GOVERNING FORESTRY:
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP INFLUENCE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND THE
US PACIFIC NORTHWEST

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of Political Science
University of Toronto

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Governing Forestry: Environmental Group Influence in British Columbia and the US Pacific Northwest

Increased societal pressures over the last thirty years for greater eco-forest protection in British Columbia and the US Pacific Northwest appear to be forces for (upward) policy convergence. However, choices regarding forest land use (what to protect; where to log) and forest practices (how to log) have been a tale of policy divergence. The relative power of the state, industry, environmental groups, and other organized interests have also responded to societal pressures in distinct ways. The dissertation seeks to explain these divergent policy responses and the differing influence of environmental groups. Employing a policy community/network approach and drawing from historical institutionalist theory, the dissertation tests the argument that macro-institutional structures, statutory regimes, and level of public land ownership appear to be key explanatory factors for understanding the nature of forest policy and network change.

The dissertation finds that the conjunction of these three variables largely explains the high level of state autonomy in British Columbia, where forest policy and network change is strongly influenced by the actions of the governing party. In contrast, significant changes in the PNW have been primarily the product of organized non-governmental interests (the forest industry in the case of Oregon and Washington State regulations and environmental group litigation in the case of US PNW federal lands policy). At the same time the research finds that this institutional explanation must be accompanied by an understanding of the role and place of each region's forest economy within the North American and international economies. These factors help account for the internationalization of BC's forest policy community in the early 1990s, and the paucity of attention US environmental groups give to private land forest regulations in the Pacific Northwest.
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The summers of my youth were spent with my family on a Northern Gulf Island nestled between Vancouver Island and the British Columbia coast. We would hike in the forest, fish for salmon and cod, or go to the beach to get clams and oysters. It was a great adventure. It was also a time to appreciate our place in a fragile and changing ecosystem. Reflecting on the important debates about forest stewardship that continue to pit environmentalists against loggers, urban communities versus rural ones, I can see how this Northern Gulf Island experience validates both positions.

On the one hand, this island is testimony to the ability of an old growth forest to regenerate after undergoing unregulated harvesting and become a second-growth forest of startling beauty. We would often hike by the old-growth stumps and wonder what the original forest must have looked like, but we never thought for a moment that the forest was anything short of spectacular. On the other hand, the forest of my youth has changed significantly for the worse in the last 20 years: salmon no longer spawn in the stream; clams and oysters have been over harvested; we are lucky to catch one or two salmon in a summer, instead of in an outing; and, owing to the plans of a developer, a bulldozed road scars the forest landscape behind the property line.

All of these changes are a microcosm of what is occurring around British Columbia, the US Pacific Northwest, and in other parts of the world. Concerns about the environment have led to increased calls for environmentally friendly harvesting practices and old-growth forest protection. This dissertation is an effort to see what kinds of effects these concerns have had on public policy in BC and the US Pacific Northwest. This has been a daunting task, and, not surprisingly, one that few have ventured to undertake. It involves summarizing highly detailed and complex policies of the four main jurisdictions that govern forestry in these regions: the province of BC, the States of Oregon and Washington, and the US federal government all play key roles.
Nonetheless, this study is necessary, for it presents a picture of different public policy responses to similar concerns about the environment. Differences exist between BC and the PNW and within the PNW. The story in the coming pages is one that tells us that institutions matter. They mediate eco-forest struggles in different ways, and they give governments very different tools with which to address these fundamental issues. Such an understanding is of particular importance for those interested in shaping the direction of future forest policy.

I have had the good fortune to have had long-term funding for this project. The bulk of the research was supported by a three-year Tri-Council of Canada Eco-Research doctoral fellowship (Award No. 752-93-0128) at the University of Toronto, while the final edits were completed on a Canada-US Fulbright fellowship at Harvard University.

Countless individuals shared their time, ideas and resources with me over the course of writing this dissertation. Over 120 interviews were undertaken for this research, and I must thank those governmental, industry, environmental, labour and other officials who generously gave of their time. Their organizations are listed in Appendix B. On the US side, I was fortunate to have key government officials patiently explain to me the intricacies of the US decision-making system as it pertains to forestry. These included Keith Corrigal, Jerry Sesco, and Peter Keller. I must also give a special thanks to Tom Tuchmann and Jack Ward Thomas, both of whom managed to find time in their extremely busy and demanding positions to meet with a graduate student from Canada. Nels Johnson of the World Resources Institute met with me at the very beginning of this project, and his advice made the research program more manageable than it would otherwise have been. Con Schelau of the American Forest and Paper Association likewise spent half a day with me during the initial stages of the research. Robert Kennedy Jr. was most gracious in agreeing to meet with me, and shed light on the important role US environmental groups have come to play in BC forest policy. Kent Robinson gave a thorough and thoughtful critique of conference papers that presented the US PNW research. Finally, Ross Gorte, one of the top experts on US forest policy, met with me three
times over the course of the research and provided a wealth of information.

Kent Weaver of the Brookings Institution enlightened me on the intricacies of conducting research in the US capital. Along the way, Kent took me under his wing, and I have benefited enormously from his advice and generous assistance. Lisa Young provided help during one of my research trips to Washington, DC. She also gave thoughtful critiques of academic presentations and has been a valuable source of advice in the last three years.

Key British Columbia governmental, industry, and environmental officials met with me. Mark Haddock spent hours with me at the beginning going over the BC and US forest policy styles, and pointed me in numerous productive directions. Terje Vold and Bob Peart both spent valuable time with me and read draft material. I am most grateful to former BC Premier Harcourt, Gerry Armstrong, Philip Halkett and Steven Owen, all of whom took time out over their hectic schedules to meet with me. Brian Gilfillan of BC’s Council of Forest Industries spent considerable time with me and William Cafferata’s ongoing intellectual interest in this project has been appreciated. Principal BC environmental actors took time to meet with me and I am most grateful to them. In particular, Alan McDonnell took a welcomed interest in this project.

I also benefited from the advice of scholars at Harvard University. Elaine Bernard of the Harvard Trade Union Program went out of her way and then some to provide a healthy intellectual setting and office space during the year at Harvard. Margy Rydzynski’s cheerful demeanor made my gruelling tasks more pleasant. Paul Weiler graciously agreed to oversee the research, and numerous Harvard faculty met with me. Most of my meetings were concerning a related topic on the Canada-US softwood lumber conflict, but many helped inform this research as well.

In particular, I would like to thank Marc Busch, Henry Lee, Lawrence Broz, Joe Kalt, Mike Scherer, Raymond Vernon, Theodore Panayotou, Ted Parson, Cary Coglianese and Paul Pierson for meeting with me and sharing their ideas. The librarian staff at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, the Harvard Business School and Hilles Library were most helpful. Ted Smith
welcomed me to Cambridge, and was a valuable source regarding US concerns about BC forests.

Many people helped me with putting together the economic data, including Debra Warren and Karen Waddell of the US Forest Service Pacific Northwest Research Station, and Barbara Leline of the Western Wood Products Association. On the BC side, Tim Gallagher and George Dufor were very helpful, as was the staff at Price Waterhouse.

I must thank Steven Bernstein whose collaboration with me on a related paper was most enjoyable. Steven greatly assisted me in understanding the way in which international environmental groups influence domestic policy making, and the BC chapters are the better because of this. George Hoberg provided a constructive critique of this article. Fae Korsmo, Landon Curry, and Michael Howlett all gave helpful comments on previous drafts of different parts of this dissertation. Jeremy Raynor provided valuable advice and ideas at various stages of this project.

I had the privilege of working with Jeremy Wilson during the Victoria years. He provided me with invaluable insight into the world of BC forest politics, and with numerous interesting intellectual discussions. His friendship was most appreciated and helped me to endure the lonely times of dissertation writing. Richard Simeon provided thoughtful comments on previous versions and greatly helped to clarify my thoughts. I am grateful to him for taking on yet one more keen graduate student.

Grace Skogstad performed numerous roles in her capacity as dissertation advisor. Her attention to the details of this project allowed me to work through with her important and difficult conceptual issues. She also provided valued professional advice over the past few years. Her ability to encourage and promote made the dissertation experience an enjoyable one. I know how fortunate I was to have had her as an advisor, and will endeavour to model her approach in my career.

Of course, mistakes that occur are mine alone.

Both sets of parents greatly facilitated the research and writing process. John and Sharon Cashore provided an affordable place to stay in a beautiful neighbourhood in Victoria, where two years of the research and writing was carried out. I also benefited from numerous conversations with
my Dad, who was heavily involved in BC forest policy changes of the early 1990s. If there is any justice in this world, he will be remembered for his preoccupation with the future of BC forest policy, instead of how many times the media mentioned his name.

My wonderful in-laws, Joseph and Mildred Krejci, likewise provided invaluable assistance over the course of this research, including the year at Harvard. My two children, Walter and Theresa, came along during this project, and gave me an additional reason to complete it. Their smiles and joyfulness have made my world a happier place.

Finally, to my wife, Donna, who has been part of this project since the beginning. She has performed a role as cheerful encourager, mother, wife, editor and provided constructive criticism. This project went on longer than expected, but she was always supportive, despite the long days, short holidays, and stressful attitude of her number one admirer. They only put one name of the doctoral degree certificate, but I know that this is as much owing to her accomplishments as it is owing to mine.

In an all too typical tale, Donna put her career on hold to be at home with our children and nurture their development, while allowing me to finish the PhD. It is to her that I dedicate this work, as a small note of my love and appreciation for all that she has done.
To Donna
INTRODUCTION: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE POLITICS OF FOREST POLICY CHANGE

In the last thirty years, two "waves" of environmentalism have resulted in a notable shift in citizen values toward ecological concerns throughout Western industrialized countries.¹ Behavioural scholars have placed much attention on documenting this phenomenon within civil society, but less scrutiny has been paid to the effects of these value changes on public policy outputs. This study explores the influence of these value changes through a comparison of "eco-forest" policy and politics in the province of British Columbia and the States of Oregon and Washington.² Situated in a geographic region often referred to as "Cascadia", this area of North America tends to attract the bulk of the attention of Canadian, American, and even international environmental groups.²

Jurisdictional matters complicate this comparison. In general, the US federal government oversees its significant holdings of federally-owned forest lands in the Pacific Northwest (PNW), while the State governments regulate private forests and a limited amount of State-owned lands.³ British Columbia has primary jurisdiction over forests in its territory, although the federal government does have a role over specific issues such as fisheries and national parks.

The US Pacific Northwest and British Columbia have much in common. The forest industry has been, and remains, important to their economic development; their political cultures are similar; and citizens in both regions increased their ecological concerns beginning in the mid-1960s. As a result, environmental struggles in the forests became important to all jurisdictions in these regions, and all made policy responses.

Such similarities lead to an intriguing puzzle: the increased societal pressures in both regions for greater eco-forest protection appear to be forces for (upward) policy convergence. However, choices regarding forest protection/land use (what to protect; where to log) and forest practices/management (how to log) policies in British Columbia and the US Pacific Northwest have

¹In order to distinguish the two meanings of the word, "state", an upper case "S" will be used when referring to the Washington or Oregon "State", while a lower case "s" will be used when referring to the political science term the "state." Together, Oregon and Washington will be referred to as the "Pacific Northwest."
been a tale of policy divergence. At the same time, the relative power of the state, industry, environmental groups, and other organized interests has developed in distinct ways. There are even marked differences among the three US jurisdictions that determine forest policy within the Pacific Northwest. The governments of Oregon and Washington State have taken one route, while the federal government in Washington, DC has gone in another direction.4

The quickest policy response affecting PNW forests occurred in Washington, DC. The US Congress passed legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s that protected endangered species, provided for clean water, called for long-range forest plans that recognized "multiple uses" of the forest resource, and expanded protected wilderness areas.5 Following this legislation, the next two decades saw US regulatory and administrative agencies developing a wide array of environmentally sensitive forest policies, culminating in the adoption of "ecosystem management" principles in the early 1990s.

Policy responses were also swift in Oregon and Washington State, with both jurisdictions ushering in forest practices legislation in the early 1970s.6 However, these acts and other pieces of legislation did not provide the same degree of environmental protection as the laws being passed by the US Congress. In fact, they were pre-emptive measures supported by industry interests to avoid potentially more difficult legislation. Future policy change did occur after this time, but it was comparatively more limited than what was taking place on US federal forest lands.

Finally, there was a third path in British Columbia. Forest policy change during the 1960s and 1970s was limited.7 Forest practice legislation was avoided, while little-used forest protection legislation was enacted. Some important wilderness areas were preserved in the 1980s (Wilson 1990), but only in the very recent past has a forest practices code and a comprehensive protected area/land use strategy been initiated.8

Similarly, the influence of environmental groups was uneven. Before 1960, policy making processes in all jurisdictions were relatively closed, and usually involved a key government forest
management agency, organized forest company interests, and individual forest companies. However, the ability of environmental groups and other organized interests to influence closed state/industry relations varied dramatically. Environmental groups gained the quickest and greatest degree of influence in Washington, DC. Although more fragmented than industry organizations and sometimes divided on key issues, many of these groups have been adept at forming strategic coalitions and have interacted on a regular basis since the early 1970s. Since then, many groups have successfully injected eco-forest values into forest policy development and administration. The dispute among resource policy experts in the US is not whether environmental groups are involved in decision making processes, but the degree of success they have obtained vis-à-vis economic interests.

The role of environmental groups in shaping policy choices in Oregon and Washington State has been limited. Few environmental groups have decided to focus on forest policy at the State level. National groups are almost never involved, while the number of local, State, and regional groups is strikingly smaller than those interested in the Pacific Northwest federal lands. Environmental groups involved in these jurisdictions do not share the same kind of influence as forest industry interests, although they made some minor inroads in the 1980s. Changes in forest policy outputs in the last thirty years in Oregon and Washington State have either been the result of industry-supported consultation processes or industry acting in concertation with government.

Just as BC experienced slow policy responses, its environmental groups historically have had limited influence. During the 1970s, few province-wide groups were established, and most were unsuccessful in influencing forest policy making processes. Instead, there was a noticeable proliferation of special area-focused groups which concentrated on preserving their chosen part of the province. Environmental groups were on the outside of forest policy making processes, with economic interests and the state dominating. During the 1980s, province-wide environmental groups attempted to increase their influence, but achieved only minor success. However, since the late
1980s, the number and types of environmental groups seeking influence in BC have changed dramatically. Not only did some environmental groups become participants in policy making, but there was also a noticeable expansion of professional, expertise-oriented environmental groups. For the first time, this new era witnessed the first successful attempt to create a province-wide coalition of some of the key eco-forest groups in the province.

Due to jurisdictional limitations, poor enforcement of the federal Fisheries Act, and deference to provincial jurisdiction in resource matters, federal jurisdiction over BC eco-forest policy has remained relatively insignificant. This distinguishes the American experience from the Canadian one, and explains why a thorough treatment of Canadian federal politics and policies transcends the scope of this study.

This dissertation seeks to explain differences in the development of policy outputs and the role of environmental groups in BC and PNW forest policy making processes, including differences within the PNW. It tests the argument that the manner in which each jurisdiction's institutional setting (including its policy legacies) mediates environmental forest struggles largely accounts for these differences. It also argues that economic or political culture factors are forces for convergence, and thus fail to shed light on the differences being explained.

Consider the political economy approach within Canadian political science. While this approach is persuasive in explaining broad differences in the role of the state in Canada and the United States, it is not very helpful for this inquiry. This is because, in political economy terms, what is striking between British Columbia and the US Pacific Northwest is not their differences, but their similarities. In both cases, much of their early economic development was built around harvesting timber and today each region's forest industry is important for economic development, revenue, and employment. Forest companies operating in these regions also compete for the same markets in the United States, Europe and Japan. And both regions face increased competition from developing
countries entering the forest products market and from technological advances creating new sources of fibre.

Yet, the PNW and BC economies are not identical, and perhaps the differences that do exist might explain policy divergence and differences in state/societal relations. While much of the work of staples theorists within Canadian political economy points to the very similar roles the state must play when facilitating development of the forest resource,¹⁴ some staples theorists have argued that the level of dependence on resource development vis-à-vis other industrial activity will largely determine which economic and societal actors the state favours.¹⁵ According to this school of thought, state actors governing a resource dependent, non-diversified economy, will have less room to manoeuvre than those in a state which is less dependent on staples exports and foreign capital. This literature’s scholars might argue that the BC government is unable to afford the luxury of including eco-forest groups and developing advanced environmental regulations.

However, this argument fails to solve the puzzle. The forest industry is important to the economic development of both the regions. For example, measuring the number of direct jobs the forest sector produce in each region, Table 1.0 shows that the differences are only a question of degree. Indeed, Washington has the lowest percentage of jobs directly employed in the forest industry, but has followed a very similar path to the one Oregon has chosen.
Table 1.0: Relative (Direct) Importance of Each Jurisdiction’s Forest Industry, 1994*,**  
(Thousands of persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Direct Jobs</th>
<th>% of total jobs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>4.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington State</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>~5.0</td>
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*In order to ensure a general comparison with PNW data, this table excludes the Value Added Sector and Ministry of Forests employment data usually included with BC figures. This means that this table under represents the number of direct jobs in each jurisdiction. For example, Price Waterhouse (1996: 16) reports the number of direct forest jobs in BC to be 96,000 in 1994, and 97,500 in 1995. Since the BC data has been altered to facilitate comparison, it is less precise than the PNW data.

**This table does not show the impact of the forest industry on indirect jobs in each jurisdiction, which is estimated at double the level of direct jobs. Price Waterhouse (1996: 16) has estimated the number of direct and indirect jobs resulting from the forest industry to be 18 percent of BC total employment, or three times their reported level of direct employment.

Others within the new Canadian political economy have focused explicitly on domestic class relations as explaining state (forest) policy development. From this perspective, class conflict in these two regions would go a long way toward explaining the forest policy processes and outputs. But again, BC and the PNW share as many similarities as differences in this regard. Both sectors have witnessed a relatively high degree of unionization, and both have lost members in the early 1980s as a result of mechanization and recession. It is true that the organization of forest industry business interests in the PNW has been more fragmented than is the case in BC. But any explanation of the fragmented associational structure in the PNW forest industry, in contrast to BC’s relatively concentrated hierarchical structure, leads back to the different institutional environment within which each industry operates.

Another potential difference highlighted by Canadian political economy literature stems from a region’s place within the North American continental economy. Melissa Clark-Jones (1987: 11, 211), argues that in Canada the federal and provincial states have facilitated “continental resource capitalism”, in which the Canadian political economy is “a specialized (resource producing) adjunct to the American political economy”. This analysis points us to the very different places Canada and the United States have within the North American economy. Perhaps these differences inform the
puzzle? It is doubtful. The "specialized resource producing adjunct" analysis could just as easily be applied to the US Pacific Northwest political economy. This region also exports the bulk of its resources to other, more industrialized regions within the North American economy. Where these two regions vary is that the PNW forest economy operates within the US institutional structure, while the BC forest economy is on the outside. The result of this institutional difference is important, and will be explored throughout this dissertation.

Thus, most approaches within Canadian political economy point to the functional similarities of these two resource dependent forest economies, or to the differences that can be traced to the very different institutional environments in which each economy operates.

Another possible non-institutional explanation is that there exists different political cultures in these two regions. Unfortunately this is a difficult argument to test, since no systematic attempt to explore political culture similarities and differences between BC and the PNW has been made. It could be argued that the forest economies and abundant forested lands in these regions have led to a single, "Cascadian" political culture, emphasizing once again similarities between these two regions. Could an argument be made for political culture differences? Conducting cross-Canada provincial comparisons, some have argued, in the holistic tradition, that British Columbia has a "frontier" political culture (Black 1979), leading to the development of non-traditional political protest parties (Blake, Johnston, and Elkins 1981; Simeon and Elkins 1974). The long tradition of a social democratic party in British Columbia seems testimony to its "collectivist" political culture, and may stand in contrast to party development in the PNW. As such, environmental values may be articulated in BC not just through organized societal groups, but also through political parties. If this is the case, it points to the different institutional settings which may have given political parties in British Columbia a greater ability to develop societal coalitions than their counterparts in the PNW. In addition, such an approach would not explain why a more collectivist political system lagged behind the US federal jurisdiction's eco-forest policy responses. Furthermore, any explanation of
regional differences between the PNW and BC fails to explain important intra-regional differences in the PNW.

The other aspect of political culture that informs this dissertation is the behaviouralist work examining citizen attitudes toward environmental concerns. Inglehart (1977; 1981; 1990) has presented survey data to argue for the emergence of a "post materialist society" in western industrialized countries, where socialization experiences and modernization have led to an increase in non-material concerns. Although Inglehart's thesis has not gone unchallenged, his analysis would apply to the environmental values of citizens in the PNW and BC. Indeed, behavioural research has found that citizens values in both regions have been affected by the above noted "waves" of environmentalism in the 1960s and late 1980s. The challenge is to understand why such convergence in values led to such divergence in policy responses and differences in the inclusion of environmental groups in policy making. This political culture approach helps in understanding changes in values, but does less well at understanding changes in policy outputs.

Thus, if political culture is a powerful explanation of policy and group organization in the PNW and BC, it seems more likely that it would predict similarity rather than difference. This is because all four jurisdictions grew out of resource dependency, exploitative economies, and because both BC and the PNW have been influenced by post-materialism. For these reasons, political culture approaches by themselves fail to explain the puzzle. They either present a picture of convergent eco-friendly values, or of different party systems that appear to be the result of quite different institutional settings. It is here where the four jurisdictions under review differ dramatically. Macro-institutional structures, policy choices regarding land ownership patterns, and statutory regimes - have resulted in three discernible institutional settings among our four cases (with Oregon and Washington State being remarkably similar).

Macro-institutional structures are the most obvious institutional difference between British Columbia and the PNW. Canadian provinces follow the Westminster model of government,
characterized by an executive within the legislature, party discipline, and a concentrated system of authority. Conversely, the US macro-institutional setting at the State and national level is characterized by a separation of powers. The executive is outside of the legislature and the judiciary carries a significant degree of power. Within the legislature, decision-making authority is further diffused among numerous committees which share responsibility over a given policy area. Moreover, on any given issue it is common that more than one administrative and/or regulatory agency will be involved. Differences in the federal structures are also important. That both countries are federations reveals at one level an obvious macro-similarity, but important differences exist. Canadian federalism is more decentralized and the US federal land ownership (reviewed below) has no real parallel in Canada. As a result, the Canadian federal government has far fewer jurisdictional handles on forest policy than does the US federal government.

The historical policy choices regarding land ownership and statutory regimes have also created important intra- and inter-regional sectoral-level institutional differences. Regarding land ownership, a conscious decision was taken by BC state actors in the first decade of the 20th Century not to transfer remaining stocks of Crown-owned forest land to private ownership. This decision resulted in the province owning and controlling 94 per cent of the forest land base. Forest land in the PNW followed a much different history. About half of PNW forest land was sold to private timber and railway interests in the 19th Century. However, beginning in the late 19th Century, an aggressive federal government strategy created and maintained a broad system of National Forest lands, allowing the federal government to own and manage almost half the forest land base in Oregon and Washington State. Conversely, Oregon and Washington State own only a small fraction of land within each of their boundaries.

The statutory regimes that developed in the late 1960s and 1970s created different constraints and opportunities for state actors. The paucity of British Columbia's legislation left a great deal of discretion to government officials. The industry supported "pre-emptive" statutory regime in
Oregon and Washington State limited litigation efforts while encouraging forest extraction. The complex statutory regime in Washington, DC included non-discretionary and directive measures.

How can these different institutional settings explain the differences in policy responses and participation of environmental groups in policy making? Two bodies of literature are helpful; the first, historical institutionalism, addresses the impacts of macro-level institutional structures on policy outputs; the second, the policy community/network approach, examines sectoral level policy making institutions and networks and their effects in mediating the interaction among state, economic and societal actors.

HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

It has been over 15 years since political science "rediscovered" the state. A number of scholars have traced the roots of this new institutionalism to the unhappiness with existing pluralist, behaviouralist, structural functionalist and neo-marxist paradigms. The new institutionalists charged that the state was either ignored by pluralists and behaviouralists or was determined by other variables (function for structural-functionalists and class for neo-marxists). In fact, three approaches have emerged under the banner of neo-institutionalism: public choice, organization theory and historical institutionalism. Due to its emphasis on past decisions and institutions as mediating social conflict, it is the historical institutionalist approach which informs this dissertation.

Historical institutionalism had its roots with those scholars who called for a renewed emphasis on the state, both as an actor and as a legal order. According to this approach, just as society influences the development of the state, the state also influences civil society, including the development of societal preferences and organized interests. Early historical institutionalists, such as Theda Skocpol, introduced the concepts of state "autonomy" and state "capacity". State autonomy referred to the ability of the state to develop its own goals independently of societal interests, while state "capacity" referred to the ability of the state to formulate and implement policy.
There were "weak states" that were unable to realize their own interests and "strong states" that were both autonomous from civil society and able to implement their own policy decisions.26

This approach has developed important hypotheses about the influence of different macro-level institutional structures (e.g., the US system with its separation of powers, or the Westminster model of parliamentary government) on public policy making processes and policy formation. Skocpol has argued that the separation of powers in the US constitutional system has led to a "weak" state, in which it is difficult for the state to have autonomy from societal interests or the capacity to implement its own decisions. As a result, according to Katzenelson and Prewitt (1979: 31-33) the US institutional/constitutional structure has created "a government of legislation and litigation", in which politics "becomes the struggle to translate social and economic interests into laws".27 Atkinson (1993a:32) hypothesizes that policy capacity is low in this institutional setting: "What can be said about the United States is that policy change of any kind is difficult if it requires co-operation among different arms of government or reliance on a strong administrative apparatus".28 Thus, according to historical institutionalist analyses, the US institutional structures have led to a weak state with little state capacity, and with policy outputs that are fairly stable.

Historical institutionalists characterize Canada's macro-level institutional structures differently. Canadian institutional structures, according to this school, have led to stronger state autonomy and capacity, and thus potential for policy outputs to fluctuate over short periods of time. It is argued that Canada's Westminster parliamentary model and centralized cabinet with ministerial responsibility rules out "an open alliance between bureaucrats and interest groups" (Atkinson 1993a:32), effectively enhancing state autonomy from societal interests. The centralized nature of cabinet decision making in Canada, in contrast with the segmented nature of the US system, has led Atkinson to hypothesize that "...concentration of authority is inversely related to policy continuity" (ibid).
However, these generalizations do not correlate well with forest policy decision making in British Columbia or the Pacific Northwest. In particular, policy change occurred first in the fragmented institutional structure of the three PNW jurisdictions under review, while until 1991, relative policy continuity characterized British Columbia. Clearly, hypotheses that directly link different macro-level institutions with corresponding policy outputs are not always accurate. Responding to this concern, Skocpol (1986: 14) has argued that:

"state autonomy" is not a fixed structural feature of any governmental system. It can come and go. This is true not only because crises may precipitate the formulation of official strategies and policies by elites or administrators who otherwise might not mobilize their own potentials for autonomous action. It is also true because structural potentials for autonomous state actions change over time, as the organizations of coercion and administration undergo transformations, both internally and in their relations to societal groups and to representative parts of government. Thus, although cross-national research can indicate in general terms whether a governmental system has "stronger" or "weaker" tendencies toward autonomous state action, the full potential of this concept can be realized only in truly historical studies that are sensitive to structural variations and conjunctural changes within given polities.29

For Skocpol, these fluctuations in state autonomy explain "initially autonomous state intervention" in the New Deal's "administrative interventions in agriculture", and subsequent "capture" by the American Farm Bureau Federation. Skocpol emphasizes change in "official strategies" or "structural potentials" across time, while Krasner (1978: 58) emphasizes change across different sectors:

There is no reason to assume a priori that the pattern of strengths and weaknesses will be the same for all policies. One state may be unable to alter the structure of its medical system but be able to construct an efficient transportation network, while another can deal relatively easily with getting its citizens around but cannot get their illnesses cured.

Clearly, historical institutionalists recognize that macro-institutional structures do not, in and of themselves, determine the relationships between the state and organized interests at different sectoral levels.

The review above raises two related theoretical questions historical institutionalists need to address: If strengths and weaknesses can change from policy domain to policy domain, how can the
effects of macro-level institutions on policy outputs and policy making processes at the sectoral level be specified?; and What is the relationship between institutions and policy change?

Recent exponents of historical institutionalism have avoided the first question by going in two directions. Some have focused solely on the study of such macro-institutional level structures as parliamentary democracy or a separation of powers; others have completely ignored or rejected them. Weaver and Rockman's (1993a; 1993b) important comparative study that asked whether "institutions matter" focuses almost exclusively on macro-level institutions and their effects on policy outputs. On the other hand, Peter Hall, in his study of post-war economic policy in France and Britain, never contrasts the effects of British Parliamentary democracy with the institutional structures of the French 5th Republic. Hall's study does address the second question, and is a powerful exploration of institutional rigidity in constraining policy change. However, this study says little about either how institutions may encourage or facilitate a particular type of policy change, or about the conditions under which institutions themselves may be adaptable.

Innovative practitioners of historical institutionalism have attempted to address the second question, examining the relationship between institutions and change (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). Of concern has been the influence of macro-institutional structures on where and when policy change is likely to occur. Immergut (1992a; 1992b), for example, has noted that in influencing the strength (capacity and autonomy) of the state, macro-institutional structures also create different "windows of opportunity" or "veto points" that allow for different opportunities for influence and change. She argues that:

De jure rules of institutional design provide procedural advantages and impediments for translating political power into concrete policies. De facto rules arising from electoral results and party systems change the ways in which these formal institutions work in practice. Together these institutional rules establish distinct logics of decision-making that set the parameters both for executive action and interest group influence (Immergut 1992b: 59).

Similarly, Hoberg (1993b), Weaver (1994: 18) and others have noted that the US macro-institutional system, with its separation of powers and weak government, can produce a "log rolling"
phenomenon, where some legislators offer to support other legislators' proposed legislation, in exchange for support of their own legislative agenda. During this window of opportunity, interest groups and state agencies focus much of their efforts on statutory change. Attention tends to dissipate after a legislative battle, leaving a statutory regime in place which often shows remarkable resilience. The US institutional system can also create a "bidding up" phenomenon between the President and Congressional leaders, which usually occurs when "partisan differences are more muted and voter preferences are clear and intense" (Weaver 1994: 23). Similar to the log-rolling phenomenon, "bidding up" tends to be a relatively short-lived process that results in long-lasting legislative initiatives. Conversely, in British Columbia's cabinet-centred parliamentary system, windows of opportunity are more related to changes in the governing political party, or changes in party leadership. Thus, these historical institutionalists argue that macro-institutional structures do not just affect state capacity and autonomy directly, they also influence how and when statutory policy change is likely to occur.

These approaches offer exciting new variables to historical institutionalism which may go a long way to explaining the puzzle of differences in policy change across polities. Perhaps the US institutional structure might have a "logic of decision making" that adapts quicker to new values in civil society. However, this focus still has not coincided with a broadly developed theoretical approach linking macro-level institutional analyses to sectoral level policy making. This line of inquiry is fundamentally important. As Coleman and Skogstad (1990a: 19) remind us, "the overall [macro] institutional configuration of the polity" will affect the policy process at the meso-level, but it will do so in an "indirect fashion".

A better understanding of the relationship between the sectoral/meso-level institutional factors and change is also needed. One promising line of inquiry in this area has been the development of E.E. Schattschneider's (1935: 288) now widely accepted claim that "new policies create a new politics". For example, Weir (1992), demonstrates that historical policy choices or
"policy paths" influence power struggles within civil society and the development of organized societal interests.\footnote{Still, this literature does not explicitly address intra-national sectoral-level differences. Perhaps this is why Paul Pierson (1993: 596) has noted that despite this attention to the influence of policies as independent variables explaining future processes, moving "to more specific propositions about how policy structures matter has proven difficult". "[W]hat needs to be determined is precisely how, when, and where particular effects are likely to occur" (ibid: 597). Part of the answer to this question lies in linking the above discussion on macro-level windows of opportunity for statutory change, to the influence of statutory change in altering state/societal relations. The evidence in this dissertation indicates that historical policy choices tend to have their most significant effect on sectoral level political struggles. As a result, the policy community/network literature informs this inquiry, and helps to develop an answer to Pierson's question.}

POLICY COMMUNITY/NETWORK LITERATURE

The policy community literature, in many ways, has brought the work of the historical institutionalists to the sectoral or "meso" level of decision making, examining the institutional constraints and opportunities on sectoral level policy making.\footnote{Building on the historical institutionalist focus on "state autonomy", "policy legacies/policy paths", and "opportunities for influence", policy community practitioners add the "organizational development of sectoral interests" and further detail the "nature of the exchange between state officials and organized groups".} Emphasis on the sectoral level has aimed to define different characteristics of societal organizations and their interaction with state officials. Unfortunately, key definitions in the policy community/network literature, such as "policy community", "policy networks" and "issue networks" are used differently by different authors. In fact, some use "policy community" as the overarching concept in which all sectoral interests would be included, while "policy network" is reserved for describing the particular nature of the exchange between state actors and organized economic and
societal interests, while others invert these terms. Still others refer to a "policy community" as the actors in a policy sector, while the policy network is the "policy subsector" (Wilks and Wright 1987).

This dissertation will use Coleman and Skogstad's (1990b: 25) definition in which a "policy community" is "all actors or potential actors with a direct or indirect interest in a policy area or function who share a common 'policy focus' and who, with varying degrees of influence shape policy outcomes over the long run." A policy community has two components: a "sub-government" and an "attentive public". The sub-government is where policy is "made" within a given policy area. Its membership may include groups that are involved as "policy advocates" and who "approach the state as lobbyists, outside the decision-making circles, seeking to influence the nature and content of public policy" (ibid: 20). Alternatively, groups and individuals may be involved in the sub-government as "policy participants" inside decision making circles. Finally, according to this model, members of the attentive public attempt to influence policy from time to time, but do not generally participate in policy making. Policy networks refer to the nature of exchange in a given policy community's deliberations over a policy matter of concern to the community. Its specific character, the strength of state actions, and the level of group autonomy are all variables to be examined.

The policy community/network approach provides a useful way to categorize and compare state/organized interest group relations among the four jurisdictions. Nonetheless, there exist certain methodological difficulties. Policy communities are less easily identified than studies limited to a single institution such as the US Congress, or individual agencies like the US Forest Service. Instead, policy communities are less formal entities, and embrace the informal interaction of societal actors and officials in a number of agencies, departments and jurisdictions. Being able to distinguish a clear "sub-government" from an "attentive public" is a difficult task. Still, such a definition seems warranted for it focuses our attention first and foremost on all the actors and institutions involved in a particular policy domain. Previous studies of public policy limited to a particular agency or macro-level institutions, often assume the relative importance of the target institution to the policy questions
they are addressing. Thus, the policy community/network approach serves well as a heuristic device for this comparative analysis.

Policy community/network theory is still being developed. However, as Atkinson (1992: 163-168) notes, the same complexity that led historical institutionalists to ignore the relationship between macro-level institutional structures and sectoral-level policy making, had a similar effect on many policy community/network practitioners. In this case, the tendency has been to ignore institutions altogether, returning us to a more traditional pluralist paradigm. This is an unfortunate direction. Instead of shying away from studying a clearly complex interaction process, we must, as Marsh and Rhodes (1992a: 268) have asserted, locate policy networks "in a number of macro-level theories of the state, and the articulation between the levels needs to be specified." Wright (1993: 528) concurs:

Any framework for sectoral analysis must provide...the means to analyze and compare the conditions of their operations, and how relationships are maintained and sustained, disrupted, transformed and dissolved by adaptations to their external environment. To do this it is necessary to understand the historical development of the institutions and structures of a state sector, and the broader contextual factors which determine the organisations of the sectoral relationships between (parts of) the State and the sector (italics added).40

In fact, a handful of scholars working in the policy community/network tradition have begun theorizing about the effect of a group's organizational structure in influencing its position in the policy community, and institutional influences on a group's organizational development (Coleman 1993; 1988). Linking historical institutionalism and policy community analyses, Atkinson, (1993a: 24) has found that "Institutions...affect the number and type of coalitions that can be formed":

Where the authority over a particular policy area is diffused among a host of agencies and officials, co-operation is often difficult to achieve. Policy advocates may not recognize, let alone act upon, their common interest....

Where authority is concentrated, opponents often experience difficulty mounting effective challenges to policy innovations. Potential coalition partners may never organize because they lack the capacity to meet institutionally imposed requirements of participation.

Some of those writing in a liberal/pluralist tradition aid this discussion.41 It is argued that the institutional separation of powers in the United States has meant that power is diffused, allowing
groups multiple-access points by which to enter the policy making process. This implies not only that groups will be able to obtain influence, but that their development, perhaps even existence, will be conditioned by this institutional setting. Conversely, in Canada, it has been argued (albeit with some notable exceptions), that the centralized cabinet structure, combined with a closed bureaucracy and executive federalism has discouraged a pluralistic decision making process. However, this literature either ignores important sectoral differences, or acknowledges that macro-institutional variables themselves cannot explain the presence or absence of pluralism within different sectoral arrangements. It is the policy community approach that takes this analysis further, probing both the nature of group structures and their role in the policy process, as well as how institutions affect the development of organized interests.

Pierson's (1993) literature review on "policy feedbacks" also augments policy community theory. Drawing on existing empirical research he finds strong support for the notion that:

[i]f interest groups shape policies, policies also shape interest groups. The organizational structure and political goals of groups may change in response to the nature of the programs they confront and hope to sustain or modify (ibid: 598).

According to Pierson, "[p]olicies provide both incentives and resources that may facilitate or inhibit the formation or expansion of particular groups" (ibid: 599; emphasis added). Pierson's work reminds us that policy legacies join macro-institutional factors in influencing the development of organized interests. However, unlike macro-institutional factors, policy legacies are often specific to individual policy sectors.
EXPLANATORY SCHEME

This dissertation seeks to explain the different eco-forest policy paths that have developed in BC and the US PNW in the last thirty years, as well as illuminating the causes of divergent access and influence of environmental groups and other organized interests in the policy making process. The preceding review of historical institutionalist and policy community literature helps formulate an explanation. In particular, these literatures support the argument that, in mediating sectoral-level conflict, institutional settings (including macro-institutional structures and historical policy choices) may produce different degrees of state autonomy and state capacity, and shape the development of organized environmental interests. This literature also supports the notion that state autonomy, state capacity, and the organizational development of interest groups dramatically influence sectoral-level policy communities, networks and policy outputs. This section hypotheses about the nature of this influence. The validity of these hypotheses will be tested as the dissertation explores the development of policy communities, policy networks, and policy outputs.

The Influence of Macro-institutional Structures

1) Macro-institutional structures influence the level of state autonomy and state capacity as well as the access and influence of organized interests.

a) BC's Westminster model of government centralizes decision-making authority and encourages a greater degree of state autonomy. This same feature also tends to facilitate state actors in developing or maintaining strong policy capacity. On the other hand, decentralization and separation of powers in the three US jurisdictions tend to lead to a weak state with less ability to initiate change.

b) The US separation of powers often leads to a fragmented state with more points of access for organized environmental groups. This provides considerable and ongoing access to the sub-government, although this does not ensure policy influence. Conversely, BC's centralized macro-institutional structures allow the party in power much more control over access to the policy making process. As a result opportunities for environmental group influence are much more dependent on the wishes of the government, and will fluctuate accordingly.

c) Differences in federal institutional relationships in these two countries influence the access, strategies, and organizational development of environmental interests. Environmental groups in the US are able to focus on that level which shows the most
potential for influence, and to develop appropriate strategies, since forest policy is in the domain of both the federal and State levels of government. With Canadian federalism granting little role to the Canadian national government, failure to gain access to the BC forest policy sub-government may have the effect of encouraging environmental groups to undertake more grass-roots focused, “valley-by-valley” campaign strategies.

d) These macro-institutional differences may have an effect on the organizational development of environmental groups. We would expect US groups to develop the necessary expertise and professional skills to interact effectively with government officials, while BC groups might lag behind in this regard. Instead, we might expect BC environmental groups to focus more on the use of media and public opinion to obtain influence or to cultivate ties with opposition parties (especially when the party in power denies them access to the sub-government).45

e) Macro-institutions can also have an important effect on the development of meso-level institutions. As a result of the Canadian Westminster model, governments tend to stress the role of ministries or short-term advisory royal commissions. Arguably reflecting the diffusion of interests, the US often relies on the use of arms length independent agencies or commissions that are often granted significant regulatory power.46

The Influence of Policy Legacies: Land Ownership

2) Previous decisions regarding privatization of forest land ownership affect the level of state autonomy, as well as the formation of organized interests.

a) Private land ownership limits both the scope of policy state actors may consider and policy instruments state actors may employ.

b) Where forest land is government owned, state officials have a much greater ability to take decisions autonomous from the dominant economic and societal actors.

c) The higher the proportion of private land ownership, the greater the likelihood of the existence of an organized private land owners’ group that seeks to limit environmental regulations. Since private land limits the type of policy changes that can be made, environmental groups will have less interest and usually much less influence in the forest policy communities that develop around private land regulations.

Different levels of private and public land ownership are highlighted in three ways: Firstly, we would expect that, in all three jurisdictions, common law regarding private property would limit the kinds of forest extraction practice regulations that governments can impose on private forest land.47 Secondly, private forest land use issues will probably be limited to questions of zoning and forest
land conversion, since permanently reserving forest land from being harvested would most often be opposed by the private land owner. This situation reduces the kinds of "eco-forest" policies the state can consider.\textsuperscript{48} Thirdly, it seems likely that this limited policy scope translates into less interest on the part of environmental groups.

The Influence of Policy Legacies: Statutory Regimes

3) During the 1970s' "first wave" of environmentalism, different kinds of legislative responses in each of the three jurisdictions created different levels of state autonomy vis-à-vis organized interests and different capacities to implement state-initiated eco-forest policy processes. The resulting statutory regimes influenced the kinds of environmental interests that would develop and seek influence in each jurisdiction.

How do these statutory regimes (detailed in Chapter Two) influence state capacity and autonomy, and the development of organized interests? Here, a distinction must be made between the substantive eco-forest policy content or orientation of the legislation, and the manner in which legislation incorporates these policies. The former is of course a prerequisite for statutes to have any relevance for a study of eco-forest policy, but their policy content is not, by itself, a determining factor. Instead, it is hypothesized that the structural characteristics of the statutory regime - whether or not it is non-discretionary, enabling, or legalistic - is what affects the development of state/societal relations, and in particular the role of environmental groups.

With respect to statutory regime development, this dissertation will test the argument that:

3a) the greater reliance on statutes that provide for only discretionary protection and/or the absence of eco-forest policy statutes leads to increased state autonomy and a great deal of latitude for the state when considering policy options (this corresponds with British Columbia's statutory regime).

This type of statutory regime will also influence the type of environmental groups that are established, as well as their policy focus. With few statutory requirements for environmental group or citizen participation (exacerbated by a political party that excludes environmental groups from the policy making process), environmental groups will tend to be highly fragmented, focusing on valley-by-valley fights, and unable to maintain long-lasting coalitions.
3b) a statutory regime that tends to rely on discretionary measures within legislative regulations, combined with regulatory authority resting with timber industry-oriented, quasi-governmental bodies also leads to diminished state autonomy vis-à-vis economic interests and reduced state capacity to initiate change (As in Oregon and Washington State).

In this regime, significant influence rests with organized economic interests. These statutory regimes also appear to have had a profound effect on the development of environment groups in each State's forest policy making processes, limiting their access, their policy scope, and their interest.

3c) a statutory regime with a greater reliance on substantive measures within the legislation itself, combined with non-discretionary substantive forest protection or forest practice requirements, leads to diminished state autonomy from societal interests (the US federal statutory regime affecting the Pacific Northwest forest lands follows this description).

Again, this statutory regime has a dramatic effect on the types of environmental groups that develop. Groups under this regime become highly professional, are supported by mass memberships, and will develop a high degree of legal and scientific in-house expertise.

In sum, this dissertation theorizes that macro-institutional structures, and previous policy paths regarding forest land ownership and statutory regimes strongly determine sectoral-level state capacity and autonomy, as well as the historical development of organized environmental interests. These three intervening variables largely determine the different policy outputs and policy community/network paths each jurisdiction will follow, including the kinds of roles environmental groups will assume.

Exploring this argument means that four comparisons will be going on simultaneously: in addition to the macro-Canada/US comparison, there is one between BC with the two State jurisdictions, one between the US federal and State jurisdictions and one between Oregon and Washington State. Within all of these is a comparison across time. The Canada-US comparison is most important when exploring the effects of macro-institutional differences, since BC is distinguished from the three PNW jurisdictions in this regard. The BC/State comparison is valuable because they share no institutional similarities, but have governments who physically are closer to
the environmental conflicts and depend more on the forest economy than do their federal
governments. The US federal/State comparison is important when exploring the effects of land
ownership. As we will see, this measure clearly distinguishes the federal and State levels, while
highlighting an important similarity of the BC and federal US cases. Both the Canada/US and
federal/State comparisons are key to the analysis of the causes and effects of the statutory regimes.
This is because the effects of macro-institutional structures and land ownership influences on the
development of statutory regimes are explored; and then the statutory regimes are examined for the
effects they have on each jurisdiction’s forest policies and policy making processes. The Oregon and
Washington State comparison provides a case of policy convergence, permitting this study to explain
why it is that some jurisdictions make similar choices.

POLICY AND COMMUNITY/NETWORK CHANGE

These hypotheses speak to a discussion of why and how policy and community/network
change occurs. The logic of the preceding argument is that different levels of state autonomy, state
capacity and the development of organized interests means that the forces behind forest policy
development, and thus any policy change in each jurisdiction, will also be quite distinct. This is
because according to historical institutionalist/policy community theory, different levels of state
autonomy and capacity mean that some policy communities and networks will adapt rather quickly
to new societal values, ideas and organized interests, while others will remain more resistant to
change. What can be extrapolated from this theory for the four cases? Drawing on the theoretical
discussion above, Table 1.1 presents a general picture of how the conjunction of the three
institutional variables in each of the cases might affect the “strength” of each state. This, in turn, has
implications for what factors cause change in each jurisdiction. Where the institutional setting leads
to a strong state, historical institutionalist/policy community theory and the preceding explanatory
scheme would argue that the immediate catalyst for change would come through state officials. (In
these cases, such as in BC, the ideology of the party in power would more often be the immediate cause of policy development and change. At the same time, the strength of the state can be used as much to resist change as to bring it about). Policy community/network change would be expected to be influenced by the direct result of state decisions.

Where a weak state exists, the literature suggests that organized interests may be the driving factors for change, or lack thereof. The logic of the preceding explanatory scheme is that in Oregon and Washington State, the low level of public forest land ownership and the extraction-oriented statutory regime would result in organized industry interests being behind most policy changes. How and why would changes improving environmental protection occur in such jurisdictions? Such changes might be strategic - the result of organized economic interests trying to head-off more radical demands for eco-forest policy change, such as direct challenges to the existing statutory regime.

On PNW federal forest lands, the non-discretionary and directive statutory regime, aided by public forest land ownership, policy output and community/network change would be initiated by courts after environmental organizations sue an agency for non-statutory compliance. Thus, change would seem to be most likely when agency policies conflict with statutory requirements.
Table 1.1: INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE STRENGTH OF THE STATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>PNW-State level</th>
<th>PNW-Federal level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macro-institutions</td>
<td><strong>Strong</strong> Centralized</td>
<td><strong>Weak</strong> Separation of Powers</td>
<td><strong>Weak</strong> Separation of powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Ownership</td>
<td><strong>Strong</strong> Government owned</td>
<td><strong>Weak</strong> Mostly privately owned</td>
<td><strong>Strong</strong> Government owned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory Regime</td>
<td><strong>Strong</strong> Limited, discretionary</td>
<td><strong>Weak</strong> Extraction oriented</td>
<td><strong>Hybrid</strong> Non-discretionary, directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OVERALL</strong></td>
<td><strong>STRONG</strong> Executive largely determines relative influence of industry and environmental interests</td>
<td><strong>WEAK</strong> The state has no autonomy from industry interests</td>
<td><strong>HYBRID</strong> Weak executive and legislature but &quot;strong&quot; judiciary. Relative influence of environmental and industry interests largely determined by court rulings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The US case appears to vary slightly from traditional concepts of weak and strong states. Table 1.1 supposes that not only can the strength of the state vary across policy sectors, but it can vary across different parts of the state within the same policy community. Thus, the US executive and legislature are classified as "weak" within the federal PNW forest policy domain, but the US judiciary in this policy sector is best classified as "strong". Yet, there are some differences between the "strong" US judiciary and what the original historical institutionalists meant when they conceived of a state as having a high degree of autonomy and capacity. Firstly, the judiciary may have "autonomy" from organized interests and other parts of the state, but it has no authority to depart from the non-discretionary statutes upon which it must base its rulings. Secondly, the judiciary must rely on the often fragmented, "weak" US administrative state structure to implement its policy making rulings.
Hoberg (1992b: 209) helps explain this hybrid phenomenon by highlighting the two key foci of historical institutionalist analyses: the state as an actor (what Hoberg refers to as "state as officials in action strand") and the state as a legal order (what Hoberg calls the "state as institutional order strand"). State officials may be "weak" because of a non-discretionary statutory regime, but, this same statutory regime renders policy decisions by the judiciary quite durable, even in the face of strong societal opposition.51

What happens when institutions themselves change?

This dissertation concerns itself with macro- and land ownership institutional factors that did not change during a 30-year period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, and statutory regimes that have remained stable since the mid-1970s.52 The fundamental characteristics of statutory regimes have been threatened in two of the four jurisdictions under review. BC’s recent statutory changes are the most noticeable, but they do not challenge, for the most part, the bureaucratic-discretion and cabinet-centred policy making capacity of the previous regime. Attempts in 1994 by a Republican-dominated Congress to challenge the prevailing statutory regime have thus far been largely blocked, mirroring the limited success of similar attempts by the Reagan administration in 1981 and 1982 (Hoberg 1992b: 209). Changes made in Oregon and Washington State were made within the parameters of the early 1970s statutory regime.

Thus, most of this dissertation will be about policy and process change within an institutional setting that has remained relatively constant. In order for this theoretical framework to be historically valid though, it must be recognized that change in the institutional settings of any of the four jurisdictions could alter state/societal relations and the three key intervening factors driving policy community, network and output change.

We must therefore understand how and when institutional settings themselves might change. This answer has already been visited when examining the development of divergent statutory regimes in each jurisdiction. However, a fuller understanding of the vulnerability to change of all three
institutional factors is needed. By disentangling institutions into three key factors, a better understanding of how and when institutional change might occur in each jurisdiction emerges. For example, the preceding explanatory scheme implies that not all institutions are created equal. They do not all have the same influence on sectoral level policy making, and, as Table 1.2 posits, not all have the same ability to change and adapt to new societal interests. Macro-institutional structures often remain constant, even during significant changes within civil society.\textsuperscript{53} The sectoral-level institutional setting of land ownership is also durable. In both British Columbia and the PNW, no significant changes have been made to the ratio of public/private land ownership since the early 1900s.\textsuperscript{54}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Durable} & \textbf{Malleable} \\
\hline
Macro-institutions (all jurisdictions) & US Federal PNW statutory regime & BC statutory regime \\
\hline
Land ownership (BC and the federal PNW) & US PNW State-level statutory regime & \\
\hline
Land ownership (PNW state level) & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Institutions and Change}
\end{table}

However, at the level of statutory regimes durability and reasons for change appear different, owing to each jurisdiction’s macro-institutional and land ownership institutional setting. The question is, “once enacted, how easily is a statutory regime changed?” In the case of the US jurisdictions, passing legislation often requires a “window of opportunity” created by extraordinary consensus, usually as result of “log rolling” or “bidding up” phenomena (both of which existed during the
development of the federal PNW statutory regime in the late 1960s and early 1970s). However, after laws were enacted, they became difficult to revoke and less susceptible to change than laws passed under a Westminster model.\textsuperscript{55} Thus, the same difficulty in creating a statutory regime may also make it difficult to change. It would be expected in such a setting, that once a legalistic statutory regime was in place, the bulk of the efforts of promoters of policy change would switch from "legislation" to litigation. Where a non-legalistic/pro-extraction statutory regime developed - as it did in Oregon and Washington State - the same macro-level institutional structure would arguably stifle the efforts of environmental groups to initiate change.\textsuperscript{56}

According to this argument, macro-institutional structures do not tell us what kinds of statutory regimes will emerge for a given sector. But they do tell us about the political forces required for statutory regime change to take place. Macro-institutional structures and the system of land ownership are two factors that rarely change. It is hypothesized that these two factors make statutory regime change easiest in BC, and the reason why statutory regimes appear less important in BC in structuring state/societal relations than statutory regimes in the three PNW jurisdictions. Thus, by disentangling institutions, policy outputs may not be predictable, but how and when institutional change will likely occur is illuminated.

\textbf{PLAN OF DISSERTATION}

The chapters to follow serve two purposes. First, they provide those interested in environmental, forest, and resource policy with an account of eco-forest policy making and process change in BC and the US PNW since the mid 1960s. This will be of interest to government, environmental groups, industry officials and other observers of forest policy in Canada and the United States, since much of the literature on forest policy is in the form of single case studies, focusing on one level of government, on one side of the border.\textsuperscript{57} Second, the chapters will elaborate and test the theoretical arguments laid out in the preceding pages. The goal is to understand why
eco-forest policy change and forest policy making processes have developed in such different ways - not only between BC and the US PNW, but also between federal and State levels within the US PNW. Of particular importance is the effort to account for the varying role of environmental groups in forest policy making processes in each jurisdiction, and influence of these groups on policy outputs.

The plan of the dissertation is designed to test the argument that each jurisdiction's institutional setting mediates environmental forest conflicts, resulting in different levels of state autonomy and state capacity, and different types of organized environmental interests. These factors in turn influence the development of policy communities, policy networks, and policy outputs. Section I explores the policy environment and details the institutional setting. Chapter One begins this task by reviewing the policy environment, looking at the structure of the forest industry in each region, and the dependence of exports to foreign markets. This chapter also details the first of the two key policy legacies identified above: policy choices regarding forest land ownership. Chapter Two presents the second key policy legacy: the development of eco-forest statutory regimes in each jurisdiction. The story will be told treating statutes as both dependent and independent variables. Statutes are treated as a dependent variable in that their historical development is influenced by the macro- and land ownership-institutional setting. They are also independent variables in terms of how their structural characteristics help shape future state/societal relations.

Section II analyses the development of eco-forest politics in BC and the US PNW. The important distinction between the concepts of "policy communities" (the types of organized interests involved) and "policy networks" (the nature of state/societal relations) is drawn out, and the relationship between them is explored. Chapter Three explores the historical development of the federal PNW forest policy community, while Chapter Four examines the corresponding development in federal PNW forest policy networks; Chapters Five and Six do the same for the US PNW's State
jurisdictions; and Chapters Seven and Eight cover forest policy community and network changes, respectively, in British Columbia.

All these chapters examine some of the most important changes in policy outputs and policy processes made in the four jurisdictions in the last thirty years. In BC, these include the 1992 consensus-oriented Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE) and the 1994 Forest Practices Code; while on US federal forest lands the US Forest Eco-system Management Assessment Team (FEMAT) process and the resulting "President's Plan" to save the Northern Spotted Owl is examined. At the PNW State level we review Washington State's two experiments with alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes - Timber/Fish/Wildlife Accord (TFW) and the subsequent Sustainable Forestry Roundtable - and Oregon's shorter-lived 1987 consensus-oriented process.

The conclusion summarizes the findings, and contemplates the ability of the historical institutionalist hypotheses and policy community/network approaches to account for the differences. Do these findings tell us anything new about the interaction of state/societal relations? Do the hypotheses presented in the introduction need modification? Do other approaches exist that could also help to explain these cases? Finally, it ends by glimpsing into the future of forest policy changes in each jurisdiction, and the possible forces behind them.
Endnotes

1The first “wave” began in the mid-1960s. See for example, Inglehart (1981), Paehlke (1989), Papadakis (1993), Rochon (1993), Berry (1993). Non-behaviouralist social scientists have observed a “second wave” in the late-1980s affecting both regions, with an renewed emphasis toward quality of life environmental values, including protection of old growth forests (Paehlke 1992). This second wave seems to have reached its peak in the late 1980s.

2Leman (1988b: 164-65) notes that “among the provinces, public activism for the preservation of natural areas from logging is greatest in British Columbia, where it approaches levels found in the United States”.

3With constitutional responsibilities over forest management ambiguous, the first half of the 20th Century witnessed a tug-of-war between the US federal government and the States over which level should regulate private forestry. After federal efforts to regulate private forestry were struck down by the US Supreme Court in 1943, the states assumed responsibility for regulating private forestry. Referring to US federal efforts to increase environmental regulations in the 1960s, Vogel (1993: 249) notes that, “…the American tradition of states’ rights effectively precluded an expanded federal role in either pollution control or land use planning [for non-federally owned land], policy that had historically been controlled by local governments”.

4The effects of policy created at the federal and/or State level are not always limited to federal and/or State/private lands. Chapter Two reveals, for example, that federal “umbrella” legislation such as the Endangered Species Act or the Clean Water Act do affect forest practices on private and State-owned land, although in a much more limited fashion.

There has also been some theoretical discussion about whether State forest practices rules might also apply to federally-owned forest land (See, for example, United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment 1992). However, this has not been treated as a serious issue, with the implicit understanding that State forest practices do not apply to federally-owned forest land.


9A recent example is the split among US environmental groups over whether to support the North American Free Trade Agreement.


11Wilson (1987; 1987-88; 1990) predicted that with its efforts to incorporate environmental groups in decision making processes, an election of an NDP government would make a shift in the role of environmental groups in forest policy decision making structures. Others have noted preliminary evidence to support this contention (Cowell 1994; Hammond 1993; Hoberg 1993a; 1993c).

