which are meant to lead those who heard them to practical applications. This nuance came to have a powerful influence in the West in the Middle Ages....The pre-scholastics seem to think along actualist lines, following certain texts of Augustine. This, at least, is the interpretation Landgraf gives of certain passages of Sedulius Scotus (ninth century). This theologian sees faith in a wider setting, linking it with the Christian hope and love; for per fidem, induendo Christum, omnes fiunt filii...et ideo filii Dei fratresque Mediatoris; and he emphasizes that man was created ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, understanding the latter term more strictly as an indication of likeness to the Trinity, but in connection with the exercise of the three theological virtues. Peter of Blois [ca.1135-1211] follows a similar course, and in connection with regeneration and the image of God, speaks of the innovatio cantaxis; he then passes on to the necessary acts and works.... It is, therefore, plain that the actualist interpretation of biblical and patristic categories dominates their thought; the dynamic aspect of grace, what we should like to call 'the fundamental driving force of the new nature given by justification,' does not appear; they are interested before all else in actions. There is not yet any question of gratia creata or habitus." Moeller and Philips, Theology of Grace, pp. 19-20.

² See Lonergan, Gratia Operans, p. 65.
which their explanations gave rise; and, third, an understanding of the solution which eventually emerged to those difficulties.

Up to the beginning of the thirteenth century, the need and necessity of grace were understood precisely in accordance with the psychological interpretation of grace. This interpretation of grace needs to be accurately understood. The reign of sin ushered in by Adam’s fall has darkened the understanding and perverted the will. In this fallen condition, human beings *possunt peccare et non possunt non peccare etiam damnabiliter.*

Grace involves enlightening the understanding through the gratuitous bestowal of faith in Christ and the rectification of the will. Grace, therefore, effects the radical transformation in the state of human liberty from the servitude of sin, in which human beings *non possunt non peccare,* to the liberty of the children of God, in which they not merely *possunt non peccare,* but are enabled, even while retaining their capacity and proclivity for sin, to avoid sin and efficaciously to will and do what is right. Not surprisingly, then, grace in the proper sense, the grace of salvation, was commonly thought of as a living faith that wells up and effectively expresses itself through acts of charity (*fides quae per dilectionem operatur*).

The prescholastics, then, understood grace, in the proper sense of the term, as the

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5. "...theologians [of the early scholastic period] generally followed Augustine’s practice of equating justifying grace with the virtues of faith and charity. As evidence for this position they could point to certain passages of the Pauline letters in which justification is attributed to faith (for example, Romans 3:28, 4:5) and faith is said to be operative and effective only when it is linked to love (for instance, Galatians 5:6 and 1 Corinthians 13:2). Hence, the manuscripts of the early scholastic period commonly designate grace as ‘faith which operates through love’ (*fides quae per dilectionem operatur,*)." J. Michael Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative: Grace, World Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), pp. 69-70. Cf. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom,* p. 11.
grace of justification, as the grace by which the radical aversion or turning away and
estrangement from God brought about by Adam's sin is annulled, and the state of human
liberty is transformed. Thus, through baptism human beings receive the grace of
justification; they are incorporated into the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the
second Adam; they are redeemed and made righteous in God's sight through their
incorporation and participation in Christ's merits; they are sealed with the Holy Spirit, and
beckoned and directed, as children of God, eventually to be with Christ at the right hand
of the Father.

Further, the annulment of this aversion, turning away and estrangement from God
is understood as a healing reconciliation with God. For the grace of justification,
transforming the state of human liberty, heals human beings of what otherwise would
maintain their state of aversion and estrangement from God, namely, their radical moral
impotence, their incapacity not to sin, which inevitably issues in sin. By liberating their
liberty from the servitude to sin, grace enables human beings not simply not to sin, but,
through their cooperating with God's grace, to act out of the love of God and neighbour.
The grace of justification, then, is understood as a healing grace (gratia sanans).
Understandably, then, the prescholastics conceive the need or necessity for grace
precisely in relation to the healing justification and reconciliation with God that constitutes
salvation.

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6 Lonergan quotes Landgraf's observation that although those who write on grace in the twelfth
century used a host of terms when speaking of grace in the proper sense, and of its necessity, in their
attempt, Lonergan suggests, to keep pace with Augustinian rhetoric, all of their terms referred to the grace
of justification. Any use of 'gratia' in relation to the preparation for justification was tentative and qualified.
L'Union Personnelle, p. 49-50.
1.2 Difficulties with the Psychological Interpretation of Grace

Now for the difficulties. In general, these were indications in the movement of theological reflection during the period that the prevailing actualist or psychological interpretation of grace, and the precise specification of the need and necessity for grace it implied, left crucial questions not just without satisfactory answers, but, perhaps, even without the possibility of satisfactory answers.

First, if grace is understood as faith operating through charity (\textit{fides quae per dilectionem operatur}), and if faith itself is to be understood as a virtue, it would seem to follow that grace is to be thought of as a virtue. This, at least, seems to have been the position of Peter Lombard.\footnote{See Peter Lombard, \textit{Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, ed tertia ad fidel codicum antiquiorum restituta}, (Grottaferrata [Romae]: Collegium S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, 1971-1981), II, d.27, cc. 6, 12.}

The issue, however, was further complicated by a diversity of opinion regarding the nature of virtue. With a reference to Peter Lombard, Lonergan summarizes this diversity of opinion in the twelfth century:

Peter Lombard gives the two opinions: first, that the virtue is a habit and not an act; second, that the virtue is not a habit but an internal as opposed to an external act. Though he obviously inclines to the former view, he does not venture to decide the question. In fact, there seem to have been a good number of theologians who assumed or maintained that a virtue which is not an act is inconceivable.\footnote{Lonergan, \textit{Gratia Operans}, pp. 29-30. In \textit{Grace and Freedom} (p. 10), Lonergan remarks: "...grace which causes and liberates man's free choice would seem to be a virtue. But whether a virtue is an internal act of the soul, as opposed to external, corporeal acts, or else some quality or form that combines with the will after the fashion that rain combines with earth and seed, is a disputed point. The testimonies of the saints can be cited for both sides." Henri Rondet offers Hugh of Saint-Victor (ca. 1096-1141) as representative of those who considered virtues not as principles of action, but as movements of the soul. See Rondet, \textit{The Grace of Christ}, p. 199.}
Now, what is it that makes the grace of justification, whether understood as a *habitus* or internal act of the soul, distinctive in relation to the other gifts of God? Certainly, it is not simply that it is unmerited. For what is there, it could be argued, that one has received from God that one can lay claim to merit?\(^5\) If some were inclined to say simply that every gift from God is an instance of grace because every gift is unmerited,\(^10\) the more frequent approach was to distinguish among the graces of God, and then, because of the radical transformation it effects and its opening of the way to eternal life, to assign a privileged position to the grace of justification in relation to the other gifts of God.\(^11\) The difficulty with this, however, is that the issue is merely postponed rather than faced squarely. So the original question merely recurs in a slightly different form: if grace in the proper sense of the word is understood as the response of faith operating through acts of charity, why is *that* response so distinctive that, unlike the other gifts of God, it alone is able to effect the radical transformation in the state of human liberty from *non posse non peccare* to *posse non peccare*, and open the way to eternal life?

Second, if the prescholastics were unable to provide an adequate answer to the question regarding the distinctiveness of the grace of justification, it is hardly surprising that they had difficulty in identifying the difference that grounds adequately the distinction

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\(^5\) Thus in 1 Cor. 4:7, Paul asks: "What have you that you did not receive? And if it was given, how can you boast as though it were not?" Again, in James 1:17 we are told: "Every good endowment and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights."

\(^10\) Stebbins mentions at least one writer of the period, Adam Scotus (ca. 1150-1213/1214), who concluded that since everything one has is a gift from God and since every gift from God is unmerited, everything one has is an instance of grace. See Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, p.71.

\(^11\) For examples of how the distinction was drawn, see Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, pp. 71-72. To mention one of these, Hugh of St. Victor distinguishes creating grace (*gratia creatrix*) and saving grace (*gratia salvatrix*).
between the naturalia and the gratuita. Lonergan describes this distinction as a “commonplace” of the period.\textsuperscript{12} However, without a clear grasp of the difference that grounds the distinction, the tendency was always present to conflate, unwittingly, the naturalia and the gratuita, and end either with a depreciation of the gratuita or a depreciation of the naturalia.

Thus, as one example of the first tendency, Lonergan cites one writer of the period, Radulphus Ardens, as arguing “that before the fall all the virtues were natural but now, because of the fall, they are gratuitous.”\textsuperscript{13} The difference, then, would not be intrinsic, and the distinction would be grounded in extrinsic, circumstantial considerations that need have nothing to do with the virtues themselves. For each one of us, the virtues would pertain to nature had they not been lost as a result of the fall. Now, in the fallen condition, they cannot be reacquired other than by way of a gift.

Another attempt to specify the difference that ground the distinction was to take the clue from one of the meanings of ‘naturalis’: the naturalia are given from birth; the gratuita


\textsuperscript{13} Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, p. 14. Interestingly, in Gratia Operans (p. 40–41), Lonergan seems to take Radulphus Ardens’ claim as an example of the depreciation of the gratuita. He writes: “Radulfus [sic] Ardens… states that originally all the virtues were natural but…now they are gratuitous because they were lost by original sin. The effect of this speculative tendency was not to deny the gratuita but to deny the naturalia….” The puzzle, I suggest, is not difficult to solve. When Radulphus Ardens says that originally all the virtues were natural, he provides an example of the depreciation of the gratuita. When he says that now, after the fall, they are all gratuitous, he provides an example of the depreciation of the naturalia. In Grace and Freedom, Lonergan focuses on the first part of the claim, and then is able to contrast the two tendencies by mentioning examples of the other tendency. In Gratia Operans, he focuses on the second part of the claim and so lumps it with other examples of the depreciation of the naturalia. The important point to note is that if the difference which grounds the distinction between the naturalia and the gratuita has been misidentified, it can easily happen that either the naturalia or the gratuita can succumb to a depreciation by a mere shift in focus.
are superadded to what is given from birth. Moreover, following John Scotus Erigena (ca. 810-877) one could fix terminologically the distinction made on this basis by the use of the terms 'datum' and 'donum'. But if one delves no deeper than the supposed fact of order in bestowal, or even if one attempts to account for the order by referring, say, to a gradually increasing capacity of the recipient to receive the gifts, then the distinction between the naturalia and the gratuita would again result from extrinsic, circumstantial considerations that need have nothing to do with the intrinsic nature of the gifts themselves.

Presumably, this was regarded as a difficulty because to maintain or imply that the gratuita in general, and the grace of justification in particular, are distinct from the naturalia simply because of some extrinsic, circumstantial consideration is to come into conflict with the commonly accepted teaching of faith, proclaimed in Scripture and elaborated in Tradition. Thus, Scripture announces the good news of salvation, and speaks of a radical change in the human condition and in the state of human liberty. It speaks, for example, of being born from above, of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit (Jn. 3:3; Tit. 3:5); of the new creation of those who live in Christ (2 Cor. 5:17; Gal 6:15); of the new self created to be like God (Eph. 4:24); of participating in the divine nature (2 Pet. 1:4). If these are references to the gratuita, as they surely are, then however the gratuita are distinguished from the naturalia, they are not so distinguished because of some extrinsic, circumstantial consideration.

It remains that the second tendency, namely the depreciation of the naturalia in

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favour of the gratuita, was more common. The three examples Lonergan mentions briefly are: Abelard’s stark disjunction of charity and cupidity, leaving no room for a natural love of God; St. Bernard’s assertion that nature itself is crooked; and the opinion that without charity, there can be no virtue at all.¹⁵ Not surprisingly, when this tendency predominated, there was an easy recognition that the gratuita and the naturalia were intrinsically different. But if the naturalia were not simply identified with all that is estranged from God, this easy recognition only exacerbated the need to identify the differences that provides the ground for the distinction.

Third, regarding the capacity of the recipient to receive, there was the perennial inability to account adequately for the efficacy of infant baptism. “Though hardly a canonist or a speculative writer failed to raise the question,” Lonergan remarks, “it remained unsolved until the first half of the thirteenth century.”¹⁶ The dogmatic issue, the question of whether infant baptism was efficacious, was not in doubt; indeed, the practice was so much a part of Christian tradition that any demand for the rebaptism of those baptized as infants was deemed heretical. The difficulty was to understand theoretically how, given the prevailing actualist or psychological understanding of grace, this baptism could be efficacious, how infants could truly receive the sacrament, how the grace of justification could be truly bestowed upon them and the gates of heaven opened to them. For infants are manifestly incapable of the required faith-response of actually believing and actually loving God. And if they die in infancy, they would have performed no act of


¹⁶ Lonergan, Gratia Operans, p. 28.
faith or charity while on earth. In the absence of such acts, then, on what theological grounds can one still say baptism is efficacious? Many answers were proposed; none seemed quite satisfactory.\(^{17}\)

Fourth, if one adheres to a purely psychological interpretation of the nature of grace, the understanding of grace is knotted with human liberty in such a way that there is considerable difficulty in arriving at a clear and coherent theory on human liberty, considered in itself. It was generally accepted that human beings are free. Yet grace is necessary for human beings to do what is good; their liberty itself needs to be liberated; their own efforts reveal only their moral impotence. Now Augustine had argued from Scripture that the human will is always free but not always good.\(^{18}\) He distinguished two states of freedom: freedom from justice, when the will is subject to sin and one wills evil; freedom from sin, when the will is subject to justice and one wills what is good. The assistance of grace is necessary for the latter state and for good performance. Grace connects with the will in such a way as to render it free from its subjection to sin; it liberates liberty. Grace *engenders* the freedom of the will so that it may freely will and do what is good. But the knot between grace and freedom here is tied so tightly that it leaves no perspective from which to loosen the bond just enough to be able to ask what it is structurally, apart from grace, that constitutes the freedom of the will. In fact, that very question is virtually precluded, and with it the likelihood of arriving at a clear and coherent

\(^{17}\) For a brief but informative discussion of the issue of infant baptism and the various solutions proposed to account for its efficacy in the absence of acts on the part of the recipient, see Philips, *L'Union Personnelle*, pp. 57-67.

\(^{18}\) What follows is a brief attempt to summarize some parts of Lonergan's discussion of the issue as it is treated in Augustine. For Lonergan's discussion of the issue, its context, and references to the original text of Augustine, see Lonergan, *Gratia Operans*, pp. 48-61; cf. *Grace and Freedom*, pp. 2-5.
theory of human liberty.

A similar pattern can be observed in Anselm's discussion of the same issue.\textsuperscript{19} Anselm's discussion circles round the central notion of rectitude. A right act of will supposes the will to be in a state of rectitude. The rectitude of the will maintained for the sake of rectitude is what is meant by "justice" of the will.\textsuperscript{20} A right act of will, then, is systematically connected with justice of the will. Freedom is not the capacity to sin or not to sin, for then it would follow that neither God nor the blessed are free. Rather, freedom is the capacity of maintaining rectitude of the will for the sake of rectitude. Therefore freedom is the capacity for maintaining justice of the will, which is systematically connected with right acts of the will. Grace is the cause of both the emergence and maintenance of the rectitude of the will. Therefore grace is the cause of the justice of the will; grace is the cause of the maintained activation of the will's capacity for rectitude. Grace, then, is the cause of the activation and maintenance of a capacity that, \textit{qua} activated and maintained, is freedom. Prescind from grace, and freedom is retained only as a denuded remnant, a bare, deactivated capacity, fettered, inoperative, idle, and effectively dormant—like the capacity to see of a man bound and blindfolded and thrown in a dungeon—but still sufficient for a sinful act to be a freely chosen act. However, the logic of this position strained coherence by demanding at the same time that the bare capacity, which could be activated by grace to become freedom, is no longer freedom properly so

\textsuperscript{19} Again, what follows is a brief attempt to summarize some parts of Lonergan's discussion of the issue as it is treated in Anselm. For Lonergan's discussion of the issue, its context, and references to the original text of Anselm, see Lonergan, \textit{Gratia Operans}, pp. 61-64; cf. \textit{Grace and Freedom}, pp. 6-9.

\textsuperscript{20} In defining justice in this manner, Lonergan remarks, Anselm pushed the psychological interpretation of grace to the extreme limit. See \textit{Gratia Operans}, p. 29.
called, but rather, in the absence of grace, clothed with servitude to sin. For freedom, properly so called, is a capacity ordered to the rectitude of the will and its maintenance. So the human condition can be expressed in a perfect disjunction: either human beings enjoy the freedom of the children of God, or they are subject to the servitude of sin. There is no third alternative.

As with Augustine, so here with Anselm, grace and freedom are meshed together in understanding so much that there is no avenue from which to consider the freedom that pertains to human nature as such. The question simply cannot arise, for "freedom [is] an effect of grace and grace [is] what makes freedom free." Indeed, the impediment the purely psychological interpretation of grace places in the way of the development of a clear and coherent theory of human freedom is a further example of the depreciation of the naturalia.

Finally, there is the difficulty the purely psychological interpretation of grace creates for the doctrine of merit. As with infant baptism, the difficulty was not doctrinal but theological, an impasse at the level of speculative reflection. Grace is necessary for merit; with the assistance of grace, one merits blessedness through good works. But the doctrine, Lonergan remarks, tended to hang in mid-air without speculative support. If grace is understood in accordance with the psychological interpretation, then the

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21 Lonergan, _Grace and Freedom_, p. 9. Elsewhere in _Grace and Freedom_ (p. 17), Lonergan remarks: "In strict logic there could hardly be any theory of liberty as long as grace was conceived psychologically...."

22 This, of course, must be understood correctly: "What merit...has man before grace which could make it possible for him to receive grace, when nothing but grace produces good merit in us; and what else but His gifts does God crown when he crowns our merits." St. Augustine, _Epistola_ 194, c.5, n.19.

necessity of grace in the case of fallen human beings seems straightforward. For, as previously mentioned, the debility of the will, as a consequence of the fall, meant that human beings possunt peccare et non possunt non peccare etiam damnabiliter. Grace was necessary to change that state of human liberty. Only then could human beings be healed of their debility, and cooperate with God’s grace in the performance of works that no longer savoured of the old Adam, and thereby merit eternal life. However, the doctrine affirmed the necessity of grace for merit universally, without exception. Accordingly, an account which seemingly suffices for fallen human beings flounders in the case of the angels and of our first parents before the fall. Thus Lonergan describes Peter Lombard’s attempt to account for the necessity of grace for Adam to merit eternal life as “most anomalous”:

...the Lombard accurately describes the need for grace in our first parents: creation was enough to enable man to avoid sin, but not enough to merit eternal life; for that another grace besides creation was needed. But he goes wrong when he tries to explain why the avoidance of sin by our first parents in the period prior to the infusion of grace would not be meritorious: he admits we merit when we merely avoid sin, but always [maintains?] that that is because we have difficulty; in the state of original innocence there was no difficulty and so no merit.24

The anomaly, presumably, is this. In our case, the necessity of grace for merit is conceived as being because of a radical debility in the human will consequent to the fall, which continues to make itself felt in the difficulty we experience in avoiding sin, even with the assistance of grace. In the case of our first parents before the fall, on the other hand, it was not their weakness but their strength, the integrity of their created nature which enabled them not just to avoid sin but to do so with ease, that necessitated another grace

24 Lonergan, Gratia Operans, p. 40. The description of Peter Lombard’s position as “most anomalous” is taken from the parallel passage in Grace and Freedom, p. 12.
besides the grace of creation, in order that they might merit eternal life. Given the account of the necessity of grace for merit in our case, the account of the same necessity in the case of our first parents is hardly what one would expect; indeed, it gives every impression of being ad hoc. The doctrine of merit demanded that the necessity of grace be maintained as universal and without exception. So, for our first parents before the fall, the account is adjusted to maintain the necessity by focusing on the secondary feature of difficulty in avoiding sin. The consequence, paradoxically, is to turn strength in avoiding sin with ease into deficiency. For that very strength, that absence of difficulty in avoiding sin, according to Peter Lombard, robs the choices and activities of our first parents before the fall of merit in God’s sight. Without any obvious, independent justification, his account effectively turns difficulty in avoiding sin into a universal, necessary condition for merit before God. And insofar as this independent justification for such a position is not supplied, and therefore no compelling reason to affirm it, the complete doctrine of merit is accurately described by Lonergan as being suspended in mid-air without speculative support.

1.3 Moving Towards a Solution

One manner in which the participants in a continuing context of intellectual reflection advance and enrich that context is through their questioning consideration of difficulties on a particular topic or set of limited topics, and their gradual discovery of satisfactory
answers to those difficulties. Many of the writers of the early scholastic period did so consider one or more of the difficulties just discussed concerning grace; and eventually, with Philip the Chancellor, an advance in theological understanding was achieved which was significant not just for one specific difficulty, but one sufficiently comprehensive in significance to provide a decisive breakthrough for each of the difficulties mentioned.

The first two difficulties were general indications of the incompleteness of the actualist or psychological interpretation of grace. The third and the fifth were particular difficulties created by that incompleteness. The fourth was in one sense more an oversight or blindspot that created unease than an always clearly perceived difficulty. It was an operative, if unwitting, depreciated understanding of human liberty, consequent to the incompleteness of the actualist or psychological interpretation of grace. And so long as that interpretation was maintained, it functioned to impede the more adequate, “philosophical” understanding of human liberty that would eventually emerge.

Lonergan refers in Gratia Operans to a familiar and typical feature of human cognition, namely, that in an investigation “[t]he mind begins from the particular and works to the more general.” It is not surprising, then, that historically, progress on the third and

25 As an example of this, recall Aristotle’s consideration of fourteen aporiae in Book III of the Metaphysics. “For those who wish to get clear of difficulties,” Aristotle remarks, “it is advantageous to discuss the difficulties well; for the subsequent free play of thought implies the solution of the previous difficulties, and it is not possible to untie a knot of which one does not know.” (Metaphysics, Bk. III, 995a 27-30.) Focusing questioningly on difficulties which knot the intellect, then, is typically the first step towards undoing the knot and advancing in understanding.

26 Thus, in Grace and Freedom (p. 17), Lonergan remarks that “[i]n strict logic there could hardly be any theory of liberty as long as grace was conceived psychologically to the practical neglect of the idea of merit.” On the distinction between the philosopher’s and the theologian’s definition of liberty, see Gratia Operans, pp. 25-26.

27 Lonergan, Gratia Operans, p. 32.
fifth difficulty provided the avenue which eventually led to the decisive and comprehensive breakthrough.

To take the third difficulty first, the demand of the Waldenses and Cathari for the rebaptism of those baptized in infancy added practical urgency to discovering a speculative solution to the issue. Philips singles out Alan of Lille (ca.1128-1203) as particularly influential in introducing the distinction between \textit{virtus in habitu} and \textit{virtus in usu} into the mainstream of theological reflection.\textsuperscript{28} As it happens, Alan's writings straddle the second and third entry of Aristotle to the Christian West. Perhaps it not surprising, then, that Philips insists that Alan maintains the distinctively Aristotelian viewpoint regarding a \textit{habitus}, namely, that it

\[ \text{ne consiste pas simplement dans une capacité d'agir chez un homme endormi, mais qui se révèle comme une puissance ou un dynamisme qui pousse à l'action dès que celle-ci s'avère possible.}\textsuperscript{29} \]

Now, it did not pass unnoticed that the concept of \textit{virtus in habitu}, could provide a key element in attaining a viable theoretical explanation of the efficacy of infant baptism. Thus, towards the end of 1201, Pope Innocent III, in the letter \textit{Maiores Ecclesiae causas}, mentioned two prominent responses made to those who say that, “the faith or love or other virtues are not infused in children inasmuch as they do not consent.” The first asserted “that by the power of baptism guilt indeed is remitted to little ones but grace is not conferred.” The second response, introduced by Innocent with the words, ‘\textit{nonnullis}

\[ \text{28} \text{ See Philips, } L'\textit{Union Personnelle}, \text{ pp. 63-64; cf. Moeller and Philips, } \textit{The Theology of Grace}, \text{ p. 21-22. The work referred to, in which the distinction is made, is Alan of Lille, } Theologicae Regulae, \text{ reg. 88: } \textit{Omnes virtutes simul, et similiter dantur homini a creatione, ut sint per naturam; ex recreatione vere infunduntur homini, ut sint virtutes per gratiam; pariter quidem habitu, sed dispariter usu.} \]

\[ \text{29} \text{ Philips, } L'\textit{Union Personnelle}, \text{ p. 64. Referring to Alan, the sentence from which this quotation is taken begins, } \textit{Mais son aristotélisme lui permet de déceler l'habitus qui...} \]
vero dicentibus', asserted "both that sin is forgiven and that virtues are infused in them [infants] as they hold virtues as a possession (quoad habitum) not as a function, until they arrive at adult age...."30

Although the indications are that Innocent preferred the first response, he does not decide between them, but merely makes use of their common ground to affirm that just as original sin is contracted without consent, so, through the power of the sacrament, it is remitted without consent. Accordingly, infants who die before the age of consent are not deprived of the vision of God.

But whatever hesitancy Innocent may have had in this regard, in a space of twenty years, according to Philips, the second response became the preferred position. As evidence for this, he quotes Robert of Courçon (ca. 1158-1219) remarking in 1219 that the common opinion of the Masters was that in baptism infants receive "fidem in habitu et non in actu."31

Now this shift coincides with the completion of the third entry of Aristotle into the Christian West. Intellectually, this was a period characterized by the dissemination, growing familiarity and influence of previously unknown writings of Aristotle, such as the Physics, the Metaphysics and the Nicomachean Ethics. The general situation was ripe for Aristotle's view that virtues are habitus to command general acceptance. Add to this the fact that in the particular circumstances of controversy regarding infant baptism, the Aristotelian view weakened decisively the argument put forward by the Waldenses and

31 See Philips, L'Union Personnelle, pp. 64-65.
Cathari for the rebaptism of those baptized in infancy, and then his view seemed most compelling. Thus Stebbins remarks:

   The earlier reluctance to conceive of virtues as anything other than acts had been forced to give way under the pressure of the Waldensian and Catharist heresies, which called for the rebaptism of those who had been baptized as infants. In this climate the Aristotelian view that virtues are habits rather than acts began to gain greater acceptance.32

   Needless to say, it was not a complete solution to the theological difficulties connected with infant baptism; that required advance on other issues. Still, the shift was a key element in advancing towards a satisfactory solution; and it maintained its dominance, and eventually received authoritative endorsement at the Council of Vienne (1311-1312).33

1.4 Breakthrough: The Theorem of the Supernatural

Historically, it was progress on the fifth difficulty mentioned above, the inability to specify adequately the theological basis for the exceptionless necessity of grace for merit, that, with Philip the Chancellor, mediated a breakthrough sufficiently comprehensive in its implications to provide the basic insight necessary for an adequate solution to each of the previously mentioned difficulties.34

   A seemingly unrelated question of fact provided the catalyst: do human beings by nature love God above all things? Lonergan remarks that William of Auxerre argued

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33 See Denzinger, Sources, pp. 190-191, n. 482.

34 The comprehensive breakthrough is named by Lonergan the “theorem of the supernatural.” Regarding it, he remarks: “It is of importance to remember always that the origin of the scientific concept of the supernatural was the problem of merit.” Lonergan, Gratia Operans, p. 40.
against St. Bernard's and Hugh of Saint-Victor's denial, to affirm a natural *amor amicitiae erga Deum*. Now if William's affirmation implied that the view of St. Bernard and others regarding the crookedness (*curvitas*) of nature was not the whole truth, it did not imply that this natural love of God was the same as charity, the meritorious love of God. Grace makes the difference between the natural and meritorious love of God. But if this is accepted, and if grace is understood purely in accordance with the psychological interpretation, the difficulty previously mentioned concerning grace and merit, namely the inability of the purely psychological interpretation of grace to specify adequately the exceptionless necessity of grace for merit, is simply exhibited in yet another instance. For the question concerning why the natural love of God is insufficient for merit is left unanswered.

Still, this issue was the catalyst for an advance. Some ten years after William's *Summa Aurea*, Philip the Chancellor proposed a solution which Lonergan describes as a "'Copernican revolution' in theory." Philip agreed with William that there is a natural *amor amicitiae erga Deum*. Indeed, as regards this natural love of God, he distinguished between an *appetitus pure naturalis* and an *appetitus sequens cognitionem*. Now earlier, Lonergan remarks, Praepositinus of Cremona (ca. 1140-1210) had argued that "the

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37 "...aliud est in appetitu sequente cognitionem et aliud est in appetitu pure naturali; appetitus enim pure naturalis se habet secundum dictum modum, scilicet ut diligat propter se, ille vero qui est secundum cognitionem modum sequitur cognitionem." Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono, de bono natur[a]e, de bono natur[a]e quod non est diminuibile per malum culp[a]e, II, de bono quod est intellectualiis creatur[a]e, q. VI, de dilectione angelorum, 138-141.
naturalia were in [a] different category from the gratuita because reason was the highest thing in nature and faith was above reason.” Accordingly, regarding this appetitus sequens cognitionem, Philip now distinguished the love of God consequent to natural knowledge and the love of God consequent to faith:

...in diligendo Deum super omnia non elevatur supra se, sicut nec in cognoscendo, sed mensuratur dilectio secundum modum cognitionis. Longe autem nobilior est cognitio fidei quam cognitio naturalis. Unde caritas qu[a]e sequitur illam cognitionem longe nobilior est dilectione naturali...[D]iffert autem cognitio fidei a prima cognitione quia cognitio fidei aut cognitio respondens fidei qu[a]e est in angelis, scilicet cognitio in Verbo, facit cognoscere de Deo ea qu[a]e videntur secundum humanum intellectum oppositionem habere, sicut est de trinitate personarum et unitate essentia et de operibus summa misericordia qu[a]e facta sunt vel futura erant, sicut quod Verbum Dei est incarnatum et qu[a]e consequuntur. Facit etiam cognoscendo tendere in ipsum tamquam in summam veritatem, et hanc cognitionem sequitur caritas ratione motus aut dispositionis, sed non infusionis, cuius est diligere summam bonum quod est elevans per gratiam et per gloriem et hoc propter se. Sed non sic est in cognitione naturali et dilectione consequentia; cognitio enim illa fuit de Deo secundum opera creationis, qu[a]e cognitio non elevat intellectum supra se. Ad hanc enim potest attingere humanus intellectus et angelicus ex dono naturae quod habet a primo datore, et hanc cognitionem sequitur dilectio de qua hic loquimur. Sic ergo patet qualiter elevatur intellectus supra se et qualiter non elevatur; utroque tamen cognoscit et diliget quod est supra se tamquam primum cognoscibile et primum diligibile.35

Here, Philip is introducing a kind of distinction that can be generalized to apply right across the board, for the ground of the distinction is an entitative disproportion that applies right across the board. That is precisely the underlying significance of what Philip is presenting. So, for example, there is an entitative disproportion between faith and natural knowledge derived from the exercise of reason, between charity or the love of God consequent to faith and the love of God consequent to natural knowledge, between merit before God and the deserved accolades of one’s fellows, and so forth. This


39 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono, de bono natur[a]e, de bono natur[a]e quod non est diminuibile per malum culp[a]e, II, de bono quod est intellectualis creatur[a]e, q. VI, de dilectione angelorum, 151-171. Stebbins remarks that Landgraf considers this the crucial passage on this issue in Summa de Bono, even though nowhere in the passage does the term ‘supernaturalis’ appear. See Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, p. 79.
significance warrants Lonergan’s naming what Philip is presenting the (generic) theorem of the supernatural.40 The first member of each pair belongs to the gratuita; the second to the naturalia. ‘Gratuita’ and ‘naturalia’ each refer to elements within an order. No element belonging to one order can be an element of the other, for the degree of

40 See Lonergan, Gratia Operans, pp. 13-14, 31-36, 38, 39, 42. In Lonergan’s use of the term, ‘theorem’, the idea of the supernatural “no more adds to...[dogmatic] data...than the Lorentz transformation puts a new constellation in the heavens.” (Grace and Freedom, p. 16). For a theorem, Lonergan explains, is the elaborated understanding of an objective fact through analysis, generalization and the two-fold enrichment with implications and significance for a system of thought. (See Gratia Operans, p. 13; cf. Grace and Freedom, p. 13). Put more briefly, a theorem adds “a new way of intelligibly relating a set of facts already affirmed as true.” (Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, p.281). It would be difficult to over-estimate the significance which Lonergan attributes to Philip’s achievement. Throughout his writing career Lonergan frequently refers to it. Indeed, not only is it explicitly mentioned in Method in Theology (see p. 310), but its permanent validity is taken for granted, for example, in the distinction between general and special theological categories (see pp. 281-291). Without even mentioning Philip’s name, one especially rich and vivid statement of the significance of Philip’s achievement can be found in a lecture originally delivered by Lonergan in 1959, and only recently published. In the lecture, Lonergan remarks: “...in every field of inquiry there comes a time when a scattered set of discoveries coalesces into a rounded whole. Pythagoras established his theorem long before Euclid wrote his Elements. Galileo and Kepler established laws before Newtonian mechanics deduced Kepler’s laws from a set of principles. Much important work was done in chemistry prior to the discovery of the periodic table. But it is only from the moment when a Euclid, a Newton, a Mendeleeev comes along with a system, that a subject has a well-defined existence, that it can be treated as a unity, that it can possess a method of its own.

“Now, there can be shown to exist in the writings of Anselm and of the twelfth-century theologians a nest of antinomies that center around the couplets, ‘grace and freedom,’ ‘faith and reason.’ to make the very conception of these terms paradoxical of and to render an attempt at formulating the theological enterprise either heretical or incoherent. From about the year 1230 these hitherto hopeless problems vanish; theology becomes able to conceive itself, to distinguish its field from that of philosophy and of other disciplines, to tackle particular questions in the light of a total viewpoint. The key discovery was the recognition of what is named the supernatural order, but...the primary emphasis lies, not on the word ‘supernatural,’ but on the word ‘order.’ Things are ordered, when they are intelligibly related, and so there is an order inasmuch as there is a domain of intelligible relations. The discovery of a supernatural order was the discovery of a domain of intelligible relations proper to theology. Just as Newton discovered that natural laws reduced to a system of their own (mechanics) and not as Galileoo had thought to a preexisting system (geometry), just as Mendeleeev, by discovering an order to which chemical entities reduced, defined the field of chemistry, so too, when Aquinas was still a boy, theology found itself. The meaning of the supernatural is that Christian theology has to deal with the gift of God, where not only is the gift from God but more basically the gift is God. It is a transcendent gift, and utterly free, not only in itself, but also in its whole retinue of consequences and implications. Knowing of it is a faith that is above reason, possessing it is a grace that is above nature, acting on it is a charity that is above good will, with a merit that is above human deserts.” Bernard Lonergan, “Method in Catholic Theology,” in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964, pp. 44-45. The same article was published earlier in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 10 (1992): 3-26. This text is, I suggest, one of the clearest statements in Lonergan’s writings of the significance for theology of the theorem of the supernatural. And if he is correct in his estimation of its significance, it means that even today systematic theological reflection stumbles along, for the most part, without any explicit acknowledgment of that significance. So in its practice, systematic theological reflection is still, in large measure, in a state not unlike physics before Newton, or chemistry before Mendeleeev.
perfection that pertains to the *ordo gratiae* intrinsically exceeds the degree of perfection that pertains to the *ordo naturae*; the orders and the elements belonging to the orders are entitatively disproportionate. Still, entitative disproportionality need not imply utter disparity such that no relation can exist between the orders or between the elements of the orders. Concretely, the orders are related to each other in such a manner that the *ordo gratiae* penetratingly supervenes upon the *ordo naturae* and fractures the limit proportionate to its finality. More particularly, the *ordo gratiae* fractures the limit proportionate to the finality of human nature. Again, to express the relation conversely, the *ordo naturae*, concretely considered, is caught up in the *ordo gratiae*, and participates in a higher finality. It follows that any consideration of the *ordo naturae* that prescinds from the *ordo gratiae* is an abstract consideration of the current state of the *ordo naturae*.

