THE DEVELOPMENT OF LONERGAN'S NOTION OF THE

DIALECTIC OF HISTORY: A STUDY OF LONERGAN'S

WRITINGS 1938-53

by

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A dissertation submitted through Regis College
to the Department of Systematic Theology
in the Faculty of Theology
of the Toronto School of Theology
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
awarded by the University of St. Michael's College

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ABSTRACT

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In my dissertation, I test a hypothesis: "In the years 1938-53, Lonergan continued to hold the dialectic of history as a concern of central importance." I use the term "continued," because it is evident from recently discovered documents that Lonergan was much exercised by such a concern in the years 1933-38. The result I obtain from this test is a qualified verification of my hypothesis. I suggest that Lonergan did, indeed, continue to hold the dialectic of history as one of his central concerns in the period 1938-53. However, I also assert that Lonergan's attention was more directly taken up with questions that were subordinate to the more encompassing question of a theory of history. I conclude that, while his interest in the dialectic of history remained one of central importance, it must be understood as being something of an "underlying" concern during this period.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE .............................................................. 5

INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 7

PART ONE
LONERGAN, THOMISM, AND CATHOLIC ACTION

CHAPTER

1. "FILE 713- 'HISTORY': A "METAPHYSIC OF CATHOLIC ACTION" . 16

Lonergan In The Context of His Times ............................. 16
The General Crisis ................................................... 17
The Church's Response ............................................... 18
The Revival of Catholic Thought .................................. 20
Lonergan as Transcendental Thomist ............................... 22

Lonergan's Epistemology ............................................. 25
Hoenen on Understanding .......................................... 26
Keeler on Judgment .................................................. 27
Intellect As Discursive ............................................. 28
The Contrast with Conceptualism ................................. 29
Intellect and Will .................................................... 32

Introducing the Documents of File 713 ........................... 34
Fundamentals of a Philosophy of History .......................... 36
The Need for a Philosophy of History ............................. 37
The Causes of Human Action ....................................... 40
A Theory of Human Solidarity ..................................... 42

Components of the Analytic Concept of History .................. 45
Dialectic ...................................................................... 46
Three Approximations ............................................... 49

Conclusion ................................................................. 58

2. WITHDRAWAL "IN SEARCH OF SOMETHING MORE EXACT
AND CONVINCING" .................................................... 61

Lonergan's Period of Withdrawal .................................... 63
Plan for This Chapter ................................................ 66
Biographical Background .............................................. 68
Catholic Laity in "Ferment" .......................................... 70
Lonergan's Pastoral Involvement ................................... 74
Lonergan's Economics ............................................... 75

A Theology of Grace .................................................. 80
The Acts of Will ....................................................... 82
The Reality of Sin ..................................................... 92
Grace and Freedom ................................................... 94
CHAPTER

3. EMERGENT PROBABILITY AND THE UPPER CONTEXT OF INSIGHT ... 124

The Epilogue as Interpretative Key to Insight .......... 126
Clarifying Terminology .................................. 128
Adding to the Old With the New ....................... 130
The Upper Context of Insight .......................... 132
Step 1: The Invariant Structures of Experiencing
Inquiring and Reflecting ................................. 134
Insight in Geometry ..................................... 135
Insight in "Classical" Science ............................ 139
Insight in "Statistical" Science ......................... 142
Complementary Methods ................................. 146
Emergent Probability as World-View .................... 148
Step 2: The Isomorphic Structures of Knowing and
Proportionate Being ...................................... 154
From Judgment to Objectivity ............................ 154
Metaphysics .............................................. 157
An Emergently Probable Universe ....................... 161
Conclusion .................................................. 170

4. EMERGENT PROBABILITY, HUMAN BEINGS, AND GOD .......... 172

Step 3: Fuller Invariant Structures ....................... 173
The Will As "Spiritual Appetite" ......................... 173
Creating New Being ..................................... 177
Decision and Emergent Probability ....................... 180
Studying Human Development ............................ 188
The Problem of Liberation ................................ 194
Step 4: The Profounder Structure of Knowing and Known
Proof of the Existence of God ............................ 203
Transforming Metaphysics and Ethics ..................... 204
Step 5: God's Solution to the Problem of Evil ........... 207
A Supernatural Higher Viewpoint ......................... 208
A Contribution to a Higher collaboration ............... 217
Intellectual Collaboration and Faith ...................... 218
Insight, Theology, and History .......................... 221
Conclusion .................................................. 230
PART THREE
THE DIALECTIC OF HISTORY IN INSIGHT

CHAPTER

5. DIALECTIC AS AN OPERATOR THEME IN LONERGAN’S THOUGHT ..... 233

Studying Unthematised Elements in an Author’s Thought... 235
Emergent Probability as a Tool for Interpretation .................. 237
Dialectic Functioning As an Operator Theme in Insight 240
Stages in the Writing of Insight .................. 242
The Significance of Chapters 6 and 7 .......... 245
A Proposal: Lonergan’s Notion of Dialectic .......... 247
Dialectic in File 713 .................. 249
A Clarification .......................... 255
Conclusion .............................................. 258

6. DIALECTIC IN INSIGHT ........................................ 259

Dialectic and Cognitional Analysis .................. 260
Oppositions in The Subject .................. 261
Dialectic and Subjectivity .................. 282
The Dialectic of History .................. 287
Intersubjectivity .................. 288
Practical Intelligence .................. 290
Three Aspects of a Dialectic .................. 296
A Cumulative Process .................. 299
Renaissance and Culture .................. 313
Method Anticipating Dialectical Situations .................. 316
Method and Dialectics of Contradiction .................. 317
Method and Dialectics of Complementarity .................. 318
Conclusion .............................................. 321

EPILOGUE ................................................ 324

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................... 331
PREFACE

The idea for this dissertation was inspired by another dissertation, one written by Michael Shute. Shute's dissertation has been published as *The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History: A Study of Lonergan's Early Writings on History.* In this work, he analyses unpublished essays written by Bernard Lonergan in the 1930's. During this time, Lonergan was still undergoing his formation to be a Jesuit priest. He wrote these essays between the ages of thirty and thirty-four.

Shute believes that these essays add significantly to our understanding of Bernard Lonergan. In these essays, the young Lonergan demonstrates a profound concern for the social problems of his age. He develops a theory of the dialectic of history. He understands this dialectic of history to be constituted by "progress," "decline," and "renaissance." He claims that individuals who want to be agents of progress in history can be greatly assisted by being guided by this theory of history.

Michael Shute goes so far as to suggest that the later works of Lonergan need to be reinterpreted in the light of these early manuscripts. This dissertation attempts just such a reinterpretation. I shall confine myself to studying what seems

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to be the most natural chronological period after that investigated by Michael Shute. This period begins with Lonergan's doctoral thesis begun in 1938 and ends in 1953. While Insight was not published until 1957, it was in fact substantially completed in 1953.

I test a hypothesis: "In the years 1938-53, Lonergan continued to hold the dialectic of history as a concern of central importance." The result I obtain from this test is a qualified verification of my hypothesis. I suggest that Lonergan did, indeed, continue to hold the dialectic of history as one of his central concerns through these years. However, I also assert that Lonergan's attention was more directly taken up with questions that were subordinate to the larger question of a theory of history. Consequently, while his interest in the dialectic of history remained one of central importance, it must be understood as being something of an "underlying" concern during the period I study.
INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation I study the writings of and some biographical data concerning Bernard Lonergan in the years 1938-53. I find sufficient evidence to suggest that the following hypothesis is verified: in the years 1940-53, Lonergan continued to hold the dialectic of history as a concern of central importance. However, I find that this concern must often be considered more an underlying concern than one to which Lonergan often explicitly refers. This creates a methodological challenge for this dissertation: how does one study an "underlying concern?" I try to pay careful attention to what I am doing methodologically and to state this clearly. I believe that a helpful way to introduce this question is to compare my work with that of Michael Shute.

From Research to Interpretation

In Method in Theology,¹ written after the period considered in this dissertation, Lonergan speaks of how the discipline of theology is characterised by eight functional specialties. In order to explain the fundamental method I employ in this dissertation, it is sufficient to discuss only two of these eight

functional specialties.

Michael Shute identifies his book as primarily a work in the functional specialty of research. He states that "research is not specifically concerned with the critique of the position taken by the author of the documents studied but assumes the more modest task of assembling the data, determining the date of authorship and judging the authenticity of their authorship."\(^2\) However, Shute is clear that his work also extends into the functional specialty "interpretation."\(^1\) He quotes Lonergan’s explanation of interpretation: "While research makes available what was written, interpretation understands what was meant."\(^4\) The task that he sets himself is more extensive than simply expounding Lonergan’s understanding of the dialectic of history in the manuscripts of File 713. Rather, Shute makes a biographical claim that the dialectic of history was central to Lonergan’s thinking during the 1930’s and probably remained so for the rest of his life.\(^5\)

Clearly then, while Shute’s study is primarily a task of

\(^2\)Shute, xxiv.

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^4\)Lonergan, Method in Theology, 127.

\(^5\)Shute is lucid about the differing weight his claims carry. His basic expounding and dating of the manuscripts are proposed with the greatest confidence. Shute then expounds what he considers to be Lonergan’s life-long notion of the dialectic of history. It is against this that he interprets the notion that emerges in File 713. He is clear, however, that his assertions regarding Lonergan’s later ideas "themselves are subject to the examination of ‘dialectic’" (Shute, xxv). In fact, I shall seek to qualify Shute’s statements about Lonergan’s later notions much as Shute anticipates.
research, it extends into interpretation. Furthermore, he exhorts other students of Lonergan to engage in acts of interpretation based on his work of research. In response to Shute's call, this work is primarily a work of interpretation.

In his chapter on "Interpretation" in Method in Theology, Lonergan devotes most of his time to the question of how we come to understand a text (other themes include how we affirm our understanding to be correct and how we communicate what we have affirmed). He asserts that one key aspect in the labour of interpreting texts is to understand the author. This will complement the other aspects involved in this task:

There can arise the need for a long and arduous use of the self-correcting process of learning. Then a first reading yields a little understanding and a host of puzzles, and a second reading yields only slightly more understanding but far more puzzles. The problem, now, is a matter not of understanding the object or the words but of understanding the author himself, his nation, language, time, culture, way of life, and cast of mind.6

I understand Shute's challenge to interpreters of Lonergan to lie primarily in the context of this dimension of interpretation. Shute offers us a greater understanding of the author on the basis of the essays in File 713. This can help us to answer puzzles that will remain in Lonergan's later writings unless, partly by means of these early essays, we understand the person we are dealing with.

6Lonergan, Method in Theology, 160, my underline.
Outline of My Argument

My dissertation is divided into three parts, each with two chapters. In Part I, I study Lonergan from the time when he was writing the essays of File 713 up to 1949. Lonergan called the period 1938-49 "eleven years of apprenticeship to Thomas Aquinas." It was at the end of this period that he began to write his master-work, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding.*

In Chapter 1, I outline Shute's account of the essays of File 713. I also use some biographical studies of Lonergan's intellectual development to place these essays in the context of their times. I stress that Lonergan was not exceptional in having a deep concern with social problems. The 1930's were a period of social crisis. His essays employ categories from Thomas Aquinas and apply them to concerns that are strikingly modern. However, in this respect Lonergan was working along similar lines to many other Catholic intellectuals. I describe Lonergan as being part of an "ethos of Catholic Action." This ethos was inspired by the leadership of Pope Pius XI, a Pope responsible for much of the renewal in the Catholic Church that would later bear fruit in the Second Vatican Council.

In Chapter 2 I seek to demonstrate that Lonergan's underlying concerns remained those of the Catholic Action ethos when he wrote his doctoral dissertation, 1938-40, and when he

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taught in Canada as a professor of theology, 1940-49. I do acknowledge that this period involved a period of "withdrawal" from a very direct involvement with questions of history. Lonergan was assigning himself to his lengthy "apprenticeship to Thomas Aquinas." However, I suggest that there are clear indications that he understood this as constituting an intellectual preparation for an eventual "return" to these same questions of history.\(^8\) I point to biographical evidence from this period that indicates that Lonergan associated himself pastorally with the Catholic Action ethos. Likewise, I point to certain written works that demonstrate that he was beginning, even during this early period, to apply the fruits of his study of Aquinas to social questions.

In Part II, I begin an effort to interpret Insight from the perspective of a knowledge of the author that includes an acquaintance with his early essays on history. I suggest that, in many respects, Lonergan's period of reflective "withdrawal" continues during this period, 1949-53. I suggest that Insight can be understood as an effort by Lonergan to advance from his studies of Aquinas and to engage the philosophical developments that occurred subsequent to this great medieval thinker.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I use the Epilogue of Insight as an interpretive key to the book. I take note of Lonergan's claim

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\(^8\)The metaphor of "withdrawal and return" is one used by the historian of civilizations, Arnold Toynbee. Lonergan read this author and used this metaphor to describe certain other authors and social movements. I will discuss this further in Chapter 2.
that the organising structure of the book unfolds in five steps, and I offer a schematic outline of these five steps. However, I also stress that Lonergan claims that *Insight* is intended as part of a "far larger work." I suggest that his concern with history would be more evident in that larger work than it can be within the constraints of what he sets out to achieve in *Insight*.

In Part III, I adopt a different method for studying *Insight*. I note that, in addition to the five steps of the organising structure of the book, there are a number of places where Lonergan seems to conduct an argument that operates at a tangent to the organising structure of the book. I suggest that many of these "loose ends" in *Insight* reveal Lonergan's underlying concern with questions of history. It is as if we can say that Lonergan demonstrates a certain impatience with the length of time his "withdrawal" is taking and starts to jump to speculations relevant to a "return" before his withdrawal is complete. In Chapter 5, I suggest that many of the tangential arguments in *Insight* employ a somewhat unsystematised notion of dialectic. I then outline the method with which I intend to study these "loose ends." In Chapter 6, I proceed to this study; I entitle this last chapter, "Dialectic in *Insight*."

In conclusion, I suggest that it is in studying these unsystematised aspects of *Insight* that the hypothesis I test in this dissertation is most clearly verified. These loose ends reveal much about the underlying concerns of the author. I suggest that the essays of File 713 offer additional knowledge of
the author that is particularly helpful in answering some puzzles concerning these loose ends.

As part of this conclusion, I reflect on an additional point. I recall how the documents of File 713 offer us a new appreciation of how a social concern motivated Lonergan throughout his life. I express the hope that this insight could invite a wider audience to become familiar with his thought. I claim that it can be an exciting experience to recognize the practical concern that motivates Lonergan's complex and abstract thought. However, I suggest that the social problems that exercised Lonergan in the 1930's, 40's and 50's are no less relevant today than then. It is my hope that the continuing relevance of the questions to which Lonergan addressed himself can become the source of a growth of interest in his work.

**Clarification By Contrast**

If I have asserted what is the proposed task of this dissertation, let me try to add further clarity by asserting what it is not.

First, I will not attempt any comprehensive comparative study of other interpretations of Lonergan's thought. As I have just stated, I will give some time to discussing other interpretations of Lonergan's work. However, this will be in the context of some particular issues raised in the course of my own interpretation. The use of other secondary sources will therefore be selective. Of course, in this dissertation I do associate
myself with the project outlined by Michael Shute regarding the importance of reinterpreting Lonergan. Consequently, there is an implication in this dissertation that not all other secondary works are accurate in their account of Lonergan’s central concerns. However, it is not my intention to conduct the systematic study of other works on Lonergan that would be required to support such an affirmation.

Secondly, as is clear from the title of this dissertation, I will not be studying Lonergan’s writings after 1953. Therefore, this dissertation is to be understood as just one contribution to a much larger project. Any final conclusions regarding the importance of the notion of the dialectic of history in Lonergan’s thought must await similar studies of later periods in his life.

Thirdly, a number of readers may be interested by my treatment of Lonergan’s substantial amount of writing on economic topics during the 1940’s. I should stress, however, that it is not my intention to offer a comprehensive introduction to Lonergan’s thought on economics. Rather, I will limit my comments to identifying how Lonergan’s economic writings are in direct continuity with his thinking on the dialectic of history.
PART I
LONERGAN, THOMISM AND CATHOLIC ACTION
CHAPTER I

"FILE 713 - "HISTORY": A "METAPHYSIC OF CATHOLIC ACTION"

In my introduction, I have outlined the basic project of this dissertation. I hope to interpret the writings of Bernard Lonergan during the period 1938-53. I do this in the light of an improved understanding of the author that I derive from the manuscripts of "File 713 -History." Clearly, my first step should now be to outline the contents of these manuscripts.

My outline of this file will rely heavily on the work of Michael Shute. However, before turning to the documents themselves, I will seek to set them in the context of their times. I will speak of a more remote and a more proximate context in which we can place these writings of the young Lonergan. For the former point I will rely on an article written by Joseph Komonchak; for the latter I will draw on sections of Richard Liddy's intellectual biography of Lonergan.¹

Lonergan In the Context of His Times

Joseph Komonchak's article explicitly focuses on the historical context of the documents of File 713. He stresses that

"the years Lonergan spent in England, France and Rome were ones of great world-historical drama, of significant ecclesiastical development, and of major breakthroughs in Catholic thought." Komonchak understands Lonergan's thought to be very much part of the spirit of his times. He describes this context in three steps.

The General Crisis

Komonchak stresses that "by the mid-1930's the sense that the world, or at least the western world, was in a state of acute crisis was very widespread." First, the First World War had given the lie to the liberal optimism that so characterised the end of the nineteenth century. Secondly, democracy seemed on the decline with the rise of fascism in Germany, Italy and Spain and with the reality of Stalinism in the Soviet Union. Finally, capitalist economics seemed shaken to its roots with the global depression that started in 1929.

Komonchak claims that an immense "literature of crisis" started to appear during this time. Among these were the works of a major historian, Christopher Dawson, who would exercise a considerable influence on the young Bernard Lonergan. Dawson wrote:

Western civilization today is passing through one of the most critical moments in its history. In every department of life traditional principles have been

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2Komonchak, 160.

3Ibid., 161.
shaken and discredited, and we do not yet know what is going to take their place.  

The Church's Response

Komonchak asserts that this time of international crisis "coincided with the pontificate of a remarkable man, Pope Pius XI (1922-39)." Pius XI, claims Komonchak, was driven by a "grand vision:"

Pius XI set out a grand vision of a Catholic solution to the great crisis of modern civilization. It would represent a third alternative to the discredited alternatives of a liberalism that was so individualistic that it could not ground a common culture and a collectivism that left no room for the person.  

Komonchak suggests that the emergence of this attitude to the modern world had been overdue in the Catholic Church. In some ways, he states, the modern world and Catholicism had defined themselves in opposition to each other for centuries. Komonchak does point out that the vision of Pius XI was in direct continuity with that of Leo XIII whose pontificate was at the end of the previous century. Intervening popes, however, had not maintained the open disposition of that pontiff.

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5Ibid.

6Ibid., 162.

7Ibid., 168.

8Ibid., 164-5.
Komonchak asserts that the great symbol of Pius XI's vision was his instituting of the feast of "Christ the King" in 1925. This feast was to be celebrated yearly in the Catholic Church. It was intended to "draw attention to the evils which secularism has brought upon society in drawing men away from Christ and will do much to remedy them." Komonchak adds that "to these grand articulations of principle corresponded a new movement of practical Christian engagement." This movement was "Catholic Action." It had begun in Belgium in 1924 and had received enthusiastic support in Pius XI's very first encyclical. It quickly spread to other countries. In a certain sense "Catholic Action" came to characterize the Catholic Church under the pontificate of Pius XI. Komonchak stresses that "these movements of popular lay engagement were outwardly directed; they were ... apostolic movements engaged in the various circumstances of the modern world in order to save them by winning them back to Christ."

91. Encyclical Quas primas, quoted in Komonchak, 164.
2. To a reader of today such pronouncements could seem to be an appeal for a return to a medieval Christendom where the Church would wield direct political power. Komonchak stresses that this was not the intention of Pius XI. As evidence of this, Komonchak points to the condemnation Pius XI made of the "integral nationalism" of the movement Action francaise led by Maurras. Pius XI emphasised that he was calling for a "New Christendom" that appealed most of all to the "conscience and commitments" of citizens. Komonchak, 167.

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 164.
Turning to the manuscripts of File 713, Komonchak identifies passages where Lonergan directly associates himself with the project of Pius XI. Lonergan writes of the "regrettable antimony between a merely traditional mentality and a mentality that is thinking in terms of the future":

Thus it is in a theory of social order, in the re-establishment of all things in Christ, in the leadership of Christ, King of the historical process, Prime Mover of the new order, that Pope Pius XI has laid the foundations for a triumph over an old, inevitable, and regrettable antimony. For it is only in the philosophy of the Church that can be attained the realization of that conception which Plato could not realise [sic].

Komonchak does not mention another passage from one of the documents that makes a similar point. Lonergan explains his whole theory of history to be a "metaphysic of Catholic Action."

The Revival of Catholic Thought

If the vision of Pius XI had immediate effects on popular Roman Catholicism its effect on theological scholarship was perhaps even more remarkable. Komonchak describes Pius XI's leadership resulting in "a veritable explosion of Catholic thought in the late 1920's and throughout the 1930's."

Komonchak stresses that only a few years earlier Catholic

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13 Ibid., 171.
14 Ibid., quoting from unpublished File 713 manuscript "Philosophy of History."
16 Komonchak, 167.
thinkers had been slow to publish anything that involved innovative thinking for fear of being interpreted by the Vatican as modernist. It was remarkable, then, to recognize what a flourishing occurred as soon as Pius XI seemed to offer some encouragement.\textsuperscript{17}

Komonchak next identifies some of the major thinkers of this movement. He gives pride of place to M. -D. Chenu, "a formidable thomist scholar."\textsuperscript{18} He reports that Chenu established a school of Thomistic studies where Aquinas would be studied with the full rigor of modern exegetical and historiographic methods. At the same time, the thought of Aquinas was to be employed in an encounter with modern questions of society and culture:

The intellectual courage of Aquinas and the evangelical creativity of the mendicant orders became models of what the church most needed to display in the face of twentieth-century challenges. He [Chenu] began to propose a notion of theology which, with complete theological strictness, recognized the church's life in the world as a "locus theologicus."\textsuperscript{19}

Komonchak also mentions a notable student of Chenu, Yves Congar. Congar performed a valuable study of the reasons for unbelief in contemporary France.\textsuperscript{20} Finally, Komonchak notes the importance of the work of a friend of Congar, Henri de Lubac. De Lubac undertook a sustained study of the central Christian dogmas of sin and redemption, of Christology and ecclesiology, of

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\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., 166, 167.
\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., 168.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20}Ibid.
sacraments and eschatology. Komonchak summarizes the perspective of de Lubac as affirming that "it was a betrayal of the integration that defines Catholicism to restrict it to a private, interior sphere: the central dogmas had social implications."^{22}

Komonchak stresses that the renewal of Catholic thought began to occur in many areas. He asserts: "By the end of the decade almost all of the movements to which the achievements of Vatican II are often traced were already under-way."^{22} He understands such movements to include: "the biblical renewal, the liturgical revival, historical studies, especially in the Fathers and in medieval thought, the ecumenical movement, the rise of the laity, the rethinking of church-world relations, etc."^{23}

This great diversity of renewing scholarship in the Church raises the question as to where exactly we should understand the young Bernard Lonergan finding his place. To this more specific question we need now to turn.

Lonergan As Transcendental Thomist

A first point to note is that Bernard Lonergan was one of nature's philosophers. We might state this in another fashion by asserting that, much as his interests were social and theological, Lonergan would always feel compelled to approach these questions from a position of deeply thought-out

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^{21}Ibid., 169.

^{22}Ibid.

^{23}Komonchak, 169.
foundations. The following quotation is one of my personal favourites from this thinker’s writings:

The disputed question is the crucial experiment of a philosophic system; you have to explain everything except what you can prove to admit no explanation; otherwise you are not a philosopher or your system is inadequate. But this, the presupposition of all argument, is precisely what 99% of the people you would argue with neither grasp nor grant. They simply do not take philosophy seriously, they do not consider whether arguments are valid or not but simply what they prove, and when they prove what seems to them the wrong thing then you are a Bolshevist in character and a heretic in mentality.24

Of particular note in this quotation is Lonergan’s desire for a starting point for reflection that does not, itself, need to be further reflected upon. This, of course, raises questions of epistemology.

In the area of epistemology, as in so many others, there were new ideas emerging in Catholic journals and doctoral theses. It was a deep principle of Roman Catholic thought to look to Thomas Aquinas as a mentor on questions both philosophical and theological.25 Thus it was that the new ideas on epistemology emerging in Catholic circles in the 1930’s focused, to a large extent, on reinterpreting the writings of Thomas Aquinas.

A very prominent Thomist philosopher of this era was Joseph Maréchal. Richard Liddy states that "Maréchal felt that the basic


25In Insight, Lonergan refers to how Pope Leo XIII encouraged a revival of interest in Thomist studies. The Pope’s dictum vetera novis augere et perficere [to add to and perfect the old with the new] became a personal motto of Lonergan (768).
The thrust of Aquinas' thought could successfully complete the 'transcendental turn to the subject' in modern philosophy initiated by Immanuel Kant.²⁶ Maréchal is thus associated with a school of philosophy called "transcendental Thomism." As we shall see, Lonergan acknowledged the considerable influence of Maréchal's thought on his own. Thus, as we consider Lonergan's place within the generalised renewal of Catholic thought in the 1930's we can place him, broadly, with the "transcendental Thomists."²⁷

²⁶Liddy, 101.

²⁷Lonergan somewhat reluctantly accepts such a label in Caring About Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan, Thomas More Institute Papers, no.82., ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, and Cathleen Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982), 68. Michael Vertin comments on the origin of the term "Transcendental Thomist" and to what extent Lonergan's thought fits into it. He notes that the term was coined by Joseph Donceel in an article written in 1966. Donceel conducts a nuanced discussion of how this label applies to various authors. In Vertin's opinion, Donceel correctly notes that Lonergan's thought lies in less direct continuity with that of Maréchal than does that of writers such as Karl Rahner and Emerich Coreth (Michael Vertin, "The Phenomenology of Knowing," Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, ed., Matthew Lamb [Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981], 412, n. 2.). Vertin's view is that Lonergan's thought advances on that of Maréchal to a greater extent than these other thinkers. In a letter to his superior in 1935 Lonergan asserts: "the whole difficulty is to grasp Maréchal's point not in the abstract but in the concrete; because Fr Maréchal is utterly in the abstract he is not understood" ("Letter to Fr. Keane," January 22 1935, 4). Lonergan's manner of being more concrete is to ground conclusions that are similar to those of Maréchal more firmly in the facts of human conscious intentionality that we can affirm for ourselves and that consequently "you can prove to admit no explanation" (ibid.).
Lonergan's Epistemology

When we begin our examination of the manuscripts of File 713 we will recognize how crucial to his theory of history is Lonergan's basic position on epistemology. For this reason, then, I want to attend more explicitly to the question of Lonergan's basic philosophic stance before proceeding with our discussion of the documents studied by Michael Shute.

There is one insight of central importance to his future work that Lonergan received from other current thinkers. It was the insight that "knowledge is discursive." Lonergan would later give most of the credit for this insight to the indirect influence of Joseph Maréchal. He asserts that an acquaintance with the original works of this author was mediated to him by a fellow student, named Stephanos Stephanou:

It was through Stephanou by some process of osmosis, rather than struggling with the five great Cahiers, [of Maréchal] that I learnt to speak of human knowledge as not intuitive but discursive with the decisive component in judgment.\(^2\)

In addition to the influence of Maréchal, Richard Liddy points out that in the question of understanding intellect as discursive, Lonergan was also much influenced by reading works of some lesser known scholars of Aquinas. In this respect Peter Hoenen and Leo W. Keeler are of particular note.

The influence of these less famous thinkers was direct

rather than indirect. Consequently, it is easier to identify and document. Thus, it is at least of pedagogical value to chart what Lonergan seems to have learnt from these sources. I will first outline the main insights they offered to the young Lonergan and then attempt to explain how such a theory of intellect can be deemed "discursive." An important additional step in this section will be to stress how Lonergan understood the will to be "moved" by such a discursive intellect.

Hoenen on Understanding

In the early months of his studies in Rome Lonergan read a significant article by Peter Hoenen in the journal Gregorianum. Lonergan would later claim to have been be "much struck" by it. Hoenen asserts that Aquinas correctly interpreted Aristotle regarding one of the most basic acts of the intelligent person. Hoenen understands Aristotle to hold that the act of insight involves the grasping of intelligible relations in the phantasm. Hoenen believes that Aristotle was correct in this assertion. He also believes that most scholars of Aquinas have misunderstood this point.

Hoenen proceeds to note that Aquinas consequently affirms

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29 Before proceeding to outline the thinkers who influenced Lonergan we should be clear that Lonergan did also think through a lot for himself. Much as he was helped by the following thinkers, he would also have a number of criticisms of them. See Caring About Meaning, 68-71. Lonergan usually found these authors remaining with too metaphysical a frame of thinking and not sufficiently one of introspective psychology.

30 Caring About Meaning, 266-7.
that a first aspect of cognitive activity is comprised of "experience, phantasm or imagination." A second aspect then consists of "agent intellect" stimulating a "grasping or understanding of relationships in the phantasm." Subsequent to the event of insight, an individual will "express" her understanding in terms of a definition or a concept.31

Keeler on Judgment

Hoennen helped Lonergan recognize that intellectual activity involves a development through certain specific stages. However, Lonergan recognised that Hoennen's article was not completely adequate as an account of the process of coming to know. We now need to take account of the influence of one of Lonergan's professors in helping him to appreciate how intellectual inquiry comes to term in an act of affirmation, or judgment.

Richard Liddy remarks that Lonergan was recognised as a gifted student as soon as he arrived for his theology studies in Rome. In his first year there, he was invited to write a review in Gregorianum of the recently completed doctoral thesis of one of his professors, Leo W. Keeler.32 A key point made by Keeler is that everyone accepts that some insights are correct and others erroneous. This raises the question of how it is that we judge the truth or falsity of insights. Keeler claims that Aquinas is very aware of this question. Keeler then insists that

31Liddy, 96.
32Ibid.
Aquinas proposes the existence of another dimension of intellectual activity beyond understanding. This additional dimension permits us to affirm the truth or falsity of our insights. Lonergan states of Keeler's work:

He especially tries to show that for St. Thomas the apprehension of a nexus is one thing, that the act of assent is another; the former dwelling in the purely intelligible world, the latter affirming the objective existence of the intellectual content.\[33\]

**Intellect As Discursive**

On the basis of the above accounts, we can assert that Lonergan as an undergraduate theologian was already in possession of the fundamentals of the epistemology he will develop in his later years. To use the vocabulary of *Insight*, Lonergan is already beginning to recognize intellectual activity as comprised of the levels of "experience," "understanding" and "judgment."\[14\]

Lonergan will regularly refer to such a notion of intellectual activity as "discursive." A discursive notion of intellect stresses that the individual arrives at sure knowledge, especially clearly conceptualised knowledge, only through a series of stages. The analogy of a discussion between two

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\[33\] Lonergan, "Keeler Review," Quoted in Liddy, 98.

\[14\] We can speak of this epistemology already being emergent in Lonergan's thought at this time. However, we should not think that Lonergan already had formulated the mature epistemology that will appear in *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*. We will note that the epistemology that is the basis of the manuscripts of File 713 does not clearly distinguish between insight and judgment.
individuals is appropriate to explain the stages through which an intelligent person has to pass. We can conceive of such a discussion occurring, above all, as a series of questions and answers. The intelligent person must first intend an object, then she must employ imagination to create a phantasm.\textsuperscript{15} Next, she considers this phantasm with the question, "What is it?" The answer that arrives to this question is the act of understanding. However, the "discussion" does not end here. Our reasonable person will experience an exigence to ask and answer the question "Is it so?" Only with the act of judgment that offers a "yes," or "no" to this question does the discursive intellect come to term. Lonergan will insist that "human knowledge is discursive and that you know when you affirm."\textsuperscript{16}

The Contrast With Conceptualism

When Lonergan speaks of intellect as discursive, he usually contrasts this position with an "intuitive" understanding of intellect. He often stated, "I was taught philosophy on an

\textsuperscript{15}In this dissertation I will tend to alternate pronouns "she" and "he." I do this to avoid having to repeatedly use the cumbersome "he or she." My concern, here, is to avoid employing gender exclusive language. Many of my quotations from Lonergan will employ such language. Being a person of his time in this respect, Lonergan's bias on this issue does reveal itself. If he is offering examples from public life, especially the world of the scientist, he invariably uses the pronoun "he." When taking examples from the realm of common sense and intersubjectivity he often uses "she." By way of balancing this, I will tend to favour the pronoun "she" in most of my examples.

intuitive basis." It can help our understanding of Lonergan's epistemological position to understand something of the contradiction it represented to the prevailing philosophical positions of conventional Roman Catholicism.

In a letter written to his religious superior in 1935, the young Lonergan states his radical belief that "the current interpretation of St. Thomas is a consistent misinterpretation." Lonergan will attribute to Peter Hoenen the credit for bringing this insight into discussion in Catholic circles. According to Hoenen, the source of this error in Catholic thought is that current Thomists worked within a tradition of reading Aquinas that misunderstood him. These interpreters understood Aquinas to hold a position that was in fact held by Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308). Hoenen claims that, unlike Scotus, Aquinas had an accurate understanding of the act of knowing. He adds that Scotus was profoundly in error. Consequently, to misread Thomas as holding a Scotist position was to make a great mistake indeed.

Hoenen explains that Scotus claims that the intellectual process begins with a kind of "taking a good look" at a thing and making some kind of direct "intuition" of concepts. So it is that

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Ibid.


Liddy, 95.

Ibid., 91.
much of the remainder of intellectual activity, then, consists of identifying the interrelationship of various concepts. Lonergan sees much of this relating of concepts to each other as a waste of time. The much more important question is how we arrive at concepts in the first place. In the 1940's Lonergan will write articulately of the insight he gained from Hoenen regarding the mistake of Scotus:

Scotus posits concepts first, then the apprehension of nexus between concepts.... The Scotist rejection of insight into phantasm necessarily reduced the act of understanding to seeing a nexus between concepts; hence, while for Aquinas understanding precedes conceptualization which is rational, for Scotus, understanding is preceded by conceptualization which is a matter of metaphysical mechanics.

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1 In *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), Lonergan becomes positively sarcastic regarding the speculative inclinations of conceptualist Thomists. He asserts, for example:

The determination of their meaning [Aquinas's writings]... is enormously complicated... for those who approach Aquinas through manuals and commentaries quite innocent of the methods of literary and historical research, by such interpreters' proclivity to smooth out linguistic oddities by giving free rein to their talent for speculative invention. The third chapter [of Verbum] is an effort to cut through this jungle (Lonergan, *Verbum*, xiv).

We may perhaps be permitted [in making an assertion that contradicts a conceptualist interpretation]... to present our daring hypothesis that perhaps Aquinas meant what he said (Ibid., 130-1).

There is one final stage of the intellect as discursive that must now be emphasised. We have taken note of how intellectual activity comes to term in judgment. We must now note that this same drive which motivates the intellect, extends beyond it to move the will. Lonergan will make much use of this principle in his theory of history. He will quote Aquinas speaking of "appetitus rationalis sequens formam intellectus" (the rational appetite following the form of the intellect). He will paraphrase this statement as "rational appetite can be moved only by the good that reason pronounces to be good."^43

I commented earlier on how difficult it is to trace exactly where Lonergan exhibits the influence of Joseph Maréchal. While he acknowledges a strong influence, he states that it occurred "by osmosis." However, if we can speculate as to where the influence is most evident, we might assert that it is with respect to what Lonergan asserts regarding the influence on the will. It is very much a Maréchalian emphasis to assert the unitary finality of the human spirit. Maréchal was very concerned, not just with the functioning of intelligence, but with intelligent action. For Maréchal, the distinction of intellect and will is best understood as a kind of retrospective distinction within this unitary finality.^44

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^43Lonergan, *Verbum*, 201, adverted to in Shute, 79.

However, even if we acknowledge an indebtedness on the part of Lonergan to Maréchal, we have to also recognize how Lonergan developed this point in an original manner. In Chapter 2 I will outline in some detail Lonergan’s understanding of the interaction of intellect and will. It is a complex interaction. For the present, I want simply to make two points. The first is that Lonergan finds a very good account of this relationship in Aquinas—an account that most interpreters of Aquinas have failed to understand. Secondly, while Lonergan only publishes an account of this relationship after 1946, there is evidence that he had already grasped the essentials of this account in 1935.⁴⁵

⁴⁵On this question Fr Frederick Crowe and I seem to have made a discovery. The explanation of it is somewhat complex.

One of Lonergan's more elaborate accounts of the interaction of intellect and will occurs in a series of articles: "The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas." Theological Studies 7 (1946): 349-392; 8 (1947): 35-79, 404-44. 10 (1949), 3-40, 359-393. I have already offered a reference to this work its book form published as: Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. A key point about what Lonergan asserts about the relationship of intellect and will is that Aquinas develops his understanding of this point because he wants to find an analogy in human operating for the procession of the Holy Spirit. In the introduction to the first of the Verbum articles Lonergan notes that a prominent theologian, Cardinal Billot, claimed that he could not find such a basis for an analogy in the writings of any theologian. Lonergan introduces the Verbum articles as an attempt to demonstrate to Cardinal Billot that Aquinas has in fact provided just what he is looking for.

Now, what Fr. Crowe and I discovered is this: in his "Letter to Fr. Keane" (January 22 1935, copy in Lonergan Research Institute), Lonergan writes a marginal note:

As to 'will': I establish from introspective psychology that the 'will' is what Cardinal Billot wants the will to be to provide him with an analogy for the Trinity. I prove what he asserts, (illegible word (p. 5). This would seem to indicate that as early as 1935 Lonergan had some of the key insights that would only find published form eleven years later.
Introducing the Documents of File 713

The contents of "File 713 - 'History'" were both discovered and catalogued by John Hochban, a Jesuit who worked in the Lonergan Research Institute in the 1980's. Hochban catalogued twelve separate items. These ranged from a title page of an essay that is not in the file to a document of thirty-five pages. In researching the contents of this file, Michael Shute first eliminates a few of these items as not especially relevant. Next, he comments on the fact that the date of authorship of these documents is by no means clear in all cases. Shute therefore proceeds to attempt a dating of some of them on the basis of the state of development of certain ideas in each document.\(^4^6\)

It is one of the achievements of Michael Shute to convincingly argue for a division of these documents into two "batches," each containing four manuscripts.\(^4^7\) He suggests that Batch A was written between 1933 and 1936. This places its manuscripts as written during the course of Lonergan's undergraduate studies in theology in Rome. The theme that unites Batch A is primarily that of "a theory of human solidarity relevant to a theology of the Mystical Body of Christ."\(^4^8\) In this theme, we can recognize the echo of Pius XI's concern with "Christ the King". A particular stress of Lonergan, however, was that developing a theory of history is central to this argument.

\(^{46}\)Shute, 64.

\(^{47}\)Shute, 65-6.

\(^{48}\)Shute, 65.
Shute lists the four manuscripts of this batch and notes the abbreviations by which he will refer to them. They are:


Shute proceeds to assert that Batch B seems to have been written in the period 1937-8 during Lonergan's "Tertianship" in France. The theme of Batch B more explicitly addresses the question of a theory of history. However, here again it is clear that Lonergan desires to apply such a theory back to a theology of the Mystical Body. The first of the documents of Batch B is "A Theory of History" [TH]. The next three documents all employ the term "Analytic Conception of History" [OACH, ACH(1), ACH(2)]. They may well be different drafts of the same paper and Shute considers them together.

I have outlined the basic structure of the content of the

49 Shute, 64-6. In naming the manuscript PA(2) as I do I correct what I take to be a misprint on Shute, 64.

50 Tertianship is a "spiritual year" of further formation that Jesuits undergo after ordination.

51 Ibid., 121-2.

2. Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies published what Shute abbreviates as ACH(2). When Shute quotes from this manuscript he gives page references from the original manuscript. When offering secondary page reference through Shute to this manuscript, I shall maintain these page references. However when making my own quotations from the document I shall refer to the version published in Method: Journal. I shall clearly indicate when I quote from this later source.
"File 713 - History." It is now time, with the help of the work of Michael Shute, to discuss the thematic content of these documents.

**Fundamentals of a Philosophy of History**

Our present task is to turn to the all-important question of the actual content of the manuscripts of File 713. However, before quite doing this, I want to indicate why I have taken so many pages to arrive at this point. Let us recall Lonergan's belief, quoted above, that philosophical argument requires that "you have to explain everything except what you can prove to admit no explanation." Lonergan believes that, ultimately, the only thing that needs no explanation is that we are knowers and doers. Thus it is his theory of intellect, will, and human action that is the secure footing upon which all further argument will rest.

My discussion of the documents of Batch A and B will not be one that takes them in chronological order. Rather, I will selectively outline the main themes covered. Only with respect to some particularly important themes will I comment on how Lonergan's thinking develops between Batch A and Batch B. I will first outline why Lonergan considers it so important to develop a philosophy of history. I will next outline how Lonergan develops his discursive notion of intellect to a "theory of human solidarity." On these foundations, I will outline the three basic

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components of the theory of history proposed by Lonergan. As we shall see, these components primarily involve notions of "dialectic," and "approximations."

The Need for a Philosophy of History

Lonergan makes repeated reference to his concern with "why the twentieth century is in such a mess." He speaks of liberalism and communism as powers "for the destruction of civilization." He then proceeds to claim that a philosopher can contribute to the cause of the survival of civilisation. His basic point is that societies and their leaders will not know how to improve their lot unless they have a broad notion of what constitutes the aim of human history. It is the task of the philosopher to provide such an analysis.

Lonergan asserts that the philosopher must provide this generalised "metaphysic" of history:

What is needed is a metaphysic of history, a differential calculus of progress.

54 Eg. PH., 98.
55 Ibid., 95.

56 In fact, we could better assert that it is the theologian that can best articulate an adequate theory of history. Only the theologian can adequately explain the nature of renaissance. In File 713 we notice a fluidity in Lonergan's terminology. This reflects the manner in which his thought was still emerging. I will take note of this problem again when I discuss Insight in Parts II and III of this dissertation. In Chapter 3 I shall comment on how this requires that an interpreter of Lonergan's thought of this period occasionally make decisions regarding vocabulary that are more systematic than Lonergan's own.

57 PH., 99, quoted in Shute, 78.
This metaphor of differential calculus is significant. Lonergan notes how much of natural science involves the application of mathematics to natural phenomena. Furthermore, the kind of mathematics relevant to phenomena undergoing change is differential calculus. He speaks of an "analytic concept of history." We will find that an "analytic concept" is really just the general case of which differential calculus is a specific instance.

An "Analytic Concept of History"

If we are to appreciate Lonergan's notion of an analytic concept, we must distinguish between acts of understanding that are "synthetic" and those that are "analytic." We have studied Lonergan's notion of intellect as discursive. We have noted Peter Hoenen's claims that insight occurs after the inquiring individual "attends to a phantasm." Normally, such a phantasm would be occasioned by our attending to a concrete thing or situation. Lonergan calls the kind of insight that occurs in such a situation a "synthetic" act of understanding. He asserts that synthetic acts of understanding "are those which proceed from a many that is concrete and particular."58

Now, Lonergan asserts that the human mind is capable of another kind of act of understanding. He calls such acts "analytic acts of understanding." These "proceed from a many that

58Shute, 132.
is abstract.\footnote{59} One example of such a proceeding would be how a scientist approaches specific tasks with a knowledge of the concepts of differential calculus. Lonergan offers a specific example of how necessary it is for a student engineer to be kept from responsibility for such activities as laying a drain or erecting a hotel until he has an adequate knowledge of the "principles of engineering."\footnote{60}

An analytic concept of history would need to identify the constant structures of history. An acquaintance with such broad categories could be applied to understand any given historical situation:

The analytic conception of history is . . . analytic because it proceeds from abstract terms to the categories of historical events, rather than from historical events to abstract categories.\footnote{61}

We can recall that a particular characteristic of human action is the freedom the will has to accept or reject the dictates of intelligence. This leads us to recognize a particular characteristic of an analytic conception of history is that it would be normative. It need not speak of the future only in terms of what will probably be. It can also speak of what should be.\footnote{62}

\footnote{59}Ibid.

\footnote{60}TH., 3, adverted to in Shute, 125.

\footnote{61}Shute, 133.

\footnote{62}Continuing Lonergan's example, we can assert that the principles of engineering are not normative in this sense. They involve the application of mathematical principles to natural phenomena. Calculating how strong a bridge needs to be to withstand anticipated strains is a task that seeks to predict fact. Understanding what new law needs to be passed to redress a social
We will now seek to outline the basic components of the analytic concept of history that Lonergan does propose. However, we must first outline how Lonergan develops his theory of intellect as discursive so as to constitute a theory of human solidarity. It is only when he can thus speak rigorously of the human species as a whole that we can identify the fundamental categories of how its history unfolds.

The Causes of Human Action

In PH, Lonergan asserts that "we define the philosophy of history as a pure theory of external human action." Such action is not just of the individual but of humanity as a whole. Lonergan next turns to the philosophical categories of Aristotle and Aquinas in order to further analyze human action. He speaks of human action as a function of three causes: material, formal and efficient. As we examine Lonergan's statements regarding these causes, we recognize that his very metaphysical vocabulary is, in fact, grounded in the kind of introspective psychology that Lonergan was encountering in thinkers such as Hoenen, Keeler and Maréchal. Shute outlines Lonergan's account as follows:

In Lonergan's account, human action is a function of three causes: material, formal, and efficient. Materially, it is the flow of change "sensible in consciousness, physical in the subconscious and the external world." Formally, it is the emergence of intellectual forms with respect to the material flow. evil is more the task of a philosopher of history. There is a normative dimension that is intrinsic to this that is not present in the work of an engineer.
Efficiently, it is the effective control of the will.

Let us look more closely at how these three causes relate to the notion Lonergan was developing of intellect as discursive. First, the distinction between material and formal cause seems to be a direct echo of Hoenen’s work on how understanding involves an abstraction from phantasm. Secondly, we can note that formal cause, as here stated, appears to collapse both functions of insight and judgment. Thirdly and finally, we can recognize in Lonergan’s statement of the relationship of formal and efficient cause the position on the relationship of intellect and will to which we adverted above. The discursive intellect, which comes to term in judgment, proceeds to move the will.

Of course, the sinner refuses to let his will and consequent behaviour to be moved by rational understanding. Lonergan speaks of the development of personality in terms of such correspondence of intellect and will. Shute states Lonergan’s position thus:

Insofar as a person accepts the intellectual forms (here meaning effective assent to the true and consent to the good) he attains the proper end, the energia (energy-power) of his personality. If the person fails to accept, and effectively implement, the intelligible dictate he is merely pre-determined by the physical flow. Sin is this failure, for “sin is the failure to obey reason.”

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63 Shute, 79, based on PH., 95.

64 Shute, 80. based on PH., 96.
A Theory of Human Solidarity

Up to this point, we have been focusing on the actions of an individual. Lonergan is now ready to develop his theory of the action of humanity as a whole. He therefore adds to his theory of intellect and will a theory of human solidarity. Paraphrasing the above question, we can assert that most fundamentally it is the species as a whole that succeeds or fails in realising the energia of its personality.

Lonergan first points out that when an individual acts she will normally influence her physical and social environment. He next makes a point of paramount importance for his theory of history. Human thought and action do not, as it were, "come out of the blue." Even if human thought and action will influence its environment, it is itself influenced by its environment in the first place.

To explain this point further, we need to explain the use Lonergan makes of Aquinas' notion of "pre-motion." As with the theory of causality, this notion has Aristotelian and Thomistic origins. Lonergan begins his explanation by quoting from Aquinas:

Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur [whatever is moved is moved by something else.] This is easily demonstrated. For if anything changed without reference to something else, then it would be from every point of view the sole sufficient reason for its change. If it were the sole sufficient reason of its change, then there would be no change now but the thing would always have been what it now is becoming.

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65Ibid.

66PH., 97, partially quoted in Shute, 81.
Lonergan applies the notion of pre-motion to further analyze human intellect, will and action. He first comments on the phantasms available to individual intellects. He claims that these are pre-determined by one's environment:

What you can think about depends upon external experience. What you think about it depends upon the mentality you have imbibed from an environment of home, school, university, and the general influence of others. 67

An Eskimo cannot think of watering his camel because he has not one. 68

As we have noted above, Lonergan is concerned with more than just thinking. He seeks a theory that also encompasses human willing and acting. In the case of the individual, we have already discussed how intellect "moves" the will. We noted Lonergan's paraphrase of Aquinas: "rational appetite can be moved only by the good that reason pronounces to be good." 69

We have also commented on the existence of sin that is "the failure to obey reason." Just as a theory of pre-motion enables Lonergan to place his theory of intellect on a social footing, so also it permits him to do the same for his theory of human willing and action.

