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ABSTRACT

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Paul's Attitude toward the Body in Romans 6-8:
Compared with Philo of Alexandria

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The inceptive stimulus for this examination of the body was the question whether Paul held a disparaging view of the body. Our investigation concludes that he did deprecate the body. For the unbaptized, this attitude came to expression in his assertion that, even though the cosmic power of sin acts upon the entire person, yet there is a peculiar relationship between that power and the body, whereby sin seizes the body, and then from its seat in the body wages war against the mind and its desire to do good. The result of this is the captivity and enslavement of the mind in the body under the power of sin.

Further devaluation of the body came into view with respect to Paul's attitude toward the body of the baptized. For while the 'mind' of the baptized experiences life, the body does not. Presently, the body of the believer is mortal and corrupt - like Philo, Paul devalues the body because it is mortal -, and as such it is the dwelling place of sinful passions.
To the extent that Paul devalued the body in ways that he did not devalue the mind, we can say he shared with the dominant Greek culture a deprecating view of the body. Yet when his attitude is brought into relation with Philo's, we are led to the conclusion that Paul's devaluation of the body was much less extreme than Philo's. For contrary to Philo, Paul identified with the biblical notion that the body is a territory for purity and dedication to God, and he held out a future for the resurrection of the body.

Also, our inquiry calls into question whether Paul's attitude toward the body should be elucidated in terms of the conventional paradigm that sets the Jewish cultural world off against the Hellenistic, and then sequesters Paul's anthropology within one or the other of these cultural matrices. Rather, Paul's attitude toward the body is better enunciated in terms of a cultural matrix - 'Hellenistic Judaism' - that was a thoroughgoing fusion of two cultural heritages.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1 Status Quaestionis:
The Scholarly Context for Examining
Paul's Attitude toward the Body in Romans 6-8

"The trouble with Paul has always been to put him in his place." This remark by Edwin A. Judge is no less valid for the examination of Paul's view of the body in Romans 6-8 than it was for studying his social context. For certainly from the commencement of the modern scholarly study of Pauline anthropology - this forms the backdrop for analyzing his view of the body - the problem has been where to place Paul and his anthropological thought culturally.

In the period prior to Bultmann, there was a pronounced tendency among scholars to see Paul as the first hellenizer of Christianity. Paul's hellenizing was viewed as extending to his dualistic anthropology, which treated the σῶμα and σῶμα as the form and substance of the physical body, over against which stood the ψυχή or ψυχή, an ontological entity distinguishable from the body. Disparagement of the body was seen in the fact that the ψυχή was the seat of sin. These views were expressed by Carl Holsten,

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Abbreviations are according to The SBL Handbook of Style: For Ancient, Near Eastern, Biblical, and Early Christian Studies, ed. P. H. Alexander et al. (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1999); supplemented by The Studia Philonica Annual 12 (2000): 235-241. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own, except for quotations of Philo's QG and QE, which depend on the LCL.

2 H. A. A. Kennedy, E. De Witt Burton, and A. Schweitzer are notable exceptions (see bibilog.).
Otto Pfleiderer, Heinrich Holtzmann, Richard Reitzenstein, and George MacGregor, and also by Hermann Lüdemann in his Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus, the most important work on Pauline anthropology prior to Bultmann.¹

Lüdemann examined Paul's anthropology in relation to Paul's soteriology. He saw the latter as providing the starting point for the development of Paul's anthropological views, and that which determined their definite form. Thus to understand the anthropology, which he saw as belonging to the periphery of Paul's thought, one must understand its place in the context of the theology as a whole.² He began by examining Paul's perspective on the composition of the human, a perspective that was not in any way distinctive from his Hellenistic environment. He divided "die physische Anthropologie" into two parts using Paul's division of the human into the ἐσω and ἐξω ἀνθρώπος at 2 Cor 4.16. The ἐσω ἀνθρώπος, being the καρδία or νοῦς, is a distinguishable ontological entity from the ἐξω ἀνθρώπος, the person's bodiliness, composed of σῶμα, σύρς, and ψυχή. The


² Anthropologie, i-ii.
material substratum, σάρξ, is pressed into a form, σῶμα, and made alive by ψυχή. Significantly, as Robert Jewett has indicated, "Lüdemann could find no particular theological significance for the word σῶμα."1

All of this was typical of Hellenistic anthropology, but Lüdemann also perceived that Paul used σάρξ in a broadened sense, following the Jewish Scriptures, to designate the whole person in a situation of subordination. From this he concluded that in Paul two entirely autonomous understandings of σάρξ stand side by side, one Jewish, and one Hellenistic.2 Building on this finding, Lüdemann, who was working with what Bultmann would call "sharply defined concepts,"3 argued that corresponding to these two anthropologies were two soteriologies, one Jewish and one Hellenistic. The Jewish doctrine of salvation is explicated in Romans 1-5. There, sin is attributed to human willing, and redemption is due to God's pronouncement of acquittal on the basis of Christ's death. But in the Hellenistic doctrine explicated in Romans 6-8, which Lüdemann thought was Paul's mature view, sin proceeds from the σάρξ, the material substratum.

1 Lüdemann, Anthropologie, 3, 7-12; Jewett, Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of their Use in Conflict Settings, AGJU 10 (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 206.


of the σώμα. But he also saw Paul using σάρξ to signify an "extra-personal" cosmic dimension. So in Romans 6-8 salvation consists in abolishing the σάρξ both in its physical and in its cosmic dimensions. This is accomplished in baptism by the imputation of the Spirit, which resurrects the person, making her or him a new creature.

Lüdemann's theory about Paul's soteriology continued to have a lasting impact, but his interpretation of the anthropology, which came to be seen as a manifestation of nineteenth-century German Idealism, went out of favour when Existentialism replaced it as the philosophical flavour of the day, as evidenced in the writings of Rudolf Bultmann.

According to Bultmann, Paul "originated in Hellenistic Judaism," and his theology must be seen against this cultural formation. Hellenistic Judaism blended together various traditions, including the OT, rabbinical learning, Hellenistic

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1 Anthropologie, 54.

1 See Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 53, 57, 207. One possible reason Bultmann was willing to interpret Paul in light of modern existential categories may be seen in a comment he made in a review of H. Lietzmann's Handbuch zum Neuen Testament. He said, "Die Spätantike 'ist eine Welt, die uns modern anmutet ... Nichts Festes, nichts Sicheres, an das man sich halten, dem man sich hingeben kann'" (cited in E. Kamiah, "Anthropologie als Thema der Theologie bei Rudolf Bultmann," in Anthropologie als Thema der Theologie, ed. H. Fischer [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978], 22).
themes from philosophy and mystery religions, oriental cosmology, and eschatological speculation.

Both prior to and after conversion, Paul felt the immense impact of Hellenism. He was "acquainted with popular philosophy and the phenomena of religious syncretism," both directly and indirectly. Bultmann said, "Die Theologie des Paulus arbeitet so stark mit hellenistischen Vorstellungen ... daß es zu wenig gesagt wäre, daß Paulus nur in eine Abhängigkeit von hellenistisch-christlichen Gemeinden, ihrem Kult und ihren Vorstellungen geraten ist; vielmehr ist er selbst positiv an der Hellenisierung des Christentums beteiligt, woher und wann auch immer ihm die Motive des Hellenismus zugeflossen sein mogen." Yet he could also say that Stoic ideas that come to expression in Romans, such as "the doctrine of the knowledge of God through God's works" in Romans 1, and the concept of consciousness in Romans 2, were mediated to Paul through Hellenistic Judaism.

For Bultmann, Paul was also influenced by Gnosticism, but this may have come after his conversion or was mediated to him by way of Jewish apocalypticism. The Gnostic religion was a syncretistic movement within congregations that existed

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independently of Hellenistic Christianity yet competed with it, influenced it, was influenced by it, and became a phenomenon within Christianity itself, with which Paul contended at Corinth. The essence of Gnosticism was not found in its mythology, but in its possession of "a new understanding - new in the ancient world - of man and the world." In contradistinction from the OT and classical Greek thinking, where the human was seen to be at home in the world, Gnosticism "recognized for the first time" that human existence is utterly different from all worldly existence. The world became "foreign soil to the human self"; it became a prison. Bultmann said, "Gnostic mythology serves to characterize man's situation in the world as a life which by its origin is destined for destruction, a life that is prone to be ruled by demonic powers.":

Paul's anthropology is expressed in terminology familiar to the Hellenistic world, that is, the terminology of Gnosticism, whose speculations had penetrated Hellenistic religious philosophy, including Philo. This does not mean Paul takes over Gnostic anthropology lock, stock, and barrel. He does not adopt a docetic Christology or a fully realized eschatology, and he does not see the self as a pre-existent spark of heavenly light. Bultmann also detected a fatal flaw in Gnosticism. In its understanding of existence it failed to recognize that "true human existence" can only be realized in actual history, where

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the person is at liberty to be responsible for her or his actual existence. But he was certain "that Paul's anthropological concepts had already been formed under the influence of Gnosticism," and that Paul "regards the Gnostic terminology as the appropriate form of expression for the Christian understanding of existence."  

Yet Bultmann also maintained that Paul's anthropology combined Hebraic elements with these gnostic ones. He could even say that "the New Testament doctrine of man," and by "New Testament" he clearly had Paul in mind, "keeps close to that of the Old Testament." That Paul's anthropology stems from various sources explains the tensions and contradictions in his thought. But Bultmann claimed that even though the languages Paul uses are those of Gnosticism and Judaism, what Paul means goes beyond those languages. Put simply, the words are the same but the content is different.

On this foundation Bultmann examined Paul's anthropological terms, terms which he thought Paul used to characterize "the formal structures of existence." Paul shows no speculative interest in "what" the human person is or what the body is. So

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\(^{13}\) *Theology*, 1.164, 167-168, 174-175, 178, 181-183.


\(^{15}\) "Urchristentum," 7. See also "Significance," 161.
when he uses σῶρα and σῶμα, as well as other anthropological terms, he is not referring to ontologically distinct parts of the human but aspects of human existence. In a stroke he rejected all that came under Lüdemann's heading of "physische Anthropologie" as having any bearing on Paul's anthropology. Rather, Paul is concerned with "how" the human self relates to the world and to God, or, how the self relates to itself." 16

Of the anthropological terms, σῶμα is the "most comprehensive" and "most complex" term Paul uses "to characterize man's existence." Bultmann conceded that there are a few passages where Paul uses σῶμα in accordance with "naive popular usage" to designate the (form of the) physical body. At 1 Cor 15.35-50, for example, "Paul lets himself be misled into adopting his opponents' method of argumentation," and hence "it was natural for interpreters to conceive soma to mean the body-form which could be stamped upon various materials." 17

But these passages were marginalized in favour of other "rightly interpreted" passages, where it becomes "clear that the soma is not a something that outwardly clings to a man's real self (to his soul, for instance), but belongs to its very

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17 Theology, 1.192, 195-196. Other passages where σῶμα means the physical body in contrast to the soul or spirit include Rom 1.24, 4.19, 12.4-5; 1 Cor 5.31, 6.13-20, 7.34, 12.12-26; 2 Cor 4.10, 10.10; Gal 6.7; 1 Thes 5.23.
essence, so that we can say man does not have a *soma*; he is *soma*, for in not a few cases *soma* can be translated simply 'I' (or whatever personal pronoun fits the context).” Important are those passages where Paul asserts the resurrection of the body. The resurrection means that the body belongs to the person qua person. Hence to be without a body means nothingness according to 2 Cor 5.1-10. In addition, in passages like Rom 6.12-13, 12.1, 1 Cor 13.3, and Phil 1.20, *sōma* is “not thought of 'dualistically'” in the sense of a body that is something one has, but is thought of as the real I. Bultmann believed this understanding of *sōma* as a denotation for the whole person had its roots in the OT and Judaism.¹³

*Sōma*, then, is used to signify the real I, but it is also burdened with the freight of theological nuance. Paul employs *sōma* in an existential sense to designate the person in her or his "temporality and historicity." Essential to this interpretation of *sōma* is the notion that the person is someone who completely transcends both the external world with which he or she is nevertheless inextricably involved, as well as his or her own subjective feelings and experiences. Because of this, he or she can have a relationship to the world and to himself or herself in one of two ways. The self can open itself up to the future. Such existence is authentic, in which case one is in control of one's self, or put another way, one allows one's being to be determined by God. But when the person identifies herself

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¹³ "Paul," 131; Theology, 1.192, 194, 196, 198-199.
or himself with the world, she or he loses herself or himself in it. Such "inauthentic" existence shuts the self off from the future that is always opening up before it. Instead, the person is determined by sin and other outside powers that "try to wrest him out of his own control." When one is out of control the cleft between self and self - for after all it is a relationship with oneself - can take on the appearance of a divorce where one "self" appears as "a totally foreign being, a 'not-I'." This "not-I" self starts to take the appearance of a material body, and what emerges is a sort of gnostic dualism, "according to which man's self is imprisoned in the body, a prison foreign to its own nature, from which it yearns to be set free." The fact that Paul "sees so deep a cleft within man, so great a tension between self and self, and so keenly feels the plight of the man who loses his grip upon himself and falls victim to outside powers," suggests to Bultmann that Paul indeed does "come close to Gnostic dualism" and deprecation of the body at times, as at 2 Cor 5.1-10 and 12.2-4. But Bultmann always backtracked and declared that it is "an error in method to proceed from such passages as these to interpret the soma-concept." So when the person qua ὄμος "yearns to be free from 'this body of death' (Rom 7:24)," he or she is not yearning to be released from its bodily prison, "as if the latter were an inappropriate shell," but is yearning "to be freed from himself as he now is, to be
'transformed', as Paul elsewhere puts it (II Cor. 3:18; Phil. 3:21; Rom 8:29).";

Not surprisingly, Robert Jewett, in his Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of their Use in Conflict Settings, fired the same broadside at Bultmann that Bultmann had leveled against exegetes like Lüdemann who had read Paul in light of nineteenth-century Idealism. Like them, Bultmann was guilty of interpreting Paul in terms of "a common denominator in the form of some philosophical or theological principle." Only this time it happened to be Existentialism. By such an approach Jewett thought it inevitable that "the most conducive expressions" of that Existentialism in the biblical text "must be abstracted from their contexts and related to a framework which is quite distant from Paul's historical setting, and the rest of the passages which do not fit so well must be set aside as non-technical, traditional, or atypical." Jewett theorized that "any interpretation which must reject a sizable portion of the evidence ought to evoke serious doubts.";

Jewett instead proposed a contextual method whereby each of the anthropological terms is first examined in its literary...
context. This involves analysing the meaning of the anthropological terms in the argument of the sentence and paragraph in which they occur and in the letter as a whole. In agreement with James Barr, who was used as a foil against Bultmann, Jewett saw the sentence, not the word, as the basic semantic unit.:

From a literary analysis, Jewett moved, secondly, to an historical analysis of the situation that gave rise to the way Paul used the anthropological terms in each letter. He agreed with Helmut Koester when the latter said, "Paul's theological vocabulary is not that of his own theology, but is intimately related to the controversies with his opponents." Paul is not using the anthropological terms in any way consistent with his theology. Rather, there is a correlation between the way the anthropological terms are used and the situations addressed in each letter.:

But when it comes to Romans, a letter sent to Ephesus as well, Jewett said that "the uniqueness of Romans stands out in unmistakable fashion," because "the interpretive axis for Romans is not so much the concrete situation in Rome as the Pauline gospel," and "the anthropological terms are probably not used

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Anthropological Terms, 7, 119, 297, 303.
polemically against a particular group in Rome." In short, Paul deploys the anthropological terms in a way consistent with the theological structure of the letter and his thought as a whole. But, having given, Jewett takes back, for he thought that "there may be occasional uses of these terms in the defense against either the nomistic or the enthusiastic dangers" at Rome. In fact, these "occasional uses" end up governing his interpretation, for every occurrence of σῶμα and σῶρα in Romans 6-8 is understood in the context of Paul's polemic against the gnostic idea present among the libertinists at Rome that salvation consists in redemption from the body. It is this polemical situation that accounts for Paul's use of σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου, σῶμα θητόν, and σῶμα νεκρόν. In Romans 7-8, for example, Paul uses σῶρα in a dualistic, gnostic sense that deprecates the body, that is, the material flesh is seen to have its own demonic inclination and is the source of sensuality and sin. But at the same time Paul emphasizes the somatic character of redemption. So he parts company with his opponents, not in asserting that the material σῶρα is evil, but in his reason for it being evil. It belongs to the old aeon. Essentially then, Paul picks up gnostic ideas from his opponents, modifies them, and uses them in a way not his own. 

The third aspect of Jewett's contextual method examines the linguistic horizon of each term as it was used in the first

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century. This religionsgeschichtliche examination led Jewett to conclude that Paul is an apocalyptic, Judaic thinker who generally uses his anthropological terms consonantly with "traditional Jewish or early Christian tradition." He said that "the raw materials for the Pauline concept" of σώμα, for example, came "from apocalyptic Judaism of a type revealed in the Qumran literature," and from the LXX, with some other aspects paralleled in Hellenistic Judaism. But he detected a trend in Paul's usage of σώμα and σῶμα away from a usage based on Jewish apocalyptic assumptions to a usage consistent with Hellenism and its gnostic proclivities. Thus Jewett agreed with Lüdemann that in Romans 7-8, σώμα is "both a personal, psychological and a cosmic reality, i.e. it is both the flesh which is circumcised and a power in the old aeon." "Thus it came that the σώμα could be both the material flesh and a demonic power."\(^2\)

Bultmann had been the starting point not only for Jewett's work, but also for Robert H. Gundry's investigation of the σῶμα concept in his Sōma in Biblical Theology with Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology.\(^3\) He investigated the way σῶμα was used in Hellenistic Greek writings, the LXX, and the NT, and came to the conclusion that there is no "convincing support" for Bultmann's "holistic definition" of σῶμα as the "whole person," a view that

\(^2\) Anthropological Terms, 6, 7-8, 10, 94, 96, 130, 154-155, 195, 222, 453.

\(^3\) SNTSMS 29 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 3-80.
had come to occupy a commanding position in Pauline studies. Gundry acknowledged that if σῶμα is used by Paul to designate the physical body, then there is in Paul an ontological, anthropological duality— he felt uncomfortable with the word 'dualism' because Paul's anthropology is Hebraic not Greek. "There is no making of Paul into a Greek." "The distance of Paul from Philo, who attempted to combine Jewish theology and Hellenistic philosophy, clearly shows the comparatively un-Hellenistic character of Pauline anthropology."

Typical of the Jewish theology of the time, Paul's Hebraic anthropology is "unitary," not "monadic." There are indeed two separable substances, a corporeal and an incorporeal, but they belong together. Even though Paul consistently uses σῶμα to refer to the corporeal body, he uses a variety of terms to denote the incorporeal, such as πνεῦμα, ψυχή, καρδία, νός, διάνοια, and ἑως ἄνθρωπος. Together, the corporeal and incorporeal parts make up the whole person, the ἄνθρωπος."

Nevertheless, in Paul's Hebraic anthropology there is no "metaphysical dualism." The soul and body are not in opposition. The body or flesh is not by its very nature evil and it is not a tomb from which the soul must escape, for the body is capable of being sanctified and resurrected. These facts act as a shield against Greek disparagement of the body. Although Paul sometimes speaks of the σάρξ as evil, in these instances he is not referring

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*Sōma*, 79, 83.
"to a physical substance as such." "Paul writes of the body only as the victim of sin, not as the origin of sin." It is "caught in the middle" between the inner person and sin, "and dominated by" and "easy prey for sin."\(^2\)

Daniel Boyarin, in his *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity*, is sympathetic to Gundry's treatment, but weighs more seriously Hellenistic influences upon Paul.\(^3\) There is in Paul, he said, "an extraordinary synthesis" of Greek and Jewish cultures. This synthesis is the cultural world of hellenized Judaism. He pointed to similarities between Paul and Philo, "similarities which cannot be accounted for by influence, since both were active at the same time in widely separated places," "as prima facie evidence for a Hellenistic Jewish cultural koine," one that was "thoroughly Hellenized and platonized."

Boyarin thought that this "eclectic middle-platonism" was the dominant philosophical influence upon "the entire Mediterranean cultural area," influencing various branches of Judaism in late antiquity, and that Paul was "thoroughly imbued with the ideology of middle-platonism" especially its dualistic ontology, which affirms "a non-material, intelligible world above and beyond this one," and "which stands as a paradigm for it." The existence of this hellenized Jewish cultural world suggested to him that the

\(^2\) *Sōma*, 83-85.

\(^3\) *Sōma*, 83-84, 135, 137-138, 159-160, 204.

older paradigm, "in which Judaism and Hellenism are considered as alternative options for explaining Paul," has to be thoroughly revised. No longer can Pauline scholarship say that Paul's religion "is fully explicable as a development of biblical religion pure and simple."\(^{13}\)

But Boyarin's Paul is also "integrally connected with Jewish tradition." Paul "writes as a Jew" and is "thoroughly trained in contemporary Palestinian biblical hermeneutics." Paul's midrashic methods of interpretation would not have surprised any Pharisee or rabbi. In fact, Boyarin set out to show just how productive it is "to read Paul as a Jewish cultural critic" who was "criticizing aspects of Judaism from within" and "confronting and attempting to deal with real social issues" that his hellenized Jewish cultural world generated.\(^{12}\)

According to Boyarin, the "theological problem that troubled [Paul] the most" was, "How do the rest of the people in God's world fit into the plan of salvation revealed to the Jews through their Torah?" Paul was motivated by a "genuinely theological" and "profound concern for the one-ness of humanity," a "cultural problematic set by the Greeks," but also "by certain universalistic tendencies within biblical Israelite religion." Paul's "primary motivation, not only for his mission but indeed for his 'conversion', was a passionate desire that humanity be

\(^{13}\) Radical Jew, 13-14, 17, 28, 30, 59, 75, 78, 118, 263 n. 3, 267-68 n. 30, 277 n. 2.

\(^{12}\) Radical Jew, 2-3, 13-14, 106, 118, 137, 142, 262 n. 6, 267-68 n. 30, 277 n. 2, 300 n. 2.
One under the sign of the One God." He was "troubled by" and "critical of" the "ethnocentrism' of biblical and post-biblical religion, and particularly the way it implicitly and explicitly created hierarchies between nations, genders, social classes."

"The culture itself," Boyarin said, "was in tension with itself, characterized both by a narrow ethnocentrism and universalist monotheism."

Paul's cultural world, then, generated "his socio-cultural problems" but it also provided the means to solve them. This was the "idealist" or "dualistic" philosophy of Plato and middle Platonism, which asserted, according to Arlene W. Saxonhouse, "the existence of a world beyond the senses, one comprehensible only to the intellect, one that unifies by abstracting from the particulars of the world that we experience with our senses."

This process of "abstracting" becomes Paul's "allegorical hermeneutic," which Boyarin considered "to be the hermeneutical key to Paul." The particular or the signifier, which belongs to outer, physical reality, is allegorized in such a way as to have universal significance. By this hermeneutical stance Paul is able to have his cake and eat it too. He can preserve, for example, the significance of Israel κατὰ σάρκα, while at the same time affirm that the true Israel is κατὰ πνεῦμα. Put another way, Paul can hold onto the "Jew" by "redefining Jewishness in such a way

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that everyone could be Jewish.\textsuperscript{14} Most importantly, the
relationship between outer signifier and inner signified in these
"bipolar oppositions on a continuum" is not one of severe
opposition. Strictly speaking, Israel κατὰ σάρκα, for example, does
not stand in "absolute opposition" to Israel κατὰ πνεῦμα. Rather,
it is carnal; the latter is spiritual. This Pythagorean way of
thinking provides "much of the heuristic energy which makes
possible Paul's religious critique and innovation." "Paul's
entire thought and expression are generated by a very powerful
set of analogical ratios." These include:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
flesh & spirit \\
body & soul \\
humans & God \\
Jesus (before Easter) & risen Christ \\
literal & figurative \\
Israel & Church \\
works & faith \\
circumcision & baptism \\
traditional teaching & revelation \\
James & Paul \\
earthly Jerusalem & heavenly Jerusalem \\
(Jewish church) & (gentile church) \\
genealogy & "Promise"
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

In short, the dualistic ontology of middle Platonism becomes the
basis, as this chart shows, not only for Paul's ontology, but
also for his hermeneutical stance toward Scripture, anthropology
and Christology, none of which can be "separated from one
another."\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} Radical Jew, 6, 9-10, 25, 52, 91, 264 n. 9, 118, 300 n.
3. See A. W. Saxonhouse, Fear of Diversity: The Birth of
Political Science in Ancient Greek Thought (Chicago: University

\textsuperscript{15} Radical Jew, 29-31, 85, 269 n. 39.
For Paul, then, "hermeneutics becomes anthropology." Just as language has an outer signifier and inner signified, so also "the human being is divided into a fleshy and a spiritual component." There is for Paul, according to 1 Cor 15.42-50:

a physical body and a spiritual body, a body of σάρξ καὶ αἷμα (flesh and blood) and a body of πνεῦμα (spirit)! Moreover, these dyadic conjunctures are so necessary or so obvious in Paul's thought that he can use them as a logical argument. He says: If there is a physical body, there must be a spiritual body as well. This argument can only be explained, if we assume that for him everything physical has a spiritual counterpart—i.e., some version of platonism.

This does not mean Paul rejected the body or radically devalued it. He simply "promoted a system whereby the body had its place, albeit subordinated to the spirit." Paul's anthropological dualism of body and soul "makes room for the body, however much the spirit is more highly valued." The prioritization of the spirit over body is seen in the fact that for Paul and other Hellenized Jews, "the essence of a human being is a soul housed in a body." The body is "'the earthly tent that we live in'; it is not we."

David E. Aune, in his "Two Pauline Models of the Person," stated, "Paul's view of human nature, like much of his thought, cannot be understood adequately apart from the cultural and

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15 Radical Jew, 62.

16 Radical Jew, 7, 15, 59-60, 181, 185, 277 n. 4.
religious context in which he lived and wrote." His study of that context led him to conclude that ancient views of human nature were far more complex than sometimes realized. To speak of a "Greek view" or "Jewish view" of human nature is to oversimplify matters and work with a superficial understanding of the evidence. In both Jewish and Greek milieus there "were, in fact, many monistic and dualistic conceptions of the universe and human nature," as well as positive and negative evaluations of the body. Notwithstanding, he agrees with Boyarin in asserting that Platonism was the dominant philosophical movement of the period.:

Paul "did not simply adopt an existing anthropological model from 'Judaism', 'Hellenistic Judaism', or 'Hellenism' (precise boundaries between these cultural categories did not in fact exist)," and "he evinces no concern to develop a consistent view of human nature." He was, rather, "an eclectic who drew upon a variety of anthropological concepts in a manner subsidiary or tangential to the more immediate concerns he addresses in his extant letters." Nevertheless, Aune saw "at least two different ancient models of human nature" coming to expression in Paul, an

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"irrational behavior model" and an "apocalyptic macrocosm-microcosm model."^{41}

The irrational behavior model, which is seen in Rom 7.14-25 and Gal 5.16-17, sees a bipartition in the human. Cognition, reason, and motivation are located in a higher aspect of the personality and irrational emotions are located in the lower aspect, with the result that they are often in conflict.^{42}

The apocalyptic macrocosm-microcosm model, however, is presupposed in passages like Rom 6.6 and 2 Cor 5.17. What is paradigmatic for human existence here is not the view that sees the human as a microcosm of the universe as in Plato or Philo. Rather, it is the apocalyptic structure of history in Christianized form that is paradigmatic. Aune said, "Just as Paul's Christian form of apocalyptic thought is characterized by a historical or eschatological dualism consisting of the juxtaposition of the old age and the new age, so his view of human nature can similarly reflect a homologous dualistic structure." He spells this out in his discussion of 2 Cor 5.17:

Here Paul uses the basic apocalyptic expectation of the renewal of creation (i.e., the inauguration of the age to come) following the destruction of the present evil age as a paradigm for the transformation experienced by the individual Christian who has moved from unbelief to belief. Thus, the apocalyptic expectation of an impending cosmic change from the present evil age to the future age of bliss has become paradigmatic for the transformation of the believer.^{43}

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^{42} "Pauline Models," 97-98.

Thus Aune, unlike Bultmann, took "Paul's apocalyptic framework seriously," and at the same time, like Gundry, saw Paul's anthropological terms as designations for parts of the person. At Rom 7.23-25, for example, the term ψως, "which is not divine, as in many strands of Hellenistic philosophy," is equated with ἐσωάνθρωπος, both of which are distinguished from the person's σάρξ, μέλη, or σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου. "This inner-outer contrast," Aune said, "reflects a split in human nature that cannot be ignored." A dualism of body and self, "that cannot be explained using Israelite models," is also seen in passages such as 2 Cor 5.1-10, 12.2-3, and Phil 1.21-26.

Aune did not see in Paul a disparaging attitude toward the body, if by that one means the "notion that the body was intrinsically evil and a temporary prison for the immortal soul." Yet in his comments on 2 Cor 5.1-10, he observed, "Running throughout this passage is an undeniably negative evaluation of physical existence in comparison to the positive evaluation of the type of existence possible following death."

2 The Course of our Investigation

Alongside Jewett, Boyarin, and Aune, our investigation will call into question whether there is anything to be gained any longer from situating the examination of Paul's view of the body in Romans 6-8 within the old argument over which cultural world

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Paul's anthropology belonged to, Hellenism or Judaism. Nevertheless, our review of research has shown the importance of cultural context for explicating Paul's anthropology. Biblical scholars have recognized along with linguists that "if the context of the utterance is changed, then the content of the utterance also is changed." The scholars we examined agreed that "Hellenistic Judaism" is the best label to paste on Paul's cultural world. There is less than unanimity on how that world is to be configured. Since Philo is the best representative of Hellenistic Judaism, and he also happens to be a contemporary of Paul, we have chosen to

Because he could not work with clearly defined cultural categories, Jewett said it is a fruitless debate trying to decide to which cultural world Paul's anthropological thought belonged to, Judaism or Hellenism (Anthropological Terms, 6). See also W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology, 4th ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), viii, who said that from at least the time of E. Schurer there have been scholars who have called into question whether "it is possible to make a clear distinction between what was Semitic or Palestinian Judaism and Hellenistic or Diaspora Judaism in the first century"; E. R. Goodenough, Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period, ed. and abr. J. Neusner; Bollingen Series 37 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 109; T. Engberg-Pedersen, "Stoicism in Philippians," in Paul in His Hellenistic Context, ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 256.


See D. T. Runia, "How to Read Philo," NedTT 40 (1986): 185. A meaningful debate in Philonic studies has centered on the question: Does Philo speak only for his group in Alexandria, or are his views representative of a broader consensus of Jews in the Hellenistic world? Goodenough (see bibliog.) devoted his scholarly career to showing that Philo's views were not sui generis among Jews. For similar conclusions, see G. E. Sterling, "Recherché or Representative? What is the Relationship Between
compare his view of the body with Paul's in Romans 6-8. In choosing to compare Philo and Paul, "I should make it clear," - and here I am unashamedly making Boyarin's words my own - "that I am not claiming that Philo is the background for Paul, but only that he provides a background for my reading of Paul, that is, that certain themes which are explicit in Philo seem to me to be useful for understanding inexplicit moments in Paul's texts."

Put another way, in the process of comparing Paul and Philo we anticipate that similarities and differences that will come to light will serve to map in a better way Paul's discourse on the body in Romans 6-8.

The problems surrounding the scholarly enterprise of comparison and the need for a reliable method for carrying out comparative investigations have been well illustrated by Samuel Sandmel, Robert Kysar, E. P. Sanders, Jonathan Z. Smith, Terence L. Donaldson, and David T. Runia. In carrying out our research


Radical Jew, 19, 187.


we try to work toward a more refined comparative methodology, being guided by suggestions raised by these scholars.

First, we have decided to examine Philo's and Paul's attitudes toward the body on their own before bringing them together to see what light Philo may shed on Paul. This allows us to probe the signification and function of the anthropological terms in relation to the argumentative strategies of the texts under discussion. The value of this is easy to see by way of example. Both Philo (Migr. 9) and Paul (Rom 7.24) cry out for deliverance from the σώμα. But it is how this topos functions in relation to the broader contours of their thought that will enable us to see similarities and differences.  

Secondly, as an inference from the first consideration, we recognize that the literary context "is infinitely more significant than the question of alleged parallels" for

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12 By way of example, Sanders has shown that Paul and Rabbinic Judaism share a number of common concepts, such as covenant, election, and grace. But when these are examined in relation to their respective "patterns of religion," it emerges that "they are talking about two different things." Put another way, the buildings may not be the same simply because some of the bricks are ("Patterns," 455-458, 466, 472). See also Smith, Drudgery, 17, 19 n. 29, 25.
determining their respective attitudes toward the body. So, in coming to understand how Paul uses anthropological terms, we pay attention to the literary context, preferring it to "alleged parallels" from elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is not a question of either/or, but of priority, since "the knowledge on our part of the parallels may assist in understanding Paul." Nevertheless, it is not a question of either/or, but of priority, since "the knowledge on our part of the parallels may assist in understanding Paul." Nevertheless, it is not a question of either/or, but of priority, since "the knowledge on our part of the parallels may assist in understanding Paul." Nevertheless, it is not a question of either/or, but of priority, since "the knowledge on our part of the parallels may assist in understanding Paul." Nevertheless, it is not a question of either/or, but of priority, since "the knowledge on our part of the parallels may assist in understanding Paul." 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Nevertheless, it is not a question of either/or, but of priority, since "the knowledge on our part of the parallels may assist in understanding Paul." Nevertheless, it is not a question of either/or, but of priority, since "the knowledge on our part

Thirdly, we follow the communis opinio and assume no literary relationship between Philo and Paul. Similarities between them are most likely due to their sharing common traditions.

But comparison is not enough. As just stated, we cannot even get to the task of comparing until we have looked at each discourse on the body on its own terms. For Paul, this involves examining exegetically his discourse on the body in the argumentative and theological context of Romans 6-8. To determine Philo's view of the body, we take into account all the passages in PLCL (12 volumes) where Philo speaks of the body. From this broad database, we select and translate all the passages that we reckon significant, and then inspect them in their argumentative

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15 So Sandmel, "Parallelomania," 6; Brandenburger, Fleish und Geist, 227-228.
context. Finally, we relate our findings to an emerging understanding of Philo's basic philosophical position.  

Since the primary aim of the investigation is to examine Paul's discourse on the body in the argumentative context of Romans 6-8, it is requisite that we set down how we shall do this. Our analysis involves examining the argumentative structure of the letter in general and Romans 6-8 in particular. We ask several questions: What does Paul want the recipients of the letter to do or think as a result of reading the letter? We also ask, What does he want them to do or think as a result of reading Romans 6-8 in particular, and how does he argue this? In the process of examining the internal logic and intricate structure of Paul's argument in Romans 6-8, we examine exegetically what his view of the body is and how this view functions within the argumentative structure of Romans 6-8. Of course, a description of conventional rhetorical features present in Romans 6-8 may have its place. But taxonomy is a "useless pastime" unless we proceed further to examine how what Paul writes contributes to the "persuasive designs" he has on his audience, or, put another way, how his composition "attempts to increase his audience's adherence to the theses he presents for their approbation."

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16 Runia's "How to Read Philo" has been profitable, but his Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato, Philosophia Antiqua: A Series of Studies in Ancient Philosophy 44 (Leiden: Brill, 1986) has been invaluable for matters of methodology in treating Philo.

Methodologically, therefore, we shall endeavour to bear in mind that what is important is how Paul's argument works persuasively to bring about changes in the behaviour and thinking of the recipients.  

This approach is justified by the way rhetoric seems to have served the purposes of writers in antiquity, and it is here, we hope, that our analysis comes "to terms with the fact that the Pauline writings are first and foremost letters." Although the three species or genres of rhetoric, "deliberative, epideictic, and forensic," served as templates for the construction of oral discourse, when it came to written discourse, ancient writers subordinated these templates to their own purposes. For as Jeffrey T. Reed says, the "three species of rhetoric were too limited to provide a model for letter writing." So, for example, in a rhetorical speech one expects only one _propositio_, but in a letter one might find several. In addition, there was no formal

"useless pastime" is found in idem, "Philo's Rhetoric: Argumentation and Style," ANRW 2.21.1:351.


relationship between the parts of a letter and the principal parts of rhetorical arrangement.  

This important difference between oral and written discourse must not, however, be allowed to overshadow an important similarity; namely, that speeches and letters worked in similar ways, and thus there are functional relationships between speeches and letters. Paul's letter to the Romans, for example, attempts to do at a distance what he would do were he in Rome. And Reed has pointed out similarities between the parts of a speech and a letter. Concerning the introductions, he said, "In the same way that epistolary openings function to expose the general nature of the relationship between the sender and the recipient (be it positive and negative), so also the exordium serves to generate a positive relationship of trust and compliance between the speaker and listener, that is, to build ethos." In sum, what Thomas M. Conley says about Philo's treatises may, not surprisingly, be said of Paul's letter, "From the smallest grammatical choices to the larger strategies of

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\[\text{"J. T. Reed, "The Epistle," in Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C. - A.D. 400, ed. S. E. Porter (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 179-182, 191. R. A. Burridge says, "However, a warning note must be sounded here about the relationship of rhetorical theory and literary practice. Classical authors sometimes discuss the genre and form of their work in a prologue or preface, while rhetorical handbooks, particularly the later ones, will list the rules of each genre and the sorts of things each example should contain. When it actually comes to literary composition however, these outlines and rules are often disregarded" ("Biography," in Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C. - A.D. 400, ed. S. E. Porter (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 372; emphasis added).} \]
'sentence' composition to the organization of entire sections ... we find the unmistakable signs of rhetorical intention."

Secondly, rhetorical analysis involves examining what Lloyd L. Bitzer calls the "rhetorical situation," that which gives rise to the discourse, but we spell this out in chapter 2.

3 Conclusion

The inceptive stimulus for this examination of Paul's view of the body in Romans 6-8 was an earlier study of 1 Corinthians 15, where I observed that Paul argues for the future resurrection of the body, but a body of a different material from the one now possessed. The σῶμα ψυχικόν will be exchanged for a σῶμα πνευματικόν, because presumably the σῶμα ψυχικόν, being composed of flesh and blood, is unsuitable for immortality. I wondered, then, whether a possible reason for Paul's espousal of discontinuity between the materials of the present and resurrected bodies might lie in Romans 6-8, where Paul's language about the body seems to imply, on the surface anyway, some sort of devaluation of the body. He can speak at 6.6 of the σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας and the σάρξ ἁμαρτίας at 8.3. At 7.18 he says, οὐκ οἶκεί ἐν ἐμοί, τὸ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἄγαθον, and at 7.24 he asks, τὸ μὲν ἡμεῖς ἔργα ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου: Then there is 8.10, where he says, τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν, and 8.13, τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦσα.

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\(^{1}\) Reed, "Epistle," 181; Conley, "Philo," 697.

Lüdemann took all this at face value and concluded that Paul deprecates the body in Romans 6-8. Bultmann, on the other hand, although granting that Paul, when writing about the body and flesh in Romans 7, sounds as though he is denigrating the body just like a gnostic, did not think that is what Paul actually meant. Jewett, who viewed matters similarly to Lüdemann, went beyond him, however, in asserting that Paul's theological vocabulary about the body in Romans 6-8 is taken directly from the libertine opponents at Rome. This resulted *mutatis mutandis* in Paul using σῶμα and σάρξ in a gnostic manner to deprecate the body, a manner not really his own. Boyarin considered Paul's thought to be thoroughly platonized, but did not think that Paul degraded the body to the same degree Philo had. Similarly, Aune saw a negative evaluation of the body in Paul, but not to the extent where Paul saw the body as intrinsically evil and a prison of the soul.

The question whether Paul devalues the body in Romans 6-8 is, then, the problem I have set for myself. What is Paul's view of the body in Romans 6-8, and how does it function within the "fuller contextualization" of the rhetorical situation of the letter, within its argumentative context in Romans 6-8, and within the cultural context of that Hellenistic Judaism that comes to expression in Philo of Alexandria? In order to resolve these issues, the first step, in chapter 2, will be to examine the "rhetorical situation" and argumentative structure of the
letter. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 then examine Paul's view of the body in Romans 6.1-7.6, 7.7-25, and 8.1-30, respectively. Chapter 6 looks at Philo's view of the body as it comes to expression in what he says about the composition and creation of the body and what he says about the body in discussing the categories into which he customarily divides people in regard to the ascent of the soul. In chapter 7 we summarize Paul's attitude toward the body as it comes to expression in Romans 6-8, and then compare it with that of Philo, bringing together the answers to the questions we have posed.

\[\text{The words in quotations belong to D. B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), xii.}\]
CHAPTER 2

THE RHETORICAL SITUATION AND ARGUMENTATIVE STRUCTURE OF ROMANS

1 What is "Rhetorical Situation"?

Paul's discourse on the body in Romans 6-8 is embedded in a rhetorical discourse, the letter to the Romans, which was a particular response to a specific rhetorical situation that called for that response. Thus what Lloyd F. Bitzer says concerning a rhetorical work in general may be applied to Romans in particular: "a work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it performs some task." In order to lay a foundation for a proper exegesis of Paul's discourse on the body in Romans 6-8, it is indispensable that we spell out the rhetorical situation that gave rise to the letter as well as the letter's argumentative structure.

The rhetorical situation is that which gives rise to discourse. It is "the context in which speakers or writers create rhetorical discourse." Bitzer has identified three constituents that will be found in any rhetorical situation. First, there is "the audience to be constrained in decision and action." For our purposes this produces the question, Whom does Paul envisage as

"Rhetorical Situation," 3-4. Bitzer's ground-breaking work on rhetorical situation remains influential and I have followed it. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's The New Rhetoric has also been invaluable, as has N. Elliott's The Rhetoric of Romans: Argumentative Constraint and Strategy and Paul's Dialogue with Judaism, JSNTSup 45 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990).
the readers of his letter? Secondly, there is the exigence, potential or actual, "which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence." This raises for us the question, What change did Paul want to effect as a result of the recipients reading "precisely this letter to Rome"? The third constituent, which will be found in any rhetorical situation, is "the constraints which influence the rhetor and can be brought to bear upon the audience," so as "to constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence." These constraints include everything needed to drive the purposes home, such as facts, beliefs, traditions, method of argumentation, character of the rhetor and witnesses. We can only deal with these constraints as we treat our subject in the following chapters. But here where we are concerned with laying the groundwork, two additional questions also concern us: Is Romans 6-8 a rhetorical unit? And

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1 "Rhetorical Situation," 1, 6, 8. G. A. Kennedy (New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism, Studies in Religion [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984], 34-36) adopts Bitzer's understanding of rhetorical situation but goes further and identifies the rhetorical situation with the Sitz im Leben of form criticism. But Elliott rejects such an identification, because "the form-critical Sitz im Leben is a typical, routine setting in life, not the specific contingent situation that invites a particular discourse," and because it results in "the misleading impression that a 'rhetorical situation' can be identified for segments of a text" (Rhetoric, 95 n. 1).
what is the argumentative structure of the letter within which this unit sits?

2 Who were the Recipients of Paul's Letter?

For a rhetorical analysis of Romans this question is significant, because the effectiveness of Paul's rhetorical argument is contingent upon how accurately he conceived his audience, and upon his ability to take his audience into consideration in tailoring his arguments.¹

Immediately we are faced with a hermeneutical problem. Are we after those actual readers of the letter whom Paul addressed at Rome, or are we in pursuit of the implied readers encoded in the text? Stanley K. Stowers has shown the practical value of keeping separate "the empirical and encoded reader" in order to produce "a careful analysis of the audience in the letter." But such a strategy does not imply that we should altogether sideline the role historical reconstruction can play, so long as we prioritize text over historical reconstruction.² Historical reconstruction, in fact, can assist us in learning more about the original readers of the letter whom Paul wished to constrain, as well as provide corroboration for conclusions reached by way of literary analysis. In short, if we were to take Stowers' goal as our own, "attempting to imagine how readers in Paul's time might

¹ Influential in establishing this as fundamental is the work of Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca, New Rhetoric. See also Elliott, Rhetoric, 15-17.
² Rereading, 1, 23.
³ On this, see Elliott, Rhetoric, 18.
have read the letter;" then historical reconstruction is a necessary complement to textual analysis.

Based on his reading of the text, Francis Watson reached the conclusion that Paul's primary readers were Jewish believers. He based his interpretation, *inter alia*, on καὶ ὑμεῖς at Rom 1.6, which he took to mean "you as well as me." Accordingly, Paul is saying, "You too are called by Jesus Christ in the midst of Gentiles, just as I am." The "you" are understood as Jews in the midst of Gentiles, because if they were Gentiles, then we are faced with an unlikely situation where "the Roman Gentile believers are being seen as the objects of Paul's missionary activity," even though "the addressees are already 'called by Jesus Christ' (1:6)."

There are two problems, however, with this interpretation. First, the adverbial καὶ at 1.6 does not link the readers' calling while Jews with Paul's calling while a Jew. Rather, the καὶ links them with Paul's sphere of ministry ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν (1.5). The ἐνοίκοι at the beginning of 1.6 functions in the same way as ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν in 1.5, thereby situating the καὶ ὑμεῖς of verse 6 inside that place or sphere. Watson, however, follows C. E. B. Cranfield in arguing that ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν and ἐνοίκοι in 1.5-6 have

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1 Rereading, 1.


1 The same idea is found at 15.9.
to do with geographical sphere. Although it is possible to read the text this way, elsewhere in Romans Paul does not speak of being an apostle in the geographical sphere of all the nations but of being an apostle to Gentiles (11.13, 15.16). Rom 1.6 makes explicit that his readers belong to this sphere, and by implication they belong to Paul's sphere of ἀποστολή. This opens the door to a second problem. Watson is working with too narrow a definition of "missionary activity." If we were to understand "missionary activity" as consisting solely of an activity of proclamation that would result in baptism, then he is correct. But the context of the epistolary prescript gives us a partial clue, just as the body of the letter gives a fuller clue, as to what Paul had in mind when he says, οὕτως τὸ κατ' ἑμείς πρόθυμον καὶ υμῖν τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ εἰσαγγελισθαι (1.15). Verses 11-12 show that Paul wants to enrich the congregation, possibly through bestowing on them some spiritual gift, and at the same time be enriched by them. Part of Paul's missionary activity is the ministry of establishing and strengthening believers (see 1.11, στηριχθήναι).

A far better case can be made for seeing the readers of the letter as Gentiles. We have already seen that verses 5-6 make better sense when it is understood that Paul sees the recipients within his sphere of apostleship to the Gentiles. At 1.13, where Paul compares them with the λοιποῖς ἔθνεσιν, this is made explicit.

Watson, Paul, 103; Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary of the Epistle to the Romans, 2 vols.; ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975, 1979), 1.68.
In addition, at 11.13, Paul identifies them as ἡγάγωνεῖν. This exceptional apostrophe has suggested to some commentators, and we are inclined to agree, that Paul is addressing an actual problem at Rome. Gentile Christians "appear to have adopted an arrogance about Jewish unbelief that may have inclined them to believe that any purposes of God for ethnic Israel were now abrogated."  

From 1.15 to 11.36 we can learn a little more about the recipients. At points Paul turns to address them directly. 7.1 illustrates this well. He begins the verse with ἡγάγωνεῖ, an expression that introduces teaching he expects will be familiar to his readers. He supposes they have a knowledge of the Jewish law and therefore will be able to grasp what he is talking about. Even writing to a Gentile audience, Paul can take it for granted that his readers know the Jewish law. For after all, it was the scripture of the churches, and some of Paul's readers will, no doubt, have had contact with Judaism. In addition, the repetition of ἀπέκλωσε at 7.1, used for the first time since 1.13, and immediately again at 7.4, suggests that Paul is turning to address a subject matter that was particularly sensitive to his Gentile readers at Rome, the relation of believers to the law.  

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12 See J. D. G. Dunn, Romans 1-8, WBC38A (Dallas: Word, 1988), 361.
From 1.16 down to 11.36, however, we can learn nothing more directly about the recipients of the letter. For we are opposed to mirror-readings of any portion of the letter unless there are explicit textual clues which invite such a reading, and for 1.16-11.36 there are none.\(^\text{1}\) The objections to his gospel, which Paul himself raises at 3.1, 8, 31, 6.1, and 7.7, are understandable objections to his teaching that may logically be inferred from what has just been said. They are not clues that invite a mirror reading.\(^\text{1}\) Paul encountered these objections in the east, some from sympathizers and some from opponents, and anticipates that they would be raised by a variety of individuals at Rome.\(^\text{1}\) In addition, the apostrophe at 2.17 does not provide a clue as to the identity of the recipients since it is attributable to Paul's

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\(^\text{1}\) See Elliott, Rhetoric, 95; Moo, Romans, 14.