This is not meant to suggest, however, that such considerations are illegitimate. For, in human knowing abstract considerations of this kind are both indispensable and useful. In this instance, it procured a vantage-point from which to consider the *ordo naturae* with less risk of depreciation. Thus Lonergan remarks that in one sense the theorem yields "not the supernatural character of grace, for that was already known and acknowledged, but the validity of a line of reference termed nature."^41 And if the line of reference is acknowledged as valid, any tendency to depreciate the *naturalia* is systematically subverted.^42 Further, once the *naturalia* and the order of nature are

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^42 To take one example, Lonergan remarks in *Insight* (p. 551) that "...once reason is acknowledged to be distinct from faith, there is issued an invitation to reason to grow in consciousness of its native power, to claim its proper field of inquiry, to work out its departments of investigation, to determine its own methods, to operate on the basis of its own principles and precepts."
accorded their proper value, one is in a better position to grasp the proper limitation that pertains to their degree of perfection in relation to the *gratuita* and the *ordo gratiae*. Grace can then be better understood by employing suitable analogies drawn from the *naturalia*, but negating their inherent limitation. For the *gratuita* exceed the proportionate finality proper to the *naturalia* and, accordingly, the penetrating supervention of the *gratuita* upon the *naturalia* fractures the inherent limit of the finality proportionate to the *naturalia*. In particular, as a result of the fracturing of this limit, personal beings are able to live a life that is not and could not be theirs by nature.

In this way, the psychological interpretation of grace was eventually subsumed within a more adequate understanding that took into account the entitative disproportion between the *ordo gratiae* and the *ordo naturae*, and the aforementioned difficulties were assigned their satisfactory solution. The key to the solution in each case lay in appreciating the significance of the theorem of the supernatural and applying it appropriately to the particular difficulty. Thus the theorem identifies the reason grace is distinctive in relation to every other gift of God and grounds the "commonplace" distinction of (the orders of) nature and grace in an entitative disproportion. Again, it specifies the theological basis for the exceptionless necessity of grace for merit, and so explains why Adam could not merit eternal life without grace, even before the fall. Finally, by identifying the ground for the distinction between the *naturalia* and *gratuita*, it removed an

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43 "...speculative theology... finds in the natural order, as philosophically analysed, the analogies necessary for the scientific conception of purely theological data." Lonergan, *Gratia Operans*, p. 27. Lest one imagine that this is a simple process, Lonergan adds a few lines later: "...the use of such analogies seems an extremely simple matter. In point of fact there is nothing more complicated and difficult than their first emergence."
impediment that effectively precluded the development of a philosophical understanding of human liberty and so increased the probability that such an understanding would eventually emerge.\footnote{Lonergan remarks that even though the development of the theory of human liberty is obscure, "[b]y and large...it should [sic] seem that the theorem of the supernatural did release speculation on the nature of liberty." Lonergan, \textit{Grace and Freedom}, p. 17; cf. \textit{Gratia Operans}, pp. 25-26. In \textit{Method in Theology} (p. 310), Lonergan remarks that Philip's completion of the discovery of the distinction between two entitatively disproportionate orders, and the organization that resulted from the discovery, "made it possible (1) to discuss the nature of grace without discussing liberty, (2) to discuss the nature of liberty without discussing grace, and (3) to work out the relations between grace and liberty."}

However, what may be obvious in hindsight can be obscure in foresight. The process of, first, appreciating the significance and then applying the theorem of the supernatural appropriately, was, of course, not automatic, as if the struggle to understand could be bypassed and all the implications of Philip's discovery could immediately be stated as a set of conclusions of an elementary deduction. It is true, as Lonergan remarks, that "certain developments were released at once." But it is equally true that other developments "followed in a series of intervals, change implying further change, till the genius of St. Thomas Aquinas mastered the situation."\footnote{Lonergan, \textit{Grace and Freedom}, p. 16.}

\section{1.5 Philip the Chancellor and the Notion of the Supernatural Habitus}

The particular development of present concern, namely, the emergence of the notion of the supernatural \textit{habitus}, was, however, relatively rapid. Indeed, Lonergan places it in the period between Peter Lombard and Albert the Great.\footnote{"Between Peter Lombard and St. Albert the Great there emerged the idea of the supernatural habit [habitus]." Lonergan, \textit{Grace and Freedom}, p. 13. Earlier (p. 3), he remarks that "only in the course of the thirteenth century was the idea of habitual grace firmly established."}
Philip the Chancellor's contribution to this emergence did not consist simply in the theorem of the supernatural. He was, Stebbins says, "responsible for giving the notion of habitual grace its initial expression."\(^47\) In his discussion, "De gratia in generali", in *Summa de Bono*, Philip in effect attempts to move towards bringing a degree of order and systematic control into the fluid terminology and manifold characterizations connected with 'gratia' by coordinating a whole range of characterizations of grace with the kinds of causes he found in Aristotle's writings. Thus, after surveying some of the common characterizations of grace, he offers the following as specifying the efficient, formal, material and final cause of grace and so as determining the "*totum esse gratia[e]*":

Gratia est gratis data gratum faciens habentem et gratum reddens opus propter beatitudinem.\(^48\)

First, let us leave aside the question of whether this characterization does indeed specify the causes of grace in the manner Philip suggests, in order to make another point. Lonergan remarks that "...perhaps it was Stephen Langton [ca. 1155-1228] that gave currency to the term *gratia gratum faciens*."\(^49\) He also reminds us that in the *Sententiae* of Peter Lombard, the expression 'gratia gratis data' referred primarily to the grace of justification, understood as faith operating through charity.\(^50\) But in Thomas' *Summa*, and

\(^47\) Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, p. 81.

\(^48\) Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de Bono, de bono gratia[e], de gratia in generali*, q. 1. *de diversis acceptionibus gratia[e] et eius rationibus*, 66-67. The sentence that immediately follows explains his meaning: "Cum...dicitur gratia 'gratis data' notatur causa efficiens, terminus a quo; cum dicitur 'gratum faciens habentem' causa formalis et etiam materialis; cum dicitur 'gratum reddens opus propter beatitudinem' causa finalis."

\(^49\) Lonergan, *Gratia Operans*, p. 83.

\(^50\) "In Peter Lombard *gratia gratis data* denoted the grace of justification, faith operating through charity." Lonergan, *Gratia Operans*, p. 83.
ever since, the expression refers to "graces of public utility such as inspiration and thaumaturgy." In the intervening period, the meaning of 'gratia gratis data' was noticeably fluid; it functioned "more [as] a sweeping gesture than an exact concept, more [as] a catalogue than a category." Perhaps the fluidity was occasioned by the questions and difficulties the psychological interpretation of grace left unanswered. In any event, the grace of justification could not be considered just one among many graces; for it was commonly acknowledged as divine help without which salvation is not possible. Within the catalogue of freely bestowed graces, then, it was necessary eventually to find some expression to single out terminologically the grace of justification in a manner that would reflect its distinctness and accord with the advances in the understanding of grace that were being made. Thus, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, Lonergan remarks, Stephen Langton "noted the connection between gratuitium and meritum to give significance to [the expression] gratum faciens." Stebbins provides slightly more detail:

Stephen Langton placed the ground of merit in the fact that one is made pleasing to God through the elevation and informing of one's works by grace.

In this way, it seems, 'gratia gratum faciens' "came to denote the essential feature of justification and the other term ['gratia gratis data'] was left with a roving commission." The central point for present purposes, however, is that Philip's preferred characterization

51 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, p. 24; cf. Gratia Operans, pp. 73, 83.
53 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, p. 15.
54 Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, p. 80.
of grace meshed neatly with the thrust of this process, both on the level of terminology and on that of meaning.

Second, a few sentences prior to his lately quoted sentence on grace, Philip mentions a characterization of grace very similar to one we came across in the earlier discussion of grace in the Halesian Summa:

...gratia est habitus universaliter totius vitae ordinativus, et h[ae]c est magistralis et determinatur comparatione ad actum.  

The use of 'habitus' here is hardly surprising if one recalls the aforementioned shift in opinion in the first two decades of the thirteenth concerning the nature of virtue. For the moment, let us hold this usage in abeyance and concentrate on the function that is ascribed to grace as a habitus, namely, that it is universaliter totius vitae ordinativus.

Just why Philip considered grace as ordinative of (human) life in this manner can perhaps be gathered from the following considerations.

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56 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono, de bono gratiae, de gratia in generali, q. 1, de diversis actionibus gratiae et eius rationibus, 60-61. For the earlier discussion, see Chapter II, § 3. I noted there in passing, in a footnote at the end of § 3, that Philip has a similar characterization of grace.

57 What follows is a selective, interpretative summary of the following texts from Philip the Chancellor: "...notandum quod primum quod respicit Deus oculo misericordiae est ipse essentia animae qui ad imaginem eius secundum id quod nobilium est in ea, secundo naturaliter ipsas vires, quae sunt datae animae ad operandum. Et sicut prius est naturaliter esse quam operari, ita esse in hoc genere et operari in hoc genere. Et sicut contingit aliquando esse vitam sine sensu et motu, sicut in paraliticus, remanet tamen motus vitæilis. Per quod patet quod anima habet quandam operationem immediatam, quandam autem mediantibus organis in corpore distinctis. Sic primo datur animae vita a Deo, qui est eius vita, per gratiam infusam gratum faciunt, quae facit eam vivere in se et per consequens in suis virtibus; et quia sicut Dominus cum remittit totaliter remittit, impietas enim est ab ipso dimidiam sperare veniam, sic cui amorem suum communicat omnia bona communicat, et cui amorem ei gratiam, et ita per consequens qui gratiam ei et omnes virtutes quae sunt ad salutem. Cum autem insit virtus cum gratia, non tamen habet effectum virtutis virtus quam cito habet effectum suum principalem; principalis enim effectus gratiae est tribuere vitam vel gratificare. Sed virtutis est potentia habilitata elicere actum bonum, quo fit merum virtutis eternae, quod non fit prius. Defectus autem ille non est ex parte virtutis gratiae, sed ex parte potentiae, quae est inhabilis de se ex impotentia naturae. Est ergo gratia prima perfectio animae in bene esse ad vitam eternam, virtus vero ut virtus secunda perfectio, non quia simul sint in sua essentia, sed ordinatur posterius ratione actus, et h[ae]c est perfectio ipsius animae illae vero perfectiones potentiarum in quantum sunt ad actus. Et videtur esse gratia sicut totum potentiale ad virtutes, quemadmodum anima est totum potentiale ad vires, ut sic se habeat perfectio ad perfectionem quemadmodum perfectibile ad
God’s compassionate action in relation to human beings and their plight penetrates into the very depth of the individual human reality. Because of his great love for us, we read in Ephesians, the God who is rich in mercy has brought us to new life and saved us in Christ by grace (Eph. 2: 4-6). Anyone in Christ is a new creation; the old (creation) has passed away and a new being is there (2 Cor. 5:17). For which reason, we are able to put

...nota quod sicut creatura rationalis est totum potentiale, ita oportet quod perfectio eius sit totum potentia; perfectio autem dico in bene esse. Est autem gratia eius perfectio. Erit ergo gratia totum potentiale. Unde quodammodo creatura rationalis est quid secundum rationem pr[a]eter vires. Ita gratia est quid pr[a]eter virtutes qu[a]e sunt perfectiv[a]e virium in quantum sunt vires. Anima igitur dicitur totum potentia; et totum potentiale sumitur iuxta totum integrale et in divisione reducitur ad illud per similitudinem. Augustinus enim dicit in libro De quantitate anim[a]e, ut supra ostensum est, quod quantitas anim[a]e est secundum extensionem potentiarum ad actus.

“Considerare est igitur animam secundum substantiam, quasi non habito respectu ad aliquem actum, et est considerare eam secundum quod inclinatur ad actus, ut intelligendi et volendi et huiusmodi. Nec in hoc additur nova substantia, sed secundum quod attendimus eam intelligere dicimus eam intellectum vel magis proprie intellectivum, et secundum quod vult voluntatem vel voluntativum. Una ergo substantia et plures vires secundum plures ad actum comparaciones. Non differt ergo ratio a voluntate potientia in substantia, et tamen differt essentialiter, quia essentia potenti[a]e est in comparatione ad actum, substantia ipsa non alia est quam anim[a]e substantia. Eodem modo et magis etiam proprius essera est circa gratiam. Intelligimus gratiam non habito respectu ad aliquem actum; erit quasi substantia comparatione virtutum; intelligimus eam comparando ad actus: quantum ad actum credendi erit fides, quantum ad actum diligendi caritas, et tamen fides et caritas differunt essentialiter et tamen sunt unum in substantia grati[a]e. Et attende quod magis propria est ha[e]c: gratia est fides, caritas, etc. quam h[a]ec: anima est ratio, voluntas et huiusmodi; potius enim dicitur voluntativum et intellectivum. Et h[a]ec est causa quia anima dicit subiectum, non solum substantiam, gratia substantiam ita quod non subiectum.

“...nota quod non propter hoc concedendum est quod unus sit habitus in anima tantum, sed plures, quia habitus dicit comparationem vel habitudinem ad actum. Plures igitur habitus, plures virtutes sunt, una gratia. Et quod plures grati[a]e dicuntur refertur ad effectus, ut plures virtutes, et quia grati[a]e nomen extendit se et ad gratiam gratis datam et ad gratum facientem. Gratia igitur se tenet ex parte essenti[a]e, virtus ex parte virium quantum ad actus.

“Ex hoc potest esse origo quod qui habet unam virtutem habet omnes; uniuntur enim in gratia. Deus autem non ex parte facit sibi gratum quod gratum sibi debet esse; quare gratia non habebit comparationem tantum ad unam virium, sed ad omnes, et ita una gratia omnis virtus.

“Quod autem gratia sit vita, accipitur ex hoc quod comparatur anima ad Deum in hoc quod est principium vit[a]e. ... Sed primum ens in creatura rationabili quo vivit per Deum est gratia, sicut in corpore quo vivit per animam vita. Ergo gratia est vita.” Summa de Bono, de bono grati[a]e, de gratia in generali, q. 2, utrum gratia ponat aliquid in subiecto, 49-87.
off the old self and put on the new self that is created to be like God in true righteousness and holiness (Eph. 4: 24-25).

Accordingly, if one distinguishes between the essence of the soul as the core of one's human reality, on the one hand, and the faculties or powers of the soul which are given for the purpose of operating, on the other, it should come as no surprise that then one will be inclined to say, as Philip does, that primarily God regards with the eye of compassion and forgiveness not the faculties or powers of the soul, but the essence of the soul, in which the image of God is found. Of course, insofar as the faculties or powers are faculties or powers of the soul, God's compassionate and forgiving regard for the essence of the soul resonates in the faculties or powers.

Now, the totum potentiale, the whole or fullness or entirety of power that is present in the soul of the rational creature, is present in each of the soul's faculties or powers, in a particularized and, therefore, diminished form. Accordingly, the soul is not strictly identical with any of its faculties or powers. Moreover, the faculties or powers differ in relation to each other; thus, the faculty or power of understanding differs from the faculty or power of willing. But one prescinds from that difference if one refers each of the distinct faculties or powers back to the soul considered as the totum potentiale.

Now, there can be a perfection that pertains to the soul, namely, well-being (bene esse) of the soul, the soul suitably disposed to attain its proportionate end. And just as the soul is not strictly identical with any of its faculties or powers, so even though the

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58 As will become clear in subsequent discussion, from the Aristotelian point of view, the perfections of the soul in well-being are properly understood as dispositions or habitus of the body optimally adapted to the soul. Health is the usual example. It was thought of as a general condition resulting from the humours proper to an organism being in their proper proportions.
perfection of the soul would register or be present in each of its faculties or powers in a particularized and, therefore, diminished form, it would not be strictly identical with any of these consequent particularized perfections. Further, the perfection of the faculties or powers consonant with the perfection of the soul would differ in relation to each other. But one prescinds from that difference if the perfection of these faculties or powers consonant with the perfection of the soul are referred back to the perfection of the soul.

Grace can be understood as a perfection of the soul. It is the well-being (bene esse) of the soul, or the being of the soul well-disposed to attain not an end proportionate to its nature, but the entitatively disproportionate end of eternal life. From grace as well-being of the soul in relation to eternal life flow the secondary perfections of the soul consonant with grace, namely, the virtues required for salvation, such as faith and charity. These are distinct when considered in relation to each other. However, if one refers them back to the perfection of the soul which renders the soul suitable for eternal life, one prescinds from the differences among the virtues. As with the rational soul in relation to its consonant faculties or powers, grace is the totum potentiale, the whole or fullness or entirety of the perfection of the soul, ordering the soul to eternal life. The virtues consonant with this perfection flow from it, but are not strictly identical with it. Still, because grace is the totum potentiale present in each of the virtues, there is a basis for attributing to the virtues, in a derivative manner, what is primarily attributed to grace.

Thus, grace as the well-being and perfection of the soul is related to its consonant virtues and acts, such as faith and charity, in a manner similar to the relation of the rational soul and its consonant faculties or powers and acts, such as understanding and will and acts of understanding and willing. In this sense if one understands the soul as a
substance because it is the whole in which all the faculties and powers are unified, and so something which exceeds the faculties or powers, so grace can be understood as a "quasi-substance" (quasi substantia) because it is the whole in which its consonant virtues are unified, and so is something which exceeds its consonant virtues. Still, the 'quasi' signals that the similarity that is affirmed here is not to be understood as complete; for grace can with more seeming justification be understood as coinciding with each of its consonant virtues than the rational soul can with its consonant faculties and powers. Accordingly, even if grace, considered as the fullness of power perfecting the soul in well-being unto eternal life, can be understood as a quasi-substance because of its relation to its consonant virtues, it ought not on that account be understood as a subject in the manner in which the soul can be understood as a subject of the faculties or powers.59

Now the analogy can be extended a step further. The soul is the principle of life; the body is alive through the life of the soul. The soul is alive in God through the life of God quickening the soul and perfecting it in well-being, such that it is conformed and made pleasing to God and rendered suitably disposed for eternal life. This life of God quickening the soul is grace "poured into" the soul in order to make the soul pleasing to God and well-disposed for eternal life. Grace, then, can be understood as a life one has; indeed, a more noble or perfect life than the life one has in virtue of one's soul:

\[ ...\text{cum gratia det vitam anim[ae] sive vivificet, vivificando conformat Deo, confor\textit{mando facit se recte habere ad ipsum ut finem. Si autem volumus actus distinguere, primus actus} \]

59 Principe notes that in some instances 'substantia' is used as equivalent to 'essentia', as when Philip says that gratia gratum faciens and gratia gratis data differ "secundum substantiam." (See Walter H. Principe, The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century, vol. 4, Philip the Chancellor's Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1975), p. 57. He adds (p. 58) that "[f]or Philip the basic notion of substance is that of existing \textit{per se}" and then it is opposed to accidents which inhere in the substance.)
universalis grati[a]e est vivificare sive Deo acceptare, secundus illuminare, tertius conformare vel unire, quartus rectificare sive rectum ad Deum facere. Primum facit gratia ut gratia, secundum ut est lux, tertium ut est amor generalis, quartum ut est iustitia generalis.  

Third, one can now return to the definition and the concept of the *habitus*. Grace, as the life of God quickening the soul, as it exists in the soul, can be understood, Philip believed, as a kind of *habitus*, something one has as a quality of oneself in a more or less permanent manner. Now, the concept of *habitus* is fruitful in affording some analogical understanding of grace if and only if, while maintaining its integrity as a concept, it is amenable to extension beyond its more usual application to the parts, namely, to the faculties or powers, and to having application to the whole, namely, to the essence of the soul. There is at least a hint of a warrant in Aristotle for such an application:

...‘Having’ or ‘habit’ [*hexis*] means a certain disposition whereby the thing disposed is well or badly disposed, either in relation to itself or to something else; for example, health is a sort of having or habit and is such a disposition. Again the term ‘having’ or ‘habit’ is used if there is a part of such a disposition. And for this reason any virtue pertaining to the powers of the soul is a sort of having or habit.

Philip does not cite this text in his discussion of grace; so one cannot claim there is direct evidence that he had it in mind when he generalized the application of ‘*habitus*’ beyond the faculties or powers to the essence of the rational soul. Indeed, it may have been his own creative insight that enabled him to take this step. But even supposing this to be true,

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60 Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de Bono, de bono grati[a]e, de bono grati[a]e in homine*, II, de gratia gratum faciente, q. 4, utrum idem sit iustitia generalis quod gratia aut virtus, 41-46. Summarizing all of this, Stebbins writes: “In attempting to grasp the meaning of the Pauline theme of the life that comes through faith in Christ (e.g., Romans 1:17, Galatians 2:20), Philip made use of the Aristotelian distinction between the soul and its operative faculties. Just as those faculties represent potencies flowing from the soul, which is the principle that gives life to the body, so the virtues of faith and charity represent potencies flowing from grace, which is the principle that gives a higher kind of life to the soul, making it pleasing to God and thereby rendering works performed through charity worthy of eternal merit. In this manner the use of a natural analogy enabled Philip to distinguish grace from faith and charity, instead of identifying them with one another, and to specify their interrelationship.” Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative*, p. 81.

the familiarity with Aristotle's writings he displays throughout *Summa de Bono*, coupled with the typically Aristotelian distinctions he employs regarding human beings in his discussion of grace in general, provide strong evidence that Aristotle's metaphysical psychology was the philosophical background that enabled the insight to emerge.62

Moreover, there is ample evidence that Philip was aware of the general strictures under which such a step could be taken. Some thirty years after the *Summa de Bono* was written, Thomas Aquinas would remark:

A *habitus*...is a disposition adapted to a particular nature or activity. A *habitus* which is a disposition adapted to a nature cannot be a *habitus* of the soul, if the nature in question is human nature, because the soul is itself the form which brings human nature to completion; and therefore, though there can be a *habitus* or disposition of the body adapted to the soul, there cannot be a *habitus* or disposition of the soul adapted to the body. But if the nature in question is a superior nature which a human being may come to share, in the way in which St. Peter speaks of us being made sharers in the divine nature, then...there is no reason why there may not be a *habitus* of the essence of the soul, namely grace.63

Now from this, the aforementioned general strictures can be specified. Thus, one can argue that since a *habitus* is a perfection, there can be a *habitus* that applies to the rational soul if and only if such a *habitus* stands to the rational soul as perfecting to perfectible. Considered in itself, then, the *habitus* must be in some sense “superior” or “more noble” in perfection than the soul it perfects. And even though the rational soul brings human nature to completion, it must in some sense still be able to stand to such a *habitus* as incomplete and receptive. Finally, it follows that such a *habitus* cannot be acquired through human effort, but must be bestowed as gift.

Philip explicitly affirmed each of these points. That he regarded grace as a

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62 “Philip...knew Aristotle directly and he quite regularly quotes or refers to most of the Stragirite’s work.” Principe, *Philip the Chancellor’s Theology*, p. 25

63 St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 50, a. 2, c.
perfection of the rational soul in well-being, such that the graced person is now ordered to eternal life or beatitude, is apparent from the text lately summarized.\textsuperscript{64} If further confirmation is demanded, let the following remark suffice:

\ldots gratia est secunda perfectio rationalis creaturae, et h[e]c datur secundum causam formalem in comparatione ad subiectum.\textsuperscript{65}

Next, the greater nobility of grace may be considered a corollary of the first point. But if that is deemed insufficient, explicit affirmation by Philip of the greater nobility of grace is not lacking. For in the third question regarding grace in general, the following objection is put:

\ldots accipitur quod nulla forma nobilior secundum suum esse dependet a substantia minus nobili. Sed omnium creaturarum simillima Deo est gratia aut gloria. Ergo non dependebit esse eius a subiecto in quo est.\textsuperscript{66}

In the course of answering the specific objection, the response affirms and seeks to clarify the greater nobility of grace:

Ad illud vero quod obicitur gratiam esse formam nobiliorum quam suum subiectum, et ita non dependeat a subiecto, dicendum est quod quantum ad quod nobilior est, scilicet in genere bonitatis, quantum ad quid minus nobilis, quia esse materiale capit ex illo, ita quod hoc sit substantia gratia vero ens in substantia.\textsuperscript{67}

As regards the third point, Philip explicitly affirms a receptivity to grace in rational creatures:

Cum dicitur quod voluntas pr[a]ecedit gratiam, intelligendum est de voluntate ut est potentia susceptiva, non ut est potentia effectiva\ldots Et non intelligitur precessio semper tempore, sed

\textsuperscript{64} See the text from Philip quoted in footnote 57.

\textsuperscript{65} Philip the Chancellor, \textit{Summa de Bono: de bono gratia[e], de gratia in generali}, q. 1, de diversis acceptionibus gratiae et eius rationibus, 56-57.

\textsuperscript{66} Philip the Chancellor, \textit{Summa de Bono, de bono gratia[e], de gratia in generali}, q. 3, utrum gratia sit forma dependens a subiecto, 22-24.

\textsuperscript{67} Philip the Chancellor, \textit{Summa de Bono, de bono gratia[e], de gratia in generali}, q. 3, utrum gratia sit forma dependens a subiecto, 70-73.
natura prius. Dico autum naturam materi[a]e qu[a]e est ad recipiendum, non naturam form[a]e qu[a]e est ad agendum.\textsuperscript{68}

Ad id vero quod obicitur de potentia suscipiendi, qua mediante inest gratia, dicendum est quod non est potentia distincta ad aliquem actum, sed sicut materia eo ipso quo est potest recipere formam qua vivit in Deo; est enim Deus vita anim[a]e sicut anima vita corporis.\textsuperscript{69}

Finally, regarding the last point, he speaks not of grace being acquired through human effort, but as infused together with its consonant virtues:

...nota... quod gratia et virtutes simul infunduntur....\textsuperscript{70}

Philip, then, seemed well aware of the general strictures under which the concept of \textit{habitus} could be extended beyond its usual application to the faculties or powers and applied to the rational soul itself.

The operative goal of such an extended application was not adventurous speculation, but, as already indicated, the achievement of some fruitful, analogous understanding of the mystery of God's gift of divine life to us, as it exists in us. If Philip believed that one means to attain this goal was to take the already existing concept of \textit{habitus}, newly available in its Aristotelian elaboration within the matrix of Aristotelian metaphysical psychology, and attempt to refashion it into theological service, he effectively acknowledged in his performance that the teachings of faith provided the operative norm his attempt had to meet. As also already indicated, his way of expressing the relevant norm of faith was to say that God's compassionate regard for us, as far as

\textsuperscript{68} Philip the Chancellor, \textit{Summa de Bono, de bono grati[a]e, de gratia in generali,} q. 2, \textit{utrum gratia ponat aliquid in subiecto}, 33-37.

\textsuperscript{69} Philip the Chancellor, \textit{Summa de Bono, de bono grati[a]e, de gratia in generali,} q. 2, \textit{utrum gratia ponat aliquid in subiecto}, 44-48.

\textsuperscript{70} Philip the Chancellor, \textit{Summa de Bono, de bono grati[a]e, de bono grati[a]e in homine, II, de gratia gratum faciente,} q. 2, \textit{an virtus sit gratia}, 91-92.
it is manifested by the life of God in us we call grace, must be thought of as penetrating to the very essence of one's soul and ordering one in one's entire reality to beatitude or eternal life. To be of service in elucidating the life of God as it exists in us, then, the norm of faith demands that the concept of *habitus* be refashioned to apply to the rational soul and not just to the faculties or powers.

Further, the concept would not be of service if the refashioning dismembered the concept's integrity. Integrity is preserved, even while the application is extended, if the *patterns* of relationships are similar and recognizable in the extension, even though the terms of the relations are extended.  

Now allowing for the difference created by the fact that the perfection of grace entirely exceeds the perfection of the rational soul, and so grace cannot be acquired through human effort, the other strictures indicate the conditions necessary to maintain the pattern of relationships, and so the integrity of the concept, even while it was refashioned for theological service in accordance with the norm of faith.

By explicitly acknowledging and observing the strictures that guaranteed the integrity of the concept in its extended application, Philip fulfills the further condition necessary to achieve some fruitful, analogous understanding of the mystery of God's gift of divine life to us, as it exists in us. His characterization of grace as a *habitus universaliter totius vit[a]e ordinativus* expresses this understanding. And like the theorem of the supernatural, and amid various shifts in terminology, the significance of this understanding quickly took root and was further clarified in subsequent theological

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71 On this issue, compare what Lonergan says on implicit definitions in *Insight*, p. 37.
reflection.\textsuperscript{72}

2 The Special Presence of the Holy Spirit

Let us now turn to a second stream of theological reflection, namely, the constant tradition concerning the indwelling or inhabitation of the Holy Spirit.

2.1 The Witness of the New Testament

There are abundant references in the New Testament to the indwelling or inhabitation of the Father and Son, and the abiding gift of the Spirit in Jesus and in us.

Thus, in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, Jesus is identified as the one who fulfils the prophecies of Isaiah which speak of the chosen servant upheld by God, of the anointed one in whom God delights and endows with his spirit to bring good news to the poor. Jesus is the chosen one and anointed one of God, God's beloved, the one in whom God delights, the one whom God endows with his Spirit to proclaim good news to the poor and justice to the nations (Mt. 12:18; Lk. 4:18-22; cf. Is 42:1; 61:1). Again, he is the one God has anointed with the Holy Spirit and power (Ac. 10:37-38). Indeed, God has given Jesus the Spirit without reserve or without measure, and therefore his words are God's own words (Jn. 3:34).

The Spirit descended upon Jesus in a manifest way at his baptism by John in the Jordan (Mt. 3:16; Mk. 1:10; Lk. 3:22; cf. Jn. 1:32). Further, we read that after his baptism, Jesus was filled with the Holy Spirit when he withdrew into the wilderness (Lk. 4:1). And

\textsuperscript{72} Albert the Great, for one, spoke of the "universalis habitus" (See his Summa Theologica, II, tr. XVI, q. 99, m. IV.) The term that eventually became standard, however, was 'habitus entitativus'.

after undergoing the temptations in the wilderness, he began the Galilean ministry with the power of the Spirit in him (Lk. 4:14).

God’s abiding gift of his Spirit is not confined to Jesus alone. For Luke tells us that the heavenly Father gives the Holy Spirit to those who ask him (Lk. 11:13). Now on the last day of the festival of Tabernacles, Jesus alludes to the gift of the Spirit to be given to those who believe in him, and likens it to streams of living water flowing from within (Jn. 7:37). Later, in his farewell discourse to the Apostles, he speaks again of the gift of the Spirit. He tells them that even though he is going away and will be with them only a little while longer they are not to let their hearts be troubled. Rather, they are to trust in God and in him (Jn. 13:33; 14:1). He promises that if they love him and keep his commandments, his word, not only will the Father love them, but he and the Father will come to them, and to anyone who believes, and make their home in them (Jn. 14:23). Moreover, he tells them he will ask the Father to give them the Spirit of Truth, the Advocate, which the world cannot accept, to be with them, to be in them, forever (Jn. 14:15-17; cf. 1 Jn. 3:24). The Father will send the Advocate, the Holy Spirit, to the Apostles in Jesus’ name; and unless Jesus goes, the Advocate will not come (Jn. 16:7). This Spirit, who goes out from the Father, will testify concerning Jesus and teach and remind them of all that he has said to them (Jn. 14:26, 15:26).

The gift of the Spirit is linked to the glorification of the Son (Jn. 7:38-39). Thus, we read that only after his resurrection does Jesus impart the Holy Spirit to the disciples in the action of breathing on them, when he sends them forth as the Father had sent him, giving them the power to forgive sins (Jn. 20:21-23). Again, just before his final departure Jesus tells the disciples they will receive power when the Holy Spirit comes upon them,
and they will witness to him (Jesus) throughout the world (Ac. 1:8; cf. Lk. 24:49). Thus, we read that at Pentecost the Apostles were filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in tongues (Ac. 2:4). Peter tells the crowd attracted initially by the noise of the wind that God is now fulfilling the words spoken by the prophet Joel, namely, to pour out the Holy Spirit on all humanity, even on slaves (Ac. 2:17-18). For Jesus, having received from the Father the promised Holy Spirit and been exalted to the right hand of God, now, in turn, has poured out the same Spirit on the Apostles (Ac. 2:33). The crowd is exhorted to repent, be baptized in the name of Jesus for the forgiveness of their sins, and receive the gift of the Holy Spirit (Ac. 2:38).

Beginning with the three thousand who responded to Peter’s exhortation (Ac. 2:41), the Acts of the Apostles gives many other examples of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Other parts of the New Testament also make reference to the gift of the Spirit given to those who become followers of Christ, especially in the Pauline epistles. But the perspective there is to remind those followers of the gift they have received and the hope that should be in them, and to exhort, entreat and admonish them to live in accordance with that gift. Thus Paul reminds the Christians in Rome of the hope validated by the love of God poured out into the hearts of the justified through the Holy Spirit who has been given to them (Rom. 5:5). Again, he exhorts them to concern themselves with spiritual things, for the Spirit of God has made his home in them. Indeed, unless they possess the Spirit of Christ, they do not belong to Christ. But if Christ is in them, even though their body may be dead because of sin, their spirit is alive. Moreover, if the Spirit of the one

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73 See, for example, Ac. 6: 3-5; 7: 55; 8: 14-17; 9: 17-18; 10: 44-47; 11: 15, 24; 13: 9, 52; 15: 8; 19: 1-7.
who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in them, that Spirit will give life even to their mortal body (Rom. 8: 9-11). Finally, Paul tells the Christians in Rome that the Spirit they have received is not a spirit that makes them a slave of fear, but one of adoption, enabling them to cry out “Abba, Father!” (Rom. 8:15; cf. Gal. 4:6).