Lonergan speaks of the "statistical law" by which individuals of a given era will tend to will the good or to

67PH., 96.

68TH., 2, quoted in Shute, 124.

69Lonergan, Verbum, 201, Adverted to in Shute, 79.
renege on this responsibility. Thus, even though each individual is free with respect to moral choices, one can nevertheless discuss how intellect tends to move will in the aggregate of human populations. Lonergan goes as far as to state that the moral achievements of one era constitute a "pre-movement" for the next:

These human elections, though free, are strictly subordinate to a statistical law. Men turn out in ever much the same proportion of good, indifferent and bad. What differentiates one social epoch from another does not lie in the individual wills of the time but in the upper and lower limits set [sic] these wills by the previous age. No man can be better than he knows how and no man can be worse than his temptations and opportunities."

So it is that Lonergan is able to explain that the knowing and willing of any individual is intimately related to her environment. Lonergan establishes this by adding to his theory of intellect and will a further notion taken from Aquinas. As Michael Shute asserts, "the argument from pre-motion establishes the link between the unity of human nature and the solidarity of human action." Lonergan is now able to speak not only of human

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70 Patrick Byrne will place great stress on the significance for Lonergan's later thought of his employing categories of statistical science in his notion of the will. ("The Thomistic Sources of Lonergan's World View" The Thomist 46 [1982]: 108-145.) Shute, however, comments that Byrne is unaware that Lonergan began to employ such concepts before his doctoral thesis. (Shute, 81, note 43). Here again, as with Lonergan's reference to Cardinal Billot discussed above, we recognize that Lonergan's thinking in the 1930's on the relationship of intellect and will was more developed than has been appreciated by Lonergan scholars.

71 PH., 98.

72 Shute, 81.
individuals but of the species as a whole:

Human achievement or progress is not that of individuals but of the species. . . . If progress [in society] is understood to be a matter of intelligence then it is properly understood only within the context of the solidarity of the species. Lonergan points out: "The individual genius is but the instrument of the race in its expansion." 71

Components of an Analytic Concept of History

We have now outlined the fundamentals of Lonergan's philosophy of history. It remains for us to identify the particulars of how he understands the analytic concept that can explain the process of history. By Lonergan's own measure, it will be by the truth of these general categories that his philosophy of history will stand or fall.

Michael Shute traces a considerable development in Lonergan's thinking on the question of the components of an analytic concept of history is articulated in the various documents. Tracing this development makes for fascinating reading. In Batch A we can recognize many similarities with the kind of commentary on history that Komonchak describes as typical of the era presided over by Pope Pius XI. By Batch B, we recognize themes that are more characteristically Lonerganian. Above all, we recognize explicit efforts on the part of Lonergan to refine his understanding of the components of an analytic concept of history. After studying this development, it is easy to agree with Shute when he concludes that "despite the fact that

71Ibid., 84, quoting PH., 100.
the manuscripts are but sketches, it is clear that Lonergan had developed something of permanent significance."

However, interesting as it can be to study the development of Lonergan's thought in these documents, I have already mentioned that it is not my intention to do this. My main object in discussing the documents of File 713 is to give a synthesised outline of Lonergan's conclusions. I will thus identify the two main components of Lonergan's theory of the analytic concept of history: "dialectic," and "the three approximations to the flow of history."

Dialectic

In the course of writing the essays of Batch A and Batch B, Lonergan refines a notion of dialectic as relevant to developing the "differential calculus of history" he deems so necessary. As with so many other dimensions of his thought, Lonergan finds a root for this idea in the work of Thomas Aquinas.

We have outlined how Lonergan understands intellectual activity to be discursive. We have also commented on how a process of knowing often comes to term in action stemming from an act of will. Lonergan adds an obvious point to this analysis. He asserts that any act of knowing is an incomplete act. Our insight is into experience. We do not experience all that there is to experience at any one time. Therefore our acts of knowing are partial. Likewise, actions that stem from our knowing are always

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74Ibid., 159.
limited in scope. A consequence of this is that as soon as we complete one act of knowing and acting, we usually begin on another.

Using Thomistic vocabulary, Lonergan asserts that we can posit the existence of a "perfect act" of knowledge where the answer to all possible questions has been attained. However, he adds that the reality of human existence is that we are forever "on the way" to such perfect knowledge. As a next step, Lonergan reminds us of the reality of human solidarity. If humans are to make incremental progress towards the "perfect act" of knowledge it is not as individuals they will do so but as a species.

Speaking of the "form of human thought itself", Lonergan asserts:

As St. Thomas remarked, it [intellectual activity] is a progress from potency to perfect act (perfect science from every viewpoint) through a series of incomplete acts. (Summa Theologiae 1, q. 85, a. 3 c.)

It is to be noted that this progress from potency through incomplete act to perfect act is to be predicated not of the individual but of humanity.\(^7\)

Now, we have already commented on how Lonergan stresses that our ideas can lead to actions and that these actions influence our social situation. Thus it is that a cyclical pattern occurs in history. New ideas create new situations, these new situations, in turn, create the conditions of possibility for yet newer ideas. At this point, Lonergan introduces his all-important notion of dialectic. A kind of two-way tension will always exist between ideas and situations:

\(^7\)PA(2) 144, taken from the version in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies (1991).
By the dialectic, then, we mean the succession (within a social channel of mutual influence) of situation, thought, action, new situation, new thought, and so forth."\(^{76}\)

This definition can fail to do justice to the sophistication of Lonergan's notion of dialectic. It can seem to imply a kind of "jerky," or "stop, start" movement. In fact, Lonergan was too well acquainted with mathematics to imagine history in such a semi-static fashion. Lonergan was clear that history will always involve a "succession or flow of events."\(^{77}\) Consequently, rather than imagine new ideas seeking to change a situation that is static, Lonergan speaks of good ideas involving "the power of

\(^{76}\)OACH., 5, quoted in Shute, 137. This quotation is taken from one of the final essays of Batch B. Shute is clear that one of the central characteristics of Batch B is that it distils a notion of dialectic as a primary component of the analytic concept of history (Shute, 157). However, there is a paradox here; it is based on the increasingly schematic nature of the later documents in File 713. I find that the best explanation of how Lonergan grounds his notion of dialectic in epistemology is found in the first essay of Batch A: "Philosophy of History." It is from this essay that I have been quoting Lonergan's account of how humans attain the energia of their personalities by "imposing the intellectual forms on the flow of change" (PH., 96). Dialectic gets only a passing mention in this document. However, I find that references to it are illuminating. Lonergan asserts that the influence of intelligence on history will necessarily be in cycles. These cycles are to be understood as a dialectical process. In the following quotation, we recognize a clear association of cycles and dialectic (the distinction of dialectic of fact and dialectic of thought will recede in later documents. The substantial point is preserved in what he later calls "stages" of history):

While the ancient cycle was a dialectic of fact, the modern cycle was a dialectic of thought: these differ in that the dialectic of fact has its first motion in material needs (socialist agriculture, empire, democracy, more empire) the dialectic of thought has its first motion from thought (canon law, monarchy, philosophy from theology, applied science from theoretical science) (PH., 111).

\(^{77}\)Shute, 40.
imposing the intellectual forms upon the flow of change."^78

So it is that Lonergan recognises that the dialectical nature of history involves differing rates of flow of change. Now, a scientist would seldom be happy with simply identifying a problem as concerning changing rates of flow. Her normal procedure will be to specify these rates of flow more exactly. She will specify "differentials" by such activities as comparing rates of change with each other. Particular ratios of rates of change will come to characterize particular phenomena. Analogously, Lonergan will seek to say more about the "differentials" that constitute this relationship between ideas and situation in history.

Three Approximations

I have commented on how Lonergan achieves increased clarity in the course of writing the documents of File 713. Above all, his clarity involves refining his notion of the components of an analytic concept of history. We have noted the profound influence that Aquinas' notion of discursive intellect has on Lonergan's notion of dialectic. When he turns to specify the differentials of this dialectic, Lonergan relies less on Aquinas and more on the exemplary figure of modern science, Isaac Newton.

Lonergan's notion of the differentials relevant to a theory of history is inspired by Newton's three laws of motion. He adverts to how Newton applied this "analytic concept" to the

^78PH., 96, adverted to in Shute, 79.
specific problem of explaining planetary motion. Newton makes an "approximation" to an explanation of the movement of the planets by applying, in turn, each of his three laws of motion. His first approximation involves the law that bodies move with constant velocity in a straight line unless another force intervenes. The second approximation treats of how the gravitational force of the sun on the planets constitutes just such an intervening force. The third approximation treats of how the planets also exert a gravitational influence on each other. 79

Each of Newton's approximations describes an "ideal construct" that is never observed in the actual situation. Taken together, however, these constructs adequately explain what is observed in planetary movement. Inspired by Newton, Lonergan proposes three idealised constructs that together explain the movement of history. They are "progress," "decline," and "renaissance."

Progress By Stages

We are already familiar with Lonergan's notions of progress and decline. What I have not commented on before is how such notions can take on a very precise meaning as differentials within a dialectical process in history. Lonergan asserts that progress "is a matter of intellect." 80 Obviously, to speak of "progress" is to hypothesize regarding an "ideal line" in the

79Shute, 139. Based on ACH(2), 8.

80PH., 99, quoted in Shute, 83.
flow of history. In best Lonerganian fashion, we can assert that the point of reference for studying the ideal line of history is the ideal line on development in the individual of her powers of intellect and will. After all, Lonergan’s central principle in studying history is that "an analysis of the mind will reveal the outlines of progress."  

From this starting point, Lonergan asserts that a study of the structure of intellectual development would indicate not only a cycle of new ideas leading to new situations, but also a "series of distinct stages." I have already referred to one important moment in intellectual development. It occurs when an individual is able to experience and to employ, not only synthetic acts of understanding, but also analytic acts.

In his discussion of stages of history, Lonergan introduces the terms "spontaneous" and "reflex" with regard to acts of understanding. It seems clear that these terms have the same meaning as "synthetic" and "analytic" acts, respectively. He then

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81 I borrow this important term from Lonergan’s later work, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, 269.

82 *ACH.* 9, quoted in Shute, 140. The development of Lonergan’s notion of stages of history through the documents of File 713 is rather complex. I rely on the analysis of Michael Shute for a synthesis of Lonergan’s position. A basic insight is that a notion of stages of history declines in importance for Lonergan as he refines his analytic concept of history. We might say that in the course of the essays stages of history are in the descendant and dialectic is in the ascendant. What I report above is Lonergan’s terminal position: the question of stages of history is a sub-theme within a discussion of the approximations to the flow of history (see Shute, 131, 156-7).

83 Shute, 140.
speaks of history being divided into three main stages. Shute summarises his argument:

On the basis of this division, Lonergan derives the ideal line of history consisting of three basic stages. The division is as follows: (1) spontaneous history and spontaneous thought; (2) spontaneous history and reflex thought; and (3) reflex history and reflex thought. 84

The first period covers the period from the beginning of human societies to the discoveries of philosophy and science. Lonergan understands Plato to be a thinker of seminal importance in the arrival of the second stage of history in Europe. Again, Shute summarises Lonergan's argument:

Arising out of the decline of the Greek city-state, philosophy provided the basis for a higher criticism. . . . It is with the discovery of intelligible forms that the basis for Plato's criticism . . . emerges. This discovery represents an epochal advance, "for it enabled men to express not by a symbol but by a concept the divine." Mere symbolic expression could not provide the necessary higher control needed to get beyond the cycle of rise and decline of the automatic [spontaneous/synthetic] stage. 85

It is clear that Lonergan believes that Plato recognised the need for an analytic concept of history. Lonergan is immensely impressed by Plato's statement that "Men and cities cannot have happiness unless philosophers are kings." 86 However, Lonergan adds another point: Plato "set a perfect question but utterly failed to answer it." 87 Lonergan holds that Plato's notion of

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84Ibid., 142. Based on ACH(2), 10-11.
85Ibid., 87-88, quoting PH., 106.
86PH 108.
87Ibid.
the human intellect was not adequate. As a result, Plato could never identify the true components of an analytic concept of history. Lonergan adds that partly as a result of its inherent flaws, philosophy in this era failed as social program. Thus it is that the second stage of history is characterised by attempts at a philosophy that is reflex thought in an era that in fact continues to be determined by spontaneous thought.

We do not need to say much about the third stage of history. It does not yet exist. Lonergan asserts that this stage would be governed by the kind of analytic concept of history that Lonergan himself outlines. He asserts: "The third [stage], is society dominated by consciousness of its historic mission." To engage in further discussion of the stage of meaning it is best to complete our account of the ideal line of history with accounts of decline and renaissance.

Decline

Obviously, an adequate explanation of the flow of history must add other components than a theoretically projected line of progress. Outlining Lonergan’s position Shute stresses that there also exists "a systematic deviation from the ideal line of history which Lonergan calls ‘decline.’" Lonergan distinguishes minor decline, major decline, and compound decline.  

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88ACH(2), 11.

89Ibid., 145, 146. Readers familiar with Insight will be surprised to find in the essays of File 713 an account of decline that is remarkably similar to Chapter 6 and 7 of this book.
Minor decline is well characterised by the oppression of one class by another. The oppressing class refuses to let a rational ordering of society occur because this would put at risk the material advantages it enjoys under a current social organization. If minor decline is simply the sinful behaviour of one group in society, Lonergan understands major decline, by contrast, to be the erecting of sin into a principle.\textsuperscript{90} Individuals and groups no longer merely offend against their consciences, they blunt these consciences themselves:

When they deform their consciences, sin from being [sic] the exception to the law becomes the law itself.\textsuperscript{91}

The long-term effects of major decline far outstrip even the class oppression that can be the expression of minor decline. When consciences remain intact, oppressed groups in society can reason their way into forming protest movements and force change on those who defend irrational privileges. By contrast, when the process of thinking itself is infected with decline the very tools by which decline can be reversed are sabotaged. Using an analogy from building construction Lonergan asserts, "an error in the plan is the ruin of a construction; an error in principle is the ruin of all constructions."\textsuperscript{92}

Lonergan asserts that both kinds of decline will usually be published some twenty years later.

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid., 147.

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., summarizing ACH(2), 13.

\textsuperscript{92}OACH, 12.
found together. This he calls compound decline. In compound decline, Lonergan asserts, the two kinds of decline "accelerate" each other. Oppressive groups can easily encourage the flawed thinking of major decline to serve their own interest. Likewise, an environment of deformed reasoning and consciences will offer little by way of constraint to groups wishing to rise to a position of unjustified advantage.

Now, Lonergan is not claiming that any one unjust social system will necessarily survive for a long time. Rather, there is likely to be a "succession of lower syntheses." Writing on the eve of the Second World War, Lonergan asserts that "since the break-up of Christendom we have had Protestantism, Deism, Liberalism, Naturalism, Communism, Racism."

Renaissance

There is one disturbing implication of our study of decline. There is not necessarily any self-correcting mechanism at work in history. Compound decline can set up defences sufficient to obstruct the return of rational order. Lonergan insists that we sorely need to find a "viewpoint that transcends the
deformations of liberalism and bolshevism." However, we do not recognize anything in our nature that is likely to help us attain this. If our natures have let us down, then, Lonergan insists that the solution to the problem of decline in history will have to be "supernatural." Michael Shute stresses that an appeal to the supernatural is "essential to Lonergan's account of history." 

In File 713 Lonergan devotes a large proportion of his time to discussing this supernatural reality at work in history. When he address this topic we recognize that Lonergan moves from reflections that are purely philosophical to those that are also theological.

Lonergan speaks of Jesus Christ as constituting the supernatural occurrence that changes the course of human history. He introduces this point by speaking of Adam and original sin as the origin of decline in history. We can recall how his notion of "pre-movement" grounded his notion of human solidarity. It is by virtue of this notion that he argues that succeeding generations can be affected by the sins of our forebears. Lonergan claims that "a tradition of sin emerges in Adam's sin." Likewise, then, Lonergan invokes St. Paul to speak of Christ as the "second

\footnote{Shute, 93.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{For example, PH. is thirty-five pages in length. Its final thirteen pages are devoted to this question.}
\footnote{Shute, 95.}
Adam." This second Adam can "restore, through a new creation, the Divine adoption of the human species." Returning to more philosophical language, Lonergan speaks of how "Christ is the first mover of the tradition of grace." This tradition is at work in history as the "Mystical Body of Christ."

So it is that we recognize that Lonergan moves to explicitly theological language to talk of the renaissance that occurs in history. However, he has not spent so much time on a philosophy of history to discard it when speaking of the third differential in the dialectical process of history. He insists that although the tradition of grace is not the result of philosophical discovery it must actively employ philosophy if it is to have any transformative effect on history:

The hope of the future lies in a philosophic presentation of the supernatural concept of social order: it must be guided by faith for reason alone is inadequate . . . but though supernatural it must also be philosophic, for only a sound philosophy can establish the intellectual conviction necessary to reassure man, can eliminate false theories in a purely natural sphere, can give positive guidance in what the Pope called in his encyclical "technical matters" lying outside the scope of his pastoral office.

Christ is the philosopher king of which Plato could only dream.

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101 Ibid. It would seem that, at this early stage in his career, Lonergan identified this Mystical Body quite closely with the Roman Catholic Church. In his later years, Lonergan will speak much more of the importance of the world religions working together as forces for redemption in history; c.f A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., ed. Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985), Part Two.

102 PH., 117, partially quoted in Shute, 94.

103 PA(1), 17.
Conclusion

It is difficult to read the manuscripts of "File 713 - 'History'" without being impressed. I agree with the claim of Michael Shute that "despite the fact that the manuscripts are but sketches, it is clear that Lonergan had developed something of permanent significance."  

As we noted, above, one of the achievements of Pope Pius XI was to allow a spirit of inquiry to return to Catholic intellectual circles. The decades preceding this had been characterised by "anti-modernist" censures that inhibited the practice of creative Catholic scholarship. What is striking about Lonergan's thought is the manner in which it is neither modernist nor backward-looking traditionalist.

Lonergan had harsh judgments to pass on liberalism and was by no means prepared to employ liberal principles to ground his theological reflection. On the other hand, he insisted that "the current interpretation of St. Thomas is a consistent misinterpretation." In the context of Lonergan's call for a reinterpretation of Thomism, we might note that there is something inherently authoritarian in a theology that is conceptualist. If Lonergan was no liberal, neither was he a trenchant conservative.

In our discussion of the intellectual revival that occurred

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104 Shute, 159.

during the pontificate of Pius XI we noted the claim of Henri de Lubac that the central dogmas of Christian faith had social implications. Clearly, Lonergan's very historical notion of redemption opens the door to a redirecting of much reflection of Christian dogmas. Here again, we might notice a contrast with the kind of thinking that was more conventional in Catholic intellectual circles. We noted how a Scotist interpretation of Aquinas was conceptualist. If little attention is given to how concepts are attained, there will be a tendency to speak of them as "timeless and self-evident." Such conceptualism favours a Church that separates itself from the world and enforces rigid conceptual conformity in the expression of its beliefs. By contrast with this, Lonergan's notion of intellect as discursive implies a Church that must always be learning. Such a Church will necessarily be constituted as a dialectical process where situations and new ideas will exist in tension with each other.

If Lonergan offers a forceful counter argument to liberalism, we can be clear that he also challenges what Komonchak calls the kind of "repressive orthodoxy" that at least partly characterized the anti-modernist censures early this century. To the extent that such orthodoxy was founded on conceptualist interpretations of Aquinas, Lonergan was telling

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106 Komonchak, 169.

such defenders of Catholicism that they have misinterpreted their own sources.

This brings me to study the period of Lonergan's life 1938-49. These years were above all characterised by a protracted study of the writings of Aquinas. In the light of the essays of File 713, I shall now seek to demonstrate that these studies are best understood as standing in continuity with Lonergan's underlying concern for the redemption of history.
CHAPTER 2
WITHDRAWAL "IN SEARCH OF SOMETHING MORE
EXACT AND CONVINCING"

As already mentioned, Chapter 1 was largely a recapitulation of research conducted by other authors. It is on the basis of these accounts that I now proceed to test the hypothesis that is central to this dissertation: In the years 1938-53, Lonergan continued to hold the dialectic of history as a concern of central importance.

In his brief intellectual biography of Lonergan, Frederick E. Crowe nicely focuses the question that serves as a basis for my hypothesis. The question concerns the transition Lonergan makes from writing the documents of File 713 to the work of the years that followed. After outlining the contents of File 713, Crowe emphasizes how different were Lonergan’s subsequent studies of Aquinas. He points out that Lonergan characterised the next period of his life as "eleven years of apprenticeship to Thomas Aquinas."1 Furthermore, the major works produced by Lonergan

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during this period contain little or no reference to questions of history. Crowe therefore asserts:

One wonders what became of this work of Lonergan's youth, how he turned from what was so topical to what was so remote, and why he kept these papers all his life, if he had abandoned the direction he seemed to have taken in them. Or did he abandon it, did it endure as an underlying purpose, and can one find it all-pervasive in his later work? Was there a massive withdrawal in preparation for an equally massive return?²

I have already noted how Joseph A. Komonchak quotes this passage and asserts: "I am myself inclined to answer that he did not abandon this interest [in the 'redemption of history'] and that it endured as an underlying, if not necessarily all-pervasive purpose."¹ I agree with Komonchak. For the remaining chapters in this dissertation, I seek to demonstrate the manner in which this underlying interest continues to influence Bernard Lonergan.²

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²Crowe, Lonergan, 27, my underline.
³Komonchak, 159-60.

¹I stress that I agree with Joseph Komonchak on this question because I am not persuaded that Frederick Crowe comes to the same answer to his own question as does Joseph Komonchak. It seems to me that there is at least implicit in some of Crowe's comments a belief that, to some extent, Lonergan left behind his underlying concern with history when he began his doctoral dissertation: It was only recently, on the basis of documents from his early life . . . that we could see how deeply involved he was with sociology and history, with Hegel and Marx rather than with Aristotle and Thomas, and only then could we come to a real apprehension of his encounter with Thomas Aquinas. With that real apprehension we are able to see the very significant shift in tactics, maybe even the very radical shift in strategy, that Insight shows over the studies in the Blandyke Papers and in File 713 (Crowe, Lonergan, 39-40, my underline).

As a young boy he [Lonergan] had already glimpsed the centrality of understanding . . . his first semi-
Lonergan's Period of Withdrawal

I find the image of "withdrawal," used by Crowe, to be particularly apt to characterize Lonergan's eleven years of apprenticeship to Thomas Aquinas. Crowe takes the image of "withdrawal and return" from Arnold J. Toynbee's work A Study of History. Toynbee studies long-term questions regarding the rise and fall of civilizations. He claims that a key factor in helping civilizations to develop is that they experience the charismatic leadership of an outstanding leader. When one investigates the biographies of these individuals, one almost invariably finds that their lives have been characterised by a process of withdrawal from ordinary social engagements for a considerable length of time. This withdrawal becomes a time of great discovery. The wisdom gained during the withdrawal enables a return and exercise a leadership in society that can herald the beginning of a new epoch.

Lonergan made a careful study of Toynbee's six-volume work published article . . . prepared him for the discovery of [insight into phantasm] in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, but that he turned somewhat away during the 1930's from this promising beginning to engage instead the questions of history represented by Hegel and Marx (ibid, 66, my underline).

I find it less than helpful to dichotomize the studies of cognitional theory and history in this manner. After all, in the first document of File 713, Lonergan asserts: "What is Progress? It is a matter of intellect" (Lonergan, "Philosophy of History," 99). Similarly, Crowe seems to suggest that Lonergan's reflections on history were more concerned with Hegel and Marx than with Thomas. Much of the discussion in Chapter 1 contradicts this point.

when he arrived in Montreal in 1940. He also used the categories of "withdrawal and return" in at least one place to discuss the thought of another author during this period. In what sense, then, can we speak of the period from 1938 onwards as one of withdrawal in Lonergan's life? As a first step in explaining the appropriateness of this term, let us recall the strong assertion he made in 1935:

The disputed question is the crucial experiment of a philosophic system; you have to explain everything except what you can prove to admit no explanation; otherwise you are not a philosopher or your system is inadequate. But this, the presupposition of all argument, is precisely what 99% of the people you would argue with neither grasp nor grant. They simply do not take philosophy seriously, they do not consider whether arguments are valid or not but simply what they prove.⁶

Based on this quotation, I believe we can appreciate in what sense the years 1938 onwards constitute a withdrawal from Lonergan's abiding concern with the question of history.

To assist true progress in history, Lonergan believed that we must have an accurate theory of history. Such a theory must be philosophically adequate. Consequently, it must be rooted in what can "admit no explanation." We have already noted how Lonergan shared with Joseph Maréchal a conviction that that which can "admit no explanation" must be grounded in an analysis of subjectivity. However, a problem arises here. From his reading of other authors, the young Lonergan did not believe he was being well informed regarding exactly what constitutes our

subjectivity. He believed that the best place to begin was in a study of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. However, we have noted his conviction that "the current interpretation of St. Thomas is a consistent misinterpretation." Consequently, Lonergan's search for foundations for a theory of history required him to engage in a protracted withdrawal. There was need to conduct a major reinterpretation of Aquinas.  

I find striking support for this point in a book review written by Lonergan in 1945. The book concerns itself with the "orientation of mind necessary for the solution of current problems of reconstruction." The reconstruction in question was of a world order after the defeat of Hitler. Like Lonergan, the author sought to find in Aquinas the principles that could guide a new order so that it would truly just. However, Lonergan recognizes in the Thomism of the author the kind of conventional


8There is more to be said on this point. Aquinas does not offer all the answers to questions regarding subjectivity. When Lonergan completes his eleven years of apprenticeship to his medieval mentor, he is not yet ready to "return" to a direct discussion of a theory of history. We can understand Insight as his effort to develop his account of foundations in the light of philosophical events that occurred in the centuries after Aquinas. Part II and Part III of this dissertation are devoted to interpreting Insight. However, already at this point we can note a certain fact about how this dissertation will unfold. My claim will be that Lonergan's concern for a theory of history remains important for him throughout the period I study in this dissertation. However, the period I study is entirely occupied by a withdrawal from a direct engagement with this question.

Catholic interpretation of Aquinas that he believes to be so misguided:

The presentation of scholastic thought is better than average, certainly adequate for a general audience not discouraged by a polysyllabic style, but too brief to satisfy the philosophically trained still in search of something more exact and convincing than what already they have been told.¹⁰

In this quotation we recognize two implications. The first is that Aquinas needs to be reinterpreted. The second is that Lonergan's interest in this reinterpretation is related to his concern with history.

This chapter studies the eleven years of Lonergan's life that he characterises as one of apprenticeship to Thomas Aquinas. It may now be evident why I entitle the chapter: "Withdrawal 'In Search of Something more Exact and Convincing.'"

Plan For This Chapter

Now, it is only in this chapter that I discuss Lonergan's intellectual development in the years 1938-49. Parts II and III of this dissertation are devoted to a study of the period 1949-53. This forces me to be selective in my account of the period 1938-49. I find it helpful to adopt a focus for my discussion. From the wide range of data available from this period, I choose mostly those which serve to demonstrate one point: there is a very considerable continuity between the thought of the Lonergan of this period and that of the preceding period when he wrote the

¹⁰Ibid., 1, my underline.
documents of File 713.

I shall begin my argument with two items of a biographical nature. The first is that Lonergan had considerable pastoral involvements in the years immediately following his doctoral studies. These point to a continuing energetic interest in what I shall call the ethos of Catholic Action in the Church. Secondly, for some four years after his doctoral work he devoted considerable time to work on economics. From this biographical starting point, I shall proceed to a more substantive discussion of Lonergan's study of Aquinas. Here again, I shall proceed in two steps. I shall first outline some of the basic insights into a theology of grace that he learnt from this great thinker. Secondly, I shall turn to shorter writings of this period to demonstrate that Lonergan clearly understood this theology of grace to be especially helpful in contributing to a profounder understanding of the components of his analytic concept of history.

Finally, space will require me to be very brief on what is Lonergan's major work of this period: "The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas." This was published as a series of articles between 1946 and 1949. These articles focus on the cognitional theory of Thomas Aquinas as providing the most adequate analogy for procession in the Trinity. My reason for

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being brief is this: the central insights of this work regarding
cognitional theory are brought forward and occasionally improved
upon in Insight. The manner in which Lonergan applies this
cognitional analysis to a study of history is best demonstrated
in the context of this later work.¹²

**Biographical Background**

In Chapter 1, I offered some biographical details regarding
Bernard J. F. Lonergan. I shall now develop these.¹³ Lonergan
completed his undergraduate studies in theology at the Gregorian
University in Rome in 1937. After this, he was ordained to
priesthood and proceeded directly to a "spiritual year" in
France. This year is a normal part of Jesuit formation and is
called Tertianship. Michael Shute believes that Lonergan wrote
most of Batch B of File 713 during this year.¹⁴

After this period, Lonergan returned to Rome for doctoral

¹²We might note that my strategy for this chapter allows me, so to speak, to "kill two birds with one stone." I shall conduct a
discussion of Lonergan's work on a Christian theology of grace
because this is a topic that is explicitly excluded from discussion
in his subsequent philosophical work, Insight. However, I find that
a helpful understanding of Lonergan's underlying concern with
history can be attained by interpreting the articles he wrote in
*The Montreal Beacon* in the light of this theology of grace. Thus,
even if Lonergan had added to his study of a theology of grace
later in the period that I study in this dissertation, it would
still have been valuable to introduce it at this early stage, prior
to a discussion of his contributions to this newspaper.

¹³For the following account of the events in Lonergan's life
during this period I rely on Frederick E. Crowe, "A Note on
Lonergan's Dissertation and its Introductory Pages," *Method:

¹⁴See Shute, 71.
studies in theology.\textsuperscript{15} He began these in September 1938, and concluded his writing in April of 1940. At this stage, the Second World War had already begun. He managed to board a boat for Canada in May of 1940.\textsuperscript{16} Upon arrival in Canada, Lonergan was assigned to teach in the Jesuit College of the Immaculate Conception, in Montreal. At the time, this was the college where young Jesuits from both the French and English speaking provinces of the Canadian Jesuits underwent their studies in theology. In 1946, the English speaking Jesuits began a theology faculty in Regis College, Toronto. In that year, Lonergan was transferred to teach there.

During his six years in Montreal, Lonergan appears to have been very involved pastorally with lay people. This work offers every indication of a continuing interest on his part in the concerns of Catholic Action. In order to understand Lonergan's pastoral involvements during this period, it is important to understand some background details about the community with which he became involved in Montreal.

\textsuperscript{15}Crowe, "Lonergan's Dissertation,: 2. Lonergan had previously been informed that he would work in philosophy, so the assignment to theology was unexpected. However, Frederick Crowe suggests that Lonergan would have been happy with this assignment as his interests had always extended from the philosophical to the theological.

\textsuperscript{16}His haste to return to Canada rendered him unable to sit his defence of this thesis. He was subsequently allowed to sit an exam to defend his thesis before his colleagues on the faculty where he taught in Montreal. His doctorate was considered awarded when he subsequently submitted excerpts from it to the Gregorian in 1943 (ibid., 3).
Catholic Laity in "Ferment"

A first point to note regarding Lonergan’s pastoral involvements during the six years 1940-46 is that they were largely confined to the anglophone Catholic population of Montreal. We can perhaps recognize that the main reason for this was that, then as now, individuals from each of the two main language groups in Montreal tended to socialize with those of their own group.

The anglophone Catholic community in Montreal seems to represent a particularly clear example of the kind of resurgent Catholicism that Joseph Komonchak describes as occurring during the Pontificate of Pius XI. There would seem to have been some particular factors influencing this. The first was that, for the most part, this community was only in its second or third generation in the city. Numerically, they were comprised mostly of the descendants of refugees from the Irish famine, 1845-8. During the 1930’s and 1940’s, they were reaching a new maturity and beginning to emerge in large numbers into the city’s middle class. This emergence brought with it a great hunger for

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17My comments in this section are based mostly on my own interviews with the members of the Thomas More Institute, and with Fr. Gerald MacGuigan S.J. in March, 1996. I also interviewed Cardinal Emmett Carter in October, 1996. I also use a tape recording of an interview with these individuals (excepting Fr. MacGuigan) that was made in 1991. In this recorded discussion, they speak of the founding of the Thomas More Institute. A copy of this recording is held in the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto.

18Significant numbers of those most active also included the Catholic children of “mixed Marriages” between Catholics and Protestants and recent immigrants from the turbulent times in Europe.
education. Thus, it was with great eagerness that this community responded to the new emphasis on educating the Catholic laity to participate in the mission of the Church.\textsuperscript{19}

A second factor explaining the vitality of the anglophone Catholic community is that they enjoyed excellent leadership. Bishop Charbonneau of Montreal did what he could to encourage the emergence of Catholic Action. Of particular note in this respect was the support he gave to an energetic young priest, newly ordained in 1937. This priest, Gerald Emmett Carter, was quickly made a Canon and would later become the Cardinal Archbishop of Toronto.

Canon Carter successfully pressed the authorities to create English language Catholic High Schools in Montreal and himself directed the first anglophone teacher-training college, St. Joseph's. He was deeply influenced by the ethos of Catholic Action; and he took care to offer opportunities to students for Christian formation that went beyond their formal schooling. From an early stage, young lay Catholics joined him in organizing such formational activities.\textsuperscript{20}

The pastoral care that Canon Carter organised for the youth

\textsuperscript{19}In the recorded interview made in 1991 by the founders of the Thomas More Institute, the term "ferment" is repeatedly used to characterize the enthusiasm of Catholic lay people in Montreal in the 1930's and 1940's for greater involvement in their Church.

\textsuperscript{20}Charlotte Tansey, the current President of the Thomas More Institute was outstanding in this respect. Most of her fellow sodalists from this period are still actively involved in the Thomas More Institute, which evolved from the "ferment" of this period.
in his charge centred on separate sodalities for boys and girls at High School level and a mixed sodality at undergraduate level. The members of these sodalities looked south to the United States for formation in the ideals of the new lay activism in the Church. It should be noted that, strictly speaking, Catholic Action, as a formal organization, did not catch on widely in North America. However, there were many movements that did arise and these participated in what we might more broadly call the "Catholic Action ethos." The kind of action with which sodality members were involved extended from retreats, to the reading of Catholic authors in book clubs, to some very direct involvement movements to promote social justice.

21It was only in the mid-forties that St Joseph's Teacher-Training College became coeducational. Before that time, there were separate sodalities for young men and women. These young adult sodalities cooperated in many activities. Thus, participating in what I call the Catholic Action ethos was one of the few opportunities for young anglophone Catholic men and women to meet each other.

22Cardinal Carter made this point in my interview with him. Consequently, it seems fair to speak of Catholic Action, in a broad sense, as characterising many of the developments in North American Catholicism in the 1930's and early 1940's.

23These young people established links with the sizable sodality movement established by Fr. Daniel Lord S.J. out of St. Louis. Sodality members also made much study of the books emanating from the new Catholic book publisher, Sheed and Ward. this publishing house, and its founders Frank and Masie Sheed, exerted a significant influence in favour of the Catholic Action ethos in the United States (see Wilfred Sheed, "What Frank & Masie did in America," Commonweal, 1 November 1985, 601-607). Frank Sheed was invited to Montreal by sodality members to give a public lecture in the mid-1940's. A number of the members of the teacher-training college visited New York to work with Dorothy Day. They also helped sell her newspaper, The Catholic Worker, in Montreal. Dorothy Day herself visited Montreal a number of times during this period. Others had links with the charismatic friend of Dorothy Day, the
In addition to the activities engaged in by anglophone youth, there was much activity at a more adult level. Various organizations were active in organizing educational events that included an older generation. Also of significance was the Catholic newspaper *The Montreal Beacon*. This newspaper was owned and edited by a committed Catholic Murray Ballantyne. It seems to have maintained a remarkably high level of journalism.²⁴

During the war years, the anglophone adult Catholic community organized a series of evening lectures on topics of popular interest. These lectures were held in one of the new Catholic High Schools for English speakers and attracted audiences upwards of six-hundred people. One of these lectures was given by Bernard Lonergan. This brings me to the topic of Lonergan’s pastoral involvements while he lived in Montreal.

Baroness Catherine De Huek. The Baroness performed similar work to Dorothy Day in Ontario (the Baroness was a prominent Catholic in the Archdiocese of Toronto who provoked the ire of the Archbishop by supporting strikers at a factory that was owned by a Mr. O’Connor, another prominent Catholic and major benefactor of the Archdiocese. She was exiled from the Archdiocese by Cardinal McGuigan. Years later, she was invited back, with a public apology, by Cardinal Carter). A final social justice connection of some of the sodality members was with a politically radical newspaper called “The Social Forum.” The links between sodality members and such activities was so recognised that at the outbreak of the Second World War, they were instructed by government officials to limit their links to such people as Dorothy Day who was a pacifist.

²⁴The paper was partly financed by private means. It was not overly driven by a need to make a profit and this seems to have helped it maintain its high level of journalism. During the war years, it was coopted to become part of the Ontario-based *Canadian Register*. It continued to be produced as the Quebec edition of this publication.
Lonergan's Pastoral Involvement

Lonergan appears to have been involved with the community just described at a variety of levels. He directed retreats for sodality members both at High School Level and at St. Joseph's Teacher Training College. I know of two young persons, one man and one woman, whom he accepted as spiritual directees during these years. One of the few marriage ceremonies Lonergan ever performed was of a young couple he met through the sodalities and with whom he maintained a lifetime friendship. On another level, he wrote a series of articles and book reviews in The Montreal Beacon and delivered more than one public lecture. One of these lectures was reported in The Montreal Beacon. The content of the lecture bears a striking resemblance to the topics treated in the documents of File 713.

Cardinal Emmett Carter speaks of having a relationship with Lonergan that was of great value to him. He says he relied on Lonergan for much advice regarding the direction he should take regarding the sodalities and other lay activities in his charge. He speaks of how he felt "part of a team" with Fr. Lonergan and of how he looked on Lonergan as the "profound" and intellectual member of this team. He understood himself to be more of a practical bent. Moreover, he attributes considerable

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25See The Montreal Beacon, Friday, February 21st and Friday 28th, 1941. Copies of these articles are to be found in a file in the library of the Lonergan Research Institute (File LB 109). This file also includes the other contributions of Lonergan to this magazine (note, the name changes to The Canadian Register [Montreal Edition] after 1941).
responsibility to Lonergan for the fruitful channels into which the enthusiasms of the war years were channelled. In 1946, a group of committed graduates of the sodality system founded an institute for adult education. The called it the "Thomas More Institute." This institute has continued to flourish. In 1996, it celebrated its fiftieth anniversary.

Lonergan's Economics

I interviewed various individuals who knew Lonergan well during the period 1940-46, when he lived in Montreal. I was struck by how many mentioned his study of economic theory. From 1940 to 1944, Lonergan seems to have devoted a large portion of his spare time to the study of economics. Friends of his comment on how his desk seemed always covered with books on economics and economic theory.

These quotations are taken from my own interview with Cardinal Carter. However, he also gave an interview at the Thomas More Institute in 1979 that covers some of this ground (see, Dialogues in Celebration [Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1980], 49-72). In his interview with me, the Cardinal stressed how he believed Lonergan to be one of the truly "progressive" theologians of the twentieth century. He spoke of how he was the "peritus" during Vatican II. He claimed that while Lonergan was not an official peritus during the council, nevertheless many of the periti sought out his advice on a wide range of topics. In this context, the Cardinal emphasised the friendship that existed between Lonergan and John Courtney Murray.

Lonergan taught a course to this group in the first year of their founding. He entitled it "Thought and Reality." It contained much of the content of what would later become Insight. Lonergan later remarked that he was surprised at how many students stayed for the whole course of the lectures. After this experience, he states, "It seemed clear that I had a marketable product" ("Insight Revisited," 268). Long after he had left Montreal, Lonergan would continue sending manuscripts of his writings to the members of the Institute for reactions. He sent them through his good friend Eric O'Connor S.J. who worked closely with the Institute.
how readily his conversation turned to this subject.²⁸ At the end of this period, Lonergan produced a manuscript.²⁹ In 1944, Lonergan offered his manuscript to some professional economists to evaluate. He would later comment on how "I got no encouragement from anyone I showed it to in '44."³⁰ In later years, he again took up the manuscript and developed it further. By this time, he felt that there had occurred certain developments in economic theory that converged with his own thought. He hoped that times might now be more propitious for a certain acceptance of his ideas.¹¹

Lonergan's work in economics makes for fascinating study. However, it will not be an object of investigation in this dissertation. I mention it primarily as evidence that Lonergan's

²⁸In making this statement, I rely particularly on interviews I conducted with Gerald McGuigan S.J. and Mr. Thomas Francoeur.

²⁹In the Lonergan Research Institute there are two different drafts of this manuscript. They differ from each other in some significant respects. The second one entitled "An Essay in Circulation Analysis," is clearly the version that was completed in 1944. The first is entitled "For a New Political Economy." Frederick Crowe tentatively suggests a date of 1942 for this version.

³⁰Caring About Meaning, 182. On this same page Lonergan mentions that the "no one" in question included economists in Montreal, Boston and St. Louis. William Mathews stresses that Lonergan's interest in economics "was not casual." He speculates that the lack of reception of his manuscript "must have been an extremely painful cross-roads in his life. It was the giving up of a most serious quest, largely because of the incomprehension of the economists of the time" (William Mathews "Lonergan's Economics," Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 3, no. 1 [March 1985]: 12, 14).

³¹See, Caring About Meaning, 165-66, Lonergan makes particular reference to A Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics, edited by Alfred S. Eichner, as indicating to him how some currents of conventional economic thought were beginning to converge with his own.
concern for questions of social justice continued to be as strong after completing his doctorate as before. If I am not about to expound the content of Lonergan's thought in detail, nevertheless, I do want to indicate how his work in this area is directly related to his interest in an analytic concept of history. In order to do this, I shall have to make a brief foray into his economic argument.

Let us recall a passage already quoted in Chapter 1 of this dissertation from the first document of File 713:

The hope of the future lies in a philosophic presentation of the supernatural concept of social order: it must be guided by faith for reason alone is inadequate . . . but though supernatural it must also be philosophic, for only a sound philosophy can establish the intellectual conviction necessary to reassure man, can eliminate false theories in a purely natural sphere, can give positive guidance in what the Pope called in his encyclical "technical matters" lying outside the scope of his pastoral office.  

In the essays of File 713, Lonergan is clear that it can require an act of God's grace to help scientists use their natural powers of intelligence in an authentic manner. The means by which this can happen is that graced intellects are open to discovering "true philosophy." Consequent on this, a correct philosophical disposition frees scientists to organize their studies to greatest effect. In his labours on economic theory, Lonergan believes that he is capable of making a contribution to the discipline. A reason for this is that he understands himself to be an instance of a graced intellect, working from a sound

\[PH.,\ 117,\ my\ underline.\]
philosophy, and applying such wisdom to a discipline that has not always benefited from the attentions of such wise practitioners.

Our acquaintance with the documents of File 713 allows us to appreciate a key insight of Lonergan's economic theory. He claims that economics needs to develop a theory of greater "scientific generalization." In our discussion of Batches A and B of File 713, we traced how Lonergan moved through a number of steps in becoming more abstract. The earlier essays tended to include lengthy comment on actual historical events. By contrast, later essays were more succinct and more clearly dedicated to developing an analytic concept of history. Now, with respect to Lonergan's economics, a key insight is this: conventional economists have not developed an adequate analytic concept of economic systems. In his economics manuscript, Lonergan prefers the term "scientific generalization" to analytic concept. Nevertheless, in the following quotation, we can recognize that the meaning of these two terms is the same. Lonergan asserts that economists have been failing to develop a sufficiently abstract concept of systems they study. The result is that they have not been discovering the basic heuristic tool that can remain constant as it is applied to the many variable factors of economic interaction.

A scientific generalization makes a new beginning, in a more remote and abstract region of pure thought; and that in terms of this radically new view-point, it transforms, reformulates, re-interprets the correlations of earlier science without necessarily denying its truth.

It is, we believe, a scientific generalization of the old political economy and of modern economics that
will yield the new political economy which we need.\textsuperscript{33}

So it is that we can appreciate that Lonergan applies the notion of analytic concept, developed in his essays on history in File 713, to the discipline of economics. Developing economic theory is an operation of natural intelligence. However, nature is so flawed by sin that bias will consistently interfere even with some rather straight-forward insights and judgments regarding our environment. This is probably more true of the social sciences than the natural sciences. In the study of social science, there must always be a reliance on presuppositions about human nature. Such presuppositions are very much susceptible to biased understanding. Consequently, Lonergan believes that there is a need for grace in order to make it more likely that those who study the human sciences do justice to their natural powers of understanding.\textsuperscript{34}

At this stage, we can recall that Lonergan wrote his doctoral dissertation on the theology of grace in Thomas Aquinas. I will devote most of the rest of this chapter to a discussion of how this theology of grace relates to Lonergan’s concern with

\textsuperscript{33}Lonergan, “For a New Political Economy,” 6, my underline.

\textsuperscript{34}Lonergan believes that the mistakes being made by economists have their origin in a bias that is common to modern culture. Like so many Catholic thinkers of his time, Lonergan criticizes those philosophies that influence members of modern cultures to think they can understand humans in the same manner as they would animals. He begins to demonstrate considerable originality by recognizing the same mistake in the assumptions of economists. He criticizes "that old economist’s robot, motivated only by self-interest and living on the animal level of pleasure and pain." He makes this comment in one of his articles in The Montreal Beacon: “Savings Certificates and Catholic Action, (February 7, 1941).
history. I will stress that there is much continuity between the interests that motivated Lonergan in writing the documents of File 713 (and those on economics) and the interest that motivated him as he apprenticed himself for eleven years to Thomas Aquinas.

A Theology of Grace

In a work of the limited length and scope of this dissertation, it is necessary to be selective in one's account of the author one is studying. As mentioned in my section above concerning the plan for the chapter, I shall now offer a schematic outline of what Lonergan learnt from Thomas about the operating of God's grace in the human subject. In doing this, I mostly employ Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. This book is an edited version of his doctoral dissertation. However, I also make limited use of other works produced by Lonergan during this period. These include an article he published in 1943: "Finality, Love, Marriage," and a series of articles written later in the decade. These articles were published in book form as Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas.35

My account of Lonergan's study in Thomism will not be a chronological one. Rather, I will offer a synthetic account of what Lonergan learnt from Aquinas regarding the operating of the will and how God's grace affects it. This question is still a broad one. I shall focus on those elements he employs to deepen his understanding of the components of his analytic concept of history. I will therefore stress how his understanding of the failure of will serves his analysis of decline. Likewise, I will outline how his understanding of the manner in which grace affects the will serves his appreciation of renaissance.


A reasonable objection can be raised as to whether "Finality, Love, Marriage" can be called a study of the thought of Thomas Aquinas in the same sense as Lonergan's two major works: Gratia Operans and Verbum. In this article Lonergan does, indeed, speak in "his own voice" to a greater extent than in these other works. However, this article is dense with the insights developed at greater length in Lonergan's more explicit studies of Thomas. Furthermore, toward the end of the article Lonergan does appear to refer to his reflections as the "dynamic Thomist position" (p. 51). At any rate, even in his more direct studies of Aquinas, Lonergan does occasionally depart from a strict repetition of Aquinas' insights to assert, "in his own voice" as it were, the direction in which Aquinas' ideas lead. In such instances, Lonergan acknowledges that his claims "may be considered Thomistic but hardly Thomist" (Lonergan, Verbum, 85). In Part III of this dissertation I will discuss at some length a methodological question that arises here. There is always a tension between, on the one hand, being objective in one's account of the thought of a writer and, on the other hand, employing a perspective in such acts of interpretation that in fact develops the thought of the original thinker.
The Acts of Will

In the introduction to his doctoral dissertation, Lonergan points out that before offering an account of the supernatural reality of grace, one has to offer an account of the natural workings of the human will:

"Inasmuch as there is a natural element within the field of the theological problem, it is necessary to make another special inquiry into St. Thomas's theory of the human will, its liberty, the limitations of its liberty, and the general way in which God operates upon it."

The manner in which grace works is primarily to influence the will. Lonergan states that before Aquinas theologians did not succeed in producing an adequate account of this natural function. As an inevitable result of this, their theologies of grace were defective. So it is that any appreciation of the contribution made by Aquinas to a Christian theology of grace must begin with a careful account of his understanding of the operating of the will.

In my last chapter, I outlined how Lonergan's notion of cognitional activity developed during his studies of theology in Rome before 1938. Using the account of Richard Liddy, I indicated how Lonergan was helped by authors such as Joseph Maréchal, Peter Hoenen and Leo Keeler. I pointed out that, already in the 1930's, Lonergan was well on his way to distinguishing the three levels

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of cognition: experience, insight, and judgment. I also pointed out that Lonergan was concerned with the question of how what we know influences our will and issues forth in action. While a concern with this question is evident in the documents of File 713, Lonergan's account there of the operating of the will is not a sophisticated one. It is in his study of Aquinas' theology of grace that his thinking on this question undergoes notable development.

