THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY IN THE WRITINGS OF SELECT THEOLOGIANS AND ECOLOGISTS:
EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP OF ECOLOGY AND ANIMAL RIGHTS

by

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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Emmanuel College and the Department of Theology of the Toronto School of Theology. In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Theology awarded by the University of St Michael's College.

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ABSTRACT

The Role of Community in the Writings of Select Theologicans and Ecologists: Examining the Relationship of Ecology and Animal Rights

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This dissertation attempts to examine the relationship between the animal rights movement and the area of environmental ethics. It critiques the theological work of Andrew Linzey in the area of animal rights, while also examining the works of Mary Midgley, Aldo Leopold and J. Baird Callicott. It attempts to take the works and ideas of the latter three and use them as a contrast to the work of Andrew Linzey. This is carried out in the historical context of the long-standing debate between animal rights ethics and environmental ethics. The thesis of the work is that a historical examination of major issues in the debate ought to yield significant critical categories. These categories can provide appropriate criteria with which to evaluate Linzey's work. Furthermore, these categories can be catalysts for a much needed and constructive "turn towards inclusive community" within the debate itself.
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Introduction

A. General

1) Thesis statement

This dissertation examines the pioneering theological work of Andrew Linzey in the area of animal rights ethics. It does so in the context of the long-standing debate between animal rights ethics and environmental ethics. The thesis of the work is that a historical examination of major issues in the debate ought to yield significant critical categories. These categories can provide appropriate criteria with which to evaluate Linzey's work. Furthermore, these categories can be catalysts for a much needed and constructive "turn towards inclusive community" within the debate itself.

II) Terms and language usage

The usage of particular terms could be one of the most difficult areas of this thesis. This is primarily because many of the terms, such as "animal", "nature", and "right", have yet to be clarified amongst the writers in this area. Inherent value, intrinsic value, moral considerability, duties, responsibilities, reverence; the list of terms is endless and complicated. Each author uses them for various reasons, and often without precise definition.

Hence it is necessary to tread carefully in reading and analyzing the works of various writers. For sometimes the author's intent is obscured by the various possible meanings of the terms used. Therefore, in reading these works recognition of the
possible conflicts in the usage of terms must be made. As a result the section demonstrates some of the difficulties in three of the most used terms: "animal", "nature", and "right". This will hopefully give some sense of the problems that can be encountered in reading and researching in this area. These terms will be touched on further in the main body of the thesis. As well, other terms are mentioned throughout and some, such as "speciesism", are covered more comprehensively in the Appendix. It is impossible to give a truly exhaustive account of the problem, however, it is hoped that some idea can be given of the complexity of the discussion.

"Animal"

One of the most difficult areas of animal welfare is undoubtedly the proper defining of what is covered by the term "animal". Some writers attempt to avoid discrimination—as humans are animals too—by changing it to "nonhuman" or "nonhuman animal". Regardless of this surface problem, there is a deeper issue and one that is far more problematic. Most of the writers use the term animal or nonhuman animal haphazardly, never fully clarifying whether they are referring to mammals, to the kingdom Animalia or to any and all creatures.

Technically, the Collins Concise Dictionary terms an animal as both, "any living organism characterized by voluntary movement, the possession of specialized sense organs enabling rapid response to stimuli, and the ingestion of complex organic substances," and "any mammal, esp. except man."¹ There is obviously a broad possible

range between these two definitions. And, unfortunately, most authors seem to use both definitions alternately.

Andrew Linzey, in particular, interchanges his meaning of the term animal depending on what he is writing about at the time, making for very complicated reading. Peter Singer and Tom Regan tend to be more aware of the complications and clearly designate what falls under the classification of animals, particularly as the term then refers to animals included in the arena of animal rights. In all quotes by or references to the work of Tom Regan, the term animal is meant to refer to "mentally normal mammals of a year or more." And in all references by Peter Singer, the term animal is usually meant to refer to all beings known to be sentient. This Singer usually categorizes as everything above an oyster.

"Nature"

Often, in theological writings, the term "nature" is used interchangeably with "creation". Both terms are meant to refer to the whole earth—land and sea—inclusively. However, deeper questions arise over whether nature is opposed to culture; whether only wilderness is considered to be nature, while urban and rural areas are anti-nature; and also whether there is any nature (that is, untouched by humans) left at all. Kate Soper, in particular, raises some of these issues in her work,

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1 Usually Linzey, when talking of animals, means only spirit-filled, flesh and blood creatures. This tends to refer to only mammals (although in one reference he includes birds). However, he is less than clear on these points and often does not clarify the term. See below, Chapters 4 and 5 for more points on his usage of the term. Often Linzey's group of animals is drawn along the same lines as Regan's animal rights category. See below for more discussion of the similarities between Linzey and Regan.

2 Tom Regan, The Case For Animal Rights (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1983), 78.

What is Nature? She is inclined, with other authors, to question why we perceive the work of an ant in creating a home as natural and part of nature and yet still perceive our simplest dwellings as un-natural or artificial. These are all questions vital to the discussion of animal rights/liberation and environmental ethics. In particular, the question of the nature of the natural world is relevant to the community paradigm. Some of these issues will be touched on in the main body of the thesis, however, it can in no way be an exhaustive account of the problem.

"Right"

The term "right" and the notion of granting "rights" is even more complicated. Too complicated to spell out here. However, some of the issues will be touched upon in the thesis, particularly in relation to Andrew Linzey, Mary Midgley and Tom Regan. Various other writers have taken the complication surrounding the term rights as an incentive to introduce new concepts regarding the environment and animals. The idea of moral considerability was introduced by Kenneth E. Goodpaster. Holmes Rolston introduced the idea of systemic value, while the notion of intrinsic value was raised by a variety of writers. Each of the terms will be addressed in the main body of the thesis, as they arise, along with their relationship with the rights argument.

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6 See also, Soper, What is Nature?
7 In particular, Ch. 5, Section A.
Gender

As regards gender language policy and the writing of this thesis, the University of Toronto Gender Neutral Language Guidelines will be used as a guideline.\(^\text{10}\) As it covers only general hints for language usage, I will spell out exactly which suggestions will be adopted. First of all, as regards general usage of the terms "man" and "he", it is agreed that the majority of references are avoidable, as the Guidelines state. However, if unavoidable, the term "he" will be maintained as generic usage, as it is still accepted to be so by the majority of press associations and publishing companies. This will be done to avoid such awkward terms as s/he or him and her. In direct quotes from authors, their terms will be maintained as they were originally used and intended.

B. Methodology

\(a\) Selection of authors

This thesis will undertake, by comparative analysis, the examination of the community models put forth in the works of Aldo Leopold, Mary Midgley, J. Baird Callicott, and Andrew Linzey. The main focus will be the critical analysis of Linzey's work. While the models of these particular authors will be the primary focus in this process, other authors' writings and critiques of the community models will also be introduced and discussed.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{10}\) While I have used the University of Toronto Gender Neutral Language Guidelines as a guideline, I disagree with it. Stating that "although the words 'man' and 'he' are often claimed to be generic and to include women, in fact listeners and readers hear and understand a reference to males only," is untrue. Anything that promotes the usage of [sic] in direct quotes after the terms "man" and "he", even if only as a suggestion, is crossing a line into hypersensitivity.

\(^{11}\) There is some difficulty in detailing the exact role and place of each writer in a theological thesis. Because of Linzey's overtly theological stance, emphasis is placed on his work. However, this does not
b) Historical-textual analysis

Because the community models of Leopold, Midgley, Callicott, and Linzey are grounded in the context of their particular work, and because each of their works is set within the framework of either environmental ethics or animal rights/liberation, and because these frameworks are grounded within the larger historical context of animal, nature and human relations, it is necessary to begin this thesis at this furthest point before moving back in to the specific community models.

As a result Chapter One will give a general outline of the historical background to the relationships between animals and humans and the natural world. This will not be an attempt to cover the impossibly broad range of issues that are part of this history. Instead the focus will be on clarifying particular points in this history that are particularly relevant to the discussion of the community models, and which resurface in any discussion regarding animal rights/liberation and environmental ethics.\(^\text{12}\)

Therefore, Section A will cover some of the changes caused by the rise of agriculture (around 10,000 years ago), as well as the period of the animal trials (around exclusion. the very real theological possibilities in the works of Midgley, Leopold and even to some extent Callicott. Having attended an Orthodox-Calvinist Christian school, where province-regulated courses, such as physics, were made "Christian" by a two-day lecture at the beginning of the semester on the place of "God and us" in creation, I am amused by the somewhat similar idea in theological courses. It seems so desperate that to maintain our Christian stance we must so brazenly support predominant Christian writers, regardless of how good they are. (I have found that this is nowhere more evident than with the Christian feminist writers, the books that were required course reading in this area begged the question that they were only published because the publishers were desperate themselves for Christian feminist material. A similar reason to why The Celestine Prophecy was published. So I suppose it is not limited to the theological market only.) So, I don't believe that I am using "secular" writers to critique a "theological" writer. Rather I am using good arguments and ideas to critique bad arguments and ideas.

\(^\text{12}\) See also Appendix 1 for an example of how historical ideas have shown influence in the discussion of speciesism.
AD 1100 to AD 1600). Both areas relate directly to the work of Andrew Linzey, and will be helpful in critiquing his understanding of creation, the order of nature and his rights argument. Section B will detail some points in the early animal welfare movement, concentrating on the relevant issues that continue into the present day discussions. In particular Keith Tester's discussion of the Demand for Difference and the Demand for Similitude will be addressed, as it is from these two "Demands" that the individualistic and holistic models are derived.

A brief introduction into the animal rights view of Tom Regan and the animal liberation view of Peter Singer will be covered in Section C. This will not be a detailed account of each author's position. Instead it is important that a clarification of the differences between the two writers be given in order to understand their roles in the ongoing debate between animal rights/liberation and environmental ethics. Plus, a brief outline of Singer's and Regan's platforms will help clarify Linzey's acceptance of and association with the work of Tom Regan, and his criticism of Peter Singer.

Finally, in Section D the two emergent ethical models will be laid out, the individualistic model that arises out of Regan's rights position (as well as the Demand for Difference) and the holistic model that is often exemplified by the work of Aldo Leopold (as well as the Demand for Similitude). Because this is a vital area of the thesis relating directly to Linzey (who works directly from the rights position) and J. Baird Callicott (who organizes his community concept on the work and ideas of Aldo Leopold) these topics will be continued throughout the rest of the chapters. Only a

short clarification of the basic problems between the two movements and a short
synopsis of the ongoing debate will be given here, in order to help ground and clarify
the differences and difficulties in Linzey's proposal of animal theology.

Chapters Two through Four will deal with a detailed textual analysis of each of
the main writers. Chapter Two will cover the works of Leopold and Midgley together,
giving both a brief synopsis of their overall positions and then a more detailed look at
their independent community models. Chapter Three will then follow directly from
this, as it will cover Callicott's proposal of using both Midgley's mixed community
and Leopold's biotic community to form one biosocial moral theory. The chapter will
begin in Section A with Callicott's understanding of Leopold's land ethic and the
criticism this interpretation has suffered under deconstructive ecology and the new
ecological paradigms. Section B will continue with Callicott's early position on the
animal rights/environmental ethics debate, in which he did not perceive any possible
relationship between the two movements. The chapter will then conclude in Section
C with his later position, which attempts to reconcile the incongruities between
animal rights/liberation and environmental ethics by proposing the biosocial moral
theory.

Chapter Four will turn back and look at Linzey's work in animal theology. It
will begin in Section A with his position on the organization of a covenant
community. Then it will go into a more detailed look in Section B at his proposed

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14 Linzey's earliest position was *Animal Rights: A Christian Assessment* which was published in 1976 by
SCM Press. However, because Linzey himself is critical of his earlier, "strongly polemical" stance and
its "insufficient theological understanding", this text will not be referenced. Linzey, *Christianity and the
idea of theos-rights and how these God-granted rights relate to his overall theory on animal welfare. Part of this section will cover the evolution in Linzey's thoughts from animal rights to theos-rights to a more general proposal (with less emphasis on rights language) in his latest work, Animal Theology. Finally, Section C will outline some of the key problems found in Linzey's work in this area.

Finally, Chapter Five will attempt to outline the possible future of the animal rights/environmental ethics debate and where a critically applied animal theology fits in. Section A will examine the idea of concentric circles that is covered by the biosocial moral theory, as well as hinted at in Linzey's "spheres of intimacy". Section B will move from this to a discussion on the rights question and how the community concept can move forward. Section C will conclude with a discussion of how Linzey's ideas, alongside Callicott's biosocial moral theory could lead the way toward an inclusive community that recognizes differing levels of intimacy. Lastly, the Appendix will briefly cover two relevant topics, the term "speciesism" and the subject of dualism. Both are relevant to the discussion and require some further clarification outside of the main body.

[Note: Due to the nature of this thesis (predominantly historical-textual analysis) and its dealing with the four main writers, a fair amount of material (particularly in Chapters 2 through 4) is quoted. To maintain a sense of flow (as the chapters try to

show the arguments of each of the authors) the majority of the longer quotes will be left as part of the main text.]
Chapter One: The History

A. Agriculture and Animal Trials

1) Agriculture

Pinpointing the exact era or decade where we went wrong regarding our relationship to the environment and animals has been a source of scholarly pondering for years. Numerous writers have pointed to the industrial era and the mechanization of the world as the source of our dominionist attitude. Others perceive the rise of the Christian religion, with its support of dominionism, dualism, and hierarchy and patriarchy as the catalyst for environmental degradation. Most say it was both, walking down the garden path together, that destroyed what must have been our previously perfect, symbiotic relationship with the natural world. Amongst this last camp are ecofeminists who attempt to lay the blame at the door of patriarchy, citing our dualistic and hierarchical divisions of the world as the primary cause of the domination of nature, woman, animals, etc. This argument can also trace its source

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17 Of these, the most famous is of course Lynn White's essay, "The Historic Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," *Science* 155 (March 10, 1967): 1203-7.
18 There is often a tendency in environmental ethics to ignore that this is the possible outcome from any discussion of "when" we went wrong. If one is willing to assume a point of "when" we went wrong, then one is also assuming that there is a point prior to this when we were "right".

There is something, I think, to the argument that the we were never "right" or in complete symbiosis with nature. When we started to become self-aware, we started to overcome natural processes (disease, winter scarcity, famine, etc.), and we ultimately, of course, took ourselves out of "nature". There is little point trying to reinsert ourselves back into these natural processes. It is impossible, and some would argue, psychologically damaging. See also, Jim Mason, *An Unnatural Order: Uncovering the Roots of our Domination of Nature and Each Other* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993); Soper, *What is Nature?*
through various historical points, deriving ammunition from both the mechanization and industrialization processes and the Christian tradition.\(^9\)

However, it seems more plausible that there is no real "root" or point of departure for our domination of nature, it is simply who we are and have become. For, as some have pointed out, "if we were equal to other creatures, there would in fact be no environmental crisis."\(^20\) Instead of a precise and real turning point, there is instead our evolution from hunter-gatherers to stable communities based on agriculture and animal husbandry.\(^21\) Growth in population rose alongside our growing ability to survive amidst natural constraints (such as drought, disease, etc.).

Writers willing to see this as a more natural outcome and less an evil plan,\(^22\) and who are then willing to work for change within our current world system with an understanding of our cultural and biological nature, have arisen in recent years.\(^23\)

\(^21\) Mason, An Unnatural Order, 21-32. As well, this is not to say that as hunter-gatherers humans lived in complete symbiosis with nature, causing no ecological damage. This is a point Mason seems to support, as do others. However evidence shows otherwise. For some discussion of the effects Paleo-Indians had on their surroundings see Wilson, The Diversity of Life, in particular Chapter Twelve.
\(^22\) I am not using poetic license here. There is, particularly in ecofeminist writings, an occasional hint that the writer perceives the domination of nature (alongside that of women and animals) as a great scheme cooked up by European white upper-class males to keep women "down". (Male writers to be fair are also willing to cite these ideas.) This idea is then countered in ecofeminist writings with the idea that the power of womanhood and femininity will bring about a new, nonviolent, nature-loving order. See, Adams and Donovan, Beyond Animals Rights, particularly the essays by Deane Curtin ("Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care"), Josephine Donovan ("Animal Rights and Feminist Theory" and "Attention to Suffering: Sympathy as a Basis for Ethical Treatment of Animals"), and Marti Kheel ("The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair"). For an interesting book disputing the benevolent kindness of all women see Patricia Pearson’s When She Was Bad: Violent Women and the Myth of Innocence. (New York: Random House, 1997).
\(^23\) Most notably, there is some attempt by Callicott to acknowledge this change in his biosocial moral theory and in particular, in his incorporation (and admiration) of the work of Mary Midgley.
Some theologians have even begun to tie in the introduction of agriculture with the notion of the Fall.¹⁴ Jim Mason, an environmental and animal rights author agrees and sees the Genesis creation myths as an answer made by a community troubled with the changeover from a hunter-gatherer or forager past to one of agriculture and animal husbandry.²⁵ As James Serpell states, "within the space of a few thousand years, a socioeconomic revolution took place which overthrew the existing order and replaced it with something entirely new and unprecedented...some authorities have described it as the most important and influential episode in the history of our species."²⁶

This change to agriculture and animal husbandry also changed human relationships with animals and nature/creation. No longer do we live in a garden of abundance, we now "toil" in the fields which bring us only "thorns and thistles."²⁷ Whereas hunted animals were frequently seen to be "equals", wild, mysterious and free, domestics were subjected to the will of humans.²⁸ "The essentially egalitarian relationship [between hunter and hunted] disappeared with the advent of domestication."²⁹

²⁴ See also, Ch. 4, Section C. The discussion of "Creation as Fallen" also includes general arguments about the nature and purpose of the Genesis creation myths.
²⁵ Mason, An Unnatural Order, 28.
²⁷ Genesis 3.17-18 (NRSV).
²⁸ "No more so than today with the recent cloning of a domestic female sheep. Adult mammal cloned successfully," The Globe and Mail February 24, 1997, A11, continued on A11. Note, however, that this previous status of animals as "equals" did not save them from extinction by over-hunting, habitat erosion, etc. See Wilson, The Diversity of Life, in particular Chapter Twelve.
²⁹ Serpell, In the Company of Animals, 5.
While the first change created new subservient species for our use, it also brought new conditions of living with animals. Animals reared for domestication generally lived in close quarters with their masters, often within the same dwelling. This continued up until the late middle ages when animals were moved out of the house and quartered elsewhere. As space decreased the free ranging of animals was no longer permitted. Boundaries were set and rules were laid down to create a new and ordered society. Agriculture, with its neat plowed fields, pushed back the wild, the beasts. Wild animals, once tolerated, were now responsible for attacks on humans and livestock. Rewards were handed out for killing wolves and bears, on sight, regardless of provocation.30

II) Animal trials

It was in the midst of these later changes in the living arrangements with animals and the new boundaries of wild/domestic and order/disorder, that the animal trials were also occurring. The trials took place on two levels: ecclesiastical and secular. The ecclesiastical courts tried bugs and rats, or groups of animals responsible primarily for crop damage. This was a world where it "was felt by some that the lower animals had legal rights, for they had been created before man and God had provided for them in the ark."31 And "any beast [which] contraven[es] this order by consuming

man's food and causing him famine automatically go[es] against God's will."  

Even so, it was also a world where animals were seen to have a right "to survive in nature."  Therefore they were tried and all attempts were made at finding a peaceful and fair resolution.

