TOWARDS AN ANSELMIAN THEODICY

by

Daniel Thomas Rakus

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Department of Philosophy

University of Toronto

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University of Toronto
Ph.D. Degree, 1997
Thesis Title: Towards an Anselmian Theodicy

ABSTRACT

This dissertation breaks scholarly ground with a preliminary and piecemeal articulation of the theodicy of St. Anselm of Canterbury. It consists of two parts: first, a collection of essays on God, justice, and freedom; second, a critique of De casu diaboli. Each has foundational significance for the definitive and systematic articulation.
Dedicated

To my first and best teachers, Kathleen and Thomas,

and

In memory of a teacher, mentor, and friend, Brother William J. Martin, F.S.C., S.T.D.

with sincerest gratitude

I shall make known to you, O man, what is good and what the Lord asks of you: by all means, that you act justly, love tenderly, and walk humbly with your God.

Micah 6:8

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**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

**Anselm:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Anselmian fragment (in SS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliq.</td>
<td>Aliquid [PF]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Causae [PF]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDH</td>
<td>Cur Deus homo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBP</td>
<td>Scriptum de beatitudine perennis vitae sumptum de verbis beati Anselmi</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Eadmer of Canterbury)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>De concordia praesentiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arbitrio</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCD</td>
<td>De casu diaboli</td>
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<td>DCIH</td>
<td>De custodia interioris hominis</td>
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<td>DCV</td>
<td>De conceptu virginali et de originali peccato</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>De 'grammatico'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHM</td>
<td>De humanis moribus per similitudines</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIV</td>
<td>Epistola de incarnatione verbi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>De libertate arbitrii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>De potestate [PF]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPSS</td>
<td>De processione Spiritus Sancti</td>
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<td>DSC</td>
<td>De spirituali claustro (in SS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSE</td>
<td>Epistola de sacramentis ecclesiae</td>
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<tr>
<td>DV</td>
<td>De veritate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVM</td>
<td>Deploratio virginatis male amissae (Meditation No.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENUW</td>
<td>Schmitt, F.S. Ein neues unvollendetes Werk des hl. Anselm von Canterbury</td>
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<td>(followed by page and line numbers)</td>
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<td>Ep.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>omnia S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi)</td>
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<td>Ex.</td>
<td>Exordium [PF]</td>
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<td>Fac.</td>
<td>Facere [PF]</td>
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<td>MA</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCT</td>
<td>Meditatio ad concitandum timorem (Meditation No.1)</td>
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<td>Mon.</td>
<td>Monologion</td>
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<td>MRH</td>
<td>Meditatio redemptionis humanae (Meditation No.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Or.</td>
<td>Oratio (followed by oration number per Schmitt's sequence in Opera omnia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>[PF]</td>
<td>Philosophical Fragment (in ENUW)</td>
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<td>Pros.</td>
<td>Proslogion</td>
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*Philosophical Fragment (in ENUW)*
RE = Responsio editoris: Quid ad haec respondeat editor ipsius libelli
S = Schmitt, F.S., Opera omnia S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi (followed by volume, page, and line numbers)
SS = R.W. Southern and F.S. Schmitt, Memorials of St. Anselm (followed by page and line numbers)
VV = Velle, voluntas [PF]

Aquinas:

SCG = Summa contra gentiles
ST = Summa theologiae

Augustine:

Conf. = Confessionum libri XIII
DeBP = De bono perseverantia
DCG = De correptione et gratia
DDQ = De diversis quaestionibus octogenta tribus
DeCD = De civitate Dei
DeLA = De libero arbitrio
DeP = De patientia
DGL = De genesi ad litteram libri duodecim
DGLA = De gratia et libero arbitrio
DM = De magistro
DNB = De natura boni
DT = De trinitate
EFSC = Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide et spe et caritate
Retr. = Retractionum libri II

Boethius:

CP = Philosophiae consolationis
Trin. = Trinitas unus deus ac non tres dei

Crispin, Gilbert:

DAP = De angelo perdito (followed by page and line numbers in edited volume)

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**Miscellaneous:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>chapter (cc = plural)</td>
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<td>s</td>
<td>section (ss = plural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sub</td>
<td>subsection</td>
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<td>v</td>
<td>volume (vv = plural)</td>
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**Serials:**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Anselm Studies: An Occasional Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina. Turnholti: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1953-. (Followed by volume, page, and line numbers.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSEL</td>
<td>Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky KG, 1866-. (Variations in publisher's name appear throughout the series. Followed by volume, page, and line numbers.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Fathers of the Church Series</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Towards an Anselmian Theodicy

Le problème d'Anselme dans le traité de l'ange, ce n'est pas tellement d'expliquer le péché, c'est de dédouaner Dieu. Il ne faut pas que Dieu soit responsable.

Yves Cattin

[In light of the general proposition that only being and goodness come from God,]

...Anselm is entitled to believe that there must exist some set of reasons whereby God's justice and goodness in relation to the Fall can be defended. But the general proposition entails only that there is such a set -- without determining this set exactly. In the assurance that such reasons do exist, Anselm has proceeded [in DCD] to specify a set which he thinks solves the theological problem posed by the origin of moral evil.

Jasper Hopkins
Research gives evidence of an imbalance in Anselmian scholarship: The 'Proslogion argument' has received an inordinate amount of attention, while Anselm's other intellectual achievements have been relatively shunned. There is, for example, *De casu diaboli*: This philosophical dialogue on the fall of the devil has received but a pittance of the scholarly attention that is presumably owed to it. A debt needs to be paid. In arrears are medieval philosophers, philosophers of religion, and theists of the Christian tradition whose interests include the perennial problem of evil and the challenge of articulating a theodicy in response to it.

The state of the scholarly problem is precisely this: Anselm's handling of the problem of evil -- of the idea or reality of evil as it confronts the idea or reality of a Creator-God who is believed to be good, just, omnipotent, and loving -- has been largely overlooked. His "set of reasons" in *De casu diaboli* has received less than due consideration. His effort to explain the origin of moral evil and "to exonerate" God before man in the face of it lacks scholarly appreciation: Wanting is a scholarly articulation of a holistic Anselmian theodicy.

That such is the state of the problem might be owing to a disregard in the spirit of John Hick's sweeping claim in *Evil and the God of Love*: that between Augustine and Aquinas most attempts to address the problem of evil were simply repetitious of the Augustinian position (p. 90). Nothing less is sweepingly implied than this: that there is a want of original thought, insight, and expression among those who stand between the Doctor of Grace and the Angelic Doctor. This includes and incriminates Anselm, the *doctor magnificus*. Now, the Augustinian influence on Anselm's philosophical and theological thought cannot be disputed, nor can there be any doubt about Anselm's interest in evil and the extent to which it challenges Christian faith in God. Y. Cattin and J. Hopkins recognize it. And G. Evans not only acknowledges it in "Why the Fall of Satan?," she also importantly suggests that the minutiae of Anselm's intellectual
interests enabled him to handle the problem and to assume the challenge in new ways and from new perspectives. Note that Hick's sweeping claim has just been swept away! And, with Cattin and Hopkins, Evans provides the incentive and rationale for correcting the state of the problem.

To that end, my dissertation comprises a critique of De casu diaboli and three complementary essays on God, justice, and freedom. My effort is a modest, circumscribed, and preliminary move towards a systematic and definitive articulation of a holistic Anselmian theodicy. 'Towards' is the essential word. For I intend only to collect and to elucidate the many 'pieces' of an Anselmian theodicy -- be they salient or subtle, philosophical or theological. I do not intend to piece them together coherently; that is my plan for the future.
PART I
Towards an Anselmian Theodicy:
Conceptual Framework for Understanding
St. Anselm's De casu diaboli:

Complementary Essays on God, Justice, and Freedom

Saint Anselme est un théologien-philosophe;
on ne peut distinguer en lui le métaphysicien
du théologien; il n'est pas théologien et philosophe
comme l'est Saint Thomas.
Son oeuvre est une œuvre de métaphysique religieuse,
de métaphysique théologique: ce n'est ni une œuvre
d'apologétique, ni une œuvre de métaphysique pure.

Alexandre Koyré
L'idée de Dieu dans la
philosophie de St. Anselme (1923),
p. 53.
Introduction to Part I

When given the claim that De casu diaboli represents Anselm's theodicean effort, one might think that the only remaining task is to consider the dialogue itself. One's understanding of the apparently simple work will then simply follow in course. But, it is not that direct, immediate, and easy. For the fact is that many philosophical and theological presuppositions underlie Anselm's discussion on the fall of the devil. Most, if not all, of them are unspoken. In order to understand Anselm's attempt to explain the origin of moral evil, to justify the good and just God in the face of it, and to offer a solution to it, it is necessary to discern and to explicate his conceptual framework.

Part I comprises three dense and nearly self-contained essays on God, justice, and freedom.

The first essay is a foray into Christian theism. I begin with the first presupposition of a theodicy: the existence of God. I do not attempt to elucidate, as one might rightly expect, a proof for divine existence; rather I, like Anselm, assume it as one who is working within the context of Christian faith and who is endeavoring to understand it and other theo-logical points of theodicean significance. The course I take is peculiar: I assume a theistic point that has Anselmian roots and is strongly contested by contemporary philosophers of religion. By arguing from Anselm's perspective against the contemporary rejection of the positive aspect of divine aseity, I hope to say whatever needs to be said about God for a theodicy and to say it in a philosophically and theologically interesting way. In subsection 'A,' consideration of the notions of aseity and perseity clarifies God's true or necessary existence. It also lays the conceptual foundation for further considerations of the unity and simplicity, omnipotence, and freedom of the Triune God who is love. These I put forth in subsection 'B' in order to enflesh, as it were, the Creator-God of Anselm's theodicy. In subsection
'C,' a brief reflection on the merciful justice of the God of love caps the key objective of this essay: to understand from Anselm's perspective the underlying dynamics of the Creator who enters into ad extra relations with rational creatures. All in all, this essay answers a question of immense theodicean import: Why, in the first place, did God create a world that would eventually go awry?

The second essay is a continuation of the first: The topic of justice begins one and ends the other. Also, the idea of relation between God and rational creatures, which is explored in the first essay in its theological, ontological, and teleological senses, is explored in this second essay in its ethical, epistemological, and psychological senses. Here, I examine Anselm's concept of justice and its correlate notion of debitum for their ethical import. The question of moral knowledge arises therefrom, as does my effort to answer it. The effort is purely speculative and, hence, purely tentative: It involves a gradual and constructive movement from key points of Anselm's linguistic theory and fragmentary verbal epistemology to the representation of a possible moral epistemology. And the result is my claim: that Anselm might have considered rational beings and moral agents to be endowed with an innate moral knowledge or a moral intuition. A concluding reflection on the rational creature as a trinitarian psychological image of God establishes the plausibility of my claim.

True freedom or Anselmian libertas is the focus of my third essay: It too builds on the idea of justice; it too presents the idea of relation between God and rational creatures -- a relation that now bespeaks the existential, ethical, and psychological. My effort focuses on a simple claim and important distinction:

Freedom in the truest Anselmian sense goes beyond the philosophical and becomes theological: Libertas is not simply the property of the rational will in choosing between opposites and doing so without restraint or constraint. Though it is very much grounded in the natural and inalienable freedom of the will to choose, it is rather the theocentric perfection of it. True freedom obtains when a
rational creature freely chooses to orientate and to determine all of the choices of his naturally free will, and hence all of his being, to justice: that is, to honoring the will of the God who is justice. His natural ability to keep justice of the will for its own sake enables him to do just that and to become truly free. For him, true Anselmian freedom is an existential, ethical, and theocentric reality: In short, it is his 'ethics of being,' his 'way of existing,' in communion with God. For to be truly free is to be free for God: To be free for God is to be just: To be just is to be ethical: To be ethical is to live rightly: And to live rightly is to live in moral relation with God.

In order to elucidate this claim, I present the contemporary state of the problem and then give my reason for maintaining that Anselm must have thought in terms of an 'ethics of being.' Then, I summarily consider the topic of Anselmian freedom in a textual overview and review. What ensues are my developing perspectives on Anselm's concepts of ability, will, and virtue in terms of and with respect to libertas. These concepts constitute nothing less than the foundation for the conceptualization of an Anselmian 'ethics of being' which has yet to be realized.

In these essays, my method is primarily expository and interpretative, at times, even critical. What is found throughout is my synthesis of Anselmian thought. Analyses -- being the basis of good synthesis -- obtain in textual, linguistic, philosophical, and theological modes. In most cases, however, I do not present them. To have placed all of my analyses in the body of the text would have rendered the already dense and cumbersome absolutely opaque and unwieldy. Hence, the indulgent reader is asked to suppose them as given and, if necessary, to chart and traverse for himself the analytical courses which have led me to my interpretations. Ample documentation is purposeful for such a task. In an equally unconventional manner, I have not put my discussions with Anselmian scholars in the body of the text. It is a dissertation on St. Anselm. With very few exceptions, such important digressions appear only in my notes. And, as if the unconventional were meant to be outdone: My references to
Anselm's *De casu diaboli* are relatively few, even on those points where, one might rightly argue, I should have made them. It is all intentional: For in the following essays I am aiming to set forth the presuppositions of the dialogue, not to pre-consider, duplicate, or prejudice any part of the task that will constitute part II.
Section 1

Three Anselmian Views of God:
Unproblematic Relational Aseity

Introduction

Certain philosophers of religion not only take exception to a traditional tenet of Christian theism, they want to debunk it. Divine aseity is at stake: not its negative aspect (a se/ex se) which holds that God is ungenerated and uncaused, but rather its positive aspect (per se) which emphasizes that the God who exists necessarily is self-sufficient. The problem is this: The self-sufficiency of the ontologically transcendent and independent Creator of contingent beings is thought to preclude this being's realization of ad extra relations. Two thinkers who have voiced rather strong opinions on the supposed untenability of the positive aspect are D. Pratt and K. Ward. They think it presents the Creator-God as being fundamentally unrelational; hence, they advocate rejection of it.