Aquinas is clear that judgments occur with respect to what is good as well as with respect to what is true. Furthermore, Lonergan stresses that Aquinas asserts that "in everyone who understands there must also be a will."38 Lonergan expresses Aquinas' insight by asserting that judgments of value create what might be called a "resonance" in the will that, ultimately, stimulates the individual to action. Thus, there is a process by which intellect influences will and will produces action. We need to investigate this process more closely.

The Will As Passive

We have just noted that Aquinas asserts that there exist judgments of value as well as judgments of fact:

\[quia \textit{potest esse duplex intuitus, vel veri simpliciter, vel ulterius secundum quod verum extenditur in bonum et conveniens, et haec est perfecta apprehensio; ideo est duplex verbum: scilicet rei prolatae quae placet, quod spirat amorem, et hoc est verbum perfectum; et verbum rei quae etiam displicet . . . aut non placet.}\]

["Because there can be a twofold intuition (gaze)

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38 Lonergan, \textit{Verbum}, 202.\]
either of truth simply or a further intuition according as the true extends into what is good and suitable, and this is a perfect grasp. Therefore, there are two words, namely, a word of the thing which pleases as expressed and there is also the word of a thing that displeases or is not pleasant].

A judgment of the good of a thing is still an event of the intellect. Lonergan asserts that Aquinas holds that a "procession" next occurs from intellect to will. Furthermore, Aquinas adds that "the basic act, to which all other acts of will are to be reduced, is love.":

For Aquinas the second procession . . . is . . . the procession in the will of the act of love from the inner word in the intellect.

Quod autem aliquid sit in voluntate ut amatum in amante, ordinem quemdam habet ad conceptionem quod ab intellectu concipitur . . . non enim amaretur aliquid nisi aliquo modo cognosceretur ["Because, however,

Ibid., 100, n. 20. Lonergan does not actually write at great length on the question of the passivity and activity of the will. The Verbum articles are devoted far more to an analysis of insight and judgment. In Grace and Freedom, Lonergan's analysis of the operating of the will in Aquinas usually occurs in the context of discussing the workings of grace. In my account of Lonergan's understanding of the operations of the will, I am indebted to a series of articles written by Frederick E. Crowe on the passive ("complacent") and active ("concerned") dimensions of the will in Aquinas. These articles deal more comprehensively with what Lonergan addresses schematically. In some ways, these articles do for the will in Aquinas what Verbum does for the intellect (see Frederick E. Crowe, "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas," Theological Studies 20:1 [March 1959]: 1-39; 20:2 [June 1959]: 198-230; 20:3 [September 1959]: 343-395.)

Ibid., Verbum, 202.

Ibid., 100. Lonergan considers this to be a point of considerable importance. He asserts that Aquinas finds, in this procession, an analogy for the spiration of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son (see ibid. n.20: "A Verbo procedit Spiritus Sanctus sicut a verbo mentali amor [The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word just as love proceeds from a mental word];" also cf., Ibid., 207-8).
anything is in the will as that which is loved is in the lover it has a certain relationship to that conception that is conceived in the intellect . . . nothing would be loved unless it were in some way known"].

So it is that Lonergan speaks of love as "the basic form of appetition." Of course, love is not the only response that we experience in our will. In one of the quotations, above, Aquinas speaks of response to that which is "displeasing" as well as to that which is "pleasing." However, he asserts that Aquinas still insists that "desire, hope, joy, hatred, aversion, fear, sadness are consequences of the basic response and reflect objective modifications in the circumstances of the motive good."

Lonergan adds that there can be modifications, not only in the "circumstances" of the motive good, but also in the very nature of the good to which the will responds:

There are many appetites, but not any one responds to any motive; each has its proper object, to which it is specially fitted, and to that alone does it respond. . . Just as food suits hunger, just as care of her child suits a mother, so the reasonable good suits rational appetite.

Obviously, it is possible for these different appetites to conflict. For example, I may feel hungry but know it to be wrong to take food from the plate of the person who gets served before me at a restaurant. However, Lonergan asserts that, by nature, we

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42Ibid., n. 20.
44Ibid.
enjoy a "dispositive upward tendency" between these appetites. He asserts that this is especially evident in the institution of marriage.

Of course, Lonergan acknowledges that the sexual appetite can seek its object to the exclusion of other possible objects of the will. In this sense, acting upon this drive can become destructive of the welfare of other individuals. Nevertheless, he insists that, far from becoming an end in itself, an appetite derived from one's biological state can serve as a platform to becoming concerned for the satisfaction of the appetites of others:

It is no small beginning in the weak and imperfect heart of fallen man to be startled by a beauty that shifts the center of appetition out of self: and such a shift is effected on the level of sensitive spontaneity by eros leaping in through delighted eyes and establishing itself as unrest in absence and an imperious demand for company. Next, company may reveal deeper qualities of mind and character to shift again the center from the merely organistic tendencies of nature to the rational level of friendship with its enduring basis in the excellence of a good person. By way of further elaborating this point, Lonergan notes that Aristotle believed "the friendship of virtue" to be something rare. In most cases it requires that an individual already possess a considerable degree of virtue before attempting such a relationship. However, within marriage, "simple decency, obtains for husband and wife what only exceptional virtue obtains

\[\text{46Ibid., 32, cf. the discussion of "the strength of the upthrust," ibid., 49.}\]

\[\text{47Ibid., 31-2.}\]
elsewhere." Lonergan asserts that, for Aristotle, such is the "dispositive upward tendency of sex to human friendship." 48

The Will as Active

We have spoken of the passive aspect of the will. This aspect involves its responding with love to a judgment of value that it receives from intellect. Lonergan notes that it was the position of Aristotle to affirm this connection very strongly. It seems that Aristotle became almost deterministic regarding the extent to which intellect was the first cause of an act of will. 49

Now, there is a Christian intuition that stresses with St. Paul that "I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate" (Romans 7:15). Aquinas therefore feels the need to qualify Aristotle's rigid confidence regarding the determination of the will by the intellect. He proposes that there exists a second cause of the will. This second factor is an ability within the will to move itself. 50 Lonergan carefully outlines Aquinas' view on these two causes of the will. We have already explained the first. This is the response of love in the will to the judgment of value made by intellect. We can now proceed to outline the second cause of the will. Patrick H. Byrne proposes a diagram by which we can understand Lonergan's two causes of the will. I find

48 Ibid., 44.

49 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 95.

50 Ibid., 142.
it especially helpful as a guide to understanding the complexities of Lonergan's account of the second cause of the will:

\[\text{Old Aristotelian Theory} \quad \text{New Thomist Theory}\]

\[\text{Will} \quad \text{Will}\]

\[\text{Act of choice} \quad \text{Choice-of-means}\]

\[\text{Object} \quad \text{End-as-object — Choice-of-end} \quad \text{Means — as-object}\]

\[\text{Intelect} \quad \text{Intelect}\]

This diagram illustrates how the Thomist theory of the will improves on the over-simple and deterministic theory of Aristotle. It also assists an understanding regarding how the will as passive is distinct from the will as active. We now need to offer further explanation of the complexities involved in the active dimension of the will.

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We have already noted how the first cause of the will stimulates a loving response to an apprehended good. This response often promotes a desire for an action that would obtain such a good for oneself. For example, a judgment regarding the goodness of achieving excellence at piano playing can stimulate a person to attempt such an achievement. It is with regard to this movement to action that the self-movement of the will becomes important.

As the will considers such an act, Aquinas speaks further of the two causes that work upon it. He refers to the first cause as coming from intellect and operating quoad specificationem actus (as regards the species of the act). In Byrne's diagram, this cause is indicated by the straight line from "intellect" to "end-as-object." Aquinas next asserts that the second cause of the will operates quoad exercitium actus (as regards the exercise of the activity). Byrne refers to this second cause of the will that involves its "self-movement."  

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53Using the term "self-movement" is problematic. Lonergan notes that Aquinas is emphatic that the movement of the will quoad exercitium actus is caused by God and has God as its ultimate goal. This is hardly a "self-movement." I want to make two points in this context;
1. The term "self-movement," though problematic, does capture something of the active nature of the second aspect of the will. This aspect of the will requires a full exercise of human freedom. The freedom of human willing (and the anxiety that can attend on this), has been much stressed by modern philosophers since Kirkegaard.
2. While Lonergan reproduces Aquinas' account of how God is the cause of this movement of the will, we should be clear on an important point. This account is of how God is involved in our natural willing. God is involved as cause of the will in an
Lonergan asserts that it is the understanding of Aquinas that this self-movement proceeds in two steps. A first is that the will "reemploys" the intellect to understand what might be possible means to the end envisaged. In Byrne's diagram, this is indicated by the curved line between "choice-of-end" and "means-as-object." Secondly, the will moves itself to seek to employ these means. This is indicated by Byrne's final line from "means-as-object" to "choice-of means." 54

Up to this point, we have been referring to the object of the will being the good that intellect affirms. Aquinas often uses the term "end" for this object. When he comes to speak of the second cause of the will, the question of a second "end" for the will now arises. This second end is the good that the will impels the individual to attain by her action.

A distinction is drawn between two lines of causation that converge in effecting the act of choice in the will: there is the line of causation quoad specificationem actus; and there is another line quoad analogous manner to the way God is the cause of the pure desire to know. There is no confusing of natural and supernatural orders here. Consequently, we can speak of the movement of the will quoad exercitium actus without referring to how this function can also be assisted by grace. This is the main task I am seeking to accomplish at this stage of my chapter: the natural functioning of the will has a passive and an active aspect. In the next section, I shall elaborate on how grace influences each of these aspects.

54 Byrne asserts that the self-movement of the will is "one of the great legacies of the Christian tradition to Western culture." He adds that "upon it were later erected, with greater or lesser degrees of coherence, the philosophies of liberalism and existentialism." However, great as was this philosophical advance, Byrne regrets that philosophers of this era have employed it to "develop a conception of human freedom as completely independent of God" (Byrne, "Fabric," 31).
exercitium actus. Thus we have two first causes: the object that is apprehended by the intellect as the end, and the agent that moves the will to this end. The consequent process is that the will moves the intellect to take counsel on means to the end, and then the object apprehended as means, together with the will of the end, moves the will to a choice of the means. Thus the rejection of the Aristotelian passivity of the will eliminates the old position that the intellect is first mover; now there are two first movers.  

We have already mentioned how that influence that is quoad specificationem actus is external to the will. We can now assert that the second cause of the will, the self-movement of the will, is necessarily internal to it.

There is a final point that I want to stress regarding love as active. This is a point that is obvious to a person of common sense. It involves the insight that one should judge individuals

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1. My use of this quotation could cause a certain confusion for those familiar with the way it occurs in Lonergan’s Grace and Freedom. In that work, Lonergan investigates the cause of the will quoad exercitium actus almost exclusively from the point of view of how God is its cause. In the previous note I stressed the distinction between God as cause of natural and supernatural events in consciousness. In this section, I am stressing how there is a natural function of the active aspect of the will quoad exercitium actus. I do not enter into an explanation of how God is the cause of the natural functioning of the human spirit. My point is to stress that our wills have to natural aspects: one passive and one active. My reference to God will especially be in the context of the supernatural event of grace (cf. In the introduction to Gratia Operans, Lonergan stresses the need to study the will in its natural functioning prior to discussing how grace works on it [Lonergan, "Gratia Operans: Preface and Introduction," 14.])
2. For the sake of simplicity I will continue to speak of the first cause and second cause of the will. However, this quotation mentions "two first causes." I understand this to be equivalent to a statement "two efficient causes." Anyway, in what follows, I choose to avoid the complication of referring to a first first cause and a second first cause of the will.

56Ibid., 100.
by their deeds, not by their words. It is captured by the scriptural dictum, "by their fruits you will know them" (Mt. 7:16). Lonergan completes his analysis of the active dimension of the will with an important assertion. It is the loving acts produced by an individual that are the measure of the authenticity of her whole process of knowing and willing:

The basic principle is that as a man is to himself, so also he is to his friend. Now a man is to himself in consciousness of his being, and he is conscious of his being through activity.⁵⁷

Similarly, with regard to the passive nature of will, Lonergan spoke of an "upward dispositive tendency" regarding the various appetites for different goods. However, for such an "ascent" to be complete, it must result in actions that produce the "higher" good:

Now already, in discussing love as passive . . . we have indicated such ascents; but if by ascent one understands development, then from the nature of the case the ascent of love comes only from love as active.⁵⁸

The Reality of Sin

A discussion of the two causes of the will makes it all the more necessary to discuss the reality of sin. With regard to the first cause of the will, I have already mentioned how there can be a tendency in the will to resonate with one appetite to the exclusion of others. This raises the question of sinfulness and

⁵⁷Lonergan, "Finality," 35.

⁵⁸Ibid., 36.
the second cause of the will.

In my account of the second cause of the will, I noted the radical freedom that this implies. Obviously, one attribute of freedom is that it can be abused. Thus, at each stage of the process of willing, the question arises of our failure to carry through the operations we know we should perform. Needless to say, both Aquinas and Lonergan are aware of this question of the failure of the will. We have noted Lonergan's references to the "dispositive upward tendency" between appetites for what is good. We can now note that Lonergan also asserts that "this upthrust is not to be exaggerated." He explains how the more biological appetites tend to have an advantage over more "rational" ones:

The very multiplicity of appetites gives rise to an inner tension. In this tension the rational part of man is at a disadvantage, for natural spontaneity takes care of itself while knowledge and virtue have to be acquired.66

As Lonergan elaborates this point, we can recognize his fondness for mathematics and his readiness to apply mathematical notions to human realities. In this case, he uses categories of probability theory. As with so many other of his ideas, this one also has its origins in comments by Aquinas. Lonergan acknowledges that there is always a certain randomness in the manner in which laws are actually fulfilled in the natural universe. Prediction is best dealt with by statements of the statistical probability of an event occurring. In the case of

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66Ibid., 49.

60Ibid., 26.
human authenticity and sinfulness, it is not easy to predict exactly when an individual will employ her freedom well and when she will take the lazy option and sin. Consequently, Lonergan speaks of sin in terms of probability. In the context of his account of the advantage held by spontaneous desire over rational desire, he asserts that the chances of our sinning are high:

Since [for Aquinas] the good is ever unique and evil manifold, the odds always are that man will do what is wrong.\(^6\)

Grace and Freedom

As I stated above, before discussing Aquinas' theology of grace, it has been necessary to discuss his account of the authentic and unauthentic operating of the will. We might assert that our discussion of the acts of willing has given us an appreciation of the nature of human freedom (we noted this especially with regard to the self-movement of the will). We can now address Lonergan's understanding of how Aquinas treats the

\(^6\)Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 42. In "The Thomistic Sources of Lonergan's Dynamic World View," Patrick Byrne stresses that Lonergan finds a basis for this statistical approach to human affairs in Aquinas. He adds that the notion of per accidens causation in Aquinas is related to another Thomistic notion, that of premotion. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation I discussed Lonergan's notion of premotion: there is a premotion by phantasm on acts of knowing and by acts of knowing on human behaviour in history. Byrne states that premotion is a theme that Lonergan borrows from Aquinas. Secondly, Byrne points out that Aquinas states that premotion works itself out in a manner that is best understood in a statistical fashion. Aquinas speaks of premotion operating according to a causation that is per accidens. Byrne stresses that, by the time Lonergan comes to write Insight, it had become a central aspect of Lonergan's thinking to apply probability to both natural and human affairs (Byrne, "Sources," 119).
question of grace and how grace relates to our free will.

Aquinas, of course, writes as a Christian theologian. Like all other Christian writers before him, he understands grace to be God's solution to the problem of sin. The originality of Aquinas becomes evident when he applies notions of grace, many of which were already expressed by other theologians, to his understanding of the acts of will. In doing this he solves problems that had dogged theologians for centuries.

Theologians prior to Aquinas had great trouble reconciling a notion of grace with that of human freedom. Many chose to avoid the question and label it a mystery. Others tended to sacrifice one of these principles so as to stress the other.62 Aquinas, however, has an account of the operations of intellect and will that is more sophisticated than that of any of his predecessors. It is on the basis of such an account that he can find room for an explanation of the gratuitous intervention of God in fallen human nature that does not suppress the continuing operation of human freedom. At the heart of his theology of grace, Aquinas distinguishes between "operative grace" and "cooperative grace." We need now to investigate each of these notions.

62Lonergan believed that even though Aquinas offered the solution to this dilemma, his meaning was not understood. So it was, according to Lonergan, that a useless debate raged on this issue right into the twentieth century. He claims that "Molinists" emphasised human freedom at the expense of the omnipotence of God; "Banezians," on the other hand, made the converse mistake (see Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 205-10).
Operative Grace

Operative grace is an action by which God directly influences the end that the will apprehends as good. As we have mentioned above, such an apprehension of a good end has to do with the first cause of the will. It has to do with the determination of the will quoad specificationem actus. We have commented on how, first of all, there is a "dispositive upward tendency" regarding the kind of good end that we will naturally choose. However, we have also noted that, in point of fact, the odds are sharply against our obeying the dictates of this "upthrust." 63

Aquinas claims that operative grace is a means by which God changes the probabilities regarding the end that intellect apprehends as good. Operative grace is communicated in two steps. The first step is God transforming the habitual orientation of the will regarding the ends it will apprehend as good. Lonergan asserts that "one has merely to want to, and the thing is done, if one has the habit." 64 Such, then, is "habitual operative grace." With regard to such grace, we can recognize that Aquinas is applying notions of probability to human operations. In our discussion of sin, we spoke of how conflicting desires can make it improbable that we do good. We can now explain habitual operative grace as that which shifts these probabilities. Phrasing these Thomistic insights a vocabulary that is somewhat

63 Lonergan, "Finality," 32, 49.

64 Ibid., 43.
more modern, Lonergan asserts:

Give man the virtues and in place of the statistical law governing humanity one will have an approximation to the statistical law governing the angels.65

Even with a positive habitual predisposition, the question still arises regarding what end an individual will actually choose in any given instance. Aquinas speaks of a second dimension of operative grace in this context. Lonergan expresses the insight of Aquinas on this question by employing the term "actual operative grace."66 By virtue of actual operative grace, God finally assures that the good that determines the will quoad specificationem actus will be the highest good.67

Regarding this external end that the will chooses under grace there is one final point to make. It is a point of great importance. Operative grace not only helps us to apprehend the highest end that is naturally possible, it enables us to

65Ibid., 45; cf., 55-61.

66Ibid., 143.

67When we discussed the passive aspect of the will, I referred to Lonergan's interest in Aristotle's point that true friendship is most likely to be found between couples that are married. Lonergan continues this argument to assert that the married state is a privileged situation for the experience of operative grace. He speaks of marital love being elevated, under grace, beyond "rational friendship" to "the divine order of charity." In this order of charity we can wish the good for another to an extent that is beyond any natural capacity:

But whence that wishing? It is the insertion of other proximity and love into the order of divine charity. It is the vertical upthrust . . . grace inserts into charity the love that nature gives and reasons approves. Thus we have a dispositive upward tendency from eros to friendship, and from friendship to a special order of charity (Lonergan, "Finality," 31-2).
apprehend an end that is beyond our natural capacity.

Aquinas asserts that habitual operative grace transforms our will to resonate to an end that is supernatural. This supernatural gift creates an alteration in the metaphysical constitution of a person. The orientation, or finality, of the good intended by the individual is no longer natural but what he calls transcendent. This transcendent finality involves what Christians have traditionally described as "brotherhood in Jesus Christ" and an "orientation toward the beatific vision." This is the Christian understanding of how "God accepts us into his kingdom."  

Cooperative Grace

So far we have only spoken about grace involving what we earlier called the "external" determination of the will. The question of the "internal" self-movement of the will still remains. We can recall that it is above all in respect to this second cause of the will that we recognised the remarkable quality of freedom that is possessed by individuals (we noted how much existentialist philosophers have made of this point). It is with respect to this second cause of the will that Aquinas speaks of "cooperative grace."

In the case of operative grace, God acts without the

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68On the importance of the distinction between the natural and supernatural orders, see ibid., 13-21; regarding the alteration of the esse (existence) of an individual see ibid., 56, 58; on the gift of "transcendence" and "God accepting us," see ibid., 34.
assistance of human nature. It is fallen human nature that operative grace first needs to heal. It is to be expected that such an act of healing would occur as an act that does not employ human freedom. How could it, when fallen human freedom is the whole problem? Furthermore, we witness how operative grace also elevates human nature to a supernatural goal. Clearly, to speak of involving human nature as cause of a supernatural transformation would be a contradiction in terms.

However, in the case of the movement of the will quoad exercitium actus (as regards the exercise of the activity), the question of freedom does arise more clearly. We have seen how this dimension of the functioning of the will involves first employing the intellect to identify means to ends and, subsequent to this, a self-movement into action. The genius of Aquinas' account of grace is this. Once he has accounted for the purely gratuitous action of God in operative grace he can speak of a process of cooperation between God and humans in the subsequent functioning of the will.

Such a cooperation of humans with God need in no way limit the omnipotence of the creator. Likewise, the fact that God has already altered the fashion in which individuals operate quoad specificationem actus need in no way take from the freedom exercised by them in the movement of the will quoad exercitium

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69 In Grace and Freedom, 17, Lonergan speaks of how the distinction between the natural and supernatural orders permitted theologians to distinguish grace for the remission of sins and grace that bestows the supernatural virtues.
As is apparent, the theory of liberty we have outlined had the singular merit of making possible a theory of operative grace; for on this theory, as opposed to that of Scotus, the free act emerges from, and is conditioned by, created antecedents over which freedom has no direct control. It follows that it is possible for God to manipulate these antecedents and through such manipulation to exercise a control over free acts themselves. . . . Indeed, both above and below, both right and left, the free choice has determinants over which it exercises no control. God directly controls the orientations of the will to ends; indirectly He controls the situations which intellect apprehends and in which it has to choose.  

Aquinas insists on speaking of a dimension of grace continuing to act on the will qua ad exercitium actus. However, he is clear that this is a cooperative grace. In the activity of the will in this second mode the individual continues to act with full freedom. Finally, Aquinas also speaks of cooperative grace as both habitual and actual. As with operative grace Aquinas speaks of God first granting an habitual ability to cooperate with grace and, subsequently, an actual ability to do so.

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76Ibid., 115-6.

71Note the titles of chapters 3 and 6 of Grace and Freedom: "Habitual Grace as Operans et Cooperans," and "Actual Grace as Operans et Cooperans." In my exposition, I have altered the order of Lonergan's account. I deal first with operative grace as habitual and actual and secondly with cooperative grace as habitual and actual. I do this for a reason. I find that when Lonergan applies a notion of grace to renaissance in history the key distinction is between operative and cooperative grace. The distinction between the habitual and actual dimensions of each of these seems to figure less prominently.
Grace and History

Earlier in this chapter I stated that I would select from the writings of Lonergan's "eleven years of apprenticeship to Thomas Aquinas" with a particular goal in mind. I have sought to demonstrate that Lonergan's profound studies of the thought of Thomas Aquinas are related to his underlying concern with the redemption of history. My point in doing this is to suggest that we can recognize a Toynbeean "withdrawal" in the manner in which Lonergan studies the thought of Aquinas in such great depth. I suggest that the "return" that Lonergan anticipates is one that will articulate a more sophisticated analytic concept of history than that found in File 713.

Now, it remains the case that during these eleven years Lonergan makes little explicit mention of the relevance of his studies in Thomas to questions of history. This fact could perhaps sow a doubt in the minds of students of Lonergan's thought that by the 1940's his interests were beginning to take a different turn. However, even on the question of Lonergan's explicit statements, we can recognize further evidence that a concern for history remained the underlying concern. In addition to his major studies of the thought of his medieval mentor, Lonergan wrote some shorter articles during these years that witness to the fact that, as his reflections on grace were deepening, so also was his understanding of the components of an analytic concept of history.

In the article "Finality, Love, Marriage," Lonergan makes
explicit mention of how foundational issues regarding the will and grace relate to the themes that are familiar to us from the documents of his File 713. Also, in the more popular articles and book reviews that Lonergan wrote for The Montreal Beacon, we recognize similar connections being made. I have found it very illuminating to read Lonergan's contributions to this newspaper from a perspective of familiarity both with File 713 and with his studies in the theology of grace.

"Finality, Love, Marriage"

We can recall that in Batch B of the documents of File 713 Lonergan's thinking became more refined regarding the differentials of history. Above all, he became clear on how central were notions of dialectic and the three approximations to the flow of history. Now, I believe the following to be a point of much significance for my analysis in this chapter: certain sections of "Finality, Love, Marriage" read like excerpts from these documents of Batch B.

I have already pointed out how Lonergan speaks in "Finality, Love, Marriage" of how the will experiences "tension and contradictions" between the appetites for different goods. In a subsection entitled "Dialectic," Lonergan proceeds to assert:

But the point to which we would particularly draw attention is the dialectical and social aspect of this tension and opposition.  

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73Ibid., 26.
The term "dialectic" continues to be employed here in the sense we encountered in Batch B of File 713. It indicates the tension between situation, idea, new situation etc. In this section, Lonergan echoes particularly his own explanation of the "dialectic of sin" in "A Theory of History." He speaks, first of all, of how human action is necessarily social. He then speaks of how "after repeated failure [to act with good will] man begins to rationalize, to deform knowledge into harmony with disorderly loves." He then describes the kind of spiral effect that makes a culture ever less open to the good. Finally, he asserts that "a culture or a civilization changes its colour to the objectively organised lie of ideology." 

Needless to say, in this article of 1943, Lonergan had not been working for years on Aquinas' theology of grace in order to leave his account of human society in this state. He continues:

To pierce the darkness of such ideology the divine Logos came into the world; to sap its root in each human will he sent his Spirit of Love into our hearts; and in this redemption we are justified, rectified, renewed." 

Now, I believe that we can recognize great significance in Lonergan's comments on how redemption counteracts the influence of sin. Lonergan suggests that the result of the missions of the Son and Spirit is "to sap its [sin's] roots in each human will." Clearly, this result is the possibility for all individuals of an

74Ibid.
75Ibid., 27.
76Ibid.
experience of operative grace. Sapping the root of sin must involve shifting the probabilities of individuals allowing their wills to respond to a higher good as its first cause. It is the definition of operative grace that it performs this function.

Once we recognize this link with Lonergan's theology of grace, we can be impressed by how very fruitfully this theology can be applied to an account of renaissance in history. Lonergan proceeds to speak of a process of renaissance that mirrors but counteracts the dialectic of decline:

Just as there is a human solidarity in sin with a dialectical descent deforming knowledge and perverting will, so also there is a divine solidarity in grace which is the mystical body of Christ; as evil performance confirms us in evil, so good edifies us in our building unto eternal life; and as private rationalization finds support in fact, in common teaching, in public approval, so also the ascent of the soul towards God is not a merely private affair but rather a personal function of an objective common movement in that body of Christ which takes over, transforms, and elevates every aspect of human life.  

I want to stress that this passage makes an important contribution to Lonergan's theology of grace. In his study of Aquinas the detailed explanation of the workings of grace was worked out in the context of an analysis of the operations of an individual subject. Now Lonergan stresses that there is a "solidarity in grace." Thus, we can recognize that grace will

77Ibid.

78Let us recall my account in Chapter 1 of Lonergan's understanding of human solidarity. Lonergan insists that intellectual activity is best understood in the context of the species as a whole. He asserts: "The individual genius is but the
never be fully understood unless it is understood as a social phenomenon.  

This social aspect of the workings of grace is evident in comments Lonergan makes about the social impact of Christian marriage. We have already noted how Lonergan believes that the marital bond helps even moderately selfish individuals advance to enjoy true friendship. Furthermore, under grace this friendship can rise to "a special order of charity." However, a full understanding of the graced married life of a couple requires that we recognize their influence on others around them:

Then their [the married couple's] mutual actuation of a common consciousness and conscience will be a rejection of the world's dialectical rationalizations, a focal point in the stream of history for the fostering of growth in the mind and heart of Christ, a pursuit of the highest human and eternal ends.  

instrument of the race in its expansion" (PH., 100). This solidarity applies as much to renaissance as to progress or decline.

Human solidarity . . . makes possible a second Adam, Christ, who would restore, through a new creation, the Divine adoption of the human species. Christ is the first mover of the tradition of grace (PH.,95).

Michael Stebbins has produced the most comprehensive account of Lonergan's theology of grace published to date. He asserts: The transformation it [grace] brings about is more than a personal event; for the primary recipient of grace is not an individual but a community, the mystical body of Christ. In order to get a glimpse of the interpersonal and historical dimensions of this transformation as Lonergan envisions it, we turn . . . to "Finality, Love, Marriage" (Michael Stebbins, The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995, 138.

Ibid., 31-2.

Ibid., 37.
Articles in The Montreal Beacon

I have suggested that an acquaintance with File 713 and with Lonergan's theology of grace illuminates a reading of "Finality, Love, Marriage." If this is true for that article, I find it to be even more evidently the case with respect to the more popular articles written by Lonergan for The Montreal Beacon.\(^2\) In fact, one can recognize that these two sources complement each other. In the first, Lonergan seems to stress the importance of operative grace in understanding the course of history. In the second, it is above all a notion of cooperative grace that seems to motivate his reflections.

There is a straightforward reason for the fact that Lonergan's contributions to The Montreal Beacon operate from a clear notion of cooperative grace. This publication was a popular Catholic newspaper. Lonergan's contributions can be understood as exhortations to Catholics to exercise their freedom so as to cooperate with God's plan. It is not enough to know oneself as blessed by operative grace; one must begin the labour of employing the full scope of one's natural gifts to cooperate with this. Finally, both operative grace and cooperative grace are more fully understood in their social manifestations.

Copies of the articles to which I refer are found compiled in a file in the library of the Lonergan research institute.

\(^2\)As mentioned above, the Montreal Beacon changed its name to the Canadian Register (Quebec Edition) in 1942. I will be specific regarding which name is applicable in footnoted references. However, in my main discussion I shall refer to the paper always by the earlier title.
There are twenty-one items. Ten of these are book reviews. Four are articles. The other items are of less importance for my investigation. They include letters written to the editor regarding contributions of Fr. Lonergan and accounts of a public lecture given by him. The nature of this work does not permit me to discuss each article. In any event, my purpose in studying them is to demonstrate the continuity they demonstrate with the

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83 File LB 109, "Articles, Letter, Reviews in The Montreal Beacon & The Canadian Register (Quebec edition)," Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto. I add abbreviations for the articles to which I will refer.

1. Book Reviews by Lonergan:

2. Articles by Lonergan:

3. Account of a lecture given by Lonergan:
"The Soul of France Was Divided Says Noted Jesuit Father," (author not given), The Montreal Beacon, February 1941, 8, [SF].
documents of File 713 and with Lonergan’s theology of grace (I will also point out similarities with parts of his economics manuscript).

I believe there is a theme that recurs in almost all the articles Lonergan wrote for The Montreal Beacon. It demonstrates a very definite concern for the redemption of history. I have commented how Lonergan’s view of authentic human operating is that individuals must undertake the labour of knowing, willing and doing in accord with the gifts they have received. His basic insight into current society is that most of the current political and economic structures serve to inhibit such human flourishing. Over against this oppression, Lonergan preaches the message of a grace that enables us to form communities of members who insist on living lives of intelligent and responsible action. He understands such communities to be a principle of renaissance in society as a whole. I shall now outline Lonergan’s statements on these points in greater detail. First I shall identify the notion of decline that arises from these articles; secondly, I shall outline those comments that describe the phenomenon of renaissance.

Decline

Lonergan is no fan of the major political systems of the twentieth century. With equal vehemence he condemns each of the
political systems that dominated the world of his time:

There is the materialistic, anti-traditional tendency. Its obvious representative is in the field of economics: eighteenth century capitalism, nineteenth century communism and twentieth century nazism. Such is the great materialist trinity . . . Despite their differences and oppositions, all three agree in their dedication of man, soul and body, to the goods of this world. None of them acknowledges and submits to a higher end or a higher law for man.\(^6^4\)

For those who might look to socialism as more benign form of government intervention than communism, Lonergan insists that it is nothing more than a "nationalization of capitalist errors."\(^6^5\)

Lonergan suggests that a first great error of democratic capitalism was that "the countryside is emptying into the cities." This causes a loss of "the organic and integral mentality fostered by a life in touch with nature."\(^6^6\) His critique of the consequences of this is strikingly general. He claims that individuals are "losing themselves . . . in the cumulative, interlocking and crushing evils of mass production, mass living, mass education, mass amusement, mass emotions, mass

\(^6^4\)OA. 1 (page references are to the typescript of the articles found in the file LB 109 in the Lonergan Library Institute library).

\(^6^5\)WR., 1. If Lonergan condemned each of these systems, the fact remained that he lived in a system that was democratic and capitalist. It need not therefore surprise us that he devoted more time in The Montreal Beacon to criticizing the corruptions of modern democracy and capitalism than any other system. Furthermore, if Lonergan is critical of this system, his intention is to reform it. Thus there is all the more need to understand it well.

\(^6^6\)Ibid., 2,3.
hatreds and mass wars." 87 The question next arises regarding groups of individuals who simply do not fit in to these massively organised systems.

Groups that do not fit into the massive machine of state include those vulnerable individuals, such as the aged and the sick, about which any society needs to be concerned. However, such groups also involve other categories of marginalised individuals. The predicament of these groups can be, to some extent, attributed to the nature of the political and economic system itself. Such groups include the unemployed, criminals and, perhaps, other categories of alienated and mentally ill individuals. Lonergan asserts that the governmental system that operated so much on the principle of mass organization for production, applies the same logic to the social problems it does so much to produce. It can surprise us to read that he is scathing in his criticism of the social welfare system. He asserts that this system is no more than a huge set of functions "that have been multiplying and accumulating for a century under the evil influence of a mistaken economic system." 88 He protests that instead of offering marginal people a "cure," government offers them a "wheelchair." 89 He adds that, while the origins of such social policies lie in abstract questions of ethics, the

87CC., 3.

88Ibid., 1-2.

89SS., 3. Lonergan further criticizes social workers who "set their hearts on the immediate goal of more divorces and fewer children for the proletariat" (CM., 1).
results are all too concrete:

[The] consequences [of materialist political systems] are not a matter of abstract deduction. The experiment has been performed and still is being performed on the quivering body of humanity. The results are not pleasant.9c

A final area of importance in which Lonergan identifies a strong influence of the forces of decline concerns culture. He comments favourably on the view of a professor from the United States on how educationalists have "thrown overboard every part of the cultural heritage of western civilization." He asserts that prominent in such education is a notion of the person based on a kind of "biological materialism." With some irony, he speaks of the notion of love that results from such a philosophy; love is considered as "no more than a matter of endocrine glands and hormones."

If students learn to think of themselves in a reductionist manner in school, Lonergan asserts that such notions are also reinforced by the mass media. He speaks of how "publishing houses, magazine editors, film magnates appear convinced that the sale of their products on the grand scale is a matter of striking the right note in salaciousness." He suggests that the authors of the news coverage of the War have similarly appealed to the spontaneous, rather than to the more rational desires in their audiences. In the following quotation, we recognize how Lonergan

\[9c\] OA., 1.
\[91\] QO., 2.
\[92\] CM., 1.
is very much of the opinion that the big gainers from current distorted social structures are the rich and powerful:

A War begun pretentiously in the high name of Christian civilization is being prostituted by press magnates and political agitators to intrigue and calumny and hatred and the miasmic materialism exhaled by the world about us.\textsuperscript{93}

Renaissance

The account given by Lonergan of the forces of decline can make them seem overwhelming. We might well ask if any recovery is possible at all. Lonergan insists that there is indeed such a phenomenon as renaissance. However, he would appreciate the value of approaching this question from a standpoint of near despair. Already in the documents of File 713, Lonergan was clear on this point: if we are left to our own natural devices, then decline wins out over progress. It is only as a result of the intervention of God that order is returned to history.

Now, earlier in this chapter we studied Lonergan’s account of operative and cooperative grace. We suggested that, while an account of operative grace seemed particularly evident in "Finality, Love, Marriage," the actualization of cooperative grace was a focus of Lonergan’s concern in The Montreal Beacon. While I believe this to be the case, Lonergan also makes some statements in this popular newspaper that obviously refer to operative grace. It is important to emphasize this. Otherwise, it could seem that Lonergan was advocating a kind of Pelagian self-

\textsuperscript{93}BD., 3.
salvation. Such an account would be naive about the nature of evil and the very real difficulty for any individual or group to raise themselves above the forces of decline.

In one of Lonergan's book reviews, he praises a group of women who are members of the spiritual movement "The Grail." He describes their heroic attempts "to obey the commandment of loving one's enemies when sirens have shrieked and the ack-acks roar and the bombs tumble down for hours... to see Christ in the wounded... in the surging mass of [the] destitute... to live Christ in the aching and crushing of a nurse's nights in a first aid hut." Lonergan understands the ability of these young women to perform these feats to be primarily a result of the intervention of God in history. There is a paradox here. It can sometimes be in the context of the worst breakdowns of human order that the most sublime examples of human transcendence become manifest. This is not primarily the result of human effort but of God's grace:

No matter what the storm of troubles nor the virulence of persecution, Christ must arise in the new Easter of a renascent Christendom. It was so when Rome had its Indian summer under the Antonines... [and in] the creative work of Augustine and Benedict, Gregory and Hildebrand, the work that made European culture the finest of all time. It is so again today when Europe stands in ruins and a new challenge goes forth to the wide world to create one more.95

94Ibid., 2-3.

95Ibid., 1. In a less poetic and more technically theological manner Lonergan also speaks of the need for the "natural virtues—courage, temperance, etc., to be augmented and sustained by the supernatural ones which perfect the natural" (SF., 2).
Now, as we have been stressing, God's intervention in history proceeds from a free gift of operative grace to an exigence that we cooperate with God's plan. When Lonergan exhorts Christians to cooperate with God's plan, his comments consistently tend to emphasize a single point: over against the alienating effects of the modern state, individuals must insist on forming communities that fully employ human intelligence, freedom and responsibility. God's grace always involves the invitation to the laborious task of reining in our unruly intellects and lazy wills. Lonergan makes this point clearly, if not very elegantly, in the notion of "hitting ourselves" in the following quote:

Communism teaches the people to be envious, discontented, not to accept willingly their lot in life. Catholicity is the opposite. Catholicity is the hard way. It is not hitting the other fellow which is easy but is hitting ourselves [sic]. It is telling ourselves what is wrong with us instead of always telling the other fellow.\(^{95}\)

Lonergan has more to say on just how it is that the labour of taking responsibility for ourselves and our society must occur. His thoughts on this matter are best organised under the Toynbeean rubric of withdrawal and return.

Withdrawal

Lonergan understands the first step in the much-needed renaissance in modern society to be the withdrawal of what

\(^{95}\)NM., 1-2.
Toynbee calls a creative minority.\textsuperscript{97}

[The solution to the problems of mass democracy] has to be a withdrawal from the modern and the creation of a new environment and culture under the inspiration of new values and new ideals.\textsuperscript{98}

Some of Lonergan's most pointed commentary on current society comes in two of his book reviews. Both concern books that discuss the cooperative movement stemming from the Catholic university, St. Francis Xavier's, in Nova Scotia. Lonergan is enthusiastic in his praise of this movement. He is also emphatic in his claim that this constitutes what Toynbee calls a creative minority that has much significance for the rest of its culture.\textsuperscript{99}

The next step for such a creative minority has to be one of education. In his comments on education, we recognize that Lonergan envisions a reformed democratic capitalism constitutive of renaissance. He asserts that education must "teach free enterprise to those who, in a regime of free enterprise, have not had the initiative to look out for themselves."\textsuperscript{100} As we have

\textsuperscript{97}Ibid., 230.

\textsuperscript{98}WR., 2.

\textsuperscript{99}I referred above to how Lonergan makes use of Arnold Toynbee's notion of withdrawal and return. I can now elaborate on this a little. Toynbee explicitly mentions two different kinds of withdrawal and return: that of individuals and that of what he calls "creative minorities" (Toynbee, Chapter XI, sections 2 and 3). I consider Lonergan's eleven years of apprenticeship to Aquinas to be an instance of an individual withdrawal. The withdrawal that Lonergan identifies as represented by the Antigonish movement is especially that of a creative minority.

\textsuperscript{100}QO., 1.
seen in his comments on decline, Lonergan believes that there are many forces in society that seek to inhibit our free and responsible exercise of enterprise. However, Lonergan adds that at any rate there is another force that inhibits our growth to full use of our intellectual and volitional capacities. It is the sinfulness of each individual:

Why does the proletariat today include almost everyone? . . . Radically it is our own fault. We leave our affairs to others, because we are too indolent and too stupid to get to work and run them ourselves. The results are palpably ruinous: our system of free enterprise cannot survive if only a few practise free enterprise.  

Clearly, the educational project involved in a withdrawal such as is evidenced by the Antigonish movement will have many dimensions. There will be a need to teach many techniques of agricultural and small scale industrial production. However, important as these are, Lonergan still stresses the importance of educating students in the responsible exercise of freedom: "The technical training needed at the present time is in the technique of cooperation."  

Lonergan stresses that the kind of education involved in such a withdrawal must draw deeply from the cultural traditions drawn from the cultural traditions.

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1. Ibid., 1. We might jokingly assert that, having insulted all the leaders of the world, Lonergan now proceeds to insult everybody else! However, we can recognize in these comments a modern application of an ancient Christian evangelical tradition. Lonergan is preaching a message regarding sin and the need for conversion. Furthermore, we can also recognize at work a theology of grace where operative grace must issue forth in the labours of cooperative grace.

2. Ibid., 3.
that influenced Europe for centuries. These traditions are especially influenced by Christianity and extol a virtuous life. Lonergan praises the education system in Quebec for not rejecting such cultural traditions to the extent that that rejection was the norm in the United States. He notes that the "the Antigonish movement attributes its success basically to the broad culture its originators received in Quebec, Montreal and Rome."  

Finally, Lonergan believes that religion needs to play an important role in such withdrawal. This point is most evident in the book review devoted to a publication by the spiritual movement "The Grail":

The "Grail" is a movement of deep spiritual culture that slipped over to English girls from Holland when the J. O. C. [Catholic Action] moved majestically from Belgium to France. It is part and parcel of the general "secession of the proletariat" of our time: a movement of souls, alienated by the vacuous hopes and strident stupidity of our civilization, and gathering round various centres to grow inwardly and then burst outwardly in the creation of a new order.  

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103 Ibid. There is a sad irony here. Within two decades of this piece being written, Quebec experienced its "Quiet Revolution." Arguably, this involved just the kind of overthrowing of cultural traditions for which Lonergan criticizes the USA. On the other hand, in interviews given later in his life, Lonergan reflects on how the culture communicated in the Ecoles Classiques of Quebec was rigidly understood. The kind of "classicist" notion of culture that these represented was in fact little suited to the kind of creative application found in Antigonish. Lonergan understood his own version of Thomism to be a rejection of such classicism (see Lonergan, "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation," A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J. ed., Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. [New York: Paulist Press, 1985], 35-54). Consequently, we need not understand Lonergan as over-romanticising Quebec's past.

104 BD., 1.
Return

Much as Lonergan admires the work of the Antigonish movement, he does offer some gentle criticism. This criticism demonstrates how much Lonergan considers any withdrawal to be in the interest of creative return. He suggests that there is a tendency in the Antigonish movement to judge the rest of society a little too harshly:

One might be inclined to ask whether our economic and social structure is not rather a sick man needing treatment than a dying man awaiting burial.105

Lonergan’s work on economic theory can be understood as an act of hope that rationality can be returned to the social structures of nation states as a whole. He believes that a crucial step in such a restoration of order would be a proper understanding of the mechanisms by which an economy operates. As I outlined above, Lonergan has many criticisms of current democratic capitalism. However, there is no doubt that his hopes lie in reforming this system.

In the first chapter of the 1942 version of his economics manuscript, Lonergan identifies his efforts with a project to defend democratic capitalism against the onslaught of totalitarianism. He points out that “it is the whole thesis of the totalitarian states that the democracies have missed the economic bus of the twentieth century.”106 Strange to say, he agrees with this view. However, he opposes the solution offered

105 WR., 3.

by totalitarian regimes as being oppressive of human liberty. Thus he holds that the challenge is to develop an economic theory that is adequate to the task of understanding the complex mechanisms of twentieth century economic systems while at the same time allowing individuals the dignity of becoming enterprising and responsible citizens:

There does exist a very real problem, a problem that has to be solved if we are to use propaganda effectively against the enemy during the war, a problem that has to be solved if we are to face and democratically to surmount our economic difficulties after the war.\textsuperscript{107}

These same sentiments are very ably expressed in an article Lonergan wrote for The Montreal Beacon in 1941 entitled "Savings Certificates and Catholic Action."\textsuperscript{108} In this article, Lonergan encourages Canadian Catholics to buy war bonds. He points out that not doing so would make it difficult for the government to finance the war effort and would lead to inflation at home. While this is a very specific exhortation, Lonergan is always a person who recognizes broad principles in concrete details. In this case, he comments that buying war bonds--without being compelled by the government to do so--is exactly the sort of responsible exercise of economic freedom that should be the hallmark of an

\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., 1-2.

\textsuperscript{108}Even the title of this article demonstrates a point that is important for this dissertation. Lonergan continued to hold the concerns of Catholic Action as important even after the beginning of his apprenticeship to Aquinas. The fact that he discusses so particular an issue as savings certificates in this context indicates how direct is the connection between this concern and his work on economics.
economic system that is the foundation for a renaissance in history.

Lonergan asserts that the call for cooperation with the call to buy war bonds is of "tremendous significance . . . for all who are interested in Catholic social thought and Catholic action." He adds that we have to be schooled in such responsibility (we can humorously recall Lonergan's comments, quoted above, that our normal state is one of stupidity and indolence). He advocates that we "drive home the idea" of intelligent and responsible economic behaviour "first in our study clubs, then throughout the Catholic community."^{109}

I find that this article offers a highly appropriate conclusion to my account of Lonergan's contributions to *The Montreal Beacon*. Clearly, his concern is for society as a whole; any encouragement he offers for the withdrawal of creative minorities from the mainstream is clearly with the hope that they can return in all the more constructive a fashion. Finally, I believe that his exhortations on this economic issue demonstrate his basic theology of history: renaissance will occur through an intelligent and responsible exercise of cooperation with God's grace:

What is [a decision to buy war bonds] if not that the old economists' robot, motivated by self-interest and living on the animal level of pleasure and pain, is supplanted by our idea of reasonable men living rational lives? . . . If we take this opportunity seriously and make the most of it, we are making here and now the greatest possible contribution we can to

^{109} SC.
the development of a democratic technique that can confront and solve any economic problem.\textsuperscript{110}

**Conclusion: Verbum and Beyond**

Let me review what it is that I have tried to achieve in this chapter. I begin by recalling the hypothesis that I seek to test in this dissertation: In the years 1938-53, Lonergan continued to hold the dialectic of history as a concern of central importance. I point out that it is only in this chapter that I actually begin to address this question. Chapter 1 is devoted to outlining the nature of Lonergan's concern for the redemption of history before this period. In Chapter 1, I focus particularly on the recently discovered documents of File 713--History. I also base my comments on the work of other commentators on Lonergan.

After stating my purpose for Chapter 2, my next step is to explain the Toynebeean notion of "withdrawal" and "return." I employ the terminology of Frederick E. Crowe to suggest that Lonergan's protracted study of Aquinas was merely a temporary withdrawal from questions of history. The purpose of this withdrawal was to develop deep philosophical foundations. I suggest that, from a position of a worked-out understanding of subjectivity, Lonergan hoped to return to questions of history with greater effect.

I next identify biographical details from Lonergan's life

\textsuperscript{110}Ibid.
that lend support to my hypothesis that a concern for history persisted as his underlying motivation. My focus is on the years when he returned from his doctorate in Rome and taught in Montreal for six years. I suggest that his pastoral involvements, as well as his interest in economics, indicate that he remained very much part of what I call the Catholic Action ethos.

