On the Christian Nature of Theology Today:
Translation and Annotation of Franz Overbeck, 
Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Trinity College and the
Theology Department of the Toronto School of Theology.
In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts awarded by the University of St. Michael's College.

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August 2000
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Preface to the Translated Edition of Overbeck's *Christlichkeit*

The purpose of this project is twofold: first, to present what may be the first full English translation of a much-quoted, controversial German work; and second, to bring together in one place enough background material to present a reasonably coherent picture of why Overbeck was saying what he was, when he was.

There are many references in theological and historical works -- certainly by English-speakers, but notably by Germans as well -- to the tortuous turns of phrase employed by Overbeck. He himself alludes to his style and to the customary claim of his readers that he is incomprehensible. There is little doubt that Overbeck's difficult and long-winded expression has been largely responsible for his not being translated before now. In this translation I have tried to avoid crude paraphrasing, being aware of the argument held by readers and students of foreign languages that one should be as pure as possible in rendering the original, both in tone and in meaning, and the result has been choppy at times. Citations of German works quoting Overbeck, illustrating his points or providing historical backdrop do not fall into the category of the murky, the pained, or the incomprehensible, so their translation should be clear. In every case I have provided the original language as well, out of regard for language students like me who enjoy being given the option of consulting the original to satisfy fine points of interpretation.

The notes to the text are often long and detailed; for in order to provide adequate context to Overbeck's polemical position, I decided to cite works, names, and sometimes political or religious affiliations of those people who crossed his path or whose lives and works shed light on his. It seemed to me, that is, that it would have been remiss not to give some small hint about the "slant" of his assailants, supporters, or even publishers.

Near the end of my translating, I came upon the new edition of the *Werke und Nachlaß* of Overbeck published by J.B. Metzler from 1994 on. I must refer to the helpful notes to the *Christlichkeit* provided by Niklaus Peter. I used
much of his material, as will be evident, and looked closely at his sources wherever they were available to me. I did not have access to the materials on or about Overbeck at the University of Basel; and as my translation is not designed to cover all aspects of his work, further research could fruitfully be done using Peter's notes as a point of departure.
Franz Overbeck

On the Christian Character

of Our Theology Today

1963

Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft
Darmstadt

[iv] Photostat impression of the second edition with supplementary
Introduction and Afterword, Leipzig 1903

Third edition, unaltered, 1963
Impression and binding: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt
Printed in Germany

[v]

To my dear young friend
Carl Albrecht Bernoulli²
in Berlin.

[vi] My dear Bernoulli,

Since the Kingdom of Heaven itself, as the Gospels say, consents to fall
prey to the violent³, could my little book even think of getting indignant
over the attack⁴ you once perpetrated upon it? On top of that old plagiarism,
do you hold another claim to my work since your recent kind interest in its
possible reappearance? If so, take straight from my hand what you
appropriated once already; perhaps it can again be of service to you.

Basel, December 15, 1902.
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Foreword to the First Edition

I was determined to put together some ideas, first by Paul de Lagarde's Über das Verhältniss des deutschen Staats zu Theologie, Kirche und Religion,* with its attack on our Theology and its attack on our published critique had predicted); and second, by the Strauss Confession. These ideas naturally considerably pre-date this occasion to express them. Nevertheless, despite my long-felt need to speak up, it would not have been difficult to continue keeping quiet on the subject of current theological argument. Of the various factors informing my decision to hold back, timidity would have been uppermost -- timidity, which I regarded as an asset keeping me from advancing unprepared. Yet I would have been powerfully driven by a
desire to speak about theology in general -- a desire subdued only by the constraints of my

[Footnote to p. ix]¹⁰

*) [Göttingen, 1873. Repeatedly reprinted since then, most recently by the author in his Deutschen Schriften,¹¹ complete edition, supervised by the author, 2nd printing, Göttingen 1891 p. 37ff.]¹²

[x] position as a Theology teacher.¹³ With this in mind, I believe I will not need to excuse myself on account of my book again, nor for the manner in which it was written, since openness must be the First Commandment for an author even under serious constraints. Moreover, I thought I might help others in a special way -- particularly young theologians -- with practical suggestions, in the conclusion of my writing that suggest vexed questions which no teachers of Theology or present-day Church authorities should disregard. In declaring myself against the efforts of those who label me as one of their scientific co-workers (among whom I include persons both close and distant, and whom I must thank for a most benevolent reception of my scientific work), I hope to have given freely a piece of advice based on personal reflection. And in no way do I wish to destroy a valid community by my writings. Indeed, by everything I have said in them, I have no more sincere wish than to help science secure a stable place with respect to theology, which latter by its very nature has made this so difficult. Especially today, when I am convinced that certain tendencies of Liberal Theology pose a threat, and when in fact it actually behoves this Theology to resolve the weighty problems arising [xi] from the history of Christianity. I hope that, at any rate, the reader who is not completely hostile will grant this text the right, despite its storminess, to be labelled, not words of conflict, but words of peace.*) I would like, moreover, to ask its enemies to consider especially that it offers merely a theoretical solution to the problematic relation between Christianity and education, and does not address the many practical conventions shared by them in daily life. My judgement therefore is not directed to the laity but to theologians, and chiefly to those speaking from lecterns and writing books. For I have no doubt many a wise pastor observes our current theological
disputes and keeps his distance, as befits his vocation. Nor would I have allowed myself to question the Christian character of today's theological parties in this way if I did not also claim unreservedly the adjective "Christian" for my own theology; or if I were not convinced that we theologians are more sincere than is generally recognized.

Basel, May 16 1873

F. Overbeck

[Footnote to p. xi]

*) [This phrase was on the title page of the book's first edition.]

Foreword to the Second Edition

In April of this year, when, to my great surprise, the prospect opened up of reviving my 1873 Notebook, Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie, and my assistance was requested in this project, I decided not to refuse. Due to the meaning the Notebook held for me personally, whose entire life -- at least the public side of it -- had been determined by it, I felt I had either to accept the idea in toto or else consent to a new edition under new printing with an unaltered text (which ultimately amounted to a dereliction of duty, and thus was not to be considered). But my Notebook was almost thirty years old, and I myself was in my sixty-fifth year. So how could I really help on this occasion, from the outside, with all my inclination to do so? Full of distress, I knew I could only help myself by the dangerous [xiii] act of asking my readers to take up the little volume before them. Yet while a good part of the danger lies in the fact that I have transferred to the text of the Second Edition what strictly speaking belonged to the Foreword, it seems that the text need only perform its original task, as concisely as possible, of commending the writer to the good will of its readers. There will be no lack of opportunities to stress the indispensability of their benevolence without my supplying many words here for that purpose.

Basel, December 29 1902

F. Overbeck
Part I.
Introduction.
How I Came to Write My 1873 Notebook

As the above heading indicates, I am not writing my life history here, but only a chapter or an episode from it. I do not consider myself bidden to do this, but neither do I think I am indulging myself at my readers' expense. Besides striving to be as concise as possible, I must be consistently guided in my writing to stay close to that for which I can be held answerable. And this should be possible, as I myself am part of the matter under scrutiny.

It was the day after my thirty-second birthday when, completely unprepared, I pondered an offer of the post of außerordentlicher Professor of Theology in Basel. My youth was certainly behind me, and I had the academic experience of five years as a Privatdozent in Jena. Nevertheless, I accepted this offer only out of necessity; and as I followed it up in the Spring of 1870, I was suffering heavily from the feeling that in leaving Jena and my lecturer's post, I was leaving Paradise, and with the dark foreboding that from now on I would have to teach more than I knew, or at least that I would be as much a student as a teacher -- and therefore that the task could miscarry. This foreboding did not prove false.

Yes, I was advancing into an unknown that called me, nevertheless not entirely without a background. As a teacher, I at least came from a School. That is, I knew I was a "Tübingen," but what did the "Tübingen School" actually signify at the time? As everyone recalls of that period, it meant a shipwreck, crewed by a small cluster of students and a schoolmaster who had been dead for ten years. For most of the students, work on the ship had virtually ceased during their lifetime. One student had regained shelter in his homeland and was carrying on with what he had learned (Hilgenfeld); a second and third were forced to go home (Volkmar) or were preparing to leave (Holsten); and a final one, to whom "the future belonged," only took part to the extent that he was busy boring holes in the ship (Ritschl). A vessel, then, knowledge of whose decks was by no means enough for my launch into life. For I had not worked for anyone's approval there except my own, and to some-
degree for that of a few good friends. [3] Specifically, then, what had I done as a "Tübinger" to consider myself one as I left Jena? I knew I was a disciplined, even narrow Tübinger, despite the fact, confidentially, that I had long included in my library the major work of the apostate Ritschl*) -- a work generally left closed or, if opened, always with the most extreme misgivings about the anticipated instruction; what is more, I had not even reached the point where I could enquire about the relationship between the first edition of the work and the second "thoroughly revised" edition.9 Such "discipline," therefore, I readily admit, meant very little, and appertained really to the School rather than to me, whose "discipline" certainly left much to be desired. On December 2, 1860, Baur10 died while I was still in my last student year with final examinations. I was not his personal student and had only seen him from afar. I was never in a committed relationship to his position as Master, and therefore I was only a "Tübinger" in a figurative11 sense, so to speak. Thus I was completely ignorant of Baur's Hegel-based philosophy of religion.12 What I was able to absorb from his historical critique of early Christianity was always reduced, it clearly seemed to me, to the exultant assertion of his right to represent it purely historically, that is, as it really was, in opposition to the theological apologetic of the day with its pretention to deny him this right altogether. But within the very broad limits of what I saw as restraints of the Jena school, I was not on very firm ground. I understood so little that I assumed what mattered was that the clever ones of the school were to bring forth to the world the main theses of Baur's reconstruction of early Christianity as fully as possible. In so doing, I counted too highly on the historical principles of the Master himself to protect me in such a gross misunderstanding. As it turned out, I had begun to ask myself, timidly but nevertheless pointedly, if his reconstruction could survive. And as I was moving to Basel, I was on the point of dragging my
colleagues with me onto the battlefield of Church History by my advancing doubts; for in the Spring of 1868 the printing of my work on the De Wette Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles was underway, and it would come out during the first weeks of my sojourn in Basel. In fact at that time my thoughts were already turned to the sphere beyond

Footnote to p. 4

*) I had been able to write the Prologue in Jena. It is dated from there -- the beginning of April, 1870 -- and on the Wednesday after the twentieth Sunday of Eastertide I found myself in Basel.

Footnote to p. 5

*) What I gathered at that time from Baur can be inferred from my review of the final volume of his Church History in the Literarisches Centralblatt (1863, No. 8).
For what was as far as I know the sole opportunity at the time to speak from a lectern other than from my own, the well-known "Rosenvorträge" lectures (February, 1867), I had chosen as my theme "The establishment of monasticism," a subject quite far removed from Baur's interest in Church History (which latter I was nowhere near ready to handle). In sum, leaving Jena I could not look back upon my alleged "Tübingen-ism" (as closely as its shackles bound me, with any great confidence) as signposts set up along the road of life before me. Nevertheless, I was not proceeding completely empty-handed; on the contrary, what I took with me still prompts undying thanks toward my unsuspecting mentor, for I had inherited from Baur the enthusiasm that can be fostered from books themselves, and I saw him as a model in my scholarly vocation.* But

[Footnote to pp. 6-7]

*) I beg leave here to refer incidentally to the intriguing "true confession" I have before me of a man of the world. He had "never espoused the fundamental tenet of the Baur School that theology (like every other science) was, according to its historical premises, wholly subject to the same rules of criticism as documents" (A. von Mohl: Lebenserinnerungen (Stuttgart and Leipzig 1902, I, 211). Because of the peculiarity of his relationship to the University world, Mohl is no homo saecularis in the strictly medieval sense. He is nevertheless to be regarded most highly, as is his kind of religion and theology. What is particularly interesting in this step-by-step weakening of Baur's authority as a theologian is precisely the combination of (a) the impartiality of a lay judgement, which I have always borne toward Baur, with unbounded respect for him as a learned man and as a person; and (b) the same sort of lay judgement seen in Mohl; except that this compatriot, colleague, and brother-in-law of Baur came to these conclusions much earlier than I (Ibid., p. 191 f.).

[7] I was to thank him for even more than this, for something not just connected with my teaching position but extending far beyond: for the presumption with which I looked past his Church-historical horizon. For with no other model, I had resolved to replicate, in the entire domain of Christian Church History, what he had done before me for the early Church. Of course my
resolution was no more firm than one would expect of someone so young, and who is not a genius, but it was firm enough to reach fulfilment. I had no idea at the time that I was entering the domain I later would call Secular Church History\textsuperscript{24} (for such it was), the impossibility of whose goal is the most certain thing I retain as a token of that time.

So I accepted the invitation to the position designated by the "Mayor and Counsellor of the Canton of the City of Basel" as "Associate Professor of Theology"\textsuperscript{25}: "ten to twelve hours' duty with particular focus on New Testament exegesis and early Church history"; an invitation which "the Canton's College of Education conveyed to me, accompanied by a welcoming greeting, [...] with "the express hope [...] that I find in my new position a sphere of activity corresponding to my scientific inclination, and that my occupation might profit the student body."\textsuperscript{26}

Such encouraging amicability was cheering to me at the moment of my leaving Jena, but in Basel this could scarcely begin to compensate for the considerable gap in my theological formation as I have stated it. I have just mentioned being engrossed in the historical project for which I have to thank Baur; in fact, in Jena I felt I had no interest in my job as theological teacher outside the pursuit of a critical-historical understanding of Christianity. I neither entertained personally nor allowed to foster in others any expectation of my being drawn to the liberal political Church endeavours of the time and place. Not that I would have been unsympathetic, but up until then I had never considered giving in to that unreasonable demand badgering me from more than one quarter, and sometimes strongly, to side purely and simply with the Protestant League of the time.\textsuperscript{27} My entire published undertaking connected with the Protestants could be reduced to a mere half-dozen small articles contributed to the Schenkel Bible Lexicon.\textsuperscript{28}

[9] Actually, that was very little in comparison with what was expected of me by certain influences in Basel. For the Associate Professorship, as I was seen to incorporate, was a new endowment by the authorities\textsuperscript{29} around which party division had reigned for years; and this division had been so clear-cut that, according to the demands of radical religious reform, the Theology Faculty needed to establish a new teaching Chair. Just which historical theology was to be taught, and according to what critical basis, was hotly
debated in the scholarly circles of Theology at the time. Amid the noise of that local party strife, however, ideas about my virtually unknown person had been floating ahead of time, in addition to the practical issues to be put to me for decision upon my arrival in Basel; and for this, alas, I was only vaguely -- and quite badly -- prepared. What I may have known about Church movements stirring in Switzerland at the time, parallel to the Protestant League movements in Germany, was so little that I was completely clueless about what events in Basel principally concerned me. And the persistence of this state as I entered my new post was one of the first (and one of the most worthwhile) examples I beheld [10] of the liberality of the country to which I was emigrating.

Even today I do not know for sure which authority figures to thank for my being named to the Basel professorship, whose considerate discretion withheld from me the "secret history" that generally lies behind every academic appointment (particularly when it concerns a new Chair) and which, to the advantage of all concerned, usually stays hidden even if things go awry afterward. It was my good fortune to learn nothing at first, and then only gradually, of the misgivings my appointment had caused others besides me*) (witness the fact that it took seven years' searching for Basel to find me).30 Not until I had been in town almost four years did I hear anything of this history, when I saw published a review-- none too favourable -- of the little book I am presently re-editing**). So for the longest period my impartiality remained intact as I began to find my way about in my newly assigned duties.

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[Footnotes to p.10]
*) A particular memory, laden with gratitude, stays with me of a preliminary conversation I had in Frankfurt-am-Main during the Christmas holidays of 1869 with that excellent man who at the time headed the Curatel of the University of Basel.31

**) Reform. Zeitstimmen aus der schweizer. Kirche 1873 p. 432.32

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[11] And actually, as I recall this time so long ago, I must include in my thanks the Swiss Reformers who, by circumstances my recently positioned enemies, grew bitterly disappointed at the way I carried out my Basel appointment but scarcely made me aware of it; for there was less tension than
I imagine I would have experienced anywhere else. For instance, I could hardly remember any systematic, petty personal annoyances disagreeably restricting the freedom of my reflections on the pedagogical axioms of my post, especially on the decisive question of whether I wanted to abstain as before from a demagogic handling of religious issues. I remained therefore, vis-à-vis my main enemies, more or less left alone, to an extent commensurate with my own wishes.

This was a type of behaviour whose merit lay in the immediate pleasantness it afforded. And it prodded me on with yet greater propulsion to be even more decisive than I really was at the time about the consequences of my preferred scholarly pursuits. The status of my own position with regard to Christianity (whose historical path [12] I was setting about to trace with the suddenly expanded idea of the popular circle involved in my activities) was a question which, though not posed under ideal conditions during my first Basel years, was nevertheless put to me under unusually lucky ones. I would certainly congratulate anyone facing a similar question if it were permitted to meddle in another person's destiny by well-wishing. As part of the tension alluded-to above, however, there was not only conflict between Pietism and Reform in Basel which, much to my surprise, involved me upon my arrival. I would not be revealing all, that is, if I did not add to this my impression of a surfeit of Pietism. I could not have leaned seriously toward this way of thinking (I was basically too far removed for that); but in the transition from a milieu so withdrawn from all Pietism as mid-Germany, where I had been raised and whose atmosphere I had been breathing fully in Jena, I would have been quite unreceptive to this new religious climate -- enough to make me forget that the thoughts which, in my Christlichkeit, had driven me eventually to a falling-out there, had been partly triggered by [13] that very climate. Only with difficulty would those thoughts have attained the expression they ultimately did if, as had been my heartfelt wish, I had stayed in Jena.

Yet with all these intimations of new influences exerting pressure upon me as a theologian in Basel, none was completely unforeseen. There was not one which, unprompted by me, would not sound an alarm, even in disinterested observers of the transition I had been appointed to oversee in Basel. Among these influences I was to encounter one so immense that it was the strongest I ever met in my wanderings through life, and indeed nel mezzo del cammin;[33] and
which I noted in my *Christlichkeit*. I refer to my friendship with Friedrich Nietzsche.

All that I knew in Jena of this extraordinary person, extraordinary even in his misfortune, was limited to the racontars which had been flying about concerning him in the German universities since the Spring of 1869, giving the prospect of a young colleague in Basel who, even before his graduation, had been offered the position of Professor. That certainly would not have led me to expect our lives to converge. Nor could I have known then that the generally indolent pace of my thoughts [14] was perhaps what differentiated me the most from N. But this much was certain for the moment: that I, the upstanding unsalaried lecturer, could not measure up to his fleetfootedness in the academic race. Then came the good luck that ran contrary to what initial augury might have led one to assume. For Nietzsche and I no sooner became colleagues in Basel than neighbours as well, thanks to the kindness of a mutual colleague who had seen to my lodgings before my arrival. On account of this proximity we had from the beginning of our second semester developed the regular practice of taking our evening meal together in my room, more spacious and situated on a lower floor of the building. Now, as one might imagine, the obligations weighing heavily upon us of the still-novel position, with its rather moderate restrictions, carried on into the next semester; and this one hour together gradually gave way to the occasion for subsequent ones, until before long our association during our *circa* four-year *contubernium* in Basel developed into a virtual inseparability, insofar as this was possible given the frequent "official" orders of solitude issued at the time, to which we had to submit occasionally. In addition, as is known, Nietzsche, at the beginning of the period described, left Basel at regular intervals. [15] But when we were together, the fact that Nietzsche was also moved by the beginnings of Theology provided material for our near-uninterrupted discussions, even unto the smallest details. This led to a far broader discussion, revealing the accumulation of our discontent, and prompted by the proceedings in Germany which we were then witnessing together from the outside. Finally, we disclosed feelings to one another on innumerable subjects ordinarily arising at our age if one has not met the other earlier and with an open heart. In this I am not trying to claim that at that time I had come to understand Nietzsche and that we were "but one heart and one soul"
-- "come to understand", I say, the person who, as today so many people know, had long before embarked upon the great voyage of discovery whose vast horizon spread itself so early before him. In fact, I am far from claiming this, for I, seven years his senior, had been completely thrown from my own rails, blindly caught up in following him along that journey. Moreover, as I have already intimated, having found so much reason to feel my own unpreparedness, how could I not heed and attend to what was so charmingly taught? What took the lead in this process, speaking especially of the published proof of Nietzsche's reigning thought during those years, was The Birth of Tragedy, which [16] I witnessed emerge before 1872, if I may thus express our daily exchanges, Nietzsche's part of which seemed a precursory, impenetrable, puzzling mixture of overwhelming communicativeness and quite anchoretic restraint.

Yet however much or little may immediately have struck me about the significance of Nietzsche's first book in relation to the whole of his thought expressed in his literary career, this could only provide, by its domineering and abundant ideas, a most powerful incitement to follow the impulse toward a broader and clearer orientation in my science. Particular proof of the connection is seen in the immediacy with which conflicts followed, in which my science became implicated, if not actually with Nietzsche, then with his contemporaries. And directly thereafter, from about the autumn of 1872, the first outlines of the plan of his Untimely Meditations came to my attention, and with them the helpful Summations, without which at that time Nietzsche scarcely discussed his views with friends. These précis, which first of all I only half-absorbed, so to speak, and to which I really did not respond directly, had stimulated so much in me by the Spring of 1873 that I understood enough to be ready to comply with [17] and test his ideas in the Easter break of that year. (It was only then that I had the requisite spare time.) And if my memories -- so distant and unconfirmed by contemporary notes -- do not deceive me, Nietzsche had no idea, when he left for Bayreuth before Easter of that year, that in his absence I would begin my Christlichkeit. He was certainly extremely surprised, upon his return after few weeks, that I was more or less ready to fall in with him. This happened again, soon after the middle of May, when I confirmed our accord by a lecture given of my written
Foreword. However, although I appeared ready, I could not have proceeded without his assistance. Concerning a publisher, I originally had one in mind who lay closer to my way of thinking and therefore appeared to outsiders a less incongruous choice than the one who actually came through. But as I had to give mine up (very reluctantly), it was Nietzsche who suggested we join our authors' luck and entrust my Christlichkeits to his music publication, along with the first section of the Untimely Meditations which was just about ready to go to press.*) I could think of nothing better,

*[Footnote to p. 17]

*) I do not possess any more exact dates of Nietzsche's publication than those from the generally-known "Nachbericht" from Nietzsche's Works Part I Volume 1 (Leipzig 1895) p. viii.

[18] and consented. His sister has already related how Nietzsche reacted as our "twins" lay before us under joint cover by Herr Fritzsch of Leipzig.*) So I had the twins bound into one volume. Hence, on the back of the "exemplar" of the "U.B." dedicated to me, one sees the verses in Nietzsche's hand:

"A pair of twins from one house
Went courageously out into the world
To destroy worldly dragons.
A product of two fathers! It was a miracle!
To be sure, the mother of the pair of twins
Was called 'Friendship'."

and underneath it the inscription: "From one father to another!"  

Now I would not think today of taking seriously a joke of Nietzsche's whose impact dwindled the moment it left him, and following up here on that strange "family" his muse at one time called to life. We are not talking about that family here, but rather about just one of its offspring; and it is only incidentally that I have started to say something about the "mother." But as this mother will only fade from existence when I do, she could
El. Foerster-Nietzsche. Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsche's [sic]. I, 127f.

[19] not be overlooked here; and I could not let it remain unsaid that, about thirty years ago, as I wrote from the heart the following renunciation of my guild members and made known to them the only conditions under which I would continue to be called their colleague, my friendship with Nietzsche was one of those conditions. The first time I wrote the renunciation, it applied to friends I was known to have among those guild members. In the meantime I have lost these friends, either because they have dropped out of life (which takes care of most of them) or because they no longer know me. It is to completely new readers, then, that this renunciation, still unchanged, is presented. It is for the sake of these new readers that I thought I must tell the story that stands here, and how it came into existence. Having come to the end of this, then, I proceed with what I wrote in 1873, in its old form.*)

[Footnote to pp. 19-20]

*) The following remarks will orientate my readers completely as to the relation of the text below (p. 21ff.) and my 1873 publication. (1) The alterations I have effected in the new text are self-explanatory and require the grain of salt with which all interpretations about both texts should be read. I have concerned myself with all infelicities of form from the older text that struck me, whether strictly printing errors or my own errors of style (especially insufficient punctuation); or actual [20] blunders committed in the first manuscript. (2) Similar alterations in the external lay-out come under serious consideration -- alterations made solely for the greater comfort of my readers, as for example the transfer of the chapter titles from the "Summary of Contents," in which they had originally stood, to their places under pages 21, 42, and so on, at the end of the whole. Nevertheless, (3) the actual supplements to my new text hardly warrant the epithet "revised," for they are all taken from the margin of my own manuscript copy of the first edition, with which they gradually and incidentally merged; and in this sense they are without any intrinsic importance for the present renewal of the 1873 text. They are only small remarks to illustrate further some individual
sections, without adding "something new," and which I only noticed, in
passing, through post-1873 readings. There are very few of them -- not even a
dozen -- and I have made them readily identifiable, without exception, by
means of square brackets. I could have made the whole visibly "simpler" (and
shorter) if I had labelled my second edition on the title page "essentially
unaltered." In eschewing this I have drawn upon my rather extensive
experience and intentionally avoided the detested word "essentially," which
nearly always looks as though it is devised by authors solely for their own
comfort and for the discomfort of their readers.
Part II.
My 1873 Notebook.
Chapter 1.
The Overall Relation of Theology to Christianity.

In times like ours, with the cry sounding loudly in all ears that not everything is Christian that bears that name (and the right to question this state of affairs is doubted by no one), can Theology ignore it, no matter how disagreeable, and claim disinterest? Certainly not: Theology is not on an island cut off from the rest of the world; and if no one is more intimately required to explain how he stands in relation to Christianity than the theologian, so also is no one under more fundamental pressure to do so. Nevertheless, before we set off in this attempt to get an answer for today from Theology, it will be expedient to look back and clarify whether Theology has ever predicated itself on Christian tenets.

[22] One often hears these days that Christianity claims to have a "disposition toward science".¹ To enable us to assess such a statement, let us first reach an understanding about the sense in which the word "Christianity" is being used. Christianity, in the form in which it has been passed on to modernity, is by no means merely a religion; it is at the same time a culture. In its final hours, Greco-Roman antiquity became Christian and, in dying, won the power to make us its heirs; so that now, from a single source, modern peoples have received, along with Christian religion, the culture of the other as well. The issue seen this way, one can say that with the embalming of Christianity we inherited antiquity. If this is understood by "Christianity," then the idea that it has a "disposition toward science" has no meaning, for in fact it already contains science. But if one takes Christianity at its original and exclusive status qua religion, then nothing can be more false than that quoted phrase, since in a sense, Christianity (as with every religion) runs quite clearly counter to science. I say "as with every religion," for the antagonism between believing and knowing is constant and thoroughly irreconcilable. And if a scholarly essay, more serious and more effectual than the usual product of theological efforts, looks to define the frontier between believing and knowing, [23] and thinks it can point us to
a religion "whose subject is not vulnerable to attack by knowledge" -- as the "eternal" religion [...]'has nothing to fear from knowledge"*)2 -- then we are being asked (unreasonably) to find the Philosopher's Stone (provided their religion does not actually put its adherents beyond the grasp of earthly care). As long as this does not happen, however, the domain of religion, whatever its origin, is our world; from this stuff it creates its forms and has its only being, and with these forms it must succumb helplessly to knowledge.3 For knowledge could dispossess religion of all existence; religion would not actually be perceptible in its believers and would only lose its fear of knowledge with loss of life itself. But in fact, no religion has feared knowledge if it was strong enough to keep knowledge from its vulnerable points (which is not possible). It is therefore not helpful in this paper to refer to Christianity as the religion against which knowledge can raise no doubts, despite the claim that it "is actually accessible to anyone who can see" and that its moral life "is offered through the human Jesus as reconciling

[Footnote to p. 23]

*) Herm. Schultz. _Zu den kirchlichen Fragen der Gegenwart_. 4 Frankfurt-am-Main. 1869 p. 9. [The author gives an answer to the above in the _Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie_ 51879 p. 44. I cannot share the idealism that sprang from it.]

[24] and redeeming, expressed through those touched by his humanity." This has nothing at all to do with knowledge6 -- that is, with the scrutiny of the sum of acts mustered under the name of Christianity. Rather, it has to do with the interpretation of these acts. And if the possibility is raised of doubting "whether the expression of this new redeeming life came about historically, as one assumed previously," then again and again everything points to a denial of Christianity as a religion. If knowledge is subjected to the contemporary view of the Christian religious life (always assuming a palpable expression of such belief), then that expression will be overthrown by knowledge. It must somehow have sprung up historically. This can only occur, however, where belief is too weak to stand alone and, imbued with doubt, gives way to knowledge, which it cannot hold at bay -- even if it means
capitulation, even if it means letting itself be defined by knowledge. In both cases belief has lost, for it has become superfluous at best. In this world no real belief can resist knowledge if the latter opposes it. Knowledge, when challenged, places itself against belief and remains forever the Other.

[25] For this reason, then, the pursuit of every theology, to the extent that it brings belief into contact with knowledge, is of itself irreligious, and no theology can ever exist that does not place itself up against religious interests. Just how juxta posed these camps are -- namely, knowledge and belief -- can be recognized very clearly, for the most fundamental assumptions and supports of belief fall victim to knowledge right off the bat and without a doubt. No conviction, for example, is more essential to an individual religion than the conviction that it alone is the true one; yet no conviction is more surely dashed by science. The faithful Christian believes that Christianity (with its pre-religion) satisfies the concept of religion, explains away other religions as false, and holds itself bound to combat them. Science -- that is, testing and comparing without prejudice -- recognizes with no effort that Christianity affords to Christians precisely what non-Christians derive from their religions as well. And no religion can combat the others without damaging itself -- shining examples of which are provided by early Christian polemic against paganism. Or let us consider the miracles: everyone knows (or can know) that they create as many believers in a religion as they lose when knowledge is encountered. For example, in Alexandria, belief contributed to a religious perception of the portrait of Serapis: Heaven would come tumbling down [26] and Earth return to Chaos if a hand were laid upon it, even for the purpose of strengthening it. And the belief held very long indeed, until a common Christian soldier under Theodosius I smashed the portrait to pieces with an axe and remained unpunished. Suddenly knowledge confronted what had up to then been touted under the protection of belief as miraculous, defying all tests. [Even among Christians the miracles effected by Jesus had to be used by him as "signs" to defend himself against unbelievers*); for he seemed like a sorcerer (goety) to them. Indeed, the miracle of transubstantiation, a cornerstone of belief according to the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, was at the same time an especially plentiful source of doubts against the institution.*]) Yes,
miracles damage one religion in the eyes of another, as Christian apologists show; for those who intoned against the miracles of pagan mythology, themselves demonstrated belief in the miracles in the first, most unlettered epoch of mankind ***) -- incidentally, a very instructive example of the extent to which common ground between religions can be overlooked amid dispute.

But at the absolute least, the fate and experience of Christianity can cause us to think of the relationship between belief and knowledge as less

[Footnotes to p. 26]

- For example Origen's *Against Celsus* II, 49. 52.10


***) See, for example, *Min. Fel.* 12 Oct. 20, 4. 21, 11. 26, 6.

[27] antithetical. Just as once upon a time there was so little earthly history as to be non-existent, so was there little theology in the primitive expectations of Christianity, which began life with the announcement of the world's decline. But if Christianity became a theology more quickly than a religion would otherwise do, it would be vain to infer a special congeniality between it and science from any particular basic idea found in Christianity. Moreover, the issue can be explained more fully, and easily enough, from a completely different perspective. Christianity is a young religion and from its outset entered a world which was at a cultural zenith (at this point one might justifiably ask whether our culture has regained that level). And even Tertullian, for whom an observation of this kind is especially foreign, stresses as an outstanding peculiarity of Christianity (as opposed to religious cults of antiquity) that it is a religion for the educated.*) In such a world the basic religious impulses of Christianity, as strong as they were, had to combat extremely powerful impediments; and it was only natural that these impulses came relatively soon into harmony with a world which could not be annihilated, seeking there a support where otherwise there had been only dangerous enmity. Thus almost from the cradle Christianity was fighting the battle between belief and knowledge, as Gnosticism, with astonishing consistency,
[Footnote to p. 27]

*) Apologeticus. Chapter 21.14

[28] quashed all historical assumptions of early Christian belief and developed it into a metaphysics, divesting it of its popular character and raising it up as religion. In spite of this serious development, however, the early Church (at least in the West) was for a short time unable to keep from wanting to strike a bargain with world knowledge, at that time represented omnipotently by Alexandrianism. Instead of having the simple belief in salvation through Christ withdraw zealously into itself, a Christian theology was posited as true gnosis beside the cast-down, false gnosis; and by means of the now-founded Christian canon, at least a certain sum of Christian tradition was thus firmly protected by belief against attacks from knowledge. What is more, the believer was thoroughly bidden to rise up against knowledge. For even stronger evidence of the opposition of knowledge to the purely religious interests of belief, science was only able to press into the Church with a sort of tempered force and, once in, could only elude accusations of heresy with the sharpest watchfulness and under conditions of great danger. Science therefore supplied a breeding-place for continual conflict within the community. Its beginning already characterized its full development, as represented by Clement of Alexandria (and after him Origen) around the turn of the third century. [29] It so happens that the way the issue looks here is not at all as one would expect after our presentation of the relationship between Christianity and science; that is, science makes its first discreet entrance into the Church amid these the oldest founders of a Christian theology, and is amicably received by belief as the elder son of the house, to grow more and more alongside it. Instead, science finds itself here at the height of power, which apogee it already inhabited above the old Church belief; and in subsequent generations it is pushed back further and further from the initial position. By this we see very clearly that science did not get through the door of the Church by way of the oldest Alexandrians without a show of force. Appreciation of the Greek philosophers,
through which Clement justified his founding of a Christian science (he seems to equate their teaching with that of Old Testament religious evidence, which was an extremely bold change from the standpoint of the early Christianity -- apart from Gnostic teaching -- and shared by no one at that time), had to appear to the ecclesiastical descendants of the oldest Alexandrians as the absolute worst heresy. And yet it is this appreciation that Clement defends, amid mockery and derision, against the unsophisticated Christian believers who generally shy away from Hellenic knowledge.

Now Origen, of course, was viciously attacked during his lifetime on account of teaching [30] that shook the Christian tradition; and he was delighted when, during the greater part of the fourth century, the Church was permitted under Roman rule to set about establishing its worldly place and thereby could not dismiss the part its creator had in its theology. This relatively uncontested recognition, however, was soon attributed to the most heinous heretics and condemned repeatedly, even though its work was adorned with undeniable traits of ecclesiastically sanctioned theology. Thus the early Church tolerated the fruit of its first theologians' daring but did not in the least allow any of their followers to do the same, let alone to surpass their work. Nor did it hesitate to abandon its cast of characters. This can be said with reference to Clement, according to Eusebius, for knowledge of him was more or less swallowed up by the Church. In fact, the latter has never been at peace over the admissibility of scientific treatment of the circumstances surrounding Christian belief. Even Origen himself, who often enough firmly claims his rights as a man of science against simple believers, displays his envy of them when he concludes the Foreword to his polemic against the heathen Celsus with the remark that the best thing would be to have no need at all of such an opposition to Celsus, that is, to be the ultimate pious Christian who, because of the Spirit, can think on the reproaches of Celsus without any alarm.

[31] If the greatest scholar of the early Church speaks in this way, it is no wonder that Athanasius began to see that a friend's requested teaching on Christianity as superfluous because the Christian religion bears witness to itself through living facts; and that Christianity should not be counted as trifling on this account, nor should Christian belief deteriorate into
logical reasoning, tolerating the mockery of heathenism. Thus from a very worldly motive Athanasius is content to impart the approved teaching.*) And it is also clearly hollow speech when Chrysostom says, with respect to his own demeanour (as so many others did), that there was nothing worse than evaluating godly things by the measure of human thought **); a feeling is expressed here from which the early Church (in opposition to its theology) will surely never be free. Nevertheless, this sentiment falls under the same condemnation which the ascetic ideals of the early Church bring concerning all worldliness -- and especially in the East, where asceticism stands out so emphatically the more one examines the pre-Christian world. The Occident defends itself much longer and much more stubbornly against all systematic scientific theology, finally approving the theology of Origen in particular (albeit under strong resistance) via the frivolous littératur Hieronymus, who actually became the founder of theological scholarship.

[Footnotes to p. 31]

*) Contra Gentes Chapter I.31

**) Works, XI, 665 B. Montfauc.32

[32] in the West, but who, as I intimated, was by nature remarkably suited to coat his weapon of science33 with harmlessness. And all this timidity in the face of theology pervaded the Christian community at a time when it should have been possible for illusion to help dispel fear. This illusion would then be a theology which was a pure apologetics of Christian belief. And the illusion does actually exist in the early Church. In fact, it is quite plausible, as its rise coincides with a period of undoubted and very rapid decline of all the sciences.*)34 Moreover, it becomes entirely possible in the Middle Ages, as Christianity, mixed with Greco-Roman education, was passed to the uneducated people who had migrated with the Roman Empire, and as the Church stowed away all sciences35 in its lap. And yet here a relationship between belief and knowledge36 is formed, whose peace is only maintained by the contrivance of state power now under the jurisdiction of the Church.
[Footnote to p. 32]

*) Very informative about the impediments that science in this period repeatedly encounters when it wants to enter the Church is Augustine's Prologue to his treatise Über die christliche Wissenschaft (on this translation of the Augustinian original De doctrina christiana see my Zur Geschichte des Kanons, Chemnitz 1880 -- now Tübingen and Leipzig -- p. 47). Augustine is to be excused if, in his attempt at a scientific method of exegesis, he does not leave the comprehension of Scripture to God's inspiration resident in each individual.

[33] Now let us stay above all with the early Church and the Middle Ages; here science stood very clearly in a position of mere tolerance with respect to Christian belief. What is more, the aversion of every religion to knowledge is so sharpened in the case of Christianity, by its entire world-stand, that it is hard to imagine how scientific expressions could have gained any ground at all if science not indigenous to theology itself, and if it did not owe its rise to theology's efforts at self-deception. The fact lies open enough for calm deliberation that Christianity only outfitted itself with a theology when it wanted to make itself plausible in a world denied to it. This proposition would be even more accurate if one traced theology in the most absolute way imaginable, to the particular religious interests of Christianity, and then said something like: in hindsight, Christianity had to provide itself with a theology in its beginnings to sustain its purity of origin, in order to protect itself from the suspicion of corruption. For the latter would mean that theology resulted from an inalienable weakness of worldly Christianity. Now such a derivation would be completely false; for precisely at the beginning of theology, that is, in the oldest Christian Alexandrianism, it is as clear as can be that theology directed its glance elsewhere altogether, and that Christianity, with its theology, wanted to be commended to the worldly-wise and be recognized by them. Seen this way, however, theology is nothing but a part of the secularization of Christianity, a luxury it permitted itself and which, however, as with every luxury, is not to be had free of charge.

Just how costly a luxury, however, we should note, if not from the chaos
of the early and medieval Church, then from modern times, in which all of the illusions mentioned above concerning science\textsuperscript{48} still irretrievably have a place. Science\textsuperscript{49} has completely emancipated itself from the Church; it devises its own proof-methods and manipulates them heedlessly toward goals that lie beyond it. None of its disciplines subordinates itself to the requirements of Christianity; they are all quite unconcerned by eventual collision with traditional Christian concepts, and at the very most they recoil from the recurrence of these collisions. While theology, to the extent that it is a science,\textsuperscript{50} does not have specific principles of discernment -- rather, being in no position to dictate such principles to the other sciences,\textsuperscript{51} it can only receive from them -- so the façade of a Christian science\textsuperscript{52} is no longer tenable. And if untenable, then theology is not to be seen on a complete par with science,\textsuperscript{53} content with the purely scientific\textsuperscript{54} goal of pursuing knowledge. \textsuperscript{[35]} For its nature is derived not from this but from a concept of something defined and valued on a different level. Now, even if for as long as one can remember Christianity has fundamentally been a scientific\textsuperscript{55} problem for theology, it is scarcely possible to recognize it as such today; for this would mean that theology sees Christianity as problematic, that is, puts it into question \textbf{period}. And this goes for all theology, whatever the product may be. Apologetical Theology, assuming its reliability, would have yielded a product no more palatable than would Critical Theology; for if Christianity were derived scientifically\textsuperscript{56} from Apologetical Theology, then the latter would have had to nullify the former as a religion.

Theology of course struggles most vehemently against recognizing this last point, yet only the theological idealism stated by us to be false (the one that sees the individual forms of a religion as unimportant) can doubt it. Modern theology in particular is quite unable to reproduce something even resembling religion. A religion can be singularly unconcerned about promulgating myths as long as the ability to formulate them exists, that is, as long as the miraculous powers that brought forth their mythos are still effective within that structure. In the Christian world these powers are known to be long gone -- basically for as long as there has been a Christian theology -- and while even earlier the Christian mythos fit into the framework
[36] of an unbending tradition, the historical interpretation of this (and especially of its canonical documents) was set into motion quite early on in the Christian community. Yet the early Church was devoid of superstition, so that sacred evidence could be accepted for its religiosity by applying historical interpretation -- and in the allegorical reception it found a kind of surrogate for the mythos which itself no longer existed. Our theology today, by contrast, not only admits of no other interpretation, as offered by religious as well as historical books about Christianity, but actually harbours first and foremost the almost inconceivable desire to be certain of Christianity historically. If successful, however, it would at best produce a religion of the educated, that is, one that cannot be compared at all seriously with a real religion. It would be something more or less of the same reality as the "Denkreligion, which haunts many a brain these days and, as one even hears said, the brains of all truly educated and discerning people who should have dismissed forever the religion of belief.*) In fact, the "foreigner" Theology, by its very nature, elucidates nothing more clearly for the religion it means to serve than the current overestimation of history for its own purposes. It brings nothing to religion but the vicissitudes of the times, in which theology has fallen

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[Footnote to p. 36]


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[37] under the sovereignty of science (in relation to which it is even lower than an ancilla -- that is, it could have been of help but was not at all wanted). Of course, our devaluation of the mythical forms and over-prizing of the historical foundations of religion in its theology allows one to grasp the relationship between belief and knowledge with enough superficiality to enable it to be veiled and, for example, to claim far too dismissively the significance for a Christian of all scientific discovery.*) Such a claim indeed is refuted by daily life, in that every rather significant discovery of historical or natural science related to the teaching or mythos of Christianity incites conflict and makes doubters out of believers. But once again, good apologetical theologians take their silencing very lightly.
Such a one is Strauss, for example, who, with reference to the Mosaic Creation story, affirms that "for a long time no intelligent Christian has proclaimed as natural science this religio-poetic picture of creation which was obviously a product of old Hebrew lore."** That Christian might indeed be called intelligent who looks upon such a conception of the Mosaic Creation story

[Footnotes to p. 37]


**) Ibid. p. 31.61

[38] as "obvious" which earlier was less so even to very intelligent people; only it would be even more intelligent of the Christian to opine that such a conception was religious. For to the religious person, the Bible indeed is principally about natural science.62 But he does not even consider the idea that it contains no natural science at all. It is moreover worth special note that the same people who so unthinkingly surrender the Creation Story to rational criticism today often defend as sacrosanct the literal meaning of many New Testament stories -- for example, the story of the Resurrection -- against everything that is called criticism, despite the most glaring invectives. In defending themselves they ignore the fact that they are going into battle armed only with the flimsiest shield of historical proof. If they placed less trust in this shield they would certainly be more circumspect about making distinctions within the Canon, since its religious authority rests on the equitable status of all of its parts. If one acknowledges this equity, then it remains to be established why, for example, the Resurrection narratives should be excluded from the critical judgement allowed for the Creation Story, permitting reflexion only as concerns the possibility of historical witness. Now then a part of this must certainly be conceded: that the occurrence of the Resurrection (according to traditional chronology) is a stronger possibility than that of the Creation; but one should have no illusion about the purely scientific and irreligious [39] character of the whole manner of observation if, with that reflexion, doubt about Scripture can arise the one time and belief in it the next, whereas for real believers in Scripture the veracity of both narratives invoked here is exactly the same.
It would be inconceivable how on a position like the one debated here the discoveries of science could be passed off as indifferent for Christianity, if one did not notice repeatedly how easily this theology presents itself with such a patchwork of religious belief to which it sees itself led by science. The same theologian whose words against Strauss inspired us above pleads the case for Darwinian theory's having proven its theses, and offers the following for the pacification of "Christian belief" : "We would say to ourselves", he thinks, "that the once-and-once-for-all seed of miracles, which the plant, animal and human worlds contained in embryo, is in fact the greatest proof imaginable of the magnificent creativity of God; that the gradual, systematic development of the possibilities set down in this original seed, all gravitating toward humanity, constitutes the strongest evidence of this; that, rather than blind coincidence, it is divine thought which regulates the matter; and finally, that the last step of this development, the step from animal to man, clearly was only accomplished so that God could breathe into the structure a breath [40] of his own personal spirit."*) Such words prove that even a theologian can be naïve (or worse; for in the area under discussion here they are all naïve as a rule). From whom exactly does our apologist expect belief in these crude fantasies? That is, from what serious-minded person? (For there are always enough of the other type around.) The believer takes his conviction about the creation of the world and humanity from the Bible, since for him this religious book has divine authority. Now the shaking of his belief does not require authority of the same sort, although it would certainly be required for the restoration of that belief. Whence does Professor Beyschlag derive the authority to expound about God's relation to the Darwinian theory of creation? The Bible says nothing about the Darwinian theory, which latter does not cite at all a "miraculous cell" but rather an "original cell." Should the first notions occurring to one about both of these be good enough, even if unsatisfactory? It goes without saying that a theology that harbours a nauseating mixture of half-knowledge and half-belief is subject to endless disappointments about its own essence; moreover, it is the most worthless verbiage which ever came to be, for in fact it consists of mere words inserted where thought and belief have departed.

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[Footnote to p. 40]
*) Beyschlag loc. cit. p. 35.

[41] Such superficial attempts at compromise make it very clear that knowledge surely can destroy religion, never to rebuild it as such again. Nevertheless, Christian theology, in its more primitive periods, proves nothing by the curtailment of knowledge at that time; while in more recent eras it establishes its proposition even less, with reference to the devastation effected by science in the forum of Christian belief, than it does by fruitless attempts to reconstruct the Christian religion by means of unfettered science. Therefore Christian theology should only be spoken of in the context of practical science in that it is the task of every theology, cosmogony, and religion to define each other by their differences with special reference to the Christian position. But the scientific character of theology cannot call itself Christian. The more one sees the overall human significance of this issue, then representing Christianity as a religion is either the business of all sciences (as it was in every age before ours), or it is the business of none, as is currently the case, when for theology that act can no longer be germane. If moreover we have generally ascertained that theology in itself contains an irreligious element, then the Christian religion must also contain an unchristian element; and we are thus well-prepared for the facts we now wish to invoke regarding the major theological [42] parties of today -- which facts, in the hands of a theologian, can actually transform Christianity to the point where it is no longer what it once was.
Part II. Chapter 2.
Current Apologetic Theology.

Two great Parties confront each other at the moment in the theological world, presenting to public opinion their current state of conflict. In actual power they are quite imbalanced (especially in Germany), yet in the eye of the public they are equally balanced and now are in the grips of a bitter quarrel. Let us call them the Apologetic Party and the Liberal Party. Their conflict turns on the number of traditional notions of Christianity that should yield to science, and it has recently increased in vehemence, as Liberal Theology (through its main advocates) has popularized a series of results of historical-critical research on Christianity and the Church, and also as the laity has sought to make gains through organizing associations (The Protestant League in Germany, The Organization for Free Christianity in Switzerland). Now the scientific side of the conflict should not even be considered here, especially the question of whether the scientific differences of the opposing Parties are as radical as they seem to outsiders. Whatever claim to the epithet "Christian" we would grant these Parties, from our standpoint, is based nevertheless on the general observations made above on theology. We want to pursue them more particularly onto the field upon which every battle over religion first gains general interest -- yes, its primary characteristic essence: onto the field of "life-view"; and one can appreciate that, with the tone reigning between the Parties, it is surprising that in this area they are more or less united. Indeed, they are not far from the enemy Strauss, from whom they both have borrowed nothing more serious than the claim that worldly education and Christianity are incompatible. Let us begin with the Apologetic Party, being the older and the one that prides itself the most on its Christianity, while its younger opponent did not claim for itself the title of Christian until so pressed by Strauss.

The possession of power, which must always be hurtful, is presumably responsible for the fact that our Apologetic Theology has no understanding of itself. Nothing is less likely to come from their mouths than Chrysostom's
saying: there would be no heathens if Christians were true Christians. As a rule, Apologetic Theology is not concerned about explaining the unbelief that their "Proof of Christianity" sees in the most manifold and ill-considered turns of phrase originating in its opponents' ill will. Now of course the polemical tone most customarily employed in [44] our apologetics today against doubters -- according to that good evangelical dictum that "by their fruits will ye know them" -- must clash with the Christian nature of this Party; and one will always be obliged to close the ears immediately to the creed, for example, of a publication such as the *Neue evangelische Kirchenzeitung* (which expresses itself with such venomous evil and petty animosity on what it sees as heretics and their views), lest it convey illuminating traces -- sit venia verbo in this case -- of heavenly provenance. But then is our Apologists' proof of Christianity really so persuasive?

The most worthless of all proofs for a religion -- the historical proof -- is for Apologists today the most respected proof by far. Now its worthlessness, even if the Party enjoys some successes, has already been asserted by us. But the historical proof of a religion will always be deficient. The establishment of every religion is exceedingly unhistorical and unscientific, and therefore whoever wants everything to fit scientifically makes use of corrupted knowledge to do so. Early Christianity, for example, demonstrates its skill in this respect when, disregarding the scientifically appearing contradiction, it sets up the Johannine picture of Christ against the synoptic picture. But once the force has disappeared that made such audacity possible, nothing can bring it back historically. In the weakness of the historical proof for religion, however, the more profound apologetics has an understanding or at least a feeling: it feels (even if it does not recognize it) that in order for its proof to be effective it must be argued artfully. The historical proof for Christianity is as old as theology, but whoever discovered its feebleness within present-day apologetics has an idea of its potential for the Church Fathers, for whom the proof is not effective in itself but nevertheless stands out against the background of their dismal, ascetic outlook on life. Less naïve, however, while better considered and more informative, is Pascal, whom one can call the greatest apologist of modern Christianity (bearing in mind
that an apologist for Christianity is different from its preacher). Pascal completely renounces the so-called metaphysical proofs of Christianity, but not the historical proofs, and therefore even his sagacity might not make the proofs any better. But if he gives last place to metaphysics, he nevertheless understands the initial awakening of a definite mood before expecting success from the actual "proofs" of Christianity; he himself says that for the religion to be true one must wish it. In order to awaken such a mood, he makes use of a potent argument for which our Apologists clearly lack the strength, although they imagine occasionally that their works "have grown from Pascal's Pensees." Above all, Pascal seeks to shock

[Footnote to p. 45]


by the thought of death as the portal to dark eternity and by the stunted comprehension of the perplexed human being fluttering between the infinitely great and the infinitely small. One must however observe the world -- and life -- differently from our Apologists in order to write rather than merely plagiarize a work of such grippingly dark despair as the "Meditations on Death" with which Pascal intended to open his work; his extremely subtle, deeply oppressive scepticism is not our Apologists' concern. Where they like to ally themselves with Pascal is in his ideas on the limitations of human views. Only a Pascal may talk of this limitation, who at the same time claims that good thought is the foundation of morality; writers should not do so -- they who sin against morality, as they understand it, on every side, and invite the suspicion that the reference to human limitation throughout only applies to them so far as that they can use the image in their arguments. Pascal may speak about it, lighting upon the apt expression, "to be shaken by reason"; but not writers, who constantly raise doubts about whether what Pascal claims is generally valid -- that is, whether this shaking could occur in one's twentieth year. What one thinks and why one promotes beliefs must be drawn from experience and not merely conceptualized; and one must feel this way also about Christianity, if one is defending it.
Just how little our Apologists possess these empathies could almost be concluded from the [47] joy with which they now and then naïvely announce: "We live in an Apologetic era"; for in reality, in this era doubts should always be raised about the connection between religion and its advocates. Even more telling, however, is the fact that the Apologists console themselves with the most confident of the "proofs" for Christianity -- which is also the most dispensible -- namely the historical proof, which taken in and of itself is clearly the most hollow one there is, and which by nature immediately retreats in the face of anyone disinclined to believe it. The historical proof is surpassed in hollowness by only one, and that is the natural-historical proof, which the fortunate Pascal did not know, but which, however, in our new Apologetics is the rival of the historical proof. But the more feebly the Apologetics speaks -- when it would have liked to find strength -- the more it is compelled to lay stress on outward signs of its work. Occasionally, moreover, in raising its tone, it reaches the level of stark impertinence, which is very easy to do with natural-historical proofs. It may be quite unseemly to talk this way; but one could ask how else to describe the process at work, for example, when one of our most respected Apologists, Professor Luthardt of Leipzig, writes in his well-known apologetical essays in the interest of his dogmatics that the earth was the "spiritual centre"21 of our solar system and the only one among the planets to be inhabited. Surely after reading arguments like this involving the planets furthest from the sun22 -- [48] arguments only a theological dabbler in the sciences23 can swallow -- even our Apologists must have been overcome with anguish. Luthardt seems to think, however, that no one would notice, for he continues: "On Mars, existence would be the most bearable, but only because it resembles the Earth while not equalling it. Venus comes close to the Earth in its constitution, but, with an axis inclination of 72 degrees, it has too crude a change of seasons. In addition, one could conclude from the lack of clouds in its atmosphere that it was waterless, and therefore unsuitable for organic life. Mercury, furthermore, whose area is only one-ninth that of the earth, is of course far too small for man: 'his Fatherland must be greater than this.'24 We see that only with the Earth is the idea of the planet perfected; the other planets represent only preliminary stages. The Earth is simply The Planet, the goal and central focus of the planetary system (at least as far as we may
judge), and the only body in our solar system suitable for the development of higher organic life.