There is a certain theological acuity in their objections. Professor Ward provides a good example: After accusing the Scholastics of having erred in claiming that God is self-sufficient, he asserts that the notion of self-sufficiency cannot stand in view of God's creativity and love. Creation automatically places creatures and God in relation, renders God dependent, and suggests, albeit reservedly, that God needs creation in order to be completely what God is. And the God who loves and creates, as Ward understands, is the God who becomes a person -- 'becomes' in a transcendence of self in relation with others. A person who becomes is "a developing, self-expressive being discovering itself in the forms of its social relationships": God becomes a person only upon creating rational agents among whom God expresses divinity!

Professor Pratt follows on the heels of Professor Ward. His exceptions to aseity are as trenchant if not as theologically
explosive. The problem, as he sees it, can be put in a question: If the divine being is absolutely other, transcendent, and unrelated without any need of relations, as the positive aspect of aseity supposedly suggests, then how can one explain the fact of the ad extra relationality of God's creativity and love? That God is a loving creator bespeaks, as Pratt puts it, an existential fact about God. In a love that is suggestive of self-expression and communication, God affectively engages the Godhead in ad extra relations. And the implication of this fact is precise in an extraordinary way: The traditional view of God as an immutable being who is ontologically transcendent and independent withers, because, as Pratt holds, "God's ad extra relations denote a relationality fundamental to the being of God."

The positive aspect of aseity is to be rejected; but the negative aspect retained: "(N)othing," as Pratt claims, "determines that God exists, yet the inherent relational nature of the being of God suggests that God's self-existence simply sets the inchoative context of the relational deity. Ontologically, this means that God is self-existent but not self-sufficient." The God, who is no longer construed as existentially independent, is now considered "necessarily expressive of ad extra relationality."

In my estimation, Pratt's identification of the supposed relational problematic of aseity rests, first, on a problem and, second, on an oversight: First, he inclines towards the view that the divine attributes are of the non-relational type, which I take as meaning for him that they are basically preclusive of ad extra relations. Second, when he considers the neo-orthodox and Barthian view of aseity which holds that God engages in unilaterally-affective ad extra relations and that aseity is the ground of divine freedom, he asks: "Might not the freedom of God be a freedom to authentically engage in relationship?" Now, that Pratt does not consider aseity as the formal constituent or logical determination of God's essence, that he does not appreciate aseity as the grounding of the unity
and simplicity of all divine attributes, that he does not see omnipotence as an essential attribute related to the divine will and freedom as an essential aspect thereof, that he does not see the free and almighty will of God as having determined the Godhead to engage man in covenantal relationships through salvation history, is all very significant. Had he done so, then he, in the wake of Professor Ward, might not have expended the effort of giving to Christian theism that which it really does not need -- a reorientation of discourse on God.

By turning to Anselm who, it is claimed, initially formalized the notion of divine aseity which the later Scholastics allegedly misconstrued, I shall show that the partly contested notion is not as relationally problematic as it is claimed to be. At least from Anselm's perspective, it does allow for relationality.

First, I shall examine Anselm's notions of 'esse ex se' (a se) and 'esse per se' -- the two semantic and complementary components of aseity -- while giving greater attention to the latter of the two. For therein lies the positive suggestion that God is self-sufficient. My examination is nothing but a brief consideration of the manner of God's existence. It has, though, an important implication for understanding Anselm's theology of God's essence. Second, I shall consider the unity and simplicity of God's essence -- the being of which is God's per se. Then, the per se omnipotence and freedom of the Triune God who is love will be earmarked for its relational import. And, finally, I shall present the mercy of the just God as that which bespeaks an aseitic and per seitic God who existentially goads sinful man to respond freely to the salvific grace of a unilaterally-affective relationship. To see man's response to and participation in the justice of God as being primarily significative of a relationship with God, nay rather, as indicative of a merciful justification by God, is most apropos to an edifying appreciation of Anselm's De casu diaboli. The notion of justice is of commanding and pivotal importance to the dialogue's ethical and theodicean
concerns, as are the ideas of divine existence, omnipotence, freedom, love, and relationship with rational creatures.

A)

Divine Aseity, 'esse ex se' and 'esse per se': A Clarifying View of the God who is Existence

It is not altogether certain that contemporary philosophers are well advised in rejecting the positive aspect of aseity. In doing so they nullify the whole concept, including its negative aspect. The fundamental task in the conceptualization of aseity is to determine logically the factual manner or mode of divine existence. When I consider Anselm's conception, I see that the logic of his view entails a semantic complementarity between the two aspects. To dismiss one or the other would effectively render his concept of God as Creator and factually necessary being both incomplete and incoherent.

Anselmian aseity is presented explicitly in Mon., cc. 5-6. Its foundation, however, lies in the meditation's first four chapters. There Anselm delivers, sola ratione,\textsuperscript{13} four interwoven and deceptively simple arguments for the existence of a supreme being and nature.\textsuperscript{16} In the first two chapters, he argues for a supremely good and great being\textsuperscript{17} who is good and great through itself and through whom all other beings are good and great; in the third and fourth chapters, while bearing in mind the idea of a hierarchy of being and some sense of a dialectic of participation,\textsuperscript{18} he argues for the highest of all existing beings who is both supremely good and great and who is such because it alone is what it is through itself and all other beings are what they are through it.\textsuperscript{19} This emphasis on the manner of being is carried forward into cc. 5 and 6 where Anselm employs the notions of 'esse ex aliquo' and 'esse per aliquid' for the sake of explaining two ontologically distinct modes of existing: that of creatures and Creator, that of contingent beings and necessary being.\textsuperscript{20} His goal is to lay the conceptual groundwork for
understanding more thoroughly the manner of an existing being, be it contingent or necessary.

There is a semantic complementarity between the notions of existing from something (esse ex aliquo) and existing through something (esse per aliiquid). Such a complement seems to hold for beings of all modes of existing. In Mon., c. 5, one reads: "Clearly, what exists from something can likewise be said to exist through it; and what exists through something can likewise be said to exist from it." Whether a being exists from itself and through itself, as in the case of God, or from something other than itself and through something other than itself, as in the case of contingent beings, it exists with respect to a source and a cause of its being. Source and cause are not essentially different: In Mon., c. 6, I see that the source is the cause, and the cause is the source. And what I see furthermore is this: that with these notions of 'esse ex aliquo' and 'esse per aliiquid' Anselm is trying to effect a conceptual clarification of the source of a being in terms of that same source sufficing as one or one of several efficient or instrumental causes of that being. On the side of contingent beings, 'esse per aliiquid' denotes not only causality but also the entailing sense of dependency on the proximate and remote causes of being, even up to the one ultimate cause of all beings. This ultimate source and cause is the highest of all existing beings through whom all other beings ultimately and dependently derive existence. It is this supreme being, the Creator, who sustains the existence of all beings that exist through something other than themselves.

But when Anselm attempts to discern the supreme being's mode of existence, he encounters a problem. He acknowledges as much in admitting that 'esse ex aliquo' and 'esse per aliiquid' do not always have the same sense for both Creator and creatures. But, instead of abandoning these distinctive notions when talking about God, and thereby averting a problem that awaits him, he retains and specifies them: He substitutes 'ex se' for 'ex aliquo' and 'per se' for 'per aliiquid'; then, he holds to the
semantic complementarity or conceptual clarification which they both afford to a mode of existence, and then predicates them of God. Upon doing so, he is hard-pressed in Mon., c. 6, to explain how the highest of all existing beings exists per se. His problem lies not in the fact of God's existence, but rather in the manner of God's existing on a different ontological plane. That is, given the unproblematic and traditional point that God is the uncaused source (ex se) of divine existence, how is God to be understood as a cause of that very same existence of which God is the uncaused source? In his own words Anselm asks: "Therefore, since it is evident that this Nature is through itself whatever it is...in what manner does this Nature exist through itself?"

When the distinction 'esse per aliquid' is specified with the reflexive personal pronoun and then applied to God, the suggestion obtains that God is the subject of self-causality, self-dependency, and self-need. Or does it not? Does the idea hold that God, existing per se, is the efficient or instrumental cause of the divine self? Do the notions of posteriority and inferiority obtain in understanding God as existing per se, as they do in understanding the cause-effect relationships among contingent beings and between Creator and creatures? Quite evidently, no: In Mon., c. 6, Anselm refuses to see God's existing per se as an instance of causa sui and, implicitly, effectum sui. Likewise, in view of God's not having been caused in any way, he adamantly refuses any suggestion that the supreme nature might be nothing or might be derived per nihil or ex nihilo, for otherwise God would not and could not exist per se and ex se.

It seems that the 'esse per se' distinction buckles when predicated of God. And so Anselm, I think, is left with only one way to support it. In short, the ideas of causal dependency and need that obtain in the notion of 'esse per aliquid' as applied to contingent beings must yield first to a cognitive shift onto a higher ontological plane; then, the ideas of self-sufficiency and self-sustainment must replace them and obtain in the specific
notion of 'esse per se' as applied to God alone. God sustains divine being not in any sense of self-dependency or self-causation. That God exists ungenerated and uncaused (ex se), that God sustains eternally and independently the divine self through the divine self (per se) can mean nothing more than that God is essentially being: ipsum esse subsistens. The creator is absolute and simple being: God is what God is because God is: \[\ldots\text{whatever \ldots[God] is,}\] Anselm writes, \[\ldots[\text{God}]\] is through no other than through...[the divine self] -- i.e., through that which...[the divine self] is. Therefore, is not...[God's] existence alone justifiably understood to be simple, complete, and absolute?"\]

My interpretation of the per seity of divine existence is clearly at odds with J. Morreall's. He acknowledges that Anselm might appear to be reasoning analogically towards a view of God who is existence just as light is shining -- that is, towards a view of God who is esse subsistens or pure being. But he summarily rejects the possibility for the simple reason that such a view would not come along until Aquinas. I surmise that G. Schufrieder, in contrast with Morreall, suspects that Anselm is nearing 'something': \[\ldots\text{just how we are,}\] he writes, "to think this notion of existing through itself (existendi per se) as a preeminent power that in some sense, constitutes the essence (essentia) of divinity -- the absolute uniqueness of the being (esse) of the being (ens) in question."

Now, to Morreall I can defer on two points: that Aquinas is at the forefront of identifying God as Pure Act of Being, and that Anselm lacked many of Thomas' philosophical resources. But it is clear enough that the man who formalized the notion of divine aseity was not without liberty and intellect in his own philosophical-theological appreciation of Exodus 3:14. His own interpreted but imprecise view of the identity of God's essence and existence does have its own textual roots.

That Anselm holds this philosophical stance is evident in his use of an obscure analogy. At the end of Mon., c. 6, he
tries to explain the sense of God existing per se and without any causality. "Should we perhaps understand how," he writes, by comparison with our saying that through itself and from itself light shines and is something shining? For in the way that 'light' and 'to shine' and 'shining' are related to one another, so 'what is' (essentia) and 'to be' (esse) and 'being' (ens), i.e., existing or subsisting, are related to one another. Thus, 'supreme being' and 'supremely to be' and 'supremely being,' i.e, 'supremely existing' or 'subsisting', are analogous to 'light' and 'to shine' and 'shining.'"

Nothing more is said. The chapter ends abruptly without any further explanation or elucidation of aseity until Anselm gets to Mon., cc. 16-17. Therein he employs this same analogy when reasoning about essential predications of God. In it, there lies the suggestion that he is nearing an understanding of the aseitic and perseitic God as ipsum esse subsistens.

Before explaining this suggestion, let me preface it with an important point that Anselm conveys too quickly in Mon., c. 25: The supreme being is "... in every respect substantially identical with itself...." With this point in mind, consider Mon., c. 16. There, after having put forth in c. 15 a working principle on divine perfection, Anselm considers how it is that whatever can be said of this supreme being should be said. What transpires is a short but philosophically-rich discussion on predication.

The upshot of his discussion is this: Nothing can be truly predicated of God either qualitatively or quantitatively; nothing can be said of the supreme being in terms of 'what kind of thing it is' or 'to what degree it is.' There are two reasons for this: First, such predications bespeak the idea of participation, that is, of some being having (participating) or possessing a quality or attribute from something other than itself, namely, the quality or attribute itself which is being predicated; and second, if such predications were allowed to hold in respect to God as they hold in respect to contingent beings, then God would be something not per se, but rather per alium,
namely, per that which is being predicated of God. Divine aseity would be undermined. But Anselm resolves to maintain it, and his position on divine predication is resolutely displayed in his principle of perfection: Whatever is thought better for the supreme being to be than not to be — this is to be predicated of it essentially and not qualitatively. The divine being who exists per se does not participate in its own attributes. In whatever respect it is, it is substantially identical with itself. This philosophical stance, together with the idea of divine per seity, is clarified in Anselm's appeal to the predicate 'justice.' He remarks:

...what [the Supreme Nature] is, it is completely through itself and not through another. So if it is just only through justice, and if it can only be just through itself, what is more clear and more necessary than that this Nature is itself justice? And when it is said to be just through justice, is not this the same as [being just] through itself? And when it is said to be just through itself, what else is meant except that [it is just] through justice? ..........

With regard to the Supreme Being, since to say that it is just is the same as saying that it exists as justice, and since to say that it exists as justice is the same as saying that it is justice, there is no difference between calling it just and calling it justice.

Here, Anselm employs the analogical reasoning of c. 6 in order to elucidate divine essential predication. Note that he does not abandon the notion of divine aseity which he first considered in terms of divine existence; rather, he extends it to encompass all that God is. Consideration of the compositional parallels between cc. 6 and 16 confirms this extension: 1) the 'what is' (essentia) of the analogy with the 'justice' or 'it is justice' of the illustration; 2) the 'to be' (esse) of the analogy with the 'to be just' or 'it is just' of the illustration; and 3) the 'being' (ens, existens, subsistens) of the analogy with the ' [being just]' or 'it exists as justice' of the illustration. What results from this subtle instantiation of
the analogy of c. 6 in the illustration of c. 16 is a paradigmatic case of analytical predication: The predicate is understood to be in the subject itself: The subject is thought to be substantially that which is being predicated of it. In the case of God who alone is necessarily, existence is such a predicate.