\(^\text{1}\) As mentioned in Chapter 1, Jewett said that Paul came up against a "pneumatic libertinism" at Rome, the "strong" (Rom 15.1), and his usage of σώμα and σώρε in Romans 6-8 is conditioned by his defense against this group that threatened the congregation. If it were possible to place the objection at 3.8 on the lips of the "strong," then a case might be made for a mirror reading of 3.8, as Jewett attempted (Anthropological Terms, 45-46, 288, 298, 302). But given Paul's hostility toward those who would raise such a slander at 3.8 and his acceptance of the "strong" at 15.7, such a link is improbable.

diatribe style. The Ἰουδαῖος of 2.17 is an "imagined dialogue partner," not an addressee of the letter.⁶

From the paraenetic section of the letter, 12.1-15.13, exegetes have generally been optimistic about the potential for learning more about the recipients. The center of attention has been 14.1-15.12, a passage where Paul gives a lengthy exhortation to the "weak" and "strong" to welcome one another. From 14.1-15.12 we learn that Paul identifies himself with the strong (15.1), and is seen to be addressing them at 14.1 with respect to how they ought to think and act toward others who are weak. But at 14.3-23 and 15.7, not only are the strong addressed but the weak as well, whom Paul considers believers (14.10, 13, 15, 21). We also learn that the weak eat only vegetables, but the strong place no restrictions on what may be eaten (14.2). The weak give preference to certain days, the strong do not (14.5). Both groups were quarreling with and judging each other over these matters.⁷

Scholars appeal to 15.7-13 to provide clues that may help identify the weak and strong. At 15.7 Paul repeats his exhortation of 14.1, but now issues it to everyone, both weak and strong. 15.8-12, however, is directed to the strong, and the example of Christ is set before them (15.8a). Just as Christ became a διάκονος περιτομῆς, that is, a servant of the Jews, so also

⁶ Lincoln, "From Wrath," 198. So also H. Schlier, Der Römerbrief, HTKNT 6 (Freiburg: Herder, 1977), 4; Elliott, Rhetoric, 130.

⁷ There may also have been a problem over wine (14.17, 21).
should the strong. The benefits of Christ's course of action for the Gentiles are explicated in 15.8b and 15.9a, and proof-texted in 15.9b, with the implication that the strong will benefit when they follow Christ's example. Scholars argue that the logic of Paul's argument invites a linkage of the two equations, weak and strong (implied even in 15.7a) with Jews and Gentiles (15.8-12), and thus an identification of the weak with Jewish believers and the strong with Gentile believers. Just as Christ served the Jews and as a consequence the Gentiles benefited, so also the strong, now identified with Gentiles, ought to serve the Jews, in order for Gentiles to benefit.

Is Paul then addressing a specific problem at Rome or offering up general paraenesis? The question cannot be easily decided. Three pieces of evidence, however, incline us toward the conclusion that 14.1-15.12 is addressed to a specific problem. First, Paul devotes a lot of space to this problem and seems intent on pounding his point home, at times becoming repetitive. Secondly, the principles that form the underpinning of this exhortation in 14.1-15.12 have already been explicated as general paraenesis in Romans 12. The concrete application of those principles suggests that Paul may have been applying them to a

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15 Moo says, "this view has become most popular in recent years" (Romans, 829 n. 13).

17 So J. D. G. Dunn, Romans 9-16, WBC38b (Dallas: Word, 1988), 795.
specific problem. Thirdly, it is possible to reconstruct an historical situation that makes sense of the text. Moo marshals data into an historical array that makes sense of the text, from which two things may be highlighted. First, with respect to the weak eating vegetables (14.2), Moo points out, "Abstention from meat and wine is, of course, not required by the Mosaic law. But scrupulous Jews would sometimes avoid all meat in environments where they could not be sure that the meat had been prepared in a 'kosher' manner." It may be added that such "scrupulous Jews" who were part of the Jewish community at Rome would have had no problem finding such meat. Accordingly, if we embrace Moo's reconstruction, then one component of Watson's hypothesis is inescapable: the Jewish believers, whom Paul labels the weak were themselves excluded from the Roman Jewish community. And secondly, with respect to a person regarding "one day better than

\footnote{Compare Rom 12.3 with 14.1-13a; 12.10 with 15.1-2; 12.13 with 14.1 and 15.1-2; 12.16 with 15.5; 12.18 with 14.19.}

\footnote{Contrary to R. J. Karris, "Romans 14:1-15:13 and the Occasion of Romans," in The Romans Debate, ed. K. P. Donfried; Revised and Expanded Edition (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1991), 65-84. Although I do not want to elevate this to a fourth proof, Rom 15.15 implies that Paul is speaking to a specific situation in 14.1-15.12. At 15.15, ἄπομέρους refers to only part of the letter, in my view to the paraenetic portion, unless it is a pleonasm referring to the whole letter. But it is doubtful Paul would provide an apology for giving an exposition of the gospel along with general paraenesis. 15.15a functions well argumentatively when it is seen that Paul is giving advice on a matter, for which his guidance has not been solicited, and over which he does not (yet) have jurisdiction.}

\footnote{Romans, 830-831.}

\footnote{Watson, Paul, 106. So also Elliott, Rhetoric, 52.}
another" (14.5), Moo writes, "the Mosaic law stipulates the observance of many special religious days: the weekly Sabbath and the major religious festivals. And many first-century Jews also observed weekly fasting and prayer days."\footnote{Moo, Romans, 831, 842. See also A. J. M. Wedderburn, The Reasons for Romans, Studies of the New Testament and Its World (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 33.}

What we know of relations between Jewish and Gentile believers in Paul's time corroborates the hypothesis spelled out above that the strong should be predominantly identified with Gentile believers and the weak with Jewish believers. It is also possible, but by no means certain, that the Gentile believers and the Jewish believers were distinguishable groups meeting separately for worship. Rom 15.6 could be read to suggest that Paul is exhorting the two groups to come together to worship ἑ anv ωστCol.

These findings do not hamper the theory advanced by a number of scholars, that at the time Paul wrote to the Gentile congregation at Rome, presumably sometime in the mid-50s, they were not part of the Jewish community there.\footnote{So Moo, Romans, 831. But Elliott correctly says, "Rom. 15.7-12 does not require two audiences" (Rhetoric, 57 n. 1).} What scant

historical evidence there is suggests that up to 49 CE Gentile believers, presumably proselytes to Judaism, were participating in the Jewish community, but by 64 CE, when Nero made the Christians scapegoats for the fire at Rome, the believers were a recognizably distinct community. The question is, when did the break come? In the absence of facts upon which to base a conclusion, our opinion is that it was Claudius' directive of expulsion in 49 CE that led to the parting of the ways. We suggest that after 49 CE, believers, whether Jewish or Gentile, whether those who had stayed in Rome or were returning after the death of Claudius in 54 CE, found the synagogue communities barred to them and began to assemble in private homes.

Further, to be part of a Jewish community in the first-century world, whether in Alexandria, Jerusalem, Ephesus, or Rome, was to live as a Jew, and to live as a Jew was to live according to the ancestral traditions of the Jews, however they were defined and enforced from place to place. But from Paul's perspective, his Gentile readers, who showed no concern for kašrūt and the observance of special days like the Sabbath, were no more living according to these traditions than Paul was (Gal 2.18)."

Romans 16 provides a few more pieces of information that help us confirm and qualify the conclusions already reached. A significant majority of individuals greeted there are Gentiles, __________

"The view that Gentile believers at Rome were not observing the Jewish Law at the time Paul wrote is held by, e.g.,
and this confirms our view that Paul is writing to a Gentile congregation. But he goes out of his way to single out Jewish believers for special greeting. Andronicus and Junias (16.7), and Herodion (16.11) are specifically identified as Paul's συγκάλεσ. Together with Prisca and Aquila, whose Jewishness is not highlighted, it emerges that Jewish believers were, in fact, part of the intended audience of the letter. We may therefore make this qualification. The historical recipients of Paul's letter were a mixed congregation of Gentiles and Jews. But there was such a predominance of Gentiles that to Paul's way of thinking, the congregation could be identified as Gentile. From Romans 16 it also emerges that the congregation was divided into house groups, such as the one that met in the home of Prisca and Aquila (16.3-5; see also 16.14, 15).

3 Why was Romans Written?

What did Paul want the recipients of the letter to do as a result of reading "precisely this letter"?

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Wiebel, "Jewish Community," 96; Watson, Paul, 94; Wedderburn, Reasons, 57-58.

This is based solely on the evidence of Romans 16. If 14.1-15.12 reflects the situation at Rome, as I suggest it may, then that evidence corroborates the conclusion reached here.


See above n. 2. For summations of scholarly opinion on the purposes of Romans down to the late 1980s, see Elliott, Rhetoric, 21-43; L. A. Jervis, The Purpose of Romans: A Comparative Letter Structure Investigation, JSNTSup 55 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), 14-28.
First, Paul wants them to become obedient to his gospel (2.16, 16.25) and hold it firmly. This does not mean that Paul does not consider them believers. It is more than evident from 1.8 and 15.14 that he does. But he is eager to announce the divine message of salvation to them in Rome in order to secure their ὑπακοήν πίστεως (1.5, 15). This entails not only establishing them in his gospel but forming them into a congregation that puts his gospel into practice, one where Jews and Gentiles worship together ἐνένιστόμαι (15.6). Hence, he will give them when he gets to Rome what he is placing before them in the letter, an "exposition of his gospel." As Aune correctly points out, Paul wrote to the "Roman Christians to convince them (or remind them) of the truth of his version of the gospel (Rom 2:16; cf. 16:25; Gal 1:6-9; 2:1), and to spell out the particular lifestyle and encourage the kind of commitment which Paul thought consistent with his gospel."  

Secondly, Paul wants them to accept his apostolic authority, which they ought to do, for as he saw things, they were well within the sphere of apostolic ministry that God had assigned to him (1.5-6; see 2 Cor 10.14). This purpose is so

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12 As Lincoln ("From Wrath," 194) and Moo (Romans, 744) call the letter. See also Jervis, Purpose, 129.

closely and intimately fused with the first purpose identified above that, if they were to commit themselves to Paul's gospel, they would be committing themselves to Paul's apostolic authority. The letter therefore functions as a letter of apostolic self-introduction,\(^\text{14}\) something he had no need of at Corinth (2 Cor 3.1). In both the epistolary prescript and conclusion Paul lays out his credentials as a proclaimer of the gospel λόγῳ καὶ ἐργῷ (15.18). He says he is not ashamed of the gospel (1.16), that he is a servant of Christ Jesus, ministering the gospel in a priestly fashion to the Gentiles (15.16), not building upon another person's foundation (15.20), and this activity has been accompanied by powerful signs and wonders (15.19).\(^\text{15}\) Not surprisingly, just as we saw earlier that Paul was doing in the letter what he wanted to do in Rome, namely, proclaim the gospel, so also we see Paul doing by means of the letter what he wants to do in Rome, that is, exercise his apostolic authority (1.1, 15.15).\(^\text{16}\) In short, the primary purposes


\(^{15}\) Scholars often point out a contradiction between 1.15 and 15.20. Although the mens auctoris is unavailable for comment, and desiring not to over-interpret matters, my guess is that since Paul saw Rome as belonging to his sphere of άποστολή (1.5-6), he could minister there as an apostle (so Jervis, *Purpose*, 103-104, 124), even though he was not the first.

\(^{16}\) So Jervis, *Purpose*, 121-124.
of Romans can only be understood when it is recognized, as was recognized in the ancient world, that the letter was a substitute for bodily presence. By means of the letter, and eventually when in Rome, Paul wants to exercise his apostleship to secure his readers' "obedience of faith" to his gospel.

Thirdly, having secured their obedience, or as a manifestation of it, Paul wants them to support in unspecified ways his planned mission to Spain (15.24). As a number of scholars have pointed out, the verb προπέμπω, which he uses at 15.24, was a terminus technicus for missionary support in the early church. He writes the letter at a decisive moment and turning point in his ministry, for he no longer has a place for ministry in the northeast quadrant of the Mediterranean (15.23). We see, then, that Paul has an expressed desire to visit the believers in Rome (15.23), to strengthen them by imparting some spiritual gift to them (1.11), to enjoy their company (15.24), to find rest in their midst (15.32), and to encourage and be encouraged by them (1.12). But at the same time, they are no longer his final destination; he wants to go to Spain and wants their help to get there.

Finally, Paul wants them to pray for him with respect to his pending visit to Jerusalem (15.30-31). At the time of writing Paul was evidently under considerable stress over his imminent

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1 So, e.g., Cranfield, Romans, 2.769; Dunn, Romans 9-16, 872; Moo, Romans, 901.
trip to Jerusalem, anxious both for his personal safety and for
the success of his mission (15.31).\textsuperscript{34}

In sum, we suggest Paul wrote to a congregation of mostly
Gentile believers to persuade them to adopt his gospel and
thereby become a Pauline congregation. By doing so they would
have no hesitancy in adopting him as an apostle and his mission
to Spain. It is apparent, under these circumstances, that the
letter expresses a number of reasons for its coming into being,
which, as Dunn has indicated, "hang together and indeed reinforce
each other when taken as a whole."

4 Is Romans 6-8 a Rhetorical Unit?

The question now before us is whether Romans 6-8 is a self-
contained rhetorical unit? There is unanimity that 8.39 closes
the unit; there is controversy on where the unit begins. The
question centers on the place of Romans 5 in the argumentative
structure of Romans. Three views worthy of attention have been
advanced: (1) Rom 5.1-11 belongs with 3.21-4.25, and 5.12-21

\textsuperscript{34} So J. Jervell, "The Letter to Jerusalem," in The Romans
Debate, ed. K. P. Donfried, Revised and Expanded Edition
(Peabody: Hendrickson, 1991), 60.

\textsuperscript{35} Romans 1-8, Lxx; idem, "Paul's Epistle," 2844. See also
Cranfield, Romans, 2.815; J. C. Beker, Paul the Apostle: The
Triumph of God in Life and Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1980), 71-74; Wedderburn, Reasons, 5-6; K. P. Donfried,
Debate, ed. K. P. Donfried, Revised and Expanded Edition
belongs with 6-8;\(^2\) (2) Romans 5 belongs with 3.21-4.25; (3) Romans 5 belongs with 6-8.

The first view, that 5.1-11 belongs with 3.21-4.25 and 5.12-21 belongs with Romans 6-8, depends on seeing 5.1-11 as a conclusion, and 5.12-21 as the beginning of a new section.\(^3\) It is argued that 5.12-21 goes with chapters 6-8 because the antithetical correspondence of two spheres of power, that of Christ and Adam, presupposed throughout chapters 6 to 8, already comes to expression in 5.12-21. But 5.1-11 ought to be assigned to the previous section of the letter because of key-word connections,\(^4\) and the difficulty of understanding the connection between 5.11 and 5.12.\(^5\)

However, there is in 5.12-21, as Ernst Kasemann says, both a "logical connection" and a "consistent development of what

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\(^1\) Included here would be the view that sees 5.1-11 as a transition or bridge between 3.21-4.25 and 5.12-8.39. See P. N. McDonald, "Romans 5.1-11 as a Rhetorical Bridge," JSNT 40 (1990): 81-96.


\(^3\) For a full list, see Cranfield, Romans, 1.253. I deal with this below in my critique of the second position.

In 5.1-11 Paul says believers have the assurance and hope of the glory of God and deliverance from future wrath (5.2, 4, 9, 10). Charles B. Cousar says, "The 'therefore' (διὰ τοῦτο) of 5:12 indicates that the section 5:12-21 is a development of 5:1-11, addressing the question of how weak, ungodly sinners can have such confidence in the day of judgment. The answer is, as Achtemeier puts it, 'Christ got us out of the mess that Adam got us into. What Adam did, Christ undid; where Adam failed, Christ succeeded'." 5.12-21, then, provides the "universal validity" for this hope, a hope that does not disappoint (5.5a). In sum, it is best to see Romans 5 as a coherent unit of two parts.

The second view, that Romans 5 belongs with 3.21-4.25, with chapters 6-8 standing as a self-contained unit, had significant scholarly support in the twentieth century." William Sanday and Arthur Headlam saw the first major break in the letter coming at 6.1. There, Paul turns to address the issue of the implications

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of faith in Christ under the banner of "the Mystical Union of the Christian with Christ." Chapter 5, the "Blissful effects of Righteousness by Faith," is still dealing with "justification," the main topic of chapters 1-4. In support of this view, Dunn argued that Romans 5 functions as a conclusion to the preceding argument, because the "backward links are too many and deliberate." 

But in response to Dunn, while we do not deny these links or their importance for the argument Paul is making, nevertheless, they are present not as conclusions but as assumptions upon which Paul develops his argument further. Just as was the case at 3.21, where Paul presupposed the argument of 1.18-3.20 in order to move forward, so at 5.1, Paul presupposes the argument of 3.21-4.25 in order to do the same. Thus there is continuity from unit to unit as well as development. So when Dunn says, "δικαιοσύνη/δικαιών ἐκ πίστεως as the chief theme of the letter as announced in 1:17 and developed through 3:21-4:25, is now summed up in vv 1 and 9," it needs to be seen, rather, that Paul is not summing up with δικαιωθέντες ἐκ πίστεως, but assuming it in order to build on it. At 5.1, the stress is not on the subordinate clause δικαιωθέντες ἐκ πίστεως, but on the principal clause εἰρήνη ἐχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεόν. Likewise it is a non sequitur to

*Der Brief an die Römer, 3 vols., EKKNT 6 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1978-1981), 1.286-287; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 242-244.*

* Sanday and Headlam, Romans, xliii-li, 119, 155-56.

* Romans 1-8, 242.*
argue on the basis of "the sudden reappearance of 'salvation' language in vv 9-10," which "recalls the only earlier but important reference in 1:16," that Romans 5 belongs with the preceding. As Dunn himself points out, 1.16 is a "thematic statement of the entire letter," to which everything in the body of the letter is tied. Paul is introducing a motif, the assurance of future salvation, in 5.9-10 for the first time in the body of the letter that he will return to in chapter 8. The link is between 5.9-10 and chapter 8. The same applies to other links identified by Dunn. At 3.24 Paul argues that believers are justified "by his grace," but at 5.1-2, that is presupposed in order that he may move on to say they have gained access "into this grace." At 3.23 Paul speaks of everyone failing to attain "the glory of God," but the link at 5.2 is not to conclude or summarize, but to affirm that, on the basis of being justified, believers have hope of "the glory of God." What we are witnessing is the "now" side of a "formerly ... now" type of "Christian" preaching identified by Bultmann.

The third view, which we have adopted, sees 5.1 beginning a new section that runs down to 8.39. We have already drawn

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\(^{13}\) Romans 1-8, 37.

\(^{17}\) Theology, 1.105-106.

\(^{11}\) This position also had significant scholarly support in the twentieth century. See, e.g., C. H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932), 71; A. Nygren, Commentary on Romans, trans. C. C. Rasmussen (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1949), 187-189; N. A. Dahl, "Two Notes on Romans 5," ST 5 (1951): 37-48; Bultmann, Theology, 1.279; O. Michel, Der Brief an die Römer, 4th ed., Meyer (Göttingen:
attention to the fact that the point Paul argues in 3.27-4.25, that a person is justified by faith apart from works of law, is now being assumed in order to build upon it. Although somewhat a simplification, Nils Dahl's formulation correctly points out the shift in themes. In Romans 1-4, the theme is, "The righteous will live by faith"; in Romans 5-8, it is, "The righteous will live by faith." 

We have also alluded to links between Romans 5 and 8. Dahl generated a comprehensive list of parallels between these two chapters, and concluded, "Chapters 5 and 8 are not two parallel statements of related themes; but 5:1-11 states the themes, and 8:1-39 brings a fuller elucidation of the main points." One of those new themes, ἡμέρις ᾠ κατασχέων (5.5), present throughout 5.1-11 and in 8.18-39, forms an inclusio for the entire section. 

Other arguments for this position have been advanced as well. Cranfield says "that the solemn formula which concludes chapter 4 strongly suggests that 4.25 marks the end of a major division of the epistle." In addition, Moo notices a shift in style at 5.1. "1:18-4:25 has a polemical tone - Paul is plainly

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), 129; N. Gaumann, Taufe und Ethik: Studien zu Römer 6, BEvT 47 (Munich: Kaiser, 1967), 23-26; H. Lietzmann, Einführung in die Textgeschichte der Paulusbriefe an die Römer, 5th ed., HNT 8 (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1971), 58; Cranfield, Romans, 1.252-254, Schlier, Römerbrief, 137-138; Beker, Paul, 83-86; Käsemann, Romans, 131; Fitzmyer, Romans, 97; Moo, Romans, 290-295.


iii "Two Notes," 40. See also Moo, Romans, 292-294.

iv Romans, 1.254.
arguing against a (mainly) Jewish viewpoint, sometimes addressing his opponent directly in the second person singular. But with 5:1, the first person plural begins to dominate, Paul including fellow Christians with him in a more 'confessional' style.¹⁵

In sum, in answer to our question whether Romans 6-8 is a self-contained rhetorical unit, we suggest, on the basis of the close links between chapters 5 and 6-8, that Romans 6-8 belongs to a larger rhetorical unit consisting of chapters 5 through 8, which focuses on the nature of life that one receives as a consequence of being justified by faith.²⁰

5 What is the Argumentative Structure of Romans?

The introduction (1.1-15) and conclusion (15.14-16.27) have been treated sufficiently for our purposes above. In this section we examine the statement of the case and the argument in 1.16-15.13, apart from chapters 6-8, and how these function argumentatively and contribute to the letter's purposes.²¹

The statement of the case: 1.16-17

In these verses we have the theme, or what Aristotle called the πρόθεσις of the letter (Rhet. 1414a34). The gospel, that which Paul would proclaim in Rome (1.15) and of which he is not ashamed

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¹⁵ Romans, 292. See also Dahl, "Two Notes," 40.

²⁰ However, because words for the body do not occur in Romans 5, we treat the chapter below as part of our discussion of the argumentative structure of Romans.

²¹ The importance of the link between structure and purposes is made explicit by R. Jewett, "Following the Argument of Romans," in The Romans Debate, ed. K. P. Donfried, Revised and Expanded Edition (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1991), 266. See also
(1.16), is "the power of God unto salvation to everyone who believes, to the Jew first, and to the Greek." Verse 17 functions to show in what way the gospel can bring about salvation. In the gospel is revealed δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ. From first to last, that righteousness is obtained by faith. The quotation of Hab 2.4 functions to show that Paul's gospel is witnessed to in the Jewish Scriptures. Paul does not take the time to explain how he understands the important words he uses in this section, or how they relate to one another, or even why they are important. As far as we can tell, he was willing to allow the prospect of initial misapprehension for the sake of correct discernment later.

In the following analysis we hope to demonstrate that 1.18-4.25 and 5.1-8.39 function as two contingent proofs of the theme, and that chapters 9-11 and the paraenetic section in 12.1-15.13 do so too, but not to the same high degree."

The argument (1.18-15.13)

The first proof (1.18-4.25) functions, in Jewett's words, to confirm "the basic thesis of 1:16-17 by showing that the impartial righteousness of God provides righteousness for Jews and Gentiles alike, by faith."¹

Dunn, "Paul's Epistle," 2844; Stowers, Rereading, 10-11. The section's title comes from Jewett.

¹² Thus I agree with Jewett that in 1.18-15.13 Paul provides four elaborate proofs of the thesis stated in 1.16-17 ("Following the Argument," 273).

¹³ "Following the Argument," 273.
In 1.18-3.20, Paul makes one indictment against humanity, against both Jews and Greeks. It has two parts. One part is summarized at 3.9, "For we have already accused all people, whether Jews or Greeks, of being under sin" (trans. Moo). The second part, really a corollary of the first, is summed up at 3.20, "Because by works of law" - νόμος understood comprehensively here to include both the Jewish νόμος (so used at 2.12, 13, 17; 3.21) and that same νόμος written on the hearts of the Gentiles (so used at 2.15) - "no one will be justified before him."

Even though much of the material in 1.18-3.20 appears to have been composed for a different audience than the one Paul has in mind when writing Romans, Paul evidently did not have a problem using this material to serve his purposes. If there are any residual, erroneous (from Paul's point of view) beliefs among the believers at Rome that they do not need Paul's gospel, that is, that they have a different understanding of δικαιοσύνη and can

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1 See also its parenthetical recapitulation at 3.23.
2 The influence of a Stoic idea on Paul is not to be missed. Gentiles, who do not have the Mosaic law (2.12, 14; 3.19), do φυσικόν what that law requires. In short, the human conscience is in harmony with the law of God (2.13-15). For the Stoic idea, see Diogenes Laertius 7.87. So also Philo, Opif. 3.
4 But scholars have had a problem. Elliott asks, "How does this prolonged dialogue with the Jew relate to the letter's Gentile-Christian audience?" He then makes the poignant point that "the letter's rhetorical integrity is at stake in this question" (Rhetoric, 107; see also 167). I agree. If Paul is not able to take his readers into account, it is hard to imagine the letter being rhetorically effective.
contribute anything to attain σωτηρία, or that (some) people in
general are basically good, then 1.18-3.20 functions to censure
those beliefs and dissuade any of the believers from holding them
or wanting to hold them in the future. ¹²

In 3.21-26 Paul breaks off his indictment in order to
actually state his gospel. What living in accordance with the law
could not do, God gave. Paul is setting in opposition two
understandings of δικαιοσύνη, that one is δικαίος by acting δικαιοσύνης,
and that one is δικαίος by a gift of God's grace; both of which
exist side by side in the Jewish Scriptures. For Paul, God is the
one who makes people righteous (3.24). The means by which this is
accomplished is the redemption that is in Christ Jesus (3.24),
because God displayed him as a sacrifice as a means of
propitiating wrath.

If Paul's understanding of δικαιοσύνη is the theme of 3.21-
26, then in 3.27-4.25, it is the means by which an individual
appropriates that gift, διὰ τῆς πίστεως, that moves to the center. ¹³
Being justified by faith apart from works of law (3.28) excludes
boasting in one's accomplishment of δικαιοσύνη before God (3.27),
regardless of ethnicity. In Romans 4 Paul argues by means of an
exemplum that Abraham was justified by faith not by works (4.2-
9), and hence becomes a model for how Gentiles can be saved

¹² So similarly Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 40; Elliott,
Rhetoric, 106; Lincoln, "From Wrath," 198-199. In constructing
this sentence I have borrowed from Aune, "Romans as a Logos
Protreptikos," 96.

¹³ So also Moo, Romans, 243.
(4.10-12, 22-24). By this, Paul shows in what way both the law and the prophets, already represented by Hab 2.4, are witnesses to his gospel (3.21). In short, when Abraham believed and when righteousness was reckoned to him, it was not when he was a Jew outwardly (4.10-11). His circumcision, which came later, was a sign, but definitely not the substance (4.11). When Abraham believed, he became— to use the language of 2.28-29—a Jew inwardly.

The second proof (5.1-8.39) of the thesis of 1.16-17 shifts emphasis from its aspects of δικαιοσύνη and τὸ πιστεύωντες to its aspects of εἰς σωτηρίαν and ζησεται. We suggested that what Paul argues in 3.21-4.25 he then presupposes at 5.1, in order to move on to examine the nature of that life that comes to Jews and Gentiles alike who believe and have righteousness reckoned to them as a gift. In 5.1-11, Paul argues that even though believers were formerly weak (5.6), ungodly (5.6), sinners (5.8), and enemies of God (5.10), God did something, for which reason they now boast in God (5.10). He poured out his love on them (5.5, 8), made them righteous (5.1, 9), and reconciled them to himself (5.10, 11), by sending Christ to die on their behalf (5.6, 8, 9, 10). As a result, believers have hope of the glory of God (5.2, 4), and of being saved from the wrath (5.9, 10). For the believer who is no longer a sinner and enemy of God under wrath, salvation is assured (5.5a) but not yet complete. Not only do the future tense verbs in 5.9 and 10 indicate this (σωθησόμεθα), but also the present tribulation that the justified must endure (5.3).
We have also suggested that 5.12-21 functions to provide a rationale for the confidence and hope believers can have that they will be glorified and delivered from wrath. But 5.12-21 is also foundational for what Paul is about to say in Romans 6-8. In 5.12-21 he sets out to contrast the effects the righteous deed (δικαιώμα) of Christ (5.18) and the transgression (παράπτωμα) of Adam (5.15) have on their progeny.

Through Adam's transgression, sin, seen now as a cosmic power, entered into the world and through the sinning of all people, the reign of death spread over all people (5.12, 14). In 1.18-3.20 all people are sinners because they sinned. In 5.12-21 all people sin (or are made sinners), die, and are condemned, because they are Adam's progeny (5.15, 16, 18, 19). For Paul there is a definite bond between Adam's sin and everyone's fate to share in the consequences of that one transgression.

But through Christ's righteous act, the grace of God and the gift which came through that grace overflowed (ἐπερίσσευσεν) to the many (5.15), resulting in a righteous vindication (δικαιώμα, 5.16) that brings life (εἰς δικαιώσειν ζωῆς, 5.18). Paul emphasizes that this χάρισμα is not at all like the transgression (οὐχ ὡς in 5.15, 16; πολλῷ μᾶλλον in 5.15, 17). "Those who receive the abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness" will reign in life (5.17).

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"Paul speaks of being ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ and then being ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ at 1 Cor 15.22 (see Rom 6.11), but here in Romans the focus is on being in Adam's transgression (5.12, 15, 17) and Christ's obedience (5.18, 19; 6.3-5)."
Running through this passage is a dualism that is at the same time historical, transcendental, and soteriological. It is historical in the sense that Paul saw Adam and Christ as real individuals whose acts effected the course of history. It is transcendental in the sense that what Paul says here has not been derived from experience but functions to explain it, and soteriological in the sense that those who remain in the transgression of Adam (5.15) are condemned to wrath, but those who receive the gift of grace in Christ have eternal life. Adam's sin effected everyone; it made them into sinners who are under the reign of sin and death. But Christ's righteous deed had an even greater effect on those who would receive the gift of righteous vindication. They reign in life (5.17), or to put it another way, grace reigns in them (5.21).

What is more, in this dualistic framework of human existence, Paul places the Jewish law on the side of Adam - sin - death, not on the side of Christ - righteousness - life. For it is the law that sneaked in through the side door (νόμος παρεισῆλθεν), not for the purpose of encouraging and promoting righteousness, but for the purpose of increasing transgression (5.20).  

We jump over Romans 6-8 to chapter 9. "There is," Donaldson says, "nothing unclear about the goal of the argument in chap. 9-11: Paul wants to deny that the law-free mission to the Gentiles,  

4.15 must be seen in this light. By promoting transgression, the law actually brings about wrath.
and its relative success in comparison to the Jewish mission, represents the failure of God's covenantal promises to historic Israel.\textsuperscript{4} Apparently for Paul, God's faithfulness to ethnic Israel and his gospel stand together, so in this third proof (9.1-11.36) he defends his gospel by exonerating the faithfulness of God in the face of Jewish unbelief in Paul's gospel. The question Paul raised at 3.3, "If some did not believe, does their unbelief nullify the faithfulness of God?" is answered at 9.6, "It is not as though the word of God has failed." Then Paul goes on in the next three chapters to explain why. He says, first, "not all who are of Israel are Israel" (9.6b). This is due to "the purpose of God according to election" (9.11). There is not a problem of Jewish unbelief, because God chose some to believe and some not to believe (9.6b-29). Secondly, the blame for Jewish unbelief may be attributed to the fact, as Paul saw things, that they were pursuing righteousness the wrong way, by works rather than faith (9.30-10.21). Again, the trustworthiness of God is not the issue. Thirdly, there really is not a problem of Jewish unbelief because there is a remnant of Jews who have believed, Paul himself being one of them (11.1-5); and furthermore, Jewish unbelief has made time for Gentiles to believe (11.11-25).\textsuperscript{4} What is more, the problem of Jewish unbelief is only temporary, for once the fullness of the Gentiles has been achieved, all Israel will be saved (11.25-26).

On the surface, this material seems to function poorly as a proof of the thesis at 1.16-17. This is due to the fact that Paul states explicitly the inference he is trying to make only once, at 9.6a. The position Paul is arguing against and his own position may be put in the form of a syllogism:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposing Position</th>
<th>Paul's Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>God promised to bless Israel</td>
<td>God promised to bless Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many Jews have not believed</td>
<td>Many Jews have not believed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thus God is unfaithful to promises</td>
<td>Yet God is faithful, because...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The inference "Yet God is faithful" is the logical deduction from everything Paul argues in chapters 9-11, and as the doxology at 11.33-36 makes plain. The theme of assurance of the trustworthiness of God, dominant in 5.1-11 and 8.14-39, is woven into the fabric of Romans 9-11. These chapters function exceedingly well as a confirmation of what Paul has said about God and his salvation up to this point in the letter.

There is something else running through these chapters which also connects them to the letter's theme. At 9.24-26, Paul employs the notion of God's electing purposes, introduced in 9.11, to show that God chose his people, not from among Jews only but also from among Gentiles. In much the same way as he argues in Romans 4, Paul thereby demonstrates that the gospel is for Gentiles too, in this case, because they also have been chosen. In 9.30-10.21, in the midst of arguing why some Jews did not believe, Paul reasserts that faith is the great leveler; there is no difference between Jews and Gentiles. Both have to believe,

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See Donaldson, "Riches," 92-94.
and both are blessed by the same God (10.11-13). In Romans 11, Paul is able to assert that works and grace stand opposed (11.6). And if in Romans 9 Paul stresses Gentile belief due to God's electing purposes, he can do the same in Romans 11 for Jewish belief (11.1-6, 11-17). Thereby he shows that salvation comes to all who believe, and at the same time that there is a priority for Jews. Yet this priority also includes Gentiles, because according to Paul's logic, the salvation of Gentiles will bear fruit in the salvation of his own people.

The fourth proof (12.1-15.13) of the thesis in 1.16-17 functions within the context of the "already and not yet" of Pauline eschatology as an exhortation to the believers at Rome to live the life they have been given as a gift of God's grace. "The righteous person by faith will live," that is, they will present their bodies (τὰ σώματα) to God as a "sacrifice, living, holy, and pleasing to God," and they will be transformed in the renewal of the mind so as to discern God's will (12.1-2). Consequently, the righteous person will be one who loves with mutual affection, shows hospitality, contributes to the needs of believers, lives in harmony with them, and submits to governing authorities (12.9-10, 13, 16; 13.1-7). Put another way, Paul is explicating what the implications of obedience to his gospel entail. We do not want to deny that the paraenesis in Romans 12-13 is general in nature. Nevertheless, a case can be made that the teaching that Paul gives there is shaped appropriately and specifically for the situation the believers find themselves in at Rome. This is
suggested by the fact that significant aspects of Pauline ethics are absent in this section, and that, as argued earlier, the teaching that immediately follows in 14.1-15.12 deals with a specific problem at Rome.

In sum, our analysis corroborates the view, advanced by Jewett, Cranfield, Beker, and others, that Paul's argument in 1.16-11.36 in particular, develops with its own internal logic and coherence, and serves well to corroborate the proof at 1.16-17. 12.1-15.13 does so too, but is connected much more closely to the situation at Rome.

6 Conclusion

We have argued that Paul's primary readers are a congregation of Gentiles who are conversant with the Jewish Scriptures (7.1), and who are dispersed in various house groups (16.3-5, 14, 15). Together with some Jews (like Andronicus and Junias, Herodion, Prisca and Aquila), they are not living according to the ancestral traditions of the Jews, although in writing the letter Paul is still cautiously circumspect when he comes to express his views on the law to them. They seem not only to have adopted an arrogant attitude toward Jewish unbelievers

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" Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 47; Cranfield, Romans, 2.818-819; Beker, Paul the Apostle, 59, 62, 77. So also Dunn, "Paul's Epistle," 2843; Elliott, Rhetoric, 12; Aune, "Romans as a Logos Protreptikos," 112, 114; Moo, Romans, 13-15, 20, 32. I assume momentarily what I hope to demonstrate in the following chapters, that this is also the case for Romans 6-8.
(11.13-24), but also had a difficult time getting along with Jewish believers (14.1-15.13).

In the absence of coherent and explicit textual clues we are inclined to see no tangible opposition to Paul at Rome, whether that opposition is of the sort that would accuse Paul of libertinism (3.8), or of the sort that would assert such a view. Paul puts forward counter-arguments in the letter to rebut the questions of his "dialogue partner," questions which were "in most cases very real" ones that he had encountered in the east, yet which are logically inferred from the case he is arguing. Furthermore, it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that what had happened in Galatia and Corinth was much on Paul's mind, and he probably feared something similar might happen at Rome.

So Paul writes to the believers at Rome because he wants them to become obedient to his form of the gospel, in other words, to become Pauline Christians, which also entails accepting his apostolic authority and ministry among them, supporting his planned mission to Spain, and praying for him with respect to his going to Jerusalem.

Finally, we suggest 5.1-8.39 is a rhetorical unit, which functions as a second proof of the thesis of 1.16-17, and which focuses on what one has as a result of being justified: life.

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"On this, see D. Hellholm, "Enthymemtic Argumentation in Paul: The Case of Romans 6," in Paul in his Hellenistic Context, ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 143-144.

"The words in quotation marks belong to Hellholm ("Enthymemtic Argumentation, 143), whose influence is detectable in the construction of this paragraph."
CHAPTER 3
THE BODY IN ROMANS 6.1-7.6

1 The Argumentative Structure of 6.1-7.6

6.1-7.6 as a rhetorical unit

Prior to Romans 6 Paul attributed sinning to three causes. First, he traced it to people making a decision to sin (1.18-3.20). Secondly, he said it was caused because people were fatally linked with Adam and his transgression (5.12-19). Thirdly, he blamed it on the coming of the law (5.20; also 4.15). We note that nowhere prior to Romans 6 has Paul attributed the cause or production of sinful conduct to the body.

Paul also said at 5.20 that the law slipped in through a side door (5.20a), to actually increase wrongdoing (5.20b). In light of the elaboration of ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα in verse 21, Paul primarily has in mind the increase of sin's reign which brings death. Sin is seen here as a personified, cosmic ruler whom one serves by virtue of one's solidarity with Adam in the sphere of sin's lordship. The law came in, Paul says, not to alter this situation, since it was too weak to do so (8.3), but to give the power of sin the means to intensify its hold on the individual in solidarity with Adam. How this was done Paul explains in 7.7-13. Yet, secondarily, the increase of actual sinning is probably also in view, and so ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα may

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Given the usage of παρεικέφρωμα at Gal 2.4 and in the Hellenistic period (see references in BAGD, s.v.), it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Paul employs the verb negatively. So Wilckens, Romer, 1.328-329; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 286.
be seen quantitatively as well. The coming of the law brought an increase in actual sinning. But then Paul says that no matter how much sin increased, grace increased that much more (5.20cd). If this is indeed the case, it takes no effort to see how one could legitimately contemplate: εἰπεμένωμεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἣν ἡ χάρις πλεονάση (6.1). Anticipating just such an objection, one that would undermine the thesis of 1.16-17, Paul turns to address this false conclusion and to discourage anyone from holding it.

To the extent that Paul is turning aside to address an objection to his gospel, in a section-within-a-section that runs from 6.1 down to 8.13, one might consider 6.1 and following parenthetical. But because he uses this 'excursus' to explicate the relationship of sin to the baptized and to establish a foundation for pneuma-life as adopted children of God, he actually moves the argument in defense of the thesis at 1.16-17 forward. Paul is as much concerned in this section of Romans, as he is in Romans 5, to show that what one has when one is justified by faith is life.

So much alike are 6.1-11 and 6.15-23 that we can speak of them as two sides of the same coin. The obverse side, 6.1-11, disposes of the second cause of sin mentioned at the outset of the chapter. Paul's main point here is to show how believers died

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1 Acts of sin are in view at 5.12, 14; 6.15.

2 Known in classical rhetoric as prokatalepsis. See Anaximenes of Lampsacus, Rhet. Alex. 1428a8, 1432b11.

διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος by appropriating solidarity with Christ and his act of obedience. This dying had instantaneous repercussions, for they were carried, spatially and temporally, from the sphere where sin reigned to the sphere of Christ. As a result of this death and appropriation of Christ it is impossible for the baptized to remain in the sphere of and under the power of sin.

The verso side, 6.15-23, presupposes and builds upon the foundational argument of 6.1-11 (and 6.12-14). In addressing believers who have been set free from sin's power and sphere, Paul still wants them to know that they nevertheless have to present themselves to someone as slaves (6.16). By choosing deliberate acts of sin, they thereby present themselves to sin and become slaves of sin again (6.15-16, 17, 19). If they do this, sin will pay them, and the wage received will be death (6.16, 23). But they can also present themselves as slaves to God (6.22), and the gift of grace (τὸ χάρισμα) given will be δικαιοσύνη (6.16) or ζωή διώνυς (6.23). How they present themselves as slaves to God was made explicit in 6.12-13, but Paul reiterates this at 6.19, and it is implicit throughout the paragraph. They are to exhibit their entire beings, self and body, in the service of righteousness. In essence, they have the choice again. Just as was the case formerly, when they had freedom to choose for God or sin (the first cause of sin; 1.18-23), so also now, believers are

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The false conclusion at 6.15, which arises out of 6.14b, can be paraphrased, "What then? Shall we keep on sinning, because we are not under the authority of the law but under that of grace?"
found in a position where they can decide for righteousness or sin. We see, therefore, that there is no place in Paul's ethical discourse in 6.15-23 for weakness of the will or lack of self-mastery, for having been freed from the tyranny of sin's rule, the baptized are now free to choose for righteousness and life.

It is not surprising, then, in view of the close relationship between 6.1-11 and 6.15-23, to observe that many scholars take 6.1-23 as a self-contained unit. But with a minority of scholars, we suggest 7.1-6 still functions to prove the thesis of 6.2, that believers have died to sin, and thus it is impossible for them to live in it.

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"Aρασία, according to Hellenistic moral discourses, on which, see, e.g., Stowers, Rereading, 279; T. Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 360 n. 43.

Were, in fact, a three-sided coin in circulation to continue the analogy we would exploit it to explain how closely 7.1-6 relates to 6.15-23 (as 6.15-23 relates to 6.3-11), since the false conclusion at 6.15 shapes the arguments of both units. But there is enough differentiation in the way both units function to speak of them as separate proofs of Paul's thesis at 6.2. Whereas 6.15-23 addresses itself to the choice believers have of presenting themselves as slaves to sin or righteousness, 7.1-6 brings into focus what was only hinted at earlier, that the law does not reduce but actually accelerates the power of sin's rule (5.20). Paul says the baptized have died and thus are no longer in that predicament under the law's jurisdiction. In his view, freedom from the law does not lead to unbridled lawlessness but to bearing fruit for God.\footnote{See Luz, "Aufbau," 170.}

In sum, we divide 6.1-7.6 into four sections, three of which, 6.1-11, 6.15-23, and 7.1-6, function as a "cluster of proofs" for Paul's thesis at 6.2,\footnote{The disclosure formulas, ἕγνωκα εἶπόν at 6.3, 7.1, and οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι at 6.16, also serve to tie these three units together.} and a fourth, 6.12-14, is explicitly paraenetic.\footnote{The quoted words belong to Hellholm, "Enthymemetic Argumentation," 122.} In 6.1-7.6 Paul demonstrates that the three causes of sin, namely, people making a decision to sin, their fatal identification with Adam and the consequences of his

\footnote{By this division, I avoid the unimportant debate whether 6.12-14 belongs with 6.1-11 or 6.15-23.}
transgression, and the law, have been neutralized for the baptized, and thus it is impossible for them to remain in sin.

The argument of 6.1-11

Within the larger section of 6.1-7.6, 6.1-11 is a self-contained, coherent, rhetorical unit. We could say it has an introduction (6.1), a statement of the case (6.2), supporting arguments (6.3-10), and a conclusion (6.11).

As already hinted at, there are several factors that lead us to conclude that ἐπιμένωμεν τῇ ἁμαρτία at 6.1 can be paraphrased: "Shall we continue to remain in that state where sin exercises lordship and power over us?" First, as we saw in 5.20-21, the increase of transgression had primarily to do with sin's reign. Secondly, the exhortation at 6.12 shows that Paul is still concerned there with the reign of sin. Thirdly, the nature of the argument in 6.3-11, as we will show, supports this. Fourthly, the way Paul uses ἐπιμένων with the dative elsewhere provides an important clue as to how he uses it here, spatially.

In verse 2, Paul rejects categorically that believers, being who they are (οἵνως qualitatively), can continue to remain in the sphere of and under the power of sin. The reason: they are actually dead persons with respect to sin's power and grasp.

6.3-5 stages the first premise in the argument, the content of which Paul supposes the believers at Rome ought to know about

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: See 11.22-23; 1 Cor 16.8; Phil 1.24.

: So Schlier, Römerbrief, 192.
and will adhere to unambiguously and univocally. Paul’s purpose in selecting baptism was not to instruct them on the nature of baptism, but to inform them that what happened to them in baptism naturally leads to the rejection of the false conclusion at 6.1 and to the demonstration of the thesis at 6.2. Functioning as a boundary marker the ritual of baptism separates insiders from outsiders, and separates two spatial and temporal spheres, of sin and grace (see 5.2, 21). But this ritual is also the means by which one changes spheres, from that of sin and death to that of righteousness and life.\footnote{On this see K.-A. Bauer, \textit{Leiblichkeit–das Ende aller Werke Gottes: Die Bedeutung der Leiblichkeit des Menschen bei Paulus}, SNT 4 (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1971), 152-154.} Just as at 5.12-21, where everyone sinned, was condemned, and died in the transgression of Adam, so now at 6.3-4, Paul shows that in baptism they are plunged into the ὑπακοὴ (5.20) of Christ, that is, into his death, burial, and resurrection. Just as Christ died and was buried, so believers have been baptized into his death and burial, and just as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so also the baptized are now alive (6.5, 8, 11, 13) and walk in newness of life (6.4). Paul does not come right out and say that the baptized have been resurrected already, but he does speak of them, as he speaks of Christ, as being alive after being dead (6.3, 4, 6, 7). Furthermore, 6.5 functions argumentatively as the ground for what Paul says in verse 4b. The expression ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσώμθα provides the basis for walking in newness of
life. Because the baptized have been united to the likeness of Christ's resurrection, they can walk in newness of life.  

At 6.6a Paul reformulates the first premise from the preceding argument and says: ὁ παλαίος ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη, "our old person was crucified together with him." Paul uses παλαίος ἄνθρωπος to indicate the person who was baptized into Christ's death. Paul could just as well have written συνεσταυρώθημεν. But by writing ὁ παλαίος ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη he stresses it is the person in relation to the old sphere of existence prior to baptism, where the person was fatally moored to Adam's transgression and its effects, enslaved to sin and death, under judgment and condemnation, that has been crucified through participation in Christ's death, and hence released from that old power and sphere.  

This crucifixion of παλαίος ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος brings about an effect, expressed at 6.6b in what may be called the second premise in Paul's argument: ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἀμαρτίας. It is remarkable that he provides no elaboration of this premise here, but turns immediately to draw the conclusion to which he has been aiming in the argument up to this point: τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ

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11 So Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 148 n. 4. Were ἐσόμεθα a temporal future, 6.4b-5 would have no rhetorical value.

12 So, e.g., Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 149; Schlier, Römerbrief, 197; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 318.

13 Paul introduces a notion that, although rhetorically necessary in the immediate context for the point he is arguing, he will explicate more fully later.
Here again, sin is seen as a power that enslaves. The baptized person is liberated from this power and therefore cannot remain in sin. In sum, the logic of Paul's argument in 6.3-6 is clearly expressed when verse 6 is read backwards: τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, because καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, because ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη.

Seeing that verse 6 functions to move the argument to its climax, verse 7, connected to verse 6 by γάρ, in some way explains, substantiates, or draws an inference from the preceding. The ἄποθανὼν is the ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος who died through being crucified with Christ. Ἀπό τῆς ἁμαρτίας denotes separation, and ἁμαρτία has to do with sin's power and reign. At the very least, 6.7 says that the person who died is separated from that sphere where sin exercised despotic power.

Just what δεδικαίωται contributes is difficult to determine. Ulrich Wilckens argues at length, based on rabbinic parallels that he sees lying behind the text, that it means "legally free." 6.7 therefore functions to link together the dying-together of

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12 This last clause is the conclusion reached on the basis of the preceding propositions, therefore best taken as consecutive ("with the result that") or purpose ("in order that"). So also, e.g., A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research (Nashville: Broadman, 1934), 1002; Fitzmyer, Romans, 436; Moo, Romans, 376 n. 123.

13 Kuss thinks verse 7 says, "wer tot ist, kann nicht mehr geknechtet werden," and taken this way, it corresponds to verse 2 (Römerbrief, 1.304).
the baptized with Paul's earlier teaching on justification. The connection between sin and death, seen here as the penalty of sin, makes this interpretation attractive. The alternate reading, which need not be seen as preclusive of the foregoing, takes δικαιωθαι ἀπό in the sense of "be free from." This gives the verb in this instance the same semantic range as ἐλευθερωθέντες at 6.18. The parallelism may not have gone unnoticed by Paul's readers, and this interpretation has the advantage of fitting the immediate context agreeably.

6.8-10 provides the christological foundation for the argument in 6.3-11 and especially for the paraenesis at 6.11. The baptized at Rome can consider themselves dead to sin (6.11a), because they have died with Christ (6.7, 10a). They may also consider themselves alive to God in Christ Jesus, because Christ was raised from the dead and no longer dies (6.8, 11). He lives to God, and death, seen still as a power, no longer exercises lordship over him (6.9, 10b).