A further stage of the argument of this chapter involves a schematic outline of Lonergan’s understanding of the theology of grace held by Aquinas. This was the topic of his doctoral dissertation, but I also employ other sources from the 1940’s where Lonergan writes on topics relevant to a theology of grace. After this account of Lonergan’s deepening study of a theology of grace, I seek to demonstrate that he immediately begins to show evidence that this deepening theological insight is producing a more sophisticated account of both decline and renaissance in history. To make this point, I focus on Lonergan’s article "Finality, Love, Marriage," and on his more popular writings in The Montreal Beacon.
PART II

INSIGHT: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A THEOLOGY OF HISTORY
CHAPTER 3

EMERGENT PROBABILITY AND THE UPPER CONTEXT OF INSIGHT

In my last chapter, I attempted to grapple with a methodological problem: how does one study what is only an underlying concern? I acknowledged that the period 1938-49 was largely constituted for Lonergan by a withdrawal from questions of history and a direct study of the works of Aquinas. I suggested that the nature of the withdrawal pointed to an eventual return to the issues that I claim to be Lonergan’s underlying concern. Furthermore, I pointed to biographical details and some other writings produced during this time that demonstrated a continuing concern with questions of history. Likewise, I suggested that Lonergan showed some signs of applying the theology of grace he was learning from Aquinas to some current historical issues.

I now proceed to test my hypothesis regarding Lonergan’s underlying concern by studying Lonergan’s masterwork of philosophical foundations, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*. My discussion in Part II and Part III of this dissertation will be devoted to an interpretation of *Insight*. Both parts will respond to the challenge of studying what is only an underlying concern.

*Insight* is a long work and one that is very demanding on the reader. My strategy for Part II of this dissertation is one that
could make the student of *Insight* groan. In Part II, I study what Lonergan asserts to be the explicit development of his argument through its twenty chapters. However, using the Epilogue as interpretive key, I stress that Lonergan understood *Insight* to be part of a "far larger work." I suggest that this far larger work would more clearly address the question of an analytic concept of history. The difficulty of explaining this point is that it presupposes an ability to grasp many of the complexities of *Insight* in one viewpoint. Then, as an additional step, the reader needs to anticipate how this work can be considered merely the foundation for further understanding.

In Part III, I adopt yet another strategy for explaining *Insight*. I suggest that, in addition to the argument that Lonergan explicitly identifies as advancing through the pages of *Insight*, there are various "loose ends" that are evident in his discussion. These loose ends are lesser themes that constitute something of a digression from the explicit framework of Lonergan's argument in the book as a whole. Significantly, I note that such digressions often involve questions directly related to an analytic concept of history. I then attempt to discuss these themes without claiming that they are more central to *Insight* than in fact they are.¹

¹In my introduction to this dissertation, I mentioned Lonergan's account in *Method in Theology* of the tasks of interpretation. I pointed out how he asserts that increased knowledge of the author often helps answer various puzzles that arise in one's reading of the author's works. I suspect this is above all the case with respect to the kind of loose ends that are present in the writings of most creative thinkers. Consequently, if
The Epilogue as Interpretive Key to Insight

I now turn to make a somewhat paradoxical statement. My interest is in reading *Insight* in the light of Lonergan's concern with the redemption of history. I find that the best place to begin is the Epilogue. There is one main reason for this. It is only in the Epilogue that Lonergan explicitly writes as a Christian theologian. He makes it clear that, while *Insight* is strictly a work of philosophy, nevertheless, it is intended to be part of a "far larger" work that would be explicitly theological. Upon further investigation, we recognize that this theological work would include an account of an analytic concept of history. To recognize this is of great importance for my

there is anything original in the interpretation of *Insight* that I perform in this dissertation, I expect it will largely occur in Part III. Much of what I deal with in Part II is discussed in a more comprehensive manner in another dissertation, written by Anne Marie Martin Brennan: "Bernard Lonergan's World View: Emergent Probability and the God-World Relation" (PhD. diss., Columbia University, 1973 [copy in the library of the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto]).

Lonergan asserts that in the Epilogue, as opposed to the rest of *Insight*, he writes "from the terminal viewpoint of a believer, a Catholic, and, as it happens, a professor of dogmatic theology" (754).

Ibid. Lonergan speaks of theology as constituting the intellectual component of human collaboration with the divine solution to the problem of evil. He speaks of "the higher collaboration which it [*Insight*] has envisaged and to which it leads" (ibid.).

Lonergan asserts that the question of how theology relates to the human sciences "in large measure has dictated the structure of the present work" (ibid., 765). At the end of Chapter 4 I will demonstrate how Lonergan's answer to this question relies on an analytic concept of history. Thus, I feel justified in concluding that the assertion of what "in large measure has dictated the structure" of *Insight* can be referred to an ultimate purpose of
inquiry in this dissertation. In the Epilogue to Insight, Lonergan makes it clear that the concerns that motivated him in his writings in the 1930's continue to motivate him in 1953.

Throughout Insight, Lonergan is scrupulous in writing as a philosopher. The justification for this option is already present in his study of Aquinas. As I noted in my last chapter, Lonergan stresses the importance of the distinction made by Aquinas between the natural and supernatural orders. This distinction, in turn, supports a principle that philosophy has its own distinct realm of inquiry with its own proper importance.⁵

Now, it is only at the end of the next chapter that I attempt to explain more comprehensively how, in the Epilogue of Insight, Lonergan relates what has gone before it to a theology of history. My reason is this: Lonergan's assertions on this theme anticipate work that he intends to perform subsequent to the writing of Insight. There are other statements in the Epilogue that help us understand the key steps of the argument of Insight itself. I devote most of this chapter and the next one to employing these statements as a structure with which to analyze being employed in an analytic concept of history.

⁵Lonergan claims that his strategy in this respect is consistent with central themes in Roman Catholic tradition. He adverts to the statements of Vatican I on the "role of understanding in faith" and asserts that his own efforts in exploring what it is to understand "can hardly fail to promote the limited but most fruitful understanding of the Christian mysteries" (Lonergan, Insight, 756). He contrasts such a position with "the various irrationalist tendencies that can be traced from the medieval period through the Reformation to their sharp manifestation in Kierkegaard's reaction to Hegelianism and in contemporary dialectical and existentialist trends" (ibid., 754).
the book. Only after this lengthy preparation do I explore the meaning of Lonergan's statements regarding how *Insight* offers a philosophy of history that must be completed by a theology of history.

Before proceeding to offer such an account of the actual contents of *Insight* I want to make some further preliminary points.

**Clarifying Terminology**

I would now like to both recall and further clarify some terminological points. I believe that clarity on this issue can greatly assist an understanding of what is the central insight of Part II of this dissertation: *Insight* provides the philosophical foundations for an analytic concept of history to be written subsequently. This analytic concept of history has a component that is explicitly theological. Consequently, I find it helpful to refer to this analytic concept of history as a theology of history. Thus, I restate the central insight of Part II: *Insight* provides the philosophical foundations for a theology of history.

In my discussion of File 713 in Chapter 1, I speak of a deep concern held by Lonergan for the "redemption of history." In choosing this term, I follow the lead of Joseph Komonchak in his article "Lonergan's Early Essays on the Redemption of History." I choose to avoid the term "dialectic of history" favoured by Michael Shute. I understand this to be a term employed by Lonergan later in his life; I have not found it used either in
the documents of File 713 or in the works written in the years 1940-53 that I study in this dissertation.

Regarding the themes of File 713, I assert that Lonergan's concern for the redemption of history expresses itself in a search for an analytic concept of history. I now prefer to refer to this analytic concept as "a theology of history." I want to stress that it is Lonergan's belief that such a theology will provide the anticipatory categories by which all historical events can be understood and, in the context of which, choices for constructive action can be made. There is no doubt that Lonergan uses a variety of terms for this anticipatory theory; as well as "analytic concept" he includes terms such as "a philosophy of history" and "a theory of history." However, I suggest that the term "a theology of history" is more accurate in explaining what Lonergan is actually doing.

In Chapter 2, I note that in the 1940's Lonergan devotes considerable time to a study of economics. I suggest that this constitutes a new expression of Lonergan's concern with the redemption of history. I therefore speak of Lonergan's concern with the redemption of history dividing into two distinct areas of inquiry: a theology of history and a treatise on economic theory. I note that this dissertation is concerned only with the first of these.6

6In this context, it is worth recalling Lonergan's statement in a letter to his superior in 1938:
As philosophy of history is as yet not recognized as the essential branch of philosophy that it is, I hardly expect to have it assigned me as my subject during the
I now return to the task of Part II of this dissertation. I seek to demonstrate that Insight is to be understood as a work that is subordinate to Lonergan's interest in a theology of history. It constitutes the philosophical foundations for such a theology.

Adding to the Old With the New

I now want to make a further preliminary point before discussing the contents of Insight. It concerns the relationship between Insight and the products of Lonergan's "eleven years of apprenticeship to Aquinas." Here again, the Epilogue to Insight offers helpful clarification.

In the Epilogue, Lonergan quotes again the personal motto that we read in the letter of 1935 to his Provincial Superior.\(^7\)

\[\text{biennium. I wish to ask your approval for maintaining my interest in it, profiting by such opportunities as may crop up, and in general devoting to it such time as I prudently judged can be spared (Letter to Fr. Keane, August 10 1938).}\]

Now, in fact, it would appear that, after writing his doctoral dissertation, Lonergan devoted his spare time to writing economics and not to work on a philosophy of history. This suggests to me that the two concerns are very closely related. This further encourages me in making the terminological distinctions that I speak of above: Lonergan's overarching concern is with the redemption of history; this concern finds two more applied expressions: work on a theology of history and work on economic theory.

\(^7\)Crowe, Lonergan, 55. See footnote 2, Chapter 3 above.

\(^8\)In "Letter to Fr. Keane," January 22, 1935, p. 6, Lonergan writes of Pope Leo XIII's dictum "Back to Thomas" and asserts: I take him at his word. I also accept his "vetera novis augere et perficere"; hence my excursion into the metaphysic of history. (This quotation is offered in Liddy, 111, with an incorrect
He associates himself with the project of Pope Leo XIII: "vetera novis augere et perficere" ["to add to and perfect the old with the new"]. Next, he asserts that his studies of Gratia Operans and Verbum are a study of the vetera. He describes such work as an attempt to "reach the mind of Aquinas." He adds, however, that a full study of such vetera requires bringing the insights forward to be completed by the nova. Such nova are the complementary insights possible in the light of the philosophical developments of modernity. He asserts: "To penetrate to the mind of a medieval thinker is to go beyond his words and phrases. It is to effect an advance in depth."  

Finally, it is only on the basis of such an advance in depth on the question of the foundations of knowing and doing that

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9Lonergan, Insight, 768. See editor’s comment, ibid., xvi.

10Ibid., 769.

11Ibid.

12A further question of terminology arises here. I choose to use the term "foundations" to express Lonergan’s account of human subjectivity. An argument might be made that Lonergan came to use this term mostly after the writing of Insight. Certainly, it is a term that is mostly found in Method in Theology. However, if we remember Lonergan’s expression in his letter to Fr. Keane of 1935, I believe that we can accept the term "foundations" as equivalent to the things that "admit no explanation" that must ground every philosophical argument:

You have to explain everything except what you can prove to admit no explanation: otherwise you are not a philosopher or your system is inadequate ("Letter to Fr. Keane," 1935, quoted in Liddy, 112).

I avoid the term "philosophical foundations" because Lonergan holds that the fact of grace is also a foundational fact of subjectivity. Likewise, I do not use Lonergan’s term in Insight: "fixed base" (Lonergan, Insight, 22, 769-70). As a synonym for
one can hope to contribute intelligently, and thus effectively, to the solutions for the problems of our time. Clearly, Lonergan's understanding of Insight is that it articulates the insights of Aquinas for the modern day while at the same time improving on some of them:

One can hope to reach the mind of Aquinas, and once that mind is reached, then it is difficult not to import his compelling genius to the problems of this latter day.\(^\text{13}\)

It now remains for us to say more on the actual composition of this tome of twentieth century philosophy.

**The Upper Context of Insight**

Early in the Epilogue, Lonergan outlines what he claims to be "the inner logic" of the plan with which he began.\(^\text{14}\) He speaks of the book at first treating of a "succession of lower contexts."\(^\text{15}\) Such lower contexts include accounts of how insight is attained in geometry or natural science. However, Lonergan asserts that these lower contexts serve as parts of a more general argument. In this more general argument, or "upper context," Lonergan is not concerned with the truths of geometry or natural science as such. Rather, he considers such issues as "foundations," "fixed base" would obviously be acceptable. However, in Insight, Lonergan uses the term in a sense that seems to apply more clearly to knowing than to willing or the life of grace.

\(^\text{13}\)Lonergan, *Insight*, 770.

\(^\text{14}\)Ibid., 754.

\(^\text{15}\)Ibid.
examples of the more properly philosophical concerns that are the
direct object of his inquiry. Lonergan asserts that the upper
context of Insight is constituted according to five main steps:

The upper context was to be constituted (1) by the
invariant structures of experiencing, inquiring, and
reflecting, (2) by the consequent isomorphic structures
of all there is to be known of the universe of
proportionate being, (3) by the fuller invariant
structure that adds reasonable choice and action to
intelligent and reasonable knowing, (4) by the
profonder structure of knowing and known to be reached
by acknowledging the full significance of the detached,
disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, and (5) by
the structure of the process in which the existential
situation sets human intelligence the problem of rising
above its native resources and seeking the divine
solution to man's incapacity for sustained
development.\footnote{Ibid.}

I devote the rest of this chapter and most of the next one
to an outline of the meaning of these five steps. However, while
this might appear to be a helpful organising strategy there
remain some difficulties. These five steps include a great deal
of complex argument. In addition to this complexity, there is
included in the course of Lonergan's discussion an invitation to
the reader to perform acts of self-affirmation. My account of the
upper context of Insight cannot pretend to reproduce this
process. Consequently, a yet more specific principle of selection
is needed as I offer an account of the upper context. The one I
choose is an obvious one. I shall outline the steps of the upper
context in so far as they help us to understand the Epilogue. In
particular, I want to offer a basis for understanding Lonergan's
statement regarding how Insight must be considered as a
contribution "to the higher collaboration" that adds explicitly theological beliefs to the philosophical foundations of Insight.

The principles of selection that I employ in Part II lead me to focus on one theme that appears recurrently throughout Insight. The theme is Lonergan's notion of emergent probability. I will thus seek to demonstrate how our notion of emergent probability develops through each of the five steps of the upper context of Insight. In conclusion, I will suggest that the far larger, and theological work to which Lonergan understands Insight to contribute would make central use of a notion of emergent probability.

Step 1: The Invariant Structures of Experiencing, Inquiring and Reflecting

The first step of the argument of Insight covers ground that I introduced in Chapter 1. I outlined how Lonergan's notion of the levels of cognition was emerging in the 1930's. I asserted that, while he was always an original thinker in this area, he was influenced by authors such as Joseph Maréchal, Peter Hoenen, and Leo Keeler. Lonergan devotes about half of Insight to

\[17\]Ibid.

\[18\]I shall employ a direct quotation from Lonergan's expression of each of the five steps of the upper context of Insight in the titles of these next five sections. This explains why this title refers to the invariant structures of "experiencing, inquiring and reflecting" and not the more familiar expression: "experience, understanding and judgment" (cf., ibid., 769, 592).
explaining, and inviting readers to affirm on the basis of the data of their own consciousness, the existence of the invariant structures of experiencing, inquiring, and reflecting. He introduces this account of knowing with a discussion of the kind of knowing that occurs in mathematics and natural sciences.

Insight in Geometry

In Chapter 1 of *Insight*, Lonergan discusses the nature of insight in geometry. In the subsection entitled "Definition," Lonergan asserts: "As every schoolboy knows, a circle is a locus of coplanar points equidistant from a center." He adds, however, that "what every schoolboy does not know is the difference between repeating that definition, as a parrot might, and uttering it intelligently."\(^{19}\) He suggests that we are constituted by what he calls a pure desire to know. He asserts that this "primordial drive"\(^{20}\) stimulates constant questioning about our environment. He also describes this desire as a sense of wonder. Such wonder stimulates the question "why is this round?", or "why is this a circle?"

Lonergan asserts that, at this preliminary stage of knowing, it is essential for us to work with images. He offers an example. He suggests that the question of the definition of a circle might arise for an individual while looking at a cartwheel. What follows next is "the clue." This might be that "roundness has

\(^{19}\)Ibid., 31.

\(^{20}\)Ibid., 34.
something to do with the spokes all being the same length." As
imagination cooperates with intelligence, a new process can begin
that presses the limits of what can be imagined. We can recognize
that questions such as the thickness of the rim, or the distance
between spokes distract us from our basic question of what is a
circle. Thus we "push" the image "for all it is worth." We
imagine a rim of infinitely small thickness and spokes of
infinitely large number.

What happens next is of central importance for us. Insight
into the image occurs. This insight is into intelligible
relations that exist in the image. We recognize that if the
spokes are truly equal in length then the rim must necessarily be
round. We can note that at the level of insight notions of
"necessity" and "impossibility" come into play.21 We have now
entered into a new realm of cognitional activity. Necessity and
impossibility cannot be imagined. For all its capacity to imagine
what does not exist, imagination is reliant on the visual world
of sense. In understanding, we are able to grasp such notions as
necessity and impossibility. There has been a qualitative
transformation. We have transcended the world of sense and now
operate in a world of intelligence.

The distinctiveness of the world of intelligence is perhaps
most easily demonstrated with reference to what follows
immediately upon the act of insight. Lonergan asserts that we

21Ibid., 32.

22Ibid., 33.
next struggle to articulate what it is that we have understood.
We begin a process not of imagining but what we might call a kind
of intelligent "groping." Lonergan describes this groping as the
formulating of concepts: it also involves "supposing,
thinking, considering, formulating, defining." He asserts:
"Just as imagination is the playground of our desires and our
fears, so conception is the playground of our intelligence."25

In the process of supposing that succeeds insight the rim
and spokes that we imagined before the act of insight are
revisited. However thin the rim was in our imagination, it
necessarily had magnitude. Now, however, we can think about lines
and points without magnitude. This supposing enables us to
formulate an accurate definition of what it is that we have
understood. We can assert that a circle is constituted by "a

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21 Ibid., 32.

24 Ibid., 33.

25 Ibid., 32. It is worth noting that Lonergan's account of
insight and conceptualization in Insight is a direct transposition
of what he had already discovered in Aquinas. On the question of
insight into phantasm Lonergan stresses the significance of the
following statement of Aquinas:
Quilibet in se ipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis
conatur aliquid intelligere, format sibi aliqua
phantasmata per modum exemplorum in quibus quasi
inspiciat quod intelligere studet. ["Anyone can
experience this in himself, when one tries to understand
something, one forms for oneself certain phantasms as
exemplars, in which, so to speak, one sees what one is
trying to understand"] (Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I, q.84, a.
7 c., quoted in Lonergan, Verbum, 25).
Furthermore, Lonergan's account of conceptualization is based on
Aquinas' explanation of emanatio intelligibilis (see ibid., 33).
locus of coplanar points equidistant from a center.”

If we investigate such a definition more closely, we recognize that it includes both terms and relations. Terms, in this case, include points and lines. Relations include equal distance and roundness. Lonergan adds that there is a sense in which we can speak of terms and relations defining each other:

For every basic insight there is a circle of terms and relations, such that the terms fix the relations, the relations fix the terms, and the insight fixes both. If one grasps the necessary and sufficient conditions for the perfect roundness of this imagined plane curve, then one grasps not only the circle but also the point, the line, the circumference, the radii, the plane, and equality. All the concepts tumble out together, because all are needed to express adequately a single insight . . . all hang together from a single insight.  

Imagination and Explanation

In Lonergan’s example of insight in geometry I have been stressing how insight transcends the world of sense. It is of the greatest importance to appreciate this point. We have noted, also, that while insight understands that which cannot be imagined, nevertheless, imagination plays a crucial role in the questioning process that precedes insight. Lonergan calls this the "heuristic" function of imagination. The word heuristic has its origins in the Greek word "to discover."

Now Lonergan also speaks of a second, "representative"
function of imagination. This function comes in to play after the act of insight. It is a process by which we tend to use images to approximate the concepts we are abstracting from the insights we have just experienced. Such representative images are necessarily rough approximations; we should not confuse them with the concepts themselves. Nevertheless, it seems that we need to use this kind of process as we engage in the difficult process of expressing just what it is that we have understood:

Once one catches on to the law of the circle, the insight and consequent definition exert a backward influence upon imagination. The geometer imagines dots but thinks of points; he imagines fine threads but thinks of lines. The thinking is exact and precise, and imagination does its best to keep pace.²⁹

**Insight in "Classical" Science**

In chapter 2 of *Insight*, Lonergan continues to encourage us to gain "insight into insight." In this chapter, however, he moves from the more "static" world of geometry to the more "dynamic" one of empirical science.³⁰

As in Chapter 1, Lonergan offers an account of one example of insight in empirical science. The example he gives is that of Galileo discovering the law of falling bodies. While there are obvious differences between geometrical and empirical understanding, we are left with essentially the same message. In the sciences, as in geometry, there is a process of questioning

²⁹Ibid., 59.
³⁰Ibid., 57.
that leads to insight; on the basis of such insight the inquirer can formulate a definition.

The most obvious difference between science and mathematics is the necessity of fieldwork in scientific understanding. Galileo needed to perform numerous experiments with falling bodies. He needed to record his observed results from these experiments. Only after performing these tasks was he able to gain insight into the law at work and to express this in a vocabulary of terms and relations. The need for fieldwork in science raises a new question regarding the certainty of its discoveries. The world of the empirical sciences always involves a degree of approximation. Few of Galileo's results would have conformed precisely to the law he divines in them. His insight is into "possibility" rather than into "necessity and impossibility." The possible truths discovered by science are always open to revision in the light of new data.

With regard to Lonergan's discussion of empirical science there is one more important point to note. In explaining this kind of inquiry, Lonergan introduces the notion of a "heuristic structure." As we have already indicated, the term "heuristic" has its origin in the Greek word "to discover." It is a word of considerable importance to Lonergan's argument in Insight. It refers to a kind of native endowment in ourselves as knowers. Even before insight occurs we are able to anticipate the steps

\[\text{Ibid.}, 58.\]

\[\text{Ibid.}, 58-9.\]
that we need to take in order to attain it. Lonergan asserts that
the scientific method of Galileo was operated according to a
"heuristic structure." Galileo's great intuition is that
mathematics can be applied to natural phenomena to reveal "laws"
that operate in the physical world. Such an intuition provided
Galileo with what we might call his basic heuristic principle.
His task then reduced itself to discovering just what
mathematical laws were operating in any given situation:

Scientists achieve understanding, but they do so only
at the end of an inquiry. Moreover, their inquiry is
methodical, and method consists in ordering means to
achieve an end. But how can means be ordered to an end
when the end is knowledge and the knowledge is not yet
acquired? The answer to this puzzle is the heuristic
structure. Name the unknown. Work out its properties.
Use the properties to direct, order, guide the
inquiry.³³

Lonergan names the kind of method of inquiry exemplified by
the heuristic structure of Galileo as "classical."³⁴ The reason
he offers for this is that it was the structure employed by the

³³Ibid., 68. On the basis of our study of Lonergan's writings
in File 713 we can recognize something familiar in this notion of
a heuristic structure. Its meaning is very close to what he calls
an "analytic concept" in those early writings. However, we might
assert that the term "heuristic structure" is more explanatory than
"analytic concept." The application of mathematics to natural
phenomena involves more than simply an application of certain
concepts to data. It involves a structured pattern of acts of
intelligence, some of which employ mathematical concepts.
Furthermore, later in Insight, Lonergan will assert that the
ultimate heuristic structure is simply the pattern of operations
that involves our three levels of cognition: experience,
understanding and judgment. It would be very misleading to employ
the term concept in reference to this fundamental heuristic
structure. The whole point about Lonergan's account of the
cognitional levels is that they precede both insight and
conceptualization.

³⁴Ibid., 69.
famous figures of the scientific revolution. We might add another reason for the appropriateness of this term: it is based on a straightforward satisfaction of our desire to gain insight into the "nature" of things.¹⁵ Not all insights involve so straightforward an answer to our desire to know. This leads us to a discussion of what Lonergan calls statistical science and to the distinct heuristic structure that is associated with it.

Insight in "Statistical" Science

The first step Lonergan takes in explaining this distinct scientific method is to speak of a different kind of insight. He distinguishes "direct" insight from "inverse" insight. We have already been dealt with direct insight as exemplified by geometry and classical science. Lonergan now proceeds to explain this alternative kind of insight.

Unlike direct insights, Lonergan states that "inverse insight apprehends that in some fashion the point is that there is no point."³⁶ He asserts:

An inverse insight has three characteristics: it supposes a positive object of inquiry; it denies intelligibility to the object; and the denial runs counter to spontaneous anticipations of intelligence.³⁷

One example Lonergan offers is Newton's first law of motion. This law states that "a body continues in its existing state of

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¹⁵Ibid., 60.
³⁶Ibid., 44.
³⁷Ibid., 78.
uniform motion in a straight line unless that state is changed by external force." The natural expectation of any one who played with toy cars as a child is that an object will only remain in motion as long as a force is applied to it. Thus, Newton's law of motion denies the intelligibility we would naturally expect. It expresses an inverse insight.

To further explain inverse insight and the scientific method that employs it we need understand Lonergan's notion of an "empirical residue." We might jokingly demonstrate this notion by stating that it did not matter whether Galileo conducted his experiments on falling bodies from the Leaning Tower of Pisa or The Basilica of St. Peter in Rome. Lonergan stresses with regard to scientific inquiry "differences of particular places and particular times involve no immanent intelligibility of their own." Lonergan names such factors as the place and date of Galileo's experiments as part of the "empirical residue." He asserts that it was by abstracting from the "residual" details that Galileo gained his insight.

If we understand Lonergan's notions of inverse insight and empirical residue, we can now proceed to a study of statistical science. Briefly put, statistical science employs inverse insights to wrest some further intelligibility from the empirical residue than that which is possible in classical science.

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Ibid., 46.

Ibid., 50.

Ibid., 52.
Lonergan asserts that the statistical scientist concerns herself with "concrete situations." As a first step in exercising her heuristic structure, she observes occurrences. An example might be a count of daily death rates in the population of the U.S.A. in the month of April. Lonergan asserts:

The statistical scientist seems content to define events and areas, to count the instances of each defined class within the defined area, and to offer some general but rather vague view of things as a whole.  

Lonergan asserts that the statistical scientist looks more closely at that which the classical scientist considers to be uninteresting. If a classical scientist was to try and find an intelligibility in the total deaths for any one day in April, he would have to study the causes of the deaths of each individual. Even after that, the classical scientist would still reach a result that "lacked generality." The small difference in the "basic situation" of the next day in the U.S.A. would render useless any deductions from the deaths of the previous day.

Obviously, the classical scientist would never concern himself with explaining or predicting daily death rates in a country. He would confidently believe that the cause of death in any one instance could usually be identified. However, the frequencies of deaths both countrywide and from day to day would be considered of no interest. We can recognize that the classical

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41Ibid., 76.
42Ibid., 77.
43Ibid., 80.
scientist would invoke the logic of empirical residue here. He would claim that death rates are devoid of intelligibility and refuse to study them.

Now, Lonergan asserts that "statistical inquiry finds an intelligibility in what classical inquiry neglects." He asserts that just as classical science distinguishes laws from the empirical residue, so statistical science is the "positive advance of intelligence through the gap in intelligibility in coincidental aggregates of events." So it is that we now come to our explanation of what it is that most characterizes the statistical scientist. She gains a direct insight into the probability of the occurrence of certain kinds of events. Lonergan speaks of an act in which "intelligence leaps from frequencies to probabilities."

Lonergan asserts that we are able to differentiate between merely random occurrences and those that have a certain probability of occurrence. We are able to postulate an imaginary central line about which the actual occurrences of data will oscillate. In this oscillation we have discovered something that is no longer nonsystematic but, rather, systematic:

Intelligence, then, can grasp a regularity in the frequencies by abstracting from their random features and by settling on the centre about which they

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44Ibid., 80.
45Ibid.
46Ibid., 82.
Now that we have a certain understanding of the statistical heuristic structure as well as the classical one, a new question can occur to us. How do these methods relate to each other? Are they compatible or mutually exclusive?

Complementary Methods

Let us recall our image of Galileo performing his experiments by dropping weights off the tower at Pisa. Now, we should be clear that there is no evidence that Galileo had any sense of a statistical heuristic method. His was already a momentous achievement to pioneer the use of classical heuristic method in the physical sciences. Nevertheless, we can recognize that, implicitly, he would have been using the inverse insights which are the basis of statistical method.

Galileo's method for timing the falls of weights would have been rather crude. The results of his observations, therefore, will inevitably have had a considerable nonsystematic component. We can imagine Galileo first having a statistical insight into the meaning of his data. His mind must have leaped to recognize a trend in the data. He was postulating a line about which his data were oscillating in a systematic fashion. We can speculate that, only on the basis of this notional line, did Galileo then have his "classical" insight about the relation of proportionality between time of fall and distance travelled.

47Ibid., 85.
Lonergan uses the term "conjugates" to name the relations discovered in data observed. He speaks of "events" as being the concern of the statistical inquirer. Using these terms he makes a general statement regarding the compatibility of the two forms of inquiry:

Classical and statistical formulations are complementary. For classical formulations regard conjugates, which are verified only in events. And statistical formulations regard events, which are defined only by conjugates.46

Lonergan further illustrates this point with examples. One of these describes how scientists can recognize "laws of probable error" in their work. By invoking these they are thereby able "to eliminate a nonsystematic component in observations and measurements."47

Lonergan next asks a further, profound, question. This question arises when one accepts the compatibility of the two methods of inquiry. It is "What world view is involved by our affirmation of both classical and statistical laws?"50 We noted, above, that when we use the term "heuristic" we are implying a kind of native anticipation of answers that exists in the human mind. We explained both the more ordinary insights of classical method as well as the "queer type of insights"51 of statistical method. The question remains as to what is the "immanent design

46Ibid., 131.
47Ibid., 129.
50Ibid., 138.
51Ibid., 126.
or order\textsuperscript{52} that we anticipate in a universe that will yield to both of these methods of inquiry.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{Emergent Probability as World-View}

Lonergan has an answer to the question of what world-view is implied by the use of both classical and statistical heuristic methods. He states that the world anticipated by such acts of knowing is one that is emergently probable. His account of emergent probability is difficult to understand. However, once grasped it is remarkably satisfying. First of all, it embraces an account of the randomness of events in the universe—the kind of events into which some understanding can be won by acts of inverse insight. This randomness is much stressed in modern science and can seem to undermine any belief in a directedness to the universe. Secondly, however, Lonergan's account of emergent probability does enable just the kind of insight into the universe that appeals to our desire for direct insight.

A first step in understanding emergent probability is to acquaint ourselves with the complex notion of a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., 139.

\textsuperscript{53}We can note that, strictly speaking, it is a digression to discuss this issue in this section. "The invariant structures of experiencing, inquiring and reflecting" should be expected to progress through a more limited outline of the three levels of cognition: experience, understanding and judgment. However, my discussion of each of the five steps of the upper context will stress how the notion of emergent probability is relevant to all of them. At any rate, Lonergan himself introduces the notion of emergent probability in \textit{Insight} in the same order that I do.
Conditioned Series of Schemes of Recurrence

Lonergan first explains what he understands to be a scheme of recurrence. I want to offer an example of this based on some time I spent living in Southern Zambia.\footnote{Lonergan tends to engage in complicated scientific explanation of terms such as schemes of recurrence. I choose to offer more easily understandable examples while offering references to Lonergan's more scientific account in Insight.} Coming from so rainy a country as Ireland, I was surprised to witness that rainfall in Southern Zambia occurs only for three months of the year. I learnt that there is a system of rain-clouds that remains permanently placed over Africa. However, this rain-belt oscillates north and south of the Equator. In about July, it reaches as far north as the Tropic of Cancer; in about January, it dips as far south as the Tropic of Capricorn. The cause of this oscillation is the heat of the Sun. The rain-belt is drawn to the hotter regions. Furthermore, the cause of the shifting patterns of heat is the fact that different latitudes of the Earth are more directly exposed to the Sun as the planet Earth conducts its annual revolution around its star. To put this in the language of common sense, the rain-belt "follows the Sun" north and south of the Equator.

My point is this, the rainy season in Zambia is a scheme of recurrence. It is the product of a series of interconnected causes.\footnote{Lonergan asserts that examples of schemes of recurrence include the planetary system, the circulation of water over the surface of the earth, and the routines of animal life (ibid., 141).} Now, if we have an appreciation of what a scheme of
To offer an example of such conditioned schemes, I want to describe the consequences that the arrival of the rains brings to vegetative and animal life in Zambia. Once again, coming from a country that is green all year long, I was very struck by how the Zambian countryside seems to burst into life as soon as the rains arrive. Putting this in more explanatory fashion, we can note that a series of further schemes of recurrence are "conditioned" by the arrival of rain.

A first scheme that is conditioned by the falling of the rain is the springing up of thick green savannah grass that previously looked brown and dead. Subsequent on this, an enormous amount of insect life is suddenly noticeable. This seems to occur immediately, but in fact there is a short time lag. For the most part, these insects live on the newly emerging vegetation. An additional conditioned scheme of recurrence is bird life. The hatching of fledging birds occurs subsequent to the emergence of insect life. Parent birds are seen manically hunting for insects to bring back to their nests. Another, similar conditioned series schemes of recurrence is found in the game-parks. Animals such as antelopes give birth to their young as the grass begin to turn green. So also do carnivorous animals such as lions. The conditioned relationship between these schemes of recurrence
needs no explanation! \(^{56}\)

One final point is worth making here. The conditioned series of schemes of recurrence can, as Lonergan calls it, "coil around in a circle." \(^{57}\) Ecologists note that the herbivorous animals can damage grasslands by overgrazing. Consequently, they understand carnivorous animals to provide a service to the whole ecosystem by maintaining the populations of herbivorous animals at levels that the grasslands can sustain. \(^{58}\)

The Probability of Emergence of Schemes

I have now outlined Lonergan's understanding of a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence. I have stressed how each scheme is intelligible and how the conditioning relationship between schemes can also be understood by acts of direct insight. I now want to stress that there is an element of randomness in the occurrence of schemes of recurrence. This randomness can be investigated by statistical heuristic method. \(^{59}\)

The rainy season in Zambia has been becoming more

\(^{56}\) As an example of a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence, Lonergan himself points to the relationship between herbivorous and carnivorous animals (ibid., 142).

\(^{57}\) Ibid.

\(^{58}\) To a certain extent, the coiling of schemes of recurrence in Zambia extends even to rainfall. The more there is vegetation such as trees in a region, the heavier will be the rainfall. Thus, soil erosion can directly reduce rainfall. However, in the case of the Zambian rainy season, much of the rain is carried south from the evaporation of vegetation in the wetter equatorial regions.

\(^{59}\) See ibid., 143-4.
unpredictable in recent years. It is becoming increasingly variable both in time of arrival and in duration. Meteorologists are not certain of the cause of this. However, this does seem related to certain changes in climatic patterns that are occurring world-wide. One can speculate that the characteristics of the hot air that draws the rain-belt north and south of the Equator is beginning to change. This would seem to be causing a change in the pattern of movement of the rain clouds.

Meteorologists do not fully understand the nature and causes of the climatic change that is occurring. However, they are able to apply statistical methods to wrest some intelligibility from events. They are able to offer some estimation of the probability of drought occurring in Southern Zambia. This probability is increasing. In response to this, the governments of countries in the region have taken steps to build massive grain storage centres so that agricultural surpluses from one year can be saved for another one.

On the basis of what I have outlined, we can appreciate how the combining of classical and statistical methods of enquiry can help us to construct a certain world-view. Lonergan calls this

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Lonergan notes that a series of schemes of recurrence is more probable if it is conditioned than if it is not. In other words, there is a difference between the series A, B, C only occurring by a chance combination, and the occurrences B and C occurring automatically if only A occurs (ibid., 144). However, the problem with drought in Zambia is that it involves the withdrawal of the first term of the conditioned series of schemes of recurrence. As a result, even if the probability of the subsequent schemes is increased by their conditioning each other, the absence of rain makes their joint occurrence highly improbable.
world-view a "general notion of emergent probability." He adds that it "possesses rather remarkable potentialities of explanation." He asserts:

From these considerations there now comes to light the notion of an emergent probability. For the actual functioning of earlier schemes in the series fulfils the conditions of the possibility of the functioning of later schemes . . . But what is probable, sooner or later occurs. When it occurs, a probability of emergence is replaced by a probability of survival; and as long as the scheme survives, it is in its turn fulfilling conditions for the possibility of still later schemes in the series.

Having now introduced Lonergan's notion of emergent probability, I want to proceed immediately to the second step of the upper context of Insight. In doing this I am taking certain liberties with Lonergan's account of the first step. We have noted that he declares the first step of the upper context to include "the invariant structures of experiencing, inquiring and reflecting." In my account of the first step, I have only outlined the invariant structures of "experience and inquiring." I leave my account of "reflecting" over to the beginning of the next step. My specific reason for doing this will become more clear in my succeeding account. However, my general reason is that I am being selective in my account of the five steps. As I mentioned in my introductory section, I am paying particular attention to how Lonergan's notion of emergent probability is

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61 Ibid., 145.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., 754.
developed in each of the steps. My reason for doing this is that it will help me explain what Lonergan means in the Epilogue to *Insight* by asserting that the book should be understood as intended for incorporation into a "far larger work."

**Step 2: The Isomorphic Structures of Knowing and Proportionate Being**

Lonergan's account of the isomorphic structures of knowing and proportionate being is one of the great achievements of *Insight*. It involves a transition from cognitional theory to epistemology, and from epistemology to metaphysics. Unfortunately, this is also the part of that work which my account will have to pass over most superficially. My main reason for this is that, in the context of the question that guides my enquiry in this dissertation, my interest in this issue is limited. My particular interest is to trace the theme of emergent probability through the five steps of the upper context of this great work. The main significance of the second step for our account of emergent probability can be easily stated: it demonstrates that emergent probability is not merely a world-view, but the "actual order of the universe."^64^

cognition: judgment.\textsuperscript{65} I shall now offer a brief account of Lonergan's explanation of act of knowing. After this, I shall proceed, even more rapidly to comment on his metaphysics. Let us recall the account I offered in Chapter 1 of what Lonergan learnt from Leo W. Keeler regarding judgment. In 1935, Lonergan states of Keeler's work:

He especially tries to show that for St. Thomas the apprehension of a nexus is one thing, that the act of assent is another; the former dwelling in the purely intelligible world, the latter affirming the objective existence of the intellectual content.\textsuperscript{56}

In Insight, Lonergan offers a sophisticated account of how an inquiry may proceed from a "purely intelligible world" to one that is able to affirm "objective existence."\textsuperscript{67} He offers an account of the operations involved in coming to judgment. He then

\textsuperscript{65}Lonergan employs a kind of shorthand in naming the cognitional levels. He speaks of "the three levels of experience, insight, and judgment" (e.g., ibid., 592). I have already outlined how there is more to the second level of cognition than an act of insight. There is also the labour of conceptualization. Nevertheless, Lonergan labels the cognitional level "insight." Likewise, at the third cognitional level the act of self-commitment in judgment comes only at the end of a series of operations. Above all, judgment is explained as following on an act of "reflective insight" much as conceptualization follows on an act of "direct insight." Nevertheless, since Lonergan himself uses the shorthand of referring to the cognitional levels in this manner, it seems appropriate for me to follow this practice.

\textsuperscript{66}Lonergan, "Keeler Review," Quoted in Liddy, 98.

\textsuperscript{67}Frederick Crowe points out that the account of judgment in Insight is one notable place where we witness Lonergan "refine the Thomist solution" to a problem of cognitional theory (Frederick E. Crowe, "Lonergan's Search for Foundations: The Early Years, 1940-59," in Searching for Cultural Foundations, ed. Philip MacShane [Lanham, Maryland: the University Press of America, 1984], 118). In complementing Aquinas, Lonergan draws particularly on the work of John Henry Newman (see Caring About Meaning, 13-14; also Liddy, Chapter 2).
invites each reader of *Insight* to an act of self-affirmation as a knower. This self-affirmation comes to completion in an act of judgment in which an individual affirms that Lonergan's account of the three levels of cognition—experience, understanding, judgment—really do operate as he describes. He stresses that, as a result of self-affirmation, we can affirm that we are capable of knowing being. Another manner of speaking of being is that it is "the real." Consequently, he asserts that our knowing involves an objectivity.\textsuperscript{68}

Now, the next move in Lonergan's argument is significant for the discussion of emergent probability that is my concern in this present discussion. Lonergan points out that by our acts of knowing we are "heading for being."\textsuperscript{69} He adds that, while intelligence heads for being, nevertheless, intelligibility "is not all of a piece."\textsuperscript{70} He reminds us that we have to pass through experience and understanding before rational reflection brings us to judgment. He then asserts that there is an aspect of objectivity that corresponds to each of these cognitional levels. He speaks of an "experiential objectivity" that refers to how we attend adequately to the data of sense. Likewise, "normative objectivity" involves acting with the full use of intelligence that is demanded by the pure desire to know operating at the second level of cognition. Finally, "absolute objectivity" is the

\textsuperscript{68}These points are elaborated in Chapters 9-13 of *Insight*.

\textsuperscript{69}Ibid., 401.

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., 524.
dimension of objectivity that is arrived at by judgment. Let us recall that what we affirm in judgment is not an "absolutely unconditioned," but only a "virtually unconditioned." Clearly, the object of our affirmation will be a limited instance of being. Nevertheless, its existence can be affirmed absolutely."

Now, we have acknowledged that intelligibility is not "all of a piece." We have noted that objectivity involves a three-fold process by which we "head for being." Consequent on this, Lonergan concludes that there must be an "element" or "component" of being that is "proportionate" to each of the cognitional levels by which we attain being. So it is that Lonergan proceeds to discuss the broad outlines of any instance of being that can be attained by human acts of knowing. To anticipate the broad outlines of being in this manner is to engage in proportionate metaphysics.

Metaphysics

In chapter 14 of Insight, Lonergan speaks of the proportionality between knowing and being. He does acknowledge that a valid question can be asked regarding "the possibility of man knowing what lies beyond the limits of human experience." However, he asserts that "it will simplify matters enormously" if discussion of being can prescind from that question until a

71Ibid., 402-7.
72Ibid., 456.
73Ibid., 416.
later stage of the book. In a later chapter of *Insight*, Lonergan does return to the question of being that is not proportionate but "transcendent." This question involves a proof of the existence of God. We will address it in our account of the fourth step of the upper context of *Insight*.

So it is that Lonergan applies himself to a lengthy study of the "integral heuristic structure of proportionate being." He borrows a term from mathematics and names the proportionality between knowing and the objects of our inquiry an "isomorphism." He defines this term as stating that "the pattern of relations between the acts [of knowing] is similar in form to the pattern of the relations between the contents of the acts." Thus it is that we can speak of "contents" of proportionate being by analogy with our cognitional acts.

Lonergan next makes a claim regarding the most fundamental elements of proportionate being. He identifies them as "potency," "form" and "act." Simply put, these are the elements of proportionate being that are isomorphic with our three cognitional levels. He asserts that "form" is that element of proportionate being which we grasp in insight. Thus, as a metaphysical element it corresponds to the second cognitional level. "Potency" is the element that corresponds to the first cognitional level. It is the potential intelligibility of the

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"Ibid., 415.

"Ibid., 424.

"Ibid., 416-7."
materials in which insight grasps the intelligible relations.
Lonergan asserts that it is "the intelligibility of the materials
in which the idea is emergent, which the idea unifies and
relates."  
Finally, we note that a formal intelligibility may
or may not "actually" be. "Act," therefore, is the element of
proportionate being that "is restricted to what in fact is." 
It is the element of proportionate being that corresponds to the
cognitional level of judgment.

Lonergan has more to say about the metaphysics of potency,
form and act than I can deal with in this work. 
However, what
I do want to stress is that Lonergan offers heuristic
anticipations of proportionate being always by analogy with
cognitional acts. He insists:

For every difference in intelligibility there is a
difference intrinsic to the reality of known
proportionate being.  

Following on this principle, Lonergan notes that a study of
cognitional acts reveals not only the fact of three levels but
also the process by which our pure desire to know promotes us
from one level to another. In our discussion of the acts of

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77 Ibid., 524.

78 Ibid., 525.

79 Lonergan in fact speaks not of three metaphysical elements
but six. He distinguishes "central potency, central form and
central act" from "conjugate potency, conjugate form and conjugate
act." The distinction is based on the fact that we can understand
data in two different ways: as intelligibly unified (and here's
where central form comes in), or as intelligibly related to other
data (and here's where conjugate forms come in).

80 Ibid., 525.
intelligence, we have noted the great stress Lonergan places on
the emergence of insight from phantasm. Similarly, then, it is
appropriate to ask a question about the existence of an
isomorphic emergence in proportionate being itself.

Lonergan does indeed hold that there is an emergence in
being. However, when we approach this question, we return to the
issues discussed in our account of emergent probability. Lonergan
is clear that the primary instance of emergence is the "leap" of
insight that occurs into phantasm. However, we have noted that
insights can occur that are either direct or inverse in nature.
In my account of the first step of the upper context of Insight I
outlined Lonergan's argument as to how heuristic methods that
anticipate both these kinds of acts of insight imply a certain
"world-view." I next outlined that this world-view involves
anticipating conditioned series of schemes of recurrence.
Lonergan calls the process by which such schemes occur "emergent
probability."

I have now arrived at the point in my account of the second
step of the upper context of Insight that is key to what I need
to explain for the purposes of this dissertation. On the basis of
Lonergan's transition from cognitional theory to metaphysics, we
can affirm that emergent probability is not merely a world-view.
In fact, it is the "actual order of the universe."81 Lonergan
speaks of a "dynamic aspect of the real."82 He calls it

81 Ibid., 720.
82 Ibid., 472.
"finality":

It is not only our notion of being [i.e., pure desire to know] that is heuristic, that heads for an objective that can be defined only in terms of the process of knowing it, but also the reality of proportionate being itself exhibits a similar incompleteness and a similar dynamic orientation towards a completeness that becomes determinate only in the process of completion. . . . Such is the meaning we would attach to the name "finality." . . . the objective universe is not at rest, not static, not fixed in the present, but in process, in tension, fluid.83

An Emergently Probable Universe

I have now outlined the main insight from the second step of the upper context of Insight that I believe is relevant to this dissertation. However, before proceeding to the third step, I want to elaborate on Lonergan's notion of emergent probability. In particular, I want to introduce his notions of genus, species, things, and evolution. However, in order to do this, I need to return to an account of certain aspects of cognitional activity. Using the principle of the isomorphism of knowing and proportionate being, Lonergan proceeds from an account of these cognitional events to definitions of these terms.

Higher Viewpoints

At the beginning of this chapter, I outlined Lonergan's account of how insight occurs into phantasm. I considered

83Ibid., 470. A comprehensive account of the early Lonergan's notion of finality is offered by Gordon Rixon. This outline is offered with explicit reference to the continuity of this notion with the documents of File 713.
Lonergan's example of discovering the definition of a circle. Immediately after offering this example, Lonergan offers examples of additional kinds of insights. He points out that insights develop from each other:

The next significant step to be taken in working out the nature of insight is to analyze development. Single insights occur either in isolation or in related fields. . . . But the matter does not end there. Still further insights arise. The shortcomings of the previous position become recognized. New definitions and postulates are devised. . . . Such a complex shift in the whole structure of insights, definitions, postulates, deductions, and applications may be referred to very briefly as the emergence of a higher viewpoint.84

Lonergan offers an example of how algebra develops from arithmetic.85 He first points out how a number of insights are required to construct the intellectual system of arithmetic. Next, he explains the representative function of imagination that I have already outlined above. He points out that this representative function of imagination can be expressed in the writing of our mathematical insights in a system of symbols. He then asserts that these symbols can become the basis for additional acts of insight. Such insight grasps "a higher set of rules"86 in the symbols being studied:

The symbolism appropriate to any stage of mathematical development provides the image in which may be grasped by insight the rules for the next stage.87

84Lonergan, Insight, 37-8.
85Ibid., 37-43.
86Ibid., 42.
87Ibid., 43.
Let me attempt some more examples of higher viewpoints. Many people have a certain appreciation of how relativity theory relates to Newtonian physics. Without being physicists ourselves, we can grasp that all truths of Newtonian physics are really special instances of more general laws that are grasped by relativity theory. Higher viewpoints can also occur on a common sense level. Psychotherapy offers examples of this. An adult can come to a therapist with the insight: "something is wrong." Subsequently, the individual can labour through a series of single insights into painful experiences in her past. Finally, a higher viewpoint can arrive: "I was an abused child!"

One more example of a higher viewpoint occurs to me. In Part II of this dissertation I identify a higher viewpoint to which Lonergan invites us in the Epilogue of Insight. Reading through the eight hundred pages of this book involves a labour of winning many insights. However, in the Epilogue, Lonergan invites us to recognize the whole book as something that is to be taken up into the higher viewpoint of a "far larger work" that will be explicitly theological in nature.