That Anselm sees the 'existence' and the essence of God as being substantially and numerically identical can be seen at the end of Mon., c. 16. A list of seventeen attributes is presented, all of which presumably adhere to the principle of perfection. Of the seventeen cited,' being' (essentia) is first. What suggests that it means something other than the vague 'that which is' or 'what a thing is' is Anselm's list of present participles which follow, parallel, and complement his list of essential attributes. The first participial form listed is 'ens.' Since this word is the present participle of sum/esse, which means in its substantive sense either 'being' or 'existing,' it becomes clear that Anselm's sense of 'essentia' as a predicative attribute must be that of 'being' or 'existence.' Further, if my consideration of the illustration vis-à-vis the analogy is correct, then Anselm's use of the noun 'essentia' in the analogy could be replaced by 'existentia.' Assuming that this replacement can be effected, I think that what Anselm is doing in c. 6, at a reasonable distance from the discussion of cc. 16-17 on God's attributes, is simply isolating the existence of God as the very ontological principle of sufficient reason, the very ground -- the first essential attribute as it were -- for discerning everything else about the essence of God. In doing so his reasoning is not far removed from Aquinas'.

Whatever the supreme being is said to be, it is "...in every respect substantially identical with itself." Anselm's God is essentially being: The supreme nature is existence. And what God is, God is per se -- that is, simply, purely, and absolutely in the eternal presence that is God: in the God who is "I am who am."
Thus, it seems that the Anselmian sense of the self-sufficiency of the ontologically-independent, aseitic God must be understood in this twofold context: First, the essentia, the esse, and the ens of God is but the unique foundation for understanding everything else about the essence of this being who exists necessarily and who is eternally self-sustaining in an essential unity and simplicity. And, second, the self-sufficiency and self-sustainment of this highest of all existing beings, who is supremely good and great, who alone is ontologically unique atop a hierarchical world of contingent beings, is but the raison d'être of all creation, of all existents.

In light of this overview and interpretation of Anselm's position on God's esse per se, it is not clear to me how Pratt and Ward can reject the per se notion of divine aseity and yet think that they can retain the ex se (a se) notion. Both notions together simply form a conceptual clarification of the particular mode of an existing being -- of a necessary being whose essence is existence. Their position becomes especially problematic in view of Anselm's position on God's essence and the unity and simplicity thereof -- the understanding of which is linked to his notion of aseity, including its positive aspect. The very idea of God's self-sufficiency undergirds Anselm's entire conception of God. To reject such an aspect, as Pratt and Ward propose to do in order to see God as a being capable of ad extra relationality, would effectively destroy at least one traditional strand of theism. That is, from the Anselmian perspective, there would be no need to argue for the ontological relationality of God, as Pratt and Ward do, for there would be neither God, nor a concept thereof, to be considered ontologically relational.
Simplicity, Omnipotence, and Freedom of the Triune God: Towards a View of Relational Aseity

It is absolutely essential that Anselm argue for the unity and simplicity of God's essence. The arguments of the Monologion, cc. 1-4, demand it; in short, his theistic ontology requires it. Divine aseity in cc. 5-6, as interpreted above, founds and entails the argument for divine simplicity in c. 17 which continues the discussion of essential predication in c. 16. The argument of c. 17 in turn elucidates and broadens the scope of aseity to the extent that its positive aspect of self-sufficiency obtains with respect to the whole and absolutely one essence of the Triune God who exists per se and who is existence. Scholarly disagreement notwithstanding, this interpretation founds and justifies what follows: After a brief consideration of Anselm's concept of divine simplicity, I shall show that the one and simple Triune God who is per se omnipotence and freedom and who is per se the God of love is not preclusive of ad extra relationality. Closer consideration of the nature of the aseitic God suggests that the transcendent and wholly self-sufficient Triune Creator is ever-poised in the freedom and power of the divine being to condescend to ad extra relations.

Anselm's conviction begets a question. God is every true good: being, life, eternity, wisdom, et cetera. But many goods and attributes are appropriately and essentially predicated of God. So, is not the essence of God composed of these many distinct attributes?

Anselm would respond that if God's attributes were ontologically-distinct properties which collectively form the essence of God, then the essence would be composite. And a composite being is of parts: It is always existentially and essentially dependent upon its constitutive elements, even though they are not necessarily dependent upon it. Such a being is what it is on account of its parts, but the parts are not what
they are on account of the composite. Such a being does not exist per se but clearly per alia. By virtue of being per alia, every composite being is the existent effect of a cause-effect relationship: Its being is posterior to, inferior to, and dependent upon the various causes of its being. In many different respects a composite being can be thought; in understanding and in reality it can be separated. But, if the essence of God were composite, God would be causally dependent upon the divine attributes not only for 'what God is' but also for 'that God is': At once, God would be explainable in terms of sufficient reasons other than the divine self. Then, God, that being to whom Anselm ascribes the nominal notion of "that than which no greater can be thought," would not be per se; the notion would not be ascribable. Ontologically-distinct attributes undermine God as the highest of all existing beings.

Like many Christian and Platonic thinkers before and after him, Anselm rejects the idea of the essential multiplicity of God and asserts essential simplicity: God is "absolutely one" (omnino unum); God is indivisible unity. Unlike composite contingent beings, God is neither separable in the understanding nor in reality. Even though we may and do speak of God in terms of many predicable attributes or goods, as if they were ontologically-distinct in God, in reality each and every attribute predicated essentially, each being what all of the other attributes are, is at once wholly and simply God. There are no essential, spatial, or temporal parts in the asetic God who is per se numerically and essentially one as existence, life, eternity, and wisdom among other goods that include omnipotence and the freedom thereof.

Anselm's consideration of divine unity and simplicity encompasses more than just God's 'great-making properties.' It includes the 'psychological and operative properties' as well. Within the context of a trinitarian psychology, which he seemingly owes to Augustine, he establishes his understanding of divine omnipotence. In doing so he does not distinguish
between the essence of God and the power (potentia) of God: Divine power is the essence, divine essence is the power. The great-making and psychological properties are one. He does, however, tend to emphasize divine power in terms of the divine will which is substantially one with divine memory and intellect in the Trinity of Divine Persons. And, thus, there is justification for focusing God's power primarily in view of the inner dynamic of trinitarian psychology.

What the begotten Second Person of the Trinity eternally understands, knows, and cognizes is a perfect expression or Word of the unbegotten First Person who eternally remembers the truth and goodness, the wisdom and rectitude that is understood, known, and cognized. What the Father remembers, so too does the Unbegotten God understand; what the Son understands, so too does the Begotten God remember. What each remembers and understands, each wills: Each loves the other and the self. The love that proceeds from the one and simple essence of the First and Second Persons: the will that follows upon memory and understanding is essentially identical to the Father and Son: The Holy Spirit, being the Third Person, is wholly present at once in the memory of the Father and the understanding of the Son, and they in it. Each person is per se memory, understanding, and will (love) and all else that is the one and simple Supreme Being who remembers, understands, and loves in eternity.

In the unity and simplicity of the divine operation or power, what is remembered and understood or expressed in the eternity of divine relations is the one and simple divine essence: the one and immutable Creator-God who is eternally existence, life, reason, wisdom, rectitude, goodness, et cetera. And what is eternally loved and willed is precisely this divine essence. Emphasis might be given here to the understanding or expression of the existence. For, more importantly, that which is remembered and understood eternally in the Creator's mind, in the one consubstantial and creating Word or Expression, is the
definition, form, pattern, or exemplar of creatures. Before "...all things were made there was in the thought of the supreme nature what they were going to be or what kind they were going to be or how they were going to be."\textsuperscript{93} With respect to this thought or Expression: It is the true and principal existence of which all contingent beings in themselves are but varying images and in which all creatures are most truly being: "...by one and the same Word," Anselm writes, "...[the Supreme Spirit] speaks itself and whatever it has created."\textsuperscript{95} And "...the more truly the Creating Being [the Supreme Spirit] exists than does created being, the more truly every created substance exists in the Word...of the Creator than in itself."\textsuperscript{96} Creation is an expression of the mind of the God who is existence per se: God thinks creatures, and creatures are thought by God.

From the preceding points, it follows that if creatures are understood eternally in the unity and simplicity of the Godhead, then they are also loved and willed eternally by the Triune God who is essentially love: essentially an eternal desire or affection for that which is eternally remembered and understood. God knows, understands, and loves the divine self, the essence of God; inasmuch as doing so, the Triune God in an essential unity knows, understands, and loves creatures.\textsuperscript{97} God's expression or understanding of the divine self, which is not other than God's being,\textsuperscript{98} is not -- nay, cannot be -- really distinct from the one and simple God's expression or understanding of creatures.\textsuperscript{99} If it were, there would be multiplicity in God. And, thus, for like reason, the unity and simplicity of God ensures that God's eternal love of the divine essence is not distinct from the divine love of creatures.

Thus, if a point of relationality is to be understood in the God who is wholly self-sufficient in one substance and three persons,\textsuperscript{100} it is right here on the side of eternity and with respect to God's essential and absolute power (potentia absoluta) as discerned in God's operative and great-making properties.

The potentia absoluta of God, as viewed from the side of
eternity, bespeaks for Anselm a transcendental relation between the God who is existence and the true existence of creatures in the mind of the immutable Triune God. It is simply a uni-perspectival relation arising, as it were, out of a discernment of trinitarian psychology and existence as its relational ground. It can be envisaged accordingly: between God the consubstantial Son, the referent, 'standing' in understanding towards creatures, the relata, as known and remembered in the paternal divine substance that is understanding, knowledge, wisdom, and truth; between God the consubstantial Holy Spirit, the referent, 'standing' in an eternal love towards creatures, as remembered and understood in the substantial unity of the Father and Son; and between God the consubstantial Father, the referent, 'standing' in truth towards creatures as eternally understood, cognized, and loved in the begotten Son and the one proceeding Spirit of the two. Surely, real distinctions are not being predicated of the divine mind. Anselm most assuredly would not have done so for the simple reason that they, if effected, would compromise the unity and simplicity of the Godhead. On this very point, a further point should be renoted about the consubstantial Son who is the Word: There are not two Words in the Triune God, one by which a son speaks the divine self and another by which another son speaks creatures. There is but one consubstantial Word, one Son, by which the Triune God eternally speaks the divine self that is eternally remembered and willed and by which this same one and simple God remembers and speaks creatures. In the unity of the divine essence, in the triune commerce of consubstantial persons, the true existence of creatures abides eternally in the understanding, knowledge, wisdom, and truth that is the God who is. Abiding in such a unity and commerce founds the transcendental relation between God and creatures.

This relation between God and creatures in the divine mind does not connote a strict accidental predication of relation to God. That is, it does not suggest the attribution of something that inheres or happens in time to God and effects a change or
dependency in God. Predication of the sort clearly compromises the immutability and simplicity of God, whereas the predication of a uni-perspectival and transcendental relation merely elucidates what seems to unfold from the logic of Anselm's trinitarian theology and psychology. Not all relations denote a happening or change in the referent of whom they are predicated. On this point Anselm is clear, but not too exhaustive in the only explanatory example that he gives. Nor is he too helpful for he elucidates the creature instead of the Creator:

For it is true [he says] that I am neither taller nor shorter than, equal nor similar to, a man who will be born after the present year. But after he is born, I will surely be able to have and lose all of these relations to him -- according as he will grow or change in various of his qualities -- without any change in myself.\(^{103}\)

Such reasoning leads Anselm to claim that divine immutability is not inconsistent with predications of certain characteristics which do not entail or imply a change in the individual substance of whom they are predicated. One can speak of God in relation (especially in relation to creatures) provided that the predication of relation does not compromise the unity and simplicity of the God\(^{104}\) whose supreme and immutable nature never admits of accidents that cause change.

The transcendental relation which I have proffered no more compromises divine immutability than does the article of faith in the Trinity. The proffered view is simply a specification of the trinitarian relationship of identicals: 'An essential' of God's eternal knowledge -- namely, the true existence of creatures -- has been logically isolated and articulated in the logic of the Trinity as generally understood and expressed by Anselm. Instead of emphasizing the divine essence as the object of the memory, understanding, and love of the Triune God, as Anselm does, I have emphasized 'an essential' of the one and simple divine essence -- 'an essential' in an essence that obtains eternally, singly, and wholly in each divine person of the "relation of identicals"\(^{105}\) that is the Triune God per se.
Thus, in response to certain contemporary philosophers, I want to hold that divine aseity, taken from the perspective of him who formalized the notion, is not the relational problematic that it is claimed to be. In fact, aseity seems to be the grounding of that very ontologically-relational status of God to which they incline. Consequently, there seems to be neither a need nor a reason to reject the positive aspect of aseity: The self-sufficiency of the one and triune God in the whole of God's being does not preclude relations. But, admittedly, they might respond, and correctly so, that my view has been that of ad intra and not ad extra relations. It is after all the latter that is the bone of contention, and not the former.

In response, I want to claim that the uni-perspectival relation which I see in Anselm's God becomes bi-perspectival by virtue of the freedom of the God who wills to create with a purpose: The relation between God and man, as seen in the divine mind, is realized in time and becomes conversely a relation between man and God. What the God of goodness, who is existence per se, knows and understands in an eternity of absolute plenitude, that same God wills ever-reasonably and either efficiently or permissively. And what God wills almightily and eternally in goodness alone must needs occur or be caused. In other words, the mind of the eternal God expresses itself and loves itself and what it loves it wills. But why does the one and triune God, wholly self-sufficient unto itself in every respect of being, will in eternity to create? Why is eternal goodness expressed creatively in time? The answer, I think, is crucial for seeing more fully the relational 'side' of the aseitic God.