12See Vanderzwaag and Duncan (1992). The Canadian federal government also has potential influence through its jurisdiction over international waterways. Other federal legislation with potential for influencing eco-forest policies is the Migratory Birds Convention Act (Haddock 1995: 21) In addition, the national Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC) lists wildlife according to endangered or threatened status. Although this has no statutory power, it provides an important scientific advocate for endangered species in Canada (Hoberg 1993c).

13It is a longstanding policy of DFO to “cooperate” with industry instead of charging polluters. Personal interview, DFO. See also Fisheries and Oceans Canada (1986a; 1986b). It is uncertain at this time what the effect of the proposed federal Endangered Species Act would be on British Columbia forest policy.

14See, Innis (1933), Mackintosh (1967), Creighton (1937), Fowke (1946), Aitken (1967).
Informed by the neo-Marxist approach, these studies focus on domestic social relations within Canada, seeing the state as developing policies in response to class conflict within Canadian society (see, for example, 1977; Finkel 1979; 1977; Pantich 1981; Traves 1979). Applying both the instrumentalist framework of Ralph Miliband and the structuralist framework of Nicos Poulantzas (1968; 1974), domestic class relations are seen as largely determining state policy.

Estimates put overall forest industry unionization levels at about 30 percent in the PNW, and 50 percent in British Columbia (personal communication, Marcus Widenor of the Labour Education and Research Center at the University of Oregon, February 14, 1997 and Schwindt and Shapins 1996: 56).

While this attempt to apply insights of the new Canadian political economy to the US Pacific Northwest may not be appreciated by its practitioners, let us not forget that Harold Innis saw three regions in the North American economy: a southern “subordinate” region, a diversified centre, and Canada, “the northern fur-producing area, at present producing staples, wheat, pulp and paper, minerals, and lumber [which] tends to be brought under [US] influence” (Innis quoted in Williams 1989). Region, for Innis, did not necessarily fall under the nation state.

Many of the explanations for BC’s arguably unique political culture and party development, however, tend to, as Blake (1981: 297) has done, focus on “economic development as the single most important question of provincial politics”.

Black (1979) also offers an institutional explanation for the resource policies BC has developed, arguing that while the cabinet system of government gives the premier extensive powers, the premier is restrained by 1) the voting public; 2) the drive to action; 3) the demands of immediate party supporters; 4) the exigencies of rapid economic development, and 5) the federal system of government and its institutions.

A particular problem confronting attitudinal research is that it is difficult to explain synchronic change. And when practitioners do explain it, they often bring in institutional and economic variables (Simeon and Elkins 1974; Wilson 1974).


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The other two approaches are public choice and organization theory. Public choice is distinguished by three characteristics: 1) it assumes the rational behaviour of individuals, 2) it is ahistorical, focusing instead on the effects of rules and standard operating procedures on how individuals attempt to realize their preferences, and 3) preferences are seen as exogenous to the institutions itself.

In many ways, organization theory is a bridge between public choice and historical institutionalism. March and Olsen (1983; 1989) have recognized the importance of institutions in shaping preferences, the historical interaction between institutions and society, and the consequences for public policy.

It is arguably useful to treat “capacity” as involving both policy formulation and policy implementation. In their wide-ranging review of policy literature, Ham and Hill (1993: 97-98) warn against a clear distinction of the policy-making process from implementation:

There has been a tendency [of implementation theory practitioners] to treat policies as clear-cut, uncontroversial entities, whose implementation can be quite separately studied. This has raised both methodological problems and problems about the extent to which the very practical concerns of implementation studies may involve, explicitly or implicitly, identification with some actors’ views of what
should happen.

27 Quoted in Skocpol (1986: 22).

28 Linking party and institutions, Atkinson (1993b: 32) observes that "[i]n the United States, where electoral politics has entrenched a Democratic coalition in Congress, there is greater policy continuity than in Britain where power has (until recently) shifted between parties whose electoral dominance has been temporary."

29 At a general level, Skocpol (1986: 22) has argued that "...various sorts of states... give rise to various conceptions about the meaning and methods of "politics" itself, conceptions that influence the behavior of all groups and classes in national societies". Atkinson (1993b: 24) has posited that, "[i]nstitutional norms often discourage certain types of coalitions."

30 Hall (1986: 17) also rejects the usefulness of Skocpol's focus on state autonomy: "[w]e must be careful not to search for, and even postulate autonomy, when we should be sketching the institutional outlines and limits of societal influence."

Hall's (1986: 20) conceptualization of institutions is probably the broadest of all scholars operating within an historical institutionalist framework, for he includes not only organizations of the state, but also labour organizations, business organizations, political parties and even a nation's place in the world economy:

...the approach proposed here ranges more widely [than the old institutionalism] to consider the role of institutions located within society and the economy, as well as less formal organizational networks, in the determination of policy.

31 Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 17) inquire into situations in which institutions may remain the same, but the interaction of state, economic and societal interests change over time, or organizations "adjust their strategies to accommodate changes in the institutions themselves". Atkinson (1993a) also examines the question of institutional change.

32 Drawing on the work of Gilmour (1990) and Vogel (1993), Weaver notes that this phenomenon accounts for the flurry of environmental legislation passed by the US Congress in the early 1970s. For instance, Vogel (1993: 259) argues that:

...the US system of separation of powers contributed to the strengthening of the representations of diffuse interests during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed, the fact that Congress and the presidency were controlled by different political parties during this period may well have led American pollution control statutes to be stricter than they might otherwise have been.

33 See also, Pierson (1993), Esping-Andersen (1990) and Skocpol (1986).

34 Although it is true that Katzenstein (1978: 297) did draw our attention to "policy networks" to explain diverse reactions to economic shock and Hugh Heclo (1978) first used the term "issue network" to improve upon the "iron triangle," special attention, either theoretical or empirical, had not been placed on the "meso" level of the decision making process.

35 Coleman and Skogstad (1990a).


37 There is a subtle but crucially important distinction in Coleman and Skogstad's model between being involved in "policy making," which refers to both policy advocacy and policy participation, and being involved in "decision-making" circles (Coleman and Skogstad 1990b: 25) which refers only to policy participation. Thus, "policy advocates" are deemed to be part of the sub-government, but do not generally assist government officials to prepare the policy response or policy initiative decided upon.

38 Atkinson and Coleman (1989b: 77-94) note that policy networks essentially vary across three dimensions - the degree of state autonomy vis-a-vis society, the concentration of state authority in the bureaucracy, and the mobilization of societal associations.

Some initial efforts at broaching such questions have already begun by exponents of comparative policy community approaches. See for example, Coleman (1991), Dohler (1991), Mann and Mayntz (1991).

At a general level, pluralism/interest group theory (Bentley 1908; Dahl 1958; 1961; Truman 1951) developed a theory of democracy in which group competition ensured that no one group exercised a monopoly of power and, as a result, we all govern (Dahl). The state is seen as a neutral arbiter in which decisions are made based on the balance of interests from various groups. David Easton (1953) has developed systems approach compatible with this theory, arguing that the state is a black box in the political system, which turns political inputs into policy outcomes. This approach might account for the puzzle by positing that more people in the PNW organized to fight environmental degradation, and therefore, the state was able to see this concern and respond with favourable policies. However it does not appear that this is the case - organizations in the PNW and BC are different, but their level of public support is similar.

The idea that group competition best represents democracy and equality has been modified by group theorists, who recognize that the most powerful groups in society are not necessarily representative, and a host of work has been done on the unequal access and opportunity of business groups vis-à-vis citizen groups. As Peter Hall has noted, few would now support Bentley's statement that, "The great task in the study of any form of social life is the analysis of these groups. When the groups are adequately stated, everything is stated" (quoted in Hall 1986: 14).

There is an uneasy tension in this approach, between the normative belief that institutions create a democratic pluralism, and the acknowledgment that a group’s own financial base, membership, and organizational structure also influence its ability to enter the policy making process.

See Pross (1986).


See Winfield (1994).

At the federal US level, the Environmental Protection Agency is an obvious example, although its influence on forest policy is limited. Important examples at the State level are the Oregon and Washington State forest practice boards.


For a broad review of these differences, see Leman (1988a).

Inherent in a non-discretionary statutory regime is some kind of institutionalized system enforcing non-compliance. Chapter Two reveals that the non-discretionary elements of the US statutory regime are supported by the explicit right to sue government agencies, contained in the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water Act. In addition, the judiciary itself shifted the judicial doctrines of “standing, openness, and reviewability” in the early 1970s, further encouraging environmental group litigation (see Hoberg 1992b: 210-211).

Although there are cases where agencies consciously fail to follow the requirements of the statutory regime, it is more often the case that agency officials are uncertain what policies they should pursue, given the complex and often conflicting direction of the US statutory regime. (My thanks to Kent Robinson for helping me to clarify these thoughts).

Referring to the US federal experience with environmental politics, Hoberg (1992b: 208-209) notes that:

…the [legalistic] pluralist regime is characterized by the paradox that while the authority of regulators increased immensely, their autonomy did not…The new procedural regime tied regulatory actions to the initiatives of public interest groups, the carefully specified goals and timetables of Congressional statutes, and the dictates of federal judges. The weakness of the state as officials in action strand of [historical institutionalism] is a direct function of the strength of the state as institutional order strand.

For a comprehensive analysis of the resilience of the US “regulatory regime”, even in the face of concerted partisan efforts, see Hoberg (1992b).
The introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is clearly an example of rare macro-institutional change. The Charter has had significant effects on Canadian society but its effects on BC forest policy and the BC forest policy community appear limited - the important exception being its influence on aboriginal litigation and treaty rights.

The chart above places land ownership in the PNW State level as slightly more durable than BC or the federal PNW lands. The reason for this is that it is arguably easier financially for a government to sell its own land than it is for a government to purchase privately held land.


The high level of private land ownership would also appear to be a factor further constraining any "eco-forest" statutory change.

Existing broad comparisons such as this and Hoberg's (1992a) study are rare. Comparative works that comprise particular aspects of forest policy include Kamieniecki (1990), Munton and Castle (1992), Boardman (1992), Selmi (1990), Fox (1992), Cashore (1988), Sedjo (1979), Lester (1990), Spurr (1982), Repetto (1988).
CHAPTER 1
THE FOREST POLICY ENVIRONMENT:
LAND OWNERSHIP, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, AND FOREST PRODUCT EXPORTS

Three factors are key to the forest policy "environment" in British Columbia and the US Pacific Northwest: land ownership patterns, the structure of the industry, and the role of forest product exports. Most differences in these measures are the result of institutional factors or policy legacies, while similarities are attributable to the economic production requirements of the timber industry.

I. LAND OWNERSHIP PATTERNS

Different policy choices over economic development and forest resource management have resulted in vastly different levels of forest land ownership and commercial forest land in British Columbia and the Pacific Northwest (Chart 1.0 and 1.1 summarize these patterns). Public-land ownership in BC also permitted the government to introduce a non-competitive "tenure" system for allocating harvesting rights in the province, and its accompanying government-driven timber pricing system.

PNW

A fairly even split exists between privately-owned and federal government-owned forest land in the US Pacific Northwest. Federal ownership would have been insignificant in the PNW were it not for the decision of the Congress and White House to create a system of government-owned National Forest lands at the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century (Gregg 1989: 143-6; Steen 1976; 1992a; 1992b), whose original purpose was to maintain a healthy supply of timber for future generations. In Washington State, the federal government owns 45.3 percent of the forest land base (excluding 6.2 percent tribal lands) and in Oregon, it owns 57.5 percent (Chart 1.0). The Washington State government owns 9.9 percent of forest lands in Washington, and the Oregon government owns 3.2 percent of its forest lands (Chart 1.0). A large portion of federal land
Chart 1.0: Total Forest Land Ownership

Federal 57.5%
State 3.2%
Other Public 1.9%
Private 37.5%
Province 95.0%
Private Federal 4.0%
Federal 1.0%

Oregon
Based on 11,354,512 hectares or 28,057,000 acres
Including 21% non commercial and 9% protected
Other public includes tribal lands, counties and municipalities

British Columbia
Based on 60,600,000 hectares or 149,742,600 acres

Federal 45.3%
State 9.9%
Other 1.1%
Native American 6.2%
Private 37.5%

Washington
Based on 8,845,002 hectares or 21,856,000 acres
Other equals County and Municipal including 21% permanently
reserved or non-commercial

Includes reserved and non-commercial timberland

Chart 1.1: Commercial Forest Land Ownership

Federal 50.7%
State 4.0%
Other Public 2.1%
Private 43.2%

Oregon
Based on 8,937,677 hectares or 22,085,000 acres
Other public includes Tribal lands, counties and municipalities

British Columbia
Based on 27,700,000 hectares or 68,446,700 acres

Private 5.0%
Small private

Federal 31.0%
State 12.5%
Other 1.4%
Native American 7.8%
Private 47.3%

Washington State
Based on 6,818,696.8 hectares or 16,849,000 acres
Other equals County and Municipal

Recent increases in administratively reserved areas on U.S. federal lands as part of the President's spotted owl recovery plan (Option 9) are not included in this table because actual impact on the federal commercial land base is not completely certain. The U.S. Northwest Forestry Association estimates that with the implementation of Option 9, up to 80 per cent of the federal commercial land base in the Pacific Northwest will be taken out of production.

Source: Northwest Forest Industries Council; Western Forest Protection Association; U.S. Forest Service, Washington State Department of Natural Resources; Oregon Department of Forestry; Council of Forest Industries of B.C.; Forest Fact Book, 1992. This table excludes reserved and non commercial timberland. Non commercial is defined as "incapable of producing 20 cubic feet of industrial wood per acre per year" (Evergreen, 1994, p. 6).
Chart 1.2: Forest Land Under Each Government Jurisdiction

State owned 20.5%
Other 2.2%
Private 77.3%

Province 95.0%
Private 4.0%
Federal 1.0%

Washington State Government
Based on 9,937,000 hectares or 24,01729 acres
Other equals County and Municipal

State owned 7.8%
Private 92.2%

BC Provincial Government
Based on 60,600,000 hectares or 149,742,600 acres

BLM 13.3%
Other federal 3.0%

Oregon State Government
Based on 11,289,000 acres

US Federal Government (PNW)
Based on 9,781,954 hectares or 24,189,000 acres
Other includes National Park Service Lands

Includes reserved and non commercial timberland. Native American lands omitted from calculations.

1988

- Federal lands: 21.3%
- State lands: 11.7%
- Other government: 3.6%
- Native lands: 3.8%
- Private lands: 62.5%

Based on a total of 7,045,372,000 board feet

1991

- Federal lands: 14.0%
- State lands: 10.5%
- Other government: 3.4%
- Native lands: 3.7%
- Private lands: 71.5%

Based on a total of 5,103,920,000 board feet

1992

- Federal lands: 9.4%
- State lands: 9.5%
- Other government: 9.5%
- Native lands: 3.7%
- Private lands: 76.6%

Based on a total of 5,017,676,000 board feet

Source: Washington State Department of Natural Resources: Timber Harvest Summary All Ownerships
is permanently set aside for national parks, wilderness areas, and other such uses so that the US federal government's share of commercial forest land is considerably less: 31 percent in Washington and 50.7 percent in Oregon (Chart 1.1). Federal lands produce an even smaller share of timber cut, largely a result of being located in more remote and higher elevation areas. For example, aggregate data from the 1980s reveal that federal forest lands in Washington made up 18.9 percent of the gross volume cut; while in Oregon they accounted for a great deal more (51.5 percent of the gross volume), but still less than its share of federal forest lands (Sierra Club and Lawler 1993: 8-9). The share of the federal forest cut has been declining further in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following US court orders to reduce timber sales in order to protect endangered species. As a result, federal policies governing forest harvesting practices have applied to an increasingly smaller share of the annual timber harvest in Oregon and Washington (Chart 1.3; Appendix 1.0).

Overall, forest land accounts for about half of the total land base in the PNW. It is physically divided by the Cascades mountain range, with faster growing temperate rainforests to the West, and slower growing species in the drier climate to the East. The main species of tree harvested in the West is the Douglas-fir, followed by western hemlock and Sitka spruce. These trees are found in a biologically diverse ecosystem, home to a wide array of flora and fauna. In the East, the ponderosa pine is the main species, but true fir, larch, and lodgepole pine are also harvested (Kellog 1996). Harvesting does not occur near the top of the Cascade range or in the eastern "high desert" areas in Washington and Oregon.
BRITISH COLUMBIA

A decision taken almost a century ago by British Columbia state actors not to sell the province's Crown land (Cashore 1988: Chapter Three) has resulted in the provincial government owning 95 percent of the forest land base (Chart 1.0) including 94 percent of commercial forest land (Chart 1.1) Consequently, forest policy emanates almost entirely from the provincial government and its forest, land use and environmental agencies.

Two-thirds of the area of British Columbia is forest land, of which almost half is "productive and available", with the remainder either non-commercial or protected (Schwindt and Heaps 1996: 11). For administrative purposes, the BC Forest Service divides the province into two geographical regions: the Coast and the Interior. The Coastal forest is the more productive per hectare than the slower growing interior forests. In 1993, the Coastal region supplied 32 percent of the provincial harvest while accounting for only 17 percent of productive forest land (Schwindt and Heaps 1996: 12). The Coast forest is dominated by hemlock, cedar, Douglas-fir, and balsam species, while the interior lodgepole pine and spruce makeup the majority of the Interior harvest.

Land Tenure/Resource Rent Charges

Before World War II similar methods of charging for the right to harvest government-owned timber (resource rents) were employed on publicly-owned lands in BC and the PNW. Governments relied on a standard "upset" price (minimum bid) along with a competitive bidding process. Most private forest land was sold in a similar manner. After World War II the system of resource rents on public forests changed between these two regions, as BC moved to a non-competitive bidding "tenure" system in the belief that this would create stability and improve prospects for sustained yield management. Thus, although the provincial government owns most of the forest land in BC, the tenure system has transferred much of the management of the forest land to large forest companies. The two main types of tenure arrangements are area-based Tree Farm Licences (TFLs) found
mostly on the BC Coast, and Timber Supply Areas (TSAs) found mostly in the Interior.\textsuperscript{2} Administration of these tenures is overseen through 43 Forest District offices throughout the province. Accompanying the tenure system was the decision to use "a residual" method of charging companies for the timber that they harvested. This system calculates the stumpage rate (the amount companies must pay the government to harvest timber) as the amount of revenue forest companies make for selling timber, after the cost of inputs and a profit margin are subtracted. This "residual" system meant that wages paid to forest workers would be largely offset by lower stumpage rates (Cashore 1988: 82-88) which has contributed to a comparatively high wage, low resource rent economy (Fox 1992). As Marchak (1983: 71) notes:

In the forestry industry the capacity of firms to pay higher wages than is the case in the same sectors in the United States and Canada is much improved, and the cost to employers considerable decreased, by the stumpage formula.

These differences have led to a decade and a half-long Canada-US softwood lumber dispute, with many US forest companies arguing that Canadian provincial governments unfairly subsidize their Canadian competitors through below market rates to harvest government owned timber (Cashore 1996a; Cashore 1996b).\textsuperscript{3}

Taxation policy

Both governments rely on their forests for economic growth and to raise funds for the treasury through resource rents and the corporate taxes paid by forest companies.\textsuperscript{4} There are additional tax requirements for publicly-owned land in the PNW. The US Forest Service and the US Bureau of Land Management must, by law, pay counties up to 50 percent of the revenues from selling timber in lieu of property taxes (Barber, Johnson, and Hafild 1994: 47-62, 83-86). Similarly, revenues from Washington State "forest trust" lands are earmarked for State education and other social services. This means that any eco-forest policy outputs that attempt to reduce forest harvesting on these lands conflict with those policies aimed at increasing funding for schools,
hospitals and other community development programs. Similarly, through the tenure system, many BC companies are required to build saw mills and provide jobs as part of their licensing agreements.

STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY

Overview

Economic production in both regions is distinguished between the logging and wood products industry on the one hand, and the pulp and paper industry on the other. These industries are closely related: in both the PNW and BC, the pulp and paper sector uses wood chip by-products from the logging mills. Land ownership and tenure arrangements have affected the way the forest industry has development in each region, but both regions have much in common. For most of the 20th Century, both regions were governed by an exploitation/sustained yield philosophy wherein the value of the resource lay in providing a steady supply of employment and economic development. The dominant paradigm was the "German school" of forestry, aimed at enhancing the volume of timber cut through wise management of the forests (Gregg 1989: 144-6).

Large, vertically integrated forest companies exist in both regions, owning establishments in both the wood products and pulp and paper industry. Different factors have encouraged this phenomenon in the two regions. British Columbia's tenure system has fostered vertical integration and corporate concentration because of its guaranteed access of most of BC's commercial timber to a limited number of companies. At the same time, vast holdings of private land have fostered the development of large forest companies in the PNW.

Both regions have a large number of independently-owned logging establishments, hundreds of sawmill companies, but few pulp and paper companies. In both regions, the number of logging establishments (mostly contractors) is highest, while saw mills vastly outnumber the pulp and paper mills. This is due to the higher capital costs of establishing a pulp mill, and the relatively minor costs
of establishing a logging company, with saw mill costs in-between.\textsuperscript{7} Saw-mills must also be located close to the trees that are being harvested, due to the high costs of transporting raw logs.

The relative importance of the forest industry to the PNW and British Columbia has been declining since the 1980s, as both regions' urban areas have witnessed a population explosion.\textsuperscript{8} The result was a decrease in the relative importance of the forest economy in each region. Yet, the absolute value of the forest industry has increased since the 1970s, even though its percentage contribution to the respective GDP has declined. The forest industry is more important to the State and provincial economies, than it is to either the US or Canadian national economies.

**THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST**

The large, vertically integrated forest companies that own vast chunks of forest land include industry giants such as Weyerhaeuser, Georgia-Pacific, Champion Corporation, and Louisiana-Pacific.\textsuperscript{9} The forest industry is home to a number of small establishments - most of them non-land owning logging, sawmill, and other wood product companies. Ascertaining exactly how many forest product companies exist in Oregon and Washington is difficult, since data are kept by number of establishments, rather than by corporate ownership. The 1992 Census of Manufacturers reports that Oregon had 2,088 establishments under the category "lumber and wood products", with the vast majority logging operations (Table 1.0) while only 60 under the "paper and allied products category". Washington was only slightly more diversified (Keegan 1992: 2) with 1,837 wood product establishments (1037 of these were logging) and 112 pulp and paper facilities.
Table 1.0: Number of Establishments by Major Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>Oregon</th>
<th>Washington</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logging</td>
<td>3,297</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>1,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Industry *</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and Allied</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: data for BC are 1993; data for Oregon and Washington are 1992
*excluding furniture industry

Table 1.1 outlines employment differences in these sectors for each State. Since 1975, Oregon has consistently ranked above Washington State in terms of the number of lumber and wood product jobs, but Washington State has always ranked above Oregon in terms of paper and allied product employment. Nonetheless, lumber and wood products industries dominate in both Washington and Oregon and together produce much of the US timber supply. Oregon and Washington comprise 4.6 percent of the United States land base and three percent of its population. In the 1980s these States produced an average of 25 percent of the nation's lumber (Reinhardt 1991).
Table 1.1: Employment in Forest Products Industries in Washington and Oregon: selected years (thousands of persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OREGON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber and Wood Products</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and allied products</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASHINGTON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber and Wood Products</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and allied products</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>17.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>52.8</td>
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<td>OREGON AND WASHINGTON</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber and Wood Products</td>
<td>110.8</td>
<td>133.4</td>
<td>103.1</td>
<td>105.8</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>89.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paper and allied products</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>137.2</td>
<td>159.0</td>
<td>128.1</td>
<td>131.9</td>
<td>120.7</td>
<td>116.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite the importance of the forest industry in the Pacific Northwest, it has been declining in recent years. For example, Table 1.1 reveals that the number of jobs in the lumber and wood products sector in 1995 fell to 89,700, two thirds of the 1979 level. Lumber production (Table 1.2) for 1995 was also two thirds of the 1987 figure. Much of this trend is due to environmental restrictions (detailed in future chapters) that dramatically reduced the timber harvest permitted on National Forest and BLM forest lands. Appendix 1.0 and Chart 1.4 reveal a staggering reduction in PNW timber harvest from National Forest and BLM lands. Over 4 million board feet of timber were harvested on National Forest and BLM lands in Oregon in 1985, but only 654 million board feet in

Due to its greater historical reliance on federal forests for timber supply, this drop is more severe in terms of Oregon's overall timber harvest output. While Washington's total harvest fell from 5,963 million board feet in 1985 to 4,392 in 1995, Oregon's harvest tumbled from 8,127 million board feet in 1985 to 4,307 in 1995 - nearly a 50 percent reduction in a single decade. Table 1.2 reveals that the plunge in federal in timber harvests is virtually synonymous with a plummet in lumber production. Table 1.3 shows that National Forest lands were contributing only a small amount of timber to mills in Oregon and Washington by 1994.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>8,846</td>
<td>8,601</td>
<td>8,521</td>
<td>7,511</td>
<td>6,595</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>5,448</td>
<td>5,703</td>
<td>4,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>4,645</td>
<td>4,408</td>
<td>4,274</td>
<td>3,919</td>
<td>3,820</td>
<td>4,072</td>
<td>3,863</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>4,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,491</td>
<td>13,009</td>
<td>12,786</td>
<td>11,430</td>
<td>10,415</td>
<td>10,272</td>
<td>9,311</td>
<td>9,903</td>
<td>9,048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Western Wood Products Association

| Source of Timber for Oregon and Washington State Saw Mills, Percentage, 1994 |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| WASHINGTON      | OREGON                      |
| National Forest  | 6.5                         | 16.0                        |
| Other Public     | 12.5                        | 8.5                         |
| Forest Industry  | 42.7                        | 47.8                        |
| Other Private    | 8.3                         | 27.5                        |
| Imports          | 0.2                         |

Source: Western Wood Products Association
BRITISH COLUMBIA

Like Oregon and Washington, Table 1.5 indicates that the BC pulp and paper industry has fewer operations than the lumber and wood products industry. There are over 3,000 logging “establishments” in the province, and 607 wood industry “establishments”. The number of actual companies is difficult to cite, since data are not kept on this. As Schwindt and Heaps (1996: 76) note, many BC companies are vertically (they own establishments at each stage of the production process) and horizontally integrated (they own numerous establishments in the same industry). A single company can possess numerous logging, plywood, sawmill, and pulp and paper mill “establishments”.

Independent contractors dominate harvesting, cutting 83 percent of the supply in 1993 (Schwindt and Heaps 1996).\(^\text{10}\) There are three reasons for this high rate. First, Tree Farm Licences (TFLs) require that half of their harvests be undertaken by independent contractors, and Timber Supply Area (TSA) Forest Licences have similar requirements. Second, independent contractors are usually less expensive than in-house operations (Schwindt and Heaps 1996: 77). Third, of the Annual Allowable Cut, 14 percent is designated for “unintegrated” logging companies.\(^\text{11}\) Overall, there are between 2,000 and 2,500 logging companies operating in British Columbia (Schwindt and Heaps 1996: 77).

Although the number of establishments is large, a small number of forest companies dominate sawmilling. In 1994, the top 10 firms led by Canfor (8.4 percent) and Slocan (8.1 percent) milled 56 percent of the total, and the top 20 firms produced 79 percent (Schwindt and Heaps 1996: 78). Pulp and paper is even more concentrated, with the top five companies, led by Fletcher Challenge (32.8 percent) and MacMillan Bloedel (24.5 percent), producing 87 percent of paper output and the top ten companies making 84.2 percent of market pulp.\(^\text{12}\) Foreign ownership is difficult to measure, but Schwindt and Heaps (1996: 81) show that of companies with 50 percent or more foreign ownership, lumber companies comprise 31.9 percent and pulp and paper about 55 percent.
### Table 1.4: British Columbia Timber Harvest, 1985-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coast</th>
<th>Interior</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>27722</td>
<td>49146</td>
<td>76868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>26561</td>
<td>50942</td>
<td>77503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>33791</td>
<td>56800</td>
<td>90591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>32812</td>
<td>53994</td>
<td>86806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>29904</td>
<td>57474</td>
<td>87806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>25209</td>
<td>48916</td>
<td>78317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>24760</td>
<td>48916</td>
<td>73676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>24681</td>
<td>50239</td>
<td>74920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>25684</td>
<td>53555</td>
<td>79239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>25215</td>
<td>50435</td>
<td>75650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>25959</td>
<td>50512</td>
<td>76471</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thousands of Cubic Metres

The Coast comprises the Vancouver Forest District and 1/3 of the Prince Rupert Forest District.

The Interior comprises Cariboo, Kamloops, Nelson, and Prince George.


### Table 1.5: Direct Forest Employment in British Columbia: Number of Employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lumber and Wood Products</th>
<th>Paper and Allied Products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logging</td>
<td>Newsprint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>25,300</td>
<td>4700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>23,500</td>
<td>4900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>23,200</td>
<td>4900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>25050</td>
<td>4900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>26300</td>
<td>4600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>28200</td>
<td>4200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>29400</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*In order to ensure rough approximation with PNW data, this table excludes the Value Added Sector and Ministry of Forests employment data.

** Other includes: linerboard, deinked pulp, sackraft and other paper, shakes and shingles.

As of 1995, the annual harvest had declined roughly 15 percent since its peak in 1987 (Table 1.4). Employment has remained steady since the late 1980s. Reductions in the rate of harvest and employment levels are anticipated as a result of the post-1991 forest practices rule changes and land use/forest protection initiatives. In both regions, the level of unionization in the forest industry is high. Precise data are difficult to obtain for both regions, but the PNW rates are estimated at about 25-30 percent overall, and in BC are about 50 percent, although there is much variance across region and industry.13
INTERNATIONAL TRADE/EXPORTS

The most significant markets for both the PNW and BC are other regions within the United States. While in one sense this is a similarity, it is also an important difference. The bulk of BC’s products go to a foreign market, while PNW exports do not (Charts 1.4-1.17). Moreover, BC’s forest product exports account for over 60 percent of the province’s total exports (Price Waterhouse 1996: i). This means that BC’s forest industry is dependent on foreign markets to a far greater degree, and thus the potential exists for non-domestic consumers and other actors to exert influence. This dependence on primarily the US market for softwood lumber exports (Charts 1.13, 1.14) has also made BC forest companies vulnerable to attacks by US forest companies launching countervail action against Canadian lumber. Consequently, the softwood lumber dispute has important ramifications for BC resource policy, and the seriousness with which BC industry takes this trade battle is directly related to BC’s dependence on the US market.14

The export of raw logs in both countries is affected by taxation and export policy. Taxation policy also affects support for export restrictions on raw logs. Since 1974, the US federal government has banned the export of raw logs on western federal forest lands (except Alaska) through the use of riders on annual appropriations bills (Gorte and Thomas 1993: 2; Reinhardt 1991: 13). This ban was made permanent in 1990 with the passage of the Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act. This Act also banned the export of raw logs from State and local government lands, except for those with annual timber sales exceeding 400 million board feet (Gorte and Thomas 1993: 3). The result was that Oregon could not export from its State-owned lands, but Washington State - with a much more significant share- was able to continue this practice. The result is that, ceteris paribus, the highest prices for raw logs are paid for those harvested on privately owned land that are not covered by export restrictions, since competition from Japanese and other interests drives up the price.
Consequently, those counties and educational organizations that benefit from achieving the highest possible price on the timber tend to be opposed to raw log export restrictions, while environmental groups, small sawmill owners that possess no forest land, and others that wish to maintain processing jobs in the domestic market, push for increased restrictions. BC raw log exports from publicly-owned lands are banned, except when deemed to be "excess capacity" and a special permit is obtained (Council of Forest Industries of BC 1994).

CONCLUSION

The nature of forest economy means that there are many similarities between BC and the PNW. Numerous logging, sawmill and a limited number of pulp and paper establishments scattered across these regions have resulted in the development of many small towns and communities dependent on the forest industry for its economic well-being. At the same time, urban areas (particularly Seattle and Vancouver) have been undergoing dramatic population growth, which has helped nurture environmental concerns about the future of the regions' forests.

The key differences that exist have institutional or policy legacy roots. Land ownership differences have led to different pricing systems for harvesting timber. These different resource rent policies have caused conflict between BC and PNW forest companies that compete for the same markets and were the direct cause behind the Canada/US softwood lumber dispute. This dispute, in turn, has put on some pressures for resource rent convergence, and was largely the reason behind stumpage fees increases in BC in 1987 and 1991. Since BC is not part of the United States and the PNW is, US forest companies can use US trade law in their efforts to reduce competition from BC. They can even have BC laws declared to be a subsidy, even when similar laws exist in the US. For example, US companies have been successful in arguing that BC raw log exports restrictions amounts to a subsidy, despite similar restrictions on US federal forest lands. At the same time, the high dependence on foreign markets (in the US, Europe and elsewhere) for its forest
product sales also makes BC vulnerable to the influence of consumers and organized interests who may threaten to boycott BC forest products.
Chart 1.1: Oregon, 1995

Chart 1.2: Washington, 1995


Domestic Market

Total Softwood Exports

(66.9%)

(14.1%)

(77.3%)

(22.7%)

Japan

Other Exports

Million Board Feet

0

1

2

3

4

5

Harvest and Log Exports, 1995

Harvest and Log Exports, 1995

Log Exports as % of Total Harvest

Million Board Feet

0

1

2

3

4

5

Chart 1.1: Oregon, 1995

Chart 1.2: Washington, 1995

Chart 1.12: Destination of US Softwood Lumber

Western Woods Region

Source: Western Wood Products Association
January through September 1995. Oregon and Washington State production comprises 47% of this data.
Chart 1.13
British Columbia Lumber Shipments, 1985-1994

[Graph showing lumber shipments from 1985 to 1994 by country, with data points for CANADA, USA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, OTHER, and TOTAL.

Source: B.C. Council of Forest Industries, Statistics Canada]

Chart 1.14: B.C. Lumber Shipments, 1994

Billion Board Feet

- 1.8609 (13.2%) CANADA
- 9.3903 (66.4%) USA
- 2.2463 (15.9%) JAPAN
- 0.291 (2.1%) EUROPEAN UNION
- 0.344 (2.4%) OTHER

Source: B.C. Statistics
Chart 1.15: BC TRADE FLOWS, 1990
PAPER & PAPER PRODUCTS

Source: B.C. Statistics, Statistics Canada

Chart 1.16: BC, Rest of Canada, and External Markets
Paper and Paper Products, 1990

Source: B.C. Statistics, Statistics Canada
Chart 1.17: BC Pulp and Paper Exports

Source: BC Stats, Statistics Canada
### APPENDIX 1.0: WASHINGTON AND OREGON TIMBER HARVEST BY OWNERSHIP, 1985-95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/year</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>NF</th>
<th>BLM</th>
<th>BAI</th>
<th>OP</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>WASHINGTON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3,561</td>
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<td>1,128</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5963</td>
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<td>3,989</td>
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<td>235</td>
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<td>4,367</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>1,423</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4,406</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>3,332</td>
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<td>3,480</td>
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<td>8215</td>
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<td>483</td>
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<td>5742</td>
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<td>3,608</td>
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<td>361</td>
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<td>3,244</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>3,435</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a=less than 1 million board feet; NF=National Forest; BAI=Bureau of Indian Affairs; OP = other public Source: Warren, 1996*
Endnotes


2There are currently 35 TSAs and 32 TFLs in the province. Forest companies holding TFLs are responsible for strategic planning, while the Forest Service undertakes comprehensive planning for TSA lands. For a detailed review of this history of forest tenures in BC, see, British Columbia. Forest Resources Commission (1990a; 1990b), Haley (1985), Pearse (1974), Vance (1990).

3United States critics argue that the Forest Service subsidizes its industry through "below cost" timber sales. See O'Toole (1988) and Mattey (1990).

4For a general discussion on forestry and taxes in both Canada and the United States, Leman (1988: 166-169).


6The existence of large, vertically integrated forest companies in the PNW, such as Weyerhaeuser, can be traced to huge railway land grant "giveaways" that eventually led to forest company ownership.

7The capital costs of a pulp and paper mill are 20-30 times greater than those for a sawmill or plywood mill (Reinhardt 1991: 7).

8Personal Interview, Washington State Department of Natural Resources. See also, Anderson (1991a; 1991b) and Sierra Club (1993).

9GP and Weyerhaeuser are the largest in terms of sales and employees. In 1995 GP had $12,738,000,000 in sales and 47,000 employees, mostly located in PNW and US South (Dun and Bradstreet 1996). In the same year, Weyerhaeuser had sales of $10,398,000,000 sales and 36,665 employees in 1994. Unlike GP, Weyerhaeuser and Champion, Louisiana-Pacific relies heavily on federal forest lands for its timber supply, and is the Forest Service's largest single purchaser.

10Schwindt and Heaps (1996) note that independent contractors logged only 48 percent of the Coastal harvest, but 100 percent of the Interior production.

11These are "open to market loggers without manufacturing facilities" (Schwindt and Heaps 1996: 77).

12Market pulp is a high grade component that other paper companies use to supplement paper produced from lower grade pulp.

13Schwindt and Heaps (1996: 58) note that union sawmill membership fluctuates between 80 percent in the northern Interior, 85 percent in the southern Interior, and 90 percent on the coast. Logging unionization differs more dramatically: 75 percent on the Coast are unionized while almost none in the interior belong to unions. Over 90 percent of the pulp and paper sector is unionized.

Marcus Widenor of the Labor Education and Research Center at the University of Oregon estimates that about 80 percent of "basic" paper workers are unionized, while approximately one third of the workforce in sawmills, plywood mills, and panel products are union members (person communication, February 14, 1997).

CHAPTER 2
ECO-FOREST STATUTORY REGIME DEVELOPMENT IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND
THE US PACIFIC NORTHWEST

Statutory regimes emerged in each jurisdiction from the 1960s to mid-1970s that cast a long shadow onto future policy development. These policy "legacies" influenced state/organized interests relations and led to different requirements and responsibilities for state officials. In some jurisdictions, state actors had a significant degree of latitude in whether and how to respond to demands for increased eco-forest initiatives, while the state in other jurisdictions enjoyed limited options. This chapter presents a schema for comparing these regimes, and then details the regimes' impact on rule-making in each jurisdiction.

Defining, Classifying and Comparing Regimes

A statutory regime can be defined as the legislative framework each jurisdiction has created to address eco-forest issues. A regime represents the overall direction and sum total of eco-forest legislation. Since statutory regime development can be multi-faceted and complex, a classificatory system is needed that facilitates comparison and illuminates the key differences among the eco-forest statutes in the four jurisdictions. Simeon's (1976) classificatory framework is helpful in this regard. He suggests policy can be distinguished along three dimensions: the scope (What does government do?), the means (How does government do it?) and the distributive (What are the effects?).

In the case of eco-forest legislation, both the scope and the means can themselves be further classified (Table 2.0). The scope can be divided between the policy "focus" and policy "applicability". For example, eco-forest statutes can be distinguished between whether they focus on land use/protection issues (where to log, what to protect), forest practice matters (how to log), or broader "umbrella" environmental legislation (laws that go beyond issues specific to forestry), such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA) or the Clean Water Act. At the same time their scope is also
determined according to whether they apply to private or public land ownership. Similarly, the means can be distinguished by the "structure" and "method" of eco-forest statutes.

**Table 2.0: STATUTORY CLASSIFICATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEANS</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Method</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discretionary</td>
<td>Substantive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-discretionary</td>
<td>Planning/procedural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In legislation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In regulations</td>
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</tbody>
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The structure of eco-forest statutes refers to whether they are discretionary or non-discretionary (the extent to which state bureaucratic officials can exercise their own discretion when implementing statutory requirements), and whether policy requirements are contained in the legislation itself, or the easier-to-change regulations. The method refers to whether statutes contain "substantive" eco-forest policy measures which directly address environmental protection requirements, or whether they outline planning/procedural requirements. This category goes to the heart of the distinction among each jurisdiction's statutory regime, and the hypotheses about the influences of different regimes on state/societal relations.

According to this scheme, statutory regime change could occur through an extension in method or scope of legislative initiatives. However, the most fundamental change would be a shift in structure: from discretion to non-discretion and from regulations to statutes. These changes, combined with the right of groups to litigate, would dramatically alter the nature of state/societal relations. Where non-discretionary requirements are contained in the statutes themselves, the autonomy of (non-judicial) state actors is the most limited. It is also more difficult for state actors to change "unwanted" statutory requirements, than it is for them to change regulations issued by their
own administrative agencies. Discretion is further limited when, as in the three US jurisdictions, macro-institutional features render statutory change even more difficult.

Forest Planning Policies

Forest planning and procedure policies have become so complex and specialized that a brief discussion is warranted. Planning can be defined as the process of developing the overall goals and purposes that policy should pursue, and developing the rules and procedures which will permit achievement of those goals. In this sense, planning is an attempt to develop a policy framework, within which specific policy actions will be fitted. Planning can occur at both the strategic (land use/forest protection) and operational (harvesting/forest practices) levels. Planning policy is once removed from substantive eco-forest protection policies, since there is no inevitable guarantee that well-developed planning policies will always lead to increased environmental protection. Nonetheless, the story to follow shows that the relationship between well developed planning procedures and increased environmental protection is strong, particularly when those planning procedures are required by statute.  

THE STATUTORY REGIMES

Overview

Legislative developments in Washington, DC, Oregon, Washington and British Columbia in the early 1960s to mid-1970s, resulted in distinct statutory regimes. The federal statutory regime (Table 2.1) affecting the PNW includes the non-discretionary procedural National Environmental Policy Act, the non-discretionary substantive Endangered Species Act and the comprehensive, eclectic National Forest Management Act that contains both discretionary and non-discretionary measures. These and other statutes reviewed below have created a "complex web" of planning/process and substantive forest protection statutory requirements, explicitly granting
organized interests the right to sue government agencies for non-compliance. This regime leaves US state officials with less room to manoeuvre than their counterparts in BC and in the PNW States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Applicability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discretionary</td>
<td>Substantive</td>
<td>Land Use</td>
<td>Private land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-discretionary</td>
<td>Planning/ procedural</td>
<td>Forest practices</td>
<td>Public land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In legislation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Umbrella</td>
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<tr>
<td>In regulations</td>
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</tbody>
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*Shaded areas = a statutory regime where at least some key pieces of legislation fall under this category. Lined areas = Where the categories apply infrequently. Clear areas = Where the categories do not apply to the statutory regime.

The State governments of Oregon and Washington both ushered in forest practices legislation in the early 1970s. These forest Acts were aimed at facilitating forest extraction, creating forest practices boards that tended to be dominated by industry interests, and the Acts and the rules worded explicitly to avoid litigation by organized interests. These statutory regimes (Table 2.2) direct much of the political struggle for policy change toward industry-dominated forest practice boards, and appear to have reduced the capacity of the State governments to initiate changes independently of the boards.
Conversely in British Columbia, the early 1970s saw no comprehensive forest practice legislation introduced; only discretionary forest protection legislation was brought forward (Table 2.3). This regime saw state actors maintain a great deal of discretion and latitude in deciding how to respond to environmental concerns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.3: BRITISH COLUMBIA ECO-FOREST STATUTORY REGIME*</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEANS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discretionary</td>
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<td>Non-discretionary</td>
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<td>In legislation</td>
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<td>In regulations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Until early 1990s

I. THE FEDERAL UNITED STATES ECO-FOREST STATUTORY POLICY REGIME

The first statutory response to environmental pressures by the US Congress was the 1960 Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act. This Act directed the US Forest Service to manage national forests for multiple uses including "outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish..." and gave statutory recognition to the principle of integrated resource management. Yet it was highly discretionary, with few substantive provisions about how to balance the different values. The legislation was in fact written and proposed by the US Forest Service in an attempt to maintain agency control over management of national forest lands. It did little to change the attitudes and
procedures of agency staff (Twight and Lyden 1988) and had much less impact than legislation passed in the 1970s:

The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, in the end, was not a seminal piece of legislation, but rather a codification of the Forest Service management policies that had evolved to that point in time...As a guide for decision making or as a standard for evaluating the performance of programs, MUSYA is not very helpful. Little guidance for setting priorities is given in law (Cubbage and Ellefson 1980: 331).

At the same time as the Forest Service was being pressured to develop a multiple use mandate, wilderness groups were promoting national legislation to require the National Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Forest Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service to designate a certain percentage of its lands as wilderness areas, limiting economic development and promoting ecosystem values. This effort resulted in the US Congress passing the Wilderness Act of 1964, which designated certain federal lands as wilderness areas and created a process for future designations. This Act severely limited US federal land use agency discretion for lands designated as wilderness, cutting off most forms of economic development and timber extraction. The legislation was also significant for focusing attention on sheltering forest land from timber harvesting, thus reducing potential timber supplies. It also directed environmental groups' efforts toward land use considerations rather than sustainable forestry practices.

The Wilderness Act was followed by the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 which was slightly less prescriptive in nature, giving land use agencies discretion in determining what activities would conform to the Act. Wilkinson and Anderson (1985:119) have noted that up to this time, US Forest Service officials still enjoyed a great deal of discretion in the creation and implementation of policy.

The end of the 1960s and early 1970s saw the passage of three key "umbrella" statutes that would fundamentally alter forest policy and state/societal relations. These were the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the 1972 Clean Water Act and the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA). They contained explicit provisions allowing for organized interests and citizens to sue
agencies for non-compliance with their non-discretionary provisions. These statutes were introduced during a time when both the Democratic and Republican parties were vying for an increasingly strong "environmental" vote. The NEPA, and the ESA were passed by a Democratic Congress and Republican president while the Clean Water Act was passed by a Democratic Congress over Republican president Richard Nixon's veto.

The NEPA is a procedural statute containing mandatory provisions both within the legislation itself and the accompanying regulations. It requires that all federal agency planning contain interdisciplinary Environmental Impact Statements and that the agency solicit "comments from those persons or organizations who may be interested or affected" (Section 1503.1.a.4). This legislation is important not for the substantive content regulating forest practices, but for requiring in law that an agency must consult with the public and organized interests when developing its draft and final EIS. Each EIS must be accompanied by a Record of Decision outlining the proposed alternative and choice of action taken. There is no provision that agencies reflect these interests, but this Act provides an important legal tool to organized environmental groups in their efforts to become full members of the US forest policy community.

The second "environmental protection" legislation relevant to eco-forest policy was the Clean Water Act. The Act contained regulations restricting emissions on sources of pollution and required States to follow these regulations. Alternatively States could set their own regulations equal to or more restrictive than the federal standards. The Act also requires all federal agencies to adhere to State guidelines, giving State legislatures and regulatory agencies the ability to limit federal agency discretion.

Finally, the ESA created onerous responsibilities on forest management practices and has provided a significant tool for environmental groups to use, or threaten to use, litigation. It is a non-discretionary piece of legislation with clear direction within the statute. Administered by the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) or the National Marine Fisheries Services (NMFS), the ESA requires
that these agencies list threatened and endangered species and their "critical habitat" and then ensure that a plan is developed that will result in species recovery.

The determination of threatened or endangered must be based "solely on the best scientific and commercial data available" (section 4(b)(1)(A)) with explicit direction that the economic effects of such a decision not be given consideration. Section 7(a)(2) requires each federal agency to ensure that any of its actions "...is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat". This means that all federal forest land use plans must undergo consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service and/or the National Marine and Fisheries Service to ensure that such plans do not contravene this section. Since the effects of plans are often difficult to predict, this provision has resulted in ongoing interagency consultation.13 The Endangered Species Act also affects private and State land, but with fewer requirements than exist for federally-owned forest land.14

Counteracting the strong measures of the ESA is that species protection policies resulting from this Act can be overturned by the establishment of an "Endangered Species Committee", known as the "God Squad" (Davis 1992). Once constituted, this committee has the authority to decide that the "economic and social benefits of the proposed action outweigh costs to the listed species" and can exempt a particular action from the requirements of the ESA (Smith, Moote, and Schwalbe 1993: 1039) However, there are strong political costs in doing this, and such actions are rarely taken.

Two factors in the early 1970s led Congress to "reassert its authority over Forest Service planning and decision making"15 with the passing of the national planning-oriented Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (RPA): first, the conflict between the non-discretionary environmental protection laws (ESA, NEPA, Clean Water Act) and the discretionary MUSYA governing the US Forest Service; and second, the need for legislative guidance as to how the Forest Service was to conform with the NEPA. Consequently, the RPA detailed the process by which the Forest Service would comply with NEPA and also directed the Forest Service to undertake
a number of inventory and long-term planning initiatives.\textsuperscript{16} However, the Forest Service still maintained discretion as to how the directives would be carried out.

The following year, the Forest Service interpreted its new RPA planning responsibilities by proposing a costly multiple-use plan, which Congress failed to fund. A stalemate resulted between the Forest Service and Congress over which body should take the lead in directing forest management policy. Coinciding with this Agency/Congress conflict, environmental groups were becoming increasingly vocal about continued clearcutting and the wilderness planning processes arising out of the 1964 \textit{Wilderness Act}. This culminated in 1975 when the West Virginia Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America took the US Forest Service to court. This group argued that the Forest Service’s continued use of clearcutting in the Monongahela National Forest violated the non-destruction provisions of the 1891 \textit{Organic Act}.\textsuperscript{17} The courts ruled that clearcutting did contravene the 1876 Act and recommended Congressional action to remedy the situation (Nelson 1976).

As a result, Congress increased Forest Service directives beyond the MUSYA once again (Hungerford 1994: 1402), passing the \textit{National Forest Management Act} (NFMA) in 1976.\textsuperscript{18} Whereas the RPA was unclear as to how National Forest Rangers’ Offices were to prepare individual National Forest plans, the NFMA directed the Forest Service to develop Forest Land and Resource Management Plans (LRMPs) for each National Forest. These LRMPs were required to integrate all multiple uses.\textsuperscript{19} The NFMA requires that these plans be prepared by an "interdisciplinary team of specialists in forestry, wildlife, recreation, social sciences, and other relevant disciplines" and requires LRMPs to provide for "outdoor recreation (including wilderness), range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish."\textsuperscript{20}

The NFMA also directs the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations for LRMPs that "provide for diversity of plant and animal communities". The resulting regulations require that LRMPs maintain "viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species", "where appropriate" and "to the degree practicable." In addition to these umbrella protection requirements,
the NFMA also contains numerous substantive forest practices provisions that limit clearcutting and harvesting near water. Procedurally, the NFMA details how the NEPA will be applied on national forests by explicitly providing for public involvement in the planning process. However, reflecting the ambivalent nature of this Act, much of what the Forest Service must do with the information it receives from the public is contained not within the legislation, but the accompanying regulations.

Unlike the broad environment protection legislation of the early 1970s and despite its detailed forest practices requirements, much of the NFMA provides for agency discretion and interpretation. Prior to introducing the NFMA in Congress, Senator Hubert Humphrey (1976) gave a speech to the American Forestry Association arguing that deference to Forest Service employees was crucial:

The fundamental issue we must face is whether forestry should be practiced in the courts, or in the woods. The next issue we face is whether Congress should write tight instructions into law, or allow the professional resource manager the flexible authority needed to apply the best scientific forestry practices in a manner that assures complete respect for the environment. In this connection, my sentiments are similar to those of a former chief of the Forest Service, who [said] in 1935, "Forestry is a profession that will not tolerate political dominance".

A 1992 US government report also argues that much discretion remains:

The actual impacts of NFMA on Forest Service management discretion cannot be known precisely. While the law requires regulations constraining the use of certain practices that might have significant adverse impacts, the determination of significance is largely a matter of agency discretion. In addition, courts remain relatively deferential to the agency's management discretion under NFMA.

The same year that the NFMA was passed to govern the Forest Service, Congress finally turned its attention to the Bureau of Land Management, when it passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). The FLPMA was similar in many ways to the NFMA, but contained fewer substantive forest practice direction and no provisions to maintain "viable populations" of desired
species. Its impetus came from BLM officials who wanted to codify practices long-existing agency practices. As Gregg (1989: 168-9) has noted:

The Bureau of Land Management took advantage of the environmental era to seek a firm charter legitimating and strengthening its role as manager of public land resources. The agency had developed an administrative structure, a multiple-use management philosophy, and a management system based on application of professional concepts and practices without the explicit blessings of Congress over a period of decades since its birth in 1946.

In sum, from 1960 through 1976, the US Congress addressed environmental and non-timber values concerning its national forests through a series of legislative measures - starting with discretionary and procedural legislation, building with broad non-discretionary umbrella environmental protection legislation, and ending with detailed legislation directing management of forest lands (Appendix 2.0 outlines this development). Taken as a whole, these laws create a cumbersome statutory regime that includes non-discretionary substantive requirements within the legislation itself. The non-discretionary aspects have allowed environmental groups to pursue litigation, which has increased their influence within the US forest policy community and its policy networks. Critics of the US statutory regime have argued that it is "a crazy quilt of apparently mutually incompatible statutory directives" that has lead agency officials to concentrate on "bomb-proofing" proposed forest plans, instead of focusing on long-range strategic planning.

Despite this litigious atmosphere, Congress is not out of the picture: it retains the ability to pass legislation explicitly exempting court decisions from the existing statutory regime, although as with the God Squad, there are political costs that curtail this type of action. Most importantly, however, the US macro-institutional setting gives power to Congressional appropriations committees that can often dictate particular forest policy initiatives, including how the Forest Service and BLM spend their funds. They may require, for example, that funds not be used to build roads, or to implement ecosystem management. Appropriations committees may also require that a certain level of harvest take place on federal forest lands.
II. THE OREGON STATE ECO-FOREST STATUTORY POLICY REGIME

The key piece of legislation governing Oregon is its 1971 Forest Practices Act, which has dramatically influenced forest policy change, and the role of environmental groups in the policy making process. The 1971 Act has antecedents dating back to 1864, when legislation aimed at preventing forest fires was introduced (Anderson 1977: 16). This legislation was revisited on three occasions at the turn of the 19th Century, and was followed by a 1911 law that established a Board of Forestry with the power to create policies and oversee implementation. This Act also created the office of the State forester who would, "under the supervision of the State Board of Forestry, execute all matters pertaining to forestry within the jurisdiction of the state" (Anderson 1977: 16). This 85-year old institutional structure has changed very little: rules are still created by the Board of Forestry and are still administered by the State Forester.

Statutory change also occurred in the mid-1930s, when, in addition to "professional and political" impetuses, members of the public were concerned that the limited focus on insect or forest fire issues "would not alone insure high levels of continuous timber productivity" (ibid: 52). The Oregon State Board of Forestry responded by endorsing a "sustained yield" policy and recognized non-extractive "secondary forest benefits" (ibid: 52). In an uncanny reflection of debates surrounding forest policy in the 1990s, Governor Charles Sprague signed into law the Oregon Forest Conservation Act of 1941, arguing:

By adoption of progressive policies now, we may successfully bridge the transition period from the "cut and get out" practice of the past to a stable economy based on sustained production in the future (Anderson 1977: 53).

This law gave discretion to the State Forester who was simply empowered to issue new rules. The legislation was narrow in scope and limited to regeneration requirements. As Anderson (ibid: 56) argues, the Oregon Forest Conservation Act, "...by addressing itself almost exclusively to the problem of reforestation, ...ignored the importance of forest practices aimed at protecting other forest resources such as fish and wildlife".
These pre-1971 statutory policy legacies influenced the nature and structure of the statutory changes made in 1971. However, the precise timing of the 1971 Act can be traced to the US Congress' deliberations and eventual enactment of the Clean Water Act of 1972. The federal Clean Water Act worried the Oregon forest industry about possible unwelcome federal and/or State regulation of forest practices on private lands. The industry feared that a non-forestry agency might end up with regulatory responsibility over forest practice regulations, with uncertain and unpredictable consequences for industrial landowners. In addition, there was a widely held belief among forest industry officials that State regulation of private forest practices would be less severe than federal regulation.

Instead of waiting for impending legislation, the Oregon Forest Industries Council made the decision to assist in writing, developing and promoting the 1971 Forest Practices Act. The price of increased regulations would be worth the favourable light the Council would receive for proposing one of the toughest forest practices Acts in the country (Armstrong 1991). The Act would also entrench the authority of the Board of Forestry, the State Forester and the Department of Forests over forest practices.

The 1971 Forest Practices Act contained few substantive provisions within the legislation. Instead, an industry-dominated Board of Forestry was directed to promulgate regulations concerning a wide-range of forest practices. Administration would be undertaken by the State Forester and the Department of Forests. Procedurally, the Act makes compliance relatively easy, since it simply requires that notification be given to the Department of Forests that forest practices (logging, or actions preparing for logging) are planned, rather than requiring state officials to issue a permit (Cubbage, O'Laughlin, and Bullock 1993: 426). In some cases notification itself is not even required.

In sum, the Oregon Forest Practices Act of 1971 extended regulating private forest practices beyond reforestation matters, and directed the Board of Forestry to create standards over an array
of forest practices. However, the design of legislation and accompanying rules created little opportunity for environmental groups to pursue litigation.36

In addition to forest practice legislation, Oregon also turned its attention toward land use planning in 1973 with the passage of the Oregon Land Use Act. The purpose of the Act was to prevent conversion of forest lands to other uses and created a Land Conservation Development Commission (LCDC) and a Department of Land Conservation.37 This legislation does not allow regulation of private forest land use planning (M'Gonigle et al. 1990: 44-51).

Legislative amendments made in 1987 and 1991 regarding riparian (stream side) zone protection, endangered species protection, and forest practices board membership did not alter the fundamental characteristics of the existing statutory regime. Instead, the existing statutory regime shaped the nature of future amendments. Bureaucratic discretion was paramount, exceptions to rules were still allowed, and the Department of Forestry dominates forest management (Appendix 2.0 summarizes the key legislative initiatives since 1971).