On the other hand, the secular courts dealt with the individual animals responsible for damage to human property or death or damage to humans themselves. "Within the hierarchy of the universe, animals occupied a lower rung than humans, and therefore any damage by an animal to a human being was an offense against justice. It was therefore necessary to try offending animals and punish them, not so much as individual retribution against the specific beast, but far more as a gesture restoring the balance of justice." As Cohen states, "It took the medieval legal mentality to assume that one could no more punish an animal than a human being without a proper trial." Thus the popular stance implied an equality of man and animal before justice by virtue of certain similarities, while the judicial position assumed that animals were tried before human courts by virtue of their subjection to man, and the ecclesiastical attitude claimed that animals were punished not by people,

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14 So much so, that in one ecclesiastical case another plot of land was found for weevils guilty of eating a farmers crops. While criticisms were brought by counsel against the quality of land in this relocation program, the bugs were still encouraged to leave for this new location (it was even made out to seem better than it was to them). See E. P. Evans, *The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals* (Great Britain: William Heinemann Limited, 1906).


but by God acting through certain people.\textsuperscript{37} While much ink is wasted on explaining away this "insanity", the animal trials do add something of great significance to any understanding of the medieval world order.\textsuperscript{38}

Traditionally when books on the middle ages discuss the medieval mind, they focus on the cosmological worldview and the beginnings of philosophy and scientific thought that can be traced to this early period. They analyze the shifts in economics and society. They list the changes in monarchy and political boundaries. But they do not address the animal trials.\textsuperscript{39} And it is the animal trials, when taken together with the divine world order, that give greater depth and understanding to exactly how much this natural order and medieval understanding of justice played a role in society.\textsuperscript{40}

In this natural order, as Thomas Aquinas so clearly stated, "the imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment,

\textsuperscript{37} Cohen, \textit{The Crossroads of Justice}, 130.
\textsuperscript{38} "Animal trials are unthinkable, but animal rights is not, because modern systems of classification rest on different rules than those which informed the understanding of the worthies of Falaise." Tester, \textit{Animals and Society}, 77. Tester's reference to Falaise, is to a particularly famous trial that took place against pigs who had mauled a child.


\textsuperscript{39} See, Robert Bartlett, \textit{The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change} 950-1350 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; David Nicholas, \textit{The Evolution of the Medieval World: Society, Government and Thought in Europe} 312-1500 (London: Longman, 1992). Both books cover the exact time period of the trials' heyday (around 1100-1300), without ever mentioning them once. Of course this is also part of the greater dismissal in history texts of our relations with animals and nature.

\textsuperscript{40} Max N. Wildiers, \textit{The Theologian and His Universe: Theology and Cosmology from the Middle Ages to the Present} (New York: Seabury Press, 1982). Wildiers feels that the hierarchy, order and cosmology in the middle ages are critical for understanding the medieval mind (in particular, p. 57). Since the animal trials clearly represent and arise out of these same systems, they are also critical to this understanding.
and animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. While traditionally Aquinas is discredited for his scholarly treatment of animals, when he is read in the context of the animal trials it becomes even more clear that he was simply stressing an already accepted natural order, while also reacting against an unusual ecclesiastical matter. "It would be wrong to be too self-righteous about Aquinas. From his perspective what he was trying to work out was the nature of creation in the light of the truth that God has destined it for order rather than chaos."

Therefore when Aquinas restates the already accepted natural order, he also clearly states that animals could not be cursed. "Curses and anathemas presupposed both the objects' culpability and its amenability to punishment." As a result, Aquinas pointed out that animals were not rational and therefore did not set themselves in motion. Rather they were "God's creatures fulfilling by their actions, God's will." Because they were not rational, animals did not have intent; and because they were not responsible or guilty, they could not be cursed. Aquinas also justified the human use of animals for food and supported their position as property because of their role in the natural order.

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42 Linzey, *Christianity and the Rights of Animals*, 27.
45 Ibid., 125.
Still, "while eminent theologians might have disapproved, local curates and canons, and in certain areas even bishops, adopted a far more lenient attitude" to the animal trials. 47 When local churches conducted these trials and the local priests cursed animals that were found guilty, 48 they also "insisted upon one point—that the objects of the ritual should suit their existence to human convenience." 49 Working against a more popular stance that accepted a certain degree of similarity between humans and animals, Aquinas attempted to spell out the differences. Labeling Aquinas as a "source" of our speciesism, 50 when he was simply dealing with other theological concerns, 51 is not particularly fair to him or to his work. 52 Aquinas still advocated kind consideration of animals, arguing that acting in mercy toward the "brute creation" would also "dispose men to pity and tenderness for one another." 53

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48 While some sources state that animals were excommunicated, there is no real evidence that this occurred. See, Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice; Hyde, "The Prosecution and Punishment"; Carson, Men, Beasts, and Gods; Bierne, "The Law is an Ass."
49 Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice, 123.
50 The term "speciesism" is used here to denote the assumed boundary line of moral concern, which was drawn around humans for years. See Appendix 1 for further discussions of the term.
51 Some recent writers have argued that the marginalization of nature and subjection of animals "has happened not so much because of a primary or self-conscious attention to nature itself, but as the byproduct of other—in themselves honorable no doubt—religious purposes and concerns." Theodore Hiebert, "Re-Imagining Nature: Shifts in Biblical Interpretation," Interpretation 50,1 (January 1996), 40. Aquinas, like others who covered this issue (e.g., Descartes), was also concerned with reconciling the "benevolence of God...with the suffering of his creatures." Peter Harrison, "Animal Souls, Metempsychosis, and Theodicy in Seventeenth Century English Thought," The Journal of the History of Philosophy 31,4 (October 1993), 521.
52 And as the animal trials give evidence to, church doctrine actually had little to say on the actual way animals were treated in the middle ages. Regardless of the position of the Catholic church, the popular stance maintained its hold and animal trials continued up to the 1800s (although they became less common in the later decades).

Compare this to the modern situation, where the Catholic church is less than willing to come out in support of animal welfare and yet lay Catholics are more likely, than even their Protestant neighbors, to support animal rights. See, David Nibert, "Animal Rights and Social Issues." (On-line Internet). It would be easy to state that the Catholic church is lacking in understanding on the issues and in continuing its stance of domination and hierarchy is supporting the current crisis. But, who is it we are talking about here?
53 Carson, Men, Beasts, and Gods, 17.
It is this kind consideration or humane treatment that is usually overlooked in the writings of Aquinas, as well as in Kant, Hume and others. For example, as Linzey states, "it must be remembered that almost all human thinking, secular, utilitarian, rationalist as well as Christian, has been guilty of what Mary Midgley calls 'the absolute dismissal' of the claims of animals."\(^{54}\) However, this is not true and more importantly, this is not Midgley's point at all.\(^{55}\) Instead she devotes two chapters to analyzing the different writers in the rationalist tradition.\(^{56}\) Often, simply because they did not extend equality or rights to animals, writers such as Hume, Kant and Aquinas are criticized for their "absolute dismissal". But, as Midgley states, "In these two chapters, we have searched the tradition to find clear arguments for absolute dismissal. We have not found them....What we have found instead of reasoned absolute dismissal is a set of brief, casual but explicit demands for humane treatment of animals."\(^{57}\)

\(^{54}\) Linzey, Christianicity and The Rights of Animals, 24. See also, Linzey, Animal Theology, 64.

\(^{55}\) This is one of two misjudgments that Linzey makes in regards to the work of Mary Midgley. He also misunderstands another chapter title, "Equality and Outer Darkness," and cites it as proof that Midgley completely dismissed equality. Actually Midgley's reference is to the "outer darkness" that nature was usually relegated to. So even though Midgley does not support equal rights for animals, neither does she support complete outer darkness, which is the point of her chapter title. See, Linzey, Animal Theology, 29 and Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter: A Journey Around the Species Barrier (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1984), 69.

It seems that Linzey has simply read Midgley's chapter titles and not actually the chapter contents. This problem continues into his discussion of the actual nature of the natural world/creation. See Chapters 4 and 5 for further discussion in this area.

\(^{56}\) Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, Chapters 4 and 5.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 63. See also, Robin Attfield, "Western Traditions and Environmental Ethics," in Robert Elliot and Arran Gare, eds., Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of Readings (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983), in particular 211.
B. The Early Animal Welfare Movement

The growth of the animal welfare movement in the 18th Century and its successes in the 19th Century are frequently attributed to the corresponding rise in pet-keeping. For, "various historical studies have shown that strong affection for animal companions did not become widespread in Europe until the nineteenth century." While there had been pets kept prior to this point, traditionally it was only the norm for royalty or nobility to own pets. However, with the growth of towns and a rising middle-class, a new economic group now had the disposable income to enter the arena of pet-keeping.

However, the exact correlation between the rise in pet-keeping and the growth of the humane movement is less than clear. With the move to towns and urban

58 Serpell, *In the Company of Animals*, 23.
59 An early example of pet-keeping that is often missed, is found in II Samuel 12.1-3. The story used by Nathan to David describes the relationship between a lamb and a man. "He brought it up, and it grew up with him and with his children; it used to eat of his meager fare, and drink from his cup, and lie in his bosom, and it was like a daughter to him." This "pet" is accepted as completely legitimate in the analogy and when the lamb is taken and slaughtered, David charges the man responsible for this slaughter with having "no pity" and states, "As the Lord lives, the man who has done this deserves to die." II Samuel 12.5-6. As Midgley states, it is not as if David had replied "that of course poor men can expect that sort of thing to happen if they will go in for sentimental pet-keeping." Instead Nathan and David "both understand clearly how this strong individual relation was possible." Midgley, *Animals and Why They Matter*, 116.
60 Still maintained in the present-day with the Queen of England and her Corgis. See also, Serpell, *In the Company of Animals*, 43-59.
61 See also, Serpell, *In the Company of Animals*, in particular Part II; Tester, *Animals and Society*; Thomas, *Man and the Natural World*. All three see the rise in pet-keeping as an important factor in the growth of the humane movement.
62 Both Keith Thomas and James Serpell feel that the rise of pet-keeping is extremely important to this period. Serpell goes so far as to state, "It is clear that since the Middle Ages the growth in popularity of companion animals has been inextricably linked with the decline of anthropocentrism, and the gradual development of a more egalitarian approach to animals and the natural world." Serpell, *In The Company of Animals*, 168.

Keith Tester agrees, but to a lesser extent and instead introduces some of the social and economic factors that seemed to play a part in the rise of the humane movement. However, there is little doubt that the modern phenomenon of pet-keeping (a multi-billion dollar industry) has a very significant role in the strength of the animal rights and welfare movement, as well as the wildlife groups.
centers came close quarters, and with this came problems with sanitation and violence. The majority of the animal welfare legislation was directed against the lower-class and their "sports" of bull-baiting, cock-fighting, etc. These bills tend to read more like laws aimed at crowd control than actual concern for the welfare of the animals involved.\(^6\) Emphasis was placed on the violence that occurred amongst the men at such events. "Those people who do not know better are inhumane. They are cruel and something less than human. They are beasts."

In fact, Tester states that some bills were simply used as opportunities to harass certain groups of the lower classes.\(^5\) The animal welfare movement in this time was concerned with cruelty,\(^6\) but it was mainly because cruelty "undermine[d] social order".\(^7\) It is ironic that in the attempt to put down brutish behavior, the welfare of the "real" brutes was protected, while at the same time they were even more clearly defined as "brutes". As society defined what was civilized or human, it also more clearly defined what made animals nonhuman.


\(^5\) Tester, *Animals and Society*, 100. Ironically other "sports" such as hunting, falconry, etc., sports of the rich, were not seen as cruel, due mainly to the civilized and restrained manner in which it was considered they were enacted.

\(^7\) Ibid., 107. This is not to say that all of the people were only interested in controlling the lower classes. There were certainly persons in this time period that were genuinely concerned with the welfare and care of animals. However, the bills that were proposed and passed fit into the general social thinking of the time.

\(^6\) The term cruelty in this period, is used frequently. Since it often was tied in to a generally negative attitude to the persons involved, (i.e., they enjoy causing pain and suffering) it was fitting. However, there is strong opposition today to the usage of the term. Particularly when it is used to refer to scientists or experimenters. See, Tom Regan, "Animal Rights, Human Wrongs," in Zimmerman, ed., *Environmental Philosophy*, 34-36; Regan, *The Case For Animal Rights*, 196-198.

\(^7\) Tester, *Animals and Society*, 105.
In general, therefore, this period was more concerned with creating an ordered society. And in so doing it was necessary to detail what created order and what caused disorder. This is similar to the earlier changes in the agricultural, rural communities, which saw order as plowed fields and neat lots, and disorder as what lay beyond the fence. Now, order and disorder needed to be defined within a new community, the community of urban society. It was clear that gentle manners, honesty and civility helped society run smoothly, while crowds of men gathered around a cock-fight or bull-baiting, drinking and fighting among themselves, did not.

In the process of clarifying society's new boundaries, this period gave play to two interesting strains of thought that are still evident today. Tester calls them the Demand for Difference and the Demand for Similitude. The former attempts to place as much distance between animals and humans as possible. It places culture/society and order over and against nature and disorder. "The Demand for Difference attempted to make humans subjects, by controlling the objectivity of animality." Ultimately, the Demand for Difference encompasses the dualistic trend that is repeatedly pointed to by environmentalist writers.

On the other hand, the Demand for Similitude supported the close association of humans with nature. It went to the other extreme and portrayed culture as evil and debilitating. Rather than reform social order (such as the Demand for Difference championed) it suggested getting rid of social order altogether as it alienated us from

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68 Ibid., in particular 120-149.
69 Ibid., 89.
70 See Appendix 2.
our true being. Instead humans should return to nature and live in solitude. This Demand was characterized by the figure and writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau who felt that "the more we acquire new knowledge, the more we deprive ourselves of acquiring the most important knowledge of all." Traditionally it is the Demand for Difference that is most written about, although both Demands are evident in all periods. They are, however, particularly at odds in the modern period. The Demand for Similitude has reached a certain prominence in the organic and holistic streams of environmental ethics, as well as in the animal rights/liberation movements. On the other hand, the Demand for Difference label can usually be given to anything that is hierarchical, patriarchal, scientific, technological, etc. As Tester states, "The discontinuities in the history of Western thought are the background to the specific struggles of social groups and the attempts to found morality on either the uniquely human or the abstractly natural."
C. Animal Rights v. Animal Liberation

The present day movement of animal rights is dominated by the writings of two authors, Peter Singer and Tom Regan. Singer's work arose out of the liberation movements that came to the fore in the '60s and '70s. His Animal Liberation was a direct follow-up to these movements, the only difference being it proposed liberation for animals and outlined a fight against speciesism. Singer based his liberation movement on the nineteenth-century utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham. It is Bentham who so succinctly questioned the previous requirement of reason or speech in animals and suggested instead that one take pain or sentience as the point of relevance.

Singer was not alone in his support of pain and suffering as a criterion for inclusion into the moral community. Tom Regan, in his work on animal rights, also supported the use of the criterion of sentience. As well, both rejected the Kantian account which argued that we should not be cruel to animals, for this disposed us towards cruel behavior, which we could then take out on other humans. Regan and

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78 See Appendix 1 for an outline of the argument behind the term "speciesism". Note again, "All animals" for Singer does not mean all animals. He draws the line somewhere between the oyster and the shrimp. See, Singer, Animal Liberation, 178-179. He then designates everything on the other side of the line as vegetables.


80 Regan, The Case for Animal Rights.

81 The argument from cruelty or the prudential argument is found in many writers, most notably Aquinas and Kant. It is often dismissed for being humanocentric, for it centers on the idea of preventing someone from causing animal pain as it may some day lead to them inflicting pain on humans; not because inflicting pain on animals is in itself bad. Due to all the statistics, however, that proves this relationship between early violence against animals and later violence against humans, Regan and Singer (and others) are probably too quickly dismissive of Kant's point. For example, "a recent study of criminal psychopaths in the USA has even demonstrated a statistical correlation between the two tendencies. During interviews, a significantly higher proportion of psychopaths reported inflicting cruelty on animals during childhood than a matching control group of convicted
Singer also argued against perceiving animals as merely means, rather than as ends in themselves. It is these agreements between the two works that has caused confusion in the understanding of their very real differences. For a period of time, most associated the two as one movement. However, Regan and Singer are actually quite different.

Singer supported not only Bentham’s point about suffering, but also accepted the 19th-century utilitarianism that was Bentham’s position. Bentham defined good as pleasure and bad or evil as pain. Equal consideration is given to those who are shown to have interests that can be affected, or more accurately, those who can feel pain, and therefore suffer evil. It also supports the greatest possible outcome of good. Therefore, as critics of the utilitarian position have demonstrated, it is possible to kill or dispose of an individual if this is in the interests of the common good.

Regan, on the other hand, works within the individualistic rights position. He feels that Singer’s approach leaves too much open to abuse, particularly in the area of factory farms and science experiments. Instead, he feels that the rights position,

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which allows for the interests of the individual to "trump" those of the group, is the better road to take in animal welfare. While he accepts the implications of pain and suffering in animals, he changes his criteria for consideration to those who qualify as a "subject-of-a-life", and also grants those who meet the criteria as having inherent value.

It is by way of inherent value that Regan also feels there is a possible opening for a rights-based environmental ethic. "It may be that there are individuals, or possibly collections of individuals, that, though they are not subjects of a life in the sense explained, nevertheless have inherent value." It is therefore only necessary to prove that such natural objects have inherent value for there to be an environmental ethic that is genuinely "of the environment" rather than just "for its use". Regan feels

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87 Individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests." Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 243.

88 See also, Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 243-248, and "Animal Rights, Human Wrongs," for more on subject-of-a-life criterion. Also the first few chapters of The Case For Animal Rights describe in more detail the basis for the criterion mentioned in the above quote. Basically this reverts the criterion back to consciousness. As a result, Regan limits the granting of rights to only those who definitely meet the criteria of "subject-of-a-life". These are only mentally normal humans or mammals of one-year of age or older. See, Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 78. Regan still allows that there is important moral consideration of other creatures, etc., but that they are not deserving of rights.
89 Regan, The Case For Animal Rights, 245.
90 Ibid., 245. This is, of course, the exact trend that is occurring in environmental ethics right now. Inherent or intrinsic value for all animals or for all of the natural world is the current concern amongst many writers. See, John A. Hoyt, "Appreciating Animals for Their Own Intrinsic Value," [On-line. Internet. Extracted from Animals in Peril (Garden City Park, N.Y.: Avery Publishing Group, 1994).] Most argue for inherent value, assuming that this automatically grants rights, while others argue for inherent value and ask only for consideration of or duties toward animals. See the recent issue of Environmental Ethics, Rick O'Neil, "Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species" 19,1 (Spring 1997): 45-52. O'Neil attempts to clarify some uses and definitions in this area.

Theologians also argue for intrinsic value of all creation, based on, of course, divine generosity. See in particular, Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, and Animal Theology; James
that the environmental movement must now go in this direction for there to be a workable ethic.  

D. Emergent Ethical Models

It is unsurprising that with the direction taken by the animal rights movement, as exemplified by Regan, it would have little in common with the majority of the environmental ethics movement. Whereas animal rights works from an extensionist policy, thereby merely extending the prevailing individualistic rights theory to relevant members of relevant species, the environmental arena is dominated by the holistic model, which to some extent is based on Aldo Leopold's land ethic. The holistic model states that "the move from rationality or sentience to systemic beauty, stability and integrity is necessarily a noninclusive move from an individualistic to a nonindividualistic criterion, so it is a shift, not an extension."  