*) One glimpses that the speaker is no less concerned about the comfort of possible planet-dwellers (as he understands the inhabitants of the Earth) than he is about his argumentation. He hardly bothers to hide that he is managing here with only one fixed idea,

[Footnote to p. 48]

*) Luthardt loc.cit. p. 63f.

[49] namely that the Earth "is simply the Planet" (from which stressing of the article nothing could be more expressive), and that the only inhabitable planet would be one that "attained" the Earth's level -- which strictly speaking can only be the Earth itself. Yes, the speaker surrenders his evil conscience to the publicum in an aside and leaves them to do with it what they will. It should of course be masked by a small rhetorical sleight-of-hand. But is there anything lower and more tasteless than this quotation from the gutter, by which poor Mercury is passed over? How little of any essence must one have to say, despite all the pronouncements about Christianity, if one has to lead one's listeners into the quicksand of this whole question at all and base Christianity on such shameless nonsense!

And yet, we are asked, do current Apologists really base Christianity on proofs of this kind alone? Do they not also speak of sins, misery, and death in the world? Of course; but to such an extent that no one can believe their diatribes; and one has the constant impression that they are really only at home in the paralogisms of their historical and natural-historical proofs, which they consequently promote with especial zeal. It is indeed a basic ill of theology that so much is voiced under that rubric -- and by speakers who lack all intuition, experience, and inner conviction; and nowadays their teachers fail to attend to such requirements of discourse which are employed to convince others. [50] If theologians felt more clearly than is usually the case how perfidious human speech generally is, they would speak less about lofty things, or at least more softly, and let their mouths overflow less with that of which their heart is empty. But this insight customarily is lacking in them, which means here: quem deus perdere vult dementat. The evil custom of standing up for things with no inner truth for us begets that impure
fire that heats one up in favour of things one does not quite believe, which is the source of all pastoral hideousness and all theological fanaticism. Take, for example, the picture of Hell which -- with as much harm as it has always done, and as often as it has been fed by mutual hatred of theological opponents alone -- was actually capable of serving as a reproof to a great poet in the climate of the Middle Ages and therefore yields the grip of a really effective and living motif for the Church Fathers. But as things stand from Christian images of the Last Things, it can be generally said that the light Christianity sheds on the next world serves less to illuminate it than to darken the earthly one. Thus the idea of Hell becomes completely meaningless if severed from the dark picture of earthly life that the Church holds up, and which our Apologists today no longer possess. Taken purely by itself, the image of eternal Hell surpasses all inventions [51] of head and heart; and thought out with the peace and logic science demands, it leads either to madness or to its own annihilation. Whence the particular iciness from which, in the dogmatics of our modern Apologists, descriptions of Hell suffer when declaimed in pedagogical tones. When this tone is raised against opponents, one witnesses histrionics worthy of theatre; it is a tone clearly aimed at creating the impression of sublime awe such as we experience when, for example, a modern rabbi informs us with great authority that in Hell there is "not just teeth-grinding but also howling."*)

But to continue: with what then do Apologists back up their insistence that we accept their proof of miracles? No one yet has been brought to believe in them by mere syllogism. Whoever defends such belief is obliged in a certain measure to perform miracles himself.**) At the very least his rhetorical delivery should lift us to the world from which miracles are thought to come, and this the teachers of the early Church were able to do by the shadows they cast over the earthly world and by the endlessly repeated practical attempts to represent the existence of a better one. There are people here a great deal worse off, who, as far as one knows, arrange their lives more or less as

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[Footnotes to p. 51]
*) F. Delitzsch Commentar zum Brief an die Hebräer. Leipzig 1857. P. 231.30
(**) [Qui enim loci sui necessitate exigitur summa dicere, - says Gregory the Great in his Pastoralregel (II, 3) -- hac eadem necessitate compellitur summa monstrare].

[52] everyone else these days -- that is, as if there were no miracles -- and who, when we speak of a better world, always serve to remind us that the earthly has its good as well. For these people the miracles in which they believe have become something historical. In fact, nothing better illuminates the situation (vis-à-vis our modern belief in miracles) than the uncritical way in which Protestant Theology adopted the notion that, about eighteen hundred years ago, several miracles doubtless occurred in various areas of the Roman Empire but had suddenly come to an end and today do not occur. When and why did miracles cease? The different answers to this, as propounded by theologians, will probably always provide especially telling examples of the absurdities in which human perversity must engage when it lets vexed questions take the place of real problems in the world. When, however, one of these answers (and in no way the least popular) reads: "miracles soon became superfluous," it reveals with startling naïveté how highly the theologians think of the miracles they are defending, and how little it therefore matters to them that our world be disturbed by these foreign guests. Instead, they should say to themselves that if they are right about the miracles of pre-history, and in fact no more miracles are effected today -- especially the eye-poppers -- then they are defunct just like anything else that no longer works. And with confidence they can [53] leave it to scientific discussion to prove in theory that there are no miracles in this world -- which theologians would have had to argue in practical terms if they were to gain the right to argue by theory. They would thus spare themselves quite a few of the crudities with which they wage their beloved war today. What should one say in response to yet another well-respected Apologist, Professor Zöckler in Greifswald, who says: "In our earthly world we are situated relative to the acts of Heaven's inhabitants: proofs of divine intelligence and divine strength via earthly human organs or indeed via angelic organs; first-fruits of the transfigured world to come, in the midst of the temporal passing of our world. We regard them, filled with just the same wonder as did those southsea island savages who first beheld the triumphs and discoveries of European
civilization -- whether the effects of the printing press, or the steam
engine, or the telegraph, or a photographic apparatus. And, just as
unsophisticated children of nature will only very gradually give up their
assessment of the magical, thoroughly supernatural -- indeed, counter-natural
-- character of these circumstances that amaze them, we see people in general
acquire some insight only very gradually into the true essence of miracles in
terms of an outpouring of a higher or glorified natural order. We predict,
however, that the full recognition and empirical appropriation of this higher
natural order will take place at the [54] end of the world, reserved for
palingenesis; we are just like those savages who could not arrive at a full
understanding and overall active communal enjoyment of the blessings of our
culture until they had been exposed to Christian education, customs and
formation."*)33 It is not possible to do justice here to all of the
peculiarities of this position -- for example, the idea of explaining steam
ingines and such by "Christian education." If we stick to the main issue, it
seems that our judgement of the theologians was too charitable when we
reproached them for thinking and forming their God as human. Actually, a
subhuman God would even be better. For what does a cultivated person find
more painful than the barrier which education places between him and his
fellow men who are uncultivated -- a feeling so powerful that in fact nothing
stands between people more impenetrably than education? Will not such a
person on that account exert himself to overcome (as much as possible) this
barrier to direct understanding between people? And would he not feel it a
duty, for example, in the case of the photographic apparatus cited above, to
prevent any unfounded "amazement" of those islanders, and where possible to

[Footnote to p. 54]

*) Beweis des Glaubens 34 Vol. 2 (Gütersl. 1866) p. 78f. [There are
instructive parallels in passages of J. G. Fichte, Versuch einer Kritik aller
Offenbarung §8 (p. 123 of the second edition Königsberg 1793 [p. 81 of the
30th Volume of the von Kirchmann library, Leipzig 1871]), especially §9 (p.
155 [100]).]35

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the innocence of his spectators from abuse for egotistical ends? In such a case, this deicusculus of Zöckler seems opposed to us poor, ignorant inhabitants of the earthly isle, when he wishes to take the opportunity "to incite our astonishment" with his little magic wand, to keep us fettered for millenia and not allowed until the "palingenesis" to recognize that basically everything had happened quite simply and naturally! (Of course he would not have counted on the great cleverness of the theologians, who would have exposed his game long before.) Here is the way theologians defend the miracles nowadays: they talk about the "blessings of our culture." No wonder efforts are made to avoid their utterances about it; it keeps one from constantly returning to the situation of the vacant-gazing savage.

"The blessings of our culture": that sort of expression is heard with suspicious frequency from the mouths of our contemporary Christian Apologists. At one time, Christianity thought quite differently about these "blessings," and since in the world astonishingly little has changed after two thousand years, there is no reason that today we should not still think as before. Our Apologists should not even have to invoke the educated Christians of the fourth century such as the great Cappadocians and Chrysostom. For in actual fact -- at least for the eye that desires precision -- there is scarcely a more offensive picture than that of the Eastern educated Christians of the fourth century. For during this period, right after the peace closed between State and Church, the opposing forces of later pagan education and Christianity are held in a sort of equilibrium; yet in that very configuration their conflicting essence is seen all the more clearly and comprehensively, damaging all the more fundamentally on both sides. It is a secondary point. Yet one should not shut one's eyes to the deep melancholy that rests with all of those figures of the fourth century; in particular, one should not forget that behind and beside them stands monasticism, which gives them satisfaction (for they are all its enthusiastic and practised admirers). Who today satisfies our contemporary Apologists' wish for education? Since they do not appear unsatisfied, no melancholy shows upon the traits of our modern Gregorys and Basils. Indeed, in contrast to our forebears, who could not console themselves over the contrast between their education and that of the Apostles, modern people are much more at peace about it. Quite recently, in fact, one of the smoothest of these Apologist-educated Christians, in the words of the
Apostle's story which had the spirit of Paul "grow angry" upon his entry into Athens ("seeing the city to be so completely idolatrous"), has found in addition to Paul's anger his expression of "purely human admiration" for the beauties of the Parthenon. Hereafter it does seem

[Footnote to p. 56]
* Beyschlag loc.cit. p. 7.

[57] that, just as earlier on it was belief in Christ that misled theologians to make what they pleased of the words of Scripture, today the same is done with belief in education. In this we include the practically childlike joy many theological readers experience from the two or three quotations of Greek proverbs in the Pauline letters (well-known at that time) -- a joy compounded by all they built upon it. Christ is claimed to show himself a friend of education -- at least in the style of his speech -- and for the incomprehensible reason that this style is original. Of course, a view of life that is quite inimical to a culture can also be a very beautiful and distinctive form, as for example the *Imitatio Christi*, whose style is certainly beautiful, even if it expresses contempt for what we call Culture; and this is precisely the case of the synoptic speeches of Jesus. So let us permit our Apologists' need for education to be satisfied in grasping at New Testament straws. What do they perceive to be the connection between Christianity and the education which they aspire? On this point the Generalsuperintendent in Berlin instructs us very clearly, in a book that is all the more recommended -- however much it puts on priestly airs -- to anyone who wants to be well-informed about the death of the really practical ideas of Christianity in the circles of its highest official representatives, as it were. Here the challenges of the Protestant Leagues

[Footnote to p. 57]
* Conrady, *Cultur und Christenthum* Wiesbaden 1868 p. 35f.

[58] are clarified: "It can be admitted that Christianity and modern education have to draw closer together, and that the gesture must not merely come from the latter. A higher esteem of the peripheral effects of
Christianity can be demanded of the guardians, leaders and servants of the Church. Emphasis can also be placed upon the separation of what really belongs to belief from what falls purely under the rubric of knowledge -- a claim can be made for the curbing of the Church in its judgement of science. But the Church many never, ever relinquish its beliefs -- in the personal trinitarian God; in the incarnation of God in Christ; in salvation through Christ's life, suffering, and death; in reconciliation through his resurrection and ascent to Heaven; and in the foundation of the Church through the Holy Spirit -- in order to draw nearer to contemporary modern education. For if it does, then it is not shedding an opinion but a religion. This is clearly put; it is an excellent articulation of the position on Christianity and education held by our contemporary Apologists, although one notices right away from the overall tone that here one of the heads of the household is speaking who has in his hands the keys to the portals of education as well as to those of Christianity -- and who may therefore put things more cleverly than others. Clever, very clever, from such lips; but as the observant

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[Footnote to p. 58]


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[59] reader will easily perceive, the distinction between an "opinion" and a "religion" in Christianity is very welcome to us. Of course, as strongly as we earlier had to underline the significance of conventions for religion, we now stress the hope that we have led no one to suppose the existence of any Christian religion devoid of an "opinion," or with a changing one. Indeed, we find ourselves most radically opposed to the evaluation of what our Apologist calls "religion" and "opinion" in Christianity, as the reader has surely noticed. It is clear that what we have already designated as the Christian outlook on life is here called "opinion"; and one must understand by this expression Christianity's judgement of science and what is obviously meant by the unpleasantly ambiguous and obscure expression "the peripheral effects of Christianity" (in less flowery terms, of course, the secular life). In
this latter domain the "opinion" of Christianity should yield to education (or at least it should permit discussion). There might actually be a type of education compatible with this -- and in fact it could revel in having usurped the kernel, leaving the shell with a light heart to those who want to play further with it. Such an education would certainly be unusual. At least it would not have to strive for harmony, for if it did its survival would be doubtful in the face of the dogma the General- [60] superintendant has placed under the protection of his proud "never, ever." Such an education would have to be more or less along the lines of the one lately made possible in Berlin, to facilitate enquiry in the full light of day concerning the supernatural begetting of Christ. At any rate, the education could apply to a sect, founded on what science has achieved, and subject to early and certain modification whenever appropriate.

Now it is not our intention here to pick on the life-view of today's apologetics in one single area of secular life. One aspect about the latter, however, does remind us quite vividly of the work of the Berlin Generalsuperintendent who -- as everyone knows as a German Filmer, and moreover apparently unbidden -- compares the annexation of Hannover in 1866 with the acquisition of Canaan by the Hebrews. And what is noteworthy in this enterprise is too powerfully put forward to escape brief mention here -- by which we mean its political implications. For Christianity is in its origin unpolitical -- an unambiguous truth which would be misjudged less frequently if in all of our Church histories on the relation of the Church to the State there did not predominate error and lack of clarity in the most fundamental issues. At the moment, especially in Germany, the representation [61] of this truth appears to have fallen completely into the impure hands of the ultramontanists; and it is no surprise if, on the other side, the Christianity of the ruling circle of Protestant Conservative Theology, taking refuge in some dogma eternally secure from collision with politics or with anything that actually lives, has relinquished "opinions." A couple of examples to clarify the lack of backbone displayed in the "Christianity" of today in Germany (which lack, from the experiences of the latter years, has been quite significantly aggravated): Among the many and great dangers that an era of splendour hides from every politically-successful nation, there is the danger of arrogance. If we Germans, however, have striven honourably to
harness our entire moral strength so as not to be conquered by the victories themselves, then we must especially hope that in these days of our good fortune we do not lose our magnanimity and clearness of judgement about foreign peoples. What we have kept of this up to now may not actually be attributable to our Christianity; but in any case, in our efforts to maintain it, we will not be supported by its contemporary representatives. Indeed, the Generalsuperintendent informed us, "in the light of the Kingdom of God,"\(^{54}\) that "in God's great Kingdom the manifold character of the nations is justified", [...] "first for the [62] Germans, then for the Romans and Slavs."\(^{55}\) The dilemma cannot be a paltry one when Christianity speaks of a greater "justification" for the Germans; one would have to see it as a newly-interpreted allegory of the Pauline "first to the Jew and then to the Greek."\(^{56}\) Truly we have lost here one of the most original sentiments of Christianity. \(^{29}\) Also worth recalling is the case of the ecclesiastical assembly convened in October of 1871 in Berlin, bringing together with all sinful pomp the leaders of official Christianity (especially in Prussia) of the time. A clerical administrator from Wiedenbrück\(^{57}\) allows himself at one point to let drop, as a Christian, some sympathetic words about the recently terminated war: that wars would no longer be possible, if people were truly Christian. "The increasing unrest of the Assembly, which ardently seeks closure to the meeting, requires the speaker to discontinue,"\(^{58}\) report the annals published by the Secretariat of the Assembly, and with that the matter is settled. Except that, the next speaker, before coming to his theme, throws the remark back at the previous speaker: "as long as there are still sins in the world, there will still be wars waged, in which, moreover, God will continue to manifest himself as the Lord Sabaoth"\(^{59}\) -- proof of the cleverness of the performance on the high wire stretched between the Old Testament and the New Testament.

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[Footnote to p. 62]

*) Loc. cit. p. 529.

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[63] where theologians have always withstood the test (for they certainly knew what they were doing when, in the second century, they so bravely defended the
one pole of the tightrope apparatus against the Gnostics who wished to tear it from them). But when an assembly calling itself Christian has no answer to such words as those of that clerical administrator other than the answer relayed, then however unclever and untimely it might be, in this case one may justifiably place their Christianity on a par with the well-known ritual eyewash of Christian verbiage⁶⁰ [which, in addition, according to 2 Tim. 4:2, should not be of such consequence]⁶¹ -- whose overall Byzantine flavour one wishes would go away.

From all that has been said, this much must be clear: our modern Apologists aspire to be Christian, or perhaps more clearly, they aspire to have worldly education. Now the question is still worth asking: what kind of education? In their heart is there such a fear of the world and its education -- a fear characteristic throughout Christianity -- that they would be really prudish and approve only a thoroughly specific education appropriate to the special requirements of the Christian view of life?⁶³ Who would claim that? Granted, here and there they hold a small intellectual exercitation, in the stifled, textbook style, against modern education and modern unbelief; but do they themselves bring out anything original? To say "yes" to this, one must allow the "Christian novel" to be worth something, which they [⁶⁴] place here and there in the world and, as their journals indicate, which they enjoy alongside the novels the entire world reads. On the whole, one can only be astonished at how much the education of today levels (in outward appearance) our most inimical theological parties -- thus proving with greater certainty the actual nullity of their opposition, since antitheses like those between our Apologetical and Liberal Theologies, if serious, would have to spring from cultures of more fundamental variety. So let us get back to literature: do our Apologists write any differently than their opponents? No; on all sides one can see what reigns these days in literature -- the newspaper. Are they parsimonious with the riches they claim to disburse, so that they may carry them back to market if they get scared? It would seem so, or at least pretty close to it. But everyone knows this is not the case. Where yesterday a man of the Protestant League stood as speaker, today there stands an Apologist; and as pressure is exerted forcefully upon them, they are all the more obliged to say to the people straight out that the other Party is wrong. For if not, in the great connection between influencing and presenting thought, people
might not always notice they had heard something quite different. Are Apologetical Journals consciously redacted along different lines from Liberal Journals? Here as well they are just about the same -- if at times a degree more spiteful on the Apologetical side. [65] With this in mind one may observe the critical standards established by a Bulletin like the Neue evangelische Kirchenzeitung. [65] The more a work approaches in character what we call "literary," or estranges itself from real theological interests, the more certain it is to be received graciously, even if its theological "orientation" is disagreeable. Whereas if it has a strong scientific [66] bent, the "orientation" alone determines the judgement. A work like Lüdemann's Anthropologie des Paulus [67] for example, is dismissed with a blunt "wrong"; but Hausrath's Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte [68] is received not without reverence, although every serious theologian of whatever orientation, if not restricted to passing judgement on a mere mass of facts, can learn much more from the first work than from the second. Given the theological characterlessness -- paired with the greatest narrowness -- of current Apologetics, one can generally grant a secure reception to the young man who wants to approach it scientifically. One can say to him, "Write a grammatical or a historical treatise. If you decide on a grammatical treatise, then I recommend a theme taken from the Bible. For if you write on Hebrew accents or on the use of a preposition in the New Testament, it looks as if you are joining together theological and scientific interests. Or if your point of view is a historical one, choose astutely; [66] best leave the Bible aside if you are not completely sure of your dogmatics, especially the New Testament. Draw up perhaps a patristic monograph instead; these days enquiries on this sort of work are prevalent, and such an endeavour would be very appropriate here -- especially if you do not handle your subject more cleverly than, for example, Zöckler did with Hieronymus. [69] Actually, something from the Papal Middle Ages will always be the surest and the best, whose abstruseness even the obscurantist Protestants among us do not question." One can be persuaded to go far with such advice. In any case, an essay concluding with fundamental ideas falling between apologetics and science would ensure a long peace, protected as it would be by the guarantee of decorum from both sides. And if the essay were thus built upon the silence of both sides, then the ear would be unassailed by apologetics, and science (that is, whatever of it found any
expression) might remain at liberty. And who can deny that the prodigious mass of modern linguistic and historical work before us is enough to defend whole armies of living people? Yet in the realm of Theology, whose works (if worthy of that name) necessarily have an intention, scientific undertakings will always be so far from the Truth that for easily conceivable reasons one finds few advocates of it. Apologetics, which at best deceives itself in its undertakings, has been suffering for years from the bleakest barrenness in matters scientific. If one just considers, for example, that the work of the Erlangen Biblical scholar Hofmann conjures up a phantasmagoria of science, how many works of this kind have recently arisen based on Hofmann's delusion? And there seems no chance that its scientific barrenness could be identified when such frivolous judgements are possible as, for example, again in the *Neue evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, where Keim's *Leben Jesu* claims that "today's science" could "give a truer illustration of Jesus's life in which the magnificence of the Only-begotten of the Father was apparent." Now for decades "today's science," so called by the periodical cited, has offered such "illustrations" in very pressing, forceful challenges. What are these illustrations? In all fairness I will not cite the flood of ineffectual brochures and speeches which Apologetics zealously sets up against more recent works on the *Leben Jesu*. But where has today's Apologetics offered us a work on Jesus even comparable to Keim's (which cannot be defended here) in assiduity, scholarship, soundness of reasoning, and richness of thought? Or which would yield as clear evidence of serious and original work in its skilfully formulated position, not forever based on traditional turns of phrase and thought? On the strength of the *Neue Evangelische*, one would have to assume that the desks of our Apologists are full of material far superior to Keim's. They would do well, indeed, to nurture their apparent fear of daylight. One does not need, in fact, to be a prophet to pronounce that no more significant scientific work will come out of early Christianity from the collection of theologians of the *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* that could be of even slightly greater universal significance, or that, apart from being of use for pure scholarly or polemical purposes, would receive any attention outside of a small sect. This future is only too predictable, thanks to these apologetics' lack of principle.
So the extraordinary ineffectualness of what the Apologists actually produce (especially their popular literature) should open up their eyes about themselves. But instead, they show a marked tendency to celebrate from time to time the lofty success of their writers; they refer us to Luthardt's essays (to which we have alluded above), owned by hundreds -- even thousands -- of people a few years ago in Leipzig, according to the newspapers, and which are currently available in many editions and translations; or else we are referred to Tischendorf's apologetical writings, whose success is similar. But one should actually call it a "succès terrible," for it serves as proof of the shallowness of the genre it represents. This kind of success can be claimed particularly by popular theological writings, [69] which incite a very wide, animated interest and which, while essentially avoiding deception, by their theological style above all rob people of the opportunity for real judgement. They may well enjoy a wide readership because of their complete lack of substance, but their effectualness stands in a reverse ratio to their popularity. It is of course true that in Luthardt's time half of Leipzig had heard the great Apologist. How have things changed since then? It is also true that his essays have been propagated in both hemispheres in unnumbered quantity; but would the world really hear about things were it not for the book trade?

But what should one expect from a Theology that in fact considers belief to be something dwelling in Cloud-cuckooland, to be satisfied with a few lifeless stories and dogma, with consequently little or nothing to seek on Earth? Let us once more share our thoughts, this time concerning a good Apologetical Church historian who, on the subject of the Donatist struggles, thinks that the ideal of the Church allows itself "to be realized only incompletely in a sinful world" *) 77 -- with this or similar banal rhetoric our Church histories make a special effort to come to terms with the great pietistic movements of the early Church. What person of simple sentiment will not marvel unswervingly, unperturbed, at the remonstrations of Protestant Orthodoxy,

[Footnote to p. 69]

when, for example, this Apologist compares the Anchorites and monks of the early Church, who sought to make possible the impossible because they believed in it, with theologians who express so calmly the impossibility of realizing their ideals yet want to be seen in the world as if they did believe in them? The early faithful were surely strengthened in their passionate endeavour by the precise view of earthly life that our Apologists lack and often reject -- despite the fact that one need only hold this view to make the Christian ideal significantly easier to attain. And even where Apologists do seem to share this view, it merely puts their sincerity into question. For who will seriously be fooled when reference is made to the "sinful world" with a shrug? For it was precisely this which was such as a thorn for the old world. On the contrary: it is blissfully used now as an excuse to shift the realization of the Christian ideal to another world. And this only serves to underline that one is of the "sinful world" while at the same time softening the impact of the term "sinful." In order to avoid this censure, Apologists would have needed greater eloquence in displaying their pain at the failure of the Christian ideals. Above all, Apologists exude hateful zeal when they try to force upon us the belief in an ideal whose impossibility they themselves declare -- not even belief in this ideal itself, but rather in dogma that, being severed from the ideal, is ultimately worthless. Silence reigns about an ideal they admit cannot be realized (if "realized" can be applied with reference to an ideal); or at least the talk about it is not too loud. And in any case, by such a view one renounces everything that is right, in order to sway the beliefs of others.

Christianity was never seriously founded on anything other than the world's unhappiness. If Apologetics does not recover the strength to do this as in former times, then it may ransack Heaven and Earth, but it will return no free-thinking or true-feeling people to its myths and dogma once they have strayed. For if the Apologists belong inseparably to the religion that maintains them, they do not live it. Just the opposite: they will not let themselves be disengaged from the background of a certain world-view and life-view that has brought them forth like the stem brings forth the lilac. But if Apologetics, which has thoroughly estranged itself from the Christian world-view and life-view, thinks to hold Christianity in the withered branches of those myths and dogma, then it may have to consider how much longer it can
hold this opinion. And others must be permitted to deny that this Christianity is in fact Christian.
Part II. Chapter 3.
Current Liberal Theology

If we turn now to the other of the two main theological Parties of today whose claim to the term "Christian" we want to examine here -- the Liberals -- then under this name so many seemingly different theological standpoints can be assembled that, for clarity of representation, we will content ourselves with taking from these standpoints the one that is the most comprehensible, in that it is advanced particularly scientifically and has for all practical purposes surfaced the most boldly recently in the above-cited Liberal Leagues. In this we must not worry about personal allegiance to these Leagues, which would impose upon us a very burdensome stricture (as well as a superfluous one), since naturally we are only concerned with the theological notions to whose popularization the Protestant League and the Association for Free Christianity have dedicated themselves. Indeed, by circumscribing the direct references of our project, points of view will arise whose more universal applicability to all recent Liberal Theology will of itself be enlightening to the expert.

If we reproached Apologist Theology for what it represents, having only the shell left in our hands without the kernel,\(^1\) then, \([73]\) from the acknowledged open position taken toward Christian myths and dogma by the Theology nowadays chiefly called "Liberal," it seems that Apologists have in and of themselves passed judgement against this Theology. For the latter has thrown away not only the shell of Christianity but also the kernel, and therefore they must be entrapped in more powerful illusions if they intend to operate unreservedly as a Christian religion; and they have defended themselves most vehemently against Strauss's contesting the stability of their endeavours, even accusing him of "perfidy."\(^2\) Nevertheless, this augmented illusion on the side of Liberal Theology is certainly not triggered by the vehement opposition voiced against it by Apologetics. Not merely because both agree in their counter-Christian view of life,\(^3\) but also because they pay homage to the same illusion (although in different ways), in their execution of Christian religious practices. On the one side, the Apologists defend traditional Christianity with scientific\(^4\) (and especially historical) means;
and on the other side, their opponents think they can rebuild Christianity by the self-same means, but according to their own critical solution.

In recent times we have often heard that today's Liberal Theology wants nothing to do with the "early Church beliefs"; no criticism is made more often than the one against Strauss's newest work, which allegedly identifies Christianity with that early belief. Now if, as before, we further distinguish from among "historical" forms of Christianity those with a corresponding life-view, then it follows from our earlier general reflections on theology that Strauss is correct in the main. And what especially follows is the perception of the religious worth of the "ideas," the "spiritual" principles," and other learned abstractions of the sort, which Liberal-school Theology aims to substitute for the concrete myths and dogma they have put aside. And there is one main area in which we especially want to examine their suggestions on the relation of science to "ecclesiastical" belief more closely: in the appeal to the "Christianity of Christ" and the consequent untruth regarding his divinity.

As the fixed point for determining the fundamental essence of Christianity, at which indeed the more advanced Liberal Theology must arrive, even with all of the "perfectibility" it sees in Christianity, the "Christianity of Christ" supplies a notion that finds general recognition in this Theology but that contains overall a characteristic lack of precision. There is no doubt, of course, that we are talking inappropriately here of Christianity. For Christianity is, in any case, as surely the etymology of the word tells us, a belief in Christ, consequently not his own belief. In fact, this impossible picture of a Christianity of Christ contains another notion that clearly does not permit the illusion of a Christianity of Christ: Lessing's idea, namely, of a "Religion of Christ." Make no mistake: this latter idea unhinges Christianity as a religion. Lessing certainly shows this very well in his fragment on the "Religion of Christ": whoever speaks of a Religion of Christ, and means to stick by it, places himself outside the Christian religion which, as it follows from the whole picture of Christ, can have nothing to do with that -- at least not in the sense that it could become the religion of all people. The idea of a "Religion of Christ" actually rests on the historical discovery of Christ's humanity, that is, on the discovery that the Christian religion (raising Christ to divinity upon its
being named a universal religion) contradictorily took its image of him from back in antiquity; and their particular mistake was to rely on the witness of the founder. Now the critical significance of this discovery for the whole of Christian religion lies quite obviously in its uselessness for the purposes of its reconstruction. For it was just that temporal transfer that made Christianity into the universal religion we call "Christianity." It never existed as such before that shift, whereas the discovery of the error, considered practically, can only relocate us to the so-called Judaeo-Christian standpoint, [76] that is, to a standpoint whence, even if Jesus could be raised to universal significance by the mediation of the disciples, he has at any rate far less chance to be so raised by us -- certainly not by our scholarly discoveries. When we speak of a Religion of Christ, we ourselves are reiterating the standpoint of the oldest believers in Christ who honoured him as a human Messiah and therefore viewed in him more than just the prototype for a religion -- to which prototype his belief of being the Messiah naturally cannot belong. So when we confront a special human religion of Christ, we in fact arrive at an underlying reality whose positing Christianity observed with indifference. For really, Christianity did not find this religion which, whether or not of value for us today, could only count as an historical discovery, as it would count as the foundation for a new religion.

One must therefore admit that Strauss is right when he underlines the extraordinarily fateful meaning -- lately reiterated -- contained in the modern idea of a human life of Jesus, and particularly when he advocates that the Christian religion come to terms with this. According to Strauss, "the thought of a life of Jesus is the trap into which the theology of our time fell, and had to fall";[10] [77] so in fact it is hard to see what is being said against Strauss when Keim responds that this thought emanates far rather "from a time which put aside the old notions of divinity and exchanged for this a fuller delight in a human Jesus." *)[11] The Christian religion has always had "delight" in the human only as a form of commiseration, and therefore only takes "delight" in the humanity of their Christ in as far as is necessary for the purposes of Redemption. In every other way it has sought to forget this humanity. If more recent theology feels, on the other hand, a "fuller delight in a human Jesus," then it should admit openly that it no longer entirely sympathizes with Christianity; and if it "has put aside the old notions of
divinity," then it may have executed its office as a science,12 but it should not overlook the deeper bond connecting these notions with Christianity and which cannot be loosened unless one attacks and weakens Christianity overall. Surely even Keim's suggestions of abandoning the old ideas should not be taken too seriously. Moreover, he sets himself the task of cementing together the Christ of the Church with the Christ of science,13 and he thinks that after he has critically destroyed all traditional witnessing authorities on the godly being, he can give us back a Jesus by purely historical means who, although undoubtedly human (whose

[Footnote to p. 77]


[78] "personal religion" Keim mentions repeatedly), is still more than human. The most high-flown phrases are employed in this task, and it can hardly be grasped how a work of such seriousness and whose laudable traits we have already acknowledged (see above, p. 67) could so stray from its scientific intent by the writer's missing an obvious detail -- which actually explains much here. Just as Keim extrapolates from Jesus himself that the latter displayed the potential for various kinds of vocation although "dictatorship was the religion of his spiritual essence,"16 one can say from Jesus' work that it revealed a wealth of the most lovely kernels, so that "dictatorship" would be an overblown term for it. In fact, one does not readily find a writer of such rigorous scientific education who is at the same time so defenceless against flowery tenor and turns of phrase. Only with this defencelessness, however, could it have been possible to write one of the most affected literary works of our day on a subject allowing us, as hardly any other, to approach the sublime in its simplicity of treatment. And one should add to this unimportant rule of the word what one is otherwise unwilling to censure (as offensive as it is perceived to be): that a type of reverence is conferred upon a being, about whose humanity we are not left in doubt, precisely because of this humanity, [79] believing in the "worthiness of humanity" that had only been granted when that human essence had been dismissed.*)
In fact, current Free Theology,\textsuperscript{19} with its notion of the life of Jesus and the way he was duty-bound to lead it, has distanced itself from the interests of Christianity as a religion more than it would like to admit, for it drew near to a light that soon disappeared into significant obscurity. The most one could expect from the task would be that it might hide another type of Christian religious interest, which raises doubt about whether a self-validating science\textsuperscript{20} -- posing only those questions it is in a position to answer competently -- would attempt the biography of a life of which only a single year is known, and this fragmented. In any case, an exact definition of known and unknown areas would be scientifically\textsuperscript{21} more worthwhile than the sketchy narration of thoroughly problematic traits of Jesus's life; as would a demarcating of the boundaries between the two in terms of the person's historical significance -- at least this task suggests itself more directly from the facts available.

But if we now leave aside the life of Jesus and on the whole all freedom that today's Liberal Theology

[Footnote to p. 79]

*) See especially Th. Keim, \textit{Der geschichtliche Christus}.\textsuperscript{22} Zurich 1866. P. 202 f.

[80] arrogates concerning the mythical and dogmatic structures of Christianity (thereby to leave it unassailed as religion); and if we pursue this Theology, as we clearly stated earlier, especially into the domain of life-view,\textsuperscript{23} then we have before us precise, compelling reasons to draw to a halt. For Apologetics at least still articulates, often revealingly, the true position of Christianity to the secular world; whereas our Liberal Theology, and especially the Protestant League -- no doubt more honourable but also more profoundly guilty of l\textit{é}ger-de-main -- admits almost nothing in this regard. Liberal Theology thinks it has hit upon a Christianity whose reconciliation with world-education is hardly a problem; and with this we approach a state of affairs whereby we must esteem the Christian religion above all others, as it is the one with which one can do as one pleases.

This definition of Christianity is not so far removed from the opinion, tirelessly repeated by recent Apologists and non-Apologists, on the peculiar
capacity of Christianity to accommodate all possible people and cultures, "to live through the souls of the times and the peoples," as is expressed by an opponent of Strauss from the Protestant League.*) It is an opinion, however, based on an extremely arbitrary re-interpretation of the factual experiences of Christianity in terms of the latter's intrinsic fitness.

[Footnote to p. 80]

*) H. Spörri. _Der alte und der neue Glaube_. Hamburg 1873. P. 12.25

[81] In its beginnings Christianity was the religion of a dying but highly cultivated people. It of course made a pact with education; and certain practices, so to speak, had to be sustained in order to adapt to the culture. Thus appropriate ways were devised to make this accommodation and give the appearance that it was in its essence to do so. At any rate, the earliest experiences of Christianity in the Roman Empire leave the question wide open as to whether what was possible with a dying culture would have been just as possible with a younger culture and among peoples of unbroken vitality; and whether too, in particular, it were only possible among younger peoples as long as Christianity sanctioned the content and level of that culture. The history of the early Church leaves no doubt about how these questions had to be answered. If today's popular opinion about the compatibility of Christianity and education is right, then one would think the alliance was struck between Christianity and the expiring Greco-Roman culture without any difficulty. With no thought for itself, Christianity would have hastened toward this sickly sister and have seen no harm in making every effort to restore her strength. But everyone knows that things did not go that way at all. It is true, of course, that the fallen condition of classical education in the first Christian centuries resulted in its being approached by Christianity. One should also state that Christianity was a supporting power for early education -- but in so doing it laid to rest the remaining vital signs of antiquity. Thus one cannot speak of Christianity's fraternal sentiment toward its opposing education. Christianity did not keep (or attempt to keep) this education from sinking; nor did it save any more than its barest life. Christianity did not permit its continued life, but instead rendered it a helpless instrument and subdued it. In fact, Christianity, in
its early Church period, far from being particularly hermetic (as one usually thinks), never had a greater capacity to enter the world than at this time, since the world was so weak and so much in need of it. But Christianity never unconditionally gave in even to this weakened and decayed education, never approached it without also retreating somehow from it; thus what on the one hand it appeared to yield to education, on the other hand it appeared to regain in that it held itself back with even more vehemence. The best example of its relation to the old culture is the appearance of monasticism -- the purity of whose view has long escaped Catholic Theology, and whose righteousness Protestant Theology never possessed, but of whose profound connection with Christianity we need only two facts to be convinced. The first fact one may confidently posit is that these days we all -- and especially we who descend from younger peoples -- would have a vastly different knowledge of Christianity, as we do of Greco-Roman paganism, parseeism, brahmanism, and other religions, if the old Church had not produced monasticism. Even more certain is the second fact: from the fourth century until the Reformation, nothing great in the Church existed or happened that did not proceed from the cloister, or was not at least connected with it. Now monasticism, born at the same time as the Church was raised to State-status in the Roman Empire, was nothing less than the institution by which the Church protected itself and through which it actually withdrew from the State.27 This it did at the precise moment when it seemed to be surrendering completely to the pagans. It disengaged itself from the iron clasp of the people of whom it had no need; while the pagans nourished themselves with empty words, thinking to have re-directed the Church to their dualism in commingling Jewish legalism with Protestant error. [84] When the Church, however, created as a compensation for the loss of martyrdom -- unavoidably linked to their condition; a loss that could not be avoided and was eagerly awaited by Origen in the third century -- the martyrium quotidium of monasticism, it did what amounted to saving its own life. A Theology, on the other hand, that holds the ascetic outlook to be unessential to Christianity and merely characteristic of a certain period, and that intends to marry Christianity to secular education with no loss of strength, must regard monasticism as something to be dismissed by the Church. Whereas, in fact, an understanding of not just this institution but of all of the deepest and most noble aspects
in general of Church history up to the Reformation (at which point the productivity of the Church stops) makes this impossible. Indeed, while a world-denying character, at any rate since the time of the Apostles, is attributed to Christianity and is most acutely presented in the glaring light of the Apostle Paul's history, such a conception of Christianity is manipulated to the absurd length that it went through a period of about five hundred years in which this particular view of life was overshadowed by one completely foreign to it. So where should one state this kind of an opinion so that it might rise and show us how to affirm so-called [85] reality and its perception of Christianity and education in the world?

Early Christianity -- at least in its entire breadth -- cannot help us in this. For there cannot be a more world-renouncing belief than that of the earliest Christians in the imminent return of Christ and in the toppling of the prevailing world order. Here we must protest against a recent opinion which on this account restricts the ascetic view to earliest Christianity. "The small conglomeration of the first believers, we are told, "felt like a mere troop of pilgrims and strangers in their world, awaiting their Lord's call at every hour. Renunciation of the world is therefore the hallmark of original Christianity. From as early as the middle of the second century the Church felt itself to be a power in the world, and it daily opened its doors wider to take in the overflow of pagans. The belief, on which at first the secret of rapid growth rested, receded further and further the more the prayer-houses filled up." What must be contested here, first of all, is the notion that, with the opening-wide of their doors from the second century onward, the Church gave up the world-denying life-view of original Christianity. Rather, this opening-wide became for the Church the cause of extremely bitter internal conflict, and when it silenced

[Footnote to p. 85]


[86] the Puritanical sects sprung up in its midst beginning the latter half of the second century, there was no mention of the fact that this was the way the Church achieved peace -- nor that it modified its ideal of the Holy after
assimilating an unholy mass.\textsuperscript{34} In doing this it remained for the most part in accord with the Puritans. The Church was unceasingly careful to give living expression to this ideal when faced with pressure from which it could not completely withdraw. And it finally arrived at defining a two-fold Christianity without being in any doubt of the inferior character of lay or secular Christianity. So that -- and this fits closely with the points just mentioned -- it must be firmly denied that the original Christian expectation of the imminent return of Christ, after its actual failure to be fulfilled, had merely withdrawn into the Church, thereby especially setting to rest the world-renunciation of the original movement. If the issue is seen this way, it remains a puzzle how a faith whose entire world-view\textsuperscript{35} relied upon the physical realization of a promise, has not been shattered by its lack of fulfilment. Just how would the Christian belief, actually disproved on such an essential point as the expectation of the return of Christ, still carry on, if it did not find a better form in which to take refuge? And it did find this form -- precisely in the ascetic view\textsuperscript{36} and way of life, [87] which is actually a metamorphosis of the original Christian belief in the return of Christ, inasmuch as it rests on the perpetual expectation of this return. It continues to consider the world ready to topple, and it urges believers to withdraw so that they might be ready for the ever-impending appearance of Christ. The expectation of his return, untenable in its original form, which cheered itself in the image of the world's collapse with all kinds of Judaistic hopes, changed its views about death; views, according to Irenaeus, that should accompany all Christians. They became the \textit{memento mori} of the Charterhouse greeting, expressing the basic wisdom of Christianity, more or less, in the modern formula : "Do not promote anything disturbing between man and his source."\textsuperscript{37} In this formula lies a hollow negation for only too ecclesiastical-polemic purposes, for one might overlook that, according to the Christian view, it is the property of the world on the whole to be "disturbed." But regarding this precise issue of belief in Christ's return, our modern Liberal Theology would once again have special cause to demonstrate its incongruity in relation to the basic ideas of Christianity. For them, original Christian belief is founded on something never established by the early Church; moreover, it tries to hide from itself in the sweat of its brow. It fabricates a deception from which one learns only that
[Footnote to p. 87]
*) Thus for example Spörri loc. cit. p. 36.38

[88] "it is characteristic of the Kingdom of God, established in the world by Jesus through his Gospel, to be ever coming and ever becoming."*) If this is to be understood otherwise than in the context of the early Church -- that is, not as a dynamic force to realize the perpetual coming of God's Kingdom through the leaving of this world, but rather as a waiting for the Coming within the world -- then it approaches a reversion to bald Judaism and its Messianic hope. The Christ generation, however, naturally could not be so easily appeased, as they had really believed in the return of Christ and were now facing the failure of his return.

So if once more we raise the question of how Christianity's real, non-ascetic outlook40 was to be recognized after it had clung so early and so long to an opposing view, then, as we have just seen, reference should not be made to early Christianity. It seems to us, therefore, that the question about the so-called "Christianity of Christ" still stands. This has been repeatedly raised in recent times -- particularly as a counter to Strauss's claim that Jesus with his personal image did not exhibit important sides of human existence41 -- and in this objection Jesus has been made into a kind of cultural ally. Now we do not want to return here to the idea that whoever relies on personal views

[Footnote to p. 88]

[89] of Jesus places himself strictly beyond the borders of Christianity. By the "Imitation of Christ," what is in mind is not so much his personal views as his fate, the drama of his life; and moreover, this provides one of the firmest foundations for ascetic ideals. Therefore we will leave aside the question of whether and in what sense Jesus announced his imminent return for the Last Judgement; nor will we enter into detail on the question of the relation of Jesus to culture. If we but keep with the two basic pillars of
all human civilization -- family and state -- then: this much is clear and no more: whoever looks for ideals in the past, and finds them not in the pre-Christian ancient world but rather in Jesus, might just as well claim that the moon illumines our world rather than the sun. One should not assume a connection between Christianity and asceticism from the personal views of Jesus -- even if these views, generally speaking, ought to be considered absolute gauges of the Christian perspective.\(^{43}\) As long as we have before us the passage from Matthew 19:12.\(^{44}\) Actually, from time to time one has trouble taking seriously what is put forward by Protestant League writers against Strauss. Let us listen, as an experiment, to one such attempt at refutation, always refraining from intentionally choosing its poorest arguments. According to Strauss, says one of his [90] more closely-identified enemies, Jesus lacked "understanding of marriage and family life."\(^{45}\) Now Strauss at one point says something different: the image and the teaching of Jesus would be unprofitable for the virtuous people of home and family life, since he himself has no family. And Strauss's opponent, if Strauss had really disputed Jesus' "understanding" of marriage and family life: because he was a bachelor, would have been able to reproach his representation for its peculiar crudeness. Instead of this, he replies: "But whoever chooses the relationship of Father and child as the symbol of the highest religious idea must indeed have thought otherwise about these relationships than Strauss supposes."\(^{46}\) I add nothing to this here, for it is certainly not a question of what Jesus thought about those relationships -- assuming that it is wrong to imagine an extremely ascetic view would cast a shadow on these familial relations and rob them of their sublimity. The Church itself has tried to link such an interpretation to its ascetic view of the world.\(^{47}\) For an example we have simply to recall Augustine's views on marriage.\(^{48}\) "Art and science," our critical speaker later has Strauss say, "were closed to Jesus"; to which the rejoinder: "in return, a new strain of art developed out of his community, and thoughtful human speculation found in him one of their

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[Footnote to p. 90]

\(*\) Spörri loc. cit. p. 9.
[91] deepest problems." One cannot speak in a few words only about art in Christianity, but one must deny what is said here of Jesus' being a problem for thoughtful speculation as far as his historical person is concerned. For there must be evidence of such a problem, and as yet not even a half-dozen serious books allow for discussion of this, one of the "deepest problems for thoughtful speculation." At any rate, however, it is inconceivable that the attitude of artists and thinkers should help with the problem of what Jesus' personal views might have been.

Yet another consideration may bring us closer to the question of how essential to the Christian religion is its world-denying character. If we think of religion as a matter of everyday life, and compare its manifestations with those of earlier eras, first of all we will just be repeating what has already been often said: our earliest forebears were much more pious than we. Christianity and the Reformation, as it appears at first glance, fashioned religion from the world. Now it should not even be asked to what extent religion has in fact generally diminished in the world compared to earlier times. It cannot be contested that the Reformation very much narrowed the sphere of religion in life; this, however, will be of no value to the person who sees the Reformation as a political as much as a religious movement, [92] for these two tendencies are both wonderfully incorporated in its greatest men. But how does it apply to Christianity? The latter in fact secularized the world, leaving unmolested secular practices and pleasures which it could not destroy; but it took away the sacred that had infused earlier times. One needs flowers, Tertullian at one point explains, which is why they are present in nature, but not just for the purposes of divine worship. "Therefore I slaughter me a hen", he says, "no less than Socrates did to Aesculapius; and I ignite incense where a scent bothers me, not just during feasts and following customs that do so before idols." We should also recall the edicts of the first Christian emperors who, despite their concern to perpetuate popular festivals, nonetheless removed all religious character from them and forbade all practices redolent of religious meaning.** These significant examples -- countered only by the known effort of the Catholic Church, which Church historians correctly view as the paganization of Christianity -- are sufficient to make it understood that Christianity prepared a world in which religion could hardly even attain visibility. Now
if one takes as a point of departure

[Footnotes to p. 92]

*) Vom Kranze des Soldaten 52 c. 10. [Which does not in the least hinder Tertullian from assessing Old Testament ritual legislation as the religious consecration of everyday business. Gegen Marcion 53 II, 19.]

**) E. von Lasaulx, Der Untergang des Hellenismus 54 Munich 1854. P. 115.

[93] this tendency to say "yes" to the secular world, it still cannot be understood how one can continue to speak of Christianity as a religion, since it would then even more clearly be a mere systematic denial of religion. The issue appears differently only if one looks on world-denial as the innermost soul of Christianity, with the world no longer considered a possible worthwhile place for religion. This would result in an extraordinary paucity of great and unsullied characters in Church history. History knows nothing of the greatest and purest in this area.

Since in fact all power is taken from Christianity when one foists upon it any kind of restriction in favour of secular civilization, in order to avoid saying one desires secular culture but not Christianity. the result of such a procedure can be the most obnoxious sentimentalizing, levelling and draining of Christianity as these days, unfortunately, is poured in great torrents over our heads by popular Liberal Theology. What help is it to speak of the "eternal light" of Christianity, of "a love without end, of a clemency toward all sins, of a blessedness in all earthly pain, of a life which does not recognize death,"*)55 if one looks for this light by a method

[Footnote to p. 93]

*) Spörri loc. cit. p. 11.

[94] that will not actually teach us to find Christianity? The latter, certainly, is not of the opinion that all these boundless, exalted things are so easily obtainable in the world that one hardly need look for them beyond secular education! It cannot be regretted enough, however, how rapidly the confusion of general thought and feeling about these things is spreading by
how that theology is throwing its cause to the laity.

When one comes to the chapter on the so-called popularization of science, one is not easily prepared for the question of whether nowadays, despite the distinguished powers who dedicate themselves to the task, its importance and seriousness are far underestimated. Let us stay with theology: in general, everyone admits that science in its strictest forms is inaccessible to people, so that the form in which a scientific position is to be popularized is the preponderant concern of the writer or the speaker. Therefore it cannot be the goal of the popularization of science merely to free up knowledge among the people, but rather that science first of all envisage the uses that can be derived from it; and if these pursue higher goals, then the result is the education of the intellect and heart in a higher sense. The issue judged from this angle, one may wish to leave behind the striving for current popularizing of all sciences. Among those involved in popularization, the most guilty is theology in any case, and this goes for both main Parties opposing each other at the moment. Today's Apologist Theology, for example, is characterized throughout by the facility with which it follows its opponents into the public arena, and by the petty ecclesiastical propriety with which it furthered the division between chancel and rostrum, the disastrous significance of which it would have behoved them to recognize beforehand. Before we pronounce judgement on the popular theology of our day, however, let us dwell for an instant on the character of the movement which these days has assumed such a prominent place in the public interest.

No reasonable judge of the theological agitation currently motivating the Liberal Theological Associations of Germany and Switzerland will misunderstand that a very real, very critical state is destroying it. It must be asserted, just as certainly, that this critical state has not been properly appreciated, and the movement founded upon it has only the appearance of popularity. This is particularly the case in Germany. Here the original guilt for the admitted crisis lies in the truly dull way, loveless as well as witless, with which ecclesiastical concerns have been addressed for years in the most important German States, while a desolate political reaction let their authority in the country churches (which now are suddenly assembled from many a variety of elements), slip into the hands of a sect, that is, of a
Church party. This Party, though avowedly characterless enough with respect to culture -- science in particular -- imagines there is no conflict between civilization and traditional Christianity; and this opinion, with all the lack of vision which accompanies narrowness, informs their practical execution of things ecclesiastical. The crisis created by this must first have been felt by theologians, especially the clergymen, who grew up no differently from us, and who received a scientific education leading them directly into a conflict which others in comparison only experience from hearsay; an education which, as long as it is imparted in our universities, can never completely sink to the level of the Jesuit seminary. Concerning this crisis facing theologians -- and especially practising theologians -- it should just be said here that it cannot be stressed seriously enough. Even more questionable is how much the crisis is at hand for educated people -- theologians excepted -- or indeed how much they feel it -- to the extent that one can venture a judgement on such an inconceivably vast group of people as the epithet "educated" takes in these days. No one will expect to read here that learned circles are ignorant of the antagonism existing between Christianity and our culture, nor that it does not call forth a complex mixture of feelings. But these sorts of conflict proceed very quietly as a rule -- excepting all those who help themselves and break from the Church. On the whole, nowadays, on account of a political freedom for which we are thankful, the possibility of avoiding religious issues is so great that one can almost reduce the number of cases to two in which, among educated laity who deny Christianity but are not inimical to it -- and that is among unbelievers the majority of them -- current conflict over religious matters even sees the light of day. The first case hangs on the question of the raising of children; and the second on the disturbance incurred in the consciences of many educated believers over the increasingly tempting bond between Church and State. It must be recognized, however, that the basis for a religious movement among the educated, even if not completely lacking, is far weaker than the audible battle waged by Theology would have us suppose. But when we advance further into the circle of those people deprived of higher education, no investigator will deny that here, with relatively few exceptions, the religious conflict of the time is hardly even present; so that the educated have it largely in their power to carry the conflict in these circles however they choose. In fact, then, if one compares today with the
most recent great popular religious [98] movement in our history, the
Reformation, and one considers with what means and dexterity Reformers drove
on to a common goal the exalted and the lowly, the nobleman and the bourgeois,
the city-dweller and the countryman, the educated and the uneducated, the
theologian and the layman, it is difficult to understand how one can really
call our religious fight today a "popular" one. In fact, there is no shortage
of indications that it is not a popular movement. In Berlin, next to the
noted Virchow-Holtzendorff collection of popular lectures,56 there appears a
second, similar work assembled from generally comprehensible theological
lectures and treatises, mostly from the Protestant League.57 According to the
effects which both collections have had, it is very doubtful whether the
sympathy the public grants to each is really different, even though the one
appeals to people's ever-moderate interest in science while the other appeals
to its ever-lively, excitable interest in religion. What is implied by this
becomes even more poignant when we consider with what incomparably stronger
methods today's theology is able to reach people than could the Reformation--
and with what incomparably weaker results. The Reformers and their
contemporaries adorned their fabric with the deceit and falsehood upon which
Papist power had been built up over time; they compared the early Church with
their own; and in particular they called for testimony against the Church of
the Apostle Paul. The result was the greatest act of the Reformation: the
schism with Rome. As for us, we allow ourselves be told that practically the
[99] entire New Testament is a tissue of fabrications; and rather than seize
upon the early Church, we attack early Christianity; rather than blame Paul,
we name Jesus himself -- and absolutely nothing happens. Now it may be a good
thing that nothing happens; for who wants to recall the religious history of
humanity and all the unhealthiness that has been more and more inseparable
from the grandeur of its tempests, to have to consider overcoming the fear of
new tempests? But what conclusions will a cautious theology draw from such a
war of wind?58 Either 12 that the public is not interested -- what passes for
interest is not very deep and the few sincere cases are outnumbered, fighting
only half-earnestly (not to mention the cases where the interest stems from
pure curiosity); or 22 that theology itself offers nothing to interest the
listeners -- barring the fact that it is empty of religious merit or the
equivalent -- or that the scientific results it propagates lack the evidence
needed to prevail and be made popular. Its status these days with the public may depend on this. And now, on the other hand, a word about the nature of the theology offered the public.