2 The Body of Sin at 6.6

The body of sin as the sin-ruled self

Most scholars have understood σῶμα in the phrase το σῶμα τῆς ἀμαρτίας at 6.6 in one of two ways. One way sees σῶμα as a synonym

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Römer 2.17-18.

So, e.g., BAGD; Käsemann, Romans, 170; Beker, Paul, 215. See also C. K. Barrett, The Epistle to the Romans, BNTC (London: Black, 1971), 125.

A third way takes τῆς ἀμαρτίας as epexegetical with the result that σῶμα τῆς ἀμαρτίας is the "mass of sin." This view was
for ἐγὼ or ἀνθρώπος, with the result that τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας means "the sin-ruled self." The second way takes σῶμα as the physical body, and thus τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας means either "the sinful physical body" or "the sin-ruled physical body."

Bultmann, Dunn, and Moo are representatives of the first view.\(^3\) Bultmann understands σῶμα to mean the actual historical essence or being of the person, in so far as that essence or being is not under the person's control, but is determined by sin. Here, where the σῶμα is "in a qualified ontic sense" controlled by sin, its mode of existence is σάρξ. Paul says that this "sin-ruled self" has been destroyed when "the person one used to be is crucified with Christ." Instead, the person is "a 'new creation', for 'the old has passed away, behold, the new has come' (II Cor. 5:17)."\(^4\)

Dunn sees Paul using σῶμα in a "characteristically Hebraic" way. So σῶμα has to do with human frailty and it can be seen as a synonym for the personal pronoun. But it also has to do with relationships. "[Σῶμα] is man embodied in a particular

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\(^4\) "Significance," 160-162; Theology, 1.197, 227, 348.
environment, the body being that which constitutes him a social being, a being who relates to and communicates with his environment. It is as an embodied entity that he can act upon and be acted upon by his environment." With this understanding, σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας "denotes man as belonging to the age ruled by sin." It refers "to humanity in solidarity with Adam, our belongingness to the old era, the age dominated by the power of sin."

Moo agrees with Bultmann that because of passages like Rom 6.12-13, where σῶμα and words denoting the whole person are used in parallel, here at 6.6 it also makes sense to see σῶμα as referring to the whole person. Such an interpretation, according to him, explicates the sense well. "What must be 'rendered impotent' if I am to be freed from sin (v. 6c) is not just my physical body but myself in all my sin-prone faculties. There is little evidence that Paul conceived of the physical body as the source or reigning seat of sin." Like Dunn, Moo also notes that σῶμα depicts the person in relationship and contact with the world. "It is that 'aspect' of the person which 'acts' in the world and which can be directed by something else: either by that person's new, 'higher nature' or by 'sin'."

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1 Romans 1-8, 319-320. See also idem, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 55-61.

26 Romans 1-8, 320, 332.

27 Romans, 375, 375 n. 119.

28 Romans, 376.
Critique of the body = self view

As influential as these interpretations have been, there are several problems.

First, because the act of reading or listening is progressive and linear, it follows that what Paul's readers would have already learned about the word ὁμορροφή through its use earlier in the letter, at 1.24 and 4.19, may provide a clue as to how Paul uses the word at 6.6.¹⁷

Just prior to 1.24, Paul said people had known God because God had made his invisible attributes visible to them. Yet people did not glorify God or give thanks, preferring to idolize creation. As a consequence, their deliberating abilities were rendered futile and their foolish hearts were darkened (1.20-21, 23).

Paul uses καρδία at 1.21 and again at 1.24, as he does in the rest of the letter, to designate the center of the human self, where volition, emotion, and cognition are located.¹⁸ Whereas we shall see in the case of Philo that these functions are divided between the νοῦς and ψυχή, Paul locates them all within the unity of the "I." What we find in these verses, then, is a view that sees sin originating in the cognitive and deliberative capacities of people, in the place where people

¹⁷ On the methodology applied here, see Stowers, Rereading, 30, 171.

¹⁸ Καρδία at 1.21 is synonymous with the subject implicit in the verb ἐμορροφήσαν at 1.22. See, e.g., Lüdemann, Anthropologie, 16; Bultmann, Theology, 1.220-227; Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 142.
possessed knowledge of God and could make choices about serving God. But they chose impiety and wrongdoing.

At 1.24 Paul then says, "Therefore, God handed them over in the lusts of their hearts unto uncleanness that their bodies might be dishonoured among themselves." John A. T. Robinson and Udo Schnelle think Paul uses σώμα in this clause as a substitute for the personal pronoun.11 After all, he has just used καρδία that way. Consequently, if one wants to see a further downward step of degradation at 1.24 beyond what is contained in 1.21-23, then it is in the direction of defiling relationships.12 The stress is placed, not on σώματα αὐτῶν, but on ἐναύωταίς. Although not impossible, there are several factors that lead us, as well as most scholars, to think that the stress falls on σώματα αὐτῶν, and that σώμα just means the physical body.

First, in conformity with ordinary Greek usage of words, the physical body is what Paul’s Gentile or predominantly Gentile readers at Rome, even familiar with the LXX, would have initially imagined when they came across σώμα until they encountered textual clues telling them otherwise. But there are none.13

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11 Robinson, Body, 25, 29; Schnelle, Human Condition, 57. Bultmann seems to be in two minds, for in "Paul," 130, he says σώμα at 1.24 is used in the sense of "I," but in Theology, 1.193-194, the impression is given that σώμα denotes the physical body.

12 Robinson, Body, 25.

13 Two examples in the LXX where σώμα is used by means of synecdoche as a synonym for the personal pronoun illustrate the importance of textual clues for altering word meaning. At Job 6.4, σώματα in line 1 parallels με in line 3 in such a way that were the two words reversed there would be no alteration in
Rhetorically, if Paul is intent on effective communication, we expect he would stipulate how he is employing σῶμα if he is breaking away from its common usage. The fact that he does not suggests that what we are dealing with is what Eugene A. Nida calls "the non-specification of shared information." He says:

As an analogy of the First Law of Thermodynamics, dealing with the conservation of energy, one may show how in actual communication the source does not make overt that information which is shared by the source and the receptor. To do so would not only be a waste of energy, but would also be a symbol of psychological distance. Going into detail about common information immediately creates a barrier to real communication, since it suggests to the receptor that the source and he do not have much in common after all or that the message is really being directed to someone else.¹

Now the fact that Paul does not go "into detail" about how he uses σῶμα at 1.24 suggests that, in his mind anyway, his readers will have understood how he is using the word. Put another way, for the letter to have been read well, Paul assumed that his readers shared "common information" that would have arisen out of the same cultural context.²

meaning. The presence of με in line 3 provides a textual clue that line 1 is to be understood figuratively. At Gen 47.12, the use of synecdoche again provides the clue that σῶμα - in a prepositional phrase κατὰ σῶμα, used distributively - designates persons who were to be recipients of the grain distributed by Joseph.

¹ "Implications of Contemporary Linguistics for Biblical Scholarship," JBL 91 (1972): 79.

² Burridge says, "For communication to take place successfully, it is essential that both sender and receiver use the same code" ("Biography," 372). See also Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, New Rhetoric, 14-16; Stowers, Rereading, 6.
Secondly, a better interpretation of 1.21-28 can be had when σῶμα denotes the physical body. Understood thus, 1.21-23 speaks of the heart or inner person being corrupted due to the human choice for idolatry, and 1.24 speaks of the further degradation of the physical body that takes place as a result of that choice. 1.25 echoes 1.21 and 23, and 1.26-27 illustrates how the physical body is dishonoured. In a state of defilement, the body is treated in a manner contrary to the natural order. Mary Douglas has shown the link between purity and order, and impurity/pollution and disorder. Such a framework suits this context well. In an impure state it is only natural for the gendered female and male bodies and their sexual organs to be used in an unnatural manner.

Thirdly, such an interpretation of σῶμα as physical body is consistent with Paul's thought elsewhere, where he links sexual sin with the body (1 Cor 6.12-20).

Our analysis of 1.24 in its context leads us to conclude that Paul uses σῶμα to indicate the physical body, and he employs καρδία to denote the thinking and willing capacity of the person. Paul does not see sin having its source or origin in the σῶμα,

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15 There are a few passages in the LXX where σῶμα as physical body and καρδία as inner person stand in close proximity and together make up the entire human. See 1 Kgs 21.27; 2 Macc 3.17; 4 Macc 13.13; Prov 5.11-12; Wis 8.17-20; Sir 30.16, 47.8-19.
but in the καρδία, and first corrupting the heart, and then reaching to the physical body, which is seen as a passive object and susceptible to sin and defilement. So even though Paul's thought is expressed in terms of a dualistic anthropological framework of inner καρδία and outer σῶμα, yet his view that sin originates in the heart and then extends to the body reverses the Orphic-Platonic view where the soul is polluted when it comes in contact with the σῶμα.

At 4.19, the other passage prior to 6.6 where σῶμα occurs, there is near unanimity among scholars that σῶμα is used to designate the physical body in its (in)ability to procreate. As Gundry says, any attempt to read into σῶμα a reference to the whole self is ruled out by the parallel, καὶ τὴν νεκρωσιν τῆς μήτρας Σάρρας. Sarah's inability to conceive was physiological. Again, as was the case at 1.24, so here too, there is a link between σῶμα and sexuality.

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1 Bauer says it is a communis opinio with respect to the Old Testament and later Judaism that opposition against God arises in the heart and not in the body (Leiblichkeit, 142 n. 14).


3 Gundry, Sôma, 49-50.
In sum, Paul uses σῶμα to denote the physical body at 1.24 and 4.19, and his readers would have understood the word as such. Coming to 6.6, it would have only been natural for them to continue to understand σῶμα as the physical body unless there were clues telling them otherwise.

A second problem with the view that equates σῶμα with the self at 6.6 concerns the way a supposed "Hebraic anthropology" is invoked as the cultural framework for Paul's use of the word. It is beyond the scope of our inquiry to decide whether there actually existed a consistent anthropology in the Jewish Scriptures to which one could appeal. Yet a cursory examination of the anthropology reflected in the Hebrew Bible and what scholars have been saying about that anthropology suggests certain dominant motifs, but also diversity. But regardless of what the Hebrew Bible does or does not say, an examination of Hellenistic Jewish texts reveals with remarkable consistency the presence of an anthropological dualism where σῶμα means the physical body.

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Aune has argued judiciously that there really was no such thing as an essentially Hebraic or Greek anthropology, that an examination of writings from both milieux show more diversity than homogeneity, as monistic, dualistic, as well as more complex anthropologies are found in both streams ("Human Nature," 292; "Two Pauline Models," 91). See also H. W. Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974), 3, who says, "The Old Testament is not based on a unified doctrine of man"; J. W. Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting. Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 42.
In the LXX, σῶμα is used consistently to denote the physical body to the exclusion of the ἐγώ, γυνῆ, or πνεῦμα in an overwhelming number of instances. In its less than 140 occurrences, σῶμα denotes the physical body approximately seventy-eight times. But to be included with these are those usages of σῶμα that signify the corpse of a dead person or animal, twenty-six times; slaves, five or seven times; and the penis, five times. This gives us a total of about 114 occurrences. But there are between ten and eighteen instances where σῶμα is used synecdochically of the whole ἄνθρωπος.

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1. J. Lust, E. Eynikel, and K. Hauspie mention 136 occurrences (A Greek - English Lexicon of the Septuagint, Part II K - Ω [Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1996], 466). E. Hatch and H. A. Redpath list 140 (A Concordance to the Septuagint and the Other Greek Versions of the Old Testament [Oxford: Clarendon, 1897], 1330). I have used Hatch and Redpath despite its deficiencies, although excluding the six occurrences in Theodotian Daniel and Bel (and LXX Dan 4.13?), which more or less overlap with the LXX. There are several texts where σῶμα may be textually suspect: Tob 13.7; Psa 39.7; Job 7.15, 18.15, 19.26; 4 Macc 4.10.


4. Gen 34.29, 36.6; Tob 10.10; 2 Macc 8.11 (twice). Ziesler thinks Gen 47.18 and Neh 9.37 can also be included here. But since a "more-than-physical meaning is required" for σῶμα in these passages, as Ziesler himself points out, I prefer to include them in the list in the next note.

5. In agreement with Ziesler ("ΣOmega," 138-143): Gen 47.12; 1 Chr 28.1; 1 Esd 3.4; Tob 11.15, 13.7 (possibly corrupt); Prov 11.17; Sir 51.2; Job 33.17; Bel 32; 2 Macc 12.26. I would also add Job 6.4, which is not discussed by K. Grobel ("Σωμα as 'Self, Person' in the Septuagint," in Neutestamentliche Studien für Rudolf Bultmann zu seinem siebzigsten Geburtstag, Beihefte zur ZNW 21 [Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1954], 52-59), Gundry, or
importantly, in each of these instances, there are textual clues that invite such a reading. Because Paul and the congregations at Rome used the LXX, it would be fair to say that this semantic range of meanings of σῶμα was known to them.

Anthropological dualism, then, is consistently present throughout the LXX. Σῶμα normally denotes the physical body. But in ten or so passages where σῶμα is used holistically, in every instance there are textual clues that compel the broader denotation. Furthermore, in no single instance where σῶμα denotes the physical body or is used metaphorically of the entire ἄνθρωπος, is the mere word itself weighted down with conceptual content beyond its basic meaning.

The same goes for the way σῶμα is used in other Jewish writings of the Hellenistic period. Gundry has shown, on the basis of an examination of writings as diverse as Tobit, Wisdom of Solomon, 2 Maccabees, 1 Enoch, 4 Ezra, Qumran, Philo, Josephus, and the Rabbinic literature, that there was "an anthropological duality so clear and widespread that it can justly be described as the normative view within late Judaism."

Ziesler; Gen 47.18; 2 Esd 19.26, 37; Ezek 23.35; Esth 9.14; Sir 51.2; and possibly Job 33.24.

It is fair to say the LXX was a point of contact between Paul and his readers, but their texts probably differed in extent and in some places in translation.

Our third problem with the view that equates σῶμα with the self at 6.6 specifically addresses the Hebraic or existential anthropology that the word is seen, particularly by Bultmann and Dunn, to carry into the discourse. There is no denying that a word can deliver conceptual baggage into the sentence. Paul’s use of ἀπόστολος at Rom 1.1 illustrates this well. In using the word there he probably had more in mind than what would be conveyed by a bare word-substitution of "messenger" or "envoy." The word had become for Paul and evidently for his readers a terminus technicus. But even conceding that the semantic range of ἀπόστολος specific to 1.1 is broader than a provisional English word substitution, nevertheless what Paul wants to communicate had to have already been communicated by means of "sentences, paragraphs, discourses, and so forth; that is, by larger semantic units than the word."17 And without that discourse, there can be no correspondence between the sign ἀπόστολος and its function. Essentially then, it is "sentences, paragraphs, discourses" that are the carriers of meaning, to which words contribute. Barr emphasizes this by way of a principle: "Theological thought of the type found in the NT has its characteristic linguistic expression not in the word individually but in the word-combination or sentence."18 Thus, to speak in quantitative terms,

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17 The words in quotations belong to D. A. Carson, Exegetical Fallacies, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996), 53 n. 65.

18 Semantics, 233. See also 249-250, 263; M. Silva, Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics,
to overload a word with conceptual freight not demanded by the context leads to distortion. And this is precisely what Jewett charged Bultmann with doing. We saw in Chapter 1 that Jewett used Barr to batter Bultmann's method of seeing rather sophisticated architectonics in individual anthropological words. This criticism is the death knell of Bultmann's method, and even if it does not thereby invalidate his conclusions, yet it does cast doubt on any interpretation that reads more into the meaning of σῶμα than what is necessary to the sentence.

Fourthly, if it is the case that σῶμα at 6.6 is used synonymously with the personal pronoun or ἀνθρωπος, then σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας means the same thing as παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἀνθρωπος, and consequently, we have a tautologous argument where Paul says the same thing in 6.6b as in 6.6a by means of a thoroughly repetitive clause that adds nothing to παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἀνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη. This is not impossible, but the middle clause in verse 6 becomes redundant because Paul spells out the implications of the crucifixion of παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἀνθρωπος in the last clause of verse 6. Furthermore, if the expressions are synonymous, why does he introduce a new and potentially confusing term? If he wants to

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simply vary his style, why not just use the personal pronoun, as he did in 6.2-5?

In sum, the way Paul uses σώμα at 1.24 and 4.19 to indicate the physical body, the way Paul's Gentile readers at Rome would have understood the word according to its everyday usage, the fact that the view of the body reflected consistently in Hellenistic Jewish texts rested on a dualistic anthropology, the semantic problem of overloading σώμα with theological freight, and the problem of a tautology at 6.6 when σώμα is taken as a synonym for the personal pronoun, all weigh against taking σώμα in any way other than as a denotation of the physical body.

The body of sin as the sin-ruled body

Given our criticism of the alternate interpretation above, which takes σώμα as a synonym for ἐγώ or ἀνθρωπός, and given what Paul will go on to say about the σώμα (and σάρξ at 7.18, 25; 8.3bc) in Romans 6-8, we are persuaded Paul uses σώμα to indicate the physical body at 6.6. What remains to be determined is how τῆς ἁμαρτίας relates to it.

Ludemann says τῆς ἁμαρτίας is that which determines σώμα. For him, this means the body qua flesh is inherently sinful. We recall he took σώμα as the body's form and σάρξ as its material. When this body of flesh is seen "in der innigsten Verbindung mit der ἁμαρτία," as is the case at 6.6, then it emerges "dass nach Paulus die σάρξ als belebte Materie des menschlichen Leibes Sitz und Quell der Sünde sei." But σάρξ is not mentioned at 6.6, σώμα

\[\text{See Nida and Louw, Lexical Semantics, 12, 18.}\]
is. So Lüdemann concluded that here is one of those passages where σῶμα is used synonymously with σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας. Had Paul written ἡ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, he would not have been saying anything different. Paul is saying that the body of flesh has a definite quality and power that is hostile to the good. It is not morally indifferent, for it is through the body qua flesh that sin comes to actualization. 13

Jewett thinks the views Lüdemann pins on Paul had more to do with Paul’s opponents at Rome than with Paul himself. According to his reconstruction, Paul polemizes against Gnostic-libertinists at Rome, and this accounts for σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας occurring in Romans for the first time. They see sin rooted in the material of the body and redemption consisting in the body's destruction. The baptized person is someone who has thereby transcended bodily existence and is free to sin. Paul takes over their gnostic understanding of baptism, but corrects its libertine implications. He does this by adding τῆς ἁμαρτίας to σῶμα. His view still stands "dangerously close to Gnosticism," but this codicil shifts the blame for the human plight away from the body per se, to sin, the power of the old aeon. 14

Like Jewett, Gundry thinks Paul’s position on the body at 6.6 may be confused with gnostic views. But he says, "It would be more accurate to say Paul associates sin with the body and makes

13 Anthropologie, 53-54, 56-57.
14 Anthropological Terms, 290-292.
redemption consist in the resurrection, in new form, of the old body necessarily destroyed because of the weakness of its natural instincts and consequent vulnerability to sin."\textsuperscript{55}

Similarly, Karl-Adolf Bauer argues in light of passages like Rom 6.12-13 and 12.1-2 that since the body can be put forward in service of God it is not sinful as such. As a consequence, it is better to take της ἁμαρτίας as a genitive of possession.\textsuperscript{56} The body is under the reign of sin; it is the territory or dominion of sin's rule. In the body sin finds a base for action, and from this base sin comes to expression physically and expansively.

This review reveals that several scholars, in order to arrive at a comprehensive description of what Paul means by σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, have found it necessary to read back into the expression what Paul will go on to say about the body in the ensuing context. For example, when σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας is read in light of 7.22-23, a view might emerge that sees the body qua flesh as intrinsically sinful. But when read in light of 6.12-13 and 12.1, we could have an assessment that is less negative. Now, it may well be that until we have offered an exegesis of these other passages, that we will not be able to decide definitively how Paul understands σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας at 6.6. Nevertheless, there is

\textsuperscript{55} Sōma, 58.

\textsuperscript{56} Leiblichkeit, 151. So also Schlier, Römerbrief, 197.

\textsuperscript{17} Leiblichkeit, 151.
enough in the immediate context to lead us to a provisional judgment.

In light of 6.6a, where Paul uses παλαιός ἡμῶν ἀνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη to speak of the person in relation to the old sphere of existence under the domination and power of sin, and in light of 5.20, 21; 6.1, 2, 6c, 7, 10-12, where ἁμαρτία is seen, not as transgressions, but as the power of the old sphere, we suggest that it makes good sense, in agreement with Bauer, to understand σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας as the physical body that had come under the oppressive domination of sin's reign. In light of the way Paul used σῶμα in the letter up to this point and ἁμαρτία in the surrounding context, "the sin-ruled body" is most likely the way Paul's readers at Rome understood the phrase. The σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας is the body under the rule of the power of sin. There is no reason to deduce that Paul sees the body as sinful on account of its materiality, as Lüdemann thought. Rather, as we saw at 1.24, the problem lies in the body's impotence in the face of sin's power, and its susceptibility to be taken over by sin, in order to promote sin's death-grip on the person and more sinning. We see emerging here a view that sees the body as a seat for sin, by which and from which, sin reigns.

The problem of translating καταργηθή is seen when the NIV's 1978 translation, "that the body of sin might be rendered powerless," is set beside its revised 1984 translation, "that the body of sin might be done away with" (emphasis added). Dunn says, "In Paul [καταργέω] is one of the most difficult words to pin down
as to its precise meaning." He notes that at one end of the spectrum, Paul uses it in the sense of "render ineffective," as, for example, at Rom 3.3, 31; 4.14; 1 Cor 1.28, and Gal 3.17. But at 1 Cor 6.13; 15.24 and 26, it is used in a stronger sense of "abolish" or "destroy." "In between there are a range of uses whose precise force is difficult to quantify." Dunn goes on to argue, convincingly we believe, that the eschatological orientation of passages where καταργέω is found is a crucial factor in pinning down precise meaning, and he thinks this goes for 6.6 too. So, in a passage like 1 Cor 15.24-26, for instance, where the final eschatological judgment is in view, "abolish" or "destroy" suits the context well. But at Rom 6.6, where a decisive step toward final eschatological judgment has been taken but not fully executed, he thinks a translation like "put out of action" or "render powerless" is more appropriate. However, in view of the fact that the "final eschatological judgment" has been fully executed on παλαιός ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπος, in that the person was put to death, and in light of our position that σώμα τῆς ἀμαρτίας signifies sin's oppressive reign in the physical body, it is not, then, the "sinful body" that has been rendered powerless, but sin's reign over the body that has been destroyed or nullified.

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14 Romans 1-8, 319.

15 Romans 1-8, 319.

16 One can draw a parallel between the way καταργηθῇ works at 6.6 with the way καταργηθησανευ works at 7.6.
In sum, when σῶμα is taken as the physical body at 6.6, we notice five things. First, the clause in which σῶμα is found, ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, functions argumentatively as a second premise in Paul’s argument. Logically, Paul can state the conclusion, τοῦ μὴ κεῖται δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, because καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, because ὅ παλαιός ἦμων ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη. As a result, the clause at 6.6b takes on central importance in the argument.

Secondly, Paul is saying that in order for the person to be free from the tyranny of sin’s lordship, not only must the person die, as ὃ παλαιός ἦμων ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη makes plain, but the physical body must be set free from sin’s rule as well.

Thirdly, even though there is nothing to lead us to suppose that the σῶμα is a source of sinning, yet we witness the emergence here of a view that sees the body in the old order as a seat for the power of sin. From this seat sin rules not only the body but the whole person.

Fourthly, we notice congruence between 1.24 and 6.6, for in both passages the body is seen as a victim. At 1.24, the body was rendered dishonourable because it was the victim of the sinful choices the person made. At 6.6 the body was the victim of the cosmic power of sin.

Fifthly, we see that prior to baptism the body was a base of operations from where sin exerted power over παλαιός ἦμων ἄνθρωπος enslaved to sin’s reign. But in baptism, the person died and the physical body was set free from sin’s enslaving power.
3 The Mortal Body and its Members at 6.12-13

6.12-13 functions to elaborate the paraenesis of 6.11, as well as that which is implicit in 6.2-10. The passage, which consists of two negative warnings followed by two positive exhortations, reads:

Therefore, do not let sin rule in your mortal body so as to obey its desires, nor present your members to sin as weapons of unrighteousness, but present yourselves to God as those who are alive from the dead and present your members as weapons of righteousness to God.

The mortal body as the whole mortal person

This is the instructive passage that Bultmann cites to show that σῶμα means, not the physical body, but the whole person. The parallelism of τὸ θνητὸν ὑμῶν σῶματι, τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν, and ἑαυτοῦς is transparent. Bultmann says that τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν at 6.13 "is a synonymous variation" of τὸ θνητὸν ὑμῶν σῶματι at 6.12, and that both expressions stand parallel to ἑαυτοῦς at 6.13. Furthermore, the interchangeability of παριστάνετε ἑαυτοὺς at 6.16 and παρεστήσατε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν at 6.19 adds further corroboration to the view that Paul uses σῶμα and μέλη interchangeably with the personal pronoun to denote the whole person.

Indeed, we have in these verses the sort of clue necessary to reach the conclusion Bultmann argues. The parallelism invites just such an interpretation. Moreover, this reading has the

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1: Theology, 1.192.

2: So also Cranfield, Romans, 317-318; Schlier, Römerbrief, 203; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 338, who says the parallel underscores "the Hebraic character of Paul's anthropology"; Moo, Romans, 383 n. 156.

3: Bultmann, Theology, 1.194.
cogent potency, according to some, of evading the inference that
Paul sees sin or the passions connected in a conspicuous way to
the physical body.⁴⁴

Critique of the body = person view

Nevertheless, there are several considerations that guide
us to the conclusion that Paul has not altered his meaning of
σῶμα at 6.12 from 6.6, or that μέλη means anything other than the
physical body seen under the aspect of its parts.

First, the way in which writers used θνητὸν σῶμα in Paul's
time leads us to suppose Paul's readers would have understood the
expression to signify the mortal, physical body. Philo, Plutarch,
and Josephus all use θνητὸν σῶμα, and in every instance they employ
it to refer to the physical body to the exclusion of the mind or
(higher) soul.⁴⁵ In fact, an instance has yet to be unearthed
where θνητὸν σῶμα means anything other than the mortal, physical
body.

In addition, the way Paul uses θνητὸς elsewhere in his
writings provides no intimation that he is referring to anything
but the mortal, physical body here. Leaving aside 8.11, and
starting out from 2 Cor 5.4 where the foremost measure of

⁴⁴ Accordingly, ἐπιθυμία τοῦ σώματος means the same as ἐπιθυμία
tῆς καρδίας at Rom 1.24. So Cranfield, Romans, 317; Dunn, Romans 1-
8, 336.

⁴⁵ Philo, Plant. 14; Mut. 36, Mut. 187, Mut. 219; Somn.
1.67, 138; Ios. 71; Spec. 2.230, 4.188; Virt. 9; Prov. 2.22; QG
3.11; Plutarch, Mor. 398a, 404e, 415c, 573e, 996c. See also Mor.
104a, 353a, 357c, 432a, 499a, 499c, 607d, 1026d, 1105d; Josephus,
Ant. 282; J.W. 3.372; 7.344. The expression θνητὸν σῶμα does not
occur in the LXX.
assuredness is to be had, τὸ θνητὸν means the same as ἡ ἑπιγείος ἡμῶν σκήνα τοῦ σκήνως at 5.1, and this "earthly tent" is explicitly named the body (σῶματι) at 5.6. We are dealing here with the mortal, physical body that belongs to the category of τὰ βλεπόμενα πρόσκαιρα (2 Cor 4.18), and will be clothed in an eternal body from heaven." Uncertainty about what Paul intends creeps in, however, at 1 Cor 15.53-54, where he speaks, after the fashion of 2 Cor 5.4, of τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο (= τὸ θαρτὸν τοῦτο) putting on immortality. Is Paul referring to the mortal, physical body or using the neuter abstractly for the entire person? If σάρξ καὶ αἷμα at 15.50 denotes people in general, as at Gal 1.16, " then the case is sufficiently made for taking τὸ θαρτὸν τοῦτο at 15.53-54 in the same holistic way, and extrinsic factors weigh heavily toward taking σάρξ καὶ αἷμα holistically." But against such a view, 15.50 functions to emphasize a point Paul makes in 15.36-49, that the σῶμα γυμνικόν, being perishable, dishonourable, and weak, is not suited for pneumatic existence. At 15.50, he speaks of this same body made

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2. τοῦτο δὲ οἶμαι may be rendered "This is what I am saying." The ὅτι-clause, which follows gives the content of τοῦτο.

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of flesh and blood as not able to inherit God’s kingdom. Down to and including 15.50, what is in view is not the resurrection of the entire person, but the resurrection of the body. Paul is answering the question of 15.35b. Thus σάρξ καὶ αἷμα at 15.50 means the body of flesh, and it leaves open the possibility that that is what we are dealing with in 15.53-54. Nevertheless, we notice a widening of the scope of resurrection in 15.51-52. The object of transformation in these verses is no longer just the body, but "we" (subject of ἀλλαγοσώμεθα) and οἱ νεκροὶ (dead people, not corpses). This shift invites reading τὸ θνητὸν τῶν (and τὸ φθαρτὸν τῶν) at 15.53 and 54 holistically. This interpretation is possible, but it is equally feasible that we continue to deal with a reference to the mortal, physical body, given that 15.53 "is in content a repetition and modification of v 42," and that the "clothing" imagery in 15.53-54 connects back to 15.49, and what was in view in those verses was the physical body. In sum, it is workable that Paul is referring to the mortal, physical body at 15.53-54, and it is certain that he is at 2 Cor 4.11 and

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2. Schweizer, TDNT 7:129.


4. So Fee, First Epistle, 802 n. 33.
5.4. We suggest that when this evidence is tallied with the evidence that θητην σώμα was uniformly used to denote the physical body by writers of Paul's time, then it is judicious to suppose Paul was denoting the mortal, physical body at Rom 6.12.

There is a second consideration that helps us conclude that Paul has in mind the physical body at 6.12, and this is found in the next verse. It was common in Paul's time to speak of the arms and legs in particular and parts of the body in general with μέλη. In the undisputed Pauline letters, the word occurs twenty-five times. When the six occurrences in Romans 6-7 are set aside, we see that in every other instance, μέλος denotes parts of the body, whether that body is physical or ecclesiological. The same phenomenon is seen at Eph 4.25 and 5.30. At Col 3.5, too, μέλη may denote the physical body, but it may function, as seems more likely, as a headword for the vice-list that follows giving the expected physical sense an ethical twist. In the rest of the NT the word appears five times, at Matt 5.29, 30, and at Jas 3.5, 6, and 4.1, and in each instance parts of the body are in view. When we move outside the NT, we observe, for example, in the seventeen occurrences in the LXX and the thirty-three instances in Philo

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 Rom 12.4 [2 times], 5; 1 Cor 6.15 [3 times]; 12.12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26 [4 times], 27.


 So Lincoln, Paradise Now, 130.
where μέλος does not refer to musical melody, that it always refers to parts of the body. In short, when we look at the way μέλος is used in the rest of Paul's letters, the disputed Paulines, the LXX, and Philo, we discover that the word is not used holistically. Only at Col 3.5 do we have the sort of grammatical parallel that would corroborate a holistic reading at Rom 6.13, but even there μέλη is not semantically parallel with the personal pronoun. This evidence goes a long way toward corroborating Gundry's conclusion that the "term melé has physical connotations which are hard to mistake."

Thirdly, locating εἰσθαμμένα in the mortal body or in the flesh of the body was a commonplace in the Hellenistic moral discourses. So well documented is the Greek material that it requires no rehearsing. If we take seriously that Paul is writing to a Gentile audience, we have to conclude that they would have undoubtedly understood him to be speaking about the mortal, physical body and its desires at 6.12.

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1 LXX Exod 29.17; Lev 1.6, 12; 8.20 (twice); 9.13; Judg 19.29 (B); 2 Macc 1.16; 7.7; 8.24; 9.7; 3 Macc 2.22; 4 Macc 9.14, 17; 10.20; Sir 50.12; Ezek 24.6; Philo, Opif. 67, 103; Leg. 1.12; Sacr. 84; Deus 52; Her. 133; Mut. 173; Somn. 2.168; Abr. 198; Tov. 27, 187; Mos. 1.128; 2.106; Spec. 1.99, 1.145, 147, 199, 208, 210; Spec. 3.108, 182; Virt. 32, 136; Praem. 125, 143, 145; Prob. 89; Aet. 143; Flacc. 176; Leg. 131, 243, 267; QG. 2.2.

2 Sōma, 30.

3 See E. Schweizer, "Die hellenistische Komponente im neutestamentlichen σώμα - Begriff," ZNW 48 (1957): 240-252; idem, TDNT 7.103-105, for references.
Moreover, Jewish writers in the Hellenistic period also located desires and passions in the σῶμα, the σῶμα σαρκός, or the μέλη of the body. Leaving aside Philo, who, as we shall see, perfectly proves our point, we see the writer of 4 Maccabees locating πάθη in the material σάρξ of the body (4 Macc 7.18; see also 3.17-18). Likewise, the source of conflicts and disputes among the recipients of the letter of James was, according to the letter's writer, the "pleasures (ἡδονῶν) that were at war (τῶν στρατευομένων) in their members (ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν)," that is, in the parts of their bodies (Jas 4.1). This passage is one of several put forward by Eduard Schweizer to validate Otto Michel's suggestion that Paul probably drew on a Jewish and not Hellenistic tradition when he connected τὰ μέλη, understood as members or parts of the physical body, with sin at Rom 6.13 (as well as at 6.19, 7.5, and 23). Some of the passages Schweizer cites must be set aside as anachronistic or dependent on Paul, but two are particularly instructive: 2 Apoc. Bar. 49.3, which asks, "Will they, perhaps, take again this present form, and will they put on the chained members which are in evil and by which

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1: Schweizer, "Sünde," 437-439; Michel, Römer, 157. Schweizer thinks the tradition Jewish rather than Hellenistic, because, although the link between sin and σώμα/σάρξ is found frequently in Hellenism, the link between μέλη and sin is not ("Sünde," 437).

2: E.g., Gos. Phil. 103; 'Abot R. Nat. 16. It is interesting to find in the rabbinic material just the sorts of "un-Jewish" views some scholars are unwilling to attribute to Paul.
evils are accomplished?"; and T. Reub. 3, which links error with parts of the physical body.

A fourth consideration that leads us to decide that Paul has not changed the meaning of σῶμα at 6.12 from 6.6 rests on the close dependence of verse 12 on the preceding argument in verses 1-11, a passage where σῶμα as the physical body figured briefly but dominantly. The way σῶμα was employed at 6.6 does not of course have probative value for deciding on σῶμα in 6.12, but when combined with the three considerations just mentioned, the conclusion is fortified that σῶμα denotes the physical body at 6.12. By taking σῶμα as the physical body and μέλη as the same body viewed partitively, what then is Paul saying?

We said that at 6.6 Paul argued that the person (παλαιός ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος) died to her or his former sphere of existence enslaved under the power of sin. With this death in baptism sin's enslaving reign over the physical body was destroyed. No longer could sin use the body as a base of operations to enslave the person and produce wrongdoing. Consequently, the person was now free of that sphere to live for God (6.11). Verses 12-13 draw the inference that being in Christ (ἐν Χριστῷ; v. 11) not only has

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34 We will witness this again in Romans 8. Like 6.12-14, 8.12-13 draws out obligations from what was just said, and as we will see, the anthropological terms are utilized in 8.12-13 consistently with the way they were used in 8.4b-11.
ethical implications for what was dead and is now alive (vv. 6, 11), but for the mortal body as well.\footnote{Bauer says, "Die Getauften werden aufgerufen, ihrem in der Taufe verliehenen neuen Sein leibhaftig zu entsprechen" (Leiblichkeit, 152-153).}

By associating αὐτοῦ in verse 12, whose antecedent is θνητὸς σῶμα, with ἐπιθυμίας, which may be translated "desires" but contextually means "sinful desires," we see Paul connecting sinful desires in a conspicuous way with the physical body that is still mortal. As such, the mortal body is susceptible to its own sinful desires, and sin, the power of the old Aeon, which seeks continually to reclaim that territory it formerly lost, has the potential to reacquire what it lost by exploiting the body's sinful desires and to rule again as a consequence of the person obeying the body's desires. Thus left unchecked, the body's sinful desires are a potential hindrance in the pursuit of righteousness and life.

Paul is not saying, then, that the body's sinful desires are now eradicated for the person who has been crucified with Christ and has died to sin's power and sphere.\footnote{See Schlier, Römerbrief, 202; Moo, Romans, 383.} It is true that

\footnote{So also Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 154-155. Schlier says, "Αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αὐτοῦ sind sozusagen die Basis der Sündenherrschaft in uns, den Sterblichen. ... In den ἐπιθυμίας meldet sich sozusagen die Vergangenheit des Getauften wieder zu Wort" (Römerbrief, 202).}

\footnote{So also Schlier, Römerbrief, 202. In the Hellenistic moral discourses, there was debate whether the ethical goal was freedom from the passions/emotions (ἀμέθεια), so Stoicism, or just control (μετροπολίσσα), so Middle Platonism. See D. C. Aune, "Mastery of the Passions: Philo, 4 Maccabees and Earliest}
such a person has changed places, spatially and temporally, and is now in a new place and time (6.11; 13.12), but this does not mean the person is free from sinful, bodily desires or can live with little regard to them. What the person is now in place to do is control them. Where formerly there was no choice but being subjugated, now the baptized person is free to decide not to let sin rule in her or his mortal body. What we are witnessing is Paul’s confident optimism that the baptized believer will triumph over the power of sin because she or he can rule the body’s passions.

Verse 13a is grammatically coordinate to verse 12, and it makes little sense to place a full stop at the end of verse 12, as the NRSV does. But verse 13b is also grammatically coordinate with 13a, as is 13c with 13b. We have, from the grammatical point of view, four coordinate imperative clauses. But verse 13b and 13c stand parallel to one another, and together they oppose 13a, and when approached from this perspective a slight nuance of differentiation between verses 12 and 13 is to be detected. The command μὴ βασιλευέτω ἡ ἁμαρτία in verse 12 as well as that which is implicit in ἡ ἁμαρτία οὐ κυριεύει in verse 14a say what the baptized ought not to do. The three imperative clauses sandwiched in


" On this, see Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 152-154.
between function to inform Paul's Gentile readers how they can prevent sin from ruling them again. They must not, Paul says, present their members (μέλη) as weapons of unrighteousness to sin (ἀπολα ἀδικίας τὴ ἀμαρτία), but instead present themselves (ἐαυτούς) to God as people who are alive from the dead, and present their members (μέλη) to God as weapons in the service of righteousness (ἀπολα δικαιοσύνη).

Verse 13, therefore, makes explicit that Paul is not calling believers to be estranged or alienated from their bodies. Rather, he is calling them to put the body, seen here through its parts, to good use for God in the service of righteousness. Where prior to baptism the body was under the dominion of sin so as to promote sinning, now the body is in a place where it can be employed in the service of God.

It all comes down to the choice a person makes. There is still in the mortal body, and on account of its sinful desires, a predisposition toward sinning and unrighteousness. But the

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1 So Wilckens, Römer, 2.21. Schlier says, "Die Sündenmacht kann nur herrschen, wenn man ihr gehorcht" (Römerbrief, 202).

2 So also Moo, Romans, 384.

3 As often noted, ὀπλα may indicate "weapons" or "tools." Either works here, but "weapons" is preferable in view of the warfare imagery in Romans 7. So Russ, Römerbrief, 2.383; Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 156 n. 61; Schlier, Römerbrief, 203.

4 See Wilckens, Römer, 2.21.
baptized person has freedom of choice and the capacity not to present her or his body to sin.\textsuperscript{14}

What we see, then, is a devaluation of the body when it is compared to what happens to the "I" in baptism. Operative here is an eschatology that sees the divine purpose manifesting itself on the "I" in one way and on the body in another way. The "I" is alive in a way the body is not.\textsuperscript{15} But this does not mean that the body is outside of the sphere of Christ, for in Paul's discourse, not to be in Christ is to be back in the sphere of Adam, sin, and death.\textsuperscript{16} Not alive and certainly not yet resurrected, the body, as mortal, is still weak and susceptible to the power of sin because it still carries in it its sinful desires.\textsuperscript{17} This does not mean the body should be considered sinful or evil, because already the baptized can freely choose to use the body as a weapon for God in

\textsuperscript{14} Wilckens says, "Andererseits denkt Paulus den Leib nicht als nach außen abgeschlossene Behausung der >autonomen< Personlichkeit, sondern als Herrschaftsbereich, sei es Gottes, sei es der Sünde" (Römer, 2.21).

\textsuperscript{15} Bauer says, "δειν [δε may be the better reading though] hat hier nicht den Sinn von 'wie', 'gleichsam' oder gar 'als ob'. Vielmehr heißt es 'als' und gibt dem Zusammenhang entsprechend die Begründung für die Anforderung für Gott durch die Mahnung des Apostels: da ihr aus den Toten heraus lebt" (Leiblichkeit, 157 n. 72). So also Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.384.

\textsuperscript{16} Dunn says, "The alternative is deliberately stark: there is no middle ground, or neutral position" (Romans 1-8, 337).

\textsuperscript{17} E. Kasemann (Leib und Leib Christi: Eine Untersuchung zur paulinischen Begrifflichkeit, BHT 9 [Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1933], 123) and Bauer (Leiblichkeit, 154) say that the σώμα τῆς ἀμαρτίας is the body of the baptized person's past, the σώμα θνητὸν is the body that corresponds to the "neuen Ich," and the σώμα πνευματικόν is the body anticipated in the future.
the fight for righteousness. Salvation or redemption has already begun to have an effect on the body.

In sum, Paul says at 6.12-13 that there is potential for the power of sin to rule again in the arena of the physical body of the baptized believer. But sin cannot recapture that base of operations without collaborators. It is only when the believer chooses to obey the sinful desires in her or his body, only when the believer presents her or his body as a weapon in the service of unrighteousness, that sin is able to rule again in the arena of the mortal body. The chink in the believer's armour is the body's sinful desires, and through lack of containment, sin can re-exert a destructive influence over the person. Thus the command is given not to let sin reign in the mortal body. Now the fact that Paul can exhort the baptized to present their bodies as weapons in the service of righteousness means that for him the body can be controlled by the willing subject and be protected from the ever-threatening pollution of sin's reign.

At 6.19, he speaks again of presenting τὰ μέλη, but the only thing changed is the metaphor, slavery instead of warfare. Paul evidently felt some unease about using the metaphor, for he introduced his remarks with ἀνθρώπινον λέγω διὰ τὴν ἁσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός. Elsewhere in Paul, the expression δι᾽ ἁσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός occurs at Gal 4.19, where σάρκις denotes the material, physical body. Given this parallel, as well as the commonplace in the Hellenistic moral discourses of seeing the physical, bodily flesh as a hindrance to knowledge, we cannot rule out the possibility of a
reference to the body of flesh at 6.19. However, we prefer to defer discussion until we come to the more potent usages of σῶμα in Romans 7. We turn, then, to the one other place in 6.1-7.6 where the body comes into view, 7.4-5.

4 The Body of Christ and Our Members at 7.4-5

The argument of 7.1-6

Paul lays down the axiom at 7.1 that the law has jurisdiction over a person only so long as that person lives. By means of an illustration he paints a picture of this principle in verses 2 and 3. The law binds a married woman to her husband while he lives, but when the husband dies, she is free to marry someone else. 7.4 draws two inferences from the axiom stated in verse 1 and the illustration in verses 2-3. Taking ἐθανάτωθητε as a passivum divinum, and διὰ τοῦ σῶματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ as the means by which the divine action is accomplished, we understand Paul to be saying that God put them, that is, Paul's baptized brothers and sisters at Rome, to death πάνυμὡ, that is, to the law's jurisdiction. Moreover, if they died, then the law can no longer confine them; and if dead, then just like the woman in the illustration, they are freed to do what they really want, to be

"See Moo, Romans, 416; Heckel, Innere Mensch, 175-176.

" Of course, in the illustration the husband dies and the wife is free to remarry, but in the application the believer both dies and is freed. Paul is obviously willing to live with logical incongruity in order for the illustration to serve two functions, for after all it is impossible to have a precedent in law where a person dies and then joins another. So also R. C. Tannehill, Dying and Rising with Christ: A Study in Pauline Theology (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1967), 44-45.
joined to Christ. The purpose of this new union was to bear fruitful offspring for God.

By means of a ὅπω ... νυμίδε contrast, verses 5-6 function to explain why it is necessary for the baptized to die to the law. Continuing to identify himself with his readers, Paul begins by saying that they were formerly ἐν τῇ σαρκί. As at 6.19, so here we hold off discussing σάρξ until later. Nevertheless, a brief comment is in order. Since Paul speaks elsewhere of still being ἐν σαρκί (2 Cor 10.3; Gal 2.20; Phil 1.22), by which he means he still lives in a fleshly body and is subject to the way of existence conditioned by life in the body, we are led to surmise that Paul has in mind something other than life in a σῶμα σαρκός, for he speaks here of the σάρξ as something belonging to his and his readers' past before being joined to Christ. Given the content of the rest of verse 5, and the links between that content and the rest of Romans 7, we suggest that what Paul means by ἐν τῇ σαρκί at 7.5 is fully explicable in 7.7-25. In short, it is a way of existence under the law where the sinful passions, which were through the law, worked in a person's members to bear fruit for death.

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See Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.508-509.

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In my treatment of σάρξ, I have let myself be guided by J. P. Louw's remark: "one can never say what sarx means, but only what it means in this or that context" (Semantics of New Testament Greek [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981], 39-40). See also Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.506.
"But now" (νυνί δέ), as Paul goes on to say in verse 6, he and his readers are in a new place. They have been set free from the law, because they have died to that which bound them. In this place of freedom they serve God ἐν καινότητι πνεύματος, not in παλαιότητι γράμματος, which for Paul is just another way of speaking of the law. Furthermore, 7.5-6 functions as a segue into 7.7-8.30, with 7.5 introducing notions Paul will explicate in the rest of Romans 7, and 7.6 doing the same for what will follow in Romans 8.

The body of Christ at 7.4

Διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ functions to express the means by which the baptized have died to the law.

In the contexts of 1 Cor 10.16 and 12.27, the only other verses in the undisputed Paulines where σῶμα Χριστοῦ occurs, Paul uses the phrase to couple the notions of the actual physical body of Christ and the church as Christ's body into one pregnant conception. Not surprisingly, some scholars take this understanding from 1 Corinthians and read it into Romans. Such a hypothesis might gain credibility if we could imagine there being one lector in the congregation at Rome reading 1 Corinthians antiphonally with another reading Romans. But without

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''''The important κατηγορήθηκεν, which we have already encountered at 6.6, was previously used at 7.2 antithetically with δέδεται. At one time the woman was bound, then she was freed. The same nuance of meaning should be transferred to 7.6.

''''See Elliott, Rhetoric, 244 n. 1.
such a vivid imagination it is preferable to read Romans on its own terms, and when this is done, there is no need to read a reference to ecclesiology into σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ at 7.4. As a matter of fact, the context of the letter provides ample clues as to how Paul uses the expression.

It is basically equivalent to ἀπεθάνωμεν σῦν Χριστῷ at 6.8, ἐν τῷ άυτῷ άἵματι at 3.25, or even ὑπακοή at 5.19, where ὑπακοή functions as a catchword for Christ's death, burial, and resurrection, an act of obedience into which the baptized were immersed. The means by which the baptized died to sin, according to 6.3-11, turns out, then, to be the same means by which they died to the law. It is by means of Christ's physical body, to which they are now related, that the baptized died to the law.

In our members at 7.5

What Paul fears could once again become a reality in the life of the baptized if they are not vigilant (6.12-13), is for him the typical experience of people ἐν τῇ σαρκί.

At 7.5, Paul says, "the sinful passions (τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν), which were through the law (τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου), worked (ἐνηργεῖτο) in our members (ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν) to bear fruit for death." Without the mention of the law, we have a repetition of what Paul said about the relation of sinful desires to the body in 6.12. What we are looking at is the reign of sin. It is easy to imagine that τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν here is interchangeable with

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114 E.g., Schweitzer, Mysticism, 118; Robinson, Body, 46-47; Wilckens, Römer, 2.64-65.
ταίζέπιθυμίας at 6.12, and there is no reason to suppose Paul has altered or broadened the signification of μέλος. With the additional mention of the law, Paul has in this verse summarized what he will go on to spell out fully in 7.7-25, and since those verses provide Paul's own commentary on 7.5, we prefer to defer our exposition until we have heard Paul's.