Leopold's land ethic is best characterized by his maxim, "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." Leopold, "The Land Ethic," in Zimmerman, ed., Environmental Philosophy, 108. It is debatable how much the holistic field and environmental ethics is actually derived from Leopold. See below.  

Luke, "Solidarity Across Diversity: A Pluralistic Rapprochement of Environmentalism and Animal Liberation," *Social Theory and Practice* 21,2 (Summer 1995), 183. See also, "But it is not...an extension of traditional morality...If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations." Richard Sylvan (Routley), "Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?" in Zimmerman, Environmental Philosophy, 12-13.
"In all cases, [holistic ethics] is a matter of questioning the modern tradition of legal humanism to arrive at the idea that nature possesses an intrinsic value and that it is, as such, worthy of respect." It is "a demand for a more realistic, holistic, and worldly moral philosophy that includes, rather than excludes, humanity from nature and the animal kingdom, since after all such inclusion is an existential and biological fact." It supports our kinship with animals and our natural context. We, as humans, are also part of the "awesome web of life in the world....the cycles of birth, life, death, and rebirth that keep all of nature alive and evolving." Because the ecosystem itself is often seen as a center of value, there is frequently focus placed on the organic unity, where the systems' "character is an integrated expression of its subsidiary systems." Therefore, instead of trying to extend a rights theory, holistic ethics can support the idea that the system has value independent of human valuing.

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91 Ferry, The New Ecological Order, 73. Ironically, it is this intrinsic value, from holistic ethics, that is also used to support rights (individualistic ethics). Regan proposes a rights-based environmental ethic that is founded on the idea of inherent value. This idea also surfaces in Linzey's work, see below for further discussion.


93 Here the Demand for Similitude begins to rear its head.

94 Mason, An Unnatural Order, 297.

95 Lawrence E. Johnson, "Toward the Moral Considerability of Species and Ecosystems," Environmental Ethics 14,2 (Summer 1992), 150.

96 The holistic model is closer to rights theory than it seems or purports to be. This move to consideration of the inherent value of systems and species seems to also support the idea of the consideration of their "interests". See, Lawrence E. Johnson, A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Johnson feels that animal rights and environmental ethics should both be placed on the idea of interests. He supports this in that life processes for him are designated as having interests.

While inherent value, in and of itself, should not denote equal moral considerability, it is often taken this way by various theorists. Both inherent value and interests are ideas that are often directly related to an individualistic rights theory. But they are also both ideas trumpeted by holists. The issues are complicated even more by the different usage of the terms involved. See, O'Neil, "Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species."

So, although the two movements have maintained separate stances for years, there are numerous examples of confusion and inconsistency. Occasions where holism has begun to take on many of the arguments used in the individualistic system without fully analyzing where the terms and
And because this value is noninstrumental and therefore inherent, preservation of it is of importance and worthy of our moral consideration.\textsuperscript{99}

However, because holistic ethics supports the preservation of the biotic system and frequently attaches value to the role certain parts play in the whole, it falls under attack for a variety of reasons. First, "if an entity is considered valuable because of its functional role in the system, then what is really important is the role, and if an adequate substitute can be found, then the entity itself can be destroyed or replaced without loss of value."\textsuperscript{100} As well, the holistic ideal of preserving whatever is considered natural or part of the system of life and death can lead some to conclude that all diseases that arise should also be allowed to flourish and live without interference.\textsuperscript{101}

Critics of the individualistic/extensionist model, on the other hand, feel that in working within the prevailing system of society and rights, extensionists also then "retain this dualistic, exclusionary thinking. The boundaries shift, certainly, but the logic does not: there are insiders and outsiders, and only insiders are worthy of moral ideas come from and what their implications are, and vice versa. Or for example, a foreword to Christopher Stone’s work on granting rights to trees and systems (or collectives) being written by an adamant holist. This holist, Garrett Hardin, then praises Stone (an individualist) for following in the steps of Leopold’s land ethic (a "pure" holist). See Stone, \textit{Should Trees Have Standing}?\textsuperscript{99} See Goodpaster, "On Being Morally Considerable," and "From Egoism to Environmentalism," in K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre, eds., \textit{Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century} (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979).

\textsuperscript{100} Eric Katz, "Organism, Community, and the ‘Substitution Problem’," \textit{Environmental Ethics} 7,3 (Fall 1985), 251. However this is slightly naïve in view of the nature of biodiversity and its evolution in time and space. See Wilson, \textit{The Diversity of Life}. Also, it seems that role replacement does occur naturally, ecosystems substitute new organisms to replace the role of extinct organisms. See, Niles Eldredge, \textit{Reinventing Darwin: The Great Debate at the High Table of Evolutionary Theory} (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), 154-155.

consideration." Therefore, "the extensionist strategy is to declare ourselves good...and then to wonder which beings are sufficiently similar to us also to warrant this privileged standing." In fact, "that the stages of the extensionist model exactly reproduce the levels of value in the hierarchical great chain of being should also give us pause." 

Assigning moral consideration by an extensionist model is also criticized by those who feel that this excludes particularity and disallows discrimination. Therefore, "we abolish or ignore particularity and distinctiveness in so far as we reduce the richness and complexity of things to the mere sharing of common characteristics." This same reproach is used against the holistic model. Holmes Rolston, designated a holist, criticizes the need to define a boundary, yet also supports the idea of maintaining a discriminating attitude. "Neither logic, nor justice, nor charity, nor biology, nor ecology, nor psychology, nor humanism, nor naturalism, nor religion, nor anything else permits stopping short at the human/nonhuman line, with all moral considerability on the one side and none on the other, although any and all these permit the discriminating treatment of humans as much as they require the discriminating treatment of nonhuman animals." 

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106 Rolston, Environmental Ethics, 77 [emphasis mine].
The most fundamental differences between the individualistic and holistic model, and the ones that are the source of the greatest conflict, are the relationship of domestic animals to wild animals and the question of time and scale. When arguments are made for removing suffering and preserving the rights of domestic animals subjected to factory farms or science experiments, some of the arguments resonate. However, when these arguments are extended to individual animals in the natural world, a world that does not respect the individual right to life, numerous problems arise. On the other hand, the holistic arguments, based on the science of ecology, tend to focus attention on the natural system and ignore individual and domestic animals. It is this area of conflict between two different ethical models, individual vs. community, that has resulted in the continued non-relationship between the animal rights/liberation movement and environmental ethics.

The other problem that the two movements have faced is the understanding and use of a time scale. The environmental movement tends to work from an evolutionary or geological time scale. It points out the length of time the earth and its

107 Fox states the basic right of individual animals should be "freedom for an animal to develop (and actualize) its natural potentials in the environment for which it is best suited or pre-adapted." Fox, "Philosophy, Ecology, Animal Welfare, and the 'Rights' Question," in Miller and Williams, eds., Ethics and Animals, 313. This is obviously problematic when taken for individual animals in the wild. The freedom to develop natural potentials is not always met, and if this is a basic right are we not responsible to see it is met? Does this then involve preventing animals in the wild from having this basic right infringed upon? See below (Ch. 5, Section A) for further critique of the rights argument for these very reasons.

108 See below (Ch. 3, Section B) for Callicott's initial position that domestic animals were "artifacts" and unworthy of consideration in an environmental ethic. As well, the holistic movement ignores urban wildlife which is part of a particular and unique urban ecosystem, an ecosystem that is not recognized as "natural" and therefore they are not deemed to be important or to have value.

inhabitants have existed in harmony and the comparably short time humans have dominated and decimated the earth, its species and plant life. The environmental movement while it accepts the need to solve practical issues also feels the need to address a change in consciousness, and to do this by making people aware of this larger time scale.\textsuperscript{110}

On the other hand, the individualistic rights position works more in the here and now. It attempts to address issues that are occurring at this moment and gives less attention to the geological time scale. Its focus lies on a particular animal or animal community in crisis and actions that need to be stopped in order to prevent more suffering to the various animals involved. The focus is on educating humanity as to humane standards in our current systems of farming, hunting, fishing, etc.\textsuperscript{111} Because of these differences some have argued that it is the joining of the two movements that will solve each of the other's problems while still meeting the needs of domestic and wild animals.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{110} See, Thomas Berry, \textit{The Dream of the Earth} (San Francisco, Calif.: Sierra Club Books, 1988).

\textsuperscript{111} This is usually accomplished by actively appealing to humanity's abhorrence of "the horror" found in such actions and their strong emotional reaction to such signs of "the horror". Note the recent video tape release of the seal hunt in Newfoundland (February–March 1997). The environmental holistic movement on the other hand, traditionally has a much more passive attitude with its cosmological worldview.

\textsuperscript{112} See Mary Anne Warren, "The Rights of the Nonhuman World," in Hargrove, ed., \textit{The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate}. 
Chapter Two: Leopold and Midgley: Community Models

A. "The Land Ethic": A Biotic Community

Aldo Leopold over a period of several decades wrote a collection of essays that attempted to detail his experiences and his understanding of how humans should relate to nature. He was critical of humanity's outlook because "in short, land is something [we] have outgrown." We "have no vital relation to it; to [us] it is the space between cities on which crops grow." While Leopold's writings are considered to be the foundation of the holistic environmental movement, he is little understood and frequently misinterpreted. Due to the nature of Leopold's writings, which are often characterized as nature writing while many mistake it for a philosophical treatise, there is often a discontinuity between Leopold's meaning (which is often hard to decipher) and his many interpreters.

Leopold documents the land ethic as third in a series of steps in our ethical evolution. He is not alone in his understanding of humanity on a path of ethical progress. For Leopold, the first ethic worked out the relationships between

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113 Leopold's influential essay, "The Land Ethic" was published originally in his collection of essays, A Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949). The copy I will be quoting from was reprinted in Zimmerman, ed., Environmental Philosophy.
115 Ibid., 108.
116 Leopold is often called the father of the environmental movement. However, since the environmental movement has branched out into various theories (for example, social ecology, feminist ecology, deep ecology, etc.) he is traditionally associated with the more holistic movement and his most ardent supporter is J. Baird Callicott.
117 Many see our acceptance of other races and of women as a natural ethical progression that will ultimately lead on to animals and then to the land. While Leopold moved straight to all-inclusivity, others hesitate, such as both Regan and Singer, and support a first extension to certain groups of animals. This theme of ethical progression is a common assumption in many writings, however it has little actual support. See Soper and Midgley for critiques of this idea; Soper, What is Nature, and Midgley, Beast and Man, Animals and Why They Matter.
individuals while the second dealt with the relationship of the individual to society. The land ethic, on the other hand, details an extension of human consciousness to the land.  

Leopold sets up his land ethic on the land pyramid and the biotic community. The land pyramid details the various relationships in the biotic community. It is founded on the idea of food sources (like the original food chain), but it recognizes, rather than one single chain, "a tangle of chains so complex as to seem disorderly....Its functioning depends on the co-operation and competition of its diverse parts." These numerous chains are part of the energy circuit of land which Leopold sees as conveying three basic ideas: "(1) That land is not merely soil. (2) That the native plants and animals kept the energy circuit open; others may or may not. (3) That man-made changes are of a different order than evolutionary changes, and have effects more comprehensive than is intended or foreseen." 

The biotic community, while it is composed of the land pyramid, is not synonymous with it. Several writers, however, mistake Leopold's detailing of the land pyramid in the light of his moral maxim, plus his statement that humans are "plain members and citizens" of the biotic community and hold only an intermediate rung on the pyramid, as stating that humans hold no more significance in the biota than bees or bovines. Others state that, "indeed, almost the only right actions on this

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118 Leopold, "The Land Ethic," 95-96.
119 Ibid., 103. This is not so radically outdated as some have hinted. Biologists like Edward Wilson still uphold a food-based relationship in nature, and much of Wilson's writing actually sounds very similar to Leopold's. See, The Diversity of Life.
120 Leopold, "The Land Ethic," 104-105.
interpretation of Leopold's principle would be the cessation of most human projects and the setting up of wilderness preserves.\textsuperscript{121}

However these understandings of Leopold's land ethic refuse to acknowledge that Leopold never once advocated complete human irrelevance and total noninterference. His concluding statement in his famous essay clearly illustrates, "We are remodeling the Alhambra with a steamshovel, and we are proud of our yardage. We shall hardly relinquish the shovel, which after all has many good points, but we are in need of gentler and more objective criteria for its successful use."\textsuperscript{122} As well, Leopold was openly aware that while we needed a new relationship with the environment that went beyond economic value, this did not completely dismiss the continued role of economic value in his land ethic. "It of course goes without saying that economic feasibility limits the tether of what can or cannot be done for land. It always has and it always will. The fallacy...is the belief that economics determines all land-use. This is simply not true."\textsuperscript{123}

Other critics feel that Leopold's land ethic fails in areas such as its ecology or understanding of the "system" of the environment. While their criticisms are relevant and somewhat true, they do not detract from Leopold's main points.\textsuperscript{124} Leopold himself was hesitant about his understanding of the land pyramid and the environment. He refuted the use of the term "balance-of-nature" and stated often that

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\textsuperscript{122} Leopold, "The Land Ethic," 109.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 108-109.
\textsuperscript{124} Callicott addresses some of these criticisms in his essay, "Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology Undermine Leopold's Land Ethic?" \textit{Environmental Ethics} 18,4 (Winter 1996): 353-372. See Ch. 3, Section A for further discussion in this area.
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he perceived his ideas as part of an evolutionary process rather than as a definitive statement. For Leopold, "the biotic mechanism is so complex that its workings may never by fully understood." Leopold never saw his land ethic as fixed in stone. In fact, he compares his work to a "tentative summary" which has evolved out of a community. And he communicated this idea of an evolving ethic to his land ethic when he said, "Ethics are possibly a kind of community instinct in-the-making."

While some might argue that Leopold's land ethic is offering a direct answer or system for our relationship with the land, others state that "Leopold is [not] suggesting...a direct ethical holism which would justify or obligate individual acts by reference to their consequences in the biotic community; rather, he is an indirect holist, i.e., one who applies holistic criteria not directly to acts, but only indirectly to these through criticisms of practices, rules, predilections, and attitudes." Therefore in Leopold's "view, an ethic evolves in the minds of a thinking community by a complex intellectual and emotional process, not by deciding what sorts of rules there are."

Others charge that when you look at the processes in the biotic community as natural, and the changes over time as well, then Leopold's land ethic can be open to

125 Leopold, "The Land Ethic," 102. However it is not as serious a problem as some have claimed. The majority of writings in biology and ecosystems still clearly resound with Leopold's tentative observations. In particular, Wilson, The Diversity of Life.
127 Ibid., 109.
128 Ibid., 96.
the charge that all and any changes are good. "The biotic community changes over time; the environment alters; forms of flora and fauna appear and disappear; deserts become oceans and oceans dry up, with all the attendant metamorphoses. The crucial question is: why isn't whatever happens integral, stable, and beautiful?" But as Leopold points out, it is not that change is bad, "change does not necessarily obstruct or divert the flow of energy; evolution is a long series of self-induced changes," rather it is the scale of change that humans can cause in a short amount of time. "Man's invention of tools has enabled him to make changes of unprecedented violence, rapidity, and scope."

Leopold was, again, hesitant to state as fact that these changes wreaked havoc; however, he did feel that the evidence at least offered this suggestion of an ecological interpretation of history. "Presumably the greater the losses and alterations, the greater the risk of impairments and disorganizations." He felt that while some ecosystems might be better able to survive and adapt to human alterations, others were less capable. And while "the land recovers, [it is] at some reduced level of complexity, and with a reduced carrying capacity for people, plants, and animals."

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133 Leopold, "The Land Ethic," 104.
134 Ibid., 97-98.
135 Leopold, "Conservation: In Whole or in Part?" in Susan L. Flader and J. Baird Callicott, eds., *The River of the Mother of God and Other Essays by Aldo Leopold* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 312 [emphasis mine].
136 See Leopold, "The Land Ethic," in particular 98, 98, 105-106.
137 Ibid., 105. Leopold's words are not so archaic as sometimes supposed. There is a close correlation with the direction of Leopold's thinking and the work and words of Edward Wilson. Wilson in particular speaks of a lower equilibrium in areas eroded by human occupation and human changes. Wilson, *Diversity of Life*, 278.
Instead, as Leopold states, "the real end is a universal symbiosis with land, economic and esthetic, public and private."\(^{138}\) "An ethic, ecologically," for Leopold, "is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence."\(^{139}\)

B. "Beast and Man": A Mixed Community

Mary Midgley believes that we once had a better idea or understanding of our relationship with animals and the natural world. "But so drastic have social changes been in this century that it becomes necessary to state all kinds of facts about our animal nature which used to be taken for granted—for instance, that we cannot live properly in infinite crowds or in conditions of ceaseless change."\(^{140}\) Therefore, Midgley attempts, in *Beast and Man*, to understand human nature by uniting our social natures and culture-building tendencies with our biological tendencies.

Midgley works within a very particular framework of culture and biology. She attempts to show that our understanding of animals is extremely important to our own understanding of ourselves. "Our difference from other species may be striking, but comparisons with them have always been, and must be, crucial to our view of ourselves."\(^{141}\) She is critical that "people have been strangely determined to take genetic and social explanations as *alternatives* instead of using them to complete each other."\(^{142}\) Midgley instead supports that we should use both to understand ourselves

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\(^{139}\) Leopold, "The Land Ethic," 95.


\(^{141}\) Ibid., xxxiv.