Genus and Species

Having returned to a discussion of cognitional acts, I want to proceed again to a discussion of aspects of proportionate being. To do this, I want to take up again the example I offered of the events of the rainy season in Southern Zambia. I have spoken of occurrences such as rainfall, the growth of grass, and
the activities of herbivorous and carnivorous animals. I pointed out that all these constitute a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence. I now want to point out that these schemes of recurrence can differ with respect to genus.

Let us first think of the new rains interacting with the soil. This interaction occurs at a level that can be studied in terms of physics and chemistry. These sciences are powerful tools; one can employ them to study a range of phenomena. One can study the chemistry of soils, or one can turn to astronomy and speculate as to the chemistry of stars. However, if we think of the plant life that begins to sprout from the soil when the rains begin to fall, we recognize that the heuristic methods of physics and chemistry are not adequate to the task:

When one turns from physics and chemistry to astronomy, one employs the same basic terms and correlations; but when one turns from physics and chemistry to biology, one is confronted with an entirely new set of basic concepts and laws.88

The biological events of a plant constitute a higher integration of physical and chemical events. Chemical events such as photosynthesis are now employed in the service of a living thing. Lonergan asserts that things studied by biology are of a higher genus than those studied by chemistry or physics. He employs the principle of isomorphism to explain genus. It is that dimension in proportionate being that is isomorphic to higher viewpoints in cognitional activity. He asserts that the sciences that study the different genera are related to each other as

88 Ibid., 281.
lower and higher viewpoints:

The successive departments of science are related, for the laws of the lower order yield images in which insight grasps clues to law of the higher order. .... the chemistry of the cell can yield an image of catalytic process in which insight can grasp biological laws. Again, an image of the eye, optic nerve and cerebrum can lead to insights that grasp properties of the psychic event 'seeing.'

If plant life is a higher genus than soil chemistry, so also is animal life a higher integration of biological life. Lonergan points out that animals integrate the biological events of neural activity into the functioning of a nervous system. Thus, what distinguishes animals from plants is psychic consciousness.

Now, within the one genus we can also recognize differences of species. Different species of plants will organize the physical and chemical possibilities of their environment in different manners. Thus, savannah grass has a hardiness that helps it survive in the rather dry plains; certain kinds of shrubs and trees will only flourish by rivers. Let us again employ the principle of isomorphism of knowing and proportionate being to explain species. A difference of species is analogous to a difference of insights within the one viewpoint. Let us think of the different definitions of a circle and of an equilateral triangle. These definitions are both within the viewpoint of Euclidian geometry. Analogously, we can speak of savannah grass and other shrubs as constituting different species of the genus of plant.

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89Ibid., 282.
I next want to outline how Lonergan defines the term "thing." Readers of Insight might jokingly protest that they thought they knew what a thing was until they encountered Lonergan's definition of it. However, Lonergan insists that what a thing is is not as obvious as it often seems to be. The complication becomes evident when we consider an example. In an animal there occur, all at once, schemes of recurrence of different genera. At one level, the animal is just a collection of atoms. These atoms can be studied by physics. However, if we take an example of the atoms in the liver, there will occur an interaction of the atoms of the liver itself with those of the blood streaming through it. These events cannot be adequately explained by physics. Chemistry is needed to understand that what is in fact happening is that blood is been purified before being sent, once again around the vascular system:

If the laws of subatomic elements have to regard the regular behaviour of atoms as mere patterns of happy coincidences, then there is an autonomous science of chemistry.\(^90\)

In addition to our example of physical and chemical genera in an animal, we can note that events of yet higher genera occur. The "happy coincidences" of the chemical level transpire to be essential parts of biological functioning. Likewise, the happy coincidences of biological functioning transpire to be the

\(^{90}\)Ibid., 276.

\(^{91}\)Ibid., 281.
organization of neural events into psychic functioning.

So it is that Lonergan asserts that in each thing there can be a "series of levels of operation with each higher level making systematic what otherwise would have been merely coincidental on the previous level." So thus we can replace the descriptive term "happy coincidence" with the more explanatory one "coincidental manifold." Lonergan asserts that there cannot be a "thing within a thing." Rather, to identify a thing we must identify the laws of the highest genus that are at work. We need then to gain insight into the fact that there is a "unity-identity-whole" that is the unifying principle for the schemes of recurrence at all these different levels.

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92 Ibid., 639-40.

93 Ibid., 477.

94 Ibid., 283.

95 Ibid., 284. A pertinent example occurs to me of the need to recognize the distinction between a thing and the terms and relations that can occur at lower genera within it. My example is taken from one episode of the television series "Star Trek." The crew of space explorers of the "Star Ship Enterprise" find what appears to be a cloud of matter particles that is the size of many planets put together. The particles in this cloud are not very densely packed. The captain orders the space ship into this cloud only to find many particles combining and starting to bombard them threatening to break up the ship. They eventually deduce that the cloud is, in fact, a giant single-cell organism. They recognize that by flying into it they had severely damaged it. The organism is responding by forming structures similar to the antibodies humans form against viral invasion. Armed with this knowledge, and to the viewers relief, the crew are able to find a way of safely exiting the organism and healing the damage they produced in it.
Evolution

If we understand Lonergan’s definition of a thing, we can proceed to a further insight regarding emergent probability. Evolution occurs whereby the process of emergent probability of proportionate being fosters the emergence of new things.

Let us once again return to the facts of cognitional activity to recognize the ground for what we can assert regarding evolution. Let us recall Lonergan’s principle for metaphysics: "For every difference in intelligibility there is a difference intrinsic to the reality of known proportionate being." 96 Let us also recall Lonergan’s account of how we are driven by our notion of being to strive to answer one question after another. Lonergan concludes that this conscious striving is only the human manifestation of a principle of striving at work in all of proportionate being. He speaks of the "dynamic aspect of the real." 97 He calls this aspect "finality":

It is not only our notion of being that is heuristic, that heads for an objective that can be defined only in terms of the process of knowing it, but also the reality of proportionate being itself exhibits a similar incompleteness and a similar dynamic orientation towards a completeness that becomes determinate only in the process of completion. . . . Such is the meaning we would attach to the name "finality." . . . the objective universe is not at rest, not static, not fixed in the present, but in process, in tension, fluid. 98

Let us recall that our account of the actual order of the

96 Ibid., 525.
97 Ibid., 472.
98 Ibid., 470.
universe includes an attentiveness to random occurrences as well as classical laws. There is a randomness in the occurrence of events at the level of any given genus. It is not possible to predict just what plants will take root where along a river bank in Zambia. Similarly, just where the antelope are grazing in a game park is a question that causes anxiety for many a tourist guide.

If these examples of randomness are somewhat trivial, let us consider some that are less so. In the reproductive process of every species there is a certain randomness in the genetic characteristics of each offspring. For example, scientists believe that in prehistoric times certain fish accidentally developed a limited ability to breathe oxygen directly from the atmosphere. Some of these fish began to use this facility to avoid predatory fish. They would beach themselves on a shore at high tide and wait for a return of the tide to carry them back to sea. These creatures were sufficiently successful to propagate in numbers. Eventually, further accidental developments led to the emergence of the species of amphibians and, later still, of mammals.

Lonergan now asserts that this randomness affords a kind of "raw material" for the emergence of new genera and species. Those events that can only appear as a coincidental manifold at the level of a given genus and species can "call forth," as it were, new laws and schemes of recurrence that employ these events systematically. A new thing emerges that can be either a new
species, or occasionally, a new genus. Lonergan calls this assertion the "evolutionary postulate." 99

Conclusion

I have now outlined the first two of the five steps of the upper context of Insight. As already mentioned, I am attempting to outline each of the five steps with a particular goal in mind. I am seeking to explain the meaning of Lonergan's statement in the Epilogue that Insight is intended as part of a far larger work. I hope to demonstrate that in this far larger work Lonergan's concern with developing a theology of history would be evident. Consequently, Insight can be understood as providing the philosophical foundations for such a theology of history.

My account of the steps of the upper context of Insight has focused on explaining Lonergan's notion of emergent probability. In the first step, I outlined Lonergan's argument that both classical and statistical heuristic methods are compatible with each other. Consequent on this, I outlined how he claims that the fact that these two methods can be employed to understand how our environment implies a certain world-view. This world-view is characterised as one of "emergent probability." In studying the second step of the upper context, I stressed that emergent probability can be affirmed as not merely a world-view but as the

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99Ibid., 285. Lonergan asserts that this principle was already understood in the middle ages. He quotes an old axiom: Materiae dispositae advenit forma [form comes to matter disposed to receive it] (ibid., 285).
"actual order of the universe." I proceeded to outline some more of its characteristics. A key point to recall is that Lonergan speaks of "the dynamic aspect of the real." This helps me proceed to my next chapter and to introduce Lonergan's third step. In it he makes the key affirmation: "The advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability." I want to stress the importance of the insight expressed in this quotation. I might hazard the suggestion that it is the single most important contribution that Insight makes to the theology of history that Lonergan had been developing prior to the writing of this book.

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106 Ibid., 235.
CHAPTER 4
EMERGENT PROBABILITY, HUMAN BEINGS, AND GOD

In this chapter I outline the remaining three steps of the upper context of Insight. On the basis of this, I finally return to the discussion that is most directly relevant to the question I am investigating in this dissertation. This discussion highlights how, for all that Insight is a highly demanding work in its own right, it should properly be regarded as part of a "far larger" work.¹ Now, my main argument in Part II is that the relevance of Insight to a theology of history is best understood in the context of what Lonergan intends to write subsequent to this book. However, the final three steps of the upper context also have some direct applicability to such a theme.

Lonergan’s ethics is directly relevant to an account of progress and decline. His discussion of the divine solution to the problem of evil is relevant to an understanding of renaissance in history. As I now proceed to outline Lonergan’s account of ethics the links with the documents of File 713 become more evident. However, more than this, there are many links with Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Lonergan’s commentary on ethics in Insight is not extensive. We can recognize that much of what he does assert is directly transposed from the insights he found in Aquinas.

¹Lonergan, Insight, 754.
Step 3: Fuller Invariant Structures

Lonergan explains the third step of the upper context of *Insight* as speaking of

The fuller invariant structure that adds reasonable choice and action to intelligent and reasonable knowing.¹

In Chapter 2, I have already noted Lonergan's interpretation of how Aquinas understands the relationship of intellect and will. Chapter 18 of *Insight* is entitled "The Possibility of Ethics." This chapter on ethics carries forward the insights of Aquinas in a direct manner.² In my account of this chapter, I first demonstrate the similarity between the account of the will in *Insight* and in the works of Aquinas as interpreted by Lonergan. After this I proceed to identify how Lonergan develops the insights of Aquinas. Above all, he does this by applying this account of human decision-making to the context of emergent probability.

The Will As "Spiritual Appetite"

In our account of Lonergan’s interpretation of Aquinas we noted a claim that there are two causes of the will. The first is

²Ibid., 754.

¹It will be in Lonergan’s later work, *Method in Theology*, that he offers a major development of Aquinas’ account of the operations of the will. This later account will centre on an argument that decision constitutes a fourth level of consciousness. Now, in *Insight*, Lonergan does advance on Aquinas’ ethics. However, he does this largely by applying it to the context of a metaphysics of emergent probability. His account of the workings of the will seems to remain very close to the one offered in *Grace and Freedom*. 
intellect; the second is a power within the will to exercise its own self-movement.  

In Chapter 18 of Insight we find this same distinction. Lonergan asserts that "the goodness of being comes to light only by considering the extension of intellectual activity that we name deliberation and decision, choice and will."  

Lonergan's explanation of the first step of this extension is essentially the same as his account of the first cause of the will in Aquinas. He describes how the will is moved by intellect:

Will . . . is intellectual or spiritual appetite. As capacity for sensitive hunger stands to sensible food, so will stands to objects presented by intellect. As a bare capacity, will extends to every intellectual object, and so both to every possible order and to every concrete object as subsumed under some possible order.  

In Chapter 2, I stressed Lonergan's claim that there are a number of goods toward which the will is drawn. I further noted Lonergan's assertion that there is an "upward dispositive tendency" whereby the authentic person recognizes some higher

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4Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 101. Aquinas refers to the first cause as coming from intellect and operating quoad specificationem actus (as regards the specification of an activity). The second cause of the will operates quoad exercitium actus (as regards the exercise of the activity). In fact, Aquinas speaks of these two causes as being two "first causes" of the will (ibid; 142). However, such terminology is cumbersome and I will speak simply of two causes. At any rate, it would seem that these two causes should best be explained as being efficient causes (a definition of efficient cause is offered in Lonergan, Insight, 619).

5Lonergan, Insight, 619.

6Ibid., 621.
goods that have a primary call on our loyalty. Likewise, in *Insight* Lonergan differentiates between different appetites of the will. He gives particular mention to three levels of the good.

A first or "elementary level" of the good is where the good is an "object of desire." It is "experienced as pleasant, enjoyable, satisfying." Corresponding to this, the bad is considered to be all that is opposite to these sensations. When we pursue and obtain such satisfactions, we learn something. This introduces a second level of the good that Lonergan calls the "good of order." He points out that there is a manner in which the repeated availability of satisfactions can be obtained by the creation of such institutions as "polity, the economy, the family". Such a good of order appeals to our intelligence.

Finally, Lonergan speaks of a third level of the good that "emerges on the level of reflection and judgment, of deliberation and choice." He calls it the "good of value." The good of value can be well explained by reference to Lonergan's writings before *Insight*. We have already noted Lonergan's assertions that there is a "dispositive upward tendency" between the various appetites of the will. Now, we have noted that the good of order is a value that appeals to the intelligence. A good of order can

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9Ibid., 620-21.
ensures that appetites are satisfied not randomly but systematically. The appeal of the good of order can simply be that it offers an intelligent manner of satisfying our spontaneous desires. However, Lonergan speaks of the importance of our ability to experience and respond to "higher" or "more rational" desires. Essentially, a response to a more rational good involves a concern for the good of others as well as one's self. From this account of a more rational good, we can explain Lonergan's understanding of the good of value. An individual can respond to a good of order in a rational fashion. She can experience it as an "object of human devotion" because of how it fulfils the needs of others as well as those of herself. People who respond to a good of order in this fashion can then commit themselves to a cause with "all the ardor of their being." They can sustain a commitment to such a value to the extent of foregoing the satisfaction of many personal needs. An example of this is the manner in which some women in recent years have devoted themselves to the women's movement. We might recall the example of the English Suffragette in the early part of this century who met her death by throwing herself under the hooves of

 Lonergan asserts: There are many appetites, but not any one responds to any motive; each has its proper object, to which it is specially fitted, and to that alone does it respond... Just as food suits hunger, just as care of her child suits a mother, so the reasonable good suits rational appetite (ibid., 24-5).

 Lonergan, Insight, 621.

 Ibid.
the racehorse of the King of England. She did this as a protest at refusal of the right to vote for women.

Creating New Being

I have outlined Lonergan's account in *Insight* of how the will resonates to the notion of the good provided to it by intellect. This corresponds to Aquinas' first cause of the will. Lonergan next proceeds to an account of the exercise of human freedom. This corresponds to the self-movement of the will that constitutes Aquinas' second cause.14

Having outlined how the will desires the good, Lonergan now points out how the will seeks to attain it. This will usually require a move to decision and action. He asserts that, at this stage, the will "reemploys" intellect. This time intelligence is being employed in a manner that is "practical." Lonergan distinguishes practical intelligence from the speculative intelligence that he investigates with respect to mathematical and scientific inquiry. He stresses that the objective of practical insight "is not what is but what is to be done":15

14Lonergan does not actually distinguish explicitly between these two causes of the will in Chapter 18 of *Insight*. However, the titles of his first two sections are "The Notion of the Good," and "The Notion of Freedom." I understand this division to be influenced by Lonergan's acquaintance with the distinctions of Aquinas. It is the good that is affirmed by intellect that causes a movement of appetite in the will. This corresponds to the first cause of Aquinas. On the other hand, the question of freedom arises in the context of the will moving itself to action. This corresponds to Aquinas' second cause.

15Ibid., 633.
For human intelligence is not only speculative but also practical. So far from being content to determine the unities and correlations in things as they are, it is constantly on the watch to discern the possibilities that reveal things as they might be.  

Lonergan next stresses that practical insight is only a first step in the self-movement of the will that leads to external action. He insists that "the grasp of a possible course of action need not result automatically and blindly in its execution." He stresses that subsequent to practical insight, there occurs a process of practical reflection. He states that reflection of this kind considers such factors as the consequences of the proposed course of action, and whether such action would have a negative consequence on other values. Practical reflection seeks, as it were, to "double-check" how sincere are one's motives in choosing an action.

Now, we have already discussed another kind of reflection that occurs at the third level of cognition. It is the reflection that is involved in a judgment of fact. Instances of this kind of reflection are terminated by an act of reflective insight. There is a difference with practical reflection. Practical reflection is concerned, not with affirming the actuality of an instance of proportionate being, but with a decision to try to create a new instance of proportionate being. Consequently, practical reflection cannot be terminated by an insight that the conditions

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16 Ibid., 621.
17 Ibid., 633.
18 Ibid., 633-4.
for affirming the existence of a conditioned are in fact fulfilled. In fact, practical reflection "can expand more or less indefinitely." The question thus arises: how is practical reflection brought to a conclusion?

Lonergan asserts that practical reflection is brought to term by decision. He adds that decision occurs as a kind of intervention of the will. Decision either consents or refuses to perform the action proposed by practical insight. In the act of deciding, the will reaches a conclusion that the process of practical reflection has arrived at a moment of what we might call "diminishing returns." It is unlikely that further reflection will greatly assist one's assessment of the situation. To use a popular idiom, one might say that the will recognizes that it is time to "put its money where its mouth is." A decision must be taken--either to act, or not to act.

Lonergan speaks of this act of decision as constituting a "final enlargement and transformation of consciousness." No longer is the individual merely concerned with the rational project of coming to grasp a virtually unconditioned and expressing it in a judgment of fact. Now there is the challenge of making one's doing conform to one's knowing. Lonergan calls this an act of "rational self-consciousness." More than at any prior level of consciousness, one is now challenged to involve

\[19\text{Ibid., 635.}\]
\[20\text{Ibid., 636.}\]
\[21\text{Ibid., 637.}\]
one's whole self in carrying through acts of knowing to their authentic end:

Judgment is an act of rational consciousness, but decision is an act of rational self-consciousness. The rationality of judgment emerges in the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know in the process towards knowledge of the universe of being. But the rationality of decision emerges in the demand of the rationally conscious subject for consistency between his knowing and his deciding and doing.22

Decision and Emergent Probability

In the section above, we can recognize a direct continuity between Lonergan's own account of the acts of will in Insight and those views he understands to have been held by Aquinas. We can now recognize how it is that Lonergan's account of ethics develops that of his medieval mentor. In the Epilogue to Insight, Lonergan indicates that his notion of "explanatory genera and species and of development itself" is one area where he significantly develops the thought of Aquinas.23 So it is that we can recognize a valuable originality in the manner in which Lonergan inserts his ethics into a context of emergent probability. In order to appreciate his argument in this respect we need to reflect a little more on the nature of the emergence of higher genera from lower.

22Ibid., 636.
23Ibid., 760.
Genera and Immanent Intelligibility

In our definition of genus above we pointed out that it obeys a set of laws that differ from those applicable to the genera preceding it. Lonergan takes note of the various genera and remarks on one striking difference as one climbs to each higher genus. He asserts that the question of intelligibility as an organizing principle increases in importance with each succeeding genus. We can begin to explore this point by investigating some of the most basic genera.

The move from subatomic particles to chemical combinations seems driven, as it were, by what we might call a logic from below. There are characteristics that are innate to certain subatomic particles which make their combination into chemical elements highly probable. However, as we move to the genus analyzed by biology we begin to notice a different logic at work. Biological species adapt to their environment in a manner that admits of vast variety. Lonergan explains such species as involving "a series of solutions." A plant, for example, is a solution to the problem of coping with a given environment. At the same time, the plant constitutes one "choice" of how to organize "coincidental aggregates of chemical processes" from the many possibilities open to it.

This greater complexity is still more obvious in the genus studied by zoology. The nervous system of an animal "makes systematic otherwise merely coincidental aggregates of neural

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24Ibid., 289.
events." Now, even more than a plant, animal species are to be understood as constituting differing solutions to the challenge of organizing neural events and adapting to an environment. We note, for example, that differing species of animals can have similar nervous systems; but where one animal develops speed, another develops strength.\(^{25}\)

So it is that higher genera are to be understood less as "driven from below" and more as constituting solutions to problems. However, Lonergan stresses that "a solution is the sort of thing that insight hits upon."\(^{26}\) Consequently, he speaks of "immanent intelligibility" increasing with genera:

Immanent intelligibility or constitutive design increases in significance as one mounts from higher to still higher systems.\(^{27}\)

This insight of Lonergan poses a challenge to modern biology. Lonergan criticises a practice in biology that is reductionistic. He insists that "an explanatory [as contrasted with a merely descriptive] account of animal species will differentiate animals not by their organic but by their psychic differences." He states that the approach by biologists "associated with the name of Darwin" has failed to do this.\(^{28}\)

We have been reflecting on how the laws that characterize one genus differ from the genera below it. This is most notably

\(^{25}\)Ibid.

\(^{26}\)Ibid., 290.

\(^{27}\)Ibid., 289.

\(^{28}\)Ibid., 290.
the case when we arrive at our own genus, the human. In our study of direct insight we noted the heuristic role played by imagination. Now, imagination is a function of our psyche. We next noted how insight grasps terms and relations in the data that are presented to us by our imaginations. Of course, this faculty of intelligence is a distinctively human capacity. Thus, Lonergan explains our intellectual capacities as "a higher system of sensitive process."\(^\text{29}\)

We have also noted how "immanent intelligibility" becomes an increasing characteristic of mounting genera. Lonergan declares that at the human level we recognize a final development. There now occurs "the transition from the intelligible to the intelligent."

**Emergent Probability and the "Advent of Man"**

We have noted Lonergan's account of how intellect can influence the will to produce decision and action. He adds that human action involves a creation of new being. He asserts that, "while speculative and factual insights are concerned to lead to knowledge of being, practical insights are concerned to lead to the making of being."\(^\text{30}\) Now, in my discussion of the second step of the upper context of *Insight*, I stressed Lonergan's insight

\(^{29}\text{Ibid., 291.}\)

\(^{30}\text{Ibid., 633. Of course, what humans create are new instances of proportionate being. However, in talking of the creations of moral action Lonergan does not always maintain this qualification. Following his lead, I do not now employ it with the same constancy as I did in earlier sections.}\)
that proportionate being is characterised by a process of emergent probability. He therefore comes to a conclusion of great importance:

The advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability.\textsuperscript{31}

Lonergan insists that intellectual development "reveals to a man a universe of being in which he is but an item."\textsuperscript{32} In my discussion of objectivity we have already outlined how speculative knowledge is a "heading for being."\textsuperscript{31} I now need to add that practical intelligence and reflection and action involve what we might call a "prolonging" of being. This prolonging of being must be in continuity with the world-process of emergent probability. Lonergan also names this process "finality."

I have been stressing that the arrival of a genus that is intelligent is in continuity with something that is emergent in earlier genera. Pre-human genera can increasingly be understood as intelligible solutions to problems posed by their environment. At the human genus a transition occurs from what is merely an increase in "constitutive intelligibility" to a genus that is intelligent.

If I have been stressing the continuity of the human genus with prior genera, I can now also affirm a more obvious point. The arrival of a genus that is intelligent introduces something

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., 235.

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., 498.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., 402.
radically new in the universe. This intelligent genus is capable of actually creating further instances of intelligible proportionate being. To explore this newness it is helpful to employ a distinction between "matter" and "spirit." Lonergan asserts that "spirit originates intelligible orders that are parallel to the intelligibilities investigated by empirical scientists." We therefore recognize a remarkable quality in the human exercise of practical intelligence. It not only obeys the laws of nature but also, to a certain extent, it creates them:

Practical insight, reflection, and decision are a legislative function: instead of being subject to laws, as are physical and chemical events, they are what make the laws of the distinctively human level of operations. This "legislative function" does indeed indicate a remarkable power wielded by humans. Nevertheless, we must also assert that the "new creations" of spirit should never be arbitrary. Individuals experience a sense of "responsibility" that their actions be both intelligent and rational. The study we have made of Aquinas' notion of the two causes of the will helps us to understand Lonergan's account of responsibility in Insight. To phrase this in the vocabulary of Aquinas, we can assert that the second cause of the will ought never to proceed without the first.

34 Ibid., 641.
35 Ibid., 640-1.
36 Ibid., 642.
Responsibility is an exigence that relates to freedom. Freedom, in turn, relates especially to the process by which practical insight passes through practical reflection to decision. Now, we are clear that this free "self-movement" of the will is the second cause of the will. By contrast, the first cause involves a resonance that is created in the will from the good that intellect affirms to be good. Consequently, judgments of value require a kind of humility on the part of the knowing subject. It is not for us to decide what is good. It is for us to dutifully recognize what is really and truly good in its own right:

Willing is rational and so moral. . . . Man is not only a knower but also a doer; the same intelligent and rational consciousness grounds the doing as well as the knowing; and from that identity of consciousness there springs inevitably an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing.37

I have now arrived at a central conclusion with regard to the third step of the upper context of Insight. The human spirit is characterised by both freedom and responsibility. Freedom involves the remarkable ability not only to know being but to create it. Responsibility, on the other hand, dictates that we should not create being in an arbitrary fashion. Rather, it is our responsibility to discern the process of the emergence of being and to prolong it in a way that is consistent with pre-

37Ibid., 622.
human process:

Freedom possesses not only the negative aspects of excluding necessity but also the positive aspect of responsibility.\textsuperscript{18}

Before concluding my account of the third step of the upper context, I want to investigate another point. To what extent can the vocabulary of genus and species be applied to human action?

Species of the Human Genus?

I have mentioned above an assertion of Lonergan's that I consider to be of great importance: "The advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability."\textsuperscript{19} Clearly, humans constitute a new genus in proportionate being. Lonergan next asserts that because of the intelligent nature of this genus, it no longer becomes relevant to speak of species. Of animal species

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., 642. Arguably a great mistake of twentieth century philosophy has been to ignore the fact that freedom carries with it responsibility. Perhaps a more balanced expression of this point would go as follows. In the centuries after Aquinas, philosophers did not always grasp what the self-movement of the will implies for human freedom. In the twentieth century, thinkers such as Jean-Paul Sartre counteracted this tendency with a very strong emphasis on freedom and moral agency. This insight was expressed in a context where the modern individual is very aware of how social reality is constructed by the free choices made by groups. However, this point was often made to the exclusion of any account of how the freedom of the will is related to rational judgment of value. It can seem that, for Sartre, the only "Bad Faith" is to deny that one possesses moral freedom. He does not seem to address the question of whether or not one exercises that freedom in a responsible manner.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., 235.
he asserts:

An animal species is a solution to the problem of living, so that a new solution would be a new species; for the animal to begin to live in quite a new fashion, there would be required not only a modification of its sensibility but also a modification of the organism that the sensibility systematizes.40

By contrast with this Lonergan reminds us that the human genus is characterised by intelligence. He asserts that "inquiry and insight are not so much a higher system as a perennial source of higher systems." He points out that we can create such higher systems as "science, a new civilization, a new philosophy." Momentous as are these achievements, they do not alter the nature of our intelligence or rationality once we have created them. So it is that it is not relevant to speak of different species of the human genus:

Mar., then, is at once explanatory genus and explanatory species. He is explanatory genus, for he represents a higher system beyond sensibility. But that genus is coincident with species, for it is not just a higher system but a source of higher systems. In man there occurs the transition from the intelligible to the intelligent.41

Studying Human Development

I have now introduced Lonergan’s understanding of how we can understand human activity in the context of an actual order of the universe constituted by emergent probability. I have noted his assertion that the human spirit has a legislative function

40Ibid., 291-2.

41Ibid., 292.
whereby it is capable of creating new instances of being. I have also noted his stress that this freedom comes with responsibility. I now need to outline more of Lonergan's analysis of human nature. In particular, I shall outline his account of human development. This will allow me to discuss Lonergan's account of the failure of human development that results in irresponsible acts. Clearly, this account will be relevant to an account of decline.

Genetic Method

The issue of studying things as participating in the process of emergent probability raises new questions regarding heuristic method. In fact, Lonergan asserts that a new heuristic method is required to study adequately the process of finality as evidenced in the biological and higher genera. He calls this "genetic method." In the following quotation, Lonergan defines genetic method as the study of development. In so doing, he offers a definition of development itself:

Where the physicist or chemist is out to determine single sets of conjugate forms and consequent schemes of recurrence, the biologist or psychologist or intellectual theorist is out to determine genetic sequences of conjugate forms and consequent sequences of flexible circles of schemes of recurrence.42

I have already explained what it means to say that things can be related according to "flexible circles of schemes of recurrence." I understand this to have the same meaning as the

42Ibid., 486, my underline.
"conditioned series of schemes of recurrence" that I explained in my last chapter. I noted Lonergan’s example of how animal life depends on vegetative life and how, in turn, there would be no carnivorous animals if there were not already herbivorous ones.\(^3\) In his account of development Lonergan stresses that we can also notice a "genetic sequence of conjugate forms" in proportionate being. This phrase refers to the fact that we can recognize a "genesis" within a living thing over time. At different stages of the development of this thing it is governed by different laws. Lonergan’s use of the term "conjugate form" in this context is equivalent to what I have been referring to simply as laws.

Lonergan offers an example to illustrate the development of "genetic sequences of conjugate forms." He speaks of an acorn undergoing germination and growing into a mature tree.\(^4\) Clearly, there will be a given circle of schemes of recurrences occurring as the acorn germinates. There will then be a different circle of schemes occurring when the tree comes to maturity. For that matter, the mature oak tree will demonstrate different circles of schemes of recurrence during Spring and Fall. Lonergan stresses that it is only by employing genetic method that "genetic sequences"\(^5\) can be studied with rigour. I will now outline some key dimensions of what a genetic method anticipates

\(^3\)Lonergan, *Insight*, 142.

\(^4\)Ibid., 486.

\(^5\)Ibid., 479.
as it studies its object.⁴⁶

**Integrator and Operator**

Genetic method investigates the transformations of laws that occur in development under the notions of "integrator" and "operator."⁴⁷ The term "integrator" is easy to understand in the light of our explanation of genus. It is the principle by which a higher system organizes the events and laws of the levels below it. If we study the plant as integrator we take note of how it provides a higher viewpoint for the physical and chemical processes occurring within it.

The notion of the operator refers to the principle of finality at work at any given level:

The organism grows and develops. Its higher system at any stage of development not only is an integrator but also an operator, that is, it so integrates the underlying manifold as to call forth . . . its own replacement by a more specific and effective integrator.⁴⁸

⁴⁶In fact, Lonergan offers a more explicit definition of development as "a flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence" (ibid.). For reasons of space, I have chosen to use the more implicit definition of the quotation given above. I believe it captures the essence of the meaning of development while avoiding the need to explain the meaning of terms such as the "principles of correspondence and emergence."

⁴⁷Ibid., 490.

⁴⁸Ibid., 490.
It is constituted inasmuch as the higher system not merely suffers but provokes the underlying instability.\textsuperscript{49}

Thus, a central dimension of genetic method is to "specify" both integrator and operator. The process involved in specifying the operator is particularly laborious. Lonergan speaks of the need to study carefully an organism at its various stages of development so as to specify the conjugate forms at work at any one stage. Next, one needs to study sequences of abnormal development as well as normal. Only after studying such data can one hope to move to the level of understanding. Thus, Lonergan asserts that understanding the operator is "grasping the interrelated set of capacities-to-perform."\textsuperscript{50}

There is another insight regarding integrator and operator that is important to grasp. Both integrator and operator are compelled to coexist as principles in things of the same genus. We can note that these principles must necessarily exist in tension with each other. Lonergan speaks of this tension as existing between what a thing is and what it can yet be. Consequently, he speaks of a law of development that is the "law of limitation and transcendence."\textsuperscript{51} The integrator limits what a thing is so as to provide a stable organization of the events of lower genera. The operator seeks to destabilize this situation so as to allow it to participate in a yet higher integration.

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., 497.
There is a further tension in the process of development that is of great significance. This tension concerns the fact that in any organism of reasonable sophistication there will be events of different genera occurring at the same time. Lonergan explains these tensions as related to what he calls "compound development."

Compound Development

Regarding the operating of laws of different genera within the one thing Lonergan asserts:

In the plant there is the single development of the organism; in the animal there is the twofold development of the organism and the psyche; in man there is the threefold development of the organism, the psyche, and intelligence.⁵²

These different genera of activities proceed according to laws that are distinct from one another. Nevertheless, what occurs at one level of activity will affect occurrences at other levels. Lonergan pays particular attention to the reality of "compound development" with respect to the "threelfold development" of the human.⁵³

Development occurs in the individual on each of the three levels of organism, psyche and intelligence. A point that follows from this is that there exists what Lonergan calls "a law of integration." Whenever a change occurs at one level, it will not survive unless "complementary adjustments and advances" occur at

⁵²Ibid., 484.

⁵³Ibid., 494-504, especially 495-97.
the other two levels:

The law of integration . . . is a declaration of what is meant by human development. Because man is a unity, his proper development is no more than initiated when a new scheme of recurrence is established in his outward behaviour, in his thinking and willing, in his perceptiveness and feeling, in the organic and neural basis of his action. Generally speaking, such an initiation of development invites complementary adjustments and advances, and unless they are effected, either the initiated development recedes and atrophies in favour of the dynamic unity of the subject, or else that unity is sacrificed and deformed.54

However, in the case of the human individual there remains more to be said regarding this tension. To begin with, Lonergan points out that "the tension that is inherent in the finality of all proportionate being becomes in man a conscious tension."55 He asserts that this tension exists between our conscious psyche and our spirit. We might quip that "this is where the problems begin." Lonergan asserts that in the case of human development this tension leads to a breakdown in the process of emergence in proportionate being. He adds that in the case of the human genus there is a natural "incapacity for sustained development."56

The Problem of Liberation

Lonergan asserts that there is an "existential" problem in compound human development. This problem results from the fact that spiritual development is at a permanent disadvantage with

54Ibid., 497.
55Ibid., 498.
56Ibid., 653.
respect to psychic development. Such a statement as this is familiar to us from Lonergan's writings in File 713 and in his studies of Aquinas. In the works of those earlier periods, Lonergan speaks of how rational desires are at a disadvantage to spontaneous desires. I understand Lonergan's comments on the problem of liberation to be a direct transposition of these insights. However, by situating such a phenomenon in the context of emergent probability Lonergan offers an account of it that has far greater explanatory power.

The Opposition of Psyche and Spirit

In order to investigate the tension of human consciousness, we now need to comment briefly on the nature of psychic development. Lonergan explains psychic development after discussing the development of earlier genera. From the biological level, he proceeds to discuss how a higher integration of organic development can be achieved by a development of the psyche. He notes that organic tissue can be arranged so as to become the neural tissue of a nervous system. So it is that an animal will organize the organic events of this level to "provide a basis for a sequence of increasingly complex forms of sensitive consciousness." Lonergan thus asserts that psychic development consists of "capacities for perceptiveness, for aggressive or affective response, for memory, for imaginative projects, and for skilfully and economically executed performance." 57

57Ibid., 481.
From this account of psychic development, Lonergan proceeds to discuss the tension in human consciousness between psyche and spirit. He speaks of how there are "deeper" dimensions to this tension than will be found in the tension between integrator and operator at any other genus. In fact, he explains the tension experienced in human consciousness as an opposition.  

Lonergan asserts that our desire to know differs from all other desires because it is "pure." He speaks of the pure desire to know as an "immanent source of transcendence" in each individual. We can appreciate this transcending quality of the pure desire by contrasting it with our other desires. These other desires are driven by our psychic needs. We might say that the psyche represents to the brain the biological demands of the organism. A central characteristic of the desires motivated by the psyche is that they have a self-centred quality. Above all, these desires revolve around concerns for nourishment, self-protection, and reproduction. By contrast with this the pure desire to know does enjoy a satisfaction in the experience of understanding. This satisfaction is not directly related to whether or not what is understood will result in the satisfaction of some bodily needs in the knower. Even the satisfaction of gaining insight is not sought merely for its own sake. The pure desire enjoys the satisfaction of gaining insight, but it

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58 Ibid., 498.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., 659.
"scorns" the pleasure of mistaken understanding. This purity of desire extends into the realm of human choice. We can feel attracted to, and believe to be correct, an exigence to put the good of others before our own.

We can state the difference between the pure desire and other desires in a simple manner. Each operates under different notions of what constitutes success. As an example of this let us imagine a woman teacher working in a high school in a poor inner-city. Let us imagine that she is short of stature and about to confront a male student who is both large and violent. We can imagine that she believes fervently in the value of maintaining proper behaviour in the school and successfully confronts the student. However, let us imagine that after this confrontation her body shakes for a considerable time. We might ironically assert that, in the act of shaking, her psyche is begging to disagree with her spirit's notion of successful operating. On this topic Lonergan asserts:

It is difficult for man, even in knowing, to be dominated simply by the pure desire, and it is far more difficult for him to permit that detachment and disinterestedness to dominate his whole way of life. For the self as perceiving and feeling, as enjoying and suffering, functions as an animal in an environment, as a self-attached and self-interested centre within its own narrow world of stimuli and responses. But the same self as inquiring and reflecting, as conceiving intelligently and judging reasonably, is carried by its own higher spontaneity to quite a different mode of operation with the opposite attributes of detachment and disinterestedness. It is confronted with a universe of being in which it finds itself, not the centre of reference, but an object coordinated with other objects

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61Ibid., 373.
and, with them, subordinated to some destiny to be discovered or invented, approved or disdained, accepted or repudiated.\textsuperscript{62}

When we appreciate the nature of the opposition between psyche and spirit, it is a small step to assert that the urges to satisfy more self-attached desires enjoy an advantage over the desires of objective knowing and truly free doing.

**Moral Impotence**

Lonergan points out that our more self-attached desires arise spontaneously. The pure desire to know is also a spontaneous desire. However, it is easily interfered with by other competing desires. This is especially the case regarding moral desires. Any child will agree that it is not easy to be good. Consequently, Lonergan points out that children have to be schooled into giving full rein to the more pure desires of the spirit. Of course, the truth is that, even with a good education, few if any individuals demonstrate a willingness that matches the unrestricted quality of the pure desire to know. Desires motivated by the psyche are seldom so well subordinated to the desires of spirit.

In this context, Lonergan makes a distinction between freedom that is "essential" and freedom that is "effective." \textsuperscript{63} He asserts that "essential freedom" is simply the result of the structure of our subjectivity. "Effective freedom," on the other hand,

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., 498, my underline.

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid., 643.
hand, is the actual freedom that is permitted by the degree of willingness we in fact possess. The gap between our essential and effective freedom is the measure of what Lonergan calls our "moral impotence." 64

If we are unlikely to meet any individual who possesses universal willingness, this is not to say that every individual exists in a state of complete moral impotence. Lonergan speaks of a half-way point between a condition where we reject all promptings of the pure desire and one where we enjoy universal willingness. He calls this "genuineness," 65 and asserts that to live in this state is a great achievement. Genuine individuals can acknowledge the value of universal willingness without claiming to possess it. Lonergan stresses that such persons will agree that their behaviour is inconsistent with their understanding.

There emerges into consciousness a concrete apprehension of an obviously practicable and proximate ideal self; but along with it there also emerges the tension between limitation and transcendence; and it is no vague tension between limitation in general and transcendence in general, but an unwelcome invasion of consciousness by opposed apprehensions of oneself as one concretely is and as one concretely is to be. Genuineness is the admission of that tension into consciousness. 66

The key point about a genuine person is that she is open to

64Ibid., 650.

65Ibid., 499. In the context of discussing genuineness we can recognize a particular appropriateness to the current idiom: "get real!" The genuine person can accurately affirm the reality of her degree of ability to let her doing follow her knowing.

66Ibid., 501-2.
further persuasion regarding increasing the scope of her willingness.\textsuperscript{67} By contrast, if some one denies the true extent to which his actions are governed by merely spontaneous desires, he is unlikely to grow in his ability to respond to the dictates of the pure desire.

Lonergan stresses a further unfortunate truth. He asserts that such is the extent of the moral impotence of humans that even the genuine person is hard to find. The truth for most of us is that even our intellectual activities conspire to close us to the insight that our self-attached desires should be prepared to give way to others of a purer motivation:

If effective freedom is to be won, it is not to be won easily. Just as the pure desire to know is the possibility but not in itself the attainment of the scientist's settled habit of constant inquiry, so the potency 'will' is the possibility but not in itself the attainment of the genuine person's complete openness to reflection and to rational persuasion. Clearly, this confronts us with a paradox. How is one to be persuaded to genuineness and openness, when one is not yet open to persuasion?\textsuperscript{68}

In fact, Lonergan concludes that the paradox mentioned in

\textsuperscript{67}Let us recall Lonergan's comments in "Finality, Love, Marriage" about friendship in marriage (Lonergan, "Finality," 44). We might assert that if a person starts from a position of a certain degree of genuineness, she can widen the scope of her willingness considerably by falling in love. Feminist authors would seem to stress that men and women tend to be schooled into different kinds of moral impotence. If men can be egocentric and domineering, women can be dependent and afraid of risking the kind of "self-construction" that is involved in an exercise of their freedom. Thus, a true growth in virtue in marriage could often involve an increase in concern for others on the part of the man and an increase of self-confidence and self-assertiveness on the part of the woman.

\textsuperscript{68}Ibid., 647.
this question is not normally overcome. Most of us are not open to persuasion. Consequently, we do not attain genuineness, much less universal willingness. Lonergan calls this a "vicious circle." He explains that "we cannot become wise and discriminating without concentrating on the right questions, and we cannot select those questions unless we already are wise and discriminating." He adds that some morally impotent individuals rationalize their failings with fine-sounding philosophies. Such philosophies inform the cultures of whole societies. Consequently, children are schooled not to overcome an overindulgence of self-attached desires but rather to neglect the dictates of more "pure" desires.

Such a situation is indeed a vicious circle. Lonergan insists that "the problem is radical, for it is a problem in the very dynamic structure of cognitional, volitional, and social activity." He adds that the problem is "permanent." He stresses that "both development and tension pertain to the very nature of man, and as long as they exist the problem remains in full

69Ibid. 502.

70Ibid., 651-2. The social character of moral impotence is, of course, directly relevant to an account of decline and so to a theory of history. However, Lonergan asserts regarding moral impotence that "the problem is not primarily social." He insists that "its root is elsewhere" (Ibid., 654). This other place is the tension in the subject between psyche and spirit. For this reason, I do not treat the various comments of Lonergan on social factors as intrinsic to an account of moral impotence. Rather, I discuss such matters in Part III. In that part, I treat of the numerous comments on social structures in Insight that I consider to operate at something of a tangent to the central argument.
force." We might therefore ask: "What can be done?" Lonergan comes to an answer to this question that can seem shocking. We can paraphrase his answer: "left only to our own natural devices, nothing can be done. Unauthenticity wins out over authenticity; decline wins out over progress."

Lonergan stresses that even if authentic individuals were to emerge their task would be especially difficult. Any effort to contribute to one's society must now involve more than attaining a correct philosophy so as to contribute to what is good. Truly intelligent positions will seem unintelligent to minds beset by rationalisations. In fact, Lonergan asserts that "precisely because they are correct, they will be weak competitors for serious attention in the realm of practical affairs."\(^2\)

Those of us who are familiar with Lonergan’s writings before Insight will be familiar with the next turn in his argument. It is to an intervention by God that Lonergan turns to address the question of how it might be that right order is returned to individual and social behaviour. This leads us to discuss the fourth and fifth step of the upper context of Insight.

**Step 4: The Profounder Structure of Knowing and Known**

In my discussion of step 2 of the upper context of Insight, I spoke of the problem in this dissertation of having to pass over some complex and important arguments in a very superficial

\(^{71}\)Ibid., 653-4.

\(^{72}\)Ibid., 654.
manner. This problem arises again as I discuss the fourth step of
the upper context. This is partly because step 4 relies heavily
on step 2. However, there is an additional reason for my brief
treatment of this topic. My interest in Lonergan’s theology of
history limits me to deriving one key insight from step 4 of the
upper context of this book: God exists and is capable of
intervening in the actual order of the universe so as to promote
renaissance in history.73

Proof of the Existence of God

Lonergan’s proof of the existence of God has the following
structure:

If the real is completely intelligible, then complete
intelligibility exists. If complete intelligibility
exists, the idea of being exists, if the idea of being
exists, then God exists. Therefore, if the real is
completely intelligible, God exists.74

The key judgment in this argument is that the real is completely
intelligible. This affirmation can only be made on the basis of
one’s own self-affirmation as a knower. It is only by
understanding and affirming the nature of how one comes to
judgment that one can affirm the complete intelligibility of the
real.75 If one does not affirm the complete intelligibility of

72Gordon Rixon devotes greater space to investigating "General
Transcendent Knowledge" from a perspective of an acquaintance with
the documents of File 713 ("Vertical Finality," 298-322).

74Ibid., 696.

75Bernard Tyrrell stresses this point in Bernard Lonergan’s
Philosophy of God, ed. Philip McShane (Notre Dame, IN.: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1974). He asserts: "For Lonergan it is
the real one will not be able to accept Lonergan's proof of the existence of God. This point clearly limits what I can state here about the fourth step of the upper context of Insight. In my account of the second step of the upper context, I passed over Lonergan's account of the transition from self-affirmation to metaphysics very briefly. Consequently, I can now merely assert that Lonergan advances from his account of proportionate being to that of transcendent being. I shall not outline how it is that he establishes his point.

Brief as is my account of Lonergan's proof of the existence of God, there is one point I do want to stress. To affirm the existence of transcendent being is to introduce a new perspective on metaphysics and ethics.

Transforming Metaphysics and Ethics

As a consequence of his proof of the existence of God, Lonergan asserts that transcendent being is also the "ultimate conversion and not proof which is at the heart of the matter in regard to the God problem" (ibid., 118). This comment includes a reference to the "religious conversion" that becomes a concern of Lonergan after the writing of Insight. However, it very definitely also includes the "intellectual conversion" that is the achievement of the self-affirmation that Lonergan explains so well in this book. Tyrrell adds: "Lonergan is at pains to emphasize in chapter XIX that his discussion of human knowledge of transcendent being is not only 'continuous with all that has gone before but also its culmination'" (ibid., 122).

Bernard Tyrrell discusses the objections of a number of philosophers who disagree with Lonergan's proof of the existence of God. He concludes that the main problem with their arguments is that they fail to understand Lonergan's basic account of human knowing (ibid., 163-79).
objective of all finalistic striving." To reflect more deeply on this notion of the objective of the process of emergence in the universe, we need to recall that being is not only intelligible, it is good. We can recall that it is the responsibility of the human genus to "prolong being" by creating "systems" such as "science, a new civilization, a new philosophy." We create such systems not simply by making judgments of fact but, above all, by making judgments of value that prompt us to decision and action. We have already noted the beginnings of a transformation of ethics by acknowledging that our judgments of value are grounded in a good God. Lonergan now adds that the objective of the finalistic striving of being with which we cooperate is also the same good God:

There follows a transformation of the ethics based on restricted metaphysics. For that ethics was concerned with the consistency of knowing and doing within the individual's rational self-consciousness. But now it is clear that true knowledge not only is true but also is an apprehension of the divinely ordained order of the universe, and that doing consistent with knowing not merely is consistent with knowing but also is man's cooperation with God in the realization of the order of the universe.

This, indeed, is a "profounder structure of knowing and known."

Our inquiry into the idea of being reveals that "apart from the

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77Ibid., 687.
78Ibid., 292.
79Ibid., 688-9.
surd of sin, the universe is in love with God." However, we might add, so to speak, that "that is a big 'apart'!" It is indeed a beautiful thing to broaden our perspective on metaphysics and ethics so as to recognize that we should play our part in helping the universe be in love with God. However, this perspective only helps us recognize how tragic is the reality of moral impotence. Human nature consistently causes the finalistic striving of the universe to fail to attain its object.

It is in the context of a kind of cry of despair regarding this fact that Lonergan introduces the question of the divine

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80 Ibid., 721. In the context of this attractive assertion it is worth noting a point about the provenance of this idea. Lonergan derives this insight from Aquinas. In his turn, Aquinas affirmed it by way of contrast with some questions Aristotle had on the matter.