Nor is the Spirit that Christians receive a spirit of this world. Rather, it is the Spirit who is from God, who reaches the depths of everything, even the depths of God, and who is now received by the followers of Christ in order that they may know the things freely given to them by God (1 Cor. 2:10-12). For example, they may know that they are each in their body a temple belonging to God, in which the Holy Spirit, who is from God and not from them, dwells (1 Cor. 3:16; 6:19). This is true irrespective of whether one is Jew or Greek, slave or citizen, since all were baptized in the one Spirit, into the one body of Christ, and given the one Spirit to drink (1 Cor. 12:13).

God has put the Spirit in the hearts of the followers of Christ not only to know the things already given freely by God, but also as the pledge and guarantee of what is to come. With the Spirit in them, God has anointed them, set his seal of ownership on them, and instilled in them a longing that their earthly, mortal tent will be swallowed up by life. Thus, even now they groan in anticipation of what is to come (2 Cor. 1:22; 5:5; cf. Tit. 3:4-8).

2. 2 Augustine’s Contribution

Francis Cunningham remarks that Augustine, as the primary patristic authority for the Scholastics, is “most especially... their source in the elucidation of the mysteries of the
divine missions and the divine inhabitation.” Accordingly, some consideration of his contribution to the constant tradition regarding the divine missions and the indwelling or inhabitation of the three-personed God is pertinent to present purposes.

2. 2. 1 The Letter to Dardarnus

In his letter to Dardanus concerning the presence of God, Augustine distinguishes between the universal presence of God in creation in virtue of his divinity, and God’s special presence by the grace of inhabitation or indwelling:

Although God is everywhere wholly present, He does not dwell in everyone. It is not possible to say to all what the Apostle says...: ‘Know you not that you are the temple of God and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?’ [1. Cor. 3:16]. Hence, of some the same Apostle says the opposite: ‘Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his’ [Rom. 8:9]. Who, then, would dare to think, unless he were completely ignorant of the inseparability of the Trinity, that the Father or the Son could dwell in someone in whom the Holy Spirit does not dwell, or that the Holy Spirit could be present in someone in whom the Father and the Son are not present? Hence it must be admitted that God is everywhere by the presence of His divinity, but not everywhere by the grace of His indwelling.

Because of God’s indwelling, we are, even in our pilgrim state, God’s temple in some measure. That measure varies among individuals; for God “does not...dwell equally in those in whom He does dwell.” To be more precise, God “is wholly present in the one in whom He does dwell, although this one does not receive Him wholly.” The source of

Cunningham, *Indwelling of the Trinity*, p. 46. Admittedly, reflection on the doctrine of divine inhabitation in the Scholastic period was hampered by limited access to the writings of the Greek Fathers. Cunningham indicates, however, that through such figures as Ambrose and Jerome, the core of the Greek tradition on the divine inhabitation was transmitted to the Latin Fathers (see. pp. 47-48). More particularly, Edward Hill remarks in the introduction to his translation of Augustine’s work on the Trinity (p. 38), that besides having a general knowledge of the kinds of linguistic and metaphysical problems concerning the Trinity that engaged the Greek Fathers, “it seems certain that Augustine had read the relevant writings [that is, those concerning the Trinity] of Gregory Nazianzen and Didymus the Blind [and] possibly also Basil the Great and Epiphanius of Salamis.”


the difference, then, is not the wholly present God, but one's capacity to receive the wholly present God. To the extent of one's capacity to receive the God who dwells and is wholly present in one, to that extent God registers and is recognized as a presence within one's consciousness.\textsuperscript{77}

In all in whom God dwells, however, God "works...secretly" and "carries on the building of His dwelling.\textsuperscript{78} God builds all of them up "by the grace of His goodness as His most beloved temple,"\textsuperscript{79} so that they may "advance in virtue and persevere in their progress."\textsuperscript{80} In this life, however, the building up does not reach the perfection of the "pure and everlasting temple."\textsuperscript{81} For that is the perfection of "the most blessed...who have this possession of God because they know Him."\textsuperscript{82}

In this life, typically, one can distinguish three states of reception. And if, as Augustine says, God works secretly and carries on the building of his dwelling, then at least in some instances these states can also be considered as successive stages of development in a person whereby his or her capacity to receive the wholly present God is gradually and progressively heightened and enhanced. First, there is the temporary non-knowing of baptized infants.\textsuperscript{83} Second, there is the non-recognition of sensual

\textsuperscript{77} Augustine, \textit{Epist.} 187, 6:18.

\textsuperscript{78} Augustine, \textit{Epist.} 187, 8:27.

\textsuperscript{79} Augustine, \textit{Epist.} 187, 6:19. The reference is to 1 Cor. 3:16, 6:9; 2 Cor. 6:16.

\textsuperscript{80} Augustine, \textit{Epist.} 187 8:27.

\textsuperscript{81} Augustine, \textit{Epist.} 187, 8:27, 29.


\textsuperscript{83} Augustine, \textit{Epist.} 187, 7:25, 8:26.
people, the "little ones" not in carnal but in spiritual age, whose capacity to receive
cognizably the wholly present God is minimal. They belong to the unity of the body of
Christ and "hold steadfast to the rule of faith"; yet, in spite of the Spirit of God dwelling
within, they perceive neither the Spirit within nor the things of the Spirit; so, for the
present, they must be fed on milk and not solid food.84 Third, there are the truly wise who,
knowing God and recognizing the Spirit of God within, glorify God and give thanks.85

In view of what is said in De Trinitate regarding the missions of the Son and Spirit,
their "practical identification" with the indwelling or inhabitation, and the understanding of
both in relation to "temporal and created knowledge of the proceeding and indwelling
Persons,"86 Cunningham understands Augustine as implying here neither utter non-
knowing in the case of baptized infants, nor utter non-recognition in the case of sensual
people. Augustine grants, he says, "that actual knowledge of God need not be present
for the indwelling." Still, he claims that for Augustine "some sort" of knowledge of God
founded on the grace-state, say an habitual knowledge, "is intimately connected with the
presence of God in the soul."87

84 See Augustine, Epist. 187, 8:26, 29. The reference is to 1 Cor. 2:14, 3: 1-2. The "sensual" people
Augustine has in mind here "do not make a dogma of their carnal thoughts" and so "are not hardened by
clinging to contentious excuses." Rather, they walk "the way of advancement," struggling with the
understanding, and moving towards "clear sight by their pious faith," which they eventually attain.

85 See Augustine, Epist. 187, 6:21, 8:29. The allusion is to Rom. 1: 21. One may add here, by way
of clarification, that in the first paragraph of Book XIV of The Trinity Augustine remarks: "...God himself is
supreme wisdom; but the worship of God is man's wisdom." Later in the same book (XIV, 15), he remarks:
"Let it [the mind]...remember its God to whose image it was made, and understand and love him. To put it
in a word, let it worship the uncreated God, by whom it was created with a capacity for him and able to share
in him. In this way it will be wise not with its own light but by sharing in that supreme light, and it will reign
in happiness where it reigns eternal."

86 See Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 52.

87 See Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 53.
In one sense, this goes beyond what Augustine says; for nowhere in the letter does he distinguish this knowledge as actual and habitual. In using the terms, then, there is a danger of foisting onto Augustine the kind of distinction that perhaps more properly belongs to the panoply of medieval speculation. Still, Cunningham cannot be faulted either for understanding Augustine as affirming an intrinsic connection between the special presence of God in the soul and knowledge of God, or for recognizing that the said knowledge is not all of a piece. Perhaps the issue lies not so much in the terms one might use to make the distinction, as it does in ensuring that whatever terms are used, the distinction they express can be clearly identified and anchored in Augustine's text. If that is achieved, the aforementioned danger is rendered largely innocuous.

Let us attempt, then, to identify and anchor in the text an affirmation of some kind of distinction with regard to the knowledge of God connected with the special presence of God in the soul. The Holy Spirit is said to dwell in baptized infants and the "little ones" in spiritual age "because He works in them secretly that they may be His temple, and He perfects His work in them as they advance in virtue and persevere in their progress."86

This is so even though there is no consciousness of the Spirit's presence in the first group, and little or no recognition of the Spirit's presence in the second. What is operative within both kinds of "little ones", because of God's secret, perfecting work, is a "call", an orientation, a direction.89 Its objective in this life is the state in which one knows God, recognizes the Spirit of God within, and glorifies and gives thanks to God. This kind of

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86 Augustine, Epist. 187, 8:27.

89 "...He is rightly said to dwell in those whom He has called according to his purpose, and whom He has received in order to justify and glorify them even before they are able to know His incorporeal nature..." Augustine, Epis. 187, 8:29.
recognition is actual or express knowledge of God, even if it falls short of knowing God face to face. For in this life, God can only be known in part, through a glass, in a dark manner.\textsuperscript{90} Beyond this life, the final objective of the "call", orientation or direction is the "most blessed" state of "those who have the possession of God because they know him." And this is "most complete, true and happy knowledge," the face to face, actual knowledge of God.\textsuperscript{91}

The objective in this life can be approached, and perhaps even attained, as certain conditions are gradually and progressively fulfilled. Then the presence of God can begin to register distinctively in consciousness, and even come to be recognized. Thus, with the passing of infancy the Spirit of God who dwells within registers in consciousness as the call, orientation or direction that results from God's "secret working", even if its whence, as from God, and its whither, as to God, remain more or less obscure or opaque. If one advances in the spiritual life, however, and ceases to be a "little one" in spiritual age, the opacity and obscurity may give way to a dim, dark-glass clarity, in which the Spirit of God may come to be recognized as one who dwells within and is possessed.

Because the final objective is not attained in this life, it is still a matter of hope. However, because the call, orientation or direction is towards the attainment of the "most blessed state" of possessing God because one knows God face to face, if the states of reception become successive stages in which one's capacity to receive the wholly present God is gradually and progressively heightened and enhanced, as conditions are

\textsuperscript{90} Augustine, Epist. 187, 8:29. Augustine is, of course, referring here to 1 Cor. 13:12.

\textsuperscript{91} Augustine, Epist. 187, 6:21; cf. 8:29.
fulfilled, then each successive stage, if compared to its prior stage, will more fully approximate the final objective of possessing God because one knows God face to face. Knowing God is concomitant with the graced state, though initially it exists in silent, seminal form. In this sense, one can speak of an inexpress or unknowing knowing that is "habitual", of something one has concomitantly with the graced state. Under God's "secret working", the potentialities of this silent, seminal, "habitual" knowledge gradually break forth in consciousness, and unfold and flower, as conditions are fulfilled and one is drawn ever closer to the final objective. The prior stages, then, are properly understood only in relation to their final objective, even if for *homo viator* that objective remains a matter of hope. Now, sometimes things are spoken of in divine Scripture, Augustine remarks, as if they were accomplished; but in reality they are still matters of hope.\(^{92}\) Such is the case here regarding the knowledge of God concomitant with the special presence of God in the soul; Scripture sometimes speaks of the final objective as if it were attained. Accordingly, in such speaking Scripture provides us with the very context needed for understanding properly the significance of the states and stages of reception prior to the attainment of the final objective, and, in particular, for characterizing them as inchoate forms of knowing.

2. 2. 2 *De Trinitate*

Turning now to *De Trinitate*, Cunningham remarks that in this work Augustine connects the visible mission of the Son and Spirit with the notion of the manifestation of the

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\(^{92}\) Augustine, *Epist.* 187, 8:27.
Persons, and then applies the same notion of manifestation to the invisible mission of Son and Spirit in order to provide some understanding of the indwelling and special presence of the Trinity in the soul.\footnote{See Cunningham, \textit{Indwelling of the Trinity}, p. 50.}

First, then, as regards the visible mission of the Son, Augustine remarks that “the invisible Father, together with the jointly invisible Son, is said to have sent this Son by making him visible.”\footnote{Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, II, 9.} ‘Being sent’ means a “going forth from the Father and coming into this world.”\footnote{Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, II, 7. The allusion is to Jn. 16:28.} This coming into the world is accomplished in the Son’s “issuing...from the hidden invisibility of the Father’s bosom,” his being “made visible,” and his “appear[ing] in the flesh,” in “created, bodily form,” by “being made of woman.”\footnote{See Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, II, 7, 8, 9, 10; III, 3.}

Next, the Holy Spirit can also be said to be sent because “[h]e was visibly displayed in a created guise,” whether it be as a dove descending on Christ, as a gushing wind, or as tongues of fire settling on the Apostles.\footnote{Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, II, 10.} Creation serves the creator in these actions; it responds to the “bidding of him who abides unchanging in himself,” and provides suitable “outward signs,” temporal, public manifestations of the Spirit’s mission. The manifestations “spring into being in time in order to signify him [the Holy Spirit] and show him in a manner suitable to human senses”; after which, they “ceased to be.”\footnote{Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, II, 12.} Their purpose is to “stir the minds of men, and draw them on from the public manifestation of
his coming in time to the still and hidden presence of his eternity sublime.\textsuperscript{99}

Augustine is, of course, well aware that taken by itself, this understanding of the missions of the Son and Spirit is incomplete and inadequate. For, on the one hand, it is insufficient to secure the equality of the one or ones who send with the one or ones who are sent, and, on the other, it does not explain why Old Testament theophanies, as visible manifestations of divinity, are not to be considered as missions. Accordingly, in Book IV of \textit{De Trinitate} Augustine attempts to probe more deeply into the nature of the missions of the Son and Spirit.

The rational mind, Augustine says, is meant to contemplate eternal things.\textsuperscript{100} The worldly-wise fancy that they need not live out of faith, and that they can purify themselves, grasp “the light of unchanging truth,” contemplate God and cleave to him.\textsuperscript{101} Those who live out of faith, on the other hand, recognize their need for a purification they acknowledge they cannot bring about themselves, before they can contemplate eternal things. For them the purification and adaptation to the contemplation of eternal things is by way of temporal means: “the rational mind...while still needing purification [is meant] to give faith to temporal things.” For we are purified by giving our faith to “things done in time for our sakes.” Through such purification, our faith will be transformed into eternal

\textsuperscript{99} See Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, II, 10, 11.

\textsuperscript{100} See Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, IV, 24. Cunningham remarks in a footnote (\textit{Indwelling of the Trinity}, p. 67, footnote no. 71) that “[t]he word ‘mens’...signifies for Augustine the higher, spiritual part of the soul, embracing both intellective and appetitive powers....” In the forward to Books IX-XIV of his translation of \textit{The Trinity} (p. 260), Edmund Hill makes much the same point: “[the word ‘mens’] means more than ‘mind’ commonly means in English; it is the subject of the higher psychic functions, volitional and affective as well as cognitive. One might be inclined to say that it is practically synonymous, or at least coterminous, with what he [Augustine] calls the inner man; only he seems most to use it when he is talking about the highest or the innermost function of the inner man....”

\textsuperscript{101} Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, IV, 20.
truth, and our mortality will be transformed in the attainment of the promised eternal life of knowing the one true God and Jesus Christ whom he has sent.\textsuperscript{102}

The Son of God was sent to accomplish our purification. Co-eternal with the Father, in becoming Son of man he entered into our temporality and mortality in order to set us free from death, perishability and liability to change, and to provide us with a bridge to eternity by eliciting and taking our faith to himself and drawing it to his own eternal truth.\textsuperscript{103}

Now, one might suppose that insofar as the one who is made is less than the one who makes, the Son, as the one who is sent by being made visible, is less than the Father who sends. However, the Son is both the one through whom all things were made and the one who is sent. Because the Son is the one through whom all things were made, "what was seen in the Son was the work of Father and Son who remain unseen; that is that the Son was sent to be visible by the invisible Father together with the invisible Son."\textsuperscript{104} Moreover, as the one who is sent, the Son "took on our mortality in such a way that he did not lose his own divinity"; he took on our changeability without changing his divinity.\textsuperscript{105} In other words, the Son is truly the one who is sent; but his personal equality with the Father is not lost or compromised in his being sent. His mission truly includes his personal equality with the Father and his relation to the Father. For the Son is none other than the one who is from the Father; the Father is the begetter, the Son is the begotten.

\textsuperscript{102} See Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, IV, 24. The allusion is to Jn. 17:3.

\textsuperscript{103} See Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, IV, 24.

\textsuperscript{104} Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, II, 9.

\textsuperscript{105} Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, IV, 24; V, 5.
So the one who is from the Father is the one who is sent. If the Son, the one who is from the Father, is the one who is truly sent, then the meaning of ‘being sent’ cannot prescind from this relation of the Son to the Father, although its meaning necessarily includes created, temporal manifestations. Indeed, not only can the meaning not prescind from the relation of the Son to the Father; its core content must be identified with this relation:

...the Son is not just said to have been sent because the Word became flesh, but that he was sent in order for the Word to become flesh, and by his bodily presence to do all that was written. That is, we should understand that it was not just the man who the Word became that was sent, but that the Word was sent to become man. For he was not sent in virtue of some disparity of power or substance or anything in him that was not equal to the Father, but in virtue of the Son being from the Father, not the Father being from the Son.  

The Son is the Word and Wisdom of the Father, the undiminished outflow of the Father’s glory, the undiminished brightness of eternal light; and this Son is the one who became man. If the Son is truly sent to us, then by such sending accessibility to the Word and Wisdom of the Father, to the undiminished outflow of the Father’s glory, to the undiminished brightness of eternal light, to the Son, therefore, in his divine relation to the Father, is rendered possible for us through the purification of faith in the Son by which we make progress towards God. Thus, Augustine remarks that the Word of God is sent by the one whose Word he is “when he is known and perceived” by the one to whom he is sent “as far as he can be perceived and known according to the capacity of a rational soul either making progress towards God or already made perfect in God.”

As regards the Son, then, the full meaning of ‘being sent’ includes, besides the core content of being born of the Father, two additional contents: first, the visible mission,
namely, that the Word born of the Father, by being made flesh "showed himself to the world" precisely as the one born of the Father "from eternity to eternity"; second, the invisible mission, namely, that the Son is known in time by the rational soul to be the one born of the Father. In this sense, 'the Son is sent' means the Son in his relation to the Father is known in time. Thus, Augustine remarks that "just as being born means for the Son his being from the Father, so his being sent means his being known to be from him."  

What is said regarding the invisible mission of the Son can also be said regarding the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit who is not born or begotten of the Father, but who proceeds or comes forth as being given from the Father and Son:

[Just as for the Holy Spirit his being the gift of God means his proceeding from the Father, so his being sent means his being known to proceed from him.]  

Now, 'gift of God' is the proper and personal name of the Holy Spirit; in the present context one speaks of the gift of God not in reference to the divine majesty considered in itself and according to substance, but in reference to another and according to a relationship. For the Holy Spirit is called "the Spirit of the Father and the Son who gave him"; he "comes forth...not as being born, but as being given...."  

Thus, the Holy Spirit

\[106\] Augustine, The Trinity, IV, 29.

\[109\] Augustine, The Trinity, IV, 29. He adds immediately: "Nor...can we say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son as well...." Hill remarks (p. 184, footnote 95) that this sentence and the parallel sentence just quoted regarding the Son "are the culmination of the whole discussion of the divine missions from Book II onward."

\[110\] Augustine, The Trinity, V, 15. The distinction between what is said of God in reference to the divine majesty itself and according to substance and what is said of God in reference to another and according to a relationship is found in V, 9.
is called the gift of God in reference to the Father and Son as origin.111 Moreover, the Holy Spirit comes forth as being given eternally from the Father and Son. Independently of there being anyone to whom the Spirit can be given, then, he “proceeds as to be giveable,” as the everlasting gift.112

The Spirit “is both God’s who gave it and ours who receive it.”113 Accordingly, while the Holy Spirit is called “gift of God” primarily in relation to the Father and Son as origin, he is also called “gift of God” in relation to those to whom he is given “from a point of time”; he is not only the donum, then, but also the donatum:

[W]hat has been given is referred both to him who gave and to those it was given to; and so the Holy Spirit is not only called the Spirit of the Father and the Son who gave him, but also our Spirit who receive him.114

The Spirit...is everlastingly gift, but donation only from a point of time.115

And just as the Son did not change in taking on our changeability, so the Spirit’s being given to us is a change in us, not a change in him. For

when he [God] is called something with reference to creation, while indeed he begins to be called it in time, we should understand that this does not involve anything happening to God’s own substance, but only to the created thing to which the relationship predicated of him refers... [T]he change takes place in us.... But in him no change at all. So...he begins to be our Father when we are born again in his grace, because He gave us the right to become sons of God (Jn 1:12). So our substance changes for the better when we are made his sons; at the same time he begins to be our Father, but without any change in his substance. So it is clear that anything that can begin to be said about God in time which was not said about him before is said by way of relationship, and yet not by way of a modification of God, as though something has modified him. It is however said by way of

111 Augustine, The Trinity, V, 15.
112 Augustine, The Trinity, V, 16, 17.
113 Augustine, The Trinity, V, 15.
115 Augustine, The Trinity, V, 17.
a modification of that with reference to which God begins to be called it.\textsuperscript{116}

Now, what is this change or modification in creation that is connected with the invisible mission of God the Holy Spirit? The Son is said to be sent invisibly if and only if the rational soul knows or can know him to be from the Father. Similarly, the Holy Spirit is said to be sent invisibly if and only if the rational soul knows or can know him to be from the Father and Son.\textsuperscript{117} For Augustine, then, these manifestations of the proceeding Persons in knowledge are the changes or modifications in creation connected with the invisible missions of both the Son and Spirit.\textsuperscript{118}

If this interpretation is correct, it gives rise to two closely connected questions: What kind of knowing is this? And how exactly does it arise? For already, in the brief discussion of Augustine's letter to Dardanus, it was evident that the knowing connected with the special presence and possession of God in the soul is not all of a piece, and that there are conditions attached to the movement from a less complete form of knowing to a more complete form. Hill calls this question the “ultimate communications problem” between God and humankind, solved in an ad hoc manner in the first seven books of De Trinitate by appealing to faith, but now, in the pivotal Book VIII, the focus of sustained

\textsuperscript{116} Augustine, *The Trinity*, V, 17. Thus, as with the mission of the Son, the Holy Spirit is not less than the Father or Son because he is given. For “[h]e is given as God’s gift in such a way that as God he also gives himself.” *The Trinity*, XV, 36.

\textsuperscript{117} See footnotes 108, 109 and 110 above.

\textsuperscript{118} “For Augustine... a mission necessarily implies some sort of manifestation of a proceeding Person. But because of this very fact, one must carefully distinguish between the processions themselves and the knowledge of them acquired in time.... To send does not involve authority but rather the intention of making evident the proceeding Persons or Their processions; to be sent is to be known or knowable in time. The authority of God is entailed not in respect to the Persons, then, but in respect to something created, by means of which the Persons become recognizable by the rational creature on whose behalf the Persons are sent.” Cunningham, *Indwelling of the Trinity*, pp. 51-52. The latin phrase that summarizes this doctrine is: *mitti est cognosci.*
Indeed, Augustine himself describes Book VIII as an effort to understand God, whose nature is incorporeal and unchangeable, insofar as God can be understood through truth itself beheld by understanding, through the highest good from which every (other) good derives, through our capacity to recognize we ought to love what is just or righteous (iustus) even if we are not just or righteous ourselves, and through our coming to participate in the charity scripture identifies with God. And at last, with charity, Augustine adds, “our minds begin to perceive some kind of trinity or trio, like lover and what is loved and love.” Accordingly, at least this much seems clear regarding the “ultimate communications problem” between God and humankind: for Augustine, the knowing that provides the solution to this problem is a knowing that is intimately and perhaps even intrinsically connected with charity; it is a knowing that springs from love.

Let us begin, then, with truth. God is truth, God’s being is truth itself, Augustine says, for God is light or intelligibility itself. This is not the light that can be seen with bodily eyes, but the unchangeable light that can be glimpsed with the eyes of the heart; usually, however, only in a momentary, elusive flash of understanding, when, say, one hears it said that God is truth. For the yet-to-be-purified heart is weighed down with “flesh-bound habits of thoughts” and the blinding scars that result from wayward wandering; it cannot abide in the flash of understanding; it quickly glides back toward “familiar and earthy things.”

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119 See the introductory essay to Book VIII of his translation of The Trinity, pp. 237-8. The entire introductory essay (pp. 237-240) is an instructive statement of the movement of Augustine’s thought in Book VIII.

120 Augustine, The Trinity, XV. 5.

121 See Augustine, The Trinity, VIII, 2, 3.
Again, we have some notion of good itself "impressed on us." Its presence is evidenced in our capacity properly to discern, approve, order, and prefer one to another, the various goods subject to change. This notion is not of this or that good, but of "the good of every good," the good in which every good subject to change participates. As with truth, the good of every good would be clearly discerned in the various changeable goods if the attention of our yet-to-be-purified hearts was not absorbed in this or that good, and we could for a moment "put them aside," shift our attention, and regard good itself. Moreover, in that moment of enlightenment we would understand that God is the good of every good, good itself, the good that is not good by a good other than itself. For good itself is the unchangeable good without which there would be no changeable good.\textsuperscript{122} God alone is by nature eternal and therefore unchangeable. Again, God is the origin of every being and so the origin of every changeable good. Consequently, in that moment of enlightenment we would understand that the notion of good itself, "impressed on us," is the notion of the source from whom each and every changeable good derives; it is the notion of the originating, unchangeable, primary good we call God.

Now, good is the object of love; we "only love what is good."\textsuperscript{123} Just as we ought to love the various changeable goods in accordance with their proper ordering with respect to the unchangeable good, so we ought to turn to God as the unchangeable

\textsuperscript{122} "...there would be no changeable good things unless there were an unchangeable good." Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 5.

\textsuperscript{123} Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 4.
good, and cleave with love to God above all else. For God is the "good of the soul"; and by such cleaving we each become a "good soul." Indeed, were we able properly to cleave to God with love, not only would we each become a "good soul"; we would also perceive God and "straightaway enter into bliss." For a "good soul," as Augustine intends the term here, is not simply the goodness of the soul "just because it is soul." As with every good other than good itself, the soul is good by participating in the unchangeable goodness of the unchangeable good. In addition to this goodness of the soul, however, there is a more complete created participation in the unchangeable goodness of the unchangeable good that is intended for the rational soul. For Augustine, a "good soul" is good by deliberately turning with love to the unchangeable good itself, to "the good from which it gets its being soul at all." For then the soul is true to the artistry according to which it was made and "the reason why it was worth making." And if it does so turn, then the essential dynamism of its being is in harmony with its maker's intention for it, namely, that it be gradually purified and perfected in goodness, and finally see face to face the one who is truth itself, and so enter into bliss.

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124 "...when other things [other than God] are only loved because they are good, you should be ashamed of so clinging to them that you fail to love the good itself which makes them good." Augustine, The Trinity, VIII, 5.

125 See Augustine, The Trinity, VIII, 2, 3, 4, 5. In Bk. XV, 5, he remarks that the happy life is nothing if not eternal, and is promised to us in the contemplation of the three-personed God.

126 The word Augustine is using here, which Hill has translated as 'soul', is 'animus'. Later, at the beginning of Book XV, Augustine will refer to certain Latin authors using 'animus' "to distinguish what is pre-eminent in man and not found in beasts..." and their use of 'anima' for man and beasts alike. Accordingly 'soul' is to be understood here as the principle of life precisely as rational and spiritual. Hill, therefore, sometimes uses 'mind' instead of 'soul' in his translation.

127 See Augustine, The Trinity, VIII, 5.
the abiding vision of God face to face.\textsuperscript{128}

The way of purification is the love of charity, mounting, under the impetus of the truth or reality or form within, from the neighbour one sees to the God one does not yet see. Earlier, in discussing Augustine's letter to Dardanus, reference was made to the "secret working" of God in the "little ones" in spiritual age, whereby they are purified and move towards the objective possible in this life of knowing and recognizing the Spirit of God within, and glorifying and giving thanks to God. Here, Augustine, in effect, is offering an illustration of this process of purification, in so far as it is open to human scrutiny. We love what we know and, as a first approximation, we know by what we are. Thus, "we know what mind is...from ourselves; there is mind in us." However, this is only a first approximation. For "even the man who is not so yet knows what 'just' is." So, even if we are not just ourselves, we still learn what "just" is, if not by what we are, at least "from inside":

[I]t is in ourselves that we have learnt what "just" is. When I seek to express what it is I do not find the answer anywhere but with myself; and if I ask someone else what "just" is, he searches in himself to find the answer. And anyone who has ever been able to answer the question truly has found the answer in himself.\textsuperscript{129}

For Augustine, then, what "just" is is discerned as a truth or reality or form that one may behold and appreciate as present to oneself within oneself, even if one is not yet just

\textsuperscript{128} "...to behold and grasp God as he can be beheld and grasped is only permitted to the pure in heart—blessed are the pure in heart, because they shall see God (Mt 5:8); so before we are capable of doing this we must first love by faith, or it will be impossible for our hearts to be purified and become fit and worthy to see him." Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 6; cf. I, 3.

\textsuperscript{129} Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 9.
oneself.\textsuperscript{130} Or, perhaps more accurately, it is discerned as present to oneself as truth itself within oneself, and so as “inner truth” that is \textit{above} oneself.\textsuperscript{131}

Knowing what “just” is from inside, one may \textit{believe} that a person, say the apostle Paul, lived the life he proclaimed, and participated in or embodied that truth or reality or form. Now, under the impetus of the truth or reality or form within, one also already \textit{knows} from within oneself that people, especially ministers of God, should participate in or embody that truth or reality or form. When, therefore, one believes that they do, one is inclined and even fired to love them, and filled with the hope of eventually becoming like them.\textsuperscript{132} The love arises, it seems, because that same truth or reality or form is beheld and appreciated also as \textit{good}; for “love is of the good.”\textsuperscript{133} Further, this truth or reality or form within, beheld and appreciated as \textit{good}, is \textit{primary}; there is nothing prior, in which

\textsuperscript{130} "...when I say, and say with full knowledge [what “just” is]...I am perceiving something that is present to me, and is present to me even if I am not what I perceive.... And anyone who hears me and knowingly agrees with me also perceives the same thing in himself, even if he is not what he perceives. When a just man says it he perceives and says what he himself is. And where would he too perceive it if not in himself? But this of course is not surprising; where after all would he perceive himself if not in himself? “What is wonderfully surprising is that a mind should see in itself what it has seen nowhere else, and see something true, and see something true that is a just mind, and be itself mind, and not be the just mind which it sees in itself. Is there then another mind in the mind that is not yet just? If not, then what is it seeing there when it sees and says what a just mind is, and does not see it anywhere but in itself, though it is not itself a just mind? Or is perhaps what it sees the inner truth present to the mind which is capable of beholding it? Not all are so capable, and of those who are, not all are what they behold, that is to say they are not just minds in the same way as they can see and say what a just mind is.” Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 9.

\textsuperscript{131} See Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 9, 13. Hill’s comment here (see p. 257, footnote 31) is instructive: “Here the form of justice is concretely identified with the truth discussed in chapter 1 [VIII, 2,3], just as good itself was identified with the truth at the end of chapter 2, section 5.” Elsewhere, he writes, “Augustine chooses justice to illustrate his argument because it concretizes or specifies together the two cardinal ideas of the true and the good. Our minds are capable of discovering, and valuing \textit{truth}, and they constantly make judgments about the \textit{goodness} of the things.” Edmund Hill, \textit{The Mystery of the Trinity} (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985), p. 124.

\textsuperscript{132} See Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 8, 9, 13.

\textsuperscript{133} Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 14.
it can be said to participate or by which it can be said to be measured:

...a man who is believed to be just is loved and appreciated according to that form and truth which the one who is loving perceives and understands in himself; but this form and truth cannot be loved and appreciated according to the standard of anything else. We simply cannot find anything else besides this, which is such that from this something else that we know we can love by believing this form and truth, while it is still unknown to us. If in fact you ever observe any such thing else, it is this form and truth, and so is not any such thing else, because this form and truth alone is such as this form and truth is.\textsuperscript{134}

Thus, Paul can be recognized as having participated in the \textit{primary} truth or reality or form beheld and appreciated as good, and so as worthy of love.

Now if one is spontaneously inclined and even fired with love for certain people because they participate or embody the truth or reality or form of what “just” is, then even more so, by a kind of immanent exigence that the dynamism of one’s living should unfold consistently, ought one to \textit{relate} to this “inner truth”, beheld and appreciated as good, by cleaving to it with love. For one cannot consistently love a person on account of that person’s participation in a value, and not love the value itself. If one does love the value itself, one is secure in loving others truly, loving them with “spiritual charity.”\textsuperscript{135} For true love, Augustine says, “is that we should live justly by cleaving to the truth....”\textsuperscript{136} This “inner truth” provides the standard or measure for living justly and loving others with a true and not a covetous or improper love. Indeed, it provides the standard or measure that enables one’s love to extend to \textit{all} others. For the standard or measure enables one to love them

\textsuperscript{134} Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 9.

\textsuperscript{135} “...unless we also loved this form [justice] we would in no wise love him whom we love and appreciate by this form, but...as long as we are not just we love it less than is necessary for us to be able to become just ourselves.” Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 9. Love is spoken of as charity in sections 12 and 13.

