THE GENESIS AND SPIRIT OF IMAGINATION
(HEGEL'S THEORY OF IMAGINATION BETWEEN 1801-1807)

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto

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ABSTRACT
The Genesis and Spirit of Imagination
(Hegel's theory of Imagination between 1801-1807)
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Given the importance of imagination for Kant, Fichte and Schelling, it is significant that the word only comes up once in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and that it is not a chapter heading alongside "Sense-Certainty," "Perception," "Understanding" and "Reason."

Part I "Imagination in Theory" looks at the development in Hegel's theory of imagination from the Differenzschrift and Faith and Knowledge, through three different versions of the Philosophy of Spirit (1803, 1805, 1830). Part II "Imagination in Practice," focuses on the final moment of the imagination according to the 1830 Philosophy of Spirit--Sign-making Phantasie. I discuss two examples--the artist's activity as described in the Aesthetics, and the 'religion of imagination'--Hinduism as Hegel understood it in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Part III synthesizes the two previous parts, showing that the Phenomenology of Spirit is the culmination of the imagination's theoretical and practical activity: while in theory imagination is the middle moment of Vorstellen, practically it is at the heart of Aufhebung and thus of Spirit's inception and development. The Phenomenology is the story of consciousness' progress through its self-presentations. Imagination is therefore present throughout the entire book. I do not engage the moments of the Phenomenology, but focus instead on the single appearance of the word imagination in the Preface, and on how Hegel reinterprets Fichte's wavering imagination as a moment within the reflection--the "medium" of this 'Science of Experience.'

Between 1801-1807 language becomes an increasingly important moment of imagination; by 1830 the externalizing of representations in communication (sign-making) is a moment of imagination. Hegel's psychology of the genesis of imagination and its moments reveals Spirit to be the community of interpreters. In the thesis Hegel's imagination is thought through to the Phenomenology, however, it is in the final transition of the Phenomenology--from Religion to Absolute Knowing, from picture thinking to knowing according to the Concept—that Hegel thinks the imagination through to its end. My Epilogue briefly discusses that transition, and the end of imagination in Absolute Knowing.
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The Genesis and Spirit of Imagination
(Hegel's Theory of the Imagination Between 1801-1807)

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### Works by Hegel

**Aesth.**


**Ästh.**


**Diff.**


**Differenz**


**Enc. Phil.Spir.**


**Enz. Phil.G.**


**Faith**


**FirstPhil**


**G1**


**G2**


**GW**


**PdG**

Phil. Rel.  

PoS  

SPR  

SysEth  

Works by Fichte  
Sc. Kn.  

WL  

Works by Kant  
CJ  

CPR  

KdU  

KrV  

Works by Schelling  
STI  

Sys. Tr. I.  
Glossary of Important German Terms and their Translation

"Imagination" and Related Words:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bildung</td>
<td>formative education (Miller)</td>
<td>(Eg. PofS ¶33 p. 19).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durchbildung</td>
<td>formation (of consciousness) (Miller)</td>
<td>(Eg. PofS ¶33 p. 19).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Einbildungskraft</td>
<td>imagination (faculty of) (Miller and most others.)</td>
<td>(Eg. PofS ¶68, p. 42.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herausbildung</td>
<td>constructive unfolding (Miller)</td>
<td>(Eg. PofS ¶52 p. 31.)</td>
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The following two words are often translated as "imagination" or "imagining" by various translators, but are not the same as Einbildungskraft.

Einbildung: imagination (as false presentation) as in imaginary, illusion or conceit. (In common dictionaries it is misleadingly translated as "imagination" as though it could also mean the faculty of imagination).

(Eg. It comes up five times in the Phenomenology of Spirit: Miller translates it as "conceit" in the Preface, ¶51 [PdG p. 50] and in ¶382 [PdG p. 284]; as "imaginary" in ¶394 [PdG p. 292]; and as "imagination" in ¶758, [PdG p. 551].)

Einbilden, Eingebilder: It is rightly translated as "imagining," "imagined" [Miller] (Eg. in ¶756 PofS [PdG p. 550].) as long as one understands it to be limited to imagining which is a conjuring-up of images; thus in ¶756 it is qualified further as "visionary dreaming" [Schwärmeret].
Phantasie: Imagination (Harris and Knox) (Eg. in SysEth)
(Cf. Aesth. Knox p. 5 n. 2.
and my comment in Chapter
5 my page 156, note 238.)

But leaving it as Phantasie is
more accurate: it is the second moment
of the imagination in the 1830 Phil.Spir., with
Symbolizing, Allegorizing and Poetical Imagi-
nation as its moments; and
Sign-making Phantasie is the third moment of
the imagination in that work.

vorstellen: imagining,

but it is better translated as re-pre-senting,
or as picture-thinking (This form is
much more frequent esp. in
in Miller)

(Eg. Miller PofS ¶16 p. 9, and
Harris Commentary to the PofS
[forthcoming], draft notes on ¶16, p.
2)

(Eg. Miller ¶764 PofS [PdG p. 556];
"form des Vorstellens" = "form of picture-thinking," Miller ¶765, [PdG
p. 556].)
Preface

The main concern of this thesis is to discover what it means, according to Hegel, to think the imagination through to the end. My primary material is the role of the imagination in Hegel’s early, Jena writings from 1801-1807. But I also appeal to his later Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit discussion of the imagination, to his view of the artist’s activity in the Berlin lectures on Aesthetics, and to his discussion of what he calls the religion of Phantasie—Hinduism—in the 1827 lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.

I originally became interested in the fact that although the imagination (die Einbildungskraft) is absolutely central to Hegel’s predecessors Kant, Fichte and Schelling, the imagination appears to play a relatively small role in Hegel’s thought, the word occurring only once in what is perhaps the best known of Hegel’s works and that which put him clearly on the philosophical map of the time, the Phenomenology of Spirit. Why, when Sensation, Perception, the Understanding, and Reason all had chapters devoted to them in that work, did the imagination not likewise appear? But my research has shown me that the imagination is not only absolutely central to Hegel’s thought, it is also one of the few places from which a proper defense of Hegelian speculative science can be made.

My Introduction offers a very general overview of how important the imagination was for Kant, Fichte and Schelling, and looks at how the imagination appears in Hegel’s first publication, the 1801 Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy. Then,
in the spirit of Hegel, my thesis as a whole is divided into three parts.

Part One "Imagination in Theory" begins (Chapter 1) with a look at Hegel's theory of the imagination in the context of his criticism of the philosophies of subjective reflection. Though I look at the Differenzschrift, at Fichte for contrast and at Schelling for his influence, the textual focus here is mostly Faith and Knowledge. In Hegel's first publications generally (the Differenzschrift, and Faith and Knowledge) he is still under the influence of Schelling. Hegel's productive Einbildungskraft is therefore essentially what Schelling calls the "indifference point."

It is at the heart not only of all subject-object relations but of the very creative process of the Absolute. It is identified with Absolute Reason. In that chapter I discuss this sundering imagination; the one-sided vs. proper reconstruction from that sundering, and I show in conclusion why for Hegel the philosophies of subjective reflection are locked within the logic of loss.

The subsequent chapters of Part One deal with how this changes for Hegel, and why. As Hegel's thought moves away from Schelling and becomes more adoptive (though transforming) of a Fichtean subject ontology, the imagination becomes specified as a moment within subjective spirit. It is therefore in the two Geistesphilosophie (Philosophy of Spirit) lecture-series (1803-4, and 1805-6) that the imagination turns up in detail in the Jena System manuscripts. An analysis of the role given to the imagination in these two Geistesphilosophie is made in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 respectively. The role which Hegel gives to the imagination in these works is particularly interesting to sort out, since the relationship between what would eventually become distinct parts of Hegel’s methodology—the logical, the phenomenological and the Scientific investigation of spirit—are not clearly defined before 1807. Hegel's final discussion of the
imagination in his 1830 *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit* (discussed in my Chapter 4) does not suffer as much from this confusion: Hegel’s thought on the role of the imagination is clearer by this time, and so its moments are able to be discussed in detail.

This difference in clarity calls for comment with regard to my discussions of *Faith and Knowledge* and of the three versions of the *Philosophy of Spirit* in my chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4. I have done my best to analyze the passages concerning the imagination in each of the four works, but the clarity of my exegesis is affected by the clarity or lack thereof of Hegel’s writing in each case. There is therefore a progression in clarity about the imagination’s activity from my Chapter 1 through to Chapter 4. But the obscurities are to a degree intentionally preserved in my exegesis: I decided to work through the texts chronologically in order to avoid explaining the earlier texts through the later ones. I hope in this way also to have provided some insight into the development of Hegel’s thought about the imagination. Nevertheless, to alleviate some of the obscurity, at the end of each Chapter, in the light of my understanding of Hegel’s thoughts on the imagination altogether, I point out what is most problematic, inadequately expressed or on occasion better highlighted in the given text. I have also included an Appendix which indicates in schematic form the relevant moments of the three versions of the *Philosophy of Spirit*.

As clear as it is, the 1830 *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit* version of the role of the imagination still leaves us with two problems. *Part Two* ("Imagination in Practice") begins (Chapter 5) by highlighting and discussing these. 1) First of all, there is a key, unresolved question arising in the various philosophy of spirit accounts of the imagination: they do not make evident by what principle the imagination synthesises. Though in the final 1830 version Hegel
speaks of some "latent content" from which the imagination's synthesis is derived, he says it can only be mentioned "in anticipation." 2) Secondly, there is the problem of properly understanding the relation of phenomenology to philosophy of spirit. The transition in which the imagination arises in all three Philosophy of Spirit texts is generally that from Vorstellen (representing) to Denken (thought). But this transition is also what happens in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit as a whole.¹ What does this mean? What role is the imagination playing in the Phenomenology? None of the Philosophy of Spirit texts on the imagination provide of themselves an answer to this question, nor to the important question why the word imagination arises only once in the entire Phenomenology of Spirit, or why it is not among the dialectical moments which it develops.

To answer these questions one has to look at the role of the imagination in objective Spirit, and in Absolute Spirit. I begin to answer them in Chapter 5, first by giving more careful attention to Memory (Gedächtnis), the moment following the imagination in the Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit. For it is in the transition to Memory that the third moment of the imagination (Sign-making Phantasie) externalizes its products, opening the inner world of representations to interpersonal--objective--communication. It is in Phantasie and Memory that Spirit has its actual birth; it is here that we begin to understand what Hegel meant by a latent content, and what it means to speak of its unfolding.

The moments of Spirit are aufgehoben--superseded but also raised--into each new level. The genesis of Spirit in and through the imagination is particularly crucial as reiterated at the level of objective Spirit and of Absolute Spirit. In the second part of Chapter 5 I therefore look

¹ There is also the additional transition at the end from Denken to Begriff.
at two ways in which the moments of the imagination are active 1) as objective spirit in the individual—the artist, as described in the lectures on *Aesthetics*, and 2) as absolute spirit in religion—in Hinduism as described in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*.

**Part Three** shows how the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the synthesis of the theoretical and the practical imagination. I begin Chapter 6 by looking at the single appearance of the word "imagination," in §68 of the Preface. I then discuss how in the years between *Faith and Knowledge* and the *Phenomenology* Hegel has changed his view regarding the nature of reflection: in 1807 reflection is no longer merely a production of the finite, something to be sunk in the Night of Reason, to be gone beyond; it is rather the very medium of Speculative Science. This clear-sightedness about reflection enables Hegel to criticise the ways in which it is improperly thought through. I show why the imagination is important to this new understanding of reflection, and I discuss several of Hegel’s examples in the Preface and elsewhere of its improperly thought-through forms. In the Preface Hegel shows how, properly thought, reflection deposes the Enlightenment’s one-sided Understanding, and gives birth to Absolute Knowing.

I argue in my conclusion to Chapter 6, that the imagination does not appear as a chapter heading or dialectical moment within the *Phenomenology of Spirit* because this proper thinking through of reflection necessitates the proper thinking through of representation. Imagination, as the central moment of *Vorstellen*, is at the heart of the very movement of the *Phenomenology*. The imagination is the moment of synthesis, of comprehension, but in being such it is also the moment of difference, of dis-closure. Our task in the *Phenomenology* is to think through the imagination, and thereby be taken up into objective Spirit and into Absolute Spirit. This is the proper reconstruction.
With that conclusion my thesis comes to its end. But in thinking Hegel’s *theory of the imagination through to the Phenomenology*, and discussing how it is at work in the *Phenomenology*, we have revealed that the task of the *Phenomenology* itself is to think the imagination through to its end. Ever more comprehensive and ever more revealing, Hegel’s *Phenomenology* dis-closes the absolute: in it lies the culmination of *Vorstellen* in *Denken* and of *Denken* in *Der Begriff*. While, in order to grasp this about the *Phenomenology*, we have had to understand what it means to think the imagination through to its end, the phenomenological insight into its culmination requires looking closely at the final transition in the *Phenomenology* proper—that from religious imagination to Absolute Knowing. And that requires a new beginning and a new development. Thus standing at the end, outside of such an endeavour, I offer an *Epilogue*, which is also a *Prologue*: in it I provide a brief examination of that transition and of how Hegel thinks the imagination’s end in Absolute Knowing.
Introduction

In his Treatise of Human Nature (1739) David Hume reluctantly granted to the imagination the enormous task of mending the rift in reality which scepticism had revealed. To the sceptic’s questions "how do we know that the objects I see in this room are the ones I saw when I left it last?" "How do I know that I am the same person today as the one who went to sleep last night?" Hume replies: by presenting ideas of things that are no longer immediately present to us, the imagination is the connecting link between ideas from memory and new intuitions. The imagination, according to Hume, thus allows us to see the world as made up of objects which are continuous in time and space and which are independent of us and of each other. Hume repeatedly worries, however, whether the imagination can really perform such a task, writing in one place: "I cannot conceive how such trivial qualities of the fancy, conducted by such false suppositions, can ever lead to any solid or rational system."²

Kant’s Copernican revolution claimed to have put an end to that scepticism by showing the mind to be the a priori ground of knowledge. As we shall see, for Kant the imagination was analyzed as one faculty of the mind among others, its synthesis operative in the service of the higher faculties of understanding and reason.

The story of the imagination in Hegel begins with Kant, but the Kantian critical optimism is in Hegel balanced by the return of a kind of scepticism—more specifically, by a negative

movement. This movement makes the faculties no longer functions which are thought, and functions through which all we know is thought: they become moments which are themselves thought through, in both senses. Importantly, for Hegel, as we will see, the negative movement is the middle term of representation: it is imagination. No longer in the service of "higher" faculties, the imagination in Hegel is the success and failure of representation, and thinking it through to the end is the process of revealing the historical forms of reason. So, while Hume was reluctant to give the imagination such an important task as the creation of a rational system, and while Kant placed the imagination inside of and in the service of a rational system, Hegel shows it to be the heart of rationality, outside of which there is no system to be known.

What is the story of Hegel’s coming to view it this way? We must look to the main players between Kant and Hegel, as well as to these two thinkers. The following analysis of Kant, Fichte and Schelling can however only be in the service of introducing the essential issues and problems concerning the imagination in their thought: I do not here provide in-depth analysis or solutions. Hegel is of course another matter: by the end of this introduction we will be at the starting point of Hegel’s engagement of the imagination, and thus in a position to begin careful analysis of the imagination in Hegel.

**Imagination from Kant to the Early Hegel**

Generally speaking, for the Kant of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the imagination is that faculty responsible for relating sense perception and the understanding. Its primary characteristic
is its ability to conjure an image of something not present to the senses.\textsuperscript{3} Its work is that of synthesis.

In paragraph 10 of the first \textit{Critique} (section A77/B102-A78/B104--just prior to the Deduction of the Categories) Kant provides a number of propositions about synthesis. Of these, three are of particular interest:\textsuperscript{4}

"...if this manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our thought \textit{requires} that it:

(a) "(first) be \textit{gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected}. This act I name \textit{synthesis}." (my italics).

(b) "Synthesis in general ...is the mere result of the power of the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious."

(c) "To bring this synthesis to \textit{concepts} is a function which belongs to the understanding, and it is through \textit{this function of the understanding} that we first obtain \textit{knowledge properly so called}" (my underlining).\textsuperscript{5}

As we progress through the deduction of the categories and beyond, it becomes clear that this product of the imagination includes figurative syntheses and schemata. Just as in

\small
\textsuperscript{3} "\textit{Imagination} is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is \textit{not itself present}" (CPR B151, p. 165).; "Einbildungskraft ist das Vermögen, einen Gegenstand auch ohne dessen Gegenwart in der Anschauung vorzustellen" (KrV B151, s. 166a).

\textsuperscript{4} I have separated and alphabetized them in order to discuss them clearly.

\textsuperscript{5} "Allein die Spontaneität unseres Denkens erfordert es, dass dieses Mannigfaltigkeit

a) zuerst auf gewisse Weise durchgegangen, aufgenommen, und verbunden werde, um daraus eine Erkenntnis zu machen. Dies Handlung nenne ich \textit{Synthesis}*. 

b) "Die Synthesis überhaupt ist...die blose Wirkung der Einbildungskraft, einer blinden, ohnegleicher unentbehrlichen Funktion der Seele, ohne die wir überall gar keine Erkenntnis haben würden, der wir uns aber selten nur einmal bewusst sind.

c) "Allein, diese Synthesis auf Begriffe zu bringen, das ist eine Funktion, die dem Verstande zukommt, und wodurch er uns allererst die Erkenntnis in eigentlicher Bedeutung verschafft" (KrV 116).
figurative synthesis the imagination is a hidden faculty, the "schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze" (A141/B180-181).\(^6\)

According to Kant, figurative synthesis is responsible for the Euclidean shapes empirical objects have for us; pure figurative syntheses yield pure geometrical intuitions. But problematically, in paragraph 24, Kant defines the "figürlich" synthesis against an "intellectual" synthesis: while the former is a transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the latter involves no imagination (B150-51).\(^7\) This is odd since Kant has earlier said that "synthesis in general" is the product of the imagination. So the problem arises of how intellectual synthesis can be a synthesis if it occurs without the activity of the imagination, or inversely, how the understanding can be thought separately from the imagination.

To understand what intellectual synthesis is, one might appeal to the practical realm: perhaps Kant meant that intellectual synthesis is something we can only experience in so far as we are morally free agents, in the act of willing. But if we want to keep the discussion within the epistemological framework, our best bet I think is to look back to paragraph 10. As we saw the synthesis of the imagination is there said to be necessary but not sufficient for knowledge: what is still needed is the bringing of the synthesis to concepts of the understanding (in citation

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\(^6\) "Dieser Schematismus unseres Verstandes, in Ansehung der Erscheinungen und ihrer bloßen Form, ist eine verborgene Kunst in den Tiefen der menschlichen Seele, deren wahre Handgriffe wir der Natur schwerlich jemals abraten, und sie unverdeckt vor Augen legen werden."

\(^7\) "Th[e] synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary a priori, may be entitled figurative synthesis (synthesis speciosa), to distinguish it from the synthesis which is thought in the mere category in respect of the manifold of an intuition in general, and which is entitled combination through the understanding (synthesis intellectualis)" (CPR B151 my underlining).
Kant says this 'bringing' is accomplished by the understanding. One might conclude that this 'bringing' to concepts is synthesis intellectuali. If our epistemological reading is right the "spontaneity of our thought" (A77/B102) requires synthesis of the imagination and of the understanding. But it is not clear.

I am unwilling to assert with H. Mörchen that for Kant the imagination and the understanding are one and the same faculty. I am also unable here to enter further into the debate about the imagination’s role in the first Critique. I therefore leave this work of Kant’s, pointing to the clearest articulation of Kant’s ambiguity regarding this topic in the first Critique, in the footnote at B161. He writes: the two syntheses are one and the same spontaneity, "there under the name of the imagination, here under the name of the understanding." The phrase "under the name of" hangs like an ambiguous sign above the entrance to critical idealism.

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Generally speaking, the imagination’s central role in Kant’s Critique of Judgement is in the experience of beauty. In our appreciation of the beautiful, the spontaneity of our thought requires synthesis to be brought under concepts of the understanding, but that requiring does not achieve closure: it is drawn on. It seeks the satisfaction of bringing intuition under concepts but is unable to do this definitively; its authority is pleasantly captured in the play between imagination’s synthesis and understanding the object. The spontaneity of thought is required for

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the play to continue, but the question arises as to what, in the experience of the beautiful object, prevents the synthesis of the imagination from being brought successfully to concepts. What is so captivating? Is it the sensible object which has that power? Instead of fixing, the mind is transfixed. But by what, exactly?

What draws the spontaneity of thought on in this play is not the direct concern of the aesthetic consciousness. But the critical idealist must answer, and Kant's answer is that we must assume a supersensible power. In the play of the faculties we witness our purposiveness, but without a particular purpose: in being so transfixed, it is "as if" nature itself were purposive. The judgement of taste reveals our disinterested purposiveness, and that purposiveness without a purpose is the ground not only for all judgements, it is also akin to moral feeling. So in the beautiful rose the perpetuation and advancement of culture is designed, and the appreciated beautiful object is the symbol of our morality (cf. ¶59).

But for Kant it is in the experience of the sublime that our freedom is revealed to us: there the limits of the imagination are exceeded. While the experience of the beautiful is restful contemplation, the experience of the sublime is an agitation. The discordance between the understanding and the imagination reveals purposiveness, and this purposiveness is the a priori ground of all judgements; known reflectively this ground is not experienced as discordance but rather as contemplative, pleasurable accordance. In the experience of the sublime the requirement of totality, which is an idea of Reason, calls upon the imagination to comprehend the infinite or the mighty; it is imagination's inability to accomplish this task which announces the vocation of the imagination for supersensible use. The displeasure aroused in our inability to imagine the infinite therefore gives rise to the pleasure of knowing the supersensible within
us.

The imagination refers the agitation "either to the cognitive power or to the power of desire...The first kind of agitation is a mathematical, the second a dynamical attunement of the mind" (CI \&24, p. 101). In the mathematical sublime the imagination is unable to comprehend. Kant writes of our attempt to think "something not only large but large absolutely [schlechthin, absolut], in every respect (beyond all comparison), i.e., sublime" (CI 105). Since we cannot find an object which corresponds to the absolutely large, our liking is not of an object, nor a liking of a "purposeful attunement" of our faculties (as in the cognizing of a beautiful object). "[T]he sublime must not be sought in things of nature, but must be sought solely in our ideas" (CI 105). The liking is "for the expansion of the imagination itself" (CI 105).

[What happens is that] our imagination strives to progress toward infinity, while our reason demands absolute totality as a real idea, and so [the imagination,] our power of estimating the magnitude of things in the world of sense, is inadequate to that idea. Yet this inadequacy itself is the arousal in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible power; and what is absolutely large is not an object of sense, but is the use that judgment makes naturally of certain objects so as to [arouse] this (feeling), and in contrast with that use any other use is small. ...Sublime is what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense (CI \&25 p. 106).

The magnitude of some objects can nevertheless inspire this appreciation. Kant gives as example an account of standing next to a pyramid. The imagination's struggle is the inability to match up comprehension [Zusammenfassung] (of the thing’s magnitude as a whole), with the

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9 He exhibits a peculiar bias against the small: "...we connect a kind of contempt with what we simply call small.... That is sublime in comparison with which everything else is small" (CI p. 105).

10 "Aber eben darum, dass in unserer Einbildungskraft ein Bestreben zum Fortschritte ins Unendliche, in unserer Vernunft aber ein Anspruch auf absolute Totalität, als auf eine reelle Idee liegt: its selbst jene Unangemessenheit unseres Vermögens der Grössenschätzung der Ding der Sinnenwelt für diese Idee die Erweckung des Gefühls eines übersinnlichen Vermögens in uns; und der Gebrauch, den die Urteilskraft von gewissen Gegenständen zum Behuf des letzteren (Gefühls) natürlicher Weise macht, nicht aber der Gegenstand der Sinne, ist schlechthin gross, gegen ihn aber jeder andere Gebrauch klein" (KdU \&25, p. 172).
practically infinite apprehension of its parts (CJ ¶26 p. 108).\footnote{Unbeknownst to Kant he is here on the brink of something even greater, from the point of view of a Hegelian: the conflicting relationship of these two acts of the imagination—comprehension and apprehension—evokes as we shall see, not only Fichte's imagination, which wavers between the finite and the infinite, but also the dialectic of comprehension and disclosure at the heart of Hegelian Aufhebung.}

In the dynamically sublime it is not our reflective idea of magnitude which exceeds nature. Rather here it is a question of our reflective dominance over the might of nature. "When in an aesthetic judgment we consider nature as a might that has no dominance over us, then it is \textit{dynamically sublime}" (CJ ¶28, p. 119). The mighty object of nature must arouse fear in us, but not in a way which prevents us from passing judgment. In other words it must arouse fear, but not make us afraid (CJ ¶28 119-20). Kant gives as example our appreciation (from a safe place) of "bold, overhanging, and as it were, threatening rocks, thunderclouds piling up in the sky and moving about accompanied by lightning and thunderclaps, volcanoes with all their destructive power, hurricanes..." etc.. (CJ ¶28 p. 120). But, he explains,

although we found our own limitation when we considered the immensity of nature and the inadequacy of our ability to adopt a standard proportionate to estimating aesthetically the magnitude of nature's domain, yet we also found, in our power of reason, a different and nonsensible standard that has this infinity itself under it as a unit; and since in contrast to this standard everything in nature is small, we found in our mind a superiority over nature itself in its immensity (CJ ¶28, p. 120).\footnote{"Denn, so wie wir zwar an der Unermesslichkeit der Natur, und der Unzulänglichkeit unseres Vermögens, einen der ästhetischen Größenschätzung ihres Gebiets proportionierten Massstab zu nehmen, unsere eigene Einschränkung, gleichwohl aber doch auch an unserem Vernunftvermögen zugleich einen andern nicht-sinnlichen Massstab, welcher jene Unendlichkeit selbst als Einheit unter sich hat, gegen den alles in der Natur klein ist, mithin in unserem Gemüte eine Überlegenheit über die Natur selbst in ihrer Unermesslichkeit fanden" (KdU ¶28, p. 185).}

For Kant, then, the force of nature ushers in its own demise into unified representation, and again we marvel at our supersensible nature. Nature itself is called sublime \textit{[erhaben]} only insofar as "it elevates \textit{[erhebt]} our imagination, [making] it exhibit those cases where the mind can come to feel its own sublimity, which lies in its vocation and elevates it even above nature"
Thus, rather than being transfixed in the zone between intuition and concept as in the experience of the beautiful, in the experience of the sublime we transcend the limits of our representational faculty. But in both the experience of the beautiful and of the sublime, we access the possibility—the "as if"—of nature's supersensible purposiveness, and the possibility of our vocation being its fulfilment.

But while in the experience of the sublime imaginative representation becomes a superseded (though agitated) object, Kant does not adequately think through how the imagination remains an involved moment. We are in the arena of what Kant calls reflective judgements. But the judgements do not reflect the sublating movement of the self. Kant's reflective, sublime supersession preserves in isolated agitation the faculty beyond which it moves: the negative moment which allows for Erhebung has been contained—indeinitely postponed—in the reflexive "as if." The sublime itself therefore is spared negation. Fichte would make steps toward changing this, by making the transcendental ego an act rather than a standpoint.

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Fichte's Science of Knowledge of 1794 was an attempt to bring philosophy through a metamorphosis: not by producing its final form—for Fichte the Kantian critical project was this final form—13—but rather by going back to and grasping the very first principles of all knowing. Fichte wanted thereby to show the necessity of the Kantian critical system.14 By failing to

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13 By 1793 all three of Kant's Critiques had been published.

14 According to Fichte "Kant hat überhaupt die richtige Philosophie; aber nur in ihre Resultaten, nicht nach ihren Gründen." (Briefwechsel, Hrsg. Schulze, Bd. I 1930, S. 319, Brief Nr. 145; in; Gesamtausgabe, Hrsg. Lauth/Jacob, Bd. III 2 1970, S. 18, Brief Nr. 171.)
properly determine a first principle Kant left his system a target for sceptics and dogmatic realists.

Reinhold, Schulze, and Maimon among others had attempted to complete Kant’s project. After reading Schulze’s work the *Aenesidemus* in 1793, Fichte remained unconvinced that Kant’s philosophy had reached the level of science. But in the *Science of Knowledge*, published the following year, Fichte asserted that he had found the needed principle: the act of consciousness, *die Tathandlung*, was the ground. The first principle of the entire science was thus "Das Ich setzt ursprünglich schlechthin sein eignes Sein" ("the I posits its being absolutely [primordially]") (*Sc.Kn.* I, 98).

While the first principle is that the self posits itself absolutely, the second principle is that the self posits a not-self in opposition to itself, thus giving rise to a contradiction. The third principle resolves it: "In the self I oppose a divisible not-self to the divisible self" (*Sc.Kn.* I. 110). The first proposition cannot of itself yield knowledge because there is no opposition; the other two provide and are this opposition; the three principles together are the process of knowing.

The relation between the self and the not self is then described as a *Wechselwirkung*, a wavering interdetermination, and this *Wechselwirkung* between the self and the not-self is the imagination. For Fichte imagination therefore is the centre-piece, indeed the centre-piecing, of the world we know.

*[O]ur doctrine here is therefore that all reality—for us being understood, as it cannot be otherwise understood in a system of transcendental philosophy—is brought forth solely by the imagination....* (*Sc.Kn.* I, 227).

The imagination gives the truth and the only possible truth (*Sc.Kn.* I, 227).
This act of the imagination forms the basis for the possibility of our consciousness, our life, our existence for ourselves, that is, our existence as selves... (Sc.Kn. I, 227).

In the Science of Knowledge, in the final section of the Foundation of Theoretical Science--"The Deduction of Presentation"—Fichte investigates the movement involved in the wavering of the imagination between the ideal and the real, between the finite and the infinite, between the Self and the Beyond. He uses the metaphor of a line extending outward from the self into the infinite. The imagination is for him an act of building, die Einbildungskraft—the power (kraft) of building (conjuring) some thing (Ein-bildung). It is also a building-forward, because it goes out beyond what is already, and in so outreaching itself builds the new. But this outgoing simply by itself is unconscious: the self "requires" of itself a check. The check is essentially the positing of the not-self by the self (the second principle of the system). Fichte writes:

...if something is to be determined as subjective with the self, and something else by that determination to be excluded from its sphere as objective, then it needs to be explained how this latter element, that is to be excluded, could come to be present in the self... Our present principle yields an answer to this objection, as follows: The objective to be excluded has no need at all to be present; all that is required -- if I may so put it-- is the presence of a check on the self, that is, for some reason that lies merely outside the self's activity, the subjective must be extensible no further. Such an impossibility of further extension would then delimit --the mere interplay we have described, or the mere incursion; it would not set bounds to the activity of the self; but would give it the task of setting bounds to itself. But all delimitation occurs through an opposite; hence the self, simply to do justice to this task would have to oppose something objective to the subjective that calls for limitation, and then synthetically unite them both...; and thus the entire presentation could then be derived. It will at once be apparent that this mode of explanation is a realistic one; only it rests upon a realism far more abstract than any put forward earlier; for it presupposes neither a not-self present apart from the self, nor even a determination present within the self, but merely the requirement for a determination to be undertaken within it by the self as such, or the mere determinability of the self (Sc.Kn. I, 211 my underlining).

For Fichte the self requires the check. Since Fichte claims that the entire Science of
Knowledge is based on intellectual intuition,\textsuperscript{15} it would appear that we must begin with an \textit{a priori} synthetic unity which is separate from the imagination and yet which requires from the imagination a synthesis in order to have figurative (empirical) filling. Is the positing of the check a kind of synthetic moment above and beyond the imagination? For Fichte the imagination is absolutely central, but the logic of its activity is not clear.

What is perhaps most important for our purposes in the above brief outlines of Kant and Fichte is that for them both, the imagination is a subjective faculty whose product (synthesis) is the result of a requirement placed on it by the self. This is not the case in Schelling and Hegel.

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Schelling's main assertions about the imagination prior to 1801\textsuperscript{16} are in his \textit{System of Transcendental Idealism} (1800). Schelling's attempt to complete the project of critical philosophy differed from Fichte's by virtue of his more Spinozistic approach. Hegel praises Schelling in 1801: while Fichte presents only a subjective transcendental idealism, Schelling's system develops the Absolute as both subjective and objective. The subjective side of philosophy is presented in a system of transcendental idealism, and the objective side in a philosophy of nature. These two sciences are inseparable, because they are two sides of the absolute, and


\textsuperscript{16} I am restricting my analysis to begin with to works which appeared prior to Hegel's first publication in 1801.
together make up an organic whole.17

Schelling’s more Spinozistic approach means that, instead of reflection being a mirroring of the world for the understanding, reflection recognizes in its own gaze the unity and becoming of two perspectival poles.

The conscious observer of nature is the "centre" of an external world which he organizes in his empirical knowledge. But as he does transcendental philosophy he discovers himself to be the internal centre, to be the focus of the life that animates the world. This is the true "begetting of the Logos," the discovery of our identity with the eternal Reason. It is a discovery which is throughout a self-making; (Harris "Introduction" Diff 51).

The story of that making has several "epochs." These constitute Schelling’s System of Transcendental Philosophy. They are the levels of Reason’s coming-to-consciousness or self-making: from original sensation to productive intuition, from intuition to reflection, to the will and to creative production. The culmination of the transcendental science is the "Deduction of the Art-Product as the Universal Organ of Philosophy," and the imagination is central to it.

According to Schelling:

It is the poetic gift, which in its primary potentiality constitutes the primordial intuition, and conversely, what we speak of as the poetic gift is merely productive intuition, reiterated [repeating itself, sich wiederholende] to its highest power. It is one and the same capacity that is active in both, the only one whereby we are able to think and to couple together even what is contradictory—and its name is imagination (STT 230).18

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17 "...the philosophy of Nature is the theoretical part of philosophy (where we contemplate necessity) and transcendental philosophy is the practical part (where we enjoy the consciousness of our own productive activity). But since this opposition is only an ideal one, and each of the two sciences is a conscious expression of the whole, each of them must strive away from its own ideal pole (necessity or freedom) towards the opposite one" (Harris, "Introduction." Diff 49-50).

18 "Es ist das Dichtungsvermögen, was in der ersten Potenz die ursprüngliche Anschauung ist, und umgekehrt, es ist nur die in der höchsten Potenz sich wiederholende produktive Anschauung, was wir Dichtungsvermögen nennen. Es ist ein und dasselbe, was in beiden tätig ist, das einzige wodurch wir fähig sind, auch das Widersprechende zu denken und zusammenzufassen—die Einbildungskraft" (Sys. Tr.I. 297).
Imagination is that "poetic gift" whereby "art...achieves the impossible, namely to resolve an infinite opposition in a finite product" (STI 230).19

Because of the central importance of the faculty of the imagination for Kant, Fichte and Schelling, and since Hegel comes directly out of this tradition, the question naturally arises: what happened to the imagination in Hegel's philosophy? The word Einbildungskraft appears only once in the Phenomenology of Spirit as a whole, and this is in the Preface.20 The other "faculties"—Sensation, Perception, Understanding and Reason—are dialectically thought through.

One might think that the reason for the absence of the imagination is that it is such a one-sided notion belonging to Fichtean idealism, but each of the other faculties is brought into the Phenomenology precisely in order to show their one-sidedness in the dialectic of failure which the Phenomenology is. So this cannot be the answer.

Ultimately the answer to this question lies in a careful study of various Philosophy of Spirit lectures and a comparison of the imagination in them with it in the Phenomenology, as I shall do in the following chapters. But we can make a general beginning here in the introduction by looking at Hegel's first major publication—The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's

19 "Jenes produktive Vermögen ist dasselbe, durch welches auch der Kunst das Unmöglichliche gelingt, nämlich einen unendlichen Gegensatz in einem endlichen Produkt aufzubeheben (Sys. Tr. I. 297).


The word Einbildung comes up five times in the Phenomenology, and while it is translated as "imagination," the correct translation, at least in Hegel's use of it (as well as in the Wahrig German dictionary) is imagination (as false presentation) as in "imaginary," "illusion," or "conceit." Cf. my Glossary for a list of places. What Hegel discusses in those places is clearly not the synthesis (in the aid) of understanding intuitions.
System of Philosophy (1801). In this work Hegel compares the two philosophies and defends Schelling's identity theory. We see here Hegel's rejection of the role of imagination's synthesis within a philosophy of subjectivity (like that of Fichte), and his adoption instead of the Absolute Synthesis of the identity theory. The synthesis is not that of a subjective faculty but is rather part of the becoming of the Absolute. These statements require elaboration.

Rather than asserting that the in-itself—of the subject or object—is beyond our theoretical knowledge as in Kant, or infinitely displaced by the check as in Fichte, Schelling and Hegel assert that in the absolute point of indifference subject and object are one, with the result that the synthesis cannot be the required product of a self—but rather springs out of both subject and object, indeed gives rise to that opposition. Thus in criticizing Fichte in the Differenzschrift Hegel redefines synthesis. It is no longer called the synthesis of the imagination, but rather the synthesis of the Absolute:

For absolute identity to be the principle of an entire system it is necessary that both subject and object be posited as Subject-Object. In Fichte's system identity constitutes itself only as subjective Subject-Object. [But] this subjective Subject-Object needs an objective Subject-Object to complete it, so that the Absolute presents itself in each of the two Subject-Objects, and finds itself perfected only in both together as the highest synthesis that nullifies both insofar as they are opposed. As their point of absolute indifference, the Absolute encloses both, gives birth to both and is born of both (Diff 155, my underlining).21

According to Hegel in the Differenzschrift, realization of this synthesis occurs in art, religion and in speculative philosophy. Each is an "intuition of the self-shaping or objectively

21 "Dass absolute Identität das Prinzip eines ganzen Systems sei, dazu ist notwendig, dass das Subjekt und Objekt beide als Subjekt-Objekt gesetzt werden. Die Identität hat sich im Fichteschem System nur zu einem subjektiven Subjekt-Objekt konstituiert. Dies bedarf zu seiner Ergänzung eines objektiven Subjekt-Objekts, so dass das Absolute sich in jedem der beiden darstellt, vollständig sich nur in beiden zusammen findet, als höchste Synthese in der Vernichtung beider, insofern sie entgegengesetzt sind, als ihr absoluter Indifferenzpunkt beide in sich schliesst, beide gebiert und sich aus beiden gebiert" (Differenz 94).
self-finding Absolute" (Diff 171): in Hegel's Christian terms it is "the intuition of God's eternal human Incarnation, the begetting of the Word from the beginning" (Diff 171); in his philosophical terms it is "absolute, self-intuiting Reason" (Diff 174).

According to Hegel, though the Absolute exhibits itself in art and religion, these two do not satisfy the need for conscious and immediate intuition of the process: only speculative philosophy can do that.

In art properly speaking, the intuition appears as a work which, being objective, is enduring, but can also be regarded by the intellect as an external dead thing; it is a product of the individual, of the genius, yet it belongs to mankind. In religion the intuition appears as a living (e)motion (Bewegen) which, being subjective, and only momentary, can be taken by the intellect as something merely internal; it is the single individual. In speculation, the intuition appears more as consciousness, and as extended in consciousness, as an activity of subjective Reason which suspends objectivity and the non-conscious. Whereas the Absolute appears in art, taken in its true scope, more in the form of absolute being, it appears in speculation more as begetting itself in its infinite intuition (Diff 171-2).²⁴

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So far I have only scratched the surface and presented the basic issues. Leaving a

²² "Diese Anschauung des sich selbst gestaltenden oder sich objektiv findenden Absoluten..."; "...die Anschauung der ewigen Menschwerdung Gottes, des Zeugens des Worts vom Anfang" (Differenz 112).

²³ "d[ie] absolut[e] sich selbst anschauend[e] Vernunft" (Differenz 115).

²⁴ "Jene Anschauung erscheint in der Kunst mehr in einen Punkt konzentriert und das Bewusstsein nieder schlagend, —entweder in der eigentlich sogenannten Kunst als Werk, das als objektiv teils dauernd ist, teils mit Verstand als ein totes Äusseres genommen werden kann, ein Produkt des Individuums, des Genies, aber der Menschheit angehörend, —oder in der Religion als ein lebendiges Bewegen, das als subjektiv, nur Momente erfüllend, vom Verstand als ein bloss Inneres gesetzt werden kann, das Produkt einer Menge, einer allgemeinen Genialität, aber auch jedem Einzelnen angehörend. In der Spekulation erscheint jene Anschauung mehr als Bewusstsein, und im Bewusstsein Ausgebreitetes als ein Tun subjektiver Vernunft, welche die Objektivität und das Bewusstlose aufhebt. Wenn der Kunst in ihrem wahren Umfang das Absolute mehr in der Form des absoluten Seins erscheint, so erscheint es der Spekulation mehr als ein in seiner unendlichen Anschauung sich selbst Erzeugendes" (Differenz, 112-113)
scepticism which turns reluctantly to the imagination’s synthesis for rational coherence (Hume), we looked at Kant’s critical analysis of the imagination as an a priori faculty whose synthesis is required by the self, and whose limitation—rather than renewing scepticism—indicates our moral vocation. Fichte grasped this vocational attitude as a dialectic between the two poles of self and the forever-beyond of the self’s moral completion, with the imagination as the wavering middle between them. From there we moved to Schelling’s and (the early) Hegel’s rejection of this one-sided, subjective (moral) requirement of imagination’s synthesis. Synthesis is for them rather the activity of the Absolute; it is the heart—the ‘indifference point’—of the subject-object opposition, and all truth is the dialectic of the Absolute’s self-revealing.

We have arrived at our point of departure for discussing the imagination in Hegel’s early philosophy. In Hegel, unlike in his predecessors, "It is as if the concept of imagination were imagining itself into existence: rather than an object of analysis or Wesenschau, it becomes one of the shapers of our conceptual world."25 From this idea of the imagination (the Absolute) imagining itself into existence, we now must try to think the imagination through to the end.

25 Sparshott, Francis, "Imagination—the very Idea" in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48:1 Winter 1990, (7). I have taken the liberty of lifting Sparshott's line out of an essay and passage which had nothing to do with Hegel; but the aptness of the phrase for describing Hegel, legitimates, I feel, my use of it here.
PART I

Imagination in Theory: "Subjective Authentication."