Aristotle was aware of the randomness of occurrences in the universe. In this respect he can be understood as a forerunner of statistical scientists who not only recognize this reality, but manage to find a "queer" sort of intelligibility in it (ibid., 126). Aristotle contrasted his views with deterministic philosophers of his time. Like the practitioners of the statistical scientific method of today, he stressed that there is a dimension of unintelligibility in random occurrences. Now, Aristotle had the intelligence to recognize that this creates a problem for our understanding of how God can be all-knowing. However, he failed to find a way to solve this problem. He asserted that what is unintelligible to us must be unintelligible also to the Unmoved Mover (see Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 77). For the Christian Aquinas, this constituted a problem. Aquinas answered this problem by affirming the transcendence of God. He recognised that as creator of all things, God must also have created time. Aquinas therefore places God "beyond the created orders of necessity and contingency" (ibid., 79). Lonergan's proof of the existence of God follows Aquinas in this regard. Lonergan thus asserts that while random occurrences are indeed unintelligible to us, they are perfectly intelligible to God "inasmuch as coincidences, concurrences, interferences are reducible to the divine design" (ibid., 114). We might state that God lives in a kind of eternal "present moment." The "before" and the "after" of random occurrences are thus equally known to God.
solution to the problem of evil.

**Step 5: God’s Solution To the Problem of Evil**

Lonergan asserts that the fifth step of the upper context is constituted by

The structure of the process in which the existential situation sets human intelligence the problem of rising above its native resources and seeking the divine solution to man's incapacity for sustained development.\(^6^1\)

For the purposes of this dissertation, there are two key insights that we can retrieve from this final step of the upper context of *Insight*. The first is a strength; the second we might call a limitation. The strength of Lonergan’s argument is that he speaks of the divine solution in terms of continuing the "actual order of the universe" that is constituted by emergent probability. By discussing the intervention of God in history in this context, Lonergan adds explanatory force to the accounts that he offers in earlier writings. What we might call the limitation of Lonergan’s argument is that it confines itself to assertions that are strictly philosophical. Lonergan does not refer to Christ or any other datum of divine revelation. Consequently, Lonergan’s account of the divine solution to the problem of evil in *Insight* has to be considered a preliminary to a fuller account that must subsequently be outlined.\(^6^2\)

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\(^6^1\)Lonergan, *Insight*, 754.

\(^6^2\)Lonergan makes this point clear in the Epilogue to *Insight*. I will discuss this point in the concluding sections of this chapter.
A Supernatural Higher Viewpoint

It is Lonergan's task in Insight to write in a manner that is strictly philosophical. He asserts that he does this so as to affirm a belief that is important in his Roman Catholic tradition. This belief asserts that "by the natural light of human reason man can know with certitude the existence of God; and from this acknowledgment it follows that there can and do exist independent inquiries that can reach valid conclusions out of their own resources." 83

Now, if there is to be an intervention of God in history that solves the problem of evil it cannot be adequately studied by means of philosophy alone. Philosophy explores the knowledge that is available to individuals by virtue of their natural reasoning alone. If God were to, or already has, intervened in human history this cannot be considered a necessary product of the way God created the world. To assert this would be to limit the freedom of God. 84 Consequently, philosophy cannot speak in specific detail about the nature of God's intervention. For example, Lonergan insists that the all-powerful God could instigate "any of [a] series of possible solutions." Thus, by definition, a work of philosophy can only "anticipate" the broad lines of how God can be expected to intervene in the universe God

83Ibid., 765. In his phrasing of this point Lonergan is in fact echoing the statements of the First Vatican Council.

84Lonergan stresses that God was free not to create the universe (ibid., 684). This same logic establishes that God must be free also in choosing to intervene in the created order.
Lonergan turns to the categories of emergent probability to discuss how we can anticipate the divine solution. A first point to note is that such an intervention must constitute a "higher viewpoint" in the order of emergence. Such a higher viewpoint will integrate the reality of sin into a new emergence. This new viewpoint no longer permits sin to cause a blockage to the emergence of being. Rather, it integrates the fact of sin as one among other manifolds present at a lower level:

That higher integration [the divine solution] will solve the problem by controlling elements that otherwise are nonsystematic or irrational.  

By definition, a higher integration will integrate events of lower levels without suppressing them. Consequently, the divine solution will be in "a harmonious continuation of the actual order of this universe." On the other hand, the occurrence of this new genus will differ from the manner in which all other genera emerge from those preceding them. Lonergan asserts that it will be "in some sense supernatural." Lonergan reminds us that all other genera evolve by a process of "natural emergence." Given the potencies of lower genera the probability of the emergence of the higher genus is high. Consequently, over time, the genus emerges. However, in the case of the moral impotence of

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85 Ibid., 741, 724.
86 Ibid., 719.
87 Ibid., 718.
88 Ibid., 719.
human nature, Lonergan asserts that "what arises from nature is the problem." Thus, if a higher viewpoint in human living is to be attained, it will be so as a result of an intervention of God:

[The divine solution] will be in some sense transcendent or supernatural. For what arises from nature is the problem. The forms that solve the problem, then, do not arise from nature; they are not the result of accumulated insights, for such accumulation takes time, and the problem arises because man has to live during the interval in which insights are being accumulated. 89

Now, if we are clear that the divine solution to the problem of evil constitutes a supernatural higher viewpoint in created being it remains to say more of the nature of this higher viewpoint.

New Conjugate Forms in the Individual

Lonergan explains the supernatural higher viewpoint as "the introduction of new conjugate forms in man's intellect, will, and sensitivity." 90 I have adverted to what Lonergan means by conjugate form. It is equivalent to the "law" that I spoke of as characterising any given genus. 91 Lonergan first asserts that

89Ibid., 719.

90Ibid., 718.

91 In addition to the law, or "conjugate form," that characterises a genus; I also spoke of the thing, or "central form," with respect to which the laws operate. In the supernatural higher viewpoint there is an occurrence that is unlike any that can be witnessed in things of other genera. A new conjugate form is added without a new central form emerging. Thus, the individual experiences a transformation in the laws by which she is governed without becoming a thing of a different genus or species:

The solution will not consist in the addition of central forms of a new genus or species. For the solution is to
when God transforms human willing "the appropriate willingness will be some type or species of charity." He explains this point by steps.

Lonergan first reminds us that good will follows intellect. He next asserts that good will intends God just as intellect does. However, the way in which the will intends a thing is to will the good of that thing. Clearly, then, "the good that is willed by good will is God." He next adds that "to will the good of a person is to love a person." Considering the fact that God is a person, he asserts that "good will is the love of God." Lonergan next adds that we understand the created universe to be "a good and value chosen by God." Consequently, if we love God we will love the order of the universe that God has created. Thus if we love God we will love all created things:

To will the order of the universe because of one’s love of God is to love all persons in the universe because of one’s love of God. 

So it is that, from the rigorously established foundations of self-affirmation, Lonergan asserts that the divine solution to the problem of evil will involve transforming humans into loving beings of a kind they could not have become by nature. If this statement seems unremarkable, the consequences Lonergan

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92 Ibid., 720.
93 Ibid., 721.
94 Ibid.
understands to flow from it are more striking. He asserts that if human willing is to cooperate with God in solving the problem of evil it must adopt an attitude of self-sacrificing love that refuses to respond to evil with anything other than good.

To explain this point, Lonergan reminds us that the individual of good will will live in a situation that is characterised by moral impotence and the "social surd" that results from it. He insists that good will must adopt "a dialectical attitude that parallels the dialectical method of intellect." This attitude refuses to treat evil as anything less than an aberration of human freedom. Consequently, the fact of evil should in no way detract one from one's well-founded decision to be universally loving:

The dialectical method of intellect consists in grasping that the social surd neither is intelligible nor is to be treated as intelligible. The corresponding dialectical attitude of will is to return good for evil.⁹⁵

Now, we can recognize here how it is that the divine solution to the dilemma of human nature integrates the fact of evil into a higher viewpoint. The ability to respond to evil with good is a powerful moral example. It can do much to persuade others not only to fight injustice but to fight it in a way that does not descend to the logic of those who instigate it. If evil can be confronted in so loving a manner, evil becomes a "potency for the good." As such, evil is integrated into a higher viewpoint that restores intelligibility to the universe:

⁹⁵Ibid.
For it is only inasmuch as men are willing to meet evil with good, to love their enemies, to pray for those that persecute and calumniate them, that the social surd is a potential good.96

Clearly, a new ability to love is a conjugate form that is established in a new way in the human will by the supernatural higher viewpoint. Lonergan speaks of an additional conjugate form that is "hope." This too is established in the will:

Besides the charity by which the will itself is made good, there will be the hope by which the will makes the intellect good.97

A good intellect for Lonergan is simply one that is confident in pursuing the dictates of the pure desire. There are many temptations to lose hope that being is truly intelligible. Above all, we can easily lose hope in our ability to discern the intelligible good and to let such judgments determine our actions. One temptation to diverge from consistent loyalty to the pure desire is simply "its difficulty and its apparently meagre returns."98 However, another clear temptation to disbelieve in intelligibility is the evident lack of intelligibility of much that occurs in the social order. Lonergan stresses that loyalty to the pure desire to know "must be aided, supported, reinforced, by a deliberate decision and a habitual determination of the will itself." To persist in a confidence in the complete intelligibility of being is "a decision against man's despair."

96Ibid., 721-2.
97Ibid., 723.
98Ibid., 251.
In principle it is possible for unassisted human nature to encompass both hope and a universal love of God and creation. However in practice, given an environment so affected by the social surd, hope as well as love comes as a gift from God.\(^9\)

In my account of moral impotence I have already adverted to the difficulties facing the authentic individual in an environment characterised by decline. I mentioned Lonergan's assertion that any effort to contribute to one's society must now involve more than attaining a correct philosophy so as to contribute to what is good. Truly intelligent positions will seem unintelligent to minds beset by rationalizations. In fact, Lonergan asserts that "precisely because they are correct, they will be weak competitors for serious attention in the realm of practical affairs."\(^{10}\) So it is that, in the context of an explanation of hope, it is appropriate to outline Lonergan's notion of a fourth heuristic method: dialectic method.

**Hope and Dialectic Method**

Lonergan asserts that combatting decline includes a correcting of false ideas. In this context he introduces an

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\(^9\)Ibid.

\(^{10}\)Ibid., 654.
explanation of a new heuristic method:

To the complexities of genetic method there have now to be added the graver complexities of dialectical method.102

Dialectic method concerns itself with a task of interpreting ideas and distinguishing truth from falsity in them. With regard to ideas that are true, it distinguishes such factors as the degree of sophistication with which these ideas are expressed. A key question, for example, is whether the expressions of a writer are scientific or reflect merely a common sense use of language. Often, one can trace the "genetic sequence" of the same insight through levels of expression that are increasingly sophisticated. Such a "genetic analysis" will often be able to establish that statements that appear to differ in fact express the same insight.102

However, Lonergan also stresses that ideas can be related not only genetically, but also dialectically.103 He holds that when difference of expressions is dialectical one is confronted with alternatives of truth and error. In conducting a dialectical analysis one must identify the notions of knowing, being and

101Ibid., 598. We need to note that here Lonergan is employing a notion of dialectic that is not familiar to us from our reading of the documents of File 713. There, dialectic referred to the interaction between situations and new ideas. Here, as we shall see, it refers to the necessary opposition between truth and error. The question of the development of Lonergan's notion of dialectic is a complex one. In fact, it is also one that is controversial in Lonergan scholarship. I will discuss it at somewhat greater length in Part III of this dissertation.

102Ibid., 600-601.

103Ibid., 600.
objectivity that are operative in any given expression of ideas. Lonergan calls a correct understanding of these notions the "positions." All the mistaken understandings on these questions he calls "counterpositions."¹⁰⁴ Thus, it is the heart of dialectical method to "advance positions" and "reverse counterpositions":

We have worked out our philosophic position in terms of simple contrasts: either the real is being or it is a subdivision of the 'already out there now'; either objectivity is reached by intelligent inquiry and critical reflection or else it is a matter of taking a good look at what is 'out there'; either knowing is mounting up the levels of experience, of understanding and formulation, of reflective grasp and judgment, or else it is the ineffable confrontation that makes the known present to the knower.¹⁰⁵

My account of dialectic method has outlined an activity of crucial importance that would be conducted by an authentic individual in a society that is characterised not only by intelligent behaviour but also by the irrational behaviour of the morally impotent. The need for such intelligent action ought not be underestimated. Lonergan stresses that there occurs a "transposition of the inner issue" of moral impotence to the "outer social milieu." He adds that the irrationality that ensues "becomes intractable without dialectical analysis."¹⁰⁶

In theory, it is possible for anyone to begin to employ dialectic method. However, this theoretic point is only true in

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 413.
¹⁰⁵Ibid., 598.
¹⁰⁶Ibid., 715.
the same manner as we can say that any one can discover correct philosophy. Lonergan points out that, in point of fact, it is highly improbable that either of these theoretic possibilities will actually occur given the reality of moral impotence. Consequently, it is above all an individual who has received the supernatural conjugate form hope that is likely to be able to employ dialectic method.

A Contribution To a Higher Collaboration

At the beginning of Chapter 4, I mentioned how significant the Epilogue is in understanding the influence of Lonergan's concern for the redemption of history on how he structured the argument of Insight. I placed great stress on Lonergan's assertion that Insight is intended as a "contribution" to a "higher collaboration."\(^{107}\) This higher collaboration is with a theology that takes an explicit stand on the judgment that the divine solution to the problem of evil has already occurred. Before proceeding to discuss these matters, we must briefly outline one more philosophical point. It regards the nature of intellectual collaboration and the nature of the conjugate form that allows the intellect to accept the fact that the divine solution has occurred.

I have now spoken of two conjugate forms that the supernatural solution introduces into the human will: charity and hope. Lonergan adds a third conjugate form to the two already

\(^{107}\)Ibid., 754.
mentioned: faith. I offer my account of this conjugate form in
the next section. This concluding section returns us to a
discussion of the Epilogue of Insight with which I began Part II
of this dissertation.

**Intellectual Collaboration and Faith**

Lonergan notes that much of Insight is devoted to an
analysis of the knowing activities of an individual. In a section
entitled, "The Notion of Belief," he stresses that, in point of
fact, much of the knowledge we possess is in fact taken on trust
from others. Of course, there are dangers in this. In a
society infected with the social surd, the authentic individual
needs to withhold her belief in much of what is commonly held to
be true. Even common sense holds the dictum "don’t believe
everything you read in the papers." Nevertheless, Lonergan
believes it to be one of the myths of modernity that anyone can
live a life based only on insights she has worked out for
herself. He stresses:

> There can and to some extent there does exist a
collaboration of men in the advancement and the
dissemination of knowledge.\(^{109}\)

Lonergan next analyzes the acts of knowing and choosing that
are involved in the phenomenon of individuals collaborating in
the pursuit of knowledge. He calls this collaboration belief.
Above all, it involves accepting the judgments of others, and

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\(^{108}\)Ibid., 725-40.

\(^{109}\)Ibid., 729.
building on them as if they were one's own.

Lonergan speaks of five main stages involved in acts of belief. The first stage involves making a series of preliminary judgments regarding "the value of belief in general, on the reliability of the source for this belief, and on the accuracy of the communication from the source." A second stage involves coming to a reflective insight. This insight "grasps as virtually unconditioned the value of deciding to believe some particular proposition." Any reflective insight should lead to a judgment and Lonergan names as this third stage of belief "the consequent judgment of value." Stages four and five follow on from this judgment. He calls them "the consequent decision of the will" and "the assent that is the act of believing."^110

Lonergan insists that belief is a normal dimension of the pursuit of any kind of knowledge. We might state that scientific journals are devoted entirely to supporting the function of belief on the part of an academic community. The task of such journals is to disseminate to all members of a discipline the discoveries of a few. Now, Lonergan claims that when the divine solution to the problem of evil does occur it will also involve a process of belief in the community of humans. He names this kind of belief faith. He adds:

By faith is meant the requisite conjugate form that the solution [to the problem of evil] brings to man's intellect.^111

^110Ibid., 729-30.

^111Ibid., 741.
We have spoken about how the supernatural higher viewpoint will integrate lower activities without suppressing them. Not least among the "lower activities" of humans are the functions of understanding. Lonergan asserts that we can therefore anticipate that the divine solution will appeal to the understanding of individuals. However much the graced individual will exist under a supernatural giftedness there will still be required of him a labour to understand this fact and its various ramifications. Let us further recall how much we have spoken about the proper relationship between knowing and doing. Consequent on this, we can expect that the better is our understanding of God's redemptive work, the more likely are we to engage in free acts of cooperation with it.\footnote{To today's reader, this definition of faith may seem somewhat foreign. In fact, by the time Lonergan writes Method in Theology, he changes his terminology to conform with the usage that is more popular and that is used by Protestant thinkers. In Method, he employs the term religious "beliefs" to indicate what he calls "faith" in Insight. In Method, he offers a more developed account of how affectivity is involved in our relationship with God. He speaks of how "religious conversion" causes in us a "state of being-in-love." In Method, he identifies faith as the knowledge born of religious conversion. Consequently, faith is not the exclusive preserve of Christians, much less of Roman Catholics (see Lonergan, Method, 123-4).}

Thus, for Lonergan, faith is the third conjugate form that God introduces in the human subject. If love and hope are new conjugate forms in the will, faith is a conjugate form in the intellect.\footnote{I quoted Lonergan's statement above that as well as introducing new conjugate forms in the will and intellect, the supernatural solution introduces new conjugate forms in human sensitivity (Ibid., 718). Lonergan does not comment on this final}
In the Epilogue, Lonergan explicitly states his position as a Catholic theologian. He states that he is a person of faith. Of course, to be a person of faith is to be more than a philosopher. Nevertheless, Lonergan asserts that the philosophical work accomplished in *Insight* reveals the human person as a seeker of God:

The self-appropriation of one’s own intellectual and rational self-consciousness begins as cognitional theory, expands into a metaphysics and an ethics, mounts to a conception and an affirmation of God, only to be confronted with a problem of evil that demands the transformation of self-reliant intelligence into an *intellectus quaerens fidem* [an intelligence seeking faith].

Lonergan asserts that *Insight* "has been written from a moving viewpoint." He acknowledges that there remains a problem for the "long-suffering reader" of his tome. In the Epilogue he asserts that he does not consider himself ready to offer a concluding summary that could help the reader integrate the pages dimension of the divine solution at great length. However, he does assert:

Besides the image that is a sign of intelligible and rational contents and the image that is a psychic force, there is the image that symbolizes man’s orientation into the known unknown; and since faith gives more truth than understanding comprehends, since hope reinforces the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, man’s sensitivity needs symbols that unlock its transforming dynamism and bring it into harmony with the vast but impalpable pressures of the pure desire, of hope, and of self-sacrificing charity (ibid., 744).

In Part III of this dissertation, I have more to say on statements such as this. I reflect on how statements such as these could be developed into contributing to a more comprehensive notion of dialectic method.

114Ibid., 753.
of his work. The reason he offers for this is that the moving viewpoint of *Insight* does not come to any kind of terminus from which a summary could be easily made.\(^{115}\) He claims that such a terminus would only be found in a study that adds theology to philosophy.\(^{116}\)

Theology is the intellectual discipline that takes as its starting point a conviction that the divine solution to the problem of history is already a reality in history. Lonergan therefore stresses that, while *Insight* is a long and demanding work, it should nevertheless be understood as having an "ulterior significance" that would place it in a "far larger" work. So it is that Lonergan organizes his comments in the Epilogue in a particular manner. Instead of offering a concluding summary, he attempts to indicate some central features of the more complete viewpoint of this larger work:

If the inner logic of this work is a process that admits no concluding summary, it is possible to view that process, not in itself, but in its *ulterior significance*, and to ask whether it has any *contributions to offer to the higher collaboration* which it has envisaged and to which it leads. To this question the remaining paragraphs of this epilogue will be devoted, and as the reader already has surmised, they will be written, not from the moving viewpoint whose exigences, I trust, I have been observing honestly and sincerely, but from the terminal viewpoint of a believer, a Catholic, and, as it happens, a professor of dogmatic theology.\(^{117}\)

I have taken the phrase "contribution to a higher

\(^{115}\)Ibid., 754.

\(^{116}\)Ibid., 753-4.

\(^{117}\)Ibid., 754, my underline.
collaboration" from the above quotation and used it in the title to the entire Part II of this dissertation. The reason I do this derives from my study of Lonergan's comments in the Epilogue regarding how *Insight* relates to intellectual activities that are more properly theological. The theology anticipated is clearly a theology of history. I will now illustrate this point by outlining some of the more specific arguments Lonergan makes in the Epilogue regarding how *Insight* can contribute to a study of theology.

History and the Development of Doctrine

For many centuries, a central issue in Christian theology has been the issue of the permanence and development of doctrines. Lonergan comments on how the philosophical groundwork completed in *Insight* can be applied to this issue. From the few comments offered in the Epilogue, it is very clear that Lonergan's approach to the question insists on considering the historical dimensions of dogmatic development.

We can define a doctrine as a key insight of faith that has been affirmed as true by the Christian community.\(^{118}\) Key Christian doctrines include those concerning Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption. Regarding the permanence of doctrine, Lonergan reminds us of one characteristic of any belief system. It must be passed on from generation to generation. Of

\(^{118}\)Here I use the term "faith" in the sense that Lonergan employs in *Insight*. It is a belief that is consequent on an experience of grace.
course, the challenge of such a passing on applies to any system of judgments of fact. A high-school science textbook involves just such a communication of beliefs. However, with regard to beliefs that explain human affairs, one's task is likely to be more complicated. Communicating ethical truths will often require that one adapts one's explanation to the vocabulary and symbol system of the group to whom one is communicating. If this challenge exists with any ethical belief system, it will be all the more of a challenge when ethical beliefs are understood in the context of additional theological beliefs. Lonergan thus asserts regarding the communication of doctrines:

There will be the collaboration that consists in transmitting it [faith] from each generation to the next. . . . recasting the expression of the solution into the equivalent expressions of different places, times, classes, and cultures.¹¹³

Lonergan is confident that a community that believes that the solution to the problem of evil has already occurred in history will be able to meet the challenge of communicating its basic insights across generations. He asserts: "Catholic teaching presents the same doctrine and the same meaning through a diversity of conceptualizations and expressions."¹²⁰

When he addresses the question of the development of doctrine, Lonergan places it in the context of his elaborate metaphysics of development. He insists that ideas must be understood with reference to the action to which they lead. Thus,

¹¹³Ibid., 743.

¹²⁰Ibid., 761-2.
the development of doctrine is to be explained in terms of the developing efforts of the believing community to cooperate with the project of redeeming history.

We can recall two central aspects of Lonergan's metaphysics. The first is that the universe is constituted by emergent probability and that human development occurs in this context. The second is that the development of things of higher genera is a compound development. Regarding the compound development of humans, Lonergan reminds us that he has spoken not just of development on biological, psychic and intellectual levels, but also on the level at which God introduces new conjugate forms of faith, hope and charity to human consciousness. He insists that considerations of human development "regard not three but four levels of development."[121]

Now, Lonergan comments further on how the four levels of human development should be studied. He begins with three considerations with which we are already familiar:

In man . . . one may consider (1) any level in itself, (2) any level in its relations to other levels, (3) the harmonious or conflicting process of development on all three levels in any individual.[122]

[121]Ibid., 762. I have already adverted to a paradox here. In all other genera, the emergence of a new level of development involves the emergence of either a new species or an entirely new genus. By contrast, humans can experience within their own consciousness a promotion from the third of these levels of development to a forth. We need not be surprised by anomalies that occur in our account of how the supernatural solution engages the actual order of the universe. We are dealing with profound mystery here. Our efforts to explain it, while fruitful, must always be considered somewhat rough and approximate.

[122]Ibid.
However, Lonergan now introduces a fourth consideration that was not discussed so directly in his earlier account of metaphysics. He now asserts that one must recognize that development occurs in a "multiplicity of individuals" and that these people influence each other with respect to the manner in which they develop. Consequently, only a consideration of the social dimension of human development completes the study:

One may consider . . . (4) the cumulative historical process of development in a multiplicity and succession of individuals. Clearly, the only complete consideration is the fourth.123

The implications of Lonergan's assertions for the study of the development of doctrine are radical. He stresses that development of ideas is intimately connected to the development of individual and social action. Consequently, he asserts that the development of doctrines must be considered in the context of the life of the community in which such development occurs. Furthermore, at the centre of the identity of this community is a task not just of its own development but the development of the response of all of humankind to the gift of God's grace. Consequently, Lonergan concludes that the development of doctrine must be considered in the context of the redemption of history. So it is that, in a section where he is discussing the development of doctrine, Lonergan asserts:

To the foregoing considerations that regard any individual that has embraced God's solution, there is to be added the consideration of the cumulative historical development, first of the chosen people and

123Ibid.
then of the Catholic church, both in themselves and in their role in the unfolding of all human history and in the order of the universe.124

Theology and The Human Sciences

As we read the Epilogue of Insight it becomes clear that its ulterior significance is to be employed in an explicit theology. In its turn, this theology is to be understood as part of the cooperation with God in solving the problem of evil. Now, we have witnessed from the very earliest writings of Lonergan that he places great stress on the importance of action being not merely well-meaning but also intelligent. Theology, then, is the intellectual activity whereby humans articulate and try to work out the consequences of a belief that the solution to the problem of evil has already occurred.

However, in Insight, as in his works on Aquinas, Lonergan insists that God's intervention in history never interferes with the essentials of what God has already created. For Lonergan, grace builds on nature. Consequently, theology can never be the only intellectual discipline that we employ as we try to do what is true and good in history. Lonergan thus insists that theology must cooperate with various human sciences in implementing God's

124Ibid., 763. Writing in 1953, Lonergan makes no effort to express himself in a manner that demonstrates an ecumenical sensitivity to how Protestant Churches participate in God's solution to the problem of evil. In writings produced later in his life he will go so far as to consider how other World Religions participate in such a solution (e.g., "Prolegomena to the Study of the Emerging Religious Consciousness of Our Time," in Lonergan, A Third Collection [New York: Paulist Press, 1985], 55-73).
solution to the problem of evil. He insists that human sciences "can reach valid conclusions out of their own resources."\(^{125}\)

The question thus arises as to what exactly is the proper relationship between theology and the human sciences. Lonergan believes that we need to employ the full force of the foundations worked out in *Insight* to answer this question. In fact, he asserts:

It is this problem that in a large measure has dictated the structure of the present work.\(^{126}\)

This statement is of great importance for my inquiry in this dissertation. This one statement alone offers persuasive support for the thesis that a concern for the redemption of history remained an all pervasive concern for Lonergan in the writing of *Insight*. Let us investigate a little more closely just how it is that the relationship of theology to the human sciences should be of central importance for the redemption of history.

Lonergan points out that it is only in recent centuries that individuals have thought to apply empirical method to human behaviour. He claims that this poses "a fundamentally new problem" for the way theology has traditionally been

\(^{125}\)Ibid., 765. This statement echoes statements I made in Chapter 2. Lonergan's work on economics can be understood as an effort on his part to contribute to this independent and distinct discipline. While such an effort is clearly an expression of his concern for the redemption of history, it is also clearly a distinct task from developing a heuristic theology of history. For this reason, I felt justified in not studying his economics manuscripts at any length in this dissertation.

\(^{126}\)Ibid.
conducted.\textsuperscript{127} The problem, now, is to "consider man in his concrete performance." Great as was the achievement of Aquinas, Lonergan understands the medieval world-view to treat the individual in static and abstract terms. He understands \textit{Insight} to have carried forward the achievement of Aquinas to engage the more dynamic world view that is the product of the modern empirical mentality.\textsuperscript{128}

A central strength of \textit{Insight} is to provide an account of the actual order of the universe. This account is not only philosophically rigorous but also defends the proper role of religion in human living. As a Christian, Lonergan believes that the divine solution to the problem of evil is not only a possibility but a realised fact. Consequently, he holds that the empirical reality of human living includes the fact of supernatural conjugate forms in human consciousness. He believes that this is not only a subjective fact but also one that has objective expression in history. He asserts that realities such as this should be acknowledged in any study of human affairs:

These [human] sciences consider man in his concrete performance, and that performance is a manifestation not only of human nature but also of human sin, not only of nature and sin but also of a \textit{de facto} need of divine grace, not only of a need of grace but also of its reception and of its acceptance or rejection. It follows that an empirical human science cannot analyze

\textsuperscript{127}Ibid., 765.

\textsuperscript{128}We can recall Lonergan's claim that "agreement with Aquinas on the basic elements does not preclude a development of his thought to provide a metaphysical analysis of explanatory genera and species and of development itself" (ibid., 760).
successfully the elements in its object without an appeal to theology. 129

Lonergan notes that in recent centuries Christians have often found themselves on the defensive regarding "the alleged conflicts between science and religion." 130 Lonergan now proposes a philosophical system that restores an initiative to Christian thinkers. He claims to establish for the modern empirical mentality the traditional principle that theology is the queen of the sciences. 131 He stresses that it is in the interest of scientists that societies recognize the importance of theology. He asserts that theologians should not only "encourage scientists to complete fidelity in their calling" but also "teach non-scientists the high office of scientific spirit." 132

Conclusion

I have now come to a conclusion of Part II of this dissertation. These two chapters labour to make a somewhat subtle point. I seek to demonstrate that for all the great length and complexity of Insight, it is best understood with respect to its ulterior significance. I appeal to Lonergan's own statements in the Epilogue to make this point.

However, it was not possible to discuss the ulterior

129 Ibid., 765.
130 Ibid., 755.
131 Ibid., 764.
132 Ibid., 768.
significance of *Insight* without outlining its contents. Here again, I used the Epilogue as interpretive key to understand not only the ultimate aim of *Insight* but also the basic outline of its content. Through Chapters 3 and 4, I have outlined the five steps of the upper context that Lonergan claims characterizes his work. In a sense, then, it is only in the final section of this present chapter that I am truly able to address the key issue for this dissertation. The issue is this: it is in Lonergan's statements regarding the ulterior significance of *Insight* that we can most clearly recognize that a concern for the redemption of history continued to motivate him years after his writing the documents of File 713. *Insight* is to be understood as providing philosophical foundations for a theology of history.

Thus I conclude my study of *Insight* in Part II of this dissertation with a quotation from the Epilogue that could have been extracted directly from one of the manuscripts of File 713:

> It was at the fullness of time that there came into the world the Light of the world. It was the advent not only of the light that directs but also of the grace that give good will and good performance. It was the advent of a light and a grace to be propagated, not only through the inner mystery of individual conversion, but also through the outer channels of human communication. *If its principal function was to carry the seeds of eternal life, still it could not bear its fruits without effecting a transfiguration of human living, and in turn that transfiguration contains the solution not only to man's individual but also to his social problem of evil.*

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133Ibid., 764, my underline.
PART III

THE DIALECTIC OF HISTORY IN INSIGHT
CHAPTER 5

DIALECTIC AS AN OPERATOR THEME IN LONERGAN'S THOUGHT

In Part II of this dissertation, I attempted to offer a somewhat straightforward account of the contents of *Insight*. My outline of the book was influenced by an increased knowledge of the author stemming from an acquaintance with the documents of File 713. I suggested that this increased knowledge can help an interpretation. Above all, I sought to demonstrate that this increased knowledge will encourage the reader of *Insight* to take seriously Lonergan's claim that it is best understood as intended to be part of a "far larger work" that would be explicitly theological.

It might be claimed that I made a rather unremarkable point in Part II. In some respects, I simply encouraged readers of this difficult book to keep attending carefully to its argument through to the Epilogue. This advice is perhaps not completely without merit: Lonergan himself comments on how few readers persist even as far as Chapter 20.\(^1\) Nevertheless, a question can still remain as to whether this is the only conclusion that can be drawn from reading *Insight* in the light of Lonergan's essays of the 1930's.

In fact, I believe there is considerably more advantage to be had from employing the hermeneutic perspective that I attempt

\(^1\)I have not been able to locate where I read this statement.
in this dissertation. There are various further puzzles in *Insight* that we can explain by reference to Lonergan's underlying concern with the redemption of history. However, to draw this benefit from our reading of the book, we need to adopt a new method in interpreting it. Most of Part II was devoted to demonstrating that *Insight* follows a very organised structure. I carefully outlined each of the five steps of the upper context of the book. I now want to investigate what might be called the "loose ends" in *Insight*.

In any work that relates to human meaning, thinkers will usually explore certain sub-themes or tangential arguments in the course of the discussion. Similarly, some of their central insights will often be expressed in an inadequate fashion. Not surprisingly, this is often where some of the greatest puzzles in understanding an author occur. Likewise, it can be the area where a more comprehensive knowledge of the author most helps our task of interpretation. This is a point of considerable importance. Accordingly, before proceeding with an analysis of the text of *Insight* I want to offer a more exact explanation of the method I intend to employ.

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²Here I paraphrase Lonergan where he remarks that greater knowledge of the author assists the task of interpreting the writings of that author (see *Method in Theology*, 160). Likewise, I echo Komonchak who speaks of Lonergan's "underlying concern" with the redemption of history ("Lonergan's Early Essays," 159).
Studying Unthematised Elements In an Author's Thought

In Part II, I studied Insight much as if it were a treatise. Lonergan offers the following definition of a treatise:

[A treatise] undertakes to define all its terms implicitly or explicitly, to prove all its conclusions, and to accept every conclusion that follows logically from its premises. . . . for its function primarily is to present clearly, exactly, and fully the content and the implications of a determinate and coherent set of insights."

Of course, Lonergan is clear that the treatise is a highly valuable mode of discourse in certain circumstances. However, he is emphatic that one can seldom treat works of philosophy or theology as if they were treatises.

A treatise is an exercise in logic. As we saw in Part II, Lonergan is at pains to demonstrate that there is much more to intellectual activity than mere logic. We can assert that logic assists with the clear expressing of an insight. However, the gaining of an insight in the first place constitutes a kind of "leap" with which logic has little to do. Lonergan asserts that unless one has "made notable progress in cognitional analysis" one will tend to be an inadequate interpreter of works that treat of human meaning:

A little learning is a dangerous thing, and the adage has, perhaps, its most abundant illustrations from the application of logic to the tasks of interpretation. A familiarity with the elements of logic can be obtained by a very modest effort and in a very short time. Until one has made notable progress in cognitional analysis, one is constantly tempted to mistake the rules of logic for the laws of thought. And as all reading involves interpreting, there follows automatically the

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1Lonergan, Insight, 596.
imposition upon documents of meanings and implications that 'logically' they must possess but in fact do not bear."

Lonergan asserts that a study of human meaning must be content with a method that is at once more subtle and more imprecise than that which is sufficient for understanding a treatise. The interpreter of a work that expresses human meaning must plot the leaps of insight in an author's thought; she must note the themes that receive complete treatment and those themes that are present but do not find full systematic expression. In employing such a method, Lonergan's own efforts at interpreting the thought of Thomas Aquinas offer an outstanding example. Grace and Freedom, and Verbum are masterpieces of interpretation. In these studies we do well to note that, much as Lonergan admires Aquinas, he never assumes that the writings of this thinker resembled a treatise:

To penetrate to the mind of a medieval thinker is to go beyond his words and phrases... It is to discover for oneself that the intellect of Aquinas, more rapidly on some points, more slowly on others, reached a position of dynamic equilibrium without ever ceasing to drive towards fuller and more nuanced synthesis, without ever halting complacently in some finished mental edifice, as though his mind had become dull, or his brain exhausted, or his judgment had lapsed into the error of those that forget man to be a potency in

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4Ibid., 595-6.

5Lonergan asserts: "Not only must the treatise on human meanings dispense with precise terms, it also has to get along without definable relations." He continues to speak of how often expression is in terms of an imprecise language of common sense and asserts that interpretation must often proceed "without verifiability through which it might be fixed by its correspondence with concrete situations" (ibid., 598).
Clearly, if Part II of this dissertation tended to interpret *Insight* as if it were a treatise, then the task remains to study the less systematised themes that are also present in this work. Now, the manner in which I intend to proceed could be called "applying Lonergan to Lonergan." A key theme that I traced in Part II was that of emergent probability. In my efforts to render some of Lonergan's arguments more systematic than he does himself, I intend to apply the notion of emergent probability to his own achievement in *Insight*. Using the device of genetic method, I shall study the developments of Lonergan's thought as examples of emergent probability in proportionate being.

**Emergent Probability as a Tool for Interpretation**

In his article, "Lonergan's Search for Foundations: the Early Years, 1940-1959," Frederick Crowe suggests that the interpreter can fruitfully employ a notion of emergent probability in interpreting the thought of an author. He asserts that this method could be applied to two kinds of thematic developments in the corpus of an author's works.

A first kind of thematic development that could be studied is the following. The interpreter can identify the initial, often fragmentary, appearances of insights that will later become more systematic in and central to an author's thought. He suggests that "the data collected from the years prior to thematization

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stand to the thematization somewhat as a coincidental manifold does to the higher integration."\(^7\) While Fr. Crowe does not express his point in this manner, his suggestion implies that we identify "operator ideas" that are present in a author's early thought and that stimulate him to subsequent higher viewpoints.\(^5\)

Now, Crowe also speaks of a second kind of thematic development that can be studied by employing notions of emergent probability. He asserts that the interpreter can also identify coincidental manifolds that occur with a certain frequency but never quite find integration in a higher viewpoint:

I would further suggest that, if the image/analogy/instance has any value where thematization has occurred . . . it has value also where thematization has not

\(^7\)Frederick E. Crowe, "Lonergan's Search for Foundations: the Early Years, 1940-1959," in Searching for Cultural Foundations, ed. Philip McShane (Lanham, Maryland: the University Press of America, 1984), 138. An example of the first form of such a procedure has already occurred in this dissertation. In Chapter 1, I employed some themes from Richard Liddy's book Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan. This whole book is an example of the first form of the method of interpretation proposed by Fr. Crowe. It seeks to trace the early sources of the notion of intellectual conversion that would only become a central theme in Lonergan's thought when he wrote Insight. Thus, we can regard Lonergan's favourable comments on the thought of Joseph Marechal, or the review he wrote of the dissertation of Leo Keeler as examples of a coincidental manifold that will find integration in a later higher viewpoint concerning intellectual conversion.

\(^8\)It is a small step to proceed from Fr. Crowe's comments about "coincidental manifold" to speak of the ideas of an author in terms of integrator and operator. Nevertheless, I should stress that my doing this in the remainder of Part III is something for which I take responsibility myself. Lonergan does assert that interpreters need to be aware that "meanings form a genetically . . . related sequence" (Lonergan, Insight, 601). However, I have not found any statements of his that apply the notion of integrator and operator to the realm of ideas. My doing so is based on a belief that this follows from the logic of Lonergan's own argument.
This second approach to interpreting thematic development follows logically from the first. There is no particular reason why the thought of a creative thinker should reach some kind of stable plateau before he dies. Lonergan himself works from this assumption in parts of his interpretation of Aquinas. In Verbum he states that he detects in Aquinas the beginnings of an insight that each individual needs to be invited to an act of cognitive self-affirmation. However, he does not claim that Aquinas ever actually achieves this viewpoint. He concludes that to speak of self-affirmation "may be termed Thomistic but hardly Thomist." 

In Part III of this dissertation I suggest that there are some insights expressed in Lonergan's masterwork that are of great importance and yet do not find fully thematised articulation. In the vocabulary of Fr. Crowe, these insights remain at the level of coincidental manifold. I will call these operator themes in Lonergan's thought. I believe that our

9Ibid., 223.

10Lonergan, Verbum, 85. A key passage where Lonergan makes this "Thomistic" claim is the following: 'secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra se ipsum reflectitur'[this is how the intellect knows the truth by reflecting back upon itself]... I cannot take this passage as solely an affirmation of the reflective character found in every judgment. Not in every judgment do we reflect to the point of knowing our own essence and from that conclude our capacity to know truth. Rather, in this passage Aquinas subscribed, not obscurely, to the program of critical thought: to know truth we have to know ourselves and the nature of our knowledge, and the method to be employed is reflection (ibid., 74-5).
knowledge of the author’s prior interest in a theology of history greatly helps our efforts to understand such notions. Inevitably, such a study will involve, to a certain extent, that I "go beyond his words and phrases" and perform something of a constructive work of my own. However, I hope to do this narrowly within the confines of an attempt at interpretation that merely renders more systematic certain ideas that are already emergent in the author’s thought.

**Dialectic Functioning As an Operator Theme in Insight**

I believe that Lonergan’s notion of dialectic is a key operator theme in *Insight*.

Part III of this dissertation will focus largely on this theme. I will attempt both to identify what Lonergan stated regarding it, and, to a certain extent, render his notion more systematic. My efforts at interpreting *Insight* are of course influenced by the greater knowledge of the author.

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"I want to define exactly what I mean by an operator theme. It is a theme that expresses an insight that is not central to the main argument of an author in a given work. However, while it may be merely a coincidental manifold in that argument, it deserves to be integrated, along with the main argument of that work, into a subsequent higher viewpoint. Recall one of Lonergan’s explanations of his notion of operator:

The organism [for this I replace "The argument"] grows and develops. Its higher system at any stage of development not only is an integrator but also an operator, that is, it so integrates the underlying manifold as to call forth ... its own replacement by a more specific and effective integrator (ibid., 490).

It is constituted inasmuch as the higher system not merely suffers but provokes the underlying instability (ibid.).
that stems from my acquaintance with the documents of File 713. In virtue of the principles of emergent probability, I suggest that this strategy of studying operator themes is a valid exercise in the study of the work of any author. However, in the case of *Insight* there are some particular reasons that recommend this method of study: the argument of *Insight* is more characterised by "loose ends" than some other works; a reason for this is that it was finished in a hurry.

Part III will involve a particularly close study of Chapters 6 and 7 of *Insight*. These chapters address questions of what Lonergan calls "common sense." I have made little reference to these chapters in Part II because I believe they operate at something of a tangent to the upper context of the book. When we investigate more closely what we can know about the provenance of these chapters my reason for treating them as a special case

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13 There is a sense in which the first of these chapters fits into the upper context better than the second. It is entitled "Common Sense and Its Subject." It discusses how even our unconscious is involved in acts of knowing. It also elaborates on the nature of common-sense insight. Thus, strictly speaking, Chapter 6 offers an explanation of one more instance of insight. This completes the account of direct and inverse insights as they occur in mathematics and natural science. Consequently, it is relevant to the first step of the upper context. However, such is the complexity of common-sense insight that it is not a good candidate for examination in the act of self-affirmation. Consequently, I suggest that this chapter of nearly thirty pages operates at a tangent to Lonergan's most overt argument in *Insight*. If this is true of Chapter 6, it is even more so of Chapter 7. This chapter is nearly 50 pages long. It speaks of "Common Sense as Object" long before Lonergan outlines his notion of objectivity. It is best understood as an elaboration of the third step of the upper context. This step is most directly explained in Chapter 18 on ethics. Chapter 18 discusses how human action either prolongs the emergence of proportionate being or fails in its responsibility to do so.
becomes more clear. To perform this task, I again turn to the work of Frederick Crowe.

**Stages in the Writing of Insight**

In the Editor's Preface to *Insight*, Crowe offers a detailed account of the stages of Lonergan's writing of *Insight*. Ideas for this opus crystallised when Lonergan was teaching a course entitled "Thought and Reality" to his old friends in the Thomas More Institute in Montreal in the academic year 1945-46. However, Lonergan took care to complete his study of the vetera of Thomas Aquinas, and to publish his findings, before embarking on this project. Accordingly, he began his work on *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* only with the publishing of the last of the *Verbum* articles in 1949.

For the next three years, until the Fall of 1952, Lonergan laboured at this project. He completed more or less what appears as the present Chapters 1-13 of the book. Then, during that Fall, he received the surprising news that he was being sent as a teacher to the Gregorian University in Rome. His plans for the book he was writing now had to change as he was told that he would have little time for writing in his new job. He states clearly that his original intention was not merely to write a

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14 The class members in this course included many of the founders of the Institute. Fifty years later, the leaders of the Thomas More Institute still regard this course as having helped them establish the methodological approach that has governed the direction of the institute ever since.

15 Ibid., xv-xvi.
work that would be "a contribution to a higher collaboration." Rather, it was his original intention to undertake, all at once, the "much larger" work that would apply the philosophical achievements of the present Insight to an opus that would be explicitly theological.\textsuperscript{16} His assignment to Rome now made this project unpractical.

As a consequence of this new time constraint, Lonergan attempted, in his own words, to "round off" the work he had started, and have it ready for publishing before his departure for Rome in September of 1953.\textsuperscript{17} Lonergan largely succeeded in this project. While Insight was actually published in 1957, Lonergan made only relatively minor alterations to the text he had completed in 1953.\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, we can assert that the seven chapters, Chapters 14-20, were completed in less than ten months.\textsuperscript{19}

At this stage of my account of how Insight came to be written, I might assert: "the plot thickens." From early 1953 Lonergan hurried to plan a chapter outline of how he might realistically complete his work. There are extant in the Lonergan

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., xvi. Crowe asserts that "this rounding off gives a basic perspective on Insight: though integral within its assigned limits -- 'In constructing a ship or a philosophy one has to go the whole way' (p.7) -- it is not the finished book he had planned" (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{17}As well as in the Editors' Preface these facts are clearly recounted in Lonergan's "Insight Revisited," 267-8.

\textsuperscript{18}See Editors' Preface, xix-xx.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., xx.
archives various drafts of prospective chapter outlines written during this time. These tend always to have the same listing of the first twelve or thirteen chapters. However, the listing of the chapters after these show considerable variation. It seems reasonable to conclude that Lonergan went through a series of plans for how he might bring *Insight* to a conclusion. Similarly, it seems reasonable to suppose that an important reason for his rejecting earlier plans was that they would render the book too long to be completed in time.

I now come to an assertion that is of great significance for my argument in Part III of this dissertation. At least some of these chapter outlines make much greater use of the term "dialectic" than now appears in the table of contents of *Insight*. One such outline is found in a letter written by Lonergan in December 1952. Summarising this letter, Crowe asserts:

Contemporary with his "rounding off" decision there is a letter adding precious details: "About 12 chapters done. About 6 chapters to go." It then lists the topics as follows: "insight in maths, empirical science, common sense, knowing things, judgment; objectivity of insight; nature of metaphysics; God; dialectic of individual consciousness (Freud), of community (Marx), of objectivity (philosophies), of religion."²⁰

To a reader acquainted with the documents of File 713, there is a familiar ring to the chapter headings listed here concerning the dialectics of individual consciousness, of community, of objectivity and of religion. It is helpful to recall the penultimate article of Lonergan's 1930's essays entitled "A

²⁰Ibid., xxi, my underline.
Theory of History." In this article Lonergan speaks of the "natural dialectic," the "dialectic of sin," and the "supernatural dialectic." We can also recognize a further point of importance. Two of the above chapter headings, dialectic of individual consciousness, and dialectic of community, are more or less sub-headings that occur in Chapters 6 and 7 of the published version of Insight. This leads us to a question of particular importance for Part III of this dissertation: the significance of Chapters 6 and 7 in the overall schema of Insight.

The Significance of Chapters 6 and 7

In the Editor's Preface, Frederick Crowe arrives at a tentative conclusion regarding the stages by which Lonergan wrote Chapters 6 and 7 of Insight.

It is . . . possible that Lonergan had written an early draft of a chapter (or chapters) on common sense, then put it aside, and rewrote it completely [when Lonergan was preparing his full draft of what is now Insight].

Crowe stresses that this account of the writing of the chapters on common sense is merely speculative. Nevertheless, I find his hypothesis very persuasive.

I believe that it is likely that Lonergan decided that it was not practical to elaborate on his notion of dialectic in the

\[21\text{Ibid., xxii. Crowe bases his conclusion on a number of sources of evidence. One such source is the collection of chapter outlines that differ from the final version of Insight. Another source is textual evidence from original manuscripts regarding which chapters were written in what order. Finally, there is the evidence of an oral tradition from those who spoke to Lonergan on this question (Ibid., xx-xxii).}\]
later chapters of *Insight* as he had originally planned. As a result, he returned to and rewrote the chapters on common sense that are placed earlier in the book. Presumably he had written the original version of these chapters during the period 1949-52 when he had been less rushed. In his rewrite of these chapters, in 1953, it would seem that he added some material that he had originally hoped to place later in the book. We can imagine that this later treatment would have been at greater length.\(^{22}\)

If this hypothesis is correct, I believe it explains how awkwardly Chapters 6 and 7 fit into the upper context of *Insight*. We can also note that Lonergan makes more reference to a notion of dialectic in these chapters than anywhere else in the book. It is for this reason that I feel more confident than I otherwise might to treat some of the themes found in Chapters 6 and 7 as a coincidental manifold that is relevant to a higher viewpoint. This higher viewpoint would offer an integrated account of the term "dialectic." I believe that such an integrated account is never quite attained in *Insight*.