\textsuperscript{136} Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 10.
either because they are just or in order that they may become just.\textsuperscript{137}

By coming to love others precisely in accordance with the standard or measure of this truth or form within, one becomes just oneself and attains the perfection of justice which is brotherly love or charity.\textsuperscript{138} For in cleaving to the form with love, one is \textit{formed} by that truth or form; one’s substance is changed or modified “for the better”. One becomes a “good soul”, knowing what “just” is no longer merely “from inside”, but from what one has now \textit{become}, from some actual participation or sharing in the “inner truth” of the form through love:

Not all are... capable [of beholding the “inner truth” of what a just mind is], and of those who are, not all are what they behold, that is to say that are not just minds in the same way as they can see and say what a just mind is. And how will they ever be able to be so but by cleaving to that same form which they behold, in order to be formed by it and become just minds, now no longer merely perceiving and saying that the mind is just which “knowingly and deliberately in life and in conduct gives each man what is his own,” but themselves now living justly and conducting themselves justly by giving each man what is his own.... And how is one to cleave to that form except by loving it?\textsuperscript{139}

In the transformation actually loving one’s neighbour brings about in one, one attains some knowledge of God and some understanding of the Trinity.\textsuperscript{140} Augustine remarks that one knows the love by which one truly loves one’s neighbour better than the

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\item \textsuperscript{137} See Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 9.
\item \textsuperscript{138} “…let us observe how much the apostle John commends brotherly charity: \textit{Whoever loves his brother, he says, abides in the light, and there is no scandal in him} (1 Jn 2:10). It is clear that he sets the perfection of justice in the love of one’s brother; for a man in whom there is no scandal is clearly perfect.” Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 12. Presumably, Augustine does not understand brotherly love or charity as just the perfection of justice, but as a reality that goes beyond justice while at the same time assuring perfect justice among human beings.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 9. Note that Augustine adds that we can love the form in a manner that is “less than necessary for us to be able to become just ourselves.”
\item \textsuperscript{140} “…in this question we are occupied with about the trinity and about knowing God, the only thing we really have to see is what true love is; well in fact simply what love is.” Augustine, \textit{The Trinity}, VIII, 10. So why, he asks in the next section, “should we go running round the heights of the heavens and the depths of the earth looking for him who is with us if only we should wish to be with him?”
\end{itemize}
neighbour one loves because the love is more present, more inward and more certain.\textsuperscript{141} Now this love is also appreciated as good. For such loving is the principle of purification, transformation and perfection in justice whereby each and every person becomes a “good soul”; it is the principle that “unites all the good angels and all the servants of God in a bond of holiness [and] conjoins us and them together....”\textsuperscript{142} Accordingly, this more present, more inward, more certain love is itself worthy of love. If one actually loves one’s neighbour with the “love of charity,” one has surrendered to, and one is participating in, the principle \textit{by which} one loves one’s neighbour, as it functions to purify, transform, perfect and unite rational creatures. The dynamism of one’s being has then been brought into fundamental harmony with the nature of the principle; one cannot at the same time not surrender, not participate, not be in harmony with the principle; one cannot at the same time not love the love \textit{by which} one loves one’s neighbour.\textsuperscript{143} Thus, Augustine writes:

...if a man loves his neighbor, it follows that above all he loves love itself....\textsuperscript{144}

Augustine identifies the love \textit{by which} one loves one’s neighbour with God. The

\textsuperscript{141} See Augustine, The Trinity, VIII, 12

\textsuperscript{142} Augustine, The Trinity, VIII, 12. At the end of Book VIII, Augustine remarks: “And what is love but a kind of coupling or trying to couple together two things, namely lover and what is being loved?”

\textsuperscript{143} "...no really holy being takes pleasure in his own power, but rather in the power of him from whom he receives the power to do whatever he appropriately can do...." Augustine, The Trinity, VIII, 11.

\textsuperscript{144} Augustine, The Trinity, VIII, 10. In section 11 Augustine writes: “...when we love charity, we love her loving something, precisely because she does love something. What then does charity love that makes it possible for charity herself also to be loved? She is not charity if she loves nothing; but if she loves herself, she must love something in order to love herself as charity. Just as a word indicates something and also indicates itself, but does not indicate itself as a word unless it indicates itself indicating something; so too charity certainly loves itself, but unless it loves itself loving something it does not love itself as charity. So what does charity love but what we love with charity? And this, to move beyond our neighbor, is our brother.” And in section 12 he remarks that “it is impossible that we should not love especially the love that we love our brother with.”
earlier identification of God with truth itself and good itself prepared the way for this identification. Now, the first epistle of John provides Augustine with an express warrant for expressly affirming it:

My dear people, let us love one another since love comes from God and everyone who loves is begotten by God and knows God. Anyone who fails to love can never have known God, because God is love... [S]ince God has loved us so much, we too should love one another. No one has ever seen God; but as long as we love one another God will live in us and his love will be complete in us. We can know that we are living in him and he is living in us because he lets us share his Spirit... God is love and anyone who lives in love lives in God.¹⁴⁵

To be full of love, then, is to be full of God.¹⁴⁶ Again, to love another with "brotherly love," with the love of charity, is to love the other "out of God."¹⁴⁷ And in such loving, we see God with an "inner vision":

Whoever... does not love his brother is not in love, and whoever is not in love is not in God, because God is love (1 Jn 4:8). Accordingly whoever is not in God is not in light, because God is light and there is no darkness in him (1 Jn. 1:5). Is it surprising then that a man who is not in light should not see light, that is not see God, because he is in darkness? Now he sees his brother with ordinary human vision which God cannot be seen by. But if he were to love with spiritual charity the one he sees with human vision, he would see God who is charity with the inner vision which he [God] can be seen by.¹⁴⁸

Now just as Wisdom is an attribute of the three-personed God, and so is common to the Father, Son and Spirit, so Love or Charity is an attribute of the three-personed God, and so is also common to the Father, Son and Spirit. However, besides this common use of the terms, 'Wisdom' and 'Love' or 'Charity', there is a proper or distinctive use in which the terms are understood in a manner not common to the Father, Son and

¹⁴⁵ 1 Jn. 4: 7-8, 11-13, 16.
¹⁴⁶ "...if a man is full of love, what is he full of but God?" Augustine, The Trinity, VIII, 12.
¹⁴⁷ "When...we love our brother out of love, we love our brother out of God...." Augustine, The Trinity, VIII, 12.
¹⁴⁸ Augustine, The Trinity, VIII, 12.
Spirit. Because the Son alone is the Word of God, the Son is called the “Wisdom of God” in a proper or distinctive sense. Again, because the Holy Spirit alone is the Gift of God, the Holy Spirit is called “Love” or “Charity” in a proper or distinctive sense, the one who “shows forth” the love of the Father and Son for each other and their communion.149

Scripture attests that the Holy Spirit, the Gift of God, Love or Charity, has been given to us.150 This gift alone distinguishes the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal perdition.151 Without it, no other gift, not even faith, can “bring us through to God.”152 Because of the gift of the Spirit, we abide in the three-personed God and the three-personed God abides in us.153 Again, because of the gift of the Spirit we are able to love God and neighbour with “spiritual charity,” and are fired to do so.154 Such love is transformative. And in this transformation, we come to share in God’s Spirit; and we are able to “see God who is charity” with the “inner vision” by which, alone, God can be known and the proceeding Persons in the divine nature can be manifested.

149 See Augustine, The Trinity, XV, 27-31, 37.

150 See Augustine, The Trinity, XV, 31-36.

151 “Nothing is more excellent than this gift of God [i.e. the Holy Spirit] This alone is what distinguishes between the sons of the eternal kingdom and the sons of eternal perdition.” Augustine, The Trinity, XV, 32.

152 “…this gift [of the Holy Spirit], surely, is distinctively to be understood as being the charity which brings us through to God, without which no other gift of God at all can bring us through to God.” Augustine, The Trinity, XV, 32.

153 “…the love which is from God and is God is distinctively the Holy Spirit; through him the charity of God is poured out in our hearts, and through it the whole triad dwells in us.” Augustine, The Trinity, XV, 32.

154 “…it is God the Holy Spirit proceeding from God who fires man to the love of God and neighbor when he has been given to him, and he himself is love. Man has no capacity to love God except from God.” Augustine, The Trinity, XV, 31.
2. 3  *Peter Lombard's Sententiae*

Cunningham remarks that although the common teaching regarding the indwelling or inhabitation of the three-personed God was kept alive by spiritual writers during the lengthy period between Augustine and Peter Lombard (ca. 1095-1160), no notable advance in theological understanding of the common teaching occurs until after Peter Lombard. Cunningham's enunciation of the main features of the common doctrine has already been presented, but it bears repeating. First, the three divine persons really, personally and substantially dwell in human beings. Second, this dwelling is unique; it is a special presence of the three-personed God entirely distinct from the common presence of God in creatures *per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam*. Third, this special presence is realized only in the just, and in some way by means of grace. Finally, this special presence is not exclusive to the Holy Spirit, but because of his personal property it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Now, the advance in understanding, according to Cunningham, occurs not with Peter Lombard, but with the Halesian *Summa*, with Bonaventure and, most especially, with Thomas Aquinas. All the same, by drawing on certain texts from Augustine's *De Trinitate*, and interpreting them in a manner that in subsequent theological reflection was generally regarded as unsatisfactory, Peter's

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155 "...tradition will perpetuate the doctrine of the inhabitation through the dark ages by such spiritual writers as Cassian, St. Gregory, St. Bede and St. Peter Damian, to climax in St. Bernard. But there will be little properly theological activity from the seventh to the eleventh century; what intellectual work is accomplished will be largely restricted to the collection of texts from the Fathers as commentaries on the Bible, the *florilegia* on which scholastic theologians will by force of necessity so largely depend for their patristic sources. So the intellectual movement inaugurated by St. Anselm and by Abelard will be a true revival; and theological tradition will find its primary source in St Augustine." Cunningham, *Indwelling of the Trinity*, p. 70. On the following page, Cunningham adds that "not a trace of the doctrine [of inhabitation] appears in the works of St. Anselm...nor in the *Theologia Christiana* of Abelard...."

156 See Chapter II, footnote 25.
Sententiae can at least be credited with setting the stage for that subsequent reflection and the resultant advance in theological understanding of the common teaching.

In distinction 17 of Book I of the Sententiae, which is concerned with the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit into the hearts of the faithful, Peter argues that the Holy Spirit is (identical with) the love or charity by which we love God and neighbour, and that on that basis the Holy Spirit can be said to be sent, given or bestowed upon the faithful.\textsuperscript{157} The argument is actually an appeal to the authority of Augustine, and it consists of a string of quotations from Augustine, some of which have already been referred to, at least in part.\textsuperscript{158}

First, then, on the basis of the following two texts, Peter concludes that Augustine's words \textit{satis ostendit...quod dilectio ipsa, qua diligimus Deum vel proximum, Deus est:}

\begin{quote}
Qui proximum diliget, consequens est ut ipsam praecepue dilectionem diligat. \textit{Deus autem dilectio est} [1 Jn. 4:8, 16]; consequens ergo est ut praecepue Deum diligat.\textsuperscript{159}

\textit{Deus dilectio est}, ut ait Ioannes apostolus.... Nemo dicat: Non novi quid diligam. Diligat fratrem, et diligat eandem dilectionem. Magis enim novit dilectionem qua diligit, quam fratrem quem diligit. Ecce iam potest notiorem Deum habere, quam fratrem, plane notiorem, quia praesentiorum, quia interiorem, quia certiorum. Amplectere dilectionem Deum, et dilectione amplectere Deum.... Quanto...sanctiores sumus, quanto a tumore superbiae inaniores, tanto sumus dilectione pleniores; et quo nisi Deo plenus est, qui plenus est dilectione?\textsuperscript{160}
\end{quote}

Second, as if to reinforce the point just made, Peter concludes on the basis of the

\textsuperscript{157} See Peter Lombard, \textit{Sententiae}, I d. 17, c. 1, 2. The invisible mission of the Son is discussed in distinction 15.

\textsuperscript{158} Most of the quoted texts are taken from Augustine's \textit{De Trinitate}. Those I present I shall give as they appear in distinction 17, sometimes abbreviating as Peter himself sometimes abbreviates Augustine's texts. I shall first give the location in \textit{De Trinitate} and then the place in Peter's \textit{Sententiae} where the text is quoted. The part of the quoted text that appears in bold type corresponds to the part of the quoted text that is italicised in the modern edition of Peter's \textit{Sententiae} I am using, and usually indicates a scriptural allusion.

\textsuperscript{159} Augustine, \textit{De Trinitate}, VIII, 10, as quoted in Peter Lombard, \textit{Sententiae}, I, d. 17, c. 2, 3.

\textsuperscript{160} Augustine, \textit{De Trinitate}, VIII, 11, 12, as quoted in Peter Lombard, \textit{Sententiae}, I, d. 17, c. 1, 3.
following two texts that Augustine apertissime dixit fraternam dilectionem Deus esse:

Dilectionem fraternam quantum commendet Ioannes apostolus, attendamus. Qui diligit, inquit, fratem, in lumine manet, et scandalum in eo non est [1 Jn. 2:10]. Manifestum est quod iustitiae perfectionem in fratris dilectione posuerit; nam in quo scandalum non est, utique perfectus est. Et tamen videtur dilectionem Dei tacuisse, quod numquam faceret, nisi quia in ipsa fraterna dilectione vult intelligi Deum. Apertissime enim in eadem Epistola, paulo post, dicit ita: Dilectissimi, diligamus invicem, quia dilectio ex Deo est; et omnis qui diligit, ex Deo natus est et cognovit Deum. Qui non diligit, non cognovit Deum, quia Deus dilectio est [1 Jn. 4:7]. Manifestum est quod iustitiae perfectionem in fratris dilectione posuerit; nam in quo scandalum non est, utique perfectus est. Et tamen videtur dilectionem Dei tacuisse, quod numquam faceret, nisi quia in ipsa fraterna dilectione vult intelligi Deum. Apertissime enim in eadem Epistola, paulo post, dicit ita: Dilectissimi, diligamus invicem, quia dilectio ex Deo est; et omnis qui diligit, ex Deo natus est et cognovit Deum. Qui non diligit, non cognovit Deum, quia Deus dilectio est [1 Jn. 4:7].

Qui non diligit fratrem, non est in dilectione; et qui non est in dilectione, non est in Deo, quia Deus dilectio est [162].

Third, Peter now shifts to Book XV of Augustine's De Trinitate to argue on the basis of the following series of texts that brotherly love is identical with neither God the Father nor God the Son, but with God the Holy Spirit:

Si in donis Dei nihil maius est caritate, et nullum est maius donum Dei quam Spiritus Sanctus, quid consequentius est quam ut ipse sit caritas quae dicitur et Deus et ex Deo? [163]

Ita enim ait Ioannes: Dilectio ex Deo est; et paulo post: Deus dilectio est. Ubi manifestat eam se dixisse dilectionem Deum, quam dixit ex Deo. Deus ergo ex Deo est dilectio. [164]

Ioannes, volens de hac re apertius loqui, in hoc, inquit, cognovimus quia in ipso manemus et ipse in nobis, quia de Spiritu suo dedit nobis [1 Jn. 4:13]. Spiritus itaque Sanctus, de quo dedit nobis, facit nos in Deo manere et ipsum in nobis; hoc autem facit dilectio; ipse est igitur Deus dilectio; ipse ergo significatur, ubi legitur: Deus dilectio est. [165]

Fourth, Peter appeals to the following text in order to exclude any weaker interpretation of the position he is affirming:

161 Augustine, De Trinitate, VIII, 12, as quoted in Peter Lombard, Sententiae, I, d. 17, c. 1, 4.
162 Augustine, De Trinitate, VIII, 12, as quoted in Peter Lombard, Sententiae, I, d. 17, c. 1, 4.
163 Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, 37, as quoted in Peter Lombard, Sententiae, I, d. 17, c. 2.
164 Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, 31, as quoted in Peter Lombard, Sententiae, I, d. 17, c. 2.
165 Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, 31, as quoted in Peter Lombard, Sententiae, I, d. 17, c. 2.
Non dicturi sumus caritatem non propterea esse dictam Deum, quod ipsa caritas sit uilla substantia quae Dei digna sit nomine, sed quod donum sit Dei, sicut dictum est Deo: Tu es patientia mea [Ps. 71:5]. Non utique ideo dictum est, quod Dei substantia est nostra patientia, sed quia ab ipso nobis est; unde alibi: Ab ipso est patientia mea [Ps. 62:5]. Hunc enim sensum facile refellit Scripturam ipsa locutio: tale est enim Tu es patientia mea, quale est Omne spes [Ps.71:5] et Deus meus mericordia [Ps. 59:17]. Hunc enim sensum facile refellit Scripturam ipsa locutio: tale est enim Tu es patientia mea, quale est Ommine spes [Ps.71:5] et Deus meus mericordia [Ps. 59:17], et multa similia. Non est autem dictum Domine caritas mea, aut Tu es caritas mea, aut Deus caritas mea, sed ita dictum est: Deus caritas est, sicut dictum est: Deus spiritus est [Jn. 4:24].

Fifth, having established to his own satisfaction that the Holy Spirit is (identical with) the love by which we love God and neighbour, Peter now specifies the manner in which the Holy Spirit is sent and given to us: the Holy Spirit is so in us that he enables us to love God and neighbour. In such loving, we abide in God and God abides in us, and we are said to possess the Holy Spirit in some measure. The following two texts from Augustine are enlisted in support of this position:

Deus Spiritus Sanctus, qui procedit ex Deo, cum datus fuerit homini, accendit eum ad diligendum Deum et proximum, et ipse dilectio est. Non enim habet homo unde diligat Deum, nisi ex Deo.

Dilectio...Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris, ut ait Apostolus, per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis [Rom. 5:5].... Dantur et alia per Spiritum munera, sed sine caritate nihil prosunt. Nisi ergo tantum impertiatur cuique Spiritus Sanctus ut eum Dei et proxime faciat amatorem, a sinistra non transfertur ad dexteram. Nec Spiritus Sanctus proprius dictur donum nisi propter dilectionem.... Quantum ergo bonum est, sine quo ad aeternam vitam neminem tanta bona perducunt! Ipsa vero dilectio vel caritas (nam unius rei nomen est utrumque) perducit ad regnum. Dilectio igitur quae ex Deo est et Deus, proprius Spiritus Sanctus est, per quem diffunditur in cordibus nostris Deus caritas, per quam nos tota inhabitet Trinitas. Quocirca rectissime Spiritus Sanctus, cum sit Deus, vocatur etiam donum Dei. Quod donum proprium quid nisi caritas intelligendum est, quae perducit ad Deum et sine qua quodlibet aliud Dei donum non perducit ad Deum?

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166 Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XV, 27, 28, as quoted in Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, I, d. 17, c. 3.

167 "Christo...qui est Dei Filius, non ad mensuram datus est Spiritus.... Ceteris autem ad mensuram datur, et datus additur, donec unicumque pro modo suae perfectionis propria mensura compleatur." See Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, I, d. 17, c. 5, 7. He is quoting here from Augustine’s work, in *Ionannis Evangelium Tractatus CXXIV, Tractatus LXXIV*, 3.


Peter's own conclusion follows:

Ecce hic aperitur quod supra dictum erat, scilicet quod caritas sit Spiritus Sanctus et donum excellentius, et quomodo hoc donum, id est Spiritus Sanctus, detur nobis, scilicet cum ita imperititur alicui, id est ita habet esse in aliquo, ut eum faciat Dei et proximi amatorum. Quod cum facit, tunc dicitur dari sive miti alicui, et tunc ille dicitur proprie habere Spiritum Sanctum.\footnote{Peter Lombard, Sententiae, I, d. 17, c. 4, 3.}

Even while writing, Peter acknowledges that his position is held only by a minority.\footnote{See Peter Lombard, Sententiae, I, d. 17, c. 6, 1.} He mentions three arguments advanced against the position he is defending. First, if the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father and Son, by which they love one another and us and we love God and neighbour, then it is \textit{one and the same} love by which God loves us and we love God. However, Augustine can be cited as making a real distinction between God's love for us and our love for God.\footnote{For the texts from Augustine that Peter cites as seeming to imply a position that contradicts his own, see his Sententiae, I, d. 17, c. 6, 2.} Accordingly, the loves are not one and the same.

Peter's response, in effect, is to allow that, for diverse reasons and causes, Scripture sometimes takes the expression, \textit{‘caritas Dei’}, ‘love of God’, as an objective genitive and sometimes as a subjective genitive, as do writers like Augustine. However, this in no way implies that the Holy Spirit, as the love by which God loves us, is not \textit{identical} with the love or charity by which we love God and neighbour. When Paul says in \textit{Romans} that the love of God is poured into our hearts, and when Augustine refers to the remark, the expression \textit{‘love of God’} functions as an objective genitive.\footnote{\textit{Cum...ab Apostolo dicitur caritas Dei diffundi in cordibus nostris}, non est dicta caritas Dei qua diligit nos, sed qua facit nos diligere: id est non ibi appellatur ‘caritas Dei’ eo quod Deos nos ea diligat, sed eo quod nos ea sui dilectores facit. Et quod ea ratione posset dici ‘caritas Dei’, quia nos ea diligere facit, ex}
Alternatively, when the first epistle of John speaks of the love of God, shown by God sending his Son as an atoning sacrifice for our sins (1 Jn. 4:10), and Augustine refers to this passage, the expression ‘love of God’ functions in this context as a subjective genitive. Thus Peter argues that all that has been shown by the quotations from Augustine is that for various reasons one and the same love referred to by the expression ‘love of God’ can be considered from different angles. It has not been shown that the love of God by which God loves us is not one and the same as the love by which we love God.

The second objection seeks to draw a parallel between faith as originating from the Holy Spirit and love as originating from the Holy Spirit. In the first text cited from Augustine purporting to show that Peter’s position is incorrect, Augustine speaks of the Holy Spirit as the one from whom faith originates. Faith, then, is not identical with the Holy Spirit. Similarly, the love by which we love God originates from the Holy Spirit. But if the Holy Spirit is himself the love by which we love God, then the Holy Spirit would originate from himself.

This objection, according to Peter, overlooks the fact that the Holy Spirit is truly a gift bestowed, that consequently there is a recipient for the one who is bestowed, and that the ‘from’ must be understood not just in relation to the giver, but also in relation to the recipient. Thus, the Holy Spirit is given to us from himself; the Holy Spirit himself gives himself to us; charity, the Holy Spirit himself, is in us from himself. Accordingly, there is

174 "Similiter et aliam exponimus auctoritatem, ubi ait dilectionem Dei commemorari, non qua nos eum, sed qua ipse dilexit nos: ac si diceret: commemorat dilectionem Dei, non secundum quod ea nos diligimus Deum, sed secundum quod ipse ea diligit nos." Peter Lombard, Sententiae, I, d. 17, c. 6, 4.

175 For this text, see Peter Lombard, Sententiae, I, d. 17, c. 6, 2.
no implication that the Holy Spirit originates from himself.

Finally, it is argued that Augustine can be cited as affirming that charity is an affection of the mind and a movement of the soul. But the Holy Spirit is neither. Augustine, therefore, does not identify the Holy Spirit with charity.

Peter's response to this objection highlights the key issue distinguishing his position from the position of those who comment on his text and disagree with him. Easily enough, it seems, he is able to respond adequately to the more obvious thrust of the objection. Just as God can be said to be our hope and our endurance because he makes us hope and endure, so the Holy Spirit as charity can be said to be an affection of the mind and a movement of the soul because through the Holy Spirit as charity the mind is affected and the soul is moved to love God. Nor is there anything untoward in calling the Holy Spirit or charity a movement in this sense. For the Book of Wisdom speaks of the Spirit of Wisdom as more mobile than any mobile thing (Wis. 7:24), meaning not that Wisdom itself is mobile, but rather that it reaches or penetrates all mobile things from its own immobility.

Now, the key point of disagreement between Peter and some of his more illustrious commentators emerges. The Holy Spirit operates in individuals as he wishes; through the Holy Spirit human beings are moved and affected in such a way that they come to

\[\text{176 For the texts, see Peter Lombard, Sententiae, I, d. 17, c. 6, 6.}\]

\[\text{177 "Non...mireris si caritas, cum sit Spiritus Sanctus, dicitur motus mentis, cum etiam in libro Sapientiae dicitur de Spiritu sapientiae [Wis. 7:22; 8:1]. quae attingit a fine usque ad finem, quod est actus mobilis, certus, incoinquinatus. Quod non ideò dicitur, quod Sapientiae sit mobile aliquid vel actus aliiquis, sed quia sui immobilitate omnia attigit: non locali motu, sed ut ubique semper sit et nusquam inclusa teneatur. Sic ergo caritas dicitur motus animi: non quod ipsa sit motus vel affectio vel virtus animi; sed quia per eam, quasi esset virtus, afficitur mens et movetur." Peter Lombard, Sententiae, I, d. 17, c. 6, 7.}\]
believe, to hope and to love. In the case of believing and hoping, the Holy Spirit brings about the acts through the *mediation* of the appropriate virtues of faith and hope. In the case of loving, however, the Holy Spirit, being himself Charity, brings about the act of loving God and neighbour in human beings *immediately*, that is, without the mediation of a virtue of charity:

...sane dici potest quia alios actus atque motus virtutm operatur caritas, id est Spiritus Sanctus, mediantibus virtutibus quorum actus sunt utpost actum fidei, id est credere, fide media; et actum spei, id est sperare, media spe: per fidem enim et spem praedictum operatur actus. Diligendi vero actum per se tantum, sine alciuus virtutis medio operatur, id est diligere. Aliter ergo hunc actum operatur quam alios virtutum actus; ideoque differenter de hoc et de aliis loquitur Scriptura, quae istum specialiter caritati tribuit.\(^{178}\)

For Peter Lombard, then, the Holy Spirit as Uncreated Charity is sent or given to us and abides in us in that the Holy Spirit himself, without any created mediation, brings about in us the acts by which we love God and neighbour.\(^{179}\) In such acts we respond to God's bidding and abide in the Love that abides in us; then we can truly be said to have or possess the Holy Spirit.\(^{180}\) There is no *created* charity apart from the *act* of charity which the Holy Spirit brings about in us. Thus, Peter's position expressly excludes any internal, created principle of the act, such as the *habitus* of charity. The internal principle of the act is Uncreated Charity, the Holy Spirit himself.

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\(^{178}\) Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, I, d. 17, c. 6, 8.

\(^{179}\) "...cum ita [Spiritus Sanctus] impartitur alciui, id est ita habet esse in aliquo, ut eum faciat Dei et proximi amatorem: quod cum facit, tunc dicitur dari sive mitti alciui; et tunc ille dicitur proprie habere Spiritum sanctum." Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, I, d. 17, c. 4, 3.

\(^{180}\) "Tunc enim [Spiritus Sanctus] mitti vel dari dicitur, cum ita in nobis est ut faciat nos diligere Deum et proximum: per quod manemus in Deo, et Deus in nobis." Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, I, d. 17, c. 4, 1.
CHAPTER V

The HALESIAN SUMMA

1 A Preliminary Clarification of the Issue

In the Halesian Summa the divine missions are understood as the eternal, uncreated processions of the Son from the Father and the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son, considered not just in themselves, but as encompassing or including, as consequent effect, the prolongation and visible or invisible *manifesting* or showing forth of the processions and the proceeding persons within temporal, created reality:

...dicendum est quod in missione duo sunt: est enim ibi principale significatum, quod est quid increatum; et est ibi aliquid connotatum, scilicet effectus in rationali creatura, quod est quid creatum: nam missio est processio alicuius personae manifestata in creatura vel manifestatio processionis aeternae facta rationali creaturae. Ratione ergo connotati, quod temporale est, dicitur missio temporalis; sed illud connotatum non praedicatur de ipsa nisi oblique, non in rectitudine; sed illud quod praedicatur de ipsa ratione principalis significati, quod est quid increatum, dicitur in rectitudine....

...dicendum quod est loqui de missione quantum ad principale significatum et quantum ad connotatum; ratione principalis significati est quid aeternum. Ratione connotati est ex tempore; cum autem aeternum coniungitur temporali in eodem termino, proprie loquendo debet iudicari temporale, sicut quando necessarium coniungitur contingenti, totum iudicatur contingens.

...dicitur...missio propter effectum aliquem, quia scilicet ille qui mittitur efficit aliquid quod prius non efficiebat. Et hoc est essentiale missioni, tamquam illud a quo imponuntur haec verba 'mittere' et 'mitti', licet principaliter significent aliquid increatum. Unde non solum exigitur distinctio inter mittentem et missum et illum cui fit missio, sed oportet quod aliquid procedat ab ipsis, scilicet alicuis effectus, qui prius non procedebat: nam ratione huius transfertur missio ad divina.

...dicendum quod natum esse de Patre non est tota ratio missionis, sed manifestari

1 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 71, m. 2, c. 2, ad. 1.

2 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 71, m. 4, c. 4, ad. 1.

3 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 71, m. 4, c. 4, ad. 3.
Two orders can be distinguished if one considers the processions and the manifestations. First, there is the order according to *quod est prius simpliciter*, in which the processions precede the manifestations. Second, there is the order according to *quod est prius quoad nos*. If one considers the processions and the manifestations according to this order, then the previous order is reversed and the manifestations precede the processions.

An example of this latter kind of consideration is given, the author argues, in Augustine's *De Trinitate*, where Augustine encapsulates his understanding of the missions of the Son and Spirit in the expression, '*mitti est cognosci*'. The missions are characterized through their consequent effects; the *cognosci* equates with the consequent effects; the manifestations or showings forth equate with the *cognosci*; and *quod est prius quoad nos* equates with the manifestations or showings forth.\(^5\)

Now, the author also regards the inhabitation or (receptive) *possession*\(^6\) and

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\(^4\) [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 73, m. 2, a. 1, ad. 5.

\(^5\) "...cum dicitur 'Filium a Patre mitti est cognosci quod a Patre procedit'; non datur ista definitio per essentiam, sed per effectum consequentem. Nam cognitio processio est effectus missionis; processio vero manifestata in creatura rationali vel manifestatio processio est illud quod essentialet praedicatur de missione; effective vero cum dicitur missio est cognitio facta in creatura vel gratia data creaturae...." [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 71, m. 2, c. 2, ad. 2; "...dicendum quod non semper datur definitio per priora simpliciter, sed per priora quoad nos; unde non semper datur definitio per genus et differentiam, sed alicuius per causam, aliquando per effectum consequentem. Unde concedo quod haec definitio <<mitti est cognosci>> etc. datur per effectum...." [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 73, m. 1, c. 1, sol; "...illa definitio Augustini <<mitti est cognosci esse ab alio>>...datur per effectum consequentem in quo potest manifestari eorum processio sicut in processione temporalis processio aeterna." [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 73, m. 4, a. 2, ad. 1.

\(^6\) "...[missio visibilis] addit manifestationem personae in quantum existentis ab alio et existentis in alio tamquam inhabitantis vel possessae ab alio, quia in missione effectur ut persona missa ad nos habeatur a nobis et inhabitet in nobis...." [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 74, m. 1, c. 1, ad. 5; "...quando autem alicuius mittitur in ratione doni, donum illud non habet completam rationem missionis donec (continued...)"
special presence of the three-personed God in the soul as a consequent effect of the missions; or, more accurately, as connected with the consequent effects of the missions, and as the purpose of the missions.\textsuperscript{7} If, then, the *cognosci* and inhabitation and special presence of the three-personed God are each distinct effects in the divine missions, or, more accurately, if the former is an effect and the latter is connected with an effect, and if in relation to the divine processions the *cognosci* and inhabitation and special presence of the three-personed God are each distinct effects in the divine missions, or, more accurately, if the former is an effect and the latter is connected with an effect, and if in relation to the divine processions the *cognosci* and inhabitation and special presence of the three-personed God are each in some sense *prius quoad nos*, how precisely, according to the Halesian *Summa*, do the *cognosci* and inhabitation and special presence of the three-personed God relate to each other? Here, within this question, the focal issue of the entire discussion is contained. And with its asking, the focal issue begins to come into sharp relief.

To take up this beginning, then, the knowledge said to coincide with the invisible

\textsuperscript{6}(continued)

habeatur et possideatur ab eo cui mittitur." [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 74, m. 1, c. 1, ad. 7.

\textsuperscript{7} "...conferre Spiritum Sanctum non terminatur ad Spiritum Sanctum, sed ad hoc quod est habere Spiritum Sanctum inhabitantem animam tamquam templum suum." [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 73, m. 4, a. 1, ad. 3a; "...effectus huius missionis est inhabitatio..." [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 73, m. 4, a. 2, Ic; "...missiones invisibles] conveniunt in fine, scilicet in hoc quod est inhabitare animam....." [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 73, m. 4, a. 2, ad. 3; "...cum mittitur Filius vel Spiritus Sanctus, efficitur aliquid in creatura per quod dicuntur inhabitare creaturam....." [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 74, m. 1, c. 1, 6; "...ratio missionis...est inhabitatio creaturae rationalis per aliquem effectum gratiae gratum facientis: est enim missio ad inhabitandum." [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 74, m. 1, c. 1, sol. 1. In the discussion that follows, I speak in some instances of the special presence or inhabitation of the three-personed God; in other instances, of the special presence or inhabitation of the Holy Spirit; and occasionally of the special presence or inhabitation of the Holy Spirit, and of the Son and the Father through the Spirit. If the expressions differ in connotation, perhaps the following quotation can be cited as indicating that for present purposes they can be considered as coinciding in denotation: "...sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro *De anima et spiritu*, dicens quod <<omnis usus deitatis est nobis ex munere, qui est Spiritus Sanctus; unde per ipsum est nobis communio totius Trinitatis>>. Et ratio huius est quia Spiritus Sanctus amor est; illud enim, per quod communicat se Trinitas, est amor, amor autem essentialiter et personaliter in ipsa Trinitate est Spiritus Sanctus, et ideo per ipsum est nobis communio deitatis....." [Alexander of Hales(?)], *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 12, m. 1, a. 1, sol.
missions as consequent effect need not be understood as actual or express knowledge. Just as Augustine did not require actual or express knowledge in connection with the divine missions when he characterized them with the formula, 'mitti est cognosci', so, similarly, the Halesian Summa does not require it. What is considered actual or express in the understanding of the Halesian Summa, it seems, is the representation (repraesentatio), the spiritual sign (signum spirituale) of the divine processions, by means of which one is ordered and destined to actual or express knowledge of the proceeding persons and of the one who does not proceed. This repreaesentatio and signum spirituale is not merely some oblique trace (vestigium), but a created patterning (imago), a received, created similitude of the uncreated processions in rational creatures. It is constituted as true of rational creatures precisely because the Son and Holy Spirit are sent; and as prius quoad nos, it enables the proceeding persons to be known by the ones to whom they are sent, and for those ones to advance toward such knowledge and, in the fullness of time, to attain it. The repreaesentatio and imago, then, encompasses both the procession of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit.⁹

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⁸ See pp.166-170 above for my discussion of Augustine on this issue.

⁹ "...dicendum quod cum dicitur "mitti est cognosci" etc., ibi dicitur cognitio non actus ipsius cognitivae, sed repreaesentatio ipsius processio in effectu, ordinata ad actum cognitivae: unde illud cognosci est repreaesentari in effectu sive per effectum aliquid per quod potest cognosci Filium vel Spiritum Sanctum esse ab alio. Et est talis modus loquendi, sicut cum dicitur 'in hoc opere cognoscitur sapientia vel bonitas artificis' id est in hoc opere repreaesentatur aliquid per quod potest cognosci sapiencia vel bonitas artificis; unde secundum hunc intellectum manifestum est quod primo et principaliter ponitur illud per quod habet cognosci, et non ipsum cognosci." [Alexander of Hales (?), Summa Theologica, l, q. 73, m. 1, c. 1, ad. 2; "...etsi nunquam cognoscetur ille effectus vel per illum effectum processio Filii vel Spiritus Sancti, nihilominus per illum effectum repreaesentatur illud per quod potest cognosci, et hoc modo dicitur hic cognoci, scilicet signo aliquo spirituali cognoscibiliter repreaesentari." [Alexander of Hales (?), Summa Theologica, l, q. 73, m. 1, c. 1, ad. 3; "...mitti non dicitur de Filio vel Spiritu Sancto ratione cognitionis actualis, sed ratione aliquid effectus appropiabilis Filio vel Spiritui Sancto, in quo potest cognosci Filius vel Spiritus Sanctus esse ab alio. Unde si ille effectus approprietur personae Fili et per illum effectum potest cognosci Filius esse (continued...)
Now this *representatio*, spiritual sign or created pattern and received similitude (*imago*) of the divine processions pertains to grace in the proper and especial sense, that is, to *gratia gratum faciens*:

...cum efficitur aliquid in mente in quo habet cognosci processio Filii vel Spiritus Sancti, tunc dicitur mitti Filium vel Spiritum Sanctum, et intelligo non de quocumque effectu, sed de effectu pertinentem ad gratiam gratum faciendum.  