If there had never been a creation, Anselm tells us, there would still be a Word that is eternally expressive of the divine essence: Of this he is confident. The counter-factual, though couched in confidence, is nonetheless intriguing: It could be rightly construed as Anselm's suggestion that there might not have been a creation, but, because there is, it is by
virtue of a free act\textsuperscript{109} of God. Presumably, God could have chosen not to create, if God so willed. However, when the textual evidence is considered with respect to divine absolute power, it seems to cast doubt not on the fact of creation or its derivation in God, but rather on the manner of its having been effected by God.

By dint of his own reasoning or my interpretation of it, Anselm seems to imply that God must needs create, not by any antecedent or causal necessity\textsuperscript{110} but simply by virtue of the divine nature. Of this he is certain: that remembrance and understanding of anything by anyone, be they divine or contingent, would be in vain and useless if it were not loved or shunned by the will in accordance with the dictates of reason.\textsuperscript{111}

A serious difficulty must be faced. The foundational motivation of the will and its love is grounded, as it were, in the intellect: The intellect presents to the will its appetible object.\textsuperscript{112} God must be fully desirous of what God remembers and understands and this includes being expressive and fully desirous of creatures. God loves and wills to the extent that God knows and understands.\textsuperscript{113} If God does not will and love to the extent that God knows and understands, which operations are of the unity and simplicity of the divine essence, then to that extent the divine essence is useless and in vain. But surely for Anselm the antecedent fails, given the impossibility of the consequent: And so, it seems first that God eternally wills to create. That which God wills occurs. And second, it seems that God is not free not to create that which God knows and consequently wills and causes.

A closer look at the absolute power and freedom of God is necessary in order to get at the root of what here seems to be the case. Specifically, what needs to be considered is what obtains eternally in the Godhead that, per se, loves what it remembers and understands itself to be: We need to arrive at some understanding of God as love. For, as the Johannine
community recorded and as Anselm professes, God is love. In doing so, it will be shown not only that aseity is not preclusive of relationality, be it \textit{ad intra} or \textit{ad extra}, but that, given the unity and simplicity of God's essence, it is the very ground of the freedom of God whence divine \textit{ad extra} relationality springs.

To begin, let me put forth a concept of love\textsuperscript{14} and posit as axiomatic that which many of us would consider a commonplace: that love is essentially a relational activity. Thus: In true love, that is, love involving self-conscious beings capable of responding affectively and mutually, love is always a love of someone -- always a desire directed towards someone other than oneself. Love is being ever-poised towards another: being ever-poised to communicate oneself, to share oneself, indeed to surrender oneself in order to enjoy oneself in participation with another who is capable of responding in like manner. The objective is personal fulfillment and growth in an interpersonal union or alliance. Between lover and beloved there obtains a mutuality of love. What brings them together at first is a personal desire, a solitary love, grounded in one for the other and then in the response of the other. What binds them together as lover and beloved in a love-relationship, a union which bespeaks two conscious beings endeavoring together towards personal fulfillment and realization, is not the distinct personal desires which each one first had for the self and the other, but rather the melding of those personal desires. In the union of personal loves, there arises a mutuality of love, a new love, which signifies the unity of two conscious beings who love and are loved by each other. This mutual love of two lovers, being what love is essentially, is no different from the first solitary loves: That is, mutual love is ever-poised to be expressed, to be shared, to be enjoyed in participation with others. Out of the loves of two kindred persons, of lover and beloved, love itself proceeds and subsists. It too is relational, but unlike its personal progenitors, it is a communal love. Communal it will be in the realization of its being
communicated and shared when it endeavors, as does all true love, to seek and to find its own beloved, its own relational other.

To this conceptualization and to a traditional view of love as that which comprises a lover, a beloved, and love itself, I want to approximate my understanding of Anselm on the Trinity.

The one and simple God, the "Author and Giver of Love," is love. In the Trinity there is the yearning of the eternal unbegotten lover who endeavors towards another insofar as begetting another in an eternal act of divine self-expression; there is the eternally begotten beloved who requites in love; and there are the two together who, in that knowledge and understanding of each other which founds the love they have for themselves and each other, put forth a mutuality of love. The Father loves the Son, the Son the Father, and each loves himself in a substantial unity with the other. Between the two divine persons subsists a conscious love-relationship which at once bespeaks their love for themselves and each other; between the two there arises eternally the "affection of mutual love": Father and Son, in the unity of substance and in their love for each other, breathe out (spírare) a love common and equal to both in substance yet distinct from both in person. The mutual love which proceeds substantially from the eternal and identical lover and beloved is an eternal and common love of all that the divine essence is: that which proceeds eternally from the affection of their mutual love is uncreated, consubstantial Love.

In the Trinity, the love-relationship between the Father and Son is actually an identity of lover and beloved: It is an instance of self-love. With such being the case, and with all love being a desire or yearning for something, that which obtains in self-love, as Augustine says, is a love of love itself: the medium operating between lover and beloved is love itself. Hence, the Father and the Son love Love, their own consubstantial Love. Inasmuch as being a true love that proceeds consubstantially from the Godhead, and with true love understood
as being fundamentally relational, then: In the eternal presence and subsistent freedom (power) that it is per se, the supreme being is ever-poised to express itself beyond itself: to communicate itself with others distinct from itself. Divine consubstantial love, ever proceeding from the love of the Father and Son in a third distinct person of the Trinity, is per se the one and simple God who is a lover and who, like all true lovers, seeks a beloved.

Understanding God as love affords an explanation of why God wills eternally to create that which is known and understood eternally and which exists eternally and most truly in the divine mind. Like every true lover, God seeks union with a beloved who can respond freely, consciously, and intelligently to the initial prodding of a lover's self-expression, and who can thenceforward endeavor in union towards the mutuality of love and its beneficial effects. Beyond the supreme being who is singularly transcendent, beyond that same being who is ontologically unique, beyond that being from whom all other beings derive being: In the beyond of creation there are those who are loved by the Creator-God who is love. The God who is ex se and per se 'that God is' and 'what God is' is the very God who eternally loves and seeks to be loved. In the freedom of divine power, Love creates in order to be loved. By virtue of the freedom of divine will, the aseitic and Triune God condescends from ad intra to ad extra relationality: That is, the Creator-God proceeds by virtue of the ability or power proper to the one and simple divine essence.

Now, there is only one way to understand the freedom of the divine nature and, thus, how it is that creation is a free act of the omnipotent God. Because Anselm understands freedom under the genus of ability (potestas) or power (potentia, potestas), it is necessary to come to terms first with his understanding of the two.

Ability, specifically, and power, at least insofar as it is conceptually linked with ability, can be construed as an aptitude
for doing (aptitudo ad faciendum).\textsuperscript{131} 'Doing' (facere) suffices, for Anselm, as a predicate-variable.\textsuperscript{132} In Pros., c. 7, and De potestate,\textsuperscript{133} he holds that there is proper and improper power. Any ability for doing something or other is proper or correct and true if it accords with rectitude: Proper power respects that which ought to be done and the very act thereof; it always accords with that which is fitting and advantageous or, in sum, accords with the rectitude of the matter.\textsuperscript{134} Conversely, to speak of a power or ability to do anything which is unfitting or disadvantageous is not an ability in the proper sense but rather an inability (impotentia).\textsuperscript{135} To do anything out of sorts with rectitude, to do anything that is not true and correct, is simply not power: It is rather an inability that suggests a rational agent's having succumbed to adversity or perversity, and thus his acting not with sensitivity to the precepts of rectitude but rather with an insensitivity that seemingly suggests something else having power over him.\textsuperscript{136} In this case, an individual is improperly said to be powerful, and is more correctly said to be powerless.\textsuperscript{137}

The long and short of Anselm's position on power is ultimately his acute sense of the ethical or of God as the ethical paradigm: as the supreme rectitude to which all of creation, being ontologically-ordered, should be morally-ordered. The implications of his position are precise with respect to God and to what the Creator-God can and cannot do.

The 'omni-potence' of God might be understood literally as meaning that God is able to do anything at all: God is 'all-powerful.' In fact, though, owing to Anselm's claims that every ability-to-do presupposes an ability-to-will-to-do\textsuperscript{138} and that God's power is God's essence, it is the case that God is not literally all-powerful. In some respects, God is omnipotent; in others, no.

God cannot do just anything, because God cannot will just anything. In short, God cannot will against or violate rectitude, that is: God cannot will against the divine will or
against the divine essence of which the will is in unity and
simplicity with the rectitude and justice that the Triune God
knows and understands the divine self to be. To do so would
be tantamount to God's willing an essential self-contradiction.
Thus, the power of God cannot be considered a power to do
anything and everything whatsoever; it must rather be viewed as
an ability to do that which God wills. And that which God wills
always accords with and expresses what God is and is believed to
be. In view of Anselm's peculiar sense of power or ability,
then, the ability of the God who is per se supreme rectitude is
always proper. It is never improper: There is never any
inability pertaining to God for it is the case, as Anselm likes
to put it, that no person or thing is ever able to sway God from
that which God is per se. There is no lack of true and correct
power in the God of rectitude. And it is in this sense alone
that Anselm considers God to be truly omnipotent.

It is indeed a peculiar sense of power insofar as attesting
to the pervasive theo-centricity of Anselmian thought. Likewise,
it is a peculiar sense of freedom in that it is truly freedom
"only with respect to what is advantageous or what is
fitting...," that is, only with respect to the rectitude of
which God is the eternal source. Peculiarly, the notion of
freedom analytically complements the notion of power: True power
or ability is free. With the power of God being the essence of
God it follows that the essence of God is freedom -- freedom per
se.

God's power is free not only in the ordinary sense of not
being compelled or restrained by any extern; it is also free
in the refined sense of being aligned with the beneficial or
advantageous and with rectitude. Freedom in its truest
Anselmian sense is not simply the property of the will, that is,
the natural ability of the will (liberum arbitrium) to will or
reject an array of opposites. Rather, true freedom is the
perfection of that property by which there is a certain freely
chosen and fundamental determination of the will to subsist and
to act vis-à-vis a certain honorable standard: In the case of rational creatures, it is to regulate freely the will and all of its choices, as it were, to a supreme moral good; but, in the case of God, it is to subsist ex se and per se in an eternal act or life (vita) of the goodness, rectitude, and justice that God is essentially. This eternal act or life is not distinct from that which God is understood to be, either in terms of God's operative properties or great-making properties: For the power of God's one act or life is the whole of God's essence in its unity and simplicity. To speak of the freedom of such a power is to speak of the essence. The essence identifies the power, the power the essence, and both together are the breath and depth of freedom. That which God wills and does in one eternal act, or as perceived by man in its manifold effects in time, is the absolutely free expression of God.

Thus it is that in essential freedom the aseitic and perseitic God creates. It is not that God must create; it is rather that it behooves God to create: Creation becomes the one and simple essence of the good and just God whose nature is love and whose unity and simplicity of power is an eternal expression of that very love in an eternal act or life of love. To Pratt's question -- "Might not the freedom of God be understood as a freedom to authentically engage in [ad extra] relationships?" -- the answer is 'yes.' And it does not entail any weakening of the positive aspect of aseity. But it does entail the difficulty of making theological and philosophical sense out of divine freedom.

C)

The Merciful Justice of God:
A View of Ad Extra Relational Aseity

The contemporary philosophers' case against aseity falters almost immediately in view of Anselm's concept of the justice of God. In view of the preceding developments, it cannot be
mistaken that God is essentially just: God is just per se: That is, God is sufficient unto the divine self insofar as needing nothing to sustain or to effect the justice that God is. In light of a further development, it cannot be mistaken that the justice of God is relational ad extra in a soteriological sense. This sense clearly indicates the Creator-God's covenantal fidelity or commitment to rational creatures: the precise Anselmian indication of which points to the justice of God as being relationally an indwelling grace in the creature's soul. In being such it confirms a real relationship that subsists between the rational creature and the aseitic and perseitic God who freely created him.

Furthermore, the contemporary claim falters because it lacks an appreciation of the freedom of the will of God. Failure to consider the concept of potentia ordinata dei¹⁰ and the extent to which this logical distinction in divine power affords an appreciation of God's ad extra relationality is indeed damaging to the contemporary objections. For it is the case that this simple distinction, as seen rudimentarily in Anselm,¹¹ grounds the idea of a transcendent Creator-God in relationship with creatures.¹²

Potentia ordinata dei logically distinguishes what God does in contrast to what God has the ability to do in virtue of God's potentia absoluta. But more importantly and simply, the ordained power of God marks the extent to which God, in virtue of doing whatever and doing so miraculously,¹³ is understood as having committed and obliged the divine self to that which is chosen and effected by the divine free will. In the essential freedom of the will, God creates. Consequently, the power of God is freely ordained to that which is freely willed and caused: In other words, in freedom God binds or commits the divine self to creation inasmuch as endeavoring, as source of order and governor of the world, to secure moral order and to realize the purpose for which creation was effected.¹⁴

At issue in this concept is a rarefied sense of necessity.
It is not necessity properly understood as that which externally and causally compels or restrains something or someone to be or not to be, to do or not to do (necessitas praecedens): It is, rather, a logical necessity or, as Anselm puts it, a subsequent necessity (necessitas sequens). An improper sense of necessity can obtain in an instance of a free act of a will, be it divine, angelic, or human. When it does, it is basically the 'necessity' of maintaining the integrity and honor of one's self insofar as carrying through responsibly with that which one intended and willed to do in commitment, covenant, or promise to others. 'Necessary,' here, looks more like a sense of responsible propriety and moral decency that is internally generated. When it obtains, it is a way of 'saving one's face,' as we moderns might put it, or, as Anselm puts it, of not being caught in a lie. It holds equally well with respect to God, as it does for rational creatures.