Part I investigates the theoretical aspect of the imagination: its epistemological role in the intellect's ability to present things to itself. Specifically I investigate the development of Hegel's thought concerning the 'place' of the imagination, beginning with Faith and Knowledge, and parts of Differenzschrift (Chapter 1) and then in his two sets of lectures on Geistesphilosophie 1803-4, 1805-6 (Chapters 2-3). I then look ahead to Hegel's final discussion of the imagination in theoretical Spirit in the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit of 1830 (Chapter 4).

Though in places I discuss some of the later moments of imagination and of representation (signs and memory), the discussion here in Part I ultimately only gets us as far as subjective authentication: that is, it only follows the development of the imagination up to the externalization of the imagination's representations in symbols. This prepares us for Part II, where we look at the imagination in practice: following upon the moment of memory, we look there at the imagination's objective authentication in signs--in artistic creation, and in religion.
Chapter 1

Hegel's Imagination in the Philosophy of Identity

The Imagination's Synthesis: Sundering. One-sided vs. Proper Reconstruction: the Logic of Loss

I: Sundering

In *Faith and Knowledge* Hegel writes triumphantly that

the metaphysic of subjectivity has run through the complete cycle of its forms in the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte...[and it] has brought this cultural process to its end. Therewith the external possibility directly arises that the true philosophy [i.e. Speculative philosophy --JB] should emerge... (*Faith*, Conclusion 189).

It is in this work, in the criticism of Kant and Fichte in particular, that the imagination's role as Hegel perceived it starts to become apparent. Hegel's discussion of it begins where Kant places the imagination in his epistemology, and develops in that context. His discussion of Fichte leads into the practical sphere. As in the *Differenzschrift*, Hegel contrasts grasping truth through the intellect with the recognition of Reason's self-making through Speculative Philosophy. According to Hegel Kant fails to recognize the Speculative Idea in the transcendental

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26 "...diese Metaphysik der Subjektivität, während andere Gestalten derselben auch selbst in dieser Sphäre nicht zählen, den vollständigen Zyklus ihrer Formen in der Kantischen, Jacobischen und Fichteschen Philosophie durchlaufen,...und damit das Bilden beendet hat, so ist hierin unmittelbar die äussere Möglichkeit gesetzt, dass die wahre Philosophie, aus dieser Bildung erstehend..." (*GW* 133).
imagination; Fichte fails to see the Speculative Idea in the practical ends of Reason. The following discussion of the imagination is informed by *Faith and Knowledge*, but it wanders occasionally from its confines—into the *Differenzschrift* and into works by Kant, Fichte and Schelling—in the interest of exposition.

For Kant there is a difference between Reason and the imagination. They are distinct faculties, with different products: respectively the ideas of Reason (which give rise to antinomies and paralogisms) and the syntheses of the imagination. Ideas for Kant are pure intuitions: "Ideas are not concepts, rather they are pure intuitions, not discursive, but rather intuitive representations." For Kant only a divine mind could be capable of true ideas (intellectual intuitions): we are left to postulate the existence of such a mind without knowing it or its inner possibility.

For Schelling and the early Hegel, however, there is no question of a hypostatised intuitive understanding. Kant's division between Reason and imagination does not hold: according to them imagination is Reason. Before Hegel says it in *Faith and Knowledge*, Schelling says it in his *System of Transcendental Idealism*. Using the language of Fichte but to a different end Schelling writes:

...what is commonly spoken of as the imagination is in fact such a wavering between finitude and infinity; or, what comes to the same, an activity mediating

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27 At the end the book Hegel summarizes: "We threw light earlier on the subordinate sphere of this intellect, *where speculation can be found, i.e., upon the idea of the transcendental imagination* in Kant's philosophy. Then we had to pursue the intellect [in Fichte] into the reaches of what are for it the practical realities—the Ideals of the moral world order and of the End set by Reason—in order to show the absence of the Idea in them" (*Faith* 187 my italics).

the theoretical and the practical; the proof of all of which will in fact be found in what follows. This power, therefore, which we refer to meanwhile as imagination, will in the course of this wavering also necessarily produce something, which itself oscillates between infinity and finitude, and which can therefore also be regarded only as such. Products of this kind are what we call Ideas as opposed to concepts, and imagination in this wavering is on that very account not understanding but reason; and conversely, what is commonly called theoretical reason is nothing else but imagination in the service of freedom. ...[O]nce they are made objects of the understanding, they lead to those insoluble contradictions which Kant set forth under the name of the antinomies... these Ideas must assuredly be mere products of imagination, that is, of an activity such that it produces neither the finite nor the infinite *(STT 176 my underlining).*

There is much to discuss here but it is really Hegel’s version of this in *Faith and Knowledge* that interests us for now. In his criticism of Kant, Hegel claims that the imagination is Reason:

[W]e must not take the faculty of [productive] imagination as the middle term that gets inserted between an existing absolute subject and an absolute existing world. The productive imagination must rather be recognized as what is primary and original, as that out of which subjective Ego and objective world first sunder themselves into the necessarily bipartite appearance and product, and as the sole In-itself. This power of imagination is the original two-sided identity. The identity becomes subject in general on one side, and object on the other; but originally it is both. And the imagination is nothing but Reason itself *(Faith 73, my underlining).*

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29 "Wir nennen diese Tätigkeit indes Einbildungskraft bloss der Kürze halber, ...das, was man insgemein Einbildungskraft nennt, sei eine solche zwischen Endlichkeit und Unendlichkeit schwebende, oder, was dasselbe ist, eine Theoretisches und Praktisches vermittelnde Tätigkeit, wie sich denn für dies alles in der Folge der Beweis finden wird. Jenes Vermögen also, was wir indes Einbildungskraft nennen, wird in jenem Schweben auch notwendig etwas produzieren, das selbst zwischen Unendlichkeit und Endlichkeit schwebt, und was daher auch nur als ein solches aufgefasst werden kann. Produkte der Art sind, was man Ideen nennt im Gegensatz gegen Begriffe, und die Einbildungskraft ist eben deswegen in jenem Schweben nicht Verstand, sondern Vernunft, und hinwiederum, was insgemein theoretische Vernunft heisst, ist nichts anderes als die Einbildungkraft im Dienste der Freiheit. Das aber Ideen blose Objekte der Einbildungskraft seien, die nur in jenem Schweben zwischen Endlichkeit und Unendlichkeit Bestand finden, erhellt daraus, dass sie, zum Objekt des Verstandes gemacht, auf jene unaufloslichen Widersprüche führen, welche Kant unter dem Namen der Antinomien der Vernunft aufgestellt hat,...so müssen jene Ideen wohl blose Produkte der Einbildungskraft, d.h. einer solche Tätigkeit sein, die weder Endliches noch Unendliches produziert" *(Sys. Tr.I. 228-9).*
A question immediately poses itself when reading this paragraph: how is it that we are conscious of the difference between the ego and nature? We are told that the imagination is the "sole-in-itself." But while it is the Absolute, it is also only one moment of the Absolute. To the above paragraph Hegel adds "*But it [imagination] is only Reason as it appears in the sphere of empirical consciousness*" (my italics). So while the imagination is Reason, it is not the "absolute, *self-intuiting Reason*" (*Diff* 174); while it is self-shaping, it is not the "*intuiting of th*[is] self-shaping or objectively self-finding Absolute" (*Diff* 171). There is a difference between the sundering imagination and reason’s consciousness of itself as this sundering (and the development of the latter as Spirit). This difference is a reconstruction, and it is what we need to investigate next.

II: Reconstruction

There are two ways in which the reconstruction can take place: one is a one-sided reconstruction—the kind Hegel believes Kant and Fichte engage in—and the other is the proper reconstruction—the one Hegel will spend the rest of his time in Jena attempting to make. (The proper reconstruction could be articulated as Hegel’s eventual three-part *Encyclopedia System of Philosophy*, though I think that one need not look beyond the *Phenomenology*. But I am getting ahead here.)

Kant’s line between intuition and the thing-in-itself is that horizon which Fichte widens into a new dimension funnelled out toward the infinite beyond, fixed at this end by the subject; in Fichte’s mind it is thus the "projected line," the checked infinite extension of which makes that line into imagination’s dialectical wavering between finite and infinite. Hegel and Schelling see the point in the infinite, beyond where Fichte imposes the check, as the point of indifference:
there is no subjectively imposed check, for the subject had its origin in the point of indifference; the infinite and the finite are created in the original sundering of the Absolute, and what the subject is is one pole of the absolute's becoming. The difference between Fichte on the one hand and Schelling and Hegel on the other is thus perhaps best understood in the way in which the subject views itself: for Schelling and Hegel the subject appears as as much a creation as the infinite it contemplates; for Fichte the subject is one pole, a necessary given which in Hegel's terms has not transcended its immediate relation to itself.30

The genetic history of self-consciousness is the natural history of the absolute's coming to be self-conscious. Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism gives the stages of development of the subject: his ideal reconstruction is the account of the various graduated powers (Potenzen) of consciousness.

Hegel's criticism of Kant in Faith and Knowledge can be read as revealing the first two logical moments of this structure (intuition and intellect). Kant's hidden (verborgene) imagination, instead of a subjective spontaneity in the service of an already present understanding, is in Hegel an originary (still unconscious) sundering into subject and object: intuition is the first division, the understanding a second, more differentiated level of the absolute's self-reflection. Both have the same principle--the sundering into opposition. Thus Hegel writes:

This original synthetic unity [the Absolute--JB] must be conceived, not as produced out of opposites, but as a truly necessary, absolute, original identity of opposites. As such, it is the principle both of productive imagination, which is the

30 In the above paragraph we can see how Hegel could eventually take the views of his predecessors as moments in the logic of representation (immediate opposition [Kant], alienation [Fichte], reconciliation of opposites [Schelling and Hegel]).
unity that is blind, i.e., immersed in the difference and not detaching itself from it; and of the intellect, which is the unity that posits the difference as identical but distinguishes itself from the different. This shows that the Kantian forms of intuition and the forms of thought cannot be kept apart at all as the particular, isolated faculties which they are usually represented as. One and the same synthetic unity—we have just now determined what this means here—is the principle of intuition and of the intellect (Faith 70 my underlining).

As we have seen, Schelling says much the same in his System of Transcendental Idealism of the concluding Potenz (poetry-making):

What we speak of as the poetic gift is merely productive intuition, reiterated to its highest power. It is one and the same capacity that is active in both, the only one whereby we are able to think and to couple together even what is contradictory—and its name is imagination (STI 230 my underlining).

The question of freedom naturally arises when one reads passages like these. To say that the unity which posits has the original sundering as its principle would seem to make freedom impossible. Although Hegel (to my knowledge) does not discuss it in this way in Faith and Knowledge, I think we are safe in assuming that freedom is consciousness' awareness of itself, and it too arises out of the sundering indifference point. The only freedom it might show to be false is a self-understanding which took itself to be an abstract unity, and therefore undeveloping. While the productive imagination is the unity "which is blind," false freedom

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31 We recall Kant's statement "the power of the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious" (CPR A77/B103).

32 *Diese ursprüngliche synthetische Einheit, d.h. eine Einheit, die nicht als Produkt Entgegengesetzter begriffen werden muss, sondern als wahrhaft notwendige, absolute, ursprüngliche Identität Entgegengesetzter, ist sowohl Prinzip der produktiven Einbildungskraft, der blinden, d.h. in die Differenz versenkten, von ihr sich nicht abscheidenden, als der die Differenz identisch setzenden, aber von den Differenten sich unterscheidenden Einheit, als Verstand; woraus erheilt, dass die Kantischen Formen der Anschauung und die Formen des Denkens gar nicht als besondere isolierte Vermögen auseinander liegen, wie man es sich gewöhnlich verstellt, Eine und ebendieselbe synthetische Einheit,— und was diese hier heisst, ist soeben bestimmt worden — ist das Prinzip des Anschauens und des Verstandes;* (GW 17-18).

33 Cf. my Introduction.
would posit blindly, since the imagination would continue to be active even though such freedom declared itself free from the imagination. An argument for such freedom would be an argument for a disembodied unity—a negation of the earlier Potenzen; and given that for Schelling and Hegel the original Identity of substance and subject is that unity from which all difference arises and from which all difference is ultimately not separate, such disembodied freedom would be an illusion. The proper freedom of theoretical positing (on the other hand) is just the reflection of what is; and what is in reflection, is expressing its freedom as theorizing. But I do not think that Hegel gets this story clear until he has changed his focus from the Absolute of the Identity Theory to that of the pro-reflection theory of his later Jena works: in this earlier work we are left to deal with such phrases as: the intellect "posits the difference as identical but distinguishes itself from the different." This is indeed difficult to understand. But for now we must work with this idea that the principle of that activity is the sundering Absolute.

This principle means that the intellect, although creating difference, is nevertheless creating a difference which is a level of the Absolute’s self-reflection. The positing is (conciliated with) Being. It is not (as in Fichte) the action of an incomplete self striving toward its completion. For Fichte...

...the idea of an infinity to be thus completed floats as a vision before us, and is rooted in our innermost nature. We are obliged, as it enjoins us, to resolve the contradiction [of realizing the infinite]; though we cannot even think it possible of solution and foresee that in no moment of an existence prolonged to all eternity will we ever be able to consider it possible. But this is just the mark in us that we are destined for eternity (Sc. Kn. I, 270 my underlining).

For Fichte the principle of the intellect is the check which the subject imposes on its own activity, thereby initiating the wavering of the imagination between the self and the beyond toward which the self strives. In that opposition there is no reconciliation with the infinite, only
a striving to reach beyond the finite. It appears as though the self both posits itself and exceeds itself. The consequent history is therefore an ongoing reconstruction required and motivated by the intellect, an intellect which is never able to cash in its check.\textsuperscript{34} In one of Hegel's more sardonic criticisms of Fichte he writes

...what is most horrifying and saddening for Fichte's I is being one with the universe, having the universe live and act in me, being obedient to the eternal laws of nature and to the hallowed necessity. Since difference, or the bad, is so incorrectly conceived, the reconstruction cannot be authentic either. For the infinite is posited as originally un-unified and un-unifiable with the finite: the Ideal (das Ideelle) cannot be united with the real or pure Reason with existence (\textit{Faith} 182).\textsuperscript{35} \textsuperscript{36}

If, on the other hand, the reconstruction has its principle in an originary sundering, then the reconstruction would be the history of that self-reflective Being, a history which is that of the infinite. Rather than Fichte's line which extends from the subject out toward infinity, for Hegel the Absolute's history is an infinite circle of sundering, opposition, and self-conscious

\textsuperscript{34} Hegel cashes out the moment of the negative in the \textit{Phenomenology}: it is the story of the overcoming of this preponderance. Throughout the book consciousness has the preponderance of dawning forms of subjective Reason which are one-sided, and of attempting to place the truth outside (beyond) itself, of attempting to name its truth. We are not reconciled with the sundering of Reason (negation) until the negation of the negation in Absolute Knowing. Hence the description of the \textit{Phenomenology} as the "path of despair."

\textsuperscript{35} "[wie wir oben gesehen haben], dass das Einsein mit dem Universum, dass das Universum in mir lebt und wirkt, der Gehorsam gegen das ewige Gesetz der Natur und der heiligen Notwendigkeit, das Entsetzlichste und Wehmütigste für den Ich ist. So wenig die Differenz oder das Übel richtig begriffen ist, eben so wenig kann auch die Rekonstruktion echter Art sein, weil das Unendliche dem Endlichen, das Ideelle, die reine Vernunft, dem Reellen, der Existenz als ursprünglich unvereint, und unvereinbar gesetzt ist" (GW 126-7).

\textsuperscript{36} Kant asserts that "...happiness is an ideal not of reason but of imagination" (Kant, \textit{Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals}. Trans. L. W. Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc. 1959. p. 36 [418 AK]). Since for Hegel imagination is reason as it appears in empirical consciousness, this suggests that happiness is not only possible but also morally permissible. In what we can take to be a twist on Kant's repeated "as if" phrase in the \textit{Critique of Judgement} and elsewhere, Hegel writes exasperatedly in \textit{Faith}: "as if the laws of nature were something quite different from rational laws! As if they were laws which a moral self would be ashamed to submit to, and as if obedience and subjection to them would make him indescribably miserable and bring him to despair!" (\textit{Faith} 177).
According to Fichte the category which underlies all the other categories in Kant's table is the third category of relation—that of Wechselwirkung (interdetermination). This Wechselwirkung is the wavering of the imagination between the finite and the infinite. It lies at the basis of all the other categories because all the other categories presume opposition. (For example, quantity: one cannot isolate a quantity without having an object over against one.) In the Fichtean framework the imagination is the subjective synthesis at the heart of all the categories. For the early Hegel, since the imagination is that which lies at the indifference point between subject and object, and which sunders itself into the subjective Ego and the objective Other, the imagination is the basis of all thought. It is not only subjective synthesis: the basis of all categorial determinations is substantive as well as subjective. In Hegel the imagination is not causal in the Fichtean sense because as we saw the self does not require synthesis but rather itself arises out of the synthesis. The primary category for Hegel is therefore not that of interdetermination. Rather, "the true relation of speculation" is that of substance and accident (Diff 116, and cf. 161).\footnote{Later, in the Phenomenology, this is modified; Hegel has by that time integrated Fichte more positively. As we will see in my Chapter 6, by 1807 the moment of Wechselwirkung becomes salient in reflection: in mere reflection as a "to and fro" movement, and in Speculative reflection as Aufhebung, which latter is the medium of Science. Thus Hegel will say in the Phenomenology Preface that "everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not as Substance, but equally as Subject" (PoS 10, [with correction to Miller's translation: Miller writes "not only as Substance..." which is incorrect: "...das Wahre nicht als Substanz, sondern ebensosehr als Subjekt aufzufassen und auszudrücken" PdG 22-23]).} As a result for Hegel, "Both art and speculation are in their essence divine service--both are a living intuition of the absolute life and hence a being at one with it" (Diff 172).
One-sided Reconstructions:

The one-sidedness for which Fichte is criticized is a preponderance of consciousness. In the Differenzschrift Hegel writes

...though speculation certainly conceives the Absolute as becoming, it also posits the identity of becoming and being; and what appears to speculation as self-begetting is at the same time posited as the original absolute being which can only come to be so far as it is. In this way, speculation can rid itself of the preponderance that consciousness has in it; the preponderance is in any case something inessential (Diff 172 my underlining).\(^3\)

The "preponderance" is, in the reconstruction, to suspend objectivity and to take the truth to be that of subjective reason. According to Hegel this is what both Kant and Fichte do, the former by referring to a thing-in-itself and the latter by setting up the check, and by making absolute reconciliation something for which practical reason can only ever strive.

As we have noted, according to Hegel both Kant and Fichte make the mistake of staying at the level of the understanding and determining the Absolute conceptually from that intellectual standpoint. They ought rather to have seen the determining from the standpoint of Reason, which latter makes a completely different kind of 'demand.'

Having looked at the one-sided nature of Fichte's reconstruction, it is easier to see how one-sided Kant's reconstruction of the intellect is for Hegel.

i) The One-sided Reconstruction into Faculties

We recall Kant's statement that the two syntheses--of the imagination and of the intellect--are one and the same spontaneity "there under the name of the imagination, here under the name

\(^3\) "...aber indem sie [Spekulation] es zwar als ein Werden begreift, setzt sie zugleich die Identität des Werdens und Seins, und das als sich erzeugend ihr Erscheinende wird zugleich als das ursprüngliche absolute Sein gesetzt, das nur werden kann, insofern es ist. Sie weiss sich auf diese Art das Übergewicht, welches das Bewusstsein in ihr hat, selbst zu nehmen, —ein Übergewicht, das ohnehin ein Auserwesentliches ist" (Differenz, 113, my underlining).
of the understanding."\(^39\) As we saw, what Kant means by "under the name" is not clear. Generally speaking a name is proper to some thing: in this case the thing is a faculty. But for Hegel this answer is not adequate. That which acquires the name "imagination" or "intellect" does so as a result of the synthesis; the synthesis cannot simply be said critically to exist under those faculty names, for the synthesis is in their production. Giving an account of the way each is, is the task of proper reconstruction. But the critical perspective suppresses that actuality, and thus suffers from intellectual one-sidedness.

For Hegel 'faculties' are products: insofar as we have isolated them we abstract ourselves from the absolute as true becoming and reify cognitive activity. To remain contented with this is to end up with what Hegel later calls a 'bunch of powers' and a view of the mind as a "skeleton-like mechanical collection."\(^40\) While reification is part of the self-determining process of the Absolute, to fix on the abstracted products is to slip into a point of view which itself is abstract; to slip into a dualism which takes the place of becoming.\(^41\)

ii) Kant's Beautiful Reconstruction

Hegel does not deal with Kant's *Critique of Judgement* in *Faith and Knowledge*, but it is worth looking briefly at this reconstruction too.

As is well known, Hegel views Kant as having got part way to his own conclusions. In

\(^39\) Cf. my Introduction.


\(^41\) This is what Hegel accuses Jacobi of doing when he says that Jacobi takes the "copy" to be the real (cf. *Faith*, Fichte section). Thinking the faculties through properly is the task of the first five chapters of *Phenomenology of Spirit*. To give Fichte some credit, his "Deduction of Presentation" in the *Wissenschaftslehre* 1794 is an attempt to deduce the faculties. While it introduces the important dialectic process (the three principles) lacking in Kant's deduction, it remains, as far as I am concerned, unintelligible, largely due to the prerequisites which a deduction (as opposed to a phenomenology) place on the process. I discuss this more in Chapter 2.
Kant’s explanation of the experience of the beautiful, and in the section on teleology in the same book, Kant discusses the notion of regulative ideas—nature appears to act as if it were purposeful. According to Hegel these ideas are insights into an intellectual intuition, though Kant did not fully understand them to be such.42

When we look at something beautiful, say a rose, according to Kant43 we become aware of the fact that though we can isolate different aspects of the rose (for example the shape of a petal’s curve or the intensity of the colour; the relation of the petals to one another; the necessity of the rose being as it is or the possibility of its withering) we are aware of how none of the isolated concepts are adequate to explain why the rose is beautiful. Beauty is the play between the imagination (which synthesises the sensory input) and the understanding (according to whose categories the synthesis occurs). The play is a sustaining of the failure to conceptually grasp beauty, and this play of our powers is pleasurable to us.44

42 *Hegel found the structure of the absolute identity of opposed determinations veiled in Kant’s theory of the beautiful, but clearly expressed in Kant’s theory of intuitive Understanding. It characterized for Hegel the essence of actual and true Being, of the One substance. This structure is the All-One which [underlies] and is the thinking (überlegene) of finite consciousness, in which we intellectually intuit and grasp any particular." My translation of: "Die Struktur der absoluten Identität entgegengesetzter Bestimmungen, die Hegel verbüllt in Kants Lehre vom Schönen, aber klar ausgesprochen in dessen Lehre vom intuitiven Verstand findet, charakterisiert fuer Hegel das Wesen des eigentlichen und wahrhaft Seienden, der Einen Substanz. Sie ist das dem endlichen Bewusstsein überlegene All-Eine, in dem wir jegliches Besondere intellektuell anschauen und begreifen" (Düsing "Aesthetische Ein." s. 118-9).


44 "...[T]he cognitive powers brought into play by this presentation are in free play...the mental state in this presentation must be a feeling...of a free play of presentational powers" (*CJ* ¶9, 62). The expression "free play" (*freies Spiel*) invites comparison with Fichte’s wavering (*schwebende*) imagination. The wavering in Fichte is between the finite and the infinite, the ideal and the real. Kant’s notion of play is in a sense between the finite and the infinite: for it is a play between the desire for conceptual definition (*finitude*) and the multitude of the beautiful object’s attributes (*infinite*); the play is at the heart of a kind of judgement which by definition cannot come to rest but is spurred on by the seeming infinite possibilities presented by the beautiful object. It is a "quickening [*Belebung*] of the two powers to an activity that is indeterminant but, as a result of the prompting of the given presentation, nonetheless accordant..." (*CJ* 63).
Kant was on the right track, according to Schelling and Hegel, when he recognized the play as one between the finite understanding and the infinite possibilities producible in the contemplation of beauty. But he wrongly maintains the antithesis between subject and object by intellectualizing the product of that difference—the Idea—and asserting that no idea can be complete precisely because it is (merely) an intellectual idea. Its completion lies in the moral sphere. For Hegel, however, "the sole Idea that has reality and true objectivity for philosophy, is the absolute suspendedness [Aufgehobensein] of the antithesis" (Faith 68). For some insight into what this means here, we look at what he writes in Faith and Knowledge about the reconstruction which is not one-sided.

Proper Reconstruction

If the imagination is limited to—the limit of—empirical consciousness, how does reason, through its sundering, go from being unconscious to being empirically conscious to being self-conscious? As I mentioned, this question was Schelling's point of departure in The System of Transcendental Idealism, and it is this question which Hegel's Jena lectures on the philosophy of Spirit will attempt to answer. The question also points us beyond that, toward Hegel's later development of the Speculative Idea as Spirit. While it is apparent in Faith and Knowledge that for Hegel reconstruction cannot be separated from the ethical, Faith and Knowledge only

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45 In the experience of the sublime, the agitated relation of comprehension and apprehension culminates in an idea of our supersensible vocation. As we noted in our introduction, this agitation is likewise a precursor of Hegel's Aufhebung.

46 My discussion in this chapter has been led to a degree by the structure of Faith: The development of Hegel’s criticism in that work from Kant to Jacobi to Fichte take us from the problems of the Speculative Idea in epistemology (in Kant) to the problem of the Speculative Idea in ethics (in Fichte). But for a phenomenological examination of why Hegel's epistemology implies morality and therefore ethical development, cf. John Russon's
offers a murky set of propositions about it. Hegel writes there that to be authentic

this reconstruction would have to unveil the essence of the spirit and [first] expound how nature reflects itself in spirit. Nature takes itself back into itself and lifts its original, unborrowed [ungeborge] real beauty into the ideal realm, the realm of possibility. Thus nature rises as spirit…[Secondly the reconstruction would have to expound] how the essence of nature, in the form of possibility, i.e., as spirit, has enjoyment of itself as a living Ideal in the visible and active reality; and how it has its actuality as ethical nature in which the ethical infinite, that is, the concept, and the ethical finite, that is, the individual, are one without qualification (Faith 182).47

Though sketchy, this passage is important because it contains within it the seeds of the reconstruction as Hegel viewed it. It also contains an implicit criticism of Kant’s notion of beauty: Hegel says "Nature takes itself back into itself and lifts its original, unborrowed real beauty into the ideal realm, the realm of possibility." The implication is that in Kant beauty is merely borrowed (by a subjectivity supposedly already in place) rather than real. In Hegel’s reconstruction, on the other hand, it is not the subject per se which causes the experience of beauty, but rather Nature which "lifts its original, unborrowed real beauty" into the realm of the subjective, the ideal realm in which what is, becomes what is possible.

In the language of the Phenomenology, this passage deals with the Speculative Idea as Spirit. Since in the Differenzschrift and in Faith and Knowledge the imagination is depicted as originary, as the point of indifference—as the unconscious original sundering into subject and

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47 "Diese Rekonstruktion müsste das Wesen des Geistes enthüllen, und ihn darstellen, wie in ihm als frei die Natur sich reflektiert, die sich in sich zurücknimmt, und ihre ursprüngliche ungeborgte reelle Schönheit in das Ideelle oder die Möglichkeit und somit sich als Geist erhebt, welcher Moment, insofern die Identität als Ursprünglichkeit mit der Totalität verglichen wird, dadurch allein als Bewegung und Zertrümmerung der Identität und als Rekonstruktion erscheint; —und wie das Wesen der Natur, in der Form der Möglichkeit, oder der Begriff, und das sittlich Endliche, oder die Individualität schlechthin Eins sind" (GW 127).
object, and "sole in-itself"—for the answer to how Reason becomes self-conscious one would have to go beyond these works to those in which Hegel develops the notion of Spirit. That notion starts to take shape in Hegel's subsequent Jena works—in *The System of Ethical Life* (1802/3) and in *First Philosophy of Spirit* (1803/4). Ultimately, how Reason becomes self-conscious Spirit will be what the *Phenomenology* teaches us.

Leaving for now the eventual ways in which the reconstruction occurs, in both the *Differenzschrift* and at the end of *Faith and Knowledge* Hegel points to what he takes to be the key to proper reconstruction: what overcomes the propensity of consciousness to create a one-sided view is the demise of abstraction in(to) the original sundering. For the self of the one-sided reconstruction this means its own negation, a fall into the night.

III: The Logic of Loss

In "Das Absolute als Nacht, Nichts und Abgrund," Bonsiepen claims that in the early Hegel negation is connected more to destruction and death than it is in his later texts. Indeed, Hegel asserts that to become one with the imagination as Speculative Idea (i.e. to stop understanding it and to be [one with its] becoming), the self must throw itself into "the abyss," into the night. But because this loss is also originary, the night is also the birth-place of truth. Like the perpetual circular turning of night into day, we can begin anywhere on the circle and end up looking at the beginning as the end. But though the night is one of the three moments of an absolute whole, in these early texts it is the predominant moment: "The manifoldness of

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being lies between two nights, without support. It rests on nothing—for the indeterminate is nothing to the intellect—and it ends in nothing" (Diff'95);49 "The Absolute is the night, and the light is younger than it; and the distinction between them, like the emergence of the light out of the night, is an absolute difference—the nothing is the first out of which all being, all the manifoldness of the finite has emerged" (Diff'93-94).50

The night is the birth-place of truth, and the necessary ground to which all must go in order for birth to occur. But for the subject, it is the negation of the antithesis of reflection, of consciousness itself:

[In its highest synthesis of the conscious and the non-conscious, speculation also demands the nullification of consciousness itself. Reason thus drowns itself and its knowledge and its reflection of the absolute identity, in its own abyss.... (Diff 103 my underlining).51

The "demand" of Reason here is entirely different from the demand in Kant and Fichte.

But negation is not a return to unconsciousness point final. It is rather a return which, in negating the antithesis, is the condition of Spirit's becoming. The negation happens within the circular movement of the Absolute's self-development. So instead of mere negation, one must speak of the suspendedness (Aufgehobensein) of the antithesis. Like any reflection, the "reflection of the absolute identity" implies the subject-object antithesis. But in the negation of

49 "...die Mannigfaltigkeit des Seins liegt zwischen zwei Nächten, haltunglos; sie ruht auf dem Nichts, denn das Unbestimmte ist Nichts für den Verstand und endet im Nichts" (Differenz 26).

50 "Das Absolute ist die Nacht, und das Licht jünger als sie, und der Unterschied beider, sowie das Heraustreten des Lichts aus der Nacht, eine absolute Differenz. —das Nichts das Erste, woraus alles Sein, alle Mannigfaltigkeit des Endlichen hervorgegangen ist" (Differenz 24-25).

51 "denn die Spekulation fordert in ihrer höchsten Synthese des Bewussten und Bewusstlosen auch die Vernichtung des Bewusstseins selbst, und die Vernunft versenkt damit ihr Reflektieren der absoluten Identität und ihr Wissen und sich selbst in ihren eigenen Abgrund..." (Differenz 35, my underlining).
this antithesis by Reason's drowning itself in its own abyss, what is given up is the singularity of the negation—the act of a single will is given up and becomes simply the negative moment of self-becoming substance. Rather than the Fichtean negation which propels us linearly beyond what is toward the future (that is not yet), in Hegel the horizon that has become (abstract, mere appearance) is nevertheless the material expression of the Absolute. The future is a projection of the negative moment of the Absolute. The night—as past, as potential and as determining—is thus always already (full of) appearance.

Absolute negation is also absolute determination. The full citation begun above is thus:

"Reason thus drowns itself and its knowledge and its reflection of the absolute identity, in its own abyss: and in this night of mere reflection and of the calculating intellect, in this night which is the noonday of life, common sense and speculation can meet one another" (Diff 103 my underlining).  

Just as the understanding in Fichte is the fixed wavering of the imagination, in Hegel "mere reflection" establishes a fixed absolute opposition. The generated abstraction is immediate but not actual. The immediate must be seen to be mediated: therefore "the task of philosophy consists in uniting these presuppositions [night and light], to posit being in non-being, as becoming; to posit dichotomy in the Absolute, as its appearance; to posit the finite in the infinite, as life (Diff 93-94 my square brackets). Positing being in non-being means

52 "und die Vernunft versenkt damit ihr Reflektieren der absoluten Identität und ihr Wissen und sich selbst in ihren eigenen Abgrund, und in dieser Nacht der blossen Reflexion und des räsonierenden Verstandes, die der Mittag des Lebens ist, können sich beide begegnen" (Differenz 35, my underlining).


54 "Die Aufgabe der Philosophie besteht aber darin, diese Voraussetzungen zu vereinen, das Sein in das Nichtsein—als Werden, die Entzweiung in das Absolute—als dessen Erscheinung, das Endliche in das Unendliche—als Leben zu setzen" (Differenz 25).
mediating what has become immediate: non-being is that which has no movement.

Given that the night is--"the noonday of life"--we can assume that in the following passage it is the night which is the 'irradiating focus': "To speculation, the finitudes are radii of the infinite focus which irradiates them at the same time that it is formed by them. In the radii the focus is posited and in the focus the radii" (*Diff* 111).

In his conclusion to *Faith* Hegel writes similarly:

Infinity is the pure nullification of the antithesis or of finitude; but it is at the same time also the spring of eternal movement, the spring of that finitude which is infinite, because it eternally nullifies itself. Out of this nothing and pure night of infinity, as out of the secret abyss that is its birthplace, the truth lifts itself upward (*Faith* 190).

What has gradually emerged in this discussion is Hegel's early picture of the Speculative Idea. We recall that for Hegel that which underlies all opposition is equally substance and subject: *Aufhebung* is substantial, and rational. The discussion of that rational whole--still relatively undeveloped in these early works--is embodied for the early Hegel in Christian form. More precisely, the dialectic of night and light and their becoming, taken as a whole, is expressed by Hegel in the *Differenzschrift* as the Trinity. The original sundering of the

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55 As we mentioned, while subjectively it appears as though we check the abstraction and move beyond it, the negation is part of the absolute's self-development. Thus whether the self perceives negation as self-determination, or as the self's undergoing a negation, a merely subjective encounter with absolute negation cannot but be an experience of loss.

56 "Für die Spekulation sind die Endlichkeiten Radien des unendlichen Fokus, der sie ausstrahlt und zugleich von ihnen gebildet ist; in ihnen ist der Fokus und im Fokus sie gesetzt" (*Differenz* 43).

57 "...indem in denselben das Denken als Unendlichkeit und negative Seite des Absoluten, welche die reine Vernichtung des Gegensatzes oder der Endlichkeit, aber zugleich auch der Quell der ewigen Bewegung oder der Endlichkeit, die unendlich ist, das heisst, die sich ewig vernichtet, aus welchem Nichts und reinen Nacht der Unendlichkeit die Wahrheit als aus dem geheimen Abgrund, der ihre Geburtsstätte ist, sich emporhebt,—erkannt wird" (*GW* 133).
imagination is the night, the Father; the product is the Son, the Logos; and the figurative reconstruction, the reconstruction of "nature as possibility," is the Holy Ghost. 58

But in the concluding section of Faith and Knowledge the religious picture is taken up into the Speculative Idea. It is the philosophies of subjectivity which have been the object of criticism in Faith and that book ends with what must be their logical conclusion: the experience of loss.

...the pure concept or infinity as the abyss of nothingness in which all being is engulfed, must signify the infinite grief [of the finite] purely as a moment of the supreme Idea, and no more than a moment. Formerly, the infinite grief only existed historically in the formative process of culture. It existed as the feeling that "God Himself is dead," upon which the religion of more recent times rests.... By marking this feeling as a moment of the supreme Idea, the pure concept must give philosophical existence to what used to be either the moral precept that we must sacrifice the empirical being (Wesen), or the concept of formal abstraction [e.g., the categorical imperative]. Thereby it must re-establish for philosophy the Idea of absolute freedom and along with it the absolute Passion, the speculative Good Friday in place of the historic Good Friday. Good Friday must be speculatively re-established in the whole truth and harshness of its God-

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58 As Harris explains:
The light that shines in the primeval darkness is the light of Reason—the Logos that was "begotten not made"; and its seems that the nothing out of which God the Father made the world is to be identified with the creative might of the Father himself. We should note that there are two sides to the speculative interpretation of all this religious language. On the one side of the Philosophy of nature, "light" refers both to the physical principle of light (and heat) and to the principle of life, and "night" means not only darkness but that which, being impervious to light, is shown up by it, the heavy matter which is always inwardly dark till the higher light of life itself shines within it. On the side of transcendental Philosophy "light" stands for the reflective consciousness which discovers all the creative activity (of the Father?—Harris) that has already gone on in the "night" of unconscious nature; and "the nothing" means the mighty force of thought, the abyss out of which everything comes and into which it is hurled. God himself, when not identified with this abyss, which is both his creative power and his negative side, is identical with the life and order of the creative activity. Thus the night or the abyss is God the Father, while Reason in nature is God the Son, the Logos; and speculative Reason returning from the creation and reconciling it with its ground in the divine power will be God the Holy Spirit, "proceeding from the Father and the Son" or "posing being in non-being" as becoming [the Father], dichotomy in the Absolute as its appearance [the Logos], the finite in the infinite as life [the Spirit]" (Hegel 93-4). The trinitarian dogma of the Christian faith is a proper religious expression of speculative truth; while on the other hand, the Judaic creation story (in Genesis) expresses the truth from the "standpoint of dichotomy" (Diff "Intro." 22).
forsakenness....the highest totality can and must achieve its resurrection solely from this harsh consciousness of loss....(Faith 190-91. [Square bracket additions are Harris']).

Had Kant used the metaphor of the night it probably would have referred to the inaccessible noumenal world. Had Fichte, it probably would have referred to the intellectual intuition of the beyond toward which we strive. Although the failure of their respective versions of the self to achieve completion calls for an experience of such complete loss, neither Fichte nor Kant point to such an experience. Because for Hegel "the True is the whole" (PoS 11) such an experience of loss is an integral part of the whole, and the logical conclusion of the subjective attitude. It is fitting, then, that the end of (Hegel's critique of) subjective philosophies is the consciousness of such loss.

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59 "Der reine Begriff aber, oder die Unendlichkeit, als der Abgrund des Nichts, worin alles Sein versinkt, muss den unendlichen Schmerz, der vorher nur in der Bildung geschichtlich und als das Gefühl war, worauf die Religion der neuen Zeit beruht, das Gefühl: Gott ist tot...rein als Moment, aber auch nicht als mehr denn als Moment der höchsten Idee bezeichnen, und so dem, was etwa auch entweder moralische Vorschrift einer Aufopferung der empirischen Wesens oder der Begriff formeller Abstraktion war, eine philosophische Existenz geben, und also der Philosophie die Idee der absoluten Freiheit, und damit das absolute Leiden oder den spekulativen Karfreitag, der sonst historisch war, und ihn selbst, in der ganzen Wahrheit und Härte seiner Gottlosigkeit wiederherstellen, aus welcher Härte allein...die höchste Totalität in ihrem ganzen Ernst und aus ihrem tiefsten Grunde, zugleich allumfassend, und in die heiterste Freiheit ihrer Gestalt auferstehen kann und muss" (GW 134).

60 As we noted above, Fichte claimed intellectual intuition to be the basis of all knowledge (cf. Sc.Kn. Introduction 1797).

61 The experience of the sublime in Kant, while an experience of the loss of the ability to comprehend, is nevertheless an opening onto the supersensible, and so is not really an experience of the loss of reason. Fichte's experience of never arriving is appropriated representationally: it "is just the mark in us that we are destined for eternity" (Sc.kn. I, 270).

62 "Das Wahre ist das Ganze" (PdG 24).

63 That Schelling is surreptitiously included in the scope of that loss will only become clear in the famous passage in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit: there the depth of Schelling's Absolute is measured in the shallowness of "the night in which all cows are black." But a discussion of that leads us beyond the scope of this chapter.
Conclusion

The Identity Philosophy version of the imagination as the absolute original sundering leaves us with too bald an assertion about the identity of intellect and substance, and how the former is nevertheless somehow a development out of the latter. This makes the role of reflection in the reconstruction unclear, and it will remain so until Hegel develops the concept of Spirit over the next few years in Jena.

While Hegel shows why one-sided reconstructions must suffer the logic of loss, his adoption of the Identity Theory in *Faith and Knowledge* does not yield an account of how the sundering imagination is related to the genesis of the intellect or to the history of Being. For his first attempt at accounting for the former we look two years later, to Hegel’s 1803-4 *Geistesphilosophie* lectures. Hegel’s labours will eventually, in 1807, yield the reconstruction of both intellect and history of Being, as the dialectical history of speculative reflection.

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64 Compare for example, its role in “Absolute Knowing” in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: “the pure knowledge of essence has in principle renounced its simple unity, for it is the self-sundering, or the negativity which the Notion is; so far as this self-sundering is the process of becoming for-itself, it is evil; so far as it is the in-itself, it remains good” (¶796 p. 484).
Chapter 2

Geistesphilosophie 1803-4

I begin the following discussion by establishing the context of the Geistesphilosophie 1803-4 and by pointing out some of the significant changes which had occurred in Hegel’s thought since his earlier works of the Critical Journal (the Differenzschrift and Faith and Knowledge). Then I offer an exegetical discussion of the role of the imagination in the 1803-4 Geistesphilosophie.

Because the text under analysis consists of Hegel’s lecture notes (published posthumously), the normally difficult task of understanding Hegel is even more difficult: Hegel often uses dashes rather than full sentences, and the dialectical moments are not always clearly marked. Nevertheless, because of this complexity it can be said of both Geistesphilosophie lecture series that they are more interesting than the more clear, later works.65

1. Context; the Shift from the Earlier Jena Works:

Hegel was reportedly not particulary good in the classroom at Jena (among others is a report in a letter from an British student, Henry Crabb Robinson who wrote "I once heard the poor Hegel. You cannot imagine how pitiful his lecture was. He coughed, cleared his throat,

65 While the first Geistesphilosophie is a concerted effort to hammer out the dialectic, and is thus both more intense and less skilful, by the time Hegel writes his 1805-6 Geistesphilosophie lecture notes he has developed enough ease to occasionally wax poetic, as we will see in Chapter 3.
stuttered, he couldn’t even articulate two sentences clearly.”66) Lecturing at the same university as the great Schelling was a difficult task and Hegel even had to cancel a number of courses for lack of attendance.67 The course for which the Geistesphilosophie fragments of 1803-4 were written was, however, well attended.