Next, just as the *repraesentatio* or *imago* pertains to grace, so too does the special presence or inhabitation or (receptive) possession of the three-personed God in the soul. As previously remarked, this was part of common teaching. However, it may not be amiss to verify briefly the presence of the common teaching in the Halesian *Summa*:

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9 (...continued)

a Patre, ut donum cognitionis vel sapientiae, dicitur mitti Filius; si vero approprietur personae Spiritus Sancti et per illum effectum, sic ei appropriatum, potest cognosci Spiritus Sanctus esse ab utroque, et donum amoris, dicitur mitti Spiritus Sanctus." [Alexander of Hales (?)]. *Summa Theologica*, l. q. 73, m. 1, c. 1, ad. 4; "...mitti, in intellectu suo importat esse ab alio; unde cum Filium vel Spiritum Sanctum dicuntur mitti, intelligitur ipsos aliquid efficere per quod cognoscentur esse ab alio...." [Alexander of Hales (?)]. *Summa Theologica*, l. q. 73, m. 2, a. 1, resp.; "...missio non imponitur a processione, sed ab effectu in quo repraesentatur ipsa processio, a quo etiam accipit rationem...." [Alexander of Hales (?)]. *Summa Theologica*, l. q. 73, m. 2, a. 2, l. ad. 1; "...cum dicitur <<mitti est cognosci>>...hoc quod dico ’cognosci’ non supponit ibi pro actu cognitivae, sed pro aliquo effectu ordinato ad actum cognitivae...."

As previously remarked, this was part of common teaching. However, it may not be amiss to verify briefly the presence of the common teaching in the Halesian *Summa*:

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10 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. *Summa Theologica*, l. q. 73, m. 1, c. 1, sol.
...Spiritus Sanctus incipit esse in rationali creatura quando datur ei gratia. 

...non ratione cuiuscumque effectus sive doni, in quo cognoscitur Filii vel Spiritus Sancti ab alio esse dicitur mitti Filii vel Spiritus Sancti, sed exigitur quod ille effectus sive illud donum pertineat ad gratiam gratum facientem, quia solum secundum illum inhabitant animam et sunt in ea modo speciali quo Deus dicitur habitare in iustis...

...Deus non dicitur esse in rebus nisi tripli, scilicet communi modo, quo est in omnibus rebus per praesentiam, essentiam et potentiam; speciali modo, quo est in sanctis per gratiam gratum facientem; singulari modo quo dicitur esse in Christo per unionem. Sed cum dicitur mitti, hoc non potest esse quia sit ubi non erat prius, sed quia ibi est alicuius modo quam prius; sed iste alicuius modo non potest esse nisi vel per gratiam qua dicitur esse in sanctis vel per illam qua dicitur esse in Christo, quorum utroque est gratum faciens; ergo quocumque modo dicitur mitti Filius, hoc non erit solum ratione gratiae gratis datae, sed solum ratione gratiae gratum facientis.

...loquendo proprie de missione non dicitur mitti Filius vel Spiritus Sanctus nisi ratione alicuius effectus pertinentis ad gratiam gratum facientem nec dari similiter. Nam in missionibus eorum non solam dantur dona eorum, sed etiam ipsi, et inhabitant animam et sunt ibi specialius modo quam prius. Unde solam dicitur missio ratione ipsorum donorum ratione quorum dicuntur inhabitare animam et esse ibi secundum alium modum quam prius, ut in missione eorum non solam dorum eorum sint nostra, sed etiam ipsi: quod est solam per gratiam gratum facientem. ... illa definitio Augustini <<mitti est cognosci esse ab aliis〉...datam per effectum consequentem, in quo potest manifestari eorum processio sicut in processione temporali processio aeterna. Dicendum ergo quod in illo effectu, in quo manifestatur processio Filii vel Spiritus Sancti, non solam manifestatur Filium vel Spiritum Sanctum esse a Patre, sed praetere hoc ponitur ipsos esse a Patre in animam secundum alium modum quam prius sive ipsos dari animae ad inhabitandum: et hoc ponit hoc quod dico 'temporaliter procedere', quod est mitti. Licet ergo per effectum gratiae gratis datae possit cognoscere Filium a Patre procedere et similiter Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque, tamen per solam effectum gratiae gratum facientis potest cognoscere Filium et Spiritum Sanctum procedere in animam ad inhabitandum ipsam, cum per illam solam sit inhabitatio. Unde si illa definitio integra complectatur rationem missionis, oportet quod in illo effectu habeat cognoscere processio Filii et Spiritus Sancti et quantum ad terminum a quo et quantum ad terminum ad quem: et tunc illud cognoscere non habet esse nisi in effectu gratiae gratum facientis.

...tota ratio missionis invisibilis non est manifestatio personae, sed manifestatio personae ut emanantis ab alio et inhabitantis in alio.... [H]oc autem est in aliquo effectu gratiae gratum

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11 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. Summa Theologica, 1, q. 72, m. 1, c. 1, ad. a.
12 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. Summa Theologica, 1, q. 73, m. 1, c. 1, ad. 5.
13 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. Summa Theologica, 1, q. 73, m. 4, a. 2, l. d.
14 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. Summa Theologica, 1, q. 73, m. 4, a. 2, sol. I-II.
15 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. Summa Theologica, 1, q. 73, m. 4, a. 2, ad. 1.
facientis appropriato personae, quia secundum illam solam dicitur inhabitare....

Both the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the divine processions and the special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit, then, pertain to *gratia gratum faciens*.

Now, in the earlier discussion of grace in the Halesian *Summa*, *gratia gratum faciens* was characterized as a *habitus* of Godlikeness (*deiformitas*), a *per se* permanent sharing and assimilation into the inner life and goodness of God that is beyond simply that participatory goodness intrinsic to created human nature, irrespective of whether it is considered as such or in relation to its proportionate perfection. This likeness to God and sharing in the divine life and goodness is bestowed by God upon the recipient without the recipient in any way meriting it. Moreover, as a *habitus*, it is not received, as is typically the case with *habitus*, in any proximate principle of operations, that is, in a faculty or power of the soul. Rather, it is a *habitus* that is *superadded* to the core of the recipient's being and the remote principle of operation—the rational soul—an already complete first being (esse *primum*) or natural being (esse *naturae*). And because it is superadded to the rational soul, the recipient, in his or her being, is rendered pleasing and acceptable to God, proportionate to attaining the end of eternal life, the *full* sharing and assimilation into the inner life and goodness of God that God intends, and worthy of it. Further, with respect to second being (esse *secundum*), ordered being (esse *ordinis*), and well-being (bene esse) or perfection in the attainment of its end, the *habitus* is said to function like a substantial or embracing foundational principle. For from it results a universal ordination.

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16 [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 74, m. 1, c. 1, ad. 3.
of the entirety of the recipient's life, such that the recipient becomes effectively ordered in all of his or her rational operations, and in the proximate principles of those operations, to the attainment of eternal life as his or her consummate perfection and ultimate end.

The claim thus far, then, is that for the Halesian *Summa* both the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the divine processions and the special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit pertain to the (entitative) *habitus* of Godlikeness that God posits in one. They pertain to the sharing and assimilation into the inner life and goodness of God that is superadded to the very core of one's being and effectively orders one to the full sharing in the inner life and goodness of God that God intends for one as one's consummate perfection and ultimate end.

2 A Triangle of Relationships

If this preliminary clarification is accepted, perhaps one can proceed with some greater surety toward an answer to the aforementioned question regarding how the Halesian *Summa* understands the relation between the *cognosci*, that is, the manifestation and consequent effect of the divine missions, and the special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit. And one can do so by transposing and expanding the original question so that now it includes explicit mention of *gratia gratum faciens* and the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the divine processions.

Thus, the inclusions give rise to a triangle of relationships to be considered. In place of the aforementioned question, one now has the following three questions. First, precisely how, according to the Halesian *Summa*, does the special presence, inhabitation
or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit pertain to *gratia gratum faciens*? Next, restricting consideration just to the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit, in line with the limited focus of the entire discussion, precisely how does the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of that procession pertain to *gratia gratum faciens*? Third, how, according to the Halesian Summa, do the special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit and the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit relate to each other? This third question is virtually the same as the earlier, initial question—except that now the *cognosci* has been clarified in terms of the *repraesentatio* or *imago*. But the advantage, I suggest, of including some mention of *gratia gratum faciens*, and therefore considering not one but three relationships, is that it affords a more comprehensive perspective, an initial, heuristically significant layout within which one can gradually assemble the positions the Halesian Summa affirms, and do so in such a way that some positions facilitate the determination of others. In this way, one can gradually move to some comprehensive, integrated understanding of the three relationships. And with that understanding, one can provide a more adequate statement of the Halesian Summa’s position on the special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit that includes all the key elements.

### 2.1 The Relationship between Gratia Gratum Faciens and the Special Presence of the Holy Spirit: The Precise Question

First, then, as regards the relation between *gratia gratum faciens* and the special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit, there is the affirmation mentioned in the earlier discussion of *gratia increata* and *gratia creada* in the Halesian
Summa. In that discussion, it was seen that *gratia gratum faciens*, the *habitus* of Godlikeness, the sharing and assimilation into the inner life and goodness of God, was affirmed as the necessary, proportionate preparation for the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit. The *habitus* is the form that gives the human soul a transformed state (*forma transformata*)—utterly beyond the capacity of human nature to initiate or sustain—whereby the Holy Spirit comes to dwell in human hearts. Rationality constitutes the *mere* possibility of one being a temple of the Holy Spirit. Next are the preparatory dispositions, the gifts of the Holy Spirit collected under the rubric, *'gratia gratis data'*, and which could include such things as prophecy, knowledge (*scientia*), etc. Finally, there is the *dispositio* or *habitus* that is necessary for the rational soul to be a temple of the Holy Spirit, and from which it necessarily follows that the Holy Spirit does indeed dwell in one; and this *dispositio* or *habitus* is spoken of as *gratia creata* and identified with *gratia gratum faciens*. The special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit in human hearts pertains to or is associated with grace in the proper and especial sense, then, because grace so understood is affirmed as the necessary, proportionate preparation for such a bestowal.

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17 *...cum dicit Bede quod <<cum gratia hominibus datur, mittitur Spiritus Sanctus>>, non vult dicere quod nihil aliud detur in missione Spiritus Sancti quam gratia, sed quod unum concomitatur aliud nec unum habetur sine alio,* [Alexander of Hales(?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 73, m. 4, a. 1, ad. 3b. Ernesto Primeau comments on this text: "Unde Spiritus Sanctus nequit inhabitare seu haberi sine gratia gratum faciente; nec gratia gratum faciens datur, quin ipse Spiritus Sanctus etiam detur. Igitur inhabitatio ex infusione gratiae necessario resultat et gratia necessario requiritur ad inhabitacionem habendam." Ernesto J. Primeau, *Doctrina Summæ Theologicæ Alexandri Halensis de Spiritus Sancti apud Justos Inhabitatione* (Mundelein, Illinois: Seminarii Sanctæ Mariæ ad Lacum, 1936), p. 47.

18 See [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 11, m. 6, c. 6; cf. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2, sol. For the earlier discussion, see pp. 94-105 above. A typical and succinct expression of this doctrine is the following: "...sicut acumen necessario est in oculo ad susceptionem lucis, sic gratia creata necessario est dispositio in anima ad susceptionem gratiae increatae, sic lucis divinae." [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa* (continued...)
If one were to probe beneath this affirmation, one might advert to a prior question for direct understanding and seek to identify the precise proximate reason why the Halesian Summa is able to consider gratia gratum faciens, the habitus of Godlikeness, as the necessary, proportionate preparation for the gift of the Spirit, as something suitably and adequately ordered to the attainment and receptive possession of the Spirit.

The question is not superfluous. For to appeal simply to gratia gratum faciens in this connection, and even to understand it as a sharing and assimilation into the inner life and goodness of God, is essential—but more is required. As Augustine noted, the three-personed God is already wholly present. If God comes to be present to the just with a special presence, there is a change; but the change is on the human side. Now God's bestowal of gratia gratum faciens is certainly a change on the human side: it is an additional reality received and possessed by human nature, over and above what belongs either to human nature qua human nature or to the degree of perfection that could belong to human nature qua human nature. But it is a change that is radicated in the essence of the soul, superadded to the core of the recipient's being, and so it is understood as an entitative habitus. When God comes to be present to the just with a special presence, however, the just attain God in some manner. And attainment pertains not to entitative habitus, but to operations and to operative habitus. Accordingly, any attempt to offer some theological understanding of the special presence of the three-personed God or the gift of the Spirit that appeals just to gratia gratum faciens does not explain the proximate reason why gratia gratum faciens is the necessary and sufficient preparation for that.

\[18\] (continued)
Theologica, I, q. 11, m. 1, c. 1, ad. 1.
presence and gift. The proximate reason remains to be specified.

This is indeed the issue I am attempting to clarify. And the affirmation recently recalled anticipates the clarification by settling the condition any answer will have to fulfill, namely that *gratia gratum faciens* as the *habitus* of Godlikeness, or, more likely, *gratia gratum faciens* and the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the divine processions that pertains to *gratia gratum faciens* in a manner yet to be determined, will have to be understood in such a way that it becomes intelligible why it or they are the necessary, proportionate preparation for the special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit.

Indicating in advance an intelligibility to be attained, then, the condition can function as a guide for subsequent investigation. Accordingly, let us bear the condition in mind, but leave this question for direct understanding open for the moment, and shift attention to the second relationship of the triangle, namely, that between *gratia gratum faciens* and the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

2.2 The Relationship between Gratia Gratum Faciens and the Repraesentatio of the Procession of the Holy Spirit

In the Halesian *Summa*, we read that “*gratia nihil aliud est quam similitudo Dei in creatura rationali, quae est effectus Dei.*” As previously noted, the full Halesian position acknowledges an ordered positing of a threefold sharing or participating in God’s own life. God is the efficient cause of grace; so the recipient of grace can be truly said to be assimilated to God and like God *secundum virtutem* or *secundum potentiam*, to be

\[19\] [Alexander of Hales(?)]. *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 61, m. 4, a. 2, § 1, sol.
assimilated to God and like God with respect to God's power. God is also the exemplary or (external) formal cause of grace; so the recipient of grace can be truly said to be assimilated to God and like God secundum expressionem, to be assimilated to God and like God with respect to God's wisdom and truth. Finally, God is the final cause of grace; so the recipient of grace can be truly said to be assimilated to God and like God secundum inclinationem vel ordinem. For as a result of such final causality, there exists a new responsive life in the soul: one comes to be assimilated to God and like God with respect to God's goodness; and from this assimilation and likeness springs an ordination and effective inclinatio to God as the summa Bonitas, and a concomitant movement away from sin. By appropriation, that is, on the basis of a similarity between an attribute and the personal property or notion of a divine person, power is attributed to the Father, wisdom and truth to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit. Thus, in virtue of the habitus of Godlikeness having been superadded to the recipient's first being, that is, to his or her rational soul, the recipient can be said to be like each of the three distinct persons of the three-personed God. The Halesian Summa, however, gives priority to understanding grace, in the proper and especial sense of the term (gratia gratum faciens), as the habitus of Godlikeness, characterized as a likeness secundum inclinationem vel ordinem, as the soul being brought into a condition of life by being formed in the likeness of the summa Bonitas, of the Holy Spirit who is Love.20

20 See above, Chapter II, footnote 22. For convenience, let us recall from that footnote the following text: "...dicendum quod prior est comparatio gratiae ad animam ut vita quam aliae comparationes, quia prior est configuratio sive conformatio animae ad summam Bonitatem, quae est Spiritus Sanctus; unde primo configurat nos sibi Spiritus Sanctus, deinde ex illa configuratione est nobis communio totius Trinitatis; sed ex illa conformazione ad Bonitatem vel ad Spiritum Sanctum, qui est amor, sumitur vita; unde per illam conformationem et configurationem, quam dicimus gratiam, vivit anima Deo.... Consequens vero comparatio (continued...)
Now, the claim in the Halesian *Summa* is not simply that in the bestowal of *gratia gratum faciens* there is a threefold likeness to God in rational creatures. Nor is it that each likeness, by appropriation, is associated with one of the distinct persons of the Trinity, and with no more than one. Nor, again, is it that there is an order in the positing of the threefold likeness. The further claim is that with the sending of the Son and Holy Spirit and the bestowal of *gratia gratum faciens*, there is constituted in rational creatures a *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Son and a *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

One can, I suggest, plausibly anticipate that the Halesian *Summa* will understand the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Son as being somehow connected with the likeness to God's wisdom and truth, and the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the processions of the Holy Spirit as being somehow connected with the likeness to God's goodness. Indeed, one can plausibly anticipate that the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the Son, the one who proceeds from the Father, will be the likeness to God's wisdom and truth—together with some relation of origin, some internal *ab alio* structure pertaining to the likeness. Similarly, one can plausibly anticipate that the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the Holy Spirit, the one who proceeds from the Father and Son, will be the likeness to God's goodness—together with some relation of origin, some internal *ab alio* structure pertaining to the likeness. And if this is so, then identifying the *ab alio* structure pertaining to each likeness and rendering it explicit would seem especially germane to...

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20(...)continued)

vel configuratio est ad Veritatem primam, et secundum hoc comparatur gratia ut lux. Ultima configuratio est ad ipsam potentiam Patris vel virtutem, et secundum hoc comparatur ut motor." [Alexander of Hales(?)], *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 61, m. 6, a. 6, sol.
understanding how the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Son and the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit are constituted.

Here, as mentioned previously, I shall restrict consideration just to the *repraesentatio* or *imago* that pertains to the procession of the Holy Spirit. And I shall use the anticipations just mentioned as pointers or guides in clarifying the manner in which this *repraesentatio* or *imago* is constituted, and the role *gratia gratum faciens* plays in its constitution.

Moreover, I would argue that restricting consideration just to the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit is not distortive of the Halesian position—though, admittedly, it results in an incomplete statement of the position. The limited focus of the entire discussion is the Halesian Summa’s understanding of the relationship between *gratia increata*, the special presence, inhabitation and receptive possession of the Holy Spirit, and of the Father and Son through the Spirit, on the one hand, and *gratia creata* or *gratia gratum faciens*, the proportionate created manifestation and preparation connected with this special presence, on the other. Accordingly, given that the Halesian Summa understands *gratia gratum faciens* in rational creatures as a *per se* permanent likeness to God and accords a priority to the likeness to God as the *summa Bonitas*; given that the *summa Bonitas*, by appropriation, is attributed to the Holy Spirit; given that the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the divine processions pertain in some way to *gratia gratum faciens*; then one does not depart from the thrust of the position advanced in the Halesian Summa if one accords a similar priority to the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit. And in view of this latter priority, one can justifiably claim
that restricting consideration just to the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit is not distortive of the Halesian position—provided, of course, one acknowledges that it results in an incomplete statement of the position.

Now, the clarification of the relationship between *gratia gratum faciens* and *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit can be achieved, I suggest, in three steps. In the first step, I shall discuss briefly the notion of final causality in general, and God as final cause. In the second step, I shall complicate the general scheme outlined in the first step by introducing some considerations connected with the affirmation that God is the final cause of *gratia gratum faciens*. Finally, employing the results of the first two steps, and drawing on texts from the Halesian *Summa*, I shall attempt to make explicit how the *Summa* understands the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit to be constituted and related to *gratia gratum faciens*.

### 2. 2. 1 Final Causality

The first step, then, is concerned with general considerations regarding final causality. If one understands causality in general as constituted by a real relation of dependence in what is said to be caused, with respect to what is said to cause, then the precise formal constituent of final causality, the constituent that distinguishes it from other kinds of causality, is the good as cause: "...a real relation of dependence on a *cuius gratia*."21 Thus, we may speak of A as a final cause, and of the real relation of dependence on a *cuius gratia* as instantiated, if an object, B, is really related or ordered to A, and thus

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dependently determined by A and adapted to A, in the sense that, because of A's goodness, B has a tendential existence toward A as an end or term perfective of its existence. Accordingly, correlative to A as final cause, we may speak of finality as being instantiated in B, so related, ordered, dependently determined and adapted.\textsuperscript{22}

Now, God as the primary, uncreated good is the ultimate final cause of all created reality. For God, intending to communicate his goodness, creates! And in creating, God yields himself to created reality in such a manner that because of his goodness, created reality, in its intrinsic or natural structure, is really related or ordered, and so determined and adapted in its every aspect, to God as its consummate perfection, its ultimate end and absolute term. God, then, is not just the origin of every created reality in its every aspect. God is also the primary, uncreated cuius gratia, to which every created reality in its every aspect exists in a real relation of dependence. And correlative to God as ultimate final cause, this relation of dependence in created reality, this ordination to God as the primary, uncreated cuius gratia, is universal finality, the tendential manner of existing that pervades all created reality in its every aspect. In this sense, one can say with cool realism, and without any trace of anthropomorphism or hyperbole, that "...apart from the surd of sin, the universe is in love with God...."\textsuperscript{23}

The relation of dependence on God as the primary, uncreated cuius gratia is variously realized in created reality. For if God as the primary, uncreated good remains ever the ultimate final cause of all created reality in its every aspect, such that in virtue

\textsuperscript{22} "Finality' denotes the relation of a thing to its end, where the end motivates an appetite or orients a process precisely because the end is good." Stebbins, The Divine Initiative, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{23} Lonergan, Insight, p. 721.
of God’s goodness *omnia appetunt Deum* and *omnia intendent assimilari Deo*, finite essence is the principle that limits the manner and measure in which each created reality is ordered or attracted to the primary good, and can attain it. Consequently, finite essence is the principle that limits the manner and measure in which each created entity can become like God and be assimilated to God. For this reason, if one considers in an abstract manner a hierarchical order of distinct kinds of essences, distinct grades of being, one can argue to a hierarchical order of distinct manners and measures of being attracted, responding and possible attainment of God.

Because the attainment of ends is through operations and finite essence is either a remote or proximate principle of operation, and because finite essence functions quite generally as a limiting principle determining the manner and measure in which an end can be attained, there is needed the distinction between the *finis qui* and the *finis quo*, between the end or term which attracts and is or can be attained (the objective end), and the manner and measure in which the end or term attracts and is or can be attained (the formal end). In general, the *finis quo* includes a reference to the operation(s) by which an end is attained. Thus, taking human knowing as a manifestation of finality, I attain reality, albeit partially, in a true judgement: reality is the *finis qui*, the end which I attain; the true judgement, as the operation by which I (partially) attain reality, is the *finis quo*.

As regards God, then, if God in his goodness ever remains the ultimate *finis qui* of all created reality in its every aspect, since the operations by which the distinct grades of created reality attain God in his goodness will vary enormously, in accordance with the limiting principle of finite essence, the manner and measure in which each grade of
created reality can attain God will also vary enormously.  

2. 2. 2 God as Final Cause of Gratia Gratum Faciens

The next step in the argument is to introduce into the equation some considerations regarding grace. Grace complicates the general scheme just outlined in an important way. For even while the human essence is retained, God's communication of his inner life and goodness in the bestowal of gratia gratum faciens, God's yielding of himself to us in this bestowal, "transformat nos in divinam speciem." Grace fractures or opens up and elevates the created human essence at its core, endowing it with a new state such that

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24 I am drawing here in part on a discussion from Bernard Lonergan: "...the final cause is the cuius gratia, and its specific or formal constituent is the good as cause. Under this formal constituent may be had either of two material differences: the good may be cause as motive for the response of appetite or as term for the orientation of process. But with regard to the formal constituent itself, it is necessary to distinguish between the qui and quo, between the good thing which is motive or term and the mode of motivation or termination. Now in our hierarchic universe God is at once absolute motive and absolute term: 'omnia appetunt Deum'; 'omnia intendunt assimilari Deo.' On the other hand, the mode in which the different grades of being respond to God as motive or attain him as term is always limited; this remains true even in the beatific vision, in which the infinite as motive is apprehended finitely and as term is attained finitely. Further, the ground of such limitation is essence: remotely it is substantial essence; proximately it is the essence of an ontological accident, the essence, say, of sensitive appetite, of rational appetite, of infused charity; for it is essence that limits, that ties things down to a given grade of being, that makes them respond to motives of a given type, that assigns them their proper and proportionate ends." Bernard Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," in Collection, pp. 19-20. In the beginning of the next paragraph (p. 20), Lonergan adds that, "...the application to the hierarchic universe of the notional distinction between finis qui and finis quo...[gives] two distinct types of finality: the absolute finality of all things to God in his intrinsic goodness; the horizontal finality of limiting essence to limited mode of appetition and of process." He goes on to speak of vertical finality, and what is particularly pertinent to present concerns, of obediential vertical finality (see pp. 20-23). I gloss over explicitly mentioning vertical finality here, and more particularly over mentioning obediential vertical finality by which human beings are proportioned to receive the communication of God himself, in order to keep the discussion as simple as possible, and because all I need to make a point similar to Lonergan's is the distinction between the finis qui and finis quo. For, given that distinction, I shall attempt to argue that God's bestowal of grace upon human beings involves a shift in the finis quo, a shift in the kinds of operations, in their principles, and, consequently, in the mode and manner in which human beings are attracted to God, respond to God and attain God as finis qui, as their consummate perfection, their ultimate end and absolute term. As I hope will become evident from the discussion to follow, the kind of shift envisaged here is a consequence of obediential vertical finality in human beings responding to God's bidding.

25 [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2, sol.
human nature ceases to be the measure of human fulfilment. God's yielding of himself to us in this manner is not a change in God, but a change in the state of the human essence. Derivatively, as regards the proximate principles of operations, one may characterize the change heuristically as a shift in their responsive possibilities, and so a shift in the manner and measure in which human beings are attracted to God, respond to God, and attain God. It is a shift from the finis quo that would have been if God were subject to afterthoughts, and rational creatures had existed for a time within world-order but without God's yielding of himself to them in the divine missions and in grace. It is an elevation, then, not simply as regards the core of the retained human essence; it is also a shift, an elevation in the kind of operations, and therefore in the proximate principle of those operations, by which human beings can attain the wholly present God. It is an elevating shift in the manner and measure in which they can attain the wholly present God as their consummate perfection, their ultimate end and absolute term. Given God's communication of his inner life and goodness in the bestowal of gratia gratum faciens, then, the hypothetical finis quo just spoken of, the finis quo proportionate to created human nature considered as such, cannot be accurately thought of as ever being the operative limiting principle determining the manner and measure whereby human beings attain God. Gratia gratum faciens fractures the limiting function of the limiting principle.

26 "Quodam...modo loquendi iuxta modum humanum, secundum quem meliora dicuntur magis accepta, possunt dici, quodam modo generali sumendo acceptationem, omnia facta a Deo illi esse accepta; specialiori modo et propriiori creatura rationalis, in quantum est creatura huiusmodi; specialissime sive propriissime creatura rationalis, in quantum consecratur Deo ut sit eius templum, adoptatur in filium, assumitur in sponsam. Haec autem sublimatio creaturae rationalis est supra naturale complementum, et ideo nec consecratio nec adoptatio nec assumption huiusmodi fit per aliquam proprietatem naturae, sed per donum superadditum naturae, consecrans animam ut sit templum, assimilans Deo ut sit filius vel filia, confoderans Deo sive uniens per consequitatem voluntatis ut sit sponsa: haec autem fiunt a Deo mediante gratia gratum faciente." [Alexander of Hales(?)], Summa Theologica, II, q. 91, m. 1, a. 3, §. 1, res.
2.2.3 The Image of *Fructus*

Now we can move closer to clarifying the relation between the *gratia gratum faciens* and the *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

If we can speak heuristically of an elevating shift from a hypothetical *finis quo*, occurring in the proximate principles of operations, the clue *prius quoad nos* for identifying more precisely or determinately the Halesian *Summa*’s understanding of this elevating shift, at least as regards its primary aspect, is the image of *fruit* (*fructus*) whose sweetness is tasted and enjoyed. Francis Cunningham remarks that William of Auxerre had spoken of the Holy Spirit, given and *possessed*, as spiritual food to be delighted in and enjoyed.27 The aptness of the image lies partly in the intimacy it suggests and partly in the experienced quality it identifies as accompanying this intimacy. “Gustate, et videte quoniam suavis est Dominus,” the Medieval theologians would have read in Psalm 33:9: “Taste and see that the Lord is sweet.”28 In the Halesian *Summa*, the special presence or inhabitation of the Holy Spirit is considered under the aspect of fruit to be enjoyed or delighted in:

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28 Psalm 34:8 in our numbering. Regarding the intimacy the image suggests, Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on the verse is, one might surmise, representative of a common understanding: “Experientia de re sumitur per sensum; sed aliter de re praesenti, et aliter de absente: quia de absente per visum, odoratum et auditum; de praesente vero tactum et gustum; sed per tactum de extrinseca praesente, per gustum vero de intrinseca. Deus autem non longe est a nobis, nec extra nos, sed in nobis... Et ideo experientia divinae bonitatis dicitur gustatio...” Thomas Aquinas, *In Psalms Davidis Exposito*, 33, v. 9, in *Exposito in aliquot Libros Veteris Testamenti*, vol. 14 of *Opera Omnia* (Parma: Fiaccadori, 1863),
Spiritus Sanctus est in iustis in ratione fructus, quia eo fruuntur iusti; dona autem Spiritus Sancti in iustis sunt, non sicut fructus, sed sicut dispositiones mentis vel liberi arbitrii ad fruendum: anima enim de se non habet virtutem fruendi bono increato, sed gratiam et virtutes.²⁹

...Spiritus Sanctus in missione alio modo est in creatura quam prius, quia prius habebatur in quantum Spiritus, sed non in quantum Sanctus nec per modum fructus. Verum est etiam quod ille alius modus attributur Spiritui Sancto, non ratione sui, sed ratione effectus sivi doni; non tamen sequitur quin aliud sit illud quod hoc modo haberi dicitur et illud ratione cuius haberi dicitur. Non enim sequitur si gratia sit illud ratione cuius inhabitat Spiritus Sanctus vel hoc modo est in anima tamquam medium ex parte animae, disponens ipsam ad fruendum ipso, quin aliud sit gratia existens in anima et Spiritus Sanctus existens in ipsa vel quod in se ipso non habeatur ab anima.³⁰

...in missionibus eorum [i.e. in missione Filii et Spiritus Sancti] non solum dantur dona eorum, sed etiam ipsi, et inhabitant animam et sunt ibi specialiori modo quam prius. Unde solum dicitur missio ratione ipsorum donorum ratione quorum dicuntur inhabitare animam et esse ibi secundum alium modum quam prius, ut in missione eorum non solum dona eorum sint nostra, sed etiam ipsi: quod est solum per gratiam gratum facientem, secundum quam ipsi sunt in anima in ratione fructus.³¹

...licet timor servilis et alia dona gratis data sint dona Spiritus Sancti, non tamen in illis vel cum illis datur Spiritus Sanctus, similiiter nec Filius ratione cognitionis informis: et hoc est quia per illa dona non efficitur anima templum sive habitaculum Filii vel Spiritus Sancti, sicut dicitum est supra, nec etiam dona illa faciunt Filium vel Spiritum Sanctum esse nostrum, disponendo ipsam animam ad hoc ut sint in ea in ratione fructus.³²

...[missione invisibles] conveniunt in fine, scilicet in hoc quod est inhabitare animam vel esse in anima secundum rationem fructus.³³

...dicitur inhabitare Filii vel Spiritus Sanctus vel etiam possideri vel haberi in ratione fructus....³⁴

Now, it is within the context of Augustinian teaching especially that this image of fruit (fructus) whose sweetness is tasted and enjoyed functions as a clue to the nature of

²⁹ [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, I, q. 73, m. 4, a. 1, res.
³⁰ [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, I, q. 73, m. 4, a. 1, ad. 3c.
³¹ [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, I, q. 73, m. 4, a. 2, sol. I-II.
³² [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, I, q. 73, m. 4, a. 2, II, ad. 1.
³³ [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, I, q. 73, m. 4, a. 2, ad. 3. Cunningham comments on this text (see Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 111) that the characterization of the inhabitation or special presence under the aspect of fruit and as the object of enjoyment "may serve as a sort of definition, specifying, like the inhabitation itself, the very purpose of the divine missions."
³⁴ [Alexander of Hales (?)], Summa Theologica, I, q. 74, m. 2, c. 1, ad. 6.
what I am describing as an elevating shift from an hypothetical *finis quo*.  

First, if, as faith affirms, the Holy Spirit, and the Son and Father through the Spirit, come to dwell with a special presence in the hearts of the just in a *per se* permanent manner; and if, as the image of fruit tasted suggests, joy or delight is the characteristic attendant feature of this inhabitation or special presence; then one can argue that the just are given concomitantly a *per se* permanent capacity to possess joyfully and to delight in the special presence of the three-personed God.  

For no capacity proportionate to human nature as such suffices for such joyful possession.  

Second, in the Augustinian tradition within which theological reflection in the Middle Ages was largely conducted, joy or delight is understood as love in a qualified sense. In *On Christian Doctrine*, Augustine remarks that “...to enjoy something is to hold fast to it in love for its own sake.” In the *Confessions*, and indeed throughout his entire work, Augustine likens love to a vector quality, a weight (*pondus*):

> Fire tends upward, a stone downwards. By their weights they are driven, they seek their own places.... Not perfectly placed in the order of things, they are restless; put in order, they

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35 Cunningham refers briefly on p. 119 of *The Indwelling Trinity* to the acceptance “verbatim” of Augustine’s teaching on spiritual enjoyment or spiritual delight in the *Sententiae*, and of its influence on “...the Irrefragable Doctor and his foremost disciples....”