If first we consider the popular theology of the present in relation to its scientific character, then it may be recalled here in general terms that, in and of itself, no science is more unpopular than theology. Religious interest, however, is the most popular [100] interest that there is, and theology has this at its disposal. Anyway, all popular science is aimed at the practical, so theology, as soon as it turns toward people, becomes by its nature inclined to appeal only to their practical interests, after which it not only veils most of its scientific character but forfeits it completely. If, therefore, theological Parties place before the people the battle they have not been able to settle by scientific means, then that battle loses all prospect of disciplined arbitration. And it will never be indicative of the level of prevailing education if theological disputes dominate general interest. With respect then to the formlessness, encountered easily by scientific attempts at popularization when they fail to consider the substitute for strict scientific form, historical-critical lectures and brochures of Liberal Theology are particularly at fault; for they are very often superficial and ill-conceived excerpts, blunting scientific consequences and usurping the place of better-founded, more coherent and more consequential scholarly representations. The most wicked aspects of today's popular theology, however, are its usefulness and its educational value. First, the usefulness. From certain natural-scientific essays, for example, as unedifying as they might be, people still draw a sum of knowledge that can be helpful, in certain circumstances, [101] in the so-called existential struggle. Popular scientific theology cannot be of use in this way at all. For what religion can be to people in times of need is neither elevated nor strengthened by theology, but instead narrowed and weakened. Thus the chief issue would be the educational value of popular theology. One may well ask whether in this there could be any real value at all, for with the characteristic posture of theology toward the general public, from whom it generally receives interest at the most from religious motives only, popular theology all too easily confuses the boundaries between believing and knowing;
and that is the beginning of all barbarity. What educational value is to be had from the Theologies we have accused of turning concepts away from true Christianity needs no detailed exposition here. But what is worse: Apologist Theology deceives people in that it offers them in the name of science many untruths, of which a few cannot be completely detected, and many not detected at all. Critical Theology confuses people with its pure scientific form, for its aim is not to appease actual popular theological interests; and it perplexes people completely when it undertakes with scientific means to satisfy religious interests. For it confuses the natural impulses of the people led astray in this very act of "appeasing." In particular, people find that in all recent theological attempts at reform, [102] a subject for new belief is immediately created out of what had been a critique of the old one. And in every case, the most valuable strengths and impulses are used up and squandered; fundamentally, every serious and true step forward is rendered indescribably more difficult and ultimately impossible.

A quick glance at the Protestant Bible, whose first half lies opportunely before us -- this most extreme attempt at popularization on the part of Protestant theologians -- may render even a bit more conspicuous the evils, including those just mentioned, of such projects today. What does the Protestant Bible intend? With this question we hit directly upon an error of today's popular theology, which is clearly a cardinal one for every science, especially where people are involved: that is, ignorance of one's intentions. The Protestant Bible in any case does not know -- we are left in no doubt of this by the Foreword, with which one Berlin scholar, not unknown as a jurist, opens the entire effort, putting into question the idea of presenting a Bible to the Protestants or "German people" in the first place. Is the purpose of the Protestant Bible a religious one or a rational one? There seems at first to be no doubt about it: most of all it is a religious one. We are told that the Bible should be for the German people what it once was for them as Reformers. "In Luther's time our forebears read the Bible in a spirit of Protestant apologetics and edification, as well as of Protestes against the medieval tradition of priestly domination." Assuming that this is the way, creatively depicted, that our ancestors of that period did in fact read the Bible, a certain hypothesis is laid to rest about the
essence and origin of the Bible. What was this view? The redactors of the Protestant Bible will surely not dare to claim it was theirs; one hopes they do not attribute it to Luther, for they are in the position to establish that Luther's belief in Scripture was not that of Protestant scholarship. It is also evident that they do not follow him in the liberty of his judgements on Scripture; like him, they believed in it, but one sees nothing of this. If, therefore, the evocation of Luther in the Introduction to the second edition of the Protestant Bible rests on an unpleasant ambiguity, at the same time it is not directly said that Luther himself is speaking from its pages. In any event, Professor von Holtzendorff, having to plead the cause of the religious importance of the new undertaking, feels the need to add, in his own name, a confession of belief in the Bible. As concerns "unresolved contradictions in the New Testament," we read, only those people should speak who "judge without recourse to history." What we openly call contradictions in the Bible are nothing more than the surface ripples of an ocean unmoved in its depths." This phrase belongs to the common stock of our Apologists and [104] popular-critical theologians and, like the majority of that stock, is hollow, flying in the face of the very science the Protestant Bible sets out to represent. The discoveries of more recent science concerning the Bible (which, incidentally, do not fall into the category of "contradictions") have indeed stirred up that "ocean" to its very depths. If the redactors of the Protestant Bible were to disagree with this, they would be obliged to speak with people about the "ocean" -- for this concerns them above all -- and therefore the play of undercurrents and ripples would be left aside completely, since it would be of interest to no one. If, however, one discounts that the Lutheran text is printed in the Protestant Bible (and the "ocean" therein speaks for itself), one will not easily catch sight of it.

But with the above proposition the reader, hand in hand with his learned leader, has ascended Peak Number One of the preamble; and once atop this Peak, one believes or will believe that the Protestant Bible has a religious purpose. The reader must now begin the ascent of the Peak Number Two, from whose heights this Bible even appears rationalistic. Yet first he must hack through a region in between, in which he encounters the following oracular saying: "The authority of the Bible does not grow in the mystical darkness
of the supernatural, but in the light of history."81 It is possible that the basis for such a completely untrue claim is to be found in the mystical darkness of the supernatural; [105] for it cannot be found in the whole of the illuminated world. It is no surprise, therefore, that the sentence immediately following claims: "Historical experience teaches that eye-witnesses of a fact are indeed the best reporters but not the most accurate judges of essence."82 Naturally the authority of writers is not strengthened when the certainty of their judgement is questioned. We would like to be careful in this regard here, since we were trying to strengthen the authority of the Protestant Bible's reductor as theologian. Yet once atop the second Peak, already prepared by the oracular sayings received en route, we are told that the Protestant Bible should be a guide "to the understanding of the Bible," and indeed to its historical understanding, with the help of more recent "Protestant science"83 compiled for that purpose. One must admit that the view from this second Peak of the preamble is clearer than the view from the first one, even though farther removed from the brightness of the sun. Indeed, the view changes quite dramatically, as we read: "Formerly the word of the Bible ruled; today we look for its in-dwelling Spirit" -- a sentence that stands the truth on its head again, exposing to enquiry an ugly confusion of thoughts involving questions of principle for a venture like the Protestant Bible. For the truth is: earlier one looked for the Spirit dwelling in the Bible; but today the word reigns among us.

[106] The history of exegetics is another dark area. What can be recognized by everyone is that ecclesiastical exegetics is based on a theory that regards words as unimportant and only the spiritual sense of the writing as worthwhile. A major concern about this exegetical method for the theology claiming to represent the Protestant Bible is that it is excessively detached from words. We have recently restituted the word, and upon it we have built what we call historical meaning, in order with its help to discover best the "spirit" of the individual books of the Bible. However, we have waived all scientific-exegetical means, in order to gain possession of what remote times called the "spirit of the Bible"; and how the Protestant Bible restores this to us is not at all evident. Yet it should not be believed that its whole teaching is to be rejected as superfluous, observing that the speaker who preceded us thought that for us the letter of the Bible has no longer the
requisite holiness to be the vehicle of the "spirit." If one concedes that this opinion was perhaps unsuitable for the Foreword of the Protestant Bible, that Foreword still has no right to substitute in its place a resounding and wholly misleading proposition. If now we leave the Foreword and proceed to the Bible itself, we may forego examining its scientific\textsuperscript{84} value here, for it would detain us disproportionately. Let us just ask straight out [107] what is accomplished by its perpetration, at least in terms of bolstering its authority. Now first of all, to this section there is no objection (that is, to the Lutheran text's being printed for this purpose); no injury occurs to authority here, at any rate. The commentary on the Synoptics could perhaps be of great benefit, if unwillingly, because of its contrast with the text itself and especially because of the superstition running through it which says (completely understandably but nonetheless naïvely, obviously, and inimitably) that the Scriptural text must be clarified and will be so when rendered abstractly and without illustration. The idea, however, that the historical commentary on the Fourth Gospel and on the Acts of the Apostles is in a position to add to the religious authority of these books can be accepted only by the person who shares the opinion of the Preface to the Protestant Bible that, in order to grow, the authority of the Bible needs the "light of history."\textsuperscript{85}

With all that has been observed here concerning this modern undertaking, nothing, of course, has been said about the reader who, along with one of its reviewers, possesses the key: to read the Bible -- or as the critic means to say more prettily, "the classics of our religion" -- "devotionally and thoughtfully \textit{at the same time}."] Such readers of the Protestant Bible will not be small in number in any case. If there is no fear, then, of its becoming an actual book of the people, there is just as little [108] doubt that it will not run completely against the flavour of an era which displays either that it is so greedy that, to possess everything, it wants to have at least a part of everything, preferring to grasp the halves of two incompatible wholes rather than to possess only one of them in entirety; or that it is so uninspired that it seeks nothing completely anymore and at most is pleased by a combination of halves.\textsuperscript{86} Whichever is accepted -- greediness or dull-heartedness -- both could be explained by the lack of resolve in our contemporary education. It is not resolutely enlightening. In the world
there is but a single plant that has grown up against obscurantism: Enlightenment; and it has the greatest effect when offered in as undiluted a form as possible. Where would we be if the great Enlighteners of the previous century had put that light under the umbrellas with which today the epigons among theologians love to cast shadows upon it? If obscurantists want to ignore good sense, and if their activity threatens to blow out the life-light of truth, then let them see what science can and may do, without timidity and cloaking. Let them see that science, even without faith, brings the necessary courage to this fight from a perspective just like that of Christianity. But let one deceive neither one's enemies nor each other about the nature of its weapons, imposing a limitation preventing their true sharpness from being felt. If Liberal Theology believes it must perpetuate the battle in its existing form -- which, if one regards earlier efforts, is not to be recommended -- [109] then it has no alternative, if it does not wish to bring itself crashing down or cause confusion at every real step forward, but to embrace science, to whom it is indebted for what it possesses of independent strength, without looking back; and it must ponder more seriously to what extent it can still call its efforts Christian.
Part II. Chapter 4.

Critical Theology and Its Postive Relation to Present-day Christianity.

The Strauss Confession.¹

If, then, a preferable theology is to be posited, in opposition to the Apologist and Liberal Theologies deplored in the foregoing sections, it can only be Critical Theology, which above all represents an improvement in structure; for it will not permit a lack of precision in its goals in defining what is not purely religious, and it knows that by its results it is in no way serving Christianity exclusively, but secular education as well, in a State alongside Christianity.

Of course, such a definition of its task precludes the idea that such a theology would [110] negate or be fully inimical to Christianity. So in this respect, unfettered as it stands in relation to Christianity, Critical Theology can actually be its protector against all Theologies claiming to represent it; for the latter accommodate it to the world but, by ignoring its outlook, either dry it up into dead orthodoxy created from the secular context or lower it to the worldly level, thus causing its disappearance. Critical Theology will have to resist such Theologies, for in the name of Christianity they drag a false and soulless creature through the world: namely, world-denial. Critical Theology, neither identifying completely with the Christian life-view,² nor mistaking the excessiveness that Christian world-denial means for human existence (the actual recognition of which Christian theology depended on in order to exist at all), can then adequately sympathize with the Christian viewpoint to refrain from expunging it completely from our minds (as Strauss puts it, in his most recent book, with great courage and consciousness).³

Strauss in his early work⁴ rendered such an essential service to theology qua science,⁵ as he also did in his most recent work, by rejecting certain nefarious and (currently at least) very effective half-measures among theologians, so that Critical Theology cannot be indifferent to finding itself in opposition to him. [111] It is not possible to base my writing here on an utter refutation of the Strauss "Confession" by a comprehensive evaluation of its advantages (and of its far greater weaknesses); rather, I will concentrate
on a few fundamental ideas taken from their own context.

It is as if a tacit agreement rules, among the most antithetical theological proponents these days, that Christianity consists merely of a sum of historical or mythical statements and dogma that one must either accept or reject, half or fully, in order to define one's position. In which case religion does not possess a special life-view, or if it does, at most quite an indifferent one. Corresponding to the observations we made in this respect about Apologist and Liberal theologians, Strauss thinks to have finished Christianity off by critically denying a series of its basic dogma (especially the ecclesiastical conception of its early history). But he abridges his discussion on the ascetic life-view of Christianity with two or three remarks thrown away quite casually. Now if, as has been said, Strauss is not to be held solely responsible for this, it is nonetheless inescapable that he does claim very loudly to have done away with Christianity. One should assume that an historical occurrence like Christianity could be fully recognized and judged only [112] by its collective effects. It should not let itself be easily cast out by empty formulae or restricted to isolated (and, moreover, superficially understood) periods of existence, ignoring all forms exhibited later on. Indeed, with no regrets at all we could have dismissed completely the whole critique of the apostolic image and life of Jesus with which Strauss opens his book, if we had been offered instead of this a coherent representation (excepting the history of the Church) of worldly life with its main phenomena, as a counter to a Christianity ever-resistant to secular education. Not only would such a representation, more or less rich in facts and outlined intelligently, have filled one of the most egregious gaps of our Church history (while on the other hand we are now offered something far more fundamental and scholarly, but directed elsewhere, from Strauss himself); but also, the representation would have placed us in a good position to sway judgement on the organization proposed by Strauss once Christianity has been put aside. A far more damaging light would certainly have been cast upon this conclusion to Strauss's work than is projected from the picture of Christianity at the beginning of the book.

Nothing more foreign to Christianity and its sympathizers can be conceived than the cultural ideal disclosed by Strauss as an answer to the
question of how our life unfolds without Christianity. But where does it lead us? More or less to the standpoint of the common man at the time of the Roman Empire who derives his religion from the _mysterium_ of the head of State; who, in peaceful enjoyment of his wealth, is protected by the army against external enemies and by the strength of the law against internal enemies; who, occupied with a dead art, beguiles away gloomy hours from which State regulation is in no position to keep him; and who, actually, in that he had the possibility to become Christian and did not do so, is perhaps the most un-Christian figure presented to us by history. A standpoint so low, that to prove its baseness it has no need to refer to Christianity or pre-Christian, Greco-Roman paganism (that would certainly provide a most embarrassing parallel to Strauss's life-ideal); for this, the pagans of the Roman Empire suffice. For even they -- at least the thinkers among them -- felt the bitter results of every State organization that attained its goal of uncontested and complete rule, since at that stage all powers had vanished who earlier had helped to found, justify, and establish the State. Such was the melancholic and fearful perception of Plutarch and Tacitus, for example; the former explained the daily, menial questions in appropriate terms rather than by poetical reference to the Pythian Oracle of his time (to whom, however, appeal could still be made in the regulated context of the era*)); and the latter found no trace among the good police of Trajan's Rome** of the great political eloquence of former days. Strauss, on the other hand, seems not to be of the opinion that anything at all would impede the happiness of a people who allowed themselves to be put in the cage of such a "finished" State organization, which by definition is a closed one. Strauss appears to regard the Germans as we ourselves certainly would not have done ten years ago (and, we hope, still do not) -- unless we have found it easier than before to ignore the minor detail that we are human. With Strauss we have to forget this. For "as to human feeling," he tells us, "one only arrives at it by way of national sentiment". Is it possible that one should need such sentimental feats in order to feel human? Also Strauss speaks far too lightly about cosmopolitanism. He well knows that cosmopolitanism in itself does not necessarily mean one "wants to know nothing" of one's own people. He cannot overlook the more noble forms of cosmopolitanism, represented by our great thinkers and poets, and cannot reasonably object if the latter "embraced all
of humanity in their sympathy, and wanted to see all peoples increasingly realize their ideas of beautiful morality and sensible freedom."

[Footnotes to p. 114]


**) In a conversation on orators.

[115] And yet, instead of actually considering this, instead of saying to us (as should be evident) that we "have not forgotten" these noble models, he thinks the best thing to do is suddenly to turn them against international models. It may well be that "these sorts of world citizens" ought not to cite Goethe and Schiller -- but, then, to what extent should Strauss? But we want to talk here about Christianity, which Strauss indeed renounces citing insistentely enough. And despite the culture-ideal that he devises for us, he cannot escape the question: is it really possible for a culture to win over a people like the Germans, who are not completely detached from Christianity but would be unwise to behave as if they were, or as if Christianity had never existed? What then was this Christianity? Was it a bad dream of humanity, from which the latter may have awakened? A confusing intoxication after which it simply had to sober up and forget everything without trace? It takes an effort to convince oneself of this, when one compares what Strauss asserts about State, war, and authority to punish, as well as about working classes, with, let us say, the Christian parallels in Augustine's City of God: for there one finds everything so much more profound and at the same time more human -- and consequently more true. So one struggles against thinking this could be the entire wisdom accrued from Christianity, the deepest experience of the humanity to which we belong; [116] we do not forget or disregard the experiences of antiquity, but rather want to make use of these as fully as possible. Christianity at one time surely got on well with a culture like the one Strauss paints. Humanity will always ask whether such a culture deserves to exist which has come through the ancients' school, whose demise Christianity fashioned; and it will be particularly motivated to promote an education for Christianity sufficiently noble and lofty to be considered right
in relation to it. In any case this education must raise itself, so to speak, from its position when Christianity ruled over it. There is also the question of whether Strauss would have posited his life-ideal\textsuperscript{23} in opposition to Christianity so carelessly if he had worked less to colour that ideal with the history of the day and more to propose it in the context of a general life-view,\textsuperscript{24} and if he had been mindful, with his moral-religious counsel and illustrations (which in essence only scratch the surface of human affairs, the way they appear in newspapers), of dealing, for example, with deeper and more serious needs. What should one say about the fact that there is nothing remarkable in a work of this kind on a question of such immediately practical significance as that of education? For then the suggestion could viably be made that the Bible be replaced by \textit{Nathan der Weise} and \textit{Kermann [117] und Dorothea} (a suggestion whose coyness must be excused if it cannot be taken seriously).

But what about the confidence of this life-ideal\textsuperscript{25} in opposition to Christianity, whose optimism, we hear, tends "to make things too easy for itself?" Yet how could confidence be making things difficult for itself in this era, if it thinks pain and evil merely "play a role" in the world -- a "powerful role," granted, but still only a "role"?\textsuperscript{26} So that every day we can be raised to the heights of happiness and "have nothing further to wish." In the end, the literary writer may confidently consent to a more cheerful picture in which, admittedly, the road travelled with the reader is uneven, but whose adequacy nonetheless expresses itself just as clearly, so that the breast heaves in proud consciousness of having transformed the "world's future course."\textsuperscript{27} And yet this happy confidence is not entirely convincing. As jovially and loudly as it might exhibit itself at times, it can never keep tones of a completely different kind from pressing upon our ear, and these drone on with far more power than the others do. Especially the tone of muffled, fruitless and therefore false resignation, which our Confession (by the latest glance at its destructiveness) cannot suppress. We are supposed to be consoled for our lost belief in miracles by an aimless "striving";\textsuperscript{28} consoled for our [118] lost belief in Providence by the insight that "our external condition gets its form or shape from good luck or bad luck, but purely as a product of our own interior"\textsuperscript{29} -- a sentence that clearly ignores
the ethics developed for us by earlier stages. As to the lost belief in immortality, everyone is left completely to himself: "The person who does not know how to help himself in this cannot be helped; he is not ready for our viewpoint." On the whole, then, this same hopeless withdrawal of the individual into himself, which contradicts the real helplessness of the individual, makes all genuine human existence impossible and thus can only avoid the reproach of naked egoism by renouncing the world altogether.

But if this is the goal toward which the "new belief" leads us, then it must be permitted not to share the haste and lack of consideration with which we are taught to rip up all ties to the old belief. It will be better to make plans that secure the continuation of this link in the broadest sense possible, all difficulties of the changing times notwithstanding -- all the more in today's distress, into which the Christian outlook can still cast some helpful beams of light. These days, when people so often spread out, social conditions threaten to pit man against man, so that individuals suffer from a grave indifference to all society, not just society based on mean interests. It is still of inestimable value for the name of Christ to hover over this unhealthy solution, as a sort of categorical imperative by which to judge it. But in such times, hardly anything could be more deplorable than the branching-off of a kind of religion whose proclaimers themselves scarcely hide the fact that, until further notice, they must be a religion of the middle class. Of course this peculiar religion could not be outlawed; and understandably one can only share Strauss's wish that State legislation grant to "a number of citizens" the possibility of belonging to no Church at all except in appearance." But the gain we experience from the "establishment of such a group" is difficult to see when the right of the assembled "number" to call itself a "group" remains at question.

It is not known right now whether this new religion will have great yearnings toward theology as well. It is certain that it will be more possible for Critical Theology to serve as an actual religion than as a mere concept such as this cult of the "universum," whose inspired prophet our most sober critic has touted himself to be -- and actually, if we have succeeded up to this point in making it clear that nowadays it is possible (in some ways) for a Critical Theology to protect Christianity from misunderstanding, we nevertheless know very well that we [120] have not
eliminated all doubt about whether a Theology like ours, placed so clearly in opposition, can serve practical needs. For that reason we must pursue this question to its conclusion.
Part II. Chapter 5.
The Possibility of a Critical Theology in Our Protestant Churches.

We will begin with a practical attempt at preparing a place for science-free theology, which attempt appears to us extremely worthy, even though we must oppose it; for it is based on a keen insight into the difficulties of the task, discloses these distinctly and is intent on actually showing us a way out. By this we refer to the proposal of the reform of theological Faculties recently made by Professor Paul de Lagarde in his dense treatise, uncommon for its stimulating and spiritual thought, "Über das Verhältniß des deutschen Staates zu Theologie, Kirche und Religion"¹ -- especially concerning Germany, whose pertinent circumstances have essentially been replicated here in Switzerland. The basic lines of this proposal are as follows.

Our Theology professors must all examine closely what is implied by their oaths, with respect to method and results; and they must renounce their right to serve science.² [121] The Faculties to which they belong must instruct the appointment of intellectuals of definite Confessions, and therewith commit each one to that Confession. Now the State cannot support any of these Confessions, since of course they are mutually exclusive, and none sees itself becoming the National Church. The State therefore must withdraw its hand completely from them and declare them to be sects;³ consequently, however, it must close current Theology Faculties and hand them over to individual Churches as seminaries.⁴ But since no nation actually dispenses with religion, the State has no choice but to concern itself with it. So it should, since the existing Churches do not satisfy the religious needs of the nation. The State cannot invoke a national religion, but it can at least prepare the way for one.⁵ But to do this, it must above all explain religion, and here Theology regains interest. Only a Theology free from all Confessional bonds, such as a knowledge about religion in general, can point the way for the German religion to come.⁶ The State, accordingly, has to establish this Theology in the universities in place of the discipline bearing that name up to now, and determine its requirements appropriately. The adoption of this new Theology Faculty must of course be quite freely
undertaken; above all, it cannot be demanded of the future servants of the existing [122] Churches, despite the fact that it is in their own interest.

Now by no means do I intend to submit this suggestion, which rests upon very complicated suppositions, to broad critique here. The problems standing in the way of its practical execution under the particular circumstances of the moment (namely the new German religion laws just passed)7 should therefore remain to one side at this juncture. Only its most important theoretical premises (as related to our suggestions) and its most general, practical considerations will now be addressed.

Above all, one point about our agreement with the present suggestion should be raised: it is only by putting ourselves on this level that respectable dispute is possible. We are referring to the oaths exacted of Theology teachers when they receive their Licenciate or assume their position. In his interpretation of these oaths, Lagarde first of all is far from wholly innocent of exaggeration when he blithely bases their incompatibility with scientific efforts (because of the problematic nature of scientific results) on the proposition that science, never knowing at the beginning where its inquiries will end, must refuse absolutely to be restricted ahead of time.8 Herewith a concept of science is presented which, in its rigour, does not submit to the authorities responsible for the oaths. [123] Not one admits to holding the opinion Lagarde ascribes to them -- that is, their intention to set a definite limit to the thought of the Theology scholar -- presuming that correct, not wilfully-hemmed thought would transcend this limit. Moreover, the illusion about the limits of knowledge is laid to rest -- the illusion that these limits conform precisely to the requirements of belief, and that thought, by its own nature, stays right in line, confirming its compatibility with belief. If it were otherwise -- that is, if these oaths were originally based on the Lagardian view of the contradiction between knowledge and belief -- then obviously from the outset they would be the product of quite serious perfidy. But since, however, illusion is in fact at the root of the oaths, it follows that changes were made recently at least in some Universities. One example would be the Licentiate oath, in which an adjustment is made according to the shifting relation between belief and knowledge; and the illusion about this relation is maintained. Of course one could say that, with the existence of such an illusion the need for such oaths is imperceptible; and it must be
admitted that the illusion here named has perhaps not clothed itself with the clear theoretical proposition that the domains of knowledge and belief should coincide exactly. For this would suppose excessively definite concepts of belief and knowledge and of their opposing natures. In this respect, there is a theoretical fuzziness about the entire issue that oaths of this type are even taken, let alone carried out; only too often in earlier times these oaths were only obtained through brute force, to which a particularly odious side of Protestant history can attest. Such oaths have always stemmed from evil, in fact, and the present remarks against Lagarde should not serve to defend them but rather to illumine a point to which we have to return; it should be questioned, however painful this may be, rather than become too acute. But for now, we must concede to Lagarde without further ado -- and this is the simple consequence of earlier propositions -- that every Theology that binds the scientific freedom of its teachers by oaths sacrifices its scientific character; for nowadays the illusions about belief and knowledge which earlier were prevalent can no longer exist. Every scientifically educated theologian (at least every Protestant one) knows, along with all scientifically thinking people, that science seeks its methods itself and can acknowledge as conclusive only what it has proven by thorough application of these methods. These days, therefore, theological oaths actually threaten to become a conscious falsification of science (which Lagarde states only too comprehensively); and their suspension for academic teachers of Theology becomes a requirement of public morality, inasmuch as these theological oaths really erect conflicting boundaries to the essence of science and do not just pertain to the practical direction of the Theology teacher's task of educating the clergy of its Church. In this last respect, even today the teacher may (at least for the sake of peace) tolerate a situation that obliges him to undertake this part of his duty with zeal and honesty and yet remain aware of it. Scientifically there can be only one duty for the Theology teacher (if a duty at all, for the has no others): to make known the new truth he has found and is convinced he can prove; whereas a theology, against which there generally exists more than an obscure suspicion of suppressing the truth under the sheen of its proclamation, must very soon sink beneath the burden of general contempt. As things stand nowadays, the
maintaining of scientific\textsuperscript{16} oaths for all people seriously concerned with science\textsuperscript{17} will therefore close Theology Faculties and henceforth make impossible their union with our universities, whose other Faculties are founded on a concept of knowledge which does away with oaths of this sort -- and theology, if not exactly a science\textsuperscript{18} but rather an application of it, [126] does not have a special well from which to draw what science\textsuperscript{19} it needs. Scientific\textsuperscript{20} oaths, then -- and in this one must give justice to Lagarde -- shatter the scientific\textsuperscript{21} character of our Theology Faculties. In the very fact, however, that we want to have these oaths abolished and not these Faculties, lies the seed of our opposition to Lagarde. The justification for this opposition will be evident as we continue, let us consider the Protestant situation.

Lagarde's suggestion creates, instead of one theology requiring improvement, two -- which in fact is impossible and thus will remain unrealized. First of all, the strict confessional seminaries, to whose level Lagarde wishes to drag down current Theology Faculties -- except that in Lagarde's opinion none of the Faculties, even the most orthodox, will allow this to happen. No Lutheran Faculty, for example, however rigorous, will admit to Lagarde's description -- again based on a certain exaggeration -- that it is only concerned with imparting "knowledge about the Lutheran religion."\textsuperscript{22} No Lutheran Faculty will assume that there is a theological knowledge other than their own, otherwise employed -- for example, a theology that "imparts knowledge about the Catholic religion." In stating the issue, Lagarde incorrectly refers to "the peaceful coexistence\textsuperscript{23} of Faculties [127] of different confessions in our midst. For this coexistence is in the main founded upon external circumstances and not at all upon the theoretical premises of these Faculties. This is certainly the case with the Catholics, but it is none the less so for the Protestants. As a part of these premises, moreover, the Theology of every Confession claims an especially close relationship with science,\textsuperscript{24} applied with a purity impossible for other Theologies. Even a strictly Confessional seminary -- the Lutheran, for example -- could not give up the claim to be the most scientifically\textsuperscript{25} valid Theology without giving itself up as well. Whether it would be right in making such a claim vis-à-vis other Theologies is immaterial. Besides, every
Theology is based upon this claim; there are no Confessional Theologies without it, as Lagarde maintains, and there can never be any. None of them, that is to say, can admit to making purely formal use of knowledge for its own ends; they cannot admit that their "ends" have no claim to objective truth affirmed through science, nor that in regard to objective truth theirs is better situated than the Theology of every other Confession.

But while Lagarde overlooks the component of real science in current Theology Faculties that is found in every Theology, and would obstinately confine the Faculties to transmitting the contents of their [128] Confession (which in fact is not what they do at all), he himself is establishing a discipline whose right to a distinct existence under the name of Theology must be questioned. Lagarde's fundamental theory has for a long time now elicited suggestions about the future of our Theology Faculties. But when one assumes the necessity of untied these Faculties from their former vocation of training clergy of their Confession, one is generally ready to let them desert as purely scientific bodies to the philosophical Faculties.* That would be the only logical outcome. The discipline which Lagarde would call Theology in our universities should indeed not be a philosophical one but rather, he tells us, an exclusively historical one. It would yield a knowledge of religion, "to the extent that it would give a history of religion." The researcher in Theology would "learn about religion in general and about the laws according to which religion exists in given contexts. This he would do by observing all religions, from which he could gather more definite information overall." With these several descriptions, nothing yet has been uttered about this discipline which would have claim to a special place outside of our philosophical Faculties. Now if Lagarde wants to have such a place acknowledged for his Theology, it depends on our fully recognizing

[Footnote to p. 128]

*) Cf. e.g. E. Zeller, Theologisches Jahrbuch 1849 p. 143 ff.

[129] The existence of a particularly practical task, that of serious scientific Theology -- for which task such a Theology in any case would be lost if simply incorporated into the Philosophy Faculties. But what must be
questioned is whether a task of this nature can be seen at all in Lagarde's Theology. He himself does outline for us such a Theology, saying it should be "the pioneer for the German religion." However, theologies always succeed religions, and indeed, the more energetic and uncontested the original motivation of the religion, the later the theology emerges. That theology would ever precede a religion is unheard of, and that something of the sort could even happen is hardly to be expected. Indeed, Lagarde claims to foresee that this new Theology "could straighten the crooked, earlier course of the blessed star of religion, in which corrected path it would continue." But one may well maintain that such foresight is only acquired by extravagance, a type of possessed state of scientific rationalism which itself likes to grasp at what is most elusive and only visible to ecstatic prophets. It could be posited that, if theology can only understand itself in terms of a past laden with obvious schisms and confusion, then it must be fully prepared for adventure in aiming at a future goal -- always assuming, of course, that the goal of this new Theology would be taken seriously. Naturally, what is almost more pressing is the concern that this Theology, by the fully historical character of its task, the hopelessness of its latest endeavour, and the predominance of the historical direction of scholarly studies at present, would very soon lose sight of its goal and become a purely historical discipline.

So one can see that the Lagardian attempt to unite in a new picture the two currently separate, basic elements of theology -- scientific method and practical orientation -- miscarries in both of its parts. The result of this attempt is first of all the dividing of these two given basic elements into two disciplines, so that praxis falls to the Confessional seminaries, and theory to the new Theology. But the seminaries do not want to be reduced so completely to praxis; and the new Theology is so entirely theoretical that praxis is completely opposite to it. Another particular circumstance pitting itself against this whole idea of union consists in the fact that Lagarde's Confessional seminaries, seen from his particular scientific standpoint, would be an absurdity. But the absurd promotes its own interest in the world powerfully enough; so it is a difficult question whether or not to offer it a hand and call it into existence -- especially when in so doing the cleverer and the superior might be assisted. In such cases, therefore, the means to an
end too easily remains the only goal attained. If Lagarde's suggestion should evoke even the most trifling difficulties and considerations, [131] then surely one should only follow him while keeping a close eye on what he is abolishing. In severing the bond between our ecclesiastical Theology and our most eminent scientific institutions, he is destroying, in our opinion, one of the most precious heirlooms of a sage past, as well as a virtually irreplaceable cornerstone on which are built hopes for the future of our ecclesiastical interests (insofar as one may connect such hopes to theology at all). In any case, what theology can still give us depends above all on a correct relation between its scientific and practical elements. Now practical orientation is the soul of theology, and because of its subsistence requirements it cannot easily wholly distance itself from praxis. On the other hand, it has no small job to avoid becoming a mockery of science; and its connection with the universities contains the most vivid reminder imaginable that it should look after itself within this relationship: it is the most effective shield against the deterioration to which every Theology of sect or seminary succumbs in short order. Nevertheless even we would not refuse outright to listen to such radical suggestions of reform as Lagarde's, if not for the fact that on two other points they smooth over difficulties inherent in a university Theology as it has existed up to now.

The first of these points is the separation of Church and State. The considerations that we see arising from this are at present difficult to assess, since the requirements from which one has to proceed have been realized, even unto the smallest parts. For now, at least, the greatest difficulty of these considerations lies in their immeasurability. In actual fact, we currently appear to be coming up quite quickly against such a separation of Church and State. Indeed, one could only wish this separation in effect now, and as honourably and completely as possible, so that truth and honour might finally be connected in a relationship in which, from its establishment on, and because of guilt on both sides, disappointment and ambiguity have reigned. The abolition of the present Theology Faculties, however, seems to be the inevitable consequence of such a separation. Now, when we dispute this inevitability, we want to disregard that at the present time the prospect of its practical execution is in fact very remote in this country at least, because of the new political Church legislation in
Germany, which controls the theological education of the clergy. Indeed, it cannot be denied that this right claimed by the State is not to be established on the assumption of a conclusive separation of Church and State; and if today, where the separation does not yet exist and the circumstances of the moment do not cause the State to assert this right overwhelmingly, this can always change. Let us in any case assume the worst scenario: that the State neglects to promote the visit of its most prominent scientific figures from among the theologians of any Confession. At that point can our current Theology Faculties possibly survive? Certainly not, since the result of the separation of Church and State would really mean utter ruin for the Protestant Churches; one often hears that this separation would only strengthen the Catholic Church and threaten the Protestant Church with dissolution, running it up against American influences, so to speak. We would then have to expect a complete break-up of the great communions of current State and country Churches into sects, beside which would walk the multitudes who renounced every Church -- the "Strauss Group." Now suppose also that our ecclesiastical circumstances were seriously threatened by this exit, obliged as they would be to do without the binding power of the State (serious proof of its poverty in any case). Of course the State, after renouncing the Church, would take a keen interest in quelling such an exodus, since an overwhelming formation of sects would seriously threaten our culture; and the formation of the "Strauss Group", which as far as one knows will "have nothing to do with the Church in any way," promises little that is advantageous to this culture. In aiming at a quelling, however, the Theology Faculties would be obliged above all to serve the State, and the State would have to hold open the possibility -- as long as this went on at least -- of a basic formal scientific education. But what if no sign came from the former national Churches of a willingness to meet this endeavour halfway? In Germany and Switzerland such a result would scarcely be expected. By the status of general education in these two regions, which throughout the centuries up until now has bred dependence upon great ecclesiastical congregations, not to mention on the power of habit, one would imagine significant powers in their congregations would rise up against dissolution, and that, after the branching-off of many elements, a very strong kernel would be held together, whose interests in the Theology Faculties concurred with those of the State, so that their visit
would be assured without force. In any case this much can be said: the condition of leadership in Church-matters at the critical moments of the separation between Church and State, will depend above all upon whether the Theology Faculties have to fall victim to the separation as well. Pronouncement cannot yet be made, however, on this scenario.

Far more pressing than the deliberation of the results of separating Church and State -- at present still very problematic -- is the settlement of a second point, with its contingent considerations: that is, the opposition to the continued existence of the scientific Theology Faculties in our universities. The [135] reproach is that the results of education, contrary to expectation, are responsible for the paucity of clergy. "The Protestant Church, at least," Lagarde tells us" (to the extent that its existence can still be discussed), is brought to the point of looking after the scientific training of their clergy by the upstanding, well-intentioned efforts of governments; with the result that in fact there will soon be no more clergy. Such a difficult notion underpins the scientificity of the Protestant Faculties; it has meant that with a minimum of criticism a group of young people -- and not the weakest -- who have enrolled, when faced with the question of whether they want to take the ordination vow and enter the service of a distinct, organized Church, shy completely away from Theology and prefer to study Philology or Medicine, so as not to lie to themselves."45 In fact, the way things are these days in the study of Theology (and a Theology of as little openness in relation to science as is claimed here), it appears that our clerical body will be completely depopulated. But let us not stress an excess of unhappy consequences. For if the results of the half-scientific Theology Faculties are as we have stated -- and we have stated the case accurately -- these Faculties are certainly ripe for being brought down if the means to prevent it are not found. [136] The consequences here suggested, however, procure the possibility for a strictly scientific Faculty to continue to exist in the university according to the former arrangement, just as much as for a half-scientific Faculty. One answer is to modify the ordination vows; another is to acknowledge a personal, esoteric standpoint of the scientifically trained clergy next to the exoteric view represented by them within the parish.
It is unlikely that anyone of understanding will doubt that ordination vows, binding the personal beliefs of the one sworn to Christianity as a historical religion and to the historical facts on which it is nowadays carefully based, have cut off Church ministry from a whole series of members who otherwise would be called to it. Of course, those people for whom this issue is not indifferent -- and they alone have a right to complain about current Theology Faculties -- will want to see the vows either abolished or at least modified. Now, our ordination vows are binding in two ways: they bind the personal beliefs of those to be ordained as well as their professional utterances. But if the desired modification of the oath results in a restitution to these members of what is now restricted by the ordination vow, then of course the vow is abolished altogether. This disregards suggestions of reform like that of Max Krenkel, for example, in one of his writings (incidentally very commendable), Religionseid und Bekenntnissverpflichtung.\(^50\)\(^{[137]}\) in which he advocates including among the duties of our clergy the "reference" -- which, moreover, is to be restricted to the Scriptures and not to be understood as literally and legally binding -- "to the duty incumbent upon every Protestant preacher to investigate assiduously and conscientiously the honourable sources of the Christian faith; to strengthen his morally religious life more and more from the fill of Spirit revealed to him; and to build up, in pious devotion, a firm, self-reliant conviction he can preach to his parish with complete inner truth."\(^51\) With this, every ordination vow is even more fundamentally abolished, since the unique goal of such a vow is ignored or its fulfilment made illusory. This goal is the protection of the congregation against the individual. If one misunderstands this goal, or does not even acknowledge it, then the sole consequence is the necessary abolition of every official duty of the clergy. Thus do others do, in fact, remarking that it is "the public recognition of the right to individual religious convictions; nothing less than the urgently needed promotion of a factual condition to a legally sanctioned one."\(^52\)

Very true; except that one should not be blind to the idea that, if the matter remains here, the ecclesiastical congregation

\(^{[Footnotes to p. 137]}

\(^*)\) Heidelberg 1869. P. 112.
J. Seebens, *Das Recht der religiösen Überzeugungen in der evangelischen Kirche*. Berlin 1871.53

[138] has come to dust, all ecclesiastical order becomes impossible, and a circumstance arises which Lagarde's words again describe aptly: the clergyman's gown, thanks to theological education, "has become just a costume, under whose protection just as many Protestantisms and Christianities infiltrate the Protestant Church as there are Protestant pulpits."54 It is quite certain that the purity of individual conviction merits protection, but there is only one way to save the individual from our ordination vows while not hurting the congregation: by freeing up individual conviction in these vows while keeping their official expression fixed. It is evident that by this reduction the form of the ordination vows considered valid up to now would really be improved, since it fully assures the already stated true purpose of these vows; and it saves them from what is basically an extravagance contrary to common sense and deserving complaint -- namely the intention to put in chains what by nature is not to be fettered, while the attempt to do so, unfortunately, is often enough to bring about the most destructive conflicts of conscience. Clearly, assuming the feasibility of such a reduction implies a recognition of differentiation that lies far from modern -- particularly Protestant -- thought; but without it our religious conundrum has no tolerable solution in sight -- at least not through current powers.

[139] This differentiation is that of the esoteric from the exoteric standpoint of the scientifically trained theologian. The first theologians of the early Church were more enlightened than we about their indispensability; and after our presentation at the beginning of this piece on the relationship of knowledge to belief, this requires no further explanation. The essential difference between knowing and believing, however, is so deeply essential to the subject at hand; it is so certain that the theologian regards the objects of belief that he has scientifically thought through in a different way from the simple believer, that in practice everyone acts exoterically in a thousand cases -- that is, everyone keeps his own theology to himself and leaves undisturbed a belief not required for it. Nevertheless, an overall more powerful basic error in the world of Protestantism stands in
the way of an unconditional, principle-based recognition of the ambiguous position of every practical theologian. This error lies in the notion that the clergy member has to present his personal views and his convictions (arrived at scientifically)\textsuperscript{57} to his parish by preaching to them "with full inner truth." As obvious as this notion seems, and as worthy of acknowledgement as the feelings at its root, it is nonetheless one of the richest sources of the Protestant Churches' dilemma and confusion. In times past our Churches were depopulated by nothing so much as the preachers' infusing the service of worship with their personal views. [140] In a large measure these will naturally be, as with all people, of highly questionable value; indeed, due to the bondage resulting from the current position of the Protestant clergy, these views will be particularly worthless. Besides which, nothing wears out our clergy as fast as the fact that their office makes such a constant claim on them that they can scarcely forget themselves -- especially in their main function, preaching, where they are exclusively teachers and not priests. Clearly, the strict notion of the priest in Protestantism is so fully uprooted that its restoration is out of the question. Yet in this, Protestantism is right (as opposed to Catholicism), and supported by a multitude of experiences. Full priesthood -- that is, the complete sacrifice of the individual to the religious office -- cannot be demanded of people. Nevertheless, the concept of the priest is so essential to every religion that it cannot be lacking to any religious congregation with life still in it. If no general priesthood reigns -- always and necessarily a fictitious ideal in such great communions as our State and national Churches -- then there is nothing left but for priestly individuals to rise up from the multitudes who represent for others religion per se; and of course they cannot do this as simple individuals but only as bearers of a delegated office. At least this much priestliness must adhere to the ministers of the Protestant Church, [141] if their position is in any way based on religion overall, so that they are not facing their parishes first and foremost as mere persons; that is, their personal convictions retreat entirely in the face of the religious needs of their parish, as their occupation is to assure that the religion of the parish is what it should be (by consoling it, raising it up and improving it) and that, in effect, peace rule in it. But if this task must take precedence over all others for the parish officer, and if under
those circumstances he must suppress his scientific\textsuperscript{58} convictions altogether and not let them appear as such at all, then nothing should impede his being inaugurated by means of a duty-formula, releasing his personal convictions completely and unambiguously, yet binding him, in the practice of the office, to fulfilling the needs of his parish. The formula need simply resonate with these or other especially acknowledged symbols of the congregation.

Opposed to such regulating of the pastor's position vis-à-vis the parish, the advocates for complete emancipation will object first of all to the requisite personal abdication. Now this abdication should in no way exact from the pastor complete renunciation of a particular conviction or of its observance (a word on this a little later); yet abdication is certainly expected of him here. But of course if any communion restricts the individual in his freedom, [142] then indeed the director of a Christian parish may wish to shy away from demands of abdication, since if he were to do this, one might ask what Christianity in fact means to him. In addition, however, one may wonder whether the abdication here sought from the clergy and the sacrifice demanded of him are not richly repaid by the victory they bring, if wealth can be accrued from ideals. In any case, freedom of his scientific\textsuperscript{59} conviction would be much more secure than if his relation to his parish were based primarily on a vow superimposed upon this conviction. Furthermore, in his appointed position he might forget himself, only to have to "regain" himself subsequently. For the fact that he is still himself in the exercise of his office is the most fundamentally oppressive servitude weighing upon the Protestant clergyman. And it is because of this that one finds the doors and gates open to theologians' insincerity and hypocrisy. To hypocrisy -- this may not be fair; for one ought not to forget that it is precisely by the Protestants' placing emphasis on the person in office that the most developed and subtle forms of hypocrisy in the Protestant world have found a home. How easy it is, in fact, to see that whoever practises self-denial ensnares himself the most deeply in inescapable falsehood. But as to opening a door to insincerity: of course it cannot be denied that the setting-aside of personal conviction required by the office [143] can become an evil habit. The best protection against this will be the zeal and uprightness with which the pastor considers the weal of his parish, since the more he does this, the neater the way in which the "setting-aside" during the exercise of the office takes
are compared among themselves and their individual members with one another, Christianity "possesses" very different degrees of inner truth. Therefore in such relations, the goal toward which our theologians are trained is to be able to be all things (if not everything) to all men.61 Now this goal will certainly not be reached in all cases, and indeed does not even need to be reached for the pastor to fulfil his responsibility to a parish. But it must be pursued practically if culture and Christianity are not to have a falling-out; and so there is a serious interest in not letting the ideal bond, which our churches even now bind around people of quite different levels of education, quite different ways of thinking, and even of very different belief, unravel entirely and without replacement. But the ability to respond even to a certain degree, and in a valuable way, to the task just described as facing today's theologian, is no more suited for acquisition than is the profound, scientific62 formation that enlightens views of the world and of humanity and that actually curtails divisional strife.

With these intimations of the possibility of a free-thinking theology in our Protestant churches we really would like to let the matter rest, since the reader could expect nothing theoretically satisfying from further exposition and thoughts that do not offer the reconciliation of contradictions (which, based always in worldly being, consolidates no theory, and whose possible union therefore we can only see in living people). We are well aware also that any duty-formula such as the one suggested still surrenders power to the authorities set before the clergy, be they the mixed State-ecclesiastical authorities of the present or the pure (or purer) ecclesiastical authorities of the future, whose power-seeking manipulation, based on ecclesiastical Party ideas, can make the improvement of circumstances expected from such a formula a pipedream. But first and foremost, if our ecclesiastical affairs are to be directed onto more peaceful paths, there to remain, it rests chiefly on the non-partisan insight and human love of the authorities who are to guide these affairs; on the insight with which they recognize the depth of the contradictions filling the whole history of the Church and the weightiness of the conflicts arising from this for theologians of today in particular; and even more, it depends on the love of humanity, filling them with the purest and most unerring will, to avoid sharpening the conflicts to which the clergy (especially the younger members) are exposed at this time -- conflicts from
which few emerge victorious and the besieged emerge broken -- and to soften
the conflicts in every, any, admissible way. At any rate, we will have come a
notable step further on this path to ecclesiastical peace [147] if in
particular the leaders in ecclesiastical affairs are open to the recognition
that, in all theology, science emerges as a disturbing element restricting
to religion. But if one cannot abandon theology yet still wishes to shut away
the effects of its irreligious tendencies, it is not necessary that theology
trifle with science, falsifying it and pursuing erroneous ideas about its
consequences. On the contrary: theology should apply the findings of science
with discretion and wisdom.
Part III.

Afterword.

What I Experienced from Publishing My Notebook.

After reporting how my Notebook came into existence (page 20 above), both for clarification and to excuse the attempt to present it to the public in its old form for a second time, I set up this Afterword to recount what amounts to a continuation of the excuse already begun: that even with all I have experienced up to now as a result of my Notebook, I have found no reason to deviate from its fundamental ideas. On the contrary: with all concomitant perils, I have stuck by it. What I am calling "experiences" should be divided into those lesser and greater. The lesser experiences are, so to speak, our private experiences (mine and the Notebook's), and what I call greater ones denote what I have experienced in the outside world when it encountered the substance of the Notebook, in this case the development of theology.

[149] I will close with the "greater experiences," by which at least I will not have to worry about public interest nor about the forum to which this interest could lay claim by stirring itself, since I will be talking about a period of nearly thirty years. This will not apply to the first two sections of this Afterword, at least as far as the public interest is concerned; and with no doubt at all, when I discuss the consequences I myself faced as creator of the Notebook, or when I limit these consequences (so as not to get too private) to those faced as a public figure still employed to teach Theology. But also, my immediate experiences from the Notebook (with which I intend to begin right away) will depend upon acknowledging similar restrictions of my own devising: I will only speak here of criticism that has appeared in contemporary literature. With reference to how personal friends far and near have judged my Notebook, or distant witnesses unknown to me -- and these have never been lacking -- that must remain entirely beyond consideration, however little it may deserve it.
To my knowledge the following critiques of my Notebook have made it to publication:

1. *Neue Evangelische KStg.* 1 1873 No. 41 p. 646 (where I am cited along with de Lagarde's well-known "Versuch, Nicht-theologen zu orientiren" 2 Göttingen 1873 -- see above, first Foreword).


3. *Im Neuen Reich*4 1873 No. 45 p. 734f. (an article by the editor A. Dove5 entitled "Ein Theologe wider Willen").

4. D. Schenkel, *Deutsches Protestantenblatt* 1873 No. 44.6

5. H. Herrig, *Magazin für die Litteratur des Auslandes* 1873 No. 45 p. 662-664, followed by an editorial Afterword in No. 46.7


8. Ibid. No. 25 p. 451 ff., an article by Pastor H. Lang with the title: "Zwei seltsame Käuze."10 (Meaning Nietzsche and me.)


12. *Hilgenfeld* in his Journal 1874 p. 296f.14

13. Supplement to the *Augsb. Allgem.* 1874 No. 35.


15. F. Nitzsch, *Jenaer Litt. Ztg.* 1874 No. 5 especially 65f.16

17. C. Fuchs, *Musikal. Wochenblatt* 1874 No. 13 p. 163.18


19. *Blätter für litter[arische] Unterhaltung* 1874 No. 30 p. 473 f.20

20. H. Schultz, *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theol.* 1874 p. 44.21

21. Palmer Ibid. p. 333f.22


27. H. Reuter, *Gesch. der Aufklärung des Mittelalters* Vol. II. (1875) p. 346, where I am named under the Averroistic dispute of the 13th century, sometimes quoted with single, sometimes double question marks. See also p. 348 f. notes 2 and 11.28


29. C.A. Bernoulli, *Die wissenschaftliche und die kirchliche Methode in der Theologie. Ein encyclopädischer Versuch*. Freiburg i.B. 1897.30


Before I even consider this list, which I have in mind to do now, I must first ask my readers to single out C.A Bernoulli (Item 29). For me his case is unique, anyway, and I will have a better chance to express my views on it in more depth below (§2). So let his case be excepted here altogether.

Next, I insert another prefatory remark here on the source of the above list. It is a sheet on which I recorded and have preserved up to now, in my
above-mentioned (p. 20) private copy, everything about the publication of my Notebook that my readings on it gave me to learn. Whatever else one may think of the value of this source, presumably a better one for the purpose of studying the reception of the Notebook does not exist. I can at least support the claim that the entries are complete [153] by explaining that no intention on my part need be questioned regarding what gaps remain to be pointed out. The above list contains everything I know of at this point (or that I am aware of ever having known at all) of the published thought on my Notebook.*)

But enough of the preamble to the main text, which I have absolutely no reason to delay any longer. For I am speaking of the reception granted my Notebook, as I did formerly in the title of this section (p.150), and again with the long list of published notices the Notebook elicited, and lastly

[Footnote to p. 153]

*) The sole wish to speak here with all precision and Parrhesie obliges me to confess to another dark memory I retain of an article in a Bern Reformblatt -- definitely not the cited "Voices of the Time" -- in which it was slanderously said of me, point-blank, that the tenor of my Notebook, because of its controversy, would certainly sustain my professorship and its emoluments.32 This utter meanness I unfortunately failed to jot down at the right time and place in our public adventures. And to undertake after the fact the requisite supplementary research just to complete the above list appeared to me excessive. For clearly I could not make room in these pages for further incursions into this unicum even for a later addendum to my list.

[154] even with the expression "study of its reception," which just this minute flowed from my pen. I am in an excellent position to lead my readers completely astray here regarding the interest I have in the said reception -- and indeed to my disadvantage. So I hasten to depart from this path, turning directly to the issue the above list raises for readers and for me : to give them as briefly as possible at least a representation -- close to conceivable and not completely incorrect -- of what I here call the "reception of my Notebook." My list is strictly chronological in construction, to which I need add only a few simple changes to the outline on page 152. If this outline is regarded attentively, one can practically gather straight from it how things
stand with the success of the Notebook. It seems to have enjoyed a kind of extremely fleeting "moral success." For not even two years, various circles and even theological masterminds of the time were interested in it. After that there was hardly any talk of it at all; so that as concerns the paltry latecomers to my list, to the extent that they could signify a notable resurrection of slumbering interest, they will have to be postponed until the next list. But concerning one of these latecomers, I myself have just now alluded to the prospect of a later word on him; and I have no objection at all if my readers, [155] subsequent to this printing of my list, relinquish all further interest in the reception. Actually, they could expect no especially profitable gain from it. But whatever I say to dispel all apprehension as conclusively as possible, my list proposes to exhort all and sundry to "study" the literature outlined therein. My readers are safe from having to conduct this study under my more or less unsolicited direction. Indeed, in these pages I myself encourage my readers' reactions to the list, and accordingly I reduce my involvement with it. Nevertheless, in order not to be misunderstood, I must go back to a rather earlier explanation.