Despite Hegel’s rather mediocre success in Jena, his manuscripts over the seven years are evidence of a deep and prolonged development in his philosophy. As Klaus Düsing writes:

In the balance with such modest outward accomplishment was the distinct contrast of the content of his speculative lectures and the development of Hegel’s thought, which latter could not have been more original, richly variable and sweeping as it was in Jena. The decision for a Metaphysic of the Absolute as Science occurred during the transition from Frankfurt to Jena and was definitely original. During the Jena phase Hegel succeeded in moving—and this is evident in particular in his lectures—from the Metaphysics of Absolute Substance, which he first held, to the Metaphysics of Absolute Subjectivity; he also moved from a negative Dialectic—as he first conceived it in Jena—to a speculative dialectic. Furthermore he formulated a complete system in detail, trying out multiple alternatives. So it was in Jena that the ground was laid for Hegel’s mature system.68

The most important shift during this Jena period from 1801-7 was in Hegel’s concept of

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67 Düsing, “Hegels Vorlesungen...” s. 23.

Logic and Metaphysics. As Troxler’s notes from Hegel’s lectures in 1801-1802 show, initially Logic was the science of the finite, Metaphysics that of the infinite. Logic was about the finite because it dealt with determinate units of thought. It had to be got beyond if one were to do Metaphysics, which concerned the indeterminate. The change was that for Hegel Logic became the science of the infinite, since the determinations involved were seen as moments in the movement of thought. Generally speaking, the notion that logic is infinite is the notion that thought is infinite: thought is (the movement of) the Absolute.

The move Hegel had made completely by 1807 is one from the more substance-based ontology of Schelling’s Identity Philosophy, to a kind of Fichtean subject ontology. It is almost as if, even in this first 1803-4 Geistesphilosophie, Hegel began trying to rewrite the “Deduction of Presentation” section of Fichte’s 1794 Wissenschaftslehre: Fichte had shown how movement, or more precisely time, must be not only recognized in a critical deduction of representation: it must be actual in it. That is, the self posits itself and also limits itself by positing something beyond the self, thus being (generating) the three moments of time. We can see in the Geistesphilosophie dialectic that Hegel has taken this up: he wants us to experience the moments of consciousness’ development. Just as Fichte said, ‘the moments must rise before our eyes.’

But while he takes on Fichte’s logical movement, he rejects the loss of content in Fichte.

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70 This is the standpoint that Hegel takes at the beginning of the 1812 Science of Logic: the first dialectical progression shows that Being is becoming. A more in-depth analysis of the problem of the beginning of philosophy for Hegel is given in my Chapter 3.

That is, in the long run what Hegel succeeds in realizing (and which Fichte did not)—is: first, the degree to which the self must lose itself in its posited other, and second, that a fully dialectical account of experience is therefore also a **history** of it. While Fichte introduced time into critical philosophy, Hegel introduces history. For Fichte the imagination’s wavering creates space and time, but reconstruction is only ever in the service of moving beyond the present condition. For Hegel reconstruction is the present’s rational self-superseding (its process of *Aufhebung*). How the imagination is at work in this process is something we will be investigating shortly. In Fichte the movement is confusingly both descriptive and dialectical. Hegel’s dialectic is based on a more profoundly dialectical movement of thought in and through its other. Following our assumption, Hegel’s final ‘version’ of Fichte’s "Deduction of Presentation," is phenomenologically rich: the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Hegel eventually writes a pure logic in 1812, but not before he reconstructs the **content** of experience (its history) in the ‘Science of Experience’ (as the original title of the *Phenomenology* was given) in 1807.

But when Hegel writes his lectures on *Geistesphilosophie* in 1803 and in 1805, the logic-phenomenological division is not yet completely clear in his mind. To the extent that during that time Hegel remains unclear about the difference between explanation and the way one gets the reader to think dialectically, he falls short just as Fichte did.

The shift from viewing logic as finite to viewing it as infinite is, as noted already, a step away from Schelling in the direction of Fichte. It is a shift away from trying to transcend the standpoint of subjective reflection (as in the *Differenzschrift* and in *Faith and Knowledge*—both

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72 "Imagination is a faculty that wavers in the middle between determination and nondetermination" (*Sc.Kn.* I 216, p. 194). "For Reason pure and simple, everything is simultaneous; only for the imagination is there such a thing as time" (*Ibid.* I. 217).
works in which he was critical of Fichte). And it is a shift toward the view which would be clearly expressed in the Preface of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, that reflection is the medium of consciousness and is always already infinite. We can see the shaky beginnings of this view in the *Geistesphilosophie* of 1803-4, for in it Hegel’s genesis of consciousness is dialectical from the start, with the consciousness already being the "Concept of the union of the simple with infinity" (*FirstPhil* 206).73

It is no doubt the collapse of the difference between the logic of reflection and the infinite, which gives rise ultimately to the possibility of phenomenological system. But it is predominantly the initial confusion of that collapse which we experience in the 1803-4 *Geistesphilosophie* fragments as the not-quite distinctly phenomenological, not-quite distinctly logical, not-quite distinctly ‘philosophy of spirit’ account of the forms of consciousness.

We recall Hegel’s passage about "reconstruction" in *Faith and Knowledge*, in the section in which he criticizes Fichte’s ethics. We noted that for Hegel this reconstruction was not separable from the ethical, from Spirit. The difference between the starting point of Hegel’s first attempt at a reconstruction in the *System der Sittlichkeit* of 1803, and that of the 1803 *Geistesphilosophie* reconstruction, indicates the change in Hegel’s attitude.

While the *System der Sittlichkeit* focuses first on natural ethical relations and then on the development of that into the levels of government and classes (*Stände*), the focus in the *Geistesphilosophie* is at first on consciousness and then on the development of that into *das*

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73 "Begriff des Einsseins der Einfachen und der Unendlichkeit" (*GI* Frag. 15, p. 183).
The point of departure in the *Geistesphilosophie* is consciousness, and the subsequent moments are developments of Spirit in and through this concept.

The *Geistesphilosophie* 1803-4 is a progression from consciousness (the most fundamental form of *Geist*) to social forms of *Geist*, such as the family. Like the *System der Sittlichkeit*, its development goes through three moments, the second moment being the negative one. But unlike the *System der Sittlichkeit*, in the *Geistesphilosophie* Hegel is concerned with ethical forms as dialectical developments arising from the concept of consciousness as the ground of Spirit. After this work, Hegel is unwilling to abandon the standpoint of consciousness.

2. The *Geistesphilosophie* of 1803-4 in General:

This work belongs to one of Hegel’s first attempts at a complete system of philosophy. In Fragment 16 Hegel articulates three parts of this system, the first being a kind of logic, the second a philosophy of nature and the third a philosophy of spirit. Due to an incomplete manuscript, only the second two are presented in the volume left to us. Thus what we have begins with fragments from a philosophy of nature; and the volume’s second part is the system’s

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74 While the three divisions of the *System der Sittlichkeit* are 1) Relation 2) Transgression and 3) Ethical Life, in the *Geistesphilosophie* the three are 1) Consciousness, 2) the Negative, and 3) The People.

(It is interesting to note that one can make out in this work what would later be defined by Hegel as Subjective and Objective Spirit; this distinction is not however formalized in 1803.)

75 Harris notes the fact that "the 'concept' of spirit is consciousness, is not mentioned in the *System of Ethical Life.* " (*Introduction* *FirstPhil*, 190.)

76 "We can see from the *Philosophy of Spirit* of 1803/4 that having once laid it down that 'Bewusstsein' is the 'concept' of spirit, he was unwilling to abandon the standpoint of 'consciousness' at all" (Harris, *Introduction* *FirstPhil*, 190.).

77 Cf. Fragment 16. Given the explanation above of the shift in Hegel’s view of logic, it would be wrong to assume that the logic referred to in Fragment 16 is that presented in his lectures on Logic and Metaphysics in 1801.
third—the *Geistesphilosophie*. This latter begins at Fragment 15 and ends at Fragment 22.

The fact that this work springs out of and is a dialectical progression from the *Naturphilosophie*, is clear from the fact that what is being looked at here is (the nature of) consciousness: the same attitude of doing a philosophy of something is carried over into the analysis of consciousness. This is evident in Hegel’s discussion of consciousness in terms of *Potenzen*—levels or powers.\(^78\)

As tedious as a mere overview is, it is nevertheless helpful here to get a general sense of the developments in the *Geistesphilosophie* as a whole. I begin therefore by paraphrasing the summary Hegel provides in Fragment 19. (Please see my Appendix as well.)

Hegel asserts that "The first form of the existence of spirit is consciousness in general, the concept of spirit...its pure theoretical existence" (*FirstPhil* 210).\(^79\) This form is then determined to be memory and its product, speech, a determination in which imagination plays a role. Then, through the understanding consciousness is determined (in speech), becoming absolute reflection in itself. It thus recognizes itself as the emptiness of the formal capacity for absolute abstraction (*GL* 195, *FirstPhil* 210).

This process evolves into a practical process, which is the second *Potenz*. While the consciousness of the first *Potenz* had nominal command over nature, in the second it has real command over it: what stands over against consciousness is not merely named but is used as a tool. So while the first *Potenz* is an ideal mastery, the second is real mastery.

It is because of community (however small or limited) that language is possible, and the

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78 For a discussion of *Potenzen* see Harris’ Introduction to *FirstPhil* pp. 52-55.

79 "Die erste Form der Existenz des Geistes ist das Bewusstsein überhaupt, der Begriff des Geistes....seine rein theoretische Existenz." (*GL* 195).
individual has a real existence only in that community. It is in part because of this that the raising of sexual desire to the ideal is possible: natural sexual desire is sublated (aufgehoben) into a sustained mutual desire (of one sex for the other). This gives rise to the family and the ethical system, which constitute the third Potenz.

But the three Potenzen pass over into a higher form. This is because the two sides reached in the third Potenz — "[on the one side] the ideal constitution of consciousness as formal Reason, absolute abstraction, absolute emptiness [and] singularity, and [on the other side] its real constitution as the family..." (FirstPhil 211) — and these two sides are ideal moments of the existence of spirit, organized negatively against nature. This opposition as itself ideal becomes real in the final sections of the Geistesphilosophie through das Volk: all the forms are then contained within a self-determining totality.

Thus to summarize in general, Hegel develops three Potenzen: a) Speech b) the Tool, c) Possession and the Family; and these three pass over into the higher form of das Volk. The discussion of the imagination falls within the first Potenz (Fragment 20). That is, it is directly involved in the development of language.

With this general overview, we can look at the fragments introducing the work and leading up to the discussion of the imagination. Fragments 15 and 16 are two different versions of an opening paragraph, and do not deserve further comment here. But Paragraph 17 is interesting for two reasons. 1) Although we do not have the time to look closely at it here, the beginning of the dialectic in Fragment 17 is a dialectical tour de force. Here Hegel attempts a

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80 "die ideale Konstitution des Bewusstseins als formaler Vernunft, absoluter Abstraktion, absoluter Leerheit, Einzelheit, und desselben als realer Konstitution als familie" (Gl 196)
derivation of consciousness which is nothing short of tortuous.\textsuperscript{81} The moments are excruciatingly difficult to follow, assaulting as they do one’s usual, linear approach to inquiry. But such labour is necessary if one is eventually to get into the "spirit" of Hegel.\textsuperscript{82} Hegel is trying to (get us to) think two opposed sides. It is passages like this which highlight how much more involving Hegel’s dialectic is than Fichte’s descriptive one. 2) Also, in Fragment 17 Hegel offers the condensed development of an absolute singularity (absolute Einzelheit) into das Volk. This highlights what we noted above, that it is consciousness which is formed by, and which forms, Geist:

In so far as we are cognizant of the organization of the spirit, we do not regard consciousness as the merely inner aspect of the individuals...Instead, because we recognize consciousness generally, according to its concept, as the absolute union of singularity and the determinate concept, we take cognizance of its organic (organisierenden) moments too, in the way that they are on their own account as moments of the absolute consciousness, not as something which is merely, in the form of the individual, one side of the absolute consciousness (FirstPhil 209).\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{81} I cite it here but make no attempt to explain it: "The simple essential multiplicity is the thus determined concept, the single [being] immediately taken up into positive universality, the single [being] as self-identical, or its other-being, its nonidentity made identical with itself. What is opposed to it is unity as absolutely unequal [or] as absolutely exclusive [i.e.,] numerical one; this is indeed self-identical but in its self-identity it is the direct other of itself as absolutely negating [itself], or the absolute singularity" (FirstPhil. 208).

"Die einfache wesentliche Vielheit ist der soeben bestimmte Begriff, das unmittelbar in die positive Allgemeinheit aufgenommene Einzelne, das Einzelne als ein Sichselbstgleiches oder sein Anderssein, seine Ungleichheit, sich selbst, gleichgemacht. Das ihm Entgegengesetzte ist die Einheit als absolut ungleiche, als absolut ausschliessende, das numerische Eins; sich wohl selbst gleich, aber in seiner Sichselbstgleichheit das unmittelbar andre seiner selbst, als absolut neferierend oder die absolute Einzelheit" (GI 186-7).

\textsuperscript{82} "The most important and the most difficult step toward understanding the text as a whole is the comprehension of Hegel’s theory of consciousness" (Harris, Introduction. FirstPhil 191-92).

\textsuperscript{83} "Indem wir die Organization des Geistes erkennen, so erkennen wir das Bewusstsein nicht als das Innere der Individuen...sondern indem wir das Bewusstsein überhaupt seinem Begriffe nach als absolutes Einsein der Einzelheit und des bestimmten Begriffs erkennen, so erkennen wir eben seine organisierenden Momente, wie sie für sich als Momente des absoluten Bewusstseins sind, nicht als etwas, das bloss in der Form des Individuums, der einen Seite des absoluten Bewusstseins,...wäre..." (GI 188)
Fragment 18 provides insight into the process of Aufhebung, which is the movement of consciousness; Fragment 19 the overview of the Geistesphilosophie paraphrased above.

Since concern with the imagination places us within the first Potenz just before memory and speech, I turn now to it (Fragment 20).

3. The Dialectical Context of the Imagination in the Geistesphilosophie:

What is described in the first Potenz is dialectical development of the primary dialectic (consciousness in general) into the tool-using consciousness. The first tool is speech, and so Hegel develops a genesis of the form of consciousness which is communicative.

This genesis takes us through what might appear in a general way to be a compressed version of Kant's "Transcendental Aesthetic" and "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories" in the Critique of Pure Reason: Fragment 20 begins as Kant does with Sensation (Empfindung), moves to intuition (Anschauung)—a discussion centred upon consciousness as space and time—and then to reproductive imagination (die Einbildungskraft). But this comparison with Kant does not take us far: first because memory, which follows upon imagination in Hegel's text, does not get discussed by itself by Kant; and second, because the nature of consciousness and its medium—reflection—is profoundly different in Hegel and in Kant. For Hegel consciousness is generated out of the opposition of a primary dialectic whose components are both equally cause and effect, and so do not stabilize into a fixed schema for the understanding. This is evident in Fragment 17, in which the reader is required to think (the situation) first (from) one side and then (from) the other in Hegel's working through of the activity (Begriff) of consciousness. Kant, however, by taking the position of critical appraisal, is able to investigate the components of the intuitive
consciousness theoretically, without the practical trial of really being such a (temporally changing) consciousness.\(^4\)

Alongside this development of sensation-intuition-imagination-memory is the development of the products of consciousness: signs and then names. Signs are the product of the reproductive, imaginative consciousness and names are the product of the consciousness which has memory. The products are important in understanding the "must" which underlies the transitions from sensation to memory: the necessity is that involved in arriving at language. If language is to be arrived at, consciousness "must" develop from the mere *aufhebende Begriffe* (superseding concept) of space becoming time becoming space and so on, through a series of *Aufhebungen* (analyzed in the next section below).

Consciousness is that which can reproduce individual moments and spaces from a previous time and a different place.\(^5\) Its activity in so doing is the imagination. While this echoes Kant’s view that the imagination is that which can call forth images of sensible objects not present,\(^6\) it is unlike Kant’s imagination since the conditions of the image being there in first the place differ in Hegel by virtue of their arising dialectically.

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\(^4\) Our comparison with Kant brings up the difficulty of reading Hegel’s text. It is difficult for the very reason that it attempts, as we pointed out earlier, to carry on the project of the philosophy of nature into an analysis of consciousness as the next "nature" under consideration, while also wanting us to go through a kind of phenomenological process, following the logic of *Aufhebung*, in order to experience what consciousness at the level of sensation, intuition, imagination, and memory is. The result is that there is no clear distinction—as there is in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*—between the "we" (the philosophers doing the philosophy of spirit) and the consciousness whose genesis "we" are nevertheless experiencing. The seeds of the *Phenomenology* are in this text, as are those of the *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. These seeds will fortunately drop into the more carefully tilled logic of Hegel’s mature thought.

\(^5\) Consciousness is "das Hervorrufen in ihm selbst der ehmals oder an einem andern Orte gehabten Anschauungen;" (*GI* 199).

\(^6\) Kant, *CPR* B151, 165.
Now we can turn to the details.

4. Exegesis of the Passages on the Imagination in the Geistesphilosophie:

The first division which concerns us—(a)—is intuition and the transition to the imagination. Hegel introduces the imagination in that first division as follows. (I have divided the citation according to the main propositions):

It [consciousness] does not intuit

1) Space and Time as such, they are universal and empty, higher idealities in themselves, concepts

A 2) but it intuits them only as both being and not being qua universal; [being] when it posits them as singular particularized [contents] as filled [time and space];

B 3) [not being] because even while space and time are the positive universal [side] of consciousness, it makes them at the same time immediately and formally the opposite of themselves\(^\text{87}\) and particularizes them;

A+B 4) that being of consciousness [i.e., its positing space and time] is just as much theoretical, passive, as it is practical;

5) the theoretical side consists in its being in the form of positive universality, and the practical in its being simultaneously in negative universality, and particularizing this universality itself.

6) This form of consciousness is empirical imagination:

7) as positive universality, intuition is in the continuity of time and space generally; but at the same time [empirical imagination is] breaking it up, and turning it into determinate singular beings, i.e., making it into filled pieces of

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\(^{87}\) I agree here with the translator that \textit{ihrer} belongs to \textit{Zeit} und \textit{Raum}. Technically it might also be taken as "of the ‘positive Allgemeinheit,’" which means that what consciousness makes the self-opposite is the \textit{positive Allgemeinheit}. The argument against this is that Hegel does not use \textit{Allgemeinheit} but rather \textit{Allgemein}, which is neutral.
time and space (*FirstPhil* 219)\(^8\) In #2, consciousness relates to times and spaces as filled; since all times are spatial and all spaces are in time, and since space is the *Bestehende* (enduring) and time is the *Vergehende* (disappearing), the filled times and spaces both are and are not.\(^9\) Consciousness relates to them as such, that is, as both being and not being. But this relationship is simply an opposition of consciousness to space and time as consciousness’ "positive universality." The moment of consciousness as time and space is suppressed. This might be called the *bestehende* (enduring) side of consciousness, and the *vergehende* (disappearing) side of spaces and times.

This disappearing side of time and space is what is looked at in #3: space and time are turned into their opposites. This could mean into not-space and not-time; but since space as the

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\(^8\) Es [consciousness] schaut

1) nicht Raum und Zeit als solche an —sie für sich sind allgemeine, leere, an sich höhere Idealitäten, Begriffe

A 2) —sondern sie nur als insofern allgemeine seien und nicht seien, als es sie als einzelne, besondere setzt, erfüllte,

B 3) so zugleich, dass es ebenso, wie Raum und Zeit sein positives Allgemeines sind, es sie ebenso unmittelbar formal zum Gegenteil ihrer selbst macht und sie besondert;

A + B 4) jenes Sein des Bewusstseins ist ebenso theoretisch, passiv als praktisch;

5) jene Seite ist, dass es in der Form der positiven Allgemeinheit, dies, insofern es zugleich in der negativen Allgemeinheit ist und diese Allgemeinheit selbst besondert.

6) *Diese Form des Bewusstseins ist empirische Einbildungskraft.*

7) als positive Allgemeinheit ist die Anehnung in der Kontinuität der Zeit und des Raumes überhaupt, zugleich aber [als negative Allgemeinheit, praktisches Bewusstsein] sie unterbrechend und vereinzelnd, zu einzelnen bestimmten, d.i. erfüllten Stücken der Zeit und des Raumes machend (*GI* 198).

\(^9\) The German language allows us to follow the dialectic more easily because of the closeness of the words used: compare *Bestehende*, *Vergehende* and *Verstehende* (the last is the essentially fixed, and translates in English into "the understanding." We will encounter the latter shortly.
Bestehende gives over to time in so far as space is also vergehende, and since time as the Vergehende is also space in so far as it is bestehende, it seems more likely that what Hegel means by ‘becoming their opposites’ is that they fold into one another, become each other.

While in #2 consciousness viewed spaces and times as already defined, delimited (besondert), in #3 consciousness does the limiting of them. Thus in #4, Hegel says that consciousness is both theoretical and active. #5 is just a repeat of the conclusion he has reached: positive universality is theoretical times and spaces; negative universality is practical divisions of time and space.

Hegel goes on in # 6: "This form of consciousness is empirical imagination;" It is somewhat unclear whether in the German "Diese Form" refers to the "latter" i.e. to consciousness as practical (negative universality) or to the whole of what has been described in this passage so far. Had Hegel used, as the translators do, a semi-colon after the word "imagination," rather than a comma, the second would appear more likely, for what follows is then the fleshing out of the statement in terms of positive and negative universality. But there is also a reason why we ought to take it as meaning the whole, rather than just negative universality. On the one hand it is tempting to interpret the empirical imagination along the first line--as being the practical (negative universality)--since in #7 Hegel speaks of the positive universality as "Intuition." Intuition is needed by the empirical imagination, but what characterizes the imagination is that it is the negative, limiting (besondernde) consciousness. But on the other hand, since every new moment contains the previous moments, imagination also contains intuition, and so the imagination’s concept (its dialectical moments taken together) must be the whole and not just the negative universal. Therefore empirical imagination is both positive
and negative universality, and "diese" refers to all the moments described in the passage so far.

Nevertheless, the accent in imagination does fall on the negative, and this will be true in all versions of the philosophy of Spirit lectures. This is clear here when we look more generally at the dialectical movement from intuition to memory: the imagination is the practical, negative moment, since it breaks up interiorized intuition and reproduces them.

While (a) was about intuition and the transition to the imagination, Hegel's second division—(b)—is the development of this practical side of consciousness at this level.

As noted in (a), the practical side arose as the dominant part of the imagination's dialectic, and as noted, the practical is nevertheless not separate from the theoretical—it subsumes the theoretical within it. But it is because the theoretical moment is underdeveloped and subsumed within an active reproducing, that in (b) we witness the loss of objectivity. This has to be looked at in more detail.

We suggested that the moment of the positive universal is the enduring side of consciousness (the Bestehende); this new moment in which consciousness is subjectively determining could be said to be the disappearing (Vergehende) moment of consciousness. For here consciousness is free but out of control—there is no abiding unity. Thus here in (b) Hegel takes us through the development of imagination as it is in merely subjective reproduction:

The determinacy of the sensation, the this of time and space, is abolished in it, and their succession and coordination appears as a free one, it is quite contingent (gleichgültig) for the universal element; [it is] an active reproducing, since it is this universal element that is particularized.

This formal being of consciousness has no genuine reality, it is something subjective, it does not exist externally; it only is as the form of the abstract, pure concept of infinity, as space and time, the concept of infinity as it immediately is as consciousness; and consciousness as this empirical imagination is a waking or sleeping dream, empty and without truth, [occurring in human experience] either as permanent derangement, or as a transient state of sickness, when
consciousness falls back into the animal organism, and only is as its concept.
This dumb consciousness is its formal being in its own universal element of infinity... (FirstPhil 285)\textsuperscript{90}

From a common-sense point of view Hegel is not saying anything particularly revealing, but rather only that the consciousness locked in imagining is a purely subjective, dreaming or deranged consciousness. Nevertheless, there is a subtle problem here. Hegel has attempted to derive the moments so far from a dialectic which never fell back onto solely common-sense notions of space and time, or of what is internal or external to consciousness. Hegel has been trying to show these common-sense concepts to be fundamentally dialectical: while the common sense notions have their place, they are not self-explanatory and cannot be taken as presuppositions. So in the above passage, when Hegel starts making a distinction between, on the one hand, the "genuine reality" and the "external existence," and on the other, the consciousness which is "empty...without truth" and purely subjective, we cannot simply acknowledge this from a common-sense point of view. We have to ask what "genuine reality" is, and what the standards for the objective and the "external" are.

No doubt--from the psychological standpoint--the subjectivity we are witnessing is simply that consciousness which now has an inner world of images which it can reproduce. Such a consciousness is the result of the progression from being merely intuitive to being imaginative. Times and spaces are being reproduced such that "their succession and coordination appears as

\textsuperscript{90} "...es ist in ihm [consciousness] die Bestimmtheit der Empfindung, das Dieses der Zeit und des Raumes getilgt, und ihre Sukzession und Koordination erscheint als eine tätiges Reproduzieren, indem es dies allgemeine Element ist, das besondert wird.

Dieses formale Sein des Bewusstseins hat keine wahrhafte Realität, es ist etwas Subjektives, es existiert nicht äußerlich; es ist nur als Form des abstrakten, reinen Begriffs der Unendlichkeit unmittelbar als Zeit und Raum, wie er als Bewusstsein ist; und das Bewusstsein als diese empirische Einbildungskraft ist ein leeres, wahrheitsloses, wachendes oder schlafendes Träumen oder eine bleibende Verrücktheit oder vorübergehender Zustand der Krankheit, indem das Bewusstsein in den animalischen Organismus zurückfällt und nur als sein Begriff ist" (Gl 199).
a free one" (FirstPhil 285). But the problem remains: what is it free of? Apparently it is free of the necessity which bound the spaces and times together in the original intuitive consciousness of them. But what is that necessity?

Hegel writes of this consciousness that its "particularization is just those primary sensible representations" (FirstPhil 219). The difference between the "primary sensible representations" and the imagined ones is that in the reproductive consciousness what is being determined is the "Universal element of consciousness itself" (FirstPhil 219). In (a) what was being determined were times and spaces; these were the filled moments of consciousness. But the latent or ideal moment was the empty infinity of consciousness (the "leere Einfachheit")—that which gave unity to the spaces and times. In (b), however, it is the element of consciousness, this infinity itself which is the medium being cut up. Hegel writes "...the universal [Form] that is particularized is the universal element of consciousness itself, its empty infinity as time and space; the recalling within itself of intuitions had previously or in another place" (FirstPhil 219). In this folding in upon itself consciousness is folding back upon reflected—previously intuitively delimited—objects, determining them apart ("freed") from—we can only assume—wholly 'new' intuited objects. One way of explaining this is to say that, in terms of the genesis of further levels of consciousness, from this reflective point on in the dialectic the 'new' will always be reflectively mediated. But in fact the 'new' is just the spontaneity of the imagination's

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91 "Diese Besonderung ist zunächst dem Inhalt nach jene ersten sinnlichen Vorstellungen" (GI 198)

92 "allgemeine Element des Bewusstseins selbst" (GI 199).

93 "das Allgemeine, das besondert wird, ist das allgemeine Element des Bewusstseins selbst, seine leere Unendlichkeit als Zeit und Raum, das Hervorufen in ihm selbst der ehmal oder an einem andern Orte gehabten Anschauungen" (GI 198-99 my italics)
negation, which as space and time first determines something out of the inner manifold of intuition. Reflection implies this, for in the genetic account reflection is the return of imagination's time-space dialectic onto itself. This is predominantly a vergehende activity—as Kant had asserted, time is the form of inner intuition. But time folded back on space and time is also spatially determined—a new shape of consciousness has arisen. A time development which did not develop through further levels of reflection would be precisely just this subjective, imaginative consciousness, unraveling its syntheses in a world cut off from the new. And the new which is missing at this level is nothing other than a further moment of imagination's negation—another imagination. That is, for Hegel the further bestehende moment will be the presence of another consciousness. Once another consciousness (other consciousnesses) enter the dialectic, the reflective determinations become interpreted moments of time and space. Therefore, looking ahead in the text, we can give the short answer as to what constitutes objectivity according to Hegel: it is language. The first true universal is, according to Hegel, the name (of an object). Communication is the basis of "genuine reality": consciousness raises itself out of the merely subjective by making use of its reproductive power to "indicate" something which is understood by another person in his/her linguistic community. The two sides of consciousness—the Bestehende and the Vergehende—only occur—properly developed and together once time and space are externalized again in such a way as to be both objectively and subjectively taken up—that is, once consciousness is language. In other words, to gain objectivity in this developed form consciousness will have to have externalized its (re)products in a way

94 "Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state" (CPR §6 A33/B49, p. 77); "Die Zeit ist nichts anders, als die Form des inneren Sinnes, d.i. des Anschauens unserer selbst und unseres inneren Zustandes" (KrVs. 76). Note that for Kant there is already a self for which time is this form of inner sense.
which can be taken up by its own consciousness—and more importantly by other consciousnesses. At that point we have not only the Bestehende and Vergehende but these two sublated and preserved as the understanding—the Verstehende.

But in the text cited above we are still a ways off from language. First Hegel will describe the production of the sign. (In the early Geistesphilosophie it is a product of the imagination which has not been reflected into itself through another person, so the sign does not break out of the subjective entirely.) Only after that does Hegel go on to discuss the production of names, which raises the individual communicator to an objective level, to a level of universality determined as much by other consciousnesses as by the individual.

Conclusion:

Hegel’s account here seems somehow to beg the question: how can we have a speculative genesis of imagining consciousness when we cannot ourselves get to a point in consciousness which is free of the very reflective determination we are trying to account for? Similarly, how can he give a genetic account of the externality which subjective reproduction lacks, by appealing to an externality which only arises in a later moment of development?

Part of the problem is that, though Hegel succeeds in separating out the dialectical moments and in showing their movement, the dialectical moments still lack clarity. Part of that problem is due to the fact that Hegel has not given an adequate account of the negativity involved in this genesis of the imagining consciousness. In this 1803–4 work Hegel is so keen to develop the Concept (consciousness) in its progress toward the universality of language, that he carries us into the night of the ideality of reflection and tries to show us from inside how the
filled times and spaces of intuition are reproduced in it. But then he switches from this phenomenological perspective into that of the philosophical observer of consciousness, inviting us to see how subjective that level of consciousness is. That objectivity which makes our switching over possible, is the very objectivity which is missing in the subjective imagination consciousness. But it is also an objectivity which makes a genuine taking up of that earlier subjectively imagining standpoint difficult. Without more clarity about the nature of objectivity, "we" the readers are at risk of only apparently being able to take either standpoint--of the subjective, reproductive imagining consciousness, or of the philosopher looking at how crazy such a consciousness is. Hegel has here therefore in 1803 not yet reached the ideal of Speculative Science.

In the more reflective-oriented account of the 1805-6 Geistesphilosophie we will see a more powerful account of the first inwardization—the first negative moment which gives rise to externality in the first place, and which thereafter works its way through the moments. In Hegel's later working-through of these moments, the negative is given more definition as the Night and later still as the nightly mine (nächtlicher Schacht) of reflective determination. Hegel thereby defines more clearly the dialectical moments involved. But despite this, the tension between on the one hand our phenomenological following of the moments, and on the other the logic of the genesis, persists within the structure of his philosophy of Spirit, even in the 1830 version.

But let us move on now to a discussion of the 1805 text.
Chapter 3

*Geistesphilosophie of 1805-06.* 95

I. General Overview of the Text

The basic triadic development of Hegel’s notes are given in bold headings by Hegel:

**Geistesphilosophie 1805-6:**
A) Spirit according to its Concept
B) Objective Spirit
C) The Constitution96

Our concern with the imagination places us in the first moment, with Spirit according to its Concept. Within this moment, Hegel does not indicate the articulations of his text according to moments in the way with which we are familiar in his later works. But the general structure of this section of the 1805-6 *Geistesphilosophie* can be eked out of his text and out of his own structural plans which he jotted down in the margins of his lecture notes. Because such an overview of the triadic, dialectical developments is helpful, I give it here as I have been able to extract it.

95 Hegel, G2. All translations of this work are my own. Leo Rauch provides a translation of the text in *Hegel and the Human Spirit* (Wayne State UP: Detroit, 1993 —henceforth [Rauch p. **]), but I prefer my own translations.

A note about the text: the same must be said of working with it as of working with the 1803-4 text. Because it consists of Hegel’s posthumously published lecture notes, understanding Hegel is difficult. He often uses dashes rather than full sentences, and the dialectical moments are not always clearly marked in the text. As with G1 however, the rewards of studying it are not to be underestimated.

96 Der Geist nach seinem Begriff; Wirklicher Geist; Konstitution.
The first moment is an overarching triad with two sub-triads. The overarching triad is:

**Theoretical knowing:**
- a) Intelligence
- b) The Will
- c) Objective Spirit *(Wirkliche Geist)*

The discussion of the imagination occurs in the transitions of the first moment: *Intelligence*. This section on *Intelligence* is Hegel’s development of theoretical knowledge, which, as in his 1803-4 lectures, is for him the development of the epistemological foundations of language. So in the intellect we have two sub-triads, as follows:

**A) Imagination in General:** *(dreaming spirit/traumende Geist)*

- i) Intuition/Imagination (Images)
- ii) Recollection *(Erinnerung)* (the familiar)
- iii) to mean *(bezeichnen)* (Signs)

**B) Language *(Sprache)*:** *(awakened spirit/erwachende Geist)*

- iv) Names (Tones)
- v) Memory *(Gedächtnis)* (order)
- vi) Understanding *(Verstand)* (knowledge)

The three powers at work in the intelligence are: the headings A) The representing power of the imagination; and B) the Name-giving power, which is the “first creative power which

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97 This last moment is the new beginning of the next (second) major triad of the *Geistesphilosophie*.

98 Much later (in Objective Spirit) Hegel provides a margin note in which the moments here are listed as: *Ei*mbildungskraft, *Erinnerung*, and *Zeichnen*. (Cf. G2 204 note 1).

99 This division is essentially articulated by Hegel in his margins as follows:
- a) Namen geben, das Allgemeine dieser Sphäre
- b) Tätigkeit, Fürsichsein, Gedächtnis
- c) Anundfürsichsein...Verstand. (G2 180, note 1).

100 Die *Einbildungskraft*: die "bezeichnende [kraft]" (G2 174).
spirit uses; and the final transition in Language—c) the Understanding. Explaining their roles and their relation to each other is part of the task of the following discussion.

The problem in the first of these sub-triads ("Imagination in General") is that of creating an inner world of representations (images) which are meaningful (to oneself). The problem which leads to language is that of making that meaningfulness universal in the sense of communication (with others). The problem addressed in Language (the second triad) is how that order comes about which is required for something to make objective sense: in other words, Hegel tries to develop the necessity in communication. This necessity gives rise to the understanding, which is the conclusion to the section on the intellect and the beginning of the section on the Will.

The word imagination only comes up three times in this section on the intellect: once at the beginning in the first moment, as defining the general realm we are working in, then twice in the third moment: as clarification again of its general power, and then in a comparison of how the two powers differ in taking up their objects. How these passages fit into the whole will become clear in the textual analysis.

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101 (die Namengebendekraft, die "erste Schöpferkraft, die der Geist ausübt" (G2 175).

102 The passages are:

i) "Als anschauend überhaupt, dass für ihn ein Sein ist, ist er unmittelbar—aber er [kerht] aus dieser Unmittelbarkeit heraus in sich zurück, [ist] für sich....so ist er vorstellende Einbildungskraft überhaupt" (G2 171).

ii) "Dies ist die Sprache, als die Namengebende Kraft, —Einbildungskraft nur leere Form gebende, bezeichnende [Kraft] die Form als Innerliches Setzen, aber die Sprache [setzt Innerliches] als Seiendes" (G2 174-5).

iii) "die Einbildungskraft nimmt den Gegenstand mit seiner Vielheit, seinen nächsten Umgebungen heraus [Am rande: (schneidet ein Stück Raum heraus, unterbricht, negiert die Kontinuität des Raumes...)] aber der namen ist einsam ohne Beziehung und Verknüpfung...." (G2 176).
II. The 1805-6 Notes in contrast with the 1803-4 *Geistesphilosophie*.

By 1805 Hegel's lecture notes on the *Geistesphilosophie* have become clearer. Many of the divisions established here are kept twenty years later in the *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit*.\(^{103}\) Notable in this respect is the discussion of *Erinnerung*. Noticeably absent from his discussion here, but present in the earlier *Geistesphilosophie* are the difficult introductory derivations of consciousness (i.e. in Fragment 17). Their absence here is interesting: Hegel has decided not to take consciousness as a starting point but instead to start with the intuited, the immediately given. He has apparently given over the attempt at beginning with a primary dialectical opposition and is taking the intuitively given as the first side of an opposition which will become apparent. I think it is safe to say that this characterizes his philosophy henceforth: at any rate it characterizes the dialectic of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and of the 1812 *Logic*.\(^{104}\)

This brings up what is most important for us. Hegel moves more quickly in these notes to a discussion of imagination: the first overarching development is not intuition but rather "the representing imagination in general" ("[die] vorstellende Einbildungskraft überhaupt"),\(^{105}\) with intuition as its first moment. It may be safely assumed, I think, that Hegel chose the imagination as the first development because it is the first reflexive movement of consciousness and thus what properly makes it consciousness. It is the first reflexive moment. This may also be an

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\(^{103}\) This is corroborated by Petry in his translation of the 1830 *Philosophy of Spirit*: Petry writes "by 1805/06, Hegel was already treating imagination in a way which was not so very different from that of the mature Encyclopedia" (*Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, ed. and trans., Vol. 3 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978) p. 408.)

\(^{104}\) The beginning of the 1807 *Phenomenology* is *Sense-certainty*, and the 1812 *Logic* begins with *Being pure Being*.

\(^{105}\) *G2* 171.
explanation why the derivations of consciousness with which he began in the fragments of the 1803-4 *Geistesphilosophie* are missing. The first development is premised on how we relate to the things we sense, rather than how we might unravel the basic categories operative in any action of consciousness. It may be, therefore, that like Fichte he has realized that the first movement is best characterized not by the oppositions of the understanding (of its categories) such as unity and multiplicity, but by the oppositions present only to the imagination. This is only speculation on my part, but I think it is tenable given the general character of his speculative philosophy subsequent to this work. Even in the 1830 *Geistesphilosophie*, which devotes the first development to intuition (not the imagination), the first moment of intuition is feeling—something immediately present to us, not some abstract category like unity. Nevertheless, the negation which makes for the mediation of such immediate starting points, first arises in the moment of the imagination, and so it is ultimately the truth of the imagination which is revealed and brought forward through the other moments. How this is so will become more clear as we go.

Also absent here in the 1805-6 notes is the elaboration we saw in 1803 of the productive imagination as a merely subjective (deranged or dreaming) consciousness. Hegel mentions that such a consciousness is "träumende" but he does not develop it as such. His concern in the 1805 notes is more logically defined, so in his discussion of the imagination proper he spends less time looking at the world through the glasses of the imaginative subject and moves on in his

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106 Harris has also pointed out to me that "perhaps Hegel is already realizing [in 1805-6] that an immediate beginning with what is taken as "given" is impossible.—One cannot actually begin the first triad without having (implicitly) reached the end of the second." (Harris adds that this may be his own Peircean preconception, but I think that Harris' point is right, Peircean or not.) Hegel's failure to see this earlier was the main problem in the first *Geistesphilosophie* lectures.
general goal of showing how we get from immediate consciousness to consciousness of the truth and consciousness in truth or "Geist."  

III. Intuition and the Problem of the Beginning

This general problematic of subjective spirit—moving from immediate consciousness to consciousness of the truth—is articulated in the opening paragraph of the notes. Hegel distinguishes between intuition—in which what simply is there (das Seiende) is immediate—and Geist or the truth of that perception. The latter involves the supersession or retreat from the immediate sensible intuition: "Spirit is this [knowledge of a being] through mediation with itself; spirit is only in suspending and superseding what (it) immediately is—in the retreat (return) from the immediate" (G2 171). This is Platonic to the extent that the intuited object is the last, not the first thing to occur, even though what appears is at first taken to be what is there prior to any thinking about it. But it is not Platonic in the sense that, for Hegel, the result is also the beginning. Hegel's point is that Geist is not separable from the making of an intuited thing: the merely immediate Anschauung is what is there when we have forgotten how we got (it) there. Thus Hegel speaks of moving from Being to truth: "Being (Sein) is the form of immediacy, but it should come to be (soll) posited in its truth" (G2 171). The move is from the Allgemein in form only, to the universal in truth (wahrhaft allgemein). It is this procedure that is gone

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107 It is perhaps worth noting here that although the term Geist went out of fashion in the 18th century, Hegel chooses it rather than some cognitive term. But the choice to translate it as Spirit rather than as "Mind," despite the fact that spirit lends itself to misinterpretations, avoids mistaking the movement of consciousness for a faculty.

108 "der Geist ist dieses [Wissen eines Seienden] mit sich Vermittelnde, er ist nur als aufhebend das, was er unmittelbar ist, davon zurücktrendend" (G2 171).

109 "Sein ist Form der Unmittelbarkeit, es soll aber in seiner Wahrheit gesetzt werden" (G2 171).
through in the pages which follow in Hegel's text, which contain the discussion of the imagination, and which I analyze below.

IV. Exegesis of the Text

A) Imagination in General:

Just as in the first Geistesphilosophie, Hegel develops intuition in terms of space and time. In the two-paragraph introduction, before we get to the first division, we find ourselves on one side of the dialectic of Space and Time. "I and the thing are in Space" (G2 171). What we are dealing with here is "[t]he enduring of the object...Being.... the abstract pure concept of enduring Being (das Bestehen)" (G2 171). But that stable 'over-against' has to be thought through. In the first section (a), Hegel describes the other side of the dialectic—Time. This is the movement of Geist inward. Any movement (away from what is) means a breach in the immediate "nowness" of the enduring object. Such a breach, while establishing spatial difference, is movement and therefore temporal. This negative moment is, as we saw in the earlier Geistesphilosophie, that proper to the imagination.