Toward a tentative summary, we may say that, as was the case with Paul's treatment of the body in Romans 6, so here at 7.4-5 we witness positive and negative valuations of the body. On the one hand, Christ's ὑπακοή (5.19) was a death in the σώμα, and it is through Christ's crucified body that the baptized have died to the law. But a negative evaluation of the body, seen in terms of the body's μέλεσιν, comes to expression in verse 5 in the person who is ἐν τῇ σαρκί, which is the sphere of existence under the rule of sin. There, the reign of sin manifested itself in the παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, aroused by law, working freely ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν to bring death. We see a chaining of the σώμα or μέλη to its ἐπιθυμία or παθήματα, and it is through this that sin, provoked by the law, enslaves the person to sin and death ἐν τῇ σαρκί.
CHAPTER 4

THE BODY IN ROMANS 7.7-25

1 The Argumentative Structure of 7.7-25

7.7-25 as a rhetorical unit

Romans 7.7-25 is a self-contained, rhetorical unit within a larger section, 6.1-8.13. Like 6.3-7.6, it functions to demonstrate the propositio of 6.2. But whereas 6.3-7.6 explicated matters positively in terms of the new existence in Christ, 7.7-25 comes at things negatively. For as we will demonstrate, 7.7-25 focuses on what remaining in sin looks like - or more accurately, looked like - for the person in the sphere of and under the power of sin. So 7.7-25 is set off from 6.3-7.6, and it can be seen as functioning as an argumentatio for 7.5. For verse 5 may legitimately be considered the propositio for 7.7-25, since it provides a brief summary of what Paul goes on to argue.

7.7-25 is also set off from 8.1-30. The latter portrays life ἐν πνεύματι; the former portrays how, when Paul and his readers were ἐν τῇ σαρκί, the law was helpless to bring about life and instead brought death. Structurally, 7.7-25 mirrors 8.1-30, and both units together explicate the nature of existence depicted tersely in 7.5-6 with the ὅτε ... νυμβε δὲ clauses. Seen from this

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So, e.g., Bultmann, "Romans 7," 154; Wilckens, Römer, 2.63; S. K. Stowers, "Romans 7.7-25 as a Speech-in-Character (προσωπογραφία)," in Paul in His Hellenistic Context, ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 192.
perspective, 7.7-25 and 8.1-30 "function like both panels of a
diptych: each illuminating the other by way of contrast."

But not only does 7.7-25 function as a proof for the thesis
at 6.2 by delineating existence ἐν θαρσε, it serves another
purpose as well. Structured around the rhetorical question at
7.7, ὁ νόμος ἀμαρτία; and reformulated at 7.13, τὸ οὖν ἁγαθὸν ἐμοὶ ἐγένετο
θάνατος; this unit seeks to demonstrate the motifs that come to
expression crisply at 7.12 and 7.14a, that the law is holy,
righteous, good, and spiritual. Consequently, the unit may be
taken as an apology for the law, and given Paul's primary
objective in writing the letter, to convert the Roman believers
into a Pauline congregation, this section is inflated in
importance if the letter is to be rhetorically effective.

Paul, then, is able to kill two birds with one stone. He
attempts to deflect criticism by rebutting a significant
objection arising from his gospel (3.8, 6.1). And he wants to
vindicate his law-free gospel. For in his universe of discourse
the law of Moses operates by divine design in Adam's sphere of
sin and death, not in Christ's sphere of righteousness and life.
The law is unable to bring about that which it was purposed by
God to accomplish, life and righteousness. In fact, the law is
involved in the proliferation of sin's reign; for sin, seen as a
power, is able to enslave the person so long as the person is
under law. Not surprisingly then, Paul speaks of God working
outside the sphere of the law to bring salvation. He reaffirms

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1 Byrne, Romans, 213. So also Wilckens, Römer, 2.118.
much of this in Romans 7 by showing just how powerful sin is over the person who lives ὑπὸ νόμον in the sphere of existence ἐν τῆς σαρκί.

7.7-25 may be subdivided into two paragraphs, 7.7-13 and 7.14-25. As attractive as it is to follow the UBS and allow the rhetorical questions at 7.7 and 7.13 to provide the structural framework, the content of 7.13b is merely a peroration of Paul's first proof in 7.7-12. It is true that Paul introduces a word in 7.13, καταργαζομένη, which he will over-work in the following verses, but it is worth noting how differently the word functions in both paragraphs. In 7.13, the subject of καταργαζομένη is ἁμαρτία, but it is ἐγώ in the following verses. In addition, it is hard to see how 7.13b can be a header for 7.14-23, when the law moves to the background in 7.14-25, though never completely out of sight, but it is still front and center in 7.13. This evidence leads us to think 7.13 concludes the argument of 7.7b-12, whereas 7.14 acts as a header for the content of the second paragraph.

The argument of 7.7-13

These verses "explicate the expression τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου in v. 5." 7.7a states in the form of a rhetorical question an oxymoron, ὁ νόμος ἁμαρτία; and 7.12 answers this false

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1 ἀλλὰ ἡ ἁμαρτία διὰ τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ μοι καταργαζομένη θάνατον connects to 7.8, 9b-10 and 11; ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία connects to 7.7b; and ἵνα γένηται καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἁμαρτιώλος ἡ ἁμαρτία διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς connects to 7.8-9.

1 Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 145.

2 According to H. Lausberg, an "Oxymoron is the closely tightened syntactic linking of contradictory terms into a unity which, as a result, acquires a strong contradictory tension" (Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study,
conclusion. Although rejecting the notion that ἀμαρτία is attributable to νόμος, Paul still maintains that the two are connected, and this is due to the role assigned the law. He states that role at 7.7b, in the subpropositio of 7.7-13, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀμαρτίαν οὐκ ἐγνώς εἰ μὴ διὰ νόμου.'

At 7.7c, Paul introduces a partial quotation of the tenth commandment (LXX Exod 20.17 or Deut 5.21). Jean-Baptiste Édart says that by omitting the direct object modifiers for οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις (τὴν γυναῖκα, τὴν οἰκίαν, etc.), Paul can allude to the entire law and interpret the tenth commandment so as to forbid every kind of desiring, as πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν in 7.8 makes plain. The coming of the law became the means by which the cosmic power of sin was able to begin and carry out its manufacturing of πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν on the inside of the person (ἐνέμοι). There is no place for the protective role the law might play in the encounter with sin. The law may not be sin, but sin thrives in its presence.

Thus in Paul's discourse one is better off without it. For in 7.8b-10 he goes on to contrast chiastically the conditions of the person χωρίς νόμου and then ἐλθούσης τῆς ἐντολῆς. "Without the law," he says, "sin is dead" and "I was alive," but "when the commandment

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came," "sin sprang to life" and "I died." Paul has no difficulty in Romans speaking of the law as having been purposed to produce life, but all the law could do, weak as it was, was bring death. But this does not mean the law is to blame for the human predicament. Rather, as 7.11 says, the "active culprit" is sin, which was able to manipulate and exploit the law, seen as a "passive instrument."

The identity of the "I" in 7.7-13

In the context of constructing this elaboration and apology, Paul says some things about the ἐγώ. In 7.7-8 he speaks of the ἐγώ coming to know, that is, to experience sin through the law. In 7.9-11 he speaks of a time when the ἐγώ was alive apart from the law, but when the commandment came, sin sprang to life, deceived, and killed the ἐγώ.

We propose that the person being described abstrusely here in 7.7-13, by means of the rhetorical figure prosopopeia, is, as we have already hinted at, the person included in Paul's remark at 7.5: ὁ ἡμενὲν τῇ σαρκί. In that Paul saw himself as formerly ἐγώ.

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D. J. Moo, "Israel and Paul in Romans 7.7-12," NTS 32 (1986): 122.


So Theissen, Psychological Aspects, 201; Ziesler, "Tenth Commandment," 137 n. 2. Dunn, who defends the "Christian" interpretation of 7.7-25, recognizes that Paul is dealing with
τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ ὑπὸ νόμον, he is depicting his past, as well as that of other Jews to whom the law was given. We have no problem agreeing with Stowers that this passage is set off from 6.1–7.6 by a "change in voice (ἐναλλαγή or μεταβολή)," yet contrary to him, we are still dealing with the "authorial voice" of 7.5 and not just a rhetorically fictitious "I."

Yet even though Paul describes his past in 7.7–13, the past he is proffering is more of a theological interpretation of human existence ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ and ὑπὸ νόμον from the perspective of someone in Christ, rather than a personal autobiographical anecdote. This stratagem, seen already at 1.18–32 and 5.12–21, accounts for the allusions to Genesis 2–3. For just as Paul interprets the existence of the believer in terms of the τύπος Christ, so he depicts the person ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ and ὑπὸ νόμον in terms of Adam.

The argument of 7.14–25

This paragraph, which is set off from 7.7–13 by the conspicuous change of tense, still serves the same purposes as 7.7–13. But whereas the foregoing zeroed in on τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτίων τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου in 7.5, and had τὴν ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἔγνυ οὐ διὰ νόμου in 7.7b as its subpropositio, 7.14–25 elaborates on τὰ παθήματα τῶν "pre-Christian experience" in 7.7–13 ("Rom. 7,14–25 in the Theology of Paul," TZ 31 [1975]: 261).

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"Romans 7.7–25," 191.

So Moo, "Israel," 129; Édart, "Rhétorique," 363.

See also Ziesler, "Tenth Commandment," 150.

So Dunn, Romans 1–8, 381; Heckel, Innere Mensch, 180–181.
άμαρτίαν ἐνηγείτο ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν in 7.5, and has ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστιν.

εἰς δὲ σάρκινος εἰμι. πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν as its subpropositio.

Structurally, 7.14-17 and 7.18-20 parallel each other. Not only are both sections introduced by disclosure formulas, οἴδαμεν γάρ in 7.14 and οἶδα γάρ in 7.18, but they end with the same ten words in 7.17 and 7.20b. There are other similarities. Édart has distinguished four parallel stages in the reasoning of each section, and we have found this helpful for navigating the passage:

1) présentation de la thèse qui va être développée (v. 14b/v. 18a);
2) premier argument, reprise de la thèse (v. 15a/v. 18b);
3) deuxième argument sous la forme de correctiones (v. 15b/v. 19);
4) syllogisme conclusif toujours sous la forme de correctiones (vv. 16-17/v. 20).

In 7.14a Paul defends the essential goodness of the law by labeling it, somewhat surprisingly, πνευματικός. He then contrasts the πνευματικός law with the ἐγώ, which is σάρκινος πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν. 7.18, which stands parallel to 7.14, has σαρκί corresponding to σάρκινος, but noticeably absent is a counterpart to ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστιν, which suggests to us that the stress in the paragraph is being placed on the last half of the subpropositio in 7.14.

Édart divides 7.15-17 into two arguments and one concluding syllogism, a partition that is paralleled precisely in 7.18b-20.

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13 So, e.g., Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.454; Aletti, "Romans 7,7-25," 79; Édart, "Rhétorique," 373.
14 "Rhétorique," 374.
When the first arguments in each section are compared (15a and 18b), we see more difference than identity. In 7.15a, the "I" does not recognize its own behaviour as its own. But in 7.18b, willing is present in the "I," but doing what is good is not. The second arguments in each section (15b and 19) function to explain the first arguments. 7.15b and 7.19 are identical in content except for two variants. In the latter the object of the willing is identified as ἀγαθόν, a synonym of τὸ καλὸν in 7.18, and the hated behaviour of 7.15b is now identified as κακὸν.

In these verses Paul presents a topos, proverbial in the Hellenistic world, which speaks of a conflict between willing and doing in the person, which results in ἀκρασία. The person knows what ought to be done and even desires it, yet is unable to bring that good intention to actualization in behaviour. Similarly, the ἐγώ of Romans 7 finds it not just difficult to do the good, it finds it impossible.

The concluding syllogisms in 7.16-17 and 7.20 are word for word identical with the exception of σύμμηκτι τῷ νόμῳ ὁπὶ καλὸς in 7.16 and possibly ἐγώ in 7.20. This verbatim repetition of the conclusion in each section lays stress on the point Paul wants to score: οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ ἢ οἰκούσα ἐν ἑμοὶ ἀμαρτία. It is not

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2 So correctly, Lüdemann, Anthropologie, 15, 108; Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.453; contrary to Dunn, Romans 1-8, 391.
the ἐγὼ that does κακόν, but another force or entity altogether: ἡ σιγοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία.

Noticeably absent in 7.18-20 are verbal correspondents to ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστιν in 7.14 and σύμφωνη τῷ νόμῳ ὁ ποιν καλὸς in 7.16. Two explicit references to the law of Moses have been dropped and in their place τὸ καλὸν and ἁγαθὸν are substituted. Omitting explicit reference to the law suggests that Paul is now using the substantival adjectives inclusively, to encompass the law to be sure, but also the ἁγαθὸν that Gentiles, who do not have the law, pursue:

7.21 functions to draw an inference (ἀρα) from what Paul said in 7.14-20. Grammatically, τῷ θελοντὶ ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν τὸ καλὸν is placed ahead of the ὅποιείν clause, to which it belongs, for emphasis. The ὅποιείν clause following the verb of perception εὑρίσκω functions as an object clause explicating τὸν νόμον.

It is possible to see εὑρίσκω τὸν νόμον in 7.21 and εὑρέθη μοι ἡ ἑντολὴ in 7.10 as synonymous expressions, and thus to identify νόμος in 7.21 with the Mosaic law. This interpretation is attractive. Given the parallels between verses 16 and 22, it is

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1 In light of Rom 2.10, 14, Paul probably knew ἁγαθὸν was used in philosophical discourses (e.g., Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1094a; Epictetus, Diatr. 3.3.3-5; Diogenes Laertius 7.94) for the goal of virtuous action, and he equates Gentile doing τὸ ἁγαθὸν with doing τὰ τοῦ νόμου.

2 So Kuss, Romerbrief, 2.455; Cranfield, Romans, 1.362, who says the ὅποιείν clause as declarative "states the substance of the law under discussion"; Moo, Romans, 460; M. Winger, By What Law? The Meaning of Νόμος in the Letters of Paul, SBLDS 128 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), 81 n. 74. See also Robertson, Grammar,
clear that Paul is continuing his apology for the law. In addition, a change in meaning of νόμος at 7.21 leads to potential confusion. Dunn argues, in fact, that νόμος is used throughout these verses to denote the law of Moses, and that what we are dealing with is a duality in that law, in that it is determined by σάρξ/ἀμαρτία and πνεῦμα.\(^2\)

However, there are problems with taking νόμος as the law of Moses at 7.21. First, Dunn's interpretation of a duality in the law presupposes his interpretation of a split in the ἐγώ, which in turn presumes seeing the ἐγώ as a reference to baptized believers. But when it is shown, as we shall below, that this understanding of ἐγώ is not "the most natural interpretation of Rom. 7 itself and of Rom. 7 in its immediate context," then there is no need to posit a "two-sidedness" in the law.\(^2\) Secondly, if νόμος denotes the Mosaic law at 7.21, then paraphrased, Paul is saying, "So then, I find with respect to the Mosaic law, that (ὅτι) that which is evil (τὸ κακόν) is present in me who wishes to do the good." Paul is, therefore, seen to be equating in some sense the law and τὸ κακόν, but this creates a contradiction with 7.13 and the intent of the passage.\(^3\) Thirdly, an easier

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\(^2\) *Romans 1-8*, 387.

\(^2\) To quote Dunn, "Rom. 7,14-25," 258, against himself. See also idem, *Romans 1-8*, 392-395, 398.

\(^3\) If, as Dunn says, 7.21 "echoes and repeats in variant form what Paul has already said in v 10," (*Romans 1-8*, 392), then
interpretation of the verse is to be had when νόμος is understood as "principle" or paraphrased "to be true." Given the description of existence explicated in 7.14-20, Paul says, "I find this to be true," and the ὄν-clause gives the content of what was found. Thus, we conclude that with Paul's use of νόμος in verse 21 we are dealing with antanaclasis.\textsuperscript{11}

7.22-23 then functions to explain (γάρ) or unpack verse 21,\textsuperscript{11} and 7.24-25 functions to conclude the entire unit (7.7-25).\textsuperscript{11} In contrast to the antipathy at 1.32, where the reader is led along to applaud the verdict that the Gentile sinner is worthy of death, here in a verse thick with pathos, the reader's sympathies for the helpless victim are accentuated.\textsuperscript{11} For that person had been enslaved and made miserable by the merciless and murderous power of sin, and cries out in despair for deliverance ἐκ τοῦ

his chart on page 392 of his commentary is deceptive, for it fails to show the full picture of what should be paralleled: (1) he links εἰς ζωὴν with τὸ καλὸν, but what should be linked is ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ εἰς ζωὴν with τὸ καλὸν; and (2) he links εἰς θάνατον with τὸ κακὸν, even though εἰς θάνατον in 7.10 functions differently (result) from the way τὸ κακὸν does in 7.21 (definition). But again, what should be linked is αὕτη (= ἡ ἐντολὴ) εἰς θάνατον with τὸ κακὸν. Dunn avoids this conclusion by simply linking εἰς θάνατον and τὸ κακὸν, and taking the latter as result too ("actually helps bring about the opposite").\textsuperscript{11} Defined by Quintilian: "eiusdem verbi contraria significatio" (Inst. 9.3.68). For more arguments in support of our position, see Cranfield, Romans, 1.362.

\textsuperscript{11} So Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.455; Wilckens, Römer, 2.89; Cranfield, Romans, 1.362. I defer discussion of the internal argument of 7.22-25 until later.

\textsuperscript{11} So Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.458; Edart, "Rhétorique," 390, who speaks of Paul resorting to a "climax descendant" here.

\textsuperscript{11} On this, see Edart, "Rhétorique," 390.
With respect to 7.25b, we are inclined to consider it Pauline. It is, as we hope to show, a fitting summary of Paul's argument in the unit.

In the course of his argumentation Paul sets in parallel the νόμος in 7.7-13 and the ἐγώ in 7.14-23. Both have the best of intentions, but both are subjugated by and to a more powerful enemy, ἀμαρτία. Thus the real blame for the predicament of the person ἐν τῇ σαρκί and ὑπὸ νόμον is not to be found in the νόμος, or in the ἐγώ for that matter, but in ἀμαρτία itself.

The Identity of the "I" in 7.14-25

Dunn says the ἐγώ in 7.7-13 and 7.14-25 are more or less the same, and what we are dealing with is the existence of the believer. In support, he says that if 7.7-25 depicts "pre-Christian" existence, then it "becomes an unnecessary interruption and digression in Paul's train of thought, much more suited to the context of Rom. 2-3 than that of 6-8." But because "Romans is a much more carefully planned work than any of his other letters," he thinks "it is more likely that 7.7-25 belongs where it does by deliberate choice." Accordingly, Romans 7 is not a digression, but depicts the believer in relation to sin and the law, just as Romans 6 shows the believer's relation to sin, and

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15 Contrary to Bultmann, who says 7.25b "verrät sich als sekundär ... vor allem dadurch, daß sie den Sinn der vorangegangenen Ausführungen gar nicht wirklich trifft" ("Glossen im Römerbrief," TLZ 72 [1947]: 198).

16 "Rom. 7,14-25," 258. Dunn's theory, which is my counter-example, treats 7.7-13 and 7.14-25 as all of a piece, but we have
Romans 8 the relation to the law and Spirit. The differences between the chapters are accounted for by the fact that "the same condition" is being "viewed from different aspects." "The 'wretched man' of Rom. 7 may be the believer seen only in terms of the flesh, law and sin." He says that not only is the Christian interpretation "wholly of a piece with Paul's larger understanding of what the experience of grace means for the believer in the here and now," but that it is impossible to imagine that Paul could speak "so positively" of the "natural" mind. Only the mind renewed by the Spirit could confess that it agrees with and delights in God's law.¹

Nevertheless, we are convinced Paul is still portraying his past "pre-Christian" experience in 7.14-25, as well as that of any Jew ἐν τῇ σαρκί and ὑπὸ νόμου from the perspective of faith. Yet we also think that the denotation of the ἐγὼ has been expanded in these verses to include Gentiles as well. For as already mentioned, the two explicit references to the law, at 7.14 and 7.16, are omitted in 7.18-20 in favour of the generic ἀγαθὸν, which, incidentally, Paul had used at 2.10 to indicate the end of ethical pursuit for Jews and Gentiles. It may be that, in order to include Gentiles inside the boundary of the ἐγὼ, Paul dropped the reference to the Mosaic law in 7.18-20. Also, when this unit is synchronized with the content of 7.5 and the context of the

already seen (n. 10) that in practice, he differentiates between the two.

letter, then the likelihood of an expansion to draw Gentiles into the argument is increased.

In response to Dunn's contention that the pre-baptismal interpretation disrupts the context, we point out that even he concedes that in 7.7-13 Paul "describes his pre-Christian experience from his now Christian standpoint." And if that is so for 7.7-13, then it may be not only that 7.14-25 continues that stream of thought, but that Paul may have his reasons for placing the unit here. We suggest that even though the passage functions as an apology for the law (see 7.7 and 7.13), this is neither the passage's primary purpose, nor does it explain why Paul placed the unit here. Instead, the passage functions principally as an apology for Paul's law-free gospel in the face of the charge that it promotes sinful behaviour (6.1). For in 7.7-25, Paul describes what it was like formerly to have been ἐν τῇ σαρκί, and in particular what it was like to be ὑπὸ νόμου. Indeed, such a person ὑπὸ νόμου is no better off, because, as he explains in 7.7-25, the law cannot help in living a life pleasing to God, because it has never been able to prevent sinning, and what is more, it has colluded with the power of sin to produce a situation of despondency and bondage, which results in death. Paul is showing just how unappealing, from his point of view, life ὑπὸ νόμου is.

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2: Moo provides a plausible explanation for the change from past tense in 7.7-13 to present in 7.14-25: "Paul first narrates past events, then depicts the continuing status of those who were involved in those events" (Romans, 451).
This passage thereby illustrates the necessity of believers at Rome adopting his law-free gospel—a gospel that does not promote sinning as some thought—in order to attain life.

In response to Dunn's view that the Christian interpretation "is wholly of a piece with Paul's larger understanding of what the experience of grace means," we argue, to the contrary, that such a view thoroughly undermines and contradicts the argument in 6.1-7.6 and 8.1-17. No matter how far Dunn can stretch the eschatological "already ... not yet" in order to soften the resulting contradictions that his interpretation generates, the fact remains that in Romans 6-8 Paul explicates human existence in terms of an eschatological "either ... or."\(^{13}\) This is witnessed as far back as 5.15, but it comes to explicit expression at 6.16 and in what follows (to 8.13). Either the baptized, for whom there is no ἀκρασία, indenture themselves to the enslaving power of sin, which results again in death, or they indenture themselves to righteousness, with the result, life. They had been enslaved to sin, but now are free; they were ὑπὸ νόμον, but now have died ἐν ὑπ' ἑκατερόμεθα; they were ἐν τῇ σαρκί, but now are ἐν πνεύματι. But if at 7.14 Paul introduces the notion that the believer is still πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, and thus unconditionally and wholly impotent, as ἄκρατις, to bring to actualization the desired good, then we have a situation that not only contradicts the surrounding context, but also one where the

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\(^{13}\) Dunn concedes this. See his "Jesus-Flesh and Spirit: An Exposition of Romans I.3-4," JTS 24 (1973): 52-53.
baptized is seen to be simultaneously an enemy of God and at peace with God, where the believer remains enslaved to the power of sin and free from it.

Finally, to counter Dunn's argument that only a believer could desire to obey the law, we need only point out that Paul already acknowledged at 2.17-20 that unbelieving Jews know that they have τὴν μόρφωσιν τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν τῇ νόμῳ.

In sum, in 7.14-25 Paul serves up a theological interpretation of what it was like for himself and his readers, when they were ἐν τῇ σάρκι and ὑπὸ νομὸν. We also noted that 7.21 functions to draw an inference from the argument in 7.14-20, and that 7.22-23 functions to explain what Paul says in 7.21. Furthermore, we argued that νόμος in 7.21 is not the law of Moses but could be translated "principle," or paraphrased "to be true." Since 7.22-23 explains 7.21, and together they explicate 7.14-20, and in particular the subpropositio at 7.14, we commence our analysis of Paul's view of the body in 7.7-25 at 7.21-23, and then move back to 7.14-20, before finally considering 7.24-25.

2 The Body in 7.21-23

At 7.23, Paul employs μέλος, a word we have already met at 6.13, where it served to signify the physical body seen through its parts. Our task, assuming he supplies this word with content at 7.23, is to determine what that content is, and explore how that content contributes to the argument of 7.22-23. However, in 7.21-23, Paul also makes use of several other consequential terms in discussing the person, ἐσωάνθρωπος, νοῦς, and the personal
pronoun. Because, as our critique of the interpretation of Bultmann will show below, how these terms are interpreted effects how one understands μέλος, it is imperative that we spread our net wide and cover not only μέλος, but the other anthropological terms found there as well.

_Critique of Bultmann's interpretation_

Bultmann's explanation of the anthropology in 7.22-23, which is our counter-example, cannot be understood apart from his powerful exposition of the anthropology in 7.14-25. Thus to be fair to his interpretation we avoid a piecemeal treatment and present his view in full, as well as a critique. According to him, Paul does not use ἐσοφ ἀνθρωπος, μέλος, νοῦς, σάρξ, σάρκινος, and σώμα in 7.14-25 to denote things-in-themselves, a view which would entail anthropological dualism. Rather, the terms have to do with relationships, or with what he calls the "formal structures" of "human existence."³¹

Built-in to human existence is the possibility of the person losing self-control, and thus "being at the mercy of a power not one's own." This "outside power can be experienced as an enemy power which estranges man from himself." Here, where the person views itself as an object of its own action, we are dealing with a way of "perverted" self-perception or inauthentic existence. This is what Paul describes with μέλος at 7.23, as well as with its synonym σώμα at 7.24, about which Bultmann says,

³¹ Theology, 1.191-192, 193, 196, 201, 209.
"soma means the sin-ruled self, the self under the sway of sin—and that cry applies not to release from the soma absolutely, but release from this soma as it is ruled through and through by 'flesh', and that really means release from 'flesh' itself." Thus σῶμα is identified with σάρξ as the "outside power," an enemy "which estranges man from himself."

On the other hand, Paul uses ἐσω ἄνθρωπος at 7.22 for the "formal designation for that self" that has an "appropriate" relationship with itself, when that self "is the subject of his own willing and doing, when he is his real self who can distinguish himself from his soma-self." Even though ἐσω ἄνθρωπος is "derived from the anthropology of Hellenistic dualism," Paul fills the term with his own significations, since it is used differently in the two texts where it is employed. At 7.22, it "is the bearer of man's real will," it is "man's real self in contrast to the self that has come under the sway of sin," but at 2 Cor 4.16, it stands "in contrast to the physical body."

Likewise, Paul uses νοῦς at 7.23 in its full "formal-ontological meaning," synonymously with ἐσω ἄνθρωπος, to signify the "will," "inclination," "intent," or "understanding volition" that belongs to the person as a person. It is not the mind seen as a special faculty, but the "knowing, understanding, and judging" that determines which somatic attitude will be adopted.

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13 Theology, 1.196, 197, 200.
14 Theology, 1.197, 200, 203.
When the \( \text{νοῦς} \) as will becomes estranged from itself it "falls under the sway of flesh - exactly the cleft which Rom. 7:14ff. depicts." In Romans 7, the estranged relationship with oneself "is regarded as so far-reaching that this second self seems almost a foreign one, not belonging to the same person." With this cleft the two possibilities of somatic existence come to expression. On the one side is the \( \sigma\omega\mu\alpha \) as \( \epsilon\gamma\omega, \ \epsilon\gamma\omega \ \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\omicron\varsigma, \) or \( \text{νοῦς}. \) This will wills the good, which for Bultmann is life itself. On the other side is the \( \sigma\omega\mu\alpha \) or \( \mu\ell\eta, \) determined by \( \sigma\alpha\nu\zeta. \)

To be controlled by the \( \sigma\alpha\nu\zeta \) is to be in a sphere of existence characterized by sinning. Paul uses \( \sigma\alpha\nu\kappa\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma \) at 7.14 to describe this "sinful" manner of existence, and people who live in accordance with this existence are enslaved to it, for as Bultmann sees things, "there is for man no absolute belonging-to-one's-self." Since \( \sigma\alpha\nu\zeta \) or sin - for \( \alpha\mu\alpha\rho\tau\tau\iota\alpha \) would be a suitable synonym for \( \sigma\alpha\nu\zeta \) - enslaves, it is manifest that \( \sigma\alpha\nu\zeta \) is a personified "power," which has "a definite tendency peculiar to itself," and which dominates human willing and acting. Paul does not see sin as a cosmological power, however. He is using figurative, rhetorical language to express the fact that people have lost the capacity to be the subject of their own actions.\(^{13}\)

Powerless in the face of these powers, "the true self" becomes "inwardly split," for at the level of "willing," the "I" and the "flesh" are opposed to each other, which means the same as the "'I' and 'I', self and self, are at war with each other."

He reaches this conclusion by equating οὐρα in verse 18 with the ἐγώ, and then deducing, "it is apparent that the subject-self, the true self of a man, is inwardly split," because that subject-self can "distinguish itself from the 'sin which dwells in me'."

The ωφρησθησαί person, accordingly, is precisely the person split between willing good and doing evil. And "to be innerly divided," Bultmann says, "is the essence of human existence under sin."\(^1\)

Bultmann recognized a problem with all this as it comes to expression in 7.14-25. The "formal-ontological meaning" of οὐχ requires that it be "a formal, neutral possibility capable of taking either direction," but the "ontic point of view" is the οὐχ "already pointed in one specific direction."\(^2\): Therefore, in order for his construal of Paul's "ontological structure of human existence" to work, Paul must keep distinct the ontological and ontic understandings of οὐχ/ἐσω ἄνθρωπος. But 7.14-25 says the οὐχ

\(^1\) Theology, 1.245; "Romans 7," 151.

is naturally inclined to the good. So Bultmann reasons that the ontological and ontic points of view are "peculiarly intertwined" here. Given his construal, it is easy to see the ontic aspect. The intertwined ontological point of view, though, he sees coming to expression in "willing what the Law requires." The law was given for life (7.10), and the ὑποκρίτης has the natural inclination to pursue that. But "as 'depraved inclination' (Rom. 1.28)," the ὑποκρίτης, in striving for what the law requires, "may factually be striving toward the bad." Thus both ontic possibilities of the ὑποκρίτης's ontological existence are expressed in 7.14-25 in the pursuit of the law.

However, when Bultmann's view is checked against the reality of the text, it emerges that this is not what Paul said, even were we to concede that the anthropological terms have nothing to do with things-in-themselves. For even according to the rules of Bultmann's game, as hard as he tries to derive both ontic possibilities from the text, all we have here is an exclusively positive perspective. Without qualification the ὑποκρίτης recognizes and desires the good. There is absolutely no hint in this passage that with the notion of seeking the good, which the law demands and which the ὑποκρίτης desires, what we are dealing with is a manifestation of a "depraved inclination" or a display of ὀμφάλων existence. He makes the text pronounce this so that he can say, "all the possibilities that human existence has" reside

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in the ψωκ, since it is there in the willing subject that the person has the possibility "of choosing one's goal, of deciding for good or evil, for or against God." The human problem, according to Bultmann's reading of 7.7-25, ultimately lies in the ψωκ. Although he is right that "the nous has the possibility of recognizing the demand of the good," he is wrong to think that Paul says in this passage that the ψωκ has "the ontic possibility of being good or evil," of being able to assume responsibility for choosing the path of life," of being able "to lay hold of one's true existence." Quite the contrary, Paul has the ψωκ, or ἐγώ, or ἐστι ἀνθρωπος declare twice, at 7.17 and for emphasis again at 7.20, that it is not at all responsible for its body's evil behaviour. Rather, that responsibility belongs to another power altogether, ἀμαρτία. To reduce that power to "the possibilities of historical existence," is to fail to observe that for Paul, that power, namely ἀμαρτία, is expressly culpable for the evil behaviour and at the same time is external to the ἐγώ, but not the σάρξ, and also that Paul teaches that even if the person wills the good, the achievement of it is impossible. The problem,

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12 Theology, 1.209, 213.
13 Theology, 1.215, 218.
14 Theology, 1.219, 228, 232.
15 "Romans 7," 150.
according to 7.7-25, does not ultimately lie where Bultmann would have it, in the ἐγώ as will, but elsewhere."

Of course, Bultmann the exegete takes note of the text's determinism, which expresses itself in the utter incapacitation of the ἐγώ to do the good. But Bultmann the theologian does not, and in the process he serves up two mutually exclusive interpretations of the identity of the ἐγώ in Romans 7. For on the one hand, he agrees with Kümmel that "the situation characterized here is the general situation of man under the law and, to be sure, as it appears to the eye of one who has been freed from the law by Christ." But he also says that the ἐγώ "is man insofar as he knows about his authenticity," and "to know about one's authenticity" is "to be determined by the claim of God," since they "are one and the same thing."

There is another problem. Although Bultmann recognizes that τοῦτο ἔστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ μου at 7.18 functions restrictively with respect to ἐνέμοι, his interpretation amounts to reading the text as ἐν σαρκὶ, τοῦτο ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ἐμοί. This move can then substantiate "the ontological structure of existence" that he sees coming to

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14 Bultmann was aware of this criticism ("Romans 7," 151), but his response is not convincing. He fails to observe that it is an altogether different will that wins the day. We are not dealing with a split in the ἐγώ, but with two separate willing entities, the ἐγώ that desires the good, and ἀμαρτία lodged in the σάρξ.

15 See, e.g., Theology, 1.235, 243-244.

16 "Romans 7," 147, 151-152; "Significance," 153.

17 Theology, 1.245.
expression in the text, that the "'I' and 'I', self and self," is split. But were one to read what Paul actually wrote, one faces the likelihood that the split between "willing and doing" is not internal to the single subject, νοῦς, but is between "two constituent elements" of the person, the νοῦς/ἐσω ἀνθρωπος and the μέλη/σώμα.

An interpretation that misreads the text to substantiate itself must be called into question. It emerges, then, that he gives the νοῦς or ἐσω ἀνθρωπος in Romans 7 the same "ontic" possibilities as the believer possesses in Romans 8. In short, Bultmann's exposition of Paul's anthropology in 7.14-25 is on its own terms internally incoherent and built on a misreading of the text.

The meaning of ἐσω ἀνθρωπος at 7.22 and νοῦς at 7.23

Plato originated the concept contained in the phrase ἐσω ἀνθρωπος, although he wrote, τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἐντός ἀνθρωπος. No debate gyrates around what he meant. "The person within the person" is the νοῦς or τὸ λογιστικὸν, the reasoning faculty of the soul. Although Paul neither holds to Plato's tripartite architecture of the soul nor its original divinity, we are nevertheless persuaded he utilizes ἐσω ἀνθρωπος at 7.22 to denote the interior faculty of thinking and willing, for several reasons.

"Romans 7," 151.

First, it is how he uses ὀ ἑσον (ἄνθρωπος) at 2 Cor 4.16, the only other occurrence in the undisputed Paulines. In light of 2 Cor 4.12, we might suppose he is speaking of frail, mortal human existence with ὀ ἑσον ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος, and thus with ὀ ἑσον ἡμῶν, of human existence that manifests "the life of Jesus" (4.11). But the thoroughgoing anthropological dualism voiced in the context from early in 2 Corinthians 4 down to 5.10 points us in a different direction. Already we have said that ἡ ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν ὀικίᾳ τοῦ σκύνους at 5.1 is the mortal, physical body (τὸ θνητὸν at 5.4; σῶματι at 5.6). In this body Paul groans and longs to be clothed with the ὀικίαν ἁμαρτοποιητον αἰώνιον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, which can only be taken possession of after the earthly body, which is metaphorically spoken of as a tent, is destroyed (5.1-4).  

The fact that he wonders about being found "naked" (5.3, 4), that is, not dwelling in the present "tent" or anticipated "house," indicates that this body is something one has. It is distinguishable from the "I." Moving back to 4.7, it makes excellent sense to identify the "clay jars" with the "earthly tent" of 5.1. For Paul speaks of "this treasure," which God shone ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν (4.6), as being contained ἐν ὀστρακίνοις σκεύεσιν (4.7). Then he goes on to speak of carrying "the death of Jesus" ἐν τῷ σώματι, "in order that the life

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12 As witnessed at Wis 9.15, the σῶμα is already spoken of as a "tent" over against the νησί or νοῦς in Hellenistic Judaism. See M. E. Thrall, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 1.357-358.

13 That is, τοῦ εὐαγγέλιου τῆς δόξης τοῦ Χριστοῦ of 4.4 or γνώσεως τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ of 4.6.
of Jesus might be manifest ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν (4.10). If he concluded the letter at 4.18, then the case is made for equating ἐν τῷ σώματι with ἐν ἡμῖν in 4.12. But when 4.7-18 and 5.1-6 are read together, it becomes clear that the reason for Paul's groaning for release from the present body and longing for the τὸ ἐξορανθήμα τοῦ θεοῦ (5.2), is due, not to the materiality or evil nature of the body, but to the apostolic hardships he experienced in preaching (4.8-10a, 13, 17a). He speaks of carrying these apostolic hardships ἐν τῷ σώματι (4.10), the same σώμα as 5.6. This, then, is the ὅ ἐστι ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος of 4.16. It is a tent that will be torn down, but even now, under the weight of affliction (4.17), is in the process of decay (διαφθείρεται). Over against this is the ὅ ἐστι ἡμῶν (ἄνθρωπος), which is the καρδία of 4.6; and presently resides ἐν τῷ σώματι, but awaits a "house, not made by hands, eternal in the heavens." And just as the body experiences proleptically its fate now, so the ὅ ἐστι ἡμῶν (ἄνθρωπος) presently experiences to some degree its eschatological fate as well, since ἀνακανονθῆται ἡμέρα καὶ ἡμέρα. In sum, although

11 For Bultmann, this is one of those side-lined passages where Paul "comes very close to Hellenistic-Gnostic dualism" in seeing the ἐστὶ ἄνθρωπος as the self contained inside the "inappropriate shell" of the "physical body distressed by care and suffering" (Theology, 1.201-202).

12 Jewett convinces us that νοήματα at 4.4, as at 3.14, 10.5, and perhaps 11.3, do not denote "thoughts," but the νοῦς. In which case, νοήματα at 4.4 is equivalent to καρδίαις at 4.6 (Anthropological Terms, 380-384).

13 See Moo, Romans, 462 n. 67. To equate ὅ ἐστι ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος with the παλαιόν ἄνθρωπον of Col 3.9, as Dunn does ("Rom. 7.14-25," 262; idem, The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon, NIGTC [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996], 220-221), and then interpret these terms as a "whole way of life" "prior to faith in Christ,"
this treatment does not determine how Paul uses ἔσω ἄνθρωπος at Rom 7.22, yet it does show that he can use the term anthropologically, without any soteriological sophistication, to denote the interior "I" or καρδία, separate and separable from the ὁ ἐξω ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος, σῶμα, or μέλη.¹

Secondly, additional support for the view that the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος of 7.22 signifies the interior faculty of thinking and willing is seen in the next verse, where Paul uses νοῦς as a synonym for ἔσω ἄνθρωπος,¹ inasmuch as, according to Heckel, "Eine Bedeutungsnuance wird durch den Kontext nicht vorbereitet."

Heckel then adds that ἔσω ἄνθρωπος and νοῦς stand out together here as very appropriate words to indicate the "Innenbereich des Menschen," since νοῦς was a "Komplementarbegriff" for the "Inneren Menschen" "in die platonische Tradition,"¹ as well as in

violates the argument of 2 Corinthians 4-5, since Paul connects ὁ ἐξω ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος with his apostolic hardships, not with some continuing sin nature.

¹ In addition to Bultmann and Stacey, Ludemann (Anthropologie, 3, 13, 12-19), Jewett (Anthropological Terms, 399), Gundry (Sōma, 135-137), Boyarin (Radical Jew, 82-83), Thrall (Second Epistle, 1.348-351), and Moo (Romans, 462 n. 67), see anthropological dualism at 2 Cor 4.16.

¹¹ So Ludemann, Anthropologie, 3, 13, 12-19 passim; Lietzmann, Römer, 74; Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 388, 399, 401; Cranfield, Romans, 1.363; Gundry, Sōma, 35 n. 4, 137: "Paul associates the 'inner man' quite Hellenistically with the 'mind'"; Moo, Romans, 464; Aune, "Human Nature," 300.

¹² Innere Mensch, 193, 194: "Der Beleg aus dem Römerbrief zeigt nun, daß Paulus nicht ahnungslos Stichwörter übernommen hat, sondern auch über die sachgerechte Verwendung der Begriffe Bescheid wußte." Boyarin says, "The association of the inner self with nous strengthens the platonic connections of the thought sevenfold" (Radical Jew, 83). Even Dunn says, "It is quite
Hellenistic Judaism, \(^\dag\) and elsewhere in Paul, at Rom 1.28.\(^2\)

Furthermore, we add what no one disputes, that since at 7.23 με is a synonym for νοῦς, we gather that Paul uses ἐσω ἀνθρωπός, νοῦς, and ἐγώ interchangeably in these two verses.

Thirdly, understanding ἐσω ἀνθρωπός as the interior faculty of thinking and willing is most probably how Paul's readers at Rome would have understood the term.\(^3\) In its variety of forms, the concept "had become widespread in the hellenistic world."\(^1\)

In addition, when 7.14-25 is taken to portray pre-baptismal existence ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ and ὑπὸ νόμον, as we have argued, then there is no justification whatsoever for Dunn's judgment that ἐσω ἀνθρωπός is "the 'I' insofar as I am already united with Christ in his death and share in his resurrection."\(^4\)

In sum, there are several sound arguments for taking ἐσω ἀνθρωπόν in 7.22, and νοῦς and με in 7.23, as denoting the interior faculty of thinking and willing. On the other hand, there are no possible in fact that the phrase here reflects Paul's awareness of the anthropological dualism of Greek thought, where the mind, the rational, is precisely 'the inner man'" (Romans 1-8, 395).

\(^1\) See, e.g., LXX Job 7.20, 36.19; Wis 4.12, 9.15; 4 Macc 1.35, 2.16. On Philo, see Chapter 6. For additional references, see J. Behm, "νοέω, νοος κτλ," TDNT 4:953-954.

\(^2\) So also Moo, Romans, 118 n. 141.

\(^3\) Contrary to Dunn, Romans 1-8, 394.

\(^4\) Thrall, Second Epistle, 1.348.

\(^5\) Romans 1-8, 394. For Dunn, like Bultmann, the "'I' is split," since it is determined simultaneously by ἁμαρτία and πνεῦμα. The side determined by πνεῦμα comes to expression at 7.22 in the Christian or ἐσω ἀνθρωπος delighting in the law.
sustainable opposing reasons that might lead us to call this judgment into question.

The meaning of μέλεσιν at 7.23

Paul uses μέλος twice in 7.23. We established earlier that he used μέλος at 6.13 to represent the physical body, seen from the viewpoint of its parts or limbs. The term appeared again at 7.5 (ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν). We think, however, that an adequate interpretation of its usage in the propositio will need to take account of the elaboration of the argument in which the term appears again, at 7.23.

Plainly there are no textual clues at 7.23 to lead us to infer the word's meaning has been altered from its usage at 6.13. Furthermore, since μέλεσιν in 7.23a stands opposed to ἐσωάνθρωπον in 7.22, it makes sense to take it as referring to the physical body, because, as we have just argued, ἐσωάνθρωπον in 7.22 refers to the interior faculty of thinking and willing. In addition, a similar contrast is also witnessed in the context of the second occurrence of μέλος in 7.23. There, μέλεσιν stands opposite νοος and με, two words that we have also proposed Paul uses synonymously with ἐσωάνθρωπον to indicate the interior faculty.²⁵

Therefore, we conclude our discussion of the basic meaning of the anthropological terms in 7.21-23 with a reaffirmation that with ἐσωάνθρωπον in 7.22, and νοος and με in 7.23, Paul signifies the interior faculty of reasoning and willing, and that with

²⁵ So similarly Moo, Romans, 462 n. 70.
μέλεαν in both its occurrences in 7.23 he signifies the physical body. What, then, does this mean for the interpretation of 7.22-23?

*The argument of 7.22-23*

Édart points out most perspicaciously that in the argument of 7.22-23 Paul "procède ni par induction ni par déduction mais il recours à une une preuve de «fait», nécessairement vraie." To be rhetorically effective, Paul had to suppose his readers would have concurred that the "fait" of 7.23 was necessarily true.

In 7.22, which explicates 7.21 and in particular τὸ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν, Paul says, "I rejoice in the law of God," and this attitude corresponds to the ἐσω ἄνθρωπον. By using ἐσω ἄνθρωπος he makes it clear what part of the person agrees with the law of God; it is "the person inside."

We have a reference to the Mosaic law in the phrase τὸ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ at 7.22. The parallel at 7.16 invites such a reading, and one purpose of the passage is to protect Paul's gospel against an indictment of malevolency toward the law." Yet just as we saw that Paul uses τὸ καλόν and ἄγαθὸν in 7.18-19 to encompass both the Mosaic law and the ἄγαθὸν that Gentiles pursue, so we think νόμος at 7.22 is being used in the same inclusive sense."

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"Édart, "Rhétorique," 385.

* So Édart, "Rhétorique," 385.

ε See Édart, "Rhétorique," 387.

" So Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.456.
In 7.23, which stands in contrast (δὲ) to 7.22, we have the explication of ἐμοὶ τὸ κακὸν παράκειται in 7.21. Paul formulates the verse chiastically:


There are obstacles standing in the way of seeing any explicit reference to the Mosaic law in the three occurrences of νόμος here. With respect to its first occurrence, at 7.23a, if we are dealing with the law of Moses, then it is the subject of the two participles in 7.23b and 23c. Since the entire verse explicates 7.21, the case would become stronger that not only is νόμος in 7.21 the law of Moses, but that Paul is equating it with κακὸν, for according to 7.23 the law would have moved from being a passive and helpless victim of sin (7.7-13) to being an evil co-conspirator. But as we have already said, this contradicts 7.13 and the intent of the passage. Furthermore, when 7.14-25 is taken to refer to human existence prior to baptism, and when the anthropological terms are taken anthropologically and not soteriologically, as Bultmann and Dunn did, then there is no need to posit a split in the "I," at least in terms of an "eschatological tension," or a corresponding "two-sidedness" in

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So similarly Édart, "Rhétorique," 386; Moo, Romans, 463-464.

Only in appearance is my view similar to Dunn's. Both views posit a split in the "I" qua ἀνθρωπος, but his sees the
the law. Without that "two-sidedness" in the law, it is impossible to assert that ἕτερον νόμον refers to the Mosaic law.

Instead, since both ἕτερον νόμον at 7.23a and νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας at 7.23d are qualified by (τῷ ὄντι) ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου, "it seems natural," as Cranfield says, "to identify the ἕτερος νόμος with the νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας." This, then, defines the ἕτερος νόμον in 7.23a. Paul is thereby using νόμος in these two clauses (7.23a and d) after the manner of what Heikki Raisänen calls "a typical kind of behaviour or a characteristic tendency." Sin, which continues to be seen here as a power, has a law-like tendency, and that is to wage war τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοὸς μου and from its stronghold ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου take me captive.

Kuss, Cranfield, and Moo agree that the references to νόμος at 7.23a and 23d do not signify the Mosaic law, but they still think νόμος at 7.23b does, since τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοὸς μου is "closely related" to τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ of 7.22. Accordingly, Paul is speaking of the law "which my mind acknowledges." There are thus two laws split in terms of the "process of salvation" (Romans 1-8, 398-399, 411), whereas mine sees the split in terms of the component parts of the individual (anthropological dualism).

Romans, 1.364.


in opposition, the law of the power of sin and the law of Moses. The attractiveness of this view lies in its parsimony.

But it is also possible to see ὁ νόμος functioning in 7.23b just as it does in 7.23a and d, and consequently see only an indirect reference to the Mosaic law at 7.23b. In light of the broader context, we believe this is preferable. In 7.7-20, sin is seen to be always only in pursuit of the person, and in this assault, it has on its side the Mosaic law (7.8-11). Prior to 7.23b there is nothing about sin waging a direct war against the Mosaic law, and we think there is no need - parsimony can work both ways - to introduce a new thought here. So, by means of this strange phrase ὁ νόμος τοῦ νοὸς μου, whereby Paul admittedly and deliberately plays on what he has just said in 7.22, he says that the νοῦς also has a characteristic tendency, to will the good and rejoice in the Mosaic law. The Mosaic law is thus present in an indirect way, although with νόμος itself, we are inclined to see it functioning as it does in 7.23a and d.

In sum, we see coming to expression in 7.22-23 three "laws." There is the Mosaic law (7.22), but then there are two

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7 Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.457; Cranfield, Romans, 1.364; Moo, Romans, 464.

laws internal to the person." There is the "other law" (7.23a), which is the same as the "law of sin" (7.23d). By means of these expressions Paul says that the power of sin, which is located in the physical body, manifests its characteristic tendency to wage war against the "law of my mind" (7.23), seen here as the characteristic tendency of the mind to will the Mosaic law (7.22). The consequence of this warfare is the enslavement of the μή.

Here, then, we have the rationale why the ἑγώ qua νοῦς is powerless and unable to bring to actualization its commendable intention to do the good. Drawing on metaphors of warfare, Paul sees the ἐπιρροή νομοῦ, namely the power of sin, having its accustomed habitation ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν. From this base of operations in the body, sin carries out its typical or characteristic behaviour of "making war against" (ἀντιστρατευόμενον) the νοῦς and "taking it (μή) captive" (αἰχμαλωτιζόμενα). Paul has taken up topoi, common among writers in the Hellenistic world, which speak of the soul's captivity in the body and of the incessant warfare between body and soul, and tailored them to his own design. For now the warfare is not directly between the mind and body, but between

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So Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 183.