36 “...anima...de se non habet virtutem fruendi bono increato, sed per gratiam et virtutes.” [Alexander of Hales (?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 73, m. 4, a. 1, res. 1. Just what this capacity is will, I hope, be clarified presently.


are at rest. My love is my weight; by it I am borne wherever I am borne.\textsuperscript{39}

The correct way to take the metaphor can perhaps be gleaned from a text from \textit{The City of God}:

A right act of will is...good love, and a wrong act of will is evil love. Love, then, longing to have what is loved, is desire; but having and delighting in it is joy; shunning what is opposed to it is fear; and feeling what is opposed to it when it has happened is sorrow. And so these affections are evil if the love is evil, good if the love is good.\textsuperscript{40}

One may argue, then, that for Augustine love is not simply identical with desire. Nor is it simply identical with joy. Rather, love (\textit{amor}) is the basic, unqualified act of will.\textsuperscript{41} One's love is one's \textit{pondus}; but \textit{pondus} is not a mere metaphor for desire. Rather, love is the fount of desire and joy. Love as \textit{pondus} underpins and penetrates both desire and joy. It underpins insofar as both desire and joy can arise as a consequence of love. It penetrates insofar as desire is love \textit{actively} longing or striving to attain that which or the one who is loved, and joy or delight is love reposing in the attainment and possession of


\textsuperscript{40} See Augustine, \textit{De civitate Dei}, Corpus Christianorum Latina Series, vol. 48, ed. Bernadus Dombart and Alfonsus Kalb. (Turnholti: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1955), XIV, 7. Again, I am using Toner's translation as it appears on p. 38 of \textit{The Experience of Love}.

\textsuperscript{41} Augustine's vocabulary concerning love is somewhat complicated. Bourke provides us a with a brief guide: "\textit{Amor} is the broad generic term that he [Augustine] uses for love: it signifies almost any sort of attraction, psychic or physical. \textit{Dilectio} is less broad: it usually means a high-minded love of intelligible or spiritual objects. \textit{Caritas} names the highest kind of spiritual love, a love of God and of other realities as creatures of God. \textit{Voluptas} is used for any kind of pleasure but it frequently signifies lower sensual satisfaction. \textit{Libido} or \textit{cupiditas} designates lustful craving for sexual and other attractions of bodies. Finally, the term \textit{delectatio} means any kind of psychic delight, ranging from sexual pleasure to joy in the supreme good." Bourke, \textit{Joy in Augustine's Ethics}, pp. 35-36.
that which or the one who is loved. And as penetrated by love, both desire and joy are love in a qualified sense.

Accordingly, if, as faith affirms, the Holy Spirit, and the Son and the Father through the Spirit, come to dwell in the hearts of the just with a special presence and in a per se permanent manner; if, as the image of fruit tasted suggests, joy or delight is the characteristic attendant feature, prius quoad nos, of this special presence or inhabitation; if this special presence or inhabitation and its attendant joy or delight suppose a concomitant, per se permanent capacity to possess joyfully and delight in the special presence of the three-personed God; if joy is a consequence of love in the sense that

42 Toner acknowledges that Augustine is commonly interpreted as identifying love and desire. Referring to the passage cited above from the Confessions, and to others like it, he remarks that "...amor as pondus is readily taken to mean desiring or seeking one’s ‘place.’" Against this interpretation, he argues that "...closer inspection in the light of what is said in the literal statements of The City of God [he is referring to Book XIV, Chapters 6-7] leads us to understand the metaphorical statement of the Confessions in a different way. For nothing in the latter’s statement necessitates fully and simply identifying the pondus with psychic movement toward or rest in one’s place. Pondus by itself is what accounts for movement and rest, for desire and joy or peace." Toner, Experience of Love, p. 38. This interpretation, he argues on the next page, has greater textual warrant: “Let movement in the metaphor parallel desire, and let rest parallel joy. Now, by my weight I am borne wherever I am borne, and by my weight I rest in my place. But it is not by desire that I rest any more than it is by joy that I move. It is by my weight, my love, that I move and rest. Thus love is not simply identifiable with either movement or rest, with desire or joy. Nevertheless..., desire and the joy must be understood as love qualified by a certain relation to the object loved, its presence or its absence, a relation which is not essential to unqualified love, love simply in itself.” For Toner’s own analysis of the distinction and relation between love and desire and love and joy, see pp. 72-86. Further, as the term ‘inclination’ will be used on occasion in subsequent discussion regarding love, and as the various meanings of the term can be easily conflated in such discussions and so lead to misunderstanding, I quote the following remarks from Barry Miller as a useful clarification: “…inclination can be understood in three senses, and of these only one is applicable to the inclination which is proper to love. Inclination can be understood as the actual motion towards a real object. Or it can also be understood as demanding motion towards the object, as, for example, in the case of desire. In neither of these senses is inclination applicable to love, for there can be love without any motion, whether actual or demanded. But there is a third sense in which inclination can be understood, and it is in this that there is no reference to motion. Thus understood, inclination signifies simply a leaning, or bending, resulting from the presence of some kind of weight. There is not implied here any leaning or bending to something outside, but rather simply a leaning or bending of something as a result of the weight of something, which latter can be either the lover itself or another.” Barry Miller, The Range of Intellect (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1961), p.128. The text quoted within the quotation is from Bernard James Diggs, Love and Being: An Investigation into the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: S. F. Vanni, 1947), p. 28.
love becomes joy in love's attainment of its object; then one may affirm that this per se permanent capacity that is given concomitantly with the gift of the three-personed God poured into human hearts is really the per se permanent capacity of the just to love the ones who dwell with a special presence in their hearts.

Further, if, as faith affirms, the Holy Spirit, and the Son and Father through the Spirit, do indeed dwell in the hearts of the just, and if, as the image of fruit tasted suggests, joy and delight are actual, then this capacity to love is to be understood as also actualized, and not as a bare, unactualized capacity. It is to be understood as a willingness, as an operative potency, an habitually actuated capacity to love, such that it is only per accidens that it does not issue in acts of love. Indeed, it is to be understood not merely as an inclining pondus, but as an inclining pondus in fundamental fulfillment and repose, and therefore joyful in the possession of the ones who dwell.

Thus it is that the image of fruit tasted functions as the clue prius quoad nos for identifying more precisely the necessary, consequent condition that must be met if the special presence or inhabitation of the already wholly present God is to be accomplished in human hearts, if human beings are to enter into the presence of the already wholly present God. In so functioning the image makes a contribution to answering the aforementioned question for direct understanding, although as yet not one that answers the question completely. For even if the necessary and sufficient preparation for the gift of the Spirit has now been identified more precisely, it has still not been rendered explicit why this habitually actuated capacity to love attains the already wholly present God.

Only when the discussion turns to the third side of the triangle of relationships will
an attempt be made to answer this question. For the moment, let us continue attempting
to clarify the second side.

Note, then, that this fundamental fulfillment and repose is nascent, and so not
equivalent to complete fulfillment and repose. For in this life the actuated capacity to love
remains the ever precarious, actuated capacity of the wayfarer. It is truly a willingness,
but one that can continually grow and increase, and one that can never be serenely taken
for granted as a secure possession. Indeed, for the most part, it remains the actuated
capacity of the “little ones in spiritual age” described by Augustine, who yet are “called”
or ordered by the God who “works secretly” in human hearts toward the full sharing and
assimilation into God’s own inner-trinitarian life.43

Further, the special character of this capacity bears a repeated emphasis. God in
his goodness ever remains the ultimate finis qui, the consummate perfection of human
existence, the ultimate end and absolute term which attracts and is or can be attained.
But the capacity to love presently being considered is a willingness or an habitually
fulfilled inclining pondus that involves a shift from the aforementioned hypothetical finis
quo. For it is not simply a capacity to love narrowed down to what belongs or can belong
to human beings by virtue of their nature. It is a capacity to love God over and above any
natural, human capacity. Indeed, it is a capacity to love over and above any possible
natural love of God, any love of God proportionate to any created nature. As the image

43 For indications of this in the New Testament, see 1 Cor. 14:1; Ph. 1:9; 1 Thes. 3:12; 1 Tim. 6:11;
2 Tim. 2:22; 1 Pet. 1:22. For the discussion of Augustine, see pp. 166-170 above. For an affirmation of the
same point in the Halesian Summa, let the following suffice: “Dicendum quod nec per amorem nec per
cognitionem est in praesenti quies perfecta, quia ex parte cognoscimus, sicut dicitur 1 ad Cor. 13, 9, et
imperfecte diligimus, et ideo non est quies nisi in parte per scientiam vel amorem.” [Alexander of Hales(?)].
Summa Theologica, III, q. 32, m. 6, c. 6, sol.
of fruit tasted suggests, it is a capacity to love God that involves a special intimacy; and that is possible only by being given a share in the inner life and goodness of God. It is the love of God that is consequent to the bestowal of *gratia gratum faciens*:

...dicendum quod licet sit una gratia gratum faciens, tamen plures sunt effectus gratiae gratum facientis.... Unde si datur gratia gratum faciens ad sanctificandam animam vel gratificandam vel accendandam ad amorem, cum huiusmodo actus sint appropriati Spiritui Sancto et in illis habeat cognosci, dicitur mitti Spiritus Sanctus.\(^{44}\)

Secundum... quod gratia est similitudo Bonitatis summæ, comparatur ad animam ut vita, quia sic comparatur ad animam ut amor, et iste amor impressus vita est qua anima vivit Deo.\(^{45}\)

Now, this actuated capacity to love, consequent to the bestowal of *gratia gratum faciens*, is really the supernatural *habitus* of charity. Further considerations are required, however, to clarify the manner in which the Halesian *Summa* understands it as consequent to *gratia gratum faciens*. And it is in this clarification, I suggest, that the internal *ab alio* structure of the capacity becomes explicit—and with it, the manner in which the *repreaesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit is constituted.

### 2. 2. 4 The Image of Light and Rays of Light

The Halesian *Summa* depicts the relation between *gratia gratum faciens* and its consonant virtues through the use of the image of light and rays of light.\(^{46}\) Light is thought

\(^{44}\) [Alexander of Hales(?)], *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 73, m. 4, a. 2, ad. l, 3.

\(^{45}\) [Alexander of Hales(?)], *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 61, m. 6, a. 2, resp.

\(^{46}\) Remec comments on the appropriateness of the image in the mind of the author thus: "Sicut lux in aere tria efficit: primo purgat ipsum aer a dispositione sibi contraria, secundo disponit aer ut sit sibi consimilis eoque illuminat ipsum, ultimo informat ipsum et quantum hoc attinet eum perficit; ita similiter dicendum est de gratia, inquantum ipsa ut lux comparatur ad animam: primo removet ex anima dissimilitudinem lucis aeternae et propter hoc dici potest purgare eam, secundo disponit eam, ut possit esse similis in actu et ex hoc dicitur ipsum illuminare, ultimo informat eam et eo dicitur eam perficere." Remec, *De Sanctitate et Gratia*, p. 30.
of as perfecting the air or atmosphere without distinction (*indistincte*). ‘Light’ and ‘rays of light’ refer to the same substance; but the terms differ in meaning because speaking of rays of light introduces the notion of the direction of light, and so of perfecting a part of the air or atmosphere. Now just as light may be thought of as perfecting the air or atmosphere without distinction, so *gratia gratum faciens*, the light of the soul, may be thought of as perfecting the soul indiscriminately, without introducing any consideration of the parts of the soul, namely, the faculties or powers. Again, just as speaking of rays of light introduces the notion of the direction of the light, so speaking of the virtues consonant with *gratia gratum faciens* introduces a consideration of the distinct parts of the soul, the faculties or powers, and the perfections of those parts.

In the view of the Halesian *Summa*, then, *gratia gratum faciens* and its consonant virtues differ in meaning but not in substance. As the definition mentioned earlier on several occasions has it, *gratia gratum faciens*, radicated in the first being (*esse primum*) or natural being (*esse naturae*) of the soul, is ordinative of the whole of one’s life. The virtues consonant with *gratia gratum faciens* express this ordination of grace, as it disperses and resonates within the various faculties or powers of the soul, and in the acts which have the faculties or powers as their proximate principles. *Gratia gratum faciens*, then, radicated in the first being of the soul, prepossesses the perfections of its consonant virtues.

Now, several pages back, the image of fruit tasted was seen as providing the clue in the Halesian *Summa* for identifying the *finis quo* or that by which human beings, transformed *in divinam speciem* with the bestowal of *gratia gratum faciens*, can attain God
as their consummate perfection, their ultimate end and absolute term. It was also seen as the clue for pinning down more precisely the Halesian Summa's understanding of the necessary, consequent condition that must be fulfilled if the special presence of the already wholly present God is to be accomplished in human hearts, if human beings are to enter into the presence of the already wholly present God. In both instances the clue pointed to the habitus and act of charity. Now, another image in the Halesian Summa, light and rays of light, has come into play to provide us with the clue to its understanding of the relation between gratia gratum faciens and its consonant virtues. Among these consonant virtues is the habitus of charity. Perhaps, then, it may not be extravagant to suggest that the points made thus far can now be drawn together in such a way as to clarify the second side of the triangle of relationships, namely, the relation between gratia gratum faciens and the repraesentatio or imago of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

Thus, consider another statement regarding grace as the similitudo Dei in creatura rationali. In the Halesian Summa, we read that

...gratia [creata in creatura]...est similitudo, qua anima est imago actu, id est in imitatione actuali; et...se habet anima per conformitatem ad Deum in similitudine expressa....

Gratia creata or gratia gratum faciens, then, is the express similitude to God, an (unmerited) gift bestowed by God and radicated in the first being (esse primum) or natural being (esse naturae) of the soul. In virtue of this gift, the soul is the image of God in act or in actual imitation, and is conformed and made affinitive to God in such a manner that by it one is made proportionate to the end of sharing in the inner-trinitarian life of God.

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47 [Alexander of Hales (?)]. Summa Theologica, I, q. 11, m. 1, c. 1, sol. Cunningham remarks in a footnote (Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 327, footnote 19) that "[t]he term 'similitude' has a very special meaning for the Schoolmen, signifying the perfection by grace of the image of God in man...." One of the works he cites in support of this is the Halesian Summa.
The express similitude is not simply radicated in the first being or natural being of the soul; it also penetrates effectively the structure of the human essence. In so doing, it is patterned in accordance with the exigencies of that structure, retaining and taking to itself the characteristic features of what it penetrates.

Now, in the structure of the human essence, the principle of rational, appetitive operations (concupiscibilis=the spiritual inclination or vector quality of will) is a particular directional emanation from the soul, a partial expression of the totum potentiale of the soul, which inclines the soul to the good as its perfection, and gives repose in attainment. Its fundamental, unqualified act, accordingly, is a spiritual inclinatio to the good, an act that is prior to and distinct from desire. But such an act is what is meant fundamentally by 'love of the good'. The basic, unqualified act of the will, then, is love of the good.

Gratia gratum faciens, the similitudo Dei, as it penetrates the will, accords with the nature of the will as the proximate principle of rational, appetitive operation, and it perfects it supernaturally. Accordingly, the similitudo Dei, in the will, actuates and perfects the will, and takes on the quality of a spiritual, supernatural inclinatio to the good. It becomes the per se permanent similitudo Dei, characterized specifically secundum inclinationem vel ordinem. It becomes the "...radius, per quem dirigitur concupiscibilis in summam Bonitatem...." It becomes the habitus of charity.48

48 "Dicendum quod sicut se habet esse ad operari, et bene esse ad bene operari, sic gratia et virtus, sive dicamus esse substantiae anima sive esse potentiae. Nam quo anima sive potentia sua bene esse est, est id quo gratia est; quo autem est, sive secundum substantiam sive secundum potentiam, est gratia; quo vere bene operatur, est virtus. Quamvis ergo secundum substantiam et rem sint idem gratia et virtus, non tamen secundum esse et rationem. Unde ad maiorem differentiam voluerunt quidam dicere quod quae est comparatio animae ad suas vires vel potentias, eadem est comparatio gratiae ad virtutem. Et exemplum patet de radio et lumine in aëre: lumen enim et radius sunt idem secundum substantiam, quia lumen est substantia radii; differunt tamen secundum rationem et esse, quia lumen dicitur quod perficit aërem (continued...)"
Given that the will as a capacity is an emanation that pertains to the human essence, then, the *habitus* of charity can be thought of as a *perfection* of the will, a willingness that originates and flows from the bestowal of the perfection of *gratia gratum faciens* in the first being or natural being of the soul. *Gratia gratum faciens*, the express similitude to God, is the “*causa effectiva substantialis*” of charity. And charity is *gratia gratum faciens*, respecting the retained structure of the human essence, penetrating and perfecting the will as the proximate principle of rational appetitive operations that emanates from the soul, and being narrowed down in accordance with that principle.

Thus, the *habitus* of charity is the *same* similitude as that by which the soul is the image of God in act and in actual imitation. It is that same similitude, the express similitude to God—but it is that similitude narrowed down and manifested in accordance with the structure of the will. Charity, then, is a *derivative* manifestation of the similitude, originating from and dependent on the express similitude by which the soul is constituted as the *imago actu* of God. And it is in this way that an internal *ab alio* structure pertaining to charity is constituted.

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*48(...continued)*

indistincte; radius autem dicit illud quod perficit per distinctionem in partibus, quia radius dicit directionem ipsius luminis ad hanc partem aeris et ad illam, lumen autem non. Similiter in anima lumen est gratia, radius autem virtus, quia gratia, quae est ipsa lux, perficit animam quantum ad essentiam et indistincte quantum ad omnes vires; virtus autem perficit animam quantum ad partes, quae sunt vires eius, quia per fidem in anima intelligimus radius quemdam dirigentem vim rationabilem in primam Veritatem; caritas autem est radius, per quem dirigitur concupiscibilis in summam Bonitatem; spes est radius per quem dirigitur irascibilis in summam Maiestatem. Sicut ergo radius substantialiter est in lumine, et per hoc est lumen causa substantialis ipsius radii, item, lumen est causa effectiva radii et efficit radium; similiter est virtus in gratia substantialiter et est gratia causa effectiva substantialis ipsius virtutis. Unde dicit Bernardus quod <<virtutes sunt ordinationae per gratiam affectiones>>. Et propter hoc sicut diceremus quod radii sunt luminis directiones, ita debemus dicere quod virtutes sunt ordinationes gratiae. Secundum hoc ergo, cum dicitur radius est lumen, non est praedicatio per essentiam, sed per causam. Similiter hic ‘gratia est virtus’ vel e converso; sed sunt idem substantialiter et non formaliter, sicut ferrum et cultellus substantialiter idem sunt, et non formaliter; et sic gratia non est virtus omnino secundum esse et rationem, sed secundum substantiam.” [Alexander of Hales(?)], *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 4, sol.
Finally, to repeat a point already made, the similitudo Dei, present in the will as charity, is not merely love as an inclining pondus. The image of fruit tasted (fructus) betokens joy and delight. Joy and delight are love in a qualified sense, love as reposing, to some extent, in the attainment or receptive possession of that which or the one who is loved. The similitudo Dei, penetrating and perfecting the will, and giving joy and delight, is, as we have seen, without as yet venturing to say why, the necessary, consequent condition for the accomplishment or realization in human hearts of the special presence or inhabitation of the already wholly present God, of the Holy Spirit, and of the Father and Son through the Spirit. It is the habitus of charity as love reposing.49 And as love reposing, and as originating or flowing from gratia gratum faciens, the similitudo Dei radicated in the first being or natural being of the soul, the habitus of charity is, in the understanding of the Haesian Summa, the term whereby the created, dynamic repraesentatio or imago of the procession of the Holy Spirit as Proceeding Love is constituted.50

49 I say 'to some extent' because, as mentioned previously, the repose spoken of here is not the love of complete repose that results from the attainment of beatitude. It is indeed love in joyful, fundamental or nascent repose. But insofar as it remains in this life the love of the wayfarer, it remains a repose that is incomplete and ordered to the complete repose of beatitude and the full “tasting” attainment of the summa Bonitas.

50 I am borrowing the term, ‘dynamic’ from Cunningham: “…grace is to be understood in the dynamic sense, as issuing in acts of knowledge and love of which the Trinity is the object; only in this sense is there an image of God ‘in act,’ ‘in actual imitation,’...; only in the operations are the Persons represented (therefore capable of being known; therefore sent and indwelling), only by the operations, then, can They be had, possessed, enjoyed: which is to inhabit.” Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 117. Later, he remarks that “[s]imilitude...for the Summa Alexandri is not just any similitude, but a dynamic, practical likeness—the image of conformity.” Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 330. In my use of the term, ‘dynamic’ can refer to gratia gratum faciens as issuing in the habitus of charity, to the relation between gratia gratum faciens and the habitus of charity as a created image of the procession of the Holy Spirit, and to the habitus of charity as the loving repose whereby one enters into the special presence of the already wholly present God. Each of these falls within the purview of the Haesian Summa, the last being the concern of the pages to follow.
2. 3 The Relationship between Special Presence of the Holy Spirit and the Repraesentatio of the Procession of the Holy Spirit

With this clarification of the side of the triangle of relationships concerned with the relation between gratia gratum faciens and the repraesentatio or imago of the divine processions, and recalling the earlier, preliminary clarification of the side of the triangle of relationships concerned with the relation between gratia gratum faciens and the special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit, perhaps we are well placed, finally, to clarify the remaining side of the triangle of relationships, namely, the relation between the repraesentatio or imago of the divine processions and the special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit.

Recall, then, that in the discussion of the first side of the triangle of relationships, I mentioned that the Halesian Summa affirms gratia gratum faciens, the habitus of Godlikeness, as the necessary, proportionate preparation for the special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit. I left as an open question, however, the precise reason why the author is able to consider gratia gratum faciens as truly a preparation proportionate to the gift of the Holy Spirit, something suitably and adequately ordered to the possession of that gift. For I argued that, by itself, the specification of gratia gratum faciens as the habitus of Godlikeness and the sharing and assimilation into the inner life and goodness of God does not constitute the sought-for imperfect understanding. Indeed, as Cunningham pointedly remarks, to suppose that gratia gratum faciens, as an effect of God, constitutes the formal reason for the inhabitation, without recourse to the specific gifts of wisdom and charity which flow from

51 See pp. 204-207 above.
gratia gratum faciens, is to impale oneself in hopeless confusion. Overlooking the fact that an entitative habitus can provide only the initial element of theological understanding of the divine inhabitation, one fails to notice the heuristic significance of that initial element, rests content with that initial element, and neglects to follow through to the more complete understanding that would assign the correct proximate formal reason for the inhabitation. Then, not unnaturally, one confuses the proximate formal reason with gratia gratum faciens as an effect of God’s efficient causality.\(^52\)

2.3.1 Cunningham’s Criticism of the Halesian Position

Cunningham does not consider the Halesian Summa as exhibiting this particular confusion.\(^53\) Indeed, as the discussion of the second side of the triangle of relationships indicates, the Halesian Summa does not simply appeal to gratia gratum faciens. Rather, as I have argued, it affirms that the habitus of charity is the necessary, proximate, consequent condition for the special presence or inhabitation of the already wholly present God to be accomplished or realized in human hearts, the necessary, proximate, 

\(^{52}\) Commenting on the statement that “[c]onsidered as an effect of God, sanctifying grace does not constitute the formal reason of the inhabitation,” Cunningham remarks that “[o]n this point many modern theologians have impaled themselves in hopeless confusion....” They have done so by supposing that gratia gratum faciens does constitute the formal reason for the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit. One such well-known theologian Cunningham mentions is Paul Galtier (1872-1961), the author of L’habitation en nous des trois Personnes, ed., rev. et augm. (Roma: Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 1949) and of De SS. Trinitate in se et in nobis (Romae: apud aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1953). See Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 192.

\(^{53}\) “The formal reason of the divine indwelling is the gifts of sanctifying grace [specifically, Wisdom and Charity], explained by the Franciscan Summa as the dispositions necessary to possess the Persons as fruits....” Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 280; “By sanctifying grace and its gifts, the Summa of Alexander of Hales repeats over and over, we are properly disposed for the inhabitation of the divine Persons.” Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 282; “The Franciscan Summa...will situate the proximate formal reason [necessary to account fully on a theological basis for the mystery of the indwelling] in the supernatural habit [habitus] of Charity.” Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 283.
consequent condition for human beings to enter into the presence of the already wholly present God. In this regard, Cunningham speaks of the contribution of the Halesian Summa on the issue as "immense," and of the "fact...[which] must be regarded as incontestable," namely that the Halesian Summa "represents a definite theological advance in the understanding of the mystery of the indwelling and the problem it raises."

His summary statement of the advance follows:

For the Summa Alexandri the triune presence is explained by the fact that man, in a state of grace, knows or is capable of knowing the three Persons, and consequently can love Them; and in loving Them he possesses Them, They are his as objects of his enjoyment, as fruits for his delectation: as dwelling within him.

That is the positive side: "...to have well understood the problems, and to have developed the intrinsic principles of solution...." On the negative side, Cunningham regards this explanation of the presence of the three-personed God in the hearts of the just as inadequate and, in that sense, a failure. The inadequacy and consequent failure consists, we are told, not in misunderstanding the problem nor in a misapplication of principles, but in its "extrinsic principles." For the Halesian Summa holds, with all the Franciscan school, following the tradition of Augustine and the Victorines

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54 Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 130.

55 Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 128.

56 Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 128.

57 Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 130. Later (p. 351), summarizing the earlier discussion, Cunningham will specify the central problem thus: "how do the Persons dwell in man? what is the formal reason of Their inhabitation." To resolve the central problem, one must, he says, resolve two chief difficulties: "the specification of the special presence of the indwelling Trinity; and the relation of the manifestation of the Persons to Their inhabitation." Cunningham then speaks of the "great contribution" of the Franciscan Summa as having solved successfully the first of these difficulties: "the Persons are present as possessed by the just as fruits to be enjoyed." This solution, he remarks further, "is accepted unreservedly by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, as it will be by their followers."
and Peter Lombard, that love formally effects a real union with the object loved.\textsuperscript{58}

Cunningham argues further that the inadequacy of the explanation is overcome and the positive achievement of the Halesian \textit{Summa} on the issue incorporated, corrected and completed by none other than Thomas Aquinas. The Halesian \textit{Summa}, not so much by express statement as by inevitable consequence of the work's general teaching, identifies the proximate formal reason for the inhabitation in the supernatural \textit{habitus} of charity. For Thomas, on the other hand,

\ldots the final explanation of the inhabitation lies in the quasi-experimental knowledge of the divine Persons, a supernatural contuition or intuition which presupposes supernatural Charity and from which supernatural love inevitably flows. It is in the gift of Wisdom, then, which gives man the capacity for such knowledge, that the formal reason of the divine indwelling is ultimately and definitely placed by St. Thomas. And in this solution is found the perfect theological flowering of the Augustinian insight: \textit{mitti est cognosc}.\textsuperscript{59}

\section*{2. 3. 2 A Response to Cunningham's Criticism}

In his discussion, Cunningham displays considerable familiarity with a range of texts and analytic skills that are far from mediocre. Still, with all due deference to his erudition and analytic skills, I want to suggest tentatively that on one important point here he is mistaken.

In his criticism of the explanation of the divine inhabitation in the Halesian \textit{Summa}, Cunningham writes:

\begin{quote}

The inadequacies of this theory—proposing the faculty of enjoying the Trinity as a formal reason for the real presence of the divine Persons—are immediately apparent. Against such an explanation, the criticism John of St. Thomas will later level against the proposals
\end{quote}

\footnote{Cunningham, \textit{Indwelling of the Trinity}, p. 130. It is with regard to the second difficulty mentioned in the previous footnote, then, that Cunningham argues that the Halesian \textit{Summa} falters. Indeed, as I hope will become evident from the discussion to follow, Cunningham regards the Halesian \textit{Summa} and the Franciscan school generally as having misidentified the formal reason for the inhabitation.}

\footnote{Cunningham, \textit{Indwelling of the Trinity}, pp. 283-284.}
of Suarez is equally valid. As St. Thomas himself points out, real, physical union is an efficient effect of love, but love itself can never be the formal reason for this real presence, nor even a disposition by means of which the loved one becomes present. No matter how perfect love may be, neither on the natural nor on the supernatural plane can it do more than seek and tend toward real and physical union. It must remain in the moral and intentional order, as opposed to the order of substantial presence.

Fruition is an act of an appetitive faculty, as all the Scholastics agree; on the intellectual level, it is an act of the will or a perfecting power modifying the will: for it is the enjoyment of an end possessed, ultimately of eternal life, of God Himself in His trinity of Persons. Such an enjoyment, obviously, can only be imperfect in this life, where beatitude is possessed not in the physical order but only in expectation and intention; it will be perfect in heaven, when we enjoy our final end—but an end already possessed. But to possess the Trinity in intention and hope does not explain our real possession of the Trinity here on earth, the fact of its real presence in those in whom the Three dwell as in a temple. If enjoyment follows real possession, it cannot account for it.... The will, or a supernatural gift elevating the will, can urge us toward God, can rejoice in the presence of God once He is possessed: neither the will nor any supernatural appetitive habit can possess God, in the proper sense of that word. The power of enjoying the Trinity is not identical with the supernatural gift of possessing Them as objects of enjoyment. And so it cannot be the formal reason of the inhabitation.60

Again, in his discussion of what he regards as the same explanation in Bonaventure, though better and more explicitly expressed in his writings than in the Halesian Summa, Cunningham first states the theory:

God inhabits when He is possessed by man; He is possessed when He is enjoyed; He is enjoyed when man can enjoy him. The power of enjoying God is for St. Bonaventure, more clearly even than for the Summa Alexandri, the formal reason of the inhabitation. But what is this power? There can be no doubt of the answer of the Franciscan doctor: “fruition by its general notion bespeaks a union of love, that is, of the enjoyable with the one enjoying.” Essentially this act is an act of the will, for which knowledge serves merely as a disposition. Appealing to the three Persons of the Trinity, we can see that He is not simply the object of enjoyment in the world of relativity, but that enjoyment of Him is the most efficacious act of the will, because of the supernatural virtue of Charity. The enjoyment of God by the gift of Charity will be perfect in heaven, like the inhabitation itself; here on earth, whether by act or habit, it can only be imperfect. And the special presence of the Trinity in the souls of the just, like Their enjoyment by the just here on earth, will have as its formal reason the theological virtue of Charity.61

A few pages later he states his criticism:

The defects [of Bonaventure’s solution] are obvious enough to those who enjoy St. Thomas’ profound analysis of the psychology and metaphysics of love and knowledge. Love can only achieve an intentional, affective union, not a real and physical one; as efficient cause it can tend to such a union, can even effect it, but as formal cause it can do nothing. And fruition,

60 Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, pp. 128-130.

61 Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 158.
the ultimate act of love, can only enjoy what is possessed by some means other than itself.62

Cunningham’s criticisms here, I suggest, result from a particular oversight regarding the nature of love, and they dissolve once that oversight is identified and rectified. And perhaps one simple and effective way to identify the oversight is to defer, as Cunningham himself does, to Thomas Aquinas.

Is it the case, as Cunningham claims, that Thomas disagrees with the affirmation of the Franciscan school, “following the tradition of Augustine and the Victorines and Peter Lombard,” that love formally effects a real union with the object loved? Cunningham himself notes that in his Summa Theologiae, Thomas alters the formula in the commentary on the Sentences indicating the manner in which the three-personed God is specially present in the hearts of the just, namely, from ‘sicut res est in similitudine sua’ to ‘sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante’.63 Still, he would have us believe that Thomas, following “profound Aristotelian psychology,” teaches without more ado that “love is indifferent to the presence or absence of its object.”64 If this statement can be accepted without qualification, if the presence or absence of the beloved is purely and simply incidental to love, it would indeed follow that love cannot be a proximate formal reason for the divine inhabitation. For this reason, in Cunningham’s interpretation of Thomas love is relegated to the role of cause and formal objective medium and rule of

62 Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 162. Concluding his discussion of Bonaventure’s position (p. 164), Cunningham repeats the criticism: “...love, even the divine love of Charity, explains an affective union but not the real union...characteristic of the divine indwelling.”

63 See Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, pp. 297, 299. Later (p. 330), arguing that Thomas always held a strictly intentional theory concerning the divine inhabitation and rejected the ontological theory proposed by Albert the Great, Cunningham remarks that the formulas are equivalent.

64 Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 352.
wisdom. And wisdom either is or gives rise to a quasi-experimental knowledge which, for him, is the true proximate formal reason for the divine inhabitation. Thus, Cunningham writes:

To have or possess a spiritual object requires an act of the intellect: this is certain from psychology and is brought out in respect to the missions and inhabitation by St. Augustine's notion of manifestation. But obviously not any knowledge suffices, since it must be a knowledge uniting us with God Himself, establishing a real contact with the really present Trinity; it must be a knowledge springing from grace and intimately linked with love. Natural gifts, no matter how perfect; unformed Faith, no matter how exalted; all the charismata, no matter how extraordinary—none of these enable man to possess the divine Persons, and in none of them are They sent or given, do They come or proceed, can They abide with us and dwell in us.

Why cannot these effect what grace produces? Because none of these lesser gifts enters into contact with an object as had or possessed, that is as really present to us. But the knowledge of grace is in every way special, because it is informed by love. It is a type of experimental knowledge, as St. Thomas states many times....

The loving-knowledge rooted in grace which is implied by the inhabitation attains the Persons as objects present to us and within us. So it cannot be a discursive knowledge, which by definition has no direct contact with the thing known. On the contrary, like sense experience it involves a sort of sympathy with the object; and since the object is the Holy Trinity, this is a judgment without reasoning caused by love....

There is...a formal objective medium in this experimental knowledge, by which God is known; and so it cannot be an immediate knowledge.... But not any effect of God suffices as a medium for the contemplation of Him; it must be an effect within man, an effect to which God is immediately perceptible, an effect supremely expressive of God. And these conditions are realized only in the gifts of grace, but especially in the gift of the Holy Ghost of Wisdom and in the supreme theological virtue of Charity....

It is important to note...that love here functions not only as cause but as the formal medium and rule of Wisdom: we contemplate divine things loved....65

Now I suggest there are strong reasons for supposing that Cunningham's relegation of love to the role of formal objective medium, in his interpretation of Thomas' attempt to offer some theological understanding of the special presence of the three-personed God, is not an adequate statement of Thomas' position. For I do not believe that Thomas teaches that love itself does not necessarily involve any real presence of the beloved within the lover, any real union of lover and beloved. Nor do I believe that one

65 See Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, pp. 197-200. Perhaps the clearest statement of what he takes to be Thomas' position is the following: "It is clear...that in the experimental knowledge which Wisdom gives birth to, whose cause and formal medium is divine Charity, the formal explanation of the Trinity in the souls of the just is found." Cunningham, Indwelling of the Trinity, p. 202.
can say without more ado that for Thomas love is purely and simply indifferent to the presence or absence of its object.