But let us begin analyzing this first "moment" more closely.

i) Intuition and the Work of the Imagination

In simple intuition the object has immediate Being, Sein. But Geist "returns out of this immediacy [of Anschauung] into itself, and is for itself" (G2 171). It is in the description

110 "Ich und das Ding sind im Raume"

111 "Das Bestehen des Gegenstandes...Sein....[E]s ist der abstrakt reine Begriffe des Bestehens"

112 "er [kehrt] aus dieser Unmittelbarkeit heraus in sich zurück, [ist] für sich"
of this return that Hegel introduces the imagination:

it sets itself free from this immediacy, distances itself from it at first, it is, like the animal, time, which is for itself, and just as much the freedom of time; this pure Subject, which is free from its content; but also master of it, unlike time and space which are selfless; it goes from this Being out, and sets the latter in itself as a non-being,\textsuperscript{113} as a something superseded in general, and in so being it is the representational power of the imagination in general—It is the Self against itself (G2 171-2).\textsuperscript{114}

We need to look at what Hegel means when he says that this return is the animal state, time; the "freedom of time"; and the pure subject.

1) Keeping in mind that we are in the arena of "the representing imagination in general" (G2 171), I thought at first that we could solve the identification of the return with the animal state, by looking to Aristotle. I believed this was justified in part by the fact that in his 1830 Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel states a clear indebtedness to Aristotle.\textsuperscript{115} But Hegel also indicates there the importance of reinterpreting Aristotle’s lesson, of "reintroducing unity of idea (den Begriffe) and principle into the theory of mind." I therefore include here the development in my interpretation as to whether this return, which typifies the imagination and which is identified

\textsuperscript{113} We recall from Diff "the task of philosophy consists in uniting these presuppositions [night and light], to posit being in non-being, as becoming" (Diff p. 93-4). The imagination’s role in philosophy is that of spiritual genesis.

\textsuperscript{114} "er setzt sich frei von dieser Unmittelbarkeit, erstens sich entfernt davon, er ist, wie das Tier, die Zeit, die für sich ist, und ebenso Freiheit der Zeit; dies reine Subjekt, das frei ist von seinem Inhalt; aber auch über diesen Herr, wie Raum und Zeit nicht sind, die das selbstlose sind; er geht von diesem Sein [aus], und setzt dasselbe in sich als ein Nichtselsendes, als ein Aufgehobenes überhaupt, so ist er vorstellende Einbildungskraft überhaupt —Er ist das Selbst, gegen sich selbst" (G2 171-2). It is interesting how evocative of Fichte’s third principle that last line is.

\textsuperscript{115} "The books of Aristotle on the soul, along with his discussions on its special aspects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the theory of mind, [den Begriffe in die Erkenntnis des Geistes wieder einzuführen] and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books" (Enc. Phil. Spir. [378 p. 3]).
with the animal state, can be explained through Aristotle, for my discovery of why it cannot provides such a reinterpretation of Aristotle’s lesson on the imagination.

According to Aristotle all animals possess imagination since they can (or appear to) dream, and imagine desired food.\textsuperscript{116} Hegel seems to hold generally to the view that what distinguishes humans from animals is not the ability to have inner representations, but rather thought.\textsuperscript{117} I therefore believed that we were safe in beginning to interpret Hegel’s identification of the imagination with the animal state along these aristotelian lines.

There is, however, a significant difference between Hegel and Aristotle’s views on the immediacy of intuition, which makes Hegel’s account of the imagination very different. Essentially the difference is a kind of Platonic moment in Hegel we mentioned earlier. More precisely, Hegel writes of an inwardizing which makes Being (\textit{Sein}) into the possession of the self (it becomes \textit{sein}). Let us look at this difference between the two thinkers more closely.

For Aristotle imagination is a second movement following from sensation.

[The] imagination must be a movement produced by sensation actively operating. Since sight is the chief sense, the name \textit{phantasia} (imagination) is derived from \textit{phaos} (light), because without light it is impossible to see (\textit{De Anima} 429a).

The role of light in this citation fits in well with the kind of immediacy Aristotle attributes to perception: for him "the activity of the sensible object and of the sensation is one and the same" (\textit{De Anima} 425b26, p. 147). But this formulation alone does not work for Hegel, for in imagination actuality is not only the light (\textit{Sein}) of sensation, it is also the darkness (negativity,\textsuperscript{118}


\textsuperscript{117} Cf. \textit{Phil.Rel}. "It is a universal and ancient preconception that human beings are thinking beings, and that by thinking and thinking alone they distinguish themselves from the beasts" (p. 121).
possession, *sein*) of the soul. Indeed the presence of the imagined content arises as a result of the movement inwards of the light, *because* of the inward movement of consciousness into its Night. "In intuition consciousness is first in itself; it complements this with the for-itself, —through the Negativity, separation from the in itself and goes back into itself" (*G2* 172).118

What is missing in the Aristotelian account is this für sich, this grasping—or in the language above of the *Encyclopedia*, this "unity of idea (den Begriffe)."119 The inwardizing is the condition for there being a preservation of the intuitions. In drawing itself inward, consciousness not only sets its intuitions over-against itself—it also draws them into itself, into its Night. The very power of difference is also a drawing in and a possession. It is determination.120 The dialectical truth of this return is thus that it creates intuitions as property, as internal to consciousness. As such property, the object is no longer intuition but Image (*Bild*). "This image belongs to consciousness, it is in possession (*Besitz*) of it, consciousness is master (*Herr*) over it; it is held in its treasure (*Schatze*) in its Night—the image is unconscious" (*G2* 172).121

But then how do we account for the identification of this return with the animal state?

118 "im Anschauen ist er nur erst an sich, er ergänzt dies durch das Für sich, —durch die Negativität, Abtrennung des Ansich, und geht in sich zurück" (*G2* 172).

119 John Sallis writes it thus: "Hegel will think imagination through to the end in the sense not only of filling out and completing the Aristotelian account but also of thinking it through to that point at which what was lost is recovered, to that end in which negativity comes to serve for reaffirmation, difference for self-identity, and absence for the recovery of presence" (Sallis, "Imagination and Presentation in Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit" in *Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit*, ed. Peter G. Stillman. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987. 66-88. p 71. Henceforth (Sallis p. —)). But one must be careful with such terms as reaffirmation. As we saw in Chapter 1, and will see in later chapters, the wavering imagination is not of itself positive: it is essentially a movement of difference, of alienation as well as of mastery; and the moment of mastery is itself subject to further mediation.

120 Interestingly, this powerful description of inwardizing is lost in the 1830 account.

121 "Dies Bild gehört ihm an, er ist im Besitz desselben, er ist Herr darüber; es ist in seinem Schatze aufbewahrt, in seiner Nacht—es ist bewusstlos" (*G2* 172).
In Hegel, at the level of the imagination, there is no knowledge of the inwardizing, no reflection of it for the self—indeed no self yet for which it would be reflected. "The image is unconscious," and so is the inward movement. The movement is like the body itself, prior to subject-object distinctions. Thus it is like the animal.

Such a movement inward is Time in itself, for there is no consciousness of the enduring nature of what has been inwardized. But the inwardizing is also the for itself of consciousness. It will be revealed to be the giving of a time to the object. But prior to some objective measure by which it can compare times and spaces, it is only the temporalizing of what is. Thus "er ist, wie das Tier, die Zeit, die für sich ist..."

What is missing in the Aristotelian account is an account of the soul’s activity of moving inward—the ideal moment of the dialectic.

2) It is difficult to know whether by "Freiheit der Zeit" Hegel means freedom of time or from time. I suspect that it is both: given that consciousness is time, it must be the freedom of time; based on the first Geistesphilosophie (1803-4), the return into self as "freedom from time" can be explained as the inwardizing of representations—once in the Night, an image is not bound by the temporal order of the original intuition. Any reproduction will be free from those temporal (and spatial) constraints. But this could only be an explanation based upon the determination of intuitions in terms of times and spaces, and such determination is a result of the very inwardizing of which we are speaking. So reproduction will require a determination of that temporal and spatial determination. I don’t think Hegel has quite figured out how this happens here, though in 1830 it is more clear. But we can see at any rate that the inwardization,
as time, is also free—freely determining, and free of its past determinations.

3) This freedom from time explains in turn that we have here a pure subject: only time, this "für sich," could be a pure subject. But it is hard to reconcile this with the return as animal state. We are reluctant to call animals pure subjects. However, the subjectivity in question here is not that of a person—of an interpersonally connected identity. It is that of the body. Its purity lies strictly in the initial unconscious freedom which this inwardizing moment of the imagination is. Though an animal’s imagination can freely combine and separate different images despite the order and is therefore a pure subject, it is not a free subject. The difference between a pure subject and a free one will ultimately have to do with the mediation of the Night in language: I think it is safe to conclude that for Hegel animals are pure subjects in the sense that they create a reflected inner world, but they do not have knowledge of this reflectedness per se: such knowledge first appears as self-certainty, and then as the will. Only then is it freedom as we know it.

In summary, then, according to Hegel, in the first stage of interiorizing, what are created are images (Bilder). An image is "the object taken up—superseded but preserved (aufgehoben)—as being" (G2 172). But in the return into itself, this being für sich, consciousness gives rise to a mastery over what is merely being. While in intuition Geist is identified with the image ("its first self is the object for it"), the aufgehobenes Bild belongs to Geist: "this image belongs to it, the self is in possession of it, is master over it." Both these moments are the

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122 "den Gegenstand aufgehoben als seienden"

123 "sein erstes Selbst ist ihm Gegenstand" (G2 172).

124 "Dies Bild gehört ihm an, er ist im Besitz desselben, er ist Herr darüber" (G2 172).
"vorstellende Einbildungskraft überhaupt."

The negative which makes for the possibility of this possession of an image (instead of a mere merging with the intuition), is as we have seen what Hegel calls "the Night." The image is "taken up (stored) in the self's treasury, in the self's Night" (G2 172). Hegel produces here a wonderfully romantic passage about the Night, a passage which, while echoing the Aristotelian notion of the soul as the form of forms, and while in the last lines prefiguring existentialism, also drifts mid-way into a kind of Goethean "Walpurgisnacht." The passage is worth citing in full:

Man is this Night, this empty Nothing, which holds everything in its simplicity - a kingdom of endless representations, images, none of which appears immediately to him--, or which are not immediately present. This is the Night, Nature's inner, which here exists--pure self, --phantasmagorical representations are surrounded by Night, here shoots out a bloody head, --there another white figure suddenly comes forward, and disappears just as suddenly--One catches a glimpse of this Night when one looks others in the eyes--into a Night which would be frightful, --here hangs over against one the Night of the world.

Until this passage we have focused on the inwardizing as time. But here it appears as space. In a note on the side of his manuscript Hegel writes "Night of safekeeping/storing up"

125 "in seinem Schatze aufbewahrt, in seiner Nacht" (G2 172).

126 "It has been well said that the soul is the place of forms..." (de Anima 429b27).

127 Cf. Goethe's Faust, Part One, line 3835ff. This reference is in fact anachronistic since Faust Part One was only published in 1808 (after Schiller's prodding), 3 years after our present text. Hegel would certainly have known of (or even read) Faust, ein Fragment which came out in 1790. But the Walpurgisnacht is not in it.

While this poetic section under question in Hegel's passage might nevertheless represent a sympathy with the romantics at this point in his life, it could also be simply interpreted as a late-night writing endeavour.

128 "Der Mensch is diese Nacht, dies leere Nichts, das alles in ihrer Einfachheit enthält --ein Reichtum unendlich vieler Vorstellungen, Bilder, deren keines ihn gerade einfällt--, oder die nicht als gegenwärtige sind. Dies die Nacht, das Innere der Natur, das hier existiert--reines Selbst, --in phantasmagorischen Vorstellungen ist es rings um Nacht, hier schiesst dann ein blutig Kopf, --dort eine andere weisse Gestalt plötzlich hervor, und verschwinden ebenso--Diese Nacht erblickt man, wenn man dem Menschen ins Auge blickt--in eine Nacht hinein, die furchtbar wird, --es hängt die Nacht der Welt hier einem entgegen" (G2 172).
(Nach der Aufbewahrung, G2 172 note 2). It is the condition of representations because it is the negative power of determination, and the subjective space of representations. It is the latter because what is aufbewahrt--held in the mind--is held not in another representation but in the grey area between fixed representations and their being fixed within an infinite set of possible constructs (one might say today that they are held in the 'grey-matter' of the mind). But the difference from Kant’s a priori form of Space is most evident in that here the infinity is only actual insofar as it is the Concept, the ‘grasping of’, insofar as there is the movement of consciousness; and that movement implies negation, and not simply the possibility of relation.

The withdrawing into the Night is also a drawing up of images from the Night. Hegel goes on to give an elucidation of the relation of the image to Geist.

The image is a manifold--the Form is to it as determination, and through its being defined as an object different from others, [it is] plurality in general. ‘I’ is the form not only as simple Self, but rather as movement; the relationship of the parts of the image,--the Form, relationship posited as the self’s own (G2 173).

This moving determination of relations which the image is and which belongs to Geist is under the rule of caprice, of the arbitrary. One form of arbitrariness, Hegel asserts, is what the English at the time called the associations of ideas. It is based on the passive receptivity of things in the order in which the objects come to be known to us. The arbitrary determination is based on the way in which a given idea gives rise to an idea closely associated with it. But this is a passive form of arbitrary determination. The general arbitrariness to which Hegel is

129 Here Hegel includes the Aristotelian side which Kant does not: there is a dialectic between the Light (phaos) and the Night, rather than an (a-temporal) a priori form of intuition.

130 "Das Bild ist ein mannigfaltiges--die Form is an ihm als Bestimmtheit, und dadurch andere Bestimmte, Vielheit überhaupt. Ich is die Form nicht nur als einfaches Selbst, sondern als Bewegung; die Beziehung der Teile des Bildes, --die Form, Beziehung als die seinige setzen."
referring is due rather to the fact that consciousness at this stage is not actively aware of its formal role—it is just building or taking apart.

In the inwardizing into the (op)position of being für sich, the pure subject is, as we saw, free of time and space. Rather than being merged with the changes of intuitions, in determining space and times inwardly the self maintains itself in its movement. Its movement is "a completely other movement from the one of Space and Time, remaining free from the movement of mere being (seienden Bewegung)" (G2 173, note 3, my italics).^{131}

Geist is both the negative and the Night in which images are aufbewahrt. But here the negative side is not being fully developed, so that it appears as though only the enduring nature of Geist is the Night. Undeveloped is the way in which the Night is inseparable from the production of determinate form and therefore cannot itself be held—beheld, be seen as simply "bestehen." Its form cannot remain merely formal, for Hegel's analysis will show that the seemingly self-consistent time-movement which goes from one image (or part of an image) to another and thereby actually defines the representations is itself defined spatially by the differentiations of the images. There is here no a-temporal (bestehende) self.^{132}

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^{131} "seine ganz andere Bewegung als die des Raums und der Zeit, freie vor dieser seienden Bewegung bestehende" (my italics).

^{132} One would do well to turn at this point to Kant's difficult footnote at CPR B161 (p. 170-171). In discussing Space there, Kant distinguishes between the form of intuition which "gives only a manifold" and the formal intuition which "gives unity of representation." Kant writes that the latter "presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible." Given this, one would think that the presupposed synthesis would belong to the understanding—that it would be expressed as the transcendental unity of apperception. But Kant goes on unclearly: "the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding." He notes that we should turn to his §24, the paragraph in which the imagination is defined and discussed. But his discussion of the imagination there does not clarify the confusion at B161: Kant has made the synthesis the condition of concepts of space and time and yet also made the unity of this a priori intuition belong to space and time. At any rate, Kant's incomplete insight here about the relation of synthesis to time and space is clearly what Fichte and Hegel are trying to complete, the former with the waver ing imagination (which originates space and time), and the latter with the bestehen/vergehen dialectic of the Night
The self which is capable of taking times out of temporal order (and spaces out of their places) is only the appearance of freedom: in fact this arbitrariness with regard to times—this freedom from time—contains a contradiction. Hegel calls this arbitrariness "die leere Freiheit"—an empty freedom—since Geist, though it is the determining movement, is determining with only immediate consciousness of its determining activity. Such immediacy of its activity has to be seen to be mediate if it is to have any truth. That process—of making the immediate activity self-mediated, is a long process, ultimately involving (communication with) other consciousnesses. The passive, bestehende self must become active and a giving-over or disappearing (vergehende) one.

ii) Recollection (Erinnerung)

This moment is a repetition of inwardizing, but one which presupposes not only the appearance in the night of an object, but also the first inwardizing. This requires some explanation. I begin with the German term itself.

Though Erinnerung is translatable as "remembering" or "recollection" the force of the German meaning is thereby lost: the word describes rather the going-inside-of, Er-inner-ung. In this moment the thing not only is, but it is mine [das Mein]: the object is "already familiar; or I remember it. Or I have the immediate consciousness in this procedure that it is mine."

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133 Miller translates it as recollection in his translation of the 1830 Philosophy of Spirit, Rauch translates it as "remembering," as "I remind myself"; he also suggests "'re-internalize' myself" (Rauch p. 88).

134 "schon bekannt; oder ich erinnere mich seiner. Oder ich habe unmittelbar das bewusstsein Meiner darin."
This is not yet purposeful recollection of something (Memory, Gedächtnis), for the thing of which we become innerly aware can be aroused without our trying to recollect it: the presence of something else which reminds us of it is sufficient to give rise to it. But it is more than mere idea association because there is here the consciousness of the object being familiar to us, consciousness of ourselves as familiar with it: "Recollection posits alongside [the object recollected] the moment of the being-for-self—I have already seen or heard of this once: I recollect [myself to it]" (G2 173). Key here of course is the fact that the verb 'to recollect' in German is reflexive, which makes it awkward to translate:

ich erinnere mich; ich sehe, höre nicht bloss den Gegenstand, sondern gehe dabei innerhalb meiner—erinner-mich, nehme mich aus dem blossen Bilde heraus, und setze mich in mich; ich setze mich besonders zum Gegenstande.

I recollect [myself to it]; I see, hear not only the object, but go thereby inside what is mine—re-member myself, take myself out of the simple image, and put myself in myself; I posit myself in particular [relation] to the object (G2 173-4).

The animal is not capable of self-awareness in its imaginative conjuring of an edible thing. We however are, and Kant made this clear when he said that "[i]t must be possible for the "I think" to accompany all my representations" (CPR 152). When the self recalls the familiar, what makes it familiar is not the presence of the thing being there again, so much as the fact that the thing there already stands in (relation to) the Night. If it stood only in relation to other things in the mind it would have its place, but when "ich erinnere mich" I am accessing not only the memory--dreams do only that much--I am going into a space which I regard as my

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136 "Das 'Ich Denke,' muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können" (KrV B132 s. 140)
own, I am conscious of myself going about the representations in my mind.\textsuperscript{137}

What is missing in this moment is an externality which adequately reflects the relation of the self to its familiar object. The derivation of this externality is basically the story of language, and Hegel goes on to tell it in the next--the third and conclusive--division. But the story itself is a long one, and due to the impenetrability of Hegel's notes here, the full story will come only with a look in our next chapter at Hegel's 1830 \textit{Philosophy of Spirit}. For now I offer at least a look at his notes here on signs and on language in general.

iii) To Mean (\textit{Bezeichnen}), Signs

In this third moment--that of the sign (\textit{Zeichen})--the object which stands before one in \textit{Erinnerung} is the synthesis of the representation and being-for-me (\textit{Fürsichsein}). While in \textit{Erinnerung} the being for self was what gave the object familiarity, here Hegel writes: "In the sign, [the I's] being-for-itself as the essence of the object is \textit{itself object}\textsuperscript{138} (my underlining).

\textsuperscript{137} Nostalgia captures (in romantic relief) the nature of this movement (\textit{nóstos} is Greek for 'a return'). Although the Romantic relief is an unwanted addition to the movement, my evocation of the Classical Greek culture upon which the Romantics relied so much is relevant: this movement of recollection is prior to self-consciousness and its freedom. And it is a movement in some ways best captured at the ethical level by the classical Greek attempts at resolution (as in Odysseus' return in Homer's \textit{Odyssey}). Odysseus' return is to ethical substance--a set of previously established relations between people in construed roles. This is the ethical equivalent of the relations between previously interiorized and reproducible images. If we turn to the \textit{Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion}, the Classical Greek religion (prior to Plato) is characterized by, on the one hand, the lack of self-conscious unity and on the other by the imaginative representations of the gods in human form. According to Bruno Snell the Greeks of Homer's time had no personal identity as we know it. Rather their body was viewed as a mélée of impulses: Achilles has his anger in the heart, and courage in his arm. The ethical mélées are mirror-images of the mêlée constitutive of personal identity. Without a unified sense of self and the responsibility which goes with it, once the ethical order has been placed in crisis, the attempts at a return to self often result in tragic death (as in Sophocles' \textit{Antigone}). In the 1827 Lectures, the Athenian religious order stands between the purely imaginative Hindu religion and the monotheism of Judaism: it is imaginative but it is working toward the expression of self-conscious unity. (Aside from the reference to Snell most of the reading of the \textit{Phil.Rel.} in this footnote is indebted to Harris' lectures on that work [York University 1995-6]. Harris also notes that self-conscious unity only comes with Socrates.)

\textsuperscript{138} "Im Zeichen ist das Fürsichsein als Wesen des Gegenstandes Gegenstand."
This requires explanation.

The self here has not become object as a mere Sein. Although the dialectic of the imagination has given Sein to the inner image, that was an earlier moment. At that point the self was the object's Sein, as Hegel said. But here "my being-for-me is the object as the essence of the Thing" (G2 174 my underline). The reason for this is that the self not only gives inward being to the images it holds in its treasury, it also determines them. Insofar as it determines them it is their essence, and not just their being.

We will see in our next two chapters how important a moment this is: this interdetermination of self and object means that self and object each are, as imagination, somehow, according to some principle, mutually designing the content. It will be necessary to discuss later by what principle a given synthesis arises.

The images as signs are at first only subjective characters--when the self relates to itself through signs, the objects it ponders (the signs) are essentially the self. "[T]he content [the sign] is its [the self's] simple essence in general." The content is only the simple essence of the self because the self is not yet objectively universal. For if we look to the object, its essence is only the self's self-relation: the essence of the sign is my being-for-me; its essence is that I am my content for me. My being-for-me is not the same as the self which will become in and for itself. (At the point at which it becomes in and for itself it is no longer a merely subjective self, but is becoming Spirit properly speaking.) So the present dialectic is between my being-for-me and the object, not between the self and the object.

139 "mein Führichsein ist Gegenstand als Wesen des Dinges."

140 "der Inhalt ist sein einfaches Wesen überhaupt"--it appears syntactically that by "its" here Hegel means "the Self's." Though Hegel's reference remains unclear, I think this is the best way to read it.
At the level of sign-making there have been two *Aufhebungen* of moments of consciousness: first it determines the object by an inwardizing temporal fixing; this *aufheben* of intuition yields consciousness as possessive; then, that dialectical moment of possession is itself *aufgehoben, possessed*. This is the consciousness which *recollects* something. When in a further *Aufhebung* consciousness possesses familiarizing recollection it is meaning something, intending something, showing something to be its familiar possession.

We can explain this further by turning to a peculiar statement by Hegel. He writes "[t]his, my being-for-me, which I add *(hinzusetze)* to the object, is that Night, that self, in which I sank the object" (G2 174).141 What is being recognized here is the activity of subjective, intentional determination. That activity has shown itself to be two-sided: subjective determination is an interiorizing of the object to the infinite--to the point of negation, to the point at which it is contained in my Night (that Night in which I sank the object). This is the moment of imagination in which the intuited object is interiorized into the unconscious. That interiorizing was itself unconscious. As we saw, the Night is preservation as well as negation, and in negation the object does not cease to be, rather, it is the unconscious self. As negated and unconsciously *aufbewahrt* the image is both no longer present and preserved. It is a "non-being." The imagination re-collects the image out of the manifold of the negative infinity (the Night)--and thus gives it being. But the object is not yet the essence of the self. For the object to become the essence of the self I must raise up as a superseded dialectical moment the thing's negation into Night: I must negate that moment as other; that is, I must take up the moment of

141 "Dieses Für michsein, das ich zum Gegenstande hinzusetze, ist jene Nacht, jenes Selbst, worin ich ihn versenkte..." Hegel does not have the clear moments of the imagination demarcated which he will have by 1830, and so the next part of the dialectic is murky here. But I think we can nevertheless trace Hegel's meaning here.
inwardizing negation as a moment which is for me. But in sign-making imagination, such interiorization is conscious. Negation is recognized, or recollected, and used as a genesis. We spoke earlier of a need for a determination of the determination. This is that moment. The original negation expresses the thing’s becoming mine, and as taken up this "becoming mine" or "being for me" is now also "for me." So the first negation is also re-collected as "being-for-me." The original negation is sublated into the new object: I add it to the object--thus "[t]his, my being-for-me, which I add (hinzusetze) to the object, is that Night, that self, in which I sank the object" (G2 174).

In signification, what is being reproduced is not just the image, nor just the familiarity of the images, rather the image stands for its history, its re-collectedness. The sign is not only a reproduced content, it also bears the traces of--or has re-collected as part of its being--the previous re-collection. This entire process, held together objectively as the sign, is the essential nature of the self at this level. But it is as yet, still subjective essentiality.

An interesting question arises at this point: how is it that this second Aufhebung gives rise to meaning? Hegel’s notes, although somewhat unclear here, go on to yield some insight.

Hegel switches from talking about the object--der Gegenstand--to talking about das Ding. I take the "thing" to be the sign: that is, the sign is no longer just a recollected image of an object, it is one which means. So when Hegel writes "my being-for-itself is object as the

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142 The bare logical structure evokes Fichte’s three principles of the Sc. Kn.: in Fichte’s second principle the Self posits a not-self over against the self (I, 104)—negation; then according to the third principle, "in the self I oppose a divisible not-self to the divisible self." (I, 110)—essentiality. But it is clear that Hegel is thinking more deeply than Fichte: Hegel expresses the dialectic from both the subject’s and its object’s side, i.e. the first principle does not remain unmediated by the process.

143 I am following Harris’ translation, using a capital (Thing) for Sache, and "thing" for das Ding (Cf. Hegel p. 24).
essence of the thing" (G2 174), I take him to mean that the sign is my essential concrete being-for-me. With the instigation of the word "thing" we are also entering the moment of the externalization of the sign, its being there for others. If the sign-making is to become universal, the inner must become outer: "it (I) is first immediately innerward, it must also step into existence (Dasein), become object, as opposed to this inwardness it must be outward; return to Being" (G2 174).

Hegel writes that the universal is characterized by the thing being posited as thing ("das Ding als Ding gesetzt" G2 174). One might want to make this sentence less redundant by translating it as "the object is posited as thing." But Hegel really does mean that what I mean (and not just some arbitrary content of my mind) is posited: the "thing" is what is being-for-me in my mind before it becomes externalized. It has to be familiar and have been consciously determined before it can make sense to others. With this change we move back into the objective world; once we begin discussing the sign as a thing for others we are in the realm of language (Sprache).

A final remark here regarding signs in this work is that, although for Hegel the power

144 "mein Fürsichsein ist Gegenstand als Wesen des Dinges"
145 "es (Ich) ist unmittelbare Innerlichkeit erst so, es muss auch ins Dasein treten, Gegenstand werden, umgekehrt diese Innerlichkeit äusserlich sein; Rückkehr zum Sein."
146 As we will see in our next chapter, Hegel's interpretation here of signs as primarily subjectively meaningful is in 1830 reserved for the symbol; by 1830, 'sign' is the term Hegel uses to indicate the next step beyond symbols: it refers to the externalization of an image or tone which is conventionally understood.
147 Standing back from the text and comparing it with the 1803-4 Geistesphilosophie, we see that Hegel's focus at this point in his notes has been on essence, whereas in 1803-4 he does not discuss essence and focuses rather on how phenomenologically confused the merely subjectively imagining mind was. This is due in part to the fact that the logical moments are much more clearly articulated in 1805-6, the role of the negative (the Night) being explicitly developed.
of making signs follows upon recollection and falls under the heading of the third moment of Imagination in General, it is not explicitly discussed as the work of the imagination. Hegel changes this by 1830, when he gives greater precision to the imagination, making sign-making its third moment.

B) Language:

The general dialectical path from Naming to Memory to Understanding is the following. In naming there are two sides: the self and the name which it gives to the thing. That opposition takes on two forms: one in which the self becomes the name (loses itself in its Being, even though it is actually the Being of the name); and one in which the name is thought of (the self moves toward it and gives it its Being). While both cases imply memory, memory is fully itself only in the second case. The first case yields only repetition: knowing in the sense only of knowing something by heart--being able to recite the parts and relations by memory. But the second case is actual memory because it is the process by which a thought is created: it is the inwardizing of the self in such a way that the relations established are not merely relations but are actions of the self, and the self knows itself to be these actions. Unlike recollection which sets up the relations again, memory is, actually, the creation of those relations. In this way the Night becomes thought, and the thing which is named is a set of relations according to the self’s self-conscious making of them: they are thoughts of the object (Gedanken). But Hegel stresses that the making is not just of the thing, but of the matter at hand (as it is itself), of the Thing (Sache); that is, the self is analyzing something for the purposes of knowing it, not just of naming it or learning through names of its parts in a memorizing way. Naming is turned into
actual knowing of the Thing through memory, because memory is the self's sustained action upon—in and through—the plurality constitutive of the Thing. Memory gives rise to the possibility of objectivity, of knowledge, because it is a folding back of the self on its own developed and developing movement, rather than just on its own interiorized, fixed content. That movement is what makes intelligence knowing rather than just repetition of learned formulae. Knowing is the movement which makes up the Thing itself.

This summary—like Hegel's 1805-6 notes on memory and understanding—leaves a host of questions unanswered. But it at least gives some shape to our discussion below.

iv) Names

Hegel notes the different powers (Kräfte) of consciousness at work so far, (powers I pointed to in my structural overview at the beginning of this chapter). According to Hegel "the [power of the] imagination gives only empty form"—this is the form of universality which has a temporal unraveling of syntheses as its content. But "the sign-making power posits the form as inner" (G2 174)—here we have the recognition of the universal, and a degree of control over the syntheses: I try to mean something, intend something by them. The Name-giving power is a higher order still, since it contains these two powers and externalizes their product. Name-giving, Hegel notes on the margin, is the same as Memory (Gedächtnis), and as Creative power (Schöpferkraft) (G2 174 note 3). How this is so needs to be explained.

One can extrapolate from the text here and assert that sign-making creates an external

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148 "Einbildungskraft nur leere Form gebende"

149 "bezeichnende [Kraft] die Form als Innerliches Setzende"
sign, but that it has significance only for the individual: the accent falls on the fact that something is meant by that person. In name-making, however, what is externalized is understood by the community as well. The name is taken up by a plurality of others. The sign is an object for me to express myself through; but the name is a thing which has its status aside from my singular use. This objectivity of the name—and yet its necessary subjectivity in my use of it, is the opposition at the root of the dialectic here. Hegel begins by indicating how the self is responsible for names. But he goes on to show the problem involved in them once they are part of our consciousness: our identity is defined by them, by their already established social usages. We are inside them as much as they are inside us. And through them we are inside each other.

Hegel writes "This [language] is then the true being of Spirit as Spirit in general—-it is there as the unity of two free selves" (G2 175). This true being of Spirit is equal to the concept of Spirit because it exhibits in itself the character of Aufhebung. A name's content is both held and superseded. A name and the thing (meant) are completely distinct in terms of what is immediately present: the name is a sound—a tone—my sound when I speak. It is completely different from the intuited object in front of me. To name the object I must produce a new object which is fully mediated by Geist—a tone which has meaning. It is, Hegel grants, "itself only the very superficial spiritual being" (geistige Sein) (G2 175). But Spirit it nevertheless is. It is the first power over represented objects.

The first Creative power which Spirit practices is therefore through names; Adam

150 It must also be kept in mind that the form of the self is different in sign-making and name-making.

151 "Dies [Sprache] ist denn das wahre Sein des Geistes als Geistes überhaupt—er ist da als Einheit zweier freier Selbst"

152 Name ist selbst nur erst das sehr oberflächliche geistige Sein"
gave all things a name—this is the magisterial right and first seizure of the whole of nature, or the creation of nature out of Spirit; *logos*, Reason, essence of the thing and of speech, of Things (*Sache*), of sayings/legends and categories. Man speaks to things as to that which is his own, and this is the Being of the object. Spirit relates itself to that which is his own, and this is the Being of the object (G2 175).

He goes on with an example:

"Donkey" is a tone, which is wholly something other than the sensible being itself; insofar as we see it [the donkey], and feel and hear him, we are it, [we are] immediately one with him, filled [with him]; but stepping back, it is as name that [the donkey] is spirit [*ein Geistiges*]—[he] is something wholly other (G2 175).

Names give a representation a spiritual Being—that is, one which is equally inward and outward. The name is a tone used, and anyone hearing it who speaks the language will have in themselves an appropriate reference. The world is no longer a kingdom of images ("*Reich von Bildern*")—which is only inwardly *aufgehoben* and which possesses no (external) Being. Rather, the world is a kingdom of words ("*Reich der Namen*" G2 175). Hegel refers to the first kingdom as the realm of the dreaming Spirit ("*der träumende Geist*") and says that this world has "no reality, no existence" (G2 175). To wake up from this dream-world is to enter the

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153 "Durch den Namen ist also die erste Schöpfkraft, die der Geist ausübt; Adam gab allen dingen einen Namen, dies ist das Majestätsrecht und erste Besitzergreifung der Ganzen Natur, oder das Schaffen derselben aus dem Geiste; *logos*, Vernunft, Wesen des Dinges und Rede, Sache und Sage, Kategorie. Der Mensch spricht zu dem Dinge als dem seinigen, und dies ist das Sein des Gegenstandes. Geist verhält sich zu sich selbst."

154 "Esel ist ein Ton, der ganz etwas anderes ist, als das sinnliche Sein selbst; insofern wir ihn sehen, auch fühlen oder hören, sind wir es selbst, unmittelbar eins mit ihm, erfüllt; zurücktretend aber als Name, ist er ein Geistiges—etwas ganz anderes."

155 "keine Realität, kein Dasein. " We recall the similar assertion in the 1803-4 *Geistesphilosophie*. Also noteworthy is how this echoes Aristotle’s account (though we know now to think the following through differently):

Again, because imaginations persist in us and resemble sensations, living creatures frequently act in accordance with them, some, *viz.*, the brutes, because they have no mind, and some, *viz.*, men, because the mind is temporarily clouded over by emotion, or disease, or sleep (*de Anima*, 429a6ff).
world of names: the self’s images for the first time have truth (G2 175).

The notion of truth introduced here needs some investigation. Hegel makes two interesting comments: first, the dreaming Spirit believes/intends (meint) its images to be true, but they are not; secondly, while the dreaming Spirit cannot distinguish itself from the waking Spirit, the waking Spirit can separate itself from the dreaming one since the products of the waking Spirit are, and in this sense they are true. Hegel specifies the difference: the previously enclosed (verschlossene) being-for-itself (meaning) now has the Form of Being in the name (G2 175-6). But this hardly answers our query about what he means here by truth. Usually the truth is related to propositions about the world. But here Hegel says "...that is true, which is for him" (G2 176). Is it the name which is true? or the nature of name-making which is true? It appears that according to Hegel the externality of names makes their production a wakeful, true production. Truth must therefore be a function of two selves communicating. But this hardly squares with notions of mathematical truth or geometric truth. Is Hegel advocating a consensus theory of truth? It appears that the answer is more simple than even this. For Hegel truth is the movement of concept-formation and cannot be separated from that process. There is no universality to names apart from their use. Names are the articulation of a Spirit in relation to itself, and such a relation is the true. Just as in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Hegel will say that "God is spirit only insofar as God is in his community,"157 the name only is insofar as it appears in the language of users for whom it has meaning, and only insofar as it is, is it true. 2+2=4 is not true for beings which have no language; it remains true only because

156 "...es ist wahr, was für ihn ist"

157 Phil. Rel. 90.
we never encounter circumstances in which $2 + 2 = 5$. The ideality of truth is that it is "for us" and requires the interiorization which Plato has Socrates advocate in the *Phaedo*.

Hegel goes on from here to develop this realm of names. Although he does not introduce the notion of memory (*Gedächtnis*) just yet, in the interest of not losing the wood for the trees, it is reasonable for us to do so. Hegel is beginning a new question here, one about how names are universal. He is concerned with how their order is such that there is not only subjective meaning (as there was for the sign), nor only historically objective meaning (as there is in the natural relation of some names with others) but also actually subjective-objective necessity to them (as when we truly *know* the Thing---*Sache*---which is before us). The derivation of any of these forms of objectivity involves another venture into the subjective, this time to see how the negative moment (the Night, the self) is an *act* of the self for the self. And this venture is that of memory.

In recollection (*Erinnerung*) the Night was witnessed reflexively, it was there alongside as part of the recollected, familiar thing. But in memory we do not just come across the unity of the Night with the thing, rather, we re-engage the activity of the negative itself as an act; we re-enact it. Memory is not so much a question of the result (the thing recollected) as of the process. This act, this re-enactment, is necessary in order for the manifold of mediations—the correlations making up a (proposition about a) thing—to be universally meaningful.

Hegel begins by comparing the name's signification with the image. (This is the third and last appearance of the term *die Einbildungskraft* in this section.) We saw earlier that the

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159 As there is for example in the case of "thunder" and "lightning" (an example we will deal with more clearly later); or as there is in the recitation of a line from Shakespeare that we have learned by heart.
imagination "cuts out a piece of Space, interrupts, negates the continuity of space" (G2 176); in so doing it brings with the image, the images which are associated with it. "Imagination brings the object forth with its plurality, its nearest surroundings" (G2 176).

But a name stands alone "without relation and connection" (G2 176). While images have their associative entourage, for a name to have context the self must put it in an order among other names. For this the negative moment is again needed.

Following the first movement into the Night, we saw the reflexive moment of image-making—the drawing of an image; we then saw the atemporal stability (bestehende nature) of the image in the inner space of the mind. We also saw that the recollection of the image out of the infinity of the Night, is a movement of the self's negative power acting on itself, but one which is not concerned with that act itself. We saw that the image was always involved in a plurality from which it was extracted—the manifold of other images in the mind. The sign was the first attempt to give representative unity to that recollection: to join images in a meaningful way. This made it possible to give external shape to a subjective recollection, to give expression to the self. But the sign failed on the one hand because the connection of images was recollected under a merely subjective unity—it was too subjective. But on the other hand it failed because it was not subjective enough: the subjective act (of having one thing stand for another) had not become

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160 "schneidet ein Stück Raum heraus, unterbricht, negiert die Kontinuität des Raumes"

161 "die Einbildungskraft nimmt den Gegenstand mit seiner Vielheit, seinen nächsten Umgebungen heraus"

162 "ohne Beziehung und Verknüpfung"
objective to the subject; the synthesis was only imaginative. When the act of reflectively making one thing stand for another becomes objectively subjective, the movement of the subject does not merely appear (as a conjunction), rather, it is for the self. This is the movement of Memory.

v) Memory: order

Hegel’s problem here is how to articulate the movement from appearance of order (which the imagination yields/is through signs) to real order (which the understanding yields/is through language). And this is the transition made in the discussion-proper of Memory.

The return of the negative in/as Memory is a higher spiritual order than sign-making.

The first real overcoming of intuition, of the animal, and of Time and Space occurs in naming; the intuited [object] is a vanishing one; its wholeness is like the simple atmosphere, like odour: the simple individuality is raised from feeling into the higher spiritual meaning (G2 176).

Even though the connection to that outer thing is radically mediated (i.e. spiritual), the meaning of the name is the outer (shared) thing, whereas the meaning of the sign is the inner subject (G2 176). So what needs to be investigated is the nature of that radical (geistige) mediation. What is under investigation is not the order of words in a meaningful sentence considered in terms of the parts of language as modern linguists have divided them up (i.e. in

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163 It is important to note that, according to this 1805-6 development of the moments, we are moving beyond the arena of the imagination. In Hegel’s final version we do not: the imagination’s final moment is the exteriorizing of signs in an objective way. Imagination and Memory will be much more dialectically interdependent in that later text, as we will see in my Chapter 4 and 5.

164 "In Namen ist erst eigentlich das Anschauen, das Tierische, und Zeit und Raum überwunden; das Angeschaute ist ein verflüchtigtes; seine Ganzheit gleichsam die einfache Atmosphäre, der Geruch, einfach Individualität, aus dem Gefühl emporgehoben in den höheren geistigen Sinn."
terms of syntax\textsuperscript{165}). Rather, under consideration is the mediation between the self, the name and the thing signified.

Unfortunately, Hegel does not make it clear in this discussion what role the imagination has. We can go some distance in figuring it out by comparing the two basic triads (Imagination in General and Language). The mediating moment of Memory—the middle, negative moment of

\textsuperscript{165} It seemed to me at first that what Hegel was trying in part to discuss when he is talking about order was syntax. I think this still comes into play, but not in the way in which it is discussed by philosophers today. That is, there is no question here of the 20th century debate about whether syntax is innate—part of the genetic building blocks of the human mind—or learned. The reason it escapes both of these poles is that Hegel’s explication is of what is necessary dialectically (i.e. in the relation of the self to its object) for syntax to occur. The question for Hegel would not be whether syntax is innate, but to what it could be said to be innate if one were to pose the question that way at all. Both the theory of innate syntax and the theory of it not being innate depend on a theory of the mind as something explicable from outside of the mind. Hegel’s analysis however tries not to presuppose anything other than what we appear already to know, and then he investigates how this apparently necessary state of affairs (e.g. that we communicate) arises out of the basic opposition of self and object from the most basic level of consciousness up to its most developed rational form. Syntax appears to us as a necessary fact of language; whether rightly or wrongly, Hegel derives its necessity from oppositions which already involve the problematic dialectic of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the mind.