\(^{142}\) Ibid., xxxix.
and also to explain why animals can still matter to us. "Understanding," to Midgley, "is relating....Nothing can be understood on its own. Had we known no other animate life-form than our own, we should have been utterly mysterious to ourselves as a species."143

Midgley explains that when we say humans are instinct-free while animals are completely "controlled" by their instincts, we need to clarify what we mean. Therefore she defines humans and animals as having a complex range of behaviors that are set on the scale between open instincts and closed instincts.144 "Closed instincts are behavior patterns fixed genetically in every detail....Here the same complicated pattern, correct in every detail, will be produced by creatures that have been carefully reared in isolation from any member of their own species and from any helpful conditioning."145 On the other hand, "open instincts...are programs with a gap. Parts of the behavior pattern are innately determined, but others are left to be filled in by experience."146 Therefore open instincts allow for learning from the group, they include only "strong general tendencies" for certain behavior, while the genetic programming involved in closed instincts "takes the place of intelligence; learning [instead] is just maturation."147

143 Ibid., 18. See also, "If we had never interacted with others, and so had no external experience at all, we would have no sense of self." Gus diZerega, "Empathy, Society, Nature, and the Relational Self: Deep Ecology and Liberal Modernity," Social Theory and Practice 21,2 (Spring 1995), 247
145 Midgley, Beast and Man, 52-53.
146 Ibid., 53.
147 Ibid.
In accepting both cultural and biological explanations for our actions Midgley also states that culture and nature arose together: "Nature and culture are not opposites at all. We are naturally culture-building animals. But what we build into our cultures has to satisfy our natural pattern of motives."\(^{148}\) "In the evolutionary perspective, then, society and genetic programming imply each other. And the more complex the society, the richer the genetic programming has to be. When we try to study human society without reference to that programming, we are abstracting from a species repertoire that we take for granted."\(^{149}\) She also stresses that the intricacy of social relations is not unique to humans. Instead, patterns of behavior found in humans can be found in other species groups as well. "Thus we know...that people are descended from social creatures already provided both with contentiousness and with a strong, subtle, positive sociability to control it."\(^{150}\)

In this way Midgley is much more open to accepting dominance hierarchies, and competition and co-operation as dual attributes in all societies. "As for our natural interest in dominance, it is not a lust for oppression. It is a taste for order, one that can get out of hand, but does not have to."\(^{151}\) "Competition is not the basic law of life. No social group is ever so isolated and so independent that it can write off the disasters, and the possible resentment, of everybody outside it."\(^{152}\) Instead, "mutual dependence is in general quite...important. Each kind exists within an ecosystem, and

\(^{148}\) Ibid., 29, and also 285-317.  
\(^{149}\) Ibid., 96.  
\(^{150}\) Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, 86.  
\(^{151}\) Midgley, Beast and Man, 330-331.  
\(^{152}\) Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, 21.
needs the others to keep the system going.\textsuperscript{153} Selection does not work by cutthroat competition between individuals, but by favoring whatever behavior is useful to the group. Where creatures are competing (as a fact), their success will be decided by whatever tendencies they have that best help their predicament. These need not be quarrelsome tendencies at all.\textsuperscript{154}

Therefore, even though Midgley recognizes interspecies relationships, she also stresses the importance and validity of the species-bond. "Beings which treat acquaintances and strangers alike—as do those simpler creatures which merely go about in herds, without individual recognition—have no reason to be exclusive. They will accept, in their weak kind of acceptance, any conspecific who arrives and for them, therefore, their species is the only real community. But the more lively and complex creatures cannot possibly do this. Their attachment to their own small community stands in the way of wider bonding."\textsuperscript{155} Therefore Midgley states that she thinks "it is important to stress in this way that species-bonds are real, because unless we take account of them, the frequent exclusive attitude of our own species is hard to understand....And this, rather than some abstract judgment of value, does seem to be the main root of that relative disregard of other creatures which has been called 'speciesism'."\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{154} Midgley, Beast and Man, 132.
\textsuperscript{155} Midgley, "The Significance of Species," in Hargrove, ed., The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate, 130. Midgley also addresses that this can lead to pseudo-speciation, "the tendency for human beings to regard their cultures as if they actually were separate species." Ibid., 133.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 130. For more on the discussion of the term speciesism and Midgley's critique of it, see Appendix 1.
Despite the fact that Midgley stresses the recognition of the species-bond, she also clearly points out, particularly in her work *Animals and Why They Matter*, that we frequently maintain relationships beyond the species-bond. 157 "Man," for Midgley, "does not naturally exist in species-isolation." 158 Therefore, "the proper way to treat [the principle of nearness or kinship] is to recognize [it] as a perfectly real and important factor in our psychology, and therefore in our morality, but to refuse to treat it as the sole or supreme one." 159

For Midgley then, "the species barrier is, in itself, irrelevant. Members of one species do in fact often succeed in understanding members of another well enough for both prediction and a personal bond." 160 As she points out, "for social creatures, the behavior of those around them is the main guide to survival. But they can only use it if their powers enable them to understand it." 161 Humans have a particularly strong ability to recognize and understand other species. It is this understanding in relationships that has made possible our domestication and use of a variety of animals within our community. 162 It also is recognized that the animals that we have domesticated are frequently also social creatures. 163 Here, for Midgley, "beasts are neither incarnations..."

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158 Midgley, "The Significance of Species," 135.
162 This includes everything from domestication as companions, as food, as workers, as entertainment, etc. There is a wide range of relationships that occur between humans and animals. See, Ted Benton, *Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights and Social Justice*, (London: Verso, 1993), 62ff for nine broad categories covering human and animal relationships. See also Leslie Pickering Francis and Richard Norman, "Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others," *Philosophy* 53,206 (October 1978): 507-527.
163 See Midgley, *Beast and Man*, and *Animals and Why They Matter*; also Serpell, *In the Company of Animals*. Serpell also includes an interesting chapter on the various relationships between humans and animals in various tribal or primitive communities. See Serpell, Ch. 4.
of wickedness, nor sets of basic needs, nor crude mechanical toys, nor idiot children. They are beasts, each with its own very complex nature."164

Midgley explains that "there are two likely reasons for this extra emotional porousness of the human species-barrier. The less interesting one is sheer security....Human life...is usually secure enough to allow some wider experiment. But the second and more profound reason is simply the much greater intensity of human sympathy and curiosity. That eager reaching-out to surrounding life and to every striking aspect of the physical world."165 "If the 'aim'...were just surviving, amoebas would be the thing to be."166 But instead as humans, "we are receptive, imaginative beings, adapted to celebrate and rejoice in the existence, quite independent of ourselves, of the other beings on this planet. Not only does our natural sympathy reach out easily beyond the barrier of species but we rejoice in the mere existence of plants and lifeless bodies—not regarding them just as furniture provided to stimulate our pampered imagination."167

"Thus the social community which humans recognize does not necessarily contain their whole species. But neither, on the other hand, does it necessarily exclude all members of other species....Thus [Midgley] suggest[s] that theorists who have hoped to find a clear, unmistakable definition of 'the human community' simply given as part of the natural history of our species are likely to be disappointed."168 Instead

164 Midgley, Beast and Man, 39.
166 Midgley, Beast and Man, 150.
167 Ibid., 361.
168 Midgley, "The Significance of Species," 134.
what we do find, throughout history, is various relationships between humans and animals, or as Midgley points out, a "mixed community".

And within this mixed community, "we have to consider priorities. Conflicts of interest must be recognized both within the human species and outside it. We have to take sides, and are entitled to put our own species first. All species do this. No creature can in fact subsist without killing some others, if only by competing with them for food. The point is not that we can hope to avoid injuring either animals or people. It is that we ought to recognize that such an injury matters, and to try to avoid it where no adequate reason justifies it."169 For as Midgley stresses, "we are members of the species we study, and we live here and now, not in evolutionary time."170

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169 Midgley, Beast and Man, 223. Cf. "If our high growth economies do collapse and we are...obliged to return to small-scale agriculture, then we may once again have cottagers killing their pigs and keeping a few hens which finish up in the pot....It is quite idle to pretend that ordinarily decent people would give up eating meat if they had to kill for their own needs." Benson, "Duty and the Beast," Philosophy 53,206 (October 1978), 545.
170 Midgley, Beast and Man, 101.
Chapter Three: Callicott: The Biosocial Moral Theory

A. The Land Ethic

Leopold's main interpreter and supporter is J. Baird Callicott, who has taken the land ethic proposed by Leopold and attempted to set an environmental ethic around its main maxim: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." Callicott argues that Leopold's land ethic is based upon a Darwinian community concept and that it also contains a Humean moral theory.

Callicott outlines the logical and conceptual foundations of the land ethic as follows:

Its conceptual elements are a Copernican cosmology, a Darwinian protosociobiological natural history of ethics, Darwinian ties of kinship among all forms of life on Earth, and an Eltonian model of the structure of biocenoses all overlaid on a Humean-Smithian moral psychology. Its logic is that natural selection has endowed human beings with an affective moral response to perceived bonds of kinship and community membership and identity; that today the natural environment, the land, is represented as a community, the biotic community; and that, therefore, an environmental or land ethic is both possible—the biopsychological and cognitive conditions are in place—and necessary, since human beings collectively have acquired the power to destroy the integrity, diversity, and stability of the environing and supporting economy of nature.

Callicott's particular portrayal of the land ethic has often been criticized for its radical holism. The land ethic, under his direction, has come to be seen as almost antihuman by some. Callicott did in fact originally support a line that subordinated

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173 Regan terms it as "environmental fascism". Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 361-362. See below for further discussion of this charge. See also Ch. 4, Section B, as Linzey supports Regan's charge against Leopold. Cf. Ferry, The New Ecological Order.
the human to the biotic community. As he once stated, "the human population has become so disproportionate from the biological point of view that if one had to choose between a specimen of *Homo sapiens* and a specimen of a race even if unattractive species, the choice would be moot." 174

However Callicott now has clarified his earlier position and states that he only meant that if the rule was to be applied with "ruthless consistency" that this would be the result. He no longer thinks "that antihuman prescriptions can be deduced from the Leopold land ethic." 175 As he has now clarified, "our recognition of the biotic community and our immersion in it does not imply that we do not also remain members of the human community...or that we are relieved of the attendant and correlative moral responsibilities of that membership, among them to respect universal human rights and uphold the principles of individual human worth and dignity." 176

Part of this antihuman stance stemmed from the characterization of the ecosystem as an organism versus that of a community. While Leopold himself abandoned the idea of the ecosystem as organism early on, residues still remained in his works. 177 But, as Callicott clarifies, it is the community model that Leopold did after all favor, and it is this concept that Callicott also upholds. 178 As Callicott points

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177 "That the 'dead' earth is an organism possessing a certain kind and degree of life, which we intuitively respect as such." Leopold, "Some Fundamentals of Conservation in the Southwest," quoted in Callicott, "The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic," 201. Some references to and understanding of the ecosystem as organism are also still evident in the land ethic itself, as Callicott also points out.
178 Leopold even sections part of his land ethic, "The Community Concept".
out, "the superorganism ecological paradigm invites one, much more than does the community paradigm, to hypostatize, to reify the whole, and to subordinate its individual members." With a community concept or paradigm, the land ethic now "has a holistic as well as an individualistic cast."

In accepting a Darwinian understanding of society and ethics, Callicott sees "ethics and society or community as correlative." Therefore, "with each change in society came corresponding and correlative changes in ethics. The moral community expanded to become coextensive with the newly drawn boundaries of societies and the representation of virtue and vice, right and wrong, good and evil, changed to accommodate, foster, and preserve the economic and institutional organization of emergent social orders." As regards the land and its numerous residents, Callicott points out that "the environment and animals have been around all along. That we now regard them as appropriate beneficiaries of ethics depends not on our recent perception of something in them that we didn't perceive before, but on our recent understanding of what and who they are in relation to what and who we are."

What and who we are is defined now not only by our social culture nor entirely by our genetic patterns; Instead, Callicott supports a cohesive understanding that recognizes our culture producing tendencies, as well as our more biological

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179 Callicott, "The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic," 202. For an interesting analogy, the ant communities as stated by Edward O. Wilson: An ant "colony is a superorganism, an assembly of workers so tightly knit around the mother queen as to act like a single, well-coordinated entity...[The death of workers] matter no more to the colony than the loss of hair or a claw tip might to a solitary animals." Wilson, The Diversity of Life, 6.


181 Ibid., 191.

182 Ibid., 192. See also, Callicott, "Traditional American Indian and Traditional Western European Attitudes Toward Nature: An Overview," in Elliot and Gare, eds., Environmental Philosophy.

183 Callicott, "The Cast Against Moral Pluralism," Environmental Ethics 12,2 (Summer 1990), 120.
tendencies. He recognizes, following in the line of Hume, Smith and Darwin, that humans, like other species, are altruistic.\textsuperscript{184} As well, Callicott supports Leopold's statement that humans feel they have "outgrown" nature.\textsuperscript{185} And also Midgley's understanding that humans see themselves as completely separate from the system of nature: "It used...to be assumed that people stood outside this system and could ignore it, because they were culturally so flexible and could live anywhere."\textsuperscript{186} For Callicott, "as a culture evolves toward civilization, it increasingly distances itself from the biotic community; 'Civilization' means 'cityfication'....Nonhuman natural entities, thus, are divested of their status as members in good standing of the moral community."\textsuperscript{187} Therefore we must include both our culture along with our interrelationship with the rest of the earth.

Callicott and Leopold's land ethic have taken the most criticism from deconstructive ecology. As Callicott states, "Leopold's land ethic...is extremely vulnerable to the current deconstructive turn in ecology. For of all the systems of environmental ethics so far articulated, the Leopold land ethic is the one most thoroughly grounded in evolutionary and ecological biology."\textsuperscript{188} Callicott points out

\begin{footnotes}
\item [185] Leopold, "The Land Ethic," 108.
\item [186] Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, 24.
\item [188] Callicott, "Do Deconstructive Ecology," 356. I disagree with Callicott's assessment here. Deconstructive ecology doesn't deliver that harsh of an attack if Leopold's land ethic is understood the way he meant it to be: as an evolving process. Leopold did not think that he had all the facts regarding ecology nor did he propose that the land ethic was the answer to the environmental problems of even his time. The majority of the criticisms the land ethic has faced have arisen because Callicott has attempted to set it in stone. Callicott does make most of these points in his essay, and is presumably just answering the misunderstanding of various critics when he deals with these problems.

Callicott also points out in this essay, that the one area that does not suffer from a deconstructive attack is the stewardship environmental ethic, for "they [species] are still God's
that Leopold never actually supported the idea of the "balance-of-nature", therefore an acceptance of the "flux of nature" is possible. However he cautions against this in that its use as a metaphor and its "underlying ecological paradigm may suggest to the thoughtless and greedy that since flux is a fundamental part of the natural world, any human-caused flux is justifiable. Such an inference is wrong because the flux in the natural world has severe limits.... Two characteristics of human-induced flux would suggest that it would be excessive: fast rate and large spatial extent."189

In the new ecology paradigm ecosystems are seen as "process-oriented" and "temporally rather than spatially ordered."190 As regards Leopold's moral maxim, which focuses on the integrity, stability and beauty of the ecosystem, the new ecological paradigms are sharply critical. "Apparently biotic communities lack integrity.... And apparently they lack stability: Apparently, that is, they do not persist; nor, apparently, do they resist alteration... and, apparently... they are not resilient. All that seems left to preserve is the beauty of the biotic community."191 While Callicott

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189 Callicott, "Do Deconstructive Ecology," 371-372. The rapidity and scope of human alteration of nature has been dealt with in Leopold's land ethic already. Plus, the criticism made by Callicott against the "flux of nature" has also been used against those who see holism as advocating humans as a natural part of the process, see above. See also, Wilson, The Diversity of Life. Wilson also speaks critically of human-induced change and its long-term effects.
191 Callicott, "Do Deconstructive Ecology," 361. See also, Callicott, "The Land Aesthetic," in Callicott, ed., Companion to A Sand County Almanac. I think Callicott is too quick to accept deconstructive ecology. It is only a theory and it seems that he has not delved into the differing perspectives enough to come up with his own understanding and position in this area. There are still many evolutionary biologists who believe in the stability of ecosystems. It is a little soon to dismiss everything previously understood about ecosystems. Plus there are theories about the level of organization to be found in natural systems, and underlying natural laws that are under consideration. For example, Stuart Kauffman's ideas of self-organization and complexity in the world. See, Kauffman,
does caution against accepting the new ecological paradigm too quickly, he still attempts a rewrite of Leopold’s moral maxim in response to it. Therefore, he concludes: "A thing is right when it tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."\(^{192}\)

Nevertheless, "the community concept in ecology," as Callicott states, "is a metaphor. The metaphor assimilates the way proximate organisms are mutually dependent to the way proximate human beings are mutually dependent....Human communities—at least recent human communities—are neither stable nor typological. They change over time and in the process of change they do not come and go as units."\(^{193}\) And as a human community, we are capable of evaluating our ecological impact. "Since Homo Sapiens [sic] is a moral species, capable of ethical deliberation and conscientious choice, and evolutionary kinship and biotic community membership add a land ethic to our familiar social ethics, anthropogenic changes may

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\(^{192}\) Callicott, "Do Deconstructive Ecology," 372. Callicott recognizes that this is incomplete, but feels it is a starting point.

\(^{193}\) Callicott, "Do Deconstructive Ecology," 366. See also, R. L. Clark, "Gaia and the Forms of Life," in Elliot and Gare, eds., *Environmental Philosophy.*

Another criticism is levied against the frequent representation of the community as goal-directed. This because natural selection operates on the level of the individual and not the species. See, Paul Taylor, "The Ethics of Respect for Nature," in Hargrove, ed., *The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate*, 110. As Harley Cahen points out, it is not necessarily that an ecosystem or community is goal-directed, but rather that community is merely a possible by-product of co-operation and competition. See, Cahen, "Against the Moral Considerability of Ecosystems."

However, as Midgley points out, "Species survive not merely by having happy members, but by having ones who do something about the next generation." Midgley, *Beast and Man*, 92. See also Stephen Jay Gould, *Dinosaur in a Haystack: Reflections in Natural History* (New York: Harmony Books, 1995), in particular "A Humongous Fungus Among Us," which details an interesting theoretical argument about individuals and species, as it relates to blades of grass, and in particular, a fungus.
be land-ethically evaluated. But by what norm? The norm of appropriate scale."  
And this scale, as Leopold also has pointed out, is both temporal and spatial.

B. "A Triangular Affair"

Callicott entered the animal rights/liberation and environmental ethics debate full force in 1981 when he published his article "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair" in the journal *Environmental Ethics*. His opposition in this article to any relationship between the animal welfare movement and environmental ethics has been the source of much debate. And even though Callicott recanted the majority of his argument in his following article, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again," he is still most often remembered and cited for his first foray into the field.

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194 Callicott, "Do Deconstructive Ecology," 370. See also, Cheney, "Callicott's 'Metaphysics of Morals',' in particular 320. This question of scale, as pointed out in Ch. 1, Section D, is central to the discussions between animal welfare and environmental ethics. Callicott's biosocial moral theory attempts to deal with this issue of differing scales by proposing differing solutions for domestic and wild animals, see below.

195 Callicott, "Do Deconstructive Ecology," 370. See also, Leopold, "The Land Ethic;" Cheney, "Callicott's 'Metaphysics of Morals'."

196 Callicott, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again," in Hargrove, ed., *The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate*. Not only is he remembered for his first article, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," most writers criticizing him still quote it in their papers. This despite the fact that he has recanted the majority of his statements and proposed a completely new moral theory, not only in "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics," but in other articles as well. Callicott himself is mystified why his biosocial moral theory has been largely ignored and left uncriticized. See, Callicott, "The Case Against Moral Pluralism," 123.

See in particular Rita C. Manning, "Caring for Animals," in Adams and Donovan, eds., *Beyond Animal Rights*. Manning's article was written in 1992, four years after Callicott restated his position. Yet she focuses exclusively on criticizing his first article in this area. In particular she criticizes Callicott's understanding of animals as artifacts, the main point he later recinds. Manning, 118.

See also Angus Taylor's article, "Animal Rights and Human Needs," *Environmental Ethics* 18,3 (Fall 1996): 249-264, in particular 252-253. Taylor also argues against Callicott's treatment of domestic animals. While he initially cites Callicott's second article, all his quotes of "proof" of Callicott's position against domestic animals comes from the first article, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair." See also Ch. 4, Section B for further discussion of this.
Part of Callicott's militant position against animal rights/liberation as having anything to offer was that he felt it initially had no place in the land ethic. The land ethic, "manifestly does not accord equal moral worth to each and every member of the biotic community."\(^{197}\) He instead considered that the moral worth of all beings in the community was relative. It is "assessed in accordance with the particular relation of each to the collective entity which Leopold called 'land'."\(^{198}\) So, according to Callicott, the two movements "rest[ed] upon very different theoretical foundations."\(^{199}\) And even stronger, he believed that animal rights was in practice "unpracticable".\(^{100}\)

Callicott felt this strongly about the animal rights/liberation movement because he believed that animal rights/liberation also rested upon the same theoretical foundation as ethical humanism, which gave rights to only humans. "The humane moralists [animal rights/liberation], like the moral humanists, draw a firm distinction between those beings worthy of moral consideration and those not. They simply insist upon a different but quite definite cut-off point on the spectrum of natural entities, and accompany their criterion with arguments to show that it is more ethically defensible (granting certain assumptions) and more consistently applicable than that of the moral humanists."\(^{201}\) "Hence, without having undertaken any creative ethical reflection or exploration, or any reexamination of historical ethical theory, a fresh


\(^{198}\) Ibid. Callicott's initial antihuman stance (hinted at here), and his subjection of the individual to the welfare of the group, also has been dealt with above.