III. THE WASHINGTON STATE ECO-FOREST STATUTORY POLICY REGIME

As in Oregon, the key statute governing Washington State's forest politics and policy is its 1974 Forest Practices Act. Washington also developed forest practice legislation dating back to 1945 (Cubbage and Ellefson 1980: 427), but this was limited to regulating forest fires and forest regeneration. As with Oregon's experience, a significant catalyst for the Forest Practices Act was the forest industry's desire to limit the effects of the federal Clean Water Act. In addition, the forest industry wanted to avoid review of its forest practices under the 1971 State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA).

The Forest Practices Act itself has a pro-extraction focus, with the preamble stating that "a viable forest products industry is of prime importance to the state's economy" and that "...coincident with maintenance of a viable forest products industry, it is important to afford protection to forest
soils, fisheries, wildlife, water quantity and quality, air quality, recreation and scenic beauty".\textsuperscript{36} The Act is similar to Oregon's Act in that it contains few substantive regulations. The Act provides for an 11-member Forest Practices Board, most of whom represent government agencies. The majority of these government agencies have industry-oriented mandates, rather than consumer or environmental missions.\textsuperscript{39} Despite a more open Board than exists in Oregon, the Washington Environmental Council asserts that an industry bias exists since "a majority of the Board's members have a direct interest in promoting the timber industry" (Rowland 1994).\textsuperscript{40}

Washington's Act requires forest companies to notify the Department of Natural Resources when undertaking forest practices that have no "direct impact for damaging a public resource", but requires that a permit be given for those practices that "have the potential for substantial impact on the environment" (Cubbage and Ellefson 1980: 466).\textsuperscript{41} In contrast to Oregon, in Washington there is some limited influence by other agencies. The Washington Department of Ecology may conduct inspections for water quality and local governments have the power to require environmental impact statements and additional forest practices.\textsuperscript{42}

An additional element in the statutory regime was the passage of Washington's State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), which created a Department of Ecology and "an environmental impact review process for agencies which regulate industrial activities" (Pinkerton 1992: 333). This Act allows Washington State environmental groups to contest some government agency decisions in court, although legal options are more limited than those at the national level.

Forest practices in Washington are influenced by the 1981 Wildlife Code and its creation of a Fish and Wildlife Commission. The Code created a Commission that oversaw the Director and Department of Wildlife. Since 1987, the Commission has had the power to designate threatened or endangered species (Haddock 1995: 43).\textsuperscript{43} Most of its provisions are contained in the accompanying regulations which require the Commission to make a listing decision "solely on the basis of the biological status of the species being considered, based on the preponderance of scientific data
available". If the species is listed, the Department of Fish and Wildlife must prepare a recovery plan, although there is no required timetable.

Overall, the Washington State statutory regime is similar to Oregon's with its **Forest Practices Act** substantive provisions contained in the regulations, and the limited chance for court enforcement. Differences between the two States include the existence of a **Washington State Environmental Protection Act** that applies to some forest practices, the participation of the Washington State Department of Ecology in enforcing forest practices, and the existence of an Endangered Species Commission. Still, the **Forest Practices Act** dominates forest policy-making, and changes made after 1971 did not alter the fundamental characteristics of the statutory regime (Appendix 2.0 reviews the key legislative developments).

Reflecting on these differences, Cubbage and Ellefson's 1980 comparative study found that Washington's **Forest Practices Act** were slightly stronger than Oregon's:

The aggressiveness of the Oregon law may be weakened by the dominance of timber interests on the State Forestry Board, the timber production orientation of the Department of Forestry, and the strong timber interests in the state. Oregon operates on a notification system which is less strict than a permit system. These factors combine to make their laws less stringent than the Washington law.

...Washington [has] the same wide scope of authority and sanctions available as in the Oregon...[law]. In addition, Washington requires notification for less significant forest practices and application and approval for more significant forest activities. The enforcing agencies are rigorous in review and approval of plans and in inspections. Strong environmental group and other state agency input into the rule making process also increases the degree of regulation (1980: 432).

Despite the differences between Washington State's and Oregon's statutory regimes, both have timber extraction-oriented legislation and a forest practice board membership whose majority has been more oriented toward industry than environmental interests. These characteristics make them more similar than different. Minor changes were made after 1971, but because the statutory regime virtually required industry consent, policy choices were limited.
III. THE CANADIAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ECO-FOREST POLICY REGIME

Responding as the US federal government did to the "first wave of environmentalism", the Canadian federal government enacted nine new environmental statutes from 1968-1972 (Vanderzwaag and Duncan 1992). However, unlike US legislation, these were mostly discretionary initiatives that failed to grant explicit rights for environmental group litigation (Hoberg 1993). Because the Canadian federal government lacks significant jurisdiction or land ownership in BC forest matters, most of these statutes did not affect eco-forest policy. Two exceptions warrant discussion: amendments to the *Fisheries Act* and the creation of a federal Department of Environment (Hoberg 1993: 6).46

The amendments to the *Fisheries Act* in 1970 contained strong measures against polluting fish habitat. Recent analyses have called this Act, "...potentially Canada's most powerful weapon in protecting the environment" (Vanderzwaag and Duncan 1992: 15) with strong non-discretionary wording found within the statute. In particular, section 35(1) makes it unlawful to "carry on any work or undertaking that results in the harmful alteration, disruption, or destruction of fish habitat" and section 36(3) "prohibits persons from depositing or permitting the deposit of deleterious substances into water frequented by fish" (Vanderzwaag and Duncan 1992: 15). Despite this strong wording, enforcement has been minimal and is often shared with provincial agencies.47 It is a longstanding policy of DFO to "cooperate" with industry instead of charging polluters.48

Poor enforcement and deference to provincial jurisdiction in resource matters, combined with the inability of environmental groups to enforce provisions of the federal *Fisheries Act*, have limited what otherwise would be a significant statutory tool for a federal government wishing to influence BC's eco-forest policy outputs.

The Canadian government also responded to the second wave of environmentalism with the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act* and the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*. However, because of federal/provincial jurisdictional issues, neither of these Acts has any significant influence
on BC eco-forest policies. As of the Spring of 1997, it was uncertain what the effect of the federal Endangered Species Act would be on British Columbia.

IV. THE BRITISH COLUMBIA ECO-FOREST STATUTORY POLICY REGIME

Although BC experienced the first wave of environmentalism, the institutional and statutory setting led to a completely different response from that in Oregon and Washington State. With no Canadian counterpart to the US federal Clean Water Act of 1972, BC industry had no strategic incentives to advocate forest practices legislation at the provincial level and the BC government had no incentives to act in order to maintain provincial jurisdiction. Although BC did introduce provincial legislation, it departed from the approach taken in Washington, DC, Salem and Olympia.

The first statutory response to the first wave of environmentalism in British Columbia was the 1965 Park Act, which added conservation responsibilities to the Department of Recreation and Conservation's tourism and recreation mandates (Duffy 1990). Unlike the MUSYA or the US Wilderness Act of 1964, this legislation provided scant direction regarding the creation of provincial parks.

The next and arguably most important statutory response to the first wave of environmentalism was the 1971 Environment and Land Use Act, one of the last pieces of legislation brought in by the Social Credit regime of WAC Bennett. This legislation institutionalized an informal committee of Cabinet Ministers created three years earlier "to resolve resource conflicts" (Duffy 1990: 8). However, unlike the complex and detailed legislation brought about in Washington DC, Oregon and Washington State, this was a short, two page piece of legislation creating a cabinet Environment and Land Use Committee (ELUC) and simply enabled the government to set up processes to deal with selected land use conflicts throughout the province. Unlike responses elsewhere, there was no mention of changing forest extraction practices. Instead, attention focused on the land use side of eco-forest policy initiatives.
The ELUC was empowered to "ensure that all the aspects of preservation and maintenance of the natural environment are fully considered in the administration of land use and resource development". It had the statutory authority to hold public meetings and resolve land use conflicts, but the legislation contained no provisions for mandatory public participation nor any of the specific biodiversity and forest practices requirements in the US NFMA. The Environment and Land Use Act vested broad discretion in the cabinet committee. Section 6 of the Act stated that the committee "may make such orders respecting the environment, or land use, as [it considers] advisable" and that such orders will have supremacy over all previous Acts or regulations.

With general, permissive guidelines and the ability to promulgate regulations or orders-in-council that superseded all other statutes, this legislation created a powerful committee of cabinet whose actions were not constrained by general environmental protection legislation. Environmental groups and other non-governmental organizations were left with little opportunity to pursue litigation. Still, this legislation also marked a break from previous ad hoc land use planning within the Ministry of Lands, Forests and Water Resources by permitting "the integration of multiple objectives in land allocation" (Duffy 1990: 8; see also O'Riordan 1987). The centralized nature of this Committee would later facilitate the creation of multi-agency planning initiatives at the regional and provincial level (Duffy 1990). With the election of a New Democratic government in 1972, a permanent secretariat was created to assist the Committee in 1973, but there remained no non-discretionary provisions within the legislation or the regulations. The ELUC legislation incorporated a widely-held belief within the BC civil service that agency discretion should be maintained, and that BC should avoid the directive, mandatory and non-discretionary route followed in US federal legislation.

The Ecological Reserves Act was also passed by the Social Credit government in 1971. It was even shorter than the Environment and Land Use Act. Curiously, its non-enforceable preamble promotes setting aside "...reserve areas of Crown land representative of distinctive ecosystems" for "scientific study", including the (unattained) objective of creating one hundred of these areas before
1976. This Act was subservient to all existing legislation and was a non-mandatory, non-binding, enabling Act that had little effect on wilderness protection in British Columbia.51

British Columbia did not embrace the same type of umbrella environmental protection statutes that the US Congress did in the early 1970s. There was no Clean Water Act, no Clean Air Act, and no National Environmental Policy Act. Nor was there a non-discretionary Endangered Species Act requiring listing of endangered and threatened species. Instead, BC did respond with sections 5 and 6 of the 1980 Wildlife Act which allow for non-fish, vertebrate species and their habitat to be designated as "endangered" or "threatened" (Sandborn 1990: 61). Yet, such a decision remains under the discretion of the provincial cabinet and Ministry of the Environment. There is no listing process and no requirement that agencies devise a plan for species recovery.52

The next significant pieces of legislation passed in British Columbia affecting eco-forest policy were the 1978 Ministry of Environment Act, the Ministry of Forests Act, a strengthened Park Act and a new Forests Act. The 1978 Ministry of Environment Act created an agency at the cabinet table with a different mandate and clientele than that of the Ministry of Forests. However, the accompanying Ministry of Forests Act gave statutory responsibility for 85 per cent of all Crown land in BC to the Forest Service, leaving the Ministry of Environment and the ELUC with little forest land under their purview (Vance 1990: 20). This Act explicitly recognized the Ministry of Forests as having primary "responsibility for planning and managing lands designated as provincial forests" (Duffy 1990: 13).

At the same time, environmental and other non-harvesting values were included in the purposes of the Ministry of Forests Act, calling on the Forest Service to "coordinate and integrate" timber production with "fisheries, wildlife, water, outdoor recreation and other natural resource values"....53 These legislative changes did not significantly alter the existing statutory regime. The Forest Service had more explicit planning and non-timber responsibilities, but how this was to be carried out was discretionary. In 1979, the Ministry of Forests Act was amended to require the Ministry of Forests to prepare yearly forest and range resource programs. Borrowing from the US
RPA legislation, extensive resource analyses were required every five years. Unlike the RPA requirements, this BC Forest Service had more discretion in deciding what to include in these studies (Vance 1990: 19).54

A new Forest Act was enacted in 1978 in BC, following the Pearse Royal Commission on Timber Rights and Forest Policy.55 This is a comprehensive piece of legislation whose main purpose was to improve forest management, rather than introduce comprehensive eco-forest policy requirements. Much of the Act addresses management operations on the two basic forms of tenure: area-based Tree Farm Licenses (TFLs) and volume-based Timber Supply Areas (TSAs). The Act permits the Chief Forester to order licensees to prepare operational level management plans, but is silent on public input requirements.

Some students of BC forest policy claim that the 1978 Forest Act represented an abandonment of "sustained yield" management because of a provision that allows the Chief Forester to consider a multitude of values when setting the annual harvesting rate (Marchak 1983).56 Dellert (1994) has argued that this increased discretion allows the Chief Forester the power to set more eco-friendly cutting rates. Overall and unlike the US NFMA, the Forest Act gives little guidance about planning or substantive forest practice requirements, leaving a great deal of discretion to BC Forest Service officials.

A key exception to this characterization is a provision that orders forest companies to prepare detailed plans for regeneration before they can even apply for a cutting permit. Completely at odds with the discretionary provisions of the Act, these measures, contained within the legislation itself, require that these plans "must address recreation, fisheries, wildlife, water and other natural resource values" and must also "be conducted in consultation and cooperation with the public".

The next significant eco-forest policy statutes were introduced in 1987, when the BC government responded to pressures to increase wilderness protection by amending the Forest Act. This amendment allowed the cabinet to designate a particular area of forest as a "wilderness area"
to be "managed and used for preservation of wilderness or uses consistent with preservation" (Loukidelis 1990: 240). These lands would remain within the provincial forest system and would still be managed by the Ministry of Forests. Keeping with the overall characteristics of the statutory regime, their designation is completely discretionary (Vance 1990: 56). There is no requirement that wilderness areas be created. Unlike the US Wilderness Act of 1964, there are also no provisions for creating a designation process. Amendments were also made during this time that strengthened regeneration and multiple resource values requirements. Summarizing the discretionary-oriented statutory regime before 1991, Vance (1990: 18) notes:

...because there are no specific ecology or fundamental forestry concepts contained in British Columbia law, there is no way to compel the Ministry of Forests to develop and adhere to policy that establishes a certain standard of care for managing the different parts of the forest resource like wildlife or wilderness.

No new major eco-forest policy legislation was passed until 1992. Between 1992 and 1994, the New Democratic government passed five significant legislative measures aimed at forest protection and land use (summarized in table 2.4): the 1992 Commission on Resources and the Environment Act, the 1993 Forest Renewal Act, the 1994 Forest Practices Code Act, the 1994 Forest Reserve Act, and the 1995 Protected Area Act. Together, these altered the existing statutory regime by expanding the scope to include forest practices, providing some substantive wording within the legislation itself, and slightly reining in agency discretion.
Overall, British Columbia's statutory response to the second wave of environmentalism was more comprehensive than that of the 1970s. Its statutes tackled forest practices and comprehensive land use planning. However, unlike the U.S. federal eco-forest statutory regime, BC legislation was brought about without the general umbrella environment protection legislation governing endangered species or clean water. In the case of environmental assessment legislation, forest practices were exempt. The government responded with a comprehensive set of statutory initiatives, but in a way that maintained bureaucratic and cabinet discretion (Appendix 2.0 presents a chronology and overview of BC's key legislative initiatives).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented legislative responses in each jurisdiction since the 1960s, arguing that three distinct statutory regimes resulted during the first wave of environmentalism. The fundamental characteristics of these statutory regimes have remained remarkably resilient, with subsequent legislative changes reinforcing the existing regime. Since the mid-1970s only BC's statutory regime has changed, even though many of its previous characteristics remain. Drawing on the statutory characteristics analysed in this chapter, the next six chapters examine their influence,
along with the macro-institutional and land ownership factors, on state capacity, state autonomy, and the development of organized interests. These chapters will develop the central argument of this dissertation - that different levels of autonomy, capacity and organized interests have largely determined the nature of policy community, network, and output change in the four jurisdictions under review.
### APPENDIX 2.0: PNW ECO-FOREST STATUTES, 1960-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEANS</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1960</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wilderness Act</td>
<td>1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wild and Scenic Rivers Act</td>
<td>1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Environmental Policy Act</td>
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<td>Clean Water Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>Endangered Species Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA)</td>
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<td>Federal Land Policy and Management Act</td>
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<td>Washington State Forest Practices</td>
<td>1974</td>
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<td>Wildlife Code</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>Washington Forest Practices Act Amendments</td>
<td>1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oregon Forest Practices Act</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oregon Land Use Act</td>
<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oregon Endangered Species Act</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>Oregon Forest Practices Act Amendments (threatened and endangered species)</td>
<td>1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oregon Forest Practices Act Amendments</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Leg=Legislation; Reg=Regulations; D=Discretionary; ND=Non-discretionary; FS= Forest Service; BLM = Bureau of Land Management; NPS = National Park Service*
## APPENDIX 2.1: BC ECO-FOREST STATUTES, 1960-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGISLATION</th>
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<th>MEANS</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
<td><strong>Leg</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Clean Water Act</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries Act (Amendments)</td>
<td>1970</td>
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### FEDERAL LEGISLATION

### PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION

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<td>Park Act</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment and Land Use Act</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Reserves Act</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forest Act</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Forests Act</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Environment Act</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park Act Amendments</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife Act (S. 5 &amp; 6)</td>
<td>1980</td>
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<td>Forest Act Wilderness Amendment</td>
<td>1987</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forest Act Reforestation Amdmnt</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commission on Resources and the Environment Act</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Renewal Act</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forest Land Reserve Act</td>
<td>1993</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leg=Legislation; Reg=Regulations; D=Discretionary; ND=Non-discretionary; FS = BC Forest Service; PS = BC Park Service.
Endnotes

1 A statutory regime is at once less and more than the “regulatory regime” concept that Eisner (1993), Hoberg (1992) and others have used to describe different eras in US policy making. It is less in that the structure of a statutory regime only influences, but does not always determine, the nature of a jurisdiction’s regulatory regime. The influence of a statutory framework on regime development is disputed. Hoberg argues that the US legalistic structure resulted in a change from a business-dominated environmental regulatory regime, to a one in which environmental interests had equal influence. He asserts that this statutory framework meant that pro-business interests had little success in the 1980s when they tried to change to a more business-dominated regulatory regime. On the other hand, Eisner finds evidence that the regulatory regime did change in the early 1980s, from one controlled by environmental interests to one more dominated by business groups. For our discussion the statutory regime is treated as an independent variable whose influence on policy and regulatory change is to be explored.

A statutory regime is more than the notion of a regulatory regime because it deals with policy choices that are not limited to a discussion of regulations. This is important for this study, since eco-forest policy is as much about removing forest land from the extractive land base (forest protection), as it is about devising regulatory rules on how to conduct eco-sensitive logging (forest practices).

2 This chapter addresses only those planning and procedural requirements that have statutory backing. Future chapters address the effects of non-statutory planning requirements insofar as they influence the development of policy communities and networks.

3 Federal US agencies’ failure to follow the requirements of the statutory regime is often not due to any deliberate attempt to break the law. Instead, it often results because land management agency officials feel pulled in different directions by what they perceive are conflicting requirements of the statutory regime.

4 The Forest Service Organic Act of 1891 is also important for the direction it gives to the US Forest Service in managing national forest lands. In particular, the Organic Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate rules and regulations that protect national forests (then called forest reserves) “from depredations and harmful uses” and to “preserve the forests from destruction” (Forest Service Organic Act of June 7, 1897, Ch 2, (30 Stat. 11)).

5 See Twigt and Lyden. (1998), and Cubbage, O’Laughlin and Bullock (1993: 331). The only major interest group not to support the MUSYA was the Sierra Club, who “objected to the lack of specific management standards” (ibid: 332).


7 See United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment (1992: Chapter 4 The Legal Framework for Forest Planning and Management). For federal lands in Washington, the wilderness designation process culminated in the Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984 in which Congress attempted to systematically address the land use conflict by increasing the number of wilderness areas.

8 As Vogel (1993: 256) notes, in some circumstances, environmental groups were given statutory authority to sue private companies that were in non-compliance. In addition, the judiciary itself relaxed the judicial doctrines of “standing, reviewability and ripeness” in the early 1970s, further encouraging environmental group litigation (see Hoberg 1992: 210-211).


10 In order to conform with NEPA, the Forest Service rules also require that each EIS process involve the natural, social sciences, and environmental design arts approaches (Cubbage, O’Laughlin, and Bullock 1993: 332).

11 The official legislative title is the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.

12 A significant amendment was also made to the Clean Water Act in 1987, “requiring States to develop standards for regulating non point sources of pollution,” which would include timber harvesting practices. Not only do agency planning documents have to comply with these regulations, but so do the actual forest practices resulting from these plans.
A report for the US Office of Technology Assessment (1992: 72) notes that:

Because of the programmatic and strategic nature of forest planning, it is virtually impossible to determine in advance whether particular management activities under the plan will lead to a finding of jeopardy or adverse modification. Thus, the section 7 consultation process is an ongoing one. To the extent that national forest plans and activities conflict with ESA's requirements, amendments and/or revisions to the plans may be necessary.

Private land owners are not always required to stop actions that might harm a listed species. Instead, the ESA allows private land owners to develop a "habitat conservation plan" (HCP) that the Secretary of Interior considers for approval. The HCP must include a list of possible impacts of an action (e.g. logging), steps to be taken to limit detrimental effects, and a justification for the plan over other possible options (Smith, Moote and Schwaebke 1993: 1039). If approved, an "incidental take permit" is issued for a project. Also, a "4(d)" rule can be developed by the Fish and Wildlife Service to relieve designated private land owners from "incidental take" requirements, where such measures "are no longer deemed necessary or advisable for conserving the" threatened or endangered species (Tuchmann et al. 1996: 131).

Regulations under the Act define "taking" of a species to include harming its habitat. These rules were struck down in 1994 by a Washington, DC judge in the Sweet Homes court case who ruled that this definition was ultra vires. See Haddock (1995: 43). However, the Supreme Court overturned this ruling, which would have had the effect of having the Endangered Species Act apply only to private lands where the actions of a private land owner directly resulted in a species being threatened or endangered (see Associated Press 1995; Washington Post and New York Times News Service 1995).


As the lead land use agency, the Forest Service is required to provide an assessment, including an inventory of all private and public resources, every 10 years; and to offer a program proposing resource goals every five years. Using this information, the Forest Service must offer different options about how to meet the nation's forest resource requirements, and benefits and drawback of each (Cubbage, O'Laughlin, and Bullock 1993: 333). This Act also requires the President to issue every five years a "statement of policy" used in framing budget requests. See United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment (1990). For a detailed description of long-range planning, see United States. USDA Forest Service (1990), Lyden (1990), Behan (1990), Mohai (1987), Blahna (1989).

Lyden, Twight and Tuchmann (1990) have found the national public input requirements of the RPA have not satisfied those involved. They argue that, "The differing expectations and values of both the agency members and the participant groups suggest that resource planning is not seen as a neutral process" (ibid: 123).

Provisions of the 1997 Organic Act were also used in similar litigation over logging in Montana's Bitterroot National Forest and Alaska's Tongass National Forest.

Technically, the NFMA is an amendment to the RPA.

This would have a significant influence on the nature and direction of future environmental work. Local chapters of the Sierra Club in the Pacific Northwest, for example, devote almost all their time to reviewing and opposing plans for specific National Forests.

Section 1604(g)(3)(B). All future quotes are from this section.

These include requirements that harvesting only take place where watersheds, soil and slope would not be "irreversibly damaged"; that harvesting is only allowed where lands can be "adequately restocked within 5 years"; and where streams and other water areas can be protected. An area chosen for harvesting cannot be based solely on its profit value. Clearcutting size limits must be promulgated and clearcutting is limited to areas where it is deemed to be the "optimum method" of harvesting.

Section 6(d), for example, requires public participation, "in the development, review, and revision" of forest plans. United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment (1992: 80).
23 These public participation regulations were promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1979 and detail the "intent of public participation." Section 219.7(a) requires the Forest Service to:

(1) ensure that the Forest Service understands the needs and concerns of the public;
(2) inform the public of Forest Service land and resource planning activities;
(3) provide the public with an understanding of Forest Service programs and proposed actions;
(4) broaden the information base upon which land and resource management planning decisions are made; and
(5) demonstrate that public issues and inputs are considered and evaluated in reaching planning decisions.

Section 219.7(e) of the regulations state, that information from the public will be incorporated "to the extent practicable".

Indicative of the easier ability to change regulations than legislation, the 1982 Reagan Task Force on Regulatory reform recommended that virtually all of the regulations under Section 219.7 be modified or deleted. After strong public protest, most regulations were kept but section 219.7(a)(3) and 219.7(e) were eliminated, reducing the Forest Service's requirement to reflect public views (Shannon 1992).


The NFMA itself has no specific provision for judicial review of forest plans, which means Land and Resource Management Plans are subject to litigation under the Administrative Procedures Act (United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment 1992: 63). This Act states that every "authority of the Government of the United States" is open to judicial review and decisions may be reversed if, as reviewed by Haddock (1986: 9), they are found to be:

a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,
b) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity,
c) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory rights,
d) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of any agency hearing provided by statute,
e) without observance of procedure required by law, or
f) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the acts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.

25 The NFMA by itself would not meet this description as many of its requirements are discretionary and based in its regulations. Supporting an approach that transcends an examination of a single piece of legislation, the Forest Service has argued that:

Public land management is complicated by a long series of laws and regulations enacted over many years...Thus, the controversy which often has surrounded forest planning must be viewed in light of the many requirements imposed by statutory and regulatory requirements other than the National Forest Management Act (e.g., the National Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, Clean Water Act...) It is often the interaction of these other laws and regulations that has increased the controversy surrounding forest planning and land use (Federal Register, April 13, 1995. From Internet gopher: essential.org) (italics added).

26 Much of the existing literature argues this legal environment has resulted in uncontrolled litigation. See, for example, Wondolleck (1988), Brizee (1975), Buckle (1986), Bingham (1986; 1981), Cutler (1972), Mernitz (1980), Sheehan (1990), Hungerford (1994). However, only 11 of about 500 forest plan appeals and only 32 of 525,000 timber sales were litigated (United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment 1992: 73). Yet, the power derived from these laws is not measured in litigation statistics alone, but in the ability of environmental groups to gain entry into eco-forest policy networks by threatening legal action.


Since the 'Specific' ORovand inspections occur "before, during, and after completion" (Cubbage and Ellefson 1980: 466) by the Department of Natural Resources.

Rowland argues that "[s]ince its inception, the Board repeatedly has failed to adopt adequate rules to protect our resources" (Rowland 1994).

Specific requirements vary according to a four tiered classification system. Some forest practice operations require that inspections occur "before, during, and after completion" (Cubbage and Ellefson 1980: 466) by the Department of Natural Resources.

Since 1980, landowners can appeal enforcement to a Forest Practices Appeal Board.

RCW 77.12.020
"A Multiple Use Act requires the Department of Natural Resources to practice multiple resource use and sustained yield management on Washington State-owned (M'Gonigle et al. 1990: 39).

The Canada Water Act enacted in 1970 has had little applicability to BC since water remains de facto and arguably de jure, a matter of provincial jurisdiction. Whatever the legal position, and unlike the US experience, the Canadian federal government usually retreated from possible incursion into areas of provincial responsibility (Fylyk and Cote 1992: 76). Similarly, Haddock (1995: 21) points out that regulations under the federal Migratory Birds Convention Act "prohibit disturbing, destroying or taking a nest or egg of a migratory bird" but these provisions "have never been enforced by the federal government in relation to logging activities.

Personal interview, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Ottawa. See also Vanderzwaag (1992: 15). Sourcing Dorsey (1980), Hoberg explains that "The Fish and Wildlife Branch of the Ministry of Environment has been given responsibility for the protection of non-anadromous fisheries, selected anadromous fisheries, and the enforcement of the Federal Fisheries Act in these waters.

Personal interview, DFO. See also Fisheries and Oceans Canada (1986a; 1986b).

Environment and Land Use Act, section 3(b).

Personal interviews, BC Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks, BC Ministry of Forests and former officials from the ELUC secretariat.

As of 1989, only .1 per cent of BC's Crown land had been protected using this Act (Duffy 1990: 51).

Section 5 permits the designation of "special critical wildlife areas to protect endangered and threatened species", but this provision this has never been invoked (Sandborn 1990: 62).

Section 4 (c).

The first report was produced in 1984 and contained an overview of land, timber, range and recreation resources, current management programs for these resources, an analysis of future trends and implications of this for resource management (British Columbia. Ministry of Forests 1984).

The Pearse Commission was created largely because of concerns of concentration in industry and resource rent collection (Wilson 1987-88).

Marchak (1983: 80) notes that although "... the Pearse Commission was established by the NDP government, the Forest Act that emerged from it under the Social Credit government provided for even greater concentration of forest holdings".

From 1987, three other amendments were made to the Forest Act. One involved changing the way stumpage was calculated, moving from a Residual Value System to a Comparative Value Pricing System (British Columbia. Forest Resources Commission 1990: 17).

This amendments arose out of the Softwood Lumber Countervail Dispute in which the United States Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports agreed to allow BC to drop a 15 per cent export tax on softwood lumber in exchange for imposing this new methods of collecting resource rents.

The second amendment made holders of TFLs and Forest Licences responsible for their own reforestation costs (British Columbia. Forest Resources Commission 1990: 17) and the third saw 5 per cent of the Annual Allowable Cut taken from TFL and Forest Licenses within a TSA and given to the Small Business Forest Enterprise Program.
SECTION II
CHAPTER THREE
THE CHANGING NATURE OF FEDERAL LANDS PACIFIC NORTHWEST ECO-FOREST
POLICY COMMUNITIES: 1965-1995

PREFACE: POLICY COMMUNITIES AND POLICY NETWORKS

Section II gives empirical flesh to the related but distinct concepts of policy communities and policy networks in the jurisdictions under study. The policy community chapters are about understanding the societal and governmental interests active in the policy domain. We are interested in how they formed, their internal organizational structure, the types of resources they enjoy, and the reason for their interest in policy community affairs. In order to map changes over time, the policy community chapters use Coleman and Skogstad's (1990a) model which places groups according to whether they belong to the "sub-government" (where policy is made) or "attentive public" (interests that are involved from time to time). The sub-government is further distinguished between those groups that act as "policy participants" and those that tend to lobby the government as "policy advocates", but are not usually involved in decision-making circles.¹

Policy networks refer to the nature of exchange, or the relationship between the state and organized societal interests within a given issue. Here, the goal is to understand whether this relationship is closed or open, whether a number of societal groups are involved, or whether a single governmental agency and organized interest dominate. We also want to know what types of state and societal interests dominate, and whether these have changed historically. To facilitate comparison, the network chapters refer frequently to Coleman and Skogstad's policy network model.
Table 3.0: Groupings of Policy Networks

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<td>parentela pluralism</td>
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</table>

From: Coleman and Skogstad (1990b: 27)

Coleman and Skogstad identify six policy network "ideal types" involving three families: pluralist; closed, and state-directed (Coleman and Skogstad 1990a: 27). Pluralism is defined as "a mode of group-state relations where groups approach the state independently, often competing for the ear of the state" (ibid). If the groups "assume primarily a policy advocacy role and state agencies remain autonomous", the network is referred to as pressure pluralism. Conversely, when groups are policy participants and state agencies have little autonomy from one or more organized interests, the network is clientele pluralism. Coleman and Skogstad also identify a third, but quite rare pluralist relationship, parentela pluralism - "when organized interests gain a dominant place within a governing political party that, in turn, has members in prominent bureaucratic positions."

The second major family for Coleman and Skogstad are "closed" policy networks in which "state decision-making capacity is concentrated and well-coordinated, normally through the offices of a single agency that has persisted from some time" and organized interest(s) participate in the formulation or implementation of policy. The first type of closed network is a corporatist network, in which "two or more organized interests representing conflicting producer or consumer groups participate with the state in the formulation and implementation of policy" (ibid: 29). Coleman and Skogstad note that corporatist arrangements are distinguished from clientele pluralism by "[b]oth the multilateral character of the network and the stronger position of the state."²
The second "closed" network is **concertation**, defined as a network in which "a single association represents a sector and participates with a corresponding state agency in the formulation and implementation of policy" (ibid: 28). As they describe:

The state agency has considerable capacity in its own right, being autonomous and able to concentrate power for coordinated decision-making. Sectoral interests match the state's strength by drawing on an inclusive, hierarchical associational system capable of engaging in longer term policy deliberations while maintaining member support (ibid).

The final family is termed "state directed" policy networks in which "state officials dominate policy-making and are able to impose their solutions, often without even consulting organized interests", which are often, but not always, at a low level of organizational development (ibid: 29).

**INTRODUCTION: CHANGES TO THE FEDERAL LANDS PNW FOREST POLICY COMMUNITY**

The forest policy community concerning Pacific Northwest federal lands underwent two key transformations in the last thirty years. The first was marked by explosive growth in the number of citizens belonging to environmental groups, culminating with the emergence of professional and litigious groups in the early 1970s. The second began with an expansion in the number, policy orientation and membership of environmental groups in the mid-1980s, followed in the early 1990s by an increased role of US regulatory agencies in the sub-government (Diagrams 3.0 and 3.1 visually present these relationships). This chapter outlines these changes, and then examines the ability of the three historical institutionalist hypotheses to account for them.

The involvement of groups and organisations in the PNW forest policy community partly depends on whether the issue has a national or regional focus. With respect to the former, national groups tend to take the lead, while PNW based groups typically seek influence through any existing national affiliate. In the latter case, the regional groups usually take the lead within the sub-government, acting as both policy advocates and policy participants. In this case, national groups
are usually only involved as members of the "attentive public", unless a particular issue vaults PNW federal forest land policy into the national spotlight.

I. THE FIRST TRANSFORMATION: 1965-1975

Environmental Groups

The growth of environmental groups in the federal PNW forest policy community during the first transformation manifested itself in two ways: an expansion of membership and budgets of existing forest conservation organisations, and the creation of new groups. These were followed by the creation of litigation-oriented environmental groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many of these groups became active members of the sub-government, as both policy advocates and policy participants.

At the national level, the existence of established forest conservation groups before 1960 was an important factor in understanding the development of the policy community during the first wave of environmentalism. Previous studies have noted the long tradition of the conservation/preservation movement in American politics, beginning with the creation of the Sierra Club in 1892. Mitchell, Mertig, and Dunlap (1992: 112) argue that two historical "conservation movements" took place in the United States. The first pre-World War II movement saw the creation of the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, and the National Parks and Conservation Association. The second conservation movement occurred between the two World Wars and saw the creation of the Wilderness Society, the Izaak Walton League and the National Wildlife Federation, the latter two founded by sports hunters interested in preserving wildlife. The Defenders of Wildlife was created just after the second conservation movement, in 1947.

Mitchell, Mertig, and Dunlap distinguish these two conservation movements from the new "environmental movement" beginning in the mid-1960s. The difference is that the conservation movement had a concern with "particular areas or species", while the latter movement was a more
holistic "ecological perspective" that involved "consequences that are often delayed or subtle; and their causes are typically difficult to prove" (Mitchell, Mertig, and Dunlap 1992: 14). The existence of these conservation groups meant that in most cases, rather than new groups being established, traditional groups saw changes in their membership base, policy orientation, and place in the policy community.

As existing groups moved from being conservation-oriented to environmentally-focused, they became more professional, highly skilled, and, perhaps inevitably, more bureaucratic. These groups also developed niche expertise. For example, the Wilderness Society devoted itself to scientific and economic analyses. Such policy expertise, Mitchell, Mertig, and Dunlap note, provides a "counter science" capability (ibid: 22). These groups were able to interact with each other effectively to form strategic alliances around specific initiatives. Interaction was also aided by the existence of the Natural Resources Council of America, a group that brought together environmental, research and professional organisations to exchange information and ideas.

The other part of this story is the establishment of litigious environmental groups, which comprise the Environmental Defence Fund (EDF) created in 1967, the Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC) created in 1970, and the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (SCLDF) established in 1971. The EDF, NRDC, and SCLDF were joined by Defenders of Wildlife, which adopted a litigious approach to its environmental advocacy. With the exception of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, whose sole purpose is to litigate, these groups also act as policy participants in the forest policy community, advising on policy changes at both the congressional and executive levels. The Natural Resources Defence Council and the Sierra Legal Defense Fund became the two leading US groups in the federal forest policy community. Defenders of Wildlife is also an important organisation, but has fewer financial resources. The EDF has chosen to be a member of the "attentive public", limiting its involvement to changes regarding the Endangered Species Act.
These national changes were matched at the regional level. In fact, a large number of the regional groups have ties to the main national groups. The National Audubon Society and Sierra Club have numerous local chapters spread throughout Oregon and Washington (although National Audubon Society chapters are fairly independent of the national office\(^1\)) which form an important link between the regional and local levels. Such groups include the Audubon Society of Portland, the Seattle Audubon Society, Pilchuk Audubon, Kalmiopis Audubon, Lane Country Audubon and the Oregon Chapter of the Sierra Club. In addition, the Wilderness Society, the National Wildlife Federation, the Sierra Club, and the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund have all established regional offices in the PNW.

Other groups in the PNW have no direct links to national groups, such as the Oregon Natural Resources Council (ONRC) established in 1971 and Headwaters, a southern Oregon focused group that has developed a regional profile. The ONRC has both individual and group membership. Developing both scientific\(^13\) and in-house legal expertise, it has earned the reputation among government and industry officials as “uncompromising”\(^14\), and its official policy is not to enter into dispute resolution processes.\(^15\) Both of these groups focus on management of Forest Service and BLM federal lands, with little interest or influence in State forest policy communities.

**Industry Organisations**

As with environmental groups, different industry associations have developed concerning federal and State level issues. Individual forest companies often belong to both associations, but the organisations vary significantly on their policy orientation and influence. At the federal level, the key industry organisations were split among the lumber-oriented National Forest Products Association (NFPA), the pulp and paper-oriented American Paper Institute (API), and the trade-oriented American Forest Council (AFC).\(^16\) A similar split occurred at the regional level, where federal forest lands-focused groups included the Industrial Forestry Association, representing companies West of
the Cascades and the Northwest Pine Association, representing manufacturers in Washington and Oregon.\(^7\) The functional divisions have created a less integrated associational system than in British Columbia.\(^8\) There is also a distinction in the federal PNW between large-industrial and small, usually non-industrial land owners (Leman 1988b: 158-62). Large-industrial organizations are effective lobbyists, forming the coalitions noted above and in Chapter Five. Small land owners are less effectively organized, lacking "the financing and the technical forestry and business skills that long-term efforts require" (ibid: 159).

**Labour**

Forest unions are usually members of the attentive public, especially concerning sustainable forestry matters. There is no dominant union, but the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, the Western Council of Industrial Workers, the Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, the International Woodworkers of America and the United Paperworkers International Union all have members in the Pacific Northwest.

**Other Organisations**

There are a number of other research and professional organisations that comprise policy community members. Research organisations tend to be actively involved in preparing analyses and conducting important studies, but are usually not directly involved in policy making. These groups include American Forests,\(^9\) founded over 100 years ago (formerly called the American Forestry Association), the World Resources Institute,\(^10\) and the Society of American Foresters, which publishes the highly respected *Journal of Forestry*.\(^11\) The Society of American Foresters is also important for injecting the voice of professional foresters in regional matters through their Oregon and Washington State offices.\(^22\) The Pacific Coast Federation of Fisherman's Association is also important with respect to stream side forest practices issues.\(^23\)
Government agencies

Reflecting both the US federal macro-institutional structure and its statutory regime, government organisations crowd the forest policy community. The White House, other executive offices, Congress and the judiciary are all in the sub-government, as are numerous House and Senate Sub-Committees with oversight responsibilities, House and Senate Appropriations Committees and the offices of individual Members of Congress.\(^{24}\) Government management agencies comprise the US Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the National Park Service, while regulatory agencies include the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the US National Marine Fisheries Service (the Environmental Protection Agency has only limited influence in the forest policy community). During the 1960s and 1970s, management agencies were clearly policy participants, while regulatory agencies tended to act more as policy advocates.

II. THE SECOND TRANSFORMATION: 1985-1995

The second transformation was marked by an increase in the number of environmental groups and environmental coalitions, and by a greater role for US regulatory agencies. In response, industry consolidated its associational structures in order to speak more cohesively on environmental issues, and formed linkages with organized labour. Diagram 3.1 presents the new constellation of policy community actors as of 1995.
Chart 3.0: Selected Major Eco-Forest Groups
U.S. Federal Sphere

Source: Mitchell et al. (1992); Selected Annual Reports

Chart 3.1: Selected Major Eco-Forest Groups
U.S. Federal Sphere

Source: Hendee and Pitstick (1994); Selected Annual Reports
Chart 3.2: Litigation Oriented Eco-Forest Groups
U.S. Federal Sphere

Source: Hendee and Pittsick (1994); Selected Annual Reports

Chart 3.3: Litigation Oriented Eco-Forest Groups
U.S. Federal Sphere

Source: Mitchell et al. (1992); Selected Annual Reports
Eco-forest Groups

An increase in membership, the emergence of new alliances, and the creation of new groups altered the influence of environmental groups in the PNW federal forest policy community in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The new groups are distinguished between “mainstream” groups, largely supported through foundation funding, and more radical “zero cut” groups that rely heavily on membership for funding, and have difficulty attracting foundation support. In addition, the sub-government expanded to include groups that historically tended to be involved as members of the attentive public.

During this “second wave of environmentalism”, the National Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation, the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society all witnessed an explosion of membership, reaching a total combined membership of 1,693,000 in 1983, to 2,740,000 in 1994 (Chart 3.0). This increase helped give the groups greater financial resources (Chart 3.1) and the capacity to develop “alternative” expertise and increased specialization.

The four national litigious groups also saw membership (Chart 3.2) and budget expansion (Chart 3.3). The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund’s membership grew from a few thousand members in 1971, to 120,000 in 1990, and to 150,000 in 1994. Its budget rose from $670,000 in 1990, to $1.5 million in 1994. NRDC’s membership has followed a similar path, moving from 48,000 in 1983, and to 170,000 in 1994. With significant foundation funding, its current budget is over $20 million.

The creation of four new alliances during the second wave of environmentalism stands out. First, the Western Ancient Forest Campaign (WAFC) was created in 1991 to “disseminate information between grassroots conservation organisations [in the PNW] and national environmental groups”. Second, the Northwest Ancient Forest Alliance was established to focus on old growth preservation issues. Third, the National Forest Protection Campaign was created in 1994, largely arising out of, and focusing on, Pacific Northwest eco-forest struggles, but it does have a national mandate. Fourth, the Forest Watch Network was formed at the regional level in 1994 to coordinate
forest protection efforts. Other relevant coalitions include the Endangered Species Coalition created to coordinate efforts for the Endangered Species Act reauthorization and the Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Alliance.

These new alliances coincided with both an expansion of the policy community to include groups that historically were members of the attentive public, and the establishment of new groups. At the national level, American Rivers became an important player because of its expertise on salmon issues, while Trout Unlimited's expertise on the Clean Water Act increased its importance in the forest policy community. At the regional level new "specialized" groups were formed. Founded in 1987, the Pacific Rivers Council steadily increased its influence in the federal PNW forest policy community, developing an expertise on salmon and other fish species. This expertise allowed the Pacific Rivers Council to obtain significant influence as a policy participant in the forest policy community. The vast share of the Pacific Rivers Council's funding comes from foundation grants, although it does have a membership base. Other new groups include the Associations of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (AFSEE) - an organisation formed in 1991 which by late 1994 had 1,000 Forest Service employees members and an additional 8,000-10,000 public supporters. It is devoted entirely to better management of US Forest Service Lands, and recently spawned a wider coalition, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility. Similarly, the Public Forestry Foundation, which was created in the late 1980s, is a coalition of foresters, resource professionals, and citizens whose purpose is to "monitor the Pacific's public forests" by "seeking out good models of forest management and exposing bad forest practices".

At the same time, more radical groups were established that were frustrated with what they saw as compromises of existing major national eco-forest groups with respect to logging Pacific Northwest old growth forests. One such group is Save our Forests, a group claiming over 500 affiliate organisations, representing a combined membership of over 3 million. This group focuses solely on lobbying Congress for better legislative protection of remaining ancient forests and
wilderness areas on US federal lands. Greenpeace took advantage of this increased radicalism by consciously joining the federal forest policy community, and lobbying for the Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act.

Radical "zero cut" groups were also formed in the region, of which three stand out: the Native Forest Council, Save the West, and the Forest Conservation Council. All of them oppose any future cutting of old growth forests on PNW federal lands. Aside from litigation, the only other area in which these groups are actively involved in the forest policy community is the Congressional arena, proposing and lobbying for legislation that would permanently remove all federal PNW old growth areas from timber extraction.

Some new groups are not membership-based at all, but rely almost completely on foundations for funding. One such group is Northwest Environment Watch, created by employees from the Washington, DC-based Worldwatch Institute. Its mission is "to foster a sustainable economy and way of life in the Pacific Northwest" by monitoring key indicators. Equally significant is the 1991 formation of Eco-trust by former employees of Conservation International. Eco-trust is perhaps the only group that has consciously chosen not to be influenced by the incentives and structures of the US legalistic statutory regime. It has chosen to focus on preserving ecosystems and watersheds in the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia through working with the communities that will be affected by their goals. First, it chooses a broad area it wishes to protect, and then it attempts to facilitate a community-based resolution to the issue. Usually only after this point does it approach state officials for assistance in a potential resolution. By rejecting the litigation incentives of the US statutory regime, Eco-trust appears to have been influenced by whether the land it seeks to protect is government or privately owned. While this holistic approach is comprehensive, its project-by-project orientation and focus on particular areas tend to preclude Eco-trust from becoming an ongoing member as a sub-government policy participant. Its approach works well at preserving
certain protected areas, but appears to do less well at being involved in developing sustainable forest practice regulations.

**Forest companies**

The organisational structure of US industry interests changed in order to respond more cohesively to environmental concerns. The National Forest Products Association (NFPA), the American Paper Institute (API), and the American Forest Council (AFC) merged into a single industry association, the American Forest and Paper Association (AFPA). The AFPA was formed, according to the industry, to give "the nation's forest and paper industries a stronger, more effective voice to address major business and public policy issues". In fact, the merger was largely an attempt by the forest industry to improve its public relations image on forest issues, and to take a more proactive role in responding to the increased public concern over the forest industry and the environment. As an AFPA (1993) brochure explained, the creation of AFPA "...symbolizes industry's growing resolve to respond affirmatively to public demands for environmental commitment". One of the first actions on the part of the new AFPA was "spearheading an industry effort to establish environmental principles for forest management, recycling and eventual reuse of paper and paper board products". In May 1994, the AFPA adopted a definition of "Sustainable Forestry" and a list of "Principles for Sustainable Forestry". This shift in tactics has been matched by AFPA's attraction to consensus-oriented disputes at the local level.

The American Forest Resource Alliance was also created - a "coalition of concerned builders, retailers, and workers" with the objective of taking "legal action to protect property rights" to "support legislation providing a stable timber supply from public lands while protecting environmental values", and to "tell the story about wise stewardship and the role of wood products in the national economy". Intended as a two year project, its remaining functions were placed with the National Forest Products Association.
The two regional trade associations focused on federal PNW lands also merged to form the Northwest Forestry Association in 1986. This was done so that the industry could "speak as a central voice" on federal forest policy matters and to avoid land management agencies "playing one group off over the other." In addition, the Northwest Forest Resources Council was created in 1987 - as an association of virtually all the forest industry organisations in the Pacific Northwest. The Council's purpose is to focus on timber supply issues. It has recently led litigation efforts to force the Forest Service to increase timber sales.\textsuperscript{52}

Labour

Eco-forest policy was not a primary focus of most key US unions, including the International Woodworkers of America (IWA - US) and the Western Council of Industrial Workers (WC IW). After suffering through the downsizing of the early 1980s and in "disarray" during the mid-1980s, US organized labour interests were unable to forge a "third path" on environmental issues, particularly during the timber reduction/job loss/Spotted Owl crisis beginning in the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{53} The result was that US unions allied themselves much more closely with industry during this time than did BC unions with BC industry.\textsuperscript{54}

Indeed, industry formed an alliance with organized labour in its efforts to respond to increasing environmental pressures. The strongest linkages were developed with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, the Western Council of Industrial Workers and the International Woodworkers of America. Also involved in these efforts from time to time were the United Paperworkers International Union, the Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers and the national AFL-CIO. These efforts culminated in the establishment of the Forest Products Industry National Labor Management Committee (LMC) as a "coalition representing the shared policy interests of labor unions and management in the forest products industry", working to ensure that
public policy decisions affecting "timber supply balance environmental concerns with economic realities".  

Other Groups

The role of research/policy-oriented groups within the federal forest policy community did not change significantly after the second wave of environmentalism. However, research strategies were adapted to specifically address concepts such as ecosystem management and biodiversity.

Government Agencies

The creation of new government agencies actively involved in the forest policy community was limited to two new offices within the White House: the White House Office of Environmental Policy, and the establishment of a White House office in Portland, Oregon, called the White House Office of Forestry and Economic Development. New inter-agency processes were created to increase interaction between the key administrative agencies comprising the Bureau of Land Management, the Forest Service, the National Park Service, and the key regulatory agencies, comprising the US Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service. During this time, regulatory agencies became central sub-government players. Finally, new citizen advisory committees at the regional, landscape and watershed levels were also established.
EXPLAINING CHANGES

The most obvious and direct influence behind the two key policy community changes was an increased concern within civil society about the environment. These changes in values during the first wave of environmentalism explain the increases in membership of environmental groups, and the growth of budgets, policy expertise and professional staff. Increased societal interest about the environment during the second wave of environmentalism also explains a noticeable increase in environmental group membership in the 1980s. It also explains why industry took the strategic decision to consolidate its associational system in order to better respond to environmental pressures.

However, these societal factors tell us little about the shape and direction of policy community change. For an answer to these questions, the three historical institutionalist hypotheses have much to offer. The evidence indicates that the US macro-institutional structure, the fact that national forests are publicly owned, and especially the statutory regime, mediated this growth and largely determined the policy goals environmental interests would pursue.

During both transformations, the macro-institutional structure played a subtle role - affording environmental groups numerous points of access, providing an immediate incentive to participation in the policy community. Public-ownership of federal lands provided for a greater degree of policy choice, once again encouraging environmental group participation. However, the key factor in structuring the nature of policy community change was the emergence of the legalistic statutory regime. Its effects were direct in the case of the first transformation, while court rulings based on this regime shaped the development of the second alteration.

Two key aspects of the statutory regime stand out. The first is that the non-discretionary contents of the statutory regime and its litigation opportunities allowed environmental groups not simply the ability to litigate, but to threaten litigation. The second is the statutory regime's detailed procedural and planning requirements, most of which dictate clear rules about public involvement.
These two characteristics permitted groups access to the forest policy community, which necessarily forced them to develop a high level of expertise for effective interaction with bureaucratic officials and other members of the policy community.

The Legalistic Statutory Regime and the Development of the Eco-Forest Policy Community

The most obvious and direct result of the development of the legalistic statutory regime on policy community development was the creation of litigation-oriented environmental groups. These groups would have had no reason to organize without a legalistic statutory framework. This legalistic regime also caused environmental groups to develop scientific and technical expertise. The reason was that in order to participate in litigation, environmental groups needed to employ scientists and policy officials who would be able to identify policy choices that contravened statutory requirements. The legalistic statutory regime also increased the role of environmental groups in the policy community, simply because agencies feared they would litigate. This created another need for policy expertise in order to participate effectively with administrative and regulatory agencies. The main reason groups emerged with highly scientific, socio-economic, and litigious expertise was because of the non-discretionary/legalistic statutory regime.

At the regional level, the public participation requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the planning requirements of the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) meant that local environmental groups now had the legal right to comment and offer advice on individual National Forest plans - from five year development plans to individual cutting permits. This explains the growth of numerous environmental groups that focus their management decisions on individual National Forests and BLM Forest Districts. Without the non-discretionary requirements of the statutory regime, there would have been little incentive for these local groups to focus on the management of individual local forest areas.
The Legalistic Regime and the Second Transformation of Policy Community Change

Whereas the first policy community transformation was directly influenced by the statutory regime itself, the second transformation was caused by court rulings, the consequences of which were largely unforeseen and unintended by US legislators. The story of these court rulings for the PNW centres on the Northern Spotted Owl controversy. This dispute is far more than a case study of the consequences of a litigious statutory regime: the owl litigation largely explains the nature of policy community change noted above, and policy network and output change outlined in the next chapter. The following reviews the Spotted Owl controversy, and then details how this litigation influenced the second transformation of policy community change in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The Influence of the Northern Spotted Owl

The genesis of the Northern Spotted Owl conflict occurred in the late 1970s, when scientific research showed that the survival of the owl depended on old growth forests - which make up less than 10 per cent of Pacific Northwest forests (Yaffee 1994: 14). After the Forest Service failed to take action to protect Spotted Owl habitat, the Seattle and Portland Audubon Societies launched litigation in the early 1980s, arguing that existing land management agency policies concerning the Northern Spotted Owl failed to live up to the non-discretionary requirements of the Endangered Species Act, The National Environmental Policy Act, and National Forest Management Act. The heart of their litigation was an attempt to force the Fish and Wildlife Service to list the Northern Spotted Owl as threatened. The litigation eventually forced the listing of the Northern Spotted Owl as endangered, and led to a number of agency and inter-agency attempts to devise a recovery plan. When it was clear that any plan to save the Northern Spotted Owl would result in a considerable loss of timber supply in the Pacific Northwest, Congress attempted to override temporarily the endangered species requirements of the federal statutory regime (Hoberg 1993b).
These Congressional efforts ultimately failed and the White House initiated a highly publicized "Forest Summit" in Portland, Oregon in April of 1993, at which environmental, industry, labour and other non-government organisations pleaded their cases before the President and members of his cabinet. The summit resulted in the establishment of the Forest Ecosystem Management Team (FEMAT), comprised mostly of government scientists. It was charged with presenting the Clinton Administration with different options for saving the Northern Spotted Owl, and was told to estimate each option's chances of achieving Spotted Owl recovery. In the end, the Administration chose "Option 9" which they believed would entail the least economic impact while staying within the law, therefore allowing for plausible species recovery.

Option 9, or the "President's Plan", reduces most harvesting of federal old growth forest lands in the PNW and adds to existing intra-agency planning processes another layer of interagency ecosystem management processes. Such a plan was supported by the rulings of Judge Dwyer in 1994 when he upheld Option 9. Dwyer ruled that in order to comply with the substantive non-discretionary requirements of the Endangered Species Act and the National Forest Management Act and "[g]iven the current condition of the forest, there is no way the agencies could comply with environmental laws without planning on an ecosystem basis. As US Forest Service Chief Jack Ward Thomas said:

One of the more interesting things that came out of [the FEMAT/Option 9 decision was the charge that Option 9 was illegal because] the law specified that these plans had to be done on a forest by forest and district by district basis. And that to use this more comprehensive process was illegal. ...Judge Dwyer said, "no"...it was essentially mandatory, there was no way we could meet all the legal requirements without going through a more coordinated planning operation that meets ecosystem standards.

Thomas argues that this ruling, "...may, in the end, be the most significant decision that came out of [the FEMAT/Spotted Owl issue]". The effects of the owl litigation transcend the Pacific Northwest.

The Forest Service recently noted:
...the Spotted Owl controversy in the Pacific Northwest has become a focal point for exploring ways to implement the principles of ecosystem management. In light of the experience in the Pacific Northwest and elsewhere, there is much interest in finding ways for Federal land management agencies to better incorporate the principles of ecosystem management when conducting resource planning and decision making activities.

The effects of the owl litigation on the second policy community transformation were overwhelming. It was the reason for the creation of all of the new forest alliances noted above, for the development of radical “zero-cut” groups, why fisheries and water-focused groups became members of the sub-government, why regulatory agencies became more influential in the sub-government, and why new interagency governmental organisations were added to the policy community.

The Northwest Ancient Forest Alliance was created after the Spotted Owl issue reached national prominence and was specifically designed to coordinate efforts among the various interested environmental groups on this issue. The Western Ancient Forest Campaign was created to facilitate the actions of grassroots organisation in the PNW over the owl issue with the efforts of those focusing on Congress and the White House. Indeed, the sole purpose of the Forest Watch Network is to have local groups monitor the implementation of Option 9 and ecosystem management. The owl litigation was even behind the NRDC’s decision to become involved in issues specific to PNW forest policy, including its role with an environmental coalition focusing on forest land east of the Cascades.

The existence and growth of the radical “zero-cut” groups is directly attributed to the Spotted Owl litigation. The Native Forest Council, Save the West, and the Forest Conservation Council all developed after national environmental groups began promoting what the “zero-cut” groups considered to be “compromises” regarding Spotted Owl preservation initiatives and harvesting on National Forest lands. However, even these groups’ activities were heavily influenced by the incentive structure of the legalistic statutory regime. Rather than opting out of the litigation process,
what distinguishes these radical groups is that they failed to join the main litigation effort to improve Option 9, instead choosing to file a more radical suit opposing the very spirit of Option 9.67

The emergence of water-focused groups in the forest policy community is also a direct result of the owl litigation, and Option 9’s focus on ecosystem management and biodiversity. Thus, American Rivers and the Pacific Rivers Council became important players because of their expertise on salmon issues and riparian matters, while Trout Unlimited’s expertise on the Clean Water Act increased its importance in the forest policy community.

The focus on ecosystem management and biodiversity also explains the increased role of regulatory agencies in the subgovernment. The changes in forest management networks noted in the next chapter were a result of Option 9, which entrenched regulatory agencies such as the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service into the forest policy community as policy participants.