\(^{22}\)In the Lonergan archives there are some pages that seem to be another prospective chapter outline. This outline differs both from the one mentioned by Lonergan in his letter to Fr. Crowe of December 1952, and from what was eventually published. In this outline, the chapter headings resemble the published version of *Insight* more than does the outline of Lonergan's letter. It seems reasonable to conclude that this was a later outline that needed less modification to arrive at the final result. The title for the last chapter in this outline is "The Structure of History." It seems fair to assume that much of the content of what is now Chapter 20, "Special Transcendent Knowledge" was to be part of this chapter. However, at this stage Lonergan still planned to address the question of the dialectic of history to a greater extent than was eventually possible (Lonergan archives files: Batch 4, files 2 and 4).
I have already mentioned how an effort to be systematic in this fashion will inevitably involve a "going beyond" the actual contents of *Insight*. Consequently, before I undertake a direct study of Chapters 6 and 7, I will outline a systematic account of the notion of dialectic that I believe to be present but not thematised in Lonergan's thought. I will base these preliminary reflections on a review of his works prior to the writing of *Insight*, and on what we have already understood about this larger work in Part II of this dissertation.

**A Proposal: Lonergan's Notion of Dialectic**

I have proposed with some confidence that Lonergan's thought on dialectic does not attain a clarity that can be called a stable higher viewpoint within *Insight*. I now proceed to offer an account of Lonergan's notion of dialectic that is somewhat more systematic than what he himself articulates. I consider this account to be only a tentative proposal. I welcome improvements or corrections. Furthermore, I consider my proposal to be a rather minimal one. It leaves a number of questions unanswered. While rendering some of Lonergan's thought more systematic, I do not believe that my account itself constitutes a higher viewpoint on dialectic. I suspect that attaining a stable viewpoint on this question may require more of a development of Lonergan's thought than is possible in a work such as this.\(^{23}\)

\(^{23}\)I suspect that this higher viewpoint has been proposed by Robert M. Doran in *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). Doran does more than...
Let me introduce my outline of Lonergan's notion of dialectic with his own definition:

A dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change. Thus there will be a dialectic if (1) there is an aggregate of events of a determinate character, (2) the events may be traced to either or both of two principles (3) the principles are opposed yet bound together, and (4) they are modified by the changes that successively result from them.²⁴

I shall suggest that this definition of dialectic in fact applies to three distinct areas of inquiry addressed by Lonergan: cognitional analysis, metaphysics, and method. I also want to suggest that the dialectic that characterises each of these steps can unfold in either a complementary manner or a contradictory manner. To elaborate these points, I shall organize my comments about Lonergan's notion of dialectic with reference to the

render Lonergan's thought on dialectic more systematic. He makes proposals that develop it considerably (ibid., 9). Doran's notion of "psychic conversion" is original and, if true, constitutes an advance on Lonergan's thought that is of major significance. Let us recall what I have said about emergent probability as a model for studying speculative development. In the context of this, it is perfectly reasonable for a disciple of Lonergan to attempt such a development. To think otherwise would be to think of Lonergan as the writer of a logical treatise that could not be improved upon. However, a discussion of the development of Lonergan's thought performed by Robert Doran is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

I should acknowledge that my interpretation of Lonergan is considerably influenced by the perspective of Robert Doran. This could open me to the accusation that my interpretation of Lonergan on such issues as dialectic is biased by a desire to recognize in it a basis for the developments made by Doran. I have tried to avoid this mistake and to attribute to Lonergan only those ideas that he actually holds--whether systematically expressed or not. At any rate, Lonergan himself criticises "the principle of the empty head" in hermeneutics where interpreters pretend to approach texts with a naivete that does not involve any predisposition to interpret in a certain manner (Lonergan, Method in Theology, 204).

following diagram:

**Lonergan's Notion of Dialectic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STEP 1</th>
<th>STEP 2</th>
<th>STEP 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COGNITION AS DIALECTICAL</td>
<td>THE DIALECTIC OF HISTORY</td>
<td>METHOD ANTICIPATING DIALECTICAL SITUATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complementary Dimension</td>
<td>Complementary Dimension</td>
<td>Complementary Dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or Contradictory Dimension</td>
<td>or Contradictory Dimension</td>
<td>or Contradictory Dimension</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This diagram is characterised by a distinction between what I call "steps" and "dimensions" of Lonergan's notion of dialectic. I believe that these categories help render Lonergan's notion of dialectic a little more systematic. For the most part, I shall illustrate how these categories apply to Lonergan's thought by a discussion of Insight. However, by way of introducing my method, let me illustrate it by referring to themes in the documents of File 713 with which we are already familiar.

**Dialectic in File 713**

The essays of File 713 are clearly concerned first and foremost with what I call Step 2 of Lonergan's notion of dialectic. Lonergan's most commonly expressed understanding of
dialectic refers to the interaction of situations and new ideas in the course of history. I now want to apply the definition of dialectic, quoted above, which Lonergan states in Insight, to the notion of dialectic that Lonergan mostly uses in File 713. I believe that two insights result. The first is that the different parts of the definition do apply successfully to Lonergan's comments in these earlier writings. The second is that dialectic can be clearly understood to unfold in either a complementary or a contradictory manner.

Step 2 of a Notion of Dialectic

In Lonergan's account of the interaction of situations and new ideas, there is clearly "an aggregate of events of a determinate character." Likewise, the events clearly "may be traced to either or both of two principles." Similarly, I have outlined how the situations and new ideas can be understood as "opposed yet bound together." Finally, we can recognize that both situations and new ideas are "modified by the changes that successively result from them."25 There are four parts to this definition. If we investigate the third and fourth a little more closely, we recognize the value of distinguishing between complementary and contradictory kinds of dialectical process.

The nature of the opposition between situations and new ideas can be twofold. If the situation is already the result of intelligent and responsible action then the opposition will only

25Ibid.
be that of a kind of inertial tendency to resist change. However, when new ideas are actually adopted they constitute a rather painless "development" of the previously existing situation. However, if the situation is characterised by a considerable influence of stupid and irrational actions, then a good new idea will be yet more unwelcome. New ideas will be needed that not only "develop" the prior situation but also offer it "correction." Greater resistance can be expected to such correcting ideas than to those that seek merely to develop. So it is that in the dialectic of history, we can recognize dialectical oppositions that are either complementary or contradictory.

I have now arrived at a first conclusion in my attempt to apply the categories of my diagram to Lonergan's thought in the documents of File 713. Lonergan's definition of dialectic in Insight clearly applies to what he states about history in the documents of File 713. Furthermore, it clearly applies to dialectical processes that are both complementary and contradictory. Now, if we continue to reflect on Lonergan's

26The terms "development" and "correction" are significant ones that I take from "Analytic Concept of History," 13. This point is also made very clearly by Lonergan's distinction of the "natural dialectic" from the "dialectic of sin" (TH., 4).

27As mentioned in my introduction to this dissertation, Lonergan's use of the term "dialectic of history" will occur mostly later in his career. It will later become the almost exclusive term for what he names by a variety of terms at this stage. I have not actually found Lonergan employ the term in the years 1938-53. However, as I attempt to render Lonergan's thought more systematic for these years, I find that the dialectic of history is a very suitable term by which to name what I call Step 2 of his notion of dialectic. This is one reason for my keeping the term in the title of this dissertation. Another reason is that, in addition to
In Chapter 1, I stressed that from an early stage of Lonergan's academic career he sought to ground all his philosophic statements in cognitional analysis. He insisted: "you have to explain everything except what you can prove to admit no explanation; otherwise you are not a philosopher." Only in cognitional theory did he believe that foundations "that admit no explanation" could be found. In the documents of File 713 there is clear reference to the dialectical nature of cognitional acts. Consequently, I find in these documents evidence to support my distinction between Step 1 and Step 2 of Lonergan's notion of dialectic. However, it has to be said that Lonergan's account of cognition in the documents of file 713 is far less sophisticated that it will become in Insight.

In Chapter 1, I discussed the influence of Joseph Maréchal on the young Bernard Lonergan. A key aspect of Maréchal's thought was to recognize in Aquinas a notion of knowing as discursive. In File 713, Lonergan begins to employ a discursive notion of intellectual activity as a foundation for his account of the unfolding of history. In "Panton Anakephalaiosis," Lonergan

Lonergan's eventual preference for the term, it is the term Michael Shute uses in the title of his book on the documents of File 713.

adverts to Aquinas's notion of how human acts of knowing are incremental and progressive:

As St. Thomas remarked, [the form of human thought] is a progress from potency to perfect act (perfect science from every viewpoint) through a series of incomplete acts. 29

He then states that cognitional acts of this nature become the foundation for the dialectical process whereby situations and new ideas interact to constitute history. 30

As I have stated, Lonergan's account of cognitional acts in File 713 is not very sophisticated. For the most part, we might say that he conflated what I distinguish as Step 1 and Step 2 of his notion of dialectic. However, in the following quotation, it seems to me that there are clear grounds to distinguish dialectic as a cognitional notion and dialectic as explaining history. Likewise, Lonergan's distinctions of "development" and "correction" support the distinctions of complementary and contradictory dimensions of dialectic:

Because the unity of the dialectic is the unity of thought that goes into action, it follows that this thought produces the social situation with its problems. If the thought is good, the problems will be small and few; thus the situation will require but slight modifications of previous thought and leave man opportunity to advance and develop. If, on the other hand, the thought is poor, then its concrete results

29Lonergan, PA., 144., quoting Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 3 c.

30In the first document of File 713 Lonergan speaks of a "dialectic of fact." This historical process has its "first motion in material needs." These needs stimulate insights that result in actions that produce a "cycle" of systems of social organization: "socialistic agriculture, empire, democracy, more empire" (see PH., 111).
will be manifestly evil and call for a new attitude of mind.

Taking the matter more largely, we may say that the dominant thought at any time arose from preceding situations; that its tendency is to transform the actual situation either by correction or by development; that the transformed situation will give rise to new thought and this not merely to suggest it but to impose it by the threat of suffering or the promise of well-being.1

Finally, in the documents of File 713, Lonergan also makes statements that are relevant to what I call Step 3 of his notion of dialectic. He stresses that the process of renaissance in history will depend on graced individuals persuading decision makers in society to be influenced by an accurate philosophy of history to guide their actions. However, because of the fact that his cognitional analysis is not sophisticated, the notion of philosophy that he proposes is left somewhat vague. Nevertheless, in various places in File 713, I find evidence to support a proposition that the beginnings of Step 3 of a notion of dialectic are evident.

In each of these essays on history, Lonergan proceeds from a straightforward analysis of the dialectic of history to an exhortation to graced individuals to employ a method that will assist the process of renaissance. Furthermore, there are indications that Lonergan believes that philosophers will have to engage situations that are characterised both by a dialectic of complementarity and a dialectic of contradiction. This is the significance I identify in the following quotation of Lonergan's

1Lonergan, "Analytic Concept of History," 13, my underline.
reference both to the need of "giving positive guidance" and of attempting to "eliminate false theories":

The hope of the future lies in a philosophic presentation of the supernatural concept of social order: it must be guided by the faith for reason alone is inadequate . . . but though supernatural it must also be philosophic, for only a sound philosophy can establish the intellectual conviction necessary to reassure men, can eliminate false theories in a purely natural sphere, can give positive guidance in what the Pope [Pius XI] called in his encyclical "technical matters" lying outside the scope of his pastoral office.

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A Clarification

In Chapter 6, I proceed to apply my three-step and two-dimension notion of dialectic to Insight. However, before I do this I want to make a clarification. In Step 2 of my account of Lonergan's notion of dialectic I consider dialectic to be employed as a metaphysical term--I understand it to explain a broad outline of proportionate being. However, I want to stress that as a metaphysical term, I understand dialectic to apply only to those systems that are the product of acts of human intelligence. I want to stress this because my argument is similar to another commentator on Lonergan's notion of dialectic, Ronald McKinney, who does not make this distinction.

When I distinguish Step 1 from Step 2, I am aware that such a distinction involves a specific instance of a general principle

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^3^Lonergan, PH., 117. We might recall that in his work on economic theory Lonergan understood himself to be performing just this task of "eliminating false theories" and "offering positive guidance" in the technical sphere of a social science.
that Lonergan employs in his philosophy. This principle is to begin with cognitional theory and to proceed to metaphysics. I have already pointed out that Lonergan achieves this transition in the third step of the upper context of *Insight*. McKinney makes the valuable point that Lonergan’s notion of dialectic proceeds in this manner:

Lonergan’s method of exposition concerning . . . dialectic is similar to his treatment of metaphysics. In the latter case, he first examines the nature of cognitional process, establishes his metaphysics on the basis of the fundamental isomorphic elements involved in knowing, and then regards the cognitional process as but one exemplification of this integral heuristic structure.33

However, valuable as is this point, McKinney proceeds to come to a conclusion that I believe is invalid. He asserts that the notion of dialectic can be applied to the principle of emergence in all proportionate being. Consequently, he asserts that all of the heuristic methods advocated by Lonergan can be sublated within an umbrella notion of dialectical method. He acknowledges that Lonergan made explicit and frequent denials of the possibility of applying dialectic to pre-human genera. McKinney claims to correct an error on Lonergan’s part in this respect.

By contrast with McKinney, I accept Lonergan’s claim that dialectic is a notion that “is relevant to human knowledge and to human activities that depend upon knowledge.”34 I have explained


"dialectic as relevant to human knowledge" to constitute Step 1 of Lonergan's notion. Dialectic as relevant to "human activities that depend on knowledge" I explain as Step 2 of Lonergan's notion. However, even if dialectic can only be applied to these phenomena, I do want to stress that when used in the sense of Step 2, it is a metaphysical term.

Let us recall that Lonergan speaks of activities that depend on knowledge as including "systems" such as "science, a new civilization, a new philosophy." Such systems are instances of proportionate being. In my account of the third step of the upper context of Insight I emphasised that Lonergan understands authentic human action to prolong the emergence of proportionate being. Consequently, even if dialectic is restricted to human knowing and its products it can still be understood to have an application as a metaphysical term.

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15Ibid., 292.

16A response to the ideas of Ronald McKinney is offered by Glen Hughes in an exchange conducted with McKinney in Method. Journal of Lonergan Studies 1, no. 1 (March 1983), 60-73. Hughes criticises McKinney for attempting to apply the notion of dialectic to pre-human genera. On this point, I agree with Hughes. However, Hughes also seems to assert that one should only employ the term dialectic with respect to dialectical method (Hughes, 67). In terms of my diagram, Hughes thus only accepts a notion of dialectic that applies to a contradictory dimension of Step 3. McKinney responds to Hughes by criticising his "more orthodox and restrictive interpretation of Lonergan's notion of dialectic" (McKinney, "A Reply to Glen Hughes," ibid., 68). Whatever one thinks about the "orthodoxy" of Hughes' position, I do believe that it is excessively restrictive. Michael Shute comments on the debate between McKinney and Hughes (Shute, 169-173). He agrees with Hughes concerning the application of dialectic to pre-human genera. However, he disagrees with the extent to which Hughes seeks to restrict the term even when applied only to human knowing and its products. Based on his study of the documents of File 713, Shute
Conclusion

The logic of my argument now leads me to investigate more extensively the notion of dialectic that is operative in Insight. In this chapter, I have outlined the method with which I intend to undertake this task. I have stressed the value of recognizing unthematised insights in any philosophical work and have pointed out how a discussion of these insights will rarely avoid a certain development of them in order to express them in a more systematic manner. I have also commented on the rushed nature of Lonergan's writing of the final chapters of Insight. I suggest that this fact makes it all the more appropriate to study the insights that he offers but does not fully develop. Finally, I proposed a structure for understanding Lonergan's notion of dialectic. I illustrated the usefulness of this structure by applying it to an account of what Lonergan states about dialectic in his essays on history in File 713. I must now turn to a study of Lonergan's use of the term dialectic in Insight itself.

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asserts: "the evidence from these manuscripts argues in favour of a broad application of the notion of dialectic" (Shute, 173).
I now turn to a discussion of Lonergan's notion of dialectic in *Insight*. I focus primarily on Chapters 6 and 7 of this work. The chapters are entitled, respectively, "Common Sense as Subject" and "Common Sense as Object." As I explained in my last chapter, I now attempt to offer an account of Lonergan's notion of dialectic that is somewhat more systematic than anything he actually offers himself. I suggest that his account fits into the three steps concerning cognition, history, and method. Likewise, I stress that the two dimensions of complementarity and contradiction can be applied to each of these steps. I suggest that the insights concerning these steps and dimensions are at least emergent in what Lonergan asserts.

Broadly speaking, I understand Chapter 6 to deal with what I have been calling dialectic as applied to cognitional analysis. Next, I suggest that Lonergan discusses the dialectic of history in Chapter 7. On the question of method anticipating dialectical situations, I turn to his chapters on metaphysics, especially Chapters 15 and 17.

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¹We might note here that Lonergan speaks of common sense as object in Chapter 7 but only introduces his notion of objectivity in Chapter 13. I take this as another example of how uneasily Chapters 6 and 7 fit into the upper context of *Insight*. 
Dialectic and Cognitional Analysis

In Chapter 6 of *Insight*, Lonergan offers an intricate account of human subjectivity. This account deepens considerably anything that Lonergan had written before *Insight* on the questions of how our unconscious plays a role in cognitional acts. It also introduces us to a rather sophisticated account of the acts of insight and judgment that occur in common-sense knowing. The previous chapters in *Insight*, and indeed his studies in cognitional theory before this book, tended to focus on more rarefied cases of theoretic insights in the sciences or in philosophy.

Now, while Lonergan's account of human subjectivity in Chapter 6 is quite sophisticated, anyone trying to study his notion of dialectic and subjectivity encounters a problem. Nowhere in Chapter 6 does Lonergan employ the term dialectic. It is only in Chapter 7, while speaking of the dialectic of community, that he makes what we might call a "throw-back" reference to the "dialectic of the subject." In the last chapter, I spoke of how I consider Lonergan's notion of dialectic in *Insight* to be relatively unthematised. Clearly this is an example of what I mean. Consequently, with regard to Lonergan's account of how dialectic applies to an account of subjectivity, I will seek to render his thought more systematic.

I will suggest that in Chapter 6 Lonergan in fact implies that there exists not one but two dialectics of the subject. One

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of these operates between our unconscious and consciousness. The other operates between those desires that primarily express biological needs and those desires that express the pure desire to know and to be responsible.

I shall try to be clear on where I am directly reporting what Lonergan asserts and where I am offering a more constructive thematisation of his ideas. For this reason, I shall first outline his account of subjectivity. I shall focus on the opposition that Lonergan describes as operating in this subjectivity. Only after this shall I discuss how the term dialectic can be applied to these oppositions. Furthermore, even when discussing Lonergan's notion of subjectivity, I shall not only use Chapter 6 as a central point of reference. I shall also employ statements of Lonergan from other chapters of *Insight.*

**Oppositions in the Subject**

A key point that Lonergan makes in Chapter 6 is that our conscious levels of cognition operate a function over preconscious activity in our nervous system that he calls a "censorship." His account of the censor is complex and best outlined in stages. This censorship constitutes an opposition that exists between consciousness and our unconscious. However,  

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3Such a selective use of Lonergan's comments from different chapters may still seem strange to the reader. However, I have already given my reasons for doing this. Essentially, I claim that in *Insight* there are a number of insights that are emergent without being very systematically expressed. Consequently, rendering Lonergan's thought more systematic requires a certain weaving together of arguments made in different parts of the book.
this is not the only opposition that Lonergan describes. He also speaks of a "conscious tension" that is the result of the "opposite" desires stimulated by the different levels of development: psyche and spirit.¹

Describing these different oppositions is a complex affair. I will first outline the opposition between our censor and our preconscious neural events. A good manner in which to begin is to first study a manner of functioning of the censor that we share with animals; only after this shall I outline the distinct nature of the censorship in humans. After that, I shall discuss the conscious opposition that also exists in subjectivity.

Experience and the Unconscious

When Lonergan studies the difference between biological and psychic levels of development, he notes that organic tissue can be arranged so as to become the neural tissue of a nervous system. A nervous system then allows for the possibility of "sensitive consciousness" in an animal.² He adds that neural events make a kind of "demand" for expression in consciousness. However, not all of these demands can be met. A certain kind of "preconscious selection" must be performed:

Besides the demands of neural processes, there also is the pattern of experience in which their demands are met; and as the elements that enter consciousness are already within a pattern, there must be exercised some

¹Ibid., 497, 498.
²Ibid., 481.
preconscious selection and arrangement.  

The relationship between "neural patterns and processes" and what is actually admitted into consciousness involves an activity that he calls "censorship." He asserts that the presentations that arrive in consciousness are oriented toward certain acts of knowing. He states that animals operate in a "biological pattern of experience." This is a pattern of experience in which humans can sometimes exist and animals always do. He asserts that in this pattern of experience "unconscious process and conscious striving both pursue the same end." Regarding this end, he states that the various conscious events such as "sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions, and bodily movements . . . converge upon terminal activities of intussusception or reproduction, or, when negative in scope, self-preservation."

Lonergan stresses that there is a kind of knowing that is facilitated by the biological knowing; he calls it "elementary knowing." He distinguishes it from the "fully human knowing" that I have been discussing in this dissertation in terms of three levels of cognition. He offers a description of elementary knowing. He takes the example of a kitten seeking to lap milk

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6Ibid., 213.
7Ibid., 214.
8Ibid., 205.
9Ibid., 214.
10Ibid., 206.
from a saucer. He claims that such a kitten engages in a kind of knowing that "is constituted completely on the level of experience." He adds that the nature of the ends constrain the type of means employed:

The means lie in external situations, and so anticipation is extroverted. The kitten’s consciousness is directed outwards towards possible opportunities to satisfy appetites. This extroversion is spatial: as it is by the spatial maneuvers of moving its head and limbs that the kitten deals with means to its end, so the means also must be spatial, for otherwise spatial maneuvers would be inept and useless; the extroversion is also temporal: present data are distinct from the imagined courses of future action to which they lead. Finally, the extroversion is concerned with the 'real': a realistic painting of a saucer of milk might attract a kitten's attention, make it investigate, sniff, perhaps try to lap; but it could not lead to lapping, and still less to feeling replete; for the kitten, painted milk is not real.  

Lonergan follows this description of the kitten's knowing activities with an explanation of what is essential to them. He states that this kind of knowing is orientated toward what he terms "bodies" (such as a saucer of milk). He claims that the "body" intended by this kind of knowing is considered to be an "already out there now real."  

Obviously, the term "out" refers to the extroverted nature of the consciousness that seeks means to its ends. The term "already" indicates that such extroversion "does not create but finds its environment; it finds it as already constituted,

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11Ibid., 277-8.
12Ibid., 276.
13Ibid.
already offering opportunities, already issuing challenges.\(^{14}\)
The terms "there" and "now" indicate the spatial and temporal references needed to exercise the means necessary to obtain such ends.

The term "real" is of particular interest to us here. We saw that our kitten does not consider a painting of a saucer of milk to be "real." Lonergan therefore defines this notion of the real as follows:

'Real' . . . is a subdivision within the field of the 'already out there now': part of that is mere appearance; but part is real; and its reality consists in its relevance to biological success or failure, pleasure or pain."\(^{15}\)

Let us note in passing how different is this notion of the real from that which we have already been discussing in this dissertation. We have noted Lonergan's repeated assertion that, for fully human knowing, the real is that which is verified by the grasp of a virtually unconditioned and consequent judgment. Clearly, there is a difference between elementary knowing and the fully human knowing that we have already been investigating. In fact, we can speak of an opposition that exists in human consciousness between the tendencies to engage in each of these different kinds of acts of knowing.

\(^{14}\)Ibid.

\(^{15}\)Ibid., 277.
The Opposition of Psyche and Spirit

Now, in Chapter 4 of this dissertation I have already spoken of the opposition that exists in consciousness between our psychic level of development and our spiritual level of development. Our psyche tends to encourage us to function as "a self-attached and self-interested center." By contrast with this, our spirit encourages us to be motivated by the "opposite attributes of detachment and disinterestedness." 16 Now, I have just spoken of the censorship that our conscious activities exercise over our preconscious neural events. Clearly, this censorship will be exercised differently depending on whether we are submitting to the dictates of our psychic or our spiritual desires. To explore this opposition more closely, we need to be clear that we seldom operate entirely within the biological pattern of experience. Rather, our consciousness usually functions in what Lonergan calls the "dramatic pattern of experience." 17 It is within this dramatic pattern of experience that the opposition between psyche and spirit is most often felt.

The Dramatic Pattern of Experience

A first dimension of the dramatic pattern of experience to note is that it includes many of the presentations that are relevant to elementary knowing. However, there is always a kind of flexibility in just how the human satisfies even the most

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16Ibid., 498.

17Ibid., 210.
basic of biological needs. Lonergan stresses that there are few areas in which human response to a stimulus is automatic:

Man's bodily movements are, as it were, initially detached from the conative, sensitive, and emotive elements that direct and release them; and the initial plasticity and indeterminacy ground the later variety.\(^5\)

Clearly, we now need to study further the later variety to which Lonergan refers in this quotation. A first step is to note that we humans use greater powers of intelligence in satisfying our needs than is possible for animals. This is true even when the needs that we are satisfying are needs that we share with animals. Lonergan states that for this purpose we normally use a kind of knowing that he categorises as "common sense." Thus, it is to a study of common sense that we must now turn.\(^9\)

\(^5\)Ibid., 212-3.

\(^9\)Readers who are familiar with Chapter 6 of Insight will recognize that I am outlining Lonergan's thought in a somewhat different order than he does himself. I treat the dramatic pattern of experience as what might be called an "umbrella notion." It is in the context of this pattern of experience that I discuss both common sense knowing and our aesthetic desires. I do not mention the "aesthetic pattern of experience." I understand this to be closely related to the dramatic pattern of experience. It is the "mind-set" of the artist who focuses in a specialised manner on that aesthetic awareness that is present, to some degree, in the ordinary experience of everyone. Thus, in the dramatic pattern of experience aesthetic experience is a means to an end. This end is decision and action. In the aesthetic pattern of experience, aesthetic experience is sought as an end in itself.

In outlining Lonergan's ideas in this manner, I seek to stress that a basic challenge exists in human living regarding the ability to let the motivations of psyche submit to the higher control of spirit. This challenge already exists within acts of knowing that occur in the dramatic pattern of experience. However, I shall stress that our ability to submit to the dictates of spirit is tested in a particular manner when we feel an exigence to shift out of the dramatic pattern of experience altogether and engage in acts of knowing based on the intellectual pattern of experience.
Common sense is not the same kind of knowing as the more scientific acts that I have been studying for most of this dissertation. However, it is a point of great importance to appreciate that common sense is not an elementary form of knowing. Lonergan insists that common sense is one type of fully human knowing:

The occurrence of insight is not restricted to the minds of mathematicians when doing mathematics, and . . . physicists . . . On the contrary, one meets intelligence in every walk of life . . . In every case, the man or woman of intelligence is marked by a greater readiness in catching on, in getting the point, in seeing the issue, in grasping implications, in acquiring knowhow.20

Now, with regard to the difference between scientific and common-sense knowing, Lonergan makes some clear distinctions. He reminds us that the scientist seeks to understand in an explanatory manner.21 The scientist seeks not only to gain insight into events but to express these insights in concepts and rigorous definitions. So it is, for example, that it is one thing to grasp what makes a circle round, it is another to express this in a clear definition. Lonergan now asserts that the person of common sense does not seek to abstract an explanatory expression of what she has understood. The person of common sense desires not explanation but, rather, is content with "description."

Description concerns itself with the "relations of things to

20Ibid., 196.

21Ibid., 36.
Such descriptive knowledge is a sufficient basis for the kind of decisions that we are normally required to make in our daily living. Lonergan makes the following distinction:

The intelligibility that science grasps comprehensively is the intelligibility of the concrete with which common sense deals effectively.

Common sense seeks to "master each situation as it arises." Clearly, there will be a host of different brands of common sense. Lonergan asserts that for every difference in geography, occupation, social arrangement, etc., "there is an appropriate variation of common sense."25

There is one more important point to note in introducing common sense. It is connected to the phenomenon of belief. In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I discussed belief while outlining the fifth step of the upper context of Insight. Cultures convey a kind of generalised common sense to the individuals formed by them.25 Thus, common sense is not only an attainment based on personal quickness of mind. It can be understood as "that vague name given to the unknown source of a large and floating population of elementary judgments which

22Ibid., 204.
23Ibid., 323.
24Ibid., 200.
25Ibid., 203.
26This still allows for more specialized forms of common senses within such a culture. Nevertheless, it will remain the case that a foreign visitor to a country will often find that attitudes, which are taken for granted by citizens, seem strange to her.
everyone makes, everyone relies on, and almost everyone regards as obvious and indisputable." 27 So it is that societies pass on to their young some part of an accumulation of common sense insights and judgments that can guide their living. Not surprisingly, then, Lonergan remarks that this makes possible a reality that makes "the achievement of each successive generation the starting point of the next." 28 It would seem fair to assert that common sense knowing involves what must be the primary instance of belief operating in human living.

Now, a first point of importance that we need to assert regarding the dramatic pattern of experience is that it often employs common sense knowing to guide action that answers needs that are dictated by the psyche. Now, Lonergan does assert that human beings can at times operate within a biological pattern of experience. However, I believe this is rare. 29 Most of the time, humans use their common sense to find means to satisfy their biological needs. So it is that for human beings censorship of preconscious neural events is usually more sophisticated than that which occurs in animals. We might assert that censorship

27Ibid., 314.

28Ibid., 198.

29One example that comes to mind is of soldiers at war. When soldiers emerge from an encounter where hand-to-hand combat has occurred, they often remark that they remember little of what happened. It would seem that, in the heat of battle, individuals revert to the most biologically patterned of experiences--and the most elementary forms of knowing. Memory is a function that is little needed in these situations and that seems sometimes not to be engaged.
needs to select neural events that are relevant to two distinct sets of concerns. The first set serves the interests of elementary knowing; the second supplies common sense with the images into which it will gain insight. Clarifying this point requires us to address another one. In addition to selecting conscious experiences relevant to answering biological needs, the censor also caters to a kind of knowing that distinguishes the beautiful from the ugly or mundane.

Lonergan asserts that there is an added aspect to the patterning of conscious human experience which differentiates us from the animals. It is an "artistic" or "dramatic" component:

If now we turn to ordinary human living . . . there is a stream of consciousness, and the stream involves not only succession but also direction. Conspicuous in this direction is a concern to get things done. But behind palpable activities, there are motives and purposes; and in them it is not difficult to discern an artistic, or more precisely, a dramatic component.  

Lonergan claims that our ordinary experience shows an instinctive kind of "playfulness" which insists that "experience can occur for the sake of experiencing." It resists the "confines of serious-minded biological purpose." We can identify a sense of the aesthetic in the fact that humans surround eating with "the table manners imposed on children," and sexual activity with "an aura of romantic idealism." Above all, however, Lonergan asserts that the individual's "first work of art is his own living." He speaks of how individual character and personality emerge from the decisions regarding just how each person answers his needs:

30Ibid., 210.
"out of the plasticity and exuberance of childhood through the discipline and play of education there gradually is formed the character of the man."31

So it is that we can now characterize the various factors that influence the dramatic pattern of experience. First among these are the organic concerns that communicate themselves through the self-concerned urgings of the psyche. Secondly, there is the motivation to provide phantasms suitable for common-sense insight. Finally, there is the playful sense of artistry that adds data to influence our common sense choices with a criterion of the aesthetically pleasing.

Let us now try to be more precise regarding exactly where the opposition between psyche and spirit occurs when we function within the dramatic pattern of experience. I want to suggest that it occurs as soon as we engage in acts of knowing that are not simply acts of elementary knowing. Even when common sense is being employed to address the self-concerned demands of the psyche it employs a power of intelligence that is a function of our spiritual level of development. Such acts of intelligence are a higher integration of our psychic manifold. So it is that I suggest that any act of common sense knowing occurs in opposition to an instinct in us to engage in merely elementary knowing.32

31Ibid, 208, 210, 212.

32An example of this might be taken from our first ancestors who developed an ability to till the soil. These farmers learnt that the best ears of corn from one season should be preserved as seed for the next season. This reasoning would oppose the instincts of elementary knowing which would seek to devour the most enticing
However, this opposition becomes particularly evident in certain occurrences of common sense knowing. The strangeness of our pure desires as opposed to our self-concerned desires is especially clear when common sense becomes employed to respond to choices of value that are not spontaneous but rational.

In Chapter 2, I spoke of two causes of the will.\(^3\) The first cause is constituted by those values that intellect affirms. The will experiences what Lonergan calls an "appetite" for these values. He asserts that there are different appetites for different values; he adds that these appetites can exist in tension with each other:

There . . . is a multiplicity of appetites and of loves generating within a single subject tensions and even contradictions. . . . Just as food suits hunger, just as care of her child suits a mother, so the reasonable good suits rational appetite; on the other hand, being unreasonable is what suits mistaken self-love.\(^3\)

Now, the article from which this quotation is taken was published in 1943. In the light of what I have outlined from Lonergan's argument in *Insight*, we can recognize that the tension to which Lonergan refers is in, fact, the opposition that exists between our psychic and our spiritual levels of development.

We can recall that Lonergan also explains the second cause of the will. He states that it involves a self-movement of the will. In the course of this second cause, common sense knowing is corn first.

\(^3\)See *Grace And Freedom*, 101.

\(^3\)Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," 24-5.
employed in considering what acts might obtain certain valuable results for us. It also considers what might be the consequences, good and bad, of such action. It is on the basis of this common sense consideration of options for action that we finally come to decision about action.

Now, I have asserted that there is an opposition between psyche and spirit when common sense is employed for any purpose. However, I believe that this opposition is most clearly felt when common sense is employed to produce a decision that responds to a judgment of a value that is rational. An example occurs to me from my own experience of how such opposition can be experienced. At one period I considered becoming a vegetarian. I was motivated by ethical concerns in this matter and experimented with a vegetarian diet for a short time. However, growing up in Ireland, I had formed a habit of eating a great deal of red meat. I soon began to feel a keen tension between my spiritual and my psychic desires. I experienced a craving for meat at every meal. I also developed a revulsion to the sight of bean stew and sea-weed salad. I quickly retreated from this effort to let spiritual desire govern psychic yearning.

The Intellectual Pattern of Experience

In my discussion of the dramatic pattern of experience, I have commented on how it normally employs common sense knowing. I have stressed that, while this is a fully human kind of knowing, it can respond to the dictates either of the psyche or of spirit.
I have also commented on how common sense knowing is different from scientific knowing. I now want to outline Lonergan's comments regarding how scientific knowing requires that we shift out of the dramatic pattern of experience. He asserts that scientific knowing requires that we operate in the "intellectual pattern of experience." He adds we often find it difficult to shift from a dramatic to an intellectual patterning of experience. I will stress that in the difficulty we can recognize a particularly clear example of how our psyche resists being subordinated to the dictates of the pure desire of spirit.

Lonergan describes the intellectual pattern of experience as a more rarefied affair than the dramatic pattern of experience. In the intellectual pattern of experience the censorship that occurs of preconscious neural events can be highly selective. Consciousness will tend to experience only those presentations that are relevant to a very specific theoretical question. Lonergan offers an example of this patterning of experience in a mathematician:

In the seasoned mathematician, sensitive process easily contracts to an unruffled sequence of symbolic notations and schematic images . . . even the subconscious goes to work to yield at unexpected moments the suggestive images of clues and missing links, of patterns and perspectives . . . In reflection, there arises a passionless calm . . . Memory ferrets out instances that would run counter to the prospective judgment . . . so strange is the transformation of sensitive spontaneity, that memories and anticipations rise above the threshold of consciousness only if they possess at least a plausible

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35Ibid., 209.
relevance to the decision to be made.  

This patterning of experience can produce an inattentiveness to ordinary matters that can seem laughable to individuals who remain in the dramatic pattern of experience. The comic image of the absent-minded professor is a familiar symbol of modern culture. Lonergan stresses that individuals need to be schooled to become capable of scientific knowing. Much of this schooling involves being instructed regarding the conscious steps required by scientific method. However, while one is being schooled in this, one is also being schooled into how to shift to the intellectual pattern of experience. Let us think of an image of an elementary school girl sucking at the end of her pencil as she struggles with a problem in her mathematics homework. We can recognize here that a habit is being formed of operating within the intellectual pattern of experience: intelligence is learning to censor preconscious neural events so as to promote images that facilitate theoretic insight.

Now, nobody is able to remain in the intellectual pattern of experience at all times. Even the research scientist will have to alternate between the intellectual and the dramatic pattern of experience. Even for such an individual, it can take a certain effort to "switch off" her other concerns and "get back to work."

\[36\text{Ibid., 209.}\]

Lonergan offers an example of this from the ancient Greeks. The story, which he takes from Plato, is of the "milkmaid who laughed at Thales." Thales the philosopher was watching the stars as he walked along at night. He was so preoccupied with this that he fell into a well (ibid., 96).
Lonergan stresses that the individual operating in the dramatic pattern of experience usually feels a resistance to shifting to the intellectual pattern of experience. One reason for this is that an individual who is functioning in this pattern easily thinks that her knowing is elementary knowing and that any other attitude to how to employ intelligence makes no sense:

No one can hope to live exclusively in that pattern [the intellectual pattern of experience]. As soon as anyone moves from that pattern to the dramatic pattern of his intercourse with others or the practical pattern of his daily tasks, things as intelligible unities once more will take on for him the appearance of unreal speculation, while 'bodies' or instances of the 'already out there now real' will resume the ascendancy that they acquired without opposition in his infancy.  

We can now be clear that the individual in the dramatic pattern of experience naturally experiences a resistance to shifting to the intellectual pattern of experience. However, Lonergan stresses that our nature does not leave us without resources in overcoming these obstacles. First and foremost, he recognizes in our sense of the aesthetic a principle that destabilizes any over-serious attachment to the very practical concerns of common sense:

The aesthetic liberation and the free artistic control of the flow of sensations and images, of emotions and bodily movements, not merely break the bonds of biological drive but also generate in experience a flexibility that makes it a ready tool for the spirit of inquiry.  

Another dimension to this point relates to what I stated

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38Ibid., 293.  
39Ibid., 209, my underline.
above regarding how much common sense relies on belief. Lonergan stresses, for example, that the aesthetic leanings of an individual will be greatly encouraged if she lives in an environment where such pursuits are encouraged. Likewise, if the common sense of a culture values individuals who operate often in the intellectual pattern of experience then the chances will be higher of individuals in that culture making that transition.¹⁴ I will discuss the question of culture further when discussing the more metaphysical question of the dialectic of history.

Clearly then, we have resources that help us shift from the dramatic pattern of experience to the intellectual pattern of experience. However, we do not always employ these resources. This resistance can involve a kind of stubbornness by which we resist submitting to the dictates of the pure desire to know and its consequent exigence to be responsible. To further explore this resistance, we need to explore Lonergan's notion of bias. This notion concerns the state of imbalance into which each of the oppositions of subjectivity can descend.

**Bias**

I have now outlined two oppositions in subjectivity. The first is the opposition that exists between preconscious neural events and the censorship function exercised by consciousness. The second opposition is a conscious one. It exists between the dictates of psyche and the dictates of spirit. Now, we can

¹⁴See ibid., 261.
further investigate these oppositions by outlining Lonergan's notion of bias. We can understand bias by appreciating a truth about most situations of opposition: opposition can exist either in a state of what we can call "healthy tension," or in a state of breakdown. In a state of breakdown we can speak of one pole of the opposition gaining a kind of "unfair advantage." Instead of healthy tension, there results a distortion. In this distorted situation, the neglected pole of the opposition creates a kind of disturbance that calls attention to the need to restore balance.

A first bias outlined by Lonergan is "dramatic bias." This involves a malfunctioning of the first of the oppositions I have outlined: the censorship function exercised over preconscious neural events. Lonergan explains that "elementary passions bias understanding in practical and personal matters." He asserts that dramatic bias is usually the result of damage done to our censor by past experiences. Memories of some kind of negative experience can create a distorted process of selecting from the neural messages of the unconscious. These kinds of distortions can often be fruitfully treated by psychotherapy. Lonergan, appreciates the foundational work done by Sigmund Freud in this area and mentions that a very common source of dramatic bias is distortion in "sexual development." So it is that he asserts

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Ibid., 214.

Ibid., 220. It is worth stressing that virtually all individuals suffer from some degree of dramatic bias. One does not have to manifest serious psycho-neuroses to have a psychic censor that excludes certain data from consciousness that perfect objectivity would require.
that censorship can be either "constructive" or "repressive":

Primarily, the censorship is constructive; it selects and arranges materials that emerge in consciousness in a perspective that gives rise to an insight . . . In contrast, the aberration of the censorship is primarily repressive; its positive activity is to prevent the emergence into consciousness of perspectives that would give rise to unwanted insights.43

A second bias identified by Lonergan is "individual bias." This bias concerns the second opposition that I have outlined. It is a situation in which the dictates of psyche gain precedence over the dictates of spirit. Lonergan defines individual bias as "the interference of spontaneity with the development of intelligence."44 Spontaneity is clearly defined as a motivation governed by the psyche that pursues a self-interested agenda. We should take careful note that Lonergan is not speaking here of a straight-forward case of a biological pattern of experience leading to acts of elementary knowing. Rather, the individual employs fully human intelligence. However this only occurs insofar as it serves a self-centred interest:

Spontaneity is concerned with the present, the immediate, the palpable . . . Egoism is neither concerned with mere spontaneity nor pure intelligence but an interference of spontaneity with the development of intelligence. With remarkable acumen one solves one’s own problems. With startling modesty one does not venture to raise the relevant further questions, Can one’s solution be generalized? Is it compatible with the social order that exists? Is it compatible with any social order that proximately or even remotely is possible?45

43Ibid., 216.
44Ibid., 245.
45Lonergan, Insight, 245.
A third bias that affects the individual is the most insidious of all. Lonergan calls this "general bias." Like individual bias, it concerns the opposition of psyche and spirit. However, in this instance, the effect of excessive influence by the psyche is to inhibit the shift from the dramatic pattern of experience to the intellectual pattern of experience. I have noted Lonergan's point that there will always be a kind of natural resistance to allowing a shift to the intellectual patterning of experience. He now asserts that general bias advances this natural resistance to a point of principle. What can begin as a simple resistance can harden into a fixed rationalization:

The lag of intellectual development, its difficulty, and its apparently meagre returns bear in an especial manner on common sense. . . . It easily is led to rationalize its limitations by engendering a conviction that other forms of human knowledge are useless or doubtfully valid.46

I will return to a discussion of the effects of bias in my metaphysical section on the dialectic in social affairs.47 I want now to proceed to a discussion of how the opposition in human consciousness can be understood as dialectical opposition.

46Ibid., 251.

47I leave until that section two further important points. The first is that there exists a phenomenon of "group bias;" the second is that general bias has an important social dimension--one that leads to a "longer cycle of decline."
In my outline of Lonergan's comments on subjectivity and patterns of experience I have spoken of two main oppositions that exist in subjectivity. I now want to outline how both these oppositions conform to Lonergan's definition of dialectic. Lonergan, himself, affirms this of the first opposition. In affirming this of the second opposition I believe that I am merely rendering Lonergan's thought more systematic.

Concerning the opposition between our censor and our preconscious neural events, Lonergan has this to say:

The dialectic of the subject is concerned with the entry of neural demands into consciousness.\(^8\)

If we reflect on Lonergan's four point definition of dialectic,\(^9\) which I stated in the last chapter, we can identify how it is that the relationship between our censor and our preconscious neural events is a dialectical one. Regarding the first aspect of Lonergan's notion of dialectic, it is clear that between consciousness and the unconscious there is an "aggregate of events of a determinate character." Furthermore, it is obvious that "the events may be traced to either or both of two principles." One of these principles is constituted by the large number of neural events occurring in the nervous system at any given time. The other principle is the selecting mechanism by which our higher capacities--for elementary knowing or for fully

\(^8\)Ibid., 243.

\(^9\)Ibid., 242.
human knowing--selects from these neural events.

The third aspect of Lonergan's definition of dialectic speaks of how "the principles are opposed yet bound together." Lonergan asserts that psyche and intellect are "linked as patterned and patterning." We can recognize in this relationship both an opposition and a bondedness. Finally, the fourth and final aspect of Lonergan's definition of a dialectical relationship requires that the two principles "are modified by the changes that successively result from them." This is clearly the case with respect to the relationship between our censor and our preconscious neural events. Lonergan points out that, with respect to both neural demands and the censor, "change is cumulative." He stresses that "the orientation of the censorship at any time and the neural demands to be met both depend on the past history of the stream of consciousness." To put this point in another manner, prior acts of knowing help the censor to anticipate what neural events are likely to be relevant to further acts of knowing.

There is one final point I want to stress about this dialectical relationship. It can be either complementary or contradictory. Now, Lonergan himself does not make his distinction between these two dimensions of dialectic as

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50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 243.
explicitly as I do. However, he does state that censorship of preconscious events can be either constructive or repressive. Clearly, there will be much difference between the dialectics that unfold from each of these kinds of censorship. I call this a difference of complementary and contradictory dimensions of a dialectical relationship.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{52}While Lonergan does not explicitly differentiate complementary and contradictory dimensions of dialectic let us recall his statement:

[Dialectic] is adjustable to any course of events, from an ideal line of pure progress resulting from the harmonious working of the opposed principles, to any degree of conflict, aberration, breakdown and disintegration (ibid., 269).

\textsuperscript{53}I have stated that in Part III of this dissertation, I am self-consciously trying to render a more systematic account of dialectic than Lonergan quite does in \textit{Insight}. Consequently, I do not attempt to discuss all of his references to dialectic. Many of these references are merely made in passing in the context of a discussion whose focus is not this notion. However, let me note briefly a certain pattern that I perceive in Lonergan’s unsystematic method of employing this notion: Lonergan tends, dominantly, to apply the term dialectic to situations of breakdown, not of complementarity. I believe that this has encouraged many interpreters of Lonergan to neglect the fact that he does also insist that dialectic can be applied to an "ideal line of progress."

There is one striking example of Lonergan’s tendency to emphasize dialectic as applying to situations of breakdown. Just after introducing his four-point definition of dialectic in Chapter 7 he states: "For example, the dramatic bias described above was dialectical" (\textit{Insight}, 242.) I find it curious that he would choose dramatic bias as his example of dialectic when it is clear that even the authentic functioning of the censor causes it to exist in dialectical tension with neural demand functions. Let me make a similar point with regard to a quotation in Chapter 15:

To fail in genuineness is not to escape but only to displace the tension between limitation and transcendence. Such a displacement is the root of the dialectical phenomena of scotosis in the individual, of the bias of common sense, of basic philosophical differences, and of their prolongation . . . in educational theory and history (\textit{Insight}, 503).

The point I want to stress, is that much as this passage involves
A Second Dialectic of the Subject

Now, I want to rename what Lonergan calls the dialectic of the subject. I want to specify it as the "fundamental dialectic of the subject." I next want to suggest that we need to speak of a second dialectic of the subject that I call the "conscious dialectic of the subject." I believe that some of Lonergan's assertions about the meaning of the term dialectic can only be explained by reference to the "conscious tension" between psyche and spirit. When contrasting his notion of dialectic with that

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54 In outlining what I call a "conscious dialectic" I follow the lead of Robert Doran who writes of "a second, derived dialectic of the subject. It is a dialectic between the spiritual or intentional and the psychic dimensions of the censorship" (Theology and the Dialectics of History, 212).

However, Doran speaks of the "derived" dialectic on the basis of his notion of psychic conversion. This notion is a development of Lonergan's thought based on Doran's study of the thought of Carl Jung. Doran does not perform a documented study of the extent to which such a "derived" dialectic is already implicit in Insight. In this section I attempt such a study.

To use the vocabulary of genetic method, I believe that there are sufficient schemes of recurrence in Lonergan's writings for a higher viewpoint to be attained regarding this second dialectic of the subject. However, I suspect that Doran's insight into psychic conversion is a scheme of recurrence that is necessary for this viewpoint to not only emerge but also to survive.

55 Recall Lonergan's assertion: "The tension that is inherent in the finality of all proportionate being becomes in man a conscious tension" (ibid., 497).
of some other thinkers he asserts:

Our dialectical opposition is the conflict between the pure desire to know and other human desires. ⁵⁶

This dialectical opposition cannot refer to what I call the fundamental dialectic of the subject. That dialectic exists between our conscious states and our unconscious. The dialectic to which Lonergan here refers is one between two opposing desires. Now, a desire must register in consciousness. Consequently, I believe that it is necessary to render Lonergan's thought more systematic by speaking of a second--"conscious"--dialectic of the subject.

I believe that this second dialectic of the subject can be demonstrated to conform to Lonergan's four-step definition of dialectic. Clearly, the two poles of the conscious tension in the subject are "events" which are both linked and opposed to each other. We spoke, above, of the linked quality of censor and unconscious as "patterning and patterned." We can now recognize that the events of the human psyche are similarly oriented to being sublated by spirit. Conversely, the difference of motivations of psyche and spirit obviously qualify as an opposition. My discussion has also pointed to the "cumulative results" of this interacting of psyche and spirit. One example of this is that no insight occurs without a phantasm presented by the psyche. We can further recognize that the cooperation of psyche and spirit can produce "new creations" that are either

⁵⁶Ibid., 447.
intellectual or practical. Furthermore, in the spirit of Lonergan's writings in File 713, we can also note how any one such creation constitutes a new environment from which images arise that are employed for further insights.57

Finally, it is clear that the conscious dialectic of the subject can be either complementary or contradictory. Regarding a complementary dimension, we can note that the human is always a compound of spiritual, psychic and organic levels of development. If psyche and spirit exist in opposition, this is not an opposition that can be expected to disappear. Regarding the contradictory dimension of this dialectic, I have already discussed both individual and general bias. Both these states represent an imbalance where psychic motivations are inhibiting the proper unfolding of spirit.