\(^{199}\) Ibid., 40.

\(^{200}\) Ibid., 60. Callicott has not changed his position on this. He has instead accepted the non-rights position supported by Midgley. See below, Ch. 3, Section C for further discussion of this aspect of Callicott's platform.

\(^{201}\) Ibid., 42.
debate has been stirred up. The familiar historical positions have simply been 
retrenched, applied, and exercised.\(^{202}\)

As a result, Callicott instead supported the idea of a new theoretical 
foundation. This would be the third argument, after ethical humanism and humane 
moralism, making it "a triangular affair". For Callicott, the land ethic, a holistic ethic, 
is an ethic which allows room for moral consideration of animals and humans, as well 
as of plants and ecosystems. Based on the science of ecology it focuses on the 
relationships between and among things.\(^{203}\) It dismisses the "hyper-egalitarianism"\(^{204}\) of 
the animal rights/liberation movement and recognizes important differences between 
wild and domestic animals, which the animal rights/liberation movement fails to 
do.\(^{205}\)

Even though the land ethic recognized important distinctions between 
domestic and wild animals, it still seemed to conclude that domestic animals were 
unworthy of attention. In particular, Callicott concluded from his reading of 
Leopold\(^{206}\) that domestic animals were "living artifacts", "creations of man...they 
constitute yet another mode of extension of the works of man into the ecosystem."\(^{207}\) 
Therefore, "from the perspective of the land ethic a herd of cattle, sheep, or pigs is as

\(^{202}\) Ibid., 43.  
\(^{203}\) Ibid., 45.  
\(^{204}\) Ibid., 38.  
\(^{205}\) Ibid., 52.  
\(^{206}\) Particularly Leopold’s statement that such a "shift of values can be achieved by reappraising things unnatural, tame, and confined in terms of things natural, wild, and free." Leopold, quoted in Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," 52.  
\(^{207}\) Ibid. It is because of this that Callicott decided there could be no consideration of the "natural behavior" of animals in factory farms, for these animals could have no "natural" behavior. Numerous essays and articles have of course refuted this point. See, Manning, "Caring for Animals;" Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter and Beast and Man; Serpell, In the Company of Animals.
much or more a ruinous blight on the landscape as a fleet of four-wheel drive off-road vehicles." Instead, for Callicott, the immorality or "ghastly abuse of animal life" in such things as factory farms was "the transmogrification of organic to mechanical processes." As Callicott points out, Aldo Leopold "to all appearances never considered the treatment of battery hens on a factory farm or steers in a feed lot to be a pressing moral issue."  

Because this essay for Callicott was a particular attack against the animal liberation movement of Peter Singer, he spends a fair amount of time discussing the role of pain and sentience and the pleasure/pain principle of utilitarianism. For Callicott, "If nature as a whole is good, then pain and death are also good." Therefore, "pain and pleasure seem to have nothing at all to do with good and evil if our appraisal is taken from the vantage point of ecological biology."  

Callicott then proceeds to point out that if we perceived pain as a natural process rather than as an evil, "personal, social, and environmental health would, accordingly, receive a premium value rather than comfort, self-indulgent pleasure, and

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108 Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," 52. As can be imagined, this statement gets more than its fair share of attention from animal welfare writers.  
109 Ibid., 58. This is actually a good point, however it gets lost in the hubbub over his previous statements. As well, Callicott is able to extend this idea of transmogrification to the modern usage of fields. And therefore Callicott is able to argue for better treatment of land in agribusiness.  
110 Ibid., 39. However there is some question of how relevant and timely such issues were for Leopold. The rise of intensive factory farming is relatively new and only became a pressing issue in the last twenty-odd years.  

Even though Callicott seems harsh for criticizing the reign of domestic animals, there is something to his criticisms. The recent book by Roger A. Caras which outlines the environmental effects of the domestic goat, offers agreement with Callicott's initial criticism of the damage domestics do in natural ecosystems. See, Roger A. Caras, A Perfect Harmony: The Intertwining Lives of Animals and Humans Throughout History (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997); See also Callicott, "Introduction," in Zimmerman, ed., Environmental Philosophy, 4; Gould, Dinosaur in a Haystack, 278.  
111 Tom Regan's work on animal rights was not published until after Callicott's essay.  
113 Ibid., 55.
anesthetic insulation from pain. Sickness would be regarded as a worse evil than
death. The pursuit of health or wellness at the personal, social, and environmental
levels would require self-discipline in the form of simple diet, vigorous exercise,
conservation, and social responsibility."214 "The land ethic...as Leopold has sketched
it, provides for the right of nonhuman natural beings to share in the life processes of
the biotic community."215

C. "Back Together Again"

Initially Callicott’s position on the relationship of animal rights/liberation and
environmental ethics was one of opposition. He felt that rather than enlarging the
moral community’s boundaries to include sentient beings, a holistic ethic which
included all of the earth was more appropriate. Because the underlying foundation of
animal rights/liberation is an egoistic/individualistic model Callicott felt that there
could be no shared understanding between environmental ethics and the animal
welfare movement.

However, Callicott soon regretted his earlier position and published a later
article that attempted to recant most of his polemical statements. As he stated in its
introduction:

Probably more than any other thing, my article 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular
Affair' has led to an increasingly acrimonious estrangement between advocates of
individualistic animal welfare ethics and advocates of holistic ecocentric ethics. I
think this estrangement is regrettable because it is so divisive. Animal welfare
ethicists and environmental ethicists have overlapping concerns. From a practical
point of view, it would be far wiser to make common cause against a common

214 Ibid., 56.
215 Ibid., 54.
enemY—the destructive forces at work ravaging the nonhuman world—than to continue squabbling among ourselves.\(^{216}\)

However Callicott does not propose a simple acceptance of either Regan or Singer, for the individualistic rights movement still, for him, is incompatible with the holistic environmental ethic; not least for its limited understanding of the radical differences between domestic and wild animals. Instead, Callicott feels that "Mary Midgley has pointed the way out of this dilemma....If the case for animal rights would be theoretically restructured to divide animal rights holders from non-holders along the domestic/wild axis rather than the subject-/non-subject-of-a-life axis, then its reconciliation with environmental ethics could be envisioned."\(^{217}\)

Rather than supporting a rights ethic for the domestic sphere and a holistic ethic for the environment or biotic community, Callicott feels instead that there must be a "lasting alliance" between the two. Further, such an alliance "will require the development of a moral theory that embraces both programs and that provides a framework for the adjudication of the very real conflicts between human welfare, animal welfare, and ecological integrity."\(^{218}\) Callicott feels that this unified moral theory is possible when one works from the root moral concept in the land ethic: the community concept.\(^{219}\)

\(^{216}\) Callicott, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics," 249.
\(^{217}\) Callicott, Review of The Case for Animal Rights by Tom Regan, Environmental Ethics 7,4 (Winter 1985), 372. This is one of Callicott's earliest published statements on this idea. He later clarifies it and maintains an anti-rights platform in his later articles, which is not completely evident here. See below.
\(^{219}\) See, Callicott, "The Case Against Moral Pluralism," 121. See also, Leopold, "The Land Ethic," 96-98.
In Midgley's mixed community, Callicott therefore sees the beginnings of a unified moral theory. He feels that Midgley recognizes a "common bio-sociality" in her community, where the "species-barrier to human-animal social interaction is both artificial and unhistorical." While Midgley supports the argument that animals do matter (or are morally considerable), she "certainly does not go on to argue, à la Peter Singer, that the 'sentience' ambient among animal members of the mixed community...should constitute a criterion for equal moral consideration; nor does she argue, à la Tom Regan, that having a rich subjective life entitles domestic animals to equal moral rights." Instead Callicott sees Midgley's mixed community based upon a more Humean approach; where morality is grounded in feelings and "altruism is as primitive as egoism." And, because Leopold's biotic community is also grounded in a Darwinian-Humean theory, Callicott believes that the two "share a common ethical bridge between the human and nonhuman domains in the concept of community....[In] combining these two conceptions of a metahuman moral community we [then] have the basis of a unified animal-environmental ethical theory." This unified theory, according to Callicott, provides for both "a holistic as well as an individualistic moral orientation."

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221 Ibid., 252.
222 Ibid., 253.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid., 254.
225 Ibid., 258.
As humans, "We must operate effectively within a multiplicity of moral spheres—family obligations, the duties associated with our professional lives, our public lives, our interspecies, and ecosystemic and biospheric relationships—each with its very different set of demands that often compete, one with another." In the biosocial moral theory, which is based on the community concepts of Leopold and Midgley, Callicott then sees "the bare bones of a univocal world view that provides, nevertheless, for a multiplicity of hierarchically ordered and variously 'textured' moral relationships...each corresponding to and supporting our multiple, varied, and hierarchically ordered social relationships." 

It is this combination, the Darwinian basis of the community concept in particular, that makes possible a different understanding of the wild/domestic axis that has been a source of conflict in most animal rights/liberation works. Therefore, "how we ought and ought not treat one another (including animals) is determined, according to the logic of biosocial moral theory, by the nature and organization of communities." "Domestic animals are members of the mixed community and ought to enjoy, therefore, all the rights and privileges, whatever they may turn out to be, attendant upon that membership. Wild animals are, by definition, not members of the mixed community....rather, [they] are members of the biotic community. [Because] the structure of the biotic community is described by ecology....the most fundamental fact

227 Ibid., 123.
228 Ibid., 121.
of life in the biotic community is eating... and being eaten.... [Therefore] whatever moral entitlements [a] being may have as a member of the biotic community, not among them is the right to life."\textsuperscript{130}

As a result of this new outlook on domestic animals based on the mixed community Callicott recants his earlier statement of "living artifacts" and acknowledges that our co-evolution with domestic animals, both companion and "barnyard", has behind it a kind of unspoken social contract. Pets acquire a higher treatment based on our complex social relations with them, while barnyard animals, even though they are not owed a "right to life", should not be treated as they have been in factory farms, etc., due to our relationship with them.\textsuperscript{231} For, "the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community depend upon all members, in their appropriate numbers, functioning in their co-evolved life ways."\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{130} Callicott, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics," 257. It is hard to say how or where urban wildlife fit in to this discussion. Where the main predators are cars or people's ignorance.

\textsuperscript{231} "Pets, for example, are... surrogate family members and merit treatment not owed either to less intimately related animals... or, for that matter, to less intimately related human beings." Callicott, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics," 256.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 257-258. From the relationship between ourselves and the environment, Callicott states that we may then "abstract certain general conceptual notions." Callicott, "The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology," in Callicott, In Defense of the Land Ethic, 101.
Chapter Four: Linzey: Animal Theology

A. The Moral Community

The working out of a theology that considers both animals and the whole of creation has not been of the utmost priority in the past. While green theology is growing, the movement tends to focus on the more holistic ethical model and often considers creation as primarily wild nature. As a result little attention is paid to the role of companion and domestic animals in the majority of this work. Therefore while environmental ethics is usually considered to be theologically worthy, animal rights, traditionally, is not. As Linzey points out, "It is not that the Christian tradition has faced the question about animals and given unsatisfactory answers, rather it is that the question has never really been put. We do not have books devoted to a consideration of the theological significance of animals. These are signs of the problem. The thinking, or at least the vast bulk of it, has yet to be done."

Linzey has attempted to rectify this situation with his various writings, which attempt to work out a theology of animal rights. His acceptance of a particular moral community as divinely appointed is laid out in his two major works, Christianity and the Rights of Animals and Animal Theology. Unlike theologians in the green tradition,

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234 There are bits and pieces to be found, however, most of it is ignored by the majority of the major works. Similar to the assumption that there is absolute dismissal in the philosophical past, is the assumption that no person in theology deals with these issues. Still the majority that is written is not concrete enough for today's critical issues. For example: "The moral law is changed...by the revelation of God's self in that its evermore extensive and intensive application becomes necessary...The will of God [cannot now] be interpreted so that it applies within a world of the irrational, so that men must be treated as ends because they are reasonable but non-human life may be violated in the service of human ends...The line cannot be drawn at the boundaries of life..." Reinhold H. Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 167.
however, Linzey is hesitant to designate all creation as having inherent value. This is because he has traditionally associated inherent value with the granting of rights. And, since he draws the moral boundary and the granting of rights at sentient beings he has not associated inherent value with the rest of creation. While he has acknowledged the criticism of his position in this regard and has stated occasionally that all creation has value, it is less than clear that he really feels this way. In particular when his corresponding points on the moral community are considered in relation to his occasional statements on inherent value, as well as his stance on creation as fallen, it is clear that Linzey does not support the idea of the inherent value of all creation.

For, as Linzey states, "While the biblical material does suggest that all nature has value to God the Creator, it also points us to an appreciation that different forms of life have increased capacities for responding self-awareness in the presence of God." Other statements of value made by Linzey clearly refer to animals or "beings": "God alone is the source of the value of all living beings." Animals are

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136 This is one of many signposts that, while Linzey seems to have created theos-rights separate from the traditional animal rights platform, his theos-rights is still radically similar to Regan’s rights in particular. Here Linzey’s points on inherent value and its relationship to the rights movement ties directly in to Regan’s points. See previous section, Ch. 1, Section C for a short synopsis of Regan’s platform.

137 This was first set out in Linzey’s first work, Animal Rights: A Christian Assessment. Even though he has backed away from his initial association with the rights movement, his more recent works still uphold a definite line around the moral community, which has expanded to only allow particular animals, i.e. mammals.


139 See below for the discussion of Linzey’s understanding of creation as fallen.

140 Linzey, Animal Theology, 23.

valuable in themselves by virtue of their creation by God." While other statements are more ambiguous: "All creation, large and small, intelligent and unintelligent, sentient and non-sentient has worth because God values it." So when Linzey states that "it cannot be claimed that creation is of little or no account," it is still "the value of all created beings" that is affirmed.

This insistence of Linzey's on the value of "being" and "creatures" (i.e. spirit-filled, flesh and blood creatures) is not surprising when viewed alongside his understanding of the moral community. For Linzey bases his moral community on the order of creation found in Genesis as well as on the covenant relationship between God, humans and "living beings". So, "while it is true that on one occasion the covenant is extended to include earth itself (9.3), the principal subjects of the covenant are not just humans but 'every living creature that is with you' and specifically, 'the birds, the cattle, and every beast of the earth with you'." Linzey feels that "whereas the notion of dominion has been overplayed as regards the non-

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243 Linzey, Christianity, 9. This statement does not refer to non-living creation in any way, as well it seems to ignore plant life. Instead it covers Linzey's understanding of animals, those sentient and non-sentient, etc. This is one of many instances where Linzey defines creation as only living creatures. He never clearly states what the term creation means to him and in most passages it seems to alternate between all of nature and just spirit-filled, flesh and blood creatures. As a result this is a tricky area in Linzey's work.

244 Linzey, Animal Theology, 103 [emphasis mine]. This can be compared with the stance taken by Aquinas and Kant. Even though Linzey has extended the circle, it is limited and those outside only achieve humane treatment, exactly as they did with Kant, Aquinas, etc. It is not that Linzey's qualification of different types of value is problematic. Rather it is his insistence that it is mammals only that have inherent value. And, especially difficult, that this inherent value automatically grants "rights" of a kind that are extremely suspect. See below for further discussion of this.

245 See below, for further discussion of Linzey's understanding of the order of creation as spheres of relationality.

246 Linzey, Animal Theology, 34.
human, the insight of covenant has been considerably underplayed.  

"we have yet to learn the necessary depth and subtlety of this covenanted fellow-feeling and empathy towards animals....we should love our fellow creatures not for our own sake but for their own."  

It is this understanding of the covenant community, alongside Linzey's understanding of certain creatures being spirit-filled, that denotes the limits of his moral community. "The Spirit is itself the 'breath of life' (Gen. 1.30) of both humans and animals, the Torah delineates animals within its notion of moral community.

Therefore, Linzey states that "man and animals form a moral community, not only because of their common origin, but because God elects them within a special relationship with himself....Because men and brutes are elected by God, we form one covenanted community of Spirit-filled beings before him."  

Linzey then ties his understanding of community back in to his understanding of inherent value and even more clearly shows his alliance against granting inherent value to all creation. "While, therefore, all living things have value to God, the election of spirit-filled creatures, composed of flesh and blood, gives them what we may call 'inherent value' by virtue of their capacity to respond to him."  

Linzey's understanding of the importance of animals comes slowly clear. He still draws the line

\[\text{\textsuperscript{47}}\text{ Linzey, \textit{Christianity}, 29.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{48}}\text{ Ibid., 32.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{49}}\text{ Linzey, "The Theological Basis of Animal Rights," 908. "For the fate of humans and the fate of animals is the same; as one dies, so dies the other. They all have the same breath, and humans have no advantage over the animals; for all is vanity. All go to one place; all are from the dust, and all turn to dust again." Eccles. 3. 19-20 (NRSV).}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{50}}\text{ Linzey, \textit{Christianity}, 98 [emphasis mine].}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{51}}\text{ Ibid., 80 [emphasis mine]. Here again Linzey maintains a separation, mainly based on his understanding of inherent value and its connection to rights. He never qualifies exactly what the other value means for creation.}\]
on his moral community, and while Linzey has stated that he no longer draws it at the sentiency criterion found in animal rights, the line actually gets drawn at a very similar level.\textsuperscript{252}

As Linzey states about line drawing, "There seem to be two major options. One we may call the 'inclusive view' and the other the 'exclusive view'. The inclusive view holds that all classes of animal, over and above insects, have theos-rights....The exclusive view holds that only animals which come clearly within the definition of 'Spirit-filled, breathing beings composed of flesh and blood' have theos-rights....This view argues that to confuse known cases with doubtful cases weakens the overall force of the argument for theos-rights."\textsuperscript{253} Linzey accepts the exclusive view and also feels that it is the "more clearly biblical view."\textsuperscript{254}

As he restates in \textit{Animal Theology}, "doubtless there is something beautiful about flowers and magnificent about the intricacy of insects. Doubtless trees too have some dignity and standing before God. Perhaps there is spiritual power in the earth and all its attendant life....And yet the glory of created life must not blind us to the reality of individuals filled with the gift of the Spirit."\textsuperscript{255} As Linzey says, he wants "to

\textsuperscript{252} It is a matter of some question how much change the notion of theos-rights actually brought to Linzey's position. It seems he still works from his view of rights, Regan-style, that he initially proposed in his work, \textit{Animal Rights: A Christian Assessment}. As a result he does not acknowledge the various points made by numerous green theologians about the value of all creation (the entire world, not just mammals). See below for more discussion of Linzey's points in this area.

\textsuperscript{253} Linzey, \textit{Christianity}, 83-84. Therefore, technically only birds, cattle and beasts of the earth may be included. Because he bases his moral community on the covenant relationship and not on the spheres of intimacy (see below, Ch. 5 for further discussion of this) he completely disregards all sea creatures.

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., 84. It is only the more clearly biblical view if the moral community is granted rights, and this community is based on the covenant. It is not the more clearly biblical view from the standpoint of the order of nature found in Genesis and Linzey's own theory of differing spheres of intimacy.