Édard rightly says 7.23 is where Paul develops "la thèse centrale" of the paragraph ("Rhétorique," 385).

Concerning the indwelling of sin in the body, Édard says, "L'inhabitation du péché indique que celui-ci n'apparaît pas comme une force contraignante extérieure à l'homme, mais intérieure à celui-ci et y demeurant habituellement" ("Rhétorique," 378).
the mind and the power of sin, which dwells in the body (ἐν τοῖς μελεσίν μου; twice in 7.23). Furthermore, the place of the mind's confinement or slavery is, to be precise, in sin (ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας), which happens to be in the body (ἐν τοῖς μελεσίν μου).

Finally, in Paul's appropriation of these topoi there is no hope at all of victory for the mind. But in Hellenistic thought the mind had an innate capacity to wage war against the body and be victorious, theoretically at least for all people, but practically only for a few. To be precise, therefore, the conflict is not, as Lüdemann and Lietzmann maintained, directly between the νοῦς and σώφρος (= μέλη), seen as the "Quell" (Lüdemann) or "Ursache der Sünde" (Lietzmann), but between the mind and the cosmic power of sin.

Moreover, we may now have the reason Paul placed τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν τὸ καλὸν ahead of the ὁπ-clause in 7.21. It is placed there, not to stand in apposition to the ἐμοὶ inside the ὁπ-clause, but in distinction from it. For just as 7.22 explicates τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν in 7.21, so also ἐν τοῖς μελεσίν in 7.23 explicates the ἐμοὶ inside the ὁπ-clause of 7.21. Had Paul written ὁπ ἐν τοῖς μελεσίν μου τὸ κακὸν παράκειται in 7.21 he would not have meant anything different.  

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1: Paul's position is the antithesis of 4 Macc 1.35.

2: Lüdemann, Anthropologie, 54, 96; Lietzmann, Römer, 74, 75.

3: Thus, according to my interpretation, it would be possible to speak of a split in the ἐγώ, but only so long as the personal pronoun in 7.14-25 is sometimes seen as synonymous with
3 Marking the Flesh in 7.14-20

With this understanding of 7.21-23 in hand, we are now well situated to interpret Paul's usage of σάρξ at 7.18 and σάρκινος in the subpropositio at 7.14.

Nothing good in my flesh

Parallels between 7.18 and 7.21-23 provide substantiation for taking σάρξ at 7.18 as the material body. We saw at 7.21-23 that Paul links τὸ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν and συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ with τὸν ἐσο ναθραπόν, and that ἐσο ναθραπόν, νούς, and με function as anthropological terms to signify the interior faculty of reasoning and willing, whereas he links τὸ κακόν παράκειται and ἔτερον νόμον/ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας with ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν, that is, the physical body. At 7.18, when σαρκι is understood as the person's material body, we see the same anthropological dualism, the same link between the body of flesh and the power of sin, the latter expressed at 7.18 by οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἡγαθόν, and the same link between the ἐγώ (qua νούς) and good intentions. This should not surprise us, since 7.21-23 functions as a deduction from and clarification of 7.15-20.

νούς and ἐσο ναθραπόν, as at 7.23, sometimes seen as synonymous with μέλη and σῶμα, as at 7.21c, and sometimes seen as meaning the whole person, mind and body, as probably at 7.14, 7.24a (ἐγώ ἀνθρωπός), and 7.25b (σὺ τός ἐγώ). The problem here is that we are potentially bringing a level of precision to Paul’s use of terms that he did not intend. On this Kuss says: "Auch hier wird es gut sein, sich von vornherein klarzumachen, daß Paulus nicht mit einem System scharfgeschliffener Begriffe arbeitet, daß er sich weitgehend der unbestimmten Terminologie einer eher »volkstümlichen« als exakt philosophischen Sprechweise bedient" (Römerbrief, 2.506).
Paul says at 7.18, "Good does not dwell in me" (οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐμοί ... ἀγαθόν), but he clarifies ἐν ἐμοί, which he picked up from 7.17b, so that he will not be misunderstood, "that is in my flesh." This τοῦτ’ ἐστιν ἡ σαρκί μου functions restrictively. It defines more carefully what he means by the ἐν ἐμοί of 7.17b and 18a. We must not fill the content of this ἐμοί with the content of με at 7.23. There, the context demanded that it denote the νοῦς. But at 7.18 it means "me (ἐγώ), that is, the whole person (ἄνθρωπος)." Nevertheless, he does not actually want to say that good does not dwell in the whole person. So he narrows down the meaning from whole to part, from ἐγώ as ἄνθρωπος to corporeal σάρξ. Accordingly, when he says, "Good does not dwell in me," what he really means is, οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου ἀγαθόν. Essentially then, if we may be allowed to impose the anthropological terms of 7.22-23 on 7.18, what gets dislodged from the ἐμοί of 7.17b and 7.18a by the restrictive clause τοῦτ’ ἐστιν ἡ σαρκί μου is the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος or νοῦς, and what remains is the μέλη, expressed now by σάρξ.

When we step back to examine the contribution of 7.18 to the argument of the immediate context, we observe that in order

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117 So W. G. Kümmel, Römer 7 und das Bild des Menschen im Neuen Testament: Zwei Studien, TB 53 (Munich: Kaiser, 1974), 61; Moo, Romans, 458. According to Sand, σάρξ should not be taken restrictively, because, "Nicht in der Substanz 'Fleisch', so daß σάρξ 'im stofflichen Sinne als Herd sündiger Begierden und als Sitz der Sünde' zu begreifen sei, nicht im Leibe wohnt die Sünde, sondern der ganze Mensch ist Sünder" (Begriff, 190; he quotes W. Schauf). 7.23 suggests otherwise.

118 So even Bultmann, "Romans 7," 151; Sand, Begriff, 193 n. 3.
to get to 7.16b, σύμφωμα τῷ νόμῳ ὑπὶ καλός, Paul says at 7.16a that the person does things it does not want to do. 7.16a is then qualified by 7.17. It is not the ἐγώ - it is absolved - that does these undesirable things, but the power of sin that dwells ἐνέμοι. 7.18 provides the needed explanation and clarification. What he says at 7.17b with ἡ οἰκουσία ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία, is now expressed at 7.18a by οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτόν. But what he intends to say, as the restrictive clause shows, is that the power of sin dwells in the body of flesh.

Furthermore, the parallelism between 7.16a and 7.18b (Θέλω and τὸ θέλειν) invites us to equate the ἐγώ of 7.17a, which is the expressed subject of Θέλω in 7.16a, with the μοι at 7.18b. Thus this μοι, which may be seen as that part of the person excluded from the ἐνέμοι by the restrictive clause,\footnote{To impose the language of 7.22-23 again, what is excluded from ἐνέμοι by the restrictive clause is the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος or νοῦς.} and which is the same ἐγώ of 7.17a, truly is absolved, for although sin dwells in the flesh, τὸ γὰρ θέλειν παράκειται μοι. We have not only seen this same linkage at 7.22-23, where good intentions belong to the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, but we also notice Paul using the personal pronoun in two distinct ways. It can stand in for the whole person (ἐνέμοι at 7.17b and 18a), and it can be used restrictively to delimit the interior faculty of thinking and willing (ἐγώ at 7.16 and μοι at 7.18).

As a consequence, we witness the same valuations at work at 7.17-18 as we saw at 7.21-23. There, willing the good and
delighting in the law of God were seen as commendable characteristics of the νοῦς, in the same way that at 7.18b, τὸ Θέλειν, which by clear implication is good, lies close at hand to the μοι. Conversely, just as Paul says at 7.23 that sin is ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν μου waging war, so at 7.18 he says that nothing good dwells ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ μου, that is, in his material flesh.

In fact, 7.23 illustrates perfectly what Paul means and does not mean by his negative valuation of the σαρκὶ at 7.18. The σαρκὶ is evaluated "not good," neither because it is material per se nor because it is intrinsically corrupt, but because it has been taken over by the power of sin in a conspicuous way, "is now the dwelling place of the power of sin, and the bridgehead for a false orientation of life."

There is nothing in the immediate context or the letter as a whole that requires us to suppose Paul uses σαρκὶ other than as a denotation for the person's material body here. We observe, then, the same thoroughgoing anthropological dualism at 7.18 as we saw at 7.22-23, a dualism that distinguishes the material body from the thinking and willing faculty of the person."

But should we see something more in the word σαρκὶ here in addition to just "a simple material meaning"? Moo sees nothing

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14 So Moo, Romans, 459.
15 So Lüdemann, Anthropologie, 60.
16 So Moo, Romans, 459.
17 Moo, Romans, 459. Lüdemann identified the issue, which is still the issue, for understanding Paul's use of σαρκὶ at 7.18:
more, for he thinks that this material usage of \( \sigma\alpha\rho\varsigma \) is separate from the "more theologically significant uses of the term," which occupy a spectrum of meaning from a rather neutral use, designating human nature or existence as such (e.g., Rom. 4:1; 8:3; 9:8; 1 Cor. 1:29; 15:50), to a much more negative (or ethical) meaning: human life, or the material world considered as independent of, and even in opposition to, the spiritual realm."

Dunn would agree with Moo when the latter speaks of Paul's use of \( \sigma\alpha\rho\varsigma \) reflecting a "spectrum of meaning," but, like Ludemann, would disagree when Moo (and Bultmann) sequesters the physical off from the ethical into a separate compartment. Instead, Dunn says, "Paul's use of \( \sigma\alpha\rho\varsigma \) cannot be neatly classified into separate categories and pigeon-holes." He explains:

"Wir sehen, es wird sich darum handeln, welche Geltung in der ethischen Anthropologie die Bestimmungen der physischen haben resp. behalten sollen" (Anthropologie, 54; Dunn echoes this question in his Theology, 63). On this issue, it is clear what side Ludemann came down on: "Wollen wir nun den Begriff "\( \sigma\alpha\rho\varsigma \)" als ethischen bestimmen, so ist vor allen Dingen klar, dass wir jenen physischen Begriff streng festhalten müssen" (53). He was arguing in the face of the "gewöhnliche Auffassung" of his time, as expressed especially by J. Müller, H. F. Ernesti, and B. Weiss (see bibliog.), which kept the physical and ethical meanings of \( \sigma\alpha\rho\varsigma \) separate.

\* Moo, Romans, 47 n. 36. Examples in Romans of the negative include 7.5, 8.8, 13.14.

\* See his "Jesus," 44.

\* "Jesus," 44. See also "Rom. 7,14-25," 266.
immediate emphasis is more narrowly defined in a particular context. That is to say, even when sàrx is used in a physical sense, there is almost always a moral overtone present; and when sàrx is used in a moral sense, a physical connotation almost always lurks in the background.

At one end of the spectrum is "the more or less neutral usage, denoting the physical body, or physical relationship or kinship, without any negative connotation." Moving along but closely related is that usage which "embraces the typically Semitic thought of weakness," whether that weakness stems from the body of flesh being physically "mortal and perishable," or from "moral inadequacy and imperfection."

Moving along further, but not by much, we arrive at the way σαρξ functions at 7.18. This usage sees "σαρξ as the sphere of sin's operations, the instrument of sin," "which merges into the sense of σαρξ as itself a source of corruption and hostility to God." Although still revolving around the physical denotation, because the person's "moral corruption and hostility stems largely from his physical appetites and passions and his indulgence of them," σαρξ nevertheless now "carries with it also a further dimension," which stands "in contrast to a superior realm, mode of being, or pattern of conduct." What we are dealing with is a "spiritual antithesis between two modes of existence," an antithesis that "becomes most apparent when σαρξ, as not only mortal but defective, disqualifying, and destructive, is set

17 "Rom. 7,14-25," 267. See also "Jesus," 44.

14 "Jesus," 44.

15 "Jesus," 44. E.g., Rom. 3.20, 8.3, 8.
against the life-giving πνεῦμα." This does not imply, however, that we have anthropological dualism coming to expression at 7.18. For, as Dunn sees things, σάρξ needs to be understood in light of the reality that Paul was "influenced more by Hebrew than by Hellenistic thought," which means, "Paul's anthropological terms view man as a whole from different aspects rather than by subdividing him into different parts." And this in turn means, "Sarx then is an aspectival or relational term rather than a partitive term - man is flesh, not, man has flesh."

However, as we have already seen, Paul does use other anthropological terms partitively and not aspectivally in 7.22-23 and in Romans 6. Given the parallels between 7.18 and 21-23, it makes perfect sense to take σάρξ at 7.18 as physical. In addition, at 2.28 Paul has already used σάρξ to denote the animated material of the body, upon which circumcision may be performed, just as it was used in the LXX." If, in order to arrive at the meaning of

"Jesus," 45-46. Kuss's handling of σάρξ is similar to Dunn's, in that he also thinks Paul uses σάρξ here in a "theologisch-technischen Sinn," a sense which stands "im Gegensatz zu dem Begriff Pneuma" and "muß aus diesem Gegensatz begriiffen und definiert werden." What is more, this "paulinisch" sense does not exclude the material: "Es wird nicht zu übersehen sein, daß die Sarx - wie schon die Wortbedeutung "Fleisch" nahelegt - in manchen Texten [he cites 7.18] eine deutliche Beziehung zum "Leibe", zu den "Gliedern" hat, in deren Handeln sich das Verhängnis des Menschen Ausdruck schafft" (Römerbrief, 2.437, 514-515).

"Rom. 7,14-25," 265. See also "Jesus," 63.

See, e.g., LXX Gen 17.11, 13, 14, 24, 25; Sir 44.20. See also Lüdemann, Anthropologie, 3-7; Bultmann, Theology, 1.233; Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.506, 511-512, 514.
σάρξ which fits the context best, we follow the assumption that the "meaning of a sign is the minimum of what that sign contributes to the context," then we are on safe ground when we stand with Moo and see nothing but "a simple material meaning here.""

*I am fleshly, sold under sin*

It is conceivable that σάρκινος signifies the material body at 7.14. After all, that is what σάρξ requires at 7.18, a verse that contributes toward the elucidation of 7.14, and that is what adjective forms ending in -ίνος mean. "Made of flesh" is what σάρκινος literally means. In fact, at 2 Cor 3.3, one of two other instances where Paul uses the word, it is employed in a non-technical and literal manner. Just as tablets are "made of stone" (λιθίναις), so human hearts are "made of flesh" (σαρκίναις). In addition, the presence of anaphora and assonance in the immediacy of 7.14 makes it conspicuous that Paul wrote σάρκινος rather than σάρκικος, since σάρκικος would better resemble πνευματικός in sound."

Lüdemann took σάρκινος here to mean, "der Substanz nach aus Fleisch bestehend," and exclusively that. Rather than interpret σάρκινος in light of πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, he interpreted the latter in terms of the former, hence the sense: ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ μονοικεῖῃ

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... Moo, *Romans*, 459.

... On this, see Édart, "Rhétorique," 374. In the five occurrences in the LXX, σάρκινος may be translated literally, without nuance, "made of flesh" (2 Chr 32.8; Prov 24.22c; Ezek 11.19; 36.26; Esth 4.17p).
The condition of being sold under sin derives "aus dieser anscheinend rein physischen Naturbeschaffenheit des Menschen."

Thus the material σάρξ is seen in the most intimate relation with ἁμαρτία as the "Sitz und Quell der Sünde." For substantiation he pointed to 7.21-25 where he saw sin inhabiting the flesh "mit einer naturgesetzlichen Nothwendigkeit.":

In Bultmann's view, which is the antithesis of Lüdemann's, Paul uses σάρκινος at 7.14 to denote the sphere of the person without Christ. This sphere of existence opposes life "in the Spirit," and since those who are in this sphere cannot please God, it emerges that this is the sphere of sinning and hostility to God. Such a person in this sphere is "wholly flesh" and "inwardly split," for, as the passage goes on to explain, at the level of "willing" the σάρκινος person is precisely the person split between willing good and doing evil. And "to be inwardly divided," Bultmann said, "is the essence of human existence under sin." Thus he did not see in σάρκινος anything of a fleshly human substance, which would struggle against another part in the human, the νοῦς, because for Paul, σάρξ and πνεῦμα are "protagonists in the conflict," not σάρξ and νοῦς.:

Corroboration for Bultmann's non-material reading might be had, not only at 7.14, where πνευματικός and σάρκινος are antithetically opposed, and so one could - if so inclined -

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"Anthropologie," 53-54, 60.

"Theology," 1.235-238, 244-245; "Significance," 161; "Christ," 51.
define σάρκινος as "unspiritual" against πνευματικός as "spiritual," but also at 1 Cor 3.1, the third passage where Paul uses the adjective. In contrast to the πνευματικός, Paul had characterized his readers as σαρκίνοις. He could not use ψυχικοί (2.14) because he supposed his readers had πνεύμα. So he spoke to these νησίοτιν Χριστῶ as σαρκίνοις (3.1), and says they are still (ἐπὶ) σαρκίκοι (3.3). The presence of ἐπὶ in 3.3a invites a reading that sees the two adjectives overlapping in meaning, as, of course, they do anyway: The readers were σάρκινοι and they still are σαρκίκοι.

Filtered one way, if we were to allow σαρκίκοι at 3.3 to fill in the content of σαρκίνοις at 3.1, then a material meaning is absent altogether, since with κατὰ ἀνθρώπων περιπατεῖτε Paul tells how his readers are to understand σαρκίκοι.13 On the other hand, were we to strain 1 Cor 3.1-3 through the sieve of Dunn's general theory of σῶς, then we would reason that even though σάρκινος moves beyond the literal, material denotation, yet it retains and depends on the literal. By calling them σαρκίνοις Paul is saying they are "ruled by the limitations and impulses of the σάρξ."14

Unlike Ludemann's merely material and Bultmann's wholly non-material reading, we propose that σάρκινος at 7.14 has to do with the material body but also with more besides.

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13 So Sand, Begriff, 174; Fee, First Epistle, 127 n. 2.
14 The quoted words belong to H. A. W. Meyer, Critical and Exegetical Hand-Book to the Epistles to the Corinthians, trans. D. D. Bannerman; MeyerK (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1883), 64.
There can be no doubting that \( \text{πεπραμένος ύπο τήν άμαρτίαν} \) functions expegegetically with respect to \( \text{σάρκινος} \). Without more to go on, we could say the attribution is appositional or pleonastic in nature: the \( \text{ἐγώ} \) is \( \text{σάρκινος} \), that is, the \( \text{ἐγώ} \) is \( \text{πεπραμένος ύπο τήν άμαρτίαν} \), with sin being seen as the enslaving power. Thus Édart can deduce, on account of the enslaving action of sin, that to be \( \text{σάρκινος} \) "n'appartient pas à la constitution originelle de l'homme." Furthermore, this interpretation works well when read back into \( \text{ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ} \) at 7.5. When Paul says, \( \text{ὅτε γὰρ ἦμεν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ} \), what he means is "when we were sold under sin."

However, given that 7.14 is the subpropositio for 7.15-25, we need to look further than just \( \text{πεπραμένος ύπο τήν άμαρτίαν} \) for all the clues necessary to explicate \( \text{σάρκινος} \). We suggest that \( \text{σάρκινος} \) functions like a catchword for the person described in 7.15-25. That person approves of and rejoices in God's law, and even wants to do the good, but is incapacitated from bringing those good thoughts and desires to actualization, for sin not only prevents the \( \text{ἐγώ} \) from accomplishing the good, but also brings about evil. The power of sin can do this because it is lord of the body, seen under the aspect of its \( \text{μέλη} \). This cosmic power has its seat \( \text{ἐν τοῖς µέλησιν} \), and from that bodily base wages war against the

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\( \text{"Rhétorique," 375.} \)

\( \text{H. D. Betz says, "the 'inner man' (ὁ ἐσώ ἀνθρωπος) who wills the good ... must witness as through a prison window how 'his other will', which is the power of sin (ἀμαρτία), not only wills but also carries out evil" (Galatians, Hermeneia [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979], 280).} \)
νοῦς or ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, taking it captive ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν. In sum, at 7.14 σάρκινος functions as a label for the person described in 7.15-23, and the word underscores the notion that sin's enslaving power works through the person's fleshly body.

4 This Body of Death at 7.24

There is no question that Paul regards the σῶμα here as anything other than the physical body, which, according to the preceding verses, was seen to be the seat of sin and from which sin waged war and took the νοῦς captive.

Since 7.7-25 concerns itself with the plight of the unbaptized, there is no basis for linking the anguish expressed at 7.24 with the believer's groaning in anticipation of the future redemption of the body. As our interpretation of Romans 8 will explicate, the baptized has already been rescued from that condition from which the μέλη of 7.24 cries out for deliverance, whereas the redemption of the body at 8.23 is still future.

Out of context, 7.24 sounds a lot like the soul's cry for deliverance from captivity in the material body, a theme common in various streams of Greco-Roman thought. But in context, it emerges that the person is yearning for deliverance, not from the body per se, but from the body as it exists in a certain condition "under the occupation of sin."

\footnote{12}{As at 6.12-13, so at 7.23-24, σῶμα is used interchangeably with μέλη.}

\footnote{13}{Cranfield, Romans, 1.367. So also Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 295; Gundry, Sōma, 138; Heckel, Innere Mensch, 194.}
At the very least, τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου acts as a slogan to denote the predicament of the body described in the previous verses. However, with the utilization of θανάτου, a word last encountered at 7.10, instead of ἀμαρτίας, we meet with the prospect that Paul is saying something more besides. Contextually, he presents us with two alternatives. In light of 5.14, 17, and 6.9, it is possible to take θανάτου as a power that reigns, and then deduce that θανάτου functions more or less synonymously with ἀμαρτίας at 6.6. Hence τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου is precisely the same as τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἀμαρτίας. As attractive as this interpretation is, and we certainly do not want to deny that σῶμα in both locutions is the same, we nevertheless prefer to take θανάτου as the consummation of sin's rule through the body. This is how θάνατος is used at 7.5, the verse that functions as the propositio for 7.14-25, at 5.12, 14; 6.16, 21, 23; 7.13, and most especially in relation to νόμος at 7.10. We suggest this parallel: Just as the law brought death because it was taken over by the power of sin, so the body brought death as it too was taken over by the reign of sin.

There is also the matter whether τοῦτου goes with σώματος, "this body of death," or with θανάτου, "the body of this death." Put another way, is Paul accentuating one concept, "this body of

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... So Beker, Paul, 214; Édart, "Rhétorique," 391.

... So Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.459; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 397; Moo, Romans, 466; Bultmann, Theology, 1.247.
death," or two, "the body of this death." Although the issue is not of great significance, it seems reasonable to suppose, on account of the prominent place the body has in the discussion of 7.15-23, that what Paul is stressing with θανάτῳ is only one concept, "this body of death."

5 The Flesh at 7.25

Given our line of interpretation, which takes 7.7-25 to refer to pre-baptismal existence, 7.25a functions "as anticipatory, a momentary glance forward to what is to be made clear in chapter 8," not as an exclamation of confidence in God that he will bring final deliverance at the Parousia.

7.25b functions as a "summarizing recapitulation" of Paul’s argument in 7.14-23, as ἀράμεν indicates. He goes back and picks up the διάλεγμα language of 7.6 to express with "epigrammatic conciseness" that, "on the one hand" (μέν), the

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5 For discussion and Forschungsgeschichte, see Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.459.
6 So Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.459; Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 160.
7 So Fuchs, Freiheit, 80; Cranfield, Romans, 1.367.
8 The words belong to Cranfield, Romans 1.369, but the view belongs to Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.460; Édart, "Rhétorique," 391; Moo, Romans, 467.
9 As Cranfield (Romans, 1.366) and Dunn (Romans 1-8, 411) think.
10 So Ludemann, Anthropologie, 99; Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.460; Édart, "Rhétorique," 391; Moo, Romans, 466-467, to whom the words in quotations belong.
11 The fitting words, taken from another context, belong to Dunn, Romans 1-8, 283.
"serves" (δουλεύω) "the law of God" (νόμω θεοῦ), an expression which means the same thing as τὸ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ at 7.21 and τῷ νόμῳ at 7.16. Where and how this is done is "in the mind" (νοῦ). Given that 7.25b functions as a summarizing conclusion, and given the absence of clues to point us in another direction, there is no reason to suppose Paul has altered the way he uses νοῦς here from the way it was used at 7.23, to denote the interior faculty of reasoning and willing. Thus, by allowing 7.14-23 to fill the content of δουλεύω at 7.25, rather than the other way around, we see Paul saying nothing different with αὐτός ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν νοὶ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ than what he says at 7.16 with σύμφωνι τῷ νόμῳ ὃ ἐστιν καλός, or at 7.22 with συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἀνθρώπου.

But "on the other hand" (δὲ), the same αὐτός ἐγὼ "serves" (δουλεύω) "the law of sin" (νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας), an expression picked up from 7.23 and intending the same thing. Where and how this is done is "in the flesh" (τῇ σάρκϊ).

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On the significance of which, see Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.460.

So Moo, Romans, 467.

So Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.460. Bultmann removed 7.25b from the text as a gloss because he saw it contradicting what Paul had just said. According to him, in 7.25b the ἐγὼ is seen to actually perform the law, but in 7.15-23 it never gets to a place where it can δουλεύω ("Glossen im Römerbrief," 198-199). But when 7.25b is seen as expressing the substance of 7.15-23 in the language of 7.6, then there is no need to tamper with the text.

So Moo, Romans, 467.
Édard rightly says that 7.25b "est construite sur une antithèse marquée par l'emploi de μεν...δε et par le parallélisme strict entre les deux membres. A voï correspond σαρκι, et à νόμο θεοù correspond νομοκαμαρτίας." Consequently, because voï is taken to denote the interior faculty of reasoning and willing, it makes sense to take σαρκι as denoting the material human body, by means of which behaviour is accomplished, on account of the "parallélisme strict" in this verse, the thoroughgoing anthropological dualism running through the passage, as well as the usage of σαρς at 7.18. Thus, in words picked up from 7.6, 18, and 23, Paul is summarizing what it means to serve παλαιότητα γράμματας, as that comes to expression in 7.14-23.

6 Implications for 7.5 and 6.19

We are now well equipped to explain the proposicio at 7.5, as well as διὰ τὴν ἀθέτησιν τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν at 6.19, which we passed over in the previous chapter.

When we were in the flesh

Since 7.7-25 explains the proposicio at 7.5, we may proceed under the assumption that what is needed to explain 7.5 is at hand in 7.7-25.

To be ἐν τῇ σαρκί, according to 7.7-25, is to be in a place or sphere ὑπὸ νόμου, where sin thrives. Unrestrained, the power of sin seizes the law as a base of operations and from that base

123 "Rhetorique," 392.

121 So Lüdemann, Anthropologie, 53; Moo, Romans, 467.
manufactures πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν, resulting in death. If sin is the murderer, law is a murder weapon.

But not only is the law helpless in the sphere of the murderous power of sin, so is the ἐγώ qua ἔσω ἄνθρωπος or νοῦς. The interior faculty of reasoning and willing has become paralyzed and incapable of acting out its commendable intention to will the good, because the outer μέλη, σάρξ, or σώμα, the means by which the "person inside" would accomplish the good, has been taken over and occupied by another power entirely, ἁμαρτία. This alien power now uses the body as a theatre of operations to wage war against the mind and take it captive. The "I" is now so enslaved to sin in the body as a result of sin's war of aggression that Paul can place the blame, both for failing to do the good and for doing evil, at the doorstep of sin itself.

Thus to be ἐν τῇ σάρκι is to be divided along a battle line, which runs inside the ἄνθρωπος, between two constituent, anthropological parts. On the one side is the mind, which recognizes and desires the good. On the other is the body. If this body of flesh is evaluated "not good," it is not on account of its materiality or a supposed intrinsic evil nature, but because it has become sin's battledress for waging war. In a conspicuous way, the body of flesh is the seat of sin. But it is not the source of sin.

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12 So Moo, Romans, 463; contrary to Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 158 n. 2.

126 So also Moo, Romans, 462.
Moreover, in light of 6.12 and 7.5, sin's other weapon of choice to wage war against the mind is the desires and passions, which have their origin and seat in the body of flesh. "Again, Paul takes up a tradition, "die, von Plato herkommend, die Begierden und Lüste als die Mittel sieht, mit denen der Körper die Seele bezaubert, befeucht und verunreinigt." But yet again, Paul modifies the tradition to serve his ends, for now it is not the body per se that "bewitches, stains and contaminates," but sin - the occupying army - in the body. The combatants in this war are not ultimately the mind and body, as in Pythagoreanism and Platonism, but the mind and sin. It just happens that the power of sin has the law, the body of flesh, and the bodily passions as captive and cooperative aides-de-camp.

Indeed, the "I" ἐν ῥαπκι cries out for deliverance from the body of death, and to that extent we can suppose Paul views this body as a prison, and thus agree with Ludemann when he quotes approvingly the interpretation of L. I. Rückert and C. F. A. Fritzsche for ὅτε γὰρ ἴμεν ἐν ῥαπκι at 7.5: "nam quem in voluptarii corporis carcere inclusi essemus." But contrary to Ludemann, the body is not a prison on account of its materiality or design.

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"" In view of the plural, τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν should be taken attributively with τὰ παθηματα, hence "sinful passions." See similarly, παθηματιας at 1.26.

-- Schweizer, "Die hellenistische Komponente," 242. In context, he is speaking of Epicurus and his followers. In this article he has carefully documented just how widespread these Platonic-Epicurean notions were in antiquity.
Rather, it is so because its warden is sin, and that makes all the difference.

Because of the weakness of your flesh

Turning back to 6.19, the evidence can support two different interpretations of σάρξ in ἀνθρώπινον λέγω διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς ύμῶν. On the one hand, it is likely some of Paul's readers will have understood the phrase in terms of the Hellenistic commonplace that attributed intellectual inaptitude to the fleshly body. Support for a solely material reading of σάρξ may also be had at Gal 4.13, where Paul uses the identical phrase to designate a physical ailment. Taken as such, Paul would be chiding his Roman readers, subtly to be sure, of being still too tied to their fleshly bodies. This interpretation benefits from one not having to throw in added shades of meaning to clarify σάρξ, apart from what is already present at 7.18 (and 2.28).

According to the other interpretation, Paul is not saying anything different than at 3.5, thus κατὰ ἀνθρώπινον of 3.5 and ἀνθρώπινον of 6.19 function more or less homologously, with διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς ύμῶν at 6.19 qualifying ἀνθρώπινον by adding that the readers are simply subject to human limitations. Put another way, Paul has to speak to his readers in human terms because they are κατὰ ἀνθρώπινον (to borrow a phrase from 1 Cor 3.3 which could easily be a conceptual parallel). This reading is preferable,

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59 Anthropologie, 59 ("for when we were in a sensual fleshly prison confinement"). See bibliog. for Rückert and Fritzsche.
since it evades two pitfalls of the alternate reading. According to the alternate interpretation, it is hard to imagine what sort of material ὧν the believers at Rome ought to have had in order for Paul not to speak ἀνθρώπων. If not "weak flesh," then what kind of flesh? There is also the danger of over-interpreting the phrase, that is, adding content that may not be there, since nowhere else in Paul can we find corroboration for the sentiment that the material flesh alone effects the cognitive capacity of believers.

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15 See, e.g., Plato, Phaed. 82e-83b, Symp. 211e; Plutarch, Mor. 432a, 745e-f, 1105d. For Philo, see Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 5
THE BODY IN ROMANS 8

1 The Body in 8.1-8

Rhetorical purposes and argumentative structure

Romans 8 is occupied with what the baptized have received as a result of being transferred from the sphere of existence "in the flesh" (7.5) to the sphere of existence "in Christ Jesus" (8.1). Moo says, "It is those blessings and privileges conferred on believers by the Spirit that are the theme of this chapter."

There is no consensus on how Romans 8 should be subdivided. The argument flows virtually uninterrupted from thought to kindred thought until its culmination at 8.31-39. Nevertheless, fluctuations in the flow of the argument are perceptible, with the one at 8.14 being the most conspicuous. So we propose dividing the chapter into three units, 8.1-13, 14-30, and 31-39.

8.1-13 brings to a climax Paul's defense of his law-free gospel in the face of the charge that it promotes sinning (6.1). For as he sees things, quite the opposite takes place, for obedience to his gospel fulfills "the just requirement of the law" (8.4) and leads to life (8.13). Alongside 6.3-7.6 and 7.7-25, 8.1-13 affords a third line of argumentation why Pauline believers do not sin. And when 6.1-8.13 is brought together with 3.21-5.21 and the remainder of Romans 8, we have the key components in Paul's thesis statement of 1.16-17 defined and defended.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{ Romans, 468.}\]
Within 8.1-13 itself, detectable shifts in the argument may be seen in the middle of 8.4, at 8.9, and at 8.12. The ἴνα-clause at 8.4a climaxes the discussion of the opening verses, and 8.4b functions as a segue into what follows immediately in verses 5-9a, which contrasts walking κατὰ σάρκα and κατὰ πνεῦμα, but also in the rest of the chapter. At 8.9b-11, Paul momentarily drops the antithetical parallelism of σάρξ and πνεῦμα, which controls 8.4b-13, and focuses on what having πνεῦμα means for the σῶμα. Then in 8.12-13, he takes up the σάρξ-πνεῦμα contrast again to draw out the implications of 8.1-11 in terms of the ethical obligations required of believers having πνεῦμα, so that they can maintain their covenantal relationship with God. In sum, 8.1-4a, 4b-9, and 9-11 combine to give the descriptive basis for the ethical deduction at 8.12-13.

The argument of 8.1-4a

At 8.1, Paul affirms that "for those who are in Christ Jesus" there is "now no condemnation." Because this verse, which is characteristically Pauline in content, cannot be seen strictly as providing an inference (ἀρα) from 7.25, that does not mean it should be removed as a gloss or transposed after 8.2. What we have is metabasis (μετάβασις, aversio), "an abrupt change of

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* So Kuss, Römerbrief, 485.
* So Wilckens, Römer, 2.119.
* So Bultmann, "Glossen," 279, and Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 148 n. 1 respectively.
subject or a return to the subject from a digression." The change at 8.1, which sets the condition of "no condemnation" against the wretched despair and servitude of humanity in Romans 7, would have elicited just the sort of response from Paul's readers that would serve to increase their adherence to the message and messenger. On account of the links between 8.1 and Romans 5, as well as 7.6, the verse functions to reorient the argument. Thus, rather than regarding 8.1 as a summary statement for the content that follows, it is preferable to see it, just like 5.1a, as a concluding statement, which together with 8.2-4a, functions as a bridge to the main discussion of the chapter.

8.2 furnishes the reason why there is no condemnation. Paul could have said "for we have been justified by faith," or "for we have died to sin," but he decides to align the argument to πνεῦμα. There is no condemnation ο γὰρ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἠλευθέρωσέν σε ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

Since, as we will propose below, τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου is the interpretive key for διὰ τῆς σαρκός at 8.3a, and because Wilckens and Dunn appeal to 8.2 to support their views of νόμος at 7.21 and 23, we are compelled to submit an explanation why we think νόμος is not the Mosaic law at 8.2, and state what the word contributes to the argument.

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2 Against Heckel, Innere Mensch, 198.
Wilckens offers three proofs in defense of the idea that νόμος denotes the Mosaic law in both of its occurrences at 8.2. One, he cannot verify any usage of νόμος "in übertragener Bedeutung als »Regel« bzw. »Ordnung«" in Classical or Hellenistic Greek. Two, he finds it "unbegreiflich" how anyone could argue that Paul uses νόμος figuratively at 8.2 and then literally of the Mosaic law right afterwards at 8.3a. Three, he says that the problem of the law is what determines all of Romans 7-8: The law as πνευματικός ought to have brought life according to its original intent but it brought death instead. 8.2 says that in Christ Jesus the original intent of the law to create life has now come into effect by setting the person free from "die universale Verurteilungskraft des Gesetzes," which resulted in death.

This cannot be sustained. In response to his first argument, Räisanen has demonstrated that the non-literal explication of νόμος cannot be rejected on philological grounds. In response to the second argument, we grant what no one disputes, that νόμος at 8.3a is the Mosaic law, but we contend that if the evidence constrains us to interpret νόμος at 8.2 differently, then we must accede to Paul's ability to use the same word with distinct meanings in close proximity.

More importantly, however, the contradictions that arise in Paul's thought and the historical improbability that he held the view Wilckens and Dunn suggest lead us to reject the notion that

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Wilckens, Römer 2.122-123. See also Dunn, Romans 1-8, 419.
νόμος is the law at 8.2. First, if such were the case, Paul would be attributing to the Mosaic law what he attributes to Christ elsewhere. For he would be saying that it is the law, albeit under the dominion of πνεῦμα, that sets people free from the same law, albeit misunderstood and abused under sin. But at 7.4 and 7.6 Paul ascribed the "dying to" and "setting free from the law" to Christ. Granted, Wilckens does not wish to say that the law sets free, so he makes 8.2 say what 7.4 and 7.6 said. He picks up ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ at 9.2 and, after mentioning a proof-text from Gal 5.1 (ἡ ἐλευθερία ἡμῶν ἡμῶν ἡμῶν), pleasing incidentally to our purposes, says that it is "nicht das Gesetz (sic!), das Sünder nur zu verteilen, nicht aber ihnen Leben zu schaffen die Kraft hatte (Gal 3,21)," but Christ, "der uns vom Joch des Gesetz befreit hat." But this is not what the text says when νόμος is the Mosaic law. Secondly, if νόμος is the law of Moses, then it is on account of (γὰρ) its "very positive role" that Paul says there is no condemnation for those in Christ at 8.1: But at 5.1, the basis for this is attributed to Christ. Thirdly, since θησ

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See his "Paul's Word-Play," 69-94.

Römer 2.123.

So Raisänen, "'Law' of Faith," 66.

Wilckens says as much (Römer 2.123). The words in quotations belong to Dunn, Romans 1-8, 417.

In view of the interchangeableness of πνεῦμα, πνεῦμα θεοῦ, πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ, and Χριστὸς at 8.9-10, on which see, e.g., Küss, Römerbrief, 2.501-502; E. Schweizer, "πνεῦμα, πνευματικὸς κτλ," TDNT 6:433-434; Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 165; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 430,
Caij at 8.2 functions argumentatively in the same way as eicζωήν at 7.10.\textsuperscript{13} Paul is then seen to be saying - if νόμος is indeed the Mosaic law - that with the help of πνεῦμα, the formerly "frustrated goal of the law" can now be fulfilled. Since "the law is [no longer] ineffectual as a means of grace," it can now provide life for the person obedient to it. Since an issue to the fore in Romans 6-8 is obedience (e.g., εἰς ὑπακοήν, 6.16), Paul is therefore asserting that to experience the law as a "positive liberating force" procuring life, all one need do is understand it "in its true nature," and respond to it correctly "at the level of the πνεῦμα."\textsuperscript{14} But at 8.10, πνεῦμα is seen as that which gives life, at Gal 3.21 Paul rejects the thought that the law had such a life-giving role,\textsuperscript{15} and at Rom 4.15, νόμος, in an unqualified sense in Paul's universe of discourse, ὄργην κατεργάζεται.

In short, what we are countering in the view of Wilckens and Dunn is a view much like that of Paul's opponents at Galatia. They agreed with Paul on the role of πνεῦμα for "getting in," but supposed that obedience to the law (or part of it) was requisite little should be made of the fact that πνεῦμα occurs at 8.2 but Χριστός at 5.1.

\textsuperscript{13} On the relation of τῆς ζωῆς to τοῦ πνεύματος at 8.2, see, e.g., R. Bultmann, "ζωή, ζωή, κτλ.," TDNT 2:869; Wilckens, Römer, 2.122-123; Moo, Romans, 475 n. 28.

\textsuperscript{14} To quote Dunn, Romans I-8, 392, 393, 409, 417, 419. See also 443. Similarly Wilckens, Römer, 2.119.
after arriving. Paul reasons that if they hold this, someone has bewitched them with the evil eye (Gal 3.1). Later, Paul might have come to regret his heat of the moment proneness to sharp polemic, but one cannot imagine him retracting his label for the attitude: ἵππος (Gal 3.3). If he truly taught the view Wilckens and Dunn ascribe to him, we have to wonder how he got into such hot water on the problem of the law.

Much to be preferred is the view that sees both occurrences of νόμος at 8.2 functioning, as at 7.23, to indicate "a typical kind of behaviour or a characteristic tendency," or what Murray describes as "a regulating and actuating power as well as a legislating authority." Just as πνεῦμα works in a sure way to bring liberation and life to people (8.2a), so "the activity of the law of sin," whether by means of the law (7.7-13) or physical body (7.23), procures death (8.2b). As a result, τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου functions as a fitting précis for sin's two-pronged attack according to 7.7-23, from which the baptized have been set free.

At 8.3, which Ludemann said is "der Kern und Stern, der Angelpunkt, um die sich alles dreht," Paul explains how the σέ

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See Moo, Romans, 474. Dunn thinks Paul's views may have developed on this matter between Galatians and Romans (Romans 1-8, 417).

Raisanen, "Paul's Word-Play," 89.

Romans, 1.276.

The words in quotations belong to Murray, Romans, 1.276.

Anthropologie, 109.
of verse 2 is set free. We have an anacoluthon at 8.3a, but the meaning is unambiguous. Whether it was "impossible" for the law, or the law was simply "unable" to accomplish it, the result was the same, the Mosaic law could not "condemn sin in the flesh," something required to set people free (8.2) and make it possible for them to fulfil τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου (8.4a). The reason is given: ἐν ὧ ἡθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός, with διὰ τῆς σαρκός acting as the efficient cause. With the problem identified as σάρξ, God takes aim at it. He sends his own son ἐνόμωσις σαρκός ἀμαρτίας, and in that place, namely ἐν τῇ σαρκί, God condemns, not σάρξ, but ἀμαρτίαν. Although the LXX affords ample ammunition for taking περὶ ἀμαρτίας in the sense of "sin-offering," this penultimate usage of ἀμαρτία at 8.3 is more appropriately fitted with the content it has in its other two appearances in the verse: it is a cosmic power, with περὶ functioning - as it typically does - to center the thought on that object.\footnote{See, e.g., Wilckens, Römer, 2.126-127; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 422 (for LXX references); N. T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 220-225.}

8.3 also sets the stage for 8.4. God condemned sin "in order that the just requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us who walk not κατὰ σάρκα but κατὰ πνεύμα" (8.4). What Paul says in the latter half of 8.4 and in the following verses invites a

\footnote{So, e.g., Sand, Begriff, 199; Cranfield, Romans, 1.382; Schlier, Römerbrief, 240.}
reading that sees δικαίωμα encompassing its meaning at 2.26.\textsuperscript{22}

Those who walk κατά πνεῦμα do that one thing the law requires, namely, τὸ ἁλλήλους ἁγαπάν (13.8), though not under law but through obedience to πνεῦμα.\textsuperscript{23}

The flesh at 8.3

This sketch of the argument of 8.1-4a shows that to get at the real assailant, ἁμαρτία, God had to deal with the σάρξ.

Concerning its first use, at 8.3a, the interpretation that makes best sense is one that equates it in meaning with ἁμαρτίας in the previous verse. We said that τὸ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου functioned to encapsulate the power of sin's two-pronged attack as described in 7.7-23. Paul has, of course, already used ἁμαρτία and σάρξ interchangeably to denote the sphere of sin's reign and activity (compare 6.1 with 7.5). But now he employs σάρξ in the place of ἁμαρτία as the power of that sphere, for what was ascribed to ἁμαρτία at 7.8-13 is now imputed to σάρξ. With διὰ τῆς σαρκός Paul is therefore saying that the law could not produce life (to use the language of 7.10), set people free (8.2), or condemn sin in the flesh (8.3), because the cosmic power of σάρξ

\textsuperscript{22} So, e.g., Cranfield, Romans, 1.383-384; Wilckens, Römer, 2.128; Dunn, Romans 1-9, 423.

\textsuperscript{23} So similarly Moo, Romans, 482; Boyarin, Radical Jew, 152. Contrary to Wilckens, Römer, 2.128-129, the singular δικαίωμα is significant. Given Paul's usage of τὰ δικαίωμα at 2.26, which reflects LXX usage, the singular δικαίωμα denotes an individual commandment and the plural (2.26) more than one. See Moo, Romans, 481 n. 55.
had captured, manipulated, and exploited the law for its own ends in its own sphere of existence. 

This explanation is preferable to one that takes σαρκός as the material body. Assuredly, to the extent that the body is by implication present at 8.2b, we might say it is also there at 8.3a; for the fleshly body was one of the ways by which sin enslaved according to 7.7-23. But inasmuch as 7.7-23, which provides the interpretive key for τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου and thus for διὰ τῆς σαρκός as well, does not say the fleshly body worked against the law (what sin affected was the ability of the νοῦς to perform the law), it is improbable that we have a connotative reference to the body at 8.3a.

Concerning the second and third instances of σαρξ at 8.3, a variety of choices is workable. For 8.3b, were Phil 2.7 allowed to decipher it, then a case might be had for treating σαρκός as a synonym for ἄνθρωπος. It thus approaches, more or less, the denotation of σαρξ at 6.19. What we are then dealing with is "the full participation of the Son in the human condition." As a second possibility, σαρξ as the material body works, as we will explain below. But it is not feasible to fill σαρκός at 8.3b, and σαρχί at 8.3c, with the content σαρκός had at 8.3a. For not only is

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14 So Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.516; Wilckens, Römer, 2.124; Moo, Romans, 478.

15 Moo, Romans, 479. So also Wilckens, Römer, 2.126. One might go further afield and connect σαρκός ἁμαρτίας with what Brandenburger (Fleisch und Geist, 100-101) and Wilckens (Römer, 2.125 n. 514) consider the corresponding Aramaic expression, לֹא חַיְבָ ("evil humankind") at 1QS 11.9, 12; 1QPh 4.3; 12.12.
it hard to conceive how the son could be sent in the likeness of sin's power, but the concept of the power of sin is already present in ἀμαρτίας, which modifies σαρκός at 8.3b. For the usage of σάρξ at 8.3c, if it denotes the sphere of sin, as at 7.5, then Paul is saying God condemned sin in its own sphere; if it functions as a synonym for ἀνθρωπος, then God condemned sin in the person of his own son; if it means the fleshly body, then God's condemnation of sin is more precisely focussed there. Then there is the prospect that σάρξ at 8.3c combines more than one of these denotations."

We said a moment ago that whatever σαρκός and σαρκί may intend at 8.3bc, they do not communicate what σαρκός signified at 8.3a. Furthermore, the progress of the argument from 8.3b to 8.3c invites a reading that sees Paul utilizing σάρξ in its second and third occurrences univocally. For in one breath he joins σάρξ and ἀμαρτία together into one σαρκός ἀμαρτίας at 8.3b; but in the next, at 8.3c, he picks up σαρκός and ἀμαρτίας from 8.3b, and by separating them with the addition of καὶ περὶ ἀμαρτίας he shows that the problem identified really has more to do with ἀμαρτίαν, which is the object of God's condemnation ἐν τῇ σαρκί.

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1 So Wilckens, Römer, 2.127 n. 521.

2 So A. Schlatter, Romans: The Righteousness of God, trans. S. S. Schatzmann (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1995), 176; Sand, Begriffe, 201; Cranfield, Romans, 1.382.

3 So Moo, Romans, 480, who says σαρκί means "the humanity of Christ, but it also alludes to that sphere of human weakness into which Christ entered to accomplish his work."
This has one repercussion for how we elucidate σάρξ at 8.3bc. Since σαρκί at 8.3c signifies the same as σαρκός at 8.3b, then of the variety of possible choices sketched above, only those are viable that work for both. Consequently, because an interpretation of σάρξ as the sphere of sin's activity makes no sense of 8.3b, we deem it inappropriate to introduce this thought at 8.3c. We are left, then, to decide between two alternatives, σάρξ as ἄνθρωπος and σάρξ as material body.

We do not claim that σάρξ at 8.3bc cannot be interpreted as ἄνθρωπος, but we have elected to decipher it solely in conjunction with the predicament posed in 7.7-25. For when σάρξ at 8.3bc is taken to represent, not the ἄνθρωπος, but the body of flesh, we have a reading of the passage that answers the question posed at 7.24. For according to 7.7-23 there was a two-fold problem; one, the presence of the law had disastrous consequences for people due to the overwhelming presence of the power of sin (7.7-13); two, on account of that same overwhelming presence of sin in the body of flesh, the νοῦς was impotent to carry out its good intentions (7.14-23). The first problem was disposed of, as 6.14 and 7.1-6 make plain, by the removal of the baptized from the sphere where the law operated. Instead of revivifying the law with new power for life, God chose to work outside the law altogether. He sent his son ἐν ομοιώματι σαρκός ἁμαρτίας (8.3b), not just to constitute a new temporal and spatial sphere of existence for humanity in Christ Jesus, but to confront the second problem posed at 7.7-23. Paul targets that issue here, for in conjunction
with 8.2, 8.3 explains how the baptized are set free ἐκ τοῦ σάματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου (7.24) by being set free ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου, and placed in a new sphere of existence so that they can fulfill "the just requirement of the law" (8.4a). We therefore think Paul uses σάρξ at 8.3bc, just as at 7.18 and 7.25, to signify the physical body of flesh, and that alone.3

The genitive ἁμαρτίας is not attributive at 8.3b. We are not dealing with "sinful flesh," as though the flesh by its materiality was evil.4 Neither are there grounds for taking this genitive as objective, in the sense of "the flesh that produces sin."5 Rather, it is possessive; σαρκός ἁμαρτίας denotes the body of flesh possessed by the power of sin.