In speaking of my experiences with the Notebook, up to now in this whole Chapter I have separated myself from it. Sympathetic readers will surely have excused me for this, since without such a separation there could be no serious talk at all of its reception. At times its invective was bound to attract criticism, directed in part at its creator and in part at its theses. Accordingly, therefore, I cannot avoid saying something here about both; and I begin with the personal side, treating it as briefly as possible, for I am bidden to do so principally because only a decreasing minority of the critics named in my list are still living. [156] For this reason the public has ceased being concerned about what praise or admonition I might at another time have uttered; so my reaction has more or less receded into the collection of my private affairs -- concerning which affairs, as I have already said, nothing will be mentioned here at all. It would be appropriate to express my gratitude at this point, for I do continue to feel grateful for the tolerance and approbation afforded me. Yet there is scarcely anyone still around to be thanked. And perhaps I should have reacted more defensively than gratefully to the judgements on my 1873 Notebook; in this, tacit until today, I neglected the right time altogether, the only suitable time. And therefore,
disregarding all respect I owed to the souls of the now-departed (who at the "right time" were still enjoying the sunlight), I would only be indulging myself if I set about ripping up the grass I myself allowed to grow beneath my feet. So I will say no more about the personal element in the criticism of my Notebook, other than that it was as it had to be and as I more or less had to expect; and I only avow this much because I know there is no resentment hiding behind my words, nor behind the warning I have just delivered to my readers not to let themselves be lured by the above list to an immoderate occupation with the reception. No more [157] need be offered than the honest opinion that they would not gain much by it. However frank this view might be, and however little I myself feel inclined to engage my readers' interest in the list with anything more than summary references, will be evident from what is to come, when in what remains of this section dedicated to the critique of my Notebook I turn to the question of the fate which public judgement of my Notebook prepared for its "subject," its contents, or what I have called its theses.

If now I take a look at how offering an opinion can help me attain the goal I am pursuing at present -- namely to convince my readers that their occupation with the criticism of my Notebook will yield them little profit -- then I see myself first of all tempted to cut from my list the scattered voices who have spoken out unreservedly in favour of my view of things. This is true of the names given under numbers 5 and 7 of the list, even so to speak as mere supporters, without going into a discussion of the questions I raised, so that they themselves cannot be considered when it comes to understanding the essential harvest that the criticism of the Notebook yielded for my thesis. For similar [158] reasons I must also exclude E. von Hartmann and von Hellwald (numbers 24 and 25), since they do not at all support my ideas, even if they do exhibit a limited recognition of my views, from a distant, general vantage point -- at any rate their discussion is incidental, occasional and to a certain extent casual. What remains of my list after these deletions is the theological part of the criticism, that is, the part necessarily of particular consequence both to my readers and to me. Now this side has proven to be uniformly negative, but in such a peculiar form that I must be permitted to call the theological criticism completely fruitless, no less for other people than for me; indeed it would be a serious self-deception to give a different
opinion about the success of my Notebook. For it failed completely to promote an interesting discussion revealing a progressive and pertinent understanding of the questions raised. What it has particularly incited in its judges is wonder and perplexity. In these circles too much concession has been made to me as an individual for me to accept that people did not want to understand me; but nevertheless it is certain that I have not been understood and that people wanted to have virtual carte blanche in not taking me seriously. [159] Indeed, I have heard nothing more frequently (even if indirectly) than that I am barely comprehensible, as I gather from my readers' guardedness concerning their own understanding of my words. I have been assaulted with no weapons more often than with those of questions relating to the religious confusion of our time and the emergency emanating from the resultant theology — to which questions people hardly dissemble their own lack of answers. Even if recently the latest of the critical voices mentioned in my list intimates no more than that "there is a lot to learn" from the Notebook but that it contains nothing that is on the mark, nothing that is useful, 33 I hear from theological criticism no stronger note than this. It is the fundamental note or point d'orgue from which all of their embellishments proceed; and on the positive side, it lets me see how "modern theology" has flatteringly included me in the holy circle of speakers who in their view are still worth listening to at all. Thus, during the few years in which my Christlichkeit still had a certain audience, a public view of it formed which gained a respite before "modern theologians" to give the Notebook itself at least the space to disappear gradually altogether.

It might perhaps be thought, at least at first glance, that such a discourteous evaluation of my Notebook obliges me all the more to launch a rebuttal, drawing from the literature assembled in my list. Whether it does or not, I shrink from this challenge; [160] not because of the difficulty of the task, but because of its time-consuming nature — an important consideration not just for me alone but more particularly for the readers whom I strongly bear in mind, and who will infer from an earlier hint of mine the completely opposite counsel. Why append a "fruitless" discussion, they will say, rather than curtail it? This advice appeals much more to me; therefore I will try to follow it.
The hint just mentioned consists in the idea that, in the overall harm just depicted, I myself may be the most guilty. This I do not at all deny; and I believe I am expressing myself as clearly as possible when I explain: my Notebook is a monologue, and as such has met with the kind of understanding as have all lucubrations of that ilk in the world -- that is, with virtually no understanding at all. At this juncture it only remains for me to prove that the Notebook is in fact a monologue.

Indeed, it was so to begin with -- judging from the whole Introduction and the story of its emergence (set out by me above -- page 1 ff.), it could have been nothing else. But there is nothing to be gained by further analysis of this conclusion if the readers have not reached it themselves already. [161] Therefore it would be shaky to support my assertion about the nature of the Notebook by an appeal to my earlier explanation of its reception; and its claim to be a monologue would have to be rejected if I did not supplement what has already been said with data from the Notebook itself. And in this, however little I may be considering bringing in this last piece of evidence, I still cannot make a report craving my readers' indulgence once again. I would very likely overtax their patience unnecessarily with my current design if I did not disclose many an opportunity from my Notebook, for instance, to give proofs that I took too lightly,* and if I did not make the most earnest efforts to hold fast to the overall thrust of the Notebook with strength and singleness of purpose. With such allusions I would confirm that at the base of it I was thinking only of myself, that what I was working through

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[Footnote to p. 161-2]

*) Incidentally, however, to clarify what I mean by examples of this kind, let me give one detail. The Notebook is founded upon a view of Theology according to which this discipline, toiling away arduously between the two spheres of intellectual life -- science and Christianity (or religion) -- stands in an equally distorted relation to both of them. Now if I have given no proof at all of the perniciousness of Theology [162 footnote] vis-à-vis the continuation of Christianity, at the same time I have given almost no proof on the other side -- that Theology is certainly no science but rather a parasite on its wall. Nevertheless, as I wrote my Notebook I was surely more convinced of the second point than of the first; and secure enough in my view that I
almost imagined every one of my arguments to be overstated.

[162] responded to my needs alone, and that therefore this constitutes the context for a monologue, understandable from the outside only with difficulty.

And the fact is: what else could my Notebook be about except about me and about helping myself by means of it? It is certainly not about helping Christianity; for whatever its present need (neither misconstrued nor contested by me), I deny the pretension of showing it a way out from the outset of the text (see the first Foreword, near the end). And it is even less about helping theology, about which I convey such a negative opinion (and that goes for all forms currently extant, whether Apologetic or Liberal). Granted, I did once let slip a word about "Better Theology" as being a goal pursued by me (above, p. 109). A keener, more attentive reader may allow himself to be distracted from a more accurate interpretation by this slip of the pen: for I know absolutely nothing directly (or at least only very relatively) about a "Better Theology," and certainly not enough to nourish even the smallest desire to become any sort of theological reformer. For this Theology, which I call at the same time "Better" and "Critical," is the [163] Theology that heightens the awareness of the perniciousness I attack, and thus perhaps may sustain itself, but certainly not Christianity, which it generally is thought to serve. This self-serving Theology, however, is also the theology which I myself required when I wrote my Christlichkeit, as my already-cited Introduction will have shown. What I wanted at the time was of course nothing less than to profess a love of the Theology which, from the moment I turned my thoughts to this discipline, I had never felt; but I was so far from it, that despite all the aversion it instilled in me I had gradually found a place in which I could study Church History better than anywhere else and thereby could apply myself to a life's work. In this, I sought with my Notebook to sustain a Theology for myself -- but certainly for no one else.

But is it true that I thought only of myself and of my own needs in composing my Notebook? For indeed, in more than one place I reveal an intention to help others by it (p. 144 and in the first Foreword). With this question a hostile reader might push the foregoing interpretation of the contents of my Notebook ad absurdum and accuse me of idealizing it or of making it more attractive by disparaging it. To this I would [164] have to
answer that I have not overlooked assuming responsibility for its patent incorrectness; in fact, from page 160 onward I have not idealized my Notebook one jot, but rather have pointed to its defects. Thus I have in no way employed the diabolical art of dialectic in its presentation as would be accused of me. Close examination of the passages held against me will show that I do not mean to help people in distress, as needy as they may be; I do not at all offer them my assistance, but rather point them partly to themselves, partly to the help that other people than I can offer (namely the authorities set before them). After which the matter can rest as concerns my readiness to help others. Nevertheless I want to insert here what remains to be said in further detail, about one point (and its far-ranging exposition) which particularly occupied the critics of my Notebook, and which accordingly is especially damaging to it. And with this exposition I believe I can finish in the best way possible the clarification of what I mean by the monologic nature of my Notebook.

There is hardly a single idea of my Notebook that has caused greater offence and strengthened its critics more in their impression of its oddness and ambiguity than the suggestion I make in the closing paragraph (above, p. 139f.) to restore more respect to the idea of adaptation in the theological advocacy of the Church, [165] according to the model of the early Church. Now this suggestion is the one heresy of all the heresies of my Notebook which I fully acknowledge, conscious as I am of its current paradoxicality and of a certain concern about the difficulties it might be making for the Notebook's reception (p. 140). And yet, in truth, not a single idea in the Notebook is more casually proffered, so to speak, than this one. I hazarded it, convinced of the impossibility for an idea of such great and long-lasting significance for the theoretical representation of Christianity to disappear completely from the Church without causing a fundamental shake-up of the erstwhile relationship between the Christian world and its religion. So that whoever evokes this idea reveals a kind of actor's trick of the trade -- that is, he reveals an obvious truth whose basis scarcely anyone questions, since it is a part of life itself. In any case, I have conducted myself in this whole matter in a manner appropriate to this unspoken conviction, which I have so far found no cause to relinquish.*)
[Footnote to p. 165-6]

*) At any rate not in the organization of Theology in its currently prevalent "modern" form. So if I do not wish to place exaggerated stress on the betrayal of an individual School's secrets through one of their pupils, as does E. Rolffs' *Harnacks Wesen des Christenthums*, Leipzig 1902 p. 10f. -- however imposing the image of the Theology Master therein --, it is perhaps more illuminating if a [Footnote p. 166] systematician of Modern Theology as strict as E. Troeltsch is seen to be weak and heard to admit that "in the praxis and above all in the dogmatic teaching of theologians who wish to be of service to the Churches extant under certain historical authorities, an attentively forbearing and gently reforming adaptation is necessary." (*Die Absolutheit des Christenthums und die Religionsgeschichte.* Tüb. a. Leipzig, 1902 p. ix.)

A concession whose significance can hardly be diminished, when the demand for "grand style" is added right away to an adaptation just now admitted, provided it treads lightly. The obstacle in the text just quoted originates with me, naturally.

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[166] Not only have I expressly rejected its reasonable foundation (page 145f.) and just as expressly posited the manipulating of wisdom among pastors (which I preach to them -- see the first Foreword, near the end); but also, in the last pages of my Notebook, in presenting my theses (see especially page 146), I nearly trespassed on the region of the multitudes's limited understanding, offending against the maxim "Peace is the citizen's first duty"; that is, I descended to what is admittedly the basest type of surrender to the habits of one's own intellect. My Notebook is *just that* monologic and lies *just that* far from intending to help other people.

Now I think I can bring together briefly where I want to go with this whole Chapter dedicated to the reception or criticism of my Notebook, as it has in part become -- although not so much as far as my last comments are concerned. I am willing enough to hand over my Notebook, within the framework of my experiences accrued from it; [167] and my mind is hardly turned at all toward any *Pater peccavi* that might result. My Notebook shall be made no better than it is, but also no worse. I openly admit that it is not guiltless in appearing so impenetrable to my critics that a shadow of ambiguity and insidiousness remains about it (which they did not like, nor could they like);
for them it was an inconvenience even to try to make heads or tails of it. But this guilt of mine does not make the criticism wielded against me and against my Notebook any more valid or any more fruitful, as I have already said. Clearly, I have benefited so little from the criticism to which my Notebook was subjected that I could dismiss the account I have given above (page 158) of their results. Nevertheless, what correction I have since admitted has been conceded to my critics, not without the hope of a reciprocal concession -- at least from those readers who do not completely deny me fair judgement -- that I am not being egotistically stubborn if I disregard all criticism of my Notebook as theologians understand it and still adhere to its fundamental ideas; and if I think, now as before, that we of the present live in an age which is in the process of coming to grips with Christianity, that is, of liberating itself from Christianity. And Theology is far from devoid of responsibility for the fact that things have come this far.
Part III. Chapter 2.

Personal Consequences Arising from the Notebook.

It would not be of helpful here if I said nothing about how the Notebook affected me personally. For it would follow from such an omission that, if the Notebook's creator is not taken seriously, neither does he himself take his creation seriously; and that he wrote it -- inexplicably -- as though it applied to other people but not to himself. Now this is not at all the case. My Notebook is not so monologic that in the drafting I shed my skin and stood outside it. Much rather, I knew that in the act I was writing against myself; and in any case, from the beginning to now I have submitted unresistingly to the consequences to which the Notebook sentenced me. Whether or not I have done so willingly is a side issue.

At first I actually overestimated these consequences. I really thought that, when finished with the Notebook, it would mean the end of my Theology position. But I never sensed at Basel even the slightest glimmer that anyone entertained thoughts of removing me. I remained completely undisturbed in the exercise of my post until I abandoned it twenty-four years later. Basel has always remained a refuge for my "Theology"; I felt this to be so from the moment I arrived. I have not ceased to think thus, which has earned [169] it claim to my equally unswerving thanks.

Another notion that accompanied me as I composed my Christlichkeit was less ill-founded -- and from the very beginning it bore to my mind the ring of truth much more clearly: namely, that in composing it I became unfit for every Theology lectern in my German fatherland. That this country or "Reich"\(^1\) (as it became known after my emigration in 1870) was on the outs with me from 1873 it presumably did not know until today; therefore understandably I could not have meant my work to serve as a declaration of war. But I indeed had committed enough treason in the writing to know that it would entangle me in an unhealthy conflict with the Theology thriving in the German Reich and condemn me to ostracization. And accordingly, this is indeed what befell me -- with the exception of a single case\(^2\) in which former ties existing between me and the place brought my name to mind (but nothing at all of this case even reached my ears -- not even vague hints), in the form of a distinct wish by a
German University after my emigration to take me into their Theology Faculty. What I am stating here, however, is naturally not meant to exact an account not owed me; but rather to defend my Notebook, for whose sake alone in this whole report [170] about my experiences I have given an account of my behaviour vis-à-vis the fall-out, and of the rule of conduct it set for my relationship with the Theology I had renounced.

If in this regard I look back on all my commissions and omissions, I notice a single point which, for an observer of my outlined conflict who did not see things with my eyes, could be considered grounds to counter that in fact I did still maintain relations with German Theology after 1873, which a claimed indifference toward my Theological "advancement" or "career" would have precluded. I am thinking of my contributions, spread out over eleven years, to the *Theologische Litteraturzeitung* 3 (1876-1887) -- never a steady stream, and eventually just a gradually ebbing rivulet dribbling through the crevices of the periodical. If by this point I have not refuted such an interpretation of my involvement in a main organ of "Modern Theology," this is for two reasons. First, that what is possible is not necessarily probable, so that in defending myself I may be doing something completely superfluous. And second, I am only too anxious to avoid overburdening the attention of my readers by such a defence. [171] Therefore I prefer (at least as concerns the redaction 4 of the cited literary Journal) to dispute my connection with their publication before I acknowledge the duty to enter into a discussion about this relation. In the hope of sparing others (and myself) this discussion once and for all, let me not be carried away needlessly by a wealth of peculiar knowledge about my participation in what is under discussion here. On the other hand, if I accept what might be said against me, even for the time being, I maintain that, since the composition of my Notebook, I have not wavered one hour in my personal conviction that I was writing qua Theology teacher from Germany -- a conviction that will not be overrated by anyone who considers how early on the presentiment must have become a certainty that, thanks to the rise of the so-called "Modern Theology" 5 in Germany, I would have nothing further to seek there as a teacher of this science.

Therefore, in connection with the account begun here, another point is actually more pertinent than my going off track into the more or less "speculative" region of the job-offer I never received. That point is: how
in fact did I execute the teaching position with which I was entrusted at Basel [172] from the time of my 1873 Notebook onward? That is surely the next question my readers will put to me. To which I answer: since my Notebook, in the main nothing has happened differently from before the Notebook; except that, what was once half-unconscious and instinctive has since acquired with steadily increasing clarity its own particular consciousness, and has consequently determined my behaviour more and more acutely. With my Notebook, nothing would have happened differently than without it, that is, than if I had never written it; except that presumably I would have had no cause for the present writing (which could also have resulted from a refusal on my part to say anything about the Notebook).

The final section, examined in particular once already (page 164f.), which ended up being the especial stumbling block for my Notebook, gives the appearance of my having launched myself into it advisedly, deeming it expedient at the time, as an example to outside pastors with a tacit claim on my person as an academic teacher. Now I do believe I said something in the supplement to my old Notebook which opportunely protects me sufficiently against such an interpretation of my intent. In truth, what I think in this regard has not remained unexpressed. As early as my [173] first Foreword (toward the end), I state expressly that I considered pastors to be particularly little in need of my advice concerning academic teachers; and, in fact, in 1873 I did not think so naïvely of these pertinent questions about life that I would have dismissed whether it made any difference if we preached our wisdom from lecterns or from chancels, as this was of great importance to us, the Protestant teaching representatives in the Church. Nor was I so blind that, assuming such a distinction, I would have regarded us academics as an exceptional teaching body, more removed from the everyday cares of existence (for which purpose our universities were created) than pastors, who from the outset are so much closer to these cares. And I did not just have mainly "cathedra theologians" in mind, but instead, theologians in general, which model I required for the mere formulation of my advice -- a model fashioned by no one but me, and advice that applied to no one more particularly than to me. It was I, as a teacher on Christianity, who was giving lectures some while before I wrote my Notebook -- not on what I believed about Christianity but rather on what I thought expedient for treating what I assumed was their
belief. After the publication of my Notebook, nothing changed in my teaching lectures, since as concerned my listeners' relationship to it I proceeded from the daring fiction that my publication [174] was completely unknown to them; and I persisted in this without wavering, in that I never cited the Notebook in the auditorium, and it never came into the discussion between my hearers and me at my instigation. What concerns me as a teacher, however, was that in publishing my Notebook I had in effect actually betrayed my secret, hitherto known only to me in my forum internum; and gradually, over the years, the farther I myself made progress in the object of my teaching and also in my consideration of the theological world, the more steadily the gap widened between that object and me.*)

As befits these allusions, I have been devoting myself, uninterrupted for twenty-five years now (from the Spring of 1872 to the Spring of 1897), to the teaching of a two-year course, of which the first year is dedicated principally to the exposition of general

[Footnote to p. 174]
*) Since 1873, the Christliche Bedenken über modernes christliches Wesen. Von einem Sorvgollen (3. neudurchgesehene und vermehrte Auflage, Gütersl. 1889) is the only product of contemporary theological literature that I have read with some personal interest and a certain sympathy. Not that much more than a glimmer of edification could accrue from a sympathetic reading; for I was still too clearly conscious of not sharing the "concerns" of the author. The little book is known to be written by the Tübingen Professor of Theology, R. Kübel, who died in 1894; and, curiously, it is omitted altogether in the third edition of the Holtzmann-Zöpfel Lexikon für Theologie und Kirchenwesen, Braunschweig 1895 p. 628, by which point his anonymity had long subsided.

[175] Church history up to the end of the Middle Ages, with incidental supplements of exegetical lectures; and the second year primarily to exegesis of the New Testament with incidental supplementary lectures on isolated chapters of general Church history. *) Should I now proceed with descriptions of the overall status of these lectures I appear to have begun? Under the assumption that the general conditions of the narration undertaken by me in
this Afterword are still the same as they were when I began it, and in consideration of the formative concept of the narration, I think that I must answer in the negative. The purpose of this concept is to show that with everything I have experienced through and with my Notebook, no cause has arisen to sway me from its basic theses; I have stood by it in all attendant danger. Despite this already stated idea (page 148), however, my tale is nonetheless a narrative venture like any other, or at least similar to one. Its form, of course, obliges me

[Footnote to p. 175]

*) I am taking a risk here by omitting completely the two external interruptions that affected the regular course of this rotation (in the summer of 1875 and in the winter of 1891-92) by a leave I was required to petition by reason of illness; for these interruptions yielded no consequences that would have decisively intruded upon the outlined system of my bulletin board notices or the printed list of my lectures.

[176] to let no difference arise between my readers and me that could place them beyond grasping the outlined idea; in other words, I must omit nothing that could serve to insure our necessary agreement. It strikes me that even in my most recent work I do not shirk this duty. For what I have indicated up to now about the status of my theological lectures is enough to show the above-mentioned necessary agreement between my readers (or my public) and me -- at least as concerns what follows the assumption posited at the outset of this whole argumentation. For if what I have led these readers to understand about the general form of those lectures confirms the gravity of the situation, I will not contradict this idea in order to defend the necessary by-products of my exegetical and Church-historical lectures from being thought mere models not to be followed by theologians. In that respect all attempts to give my readers an illustration of my accomplishments would be completely superfluous and without purpose. And this would weigh all the heavier if one considered how detailed each [177] attempt had to be -- so detailed that, however cleverly I might work from within our circle of readers, I invariably had to take care that my readers understand the right direction to take. I enlightened them about my private affairs beyond all limits of discretion, and
I claim more responsibility for the trouble I caused than they themselves would do. Whatever may ultimately accrue to me, it is time to break off with the matter taken up above (page 171 -- that is, my Theology lectures given at one time in this University) and turn to another topic I more or less had in mind to broach in this Chapter on the personal consequences of the Notebook. It is just unfortunate that, in so closing, I may appear blind to facts no one except me needed to -- or was even able to -- investigate. I refer principally to the transformation which took place the moment my present narration embarked upon its most recent, just-outlined theme, in the public forum. It drew its narrative from the sphere of the common novelistic undertaking, under which rubric it was originally considered by me, and could be so judged (up to page 171). I want first of all to say something about this sphere (alluded to on page 175) in order to make myself understood.

In every novelistic enterprise, the public whom the author faces is in a strong sense a dark abyss toward which he aims his text with the consciousness of being neither personally known there nor even able to claim acquaintances. If the author looks to the future, this notion is self-evident; but even as regards the present, things are no different. Thus the author and his readers are linked by no bond other than that of contemporaneity. That may be cause for a disposition in favour of the author, but if this favour remains unsubstantiated, then clearly it will not suffice to establish a relationship between author and reader that, strictly speaking, might be designated "mutual personal acquaintance." Now it is precisely this natural relationship of mutual estrangedness between author and public that ceased to exist when I took up the theme of my lectures (as already indicated on page 171). Not having begun to consider the listeners attending these lectures, up to this point my narration has let me ignore their incidental presence among my readers. Now even this has reached an end: with the subject under my pen at the moment, my erstwhile listeners have in particular (and more than anyone) stopped being for me an element of my public that I could overlook. And actually, a great proportion of their number is completely indifferent to this. They will not all associate themselves with this public, and it is with difficulty that they are visibly represented in any quantity at all. Yet they will never be completely absent, and even the smallest number of them among my public is enough to dispel for me the
aforementioned strangeness, which I clearly had in view in my preceding exposition when I spoke further about my fundamental opposition (page 175) to disclosures about my lectures. That basic assumption crumbles the moment I see my listeners as a special group among my readers; and how can I keep them from view while I blithely continue talking about the lectures? Should I not try to ignore that my public had so changed by now that I need not flesh out people's conception of my lectures? By the same token, there is no longer any sense in my concern that if I continued to talk about the lectures I might be upbraided for expanding lengthily on issues really of more interest to me than to others. Instead of which, a different upbraiding, completely contrary to this, is significantly close at hand for me to fear. Namely the following (from my listeners): "Most honoured teacher, your talk about 'breaking off' your communication concerning the lectures seems to us to betray in you an uncharacteristic [180] display of power. For are these lectures not our business as much as yours? You delivered them to us as property; so now we must we inquire what that gift is really worth, since you have just related such things to make its value highly questionable." Of course I would not think of withdrawing from openly denying justice to this remonstrance. That we (my listeners and I) may have come to know each other so imperfectly that we have remained complete strangers -- this I cannot even wish and therefore certainly not hope. Except that one wonders how to give room to this acknowledgement. I see my way through it so imperfectly that I must bow completely to the claims of my listeners regarding my arguments and the superfluousness of further public discussion of my narration. Therefore, in practical terms, I will keep the crux of my reasoning afloat throughout the rest of this narrative, and regard the theme of my lectures, along with what has already been said about it, as a closed matter. Yet I see no possibility of acknowledging the claims of my listeners (which I may in no way deny) unless I myself -- at least for a little while -- abandon the narrative form of my experiences employed up to now [181] and step out of the text with my listeners, so to speak, in a small a parte of use to our mutual understanding of my conduct as their teacher. I ask only that they concede one thing from the start: namely that neither this place nor this occasion is suitable for an intimate dialogue about common memories. And with admitting my role, I cannot get around bowing to disfavour, even if I risk appearing indecorously
curt in keeping to the main issue of our differences, no matter how "entertaining" or brief an a parte might been.

Let me reveal, then, without further ado, the fundamental damage I wrought in the overall commerce between my listeners and me. For I recoiled from them, a stubborn theologian; that is, I deprived them of the advisor they particularly sought in me. The theologian was precisely what was missing in our relationship, and I could not produce him. He was not just missing from my lectern, replaced by a teacher trying to present the New Testament (without bias, if possible) to students who were to be instructed in Christianity, and who was also trying to narrate the history of the Church in the same manner; who, in connection with his office's duty, had essentially imparted this material to these students in a form [182] almost entirely beyond them for their immediate requirements -- that is, for their examinations. Even more acutely, my students must have missed in me an advisor on all those questions young theologians make it their duty to direct to their teachers outside the auditorium -- questions I designate here quite briefly by the broad, generic term "matters of conscience." In any case, from my interpretation of my teaching post, what I have just expressed is proof enough that I did not deceive myself as regards my cheating conduct. For I know only too well what I owed my listeners, and that they were doubtless done an injury; let my apology be extended to them emphatically.

Even in my own court of appeal, though, I could not defend the sincerity of this apology if, from the remaining recollections of my entire, many-year relationship with my listeners, I unearthed something to convince me of the hopelessness and futility of that apology, raising certain impressions that would be unforgivable: for example, they might think I had "tricked" them; or that, by my holding-back, personal contempt toward them had been in play; [183] or finally, that any advantage in holding back would have redounded to me alone, and at their expense. Nothing like that ever arose between us. I say that here not only for myself, but also because, among the numerous observations our relationship of many years allows me to make, not one belies the conviction that their possible memories of this relationship will incline them to contradict what I have just been saying. For in fact, I have not "tricked" them in any way -- neither those among them who very correctly deplored the lack of edification in my essays (something about overtones of
belief in the issues, belief which after all did not exist); nor the others, whose critical disposition to start with might have brought them nearer to me, and would have helped dissuade them about the facility of the "life-task" they were facing. These latter would be especially justified in complaining about help denied. But what am I supposed to say about it? That ill will was at the root of this denial? For I thought of my listeners much more often with feelings of a completely different sort than with malice or contempt. Very few of these feelings have my listeners come to hear of or even notice -- and of the other sort of feelings, certainly just as few. What ultimately concerns the equitable distribution (between my listeners and me) of the injury wrought by this perception [184] of my teaching position, is not at a point which could reasonably have attained expression through me at the time, when our exchanges were not yet based on recollections (either preponderantly or exclusively). Nor was the issue in all probability much considered by my listeners. Moreover, there is no point I would be reluctant to raise with them after the confessions already made in these pages (namely that I learned disproportionately more about New Testament exegesis and Church history than did my students [see Introduction, page 2 above]), as I remember that I am no longer their most recent teacher -- not by a long chalk -- and that another teacher has replaced me altogether, for whom I certainly did not pave the way, and with whom I never intended to compare myself. By this I mean Life and the experiences one amasses in its school. Concerning these experiences, I assume that even the youngest of my former listeners has received sufficient instruction to be prepared for my claim that they were not the only injured party in our sometime relationship. This they should accept at face value, requiring no more than a fleeting reference to my sacrifice in renouncing the better part of personal satisfaction which a teacher generally strives to glean [185] from the relationship with his students. So with all they now know of the shadow lying across our relationship, they should not hold my sacrifice in low esteem nor harbour solely toward me an inclination to dismiss me out of hand. Besides which, we are faced with the whole question of the execution of my post and the seriousness of the consequences I had to endure because of my 1873 Notebook. This pertains to the content of the Notebook, in which I acknowledged directly the special interest of my former listeners, who therefore had a special claim upon my consideration. This consideration
they have now received in my personal apology directed to them above. Of course at the same time I have allowed myself to append an expression of personal confidence that I wish equally taken to heart: namely, my confidence that our common recollections of our former relationship will tolerate the unavoidable jostling of these recent confessions. With this, moreover, I close the a parte opened on page 181 above, and arrive at what I have to report in this section about the [186] consequences of my Notebook as concerns my teaching post, strictly speaking at least. What remains to be told of this has in part gone far beyond the subject of my relationship with my listeners and no longer belongs to what particularly concerns them here. So I shall take up again the thread of my tale (from page 174 above).

It is debatable whether the tradition behind academic teaching in the German-speaking world, which steers us at the same time and in the same degree toward both lecturing and writing, does not make way for serious doubts about the essence of German academe. For my part this question is a vexed one, not just because I have operated wholly within the confines of this tradition, but rather because I would not expect any power to succeed in restricting an attempt at reforming the essence of the university -- that is, its traditionally-rooted academic freedom (and the alternatives created by it) -- without encountering the most vehement opposition from academic teachers. I make this remark straight out, to remove all appearance in the following exposition of complaining about the dualism just described in the teaching practice simply because I myself did not have the happiest experience of it. [187] The public that the academic teacher has before his lectern in the auditorium is entirely different, in fact, from the public he addresses as a writer. First of all, the teacher who speaks to the closed circle of students does not have to seek out a public as does the writer. The former, however, does deal with "seekers" whom he must assist in their quest for something. In this it is incumbent upon him to consider how much he wants to communicate in order to help them; in fact, he is even obliged, in a certain measure, to hold back and choose what to communicate to his listeners from the material he possesses. For the writer, on the other hand, the case is quite otherwise: he does not know to whom he is speaking. First of all he looks for an audience; and what chance does he have of finding one if, first and foremost, he does not make himself fully comprehensible? As matters actually stand, the
goal of the teacher presupposes a circumscribed discerning on the part of his listeners; while the goal of the writer with respect to his readers is the exact opposite. The teacher can keep quiet whereas the author is forbidden to do so. Against this, of course, it is said that the writer as well must educate his public; but apart from the fact that such a presumptuous interpretation of the literary task is permitted only to extremely rare minds, this manner of expression always contains something of the allegorical, resting its "truth" on a metaphorical transfer of the real experiences of the oral exchange between teacher and students to the ideal exchange between writer and readers. [188] Howsoever that might be, in the composition of my 1873 Notebook I certainly did not shirk from expressing insights about the differences between these two audiences of the academic teacher; their duality lets the latter operate at times as a teacher in the narrower sense (orally and in exchange with his students) and at times as a writer in a wider forum. At any rate it is certain that back then I perceived the consequences of this quite incompletely. I have already tried to show (page 173f. above) just how early on I recognized the shackles my Notebook imposed upon the exchanges with my students. When at the beginning I speak, in particular, about the fiction to which I was committed in dealing with my listeners, I should add that nothing confirmed me more in this idea than the consideration of how my theological writing badly suited my future academic teaching aims overall. If my theological writing, which with the essay of 1873 had already begun to have an inadmissible existence (even for me) in my auditorium, how could I fail to recognize at the same time that from then on my writing could not help being tarred with that brush, and that what I concealed in my auditorium (namely that I was no theologian at all) would exude more and more irresistibly from every pore, affecting the whole of my work. [189] Yet, in the first years after the composition of my Christlichkeit, I was troubled by illusions difficult to conceive of. Completely hypnotized by the idea of so many historical tasks I had opened up in the Notebook, I not only intended to step forward in 1875 with a first issue of Studien zur Geschichte der alten Kirche, but indeed accomplished this very thing, making an express link with my preceding Notebook in the clearest presentation of its fundamental ideas.*) Accordingly, the treatment which Church History receives therein was very nearly the selfsame treatment from which I meant to abstain in my auditorium.
Now I need hardly stress here that the praxis of my lectures soon made me see I would unable to carry out through them the plan I had envisaged in my Christlichkeit. It would have been far too theatrical to follow my own counsel systematically in the Church History lectures, with the three treatises contained directly in the cited Studien ("Brief an Dioglot, "Verfolgungsgesetzgebung der römischen Kaiser," "Kirchliche Anschauung von der Sklaverei im römischen Reiche"). So at first I did not think about it, and as far as I recall, I referred my students without guile to the treatises when appropriate; but eventually this occurred more and more

[Footnote to p. 189]

*) See the Foreword of the volume.

[190] reluctantly, and always in an endeavour, not so much to elucidate as much as possible the anti-Church stance of these papers (as I should have done), but rather to make that stance almost indecipherable. This endeavour of mine, moreover, kept on growing, except that, unfortunately for me, the difficulty of carrying it out grew along with it, as did the feeling of the irreversible contradiction between my oral teaching and any further theological authorship. No wonder the first volume of my Studien not only did not find the promised followers but actually remained, strictly speaking, the only book I have written since 1873 (for the following one [Zur Geschichte des Kanons, 11 Chemnitz 1880], was a mere pamphlet*) which in different circumstances probably would not have been written at all). What little writing did follow was not generally in book-form. It contains nothing that anyone other than I (as far as I knew) took the trouble to make comprehensible -- not just because of the subject matter, but also because I was a "theologian." But everything tries to hide, or else to stress place and opportunity, especially the narrow public. Hence the paucity of reviews and treatises

[Footnote to p. 190]

*) This in a double sense, for the little book was not only a jubilee piece for Karl Hase12 (as it was touted), but also served as formal thanks for the Doctor of Theology conferred upon me in 1870 from Jena, as I supposed the
Doctorate had been particularly promoted by Hase.

[191] I caused to appear up to 1882 in the *Sybel'sche historische Zeitschrift*, and up to 1884 in the Göttingen scholarly reviews, arisen particularly out of (and subsequently engendered) my Basel University programs of 1877, 1892 and 1898. Regarding those publications, everything rested for me on their non-theological nature.*) My relationship to the *Theol. Litt. Zq.* (already touched-upon above : page 170f.) was from the beginning unfortunately not without mental reservations. And as may be understood, my mind was against strengthening that relationship. So that when a theological journal in the late autumn of 1899 announced a program that might well have attracted me a few years before as a collaborator,**) instead of accepting it I had to decline the invitation;¹⁴ for at that time I was too firmly decided upon renouncing all theology publicly ere I let myself be seen again among its co-workers. My renunciation will hardly have been interpreted in this light, however, as it was directed toward the editorial office in apparently poignant tones of regret.

[Footnotes to p. 191]
*) I gladly take the occasion here to offer my sincere thanks to the editorial staff of both Journals just cited for their invitation to collaborate. I ask them to infer from my descriptions the value this invitation held for me and why at the time I took so little advantage of it.
**) I am speaking of the *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*,¹⁵ which appeared from 1900 on.

[192] Be that as it may, my already aired views would have served the Basel program far better than any Journal, and with longer-lasting effect. For not only did I benefit from the natural obscurity of their overall genre, but also I used them as an obolus toward paying off my debt to the University, of which I was certainly aware in my overall understanding of my teaching assignment. For my programs had the immediate disadvantage of their particular availability for the students, of whom a good number were placed at my disposal, and whose systematic concealment was therefore even less to be considered than ever. Indeed, I remained at liberty to omit anything that
could have enticed students to further their studies after the lectures.*)

I really fear now that I have gone too far into the past (see page 187 above) to clarify for my readers the experiences to which my 1873 Notebook exposed me as a theological writer. If I have done so, it was basically because I wanted to say that, originally, the force of facts led me (with a certain expense of time) to the view that, with my Notebook on the Christian nature of Theology I had not only placed a difficult obstacle in my way as a Theology teacher in the strict sense,

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[Footnote to p. 192]
*) Both my Eusebius course (1892 and 1898) and the beginning of my general lectures on Church History offered me the particular occasion to make such omissions.

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[193] but I had also muzzled myself as a writer. So that I can now be that much briefer in coming to the overall conclusion to my career as a teacher of Theology.

I finally reached the point of retiring in the Spring of 1897, after my post had begun to become a difficult, almost unbearable burden, as it certainly was during the two last years I held it. Suffering from unstable health before this, at times I clearly felt the oppressive weight of age; its signs were prematurely upon me, rendering me a true office-invalid, and prompting me, in the summer of 1896, before the end of my 59th year, to tender my resignation for the coming new year. The extent to which this was long overdue was relayed to me convincingly by an experience — a trifle after the event itself — that revealed the whole danger of the position in which I ultimately found myself as a lecturer. I refer to the Encyclopaedischer Versuch of C.A. Bernoulli, cited on page 152 above and described as an "unicum" among the public judgements of my 1873 Christlichkeit. This author was already introduced to my current readers via my dedication to the present edition of the Notebook. And clearly Bernoulli had long needed no introduction for the general reading public of that period. [194] Among theologians he is not only quite well known through the cited Versuch; he is even better known from his novel, already circulating in two editions, Lucas Reland, and from other literary works of the so-called belles-lettres genre.
I do need, however, to explain my calling his Versuch an unicum, as well as my dedicating this book to him; and I intend to give an explanation in this closing section of the second part of my Afterword. Except that what remains for me to relate is not my experience alone, so that only a little of it is at my disposition.

For a long time, Bernoulli had grown closer to me than had others among my listeners -- he had even favoured me at the beginning of 1895 with the dedication of his Licentiate work which I had inspired (a bibliography of Hieronymus) -- when he began, directly after my retirement (if I remember correctly), to mutter something in my presence about a piece of work for which he was thinking of drawing on my Christlichkeit der Theologie in order to point out to students of this discipline a more useful route to follow. I use the rather offensive verb "to mutter" purposely. For the fact that it did not amount to more than a "muttering" between Bernoulli and me on that occasion is not entirely his fault, or if so only to a small degree. It was much more my fault, for I was only half-listening to his scarcely comprehensible [195] allusions, as was my wont when statements or questions about my Notebook came to my ears now and then. Now Bernoulli, as an unsalaried lecturer, had at this time of course passed beyond the status of student for me, and therefore my listening should have been unusually acute when my former student seemed busy, it seemed to me, outlining a problem of whose solution I myself despaired. Furthermore, I was clearly given to understand that this was not merely a plan, but rather a concluded project. In the end I was moved to limit myself to evasive comments -- a method to which I had been accustomed, so to speak, from analogous cases. For the already-published Versuch was presented to me as early as June of 1897 by the author in person, so that I had to fumble about with him alone. This was not at all easy; for if relations between us had been fine once, they had subsequently grown intolerable.

I take for granted here the knowledge that Bernoulli in fact concerns himself in the Versuch with a new method of theology by which the branches of the tree that he calls "scientific" and "ecclesiastical" should be forced together, under whose shady bowers all students of this discipline might find rest; and that of the four scholars distinguished in this effort [196] who could be called Bernoulli's four great prophets,*16 I am cited as one (see
especially op.cit. p. 95f.) Being thus named patron of a plan for theological reform, how could I have reacted other than with abrupt shock?

For it could not have been a more fundamental misreading of my 1873 Notebook, as I hope to have shown satisfactorily above (p. 162 ff.). One could well ask here whether the first moment I perceived the inflicted damage would not have been the best for discussing it with the sinner. But too clearly the postponement of all discussion recommended itself to me.

To begin with, when his Method came to my view, Bernoulli had been an unsalaried lecturer of Theology in our University for under four semesters. How could I seriously consider pointing out mistakes which in essence would cause the bottom to fall out of his effectiveness as a teacher? In my opinion it would have been the equivalent of letting a student go to the wall so as to ruin him. Second, it happened that, as Bernoulli's former teacher, I was considering his work solely from the point of view of its intrinsic scholarship. In all particulars, Bernoulli's Methode struck

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[Footnote to p. 196]


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[197] me as it did others: as a highly respectable beginner's work, in no case to be whisked under the table, and from which rather it was to be expected the author might earn somewhat more than a fleeting, momentary indulgence. Of course it suffered from a surfeit of immaturity. But who at my age does not pause before taking offense at this particular fault? And if I had my own feelings against the rush of adolescent reformers, which the recent Theology had stirred up in me -- perhaps students were to a large degree responsible for the modernity -- nevertheless I did not especially finger Bernoulli in studying the maladies of that time. But a third consideration resounded much more loudly concerning this young theologian -- and here I return to my designation "unicum." As hastily as he might have read me, from youthful excess or else from some deficiency, he was indeed the only reader of my 1873 Notebook I knew who had envisaged "what to do with it" -- granted, he was certainly not to my mind "right," but in any case he had succeeded in doing more than anyone else with it. However, in the end I formed a thoughtlessly strict judgement of his mean turn, which -- however
unwillingly rendered -- constituted the deciding factor at that precise moment, and which had a considerably dissuading effect upon me. [198] In my opinion, Bernoulli had been "lucky" in the timing of his book. It was as if he had waited for the precise moment that I abandoned my office. So I felt I could act with all serenity, whereas it might have ended catastrophically if Bernoulli's challenge had found me still at my lectern. The latter situation would have been extraordinarily more difficult; I would scarcely have been allowed to avoid a public defence, or at least a kind of defence to protect my listeners from the further spreading of like misunderstandings. But things were now different: my situation was much less hampered, for I knew for certain that, through a completely unambiguous act of free will, I had distanced myself from the dangerous accusation of inexcusably and thoughtlessly perplexing my students. Now nothing was forcing me to involve myself in a situation I so wished to avoid. And I did make an attempt and, even if not quickly, I succeeded -- unexpectedly. Of course there was no talk of this; after I knew about his book, Bernoulli himself let only one day pass before making it clear that he did not have my blessing in it. But a few weeks after my lecture of July 1897, I wrote down (for my eyes only), in the copy of his Method dedicated to me, something about the gulf separating us, [199] and which I have only "intimated" to him, after more than five years (in January of the current year -- 1902), in a lecture in which we were more certain of mutual agreement. It is incumbent upon me, however, to be discreet about all this, as one can easily imagine. But this much I should say: that from that time to this I have remained sitting peacefully with my annuity here in Basel, while my "wild" student, who abandoned residence in his native city as far back as the end of 1897, has kept on the move, restlessly, far away, thus not only spreading his own teaching farther, but also finding the time and opportunity to drift away considerably from my "school." This moving-apart of our circles may possibly have secured them from collision. But as we were never really seriously divided before, we have become even better friends since then, to the point that I could ask permission to offer the dedication to him found in the present book.

If I have dwelt so much on Bernoulli, it is only to make clear why I could not hold back once I relinquished my Theology post in the Spring of 1897. However, with this last episode I have transcended (and doubly
transcended) the narrative borders as I myself drew them (see page 148f. above). For not only have I strayed into the experiences of another, but also I have pulled out personal experiences from the cupboard of time which should have stayed inside it. The thought of these transgressions [200] forces me to stop, since in fact an important area remains yet to be treated, to which I have already referred (page 149 above): it is one of those "greater" experiences following upon the publication of my Notebook (experiences that in fact threaten to shatter the entire form of this discourse as I laid it out before beginning the Afterword). Finally, then, I shall permit this major section to unfold without further delay.
By this title, and by setting down the extremely limited point of view from which Modern Theology is to be discussed here, I think I have clearly struck down any false expectations about the breadth or the content of the following communication on this "flash in the pan."¹ Thus I have paved the way for its probable retreat into the background; and above all it should promote a better understanding of my Notebook where possible. If I reflect upon all I have recounted about the book, what I have explained and what must follow from it, [201] so that I now claim it to be a "success" (that is, as identified by those who speak of books, a gain in influencing further development of issues upon which the book expresses judgement), then of course one could think me safe from all misunderstandings in the close of the Afterword I am about to begin. If this is really so, as it now appears, then the Notebook is a novelistic product that should not have been "successful" in the above-defined sense at all. For since I only wrote it for myself and for my own emancipation, this I did without the many talents and characteristics essential for surmounting difficult obstacles to success. Perhaps then it could not have been successful and in fact was not successful; so that this closing appendix will not stray from the groove within which everything related to it up to now has dwelt. And this lends merit to the prediction that the "lack of success" here ascribed to my Notebook will remain intact. Thus reasoning, and having blind faith in what I have allegedly accomplished in the text prior to my Afterword (and in the title just commented upon), ought I now to rush carelessly, and without further preamble, into answering the very simple question which alone remains after the outline sketched for my Afterword (see above, page 148; and also page175)? [202] In that outline I was already preparing myself for the difficulties of which I am now very aware, for there I announced a change of focus of the Notebook experiences, pointing to the recent experiences as the "greater" ones and therefore showing what I understood by this. However I may have spoken in the first and second sections of my Afterword, I do not know whether or not I
was merely addressing good friends and sympathetic readers; even less do I make fanciful assumptions about our accord on the subject. Nevertheless it was certain that, with respect to the point just made, I at least had not called forth other readers than the sympathetic ones, so I cherished no wild illusions about my readership. But now! In my title I have specifically called "Modern Theology" a "flash in the pan"; and at this juncture I must let my drift go, and move this important chess piece to "the background" of my Notebook, placing it entirely at the latter's disposal. For pressing considerations cause me to go far back and turn pointed attention to a question that lures me right away (and I do this before proceeding whither I would like to end up eventually) : with what justification, if any, am I to relate my [203] Notebook to Modern Theology, allowing the former to speak about the latter in terms of experience? To what extent may this be done?

To resolve this properly, it will be necessary above all to understand what of my Notebook is to be considered prophetic. This should not even be a matter for dispute. For insofar as Theology is its subject, my intention was to keep myself more or less within the borders of historicity, and accordingly to concern myself exclusively with the past and the present of the discipline. Yet even so, it seems I have overstepped those borders occasionally and conducted myself prophetically concerning the future of Theology, to say the least. And while "Modern Theology," as it calls itself, is recognizably a product of the period that falls between the composition of the Notebook and today -- therefore unknown to the Notebook -- its being concerned with "Modern Theology" at all is nonsensical. But whether in this it was successful is quite another question, to be kept well apart from the one just settled. At least I have good reason to do so. In fact, the notion that from my prophetic image I have had only unhappiness, pointed and constant, may be difficult to grasp, and not just for me alone (see, for example, [204] page 68 above). In particular, I am not far off, it seems, when (page 80 above) I see in Modern Theology a "situation in which one must commend the Christian religion above all others, as the religion with which one can do what one wants." But still, without pushing on with all that I would prefer kept in petto today of the criticism of this prophetic word, and even if others besides me did not doubt my aptness, of what use could it be to me in the fight against Modern Theology? I could actually pass for not a bad soothsayer, with dozens of
"bull's-eyes" -- but as a prophet? That is, as a man who from the "signs" of his time has read and seen things to come? Never! I especially, who after the fact saw things proceed so very differently from my how I had originally intended thirty years ago? That is, when I doubted the capacity of Theology to be up to its task and recommended it to remain silent. Instead of this, as I have learned from "Modern Theology," it entered into one of its most prolific periods in terms of speech and script, and at present it has come so far that it almost seems to be marching at the vanguard of the times in opposition to the restoration of Christianity! So I ask myself what I could have been thinking of when acting as Oracle in my Notebook. With this admission, however, I believe to have strayed from the excursion on my prophetic nature; so I can abstain from any further exposition of the refutation to which I was subjected with my Notebook. I was no prophet, as evidenced by the circumstances surrounding the establishment of Modern Theology and even recently, by the discovery of the "essence of Christianity" via its master acknowledged far and wide. And I have broken off without enduring the unpleasant consequences of a premature start to the one subject remaining to this concluding section of my Afterword. Should I still delay? I prefer to have everything tied together in advance -- all, or at least the most consequential concessions I have to make to Modern Theology (besides the one made just now) -- before I offer my opinion about those concessions here. What I have revealed in this respect up to now does protect me from the accusation of denying all merit to Modern Theology, but it does not protect me from the absurdity of restricting the merit to their rebuking my "prophecy." Who is there besides me who will question this merit; in this I have "learned" far more from Modern Theology. I come to a halt first of all at the praises my Notebook sings of it. For who is it who nearly let disappear from the public arena they once filled, both of the theological Parties I criticize in my book? No one can trace this back to me; and in fact I could not claim any credit for it without exposing myself to public ridicule. No one, moreover, thinks so mythologically any longer; so that one may rest in the idea that those theological Cadmeans of the 60s and 70s of the last century dispatched one another. No; Modern Theology alone bears the laurels for the fact that they are hardly seen anymore. And is it just that today Theology looks different from the way it did about thirty years ago, and that "Modern
Theology" has altered the image overall of the entire discipline? Who, looking around, would hesitate to concede this? When I myself had to move about middle-class society in academic dress, for example, one could pass for what one wished to; qua theologian, one wrote a treatise which by no syllable betrayed one to be a railway worker or a businessman. And in addition, like the Jesuits, one was content to place a type of S.J. on one's title page, and at the end an equivalent of SDG.*) Yet here I touch upon an area of the most recent advancements in Theology, which likely appears problematic to others besides me. Arguing ad hominem even further, however -- that is, as I have just done ad me -- I must grant to Modern Theology

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[Footnote to p. 206]
*) See P. Rohrbach, Die Bagdad Bahn. 5 Berlin 1902.

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[207] accomplishments of generally acknowledged merit. If in doing so I am speaking of fruit unfortunately no longer borne for me, this is no reason to undervalue that Theology. Undoubtedly, Modern Theology, thanks to its gargantuan activity, has acquired a treasure of new and better historical information in every aspect. This could not be more visible. How much bitter toil would I be spared by this treasure, if, for example, I continued to devote myself to the dream of a profane Church History and, in dreaming, re-ensconced myself in the idea, revisiting my first publication, devoted to the Roman Hippolytus mentioned in the Introduction (page 5 above)! And even if, while dreaming about my own past, I did not go back that far, and tried instead to imagine how, much more recently, I was indebted to Modern Theology... Nonetheless, I would quite easily be in danger of rebelling when it came to acknowledging help. It would be difficult, however, to deny the help altogether, especially in the area which, above all others, Hippolytus pushed from my mind at that time, and to which Modern Theology has already dedicated libraries: early Christianity. For I cannot understand that, out of and since early Christianity, a named Theology with its libraries brought forth something other than a heap of ruins with which no one feels at home yet (or at least no two people see it in the same way), [208] to such an extent that the most important and most interesting problems of that early era sink into obscurity. I understand just as poorly that this situation -- the status
of Christianity in our midst -- should be treated with as much indifference as it appears to be by current leaders of Modern Theology.*) At the very least I feel edified in believing that nothing has been learned about early Christianity beyond what was disseminated thirty years ago, and in particular by us "Tübingers." Right now, I would almost prefer to make a blind reverence toward the house of cards built since early Christianity, strengthening myself with a strange, vigorous rhetoric found in the theological doctor gravis**) just mentioned. If however I am prepared to acknowledge the work on early Christianity actually accomplished by Modern Theology, I am far from asserting, in the guise of a reporter, what Modern Theology did to "enlighten" other, less controversial periods of Church history.

It is finally time to conclude this long insertion in my "Afterword" which did seem unavoidable (according to the outline above [page 201f.]) before embarking upon the "simple question"

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[Footnotes to p. 208]
*) For example Harnack, Wesen des Christentums . Leipzig 1900 p. 119.
**) "Die Arbeit entscheidet" (Harnack op.cit. p. 121).
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[209] which for me remains fundamental to this closing section. The question reads: "Should I try to resurrect my thirty-year-old Notebook, and address events experienced in the interim in the history of Theology? More specifically, after such a long time can the Notebook's titular claim to contemporaneity be defended?" With the question reduced to this most simple and blunt configuration, my above-mentioned hesitation is made comprehensible that much sooner -- that is, my fear of a premature handling of it and my overriding confidence in nevertheless going ahead with it. After establishing so unambiguously how little I myself thought "Modern Theology" an historical Nothing, and how much I felt it to be a very distinct Something in my Notebook (thereby forbidding me to pass over it on personal grounds), I place myself under the protection of the title on page 200 with greater peace of mind concerning the "liberties" I permit myself here on the subject of "Modern Theology". Thus the greatest of these liberties becomes the most harmless: which was, that I omitted to initiate my readers in this Theology or even to introduce them to it. This happened for no other reason than that they know
just as well as I do whom we would have to involve in this initiation, and this [210] lets me escape further communication on the question. Who and what "Modern Theology" of today is, is not unknown to anyone working on this subject who comes upon this second edition of my Notebook. At the very least, in order to hear something about the claims Modern Theology has gradually amassed along its way, one should not overlook the Notebook. I did not even need to excuse my oversight, and what I have just uttered to explain the inclination to oversight requires no excuse either. I have never "shared in" the successes of Modern Theology; it is not unreasonable to ask my contemporaries to keep this fact in mind, as I do, and thus to be a little reserved, as I am. They do not have to forget my name, but just not involve it in discussing the current Theology which calls itself Modern. That way they will not be offended if I do not hasten to mediate between them and the great "Modern Theology". But if, thus absolved of any proclivity to be the historical Master of Ceremonies, I may be allowed to speak freely about Modern Theology, I have formally placed into their hands this new edition of my Notebook, in which I draw to their attention the length of [211] time during which I, who did not "share in" the establishment and growth of Modern Theology, nevertheless did look on: for the length of a so-called generation of men! Certainly a long time, if gauged by the lifespan of a human individual. So how could I allow Modern Theology to turn up so unceremoniously in this closing section of my Afterword? My readers may ask me this; and among them, not even those who recoil from me with real mistrust can doubt that I have absorbed something from this spectacle so long observed.