Option 9 was responsible for new interagency processes and at least partly responsible for the internal reorganisation of the US Forest Service. The new regional inter-agency processes and new citizen advisory committees were created to oversee the implementation of Option 9. So, too, were Option 9’s creation of the new coordinating mechanisms and planning across landscapes, “provinces” and regions.68

Land ownership issues also affected the Owl politics in two ways. Since most PNW federal lands are part of the much larger National Forest System, national groups are often involved not because an issue is important just to the PNW, but because it is important to the whole country. Second, there is the potential for highly charged PNW issues such as the Spotted Owl to gain national attention because publicly-owned National Forests carry a special significance for all Americans. This may help to explain why so many national groups became involved in PNW issues following the owl litigation.
The number of national groups involved put pressure on the government not to exempt the Northern Spotted Owl from the non-discretionary requirements of the statutory regime. This is important. In the context of the Spotted Owl controversy, Hoberg (1993b) has argued that legislators from eastern US have little political capital to lose when supporting environmental measures that will reduce forest jobs and the forest economy in the Pacific Northwest. Recognizing this, American Forest Paper Association and Northwest Forest Product Association officials have expressed their desire to move resolution of the Spotted Owl issue back to the PNW and its Congressional delegation, and out of the national sphere. As one senior official said:

You need to have decisions made by people that are going to be held responsible for those decisions. It is very easy for members [of Congress] from back east to vote a certain way because they know it is not going to impact them or their constituents.69

At the same time, the institutional setting and policy legacies do not completely account for the shape and direction of the policy community transformations. In particular, the role of foundations, particularly during the second policy community transformation, was important. Foundations shaped and developed coalitions, affected the policy goals of environmental groups, and providing much needed resources. The statutory regime may have provided much of the institutional incentives, but foundations provided much of the needed resources.
CONCLUSION

The evidence shows that during the two waves of environmentalism, environmental group membership increased and societal concern about forest biodiversity heightened. However, the direction of policy community change is largely accounted for by the legalistic non-discretionary provisions of the statutory regime. The macro-institutional structure and public ownership of the resource facilitated these changes, since both of these factors allowed relatively quick access to the policy community. The federally-owned forest lands also contributed to increased national attention.

The change in the role of environmental groups and regulatory agencies in the policy community during the second transformation was not caused by proactive decision-making on the part of government, but rather by a government with limited policy options that was forced into a decision because of the legal requirements of the statutory regime. And many of the changes in the forest policy community - especially concerning the increased role of regulatory agencies in the sub-government - are explained by parallel changes being made in the policy networks.
Endnotes

1 Policy community membership was determined in this paper by conducting over 120 interviews in Washington DC, British Columbia, Oregon and Washington State with officials from key government, industry and environmental organizations. After a discussion on what was meant by forest policy, each respondent was asked to identify the government and non-government organizations active in forest policy on a "day to day" basis and from time to time.

2 Coleman and Skogstad agree that since these are ideal types, some networks will show characteristics of two or more of these categories.

3 This era was actually marked by two different philosophies and organizations. On the one hand, organizations oriented toward forest conservation include American Forests (formerly the American Forestry Association), the Society of American Foresters, and the US Forest Service under the tenure of Gifford Pinchot. On the other hand, organizations geared toward forest preservation include the Sierra Club, led and created by John Muir. For a more detailed discussion, see Dana and Fairfax (1980), and Pepperman and Taylor (1992). My thanks to Kent Robinson for explaining these two different philosophies.

4 The National Parks and Conservation Association limits its efforts to management issues concerning US national parks, and is therefore not a dominant player in the federal eco-forest policy community.

5 Rachel Carson's (1962) Silent Spring is seen as drawing attention to these "second generation" issues. There is a danger in overstating these differences. In the case of forest policy, the more "holistic" approach to broader environmental matters did not significantly affect environmental groups' immediate concerns. Wilderness areas and species preservation dominated the agenda during the 1960s. With the exception of clearcutting and the definition of "sustainable harvests", it was not until the mid-1980s and that more holistic concepts such as "ecosystem management" and "biodiversity" were championed by environmental groups.

6 See Mitchell, Mertig, and Dunlap (1992: 21, 24). These authors (ibid: 21-22) argue that:

   ...the earlier amateurism was rapidly transformed into professionalism by the early 1970s, a professionalism whose hallmark was the sizable cadre of lobbyists, lawyers, and scientists employed full-time by the national environmental organizations. Volunteer experts continue to be used, but now their efforts are coordinated for the most part by the staff experts.

   ...The result was a shift from an essentially amateur management to a professional form of advocacy characterized by paid staff, planning exercises, budgets, and financial control (emphasis added).

7 Drawing on the work of Mitchell (1979), Mitchell, Mertig and Dunlap (1992: 22) develop this "counter-science" point in the following way:

   The environmental organizations in the United States, particularly the environmental law organizations (EDF and NRDC), have succeeded in institutionalizing a "counter-science" capability. They have access to sufficient scientific and technological expertise and information so that they can evaluate the scientific basis for environmental policies and, if necessary, dispute the scientific and technical issues within the appropriate policy arenas. The use of science by environmentalists in cases such as these may be termed advocacy science.

8 Personal interview, Natural Resource Council of America, Washington, DC

9 Mitchell, Mertig and Dunlap (1992: 14) point out that the first two were heavily assisted by US Ford Foundation seed money.

10 Personal interview, Defenders of Wildlife, Washington, DC

11 Sierra Legal Defense Fund litigates on behalf of other environmental groups and citizens. It is also active in negotiating settlement agreements.

12 Personal interview, Portland Audubon Society.
See Belsky (1993), Oregon Natural Resources Council (1993a).

Personal interviews.

See Oregon Natural Resources Council (1993b).

Personal interview, American Forest and Paper Association. As an AFPA (1993) brochure explains:

[The establishment of] AFPA ... symbolizes industry's growing resolve to respond affirmatively to public demands for environmental commitment. The association is spearheading an industry effort to establish environmental principles for forest management, recycling and eventual reuse of paper and paper board products.

These principles are intended to meet public expectations for a healthy environment while also enabling US manufactures of forest and paper products to remain among the nation's globally competitive industries.

Personal interview, Northwest Forestry Association.

Forest companies that own large chunks of private land, such as Weyerhauser, often have quite different interests than those saw mill owners who rely on the federal government and private land owners for the source of their fibre.

See, for example, Sample (1993a; 1993b; 1992).


Personal interview, Oregon Society of American Foresters.

The Pacific Coast Federation of Fisher's Associations is the largest organisation of commercial fishers in the Pacific Northwest. Due to its primary concern about maintaining fish habitat, it is one of the few organisations that is involved in both the federal and State-level forest policy communities.

The White House and its Office of Management and the Budget (OMB) plays an important role in National Forest Planning because of its role in the funding process (Davis 1977; Sample 1990).

The Izaak Walton League failed to follow this pattern, with its membership base remaining the same as it was in the 1970s. This coincided with a virtual withdrawal from involvement in environmental forest issues, largely owing to internal divisions over policy direction. For example, the Oregon chapter of the Izaak Walton League has been critical of increased for protection measures in the PNW in the 1990s (personal interview, Izaak Walton League).

Similarly, EDF's membership has risen from 3,000 in 1972 to 150,000 in 1990 to 250,000 in 1994.

See Western Ancient Forest Campaign (1992). Its mandate has gone beyond information-sharing, however, and is also used to facilitate better interaction between those national environmental groups based in Washington, DC, and the grass roots organisations located in the US Pacific Northwest (Personal interview, Western Ancient Forest Campaign).

This also spawned the Oregon Ancient Forest Alliance Steering Committee.

Personal interviews, Sierra Club, National Audubon Society.
The groups involved include the Greater Ecosystem Alliance, the Western Ancient Forest Campaign, Lighthawk, the Oregon Natural Resources Council, the Pacific Rivers Council, Headwaters, the Klamath Forest Alliance, Safe Alternatives for our Forest Environment and the Northcoast Environmental Center. See Forest Watch Network (1994).

Also significant was the creation of the Greater Ecosystem Alliance. This is one of the few formal alliances between BC and PNW environmental groups. Its purpose is to lobby for the creation of one large international park out of existing parks on both sides of the border. The Greater Ecosystem Alliance has expanded its interests to include broader forestry issues as well, including being part of the Forest Watch Network.

This coalition formed around efforts to pass the proposed Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act. See Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Alliance (Not dated).

Personal interview, American Rivers.

See, for example, Pacific Rivers Council (1994a).


Personal interview, Association of Public Employees for Environmental Ethics. Again, much of this is foundation funding. AFSEE has local chapters in Washington, Oregon, California and Montana.

Personal interview, Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics.


Personal interview, Save Our Forests.

Personal interview, Greenpeace USA, Washington, DC.

In order to participate in lobbying activities, Greenpeace Action was formed in 1998. As Mitchell (1992: 13) notes, its "membership overlaps considerably with that of Greenpeace USA".

After a key official left the Forest Conservation Council, its influence in the PNW forest policy community "whittled away" (personal interview, National Wildlife Federation regional office).


This definition of the Pacific Northwest includes parts of British Columbia, Montana, Idaho, and California. See, Ryan (1994).

Personal interview, Eco-Trust.

Personal interview, American Forest and Paper Association.

See, American Forest and Paper Association (1993: 1).

Part of the reason for this had to do with concerns about duplication and the high administrative costs of supporting three separate organisations (Personal interview, former official, National Forest and Paper Association).

American Forest and Paper Association (1994a). In response to new concerns about biodiversity and ecosystem management, AFPA has recently begun initiatives to implement a sustainable forestry certification program.

An official with the AFPA noted that one positive example of this type of consensus process is found in the creation of the multi-stakeholder Black Bear Conservation Committee focused on forest lands in Louisiana, Mississippi and East Texas. See Bullock (1992).

See, American Forest Resources Alliance (Undated).
61Personal interview, Northwest Forestry Association.

62Personal interview, Northwest Forest Resources Council.

63My thanks to Marcus Widenor and Steven Hecker, Associate Professors, Labor Education and Research Center, University of Oregon, for their personal communications on this matter. Of course, any mistakes made are mine alone.

64Even though organized labour in both BC and the Pacific Northwest forest economies suffered a decline in membership and influence due to the early 1980s recession and subsequent automation, in BC organized labour’s ties to the New Democratic party muted a decrease in influence.


67Personal interviews with senior officials in Washington, DC with the Bureau of Land Management, the Forest Service, the National Park Service, the US Fish and Wildlife Service.

68See Sher (1993; 1990) and Hungerford (1994).

69See Thomas (1990). Jack Ward Thomas later become Chief of the US Forest Service. This was an Interagency committee because the Spotted Owl listing issue included the Bureau of Land Management Lands, Forest Service Lands, Indian Lands, and involved the Fish and Wildlife Service and the US Marine Fisheries Department. Public organisations were not involved. After this report, a Scientific Panel on Late-successional Forest Ecosystems commonly referred to as the “gang-of-four”, was established, with similar composition, purpose and in the end, fate. Finally, the Forest Service decided to conduct its own assessment. It was called the Scientific Analysis Team (SAT) and attempted to devise its own intra-agency plan for saving the Spotted Owl.


62Personal interview, US Department of Justice.

63See also Sleeth (1994).

64At the national level, the Forest Service has developed similar landscape/province/regional interagency and advisory processes that are supposed to inform, but not replace existing planning structures (United States. Department of Agriculture. Forest Service 1994). In February 1994, Chief of the US Forest Service, Jack Ward Thomas, issued a National Action Plan for Implementing Ecosystem Management in which he explained that these eco-region and landscape analyses (or assessments) “will not replace the forest plan revision process, but will be used to provide a consistent ecological and social approach to managing these forests” (Thomas 1994b).

65Yet another coalition formed around the old growth/Spotted Owl/landscape management issue is the Washington Wilderness Coalition.

66Personal interview, NRDC. NRDC consciously decided to stay out of the Spotted Owl litigation because of the expertise developed by the SCLDF. However, the East side Cascade project was a direct result of the Spotted Owl litigation, with federal agencies attempting to replicate this process in the eastern parts of Washington and Oregon (Sierra Club and Johnson 1993).

67As Todd True, lead attorney for the majority of environmental groups litigating over the Northern Spotted Owl has said, “there’s no way to turn your back on what a Sen. (Mark) Hatfield or a Speaker (Tom) Foley might do” (Pryne 1994: A1, A6). As a vice president and lead lobbyist for the National Audubon Society in Washington, DC explains, “The people who are making the noise haven’t come out here and wrestled in the mud” (Pryne 1994: A6).
Option 9 administratively creates interagency Regional Conservation Plans that are to inform BLM Resource Management Plans and Forest Service LRMPs. All of these plans are to influence administratively created interagency Provincial Conservation Plans. In turn, the Provincial Conservation Plans are to be influenced by traditional local planning initiatives which are then supposed to influence watershed planning.

Due to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the process chosen for advising the "province" and regional level conservation plans is also complicated. Instead of creating one advisory body consisting of government and non-government agencies at the regional and provincial levels, the administration created two: one interagency committee with policy responsibilities and one advisory council to the interagency committee with agency and non government representation that had no policy responsibilities. See United States, Forest Service (1994).

Personal interview, the Northwest Forest Products Association.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL PNW FOREST POLICY NETWORKS

Until the mid-1960s, as with all jurisdictions under review, policy networks affecting PNW national forest lands were usually clientele-pluralist, involving closed industry/government collaborative relationships. Changes to these networks first started to appear at the national level. As the number and resources of environmental groups increased, a pressure pluralist-network developed over land use/forest protection policy. The clientele-pluralist network concerning forest practices remained until the mid-1970s when it, too, became pressure-pluralist in nature. Regional networks also changed, with pressure-pluralist forest protection networks developing by the early 1970s on most National Forest and BLM forest districts lands. Not until the late 1980s did National Forest and BLM forest practices/management networks succumb to pressure-pluralism. This chapter reviews these changes, and then examines the ability of the historical institutionalist hypotheses to account for them.

Network development before the 1960s

Until the 1960s the goals of the state were usually indistinguishable from those of industry, although some changes in the policy focus of these networks had occurred. Before 1945 the US Forest Service’s mission was to promote forest stewardship with private land owners. Under the direction of Gifford Pinchot, the first Chief of the US Forest Service, the agency promoted "rational" forest management, the conversion of old growth forests to faster-growing second growth forests, and forest regeneration. The state exercised little autonomy from private-forest land owners, and forest companies, choosing to work in collaboration with them.

The clientele-pluralist nature of the national forest policy network was altered briefly when conservation organizations succeeded in lobbying Congress to create National Parks out of existing National Forest lands. During this time, industry was unable to maintain its dominant position, because conservation groups made the conscious effort to become part of this policy community.
This pressure-pluralist network generated one of the first conflicts between those organized groups led by historical figures such as John Muir of the Sierra Club, who wished to see some forest land protected from being logged, and agencies such as the Forest Service that wished to maintain the principles of forest conservation. Of course, this effort to protect publicly-owned forest lands owed itself to the creation of the National Forest lands, whose original purpose was to maintain a steady supply of timber for future generations.

Once most of the old growth forests on private lands was logged, National Forests became an important source of fibre for forest companies, altering agency procedures and focus. Yaffee (1994: 341) notes that:

...the evolution of [Forest Service] organizational management style [went] from one of technically based, paternal benevolence before the second world war to a more quasi-industrial, military style after the war.

Despite these changes, the post-World War II forest management network structure was not significantly altered. In many ways, the clientele-pluralist characteristics were entrenched, since forest companies had direct, material interest in obtaining federal timber and developing close relationships with Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management managers.

FOREST POLICY NETWORKS CHANGE FROM THE 1960s TO MID-1980s.

Federal PNW forest policy networks are distinguished between those at the national level of decision-making, and focus on legislation, House and Senate appropriations processes, and federal government agency policy deliberations; and those in the region that have developed around managing individual National Forests, BLM Forest Districts and National Parks.
National-level Forest Policy Networks

During the 1960s, a national pressure-pluralist network developed over forest protection matters, corresponding with environmental group pressures to increase wilderness preservation. This pressure pluralist network led to the state (through the US Congress) taking a decision at odds with most industry interests when it passed the Wilderness Act and other related forest protection legislation. Environmental groups never achieved complete victories, but previously dominant industry interests lost their relatively privileged position.

The overwhelming focus of environmental groups on forest wilderness protection matters meant that in the short-term, the clientele-pluralist network related to forest practices was less challenged. By the early 1970s, though, environmental groups expanded their efforts to include clearcutting and species preservation. Their efforts were not entirely successful, but significant statutory victories were achieved, including the non-discretionary provisions in the National Forest Management Act requiring the maintenance of species preservation and viability.

Forest Management level

Closed clientele-pluralist networks at the local individual National Forest and BLM Forest District level in the PNW came under scrutiny in the 1960s. By the early 1970s, most forest protection/land use networks were decidedly pressure-pluralist in nature. Spurred by the spirit of the discretionary Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, the passage and implementation of the Wilderness Act was a key cause of this change. Indeed, after two attempts to develop proactive strategic national and regional mechanisms, implementation of the Wilderness Act during the late 1970s and early 1980s was left largely to individual National Forest and BLM Forest District managers. The Act reduced agency managers' discretion over where harvesting could occur, and gave agency officials increased autonomy from their forest industry clientele, who were generally opposed to permanent reductions in the commercial forest land base.
The clientele-pluralist forest practices networks at the local National Forest and BLM level were more successful in limiting the influence of environmental groups. By the mid-1970s, environmental groups sought increased access to this network, and interacted with Forest Service National Forest supervisors, the Forest Service Regional Supervisor for the PNW, and BLM District Rangers and State and regional offices. These groups began to monitor timber sales, launch administrative appeals, lobby local Congressional offices, and participate in litigation (Atkin 1986). However, forest managers continued to use their discretion, and the overall structure of the clientele-pluralist network between forest companies, forest company associations, and forest land management agencies remained in place.

The literature is divided as to the extent to which the industry/government clientelist policy networks eventually adapted to include environmental interests. Two seminal Forest Service studies by Kaufman (1967) and Foss (1960), paint a picture of an agency "captured" by its forest industry clientele. This, these authors argued, was because the "military-oriented" organizational structure created a staff that was largely unable to adapt to change. As Runge (1982) notes:

Kaufman presented the Forest Service as a strictly hierarchical agency, with its own elan, in which formal and informal practices yielded a high degree of conformity with central agency policy from field officers. This traditional public administration view led critics of the Service to argue that it is insulated from change.

These studies have been supported by analyses conducted by Twight (1983) and Twight and Lyden (1989), who found that the values and ideas of Forest Service officials were slow to reflect changes that have taken place within civil society.

However, in a wide-ranging study involving officials in both the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Culhane (1981) found that descriptions of closed agency/industries ties may have been accurate in the past, but only because Forest Service and BLM officials acted as "honest brokers" balancing the interests of those wishing to influence the decision-making process. A clientele-pluralist network between industry and government developed only because environmental groups had not shown a sustained interest in influencing forest
practices policy. As the policy community expanded during the 1960s and 1970s to include more environmental interests, Culhane found that Forest Service and BLM officials did adapt to include these interests. Culhane’s analysis, which draws from interviews conducted in the early 1970s, is supported by Leman (1981) and Brown and Harris (1992a; 1992b), who found “that Forest Service employees were more environmentally aware [in 1990] than in 1980 and that the agency’s ideology was changing from within”.

These value changes were matched by the use of “alternative dispute resolution” (ADR) processes by some National Forest Supervisors and BLM District Managers. These were processes that attempted to get all key stakeholders to agree on a range of forest management decisions and increased the influence of environmental groups on forest management issues (Wondolleck 1985; 1986; 1988). Yet the discretion in creating such processes meant that not all National Forests were affected by these initiatives. How groups were included in National Forest decision making was still decided by agency managers (Runge 1982). As one senior Forest Service official noted:

...there are some supervisors who rarely have any major conflict on their forests....And then there are some that are just constantly in a problem. ...A lot of that has to do with the way they deal with their publics. [In some forests]...every... group [knows] that [it has] access to that Forest Supervisor ...[and]... that he or she [will] listen to their concern. ...[Other] Forest [Supervisors] have none of that.

While there is no question that environmental groups began to have influence and networks were under pressure to change at this stage clientele-pluralist networks had not yet been fundamentally altered. Individual National Forest Supervisors and BLM District Managers exercised a great deal of latitude in decision making up to the mid-1980s, which allowed most officials to remain close to their industry clientele.
III. POLICY NETWORK CHANGE SINCE THE MID-1980s

Overview

Local policy networks underwent significant transformation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, eventually yielding to pressure-pluralism. There were no changes in the structure of national level pressure-pluralist policy networks during the latter half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, but there was a change in their policy deliberations and locus of network activity. Concepts such as "biodiversity" and "ecosystem management", almost unheard of in the 1970s, became the dominant focus of network activity. Since ecosystem management combines the issues of forest protection and forest practices, a single "eco-forest" policy network emerged during this time. And, although litigation efforts continued, others areas of network activity moved from focusing on Congress during most of the 1980s to virtually ignoring Congress for two years following the election of President Clinton - instead organized interests lobbied the White House and executive agencies. After the adoption of Option 9, groups once again focused their efforts on Congress.

Regional/Local level

The regional/local forest management networks changed significantly in the early 1990s, moving first towards state-direction, then to pressure-pluralism system. The first short-term change was the result of the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT) deliberations. The FEMAT process was comprised of officials from the key federal agencies and expert officials from the academic community. The most influential of these were scientists and biologists with an expertise in forest biodiversity and species habitat. Scientists estimated the chance of species recovery based on nine different options. Their role was critical because without conclusive scientific
data about what had to be done, it was the opinion of scientists that guided decision making. This process angered industry officials. Mark Rey of the American Forest and Paper Association explains:

We had a group of scientists who developed a plan....Science is a process of forming hypotheses and then doing experiments to collect data to see if the hypothesis is correct. That is science. At best this was a group of scientists forming a hypothesis. And whether it is the right hypothesis is a question we will only be able to answer some years in the future as we collect data.  

Moreover, the identities of the participating scientists were important. Industry complained that scientists with opinions differing from most of the experts on the FEMAT process were deliberately excluded from the FEMAT. As Rey notes, "[t]here were scientists who had alternative views, or alternative hypotheses they wanted to test, and who weren't able to procure the laboratory for their purposes".  

Substantively, Option 9 created old growth reserves, dramatically increased the size of non-harvestable stream side "buffer zones", and rules governing harvesting outside of these zones. These measures eliminated most logging on lands inhabited by the Northern Spotted Owl - about half of all federal PNW forest land.  

The network during this period resembled a "state directed" one because bureaucratic officials devised the policy choices on their own, with considerably autonomy from organized interests (particularly from those in the forest industry). But they made these choices within the strict policy constraints of the legislation and court rulings which required them to protect the Northern Spotted Owl.

The administration's decision to choose Option 9 also had long-lasting consequences for the structure of the network. The decision (or court-ordered "requirement") to embrace ecosystem management was key. Once the FEMAT deliberations ended, the forest practices issues networks at the level of individual National Forests and BLM Forest Districts finally changed to pressure-pluralism as organized environmental interests and regulatory agencies gained increased access. Indeed, the increased role of regulatory agencies was essential in eliminating industry/agency
collaborative policy decisions. As the Regional Forester for US Forest Service Region 6 (Oregon and Washington State) noted:

...there has been one basic philosophical change in the last five years in this outfit in how you deal with things. Ten years ago, we did what we wanted, basically, from a timber sale standpoint, and it was up to the Fisheries people to prove that what we were doing was going to harm the fish.

That has turned around. The fish people are telling us now that, 'Hey, we don't want you [doing anything] in that riparian zone until you can prove to us that it is O.K.' Now you talk about putting a different shoe on the horse, that puts a whole new light on the ball game.'

This same official notes that traditional forest industry interests have difficulty understanding the new paradigm in which a Forest Supervisor no longer has the same latitude. He notes that:

Some [forest industry interests] don't understand...that we are not still in that role. So [they believe] the Forest Service people no longer care about us. [They think that] if they just had some of the old guys back, they could pick this forest [to harvest].

The regional and sub-regional interagency ecosystem management committees reinforced these pressure-pluralist changes by providing increased points of access. Finally, the distinction between forest protection and forest practices networks unraveled as ecosystem management was embraced.

EXPLANATION

Environmental value changes in civil society do not, on their own, explain changes in policy networks affecting the Pacific Northwest. They do not explain why some networks changed faster than others, nor why the most resilient of clientele-pluralist networks finally gave way to pressure-pluralism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Instead, value changes have an indirect effect: through their influence on policy community development and the emergence of the US statutory regime. This regime, combined with the US macro-institutional structure, public land ownership, and policy community development, accounts for most of the key network changes.
The most obvious influence on policy network change was the legislation, beginning with the 
Wilderness Act and followed by the Wild and Scenic Rivers Preservation Act. These Acts were the 
result of a pressure-pluralist network in Congress, but their implementation also caused the 
pressure-pluralism networks at the national, regional and local forest levels.

Further developments, including the procedural National Environmental Policy Act, the 
Endangered Species Act, and the National Forest Management Act, had similar effects on forest 
protection and forest practices networks. The policy networks that led to these Acts were pressure-
pluralist, but the greater-long term impact was how they restructured state/societal relations 
subsequently. The impact was not immediate or even. Individual National Forest and BLM land 
use/forest protection networks adopted pressure-pluralism structures faster than individual National 
Forest and BLM forest practices networks, which remained clientele-pluralist until the early 1990s. 
This is also a logical result of the statutory regime, since forest managers still had discretion over 
forest management decisions, even though their decisions could be appealed by unsatisfied 
interests. Moreover, managers were unsure of the effects of the statutory regime, due to its complex 
nature. As one senior US official notes:

The biggest crisis facing us is that there was quite a spate of environmental law and 
law affecting natural resources management passed in the '60s and '70s. That went 
along for quite a long time without causing much of a problem and then it took that 
[long] for the case law to [develop]...and for everybody to learn how to operate under 
the law.14

Once again, the most important case for the PNW was that of the Spotted Owl. Despite 
increased criticism of Forest Service and BLM management in the 1980s over below cost timber 
sales (O'Toole 1988), poor harvesting methods, and species protection, agency and executive 
officials attempted to contain these pressures. But, Judge Dwyer's rulings caused the network to 
change. Congress and the executive played important reactive roles, the courts were the catalyst 
for change.
The timing and manner in which the owl story unfolded is very much part of the way US forest practice and protection networks developed. Environmental groups focused their efforts on forest protection policy in the 1970s and early 1980s, because these networks opened up faster than forest practice networks, and because wilderness protection tended to gain more attention than developing "rules for logging".

Once strategic wilderness designations had all but ended, groups had little choice but to focus on forest practices. So, groups looked for rules regarding forest practices that might result in de facto forest protection. The Spotted Owl provided such a tool (Kimmins 1992: 150). By embracing ecosystem management, the Owl litigation did more than environmental groups could have imagined: effectively linking forest protection and forest practices into a single, more holistic, forest policy network.

This says much about the hybrid nature of the US state, and the difficulty in ascribing the labels of "weak" or "strong". As a result of the "log rolling" and "windows of opportunity" characteristics of the US macro-institutional setting, Congress and the executive can exercise a fair degree of autonomy and formulate and implement wide-ranging legislative decisions, on occasion. However, state actors then become constrained by previous legislative choices. During periods of statutory regime stability, many of the "strong" state characteristics are transferred to the courts. However, the autonomy of the courts is also limited. Far from being able to "realize their own goals", the courts must ensure that state agencies follow the non-discretionary provisions of the statutory regime. Because forest lands were publicly owned, legislators could more easily pass strict eco-forest laws, that, in many instances, would have contravened private property rights.

Paradoxically, the statutory regime has both reduced and expanded the role of consensus-oriented or "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR) processes. At the national and regional levels, a series of court decisions struck down multi-stakeholder consensus and strategic processes, resulting in a national leadership hesitant to re-invoke these kinds of mechanisms. The key cases involved
the Roadless Area and Review Evaluations Processes (RARE I and II) in the 1970s, and the court ruling in the early 1990s that the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT) process was a violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). The United States Forest Service now states "that the requirement to conform with the Federal Advisory Committee Act inhibits its use of consultative advisory boards". As one senior Forest Service official noted, concern over contravening FACA has become so intense that the Forest Service and other agencies "...have almost become paralysed in terms of our public input". Although one report argues that Forest Service has taken these lessons too far, the effect of the statutory regime at the national level has been to limit consensus-oriented boards. The result, as Brenneis (1990:50) notes, is that broad public "participation in the development of national [policy] is limited to participation by Congress".

The fears over the legality of formal consensus-oriented multi-stakeholder processes are one reason why Option 9’s ecosystem management planning processes do not allow for direct citizen participation. Instead, multi-stakeholder boards are limited to advising formalized interagency planning committees. Moreover, NEPA’s requirement that key government decisions undergo an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) has led the government to declare that policy choices made by these ecosystem management interagency committees are not actually “decisions” (thereby avoiding yet another EIS).

Similarly, with ecosystem management planning processes superimposed over existing statutory planning requirements, a cumbersome and complex decision making process has resulted. The existing statutory regime was not only the cause of the adoption of ecosystem management, but also the reason for difficulty in its full implementation. The FEMAT report itself called for a
change in these laws to permit a more holistic ecosystem approach \(^2\), and the Forest Service recently argued:

"Although progress can be made within the existing legal framework, the agency believes that a review of NFMA and other relevant statutes may be appropriate before the concept of ecosystem management can be transformed from an evolving vision into a fully operational reality."\(^2\)

It is paradoxical that the hesitancy to use consensus-oriented bodies at the national and regional levels coincided with more and more forest managers using consensus-oriented multi-stakeholder ADR decision making process at the local level, which were invoked in order to reduce litigation of management decisions. (However, research by (Coglianese 1996) reveals that such processes do not tend to reduce litigation).

Thus, policy network change is largely attributable to the emergence of a legalistic statutory regime. Two other factors also had an important influence on network change. The first is the development of the forest policy community. Without the creation of litigious groups and increased expertise of existing groups, policy networks would have remained clientele-pluralist, since environmental groups would have been unable to effectively participate in sub-government deliberations. Second, the large proportion of private land in the PNW made it easier for environmental groups to pressure Congress not to reverse the decision to implement Option 9. Groups consistently argued that the impact of Option 9 on overall harvesting rates would not be that significant because of the importance of private land to the regional forest economy (Stiak 1991). (British Columbia environmental groups could not make this same argument, owing to the limited amount of private forest land.) In fact, the Sierra Club’s Northwest Office produced an economic analysis showing that reductions in harvesting on US federal lands to protect the Northern Spotted Owl could be made up by harvesting on private lands. Citing Adams and others (1992) and Sessions and others et. al, (1991) the Sierra Club (1993: 10) argues that:

...spotted owl recovery plans will have little impact upon overall non-federal timber production [in the Pacific Northwest], and that total non-federal output...can maintain approximately 1980s levels or higher into future decades (emphasis added).\(^2\)
How protected are these new networks and policy outputs from further change? Previous discussions have noted that the US institutional “rules of the game” allow Congress to pass legislation that exempts specific measures from the statutory regime. Congress used such powers to address the Spotted Owl controversy in 1992 (Hoberg 1993) and again in 1995 when Washington Senator Slade Gorton attached a “rider” to a US Senate recision bill.23 This bill mandated that "salvage logging" (removal of dead or damaged trees) could take place on PNW federal forest lands, including on some lands where Option 9 had halted harvesting. Environmental groups focused much of their Congressional efforts in 1995 and 1996 attempting to repeal the Gorton “rider”.24

Despite a Republican majority in both the House and Senate in 1995, Congressional efforts to undo the Option 9 decision have had limited success. Aside from the salvage logging rider, Option 9 and its ecosystem orientation remains intact. This supports the point that even with a change in political party, statutory change is difficult in the US political system. Consequently, the important catalyst for change remains the conjunction of scientific evidence about species habitat, and litigation. Future change can go in one of two directions. If new evidence shows that the Northern Spotted Owl is not in danger or does not need old growth forests to survive, then industry interests would be able to seek an alteration to Option 9. At the same time, future litigation over additional species could result in further initiatives. As Thomas notes, under the US statutory regime, "... things change every time you get a new endangered species".25 Thus, change in networks and outputs could occur, but it will not likely be the result of a policy choice.

Forest policy network changes in the 1990s coincided with a government on the defensive, with little room to manoeuvre. It was the conjunction of a highly fragmented decision-making structure, a directive and non-discretionary statutory regime, public land ownership, environmental group litigation, and an owl, that led to profound policy network change affecting Pacific Northwest federal forests. An important theoretical point is that significant policy change can occur within fragmented states with narrow policy capacity.
It is doubtful that such a change could occur in Oregon, Washington State or British Columbia. The chapters to follow show that Washington State’s and Oregon’s statutory regimes would have allowed industry to veto it. The lack of legislated endangered species protection in BC has resulted in the government “trading off” levels of biodiversity and endangered species protection in order to maintain a certain level of cut.36
Appendix 4.0: BLM/Forest Service Planning Before and After Option 9

Pre Option 9

Forest Service LRMPs; BLM RMPs

Regional Conservation Plan

Local Planning

Action

Option 9

Provincial Conservation Plans*

Watershed Planning*

Action

*These are deemed "non-decisions" by the U.S. administration, in order to avoid the procedural requirements of the U.S. statutory regime. Planning support for development of Provincial Plans and Watershed Analyses and planning will be provided by interagency planning teams established on an as-needed basis to assist with specific levels of planning.

Endnotes

1 Given the lack of harvestable land base, forest companies do not dominate National Park Service clientele. See Alston (1984), Freemuth (1990), and Miles (1984; 1995).

2 Forest conservation is largely about maintaining a productive forest land base. Consequently, reforestation, proper management of the forest resource, and stopping forest land from being converted to other uses constitute the key elements of the conservation effort.

3 The Wilderness Act had little influence on changes to the forest practices/management network. As Hoberg (1997: 6) notes, "While this statute did constrain the Forest Service's discretion by removing certain areas from its multiple-use mandate, it did not directly affect the essential timber management activities."

4 Two "Roadless Area Review and Evaluation" (RARE) processes were established in the 1970s. The first processes, RARE I was created by the Forest Service in 1970, which "chose to expand the required primitive area review...[of the 1964 Wilderness Act], to include many roadless areas..." (United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment 1992:68). However, this process ended in 1972 after a lawsuit argued that it violated provisions of NEPA because the Forest Service had predetermined which lands would be reviewed under the RARE process (Gorte 1989).

RARE II was begun in 1977 and was designed to "accelerate NFMA planning processes, and thus was to be consistent with MUSYA and NEPA" (United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment 1992:68). In 1979, the Forest Service RARE II recommendations were outlined in an environmental impact statement (a requirement of NEPA), presented to Congress by President Carter, and then ruled illegal by a California Court in 1980 and upheld on appeal in 1982 (Wondolleck 1988:131). The Court ruled the RARE II EIS "contained inadequate site-specific information on the consequences of the recommendations."(United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment 1992:68-69). It was upheld in appeal in 1982. For a detailed review of the RARE processes see, Johnson (1979), Sumner (1977). After this setback, most wilderness evaluations took place on a state by state level, using initial forest plan processes.

5 Personal interviews conducted for this dissertation with Forest Service and BLM officials, in both Washington, D.C. and the PNW, revealed that not only have officials' attitudes changed, but that employment recruiting practices have also changed to better reflect changes in societal values.

6 Personal interview.

7 Officials from all of the major environmental groups involved in federal forest policy making were unanimous in saying that while their access to the White House increased dramatically with the election of President Clinton, this had little bearing on their policy success. Some longed for the day where statements or initiatives from a less environmentally inclined administration would stir up their members into forcing action, or in rejecting damaging initiatives.

8 Personal interview.

9 Organized industry interests (Northwest Forest Resources Council and Counties 1991) made the same point about the "unscientific" nature of the decision-making process regarding earlier 1990 interagency attempt (Thomas et al. 1990) to forge a solution. Court rulings have consistently maintained that government agencies must operate on the principle of "best available information".

Industry argues that a similar exclusion existed with respect to those economists, political scientists and sociologists working on FEMAT report. One of the most vocal critics of this process has been Robert Lee of the University of Washington School of Forestry. Lee (1994) argues that the FEMAT process was "special interest group elitism". As the industry's magazine, Evergreen (1994: 46) explains:

...Dr. Lee was invited to work with a panel of social scientists called together by the Administration's Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT) to assess the social and cultural impacts of its then-contemplated forest plan. He resigned a month later, and in a subsequent letter to FEMAT's social assessment group, Dr. Lee criticized Administration social scientists for having 'greater interest in making policy than in gathering information to predict consequences of alternative policy options'.

Lee and Oliver (1993: 14) have written that environmental regulations can actually hurt spotted owl species recovery:
Extreme regulations may inhibit investment in silvicultural operations and cause landowners to avoid thinning and to harvest stands early. For example, some owners may do so to prevent spotted owls from occupying their stands—which prevents timber harvest and resultant income.

The Northwest Forest Resource's Council's official magazine prints articles exploring these types of phenomena. For example, it has quoted forest scientist and former Dean of the University of Montana School of Forestry who argues:

...the federal government's decision to virtually eliminate its national forest timber harvesting program has caused mills in the Sweet Home, Oregon area to import logs from Chile. This unavoidable economic decision has an unintended environmental impact: Fossil fuel must be expended to bring the logs from Chile, adding unnecessarily to atmospheric carbon buildup (Stout 1994).

16Personal interview.
17Personal interview.
18Personal interview.
20Personal interview.

In addition, the potential of the RPA to inject a national level strategic planning orientation into the federal forest land use policy network proved to be limited. Although the RPA was intended to provide “top down” guidance to individual national forest management, the Forest Service “does not consider RPA Program objectives to be binding on local forest plans. See Wilkinson and Anderson (1985: 90). Even though the RPA dealt with long-term national forest planning, its record of effective public involvement has been poor (Lyden, Twight, and Tuchmann 1990).

Although section 14 (b) of the NFMA permits the Secretary of Agriculture to “establish and consult...advisory boards” the Forest Service has stated “that the requirement to conform with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) inhibits [its] use of advisory boards. See United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment (1992: 80) Referring to a recent court ruling that the FEMAT was contrary to FACA, the Chief of the US Forest Service has also said that FACA significantly limits broad consensus oriented initiatives (Personal interview, January, 1995).


This section will not examine the numerous committee hearings undertaken regarding eco-forest policies and management of the US Congress. They number in the hundreds and are a result of the US macro-institutional system.

See, United States. Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (1993, Ch. VII). The conflict between rigid laws and adapting to ecosystem management was a recurring theme in virtually all of the six interviews conducted for this dissertation with senior officials in the US Forest Service in Washington, D.C. For a detailed review of the effects of these laws, see Shannon (1994)

The agency also argued that:

...the controversy which often has surrounded forest planning must be viewed in light of the many requirements imposed by statutory and regulatory requirements other than the National Forest Management ACT (e.g. the National Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, Clean Water Act...)

A number of analyses have found or predicted a correlation between reduced harvests on federal lands, and an increased cut on private lands (See Associated Press 1995; Citizen Forester 1992. 18; Robertson 1990; Rowland 1994).

The rider requires the Forest Service to offer 2 billion board feet of timber in all regions including the Pacific Northwest, suspending judicial review. (Western Ancient Forest Campaign Internet posting, April 15, 1995). This means that any harvesting taking place under the terms of the Gorton “rider” is not subject to any of the laws reviewed in this chapter nor
any of the rules established under Option 9.

A rescission bill withdraws funds already committed by Congress, and in this case is the result of the new Republican dominated Congress attempting to revoke decisions made by the previous Democratically controlled Congress.

In July of 1996, the environmental campaign to repeal the rider came within one vote in the House of Representatives of meeting this goal.

Personal interview.

Indeed, Rowland (1994) and Haddock (1995) have shown, respectively, the dramatically weaker approaches the Washington State Forest Practices Board and the BC government have taken in protecting the spotted owl.
CHAPTER FIVE
OREGON AND WASHINGTON FOREST POLICY COMMUNITIES: 1965-1995

Despite increased societal concerns about the environment, policy communities at the State level have changed little since the 1970s, compared with what was taking place in the US PNW forest policy community. Few environmental groups are involved in the sub-government, and well-organized industry interests have maintained their place as policy participants. This chapter reviews the limited changes in the Oregon and Washington forest policy communities, and then tests an historical institutionalist explanation. It argues that State-level statutory regimes have limited the interest and influence of environmental groups and other organized interests. Coupled with regulations that concern private land and limited opportunities for wilderness preservation, most environmental groups chose to focus their efforts on the more rewarding opportunities at the federal level.

OREGON

Diagrams 5.0 and 5.1 graphically present the stability of Oregon State forest policy communities between 1975 and 1995. Environmental groups themselves are either not interested in this policy community, or wield less influence than those involved in federal PNW lands.

Environmental groups

Overall, environmental groups have rarely been active as policy participants within the Oregon forest policy community, instead they have either been policy advocates (either by making presentations to the Board of Forestry, interacting with Department of Forest officials, or unsuccessfully lobbying representatives for more eco-friendly legislation) or members of the attentive public. Although the early 1970s was a time of considerable expansion of Oregon-based environmental groups, such as the Oregon Natural Resources Council and Headwaters, they showed little interest in developing regulations for private lands.
The group with the longest history in the Oregon forest policy community is the Oregon Environmental Council. Involved since the early 1970s, it is perceived by industry as being "less extreme" than other groups.¹ Its interest in State forest practices has fluctuated significantly. Satisfied with the 1987 rule changes, the Council has absented itself from the forest policy community since that time.²

In the mid-1980s, the key environmental groups seeking access to the Oregon forest policy community were 1000 Friends of Oregon, Oregon Trout, and Portland Audubon.³ The 1000 Friends of Oregon was concerned with land use/zoning matters, and have had little interest since 1987, after legislation exempted forest practices from the State’s zoning legislation. Oregon Trout was involved in 1987 and 1991 debates about rule changes, and was a participant in a multi-stakeholder riparian rules committee during the early 1990s.⁴ The only group to maintain an ongoing presence since the mid-1980s has been Portland Audubon, owing to the expertise and personal credibility of one of its senior officials. Portland Audubon maintains complete policy autonomy from the National Audubon Society, and some of its 7,000 members do not belong to the national group.⁵ Finally, a limited number of environmental groups, including Oregon Trout, have been involved in the development of strategic land use planning exercises on the limited amount of Oregon State owned land.⁶

Forest industry

The main forest industry organization is the Oregon Forest Industries Council (OFIC), whose sole focus is at the State level and comprises 75 industrial forest land members.⁷ Large forest companies and small mills are included in this membership, but small wood lot owners are not. Well-organized with professional staff, the OFIC is the only industry voice at the State level. Small woodlot owners have formed the Small Woodland Owners Association, but this group has failed to become an active member of the policy community.
Other groups

Forest unions are virtually absent from the Oregon forest policy community. Associations that emerged in the 1980s as important allies of environmental groups are the Northwest Steel Headers and the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Association. Both of these groups were concerned about salmon stock depletions and riparian rules. The Oregon Society of American Foresters (OSAF) is the key professional association of foresters, and uses its expertise to educate and respond to forest policy initiatives. This association is one of the few to get involved in both federal and private/State owned lands issues. Yet, it is most involved as a provider of expertise when reviewing proposed policies, rather than as a policy participant. As part of the national Society of American Foresters, OSAF focuses exclusively on matters that pertain to Oregon. Universities and their research centres also play an important role as the provider of information, expertise, and critiques.

Government agencies

Since 1971, the two most important government agencies involved in the Oregon State forest policy community have been the Board of Forestry, which has been given the statutory power to issue forest practices regulations, and the Department of Forestry, which administers the rules. Government agencies in the attentive public include the Oregon Fish and Wildlife Service, the Department of Land Conservation and Development, and the Department of Environmental Quality. The State legislature and House and Senate committees also influence the forest policy community. Unlike their federal counterparts, they are best seen as members of the attentive public, since their involvement is only intermittent. The Governor's office is an important actor from time to time, having formally established a consensus-oriented process in 1987.
WASHINGTON STATE

The Washington State forest policy community changed only slightly between 1975 and 1995, with new membership limited to establishment of consensus-oriented processes. Diagrams 5.2 and 5.3 visually present this continuity.

Environmental Groups

Like Oregon, and unlike the BC and US federal forest policy communities, few environmental groups are active in Washington State forest policy.9 There are only two key groups: the Washington Environmental Council (WEC),10 and the Washington State Audubon Society.11 Formed in 1967, the WEC is an organization of about 2,000 individual members and 110 loosely affiliated group members.12 The WEC focuses solely on the State level.

Other groups that are best placed within the "attentive public" include: the Washington State Wildlife Federation,13 Washington State's association of professional wildlife biologists, the Washington Wildlife Society14 and the Washington Recreation and Park Association - primarily focusing on the ten per cent of State-owned forest land.15 All of these groups were created before 1975. The Sierra Club and the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund are involved, in rare cases, usually concerning Washington State trust lands.16
Industry

The major industry organization is the Washington Forest Protection Association (WFPA), which represents most of the State's forest companies. Founded in 1908, and with a current staff of 14, WFPA represents small and large forest companies, including private landowners, who together own 23 percent of all forest land in the State. The Washington Farm Forester’s Association, a small land owner organization, became more important in the early 1990s as federal lands produced smaller harvests.17

Other groups

As with Oregon, labour is not active in the Washington State forest policy community. The Washington Society of American Foresters plays an educational role and offers critiques of proposed and existing policy. Universities and research institutions offer more detailed criticism, with Forestry schools producing reviews more favourable to industry's interests, and environmental resource centres providing a more ecological critique.

Government Agencies

The Washington State Forest Practices Board is a key government actor, charged with promulgating forest practices rules. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) manages private and State-owned forest land. The Head of DNR is the elected Commissioner of Public Lands, who often represents a different political party than that of the governor. Because seven other government agencies comprise Forest Practices Board membership, they are also involved in the forest policy community with respect to deliberations over rule development. In the late 1980s, the Timber/Fish/Wildlife Process became a new member of the policy community, representing an effort at consensus-style alternative dispute resolution (ADR). This was followed by the short-lived Washington State Sustainable Forestry Roundtable.
EXPLAINING POLICY COMMUNITY STABILITY IN OREGON AND WASHINGTON STATE

Oregon and Washington State forest policy communities have been relatively unaffected by increased environmental concerns since the 1960s. This lack of change is largely attributable to the State-level statutory regimes, aided by the limited policy options for private land regulation, the macro-institutional structure that makes statutory change difficult, and the greater opportunities environmental groups have to influence policy change in the federal PNW forest policy community.

The most important factor in understanding the limited policy community change has been Oregon and Washington State's forest practices Acts. They have limited the influence of environmental groups in forest board deliberations, and provided few legal handles with which to gain increased access to the forest policy making process.

The Acts state that eco-forest regulations must be consistent with the maintenance of a strong forest economy. Both rely on regulations found not in statute, but in rules promulgated by forest practice boards. In Oregon and Washington State, the majority of these boards continue to have a pro-extraction orientation. Both Acts put economic benefits of the forest industry above the need to protect the environment. This is in dramatic contrast to the federal National Forest Management Act and Endangered Species Act that require decisions about species viability not to take into account economic issues. These forest practices Acts reduce the ability of the fragmented macro-institutional structure to provide access to environmental groups, since they transfer decision-making authority from the legislature to the forest practice boards. This, coupled with the fact that the Oregon and Washington State legislatures only meet for six months every two years, limits the role of the legislature and other macro-political institutions in the policy community.

In contrast to the numerous opportunities afforded to environmental groups at the federal level during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the paucity of attention paid by environmental groups to private/State forest issues is logical. The incentives and rewards for participation on federal lands issues were greater. This institutional explanation accompanies the forest protection limitations at
the State level, since removing private forest land from harvesting is rarely an option. As Salazar (1989: 113) found, environmental organizations based in Washington State were less interested in participating in the development of forest practice legislation, than they were in influencing wilderness allocation in the national forests. As a senior official from the Washington State Environmental Council explains:

[We have]...a very comfortable arrangement because we never fought turf battles with anybody. Nobody much wanted our turf. It is not jazzy. It doesn't have the appeal to the [federal land-oriented] Wilderness [groups].

Portland Audubon also understands this problem. One senior official puts it this way:

There is not near as much interest in...private land management as there is in federal public lands. Number one, because it is a hell of a lot harder. It is easy to talk about public land preservation because it is owned by the people....But on private lands it is a different story, because you are smack dab right in these private property rights issues, and much more involved in balancing public interest with the private interest.

Where State-owned land is concerned, environmental groups have slightly more access to the policy making process, additional evidence that private land ownership limits environmental group participation. However, environmental group influence on State-owned land is significantly less than on federally owned land in the Pacific Northwest, because the State Forest Practices Acts govern both private and State-owned lands.

The pro-industry/harvesting orientation of the statutory regime also explains why unions are even less involved at the State level. Unions were involved at the federal level at the behest of forest company associations, to build a coalition against increasingly powerful environmental groups. In the absence of environmental group power at the State level, there was no corresponding need for industry to develop such linkages.
CONCLUSION

Despite sharing similar macro-institutional features, the federal lands forest policy community differs significantly from those that have developed under the jurisdictions of Oregon and Washington State. Differing patterns of land ownership and distinct statutory regimes have led to different levels of organized interest participation in the policy community. Oregon and Washington State have followed similar paths largely as a result of their common institutional features.

At the same time, the federal and State-level forest policy communities have influenced one another. The greater inclusion of environmental interests on federal forest land policy making processes helps account for the lack of even locally based group interest to enter closed State forest policy communities. The sheer numbers of environmental groups seeking access to the forest policy community for federal lands in the PNW is unmatched in any other jurisdiction this dissertation reviews. However, private lands in the PNW - lands adjacent to the federal lands and contained in the same ecosystem - have drawn the attention of only a few committed, relatively poorly funded environmental groups. However, the policy community was not only shaped directly by the institutional setting, it was also influenced by the lack of change in policy networks.
Endnotes

1 Personal interview. Oregon Forest Industries Council.

2 As one senior official with the Oregon Department of Forestry said, "we seem to have satisfied them" with the 1987 policy changes (personal interview).

3 Personal interviews, Audubon Society of Portland, Oregon Forest Industries Council, Oregon Department of Forestry, Oregon Trout.

4 Personal interviews, Oregon Department of Forestry, Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife. Oregon Trout has now limited its role within the Oregon Forest Policy community to developing land management plans for Oregon's public forests (which comprise about 3 percent of the Department of Forestry's purview).

5 Personal interview, Audubon Society of Portland. Its annual budget is close to half a million dollars per year.

6 Oregon State owned lands are relatively insignificant, making up only 835,000 acres.

7 Twelve local "forest protection" associations also belong to the OFIC, which were created as vehicles to protect private forest land from forest fires and other damage.


9 One group established after 1975 is the Washington Wildlife and Recreation Council. Its 10 year plan includes raising $450 million at the State level "to acquire and develop parks, trails, water access, wildlife habitat, and natural areas". Its co-chairs have included senior politicians from the State including former Governor and U.S. Senator Daniel Evans and current governor Mike Lowry (National Wildlife Federation 1994: 315).

10 The WEC has received significant revenues from US Foundations.

11 The WEC takes the lead on State matters, with Washington State Audubon Society focusing more attention on federal issues (personal interview, Washington Department of Natural Resources). Washington State Audubon appears to be one of the few groups active in both federal and State level forest policy communities.

12 The WEC was updating its group and individual membership list in the Fall of 1995. Groups that officially belong to WEC include a vast array of organizations including: numerous local Audubon Chapters, numerous issue specific groups such as "Citizens Against Wood Stove Fumes, Clean Air Coalition" and specific area groups which include "Friends of Cypress Island, Friends of the San Juans", etc. Only in the last five years has the WEC had full time staff members, and most of this money has come from foundation funding (personal interview, correspondence, Washington Environmental Council).

Due to the affiliation of local Audubon Chapters, there is in fact a technical overlap between groups involved at the State level and at the federal PNW forest policy community level. However, evidence to date seems to indicate that most of these groups maintain a fairly passive membership in the WEC - that what constitutes its importance is its paid staff and the resource policy lawyers who give advice and have been relied upon to participate in the TFW and Sustainable Forestry Roundtable Processes.


14 The Wildlife Society was created in 1966 to offer a "professional voice in state conservation issues" (National Wildlife Federation 1994: 316).

15 The Washington Recreation and Park Association was created in 1947, dedicated "to enhancing and promoting parks, recreation, and leisure pursuits in Washington state and plays a vital role in promoting public support for parks and recreation" (National Wildlife Federation 1994: 316).
16 Personal interview, Washington Department of Natural Resources.

17 Personal interview, Washington State Department of Natural Resources.

18 Recall that the Endangered Species Act poses far less requirements on privately-owned forest lands, than it does on federally-owned lands.

19 Personal interview.

20 Personal interview.
CHAPTER SIX
FOREST POLICY NETWORK RESILIENCE IN OREGON AND WASHINGTON

Despite increased societal concern about the environment since the 1960s, clientele-pluralist forest policy networks in Oregon and Washington remained resilient. Networks did adapt and policy outputs did change, but these were an effort to maintain existing networks and to contain more stringent environmental regulations. This chapter reviews this stability, and the limited effects of periodic efforts to alter these networks. To account for this resilience, a historical institutionalist explanation is offered, arguing that macro-institutional structures, levels of private versus public land ownership, and statutory regimes appear to have reduced state autonomy vis-à-vis economic interests, and the state's ability to formulate its own goals. It also argues that the lack of environmental group participation in the policy community itself is an important factor for limited network change.

FOREST NETWORKS PRE-1960S

Forest policy networks in Oregon and Washington State before 1960 consisted of a state with little autonomy from organized industry and forest companies, which participated in the creation and implementation of the rules. Most policies centred around forest regeneration and fire control. Given the limited amount of State-owned land and the high degree of private land ownership in the two States, the scope of forest policy rarely covered forest protection issues.

II. FOREST POLICY NETWORKS DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE 1960S TO MID-1980s.

The existing forest practice networks in Oregon and Washington State were reinforced with the passage of forest practices Acts in the early 1970s where regulatory policy making was dominated by commodity-oriented forest practices boards.
OREGON STATE

The clientele-pluralist network of the pre-1971 era was solidified following the 1971 Forest Practices Act and the creation of its industry-dominated, nine-member Forest Practices Board. As Anderson (1977b) notes, "the timber industry, [was] in effect, allowed to regulate itself". The network was further reinforced by the Act's recognition that the Department of Forestry had responsibility for implementing and managing forest practice rules. Even though the Board heard submissions from the public and environmental groups, this did not create enough opportunity to challenge the clientele-pluralist relationship. The state continued to exercise little autonomy from forest companies and the Oregon Forest Industries Council. Incapable of formulating its own goals, the state relied on industry government collaboration and the use of non-coercive measures to enforce limited forest practice regulations.

Although the government of Oregon created the Department of Environmental Quality in 1969, with a mission "to be an active force to restore, enhance, and maintain the quality of Oregon's air, water and land"\(^1\), a Department of Fish and Wildlife in 1975 and a Department of Land Conservation in 1973, these agencies were excluded from participating in administering and enforcing the 1971 Act. Given this institutional setting, the Department of Forestry and the Oregon Forest Industries Council successfully fought off attempts by non-timber agencies to regulate forest practices for the next twenty years.

Indeed, after attempts by the Oregon Land Use Development Commission to regulate forest practices in the mid-1980s,\(^2\) industry successfully lobbied for legislative amendments that explicitly recognized the Board of Forestry as the sole agency in charge of forestry regulation.\(^3\) When the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)\(^4\) attempted to issue regulations four years later, industry again succeeded in defeating the challenge.

The administration of these rules reinforced the clientele-pluralist nature of the network. While the Forest Practices Act moved the Department of Forests rule-making powers to the Forest
Practices Board, the Act’s discretionary, pro-timber industry orientation encouraged the closed state/industry relations to continue. Unlike the fragmented agency structure at the national level, the Department of Forestry has been able to maintain authority for the administration of Oregon forest practices rules and other management responsibilities.

While environmental groups could openly challenge existing regulatory policies, they were limited to policy advocacy, while industry was ensconced as a policy participant. The Oregon Forest Industries Council describes this relationship with the Board of Forestry as a "collaborative one". A Department of Forestry senior official notes that forest regulations were, and continue to be, developed "in a somewhat pleasant atmosphere", since the regulations have been written by the Board of Forestry and the foresters, as opposed to "politicians and environmental groups". This situation has led one senior official from the Portland Audubon Society to argue that before 1987, "...the Board of Forestry...was so industry dominated that there was no way the public interest was being adequately represented". Few significant policy changes occurred without the consent of industry, and environmental groups have been dissatisfied with the slow pace of policy change.

OREGON CHANGES SINCE THE MID-1980s

Of all the jurisdictions under review the new forest policy making processes established in Oregon since the mid-1980s have been the most limited. As a result, the clientele-pluralist relationship between the Department of Forestry, the Oregon Forest Industries Council and individual forest companies was not challenged. The creation of two short-term, but more inclusive forest policy making processes in 1987 and 1991, illustrate the difficulty in altering the structure of existing networks. The first process was created to assist the legislature in making legislative changes while the second was created as a result of industry supported legislation passed in 1991.
The 1987 Oregon Dispute Resolution Process

In the year and a half preceding the 1987 session of the Oregon State legislature, environmental groups and the Oregon Forest Industries Council expressed their dissatisfaction with certain elements of the forest practices statutory regime. Industry was concerned about attempts by the Oregon Land Use Development Commission to regulate forest practices. Environmental groups were concerned about industry domination on the Board of Forestry, its broad discretionary powers, poor enforcement of the rules, and inadequate communication between the Oregon Department of Forest and other State agencies. These environmental concerns gained increased media attention and public sympathy after the 1000 Friends of Oregon environmental group released a study of current forest practices to the Governor’s Office and the Board of Forestry. The report documented a number of ecologically damaging forest practices on privately-owned land.