Names are several sublations (away) from images; but images arose from the dialectic of consciousness’ object formation through a spacio-temporal dialectic. There was never a moment in which opposition was not, for that is the nature of consciousness. As beings which experience temporally and spatially our brains must be geared for temporal and spacial order. This development is hard to discuss in terms of either growth or learning alone. An argument for syntax being learned would have to define what delimits growth from learning. In answer to this question I think that Hegel would say that there is no clear distinction between ourselves as growing organisms and as learning organisms because part of our organism is rational—the part of us which makes (our) identity significant is essentially rational growth. One might point to Hegel’s assertion that language ”ist da als Einheit zweier freier Selbst” (G2 175) as reason to believe that syntax arises out of some form of interaction and is therefore learned and not innate. But the learned-innate difference does not make sense if the rational part of us is fundamentally interpersonal to begin with: we don’t learn syntax any more than we learn to interact: it is simply a function of reason. To say that a child who never learned to understand any language at all is rational would, I think, according to Hegel, be absurd. The inseparability of language, of interpersonal interaction and of reason makes the innate-learned debate impossible in Hegel: for it would amount to asking whether we are innately rational or learn to be rational. According to Hegel—made clear in his System der Sittlichkeit—even the most brutish among our communities is acting according to a kind of reason, though not absolute reason. The key case for Hegel I think would be whether autistic children were rational. I suspect that he would say they are not.

In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Hegel notes:

The child is not yet a rational human being, for it has merely a capacity, is to begin with merely implicit reason, implicit spirit. Only through its formation and development does it first become spirit, for spirit is only genuine spirit insofar as it is the final stage (Phil. Rel. 108).

So, the order of words in a meaningful sentence is at issue in our text, but Hegel does not address it in terms of syntax, because that would be to look at the problem from a non-dialectical perspective.
language—repeats the earlier mediating term of the first triad, recollection (Erinnerung). In one sense, the same rule applies for both. In other words—leaving the text for a moment—just as gravity is the same principle by which things fall to the earth and by which planets complete their eternal orbits around the sun, the negative is equally responsible for the merely subjective connection between images, and the universal connections between signified and signifier; and that moment is the negativity of the subject. Just as the gravitational pull can be said to be differently cast in its eternal pull on the planets as compared to its effect on a singular object’s finite, linear trajectory downward, so too the subject as the unifying force is different when it is engaged in the activity of understanding (universals) as compared to imagining immediate connections.166

According to Hegel here the self is the substance of names: "The I is alone the bearer, the space and substance of these names—it is their order..." (G2 177).167 The self must look to itself for the order: "The I must look to itself [intuit itself] as this ordering, or the names as ordered, and maintain this order;—so that the order becomes an enduring one" (G2 176).168 The reflexive "Ich muss sich nun anschauen" is indicative of the move from externalization (a name being ‘out there’ for others) to the moment of internalization again (as in the moment of Erinnerung). The self is returning to the Night in order to discover (its) order there: "[the I]
must (be)hold the names/the order in its Night, as useful, as belonging to the self" (G2 177). 169

The reason order arises is that, that first subjective recollection is not stable--it is in fact still temporal, an active recollecting. We recall from the 1803-4 *Geistesphilosophie*, that the moment which is *bestehende* is actually *vergehende*, that in seeking to recollect these two together, the self is *verstehende*--the understanding.

In the margins of his text Hegel establishes a triad articulating what I think we can safely call the first concept of the understanding. Generally speaking, he indicates there that the understanding is a fixing into order, by the self, of the self’s inner unrest. We have seen that fixing was defined by Fichte in the *Wissenschaftslehre* as the work of the understanding. But Hegel clarifies its inception in and through Memory. "[I]t is real memory, memory which is still in its object as object-having understanding" (G2 178). 170 To explain this we must turn to Hegel’s marginal note in detail. Hegel is clearly musing over the problem:

a) The Self stands over against the multiplicity of Names; their singular content is foreign to it; but their determinacy is the Self--and their singularity is simple.

b) Overagainst Names is the Self, as their essence and singularity; they are through the Self, through their essence, related to one another; the Self is alone the necessity, that which in itself is the opposite of itself--they (Names), moreover, have the Self for their Being--because they are simple--.

c) How is Self their necessity or constraint (*Befestigung*) such that it is their Being? Or, how is it that the Self as their essence can become their Being, since Being is the fixed object(ivity), the I is the form of pure unrest, movement, or Night of disappearance--Or: I is in Names immediately (universal) Being; now through mediation--it must become this through itself; its unrest must fix itself, it must itself--as unrest, as pure movement--become sublating movement (*aufhebende Bewegung werden*). This is the work; its unrest becomes object, as

169 "Es muss sie Behalten in seiner Nacht, als dienstbare, die ihm gehorchen;"

170 "Oder es ist Gedächtnis (eigentliches), der sich noch in seinem Gegenstande als Gegenstand habende Verstand."
fixed Plurality, as Order; —the unrest becomes order precisely through this, that it becomes object (G2 177 note 1).\textsuperscript{171}

In the running text Hegel explains the way in which the unrest comes to be fixed. As far as I can gather this happens in two ways. One way is a fixedness of order due to the appearance of the images in sense-perception. The other way is a fixedness of order due to the self's conscious use of memory. In the latter, something more than just a repeat of some sense-perception sequence is being actively engaged and articulated. As we noted already, that something more is the activity of consciousness on its own activity. These two lend themselves to the general assertion that "Memory holds the names in general, the free, arbitrary connection of these images, (the meaning) and the names, so that by the image the name appears, and by the name the image is there" (G2 178).\textsuperscript{172} But the two ways of fixing need to be more thoroughly investigated.

Let us deal first with fixedness of order due to the appearance of the images in sense-perception. Memory allows us to relate and hold onto (\textit{Bewahrung}) the two thoroughly distinct parts of a name—the sound or written form and its representation (\textit{Vorstellung}) in an image (\textit{Bild})

\textsuperscript{171} "\textit{Am Rande:} a) Ich tritt den Vielen Namen gegenüber; ihr Einzelner Inhalt ist Fremde; aber ihre Bestimmtheit ist Ich —und ihre Einzelheit einfach.

b) gegenübertreten ist Ich, ist ihre Einfachheit, ihre Wesen; sie sind durch Ich, durch ihr Wesen aufeinander bezogen; Ich ist allein die Notwendigkeit, was an sich selbst das Gegenteil seiner selbst ist—sie haben nunmehr Ich zu ihrem Sein, —weil sie einfach sind.—

c) Wie wird nun diese ihre Notwendigkeit oder ihre Befestigung—so dass Ich ihr Sein wird; oder dass das ich, das ihr Wesen ist, zu ihrem Sein werde, denn Sein ist das feste Gegenständliche, Ich ist die Form der reinen Unruhe, Bewegung, oder Nacht des Verschwindens—Oder: Ich ist im Namen seiend (allgemein) unmittelbar; jetzt durch Vermittlung—es muss es durch sich werden; seine Unruhe muss das sich Befestigen, sich als Unruhe, sich als reine Bewegung aufhebende Bewegung werden. Dies die Arbeit; seine Unruhe wird Gegenstand, als befestigte Vielheit, als Ordnung; —die Unruhe wird Ordnung eben dadurch, dass sie Gegenstand wird."

\textsuperscript{172} "Das Gedächtnis bewahrt den Namen überhaupt, die freie willkürliche Verknüpfung dieses Bildes, (der Bedeutung) und des Namens, dass bei dem Bilde ihm der Namen, und beim Namen das Bild da ist."
It also allows us to give an account of events as they appear, and in this first form of fixing, the relations between the names are determined by their relation in sense-perception. Hegel's example is that of thunder and lightning. "Lightning" and "thunder"—two words with different meanings—are used to describe a single sensible event (supposing they appear simultaneously in our experience). The order of these connections appears necessary, according to sense-perception.

But a result of this first level of fixing is that the arbitrary nature of the **name-object** relation is buried. Nevertheless, that relation is conventional, and so the necessity which is buried is convention, not necessarily truth. This is what Hegel will later call "mechanical Memory."

But at a higher level, memory is also that which allows us to connect names to each other in ways distinct from their relation in perception. This is what I take Hegel to mean by "freie Name" (*G2 178*). (This moment is a repetition at a higher level of the moment of "freie Zeit"—that is, of the freedom which consciousness had with regard to the first interiorized images and the perceptual freedom of relating (to) them out of the given order.) There is necessity in the first kind of connection but the necessity in the connection of "freie Namen" is mediated through the speaker. While Hegel does not give an example here, comparing the cloud to a mountain and the bolt of lightning to a bright chasm opening up would be such an example, as would coupling the lightning with the idea of vengeance. The conventionally necessary relation between sign and signified is in this case loosened, mediated by subjective synthesis. But because we are in the realm of names, the conventional associations are not lost—they are taken up into the new, creative order.
I am assuming too, that the first kind of order is the memory which is still tied exclusively to the sensory unity (as in the lightning and thunder example). After all as we saw above, Hegel says that it is "(real) memory, memory which is still in its object as object-having understanding" (G2 177 my italics). But the second kind of ordering is free:

The I is the power [Kraft] of this free—not yet posited as necessary—order[,]--it is the free holder, the free objectless order. --It is the first 'I' to grasp itself as power; the I is itself the necessity, free from the picture-thought (Vorstellung) -- the fixing and fixed order -- the exercise of memory is therefore the first work of the awakened Spirit as Spirit (G2 178).

We saw earlier that according to Hegel language is the "true Being of Spirit as Spirit" (G2 175). Hegel specifies now that "the exercise of memory is the first work of the wakened Spirit as Spirit" (G2 178). The first—the Being of Spirit as Spirit—is the immediate universal. But this universal can be merely conventional: in a sense language is memorized, and insofar as it is only memorized, it has lost the subjective depth necessary for Spirit; the actuality of the Night is lost. In awakened Spirit however, language is actual: the Night of the other, their infinite otherness, is actual, engaged as the mediation of language by the language user.

Interestingly Hegel uses the expression "Erfinden der Namen" (G2 178)—the "making" or "discovery of names." The double meaning of erfinden is significant, for though Hegel does mean that we create names capriciously for things—he says so when he playfully says to the donkey "your Being is a sound (Ton), which I capriciously discovered (erfunden)" (G2 175)—we

173 "Gedächtnis (eigentliches), der sich noch in seinem Gegenstande als Gegenstand habende Verstand."

174 "Ich ist die Kraft dieser freien, noch nicht als notwendig gesetzten Ordnung—es ist der freie Träger, die freie ungegenständliche Ordnung. —Es ist das erste sich selbst als Kraft erfassende Ich; es selbst ist die Notwendigkeit, frei von der Vorstellung —die fixierende und fixierte Ordnung —Die Übung des Gedächtnisses ist deswegen die erste Arbeit des erwachten Geistes als Geistes"
also "discover" in memory the word we need to make our utterance. The separation of creation and memory is not easy to make at the level of language usage: words have histories, and memory is their existence and where they have their existence; though Hegel does not mention it, we can see that the temporal-spatial dialectic is very much still present here.

We can suggest therefore that the dominant moment of mechanical memory is the spatial moment: understanding is predominantly a fixing (verstehende); in real memory, however, time, the pure subject, negation, the Night, is the dominant moment, and the understanding is predominantly movement (verstehende).

This first activity of the wakened Spirit is however incomplete. This comes out in Hegel's discussion of the kind of necessity present in Memory. As we saw, the relation of names to their objects is one of "discovery." But that relation is at first suppressed when we use language, because of the immediate universality that language appears to have: we take the relations to be necessary because in a language the names are universally understood (by the language users) to mean what they do. "A name is a fast-held sign; an enduring relation, a universal" (G2 178).\footnote{175 "Namen ist befestigtes Zeichen; bleibende Beziehung, eine allgemeine"} I have called this the conventionality of language. We recall that the self immersed itself in the names and became Sein: "the I has given up its caprice (arbitrariness) in its Being; it has posited itself as universal" (G2 178).\footnote{176 "Ich hat seine Willkür in seinem Sein aufgegeben; sich als allgemeines gesetzt"} Suppression of the subjective moment in Erfindung makes the ordering of language into convention--an "inward, or itself accidental order, arbitrary necessity" (G2 178).\footnote{177 "innerlich, oder selbst zufällige Ordnung, willkürliche Notwendigkeit"} The two sides of the order, "ihre Seiten," are not yet posited,
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not yet "an sich selbst" (G2 178). We have ultimately to move beyond the intellect, to the will, in order to get to thought which is in and for itself.

But the fact remains here that insofar as the self creates order through language—new order other than sense-experienced order—the self is an ordering power, a free power which recognizes itself as such. Hegel focuses next on that side of the dialectic of memory, a development which takes him into the understanding as judgement-making, and then to his conclusion of the section on the Intellect. Our business with this 1805-6 work, however, has ended with the discussion so far. We will be dealing with memory in more detail in Chapter 6 using the 1830 text.

Nevertheless, it is helpful here to project, in a general way, what has been learned so far into what the shape of the appropriate use of memory in language, and to thereby properly recollect the meaning of the Night.

In a properly understanding use of memory, there is a subjective genesis—a combining of names (words) in a meaningful way, a way which reflects the meaning-making nature of each interlocutor. Whether we remember a name or make up a name we do so in the context of Spirit's wakeful self-reference. We recall Hegel's earlier words "one catches a glimpse of this Night when one looks others in the eyes—into a Night which would be frightful, --here hangs over against one the Night of the world" (G2 172). In awakened Spirit this glimpse is a sustained gaze into the other, into the mediating genesis of Spirit. It is here that we realize that without the spontaneity of subjective reflexion—of the imagination's return; of the Night which is now reflected in the gaze of the other--there is no true language.178

178 Hegel realized well before Wittgenstein that there can be no private language.
Conclusion

On the one hand, perhaps one of the better insights which the 1805-6 lectures offer and which is lost in 1830, is the power of the inwardization, imagination's für sich—the separating from the immediacy of intuition, which creates consciousness of an intuited other. This "pure subject," which is time, reappears in the Preface to the Phenomenology, and has its 'final' return in the final chapter of that work, in Absolute Knowing. So its role is not to be underestimated. But, on the other hand, in 1805-6 Hegel gives an underdeveloped account of the other end of imagination's activity: the moment of sign-making is a moment which has exceeded the imaginative—merely subjective—syntheses. In the later 1830 version, this has changed: imagination has as its culminating moment, memory-dependent sign-making. This difference is due in part, I believe, to the different role reflection—and therefore representation—begin to play in Hegel, particularly from 1807 onward. But I leave discussing this until Chapter 6. We must first look at the form which Hegel gives to the imagination in his final Encyclopedia version of the Philosophy of Spirit.

179 There is some irony here: Hegel has rehearsed these moments of the intellect for over twenty years by 1830; while they are more clearly articulated then, they are also articulated more mechanically.

180 Cf. PoS ¶801 p. 487.
Chapter 4

Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, 1830

Preamble

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an exegesis of the 1830 Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit discussion of the imagination, and to then raise the question of whether and in what way imagination is predisposed to produce or reproduce certain syntheses and not others. This sets us up to move into our investigation of the practical imagination in Part 2 of the thesis.

According to the 1830 Philosophy of Spirit, the moments of the intellect are:

1) Intuition (Anschauung)
2) Representation (Vorstellung)
3) Thinking (Denken)

If we follow the middle term of each triad we get to the imagination: the middle term of the intellect is Vorstellung, and if we look to its three moments we find the imagination to be the second:

i) Recollection (Erinnerung)
ii) Imagination (Einhaltungskraft)—which includes not only the production of signs but also of
iii) Memory (Gedächtnis) names)

In Hegel’s thought generally the middle term in a conceptual development is always negative. The fact that by following the middle moments of the intellect here we arrive at the imagination is noteworthy, since this was not the case in the earlier versions before 1807 (see
my Appendix). By making imagination the middle moment of representation, Hegel has made it central to reflection.\textsuperscript{181}

In 1830 Vorstellung is the overarching moment for what in 1805-6 were Imagination in General and Language, but with two important differences from 1805-6: 1) in 1805-6, intuition is the first moment of the Imagination in General—it is viewed as part of representation. But in 1830, intuition is the first moment of the Intellect and precedes Vorstellung, the second moment of the Intellect. And it is in that second moment that we find the imagination. Thus in 1830, even though it turns out that the beginning is always already mediated, the logic of development grants intuition a role as immediate and independent of representation. 2) We see the second major difference when we look at the second moment of Vorstellung—Einbildungskraft—and its three moments (¶455-459):

\begin{itemize}
  \item[aa)] Reproductive imagination (¶455)
  \item[Bb)] Phantasy, symbolizing, allegorizing or poetic imagination (¶456).
  \item[cc)] Sign-making phantasy: Signs, Language (¶457 intro, ¶458 signs, ¶459 language, ¶460 Names).\textsuperscript{182}
\end{itemize}

We note that Sign-making and Name-making, rather than being subsequent moments to the imagination as in 1805-6, have their place within the third dialectical moment of imagination. Again, this is evidence that the imagination is playing a more central role in reflection, though this will have to be explained in more detail later.

\textsuperscript{181} I discuss in Chapter 6 what this means.

\textsuperscript{182} aa) die reproduktive Einbildungskraft

  Bb) die Phantasie, symbolisierenden, allegorisierende oder dichtende Einbildungskraft (par. 456).

  yy) die Zeichen machende Phantasie: Zeichen, Sprache
Exegesis

It is interesting to note first of all how much further Hegel has come in determining the moments of Reason—how much more developed his original 1801 assessment of Reason as "intuition of the self-shaping or objectively self-finding Absolute" (Diff 171) has become. His development of the notion of Spirit has made it possible to view the imagination as one moment of Subjective Reason. The imagination is no longer merely an original sundering at the indifference point. Rather Hegel exposes the necessary one-sidedness of its initial moments within a subjective system, and reveals its final moment to be the starting point of objective phenomenological development.

To begin let me go briefly over the moments leading up to and including the imagination. Hegel begins with intuition and its moments. These resurface throughout the remaining moments in superseded form.

1) Intuition.

α) The first moment of intuition is the feeling Spirit—that is, the Spirit which has some sensible object over against it.\(^\text{183}\) β) There is a diremption of this feeling Spirit into two moments: 1) awareness: in awareness the object belongs to Spirit, is its own (es ist "Seinige"). This is the moment of possession. And 2) the determination of the feeling—the object is a being (das "Seiende") that is, something Negative over and against Spirit (though nevertheless posited by spirit). This is the moment of being.

γ) The third moment of intuition is intuition proper (eigentliche Anschauung). It only

\[\text{183 This first moment—der fühlende Geist—is also the first form of faith in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. (The second form is representation, Vorstellung.)}\]
occurs when the intellect has unified these two sides on the side of being. It does this by casting the immediate object into space and time "[sie] wirft (dieses unmittelbaren Findens) in Raum und Zeit hinaus" (Enz.Phil.G. ¶448, s. 249). Intuitions are temporal-spatial castings. But this intuition proper is one-sided since we have gone over to the side of being (des Seienden) at the expense of the side of possession (das Seinige). The conclusion of the moments of intuition therefore is the reemergence of the moment of ownership (the moment "des Seinigen"): it is the unification of being with and by means of possession. Because possession is also a moment of awareness, it is a reassertion of awareness; at this point the intuition belongs to the Intellect, is "its own" ("Ihrige"). But precisely because of this change, in this concluding moment Hegel no longer speaks of intuition—proper or not. Rather, we are in the realm of representation (Vorstellung).\textsuperscript{184}

2) Representation (Vorstellung).

The three moments of representation are, as noted above, i) Recollection ii) Imagination

\textsuperscript{184} Hegel explains the relation of intuition to Spirit in his lectures on the Philosophy of Religion:

I have representations and intuitions, which constitute a specific content: this house, etc. They are my intuitions and represent themselves to me. But I could not represent them to myself if I had not grasped this content within myself. This entire content must be posited within me in a simple and ideal way. Ideality means that this being [that is] external [to me] (i.e. its spaciality, temporality, materiality, and mutual externality) is sublated. Inasmuch as I know this being, its contents are not represented things, being outside one another; rather they are within me in a simple manner. Though a tree has many parts, it nevertheless is merely simple in my representation. Spirit is knowledge. For it to be knowledge, the content of what it knows must have attained this ideal form, it must have been negated in this manner. What constitutes spirit must have come into its own in such a way. Spirit must have been educated, must have traversed this circuit. These forms, distinctions, determinations, and finitudes must have been, in order for it to make them its own and to negate them, in order for what it is in itself to have emerged out of it and stood as object over against it, yet at the same time be its own.

This is the path and the goal by which spirit has attained its proper concept, the concept of itself, and has arrived at what it is in itself (Phil.Rel. 110).
and iii) Memory. To get a sense of the imagination we have to look at the moments preceding and following it. The moments following intuition and directly prior to the imagination are those belonging to recollection (Erinnerung).¹⁸⁵

i) Recollection

The three moments making up the concept of recollection are α) the image (Bild), β) the nightly (unconscious) mine ("der nächtliche (bewusstlose) Schacht") which is the universality of the intellect, and γ) due to the presence of a new external intuition which solicits the internal image, there is a relating of the new intuition to the inwardized image, and a subsumption of that intuition under the recollected image. In this last moment the image returns to consciousness in a new way: it becomes a recollected representation (as opposed to a merely inwardized image) when the external intuition which solicits, and the internal image which is solicited, fall under a universal representation. We must look at these moments in more detail.

α) An image differs from an intuition in that the image is inwardized ("Er-innert"). The nature of the image is that it is (potentially) a universal representation. As far as I understand, the representation is universal in that the intuition does not belong to the abstract, outside Space and Time (äußerlichen Raum und Zeit), but rather to the universal, inner space and time of the subject—in its own space and time, its "eigenen Raum und ihre eigenen Zeit" (Enz. Phil. G. 7452). The universality consists perhaps in the fact that the image is able to be brought forth again potentially at any time and in any relation. As a recollected (erinnerte) intuition, the image has been snatched out of its immediate time and space context and exists in the subject’s inner

¹⁸⁵ See my discussion of Erinnerung (Chapter 3 ii). It is important to keep in mind the reflexivity of the German expression "Ich erinnere mich."
space and time. In the inner space and in the inner time subject and object are no longer determined (bedingt) through the transforming power of space and time as external and continuous. The image is "freed from its first immediacy and abstract singularity over against others" and "taken up into the universality of the I in general" (¶452).  

β) Hegel writes then of a mine (Schacht), in which there is an infinite number of images. This infinity (Unendlichkeit) is the formal universal of the I. Recollected in the Intellect, the image is unconsciously taken up ("erinnert, ist das Bild, nicht mehr existierend, bewußtlos aufbewahrt" Enz. Phil. G. ¶453).

γ) In order that it come out of this Schachte into consciousness—that is, in order that it be recollected—a new intuition is necessary. The external intuition evokes the internal one. The moment of being—des Seienden—has come again into play in the shape of the external intuition. This relation of the image to a new intuition is recollection proper "eigentlich Erinnerung."

Only when the image is recalled, is/has the image a recalled existence—"[ein] erinnert(es) Dasein."

But it is important to note that it is always still the power of the Intellect which recalls the images out of the Schachte, and it is this power which gives the images existence again. Self-consciousness of that power is not yet present—that only comes further on in the dialectic, with the moment of Memory. But it is nevertheless the intellect and not the external intuition which is the power behind the return of the images to conscious existence. The external intuition is necessary for the recollection of the image, but it is not sufficient. Hegel does not believe that

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186 It is "von seiner ersten Unmittelbarkeit und abstrakten Einzelheit gegen anderes befreit" and "in die Allgemeinheit des Ich überhaupt aufgenommen" (Enz. Phil. G. ¶452, s. 258).
intuitions act on the nightly mine and elicit the corresponding or associated images out of it. It is the mind which is the power which relates the two. This is an important point, because this power—in itself—is reproductive imagination. But as long as this power is in the service of recollection—in the service of relating external being to the internal images—it is not in itself and not properly reproductive imagination. Only when the images are reproduced without relation to an external intuition do we have a clear expression of reproductive imagination. But I am getting ahead here. At this point Hegel only says that it is the intellect generally which is the power at work relating the external intuition and the internal image.

According to Hegel, the external intuition becomes dispensable once the internal image has come into existence. The giving of existence (Dasein) to the image produces what Hegel calls real representation ("eigentliche(r) Vorstellung"). The giving of existence is a synthesis of the intellect's power with the image. That intellectual power, as I mentioned, is not self-conscious, it is not in-itself, but it nevertheless is. It is not this image or that, not this intuition or that—it just is the power of consciousness. It is this which is recollected alongside the image, as part of the image. We saw in 1805-6 that this gave rise to the familiar. This is the only interpretation I can give to Hegel's assertion that real representation is the synthesis of the inner image with the "recollected existence" ("des innerlichen Bildes mit dem erinnerten Dasein"). Erinnertes Dasein—recollected existence—is not the image, it is its recollectedness, its inward being-there, Dasein, inward presence; this recollectedness is synthesized with the image.

The movement can also be recapitulated in terms of Seiende and Seinige. The moment of Seiende (Being) was a hidden presence in the mind: as unconsciously aufbewahrt in the mine, it had no explicit being. But when the intellect recollects the image, the moment of Seinige (the
moment of being-for-the intellect) gives being back to the image: the image is being-for-the intellect. Conversely, the moment of Seinige was hidden in the mine: the image was not properly in the possession of the intellect because the intellect was not conscious of it. But when the image has being again, its existence is a recollectedness, and so the moment of its having been for the intellect—having been Seinige—becomes explicit as well. But that moment comes forward in a new form: Hegel makes a distinction here between the image being merely the property (Eigentum) of the intellect—that is, present only in the inner mine (in the unconscious in its Besitze)—and the image being in the intellect's possession—that is, when the intellect is conscious of the image. "The image, which in the mine of the Intellect was only its property, now that it has been endued with externality, comes actually into its possession." (Enc. Phil. Spir. ¶454).  

Stepping back for a moment for an overview, it is important to remember that the moment of recollection is predominately characterized by the need of an external intuition (cf. ¶455Z). Something must be externally there as a reminder, in order for the image to become conscious and thereby properly in the possession of the Intellect.

But if we return to a focus on the power of the intellect rather than on the objective trigger for the recollection of an image, we uncover the activity of the imagination. The section on the imagination begins with Hegel’s investigation into how the intellect is the power of determination or "reproduction" of an image: imagination is the moment in which the unconscious manifold which the image has become, is synthesized into an image which is being-there for the intellect; it is the power of the intellect to pull the image out of the night and give

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187 The translation is Miller's (page 205): "Das Bild, das im Schachte der Intelligenz nur ihr Eigentum war, ist mit der Bestimmung der Äußerlichkeit nun auch im Besitze derselben."
But while implicit in recollection (acting for it, as it were), in itself the imagination is in fact a higher order of synthesis. Imagination is unlike recollection, for it does not need the help of an external intuition in order to reproduce the image. This is what makes the imagination such an important moment: the power of the intellect is here the dominant feature. The imagination is the intellect’s nascent in-itself.

But the imagination is not yet for-itself. For the moment, it is essentially negative, a free determining; even though it is recollecting itself in the image, it is not yet reflecting on itself as this free determining power.

As negative in-itself, it is also merely subjective--its images are for it, and have their existence only for it. Sharing the image in an external manner through symbols and signs is a further development of the imagination, a development which involves the transition from imagination to the shared arena of conventional meaning systems. The intellect’s being-in-other (its having being in its own syntheses) will necessarily (re)emerge later as being-for-another, and that dialectic will eventually lead it to produce objects which are fully mediated, in and for Spirit. But to begin with the imagination, as we have seen in the two earlier Geistesphilosophie, is a subjective activity.

ii) Imagination

The imagination differs from recollection in that it actualizes (verwirklicht) the moment of the intellect’s positing (des Setzen). As in Kant, the imagination does not need the

188 "[Die Einbildungskraft] ist überhaupt das Bestimmende der Bilder" (Enz. Phil. G. 455Z. p. 264)

189 "Die zweite Entwicklungsstufe der Vorstellung ist...die einbildungskraft. Zu di...
mnemonic help of an intuition in order to (re)produce its representation. Therefore the reproductive imagination is "the coming-forth of the images out of the self's own inner, which is also their power" (my translation Enc. Phil. Spir. ¶455).

Not surprisingly Hegel divides the imagination into three moments: aa) Reproductive imagination (¶455) BB) Phantasy, symbolizing, allegorizing or poetic imagination (¶456) cc) Sign-making phantasy: Signs, Language (¶457 intro, ¶458 signs, ¶459 language, ¶460 Names). The first thing the imagination does, as we have seen, is bring forth images into existence. This is a formal (formelle) capacity on the part of the imagination. One might better call it a forming capacity. The next step the imagination, what we will refer to as Symbolizing Phantasie for short, accomplishes is a more complex task: first of all it is the connecting of some images with other images, to form a universal representation. The creation of the universal is the same forming activity of the imagination as was the giving of existence to the image, but it is more complex because it also involves images already formed by the imagination, the relation of those images to one another, and their unity under a single representation. It is secondly a forming for the purposes of giving concrete existence to the universal representation: this is the creation of the symbol. When, in a more refined moment still, the image which is used to mean something differs radically from the meant object, then we have a sign, and have


190 "[D]as Hervorgehen der Bilder aus der eigenen Innerlichkeit des Ich, welches nunmehr deren Macht ist" (Enz. Phil. G. par. 455). I have used my own translation because I find Wallace's misleading: "...the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego, which is now the power over them"—the problem is in the line "power over them" (Enc. Phil. Spir. ¶455).

191 The Kantian version of this moment is Schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason.
entered the third moment of the imagination: *Sign-making Phantasie*.\(^{192}\) (Because with the sign we enter into the arena of externalizing the imagination’s content for others, we can say that here the intellect is not just forming in an increasingly complex way, rather, this is the beginning of the intellect as informing—and the beginning therefore of its possession of information.) The latter precision is the transition to memory.

**Commentary and Analysis**

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Generally speaking the three moments of the imagination contrast most obviously with Kant’s division of the imagination in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. In Kant’s analysis there are three ‘kinds’ or functions of the imagination: 1) reproductive (associative) 2) productive (figurative synthesis) and 3) transcendental. (All these are of course specifications of the imagination as, generally speaking, the synthesis which joins intuition and the understanding.) The specific differences between Kant’s and Hegel’s divisions would be too numerous to go into here. But it is interesting to note that what for Kant is a transcendental imagination, for Hegel is *Sign-Making Phantasie*: while Kant’s accent falls on transcendental unity, Hegel’s Sign-making *Phantasie* is transcendental in the sense of moving beyond the subjective toward others

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in communication.

Speaking more generally still, Hegel makes a similar criticism of Kant as he made of the empirical psychologists in the Scepticism essay:193 Kant provides "only a manifold of powers and faculties,... a sack full of powers."194 Hegel criticizes faculty-oriented investigations for their "want of organic unity," for in such approaches

[any aspect which can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity, and the mind is thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. It makes absolutely no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for power and faculties. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate, and treat their essential correlation as an external incident (Enc. Phil. S. ¶445, p. 189).

One might well ask how Hegel’s division of the imagination into three "parts" avoid this problem. Hegel's answer is that

the true satisfaction... is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind, by rational conception, by products of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas—in a word, by cognitive intuition, cognitive conception, etc. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this, that intuition, conception, etc. are not isolated, and exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself (Enc. Phil. S. ¶445, p. 190).195

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193 See Hegel’s 1802 Critical Journal essay "The Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy" (in Between Kant and Hegel, trans. di Giovanni and H. S. Harris, Albany, SUNY Press, 1985. pp. 311-362): "As for the concepts, they stem from the sort of empirical psychology that disperses the spirit into mutually external qualities, and hence finds no whole, no genius and no talent among these qualities, but describes them as if they were a sack full of faculties..." (p. 354). Hegel's rhetoric is worth citing: "The process lacks all the quickening vitality of an Idea of Reason; it carries on without the touch of fancy or of fortune in a resounding, sense-clouding, sleep-inducing, overwhelming tone, producing the same effect as if one was wandering through a field of henbane in bloom, the stupefying scent of which no efforts can withstand, and where one is not aroused by any enlivening beam, not even in the shape of an impending nemesis" (Ibid. p. 353-4).

194 My translation of "nur eine 'Mannigfaltigkeit von Vermögen und Fähigkeiten des Geistes'... gleichsam einen 'Sack voll Vermögen'" (Enz. Phil. G. ¶).

195 "Die wahre Befriedigung aber, gibt man zu, gewähre nur ein von Verstand und Geist durchdrungenes Anschauen, vernünftiges Vorstellen, von Vernunft durchdrungene, Ideen darstellende Produktionen der Phantasie usf., d.i. erkenncnendes Anschauen, Vorstellen usf. Das Wahre, das solcher Befriedigung zugeschrieben wird, liegt darin, dass das Anschauen, Vorstellen usf. nicht isoliert, sondern nur als Moment der Totalität, des Erkennens
The "truly philosophical grasp" of these forms of mind (the faculties of recollection, imagination and memory) "just consists in comprehending the rational connection existing between them, in recognizing them as stages in the organic development of intelligence." We have seen so far that Hegel has had methodological problems in his lectures on Geistesphilosophie. By 1830 however, Hegel has written the Phenomenology as a propaedeutic to Speculative Science, and rewritten it as that which precedes psychology in the Philosophy of Spirit. Thus in Hegel's discussion here, a phenomenology of Spirit is presupposed: one must already be at the standpoint of science to do philosophical psychology. And therefore the success of the Phenomenology determines the success of his account of the imagination in the psychology. It is the success of thinking the imagination through to the end in the Phenomenology which ultimately makes it possible for Hegel to articulate a psychology that does not make the imagination into one mechanical-like faculty among others.

But we are looking at these various Philosophy of Spirit versions in order to aid us in figuring out what role the imagination plays in the Phenomenology of Spirit. And in our move toward an answer, we need to focus in the psychology on the moments in which the intellect begins to externalize its content; on how it begins to be self-informing, on how it possesses and imparts that information. This is properly the arena of the second and third moments of the imagination--Phantasie--and in particular the distinction in it between the symbol-making Phantasie and the sign-making Phantasie. We will also see that in fact, at the centre of the distinction between a philosophical psychology and a phenomenology is the imagination's third

selbst, vorhanden ist" (Enz.Phil.G. ¶445, s. 243).
moment. But I save that discussion for Chapter 5.

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We recall that in *Faith and Knowledge* Hegel asserted alongside Schelling that the imagination is reason. Here Hegel explains how:

As reason, its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (§445, §435), i.e. to universalize it; and now its action as reason (438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. In other words, it aims at making itself be and be a fact. Acting on this view, it is self-uttering, intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs (*Enc. Phil. Spir.* §457 p. 211).

Imagination, when regarded as the agency of this unification is reason, but only a nominal reason, because the matter or theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference; whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content (*Enc. Phil. of Spirit* §457 p. 211).¹⁹⁶

We have a much different picture here than we had in 1802: the accent here is not on a sundering absolute, of whose moments the intellect is one; rather the accent is on truth, and its arena is language. Let us turn to the symbol and the sign for more detail.

We are familiar from the 1805-6 *Geistesphilosophie* with the dialectical moment which the symbol here represents. In 1805-6 what Hegel discussed under the name of "sign" (*Zeichen*) was essentially what he here means by "symbol." Hegel is here adding a further distinction when he differentiates between symbol and sign.¹⁹⁷

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¹⁹⁶ "Als die Tätigkeit dieser Einigung ist die Phantasie Vernunft, aber die *formelle* Vernunft nur, insofern der *Gehalt* der Phantasie als solcher gleichgültig ist, die Vernunft aber als solche auch den *Inhalt* zur *Wahrheit* bestimmt" (*Enz. Phi. G.* §457 An., s. 268).

¹⁹⁷ John Sallis notes that Hegel's ordering of the moments of the imagination differs in the *Zusatz* and the paragraphs. (Sallis notes as well the differences between the 1817, and 1827 editions on this matter.) He does this to highlight the difficulty he thinks Hegel had with these transitions in the imagination, particularly with regard to the second and third moments (Sallis 77), and thereby to open up a space for Sallis' own interpretation of the imagination. But such differences may be due only to the fact that the *Zusatz* belong to different periods of Hegel's thought than the paragraphs. Regardless of the outcome of that debate, the difference in the ordering is even more noticeable if one turns to the 1805-6 lectures. In those lectures the sign is the product of the imagination *par*
The distinction (¶457Z) lies in that the symbol relies on something in the image to portray the meaning: for example "[t]he strength of Jupiter...is represented by the eagle because this is looked upon as strong" (Enc.Phil.Spir. ¶457, p. 212). The sign on the other hand does not rely at all on the character of the image it is using: there is a distinction between the immediate content which the sign is and that content of which it is the sign. In the sign the matter (intuition) "does not count positively or as representing itself, but as representative of something else" (Enc.Phil.Spir. ¶458, p. 212). Thus "[t]he sign is some immediate intuition, representing a totally different import from what naturally belongs to it; it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed, and where it is conserved" (Enc.Phil.Spir ¶458, Remark).

Sign-making is necessarily interpersonal: it is a highly mediated form of externalization. The sign only has its existence in communication: "[t]he arbitrary nature of the connection between the sensuous material and a general idea occurring here, has the necessary consequence that the significance of the sign must first be learned. This is especially true of language signs" (Enc.Phil.Spir. ¶457 Z. p. 212). (I will be discussing why this is so in more detail next chapter.)

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excellence, and only once we get to names do we have the first objective, universal exteriority. But the transition from signs to names in 1805-6 is the weakest in transition in the discussion of the intellect in that work. By 1830 Hegel has made an advance over this problem by inserting a further division—between symbols (which play the role signs did in 1805-6) and signs. The sign has the objective side which the symbol does not, for with the sign we are in the world of conventional communication.

The example of Jupiter was used by Kant in the CJ 183 (AK 315). There Kant explains how aesthetic attributes give rise to an aesthetic idea, using as illustration: "Jupiter’s eagle with the lightening in its claws is an attribute of the mighty King of Heaven" (Ibid.). It would be interesting to compare Hegel’s notion of symbol and Kant’s notion of aesthetic idea (and of aesthetic attributes). But we do not have the time to go into that here.

"Now the general idea, liberated from the image’s content, in making its freely selected external material into something that can be intuitively perceived, produces what has to be called a sign—in specific distinction from symbol. The sign must be regarded as a great advance on the symbol. Intelligence, in indicating something by a sign, has finished with the content of intuition, and the sensuous material receives for its soul a signification foreign to it. Thus, for example, a cockade, or a flag, or a tomb-stone, signifies something totally different from what it immediately indicates" (Enc.Phil.Spir. ¶457 Z. p. 212).
But at the level of the sign there is still negation left to be made before we come to objective, scientific communication, since the sign is still tied to the image. Negation is required to distance even further the content of thought and what conveys that content—a negation which does away with the image altogether as the only necessary or possible medium of representation, and which makes room for the arbitrariness of names—for tones and alphabetical combinations which make up names. So the two forms of communication at the level of the imagination (symbol and sign) are still fraught with difficulty from the objective point of view: the symbol, bound to the image, risks sending the interpreter off on a false associative track. Instead of Jupiter being represented as strong by the eagle, it might be taken that Jupiter had good eyesight. While a sign organizes meaning for individuals in a community, it still relies on the image, and the arbitrariness of that image in relation to its meaning is only countered by convention—by the convention of the sign meaning a certain thing. Without convention the sign might be mistaken for a symbol, with the differentiation the symbol presents, since the sign is still tied to the image.

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While the mind of course reproduces abstract ideas, Hegel is careful to point out that the power of the imagination is the reproduction of images, not of abstract ideas.\(^{200}\) It appears too that if the imagination is in its early moments only generative of universals and not also capable of recalling universals, then the imagination’s production of a given symbol is a one-time event;

further use of the symbol would involve remembering the imagination's three step path of generating the images, subsuming them under the universal, and generating an image which represents that universal. When this path is traversed a second, plus n times, we are traversing the imagination's activity, rather than merely imagining. This traversing is the activity proper to memory, and belongs to the making of signs.  

But there are some difficulties here. Let us look at Symbol-making Phantasie. In creating a symbol, a particular image is used as a means for the expression of a universal. The mind has made of the particular a thing which stands generally for other things. Hegel describes the dialectical dance between the universal and the image which represents it:

In the subjective sphere where we now find ourselves, the general idea [allgemeine Vorstellung] is the inward side; the image, on the other hand, is the external side. These two mutually opposed determinations, to begin with, still fall apart, but in their dividedness are one-sided. The former lacks externality, figuration, and the latter, elevation to the expression of a determinate universal.

...The truth of these two sides is, therefore, their unity. More exactly, this unity, the imaging of the universal and the generalization of the image, comes about not by the general idea uniting with the image to form a neutral, so to speak, chemical product, but by the idea actively proving itself to be the substantial power over the image, subjugating it as an accident, making itself into the image's soul, and becoming in the image for itself, inwardizing itself, manifesting its own self.

...Intelligence, having brought about this unity of the universal and the particular, of the inward and the outward, of idea (representation [Vorstellung]) and intuition, and in this way restoring the totality present in intuition as now authenticated [but only subjective so—JB], the ideating activity is completed within itself in so far as it is productive imagination.

...This forms the formal aspect of art; for art represents the true universal, or the Idea [Idee] in the form of sensuous existence, of the image (Enc. Phil. Spir. Z. ¶456 p. 210).

201 Looking ahead, memory's activity itself only becomes apparent—or in-itself and for consciousness—at an even more developed stage: when the signs are detached from images altogether. An increasingly developed memory is an increasingly developed Spirit.
Hegel asserts that the reproduced content of the imagination is impressed (geprégt) with the universality which is the I. Thus the difference between the symbol and the universal signified by it is the self. So the self is in a sense finding itself as well as the image when it signifies (or symbolizes in a repetitive way). It is that difference which, when realized as a power of the intellect, makes it possible to be more free in choosing what image will represent the universal representation. This freedom lies precisely in the difference between that which is represented and that which represents. It is this freedom that allows for the creation not only of repeated symbols, but of signs.