To the well-wishers among the questioners, however, I permit myself to note that I have already made a start to an answer on this. I myself would have despaired of doing so, if I were not concerned about being suspected of all-too-strict treatment of Modern Theology here, only seeing in it a chance to heap laurels on my Notebook at the expense of dishonouring Modern Theology, belittling the latter and scaling it down to nothing where possible. To allay this suspicion I interjected those arguments above in which I said before everyone as much about the merits of Modern Theology as I was obliged to do. And I have something else to present in my defence. In the situation in which I find myself here, pursuing my publicly-stated personal goal [212] of sustaining the influence of my 1873 Notebook, I can think of nothing better
than to close at the most difficult spot in the course of my mission; to put up staunchly with the consequences of my venture and thereby to avoid above all the appearance that I succumbed to the illusion of being able to shrug off Modern Theology "now and then." If I am not beginning to reveal something here -- anything at all -- of the obviously rich material I possess on the critique of Modern Theology, it is certainly not because of a lack of room, but rather because I well know what is entailed in "shrugging off" an eminence like Modern Theology; and so I renounce all pretention to any sort of serious analysis of it here. In what little I still want to say now about Modern Theology, no one need see any more than the confessions of a queer fish. (Admirers of Modern Theology surely acquit themselves of a higher appraisal, if they insist on being excused.)

After such a protest against misunderstandings, I hope that, in turning directly to the question of my reaction to Modern Theology's claim (as representing the theological present) to a peculiar Christianity, I can venture the statement that vis-à-vis Modern Theology itself I can only use here a characteristic confession without incurring the indictment of unbearable presumptuousness. To me this proposition appears at least [213] purely a consequence of my own insight into the confessional nature of my forthcoming explanations on the subject of Modern Theology. If I give these out as mere subjective confessions, I must nevertheless be able to direct them toward a tangible object. The general picture of Modern Theology prevalent in the today's climate, however, is not adequate for me nor for the reader to whom I am to explain it. This general picture I have left alone up to now, in that I have avoided questioning it. Of course a representative of this picture, indispensible to me, could be of great use to it, provided that in citing it I am of the correct faith and hear distinctly the voice of Modern Theology itself, enabling me to render it properly. I do find such a confession in a present-day treatise which is still quite new, in which there stands a passage giving thanks to Harnack (who with his *Wesen des Christentums* did not first await the Personality which would have called fully for the creation of such a little book): "Whoever is pushed by God into the fight between the old belief and modern education, who cannot and wishes not to live unless he be a full Christian and a modern person at the same time, will thank Harnack for not awaiting the Hero but instead going ahead
with his duty."*)

[Footnote to p. 213]


[214] I assume that no formal objection will be raised against this confession and its challenge here. It presents itself right away as the general oracle of a modern prophet, and therefore nothing will emanate from Modern Theology to argue the purity of its descent. The affiliation of the spokesman to the School of the celebrated Master of this Theology resounds in the passage quoted. True, I have not chosen them, strictly speaking, from a "Cloud of Witnesses" (as an early Christian married couple express themselves in the Letter to the Hebrews, according to a tradition recently in circulation throughout Modern Theology), for which act of choosing I lack the requisite acquaintance with the Cloud in the Firmament of current Modern Theological literature. So I would feel at ease not having to deal with an isolated, individual case of extravagance. Nonetheless I think I know enough of this literature that I may hear in the quoted words if not all, then yet many, indeed very many Modern Theologians speaking distinctly. But what it reveals, to which my attention is substantively drawn here, is not merely its origin (set down by me incidentally), nor its entire contents, as noteworthy as the latter surely is. But it summons everyone to examine the modernity of Modern Theology -- everyone, at least, who does not allow himself to be misguided by the vigour of the cited confession -- no less [215] than to examine the nature of Christianity. And once this is done, then there still remain specific issues to be raised from this extremely voluble Oracle. Yet however that may be, much tighter restraints to my project have been drawn -- even by me. Therefore I have allowed myself to sketch only a few words as an introduction to my own confession, as opposed to the confession of Rolff, in which first of all I make a brief observation on Modern Theology which should serve as both argument and closing remarks of my counsel's defence in the "case" of my 1873 Notebook, particularly as concerns the Christian nature of Theology.

How decidedly do the words of Rolff tear the veil from the place where
Christianity resides among us with our so-called Modern Theology! Christianity must put up with these Theologians' addressing it in the tone of an ultimatum: they are of course prepared to "live with" Christianity, but with a proviso. For how much more emphatic than the just-mentioned preparedness do the other words of readiness resound -- to "live" with and through modern education -- when one bears in mind how much longer Christianity has held rights of possession in comparison with its theologians! One would do well, therefore, to strike from memory completely the era in which the confessors of Christianity were eager to assure their willingness to die for it, [216] when indeed that Christianity had to be content with the fact that one was equally ready to live with and through something else. What the words of Rolff reveal, however, with such astonishing naïveté, is nothing less than what Modern Theology, with its acknowledged loquaciousness, preaches to the world with a thousand tongues. Perhaps this Theology has decided, not without anger, to preconize itself as "modern" (in this respect, one remarks, for example, that the Pontiff of the time was speaking of such a Theology six years ago in one of his "so-called" manifeste per*)). In general, with the prevailing Theology there appears little doubt that, beneath the kingly robe of modernity it has donned, Christianity is forever hidden -- beneath this same robe whence courage and confidence of calling have apparently sprung up recently (to the extent that it sees itself on a par with Christianity, claiming to be outside it only in modern education and clothed in the garb of a moment in time, under the banner of a religion which at one time called us to fight against all "temporality"). Now I do not share this confidence and cannot do so as the creator of my Notebook. For the latter work, the course of events of the most recent History of Theology, as just indicated, is at least "nothing new" For the fact that Theology

[Footnote to p. 216]


[217] has always been modern, and thus has always been the natural traitor to Christianity, is a basic thesis of my Notebook; and every example of it, therefore, is just a manifestation of that ancient relationship. In this
sense I can claim to have held views thirty years ago that could have enabled someone other than me to utter the prophetic call of warning to the Modern Theologians of today: "You theologians have always been modern, and it is precisely this which has ever been your weakest trait. So beware that you do not derive from modernity any left-over lost rights to majesty." Those views which I have already admitted and gladly admit once again at the end, have not propelled me to utter such a prophetic call. At one time, trapped in the straits of personal indigence, I noticed no trace of the threshold to the realm into which we were proceeding; and in some ways I had to become an actual student of Modern Theology before I understood it. Therefore, years ago I wrote a feeble little book which, however, is strong enough to lend me the conviction that, because of "Modern Theology," I have no reason to think differently today of the Christian character of this discipline than I did years ago. In this I have not been misguided by even the earliest event in the victorious career of this "Modern Theology" (the secular writing of Harnack); for it convinced me, with even greater urgency, of the "non-essence" rather than of the "essence" of Christianity (to which he refers on the title page).
Notes to Introductory Material (pages v-vii)

1 Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie. The term “Christlichkeit” would be literally translated as “Christian-ness”, and to avoid this cumbersome, if not “un-English”, word, I have rendered it by the somewhat interpretive expression, “Christian nature.” The rendition is “interpretive” because a valid and sometime-employed translation “Christianity” has been adopted by many (cf. Luehrs 1973, p. 16); but the argument of the book would appear to support the first translation, as Overbeck accuses theologians of having strayed from the original Christian life-view, or suggests that they examine their way of life for evidence of Christian motivation. (Jean-Marie Paul, in his French study on D.F. Strauss, solves the problem with the translation -- also interpretive -- “Des vertus chrétiennes de notre théologie actuelle” [On the Christian virtues of today’s Theology [p. 479].]

2 Carl Albrecht Bernoulli (born Basel, Jan.10,1868; died Arlesheim near Basel, Feb. 13,1937) : Given the dedication to Bernoulli in the second edition of the Christlichkeit, it would be useful to describe some aspects of the complex relationship between Overbeck and his former student. Much has been written by and about Bernoulli concerning this relationship and his involvement with the editing and publishing of Overbeck's work. It does not appear possible to propose a definitive ruling either for or against Bernoulli; all that is clear is that he and Overbeck did not see everything alike -- Overbeck expressed considerable dismay that the student who had come closest to him at Basel had so misunderstood his teacher's conviction that science and religion were irreconcilable (see Christlichkeit pp. 193-9) -- and that Bernoulli spent a good deal of time organizing and, in effect, editing Overbeck's papers after his death in 1905. Details about the relationship and the work will be given below where appropriate. As already implied, these details are not insignificant, for it is preponderantly through Bernoulli that Overbeck's influence on the academic study of religion has been made known, and it is Overbeck's disagreement with Bernoulli, along with his reactions to D.F. Strauss and Paul de Lagarde, that ultimately prompted Overbeck to put his ideas into publication. From the translator's point of view, it is worth noting that, despite Overbeck's declaration that his friendship with Bernoulli was sufficiently restored by the time of the second edition of his book, he was moved to ask his former student for permission to dedicate it to him (see Christlichkeit p. 199). Their relationship is enigmatic; for there remains arguably enough of a tone of irony (if not of bitterness) in the dedictory paragraph to indicate residual enmity.

3 Allusion to Mt 11:12: "From the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven has suffered violence, and the violent take it by force" (NRSV).

4 Overbeck is referring to the "attack" by Bernoulli on the former's ideas, as evinced in Bernoulli's Die wissenschaftliche und die kirchliche methode in der Theologie. Ein encyklopaedischer Versuch [The scientific and the ecclesiastical method in Theology. An encyclopedic essay] (Freiburg i. B. : J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1897). Overbeck's reaction, as reflected in his personal glossing and public review of the Versuch, is evoked by Martin Henry: "In a review of Bernoulli's Methode [...] [Overbeck] stated with total
clearly his own attitude towards the Christian tradition in the modern world and his opinion of Bernoulli's interpretation, or rather, misinterpretation of his ideas: 'Meine Christlichkeit der heutigen Theologie ist unter dem Eindruck geschrieben, dass wir in einer Zeit leben, die im Begriff ist die Kirche abzutragen und zum Christentum, zur Religion überhaupt, sich ein vollkommen neues Verhältniss zu geben... Eben davon hat nun mein vermeintlicher Schüler Bernoulli in diesem Encyclopädischen Versuch auch nicht das erste Wort verstanden' [My Christlichkeit (....) was written under the impression that we live in a time which is in the process of pulling away from the Church and of setting for itself a new relationship to Christianity and to religion overall... My supposed student Bernoulli, from his Encyclopedic Essay, clearly did not understand a word of this at all] (Franz Overbeck: Theologian? [Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995], pp. 13-14). Arnold Pfeiffer also alludes to Bernoulli's lack of understanding: "Durch die Methode [...] brachte Bernoulli [...] theologische Grundanschauungen zum Ausdruck, die ihn zu Overbeck in einen Gegensatz brachten. Hinsichtlich der Methode hat Overbeck selbst dies in seinen Papieren festgehalten. In der Dedikation der 2. Auflage der Christlichkeit weist er darauf hin, daß Bernoulli sich damals (1897) die Christlichkeit nur räuberisch angeeignet, sie also falsch interpretiert habe. [With his Methode], Bernoulli was expressing fundamental theological views which set him in opposition to Overbeck. This was asserted by Overbeck himself, with reference to the Methode, in his papers. In the dedication to the second edition of the Christlichkeit, he points out that at that time Bernoulli had appropriated it like a thief and in so doing had been guilty of misinterpretation] (Franz Overbecks Kritik des Christentums [Franz Overbeck's critique of Christianity] [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975]), pp. 26-27). Rudolf Wehrlı echoes Pfeiffer's evocation of Overbeck's reaction via the Dedication: "Diesen Versuch hat Overbeck selber im Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage seiner Christlichkeit (1903) unmissverständlich zurückgewiesen: Gründlicher habe er mit der erste Auflage dieser Schrift nicht missverstanden werden können [...] [Overbeck himself referred unmistakably to the Essay in the afterword to the second edition of his Christlichkeit (1903) : He could not have been more fundamentally misunderstood in the first edition of this work]." And Wehrlı goes on, in a more general condemnation of Bernoulli's editorial activities: "[Bernoulli] hat sich zwar über vierzig Jahre seines Lebens hinweg immer wieder zu seinem Lehrer Overbeck geäussert, aber -- und darin liegt die Schwäche aller seiner Urteile -- er hat sich gar nie um eine gründliche und sorgfältige, systematische Darstellung der Gedanken Overbecks und ihrer Begrifflichkeit bemüht. Er hat an den verschiedensten Orten und zu den verschiedensten Publikationen geschrieben, meist Einleitungen, Vorworte oder Erläuterungen zu Overbecks Sätzen; nicht zuletzt hat er -- als Ghostwriter gewissermaßen -- dessen posthume Bücher geschrieben. [Bernoulli spoke again and again to his teacher, over a period of more than forty years of his life, but -- and herein lies the weakness of all his judgements -- he never bothered about a fundamental and careful, systematic account of Overbeck's thought and its abstractness. He wrote in different places and publications --mostly introductions, forewords or commentaries to Overbeck's propositions; last but not least, he wrote (more or less as a ghostwriter) Overbeck's posthumous books.] ["Bismarck und das Christentum" [Bismarck and Christianity], edited by C.A. Bernoulli, in Die Tat : Weg zu freiem Menschentum 1 (1909) : 188-98 [Franz Overbeck, "Bismarck and Christianity", in The act : Pathways to a free humanity, 1]; Das Johannesevangelium : Studien zur Kritik seiner Erforschung.

Page references, in both the index and the text proper, are to the second edition of the Christlichkeit (1903) rather than to my translation. I have indicated these by square brackets.

"Notebook" : Overbeck uses the diminutive "Schriftchen", which cannot be translated easily -- or, at least, not gracefully. "Booklet" or "little book" were options quickly dismissed; the former denoted something akin to a pamphlet whereas the latter, although acceptable when read once, seemed less suitable when encountered repeatedly. Presumably Overbeck meant something by the term : that the work was not very extensive, or that it was not published; or he might have been setting the stage for his later argument that the writing was personal, somewhat like a journal. In the end, the admittedly imperfect term "Notebook" was selected as an English equivalent.


Paul de Lagarde (born Paul Anton Bötticher in Berlin on November 2, 1827; died in Göttingen on December 22, 1891) received his Ph.D. at Berlin in 1849 and was Professor of Oriental Philology at Göttingen from 1889 until his death. He came to the attention of the Basel group (Nietzsche, Overbeck and Bachofen) through his work, "Über das Verhältniß..." first published at the beginning of 1873. Overbeck wrote a congratulatory letter to him on February 1, and Nietzsche assured his friend Erwin Rohde on January 31 that, despite the unprepossessing title, it was a piece that would interest them. (In this same letter Nietzsche speaks of the new Church, of which he, Rohde, and the Wagners would be bishops and dignitaries). It is significant that Lagarde spurned the praises and invitations of Richard and Cosima Wagner in Bayreuth, with whom Nietzsche discussed the treatise admiringly (see Robert W. Lougee, Paul de Lagarde (1827-1891). A Study of Radical Conservatism in Germany [Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1962], pp. 230-231), since several Wagnerian ideas on Germany are later grouped with those of Lagarde in the twentieth century.
Although it has been said that Overbeck and Lagarde were of one mind on the damaging effect of knowledge upon religion (see especially Martin Henry, Franz Overbeck, p. 44), examination of "Über das Verhältniß..." appears to suggest another area that would find even greater sympathy with Overbeck. A brief outline of the contents of Lagarde's paper is useful on this point:

I. Knowledge:
   a. science is concerned with the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake (45); it is indifferent to the results of research and completely open-ended (47)
   b. theology has a goal in sight, therefore cannot be termed "scientific" (47)
   c. knowledge imparted by Theology Faculties is knowledge about their respective confessions (47)

II. Protestants and Catholics
   a. Protestantism, as a reform movement, purports to rely solely on the New Testament for guidance yet adheres to practices not found in that Book (infant baptism, the doctrine of the Trinity, observing the Sabbath) (50-51)
   b. anyone teaching from the New Testament has a duty to examine who compiled it and why (51)
   c. historical study of the period requires consultation of all extant contemporary materials, not just of the New Testament (52-53)
   d. at the time of the Reformation, Catholicism had been moribund for 450 years; the Vatican Council of the 1870s marks the end of the old Catholicism and the beginning of the new, post-Reformation Catholicism (prompted to change by Protestantism's existence) (57)
   e. Catholicism is the enemy of all nations because it rejects knowledge, erudition, contradiction; it controls education through its own schools (especially by the Jesuits) and exacts vows of its leaders (58)
   f. both Catholics and Protestants claim to be "Christian"; in so doing they are not using a term that would have applied in Jesus' time but rather are reflecting their Pauline heritage (63)
   g. Paul brought Old Testament concepts (notions of sacrifice, concepts of Messianic history and fallen man) with him into the Church, causing confusion (68)
   h. reliance on Paul makes no sense; Paul did not know Jesus, fanatically pursued his followers with hatred, then based his conversion on a dubious psychological experience; in fact, he represents no real bridge to those who were witnesses, except through a small number of encounters with apostles whose reception of him is not wholly favorable and not well recorded (68)
   i. the result of relying on Paul is the Church's distortion of the Gospels (73)

III. What is Religion? (71-73)
   a. religion means an individual, personal relationship with God
   b. it is a living, present phenomenon and not a sentimental revival and veneration of the past
   c. the details of Biblical and religious history only reflect a currently irrelevant means to an end -- that is, how people of the past came to know their God;
   d. religion has become a belief in abstractions and proof-statements
   e. religion should be a life, and no improvements in it (or in the Church?) will follow until it is

IV. Should the Nation Subsidize the Church?
a. the nation pays for services which are beneficial to it (75)
b. one pays for a plurality of Churches on the basis that a plurality of viewpoints is healthy to the nation (75)
c. this plurality is not co-existing peacefully, therefore the different Churches should not be funded by the State (75)
d. the nation does need a national religion; nations are formed by events, which in turn are controlled by Providence; knowledge of this rejuvenates the State, which should therefore consider its duty to prepare the way for religion (78-79)
e. the State should fund its own Church, declaring the extant Churches to be sects; theologians should be pathfinders for the new religion (76, 79)

V. Consequences of a State Religion

a. the State withdraws money from current Theology Faculties, as it cannot show favouritism (76)
b. the State would establish Chairs in Religion; religion is real, and everything real falls into the realm of science (80)
c. scientific research should be into all religions, to see how they work and to foster polytheism and the love of other religions (80-81)
d. Theology could be a part of Religion, observing and providing helpful criticism (81)
e. the State would not have the same interest in controlling its leaders via vows; thus an atmosphere for growth would be encouraged (82, 84)

Although in the Christlichkeit Overbeck expressly deals with Lagarde's ideas on state religion and the consequences for Theology Faculties (pp. 120-138), it could be argued that the point of Lagarde's work that initially would have appealed to Overbeck, and finds its echo the most clearly in the Christlichkeit, is the discussion on the nature of religion -- its being a phenomenon of the present, so that cherishing the past is impractical and ultimately harmful. Overbeck makes much of the idea that Christianity is a historical phenomenon which, being in fact a fixed object of study, proves itself obsolete. Lagarde and Overbeck might differ on the implications of a national Church and its relation to the social feelings stirred by the Prussian victory over France.

8 While Overbeck alludes to Lagarde's attack on Theology Faculties in the Introduction, it is not until page120 that he begins his specific reference to Lagarde's text, so I will refrain from citing particular passages in Lagarde until then.

9 Der alte und der neue Glaube : Ein Bekenntis [The old and the new faith : A confession] (Leipzig, 1872), by David Friedrich Strauss (Ludwigsburg January 27, 1808 - Ludwigsburg February 8, 1874). Strauss entered the Blaubeuren seminary, a philologically-based Stift of Württemburg, in 1821. His teachers there were F.C. Baur (who subsequently taught Strauss at the University of Tübingen as well) for Greek and Latin prose authors, history, and mythology, and Friedrich Kern for the classical poets, logic, psychology and Hebrew. At this level, neither theology nor philology (in the abstract) were taught. The Stift, or Faculty of Theology at the University of Tübingen (whither Strauss headed in 1825) was the training ground for future Protestant pastors. The School was undergoing financial difficulties and had an unimpressive Faculty. Strauss's reading of philosophy, consequently, was mostly carried out independently (and with some frustration) : Kant, Schelling, Schleiermacher,
Hegel. His religious thought, inspired by his readings of Schelling through Jacob Böhme and J. Jacobi to Schleiermacher, brought Strauss through a phase of pantheism to an ultimate rejection of Christianity. He passed from Schleiermacher to Hegel, whose reconciliation of philosophy and theology Strauss could not accept.

He left the Stift in 1830 and became vicar of Klein-Ingersheim. In his 1831 dissertation -- "Die Lehre von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge in ihrer religionsgeschichtlichen Entwicklung" [The doctrine of the return of all things, and its development in the history of religions -- Hindu, Persian, Jewish, Christian] -- unfavourably received by Tübingen, Strauss effectively demonstrated the subordination of Christianity to philosophy. In 1831 he received permission to study for a year in Berlin, after which he returned as tutor to Tübingen. Prompted by dissatisfaction with Schleiermacher's work on the life of Jesus, Strauss produced a Leben Jesu of his own, finished in 1834, because of which he lost his position. Among other reasons, the work had served as a rallying point for those academics -- some of them clergy -- and members of the cultivated class who had harboured doubts about the historicity of the Gospels and were only waiting for some sort of scientific justification to turn their doubts into action. The book not only represented a novelty, as the life of Jesus sub-genre had not yet begun its "roll" in 1835, but it was also daring in its radical mythological interpretation of the Gospels. Importantly, F.C. Baur (who, as already stated, had taught Strauss mythology at the Blaubeuren seminary) took care to distance himself from his student in this project. Baur saw his own method as anchored in definite, historically advanced facts, with the possibility of interpretation of literary or theological intention of the author in accordance with contemporary cultural evidence. Strauss, on the other hand, called upon myth to fill in wherever inconsistencies or contradictions in Gospel accounts arose -- of which perhaps the most salient example was the treatment of Jesus and the miracles.

Overbeck saw the Life of Jesus (Das Leben Jesu) as having contributed greatly to the scientific method of historical criticism that would enable the scholar to make a case for separating centuries of developed and embellished theological dogma from the barest possible historical traces of original Christian actions and viewpoints.

By the time Strauss wrote his Confession, however, he had changed, to some minds, from a ground-breaking, rigorous scholar to a "woolly" philosopher. The significant trigger for Strauss's "new faith" was historical, and it was the same as the trigger for Overbeck's (and Nietzsche's) concern: the victory of Germany (via Prussian military expertise) in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Very briefly put, where Paul de Lagarde and D.F. Strauss advocated a new, unified German national church and touted the superiority of German culture, proof of which lay in its domination (threatened and actual) of their political neighbours, Overbeck and Nietzsche bemoaned the superficial understanding of the two cultural spokesmen with their boastful "cultural-philistinism."

On Nietzsche's prolific writings, whose targets included prominent or renowned historical figures, it is sometimes remarked with puzzlement that he spilled so much vituperative ink on a relative unknown like Strauss (in the first essay of is Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen [Unmodern observations; Untimely meditations; Thoughts out of season -- all translations indicating that what was about to be said reflected ideas about culture that were not expected to be popular]). A consideration of personal circumstances at the time, however, makes his act somewhat more comprehensible. Nietzsche, the former music
student and current theological historian and cultural critic, had wide-ranging ideas about unifying action with philosophy in the context of a Germany rich in history and artistic achievement. These ideas he shared enthusiastically with Richard Wagner via letters and personal discussion (he would also have shared them with his envisaged élite of thinkers -- the "Unmoderns" -- at Basel who met regularly, and who included Overbeck, Erwin Rohde, Carl von Gersdorff and Adolf Baumgartner). During the Easter break of 1873, Nietzsche travelled to Bayreuth, where he received a less warm reception than usual from Wagner, who was plagued with financial problems (lack of subscriptions) of the Bayreuth Festival. This reception, on top of the cooling-off on Wagner's part when Nietzsche had stayed home the previous Christmas to work on the Pre-Socratics, contributed to Nietzsche's general feeling of dissatisfaction with their relationship. Upon his return to Basel, he wrote to Wagner, first to say that he had read the new D.F. Strauss work (Der alte und der neue Glaube) that Wagner had criticized (Wagner being an old enemy of Strauss who had dared to slight him publicly), and that he and his friend Overbeck were composing responses to the work, to be ready by Wagner's birthday, that would not only recompense the slighted composer whose musical genius was overlooked in Strauss's cultural paean, but would also cast scorn on the popularity of the book (there were six reprintings during its first year). The Basel group, along with Wagner, saw Strauss's work as a sorry reflection of a progressively shallower, vulgarized German culture, grown content to preen rather than honour its historical proponents adequately with the continued quest for artistic and scholarly excellence.

10 Overbeck's footnotes are included here as part of the text, inserted at the end of each pertinent page, and indicated by me with an announcement in square brackets. Adjustments to Overbeck's (publisher's) editorial format have not been made.


12 These square brackets are in the 1963 (1903) Christlichkeit.

13 I make the following distinction between "Theology" and "theology" : the former is used when Overbeck speaks of a type of ideological camp or formalized viewpoint, such as Critical Theology, or when he refers to the discipline qua mandate -- for example, his post as a Theology teacher. Small-case "theology" refers to all other general applications.

14 The word "science" is generally used to translate "Wissenschaft." Overbeck's context might sometimes lean toward a translation by "sense" or "rationality" or "reason" in English (particularly when he speaks of different historical periods, whose context requires a certain modification of the term); but as there are perfectly good and common German nouns for those English variations (for example, "Vernunft" for "reason"), I have preferred to keep with the one translation; the original German, however, will be supplied in every case, for the sake of accuracy.
wissenschaftlich: here the epithet "critical" might be the most appropriate translation.

From "Wissenschaft."

This is an example of a formalized partisan view; it could be argued that Overbeck is talking about a mere generic liberality, but in consideration of the entire Christlichkeit, I have taken his meaning as formal. Such questions of interpretation occur constantly, but I will allude to the translation process only in exceptionally noteworthy cases.

The day after Overbeck's thirty-second birthday was November 17, 1869.

Professor extraordinarius.

Unsalaried lecturer.

Tübinger: see footnote 10 below.

Adolf Bernhard Christoph Christian Hilgenfeld (born at Stappenbeck bei Salzwedel, June 2, 1823; died at Jena, January 12, 1907) studied first at Berlin, where he encountered Hegelianism through Philipp Marheinecke and Wilhelm Vatke. The latter introduced Hilgenfeld to the Tübingen organ, the Theologische Jahrbücher, begun in the winter of 1841-42. Although not a convinced Hegelian, Hilgenfeld did admire Baur and deplored his generally negative public reception. He moved to Halle, the centre of speculative philosophy. In the summer of 1847 he habilitated into the Theology faculty at Jena. At that time he ran into Karl Hase, who for forty years spearheaded the opposition to Hilgenfeld's official appointment to the Faculty, thereby denying him both a voice and a salary. Hilgenfeld was appointed to a special, fifth Chair days after Hase's death in 1890. His substantial contribution to the theology of the day included establishing the internationally recognized scholarly journal, the Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie (1858-1907), inaugurated partly in opposition to the Theologische Jahrbücher representing F.C. Baur in Tübingen. Baur and Hilgenfeld, hitherto thinking more or less in tandem, split over Hegel's views of the Gospel of Mark, views which Baur proclaimed "completely weak, untenable, and without principle." Further, Baur withheld an article by Hilgenfeld on 1 Thess. because he himself was engaged at the time in composing a similar article, which latter piece he advised Hilgenfeld to read so as to re-formulate his views accordingly.

Gustav Hermann Joseph Volckmar (born Jan. 11 or 12, 1805; died Zurich, January 9, 1893) studied Theology and Philology at Marburg (1829-32), displaying particular interest in the latter discipline. From 1853 he was employed at the University of Zurich, first as Privatdozent, then as außerordentlicher Professor (1857) and ordentlicher Professor (1862). He lectured in New Testament Exegesis and History of Dogma. Volkmars approach to Biblical criticism may have found favour with Overbeck; he was labelled a "Tübinger" for his method of exposing error in the chronology of the Synoptic Gospels. While in Zurich (1873) he headed a group of scholars, the "Züricher historische theologische Gesellschaft," whose only published yearbook number (1877) included a piece by Volkmart entitled "Einleitung über D. Fr. Strauß' Alten und Neuen Glauben" (Introduction to DFS's Old and new belief). Overbeck may also have shared Volkmars interest in Hippolytus seen in his 1855 work, Hippolytus und die römischen Zeitgenossen oder die Philosophumena und die verwandten Schriften nach Ursprung, Composition und Quellen untersucht [Hippolytus and Roman contemporaries, or the Philosophumena and related writings, examined by origin, composition and sources] (Vol. 1 -- with no subsequent volumes -- of his Quellen der Ketzergeschichte bis zum Nicäum, kritisch untersucht [Sources for the history of heretics up to Nicaea, critically researched]), which appeared prior to Overbeck's own Quaestional
Hippolytearum (1864). Numerous contributions of Volkmar to contemporary journals include the Theologische Jahrbücher [Theological yearbooks] of Baur and Zeller, Hilgenfeld's Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie [Journal for scientific Theology], the Zeitschrift für historische Theologie [Journal for historical Theology], the Studien und Kritiken [Studies and critiques], the Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie [Yearbooks for Protestant Theology], the Theologische Zeitschrift aus der Schweiz [Theological Journal of Switzerland], and review organs such as the Jenaische Litteraturzeitung [Jena literary Journal]. While denying traditional orthodoxy, Volkmar had explicit views on Jesus: he saw him not as a prophet but as a great teacher who had not claimed to be the Son of God. Volkmar could not explain the miracles; his proposal was that "the gospels build[ed] merely on the vaguest data from the common sayings of a later time, and [...] the details of the stories are invented." He echoes Baur in his identifying a dichotomy of Pauline and Jewish Christians in the New Testament. And by Wrede's account, Volkmar, with his critical examination (especially of Mark, whose primacy as the earliest Gospel he claimed in opposition to the Tübingen School) paved the way for a scholarly method rare for his era. Horton Harris's assessment is that Volkmar was "a hundred years ahead of his time."

7 Karl Christian Johann Holsten (born at Güstrow in Mecklenburg, March 31, 1825; died at Heidelberg, January 26, 1897): Holsten's initial academic interest was in philology (especially Greek); he studied Philology and Theology at Berlin and Leipzig (1843), and from 1845 at the Landesuniversität, Rostock. His affiliation with the Tübingen School lay chiefly in his espousal, à la F.C. Baur, of the scientific-historical method — that is, the assessment of biblical texts from a strictly material point of view. He devoted most of his scholarly career to Pauline studies, eventually applying exegesis of contemporary texts to the dating of the Synoptic Gospels. He taught New Testament at Bern, first as außerordentlicher and then as ordentlicher Professor from 1870; and in 1876 he went to Heidelberg to lecture on New Testament exegesis. Some of his theories and work he contributed (1874-75) to Hilgenfeld's Journal (see note 5 above) and to the Protestantische Kirchenzeitung.

8 Albrecht Benjamin Ritschl (born at Berlin, March 24, 1822; died at Göttingen, 1889) belonged to F.C. Baur's Tübingen School although he eventually broke with it decisively. Ritschl qualified as a lecturer at the University of Bonn in 1846, became Associate Professor in 1852 and Full Professor in 1859. He went to Göttingen in 1864 as a systematic theologian. Ritschl has been called a theological positivist who took hold of philosophical aspects of Enlightenment thought in a liberalist move to make Christianity more "accessible" and to stress the freedom of humanity to turn from sinful deeds, to live out an "ideal of life" (Lebensideal), in contradiction to mysticism and the Pietist views, involved in human good, with a Kantian sense of the best as a guiding light produced by reason. Ritschl objected to the repeated accusations of apostasy first lodged by Eberhard Vischer. He maintained that Baur overreacted to criticism, and he tried for years, in some critics' estimation, to sustain amicable professional relations with his former teacher. Ultimately, however, he found Baur's historical premise of a Hegelian juxtaposition between Pauline and Jewish Christian parties unpersuasive and academically skewed. Ritschl abandoned the study of Church History in 1857, opting for Dogmatics, and in 1864 he was appointed
Professor of Theology in Göttingen, from which position his influence grew steadily, completely overshadowing that of Baur. Overbeck, although grouped with Ritschl as an "apostate" of Tübingen, disagreed with Ritschl on matters of historical inquiry. Overbeck saw Ritschl's rejection of the "Life of Jesus" work as ostensibly unreligious, a thinly-disguised attempt at substituting history for theology. If any rejection of an historical project was to take place, Overbeck contended, it should be for lack of direct evidence.


10 Ferdinand Christian Baur (born June 21, 1792, at Schmiden bei Stuttgart; died Nov. 29, 1860, at Tübingen) was influenced by the Old Tübingen School, whose rational supernaturalism and toleration of reasoned criticism was represented especially by Johann Albrecht Bengel, who played down the supernatural aspects of Jesus in favour of stressing him as an ethical model. Baur was called to the Faculty of Theology in Tübingen in 1826, where he preached (until this responsibility was separated from the post in 1848) and taught New Testament exegesis, Christian ethics, the history of dogma and Church history.

The New Tübingen school developed around Baur, and consisted of eight personalities: Baur, Eduard Zeller, Gustav Volkmar, Albert Schweiger, Karl Reinhold Köstlin, Adolf Hilgenfeld, Karl Christian Planck, and Albrecht Ritschl. A younger generation of theologians such as Overbeck, Hilgenfeld, Volkmar, and Holsten came to the school at a later stage and witnessed its internal conflicts and eventual demise.

Karl Barth described the mockery surrounding the school by the time of its dissolution; Horton Harris attributes what academic derision may have been in the air partly to the vituperative and drawn-out attacks on Baur by the Old Testament scholar Georg Heinrich August Ewald (1803-1875), Tübingen theology professor from 1841 to 1848. Albert Schweizer and Horton Harris, on the other hand, stress the significance of the Schools: Schweizer praised Baur as "the man who more than any other was responsible for the historical-critical investigation of the Bible"; Horton calls the School "the most important theological event in the whole history of theology from the Reformation to the present day, [for] [w]ithin the two decades of its existence the whole course of Biblical and especially New Testament criticism was fundamentally changed. Indeed, it would not be too much to say that all modern exegesis and interpretation of the Bible find their roots and origins in the Tübingen School." The New Tübingen School advocated a purely historical, scientific criticism of the New Testament, without consideration of the supernatural; and the School published a Journal, the *Theologische Jahrbücher*, from 1848, organized by Zeller, to promote its views.

11 Overbeck calls his label as a "Tübinger" a figurative one as he did not espouse F. C. Baur's Hegelian philosophy of religion (cf. Niklaus Peter, *Im Schatten der Modernität*, p. 61). My interest here is in the translation of the word "allegorisch," for its cognate, "allegorical," seems inexact. I interpret Overbeck's meaning to be "Tübinger in name only" rather than
"Tübinger in an allegorical sense," as there appears to be no parallel or figurative use of "Tübinger" called—for here.

12 Baur's Hegelianism: Baur declared that without philosophy, religion seemed lifeless and dumb. The Hegelian philosophy of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which he discussed with Wilhelm Hoffmann and D.F. Strauss in weekly meetings at the Tübingen Stift (where Baur preached), Baur applied to his historical study of early Christianity, beginning especially with his work on gnosticism in 1834 and 1835. In an address given on the occasion of Kaiser Wilhelm's Silver Jubilee, Baur indicated how deeply he felt Hegel's ideas to be of relevance for all study: "[Hegel's] philosophy [...] has won such an important significance for our age. Since a philosophy was able to become a great system of thought, spreading itself through all branches of scientific knowledge and invading all aspects of life, only because it is not -- as one thinks-- the chance product of a few particular individuals, but rather the necessary and natural result of a long series of aspirations of the human spirit, coherent in themselves and directed to their highest goal, the absolute Idea. To this Idea all earlier systems and standpoints of philosophy can only be related themselves as the individual stages of the Idea, which possesses movement in itself." (Harris, p. 39).

Baur's Hegelian viewpoint led him to see the Gospel of John as the synthesis overcoming the antithetical juxtaposition of the Jewish-Christian Matthew and the Gentile-Christian Luke (cf. Barth, p. 505). He also applied the schematic to his analysis of Church history, positing the pre-Reformation Church as the time of affirmation, countering the post-Reformation Church as a negative Church lost in the world, and resolving the two in the synthesized, present Church, reflecting a higher and wiser time.

Ritschl found Baur's adaptation and application of Hegel unacceptable, and on this account he was condemned by the Tübinger as "conservative."


14 Overbeck's colleagues in Basel at the time included Karl Rudolf Hagenbach (Physics), Johann Georg Müller (Theology), Bernhard Riggenbach (Theology) and Hermann Schultz (Old Testament History). These four, along with Overbeck, were employed by the State. In addition there was Johann Jakob Stähelin (Church History), H. von der Goltz (Theology; subsidized by the Verein für Christlich-theologische Wissenschaft [Association for Christian-theological Science]), S. Preiswerk (Hebrew), and Pastor J. Stockmeyer (Homiletics).


16 Ferdinand Christian Baur, Die christliche Kirche vom Anfang des vierten bis zum Ende des sechsten Jahrhunderts in den Hauptmomenten ihrer Entwicklung [The Christian Church from the beginning of the fourth to the end of the sixth century, at major points of its development] (Tübingen: L.F. Fues, 1859). Reference is made also to Baur, Die christliche Kirche des Mittelalters in den
Hauptmomenten ihrer Entwicklung, nach des Verfassers Tod herausgegeben von Ferdinand Friedrich Baur [The Christian Church of the Middle Ages in the main moments of its development, edited posthumously by Ferdinand Friedrich Baur (F.C. Baur's son)] (Tübingen : L.F. Fues, 1861).


Christian Karl Josias von Bunsen, Baron (born at Korbach, August 25, 1791; died at Bonn, Nov. 28, 1860) : Bunsen began theological and philological studies in 1808 at the University of Marburg. Financial need changed his course slightly, as he was obliged to seek employment as a tutor and thereby came into contact with the affluent and influential Astor family of New York — an acquaintance that affected his future socio-political position. In 1812 he won the Faculty prize and a doctorate from the University of Jena for his "Disquisitio de jure Atheniensium hereditario." Extensive travel and an aptitude for languages (both common and more obscure) helped equip Bunsen for eventual ambassadorial work. In 1813 he drafted a plan of study designed to yield "Die Idee der Philosophie in ihrem Verhältniß zum Glauben, zur Philologie und Historie" [The idea of philosophy in its relation to belief, philology and history], which comprised a step in his prospective history of humanity. Overbeck considered Bunsen to have made a significant contribution to the scholarly method of modern theology despite his overall relative obscurity; in 1904 he wrote of the former ambassador: "Heute [...] denkt niemand mehr an Bunsen; insbesondere herrschte über ihn in den so geschwätzigen Kreisen der 'modernen Theologie' altum silentium. Und doch ist Bunsen mit seinem Werk Gott in der Geschichte und den damit zusammenhängenden Bibelstudien der theologischen Meister, der die kürzeste und praegnanzte Formel für das Centraldogma unserer modernen Theologie in Umlauf gebracht hat. [...] Denn Gott in der Geschichte -- das will doch, wenn überhaupt, nichts anderes sagen als 'dass die Geschichte das Mittel ist, durch das Gott sich uns Menschen offenbart.'" [Nowadays (...) no one thinks of Bunsen anymore; actually, in the gossip-circles of "modern theology" there reigns over him an 'altum silentium'. And yet Bunsen, with his work "God in history" and the concomitant biblical studies of the Theology masters, brought into circulation the briefest and most pregnant formula for the central dogma of our modern theology. (...) For "God in history" asserts nothing less than that 'history is the medium through which God reveals himself to humans.'"

Bunsen and F.C. Baur differed over the authorship of the Philosophumena, which the former attributed to Hippolytus and the latter to Caius. The subject was raised in the early 1850s with a monograph by Bunsen (Hippolytus und seine Zeit [Hippolytus and his time]) and a number of articles by Baur appearing in his journal (the Tübingen School's Theologische Jahrbücher 1853, Vols. 1 and 3). A detailed exposition of their positions is given by John J.I. von Döllinger (Hippolytus und Callistus : or, The Church of Rome in the First Half of the Third Century. With Special Reference to the Writings of Bunsen, Wordsworth, Baur, and Gieseler, trans. Alfred Plummer [Edinburgh : T. and T. Clark, 1876]). As would have interested Overbeck, Döllinger uses specific textual references to demonstrate that Bunsen reached his conclusions while ignoring the factual proof fundamental to any study appropriately rooted in historical accuracy.
Quaestitionum Hippolytearum specimen summe venerabilis Theologorum ordinis Irenensis consensu et auctoritate pro gradu Licentiatii et docendi potestate rite obtinendis die IV. m. August a. MDCCCLXIV in publico defendit Franciscus Camillus Overbeck, Leipzig, 1864 (For other stages of habilitation, see Wehrli, p. 80 ff. and Martin Henry p. 265n217).

Literarisches Centralblatt für Deutschland (Leipzig, 1850-1944). At the time referred-to by Overbeck the Centralblatt was edited by Friedrich Zarncke.

Rudolf Wehrli describes the lectures: "Die Vorlesung mit dem Titel 'Über die Anfänge des Mönchstums' hielt Overbeck an der Universität Jena am 6. Februar 1867. Sie stand im Rahmen der sogenannten 'Rosenvorlesungen', einer Reihe von akademischen Vorträgen, die in einem Saale abgehalten wurden, der sich auf einem der Universität Jena gehörenden und 'Rose' genannten Grundstück befand" (Overbeckiana I, p. 10n2). [The Lecture entitled "On the beginnings of monasticism" was delivered by Overbeck at the University of Jena on February 6, 1867. It was in the context of the so-called "Rose Lectures," a series of scholarly lectures held in a hall belonging to the University of Jena, whose main section was called "Rose."]

"Über die Anfänge des Mönchstums" was the first public lecture delivered by Overbeck. According to Niklaus Peter, the scholarly significance of the work (which in its printed form includes corrections, developments and addenda to the original) lies in its polemical exposition of the debate on the continuity or discontinuity of early Christianity and monasticism. (OWN 1 p. 5).


Profane Kirchengeschichte

See note 2 above.

"[...]mit 'dem Ausdruck der Hoffnung' begleitete, 'dass ich in meiner neuen Stellung einen meiner wissenschaftlichen Neigung entsprechenden Wirkungskreis finden werde, und dass meine hiesige Thätigkeit für die studirende Jugend eine segensreiche sein möge.'"

The Protestant League (Protestantenverein) grew out of a former organization, the Berlin Unionsverein, founded in 1848. The latter was reorganized in 1864 and took the title "Protestantenverein," holding its first Congress (Protestantenentag) in Eisenach in 1851. Some of its publications and proponents are mentioned by Overbeck in his Christlichkeit. The aim of the League is clearly stated in its first Statute: "A League is formed, based on evangelical Christianity, from among those German Protestants who strive for a renewal of the Protestant Church in the spirit of evangelical freedom and in accordance with the whole cultural development of our time. This League bears the name "Deutscher Protestantenverein."

The League pursues the following goals:

1. the strengthening of the German Evangelical Church based on a common principle, yet according to the particular relations of the various states to
the German people; also the initiation of an organic connection of state churches;

2. the fight against all non-Protestant hierarchical aspects within individual state churches, and the protection of the right, honour, and freedom of German Protestantism;

3. the preservation and promotion of Christian toleration and respect between the various confessions and their members;

4. the stimulation and promotion of the Christian life, as of all Christian undertakings and works necessary to the moral strength and welfare of the people."

["Der Zweck des Deutschen Protestantenvereins ist in § 1 des Statuts, der bei allen sonstigen, die Organisation betreffenden Veränderungen sachlich durchaus unverändert geblieben ist, folgendermaßen angegeben (nach der letzten stilistischen Redaktion von 1901) :


Der Verein verfolgt folgende Zwecke:

1. Den Ausbau der deutschen evangelischen Kirchen auf der Grundlage des Gemeindeprinzips je nach den besonderen Verhältnissen der verschiedenen Länder mit deutscher Bevölkerung, sowie die Anbahnung einer organischen Verbindung der Landeskirchen;

2. die Bekämpfung alles unprotestantischen hierarchischen Wesens innerhalb der einzelnen Landeskirchen und die Wahrung der Rechte, der Ehre und der Freiheit des deutschen Protestantismus;

3. die Erhaltung und Förderung christlicher Duldung und Achtung zwischen den verschiedenen Konfessionen und ihren Mitgliedern;

4. die Anregung und Förderung des christlichen Lebens, sowie aller der christlichen Unternehmungen und Werke, welche die sittliche Kraft und Wohlfahrt des Volkes bedingen.'" (RE)

28 Daniel Schenkel (1813-1885). Bibel-Lexikon. Realwörterbuch zum Handgebrauch für Geistliche und Gemeindeglieber. In Verbindung mit Dr. Bruch, Dr. Diestel, Dr. Dillmann, Dr. Fritzsche, K. Furrer, Dr. Gaß, Dr. Haurath, Dr. Hitzig, Dr. Holtzmann, Dr. Keim, Dr. Lipsis, Dr. Mangold, Dr. Merx, Dr. Nölske, Dr. Reuß, Dr. Roskoff, Dr. Schrader, Dr. C. Schwarz, Dr. A. Schweizer, Dr. Stark, Dr. Steiner und anderen der namhaftesten Bibelforscher. Herausgegeben von Kirchenrath Professor Daniel Schenkel. In fünf Bänden. [Bible lexicon. Specialized dictionary for the use of clergy and congregation. In association with Dr. Bruch [...] and other of the most noteworthy Bible scholars. Edited by Church Councillor Professor Daniel Schenkel. In five volumes.] (Leipzig : F.A. Brockhaus, 1875)

29 See note 30.

30 In July of 1863 the twenty-five students of theology at Basel petitioned for a new Chair in Old Testament and New Testament Exegesis as well as in Systematic Theology. Their request for more teachers was turned down for financial reasons. The students' next tack was to ask for a new faculty member more representative of the newer scientific directions, with sympathies toward Church Reform. In December of that year, Hermann Schultz was appointed,
but he did not fit the bill in terms of his "liberality." In January of 1867, W. Mangold of Marburg was selected for the post, but the Prussian government exerted pressure upon him to decline the offer. In the summer holidays of 1867, Schultz visited Overbeck and A. Merx in Jena, as well as Schrader and F. Nietzsche in Berlin, and sent a report on them to Basel in early August. The Chancellor and Advisor Wilhelm Vischer (see note 35) subsequently presented the Basel authorities with a recommendation from A. Lipsius of Jena in support of Overbeck. A vote was taken on December 1, and despite the Reformverein's fears that Overbeck might be too placid for their times and their campaign, on the 8th of January, 1870, he was called up to teach New Testament Exegesis and Early Church History.

31 Wilhelm Vischer-Bilfinger (1808-1874), "klassischer Philologe, Professor, Ratsherr, Präsident des Erziehungskollegiums und der Kuratel in Basel" [classical philologian, professor, Councillor, president of the College of Education and Chancellory in Basel].

32 Voices of contemporary reform from the Swiss Church

33 This phrase is from the incipit to Dante's Inferno. In view of Overbeck's personal and professional context, it is worth citing the entire verse, with its pregnant imagery, from the first Canto: "Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita / mi ritrovi for una selva oscura, / ché la diritta via era smarrita." ["In the middle of the journey of our life, I came to myself in a dark wood, for the straight way was lost" -- translation by Robert M. Durling (New York : Oxford University Press, 1996).]

34 The position came open at Basel in December, 1868, for a replacement for Adolf Kiessling, Professor of Greek Language and Literature. Kiessling himself enquired about Nietzsche from Ritschl in Bonn; he had seen Nietzsche's work on Theognis in the Rheinisches Museum für Philologie ("Zur Geschichte der Theognideischen Spruchsammlung," Rhein. Mus. NF 22 [1867] 161-200, begun as the crowning work of his years at the Prussian Pforta School [1864] and developed independently -- see Barbara von Reibnitz, Ein Kommentar zu Friedrich Nietzsche, "Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik" [Commentary on Friedrich Nietzsche's "Birth of tragedy from the spirit of music] [Stuttgart : J.B. Metzler, 1992] and received an effusive commendation from Ritschl (who, among other things, had recommended that Nietzsche publish his work on Theognis when he first introduced it at the Ritschl-founded Leipziger Philologischen Verein in January of 1866 -- cf. von Reibnitz, 1.3.1). At the time of the official offer (received February 12 or 13, 1869), Nietzsche had neither been "promoviert" nor "habilitiert," although he was engaged in completing both stages. He accepted the position of "Professor extraordinarius der klassischen Philologie" with mixed feelings, aware of the extra work involved in his "premature" appointment and reflecting on the consequent abruptly ended youth, and arrived in Basel on April 19, 1869. This stage of Nietzsche's academic career is described in detail by Curt Paul Janz in the first of his three-volume biography, Friedrich Nietzsche. Biographie (Munich : Carl Hanser, 1978), pp. 256-273.

35 Privatdozent
According to C.A. Bernoulli's daughter, Overbeck and Nietzsche lived at "Schützengraben 41 (today number 47 -- see Pestalozzi, p. 93)," the house of the widow Baumann. Playing on the name of the street ("trenches"), they referred to their residence as "Baumannshöhle" (Baumann's hole) (although Curt Paul Janz assumes the nickname arose from a period in the summer of 1873 when Nietzsche was "holed up" there during an extended illness -- see Janz vol. 1, p. 545) (Eva Bernoulli, Erinnerungen an meinen Vater [Basel : GS-Verlag, 1947], p. 27), and occasionally it was referred to by others in Basel as the poisonous hut (Gifthütte - see Pestalozzi, p. 93). Nietzsche describes Overbeck to Erwin Rohde in a letter of around March 22, 1873: "Overbeck ist der ernsteste, freimütigste und persönlich liebenswürdig,einfachste Mensch und Forscher, den man sich zum Freunde wünschen kann, dabei von jenem Radikalismus, ohne den ich nun schon gar mit jemanden umgehen kann." [Overbeck is the most earnest, most open, and personally the most simply amiable person and researcher one could wish to have as a friend; and he possesses that radical quality I can no longer do without in people.] (Friedrich Nietzsche. Briefwechsel mit Erwin Rohde [Correspondence with Erwin Rohde], edited by E. Förster-Nietzsche and F. Schöll, 3rd edition [Leipzig : Insel, 1923], pp. 291-2).

N. Peter (OWN 1, p. 268) identifies this colleague as Hermann Schultz, referring to Overbeckiana. Übersicht über den Overbeck-Nachlaß der Universitätsbibliothek Basel, Part I, Die Korrespondenz Franz Overbecks, ed. E. Staehelin and M. Gabathuler (Basel, 1962), p. 87; and to Curt Paul Janz, "Die Berufung Franz Overbecks an die Universität Basel 1870," in Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde 92 (1992) : 139-165 (esp. 157ff.). Schultz (born December 30, 1836, at Lückow in Lüneburg; died May 15, 1903 in Göttingen); studied Theology and Philology, from Easter of 1853, at the Universities of Göttingen and Erlangen. He was employed as a private tutor in Hamburg from 1856 to 1858, earned his Doctorate of Philosophy in 1858, and taught at the Göttingen theological Stift in 1859, habilitating there in 1861. After three years he was appointed ordentlicher Professor at Basel, where he taught -- among other things, Old Testament and the continuity between pre-Christian and Christian traditions -- for eight and a half years. He served as Basel Church Councillor for two years and in 1872 was chosen for the Theology Faculty of Straßburg. In 1874 he transferred to Heidelberg and in 1876 returned to Göttingen, where he taught until his death.

The cultural struggle (Kulturkampf) underway in Germany at the time was, broadly speaking, a conflict between Catholic social tradition and liberal socio-economic reform. Their disagreements exceeded mere debate and included oppression, demonstration, widespread imprisonment, and vivid expression against arbitrary government authority. An outline of the issues and manifestation of the Kulturkampf is given by David Blackbourn in Populists and Patricians. Essays in Modern German History, Chapter 7: "Progress and Piety: Liberals, Catholics and the State in Bismarck's Germany" (London : Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 143-167.

Overbeck was 36 and Nietzsche 29 years old when they first met.

N. Peter comments on this description of Overbeck's and Nietzsche's relationship: "auf eine Emendation des unklaren Satzes wurde verzichtet" (the emendation of this unclear sentence was renounced). The sentence does appear to illustrate the complexity of Nietzsche but does not seem beyond understanding.

Wissenschaft

Referent is to "Wissenschaft" of the previous note.


N. Peter gives the synonym "Aufforderungen" (invitations, challenges, summonses, citations) to these "Sommationen." (OWNL, p. 270).

Easter Sunday fell on April 13 that year.