Thomas' own formula in his *Summa Theologiae* indicating the manner in which the three-personed God is specially present in the hearts of the just, namely 'sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante,’ itself suggests that for him there is a manner of presence pertaining to loving that in some sense is distinct from that pertaining to knowing. It does not suggest, however, that Thomas regards only the first manner mentioned in the formula as real, or that the second manner is somehow less real than the first. Indeed, in *De Deo Trino II: Pars Systematica*, in the course of clarifying the analogous conception of the procession of the Holy Spirit, Lonergan cites a series of texts from Thomas which, at least in part, are intended to establish that for Thomas the presence of the beloved within the lover (*amatum in amante*) is not something separate from love, in the sense of being something that is *subsequently produced* by an act of love. For Thomas, Lonergan argues, the presence of the beloved within the lover is *constituted* by love. It is, in fact, the same reality as the act of love.66

Perhaps Thomas' position can be clarified somewhat by referring to an earlier discussion in Lonergan's writings. In *Verbum*, Lonergan submitted chapter 19 of *Summa Contra Gentiles*, IV, the chapter from which he draws three of the texts he mentions in *De

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In this chapter, Thomas is concerned with the analogous understanding of the procession of the Holy Spirit. He begins the discussion, as Lonergan notes, by examining the nature of love in general.

First, everything is made to be in act through its form. Thus a natural thing is made to be in act in its natural being through its proper form, and an intellect is made to be in act through an intelligible form in as much as it is actually understanding.

Second, everything, through its form, also possesses an inclining or ordinative capacity, a capacity to exist in a tendential manner with respect to its proper operations and to its proper good and end, to what is fitting, suitable or perfective of itself, which it attains through operations.

Accordingly, those finite beings which possess an intellect actuated through an intelligible form also possess an inclining or ordinative capacity, a capacity to exist in a tendential manner with respect to their proper operations and to their proper good and end, to what is fitting, suitable or perfective of themselves, which they attain through operations.

Outside the intellectual field, we name this capacity that pertains intrinsically to form, natural appetite or natural inclination. Within the intellectual field, the capacity is that

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67 See Lonergan, Verbum, pp. 209-213. Note also that the discussion in Verbum of the meaning of 'procession' as it applies to the divine processions in part anticipates the discussion in De Deo Trino II. For the discussion, see Verbum, pp. 107-113. For the anticipation, see especially p. 109, footnote 20, which extends to p.111.

68 The title of the chapter is: "Quomodo intelligenda sunt quae de Spiritu sancto dicuntur?" See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, in vol. 15 of Opera Omnia (Romae: apud sedem Commisionis Leoniniae, 1930), IV, c. 19.

69 Here, drawing on Lonergan's analysis, I offer a selective, interpretive summary of the first part of the argument of Thomas' Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, c. 19.
by which the one who understands operates for an end, and we name it rational appetite or will. There is a will, then, in everyone who understands.

Next, one can distinguish the basic act of the inclining capacity of will, and modulations of the basic act, as additional, circumstantial features accrue to it.

The basic act, the single root principle inherent in every modulated act of will is love. For a specific, actual inclination, a specific ordering or tendential manner of existing, whether natural or rational, can arise provided there is an affinity, correspondence or suitability, in some sense, between the natural or rational thing and the term to which it is moved, its proper good and end. However, in the case of the actuation of the inclining or ordinative capacity we name will, in the case of the actuation of this capacity to exist in a tendential manner, there is, prior to the actuation of the capacity, an added feature, namely, an apprehension or conscious regard of the term, intelligible through its form, as good and end, an apprehension or conscious regard of it as befitting, suitable or perfective of oneself, an apprehension or conscious regard of it as affinitive to one or attractive to one.

Now, however it arises, to be actually affected toward a term because the term is apprehended as a concrete befitting good, to exist consciously in a tendential or vectorial manner toward a term because the term is apprehended as a concrete befitting good, is

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70 The following quotation from Thomas gives the terms I have translated as ‘affinity’, ‘correspondence’ and ‘suitability’: "...res naturalis habet affinitatem et convenientiam secundum formam, quam diximus esse inclinationis principium, cum eo ad quod movetur...." Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, c. 19, § 3.

71 Again, I had best quote Thomas’ text: "...per formam intelligibilem aliquid apprehenditur ut conveniens vel afficiens." Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, c. 19, § 3.
to love the term: "Affici autem ad aliquid, inquamount huiusmodi, est amare ipsum."\(^{72}\)

Again, however it arises, once the actuation of the capacity to exist in a tendential manner is given, once love is given, it can be modulated in various ways. Thus, 'desire', 'joy', 'sadness', 'hate', and so forth, name modulated acts of will which, as Lonergan remarks elsewhere, "reflect objective modifications in the circumstances of the motive good."\(^{73}\) In various manners, each of these is underpinned and penetrated by love as a conscious, tendential manner of existing, by the "...pure response of appetite to the good, [by] nihil aliud...quam complacentia boni",\(^ {74}\) and without that underpinning and penetration they do not arise. In that sense, love can be accurately understood as the basic act of will.\(^ {75}\)

Now, how on this analysis does love as the basic act of will arise?\(^ {76}\) The aforementioned affinity, correspondence or suitability is from the intelligible form by which the intellect is actuated.\(^ {77}\) For the actuation results in a presence of the intelligible form

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\(^{72}\) Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 19, § 3.


\(^{74}\) Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," in *Collection*, p. 23. The Latin in the quotation is from Thomas' *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 25, a. 2, c.

\(^{75}\) "Prima...immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 26, a. 2, c. This point regarding the distinction between love, on the one hand, and desire, joy, and so forth, on the other, arose earlier in relation to Augustine's thought. See pp. 218-220 above.

\(^{76}\) Perhaps the following quotation will clarify the precise question being asked here: "...amor, etsi non nominet motum appetitus tendentem in appetibile, nominat tamen motum appetitus quo immutatur...ut ei appetibile complacat." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 26, a. 2, ad. 3.

\(^{77}\) "Ex hoc...oritur inclinationis naturalis, quod res naturalis habet affinitatem et convenientiam secundum formam, quam diximus esse inclinationis principium, cum eo ad quod movetur, sicut grave cum loco inferiori. Unde etiam hinc oritur omnis inclinationis voluntatis, quod per formam intelligibilem aliquid apprehenditur ut conveniens vel afficiens." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 19, § 3.
in the intellect “per similitudinem speciei.” This affinity, correspondence or suitability provides a necessary condition. In addition, the apprehended intelligible form by which the intellect is actuated contributes a specifying function. However, what is required for love to arise is not the mere apprehension of the intelligible form as intelligible, but the further prerequisite of one coming to regard the intelligible form, in the manner in which it actually exists or can exist, as a concrete befitting good—and this regard in the one who apprehends is distinct from what the mere actuation of purely knowing intellect can give. For it goes beyond merely an apprehension of intelligibility and affirmation of truth.

Now, the pure response of appetite we name love is, as a response, a conscious, affective, consenting affirmation of a concrete good—and as such, it is identical with what is described as the complacentia boni. Moreover, if this affective, consenting affirmation regards persons, it can be a consenting affirmation not merely of their qualities, but of them themselves. Again, as the affirmation of truth, especially an unqualified affirmation, involves one coming to stand in a certain relation to the intelligibility that is affirmed as true, so too the affective, consenting affirmation of personal goodness involves one coming to stand in a certain relation to the good that one consentingly affirms. The question, then, is how does this arise.

Now a cause is that on which the being of something else follows or, again, that which exercises an influence on the existence of something else, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. If love as the basic act of will is the “something else”; and if love as the basic act of will is the pure response of consenting affirmation of the good, and also, since it

involves one coming to stand in a certain relation to the good that one consentingly affirms, a conscious, tendential manner of existing; then, as Lonergan indicates, final causality, the good as cause, plays a decisive role in the actuation of love.

In the exercise of final causality, a "something else," namely a specific actuation or determination, comes to be in one's bare capacity or potency of will in dependence on the intelligible term being apprehended as good. The intelligible term, then, comes to be apprehended not merely as an intelligible term, but precisely under the aspect of the perfecting, the good and end. And it is precisely as motive good, as cuius gratia, that the end apprehended as perfecting of one, evokes, calls forth or elicits a determinate actuation of consenting affirmation in one's bare capacity or potency of will. The actuation of the bare capacity or potency of will is love. Thus, love arises in dependence on the concrete good apprehended as perfective of one.

With the actuation of love, the amative capacity of the now-constituted lover is determined in such a way as to be really related to a beloved. The determinate actuation involves a relational manner of existing, a specific referring, an esse ad, having not simply an apprehended intelligible form as the term of the relation, but the form as it exists or could exist concretely, and as it bears to one in its concrete existence a perfective significance. Through the exercise of final causality, the end yields itself in some

79 "A being is perfective of another not only according to its specific character but also according to the existence which it has in reality. In this fashion the good is perfective; for the good is in things.... Inasmuch as one being by reason of its act of existence is such as to perfect and complete another, it stands to that other as an end." Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, tr. Robert W. Schmidt, S. J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954), q. 21. a. 1. c; "...something is an object of the soul in two ways. (1) It is so inasmuch as it is capable of being in the soul, not according to its own act of being, but according to the manner of the soul—spiritually. This is the essential constitution of the knowable in so far as it is knowable. (2) Something is the object of the soul according as the soul is inclined and oriented to it after the manner (continued...)"
measure to the one who is constituted as lover as the to-be-loved, and in virtue of its
goodness, not in virtue of any exercise of efficient causality, it insinuates a real ordering
to itself in the now-constituted lover. The goodness of the end elicits a response of
consenting affirmation in the amative capacity of the one who is to be constituted as
lover; it fractures, opens up and heightens his or her manner of existence, so that with
the actuation the end comes to stand within the conscious ambit of the actuated capacity
precisely as the to-be-loved.

The to-be-loved of the beloved in the lover is nothing other than the to-love of the
lover for the beloved: they are one and the same act. “[B]y final causality,” Lonergan
remarks, “[t]here results from the beloved the amare of the beloved; and this amare of the
beloved is not in the beloved but in the lover.... [T]he amari of the beloved in the lover is
one and the same act as the amare of the lover for the beloved.”60 It is in this sense that
one may speak of the presence of the beloved in the lover. Thus, Thomas speaks of the
presence, in some measure (“aliqualiter”), of the beloved in the will of the lover as “…the
term of a movement is in its proportioned motive principle by reason of the suitability and
proportion which the term has for that principle.”61 The presence is in the esse ad as
conscious, in the relation of dependence as conscious, in the ordination as conscious.
If the expression be permitted, the presence is the lover’s conscious to-be as toing as

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61 “…in voluntate...amantis est sicut terminus motus in principio motivo proportionato per
convenientiam et proportionem quam habet ad ipsum.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, c.
19, § 4.
regards the term as good. Thus, in another place Thomas writes:

Omne autem quod ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad suum bonum, habet quodammodo illud sibi praesens et unitum secundum quamdam similitudinem, saltem proportionis; sicut forma quodammodo est in materia, inquantum habet aptitudinem et ordinem ad ipsam.

Next, Lonergan proceeds to summarize Thomas' carefully nuanced application of the analysis of love to the procession of the Holy Spirit in the divine nature. My immediate concern, however, is with Cunningham's objection to the Halesian Summa's identification of the supernatural habitus of charity as the proximate formal reason for the

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82 In Verbum (p. 210), Lonergan calls this a "dynamic presence" and asks how the term of a movement is in the movement's motive principle? "Obviously," he responds, "by final causality: the end determined the agent." Elsewhere, regarding the presence, Thomas writes: "...what is loved is in the lover, when it is actually loved. The fact that an object is actually loved, results from the lover's power to love and from the lovable good as actually known. Accordingly the presence of the beloved object in the lover is brought about by two factors: the appetitive principle and the intelligible object as apprehended, that is, the word conceived about the lovable object." Thomas Aquinas, Compendium of Theology, tr. Cyril Vowell, S.J., S.T.D. (St. Louis and London: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), c. 49. In De Deo Trino II (p. 112), Lonergan comments on this text as follows: "Qui locus determinat tum id quo constituitur <<amatum in amante>>; neque adeo detorqueni potest ut asseratur <<amatum in amante>> produci per amorem, non produci per verbum, esse aliud ac ipse amor."

83 Thomas Aquinas, In Librum Beati Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus Commentaria, in vol. 15 of Opera Omnia (Parmae: Fiaccadori, 1864), c. 4. lect. 9. Elsewhere, Thomas remarks that love transforms the one loving into the very thing that is loved: "...amor dicitur transformare amantem in amatum, in quantum per amorem mouetur amans ad ipsam rem amatum..." Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo, q. 6, a. 1, ad. 13, in vol. 23 of Opera Omnia (Rome: Commissio Leonina and Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1982). Lonergan comments on this text (De Deo Trino, II, p. 112): "Quare, <<amatum in amante>> per amorem constituitur inquantum movetur amans in amatum, et non inquantum aliquid producitur intra voluntatem per amorem."

84 "Paragraphs 5 to 12 of Contra Gentiles 4, c. 19, apply the foregoing analysis [of love]. First, it is shown that since God understands, he must have a will; further, this will cannot be distinct really from either the divine substance or the divine intellect. Secondly, the will of God cannot be mere potency or mere habit; it must be in act; and since the basic act of will is love, it must be actually loving. Thirdly, the proper object of divine love is the divine goodness which is identical with God; but love is dynamic presence; therefore the love of God for God involves the dynamic presence of God in God. Moreover, since divine loving, divine willing, divine being are identical, it follows that the dynamic presence of God in God is not mere dynamic presence but God. Just as God's thought of God is not mere thought but God, so God's love of God is not mere accidental act but God. Fourthly, the origin of divine love is treated. There cannot be the dynamic presence of the beloved in the lover's will, unless there first is intellectual conception. Further, it is not the concept but the conceived that is loved; hence divine love necessarily is related both to the Word and to God from whom the Word proceeds. The remaining four paragraphs explain why the procession of love is not a generation, why the Holy Spirit is named Spirit, and he is named Holy." Lonergan, Verbum, pp. 210-211.
divine inhabitation, according to what is *prius quoad nos*.

Cunningham denies, and claims Thomas denies, that love formally effects a real union with the beloved, and he asserts that no “supernatural appetitive habit [*habitus*] can possess God in the proper sense of the word.” I have been attempting to respond to his objection by arguing that Thomas cannot be so easily sequestered in support of this position. More particularly, by adverting to two discussions by Lonergan, I have attempted to argue that for Thomas there is a real presence of the beloved within the lover that is constituted by loving, that that presence is really the same as the act of loving.

Now when one speaks of a real union of lover and beloved, one is not speaking of some fusion that dissolves distinction, but, at least in some instances, of a real presential union of one person with another, of a union “secundum coaptationem affectus.” Accordingly, if, as I have attempted to argue, taking my cue from Lonergan, Thomas’ position is that the presence of the beloved within the lover is constituted by love, one cannot truly say that on this precise point Thomas denies what the Franciscan school affirms, namely, that love formally effects or constitutes a real union with the beloved. He affirms it no less than they. Accordingly, Cunningham’s attempt to drive a wedge between the position of the Franciscan school and Thomas’ position on this precise point is unsuccessful. Further, one cannot properly play off here the meaning of ‘real union’, on the one hand, and ‘intentional or affective union’, on the other, as if they are to be rigidly understood as mutually exclusive.

Unless I am mistaken, then, there are strong reasons to discount Cunningham’s

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65 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 28, a. 1, ad. 2.
claim that for Thomas love itself can never be understood as the proximate formal reason, according to what is *prius quoad nos*, for the divine inhabitation. For, if the position I have argued for is correct, Cunningham's position has no stronger foundation than an oversight on his part regarding the nature of love, which he foists onto Thomas.

### 2.3.3 Love and the Special Presence of the Holy Spirit

Let us take up again, then, the position of the Halesian *Summa*. The image of fruit (*fructus*) whose sweetness is tasted and enjoyed betokens both possession and joy in possession. Apart from the objection we have been considering, Cunningham provides no other reason that would necessitate relegating love merely to the role of formal objective medium and rule of wisdom, which is or gives rise to the quasi-experimental knowledge that, for him, is the true proximate formal reason for the divine inhabitation. If that objection can be discounted, then the image of fruit tasted and enjoyed can again function, as in the Franciscan school, as the clue which enables one to achieve some significant theological understanding of the divine inhabitation. For if joy is understood as love in a qualified sense, love reposing in the attainment or reception and possession, in some measure ("*aliqualiter"), of the beloved, then the image functions properly by suggesting a reference back to this love.86

Accordingly, if the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by love, then perhaps the sought-for clarification of the third side of the triangle of relationships, and

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86 Perhaps Cunningham's objection (*Indwelling of the Trinity*, p. 129) that "[if] enjoyment follows real possession, it cannot account for it..." would be sound if enjoyment were not love in a qualified sense. Because the presence of the beloved in the lover (receptive possession) is constituted by love, enjoyment "accounts" for real (receptive) possession if it is understood as love in a qualified sense. Equally, enjoyment can be said to "follow" real possession the way it follows love.
indeed of the entire network of relationships that would offer some integrated theological understanding of the divine habitation, is at hand.

Thus, the discussion of the second side of the triangle concluded by affirming that in the understanding of the Halesian *Summa*, the *habitus* of charity, originating or flowing from *gratia gratum faciens*, is the term whereby the created, dynamic *repraesentatio* or *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit as Proceeding Love is constituted. If one accepts this result, one can say that the third side of the triangle of relationships is concerned with the following question: How are the operations and operative *habitus* of charity, both of which can function as the term whereby the *repraesentatio* or *imago* in created reality of the procession of the Holy Spirit as Proceeding Love is constituted, related to the special presence, habitation or receptive possession of the three-personed God, to the special presence, habitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit, and of the Father and Son through the Spirit?

I have sought to assemble all the elements needed to propose an accurate answer to this question. If I have succeeded, the answer can hardly come as a surprise. The presence of the beloved within the lover is constituted by love. It is not a reality distinct from love, something produced by love. If love is given, then the presence of the beloved within the lover is likewise given. If love can vary in intensity, be more or less deep-seated or perfect, so too can the presence of the beloved within the lover. A supernatural love of the three-personed God, a *complacentia* in the *summa Bonitas* that exceeds the proportion of human nature, is given. It is the fundamentally reposeful love that originates or flows from the bestowal of the supernatural entitative *habitus* of *gratia gratum faciens*
in the first being or natural being of the soul. It is the similitudo Dei in the will. Accordingly, the presence of the three-personed God is likewise given. And since the love exceeds the proportion of human nature, this presence of God is not the presence per substantiam, praesentiam et potentiam, but a special presence of the three-personed God in the hearts of the just that likewise exceeds the proportion of human nature.

From this result, some integrated statement drawing together the various strands of the preceding discussion can be advanced, and the question for understanding that was left open at the end of the discussion of the first side of the triangle of relationships, and that remained open but a step closer to resolution at the end of the discussion of the second side, can be answered.

The question was why the entitative habitus of gratia gratum faciens is the necessary and sufficient proportionate preparation for the gift of the Holy Spirit, something suitably and adequately ordered to the attainment and receptive possession of the Spirit. Attainment is through operative habitus and operations which have operative habitus as their proximate principles. In the discussion of the second side of the triangle of relationships, I argued that the Halesian Summa considers the habitus of charity as the primary, proximate principle whereby the just attain the already wholly present three-personed God. With this specification, the question for understanding moved a step closer to resolution. The key for resolving the question, however, occurs in the discussion of the third side of the triangle. It may be stated thus: The bestowal of gratia gratum faciens is the necessary and sufficient proportionate preparation for human beings to enter into the special presence of the already wholly present three-personed God, and
indeed for a presential union with the three-personed God, because from it originates the operative *habitus* and operations of charity, the supernatural, reposeful love of God, the *complacentia* in the *summa Bonitas*, which as love involves intrinsically the presence of the beloved within the lover, and therefore enables the lover to *attain* the three-personed God in direct proportion to the depth of his or her love.

Accordingly, one may speak not idly, but aptly and with purpose, as Alexander of Hales and the Halesian *Summa* do, of *gratia gratum faciens* as *gratia creata*, and of the special presence, inhabitation, indwelling or receptive possession of the three-personed God in the hearts of the just as *gratia increata*. For both *gratia gratum faciens* and the divine inhabitation are something freely given; both are gifts. And the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*, suggest in their very formulation that these gifts are not unrelated. Still, if one goes by the text, it seems that in its use of the terms the Halesian *Summa* speaks better than it knows. For, although it certainly affirms that the bestowal of *gratia gratum faciens* is the necessary and sufficient proportionate preparation in human beings for the special presence or divine inhabitation; although it affirms, further, that in the order according to *quod est prius quoad nos*, the *habitus* of charity is the proximate principle whereby the just enter into that special presence, attain and receptively possess the three-personed God; it does not succeed, as far as I can discover, in crystallizing the *why* of the whereby. In other words, it does not achieve a clarification of the third side of the triangle of relationships comparable to the clarification it offers of the relationships of the first and second sides. For nowhere does the text of the Halesian *Summa* evidence a clear and distinct understanding that the presence of the
beloved within the lover is constituted by love, that it is the same reality as love.

Still, to say that the Summa does not succeed in crystallizing the why of the whereby is not to say that it does not move toward crystallization.

To clarify this, let us contrast a crystallization of this why, in effect or for all intents and purposes, and a mere movement toward the crystallization. Thomas, I suggest, provides an example of the former situation. For, as previously mentioned, in his Summa Theologiae Thomas alters the formula he uses in his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard to indicate the manner in which the three-personed God is specially present in the hearts of the just, namely 'sicut res est in similitudine sua,' to 'sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante.' Now, as regards love, I have argued, following Lonergan, that Thomas affirms that the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by actual loving or the habitus of love, and that it is not something distinct, subsequently produced by love. This affirmation, in effect and for all intents and purposes, clarifies the sicut as regards love. Accordingly, in effect or for all intents and purposes, Thomas affirms that there is a special presence of the three-personed God in part because the love of God that one is rendered capable of through the bestowal of gratia gratum faciens itself constitutes such a presence.

Now if Thomas' Summa provides an example of the former situation as regards crystallization of the why, I am suggesting that the Halesian Summa, in contrast, provides an example of the latter. It does not manage to go as far as Thomas in effectively determining the why; but it does move in that direction, in the sense that, with the benefit

See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q.43, a. 3, c.
of hindsight, that determination can be understood as a natural development out of a position such as that of the Halesian *Summa*—with nothing in the Halesian *Summa*'s actual position obstructing or impeding such a development.

Perhaps I can go some way toward rendering this claim plausible if I begin with two texts:

Spiritus...Sanctus eo facit nos gratos quo facit nos deiformes; hoc autem facit, quia amor est. Unde dicit Richardus de S. Victore: <<Scio, anima mea, quia dilectio tua vita tua est; et quidquid diligis ipsa vi dilectionis in eius similitudinem transformatis>>. Quia ergo Spiritus Sanctus amor est, immo et virtus prima amoris, inde est, cum datur nobis, transformat nos in divinam speciem, ut sit ipsa anima assimilata Deo.\(^8\)

Secundum...quod gratia est similitudo Bonitatis summae, comparatur ad animam ut vita, quia sic comparatur ad animam ut amor, et iste amor impressus vita est qua anima vivit Deo. Unde Richardus: <<Scio, anima mea, quod dilectio vita tua est>>, et ita secundum hunc modum actus gratiae est vivificare. Ad istum vero actum consequitur transformatio sive assimilatio animae ad Deum, quia haec est vis amoris quod transformat amantem in amatum. Unde Richardus, *De arrah sponsi ad sponsum*, dicit: <<Scio anima mea, quod, cum aliquid diligis, ipsa vi dilectionis in eius similitudinem transformatis>>\(^9\).

Drawing on Hugh of St. Victor’s work, *Soliloquium de Arrha Animae* for support, then, and speaking here according to the order of *quod est prius simpliciter*, the author of these texts from the Halesian *Summa* affirms that the Holy Spirit as love, indeed as the *virtus prima amoris*, and as the one who is given to us, assimilates us into the life of the three-personed God, transforms us *in divinam speciem*, and so makes us like God and pleasing to God.\(^9\) As the Holy Spirit is love, so the vivification consequent to the gift of the Spirit is such that, in some measure, we now live the life of the one who is given; or, rather, since the Father and Son are likewise given if the Holy Spirit is given, we are now

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\(^8\) [Alexander of Hales(?)], *Summa Theologica*, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2, sol.

\(^9\) [Alexander of Hales(?)], *Summa Theologica*, q. 61, m. 6, a. 2, c. 2, res.

\(^9\) Note that in both of the author’s quotations he mistakes Hugh of St. Victor for Richard of St. Victor. Also part of the text he quotes is more a paraphrase than an exact quotation from Hugh.
caught up in the inner-trinitarian life of love of the three-personed God. By the power of love (*vi dilectionis*), the text says, our life has been transformed into a loving life, one that is in some measure assimilated into the inner-trinitarian life of love of the three-personed God. Thus we are able in some measure to love as the three-personed God loves; and therefore the primary object of our love is the *summa Bonitas*.

Now, in general, if one were to acknowledge that, at least in part, the *vital* transformation or assimilation that is consequent to the gift of the Spirit is conscious; and if one were to take into consideration this conscious dimension, and the distinctive manner in which it is conscious, namely as a conscious life of love; then one would be better disposed to understand that the reality to which the language of "transformation" or "assimilation" of the soul into the life of God refers could also be expressed in the language of "presence" of the three-personed God as beloved to oneself as lover, or of "(conscious) attainment" or "(conscious) receptive possession" of the three-personed God as beloved by oneself as lover. And following that, one would then be better positioned to understand that the presence of the three-personed God as beloved in oneself as lover is in fact constituted by loving, that in the order according to *quod est prius quoad nos*, the transformation or assimilation by which the soul lives in God, is, in its conscious dimension, the principle by which one is transported into an interpersonal region with the three-personed God.

Now, admittedly, the Halesian *Summa* did not proceed in this linear fashion. But I suggest it is implausible to claim on this account that it did not even effectively acknowledge that the vital transformation or assimilation of the soul into the life of God
is, at least in part, conscious, or that it was totally oblivious of the distinctive quality of this consciousness. To recognize this, one has merely to advert to the manner in which the image of fruit tasted and enjoyed functions in the Halesian Summa as facilitating some understanding of the divine inhabitation. Nor, I suggest, can one plausibly claim that it did not even obscurely acknowledge a partial overlap in what is referred to in the language of “transformation” or “assimilation”, on the one hand, and in the language of “presence”, on the other—as if it thought the transformation or assimilation of the soul into the life of God and the special presence of the three-personed God in the hearts of the just were disparate realities, or that this special presence was completely outside consciousness. And if I am correct in this, then, at least with the benefit of hindsight, one can plausibly claim that the Halesian Summa was moving in the direction of affirming that the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by love. For it effectively acknowledged the key positions that can lead naturally to this affirmation, and it placed no obstacle in the way of such a development.

Be this as it may, it remains that the briefly sustained discussion of gratia increata and gratia creata in the Halesian Summa, after the introduction of the terms by Alexander of Hales sometime between 1220 and 1229, is a genuine, though inchoate achievement in systematic theological reflection. Taking advantage of the recent compounding of the possibilities for theological reflection by the addition of a systematic philosophic substructure, it was an initial, partially successful attempt to integrate the stream of systematic theological reflection concerned with the doctrine of grace with the stream concerned with the doctrine of the mission and inhabitation of the Holy Spirit. I have sought to present a detailed and context-sensitive statement of its positive achievement.
At the same time, I have not attempted to disguise its incompleteness. As a genuine achievement in systematic theological reflection, it possesses a kind of permanent validity. It also includes, I believe, incidental mistakes and questions left unanswered. In so far as it was a genuine achievement possessing permanent validity, it warrants our admiration. And in so far as it includes incidental mistakes and questions left unanswered, it invites correction and development.
Systematic theological reflection receives the manifold doctrinal inheritance of Christian tradition with the intention of achieving some ever-expanding, integrated understanding of that inheritance. It assumes that the realities to which the doctrines refer do not stand in isolation, but are related to each other in an intricate, coherent network. And while recognizing that it can only attain its goal imperfectly, systematic theological reflection continually seeks to understand and to articulate the understanding of that coherent network of relationships, the *nexus mysteriorum inter se*. Moreover, it does so, or ought to do so, not as an exercise of idle curiosity, but as an intrinsic part of Christian witness.

Such understanding can be a genuine achievement, and so can possess a kind of permanent validity such that all subsequent developments, however larger and richer the context they establish, will need somehow to incorporate the content of that understanding.

The anterior conviction informing the present discussion has been that at least in its fundamental lines, though not necessarily in all its elaboration, a genuine, if inchoate, achievement in theological understanding underlies the introduction of the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*, into theological discourse.

Some indication of the grounds for this conviction can, I suggest, be gleaned from a discussion by Bernard Lonergan on the ways of considering truths regarding God. The discussion is found in Part III, Section 2, of his work, *De Constitutione Christi ontologica*. 

254
et psychologica.¹ There, Lonergan distinguishes: (1) common necessary truths concerning God; (2) common contingent truths concerning God; (3) proper necessary truths concerning God; and (4) proper contingent truths concerning God. Thus, truths concerning God are common or proper by reason of their subject. They are common if the predicate truly applies equally to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, according to the Trinitarian order. They are proper if the predicate applies to one or other of the divine persons, but not to all three. Next, by reason of the connection between the subject and the predicate, true affirmations concerning God are either necessary or contingent. In affirming that God is eternal, one is affirming a necessary truth concerning God by reason of the necessary connection between God and God’s eternity. Alternatively, in affirming that God wills this world to exist, one is affirming a contingent truth; for there is nothing in the divine nature that necessitates God’s willing this world to exists.

Given this fourfold classification of truths concerning God, Lonergan argues for four kinds of resolution of such truths. Thus, he argues that common necessary truths concerning God are resolved into the divine essence; God is such and such by the divine essence and by nothing else. Alternatively, proper necessary truths concerning God are resolved into the divine subsistent relations of origin, namely, either paternity or filiation or active spiration or passive spiration. In the case of contingent truths concerning God, the statements of resolution are more complex. Common contingent truths concerning God add nothing to the divine essence except a notional relation, but they imply as consequent condition an appropriate created term, a term distinct from God that is really

related to the divine essence. Again, proper contingent truths concerning God add nothing to the divine subsistent relations except a notional relation, but they imply as consequent condition an appropriate created term, a term distinct from God that is really related to the divine subsistent relation.

Let me now suggest that if one accepts Lonergan’s arguments for this fourfold classification of the truths we know concerning God, and for the distinct kinds of resolutions associated with each classification, and in particular for the resolution associated with proper contingent truths concerning God, then one can argue that the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*, are not pieces of medieval theological lore that one can safely discard. Rather, they are highly useful fundamental concepts that express well a genuine achievement in theological understanding and, accordingly, both the understanding and the terms possess a kind of permanent validity.

Consider first, then, the proposition that the Father and Son as one principle truly and really send the Holy Spirit. It is a proper contingent truth concerning God, and it resolves into the subsistent relation of active spiration. The relevant question here is how to determine the appropriate created term.

Explaining what is meant by the expression, "The One who Spirates," Lonergan says it refers to "the principle of an intelligible emanation inasmuch as the determination of that principle is both by an act of understanding and also by the consequent word which is a judgment of value"; and following this remark he alludes in a footnote to Thomas in support of the claim that "[t]he one who spirates is the same as the one who notionally loves, the
A little later, he remarks:

The intellectually conscious procession of love is from the grasp and affirmation of the goodness of the reality that is to be loved. Furthermore, from this grasp and affirmation of goodness there arises in the one who grasps and affirms a certain intellectual or moral necessity to spirate love. Since this necessity indeed exists in the one who grasps and affirms, it is a real relation to a love that ought to be spirated; and once the love has been spirated, it is a real relation to a love that has been spirated. Finally, this real relation of the one who spirates to that which is spirated is conveniently named active spiration.

Now, as indicated in the previous chapter, in *Verbum* and in *De Deo Trino II*, Lonergan argues that Thomas affirms, correctly, that there is a presence of the beloved in the lover, *amatum in amante*; that that presence is constituted by love, is really the same as the act of loving, and not something distinct from actual loving that is produced by love; that, in other words, "the *amari* of the beloved in the lover is one and the same act as the *amare* of the lover for the beloved." This is the clue that enables Thomas to propose an explanation that enables us to understand something of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

In a masterful passage, Thomas writes:

...because...the proper object of the divine will is His goodness, necessarily it is first and

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2 Lonergan, *De Deo Trino II*, p. 68. (Here, and in subsequent quotations from *De Deo Trino II*, I am using John F. Brezovec's unpublished draft translation, available at the Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto.) Perhaps the following will help to clarify Lonergan's meaning: "Love, To Love: Amor, Dilectio, Amare, Diligere. Of themselves these terms imply a relation merely to the object that is loved, and since this relation is not one of origin, these names are essential.... Nevertheless, just as every formal truth proceeds from a grasp of evidence, so too, every intellectual love proceeds from a judgment of value. Thus, if one attends more to the reality than to the name, it is easy to discern proper names. For just as we love, not because of the fact that we are our own very love, but because of the fact that we are the intrinsic principles of our love, so, too, the Father and the Son are properly called 'those who love notionally' ('notionaliter diligentes' vel 'notionaliter amantes') inasmuch as they are the principle whence proceeds the divine love. Similarly, the Holy Spirit is properly named 'Proceeding Love' ('Amor Procedens') or 'Notional Love' ('Dilectio Notionalis'), for these terms imply a relation of origin." Lonergan, *De Deo Trino II*, p. 147. Notional Love, Lonergan explains later (p. 202) is God's essential love "with a relation of origin co-understood." So understood, "...notional love is the very Holy Spirit who proceeds and whose principle is the Spirator, that is to say, the Father and Son who spirate this love."

3 Lonergan, *De Deo Trino II*, p. 94.

4 See Lonergan, *De Deo Trino II*, pp. 84-91; *Verbum*, pp. 209-213. The quotation is taken from p. 210 of *Verbum*. 
principally His goodness and Himself that God loves. But, since...the beloved must somehow be in the will of the lover, and that God Himself loves Himself, it needs must be that God Himself is in His will as the beloved in the lover. But the beloved is in the lover so far as it loved—an act of love, of course, is a kind of act of will—but the act of will of God is His being, just as His will is His being. Therefore, the being of God in His will by way of love is not an accidental one—as it is in us—but is essential being. And so it must be that God, when He is considered existing in His own will, is truly and substantially God.