As a result of environmental groups’ and industry’s desire to see changes made to the Forest Practices Act and related legislation, the Governor’s Office convened a dispute-resolution process to find consensus on key issues (Achteman 1987; Angstrom 1989). A "core" group consisted of an official from the Governor’s Office, the Oregon Forest Industries Council and the 1000 Friends of Oregon. This group agreed on the objectives of a dispute resolution process and the list of other groups who would be invited to participate in the "working group" in which actual negotiations would take place. The process consisted of three members each from industry, environmental groups, the counties, and four government officials. Unlike the Washington State’s Timber/Fish/Wildlife process, this was a process of individuals, not groups, and there was no membership approval requirement. Nor was there a requirement that consensus be reached on all matters. Instead, after only five days of negotiations, the working group, "turned the proposed legislation over to the legislative process to resolve any outstanding issues" (Angstrom 1989: 4).

The result was that the proposed legislation, accepted by all parties, increased riparian (stream side) zone protection, restated that the Board of Forestry was the sole agency in charge of
forestry regulation and "clarified" threatened and endangered species protection (Cubbage, O'Laughlin, and Bullock 1993: 428). The legislation also altered the makeup of the Board of Forestry, reducing membership from 12 to seven, with the rule that no more than three members could have a "substantial financial interest in forestry" (Ellefson, Cheng, and Moulton 1995: 175). Even these changes did not have the effect of challenging the timber dominance of the forest industry as the largest voice on the Board. Indeed, environmental groups are not guaranteed any position on the Board, with the other members tending to come from government, university or other industry interests. Moreover, the rules that were now enshrined in the legislation allowed exceptions to be made, and set weak standards in legislation - standards that a slightly more representative Forest Practices Board could not increase. Both environmental groups and industry were well-aware of the Oregon Forest Industries Council's dominant position during this process, and that its veto power worked against fundamental changes. When industry decided it did not want to enter into such processes in 1991, it proposed its own legislation. Environmental groups input was limited to Oregon State legislative hearings.

This short-lived consensus process did not challenge the existing clientele-pluralist network between the Department of Forests and the Oregon Forest Industries Council. Group representatives were involved for a total of five days, and their approval was not required. Industry lost its majority on the Board of Forestry, but this has had little impact on most Board deliberations.

Oregon's Riparian Rules Consensus-Oriented Policy Process

The 1991 riparian rule consensus-oriented process - the result of industry supported 1991 legislation - should be scrutinized as it appears to challenge the industry/government clientelist relationship. The period after the 1987 changes saw increasing dissatisfaction on the part of industry and environmentalists. Environmental groups sought more substantive forest practice requirements, and industry had three concerns: "to better control adverse impacts of forest regulation on private
forest landowners" (Cubbage, O'Laughlin, and Bullock 1993:428); to fend off another threat of extra-agency regulation attempts - this time by the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (ibid); and to reduce the threat of "big green" environmental initiatives. Industry rejected a consensus approach, deciding that it "did not want to compromise" further. The result was forest practice amendments proposed by the Oregon Forest Industries Council and accepted by the Oregon legislature in 1991 that did not go through extensive public consultation and did not entertain a dispute resolution process. The legislation limited clearcut sizes, created a process that would advise the Board of Forestry as to how it should increase riparian standards, improve policing, provide for scenic corridors along major highways and increase reforestation standards. Again, industry supported these rules as a matter of strategy - to be seen as a leading force in environmental protection. However, many of the legislative requirements limited increased regulations from a Board no longer dominated by representatives that came directly from the forest industry.

Despite these initiatives, which eschewed consensus and generally excluded the participation of environmental groups, an amendment in the House and Senate conference included the requirement that the Department of Forestry lead a consensus-oriented process regarding increased rules for riparian protection. With environmental group participation, the process lasted three years and a report was issued in 1994. Although environmental groups had significant concerns about the details of the proposed regulations, they agreed that the regulations were an improvement and supported the document.

This process had limited effect on the existing policy network by allowing environmental groups to become involved in sub-government activities as policy participants, and moving slightly toward pressure-pluralist characteristics. However, it did not result in fundamental long-term changes to the structure of the network. First, the changes were limited to stream side rules. Second, the negotiations took place under the confines of the existing commodity-oriented character of the statutory regime. Third, the process was short-lived, after which environmental groups were once
again excluded, for the most part, as policy participants. Industry interests continued to dominate forest policy networks after this time. For example, Oregon's 1987 *Endangered Species Legislation* could have had a significant impact on forest practices, but the Oregon Forest Industries Council was successful in exempting private land.26

Thus, since 1971, the clientelist forest practice/management network has been resilient, with only minor changes. The scope of the 1987 dispute resolution process and the 1991-1994 consensus-oriented riparian rules procedure was narrow. Both were short-lived alternatives to the existing dominant forest policy networks. Compared to the changes taking place in BC and on US federal PNW forest lands, Oregon's new eco-forest practice regulations were not rigorous.

WASHINGTON STATE

Like Oregon, the pre-1960s clientele-pluralist network in Washington remained durable despite strong criticism. The 1974 *Forest Practices Act* reinforced the existing clientele-pluralist forest management network between organized industry interests and the Washington State Department of Natural Resources. The Act recognized that the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had responsibility to administer forest policy, and gave regulatory authority to a Forest Practices Board, within the constraints of the timber extraction-oriented statutory regime. Considerable discretionary authority existed for DNR officials to implement the regulations - created by a Forest Practices Board dominated by industry interests.

Because the Forest Practices Board can hold open meetings and allowed environmental interests the right to make submissions, some elements of pressure-pluralism do exist. The Board can initiate forest policy regulations autonomously, while organized industry, environmental groups, and other interests may make submissions. Supporting the pressure-pluralism appearance is that most of the people on the 11-member Board are representatives of government agencies. As one Washington State report notes, since 1974 the Board has been treated as an "umpire" by different
groups, resulting in, "[t]he timber industry, environmental groups and tribes...spending most of their energies applying opposing pressure on the Board". Indeed, the Washington Environmental Council (WEC) was involved in deliberations over Washington State's Forest Practices Act which was enacted in 1974 after three years of negotiations.

However, there were strong limits to this policy advocacy. First, the Board and all lobbying efforts to change regulations are constrained by the timber-extraction orientation of the legislation. Second, although the Board's membership may have a majority appointed from government agencies, historically the Board has been dominated not by conservation or ecological stakeholders, but by industry interests. Third, because the Forest Practices Act gives rule-making authority to the Board, it reduces the autonomy of the State legislature to make structural changes to the way forest policy is made in Washington State without launching an attack on the statutory regime itself. Thus, autonomy is extremely limited. At most, the creation of Washington State's Forest Practices Board resulted in the development of a more "contested" clientele-pluralist policy network.

The fact that the Department of Forests implements Forest Practices Board rules reinforces the clientelist nature of the policy network. State officials have a significant degree of discretion when administering the Act and Board rules. While this could lead to agency autonomy, historically the opposite has occurred, with agency officials maintaining close ties to its industry clientele. As Pinkerton (1992: 334) notes:

[the Department of Natural Resources]...was still in the mid-1980s an agency "captured" by its own and its client's timber interests, and whose past operations and regulatory practices had been little affected by forest practice regulations to protect fish, wildlife and water quality.

During this era, few policy changes occurred without the consent of industry - those that did were limited in scope. The few environmental groups that have shown an active interest in this network have been dissatisfied with the slow pace of policy change.
WASHINGTON STATE FOREST NETWORK CHANGE SINCE THE MID-1980s

Like Oregon, Washington experimented with two different consensus-oriented processes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These efforts to include non-timber industry interests as members of the sub-government resulted in clientele-pluralist networks being shaken, but not shattered. Only with the emergence of land management planning networks concerning State-owned land did non-timber interests have some success in challenging a clientele-pluralist network structure.

Two key forest policy processes were created in Washington State after the mid-1980s: the Timber/Fish/Wildlife Process, and the Washington Sustainable Forestry Roundtable. These processes focused on private land regulation and rarely considered removing forest land from the extractive land base. These initiatives have expanded the role of some environmental groups and aboriginal tribes, allowing them a greater role as policy participants within the policy community. However, their policy focus and the nature of exchange between economic, environmental interests and the state have been strongly structured by the existing institutional and commodity-oriented statutory setting.

The TFW and Sustainable Forestry Roundtable added both more inclusive and exclusive aspects to forest policy networks. Selected environmental groups moved from policy advocacy to policy participation, but organized industry interests managed to exclude other organized societal interests.

The Washington State Timber/Fish/Wildlife Process

A number of scholars have studied the Washington State Timber/Fish/Wildlife consensus/ADR process in which the forest industry, environmental groups, aboriginal tribes, government agencies, and individual companies reached agreement on a limited range of forest practice issues in 1987. Halbert and Lee (1990) have characterized this as a closed process, since participation of environmental groups was limited to the Washington Environmental Council (WEC)
and the Washington State Audubon Society. These groups' lack of financial resources meant that much of their contribution was conditional upon funding from Washington State and US foundations interested in forest policy. This process has been criticized for giving industry interests an advantage. The WEC criticized the exclusion of other environmental groups. Pinkerton (1992: 334) notes that industry had a "stronger" veto than other participants:

...the regulatory history of the forest industry in Washington gave the timber companies the reason to believe that they would be able to continue to be the major influence on implementation of policy and agreements.

In fact, any agreement over forest practice rules still must be enacted by the existing Forest Practices Board.

TFW did mark a considerable divergence from the previous rule-making and forest management networks, with environmental and tribal interests' inclusion in the decision-making process. However, the extent of this change was limited by the extraction-oriented statutory regime, and by the fact that the TFW process concerned mostly private lands. It was not a pro-active government initiating new processes, it was industry initiating strategic changes.

The TFW processes affected the role of environmental groups in three ways. First, it guaranteed the WEC and the Washington State Audubon Society a place in the sub-government as a policy participant. Second, it briefly limited the scope of the forest policy community to fish and wildlife issues. Third, other environmental groups were excluded. Fraidenburg (1989: 332) asserts that the TFW resulted in a more exclusionary process, unlike the expansion of environmental groups' roles in the BC and federal PNW:

...a traditional public decision-making process, including opportunities for full public input before the options are constrained, [was]...being exchanged for a greater degree of private and exclusive policy making.

Certainly those groups that would have been involved as members of the attentive public or even as policy advocates were not included.
In the end, the accord resulted in minor legislative initiatives, with most of the changes implemented by the Forest Practices Board regulations, changes to the Forest Practices Board Manual, and voluntary compliance. The regulatory changes included tougher riparian management rules, more detailed application review processes including a reorganization of the Department of Natural Resources with a Division of Forestry, and standards for road construction.\textsuperscript{33}

**Washington State Sustainable Forestry Roundtable**

Attempting to build upon and expand the policy scope of the consensus agreement of the Timber/Fish/Wildlife process, the Washington State Commissioner of Public Lands, the Forest Practices Board, and TFW participants initiated the Washington State Sustainable Forestry Roundtable in 1989.\textsuperscript{34} It sought consensus on four policy issues: the rate of harvest; the role of the Department of Natural Resources and Counties in forest land conversion regulations; the forest land base for the next 100 years; and a method of "comprehensive planning to accommodate growth and allow forest land owners to manage and invest for timber production".\textsuperscript{35}

Similar in structure to the TFW policy network, the appointed representatives of the stakeholder groups reached a consensus in October 1990 on a wide range of forest policy changes.\textsuperscript{36} This consensus included limits on the annual allowable cut on private land riparian areas,\textsuperscript{37} restrictions on large clearcuts and requirements that 10 percent of an owner's forest land be managed to "protect fish and wildlife habitat" (Cubbage, O'Laughlin, and Bullock 1993:95). However, the roundtable process unravelled after the membership of the Washington Environmental Council (WEC) failed to ratify an agreement reached by all of the appointed representatives of the stakeholder groups.\textsuperscript{38}

Following the failure of the Sustainable Forestry Roundtable, the focus of activity moved to the State legislature, where industry and environmental groups promoted their own versions of legislation dealing with the wide-ranging policies the Roundtable was considering. In the end, the
Weaker industry legislative proposal was accepted. These legislative changes were similar to the ones passed in Oregon in 1991. These measures directed the Forestry Practices Board to increase regulations, including the imposition of clear cut sizes and the creation of scenic corridors. As with Oregon, it was not difficult for forest companies to meet these new rules. Nor were these rules as strong as what had been agreed upon in the consensus document.39

Networks on State-owned Land

There is a slight exception to clientele-pluralist network resilience in initiatives affecting Washington State publicly-owned land. Here, broad-encompassing planning processes have led to slightly more access for environmental groups and the general public. Before 1979, only ad hoc planning was employed and there were no comprehensive statutory or agency policies in place. In 1979, a Forest Land Management Program (FLMP) was introduced as a State-wide policy to guide management on forest trust lands. The original FLMP was subjected to litigation because of Washington's State Environmental Policy Act, and led to a new FLMP in 1984 giving statutory backing to forest land planning on State owned lands (M'Gonigle et al. 1990: 39). The FLMP contained provisions for citizen and environmental group input.

The FLMPs were joined by the more focused Block/Drainage Management Plans (BDMP), and were similar to the LRMP planning processes on US National Forests.41 However, public involvement in developing BDMPs is discretionary, although it is DNR policy to consult with organized interests and the public during the development of these plans and to allow for public review before they are officially adopted.42 Washington State's SEPA creates another process for public involvement in on publicly-owned lands.43 Similarly, the government of Washington State has the autonomy and capacity to establish ad hoc/limited-term processes such as the Commission on Old Growth Alternatives on its Forest Trust lands, which provided another venue for environmental groups involvement and resulted in pressure-pluralist networks.44
Despite these differences on State-owned land, they do not compare to the public participation and environmental group influence at the national level. There are two primary reasons for this: First, because forest trust lands must provide, by law, revenues to schools and general education programs, there is a strong incentive to put harvesting above other values. Second, Washington State may have autonomy with respect to strategic planning initiatives on State owned land, but it does not extend to the realm of forest practices rules on this land, which is governed by the same Forest Practices Board that regulates private land.

EXPLAINING NETWORK RESILIENCE

The resilience of clientele-forest policy networks in Oregon and Washington cannot be explained by societal factors. Instead, the statutory regime, the high degree of private forest land ownership, and the policy community itself explain much of this network stability. Macro-institutional factors matter in terms of limiting statutory regime change. The importance of the Washington and Oregon forest industries to their economies appears to have had only an indirect effect: giving industry interests additional power in shaping the nature of their forest practices Acts, and through the election of pro-industry legislatures which, coupled with the effects of their macro-institutional structures, rend statutory regime change difficult.

The Statutory Regime

Oregon and Washington statutory regimes largely explain policy network resilience, as well as the slight differences that exist between these two States. In both, forest practices Acts are clear that environmental regulations will not take priority over the maintenance of a healthy forest economy - the opposite of the overall direction of the US federal PNW statutory regime. These Acts were created to limit the legalism of the federal regime, and reduced the industry perceived threat of more stringent federal regulation.
By moving rule-making authority to forest practice boards, the forest practices Acts limited the number of access points usually characteristic of the US macro-institutional structure, thus reducing opportunities for influence by non-industry organized interests. Rowland (1994) notes that even when Jennifer Belcher was elected as Public Lands Commissioner in Washington State in 1992, with a strong ecological agenda, she had little influence on Forest Practices Board decisions: “despite Belcher's valiant effort to raise the level of debate to include what is good for the environment as well as the timber industry”. This shows that sectoral-level statutory regimes can reduce the effects of macro-institutional structures on policy networks.

The slight differences between Oregon and Washington centring around the longer-lasting and more institutionalized multi-stakeholder processes, are also explained by minimal differences in their statutory regimes. Unlike Oregon, the Washington State State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA)\textsuperscript{45} provided a (limited) litigation tool not available to environmental groups in Oregon. The existence of SEPA allowed environmental groups to successfully challenge, in court, an administrative decision limiting SEPA review of forest practices. The 1979 court decision (known as the "Classic U" court case) forced "...all major Department of Natural Resources timber sales [to] undergo State Environmental Policy Act review",\textsuperscript{46} which industry interests had wanted to avoid.

The existence of the SEPA was an important factor contributing to the establishment of the TFW process, since industry disliked operating in the ambiguous legal environment it felt SEPA produced. Coupled with greater uncertainty following a judicial ruling that recognized Indian tribes as "co-managers" of forest, fish and other resources,\textsuperscript{47} industry began to wonder whether a dispute resolution process with environmental groups and Indian tribes might resolve their concerns.

Consequently, the Northwest Water Resources Committee was formed by industry, business, and agriculture interests to begin efforts to reach a negotiated settlement with Indian tribes. This later became a broader-purpose group, the Northwest Renewable Resources Council (NRRC) (Pinkerton 1992: 332). A series of meetings began in 1984 between "representatives of state agencies, Indian
tribes, the timber industry and environmental groups" that eventually formed the Timber/Fish/Wildlife process. Court rulings and the SEPA were behind industry's desire to create the TFW. However, it was the forest industry-oriented Forest Practices Act that directed the process, and underlined the power differences between industry and environmental groups and tribes.

Industry's power ensured that TFW rules required consensus, which further limited environmental group influence. As Hoberg (1993c: 30) has found:

Because [consensus] gives a veto to all the major participants, it is much easier to block action than to change the status quo. Thus, the consensus decision rule favours those who benefit from the status quo. In contemporary environmental politics, where the major thrust of policy making is to strengthen environmental regulation, this rule strongly favours those who oppose additional regulation. In other words, in many cases the veto implicit in the consensus rule is an additional power resource for business interests.

Unlike corporatist networks, the requirement for consensus in the TFW process did not exist because the state mandated it, but because strong, well-organized forest industry interests who benefited most from this requirement, insisted on it.

Thus, in both States, the statutory regimes ensured that administration by forest agencies officials remains a collaborative relationship with their forest industry clientele. Unlike the US federal pattern, where government agencies in the forest policy community are fragmented between land management and regulatory agencies, the statutory regimes in these States led power to be more centralized in the hands of one agency. This supports arguments by Krasner (1978) and Coleman and Skogstad (1990a), that weak macro-institutional structures do not always translate into low capacity at the sectoral level.

Still, Oregon's experiment with using non-discretionary wording in the legislation regarding stream-side harvesting rules does not conform with the description of its overall statutory regime, and warrants attention. In this case, industry supported such non-discretionary wording within the statute to ensure that even if the scientific evidence indicated a need for stronger protection, the Board of Forestry could not impose more stringent standards. This forces a slight modification of
the statutory regimes hypothesis: a non-discretionary statutory regime by itself will not necessarily give environmental groups increased influence - the substantive content must also provide for environmental protection. There is a distinction between provisions that require species protection and result in an evolution of policy as different species become endangered, and (not difficult to attain) detailed rules about how many trees to leave standing during logging operations - rules that, barring a change in legislation, stop the evolution of policy.

Statutory regimes largely account for the resilience of clientele-pluralist networks in Oregon and Washington, but they were reinforced by two other factors: private land ownership and the policy community itself.

Private land

The high level of private-land ownership of lands governed by Oregon and Washington has helped maintain network stability and limit the scope of network policy making. Owing to common law private property rights, permanently removing privately-owned forest land from the extractive land base has never been a consideration. Ironically, this has moved forest practice/harvesting regulations to the forefront of environmental issues in the early 1970s - a time when most environmental groups were still focusing most of their efforts on wilderness protection.

At the same time, the existence of large tracts of private land has led to the creation of powerful forest-land owners organizations in both States. Pinkerton's (1992: 334) analysis found that:

...the tribes and their allies had to accept the maintenance of a lucrative timber industry as one of the goals of the [TFW] agreement, because they feared conversion of private forest land to real estate even more than they feared poor logging practices. The industry could thus continue to use the threat of becoming less profitable than real estate as an indirect threat to habitat. In other words, the benefits of the agreement were widely shared by all parties, but the costs of the agreement were disproportionately borne by tribes, environmentalists, and taxpayers.

The result is that only on State-owned land can access increase for environmental groups (but even here, influence is muted due to Oregon and Washington State's statutory regimes).
The Policy Community Itself

The development of each jurisdiction's policy communities must be considered as a variable affecting policy network change. Part of the explanation for policy network durability is the lack of interest of environmental groups in the Oregon State forest policy community. As one senior official with Oregon's Department of Forestry noted, even though his department's officials interact more with environmental groups now than they did before the mid-1980s, many of their policy deliberations do not interest environmental groups. For example, the department held public meetings in the early 1990s and sought input from environmental groups regarding revisions to its civil penalties rules, but received "very little response". Industry gave "tacit" support to the proposed changes and the policy was changed rather quickly. If environmental groups had shown interest (i.e. if they had sought access to the policy community), the policy in this case might have been different. As the official explained, "If there was an opposition, we would have [had] to slow down and think it through".50

CONCLUSION

The policy network approach employed in the preceding chapters show that changes in state/societal relations may have different causes or explanations, even within the same country. It is not that Halbert and Lee (1990) are wrong when they describe the Washington State TFW Process as "... yet another example of the imperfect compromise typically found in American government - a pluralist regime that has been characterized as the majority rule by the minority that cares", as much as that this characterization of TFW is so broad it would probably apply to most policy networks in most countries. This analysis cannot explain the differences in "eco-forest" policy networks between Washington State and those on federal PNW forest lands.

Increased societal concerns about forest policy resulted in different sources of network change at the State and federal PNW levels: litigation in the US federal sphere, and the forest industry in Washington and Oregon. The combination of statutory regimes, macro-institutional
settings (regarding the difficulty in changing legislation), and private land ownership resulted in little autonomy between the state and organized interests, making it virtually impossible for government, on its own, to provide pro-active solutions to environmental conflicts.

Washington State's statutory regime and the high level of private forest ownership led to: industry initiating the TFW process; the limited scope of TFW policy considerations; and the consensus-oriented policy network in which the forest industry enjoyed more capacity and autonomy than the state or environmental groups. With a macro-institutional structure limiting the influence of the executive, the state was unable to change state/society relations. It was unable and unwilling to influence the policy outputs. Significant changes to existing regulations have only occurred after industry-initiated consensus processes, or through industry-initiated proposals.

For Oregon, societal concerns about the effects of poor forest regulations increased in Oregon after 1987, but industry was able to decide not to enter into any discussions with environmental groups. This effectively stopped environmental groups from becoming policy participants within the sub-government. Using this privileged position, industry was able to propose minimal regulatory changes, which dissipated support for more restrictive measures and citizen ballot initiatives.
Endnotes


2Personal interview, OFIC

3Ibid.

4This challenge resulted from the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act requiring States to establish standards regarding non-point sources of pollution. (33 U.S.C. 1231, Section 319)

5Personal interview.

6Personal interview.

7Personal interview.

8Other policy networks created since this time include those concerning planning on State owned forest land. Indeed, the eco-forest policy work of Oregon Trout is currently focused exclusively on these publicly owned lands (Personal interview, Oregon Trout).

9The legislature sits for six months every two years.

10Personal interviews and Cubbage, O’Laughlin and Bullock (1993: 428).


12The objectives were to “simplify regulation of forest practices on commercial forest land by placing full responsibility for such regulation with the Board of Forestry and to assure that the Board considered other natural resource values that exist on forest land” (Angstrom 1989: 2).

13The Small Woodland Owners Association was left out of this process, because the “core” group felt their concerns would be protected by the OFIC and because of the desire to keep the group “as small as possible” due to “management concerns” and the “short period of time the working group had to draft the bill” (Angstrom 1989: 4-5). In total, 12 members took part in this dispute resolution process.

14Other organized interests were excluded from participation (Angstrom 1989: 3).

15Angstrom (1989: 3), notes that the working group came up with consensus on the following four key issues:

1) The counties role in regulating forest practices.
2) The Forest Practices Act should be rewritten to direct the Board of Forestry to maintain key resources required of other state agencies under the Oregon Land Use Program.
3) The reconstitution of the Board of Forestry which would see the Governor appoint members with no designated positions for interest groups.
4) Forest practices would be exempt form the Land Use Board of Appeals.

16These unresolved issues included the matter of county representation on the Board of Forestry, detailed language regarding appeals of written plans, and the definition of the “scope” of forestry (Angstrom 1989: 4).

17For more detail and analysis of the amendments during the congressional hearings, see Angstrom (1989) and Oregon. Department of Forestry (1988).

An amendment to the federal Clean Water Act in 1987 also had an impact on State practices. It required States to develop standards “for regulating non-point sources of pollution,” which would include timber harvesting practices. Not only do agency planning documents have to comply with these regulations, but so do the actual forest practices resulting from these plans. However, the Oregon Forest industry succeeded in having these regulations come under the Forest Practices Board instead
of the Office of Environmental Quality.

More public members were also added. See Salazar (1988a: 62).

The chances of an environmentalist being appointed to the Board were slim as of the early 1990s, owing to the political climate. As a senior official from Portland Audubon explained:

It is possible that the government would make an appointment of an environmentalist to the Board. Theoretically it is possible but politically it is not because all Board appointments have to be approved by the Senate - [and] an environmentalist would not survive. Not in this legislature and not in previous legislatures (personal interview).

For an environmental group critique of the legislation, see 1000 Friends of Oregon (1991).

Consider the Portland Audubon's analysis of the Board's deliberations over protection of the Spotted Owl:

...[Board of Forestry] did adopt some rules to protect the spotted owl habitat - enough to protect the bird itself - a "take" from occurring. But it is such a minimal amount of habitat protection it is tantamount to saying, 'We'll keep from killing the bird but we will make it so uninhabitable that the bird won't stay there (personal interview).

OFIC interview.

OFIC interview. This last provision was proposed not by environmental groups but the forest industry, who feared that small land owners might turn their land to agricultural purposes.

The actual genesis of this committee was somewhat of a procedural fluke. As the Portland Audubon explains:

...one of the things that really got the goat of the industry in 1991 was in the conference committee - there was a House version and Senate version of the bill - there were some words added to require that the Board of Forestry review its stream side protection rules, to provide stream side diversity, etc. ...It passed only in Conference - it would never have gotten through on the House floor. Industry...had to swallow this pill. And this is how we got stream classification and protection reform in 1993 (Personal interview).


See Washington State. Department of Natural Resources (1988:4)

The WEC council was involved in seven drafts of the legislation and 12 drafts of the initial regulations.

Although the elected Commissioner of Public Lands is in charge of the Department of Natural Resources, it is the Governor who nominates individuals to positions on the Forest Practices Board. This means that a Governor favouring increased forest practice regulations could nominate representatives for the state agencies that would take a different stance from their historically pro-extraction/commodity-oriented position. However, such change is extremely slow. As one member of the Washington Environment Council has noted, the current Governor favours increased eco-forest regulations, but has been unable to replace enough members to change the majority outlook of the Board (personal interview).

So frustrated was the Washington Environmental Council by the current rule-making procedures, that they launched an effort to amend the Forest Practice legislation in 1985 to allow for scientific input into the Forest Practice Board deliberations. Their effort resulted in legislation being introduced, which failed to gain a majority of support in the State legislature. Specifically, the bill would have amended the Forest Practices Board by "adding members and creating an independent team of experts to review forest practices with a major chance of damaging down stream resources" (Personal communication, Washington Environmental Council).

As in Oregon, there were considerable deliberations over county zoning matters, and forest land conversion issues. See Washington State. Department of Natural Resources (1990: 14, 25).


This roundtable was formally established by the then Public Lands Commissioner Brian Boyle, who sought to expand the TFW process to include more groups considering a wider range of forest practice options.

There were some important differences between groups participating in the TFW process. First, environmental group participation was limited to the Washington Environmental Council, as the Washington State Audubon Society did not participate in these proceedings. Secondly, the Washington State Association of Counties (WSAC) was added because of the policy role counties have with respect to land use planning and zoning matters. Thirdly, The Forest Practices Board also participated as a member in this process.

The first meeting of the Washington State Sustainable Forestry Roundtable’s steering committee included a detailed list of policy areas that fall under the four general categories. This list includes policies on inventory, identification of “special areas”, the right to practice forestry and exemption of environmental assessments (Washington State Department of Natural Resources 1990: 3-4).

See Pinkerton (1992: 336). Its goal was more comprehensive than the TFW accord, and aimed at getting agreement on a wide-range of sustainable forest practices that would maintain “biological ecological integrity while producing forest products forever” (Cubbage, O’Laughlin, and Bullock 1993: 95).

The agreement was to limit the annual allowable cut to “no more than 4 percent of an owner’s forest land in a watershed area” (Cubbage, O’Laughlin, and Bullock 1993: 95).

See Gray (1991), Cubbage et al. (1993: 95). Although a tentative agreement was reached in October 1990, membership of the WEC and Washington State Audubon failed to support a deal that they felt was too lenient on the forest industry. The Washington Environment Council representative at this meeting explains that not only was there “intense pressure” at this meeting, but that it was clear that the agreement was a tentative one that would need to be cleared with the WEC membership (personal interview). In particular, the WEC membership rejected both the 10-year life of the agreement, “since it limited future options to challenge forest practices” and also “sought greater set-asides for wildlife habitat in timber harvest zones” (Gray 1991). Also see Cubbage (1993: 95), Pinkerton (1992: 336).

The inability of environmental groups to ratify this agreement jaded other members of the policy community, who became less enthusiastic about entering into such types of processes in the future (Personal interview, senior official, Washington Division of Forestry, Department of Natural Resources).

In 1988, a Strategic Plan for Forest Resource Management was prepared for all State trust lands, including forests. According to M’Gonigle and others (1990: 40), “The plan set out preferred visions, a mission statement and gathered information to develop long term goals and objectives and the strategies and policies to achieve them”.

The BDMP area creates a forest management plan “for a large contiguous forest area which has common identifiable issues or concerns (M’Gonigle et al. 1990: 41). Although often producing distinct plans, all BDMPs must contain, “a detailed description of goals and objectives; a definition of land use alternatives; a recommended planning alternative; and a method to implement the planning alternative when adopted” (M’Gonigle et al. 1990: 41). In addition, watersheds within blocks often undergo their own planning strategy. It is only after the BDMP is completed that operational plans are developed in order to conduct timber sales.

M’Gonigle and others (1990: 42).

However, since the FLMP underwent an environmental impact statement, an EIS is not required for BDMPs unless they “...are seen to deviate greatly form the norms found within the state” (M’Gonigle et al. 1990: 42).
The main concern of this process was how to balance the desire to preserve the remaining old growth forests on State-owned land, and the corresponding requirement that State forests’ revenues fund the State’s education programs. See Washington State Commission on Old Growth Alternatives for Washington’s Forest Trust Lands (1989). Melanie Rowland, Conservation Chair and Board Member of The Seattle Audubon Society participated in this committee’s deliberations, along with State agency, US forest service, industry, labour, and university representatives. Interestingly, Rowland would soon join the Washington Environmental Council, which did not share Seattle Audubon Society’s focus on federal forest land issues.

In fact, the Forest Practices Act was amended in 1975 to limit SEPA restrictions to activities “which have a potential for substantial impact on the environment”. This represented a setback for environmentalists and Native Americans. As Pinkerton (1992: 333) states:

A large part of the struggle to protect fish and wildlife habitat has centered around the effort by the tribes and their allies to enlarge the definition of which logging activities have to be reviewed by a SEPA process as potentially harmful.

See Washington State (1988: 4) and Pinkerton (1992: 333). The classic timber sale case refers to Noel V. Cole:

in which an environmental group won a ruling in 1980 that the definition of what activities were potentially harmful to the environment was too narrow and restrictive to fulfill the purposes of the Forest Practices Act (to protect other public resources) (Pinkerton 1992: 333)

The result forced the Forest Practices Board to review its regulations of what constituted a “potentially harmful” act and listed 14 issues to receive consideration to be considered in the definition of “environmental sensitivity” (Pinkerton 1992: 333).

The 1974 and 1980 “Boldt” decisions “interpreted the language of 1850s treaties that the US government had made with western Washington tribes as providing guarantee that the tribes could manage their own fisheries, subject to certain conservation restrictions, and to joint planning with state managers (Pinkerton 1992: 330). See also Washington State, Department of Natural Resources (1988: 4).

Industry insisted that the statute require that “two snags” per acre be left when harvesting near streams. As the Portland Audubon notes, this meant that the Board of Forestry could not respond to scientific data that might indicate more than two snags were needed (personal interview).

This was partly owing to a series of damning articles printed in the Oregonian. See Durbin and Koberstein (1990).
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CHAPTER SEVEN
EVOLUTION OF THE BRITISH COLUMBIA ECO-FOREST POLICY COMMUNITY

The path taken by British Columbia's forest policy community and the evolving role of environmental groups differs sharply from both the US federal and State level experiences. During the 1970s, only a handful of province-wide environmental groups existed, and most were unsuccessful in influencing forest policy making processes. Environmental groups were at the margins, with economic interests and the state dominating policy making. During the 1980s, province-wide environmental groups attempted to increase their influence within the forest policy sub-government, but achieved only minor success.

Since the late 1980s, the number and types of environmental groups seeking influence in BC changed dramatically. Not only did some environmental groups become participants in policy making, but there was also an expansion of professional, expertise-oriented environmental groups. A province-wide coalition of the key eco-forest groups was established, and new governmental and quasi-governmental agencies emerged (Diagrams 7.0 and 7.1 present the policy community in 1975 and 1995). This chapter outlines these changes, and then examines the ability of the historical institutionalist hypotheses to account for them.

POLICY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TO THE MID-1980s

As with the US federal experience, conservation groups were established in BC well before the first wave of environmentalism in the 1960s, with some roots going back to the 19th Century. Wilson (1990: 148) notes that these groups have organized into three broad province-wide umbrella organizations, according to whether they focus on hunting, naturalist or recreation issues. Fish, wildlife and hunting clubs formed the BC Wildlife Federation; naturalist groups created the Federation of BC Naturalists; and "non-consumptive outdoor recreation" groups formed the Outdoor Recreation Council (ORC). These groups have tended to take on two different roles: one as policy participants over regulatory or management matters affecting their membership's interests (such as assisting
with Provincial Park recreation policy); and the other as policy advocates for increasing protected areas within the province.

The establishment of these groups partly influenced the first wave of environmentalism, with the Federation of BC Naturalists and the Outdoor Recreation Council active in environmental issues. Like the experience of the US Izaak Walton League, the BC Wildlife Federation has not become part of this broader movement, and sometimes finds itself opposing environmental groups, particularly regarding endangered species issues.

New environmental groups started to appear in the mid-1960s. With the exception of the BC-based Sierra Club in 1969 and the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society in 1963 (with a BC Chapter created in 1980), most of them were devoted to saving a particular valley or special area threatened by logging. Such groups included the Okanagan Similkameen Parks Society and the Valhalla Wilderness Committee (Wilson 1990: 149). Their focus was on wilderness preservation, with little emphasis on sustainable forest practices. These groups had no choice but to focus at the local level on specific proposed protected areas, since they were blocked from participating in comprehensive regional or province-wide strategic land use planning.

After 1975 and continuing through the 1980s, there was another proliferation of wilderness protection-oriented groups in BC (Wilson 1990). Similarly denied influence at the provincial level, the bulk of these groups followed down the now well trodden path of saving a particular valley or watershed, and included such organizations as the Friends of Clayoquot Sound, Friends of Strathcona Park, Friends of the Stikine, East Kootenay Environmental Society, Cortes Island Forest Committee, and the Carmanah Forestry Society.

Virtually all of these groups are membership-based. They rely on membership fees and individual donations for most of their revenues, and voluntarism for most of their labour. With the exception of the 1972-1975 period, government policy excluded them from the forest policy community sub-government as policy participants, restricting their role to that of policy advocates.
Officials of eco-forest groups rarely formed broad, province-wide strategic coalitions, although they would interact and communicate informally. The creation of the Coalition for Responsible Forestry Legislation (CRFL) was a short-lived exception. It was organized by environmental groups and lobbied unsuccessfully for “ecological reserve and multiple resource use” during the period preceding the 1978 Forest Act (Marchak 1983: 59).

Gradually eco-forest values began to coalesce and groups broadened their perspectives to focus on global issues of wilderness and environmental protection. One of the most significant results of this was the Western Canada Wilderness Committee, formed in 1979. Others included the Friends of Ecological Reserves, the Raincoast Conservation Society, and the Valhalla Wilderness Society (which expanded from the Valhalla Wilderness Committee after preserving the Valhalla in 1983). Even the West Coast Environmental Law Association began to address forest issues (Marchak 1983: 60). National groups such as the Canadian Nature Federation and the Sierra Club of Canada became members of the attentive public, moving to an advocacy role when there was a federal angle to pursue.

Industry Organizations

Since the 1960s, the Council of Forest Industries of BC (COFI) has been the dominant industry member of the forest policy community. COFI represents both pulp and lumber companies, reflecting the vertical integration of the industry. Until recently, it was comprised of individual companies that owned Tree Farm Licences on the coast, and was affiliated with two interior associations that relied mostly on Timber Supply Areas for their sources of fibre. Coleman (1988: 158) has noted that COFI’s ability to organize its internal structure to mirror its work with government agencies significantly enhances its ability to participate in various policy networks. By integrating most of the dominant forest industry economic actors under one umbrella, COFI is able to respond quickly to government initiatives or citizen demands for more environmental protection.
Although COFl represents most of the companies in the province, its largest members also represent themselves individually. For example, MacMillan-Bloedel has its own government relations department, providing in-house expertise on a range of policy matters. Specific battles over protected areas often get handled by the company that holds tenure rights to the disputed areas.

Other industry groups include the BC Truck Loggers Association (BCTLA), an organization created in 1943, whose members are independent loggers, logging contractors and forest-related companies (large forest companies will often contract out harvesting to Truck Loggers members). Before the mid-1980s, the BCTLA did not play an active role in the forest policy making process, remaining part of the attentive public. The Interior Logging Association (ILA) represents contractors who focus primarily on interior operations, but is rarely involved in policy community sub-government activity.

Labour

The most dominant forest union in BC is the Industrial Wood and Allied Workers of Canada (IWA-Canada). It represents the vast majority of the province's forestry workers. The stumpage and tenure system has encouraged high wages in the forest industry and has also facilitated the development of the IWA, which broke off its ties to the US-based International Woodworkers of America in the early 1980s. This union has established institutionalized linkages with the New Democratic Party, allowing it increased access to the BC forest policy community when a New Democratic Party is in power. However, the NDP has rarely governed the province, so the IWA has tended to concentrate on obtaining high wages for its members and fighting high profile battles to maintain its membership base.

The IWA also acts as a policy advocate on a wide range of policy matters from stumpage rates to the tenure system, although much of its focus is on collective agreements with its employers. The New Democratic Party's close links to both the IWA and environmental groups has
resulted in a greater degree of union/environmentalist interaction and compromise than in the Pacific Northwest. Notably though, the IWA has often been closer to forest companies’ positions on eco-forest matters.¹⁵

Other unions within the forest policy community "attentive public" include the Communication and Paperworkers Union (CPU), and the Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada (PPWC). Marchak (1983: 60-61) notes that these unions were much smaller than the IWA, which, in 1979 had 50,000 members including the "majority of the organized labour force in logging".¹⁷ The United Fisherman and Allied Workers Union is also involved periodically due to its interests in regulating forest harvesting near fish-bearing streams.

Other Actors

Aboriginal peoples have been involved on the periphery of the forest policy community, except over individual protected area proposals (Nathan 1993: 137). The Association of BC Professional Foresters (ABCPF) is an active professional organization on matters such as forest certification and promoting provincial regulations to require the services of professional foresters in forest management. Research organizations have included the BC Public Interest Group, and academics from the University of British Columbia's (UBC) Forestry Faculty, UBC’s Forest Economics and Policy Analysis Research Unit (FEPA), UBC’s School of Community and Regional Planning, and Simon Fraser University’s School of Resource and Environmental management. The federal government’s Canadian Forest Service also provides research studies and technical advice.
Government Agencies

Until the early 1990s, the sole agency responsible for managing BC’s forests was the BC Forest Service and its 43 District Managers who administered policy at the local level. However, these managers were not dominant members of the policy community. Much of the administration of forest management practices - including harvesting permits and five year development plans - delegated to forest companies under the area-based Tree Farm Licences (TFLs).18 Forest Managers had slightly more authority administering the volume-based Timber Supply Areas (TSAs), most of which are located in the interior of the province.

From 1948-69, the Forest Service fell under the purview of the Ministry of Lands, Forests and Water Resources, which Duffy (1990) describes as a "multi-purpose agency". The federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans has been involved intermittently concerning forest practices.19 The provincial cabinet is a central member of the policy community sub-government, while the legislature is essentially unimportant.

In the early 1970s, the provincial cabinet created an Environmental and Land Use Committee (ELUC) and its Secretariat to oversee and coordinate land use disputes in the province. It reported directly to cabinet. The ELUC was joined by Resources Management Committees (RMCs) which were designed to encourage interagency collaboration at the regional level. A Ministry of Environment, created in 1977, absorbed the ELUC secretariat, but had little influence relative to the Forest Service. In fact, the Forest Service increased its dominance within the policy community in 1983, when ELUC and RMCs were abolished and replaced by an Integrated Resources Branch within the Ministry of Forests (Duffy 1990: 3). Finally, short-lived forest policy-oriented Royal Commissions have often preceded legislative change.20
CHANGES TO THE BC FOREST POLICY COMMUNITY SINCE THE MID-1980s

Environmental groups

Following heightened societal concern about the forest environment, environmental groups increased their capacity to propose and critique BC government initiatives, and some altered their internal organizational structures. The Sierra Club of Western Canada\textsuperscript{21} retained its advocacy function, but also took advantage of policy network change to become a meaningful member of the sub-government.\textsuperscript{22} For example, it augmented its wilderness protected area expertise by working with the US Wilderness Society to produce detailed maps that rivalled those in the Ministry of Forests, and increased its attention to forest practices rules (Hamilton 1994). The decision to become actively involved in the sub-government was a difficult one, and was preceded by much internal organizational debate. Much ambivalence remains, with the Sierra Club wishing to be part of the sub-government in order to shape policy choices and direction, but also wishing to maintain its ability to publicly criticize the government where strategically necessary. Overt criticism is taken only after serious reflection, since it risks removal from sub-government deliberations.

After internal debates about how to reverse a declining membership, the Western Canada Wilderness Committee (WCWC) went in the opposite direction of the Sierra Club. It decided to take more radical positions, arguing that 40 per cent of the province should be protected from forest harvesting and other industrial uses. It explicitly rejected invitations to become a policy participant, and favoured publicity campaigns to discredit the BC government and its forest policies in Europe and the United States.\textsuperscript{23} The WCWC also expanded its interest to forest practices matters, calling for a BC Forest Practices Act as early as the Spring of 1989.\textsuperscript{24} In the short term, these efforts had their desired effect: membership increased.\textsuperscript{25}

The Valhalla Wilderness Committee followed the same strategy. Once an active organization with strong links to the New Democratic Party when it was in opposition, it became disillusioned with the level of annual timber harvest the governing NDP was allowing and what the Committee
considered were inadequate policy initiatives. It became one of the most vocal critics of Harcourt's NDP government. The Valhalla Committee has taken its critique of BC forest practices and land use policies internationally, earning considerable esteem in international quarters. Other more radical groups, such as the Forest Action Network, emerged during the early 1990s. Regional and province-wide associations of environmental groups were formed to communicate with each other and to coordinate activities. For example, the Vancouver Island Conservation Alliance was formed to represent various environmental groups on Vancouver Island land use matters.

One of the most striking developments was what Bernstein and Cashore (1996 [revised February 1997]: 2) refer to as the "internationalization" of the BC forest policy community, defined as "the phenomenon whereby policies within domestic jurisdictions face increased scrutiny and participation from actors and/or institutions outside of those jurisdictions (i.e. the policy community expands to include transnational actors)." International and US-based environmental groups began to provide well-trained, professional staff with legal and scientific expertise, and considerable financial resources. One example is the addition of the international World Wildlife Fund's Toronto office, which became heavily focused on protected areas in BC in the late 1980s. An organization that relies mostly on foundation and corporate donations, WWF established a BC office in 1992, created BC Spaces for Nature and hired one of BC's best-known protected area advocates. This organization chose to work behind-the-scenes, a tactic bureaucratic officials and members of the provincial cabinet argue has worked very effectively. Government actors readily allowed BC Spaces for Nature to work as a policy participant in the sub-government, and the vast majority of areas the WWF has recommended for protection have now been protected.

Following the Clayoquot Sound controversy, the New York/Washington-based Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC) became an active player in the BC forest policy community, focusing on forest protection and sustainable forest practices. The NRDC is a product of the US statutory regime and was created in 1972 to enforce US laws through litigation. The NRDC gradually
expanded its expertise when it realized that by hiring professional scientists, it could enforce existing laws more effectively. In recent years, foundations have contributed significantly to the NRDC, so that membership revenues now account for only half of its income. The NRDC is a highly effective member of the US forest policy community sub-government. It works for legislative and regulatory change, litigates, and works on cooperative ventures with government.

However, in British Columbia the NRDC played more of an advocacy role, using the media and the celebrity status of Robert Kennedy, Jr. to highlight the BC government's actions on Clayoquot Sound in the United States. It brought aboriginal peoples from Clayoquot to New York and Washington, DC, and used its high-placed connections within the US to launch an effective campaign to raise the Clayoquot Sound issue in the White House and Congress. Recognizing the sensitivity of sovereignty issues, the NRDC also took pains to portray itself as working with BC aboriginal and environmental groups. As one senior official stated:

"...we like the partnership model with other groups, because in fact we think that's a stronger way of working than having an office, for example in Vancouver. We prefer to work with ... Sierra Club of Western Canada, Sierra Legal Defense Fund, and all the groups up there, because after all they're the groups that are Canadian. They're the groups that are going to carry on this long after we've had an association around a particular issue.

...I don't have a solution for British Columbia. Bobby Kennedy doesn't have a solution for British Columbia. What we want to do is help groups that do have a vision of the solution actually have some leverage to bring about vision of a solution."

Unlike most domestic-based BC groups, the NRDC chose to limit its attention to Clayoquot Sound.

One official explains this focus:

"We really feel strongly [that] we have to focus [US] national attention there [Clayoquot Sound] and that that will actually help everybody else be more successful."

The results of this effort gained it a small but important place as a policy participant within the sub-government. The BC Premier personally called NRDC's Washington, DC office on several occasions to discuss forest policy initiatives.
The controversy surrounding Clayoquot Sound increased the attention of other US, European and international eco-forest groups. Greenpeace Germany, Greenpeace UK, Greenpeace International and the World Wildlife Fund, UK, and the Women’s Environmental Network (WEN) all got involved in advocating boycotts of BC timber exports after the Clayoquot Sound controversy. The US boycotts were orchestrated by the California-based Rainforest Action Network (RAN). These groups had little interest in direct interaction in the BC sub-government, and many of their most vocal members knew little about the specifics of BC forest policy. Both boycotts were supported by the BC-based Western Canada Wilderness Committee.

These efforts were joined by the Vancouver Office of Greenpeace Canada. After a total lack of presence in the forest policy community, Greenpeace Vancouver seized on Clayoquot’s international attention beginning in 1992, and made the campaign to protect the Sound from logging a focus of its conservation efforts. Greenpeace adopted an advocacy approach and focused on wilderness protection and the elimination of clear cutting. However, Greenpeace Vancouver moved into a policy participant role and into the realm of additional forest management/practice policies as the NDP government set up new processes to deal with Clayoquot Sound.

Another US-based group that became involved in BC forest policy is Eco-trust, based in Portland, Oregon. An offshoot of Conservation International, Eco-trust brings a holistic ethic into its projects, promoting community cooperation and discussion. It has been most active in protecting the Kitlope, and soliciting the support of and working with the Haisla nation. It has recently set up a BC office, and has a policy of working with government officials and community groups in a consensus-oriented manner.

Since 1994, Washington State-based Northwest Ecosystem Alliance has been the impetus behind the Cascades International Alliance. The alliance is a coalition of a dozen “environment, recreation and education groups from Canada and the United States [proposing] the creation of the Cascades International Park” out of existing protected areas, to be managed on an ecosystem
basis. Research-oriented US environmental groups, such as the Pacific Environment Resource Center, began to focus their efforts on BC forest practices.

United States and international involvement was not limited to indigenous groups expanding their efforts across the border. In 1991, the Sierra Legal Defence Fund (SLDF) was created with financial support from US interests and seed money from the Law Society of BC. Following the model of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund in the United States, SLDF has had important victories, but has not equalled the success of its US cousin (Hoberg 1993). However, it has provided the environmental community expertise, offering a detailed critique of the Forest Practices Code on behalf of the BC environmental movement, conducted by highly-trained professional lawyers. The SLDF spawned a new organization in early 1995, Forest Policy Watch, whose mandate is to develop an organization of highly-trained forest policy experts. Both SLDF and Forest Policy Watch are active in forest practices/harvesting issues.

For the first time, the most prominent eco-forest activists in BC's main eco-forest groups formed a province-wide coalition in the early 1990s called BC Wild. Its purpose is to coordinate better the efforts of the BC environment movement, to act strategically, and to undertake non-public advocacy on selected issues. It provided some measure of horizontal integration of environmentalists that was previously only enjoyed by the province's largest forest companies. In addition, BC Wild is an important source of funds for community-based environmental groups across the province which otherwise would not be able to carry out local projects.
Following the increased salience of environmental issues and the growing influence of environmental groups, BC industry altered its strategic approaches and re-organized its associational structure. The COFI dropped its highly criticized and (self-acknowledged) ineffective public relations program called "Forests Forever", which attempted to defend existing harvesting practices. Instead, the Chief Executive Officers of COFI's largest companies formed the Forest Alliance of BC, and sought links with labour, SHARE groups, and even former environmental advocates. The Chairman of the Forest Alliance is former IWA chief, Jack Munro, and its Executive Director is Patrick Moore, a former member and founder of Greenpeace. The role of the Forest Alliance was not only to defend the BC forest industry, but to acknowledge that BC forest companies were responding to environmental concerns and were improving their forest practices. These actions were taken after COFI officials realized that it was losing its historically close relationship with the Ministry of Forests. As one senior official said, "the industry, in this day and age, rarely is going to be successful if it alone holds an opinion".

Consequently and most importantly, COFI reorganized its membership structure in 1993, turning its attention "more toward government affairs and less towards customer and public affairs". Instead of its mix of individual and association membership, COFI has now become an "association of associations". National affairs were left to the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association while ongoing trade disputes, such as the softwood lumber tariff, have been assigned to the Canadian Forest Industries Council. This reorganization has meant fewer financial resources for COFI's central office, as more money is spent on the Forest Alliance and on European offices focused on protecting BC's overseas markets. Nonetheless, COFI argues that this change has resulted in a centralized industry voice at the provincial level. As one COFI vice-president said:

COFI has now been given the provincial mandate. In the past, it wouldn't have been seen to be speaking very frequently for the Interior Lumber Manufacturers or the CLMA, whereas now COFI speaks provincially for all these organizations.
Demonstrating COFI's ability to adapt, its 1994 annual report states:

These decisions were grounded in the belief that the mandate, structure and priorities of COFI needed to be refocused to pave the way for ever-more effective responses to new and emerging social, political, economic and environmental conditions. Although these changes reflect the BC forest industries' ability to adapt COFI's organizational structure to address current policy initiatives better, COFI has lost key responsibilities to other industry initiatives and has suffered a slight decrease in membership. Taking advantage of the changing political climate, The Truck Loggers of BC became more active in government affairs, developing detailed proposals for tenure reform and land use initiatives often different from positions taken by COFI.

Labour

The role of organized labour also changed in two ways. First, it became an active member of the forest land use policy sub-government in 1991. Second, the IWA joined forces with industry through the creation of the Forest Alliance noted above, where labour and industry both promoted land use and forest practice changes, and defended BC against international scrutiny in Europe, Brazil, and the United States. In contrast, the Canadian Pulp and Paper Workers Union moved toward policy advocacy and sustainable forest practices, working with a group of environmental, church and community groups through the Tin Wis Coalition discussed below.

Aboriginal Groups

The establishment of the BC Treaty Commission has brought aboriginal issues to the attention of the members of the BC forest policy community. Yet in the short-term, the existence of the Treaty Commission has resulted in aboriginal groups often opting out of participation in the forest policy community sub-government. For instance, most aboriginal groups refused direct participation...
in multi-stakeholder processes fearing that this might prejudice their treaty negotiations, and result in them being treated as simply another interest.

Aboriginal groups do maintain active involvement in individual "valley to valley" protected area campaigns, including battles over Clayoquot Sound, the Kitlope and the Kutzeymateen. Environmental groups such as the NRDC and Eco-trust have actively sought links with aboriginal groups as part of their strategy to protect individual areas, although these alliances have been "somewhat uneasy" (Nathan 1993: 156) owing to differing primary interests. Industry has been developing aboriginal policies as well and coopting aboriginal peoples into its bureaucratic structures, with the Council of Forest Industries developing an Aboriginal Division and Vice-Presidency in 1993.

Finally, the Intertribal Forestry Association of BC (IFABC) was founded in 1987 to address native concerns about forestry issues. The result was national forestry legislation concerning regulations on reserve lands (Nathan 1993: 139).

Other

Increased concern about protecting the environment led to the addition of two new coalitions to the forest policy community that brought together a cross section of different interests. First, the Tin Wis coalition formed in 1988 over the issue of forest practices regulations and eventually proposed Forest Stewardship Act in 1991. It was a coalition of environmental groups, some labour organizations such as the Canadian Pulp and Paper Workers, BC Federation of Labour and the BC Government Employees Union, aboriginal groups, church groups and then opposition New Democratic Party officials. As Pinkerton (1993: 34) states:

Although many BC environmentalists focused their energy...on efforts to preserve representative old-growth ecosystems, a growing number who worked in the labour movement, with tribal councils and with non-native communities, were equally or more concerned with responsible and accountable management of "the working forest."
The Tin Wis coalition did not have any interactions with the sub-government. Instead, it served as one of the first efforts to address forest practices among different organized interests, whose ideas were then fed into the then opposition New Democratic Party. Once the New Democratic Party came to power, in October 1991, the Tin Wis coalition dissolved.\textsuperscript{68}

In addition, two related land use processes/consultations involving key members of the BC forest policy community took place in 1988 and 1991. The 1988 process, called "Dunsmuir I", aimed to find common ground between industry, environmental groups, aboriginal peoples and other organized interests. Its original impetus came from the BC Outdoor Recreation Council. These initial discussions were followed up with further negotiations in 1991, dubbed, "Dunsmuir II", and influenced the New Democratic Party government's land use/forest protection agenda.

Sensing upcoming policy change, members of the attentive public and research organizations also adapted. Forest Planning Canada magazine was established, and became an important source of material for environmental policy advocates.\textsuperscript{69} The Association of BC Professional Foresters took an active role in promoting forest land stewardship (Neizen 1987).

Government Agencies

The number of government agencies in BC involved in the forest policy community expanded considerably in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the mid-1980s, numerous types of ad hoc bodies were created, including the Wilderness Advisory Committee (WAC), which was initiated by the Ministry of the Environment and included non-government organization participation. A multi-agency Wilderness Liaison Committee was established to review WAC's recommendations, and it was followed by the interagency Parks and Wilderness for the 1990s Committee and the Old Growth Strategy Committee, both formed in 1990. An interagency Provincial Land Use Strategy (PLUS) working group of senior bureaucrats was created to coordinate these various land use processes and was still in existence as of late 1996. Parks and Wilderness for the 1990s and the Old Growth
Strategy process lasted until 1992 when they were replaced with the interagency Protected Area Strategy.

Less than two years before their defeat in 1991 by the New Democratic Party, the Social Credit Government established a "permanent" Forest Resources Commission (FRC) and the Round Table on the Environment and the Economy. The FRC was created to address increasing environmental concerns, and provided a vehicle by which public input on forest policy could be made. The Round Table on the Environment and the Economy was established to facilitate broad-ranging policy discussions, mostly among business, government and organized labour interests.70

The most significant changes to the government members of the forest policy community occurred after the 1991 election of the New Democratic Party, which introduced a myriad of new land use and forest practices initiatives. The former included the establishment of the Commission on Resources and the Environment, the Protected Area Strategy, and Land Resource Management Plans. (The NDP provincial government abolished the FRC and eventually eliminated the Round Table on the Environment and the Economy). With respect to forest practices initiatives, Ministry of Forest District Managers gained additional authority, Ministry of Environment officials became part of the sub-government, and a Forest Practices Board and Appeals Commission was created. Finally, the Forest Renewal Board Corporation was established (financed out of increased stumpage rates) to minimize job losses due to increased environmental protection, and encourage diversification of the forest economy. All of these initiatives have affected the restructuring of existing policy networks, the details of which are presented in the following chapter.

EXPLANATION

Societal influences clearly affected the salience of environmental issues (first in the 1970s and again in the mid-1980s), the increased mobilization of groups, and the increased concern by international players. However, a societal explanation does not explain why it was not until 1991 that
the old policy community remained largely in place, with environmental groups marginalized and fragmented. It does not account for the explosion of new groups and the "internationalization" of the forest policy community beginning in the late 1980s, nor for the dramatic increase in resources and expertise of environmental interests.