Nietzsche wrote to Carl von Gersdorff that he was meeting Erwin Rohde on April 7, 1873, in Bayreuth. While there, he visited Richard and Cosima Wagner and discussed with them the "Kirche und Staat" work of Paul de Lagarde. He and Rohde left Bayreuth on Saturday, April 12, and after a brief respite with Rohde in Lichtenfels, Nietzsche was back in Bayreuth in time to write to Wagner on April 18 (Curt Paul Janz, *Friedrich Nietzsche. Biographie*. Vol. 1 [München : Carl Hanser Verlag, 1979], pp. 530 ff.).

Nietzsche wrote to Rohde around March 22, 1873, in his first detailed report on his housemate Overbeck : "In den Osterferien wird [Overbeck] ein Dokument [seines] Radikalismus, ein öffentliches Sendschreiben an Paul de Lagarde machen" [In the Easter holidays Overbeck will compose a document on his radicalism -- a public letter to Paul de Lagarde.] (Friedrich Nietzsches Briefwechsel mit Erwin Rhode, ed. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and Fritz Schöll (Leipzig : Insel, 1923), 3rd edition, p. 292. Then on May 5 he reported to Rohde : "Overbeck ist mit seiner Schrift (wir nennen sie "Zukunftstheologie") fertig, auch der Verleger ist gefunden -- und wer? Fritzschius!" [Overbeck has finished his writing (we call it "future theology"), and we have found a publisher -- and guess who? Fritzschius!] (Ibid., p. 295.)

Ernst Wilhelm Fritzsch (Richard Wagner’s publisher) was born on Aug. 24, 1840 in Lützen. He studied from 1857-60 at the Leipzig Conservatory, after which he obtained employment as a musician. In 1870 he took on the editorship of the Leipzig Musikalischen Wochenblätter, becoming at the same time a music publisher and writer (address : Königstraße 6) (Deutsche Biographisches Archiv, ed. B. Fabian [Munich : K.G. Saur], microfiche no. 353, f. 307).
50 Abbreviation of "Universität Basel."

51 "Ein Zwillingspaar aus Einem Haus / ging muthig in die Welt hinaus, / Welt-Drachen zu zerreissen. / Zwei-Väterwerk! Ein Wunder war's! / Die Mutter doch des Zwillingspaars / Freundschaft ist sie gehissen!"

52 "Der eine Vater dem andern!"

Footnotes to pp. 21-42: (Chapter II, My 1873 Notebook, Part 1: The Overall Relation of Theology to Christianity)

1 Wissenschaft

2 "[...] auf die Religion, 'deren Gegenstand keinem Wissen einen Angriffspunct bietet', als die 'ewige' verweisen zu können meint, 'welche von keinem Wissen etwas zu fürchten habe' [...]".

3 Wissen


5 Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie [German theological yearbook]

6 Wissen

7 Wissenschaft

8 Wissenschaft

9 Niklaus Peter refers to Sozomen's Ecclesiastical History (OWN1, page173, footnote to line 3). Although Sozomen does speak of the worshippers of Serapis and their fear, there is no mention of a specific "image" nor of a soldier destroying it with an axe: "[The Egyptian pagans] who had shut themselves up in the temple of Serapis [guarding the statues that the Christians had exposed to ridicule] were averse to yield, from fear of the punishment that they knew would await their audacious proceedings, and they were further instigated to revolt by the inflammatory discourses of a man named Olympus, attired in the garments of a philosopher, who told them that they ought to die rather than neglect the gods of their fathers. Perceiving that they were greatly intimidated by the destruction of the idolatrous statues, he assured them that such a circumstance did not warrant their renouncing their religion; for that the statues were composed of corruptible materials, subject to decay; whereas, the powers which had dwelt within them, had flown to heaven. By such representations as these, he retained the multitude with him in the temple of Serapis" (Ecclesiastical History, Comprising a History of the Church from A.D. 324 to A.D. 440 [London: Henry G. Bohn, 1855], book VII, chapter 15, p. 332).

10 Overbeck may be referring to the following passages: (1) Origen Contre Celse II, 49 (p. 409); Origen has Jesus make the distinction between miracle-workers and those who claim to effect their acts in Jesus's name. This section deals more with "lures" extended to potential followers by demagogues than with the more precise illustration of Jesus as miracle-worker to defend his status, as seen in Origen's section II, 49, of Contre l'Ecrit de Celse intitulé Discours Véritable, Second Book, ed. Marcel Borret (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1967 [pp. 395-397]); and (2) Contre Celse II, 52: "Et, tout comme les miracles que Moïse fit d'après les Écritures étaient nécessaires pour lui obtenir l'audience non seulement de l'assemblée des Anciens, mais encore du
peuple, pourquoi Jésus lui aussi, pour gagner la foi d’un peuple qui avait appris à demander des signes et des prodiges, n’aurait-il pas eu besoin de miracles capables, par leur grandeur et leur caractère divin supérieurs si on les compare à ceux de Moïse, de les et de leur faire accepter que l’auteur de cette doctrine et de ces prodiges était plus grand que les prophètes?” [And, just as the miracles accomplished by Moses, according to Scripture, were necessary so that he could obtain not only a hearing from the assembly of the Elders but also from the people, why would not Jesus as well, to gain the faith of a people who had learned to demand signs and prodigies, have needed miracles which, by their enormity and divine nature superior to those of Moses, could be accepted as such and as proof that the author of the doctrine and of the prodigies themselves was greater than the prophets?]

11 Hermann Reuter (1817-1889), Geschichte der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter, vom Ende des achten Jahrhunderts bis zum Anfange des vierzehnten [History of the religious enlightenment in the Middle Ages, from the end of the eighth century until the beginning of the fourteenth] (Berlin : W. Hertz, 1875-77. 2 v. in 1. Hermann Ferdinand Reuter (born at Hildesheim, August 30, 1817; died at Kreiensen, September 17, 1889) studied Theology and Philology from 1837 at Göttingen under H. Ewald, Lücke, Gieseler and Schneidewin. Dissatisfaction with the level of study there led him to change to Berlin in 1838 under Neander, Vatke, Marheineke, Hengstenberg (Theology); Böckh, Benary, Bopp (Philology); and Trendelenburg and Werder (Philosophy). Despite the strong educational influence of his theologian brother and father, Reuter did not wish to pursue a theological career, and by 1840 he was producing work on less spiritual issues of the twelfth century. On July 17, 1841, he produced for his theological licentiate a paper entitled: "Johannes von Salisbury. Zur Geschichte der christlichen Wissenschaft" [Johannes von Salisbury. On the History of Christian Science], published in Berlin the next year. His later, ground-breaking work on the Enlightenment and the Middle Ages (vol. 1 in 1875 and vol. 2 in 1877), cited here by Overbeck, represented a significant historical contribution.

12 Overbeck refers to the principal section of Octavius by Mercury Minucius Felix, in which the title character argues in favour of a conversion to Christianity. This section is divided into three sub-sections with an introduction. Overbeck quotes from the second section, centred on a critique of pagan religion: (1) (20,4) "Quid illas aniles fabulas, de hominibus aues et feras [hominibus] et de hominibus arbores atque flores? Quae si essent facta, fierent; quia fieri non possunt, idemo nec facta sunt." ["A quoi bon mentionner ces contes de vieilles femmes, métamorphoses d’êtres humains en arbres et en fleurs? Si ces phénomènes s’étaient produits, il s’en produirait encore; comme ils ne peuvent pas se produire, c’est donc qu’ils ne se sont pas davantage produits." (Why mention these old wives' tales, the changing of humans into trees and flowers? If these phenomena occurred, they will occur again; since they cannot happen, it is because there have not been any more of them.)] (2) (21,11) Such a section does not exist, and sections 1, 2, and 3 of 21 do not seem sufficiently relevant to warrant any second-guessing of Overbeck. (3) (26,6) "De Pyrrho Ennius Apollinis Pythi responsa confinxit, cum iam Apollo versus facere desisset; cuius tunc cautum illud et ambigum defecit oraculum, cum et politiores homines et minus creduli esse coeperunt. Et Demosthenes, quod sciret responsa simulata, Pythiam querebatur." ["Sur le compte de Pyrrhus, la réponse d’Apollon Pythien a été
forgée par Ennius, car à cette époque déjà Apollon avait cessé de parler en vers : son fameux oracle prudent et ambigu se tut au moment où les hommes devinrent plus raffinés et moins crédules. Et Démosthène, sachant bien que ses réponses n'étaient que simulation, reprochait à la Pythie de 'philippiser' " (According to Pyrrhus, Apollo's Pythian answer was forged by Ennius, for at that time Apollo had already stopped speaking in verse: his famous oracle, prudent and ambiguous, became silent just when men became more refined and less credulous. And Demosthenes, knowing well that the answers were fake, accused Pythia of "philippizing.") Minucius Felix, Octavius (French trans. Jean Beaujeu [Paris : Belles Lettres, 1964]).

13 Wissenschaft

14 Overbeck may have been thinking of this passage: "Cum haec illis sanctae uoces praeminarentur, eadem semper omnes ingerebant fore uti sub extimus curriculis saeculi ex omni iam gente et populo et loco cultores sibi adduceret deus multo fideliores in quos gratiam transferret, pleniorem quidem ob disciplinae auctoritatis capacitatem. Venit igitur qui ad reformandum et inluminandum eam uenturus a deo praenuntiabatur, Christus ille filius dei." ["While holy voices threatened [the Jews] [...], at the same time all were continually urging, that in the last stages of time God would then choose for himself from every race, community and region worshippers much more faithful to whom to transfer his favour by reason of the capacity of a more developed teaching. He came therefore, that being, Christ, the son of God, who it was foretold would come from God to reform and illuminate the world."] (Quintus Septimus Florens Tertullianus, Apologeticus [Defence of the Christians against the heathen], translated by Alex. Souter [Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1917], chapter 21, p. 69.)

15 Wissenschaft der Welt

16 Wissen

17 Wissen

18 Wissen

19 Wissenschaft

20 Wissenschaft

21 Wissenschaft

22 Wissenschaft

23 Wissenschaft

24 eine christliche Wissenschaft

25 hellenische Wissenschaft
26 eine wissenschaftliche Behandlung

27 Wissender

28 "Plus heureux [...] l'homme qui n'a aucun besoin, même s'il lit le traité de Celse, d'une défense contre lui, mais dédaigne tout le contenu de son livre, car le premier venu des fidèles du Christ, par l'Esprit qui est en lui, avec raison le méprise." [Much happier is the man who, even having read Celsus's treatise, has no need of a defence against him, but who disdains the entire content of his book, since the first of Christ's faithful, because of his in-dwelling Spirit, despises it.] Origène, Contre Celse, translated by Marcel Borret, vol. I, books 1 and 2 (Paris: Du Cerf, 1967), preface, p. 77.

29 Athanasius begins his Contra Gentes thus: "Knowledge of religion and of the truth about the universe does not so much need instruction from men as it can be acquired by itself. For well-nigh every day it has cried out in events, and reveals itself more clearly than the sun through the teaching of Christ. None the less, since you desire to hear about it, then let us expound, my friend, as best we can, a little of the Christian faith; you could discover it from the words of Holy Scripture, yet are eager also to hear of it from others. To be sure, the sacred and divinely inspired Scriptures are sufficient for the exposition of the truth, but there also exist many treatises of our blessed teachers composed for this purpose, and if one reads them he will gain some notion of the interpretation of the Scriptures and will be able to attain the knowledge he desires. But since we do not now have the works of these teachers to hand, we must expound for you in writing what we have learnt from them -- I mean the faith in Christ the Saviour -- that no one may regard the teaching of our doctrine as worthless, or suppose faith in Christ to be irrational." (Athanasius: Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, edited and translated by Robert W. Thomson [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971], p. 3). In his introduction to the Contra Gentes, Thomson explains that Athanasius addresses the unnamed reader of his work by many different names; and he concludes that "the double work was not addressed to a specified inquirer (unlike many of Athanasius' later correspondents, such as Maximus or Epictetus), but to an interested audience both inside and outside the Church" (Ibid., p. xxii).

30 wissenschaftlich

31 See note 29 above.

32 Sancti Joannis Chrysostomi, Opera omnia quae exstant ... opera et studio D. Bernardi de Montfaucon, Edition parisina altera, emendata et aucta (Parisiiis, apud Gaume fratres, 1834-1839), Volume XI, Homily 5 on 1 Timothy, pp. 656, 656a. Note: Overbeck misquotes the reference.

33 Wissenschaft

34 Wissenschaften

35 Wissenschaften
On Christian knowledge (science)

Franz Camillo Overbeck, *Zur Geschichte des Kanons. Zwei Abhandlungen von Franz Overbeck* [On the history of the Canon. Two treatises by ...] ... Chemnitz: E. Schmeitzner, 1880. Overbeck refers to his own footnote of the above work: "Da ich einmal Augustins De doctrina christiana angeführt habe, kann ich mir nicht versagen, hier eine Probe von der Unachtsamkeit einzuschalten, mit welche die patristische Litteratur noch gelesen zu werden pflegt. Noch immer bedenkt sich kaum jemand den Titel dieser Schrift zu übersetzen: Über die christliche Lehre. Man möchte fragen, ob die, welche so thun, von der Schrift des Augustin mehr als den Titel kennen, wenn nur nicht sogar ihre Übersetzer ebenso thätten. Von vier deutschen Übersetzungen, die ich dem Titel nach kenne, wagt nur Einer eine andere Wiedergabe des Titels, als die angegebene, und diese ist nicht richtiger ("Augustins christliche Unterweisung"). Die richtige müßte lauten: "Über die christliche Wissenschaft" oder "Über die Bildung des christlichen Gelehrten." Ich brauche kaum zu bemerken, wie abträglich cler hergebrachte Titel dem Interesse ist, welches der richtige weckt und die augustinische Schrift auch wirklich befriedigt." (pp. 46-47) [As I once cited Augustine's De doctrina christiana, I cannot deny that I am including a sample of the carelessness with which patristic literature is still customarily read. Scarcely anyone anymore thinks to translate the title of this work, "On Christian teaching". One might ask whether those who do so know anything of the work other than the title, if the translators give this alone. Of the four German translations whose titles I know, only one dates another rendering of the title than the received one, and this is no more correct ("Augustine's Christian instruction"). The correct one should read: "On Christian science (knowledge)" or "On the education of Christian scholars". I hardly need remark how harmful the provided title is to the interest awakened by the correct one and which the Augustinian writing really satisfies.]

Augustine stresses particularly, in points 4, 5, and 9 of his Prologue, that instruction should be both given and received humbly and gratefully: "[...] those who exult in divine assistance and who glory in being able to understand and to treat the sacred books without precepts of the kind which I have undertaken to supply herewith, so that they think these precepts superfluous, should calm themselves for this reason: although they may rightfully rejoice in the great gift God has given them, they should remember that they have learned at least the alphabet from men. [...] Those things which can be learned from men should be learned without pride. And let anyone teaching another communicate what he has received without pride or envy. [...] By following certain traces he [who receives the precepts we wish to teach] may come to the hidden sense without any error, or at least he will not fall into the absurdity of wicked meanings. Therefore, although in this work itself it may be sufficiently clear that no one ought to criticize our labours, nevertheless, if a prologue such as this
may be seen as a convenient response to objectors, it seemed to us a proper beginning for the road we wished to follow." (Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, translated by D.W. Robertson, Jr. [N.Y.: Liberal Arts Press, 1958], pp. 4, 5, 7).

42 Wissenschaft

43 Wissen

44 Weltbetrachtung

45 Wissenschaft ("[...] wie die Redensart vom Zuge des Christentums zur Wissenschaft nur hat aufkommen können.")

46 Wissenschaft

47 Wissenschaft

48 Wissenschaft

49 Wissenschaft

50 Wissenschaft

51 Wissenschaften

52 christliche Wissenschaft

53 Wissenschaft

54 wissenschaftlich

55 wissenschaftlich

56 wissenschaftlich

57 "Denkreligion" : Martin Henry opposes this to a living religion and places it in the same metaphoric group as Overbeck's "cloud cuckoo land" (Christlichkeit p. 69) and "Wortchristentum" (Christlichkeit p. 63) (Franz Overbeck, p.52n60); he also sees it as connected to Hegel's dichotomy of "dead orthodoxy" and "living" Christianity (p.53n60). Henry refers to D.F. Strauß's Der alte und der neue Glaube [The old and the new belief], a work to which Overbeck reacts even in the Christlichkeit, and in which such a juxtaposition (thought vs. action) is also made. Henry tells us that Overbeck sees Christianity as a "Denkweise" or way of thinking, and backs this up with reference to the phrase: "Man kann über den Tod als Abschluss des menschlichen Lebens und die Bedeutung, die ... solcher Abschluss für dieses Leben hat, sehr anders denken ohne damit auch nur um einen Schritt christlicher Denkweise näher zu rücken" [One can think quite differently about death as the end of human life and the meaning that that end has for this life, without necessarily backing up one step closer to the Christian way of
thinking.] (Henry, p. 92 note 103). Grammatically, however, it is difficult to square the equation "Christianity = a way of thinking (Denkweise)" with the phrase from the quotation above: "a Christian way of thinking"; this would lead to the tautological expression "a Christian Christianity."

58 Otto Henne am Rhyn (1828-1914), Kulturgeschichte der neueren Zeit. Vom Wiederaufleben der Wissenschaften bis auf die Gegenwart [Cultural history of modern times. From the revival of the sciences to the present] (Leipzig : O. Wigand, 1870-72), Vol. 1: "Kulturgeschichte des Zeitalters der Reformation vom Wiederaufleben der Wissenschaften bis zur Zeit des dreißigjährigen Krieges" [Cultural history of the time of the Reformation from the revival of the sciences up to the time of the Thirty Years' War]; Vol. 2: "Kulturgeschichte des Zeitalters der Aufklärung. Von der Zeit des dreißigjährigen Krieges bis zur französischen Revolution" [Cultural history of the time of the Enlightenment. From the time of the Thirty Years' War up to the French Revolution]; Vol. 3: "Kulturgeschichte der neuesten Zeit. Von der französischen Revolution bis auf die Gegenwart" [Cultural history of modern times. From the French Revolution to the present.]

59 Wissenschaft

60 W. Beyschlag. Ein antiker Spiegel für den "neuen Glauben" von D.F. Strauss [An ancient model for the "new belief" of D.F. Strauss]. Willibald Beyschlag (born Sept. 7, 1823 in Frankfurt am Main; died Nov. 25, 1900 in Halle) studied in Bonn and Berlin; his self-acclaimed greatest influences were August Neander, Schleiermacher and K.J. Nitzsch. He was pastor in Trier from 1850, and court preacher in Karlsruhe from 1856. In 1860 he became Professor of Practical Theology in Halle. His theological and church-political position in the Prussian state church dates from his address in 1864, a refutation of D.F. Strauss, Renan and Schenkel, entitled Welchen Gewinn hat die evangelische Kirche aus den neuesten Verhandlungen über das Leben Jesu zu ziehen? [What profit should the Evangelical Church draw from the newest arguments on the life of Jesus?] Beyschlag took part from October 1871 in the formation of the Prussian Church, contributed to the founding of the Prussian Mittelpartei (from Aug. 1873), and contributed as well to the Deutsch-Evangelischen Blätter (from 1876), which became a significant weapon in the church-political struggles. He stood up for the legislation of the culture-struggle [Kulturkampf] as well as for Old Catholicism, and provided the first stimulus to the Evangelical Bund.


62 Naturwissenschaft

63 wissenschaftlich

64 Wissenschaft
Wissenschaft
Wissenschaft
Wissenschaft
Wissenschaft
wissenschaftlich
Wissenschaften
Footnotes to pp. 42-71 (Chapter II, Part 2: Current Apologetic Theology)

1 Wissenschaft

2 "Protestantenverein" - see note to page 8.

3 Verein für freies Christentum

4 wissenschaftlich

5 wissenschaftlich

6 This view is concisely expressed in Der alte und der neue Glaube [The old faith and the new] Section II ("Haben wir noch Religion?" [Do we still have religion?]), ch. 43 ("Wahrheit und Unwahrheit der Religion. Die Religion und die Bildung" [The truth and untruth of religion. Religion and education.]): "Religion und Bildung stünden hienach nicht in gleichem, sondern in dem umgekehrten Verhältniß, daß mit dem Fortschreiten der letzteren die erstere zurücktritt." (p. 92) [Religion and education, according to this, stand not in a similar, but rather in a reversed relationship, in which the former steps back as the latter progresses.]

7 "Vivons donc de manière à ce que le nom de Dieu ne soit pas blasphémé. Ne nous proposons pas la gloire humaine; mais ne nous exposons pas non plus à de mauvais soupçons: gardons des deux côtés une sage mesure. 'Ainsi vous brillez comme des luminaires dans le monde.' Philip., II, 15. Dieu nous a laissés ici-bas pour que nous répandions la lumière, pour que nous soyons les instituteurs de nos semblables, un véritable levain; pour que nous vivions comme des anges au milieu des hommes, comme des hommes faits au milieu des petits enfants, comme des êtres spirituels au milieu des natures animales, pour que celles-ci gagnent à notre contact; pour que nous devenions une féconde semence et que nous produissions des fruits abondants. Si notre vie brillait de la sorte, nous n'aurions plus besoin de parler; les actes remplacereraient avantageusement les paroles. Si nous étions de vrais chrétiens, il ne resterait plus d'infidèles : si nous accomplissions les préceptes du Christ, si nous ne répondions que des bénédictions aux injures comme aux rapines, par des bienfaits aux mauvais traitements, il n'y aurait pas de nature assez sauvage pour ne pas accourir à la religion [...]."

[Let us therefore conduct our lives in such a way that God's name is not blasphemed. We are not proposing glory to humanity; but neither are we exposing ourselves to malicious suspicions: let us keep a wise measure of both. 'Thus you will shine in the world like luminaries' (Philipp. II : 15). God has put us here to spread the light, to be instructors to our peers, a veritable inspiration; to live like angels in the midst of men, like men in the midst of children, like spiritual beings in the midst of those of bestial nature, so that the latter would benefit from our contact; so that we become fertile seeds and produce abundant fruit. If our lives were this brilliant, we would no longer need to speak; acts would beneficially replace words. If we were real Christians, there would no longer be any heathens; if we enacted the precepts of Christ, if we responded to injury and attack with blessings alone, and to bad treatment with good deeds, there would be no nature sufficiently savage not to come running to religion [...].]"
First Letter to Timothy, §3, *Oeuvres complètes de S. Jean Chrysostome*, trad. l'abbé J. Bareille, v. 10 [Paris : Louis Vivès, 1873]).

8 Mt 7:16 : "Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep's clothing but inwardly are ravenous wolves. You will know them by their fruits. Are grapes gathered from thorns, or figs from thistles? In the same way, every good tree bears good fruit, but the bad tree bears bad fruit. A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a bad tree bear good fruit. Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. Thus you will know them by their fruits." (NRSV)

9 For bibliographical information on the *Neue evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, see the relevant footnote to page 150 of the Overbeck text. Other references to the periodical are listed in the index at the back of this study.

10 unwissenschaftlich

11 wissenschaftlich

12 Wissenschaft

13 wissenschaftlich

14 Lebensansicht

15 Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), *Pensées de M. Pascal sur la religion, et sur quelques autres sujets, qui ont esté trouvées après sa mort parmy ses papiers* [publiées avec une préface par Étienne Perier] (Paris : G. Desprez, 1669).

"Les hommes ont mépris pour la religion. Ils en ont haine et peur qu'elle soit vraie. Pour guérir cela il faut commencer par montrer que la religion n'est point contraire à la raison. Vénérable, en donner respect.

La rendre ensuite aimable, faire souhaiter aux bons qu'elle fut vraie et puis montrer qu'elle est vraie.

Vénérable parce qu'elle a bien connu l'homme.

Aimable parce qu'elle promet le vrai bien" [Men disdain religion. They hate it and fear that it may be true. To remedy that, we must start by showing that religion is not at all contrary to reason. Venerable, it deserves respect.

Then to make it lovable; to make good people wish that it were true, and then to show that it is true.

Venerable, because it really knows men.


16 See the following note.

17 Christoph Ernst Luthardt (1823-1902), *Apologetische Vorträge über die Grundwahrheiten des Christentums, im Winter 1864 zu Leipzig gehalten* [...], 3rd edition (Leipzig : Dörfling und Franke, 1864) [Apologetic Lectures on the Fundamental Truths of Christianity, delivered in Leipsic in the Winter of 1864 by Chr. Ernst Luthardt, doctor and professor of theology. Translated from the
seventh German edition by Sophia Taylor, 6th edition. (Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark, 1882), page v. Luthardt's statement is as follows: "It is [...] the task of the advocates of the Christian view to show, in the presence of modern thought, and by the resources of modern intellectual culture, that it, and it alone, is the satisfactory solution of the problem of all existence, of human life and its enigmas, of the human heart and its inquiries, -- to prove that Christianity is truth, truth ever young and always fresh, universal truth, and therefore equally adapted and equally satisfying to all ages and all degrees of civilisation. A similar thought was the theme of Pascal in his Pensées. What he sketched in broad outline and left unfinished should be carried out by us, his successors, with the resources and according to the necessities of our days. It will easily be recognised that the following Lectures have grown out of Pascal's Pensées."

18 Arguments for the dual nature of humanity -- its greatness and its misery -- are copious in Pascal's Pensées. Humanity is caught between the knowledge of its lofty state, rendered by its capacity for intellection, and the sense of its lowness, having fallen away from God by the deceiving powers of its own vainglorious imagination, prejudicial habits and egotism.

19 See Pensées, Part II, Chapter II, section 2: "La République des chrétiens. [...] Morale. Dieu ayant fait le ciel et la terre, qui ne sentent point le bonheur de leur être, il a voulu faire des êtres qui le connussent et qui composassent un corps de membres pensants. Car nos membres ne sentent point le bonheur de leur union, de leur admirable intelligence, du soin que la nature a d'influer sur les esprits et de les faire croître et durer. Qu'ils seraient heureux s'ils le sentaient, s'ils le voyaient! Mais il faudrait pour cela qu'ils eussent intelligence pour le connaître et bonne volonté pour consentir à celle de l'âme universelle. Que s'il, ayant reçu l'intelligence, ils s'en servaient à retenir en eux-mêmes la nourriture, sans la laisser passer aux autres membres, ils seraient non seulement injustes, mais encore misérables, et se haîraient plutôt que de s'aimer; leur béatitude, aussi bien que leur devoir, consistant à consentir à la conduite de l'âme entière à qui ils appartiennent, qui les aime mieux qu'ils ne s'aient eux-mêmes." [The Christian republic. [...] Morality. God, having made Heaven and Earth who have no idea of the felicity of their existence, wanted to make beings who did know of it and who would make up a corpus of thinking members. Now our members know nothing of their fortunate union, their admirable intelligence, the care Nature takes to affect their spirits and to make them grow and last. How happy they would be to feel it and see it! But for that to happen they would have to have the intelligence to recognize it and the good will to bow to the universal soul. So that, having received intelligence, if they used it to keep all nourishment to themselves, without passing it to other members, they would be not only unjust, but also miserable, and would hate rather than love each other -- their blessedness as well as their duty consisting in the consent to the entire soul to which they belong and which loves them more than they love themselves.]

20 "Wir [leben] in einem apologetischen Zeitalter [...]". This is the incipit of the Preface to Luthardt, first edition (see note 17 above).

21 Overbeck appears to conflate two images employed by Luthardt while not misjudging his central idea. We read in Luthardt's fourth Lecture, "The
creation of the world", on Astronomy: "The small human body is not unworthy of the spirit which can nevertheless compass a world; nor is the earth, though comparatively small in the universe, unfit for God to manifest Himself therein. [...] But we may also urge that, so far at least as we are able to judge, our earth does, not indeed externally and mathematically, but essentially and with respect to its condition, actually occupy a central position in our solar system, so as to form, though not its material, yet certainly its vital centre. For no other body of our system is so adapted as the earth to be the abode of organic life. We are able to institute a comparison in this respect between the earth and the other planets; for not only do the same laws prevail in the latter as in the former, but their component matter is, as astronomy and physics teach us, similar to that of our world. On the other hand, organic, as well as mental and spiritual life, requires the pre-existence of certain external conditions, which are either entirely absent in the other planets, or exist there in a degree far below the perfection in which they are found on earth." (pp. 92-93).

22 "The further [...] we depart from the sun the less are the general conditions of matter adapted for an existence like that of the human race. Omitting Neptune, the most distant of the planets, we find that in Uranus, distant from the sun eighteen hundred millions of miles, the light received from that luminary must be so slight, that the eye must be constituted like that of the night-owl to be able to see anything in its obscure twilight. It might, indeed, have pleased God to form the eye after such a model; but even then the sun would there appear so small, -- scarcely three times as large as Jupiter appears to us, -- that it would be almost lost among the other stars. And since the light of the sun has but a three thousandth part of the power and brightness which it possesses upon our earth, there could be there but a scarcely perceptible distinction between day and night, between morning and evening, and all things would be constantly enveloped in a monotonous obscurity. In such a world poetry must be absent, and true sentiment impossible." (pp. 93-4)

23 Wissenschaften

24 Reference is thus made to the verse "Sein Vaterland muß grösser sein" of the 1813 Ernst Moritz Arndt poem:

Des Deutschen Vaterland (1813)


Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland? / So nenne mir das große Land!


Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland? / So nenne mir das große Land! So weit die deutsche Zunge klingt / Und Gott im Himmel Lieder singt, Das soll es sein! / Das, wacker Deutscher, nenne dein!

Das ist des Deutschen Vaterland, / Wo Eide schwört der Druck der Hand, Wo Treue hell von Auge blitzt / Und Liebe warm im Herzen sitzt -- Das soll es sein! / Das, wacker Deutscher, nenne dein!

Das ist des Deutschen Vaterland, / Wo Zorn vertilgt den welschen Tand, Wo jeder Franzmann heisset Feind, / Wo jeder Deutsche heisset Freund -- Das soll es sein! / Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein!

Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein! / O Gott vom Himmel sieh darein Und gib uns echten deutschen Mut, / Daß wir es lieben treu und gut. Das soll es sein! / Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein!

[The German Fatherland]

What is the German fatherland? / Is it Prussia? Is it Swabia? Is it the land of the Swiss? Is it Tirol? / The land and the people are certainly pleasing; Yet no, no, no! / Its fatherland must be greater than this.

What is the German fatherland? / Is it Bavaria? Is it Styria? Is it where the sand of the dunes drifts? / Is it where the Danube roars? O no, no, no! / Its fatherland must be greater than this.

What is the German fatherland? / So the great land is called! Surely it is Austria, / Rich in honour and victory? O no, no, no! / Its fatherland must be greater than this.

What is the German fatherland? / So the great land is called! As far as the German tongue is heard / and God in Heaven sings Lieder, That is what it should be! / Call that your own, valiant German!
That is the German fatherland, / Where a handshake swears an oath, Where truth shines brightly from the eye / And love sits warmly in the heart - It should be thus! / Call that your own, valiant German!

That is the German fatherland, / Where anger destroys the Swiss-French dross, Where every Frenchman is called enemy, / Where every German is called friend - It should be thus! / It should all be Germany!

It should all be Germany! / O God in Heaven, look down And give us real German courage, / So that we love it truly and well. It should be thus! / It should be all Germany!]

(from Ernst Moritze Arndt. Ausgewählte Werke [Selected works], Vol. 3, Part II [Leipzig : Max Besse, n.d.], pp. 25-26.)


26 He whom God destroys is driven out of his mind.

27 Wissenschaft

28 Frostigkeit; the curious mixed metaphor of a frosty Hell in German was maintained in my translation.

29 In his commentary on the Letter to the Hebrews, Delitzsch summarizes Chapter VI, 4-12 of the Epistle, then evokes the foreseen anguish of both apostates and latecomers to the Faith: "Er [der Autor] stellt ihnen die Hoffnungslosigkeit des Abfalls bei vorausgegangener lebendiger Erkenntniss Christi vor Augen, obwohl sich zu ihnen eines Besseren vernehend, dass sie nämlich durch Glaubensbeständigkeit Erben der Verheissung werden." [He (the author) lays before their view the hopelessness of falling off from the previous living witness of Christ even if providing themselves with something better, namely becoming heirs to the Promised Land through constant belief.] [...] "Es ist unmöglich, dass die Rückerinnerung an die frühere Gemeinschaft mit dem Gotte des Heils sich nicht je zuweilen zum Rückverlangen nach der schnöde zerrissenen gestalten sollte. Aber die Thür der Busse ist geschlossen und jene scheinbar besseren Aufwallungen sind ohne Werth, ohne Macht und werden bald wieder überwogt. Jammern und Lästern gehen durcheinander. Auch in der Hölle ist es nicht anders. Denn auch da ist nicht bloß Zähneknirschen, sondern auch Heulen." [It is impossible that a recalling of the earlier association with the God of salvation would not occasionally become a backward-glancing wish for what was despicably torn away. But the door to repentance is closed and any apparently better outbursts are worthless, powerless and will soon be outweighed. Yammering and blaspheming become confused. It is just the same in Hell. For there we have not only gnashing of teeth, but also howling.] (Franz Delitzsch, Commentar zum Briefe an die Hebräer [Leipzig (Dörrfiling & Franke, 1857), pp. 221 and 231.]) Franz Julius Delitzsch (born at Leipzig, Feb. 23, 1813; died at Leipzig, March 4, 1890) was
a highly influential scholar, Christian missionary and proponent of Lutheran orthodoxy. His connection with Judaism originated with his Jewish "uncle" Julius Hirsch, who cared for and supported his family, and whom he in later life (1843) converted to Christianity. He studied Philosophy, with a special interest in the idealism of J.G. Fichte (see note 35 below). He subsequently transferred his focus to Theology, and in 1835 he earned a Doctorate in Philosophy from Leipzig, where he taught as a private tutor for seven years. During this period he produced a number of works: *Sur Geschichte der jüdischen Poesie vom Abschluß der heiligen Schriften des Alten Testaments bis auf die neueste Zeit* [On the history of Jewish poetry from the end of the Old Testament Holy Scriptures to most recent times] (Leipzig, 1836); *Wissenschaft, Kunst, Judentum. Schilderungen und Kritiken* [Science, art, Judaism. Portrayals and critiques] (Grimma, 1838); *Anekdoten zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Scholastik unter Juden und Moslemen aus hebraischen und arabischen Handschriften* [Anecdotes on the history of Medieval Scholasticism among Jews and Moslems, from Hebrew and Arabic manuscripts] (Leipzig, 1841); as well as the cataloguing of the Hebrew and Syriac Manuscripts of the Leipzig Council Library (1832).

In 1839 Delitzsch spoke at the annual banquet at Dresden for the Jewish Mission, with the intent of showing "wie alle Abneigung gegen die Judenmission in religiöser Gleichgültigkeit, Unglauben und Lieblosigkeit wurzele, wie es dagegen die heilige Pflicht der Christenheit sei, durch Fürbitte, Beispiel und Predigt das Reich Gottes unter den Juden fördern zu helfen" [how all aversion to the Jewish Mission was rooted in religious indifference, unbelief, and lack of love; how on the contrary the holy duty of Christianity was to help promote the Kingdom of God among the Jews by petition, example and preaching]; and he impressed the Dresden Friends of the Mission, such that he was requested to work on their behalf. This he did in Dresden, from 1839 to 1846, under the auspices of the Saxon Central Missionary League (*Hauptmissionsverein*). During this time, and later, he was engaged at various University posts: from 1844 at Leipzig, 1846 at Rostock, 1850 at Erlangen, and in 1867 back at Leipzig. In 1871 he accomplished the union of the Nuremberg and Dresden Jewish Missions, which then were renamed "die Mission zum 'Evangelisch-Lutherischen Zentralverein für die Mission unter Israel.'"

30 See previous note.

31 (This note is not in the first edition of the *Christlichkeits.* "For he who is required by the necessity of his position to speak the highest things is compelled by the same necessity to exhibit the highest things" (The Book of Pastoral Rule, and Selected Epistles, of Gregory the Great, Bishop of Rome, translated, with Introduction, Notes, and Indices, by the Rev. James Barmby, D.D., Vicar of Northallerton Yorkshire, Part II, chapter 3, p. 10, in A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Second Series, Vol. XII. Oxford : James Parker and Company, 1895).

32 Otto Zöckler was born May 27, 1833 in Grünberg, Oberhessen, son of Rector, Deacon, and Church Councillor Konrad Zöckler, who prepared his son personally, in the town of Laubach, for further education from 1849 at the Marburg Gymnasium. He planned to pursue studies in Theology and Philology at the University of Gießen from 1851, but finished by concentrating more on Classical Philology and languages. His theological training at Gießen having
proven unsatisfactory, he subsequently travelled and studied at Erlangen, Berlin, Halle and Göttingen before returning to habilitate at his original university. Combatting a cool reception there, he was obliged to be quite prolific; his dissertation of 1857 won him a teaching post, and as a Privatdozent he prepared lessons in New Testament, Church History, History of Dogma, Patristics, and Modern Theological History. In 1860 he produced a significant work, "Theologia naturalis, Entwurf einer systematischen Naturtheologie vom offenbarungsgläubigen Standpunkt aus" [On Natural Theology: Outline of a Systematic Natural Theology from the standpoint of belief in Revelation] in which "das Buch der Bibel durch das Buch der Natur zu illustrieren und hinwiederum dieses durch jenes zu deuten" [the book of the Bible is illustrated by the book of Nature, wherein the latter interprets the former]. He contributed to Vilmar's Jahrbücher der deutschen Theologie from 1863, and in 1865 to the Beweis der Glauben. From 1882 he took over the Evangelische Kirchenzeitung for a period of ten years. Other publications and monographs produced in his academic career (and of some relevance to Overbeck's work and interests) include the first comprehensive analysis of the life and work of Hieronymus (1865), a work on the Augsburg Confession (1870), the apologetic Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen Theologie und Naturwissenschaft mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Schöpfungsgeschichte [History of the relation between Theology and Natural Science with particular reference to the Creation Story] (1877 and 1879), Gottes Zeugen im Reiche der Natur. Biographien und Bekenntnisse großer Naturforscher aus alter und neuer Zeit [God's witnesses in the realm of nature. Biographies and professions from early and modern times] (1881), and a three-volume Handbuch der theologischen Wissenschaften [Handbook of theological sciences] in the 1880s.

33 "Wir stehen nun einmal den Wirkungen der Himmelsbewohner innerhalb unserer Erdenwelt, diesen Beweisungen göttlichen Geistes und göttlicher Kraft durch irdisch-menschliche oder auch durch englische Organe, diesen Erstlingen der zukünftigen Weltverklärung inmitten des zeitlichen Weltverlaufs, wir stehen ihnen gerade so und mit ganz ähnlichen Staunen gegenüber, wie die Wilden eines Südsee-Eilands den zum ersten Male erblickten Triumphen europäischer Civilisation und Erfindungsgabe, den Wirkungen einer Druckerpresse etwa, einer Dampfmaschine, oder eines Telegraphen, oder eines photographischen Apparats. Und ähnlich wie diese rohen Naturkinder nur sehr allmählich ihre Meinung vom zauberhaften, absolut übernatürlichen, ja widernatürlichen Character dieser Gegenständer ihres Staunens aufgeben werden, sehen wir die Menschen überhaupt nur sehr langsam zur Einsicht in das wahre Wesen der Wunder als Ausflüsse einer höheren oder verklärten Naturordnung gelangen. Die volle Erkenntniss und empirische Aneignung dieser höheren Naturordnung aber sehen wir für sie ganz ebenso erst auf die Zeit des Weltendes und der Palingenesie aufgespart, wie jene Wilden, erst nachdem christliche Erziehung, Gesittung und Bildung ihr Werk an ihnen vollendet, zum vollen Verständniss und allseitigen thätigen Mitgenuss jener Segnungen unserer Cultur gelangen können."

34 Otto Zöckler, Geisteskampf der Gegenwart: Monatschrift für christliche Weltanschauung [Current spiritual struggles; Monthly writing for Christian worldview] (Gütersloh v. 1 [1865] - v. 69 [1933]). The title varies: v. 1-44, Beweis des Glaubens [Proof of faith]; with vol. 47 it absorbed Glauben und Wissen [Believing and knowing]; at vol. 70, was absorbed by Wort und Tat [Word and deed].
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (born at Rammnau in der Oberlausitz, May 19, 1762; died at Berlin January 29, 1814) first studied at the Fürstenschule in Schulpforta, in Jena and Leipzig. In 1790 he began to work on Kant, sending the latter a copy of his *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung* in 1791 (which was published anonymously in 1792 and thought to be by Kant until Kant himself announced who had written it). He became a professor at Jena in 1793 but was dismissed in 1799 during the so-called "atheist struggle" (Atheismusstreit) because of his response to Forberg's *Entwicklung des Begriffs der Religion*. He moved to Berlin where he eventually (1810) became Professor and first Rector of the newly-founded University of Berlin. Fichte's works were influential and varied. In addition to his response to atheism (and his self-defence of the same) and his work on Kant's ideas of free thought, he wrote on the French Revolution (*Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums über die Französische Revolution* [1793] [Articles to correct the public's opinion on the French Revolution], on scientific teaching (*Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre* [On the concept of scientific teaching] [1794]; *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* [Foundation for total scientific teaching] [1794]; *Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse* [Scientific teaching in its general outlines] [1810]), on historical philosophy (*Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* [Basic traits of the present era] [1800]), on the founding of a university in Berlin (*Der deduzierten Plan einer zu Berlin zu errichtenden höheren Lehranstalt* [Deduced plan for establishing higher education in Berlin] [1807 -- published in 1817], on metaphysical reflection (*Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben* [Instructions for a blessed life] [1806]), on the teaching of morality (*System der Sittenlehre* [1812]), on state education (*Staatslehre* [1813]), on *Transzendentale Logik* (1812) as well as a later-cited collection of thoughts addressed to the German nation as a whole (*Reden an die deutsche Nation* [1807-08]).

Some aspects of sections §8 and §9 of the *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung* (Felix Meiner edition, Hamburg, 1983, pp. 71-89) recall Overbeck's point here; especially (1) whether the notion of Revelation is a priori or a posteriori and the implications of both (pp. 71-2); (2) whether any teaching about Revelation is feasible if we have not yet fully witnessed it (p. 76 and 81); (3) that what might follow from the fact that supernatural occurrences can be explained by scientific means, if not right away, then perhaps later on (p. 79); and (4) that what is signified by the moral content of Revelation and the question of mutable morality depends on circumstances.

For an exposition of the term "Bildungschristen", Niklaus Peter (OWN 1 p. 194) makes reference to the article by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf: "Kulturprotestantismus. Zur Begriffsgeschichte einer theologiepolitischen Chiffre" [Cultural Protestantism. Toward a history of the concept of a theological political cipher.] in *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 28 (1984) : 214-268. Graf discusses the shift from an old to a new Protestantism beginning around the 1820s, and characterizes the two thus:

"'Altprotestantismus' bezeichnet für die Neuprotestanten [...] notwendig eine religionspolitisch naive und obsolet gewordene Bewußtseinsstufe, nämlich den Standpunkt derer, die sich in der dogmatischen Fixierung auf den historischen Altprotestantismus der Reformation und der Orthodoxie des späten 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts der aufklärerisch-idealistischen Modernisierung des Christentums erweigern, darin die gesamtgesellschaftliche Marginalität des kirchlichen Protestantismus festschreiben, folglich nichts Geringeres als die Zukunft des Protestantismus verspielen und gerade so einer kulturpolitisch ruinös..."
progressiven Entchristlichung der modernen Gesellschaft ungewollt Vorschub leisten." ["Old Protestantism" necessarily means, for the New Protestants, a religio-politically naïve and obsolete stage of consciousness -- namely the stage that, in its dogmatic fixation on the historical Old Protestantism of the Reformation and orthodoxy of the late 16th and 17th centuries, refuses the Enlightenment-idealistic modernization of Christianity; in which the collective communal marginality of Church Protestantism is established, and as a consequence nothing less than the future of Protestantism is gambled away. Thus a cultural-politically ruinous progressive de-Christianizing of modern society is unwillingly encouraged.] The contrasting "New Protestantism" is described, in the eyes of the Old Protestants: "[...] der Neuprotestantismus der Gegenwart [ist] bestenfalls eine spezifisch bürgerliche Häresie: die Verfälschung des Christentums zu einer postchristlichen synkretistischen "Bildungsreligion," die primär aus außerchristlichen griechisch-römischen und renaissancephilosophischen Traditionen sich speist und nur der kulturformmen Glorifizierung eines die Position Gottes usurpierenden autonomen menschlichen Herrschaftssubjekts dient. Aluprotestantismus und Neuprotestantismus werden hier also nicht mehr als konkurrierende Gestalten protestantischer Frömmigkeit unterschieden, sondern sie gelten nur als neue Begriffe für den alten Gegensatz von reformatorischem Rechtfertigungsglauben und humanistischer Kulturfrömmigkeit [...]". [The present-day New Protestantism is at best a particularly bourgeois heresy: the falsification of Christianity into a post-Christian, syncretistic "Educated religion," nourished primarily by extra-Christian Greco-Roman and Renaissance-philosophical traditions and only serving toward the culturally pious glorification of an autonomous human subject usurping the position of God. Thus Old Protestantism and New Protestantism here are no longer distinguished in terms of conflicting figures of Protestant piety; rather they merely count as new terms for the old opposition between Reformation-like belief in justification and humanistic cultural piety (...).]

37 Basil, bishop of Caesarea († 379); his brother Gregory, bishop of Nyssa († ca. 394); and his friend Gregory of Nazianze († ca. 390)

38 Acts 17 : 16

39 See note 57 to Overbeck text page 37.

40 Niklaus Peter (OWNI p. 195 note) gives two examples of Greek proverbs cited by Paul: I Cor 15 : 33 ("Be not deceived: evil communications corrupt good manners"), from Menander (Thaïs); and Tit 1:12 ("The Cretians are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies"), from Epimenides (De oraculis). These examples are also cited in the Interpreter’s Bible, vols. 10 and 11.

41 Thomas Hemerken or Malleolus, called a Kempis (1380-1471), De Imitatione Christi (1441). (Examination of the disputed authorship of the Imitatione is given by Albert Ampe in L’Imitation de Jésus-Christ et son auteur [Roma : Edizioni di Stora e Letteratura, 1973], especially p. 42ff.).

42 "Generalsuperintendent, in der evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands Amtsbezeichnung für die höchste geistliche Würde. Die Zusammenfassung mehrerer Gemeinden zu Aufsichtsbezirken (Inspektion, Diözese, Ephorie, Kreis)
erfolgte nach katholischem Vorbild schon in der Reformationszeit. Die Zusammenfassung dieser Aufsichtsbezirke unter einer Zentralinstanz erschien gleichfalls meist um der Einheitlichkeit der Landeskirche willen nötig. In Preußen waren die Generalsuperintendenten nach Verordnung von 1828 stellvertretende Vorsitzende der Provinzialkonsistorien; in einigen Provinzen gibt es mehrere Generalsuperintendenten. In Württemberg, Baden, Hessen-Darmstadt führten die Generalsuperintendenten den Titel "Prälaten". Durch die neuen Verfassungen der evangelischen Kirchen in Deutschland (seit 1919) ist die Bedeutung des Amtes noch gestiegen; in Altpreußen hat der Generalsuperintendent den Vorsitz im Konsistorium. Er wird gewählt vom Kirchenschatz auf Vorschlag des Oberkirchenrates. In einigen deutschen evangelischen Kirchen hat man dem Generalsuperintendenten den Titel Bischof gegeben; in Thüringen heißt er Landesoberpfarrer; auch sonst sind Titel und Befugnisse verschieden." (Der Große Brockhaus, 15th ed., 1930) [General Superintendent: highest office in the German Evangelical Church. The assembling of several congregations into supervisory divisions (inspectorates, dioceses, bodies of ephors, districts) was a result of the Catholic model in Reformation times. The assembling of these supervisory divisions under a central authority also appeared necessary mostly for the unity of the state churches. In Prussia, the General Superintendents, in accordance with the decree of 1828, are acting chairmen of the provincial consistories. In some provinces there are several General Superintendents. In Württemberg, Baden, and Hessen-Darmstadt, General Superintendents were called Prelates. With the new constitutions of the Evangelical Church in Germany (since 1919), the significance of the office has augmented; in old Prussia the General Superintendent has the chairmanship of the consistory. He is chosen from the Church Senate upon recommendation of the Upper Church Advisory. In some German Evangelical Churches, the General Superintendent has been given the title "Bishop"; in Thuringia he is called State Head Pastor. Otherwise titles and authorities vary.

43 Wilhelm Hoffmann (1806-1873): see note 46 below. At the head of the Oberkirchenrat in 1870-71, Hoffmann spoke against the Protestant League in his Deutschland Einst und Jetzt im Lichte des Reiches Gottes (see note 46 below). One section reads: "Nimmermehr kann [diese Partei] in der preußischen Landeskirche als eine zu Recht bestehende unter dem Namen einer der berechtigten Formen der Union geduldet werden, sie dann nur wie die Freigemeinden, selbst nur wie die Juden zur Kirche stehen." [This party can no longer be tolerated in the Prussian state Church as one of the justified forms under the name of the Union; it can only stand as free-church (?) as do the Jews.]

44 Wissenschaft

45 "Es kann zugegeben werden, daß Christentum und moderne Bildung sich näher zu rücken haben, und daß die Bewegung nicht blos auf Seiten der Träger der letzteren sein muß. Es kann eine höhere Schätzung der peripherischen Wirkungen des Christenthums in den Kreisen der Pfleger, Leiter und Diener der Kirche gefordert werden, es kann auch auf Scheidung dessen, was wirklich zum Glauben gehört, von dem was rein in's [sic] Gebiet des Wissens fällt, gedrungen, es kann der Anspruch an Zurückhaltung der Kirche in ihre Urtheil über die Wissenschaft erhoben werden. Aber nun und nimmermehr darf die Kirche ihren Glauben an den persönlichen dreieinigen Gott, an die Menschwerdung
Gottes in Christo, an die Erlösung durch sein Leben, Leiden und Sterben, an die Versöhnung durch seine Auferstehung und Himmelfahrt, an die Gründung der Kirche durch den heiligen Geist aufgeben, um sich der modernen Zeitbildung zu nähern, denn thut sie das, so giebt sie nicht eine Ansicht, sondern eine Religion auf.'"

46 Wilhelm Hoffmann, Deutschland einst und jetzt im Licht des Reiches Gottes [Germany, Past and Present, in the Light of the Kingdom of God]. Von W. Hoffmann, Dr. der Theologie, Hof- und Domprediger und Schloßpfarrer zu Berlin, General=Superintendent der Kurmark Brandenburg u.s.w. [etc.] (Berlin : Stilke & Van Muyden, 1868). Wilhelm Hoffmann (born at Leonberg in Württemberg, October 30, 1806; died at Berlin, August 28, 1873) engaged in many areas of study -- natural science, geography, medicine, philosophy, homiletics, theology -- and, after a dramatic moment of conversion, gained positions of pastoral leadership as Vicar in Heumaden bei Stuttgart, as "Repentent" in Tübingen, as State Vicar in Stuttgart, and as Deacon in Winnenden. He composed a "scientific" response to D.F. Strauß's Life of Jesus. In 1839 he was appointed Mission Inspector in Basel, with attention toward the Christian holdings in Asia, Africa, and North America. His missionary publications included Missionsstunden und Vorträge [Missionary hours and talks] (1847, 1851, 1853); Missionsfragen [Missionary questions] (1847); Über die Erziehung des weiblichen Geschlechtes zwischen den Wendekreisen [On the education of the female between the Tropics] (1859); Franz Xavier, Ein weltgeschichtliches Missionsbild [Francis Xavier, A world-historical missionary picture] (1869); Die Epoehen der Kirchengeschichte Indiens [Eras of Church history of India] (1853); Die christliche Litteratur als Werkzeug der Mission [Christian literature as a missionary tool] (1853); and a near thirteen-year editing of the Basel Missionary Magazine. While in Basel he also served on the theological Faculty, and later moved to Tübingen as Professor and Stiftsephorus. From 1852 he was brought to Berlin, through the auspices of Friedrich Wilhelm IV, as Court and Cathedral Preacher, as well as Upper Church Counsellor, and soon thereafter was named Generalsuperintendent.

47 Ansicht

48 Wissenschaft

49 As Niklaus Peter reports, Overbeck makes a play on the word "verblümt" in the margin of the first edition's manuscript: "Und mit was für Papier- 'Blumen'!" [And with what paper flowers!]

50 "nimmermehr" : see quotation given in note 43 above.

51 Niklaus Peter explains this allusion (OWN 1, p. 197) : "Bezieht sich auf den sog[enanneten] Apostolikumsstreit 1871-72 : Gegen Adolf Sydow, der in einem Vortrag die vaterlose Zeugung Jesu bestritten hatte, wurde ein Disziplinarverfahren angestrengt und seine Amtsenthebung verfügt, die jedoch in ein Tadelsvotum umgewandelt wurde." [Refers to the so-called "apostolic struggle" of 1871-72 : a disciplinary action was brought against Adolf Sydow, who in a lecture had contested the fatherless begetting of Jesus and who subsequently was removed from office -- which act was nonetheless overturned in a vote of censure.] Karl Leopold Adolf Sydow (born at Berlin November 23, 1800; died October 23, 1882) was the son of the mayor of Charlottenburg, where
he received his earliest schooling. From 1812 he received instruction at the Berlin Gymnasium and from 1819 at the University of Berlin. He attended the lectures of Schleiermacher on the life of Jesus and later contributed to the edition of his influential teacher's works. Late in 1827 he was appointed pastor of the Berlin Cadet Corps; he married in 1828 and twelve years later was widowed, with seven children to raise alone. In 1836 Friedrich Wilhelm III called Sydow to Potsdam as Court and Garrison Preacher. Less than four years later Friedrich Wilhelm IV came to power and held Sydow in lower esteem. In the year that followed, Sydow was sent to do on-the-spot research of the Church scene in England, with a view to working on reforms in liturgy, hymnody, prayer and other areas -- the only difficulty being that Sydow knew virtually no English. At Easter, 1844, he returned to Potsdam, from which point his relations with the Kaiser grew increasingly strained. His experience with free-thinking religious groups in England influenced his view of German ecclesiastical conflict, and in 1846 he represented the standpoint against ordination vows, among other things. That year he left the Berlin magistrature, becoming a spiritual leader of the New Church in Berlin (which he held for thirty years). He worked with others on the periodical Zeitschrift für die unitre Kirche, which evolved into the Protestantische Kirchenzeitung. He founded the peace-driven Gustav-Adolf-Verein and later co-founded the Protestantenverein, through which he published pieces inimical to the ideas of the Kaiser's consistory. In recognition of his efforts he was awarded an honorary Doctorate from Jena in 1858. At the advanced age of 72 he found himself embroiled in the argument about the divine begetting of Jesus, which battle took an official form in March and May of 1872. In early 1873 the authorities condemned Sydow's position, prompting a vehement reaction of solidarity (with Sydow) from the theological world. Changes of government and public sympathy led to Sydow's regaining his post in June of 1873.