Anselm is clearly not willing to see or to let God renege on the responsibility that follows God's free choice to create purposefully: The immutability of God's honor and integrity, the unity and simplicity of God's essence 'necessitates' Anselm's resolve. God wills and acts ever in accordance with the immutability of the essence that is supreme goodness and justice. While creation marks in time God's commitment to ontologically distinct beings, it also marks the realization of God's involvement in transcendental ad extra relations. Specifically, it marks the actualization in time of God's commitment to, or covenant with, creatures willed in eternity to merit the reward of being sufficiently happy (like God) in contemplative and loving presence of the transcendent God who is love and self-sufficient beatitude. God is committed to that which God wills, and God acts in respect to that very commitment. God freely wills to begin something with creation, and Anselm in view of his stance on the divine essence and nature is determined to see that God carries to term that which God began: "(L)et us say that it is necessary that God's goodness -- on account of its
immutability -- accomplish with man what it began, even though the entire good which it does is by grace. Whatever it be called -- 'subsequent necessity' or 'grace' -- it is the stuff of divine freedom which founds the *ad extra* relationality of the aseitic Creator-God whose nature, being love, is manifested most fully in merciful justice.

Much has been written about justice in Anselmian thought. There is little need at this point to rehearse the details of its meaning rightness or rectitude, its being specifically a rectitude of the will kept for its own sake, and its being praiseworthy when it is so kept. What is necessary, though, is emphasis on God as the source of that justice, as the origin of that moral rectitude which, when it inheres in the soul (that is, the will) of the rational creature, attests to that creatures's relationship with the God who is rectitude *per se* and who, as such, is the source of order and governor of the world. This inherence basically attests to the just and owed subordination of the rational will of the indebted creature to the will of the gracious and beneficient Creator. When it fails to inhere, it does so because it is freely deserted by the will that fails to keep it perseveringly. Its absence signifies a rupture in the Creator-creature relationship; it tells of a moral disorder in God's kingdom or a thwarting, as it were, of Divine Wisdom's plan for the fulfillment of rational creatures. With such being understood in the Christian account of the Fall, what is a God who is supreme justice to do? What is a wise and good God to do whose handiwork lies in a state of moral disarray? What is the aseitic and perseitic God to do in reestablishing relations with rational creatures who reject the indwelling presence of the sanctifying grace of justice?

A cursory reading of *Cur Deus homo* and several of Anselm's orations might incline one to the view that God, being a harsh and strict judge, is simply inclined to pound the Ciceronian gavel of strict justice: simply to mete out distributively and retributively good things to those who are morally good, and
That this is Anselm's view is most certain, but it is not all of his view. In fact, it cannot be if Anselm truly subscribes to the tenets of salvation history. For, in fact, Anselm's vision of divine justice is not simply juridically forensic, legalistic, or Ciceronian in tone. Owing undoubtedly to Anselm's sensitivity to sacred scripture — most certainly to his regular recitation of the Psalter and his evident appreciation of Paul, his God, who is justice and goodness per se, is a God of merciful justice: In the Hebraic covenantal sense, it is a God who remains ever faithful to and supportive of the chosen people who are guided by and obliged under covenantal law; in the Christian covenantal sense, it is an ever-faithful God who, by means of the satisfactory and justificatory crucifixion of the Incarnate Word, offers redemption to those who have fallen outside the moral parameters of divine ordination and governance. Hence, the justice of God should be seen foremost as a good God's justification of man in the salvific act of the Christ, of the Creator-God in covenantal relation with man: It is the mercy of the loving God who offers recourse to fallen creatures so as to enable them to reenter the fold of a moral relationship with God, to endeavor anew towards the goal for which they have been divinely appointed, and to restore to the honor and integrity of God that which is truly God's and is owed to God. And all of this is the work of an aseitic and perseitic Creator-God who loves.

It is, though, an offer of love that can be refused. Rational creatures, who lack justice of the will, can freely reject the goadings of God's grace. It is a grace that works 'necessarily' among all: It is an actual grace that turns or raises or assists the souls of God's morally wayward creatures for the sake of rendering anew a morally-ordered union with them. Indeed, they might perceive the act of grace: They might hear the revealed word of God as it is preached by those who are commissioned to do so; they, too, might conceptualize the
meanings of the word. But, if their wills do not freely consent to these gracious works — to the word, the preaching, and the cogitation, then these gracious works of God for reunification are rendered ineffective. On the contrary, when creatures will to believe that which they hear, conceptualize, and understand, and do so ultimately with the aid of prevenient grace harmonizing with their free wills, then their faith–relationship with God is restored: It is made aright by a new inbreathing of the grace of justice, of rectitude of the will, into the soul; it is sacramentalized by the regenerative water of Baptism into the redemption of the crucified and resurrected Christ who satisfies the debt which they justly owe to God after having deserted, and thus usurped, that which rightly belongs to God and that which is God.

When the goading of the grace of the loving and ever–faithful God is refused, then the good and just God punishes; when accepted, God spares mercifully. The harmony which Anselm endeavors to discern in Pros., cc. 8–11, between the strict justice and loving mercy of God, must focus squarely on the salvific act of the Second Divine Person and man's freely willed acceptance of and participation in it. Though Anselm does not fully emphasize this point in his famed address to God, I think that, given the importance he later affords to the harmony of man's free will with the gracious offer of salvation, he is able to resolve the Proslogion problematic which he poses: that is, how a good and just God punishes some who are evil and yet spares others, and why God gives good things to those who, from our perspective, are wicked and guilty.

The loving mercy which flows from the goodness of the one and simple God, a goodness which is never without justice, thus making it a mercy which always accords with justice, is offered to the morally recalcitrant, one and all. Man's experience of the essential confluence of God's goodness and justice in the Christ, in whom the demands of strict justice for satisfaction are met and occasioned by an impassible God for
whom it is just (right) to be good,¹⁹³ is the experience of the mercy of God. The opportunity to experience is given to all, but is not accepted by all: When the grace of justice is received but rejected, when Baptismal participation in the satisfying deed of the Christ is offered but refused, then it would seem, by dint of Anselm's own insistence on the strict justice of God, that such a justice should prevail in light of man's free choice not to experience the love of a good God who desires reconciliation.¹⁹⁴ Hence, God can be said to spare mercifully some evil doers because they freely accept God's offer of justification; God can punish others retributively because they freely reject it. With respect to the former, it is a case of God's merciful justice; with the latter, of God's strict justice. In both cases, it is actually the one and simple God who is per se justice and goodness.¹⁹⁵ The crucial difference between the two cases which seemingly present the view of a disjunctive and incoherent God lies not in God per se but in the free will of man who responds to God.¹⁹⁶

Scholarly attention has focused on the Prologion problematic and the supposed tension between God's justice and mercy. The question of how to resolve it has correctly focused on Anselm's view of divine goodness mediating, as it were, between divine justice and mercy.¹⁹⁷ Such a focus necessitates consideration of Anselm's soteriological positions, as Professors Cattin, Heyer, and Adams¹⁹⁸ have rightly reckoned. And yet, my own reading of Pros., cc. 8-11, does not suggest that Anselm's attempt to understand how a just God can be merciful, or a merciful God just, is all that troublesome or "difficult to understand"¹⁹⁹ provided we bear two points in mind: first, the fact of the unity and simplicity of God's essence, and then, the fact that this God lovingly deals with willy-nilly creatures.

God's mercy is properly understood from the side of man who experiences it in salvation history.²⁰⁰ God, being impassible, is not secundum se merciful, even though we speak of God as being merciful! But, God is merciful secundum nos, the graced
recipients, who fundamentally opt to experience the goodness of the just Creator-God. In love, the good and omnipotent²⁰ God meets the demands of strict justice which no fallen man can but every fallen man must in order to reestablish the rightful bonds or rectitude of moral order between the Triune Creator and creature, between the ontologically transcendent and contingent, between the condescending God who is love and man who was created to love with purposeful and ascending endeavor. The merciful justice of the one and simple Triune God who is love, who is per se 'that God is' and 'what God is,' attests to God's ad extra relationality: It is sufficient reason alone for questioning the contemporary claim against the positive aspect of aseity.

Conclusion

Aseity's positive emphasis on the self-sufficiency of God does not preclude ad extra relationality: It simply grounds conceptually the ontological uniqueness, transcendence, and independence of the Creator vis-à-vis the ontological dependence of creatures. Given the unity and simplicity of God's essence, of the God whose existence per se is divine essence, all that is to be understood about God is to be reckoned in terms of divine aseity or perseity: The idea that God is self-sufficient and self-sustaining respects more than just divine existence; it pertains to every attribute that is predicable of God — all of which are essential. And this includes justice. God is self-sufficient and self-sustaining unto the divine self with respect to being just, nay, to being justice in and of itself. If the justice of the one and simple Creator-God bespeaks ad extra relationality, and it does biblically, patristically, and scholastically (at least in Anselm), then aseity in its positive aspect is not the relational problematic that it is supposed to be by certain contemporary philosophers of religion. What is problematic is the contemporary supposition itself and what I think is the pivotal and much overlooked point for discussion of
God's relations with creatures.

Consideration needs to shift from aseity to the freedom of the ontologically-unique, omnipotent, and Triune God who condescends in love: to the freedom of the God who acts eternally in accordance with the divine nature that is love. Freedom is the pivotal point for any understanding of the ad extra relationality of God -- of the God who chooses to create and who, ipso facto, chooses to engage rational creatures in meaningful relations. The essentially one and simple God freely chooses to become relational ad extra. Such an understanding and consideration need not come at the expense of dispensing with God's aseity and, thus, of reorienting discourse on God into some form of ontological egalitarianism with creatures.
Section 2
Justice and the Created Rational Being: On the Question of Moral Knowledge in Anselmian Thought

Introduction

A considerable question arises from the twelfth chapter of De veritate. While Anselm defines and refines the ethical concept of justice as a species of truth and rectitude, he unwittingly begets an unanswered query: How is one able to know or come to know one's moral debitum or that which one ought or ought not to do? The answer is relevant and important to a holistic Anselmian theodicy. For this reason alone, it is necessary to see how he might have answered.

Answering on Anselm's behalf is neither easy nor direct. I shall maintain, if only tentatively, that he might have been a proponent of innate moral knowledge and moral intuition. To arrive at this claim I shall undertake a four-part, gradual, and linear course: first, a consideration of Anselm's concepts of justice and debitum, followed by an appreciation of the unanswered question which arises therefrom; second, a view of several Anselmian clues which point to possible answers; third, a speculative construction of an answer which, in view of Anselm's juxtaposition of linguistics and ethics, figures as a sensitive translation of his verbal epistemology into a moral epistemology; and, finally, a justification of the speculation by appeal to the teleology and psychology of the rational creature as a trinitarian image of God.

A)
Ethical Concepts of Justice and Debitum; the Question of Moral Knowledge Established

While examining De veritate, one might see that Anselm does not reject the notion of logical truth as expressed in the Aristotelian-Boethian correspondence theory. For him, though,
truth is not simply a logical or linguistic matter; words and statements alone are not the only signifiers of truth. Along with logical expressions, there are also the ontological and ethical.² Truth can be conveyed and signified by a vast array of signs: words³ and statements indeed, but also thoughts, senses, wills, actions, as well as the beings of all things (essentiae rerum). These expressions and signs do not suggest that Anselm is proffering a multitude of truths, each distinct unto itself. To the contrary, there is but one truth whence the truth of anything and everything is derived and gauged.⁴ That supreme truth is God, the one and eternal standard. If, in fact, anything or any sign is true, it is such ultimately because of its relation or correspondence with supreme truth. Whether it be a logical, ontological, or ethical expression or sign, the truth of anything, excepting the Divine, is always relational.⁵ Theocentricity pervades Anselm's theory of truth, a theory which embraces all of reality; it too undergirds truth's correlative notion of rectitude (rectitudo).

According to Anselm, truth is best defined as rectitude: precisely a rightness or correctness that is perceptible to the mind alone.⁶ Indeed, truth is nothing else but rectitude.⁷ Every consideration of every created expression or sign of truth is linked by Anselm to the concept of rectitude. And this in turn is grounded, though not with respect to the supreme truth or rectitude, in the theocentric notion of debitum.⁸

Whatever can be considered on this side of creation, whether it be a statement, thought, action, or being, et cetera, a certain 'oughtness' or obligation (debitum) prevails upon it. The obligation of anything in creation, including the rational being, is to be or to do that which it was created or divinely intended to be or to do.⁹ There is one point and only one point which governs the extent to which anything signifies truth -- it is that thing's debitum before God which bespeaks the purpose for which it was created. Thus, when Anselm speaks of the truth of anything as being that thing's correctness, rightness, or proper
ordering, it must be understood that he is effectively stating that the truth of anything is fundamentally its rectitude as established in the divine mind and as set forth originally in creation by the divine will. If anything is to be considered true or right, regardless of whether that truth or rectitude is expressed logically in statements and thoughts, ontologically in the being of all creation, or ethically in actions, senses, or wills, it is true or right by virtue of its accordance with and conformity to the ordering of the Creator: Something is true because it is right and correct, it is right and correct when it signifies what it ought to be or what it ought to do according to the divine mind and will. And, so, truth in any expression or sign is therefore ultimately a matter of the fulfillment of its debitum before God -- before the supreme truth and rectitude that is the paradigmatic first "cause of all other truths and rightnesses."

This sense of debitum, which is a cornerstone of Anselmian theology, is particularly pronounced in c. 12 of De veritate where Anselm methodically endeavors to define and to refine a certain species of truth: Justice (justitia), being the cornerstone of Anselmian ethics, is truth and rectitude that principally involves two signs: the will and the actions of a created rational being. The debitum which is so central to an understanding of Anselmian justice is not only ethically significant, it is also epistemologically weighted: The obligation of a rational creature before God is partly a function of that person's knowledge of that which ought to be done. It is this epistemological emphasis underlying the moral debitum and a person's rectitude of the will and actions that gives rise to the unanswered question of moral knowledge. Anselm clarifies it in his twofold attempt to define justice -- first, broadly, and then, specifically, as a normative ethical foundation.