Instead, institutional factors account for much of the direction of policy community development. The organizational development of environmental groups and their role within the policy community appear to be greatly influenced by British Columbia's Westminster model of government, its undeveloped and discretionary statutory regime, and that fact that the vast majority of forest land was publicly owned. The conjunction of these three factors gave the BC cabinet tremendous control over which organized interests could participate in the sub-government, and which would be relegated to the margins. Thus, unlike the PNW policy communities, the political party in power and its ideology played a determining role. The dominance of the Social Credit Party during most of the 1970s and 1980s - a party that showed little interest in including environmental groups - meant that environmental groups found few points of access to the policy making process. Conversely, when the New Democratic government decided to increase the influence of environmental groups vis-à-vis industry organizations in the early 1990s, it was able to provide financial resources to environmental interests to accomplish this objective.71

At the same time, these institutional factors only partially shaped the development of organized interests within the policy community, particularly the growth of environmental groups. The Socred's decision to exclude environmental interests at the provincial level for most of the 1970s and 1980s may explain why environmental groups established during this time tended to focus on protected areas, and why they used public relations and media to promote their cause.72 But how is the increase in financial resources to both domestic and international groups in late 1980s and early 1990s accounted for? How is the internationalization of the policy community to be explained?
Two other factors stand out: the role of US foundations in providing resources and the importance of BC forest products exports. US foundations played a crucial role in providing sources of funding to existing BC groups, for US groups that wanted to become active in BC forest politics, and for the creation of new groups established in the province. A case in point: the Sierra Club of Western Canada's entry into the sub-government coincided with an infusion of capital from US foundations. Some US-based groups, such as Eco-trust, that were an integral part of protected areas issues, were financed completely by US foundations and had no membership base of which to speak. US foundation resources were also largely behind the creation of the expertise-building Sierra Legal Defense Fund. The creation of BC Wild owes directly to the wishes of US foundation officials that key BC activists form a cohesive coalition. The direct impetus for BC Wild came from the Philadelphia-based Pew Foundation that sought to expand its temperate forest conservation efforts from Northern California to Southern Alaska. In order to invest effectively in British Columbia, Pew and other US foundations "preferred to see one sort of umbrella organization and/or coalition which they could fund and which would coordinate the efforts of the organizations represented".

In addition, the role of international actors is attributable to the importance of BC forest product exports, making it vulnerable to actual and threatened consumer boycotts. As Premier Harcourt noted:

In California, legislation has been proposed to ban BC forest products. The New York Times is under pressure to stop printing on BC paper. In England, Scott Paper suspended a $5.5-billion wood-pulp contract. In Europe alone, $3-billion a year in BC forest exports are on the line.

Importantly, Bernstein and Cashore (1996 {revised February 1997}) found that BC's dependence on foreign markets did not cause international groups to seek access to the BC forest policy community, since dependence on foreign markets had long characterized the BC forest economy. Instead, this dependence acted as a facilitator to groups in their efforts to influence BC policy.
International environmental groups became interested in the BC forest policy community in the early 1990s for three key reasons. First, many US-based environment groups and US foundations turned their attention to BC forest policy after their efforts south of the border to save the Northern Spotted Owl resulted in increased forest protection and forest practice regulations. As Robert F. Kennedy Jr. noted:

> The British Columbia issue was driven in large part by the fact that NRDC shut down a lot of the logging industry in the Pacific Northwest and increased demand for old growth timber from British Columbia. We saw ourselves in this ironic position of essentially exporting our environmental problems to British Columbia.

Another NRDC official explained the concern over BC forest practices as the result of the "spill over effect". Second, environmental groups were spurred into the BC forest policy community due to the ongoing Canada-US softwood lumber dispute, which allowed environmental groups in both countries to argue that the BC government and other Canadian provinces did not charge forest companies enough to harvest publicly-owned timber. Third, international media attention on the 1993 decision to allow logging in Clayoquot Sound heightened criticism by environmental groups and general public opinion in Europe and the US that was critical of BC forestry practices.

Thus, the policy community expanded partly because of the domestic success of US eco-forest groups (and their desire not to export environmental damage North of the Border), and because of the power US and European groups wielded in threatening boycotts. Globalization (dependence on foreign markets and capital) played an enabling factor, allowing international groups to threaten boycotts as leverage for access to the policy community.

Finally, much of the story of the manner in which the policy community changed is about the ability of the BC state to maintain or alter forest policy networks, the subject of the next chapter. For example, the role of international environmental groups in the policy community often depended on the policy network they wished to influence: those interested in influencing land use/protected areas tended to work in the sub-government, often as policy participants, while those criticizing clear
cutting and forest practices tended to reject this type of participation, using the media and explicitly threatening and invoking boycotts of BC forest products. Those working in the sub-government on land use matters were supported by foundation funding, while those supporting more radical positions such as the WCWC and boycotts relied more on membership funding.

CONCLUSION

Institutional factors were not the reason for the increased interest in BC forestry on the part of organized interests, which obviously has strong societal roots. However, these institutional elements do help explain the manner in which the policy community has developed, and the capacity of the BC state to change the nature of community membership against the wishes of the forest industry. Of the four jurisdictions under review, only in British Columbia has the cabinet shown the ability to pro-actively introduce comprehensive changes to the nature of the forest policy community and the role of government agencies. 80
Endnotes


2 The ORC is itself an association of provincial federations such as the Federation of Mountain Clubs of BC (FMCBC), and province-wide outdoor groups. ORC does not have any direct members. In addition, most of ORC’s core funding comes from the federal government through its fitness and amateur sport program. It would have serious financial difficulties if this funding were withdrawn (personal interview, past and present ORC officials).

3 Even the Sierra Club’s roots can be traced to individual forest protection efforts. Dellert (1994: 46) notes that the origins of the Sierra Club of Western Canada go back to the 1972 battle to protect the Nitinat Triangle on Vancouver Island from timber harvesting. A precursor to the influence of international groups in the early 1990s, the effort to save the Nitinat involved a massive effort on the part of the United States Sierra Club.

4 Other province-wide organizations sprung up from time to time during this era. The “Western Canada Conservation Representatives” was funded by organizations and “philanthropists” in Alberta and BC whose purpose was to deal with environmental issues in both BC and Alberta. It was modelled after the US Sierra Club’s “Conservation Representatives”, established in various parts of the US during the 1960s.

5 The exception is the ORC, which as reviewed, is an association of membership organizations.

6 The BC Environmental Network was created in 1979, but it was established mostly to facilitate communication between the province’s smaller and more local groups. The Network itself does not take policy positions, but relies on its different caucus for policy development (Personal interview, BC Environmental Network).

7 Marchak (1983: 59) notes that environmental groups’ use of “multiple resource use” meant something quite different than it did to other organized interests:

To the companies, government, and union, [multiple resource use] means simultaneous industrial and recreational use, with logging companies exercising caution in respect to streams and wildlife. To the ecologists, it means the same for designated logging areas, but it also means rigorous adherence to sustained yield principles, reforestation practices, and the establishment of reserves in excess of natural or planned reforestation capacities.

Support for the CRFL came from the Sierra Club, the West Coast Environmental Law Association, the Victoria Labour Council, the Vancouver Women’s Resource Centre, and the Union of BC Indian Chiefs (UBCIC).

8 These groups tended to become directly involved during the rare times the federal government had a role. These cases were usually confined to isolated campaigns over the creation of National Parks. See McNamee (1993) and May (1990).


10 COFI also largely finances the BC Forestry Association, an educational arm of the forest industry that promotes forest awareness and fire prevention.

11 Personal interview, MacMillan-Bloedel.

12 McGonigle and Parfitt (1994: 86-88) argue that the high wages partly explain the lack of a vibrant value added economy in BC Combined with lack of supply, most manufacturing facilities are not able to pay the same wages forestry workers earn in the logging industry. However, some agreements are being made with the IWA allowing for lower wages in manufacturing facilities.

13 Widenor (1996) notes that a large part of the reason for this split had to do with the US/Canada softwood lumber conflict, where the US union supported imposing duties on Canadian lumber exports to the US, while Canadian members supported Canadian forest companies who opposed such measures.

14 Pulp worker unions in the Pacific Northwest have also developed close institutional links with the Democratic Party.
Indeed, the industry-created BC Forest Alliance hired as its first director, the former outspoken head of the IWA, Jack Munro.

The CPU merged into the Communications, Energy and Paper Workers Union of Canada (CEP) in the late 1980s.

According to Schwindt and Heaps (1996: 57) as of 1994, the membership of the IWA was 28,952, the CEP was 9,334, and the PPWC was 7,007.

This is particularly true for those forest companies that hold Tree Farm Licences. Local government officials had a greater role in Timber Supply Areas, because the Forest Service administers these areas. For a general discussion of centralized authority in three Canadian provinces’ forest agencies, including British Columbia, see Leman (1981).

Leman (1981: 13) makes the point that during this era, those branches of the Ministry of Forests and other agencies that were charged with environmental protection were not afforded this same centralized coordination effort. The result was that the Fish and Wildlife Branch in the Ministry of Environment, and the BC Parks Branch, which in 1981 was in the Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing who less effective in monitoring and influencing decisions made by forest managers in the Ministry of Forests.

Major changes to forestry legislation in 1912, 1945 and 1956 all followed Royal Commissions. In 1973, the Government created the Pearse Royal Commission which set the stage for the new Forest Act of 1978 (Pearse 1976).

Renamed the Sierra Club of British Columbia in 1995.

This move was recognized by the Sierra Club as a difficult one. On the one hand it is well respected by senior government officials in the Ministry of Forests and Environment (personal interviews), but has sometimes been criticized by its membership for the inevitable compromises that must be made as a policy participant (interview, Sierra Club of British Columbia).


See Western Canada Wilderness Committee (1989: 2).

Personal interview.

The Chair of the Valhalla Wilderness Committee, Colleen McCrory was awarded a UN-sponsored award for her work on drawing attention to Canadian forest practices. The Valhalla Wilderness Committee also participated in the largely inactive organization called Canada’s Future Forest Alliance. See Canada’s Future Forest Alliance (1990).

Quite distinct from the San Francisco-based Rain Forest Action Network, the Forest Action Network’s members will lodge themselves in trees, burn court injunctions, and seek links with aboriginal groups that reject the BC Treaty Commission Process (personal interview and Hamilton 1995).

The attempt to create an integrated structure of Vancouver Island’s diverse environment organizations proved difficult. In its original Statement of Accountability and Authority, the Vancouver Island Conservation Alliance stated in part:

> The more than 150 environmental non-government organizations of the Vancouver Island region have never before joined together in a single umbrella organization. We have not yet managed to create a tight, efficient, cohesive structure under which every group and perspective feels well represented (British Columbia, Commission on Resources and the Environment 1994: Appendix One).

CORE sectors with environmental interests also included the Outdoor Recreation Sector. This Council’s highly developed administrative structure was used to coordinate and communicate this sector’s efforts. See British Columbia, Commission on Resources and the Environment (1994: Appendix One) and the Outdoor Recreation Council of BC (1993; 1994).

Bernstein and Cashore (1996 (revised February 1997): 2-3) make a distinction between internationalization and globalization, in which the latter is restricted to structural economic factors, mainly “rising levels of trade, finance and foreign direct investment (FDI)” (Berger 1996: 9).

31 The forerunner to BC Spaces for Nature was Tatshenshini Wild. As the name suggests, it focused its efforts on successfully having this area protected. The effort to protect the Tatshenshini involved a coalition of groups that included the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society. Much of the original WWF funding can be attributed to Glen Hairs, a Toronto-based philanthropist who began funding Tatshenshini Wild in the late 1980s (personal interview, BC environmental activist).

32 Personal interviews.

33 Personal interview, Ric Careless.

34 Interview, NRDC.

35 See Natural Resources Defense Council (1993a).


37 Personal interview.

38 Personal interview.

39 Personal interview, Natural Resources Defence Council.

40 For details on these developments since 1990, see Stanbury and Vertinsky (1995: Appendix 2).

41 The RAN continued boycott efforts even after the BC government significantly changed its forest practices in Clayoquot Sound. On May 14, 1996 the Rain Forest Action Network placed a massive ad in the New York times signed by key Hollywood celebrities denouncing BC forest practices and clearcutting in Clayoquot Sound. (The campaign is also called the "Clayoquot Rainforest Coalition", but is orchestrated by the Rainforest Action Network in San Francisco). Presenting a picture of a massive clearcut, the ad read in part:

As economic stakeholders in the wise management of BC's fragile and 'supernaturally' beautiful wilderness, join us in our campaign to end the destruction of these ancient forests (Lush 1996).


43 Before focusing on Clayoquot Sound, Greenpeace had been involved in promoting the zero chlorine effluent regulations governing BC's pulp mills.


45 See, Bohn (1994b).


47 Formerly called the Greater Ecosystem Alliance, it was founded in 1989 to "protect biological diversity through the conservation of greater ecosystems". See Frost (1993: 21-25), Batycki (1994).

48 The Pacific Environment Resources Center is particularly interested in using international law to put pressure on BC to improve its forest practices. See, Kibel (1995).

49 Personal interview, Sierra Legal Defense Fund. See also, Sierra Legal Defense Fund (1992).

The original members of the Board of Directors were: John Broadhead, West Coast Marine Protected Areas Coordinator, World Wildlife Fund; Ric Careless; BC Spaces for Nature, World Wildlife Fund; Maureen Fraser; Businesswoman, member Clayoquot Sound Central Regional Board; Vicky Husband, Sierra Club of Western Canada; Colleen McCrory, Valhalla Wilderness Society; Greg McDade, Sierra Legal Defense Fund; David LaRoche, International Joint Commission; Lloyd Manchester, EarthCare Canada Foundation and Bill Wareham, BC Spaces for Nature, World Wildlife Fund. The Executive Director is Allan McDonnell (BC Wild and Earthlife Canada Foundation 1994: 5). Colleen McCrory of the Valhalla Society later decided to leave BC Wild, following the Valhalla Society's increasing hostility toward the Harcourt government, and its overall unwillingness to become part of the sub-government.

Personal interview, BC Wild. BC Wild's policy is not to bring its advocacy efforts into the public domain unless all other efforts fail. This did occur in its efforts regarding the Forest Practices Code. See BC Wild (1994).

For example, the most well-known environmentalist involved at the CORE Cariboo table was David Neave, who is a full time employee of BC Wild.

Reed (1991: 85) explains that "[n]ow we are seeing a major effort by corporations to restore their image, but it is more than that. A noticeable change in the corporate culture can be seen with respect to adoption of codes of behaviour covering forest management, harvesting practices, and broader environmental issues... Such talk would have been heresy even 5 years ago, but many companies have adjusted remarkably to the new temper of the times".

Personal interview.

Personal interview, COFI.

Council of Forest Industries of BC (1993: 2). COFI now comprises the Cariboo Lumber Manufacturer's Association, the Coast Forest and Lumber Association, the Interior Lumber Manufacturers Association, the Northern Interior Lumber Sector, the Plywood Sector and the Pulp and Paper Sector.

COFI has currently six divisions: aboriginal affairs, competitiveness, environment, forestry, markets/trade and public affairs.

See Council of Forest Industries of BC (1993: 2) The Annual Report continues:

These conditions -- including increasing complexity of international markets, growing uncertainty on the domestic public policy front and changing public values about forest and environment matters -- combine to create a complex and difficult operating climate for the BC forest industry."

Key among the initiatives taken to reposition COFI in this climate was the development and adoption of a new mission and strategic direction. Taken together, these two key positioning elements give COFI a mandate which is more sharply defined and directed towards issues which are province-wide in their effects.

This more proactive involvement can be traced back to a decision in the mid-1980s to become more politically active (marked by the hiring of former NDP MLA Graham Lea), and participation opportunities offered by the Social Credit’s Forest Resources Commission. See, for example, Truck Loggers (1990a; 1990b; 1990c; 1990d). See Truck Loggers (1990a; 1990b; 1990c; 1990d).

See IWA - Canada (1989; 1994).

One IWA-Canada official notes that the principles surrounding the Harcourt government's land use and forest practices policy initiatives had already been promoted by the IWA's Forest Policy proposals, passed at the IWA's 1989 convention (see IWA - Canada 1989). This official notes that the reasons for much of the initial criticism is that although labour recognized these measures were a needed "bitter pill", there was still much angst as to what these policies might mean for reductions in harvest and loss of forest jobs.

Personal interview, Commission on Resources and the Environment.

For a more detailed treatment of the role of aboriginal groups in Clayoquot Sound, see Hoberg and Morawski (1996).

See, Canada, Canadian Forest Service, Natural Resources Canada and others (1994). See more generally, Wright (1994).


Nathan (1993: 157-158) explains that continuation of Tin-Wis project's Forest Stewardship Act has helped forge new links with environmentalists and some parts of organized labour. The Canadian Paper Workers Union, the David Suzuki Foundation, the Sierra Club, and George Watts of the Nu-chah-nulth tribal council in Port Alberni are all members of this coalition. The proposed Act is:

...an attempt to establish sustainable community control over forestry operations in the hope of reversing trends toward massive layoffs and falling forest revenues (Nathan 1993: 158).

Notably absent from this coalition was the IWA, whose participation was limited to the involvement of two renegade locals (1993: 37).

The Tin Wis Coalition was formed in BC in 1988 by aboriginal bands, labour unions, environmental organizations, opposition politicians and others. In 1991 this group proposed a "model forest practices act." Unlike the processes reviewed above, this process was not established by government nor were any government agencies involved. For more detail see, Pinkerton (1993).

Forest Planning Canada focused mostly on British Columbia, and has been replaced by the International Journal of Eco-Forestry.

The Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy was abolished in 1994.

For example, the Commission on Resources and the Environment provided funding to environmental groups in order to effectively represent themselves at the Vancouver Island CORE table. This funding led to the creation of the Vancouver Island Conservation Alliance.

A limited a discretionary statutory regime meant that there were few statutory tools requiring public participation and environmental groups access to province or tenure-wide planning initiatives. The BC Forest Service continued to have much discretion in deciding what to include in the Forest and Range Resource Program, and who to include in this process. Regional planning was a relatively closed process, involving informal discussions with industry and resource agency officials (Vance 1990: 34).

The individual behind the move was Ted Smith, who was Director of the Boston-based Henry P. Kendall Foundation. His task at the time was "to provide communications among foundations so that they are not tripping over each other and funding inconsistent projects" (Personal interview, BC Wild). Smith convened a meeting at Dunsmuir Lodge on Vancouver Island in September of 1992 with BC's key environmental activists making presentations to key US foundations involved in forest conservation efforts in the United States Pacific Northwest. As a result of this meeting, the Pew Foundation and others agreed to fund BC Wild.

Personal interview, BC Wild.

The economic effects of calls for boycotts of B.C. forest products are disputed within the BC forest policy community. Environmental groups and the current government see their potential impact as more detrimental to the BC forest economy than does the Council of Forest Industries (Personal interview, COFI).


See Sher (1993) and Yaffee (1994).

Personal interview.

Just as the number of governmental members of the policy community has been directed by a proactive BC state, a new government or new premier could just as quickly move to implant another view of policy community membership. In fact, the Commission on Resources and the Environment was itself abolished in May 1996 by newly elected NDP Premier Glen Clark.
Despite increased criticism and public scrutiny of forest policy beginning in the early 1970s, clientele-pluralist networks in British Columbia remained relatively stable until the late 1980s. Networks did adapt slightly and some policies were modified, but most of these changes were an effort to contain environmentalism and potentially more dramatic policy initiatives. Beginning in the late 1980s and accelerating after 1991, clientele-pluralist forest policy networks began to crumble, replaced by new networks that included pressure pluralism, corporatism, and state-directed elements.

This chapter outlines the long period of resiliency and the fast period of change. It argues that the BC macro-institutional structure, the limited-discretionary statutory regime that developed in response to the first wave of environmentalism during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and public ownership of most forest land gave state actors the ability to maintain clientele-pluralist relationships. These same conditions enabled a new government to dramatically alter state/societal relations. Other factors were also important. The development of the policy community, in particular the role of US and international environmental groups and US foundations, and the province's dependence on foreign markets for the sale of much of its forest products, all help explain the early 1990 policy and network changes.

Pre-1960

The BC government's preoccupation with forest policy historically was limited to developing the forest staple economy and deciding on the most appropriate methods for allowing privately-owned forest companies to harvest provincially-owned timber. The Forest Act of 1912 ended the sale of Crown land to private interests and set up an open system of competitive bidding for use of its forest resources (Cashore 1988). After World War II, harvesting patterns and the effects of corporate
growth led the government to re-examine its forest resource policy (Marchak 1983: 40). Following the recommendations of the Sloan Commission of 1943, the BC government amended the **Forest Act** in 1947 and implemented a system of Sustained Yield Management in which "...long-term harvesting rights over extensive forest areas" were established and companies were required to "practice sustained yield management on their holdings".

The hallmark of the pre-1960s clientele-pluralist networks was the forest land tenure system that gave forest companies the long-term rights to harvest the province's forests. In most cases, the forest companies were given the responsibility to manage the forest resource, resulting in a state that was dependent on industry to implement forest policy decisions. The pursuit of a sustained yield management policy had little to do with environmental concerns and everything to do with its economic growth initiatives in a forest economy. Provincial parks were created during this time, but the reasons were similar to those that led to the creation of the US National Parks - having more to do with tourism and recreation demands than with ecological or even conservation concerns (Duffy 1990: 5).

**FOREST POLICY NETWORK RESILIENCE: 1970s-1980s**

Clientele-pluralist networks came under scrutiny during the early 1970s, as concerns about wilderness protection increased. The Environment and Land Use Committee (ELUC) created during this time marked a slight deviance from clientele-network structure by mandating a provincial agency to make recommendations on the protection of selected parts of the province where wilderness conflicts had become heightened. Occasionally, the state took decisions that were at odds with dominant economic interests. This "ELUC" era demonstrated that the government could exercise some autonomy in land use planning, and it included other agencies in the land use/forest protection network. However, in the absence of environmental groups focused on province-wide issues, many of those pushing for environmental protection at the provincial level were state actors. Leman
(1988b) found that during this time non-Ministry of Forests bureaucratic officials, rather than environmental groups, injected ecological values into the land use policy network. However, the "clientele-pluralist" network was at best "contested" (Wilson 1990) since the dominance of the Ministry of Forests/organized industry relationship was not changed, and the state rarely exercised its autonomy. Like Oregon and Washington State's experiences, these decisions were made to subdue environmental pressures, rather than dealing with them in a comprehensive fashion.

Moreover, many of these policy changes were made during the brief interlude of the New Democratic Party in power from 1972-1975, which succeeded and preceded Social Credit administrations. The elimination of ELUC and the interagency Resource Management Committees (RMCs) following the defeat of the 1972-1975 New Democratic government, and its replacement with "integrated resources management" responsibilities given to the Ministry of Forests, reinforced the clientele-pluralist structure of forest land use/protection networks.

During the early 1970s, the forest practices-management networks remained virtually unchanged, with environmental concerns focusing almost exclusively on forest protection, rather than forest management or harvesting regulations. By the end of the 1970s, forest management issues had gained increased salience, largely owing to the Pearse Royal Commission and concerns about industry concentration in the forest industry and long-term timber supply. The resulting Forest Act was consistent with the principles of a non-legalistic and discretionary statutory regime. This Act recognized the Ministry of Forests' responsibility to manage multiple resource uses, but did not alter the clientele-pluralist network structures - either at the provincial or local forest district levels.

Similarly, only limited changes occurred during the 1980s where some forest land was protected and the law was changed to include reforestation regulations. However, most forest practice policies were left up to the discretion of bureaucratic officials and no comprehensive province-wide strategy over land use conflicts was initiated. The clientele-pluralist network responded to increased societal concern about clearcutting and harvesting practices, but it did so
with voluntary and non-binding "Fish/forestry guidelines". The process leading to these guidelines included both the provincial Ministry of Environment (MOE) and federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) officials, but excluded environmental groups and other interests. The Ministry of Forests was the dominant agency in these proceedings, owing to its resources, expertise, and close ties with the BC forest industry. The voluntary rules that came out of this process were more limited than forest practice requirements on US federal lands and only applied to harvesting in the BC coastal region. Reflecting the clientele-pluralist nature of the network structure, forest companies were left to implement these rules. The result was, as one audit found, that most companies failed to meet even the existing minimal forest practice requirements (Tripp, Nixon, and Dunlop 1992).5

Following renewed calls for wilderness protection in the mid-1980s, the forest protection network again came under pressure to adapt. The 1987 Ministry of Environment initiated Wilderness Advisory Committee (WAC) consulted organized interests to examine wilderness designation issues in BC and its proposals were reviewed by an inter-agency Wilderness Liaison Committee, which was succeeded by two other interagency processes: the Parks and Wilderness for the 1990s Committee and the Old Growth Strategy Committee, both formed in 1990. An interagency Provincial Land Use Strategy (PLUS) Working Group of senior bureaucrats was created to coordinate these various land use processes. It was still in existence as of early 1997. The Parks and Wilderness for the 1990s and the Old Growth Strategy process lasted until 1992 when they were replaced with the interagency Protected Area Strategy reviewed below.

Despite these additions to the forest policy community, the clientele-pluralist nature of the land use/protected area network was not seriously challenged. Protected area initiatives were piece-meal efforts, and the Social Credit government did not create province-wide comprehensive strategic processes for land use and wilderness protection. The clientele-pluralist network showed signs of cracking, since the BC government made the conscious decision to depart slightly from its clientele-pluralist relationship with industry. However, this was done to contain environmental pressures, and
environmental groups lost far more battles than they won (Wilson 1990: 154).

POLICY NETWORK CHANGE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA SINCE THE LATE-1980s

Thus far, the story of network resilience is very similar to that of Oregon and Washington State (with the important qualification that BC forest politics was largely about forest protection, rather than forest practices). However, unlike Oregon and Washington, clientele-pluralist networks in BC began to unravel in the late 1980s, and fell apart by the early 1990s. Some remnants of the old networks remain, but elements of clientele-pluralism, corporatism and state-directed networks all surfaced in the multi-faceted nature of BC forest politics in the 1990s. Reed (1991: 85) has observed that "[t]he influence of industry in the policy-making process [was] reduced" as the influence of environmental groups increased.

Most of the changes are attributable to a myriad of new institutionalized processes and government agencies created by the New Democratic Party, elected in 1991. This includes a closed, "state-directed", semi-consultative process concerning sustainable forest practice regulations and a consensus-oriented "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR) process deliberating over strategic land use/protected area matters (the Commission on Resources and the Environment). This section reviews these new processes and their effects on the new networks. An explanation follows of why such swift changes occurred, following decades of network insularity.
BRITISH COLUMBIA FOREST POLICY NETWORK CHANGES SINCE 1991

Overview

Land use and forest practice networks changed considerably after the election of the New Democratic Party in 1991. This party campaigned on a platform to end the "war in the woods" which had centred on the numerous "valley by valley" land use/forest protection disputes across the province. At the heart of these promises was the commitment to increase protected areas in BC to 12 percent of the land base, from five percent. Reforming forest practices was also a part of the New Democratic Party deliberations as they prepared for a possible election victory. The details of forest practice reforms were less specific, but stemmed from criticism of the widespread use of clear cutting, poor enforcement of the voluntary fish/forestry guidelines, and the harvesting of old growth forests.

THE NEW LAND USE FOREST NETWORK CHANGES

Three processes were crucial to the implementation of the NDP's forest land use goals; the Protected Area Strategy (PAS), the Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE), and Land Resource Management Plans (LRMPs). The Clayoquot Sound process is also reviewed for the impact it has had on land use and forest practices network concerning Clayoquot Sound, and for the precedent some believe it may set for future change in the province.
The Influence of the Protected Areas Strategy

The NDP's commitment to increase protected areas in the province to 12 percent of the land base governs all land use planning. The Protected Area Strategy (PAS) was set up to achieve this goal. The PAS had two procedural levels: the first was an overarching process responsible for developing a province-wide list of potential protected area sites. This process involved consultation with interagency Regional Protected Area Teams (RPATs) about ecosystem representation and was influenced by organized interests that lobbied cabinet ministers to include particular areas on this list. The second level was the development of regional processes to decide which of the areas on the list would be protected, and which would not. The CORE and LRMP processes were in part created to serve this function, but since these initiatives applied to half of the land base of the province, the PAS had to establish its own sub-regional and local processes as well.

Since 1991, most of the efforts of the US-based environmental groups in BC focused on the outcomes of these networks. In particular, Eco-trust and the World Wildlife Fund would achieve considerable success in protecting the Kitlope\(^9\), the Khutzeymateen\(^9\), and the Tatshenshini\(^10\) - all of which were protected as a result of the PAS. Overall, PAS processes resulted in pressure-pluralist networks surrounding specific protected area battles in the province. Different groups competed for the ear of the state, with the government exercising its autonomy to decide on its own just what its decisions would entail. However, there was no one uniform structure and some local processes mirrored the consensus-oriented structure of the CORE and LRMP initiatives.\(^11\)

The Commission on Resources and the Environment

The hallmark of the NDP's strategy to "end the war in woods" was the creation of the Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE) in early 1992.\(^12\) The government was faced with an increasingly polarized citizenry, divided between those who depended on forestry for their livelihood (and who were mostly rural based), and those who feared the impact of forest practices
and harvesting on the environment (whose strength came from urban areas and was buttressed with passionate environmentalists and environmental groups in the regions). In an effort to deflect initial hostility away from the government, the BC cabinet decided CORE would be an external land-use planning agency. At the same time, cabinet retained the right to alter CORE recommendations. As one senior official within the Ministry of Forests said:

As close as the government ever got to saying that it would rely on CORE’s advice was [to acknowledge that ] if CORE actually arrives at a consensus, then it...would be much more difficult for government to vary from that advice.\(^{13}\)

Or, as a senior CORE official explains:

Certainly, if you are going to give ... independence, a balancing factor has to be that you don’t have [ultimate] decision making power....The political accountability...had to stay in the cabinet if you were going to give the Commission the power to speak out publicly, have investigative resources, and [the] authority and ... responsibility to report that to the public.\(^{14}\)

The CORE’s main task was to establish regional, consensus-oriented, multi-stake holder dispute resolution processes addressing broad land use planning.\(^{16}\) Its mandate included proposing a land use strategy that would meet the provincial goal of protecting 12 percent of the land base from forest extraction and other industrial interests. Based on a “sector representation approach”, stakeholders were to include: forest companies, forest workers, the mining industry, the tourism industry, outdoor recreation groups, environmental groups, hunting organizations, youth groups and municipalities. Members at the table were deemed to represent their entire sector, contrary to the approach of some “alternative dispute processes” in which individuals are appointed from a particular sector or group, but are not responsible for gaining agreement from the constituency they are deemed to represent (Kelly and Alper 1995). Sector representatives at the CORE regional tables were required to communicate with their constituency throughout the process, which involved a constant relay of information between members and representatives.

Originally intended to cover the entire province, the BC cabinet directed CORE to establish four regional processes on Vancouver Island, in the Cariboo, and in the East and West Kootenays.
The vast organizational and resource differences between those industry/business sectors with well-developed associations and the relatively unorganized sectors representing environmental groups and youth posed considerable hurdles for each regional table. The Commission responded to these differences by granting funds to these sectors in order to help them coordinate and effectively represent their members at the table. As one senior CORE official noted:

Some groups are used to being quite disciplined. The forest sector majors...put money on the table. They hire a lawyer. They are used to working in a conscious, deliberate way. Other groups showed up [and there were] accusations [that] they couldn't even point to their constituents. Did they ever communicate with them? We don't know. So we provided some funding, [in] part to support communication back to constituencies.

In addition, the province-wide environmental coalition, BC Wild funded environmental interests at some CORE tables. This assistance to unorganized interests was important for them to become effective participants, since many sectors, including environmental interests, tended to lack the "autonomy" from their members and the "highly integrated associational system" that usually precedes corporatist style arrangements (Coleman and Skogstad 1990a: 28). Despite the sector representation approach and these organizational differences, most CORE table participants classified themselves either into "browns" or "greens", or into three "camps" comprising environmental, labour, and industry interests.

As a result of the decision to maintain cabinet's ultimate decision-making authority, these sub-regional CORE processes involved two interconnected stages. The first was the open CORE regional process that brought together diverse groups to talk about specific land use decisions and organized the unorganized. The resulting CORE reports were not written by the table participants, but by the CORE staff, based on table discussions.

The second process was conducted behind closed doors and orchestrated by the Premier's office. It was this process that brought about the final decisions. The Premier's office appointed a single official to negotiate with stakeholders, sometimes including those that had boycotted or for other reasons had not participated in the CORE process. Unlike the CORE regional networks,
these processes never involved all groups sitting down together. Rather the official from the Premier’s office negotiated with one sector at a time.

At times, this Premier’s office process involved old-fashioned commitments that provincial funds would be invested in certain communities and projects. These two processes must be seen as working together. Cognisant that the CORE regional reports would only be recommendations to government, stakeholders became more polarized as the regional processes were coming to a close. In effect, they were positioning themselves for the next round of negotiations, this time orchestrated through the Premier’s office. After the Commission released its land use recommendations to the government, there was great public criticism in all four regions. In the case of Vancouver Island, 20,000 forestry workers protested the CORE report by demonstrating on the lawn of the provincial legislature. The Cariboo demonstrations included the burning of an effigy of CORE Commissioner, Steven Owen. Yet, the decisions made by the Premier’s office, that ultimately enjoyed a high degree of support, did not vary significantly from the options proposed by CORE. The CORE reports and the government’s final decisions divided the land where forest extraction could occur into low, medium, and high intensity "Resource Management Zones (RMZs)". Owen explains it this way:

The paradox is that the closer you get to building a real consensus from the centre, the more isolated, threatened and therefore noisy the people at the extremes get. And of course the media locks in on them. So you get the appearance of rising conflict even when you are creating more consensus.

I think that is why you...go from 20,000 people in the streets of Victoria protesting the Vancouver Island plan, to almost overnight, a period of months with the government decision, having something like an 80 percent approval of the Vancouver Island Plan.

When you get in the Cariboo - hangings in effigy, people being pretty rough and an apparent...total rejection, and then a couple of months letter you get an agreement which everybody is hugging each other over [and] which... is absolutely in line with all of the principles and main points of the CORE report. Shuffling around the furniture, but very much the same structure.
In fact, virtually the same percentage of land was protected under both the CORE reports and the government's decisions. Consider the Vancouver Island CORE process, the first of the four tables to report. The CORE report proposed to increase the protected areas on Vancouver Island from 10.3 percent to 13 percent of the total land base, with the working forest further divided into "multiple resource use", "regionally significant" and more ecologically sensitive "cultivation use" areas. Similarly, the decision of the Premier's office was to protect 13 percent of Vancouver Island's forest land. In addition, "low intensity", "high intensity" and "General Forestry" (medium intensity) zones were established. The Outdoor Recreation Council describes the differences between the CORE report and Premier's office decision as "modest", yet the Premier's office decision was generally accepted by the vast majority of stakeholders and public opinion.

The Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE report plan, announced on July 14, 1994, followed a similar pattern. This report recommended doubling existing protected areas from six percent to 12 percent, while "general management" (medium) zones, "enhanced forestry" (high) and "sensitive development" (low) zones were proposed. Roundly criticized by environmentalists, industry, labour and other representatives, the Premier's office announced a "made in the Cariboo" land use plan that also protected 12 percent of the land, and included "integrated" (medium), "enhanced forestry" (high), and "special" (low) forestry zones. The specific boundaries changed, as did the percentage of land allocated to each zone. However, the principles behind each CORE report were not significantly altered. Yet, this plan gained the support of most sector representatives, including industry and environmental interests.

A similar story played out in the East and West Kootenays. The West Kootenay CORE report called for the protection of 11.3 percent of the region, doubling the previous amount and the "integrated" (medium), "dedicated" (high) and "special management" zones were proposed. The Premier's office land use decision announced that 11.3 percent of the area would be protected with "integrated" resource use, "enhanced" (high) use, "special" (low) zones established. The final
decision also initiated a process to create four "Wildlife Management Areas" within the lands
categorized under low intensity resource use.32

Similarly, the East Kootenay CORE report33 proposed to increase the protected areas in the
West Kootenays from the existing 13.2 percent to 16 percent of the land base, and also divided the
working forest into three categories based on the intensity of forest harvesting.34 Following
negotiations that occurred mostly between industry and environmentalists, the Premier's office
announced that 16.5 percent of the East Kootenay land base would be protected, and that three
categories of the working forest would be created. Once again, there was general stakeholder and
public support for the Premier's office decision.35

Thus, the CORE and Premier's office processes must be seen as linked. The CORE regional
negotiations provided a venue for groups to vent their frustration in an open forum, as well as gaining
an understanding of other participants' points of view. The "finality" of the Premier's office round
meant that groups were forced with the choice of "buying in", or having no influence on the final
decision.

Owen summarized the situation this way:

I think people finally [realized] ...we were going to have regional plans, the
government was going to make the decision and here is your last chance to blow off
steam, say something sensible or whatever. [Eventually] there is the realization that
things are going to change, they are going to change in this direction and that there
is some advantage there to be taken [in being part of a consensus].36

Harcourt explains this approach:

We knew we had mainstream support. We were backed by a pretty intense
conviction of what we were doing was right and [had] strong public backing. [This is]
always a strong position to start with.37

Part of the reason for the criticism of the CORE reports lies in the fact that the groups knew that the
CORE decisions, in the end, were not going to be the final word. Organized interests had to appear
unhappy in order to position themselves for the next process involving the Premier's office.
The effects of the CORE/Premier's office process was to demolish the previous "contested" clientele-pluralist land use network. The resulting new land use networks at the regional level are a hybrid of network ideal types, involving elements of both corporatism and pressure-pluralism. The CORE regional tables injected a corporatist element into the forest land use network. Each process involved multiple organized interests with conflicting interests, participating with the state in the formulation of policy. These networks had been spawned by "real or apprehended societal conflict" (Coleman and Skogstad 1990b: 28).

The second "decision-making" stage gave a pressure-pluralist flavour to the regional land use networks, since at this stage, environmental groups, industry interests and other participants presented their case to the state independently of one another. However, there was a corporatist influence in that the state was working for consensus of most participants, even though it made the final decision. The consequences of these processes were dramatic, with the elimination of the clientele-pluralist forest land use network, largely by redirecting policy making away from the Ministry of Forests, despite the objections of some Forest Service officials.
Land and Resource Management Plans Processes

A third component of the NDP government’s land use initiatives was the establishment of Land and Resource Management Plans (LRMP) processes. The LRMP processes were originally developed within the Ministry of Forests to replace the closed Timber Supply Area (TSA) planning system dominated by forest companies and the Ministry of Forests. Eventually LRMPs were given the mandate to develop CORE-like consensus bodies at the sub-regional level and included the same multi-stakeholder, consensus-orientation format.

Unlike CORE, LRMPs were administered by three ministries: the Ministry of Forests; the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks; and the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources (although the Ministry of Forests tends to maintain a dominant role). Thus, LRMPs are different from CORE in that they are:

...sponsored by an interagency provincial government committee, rather than by CORE; and it is facilitated by line agency staff rather than by an independent mediator.

Like CORE, LRMP processes were charged with the implementation of the Protected Areas Strategy in their geographic area:

Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) is a sub-regional, interagency planning process that uses a range of public involvement techniques, including shared decision-making, for making recommendations on Crown land use and management, particularly with respect to fulfilment of the objectives of the Protected Area Strategy.

Most LRMP processes completed as of 1996 have been successful in arriving at a consensus among all sectors. Hence, the government has accepted most LRMP process recommendations.

On the surface, LRMPs contain elements of pressure-pluralism in land use planning, since they involve different government agencies. However, LRMP share the same corporatist influences as CORE. Although officials from three agencies are involved, it was the LRMP consensus-oriented, multi-stakeholder tables where decisions were reached. As with CORE, LRMP processes enjoy
complete policy autonomy, with approval required by the Land Use Coordination Office (LUCO) and the provincial cabinet.

The Land Use Coordination Office

The NDP’s establishment of the Land Use Coordination Office (LUCO) in 1993 also affected the quickly changing forest land use/protection networks. The PAS, CORE, and LRMPs all ran the risk of fragmenting decision-making in the province, and thus reducing the ability of the provincial cabinet to maintain control of land use decision-making processes. The solution to this potential loss of autonomy was the creation of LUCO, which reduced policy fragmentation by requiring it to oversee, coordinate and approve all of the complex land use initiatives underway in the province. The creation of LUCO was consciously done to rein-in agency autonomy and maintain a high level of executive authority. With the abolition of the CORE in the spring of 1996, LUCO took over CORE land use functions, putting land use planning firmly in the hands of provincial government agencies.

Clayoquot Sound

The processes established concerning Clayoquot Sound have important implications for land use and forest practices/management networks in the sound, but are reviewed here because of the precedent they may set province-wide for land use and forest practices networks, and because of the important role Clayoquot Sound has had in mobilising international attention toward BC forest policy.

The Clayoquot story began with a multi-stakeholder process created by the 1986-1991 Social Credit administration to address the dispute over logging in Clayoquot Sound. Due to its limited terms of reference, most environmental groups boycotted this process. With the election of the Harcourt NDP government, environmental groups requested that the Clayoquot Sound decision become part of the Vancouver Island CORE processes. After heated internal cabinet debate, cabinet
members voted to exclude the Clayoquot region from the CORE deliberations, and decided to issue a land use plan for Clayoquot Sound.\textsuperscript{48} In April 1993, the government announced its decision to open up two thirds of the area to logging.\textsuperscript{49} Virtually all environmental groups in the province decried the result, and the summer of 1993 witnessed massive arrests of individuals in Clayoquot Sound participating in acts of civil disobedience.\textsuperscript{50}

Using its advisory powers, the Commission on Resources and the Environment got involved, recommending that the provincial cabinet establish the Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest Practices in Clayoquot Sound.\textsuperscript{51} The Premier's office accepted CORE's suggestion, and constituted a panel (Lush 1995). Composed of wildlife biologists, forest ecologists, aboriginal peoples, fisheries scientists, a professional forester and a hydrologist, the final report recommended sweeping changes in planning and forest practice policies in Clayoquot Sound, including the virtual elimination of clearcutting and the promotion of traditional aboriginal forestry practices.

Although it was a technical process that shut out many environmental groups as policy participants, environmental groups such as Greenpeace acquired the necessary expertise to be an active member of the network.\textsuperscript{52} Owing to intense international scrutiny, the government accepted all of the Panel's recommendations. Most domestic and many international environmental groups applauded the decision (Matas 1995).\textsuperscript{53}

This process had the effect of demolishing the previous clientele-pluralist forest practices/management relationship between the BC Forest Service and the two companies with harvesting rights in the region.\textsuperscript{54} With the extensive participation and role of aboriginal peoples and environmental groups, the network contained elements of pressure pluralism and corporatism.\textsuperscript{55} It was pluralist during the initial 1993 land use decision, when organized interests lobbied the government for their view of what decision should be made. After this time the network showed signs of corporatism, with an autonomous state requiring that different groups be involved and different forestry values be used when conducting planning and harvesting in Clayoquot Sound. With the
adoption of the scientific panel’s recommendations, land use and forest practices/management networks became essentially indistinguishable, merging into a single network focused around the holistic principles of ecosystem management.

Finally, the Clayoquot Sound experience has had important ramifications beyond its borders. It served as the catalyst behind the efforts of internationally-based environmental groups to become active and critical of BC forestry. Despite the initiatives reviewed above, it was the Clayoquot Sound decision that became synonymous internationally with BC forest policy. As a result, the BC government became more determined to introduce a Forest Practices Code.

FOREST PRACTICES/MANAGEMENT NETWORK

Two government initiatives for forest practices served to alter the long-standing clientele-pluralist relationships over forest practices/management. The first was the development of the government’s promised Forest Practices Code. It resulted in radically different, but short-term changes to the existing clientele-pluralist forest practices/management network. The second is the processes that have been established to implement the Code. It is long-term, intended to alter state/societal relations in forest practice/management, arguably moving the clientele-pluralist networks toward pressure-pluralism.

Development of the Forest Practices Code

The Forest Practices Code was developed in a different manner than the previously closed industry/Ministry of Forests processes. It was a bureaucratic process of highly trained technical experts from the Ministry of Forests and Ministry of Environment. The public stakeholders were included through a formal consultation process that the government commissioned, led by a University of British Columbia’s Faculty of Forestry professor. However, the government was unwilling to replicate the thorough consultation process it set up under CORE. Indeed, both
environmental groups and the Council of Forest Industries were dissatisfied with the minimal consultation the government undertook.\textsuperscript{58} As one COFI vice-president said:

The relationship [with the government] has changed markedly, for the worse.....[i]t became government's view that it could not be seen to be talking to the industry on some issues because it could be alleged that they were cooking deals with industry. It has become so bad in British Columbia that the Forest and Environment Ministers said they cannot, will not talk to us - the forest industry - about the Forest Practices Code, notwithstanding that we in the industry are the ones that have to deliver the bulk of the Forest Practices Code.\textsuperscript{59}

A senior official in the Ministry of Forests explains the decision:

The way I [see it] in my own mind is that we would have had a great deal of difficulty opening up the discussion to industry without being accused of simply reinventing by another name, "sympathetic administration"\textsuperscript{56}...and it would be hard to explain opening up the discussion to other sectors of other forest interests if we weren't going to discuss it with industry. No, we kept a pretty tight lid on that, as we have to this date.\textsuperscript{61}

This new process challenged the Forest Service's dominance over forest practices matters, with the Ministry of Environment officials heavily involved. Rather than signalling bureaucratic competition that could result in weaker state capacity, the involvement of the Ministry of Environment was the result of a BC cabinet directive.

The Code changed the statutory regime by requiring, in statute, that certain forest practices take place. Most of the substantive requirements such as clearcutting sizes, silviculture, biodiversity, and riparian zone requirements are still located in the easier-to-change regulations or standards.\textsuperscript{62} Moreover, unlike the US NFMA and ESA, forest practices are deemed to be in accordance with the Act once the District Manager approves of a forest plan. Even if new information showed that harvesting under the forest plan would harm the environment, the forest practices would still be in accordance with the Act.
Changes to the Forest Management Network

The Forest Practices Code Act vests discretionary authority in District Managers to determine whether a forest plan meets the requirements of the Act. The Forest Practices Code Act, with its high level of bureaucratic discretion, is administered by 43 District Managers in the field. Government staff have been shifted to the field, and the Council of Forest Industries has readjusted its own organizational structure to reflect these changes. This administrative decentralization means that policy networks surrounding the implementation/administration of the Code could develop into clientele-pluralism. Power is diffused among the 43 forest districts, and even though the BC Forest Service shares some responsibilities with the Ministry of Environment, the former remains the dominant agency. Given the increase in autonomy of officials, it is possible that clientele-pluralism networks will develop in some of the 43 Forest Districts. Much of this depends on how the District Managers exercise their discretion. Environmental groups and industry are both worried that the new institutional setting will favour the other.

The ability to change much of the substantive content still rests with the provincial government: the cabinet has the power to change the regulations and the Chief Forester has the authority to change the standards. This guarantees that a significant policy network governing forest practice regulations and standards will continue to exist at the provincial level.

Finally, forest practices/management and land use/planning networks are now intertwined because the Forest Practices Code Act requires that all forest practices and operational plans must adhere to strategic planning initiatives developed under CORE, LRMP and other "higher level" processes. In addition, the CORE regional reports and Premier's office decision to develop high, medium and low intensity logging zones, have created a direct link between land use and forest practice measures.
The Limits of Change

Existing clientele-pluralist forest practices and land use/forest protection networks were fundamentally altered after 1991, and new networks led to dramatically different policy outputs. Remnants of the old clientele-pluralist networks remained, leading some environmental groups to argue that although post-1991 marked a significant change in eco-forest policy, additional policy changes could have been made. For example, the cabinet declined to introduce an Endangered Species Act, which had been prepared by Ministry of Environment officials and proposed to cabinet in 1992. The BC government also backed off from its long promised review of forest land tenure system and its much heralded Environmental Assessment Act excluded forest practices from its purview. In addition, the cabinet agreed to the creation of the “Forest Sector Strategy Committee” - a 24-member government/industry anticipatory forest planning body, only one of whose non-government members does not have links to the forest industry. This committee was created after industry expressed concerns about their exclusion from the formulation of the Forest Practices Code. The Forest Sector Strategy Committee’s deliberations gave birth to Forest Renewal BC, which was charged with investing hundreds of millions of dollars into forest communities across the province. The Premier promised that Forest Renewal BC would ensure that, "not one forest worker will be left without the option to work in the forest..." (Cernetig 1994a) as a result of the government’s recent eco-forest initiatives.

EXPLANATION

Institutional factors help explain both forest network and policy resilience in the 1970s and 1980s and dramatic change in the early 1990s. The Westminster model of government, almost complete state ownership of the province’s forest land, and few statutory rules to govern its behaviour gave Social Credit administrations the ability to contain environmental pressures and maintain clientele-pluralist networks. It also gave the 1991 NDP government the capacity to initiate
forest policy change, and the autonomy to take decisions at odds with industry and environmental groups when it desired.

Reviewing BC forest politics before the changes of the early 1990s, Leman (1988b: 157) argues that the stronger position of labour in BC than in the PNW helped forest companies to stave off environmental pressures:

[although Canadian forest products companies suffer higher labor costs and more strikes than their US counterparts, they also benefit from union clout in securing government generosity and helping to stave off challenges such as environmental measures that would reduce profits while also inconveniencing workers.

Yet, the evidence after the late 1980s shows that despite a strong labour force, and with organized unions that had strong ties to the new NDP government, sweeping environmental forest policy changes were made. Leman's analysis is not so much wrong, as it does not help explain network change.

The ability of the state to determine state/societal relations carries much explanatory power. This autonomy explains how the Harcourt government could create a host of new processes for land use planning that had the effect of adding corporatist and pluralist elements to land use policy networks, and develop a bureaucratic-centred approach for the development of the Forest Practices Code - that tended to exclude industry and environmental interests.

While the Ministry of Forests saw its role in land use and forest practice networks diminish as other agencies and ministries gained decision-making authority, in almost all policy initiatives reviewed above, the BC cabinet maintained ultimate authority. With the various land use initiatives, the BC government addressed the fragmentation of authority by creating the Land Use Coordination Office. Whereas the various initiatives might have led to less state capacity, the government overcame this danger by maintaining ultimate decision making authority with strong central agencies.

While the provincial government's position at the CORE regional tables was relatively "weak" in terms of having only one seat, the government never gave up final decision-making authority. This marked the most significant distinction between CORE, and Washington State's Timber/Fish/Wildlife
Accord and its subsequent Sustainable Forestry Roundtable, and Oregon's 1987 dispute resolution process. In the latter, a consensus usually meant industry goals would be realized. Environmentalists at the CORE tables knew that if there was no agreement, industry interests would be no better off.

This difference in BC owes itself to the high level of state autonomy, and the state's ability to formulate overall policy goals regarding land use and forest practices, including its commitment to increased forest protection. It was the BC cabinet that created the CORE legislation and decided to make CORE's recommendations advisory. In doing so, the BC state maintained its high level of capacity to take autonomous decisions.

Clearly, the Forest Practices Code process and policies were the product of a government with a high level of capacity and autonomy to undertake its own decisions. Policy direction came from a provincial cabinet that wished to show the international community that it was cleaning up BC forest practices. It is highly doubtful that BC's forest practices networks could have been altered so quickly if it were not for the ability of the BC state also to rearrange its relationships with organized interests.

These institutional factors alone do not account for the entire story, however. The effects of the policy community itself are important: both for the emergence of new groups with the professional expertise and resources to become important players in the forest practices and land use policy networks, and for the important influence of international groups and foundations.

The influence and role of these international actors largely depended on the network they attempted to affect. As a general rule, groups that focused on land use planning/protected area designations tended to work behind the scenes with the provincial cabinet and bureaucratic actors, as policy participants. This would include groups such as Eco-trust and BC Spaces for Nature. Both domestic and international groups that followed this approach gained the admiration of many cabinet members, and they were generally successful in their effort to get certain parts of the province designated as protected.
The general tactic of these highly professional and well-funded groups was to use a carrot rather than a stick in seeking their objectives. These groups often praised the BC government in the international sphere (one group presented the Premier with an international conservation award). This approach further endeared these groups to a government that was being criticized internationally by the Western Canada Wilderness Committee, Greenpeace, the Valhalla Wilderness Society and the Natural Resources Defense Council. In the Protected Areas Strategy, the most professional and successful eco-forest groups were those that were non-membership based, enjoyed stable funding, and worked behind the scenes as policy participants within the sub-government.

Most US and international groups have not been directly involved in the CORE or LRMP regional land use processes, owing to the unfavourable media attention of allowing direct influence of foreign actors. Instead, these groups tend to be involved in Protected Area Strategy processes that develop to protect a particular area of the province, and through the funding of domestic-based groups involved in the CORE and LRMP processes.

Those international groups that wished to influence forest practices opted out of the network altogether, fighting high profile, international media campaigns to pressure the government. This pressure seemed to have important effects: Harcourt describes the environment in this way:

There was a motion before the European Parliament to boycott BC forest products that if it had gone through... it would have then gone to the individual countries to their parliaments, and then it would have been enforced. $2 billion gone.

It was before Congress. Bobby Kennedy had very well placed friends. [The] Sierra Club, Greenpeace and others had clout. And I went to Washington - first of all to accept the award of the Tatshenshini decision we made in June...[and] acknowledge we made mistakes, that .... we are going to go in and repair the damage, take out the old logging roads, replant, fix up the salmon spawning streams.  

Groups such as the NRDC used their connection with aboriginal peoples to increase international pressure. The NRDC was well-aware that it could gain sympathetic media attention for its cause by developing linkages with aboriginal groups:
[it] was clear that they [aboriginal people in Clayoquot Sound] were not getting the kind of audience they needed within the province. They were kind of being ignored by just about everybody in the province... And we knew that if we brought them to Washington and New York and the UN in New York ...[to]... talk to senior policy people in Congress and the administration here that that would give them greater stature back [home].

Thus, the institutional setting in conjunction with the internationalization of the policy community and change in political party explain network and policy change. The question remains: if the election of the Harcourt government or the “internationalization” of the BC forest policy had not occurred, how would networks and policy outputs have changed?

Employing counterfactual analysis, Bernstein and Cashore (1996 {revised February 1997}) argue that without either party change or internationalization of the policy community, little policy change would have resulted (Table 8.0). However, party or internationalization change by itself would probably have had an important effect, although outputs might have been slightly different. No party change and internationalization would have led to reluctant change, by a government that would have had no choice but to eventually respond to international pressures. Harcourt suggests that if the NDP had not been elected:

[It would have been] more of the same. Large boycotts. Responding after the fact. We would have lost a good chunk of those markets. Mac Blo would have lost - they are still being attacked in San Francisco, California - the boycott motion would have gone through the European Parliament and then through the [American] Congress. We would be [known] as “Brazil of the North.” We would be devastated.


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<th>No Election of Party with Eco-forest Agenda</th>
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<td>No internationalization</td>
<td>NO CHANGE</td>
<td>MUTED CHANGE</td>
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<td>More land protected, establishment of forest practices code much more difficult, domestic industry threatens capital strike</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internationalization</td>
<td>RELUCTANT CHANGE</td>
<td>GREATEST CHANGE</td>
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<td>Increased polarization, sustained boycotts, loss of market share, eventual acquiescence to improved eco-forest policy</td>
<td>Forest land protection almost doubled, Forest Practices Code established</td>
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Source: Bernstein and Cashore (1996 {revised February 1997})

Similarly, without internationalization, the NDP may not have had the tacit support or silence of the BC forest industry, who did not want to see market loss due to boycotts. As Harcourt explains:

"It was tactically important that we have the pressure to light a fire under the recalcitrant part of the forest industry...[it] allowed us to say if you don't like these changes your jobs and your industry will be gone. Because there will be boycotts.... [The environmental group] protagonists -- those who want to shut down the forest industry -- were both a pain in the ass and helpful: pain in the ass because they were putting out an impossible position and using that to destroy our forest industry and the markets that are important to us. Terrible impact.... But it was helpful to have them there to push our case against us...[and]... allowed us to then defeat the boycott."^3

Robert Kennedy Jr. of the Natural Resources Defense Council agrees:

"Us beating them [the Harcourt government] up gives them political cover to do what is right. If we don't beat them up from our side, they are going to get beaten up from the other side."^4

Thus, network and policy output change would have occurred if only party or internationalization had changed. However, the story of this change would be largely mediated by the institutional setting that gives the provincial government the capacity to take autonomous decisions and the ability to do so rather quickly. This autonomy explains why BC state actors were
able to "trade off" levels of biodiversity and endangered species protection in order to maintain a certain level of cut\textsuperscript{75}, something the US statutory regime does not allow US agencies to do.

And part of the reason the BC cabinet sought to "balance" biodiversity protection with the Annual Allowable Cut and refused to pass an Endangered Species Act is because of the forest industry's importance in the province and the genuine fear of capital flight. The place of BC's forest economy within the North American and international economies helps explain the eco-forest policy initiatives that did occur (threat or fear of consumer boycotts), and why more radical eco-forest initiatives did not take place (threat or fear of capital flight). The long-standing tenure system has resulted in large, vertically-integrated forest companies producing the fibre needed to maintain BC's export markets. This dependence constrains the autonomy of the BC state when addressing fundamental restructuring of its industry. Thus, a distinction must be made between polices aimed at fundamental restructuring of the industry, and eco-forest regulations that constrain, but do not radically alter existing economic relations.
Endnotes

1 The growth in the forest industry, questions of improper forest management and the fear of external competition led the state to set up the Sloan Commission of 1943. For example, Pearse (1974: 28) notes that "...apprehensions had arisen over the unbalanced pattern of timber harvesting in the province, the lack of secure timber supplies for new industrial ventures, and the inadequate provisions for future forest crops." Reid and Weaver (1974) argue that Scandinavian and Baltic firms were increasing their competition with firms operating in BC and that in order to increase their competitive ability, BC companies wanted "greater tenure security."

As well, it was at this time that the BC Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was calling for nationalization of the forest industry. Reid and Weaver (1974) suggest that a sustained yield system was seen as possibly appeasing the CCF supporters while at the same time "would undermine both the competition from small loggers and the appeal of small companies to the public, since the small loggers could not advocate or survive on more restrictive legislation".

2 British Columbia Forest Resources Commission (1990b: 16). See, also, Dellert (1994). By the 1950s, there was concern that the perpetual terms Tree Farm Licenses gave the licence holder too much security. The result was the second Sloan Commission of 1956 that proposed that TFLs be limited to, and issued at, renewable terms of 21 years. The BC state concurred, legislating these proposals in 1957 (British Columbia. Forest Resources Commission 1990b: 16).