With regard to what ὁμοιόματι adds, the word can communicate "likeness but not sameness or identity." Writers in the LXX commonly utilized ὁμοιόματι this way,6 and it appears to be the way Paul used the word at 1.23. It can also convey "likeness in the sense of sameness or identity." Perhaps 5.14 and 6.5 belong here. From as far back as the second century (if not further), both

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3 So also Ludemann, Anthropologie, 121; Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 150-153.

4 As Ludemann thought (Anthropologie, 121). Boyarin rightly says, "Paul's 'dualism' was precisely not a typical Hellenistic dualism, one that would maintain that the flesh is intrinsically evil" (Radical Jew, 77).

5 As Schlatter maintained (Romans, 174).

6 LXX Exod 20.4 and Josh 22.28 are illustrative of how ὁμοιόματι was frequently used. In the former, idols look like what they represent but are not what they represent; in the latter,
definitions have been affixed to ὀμοιώματι at 8.3 with three resulting interpretations. The traditional view posits congruence in one respect, variance in another. Paul is seen to be saying that the son's σάρξ ἁμαρτίας was a genuinely human body, but only in appearance did this fleshly body resemble one possessed by the power of sin, for in reality, it was not (see 2 Cor 5.21). Then there was the so-called "gnostic" interpretation, which asserted that the son seemed outwardly to have a fleshly body, but never assumed such. However, it is common nowadays to see ὀμοιώματι pointing to full congruence: Jesus' flesh was just like everyone else's. All in all, the traditional interpretation still has more going for it. Although Paul saw Christ inhabiting a fleshly body prior to the resurrection, it is hard to conceive that he saw Christ's earthly body as determined - like everyone else's - by the destructive power of sin, with all that that entailed according to 7.14-23. In short, ὀμοιώματι communicates sameness in body, but with respect to sin's mastery over, in, and through that flesh, incongruity.

the altar of the Reubenites and Gadites looks like the real altar of Israel, but is not the real altar. See Moo, Romans, 369 n. 80.

17 See Tertullian, Cann. Chr. 16. For Forschungsgeschichte, see Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.491-493.

14 So, e.g., J. Schneider, "ὁμοίοις ὀμοιώτης κτλ," TDNT 5:195-196; Schlier, Römerbrief, 241; Moo, Romans, 479-480.

In sending the son into the same fleshly body that everyone else had, albeit a fleshly body not controlled by the cosmic power of sin, God did what the law was powerless to do; κατέκρινεν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί (8.3c). Here, κατέκρινεν means "not just sentence pronounced but sentence effected." Sin was judicially condemned and its power was also broken in the flesh.

How this condemning of sin in the flesh was accomplished may be seen by bringing 8.3 and 6.6 together. We saw that καταργήθη τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας (6.6b) meant that the physical body under the oppressive domination of the power of sin was destroyed or nullified. This happened in baptism, when ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος, that is, the person in the old sphere of existence, was crucified together with Christ (6.6a). What we saw happening to the baptized there we now see at 8.3 as having happened to the one in whom the baptized participated. Christ, who had the same, albeit sinless, flesh as everyone else, was crucified. And in that crucifixion, God condemned and destroyed sin's power in the flesh of Christ. The dative ἐν at 8.3c is significant; it is the place where God's condemnation of sin took place, the fleshly body of

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"So Ludemann, Anthropologie, 121; Schlier, Römerbrief, 240-241; Murray, Romans, 279; Sand, Begriffe, 201; Cranfield, Romans, 1.382-383; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 422, to whom the quoted words belong.

"When 8.3 and 6.6 are juxtaposed, we have an explanation of the crucial second premise in Paul's argument at 6.6, and a warrant for the link between 6.6a and 6.6b.

"Paul had already drawn out the implications of this at 6.10: ὃ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν, τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν ἐφάπαξ."
Christ. Since the baptized died in that death, sin’s power in their flesh was also destroyed.  

According to the predicament posed in Romans 7, the νοῦς needed to be rescued ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου, it needed to be set free from sin’s demonic possession of the σάρξ. God did this by sending the son in a body of flesh, and there condemned and destroyed sin’s power in the flesh. With that power broken, the ἔσω ἀνθρωπος, which formerly could only will and delight in God’s law, can now do that one thing required by the law (8.4a; see also 6.11).

The argument of 8.4b-8

Two discrete denotations of σάρξ - as power and material body - were drawn into close proximity at 8.3. We have, of course, observed a conjunction between the power of the old sphere and the fleshly body already conceptualized in Romans 7. Although Paul did not play on σάρξ there, he does at 8.3 and for a reason. For as we will see, in verses 4-13 he wants to give an added dimension to σάρξ.

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13 The logic of this argument is also Kuss’s (Römerbrief, 498). Thus I take σαρκίκος ἁμαρτίας at 8.3 to be equivalent to σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας at 6.6. So also Lüdemann, Anthropologie, 56; Bultmann, Theology, 197; Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 152, 291; Boyarin, Radical Jew, 79. Σῶμα and σάρξ are in their respective texts the right words rhetorically. For what happened in the σῶμα at 6.6 is the basis for the consecrating of the σῶμα at 5.12-13; and the distinct uses of σάρξ at 8.3, as we shall see, provide the interpretive key to σάρξ in 8.4-13.

14 Lüdemann makes explicit the connection between the condemning of sin’s power in the flesh and fulfilling the law’s requirement at 8.4a (Anthropologie, 121).
At 8.5-8, Paul spells out what he means by and what are the outcomes of the two opposing ways of existence that come to expression in τοίς μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα at 8.4b, a clause which qualifies ἐν ἡμῖν at 8.4a and provides another condition for 8.4a. Those who walk κατὰ πνεῦμα fulfill "the just requirement of the law," those who walk κατὰ σαρκά do not.

The starting point for defining σάρξ at 8.4b, as well as in its other materializations down to 8.13 (ten times in all), is the word that opposes it at 8.4b and throughout these verses, πνεῦμα (nine times).\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{1} Since πνεῦμα is the divine, life-creating, and peace-giving power of the new sphere of existence, and since σάρξ functions antithetically at 8.4b, we therefore infer that it indicates the cosmic power of the old sphere of existence, just as at 8.3a.\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{2}

Given that 8.5 functions to explain 8.4b, φρονοῦσιν, which joins the subject οἱ κατὰ σάρκα ὄντες to τὰ τῆς σαρκός, includes its basic idea of "think," but overlaps with the meaning of περιπατοῦσιν as well.\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{3} Accordingly, οἱ κατὰ σάρκα ὄντες determine in their own minds to walk a certain way of life; they think so as to do τὰ τῆς σαρκός, with σάρξ bearing the same signification as in

\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{1} Πνεῦμα at 8.10c is omitted as it opposes σῶμα.

\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{2} Kuss says, "Der Begriff Sarx steht in diesen Zusammenhängen immer im Gegensatz zu dem Begriff Pneuma und muß aus diesem Gegensatz begriffen und definiert werden" (Römerbrief, 2.514).

\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{3} So Sand, Begriff, 194.
the preceding clause. In all probability, what \( \tau \) denotes here may be seen at Gal 5.19-21, where Paul catalogues what he thinks \( \tau \varepsilon \rho \gamma \alpha \tau \sigma \alpha \kappa \kappa \zeta \) are. Not just sexual sins, but everything that the power of \( \sigma \alpha \rho \zeta \) works (subjective genitive) in those who exist or behave in accordance with (\( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \) it.

\( \sigma \alpha \rho \zeta \) primarily represents the power of sin at 8.5. But in view of the way this power works in and through the body of flesh of the \( \sigma \alpha \rho \kappa \iota \nu \nu \) person (7.14-23), a word which undoubtedly intends the same as \( \omega \iota \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \sigma \alpha \rho \kappa \alpha \delta \alpha \tau \zeta \epsilon z \) \( \sigma \alpha \rho \zeta \) at 8.5 also includes, in addition to its primary denotation of cosmic power, a connotative meaning of material body as well. For "those who exist in terms of the flesh" are exactly those who, in letting the power of sin determine them, obey their bodily lusts or do not put \( \tau \varsigma \pi \rho \alpha \zeta \epsilon \iota \tau \sigma \tau \eta \vartheta \omicron \sigma \alpha \nu \mu \zeta \zeta \) \( \sigma \alpha \mu \alpha \omicron \) to death (6.12; 8.13). Paul contrasts all this at 8.5b: \( \omega \iota \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \pi \nu \epsilon \gamma \omicron \mu \alpha \omicron \) think so as to do \( \tau \tau \cdot \tau \) the \( \pi \nu \epsilon \gamma \omicron \mu \alpha \omicron \) (see Gal 5.22-23).

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14 Since for Paul, "Dem »Sein« entspricht ein Handeln" (Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.498; so also Wilckens, Römer, 2.130), it would be difficult to press for a distinction between \( \omega \iota \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \sigma \alpha \rho \kappa \alpha \pi \rho \iota \tau \omicron \omicron \zeta \zeta \zeta \) at 8.4 and \( \omega \iota \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \sigma \alpha \rho \kappa \alpha \delta \alpha \tau \zeta \epsilon z \) at 8.5. So also Cranfield, Romans, 1.385; Moo, Romans, 486.

15 So Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.499; Wilckens, Römer, 2.130.

16 And most especially because of 8.13 below, where we will see that living \( \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \sigma \alpha \rho \kappa \alpha \) has something to do with \( \tau \varsigma \pi \rho \alpha \zeta \epsilon \iota \tau \sigma \tau \eta \vartheta \alpha \nu \mu \zeta \zeta \).”

17 See above, pages 157-161.

18 Dunn’s translation of \( \omega \iota \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \sigma \alpha \rho \kappa \alpha \delta \alpha \tau \zeta \epsilon z \) (Romans 1-8, 425).

19 Therefore, \( \sigma \alpha \rho \zeta \) rather than \( \omega \alpha \varphi \alpha \tau \tau \alpha \iota \alpha \) is the appropriate word here.
8.6 draws out the present and future consequences. There is death for τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς, but life and peace for τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος. Τὸ φρόνημα is the cognate of the verb in the previous verse and may be translated "mind set." Since σάρξ and πνεῦμα stand opposed here, as in verse 5, there is no reason to suppose Paul has shifted meanings.

But the question whether σαρκός at 8.6 is a subjective or objective genitive is open to debate. Bultmann, Kuss, and Jewett argue that σαρκός here and in the next verse is subjective. Taken this way, 8.6a says that the power of the old sphere, σάρξ, has a mind set on death. Then in verse 7, Paul steps back for a moment to speak, not of people, but of the power of the old sphere. It is hostile toward God and cannot accede to God's law. In verse 8 he returns to describe the condition of those ἐν σαρκὶ: they are not able to please God. Taken as an objective genitive, however, τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς can be seen as a catchphrase for οἱ κατὰ σάρκα ὄντες τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς φρονοῦσιν at 8.5a. Those set on the σάρξ, the power of the old sphere, are people who do τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς, and what they procure as their recompense is death. Verses 7-8 then supply a rationale for 8.6a (δίστ). Such people are hostile toward God,

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2. So Barrett, Romans, 157-158; Schweizer, TDNT 7:133; Moo, Romans, 487 n. 81.

3. Similarly, according to 8.6b, those set on the πνεῦμα, the power of the new sphere, would be people who do τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος. Their reward is ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη.
they cannot submit to the law or please God. Although both make sense contextually, the latter is preferable, since Paul's purpose here to is explicate what it means to walk κατὰ σάρκα.\textsuperscript{13}

Next, Paul opposes σάρξ at 8.8 with πνεῦμα at 8.9. Once again, there are no textual clues to lead us to conclude Paul changed meanings of σάρξ (and πνεῦμα). For just as the baptized are in the power of πνεῦμα (ἐν πνεύματι, 8.9a), so the others are in the power of the σάρξ (ἐν σαρκί, 8.8).\textsuperscript{1} Paul has, of course, already used ἐν [τῇ] σαρκί at 7.5. There, we said σάρξ had to do with the sphere of sin's operations, a sphere that encompassed the material usages of σάρξ at 7.18 and 25. But in view of the way he employs σάρξ in these verses in Romans 8, it emerges now that any substantial partition between σάρξ as the sphere of sin's activity and σάρξ as the power of that sphere is all but erased. Just as being in πνεῦμα as power adds up to being in πνεῦμα as sphere, so also with σάρξ.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} The Body at 8.10-11 in the Context of the Argument of 8.9-11

By means of a time-honoured technique of putting forward only two disjunctive alternatives, one is either ἐν σαρκί or ἐν πνεῦμα, and by associating his audience with the latter, Paul is able at 8.9 to increase their adherence to his point of view.

\textsuperscript{11} The change from singular (8.7) to plural (8.8) may be accounted for by Paul preparing "the way for the direct address to the readers in v. 9" (Cranfield, Romans, 1.387).

\textsuperscript{15} So Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.514.
Since the alternative is now excluded, the readers know that when Paul spoke in the third person about those in the flesh, he was not talking about 'us' but 'them'. The rhetoric pushes the listeners onto the same stage as Paul, and there they have to perform his script.

Εἴπερ πνεῦμα θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν at 8.9b lays down the condition for the fulfilment of ὑπενίς δὲ οὐκ ἐν σαρκὶ ἀλλὰ ἐν πνεῦματi at 8.9a. To have πνεῦμα θεοῦ, that divine, life-creating, and peace-giving power of the new epoch of existence dwelling in them, means correspondingly that they are ἐν πνεῦματι. They are not ἐν σαρκὶ, where they are unable to please God, but are positioned in that sphere of existence determined by the power πνεῦμα.

The interpretation of τὸ σῶμα νεκρὸν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν at 8.10

A Forschungsgeschichte of τὸ σῶμα νεκρὸν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν reveals that two distinct renderings have been proposed for each of the three key elements, σῶμα, νεκρόν, and διὰ ἁμαρτίαν. Σῶμα denotes either the person or physical body. Νεκρόν is taken to signify either the same thing as θνητά at 8.11 or something different. And διὰ ἁμαρτίαν is interpreted to mean that sin's power over the σῶμα has been destroyed (baptismal or sacramental interpretation) or that the σῶμα is still mortal and under the sentence of death (judicial interpretation). Although six interpretations are conceivable, scholars link νεκρόν as "dead" with the baptismal interpretation of διὰ ἁμαρτίαν, and νεκρόν as "mortal" with the judicial. That

\[^{11}\] So Wilckens, Römer, 2.130; Käsemann, Romans, 220; Moo, Romans, 485-486.
leaves us with four and all have significant scholarly support.
This is not surprising since the aphoristic nature of this tersely written sentence has resulted in a predicament where exegetes have to decipher the meaning in terms of what they think Paul is saying about these matters in the surrounding context. 14

The sacramental, σῶμα = self interpretation

Bultmann, Barrett, and Sand understand σῶμα at 8.10 as the self under the rule of the flesh. 15 So when Paul says the σῶμα is νεκρόν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν, what he is referring to, Bultmann says, is the elimination of the "flesh-ruled soma." This takes place in the death experienced by the person in baptism, since already in Christ's death, which the believer shares in, "sin has been condemned," as 8.3 said. Bultmann paraphrases τὸ σῶμα νεκρόν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν this way: "Your body is dead because (by virtue of your fellowship with Christ) you are already dead to sin, i.e., because judgment has already been executed on sin (in your dying with Christ)." 15

The judicial, σῶμα = self interpretation

According to Cranfield, the σῶμα is the "Christian," but contrary to the previous interpretation, 8.10b does not mean the Christian is dead "to sin," but dead "because of sin." With τὸ μὴν

14 Kuss (Römerbrief, 2.502), Jewett (Anthropological Terms, 297), and Paulsen (Überlieferung, 70), among others, make this point.

15 Bultmann, Theology, 200; idem, TDNT 4:894; Barrett, Romans, 159; Sand, Begriffe, 206. So also Käsemann, Romans, 224.
Paul says that "the Christian must still submit to death as the wages of sin." But since it is rather obvious that the believer is not now dead, it becomes necessary to read νεκρόν in terms of θνητός in the next verse. Paul employs νεκρός instead of θνητός "for the sake of vividness and emphasis."

Consequently, τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρόν διὰ ἀμαρτίαν is a concessive clause and can be paraphrased, "although the person is mortal because of sin."

The judicial, σῶμα = body interpretation

This view, held by Gundry and Moo, overlaps with the one directly above with respect to how it explains νεκρόν, διὰ ἀμαρτίαν, and in taking the clause concessively. But it parts company by construing σῶμα as the corporeal body. Gundry thinks that when Paul says the body is νεκρόν, what he means, as θνητός at 8.11 shows, is "that the body is 'mortal', as good as dead, under the sentence of death." He suggests Paul patterns 8.10 after 8.6, but chooses the adjective νεκρός instead of the noun θάνατος because the latter "would have sounded harsh." But despite the

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\(^3\) Cranfield, Romans, 1.389. With some torque applied, Dunn's interpretation in terms of "the continuing two-sidedness of the believer's existence and experience" can be wrenched in here. He brings 7.8-11 to bear on the μέν-clause and says that "the state of deadness" that "characterizes all human existence in this age" "results from the coming alive of sin and the resultant death of humankind." Paul is reminding his readers that "the reality of living under the power of sin has not yet been left behind" (Romans 1-8, 431, 444).

\(^5\) Sōma, 45. Similarly, Moo, Romans, 492 n. 104. This is also the view of S. Vollenweider, "Der Geist Gottes als Selbst der Glaubenden: Überlegungen zu einem ontologischen Problem in der paulinischen Anthropologie," ZTK 93 (1996): 172.
patterning of 8.10 on 8.6, he rejects the notion that σῶμα is being used interchangeably with σάρκι as the seat of sin. For if such were the case, "it would need casting off rather than the quickening which is indicated in verse 11." Διὰ ἁμαρτίαν is then interpreted in light of "the sin of Adam which brought death (5:12-21)." "The bodies of Christians are proleptically dead and will actually die in the future, not because of their sins as individuals but because of involvement in the general judgement on the human species as such." In like fashion, Moo says that the body's deadness is "a condition that has come about 'because of sin', with the result that it is in a "state of condemnation."
The believer must still experience "the penalty of physical death." He points out that since "the Christian is no longer subject to the penalties of sin in any other way," διὰ ἁμαρτίαν can only be applied to Christians in the sense of "denoting the reason for the deadness of the body." Thus grasped negatively, Gundry and Moo see the clause as having concessive force.

The sacramental, σῶμα = body interpretation

This theory, held by Kuss, Jewett, and Wilckens, agrees with Bultmann's with respect to the explication of νεκρόν and διὰ ἁμαρτίαν, and with Gundry's and Moo's with respect to taking σῶμα as the physical body, although contrary to Gundry (and presumably

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1: Sōma, 43, 45.

2: Romans, 491-492 n. 104.

3: Gundry, Sōma, 45, 45 n. 1; Moo, Romans, 492.
Moo), it supposes σώμα at 8.10 is interchangeable with σάρξ. Kuss says that τὸ μὲν σώμα νεκρὸν διὰ ἀμαρτίαν expresses the idea that due to an "ontischen Verwandlung," the σώμα is "tot (abgetan) wegen der (grundsätzlichen Beseitigung der) Sündenmacht." Jewett thinks that "νεκρὸν σώμα picks up the tradition of sacramental death in baptism to which Paul referred in 6:6," but he thinks Paul added διὰ ἀμαρτίαν to correct any view that would blame "the material substance of the body" for the body's death. He says that Paul "insists that if the body is dead it is because of sin rather than because of its fleshly constitution." According to Wilckens, Χριστός ὑμῖν "entspricht der Teilhabe der Getaufenen am Sühnetod und an der Auferstehung Christi" at 6.1-11, on the basis of which "der Leib der Sünde vernichtet ist." "Also," he says, "ist in 8,10 »der Leib« im Sinne von »Leib der Sünde« (6,6) bzw. »Sündenfleisch« (8,3) aufzufassen; und das Totsein des Leibes bedeutet: unsere Zugehörigkeit zum »Leib der Sünde« ist aufgehoben; die Sünde hat ihre Kraft, uns in unserer leibhaften Tatwirklichkeit zu bestimmen, verloren." Thus Paul uses σώμα at 8.10 when he could have used σάρξ, for διὰ ἀμαρτίαν is to be

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"Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.503-504; Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 105, 148, 296; Wilckens, Römer, 2.132. This is also the view of Schlatter, Romans, 178-179; Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 162-163; Paulsen, Überlieferung, 68-76; Beker, Paul, 205, 289.

"Römerbrief, 2.503.

"Anthropological Terms, 105, 148, 296."
explained in the light of God's condemning sin in the flesh (8.3).²⁷

Scholars on all sides of this debate agree that σῶμα at 8.10 is determined by its usages earlier in the letter.²⁸ We see no reason to quibble. Therefore given our hypothesis, which asserts that Paul employs σῶμα at 1.24, 4.19, 6.6, 12, 7.4, and 24 to signify the corporeal body, we stand on solid ground to maintain that σῶμα means the same at 8.10. As a consequence, we are left to decide between the third and fourth theories summarized above.

The sacramental interpretation has one significant piece of evidence weighing in its favour. As Kuss says, "Nach dem »wenn aber Christus in euch (ist)« erwartet man jedenfalls zunächst nicht eine Angabe dessen, was durch die Sündenmacht erreicht wurde, sondern ganz selbstverständlich die Resultate des Heilswirkens." The sacramental interpretation, however, which speaks of the neutralization in baptism of sin's power to control behaviour through the body, seems to fit the frame of Χριστός ἐν ἰματίῳ better. For rather than serving up a concession, τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρόν διὰ ἀμαρτίαν serves to explicate ὡμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐστέ ἐν σαρκί at 8.9a. The

²⁷ Römer, 2.132.

²⁸ So, e.g., Bultmann, TDNT 4:894; Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.503-504; Sand, Begriff, 206; Schweizer, TDNT 7:1065; Schlier, Römerbrief, 247-248; Paulsen, Überlieferung, 71, and esp. 73 n. 261; Käsemann, Romans, 224; Wilckens, Römer, 2.132; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 431, 444.

²⁹ Römerbrief, 2.504. See also Paulsen, Überlieferung, 72; Sand, Begriffe, 206.
baptized are not ἐνσάρκι because sin's power over the body has been annihilated.

Although this has merit, the obstacles standing against the sacramental interpretation are implacable. We identify two. One, according to the sacramental rendering, σῶμα can be equated with σάρξ as the material body at 8.10, but the words cannot be so equated at 8.11, a verse that works as the continuation of 8.10.
To the credit of the judicial view, however, σῶμα unequivocally means one thing in both verses. Two, had Paul intended to say that the σῶμα is νεκρόν "(abgetan) wegen der (grundsätzlichen Beseitigung der) Sündenmacht" (Kuss), he could have used τὴ ἁμαρτία or, if a preposition were required, ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας to convey his intention lucidly and routinely. Διὰ ἁμαρτίαν does not communicate such an intention, and even though both accounts take διὰ ἁμαρτίαν causally and are 'guilty' of having to explain διὰ ἁμαρτίαν in terms of content collected from the context, the judicial view has in its favour a reading of διὰ ἁμαρτίαν that is not convoluted. But the baptismal view not only has to do contortions with διὰ, but what is worse, it has to throw in a whole additional notion to make the clause intelligible: "the body is dead because of what God did to sin."

Because the judicial interpretation of τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν plays fair with the grammar and content, it is to be followed. What is more, it also makes sense contextually, as we

"Gundry says this is "the fatal flaw" of the sacramental interpretation (Scôma, 43)."
will show. Paul is thus seen to be acknowledging that for those who have Christ in them, it is nevertheless the case that the physical body is dead, or in view of verse 11, mortal, and this is due to the power of sin. The cause and effect relationship between the power of sin and death, which has been encountered several times already in Romans 5-8, comes to expression again. Even though the power of sin has been annihilated in the body (6.6), the effects of that bygone domination endure. There may even be a reason Paul serves up this concession here. While those ἐν πνεύματι will walk κατὰ πνεύμα, there is still the possibility of retrogression. Because the corporeal body is mortal and corrupted, it is yet threatened by the power of sin (6.12), which seeks to regain what it lost. Paul is not, then, merely asserting a premise, the Sterblichkeit of the σώμα, accepted by himself and his audience as self-evident, something hardly worth mentioning.

The interpretation of τὸ πνεῦμα ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνη at 8.10

Inasmuch as 8.10b contributes a concession, Paul's main point is to be found here: For those who have Christ in them, although the body is mortal due to sin, yet τὸ πνεῦμα ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνην.

ζωὴ is not a riddle; it is a comprehensive term encompassing future life to be sure (e.g., 5.17, 21; 6.22-23), but also the present manifestation of that life in the baptized (e.g., 6.4;

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See 5.12-14, 21; 6.16, 23; 7.5, 9-11; and probably 8.2.

Contrary to Paulsen, Überlieferung, 73.
7.4; 8.2, 6).¹³ Much the same goes for διά δικαιοσύνην. The link between καινή and δικαιοσύνη (or cognates) elsewhere in the letter (1.17; 5.17-18, 21) recommends that what we are dealing with is a catchword indicating the salvific work of God that came to expression in Christ’s sacrificial death, burial, and resurrection. The forensic righteousness achieved by Christ’s obedience, imputed to believers as a gift (5.17), is the cause of life.¹²

The ambiguity over what ἡμαντιόντας intends has been solved in three ways; as divine ἡμαντιόντας or Holy Spirit, as an anthropological term, or - in some fashion - as a fusion of the two. If there is a prevailing view presently, it assesses ἡμαντιόντας as divine spirit or Holy Spirit. 8.11 is cited for corroboration: since ἡμαντιόντας is divine spirit there, and since that verse explains 8.10, it makes sense to conclude that ἡμαντιόντας at 8.10 is the same. Further, in view of statements in the immediate context that connect ἡμαντιόντας

¹¹ So, e.g., Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 198; Paulsen, Überlieferung, 75; Moo, Romans, 492. See further, Lincoln, Paradise Now, 128.

¹² So, e.g., Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.504; Wilckens, Römer, 2.132; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 432.

¹³ So, e.g., Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.503-504; Barrett, Romans, 159; Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 162; Paulsen, Überlieferung, 68-76 passim; Cranfield, Romans, 1.390; Osten-Sacken, Römer 8, 153-154; Gundry, Sōma, 45; Schlier, Römerbrief, 247-248; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 431; G. D. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994), 550-551; Moo, Romans, 492. Dunn says, "Most modern commentators recognize that in the context ἡμαντιόντας almost certainly means (Holy) Spirit" (Jesus and the Spirit: A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of Jesus and the First Christians as Reflected in the New Testament [London: SCM, 1975], 444 n. 69).
and ζωή (8.2, 6, 11, 13), Peter von der Osten-Sacken argues that it would be arbitrary to interpret πνεῦμα at 8.10 as anything but the heilige Geist."

There has also been a rich scholarly tradition of taking πνεῦμα as an anthropological term." Since Paul is dealing with the import of the indwelling Christ in believers,' and since σῶμα is an anthropological term at 8.10b, πνεῦμα as the parallel word is taken as denoting inner spirit, just as at 8.16. Accordingly, Paul is saying one of two things: that the human spirit, while still mortal, is being determined by the Holy Spirit, or that the human spirit has already been transformed or resurrected in some way.

While expressing this in sundry ways, a third group of interpreters erases any meaningful distinction between divine and human πνεῦμα at 8.10c.' Paul is seen to use πνεῦμα here to signify

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'^ Römer 8, 153-154. See also Moo, Romans, 492.


' So Wilckens, Römer, 2.132.

" So, e.g., A. Tholuck, Commentar zum Briefe Pauli an die Römer (Halle an der Saale: Anton, 1824), 402; B. Weiss, Der Brief an die Römer, MeyerK 4 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1881), 347; W. Bousset, Kyrios Christos: A History of the Belief in Christ from the Beginnings of Christianity to Irenaeus, trans. J.
divine πνεῦμα that has been apportioned to the believer in such a way that it makes "up the center of the person." ⁵⁰

Although we have no wish to discard this third option until further investigation is carried out, three pieces of contextual evidence contribute powerfully to show that, at the very least, πνεῦμα at 8.10c is divine. There are the links between πνεῦμα and ζωή in the context, the appearance of the duplicate τὸ πνεῦμα denoting divine πνεῦμα a mere six words away (8.11a), and the absence of any personal pronoun to qualify πνεῦμα as human, as at 1.9 and 8.16.

The interpretation of τὰ θνητὰ σῶματα at 8.11

There is nothing in the context that suggests Paul has changed the definition of σῶμα that he has so steadfastly employed up to now. Σῶμα is the physical body, the same θνητὸν σῶμα of 6.12 and 8.10. No longer, however, are we dealing with the σῶμα τῆς ἁµαρτίας or σῶµατος τοῦ θανάτου of 6.6 and 7.24. Rather, it is the mortal body that has been freed from the power and sphere of

E. Seely (Nashville: Abingdon, 1970), 169, 172-173; 175; 181; Bultmann, Theology, 1.208; K. Stalder, Das Werk des Geistes in der Heiligung bei Paulus (Zürich: Evz, 1962), 437; Schweizer, TDNT 6.435 (but no mention of 8.10); K. Kertelge, >Rechtfertigung< bei Paulus: Studien zur Struktur und zum Bedeutungsgehalt des paulinischen Rechtfertigungsbegriffs, NTAbh 3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1967), 156; Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 172-186; Vollenweider, "Geist," 163-173, who cites R. Reitzenstein, H. Leisegang, A. Deissmann, and O. Pfleiderer as holding a similar estimate (163 n 2). Dunn, after saying that "πνεῦµα of course refers to the Spirit of God (8:9-11), not the human spirit," then adds, "though nobody in the first century would see the two as wholly disconnected" (Romans 1-8, 426).

⁴: Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 198.
sin, but is still subject to death (8.10b) and, as we saw at 6.12, can still be threatened by sin.\(^2\)

There is some disagreement, though, on what ζωοποιήσαε contributes. Two alternatives are at hand. One option understands ζωοποιήσαε as a logical future, with the word not entirely overlapping in meaning with ἔγειρον.\(^3\) It has two supports.

First, in the apodosis of a conditional sentence such as we have here, Stanley E. Porter has shown that when a future indicative turns up it indicates only what can be expected to happen when the protasis is fulfilled. He examined over fifty examples from the NT where the future appears in the apodosis of a conditional sentence and concluded: "the action is not temporally based but only relative to the argument of the conditional itself (hence virtually any verb form may be said to have future reference in the apodosis of a conditional statement by virtue of implicature, not grammar or tense)."\(^4\) When applied

\(^2\) So Schlier, Römerbrief, 248; Fitzmyer, Romans, 491.

\(^3\) This view has been held by Calvin (according to Cranfield, Romans, 1.391); Lietzmann, Römer, 80; H. Grass, Ostergeschehen und Osterberichte (2d ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 165; Stalder, Werk des Geistes, 429; P. Siber, Mit Christus leben: eine Studie zur paulinischen Auferstehungshoffnung (ATHANT 61; Zurich: Theologischer, 1971), 83; Barrett, Romans, 159-160.

\(^4\) Verbal Aspect in the Greek of the New Testament, with Reference to Tense and Mood, Studies in Biblical Greek 1 (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 421 (emphasis added). His section on the future form in the apodoses of conditions (421-422) is one of several lines of evidence that he advances (403-439) to show that if there is a "unifying factor for use of this [future] tense," it is not to denote future time. Rather, it "grammaticalizes the semantic feature of [+expectation]" (403, 406).
to 8.11, what the future form ζωοποιήσει contributes grammatically is this: when the posited event is fulfilled, namely when τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἐγείραντος τὸν Ἰσσαβίου ἐκ νεκρῶν dwells in believers, then one can expect the same πνεῦμα to make their mortal bodies alive. The question when this divine activity takes place is to be settled by the surrounding text; the future form cannot help."

With this firmly in hand, the second reason for taking ζωοποιήσει as a logical future is that it fits the immediate context agreeably. It may reasonably be wondered why Paul would feel compelled to speak of the future resurrection of the body in a passage that concerns itself with explicating τοῖς ἀκὸν κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν ἄλλα κατὰ πνεῦμα at 8.4b. But to speak of divine πνεῦμα "empowering" the mortal body of believers, no doubt so that they can walk κατὰ πνεῦμα by means of their bodies, works well.

The other option takes ζωοποιήσει as a temporal future and altogether equivalent in meaning to ἐγείρω earlier in the verse. We are persuaded that the three arguments upholding this interpretation, a view which predominates among interpreters," are superior in persuasive force to what the alternative offers.

"We concede that Porter's research on what the future tense grammaticizes is sound, and hence it is incorrect to argue for the future resurrection of the body on the basis of the future indicative, as Gundry does (Sóma, 45).

"This view is held by, e.g., Lüdemann, Anthropologie, 130-131, 148; Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.504; Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 163, 166-167; R. Bultmann, "ζωοποιήσει," TDNT 2:874-75; Schweizer, TDNT 6:422; Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 298, 457; Cranfield, Romans, 1.391; Gundry, Sóma, 44-45; Wilckens, Römer, 2.134; Käsemann, Romans, 225; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 432.
First, ζωοποιέω means "make alive"; it does not mean "empower," which is the meaning required by the other view. If Paul wanted to say that the indwelling πνεῦμα empowers the mortal bodies of believers, the verb ἐνδυναμεῖν (4.20; Phil 4.13) was available. So even though a reference to the present working of πνεῦμα on the bodies of believers would seem to make better sense contextually, it cannot be sustained semantically.

Secondly, Paul's use of ζωοποιέω in the two other passages where ζωοποιέω and ἐγείρω are employed, at Romans 4 and 1 Corinthians 15, reveals that he does not discriminate between the two verbs in meaning when they are used in close proximity. In 1 Corinthians 15, the total synonymity of meaning between the two words is so obvious as to make it hardly worth mentioning. For when the occurrences of ἐγείρω at 15.20, 35, and 44 are switched with ζωοποιέω at 15.22, 36, and 45 respectively, no change of meaning ensues in the verses in question. The same goes for Romans 4. At 4.17 Paul says concerning Abraham, that he ἐπιστεύειν θεοῦ τοῦ ζωοποιοῦντες τοὺς νεκροὺς (4.17). What was dead, from the point of view of procreation, was Abraham's own body and Sarah's womb (4.19). Paul parallels all this precisely at 4.24 with respect to believers, when he says they place their trust in the same God "who raised Jesus our lord from the dead" (ἐπὶ τῶν ἐγείροντα Ἰσαοῦ τοῦ κύριον ἡμῶν ἐκ νεκρῶν, 4.24). God's giving of life, namely Isaac, to Abraham, is equivalent to God raising Jesus from the dead, and Paul's argument in the chapter depends on the correlation. He wants to show that righteousness was reckoned to Abraham in the
same way that it is reckoned to everyone else, by faith in the God who makes alive (4.17) or raises (4.24) that which was dead (4.5, 11-13, 16). In view of Paul's use of ζωονοιέω and ἐγείρω in close proximity elsewhere, and "since reference to resurrection is so plain in the first part of the sentence," Moo's inference is consequential, "'will make alive' must also refer to future bodily transformation."

Thirdly, there may be several related reasons why Paul mentions the future resurrection of the body precisely here. Support may be found in his writing style. He can drop concepts into the discourse before he discusses them - 3.3 in relation to Romans 9-11, and 6.14b in relation to Romans 7 are illustrative - so as to prepare his audience for what is to come. We may have the same here. Accordingly, Paul introduces an idea, namely, the future resurrection of the body, which he will discuss at 8.23. In addition, when 6.6 and 8.10 are read together, it emerges that although the power of sin has been annihilated in the body, death has not. In view of the reality of the indwelling of Christ in believers (8.10a), Paul goes on to say that, just as divine πνεύμα raised Jesus from the dead, so it will make alive the mortal bodies of those who have πνεύμα presently dwelling in them. To speculate further, we know that in at least one Pauline community the future status of the body became problematic and for reasons

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*Romans, 493.*
implicit or explicit in Paul's own thinking. To speak at 8.10 of the mortal body being dead because of sin might give him cause for concern that he might again be misunderstood. Thus he pens 8.11 to clarify that, yes, even though the life-creating power of πνεῦμα does not presently extend to the believer's mortal body, yet it will at the resurrection of the body. According to this line of interpretation, 8.10b calls 8.11 into being.

8.9-11 thus asserts the condition for being ἐν πνεύματι and implications for life in the body. If πνεῦμα Θεοῦ dwells in Paul's readers, they are not in the power and sphere of σάρξ but in the power and sphere of πνεῦμα. He concedes that if Christ is in them, they have not yet obtained the culmination of salvation, for at least one effect of sin still lingers. Sin rendered the physical body dead, but since it is not yet a corpse, νεκρόν should be read in terms of θνητά in verse 11. The body is mortal because of sin, but - and here is the point - divine πνεῦμα is life in a full sense for believers on account of God's righteousness reckoned by Christ's act of obedience. To have this πνεῦμα, which raised Jesus from the dead dwelling in them, gives confidence that that same πνεῦμα will also impart life to their mortal bodies. This divine activity is still future from the point of time of believers who nevertheless have πνεῦμα presently dwelling in them. And since the spirit dwells in them, and the spirit is life, there are

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implications for present life in the body, as 8.12-13 goes on to show. 8.9-11, then, furnishes an uninterrupted segue into 8.12-13, a passage that explicates what will be the case with respect to obedience for those ἐν πνεύματι in view of the state of affairs explicated in 8.1-11. For it emerges that the mortal body was not left behind in the sphere of the σάρξ when the baptized were transferred out.

3 The Body at 8.12-13

We said that the starting point for interpreting σάρξ in those occurrences in Romans 8 where it stands opposite πνεῦμα, is πνεῦμα itself. 8.12-13 offers no exception. Inasmuch as πνεῦμα at 8.13 is the divine power of the new sphere of existence, in and by which believers put to death the πράξεως τοῦ σώματος, so σάρξ in its three occurrences in 8.12-13 is the cosmic power of the old aeon. This explains why Paul can speak of σάρξ at 8.12 as a personified being to whom believers are under no compulsion or coercion to conform their behaviour.

8.13a clarifies the consequence for believers who would, however, choose again to live κατὰ σάρκα; it is inevitable that they die (μελέτε ἀποθηκεῖν), which means they forfeit life. Whereas 8.13a clarifies the negative conclusion of life κατὰ σάρκα, 8.13b expresses the positive outcome of living in and by means of πνεῦμα: ἔχεσθε. Again we see the link between πνεῦμα and life.

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"So Dunn, Romans 1-8, 432. See also Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 298, 458."
(recall 8.2, 6, 10, 11), and again the life expected should be seen in the fullest sense, as life for the present and future.

Σῶμα at 8.13b is the same mortal body of 8.10-11; there is no hesitancy about that. It has been rescued from oppressive slavery to the power of sin as pictured in 7.14-23. What τὰς πρᾶξεις brings to the text are the sinful actions that have their source in and come to expression through the body. For if Paul had something else in mind, it is hard to imagine how he could order their execution. Putting 6.12 and 8.13 together, we can say that the perceptible expressions of the ἐπιθυμία τοῦ σώματος are the πρᾶξεις τοῦ σώματος. In which case, Paul is not calling for the extirpation of the passions but their containment, and this is accomplished by means of the elimination of sinful behaviour.

The connection between 8.13a and 8.13b furnishes a justification for our earlier giving σάρξ a connotation supplementary to its principal meaning of power and sphere in 8.4-9. Here at 8.13 there is an observable conjunction between living κατὰ σάρκα and doing the πρᾶξεις τοῦ σώματος, for the way one lives the former is by practising the latter. Thus to walk, live, or exist κατὰ σάρκα is to conform or regulate one's behaviour and thinking to the cosmic power of the old sphere, and one does this by means of not putting the πρᾶξεις τοῦ σώματος to death, which is the same thing as doing them. Kuss is therefore right to affirm that Paul puts σάρξ to work here as a comprehensive term. It
indicates primarily the old sphere of existence and the power of that sphere, but it also involves the material flesh.

Consequently, it is manifest that ὑπάρχω and ὀμολογεῖν are not interchangeable terms at 8.12-13. ὑπάρχω and ὀμολογεῖν together do not denote a demonic ruler to whom the person "is in danger of falling victim," as Bultmann thought. Nor do they merely signal the material body of flesh, as some early exegetes, and Schweizer and Boyarin have said. But neither is there legitimacy for taking the comprehensive definition of ὑπάρχω (denotation as power and sphere; connotation as fleshly body) and transferring

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"Römerbrief, 2.514-518, esp. 518. This is, more or less, also the view of Moo, Romans, 493-494.

So also Bauer, Leiblichkeit, 167-170; Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 46, 149, 159, 290, 297-298; Gundry, Sōma, 36, 39, 210 n. 1; Moo, Romans, 495.

Theology, 196-197, 200, 239, 244-245. However, Bultmann said Paul was only speaking rhetorically, for Paul did not believe in such a "mythological concept." What Paul really meant was this: Even though ὀμολογεῖν is used as the "implied subject of an action," it is to be accounted for by "the fact that the soma-self (a self distinguished from the subject-self) has become so independent in Paul's thought that he can speak of its deeds." The personal human being, denoted by ὑπάρχω and ὀμολογεῖν at 8.12-13 is, as a matter of fact, the person who in relationship "to himself," "no longer has himself in hand." With or without the existential turn, the views of Sand (Begriffe, 206-208), Cranfield (Romans, 1.395), Schlier (Römerbrief, 250), and Dunn (Romans 1-8, 449) can be included with Bultmann's, that ὑπάρχω and ὀμολογεῖν here are synonymous terms denoting the person who lives in terms of self-seeking and self-gratifying existence.

Manuscripts C, D, E, F, G, S, W, 630, Irenaeus -1, Tertullian, et al., read τὰς πράξεις τῆς σάρκος. However, in addition to stronger external testimony supporting σώματος, it is easier to explain how σώματος was altered to σάρκος than vice versa.

Schweizer, TDNT 7:132 n. 267; Boyarin, Radical Jew, 79.
it to σῶμα too, as Ludemann and Kuss have done.\footnote{Ludemann, Anthropologie, 56, 59-60; Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.598: "Der Leib (vgl. Rom 6,6; 7,24; 8,10) wird hier wie eine dem Ich gegenüberstehende Macht beschrieben, mit der Sarx identisch (vgl. V. 13aa: κατά σάρκα), welche bestimmte, ihrem Wesen entsprechende "Taten" (τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος) intendiert und verwirklicht."} For even if "this is about the most negative use of σῶμα in Paul,"\footnote{Dunn, Romans 1-8, 449.} still there is reason to account for the change to σῶμα at 8.13b. Even though, as we have said earlier, Paul links ἐπιθυμία in a conspicuous way with the mortal, physical body, there is no justification for identifying this, which from another angle can be spoken of as the mortal body's own natural inclination, with the demonic power of the old age. That power's hold on the body was totally annihilated in baptism. But the destruction of the σῶμα τῆς ἀμαρτίας did not wipe away the sinful passions. They linger, lodged in the mortal body of the believer, and left unchecked, would manifest themselves in the πράξεις τοῦ σώματος.\footnote{"Even though the ἐργα τῆς σαρκός of Gal 5.19 appear outwardly the same as the πράξεις τοῦ σώματος of Rom 8.13 (their material causes are the same), different efficient causes are working on the body in each case, the power of sin in the former, the believer in the latter. I prefer this to the view of Gundry (Sōma, 39) and Moo (Romans, 495), which suggests the πράξεις τοῦ σώματος are those "deeds worked out through the body under the influence of the flesh" (Gundry).}  

There is, furthermore, as Jewett and Gundry have detected,\footnote{Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 159, 297-298; Gundry, Sōma, 36.} another reason why σῶμα is the proper term at 8.13b and not σάρξ. Whereas σάρξ was only adequate for describing the believer's past,
it could not - as the antithesis of μυστήριον - bridge the gap between the old and new in the believer. But because σώμα is "capable of dedication to God or to evil" (Gundry), it can. As mortal and impregnated with sinful passions it can be put to shameful use, with the result death, but as rescued from the power of sin, it can be presented to God as a διάλογος ἀμαρτίας (6.13), the fruit of which is eternal life.

With ἀρα αὐτόν at 8.12, then, Paul makes a deduction from what he has just said. He states what inevitably will be the situation behaviourally for believers who have μυστήριον dwelling in them and what their reward will be. Although 8.12-13 can have an unspoken paraenetic function for believers who already adopted Paul's form of the gospel, it has an apologetic function for those Roman believers who still need to be won over. For we have here "the cumulative and definite answer" to the accusation of 6.1, that his law-free gospel promotes sinful behaviour. Adherence to Paul's gospel does not promote sinning, for sinning results in death. But Pauline Christians, that is, those who live in and by means of μυστήριον, will put to death the sinful deeds of the body and thereby attain life.

4 The Redemption of the Body at 8.23

The argumentative structure of 8.14-30

At 8.14-17, Paul sets aside the σάρξ-μυστήριον contrast, which dominated the first part of the chapter, in order to focus wholly

"The quoted words belong to Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 355 n 22."
on what πνεῦμα bears witness to in Pauline believers who are led by it. It means they have assurance that they are adopted children of God and heirs together with Christ of divine glory (8.14-17), even though presently that glory is not visible (8.19, 25), on account of, for example, present sufferings, the mortality of the body, and human weakness in prayer.

According to 8.18, the present sufferings endured by believers are not worth comparing to the coming glory that will be theirs. At 8.19-22, Paul goes on to say that the creation was subjected, presumably by God, τῇ ματαιότητι, that is, to "purposelessness" or "meaninglessness," and what resulted from this subjugation of creation was a state of δουλείας τῆς θεοράς (8.21). That creation needs to be set free (ἐλευθερωθήσεται) attests that it is now enslaved, and θεορά indicates that creation is now in a state of "destruction," "ruin," or "decay" (compare 1 Cor 15.42-43). We can only surmise how Paul saw these two ideas relating.** Possibly, as a result of subjugation, creation was enslaved and marred by corruption, and in this state of slavery in decay it groans - its fate bound to the saints - while waiting for the unveiling of the children of God and its own release from slavery and corruption.

In an analogous way to creation, Paul says at 8.23 that those who have the ἀπαρχήν τοῦ πνεύματος also groan (στενάζομεν). What

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**Moo lists four options: "state of slavery that comes from decay"; "slavery characterized by decay"; "slavery that is decay"; "slavery to decay" being his choice (Romans, 517 n. 47).
ἀπαρχή typically denoted in antiquity was an offering of firstlings, whether of harvest or offspring (animal or human), given by humans to the deity. Paul, however, reverses the transaction and has believers on the receiving end of the ἀπαρχή, evidently given by God. Furthermore, the word functions here, as it does in every other instance in the undisputed Pauline letters, to denote a "first stage" with more to come. So just as, for example, Christ's resurrection was a first installment with the resurrection of the end-time to follow (1 Cor 15.20), so also here, the baptized already have an ἀπαρχή, but there is more to come. And what they have now, as the genitive modifier tells, is πνεῦμα. Paul had already said as much at 8.9-11 and 15. Such people who have the firstfruits of πνεῦμα find themselves groaning while eagerly awaiting υἱοθεσίαν, τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν.

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 Judiciary Exod 23.19; Deut 18.4; Rom 11.16; Rev 14.4; Josephus, Ant. 16.172; Plutarch, Mor. 298F, 402A.

 See Rom 11.16; 16.5; 1 Cor 15.20, 23; 16.15. So Moo, Romans, 520-521 and esp. 520 n. 60.

 So also Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.637; Murray, Romans, 306-307; Schlier, Römerbrief, 264; A. Gieniusz, Romans 8:18-30: "Suffering Does Not Thwart the Future Glory," University of South Florida International Studies in Formative Christianity and Judaism 9 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999) 199. To this extent the genitive is epexegetical, but since more is to come it is also partitive. What Meyer said is still valid: "τ. ἡμ. is the partitive genitive, as is involved in the very meaning of ἀπαρχή. Comp. xvi.5; 1 Cor. xv.20, xvi.15; Jas. i.18; and all the passages of the LXX and Apocr., where ἡμ. stands with the genitive of thing" (Romans, 327).
The redemption of the body at 8.23

Paul is affirming that the ἀπολύτρωσις of the σώμα is still future for the baptized. They need this redemption of the body, because, even though the σώμα has been set free from the reign and power of sin, it is still mortal and, as such, subject to corruption and death, in a way that the "inner person" of the believer is not. The corruption manifests itself most markedly, as we saw at 6.12 and 8.13, in the continued presence of sinful passions in the body that seek to manifest themselves as sinful deeds. 8.23 gives hope to the baptized that final victory over all this, although not presently acquired, is coming.