When he and his student set out in DV, c. 12, to define justice they arrive initially at a rather broad conception of it: Justice is simply truth. They reason that that which is true is
also that which is right, and if something is right, then it is
customarily called 'just.' It seems though that for theological
reasons Anselm must understand justice primarily as a form of
rightness. He reasons that since truth and justice are
considered identical in the supreme being, and since truth and
rectitude are conceptually linked and originate in the Divine,
then justice must be understood as a form of rectitude.
Conceivably, if such a broad understanding of justice as simply
truth or rightness were left to stand without further
specification, then the notion could conceivably encompass and be
predicated of the being and actions of all things: Justice could
be said of any and all inanimate or animate beings, with or
without a rational will, provided all properly signify that which
they ought to be or ought to do. The possibility is problematic:
For in Anselm's view, neither a stone, nor a horse, nor their
actions should be called 'just' because such an appellation would
not agree with the customary use of the word. Hence, the
definition of justice must be refined and narrowed.

In reconsidering the definition, Anselm relies upon an
important comparison and distinction between the actions of a
stone and a horse and those of a man; he then emphasizes the
difference between the two: For a stone or horse, as in the case
of all irrational beings with or without a will, actions are said
to be natural or instinctual. That is, the actions are true or
right by virtue of the nature of the being: They possess a
necessary or natural truth: These beings cannot help but to be
the way they are or to act the way they do. In the case of a
rational being, some actions are indeed natural, as in the case
of bodily organic functions: If the bodily organs do that which
they are naturally ordained to do, then they are true or right by
nature. However, as Anselm quickly suggests, sundry actions of
rational beings are governed and driven not by nature but rather
by a rational will. In contradistinction to the inanimate being
or the animate one with an irrational will, the rational being
acts freely and voluntarily: He wills and acts by reason and
free choice. In view of this point, Anselm is wont to speak of a truth or rectitude of actions that is accidental, non-natural, or non-necessary. Voluntary rational actions, only if correct or right, are said to possess such an accidental or non-natural truth. These actions and the accidental truth which they are able to possess make up the important distinction that enables Anselm to refine and narrow the concept of justice.²⁰

With the distinction between the natural and accidental truth of actions before him, Anselm is able to put the broader conception of justice aside. He is able to narrow the notion and compass of justice to the point where it embraces only a certain category of actions that can be praised as just. Effectively, he circumscribes justice exclusively to the realm of voluntary or accidental or non-necessary actions of rational beings. Those actions that are natural or instinctual to a being are undoubtedly just in the broad sense of the term if, in fact, they signify that which ought to be or that which ought to be done. Anselm does not deny or dispute the point. However, such actions are not to be praised for being just.

Praiseworthy justice pertains to and is said only of those actions which are driven by the ability of free choice in the rational will of a created being who is mentally able to perceive rectitude²¹ and is able to act upon it and will it for its own sake.²² Note the psychological and epistemological dimensions of this refined sense of justice: in the justice that counts morally. Praiseworthy justice is rectitude or truth of a moral dimension: Definitively, this justice is a "rectitude of the will kept for its own sake."²³ It is a rectitude which translates into or is signified by one's voluntary actions. And, as is the case with all forms of rectitude or truth, praiseworthy justice is not without its own sense of debitum. In particular, the rational being's moral obligation is emphasized in two of the four necessary conditions for the attainment of justice or rectitude in the will. Both convey and confirm the important, but unexplicated, point that the fulfillment of one's debitum
before God and of willing and acting justly is partly a function of having moral knowledge or knowing that which one ought to do.

If one's actions are to be called praiseworthy, the 'quid' and 'cur' conditions for willing justly must obtain: That is, satisfaction must be made with respect to that which one ought to will and with respect to the motive or reason for why one ought to will it.24 As Anselm clearly states:

Even as every will wills something, so it wills for the sake of something. And just as we must consider what it wills, so we must also notice why it wills. For a will ought to be upright in willing what it ought and, no less, in willing for the reason it ought. Therefore, every will has both a what and a why. Indeed, whatsoever we will, we will for a reason.25

That which one should will ('quid') is precisely and simply rectitude; the reason ('cur') for willing it is simply for the sake of rectitude alone, which basically means for the sake of supreme rectitude or God. In order for one to will rectitude or to will a just action, that is, to meet the requirement of the 'quid' condition, one must clearly know rectitude or, basically, know one's moral debitum. On these points Anselm is perfectly clear and concise:26 Justice does not inhere in the will unless one knows rectitude or that which one ought to do.27 If one does not know rectitude or one's debitum, then one cannot will it and hence translate it into actions. If one cannot will rectitude, then one's actions cannot be called 'just' or be praised as just: An action is just only when it is performed by the just will of one who possesses a foundational knowledge of what is true and right.

In sum, based on this view of De veritate, it seems virtually impossible for anyone's rational will or actions to signify truth and rectitude if one cannot or does not satisfy the 'quid' condition. From Anselm's perspective on justice, being ethical and acting ethically is virtually impossible unless one satisfies the necessary requirement of knowing the moral rectitude which must undergird one's voluntary actions in
fulfillment of one's obligation before God. Given this emphasis, the question of moral knowledge unequivocally arises: How does any rational being at the age of understanding become cognitively aware of the moral debitum so as to preserve uprightness (rectitude) or justice (truth) in the will and to manifest it truly in actions that are correctly motivated? Simply put, how does one arrive at moral knowledge?

B)

Three Anselmian Clues for an Anselmian Response to the Question of Moral Knowledge

Subtle clues present themselves and suggest how an Anselmian answer might best be formulated and delivered.

Anselm's emphasis on three interchangeable abstract terms -- 'truth,' 'rectitude,' and 'justice' -- gives the first clue. Knowledge of one term can be inferred from knowledge of the other. Truth is rectitude, rectitude is justice, justice is truth: If one knows one, then one knows the other two. One point seems to presuppose this reasoning: If one's knowledge of truth, justice, or rectitude singly yields knowledge of the other two, and if such notions individually bespeak the supreme and simple divine essence whence they originate, as Anselm contends, then one's ethical life, founded upon an inhering justice of the will, would seem to rest ultimately upon one's knowledge of God. The implication is that knowledge of one's moral debitum could conceivably be obtained from the complex interplay of revelation, evangelical ministry, belief, and the grace of God in an individual's faith-oriented life. Indeed, it is. Pursuit of God within the support system of an ecclesiastical Faith will yield knowledge of God, if only knowledge of God's will. This is clearly Anselm's point in De concordia.

The second clue, which bears the same theocentric emphasis, lies in Anselm's 'cur' condition for the attainment of an inhering justice of the will. As conveyed in De veritate and
corroborated elsewhere in the Anselmian corpus, the sense of this condition includes a certain concentration: Anselm's insistence that rectitude of the will be kept for its own sake anticipates, in my view, the Kierkegaardian emphasis on a single-minded concentration which alone should found one's purity of heart or will. It is a theological, faith-imbued emphasis. For Anselm, like Kierkegaard, the single-minded focus of one's life and the solely acceptable and governing motivation underlying one's will and actions is God; one's single-minded deference to the supreme source of rectitude should alone goad one's will to act. There should be no other principal focus, reason, or motivation but to uphold and to conform willingly to the divine ordering or rectitude of all things as willed in the divine mind. Justice inhere in the will when one wills that which God wills one to will. On these points it is clear that Anselm's 'cur' condition elucidates the matter of his 'quid' condition: It becomes clear that that which a just will wills is precisely that which is the will of God. One's awareness of God and knowledge of the divine will could affect one's knowledge of one's debitum before God.

In view of the preceding clues, one could easily settle upon the basic argument of DC, III, c. 6, and offer a simple and definitive response to the question of moral knowledge: Knowledge of one's moral debitum can be obtained simply by turning to, hearing, and then discerning the meaning of the Word of God in sacred scripture. After all, scripture "invites a man to will rightly." It is the wherewithal that enables one to conceive thoughts and to effect volitions which are conducive to one's spiritual salvation. But this response would be a bit hasty for scripture does not constitute the only "seed" of willing rightly. Alongside the Word of God, one must also discern the sense or understanding of rectitude (sensus vel intellectus rectitudinis). Such a necessary discernment can be attained or conceived (concipere) via many modes: either 1) through hearing the Word, or 2) through reading the Word, or 3)
through reasoning (per rationem), or 4) through unspecified other ways (quolibet alio modo).38

Modes three and four provide leeway for considering a more philosophical and less faith-oriented response to the question of moral knowledge. The third mode is of central importance: Reason holds a preeminent epistemological position in Anselmian ethical thought. Its ability for discerning truth and rectitude is nearly equal, but subordinate, to sacred scripture's expression of it.39 And the unspecified fourth mode might very well be specified: Along with reason, innate moral knowledge or moral intuition could very well constitute the combined means for discerning the rectitude or justice that is essential to willing and acting rightly. Modes three and four, together, could very well be the means by which one is able to know one's moral debitum or that which one ought or ought not to do in order to maintain justice of the will. This is my claim.

Corroboration of this claim lies in a third and final clue. Obscure and tenuous though it may be, its obscurity is not so pervasive that it excludes any possible interpretation.40 It lies in DV, c. 9, which has conceptual links to cc. 2, 5, 12, and 13.

My interpretation marks the link which Anselm forges between linguistics and ethics. Discussion of the natural and accidental truths of an action in DV, cc. 5 and 12,41 parallels his discussion of the natural and accidental truths of a statement in c. 2. Therein, the natural truth of a statement is considered that which is always present and fixed by virtue of the statement's syntactic and semantic coherence or, in other words, its proper formation. Such a coherence sets up, so to speak, or poises or readies the statement for signifying something; that is, it establishes the statement's capability for signifying. The natural truth and capability of a statement is not in any way affected or diminished by the statement's actual signification of something. In other words, the statement can in fact be used to signify something either correctly or incorrectly, but either way
its natural truth and capability remain unaffected and inviolate. When the statement happens to signify correctly that which it is designed to signify or ought to signify, then it is said to possess an accidental truth along with its natural truth. The accidentally true statement signifies that 'that-which-is' is and 'that-which-is-not' is not. In a certain sense, this notion of accidental truth, which suffices as a reality check of some sort, simply reflects Anselm's acknowledgment of the traditional correspondence theory. Only when the statement possesses accidental truth can it be said to have the truth of signification: It then possesses the rectitude of signification because it signifies that which it ought to signify and it does so correctly.

In DV, c. 9, Anselm resumes this discussion of the truth of signification, but the focus shifts from linguistics to ethics: from statements to actions. Here, he draws a parallel between the truth of signification in a statement and that same truth in an action: in other words, a parallel between the natural and accidental truths of a statement and those of an action. Clearly, the context of this chapter dictates that Anselm is concerned only with accidental actions of the voluntary sort. That is, he is concerned with non-necessary or non-natural actions of rational beings: actions with a moral dimension: voluntary actions judicable or not as praiseworthy and just. One of Anselm's two parallels is expressed thus:

Let us see, then how extensive the truth of signification is. For there is a true or a false signification not only in those things which we ordinarily call signs [i.e., statements], but also in all the other things which we have discussed. For since someone should do only what he ought to do, then [Point 1] by the very fact that someone does something, he says and signifies that he ought to do it. Now [Point 2], if [morally speaking] he ought to do what he does, he speaks the truth. But if [morally speaking] he ought not [to do what he does], he speaks a lie.4

What is most noteworthy here is this: In order to expound on the truth of the signification of actions and to maintain the
parallel between actions and statements, Anselm must classify voluntary actions according to the very same categories of natural and accidental truths under which he classifies statements. He indeed renders this classification, if only implicitly and not very clearly.

In short, what is happening in DV, c. 9, is this: Anselm wants to claim that voluntary rational actions have natural and accidental truths just like statements. At 'point one,' he presumably wants to see every voluntary action from a conceptual standpoint as that which is set up, so to speak, or poised or readied to signify something. The action is capable of signifying what ought or ought not to be done. Insofar as 'being capable,' or simply being a 'being,' the action possesses a natural truth like that of a statement. At 'point two,' when the action has presumably been effected so that it signifies that which it was designed or intended to signify, the action is said to possess an accidental truth, provided it signifies correctly. When the action possesses such, it has the truth of signification: It possesses rectitude of signification because it signifies that which ought to be.

Anselm's aim in paralleling statements and actions is best summarized in one point: He wants to think of an action as a form of speaking. When one acts, one speaks morally. One's voluntary action is a moral statement or word of some sort. An action itself can speak just as clearly, if not more clearly and instructively, as any vocalized word or statement. His example of the poisonous herbs is suggestive of the point. Like every word and statement, an action is meant to signify something, and it does -- either correctly or incorrectly. Here, at least, is the first indication of an Anselmian link between linguistics and ethics.

This conceptual link, forged between statements and actions, between linguistics and ethics, can be viewed from two other standpoints. Both pave the way for the third stage of this essay where I attempt to see how Anselm's verbal epistemology
translates into a moral epistemology.

C)

Speculative Construction and Translation of Anselmian Thought:
From a Verbal to a Moral Epistemology

First standpoint: According to Anselm, the truth of each
and every sign in creation is ontologically grounded. This is
the expressed view of DV, c. 13. His conception of the truth of
signification figures as a very broad category or conceptual
umbrella under which he places every conceivable sign whether it
be of the logical, ontological, or ethical expressions of truth:
It is the conceptual means by which he is able to link everything
that is capable of signifying truth, basically all of creation,
to the supreme truth. The truth of anything and everything is
ultimately derived from and 'participates' in this one and
eternal source: Every sign is naturally capable of signifying
something, but the rightness or correctness of that sign's
signification is only established "in accordance with rightness
which always exists." The common ground and standard of all
true and right signs, including words, statements, and actions,
is God. The logical/linguistic truth of a word or statement and
the ethical truth of an action are identical inasmuch as
proceeding from the same ontological and transcendent source of
truth.