52 Lebensbetrachtung

53 Sir Robert Filmer (1588-1653) was an Englishman of an established, wealthy family. He was educated at Cambridge and Lincoln's Inn and was involved in local government in Kent, taking an active interest in mercantile, legal, and court matters in London. A witness to unrest surrounding the reign of Charles I, Filmer opposed the notion of the people's granting sovereignty to its ruler; he advocated instead the divine hierarchical pattern of society as handed down by God via Adam, the so-called rule of Eden. Filmer's principal writings on this topic include Patriarcha: A Defence of the Natural Power of Kings against the Unnatural Liberty of the People (ca. 1635-42); and The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy.

54 "im Licht des Reiches Gottes" : see note 46 above.

55 "'in Gottes grossem Reiche die Mannigfaltigkeit der Nationen berechtigt sei,' aber 'erst der verwandten germanischen, dann aber auch der romanischen und slawischen'."

56 Rom 1:16 : "For I am not ashamed of the gospel; it is the power of God for salvation to everyone who has faith, to the Jew first and also to the Greek." (NRSV)
57 Niklaus Peter identifies this person as "Pfarrverweser Johann aus Wiedenbrück," citing the Acts of the October Ecclesiastical Assembly in Berlin, October 10–12, 1871, p. 42 (OWN 1, p. 198, footnote to line 35); for the quotation from John Chrysostom, see note 7 above.

58 "Die steigende Unruhe der Versammlung, welche zuletzt stürmisch den Schluss verlangt, nötigt den Redner abzubrechen."

59 "[...] 'so lange es noch Sünde in der Welt gebe, würden auch Kriege geführt werden, daß aber auch Gott fortfahren werde, sich in den Kriegen als der Herr Zebaoth zu offenbaren.' "

60 This is a loose and interpretive rendering of "Wortchristentum," and is open to question.

61 2 Tm 4 : 2 : "Proclaim the message; be persistent whether the time is favorable or unfavorable; convince, rebuke, and encourage, with the utmost patience in teaching." (NRSV)

62 Overbeck's use of the verb "wollen" (to want) is not fully clear in this sentence. The German reads: "Aus allem Gesagten wird so viel klar sein, dass unsere modernen Apologeten Christenthum, noch klarer vielleicht, das sie Weltbildung wollen. Es lohnt nun wohl noch die Frage: was für eine Bildung sie wollen?"

63 christliche[...] Lebensbetrachtung

64 geistliches

65 Neue evangelische Kirchenzeitung: see note 9 above.

66 wissenschaftlich


"Betrieb der Wissenschaft"

wissenschaftlich

Brief information is furnished by Niklaus Peter (OWN 1 p. 202) : "Johann Chr. K. von Hofmann (1810-1877), ein Hauptvertreter der konservativ-lutherischen 'Erlanger Schule': er betont die heilsgeschichtlichen Bezüge in der Schrift, z. B. in: Weissemung und Erfüllung im alten und neuen Testamente. 1841/44; Der Schriftbeweis. 1852-55." [Johann Chr. K. von Hofmann (1810-1877), a prominent representative of the Conservative Lutheran "Erlangen School"; he stresses the salvific references in Scripture, for example in "Prophecy and fulfillment in the Old and New Testaments." 1841/44; "Scriptural evidence." 1852-55.]

Neue evangelische Kirchenzeitung: see note 9 above.

Theodor Keim (1825-1878), Geschichte Jesu von Nazara in ihrer Verkettung mit dem Gesamtleben seines Volkes, frei untersucht und ausführlich erzählt [The story of Jesus of Nazareth with the entire life of his people, freely researched and related in detail.], 3 vols. (Zürich: Orell Füssli, 1867-72). Vol. 1: Der Rüstücktag [The Day of Preparation]; Vol. 2: Das galiläische Lehrjahr [The Galilean Teaching-Year]; Vol 3: Das jerusalemische Todesostern [The Easter-death at Jerusalem]. A relevant passage, in the translation of Arthur Ransom (London: Williams and Norgate, 1876), reads: "Science and the Church are unitedly occupied with the one problem: the attempt to recover the historical life of Jesus. They convert the problem into a commission. This commission to narrate the life of Jesus is entrusted to the theological section of historical inquiry, a branch both of the general science of history and of the literature of the Church that seeks a scientific basis or a scientific justification. Those who impose the commission only reserve to themselves the right of accepting or rejecting the obtained solution, as consistent with, or contradictory to, their principles, and, should the solution be rejected, of proposing the question afresh.

United as science and the Church are in demanding an historical life of Jesus, they appear to be quite as much at issue in their principles, and therefore to differ widely in all their verdicts upon the results offered to them. The fundamental law of historical science, even with reference to the life of Jesus, is uninterrupted sequence; the watchword of the Church, isolation: there, organic articulation; here, individuality: there, a human, here, a divine, personality-

"die 'heutige Wissenschaft' könne 'viel treuer das Leben dessen zeichnen, in dem die Herrlichkeit des Eingeborenen vom Vater erschienen ist'."

Peter Niklaus (OWN 1 p. 203) assumes that Overbeck refers to C. Tischendorf's Wann wurden unsere Evangelien verfasst? [When were our gospels created?] (Leipzig, 1865) and cites his critique of the book in the Litterarisches Centralblatt of 1865 (especially p. 521 ff.).

"[...] das Ideal der Kirche lasse sich 'in einer sündigen Welt nur unvollkommen realisieren.' " 

79 *Betrachtung*

80 *Weltbetrachtung*

81 *Lebensbetrachtung*
Notes to pp. 72-109: Chapter 2, Part 3 (Current Liberal Theology)

1 See internal reference, Overbeck text page 59.

2 I have not located a specific accusation of "perfidy" lodged at Strauß. Strong objection, however, might have been made to a particular section in his Der alte und der neue Glaube: Part I ("Sind wir noch Christen?") section 32, especially pp. 59-61, in which Strauß deplores the watering-down of or lack of respect for symbols and ceremonies on the part of the Protestant Church.

3 Lebensbetrachtung

4 wissenschaftlich

5 Lebensansicht

6 geistlich

7 Wissenschaft

8 "Christentum Christi": Niklaus Peter (OWN 1, p. 207) comments upon this expression: "Overbeck notiert sich den unklaren und apologetischen Charakter dieses Schlagwortes der liberalen Theologie schon auf einem frühen Zettel des Kirchenlexikon: A 227 'Jesus und das Christenthum. Bedeutung seiner Person für dasselbe. Kritiker', welches er bei H. Holtmann (in: Neue Protestanter Blatter für das evangelische Oesterreich Nr. 14, 1866) gefunden hatte. Auch D. G. Finsler erwähnt das Aufkommen dieses Schlagwortes in der Schweiz: Finsler: Geschichte, S. 122: 'Das Christentum Christi, von dem die Partei (sc. die 'freisinnige Richtung') nach Lessings Vorgang mit Vorliebe redet, reducirt sich dann leicht auf allgemeine religiöse Begriffe, wie denn überhaupt in der Sprache dieser Partei das 'Religiöse' öfter an die Stelle des 'Christlichen' tritt.' [Overbeck notes the unclear and apologetical character of this catchphrase of Liberal Theology in an early jotting in his Church Lexicon: A 227, 'Jesus and Christianity. Meaning of his person for the same. Critiques,' which he had found in H. Holtmann (New Protestant pages for evangelical Austria, no. 14, 1866). D. G. Finsler also notes the emergence of the phrase in Switzerland: Finsler, History, p. 122: 'The Christianity of Christ, spoken of by the Party (especially the "liberal-minded") after Lessing's favoured relating, is easily reduced to general religious concepts; how much more often, then, in the overall language of this Party, does the "religious" take the place of the "Christian."']

9 Of the eight points grouped by Lessing under the rubric "Die Religion Christi," Niklaus Peter (OWN 1 p. 208) has chosen what are arguably the three most pertinent to Overbeck's argument here: (1) 'Ob Christus mehr als Mensch gewesen, das ist ein Problem. Daß er wahrer Mensch gewesen, wenn er es überhaupt gewesen; daß er nie aufgehört hat, Mensch zu sein: das ist ausgemacht. (2) Folglich sind die Religion Christi und die christliche Religion zwei ganz verschiedene Dinge. [...] (5) Wie beide diese Religionen, die Religion Christi sowohl als die Christliche, in Christo als in einer und eben derselben Person bestehen können, ist unbegreiflich.' [(1) Whether Christ was more than human is a problem. That he was a true human being, if he was
one at all; that he never ceased to be human: that is agreed. (2) It follows that the religion of Christ and the Christian religion are two completely different things. [...] (5) How these two religions, the religion of Christ as well as the Christian religion, can both be constituted in Christ as one and the same person, is inconceivable.] (G.E. Lessing: Die Religion Christi. Werke, ed. H.G. Göpfert [Munich 1976], Vol. 7, p. 71lf).

10 "[...] "der Gedanke eines Lebens Jesu sei die Schlinge, in welche die Theologie unserer Zeit fallen und in der sie zu Falle kommen musste’ [...]" Niklaus Peter (OWN 1 p. 209) cites this passage from Strauß’s Das Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet. (Leipzig 1864, p. 5); and he refers to Keim’s quoting it as well in the latter’s Geschichte Jesu [History of Jesus] (p. 6 note 2). A similar thought is found in section 19 of Part 1 ("Sind wir noch Christen?") in Strauß’s Der alte und der neue Glauben (p.31) : "Daß die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Christentums sich zuletzt zu der nach der Persönlichkeit seines Stifters zugespiitzt hat, der Entscheidungskampf der christlichen Theologie auf dem Felde des Lebens Jesu ausgefochten werden mußte, kann zunächst Wunder nehmen, ist aber doch ganz in der Ordnung." [That the question of the truth of Christianity finally culminated in the personality of its founder, and that the deciding dispute of Christian theology had to be fought on the battlefield of the life of Jesus, can at first be surprising, but it is actually to be expected.]

11 "[...] ‘durch und durch von einer Zeit aus, welche die alten Vorstellungen von göttlicher Person hinter sich gelegt und die volle Lust zu einem menschlichen Jesus gewonnen hatte’ [...]" (For source of quotation, see preceding note.)

12 Wissenschaft

13 Wissenschaft

14 Relevant paragraphs from Keim’s History of Jesus read: "Science and the Church are unitedly occupied with the one problem: the attempt to recover the historical life of Jesus. They convert the problem into a commission. This commission to narrate the life of Jesus is entrusted to the theological section of historical inquiry, a branch both of the general science of history and of the literature of the church that seeks a scientific basis or a scientific justification. Those who impose the commission only reserve to themselves the right of accepting or rejecting the obtained solution, as consistent with, or contradictory to, their principles, and, should the solution be rejected, of proposing the question afresh.

United as science and the Church are in demanding an historical life of Jesus, they appear to be quite as much at issue in their principles, and therefore to differ widely in all their verdicts upon the results offered to them. The fundamental law of historical science, even with reference to the life of Jesus, is uninterrupted sequence; the watchword of the Church, isolation: there, organic articulation; here, individuality: there, a human, here a divine, personality" (Theodor Keim, The History of Jesus of Nazara. Freely Investigated in Its Connection with the National Life of Israel, and Related in Detail, translated by Arthur Ransom, Vol. 1, 2nd edition [London: Williams and Norgate, 1876]).
wissenschaftlich

" [...] 'die Dictatur in seinem Geistwesen Religion sei' [...] ."

pomphaft

wissenschaftlich

"freie Theologie"

Wissenschaft

wissenschaftlich


Lebensbetrachtung

" [...] 'die Seelen der Zeiten und der Völker zu durchleben' [...] ."


216, Principle of Accommodation, No. 4, p. 2-3: "No. 4. The acknowledgement of the reference given in my 1873 (Christlichkeit...) to the incontrovertibility of accommodation for today's theology has since, in spite of me, begun to be recognized by emergent modern theology itself, in Bernoulli's Method (1897). It will, however, be promoted even further along this line, and thus may forget its growth. For both, see E. Troeltsch's Absolute Nature of Christianity [(Overbeck's] abbreviations eliminated [by N. Peter])."" Overbeck shed much ink on the problem of accommodation, in particular with reference to Ernst Troeltsch and Adolf Harnack, as it amounted to a denial of original Christian tenets and an ignoring of historical critical method (see especially Martin Henry, pp. 260-273). Ernst Troeltsch (born at Augsburg, 1865; died 1923), evangelical theologian and cultural philosopher, was a private tutor in Göttingen in 1891, professor extraordinarius of Systematic Theology in Bonn in 1892, professor ordinarius of Theology in 1894 (and of Philosophy from 1910) in Heidelberg, professor of Philosophy in Berlin from 1914, and from 1919-21 held the post of State Secretary for Evangelical Opportunities in the Prussian Ministry of Culture. He was particularly influenced by the work of Albrecht Ritschl and Hermann Schultz. His philosophical interests combined with an historical knowledge of Christianity to produce an "accommodating" extension of earliest Christian principles; Protestant thought was to be communicated with recourse to historical method, historical philosophy and current psychology. A citation from the Troeltsch work mentioned by Overbeck above can serve to illustrate the basis of the latter's objection to accommodation: "Soferne -- um auf wichtige ältere Aeußerungen zurückzugreifen -- das bekannte Buch von Bernoulli Die wissenschaftliche und kirchliche Methode 1897 den meinigen ähnliche Tendenzen vertritt, kann ich auch ihm nur zustimmen. Ich glaube aber, daß Bernoulli die Wirkungen des historischen Relativismus bedeutend überschätzt, und daß sich das ganze Problem mit viel ruhigerem Blute anfassen läßt. Eine wissenschaftliche Theologie, die sich die Grundstellung zum Christentum zu einem auf absehbar Zeit unlösbaren Probleme macht, löst sich selbst und ist meines Erachtens eine arge Ueberreibung der Ergebnisse religionswissenschaftlicher Betrachtung. Die daneben bewilligte kirchliche Theologie muß sich dabei wie erhöht vorkommen und verliert jede Basis. Ich kann daher an dem letzteren Gedanken nur das Moment als berechtigt anerkennen, daß bei der starken Verwandlung der überlieferten Auffassung des Christentums durch eine religionsgeschiedlich begründete Theologie in der Praxis und vor allem in dogmatischen Autoritäten stehenden Kirchen dienen wollen, eine vorsichtig schonende und leise umbildende Akkommodation nötig ist. [...]" [To the extent that -- to go back to important earlier utterances -- the well-known book of Bernoulli, Scientific and ecclesiastical method (1897), supports similar leanings of mine, I can only agree with him. I believe, however, that Bernoulli significantly overestimates the effects of historical relativism, and that the whole problem can be approached with much less heated blood. A scientific Theology that lays the basis of Christianity upon a foreseeable time creates insoluble problems for itself; it solves itself and in my opinion exaggerates terribly the results of religio-scientific reflection. Concomitantly approved ecclesiastical Theology then, as though mocked, must come to the forefront, and loses all foundation. Therefore I can only acknowledge as justified, in this last idea, that, with the strong transformation of the inherited view of Christianity by a religio-historically based Theology in praxis, and especially in dogmatically constituted and led Churches, a careful, gentle, and softly reshaping accommodation is needed. ]
27 Niklaus Peter (OWN 1, p. 214) points to a similar statement made by Overbeck in his "Über die Anfänge des Mönchthums" [On the Beginnings of Monasticism] (p.8; also in OWN 1, p. 16): "Das Mönchthum nämlich ist die Institution in welcher die Kirche in dem Moment, da sie sich ganz in die Hände des heidnischen Staates hinzugeben scheint, sich doch seinen Netzen zu entwinden und dem Staat auf Jahrhunderte hinaus eine Unzahl seiner besten Kräfte zu entziehen und sich zu sichern weiss." [Monasticism is precisely the institution in which the Church, the moment it appeared to give itself over to the heathen State, wrested itself from its nets and, withdrawing for centuries from a host of powers, could make itself secure.]

28 Lebensbetrachtung

29 Lebensansicht

30 Lebensbetrachtung

31 "'Das kleine Häuflein der ersten Gläubigen', wird uns gesagt, 'fühlte sich nur als eine Schaar von Pilgrimen und Fremdlingen in der gegenwärtigen Welt, des Rufes des Herrn zu jeder Stunden gewättig. Weltsucht ist daher die Signatur des ursprünglichen Christenthums. Die Kirche seit Mitte des zweiten Jahrhunderts fühlte sich schon als eine Macht in der Welt und that täglich ihre Pforten weiter auf, um die Fülle der Beiden in sich aufzunehmen. Gerade jener Glaube, in welchem zuerst das Geheimniss ihres schnellen Wachstums beruhte, trat, jemehr die Bethäuser sich füllten, immer weiter zurück.'"

32 Lebensbetrachtung


34 "unheilige Masse"

35 Weltbetrachtung

36 Betrachtung

37 "[..] es solle 'sich nichts Störendes drängen zwischen den Menschen und seinen Urquell' [..]."

38 Spörri : see note 25 above.

39 "[..]'daß es dem Reiche Gottes, das Jesus durch sein Evangelium in die Welt gesetzt hat, eigenthümlich sei, ein stets werdendes und ein stets kommendes zu sein'[..]."

40 Lebensbetrachtung
The views of Jesus and Paul on marriage and the family, relative to their own personal positions, are discussed in Der alte und der neue Glaube, Part IV ("Wie ordenen wir unser Leben") [How do we order our lives?], section 77 ("Die Sinnlichkeit im Verhältniß der Geschlechter") [Meaning in the relationship between the sexes], especially pp. 168-170.

W. Brückner, Die Entstehung der christlichen Kirche in der Zeit der Apostel [The establishment of the Christian Church at the time of the Apostles] (Karlsruhe, 1873), p. 53.

Lebensbetrachtung

Beginning at Mt 19:3, one perceives a more cohesive pericope on divorce: "Some Pharisees came to him, and to test him they said, 'Is it awful for a man to divorce his wife for any cause?' He answered, 'Have you not read that the one who made them at the beginning "made them male and female," and said "For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh'? So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, let no one separate.' They said to him, 'Why then did Moses command us to give a certificate of dismissal and to divorce her?' He said to them, 'It was because you were so hard-hearted that Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so. And I say to you, whoever divorces his wife, except for unchastity, and marries another, commits adultery.' His disciples said to him, 'If such is the case of a man with his wife, it is better not to marry.' But he said to them, 'Not everyone can accept this teaching, but only those to whom it is given. For there are eunuchs who have been so from birth, and there are eunuchs who have been made eunuchs by others, and there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. Let anyone accept this who can.' "[NRSV - verse 12 underlined]

"'Nach Strauß, sagt einer seiner eben näher bezeichneten Gegner, soll Jesu 'das Verständniß für Ehe und Familienleben gefehlt haben.'"

"'Aber derjenige, welcher das Verhältniß von Vater und Kind zum Sinnbild der höchsten religiösen Idee erwählte, muß doch wohl über diese Verhältnisse anders gedacht haben, als Strauß annimmt' [...]"

Weltbetrachtung

The evocation of Augustine's views on marriage could be seen to be within a particular polemical context for Overbeck. First, Augustine is given here to be the mouthpiece of the Church, both in 1873 as well as in the fifth century, since he makes no historical distinction. Second, Overbeck cites these views as an example, not the example, of the church's linking asceticism with Jesus' thoughts on the family. Augustine's ideas are not great in number but are extensively argued in more than one literary source. I take the main points, in no particular order, from the first book of De nuptiis et concupiscentiae, and give Augustine's corresponding scriptural references, since one could argue that certain views come from Jesus' disciples and certainly more directly from the Church via Paul, thus muddying a bit Overbeck's use of Strauss. (1) Marriage is a gift from God but, as Paul says, is classed below
continence. (2) Marriage yields the natural good of procreation. (3) The man possesses the wife in sanctification and honour, since the purpose of sexual intercourse is to produce children who will, it is hoped, be born again in Christ. (4) Marriage keeps men and women from fornicating; moderate intercourse within the married state is permitted and forgiven. (5) Divorce is not permitted for reasons of barrenness or mutual continence; man and wife remain married, joined by the soul by mutual truth. (6) The conception and gestation of the child is not to be blocked or aborted by any means.

49 "'Kunst und Wissenschaft' lässt unser Redner ferner Strauß sagen, 'seien Jesus verschlossen gewesen' und antwortet: 'dafür habe sich eine neue Blüte der Kunst aus seiner Gemeinschaft entwickelt, und die denkende Betrachtung der Menschheit habe in ihm eines ihrer tiefsten Problem gefunden.'

50 At the end of the Phaedo we read: "'Crito,' said [Socrates] (these were his last words), 'we owe a cock to Aesculapius; discharge this vow forme, and do not forget it.' 'It shall be done,' said Crito. 'But see if you have anything else to say to us.' He made no answer, but after a little space of time expired [...]." (Plato: Crito and Phaedo. Dialogues of Socrates before his Death, trans. and ed. Henry Morley [London: Cassell & Co, 1888], p. 192). For questions arising from Overbeck's use of this passage, see note 52 below.

51 "'Auch ich schlichme mir einen Bahn' sagt er, 'nicht weniger wie Socrates dem Aesculap, und zünde Weihrauch an, wo mich ein Geruch stört, nur nicht unter den Feiern und Bräuchen, unter welchen dieses vor den Idolen geschieht.'

52 "Nam et ego mihi gallinaceum pacto, non minus quam Aesculapio Socrates, et si me odor alicuius loci offenderit, Arabiae aliquid incendo, sed non eodem ritu, nec eodem habitu, nec eodem apartu, quo agitur apud idola (Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus, De Corona, 10,5)." In this section Overbeck is discussing the mixture of sacred and secular in the world, and evokes Tertullian to assist his point. The De Corona deals with the implications of a Christian soldiers' refusing a pagan military crown in a time (early 3rd century) when there was question about interpreting Scriptural points a silentio -- that is, with no mention of laurels in the New Testament, it would be up to the faithful to make connections, if any, between Christian disapproval of soldiering and the concomitant wearing of its symbol. The Tertullian passage gives a rich example of the commingling of pagan and Christian cultures. Jacques Fontaine indicates several points in this short section which, separately and taken together, lead to an ambiguous conclusion about rituals in general (perhaps not entirely meant by Tertullian): he notes the mixing of culinary practices with ritual disinfection (the rooster); the incense whose Arabian provenance and idolatrous use colours its appearance in the Old Testament at least, as well as in the New, since Christians employed the substance to embalm their dead; he evokes funereal or obsequial rituals involving the posing of grain at the feet of statues of the dead; the habitu in question refers to the dress of the sacrificer, a sort of toga with a section draped over the head; the apartu encompasses all aspects of the act -- victim, furnishings, ritual procedure, and various accoutrements; and the deponent or passive verb "agitur" recalls the imperative of the sacrificer, spoken to the victim, to incite him to commit a beast for sacrifice: "hoc age" (Tertullien, Sur la couronne, ed. Jacques Fontaine [Paris: Presses
Further ambiguity in the passage as cited by Overbeck is seen in the reference to the last speech of Socrates. Jacques Fontaine describes Socrates' act as an "anecdote célèbre, utilisée par Tertullien pour montrer l'asservissement des philosophes aux dieux-démons [...]" (Ibid., p. 123) [a famous anecdote, used by Tertullian to show how philosophers are subject to demon-gods]; editor Henry Morley comments: "when Plato records as the last words of Socrates the reminder that he owed a cock to Aesculapius, his purpose is to show that, however Socrates was accused of neglect of the gods, he was punctual in observance of the religious rites by which his countrymen declared that they could lift their eyes above the earth on which they trod" (Plato, op. cit., p. 8). Accepting first of all that Plato recorded Socrates accurately, the latter's call upon Aesculapius is of interest. First of all, anyone who at the last moment shows religiosity when it was uncharacteristic during his lifetime demonstrates (1) inconsistency -- and therefore all of his other arguments in every area are suspect; and (2) that the religious may in fact have dominance over the secular. However, given that Socrates evokes Aesculapius, the picture becomes even more complex. Aesculapius, of whom the most famous descendant was Hippocrates, was the god of medicine, but his image is not wholly unambiguous. That is, he is represented by a serpent; the Aesculapian rod symbolizing medicine shows two serpents intertwined. It may be that there are two because when he was learning the art of medicine, Aesculapius was given two types of blood from the Gorgon's veins by Athena; blood from the one side produced poison and from the other side brought people back to life, so that one serpent kills while the other revives. In other words, Socrates, poisoned by his countrymen, may have been making a sardonic gesture to Aesculapius, bearer of the poison; or he could have been making a plea for rejuvenation from Aesculapius's other half, which he did not receive. Neither gesture could be called a positive one; that is his obeisance to a pagan god is not likely to have been one last respectful act, but rather an accusatory pinpointing of either Aesculapius's malice or his inefficacy. All of which tends to charge Overbeck's use of the story within Tertullian with more weight than he may have ascribed to it; yet the complexity of the image does not permit it to be left unquestioned.

53 In parts 18 and 19 of Adversus Marcionem, book II, Tertullian refers to the cultic practices of the Jews and God's use for them: "Sed quae potius legis bona defendam quam quae haeresis concutere concupit ut talionis definitionem, oculum pro oculo, dentem pro dente, et livorem pro livore repentis? [...] Et si lex aliquid cibus detrahit et immunda pronuntiat animalia quae aliquando beneficis sunt, consilium exercendae continentiae intellege, et frenos impositos illi gulae agnosce quae cum panem ederet angelorum, cucumeres et pepones Aegyptiorum desiderabat. [...] Sacrificiorum guoquoque onera et operationum et oblationum negotiosas scrupulositates nemo reprehendat, quasi deus talia sibi proprie desideraverit [...] sed illam dei industriae sentiat qua populum pronun in idololatriam et transgressionem eius modi officiis religioni suae voluit adstringere quibus superstitione saeculi agebatur, ut abs a avocaret illos, sibi iubens fieri quasi desideranti, ne simulacris facienda delinguereit." ["None of the good things of the law do I find it more natural to defend than those which hereby has sought to break down. [...] When the law places restraint upon certain foods, and pronounces unclean certain animals which have at other times received a blessing, you must understand there an advice on the exercise of self-restraint, and observe how
a bridle was put upon that gluttony which, while it was eating the bread of angels, hankered after the cucumbers and pumpkins of the Egyptians. [...] Nor should anyone find fault with the burdensome expense of sacrifices and the troublesome scrupulosities of services and oblations, as though God needed such things for his own sake [...]. One should rather see there that careful interest by which, when the people were prone to idolatry and transgression, God was content to attach them to his own religion by the same sort of observances in which this world's superstition was engaged, hoping to detach them from this by commanding them to do these things for him, as though he were in need of them, and so keep that people from the sin of making images. Also in the actual exchanges of human life and converse both domestic and public, the law has made all manner of regulations, up to and including the care of cups and platters, so that as men were faced at every point with these legal disciplines they might never for an instant be unoccupied with thoughts of God. [...] I say nothing of the law's secret and sacred meanings, although it is both spiritual and prophetic, and in almost all its concepts has a figurative significance. It is enough for the present that, without figurative meaning, it was putting man under obligation to God: and therefore none have any right to complain, except such as take no pleasure in God's service.") (Tertullian: Adversus Marcionem, edited and translated by Ernest Evans, Books 1 to 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 136-140.

54 The passage from Lasaulx is worth quoting, especially for its own references to the Codex Theodosianus: "Obwohl wir alle profanen Gebrauche nunmehr durch heilsame Gesetze abgeschaft haben, so wollen wir doch nicht, dass die festlichen Zusammenkünfte der Bürger und ihre gemeinsame Heiterkeit auch als abgeschafft betrachtet werde; sondern befehlen vielmehr, dem Volke seine Vergnügungen nach alter Gewohnheit, jedoch ohne irgend ein Opfer und irgend eine verdammliche Superstition, zu gewähren, sowie es auch seine Festmalzeiten begehen zu lassen falls die öffentlichen Wünsche dergleichen fordern." 324 [Although we have abolished by beneficial laws all profane practices, yet we do not want festive gatherings of the citizens and their common joviality to be seen as abolished; rather, we order that the people retain their enjoyment, as previously, yet with no sacrificing or damnable superstition, and with this proviso our official wishes allow such festival times and meals. 324 [...] [Footnote 324: "Cod. Theod. XVI, 10, 17, and Cod. Just. I, 11, 4. Dieselbe politische Humanität gegen die öffentlichen Volksvergnügungen liegt dem Edicte vom 25. April 396 zu Grunde: 'es hat unserer Güte gefallen, den Provinzialen das Vergnügen des Majuma-Spieles zurückzugeben, so jedoch dass dabei Anstand und züchtige Sitte beobachtet werde': Cod. Theod. XV, 6, 1 und Cod. Just. XI, 45 (46); worauf jedoch, da diese Bedingung nicht eingehalten wurde, am 4. Oct. 399 folgendes Edict erfolgte: 'Scherzhafte Spiele zu feiern, gestatten wir, um dem Volke seine Heiterkeit nicht zu verderben. Jenes scheuselische und unzüchtige Schauspiel aber was majuma genannt wird, untersagen wir': Cod. Theod. XV, 6, 2 [...]."

[ Codex Theodosianus XVI, 10, 17 and Codex Justinius I, 11, 4. The same political humaneness regarding public enjoyment underlies the Edict of April 25, 396: 'It is our wish to give back to the provincials their enjoyment of the game of Majuma, yet in this, propriety and innocent customs must be observed': Codex Theodosianus XV, 6, 1 and Codex Justinius XI, 4 (46); whereupon, as these conditions were not observed, on October 4, 399 the following Edict was issued: 'We permit playful games to be held, so that the people will not lose their joviality. However, all hateful and immodest play
in which the name of Majuma is employed, is forbidden'."

(ERNST VON LASAULX, *Der Untergang des Hellenismus und die Einziehung seiner Tempelgüter durch die Christlichen Kaiser* [The demise of Hellenism and the confiscation of its temple property by the Christian emperors] [MUNICH: LITERARISCH-ARTISTISCHE ANSTALT DER J.G. COTTA'SCHEN BUCHHANDLUNG, 1854], p. 115.

55 "Was hilft es von den 'ewigen Lichtgedanken' des Christenthums zu reden, 'von einer Liebe ohne Ende, von einer Gnade über alle Sünde, von einer Seligkeit in allem Erdenschmerz, von einem Leben welches den Tod nicht kennt' [...]"

56 Niklaus Peter (OWN 1 p. 224) qualifies these Lectures, founded in 1866, as a "Sammlung gemeinverständlicher wissenschaftlicher Vorträge" [collection of generally comprehensible scientific lectures]. Rudolf Virchow (born at Schivelbein in Pomerania, October 13, 1821; died at Berlin September 5, 1902) was *professor ordinarius* from 1856 as well as Director of the Pathology Institute in Berlin, where he founded Cellular Pathology. Franz von Holtzendorff (born at Bietmannsdorf in Uckermark, October 14, 1829; died at Munich, February 5, 1889) taught Criminology, State and Social Law from 1857 in Berlin and Munich, and was known outside Germany as the most famous jurist of his time.


58 Luftkampf: Two possibilities for the meaning of this word suggest themselves from Grimm: (1) "in übertragenem Sinne manche Redensarten" [in a figurative sense, some forms of speech] and (2) "münderlich für einen windigen, leichtsinnigen Menschen" [colloquially, for a long-winded, dim-witted person]. Overbeck may be referring to a war of words, or he may be casting aspersions on the combatants — or both.

59 wissenschaftlich

60 Wissenschaft

61 Wissenschaft

62 wissenschaftlich

63 wissenschaftlich

64 wissenschaftlich

65 wissenschaftlich

66 naturwissenschaftlich
67 Kenntnisse

68 wissenschaftlich

69 Wissenschaft

70 wissenschaftlich

71 wissenschaftlich


73 Wissenschaft

74 Franz von Holtzendorff; see note 72 above.

75 "'Zu Luther's [sic] Zeiten lasen unsere Voreltern die Bibel im Sinne protestantischer Rechtfertigung und Erbauung, des Protestes gegen die mittelalterlichen Uberlieferungen der Priesterherrschaft.'"

76 "'unversöhnten Widersprüchen im Neuen Testament'"

77 "'ungeschichtlich urtheilen'"

78 "'Was wir als Widersprüche in der Bibel offen zugestehen, bedeutet nicht mehr, als die Wellenschwingungen eines in seiner Tiefe unbewegten Oceans.'"

79 Wissenschaft

80 Wissenschaft

81 "'Nicht im mystischen Dunkel des Uebernatürlichen, sondern im Licht der Geschichte wächst das Ansehen der Bibel.'"

82 "'Geschichtliche Erfahrung lehrt, daß die Augenzugen einer That zwar die besten Berichterstatter, aber nicht die sichersten Urtheiler über ihr Wesen sind'".

83 "'protestantischen Wissenschaft'"

84 wissenschaftlich

85 See note 81 above.

86 Niklaus Peter (OWN 1, p. 230) sees in this a play on the title of D.F. Strauß's Die Halben und die Ganzen : eine Streitschrift gegen Schenkel und Hengstenberg [Halves and Wholes : Words of Conflict against Schenkel and Hengstenberg] (Berlin : F. Duncker, 1865).
87 Wissenschaft

88 Wissenschaft
Notes to pp. 109-120 (Part II, Chapter 4: Critical Theology / Strauss Confession)

1 The Strauss book, when cited in Overbeck and elsewhere, is generally shortened, not to "Old and New Faith", but to "The Confession." There may be detected in this a hint of derision or mockery; witness Nietzsche's interpretation: "In [Strauss's] very willingness to make public confessions of his faith lies a confession [...]. [A] confession of one's beliefs is [...] pretentious, since it presumes that the confessor places a value not only upon what he has experienced, explored, or observed in the course of his life, but also upon what he believes" ("David Strauss. Writer and Confessor," p. 23).

2 Lebensbetrachtung

3 For a list of the Biblical improbabilities that the Reformation has enabled society to question, but that theology lets alone for social reasons, see Der alte und der neue Glaube, Part I ("Sind wir noch Christen?"), section 32, "Der christliche Cultus und die heutige Weltanschauung" [Christian cult and today's worldview], pp. 56-61.

4 David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874), Das Leben Jesus, kritisch bearbeitet (Tübingen: C.F. Osiander, 1835-36).

5 Wissenschaft

6 Lebensansicht

7 See note 3 above; Strauss concludes section 32 by announcing: "wir sind keine Christen mehr" [We are no longer Christians], and proceeds to ask whether a religion could exist for us once Christianity is disposed of.

8 Lebensansicht

9 Strauss speaks briefly of the followers of Jesus who, awaiting his return, detached themselves from all things earthly. See Der alte und der neue Glaube, Part I ("Sind wir noch Christen?"), section 28, "Christliche und moderne Weltanschauung" [Christian and modern worldview], pp. 48-49. Niklaus Peter, however, points in his interpretation to the closing sentences of that section: "Wir könnten immerhin noch religiös sein, wenn wir es auch nicht mehr in der Form des Christentums wären [...]" [We could nonetheless still be religious, if it no longer took the form of Christianity]. (p. 61)

10 The apostolic image and statement of the Trinity is described and analyzed in Part I ("Sind wir noch Christen?"), section 4 (the description), pp. 8-9, and sections 5 to 18 (the analysis), pp. 9-31. The life-of-Jesus section is in the same Part I, pp. 31-61, covering sections 19 to 32, and following and commenting upon Jesus' life and the subsequent institutional ramifications.

11 Niklaus Peter (OWN 1, p. 233) refers to Strauss's Die christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft, 2 Bde. [The teaching of Christian belief in its historical development and in the struggle with modern science] (Tübingen /

12 Part IV of Der alte (and the conclusion, disregarding the "Zugaben" on poetry and music) is entitled "Wie ordnen wir unser Leben?" [How do we order our life?] (pp. 152-200). It includes ideas on moral principles, man in nature, sensuality, wars, nationality, nobility and the bourgeoise, social democracy and inequality, and Church and State.

13 Lebensideal

14 Zum Menschheitsgefühl rankt man sich nur am Nationalgefühl empor." [For human feeling one merely entwines oneself upward toward national feeling.] In Der alte und der neue Glaube, Part IV ("Wie ordnen wir unser Leben?") section 79, "Die Nationalitätsprinzip und die Internationale", p. 175.

15 For Strauss, units should bind together according to language and nationality. "Die große Nationalstaaten sollen sich in Haufen verbundeter kleiner Socialdemokratien auflösen, zwischen denen alsdann die Verschiedenheit der Sprache und Nationalität keine trennende Schranke, keinen Anlaß zum Hader mehr abgeben würde. Das nennt sich wohl auch Kosmopolitismus, gebärdet sich als ein Aufsteigen von dem beschränkten nationalen zu dem universalen Standpunkte der Menschheit." [The great national states should dissolve into connected assemblies of small social democracies, between whom then the difference of language and nationality would no longer give divisive cubby-holes nor cause for discord. This is also called cosmopolitanism, and acts as though climbing from the national and restricted to the universal standpoint of humanity (Der alte und der neue Glaube, Part IV ["Wie ordnen wir unser Leben?"]), section 79 ["Das Nationalitätsprinzip und die Internationale"], pp. 174-175.

16 "Wer von seine Nation nicht wissen will, der wird damit nicht Kosmopolit, sondern bleibt Egoist" [Whoever does not want to know about his nation does not become a cosmopolitan but rather an egoist] (Der alte, Part IV ["Wie ordnen wir unser Leben?"]), section 79, ["Die Nationalitätsprinzip und die Internationale"], p. 175.

17 Strauss speaks of the cosmopolitanism of great men like Schiller and Goethe: "[...] worin bestand ihr Kosmopolitismus? Sie umfaßen in ihren Mitgefühle die ganze Menschheit, sie wünschten ihre Ideen von schöner Sittlichkeit und vernünftiger Freiheit nach und nach bei allen Völkern verwirklicht zu sehen" [How were they cosmopolitan? In their sympathy they embraced all of humanity, they wanted to see their ideas of beautiful customs and reasonable freedom gradually installed in all peoples] (Der alte und der neue Glaube, Part IV ["Wie ordnen wir unser Leben?"]), section 79 ["Die Nationalitätsprinzip und die Internationale"], p. 176.

18 "The Oracles at Delphi No Longer Given in Verse", in Plutarch, Moralia, translated by Frank Cole Babbitt (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 3rd edition, 1962), vol. 5. (1) "'For my part, I am well content with the settled conditions prevailing at present, and I find them very welcome, and the questions which men now put to the god are concerned with these conditions. There is, in fact, profound peace and tranquillity;
war has ceased, there are no wanderings of people, no civil strifes, no despotisms, nor other maladies and ills in Greece requiring many unusual remedial forces. Where there is nothing complicated or secret or terrible, but the interrogations are on slight and commonplace matters, like the hypothetical questions in school: if one ought to marry, or to start on a voyage, or to make a loan; and the most important consultations on the part of States concern the yield from crops, the increase of herds, and public health -- to clothe such things in verse, to devise circumlocutions, and to foist strange words upon inquiries that call for a simple short answer is the thing done by an ambitious pedant embellishing an oracle to enhance his repute. But the prophetic priestess has herself also nobility of character, and whenever she descends into that place and finds herself in the presence of the god, she cares more for fulfilling her function than for that kind of repute or for men's praise or blame." (chapter 28, pp. 337 and 339)

19 The Roman historian Publius Cornelius Tacitus (ca. 55 - ca. 117 CE) would have written his Dialogus de oratoribus [Dialogue on Oratory] during the reign of the Emperor Marcus Ulpius Trajanus (98-177). The piece begins with the lament: "Saepe ex me requiris, Iuste Fabi, cur, cum priora saecula tot eminentium oratorum ingeniiis gloriaque floruerint, nostra potissimum aetas
Whether yeilds nature and history of the people. robberies, a crime whose seriousness he stresses has been overlooked and the monarchical state),

"Wir haben nicht vergessen, daß auch unsern großen Geistern im vorigen Jahrhundert, einem Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, die nationalen Grenzen mitunter zu enge waren" [We have not forgotten that for our great minds as well in the last century, for Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, national boundaries were too confining] (Part IV, section 79, p. 175).

"Nein, auf Goethe und Schiller darf sich diese Sorte von Weltbürgern nicht rufen" [No; this sort of world citizen ought not to call upon Goethe and Schiller] (IV, section 79, p. 176).

re: State, war, authority to punish, and working classes:

i. state: Question: what type of State is best? state form is relative. Whether a monarchy or republic is better depends on geography, and on the nature and history of the people. Republicanism of the U.S. fits its need for the practical. A republic is easier to construct; a monarchy is well-organized but mysterious (especially as concerns the birth of the leader); it yeilds a superior person instead of party squabbling (Part IV, sections 80-81 ["Die beste Staatsverfassung. Monarchie und Republic. West der monarchischen Staatsformen" (The best State constitution. Monarchy and Republic. West of the monarchical state]), pp. 177-181.

ii. war: There will always be wars. Consider then that progress and change come through wars and subjugation. In examining every case one decides whether the take-over was worth the price -- what did the conqueror bring to the conquered? (Part IV, section 78, "Der Krieg und die Friedensliga" [War and the Peace League], pp. 172-174).

iii. authority to punish: Strauss find the authority of a lone jurist too arbitrary; he may be overlenient in exacting the death penalty and is likely too soft on thieves (the latter assertion Strauss bases on statistics on robberies, a crime whose seriousness he stresses has been overlooked and should be addressed by many social institutions, including schools) (Part IV, section 86 ["Die Todesstrafe und die Agitation für ihre Abschaffung" (The death penalty and agitation for its abolition], pp. 193-196).

iv. working classes : The workers' problem is like an illness, but their doctors are French quacks (184); it leads not only to envy of wealth but to
hatred of art and science as products of luxury (185); powers have abused the workers (185), but it is too easy to pronounce slogans against this group and that and to join the swell of internal restlessness (186); workers are hurting themselves and do not see past "the most money for the least work"; the root of the problem is private ownership, which needs to be reduced (p. 188); the country should not be ruled by a few rich men; instead, the talent of everyone should be used; the masses, therefore, need to be trained and educated; as to suffrage, it is better to leave decisions in the hands of the land-owners who have the most to lose; people cannot choose a leader if they do not have those qualities themselves or have not done that job; land-owners are better educated (Part IV, sections 83 ("Der vierte Stand und die Arbeiterfrage" [The fourth class and the worker question]), 84 ("Die Socialdemokratie und die Ungleichheit unter den Menschen" [Social Democracy and inequality among people]), 85 ("Das allgemeine Stimmrecht" [General Suffrage Rights], pp. 184–193).

23 **Lebensideal**

24 **Lebensbetrachtung**

25 **Lebensideal**

26 Strauß's evocation of the role of pain and evil occurs in his analysis of optimisic and pessimistic philosophies (with reference to Schopenhauer) and their implication for reconstructing a new faith from the old: "Nun wird man aber das, was uns hienach geblieben ist, nicht mehr als Religion wollen gelten lassen. Wenn wir zu erfahren wünschen, ob in einem Organismus, der uns erstorben scheint, noch Leben sei, pflegen wir es durch einen starken, wohl auch schmerzlichen Reiz, etwa einen Stich zu versuchen. Machen wir diese Probe mit unsrem Gefühl für das All. In Arthur Schopenhauers Schriften braucht man nur zu blättern (obwohl man übrigens gut thut, nicht bloß darin zu blättern, sondern sie zu studiren), um in den verschiedensten Wendungen auf den Satz zu stoßen, die Welt sei etwas, das besser nicht wäre. Oder wie der Verfasser der Philosophie des Unbewußten es in seiner Art noch feiner ausdrückt: in der bestehenden Welt sei zwar alles so gut wie möglich eingerichtet; trotzdem sei sie 'durchweg elend und' -- das Gegenteil von dem, was man scherzweise vom Wetter zu sagen pflegt -- 'schlechter als gar keine Welt'. Demgemäß bildet für Schopenhauer den Fundamentalunterschied aller Religionen und Philosophien dar, ob sie optimistisch oder pessimistisch sind; und zwar ist ihm der Optimismus durchaus der Standpunkt der Plattenheit und Trivialität, während alle tieferen distinguierten Geister wie er auf dem Standpunkte des Pessimismus stehen. Nach einer besonders kräftigen Auslassung dieser Art (es wäre besser, wenn auf der Erde so wenig wie auf dem Monde Leben entstanden, ihre Oberfläche gleichfalls starr krystallinisch geblieben wäre) setzt Schopenhauer hinzu, da werde er wohl wieder vernehmen müssen, seine Philosophie sei trostlos. Gewiß, wenn wir es so nehmen dürfen, daß ihr Urheber beim Niederschreiben solcher Sätze nicht bei Troste gewesen. Denn in der That liegt der grellste Widerspruch darin. Wenn die Welt ein Ding ist, das besser nicht wäre, so ist ja auch das Denken des Philosophen, das ein Stück dieser Welt bildet, ein Denken, das besser nicht dächte. Der pessimistische Philosoph bemerkt nicht, wie er vor allem auch sein eigenes, die Welt für schlecht erklärendes Denken für schlecht erklärt; ist aber ein Denken, das die Welt für schlecht erklärt, ein schlechtes Denken, so ist ja
die Welt vielmehr gut. Der Optimismus mag sich in der Regel sein Geschäft zu leicht machen, dagegen sind Schopenhauers Nachweisungen der gewaltigen Rolle, die Schmerz und Uebel in der Welt spielen, ganz am Platze; aber jede wahre Philosophie ist nothwendig optimistisch, weil sie sonst den Baumast absägt, auf dem sie sitzt." [Now, what is left over will not be allowed to count as religion. If we wish to experience whether there remains any life in an organism that appears dead to us, let us tend to it with a strong -- if painful -- stimulus, to see if there is any trace at all. We submit this test to our feeling for the universe. One need only flip through Arthur Schopenhauer's works (although one would do much better to study them rather than just to flip through) to run across the statement, in its various forms, that it would be better if the world were not. Or, as the creator of the philosophy of the unconscious puts it more finely: in this world everything is designed as well as it could be; nevertheless it is "miserable through and through" -- the opposite of what one jokingly tends to say about the weather: "worse than any other world." Herein lies Schopenhauer's fundamental distinction between all religions and philosophies: are they optimistic or pessimistic? Moreover, for him optimism is the absolute standpoint of platitude and triviality, whereas all deeper, more distinguished intellects (like him) adopt the standpoint of pessimism. After a particularly powerful venting of this sort (it would be better if on Earth as little life existed as on the moon -- its surface would have remained just as pristine and cristalline), Schopenhauer adds that he would still judge his philosophy to be wretched. Certainly -- if we accept that its originator was out of his mind when he wrote it down. For in fact, it contains the most glaring contradiction. If the world is a thing that should not have been, then of course the philosopher's thought, as a piece of this world, should not have been either. The pessimistic philosopher does not notice how badly (and especially as concerns his own world) he explains how the world itself is badly thought-out. But if a thought explains badly that the world is bad, then the world is that much better. Optimism as a rule might not make this task easy. On the other hand Schopenhauer's proofs of the powerful role that pain and evil play in the world are on the mark; but every true philosophy is necessarily optimistic, for otherwise it saws off the very branch upon which it is sitting] [David Friedrich Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube. Ein Bekennniss. 12. bis 14. Stereotyp-Auflage mit einem Vorwort von Eduard Zeller. (Bonn : Emil Strauß, 1895), chapter 44, pp. 95-96].

27 "[...] wenn unsre wahrheitsgetreuen Berichte immer mehrere Nachfolger auf die neue Straße ziehen; wenn sich die Ueberzeugung verbreiten wird, daß einzig sie die Weltstraße der Zukunft ist, die nur stellenweise vollends fertig gemacht, und hauptsächlich allgemeiner befahren zu werden braucht, um auch bequem und angenehm zu werden -- während alle Mühen und Kosten, die auf die Ausbesserung der alten Straße noch verwendet werden, vergeudet und verloren heißen müssen -- wenn die Folgen unseres Unternehmens sind: so wird es uns, denke ich, am Ende doch nicht gereuen dürfen, den langen und beschwerlichen Weg miteinander zurückgelegt zu haben." [When our reports, faithful to the truth, draw more and more followers along the new road; when the conviction is spreading, that the world-road alone is the future only here and there needing work and general protection to be rendered comfortable and pleasant -- while all efforts and costs spent upon the old road are squandered and lost -- if this is the result of our undertaking, then, I think, it should not ultimately be a cause for regret that we have put aside the long and
difficult road for another one] (Der alte, Bonn: Emil Strauß, 1895, chapter IV, section 112, p. 254).

28 "Wer einmal weiß, daß es auch im sittlichen Gebiete einen solchen Zauberspruch in Wirklichkeit nicht gibt, der wird sich in der Pein des Gewissens an den Trost halten, der in dem Bewußtsein des unablängigen ernsten Strebens liegt, und durch das Unvollendete dieses Trostes eben nur zur Verdoppelung seines Strebens sich ermuntern finden." [Who once knows that in the domain of morals and customs there is no magic formula, he will hold, in the pain of consciousness, to the consolation of an unending, serious striving, and through the unsatisfied consolation will be cheered, even if his striving be doubled] (Der alte, section IV, chapter 111, p. 252).

29 "Unser Gott nimmt uns nicht von außen in seinen Arm, aber er eröffnet uns Quellen des Trostes in unserem Innern. Er zeigt uns, daß zwar der Zufall ein unvernünftiger Weltherrscher wäre, daß aber die Nothwendigkeit, d.h. die Verkettung der Ursache in der Welt, die Vernunft selber ist. Er lehrt uns erkennen, daß, eine Ausnahme von dem Vollzug eines einzigen Naturgesetzes verlangen, die Zerrümmierung des All verlangen hieße. Er bringt uns zuletzt unvermerkt durch die freundliche Macht der Gewohnheit dahin, auch einem minder vollkommenen Zustande, wenn wir einem solchen verfallen, uns anzubekommen, und endlich einzusehen, daß unser Befinden von außen nur seine Form, seinen Gehalt an Glück oder Unglück aber nur aus unserm eigenen Innern empfängt." [Our God takes us in his arms, not from the outside, but rather by opening sources of consolation in our inside. He shows us that even chance is an unreasonable world leader; that rather, necessity, the connection of causes in the world, is reason itself. He teaches us to recognize that to desire an exception from the penalty of a single natural law means to desire the destruction of the universe. Finally he brings us unnoticed through the friendly power of custom, a less-than-complete state when we are forfeit to it, to comfort us, and finally to see that our external condition is only its form, fortunate or unfortunate in configuration, but a mere conception of our own interior] (Der alte, section IV, chapter 111, pp. 252-3).

30 "Über den Ersatz, den unsere Weltanschauung für den kirchlichen Unsterblichkeitsglaubern bietet, wird man vielleicht die längste Ausführung von mir erwarten, sich aber mit der kürzesten begnügen müssen. Wer hier sich nicht selbst zu helfen weiß, dem ist überhaupt nicht zu helfen, der ist für unserm Standpunkt noch nicht reif." [One might expect from me the lengthiest exposition on the replacement our world-view offers for the ecclesiastical beliefs in immortality, but he must be content with the briefest of statements. Whoever cannot help himself on this point, cannot be helped; he is not ready for our standpoint] (Der alte, Section IV, chapter 111, p. 253).

31 "Das naturgemäße Streben unser Zeit, das Band zwischen Staat und Kirche zu lockern, das unausbleibliche Zerbröckeln der Staatskirchen in Secten und freie Gemeinden, muß in nicht allzulanger Frist die Möglichkeit herbeiführen, daß eine Anzahl von Staatsbürgern überhaupt keiner Kirche mehr auch nur äußerlich angehöre." [The natural striving of our time to loosen the bond between State and Church, the unavoidable breaking-up of the State Churches into sects and free congregations, must make it possible, in not too long a period, for a number of citizens to belong to no Church anymore except externally] (Der alte, Afterword, p. 277).
See above note.

"Aber Beschränkung, wohl auch Umwandlung, ist noch keine Vernichtung. Die Religion ist in uns nicht mehr was sie im unern Vatern war; daraus folgt aber nicht, daß sie in uns erloschen ist. Geblieben ist uns in jedem Falle der Grundbestandtheil aller Religion, das Gefühl der unbedingten Abhängigkeit. Ob wir Gott oder Universum sagen: schlechthin abhängig fühlen wir uns von dem einen wie von dem andern" [But restricting, as well as manipulating, is still not denying. Religion is no longer what it was for our fathers; but that does not mean it is extinguished. What remains to us, in any case, is the cornerstone of all religion, the feeling of unconditional dependence. Whether we say God or the Universe -- we feel quite as dependent upon the one as upon the other] (Der alte, Section II, "Haben wir noch Religion?", chapter 44, p. 93).
Notes to pp. 120-147 (Part II, Chapter 5: The Possibility of a Critical Theology)

1 Lagarde: see note 6 from Overbeck's Introduction.

2 The oaths and the renunciation of science are mentioned in the first section of Lagarde's "Verhältnis" paper (in Deutsche Schriften [German Writings], 2nd edition [Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1934], pp. 46-7).