The sign is different from the symbol: for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the visible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbol; whereas in the sign, strictly so-called, the natural attributes of the intuition, and the connotation of which it is a sign, have nothing to do with each other. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in the use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather than as symbolical (Enc. Phil. Spir. ¶458, p. 213).202

What Hegel means by the self here needs to be explained. I would like to come at this problem by discussing symbols and repetition.

Repeated traversing of the imaginative pathways is precisely what must be done in the making of signs as opposed to one-time only symbols. Hegel does not address the question of the repetition of a symbol, though it is clear that insofar as symbols are used in art and as a way of communicating, they depend upon repetition and conventional associations (which they take up or from which they deviate). My answer as to why Hegel does not discuss repetition is that

202 "Das Zeichen ist vom Symbol verschieden, einer Anschauung, deren eigene Bestimmtheit ihrem Wesen und Begriffe nach mehr oder weniger der Inhalt ist, den sie als Symbol ausdrückt; beim Zeichen als solchem hingegen geht der eigene Inhalt der Anschauung und der, dessen Zeichen sie ist, einander nichts an. Als bezeichnend beweist daher die Intelligenz eine freiere Willkür und Herrschaft im Gebrauch der Anschauung denn als symbolisierend" (Enz. Phil. G ¶458, s. 270).
artistic use of symbols presupposes Sign-making Phantasie, it presupposes repetitions at a higher level. But then is Hegel right to introduce art-symbols before sign-making?

To answer this, let us look at private meaning systems, using as example the infant's pleasure at the familiar sensation of its mother's breast, and the association it has for the infant of satisfying its hunger. These associations with the breast do not involve consciousness of the repetition involved, even though the infant is conscious of its pleasure, of the sensation, and of the image, and even though the child has the same response over and over and each successive sight of the breast. We would say that the child is having an experience of the familiar, and that the breast is a kind of proto-symbol for the child of the satisfaction of hunger.

But according to Hegel the familiar arises out of recollection, when "Ich erinnere mich." The infant is not remembering to itself. Thus insofar as Hegel is trying to give a genetic account of the psychological moment, the status of the "Ich" in that statement is problematic. We must conclude that Hegel cannot give a genetic account of the familiar without returning to it from the fully developed "Ich." The moment of "Recollection" is our moment, not the child's, even if what we are doing is returning to the same activity as the child. As long as we keep both the genetic and the "returning" in mind, we can think the moments through both ways. When "we" return to the level of thinking the familiar, then the "I" performing that task is involved in the repetition: "Ich erinnere mich."

I have developed this argument here, because the same kind of argument must be used to explain why Hegel includes art in symbol-making Phantasie. It is a return of a systematic self to the level of the inception of symbols. The child has the prototype of a symbol, but the breast only becomes a symbol once the child is able to consciously perform the act of recollecting the
system of associations involved by using the image or intuition of the breast to call them up. But to have a "system" of associations implies a self familiar with system, that is, familiar with an objective, universal synthesis. It implies communication. It is only with the consciousness of a fully developed communicative "I" that systematicity can be attributed to recollection. Let me explain further.

The condition of systematicity for Hegel is consciousness of repetition, even for the most minimal system of I=I. System implies self-consciousness. But for Hegel the simple system of a person's identity implies the radical alterity of an other universaliser—another human being. It is one thing to say that for pragmatic reasons we abandon private associations in favour of social ones that work. But the issue is deeper: the very possibility of having a private, intentionally repeated association—a private symbol—could only be for the purposes of communicating identity; but the desire for identity only arises when the symbol-image is recognized not to be the finite representation it was meant to be, not to be the singular association I mean, but rather a plurality of associations which were not meant.\(^{203}\) And such a revelation—that the symbolic image is a plurality of associations and not at all simple—arises through negation. And that negation—if it is not to presuppose the repetition or self-consciousness which we are trying to explain—must come from other consciousnesses. It must be in the face of another person's interpretation of the symbol,\(^{204}\) another person's different interpretation or their perplexity—their different association with the same image, that causes the repetition

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\(^{203}\) As far as I understand Lacan's psychoanalytic, genetic account, the symbolic arises precisely at such a point of rupture—when eg. the child recognizes that the mother ('s breast) means something other than what the child took her (it) simply to be.

\(^{204}\) —the moment of Seinige for them: its being theirs—
necessary for identity. Therefore so-called private meaning systems not only presuppose communication, but to be properly systematic (which means to continue to be systematic) they require repeated communication. The reason for repeating a symbolic association can only be for the purpose of ordering (an) experience according to an internal identity system; to be properly systematic it would have to be opened up to external exchange. The artistic symbol is not different from the sign in this way.

But for Hegel the object which captures the above development in the genetic account is not the symbol but the sign. The sign gives form as much to the intention to signify as to the relation it establishes. It gives form to the interpretive act, and thus implies another person. The difference which is the subject, between the universal and the image used to represent it, is a recognized difference. An artistic symbol must already imply such intention, and in fact be playing on the sign-system. Had he discussed symbols only as incipient failures to externalize meaning, he would have been staying within the genetic story of the difference between symbol and sign. But his inclusion of art-symbolism before sign-making Phantasie is indicative of the necessity of thinking the genesis through in terms of a self-conscious return to the moments.

So Hegel is entitled to bring in the "Ich" when he is discussing the inception of familiarity, and, more importantly here, he is entitled to discuss art when he is giving a genetic account of symbol-making Phantasie: art is just the shape of the "Ich" which "we" return to when we return to using only symbols. But we must nonetheless be clear that, insofar as Hegel is giving a genetic account, system and self are not yet there when the symbolic associations first arise.

But let us return to sign-making Phantasie. We noted that for system there had to be
negation, and that only another person could provide this at this level; we also noted that the sign is the only representation which captures that dialectic. One can see how the requisite recognition is a kind of death; it is negation and determination of the merely subjective attempt at meaning, of the imagination's symbolic spontaneity; and any reification, any identity, is fixity, non-movement. The imagination's association is fixed in the sign. In the symbol (speaking in terms of the genetic account) the association was still fluid: the association is meant, but without negation it is unfixed, unstable. But for sign-making Phantasie what is meant is externally fixed in the sign. Therefore when Hegel says that, for example, the pyramid is the sign of the buried dead leader, one might say that Hegel is playing on the notion of the leader--the imagination's spontaneity--being now a pathway, a repetition, a transferring, no longer in-itself or for itself but being-in-and-for-itself for other. As such it has died and gained a new life: imagination's spontaneity is the interpreting and interpreted subject in the system of language.

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Representation (Vorstellung) is the middle term in the elevation of the intellect to thought.205 The dialectic from intuition to thought is one from a relation between subject and object, in which the two are separate (intuition), to a relation in which the two are united (thought).

But in representation the dialectic is not only between subject and object--it is as also between Being and Universality (Sein und Allgemeinheit).206 The power which brings the

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205 "die Mitte in dem Schlusse der Erhebung der Intelligenz;"

206 Representation is "die Verknüpfung der beiden Bedeutungen der Beziehung-auf-sich, nämlich des Seins und der Allgemeinheit, die im Bewußtsein als Objekt und Subjekt bestimmt sind" (Enz.Phil.G. par. 455 A.).
different images under one universal representation, is indeed the power of the Intellect itself.\textsuperscript{207} But we are not to think of the subsumption only in terms of images being subsumed: \textit{singulars} are brought under a universal. Hegel writes: "the association of representations is therefore to be grasped as the subsumption of the singular under a universal, a subsumption which makes up their interconnection" \textit{(Enc. Phil. Spir. \#456)}.\textsuperscript{208}

But by what rule or law does the binding into a universal occur? or in other words what governs the imagination's synthesis? What is this universality?

Let us begin by looking again at the synthesis of the first moment of the imagination, and at associations of images. A given image is an inner manifold subjectively synthesised. We can turn for help to Hegel's earlier lecture (1803-4). Because the imagination operates temporally as well as spatially, this synthesis—as it appears in time—is a sequence of associations. It only appears as if the image were singular: but movement (mediation) makes this actually impossible. The pictured image is a manifold and is subject to the unfolding of its concept into the associations which make it up. An image, or a part of an image, is only as solid as it appears in contrast with that from which it is differentiated.

We can explain this further by drawing an analogy between the image and the object of perception in Chapter 2 of the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}. An image is the dialectical unity of

\textsuperscript{207} Hegel indicates the falsehood of attributing the creation of universality to the images getting together in the mind by a force other than the mind itself. It is the mind which is the power to create universality, and nothing else: [it is better in the German than in Miller's translation]

\textsuperscript{208} "Auch die Assoziation der Vorstellungen ist daher als Subsumtion der einzelnen unter eine allgemeine, welche deren Zusammenhang ausmacht, zu fassen."
characteristics, in the way that the object of perception is a complex matrix of properties defined by their oppositions to each other and to their own opposites in the dialectic of a unifying and discriminating consciousness. But the imagination does not—indeed cannot—distinguish its object (the image) in the way that readers of the Perception Chapter do in the *Phenomenology*: the imagination merely reproduces its image, and it does so under the general form of universality. Its contradictions are embedded associations and are not apparent until thought becomes involved. In the *Phenomenology*, on the other hand, thought is involved in the shape of the "we," from the start.

But why do we end up with certain associations and not others? To return to the question: Is there a rule governing the associations? Hegel makes it clear that at the level of association there is not. He asserts generally that "[t]he content reproduced, belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence, and an out-put from its universal mine, has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for the images" (*Enc. Phil. Spir.* ¶ 455).²⁰⁹ But Hegel is clear: this representation supplying the link is not a rule—the synthesis occurs according to caprice and accident (*Willkür* and *Zufälligkeit*), "the opposite of a rule."²¹⁰

The train of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacant-minded ideation, where, though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal universality, the matter is entirely pictorial.²¹¹

²⁰⁹ "Der reproduzierte Inhalt, als der mit sich identischen Einheit der Intelligenz gehörend und aus deren allgemeinem Schachte hervorgestellt, hat eine allgemeine Vorstellung zur assoziierenden Beziehung der Bilder" (*Enz. Phil. G.* par. 455).

²¹⁰ "das Gegenteil eines Gesetzes" (*Enz. Phil. G.* par 455 p. 262-3)

So Hegel, unlike Kant, does not speak of the rules of association. So much for mere associations.

With regard to the synthesis of the second moment of the imagination—the creation of universals (representations)—Hegel specifies that it is no longer a mere "formal universality" at work. During his discussion of universality in paragraph 456 he remarks:

...here intelligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally definite, concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own, derived from some interest, some latent concept or Ideal principle, so far as we may by anticipation speak of such (Enc. Phil. Spir. ¶456, p. 209).212

While this touches upon the issue, it leaves us in the dark: what could such an "interest" be? what is the "latent concept or Ideal principle" which will only be discussed later if at all? Hegel gives us no clues here. But on the basis of our discussion above, we know that it will have to do with Phantasie as communication, with language. This remains a central question, one which we must go on to discuss later.213

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To move to the Sign-making Phantasie we must develop universality further. We asserted generally above that the principle according to which the synthesis occurs is the self: the image is impressed with the self. To a degree we have shown why this—as it so simply stands—cannot be the answer: the difference necessary for a systematic synthesis is interpersonal determination. Nevertheless, the role of the self must be discussed.

212 "Die Intelligenz ist aber an ihr nicht nur allgemeine Form, sondern ihre Innerlichkeit ist in sich bestimmte, konkrete Subjektivität von eigenem Gehalt, der aus irgendeinem Interesse, ansichseidem Begriffe oder Idee stammt, insofern von solchem Inhalte antizipierend gesprochen werden kann" (Enz. Phil. G. par. 456).

213 Cf. my Chapter 5.
In ¶455 Hegel invites us to look to ¶20 of his Encyclopedia Logic. In that Logic section Hegel discusses the distinction between Vorstellungen and Gedanken, and he explains why the self is the universal.

As we have seen, the beginning of representation is the moment of intuition inwardized and become mine. But it is only truly mine when I pull it out of the night. Prior to that it is unconscious. Its being mine is equivalent to its being universal, since the self is the form of universality—the self is that to which synthetic unity is referred. When there is a Vorstellung, a representation, the object is universal—it is mine and has being, a being instituted by me. However, neither the self nor the universal representation has concrete universality until it becomes articulate.

When I give the universal external shape, it comes to be for others as well as for me—it becomes subjectively concrete in a public way. The key to the transition from a private into a public space is the self: the 'I' above all is the abstract universal; "when I say 'I,' I mean me as this one excluding all others; but what I say ('I') is precisely everyone, an 'I' that excludes all others from itself" (Logic, ¶20, p. 51). Hegel goes on:

Kant employed the awkward expression, that I "accompany" all my representations—and my sensations, desires, actions etc. too. "I" is the universal in and for itself, and

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214 He also notes, however, that it is the business of philosophy to raise Vorstellungen not only to the level of language and thought, but also to the level of Reason (Begriff). "The distinction between representation and thought is all the more important because we can say in general that philosophy does nothing but transform representations into thoughts—although, of course, it does go on to transform the mere thought into the Concept." (The Encyclopaedia Logic, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, H. S. Harris. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991. [¶20, p. 50]. Hereafter simply Logic p.).

215 "The distinction of the sensible from thought is to be located in the fact that the determination of the sensible is singularity, and since the singular (in quite abstract terms, the atom) stands also within a context, the sensible is a [realm of] mutual externality whose proximate abstract forms are juxtaposition and succession. —Representation has sensible material of this kind as its content; but it is posited in the determination of its being mine—that the represented content is in me—and of its universality, of its self-relation, or of its simplicity" (Logic, ¶20 p. 49).
communality is one more form—although an external one—of universality. All other humans have this in common with me, to be "I," just as all my sensations, representations, etc., have in common that they are mine. But, taken abstractly as such, "I" is pure relation to itself, in which abstraction is made from representation and sensation, from every state as well as from every peculiarity of nature, of talent, of experience, and so on. To this extent, "I" is the existence of the entirely abstract universality, the abstractly free. Therefore "I" is thinking as a subject...(Logic ¶20, p. 51).

The move from Vorstellen to Denken (within philosophical psychology) is the move from imagination to language. In the transition the imagination's associative pathways, and its subsumption of images under universals, become suffused with universality. But this process is also that by which the I becomes developed, determinate. Just as in symbol-making we saw that the universal subjugates the image "as an accident,...[and makes] itself into the image's soul," in language

thought is itself and its other,...it overgrasps its other and...nothing escapes it. And because language is the work of thought, nothing can be said in language that is not universal (Logic, ¶20 p. 50).

Once we have this universality, and the communication which it is, we can go back to merely private symbols, but we cannot make sense to others with them. Hegel declares in no uncertain terms: "...I cannot say what I merely mean. And what cannot be said—feeling, sensation—is not what is most important, most true, but what is most insignificant, most untrue" (Logic, ¶20, p. 50-518). The self, then, is the form of universality. But it does not as such determine the content of the synthesis.

**Conclusion**

This final version of the Philosophy of Spirit presents more determinate moments of the imagination than either of the earlier Jena lectures. Also, in the distinction of symbol and sign
Hegel has provided a clearer distinction between subjective and objective externalizations. The tension between a genetic account and an account of the self's return to these levels of consciousness is still present, but I think we have given an adequate account of how we can maintain both sides.

It is worth taking stock as well, at this point, of the change in Hegel's terminology from the earliest Jena works to this final version of the *Philosophy of Spirit*. We have seen the "Night," the abyss of Reason gradually changed into the "nächtlicher Schacht"—the nightly mine. In the *Differenzschrift* and in *Faith and Knowledge* the former was the return to the indifference point, the sinking of the finite into negation, a return to the absolute's originary sundering. We have seen how in 1803-4 *Geistesphilosophie* this process is discussed as the time-space dialectic of the imagination; how later in the 1805-6 *Geistesphilosophie* the Night is a determining inwardizing movement of the imagination--time—the negation that places the world over against a subject, the dialectical repetition of which reveals it to be the power of reproducing images out of the inner self and synthesising them; and we have seen how in 1830, the imagination is the nightly mine, *Schacht*, in and through which communication arises. What was in the earlier works the absolute sundering imagination, remains in the end the absolute sundering imagination, but with an important difference: the sundering becomes recognized as the *aufhebende* movement of self-representing consciousness, a self-representing which finds its difference not only in the negative inwardizing, but just as necessarily in the determinate differences of symbol and sign-making imagination. In other words, in the earlier works Hegel is mostly concerned with the genesis of the Absolute, and therefore the Absolute is characterized in the more metaphorical terms of the "Night" and the "abyss." But in the following Jena years Hegel develops his notion
of Spirit, and so gradually his concern lies not only with the genesis, but also with the Spirit of the Absolute; community and language play an increasingly central role in the dialectic of the imagination—a point which as we will soon see, is important in understanding the role of imagination in the Phenomenology. Hegel therefore turns to the metaphor of the Schacht, no doubt because it more adequately represents consciousness's aufhebende movement—the going in or inwardizing negative movement, the aufbewahren of representations as an inner manifold, and the synthesis out of the darkness of that inner manifold, which latter process is itself a determining motion requiring negation, plurality and synthesis. Aufhebende consciousness is thus a circular, reflective process of 'mining' experience, a mining which is also a development of it. So we can see that his original concern with the Night of the Absolute, has been recognized as a concern for the depth of Spirit. Now we must look more closely at what that means.

The biggest question which this 1830 Philosophy of Spirit discussion of the imagination leaves undeveloped is what the "latent content" is from which the universal syntheses of the imagination are derived, and whether this derivation involves some rule. We can develop this problem in more detail in the next chapter. This involves expanding on the third moment of the imagination—Sign-making Phantasie—by appealing to the third moment of Representation—Memory. We also expand on it by looking at the artist's activity, and at the 'Religion of Imagination.'
PART II

Imagination in Practice: "Objective Authentication"

While Part I established the theoretical groundwork of what the imagination is according to the Geistesphilosophie and the Philosophy of Spirit, Part II concerns the objective authentication of imagination. I discuss the "latent content" from which imagination derives its representations; and I discuss the relation of the philosophical psychology of Spirit to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Then I take a closer look at the third moment of the imagination—Sign-Making Phantasie—in relation to Memory. I then look at two cases of objective authentication—in the individual artist and as a stage of absolute Spirit in Hegel's version of Hinduism. It is upon the externalization of the imagination's products into interpersonal contexts, and what memory preserves in this process, that artistic and religious communication depends.

In memory, artistic creation and religion, we are dealing with the primacy of 'wakened Spirit.' The problem here is how to relate this Spirit to its depth. The discussion involves how, in its artistic and religious education, Spirit discovers (erfinder) itself in representation without, on the one hand, encountering the Scylla of unmediated subjective monstrosities, and on the other, being swallowed by the Kharybdis of romantic or religious self-certainty.

That discussion prepares us for Part III in which I show that imagination in the practice of philosophy is phenomenology. And I therefore discuss the role of the imagination in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
Chapter 5

Transition: Memory: The Artist and The Religion of Imagination

According to the Berlin Lectures.

Transition

Since we have been discussing Hegel’s final psychological discussion of the imagination in his 1830 Philosophy of Spirit, we can for the sake of exposition, spend some time in this chapter investigating pertinent sections of Hegel’s lectures from around that time: specifically the lectures on Aesthetics and on The Philosophy of Religion. This will enable us to return, in Part III, to a reading of the imagination—and its apparent absence—in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

I would like to begin this discussion by reiterating the problem passage we encountered last chapter with regard to the second moment of the imagination.

...even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal, which forms their connecting link. But here intelligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally definite, concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own, derived from some interest, some latent concept or Ideal principle, so far as we may by anticipation speak of such (Phil.Spir. ¶456 p. 209).

In calling forth images from the mine under a certain principle, the imagination produces Vorstellung—clusters of associations impressed with the mark of the self’s unity. It creates
something familiar, something (subjectively) universal. The problem is, what is the "interest" by which such a representational unity arises? Are we simply to take the Kantian epistemological structure and presume a synthetic unity of apperception lying behind the manifold of intuition, which, through the imagination, unifies the manifold according to categories? Clearly this model does not work with Hegel: we cannot presuppose any condition of experience, any unity lying behind the unity which presents itself. While we have seen that the self is the form of universality, we have also seen that the self develops according to the content. So where does "the latent content or Ideal principle" come from? Notice Hegel does not say "latent concept." This is significant: had he placed the onus of unity on concept we might have been able to use the Kantian model, for then the mind would be the principle. But even then, we know that the latent concept is not the self, but Spirit: or, the "I" only in so far as it is a "we." But Hegel says "derived from some...latent content." Are we to understand then that the representations created by the imagination (in its second moment) are generated by the unfolding of simply some other, earlier generated representation, and that this procedure goes on ad infinitum? Does not this do away with Hegel's genetic account of representation? of the imagination as genesis of representations?

We have a problem: if the latent content is another representation we cannot explain the inception of representation for the first time; if the latent content is not another representation, but rather images from the night unified for the first time, we have no answer as to what it is according to which images are organized into a representation.
I have tried to argue elsewhere that the imagination is the inception of meaning; that it does not presume a particular teleology, but rather that its generation of representations is the inception of subjective teleology. The reason it is the inception, I argued, is that it is at this point in Hegel's account of the genesis of subjective spirit that representations arise; and the representations have only the form of universality, not concrete expression. From the above citation it is clear however that we are not dealing merely with the "form" of universality, for Hegel says "here intelligence is more than merely a general form." Nevertheless, while the self is "subjectively concrete" it is not concretely articulate(d) at this point. So the form of the representations is incomplete. The self only has reality insofar as it is the unity of something, and at this point it is only the unity of representations not yet articulated in the external world. Its reality is one-sided: the self is not yet in and for itself, for its object is not generated in and through others. Therefore, in the genetic account, the second moment of the imagination cannot be a synthesising in the service of a self which is in and for itself. It must rather be merely part of the inception of such a self.

The genetic account allows me to stress the role of the first two moments of imagination—reproduction out of the night and synthesis under a representation (Symbol-making Phantasie)—as radical and originary, rather than always already in the service of a prior, latent content which is already a representation. It stresses the independence of the two moments of the imagination from Spirit. But the genetic account is only one side of the picture. It presents the first two

\[216\] In "Hegel, Imagination and the Nocturnal Pit," presented to the Canadian Philosophical Association, June 1996.

\[217\] This argument was made against John Sallis' faulty attribution to Hegel of the view that imagination acted in the service of Spirit's self-presentation in a way which did not account for the originary nature of the imagination in the creation of Spirit.
moments of the imagination as comprehensive, as hermetic. The other side is that imagination’s syntheses are a sequential unfolding. So the other side is that there is always already a latent content, prior syntheses which are synthesized into new shapes.

If we isolate the two sides, we get the difference between the genetic account and the account which takes the latent content to be representational already. This difference gives rise to the two directions of development which typify this imaginative level of consciousness: it both generates images out of the night by itself—the imagination lifts itself up by its own boot straps—*es hebt sich auf* (and it is the first moment of consciousness to do so); but it also does this in a temporally determinate sequence—it raises itself out of what is already there, out of what (it) already is. The imagination is the first difference in the mind of these two moments—comprehension, and sequential development. This is a marvellous juncture in which to analyze *Aufhebung*: it is the first real moment of subjective infinity—the intellect has the power to synthesize, and there is an infinity of potential representations which can be synthesized out of the night. The imagination is the first circle of reflection of the intellect upon its content, and the content is infinite precisely because of the intellect’s synthetic power. So in one respect the imagination is circular: the night from which images are drawn is the night which does the drawing up. But in another respect it never quite comprehends itself—the latency of the content, like the future it would take to reveal the content entirely, remains the ground of an infinite teleology.\(^{218}\) The ideality of the principle figures—finds expression—in the attempted

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\(^{218}\) It is like Kant’s experience of purposiveness without a purpose (cf. *C/I*, Analytic of the Beautiful), except that Kant stands over against the beautiful object and asserts that it is "as if" the object—as if nature—were that purposiveness without a purpose, whereas Hegel’s model takes us into a reflective space: the subject synthesizes from its mine (*Schacht*), not from an ‘external’ manifold; Hegel’s manifold (whether of intuitions or of ideas) is an *inward* folding, and any externality has that mediating process always already as part of it. Hegel thus makes it impossible to think nature outside of our construction of it from the mine, and so there is no point in saying that
comprehension; but such comprehension always opens up to further configurations.

If we watch as the imagination generates its representations, it does so of its own power: as we recall in from the 1805-6 *Geistesphilosophie*, the imagination is time, time unfolding the content. But if we look at the imagination’s synthesis in temporal sequence, a representation arises out of some prior *content*, and the imagination as that prior content is further mediated in the production of a new representation. The imagination thus appears as a sequence of representations modifying themselves one out of another. Representations in this view are only spatial determinations insofar as they are isolated events.\(^{219}\)

But we have not really answered the question as to what the principle is by which the syntheses occur—we have only explained the necessary dialectic between subjective genesis and the subjective temporal unfolding of syntheses, at the level of the second moment of the imagination. For the answer we must look to the next dialectic moment of the imagination—*Sign-making Phantasie*. For without externalization and reinternalization there is no memory, and without memory the genesis of syntheses is not a real genesis, but only an unconscious play. The latent content turns out to be language—more precisely, the life of language in/as the community into which the individual consciousness is born and through which it is educated.

But turning to these moments will only give us the form of the answer as to what the latent content must be. We explained earlier that for Hegel real, concrete (*actual*) genesis of synthetic unities requires radical alterity, and for Hegel there is nothing as radically other as another consciousness: another consciousness is another form of universality, indeed another

\(^{219}\) Insofar as the content of a given representation has temporal coordinates, these nevertheless stand in relation to other times, and are thus spatially comprehended.
universe. In the *Philosophy of Spirit* psychology, however, Hegel is concerned with one consciousness' development into objectivity, and he writes of language as being the "first true being of Spirit as Spirit—it is there as the unity of two free selves" (*G 2175*). But he states this without developing the dialectic between two selves. This is because he is not concerned to show the development of the latent content, but only the moments which give rise to its synthesis. For a development of the latent content one must go to the content of experience, to the science of the content of experience—in other words, to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

We can see from this discussion that the two dialectic moments of the imagination’s development at issue here are characterized by the difference between the *philosophical psychology* of Spirit and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The site of the *philosophical psychology* is a spatial one: we are looking at the mind as an object. We are already speculative scientists comprehending it. The developments of the mind are seen predominantly in a spatial way. Even though Hegel is careful to repeatedly stress that the moments are not in fact independent of one another and that we are not to look at the soul as a sack full of faculties, the moments must nevertheless be grasped as determinate. To have a Philosophy of Spirit is to look at the moments as *bestehende*, as having a certain definition.

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* on the other hand, is predominantly a temporal development: the reader moves through dialectical opposites; consciousness develops according to the unfolding dialectical progression of syntheses. Only the occasionally interjected "we" of the *Phenomenology* is a speculative, *bestehende* moment which comprehends (grasps) its own

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The most common mistake I have found among people with only a general knowledge of Hegel is that they view "thesis, antithesis, synthesis" spatially, rather than as the movement of their own consciousness.
concept as developing.

In Berlin Hegel writes that the Phenomenology is a propaedeutic for Speculative Science. It is therefore also a propaedeutic for a philosophical psychology, which is part of Speculative Science. But his phenomenology and his psychology are two sides of the same lesson about time and space, and about imagination's representative power: one is predominantly a temporal, the other spatial expression of the lesson. True Speculative philosophy must keep them both in mind. 221

As stated above, generally speaking, the latent content, the ideal principle according to which the imagination derives its syntheses, is the community of interpreters in which the subject is embedded, into which it was born and according to which s/he recollects herself. The content is latent from the point of view of the genetic account: the embedded individual learns to communicate with the already existent language users; the individual's syntheses are derived

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221 Otherwise, with regard to the Phenomenology, anyone arguing the primacy of the moments as bestehende can argue that for Hegel the historical content of the Phenomenology is fixed (e.g. that the Unhappy Consciousness is necessarily only that of the medieval Catholic Monk) and anyone arguing that the moments are vergehende will argue that they are not fixed, that the historical moments are merely examples and have no necessary relation to one another. On a larger scale, anyone arguing the former would assert that Absolute Spirit is a Unity, and someone arguing the latter, that it is a movement, and that its content is inessential. Similarly, the former position would make of absolute knowing the fixed knowledge—the sum—of all previous phenomenological moments; the latter would make it their movement without interest in the necessity of their connections. But a reasoned understanding (vernünftiges Verstehen) of the Phenomenology involves the interplay of both: thus the Unhappy Consciousness is a moment in the historical material development of consciousness in the history of Spirit as Hegel (belonging to a moment in the historical material development of Spirit in the West) understood that history; but it is no less the moment of any other consciousness which exhibits the same dialectical struggle, whether she be a 19th century Marxist or a 20th century Buddhist (Cf. J. Burbidge: "Man, God, and Death in Hegel's Phenomenology" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Brown University, VXLI, #2, Dec. 1981). The only qualification to the latter is that according to Hegel that struggle would be said to occur in the context of an Absolute Spirit which did not and could not exist (we can add—in the West—) at the time of the medieval Monk. The western Medieval interpretive exchanges (Spirit) could not have made it possible for that Monk to imagine as real the possibility of his salvation outside of membership in the Church. And Hegel would add, I think, that the "final" realization of a Buddhist would not be distinguishable from Hegel's 'Absolute Knowing,' except that the particular history of Hegel's Absolute Knowing could only have arisen in the West after the Reformation, the French Revolution, and the Enlightenment.
from exchanges with that community. But the content is latent from the point of view of the community as well, for language and its use are not fixed: language derives its being from the interpreting individuals. Spirit's self-interpretation is (in and through) individual consciousnesses. Nevertheless, there is still, at the level of the second moment of the imagination (and therefore present throughout the third and higher levels), the spontaneity of productive imagination as *Aufhebung*, as the Concept. Thus while the primacy in sign-making is communal and conceptual content, that includes the earlier, merely internal imaginative syntheses, and the primacy there is their unraveling as the content of a merely subjective Concept.

It is often asked whether Hegel's Spirit is truly originary, or simply appropriative, totalizing; and similarly it has been asked of the *Phenomenology* whether Hegel is trying to justify an Absolute Spirit with an all-inclusive history, or whether in it he reveals the necessity of the new, a necessity which exceeds formation and in so doing negatively comprehends all of Spirit's self-presentations. Given our discussion above, the question is easily answered: if the imagination were not originary, how else could *Aufhebung* preserve itself in the act whereby it gives itself a world? The original spontaneity of the absolute's self-sundering has not disappeared; it has been recognized as a moment in the genesis of Spirit, as a moment of Spirit, that is, as a moment belonging originally and continuously to Spirit.

But the problem of taking Hegel in a one-sided way is perhaps more difficult with regard to the *Philosophy of Spirit* psychology. Our problem of finding out what the "latent content" was, arose because of the genetic versus the "return of Spirit" derivations of the moments. Of that work one is therefore tempted to ask, how can an account of *Aufhebung* preserve the reality of *Aufhebung*, rather than just the letters of it? How can it grasp the *Spirit* of the letters? The
language of the Philosophy of Spirit contains this opposition which is also a return. Its language is supposed to reflect the circularity of genesis and return. But the tension between trying to give a genetic account on the one hand, and yet in order to do so having to go back, from the fully advanced philosophical standpoint to earlier states of mind, is a tension that we have seen since Hegel’s first attempts at a Philosophy of Spirit in 1803-4. Getting to the heart of the content-concept dialectic at any level of consciousness is very difficult to do in the form of a Philosophy of Spirit, even after the propaedeutic of a phenomenology. I think it is a struggle for Hegel even in the final version of the Philosophy of Spirit. Nevertheless, its lesson for us has been that we must view any representational development in both a spatial and a temporal way. This is no small contribution to our understanding—of Hegel or in general. It is therefore worth returning to it now, to look more closely at memory and its relation to objective, authentic (Sign-Making) Phantasie.

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We have generally claimed that for Hegel the "latent content" is language. Heidegger is

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222 I think it is John Sallis’ failure to see this problem which leads him to want to concoct an imagination which "exceeds" Spirit.

223 Witness again Fragment 17 of the 1803 lectures.

224 The fact that Hegel is taken up, particularly on the basis of his late texts, as advocating the comprehensiveness of Absolute Spirit at the expense of its originary and developmental side, is evidence that Hegel did not entirely succeed.

In representation, Spirit becomes finite and loses itself; this loss is a necessary moment of purposiveness: it is universal determination. The complete path of purposive determination involves the inseparability of absolute negation and absolute determination.

Unlike Fragment 17 from 1803, I think the truth of this formulation gets lost in Hegel’s Berlin work, or is at least replaced by expressions which lend themselves easily to a totalizing view of Absolute Spirit articulated by so many commentators on and detractors of Hegel’s Berlin writings and lectures. We will see some of the problem in our discussion below of Hegel’s theory of memory in 1830, and of his view of the artist.
not far off when he writes that 'Language is the house of Being.' How one interprets this statement is however the key. In Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit* discussion of the origin of language through signs and Memory, Hegel provides a great deal of insight into what this might mean.

Following our discussion of that we will look at two examples of objective authentication—artistic production and the religion of imagination. Both of these highlight how central the imagination is to such authentication. They also both illustrate a dialectic central to memory: that between mechanical repetition and spiritual profundity.

### 1. Memory

The paragraph in which Hegel discusses the objective, absolute authentication through signs is the same one in which he introduces memory (¶458).

The right place for the sign is that just given: where intelligence—which as intuiting generates the form of time and space, but appears as recipient of sensible matter, out of which it forms ideas—now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself, treating the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property, deleting the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it, and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'); since memory, which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synonymous with remembrance (recollection), and even with conception and imagination, has always to do with signs

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226 In Hegel's *Enc.Phil.Spir*. ¶459-460 deal with language. There has been plenty written on Hegel's philosophy of language. (Cf. Bodammer, *Hegels Deutung der Sprache*; Derbolav "Hegel und die Sprache" in *Sprache — Schlüssel zur Welt*; Simon, *Das Problem der Sprache bei Hegel* [see my Bibliography for full entries]). But it is not my intention to focus here on the role it plays in his philosophy, and so I am not engaging what these authors have to say. However, I think the general role and importance of language for Hegel does become apparent in my discussion.
only (Enc. Phil. Spir. ¶458 p. 213).227

Memory is the activity which a) retains the meaning of names, b) recollects the meaning of a given tone, and c) is mechanical in so far as, in performing these two functions, it is not necessarily making a sense, for we can memorize a sentence and repeat it without understanding it.

As we explained in the last chapter, memory involves the repeated traversing of the associational pathways of the imagination. Hearing a word or a sequence of words causes the mind to reproduce universals, the orders of their associations one with another, and depending on the communication, particulars subsumed under those universals. To do this memory must also be a repetition of the movement of recollection (Erinnerung): we take into our mine (Schacht) a sensible intuition—the tone of voice expressing a name. The difference from Erinnerung's simple image is that the name is already complex and a universal. But again, like Erinnerung's second moment, memory does not only take in: just as in Erinnerung another external intuition can invoke the reproduction of the image in the mine, in memory an external intuition—the tone—solicits representations from the mine. The difference between memory and Erinnerung here is that memory's representations bear the trait of the imagination's work: what is recalled is not a temporally and spatially detached image, but a representation, a universal, a synthesis of images.

As in Erinnerung, the reproduced representation is familiar to me. But memory differs from this making of the familiar, for the latter made only a subjective universal. In memory, the

227 Earlier Hegel notes in an introductory fashion that "The image produced by imagination of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symbol it adds intuitability proper; and in mechanical memory it completes, so far as it is concerned, this form of being" (Enc. Phil. Spir. ¶457 p. 211).
sign has external significance, is recognized by others to mean what it does. What is remembered not only belongs to my inner world as familiar to me, it also belongs to the world of intuited, shared utterances, with all the potential particularizations of universals into other people's particular experiences. The tone is one of a set of such intuitions common to many individual persons. Since the tone occurs in time and space it is finite and fleeting when uttered. But the meaning persists for the individual to interpret. The same is true for chains of words.

So although memory retraces the earlier moments of recollection and imagination, memory is different from these earlier moments. We have seen how it is different from recollection. It is different from symbol-making imagination (in the genetic account), first of all because that imagination does not synthesize by itself the difference between sign and signified—that requires repetition of itself, something which symbolizing imagination by itself cannot do but which memory can: memory is precisely that repetition of imagination’s synthesizing. It is for that reason that Sign-making Phantasie includes memory. But it is also different from symbolizing imagination because in memory the object has already been externalized by the imagination; the difference between sign and signified is therefore the space of other people’s particular syntheses/experiences of the expressed universal. Recognition of that space is Spirit awake to itself as such.228

But because of this multiplication of particulars under one universal, both in the individual’s experience and by virtue of its being interpreted by many individuals, even though the name requires associations provided by the imagination, the name exceeds the imagination's

228 We recall from the 1805-6 Geistesphilosophie that Memory is "das erste sich selbst als Kraft erfassende Ich, es selbst ist die Notwendigkeit, frei von der Vorstellung—die fixierende und fixierte Ordnung—die übung des Gedächtnises ist deswegen die erste Arbeit des erwachten Geistes als Geistes" (G2 178).
comprehension. Just as Descartes' million-sided polygon can be thought but not imagined, the name exceeds imaginative comprehension:

Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its image even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representation. We think in names (Enc.Phil.Spir. ¶462).

Memory is the transition to thought precisely because it yields representations—names—which only thought can properly manage. While imagination produces images formed from intuitions, memory "has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition...; it has rather to do with an object which is the product of intelligence itself" (Enc.Phil.Spir. ¶462 p. 220). Memory differs from Sign-making Phantasie because, though implied in the latter, it also involves the latter's products in an order, a system which exceeds those products.

But memory is also limited in one way because of its repetition of those products and their being ordered in a certain way. Memory is only the "outward and existing side" of intelligence (Enc.Phil.Spir. ¶462).

We can see this if we look at the third moment of memory: mechanical repetition. As Hegel puts it:

...this reception has, at the same time, the meaning that intelligence thereby takes on the nature of a thing and to such a degree that subjectivity, in its distinction from the thing, becomes quite empty, a mindless container of words, that is, a mechanical memory. In this way the profusion of remembered words can, so to speak, switch round to become the extreme alienation of intelligence (Enc.Phil.Spir. Z. ¶462).

A subtle, difficult but central problem has arisen: Hegel is distinguishing between memorizing and really making sense. But what does it mean to really make sense? As we have seen already, on the one hand Hegel does not want believe the answer lies in the ineffable:

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229 What is inwardized has the shape of something merely external. The memory is "—such a without-book [memorized, Auswendiges] as remains locked up in the within-book [night, Inwendiges] of intelligence, and is, within intelligence, only its outward and existing side" (Enc.Phil.Spir. ¶462).
To want to think without words as Mesmer once attempted is, therefore, a manifestly irrational procedure which, as Mesmer himself admitted, almost drove him insane. But it is also ridiculous to regard as a defect of thought and a misfortune, the fact that it is tied to a word; for although the common opinion is that it is just the ineffable that is the most excellent, yet this opinion, cherished by conceit, is unfounded, since what is ineffable is, in truth, only something obscure, fermenting, something which gains clarity only when it is able to put itself into words (Enc. Phil. Spir. Z. ¶462).

Hegel offers the following explanation of the proper relation of words to things:

Accordingly, the word gives to thoughts their highest and truest existence. Of course, one can also indulge in a mass of verbiage, yet fail to grasp the matter in hand. But then what is at fault is not the word, but a defective, vague, superficial thinking. Just as the true thought is the very thing itself, so too is the word when it is employed by genuine thinking. Intelligence, therefore, in filling itself with the word, receives into itself the nature of the thing (Enc. Phil. Spir. Z. ¶462).

But this merely scratches the surface, hardly giving us insight into what Hegel takes to be making sense. The transition from mechanical memory to thinking is extremely difficult. Hegel himself says that to "comprehend the position and meaning of memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of the hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind" (Enc. Phil. Spir. ¶464). Fortunately, however, we can make progress by focusing on mechanical memory and what Hegel says about its failure to really make sense, without our having here to go on to develop the moments of thought. Our concern is, after all, with the imagination and its productions.

Two passages are of particular importance, both related to the inadequacies of memorizing. After looking at these I want to compare them with a passage in which Hegel praises the memory which youths have.

1) Reading "off the tableau of fancy":

The first passage is of special interest to us for its connection with the imagination: in
it Hegel criticises the use of memorizing techniques on the grounds that they reduce memory to the level of the imagination. As we saw, the external articulation of the imagination's syntheses places these synthetic representations in a complex system of meaningful exchanges. Therefore when they are internalized again they have new associative relations, in fact a new infinite, a new indeterminacy: the indeterminacy of interpretation. So while memory is repetition of imagination's syntheses, it is permeated with difference. This makes the content of remembered names and their relations rich, and it is in deference to this richness that Hegel rejects Mnemonic systems:

The recent attempts...to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus again deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memory is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imagination, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote.\textsuperscript{230} Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be made, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, seeing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ideas, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically impressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit [Schacht] of the ego [Ich], and thus recited, but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy (Enc.Phil.Spir. \textsuperscript{462}).\textsuperscript{231}

Though Hegel does not say it, the Mnemonic system is an inverse repetition of the moment of symbolizing: while symbolizing was the externalizing of a complex interior representation

\textsuperscript{230} An example is the Greek statesman who memorizes his speech by walking around the inside of the Parthenon and connecting various ideas to various statues, and who then in speaking later walks through the Parthenon in his mind and arrives one after the other at the ideas he wishes to present.

\textsuperscript{231} The use of the term "pit" here as a translation for Schacht is picked up by John Sallis and others. (Cf. e.g. the translated proceedings of Derrida's seminar Hegel et la pensée moderne "The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology" in Margins of Philosophy trans. Alan Bass, University of Chicago Press:Chicago, 1982 (69-108).) The term "pit," while not incorrect, obscures somewhat the determining power which we are now familiar with in the word Schacht and its translation as "mine."
through the use of an image, the Mnemonic system is an *internalizing* (memorizing) of complex universal representations by using single images. Hegel rejects this because it is essentially a step backwards from more complex to less complex; it is a regression from repetitions which are *Aufhebungen*—that is, which contain the path of increasing complexity—to repetitions which do not contain development because they are standardizations.