Second standpoint: By stepping away from De veritate and
turning to Anselm's linguistic theory in the Monologion, it
becomes clear that the ontological connection between words and
God is firmly established and pronounced. But now the
pronouncement receives a very clear epistemological accent.
The foundation of all natural languages, the basis of all words
and hence of all statements comprising them, is what Anselm calls
"natural words" (verba naturalia).

Being universal and recognizable to the minds of all
rational language-users, natural words are related to and
identified with the conceptual expression (rationis locutio) eternally and immutably existing in the divine mind. This expression, being nothing but the understanding (intelligentia) of the one and simple God by which all things are understood, is the idea or form, the standard or principle, according to which God creates all things. It exists in the divine mind before creation and, as Anselm claims, it exists presently in the rational creature’s mind as natural words implanted by God. These words, as I want to understand them in Anselm, bear the sense of an innate knowledge or an Augustinian sense of innate ideas or truths.

All rational beings possess natural words; they suffice as the foundation not only of all languages but also of the knowledge of all things. Alone they necessarily suffice for recognizing (cognoscere) an object; they alone are the proper and principal words for objects: They are the definitive expressions of an object. Yet, neither natural words nor the divine conceptual expression whence they derive are "words which are significative of things." They do, however, bear a similarity or resemblance to those objects for which they are natural words. This is so inasmuch as being at once the ontological, metaphysical, and epistemological foundation of the ordinary and customary words of Anselm’s linguistic theory.

Now, if Anselm wants to consider moral actions as a form of speaking, then he must agree that moral speaking shares the same foundation in natural words as do all other forms of speaking. By juxtaposing the truth of signification of statements and actions, by considering actions as a form of speaking, and by introducing his core ethical concepts — justice and debitum — into a treatise replete with linguistic significance, Anselm implicitly suggests consideration of the question of moral knowledge within the parameters of his verbal epistemology.

If the implied suggestion is correct, then two minor points must be reckoned.

First minor point: A small problem arises at the center of
Anselm's verbal epistemology: It concerns his notion of 'word' (verbum) and the referent of a word. In the Monologion, Anselm is almost exclusively focused on words that signify a concrete reality or material object. Aside from those words corresponding to the first and second levels of speaking, even natural words on the third level are emphasized as referring to material things: When one inwardly and mentally speaks a thing on the third level of speaking, one beholds (intueri) that thing by means of an image of its corporeal nature or by means of understanding its definition or essence. If Anselm's claim that moral actions are a form of speaking is to be taken seriously, and I think it should be, then his notion of 'verbum' needs to be considered closely in order to determine if actions can be classified thereunder.

In this regard, it should be noted that for Anselm every word (verbum) is a sign. It signifies something; thus, the word has meaning (significatio). Words, though, are not simply words as we generally and commonly understand them in our linguistic sense. Anselm's use and understanding of the term 'verbum' in the Monologion is rather varied. A verbum can be an alphabetic symbol; it can also be a thought, a mental or sensory image (imago), or a likeness (similitudo) of something. Yet, the question before us is whether an action can be understood as a verbum without erring from the linguistic theory of the Monologion. Anselm's delineation of three levels of speaking with three corresponding types of words (verba) and epistemological processes suggests the affirmative. Unfortunately though, he clearly explains only one word-type, namely, natural words on the third level of speaking (intueri). Words on the second level of speaking (cogitare) are simply noted as thoughts and mental or sensory images of things silently spoken in the mind. On the first level of speaking (sentire/dicere), the class of words is rather broad and open so as, presumably, to encompass a vast range of perceptible signs, perceptibly employed or vocally uttered. If an action is to be considered a verbum, it
would seem that, for two reasons, it would have to be categorized under the first level of speaking: First, actions are sensibly perceived (a point which does not deny that they can be intellectually perceived or thought); and second, in De veritate, Anselm clearly considers an action to be a sign, whether it be natural or accidental. Given the Monologion claim that every verbum is a sign, and the assumption that a sign is a verbum, an action must figure as such.

Second minor point: Every sign signifies something: Every sign has a referent. Actions as words or signs, however, do not seem to square with the Monologion's preoccupation with words having concrete or material referents. It is generally difficult to think of the referent of a voluntary action as being concrete. Indeed, it is easier to think of the action itself as being concrete, rather than its referent or that which the voluntary action signifies. If it can be assumed for the sake of argument that an action signifies first and foremost the reason, motivation, or purpose that impels a creature to act in some manner in the first place, then it can be maintained that the referent of an action as verbum or sign is immaterial.

Assuredly, immaterial referents of words are not altogether excluded from the Monologion's consideration. Indeed, De veritate implicitly confirms that which the Monologion seemingly overlooks: that words in any Anselmian sense need not always have concrete referents. In both treatises, Anselm's discussion of qualities and abstract concepts such as truth, rectitude, and justice evidence the point. Furthermore, given that some verba do have immaterial referents, if natural words figure as the foundation of all languages, then natural words are not merely the metaphysical-ontological-epistemological foundation for knowing concrete things. For voluntary rational actions, particularly those possessing the truth of signification, the referent is not extra-mental or concrete, but rather intra-mental and ultimately, in the fullest Anselmian sense, trans-mental. That is, the immaterial referent of a true and right voluntary
action as verbum, of an action that enjoys the truth of
signification, is ultimately due to the truth and rectitude of
the transcendent God. Such is the case by way of natural words
in an epistemological process -- the verbal emphasis of which is
to be thus translated into a moral emphasis. Though
speculative, the translation provides a way of philosophically
answering the question of moral knowledge.

The first point to consider is this: In Anselm's verbal
epistemology the verbum or action at the first-level of speaking
does not in itself beget or effect knowledge. This is so because
the action itself is not within the "mental vision" (intuitu
cognitionis). Thus, the action has no immediate and
autonomous cognitive value. In order for the mind to know any
first-level verbum, an epistemological advance must be made from
the first level of speaking, that of sentire/dicere, to the
second level, that of cogitare. In other words, the mind must
advance from sensory perception to reasoning.

The cognitive link between the voluntary action as a verbum
and its referent is established through a distinct mental
process: First, the mind (mens) must form a mental or sensory
image or likeness, or thought, of the action it desires to know
or to think (cogitare) morally. The image of the perceptible
action can be formed either through sensory imagination
(imaginatio corporis), provided there is an actual perceptible
action, or it can be formed through reason (ratio) itself insofar
as retrieving from memory a stored mental or sensory image of the
action under consideration. At this point, the mind has
advanced the action from a first-level word, a perceptible sign,
to a second-level word where the action is being thought. The
word is now engaged in a process of cognition. Presumably, that
which is happening at this point when the mind attempts to think
(cogitare) about the perceptible sign is something seemingly akin
to a process of discursive reasoning. The rational mind
analyzes and evaluates, synthesizes, and then renders a judgment
on the action under its consideration: Essentially, it renders a
judgment on the action's moral rectitude and arrives at knowledge of the truth of signification obtaining between the action as word or sign and its intention or motivation as referent. Even though the mind reasons to a judgment based on a sensory or mental image which it has formed directly from sensory perception or has retrieved from memory, the correctness or incorrectness of the judgment does not stem directly from this imaged information. As Anselm notes in DV, c. 5, the senses are always true; they do not deceive. Errors in judgment are on the side of reasoning and, therefore, so are the instances of correctness and incorrectness. Just how the mind secures its judgments and knowledge of moral rectitude is a query that leads to the next important stage in Anselm's verbal-moral epistemological process: memory.

Whether the rational mind begins to think about an action by means of sensory imagination or by reason tapping memory for a stored image, the cognitive process which ends in judgment and knowledge of truth and rectitude always includes an appeal to and employment of memory: Every word is brought forth from it. The senses do play a role in the epistemological process, but they alone do not constitute a sufficient condition or an essential criterion for knowledge. The mind can obtain knowledge of something without necessarily employing the senses: The fact that the mind can form a mental image or thought of an immaterial object, as for example the mind's own image of itself, illustrates the point.

Epistemological priority is given to memory over and above sensory perception: Knowledge is secured on the side of memory with the accompaniment of reason. Yet, in spite of memory's importance, Anselm fails to express much about it. Brief remarks in Mon, c. 48, and in his treatment of the First Person of the Trinity as eternal memory exhaust his consideration. A more complete understanding of his position might be secured indirectly; indeed, it must be if the moral emphasis of his verbal epistemology is to be realized. To this end, it is
beneficial to look at Augustine. Justification for such an approach lies in Anselm's self-proclaimed and orthodox alignment with his forerunner's De trinitate.75

For Augustine, memory is not simply the mnemonic ability of the soul. It too is a storehouse of innate knowledge: It houses the principal ideas, forms, reasons, or truths which are perceived by the soul's highest faculty.76 These ideas are beheld by the mind's eye: They are like a word in the mind, perceived by the mind, and begotten from the mind when internally spoken, but always remaining in the mind; they precede every thought or action that is brought forth from a rational being.77 Indeed, these ideas or truths are present and common to all who are willing to meditate upon them,78 and are the material, so to speak, by which the reason is able to judge and to distinguish truly: The immutable truth, Augustine claims, is "present and shows itself as a kind of miraculously secret, yet public, light for all who see what is immutably true."79 In sum, they constitute for Augustine true knowledge of all things.80 In moral terms, innate ideas and truths are the epistemological foundation which enables the mind to know and to understand such things as justice and injustice.81 They are the immutable standards, the "inner rules of truth," for judging and distinguishing correctly82 and, thus, for arriving at knowledge; they are the standards by which all things exist and by which the rational being acts according to truth and right reason.83 Augustine held firmly to an understanding of an inner truth which each and every person bears in the soul's memory: This very truth is the highest teacher of all; it teaches one and all.84

In view of Augustine's perspective and by sheer dint of interpretative reasoning, this is what is happening for Anselm with memory on the second level of speaking (cogitare):

In the rational mind's attempt to arrive at judgment and to secure knowledge of the rectitude of an action, the mind shifts discursively from the second level of speaking, cogitare, to the third level of speaking, intueri. In doing so, reason shifts to
what the mind beholds in memory, the content of which presumably includes more than just mental and sensory images. It includes natural words: the foundation of Anselm's verbal epistemology, the word-type corresponding to his third level of speaking. Now, if Anselm's own regard for Augustine should be fully esteemed, then it is probably the case that his natural words should be thought to approximate Augustine's innate ideas and truths in memory. And, although Anselm does not explicitly state anything to this effect, he would also probably side with Augustine in separating that which is innate in the memory from the sensory and mental images that are acquired and stored in it.

Natural words, inasmuch as being the images of the conceptual expression of the divine mind, are the innate images (verba/words) of eternal and immutable knowledge of the God who is truth, rectitude, and justice per se. By virtue of the mind's ability to behold (intueri) or intuit these innate images, the rational mind has ready access to morally-significant words. The mind's eye intuitively beholds images of eternal and immutable knowledge which are employed in the mind's own discursive attempt to reason to a judgment on the rectitude of an action, on the truth of the signification of a voluntary action. Natural words of truth, rectitude, and justice effectively suffice as the inner standards and measures by which reason is able to judge an action in terms of its moral rectitude.

Thus, the question of one's moral knowledge or of knowing one's moral debitum is answered. Alongside justice as the normative foundation of an Anselmian ethics, there is foundationally an innate moral knowledge or sense of what is morally right and wrong. It aids and abets the actualization of the norm in one's being and in the affairs of one's existence.
A Justification of the Speculation and Translation: 
The Teleology of the Rational Creature 
as a Trinitarian Psychological Image

That natural words suffice for the mind's moral discernment, 
and that the rational being enjoys an innate moral knowledge or 
moral intuition: Both points are corroborated in consideration 
of the purpose for which the rational being was created. 
Anselm's position elucidates the ethical role of reason and 
seemingly necessitates his espousal of an innate moral knowledge 
that is universal and common to all. This claim is strengthened 
in view of his stance on the trinitarian image of the created 
rational soul.

Like Augustine before him, Anselm affords a preeminent 
position to reason as a cornerstone, as the master of the ethical 
life: Reason "ought to be," he claims, "the ruler and judge of 
all that is man." Aside from being the means by which 
rectitude of the will and actions is understood, reason also 
teaches rectitude. It teaches not only justice, but also that 
justice ought to be maintained for its own sake, and that it 
ought to be preferred to anything that is contrary to it.

Hence, it is generally inconceivable for either the human or 
angelic mind to understand that which ought to be done, or for 
the human or angelic reason to teach rectitude, unless the 
rational mind of both beings is privy to a foundational 
knowledge, natural and innate, from which it can proceed to an 
understanding and to which it can refer when teaching! It must 
be that reason works towards a discernment of truth, rectitude, 
and justice: It must be that reason is able to teach, because it 
has access to a foundational knowledge of truth, rectitude, and 
j ustice, such as that imaged by natural words and stored in 
memory.

Moreover, the link between reason and innate moral knowledge 
or natural words is suggested, if not necessitated, by Anselm's
position on the raison d'être of the rational being with a trinitarian soul.

As Anselm sees it, the basic reason for God's creation of rational beings is that they should "love above all other goods the supreme being, which is the supreme good." Towards fulfilling this ethical end, reason serves by virtue of its ability "to distinguish what is just from what is unjust, what is true from what is not true, what is good from what is not good, what is better from what is worse." Rational beings have been endowed with such an ability in order that they should desire and opt for the supreme good over any and all lesser goods. Clearly, it is an endowment with an ethical purpose: The rational mind of man or angel is most rational when it makes moral distinctions. But one cannot desire and love or will that supreme good which one is supposed to desire and to love if one is not equipped to understand or simply does not remember and understand that which ought to be distinguished.