But a thing's being in the will as a beloved in a lover bears a certain order to the conception by which the intellect conceives the thing, and to the thing itself whose intellectual conception is called a word. For it would not be loved unless it were somehow known; neither is the beloved's knowledge alone loved, but the beloved as good in itself. Necessarily, therefore, does the love by which God is in the divine will as a beloved in a lover proceed both from the Word of God and from the God whose Word He is.5

Now, the appropriateness of the created term consists in its participation in or imitation of the uncreated relative existence of the divine person or persons about which one is speaking. And if as Lonergan says, following Thomas' lead, the intellectually conscious procession of love in God is from the grasp and affirmation of the goodness of the reality that is loved, namely God's goodness,6 and if it is truly and really so that the Father and Son send the Holy Spirit, then it seems to follow that the appropriate created term and consequent condition involved in such sending will be a participation in divine goodness—beyond just the goodness of one's natural existence coming from the hand of the good God. In other words, the appropriate created term and consequent condition will be the grace of sanctification that orders one, really and specially, to the Holy Spirit. And in virtue of the gift of such participation, one's being, whole and entire, comes to be being-in-the-special-love-of-God. One can speak appropriately of this grace, then, as gratia

5 Thomas Aquinas, C gent., IV, c. 19, 7-8.

6 In another place in De Deo Trino II, (p. 61), referring to the intelligible emanation of the Holy Spirit, Lonergan writes: "...we are not discussing a causal emanation which would be eliminated were not cause and effect two really distinct absolutes. We are rather discussing an intelligible emanation in accord with which loving the good is morally good because of the fact that the loving proceeds from truly affirming that good, while affirming that good is true because of the fact that the affirming proceeds from a grasping of evidence."
creata, as created grace.

But if the Father and Son truly and really send the Holy Spirit, then the Holy Spirit is the one who is truly and really sent to human persons and is specially present to them to be possessed and enjoyed. The second proposition to consider, then, is that the Holy Spirit is the one who is truly and really sent by the Father and Son. Again, it is a proper contingent truth concerning God, and it resolves into the subsistent relation of passive spiration:

Since the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love and since a true and real mission of a divine person is merely the very procession of this same divine person to which there is to be consequently added an appropriate external term, it is impossible that the Holy Spirit himself be sent save on the basis of proceeding or notional love.⁷

The Holy Spirit himself, Proceeding Love, and not some other, then, is the one who is truly and really sent to human persons by the Father and Son. Accordingly, one can speak appropriately of the Holy Spirit as gratia increata, as uncreated grace. Again, the appropriateness of the created term consists in its participation in or imitation of the uncreated relative existence of the divine person or persons about which one is speaking. And as the Holy Spirit is Proceeding Love, so, not surprisingly, the created term and consequent condition involved in the Holy Spirit's having been sent is the habitus of charity that orders one, really and specially, to the Father and Son. And as the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted by loving, it is through the habitus of charity and the operations which flow from the habitus with some regularity that one attains the one who

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has been truly and really sent, to possess and enjoy. Finally, lest this possession and enjoyment be understood in isolation, let us note that, as Lonergan remarks, the Holy Spirit is sent as uncreated gift so as to confirm human being in the new interpersonal relations made possible by the sending of the Son.

Let this suffice, then, as an indication of the grounds for the anterior conviction informing the present discussion. Granted that a genuine and permanently valid achievement in theological understanding underlies the introduction of the terms, _gratia increata_ and _gratia creata_, into theological discourse, the goal I have sought in the present discussion has been to identify and state some of the main features of that permanently valid achievement.

The procedure I adopted to attain the goal was, I trust, fairly straightforward. The first chapter was intended as a methodological preparation for the discussion proper. In this chapter I drew heavily on Lonergan's work, _Method in Theology_, and to a lesser extent, on some of his other writings. Lonergan has acknowledged the important role ideal-types play in historical studies. Indeed, given the emphasis he places on heuristic

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8 "There are two operations through which God is attained as he is in himself: the beatific vision in the intellect, and the act of charity or love in the will." Bernard Lonergan, "De Ente Supernatural: Supplementum schematicum." Notes for a course on divine grace given at the Collège de l'Immaculée-Conception, Montreal, 1946, and re-edited by F. E. Crowe, C. O'Donovan and G. Sala, Regis College Toronto, 1973 (Draft translation by M. G. Shields, 1992, available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto), p 7. We are presently speaking of the latter.

9 "A mission occurs not so much to accomplish works as to initiate and confirm new interpersonal relationships." Lonergan, _De Deo Trino II_, p. 207; "...although each [mission] is unto the same ultimate goal, which is the heavenly city in the glory of the Father, nonetheless, the prior mission of the Son is for the reconciliation of all men to God the Father, and the consequent mission of the Spirit is to the justified individuals who are reconciled.... [S]ince the Holy Spirit has no nature beyond the divine, he works nothing proper to himself, but he does provide the foundation for cooperation because of the fact that it is through his very self-donation that he confirms the new interpersonal relationships." _De De Trino II_, p. 209; "...the Holy Spirit is sent as uncreated gift so as to confirm the new relationships initiated by the Son and to exist as the pledge of eternal life...." _De Deo Trino II_, p. 212.
structures in one's coming to know, the role of ideal-types in historical studies dovetails quite neatly into his cognitional theory. The first chapter was especially concerned with ideal-types.

The use of ideal-types in historical studies is inevitable, irrespective of whether they are made explicit or not. There are, however, distinct advantages, both for oneself and for one's readers, in bringing to light at least some of the ideal-types one uses in one's historical studies. For, just as transcendental method in actu reflexo et signato opens the way for an enhanced or more effective use of the heuristic function of transcendental method in actu exercito, so bringing to light the ideal-types operative in one's historical studies opens the way for an enhanced or more effective use of their heuristic function.

Thus, I argued that historical method is a particular method that specializes transcendental method in actu exercito and renders transcendental method in actu exercito specifically suitable for investigating what was going forward in the field of human affairs. Now, since transcendental method in actu exercito is concretely general, among the ideal-types operative in historical studies, that one is seeking to bring to light, there will be some that either coincide with what is brought to light in transcendental method in actu reflexo et signato, or derive in some direct manner from what is brought to light in transcendental method in actu reflexo et signato. These are the ideal-types I was especially concerned to highlight in the methodological preparation of the first chapter. Thus, I discussed meaning and the elements and functions of meaning, differentiations of consciousness, the different realms of meaning and the different worlds mediated by
meaning, stages of meaning in a culture, symbolic apprehension, continuing contexts and the relations between distinct continuing contexts.

Once these categories had been expressly examined in the first chapter, I shifted away from further express examination of them; and for the remainder of the discussion I sought simply to avail myself of their heuristic function for the task at hand. I hoped that with the methodological preparation provided in the first chapter, a reader would be better positioned to identify the role these categories, functioning as ideal-types, were playing in the discussion proper, and so be better positioned to follow the discussion and to judge its worth.

Now, the introduction of the terms, *gratia increata* and *gratia creata*, into theological discourse was contemporaneous with, and informed by, the gradual appropriation by theologians of a philosophical substructure that compounded the manner in which theological reflection had hitherto been conducted. That substructure led to a new method of consideration in theological reflection, to a new manner of meaning and referring to Christian realities, and to the gradual emergence and acknowledgment in practice of a new systematic ideal in such reflection.

Because the theological achievement associated with the introduction of the terms, *gratia creata* and *gratia increata*, was informed by a philosophic substructure, after an initial attempt in the second chapter to anchor the discussion by providing a preliminary clarification of the meaning of the terms, as they occur in the Halesian *Summa*, I thought it necessary to set the stage for exploring the larger question of their significance by briefly considering the philosophic substructure. Accordingly, in the third chapter titled, ‘The General Philosophical Context,’ I discussed briefly the phased entry of the
philosophical substructure into theological thought in the Middle Ages, and some of the historical factors that led to it. The opposition to this new manner of reflection among some of the practitioners of the earlier manner provided the opportunity to clarify the new by contrasting it with the old. No hypothesis was offered regarding why the opposition eventually proved unsuccessful; I noted simply that it is commonly agreed that by the beginning of the thirteenth century a general acceptance of the new manner of reflection held sway.

From the general philosophical context of theological reflection in the Middle Ages, and still with the issue of significance in view, the discussion then turned to the more specific theological context within which the terms, gratia creata and gratia increata, emerged. Two streams of theological reflection were distinguished in connection with this emergence. The first regarded the development in the theological understanding of grace and, more specifically, the development that eventually led to the understanding of grace in the proper and especial sense as a supernatural, entitative habitus. The prescholastics understood the need and necessity of grace in a “psychological” manner. Very generally, grace was understood as divine help for salvation. More specifically, it was understood as faith operating through charity. Grace is needed and necessary to counteract the reign of sin ushered in by Adam’s fall, which has darkened the intellect and radically debilitated the will—with the result that, left to themselves, human beings are incapable of not sinning. Of course, this understanding of grace is solidly based on Scripture; grace is indeed healing in the manner just indicated. Yet, if it is taken as the adequate working-understanding of grace, it was eventually recognized as insufficient to answer the speculative theological difficulties that inevitably arose. Five such difficulties were
mentioned. First, there was the difficulty of specifying precisely how the grace of justification differed from all the other gifts of God. Closely related was the difficulty in specifying precisely the difference that grounds the commonplace distinction between the *naturalia* and the *gratuita*. The third difficulty concerned the perennial inability to account theologically for the efficacy of infant baptism in the absence of any act of faith or charity. Fourth, the development of an adequate philosophical understanding of human liberty was effectively impeded, yet Christian faith affirms that human beings by nature possess freedom. Finally, an adequate understanding of merit was similarly effectively excluded; to repeat Lonergan's remark, the doctrine of merit hung in mid-air, without speculative support.

If these difficulties, taken together, highlight the shortcomings of the psychological interpretation of grace, it ought not be thought that they resulted in intellectual immobility. Indeed, I noted Lonergan's comment that the difficulty connected with identifying the theological basis for the exceptionless necessity of grace for merit provided the avenue for the emergence of a solution that would cut to the root of each of these difficulties. Around the year 1230, Philip the Chancellor distinguished between the natural love of God and meritorious love of God consequent to faith; and he grounded the distinction in an entitative disproportion between two orders. Lonergan names this recognition of two entitatively disproportionate orders "the theorem of the supernatural," and considers it the pivotal moment in which it became possible to distinguish clearly and systematically the domain of intelligible relations proper to theology. Accordingly, while the theorem provided the underlying principle for resolving the aforementioned difficulties, its significance was much greater. For in providing the key for distinguishing the domain of
intelligible relations proper to theology, it also provided a foundational turning-point which indicated heuristically the avenue along which all subsequent development in systematic theological reflection ought to take place. In this sense, it functioned both to promote and to control all such subsequent development.

One particular development concerned the enriching of the psychological interpretation of grace. It was achieved in large measure by taking the Aristotelian notion of *habitus* and adapting it for theological purposes. To Philip the Chancellor again, it seems, goes the honour of first formulation. Grace is a perfection of the soul, a new, elevating life in the soul, a vivification of the soul beyond its natural life. More specifically, grace is a *per se* permanent sharing in the life of God, gratuitously bestowed by God in the core of the recipient's being, and lost only through sin. Moreover, grace renders the recipient proportionate to the end of eternal life, the full sharing in the life of God, and worthy of its attainment. Philip generalized the notion of *habitus* to apply not merely to the faculties or powers of the soul, but to the very essence of the soul itself. At the same time, he maintained the *pattern* of relationships associated with the notion, thereby ensuring the integrity of the notion in its generalized application. As a result, there emerged an understanding of grace as a supernatural, entitative *habitus*, universally ordinate of the whole of human life toward sharing fully in the eternal life of God. Concomitantly, the theological virtues were understood as the perfections consonant with grace manifested in the faculties or powers of the soul. Finally, to mention the terminological point, I noted in the course of the discussion the opinion that probably under the influence of the writings of Stephen Langton, 'gratia gratum faciens' quickly became the accepted way to
refer to this supernatural, entitative habitus.

The discussion then turned to the second stream of theological reflection relevant to the introduction of the terms, gratia creatæ and gratia increata into theological discourse, namely the doctrine and tradition regarding the inhabitation or indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

First, I attempted to indicate the scriptural basis in the New Testament for the doctrine and tradition. I did not attempt any detailed or extended exegesis here; I merely alluded to a series of texts which in one way or another affirm the inhabitation or indwelling of the Holy Spirit, or of the Father and the Son together with the Spirit, in the hearts of the just.

Next, because of his predominant influence on theological reflection in the Middle Ages, the discussion turned to Augustine’s elaboration of the scriptural doctrine.

Two of his works were selected for consideration. The first was his letter to Dardanus (Epistola 187) concerning the presence of God. In this work, Augustine distinguishes the universal presence of God in creation in virtue of his divinity, on the one hand, and God’s special presence or indwelling or inhabitation in the hearts of the just, on the other. He argues that although God is always wholly present and dwells in the hearts of the just, their capacity to receive the wholly present God varies. Further, in the letter he distinguishes three states of receptive capacity in this life: that of baptized infants; that of “little ones” in spiritual age; and that of the truly wise. These are states of reception because they result from God’s “secret working” that calls us onward toward an ever more heightened capacity to receive and possess intimately the already wholly present God. And as the call itself enables us so to advance, so in the advance, and to
the extent that one does advance, the one who "calls," and who always was wholly present, manifests himself and registers distinctively as present within consciousness to an ever-greater extent, and even comes to be recognized. In this life, however, one never attains the perfection of the most blessed state of being a "pure and everlasting temple," knowing God face to face.

If Augustine's letter to Dardanus signposts the successive states and stages in this life of receptive capacity for the already wholly present God, his great work, *De Trinitate*, goes some way toward clarifying the process of purification, God's "secret working," whereby God moves the just from the state of being "little ones in spiritual age," in which there is little or no recognition of the three-personed God dwelling within, to the state of being "truly wise," in which one knows God in dim dark-glass clarity, recognizes the Spirit of God within, and glorifies and gives thanks to God.

For Augustine the way of purification is the way of faith and charity. The invisible missions of the Son and Holy Spirit involve a modification in creation. More specifically, the missions involve a knowing intimately connected with charity, a knowing that springs from love. The little ones in spiritual age, although weighed down with "flesh-bound habits of thought," can still on occasion catch a glimpse of the already wholly present God within, under the aspect of truth or light or intelligibility, in an elusive and momentary flash of understanding. Again, and equally elusively, the little ones in spiritual age are able on occasion to catch a glimpse of God under the aspect of the unchangeable good itself, the good of every good which, Augustine says, is "impressed on us." If there is to be more than intermittent intimation, however, the just, relying on God's "secret working," must advance beyond the state of being little ones in spiritual age and undergo a process of
Augustine offers an illustration of this process. We love what we know, and we know, generally speaking, by what we are. That, however, is not the only way. For even though we may not ourselves participate in a truth or reality or form, even though, for example, we may not be just ourselves, we can still know what being just is “from inside,” as an inner or inwardly perceived truth that is above ourselves. This is sufficient for us to know that people should participate or embody the truth or reality or form of being just. And when we believe, say, that a certain person does indeed participate in or embody the truth or reality or form of being just, we are moved to love that person. For, in participating in or embodying the truth or reality or form of being just, a person is good, and “love is of the good.” Moreover, in a manner more stable than intermittent intimations, such a person provides us with a focus through which to behold and appreciate the “inner” or primary truth and the unchangeable good that we too should participate in or embody. And beholding and appreciating it in this manner, we are motivated and able more surely to cleave to it with love, and to recognize it as the standard or measure that enables our love, by implicative exigence, to extend to all others and to love them with “spiritual charity”—either because they are already just, or in order that they may become so.

Thus, perhaps without our even noticing it, God’s “secret working” has enticed us to journey on the way of purification. For in coming to love others in accordance with the standard or measure of the truth or reality or form within, we are in the process of being changed or modified “for the better”: we are ourselves beginning to participate in the “inner truth,” growing in spiritual maturity, becoming just ourselves, and gradually attaining the perfection of justice, namely, brotherly love or charity.
As we do, the standard or measure by which we love our neighbour becomes, Augustine says, more present, more inward and more certain. As standard or measure by which we love our neighbour, it itself is love. And so it becomes more present as love, more inward as love, and more certain as love. Moreover, as the principle of purification, transformation, perfection and unity, it is itself the object of our love. Thus, Augustine remarks that if a man loves his neighbour with the brotherly love of charity, it follows that above all he loves love itself.

Now this love, which is the principle, standard or measure by which we love our neighbour, and which itself is loved, Augustine identifies with God, and in a proper and distinctive sense, with the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit is the Gift of God, the one who “shows forth” the love of the Father and Son for each other and their communion. Further, Scripture attests, Augustine says, that the Holy Spirit has been given to us. The one who is Love, then, the one who is Gift of God, has been given to us. Because of the gift of the one who is Gift, the three-personed God abides in us, and we in the three-personed God. Again, because of the gift of the one who is Gift, we are enticed to journey on the way of purification, motivated to love our neighbour with spiritual charity, and rendered capable of doing so. Thus, we are so transformed that we cease to be “little ones in spiritual age,” and our capacity to receive the one who is Love, the one who is Gift of God given to us, is so enhanced that we begin to recognize with an “inner vision” the three-personed God who is present within. Then we come to speak knowingly of the special presence within of the three-personed God.

From Augustine, the discussion turned briefly to Peter Lombard. Peter interpreted Augustine’s teaching on the divine inhabitation in De Trinitate in a way that was widely
regarded as unsatisfactory in subsequent reflection. However, as Cunningham remarks, his discussion in Book I, distinction 17, of the Sententiae set the stage for subsequent reflection and development.

On the positive side, Peter maintained, first, that the love by which we love God and neighbour is identical with the Holy Spirit. Second, because the Holy Spirit enables us to love God and neighbour, he maintained that the Holy Spirit can properly be said to be sent or given to the faithful, and the faithful can be said to possess the Holy Spirit in some measure. On the negative side, Peter denied any internal, created principle for our act of loving God and neighbour; the Holy Spirit brings about our act of love for God and neighbour immediately, without the mediation, say, of the virtue of charity.

Stated thus, perhaps it becomes clear why Peter's position was widely regarded as unsatisfactory: with the denial of any internal, remote or proximate created principle for the created act of charity, Peter's position renders that act a puppet-like operation from an extrinsic agent, namely, the Holy Spirit. There is no warrant, then, for ascribing merit to the human subject who performs the act. Further, if this criticism is cogent, and his position is truly unsatisfactory, so too is his understanding of the reason for the divine inhabitation.

Now, as previously mentioned, the third proposition in Cunningham's enunciation of the common doctrine regarding the divine inhabitation states that the special presence of the three-personed God is realized in some way by means of grace. Between Peter Lombard and the Halesian Summa, there was a notable development in the theological understanding of grace. In part, that development impinged on the issue of the internal, created principle for the created act of charity. And it enabled the Halesian Summa to
propose a more adequate theological understanding of the special presence of the three-personed God.

Thus, the Halesian Summa maintained that the invisible divine missions involve consequent effects within temporal, created reality that manifest or show forth the divine processions. These are the repraesentatio and imago of the divine processions in created reality, and they pertain somehow to grace or, more precisely, to grace in the proper and especial sense, to gratia gratum faciens. Now, as the common doctrine regarding the divine inhabitation would have it, God's special presence in the hearts of the just also pertains somehow to gratia gratum faciens. As the discussion continued, I attempted to clarify how the Halesian Summa utilized the development in the theological understanding of grace to explain what, more precisely, is meant by this vague term 'pertain(s)'. In other words, I attempted to clarify how the Halesian Summa understood each of these three factors to relate to the other two. Or, again in other words, I attempted to clarify the development in understanding of the third proposition of the common doctrine regarding the divine inhabitation which took place in the Halesian Summa.

Accordingly, in my attempt to include each of these three factors, namely, gratia gratum faciens, the divine inhabitation or special presence of the three-personed God, and the repraesentatio and imago in created reality of the divine processions (or at least the repraesentatio and imago of the procession of the Holy Spirit), I framed the discussion in terms of a triangle or triadic network of relationships, and then dealt with each side of the triangle in what seemed an order conducive to a gradual and cumulative clarification of the network.
The first side of the triangle concerned the relationship between *gratia gratum faciens* and the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit. I argued that the Halesian *Summa* affirms that *gratia gratum faciens* is the necessary and sufficient proportionate preparation for the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit. In line with the then recent development in the theology of grace, the Halesian *Summa* understood *gratia gratum faciens* as the *habitus* of Godlikeness, as the *per se* permanent sharing and assimilation into the inner life and goodness of God. The development enabled the Halesian *Summa* to state more fully and accurately the third proposition regarding the divine inhabitation: *gratia gratum faciens* as the *per se* permanent sharing in the inner life and goodness of God is the necessary and sufficient condition that must be fulfilled if the special presence of the three-personed God is to be realized in human hearts.

Second, I argued that even supposing this condition to be fulfilled, the *proximate* reason for the divine inhabitation, in the order of *quod est prius quoad nos*, remains to be specified. For the three-personed God is already wholly present. We can speak of the *special presence* of the three-personed God, not by assigning a change in God, but by assigning a change in the ones in whom God dwells, such that they are enabled in some sense to *attain* God. *Gratia gratum faciens*, however, was understood as superadded to the core of the recipient’s being, radicated in the essence of the soul, and so as an entitative *habitus*. Attainment, on the other hand, pertains to operations or to operative *habitus*. It follows that unless one specifies the operative *habitus* connected with *gratia gratum faciens*, whereby one attains God in some measure, one has not specified the *proximate* reason for the divine inhabitation.
Third, I argued that if *gratia gratum faciens* is affirmed as the necessary and sufficient condition for the divine inhabitation, then one must also affirm that the operative *habitus* whereby one attains God follows the bestowal of *gratia gratum faciens* as a necessary consequence. In effect, this issue would be the concern of the relationship of the second side of the triangle of relationships, namely that between *gratia gratum faciens* and the *repraesentatio* and *imago* of the processions of the Holy Spirit.

Fourth, if the Halesian *Summa* understands *gratia gratum faciens* as the “*similitudo Dei in creatura rationali,*” and as the “*effectus Dei,*” by which the soul comes to share in God’s own life, it distinguishes God as efficient, as exemplary or (external) formal and as final cause of *gratia gratum faciens*. And corresponding to this threefold causality, there is a threefold similitude or likeness to God in rational creatures: *secundum virtutem* or *secundum potentiam*, which, by appropriation, is attributed to the Father; *secundum expressionem*, a likeness to God as wisdom and truth, which, by appropriation, is attributed to the Son; and *secundum inclinationem vel ordinem*, a likeness to God as the *summa Bonitas*, which, by appropriation is attributed to the Holy Spirit. I noted that the Halesian *Summa* accords priority to considering God as final cause of *gratia gratum faciens*. So it also accords a priority to the likeness to God *secundum inclinationem vel ordinem*, to the soul being brought into a condition of (supernatural) life by being formed in the likeness to God as the *summa Bonitas*.

Given this priority, I thought it a justifiable procedure to confine discussion of the second side of the triangle of relationships to the relationship between *gratia gratum faciens* and the *repraesentatio* and *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit. I proposed
a three-step process to clarify this relationship.

Thus, as God is here being considered as the final cause of *gratia gratum faciens*, in the first step I attempted a brief characterization of final causality and finality in general, and then of God as ultimate final cause, and of universal finality. Thus, following Lonergan I remarked that the precise formal constituent of final causality is the good as cause, a real relation of dependence on a *cuius gratia*. Now if *id cuius gratia* is the final cause, the real relation of dependence is finality, the tendential existence of a subject toward the good precisely because it is good, toward an end or term perfective of its existence precisely because it is perfective. Now God is the ultimate final cause. And correlative with God as ultimate final cause is universal finality, variously realized in created reality, in accordance with the limiting principle of finite essence.

Now, if God as the primary, uncreated good remains ever the ultimate final cause, end and perfection of all created reality; and if the attainment of God as end and perfection is through operations, and finite essence is either a remote or proximate principle of operations; and if finite essence functions quite generally as a limiting principle determining the manner and measure in which God as end and perfection can be attained; then I argued, following Lonergan again, that one needs to distinguish between the *finis qui* and the *finis quo*, that is, between God as ever the absolute motive and absolute term and the various limited manners and measures in which by their operations distinct grades of being attain God as absolute motive and absolute term, as absolute end and perfection.

This distinction, I continued to argue, has relevance for the second step in clarifying the relationships between *gratia gratum faciens* and the *repraesentatio* and
imago of the procession of the Holy Spirit. For the second step introduced considerations of God as final cause of gratia gratum faciens and of the consequent reconfiguration of universal finality. More particularly, I argued that gratia gratum faciens fractures or opens up and elevates the created human essence at its core, endowing it with a new state such that human nature, even while retained, ceases to be the measure limiting the fulfilment or perfection that is possible for human beings. Further, gratia gratum faciens, radicated in the core of the human essence, also penetrates the entire structure of the human essence, the parts of the soul, and is patterned in accordance with the exigencies of that structure, even while retaining and taking to itself the characteristic features of what it penetrates. Thus, gratia gratum faciens also involves a penetration of and modification in the proximate principles of operations that emanate from the soul and, consequently, a penetration of and modification in the operations themselves. In this connection, I spoke of this penetration and modification as a shift in the finis quo, that is, as a shift in responsive possibilities, a shift in the manner and measure in which human beings are attracted to God, respond to God and attain God. Finally, I indicated that this shift is coordinated not to time, but to nature.

Now, in the order according to quod est prius quoad nos, this elevating shift in the finis quo, occurring in the proximate principles of operations, cannot be discounted as the proximate reason for the special presence or inhabitation of the three-personed God in the way gratia gratum faciens can. For this reason, before introducing the third step in the clarification of the second side of the triangle of relationships, I attempted to pin down concretely what in the position presented in the Halesian Summa one could plausibly
identify with this elevating shift, as least as regards its primary aspect.

The clue to the identification, I suggested, is the image of fruit (*fructus*). In the Halesian *Summa*, the special presence or divine inhabitation is considered under the aspect of fruit whose sweetness is enjoyed or delighted in. In the Augustinian tradition which pervaded the Middle Ages, love, in the unqualified sense of the term, is the basic act of will. Augustine likens love to a vector quality or weight (*pondus*). Love in the unqualified sense is a tendential manner of existing, a direction consequent to the establishment of some kind of harmony or affinity, that is still not yet desire or joy. Desire and joy are love in a qualified sense. For love, as a tendential manner of existing consequent to the establishment of some kind of harmony or affinity, underpins and penetrates both desire and joy; and without that underpinning and penetration, there is neither desire nor joy.

The image of fruit betokens joy or delight. Accordingly, it betokens love in a qualified sense. Joy or delight is love reposing in the attainment and possession of that which or the one who is loved. Thus, if in the Halesian *Summa* the special presence or inhabitation of the three-personed God is considered under the aspect of fruit enjoyed or delighted in, it is considered under the aspect of love *qua* reposing. Joyful love, as a *per se* permanent capacity, a willingness, is given with the gift of the three-personed God in human hearts as a consequent condition, even though it is *prius quoad nos*. But the love and joy referred to here is not a love proportionate to human nature. For, just as every love is a tendential manner of existing, a direction consequent to the establishment of some kind of harmony or affinity, so this love is the tendential manner of existing or
direction consequent to the bestowal of *gratia gratum faciens*, the supernatural *habitus* which makes us affinitive with God. In this sense, one can speak of this love as an elevating shift in the *finis quo*, as an elevating shift in the manner and measure in which human beings are attracted to God, respond to God and attain God.

Just as the Halesian *Summa* has an image that guides us in pinning down the kind of operation we can identify with what I have called a shift in the *finis quo*, at least as regards its primary aspect, so it has an image that facilitates some understanding of the manner in which this shift occurs. Thus, in the third step of the clarification I pointed out that in one place the Halesian *Summa* likens *gratia gratum faciens* to light that fills and perfects the atmosphere. Next, it likens the penetration of and modification in the structure of the human essence, and what I am calling a shift in the *finis quo*, namely the consequent penetration of and modification in the proximate principles of operations, to rays of light that fill and perfect parts of the atmosphere. Accordingly, *gratia gratum faciens* can be thought of as the perfecting light of the soul penetrating the soul indiscriminately or in a global manner (*indistincte*), that is, without any distinct consideration of the structure of the human essence and the parts of the soul. Indeed, this is part of the thrust of the definition of grace in the proper and especial sense that was mentioned a number of times, namely that "*gratia est habitus mentis universaliter vitae totius ordinativus.*" But just as speaking of rays of light introduces considerations of direction, and parts of the atmosphere, and the perfection of those parts, so speaking of particular virtues consonantly connected with *gratia gratum faciens* introduces a discriminating consideration of the structure of the human essence, and the parts of the
soul, and the perfection of those parts. More concisely, it introduces a consideration of the distinct operative principles that emanate from the soul as principle. The virtues consonantly connected with \textit{gratia gratum faciens}, then, are the perfections that pertain to the operative principles, that result from \textit{gratia gratum faciens} having penetrated those operative principles.

Next, I argued that meshing these images of fruit and light and its rays enables us to make explicit how the Halesian \textit{Summa} understands the \textit{repraesentatio} and \textit{imago} of the procession of the Holy Spirit in created reality to be constituted, and how it understands the term by which the \textit{repraesentatio} and \textit{imago} is constituted to be related to \textit{gratia gratum faciens}. This was the third step in the clarification of the second side of the triangle of relationships. The image of fruit enjoyed or delighted in provides the clue for identifying the shift in the \textit{finis quo}, that is, the clue for identifying that by which human beings, transformed \textit{in divinam speciem} with the bestowal of \textit{gratia gratum faciens}, can attain God as their consummate perfection, their ultimate end and absolute term. It also provides the clue for pinning down the Halesian \textit{Summa}'s understanding of the necessary and sufficient consequent condition that must be fulfilled if the special presence of the already wholly present God is to be accomplished in human hearts, and human beings are to \textit{enter into} that presence. In both instances, the image pointed to a supernatural, \textit{per se} permanent capacity to love joyfully. In other words, it pointed to the \textit{habitus} or virtue of charity. That \textit{habitus} or virtue is numbered among the operative \textit{habitus} or virtues consequent to \textit{gratia gratum faciens} and consonantly connected with it. The image of light and rays of light is intended to delineate and render more intelligible the manner in which
operative *habitus* or virtues are consequent to and consonantly connected with *gratia gratum faciens*. It follows that if the image is effective in this regard, it delineates and renders more intelligible how the *habitus* or virtue of charity is consequent to *gratia gratum faciens* and consonantly connected with it. And with this delineation and greater intelligibility, I argued that the *ab alio* structure of charity becomes evident; and with *that*, the manner in which the Halesian *Summa* understands the *repraesentatio* and *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit in created reality to be constituted.

I then turned to the remaining side of the triangle of relationships, namely, the relationship between the *habitus* of charity, as the term by which the *repraesentatio* and *imago* of the procession of the Holy Spirit in created reality is constituted, and the special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the Holy Spirit, and of the Father and Son through the Spirit. This discussion had a precise focus, namely the question regarding why the *habitus* of charity can properly be said to be the proximate principle whereby the just *attain* the already wholly present God.

The discussion of the first two sides of the triangle of relationships left this precise question unanswered and open. However, if the three relationships together form a triadic *network*, they cannot be appreciated as a network unless an adequate answer is proposed for this question. The tack I took was to seek clarification by contrast. Cunningham’s position provided the contrast. With as much clarity as one could wish, Cunningham accepted the factual-interpretive side of the issue, namely that the Halesian *Summa*, and the Franciscan school generally, indeed affirm *that* the supernatural *habitus* of charity is the proximate “formal reason” for the special presence, inhabitation or
receptive possession of the three-personed God, and that love formally effects a real
union with the object loved. And with equal clarity, he denied the theological adequacy
of this position. For, love, he argued, can never be the formal reason for the real, special
presence of the three-personed God: properly speaking, he claimed, no supernatural
appetitive habitus can enable one to possess God. Accordingly, he relegated love to the
role of "formal objective medium and rule of wisdom." And wisdom either is or gives rise
to a quasi-experimental knowledge that, for him, is the correct proximate formal reason
for the special presence, inhabitation and receptive possession of God.

In the course of his criticism of the Halesian Summa, Cunningham claims that his
position is also that of Thomas. Thomas, he argues, teaches that love does not
necessarily involve any real presence of the beloved within the lover, any real union of
lover and beloved. In response, I enlisted Lonergan as interpreter of Thomas and
attempted to argue that for Thomas, the presence of the beloved within the lover is
constituted by love, and that it is not something distinct that is subsequently produced by
love. If Lonergan's interpretation of Thomas is accurate, I argued, Cunningham cannot
legitimately appeal to Thomas for support. And I argued further that if Thomas' position
as interpreted by Lonergan is also true, Cunningham's objection to the Halesian Summa's
position can be discounted. For then it would simply represent an oversight on his part
regarding the nature of love.

Armed with this clarification, I attempted to consider the aforementioned why-
question more directly. I argued that if Lonergan's interpretation of Thomas' position is
accurate, and if Thomas' position so interpreted is true, then an answer to this why-
question is at hand: The bestowal of *gratia gratum faciens* is the necessary and sufficient proportionate preparation for human beings to enter into the special presence of the already wholly present three-personed God, and indeed for a presential union with the three-personed God, because from it originate the operative *habitus* and operations of charity, the supernatural, reposeful love of God, the *complacentia* in the *summa Bonitas*, which as love involves intrinsically the presence of the beloved within the lover, and therefore enables the lover to *attain* the three-personed God in direct proportion to the depth of his or her love.

I intended this to be a comprehensive statement of the entire triadic network of relationships, affording a perspective for the explanatory use of the terms *gratia creata* and *gratia increata*. In the closing pages of the discussion, however, I acknowledged that the Halesian *Summa*, it seems, did not succeed in clarifying the relationship of the third side of the triangle. For nowhere, as far as I could discover, does it evidence an explicit, clear and distinct understanding and affirmation that the presence of the beloved within the lover is constituted by love, or that it is the same reality as love. As a final point, however, I argued that it was moving toward this position.

Early in the discussion, I remarked, following a hint from Karl Rahner, that one could plausibly regard ‘*gratia*’ as a primordial or key word for Christian faith. ‘*Gratia*’ is a compendious utterance whose focal meaning epitomizes and tacitly gathers to itself the many-faceted mystery of God’s communication with humankind in its original unity and totality, and whispers of that original unity and totality. Today, we can appreciate the introduction of the terms *gratia creata* and *gratia increata* by Alexander of Hales, and
especially the briefly sustained discussion of their meaning in the Halesian *Summa*, as an attempt to speak of that original unity and totality in a manner that was more audible, more explicit and more systematic. Taking the words of Scripture as source, benefitting from Augustine's rich, if non-systematic, reflections on that source, and from the developments in the theological understanding of grace that were occasioned by the addition of a systematic, philosophic substructure to theology, and redressing the imbalance in Peter Lombard's position, the Halesian *Summa* proposed an original position that linked in intelligible, systematic relationship grace in the proper and especial sense of the word and the special presence, inhabitation or receptive possession of the three-personed God. I do not claim that the Halesian *Summa* said the final word on this issue. I shall be content if, having read the preceding pages, the reader comes to acknowledge that, from the perspective of systematic theology, it said the first word.
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