\textsuperscript{255} Linzey, \textit{Animal Theology}, 86.
justify...the extension of the circle to include adults, children and animals.\textsuperscript{256} It is through his three-fold definition, spirit-filled, flesh, and blood, that he finds another basis, besides sentiency, for a more "theological sense of community with animals."\textsuperscript{257} Still, even though the line around the moral community may now be theologically based, it is still remarkably the same as the one based on sentiency (and put forth by Tom Regan).\textsuperscript{258}

B. Theos-Rights

While Linzey details his moral community as including all spirit-filled, flesh and blood creatures, it is humans that hold a special position within the relationship of God and the world. While traditionally the idea of humans having a particular role in creation has been seen as based on a "tyranny of dominion" and used to exploit nature ruthlessly, a new understanding has arisen in theology. And it is this understanding that Linzey approves of; for him our human relationship to nature is based on \textit{katabasis} and a christological understanding of Jesus as servant. In this understanding we, as humans, work within a rights framework that is set up on God's right to have his creation valued. And we work under a generosity paradigm, instead of an equality paradigm.

\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{257} Linzey, \textit{Christianity}, 81.
\textsuperscript{258} Particularly the sentiency criteria and subject-of-a-life criteria put forth by Tom Regan.
Linzey bases his proposal of theos-rights on his understanding that, "in the end the basis of judgment should not be what we value but what God values." Therefore his theos-rights framework is as follows:

(i) that God as creator has rights in his creation;
(ii) that Spirit-filled, breathing creatures, composed of flesh and blood, are subjects of inherent value to God; and
(iii) that these animals can make an objective moral claim which is nothing less than God's claim upon us.

Therefore, "we are justified in claiming rights for them [animals] and for ourselves in the context of God's right to have what he has given honored and respected." "The notion of 'theos-rights' then for animals means that God rejoices in the lives of those differentiated beings in creation enlived by the Spirit. In short: If God is for them, we cannot be against them." "To put it at its most basic: animals have a God-given right to be animals." However, "this is not to deny that man may sometimes use animals for his purposes so long as these purposes are consonant with the theological good of the individual creatures themselves."

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359 Linzey, Christianity, 77. While this idea initially sounds open and inclusive, Linzey continuously qualifies this usage of value and insists on a much more exclusive view. See previous section. Therefore it is not so much what God values but what Linzey feels has inherent value, a.k.a. rights, and what has mere value, of some indefinable sort.

360 Linzey, Christianity, 69. Unfortunately there is no such clear statement that God granted inherent value (rights) to animals. The idea of rights as used by Linzey is the rights argument used by Regan, where what has inherent value, has rights and what doesn't, doesn't.

361 Ibid., 71. Sure, honored and respected, but Linzey seems to support Regan-rights, not just respect. There is some question how much God-granted rights sound and look exactly like Regan's animal rights. Linzey quite casually makes the jump from theos-rights to "claiming rights", without demarcating the one form of right from the other or how the cross-over is and can be made.

362 Linzey, Animal Theology, 25. This is one of Linzey's more vague statements about our responsibility towards animals. It is unfortunately unavoidable that we "be against" most animals at some point in time.

363 Linzey, Christianity, 112. Stating that animals have a God-given right to be animals, it could be argued, entails being eaten, hunted, experimented upon, etc.

364 Linzey, "The Place of Animals in Creation," 134-135. This is one of Linzey's many vague statements. Nowhere does he clarify exactly what would be the "theological good of the individual creatures." If the theological good is also their theos-rights, then that would mean absolutely no use by
Because of Linzey's focus on individual animals and their rights, he is critical of any utilitarian or holistic models that would seem to put the interests of the group or species over and above individual animals. "What this argument assumes is that the rights of some individual animals should be subordinated to those of the species concerned. In other words, for the good of the species, some individuals within it may legitimately suffer deprivation or harm or both. Indeed some conservationists like Aldo Leopold hold that 'a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.' Such a view, as Tom Regan indicates, might be labeled 'environmental fascism'." 

As a result of Linzey's view with regard to both utilitarianism and holistic models, he is deeply critical of conservationist measures. Therefore, "when we press wild animals into captivity, even for the otherwise righteous aim of preserving

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Because it still meant use, and humans are also equal to these same mammals, in regard to theo-s-rights, humans could then also be used.

See Ch. 5, Section B, for further discussion of the rights argument. Also see the following discussion where Linzey takes his theo-s-rights into his discussion of animals used in scientific research.

Again, note that any reference to animals for Linzey refers to his categorizing them as spirit-filled, flesh and blood creatures. This, for Linzey is occasionally just mammals, but he sometimes also considers birds.

Linzey, Christianity, 132. Linzey sounds a little odd here, particularly since this part of Leopold's maxim is not so outrageous, it is certain interpretations of it that are the problem. See also, Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 361-362; Peter Marshall, Nature's Web: Rethinking Our Place on Earth (New York: Paragon House, 1992), 357. While Regan has received a lot of attention for his statement about environmental fascism it is wrong to conclude that Leopold felt this way. And while Callicott may have initially supported such an idea, he also no longer feels that this is the correct reading of Leopold's land ethic.

Cf. Angus Taylor, "Animal Rights and Human Needs" Environmental Ethics 18, 3 (Fall 1996): 249-264, in particular 252-253. Taylor is critical of Callicott for similar reasons but, again, uses faulty arguments. He points out first of all, that Callicott has attempted to counter the charge of environmental fascism with his essay, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics," but Taylor feels that Callicott still leaves individual animals "out in the cold". He then supports this supposition by citing references from Callicott's previous article, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair." This problem with Callicott's articles has been mentioned before. It is unusual why so many writers insist on focusing on his first essay and refuse to critically examine his second. See also, Donald Scherer, "Anthropocentrism, Atomism, and Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 4, 2 (Summer 1982): 115-123.
endangered species, we do those captive individuals a harm that cannot be outweighed by the potential benefit that may accrue to the species concerned.\textsuperscript{167} For him, "there is [also] an important distinction to be drawn between individual use of animals sometimes prompted by necessity and the subjugation of animals on a huge scale on the assumption that they can be used solely for human ends."\textsuperscript{168}

As a result, Linzey is highly critical of animals used in experimentation. He questions whether "knowledge, even such beneficial knowledge that can save or prolong human life, has priority over all other kinds."\textsuperscript{169} Christians, according to Linzey, are "precluded from a purely humanistic, utilitarian view of animals."\textsuperscript{170} Instead, "one Christian answer to these questions has yet to be heard. It is that, deeply conscious of our divinely given stewardship over creation and our special bond of covenant with animals in particular, we should elect to bear for ourselves whatever ills may flow from not experimenting on animals rather than be supporting an institution which perpetuates tyranny."\textsuperscript{171}

With theos-rights, "the goal is nothing less than the establishing of God's right in creation, and the liberation of non-human creation from the hand of tyranny.

Isaiah [11.6-9] again has just the right vision to feed our imagination and kindle our

\textsuperscript{167} Linzey, Christianity, 133.
\textsuperscript{168} Linzey, Animal Theology, 109. It is ironic that he now states there is a difference between individual use and mass use, since he is opposed to the utilitarianism and holistic positions which he feels can be used to make this exact point.
\textsuperscript{169} Linzey, "The Place of Animals in Creation," 136. See also, Linzey, Animal Theology, 109.
\textsuperscript{170} Linzey, "The Theological Basis of Animal Rights," 907. Here Linzey strongly shows his support of Regan's individualistic rights ethic over the animal liberation ethic proposed by Singer.
\textsuperscript{171} Linzey, Christianity, 125. See also, Linzey, Animal Theology, 40 and "The Place of Animals in Creation," 137-138.
As humans, "we have to ask ourselves whether God's right is served by the ever-increasing numbers of human beings that every day lay exclusive claim to more and more of this common earth." Therefore, "stewardship is actually essential to theos-rights and vice versa. Human beings are to be stewards of God's right in creation, that is, they are to co-operate with the Spirit in actualizing his right reign of peace and justice."

Linzey has been criticized for his humanocentric approach (which is an idea less than popular, particularly in environmental ethics). As he himself points out, critics state that "according to the Linzey thesis humankind is essential in order to liberate animals, and therefore some kind of humanocentricity, however enlightened, is inevitable." As Linzey responds, "I must plead guilty here." However, "the new kind of humanism we need has to reject absolutely the idea that human beings are the measure of the worth of other creatures." Instead, Linzey advocates a "suffering servant humanism" based on a generosity paradigm.

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272 Linzey, Christianity, 103. Linzey refers to Isaiah 11.6-9 repeatedly in his work. This image is used to denote the goal humans should work towards, but without clarification it is hazardous for this purpose. It seems to point to forced vegetarianism for carnivorous animals. While Linzey may recognize the impossibilities of this for wild animals (he would also, it is sure, not advocate allowing children to play around "the hole of the asp") he does encourage it, for this reason, on humans. And it is possible that he could advocate its extension to domestic animals such as cats or dogs. Even though this may seem ludicrous, it actually is a sideline of some animal rights advocates, and unfortunately there were some incidents, in the USA in particular, of cats dying due to a forced vegetarian diet. See below, for further discussion of Linzey's particular image of creation freed from its parasitic nature.

273 Ibid., 88.

274 Ibid., 88.


276 Ibid., 520.

277 Ibid.

278 Ibid.

279 Linzey, Animal Theology, in particular 30-33.
Therefore, while humans are responsible for bringing about changes,\textsuperscript{180} we are to act under a moral generosity, as suffering servants who give priority to the weak.\textsuperscript{181} "The giving of dominion over animals which was once thought to be the touchstone justifying any abuse is now becoming central to the view that what we owe animals is more than what we owe vegetables or arguably even ecosystems."\textsuperscript{182} Because "the uniqueness of humanity consists in its ability to become the servant species,"\textsuperscript{183} we should use our "power in defense of the weak, especially the weak of other species, and...[we] should actively seek the liberation of all beings capable of knowing their oppression and suffering."\textsuperscript{184} Therefore for Linzey, "to cause animals avoidable injury,

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\textsuperscript{180} Linzey frequently states that it may be only when humans can make changes amongst and within themselves that this will also automatically bring about good within the whole created order. See in particular, Linzey, \textit{"Liberation Theology,"} 520.
\textsuperscript{181} This is Linzey's primary point in \textit{Animal Theology}. See in particular \textit{Animal Theology}, ix, 28-61. It is one of the few changes he made from \textit{Christianity and the Rights of Animals}. And a dangerous change it is, see below for further discussion. Still it is an attempt by Linzey to recognize some of the complications of his theos-rights, therefore he tones down that segment in \textit{Animal Theology} and instead focuses more on respect and reverence in a more general way.
\textsuperscript{182} Linzey, \textit{Animal Theology}, 34. This is one of Linzey's unclear uses of the term animals. Since animals for him are only mammals, he forgets to clarify his exact meaning here, unless he defines \textit{all} other animals as vegetables.

Also Linzey's placing the importance of individual animals over and above ecosystems is dangerous and ignores the relationship of these individuals to their habitats and their part in the biodiversity. Cf. "Conservationists now generally recognize the difference between rifle shots and holocausts. They place emphasis on the preservation of entire habitats and not only the charismatic species within them. They are uncomfortably aware that the last surviving herd of Javan rhinoceros cannot be saved if the remnant woodland in which they live is cleared, that harpy eagles require every scrap of rain forest around them that can be spared from the chainsaw. The relationship is reciprocal." Wilson, \textit{The Diversity of Life}, 259. To state that what we owe animals is more than what we owe ecosystems, ignores this interrelationship.
\textsuperscript{183} Linzey, \textit{Animal Theology}, 57.
\textsuperscript{184} Linzey, \textit{"Liberation Theology,"} 525. This is a dangerous idea of Linzey's which possibly points to his support of interference in natural systems, for the sake of rescuing individual animals from the parasitical, predator/prey system. As well, knowing whether or not particular animals are aware of their oppression and suffering is impossible, or as Callicott would say, "unpracticable".
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either through death, deprivation, or suffering, must be seen as morally wrong," and this must be taken as a moral norm.  

C. Key Problems

Some scientists have recognized, when looking back, that often the way forward in science was clouded by a particular worldview, or theory, of how and why things work the way they work. Stephen Jay Gould, in particular, has dedicated numerous of his hundreds of essays for Scientific American to this exact situation. A particular worldview can, as a result, cause obvious things to go unnoticed or to be explained away in obscure and unusual ways. It is possible that this could be the problem with Linzey's work in the area of animal rights and theology.

Linzey's work fails on two fronts, he refuses to acknowledge the problems with a rights argument for animals and, as well, he fails to take into account any other understanding of the natural world. Initially this seems to suggest a philosophical and scientific failing on Linzey's behalf (that is, he does not understand the complexities of

185 Linzey, Animal Theology, 107. Again, only mammalian species are worthy of theos-rights for Linzey, so it is unclear if only they are covered by this moral norm. And if they are, Linzey does not clarify what sort of consideration other animals are due. These kinds of uses of the term animal by Linzey cause some difficulty in understanding exactly what he says for mammals and even more importantly what implications this has on those not considered part of the moral community, and as well, the implications it has in its possible enactment. "Avoidable injury" is also a dubious term open to numerous complications. Yet, as previously noted, Linzey also thinks it is okay to override this.

186 Gould's essays have been re-published in book form, See Dinosaur in a Haystack, Bully for Bronnosaurus: Reflections in Natural History, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991). As Gould details in an essay in Bully for Brontosaurus, "Bligh's Bounty," others have noticed this problem. In 1827, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire wrote, "At first useless, these facts had to remain un-perceived until the moment when the needs and progress of science provoked us to discover them." (Saint-Hilaire is speaking of monotremes). Or, as Gould also quotes in the same essay, as Warner Oland once said in a pseudo Confucian saying (Charlie Chan in Egypte, 1935): "Theory like mist on eyeglasses. Obscure facts." Gould, Bully for Brontosaurus, 292-293.
the rights argument and is unaware of scientific advances),\textsuperscript{287} but it seems more likely that it is, as Gould might suggest, Linzey's theological framework that disallows him to see these problems and arguments.

When one looks at the progression in Linzey's three books and his attempts to explain away and yet maintain certain viewpoints that do not fit in with his overall goal for animal theology this becomes more and more apparent. Nowhere is this more evident than in his adherence to a rights basis for his animal theology. Particularly since Linzey himself acknowledges that there are problems with the rights movement for animals.\textsuperscript{288} Yet despite this he refuses to accept the alternative, that possibly a rights argument is not even necessary in an animal theology.

In Linzey's first book published in 1976, \textit{Animal Rights: A Christian Assessment}, he simply accepted animal rights as a theological argument. Later he realized that this book did not clearly lay out the theological background for such a platform. However, instead of dropping the rights argument, or at least, questioning its implications, he simply fit his theological framework to it. This resulted in the publication of \textit{Christianity and the Rights of Animals}.

It is in this text that Linzey introduces theos-rights. However theos-rights is nothing radically new or different from Regan's animal rights. It is, in fact, remarkably similar, arguing for consideration of mammals only and supporting a particular view of how these rights should be maintained. This is, on its own, not a terrible thing.

\textsuperscript{287} Which is what Parker criticizes him for, see Parker, "Man and Beast He Preserves".
\textsuperscript{288} "Perhaps it is not going too far to say that the contemporary animal rights movement needs theology to help save itself from its own degeneration into moralism and self-righteousness." Linzey, \textit{Animal Theology}, ix.
However, Linzey, in the process of creating his theological framework for animal rights, refuses to accept that there are other interpretations, and that these interpretations might actually better fit a theological framework. Also, that in simply accepting the rights argument, and supporting its essence, Linzey faces all the problems that the rights movement faces.

Actually, in supporting and accepting the rights argument in a theological framework, Linzey's theos-rights are even more problematic than the secular movement. This is mainly because the theological framework for the rights argument makes the rights argument even more rigid and impossible. This is primarily because it sets in stone what is completely ecologically irresponsible. When it makes the rights of animals God's will or God's right to be met in creation, it becomes almost embarrassing.280

Linzey seems to realize some of these problems in his next text, Animal Theology. It is here that he attempts to place theos-rights on a side platform and instead focus on the moral priority of the weak and the generosity paradigm, both new additions.280 However, both these sections are highly problematic and actually make his case all the more impossible. It is particularly in Linzey's generosity paradigm and moreso in his idea of the moral priority of the weak that his theological

280 This is the least of Linzey's problems. As his arguments are often vague and frequently contradictory, there is little difficulty in demonstrating their awkwardness.
280 Here he is also more critical of rights language, stating, "while rights language has value as a provider of checks and markers...it fails by itself to provide a sufficiently holistic and positive interpretation of the place of animals in God's world." Linzey, Animal Theology, ix. Still, most of the criticisms are in his introduction, not the main body of his work. However, it is some hint that Linzey does recognize some of the possible difficulties in maintaining such a close tie with the rights argument, particularly as it is supported by Regan. Which is why he de-emphasizes its role in this book and highlights the moral priority of the weak and the generosity paradigm.
framework comes to the fore. And it becomes all the more clear that his understanding and working out of an animal theology can not offer a satisfactory theological response to the issue of animal welfare.

It is Linzey's theological framework, which understands the issue of pain as the sign of evil in the world, that cannot possibly address the issue of animal rights and ultimately environmental ethics. The issue of pain is in fact the crucial question that can and often does divide the animal rights movement and environmental ethics. When you accept the Benthamite platform that the prevention of pain and suffering is a good, and that suffering of any sort and pain in itself is bad, and you then attempt to carry these concerns over into the lives of individual animals and humans, it creates numerous problems.

Linzey, however, has carried it a step further, as this Benthamite argument also fits in with his theological worldview on violence. The eradication of pain and suffering in any form is Linzey's ultimate vision. He repeatedly asserts the image of Isaiah 11.6-9 as "the right vision to feed our imagination and kindle our will." As a result of this vision Linzey falls into all sorts of traps and ultimately ends up offering an animal theology that is completely unworkable in the real world.

291 Linzey, Christianity, 103.
292 While I am sympathetic, probably more than most, to theological worldviews that are completely blind to what some would see as reality, I cannot accept them if they do not "hold together." Linzey's fails not only for completely misunderstanding the way the world works, but also because he keeps digging himself into a bigger hole in his attempt to hold his worldview together. He creates so many conflicts that it is impossible to treat his work as offering anything worthwhile to the argument of animal welfare. It would be interesting to find out Linzey's ties with the more conservative and fundamentalist movements in the Christian churches. His work, particularly his language in Animal Theology, reverberates with the words of the American Christian Right movement.
This is mainly because Linzey perceives the origin of pain and suffering, and the entire predator/prey relationship as originating in the Fall. Creation has been "dislocated", "the old order of harmony is lost and a new order of violence affecting every level of existence comes into being." Therefore, the pre-Fall world, the original state, was violence-free. "Genesis 1...depicts a state of perfect Sabbath harmony within creation where humans and animals are both prescribed a vegetarian diet." Now because creation has fallen and this fall is characterized by violence, it is violence that is the "pre- eminent mark of corruption and sinfulness."

Because of this worldview Linzey accepts the view that nature is predominantly violent and aggressive, "red in tooth and claw". It is from this understanding of the natural world that he draws out his platform on our relationship with nature and ultimately with animals. In particular, his section in his latest work, Animal Theology, entitled, "Jesus our Predator" is extremely strange. Linzey seems to state that if we accept the predator/prey relationship as part of the natural system we are advocating complete and total violence in all aspects of our lives. He therefore concludes that if we believe that this idea can be supported in a Christian world, we would then have seen Jesus performing random acts of violence and butchering animals needlessly.