The question remains what Hegel means by "really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego." One can only assume that the "within" out of which true communication is produced, is the latent content—latent not only in the sense that the individual must turn to his/her (past) experience, but also in the sense of the movement of *Aufhebung*, and the *aufgehoben* cognitive activities, activities which are hidden in the immediacy of language use. Good communication makes use of the imagination. So in one sense it is true for Hegel that the deep pit of the ego is always already potentially full of all potential representations, that as Aristotle said, the mind is the place of forms;232 in one sense it is true that we need only look inward to our experience for the true meaning of the words we have learned, allowing our imagination to conjure up adequate representations for otherwise empty words. But a single, reflecting individual could not understand all communication after having heard only one word; and a solipsist could not have knowledge of the actual universe. For the content is fully mediated through the cognitive activities and through externalization and reinternalization: through intuitions, experience and communication. The "latency" of the content lies in the movement of this thorough-going cognitive and *geistige* mediation.

232 "It has been well said that the soul is the place of forms, except that this does not apply to the soul as a whole, but only in its thinking capacity, and the forms occupy it not actually but only potentially" (*De Anima*, Bk. 429a25ff. p. 165).
But it is not just this either. We recall that imagination is the middle moment in the triad constituting representation. It is the negative, determining moment (as all middle moments in Hegel are). Memory, in a meaningful recitation by heart, must make use of the negation and determination which is the imagination. The imagination is spontaneity in the sense that it is the inception of difference: between images and the universal under which they are subsumed; between the universal and the symbolic image used to represent the universal externally; between the universal and the remembered sign which represents it and invokes it. These differences are not fixed—precisely in being differences they indicate movement in an otherwise fixed order. As we have explained, imagination is not just comprehension, synthesis: it is also the movement of synthesis. Productive memory relies on the spontaneity of the imagination. Mechanical memory merely repeats reified syntheses.

The mistake of Mnemonics must therefore equally be expressed as a misuse of the imagination. The misuse consists in creating a path of associated images upon which to overlay other more developed associations. The depth that has been passed over is the depth of difference, of instability, of synthesis—of the need for synthesis. Hegel’s criticism is that the remembering does not do justice to the depth of the ideas being remembered, but remains superficial. The depth is precisely the negative, determining differences implicit in the ideas—the latent content which should unfold but does not because the signs are merely ordered, and mechanical, not alive. The Mnemonic image which is used to remember the idea, limits the idea to the level of imagistic presentation and does not let the idea spring forth in its complexity.

But while the Scylla of Mnemonic repetition no doubt devoured only a few scholars in
Hegel's time, the Kharybis of romantic inwardness forever "lurks below." This is the problem of getting too close, too familiar with the meaning of the words. We see this in our second passage.

2) The Overly Familiar

The more familiar I become with the meaning of the word, the more, therefore, that this becomes united with my inwardness, the more can the objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit], and hence the definiteness, of meaning, vanish and consequently the more can memory itself, and with it also the words, become something bereft of mind [Geistverlassenem werden] (Enc. Phil. Spir. Z. 462).

Here the pit of the ego, the inwardness of the mind, is the problem. In memorizing I can familiarize myself too much with the meaning. Its newness, its differences and spontaneity drown in the repetition. While in Mnemonics it was the association with images which prevented the complexity of the words' meanings from being raised from within, here the self swallows up the words into its depth.

But the question therefore arises: if the "objectivity" and the "definiteness" come from the outside, from language as it is alive in the exchange between people in time and space, and do not survive buried in the self, how do we reconcile this second passage with the first passage in which Hegel talks about meaningful recitation being "strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego"? We have our answer already, but let us use a third passage to help us further reconcile these too.

3) "The child is father to the man"\textsuperscript{234}

The young have a good memory because they have not yet reached the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in which the fact [\textit{die Sache}], the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesis to a subjective inwardness (\textit{Enc. Phil. Spir.} \textsection464 p.223, my bold).

We can compare the "latent content" by which the imagination synthesizes, to this "implicit content" which unfolds in the minds of the youths. Memory is exercised to the point where the pit—the self—is space, pure being. We know from the \textit{Logic} that Being pure Being is the same as Nothing, and that both find their truth in becoming. I doubt that Hegel is suggesting that the youths become so developed as to be conscious of their thought as ‘God’s thought before the creation.'\textsuperscript{235} But the exercise of memory is, nevertheless, the beginning of the objective world. "Subjective inwardness" is overcome in and through otherness, in the re-memberings of Spirit. The romantic, subjective longings of youth are resolved into communicative life.

In memory we are dealing with a loop—the implicit content is past experience, experience which unfolds into new experiences which are in turn the implicit content for new experiences and so on. The sequence has no beginning. Meaning sails between the reified cliffs of representation and the whirlpool of appropriation by the self.

Hegel has added to the last remark that the youths’ memories are exercised "with or without design." This suggests that the educational \textit{direction} (design) is not the "ideal principle"


governing the production of universal representations, but rather that the ideal principle is simply the implicit content itself unfolding in the mind. Spirit’s unfolding is an Odyssey; only a historical narrative of its genesis determines the necessity of that unfolding.

Historically the child is the parent of the adult, but also, for Hegel the differences of Spirit in communication parent the growth of Spirit in the child. The child—the spontaneity of the imagination—has been not been lost: it is precisely with the imagination that the spontaneity of difference first appears; without imaginative spontaneity there is no meaningful communication, but only mechanical repetition. It is only by virtue of such spontaneity in memory and in language, that "my heart leaps up when I behold a rainbow in the sky."236

2. Imagination and the Artist237

During the period in which Hegel was writing there raged the debate between, on the one side, such Romantic critics as the Schlegel brothers and Novalis and Hamman, who held that symbolizing was the only way to access certain realities, and on the other side the scientific, enlightened rationalists and utilitarians (following out of the Condillac-Locke view of language) who viewed language primarily as a descriptive organ used to make predominantly assertoric statements about the world.238 Viewed in the former way, the symbolizing imagination is the

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236 Wordsworth, Ibid.

237 This section deals with the activity of the artist in general. Were we to do an analysis which took into account the shapes of spirit to which artists give expression, we would have to look at all the developments of art forms in the Aesthetics, a task far beyond the aim and scope of the present thesis.

238 For this division I am drawing on Charles Taylor’s unpublished lectures on Nineteenth Century Poetics (at the Centre for Comparative Literature, University of Toronto) 1996. He does not, however, bring in the imagination as I do here.
key to understanding certain otherwise inaccessible realities. Viewed in the latter way, it is one moment in a chain of functions which are part of and in the service of rational objectification and scientific explanation.

We have seen that Hegel rejects the claim that what is ineffable is the highest truth, and we have seen likewise how for Hegel the merely symbolic remains subjective. So in a sense only the second view expressed above—that the imagination's sign-making is part of and in the service of rational objectification and scientific explanation—is Hegel's view. But our investigation into the opposition in memory between on the one hand mechanical repetition and on the other repetition from the heart, has made Hegel's position more complex than either of the two above views of language.

In Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics, this opposition between mechanical repetition and repetition from the heart is present in the discussion of the artist's imagination.

Thus on the one hand, the artist deals with the configurations of the actual world, grasping what is really there and expressing it in the medium of his/her art; unlike philosophy, for which thought is the medium, the artist's medium is "actual external configurations" (Aesth. 281). The artist must have a good memory so that s/he can absorb as much as possible as deeply as possible in order to then work on the material and make objects of art: "the artist must live and become at home in this medium. He must have seen much, heard much, and retained much, just as in general great individuals are almost always signalized by a great memory" (Aesth. p. 281).

And on the other hand Hegel appeals again and again to a kind of "depth" and 'inwardness' of the artist which is essential to creativity. Thus "bound up with precise
knowledge of the external form there must be equal familiarity with man's inner life, with the passions of his heart, and all the aims of the human soul" (Aesth. 282).

It becomes clear in his discussion however that the locus of the depth is not subjective inwardness, but the depth of Spirit. Hegel writes "there must be added an acquaintance with the way in which the inner life of the spirit expresses itself in the real world and shines through the externality thereof" (Aesth. 282 my italics). We must look more closely at what these propositions mean.

As he has done elsewhere, in these lectures Hegel rejects from the sphere of art the merely imagistic: "...the artist is not relegated to what he has manufactured by his own imagination [Einbildungen] but has to abandon the superficial 'ideal' (so-called) and enter reality itself" (Aesth. p. 281). ‘Reality’ is the interpersonal reality which memory and sign-making involve. Unreflected fancy should not predominate. In the Aesthetics generally Hegel is more concerned with the artist being "durchgeistigt" rather than merely fanciful.239

It is important to note that Hegel differentiates in these lectures between a passive imagination (bloss passiven Einbildungskraft) and Phantasie which is creative (Aesth. 281). Though he does not explain the difference in these lectures, we know from the Philosophy of Spirit that the creative Phantasie is the symbol and sign-making, the allegorizing and poetry making imagination.240 And we must assume that the symbolizing here is not the repetitionless

239 That is, with the artist being ‘thoroughly Spirit’ rather than merely rich with images. This was first pointed out to me by Bjorn Thorsteinsson who is writing his dissertation on the Aesthetics at the University of Ottawa.

240 Knox underplays the distinction between Einbildungskraft and Phantasie, translating them both as imagination; Knox attributes the use of different words for the same thing to Hegel’s desire not to repeat a word in the same paragraph (cf. Aesth. Knox’s note p. 5 n. 2.). But Knox is wrong—Hegel makes it clear that here we are talking about Phantasie, which "ist schaffend" as against the "bloss passiven Einbildungskraft" (Aesth. p. 275). The distinction is important, as I go on to show above. (Knox also misleadingly translates Einbilden as imagination
one-time event, but rather the symbolism which already presupposes language. It is Spirit's return to these moments and their genesis, not their genesis per se, which is being described. Thus, though Hegel does not make it entirely clear here in the *Aesthetics* what he means by the passive imagination, we can assume on the basis of the *Philosophy of Spirit* discussion that it is the first and second moments of the imagination—the reproduction of images and the subsumption of these under a universal (viewed in terms of the genetic account). This could be said to be passive in the sense that intellect has not yet grasped itself as the power of synthesis, but is merely synthesizing. The first two moments which make up passive imagination are passive because they are pre-spirit (or as I like to say, the inception of spirit): they are the merely epistemological requirements for memory and language, no more or less important than intuition. Imagination at that level is passive because the merely imagining subject has no sense of its own power, and therefore no conscious ability to make representations which will resonate meaningfully in someone else's head. The first moments of the imagination cannot be artistically creative, because they are merely unconscious imaginative displays with no conscious connection to Spirit. Thus Hegel writes in the *Aesthetics*:

> It is therefore an absurdity to suppose that poems like the Homeric came to the poet in sleep. Without circumspection, discrimination, and criticism the artist cannot master any subject-matter which he is to configure, and it is silly to believe that the genuine artist does not know what he is doing (Aesth. 283).\(^{241}\)

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\(^{241}\) Hegel says much the same in the *Enz. Phil.* G. (¶449, s. 255-6): "Man bildet sich oft ein, der Dichter, wie der Künstler überhaupt, müsse bloss anschauend verfahren. Dies ist durchaus nicht der Fall. Ein echter Dichter muss viel mehr vor und während der Ausführung seines Werkes nachsinnen und nachdenken; nur auf diesem Wege kann er hoffen, dass er das Herz oder die Seele der Sache aus allen sie verhüllenden Äusserlichkeiten herausheben und eben dadurch seine Anschauung organisch entwickeln werde."
Hegel stresses that in the (symbol and sign-making) *Phantasie* of the artist, the content is thoroughly reflected. *Phantasie* belongs to the subject who is already Spirit; and the artist using his/her *Phantasie* does so to develop Spirit further. If the artist were to descend into the passive imagination alone, he/she would be succumbing to the Scylla of monstrous imaginings; "El sueño de la razón produce monstruos."\(^{242}\) The artist would be stepping down the phenomenological ladder to a less developed consciousness. Without the actuality of the third moment of the imagination—without that is, the attempt at interpersonal communication through signs and the memory involved in that process—there is nothing but subjective dream-like states.

But also to be avoided is the Kharybdis of subsuming the external world into an overly familiarized and therefore repetitious set of meanings: "it is the absolute truth and rationality of the actual world which should attain external appearance [in the work of art]" ([*Aesth.* p. 282]).

Drawing further from the *Philosophy of Spirit* lectures, we can also assert that Hegel’s focus in this *Aesthetics* passage on *Phantasie* does not, however, preclude the earlier moments of the imagination either. The three moments of the imagination, indeed even the moments preceding the imagination, must all work together to convey the depth of the art. In a third remark about the artist’s imagination Hegel asserts that it is *feeling* which brings forth the fruit of artistic endeavour. The artist must absorb the material so that it becomes "his very own self, as the inmost property of himself as subjective being" ([*Aesth.* 283]).

We recall that feeling and possession (the moment of *Seinige*) belong to the first moment of Theoretical Mind in the *Philosophy of Spirit*—the moment of intuition, which is prior to the imagination. The reason this first moment is important is that "the pictorial illustration [bildliche

\(^{242}\) "The sleep of reason produces monsters" Goya, *Los Caprichos* (1799) Plate 43.
Veranschaulichen] estranges every subject-matter by giving it an external form, and feeling alone brings it into subjective unity with the inner self" (*Aesth.* 283).

We recall that the object of memory was the external side of intelligence, subject itself to being reified, repeated without heart. In the *Aesthetics* the solution to this reification is the return of the moment of feeling. But this feeling is not a regression—the return is evidence of the nature of Aufhebung: the earlier moments are not dispensed with but continue in new form to play their roles.

Therefore, in Hegel's discussion of the imagination of the artist, there is a persistent appeal to the inward, to the heart. And this includes a dependence on what I would call the disclosing impulse of the imagination at the level of spirit's inception. But importantly, the ego has changed with the development—the moments belong no longer to a subjective ego but to its more mature form—to Spirit. Therefore the inwardness which was that of the subjective ego is now the inwardness of Spirit. With regard to Hegel's first remarks above concerning memory, Hegel writes "[f]or what interests a man he engraves on his memory, and a most profound spirit spreads the field of his interests over countless topics" (*Aesth.* 281-82 my italics); with regard to reflection, while Hegel says that "It is the absolute truth and rationality of the actual world which should attain external appearance" he adds that the artist must have pondered its essentiality and truth in its whole range and whole depth [*seiner ganzen Tief nach*]. For without reflection a man does not bring home to his mind what is in him, and so we notice in every great work of art that its material in all its aspects has been long and deeply weighed [*tief erwogen*] and thought over (*Aesth.* p. 282 my underlining).

...the task of imagination consists solely in giving us a consciousness of that inner rationality, not in the form of general propositions and ideas [as does philosophy], but in concrete configuration and individual reality (*Aesth.* 282, my underlining).
What therefore "lives and ferments in him" the artist must portray to himself... (Aesth. 282 my underlining).

Finally, with regard to the artist's feeling relation to his/her work, Hegel writes:

...the artist must have drawn much and much that is great, into his own soul; his heart must have been deeply gripped [tief ergriffen... worden sein] and moved thereby; he must have done and lived through much before he can develop the true depths of life [echte Tiefen des Lebens] into concrete manifestations. Consequently genius does burst forth in youth, as was the case with Goethe and Schiller, but only middle or old age can bring to perfection the genuine maturity of the work of art (Aesth. 283 my underlining).

Given these passages, it is clear that the distinction between the epistemologically necessary first two moments of the imagination (die bloss passiven Einbildungskraft) and the creative imagination (Phantasie) only serves to highlight the limit beyond which the artistic Spirit returning to the imagination cannot go without losing artistic ability. This is interesting as well, for it highlights again for us the difficulty which philosophy must also have in trying to make a return to those earlier moments without ceasing to be philosophically comprehensible. And yet, making the imagination's spontaneity the ineffable is not acceptable. This is why Phantasie is the crucial moment for Hegel.

It is clear too that according to Hegel Spirit must come to fruition in the artist before s/he can create a work of art. The "inner," the "deep" is a difference, a negation, which first arises in the reproductive imagination: it is the difference of determination, the differences implied in synthesis, in the creation of universals. These differences are what make imaginative comprehension incomplete, what makes the content latent—hidden, not yet fully revealed, in the process of being revealed: becoming. In the third moment, in the externalization of the imagination's products, in the external histories of the uttered words, and the internal histories of their reintegrations into the nights of many different people, in the work of memory,
difference and determination become Spirit. The depth of art is that of Spirit's self-interpretation in representations.

While our investigation into the relationship of imagination to philosophy occurs in our final chapter, it is helpful, in determining the role of imagination here, to cite Hegel's view in the *Aesthetics* on how the artist differs from the philosopher.

For him [the artist] philosophy is not necessary, and if he thinks in a philosophical manner he is working at an enterprise which, so far as the form of knowing is concerned is the precise opposite of art. For the task of imagination consists solely in giving us a consciousness of that inner rationality, not in the form of general propositions and ideas, but in concrete configuration and individual reality (*Aeths.* 282 my underlining).

This "inner rationality" of the artist is the imaginative working of Spirit on itself. It remains now to be seen how, according to Hegel's interpretation of Hinduism, the religious individual uses imagination.

3. The Religion of Imagination

The following discussion of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* is limited to a discussion of the role of imagination in what Hegel defines as the religion of imagination--Hinduism.243 The following concerns the dialectic present in a religion of imagination, and

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243 In his 1824 Lectures Hegel calls Hinduism "der Religion der Phantasie." But he no longer does in the 1827 or 1831 lectures. The editor of *Phil. Rel.* hypothesizes that Hegel no longer calls it that in 1827 because Hegel "now views Hinduism as having two primary characteristics: the unity of substance and the multiplicity of powers--and it is only with reference to the latter that Hindu phantasy comes into play" (p. 267 n. 192). (The editor adds that in 1831 the focus is on the first of these two characteristics, so that the 1827 lectures "play a transitional role between 1824 and 1831.")

The editor's hypothesis is based on a rendering of *Phantasie* as "phantasy," and that word, he explains, was chosen "in order to convey the sense of visionary, fanciful imagination, as distinguished from that of an unreal mental image or illusion" (p. 268). But this deserves discussion.

It is true that in the 1827 lectures on the *Philosophy of Spirit, Phantasie* means symbol, allegorizing and poetic imagination (Cf. Hegel, *Vorlesungen* Bd. 13. Hrsg. von F. Hespe und B. Tuschling. Hamburg; Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994 p. 205); and that, as we have seen, in the 1830 *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit, Phantasie* means
how it relates to what I have discussed so far—to memory and to artistic representation.

It is in religion that the work of imagination appears in its most phenomenologically rich form. Here Spirit represents the plumbing of its own absolute depth; it would therefore seem that here if anywhere ought to be found the objective authentication of the imagination.

In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, in a section entitled "Representation and its Relationship to Thought" Hegel asserts that, while imagination is able to accommodate contradiction, thought cannot.

In representation...the distinct characteristics stand on their own account.... The consciousness of...contradiction and its resolution belongs to thought.... In representation everything has its place peacefully alongside everything else: the human being is free and also dependent; there is good in the world and there is evil as well. In thought, on the contrary, these things are drawn into mutual connection, and thus contradiction becomes visible (Phil.Rel. p. 153-4).

This distinction is familiar to us from the Philosophy of Spirit:

Imagination, when regarded as the agency of this unification is reason, but only a nominal reason, because the matter or theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference; whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content (Enc.Phil.Spir. ¶457 p. 211).

This ability to sustain contradiction is evident in Hegel's version of Hinduism, and is in fact what it did in 1827 plus the added level of sign-making. But it is important to explain why it is no longer an appropriate term for describing the religion.

While it may have been the case in 1824, there is no evidence in the 1827 Phil.Rel. that what falls in Hinduism under "multiplication of powers" is limited to the visionary and excludes unreal mental images or illusion. On the contrary the productive dialectic is precisely between the unity which would be the standard by which the "unreal" would be distinguished from the "real," and its falling apart into multiplicity. It is very much the relation of illusion and reality which is at stake in the Hindu practice as Hegel understood it. So while "religion of Phantasie" is not the right description in the 1827 lectures, the reason is not that there is an added characteristic of the unity of substance, nor that the dialectic is therefore no longer limited to Phantasie; rather the reason is that Hindu practice involves a return and practice of the imaginative, cognitive moments directly prior to Phantasie. Unity of substance and the multiplicity of powers, as I show in what follows, are the dialectical moments of the imagination prior to the visionary productivity of Phantasie. So while Phantasie was no longer the right descriptive term in 1827 and 1831, Hegel could have gone on to call Hinduism the religion of imagination, for as we will now see, Hegel's discussion of it reveals how it is Spirit's return to the imagination's dialectical moments.
characteristic of the dialectic of that imaginative religion as he understood it. Before we discuss it however, two points must be made.

1) Art, religion and philosophy are moments of Absolute Spirit (the final moment of the Philosophy of Spirit as a whole). While the artist expresses the depth of the Spirit she belongs to, in our discussion of her we were able to skirt the issue of what determinate form of Spirit it is which expresses itself through the artist. But in the case of Hinduism we cannot focus on the individual alone: the religious form is a form of Absolute Spirit. We are therefore discussing not only a single person's experience but just as much that of a community.

Religion as this supreme sphere may be in general designated, if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and having its home in the subject, must no less be regarded as objectively issuing from the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community (Enc. Phil. Spir ¶554 p. 292).

Thus in the religion of imagination--Hegel's Hinduism--we are concerned with a form of Absolute Spirit whose dominant epistemological cast is imagining.

2) Hinduism, as a shape of Absolute Spirit, already presupposes not only convention and the social structures of objective Spirit, but also religious structures as well. So it does not make sense to speak of the moments of the imagination in as giving birth to a self which has not yet reached the level of communication. The Hindu religious activity must be viewed as a return to the imaginative stage of conscious development, a practice or actualization of those dialectical moments.

The reason we can compare this to that subjective epistemological level is that Absolute Spirit, like any shape of Spirit, recollects and repeats the earlier moments of Spirit. This activity

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244 See the note at my section on "Imagination and the Artist."
is part of the unfolding of the latent concept—all that is contained as moments in Spirit are also actively involved in the development of higher levels of Spirit.

To say that Hegel’s Hinduism is stuck in the repetitions of the imagination’s moments is to say that a form of Spirit, a community, is stuck there. The individuals of this community enact the play of the imagination as spiritual practice. (According to Hegel the religious consciousness of the Hindu is therefore not fully formed: a fully formed consciousness can only arise with absolute Spirit’s repetition of the moments of memory and thought: the moment of memory is the Jewish religion; and the moment of thought is revealed religion, Christianity.)

The main dialectic of Hegel’s Hinduism concerns the first two moments of the imagination—the reproduction of images out of the night, and the synthesis of these under the form of universality. But it also involves the third—the externalization of these representations in the form of symbols, and signs, for religious artistic expression gives shape to the practice and its contents. And the whole process belongs to a fully communicative society. But as part of that religious society, the religious consciousness loops back through these moments of the imagination, almost as though in perpetual desire of a unified subject. This is a religion of interiority, and any externalization is in the service of a re-interiorization. The interpersonal is subsumed by interiorization. Hinduism is thus characterized by the practice of the first two moments of the imagination.

Now we must give some content to our discussion.

Hinduism:

The religious analogue of the imagination in its universalizing moment—as that which is the form of universality—is Hinduism. Buddhism, the religious moment directly prior to it
(according to the 1827 lectures) exhibits the retreat into substantiality and the existence of that substantiality in select individuals (the Dalai Lamas). Although Hegel does not make this point explicit, Buddhism is thus the analogue of recollection, for it recollects substance and the inner world, but only with the help of a mnemonic aid— an external intuition. The Dalai Lama is that external intuition which initiates the recollection(s of) the deceased guru.\textsuperscript{245}

In Hegel’s Hinduism the universal substance is a complete interiority. It is the analogue of the power of the imagination: it calls forth from substance and is the principle of the imaginative products. Just as imagination is the night as active, as a synthesis which calls images out of the mine and is as yet still only the formal universal, Hegel’s Hinduism engages in a dialectic between the inner principle or substantial Oneness and wild phantastical outpourings. The analogue is clear when we look at Hegel’s 1831 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion:

Self-consciousness cannot, like the abstractly thinking understanding, confine itself in religion to the representational image of the power that is known only as an aggregate of determinations that merely are [the returned Lamas and their recollected truths—JB]. For then the power is not yet known as real unity, subsisting by itself, it is not yet known as principle. The opposite of this way of defining it is for the manifold determinateness to be taken back into the unity of self-determination. This concentration of self-determining contains the beginning of spirituality (Phil. Rel. 268 note 193).

Hegel goes on to discuss the “power that brings forth everything” and which "exists as the

\textsuperscript{245} In Hegel’s lectures of 1831, Buddhism comes after Hinduism. It is important to mention that there is of course knowledge available to us about Buddhism and Hinduism which was not available to Hegel. Aside from a number of beliefs (such as of that concerning reincarnation), Tibetan Buddhism is much more similar to Hegel’s Science than he could ever have imagined. For example, his contention that their main goal is the desire for the emptiness of Nirvana misses the fact that the experience of Nirvana is (in some traditions) only considered a “moment” in practice, one which therefore undergoes negation, like all other thoughts; Hegel also misses the concern for other sentient beings which is the Bodhisatva’s motivation in Mahayana Tibetan Buddhism, and he misses the practical acceptance of the ‘inseparability of Samsara and Nirvana’ (the inseparability of the wheel of change and enlightened mind). These concepts (the Bodhisatva and the inseparability of Samsara and Nirvana) can, I think, be interpreted in terms of Absolute Spirit and Absolute Knowing respectively. But that is another investigation altogether.
universal" (Phil.Rel. 268). In the terms of the Philosophy of Spirit this is properly the power of the imagination in its moment as the form of universality. In the genetic account, the first two moments of the imagination—calling images out of the night and subsuming them under universals—constitute the emergence of universality for the first time. We saw that this was the beginning of the self, not of Spirit, since the latter requires externalization and memory. We note in the citation above that Hegel asserts "This concentration of self-determining contains the beginning of spirituality": not the beginning of spirit properly speaking. For Hegel the Hindu's practice is a return which goes too far into the genesis of the self. He goes on in his discussion of Hinduism:

In its own self... universality is thought; and, as self-determining, it is the source of all determining. But at the stage where we now are, the stage where the universal emerges for the first time as what is determinative (or as principle), the universal is not yet spirit but abstract universality generally. Being known as though in this way, the universal remains as such shut up within itself. It is the source of all power, but it does not externalize or express itself as such (Phil.Rel. 268 my underlining).

Because there is no proper externalization, we must assume that the Hindu religious consciousness is a continuous return to the level of symbol-making. The reason why Hegel originally calls Hinduism the religion of (merely symbol-making) Phantasie in 1924 is that without the externality, without the proper communication of the universal principle (sign-making Phantasie, as developed in 1827), that is, without making the universal principle communicative (Spirit), the power remains merely internally productive of symbolic phantasies:

...since the principle that comes on the scene at this stage has not yet reached the point where this unfolding could occur within the principle itself—since, on the contrary, it is held fast in a simple, abstract concentration—the unfolding and the richness of the actual idea falls outside the principle, and consequently differentiation and manifoldness are abandoned to the wildest externality of phantasy (Phil.Rel. 268).
We recall Hegel's notion of the youths exercising their memories so as to allow the "implicit content" to unfold. The principle is Spirit which is, in its developed form, both internal and external; it develops in and through individuals in a community. But in Hinduism it is as if there is no memory—the focus is on the prior moment of the imagination creating universality. It is a focus on synthesis into absolute unity, not on mediation: the principle "is held fast in a simple, abstract concentration." Because the truth of the principle—of Spirit—is that it is mediation as much as unity, for the Hindu absorbed in unity the manifold and the mediation remain latent: "the unfolding and the richness of the actual idea falls outside the principle[.]"

Although Hegel does not express it this way, the struggle for an all-encompassing unity, for the principle as Oneness, is a spacial drive for comprehension. But time cannot be suppressed, and so the result is a sequence, an outpouring of imaginative syntheses, of universal representations: "differentiation and manifoldness are abandoned to the wildest externality of phantasy." Such a sequence in turn can only be understood spatially as a plenum of modifications of the One. Thus this array of phantastical powers is retrieved back into the principle, into substance. But the retrieval is not self-conscious and therefore not complete. It is a one-sided dialectic between the inner unity of substance (which is also the primary power which unleashed the phantasies) and the unleashed phantasies and their retrieval back into substance. Hegel writes:

...this retrieval, this concentration of thought, would consummate the moment of spirituality if the initial, universal mode of thinking were to make itself inwardly accessible to differentiation and were known inwardly as the act of retrieval. On the foundation of abstract thought, however, the retrieval itself remains devoid of spirit (Phil.Rel. 268-9).

The problem Hegel sees in (his version of) Hinduism is that it makes the universalizing
moment of the imagination into a practice of abstraction, an abstract practice indeed. For in this return the mind abstracts itself from language and enters the genesis of the self. While this appears to be an empowerment, for Hegel without language it is powerless. In the earlier *Geistesphilosophie* remaining in this level was said only to occur in the case of dreaming, illness, or retardation. Here it appears to be cultivated as religious practice. Otherwise the dialectic impels consciousness forward: for the truth of the universalizing moment of the imagination is that its syntheses are "derived from some interest, some latent concept or Ideal principle, so far as we may by anticipation speak of such* (Phil. Spir par. 456, p. 209).*

And, for the phenomenologist at any rate, what is hidden eventually reveals.

So Hegel's Hinduism is an interesting case of a religious return, and it gives us some insight into what a philosophical return must be: on the one hand it must be able, like Hinduism, to return to its earlier moments, to reveal the latent concept hidden in the workings of Spirit; but it must also be one which does not stay at the levels of consciousness to which it gives a genetic account—it must not abstract itself from the latent content and its development: it must not abstract itself from language.

In order for the "universal mode of thinking to make itself inwardly accessible to differentiation and...known inwardly as the act of retrieval," the moments of Memory must be actual. The intellect must recognize itself to be the power of synthesis, and re-collect itself through otherness. Its externalizations must be re-cognized as Spirit's birth, as Spirit's becoming; for this retrieval of itself through otherness is the birth and becoming of Spirit. But at the level of Hegel's Hinduism, universality to which the practitioner returns is not yet Spirit:

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246 And Hegel asserts as much here when he writes: "Nothing is lacking here as far as the moments of the idea of spirit are concerned; the idea of rationality is present in this advance" (Phil. Rel. 269).
"these moments do not constitute Spirit; the unfolding is not so consummated as to yield Spirit, because the determinations remain merely universal" (Phil.Rel. 269).

Thus we have the abstract One and the wildness of unrestrained phantasy, which is, of course, known to remain identical with the first [principle] but which does not expand into the concrete unity of the spiritual. The unity of the intelligible realm achieves its specific permanence; but this last does not become absolutely free, for it remains confined within the universal substance (Phil.Rel. 269).

Conclusion

Our discussions of Memory, of the artist's activity and of Hegel's understanding of Hinduism have given some shape to "objective authentication." The artist supplies objective authentication in art for the Spirit of his/her time; the Hindu community expresses objective authentication in so far as it exhibits the shape of Absolute Spirit returning to the moment of its imaginative inception. More importantly, this discussion has also revealed the two characteristics required for a science of psychology 1) a return of Spirit to the latent conceptual levels of Spirit, which is to say a return to its own genesis; and yet 2) a return which is driven to move beyond each level because the returning Spirit has not abstracted itself from the latent content--language--according to which its syntheses are derived. But the language of Hegel's psychology it is not explicitly recollected in the account. Hegel's concern is with the latent moments of the concept, not of the content, at each level. In a science of experience however, the concern is with the latent moments in the content at each level. It is with the externalizations of consciousness that a phenomenology is concerned. As a result, the comprehending and disclosing movements of the imagination are central, and explicit, but only as content, not as concept. Thus when the concept at work at each level is finally synthesized out of the opposites, the imagination's aufhebende
work is not what is explicit, rather what is revealed is what has arisen—a new shape of universality. It remains now to look more closely at the how the imagination is operative in the *Phenomenology*. 
PART III

Synthesis and Dis-closure: The Phenomenology

In the first two parts I have dealt with the role of the imagination in theoretical Spirit and in practical Spirit. In this third and concluding part, in the spirit of Hegel I bring these two sides together in a synthesis. For this is what one must do to understand the Phenomenology of Spirit. The Phenomenology is the synthesis of the theoretical and practical imagination: it is the story of consciousness' progress through its self-presentations. Hegel's phenomenology is the turning of theoretical into practical and vice versa—not just as Fichte saw it (as time) but as Hegel saw it (as history).

While in theory imagination is the middle moment of Vorstellen, practically it is at the heart of Aufhebung and thus of Spirit's development. It is imagination which attempts comprehension but in so doing pushes beyond closure. While the role of the empirical imagination in the Phenomenology is the transition from perception to understanding, practically the imagination is at work throughout the book, up until the last chapter. For in the Phenomenology we have the meeting of the two ends of Hegel's writings: the unconscious sundraing of the imagination of the identity theory meets the completion of Spirit's experience (in system): the two work in and through each other.

We begin Part III by looking at the single appearance of the word 'imagination' in the Phenomenology of Spirit. We see there, on the one hand, what the Phenomenology of Spirit is not to be: it is not a book inspired by phantastical genius. This is because, as we have seen, memory is key: just like the youths who must fill their mind up with the world in order to let Spirit work through them and in order to avoid the romantic subjectivism, so dialectically the reader of the Phenomenology is filled with the forms of Spirit. But imagination is also key: just as memory must not skate on the surface of images for mnemonic aid, but must remember in a way which does justice to the depth and complexity of the uttered words, the images and moments of the Phenomenology must be penetrated and fully mediated. In this mediation the negativity—the night—of the imagination is a necessary moment. So, on the other hand, our discussions of the practical have shown us how the imagination does work in the Phenomenology: it is the heart of the drive for completion—the drive to synthesize irreconcilable elements; but it is also the difference which, in the act of conciliating cannot be finally reconciled with itself. In synthesizing, it dis-closes.

I conclude with reflections from the Preface on how thinking the imagination to the end is the medium of reflection through which Spirit is born and educates itself, and that the imagination is the depth to which Spirit must return in order to maintain itself against mechanization. In other words, I reflect on how thinking the imagination to the end is speculative science in the form of phenomenology.
Chapter 6

Imagination and the Medium of Thought in the Preface to

The Phenomenology of Spirit

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The one place in which the term *Einbildungskraft* arises in the entire *Phenomenology of Spirit* is in fourth last paragraph in the Preface, paragraph 68.

In place of the long process of culture towards genuine philosophy, a movement as rich as it is profound, through which Spirit achieves knowledge, we are offered as quite equivalent either direct revelations from heaven, or the sound common sense that has never laboured over, or informed itself regarding, other knowledge or genuine philosophy; and we are assured that these are quite as good substitutes as some claim chicory is for coffee. It is not a pleasant experience to see ignorance, and a crudity without form or taste, which cannot focus its thought on a single abstract proposition, still less on a connected chain of them, claiming at one moment to be freedom of thought and toleration, and at the next to be even genius. Genius, we all know, was once all the rage in poetry as it now is in philosophy; but when its productions made sense at all, such genius begat only trite prose instead of poetry, or, getting beyond that, only crazy rhetoric. So, nowadays, philosophizing by the light of nature, which regards itself as too good for the Notion, and as being an intuitive and poetic thinking in virtue of this deficiency, brings to market the arbitrary combinations of an imagination [*Einbildungskraft*] that has only been disorganized by its thought, an imagery that is neither fish nor flesh, neither poetry nor philosophy (*PoS* §68, p. 42 my bold).³⁴⁷

³⁴⁷ "In Ansehung der eigentlichen Philosophie sehen wir für den langen Weg der Bildung, für die ebenso reiche als tiefe Bewegung, durch die der Geist zum Wissen gelangt, die unmittelbare Offenbarung des Göttlichen und den gesunden Menschenverstand, der sich weder mit anderem Wissen noch mit dem eigentlichen Philosophieren bemüht
Thus is shown Hegel's disdain for the supposed philosophies and art forms which take unthought-through concepts and submit them to imaginative synthesis. Just like the Mnemonic practitioners whom Hegel criticizes in 1830, he sees in the above philosophies and art forms a misguided return to the imagination. Hegel places this misguidedness below poetic creation as well as below philosophy: for the central moment of artistic production—interpersonal complexity, *Phantasie*—has been abrogated in favour of the immediate, "direct revelations from Heaven" or in favour of an arrogant common sense which does not re-member its content as and through the complexities of Spirit's development.

With these comments I end my discussion of this paragraph, for this single appearance of the word, while rhetorically rich, is in fact the least interesting thing about the imagination in *Phenomenology of Spirit*. What is interesting is the way in which the imagination is at work throughout the book up to the final chapter, and how it is changed there.\(^{248}\)

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\(^{248}\) It would take time we do not have here to unravel the references to Genius and to the "philosophizing according to the light of Nature." The notion of philosophical and artistic genius was a well-developed one in philosophy at that time: we recall Kant's discussion of it in the *Critique of Judgement*, and Schelling's reference to the creative genius in the last part of the *System of Transcendental Idealism*. Hegel too discusses it in an early Critical Journal essay of 1802 entitled "The Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy" (in *Between Kant and Hegel*, trans di Giovanni and H. S. Harris, Albany:SUNY Press, 1985, pp. 311-362; cf. the last section of that work where Hegel criticizes Schulze for degrading the role of genius p. 353-354.) Hegel also discusses it later in the Anthropology section of the *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit*. (Cf. also Dässing's discussion of the *Geniesthetik* in "Aesthetische Einbildungskraft und Intuitiver Verstand" in *Hegel Studien* Band 21, heraus. F. Nicolin und O Pöggeler, Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, Bonn, 1986.)
The passage is evidence that in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* we find the same sorts of assertions about what not to do if one wants to think speculatively as we saw when we looked ahead to his investigation of memory in the 1830 *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit*. But it is the change in Hegel's thought between the writing of *Faith and Knowledge* in 1801 and the *Phenomenology* in 1807 which enables him to make such criticisms. In those years Hegel changes his idea of the role of reflection: rather than something to be overcome, it becomes the medium of Science. What this means needs to be looked at more carefully, and I do so in the section which follows. But we can say generally here that Hegel's clear-sightedness about the role of reflection as medium, enables him to critique the ways in which that medium can be wrongly or imperfectly thought through. He provides numerous examples in the Preface, each typified by a "to and fro" movement of the imagination. I will also discuss some of these in the next section.

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In the years between the Critical Journal essays and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel developed the notion of reflection as a medium of reason rather than viewing it as that which reason had to overcome.\(^{249}\)

As we noted in Chapter 2, in the years directly prior to the *Phenomenology* there was a transition from identity philosophy, which was more of a substance ontology and in which logic and metaphysics were separate, to a more subjective ontology. In the former, logic was

\(^{249}\) "It ...appears that in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* he no longer uses this term [reflection] in the sense that he employed in the *Differenzschrift*. Hegel there describes the contemporary philosophy he is attacking as "reflection-philosophy" but in another sense of the term he also calls "true" speculation a reflection. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, however, the name "reflection" designates a structure of self-consciousness conceived in Cartesian terms" (Werner Marx, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. P. Heath. [Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1975] p. 36).
separate from metaphysics because logic was about the finite, and metaphysics was about the infinite. The standpoint of logic had to be overcome in order to enter metaphysics, which was the undoing of the finite.

In this more subjective ontology, consciousness is the starting point and the medium. It is so, nevertheless, without being a unified a priori subject: in the two years before the Phenomenology, the starting opposition is not that of subject and object but of Einheit and Vielheit. As we saw, Hegel's genetic account of consciousness in the Geistesphilosophie of 1803-4 begins with that opposition.\textsuperscript{250} In that work, the dialectic of absolute unity over against absolute plurality yields the fixed products of singular, particular and Universal (das Einzelne, das Besondere and das Allgemeine). These are the moments of essential determination, of (making) being for self, and of (making) being in and for itself. They are the temporal-spacial movement through which consciousness moves and which consciousness is. Because such consciousness is the starting point and medium, there is nothing which is not already reflective: logic is infinite and therefore not something to be superseded. Indeed, supersession (Aufhebung) is a logical moment.

Reflection is the space of picture-thinking--Vorstellen. When Hegel asserts that reflection is the medium of Reason, he means in part that we think of things. What is unconsciously reflected is immediately present (for example, simple intuition), but when we are conscious of this as reflection, the 'what' is not merely present but represented--vorgestellt. In the genetic account of the moments of Vorstellen in the various Philosophies of Spirit, we saw that the imagination is the central moment in representation. The imagination is therefore central to

\textsuperscript{250} See my Chapter 2.
reflection.

In the Preface to the Phenomenology reflection is discussed in terms of the space of the Understanding. While the Understanding is the power of dissolution—the power to "break an idea up into its original elements [and] to return to its moments" (PoS ¶32, p. 18), it is that place in which, as Fichte had said, things are fixed, one could say "deposited." This term "deposited" is my own—a play on Fichte's *setzen*, positing. But it works well in describing one side of the Understanding according to Hegel, for the moment highlighted by the word is the fact of the thing being there *for* the Understanding: the thing's actual development, its movement does not concern the un-phenomenologized Understanding.