3 The suggestion regarding sects is put by Lagarde in section 6 (p. 75) of his paper.

4 Lagarde advocates turning Faculties over to Seminaries in section 7 (p. 78).

5 For the Church's obligation to pave the way, according to Lagarde, see sections 6, 8 and 9 (p. 75 and 79).

6 The role of the Theology Faculties in the University is described by Lagarde in section 9 (p. 80).

7 Overbeck is referring to the "Maigesetze" (May Laws), introduced by Cultusminister Falk in January of 1873 and passed, with amendments, on the 1st of May. Their purpose was to give the government control over ecclesiastical disciplinary practices, to enforce civil education requirements of clergy, and to restrict ecclesiastical appointments to Germans. The overall political result of these Laws was to diminish the power of the Pope in Germany; of course the effect was felt more harshly by the Catholic than by the Evangelical Church. As this issue was an important one at the time of his writing, Overbeck takes care here to distinguish between the government dictum regarding education and his own argument with Lagarde over science and religion.

8 Lagarde defines the nature of scientific research in the first section of his paper (pp. 45-6).

9 wissenschaftlich

10 wissenschaftlich

11 wissenschaftlich

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13 Wissenschaft

14 Wissenschaft

15 wissenschaftlich

16 wissenschaftlich
Lagarde talks of separate denominations' truths in the first section of his paper (p.46).

The "Nebeneinanderstehen" of the different religions is mentioned shortly after the quotation cited in the above note.

Lagarde discusses the history lessons to be furnished by the discipline in section 9 of his paper (p. 80).

"[...] soferne sie eine Geschichte der Religionen gibt." Lagarde discusses the history lessons to be furnished by the discipline in section 9 of his paper (p. 80).

"[...] die Religion überhaupt und die Gesetze, nach welchen die Religion sich darlebt, kennen : er thue dies durch Beobachtung aller Religionen, von denen er überhaupt sichere Kunde erlangen könne." (See reference in note 7 above.)

Niklaus Peter (OWN 1, p. 244) cites: "E. Zeller. 'Die Trennung von Kirche und Staat in ihrer Bedeutung für die Theologie' [The separation of Church and State: its significance for Theology] In Theologische Jfahrbücher 8, 1949, p. 143-152] : 'Die theologische Facultät an den Hochschulen wird in Zukunft mit einem Wort in die philosophische übergehen, die freie wissenschaftliche Theologie wird in dieser als Religionsphilosophie und Religionsgeschichte behandelt (...)' [In the future the Theology Faculty in the higher schools will with a single word go over to the Philosophy Faculty; free Scientific Theology in this will be treated as Philosophy of Religion and History of Religion] (p. 152)."

"Pfadfinderin" : See Lagarde, section 9, p. 79.

"[...] aus der bisherigen Bahn des segensreichen Sternes der Religion die Kurve berechnen könne, in welcher er weiter gehen werde." (Lagarde, section 9, p. 80)
This is how I have translated "Voraussetzungen," but there appears to be some nuance needed.

See note 7 above.

"[...] mit der Kirche in keiner Weise befassen will" : Niklaus Peter (OWN 1 p. 247) gives the source of Overbeck's quotation as Strauß's Der alte und der neue Glaube (Leipzig 1872), p. 296, but advises that the reference is not a literal one.

"Die protestantische Kirche wenigstens (soweit von ihrer Existenz noch gesprochen werden kann) ist durch das aufrichtig gut gemeinte Bestreben der Regierungen für die wissenschaftliche Ausbildung ihrer Geistlichen zu sorgen, dahin gebracht, dass sie bald gar keine Geistlichen mehr haben wird. Denn so schweren Bedenken die Wissenschaftlichkeit der protestantischen Facultäten unterliegt, das haben sie doch mit dem Minimum von Kritik, das in ihnen zu finden ist, bewirkt, dass eine Menge junger Leute, die bei ihnen eingeschrieben gewesen sind -- und nicht die schlechtesten -- wenn sie vor die Frage gestellt werden, ob sie das Orginationsgelübde ablegen und in den Dienst einer bestimmten und geordneten Kirche treten wollen, von der Theologie ganz abspringen und lieber noch Philologie oder Medicin studieren, um nicht vor sich selbst zu Lügnern zu werden" (Lagarde, section 9, p. 82).

Max Krenkel, Religioneid und Bekenntnissverpflichtung. Sendeschreiben an Dr. G.A. Fricke [Religious oaths and confessional duty. Letter to Dr. G.A. Fricke] (Heidelberg, 1869).
51 "[...] die Hinweisung [...] auf die jedem protestantischen Prediger obliegende Pflicht, fleissig und gewissenhaft in den ehrwürdigen Urkunden des Christenglaubens zu forschen, aus der Fülle des in ihnen sich offenbarenden Geistes sein sittlich religiöses Leben fort und fort zu kräftigen und in frommer Hingabe an denselben sich eine feste selbständige Überzeugung zu bilden, die er mit voller innerer Wahrheit seiner Gemeinde verkündigen kann."

52 "[...] die offene Anerkennung des Rechtes der individuellen religiösen Überzeugungen nichts weiter als die zur dringenden Notwendigkeit gewordene Erhebung eines factischen Zustandes zu einem gesetzlich berechtigten sein."

53 J. Seebens, The right of religious conviction in the Evangelical Church.

54 "[...] nur ein Domino geworden, unter dessen Schutze so viele Protestantismen und Christenthümer in die protestantische Kirche eingedrungen sind als es protestantische Kanzeln gibt." Niklaus Peter (OWN 1, p. 250) explains this figurative expression: "'Domino,' Bezeichnung für Winterkleidung eines Geistlichen, im weiteren Sinn seidener Mantel als Maskenanzug" [Domino : designation for the winter dress of clergy; in a broader sense, silk overcoat as a costume].

55 wissenschaftlich gebildet

56 wissenschaftlich

57 auf wissenschaftlichem Wege gewonnen

58 wissenschaftlich

59 wissenschaftlich

60 wissenschaftlich

61 Paul: "I have become all things to all people, that I might by all means save some. I do it all for the sake of the gospel, so that I may share in its blessings." (I Cor. 9: 22-23; NRSV)

62 wissenschaftlich

63 Wissenschaft

64 Wissenschaft
Notes to pp. 150-167: Part III. Chapter 1. Published Criticism of My Notebook

1 *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* [New Evangelical Church news], edited by H. Meßner; volumes 1-28 (52 issues a year); Berlin: Schulze (1859-86) in 4° (Kirchner, item 8493)

2 For bibliographical information on Lagarde's work, see note 6 to Overbeck's Introduction.

3 *Volksblatt für die reformierte Kirche der Schweiz* [People's bulletin for the Reformed Church of Switzerland]

4 *Im neuen Reich. Wochenschrift für das Leben des deutschen Volkes in Staat, Wissenschaft und Kunst* [In the new kingdom. Weekly paper for the life of the German people, on state matters, science and art], edited by Alfred Dove, later by Konrad Reichard, then by Wilhelm Lang. Volumes 1-12. Leipzig: Hirzel (1871-1882). In 8°. (Kirchner item 15008)

5 Alfred Dove (born at Berlin, April 4, 1844; died at Freiburg im Breslau, January 19, 1916), historical researcher and essayist, took over the editorship of *Im Neuen Reich* from its founder, Gustav Freytag, in 1870. He habilitated at Leipzig in 1873, was Professor of History in Breslau from 1874-84, and in Bonn from 1884-91. From 1891-97 he edited of the Munich *Allgemeine Zeitung*. From 1897-1905 he taught at Freiburg im Breslau.

6 Daniel Schenkel, evangelical theologian (born at Döperlin, in the canton of Zürich, Dec. 21, 1813, and died at Heidelberg, 19 May 1885) was a pastor in Schaffhausen in 1841, Professor at Basel in 1849 and at Heidelberg in 1851. Schenkel was initially the opponent of the Catholic proselytizer Friederich von Hurter in Schaffhausen and also opposed the Liberals in Heidelberg (Kuno Fischer), then took a harsh stand against pietism and orthodoxy. He was joint founder of the Protestant League. Schenkel wrote: *Das Wesen des Protestantismus* [The essence of Protestantism] (3 volumes, 1845-51; 2nd edition in 1862); *Christliche Dogmatik vom Standpunkt des Gewissens* [Christian dogmatics from the standpoint of the conscience] (2 volumes, 1858-59); *Charakterbild Jesu* [Character-portrait of Jesus] (1864; 4th edition, 1873); Schleiermacher (1868).


7 Hans Herrig, poet, was born at Braunschweig on December 10, 1845, and died at Weimar on May 4, 1892. Following the 1883 Luther Jubilee, he incorporated his ideas in his published writing, *Luxustheater* [Luxury theatre] and *Volksbühne* [People's theatre] (1887). He wrote several historical plays, the opera libretto "Harald der Viking" (music by Hallén, 1881), the philosophical, satirical poem "Die Schweine" [The Pigs] (1876) and the humorous epic "Der dicke König" [The fat king] (1885). *Gesammelte Schriften* [Complete writings]
(7 volumes, 1886-91). His *Gesammelte Aufsätze über Schopenhauer* [Complete essays on Schopenhauer] were edited by Griesbach (1894).

**Magazin für die Literatur des Auslandes** [Magazine for foreign literature], edited by Josef Lehmann, later by others. (Volumes 1-49) Berlin: Dümmler (from 1879 : Leipzig : Friedrich), 1832-80 (from 1881 continued under the title *Magazin für die Literatur des In- und Auslandes* [Magazine for domestic and foreign literature] (Kirchner item 10568).

8 William Purdie Dickson (born at Pettinain Manse, Lanarkshire, October 22, 1823; died at Glasgow, March 9, 1901) was educated at Lanark with special attention to the Classics, and at St. Andrew's University. Although uninterested in Divinity, he was the top student in his class and became "licensed" in 1845, with a "mission" at Grangemouth, where he also catalogued the Falkirk Town Library. He became an examiner in Classics for St. Andrew's University in 1862. Having been rejected as a candidate for the Chair in Church History there in 1860, he nonetheless was awarded its newly founded Chair of Biblical Criticism in 1863, in which area he lectured for ten years. He translated from German and kept up with contemporary theological movements and methodology. In his inaugural lecture he stated the conviction that the Church was capable of erring throughout history and that the best thing is to concentrate on the Word of God and to examine the origine of Scripture set forth in the New Testament. He advocated a hierarchy of study — first Biblical Criticism, followed by Biblical Theology, History of Doctrine, Dogmatic Theology, and Apologetics — as the logically-ordered route to take in the attempt to define Christianity and ultimately to defend it. Upon his retirement in 1895 he was appointed Curator of the University Library, where he promoted funding above all to enhance research materials for faculty and students.

9 Reform voices of our time from the Swiss Church

10 two queer fish

11 *Literarisches Centralblatt für Deutschland* [Central literary paper for Germany], edited by Friedrich Zarncke; from 1892, by Eduard Zarncke; from 1923, by Eduard Zarncke and Wilhelm Freis. Volumes 1-95 (52 issues per year) (Leipzig : Wigand; from 1852, Avenarius and Mendelssohn; from 1854, Ed. Avenarius; from 1942, Verlag des Börsenvereins), 1850-1944. In 4°. (Kirchner item 6692)

12 "Dr. F. Nietzsche [Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen] appears to be what in England might be termed an Adullamite, who has set up a 'cave' from which he proposes to deliver himself periodically of what, having regard to their presumable unpopularity, he entitles unseasonable reflections upon men and things in general. A man of parts can hardly hit all round without planting an effective blow somewhere, and in his first essay, devoted to Strauss's recent work, he directs some small attacks against that author's complacent optimism and, a matter more capable of direct demonstration, the inaccuracies of a style which lays claim to classic purity. Both criticisms may be well founded to a certain extent; yet cheerfulness is probably better than discontent, and Strauss is certainly more readable than Dr. Nietzsche, who writes ably indeed, but has neither the passion nor the pungency of his models
Lassalle and Schopenhauer, and rather creates the impression of a moody Momus.

Professor Overbeck's work on "the Christianity of our present Theology" is also mainly called forth by Strauss's treatise, and, while admitting the freest theological criticism in principle, contains some stringent criticisms on Strauss's practical application of his views in his section on the regulation of human life. So far as we can understand the Professor's own conceptions of the Christianity of modern theology, it rests upon an implied contract between the pastor and his flock corresponding to that between Frederick the Great and his people, in virtue of which he is to say what pleases them, and to think as pleases himself." Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science, and Art, (No. 947, Vol. 36) December 20, 1873, p. 793. The Review was founded in 1855. Although the article-writers' names were not disclosed in the paper itself, it is known that the critic of German literature from 1866 to 1882 was Richard Garnett. Barbara McCrimmon refers to Garnett's task: "On 19 May [1866] was published the first of Richard's long series of monthly articles devoted to 'Contemporary German Literature' for the Saturday Review, which he continued until the beginning of 1882. These reviews have been called 'bright and lively,' even though each was very brief, as he had to cover ten or twelve books in about two printed pages. In later years Richard found this task 'an obstinate bore,' yet with some redeeming effects: 'The advantage of the German summary is that it enables one to be impertinent with impunity to eminent men, and to instruct others on subjects of which one knows nothing oneself. Still the employment is one in which I connive in a humble way to do a little good, and in which an illiberal or cantankerous person might easily do much harm. Lastly and principally, it contributes to the boiling of the pot':"(Richard Garnett: The Scholar as Librarian (Chicago and London: American Library Association, 1989), p. 54).

13 "Conscientious considerations, and the recent works of Strauss and Lagarde, have led a young but not unknown professor at Basle, Dr. Overbeck, to publish an essay 'On the Christian Character of the Current Theology.' In the most essential points he agrees with Lagarde, though he differs from him more or less in his view of the history of Christianity, and is not prepared to accept Lagarde's suggestions. His subject is the Christianity of the current theology, but he prefaces it with the inquiry whether theology has even been really Christian, and whether the interests of knowledge and of faith have not always been diametrically opposed. No conviction is more essential to a religion that that of the falsehood of all other religions -- none is more completely destroyed by science. True, a professedly Christian theology arose at a very early period. This was only natural, considering the highly refined form of culture which preceded Christianity, and which that religion could not hope to destroy. A compromise was the only alternative, but the theology in which this compromise issued was jealously watched and constantly suspected by the true believers. It is useless to distinguish between what is essential in Scripture, and what is not. The very idea of a life of Christ destroys the religious value of the record. Historical criticism at best will only result in a religion for scholars, as destitute of warmth and colour, as of influence on the masses. The author then examines the claims of the two great contending parties to be called Christian. He doubts whether there is any radical difference between them, either in Biblical criticism, or in their views of life. With regard to the party of Apologists (answering to our own "Christian Evidence Society"), the author remarks that the historical argument for Christianity, on which they lay so much stress, is the most rotten of all
(except, indeed, that from natural history). The deeper thinkers of the school seem to have had a dim perception of this, *e.g.*, Pascal, who admits that there must be a strong desire for the truth of Christianity, if the historical argument is to be effectual. To excite such a desire, however, he appeals to ascetic views of life from which modern apologists would shrink, though these ascetic views are of the very essence of the Christian religion. In fact, the main difference between the two parties in German Protestantism is this, that the one has the shell, but not the kernel, the other neither shell nor kernel, neither the form nor the spirit of Christianity. The Apologists imagine that they can defend the orthodox doctrine by scientific, *i.e.*, irreligious means; the Liberals that after it has been destroyed, they can rebuild it through criticism. The latter are fond of using Lessing's well-known phrase 'the religion of Christ.' But Lessing was well aware (see fragment in 'Werke', Bd. xi) though he does not speak it out plainly, that to talk of the religion of Christ is practically to place oneself outside the pale of Christianity, because such a notion is based on the discovery of the true humanity of Christ, a discovery which, though sanctioned by criticism, stultifies the primitive ages of the Church. It is true that the Church also speaks of the 'imitation of Christ,' but the reference here is not so much to Christ's personal views, as to his tragic fate, and the ascetic ideal founded upon it. But what at once condemns the attempts of Liberals to pass themselves off as Christians is their view of the world, which is diametrically opposed to that of primitive Christianity. From the 4th century down to the Reformation nothing in the grand style has existed in the Church, which has not issued from or stood in some connexion with the cloister. And even before the first of these epochs, the opposition between the Christian principle, on the one hand, and the world and culture on the other, is as pronounced as anywhere in the ascertained history of Paul, not to say of Christ. If any further argument is needed, there is the systematic limitation of popular religious ceremonies in the early Church, which is not disproved by the reaction within the Catholic Church towards the Paganizing of Christianity. This can only be explained on the hypothesis that aversion to the world is the most vital part of Christianity. The author then proceeds to question the propriety of popularizing liberal theology. Important as this subject is, we are unable to give the reader even an idea of Dr. Overbeck's mode of treatment. Certainly if it is true of Germany, it is no less true of England, as the works noticed in these pages prove, that popular liberal theology suffers from artificialness and unreality. The next section deals with the relation of critical theology to positive Christianity and culture, which are shown to be under almost equal obligations to it. The office of criticism is to elicit historical facts; it is absolutely indifferent to the practical inferences which may be drawn from those facts. It is as much opposed to a volatilized Christianity as to an enervated culture. Dr. Overbeck's practical suggestions may be thus summed up. Christianity cannot be separated from an ascetic view of life. Such a view is equally repugnant to the Orthodox and the Liberals of the day. Both therefore have as good or as bad a right to call themselves Christians; neither party has any right to exclude the other from the National Church. But though the Liberal is to be unmolested for his rejection of the "creed outworn," he is not to disturb the minds of naïve believers, who will long form the majority of the congregations, and whose religious wants can only be satisfied by that very creed. The ordination oath must therefore be so framed as to guard the liberties of both parties. In the church the clergyman is to preach the
doctrines of the formularies; out of church, he may give stronger meat to those who crave it, and speak and write without restraint. By thus legalizing the ancient distinction between the esoteric and the exoteric, the clergyman will be transformed from a mere teacher of a private theology into a genuine priest of religion. Space forbids us to give the criticism which these remarkable works well deserve. A few suggestions may however be ventured. Thus, in Professor de Lagarde's criticism of ecclesiastical Christianity, we regret his extreme depreciation of Paul. The difference, both in form and content, between the dogmatic system of Paul, and the 'good tidings' of Jesus, is undeniable, but this ought not to have blinded the critic to the points of contact between Paul and Jesus, nor to the merits of the immortal genius through whom the Gospel, however adulterated, became an universal religion. A similar remark applies to Professor Lagarde's criticism of the early Christian writers. We are also disposed to differ from him in our estimate of Protestantism. The Catholic doctrines, left by the Reformers, seem to interfere now with the sincerity of a Christian's devotions, just as penance and indulgences did in the times of the Reformers. They are also too often inconsistent with the original documents of the Christian religion; and on both grounds we seem to be justified in rejecting them, and yet retaining the name of Protestant. Dr. Overbeck, on the other hand, seems to us to be fairer to Paul than Professor Lagarde, but more unfair to Jesus. He seems, if we rightly understand him, to ignore the distinction between the asceticism of Jesus, and that of A Kempis or St. Francis. The latter condemns the world as radically evil; the former condemns the present world, but anticipates its sudden regeneration, Satan being cast out within a few years or months. But both Jesus and the modern philanthropists aim at a kingdom of God upon earth. Orthodox and Liberals are fundamentally at one in cherishing this ideal; may they not both be distinguished as followers of Jesus -- as Christians? We must also differ from Dr. Overbeck on practical points. His suggestion for the relief of the clergy seems only applicable to places where modern ideas have either not penetrated at all, or to a very limited extent. Fancy an English clergyman adopting it in a manufacturing town! A moderate use of 'accommodation' may be justifiable, but Teutonic morality forbids its development into the 'economy' apparently advocated by Dr. Overbeck. It is an almost hopeless puzzle; and even Professor Lagarde, with his admirable straightforwardness, is not much more successful in solving it. His language about preparing for a new religion, seems open to misapprehension. Does he wish for a new "German" religion distinct from the "Evangelical"? Or does he merely recommend the study of religious phenomena as a means of purifying men's minds from effete forms of thought? Probably he wishes us to return to the Gospel, purified of its temporary accretions; but this is not clearly expressed" (from the article by T.K. Cheyne in the Westminster Review, Vol. XLV no. 1 (January 1874) : 225 ff.

Thomas Kelly Cheyne (born September 18, 1841; died February 16, 1915), Biblical critic, was born in London, educated at Oxford and at the University of Göttingen. He took Holy Orders in 1864, was Rector at Tendring, Essex from 1880-85, and from 1886-1882 was a fellow of Balliol. He contributed to articles in the Encyclopedia Britannica and the Encyclopaedia Biblica (1899-1903). From around 1880 he turned slightly from his scientific criticism (especially of the Old Testament) and became a strong Evangelical proponent.

14 Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie [Journal for scientific theology], edited by Adolf Bilgenfeld (Volumes 1-55, four issues per year),
George Heinrich August Ewald (born at Göttingen, November 16, 1803; died at Göttingen, May 4, 1875) attended the Göttingen Gymnasium where he began studies in Theology and Oriental languages. From 1820 he attended Göttingen University, concentrating on Classical and Oriental Philology. He received a Doctorate in Philosophy in 1923 and accepted a teaching post at the Gymnasium in Wolfenbüttel from 1822-1824, after which he returned to Göttingen and became a Repentent in the theological Faculty. He was named extraordinary Professor in 1827 and ordinary Professor in 1831; member of the scientific society in Göttingen in 1833 and Nominal Professor for Oriental Languages in 1835. Copenhagen granted him a Doctorate in Theology in 1836. His copious publications included analyses, translations, grammars, commentaries and scientific treatises on works in Hebrew, Arabic, Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin. He contributed to the Zeitschrift zur Runde des Morgenlandes [Journal for news of the Orient] (published under his supervision for three years), and wrote many reviews while at Tübingen for the Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen (see below). In 1845 he married the daughter of Friedrich Schleiermacher. From 1848-66 he taught once again at Göttingen, having been dissatisfied (and having written about it) at Tübingen; and from 1850-72 he worked on criticism of the New Testament which was at the same time designed to challenge the approach of D.F. Strauss and the Baur School. While academically prolific, he also took some part in the religious politics of his time, and co-founded the Protestant League in 1863.

Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen [Göttingen scholarly review], Göttingen: Vandenhöck and Ruprecht from 1802 (previously under the title Göttingen Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen [Göttingen review of scholarly matters], Göttingen, 1753 ff. (Kirchner item 471). This is the oldest still-printing organ in Germany, whose mandate was to review all new scientific and otherwise notable books appearing in Germany and abroad, and became increasingly partisan with changes of editor. These included: W.B. Adolf von Steinwehr (from 1739), Albrecht von Haller (1747-72), Chr. G. Heyne (1770-1813), the Orientalist Eichhorn (1813-27), the historian Heeren (1827-38), the Germanist Benecke (1838-42); also the philologist Sauppe (1863-74) and the linguist Fritz Bechtel (1881-95).

Friedrich August Berthold Nitzsch (born at Bonn, Feb. 19, 1832; died at Kiel, December 21, 1898), Protestant theologian, began his studies in Philology in Berlin, soon switching his focus to Theology. His university studies took him to Berlin, Halle and Bonn. Producing impressive work on Acta, Boëthius, and Augustine, he was invited to the evangelical-theological Faculty at Vienna in 1865. He was named Doctor of Theology by the Greiftwald Faculty in 1866, and became ordinary Professor in 1868 for Systematic Theology in Gießen, where he produced work on the history of dogma in the patristic period. His final academic years were spent in Kiel, where he wrote the Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik [Manual of Evangelical dogmatics], a work in two parts (1889 and 1892) which was reprinted during his lifetime.

Jenaer Literaturzeitung [Jena literary news] (under the aegis of the University of Jena), edited by Anton Klette. Volumes 1-5, n.f. 6 (nos. 1-39; no more appeared); Jena: Duft (later, Leipzig: Veit & Co.), 1874-1879. In 40. (Kirchner item 15050)
17 Heinrich Julius Holtzmann (born at Karlsruhe, May 17, 1832; died 1910) studied Theology at Heidelberg and Berlin. He was Vicar in Badeweiler from 1854-57. He habilitated in 1858 as a Privatdozent in the theological Faculty of Heidelberg, becoming professor extraordinarius in 1861 and professor ordinarius of Theology in 1865. He was one of the founders and leaders of the Protestant League until called to the new University of Strasbourg in 1879, where he engaged almost exclusively in scientific studies. His publications were largely various forms of commentary on books of the New Testament, although he also produced Sonst und jetzt in Kirche und Theologie [Then and now in the Church and in Theology] in 1874.

Protestantische Kirchenzeitung für das evangelische Deutschland (Protestant Church news for Evangelical Germany) (edited by H. Krause). Volumes 1-43 (52 issues each year). Berlin: Reimer 1854-96. In 4°. (Kirchner item 8439)

18 Karl Fuchs, pianist and composer, was born at Potsdam on October 22, 1838, and died at Danzig on August 27, 1922. Fuchs was a choirmaster, organist and music examiner at the latter place from 1879; he wrote Die Zukunft des musikalischen Vortrags und sein Ursprung [The future of the music recital and its origin] (in 2 parts, 1884), Die Freiheit des musikalischen Vortrags [The freedom of the music recital] (1885), Praktische Anleitung zum Phrasieren [Practical guide to phrasing] (1886, together with Riemann), Künstler und Kritiker [Artist and critic] (1898), Takt und Rhythmus im Choral [Time and rhythm in the chorale] (1911), and Der taktgerechte Chorale [The chorale in time] (1923). (Grosse Brockhaus, 15th edition)


19 German homiletics. Homiletic Journal from the viewpoint of scientific Protestantism.

20 Blätter für literarische Unterhaltung (Pages for literary conversation). 1826-98. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1826-98. In 4°. (previously under the title Literarisches Conversationsblatt [Literary Conversation Paper], from Leipzig, 1821) (Kirchner item 484)

21 Hermann Schultz (born at Lüchow im Lüneburgischen, December 30, 1836; died 15 May 1903), studied Theology and Philology at the Universities of Erlangen and Göttingen from 1853. He taught as a private tutor in Hamburg from 1856-58, ater which he earned the Doctor of Philosophy and entered the theological Stift at Göttingen as a Repentant in 1859. Here he habilitated as a Privatdozent. He was called to Basel as professor ordinarius in 1864, where he stayed for over eight years, preaching, lecturing and serving on the Basel Church Council. He moved to the newly founded University of Strasbourg in 1872. Then in 1874 to Heidelberg, and in 1876 to finish his career and his life back in Göttingen, which had granted him a Doctorate in Theology in 1865. Schultz made a significant contribution to his discipline in attempting to encourage a delineation between Christian faith and historical fact (see especially his Wissenschaftliche Vorträge über religiöse Fragen [Scientific
lectures on religious questions (1877), *Die Lehre von der Gottheit Christi* [Teaching on the divinity of Christ] (1881). *Die christologische Aufgabe der protestantischen Dogmatik in der Gegenwart* [The Christological task of Protestant dogmatics today], and the posthumously appearing essay "Wer saget denn ihr, daß ich sei?" [Who do you say that I am?].

*Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie* (Yearbooks for German Theology), edited by Theodor Albrecht Liebner, Isaac A. Dorner, Friedrich Ehrenfeuchter and others. Vols. 1-23 (4 volumes to each year), Stuttgart (Gotha : Bauer [sic ], 1856-78). In 8°. (Kirchner item 8456)


22 Christian Palmer, theologian and pedagogue, born at Winnenden (Württemberg) on January 27, 1811, and died at Tübingen on May 29, 1875, received a teaching post in 1846 for pedagogy and elementary school at the University of Tübingen, and in 1852 became full professor of Moral and Practical Theology, in 1869 member of the State Synod and in 1870 of the State Parliament. Palmer is one of the most significant representatives of evangelical pedagogy. He wrote Evangelische Katechetik [Evangelical catechetics] (1844), *Evangelische Pädagogik* [Evangelical pedagogy] (1853), and *Evangelische Hymnologie* [Evangelical hymnology] (1865). (Grosse Brockhaus, 15th edition)

23 Although I could not locate a William Hauck, another of that surname seems a likely candidate : Albert Hauck, evangelical theologian, was born in Wassertürningen (Mittelfranken) on December 9, 1845, and died at Leipzig on April 7, 1918; he was first of all a pastor, then from 1878 professor in Erlangen, and from 1889 in Leipzig. His main work is the Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands [Church History of Germany] (1887-1920, unfinished; 2nd part of volume 5 edited from papers by H. Böhmer). From 1881 Hauck edited the Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche founded by J.J. Herzog. He later wrote Tertullians Leben und Schriften (Tertullian's life and writings) (1877), and Deutschland und England in ihren kirchlichen Beziehungen [Germany and England in their ecclesiastical relations] (1917).

*Theologischer Jahresbericht* [Theological yearly report], edited by Wilhelm Hauck [= Albert Hauck?]. Volumes 1-10. Wiesbaden : Niedner 1866-75 (Kirchner item 8587).


25 Eduard von Hartmann, *Die Selbstersetzung des Christentums und die Religion der Zukunft* [The Self-replacing of Christianity and the religion of the future] (Berlin : C. Duncker, 1874). Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann (born at Berlin, February 23, 1842; died at Großbliedterfelde, June 5, 1906) was an officer who after sustaining a career-ending injury in 1865 turned to
philosophical-scientific study (especially of Schopenhauer and Hegel), obtaining his Doctor of Philosophy in 1867. A metaphysical pessimist, in 1869 he published perhaps his most significant work, Die Philosophie des Unbewußten [The philosophy of the unknown] which dealt with the antagonism between will and imagination.

26 Friedrich von Hellwald (born at Padua March 29, 1842; died at Tölz, Nov. 1, 1892) was initially an officer, then later took on the editing of the journal Das Ausland [Abroad] and wrote numerous pieces on folk customs. His most important publication, cited by Overbeck, was the Culturgeschichte in ihrer natürlichen Entwicklung [The history of culture in its natural development, 2 vols. (1874). He also wrote Die Erde und ihre Völker [The Earth and its peoples], 2 vols. (1877-78).

27 Joseph von Bach (born at Aislingen bei Dillingen, 1833; died 1901), Catholic theologian, was a Privatdozent in 1865, and in 1867 Professor in Munich of Pedagogy and Philosophy (later of the History of Dogma and Symbolism). Die Dogmengeschichte des Mittelalters vom christologischen Standpunkte, oder die mittelalterliche Christologie vom achten bis sechzehnten Jahrhundert [The history of Medieval dogma from the Christian standpoint, or Medieval Christology from the eighth to the sixteenth century] (Vienna: W. Braumüller, 1873-75), 2 volumes. Contents: Vol. 1: "Die werdende Scholastik" [The emerging scholasticism] Vol. 2: "Anwendung der formalen Dialektik auf das Dogma von der Person Christi -- Reaktion der positiven Theologie" [Application of formal dialectic upon the dogma of the person of Christ -- the reaction of Positive Theology].

28 Hermann Reuter, Geschichte der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter, vom Ende des achten Jahrhunderts bis zum Anfange des vierzehnten [History of the religious Enlightenment in the Middle Ages, from the end of the eighth century to the beginning of the fourteenth], 2 volumes in 1 (Berlin: W. Hertz, 1875-77). Hermann Ferdinand Reuter (born at Hildesheim, August 30, 1817; died at Kreiensen, September 17, 1889) studied in Berlin from 1838 (Theology with Neander, Vatke, Marheineke, Bengsteberg), Philology (with Böckh, Benry, Bopp) and Philosophy (with Trendelenburg an Werder); he received a prize from Berlin for his analysis of the Eucharist, which made him decide for what had otherwise promised to be an unenticing career in Theology. He habilitated at Berlin in 1843; after nine years as Privatdozent, Breslau appointed him professor extraordinarius in March, 1852. In 1855 he published a book-version of an earlier work, and entitled it Abhandlungen zur systematischenTheologie. That year he was appointed professor ordinarius in Greifswald (where he was granted a PhD honoris causa in 1864). In 1858 he produced a significant paper "Zur Kontroverse über Kirche und Amt" [On the controversy over Church and office]. His main interest lay in the scientific study of Church history.

29 "The question concerning the relation of theology to the other sciences proceeds from the assumption that theology is itself a science. To establish this was the purpose of the preceding discussion, and trusting to the foundation thus laid, we might without more ado have proceeded to the answering of the question, had not the scientific character of theology, which we believe to have been proved, been disputed in quite recent times. In this onslaught theologians themselves have taken part. Lagarde, doctor of
theology, and Overbeck, doctor and professor of theology, have in speical
monographs subjected their own science to a severe criticism, so that we have
felt it quite necessary that we should deal with their views in a place by
themselves. Nevertheless, we can still attach to them only an ephemeral
significance, and shall satisfy ourselves with taking notice of them in a
summary manner; and we do this lest non-theologians should be induced without
due reflection to allow themselves to be influenced by the theological
judgment. [...] While Lagarde aims his blow against the whole Church theology,
Overbeck directs his attack against the hitherto prevailing Protestant
theology. He divides it into apologetical and liberal theology, and denies to
both the right to be regarded as Christian. Because they feign to be
Christian, they are fallen away from Christianity, and are affected with the
taint of untruthfulness. In their place, therefore, the critical theology has
to make its appearance, which breaks loose from the half and half position of
previous theology, and is according to its nature irreligious.

These two, Lagarde and Overbeck, have this in common with Strauss, that
they conjure up for their own use a Christianity, a Church system, and an
ecclesiastical or Christian theology, in order that they may direct their
attack upon the old system and its reconstruction against this image of their
own fancy. [...] An irreligious theology is a contradictio in adjecto. A
theology which does not spring from religious motives, and does not pursue
religious ends, is no theology. And if Overbeck is inclined to bring this
theology into a certain connection with the practical system of the Church,
the result can be no other than this, that the irreligious theology would lead
to practical irreligion. [...] Meanwhile, if even from the theological
side itself such voices should sound aloud against all the theology of today,
it can be no cause of wonder that non-theologians chime in with this hostile
tone and deny to theology the character of an independent science, maintaining
that it has no right to be defended in the universities in separate faculties,
seeing that its constituent parts, in so far as they are of general value,
must have been dealt with in the philosophical faculty. We believe this
estimation of theology must be traced back to a confounding of it with the
philosophy of religion. [...] (J.F. Rübinger, Encyclopaedia of Theology,
315ff.). Julius Ferdinand Rübinger (born at Lohsa, Oberlausitz, April 20,
1811; died November 18, 1891), evangelical theologian, studied in Breslau,
then in Leipzig; habilitated in Breslau in 1838, became professor
extraordinarius in 1847 and professor ordinarius in 1859. In Breslau he
divided his energy between teaching (Scriptures) and vigorous involvement in
Church politics. His purpose in writing his main work, Theologik oder
Encyklopädie der Theologie (1880; translated into English in 1884), was to put
theological ideas in a nutshell while according to that science the same
status as the other academic disciplines. In 1869 he spoke on "die
Entwicklung der Theologie zur Wissenschaft" [The development of Theology into
a science]; he did not see theology as a scientific prelude to action but
rather as a pure study in itself.

30 Carl Bernoulli, Die wissenschaftliche und die kirchliche Methode in der
Theologie. Ein encyklopädischer Versuch [Scientific and ecclesiastical method
in Theology. An encyclopedic essay] (Freiburg i.B. : Mohr, 1897).

31 Eberhard Vischer, Ist die Wahrheit des Christenthums zu beweisen? [Can the
truth of Christianity be proven?] (Tübingen : J.C.B. Mohr, 1902).
Eberhard Vischer, evangelical theologian, was born in at Göttingen on May 28, 1865. He was Pastor in Arosa and Davos, and in 1902 became Professor for Early Church History and New Testament in Basel. He wrote *Die Offenbarung Johannes* [The Revelation of John] (1886), *Die Paulusbriefe* [The letters of Paul] (1904), *Der Apostel Paulus und sein Werk* [The Apostle Paul and his work] (1910), *Die Zukunft der evangelisch-theologischen Fakultäten* [The future of evangelical-theological Faculties] (1913), and *Albrecht Ritschi* (1922).

32 Emolumente: Niklaus Peter gives as a synonym "Vorteile, Emolumente" (*OWN* 1, p. 276), although it is not clear why he provides the explanation.

33 Niklaus Peter directs the reader to p.152, item 30, and p.159 (*OWN* 1 p. 280).

34 Lucubrationen: N. Peter gives the synonyms "Nachtarbeiten, Nachtgedanken" [Night-works; Night-thoughts] (*OWN* 1, p. 281 note to line 9).

35 Internal reference: *OWN* 1 gives ChT p. x f.

36 Ernst Rolffs (1867-1947), *Harnacks Wesen des Christenthums und die religiösen Strömungen der Gegenwart* [Barnack's "Essence of Christianity" and the religious currents of the present day] (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1902). In the section to which Overbeck refers here, Rolffs criticizes the lack of clarity and the driness of Barnack's delivery, wherein a School's identifiable mode of expression falls short of capturing the imagination of its listeners (and especially of the youth).

Some biographical information about Barnack, as well as a brief statement of Overbeck's objections to his work, would be useful here.

Adolf von Barnack (ennobled by an admiring government late in his life) was born in Dorpat, Estonia, in 1851, the son of Theodosius Barnack, a professor of Practical and then Systematic Theology at the Universities of Erlangen and Dorpat. Barnack matriculated at the Dorpat University, then left for Leipzig in 1872 where he passed his doctoral examination in 1873 and habilitated in Church history in 1874. He taught at Leipzig in 1874-5 and in the next two years co-edited the *Patrum apostolicorum opera* and founded the *Theologische Literaturzeitung* (which he edited from 1881 to 1910). In 1879 he went to Giessen as Professor ordinarius, and here he completed and published the first volume of the controversial *Dogmengeschichte* [History of Dogma]. He was appointed to Marburg in 1886 amid reactions to this work; but his appointment to the University of Berlin was debated from December, 1887, to September, 1888, and required intervention from the Kaiser to be effected in 1888. In 1890 he was elected member of the Prussian Academy of Science, and the same year the Evangelical-Social Congress was formed, of which Barnack was President from 1903 to 1911. He was at the centre of several controversies throughout his career (of which eight were "major," according to Glick [p.17]), and Overbeck directs attention to the resounding one occasioned by the publication of the *Wesen des Christentums* [The Essence of Christianity].

Barnack enjoyed a large readership and general admiration from a variety of social sectors. Overbeck in fact stood out in his criticism of the *Wesen des Christentums*, which he identified as representative of modern cultural Protestantism. For Barnack's popular and prolific work fell far short of acknowledging what Overbeck saw to be an essential antagonism between believing and knowing, between Christianity and theology, and between
Christianity and culture (cf. Blaser, pp 96-97; Pfeiffer, pp. 9, 35; Henry, p. 18). And he adapted or "repristinated" (cf. Glick) what scholarly knowledge he had acquired about Jesus to fit nineteenth-century social needs -- an adaptation which for Overbeck amounted to a subservience to Bismarck's political Reich not unlike that of Eusebius in his own time (see Glick p. 151; Henry p. 269). Martin Henry, among others, sees Overbeck's attitude to Harnack as extreme if not obsessive; and in the 1996 critical edition of Overbeck's *Kirchenlexicon* assembled and commented by Barbara von Reibnitz, there is a near fifty-page example of his concentration on Harnack and his thought (pp. 234-280).

37 Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923), *Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte: Vortrag gehalten auf der Versammlung der Freunde der christlichen Welt zu Mühlacker am 3. Oktober 1902, erweitert und mit einem Vorwort versehen* [The absolutism of Christianity and the history of religion; Lecture given at the meeting of the Friends of the Christian world, Mühlacker, October 3, 1902, expanded and with a preface] (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1902). The original German as quoted accurately by Overbeck: "[...] 'in der Praxis und vor allem im dogmatischen Unterricht von Theologen, die unter bestimmten historischen Autoritäten stehenden Kirchen dienen wollen, eine vorsichtige schonende und leise umbildende Accomodation nöthig sei'."
Footnotes to pp. 168-200 (Part III. Chapter 2. Personal Consequences Arising from the Notebook)

1 Although the use of the term "Reich" originated in the Middle Ages (the "Heilige Römischer Reich Deutscher Nation"), deliberate emphasis was placed upon it after the Franco-Prussian War. This was primarily to underline the grand future of the expanding Prussian realm, but it was also a sign that the nation could be an empire itself without any connection to Rome.

2 Niklaus Peter gives the following explanation of Overbeck's reference (OWN 1, p. 287, footnote to line 3): cf. A. Harnack to Overbeck, 6 Feb. 1884: "Daß die Jenaer nicht Sie, sondern Nippold gewünscht haben, ist meinen Freunden hier und mir ein besonders schlagender Beweis gewesen, daß die höheren Rücksichten, welche jetzt alles vergiften, auch in Jena nicht verbannt sind." [That the Jenaers wanted Nippold rather than you, was striking proof to my friends here and to me that the "higher considerations" which now poison everything are not absent in Jena.] Friedrich Nippold (1838-1918), evangelical theologian born in Emmerich, was a Privatdozent in 1865 in Church History at Heidelberg, then extraordinary Professor in 1867, Professor ordinarius in Bern in 1871 and in Jena in 1884 (as the successor to Hase). He belonged to the founders of the Evangelical Bund and actively opposed the Ritschl school.


4 The editor for the first five years (from 1876) was E. Schürer; and for years 6-34, E. Schürer and A. Harnack.


6 Kübel, Robert Benjamin, Christliche Bedenken über modern christliches Wesen; von einem Sorgenvollen. [Christian thoughts on modern Christianity, by a concerned person], 3rd ed. Gütersloh. Bertelsmann, 1889. Robert Kübel (born at Kirchheim [Württemberg], Feb. 12,1838; died 1894) attended the evangelical
theological seminary in Schöntal; and studied Philosophy and Theology in Tübingen from 1856-60. He was a Repentant at the Blaubeuren Seminary from 1861-65, where he taught Hebrew and Old Testament. In 1865 he travelled and studied in Paris. In 1866, back at Tübingen, he earned his Licentiate in Theology. From 1867-1870 he was Deacon in Balingen, where he wrote his Bibelkunde [Biblical tidings]. In 1870 he was called by the Prussian government to preach at and direct the Predigerseminar in Herborn, Nassau, where he was also part of the Lutheran Bible Revision group. In Herborn he published his Christliche Lehre... (2nd ed., 1873) and an outline of Pastoral Theology. Subsequently in Ellwangen he wrote his Catechetics and other pedagogical pieces, then in 1879 he was appointed to the University of Tübingen as professor ordinarius in Systematic Theology. Kübel's later works included Über den Unterschied der Richtungen in der modernen Theologie [On the different directions in Modern Theology], Wesen und Aufgabe einer bibelgläubigen Theologie [Essence and task of a Bible-faithful Theology] (2nd ed., 1890), and the anonymous Christliche Bedenken über modern christliches Wesen, von einem Sorgenvollen (1888, 3rd edition 1889) [Christian thoughts on modern Christianity, by a concerned person]. He was co-editor of the Beweis des Glaubens [Proof of faith] and of the Neuen kirchlichen Zeitschrift [New ecclesiastical Journal], among other periodicals.

7 Heinrich Julius Holtzmann (1832-1910), Lexikon für Theologie und Kirchenwesen [Lexicon for Theology and the Essence of the Church], by Dr. H. Holtzmann and Dr. R[ichard Otto] Zöpfel ... Lehre, Geschichte und Kultus, Verfassung, Bräuche, Feste, Sekten und Orden der christlichen Kirchen, das wichtigste aus den übrigen Religionsgemeinschaften. [Teaching, history and cult, constitution, customs, festivals, sects and orders of the Christian Church, the most important from the remaining religious societies.] Leipzig, Verlag des Bibliographischen Instituts, 1882. 2nd ed. expanded and improved. Braunschweig, C. A. Schetschke, 1891.

8 Doktorfrage: although I have translated this approximately, it may be that Overbeck was playing on the idea of a difficult question or a moot point being the subject of doctoral debate.

9 Studien zur Geschichte der alten Kirche (Schloß Chemnitz, 1875) [Studies on the history of the early Church]: contains articles which Overbeck abbreviates, listed in the following note.

10 "Über den pseudojustinischen Brief an Diognet" [On the pseudo-Justinian letter to Diognet]; "Über die Gesetze der römischen Kaiser von Trajan bis Marcus Aurelius gegen die Christen und ihre Behandlung bei den Kirchenschriftstellern" [On the laws of the Roman Emperors from Trajan to Marcus Aurelius against the Christians, and their treatment by Church authors]; "Über das Verhältniss der alten Kirche zur Slaverei im römischen Reiche" [On the relationship of the early Church to slavery in the Roman Empire].

11 Zur Geschichte des Kanons. Zwei Abhandlungen. ("Die Tradition der alten Kirche über den Hebräerbrief"; "Der neutestamentliche Kanon und das Muratorische Fragment") (Schloss Chemnitz, 1880) [On the history of the Canon. Two treatises. (The tradition of the early Church on the Letter to the

12 Karl August von Hase (born at Niedersteinbach near Penig, August 25, 1800; died at Jena, January 3, 1890) attended the Altenburg Gymnasium from 1813-1818, where he formed the design of becoming a country pastor; yet he was persuaded to become a jurist, so he went to Leipzig and studied Philosophy and Biblical exegesis. On a scholarship he proceeded to Erlangen in 1821. He returned to Penig in 1822 to assist in pastoral duties, including preaching, where he continued a varied corpus of writing. In 1823 he went to Tübingen, where he earned his Doctor's and Master's diplomas, and further habilitated to become Privatdozent and teach on the Letter to the Hebrews and the life of Jesus. In quasi-novels he wrote an account of a pastor's life based on Johannine principles (1823) and an epistolary exchange between half-brothers of different denominations (1827), in which each man persuades the other to convert. Other early works include a Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik (1826) which underwent many subsequent editions over the following fifty years. His academic interests became increasingly scientific, and in 1829 he wrote a Life of Jesus "für akademische Vorlesungen" [for academic lectures]. He was appointed extraordinary professor in Jena that year. Another interest of that period: as "Karl von Steinbach" he published his political impressions of the time, influenced by events in France (Sachsen und seine Hoffnungen, eine politische Denkschrift der September Wochen 1830 [Saxony and its hopes, Political thoughts of September, 1830]). He began reading Church History in 1831, and soon formed the idea of writing a history of the Church himself, which he accomplished in a period of three years. In 1833 he was named honorary professor ordinarius at Bern; he refused a position at Zurich in 1836 and that year became professor ordinarius at Jena. In 1838 he was named Prorektor of the University, a position to which he was reappointed four times (1847,1855, 1863, 1871). During this time he also produced an anonymous Liederbuch des deutschen Volkes [Songbook of the German people]. In the unsettled climate of 1848 Hase wrote political and church-political tracts and treatises. Then in 1855 he sent an open letter to F.C. Baur, debating the methodology of the Tübingen School (which was published along with Baur's reply). It was his presence at Jena that influenced Overbeck's career as an academic Church Historian; and Overbeck dedicated his history of the Canon to his prolific and broadly educated supporter and supervisor.


Overbeck's contributions (from Index 1-56):


   (Mentioned in book-review article by H. Holtzmann on Die Christenverfolgungen der Cäseren bis zum 3. Jht. [Persecution of the Christians by the Emperors up to the 3rd century], historisch und chronologisch untersucht von Karl Wieseler. Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, 1878.)
   (book review by H. Holtzmann - pp. 504-505)


15 [Kirchner item 18129]: Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und Kunde des Urchristentums (ab Jg. 20 ... der älteren Kirche). ed. Hans Lietzmann Jg. I ff. Giessen : Töpelmann 1900 ff. 8o. See also: [NUC]: Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche. Giessen, J. Richer, etc. [...] quarterly (Irregular). Editor: Erwin Preuschen. Title varies: v. 1-19, 1900-1919/20, Z. für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde des Urchristentums.

16 Niklaus Peter (OWN 1 p. 303) identifies these four as Overbeck, P. de Lagarde, O. J. Wellhausen, and B. Duhn.

   [The Foreword to these editions, esp. the 3rd, as Overbeck cites, does not immediately show the relevance of his comment.]
Notes to pp. 200-217 ("Die moderne Theologie" : What Followed)

1 "Tagesgrösse" can be rendered imperfectly by the English expression "here today, gone tomorrow," or the colloquial locution "flash-in-the-pan." Neither translation, however, fits easily into Overbeck's sentence.

2 Overbeck refers to Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930) and his Das Wesen des Christentums; sechzehn Vorlesungen ... im Wintersemester 1899/1900 an der Universität Berlin gehalten. Leipzig : J. C. Hinrichs, 1900.

3 Cadmäer : See Niklaus Peter's note (OWN 1 p. 310) : "Nach griech. Mythos erschlägt Kadmos, der Bruder Europas, den Drachen des Ares und sät auf Athenas Rat die Drachenzähne, aus denen bewaffnete Männer (Spartoi) erwachsen. Als er einen Stein unter sie wirft, geraten sie in Streit und erschlagen sich gegenseitig, so daß nur wenige übrigbleiben." [According to Greek mythology, Cadmus, the brother of Europa, slew the dragon of Ares and, at the advice of Athena extracted the tooth of the dragon, from which armed men (Spartans) grew. When he threw a stone among them, they engaged in battle and killed each other, so that only a few were left over.] The men left over after the slaughter became the first Cadmeans.

4 "Societa Jesu" ; "Soli deo gratia."

5 Paul Rohrbach (born 1869), Die Bagdadbahn (Berlin : Wiegardt & Grieben, 1902. (Grosse Brockhaus) : Rohrbach, Paul : geo-political author, born at Irgen (Livland) 29 June, 1869. First theologian, then journalist, travelled throughout western Asia (1897-1902); was Kommissar (1903-06) for the Ansiedlungswesen [colonization] in German East Africa, there became familiar with the German colonies of Tongo and Cameroun, and in 1908 with German East Africa and parts of East Asia. In his numerous publications (travel accounts, political writings) he shows himself a proponent of German world politics. Particularly strong pieces : Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt [The idea of Germany in the world] (1912), Die Geschichte der Menschheit [The history of humanity] (1914), Weltpolitik-Wanderbuch [World politics and travel book] 1897-1915 (1916), Länder und Völker der Erde [Countries and peoples of the Earth] (1925).

6 "Das apostolische Zeitalter liegt hinter uns. Wir haben gesehen, daß das Evangelium in demselben von dem mütterlichen Boden des Judentums losgelöst und auf den weiten Plan des griechisch-römischen Reichs gestellt worden ist. Der Apostel Paulus ist es vornehmlich gewesen, der dies vollzogen und damit das Christentum in die Weltgeschichte übergeführt hat. Die neue Verbindung, die es empfing, bedeutete an sich keine Hemmung; im Gegenteil, die christliche Religion war darauf angelegt, sich in der Menschheit -- und diese stellte sich damals im orbis Romanus dar -- zu verwirklichen. Aber neue Formen mußten sich nun entwickeln, und sie bedeuteten auch eine Beschränkung und Belastung." This passage, which for Overbeck demonstrates Harnack's indifferent treatment of Christianity, is translated by Thomas Bailey Saunders (What Is Christianity? 2nd ed., London : Williams & Norgate, 1901) : "The apostolic age now lies behind us. We have seen that in the course of it the Gospel was detached from the mother-soil of Judaism and placed upon the broad field of the Graeco-Roman empire. The apostle Paul was the chief agent in accomplishing this work, and in thereby giving Christianity its place in the
history of the world. The new connexion which it thus received did not in itself denote any restricted activity; on the contrary, the Christian religion was intended to be realized in mankind, and mankind at that time meant the orbis Romanus. But the new connexion involved the development of new forms, and new forms also meant limitation and encumbrance." (p. 190)

7 "Wer den wirklich Wert und die Bedeutung einer großen Erscheinung, einer mächtigen Hervorbringung der Geschichte, feststellen will, der muß allem zuvor nach der Arbeit fragen, die sie geleistet, bezw. nach der Aufgabe, die sie gelöst hat. Wie jeder einzelne verlangen kann, daß er nicht nach dieser oder jener Tugend oder Untugend, nicht nach seinen Gaben oder nach seinen Schwächen beurteilt werde, sondern nach seinen Leistungen, so müssen auch die großen geschichtlichen Gebilde, die Staaten und die Kirchen, in erster Linie — man darf vielleicht sagen, ausschließlich — nach dem geschätzt werden, was sie geleistet haben. Die Arbeit entscheidet." (p. 121) This passage, as translated by Thomas Bailey Saunders (see note above), reads: "Anyone who wants to determine the real value and significance of any great phenomenon or mighty product of history must first and foremost inquire into the work which it accomplished, or, as the case may be, into the problem which it solved. As every individual has a right to be judged, not by this or that virtue or defect, not by his talents or by his frailties, but by what he has done, so the great edifices of history, the States and the Churches, must be estimated first and foremost, we may perhaps say, exclusively, by what they have achieved. It is the work done that forms the decisive test." (p. 194)

8 Essence of Christianity.


10 See above note.

11 "Therefore, since we are surrounded by so great a cloud of witnesses, let us also lay aside every weight and the sin that clings so closely, and let us run with perseverance the race that is set before us, looking to Jesus the pioneer and perfecter of our faith, who for the sake of the joy that was set before him endured the cross, disregarding its shame, and has taken his seat at the right hand of the throne of God." (Heb 12: 1-2) (NRSV)


[According to Barnack, Aquila and Prisca composed the Letter to the Hebrews; see A. Barnack : Probables re: the address(ee) and the creator of the Letter to the Hebrews] In BMW 1 (1900) : 16-41.
13: Re: praeconisieren: Niklaus Peter (OWN 1 p. 316) translates this as "feierlich ernennen" --to name ceremoniously.

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