I have now clarified that there are two dialectics of the subject. I believe that, on the basis of this distinction, Lonergan’s account of the dialectic of history becomes somewhat more clear.

The Dialectic of History

In my account of the dialectical aspects of human cognition I omitted one important dimension of how individuals exercise their knowing capacities. Lonergan insists that the human

57 As I have stressed, the basic insight of ideas and situations interacting is the basis for the notion of dialectic that emerges from the documents of File 713 (Shute, 169-173).
individual is a "social animal." Much of what I have investigated regarding the dialectic of the subject now needs to be extended to the context of the individual functioning in a group. By pursuing a discussion of dialectic at this social level, I proceed from an account of Step 1 of Lonergan's notion of dialectic to Step 2.

Intersubjectivity

Let us recall how we spoke of the sense of direction that our aesthetic sense gives to our dramatic pattern of experience. We now note that the individual experiences an intrinsically social dimension to her direction of living.

We spoke of how the manner in which individuals make life choices has the result of forming their character. Lonergan describes individuals as having a certain awareness that they are choosing the person they are becoming by the choices they make. He states that these choices are made according to certain "aesthetic," or "dramatic" criteria. He speaks of the "aesthetic satisfaction" individuals derive from the "good performance" in their own lives. At this point, however, he adds a further note. He states that even though such aesthetic satisfaction is a good in its own right, nevertheless, "it is well to have the objectivity of that satisfaction confirmed by the admiration of

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58 Ibid., 211.
59 Ibid., 210.
60 Ibid., 212.
Lonergan insists that a sense of social bondedness is intrinsic to the "direction" that constitutes the dramatic pattern of experience. Before any deliberation or decision on the matter we find ourselves bound to others at what might be called a "visceral" level. This bonding is a fact of life before we reflect upon or choose it. Lonergan refers to it as "intersubjectivity."

Primitive community is intersubjective. Its schemes of recurrence are simple prolongations of prehuman attainment, too obvious to be discussed or criticized, too closely linked with more elementary processes to be distinguished sharply from them. The bond of mother and child, man and wife, father and son, reaches into a past of ancestors to give meaning and cohesion to the clan or tribe or nation.  

So it is that Lonergan adds a social dimension to our understanding of the dramatic pattern of experience. Let us be clear on one point that has been implicit in what I have been saying: the reality of our intersubjective bonding with others is an instinct that occurs prior to intelligent reflection. As such, this instinct is the result of psychic spontaneity. It is the product of the psychic pole of our "conscious" dialectic.

When I discussed the dramatic pattern of experience I spoke of how the opposition between psychic and spiritual motives is felt in the individual. I have now noted how Lonergan broadens his account of the dramatic pattern of experience to discuss how

\[61\]Ibid., 211.

\[62\]Ibid., 237.
it influences social behaviour: the psychic level of development in humans encourages a sense of intersubjective bonding. The question now arises as to how the spiritual motivations that are also typical of the dramatic pattern of experience might manifest themselves at a social level.

Practical Intelligence

I have already discussed the functioning of commonsense knowing. In my discussion of the opposition in consciousness of psyche and spirit, I have pointed out that this opposition occurs any time the individual employs her facility to engage in acts of fully human knowing. I traced a series of kinds of acts of knowing where this opposition is felt with increasing intensity. A first situation is where common sense is employed to answer needs dictated by the psyche; a second is where common sense begins to engage in choices of value that are more altruistic; finally, I spoke of acts of scientific knowing.

Now, if this tension is experienced in the consciousness of an individual, we can also recognize it in how humans behave as a group. Lonergan stresses that intersubjectivity is not the only factor that is evident in the group behaviour of human beings. We can also witness how groups are influenced by the proposals of practical intelligence. Practical intelligence is a kind of commonsense knowing. It is a fully human kind of knowing; as such, it exists in dialectical tension with the instinct for elementary knowing that we also possess. Lonergan stresses that
groups often reorganize themselves in response to insights of practical intelligence:

For human intelligence is not only speculative but also practical. So far from being content to determine the unities and correlations in things as they are, it is constantly on the watch to discern the possibilities that reveal things as they might be.63

Lonergan gives an example of a primal use of practical intelligence. He speaks of the invention of spears and fishing nets by our ancestors. We can imagine a group of individuals pursuing their activities of hunting and gathering and certain individuals amongst them suddenly envisioning the possibilities of catching food by the more efficient means of nets or spears.64 Lonergan adds that the individuals who attain such insights will tend to communicate them to the larger group. As a result of the employment of these new inventions the life of the group begins to change. At first, such inventions are "an incidental addition to the spontaneous fabric of human living."65 However, over time, the consequences of such technological discoveries reveal themselves to be anything but incidental.

Inventions such as those of spears and fishing nets require societies to develop new patterns of social organization. Some individuals will continue to hunt, some will fish. Others will probably give themselves to a full-time occupation of mining

63Ibid., 621.
64Ibid., 233.
65Ibid., 238.
flint. Still, others may become specialists in spinning cord for nets. So it is that Lonergan links technological invention with economic development:

[Technology] calls forth some economic system, some procedure that sets the balance between the production of consumer goods and new capital formation, some method that settles what quantities of what goods and services are to be supplied, some device for assigning tasks to individuals and for distributing among them the common products.\(^{66}\)

Finally, Lonergan adds that "as technology evokes the economy, so the economy evokes the polity."\(^{67}\) Practical intelligence requires that some kind of political process should exist. Such a process is the means by which decisions are made regarding the many questions that arise regarding who should do what in this process of cooperation:

For the problem of effective agreement is recurrent. Each step in the process of technological and economic development is an occasion on which minds differ, new insights have to be communicated, enthusiasm has to be roused, and a common decision must be reached.\(^{68}\)

Now, I will return to discuss the role of the politician at greater length presently. For politicians have to involve themselves with more than simply matters of practical intelligence. They have to relate the suggestions of practical intelligence to the more instinctive prerational dimensions of human living. For the time being, however, it is enough for us to take note of the fact that "the practicality of common sense

\(^{66}\)Ibid., 234.

\(^{67}\)Ibid.

\(^{68}\)Ibid.
engenders and maintains enormous structures of technology, economics, and politics." Before I conclude my account of Lonergan's understanding of the practical intelligence as a principle in society there is one more important point to note: As society becomes more sophisticated, practical intelligence will need to make increasing use of scientific knowing.

Science and Philosophy

The inventions of spears and nets are discoveries of intelligence operating in a commonsense realm. However, as society increasingly adopts the new ideas of practical intelligence, it becomes progressively necessary that intellectual activity become scientific. For example, the invention of the steam engine was based on a series of prior discoveries that were of a purely scientific nature. These included discoveries regarding the properties of steam, and discoveries regarding how new kinds of steel could be smelted that would withstand high pressures. Furthermore, this same need to become more scientific occurs also with respect to questions of social organization. Lonergan stresses that it is in the best interests of common sense to acknowledge its limitations and to demonstrate a due deference to scientific intelligence. He calls this "a withdrawal from practicality to save practicality." An example of a move to theory in economic theory is

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69 Ibid., 232.

70 Ibid., 266.
provided by the foundational economist of the modern era, Adam Smith. Smith tried to answer the complex question regarding the impact on a home economy of having a free-trade policy with other national economies. He suggested that free trade helped both economies grow faster than they would in isolation. However, his conclusions seemed to defy common sense and he was much opposed. Allowing English gold be transferred to France in payment for goods received seemed to many to be obviously to the detriment of England.

At the level of political decision making, we can consider the drafters of the constitutions of the early French Republics to be political thinkers operating in the realm of theory. Common sense knowing tended to indicate that the natural order of human society was to live under monarchy. By contrast with this, the political theorists of the Age of Enlightenment turned to philosophical theory to ground a notion of an alternative political system.

Now, as scientific intelligence advances, there will occur a proliferation of disciplines of knowledge. Lonergan asserts that this increases the need for a proper employment of philosophy in informing decisions concerning social organization. He insists that it is philosophy that helps individuals to understand how the different scientific disciplines relate to each other and how each can best serve the human good. Essentially, he believes that societies and their leaders need to understand a dictum stated in Part II of this dissertation: "The advent of man does not
abrogate the rule of emergent probability." By recognizing human nature to be constituted by a cognitional structure and consequently to possess both freedom and responsibility, societies can best decide what are the appropriate new ideas for any historical situation:

Man can discover emergent probability; he can work out the manner in which prior insights and decisions determine the possibilities and probabilities of later insights and decisions; he can guide his present decisions in the light of their influence on future insights and decisions; finally, this control of the emergent probability of the future can be exercised not only by the individual in choosing his career and in forming his character, not only by adults in educating the younger generation, but also by mankind in its consciousness of its responsibility to the future of mankind. Just as technical, economic, and practical development gives man a dominion over nature, so also the advance of knowledge creates and demands a human contribution to the control of human history.

I have now outlined Lonergan's account of the two social phenomena, intersubjectivity and practical intelligence. It will not surprise us to recognize that Lonergan speaks of these two principles existing in dialectical tension. In the next sub-section, I shall outline how he explains that the opposition between these principles conforms to the first three aspects of his definition of dialectic. In the sub-section after this, I shall outline his rather elaborate account of how we can understand the "cumulative process" that constitutes the fourth aspect.

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\text{Ibid., 235.}
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\text{Ibid., 252-3.}
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Three Aspects of a Dialectic

Let us recall the first two aspects of Lonergan's definition of dialectic. It is clear that the interaction of intersubjectivity and practical intelligence conforms to this description. First of all, Lonergan asserts that there is an aggregate of occurrences in social affairs that have a determinate character. Secondly, he claims that social events can be recognised to stem from one of the two principles, intersubjectivity and practical intelligence. Now, regarding the third aspect of Lonergan's definition of dialectic, we can recognize that the interaction of intersubjectivity and practical intelligence involves both opposition and linkage.

I have pointed out how technological inventions generate changes in the economic and political structures that constitute a society. We can therefore state that practical intelligence "rebounds," as it were, on intersubjectivity. This can occur to such an extent that in more sophisticated societies the former can appear to overwhelm the latter. If we think of how tribal and clan structures have faded away with the advance of more sophisticated societies, we can appreciate how practical

73Lonergan asserts: "A dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change. Thus there will be a dialectic if (1) there is an aggregate of events of a determinate character, (2) the events may be traced to either or both of two principles (3) the principles are opposed yet bound together, and (4) they are modified by the changes that successively result from them (ibid., 242).

74Ibid., 243.
intelligence can appear to "overwhelm" intersubjectivity:

Civil community . . . is a new creation. The time comes when men begin to ask about the difference between *physi* and *nomos*, between nature and convention . . . The discoveries of practical intelligence, which once were an incidental addition to the spontaneous fabric of human living, now penetrate and overwhelm its every aspect. For just as technology and capital formation interpose their schemes of recurrence between man and the rhythms of nature, so economics and politics are vast structures of interdependence invented by practical intelligence for the mastery not of nature but of man.  

We can state that, so to speak, practical intelligence has "little patience" for the bondedness of intersubjective groupings. However, intersubjectivity is by no means defenceless in this process. Lonergan stresses that intersubjectivity is continually a principle in society that resists the proposals of practical intelligence. He points out how intersubjective urgings are never absent from society. He insists that intersubjectivity not only "precedes" society, it also continues to "underpin" it. He adds that intersubjectivity also "remains when civilization suffers disintegration and decay."  

A minimal expression of the manner in which intersubjectivity underpins society is the simple fact that the "whole unfolding of practicality constitutes no more than the setting and the incidents of the drama" of life. In the drama of most people's lives, the issues of primary importance are

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75Ibid., 238.  
76Ibid.  
77Ibid., 261.
always matters of an intersubjective nature. Furthermore, intersubjectivity often acts as a force of resistance to the dictates of practical intelligence. Lonergan asserts that it is "only in favoured times that the intersubjective groups fit harmoniously within the larger pattern of social order." Finally, it would seem that the inner cities in many parts of the United States offer an interesting example of how intersubjectivity remains when civilization decays. The phenomenon of gangs seems very much to represent a return to more primal forms of human bonding and organization in a society that has turned chaotic.

As a result of his account of the tension of community, Lonergan feels justified in concluding that this tension conforms to the kind of linkage and opposition that is described in the third aspect of his definition of dialectic:

Social events can be traced to the two principles of human intersubjectivity and practical common sense. The two principles are linked, for the spontaneous, intersubjective individual strives to understand and wants to behave intelligently; and inversely, intelligence would have nothing to put in order were there not the desires and fears, labours and satisfactions, of individuals.  

I shall now study Lonergan's account of the tension of community somewhat further. In doing this, I shall demonstrate that Lonergan describes a cumulative result of the interaction of intersubjectivity and practical intelligence that conforms to the

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78 Ibid., 241.
79 Ibid., 243.
fourth aspect of his definition of dialectic.

A Cumulative Process

I have described how it is that intersubjectivity can, as it were, "adapt and re-form" in the new environments that result from the implementations of the discoveries of practical intelligence. I have been stressing that this implies a kind of bondedness and opposition that satisfies the third aspect of Lonergan’s definition of dialectic. However, we can also recognize that there is a "cumulative process" that results from this interaction that conforms to the fourth and final aspect of Lonergan’s definition. If we are to study the cumulative nature of this interaction more closely, the best manner to begin is with a further exploration of the role of the politician.

The Politician

Let us recall Lonergan’s account of practical intelligence. He speaks of the specialised functions of those who make technological inventions and economic discoveries. He then notes that the task of the politician arises as a result of the need for "effective agreement" that arises because of these discoveries of practical intelligence. We are now in a position to make a further study of the efforts made by politicians to achieve "effective agreement." It is they who have to mediate the opposing social principles of intersubjectivity and practical intelligence. Consequently, if intersubjectivity and practical
intelligence are to interact cumulatively, it is politicians who will play a crucial role in making it happen.

Lonergan explains the role of the politician as a "specialisation of common sense." The politician must have, as it were, one foot in practical intelligence and one in intersubjectivity. She must first convince intersubjective groups that their leader is "one of them." Then she must be able to persuade the group to alter certain habits in response to the demands of practical intelligence. It is this function of "persuasion" that most clearly characterizes the task of the politician:

Beyond the common sense of the labourer, the technician, the entrepreneur, there is the political specialization of common sense. Its task is to provide the catalyst that brings men of common sense together.

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Recent Canadian history seems to offer a clear example of this matter. The Prime Minister of the federal government until 1994 was Mr. Brian Mulroney. Mr. Mulroney had been reelected to office with a large majority of the national vote. However, in his second term in office, it seems that Mr. Mulroney severely alienated himself from an intersubjective bondedness with Canadians. Reasons for this seem to have included what appeared to be a lifestyle of ostentatious wealth and the fact that he visibly conducted too close a relationship with President Ronald Reagan—a relationship that seemed to underemphasize those realities that distinguish Canada from the United States. Discontent with Mr. Mulroney focused on criticism of his economic policies and Mr. Mulroney's political party was cruelly punished in the last federal election. Mr. Mulroney's successor as Prime Minister, Mr. Jean Chretien, stood in sharp contrast to him. Mr. Chretien is more reticent in public and his relationship with the President of the United States does not seem especially intimate. This seems to appeal to Canadians and the popularity of Mr. Chretien has remained high in most of Canada. The irony is this: Mr. Chretien has succeeded in implementing largely the same economic policies for which Mr. Mulroney and his political party were so thoroughly rejected.
. . It involves some understanding of industry and of commerce but its special field is dealing with men. It has to discern when to push for full performance and when to compromise, when delay is wisdom and when it spells disaster, when widespread consent must be awaited and when action must be taken in spite of opposition. It has to be able to command attention and to win confidence, to set forth concretely the essentials of a case, to make its own decisions and secure the agreement of others.  

Now, we should be clear that the politician should not consider herself a simple advocate of the dictates of practical intelligence over against the vested interests of intersubjectivity. Rather, she should mediate between the often contradicting values of each pole of the tension of community. Lonergan insists that intersubjectivity plays a positive role in society. It constitutes a kind of stabilizing force whereby groups can feel a loyalty to a social order and thereby help the order survive and continue to provide for the needs of individuals:

The social order not only gathers men together in functional groups but also consolidates its gains and expedites its operations by turning to its own ends the vast resources of human imagination and emotion, sentiment and confidence, familiarity and loyalty. However, this formation of social groups, specifically adapted to the smooth attainment of social ends, merely tends to replace one inertial force with another. Human sensitivity is not human intelligence, and if sensitivity can be adapted to implement easily and readily one set of intelligent dictates, it has to undergo a fresh adaptation before it will cease resisting a second set of more intelligent dictates.  

I have now given an introduction to Lonergan's notion of how

\[82\text{Ibid., 234.}\]
\[83\text{Ibid., 248.}\]
intersubjectivity and practical intelligence interact cumulatively. I have commentated on the crucial role that the politician plays in mediating the tension of community. So it is that Lonergan begins to indicate how the principles of intersubjectivity and practical intelligence interact in a manner that fulfils the final criterion of his definition of dialectic. Of course, as everyone knows, politicians can offer both good leadership and bad. This issue brings Lonergan back to a theme that is very familiar to those of us who are acquainted with the documents of File 713: the difference between progress and decline. Let us also recall the distinction I have made between complementary and contradictory dimensions of Lonergan's notion of dialectic. In this context we can speak of progress representing a complementary unfolding of the dialectic of history. Conversely, decline constitutes a contradictory unfolding of the dialectic of history.

Liberty and Progress

Lonergan gives the name progress to a flow of social events where intersubjectivity and practical intelligence are being maintained in what might be called "healthy tension." A key dimension of such complementarity is that society is characterised by an exercise of liberty. He states: "There is such a thing as progress, and its principle is liberty."\(^{84}\) I believe that liberty can be explained by reference to what I have

\(^{84}\)Ibid., 259.
called the conscious dialectic of the subject.

Liberty can be understood as our ability to act responsibly. In terms of my account of the conscious dialectic of the subject, we can understand a primary instance of liberty to be our ability to employ common sense knowing to answer the demands of our psyche. However, I pointed out that the opposition of psyche and spirit is experienced more intensely in cases where common sense is involved in making more altruistic decisions. Furthermore, another experience of this opposition occurs when we feel the exigence to let our common sense yield to the dictates of scientific knowing.

Now, in the case of the individual, I spoke of how difficult it is for the individual to surmount moral impotence. However, I stressed that individual consciousness has a resource that aids the task of allowing psyche be sublated by spirit. This resource is the sense of the aesthetic that arises spontaneously in the dramatic pattern of experience. The question thus arises: is there any principle in the dialectic of history that functions in an analogous manner to the operating of our aesthetic sense in the conscious dialectic of the subject? Lonergan answers that there is; he calls it culture.

**Culture**

Lonergan reminds us that in the operating of individual consciousness our sense of beauty can introduce a playfulness that can liberate our pure desire to know from "the confines of
serious-minded biological purpose." He asserts that culture can play a role in society that is analogous to that which our sense of the aesthetic plays in our individual consciousness:

Were man a pure intelligence, the products of philosophy and human science would be enough to sway him. But as the dialectic in the individual and in society reveals, man is a compound-in-tension of intelligence and intersubjectivity, and it is only through the parallel compound of a culture that his tendencies to aberration can be offset proximately and effectively.

Now, I have already adverted to a notion of culture when we inquired into the nature of common sense knowing. We spoke of common sense as "that vague name given to the unknown source of a large and floating population of elementary judgments which everyone makes, everyone relies on, and almost everyone regards as obvious and indisputable." Clearly, an important dimension of any culture is this "floating population of elementary judgments" that is shared by the members of a society. However, there is more to culture than this. In addition to being the bearer of common sense, culture also is the carrier of a network of symbols.

If I am to explain Lonergan's notion of symbol, I must first explain what he means by the "known unknown," or "mystery." Lonergan stresses that our spirit is characterised by a pure, unrestricted desire to know. He adds that "our questions

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85Ibid., 208.
86Ibid., 261-2.
87Ibid., 314.
outnumber our answers, so that we know of an unknown through our unanswered questions." Likewise, he asserts: "Man by nature is orientated into mystery." 

Now, in my account of the conscious dialectic of the subject, I have stressed that the challenge to authentic living is that, when appropriate, we allow our self-concerned motivations to yield to the dictates of the pure desire. Lonergan stresses that if this is to happen there must be some encouragement to do this that is experienced at a sensory level. He speaks of a "principle of dynamic correspondence" that can exist between the different levels of development (i.e., a complementary dialectic). He asserts that an appeal to sensitivity is a prerequisite of this principle operating successfully:

The principle of dynamic correspondence calls for a harmonious orientation on the psychic level, and from the nature of the case such an orientation would have to consist in some cosmic dimension, in some intimation of unplumbed depths, that accrued to man's feelings, emotions, sentiments. 

Lonergan adds that the unrestricted dimension of spirit can be represented by certain images that appeal directly to the

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88 Ibid., 555. The reader who is familiar with Insight will recognize that I have introduced into my discussion of culture in Chapter 7 of Insight comments Lonergan makes in Chapter 17. As mentioned in Chapter 5 of this dissertation I do this in an attempt to render Lonergan's thought more systematic.

89 Ibid., 570.

90 Ibid., 555.
psyche. He defines such images as symbols. He asserts that cultures provide images of the known unknown in a large variety of manners; he speaks of how the unrestricted object of spirit can be symbolised in "bodily movements, in rites and ceremonies, in song and speech." 

So it is that Lonergan asserts that it is the symbolic aspect of culture that can mobilise the "vast resources of human imagination and emotion, sentiment and confidence, familiarity and loyalty." Thus, he believes that it is by virtue of culture that the intersubjective forces in a society can be brought not only to withdraw obstacles to submitting to the pure desire but also to feel motivated to support behaviour that is motivated by this selfless concern with ultimate matters:

Delight and suffering, laughter and tears, joy and sorrow, aspiration and frustration, achievement and failure, wit and humour stand, not within practicality but above it. Man can pause and with a smile or a false grin ask what the drama, what he himself is about. His culture is his capacity to ask, to reflect, to reach an answer that at once satisfies his intelligence and speaks to his heart.

Lonergan asserts: "It will be well to distinguish between the image as image, the image as symbol, and the image as sign. The image as image is the sensible content as operative on the sensitive level; it is the image inasmuch as it functions within the psychic syndrome of associations, affects, exclamations, and articulated speech and actions. The image as symbol or as sign is the image as standing in correspondence with activities or elements on the intellectual level. But as symbol, the image is linked simply with the paradoxical 'known unknown.'" (ibid., 557, my underline).

Ibid., 556.

Ibid., 248.

Ibid., 261.
There is more to be said on the question of culture. However, before elaborating, we need to retrace our steps somewhat. We need to acknowledge that, in the real world, the interaction between intersubjectivity and practical intelligence will not only be one of a complementary nature that leads to progress. It will also involve contradictions that beget decline.

Bias and Decline

Lonergan asserts that "while there is progress and while its principle is liberty, there also is decline and its principle is bias." ⁹⁵ We have already studied bias as a phenomenon in human cognition. We now need to study it as a social phenomenon. In my account of the opposition between psyche and spirit I discussed how individuals are prone to bias. In fact, we are often as much prone to oversight as to insight. Consequent on this, Lonergan defines decline as the product of oversight:

Unfortunately, as insight and oversight commonly are mated, so also are progress and decline. We reinforce our love of truth with a practicality that is equivalent to an obscurantism. We correct old evils with a passion that mars the new good. We are not pure. We compromise. ⁹⁶

Lonergan outlines two different kinds of bias that characterize social, as opposed to the individual realm. The first of these he calls "group bias." He speaks of group bias occasioning a shorter cycle of decline." The second of these is the social

⁹⁵Ibid., 260.

⁹⁶Ibid., 8.
manifestation of general bias. This issues in a "longer cycle of decline." 97

Group Bias and the Shorter Cycle

In explaining group bias, Lonergan first notes that societies will always gather individuals together in "functional groups." 98 These might be the flint miners of prehistoric societies or the managers of the international banks of today. He adds that strong intersubjective bonds will tend to emerge between the members of these groups. Next, he points out that such groups will tend to build up a kind of "inertial force" whereby the good of group members will become an end in itself. The group will then have a limited openness for new ideas that are for the good of society at large:

The group is prone to have a blind spot for the insights that reveal its well-being to be excessive or its usefulness at an end. 99

Lonergan adds that a result of such self-interested activity of groups is that a new kind of social differentiation occurs. "Classes," he asserts, "become distinguished, not merely by social function but also by social success." 100 Consequent on this, segments of society are excluded from a reasonable participation in the goods of that society. He stresses that

97 Ibid., 247-59.
98 Ibid., 248.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 249.
group bias results in a social order that "does not correspond to any coherently developed set of practical ideas." An irrationality has entered into the social structures built by humans. Lonergan takes a term from mathematics that refers to irrational numbers to explain such a situation; he calls it the "social surd." 

Now, harmful as group bias is, Lonergan suggests that "it creates the principles for its own reversal." We have already studied such principles for reversal in the case of the dialectic of the subject. We spoke of a certain self-correcting tendency whereby the neglected pole of the dialectic calls attention to itself and invites an effort to return the dialectic to an appropriate balance. Lonergan asserts that such a self-correcting tendency exists with respect to group bias. In the case of group bias, dominant groups appeal to intelligence to make their case while, at the same time, refusing to consider various relevant questions. The groups that are disenfranchised have every reason to notice and focus on the questions that have been ignored. A process of protest, reform, or revolution can thus be set in place. Of course, reforms or revolutions can at times be worse than the problem which occasioned them. However, this is far from being necessarily the case. One can hope that the distortions of group bias are intrinsically correctable. Lonergan calls the

101Ibid.

102Ibid., 255.

103Ibid., 249.
General Bias and the Longer Cycle

In my discussion of general bias in the subject, I stressed how very harmful it is. The self-correcting tendency that exists in the subject must rely on intelligence to recognize the signs of imbalance and to take steps to correct it. By effectively refusing the claims of the pure desire to know, general bias undermines the self-correcting tendency in the subject. When bias manifests itself at a social level, the destructive effects of general bias are every bit as real as in the individual. What follows is a spiral of decline in society. However, in this case, Lonergan speaks of a longer cycle of decline. When general bias is operative in a culture, it is not clear how a distorted dialectic of community is going to correct itself:

The flight from understanding blocks the insights that concrete situations demand. There follow unintelligent policies and inept courses of action. The situation deteriorates to demand still further insights, and as they are blocked, policies become more unintelligent and action more inept. What is worse, the deteriorating situation seems to provide the uncritical, biased mind with factual evidence in which the bias is claimed to be verified. So in ever increasing measure intelligence comes to be regarded as irrelevant to practical living.

Now, in my account of progress, I spoke of what an important

\[104\] Ibid., 252.

\[105\] Ibid.

\[106\] Ibid., 8.
role culture can play in enabling the dialectical relationship between intersubjectivity and practical intelligence to be one of complementarity. I now need to offer an account of one more means by which the forces of decline entrench themselves in history. As Lonergan asserts "human abberation makes an uncritical culture its captive." 107

Culture as Captive of Practicality

Writing in the 1950's, Lonergan seems to have had in mind Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union as the most extreme examples of how the state can infringe on the proper preserve of culture. He insists that it is the role of culture to pass "detached yet effective judgment upon capital formation and technology, upon economy and polity." In contrast with this, he understands that, in the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century, ideological positions prevail so that in the name of practicality ideas stemming from a free expression of the pure desire to know are excluded from having any impact on society. Lonergan then insists that "by becoming practical, culture renounces its one essential function." Recalling how society needs the ideas that stem from an unfettered scientific knowledge, Lonergan concludes that such insistent practicality in fact "condemns practicality to ruin." 108

In my discussion of culture in the context of progress, I

107 Ibid., 262.

108 Ibid.
mentioned the emphasis that Lonergan places on the role of symbols. In a context of decline he speaks of how leaders will find images that communicate at a sensory level the lie that pragmatic individuals should eschew any notion of a pure desire to know and a pure desire to be responsible. Lonergan names as myth the images that represent this falsity to the sensitive consciousness of a population.\textsuperscript{109} He asserts that it is a hallmark of "adventurers" in politics is that they know the art of "climbing to power through sagacious myth making."\textsuperscript{110} He asserts:

\begin{quote}
Because men do not develop intellectually or, if they do, because they become involved in counterpositions, they cannot be dealt with on the basis of intelligence and reason; but this makes it all the easier to deal with them on the sensitive level, to capture their imaginations, to whip up their emotions, to lead them to action. Power in its highest form is power over men, and the successful maker of myths has that power within his reach and grasp.\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

It is not just in totalitarian regimes that Lonergan identifies culture as being in the grips of decline. As was the case in File 713, he also has strong criticism for the cultures of the West. He understands the cultures of Western Europe and North America to be characterised by liberalism and he identifies tolerance as the primary virtue extolled by liberalism. He then insists on "the helplessness of tolerance to provide coherent solutions to social problems." In fact, very strikingly, he

\textsuperscript{109}\textit{Ibid.}, 566.

\textsuperscript{110}\textit{Ibid.}, 567.

\textsuperscript{111}\textit{Ibid.}.  

asserts that it has been the very helplessness of liberalism that has "called forth the totalitarian" of the twentieth century. Thus, what liberalism and totalitarianism share in common is an inadequate appreciation of the role of the pure desire to know in building social progress.\textsuperscript{112}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Renaissance and Culture}
\end{center}

In \textit{Insight}, as in the documents of File 713, Lonergan does not limit his account of the dialectic of history to an explanation of progress and decline. If he were to do this, he would be a pessimist indeed; his account of these two principles portrays a situation where decline has forever an advantage over progress. Already, in Part II, I have studied the divine solution to the problem of evil as the final step of the upper context of \textit{Insight}. I also noted that what Lonergan can assert about this solution is limited by the fact that \textit{Insight} is strictly philosophical in scope. However, it is part of the incompleteness of the argument of \textit{Insight} that, paradoxically, extra light is thrown on the argument of Chapter 20 by the discussion of the dialectic of history in Chapter 7. In the light of my discussion of the order of Lonergan's writing of these chapters, this fact need not surprise us.

The main contribution that Chapter 7 makes to our understanding of the process of renaissance in history is to emphasize the role that culture will play in the solution to the

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., 256.
problem of evil:

If men are to meet the challenge set by major decline and its longer cycle, it will be through their culture that they do so.\textsuperscript{3}

**Cosmopolis**

Now, it is over against a situation where decline has already made culture its instrument that Lonergan proposes his notion of the kind of culture that would need to emerge to restore good order to society. He calls it "Cosmopolis":

The general bias of common sense has to be counterbalanced by a representative of detached intelligence that both appreciates and criticizes, that identifies the good neither with the new nor with the old, that, above all else, neither will be forced into an ivory tower of ineffectualness by the social surd nor, on the other hand, will capitulate to its absurdity. . . .

What is necessary is a cosmopolis that is neither class nor state, that stands above all their claims, that cuts them down to size . . . that is too universal to be bribed, too impalpable to be forced, too effective to be ignored.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., 261.

\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., 262-3. In the light of Part I and Part II of this dissertation, the reader might find this quotation strangely familiar. Lonergan's notion of Cosmopolis sounds very much like the renaissance that is so often described in the manuscripts of File 713. We can also recall Lonergan's popular writings in the Montreal Beacon during the Second World War. There, a frequent theme was how the cultures of the various combatant countries had led them to their current situations. Similarly, the reader might experience some surprise that, even within *Insight*, such a notion of culture should be expressed in Chapter 7 and not in Chapter 20 where Lonergan discusses the divine solution to the problem of evil. I believe that such puzzles are addressed by my speculations in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. Lonergan did not have time to finish *Insight* in the manner he would have liked. He ended up placing some of the material that should have been at the end of the book in Chapters 6 and 7. Furthermore, there are themes found in these two chapters that function merely as a coincidental
In my account of the fifth step of the upper context of Insight I commented on Lonergan's belief that the divine solution to the problem of evil will introduce new conjugate forms in human intellect and will. My focus on Cosmopolis in this section can also help us to appreciate that this solution will also involve symbols that can become the common heritage of a culture:

The solution [to the problem of evil] . . . must also penetrate to the sensitive level and envelop it. For, in the main, human consciousness flows in some blend of the dramatic and practical patterns of experience, and as the solution harmoniously continues the actual order of the universe, it can be successful only if it captures man's sensitivity and intersubjectivity.  

Clearly, a result of reengaging sensitivity to cooperate with spirit will be that authentic individuals begin to employ intelligence and rationality to good effect. They will try to both redress present evils in society and to propose constructive developments. However, in addition to such intellectual activities, these agents of renaissance will also need to propose symbols that truly represent the known unknown. Furthermore, these symbols should also represent the arrival of a divine manifold to the upper context of the book as it is unfolding. I believe that Cosmopolis is one such theme. The following quotation from Chapter 7 would seem to lend support to this hypothesis; it directly echoes the comments in the Epilogue about the book being part of a "much larger work":

Cosmopolis is not Babel, yet how can we break from Babel? This is the problem. So far from solving it in this chapter, we do not hope to reach a full solution in this volume. (Ibid., 267, my underline).

115Ibid., 744.
solution to the problem of evil. Lonergan reminds us of the importance of such symbols: "[They can] command his attention, nourish his imagination, stimulate his intelligence and will, release his affectivity, control his aggressivity, and, as central features of the world of sense, intimate its finality, its yearning for God."

This issue of the practices that should be undertaken by agents of renaissance in history brings me to a final consideration in this chapter. It is a consideration of what I call Step 3 of Lonergan's notion of dialectic. To this question I now turn.

Method Anticipating Dialectical Situations

My discussion of Step 3 of Lonergan's notion of dialectic shall be brief. In speaking of how method anticipates dialectical situations, I seek to stress that the human situations that sound method anticipates are dialectical situations characterised both by complementarity and by contradiction. I believe that we need to exercise caution in this question. Lonergan's term "dialectical method" refers only to a method that engages situations of contradiction. I want to stress that a method that serves renaissance in history will also be aware that human

116 St. Paul is clear regarding the symbol of renaissance that is appropriate to Christians. "But we preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God" (1Cor 1:23).

117 Ibid., 745.
progress occurs in a manner that involves a dialectic of complementarity. I believe that stressing this point may render Lonergan's thought a little more systematic than what he asserts in *Insight*. However, if it does so this occurs only to a small degree.

**Method and Dialectics of Contradiction**

Already in Part II, I have outlined what Lonergan states explicitly in *Insight* about dialectical method. It is essentially concerned with the advancing of positions and the reversal of counterpositions. In this chapter, I have outlined his account of the intimate relationship between false ideas and an unjust social order. Clearly then, dialectical method as outlined by Lonergan will play a central role in renaissance. We can further specify this by stating that a key function of Cosmopolis will be to encourage the practice of and the acceptance of the results of dialectical method. In addition to this "dialectical method of the intellect," we noted Lonergan's comments about a "corresponding dialectical attitude of will." This attitude of the will is based on an insight that "the social surd neither is intelligible nor is to be treated as intelligible." The truly intelligent attitude is always to seek the good. Consequently, the dialectical attitude of the will inspires individuals "to meet evil with good, to love their enemies."\(^{118}\)

Now, while these statements of Lonergan's are both valuable

\(^{118}\)Ibid., 721.
and moving, I believe we should exercise a certain caution regarding Lonergan's terminology. What Lonergan calls "dialectical method" is not the only occasion where it is important to employ a notion of dialectic with respect to a notion of method.

Method and Dialectics of Complementarity

Let us recall Lonergan's dictum that "the advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability." He speaks of the systems produced by human intelligence as including "science, a new civilization, a new philosophy." He stresses that these systems are instances of proportionate being. Consequently, he asserts that they can be studied by genetic method. We can note that he is more clear on how genetic method can be applied to speculative systems than to the systems that constitute social organization.

With respect to speculative developments, Lonergan stresses the importance of an interpreter recognizing "genetic sequence" in how successive ideas relate to each other. He also asserts the value of "determining the operators that relate the classifications relevant to one level of development to the classifications relevant to the next." He next adds that not

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119 Ibid., 235.
120 Ibid., 292.
121 Ibid., 594-5, 603.
122 Ibid., 595.
all new ideas are good ones. Individuals are all-too-prone to try to develop true ideas with false ones. It is for this reason that Lonergan asserts: "To the complexities of genetic method there have now to be added the graver complexities of dialectical method."¹²³

Now, as I stated above, Lonergan speaks of "new civilizations" as representing systems created by human intelligence just as much as "science," or "a new philosophy." Consequently, we can conclude that genetic method should be employed as well as dialectical method in the study of history. Lonergan asserts that "meanings form a genetically and dialectically related sequence."¹²⁴ I have outlined his understanding of how historical events are constituted by meaning as well as structures of human speculation such as science or philosophy. Consequently, we can speak of historical events occurring in genetically and dialectically related sequences. We can suppose that Lonergan understands that it is appropriate to study progress by means of genetic method and decline by means of dialectic method.

I next want to stress a point of much importance. There is a significant difference between historical developments and developments in ideas. Development in ideas is purely a result of development in meanings understood and affirmed by intellect. It is purely a development in the realm of spirit. By contrast with

¹²³Ibid., 598.

¹²⁴Ibid., 601.
this, development in historical events is the product of an interaction of intersubjectivity and practical intelligence. It is the result not only of spiritual factors but also of psychic factors. I have already stressed this point in my discussion of culture. Consequently, to study historical developments requires that we study more than a development in the meanings that constitute successive social situations. We need to study the evolution of systems of symbols as well as systems of meaning.

I believe this is a point that is worth stressing. When we study history, we need to be clear that the genesis of historical events is a dialectical development. This dialectical unfolding of historical events can be complementary as well as contradictory. Whichever dimension of dialectic is operating i.e., whether we are studying a situation of progress or of decline, the evolution of meanings will be paralleled by an evolution of symbols. The student of history must therefore study more than the evolution of positions and counterpositions. She must study both the evolution of a culture's orientation either to mystery or to myth.125

125This point is made more clearly in "The Role of the Catholic University in the Modern World." Collection, 108-113. Lonergan asserts "the good that men pursue contains a threefold aspect." This threefold aspect includes the good as the object of desire, the good as the good of order and, finally, the manner in which "practical deliberation reaches its term in judgments of value and in choices." Corresponding to these three aspects of the good, Lonergan speaks of three aspects of community: intersubjective community, civil community, and cultural community (ibid., 108-9). In an editorial note, Frederick Crowe asserts "two of these [aspects of community] are very clear in Insight, the intersubjective and the civil . . . the third is somewhat obscured there by the long discussion of biases, progress and decline, etc."
The point I stress here is only a small development on what Lonergan himself asserts. He is slow to apply the term dialectic in what I call its complementary dimension. However, he is clear that in the study of human affairs metaphysics must include a study of myth and symbol:

A genetic account of the radical meaning of mystery and myth, and of their significance and function, of the grounds of their emergence, survival, and disappearance can hardly be omitted in a contemporary metaphysics.\textsuperscript{125}

It is my small clarification of Lonergan's thought to stress that a situation that must be understood both by its constitutive meaning and by its symbols is a dialectical situation.

**Conclusion**

My account of what I call the third step of Lonergan's notion of dialectic brings to a close my account of Lonergan's notion of dialectic in *Insight*. Before proceeding to my concluding reflections on this whole dissertation, let me recapitulate what I have attempted to achieve in Parts II and III.

In Part II, I study *Insight* as if it were a very organised

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 554.
work whose argument progresses in even stages. I employ Lonergan’s own claims in the Epilogue to outline what he identifies as the five steps of the upper context of the work. Having done this, I note further comments in the Epilogue regarding how Lonergan intends *Insight* to be part of a larger work that is explicitly theological. I suggest that what Lonergan indicates about this larger work demonstrates how prominent is his concern to develop a theology of history.

In Part III I adopt a different strategy. I suggest that elements for a more complete theology of history are present in *Insight*, particularly in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. I suggest that these elements do not form an important part of the upper context of the book. Rather they operate somewhat as "loose ends." I believe that prominent among such elements is Lonergan’s notion of dialectic. Using Lonergan’s own terminology of emergent probability, I suggest that the insights that constitute these elements can be understood as a coincidental manifold in Lonergan’s argument. I propose that a viewpoint is emergent in these insights that does not quite find expression in the book. Consequently, I offer a tentative outline of just what the structure of Lonergan’s notion of dialectic that is emergent in *Insight* might be.

By way of testing this systematic notion of dialectic I apply it, in my penultimate chapter, to Lonergan’s essays on history entitled *File 713--History*. In this my final chapter, I have discussed Lonergan’s notion of dialectic in *Insight*. I have
done this by organizing the coincidental manifold of Lonergan’s statements on dialectic into the categories that I recommend. As we have seen, a notion of the dialectic of history has a central place in the systematic notion I propose. This leads me now to offer concluding reflections on my dissertation as a whole. What, then can be said regarding Lonergan’s notion of the dialectic of history from 1938 to 1953?
In this dissertation I have attempted to respond to a challenge offered by Michael Shute. In his book, *The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History: A Study of Lonergan's Early Writings on History*, he suggests that the essays on history in File 713 are of sufficient significance to inspire a certain reinterpretation of the works of Bernard Lonergan. Consequently, I have attempted to test a hypothesis: "In the years 1940-53, Lonergan continued to hold the dialectic of history as a concern of central importance." The result I obtain from this test is a qualified verification of my hypothesis. I have acknowledged that in the years I study Lonergan undergoes a protracted period of withdrawal from a direct study of this question. However, I suggest that there is ample evidence to demonstrate that this withdrawal was conducted with the intention of an eventual return to a more specific discussion of issues of history.

In Chapter 1, I outline the major themes of the essays of File 713. I also emphasize that, in expressing the concerns he does, Lonergan is associating himself with the Catholic Action ethos that characterised the pontificate of Pope Pius XI. In Chapter 2, I study the period from 1938 to 1949. During this period, it is very evident that Lonergan devotes himself to a protracted "apprenticeship to Thomas Aquinas." For some eleven
years he pays little explicit attention to the issues that so exercised him in his earlier essays on history. However, I suggest that this study of Aquinas constitutes an attempt on the part of Lonergan to develop philosophical and theological foundations that are "more exact and convincing" than those offered as the conventional wisdom in Roman Catholicism. I point out that, even during this early phase of his withdrawal, Lonergan begins to apply what he is learning to issues of history. I also point out that Lonergan maintained a kind of parallel commitment to a study of economics during part of these years. I suggest that this is another expression of his all-pervasive concern with the redemption of history.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I begin an effort at interpretation of Insight: A Study of Human Understanding that occupies the rest of my dissertation. In these chapters, I outline the five steps of what Lonergan explains as the upper context of Insight. I then attempt to explain that, in a sense, Lonergan asserts that these five steps are incomplete. He claims that Insight was originally intended as part of a "far larger" work. This larger work would include the philosophy of Insight in a speculative system that is explicitly theological. I point out that from Lonergan's comments in the Epilogue it is clear that this larger theological context would be explicitly concerned with an effort to participate in a process of renaissance of history.

Finally, in Chapters 5 and 6, I adopt a different method for studying Insight. I suggest that there are sections in the book where Lonergan conducts an argument that functions at something of a tangent to the upper context. I suggest that these "loose ends" are very revealing. They demonstrate a kind of "breaking in" of Lonergan's underlying concern for history into an argument that strictly speaking deals with issues that must be dealt with prior to addressing such concerns. I claim that many of these "loose ends" relate to a notion of dialectic and I try to outline a notion of dialectic that is a little more systematic than what Lonergan explicitly articulates.

In my introduction to this dissertation, I noted Lonergan's claim in Method in Theology that knowledge of the author helps answer many of the puzzles that arise in an effort to interpret the written works of the author. In conclusion to this dissertation, I can assert that I believe that this is the case with respect to Lonergan himself. I agree with the claim of Michael Shute that the essays on history in File 713 add significantly to our knowledge of some of Lonergan's key motivations and, consequently, help us better interpret his later works.

If we take the issue of answering puzzles in interpretation in its strictest sense, I suspect that File 713 most clearly helps us answer some questions that arise with regard to Chapters 6 and 7 of Insight. Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation focus

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2Lonergan, Method in Theology, 160.
on this task and, I believe, demonstrate how a familiarity with Lonergan’s essays on history can help us interpret Lonergan’s master-work.

In a broader sense, our greater knowledge of the author can encourage us to give a new emphasis to aspects of his thought that, while not exactly constituting puzzles, have tended to be neglected. In this respect, I think of Lonergan’s theology of grace. In the Epilogue of *Insight*, Lonergan states that he would have liked to develop his argument to include the kind of explicitly theological insights that he had already studied in his doctoral dissertation. Consequently, we do well to complement our study of Lonergan’s philosophy with an appreciation of his great achievement in interpreting the theology of Aquinas. Our acquaintance with Lonergan’s essays in history can help us to make this connection. Any account of renaissance in history is the less for avoiding an explicit theology of how God intervenes in human consciousness and in history.

This dissertation does not study Lonergan’s work on economics in any depth. Nevertheless, the brief reference I have made to his efforts in this intellectual discipline points to a continuity between these efforts and his work in the essays of File 713. We might assert that there is a similar continuity between these essays and Lonergan’s pastoral involvements while living in Montreal. In addition, his articles in *The Montreal Beacon* demonstrate the same continuity.

It is worth recalling that this dissertation only studies
Lonergan's writings at an early period of his career. Similar studies would need to be made before a broader conclusions could be arrived at. However, on the basis of a study of the years 1938-53, there seems to be ample evidence that an acquaintance with Lonergan's early essays in history helps in interpreting the work of his later years.

In various ways I have been stressing that Lonergan's thought is evolving during the period I study. I have added that on issues such as the meaning of the term dialectic it does not attain great systematic clarity. However, in concluding this dissertation, I would like to stress how valuable I consider Lonergan's achievement in clarifying philosophical and theological foundations that are relevant to a theology of history.

There is profound truth in the statement: "There is needed, then, a critique of history before there can be any intelligent direction of history."¹ Lonergan's theology of grace and much of the argument of Insight make a major contribution to establishing just such a critique of history. In a statement written after the period I study, Lonergan captures much of what he has already demonstrated in Insight: "It remains that in such a dialectic [of history] one finds 'writ large' the very issues that individuals have to deal with in their own minds and

¹Lonergan, Insight, 265.
hearts." I believe that, already by 1953, Lonergan has provided an outstanding account both of what we have to deal with in our minds and in our hearts (although his account of affectivity will develop considerably by Method in Theology). Similarly, he has pointed to how these issues can be recognised in the larger canvas of history.

This point raises a question regarding why Lonergan's thought has not been more widely recognised. Such a question is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, I should like to hazard two suggestions. The first is that it has usually taken a long time for the thought of thinkers of truly seminal importance to be widely appreciated. Secondly, Lonergan's own thought on the dialectic of history is not always clearly articulated by him. On this second point I believe that the discovery of the essays of File 713 can help interpreters of Lonergan communicate, perhaps more clearly than Lonergan himself, how relevant his thought is to a critique of history. I believe that the social problems that exercised Lonergan in the 1930's, 40's and 50's are no less relevant today than then.

No problem is at once more delicate and more profound, more practical and perhaps more pressing. How, indeed, is a mind to become conscious of its own bias when that bias springs from a communal flight from understanding and is supported by the whole texture of a civilization?  

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5Lonergan, Insight, 8.
The plain fact is that the world lies in pieces before him [the human person] and pleads to be put together again.⁶

Lonergan's work is not only a prophetic naming of a problem but also, potentially, a significant contribution to its solution. As students of his theology of grace, we might make so bold as to assert that Lonergan's intellectual achievement is potentially a historically significant cooperation with the divinely initiated solution to the problem of evil.

⁶Ibid., 552.
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The essays of File 713 are mostly unpublished and are to be found in the Lonergan Research Library. The content of this file includes essays of the title: "Philosophy of History"; "Panton Anakephalaiosis" (published under this title in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 9:2 [October 1991] 139-172); "Panton Anakephalaiosis - A Theory of Human Solidarity"; "Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity"; "A Theory of History"; three further documents, all of which are entitled "Analytic Conception of History" (one of the essays of this title has been published in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 11:1 [Spring 1993] 1-36.)

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1954-


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_______ "Lonergan's Quest." Miltown Studies 17 (Spring 1986): 3-34.