Because the body has a future, ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ σώματος does not mean deliverance from the body. For Paul, salvation does not consist in escape from the prison of the body. Rather, it has to do with God's buying back or buying release of the σώμα from the mortal and corrupt state it is found in presently. This may be seen in the analogous parallel between the ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ σώματος at 8.23 and the setting free of creation from slavery of decay (ἐλευθερωθήσεται ἀπὸ τῆς δουλείας τῆς φθορᾶς) "unto the freedom of glory of

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1. The view that σώμα denotes the physical body at 8.23 is held by, e.g., Ludemann, Anthropologie, 57; Kuss, Römerbrief, 2.638; Schlier, Römerbrief, 265-266; Gundry, Sōma, 46; Beker, Paul, 290; Stowers, Rereading, 40; Fitzmyer, Romans, 510; Moo, Romans, 521.

2. See, e.g., 6.4, 5, 8, 11, 13; 2 Cor 4.16.

3. As Lietzmann thought (Römer, 85).
the children of God" at 8.21. Just as creation is not liberated from itself, but from one state, of corruption, to another, of glory, so also with the body. This is explicit at 1 Corinthians 15, where Paul speaks of the σώμα πνευματικόν that is to be given by God, at 2 Cor 5.1-4, where he speaks of οἰκοδομηνεκθεού, οἰκίαν αὐτοποιήτου αἰώνιον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, and at Phil 3.21, where he speaks of the transformation at the parousia of the σώμα from τὸ σῶμα τῆς τεθειμένης into one that is conformed to Christ's body of glory. In addition, not only should we see the ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος as deliverance of the body from a state of death to a state of glory, but we are also witnessing here the decisive reversal of the condition described at 1.24, where the body was given over unto a dishonoured and degraded state due to the human choice for idolatry."

Thus the "more to come," which is the completion of the ἀρχή, the νίκη of believers "eagerly await" (ἀπεκδεχόμενοι), is as regards the body, what Paul had in view with the σώμα πνευματικόν of 1 Corinthians 15. To explain τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος in terms of deliverance from the material σάρξ or σώμα both misconstrues this phrase and fails to notice that

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Hence Dunn is correct to say that "Endzeit would be analogous to Urzeit" (Romans 1-8, 471).

The most natural interpretation is to see τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος providing the definition of νίκη. So, e.g., Murray, Romans, 308; Barrett, Romans, 167; Byrne, Romans, 263; Moo, Romans, 521.
the σῶμα itself has a glorified and immortal future, as 1 Cor 15.42-43 shows.\(^{115}\)

\(^{115}\) So also Murray, Romans, 307; Barrett, Romans, 167; Gundry, Soima, 46-47; Schlier, Römerbrief, 266; M. J. Harris, *Raised Immortal: The Relation between Resurrection and Immortality in New Testament Teaching* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 139, 170; Fitzmyer, Romans, 510; Gieniusz, Romans 8:18-30, 199.
CHAPTER 6

PHILO'S DOUBLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BODY

1 Introduction

It is common knowledge that Philo denigrated the body. He spoke of it as a "grave" (σῶμα) or "tomb (tάφος) of the soul," and "an exceedingly painful prison." "This terrifying king," the body, is "evil and a treacherous schemer against the soul" (Leg. 1.108, 3.69; Mut. 173; QG 4.75). But he also said positive things. The body is "constituted most impeccably and most faultlessly," and because the body is "the most natural house of the soul," one ought to "take care of the body" (Migr. 93; Praem. 120; QG 2.2). In sum, what Runia said concerning Plato can be said of Philo: In Philo "a double attitude - both negative and positive - towards the body can be discerned."

To explore this double attitude we have elected to focus on two areas where positive and negative remarks on the body are concentrated. We look to what he says about the composition and creation of the body within the context of his anthropology, and then to what he says about the body in discussing the categories into which he customarily divides people in regard to the ascent of the soul.

2 Philo’s Double Attitude toward the Body as Expressed in its Composition and Creation

Philo employs different anthropological conceptualizations, usually Platonic and Stoic, and therefore it is probably

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*Philo and Timaeus, 321. See also 322.*
impossible to collate all his remarks and integrate them into a thoroughly coherent theory on the composition of the person.\footnote{See E. R. Goodenough, By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935), 372, 374, 376-77; J. M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (London: Duckworth, 1977), 144.} Nevertheless, he consistently refers to the human as a composite (σύνθετον, σύγκριμα) of two separable entities, body and soul.\footnote{See Opif. 134; Leg. 2.2, 3.161; Cher. 113-115; Det. 82; Ebr. 101, 144, Mos. 2.288 (δυάδα ὀντα, σώμα καὶ ψυχήν); QG 1.51; J. Groß, Philon von Alexandrien: Anschauungen über die Natur des Menschen, Inaugural-Dissertation (Tübingen: Tübinger Chronik, 1930), 5; Goodenough, By Light, 372-376; R. A. Baer, Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female, ALGHJ 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 14-16. See also Leg. 1.105-06; Plant. 148; Conf. 36; Abr. 258.} He also speaks of the soul in terms of lower, irrational, and higher, rational parts: "I myself am many things, soul and body, and of the soul, irrational (ἀλογον) and rational (λογικόν)."\footnote{See Leg. 2.2, 2.6; Migr. 18; H. Schmidt, Die Anthropologie Philons von Alexandrien, Inaugural-Dissertation (Würzburg: Dissertationsdruckerei und Verlag Konrad Trülsch, 1933), 49-50; Baer, Philo's Use, 14-20; Runia, Philo and Timaeus, 304-305. Philo can use ψυχή to denote, among other things, the entire soul (Leg. 2.24; Her. 55), the higher soul (Opif. 135; Leg. 1.91), and the lower soul (Agr. 89; Spec. 4.123).} The rational soul is indivisible, but the irrational or lower soul can be divided, as the Stoics did, into seven regions, the five senses, and the faculties of speech and generation (Opif. 117; Her. 232; QG 1.75). Or, like Plato, he can divide the irrational part of the soul into the "high-spirited" (τὸ θυμικὸν) and the "emotive" (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν).
The higher part of the soul, which Philo identifies as the mind (νοῦς) or faculty of reasoning (λογισμός, διάνοια, λόγος), is incorporeal (άσωματος, Somn. 1.30) and eternal (αἰτίος, Opif. 67). When God, according to Gen 2.7, breathed into the first human "the breath of life," he was giving πνεῦμα θείον or άθανατον διάνοιαν. This is the image of the image of God, and this soul only can achieve "assimilation to God" (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) and immortality. Consequently, the mind is "the heavenly component in us" (Gig. 60), and "a copy (ἐκμαγείον) or fragment (ἀπόσαμα) or radiance (ἀπαύγασμα) of the blessed nature" (Opif. 146).

Basic to the thinking here is a philosophy that asserts that the human mind is "an inseparable fragment" of God (Det. 90), a God who is utterly transcendent and incomprehensible apart from the fact of its existence. Yet because of this


... Of the thirty-nine occurrences of καρδία in F. Borgen, K. Fuglseth, and R. Skarsten's The Philo Index: A Complete Greek Word Index to the Writings of Philo of Alexandria (Leiden: Brill, 2000), nineteen refer to the physical organ. Another nineteen refer to the "mind," but in every instance we are dealing with a quotation of the LXX. In the one other reference, at Mut. 123, Χάλεβ is etymologized to mean "all heart," and is equated with the human mind. Apart from this one instance and the nineteen where he depends on the LXX, Philo (like Josephus; see Jewett, Anthropological Terms, 308), completely avoids using καρδία to denote the mind or inner person.


... See Deus 55, 62; QE 2.45; J. Drummond, Philo Judaeus; or, The Jewish–Alexandrian Philosophy in its Development and
transcendence there was yet a need to bring God into relation with the created world. Philo deduces:

He caused to shine forth, as it were, a certain radiance, which we most properly call "form," and caused this radiance of light to shine around the whole soul, and filled it with an incorporeal and more than heavenly light. ... Thus, symbolically [the biblical narrative of Gen 18.1-2 sets before us the intelligible sun, (which) sends out its incorporeal rays most luminously and splendidly upon pure souls (QG 4.1).

God, compared here to the sun, is brought into relation with the mind, as well as the universe (τὸ πᾶντα), through its (figuratively speaking) "unmixed and pure rays of continuous light" (Opif. 71). Philo does not want to speak of this stream of light as divisible into separable ontological entities. Yet as one moves down the light stream there is degradation of being. At the top is the Logos, which sends forth its two "highest Powers" (αἱ ἀνώταται δυνάμεις), of which, one is "creative" (ποιητική) and is called θεός,

Completion, 2 vols. (London: Williams and Norgate, 1888), 2.23-34; T. H. Billings, The Platonism of Philo Judaeus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919), 17-18; E. R. Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus, 2d ed., BJC (Landam: University Press of America, 1962), 86-87; Runia, Philo and Timaeus, 436; B. Besnier, "Migration et Telos d'après le de migratione Abrahami," SPhA 11 (1999): 89-90. Philo was led to this position by his epistemology, which affirmed, not only that like is known by like (Opif. 53; Leg. 1.1; Gig. 9), but that the mind, in comprehending the object of thought, is assimilated to that object (Opif. 172; Somn. 2.228). See also A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928), 133, cited in W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 1, The earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 211: "The main principle ... that the soul inevitably grows like, takes on the character of, that which it contemplates, is manifestly Pythagorean."

See Opif. 25, 69, 141, for the principle "the copies are inferior to the originals"; Her. 230-231; Praem. 29; Goodenough, By Light, 90; Whittaker, "Terminology," 10.
the other "kingly" (βασιλική) and called κύριος (Plant. 86; Mos. 2.99). These Powers are aspects of but not ontologically distinct from the θείον λόγον. Further down the light stream is the "intelligible world" (κόσμος νοητός), which may be understood as the thoughts of the Logos. At the extreme end of the light stream are minds, some of which descend into human bodies, and some of which do not. The incarnate mind, itself divine, is ontologically distinct from the mortal and corruptible lower soul, although connected to it. Just as puppets are actuated by marionette-players, so the irrational parts of the soul are actuated by the ruling part (ἡγεμονικός) of the mind.

The lower or irrational soul has for its essence blood, as Lev 17.11 and 14 teaches. So closely is the lower soul connected to the body, that when contrasted with the mind, Philo is able to lump lower soul and body together. The lower soul is the life principle, shared by animals, which animates the body (Opif. 67).

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See Opif. 20, 36, 117; Sacr. 59-60; Det. 168; Fug. 46; Mut. 28-29; Mos. 2.99; Billings, Platonism of Philo, 28; Goodenough, By Light, 36; idem, Introduction, 113; Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," 372-373.

Her. 55, 60-61; Spec. 4.123; QG 2.59. But see H. A. Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 2.387-388, who shows that Philo is able to advance a variety of views common to the philosophies of the time.

See Opif. 135; Somn. 1.42; QG 2.4, where ψύχη, which I take to be the lower soul, is one of the parts of the body, 4.178; Baer, Philo's Use, 14-15, 31. When Philo speaks of the human as a composite of two parts, body and soul, the lower soul belongs with the mortal body not the higher soul.
This soul is mortal and as such has no future beyond the dissolution of body and mind.

The common word Philo uses to designate the human body is σῶμα, but σάρξ is often used - typically of the Hellenistic period - interchangeably with it. Sometimes he speaks of the body as composed of flesh, but he never uses σῶμα as a circumlocution for the personal pronoun, although on rare occasions, following the LXX or due to his allegorizing, he uses σάρξ as a circumlocution for the mind.

Just as the mind is "endeared by nature" to the "divine reason," so the body is endeared by nature to "all the world," because both body and world are "mixed together" out of the same

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1. See, e.g., Leg. 3.152; Gig. 19,29-32, 35; Agr. 25; Ebr. 69-70; Migr. 14-15; Her. 71, 267-269; Pug. 58; Mut. 174; Somn. 2.232; Mos. 2.185; Virt. 78; QG 1.53.

2. As the whole body: Leg. 1.76, 2.20, 37, 38, 40, 49-51; Leg. 3.158; Det. 63; Ios. 96; Spec. 3.115; Praem. 134, 146. As part of the body alongside other parts: Opif. 124; Leg. 3.202; Det. 84.

3. But at Her. 68 the personal pronoun σώ (from Gen 15.4) is used to designate the body from which the person must be released. See also Leg. 3.47. Philo is adamant that the mortal body has nothing to do with "the real I" (Agr. 9; Ios. 71).

4. See Post. 67 (exegesis of Num. 27.16). Also to be included here are: (1) the first occurrence of σάρξ at Leg. 1.76, where "half of her flesh" (Num 12.12) is allegorized to mean the soul is dead; and (2) Philo's allegorizing of σάρξ to mean νοῦς at Leg. 2.41. These are good examples of his propensity to tailor his interpretations of the biblical text to a preconceived theory, even if it means standing the biblical text on its head. At Leg. 2.31, he gives his approach away: "Having said this, we must show how the terms employed [in the biblical text] accord with it [i.e., the "philosophical point of view," Leg. 2.12]" (trans. Colson and Whitaker).
four "elements" (στοιχεία) of "completely self-sufficient matter" (αὐταρκεστάτης ὕλης), earth, water, air, and fire. But even though the world will never be dissolved back into its primordial state, Philo says that the four elements in the human body have been given as a loan and must be repaid at death.

Discussing Gen 6.14-16 at QG 2.1-7, Philo says, "The nature of the human body is constituted most impeccably and most faultlessly," "by the providence of the Creator." This positive evaluation of the body is also seen at Opif. 136-138,

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Opif. 146. See also Her. 152-53, 282-283. The superlative αὐταρκεστάτης at Opif. 146 (see also Dec. 31) can be construed to mean "most ample," as at Mut. 8, in which case matter is "most ample" for the demiurge's purposes, a notion present at Opif. 137. But it may also mean "most self-sufficient" in the sense of causa sui, a notion Philo applies to God at Dec. 81. See also Spec. 1.277; Virt. 9; Cher. 46. The evidence suggests the latter is what he has in mind. At Aet. 74, the closest conceptual parallel, he describes the view of Critolaus, who held that the κόσμος is "absolutely self-sufficient (αὐταρκέστατον) and independent of every need," because there is nothing outside the κόσμος that can effect it. Philo does not hold this view, since for him, if God were to remove his providential care from the κόσμος, its elements would revert back to their original state. See Drummond, Philo, 2.69, 72-73. Yet, while the κόσμος is not self-sufficient, Philo holds that the elements that make up the κόσμος are. Matter is a second ἀρχή, "the passive object" (tó παθητόν), not created ex nihilo, not caused by God. See Opif. 8; Fug. 198; Aet. 5.

See Dec. 31; Runia, Philo and Timaeus, 259-260.


QG 2.7; Paramelle, Philon D'Alexandrie, 166: προνοία τοῦ ζωοπλάστου.
where three proofs are laid down to demonstrate that Adam's body was "most excellent" in its composition and creation. First, the stuff available to God was "unmixed, pure, and spotless." Secondly, out of this stuff, God chose the best, "the most spotless and most perfectly cleansed." And thirdly and most importantly, Adam's body was most excellent because of the skill of the craftsperson in shaping the bodily parts. In sum, his body was comparable to that part of a holy temple containing the image of the deity.

Before weighing the significance of this, we want to focus on one other area where a positive evaluation of the body with respect to its composition and creation may be found. In his adherence to the biblical text, Philo departs from Plato in attributing the moulding of the human body to God and not "fellow workers." As is well-known, the plural at Gen 1.26, "Let us make the human in our image and according to our likeness," suggests to Philo that God was not alone in creating the human, but was "conversing with some persons whom he treats as his fellow-workers." Those "fellow workers" are probably the Powers,
mentioned above. To God is attributed the creation of "those excellent things" in the human, that is, what is ontologically superior. The creation of the "contrary and worse" ingredient, what is ontologically inferior, is attributed to the Powers.

Richard A. Baer makes the valid point that it was not because the human has a body that God employed the Powers, for after all, God also "created the animals and all other parts of the material world by himself." Rather, God employed them because the human was a "mixed nature" (μικτή φύσις, Opif. 73), capable of good and evil. And since "it was impossible that the father could be the cause of evil with respect to his offspring," Philo credits God with the creation of that part of the human capable of virtue, but the part capable of vice he attributes to the Powers.

Timaeus, 336 n. 6; QG 1.19. We should not understand the word "creation" throughout this section as creation ex nihilo, but rather as a fashioning or moulding of pre-existent matter. See Opif. 8-9, 21-23, 171; Somn. 2.45; Mos. 1.279; QG 1.55, 64; Runia, Philo and Timaeus, 132, 148, 421-427.

\[\text{\footnotesize II For a careful discussion, see Runia, Philo and Timaeus, 247-248.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize I See Opif. 140: "the better the maker, so much the better what is made"; D. Winston, "Theodicy," 110.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize I Philo’s Use, 89.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize II Opif. 75. See also Agr. 129; Plant. 53; Sobr. 67; Conf. 180; Fug. 79-80; Runia, Philo and Timaeus, 139.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize VII Opif. 72-76; Conf. 178-80. Philo’s treatment of Gen 1.26 at Mut. 30-32 is anomalous. Runia observes correctly that "in this passage no mention is made of different parts of the soul, only of different types. God had nothing to do with the forming}\]
Philo is clear that God, or "the Existent" (τῶν), as creator (δημιουργός) is never the builder "through which" (δι' οὗ) the κόσμος, including the body, was constructed (to use the language of the four causes; Cher. 125-127; Fug. 133). This task is given to the Powers. Nevertheless, as Runia points out, "God, in creating via his powers, still himself creates," that is, God is still the creator "by which" (ὑπ' οὗ) and "for which" (δι' ὧ) the world and the body exist. So when Philo says that the Powers are the creators of part of the composite human in a way that they are not for the rest of the created world, we are led to deduce that the Powers are not only the "through which," but also the "by which" (ὑπ' οὗ) and "for which" (δι' ὧ) parts of the human came to be. And since we are dealing here with the cause of evil behaviour, the "for which" can no longer be the ἀγαθότητα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ."

Philo, like Plato, attributes the creation of the immortal and rational soul to God. The "mortal part of our soul" (θνητὸν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος) is the responsibility of God's assistants, the

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of the soul of the bad person (φαύλου ψυχῆν)" (Philo and Timaeus, 244).

† Philo and Timeaus, 246 n. 7.

‡ Cher. 27. Philo does not say this explicitly. What he says is that the Logos and Powers are the immanent manifestation of the providence of God in the world, and do not work contrary to God's will. See Cher. 124-127; Conf. 137-138; Her. 312; Drummond, Philo, 2.105-106. Runia says that the Powers are "not described as malevolent" or given "any form of autonomy" (Philo and Timaeus, 249).
Powers. As we have already seen, Philo locates this lower part of the soul in the body. Nowhere, however, does he directly attribute the creation of the body to the Powers. Birger A. Pearson says, "In this departure from Plato's formulation, he is doubtless constrained by the text of Genesis, which plainly states that it was God himself who fashioned man's body out of the dust of the earth (Gen 2:7)."

We might be tempted to reason from this that Philo had a more positive attitude toward the body than Plato since he attributes it directly to God and not the Powers. But once the rationale is stated why God employed the Powers in the first place, we are led to surmise that we should not make much of this departure from Plato after all. Philo says:

For God created all things from that formless matter, although he himself did not touch it - because it is not lawful for the happy and blessed God to touch indefinite and confused matter -, so he made full use of the incorporeal powers, whose real name is the Forms (Spec. 1.329).

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Leg. 1.41. See also Conf. 179; Fug. 69 (see Plato, Tim. 69c7-8). It would be erroneous to deduce from the interpretation given above that Philo's position is clear. At Opif. 73, he speaks of the human νοῦς καὶ λόγος as "the home of vice and virtue." Runia is led to ask, "Do they [the assistants] help make man's rational part, or do they make the irrational part of the soul which causes the νοῦς to go astray? From the Platonic point of view, of course, the latter is the only possible answer, but Philo is rather reticent" (Philo and Timaeus, 243). At Conf. 179, Philo also ascribes the making of "the evil road in the rational soul" to the Powers. See Winston, "Theodicy," 107, for an interpretation of this passage that dovetails with mine.

God employed "incorporeal powers" (the "through which") because it is impossible for God to come into contact with limitless and chaotic matter, the material out of which the body is formed. For according to Philo, the earthly matter from which the body is composed, is an "utterly repulsive prison" (Migr. 9), and has the "value of nothing" (Somn. 1.212). In passages such as these he is careful to make no distinction between his negative valuation of matter and the body composed of that matter, because the value of a thing is determined by its substance. Philo interprets Gen 1.31 accordingly. God is not praising the work of his hands; he is praising the hands that did the work (Her. 159-160). In short, there is nothing in the nature of matter and the body that is truly good, which is to say, there is nothing "stable, unchangeable, and immutable," or immortal (Spec. 1.311-12, 2.124; Ebr. 111). Given this evaluation, one wonders where God found that "most spotless and most perfectly cleansed" matter for the creation of Adam's body. Philo does not say.

But not only does the body as composed of matter have the "value of nothing," it is positively "evil." By its very nature (φύσει), Philo says, the body is πονηρόν (Leg. 3.70). From this wicked body, as well as from all material creation, come things

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1: Philo's negative valuation of matter and the body extends to the "corruptible creation" (Θαρτή γενέσεως, Ebr. 73). See Agr. 65; Plant. 7; Ebr. 73; Mos. 2.171; Deus. 167; Plant. 66; Ebr. 69; QG 4.164. At Fug. 9, he attributes to matter the less than flattering designation "without quality" (ἀκοινος), which he elsewhere attributes positively to God. See Drummond, Philo, 2.24.
"evil and profane," and "torrents of pure evil" (Plant. 53; Conf. 23). Running through his thought is an ontological dualism. God, of which the mind is composed, is immaterial and indivisible, a unity, good and incorruptible. On the other side is composite and corruptible matter, of which the body is composed (Opif. 8; Leg. 3.243). The body, made of a substance diametrically opposed to God's nature, is devalued because it is not "Godlike" (Θεοειδής, Opif. 69).

How then are we to reconcile this negative evaluation of matter and the body composed of matter with Philo's positive evaluation of the body and matter, which we witnessed earlier?

David Winston moves in the direction of prioritizing the positive over the negative. He says that it was Philo's "firm and confident conviction that all that God has created, without exception, is evidence of His absolute perfection and excellence." He appeals, inter alia, to the creation of Adam at Opif. 136-138 as evidence that Philo did not hold an "absolute denigration of the body," and that his negative remarks about the body do not "necessarily commit him to a severe downgrading or hatred of the body as such." So, when Philo says the virtuous and wise alienate themselves from the body (Conf. 82), feel contempt and hatred for it (Deus 167), pay it no regard (Leg. 3.69-70), live with little thought of it (Ios. 71), and even kill

\[\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{32}} "Philo and the Rabbis," 44.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{33}} "Philo and the Rabbis," 48-51.}\]
it (Ebr. 70; Fug. 90-91), we ought, Winston suggests, understand all this verbiage as "largely rhetorical, for the sake of moral emphasis."\(^3\)

In response to Winston, and in answer to our question, several things may be said. First, there are just too many passages where Philo speaks negatively about matter, the body, and the world for us to conclude that his language is "largely rhetorical." It is true he can speak "rhetorically" for the sake of moral emphasis, but one looks in vain for textual clues in these many passages where he denigrates the body that might suggest his true opinion lies elsewhere. And there are just too few passages where he speaks positively. Yet what is most interesting is that there is a textual clue at QG 2.1-7, that singular passage where he speaks of the "nature of the human body" as "constituted most impeccably and most faultlessly," which suggests his true opinion does, in fact, lie elsewhere. For he concludes the section with words that do not fit the context: "For nothing so enslaved the human as the bodily elements of its being." Is it not a little puzzling that he would add this if he did not feel his panegyric on the body needed some qualification by a notion that he puts forward throughout the treatises he wrote?

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\(^3\) Philo is not an advocate of suicide (Migr. 7). The list in the text is mine. See Winston, "Philo and the Rabbis," 48, for his.

\(^5\) "Philo and the Rabbis," 52.
Secondly, although there are statements which prevent us from altogether marginalizing Philo's description of Adam's body at *Opif.* 136-138, nevertheless, it appears he treated Adam, like Moses, as *sui generis.* He says God created Adam, but our beginning is ἑγκαταρπάων (*Opif.* 140); Adam's body was a "holy temple ... for the rational soul" (*Opif.* 137), but nowhere is this epithet applied to the bodies of any of Adam's descendants. In fact, as the passage goes on to say, with each successive generation of those descendants, the powers and qualities of the body become feeble and feeble (Opif. 141). He also admits that Adam's incomparableness does not amount to much in light of his choice of evil instead of good (Virt. 203-205). Philo was probably driven to a positive evaluation of Adam's body by the exegencies of his reading of Genesis and Plato. These told him that people of old were better than us (Plato, *Phileb.* 16c), and he went along with this even though it conflicted with his

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"See *Opif.* 9, 42; Plant. 131; Somn. 2.45; Praem. 68; QG 1.6, 1.55; Runia, *Philo and Timaeus,* 80; Winston, "Philo and the Rabbis," 55. Drummond said some contradictions in Philo can be dealt with only by sideling passages that do not appear to be his "permanent position" (Philo, 1.276, 278). Illustrative is my treatment of *Mut.* 30-32 (see n. 26).

negative evaluation of matter and the body which he puts forward consistently elsewhere.\textsuperscript{33}

Thirdly, a harsh downgrading of the body is to be observed in the reasons given for the descent of the mind into the body, reasons which also indicate that Philo saw the coupling of mortal body and immortal mind as artificial and unnatural. He suggests that even before incarnation some souls were "not able to bear the fullness of divine goods" (Her. 240), or they chose to abandon God on account of being "earthdrawn and lovers of body." In short, pre-incarnational dispositions and choices led them "to be fast bound in mortal bodies" (Somn. 1.138-139; Leg. 2.49-50; Gig. 12-16). He also speculates the descent was due to a "law of necessity," by which he means:

Perhaps this was in order that [the mind] might carefully inspect terrestrial things, that even these might not be without a share in wisdom to participate in a better life, or in order that it might be akin to created beings and not be continuously and completely happy (QG 4.74).

Two things are certain: The descent of the mind into the body is anything but a gift from God (Her. 267; Somn. 1.181), and is detrimental in the extreme to the mind (e.g., Deus. 14-15; Her. 240).

\textsuperscript{33} That Philo was sometimes driven by the exigences of text and allegorical method into contradictions has been recognized for quite some time. See Drummond, Philo, 1.319; Billings, Platonism, 52; T. H. Tobin, The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation, CBQMS 14 (Washington: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983), 4, who cites V. Nikiprowetzky, Le Commentaire de L'Écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie, ALGHJ 11 (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 238.
3 Philo's Double Attitude toward the Body as Expressed in Relation to the Categories into which he Customarily Divides People

When we bring together from the treatises the categories into which Philo divides people, and synthesize the data, the following taxonomy emerges. He divides souls into two groups, those who become incarnate in fleshy bodies and those who do not, angels and stars (Gig. 7-8, 12-16; Plant. 14). With respect to those that descend, he generally works with three classifications, the bad (οἰκακοὶ), the practisers (οἰόσκηται), and the wise (οἰοσφοι). Occasionally, he also subdivides the practisers into beginners (οῖαρχήμενοι) and those making progress (οἰπροκόπτοντες), and we shall find this division useful. There are also divisions in the class of wise.

The body and the bad

The vast majority of humanity belongs to the class of bad people. Their souls are "hard to cleanse and purify" (Fug. 85), and most, if not virtually all, remain in this condition their

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" See Leg. 3.159; Her. 45; Somn. 1.151, 2.235-237; QG 4.47, where the three classifications are mentioned together.

Leg. 3.159 speaks of the wise, reprobates, beginners, and practisers together.

(1) Those like Abraham and Jacob who commence as practisers and rise to this category; (2) those like Isaac who are born perfect; and (3) those like Moses who stand closest to God. See A. Mendelson, Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria, HUCM 7 (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1982), 52-55; Winston, "Sage."
entire lives." Dominated by pleasure," their worthless lives are
categorized by "gloom and sorrow," and are "full of misery"
(Leg. 2.107; Mut. 169). As Philo sees things, "the foolish
person, being a creature of wavering and unsettled impulses, is
subject to tossing and tumult, like the sea lashed by contrary
winds when a storm is raging, and has never even in fancy had
experience of quietness and calm." They make shipwreck of their
lives and are enemies and foes of God. As such, they have God as
their "adversary and punisher" (Virt. 174; QG 2.82). Theirs is
truly a life "not worth living" (Her. 45), and no wonder: "For
everyone who has been bereft of reason, the better part of the
soul, has changed into the nature of a wild beast, even if the
characteristic, human form of the body remains" (Spec. 3.99; see
also Abr. 8, 33; QG 4.133).

Each part of the person, mind, soul, and body, has its own
natural inclination or will. The natural inclination of the
immortal mind is toward virtue and God, but this can be perverted
into its opposite (Gig. 40; Deus 143; Plant. 22).

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12 See Leg. 1.102; Gig. 1, 3, 53; Agr. 22-25, 104; Ebr. 75;
Conf. 106; Ios. 59; Mos. 1.197; Spec. 4.179; D. Winston, Philo of
(New York: Paulist, 1981), 322 n. 3. Passages that imply movement
or its possibility out of or back into the reprobate class
include Leg. 1.89; Agr. 88, 157; Plant. 97-98; Virt. 221-222;
Praem. 43; Prov. 2.2-6; QG 4.44-45. See Mendelson, Secular
Education, 50-51, 102 n. 21; D. Winston, "Philo's Doctrine of
Repentance," in The School of Moses: Studies in Philo and
Hellenistic Religion in Memory of Horst R. Moehring, ed. J. P.
Kenney, BJS 304, Studia Philonica Monographs 1 (Atlanta: Scholars
Press, 1995), 32-33. However, on occasion Philo says there is no
movement out of the reprobate class. See Det. 149 and Her. 45.

11 Post. 22 (trans. Colson). See also Conf. 70; Somn. 2.237.
The natural inclination of the mortal, irrational soul is at best morally neutral, and is caught in an intermediate position between two opposing and warring tendencies that pull it, either upward to the mind and virtue, or downward to the body and evil. Philo compares the irrational soul to a multitude of horses that can be swayed by the mind or the body. When the body controls the irrational soul, the mind is drawn down. Due "to the violence of the passions and misdeeds that rage against it, then in all likelihood the mind becomes waterlogged and sinks; and the bottom to which it sinks is nothing else than the body, of which Egypt is the figure." And when weighed down in the body, the mind "becomes irrational and unphilosophical" (QG 4.191).

With respect to the mortal body, just as a magnet, by its very nature, attracts iron, so the "natural attraction of the

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\[1\] See Leg. 3.67-68; Sacr. 105; Her. 42; QG 2.12; Baer, Philo's Use, 90-91.

\[2\] Agr. 89 (trans. Colson and Whitaker). It seems surprising that someone who lived in Egypt would disparagingly call the body Egypt. But the reasons for this are not hard to find. On the one hand, the departure of Israel from Egypt is well suited for Philo's allegory of the soul's odyssey. On the other hand, there was mutual animosity between Jews and Egyptians in Alexandria. H. Box, Philonis Alexandrini, In Flaccum (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), xviii-xx, provides a rationale for Egyptian malice toward the Jews. They came to see the Jews as favoured by the Romans and turned their hostility toward them, since they were powerless to do so against the Romans. P. Borgen, "Philo and the Jews in Alexandria," in Ethnicity in Hellenistic Egypt, ed. P. Bilde et al., Studies in Hellenistic Civilization 3 (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1992), 123-129, provides a number of reasons for Jewish malevolence toward Egyptians, including their notion of race superiority, and Egyptian polytheism, which Jews saw as the antithesis of monotheism. See also E. R. Goodenough, The Politics of Philo Judaeus, Practice and Theory: with a General Bibliography of Philo by H. L. Goodhart and E. R. Goodenough (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), 10.
body" (ἡ τοῦ σῶματος ὀλκή φύσει), "drags down with it small-minded people, by weighing them down, strangling, and oppressing them with the fleshly mob." Or put another way, due to its evil nature, the body is a formidable menace; it attracts the mind, preys upon it, overpowers it, distracts it, inflicts wounds, sins against it, and brings the mind to ruin against its will. In Philo's allegory of the ascent of Israel (the mind that sees) out of Egypt (the body), the king of Egypt, Pharaoh, plays the role of the inclination of the body that sets itself against or opposes God, and he goes so far as to call that inclination a mind (ὁ ἀντίθεος νοῦς, Conf. 88). Time and time again, as these passages indicate, when he uses the words σῶμα and σάρξ, what he has in mind is not just the physical body, but the physical body together with its inclination to inflict destruction on the mind, and the mind's capacity to pursue wisdom, virtue, and God.

But not only is the body by nature at war with the mind, it is inclined toward pleasure. The "good of the flesh" (τὸ σαρκὸς ἀγαθὸν), Philo says, is "irrational pleasure" (ἄλογος ἴδιον, Gig. 40). Commenting on this passage from De gigantibus, Goodenough remarks:

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Spec. 4.114. The magnet analogy is used for other purposes at Opif. 141 and Praem. 58.

See Leg. 3.15-17, 69-72; Mos. 2.185; D. Zeller, "The Life and Death of the Soul in Philo of Alexandria: The Use and Origin of a Metaphor," SPhA 7 (1995): 49. The ontological nature of a thing determines its moral capacity. Therefore, as we will see, the best one can hope for is to rule the body not transform it.

See Leg. 3.46; Gig. 30-31; QG 2.7; 2.23.
Τὸ ἀγαθὸν here is used in the Aristotelian sense of the object of strivings. That is, it is quite inevitable that the flesh should seek pleasure, since pleasure is the natural aim of the flesh as such... This is "the most infallible law," he says, inherent in our lower parts and functions.\(^1\)

But pleasure is not only the good of the body, it also acts as a "covering of the body" that "protects and preserves it and closely guards its power" (QG 2.46). The surrounding context makes it plain that we should not see pleasure here as in any way beneficial, whether to the body or mind. The reason is not hard to find. For pleasure, that "wily and snake-like passion," which "coils itself around all the organs of the irrational part of the soul," is "evil by itself" (Leg. 2.84, 75, 3.68); it acts as a ἀρχή καί θεμέλιος for the passions (Leg. 3.113), and brings about the soul's destruction.\(^2\) If then, pleasure is a longing (πόθος) that acts as a spark, then it is bodily passion that is fanned into a flame, and this fire "consumes by devouring and destroying everything" (Decal. 173; see also Opif. 152). Philo compares the πόθη "to wild animals and birds, because, being untamable and vicious, they injure the mind, and because, like birds, they alight upon the understanding; for the assault of the passions is unmerciful and not to be stopped."\(^3\)

\(^{1}\) By Light, 393.

\(^{2}\) See Leg. 2.77; Drummond, Philo, 2.302. What Philo intends may be seen at Opif. 152 and Leg. 2.17, 71-72, where, even though there is a limited positive evaluation of pleasure, yet it still leads to the soul's destruction.

\(^{3}\) Leg. 2.11. See Winston, Philo, 325-26 n. 29.
It is a locus communis in Philo that the body is the dwelling place of the passions. It is "from the body" that "pour forth streams of each passion, streams many and great" (Conf. 23). And it is all but inevitable that the bodily passions drag the mind out of tranquility into slavery and misery in the body (Leg. 3.116-117; Deus 111). Philo reminds his readers, "For nothing so enslaved the human as the bodily elements of its being, and those things through which passions come, and especially wicked passions of pleasure and appetites" (QG. 2.7). For the mind to be incarnated in the body is to be "fast bound in that place of never-ending misfortunes, the body." According to Baer, "The body and the irrational soul, being subject to the power of ἄνδρον, are totally outside the realm of freedom," and when the mind comes under the dominance of body, it experiences the same fate. It is no wonder, then, that Philo says, "To be truly happy is absolutely impossible while fast bound in the mortal body" (Mut. 36; see also Spec. 2.52).

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12 See, e.g., Leg. 2.84, 3.114; Agr. 64; Her. 268; Congr. 163; Somn. 2.52, 109, 255-256; QG 4.152, 4.191.

13 Conf. 177. The body is a prison or dungeon (Leg. 3.42; Her. 68; Somn. 1.138-9), a tomb (Deus 150; Somn 1.138-9), a corpse or baneful corpse (Leg. 1.108, 3.69; Migr. 21), a dead thing or a dead burden (Leg. 3.69; Somn. 2.237), a leathern bulk (Leg. 3.39), a composition of clay and moulded statue (Agr. 25), a foreign land (Her. 82, 267-269), a shell-like growth which encases the person (Ios. 71; Virt. 76), and a log-like mass (Post. 26).

14 Philo's Use, 93.

15 Post. 22. See Goodenough, By Light, 393 n. 154a.
Rest and repose are the natural state of the mind; war is that of the body. According to Philo's allegorical interpretation, Moses uses the figure of a military encampment to describe the body; it is a "camp full of wars and all the evils that war produces, a place that has no part in peace" (Opif. 46). When the body overpowers the mind in this war, what results is the death of the soul, "the destruction of virtue and the taking up of evil," where the soul becomes "entombed in every kind of passion and evil." The soul that is dead has died "to the life of virtue, and is alive to that of evil only." It has forfeited its former desire for virtue, and instead "concerns itself with nothing other than the body and all the body's pleasures" (Agr. 22; see also Post. 73; QG 4.79). In the wicked person, "the body lives when it is animated by desire and sensual pleasure and whatever else it delights in" (QG 4.77). In short, during the time that the body lives, the soul is dead; and when the body dies, the soul lives. In support, he cites Heraclitus, "who followed Moses' teaching on this":

He [Heraclitus] means that now, when we are living, the soul is dead even when it is entombed in the body-grave. But if we die, the soul lives its own life, and is set free from the evil and dead body to which it is bound (Leg. 1.108).

Such dead souls have chosen "darkness instead of the brightest light, and have blinded the understanding, which had the power of sharp vision" (Spec. 1.54; see also QG 4.2, 62).

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*Leg. 1.105-107. See also 2.77-78; Det. 48; Post. 73; Fug. 55; Zeller, "Life and Death," 21-23."
Here, we witness the axiom that the body is clearly an impediment to knowledge of God and the "exact knowledge of all things," which God possesses. The body acts as a coat that covers and hides perception of "existences as they really are" (Conf. 105; see also Leg. 2.59). It is not surprising, then, that the worthless person is so preoccupied with the earthly body and its pleasures, thereby "doing damage to one's own thoroughly wretched soul," and, most interestingly, "also doing damage to that which one thinks he or she is chiefly benefiting, one's own body" (Det. 109).

But not only does the body limit what the bad person may know, it actually hinders "the acquisition and practice of virtue" (Leg. 1.103). Philo consistently says bad people cannot and do not produce virtue, and even when they "perform good and worthy deeds," they do so "with impure minds."

**The body and the practisers**

Nowhere is Philo's double attitude toward the body better seen than in the relationship of the body to the class of practisers, a class small in number that stands between the perfect and reprobate. This class has as its end to fly away 

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*1 Aet. 1. See Runia, Philo and Timaeus, 125-126, for the list of passages where Philo connects limitations of human knowledge with life in the body. Philo's disposition toward scepticism comes through in a number of places when he admits that "apprehension of truth" is attained only after one comes forth "free from the body" (Conf. 105).

*11 QG 4.211. See also Leg. 1.76, 3.1; Gig. 4; Spec. 2.164, 3.208-209; QG 4.221.

*12 See Leg. 1.93; Agr. 104; Mut. 213; Somn. 1.152; QG 3.13.
from earth to heaven as fast as possible so as to see or become like God. But this goal, attainable only by the perfect, is beyond the grasp of this class. Therefore, although the practisers still strive to ascend to God, yet they have as their attainable goal, the ascent to contemplate the intelligible world.

God begins the process of drawing the mind upward, and without this intervention it would be impossible for the mind to rise above the body and its passions. With a "mightier attraction" than the body and passions can muster, God's heavenly love draws the mind to itself. Yet even though God initiates the process, God works best with those minds that are already "naturally suited and fond of contemplation."
The ascent of the mind is a migration that the body does not share, for the mind's salvation is liberation from the body. As Goodenough has shown, Philo "took to his heart the pagan idea of salvation; that is, that the spirit be released from the flesh in order to return to its spiritual source in God."¹⁴ He does not think for a moment that the body, from which those vicious and untamable passions and evils flow, can be transformed or changed. The body and its passions are only to be ruled and subjugated by the mind.¹⁵

In the beginning stage of the soul's ascent, the body plays a positive role, for as Philo says, all forms of improvement begin with the mortal and progress to the immortal."¹⁶ Those

¹⁴ Introduction, 13-14. On salvation as liberation from the body, see, e.g., Leg. 3.42, 47; Cher. 31; Post. 31; Gig. 13; Ebr. 101; Migr. 2, 7-9, 14; Her. 68; Fug. 90-92; Somn. 1.138-139; Abr. 66; Mos. 1.279; Spec. 2.147; Virt. 76; QG 2.69, 3.45, 4.153. Runia speaks of "the increasing recognition by Philonic scholars that the focal point of Philo's interpretation of scripture is located in the theme of migration" (Philo and Timaeus, 524-525).

¹⁵ Philo's views mirror attitudes toward the body in late antiquity as depicted by P. Brown: "Potentially formless and eternal matter, the body was barely held together, for a short lifetime, by the vivid soul of the well-born man. Its solid matter could change as little as the crystalline marble of a sharply cut and exquisitely polished statue might blossom magically in its depths, into a more refined and malleable substance. Like society, the body was there to be administered, not to be changed" (The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity, Lectures on the History of Religions [New York: Columbia University Press, 1988], 31).

¹⁶ Her. 316. Philo reads this out of LXX Gen 15.18: ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ Αἰγύπτου ἐξ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου, ποταμοῦ Εὐφράτου. He says, "Here he shows how it stands with the perfected. Their perfecting begins with the body and sense and the parts which serve as organs... It ends in the attainment of the wisdom of God, that
starting the ascent, or beginning to enslave the body rather than
be enslaved by it, are only starting to learn but still lack
knowledge, and they lack knowledge because they lack virtue. So
they must labour at pruning and cutting away those many harmful
growths that have grown up around the mind. He says that before
one can practise virtue one must first remove sin. This pruning
away and eradicating of evil is for the most part attained by
mating the mind to the ἐγκύκλια, the general and preparatory
education. If the beginner wants to subjugate the body, he
himself will become a "student of much learning," and will devote
himself to the study of "grammar, geometry, astronomy, rhetoric,
music, and all the other therapies of rational study."

Together with the encyclia the beginners study themselves
and the sense-perceptible world, and it is for this reason that
the body and lower soul are needed. The beginner "must
necessarily be associated with the earthly and Egyptian body;

truly great river, brimming over with joy and gladness and all
other blessings" (trans. Colson and Whitaker).

Congr. 9, 11, 20. See also Det. 170-171; Agr. 165; Plant.
99-100, 104-111; Migr. 194; Congr. 6-12; QG 3.32; PE 1.8. To the
list above, dialectic and arithmetic should be added. Mendelson
points out correctly that Philo defines the entire class of
practisers, not just beginners, by the study of the encyclia
(Secular Education, 51). On the disciplines that make up the
encyclia, the question whether other arts were included, and the
improbability of Jewish women participating in this education,
see Mendelson, Secular Education, 2-24, 28. To Mendelson's
treatment on the exclusion of women I would only add that Philo
kept his ideals and reality compartmentalized. In his ideal
community women were full participants (Contempl. 32, 68-69, 83,
87) and slavery was against nature (Prob. 79, Contempl. 70), but
in the real world he shared the values of his slave-owning class.
Concerning slaves, they are "that most necessary piece of
property" (Spec. 2.123; see also Abr. 228-229; Spec. 2.79-90).
since he needs eyes to see and read, ears to listen and hear, and the other senses to unveil the several objects of sense. In fact, without the ability to perceive those external objects of sense by means of the body, the mind would be blind and powerless to begin its ascent. Put positively, it is through study of the sense-perceptible world that the mind acquires "a yearning for contemplation" (Her. 274; see also Cher. 58-62). The study of the encyclia, the "female-slave of wisdom" (Θεραπανίς, Congr. 9), becomes a stepping stone to the study of philosophy itself (Congr. 79).

A positive attitude toward the body is also seen in passages where Philo says the practisers make use of the goods of the body, as well as goods of the world (Sobr. 59-61; Mut. 221; Conf. 17-20). He reads this Peripatetic notion into Gen 9.27, where Noah prays, "May God widen for Japheth":

And therefore there is a fitness in the prayer that breadth should be added to Japhet, that he may be able to use not only the virtues of the soul, prudence, temperance, and each of the others, but also those of the body, health, efficiency of the senses, dexterity of limb and strength of muscle, and such as are akin to these, and once again that he may have all the external advantages which have their source in wealth and reputation and the means of enjoying and using such pleasures as are necessary (Sobr. 61; trans. Colson and Whitaker).

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" Congr. 20 (trans. Colson and Whitaker). See also Migr. 185, 195, where Philo considers this a second step; Mut. 76; Abr. 164; Mendelson, Secular Education, 68, for the link between study of the encyclia and study of the physical world; Baer, Philo's Use, 90; Pearson, "Philo and Gnosticism," 307.
For Japheth and beginners like him, the goods of the body along with external goods have usefulness and are seen as gifts from God. But they are beneficial only so long as the mind does not dwell on them too long. In Philo's exegesis of Gen 28.10, καὶ ἔξηλθεν Ἰακώβ ἀπὸ τοῦ φρέατος τοῦ ὅρκου καὶ ἐπορεύθη εἰς Χαρραν (cited at Somn. 1.4), "Haran" is the person who sees bodily objects by means of sense-perception (Somn. 1.41-46). Jacob, the practising soul, comes to Haran, but stays there only as a sojourner in a foreign land. For the "practiser does not dare spend his life in the region of the senses, but just a few days and a short time for the sake of the natural needs of the body to which he is bound" (Somn. 1.46; see also Congr. 33).

In short, as was the case with the encyclical studies, so the goods of the body and external goods are only a stepping stone, because the goal to strive for is not the three goods, but the one, the good of the soul only. Philo sees in the next line

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"Mut. 219-221. Philo finds a positive attitude toward the body useful in his polemic against extreme allegorists in Alexandria. See Goodenough, By Light, 83, 90; Baer, Philo's Use, 8. At Migr. 92-93, Philo says: "It is true that receiving circumcision does indeed portray the excision of pleasure and all passions, and the putting away of the impious conceit, under which the mind supposed that it was capable of begetting by its own power: but let us not on this account repeal the law laid down for circumcising. Why, we shall be ignoring the sanctity of the Temple and a thousand other things, if we are going to pay heed to nothing except what is shewn us by the inner meaning of things. Nay, we should look on all these outward observances as resembling the body, and their inner meanings as resembling the soul. It follows that, exactly as we have to take thought for the body, because it is the abode of the soul, so we must pay heed to the letter of the laws" (trans. Colson and Whitaker).
of Noah's prayer that Japheth dwell in the tents of Shem (cited at Sobr. 59), a prayer that Japheth should return to the only good, the good of the soul."

Pushing beyond the encyclopaedia the mind comes to philosophy, the royal road to truth, virtue, wisdom, immortality, and God."

Being incorporeal, the mind is able by means of philosophy to

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Sobr. 67; QG 3.16. See also Det. 6-10, where Philo castigates the soul typified by Joseph who fails to move on to the better education typified by Jacob. "Unable to bear the too great severity of his father's knowledge," Joseph is sent to "more lenient instructors," the Peripatetics. Their doctrines are "full of mazes and hard to disentangle," one of which is the doctrine of the three goods. It asserts that each good "is in need of each and all of all, and that the aggregate resulting from taking them all together in a body is a perfect and really complete good." But Joseph is only deluded and not truly ready to learn, even though he says he is, and, "This is why the lawgiver says that a coat of many colours was made for him" (trans. Colson).

See Opif. 77, 120; Post. 101-102; Migr. 191; Congr. 79; Somn. 2.170; Spec. 3.185; Virt. 8; QG 1.57, 4.167; Goodenough, By Light, 121, and Introduction, 13-14. To philosophize is "to make every effort to see things exactly as they are" (Conf. 97; see also QG 4.21); it "is devotion to wisdom, and wisdom is the exact knowledge of divine and human things and their causes" (Congr. 79; see also QG 3.43). But it is also the deep study of the Law of Moses (Opif. 8, 77). From Philo's point of view, "the self-satisfied pedantic professors of literalism" would not have been philosophizing (Somn. 1.39, 102; trans. Colson and Whitaker; Mendelson, Philo's Jewish Identity, BJS 161 [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988], 4). That which can be achieved through philosophy can also be achieved through dreaming while asleep (Migr. 190-192) and mystical experiences (see Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," 375, who makes the link with Plato), because philosophy is a mystic experience (Opif. 71; Ebr. 147, for its effects on the body; Spec. 1.37-38, 2.45; but see Spec. 1.320-321 for a different view of ἐνίκησις and their practices).
comprehend incorporeal objects, which alone give knowledge of truth and falsehood."