3 This distinction became blurred during the 1972-1975 NDP government however, when key environmentalists were hired by the Environment and Land Use Committee (ELUC).

Leman (1981a: 13) makes the point that during this era, those branches of the Ministry of Forests and other agencies that were charged with environmental protection were not afforded this same centralized coordination effort. The result was that the Fish and Wildlife Branch in the Ministry of Environment, and the BC Parks Branch, which in 1981 was in the Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing were less effective in monitoring and influencing decisions made by forest managers in the Ministry of Forests.

4 Leman (1988b: 165) details the limited influence of environmental groups during this time:

[In British Columbia]...some scenic and untouched areas were, for many years, left unlogged, partly because of their remoteness but also partly from internal administrative action. Examples were the Stein River Valley (an area with some similarities to Oregon's French Pete), the Tsetka Watershed, the Tahsis area and the Sombrio Forest Trail on Vancouver Island, Meares Island, Windy Bay on South Moresby in the Queen Charlotte Islands, and Valhalla Mountains in the interior. As these areas came under increasing pressure for logging, activist groups took them up as a cause, helping to prompt the provincial government to study options. In almost every case, the outcome was bitterly disappointing to environmental groups (emphasis added).

5 This situation did not always lead to ineffective policy outputs. Leman (1981a: 15) offers that:

When this approach works well, as it can in the Tree Farm Licenses of British Columbia, companies are made to feel more responsibility for forest reproduction, and a company may communicate a spirit to its foresters and other employees that matches the sense of mission found among some public sector foresters.

Still, Leman (ibid: 15) notes that there are limits to this voluntary compliance: "Undermanned government biologists are in a weak position to expect more; the foresters have the advantage if the issue escalates to a formal exchange of letters".

6 The 12 percent figure comes from the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987: Ch. 6) report, commonly referred to as the Bruntland Commission report. The report recommends tripling the world's protected areas from its then level of four percent.

7 For example, the recent protection of Pine-cone Burke Coquitlam watershed followed months of lobbying by local MLAs and cabinet ministers.


These groups’ low-key efforts were supported by detailed research and a willingness to work with local aboriginal and community groups. Such an approach was welcomed by the most senior bureaucratic and elected political officials.

The Lower Mainland PAS process created a Regional Protected Area Team (RPAT) that was based on a consensus-oriented model. The environmental groups participating included the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society and BC Wild.


Links between CORE and government agencies were established early in the life of CORE. Two inter-agency government committees were established to give CORE advice: the Government Liaison Committee (GLC), and the Inter-Ministry Policy Committee (IMPC). The GLC is “a committee of senior government staff from several ministries and agencies who provide professional opinions, not necessarily from their agencies’ perspective, on CORE initiatives” (British Columbia, Commission on Resources and the Environment 1994a: 31). The IMPC is “a land use policy committee of 20 senior officials which provides a direct link to resource-related ministries at the working level” (ibid: 32). In addition, the Integrated Resources Planning Committee (IRPC) was created to oversee LRMP sub-regional processes.

Personal interview.

Personal interview.

CORE was also given a mandate to advise on general questions of sustainability and to foster community-oriented involvement in land use planning.

British Columbia, Commission on Resources and the Environment (1993b). In the case of the Vancouver Island table, funding from CORE led to the creation of the Vancouver Island Environmental Alliance.

The outdoor recreation sector was able to communicate effectively with its members and represent their interests at the regional tables, owing to the advanced associational structure of the Outdoor Recreation Council. See Outdoor Recreation Council of BC (1993; 1994a; 1994b).

Personal interview. This same official continued:

I think we heard [the] complaint that we went and created those constituencies and those sectors... I guess that if you had a sector like the Outdoor Recreation Council operating everywhere, which we were blessed with on Vancouver Island ... that you can go and say - here is a group with kind of a communications network. Other sectors just didn’t have that.

I think it is difficult for individuals. There is a guy in the coal sector in East Kootenay- he did a brilliant job, I thought, under difficult circumstances, representative of that sector’s interest but also recognizing that they had to make some moves. But at the end of the day he was isolated, and in fact fired (personal interview).

The Vancouver Island and Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE table representatives tended to fall into either “brown” or “green” camps, with labour usually found in the former category. Still, the Brown and Green “coalitions” were not always unified. For example, Labour’s efforts on the Vancouver Island CORE table to propose a value added/jobs strategy did not, at first, meet with the approval of organized industry interests. Consequently, labour representatives went to the environmental representatives to gain support for this proposal. Once the green side agreed to this proposal, industry eventually acquiesced and supported the initiative (personal interview, IWA - Canada). See WA - Canada (1994). In the West Kootenay table, three camps appeared between greens, browns, and labour.

The Vancouver Island CORE process suffered a minor setback after the Western Canada Wilderness Committee and other environmental groups left CORE, protesting the Clayoquot Sound decision.

During the Premier’s office negotiations, state officials negotiators enjoyed more freedom as to whom they could
consult. Thus, for example, Ric Careless of the World Wildlife Fund’s BC Office (BC Spaces for Nature) became an important advisor for all of the Premier’s Offices land use responses, even though he had not been directly involved in any table negotiations.

27 Once the government’s Forest Renewal initiative and its accompanying Forest Renewal Board Commission (FRBC) were created, a more open and direct link was made between potential job losses resulting from regional land use plans, and government investments in these regions and communities.


23 Personal interview.


25 See British Columbia, Office of the Premier (1994d). A three-person committee of senior bureaucrats was appointed to development standards for the "Low Intensity Areas" (LIAs). This committee was headed by John Allan, Deputy Minister of the Environmental Assessment Office. The other two members were Rick Smith of the Ministry of Forests and Jim Walker, ADM, Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks (Outdoor Recreation Council of BC 1994c: 3).

26 Outdoor Recreation Council of BC (1993; 1994c). The most important difference with respect to protected area changes was the reduction in size of the 23 protected areas proposed in the CORE report, in order that smaller protected areas could also be designated (Outdoor Recreation Council of BC 1994c: 3).


Agreement on this package proved impossible because of different interpretations of the government’s Protected Areas Strategy. Some sectors believed the strategy should establish no more than 12% protected area in the region, while others felt the strategy should address ecosystem representation and wilderness issues as a first priority and protect more than 12% (British Columbia. Commission on Resources and the Environment 1994b: 10)

Six different land use proposals were presented from different sectors and groups, ranging from those proposing to protect 3.5 percent of the land base, to others who recommended protecting 14 percent.

28 The “self-identified” sectors at the Cariboo CORE table were: Agriculture, All Beings, Back country Tourism, Cariboo Communities, Cariboo Forest Contractors, Cariboo Tribal Council, Conservation, Fish and Wildlife, Forest and Employment, Government (provincial and federal), Hardrock Mining, Hotels and Restaurants, Local Government, Major Forest Licensees, Minor Forest Licensees, Place Mining, Recreation, Resorts and Campgrounds, Sustainable Communities, Sustainable Forestry, Wildcraft and Youth.

29 See British Columbia, Office of the Premier (1994b). Other aspects of the plan included the creation of a Regional Resources Board to oversee implementation of the plan, a Cariboo-Chilcotin jobs strategy, Forest Renewal investments of $3 million, and the creation of a “Resources Jobs Commissioner” to “work with companies, workers, communities and government to secure stable resource jobs now and in the future” (ibid).

30Premier’s office negotiations focused on the Cariboo Communities Coalition, comprising industry and labour sectors, and the Cariboo Conservation Council, comprising environmental interests. Other discussions were held with the recreation, tourism and sustainable forestry sectors (British Columbia. Office of the Premier 1994b: 2). See generally Hamilton (1994c), Bohn (1994c), Vancouver Sun (1994a).

31 See British Columbia, Commission on Resources and the Environment (1994): 88. The sector representation varied slightly at each CORE table, since participants were encouraged to “self-identify”. The sectors on the West Kootenay table include: Agriculture, Applied Ecological Stewardship, Community Economic Development/NGOs, First Nations (Ktunaxa/Kinbasket), First Nations (Okanagan Nation), Fish and Wildlife (Commercial), Fish and Wildlife (Recreation), Labour, Labour (Forest),
Local Government, Forest Independents (Contractors), Forest Independents (Small Scale Diversified), North Columbia Mountains Environment, Outdoor Recreation (Non-motorized), Outdoor Recreation (Motorized), Mining, Primary Forest Manufacturers, Provincial Government, Local Round Tables, Tourism Associations, Tourism Resorts, South Columbia Mountains Environment, Heritage, Watersheds (ibid: 17).

32See British Columbia. Office of the Premier (1995b: 1). Similar to the other land use decisions announced by the Premier's office, the BC government announced a series of additional measures that apply to both the East and West Kootenay boundaries. A "Kootenay Regional Advisory Group" was created to oversee implementation of the land use plans, $6 million was promised for forest jobs through the Forest Renewal Plan, a "Resources Job Commissioner" position was created, A "Rapid Response Team" was established to work with the Jobs Commissioner to help facilitate economic opportunities, and a "Regional Transition Review Board was created to review and monitor the work of the Rapid Response Team and the Resources Job Commissioner.

33The "self-identified" sectors at the East Kootenay CORE tables were: Agriculture, Community Economic Development, Fish and Wildlife (Commercial), Fish and Wildlife (Recreation), Labour (Woodworkers), Labour (Non-Woodworkers), Local Government (RDCS), Local Government (RDEK), Forest Independents (Other), Forest Independent (Logging Contractors), Outdoor Recreation (Non-Motorized), Mining (Coal), Mining (General), Outdoor Recreation (Motorized), Primary Forest Manufacturers, Provincial Government, Tourism Associations, Tourism Resorts, Global Energy, Cultural Heritage, Ecosystems (Wilderness) (British Columbia. Commission on Resources and the Environment 1994c: 17). No aboriginal groups participated in an official capacity in this process, but did attend meetings in an observer capacity (ibid: 16-17).

34In this case the zones were labelled "dedicated" (high intensity), "integrated" (medium) and "special management" (low) British Columbia. Commission on Resources and the Environment (1994c: Plan Map).


36Personal interview.

37Personal interview.


40This is partly because of the extensive employee and financial resources of the Ministry of Forests compared to the Ministry of Environment, Land and Parks and Ministry of Energy, Mines and Resources.


42Ibid.

43Personal interview, Land Use Coordination Office.

44Hoberg and Morawski (1996) argue that the Clayoquot Sound decision could set a precedent for other forest policy networks throughout the province, particularly for the way it includes aboriginal groups and aboriginal forestry values.


46The two forest companies with TFL lands on Clayoquot Sound were MacMillan-Bloedel and Interfor.


48Before the government announced its decision, environmental groups campaigned to have Clayoquot lands considered as part of the Vancouver Island CORE table. The provincial cabinet was divided over this plan of action, and in the end decided to reject this request.
Aboriginal peoples' criticism of the Clayoquot Sound decision was muted after the BC government signing an "Interim Measures Agreement" with the Nuu-Chah Nulth Tribal Council (1994a; British Columbia. Chiefs of the Central Region of the Nuu-Chah-Nulth Tribal Council 1994b). This agreement supported a strong role for aboriginal peoples in forest harvesting and forest stewardship. In fact, international groups such as the Natural Resources Defense Council took much of the credit for this "aboriginal" victory (see Natural Resources Defense Council 1994). In addition, adoption of the Scientific Panel report and its recommendations to conform forest practices with "traditional aboriginal practices" (Hoberg and Morawski 1996: 15) further served to explicitly address aboriginal issues.

Some groups such as the Toronto office of the World Wildlife Fund used the negative publicity of the Clayoquot decision to argue that the government must work doubly hard to implement the Protected Areas Strategy and to respond favourably to the CORE land use report (letter to Doug McArthur, Deputy Minister, Cabinet Planning Secretariat, from Arlin Hackman, Director, Endangered Spaces Campaign, World Wildlife Fund Canada).

Despite initial support from many environmental groups, environmental criticism on the government's acceptance of the Clayoquot Scientific Panel's recommendations has since occurred. Forest landscape ecologists such as Hammond and Bradley (1996: 220) argue that:

...much of the remaining timbered landscape in Clayoquot is not suitable for sustainable, ecologically responsible timber management.

Planning now to log wet, steep slopes with shallow soils because all the best sites have been cut in the past in neither ecologically nor economically sustainable.

These authors find no fault "with the work of the Panel itself", but argue that the:

...constraints imposed by the Panel's Terms of Reference limited their ability to advocate true ecosystem-based planning [because] "the terms of reference discouraged the Panel from making recommendations to protect undeveloped watersheds other than those protected in the "Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision," which was a political decision-making process (ibid: 224).

The two forest companies seemed eager to seek accommodations with environmental groups and aboriginal peoples. In March 1996, MacMillan Bloedel organized a "Symposium on Alternative Silvicultural Systems" in Clayoquot Sound to "design alternatives to clearcutting on the west coast of Vancouver Island" (Hammond and Bradley 1996: 220). This conference was funded by Forest Renewal BC (FRBC), which had already given MacMillan Bloedel $5.6 million as compensation for the costs of implementing the Scientific Panel's recommendations (Hammond and Bradley 1996: 220). However, months later, MacMillan Bloedel announced it was "walking away" from all of its interests in Clayoquot.

Relations between aboriginal groups and environmentalists have been uneasy, even on Clayoquot Sound. This was particularly so in the summer of 1996, when the Rainforest Action Network launched a renewed advertising campaign against forest practices on Clayoquot Sound, despite aboriginal groups' support of the way government was handling Clayoquot. See Hoberg and Morawski (1996), Lush (1996), Baldrey (1994c), British Columbia (1994), British Columbia. Chiefs of the Central Region of the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council (1994a; 1994b).

The government commissioned Gordon Baskerville of the University of British Columbia Faculty of Forestry to undertake consultation initiatives with the public, including environmental groups and industry interests (Baskerville 1994).
The government believed that CORE-style processes over forest practices issues would not work because of the highly technical aspect of the changes being made (personal interviews). This view stands in sharp contrast to Washington State’s TFV and Sustainable Forestry Roundtable processes. Since this time, the government has established informal consultations with environment and industry groups over specific parts of the Code such as biodiversity field guides.


Organized labour also had a limited role in developing the Code (Personal interview, IWA-Canada). However, it did lobby successfully to have the Code recognize that when forest practice requirements conflict with health and safety regulations, the safety of workers comes first (personal interview, IWA Canada). Interestingly, the IWA had proposed the adoption of "sustainable forestry" practices including reduction in "clear-cut openings and [that the] clear cut openings...be dependent on the ecosystem" back in 1989 (IWA - Canada 1989: 8). However, once the Code was established, in many cases the IWA joined industry in warning the government against severe measures, particularly surrounding riparian (streamside) standards (Hamilton 1994b).

"Sympathetic Administration" is a term used to describe the previous forest management clientele-pluralist relationship, and the then government's reluctance to reduce annual harvesting rates.

Biodiversity protection requirements are found in unenforceable "field guides". These rules appear the most susceptible to change. For example, the original biodiversity field guides were weakened in order to meet then Forest Minister Petter's promise that the Forest Practices Code would not result in more than a six percent reduction in the Annual Allowable Cut.

Some riparian rules followed a different route, and were strengthened following increased scrutiny. See Council of Forest Industries (Not dated), BC Wild (1994).

Recall from Chapter Two that the Act essentially establishes "rules for logging plans...rather than rules for logging...." (Sierra Legal Defence Fund, McDade, and Haddock 1994: 1) The result of this is to limit the opportunity for environmental litigation where a company's forest practices are contrary to the Act but adhere to an approved operational plan.


The evidence to date is that the BC government intends on ensuring that the District Managers are not overzealous in applying the Act. The Quesnel Cariboo Observer quotes Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks Assistant Deputy Minister as saying, it is government policy that "...there won't be [government officials] looking for every single violation" of the Code and if this did occur, such a person "would pretty soon be reprimanded" (Quesnel Cariboo Observer, Tribune, and Press 1994: 55). Walker is also quoted as saying, "If we had people out there abiding by 99 percent of the law and the operator was taken to court, I think the ministry person would pretty soon be reprimanded" (ibid: 56). Preliminary research by the Sierra Legal Defence Fund (1996; 1997) supports the view that the Code has not been strictly enforced.


Instead, of the Environmental Assessment Act applying to forest practices, provisions for possible environmental assessment are contained within the Forest Practices Code Act itself. Part 3, Section 17(1) states that an operational plan must be submitted to the district manager and the holder must carry out "assessments" "if required by the regulations".

This is different from previous legislation and may, depending on the regulations, force companies to undertake comprehensive assessments that include environmental considerations. Nonetheless, this is much more discretionary and less directive than NFMA and NEPA provisions, with no legislative requirement that environmental effects of operational plans must be included in these assessments. Nor are there any requirements for public participation or input during this process.
67 Personal interview, Council of Forest Industries.


69 In its 1993 Annual Review (1993b), the World Wildlife Fund acknowledges that the BC government responded positively to many of its protected area recommendations.

70 Personal interview.

71 Personal interview.

72 Personal interview.

73 Personal interview.

74 Personal interview.

75 Indeed, Rowland (1994) and Haddock (1995) have shown, respectively, the dramatically weaker approaches the Washington State Forest Practices Board and the BC government have taken in protecting the spotted owl.
CONCLUSION:

The development of eco-forest policy governing British Columbia, Oregon, Washington, and PNW federal lands have followed divergent paths, despite a convergence of citizen value changes concerning the environment. Using a policy community/network approach as a comparative tool, evidence presented shows strong support for the three hypotheses regarding the effects of macro-institutional structures, forest land ownership patterns, and statutory regimes on state/societal relations and policy outputs. Institutional settings clearly do matter. They influence the level of autonomy the state has to realize its own goals, as well as bureaucratic capacity to formulate and implement policy network decisions. These institutional factors also affect the development of organized interests in the policy community, which in turn determines the ability of groups to be active in different policy networks.

Some scholars have argued that the policy network approach has difficulty accounting for policy change. Atkinson and Coleman (1992: 161) argue that policy networks “can be identified, but that information alone will be of very little use in predicting policy outcomes” and that the policy community/network practitioners “have not addressed well the issues of policy innovation and policy change” (ibid: 154). Similarly, Hoberg (1996: 1) has argued that “the community and network concepts have little to say about policy outcomes” and that “the network approach thus far has had a strong static tendency, and thus has not been oriented towards explaining either institutional or policy change”.

The research presented here challenges these claims, showing a strong correlation between network change and policy output change. The most significant policy transformations that occurred were in jurisdictions where the structure of networks themselves changed. The adoption of Option 9 and “ecosystem management” in the PNW coincided with network change at the local forest management level, where the last vestiges of clientele-pluralism eroded and solidly pressure-
pluralism networks emerged. In British Columbia, dramatic forest policy change occurred in the early 1990s as clientele-pluralism networks were replaced with forest land use networks that contained elements of pressure-pluralism and corporatism and forest practices/management networks that went through a short-term state directed structure, and now appear to be headed toward pressure-pluralism. Conversely, limited policy change governing State regulated forests in Oregon and Washington coincided with clientele-pluralism network stability. Despite heightened public criticism, policy changed only slightly in these two States.

Peter Hall's (1993) conceptualization of policy change helps to reinforce this point. Hall identifies "three orders" of policy change. The first refers to changes in technical "settings" (e.g. changing the speed limit from 80 to 100 kilometres per hour), the second refers to changes in policy instruments/mecanism for delivering policy, and the third is where policy paradigms change and the goals or policy norms governing the policy domain are altered (e.g. a move from Keynesianism to Monetarism). These categories are not exclusive. Third order policy change will almost undoubtedly result in second and first order change.

Applying these categories to forest policy change uncovers important results. The US PNW underwent third order policy change twice: once during the 1960s/early 1970s period over wilderness protection and the idea that federal forests provided multiple-uses of the forest resource; and again in the 1990s, when the holistic-oriented ecosystem management principles, and biodiversity were embraced. Ecosystem management carries with it the principle that forest harvesting can only occur once the integrity of the natural environment is ensured. Under this approach, harvesting becomes a "residual". Second order policy change coincided with the adoption of ecosystem management, as new regional and sub-regional interagency committees and an executive office were established to implement these new policy goals. Conversely, Oregon and Washington State have not experienced third order policy change. The main goal is to manage the forest for its economic value. In Oregon and Washington, environmental protection is offered only after the economic value is
assured. In these two States, the “residual” is the ecosystem. Similarly, second order policy change either did not occur, or was limited in nature: Forest Practices Boards and a single forest management agency remain the key instruments for delivering policy.

British Columbia did not undergo any third order change in the 1960s, 1970s or 1980s, despite the recommendations of advisory committees and Royal Commissions, the efforts of environmental groups, and the 1979 Forest Act that addressed multiple-resource management. The establishment of the Environment and Land Use Committee in the early 1970s constitutes a slight second order change, since it offered a new mechanism to oversee forest land use disputes. However, in the 1990s, British Columbia underwent dramatic third order and second order policy change, with respect to forest practices and forest protection/land use issues. Maintaining biodiversity and wilderness protection were no longer considered luxuries that could only be undertaken after the economic health of the forest industry was assured. Government and industry officials agree that the Forest Practices Code and the increased forest protection measures will reduce logging activity and forest employment. Unlike the US federal lands case, forest harvesting did not become a residual, either. For example, the government maintained the right to revise biodiversity standards downwards in order to reduce the decline in the level of cut. In BC’s case, the new paradigm was a government trying to maintain a balance between the economy and the ecosystem, with neither being considered the “residual” (Wright 1995). British Columbia also underwent considerable second order policy change, with a new Forest Practices Code Act that ushered in a new way of regulating forest practices, and new multi-stakeholder processes for implementing forest land use protection.

What were the effects of these third and second order changes on first order change? Table C.0 generalizes about the relative strength of eight measures of first order forest practices and forest protection policy change in each jurisdiction. These generalizations are based on the preceding qualitative chapters, and on a more systematic study of first order policy change undertaken for this
dissertation (Appendix A). This comparison shows that in almost all cases, third order change leads to a higher degree of first order policy change, while lack of third order change limits first order change. In 1975, when only the PNW federal land policies had undergone third order change, first order policies were more strict here than in the other jurisdictions. This is true whether examining rules regarding clearcutting, riparian zones, endangered species/biodiversity protection, road building, the annual allowable cut or forest protection. The only exception is reforestation rules, which were relatively high in Oregon and Washington as of 1975, and where BC had the toughest requirements. (Reforestation is often supported by the forest industry since it is aimed at renewing their primary resource, and as such is not a precise measure of environmental policy.)

Table C.0 measures change 20 years later, when BC and the PNW federal lands both underwent third order policy change. The most significant development in first order policy change is in British Columbia, where rules governing clearcutting, endangered species/biodiversity, reforestation, road building, the annual allowable cut, and forest protection all dramatically increased. In addition, the US federal PNW rules increased, following the adoption of Option 9 and ecosystem management. With the exception of reforestation requirements, first order policy is now the most strict on US federal lands. Conversely, with no third order policy change, Oregon and Washington State experienced only minor increases in first order policy change.
**TABLE C.0: FIRST ORDER POLICY CHANGE***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Least Strict</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10 Most Strict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearcutting</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riparian Zones</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Endangered Species/ Biodiversity</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforestation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road building</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Allowable Cut</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Protection</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These numbers represent the author’s interpretation of relative differences of each of these measures between jurisdictions, and across time. Values are based on a detailed qualitative analysis (presented in Appendix A).

The lesson is that the ability of policy networks to be resilient, or to adapt and change to environmental pressures within civil society, predicts the magnitude of first order change. This speaks to the importance of research in understanding why and how some networks are resilient to societal pressures, and why, how and when others adapt.

The work presented in the previous chapters showed that before the first wave of environmentalism in the 1960s, all of the jurisdictions under review were governed by closed clientele-pluralist policy networks dominated between a key government agency, organized industry interests, and individual forest companies. These clientele-pluralist networks were marked by policy outputs that focused on maintaining a healthy forest economy, including reforestation, pest control,
and forest management producing high yielding second-growth forests. It was environmental struggles over protecting forests from harvesting (directly at odds with the interest of forest companies) and pursuant efforts to increase harvesting regulations, that began to challenge these networks.

Once environmental values gained increased salience, the effects of macro-institutional structures, land ownership patterns and prior statutory regimes (both in terms of their development and consequences for future conflict) begin to explain divergence in policy network and policy community development. They affect how policy networks and communities would adapt to societal pressures, and the resulting policy change. (Table C.1 summarizes the key findings by jurisdiction and across time.) An important reciprocal relationship was uncovered between policy communities and policy networks in each jurisdiction. The US federal policy community/networks affected the three other jurisdictions as well. The greater rewards provided by the US federal policy community limited the number of environmental group seeking influence at the State level. In BC, US federal PNW victories resulted in US groups seeking to influence BC forest practices to avoid seeing policy victories in the PNW offset by what they felt were inadequate eco-forest policies in British Columbia.
Influence of Macro-institutional Factors

Atkinson and Coleman (1992: 154) argue that the policy network approach encounters "obstacles in incorporating the influence of macropolitical institutions". Supporting this contention is that macro-institutional factors did not determine policy change, as evidenced by the emergence of divergent statutory regimes between the States and the US federal jurisdictions. Yet, macro-institutions played an important indirect role: through their influence on the nature of executive, legislative and judicial autonomy, and the governments' ability to initiate statutory change.

The US macro-institutional structures, common to all three PNW jurisdictions, require extraordinary negotiations or consensus for statutory development or change to occur. The cabinet-centred nature of BC's Westminster model of government requires much less consensus. This gives the BC executive the capacity to take quick statutory action, or not to act at all. Conversely, log-rolling and the bidding up phenomena, so important to statutory change under US macro-institutional structures, have no parallel in the BC case. Once enacted, US statutes proved durable and difficult to change. BC statutes were also durable until 1991, but this phenomenon and post-1991 changes had to do with the policy agenda of the political party (or government) holding power. Macro-institutional features also influenced the number of access points afforded to members of the policy community.

Land Ownership

Decisions regarding land ownership had two important effects. First, a preponderance of private land ownership limited policies governing these jurisdictions to forest practices regulations, rather than forest protection. (This had the effect of focusing the limited amount of State-level environmental group concern on the issue of forest practices regulations, since forest land use/protection was beyond the policy scope of these networks.) Second, a high degree of private land reduced state actors' autonomy because regulations are prone to collaborative relationships
with private landowners and forest companies. In the case of Oregon and Washington, the large proportion of private land held by large forest companies facilitated the development of a cohesive industry association with considerable resources and ability to become part of policy making process. Overall, a high degree of private land ownership helped industry maintain clientele-pluralist networks, while a high degree of public land ownership facilitated network changes on PNW federal lands and in BC. Where public land ownership was high, environmental groups were assisted by widely held beliefs that publicly-owned land should be managed for more than simply economic values.

Statutory Regimes

The most important explanatory factor in each jurisdiction was the structure of the statutory regime. Oregon and Washington State's statutory regimes were key to maintaining the existing structure of policy networks. And legislation passed by the US Congress during the first wave of environmentalism was the cause of the immediate change for key federal PNW policy networks. PNW networks changed again during the late 1980s and early 1990s, owing to a statutory regime change that permitted environmental groups to litigate. The development of a limited and discretionary statutory regime in BC reinforces an understanding of why the electorally dominant Social Credit party was able to maintain network resilience, and why a different government had the ability to undertake significant pro-active change, unencumbered by legislative requirements.

The differing statutory regimes had profound consequences for the organizational structure and expertise of environmental groups in each jurisdiction. The US federal statutory regime resulted in the dominance of professional, expertise, and litigious groups, complemented by grass-roots groups often affiliated with national groups who sought and obtained access to individual, local forest planning networks. Few environmental groups were interested in being involved at the State level where statutes did not facilitate litigation or long-term involvement in the sub-government (particularly as policy participants). As for BC, a lack of influence in the sub-government throughout most of the
1970s and 1980s at the provincial level meant that many of BC's groups were forced to limit advocacy to individual protected areas, where they were usually unsuccessful. This focus delayed the development of province-wide associational structures until the early 1990s, and coincided with the election of a government with an eco-forest policy agenda.

The preceding summary of the influence of macro-institutional factors, land ownership patterns and statutory regimes supports Pierson's (1993: 598) observation that the role and organizational structure of organized interests are influenced by policy outputs, and that the "[t]he activity of interest groups often seems to follow rather than precede the adoption of public policies. At the same time, not all policy outputs shaped group activity equally, which Pierson argues is because different policies have varying "lock in" effects. In the case of PNW and BC forestry, macro-institutional structures and land ownership decisions rarely changed, and once constituted, "locked in" the type of effects they would have on community and network development. The "lock in" effects of statutory regimes depended on the nature of the macro-institutional setting. US statutes are more difficult to change than BC's for the reasons noted above.

The Reciprocal Relationship Between Communities and Networks

Policy communities and policy networks influence each other. Even where strong state capacity and autonomy exists, the state will have difficulty creating inclusionary policy networks if environmental groups and other societal interests do not exist or are poorly organized. (In these cases, the state may be able to facilitate the development of societal interests.) Conversely, where the policy community is rich with environmental, industry and other organized interests, even a strong state that determines the nature of its policy networks will be influenced to some degree by policy community membership. For example, the closed forest policy networks in Oregon and Washington limited the number of environmental groups seeking access to the policy community.
This contrasts with the decision of BC's Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE) to fund environmentalists in order to help them form a Vancouver Island-wide associational coalition.

**Source of Change**

Uncovered and underlined throughout this dissertation is that although environmental values put pressure on all jurisdictions to adapt, decisions on how, when, or whether to change policy networks and outputs were made by different actors. In the US federal sphere the source of change was Congress through statutory change during the first wave of environmentalism and litigation thereafter; in BC the source of resilience and change was mostly attributable to the political party governing the province; and in Oregon and Washington State, policy network and output resilience were attributable to the dominance of forest industry interests (Diagram C.0). In this sense, historical institutionalism and policy community/network approaches do not just reveal how struggles within civil society are mediated by different institutional structures, but also shed light on recent theoretical inquiries about policy community change. Far from developing a universally applicable mid-range theory on why policy networks change, the evidence shows that different policy networks will adapt to societal pressures in different ways.

Consequently, it is necessary to qualify Hoberg’s claims regarding the effects of the presence or absence of legalism in explaining cross national divergence. Hoberg (1993: 31) asserts that:

> Without the availability of legal recourse, environmentalists in Canada are more vulnerable to resource imbalances. Their leverage depends more on their ability to mobilize public opinion and pose a threat of electoral retribution to the government. US environmentalists also have this electoral threat, but in addition, legalism gives them additional bargaining power.

Research presented in this dissertation shows that this is an important explanation for differences between BC and the US federal PNW, but does not aid in understanding the fundamentally different nature of state/societal relations and policy outputs in Oregon and Washington State.
Moreover, Hoberg's analysis that environmental groups in both countries pose electoral threats does not capture the dramatic results of a change in political party in a Westminster parliamentary system. This is not to argue that partisan politics is unimportant in the three US jurisdictions. Fraidenburg (1989), Pinkerton (1992), Ficken (1987) and Robbins (1988) all note that historically Oregonians and Washingtonians tend to elect State legislatures dominated by supporters of the forest industry. Rather, due to the different macro-institutional structures, the influence of elected legislators on the winning side is less immediate and less direct than in British Columbia. When "green" Governors and other like-minded officials have been elected in the PNW, they have had difficulty influencing policy owing to the fragmented nature of the macro-institutional structure, and the existence of a statutory regime that takes away much of their decision-making authority. Even with a change in the composition of the US Congress in 1994 and the desires of the Republican majority to significantly alter environmental legislation, the statutory regime remained resilient. Conversely, a change in political party in BC in 1991 resulted in a host of easily enacted statutory initiatives.³

Thus, macro-institutional settings, land ownership patterns, and statutory regimes have had an important influence on state autonomy, capacity and the development of different organized economic, environmental, and other interests. These three factors significantly influenced the development of policy communities, networks and outputs since the 1960s in each jurisdiction.

At the same time, institutional factors alone cannot explain all differences - such as the recent internationalization of BC's forest policy community, and the paucity of attention US environmental groups give to private forest regulations in the Pacific Northwest. Three other factors have proven worthy of review: the importance of the forest industry to the regional economy; a region's dependence on foreign markets for its forest products; and the influence of US foundations in providing funding and coalition building strategies.
The Importance of the Forest Industry to the Regional Economy

The prominence of the forest industry to the regional economies appears to have played an indirect role in explaining policy differences. The ability of organized forest industry interests to determine the direction of Oregon and Washington State's statutory regimes, and their relative lack of influence in Washington, DC's statutory regime development, must be understood in the context of the greater role of the forest industry in the PNW than in the US as a whole. If the forest industry had not been as central to the PNW regional economy, it is less likely that the State legislatures would have remained acquiescent to organized industry dominance. Conversely, the emergence of a federal statutory regime with much greater protection for the forest environment was facilitated by a more diversified, less forest dependent, national economy.

This "regional economy" explanation should not be exaggerated. The evidence from BC and the PNW is not that State and provincial governments will necessarily be less environmentally friendly, but that regions closest to the forest produce the most ardent interests and voices on both sides of the issues. Due to the macro-institutional and land ownership features, when a political party that is more prone to initiate environmental protection is elected, it will have more direct influence in BC than in the PNW.

Dependence on International Trade

The relative prominence of foreign markets for forest products does help explain the context of change in BC and the PNW. BC's dependence on foreign markets allowed US, European and other international environmental groups to gain access to the BC forest policy community, while PNW's dependence on largely domestic markets made it immune from international influences. Atkinson and Coleman (1992: 154) argue that policy community and network concepts "have some difficulty in accommodating the internationalization of many policy domains". Yet, the policy community approach disclosed the role of international groups in BC, while other approaches failed
to highlight these differences. An awareness of the role of US groups in BC led to the discovery that a policy community and its networks in one country can affect a policy community and its networks in another country. The success of US groups in the federal PNW forest policy community/networks was the main reason they entered the BC forest policy community and its networks - in order to avoid having their gains in the US PNW offset by “poorer” regulations in BC. Their influence was facilitated because of BC's forest sector's dependence on foreign exports, which made policy makers more susceptible to the views of foreign consumers. (Diagram C.1 on pages 269-70 summarizes the dissertation's findings regarding the relative influence of institutional and economic factors.)

The influence of international environmental groups, with their threat of foreign boycotts, creates a paradoxical situation in which the BC state has the capacity to take decisions autonomously from domestic economic and other organized interests, but has less autonomy from international organized interests wishing to influence BC's domestic forest policies. Such a scheme challenges Weber's notion of the state as existing within a fixed geographic territory, and confronts most existing comparative public policy analyses which often focus solely on domestic internal struggles. As David Cohen (1994: 4) has noted:

...the environmental policy which we develop [in British Columbia] will necessarily be subjected to intense scrutiny by actors who, in traditional political theory, would not have a voice in domestic let alone local politics.

Litigious, scientific and research groups such as the New York/Washington, DC-based Natural Resources Defense Council (a direct product of the US legalistic statutory regime) have become important members of the BC forest policy community. This means that theoretical work showing the influence of the domestic institutional setting on the policy community development will have to be subject to qualification, if some of the key groups gaining access and promoting change are the product of another country's institutional structure and historical developments. Still, the autonomy of the state in the domestic policy network affects the nature of non-domestic actors' influence. For example, it is doubtful that BC's forest policy community and policy networks could
have been so quickly penetrated by international interests if it were not for the ability of the BC state to rearrange its relationships with organized interests.

Interestingly, US environmental groups have not attempted the same kind of boycott pressure on forest companies operating within the United States. This is partly explained by the high level of success US environmental groups have achieved in enforcing existing environmental laws on US federal lands. It is also more difficult to advocate action that will hurt a domestic industry, than an external industry with no political clout within the US.

Role of US Foundations

This dissertation raises another fascinating observation: US foundations have become increasingly important in financing the activities of environmental groups in all four forest policy communities. The emergence of US foundations in a hitherto immature BC environmental community may partly explain differences in the way US and BC environmental groups developed. This dissertation has shown that during the first wave of environmentalism, the growth of membership in federal US environmental groups (combined with the influence of the legalistic statutory regime) led to their increasingly bureaucratic, professionalized, and expert orientation, and their resulting ability to play an active role in the forest policy community sub-government.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s in BC, it was not growth in membership that caused most environmental groups to gain resources and expertise, but the presence of US foundations. While BC groups financed by US foundations were becoming more bureaucratic, professionalized, expertise-oriented and heavily involved in the BC forest policy community, BC membership-based groups such as the Western Canada Wilderness Committee were becoming more radical, consciously refusing membership in the forest policy sub-government. Since the mid-1980s in all four jurisdictions, groups and associations that received US foundation support tended to be active in the
sub-government, while more radical groups who were less involved in the sub-government relied on membership funding.

This phenomenon raises questions worthy of further study: what are the implications of this increased role of US foundations for long-term environmental group access to the forest policy community? What would happen if foundations withdrew funding? What happens when the agenda of foundations differs from that of environmental groups? (The BC Wild coalition, the US Forest Watch network coalition, the US National Forest Protection Campaign and others were created at the bequest of US foundations.) These are exciting new areas for policy community research.

POLICY COMMUNITY/NETWORK CATEGORIES AND THEORY

Benefits of the Policy Community Approach

The research uncovered strengths and limitations of policy community/network literature as a heuristic epistemological tool and with respect to its theoretical propositions. One of the key strengths of the policy community approach is that it does not limit analysis of a particular policy area to a single agency or branch of government. The roles of various government agencies, organized industry and societal interests are a matter for empirical investigation. This approach elicits a more comprehensive picture of the kinds of relationships that develop in different sectors within the same country and cross-nationally. The weakness of a policy community approach is that it is difficult to draw precise boundaries around a particular set of government agencies and non-government organizations and deem them to have "membership" in a policy community. Policy community membership is fluid, and hence difficult to map. Nonetheless, the approach did present a way to capture a general picture of sectoral-level policy making, without making a priori assumptions about the key agencies and organizations that are involved in forest policy making.

Much of the US literature on forest policy has avoided these methodological problems by limiting inquiry to one level of government or a single agency, most often the US Forest Service.
These studies provide insight into the ways different forest management agencies incorporate organized interests. The difficulty with these single case studies is that they fail to present the broader context within which forest policy is made, nor do they explore forest policies that cover an entire region or country. This is because much of their focus is on public administration - an important but exclusive element of public policy (Simeon 1976: 549). Political science literature on comparative public policy that focuses on broad macro-based questions such as economic policy (Gourevitch 1986; Hall 1986), social policy (Esping-Andersen 1989; 1990) and even environmental policy (Hoberg 1992; Vogel 1986; 1993), has had the opposite problem. Because these studies attempt to generalize about a nation's public policy responses, usually to explain cross national divergence, they fail to capture intra-national or intra-regional differences that we know exist in the PNW and BC.

The distinction between the related, but distinct, concepts of policy network and policy community has also aided this analysis. The policy community approach directed attention to the number, types of groups, the existence of associational structure, and which kinds of groups are best able to participate in the sub-government deliberations. The network approach uncovered different types of state-societal relations over issues of concern to the policy community.

The problem with the policy community categories is that they were sometimes difficult to apply. Identifying whether groups were found in the sub-government (either as policy advocacy, policy participant) and attentive public was challenging. A group's particular role in the policy community varies according to what network was being examined, which means that the snapshot of the policy community presented in each review did not capture these intricacies. Moreover, the category of attentive public being reserved for "groups involved from time to time" fails to capture the role of a group that may only be involved from time to time, but when active, is found within the sub-government. An example of this is the US-based Natural Resources Defense Council and its influence on BC forest policy.
This model does not adequately capture the role of groups such as the US Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund that does not lobby at all, but provides litigation services on behalf of other environmental groups. US-based foundations are equally difficult to place. Many of these agencies have officials working full-time arranging grants for eco-forest group projects. Although these foundations rarely lobby or participate directly in sub-government activities, their actions influence the ability of other eco-forest groups to become policy participants within the sub-government.

This discussion reveals that the policy community is best used as a tool for mapping the groups involved in policy making. It is also an important tool for generalizing about a group or association's overall role in the policy making process, whose specific actions depend upon the actual network involved. Modifications may be appropriate to demonstrate the multi-faceted nature of the role different groups, associations, and foundations can play.

One way around this problem is to use the sub-government metaphor to apply to "potential" roles groups might be able to play: referring only to whether a group's internal organizational structure and its associational system permits it to be a member of the sub-government, rather than saying whether it is. Groups could be categorized as to whether their organizational composition or associational structure allows them to be effective policy participants, or whether they lack sufficient autonomy from their members. This "potential" would allow the reader to understand the overall differences in organizational means and structure, without labelling a group as belonging as policy participants or attentive public, when this often fluctuates according to the policy network.
Policy Networks

The concept of policy networks proved to be a valuable way to understand and compare state/societal relations in very different institutional settings. The difficulty with Coleman and Skogstad’s conception of ideal types was that state/societal relations will not always fit neatly into one of their categories. The influence of the CORE and LRMP processes on policy networks was the most difficult to categorize. They contained elements of corporatism, but no consensus was required. Some associations’ representatives had autonomy from their members, while others did not. And the subsequent Premier’s office process resembled pressure-pluralism.

The term “autonomy” may also need to be revisited. Coleman and Skogstad’s ideal types do not differentiate among the types of groups from which a state may have, or not have, autonomy. Under current policy network categories, a clientele-pluralist network that changes its “clientele” from industry to environmental groups would remain categorized as a clientele network. Even when a network structure changes from a clientele one to a pressure-pluralist or corporatist one, the types of groups represented in these changes are not completely captured by the policy network ideal types. Research in this dissertation has shown that as a general rule, the greater the participation environmental groups have in the policy community/networks, the greater the eco-forest policy response. If the networks had become pluralist or corporatist, but only involved organized labour interests, it is doubtful that the same kinds of policy responses would have occurred. The ideal types of policy networks identified by Coleman and Skogstad might be improved by distinguishing between the types of groups involved (industry, labour, environmental, consumer, and others). The risk in undertaking such a project is making the model too cumbersome. Overall, an application of Coleman and Skogstad’s network model was successful in illuminating key differences in state/societal relations across the four jurisdictions.
Policy Community/Network Theory

The findings of this research also inform theory about a group's potential role in the policy community/networks. Borrowing from Schmitter and Streeck (1981: 23), Coleman and Skogstad argue that two factors determine the role associations and groups will play in the sub-government: the groups' "logic of membership" and the "logic of influence factors" (opportunity structure). The logic of membership includes such measures at the values or "collective identity" of the membership, the potential size of the "membership domain, the geographical distribution of members, [and] their resource base (ibid)." The logic of influence refers to "the structures of significant institutions in the environment of the associational system, particularly the state" (ibid: 23).

The research presented supports the argument that these two factors strongly influence the organizational development of environmental groups, which has a resounding effect on the role in they play in the policy making process. A national membership base for groups concentrating on US PNW forest lands was important, as was the ability to gain resources to participate effectively in policy networks. Likewise the "logic of influence" factors were shown to be key in determining the organizational development of environmental groups, and their ability to crack clientele-pluralist networks. The three explanatory institutional factors raised in this dissertation are, for all intents and purposes, the same measure - only more detailed and less abstract than the definition offered by Schmitter and Streeck.
Borrowing again from Schmitter and Streeck (1981:24), Coleman and Skogstad theorize that two properties of organizational development are required for policy participation in the sub-government: "the interest organization must be able to order and coordinate a range of complex information and activity so as to arrive at positions on relatively sophisticated policy questions" and "the group must be sufficiently autonomous from members to be able to transcend their short-term interests and to take a longer term perspective on policy while still guaranteeing members' compliance". The evidence from this study is ambivalent about this point. US groups were able to build coalitions the fastest, and this allowed them to exert influence in the policy networks. A number of US national-based environmental groups have been able to meet these criteria and become more integrated than their counterparts in BC, Oregon and Washington.

However, organizational characteristics do not appear to be requirements for group involvement in policy participation, but they do seem necessary for long-term policy success. Research presented in the Chapters Five and Six shows that although the Washington Environmental Council (WEC) has a weak associational structure with little autonomy from its membership, it did take part as a policy participant in both the Timber/Fish/Wildlife Process and the Washington State Sustainable Forestry Roundtable. In the case of the Timber/Fish/Wildlife process,
the WEC was part of a policy "success" in which environmental groups, industry, the state and aboriginal groups agreed to a set of forest practice reforms. In the case of BC, government agencies and the BC Wild environmental coalition were able to provide necessary resources to fragmented environmental interests in order to facilitate their participation in corporatist-oriented policy networks.

These experiences show the need to qualify slightly Coleman and Skogstad's claim that "policy formulation in the absence of a well-developed associational system is doomed to failure" (Coleman and Skogstad 1990a: 23). Although the WEC's lack of organizational autonomy did not derail the TFW process, it was one factor leading to its limited policy gains. For the Sustainable Forestry Roundtable, environmental representatives, who did not have autonomy from their members, reached an agreement with other policy participants. The deal was scuttled after group members failed to ratify the deal. In the case of BC's Commission on Resource and the Environment regional tables, environmental representatives lack of autonomy from members may have been one reason for the inability of tables to reach a consensus. Yet this could hardly be deemed a failure, since the final policy decision was supported by most stakeholders, including environmental groups.

Additionally, the organizational structure of international groups did not appear to matter as much as their ability to threaten BC's export markets.

This dissertation also informs the policy community/network theory about the institutional causes of different networks. For Coleman and Skogstad (1990a: 27), pluralist networks "arise in sectors where state authority is fragmented and the organized [societal] interests are at a low level of organizational development ...[.]... unable to coordinate the multiple, narrow, specialized groups competing with one another". Whereas the level of organization determines the network family (pluralist, closed or state directed), the absence or presence of state autonomy determines whether the networks will be pressure pluralist or clientele pluralist:

In situations where state agencies have the capacity to be autonomous from the sectoral interests, pressure pluralism is more likely; where autonomy is less developed and officials are dependent on sectoral groups, clientele pluralism may arise (ibid: 28).
Coleman and Skogstad (1990a: 28) theorize that corporatist or concertation networks will emerge when the state agency and participating organized interests are both highly developed: "organized interests play a prominent role, tending to draw on a highly developed associational system that guarantees a virtual monopoly relationship with the dominant agency". State directed networks, Coleman and Skogstad (1990a: 29) argue, occur where the state has a high level of autonomy and capacity. In the presence of a weak associational system:

...organized interests play neither an important advocacy nor participant role in the policy process. These [networks] tend to occur in times of crisis, in fostering the development of an infant industry, or when policies tend to be horizontal in nature.

The evidence in the preceding chapters also tempers this theory. Chapter Six revealed that "very weak" associational systems do not necessarily exist in a state-directed network. Despite the presence of a highly organized forest industry and an increasingly integrated environmental community, the provincial cabinet was able to initiate a short-lived state directed forest practices network over rule development. The ability of the state to do this stemmed from the Westminster model of government, the high level of state owned land, and discretionary statutory regime. Other institutional variables influence the capacity and autonomy of the state besides the level of organizational development of state and societal interests, as Coleman and Skogstad would agree.

The Weakness of Strong and Weak Characterizations

The evidence indicates that where state capacity and autonomy are high, as in the case of British Columbia, the state can influence membership in the policy community, the type of networks that exist, and determine the nature of policy outputs. This is done by creating new processes, agencies and even facilitating the creation of new environmental associations. Conversely, where state capacity and autonomy tend to be low, the state has much less latitude.

However, evidence presented in this dissertation cautions against describing the state's role as "strong" or "weak". The introduction revealed the problem historical institutionalists have
encountered in applying these concepts to the macro-level. Many of these same problems exist at the sectoral level. Different parts of the state within the same sectoral level policy community will have both "strong" and "weak" characteristics. There were key differences among: the executive, executive agencies, the legislature and the judiciary. For example, in Washington and Oregon, the state has less autonomy from organized industry interests, than in any of the other three jurisdictions. Forest policy making authority is concentrated in the hands of a single agency to a much greater extent than in the US federal forest policy networks and the legislature is weak. Yet, the forest management agencies are strong. They have the capacity to implement network decisions, and have shown the ability to fend off "intrusion" by other agencies.

Even the "strong" BC state felt it had no choice but to allow international environmental groups a significant degree of access and influence to the decision-making process. Similarly, the BC government's fear of "capital flight" served to limit the state's ambitious policy agenda. Perhaps the best example was the NDP cabinet decision not to proceed with an already written and prepared Endangered Species Act - an Act that was strongly supported by the province's Ministry of the Environment. The United States federal PNW presents a hybrid example, where rulings from a "strong" judiciary forced land management agencies to break from their clientele relationship with forest industry officials. This gave land management agencies a greater degree of autonomy from industry interests, while reducing their autonomy from regulatory agencies and environmental interests.

Policy Outputs

This dissertation has detailed the development of policy communities, networks and policy outputs in the four jurisdictions key to forest policy making in the PNW and BC. This examination was not about measuring indicators of environmental health. Environmental groups push for eco-friendly forestry legislation and governmental policy decisions because they believe this affects the health
of the forests and their ecologies. In fact, a multitude of other factors come into play when examining these outcomes. For example, until the early 1990s, BC had protected only 5 percent of its forest land from commercial harvesting, but it had the greatest percentage of old growth forest land, estimated at 40-60 percent compared to 10 percent in the Pacific Northwest. Forest policy is an important influence on the forest ecology, but it is not a direct predictor of a region's ecological state. This is why, using Sharkansky's nomenclature, it was outputs rather than outcomes that comprised the central focus of this inquiry. Similarly, this dissertation has not addressed proposals for community based forestry. These involve normative debates beyond the scope of the work presented here.

THE DIRECTION OF FUTURE NETWORK AND POLICY CHANGE

Despite former BC Premier Harcourt's hope that the post-1991 forest policy changes would end the "war in the woods", conflict over the use of BC and PNW forests will continue. However, it is unlikely that dramatic network or policy output changes will occur in the foreseeable future in any of the jurisdictions under review. In the case of BC, the Clark NDP government has shifted attention to forestry jobs and away from the eco-forest initiatives that dominated the Harcourt years. And despite the changes made under Harcourt, many domestic and international environmental groups have increased their criticism of BC forest practices. It is possible that this renewed criticism may backfire. Unlike the Harcourt government's response that it was changing poor forest practices, BC government officials now point out that changes have been made, and argue that most of the criticism is unjustified. Indeed, in April of 1997, BC Premier Clark referred to Greenpeace officials as the "enemies of British Columbia", for their production of a pamphlet that decried BC harvesting practices, and used what some analysts claim are pictures of decade old clearcuts (Georgia Straight 1997). Given the latest criticism, the lesson for BC state officials is that eco-forest initiatives do not often result in reduced conflict or accolades. This may reduce the incentive to respond favourably
to future environmental concerns. It is ironic that once the BC government developed forest practice regulations more stringent in most cases than those in Washington and Oregon, it is BC that is still being threatened with boycotts while the State rules, for the most part, go unchallenged internationally.

The only area in which change may occur is through the Canadian federal government's Endangered Species Act. British Columbia industry and its allies are concerned that this Act might actually see the federal government use its constitutional authority to increase its role in BC forest policy (Forest Alliance of British Columbia 1997). Given the recent post-Charlottetown fascination with administrative devolution of federal powers, even this possibility seems unlikely.

Similarly, network and policy output change is unlikely in the PNW jurisdictions. Organized interests are tinkering at the margins of the Option 9/FEMAT plan. Congress has once again become the focus of environmental and industry interests over appropriations funding for road building and other management issues. The administration has turned much of its efforts to how to improve the implementation of Ecosystem Management in the PNW (Tuchmann et al. 1996). A new found endangered species could add an uncertain element in this jurisdiction, but with the vast majority of federal land already blocked from being harvested, even this might not result in discernible change.

At the State level, all indications are that the status quo will continue. Evidence indicates that an ecological disaster mobilizing public opinion would have little long-term reverberations on the State-level clientele-pluralist networks.

Herein lies a key problem: this review has found that even though the environment knows no boundaries, environmental policies and politics certainly do. Yet governments, environmental groups and other interests on both sides of the border argue that the lessons of the past decade are that if long-term sustainable forestry is to be achieved, holistic ecosystem-oriented planning will be needed. Since the PNW and BC boundaries share the same ecosystem, it seems appropriate to conceptualize the PNW and BC as single "Cascadian" region, as many observers already do. The
logic of this argument is for increased bi-national and inter-jurisdictional cooperation. Otherwise environmental victories in one jurisdiction could continue to be offset by less strict rules in other jurisdictions. The US federal government has made efforts to include non-federal lands in its ecosystem approach, but this falls far short of inter-jurisdictional pro-active cooperation. At the same time, the forest industry in both the PNW and BC has a right to compete under similar rules.

However, international agreements have proven difficult to achieve. The UN Rio conference (the Earth Summit) could only agree to a "non-binding" statement of principles (Johnson 1993: 103-116) and subsequent negotiations for a comprehensive agreement broke down after a split between developing and industrialized countries. Perhaps a smaller "Cascadian" accord might be more manageable, and potentially serve as a model for future international agreements. The hurdles for this type of international agreement also seem insurmountable. It is improbable that vested (and different) interests in each jurisdiction would give up their power for an uncertain new international policy realm. If international cooperation cannot be achieved, at least this review has demonstrated that environmental groups, forest industry officials, government actors and other interested officials must be acutely aware of the consequences of each jurisdiction's policy decisions not just on shaping their own forest policy struggles, but also on their neighbour's.
Diagram C.0: Sources of Change in PNW and BC

**PNW-Fed level**

- **Process**
  - "stable" (Subject to major legislative changes during "windows of opportunity")
  - legalism ensures "pluralism by design"
  - confrontational

- **Litigation** (Judicial rulings and enforcement of legislation)

- **Policy Outputs**
  - unstable
  - Judicial rulings/enforcement of existing legislation far from constant
  - Legislative change during "windows of opportunity"
  - Otherwise legislation is fairly stable with only minor changes.

**PNW-State Level**

- **Process**
  - "stable" (Subject to major legislative changes during "windows of opportunity")
  - Pro-extraction legislation
  - Less access to environmental groups

- **Forest Industry Interests**

- **Policy Outputs**
  - stable
  - Change related to strategic decision by industry to increase environmental protection.
  - Legislation is fairly stable with only minor changes.

**BC**

- **Process**
  - Stability related to ability of governing party to remain in power

- **Party/Cabinet**

- **Policy Outputs**
  - Stability related to ability of governing party to remain in power.
Diagram C.1: Dissertation Variables

**Values**
- Extraction focus versus environmental focus

**Institutional**
- Macro-institutions
  - Proportion of public and private land
    - Statutory Regime

**Economic**
- Historical Development/structure of industry
- Place of forest industry in North American Economy

**Independent Variables**

**Intervening Variables**
- Development of domestic based eco-forest groups and other organized Interests
  - Internal organization
  - Associational structure

**Dependent Variables**
- State autonomy and capacity
- Interest and participation of international groups and those from other countries
- Policy networks
  - Output
  - Path
  - Community

Policy Networks
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1995</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clientele-pluralist</td>
<td>Clientele-pluralist</td>
<td>Clientele-pluralist</td>
<td>Pressure Pluralist and Clientele-pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constellation of Actors</td>
<td>A number of agency and industry actors. Select conservations groups</td>
<td>One agency, one main industry organization</td>
<td>Few actors. One main government actor, one main industry actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Dominance of state and forest industry interests</td>
<td>Dominance of state and forest industry interests</td>
<td>Dominance of state and forest industry</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE C.1:**
FOREST POLICY COMMUNITIES, NETWORKS AND OUTPUTS, 1960, 1975, 1994
### TABLE C.1 CONT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patterns of Interaction</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1994</th>
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<td><strong>Fed PNW</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Oregon</strong></td>
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<td><strong>BC</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Patterns of Interaction

**Consultation between industry and state**

- **1960**: Consultation between industry and state
- **1975**: Consultation between industry and state
- **1994**: Consultation between industry and state

**Consultation between industry and state and select environmental groups**

- **1960**: Consultation between industry and state
- **1975**: Consultation between industry and state
- **1994**: Consultation between industry and state

**Governed through the courts. Litigation drives interaction**

- **1960**: Consultation between industry and state
- **1975**: Consultation between industry and state
- **1994**: Consultation between industry and state

**Consultation between industry and state and select environmental groups**

- **1960**: Consultation between industry and state
- **1975**: Consultation between industry and state
- **1994**: Consultation between industry and state

**Consultation between industry and state and select environmental groups and Indian Tribes**

- **1960**: Consultation between industry and state
- **1975**: Consultation between industry and state
- **1994**: Consultation between industry and state

#### Policy Outcomes

**Centred around sustainable exploitation of forest resource. Some lands protected as parks**

- **1960**: Centred around sustainable exploitation of forest resource. Some lands protected as parks
- **1975**: Centred around sustainable exploitation of forest resource. Some lands protected as parks
- **1994**: Centred around sustainable exploitation of forest resource. Some lands protected as parks

**Centred around exploitation of forest resource. Regulations limited to fire and reforestation**

- **1960**: Centred around exploitation of forest resource. Regulations limited to fire and reforestation
- **1975**: Centred around exploitation of forest resource. Regulations limited to fire and reforestation
- **1994**: Centred around exploitation of forest resource. Regulations limited to fire and reforestation

**Multiple use policies. Endangered species protected. Clean Water mandated. Long range forest plans required**

- **1960**: Multiple use policies. Endangered species protected. Clean Water mandated. Long range forest plans required
- **1975**: Multiple use policies. Endangered species protected. Clean Water mandated. Long range forest plans required
- **1994**: Multiple use policies. Endangered species protected. Clean Water mandated. Long range forest plans required

**Centred around exploitation of forest resource for economic development. Increased harvestin rules**

- **1960**: Centred around exploitation of forest resource for economic development. Increased harvestin rules
- **1975**: Centred around exploitation of forest resource for economic development. Increased harvestin rules
- **1994**: Centred around exploitation of forest resource for economic development. Increased harvestin rules

**Legalist statutory regime leads to ecosystem management, holistic planning**

- **1960**: Legalist statutory regime leads to ecosystem management, holistic planning
- **1975**: Legalist statutory regime leads to ecosystem management, holistic planning
- **1994**: Legalist statutory regime leads to ecosystem management, holistic planning

**Centred around exploitation of forest resource for economic development. New forest practice rules.**

- **1960**: Centred around exploitation of forest resource for economic development. New forest practice rules.
- **1975**: Centred around exploitation of forest resource for economic development. New forest practice rules.
- **1994**: Centred around exploitation of forest resource for economic development. New forest practice rules.