For example, "Far from consorting with sinners or excusing prostitutes, the Predator

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293 Linzey, Christianity, 9-11, see also, 61.
294 Linzey, Animal Theology, 126.
295 Ibid., 80.
296 Ibid., 127.
297 For an interesting discussion of this particular phrase from Tennyson, which ties it into catastrophic geology, see Gould, "The Tooth and Claw Centennial," Dinosaur in a Haystack, 63-75. It is Tennyson's original intent which fits most closely with Linzey's. See below for further discussion of this.
298 Linzey, Animal Theology, 118-121.
Jesus would be the first to cast the stone." Or, "Jesus...would be the butcher par excellence." So, if we accept a natural system of predator/prey relations as compatible with theology, we must agree that "God actually wills and blesses a self-murdering system of survival. God's will is death." 299

As a result of this idea, Linzey is able to conclude that because we do not see Jesus performing these acts or accepting random violence that, in fact, the predator/prey relationship is not natural and is not accepted by God. Of course this problematic explanation is only necessary for Linzey because he works within a worldview that perceives nature as predominantly violent, red in tooth and claw. Still, he does caution that this might not be the complete version of the natural world. As he states, "Whilst it is true that there seems to be cruelty, aggression and violence in the natural world (humans included) it is also true that there is cooperation, mutual aid, even possible altruism between species, animal as well as human." 301 But he feels that these suggestions have not been adequately addressed. 302

It is a mystery why Linzey would draw this conclusion. Particularly after having cited Midgley (although erroneously) in his text. For Midgley's key point in her text Beast and Man is that altruism is a key factor in nature, and while aggression is important in the natural world, it rarely could be compared with "murder". There is, as mentioned previously, some hint that Linzey never actually read Midgley. Nevertheless, Midgley is only one writer in a very big field. Numerous writers have

299 Ibid., 120.
300 Ibid., 119
301 Ibid., 120. Yet despite his statements to this effect, he still seems to perceive all of nature to be cruel and violent. His entire discussion of the Predator Jesus seems to discount this one sentence.
302 Ibid.
dealt with these issues in the past hundred years or more. It is mystifying why Linzey would state that very little work had been done in this area, except that possibly his understanding of the world, his worldview, has limited his acceptance of any contradicting material.\textsuperscript{303}

It seems that Linzey is working from a less-than-first-hand knowledge of this subject. He even misrepresents the work of Charles Darwin, and assumes Darwin, in advocating the "survival of the fittest", was pointing out a brutal and violent nature, whereas Darwin's actual position was more subtle than that. Linzey even categorizes Darwinism in his text under the title "Warfare among the Nonhumans".\textsuperscript{304} In fact, Linzey seems to be working more from social-darwinism and less from Darwin's own position.

Because Linzey works out his animal theology from within this worldview, it is plagued with problems. Because he accepts violence as evil and the predator/prey relationship as unnatural, he has to support that humans work to overcome both. To maintain consistency, he must then advocate that we work to displace the predatory/prey relationship in nature. As well, he maintains that animals cannot be used as food or in scientific experimentation or for human entertainment, etc., thereby eliminating all "violent" relationships humans have with animals.\textsuperscript{305} Unfortunately this is stated without acknowledgment of all the underlying

\textsuperscript{303} Linzey's statements in this area are embarrassing in their inaccuracy and misunderstanding. Fine if he misquotes Midgley and never actually read her, but to miss the past two hundred years of scientific thought in this area is inexcusable. As Parker states in "Man and Beast He Preserves", "Researchers will find Linzey's understanding of scientific method and history second-hand and simplistic."

\textsuperscript{304} Linzey, \textit{Animal Theology}, 58-61. See also the index listing and page 85.

\textsuperscript{305} This is an assumption by Linzey that all uses of animals for entertainment are violent.
complications and frequent impossibilities in abandoning all such practices.

Ultimately Linzey's is a naive argument that fails to take into account the very real problems that will arise and do arise in the world if we are going to modify our relationships with animals.\textsuperscript{506}
Chapter Five: Conclusion

A. Towards an Inclusive Community

All this line drawing and redrawing of the boundary between humans and the natural world has unsurprisingly led to numerous analogies and paradigms. Singer introduced the idea of an expanding balloon which slowly encompasses new community members who meet specific criteria or characteristics. This was, of course, unsatisfactory for some. For again it seemed to designate those within the balloon's barrier to matter, and those without to not-matter. And this "absolute dismissal" of those outside the boundary seemed to follow in the footsteps of the previous dualistic humanisitic tradition, which is what the movements were attempting to rid themselves of in the first place.

In 1980 Val Plumwood and Richard Sylvan introduced the tree ring analogy. This was picked up and supported by numerous people for its recognition of the many different relationships and communities that humans interact within. "For if [the] moral community is conceived as a series of ever-widening concentric circles encompassing the whole realm of living beings, then to say that we ought to minimize harm is to say that whenever we, in seeking our own interests, are forced to jeopardize the interests of other beings, we ought, other things being equal, always to

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308 While the idea of "absolute dismissal" is still used in numerous arguments, it is not considered by some to have actually been the case. See also Appendix 2.
309 Then both were known as Routley.
prefer the destruction of peripheral interests to central ones, and of fewer to more interests of the same degree of remoteness from the center.\textsuperscript{311}

J. Baird Callicott also believed that the tree ring analogy offered a positive alternative to Singer's balloon model.\textsuperscript{312} He felt this analogy could include both living and non-living, or the entire land. As he stated, "I suggest that we graphically represent the expansion of our moral sensibilities from narrower to wider circles...like the annular growth rings of a tree. In such a figure the inner rings remain visible and present and the outer are added on, each more remote from the center, from the moral heartwood."\textsuperscript{313} In this way, "the outer orbits of our various moral spheres exert a gravitational tug on the inner ones."\textsuperscript{314} As Jim Cheney interprets Callicott, "not only are we members of three quite different kinds of communities with quite different obligations attaching thereto, but within each of the major types we also find ourselves within a bewildering assortment of communities."\textsuperscript{315}

Midgley, however, is highly critical of the tree ring or concentric circles analogy. While the initial models of us versus them, or me versus them, were simple and attractive they were also competitive and they did not help when considering larger groups. The concentric circles analogy is also no less problematic for Midgley. For, "at once we see that the order of the circles is not at all certain. At each point we

\textsuperscript{313} Callicott, "The Case Against Moral Pluralism," 123.
\textsuperscript{314} Callicott, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics," 259.
\textsuperscript{315} Jim Cheney, "Callcott's 'Metaphysics of Morals'," 314. I think Cheney misunderstands Callicott's theory here, he actually advocates two communities, the mixed and the biotic, not three (Cheney labels them as human, mixed and biotic).
may want to reverse it, or be dissatisfied with either order. Further groupings
constantly occur to us, and, at every stage, it seems that some groupings are more
important for some purposes, some for others. The concentric arrangement will not
work at all. Instead Midgley suggests "a set of overlapping figures of varying shapes,
representing various kinds of claims and loyalties."

Whereas the tree ring analogy of concentric circles attempted to simplify moral
claims, Midgley feels that this is impossible and should actually not even be
considered to be a goal. Instead we must be willing to recognize the incredible
complexity of moral claims that we are faced with. "Each culture, and each individual,
must and does work out a map, a quite complex set of principles for relating them.
Overlaps certainly tend to make claims stronger. But they do not necessarily fix
priorities, because relatively isolated claims must sometimes prevail, when they are
very strong, over weaker ones which come nearer to the center of the web because
they have been institutionalized." For, as Midgley points out, "the lines of life lead
outward." As she states, "we know that there have to be some things that are

316 Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, 28-29.
317 Ibid., 29.
318 Cf. "Many ethical situations...require a particularized situational response, one that considers
context and history...a response that may not be universalizable or quantifiable." Adams and
Donovan, eds., Beyond Animal Rights, 15. Some writers have concluded therefore that there is no
possibility of an overall system that will solve all conflicts. See also, J. Douglas Rabb, "From Triangles
to Tripods: Polycentricity in Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 14,2 (Summer 1992): 177-183;
Andrew Light, "Materialists, Ontologists, and Environmental Pragmatists," Social Theory and Practice

Some, as a result, criticize Midgley for not proposing a detailed system of animal welfare in her
work, Animals and Why They Matter. See, Lilly-Marlene Russow, Review of Animals and Why They
Matter by Mary Midgley Environmental Ethics 7,2 (Summer 1985): 171-175. Linzey also criticizes Midgley
on this point, see above.
319 Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, 30. For this Midgley uses the example of the Good
Samaritan, a case of "special need". Animals, 30-31.
320 Midgley, Beast and Man, 355. See also, "Our self is real enough, but it is a focal point of
naturally more important, more central to human life, than others, and we have a
good general idea which sorts of things they are and how to compare them."321 "And
about the treatment of animals, most people do in fact draw the line somewhere."322

Linzey seems also to base his animal theology on the theory of concentric
circles. "Without lapsing into the predominantly hierarchical view of creation which
has dominated Christian exegesis for centuries, it is possible to understand Genesis 1
as indicating closer circles of spiritual awareness which reach their climax in man
made in God's own image. Thus birds and fish are created on the fifth day and land
animals are classed with man himself on the sixth."323 Therefore, "Genesis posits what
may be termed greater and lesser circles of intimacy with God, and therefore greater
and lesser degrees of spiritual freedom, but there is no absolute dividing line between
man and beast. Both are created in the same way and similarly blessed. This seems...of
enormous significance."324

So even though Linzey proposes a theory of concentric circles, or more so,
spheres of intimacy, it is not as problematic as the tree ring analogy of concentric
circles. For it is not that Linzey is suggesting a hierarchical selection of circles within
society. Rather it is our relationship with nature that is under discussion in Linzey's

321 Midgley, Beast and Man, 261.
322 Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, 17.
323 Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 80. See also, "The Place of Animals in Creation," 128.
This is the beginning of Linzey's problems in defining animals who receive rights. He bases it both on
the covenant (birds, cattle and beasts of the land) and the sixth day of creation (only land animals).
This conflicting definition of animals who should receive rights constantly arises therefore for Linzey.
324 Linzey, Christianity, 65. See also, Animal Theology, 34. Ironic, because for Linzey there is an absolute
dividing line in his theos-rights. This is one of his numerous problems with clarification. See previous
footnote as well.
spheres of intimacy. Plus, as Linzey clearly states in the previous quote, there is still a sense of equality in blessing on which the levels are based.\textsuperscript{325}

Linzey is not alone with his understanding of Genesis positing an order of creation that needs to be respected.\textsuperscript{326} As pointed out by Northcott, in The Environment and Christian Ethics, "love and respect for life and ecosystems are not secondary to respect for human life, but relationally intertwined with human identity and purposes in a moral and a natural ecology which is central to the cosmology of created order celebrated in Israel's worship."\textsuperscript{327} While most in environmental ethics see two or three areas of concern, either human, mixed and biotic or just mixed and biotic, theologians concentrate on three spheres. As Hall points out, there needs to be attention paid to the theocentric, geocentric and anthropocentric. "These are not to be regarded as alternative foci for the believing community but as interdependent spheres of faith's concentration."\textsuperscript{328}

While Midgley is correct to criticize the model of concentric circles if it means we are rating human communities or relationships in a fixed hierarchical manner, it is not as problematic to understand the order of nature as comprised of different levels or spheres of relationality.\textsuperscript{329} When these spheres point to a particular understanding

\textsuperscript{325} While he may lose this idea with his concentration of nature "red in tooth and claw", it is a valid point for him. See below. As a result Linzey's spheres of intimacy and relationality are actually less exclusive than his covenant-based moral community.


\textsuperscript{328} Hall, Imaging God, 200.

\textsuperscript{329} Trying to find a system that will answer all conflicts and solve all ecological problems tends to be the game played by many writers. Some, however, like Midgley feel that such a system is impossible.
of relations between humans and the world, they also point to an underlying commonality, and it is this that is maintained in the theological model of the order of creation. It recognizes both separation from nature, while at the same time supporting kinship with nature.

B. Inclusive Community and "Levels of Intimacy"

I) "The "Rights" Question"

Even though theology has attempted to embrace the environmental movement, it has repeatedly failed to come to terms with relationships humans have with a variety of animals, wild and domestic. Instead the focus has been on the green side of things, that is the more ecological or holistic side of the environmental movement. This has basically repeated the dichotomy found in the environmental movement, where the concerns of animals often is placed well below that of the ecosystem itself. While this is not necessarily a problem, it tends to ignore the fact that we as humans maintain numerous relationships with animals outside of ecosystems already, and that these relationships do need to be called into discussion.

While Linzey may be one of the first in theology to address the relationship we have with animals, he fails to offer a workable solution; not only because he limits himself within a particular worldview, but also because he fails to overcome the original separation between the animal rights movement and the environmental movement. It is possible that this separation can be overcome, so it seems foolish to so

stringently maintain it. Unfortunately the rights position in the animal welfare
movement (both domestic and wild) still is strongly upheld, despite its numerous
problems and inconsistencies with respect to ecology.

The two main problems the rights position has are: the question of equality
within the group of rights holders and then, ultimately, the use of rights language in
itself. Midgley, in particular, is critical of the use of the term equality when speaking of
animals. While some deny granting "equal rights", Midgley points out that the term
"speciesism" was coined as a comparative term with racism and sexism; thereby by its
very nature it attempted to make itself an offense against equality. Instead, as she
stresses, "the notion of equality is a tool for rectifying injustices within a given group,
not for widening that group or deciding how it ought to treat those outside it."

As others have also pointed out, "claims to flourish can be balanced most
easily if only one class of beings is allowed to make them, with equal moral standing
assigned to all members of the privileged class....[This] has, then, the appeal of
simplicity, which some theorists try to preserve by simply extending the privileged
class to include a wider field, as on the animal-rights conception. The problem with
this approach is that it obscures differences in the moral claims made by different
kinds of beings." As Callicott sums up, "Even to those deeply sympathetic to the
plight of animals there is something deeply amiss in the concept of equal moral

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130 Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, 65; see also Appendix 1
131 Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, 67.
132 Steven G. Smith, "Sympathy, Scruple, and Piety: The Moral and Religious Valuation of
Nonhumans." Journal of Religious Ethics 21,2 (Fall 1993), 323. See also, Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man
consideration or equal moral rights for animals, required by the logic of extending the prevailing modern moral paradigms."

Most see the solution to this problem as simply stating that while animals may be granted rights, they are not necessarily equal rights. Therefore they are instead *prima facie* rights and can be overridden by more important issues, such as the rights of humans. For this group, "there is no inconsistency...in the view that animals have a significant right to life, but one which is somewhat more easily overridden by certain kinds of utilitarian or environmental considerations than is the human right to life." This attempt to grant rights that are "more easily overridden" and are not equal, plus to animals who can in no way defend themselves, begs the question of why it is worth bothering to grant rights in the first place.

In this case, as Midgley points out, rights language actually becomes merely a slogan, not a conceptual tool. It fails to actually be an extension of the moral boundary when it is continuously qualified as being non-equal rights, different rights and *prima facie* rights. For it does not want to impose mutual or reciprocal obligations

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334 This same argument has surfaced with those who have a problem with inherent value. "Rather than saying that all sentient beings have equal inherent value, we could say that all sentient beings equally have inherent value." Angus Taylor, "Animal Rights, Human Needs," 258. This is probably the point of the majority of those who consider inherent value in nature/creation. But many feel they have to qualify the term inherent value due to its frequent association with the rights argument. See also, O'Neil, "Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species." This is also Linzey's point of contention. He associates inherent value with rights, and therefore cannot get past this to grant creation inherent value. As a result the rest of creation ends up with some vague sense of value that is never clearly defined.

335 Warren, "The Rights of the Nonhuman World," 202. Cf. "Whatever moral entitlements a being may have as a member of the biotic community, not among them is the right to life." Callicott, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics," 257.

336 Midgley, "Duties to Islands," in Elliot and Gare, eds., *Environmental Philosophy*, 176.
in the extending of this boundary. As Midgley states, "This is...[a] really desperate word. As any bibliography of political theory will show, it was in deep trouble long before animals were added to its worries....It is [also] welded far more thoroughly...to a legal and political context." 

As regards the legal or customary use of the term rights, Midgley feels that arguments against granting animals rights are fully justified. However, as the term stands in its moral usage, it "is far less clear." It is because of this ambiguity that Midgley feels that the term "right...cannot...be salvaged for any clear, unambiguous use in this discussion. It can be used in a wide sense to draw attention to problems, but not to solve them." 

Despite the numerous problems in maintaining rights language in the animal rights/environmental ethics debate many have adhered rigidly to its maintenance. So, instead of moving the argument forward without rights language, there are numerous attempts in the debate to overcome the problems of introducing rights language into an environmental ethic. One possible suggestion in the animal rights/environmental ethics debate, which has been proposed by Regan, is to introduce a rights-based environmental ethic. This is found, as mentioned previously, in various guises in the intrinsic/inherent value movement. Some have argued that because we are all

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338 Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter, 61.
339 Ibid., 62.
340 Ibid., 63.
342 See, Peter Miller, "Value as Richness: Toward a Value Theory for an Expanded Naturalism in Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 4,2 (Summer 1982): 101-114. Miller discusses the idea of
members of the biotic community, we all deserve rights. "Creatures should be accorded rights...not because they can feel pain and can suffer; they should, together with all natural creations, be treated with respect because we, like they, exist as part of the biotic community." It is clearly illogical, therefore, for humans to have rights that are upheld by society and for nonhuman animals to have none. However, this trend also fails again to acknowledge the problems with the idea of equality and the language of rights.

More commonly, some seem to think that a simple joining of the two movements will resolve the problems in each. "To animals in the wild, apply Leopold's land ethic: preserve species and bracket your concern for the intrinsic value of each individual. To animals that have been subjugated or domesticated apply the richness of potential as something that contributes intrinsic value to all beings, even acorns (which have the richness potential to develop into oak trees).

343 Fox, "Philosophy, Ecology, Animal Welfare, and the 'Rights' Question," 314. Everything, as well, is part of the biotic community. Are we then also granting "rights" to oxygen and centipedes? It seems Fox would agree.


345 Not to mention the problem of granting rights to all members and beings. See, Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman Rights," in Hargrove, ed., The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate. John Passmore also stresses the uselessness of granting everyone equal rights. See Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: Duckworth, 1974). It tends to return to the era of the animal trials when all beings had rights and therefore also deserved justice through a fair trial.

346 This is often what naturally happens. Animal rights' groups deal with domestic animals and wild animals within cities, while environmental ethics cover the green groups. Occasionally, however, there is overlap, mainly because few are aware they are operating under two different philosophical platforms. This can be seen when individual wild animals are injured and are spotlighted by the media. Usually the result is the rescue of the animal, regardless of the role in the ecosystem. It is a complicated issue, where our environmental impact actually causes harm to wildlife to decide how we should react. Others have argued that any association of rights with the environmental movement only weakens it. See in particular, Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). W. K. Frankena details eight different types of ethics about the environment which range within all of the following suggestions. However, he agrees with Linzey and posits an "environmental" ethic based on sentience. See, Frankena, "Ethics and the Environment," in Goodpaster and Sayre, eds., Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century. Laura Westra proposes a joint ethic, but based on hostility/indifference. See Westra, "Ecology and Animals: Is There a Joint Ethic of Respect?" Environmental Ethics 11,3 (Fall 1989): 215-230.
ethic of animal rights." For, "only by combining the environmentalist and animal rights perspectives can we take account of the full range of moral considerations." We shall have to take account of both the rights of individual animals and the value of those elements of the natural world which are not themselves sentient. "Thus we are inclined to judge animals—other than those with which we have a personal relationship—by collective or species or ecological criteria, humans and companion animals by the criteria of individual justice."350

While this may seem to some a plausible solution, it fails to address the very real problems within the rights argument: the question of equality within the group of rights holders and rights language itself.351 Since none of these considered solutions seem to be able to address the numerous problems with rights language, it seems more plausible to advocate the disuse of rights language altogether when it comes to animals. And it is when this is done that the numerous possibilities for an inclusive community concept, which includes all animals (human, domestic and wild), become apparent.