In order for the eye of the soul to see clearly it must forget the body and the objects of sense-perception, both of which prevent the sight of incorporeal objects. The practisers "shut their eyes to visual sensations, plug their ears, and keep the impulses of the other senses in check. And they think it fitting to pass their time in solitude and darkness so that the eye of the soul, which God gave so they could see mental objects, might not be darkened by any sensation" (Migr. 191; see also Ebr. 167; Somn. 1.84).

When the mind goes off to investigate things incorporeal, it benefits from a new understanding of the body, one which Philo sees again and again in the law of Moses. Philo's treatment of Gen 38.7 at Leg. 3.69-72 is representative. 1 After making allusion to God putting the wicked Er to death at Gen 38.7, Philo says that the meaning of "Er" is "leathern," and since the body is a "leathern mass," he deduces that Gen 38.7 does not refer to God putting Er to death, but the body, which had been a corpse from the first. Then he adds that this knowledge is not evident to all,

but to God alone and anyone loved by God; for it says, "Er was evil before the Lord." For when the mind journeys on

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1 See Leg. 1.1; Migr. 191; Congr. 141; Abr. 119; Ios. 127; Virt. 221; Praem. 46; Contempl. 10; Dillon, Middle Platonists, 145.

2 See also Gig. 19-20 (Gen 7.3); 28-29 (Gen 6.3); Migr. 7 (Gen 12.1); Her. 68 (Gen 15.4); Mut. 172-174 (Gen 44.18).
high and is instructed in the mysteries of the Lord, it judges the *σῶμα* to be evil and hostile (*Leg.* 3.71).

Soaring aloft, the mind sees the body for what it truly is, "evil and hostile," and "a plotter against the soul." When the "soul of the philosopher" recognizes this, it need pay the body no regard, but concern itself "for the best part, the soul, lest that evil thing, the corpse, sin against it."

The practisers thus groan over and greatly bewail their bodily condition, "thinking it a most grievous and onerous burden that the pleasures of the flesh should oppress the understanding endowed with the power of sight" (*Migr.* 14). Life in the body is a "long endless distress" (*Somn.* 1.256), "such a load of grief" (*Agr.* 25; see also *Conf.* 80, 106).

From this wretched condition of imprisonment in the body the mind seeks liberation. Philo exhorts, "Depart, then, from the earthy matter that surrounds you, by fleeing with all your strength and power from the utterly repulsive prison, the body, and from its pleasures and lusts, which act as prison guards" (*Migr.* 9). Those who yearn for contemplation must migrate from the body as far as possible, and consider all life in the body to be like living in exile in a foreign land (*Ebr.* 124; *Her.* 82). But this is not enough. The practisers must give the body its due, and that means alienating themselves from it, never counting it as their own (*Conf.* 82). Having exhorted the practisers to escape from the foul prison-house of the body and its pleasures and lusts, Philo adds, "Do not disregard anything that can be
used; rather use them all, collectively and together, to terrorize and menace the body and its lusts" (Migr. 9). We see, then, that philosophizing or contemplating the intelligible world brings in its wake "contempt for everything that is outside or of the body; for these are of no account" (Deus 167). The body can be hated, maltreated, and scorned, because it is not the real I, it is merely "the oyster-like shell that encases me."\footnote{Ios. 71. Evidently this can be advocated, because it is also the deity's attitude: "God hated pleasure and the σῶμα without furnishing reasons" (Leg. 3.77).}

At this stage a new attitude toward the goods of the body and external goods is also laid bare to the mind. What were once seen as gifts from God, are now equated with the "pleasures of the flesh" (σαρκος ηδονῶν) and are "bemoaned and greatly wept over" (Migr. 14-15; see also 191; Ebr. 87). Philo rejects the Peripatetic notion that "material resources" are necessary for the possession of virtue (Post. 128). "Because the true good is not disposed by nature to dwell in anything external, nor even in things of the body, or even in every part of the soul, but only in its sovereign part."

There is, however, a problem. Philo does not consistently hold to this new attitude. He sometimes says the virtuous life is attainable only for one who possesses bodily well-being and external goods, such as wealth and honour. At Praem. 118-122, in his discussion of Deut 7.15, where God promises freedom from

\footnote{Virt. 187. See also Gig. 38; Dillon, Middle Platonists, 146-147; Winston, Philo, 326 n. 32.}
every disease, he says that God blesses the "good person" (σωματικός), clearly not a beginner, with "keen perception together with completeness and perfection in every part" of the healthy body. Such a body is necessary in order to live a life of quietude or leisure, and have full ease to devote oneself to the lore of wisdom. To explain this discrepancy in Philo's thought, it is imaginable that he was divided in his own mind on the matter and wavered between positions. At Ebr. 200-202, he, in fact, expresses skepticism over which of the two positions one should prefer. Although we have chosen to prioritize those passages where virtue is seen as the only good, since they are consistent with his philosophy as a whole, we recognize that on this matter, one of the rough edges of his thought is exposed.

Philo does not shy away from emphasizing the good this new, negative attitude brings to the one who deprecates (αμεράκτος, Agr. 40) and flees from the body: "he will be shone upon by the light

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The same is expressed in Philo's treatment of "nurtured with peace" (Gen 15.15) at Her. 284-292. For Abraham to have "gained a calm, unclouded life, a life of true bliss and happiness" (Her. 285; trans. Colson and Whitaker), he needed, in addition to the goods of the soul (virtue), the goods of the body, such as health, wealth, leisure, and good reputation. He knows that the Genesis narrative contradicts this, since Abraham experienced war, migration, and famine; so he allegorizes each of these; the famine Abraham experienced became a famine of passions, and so on. See also Mos. 2.53, and Praem. 146.

Dillon provides this solution: "There is not necessarily gross inconsistency here. Philo would still maintain—as would Antiochus—that true happiness lay in virtue, and that virtue alone could provide a happy life—but not a supremely happy life. And what Philo is here describing is the supremely happy life" (Middle Platonists, 147-148).
of good judgment, by which he will be able to purge and wash away
the defilements of vain opinions" (Somn. 1.82; see also Agr. 40;
Migr. 15). Gone is the state of mind that is changeful and
vacillating (Plant. 111).

The mind is now free and able to use its powers to restrain
the vices and passions of the body (Leg. 3.21). Philo says:

While [the mind] is cooped up in the city of the body and
mortal life, it is cabined and cribbed and like a prisoner
in a gaoal declares roundly that it cannot even draw a
breath of free air; but when it has gone out of this city,
its thoughts and reflections are at liberty, like the hands
and feet of the unbound prisoner, and it finds free scope
and range for the employment of its active powers, so that
the clamours of the passions are at once restrained (Ebr.
101; trans. Colson and Whitaker).

Able to use its powers, the mind no longer has to submit to the
inclinations of the body. It can turn from oppressed to
oppressor, from subjugated to subjugator of the body. 1

Philo has confidence in the innate capacity of the
liberated mind to rule and subjugate the body and its passions.

He exhorts:

Make yourself an enemy to them in judgment; do not cling to
even one of them; stand above them all. They are your
subjects; never employ them as sovereigns; as a king
educate yourself to rule, not to be ruled. 2

The mind governs the body, not by giving it what it wants, for
what the body wants "utterly destroys our body, just like a city

1 See Sacr. 105; Agr. 66; Plant. 23-25; Mut. 174; Ios. 71;
Praem. 87; QG 4.163; Goodenough, By Light, 386-387; Baer, Philo's
Use, 89-91.

2 Migr. 7-8. See also Opif. 81; Leg. 2.70, 3.224; Agr. 66;
Wolfson, Philo, 2.268-79. The practiser can expect to achieve
"moderation of passions," the Aristotelian ethical goal
without a leader" (Sacr. 106). Instead, being guided by the voice of conscience and the law of nature, the mind exercises discipline, giving the body what is good for it, which is the same thing as not giving it what it wants (Opif. 128; Leg. 2.90, 3.84; Agr. 66; Migr. 7-9, 13).

Under the yoke of discipline, the body of the practiser is dead, now being what it truly is, a corpse. This means the body is dead to the life of desire and sensual pleasure (QG 4.77, 78). Thus we see a proleptic eschatology where the practisers are able to experience now what they anticipate will be theirs when "the soul lives its own life, and is set free from the evil and dead body to which it is bound" (Leg. 1.108).

Philo can even speak of the body being saved. By this he does not mean that the body has become an object of God's salvific work. Rather, when God saves the ἣγεμονικὸν νῦν, the body benefits as well, "through moderation and restraint of habits and by cutting off its insatiable desire, which is the cause of illnesses" (QG. 2.11). When the mind "leads vigorously," the body is rendered "worthy of praise and approval" (Agr. 66).

When the mind subjugates the body, the mind is "truly happy" (εὖδαιμῶν), staying on a straight course, and living a harmonious life with each part of the person in right relation to the other parts; it is a life of peace (Leg. 3.224; Fug. 92; Mut. 185; QG 3.11). Philo thinks one can be outwardly a slave but

(μετριοπάθεια). See Leg. 3.129; Abr. 256-257; Winston, "Theodicy," 402-403.
inwardly free. He quotes approvingly Anaxarchus's words when being pounded to death with iron pestles, "Pound Anaxarchus's skin, Anaxarchus you cannot pound." Even "diseases of the body do very little harm when the soul is healthy."\(^{45}\)

Yet Philo's confidence in the capacity of the mind to rule the body is tempered by the reality that the practisers will have only limited to moderate success in the war to subjugate the body and its passions. This is seen at \textit{Leg.} 1.70-71, where he puts to use the notion of the tripartite soul, each part with its corresponding virtue and vice:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part of soul</th>
<th>Corresponding Virtue</th>
<th>Corresponding Vice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>Practical wisdom</td>
<td>Stupidity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Spirit</td>
<td>Courage</td>
<td>Cowardice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire</td>
<td>Self-control</td>
<td>Desire and Pleasure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Philo goes on to say that "practical wisdom and courage are able to throw up an encircling wall against their opposite evils, stupidity and cowardice, and capture them; for both of them are weak and easy to capture." But he then adds:

But self-control is unable to encircle desire and pleasure; for they are difficult to wrestle with and hard to overthrow. Do you not see that even the most self-controlled people under necessity of their mortal bodies eat and drink, of which the pleasures of gluttony consist? (\textit{Leg.} 1.86)

The notion \textit{ἀνάγκη τοῦ ὅμνοῦ} is Platonic and one with which Philo sympathized. Discussing Plato's \textit{Timaeus} 69c8 and related passages, Runia writes:

\[^{45}\textit{Prob.}\ 108-109; \textit{Virt.}\ 13-14. \textit{See also Abr.}\ 251; \textit{Ios.}\ 71. \textit{Winston says, "Philo seems deliberately to avoid the Platonic notion that the soul may become diseased through the body (cf. Spec.}\ 3.10-11)" (\textit{Philo}, 366 n. 406).\]
Because the soul is joined to the body it cannot avoid feeling the desires etc. associated with the body's requirements, and so allowance has been made for this in the design of the body's structure. Philo fully agrees. How can it be possible, he exclaims at Leg. 3.151, that we, tied as we are to the body, should not comply with bodily necessities?

In the face of desire and pleasure, Philo says, one must be content just to keep on fighting, with the hope that the toil for virtue will be rewarded by virtue. But it is a struggle for which there are few victories while still in the body. The assault of the passions is violent and irresistible, Philo says, so, even if people wished to take pleasure in a greater number of virtues, human nature, being what it is, hinders them from attaining all but one or two.

The body and the wise

If the practisers are few in number, the wise are, as Alan Mendelson says, "very rare indeed." Virtue stands opposed to the

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1: Philo and Timaeus, 300.

2: See Opif. 164; Leg. 1.86; Somn. 2.13-14. Philo sees this toiling manifested in "a life of austerity and hardship," "continence and self-restraint," "simplicity and frugal contentment" (Mos. 2.185). But austerity is not asceticism. He reasons that because one cannot bribe God with gifts or the performance of religious rituals, and because genuine worship is that of the soul only, all attempts at ascetic behaviour are misguided. See Det. 19-21. At Mos. 2.23-24 and 2.68 we see some explicit remarks on ascetic practice (fasting), but I wonder if Philo is not "here continuing his game of 'one-upmanship'" (to borrow an idea from Winston, "Sage," 824) in this work written for Gentiles.

3: See Leg. 2.11; Sacr. 48; Sobr. 38; Her. 46; Mut. 219, 225; Somn. 1.150; Goodenough, By Light, 169-170. At Mut. 184-185, Philo is more optimistic, however.

4: Secular Education, 48. See also Leg. 1.102; Mut. 256; Winston, "Philo's Ethical Theory," 403 n. 104.
body in the practiser, but in the ἱσόφος or τέλειος, all parts—mind, soul, and body—function in harmony with virtue. Philo puts into the mouth of Abraham:

"Behold, virtue is not only in my mind but also in an empty and safe tent, in my body, extending itself and spreading as far as the senses and the other functional parts (of the body). For in accordance with virtue I see and hear and smell and taste and touch, and I make other movements in accordance with wisdom, health, fortitude and justice (QG 4.11)."

This does not mean that the body of the wise person has been transformed or changed, or that the mind has domesticated the body, and made it a proper home." Being cognizant from birth, the infant Moses weeps over his imprisonment in the body and yearns for a nature that is ἀσώματος (Conf. 106). Philo says, "Every wise soul has heaven as its country and earth as its foreign land. It thinks of wisdom as its own home and the house of the σῶμα as abnormal, a foreign land where the soul must sojourn as an alien" (Agr. 65; see also Conf. 77-81; QG 2.25).

Rather, it is the mind that has been radically changed. Philo says that the wise person enters into affinity with God, and consequently appropriates the benefits of unbodied existence.

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"Here is one instance where an argumentum e silentio carries weight. I am unable to locate one passage where Philo speaks of the transformation of the body. Only Mos. 2.288 in the English translation comes remotely close: "Afterwards the time came when [Moses] had to make his pilgrimage from earth to heaven, and leave this mortal life for immortality, summoned thither by the Father Who resolved his twofold nature of soul and body into a single unity, transforming his whole being into mind, pure as the sunlight." But in light of Virt. 76, Baer is correct in saying, "Moses was quit of the body altogether. His twofold nature of soul and body was transformed into the unity of pure mind" (Philo's Use, 49 n. 6)."
even while tied to the body. This is based on the principle that 'the mind, in comprehending the object of thought, is assimilated to that object'. Steadfast rest and tranquility, Philo says, is that which is experienced before God (Gig. 49).

Together with this, the wise naturally share in "pure knowledge" (Gig. 22). We witness here the nullification of the σῶμα's power to blind the seeing-ability of the ψυχ. The wise person and ἀλήθεα journey together, because the former has been initiated into the unerring mysteries μερικῶν πλάνων (Deus 61). Whereas the practisers "advanced from below upwards as though by some sort of heavenly ladder, endeavouring by means of probable reasoning to discern the maker from its works," that is, they traced "the nature of the monad from the dyad"; the wise, however, were given the power to comprehend and contemplate αὐτῶν ἑξηνοῦ without the need of reasoning. They are seekers for truth who "see God by means of God, light by means of light" (Praem. 43, 46).

Nevertheless, because the wise are hitched to the evil and baneful corpse, the body, they are still liable to passion, and this means they can still sin, but unlike the reprobates, they repent and recover (Leg. 2.60; Fug. 157; Mut. 49-50; Mos. 2.147; Virt. 177). There is, however, no inevitability or necessity to sin. They are above every passion in a way that the practisers

" See n. 8 above.

With the possible exception of Moses. See Mendelson, Secular Education, 53-54; Winston, "Sage," 924.
are not (Plant. 145), and they have as their goal, not just the "moderation of passion" (μετριοπάθεια), but its outright eradication (Leg. 3.131). And unlike the practisers who possess just a few virtues, the wise have them all."

With complete knowledge, wisdom, and virtue, the wise need "never be dominated by the body but may always be the ruler and chief." They have used reason to rid themselves completely of the body (Post. 137). They possess this pure knowledge because they are estranged from sense-perception and the body (Cher. 41).

4 The Relation of the Body to the Final State

Given that the goal of Philo's philosophy consists only in the rescue and liberation of the mind from the body, we are not surprised to find that he has no place for the body in the afterlife. There is "a necessary law," he says, that "nothing mortal and earth-born is made immortal" (Spec. 2.124). At death, when the mind separates from the body, the body is dissolved (διαλίθω, Somn. 1.26), and the mind returns to its "father's house" (Somn. 1.256), the intelligible world of immortality.

5 Conclusion

The contradictory nature of what Philo wrote led E. R. Dodds to conclude, "any attempt to extract a coherent system from

\[\text{Abr. 34; Sacr. 43. For this reason, the perfect do not need external rules. See Leg. 1.92-95; Goodenough, By Light, 90-91; Mendelson, Secular Education, 53.}\]

\[\text{QG 3.45. In light of QG 3.10, I am of the opinion that Philo is using "wise person" and "virtuous person" interchangeably at QG 3.45, and that what is being described is the experience of the wise person, not the practiser.}\]
Philo seems to me foredoomed to failure; his eclectic ism is that of a jackdaw rather than the philosopher. E. R. Goodenough also confessed that much in Philo's writings was "contradictory" and "sheerest nonsense." Yet, despite the contradictions, Goodenough was persuaded that Philo's philosophical position was "in principle if not in details, quite consistent and homogeneous."

Our study of Philo's double attitude toward the body corroborates this judgment. The positive and negative things he said about the body usually fit into his comprehensive, philosophical position.

The human is composed of two fundamentally distinct and opposed substances, immaterial, divine mind and corrupt matter, and the union of the two is artificial, unnatural, and unhealthy. The biblical doctrine of creation with its assertion of the fundamental goodness of creation provides no insulation against his disparaging attitude toward the body. Trapped in the body, the mind is stripped of its natural powers, and its inclination to pursue virtue, wisdom, and God is distorted. The body overpowers and enslaves the mind.

Philo's primary philosophical and religious concern is to explicate how the mind, trapped and suffocated in the tomb of the body, can escape the body and the effects of bodily existence, and migrate back to its home in God. This migration of the mind is one in which the body does not share, although it assists in

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the initial steps. Somewhat ironically, in order to pry loose the
body's grip on the mind and cleanse it of sins, the body is
needed. The study of the encyclia, the self, and the physical
world accomplishes this goal and this can only be done through
the body. Hand in hand with this, the beginner will also make
short-term employment of the goods of body and external goods,
such as good health and wealth. But when one passes from study of
the encyclia to philosophy, one turns from the study of the
sense-perceptible world to contemplation of the intelligible
world, and the body is now seen for what it really is, an evil
and hostile corpse. Therefore, one must alienate oneself from it,
treat it with contempt and hatred, and escape from it. The mind
is able, by means of philosophy, to retake its rightful position
of master, subjugate the body, and control its passions. But
there is no hope of transformation for the body. At death it is
dissolved into its elements, and the mind, free at last from the
body, soars aloft, and returns to the place whence it came, God.

Nevertheless, we have observed several passages where Philo
makes assertions about the body that run against the grain of his
general philosophical position. What he says about the matter
that was moulded into Adam's body does not conform to what he
usually says. He also appears to be of two minds about the role
that the goods of the body and external goods play in the life of
the practiser. We should not, however, take Philo's ambivalence
on this point and extend it to his entire position, for there is

*Introduction, 92.*
no doubt on what side the body belongs. In his dualistic system, the body is aligned with evil, corporeality, matter, duality, femaleness, ignorance, falsehood, literalness, limit, passivity, and death, from which the mind should flee to virtue, incorporeality, spirit, unity, maleness, truth and certainty, allegory, limitlessness, activity, and life.
PAUL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BODY
IN ROMANS 6-8: A COMPARISON WITH PHILO

1 Paul's Attitude toward the Body

Anthropological dualism

It is not enough just to say Paul's anthropology was Hebraic (read 'monistic') albeit covered with a Greek (read 'dualistic') veneer; quite the opposite, he in fact saw the σώμα and νοῦς (ἐσοὶ ἄνθρωπος, καρδία) as distinctly separate parts of the human.

We detected this thoroughgoing anthropological dualism coming to expression, first of all, in the manner he deployed σώμα throughout Romans 6-8, as well as earlier at 1.24 and 4.19. We reasoned - based on the assumption that he was intent on effective communication - that in compliance with normal usage of words, his mostly Gentile readers at Rome would have assumed that σώμα meant the physical body until they came upon textual signals telling them otherwise. We did not deny that σώμα could be used synecdochically, and we submitted a small number of passages from the LXX that seemed to require such a reading. But this usage was exceptional, and in each of those texts there were clues to guide the reader, indicators we could not detect in Romans, with the exception of 6.12-13.

But even there, we said that the coupling of σώμα with θυτῶν, and the paralleling of θυτῶν σώμα with μέλη pronounced heavily in support of construing σώμα as the physical body. For
it was usual practice in Greek and Jewish writings of Paul's time to use θνητόν σώμα and μέλη to signify the physical body, whether under the aspect of its mortality or parts. Moreover, Paul provided no intimation elsewhere in Romans, or in his other writings where he used θνητόν σώμα and μέλη, that he was referring to anything other than the physical body. If this was not enough, the appearance at 6.12 of a motif, common in Greek and Jewish writings, of locating ἐπιθυμία in the physical body added persuasiveness to the verdict that σώμα meant just that. Further evidence for this perspective was found in the way 6.12-13 functioned in close dependence on verses 2-11 to draw out ethical obligations stemming from participation in Christ and the annihilation of sin's reign in the body. For when σώμα denotes at 6.12 what it did at 6.6, a coherent reading emerges that sees sin's reign being destroyed in the body so that believers can put their bodies to use in service of righteousness.

Secondly, we saw this anthropological dualism come into view at 7.14-25 in the way Paul used σάρξ and σώμα to signify the body of flesh, and νοῦς and ἔσω ἄνθρωπος to intend the interior faculty of thinking and willing. Not only did such an interpretation of the anthropological terms make for a coherent reading of the passage, but going further afield, we showed, for example, that Paul used ἔσω ἄνθρωπος at 2 Cor 4.16 - in a passage that was as much influenced by anthropological dualism as 7.14-25 - in precisely the same way as 7.22. There was, in fact, only one way to rid 7.14-25 of anthropological dualism, and that was to
construe the passage in terms of so-called "Christian" existence. But that strategy we found implausible. Anthropological dualism is required to elucidate the argument of 7.7-25.

We also maintained, thirdly, that to affix a holistic understanding of σῶμα to an appeal to a presumed Hebraic background as the correct, cultural context for explanation was problematic. Regardless of what the Hebrew Bible did or did not say, when our examination of the LXX - the scripture of Paul and his readers - was coupled with Gundry's investigation of other Jewish writings of the time, this conclusion was inescapable: Paul's employed σῶμα to denote the physical body in a way that was typical of the anthropological dualisms of Jewish writers in the Hellenistic period.

The body of the unbaptized

The same duality that shapes the anthropology also classifies people. There are non-believers and believers, non-baptized and baptized. These two groups are bounded by two powers, σάρξ and πνεῦμα, into segregated spheres of existence. For persons ἐνάμαρτια or ἐνσαρκί Paul has, among others, the labels ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος (6.6) and σάρκινος (7.14). These do not circumscribe a part of the person in the sense of a sin nature, but the whole person sold to the power of sin in its old sphere of existence. In that place it is inevitable that they conform their lives to the power of the flesh, thinking so as to do everything that the flesh works in them (8.5).
We can hypothesize how they came into this wretched condition and what were the implications for the body. According to 1.21a, people made a decision to sin when they chose not to glorify God or give thanks. Parenthetically, were 1.21 to be integrated with 5.12-15, something Paul does not do, one might gather that the decision to sin at 1.21 was fated in view of participation in Adam's transgression according to 5.15. Be that as it may, as a result of the choice for ungodliness and wrongdoing (1.18), God caused their deliberating abilities to become delusive and their hearts to be darkened (1.21b).

Sequential to this debasement of the καρδία, the σώμα, seen in Romans 1 as a passive object and helpless victim of the person's sinful choices, was also corrupted and polluted (1.24).

This initial degradation manifested itself in God's giving people up εἰς πάθη ἀτιμίας (1.26). We think that Paul would have held that in that earlier condition the body was free of (sinful) passions (ἀπάθεια). But as a repercussion of παρέδωκεν αὐτοῖς ὁ θεός, the body was inhabited with ἐπιθυμία, on account of which, it is fair to say, the body now had its own ingrained inclination toward doing τὸ κακόν, a tendency that would manifest itself in the πρῶτες τοῦ σώματος (8.13) so long as the body was mortal.

This degradation of the body was exacerbated exponentially by the demonic power of sin's seizure and enslavement of the body. We conjecture, since Paul does not come right out and tell his readers, that in that state of vitiated weakness and corruption, the power of sin was able to slip into the body -
through a side door, as it were, on analogy to the law at 5.20 -
and set up shop. Then from this seat in the body, sin manifested
its characteristic or law-like tendency (ἐξερευνον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν
μου, 7.23) to wage a despotic war of aggression (ἀντιστρατευόμενον,
7.23) against the characteristic or law-like tendency of the
καρδία, seen now at 7.22-23 as the ἐσώ ἄνθρωπος or νοῦς, to will ὅ τὸ
καλὸν (7.22; τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοοῦ, 7.23). As the result of this, the μέ
(7.23; the same ἐσώ ἄνθρωπος or νοῦς of 7.22-23) was taken captive
(αἰχμαλωτίζοντα) to the power of sin, which inhabited the body (ἐν
τοῖς μέλεσίν μου, 7.23).

In this war, it is not at all surprising that the mortal
νοοὺς could not resist sin's devastating attack. For even the
Mosaic Law, as ἁγιος, δίκαιος, ἀγαθός, and πνευματικός as it is, could
not protect against the power of sin's intent on exploiting and
manipulating it as a base of operations (ἄφορμη, 7.8, 11), to
proliferate its reign, multiply transgressions, deceive, and kill
the person. In fact, as Paul saw things, sin was not even
experienced as a rampant aggressor until the law came on the
scene to stir it up (7.7-11; see also 5.13-14). If this was not
enough, the power of sin also had, as master of the body, the
body's sinful passions (ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ [αὐτοῦ = θνητῷ σώματι],
6.12; τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν, 7.5) as useful aides-de-camp in its
war against the νοοὺς.

With the power of sin firmly in command of its bodily
habitation and functions, and with the νοοὺς taken captive, the
mind, as ἀκρατής, finds the good it intends not just frustratingly
hard to do, but altogether impossible to perform. In fact, given
the relationship of the relentless and malevolent power of sin to
its theater of operations, the body, Paul can say that not only
is the law not responsible for the predicament the ἐγώ finds
itself in, but neither is the ἐγώ culpable for what its body is
forced to do! Rather, the blame is to be ascribed entirely to ἡ
οἰκονομονεμώνιμα, repeated twice for emphasis, at 7.17 and 20.
In short, it is as though the body of the unbaptized was a
marionette (to borrow from Philo); the cosmic power of sin works
the strings, not from without but within, while the νοῦς looks on
from the gallery, knowing that the denouement of this performance
is death (7.24).

In Romans 6-8, therefore, the body of the unbaptized is
seen in the most intimate relationship with the power of sin.
Through sin's invasion of the body, the body became the seat of
sin, with sin taking the responsibility and blame - as its source
- for sinful behaviour. To be sure, Paul goes so far as to say at
7.18 that good does not dwell in the σῶμα (physical body), but
even there it is the indwelling power of sin in the body that
accounts for this negative evaluation of the fleshly body. He
also says the body of the unbaptized has in its passions a
congenital inclination to be hostile to the νοῦς and to God. But
even though he says the bodily passions are sinful (7.5), and he
elsewhere connects mortality with corruption (θαρρά), shame
(ἀμβία), and weakness (ἀσθένεια, see 1 Cor 15.42-54), yet he holds
back from deducing from this that the material body is innately
evil or the source of sinning. It is, however, the material cause of sinning. For the power of sin, seen as the "active culprit," found in the body a suitable habitation for itself and a lethal weapon for waging war. In this condition where the wretched ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος was vanquished and enslaved to sin in its bodily base, it cries out for deliverance (7.24). This cry is not the cry of the soul for deliverance from the body per se, but from the body as it exists in the predicament of slavery to the power of sin, a predicament that ends in death.

The body of the baptized

The deliverance came when the person died in baptism. Again, it is not that death longed for by Orphics, Pythagoreans, and Platonists, when the soul at last would escape from its incarceration in the prison-house of the body and return whence it came. Rather, it was the death - in Paul's mind just as real - that believers underwent in the ritual of baptism (6.4). For just as Christ was crucified, buried, and raised from the dead, so believers too, when they were baptized into Christ Jesus (6.3), were united to the same experience (συνεσταυρώθη, 6.6; συνετάφημεν, 6.4; συζήσαμεν, 6.8). This union conveyed definite results for bodily existence.

To begin with, because Christ's death meant the condemnation, overthrow, and complete annihilation of the power of the flesh's rule in and through the body of flesh, and because the baptized participated in his death, the cosmic power of sin's

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* Moo, "Israel and Paul," 122.
oppressive reign in their bodies, as depicted in 7.14-25, was likewise condemned, overthrown, and annihilated (ό θεός ... κατέκρινεν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί, 8.3 → ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, 6.6b). With the loss of its seat in the body, sin's exclusive possession of the body was concluded; no longer could it pull the strings so as to decide the body's behaviour or exploit unimpededly the body's passions, to produce shameful behaviour and death.

What is more, the participation of the baptized in Christ's death meant that they died to the law's jurisdiction. Freed from the law that had bound them (from bearing fruit for God), the power of sin could no longer exploit the law to incite the sinful passions of the body (ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν) to bear fruit for death (7.5). As a consequence, the baptized, having been set free from sin's demonic possession of the body of flesh, and having been transferred from that sphere where they were subjugated ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν and ὑπὸ νόμον, to the sphere in Christ Jesus where grace reigned, they were now under no constraint of any kind to serve their old masters (6.6c; 7.3).

Things did not, however, simply end in death. For just as Christ was raised from the dead, so believers likewise found themselves alive after being dead (6.8, 11, 13) and recipients of the divine, life-creating, and peace-giving power of the new age of existence, which is πνεῦμα (5.5; 8.9-10). We must not infer from this that complete, eschatological redemption had been carried out on the body. Because Paul continues to speak of the σῶμα as mortal (6.12; 8.10-11), we are led to infer that this
change from death to life effected in some way only the "inner person" or πνεῦμα (8.16) of the baptized. Therefore, because they are alive from the dead and have πνεῦμα θεοῦ in them, they will now no longer live κατὰ σάρκα (8.12), but will walk in newness of life (6.4; 7.6; 8.4b-13).

There is in this new sphere of existence no place for ἀκρασία or moral incontinence, because when the power of sin was eradicated from the body, the body was set free from sin's tyrannical rule. In the new state of slavery to Christ, which is indisputably the condition of freedom (6.22; 8.2; see also Gal 5.1), the baptized can choose freely and effectively for righteousness.

How they do this is spelled out perspicuously at 6.12-13 and 8.12-13. According to 6.12-13, it comes down to the choices believers make. The power of sin will not reign once more in their mortal bodies, because they will resolve to present themselves to God as alive from the dead and present their bodies to God as weapons in the fight for righteousness. According to 8.12-13 (and context), believers will walk, live, or exist κατὰ πνεῦμα and conform their behaviour and thinking to πνεῦμα. For by means of divine spirit (πνεύματι) they will put the πράξεις τοῦ σώματος to death, which is, of course, the same thing as not doing them. The cosmic power of the new sphere is present to contain those sinful desires that are still deep-seated in the mortal body, and which come to expression in the πράξεις τοῦ σώματος.
But in this condition of freedom, if they deliberately choose to live in conformity with the power of the flesh (εἰκατὰ σάρκα ᾿Ημ, 8.13), by doing the works of the flesh, they will again become slaves to that power (6.15-19), and in the place of forfeited life, the wage earned will be death (6.23; 8.13). For there is a risk of retrogression so long as their bodies are mortal and corrupted by those sinful passions that continue to be conspicuously present - they have not been eradicated - in the body. This is not the only hazard. Paul also sees the predatory power of sin seeking to recapture what was lost, and its principal modus operandi is the exploitation of the passions inherent in the mortal body. We see, then, that the mortal body and its passions remain susceptible to the power of sin, but not fatalistically so. Left unchecked, the passions will be a hindrance to believers, but Paul is optimistic about the ability of believers ἐν πνεύμα not to live by the bodily passions and so not to let the power of sin reign in them again.

Fundamentally, then, believers are found to be in a place where they can put their mortal bodies forward in the service of righteousness or unrighteousness, with the outcomes, life or death respectively. This means they have not transcended bodily existence. However, even though the life-creating power of πνεῦμα does not presently extend to their mortal bodies, yet just as the body of flesh was rendered "not good" on account of its coupling with the power of sin residing in it (7.18), so by analogy the
σῶμα is— to use the language of 12.1— rendered a θυσίαν ζῴαν ἁγίαν εὐάρεστον τῷ θεῷ on account of divine πνεῦμα inhabiting believers.

**The body of the resurrected**

Believers exist in the time between Christ's resurrection and the resurrection of the end-time. They have πνεῦμα dwelling in them, which is the ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος, and by virtue of this they have confident hope that their mortal bodies will also be made alive or resurrected by the same πνεῦμα that raised Jesus from the dead (8.11). Nevertheless, they groan inwardly as they eagerly await the ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος (8.23), when God will buy release, not from, but for their mortal bodies, which are presently subject to sinful passions, corruption, mortality, and death.

2 Paul and Philo Compared

**Anthropological dualism**

Σῶμα is the word commonly employed by Philo and Paul (in Romans 6-8) to indicate the physical body. Philo oftentimes utilizes σάρξ interchangeably with σῶμα. In Romans 6-8, Paul can too, but only when he refers to the body of the unbaptized (σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, 6.6; σάρξ ἁμαρτίας, 8.3). He does not use σάρξ when referring to the body of the baptized and resurrected. Even though both see the person as a composite of two distinct entities, νοῦς and σῶμα, there are, nevertheless, conspicuous differences in their dualistic anthropologies.

Philo sees the νοῦς as a divine, immortal, incorporeal, and inseparable portion of the divine nature, but Paul sees it, in a state unaffected by divine πνεῦμα, as mortal. The immortality that
awaits the ψυχή is bestowed. So whereas Philo thought the human was formed of two ontologically different substances, πνεῦμα θείον and [γεώδες] σῶμα (e.g., Opif. 135), Paul held both components, ψυχή and σῶμα, to be mortal (Rom 1.23).

Furthermore, Philo has problems with the material out of which the body was formed and the way it was created. Based on the axiom that the value of a thing is determined by its substance, the body has the value of nothingness and wickedness, because it is fashioned out of an eternally co-existent substance diametrically opposed to God, that is, out of limitless and chaotic matter. This is why God could not come into direct contact with matter and had to use subordinates to get the job of moulding the human done.

If Paul has a problem with the materiality of the body, it is not because he thinks it is evil by nature. He does come close to such an attitude, as we saw, when he says, οὐκ ὠικεῖέν ἐμοί, τούτῳ ἐστιν ἡ σαρκί μου, ὁ γαθόν (7.18), and when he speaks of ἐπιθυμίαι or παθήματα residing in the body (6.12; 7.5). But the negative appraisal at 7.18 and the presence of "sinful passions" do not mean that, through guilt by association, the body is sinful by nature. As mentioned above, the problem with the mortal body lay in its weakness in the face of the power of sin, and its susceptibility to being taken over by sin. Because there is no ontological or metaphysical dualism in Paul, it is not surprising, therefore, that he has no hesitation seeing God as the creator in an unqualified sense of the world (1.21, 25),
which includes, of course, earthly bodies according to 1 Cor 15.38-40. Even though sin's domination of the θύμα is detrimental to the νοῦς according to Romans 7, it is hard to imagine him entertaining Philo's notion that the union of body and mind in its creation was unnatural and detrimental to the νοῦς.

Basically, then, Philo sees the mortal body - in view of its composition - as a perpetrator of evil; Paul sees it as the casualty of sin's war. And for both of them, their anthropological dualisms imply that the body is not an 'I' but an 'it'. Accordingly, as Jonathan Z. Smith says, "When one encounters another, a place must be found for the other within or without one's cosmos." To a comparison of the places where Paul and Philo located the body in their discourses we now turn.

The body of the reprobate and unbaptized compared

For Philo and Paul, each component of the person has its own inherent inclination. Setting aside Philo's views relating to the lower soul and its tendency, for which there is nothing comparable in Paul, we saw that Philo had no problem identifying the natural inclination of the νοῦς with the pursuit of the law, virtue, and God. Moreover, neither did Paul, according to Rom 7.15-22. For the νοῦς is seen there to have an appropriate attitude toward the law and a praiseworthy desire to pursue it.

However, earlier in Romans, we observed that Paul also speaks at 1.21-22 of the debasement of the καρδία and its

\footnote{Map is not Territory, 241.}
reasoning processes. But this too has something of a counterpart in Philo. For as he saw things, in the vast majority of humanity, which belonged to the class of "body-lovers" (πιλοσώματος, Leg. 3.72), the natural inclination of the mind to pursue the good had been perverted into its opposite. So for Philo and for Paul, we can conclude that the mind's natural inclination to do τὸ καλὸν is ineffective behaviourally.

The instinctive proclivity of the σῶμα, however, is unequivocally toward evil or sinning. For Philo, the body's inclination stems from its evil, material nature. He labels this inclination "irrational pleasure." It acts as a spark setting on fire the body's savage and violent passions, which in turn pull the mind down into slavery and dishonour in the body (e.g., Leg. 3.116-117; Deus 111). Although Paul has no use for Ἠδονή, he, too, like Philo, finds sinful passions residing in the mortal, physical body, although contrary to the Alexandrian, he does not ascribe this impulse to the body's evil nature. We note that Paul also places ἐπιθυμία in the heart (1.24), but this does not enter the argument of Romans 6-8. In addition to situating sinful passions in the body, Paul goes beyond Philo, however, when he speaks of the cosmic power of sin dwelling in the body of the unbaptized and impelling the person to sin. We thus witness in Philo and Paul a split in the ἄνθρωπος, where the two inclinations, one toward good and the other toward evil, correspond to the two constituent elements of the person. For Philo, the innate proclivity of the mortal σῶμα to do evil
ceaselessly wars against the divine νοῦς and its inclination to do good. For Paul, there is also warfare between the σώμα and νοῦς of the unbeliever, but in two respects, his view differs from Philo's. The two sinful inclinations in the σώμα – power of sin and passions – are not natural to the body's material composition, but were acquired. Moreover, the warfare is not between the νοῦς and σώμα directly, but between the νοῦς and the cosmic power of sin that resides in the σώμα, and dons it as a battledress.

The outcome of this warfare, according to Philo and Paul, is the captivity of the νοῦς. But here again, there are distinctions to be discerned. For one thing, although this enslavement of the νοῦς is the condition for the vast majority of people according to Philo, he does not see it as the predicament of everyone. There will be a small number of souls who will fight victoriously against the σώμα and enslave it, instead of being enslaved. Paul, however, sees this condition of bondage as, with the exception of Christ (8.3), everyone's fate. For another, whereas in Philo the prison of captivity is the σώμα, for Paul, to be precise, the prison is the power of sin (ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, 7.23c), which happens to be in the body (τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου, 7.23d). This is a subtle but consequential difference, for salvation, according to Philo, will consist in escape from the body; for Paul, contrariwise, redemption will include, among other things, rescue of the body from its condition of
subjugation to the power of sin at baptism, and then at the resurrection, redemption from corruption and mortality.

The body of the practisers and baptized compared

Philo's and Paul's conceptions of salvation, which in method and objective have little in common, determine the contours of their respective attitudes toward the body vis-à-vis the category of practisers or baptized. As mentioned, Philo conceived salvation as a migration of the νοῦς back to the divine, intelligible world, and since this consisted in deliverance from the body, the migration was not one that the body shared, apart from the earliest stage. For Paul, salvation likewise consisted in rescue (but assuredly not migration) from a state of decay in corruption. But unlike Philo, this redemption was for the whole person, νοῦς and σώμα, and in addition, it was a rescue from servitude to the powers of sin and death, unto a condition identical to Christ's glorified form.

Philo and Paul both know that without divine assistance, the mind left to its own devices remains totally outside the realm of freedom due to the violent assault of the bodily passions (Philo and Paul) and the power of sin resident in the body (Paul). For Philo, that divine assistance comes in the form of a therapy of education and philosophy, and this is not available to just anyone, but only to those with a disposition for it. For Paul, however, God's grace, which was manifested in and imputed through participation in Christ's act of obedience as
well as through a therapy of divine πνεῦμα, is open to all without exception.

For Philo, philosophy, which begins with study of the encyclia and moves to contemplation of the intelligible world, enables the mind to gradually set itself free from the "many harmful growths" that had accumulated around the mind from the body. For it is by means of philosophy that the person is able to stop sinning, practice virtue, and thereby make moral progress. Paul, as well, thinks that in order for the person to make moral progress, the mind must be set free. But his fundamental pessimism about the condition of the person ἐνθάσωρκι leaves no place for the part education or philosophy might play in human moral development. Only God's direct intervention, as it is spelled out, for example, at 8.3, will set the mind free from its enslavement to the power of sin. Just as before when the mind sat inactively by and watched helplessly as the power of sin played the body like a marionette, so again, the mind gains its release through no activity of its own (except for its response in faith and baptism).

Neither Philo nor Paul hold out any hope that the body of the one making progress or the body of the baptized can be transformed in this life. The most that can be hoped is that the body be ruled or administered. Thus far their views look alike. But Philo thinks that it is the mind of the one progressing that will rule the body, and he thinks that the mind will only be able to subjugate the bodily passions to a moderate degree. Paul, on
the other hand, sees the believer, by means of the direct agency of divine πνεῦμα, successfully mastering the body and its passions. This is due, no doubt, to his boundless optimism about what the endowment of πνεῦμα can do in the person ἐν πνεύματι to bring about a condition of virtual sinlessness. On this point, then, it might be more appropriate to measure Paul's baptized person against Philo's σοφος. For the moral capability possessed by Philo's wise person (e.g., Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and not too many others), is the characteristic position behaviourally for Paul's baptized.

Furthermore, both of them speak of the body of the one making progress or the body of the baptized as dead. For Philo, the body of the virtuous person is rendered dead, but not literally so, when the mind is alive, that is, when the mind rules the body by forcing the passions out of sight. Just as conversely, in the wicked person, the soul is dead and the body alive when the body "is animated by desire and sensual pleasure and whatever else it delights in" (QG 4.77). In such a condition, the body is the subjugator of the soul. But for Paul, the body of the believer is "dead" because it is still mortal and subject to death. Essentially, then, we see Philo affirming something morally commendable when he speaks of the body of the virtuous as dead. But for Paul, the deadness of the body is not something beneficial or praiseworthy; it is to be endured in anticipation that in due course death will be overcome with immortality (but not of the ἀσώματος kind).
There is nothing in Romans 6-8 (or all the Corpus Paulinum for that matter) that resembles Philo's judgment that the virtuous will at length come to feel contempt and hatred for the σῶμα (e.g., Deus 167). Granted, as Philo sees things, the soul will hold a positive attitude toward the body and its virtues (health, efficiency of senses) in the first leg of its journey of ascent. But the soul must not have a prolonged stay "in the territory of the senses"; it must go off to investigate the incorporeal realm, and there it will acquire a new attitude, whereupon "it judges the body to be evil and hostile" (Leg. 3.71). The θελόσουσος will then pay the body no regard, but concern oneself only that the evil body will not harm the soul (Leg. 3.72). For Paul, too, there is a 'new attitude' toward the body that is acquired following baptism. His outlook on σῶμα existence in 7.14-25 is made not from the perspective of such a person but from one ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰσοῦ, and it is a form of bodily existence now seen as nullified in baptism. In addition, he perceives that the body can and will be put forward effectively as a weapon or instrument in the service of righteousness (6.12-13).

We are now well situated to weigh Philo's lamentation over the sojourn of the soul in the body (e.g., Conf. 80) against Paul's (7.24). For Philo, the one who is progressing in virtue and has acquired that 'new attitude' toward the body will come to greatly bewail somatic existence, and will yearn for death when the soul separates from the body and soars aloft. This has
nothing in common with Paul’s attitude. The lament of the wretched person, according to 7.24, is a yearning for deliverance, not from the evil body, but from the body as it exists in its subjugated and death-bound relationship to the power of sin.

The final state of the body

For Philo and Paul, the final state for the person is one of immortality (ἀθανασία, Migr. 189; 1 Cor 15.53-54). For Philo, however, this state is one in which the body and lower soul do not share. Immortal existence is ἀσώματος, for only the νοῦς, partaking already of divine nature, can achieve assimilation to the divine. At death, the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) that had been mixed together to mould the body, dissolve back into their primordial states. Paul, as we have seen, does not lay aside the body, either in this life or the next. Since he holds out hope for the future redemption for the body, immortal existence for him is σώματικός (a word he does not use), although in view of 1 Cor 15.42-50, it is difficult to imagine he would describe that state as σάρκινος.

3 Putting Paul in his Place

The 'inceptive stimulus for this examination of the body in Romans 6-8' was the question whether Paul held a disparaging view of the body. That he could have devalued the body ought not to surprise us. For after all, he - like Philo - would only have been following the intellectual trends of his time. Scholars such as Goodenough, Courcelle, Dodds, Pearson, Runia, and Martin have
each observed that the Hellenistic era was marked by a tendency to identify the personality with the soul, which is a sojourner or prisoner in the tomb of the body.  

Our investigation has led us to the conclusion that Paul did indeed deprecate the ὕμνα in Romans 6-8. For the unbaptized, this attitude came to expression in his assertion that, even though the power of sin acts upon the entire person, yet there is a peculiar relationship between that power and the body, whereby sin is able to seize the body, and then from its seat in the body wage war, by means of the body and its passions, against the mind and its desire to do the good. The result of this is the captivity and enslavement of the mind in the body under the power of sin.

Further devaluation of the body also came into view with respect to Paul's attitude toward the body of the baptized. For while the "inner person" or ὑμνα of the baptized presently experiences life, the body does not; for that transformation, it must await its redemption at the resurrection. Presently, the body of the believer is mortal and corrupt - like Philo, Paul devalues the body simply because it is mortal -, and as such it

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is the dwelling place of sinful passions, which influence the person toward sinful behaviour, and which can potentially be exploited by the power of sin.

Although we have resisted the temptation in our investigation to label specific anthropological ideas 'Jewish' or 'Hellenistic', yet if there is such a conception deserving of the label 'Hellenistic', it is that of the disparagement of the physical body and the accompanying notion that salvation consists in deliverance from the body. This view, which can be traced back to Orphism, Pythagoreanism, Plato, and Aristotle, and which left its stamp on Hellenistic philosophies like Stoicism and Middle Platonism, is not found anywhere — as far as we can tell — in the Jewish scriptures. Granted, the Jewish Scriptures disparage the fleshly body when they treat it as weak, vulnerable, transient, mortal, and affected by human sinning, but these valuations are not limited to the body alone. They extend to the entire person. Philo could find the 'Hellenistic' notion of disparagement of the body in his bible only by reading it allegorically, and Paul, of course, exerted no energy to locate it there.

To the extent that Paul devalued the body in ways that he did not devalue the inner person, we can say that he shared with the dominant Greek culture of his time a deprecating view of the body. Yet when his attitude toward the body is brought into

\[\text{\footnotesize See, e.g., chapter 3 n. 42.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize Hence salvation is for the whole person and not just one part.}\]
relation with Philo's, we are led to the additional conclusion, which was also reached by Boyarin in his comparison of Paul and Philo, that Paul's devaluation of the body was, nevertheless, much "less extreme" than Philo's.¹

To venture an explanation why this was the case, we would say, first of all, that Paul's anthropological ideas were influenced by his gospel, according to which God worked salvation for those who believe through the crucified and resurrected body of Christ (6.3-5; 7.4; 8.3). Furthermore, we would add that Paul let himself be conditioned by his Jewish-cultural and scriptural heritage to a far greater extent than Philo permitted himself to be. For contrary to Philo, Paul identified entirely with the biblical notion that the body is a territory for purity and dedication to God; and together with certain others of that tradition, he held out a future for the redemption and resurrection of the σῶμα.

At the outset of our inquiry we called into question, together with Jewett, Boyarin, Aune, and others, whether Paul's attitude toward the body should be elucidated in terms of the conventional paradigm that began by setting the Jewish cultural world off against the Hellenistic, and then sequestering Paul's anthropology within one or the other of these cultural matrices. Now the fact that the sanctification and resurrection of the body stand side by side with a deprecating attitude toward the body in Romans 6-8, leads us to our final conclusion, that Paul's

¹ Radical Jew, 26-27.
attitude toward the body in Romans 6-8 cannot be seen as a
development of biblical religion 'pure and simple', nor for that
matter, of just Hellenism. Rather, Paul's anthropological views
in general, and his attitude toward the body in particular, are
better enunciated in terms not only of his Christology and
eschatology but also a cultural matrix - "Hellenistic Judaism" -
that was not so much a juxtaposition of two cultural heritages
but was a thoroughgoing fusion of them.
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