**Forest practices code, forest protected areas doubled. Consultative Commission on Resource and the Environment**

- **1960**: Forest practices code, forest protected areas doubled. Consultative Commission on Resource and the Environment
- **1975**: Forest practices code, forest protected areas doubled. Consultative Commission on Resource and the Environment
- **1994**: Forest practices code, forest protected areas doubled. Consultative Commission on Resource and the Environment

Adapted from Dohler (1991)
Endnotes

1The reader is invited to read Appendix A to gain a more detailed understanding of first order policy change in each jurisdiction.

2There will be changes to BC land ownership patterns once the current treaty process results in forest land transfers to aboriginal peoples.

3Sectoral level explanatory factors will not always be the same for different policy communities. It is doubtful whether land ownership would have much significance for the health care policy community, for example. However, macro-institutional and statutory regime factors may be more important across policy communities. More research has to be done, but certainly ongoing historical institutionalist and "new constitutionalist" (Weaver 1994) analyses continue to provide evidence that macro-institutional settings matter.


5In the case where the wishes of the BC state coincide more closely with international-based eco-forest groups, the autonomy of the BC state vis-a-vis economic actors could actually be seen as being strengthened.

6Bernstein and Cashore (1996 (revised February 1997)) present a detailed treatment of the effects of globalization and internationalization on BC forest politics that builds on the policy community/network approach.

7Coleman and Skogstad (1990b: 24) further detail what the logic of membership means for business groups:

For business associations, logic of membership factors refer to industry structure. For example, the more competitive firms in a sector are with one another the greater the differences among firms, and the larger the number of firms, the more difficult it will be to reach a higher level of organizational development. The impact of these factors is often compounded when firms are geographically dispersed and their interests differ depending on their spatial location. In contrast, organizational development becomes easier where firms are oriented to the domestic market, and hence may need the protection of the state, where oligopoly prevails, or where sectoral and territorial interests coincide at the provincial level.

8Schmitter and Streeck argue that organizational structures are more developed if strategic resources are "institutionalized" and if they have the "autonomous capacity to act and pursue long-term strategies regardless of short-term environmental constraints and fluctuations" (Coleman and Skogstad 1990a: 21; quoted in Schmitter and Streeck 1981: 124).

9Policy "success" is a highly subjective term that in this case simply refers to "achieving influence over policy". In this regard the Washington Sustainable Forestry Roundtable was a policy "failure" for environmental groups, but the 1987 Timber/Fish/Wildlife process was a policy "success".


12The Sierra Legal Defense Fund has been highly critical of the Forest Practices Code implementation (1996; Sierra Legal Defence Fund 1997) and for management to approve harvesting plans that contravene Code guidelines. The Valhalla Society has once again brought its criticism of BC forest practices to Germany, along with a new report, "Brazil of the North II" (Vancouver Province 1997). The San Francisco-based Forest Action Network has launched a new BC forest products boycott campaign in Europe (Hamilton 1997). A coalition of environmental groups has asked that former Premier Harcourt not be allowed to speak at a conference on North American biodiversity, citing his government's decision to allow logging in Clayoquot Sound (Leyne 1997).
APPENDIX A:
FIRST ORDER ECO-FOREST POLICY CHANGE

This appendix reviews the development of seven measures of forest policy change. The initial requirements as of the mid 1970s will be reviewed, and then an examination of their evolution over the next 20 years follows (Table A.0 presents an overview of these findings). The seven eco-forest policy measures to be examined are rules governing clear cuts, riparian zones, endangered species/biodiversity, reforestation, road building, the level of cut allowed per year, and forest protection. These were chosen because they represent arguably the most controversial areas of eco-forest policy. Since this is intended as a systematic account of eco-forest policy change, there will be some necessarily repetition with the dissertation chapters that also addressed eco-forest policy outputs.

OVERVIEW

All jurisdictions in the Pacific Northwest introduced jurisdiction-wide forest practices requirements in the early to mid-1970s while British Columbia did not. However, Oregon and Washington State's initial forest practices rules were often framed in non-mandatory terminology and provided for discretion and exceptions. Since the 1976 National Forest Management Act, few substantive forest practice policy changes occurred on federal lands in the Pacific Northwest until litigation over the Northern Spotted Owl. The ensuing Option 9 increases forest practice rules regarding clear cuts, streamside riparian protection, endangered species/biodiversity, forest protection and reduces significantly the annual allowable cut.

Both Oregon and Washington underwent changes to substantive forest practice regulations in 1987 following consensus processes and in 1991 following industry supported legislation. In the case of Oregon, the 1987 changes included increasing logging rules in riparian zones and sensitive wildlife habitat areas. The 1991 changes resulted in limitations on the sizes of clearcuts, a riparian consultation process that eventually led in 1994 to tougher logging rules within newly created riparian management areas, and stricter regeneration requirements on clear cut forest lands.

The 1987 Washington changes led to increased logging rules within newly created Riparian Management Zones and new rules for orphaned roads. In addition a Wildlife Code was established, listing the species threatened with extinction. Through existing forest practice rules, critical habitat areas have been designated by the Forest Practices Board for selected species, including emergency rules for the Northern Spotted Owl. The 1991 changes included limitations on clear cut sizes. Despite these initiatives, State-level changes were limited in nature, and were not as restrictive or severe as those that occurred in the PNW and BC in the early 1990s.

In British Columbia, forest practices that used to rely on individual cutting permits, regional guidelines, and ad hoc forest protection policies were replaced with statutory initiatives after 1991. The only significant exception to this pattern is in reforestation standards, where BC has historically employed the most progressive policies. With the exception of the formula for determining the Annual Allowable Cut (AAC), all of the substantive forest practices reviewed here underwent significant change in British Columbia from 1991-1995. While most federal PNW substantive changes were carried out by changes to the regional guide and administrative policy, BC changes were for the most part the result of the Forest Practices Code Act.

I. CLEARCUTTING/HARVESTING TECHNIQUES

Overview

The practice of clearcutting was one of the main catalysts leading to the NFMA, resulting in PNW clearcut limits being established in the PNW in the late 1970s. Administrative policy was changed in 1992 to reduce further clearcutting, while the Option 9/Spotted owl plan abolished clearcutting in designated areas. Conversely there were no rules regarding clear cut size on private and State-owned land in PNW until 1991, when industry in both States succeeded in having clear cut regulations passed that fell far short of requirements on US federal forest lands. In BC, the 1994 Forest Practices Code Act replaced non-mandatory regional guidelines with clearcut size regulations similar to those in Oregon and Washington State. Unlike Oregon and Washington State and similar to rules on federal PNW lands, the BC Code also moves to reduce the use of clearcutting.

PNW FEDERAL LANDS

The National Forest Management Act limits clearcutting to where it is "silviculturally essential to accomplish the relevant forest management objectives" and "a multidisciplinary review has first been made of the potential environmental, biological, aesthetic, engineering and economic impacts on each sale area." Regulations require that harvesting methods, "not be chosen primarily because they will give the greatest dollar return" and must "avoid permanent impairment of site productivity and ensure conservation of soil and water resources."
Regulations have set clearcut sizes in the Pacific Northwest at 60 acres (24.28 hectares) for Douglas fir forests and 40 acres for others. The regional guide for the PNW generally reflects the regulations, although it does allow for clearcut sizes to be increased by up to 50 percent, if they will result in "a more desirable combination of net public benefits." Still, this wording allows for considerable agency discretion and environmental groups have consistently pointed out that clearcutting is still widely used in US National Forests. In response to this, then US Forest Chief Dale Robertson issued a Policy Directive on June 4, 1992 that limited clearcutting to where it is "essential to meet forest plan objectives." In addition, Option 9 resulted in reserve areas for watersheds, old growth forests and "designated conservation areas to protect specific species." Only "very limited" harvesting can occur in these reserves, and clearcuts are not allowed.

PNW STATE LANDS

Oregon
There were no rules establishing clearcut sizes in Oregon until 1991, when the industry-supported Senate Bill 1125 amended the Forest Practices Act to limit clearcut sizes to 120 acres (48.56 hectares) within a single ownership. However, this limitation can be increased to 240 acres (97.13 hectares) if approved by the State Forester and certain requirements are met. There are also no rules limiting clearcuts as a method of harvesting, except in riparian zones discussed below.

Washington State
It was only in 1991 that the Washington Forest Practices Act was amended to require clear cut size standards on private land. Maximum clearcut size is set at 240 acres (97.13 hectares) with DNR reserving the right to have an interdisciplinary team review clearcuts in excess of 120 acres (48.56 hectares). As of 1987, the Department of Natural Resources had a policy of limiting clear cuts to 100 acres (40.47 hectares) on State land.

British Columbia
Before the 1994 Forest Practices Code Act, the only limitations on clearcut sizes or harvesting methods were addressed through the Coast Harvest planning guidelines. The guidelines recommended that cut blocks "should average 40 hectares." Reflecting the enabling nature of the Act, the Forest Practice Code only permits regulations governing clearcut and cut block sizes to be enacted. Recently released standards require maximum cut block sizes for any even-aged cuts of 40 hectares (100 acres) in the coastal region and 60 hectares (150 acres) in the interior. The Act also prohibits clearcutting where alternative harvesting systems are more ecologically appropriate.

II. STREAMSIDE RIPARIAN AREAS

Overview
Riparian areas refer to those forest lands immediately adjacent to streams. Environmental groups, scientists and other interested parties in recent years in the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia have been arguing that forest practices in these areas are particularly threatening because such activity can directly lead to declining fish stocks, the quality of drinking water and excessive erosion and runoff. On US federal lands, the President's Spotted Owl plan (Option 9) dramatically increased protection around riparian areas, vastly exceeding what is required on PNW private and State owned lands. In Oregon, substantive changes regulating forest practices in riparian areas followed the 1987 dispute resolution process and the 1991 industry initiated changes. Similar measures were undertaken following Washington State's 1987 Timber/Fish/Wildlife process. Neither State has forest practice rules prohibiting forest extraction near riparian zones. In British Columbia, non-mandatory and regionally focused Coastal Fish/Forestry guidelines have been replaced with comprehensive rules providing regulations under the Forest Practices Code Act. BC's regulations combine elements of the US federal and State initiatives, making its riparian practices less severe than the federal PNW but tougher than those on State regulated lands.

PNW FEDERAL LANDS

Forest Service
The US NFMA regulations state that fish and wildlife habitat "shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species" and that "no management practices causing detrimental changes" shall occur 100 feet from any body of water.

Much tougher riparian rules have been introduced for streams within federal forests in the range of the northern spotted owl. Option 9 amends the regional guide, National Forest Land and Resource Management plans and Bureau of Land Management Resource Management Plans within owl territory. For fish bearing streams, reserves will be created on each side of the stream equaling at least 300 feet (approximately 100 metres), permanently flowing non-fish bearing streams will have at least 150 feet (50 metres) on each side protected and seasonally flowing intermittent streams will have at least 100 feet (30 metres) protected. Timber harvesting is not permitted in these areas except for minor exceptions, and road building is highly regulated.
PNW STATE LANDS
Oregon

Instead of creating specified riparian areas, the Oregon Forest Practices Board originally focused on what practices should be avoided near streams. The Board discouraged road and trail construction and recommended that 75 per cent of the "original shade" be left. The debris from logging was not to enter streams or lakes (Cubbage and Ellifson 1980: 421-468). These rules were slightly altered after the 1987 dispute resolution process. Applying only to Class 1 waters, streamside management areas have been established in which "operators shall obtain written approval from the State Forester of a written plan, before conducting any operations." In reviewing such plans, the State Forester has been given the authority to require that "special management practices be undertaken."17

The 1991 riparian rule review process led to new rules adopted by the Board of Forestry effective September 1, 1994.18 These complicated rules expand the previous 1987 measures. Forest extraction is still permitted in streamside zones but "landowners are encouraged to manage stands within riparian management areas in order to grow trees in excess of what must be retained so that the excess may be harvested." The new rules established three new classifications of streams similar to Option 9 divisions on US federal lands. Each classification must leave a certain percentage of trees when clearcutting or selective harvesting.19 However, whereas Option 9 creates riparian reserve zones where forest extraction is not permitted, the goal of these new regulations is to continue "...to grow and harvest trees," while protecting "fish, wildlife, and water quality."

Washington State

Like Oregon, the Washington Board of Forestry's riparian rules originally emphasized what kind of timber practices should be avoided near streams but also established Streamside Management Zones in which use of logging equipment was to be minimized. These rules were modified after 1987 when Riparian Management Zones (RMZs) were first mandated by the Washington Forest Practices Board, following the Timber/Fish/Wildlife Accord agreement 1987.20 The forest practice rules regarding RMZs classify five types of waters.21 As with Oregon, the Washington rules require that a certain percentage of trees are left after harvesting occurs in these zones, rather than prohibiting harvesting from taking place.22

British Columbia

Before the 1994 Forest Practices Code Act and its subsequent regulations and standards, there were no province-wide rules governing forest extraction in or near riparian areas. Nonetheless, in 1986 industry organizations, the BC Ministries of Forests and Environment, Lands and Parks and the Federal Ministry of Fisheries did collaborate to produce Coastal Fisheries/Forestry guidelines. Theses guidelines are now in their third edition.23 Since 1986 it has been common to incorporate them into contracts between the province and the logging operator. However, the rate of non-compliance has been extremely high.24 Draft guidelines were produced for the interior of British Columbia25 and although never adopted, much of this work was incorporated into the Forest Practices Code Act and its accompanying regulations and standards.26

The Coastal Fisheries/Forestry guidelines identified three stream classes27 and created three types of zones: Fisheries Management Zones (FMZs), Marine Sensitive Zones (MSZs), and Streamside Management Zones (SMZs). SMZs are required for all streams, but only in the case of Class A streams was this area generally protected from timber harvesting. According to the guidelines, harvesting was not permitted within SMZs unless approved by fisheries agencies and if approved, harvesting was still not permitted within 10 metres on each side of the streams. Other detailed guidelines were set pertaining to some or all of the three classes: FMZs, MSZs, and SMZs guidelines included rules on road building, the timing of logging operations, and bridge construction.28

BC Riparian Standards and Regulations after the Code

The Forest Practice Code Act and its proposed regulations and standards create a new system of Riparian Management Areas containing both Reserve Zones and Management Zones. There are now three stream classifications according to whether they are fish bearing and depending on their size.29 Fish bearing streams will have a Riparian Management Area containing a reserve zone of 20 metres in which harvesting is generally not permitted and a management zone of 30 metres in which harvesting is limited to, "...single tree selection, group selection and other similar silvicultural systems approved by the District Manager."30 Non-fish bearing streams will have only Management Zones established, and will be smaller than fish bearing streams. In this sense the BC requirements follow the approaches taken by Oregon and Washington State in regulating, but not stopping forest practices in management zones. However, the BC requirements partially reflects the US Option 9 rule changes by prohibiting logging in reserve zones.
III. ENDANGERED SPECIES/BIODIVERSITY

Overview

Biodiversity generally refers to a multitude of plant and wildlife species that together make up a functioning ecosystem. This has been an evolving concept however. At first biodiversity was measured by "lead indicators" such the number of endangered species. In recent years, administrators on both parts of the border have focused more on ecosystem management, which tends to be more holistic in its approach.  

At the heart of Option 9/Spotted Owl plan were those biodiversity/endangered species provisions within the NFMA and ESA. As a result of Option 9, new regulations have been proposed by the Forest Service in order to focus protection on entire ecosystems and less on individual species.

Again, Oregon changed its biodiversity/endangered species provisions following the 1987 consensus process. These laws are less severe than those in the federal PNW, focusing mostly on limiting harvesting around known sites of endangered species during certain seasons. In Washington State, the creation of the 1986 Wildlife Code gave additional protection to endangered species. However, this Act is limited in scope, and most individual species protection rests with the Forest Practices Board. Unlike the response on the US federal lands, as of the Fall of 1996, the Board had yet to define critical habitat areas for the Northern Spotted owl.

In BC, the Forest Practices Act departs from previous policies by requiring operational plans to address wildlife species and is accompanied by a much touted non-binding biodiversity field guide. However, in the absence of a counterpart to the US ESA, comprehensive, substantive biodiversity/endangered species protection is less than that afforded on US federal lands.

PNW FEDERAL LAND

Forest Service

Two key statutes have influenced biodiversity and endangered species: the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the NFMA. The ESA applies to State and federal government agencies including the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the National Park Service and to private landowners with respect to its "taking" (where harvesting amounts to the elimination of species habitat) provisions. The NFMA only applies to US Forest Service lands. The NEPA is also important for requiring federal agencies to consider "alternatives" when making its land use decisions.

The ESA provides non-discretionary direction regarding the listing of endangered or threatened species. If the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine and Fisheries Service fail to list a species, organized groups have the right to force listing through litigation, as occurred with the Spotted Owl. Additional statutory protection for wildlife and biodiversity is found with the NFMA legislation and its accompanying regulations. The NFMA calls for regulations to be enacted that "provide for diversity of plant and animal communities," and mandates "steps to be taken to preserve the diversity of [native] tree species." As a result, current regulations require that "...viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species..." be maintained and that forest planning must "provide for diversity of plant and animal communities and tree species consistent with the overall multiple use objectives of the planning area." In addition, and as reviewed in the previous section, court rulings and Option 9 have resulted in interagency efforts to adopt ecosystem management. Part of these efforts involve the development of interagency conservation agreements designed to protect wildlife before it becomes listed.

PNW STATE LANDS

Oregon

Originally Oregon's rules simply required that "consideration" be given to wildlife habitat. However, legislative changes made in 1987 required the Department of Forestry to collect inventories of threatened and endangered species and "ecologically and scientifically significant" sites. If, after conducting this analysis, the Forest Practices Board decides that forest harvesting may conflict with these resource sites, the Board must then "consider the consequences of the conflicting uses and determine appropriate levels of protection." Although the Board "shall adopt rules appropriate to protect resource sites" they must be "consistent" with the timber extraction focus of ORS 527.630. Rules tend to focus on limiting harvesting during reproductive seasons or specifying areas around particular sites in which no logging can occur.

Washington State

The Washington Board of Forestry issued general rules in 1974, stating that "[h]arvesting practices should leave the area conducive for timber production and encourage wildlife." In addition, the Forest Practices Board has the power to designate critical habitat areas for individual species and has done so for the grizzly bear, bald eagle, grey wolf and others. Any forest practices on these lands require an environmental assessment set out in Washington's SEPA legislation.
The 1987 Wildlife Code creates a process whereby the Director of the Department of Fish and Wildlife can ask the Wildlife Commission to list a species if it is "seriously threatened with extinction." The Commission considers this request "solely on the basis of the biological status of the species being considered, based on the preponderance of scientific data available." Once a species is listed, the Department is required to prepare a recovery plan, but there is no timeline for its completion.42

BRITISH COLUMBIA

British Columbia has no endangered species legislation. The federal government had proposed an Endangered Species Act, but if the proposed version remains intact, it will only apply to "to marine waters and federal lands" (Elgie 1995: 22) and thus have minimal impact on BC forest practices. The 1986 BC Wildlife Act permits the cabinet to designate endangered or threatened species but excludes plants, "invertebrates" and fish. This action is also completely discretionary and only four species have been listed to date. The Act also gives discretionary power to the Minister of the Environment to designate "critical wildlife areas for threatened and endangered species" but this provision has been used only once.43

The Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks has developed a list of threatened, endangered and "at risk" species and has developed administrative policies regarding individual species. Similar ad hoc processes have occurred in the Ministry of Forests with respect to individual species such as the Grizzly Bear and Marbled Murrelet.44

The Forest Practices Code Act and its accompanying regulations and standards mark a departure from previous policies. Regulations state that timber companies preparing a development plan must "describe strategies for addressing specified wildlife species."45 Holders of Tree Farm Licenses (FTLs) have been given the additional responsibility "to inventory and set management objectives for wildlife" when preparing their management plans.46 Overall, four "strategies" are recommended when protecting specific flora and fauna. The first strategy is to see if other guidebooks provide "adequate protection." The second strategy is to identify flora and fauna communities whose "critical habitat" is in a "geographically concentrated area." Discretionary management options are then to be outlined. The third strategy deals with habitat needs that affect a range of species. In these cases more general measures are supposed to be recommended, including the possibility of "a more rigorous" enforcement of biodiversity guidelines. The fourth strategy is identifying those species whose protection will have a "major [impact] on the forest industry. Unlike the US ESA, the Code does not have the power to address these species. Instead it is recommended that "higher-level planning" deal with these."47

General management strategies for the maintenance of biodiversity are also detailed in the biodiversity field guides. It is assumed that "native species and ecological processes are more likely to be maintained if forest management activities are managed to resemble natural disturbance agents..." However, these are unenforceable guidelines that even the Ministry acknowledges may be "difficult to implement in "some situations."48

Thus, despite these changes, there is no explicit requirement that the BC Forest Service must ensure the maintenance of "wildlife diversity," falling short of those provisions contained in the US NFMA and its accompanying regulations.49 The Fisheries, Wildlife and Habitat Protection Branch of the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks pushed heavily for an ecosystem approach to the forest practice Code in which forest extraction would be seen as "residual" after ecosystem biodiversity had been maintained. However, the Branch fell short of this goal.50 Still, the biodiversity guidelines provide leadership in this direction, setting forth principles aimed at preventing endangered species from being listed.51 However, these rules are fairly easy changeable. For example, following Ministry of Forests commitments that the Forest Practices Code would not result in more than a six percent reduction in the Annual Allowable Cut (discussed below), the biodiversity regional guide was changed to reduce its negative impact on timber harvesting.52

IV REFORESTATION

Overview

Reforestation is an important eco-forest policy because it addresses in large part, the principle of sustainable forest practices and sustained yield management. However, reforestation is not simply a measure of eco-forest policies, as there are strong economic incentives to regenerate forest land in order to ensure future supply. Consequently, the lack of public policies regarding reforestation on private land does not mean that reforestation does not occur. In these cases, market forces create a strong incentive to reforest anyway.

With the exception of new 1991 reforestation rules for clearcuts in Oregon, neither Oregon, Washington State nor the federal PNW lands have changed their reforestation rules since their statutory regimes were established in the mid 1970s. British Columbia introduced tougher changes in 1987, when the Social Credit government amended the Forest Act to require licensees to prepare a pre-harvest silviculture prescription. The Forest Practice Code Act's regulations impose further requirements.
PNW FEDERAL LANDS

Reforestation efforts have historically been an important part of the US Forest Service’s mission. However, with the enactment of the National Forest Management Act, Congress gave statutory direction to the Forest Service to manage National Forest Lands including “…the degree of stocking...[and]...rate of growth,” “…to secure the maximum benefits of multiple use sustained yield management in accordance with land management plans.” In addition, the NFMA directed that timber extraction only occur where, “there is assurance that such lands can be adequately restocked within five years after harvest.” No changes have occurred to reforestation requirements under Option 9.

PNW STATE LANDS

Oregon

Oregon’s rules for reforestation in 1971 differed by region. In the Eastern and Southwestern regions, restocking is required when logging reduces an “acceptable species” below 25 percent of its original levels. Rules require that restocking entail planting 100 seedlings or saplings per acre, and must be completed within six years in the eastern region and four years in the southwestern region. Conversely, the Northwestern region rules required 150 seedlings or saplings to be established per acre by the third or fourth year after harvesting. No significant changes were made to these requirements until 1991 legislative changes (SB 1125) established new state wide reforestation rules for clear cuts.

Washington State

In 1974, Washington State Forest Practice Rules required that reforestation take place for “clear cuts and cuts removing more than 50 percent of the volume of a stand in any 5-year period.” The rules required that clear cuts must be either replanted within three years or naturally regenerated within five years with “adequate stocking” defined as “300 well established, well distributed seedlings per acre.” Reforestation plans must be submitted when applying to undertake a forest practice. Further, a report must be made after planting is completed and there is an inspection of the planting within 12 months. Neither the TFW Accord nor the 1991 legislative measures resulted in any significant changes to reforestation provisions.

BRITISH COLUMBIA

The history of reforestation in BC represented not so much responses to the first or second wave of environmentalism, but rather to the sustained yield system outlined above. Since 1960, holders of TFLs and other licences have been required to undertake reforestation, and the 1978 Forest Act made this a statutory requirement. The Forest Act was also amended in 1987 to require that the holder of a major license prepare a pre-harvest silviculture prescription (PHSP) for every proposed cut site. The PHSP must be prepared by a professional forester and is part of the licensee contract.

The Forest Practices Code Act’s PHSP (renamed silviculture prescriptions) provides further detail as to what must be included. A silviculture prescription prepared by a professional forester, is required to show how a “free-growing crop of trees” will occur within a given time frame. In addition, this plan must ensure that trees are “ecologically suitable”, that the applicant has an “adequate supply of seed or trees” and that plans conform to “higher level plans and long term management objectives.”

V ROAD BUILDING

Overview

Road building is also a major concern on the part of environmental organizations. However, as industry organizations point out, smaller clearcut sizes usually result in the need for more roads. The NFMA imposed significant road building requirements and again, Option 9 increased them. In Oregon, road building requirements did not change after the 1971 Act and in Washington State, only minor changes occurred after the TFW process. Before 1995, road building requirements in BC were guided by the Forest Service Manual and developed on a regional basis. Following 1993 interim rules, the Forest Practices Code Act regulations provide for maintenance or deactivation of a road. Road building location is also regulated, including strict limitation in riparian areas.

PNW FEDERAL LANDS

NFMA Regulations in the 1970s on National Forest lands required that all non-permanent roads must be “designed with the goal of reestablishing vegetative cover...within ten years.” Road building restrictions were increased on Spotted Owl lands in the early 1990s. These rules dramatically limit road building in riparian zones, require watershed analyses “prior to road constructions” and minimal disruption to natural water flows.
PNW STATE LANDS

Oregon

Oregon issued a number of rules in 1971 that should be followed when planning road location. These included minimizing the risk of harvesting equipment and material entering streams and to avoid locating roads in unstable or sensitive areas. Rules also state that road width and roads crossing streams should be minimized. Where roads are to be located in riparian management areas, they should prevent erosion, allow "adequate fish passage" and prior approval must be given by the State Forester.71

Washington State

In Washington State, early 1970s rules were similar to Oregon's and most remain in place today. Rules stated that roads be minimized in "canyons, riparian and wetland areas,"72 and not located on steep or unstable slopes, or where wildlife habitat would suffer "substantial loss or damage."73 Rules also required that active, inactive and abandoned roads be maintained and in some cases road maintenance or abandonment plans be ordered. The 1987 Timber/Fish/Wildlife process also addressed road management and the special case of Orphaned Roads, with DNR agreeing to undertake a number of management initiatives.74

BRITISH COLUMBIA

Before 1993, forest road construction practices were developed by individual BC Forest Regions.75 Road construction was mostly guided by the Ministry of Forests Engineering Manual and ad hoc reports and guidelines established by the Ministry of Forests.76 However, the Ministry of Forests did issue a regulation in 1983 which required that a permit be issued before constructing logging roads.77

In June 1993, the BC Ministry of Forests issued a comprehensive document on engineering practices establishing interim, "...province wide technical standards for pre-construction, construction, maintenance and deactivation of all forest roads and logging trails...applicable to all access-related activities within the provincial forests of British Columbia."78 These standards, along with enforcement provisions and penalties for non-compliance, have been incorporated into the Forest Practices Code Act's accompanying regulations, standards and field guides issued in 1995. Roads can only be constructed and permits issued if they are identified by a licensee in a forest development plan or access management plan. Roads must either be maintained or deactivated. There are three types of deactivation: temporary, semi-permanent, or permanent.79

The Forest Practices Code Act also creates standards for road location. As a general principle, the location of roads must be consistent with "identified resource values." Where a conflict occurs, the District Manager is required to make a decision, although s/he must consult with other relevant agency officials. Road building is prohibited in the reserve section of Riparian Management Areas unless no other options are possible.80

VII THE ANNUAL ALLOWABLE CUT

PNW FEDERAL LANDS

Overview

The annual allowable cut (AAC) is an important measure of long term sustainability. Changes can occur because the method of calculating the AAC has changed, or because variables the equation considers change (reduced supply due to protected areas, forest fires, etc.) In the United States PNW lands, changes to the equation took place in the mid-1980s introducing a strict definition of "sustainable", partly in responses to the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act. No changes in the calculation method have been made since, but the Option S/Spotted Owl plan drastically increased the amount of administratively withdrawn areas (from timber extraction), leading to significant declines in the AAC.

Importantly and again highlighting the importance of private versus state land, there have never been any requirements in Oregon and Washington State limiting the amount of timber cut on private land. Unlike the US federal lands, British Columbia has not changed its AAC calculations towards a strict definition of sustainability. However, recent increases in protected areas, the Forest Practices Code, and a 1995-1996 timber supply audit will impact AAC levels.

The US Forest Service

There is considerable confusion even within the US Forest Service, US Congress and among organized interests within the US forest policy community over the distinction between, AAC, known as Allowable Sale Quantity (ASQ), on the one hand, and timber targets provided by Congress as part of the annual appropriations process, on the other hand.81 The ASQ determination is an integral part of the NFMA's LRMP planning processes. It represents an estimate of the amount of timber that can be extracted each year over a 15 year time frame, taking into account the multiple use and environmental protection requirements reviewed in this chapter. Despite RPA efforts to provide national-level guidance, the Forest Service largely ignores RPA ASQ objectives, with the result that ASQs are determined by local forest plans" (Wilkinson and Anderson 1985: 90). The ASQs can be changed by the Forest Supervisor or Regional Director, but any "significant" departure requires...
a formal amendment to an LRMP plan, and must be accompanied by an Environmental Impact statement (EIS) and public consultation.

The NFMA requires that ASQs be calculated on the basis of land “suitable” for timber extraction,\textsuperscript{62} excluding administratively or congressionally withdrawn lands. Although economic variables are to be considered, the Forest Service “retains administrative flexibility in weighing the costs and benefits of proposed timber sales on economically marginal forest lands” (Brown, O’Laughlin, and Harris 1993: 573).

In the early 1960s following the passage of the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, the Forest Service recognized that because old growth forests grow at a slower rate than second growth forests but contain more volume of fibre, a “fall down” in the ASQ was inevitable as old growth forests were replaced with second growth forests. In order to avoid this fall down effect, the NFMA requires that Forest Service ASQ calculations provide, theoretically, for a “non-declining even flow policy (NDEF).”\textsuperscript{63}

Timber targets, on the other hand, are established by Senate and House Appropriations Committees when allocating funding for Forest Service budgets and act as directives to the Forest Service. Tied to funding for Forest Service operations, timber targets are more than ASQ “estimates”. They represent a specific requirement Congress imposes on the Forest Service. Unlike ASQs, these targets are established either at a national level or for each of the Forest Service’s nine regions. However, the US Forest Service does not have to follow Congressional timber targets if doing so would be contrary to LRMP, regional guides, standards, regulations and statutes.\textsuperscript{64} Indeed, the NFMA sets out non-declining even flow requirements not just for ASQ estimates, but also actual timber sales. The NFMA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to, “limit the sale of timber from each national forest to a quantity equal to or less than a quantity that can be removed from such forest annually in perpetuity on a sustained yield basis.”\textsuperscript{65}

Despite these rules, an important caveat remains in the ability of Congress to mandate a certain level of timber sales notwithstanding existing statutes and not open to judicial review. This occurred during the spotted owl controversy in 1992\textsuperscript{26} and recurred in 1995 when Washington Senator Slade Gorton managed to have Congress pass a bill allowing “salvage” logging in Option 9 reserve lands.

Although no recent changes have been made to how ASQs should be calculated, Option 9 measures have significantly reduced the ASQ and timber sales in the Pacific Northwest. Sales from federal forest lands were expected to stabilize at 1.2 billion board feet annually, after a high of 5 billion board feet in the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{47}

**PNW STATE LANDS**

**Oregon**

Oregon has never imposed limits on the annual allowable cut.

**Washington State**

There are no limits on the annual allowable cut for private lands in Washington State. However, since 1992, the Forest Practices Board has required DNR to prepare an annual report detailing harvesting rates on private land.\textsuperscript{34} For State owned lands, the Board of Natural Resources determines the annual cut when approving the Forest Resource Plans and is guided by a statute that requires “harvesting on a continuing basis without major prolonged curtailment or cessation of harvest.”\textsuperscript{46} In addition, the Forest Resources Plan approved by the Board calls for “an even flow harvest plan.”\textsuperscript{40}

**BRITISH COLUMBIA**

Unlike the decentralized United States Forest System where local forest plans essentially determine the ASQs, BC’s regional and sub-regional Allowable Annual Cuts (AACs) have traditionally been approved by the Chief Forester as part of TFL (Tree Farm Licence) Management and Working Plans and Timber Supply Area (TSA) Resource Management Plans.

The 1978 Forest Act gave the Chief Forester discretion to consider a range of values in determining the AAC. Only one of five diverse factors was, however, required to be considered.\textsuperscript{91} Unlike the NFMA, there is no “non declining even flow” policy and the BC Forest Service acknowledges that as old growth forests are replaced by second growth, there will be an inevitable decline in the Annual Allowable Cut because of the “fall down” effect. This policy has led to considerable public consternation over the paradox between a sustained yield policy that will eventually require significant reductions in the AAC.\textsuperscript{92}

Recent litigation over the definition of “sustainable” has upheld the Forest Service’s fall down policy. However, British Columbia’s recent forest practice, land use changes, and recent forest inventory audit will impact AACs levels.
VIII FOREST PROTECTION POLICIES

Even before the first wave of environmentalism, provincial/State and federal parks were created, although their existence is mostly owed more to recreational than environmental concerns. Thus, the current percentage of protected areas in either jurisdiction is the result of a number of historical initiatives.

Except for cases where government and organized interests work to purchase private forest land in order to save it from being harvested, forest protection is limited to public lands. Forest protection generally occurs in two distinct ways: through strategic initiatives directly aimed at preserving selected forest areas; or as a consequence of wildlife protection and forest practices policies. Both the US federal government and British Columbia have made strategic choices. The 1964 Wilderness Act and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act protected key areas from harvesting or other economic development, and created processes through which other designations could occur. No exact goals were set, but to date over 100 million acres have been protected as a result of these statutes throughout the United States. In the case of BC protected areas policies have moved from ad hoc responses to high conflict areas to a government announcement of a Protected Area Strategy with a commitment to protect 12 percent of the province.

In addition, forest protection can occur as an output of substantive forest extraction/practices rules. For example, administratively reserved areas created as a result of option 9 are the direct result of the endangered species protection within the ESA and the NFMA. Similarly, the reserved areas within BC riparian zones are a result of the Forest Practices Code rather than CORE or Protected Area Strategy (PAS) strategic land use considerations. Thus, the level of old growth or forest protection is not usually a result of a single policy but an accumulation of a number of historical strategic, forest extraction and wildlife protection policies.

What can be said however is that limited forest protection has occurred in private land in the PNW, that BC and the federal US saw recreation and wilderness areas created before and during the second wave of environmentalism, but that BC and the federal US saw different types of protection during the second wave. In the case of the United States lands in the federal PNW, dramatic "administrative" withdrawals of forest lands from the commercial land base were made as a result of the President's Plan to save the Northern Spotted Owl. These lands are not protected by legislation and will conceivably become part of the commercial land base if the Northern Spotted Owl recovers (or the current Congress changes the existing statutory regime).

On the other hand, British Columbia's protected areas have almost doubled since 1991. These areas will be protected in legislation. Thus, both regions have seen an increase in protected areas but for radically different reasons: the US federal PNW lands as a result of strict legislation regarding species protection and BC lands the result of a strategic decision initiated by government.
## Appendix A: Table 1

### The Evolution of Eco-Forest Policy in BC and the Pacific Northwest: 1975, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clearcutting</strong></td>
<td><strong>1975</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1995</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFMA limits clearcutting to when &quot;silviculturally essential&quot;. Maximum clearcut size of 60 acres.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Clearcutting only permitted when deemed &quot;essential&quot; to meeting forest plan objectives.2 No clearcutting permitted in &quot;designated conservation areas&quot;</td>
<td>Maximum clearcut size set at 240 acres (Only permitted to exceed 120 acres with approval of State Forester)</td>
<td>Maximum clearcut size set at 240 acres (Interior)</td>
<td>Maximum size of 100 acres (Coast), 150 acres (Interior)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Riparian Zones</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No &quot;detrimental&quot; management practices permitted within 100 ft from water. &quot;Viable&quot; populations of existing species must be maintained</td>
<td>Road and trail construction discouraged near streams. It is recommended that 75% of &quot;original shade&quot; be left after harvesting</td>
<td>Certain forest practices to be avoided near streams. Use of logging equipment limited in Streamside Management Zones</td>
<td>No province-wide rules.</td>
<td>No harvesting within 300 feet of fish bearing streams, 150 feet of &quot;permanently flowing&quot; non-fish bearing streams, 100 feet on seasonally flowing intermittent streams.3</td>
<td>Harvesting permitted. 1987 rule changes require written plans before harvesting near fish bearing streams. 1994 rules require leaving a percentage of trees standing when harvesting near riparian zones.</td>
<td>Riparian Management Zones (RMZ) created after TFW accord in 1987. A percentage of trees required left standing, the percentage of which varies according to the type of RMZ.</td>
<td>Fish/Forestry guidelines in 1986 limit forest practices in some coastal riparian areas.4 Forest Practices Code regulations prohibit logging in riparian &quot;reserve zones&quot;, and limit logging in &quot;management zones&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endangered Species/Biodiversity</strong></td>
<td>Federal ESA prohibits &quot;taking&quot; of species on all lands. Requires listing of endangered species, and federal agency plans aimed at species recovery. NFMA requires maintenance of &quot;species viability&quot;, and &quot;diversity&quot; of plant and animal communities</td>
<td>&quot;Consideration&quot; should be given to &quot;critical&quot; wildlife habitat including &quot;wet areas and wildlife escape cover&quot;</td>
<td>Harvesting practices &quot;should leave area conducive to timber production and encourage wildlife&quot; Designated &quot;critical habitat areas&quot; must undergo environmental assessment</td>
<td>No province-wide rules.</td>
<td>Interagency Ecosystem management and planning instituted. Interagency conservation agreements required.</td>
<td>After 1987 &quot;resource sites&quot; of &quot;threatened and endangered fish and wildlife species&quot; are to be established. Where forest practices are deemed to &quot;conflict&quot; with these areas, rules may be established limiting harvesting in these areas.5</td>
<td>Wildlife Commission created in 1980 can list species &quot;seriously threatened with extinction&quot;. Once listed, Department of Fish and Wildlife must prepare a recovery plan.</td>
<td>Ad hoc protection from 1980 to 1994. Under FPC forest plans required to address biodiversity protection. FPC field guides issued.7 Species protection that would cause &quot;major disruptions&quot; to industry beyond scope of Code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.0 Cont.</td>
<td>US federal lands</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>BC</td>
<td>US federal lands</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reforestation</strong></td>
<td>NFMA directs Forest Service to allow timber extraction only where &quot;such lands can be adequately restocked within five years of harvest&quot;</td>
<td>Restocking required when harvesting reduces &quot;acceptable species&quot; below 25 percent of original levels. Between 100 and 150 seedlings must be planted per acre.</td>
<td>Reforestation of 300 seedlings per acre required for cuts removing more than 50 percent of trees. Must be replanted within three years or &quot;naturally&quot; regenerated within five years.</td>
<td>Licence holders required to undertake reforestation requirements since 1960. The 1978 Forest Act made this a statutory requirement.</td>
<td>No changes to reforestation requirements.</td>
<td>State wide rules established regarding reforestation of clearcut areas.</td>
<td>No changes.</td>
<td>Forest Act amended in 1987 to require licence holders to prepare &quot;Pre-harvest silviculture prescription for every cut site. Forest Practices Code standards require &quot;tree growing crop of trees be established&quot;.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Road building** | NFMA regulations require road designs take into account its effects on land and resources. All non-permanent roads must be designed to "reestablish vegetative cover...within ten years" | Number of rules issued by Board of Forestry that "should" be followed. These include "minimizing" risk of material entering waters and avoiding unstable or sensitive terrain. Road building in riparian areas must have prior approval of State Forester. | Rules require that use of roads be "minimized" in "canyons, riparian and wetlands" areas and not located on steep or unstable slopes. Roads prohibited in areas where wildlife would suffer "substantial loss or damage". | Regional and ad hoc guidelines established. | Option 9 further restricts road building in riparian zones on Northern Spotted Owl lands. Watershed analyses prior to road construction required. | No changes. | TFW process agrees that the Department of Natural Resources addresses road management, particularly orphaned roads. | Province-wide standards set in 1993, later incorporated into Forest Practices Code. Forest Protection Strategy, CORE protected areas. |

| **Annual Allowable Cut** | NFMA requires that the annual cut results in a "non-declining even flow" in perpetuity. | No rules. | No rules. | Sustained-yield management the basis of tenure system. Regional and sub-region annual cuts must be approved by Chief Forester. | Option 9 withdraws most of the Northern Spotted Owl land from the extractive land base, significantly reducing the annual cut. | No changes. | In 1992 DNR begins preparing annual reports on private land harvesting rates. Harvesting must occur on State-owned lands on an "even flow" continuing basis. | 1978 Forest Act allows "range of values" when determining the AAC. Timber Supply Review results in cut reduction. Cut reduced further as a result of Forest Practices Code and protected areas. |

| **Forest Protection** | 1964 Wilderness Act begins strategic forest protection. | Limited protection on small amount of State owned lands. | Limited protection on small amount of State owned lands. | Limited protection on ad hoc basis. | About 80 per cent of land under range of Northern Spotted Owl protected | Limited protection on small amount of State owned lands. | Limited protection on small amount of State owned lands. | Protected Area Strategy, CORE double protection to 12 percent. |

**Footnotes**
Fish/Forestry guidelines began in 1986 recommend cut block sizes be no larger than 40 hectares (100 acres).
2This was a directive issued in 1992 by then Chief of the US Forest Service, Dale Robertson. It applies only to Forest Service land in the PNW.
3These increased rules only apply to those streams within the range of the Northern Spotted Owl.
4These guidelines have the force of law if the guideline rules were included in individual contractual agreement between timber companies and the government.
5The Board must "consider consequences of conflicting uses" before deciding on appropriate action. Rules must be "consistent" with the timber extraction focus of the Forest Practices Act (ORS 527.830).
6The Wildlife Act allows non-fish, vertebrate species to be designated as "endangered" or "threatened". The Ministry of Environment adopted administrative policies for "at risk species".
7Forest Practices Code regulations also require forest companies to develop strategies to "address specified wildlife species". TFL holders required to "inventory and set management objectives for wildlife.
8Rules differ slightly according to region.
9In 1983 Ministry of Forests requires permits be issued before constructing roads.
10Congress has the power to pass legislation mandating a certain level of cut and to exempt this legislation from judicial review.
11Unlike the US system, "sustained yield" does not mean "non-declining". The reason for the difference is that BC forests have a higher percentage of old growth forests. Since old growth forests contain more fibre per unit, as they decline as a percentage of the forest land base, so too, in theory, will the annual cut.
Endnotes

1The Cutting Permit, which acts as a contract between the Ministry of Forests and the Licensee, requires, that unless a Five Year Development Plan states to the contrary, destruction to lakes, streams and water supplies, will not be permitted and the licensee must take a number of specific steps to protect these resources. Specifically, cutting permits required that five year development plans ensure that a licensee not permit the destruction of water supplies "for any purpose", that debris and polluting substances not enter lakes or streams, and that certain other forest practices be undertaken away from riparian areas. In addition, the cutting permit itself contained specific forest practices rules including the construction of culverts to allow fish passage and the felling of timber away from riparian areas (Vance 1990: 55-56).

Detailed forest practices rules were first used in the late 1960s under permits sold under PSYUs (the forerunner to TSAs), commonly referred to as "P1 and P3" clauses (Personal interview, Senior official Ministry of Environment, April 19, 1995).

2Section 6(g)(3)(F).

3As Haddock (1995: 37) points out, "clearcutting rules must be read in conjunction with other regulatory provisions which state that 'management prescriptions, where appropriate and to the extent practicable, shall preserve and enhance the diversity of plant and animal communities, including endemic and desirable naturalized plant and animal species.'"

4See United States. USDA Forest Service (1990b: 3-1, 3-38), quoted in Haddock (1995).


6ORS 527.740

7ORS 527.750

8See Waldo (1987: 34).

9See Hoberg (1993c: 45).

10Forest Practices Code Act, ss 209-211.

11Exceptions can occur where the "cut block incorporates characteristics of natural disturbances" (Haddock 1995: 43).

1236 CFRs 219.19 A viable population is defined in the regulations as "one which has sufficient numbers that will ensure its continued existence is well distributed in the planning area" (Haddock 1995: 49).

1336 CFRs 219.19.

14Harvesting is not permitted where "catastrophic events degrade the riparian environment" and removal of salvage will harm the aquatic environment (Haddock 1995: 50).

15The Forest Practices Board increased riparian forest practice rules by requiring that the width of streamside riparian management areas "shall average three times the stream width, but it shall not average less than twenty five feet or average more than one hundred feet." (OAR 629-24-117.)

16Defined as those waters important for domestic use, fishing, recreation and fish spawning.

17OAR 629-24-101(8)(a), (39); OAR 629-24-113.


19OAR 629-57-2000(4)
Class F are "Streams that have fish use, including fish use streams that have domestic water use" (OAR 629-57-2100(4)(a)); Class D are "Streams that have domestic water use, but not fish use"(OAR 629-57-2100(4)(b)); and Class N streams cover all other types of streams. Each of these streams is further classified by whether it is large, medium or small. Riparian Management Areas are required ranging from 100 feet (33 metres) for type F streams to less than 20 feet for type N streams (see OAR 629-57-2250).

Once the riparian areas are established, there are further rules requiring clearcut harvesting to leave a certain percentage of trees on 1000 feet of stream on each side. See Oregon. Department of Forestry. Forest Practices Section (1994: 56).

OAR 629-57-2000(7).


According to uses by "humans, wildlife and fish, as well as stream width and gradient" (WAC 222-16-030). Quoted in Haddock (1995: 51).

Type 1 waters fall within "shorelines of the state" and identified according to the Shoreline Management Act (RCW 90.58.030). Type 2 waters have a "high fish, wildlife or human use" with 20 feet or greater channels Type 3 have a "moderate fish, wildlife or human use" with 20 feet or greater channels. Type 3 have a "moderate fish, wildlife or human use." Type 4 waters are "upstream of Types 1, 2, or 3 or until the channel becomes less than 2 feet." (see Haddock 1995: 51).


See Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans (1990).

Personal interview, Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks.

Class A streams were defined as those, "...frequented by anadromous salmonids and/or resident sport fish or regionally significant fish species; or streams that have been identified for fishery enhancement in an approved fishery management plan." Class B Streams were those "...populated by resident fish not currently designated as sport fish or regionally significant fish." and Class C streams were defined as those, "[s]trreams or portions of streams that are not frequented by fish." See British Columbia. Ministry of Forests; Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks, Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada and Council of Forest Industries of British Columbia (1993: 4).

The size of Class A SMZs was determined as "equal to the channel width on each side of the stream." For streams less than 10 metres in width, a 10 metre SMZ was required while for streams greater than 30 metres wide, "a 30 metre SMZ [was] normally considered adequate" (British Columbia. Ministry of Forests et al. 1993: 18).


See Haddock (1995: 57)


Morrison (1991) explains the change toward biodiversity and ecosystem management:

You can count all the parts of a vehicle and assess their condition individually without being assured that the assembled vehicle will start, or how well it will run over the long term. The fewer parts you inventory and monitor, the less likely you will be to predict whether the finished product is complete and how it will function. Quoted in United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment (1992).

Although this requirement does not directly affect substantive requirements, in conjunction with ESA and NFMA requirements, it has resulted in timber sales injunctions in the PNW federal lands until proper analysis of alternatives for managing spotted owl lands are undertaken. See generally Hungerford (1994) and Sher (1993).
Despite the non-discretionary direction of the ESA, exemptions can be granted by the Endangered Species Committee also known as the "God Squad." The Committee must determine that there are no reasonable alternatives, that it is in the public interest and that the benefits outweigh the costs (16 USC. 1536(h)). For four excellent reviews on the effects of the Endangered Species law on Forest Service and BLM operations in the Pacific Northwest, see Sher (1993), Sher and Stahl (1990), Yaffee (1994), and Hungerford (1994).

Section 1604(g)(3)(B).


The BLM argued unsuccessfully during the spotted owl litigation that because of the timber extraction orientation of the Oregon and California Lands Act, the ESA and NEPA provisions did not apply to the same extent as they did on Forest Service lands (Hungerford 1994: 1406).

1See Cubbage and others (1980: 463).

ORS 527.710(3)(b).

Unlike federal wildlife protection, the State Forester can grant "an exception from either structural or temporal protection as determined by the Board for each species or resource site."

"Cubbage and others (1980: 468).

The Board has been unable to define critical habitat for the northern spotted owl, relying instead on emergency rules that both industry and environment organizations agree are not adequate. See Rowland (1994).

WAC 222-16-050, 080

WAC 232-12-297, ibid, 43

There is no timetable for when the plan must be completed, although it must be initiated within one year of the listing (Haddock 1995: 43).


Proposed Operational Planning Regulation, s.37(2)(c) and s.20(2)(c)). The Act states that if required by the regulations, operational plans must "identify and classify" wildlife habitat areas (Section 17(2)(a)(ii)).

See Haddock (1995: 45). In the absence of agency agreement, BC Forest Service District Managers retain authority for approval of operational plans except for those in community watersheds (where joint approval with a MOELP official is required.) See also Times Colonist news services (1994a).

British Columbia. Ministry of Forests (1995: 1). As a result of this measure, as of July, 1996, four species have been deemed to be beyond the realm of the Forest Practices Code. They are the Marbled Murrelet, the Northern Goshawk, the Northern Spotted Owl and the Grizzly (British Columbia. Ministry of Forests Undated). The ability of "higher level" plans to adequately protect these species has been questioned. See Haddock (1995: 47), Simpson (1995).

British Columbia. Ministry of Forests (1995: 1) The province is divided into five "Natural Disturbance Types" (NDT) regions based on "frequency and type of the major natural disturbances" (ibid: 1).

British Columbia Ministry of Forests (1995: 1)
In July 1996 the BC government's own State of the Environment Reporting office reported that "one in 10 plants and vertebrate animal in BC face "imminent extinction or disappearance from some areas", thanks largely to urban and agricultural development and logging (Curtis 1996). The article quotes Sierra Legal Defence Fund lawyer Greg McDade, who argues:

I think frankly this government ought to be embarrassed with the casual way in which it has dealt with endangered species

57 Personal interview, MOELP. For a discussion of the residual debate within the BC Ministry of Forests and Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks, see Wright (1995).

58 Interview, MOE

59 Interviews, Sierra Legal Defense Fund; Ministry of Environment, Lands and Park.

60 16 USC s.1601(d)(1).

61 16 USC s. 1604 (g)(3)(e)(ii) The US Forest Service Silviculture Guide for Region 6 details the, "...minimum number, size, distribution, and species composition of regeneration that will constitute adequate restocking" (Quoted in Haddock 1995: 59).


64 Ibid


66 See Knight (1990: 5-8).

67 Forest Licences are the most common of licence agreements within a Timber Supply Area.


69 16 U.S.C. 1608(b); 36 CFR 219.27(11) (quoted in Haddock 1995: 63). In addition, the US RARE I and II processes and initial LRMPs were to evaluate all roadless areas for their potential listing as wilderness areas.


71 OAR 629-24-521(8); OAR 629-24-522.


73 WAC 222-24-020 (quoted in Haddock 1995: 64).


77 BC REG 213/83. Known as the Road Right-of-Way and Recreation Trail Regulation, it also set detailed provisions for the use of Forest Service roads. See British Columbia. Ministry of Forests and others (1993: 27).
Temporary or seasonal deactivation refers to roads whose use is suspended for up to three years. For these, ditches and culverts must be inspected and "water bars must be constructed where there is an adverse risk of erosion" (Haddock 1995: 65).

Proposed FPC standards (Quoted in Haddock 1995: 18).

Much debate has centred on industry beliefs that the ASQ represents a 'quota' or the views of environmental groups and others that the ASQ represents a 'ceiling' "on each national forest's annual timber sales from the suitable land base in order to insure a perpetual sustained yield of timber" See Brown, O'Laughlin and Harris (1993: 575).

Departures from the NDEF can only occur in order to meet, "overall multiple-use objectives" (16 USC. 1611 (a)1988). At the same time, the NFMA recognized that the ASQ could be increased as a result of intensive management techniques or an Earned Harvest Effect. See Brown, O'Laughlin and Harris (1993: 574).

According to the Chief of the Forest Service in 1992:
There should be no doubt in anyone's mind about which takes precedence if there is a conflict between standards and guidelines and [timber targets]; we expect every project to be in full compliance with standards and guidelines set forth in Forest plans (Letter from Dale Robertson Chief of the Forest Service, to Regional Foresters, February 23, 1990. Quoted in Brown, O'Laughlin and Harris 1993: 584).

Section 16 (g)(3)(d). The NFMA also requires that trees to be logged must "generally" have reached the mean annual increment, defined as within 95 percent of the CMAl See Haddock (1995: 33) and Brown, O'Laughlin and Harris (1993: 573).

See Hoberg (1993b).

See Gorte (1992) and Johnson (1994: 41-43). For related data, see tables in Chapter Two.

WAC 222-30-120, quoted in Haddock (1995: 34).

RCW 76.68.030-40.


These factors were: the "sustainable rate", the "short and long term implications of alternative rates of harvest, the timber requirements of established mills, infestations, and the economic and social objectives expressed by the Minister of Forests" (Haddock 1995: 34) As Dellert (1994: 49) reviews, these provisions gave considerable discretion to Chief Foresters who believed the AAC was not sustainable.


The Wilderness Act actually designates some US National Park Service lands as "wilderness areas," affording for these lands an even greater degree of protection.


Washington State also created a commission in the late 1980s to study the issue of old growth protection. See Washington State, Commission on Old Growth Alternatives for Washington's Forest Trust Lands (1989).

As Kimmins notes, "It has been argued that the spotted owl is as much a reflection of the desire by some environmental groups to preserve large areas of old-growth forest as it is a real concern about the survival of the species." See Kimmins (1992: 150).
There is also a methodological distinction between measuring old growth protection and measuring old growth remaining. Presenting a revised version of Waatainen (1992), Hoberg (1993: 81) reveals that as of 1991 more old growth as a percentage of forest lands had been protected in the PNW than in British Columbia but much more old growth remains in BC. Dramatic increases in old growth protection as a result of Option 9 are solely because the Northern Spotted Owl needs old growth in order to survive, and has nothing to do with a strategic desire on the part of government to increase old growth protected areas.
## APPENDIX B: SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BC Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs</td>
<td>Senior Official</td>
<td>Victoria, BC</td>
<td>October 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Forest &amp; Paper Association</td>
<td>Chief Economist, Forest Resources Group</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>June 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Forests</td>
<td>Vice President, Policy and Legislation</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>June 1994*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Rivers</td>
<td>Senior Official</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>June 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilderness Society, The</td>
<td>Senior Official</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>June 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics</td>
<td>Senior Official</td>
<td>Eugene, OR</td>
<td>November 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audubon Society of Portland</td>
<td>Senior Official</td>
<td>Portland, OR</td>
<td>November 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC Office of the Premier</td>
<td>Senior Official, International Affairs</td>
<td>Victoria, BC</td>
<td>November 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC Environmental Network</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Vancouver, BC</td>
<td>November 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC Forest Alliance</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Vancouver, BC</td>
<td>November 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC Forest Service</td>
<td>Former Chief Forester</td>
<td>Vancouver, BC</td>
<td>October 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC Land Use Coordination Office</td>
<td>Senior Policy Analyst</td>
<td>Victoria, BC</td>
<td>December 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC Land Use Coordination Office</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Minister</td>
<td>Victoria, BC</td>
<td>December 1994</td>
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<td>ADM, Policy, Planning and Legislation</td>
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<td>May 1995</td>
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<td>Treaty Negotiation Division</td>
<td>Victoria, BC</td>
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<td>June 1995</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ADM, Fisheries, Wildlife and Habitat Protection</td>
<td>Victoria, BC</td>
<td>April 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>BC Ministry of Forests</td>
<td>Manager, Land Use Section, Resource Planning Branch</td>
<td>Victoria, BC</td>
<td>June 1995</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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1 An "*" denotes interviews that were conducted by telephone. The rest were conducted in person in the noted location.
<table>
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<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>BC Ministry of Forests</td>
<td>Director, Economics and Trade Branch</td>
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<td>BC Truck Loggers Association</td>
<td>Secretary-Treasurer</td>
<td>Vancouver, BC</td>
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<td>BC Wild</td>
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<td>Official</td>
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<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Ottawa, ON</td>
<td>October 1993</td>
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<td>Canadian Institute of Forestry</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Vancouver, BC</td>
<td>July 1994</td>
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IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (QA-3)

150mm

6"

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