A given representation is only fully recognized as reflective medium—only fully thought through—when the Understanding is actualized as Reason. For Reason is the Understanding as actual, and its objects are therefore developing. But the space in which what is becoming occurs

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251 This is by no means a defense of or development of Cartesianism. While Hegel has moved toward a subjective ontology, it is worth noting just how far Hegel would have to go from his earlier thought in order to adopt Descartes' *cogito*. While Hegel's critique of the Cartesian ego will become apparent in our discussion, it is worth keeping in mind Hegel's earlier approach to consciousness in the first *Geistesphilosophie*, for it is anything but Cartesian:

> Im Geist ist der absolute einfache Äther durch die Unendlichkeit der Erde hindurch zu sich selbst zurückgekehrt; in der Erde überhaupt existiert dieses Einssein der absoluten Einfachheit des Äthers und der Unendlichkeit verbreitet in die allgemeine Flüssigkeit, aber in seinem Verbreiten sich als Einzelnheiten fixierend; und das numerische Eins der Einzelnheit, die für das Tier die wesentliche Bestimmtheit ist, wird selbst ein Ideelles, zu einem Moment. Der so bestimmte Begriff des Geistes ist das Bewusstsein als der Begriff des Einsseins des Einfachen und der Unendlichkeit; aber im Geiste existiert sie für sich selbst oder als wahrhafte Unendlichkeit;...Dieser Begriff des Geistes ist dasjenige, was Bewusstsein genannt wird; (Geistesphilosophie 1803-04, Fragment 15, p. 183-84)

And further: "Das Wesen des Bewusstseins ist, dass unmittelbar in einer ätherischen Identität absolute Einheit des Gegensatzes sei" (Geistesphilosophie 1803-4, Fragment 18, p.189).
is a kind of fixing, a medium.\footnote{It is therefore not the opposite of its reflection which consciousness relates to when it reflects. For as reflection it again finds itself in the other. Reflection is thus a movement…. Only when reflection has proved itself to be such a movement, in which both subject and object, as moments thereof, are themselves posited and superseded, has it become the element of absolute knowledge..." (W. Marx p. 38).}

Reflection is the space of experience. Reason is the consciousness of the fact that the nature of those experiences is becoming. What constitutes reflection is the deposited object, but what is constitutive of the deposited object is, finally, the fact that substance is subject; that reflection is rational, substantial, self-determination.

Compared to the detailed analysis we have seen Hegel give of the development of the medium of reflection in the moment of Vorstellen in the various Philosophies of Spirit, our discussion here has indeed been general. But it nevertheless puts us in a position to introduce what the Phenomenology does. For the various starting points in the Phenomenology appear initially as fixed: each is taken to be the way things stand for reflecting consciousness. The Phenomenology is the exercising of reflection into Reason: it is the gradual separating of consciousness from its immediate relation, from the deposited truth, from consciousness' familiarity with how things stand. One could in a pun say therefore that, inasmuch as the Phenomenology is the actualizing of the Understanding, it is the 'deposing' of its one-sided reign, of its preponderance for depositing its truth as reified and unchanging truth, of its preponderance for the deposited.\footnote{In the 1805-6 version it becomes clear that the moment of the Understanding—the completion of the intellect—is the point of departure for a phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel writes there:}

\textit{thing, understanding, necessity}: the thing as simple universality, necessity as self-movement. The thing has a necessity to it, since it has the I's selfhood to it. A difference in the thing is a difference in the Self; i.e. it is a negative relation to itself. Understanding, insight is the difference, not in the thing but rather of the thing vis-à-vis the Understanding. Actually it is not
negations, the freeing of the Understanding's actual power. For according to Hegel the "power and work of the Understanding, [is] the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute power" (PoS ¶32 p. 18). Since the Understanding's depositing is only one side of its activity, the depositing of this one-sideness is the Understanding's actualization.254

Just as in Faith and Knowledge Reason must fall into its own 'abyss,' here "the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself" (PoS ¶32, p. 19).255

the understanding which belongs here, but rather the experience of consciousness [i.e., a phenomenology of spirit]." (Rauch transl. p. 95 of:

Ding, Verstand, Notwendigkeit. Ding als einfache Allgemeinheit, Notwendigkeit als sich bewegen. Das Ding hat die Notwendigkeit an ihm, denn es hat das Selbst des Ich an ihm. Unterschied im Dinge ist Unterschied im Selbst—d.h. an sich selbst negative Beziehung—Verstehen, Einsehen ist der Unterschied, nicht im Dinge, sondern des Dinges gegen den Verstand—der hieher eigentlich nicht gehört—sondern Erfahrung des Bewusstseins (G2, 181).)

So far as I can gather, it is not the understanding which belongs here because, as Hegel goes on to show in G2, though the understanding is reason in part (G2 185), it is not actually reason. This is because the understanding at the level of theoretical intellect is only in itself—not for itself as well ("er ist das Ansich...aber [die Intelligenz] ist für sich noch nicht tätig gewesen" G2 184-5). The understanding intellect is a totalizing activity, it is judgement-making; and it is a totality itself insofar as its being is its judgments (cf. Rauch 98 footnote 30 G2 184 #3).

This is why Hegel corrects himself above: the difference of the thing is not vis-à-vis the understanding but rather vis-à-vis consciousness as it develops in, through and beyond the understanding's grasp of the difference. Reason as the development of the truth that "a difference in the thing is a difference in the Self" is therefore the arena of phenomenology (the experience of consciousness) and not that of judgement-making understanding alone. This is what Hegel is showing us in the Preface.

254 "Im Gegensatz gegen diese Verwirrung, welche in ihrem Gefolge die oberflächlichen Analogien hat, wird die verwundersame Macht des Verstandes gepriesen und ihm das Recht vindiziert, im indiziert, im vernünftigen Wissen berücksichtigt zu werden" (J. Erdmann, "Die Phänomenologie des Geistes", in Materialien zu Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes", Heraus. von H-F Fulda und Dieter Henrich, Frankfurt am Main:Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973, p. 55).

255 According to Werner Marx the final result is that the movement constituting the Phenomenology "confers complete translucency on the element, namely reflection. Once completion is attained, reflection is the element of science itself" (W. Marx p. 38). There is nevertheless a risk in thinking about it this way: the translucency might become the goal—even one to be got beyond—and "becoming" might be lost.
But how does this relate to the imagination? We saw in our Chapter 5 that a purely spatial concept of the synthesis of the imagination yields infinite modifications of a substantial plenum. But that way of looking at the imagination's syntheses suppresses the temporal element. That temporal element is something for which, I think, Hegel is indebted to Fichte. Extrapolating from the fact that Hegel, by 1807, is less critical of Fichte, one might say that Hegel has also incorporated Fichte's idea of a 'waving imagination' into his phenomenology as the dialectic of reflection, inherent in all representation.

In the Preface Hegel could be said to take up this waving in two ways, the first in order to criticize it, the second as the completion of the first. The first way he could be said to take up the waving is in his examples of a "to and fro" movement. This "to and fro" is "mere reflection," not reflection which raises itself up. Hegel's second form of the waving imagination is I suggest, the more developed form of reflection—*Aufhebung*. Fichte tried to get at this latter by talking about the self's attempt to actualize itself by going beyond itself (and as a practical striving for the ultimate moral state). But Fichte's fixed notion of subjectivity made this movement a uni-directional teleology. Hegel's waving imagination, however, is a temporal and a spatial development of representation, whose development is determined by the "latent content" of interpersonal communication in which the imagining individual is embedded, not by some subjective principle of self-striving. This lends itself to a phenomenologically rich development. The *Philosophy of Spirit* psychology has shown that the latent content begins to be revealed in the subject through the moments of imagination and memory—in the externalization of imaginative syntheses in the form of symbols and signs (*Phantasie*) and in their being re-membered as objectively significant by memory. One does not get anything like
this development or importance of memory in Fichte.  

We recall from the earlier Geistesphilosophie the dialectic between space and time. This can be applied here to reflection. The (wavering) "to and fro" of the imagination is "mere" reflection. The standpoint of such reflection is predominantly temporal: consciousness has not captured, synthesised, re-membered the movement in reflective space. It is instead immediately engaged in the moments of the reflection. The rise to the standpoint from which consciousness watches the "to and fro" sequence is a rising to a higher form of consciousness; it is the natural unfolding of Spirit, its education. But the higher standpoint is itself also a temporal one, with its own to and fro movement: its development can only be grasped from a higher spatial standpoint in which the moments are bestehende, and so on. This activity is of course that of Aufhebung.

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256 With regard to Hegel's more subjective ontology in the latter part of his stay in Jena I have focused on Fichte as the one whom Hegel has taken up. But W. Marx explains the change in terms of an appropriation of the Kantian unity of apperception. He writes that, in Kant's view of the productive imagination's synthesis of intuition and categories in schemata, the early Hegel sees

...the 'absolute original identity of opposites' (Faith 21). In this and other early writings [Hegel] conceived of imagination as the unconscious producing of intuitions which is 'immersed' in the difference of subject and object and thereby holds them together. [But]...for the later Hegel the idea of transcendental apperception takes on a greater significance than that of transcendent imagination. For in the Science of Logic (1812) he expressly states that the 'concept' has the structure of Kant's transcendental apperception. This conviction was already basic to the Phenomenology of Spirit (W. Marx p. XX).

Our investigation of the Encyclopedia Logic paragraph 20 (my Chapter 4) shows that the self is pivotal. But in the Phenomenology Descartes' cogito is being dethroned and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception is being modified; my argument here is that to understand both of these moves, it is to Fichte's ghost and wavering imagination that one must turn.

257 The process of Aufhebung is what is watched/experienced throughout the Phenomenology. Hegel's description of how this works can be found in the Preface (¶¶29-35), in his overview of the transition which the Phenomenology as a whole takes us through. That transition is from Vorstellen to Denken to Begriff. In the description, Hegel is concerned with the Erhebung of consciousness, not its activity or Aufheben. (I believe I am justified in using these
Before we look at some examples, it is interesting to note that the to and fro of the productive imagination is a reflective result which is also a movement onward. This is not because there is a beyond requiring the transcendence. The "demand" of reason which we saw in Kant and Fichte, is in Hegel bi-polar: it is a demand which Science makes of the individual as much as one the individual makes of Science.

The beginning of philosophy presupposes or requires that consciousness should dwell in this element [of reflection—JB]. But this element itself achieves its own perfection and transparency only through the movement of its becoming....Science on its part requires that self-consciousness should have raised itself into this Aether in order to be able to live—and [actually—ed.] to live—with Science and in Science. Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that Science should at least provide him with the ladder to this standpoint, should show him this standpoint within himself (PoS ¶26 p. 14-15)\(^\text{258}\).

terms in this way, since Hegel seems to use the word Erhebung when he describes the raising of consciousness to a new Potenz or level, whereas Aufhebung is the process by which that happens.) In one Erhebung to a new level there could be any number of Aufhebungen, since Aufhebung is what consciousness is: it is its essential movement or Begriff. Thus "we" in the Phenomenology watch the transitions—the Erhebung of consciousness. "We" watch how science is this raising of consciousness. But the reader going through the Phenomenology as the process of consciousness, goes through the continual Aufhebung of what is familiar to it (das Bekannte) to knowledge (das Erkennen), and finally to its knowledge of itself as aufhebend—its rise to der (absolute) Begriff. Hegel refers to this Erhebung of consciousness as its Bildung (education): "Die Wissenschaft stellt sowohl diese bildende Bewegung in ihrer Ausführlichkeit und Notwendigkeit als [auch] das, was schon zum Momente und Eigentum des Geistes herabgesunken ist, in seiner Gestaltung dar" (PdG ¶29, p. 33. Cf. also ¶28, p. 33, ¶33, p. 36).

Important to note however is Erdmann's qualification to reading the Phenomenology strictly as a history of consciousness' education: "[Es] könnte...nun scheinen, als werde die Philosophie von Hegel zwar nicht psychologish, aber historisch begründet, durch eine Bildungsgeschichte nämlich des Geistes. Da würde aber vergessen, dass die Phänomenologie nicht die Geschichte, sondern die begriffene Geschichte darstellen, dass sie nicht erzählen will, wie der Geist sich entwickelt hat, sondern wie er sich entwickeln musste (Erdmann, "Die Phänomenologie des Geistes" p. 59.) For a more detailed investigation of the concept of Bildung in Hegel see Otto Pöggeler's essay "Hegels Bildungskonzeption im Geschichtlichen Zusammenhang" in Hegel-Studien Band 15, heraus. F. Nicolin und O. Pöggeler, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1980, s. 241-269.)

\(^{258}\) "Der Anfang der Philosophie macht die Voraussetzung oder Forderung, dass das Bewusstsein sich in diesem Elemente [der Reflektion—JB] befinde...Umgekehrt hat das Individuum das Recht zu fordern, dass die Wissenschaft ihm die Leiter wenigstens zu diesem Standpunkte reiche, ihm in ihm selbst demselben aufzeige" (PdG ¶26 p. 29).

Determinate negation first appears in subjective spirit as reproductive imagination. But as we have seen it is not pure negation—not creation ex nihilo. Rather, reflection develops (according to) the "latent content" of the community into which the subject is born and according to which s/he recollects herself. So even at the beginning negation is substantial, belonging to what is (reflected), as much as to the subjective.
Examples of what Hegel means by the "to and fro" movement.

1) Since my discussion has been in the context of subjective Spirit, it would be in line to start with an epistemological example. But it is important to note, particularly in light of the Phenomenology, that the reflective "to and fro" problem is not the preserve of subjective Spirit. My first example is therefore from the System der Sittlichkeit. In this work Hegel describes a wavering on a level he would later call that of objective Spirit: he defines war as "something absolutely restless continually swaying to and fro (Mars flits from side to side)." War, though the highest form of negative relation, is of course not the highest form of Sittlichkeit. But according to Hegel it is a necessary moment in order for the highest form of Sittlichkeit to arise. Whatever one thinks of Hegel’s view on war here, this example at least shows that a return to an improperly reflected moment can be disastrous, and for more than one individual.

It is also interesting to note that in the System der Sittlichkeit Hegel writes repeatedly of a "hovering over" (e.g. "über seinen Unterschieden schweben sollte" SPR p. 487; "über ihm schwebend" SPR s. 486). What hovers over is that aspect which has not yet arisen before consciousness but which is nevertheless logically present. In that early work the relationship between the logic and the phenomenal content he is discussing is often muddy. But by the time

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259 SystEth 141. "etwas, das in absoluter Unruhe ist, von einer Seite zur andern beständig übergeht (Mars ein Überläufer)" (SPR 463).

260 As we always see, the fall of societies into war leads to the vagaries of impoverished interpersonal behaviour even among those outside the military. It is also interesting to note Harris’ remark: "Hegel was a man of his time, not least in his enlightened optimism. He was confident that no second "revolution" would be needed after that of 1789 and that no civilized nation which had felt the full impact of that upheaval could possibly fall back into the political despotism which he thought of as barbaric. The experience of this century has shown how badly mistaken he was, but his mistake was essentially empirical. There is nothing in his logical theory to warrant the belief that the motion of consciousness must always be progressive. Every position of consciousness contains the earlier positions in a sublated form, and every position is a stable circle that can maintain itself against criticism. Thus stability is "natural," and regression is just as possible as progress" (Harris, Hegel, p. 107).
of the *Phenomenology* the structure of scientific knowledge which is the union of logic and phenomena has become clear. Thus, in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* Hegel refers to reflection as forming the "element" or "aether" of science, within which the incomplete reflective forms appear as superficial "to and fro" movements. Although Hegel uses this word "aether" in the *Geistesphilosophie* of 1803-4 it is in the *Phenomenology* that we can put the two expressions—"hovering over" and "aether" together: in "mere" reflection, the abstract moment "hovers over;" but in *Aufhebung* consciousness rises through the "aether" of reflection. The aether is medium in the sense that it is the movement of self-conscious (*aufhebende*) reflection.262

Interestingly, if we go back to *Faith and Knowledge*, we find that, for the Hegel who was critical of the philosophies of reflection, reflection never comes down to earth: "...these philosophies of reflection cannot be prevented from fixating infinity, the Ego, and turning it into subjectivity instead of *letting it directly somersault* into the positivity of the absolute Idea" (*Faith

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261 That *Geistesphilosophie* is dated between the *System der Sittlichkeit* and the *Phenomenology*. In it Hegel develops *Aufhebung* in terms of a sequence from *Luft* to *Erde* to *Äther*:


262 Erdmann notes that, in the Preface, Hegel writes of how "we" stand behind consciousness when it gets mired in the empirical and loses the self-consciousness of its own movement ("'hinter seinem Rücken stehen' und ihm in das Spiel sehen"; my translation of Erdmann, "Die Phänomenologie..." p. 61.)
2) Another example, from the *Phenomenology* Preface, is Hegel’s explanation of what True and False mean. Misconception of these occurs in spatial terms: “‘True’ and ‘false’ belong among those determinate notions which are held to be inert and wholly separate essences, *one here and one there* (deren eines drüben, das andere hüben), each standing fixed and isolated from the other, with which it has nothing in common” (*PoS* 739, p. 22 my italics). But True and False are only opposites insofar as they are held fixedly apart from one another; and they are only such insofar as we go back and forth between them, for the true as such a fixed point is only called true insofar as it is in relation to what is not true. From a substantive point of view, truth is a movement. “[S]ubstantial truth is self-negative (both as self-limiting and absolutely); so one can *know falsely*....The absolute truth is the true concept of the relation of True and False.”

2) Another is Hegel’s explanation in the Preface of why what is merely familiar to us is not properly known:

Subject and object, God, Nature, Understanding, sensibility, and so on, are uncritically taken for granted as familiar, established as valid, and made into fixed points for starting and stopping. While these remain unmoved, the *knowing activity goes back and forth between them, thus moving only on their surface.*

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263 *...so war von diesen Reflexionsphilosophien teils nichts abschalten, als dass die Unendlichkeit, Ich, nicht wieder wie in ihnen geschah, statt unmittelbar ins Positive der absoluten Idee übereinzuschlagen, auf diesem Punkt sich fixierte und zur Subjektivität wurde* (GW 133-4).

264 Somersaulting is certainly down-to-earth and lends itself to the historical-material progression which the *Begriff* really is. It therefore suggests that Karl Marx’s desire to put Hegel on his head is always already occurring!

265 *Das Wahre und Falsche gehörth zu den bestimmten Gedanken, die bewegungslos für eigene Wesen gelten, deren eines drüben, das andere hüben ohne Gemeinschaft mit dem andern isoliert und fest steht* (*PdG* 739, p. 40 my italics).

266 Harris, “Phenomenology Analysis (Preface)” in the draft of *Hegel’s Ladder*. (Forthcoming.) P. 5-6.
3) Thus Hegel writes that the wrong kind of thinking is a "casual philosophizing that (durch ein hin und her gehendes Räsonnement) fastens on to this or that object relationship, or thought that happens to pop up in the imperfect consciousness, or tries to base the truth on the pros and cons, the inferences and consequences, of rigidly defined thoughts" (PoS ¶34 p. 20, my italics—the German is more telling for our purposes).

In these examples of incomplete reasoning, what is not recognized by consciousness is the identity of the object as reflectively constituted. To know that requires a different kind of "to and fro"—a dialectic of alienation and reconciliation. Proper knowledge is a circular motion, a grasping—a Begriff. Consciousness must experience not just a Fichtian wavering between self and not-self: it must experience the alienation [Entfremdung] of the self from itself as the self falls into the other and is defined by it. For "[t]he situation in which consciousness knows itself to be at home is for Science one marked by the absence of Spirit" (PoS ¶26, p. 15).

But it is not enough for consciousness to simply "make an attempt, induced by it knows not what, to walk on its head." Just like the demand, the reconciliation is two-sided: Science must "unite this element of self-certainty with itself, or rather show that and how this element belongs to it" (PoS ¶26, p. 15). In general it is thus a question of Spirit’s "becoming an other to itself, i.e. becoming an object to itself, and suspending [aufzuheben] this otherness" (PoS ¶36 p. 21, PdG p. 38).

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267 "mit allem Hin- und Herreden kommt solches Wissen" (PdG 35)

268 "...zufälliges Philosophieren...durch ein hin und her gehendes Räsonnement, Schliessen und Folgern aus bestimmten Gedanken das Wahre zu begründen sucht" (PdG: ¶34, p. 38 my italics).
And experience is the name we give to just this movement, in which the immediate, the unexperienced, i.e. the abstract, whether it be of sensuous [but still unsensed] being, or only thought of as simple, becomes alienated from itself and then returns to itself from this alienation, and is only then revealed for the first time in this actuality and truth, just as it then has become a property of consciousness also (PoS ¶36, p. 21 my italics).269

Hegel writes: "[i]t is this coming-to-be of Science as such or of knowledge, that is described in this *Phenomenology of Spirit*" (PoS ¶27, p. 15).

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A common view of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is that it is in the shape of a spiral, each successive ring of which comprehends the earlier ones. But every level/chapter is also a circle in itself, for it claims to be complete at the outset. In so far as each maintains its circularity, its closure and conclusiveness, it contains contradiction, for closure is a contradiction of the movement and development which Spirit is: "The standpoint of consciousness which knows objects in their antithesis to itself, and itself in antithesis to them, is for Science the antithesis of its own standpoint" (PoS ¶26, p. 15).

We have shown that in theory imagination is the middle moment of Vorstellung, and we have shown why this means that practically it is at the heart of Aufhebung and thus of Spirit’s development. It is imagination which gives the *Phenomenology* its shape as a spiral, and the various levels their circular shape: for it is the imagination—the form of universality—which attempts synthesizing comprehension, but in that very process pushes beyond closure.

It is important to go back to the role of the ‘I’ for a moment, and look at one passage

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269 "...das Unmittelbare... sich entfremdet und dann aus dieser Entfremdung zu sich zurückgeht und hiermit jetzt erst in seiner Wirklichkeit und Wahrheit dargestellt wie auch Eigentum des Bewusstseins ist" (PdG ¶36, p. 35).
in the Preface where Hegel evokes its importance. We recall that in the *Phenomenology* the negation necessary for Spirit is that power in the Understanding’s dissolution of its objects. Hegel writes further of the
tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure ‘I.’ Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of all things the most dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest strength.... But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death... (*PoS* ¶32, p. 19).

It is easy to understand why Werner Marx sees the Kantian unity of Apperception at work in the *Phenomenology* (Cf. my note 256). But it is important to keep in mind the developments we have traced in the various versions of Hegel’s philosophy of Spirit: for then we are reminded that the self first arises in the moments of the imagination and its transition to memory. The negation of interiorizing an image in the night, or again of reproducing it out of the night, is a negation which dialectically develops into a self, and as we have seen it only becomes a self with the exteriorisation and meaningful exchanges with others. There is no pure self to begin with. So I think that what is going on in this paragraph is the indication of how such a "pure ‘I’", such pure negation becomes of necessity mediated. Hegel begins the above passage "But that an accident as such, detached from what circumscribes it, what is bound and is actual only in its context with others, should attain an existence of its own and a separate freedom--this is the tremendous power of the negative...etc." I believe Hegel is expressing not only amazement about the arrival of a pure I, but dismay: dismay that this "accident," the Understanding, has in the rationalism of the Enlightenment become one-sided, a depositing ruler, the *Cogito*; dismay that it has lost sight of its own mediated nature. Thus the conclusion of the paragraph is that "pure" negation must be negated: "the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and
keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself." The imagination is the power of synthesis; when it has become purely subject, it has ceased to develop, it has become purely spatial and closes in upon itself. Dismemberment is the temporal facet of the imagination’s synthesis; the two together are the "reason" why the imagination’s differences become (those of) Spirit.

The imagination is the heart of the drive for completion—the drive to synthesize irreconcilable elements; but it is also the difference which in conciliating cannot be reconciled with itself. In synthesizing, it discloses. Imagination is thus the key to language—the difference by which meaning arises, the parting which is an imparting.270 It is, finally, the language of the *Phenomenology*.

It is for this reason that the imagination gets no chapter devoted to it in the *Phenomenology*. While sense-certainty, perception, understanding, reason, all have their "moment" in the dialectical sun, imagination remains the undisclosed, yet disclosing darkness of Spirit’s constant (re)birth.

So while the role of the empirical imagination in the *Phenomenology* is the transition from perception to understanding, practically the imagination is at work throughout the book—until the last chapter.

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270 "Der Mensch, indem er spricht, muss für den Augenblick einseitig werden; es gibt keine Mitteilung, keine Lehre ohne Sonderung" (Goethe).
EPILOGUE/PROLOGUE

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There are two ways in which we can think Hegel's imagination through to the end: one is thinking it through in order to be at the beginning of the Phenomenology—that is, to look at the imagination in his philosophical psychology and in other of his works in order to be able to understand (its role in) the Phenomenology. That has been the central project of our thesis. We also attempted, in the process, to shed light on the development of Hegel's thought about the imagination up to the writing of the Phenomenology. These inquiries have revealed how fundamental the imagination is to the Phenomenology as a whole.

But the other way to think the imagination through to the end is to delve into the Phenomenology chapters, and to show how Hegel therein thinks imagination through to its end. It is to observe in particular the transition in the Phenomenology from Religious imagination to Absolute Knowing. For it is in the "death of the picture thought" (¶785 p. 476) that imagination comes full circle, that it has its teleological completion.²⁷¹

²⁷¹ Such a task would also look at how Absolute Knowing dawns a new beginning—how it allows for the move on to the Logic, or for the phenomenologist, a return to sense-certainty in a new way, to a consciousness of experience which thinks its moments through absolutely. Or again, the end of the Phenomenology dawns the beginning of the Encyclopedic attitude toward intuition. As Hegel writes in the Enc. Phil. Spir.:

It is quite erroneous to imagine that one truly knows the object when one has an immediate intuition of it. Perfect cognition belongs only to the pure thinking of Reason which comprehends its object, and only he who has risen to this thinking possesses a perfectly determinate, true intuition. With him intuition forms...
This second end of the imagination is in one way reached in the thesis, since to think the imagination through in order explain its role in the Phenomenology requires grasping the end of the Phenomenology—it requires grasping the Phenomenology’s aim, its goal.\textsuperscript{272} However, a phenomenologically rich investigation of how Hegel thinks the imagination to the end in that work requires investigation of the moments in the Phenomenology:\textsuperscript{273} a task which exceeds the present thesis.

I would like nevertheless to make a gesture in that direction. As we saw in Chapter 3 (and throughout our investigation), time, or inwardizing negation, is key to Hegel’s definition of the imagination. We also mentioned in our conclusion to Chapter 3 that the ‘final’ return of time is in the final chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, in Absolute Knowing. Therefore, to get a sense of the completion of imagination in the Phenomenology, let us briefly look at the transition from religion to absolute knowing, and then more specifically look at how time appears in the Phenomenology, especially in "Absolute Knowing."

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The general difference between the most developed shape of religion—Revealed Religion (for Hegel, this is Christianity)—and Absolute Knowing, is expressed as the sublation of picture thinking (vorstellen) by Absolute Knowing. It is sublated by a knowing according to the

\begin{quote}
only the substantial form into which his completely developed cognition concentrates itself again. In immediate intuition, it is true that I have the entire object before me; but not until my cognition of the object developed in all its aspects has returned into the form of simple intuition does it confront my intelligence as an articulated, systematic totality" (§449Z, p. 200 my underlining).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{272} We dealt with the Preface to the Phenomenology, which, it must be remembered, was written after the Phenomenology was finished.

\textsuperscript{273} It would also involve looking closely at the final chapters of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.
Concept. This is, the dominance of content (in the content-concept dialectic) throughout the phenomenology is finally balanced by a recognition of the Concept in the content. While Revealed Religion has the Absolute—God—for its content, absolute knowing is the recognition in itself of God's activity: "what in religion was the content or a form for presenting an other, is here the Self's own act; the Notion requires the content to be the Self's own act" (PoS ¶796, p. 485). This is the completion of what Hegel articulates in the Preface: it is the grasping of the truth as 'not substance but just as much as Subject': "[f]or this Notion is, as we see, the knowledge of the Self's act within itself as all essentiality and all existence, the knowledge of this subject as substance and of the substance as this knowledge of its act" (PoS ¶796, p. 485).

In outline, the relation of Absolute Spirit to Absolute Knower is that the absolute knower is the consciousness we started with at the beginning of Phenomenology which has, through the development of its own content, become conscious of itself as arising out of a self-interpreting community. Or, expressed the other way around, the final shape of that Spirit is the "Spirit which at the same time gives its complete and true content the form of the Self and thereby realizes its Notion as remaining in its Notion in this realization—this is absolute knowing" (¶798, p. 485). Now we must look briefly at what this means in terms of the transition from religion to absolute knowing.

Hegel was a man of his time, and therefore (as noted above), for him Christianity was the form of religion involved in the transition to Absolute Knowing. The 'other' represented in this 'revealed religion,' is Jesus. He is the incarnate Absolute Spirit. What must occur for Absolute Knowing to step on the scene, is as we saw above, that the "content or a form for presenting" this absolute other, must be recognized as "the Self's own act." Jesus represents the
completion of Spirit representing its absolute shape to itself, he is the culmination of Spirit's self-representation; his presence is the fulfilled prophecy, and he is the fulfiller of prophecy. According to Hegel, consciousness' preponderance throughout the Phenomenology to determine its concept as other (and not recognize this fact of its having done so) is in Christianity the one-sided recognition of the absolute—the fixation on its otherness: it is determining the absolute as (only) other. For this preponderance to be overcome, for religious consciousness to recognize God as the activity of the Self, as absolute Spirit, the truth of the Jesus the "Mediator" must be recognized: mediation must be recognized by each of us as our own activity as Spirit—as members of a community of interpreters.

The consciousness which does not recognize the God within, experiences the return to the Unhappy Consciousness when the external Mediator is no more. In a further inversion, what dies is not just Jesus, the represented absolute, but also the picture-thought (vorstellen), of mediation as something other. When that dies, the one-sidedness of assuming mediation to be other (and the corresponding false identity of the self as other than a responsible mediator), is overcome. The whole process is painful. Hegel writes: "The death of this picture-thought contains, therefore at the same time the death of the abstraction of the divine Being which is not posited as Self. That death is the painful feeling of the Unhappy Consciousness that God Himself is dead" (\textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, p. 476). We must take particular note of the way Hegel describes this death, for in this death of representation lies the activity of the imagination: the pain is also that of birth.

This hard saying is the expression of innermost simple self-knowledge, the return of consciousness into the depths of the night in which 'I' = 'I', a night which no longer distinguishes or knows anything outside of it. This feeling is, in fact, the loss of substance and of its appearance over against consciousness; but it is at the same time the pure subjectivity of substance, or the pure certainty of itself which it lacked when it was object, or the immediate, or pure essence. \textit{This Knowing is the inbreathing of the Spirit.}
whereby Substance becomes Subject, by which its abstraction and lifelessness have died, and Substance therefore has become actual and simple and universal Self-consciousness (¶785 p. 476).

This death is the negation of the preponderance to be one-sided. It is the death inherent in any ideology, but told here with regard to the absolute Ideal. It is negation of the notion that a projected ideal communicator dominates actual communication. This death is the return of the negative moment, a moment which we saw in the Philosophy of Spirit is part of representation. The negation is the return of the imagination's negative moment of determination. The absolute recognition of this dialectic of negation is the beginning of proper mediation. For this death reveals the movement of (the) absolute representation—it is the "inbreathing of the Spirit, whereby Substance becomes Subject." It is the moment in which the Unhappy Consciousness hits the bottom of its despair, and gains in return the certainty it lacked—the certainty that the nature of consciousness is such that it can and does grasp itself as a member of a community of interpreters, that truth is not other than the movement of proper (self-)understanding; that truth is 'not substance but just as much subject.' In absolute knowing "[t]his letting-go is the same renunciation of the one-sidedness of the Notion that in itself constituted the beginning; but it is now its own act of renunciation, just as the Notion which it renounces is its own Notion. That in-itself [i.e immediacy] of the beginning is in truth, as negativity, no less mediated" (¶796, p. 484).

The key difference between Revealed Religion and Absolute Knowing is thus Spirit's self-certainty, the certainty that in thinking it is knowing absolutely—that in thinking it is the movement of Absolute Spirit. Let us look, therefore, at this transition in terms of certainty.

We saw in the psychology that the movement of the imagination is the inception of the
self; certainty of self is the determination of that power to determine—it is a dialectical repetition and development of time. If we go back to the chapter in the *Phenomenology* on "The Truth of Self-Certainty" we read that "[t]he determination of Life as it has issued from the Notion... [is] independence itself, in which the differences of the movement are resolved, the single essence of Time which, in this equality with itself, has the stable essence of Space" (¶169, p. 106). There what was produced was a form of certainty which was not self-conscious; and the various levels of the *Phenomenology* provide the developing shapes of self, the various forms of the stable essence of Space. But we have seen the dialectical nature of Space and Time—that it is a dialectic of *bestehen* and *vergehen*. Thus each time self becomes only *bestehende* it is one-sided: and if in its 'final' shape it seeks to preserve itself as the shape of an absolute knowing self, it is the inversion of absolute knowing—it is evil. Insofar as it this final shape is however also giving up of its stable shape, it is good. Thus Hegel writes in the chapter on Absolute Knowing: "...the pure knowledge of essence has in principle renounced its simple unity, for it is the self-sundering, or the negativity which the Notion is; so far as this self-sundering is the process of becoming for-itself, it is evil; so far as it is the in-itself, it remains good (¶796 p. 484).

The self which has a proper self-certainty, and familiarity with its previous shapes—that is, the self that is as much *vergehende* as *bestehende*, and that has therefore a proper understanding of itself (that is *verstehende*)—is an "absolute knower."274

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274 It must be kept in mind that what is going through the transition from Revealed Religion to Absolute Knowing is Absolute Spirit, not simply the individual. And for Hegel that has involved giving an account of the historical material developments of [Western] society with its 'culmination' in the Reformation, the French Revolution, the Enlightenment, and finally the completion of the meaning of the Reformation in the philosophical grasping of the individual as Scientific Knower.
[absolute Knowing] is Spirit that knows itself in the shape of Spirit, or a comprehensive knowing [in terms of the Notion]. Truth is not only in itself completely identical with certainty, but it also has the shape of self-certainty, or it is in its existence in the form of self-knowledge. Truth is the content, which in religion is still not identical with its certainty. But this identity is now a fact, in that the content has received the shape of the Self. As a result, that which is the very essence, viz. the Notion, has become the element of existence, or has become the form of objectivity for consciousness. Spirit, manifesting or appearing in consciousness in this element, or what is the same thing, produced in it by consciousness, is Science (¶798, p. 485-6).

Thus, "our journey does not stop when we achieve the true consciousness of God. We go on beyond that point. The final object of our knowledge is not "God," but ourselves as knowers. Ours is not a "journey of the mind to God," but a transformation of philosophy (the love of wisdom) into the logical science of our own being in the world" (Harris, Hegel. p. 14).

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How then does Time appear in its final form in Absolute Knowing? Hegel writes:

Time is the Notion itself that is there and which presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition; for this reason, Spirit necessarily appears in Time, and it appears in Time just so long as it has not grasped its pure Notion, i.e. has not annulled Time. It is the outer, intuited pure Self which is not-grasped by the Self, the merely intuited Notion; when this latter grasps itself it sets aside its Time-form, comprehends this intuiting, and is a comprehended and comprehending intuiting. Time, therefore, appears as the destiny and necessity of Spirit that is not yet complete within itself, the necessity to enrich the share which self-consciousness has in consciousness, to set in motion the immediacy of the in-itself, which is the form in which substance is present in consciousness; or conversely, to realize and reveal what is at first only inward (the in-itself being taken as what is inward) i.e. to vindicate it for Spirit's certainty of itself (¶801 p. 487).

We can read "Time" here as a logical moment or as history. We have given an outline of what for Hegel is logically required for Christianity to become Absolute Knowing. As a moment of consciousness the description above is really the beginning of the Logic: for time which is absolutely empty is what we discover when we try to think Being pure Being. But this
"end" of time also involves the question of history and its end.

Since the history of Spirit is the history of society and morality, our brief recapitulation of the transition from religion to absolute knowing must include the fact that the development of consciousness into Absolute Spirit is also a moral development. And the act which gives this absolute moment moral shape is forgiveness. The heading "Conscience: The 'beautiful soul,' evil and its forgiveness" is the final moment of the Phenomenology Chapter on Spirit. It shows how the inwardizing imagination, this self-sundering, is on the one side a necessary action of consciousness for-itself--each of us must act according to the dictates of our conscience: each of us acts in the interest of our limited knowledge of what 'good' means. Thus even if we are intentionally acting according to what we understand the good "in-itself" to be, in acting we cannot avoid (the possibility of) stepping on someone's toes. The possibility of negative consequences which is present in all action necessitates forgiveness. In it we express our capacity to take up the other side--someone else's viewpoint; we express the willingness to risk alienating ourselves from our own viewpoint. "Forgiveness is the only moral duty that is truly absolute, for the willingness to enter even into the standpoint of the coward who saved his own life in the battle is the condition of truly human communication. This is the reality of moral respect" (Harris, Hegel, p. 78-79). But the act must be accomplished on both sides: "The coward must, of course, confess that he was a coward and that he needs forgiveness if the communication is to become perfect" (Harris, Hegel, p. 78-79). Forgiveness is the mutual negation of 'abstraction and lifelessness' between two (or more) people: the negation of the hard heartedness of the judging individual, and of the negation of the unsociable self-interestedness of the other's cowardliness. Absolute knowing is only absolution insofar as perpetrator and victim both
recognize the evil, and negate it.\textsuperscript{275}

As noted, in the \textit{Phenomenology} we arrive at the moment of forgiveness before we arrive at the chapter on religion. But "...the spirit of the "reconciling Yes" that comes to birth in the handclasp of the agent and judge who do perfectly understand each other is the Spirit of the God who dies as a man on the Cross" (Harris, \textit{Hegel}, p. 78-79). In Absolute knowing, this moral reconciliation is Spirit's recognition that forgiveness of the other is necessary to the process of self-knowledge. Science is set back by the "valet's eye view."

But the act of forgiveness does not imply forgetting evil. Even if the negation is achieved, the negation has only served to determine the evil as something not to be repeated. The possibility of repetition is no less preserved in the \textit{Aufhebung} than the moment of the categorical imperative--in fact one necessitates the other. For a post-holocaust Hegel scholar, the moment of the Categorical Imperative remains the operative response--that is, we must declare that such a thing as the holocaust ought never occur again, and act against its repetition(s). But this does not mean that the logic of absolute knowing does not exist or that it is impossible. In fact it highlights its necessity. The absolution of Time does not take us out of history, it reveals what history demands of us. The willingness to attempt forgiveness may be what is meant by the meek inheriting the world, but it does not mean that the world they inherit is not hard hearted, or incapable of engaging in forgiveness and transformation: indeed absolute spirit is for most of humanity, most of the time, an absolute labour.

History is only what we know the past to be. If indeed the Spirit of our time is capable of producing absolute knowers, their self-certainty lies in that labour. Progress is be measured

\textsuperscript{275} Forgiveness "cannot be conditional. Reciprocity is looked for, but it cannot be demanded" (Harris, \textit{Hegel}, p. 78-79).
on the one hand in terms of the freedom from dogmatic ideology—freedom from ideology that represses our community's complex discussions with itself—and on the other, in terms of the spontaneity of the manifold of cultural, artistic, and religious expression. Through such labour and self-expression 'what is at first only inward is vindicated for Spirit's certainty of itself' (¶801 p. 487).

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What, then, is the role of the imagination in Absolute Knowing? The *Phenomenology* is the *Schacht* of the imagination, not unlike Dante's *Inferno*. It is the path of despair, motivated on the one hand by the centripetal force of consciousness' inwardizing, a force which determines the world, but whose one-sidedness is also, on the other hand, worn out by the corresponding centrifugal power of its own expansion. Consciousness begins with the simple here and now as "mine," and it moves dialectically through ever more comprehensive spheres—through the maelstrom of French Revolution ideology, and beyond.

For reasons which Hegel could not have known, the final choice of the word "*Schacht*" is an excellent description—in its translation—of what is happening in the *Phenomenology*: the *Phenomenology* is the continuous "mining" of experience—the making mine, and the development of what is already there—of the latent content, of the language and community into and out of which the 'I' is born. We recall from the *Philosophy of Spirit* that awareness in intuition divides into the moment of possession and the moment of being—into *das Seinige* und *das Seiende*. The *Phenomenology* is the process of bringing the predominance of the former into actual accord

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276 Although its complete message bears a secular resemblance to the entire *Divine Comedy*. 
with the latter—it is the process of recognizing that what is ‘mine’ is in fact “ours.”²⁷⁷

Thus if the Phenomenology is the mine—Spirit’s one-sided reconstructions, the mining of the mine—its conclusion is the emergence from that mine, from the Schacht of imagination; it is the knowledge of the way in which that Schacht operates, and the proper operation of it. In other words the final Aufhebung—that of picture thinking (of vorstellen) into absolute knowing—is not only the subsumption of representation, it is also the certainty of the role and necessity of representation. If imagination is central to the movement of Aufhebung—if it is, indeed, the inception of it—then it is never got beyond: what the imagination holds, and what it is today, is the key to understanding the depth of our time. And if we have learned anything from Hegel, we must think it through carefully.

²⁷⁷ Or, to pun on the notion of time, what is mine is discovered to be shared history—the filling of “hours.”
APPENDIX

**Geistesphilosophie 1803-4**

A) Consciousness → a) Speech → *Imagination* → i) Space/Time  
B) The Negative  
   b) The Tool  
   ii) Universality: Positive & Negative (*bestehende, vergehende* Consc.)  
C) The People  
   c) Possession  
   (das Volk)  
   iii) Theoretical and Practical Consciousness (*verstehende* Consc.)  
   & the Family

**Geistesphilosophie 1805-6:**

A) *Spirit acc. to its Concept* → a) Theoretical Knowing  
B) Objective Spirit  
   i.e. *Intelligence* → A) *Imagination in General:*  
   b) The Will  
   i) Intuition/Imagination (Images)  
   c) Objective Spirit  
   ii) Recollection (The Familiar)  
   B) *Language (Sprache):*  
   c) Objective Spirit  
   iii) To Mean (*bezeichnen*) (Signs)  
   iv) Names (Tones)  
   v) Memory (Order)  
   vi) Understanding (Knowl.)

**Philosophy of Spirit 1830:**

A) *Subjective Spirit* →  
   i) Anthropology  
B) Objective Spirit  
   II) Phenomenology  
C) Absolute Spirit  
   III) Psychology → a) *Theoretical Mind (Intelligence)* →  
   b) Practical Mind  
   c) Free Mind

1) Intuition  
2) Representation → i) Recollection (*Erinnerung*)  
3) Thinking → i) *Imagination* → | aa) Reproductive Imagination (§455)  
   | ii) *Phantasy*: Symbolizing, Allegorizing, Poetic Imagination (§456)  
   | iii) Memory | cc) Sign-making Phantasy: Signs, Language (§457 intro, §458 Signs,  
   | | §459 Language, §460 Names).
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