349 Ibid., 205.
351 "Thus the more fundamental challenge of the animal liberation debate is not about whether nonhuman animals are inside or outside the moral circle, but rather is about how to frame a nonegalitarian ethic..." Peter Miller, "Do Animals Have interests Worth of Our Moral Interest?" Environmental Ethics 5,4 (Winter 1983), 333.
II) The Community Concept

It is usually argued that due to our speciesist natures we have drawn the line of the moral community strictly around humans. The animal rights/liberation movement attempted to correct this by redrawing the line, the liberation movement at the sentience boundary and the rights movement at the subject-of-a-life boundary. On the other hand holistic/environmental ethicists have attempted to remove the line entirely. Some attempted to argue, from the more holistic model, that we are all members of one community. This is not that we are just part of a universal human community, rather that we are part of a universal community of the earth or even of the universe. All enjoy equal consideration within this community and possibly even equal rights.

This model has more than its share of critics. Some have even tried to pin this idea on Leopold's land ethic and Callicott. However Callicott adamantly refutes that this attribution can be made to the land ethic. As pointed out by Eric Katz, "the entire biosphere is neither one organism nor one community. To consider it to be either seems to result in a vague generalization—similar to the 'brotherhood of man'—that does nothing to advance environmental ethics." Instead recently there has been more focus on the fact that "human beings are living members of a complex world, existing within all sorts of relationships with it and possessing all sorts of responsibilities to it."

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352 See Appendix 1 for further discussion of the term speciesism.
353 See, Blackstone, "The Search for an Environmental Ethic," in particular 329.
355 Holm, Attitudes to Nature, 32.
With this new consideration given to the various relationships and interactions that humans have, particularly with the consideration of companion animals as family members, many more began to question the simplistic definition of one line around a circle of common characteristics. The favoring of family over strangers and even pets against strangers needed a different and more relevant definition. One which recognized our moral dilemma, that we can and do "have genuine fellow-feeling for a potentially limited set of others of...[our] species, and for some animals. But...[that we] cannot, naturally, possess comparable fellow-feeling for a potentially unlimited set extending to the whole of humankind, and beyond, to all of life itself."

A community and its ethic were therefore seen to be relational. "A community grows out of and is defined by the relationships of mutual interest that it nourishes....The most appropriate ethics [therefore] is a natural outgrowth of the type of community with which we are concerned. Each is defined in terms of respect for the types of relationships engendered within that community." A sound morality must

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357 Michael Davis' response to this is to split the world into four classes of personhood. He then designates each class as receiving certain attentions, duties, rights, etc. See, Davis, "The Moral Status of Dogs, Forests, and Other Persons," Social Theory and Practice 12,1 (Spring 1986): 27-59.
359 This is very Leopoldian: Where for Leopold an ethic was a "community-instinct-in-the-making". See Chapter 2, Section A.
be based upon, and not denigrate, the personal ties and attachments into which we are born."^{361}

Some have used this multiplicity of communities that humans belong to as a starting point for defining human speciality or centrality.^{362} "If we recognize our essential similarity with other sentient beings we can better come to comprehend ourselves as members of a community—more correctly, of several hierarchically ordered communities—and thus understand our obligations to our fellow beings—both human and non-human—in a hierarchical manner."^{363} Or as Leslie Francis and Richard Norman argue in "Some Animals are More Equal than Others," "Our claim, then, is that communicative, economic, political and familial relations are far more widespread among human beings (including infants) than between human beings and animals....taken together, they add up to a network of relations which may quite generally justify human beings in attaching greater weight to the interest of other human beings than to those of animals."^{364}

Aldo Leopold also felt that the community concept offered a suitable model for his land ethic.^{365} The idea of community "connotes...interdependence," while it recognizes independence.^{366} "An environmental ethic must take into account the good

^{361} R. L. Clark, "Humans, Animals, and 'Animal Behavior'," in Miller and Williams, eds., Ethics and Animals, 178. And this ties back into Leopold's idea of ethics as a community-instinct-in-the-making.
^{362} See also, the discussion of social distance as a defining point for what we owe and who we prefer, Lawrence C. Becker, "The Priority of Human Interests," in Miller and Williams, eds., Ethics and Animals, in particular 233.
^{363} Chamberlain and Freece, Animal Welfare and Human Values, 314.
^{364} Francis and Norman, "Some Animals are More Equal than Others," 524. This of course ignores the biotic community which the livelihood of humans depends on.
^{365} Some mention has been made previously of the confusion between an organismic model and a community model, and Leopold's acceptance of the community concept.
^{366} Benson, "Duty and the Beast," 542. As Benson continues to point out, "not every relationship of mutual dependence automatically carries with it a moral relationship." Ibid. See also, Richard (Sylvan)
for the community as a whole, and the good for each and every member of the community as an individual. The community model of nature can do this. A community is, as Rolston states, a place where "each is for itself, but none is by itself." Therefore, "a member of a community has intrinsic value in itself and instrumental value as a functioning part of a system." Callicott has been the main promoter of Leopold's land ethic and the biotic community model held within. It is because of the suitability of this model that Callicott felt that the community concept, which is based on a Humean-Darwinian foundation, was central as the bridge between the community models of Leopold and Midgley. In this way Callicott hoped to offer an alternative to the traditional dichotomy between the animal rights movement and environmental ethics. While his biosocial moral theory has been largely ignored, it does seem to point the way forward without the limitations of rights language or an ignorance of ecological issues, both problems that plague Linzey's work in this area.

Routley, "Roles and Limits of Paradigms in Environmental Thought and Action," in Elliot and Gare, eds., Environmental Philosophy.
367 Katz, "Organism, Community, and the 'Substitution Problem'," 256.
368 Holmes Rolston, III, quoted in Francisco Benzoni, "Rolston's Theological Ethic," Environmental Ethics 18,4 (Winter 1996), 343. Rolston stresses the necessity of looseness in community systems, see Rolston, "Duties to Ecosystems," in Callicott, ed., Companion to A Sand County Almanac, in particular 256. See also, "Natural individuals live and act for and in themselves and as members of a communal system. They pursue their own interests while serving in roles in the community." Katz, "Organism, Community, and the 'Substitution Problem'," 246. And "our genetic endowment is shaped...[by] nurtured affection and cooperation within, but enmity toward competing groups without." John B. Cobb, Jr, "Christian Existence in a World of Limits," in Hargrove, ed., Religion and Environmental Crisis, 175.
369 Katz, "Organism, Community, and the 'Substitution Problem'," 249. We have also, traditionally, taken individualistic and holistic models as alternatives, rather than, possibly, as equal parts of a community model.
C. Conclusion

Linzey is one of the few theologians to focus on the particular responsibility humans may have towards animals found in mixed communities. While he does attempt to rectify the lack of concern regarding animals in the area of theology, he fails by retaining a fallen creation and a rights-based theology. He also is hampered by a limited understanding of the natural world and the nature of animals. Linzey could only profit from modifying his mixed community (such as proposed by Midgley) and enlarging his understanding of the biotic community (such as proposed by Leopold).

Linzey's covenant community while it respects the spheres of intimacy outlined in Genesis,\(^\text{371}\) falters in its focus on a direct relationship between inherent value and rights. So even though Linzey puts forth the idea that God values all creation, it is only spirit-filled, flesh and blood creatures that have inherent value. And because inherent value, particularly in the Regan argument, is equal to rights, it is only the animals that meet the criteria of being spirit-filled, flesh and blood creatures that have rights. So, even though Linzey bases his moral community on the order of nature found in Genesis and the particular covenanted relationship established with God, it is a relationship and order that ultimately establishes for him a rights criterion.

Despite Linzey's repeated support of the usage of the language of rights, he does begin to recognize some of its flaws. Yet, while he acknowledges in Animal Theology the problems with granting equal rights and the difficulties that the rights

\(^{371}\) See Section A for further discussion of Linzey's spheres of intimacy and its relationship to Midgley's criticism of the model of concentric circles.
movement has experienced in then deciding what kinds of rights are being granted, he still insists that the language is useful. This is mainly because he believes that people recognize that something which has rights can then be wronged. And that this, in the long run, will outweigh any possible problems and can only produce positive changes in the way people treat animals. However, this is an extremely weak (and also unproven) reason to maintain a highly complicated and ambiguous term, as Midgley more than adequately points out.

Linzey, like Midgley, also supports a mixed community theory based on different relationships. Except that Midgley avoids rights language. If Linzey were to recognize the complications caused by rights language and that his animal theology would be better served without it, his community would immediately become more inclusive. For then he would be able to change the relationship of value within his community and what it means for his animal theology. Even with this dismissal of rights language, Linzey would still be able to maintain his spheres of intimacy and his order of creation. 372 For as he has stated,

Genesis posits what may be termed greater and lesser circles of intimacy with God, and therefore greater and lesser degrees of spiritual freedom, but there is no absolute dividing line between man and beast. Both are created in the same way and similarly blessed. This seems...of enormous significance. 373

This idea of relationality and different, even hierarchical, levels of intimacy, alongside a humanocentric platform are Linzey's best points and the ones that meld exactly with Midgley's points on different levels of relationality.

372 In fact, it would probably become clear where all creation has value to God, but because of different levels of intimacy we have different levels and types of responsibility.
373 Linzey, Christianiry, 65. See also, Animal Theology, 34.
However, Linzey would also need to correct his other and biggest flaw, that is his refusal to understand nature as anything but violent, fallen, and hence, evil. In this case, Linzey needs to move more into the area of green theology which recognizes the value of all of creation. Because for Linzey creation is fallen and evil, he cannot support the inherent value of the natural world. Rather, for him, creation has some other less clearly defined, weaker form of value. As well, the more Darwinian understanding of the natural world found in both Midgley and Leopold would help his community to be less violent and completely predator-based and more open to recognize conflict and cooperation in the natural world.\textsuperscript{374} So, while Linzey's community model is nonegalitarian, mixed, and relational; it needs also to be aware of co-operation and competition and the interrelationship of nature and culture.

Only when a community model dispenses with rights language and its accompanying problems while remaining open to a covenanted community with differing relationships or spheres of intimacy, will it be possible to accomplish the joining of animal rights and environmental ethics. In this way, a community could be inclusive, rather than exclusive, and therefore would include all creatures and creation.\textsuperscript{375} As Callicott's biosocial moral theory already is based upon a community concept that is ultimately relational, it seems possible that this could then be

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\textsuperscript{374} It is, of course, not so much that Linzey sees nature as parasitical which is a problem, for parasitical it is. It is rather that he equates this situation with evil and ultimately abhors the natural world and the entire parasitical system.

\textsuperscript{375} Despite these setbacks, Linzey's work accomplishes what he hoped it would, for as he wrote in the opening of \textit{Christianity and the Rights of Animals}, "I am now only too painfully conscious of the book's limitations and how it falls short in a variety of directions....The issue, however, is so timely and so few theologians have entered seriously into a discussion of it, that I have felt constrained to respond...If the book serves discussion it will have been worthwhile." Linzey, \textit{Christianity and the Rights of Animals}, 6.
interrelated with relational theology. This should then be examined further for the possibility of a completely inclusive community paradigm that is theologically based, which recognizes all facets of the natural world and acknowledges both our biological and our social background.

576 Some of these similarities can be seen throughout this thesis.
Appendix

Because of the numerous complicated issues surrounding both environmental ethics and animal rights/liberation, it is impossible to address all the various arguments in one thesis. However, some of these arguments are important as a background to the various discussions taking place. Yet they are too complicated to be dealt with in any detail in the main body of the thesis. Rather than simply working from set conceptions I would like to lay out some of the more complicated problems in the various arguments. This has helped the thesis move along on its intended course, rather than letting it get bogged down in side arguments. However it still allows the reader to see some of the side issues that need to be addressed in any discussion of animal rights and environmental ethics.

Appendix 1. Speciesism

The term speciesism, originally coined by Richard Ryder in the 1970s, was used by Peter Singer in his book Animal Liberation to help make his point. Singer feels that we are progressing morally, extending the boundaries of our moral concern as the years pass and we become more aware. Following in the footsteps of other liberation


Singer is by no means the only one to feel this way. Tom Regan also supports the idea that we are progressing morally, slowly extending the boundaries along the scale of being. Either the boundary is slowly expanded to include sentient beings only, or it is ballooned out to contain all of the natural world. Most writers, particularly in the rights/individualistic tradition, support this idea of a linear progress in ethics, including Leopold. Few are willing to question the idea of whether this is a natural progression at all, or to acknowledge the very real problems of extending the boundaries based on perceived similarity without carefully acknowledging the very real differences. Some writers, such as Mary Midgley, are now beginning to question this idea. Kate Soper is more openly critical and questions whether or not there has been any progress to a more humane attitude at all. *The point
movements then, Singer proposes that the next step is, logically, animal liberation. For "a liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons and an extension or reinterpretation of the basic moral principle of equality."\footnote{Singer, "All Animals Are Equal," in Regan, ed., All That Dwell Therein, 148.}

In placing animal liberation amongst such movements as women's liberation, black liberation, etc., he also compares our speciesist attitude as on par with racism and sexism. Therefore, he characterizes his book as a "challenge to every human to recognize his attitudes to non-humans as a form of prejudice no less objectionable than racism or sexism."\footnote{Singer, "Animal Liberation," in Zimmerman, Environmental Philosophy, 31; see also Singer, Animal Liberation, and "All Animals Are Equal."} The turnover of speciesism calls for nothing less than equal consideration of interests\footnote{Singer, "Animals and the Value of Life," in Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death, 246.} amongst humans and Singer's selected group of non-humans.\footnote{Where Singer chooses to draw the line for those who receive equal consideration and those who do not, is based on his usage of Bentham's dictum "Can they suffer?.} 

Several writers have been openly critical of Singer's comparison of speciesism with racism and sexism, while others have openly approved. The term has taken on a life of its own, to a certain extent, and frequently crops up in articles without a corresponding explanation. The most critical of its usage, have of course been those who do not feel that animals should be considered equal or even morally

\footnote{here is not that we have 'obviously' over time, and through such shifts of thinking, become less cruel or hypocritical in our attitudes to non-human creatures, that we now 'love' them more than in earlier epochs, or have a more profound understanding or aesthetic appreciation of them. None of these things is obviously true....Despite some rather muddled claims to the contrary, it is not clear that Western culture has become either more 'humane', or more intelligent, or more aesthetically sensitive towards other living creatures. What is Nature? (Oxford: Blackwell), 219-220.}
This has unfortunately allowed many to dismiss their critique as...speciesist.

It is Midgley's essay in *Animals and Why They Matter* entitled, "The Significance of Species" that has most carefully criticized the usage of the term. And, as it is surrounded in the book by essays detailing why animals matter, it should have received greater attention than it has. Midgley grants that the term was invented for a particular purpose, to offer a radical and destructive dismantling of our humanocentric position. It demonstrated that we were using species as a boundary for deciding what matters to us and what cannot matter to us. However, she clearly states that now that the inconsistency in our way of thinking has been pointed out, we need something more.

It is after Midgley makes these points that she becomes more openly critical of the comparison of speciesism to racism. "Race in humans is not a significant grouping at all, but species in animals certainly is. It is never true that, in order to know how to treat a human being, you must first find out what race he belongs to....but with an animal, to know the species is absolutely essential." She continues: "To liken a trivial human grouping such as race to this enormous, inconceivably varied

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384 Midgley, *Animals and Why They Matter*. This particular essay was reprinted in Hargrove, ed., *The Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics Debate*. It is this reprinted version that will be used for reference purposes.
385 Midgley is less critical of its comparison to the term sexism. For as she states regarding the idea of sexism, "A belief is not a prejudice simply because it indicates a difference." Midgley, "The Significance of Species," 125.
range of possibilities is to indulge in what revolutionaries call 'patronizing' thinking—a failure to recognize the scale of difference between others and oneself.\textsuperscript{586}

It is Midgley's critique that points out one of the biggest flaws in the animal rights/liberation movement, in their attempt to extend the boundary they are frequently in a rush to eliminate the very real differences between humans and animals. In the push to grant rights, prove interests, and demonstrate consciousness, animals are actually given very little credit for being what they are...animals. This ties back in to the historical argument presented in Chapter One on the two lines of thought pointed out by Keith Tester: the Demand for Difference and the Demand of Similitude.\textsuperscript{587} In attempting to correct the former, the animal rights movement has swung dangerously into the latter. Works like Midgley's are attempting to offer a staying force to the pendulum swing.

\textsuperscript{586} Midgley, "The Significance of Species," 121-122.
\textsuperscript{587} Tester, Animals and Society.
Appendix 2. Dualism

Keith Tester, in his work *Animals and Society*, outlines two separate Demands, the Demand for Difference and Demand for Similitude, that have played a significant role in the change in relationships between animals and the natural world and humans. Traditionally the idea of dualism, an integral part of the Demand for Difference, has been a derogatory term. It has been labeled by various environmental ethicists and animal welfare writers as the source of our problems. We dominate and ruthlessly use nature and animals because of our belief that we are rational and ordered, while they are part of irrationality and disorder.

Nevertheless, it is likely that the Demand for Difference is less radical and dangerous than it is usually portrayed. The idea of dualism, frequently the subject of much derision, has few supporters. However, there has been a recent change. Some are now willing to critique whether or not the idea of Similitude might not carry the some of the same dangers as the Demand for Difference/dualism, while others are also questioning whether or not dualism is in itself truly evil.

"The dualist position has indeed frequently served to legitimate the abuse of animals and destructive appropriations of natural resources. It is by no means obvious, however, that any devaluation or misuse of nature automatically follows from the insistence on our difference in kind from the rest of organic and inorganic

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388 It is doubtful that the Demand for Difference was ever that radical. While it supported culture over nature, it did not necessarily advocate complete abuse of animals and nature. And the Demand for Similitude is not so innocent as well. Such ideas are sometimes simply used for "putting victims on a pedestal, the better to exploit them in good conscience." Jane Jacobs, *Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce and Politics* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 22.

389 This idea of Similitude is predominant in the holistic model. Therefore it will also be dealt with there. See Ch. 1, Section D: Emergent Ethical Models.
nature."\footnote{Soper, \textit{What is Nature?}, 131-132.} The "recognition of the ontological duality of human and animal being...is not necessarily inimical to ecological objectives."\footnote{Ibid., 162.} For, "it does not logically follow from the fact that we think ourselves as different from—or even superior to—the rest of nature that we shall maltreat it; it follows only that, if we are looking for reasons to justify the maltreatment, this may be one that gets invoked."\footnote{Ibid., 132.}

This questioning of the real character of dualism is also part of the recent call to support discrimination, difference and particularity.\footnote{See also, Gunton, \textit{The One, The Three, and The Many}. As well, it follows from Midgley’s critique of the term speciesism, see Appendix 1.} While the general move in past scholarship has attempted to remove the differences and stress the kinship and similarity between animals and humans in order to increase their welfare, stressing such similarity is highly problematic. Not only does it create huge issues between the equal treatment of, say, a human and a cow; it also creates problems by ignoring the very real differences between other species, say, an eagle and a beaver; as well it ignores our differing social relations with various species. "Is, for example, the moral status of a farm animal, a domestic pet, or a 'wild' animal to be conceptualized in identical terms?"\footnote{Benton, \textit{Natural Relations}, 92. And this brings the discussion full circle back to the problems between the individualistic and holistic models.}
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