Like Augustine before him, Anselm holds that the creature's rational soul is an image of the Trinity, of the Triune God of memory, understanding, and love/will. In possessing natural abilities to remember (reminisci), to understand (intelligere), and to love (amare), the soul realizes them maximally when it endeavors towards the supreme good over and above all other goods:

...there cannot at all be thought to have been naturally bestowed upon the rational creature anything as excellent and as similar to the supreme wisdom as is the ability to remember, to understand, and to love that which is the greatest and best of all."

By virtue of this imaging of divine abilities, the soul is able to strive towards knowledge of the supreme good and supreme wisdom. Indeed, the rational being is obliged to do so, according to both Anselm and Augustine. One can only arrive at the moral end if one strives towards the fullest and most harmonious employment of these abilities: That is, one must strive to remember and to understand in addition to loving and
In sum, this is the *raison d'être* of the rational being.

Full appreciation of Anselm's vision of the soul as an image of divine memory, understanding, and love demands consideration of his trinitarian theology. Only then does it become certain that he had to subscribe to innate moral knowledge or moral intuition -- indeed, to 'something' that could be remembered and understood so as to enable the rational being, as an image of the Triune God, to employ his God-given natural abilities towards realizing his divinely-intended moral end.

Inasmuch as imaging the First Person as memory, the Second Person as understanding, and the Third Person as love/will, the created rational soul of natural abilities images the eternal relation of Divine Persons. If the soul's ability to understand and to reason is to be an image of the Second Person who is the perfect image and understanding of the truth and knowledge of the First Person who is eternal memory, then the creature's imaging of divine understanding in his natural, but imperfect, ability to understand should include a relation to his own memory and should likewise include an imaging of that which is understood by the Second Person in his imaging of the First. A rational creature's understanding and reason must enter into a relation with memory. Something must be retrievable from memory if his memory itself is to be an image of the First Person. Such is seen to obtain in view of Anselm's verbal-moral epistemology.

Natural words in memory suffice in establishing and securing the relation between the creature's understanding (reason) and memory: In the created rational mind, natural words are required as the images (words) of the First Person's eternal and immutable truth and knowledge which is perfectly understood by the Second Person, and which must be understood to some degree by the creature if he is to image, though imperfectly, the Second Person in relation to the First Person. With natural words themselves stored in memory, the ability images the First Person with respect to that Person's being eternal remembrance of truth and
knowledge. In the harmonization of natural abilities, the creature is truly an image of God.\textsuperscript{104}

The natural words of Anselm's verbal epistemology are required for the rational being because of his trinitarian theology and his vision of the creature as an image of the Triune God. If such a requirement is not satisfied, then his view of the soul as a trinitarian image, his vision of the soul (itself of relational powers/abilities [vis]) in relation to the Divine Triune Relation, is compromised. Otherwise put: The harmonization of the creature's natural abilities, a concord which bespeaks the creature's truly being an image of God, becomes unrealizable. And, thus, thwarted is the moral end for which the rational being was created and is obliged before God to will and to love.

Conclusion

When the question of moral knowledge arises from Anselm's De veritate: when asked how Anselm reckons the rational being's attainment to knowledge of moral debitum before God, an Anselmian response might very well be delivered on the basis of a speculative construction and translation of his scant verbal epistemology into an even scantier moral epistemology. When the natural abilities of the creature's trinitarian soul discursively deliberate on a voluntary action or significant instance of moral speaking, it analyzes and evaluates that action's moral standing. It seeks to measure the truth or rectitude of its signification: In doing so, it weighs the action against eternal and immutable standards and principles set innately in memory and intuitively beheld by the mind's eye. Memory, together with understanding and reason, enters into an epistemological relationship of natural abilities which images the relationship of the Trinity of memory, understanding, and love/will. Inasmuch as being and doing so, the course is set for the rational being's attainment of moral knowledge of the truth and rectitude of the
signification of voluntary, accidental actions. The rational being knows that which he ought or ought not to do, because he innately knows and reasons with words or images of the conceptual expression of supreme wisdom -- a perfect wisdom that is at once the truth, rectitude, and justice of the one and simple God.
Section 3

Anselmian libertas --
'Freedom of the Choice' of the Free and Rational Will:
Notes for a Future Conceptualization of an 'Ethics of Being'

Introduction

Two contemporary expositors of De libertate arbitrii think that Anselm, unlike Augustine, does not distinguish between liberum arbitrium (free choice) and libertas (freedom). That is, he does not emphasize the difference between freedom as the natural property of the will and its choices and the Christian idea of true freedom as it is conveyed in the New Testament, as it is believed to obtain in the rational creature's salvific union with God through the Christ who liberates from sin, and as it is manifested in one's good and just uses of the naturally free will. To a limited extent, they are right: Nowhere in De libertate arbitrii is the distinction as explicit and precise as one would expect from a theologian who is ever respectful of sacred scripture and Christian tradition and who unequivocally thinks of true freedom as particular liberation:

Behold, O Christian soul, this [the cross of the God-man] is the strength of your salvation, this is what has made possible your freedom, this is the cost of your redemption. You were in bondage, but through the cross you have been redeemed. You were a servant, but through the cross you have been set free.

Nor is murky imprecision to be expected from him who staunchly defends the natural freedom of the will and its choices vis-à-vis divine foreknowledge, predestination, and grace. The choices of the rational will are neither compelled, nor constrained, nor necessitated. In the most pedestrian sense of the word, they are 'free.' Thus, it must be said to these contemporary expositors that the Anselmian texts in toto evidence a distinction between liberum arbitrium and libertas. And, furthermore, the absence of a clear distinction between the two in De libertate arbitrii might very well be attributed to
Anselm's unwillingness to reiterate a traditional stance. For, by his own admission (and it is a point too frequently overlooked), he has only one concern when he sets out to define 'freedom of choice' in DLA: It respects the ethical and to this I might add the ethical that is thoroughly theocentric. Clearly, he aims to define; but obliquely and more importantly, he aims to establish, I think, the foundation of an ethics.

The dialogue which Anselm presumably wrote before De libertate arbitrii implicitly tells why it should be understood and interpreted as being ethically foundational.

In De veritate, Anselm sets forth his position on the truth of the being of things (essentiae rerum). In the supreme truth, all things are what they are or are able to be: "Whatever is is truly -- insofar as it is what it is in the supreme truth." Insofar as imagining the supreme existence that creates and sustains what is created, creatures in their varying degrees of existence signify the truth of being: When they are what they are in the truth of the supreme being, then they are what they ought to be. Nothing ought to be different from what it is in the supreme truth. With respect to inanimate and non-rational animate beings this stance is unproblematic: Consistently, these creatures are what they ought to be. But with respect to rational creatures, a problem arises. Insofar as the rational will and its actions are beings, qua being, they are essentially good and thus enjoy the truth of being: They are what they are in the supreme truth. From a metaphysical perspective this is fine, but not from a moral one. For the rational will and its actions are not necessitated or instinctively driven: They are free and voluntarily realized. The rational will can desire and choose what it ought not to will and do: In other words, from a moral perspective, the rational will and its actions can indeed be different from what they should be in the supreme truth. When such a difference obtains, both the will and its actions fail to signify the truth as fully as they should. From Anselm's perspective, they cease to be just.
While looking ahead to De casu diaboli and its focus on the problem of evil, it seems to me that if Anselm wants to account for the moral integrity of creation or the lack thereof under a supremely good and just Creator-God and to defend this God in the meanwhile, then one directive is in order: He needs to ensure the basis on which rational beings can acquire for themselves the fullness of the truth of their being -- both moral and metaphysical. In other words, he needs to allow for the idea that all rational beings are at least fundamentally capable of being just and that they are fundamentally able to secure that very justice which founds for them the truth of their wills and actions and, hence, bespeaks the moral truth of their being. Simply put: Anselm needs to complement his stance on the truth of being with an 'ethics of being.'

The foundation of such an ethics, or 'way of existing,' is proffered in De veritate, c. 12. Therein Anselm develops his concept of praiseworthy justice and moral debitum. This normative ethical foundation, however, is not sufficient. Another complementary foundation needs to be offered: that is, one that focuses on one's ability to abide by the ethical norm. When Anselm endeavors to define 'freedom of choice' or libertas in De libertate arbitrii, he seeks to correct this insufficiency and to satisfy the suggested need. At least this is my claim. And this is my intention: to note the salient points of Anselm's conception of 'freedom of choice' and, as I see it, of an Anselmian 'ethics of being.' In this regard I shall focus on his concepts of ability, will, and virtue. My notes are prefaced by an overview of Anselmian libertas and, then, a textual review of it in light of a short, but difficult, section of DLA, c. 2.
A) An Overview and Textual Review of Anselmian libertas: Context for an 'Ethics of Being'

The Overview:

Anselm's concern in De libertate arbitrii is at once simple, novel, and ingenious. He endeavors, albeit tacitly, to express the Christian idea of true freedom almost purely philosophically and shy of its soteriological context. The ultimate effect of defining 'freedom of choice' as each and every rational being's natural and inseparable⁹ "ability to keep rectitude of the will for the sake of that rectitude itself"²⁰ and of defining 'free choice' as a "choice that is able to keep rectitude of the will for the sake of that rectitude itself"²¹ is nothing short of laying the conceptual foundation for the universalizability of true freedom among all rational creatures. It is nothing short of understanding each and every rational being as always having the raw ability for realizing a moral union with the God who is rectitude per se. In other words, rational creatures always bear the potentiality for such a union which frees the naturally free will and its choices from servitude to sin and subsequently frees them for servitude to justice.²²

Every rational being has the ability to keep that rectitude which founds the good and just uses of his will and which bespeaks his moral relation with God: When he possesses rectitude of the will, the natural 'ability to keep'²³ is actualized and the inhering grace of justice²⁴ thus renders his will truly free and its choices fitting and advantageous. This is so because his will now subsists and its choices are henceforward voluntarily effected in deference to and in harmony with God.²⁵ According to Anselm, this is what it means to be truly free: to be free for justice, to be free for God, to be freed from sin and to be able to avoid sinning.²⁶ To enslave or to determine oneself voluntarily to the justice of God in one's will and choices: This is the Anselmian 'freedom of choice' of the
naturally free and rational will. Such a freedom bears no sense of being just a neutral property of the will that desires and chooses undirected among an array of indiscriminate and sundry alternatives. Nay, it is an ability subsumed under the power of the will and it affords to the will and its choices a certain orientation, direction, and purpose in a meaningful context that is at once existential, ethical, and theocentric.

But, when the naturally free will elects to forsake or not to accept the inhering, prevenient, or subsequent grace of justice, or when it simply fails to choose in deference to it, then the will and its choices fail to be truly free. And this is so even though they always remain naturally free or unconstrained and uncompelled. Without justice, the naturally free will becomes a slave to sin, and its choices become sinful or unjust. It is unable to avoid sinning and to keep from willing fervently those goods which it cannot obtain. From an objective point of view, an individual might seem to be performing good and just deeds, but in view of his inner disposition, he is unable to avoid sinning. His slavery to sin obtains because, without the rectitude or justice which he is unable to regain without divine assistance, he is out of union with the God who is justice. His will and its choices are not meaningfully grounded, in other words. Owing to the absence of rectitude in his rational will, moral order and union between him and God fail to be established in truth and to prosper as such in existence.

Anselm's definition and understanding of 'freedom of choice' constitute, along with justice, a foundation of an ethics -- be it called, as I care to understand it, an Anselmian 'ethics of being.' Freedom thus defined and envisaged as an 'ability to keep' is not only ethically significant but it is also clearly theocentric. Regardless of whether or not this ability be actualized in the presence of justice or through the harmony of grace and the naturally free will, 'freedom of choice' is always that ability in virtue of which each and every rational
creature, upon reaching the age of understanding, is obliged and held accountable for his good and evil deeds before the God to whom each ought to be morally-ordered and in whom each ought to live. It is always the ability that enables one to be ethical in relation with God.

Insofar as 'freedom of choice' is always conducive to the rectitude or justice that ought to be domiciled in the rational will and ever testifies to the rational being's moral debitum before God, Anselmian freedom bespeaks the objectivity of a duty-ethics. And, insofar as this freedom respects the Christian idea of true freedom and, presumably, the extent to which this theological idea prescribes character development and spiritual growth throughout one's life in the Christ, it bespeaks the subjectivity of a virtue-ethics. Duty and virtue, objectivity and subjectivity, unite in Anselm's conception of 'freedom of choice': Unity underlies the 'ethics of being' that helps the rational creature to secure the fullness of the truth of his being. In such an ethics, duty and virtue are harmoniously orientated in time towards his teleological and moral end: towards the supernatural happiness in love and enjoyment of the God who is goodness and justice per se.

The Textual Review:

Consideration of a very difficult and important segment of De libertate arbitrii, c. 2, expounds upon the foregoing overview and foreshadows De casu diaboli. It also prefaces my ensuing consideration of the complex structure of 'freedom of choice' as an ability.

At the beginning of c. 2, the student accepts Anselm's reasoning in c. 1 for why the ability to sin cannot be construed as freedom or a part of 'freedom of choice.' Anselm wants to link freedom and rectitude conceptually. In spite of the fact that his reasoning rests on an untested assumption, the student complaisantly abides him. Immediately, the dialogue indicates the student's inability to see how both Satan and Adam sinned by
means of an ability to sin which was not a part of 'freedom of choice.' Given the exclusion of the ability to sin from the definition of 'freedom of choice,' did they sin freely or necessarily? If they sinned freely, the student queries, then how could they not have sinned by free choice? But, if they did not sin freely, then they sinned necessarily. And, if necessarily, then the ascription of moral culpability to either Satan or Adam is neither feasible nor warranted.

At the very least, Anselm's response to the incisive questioning is a bit cryptic: "It was by means of an ability to sin," he says, "as well as freely (sponte) and by free choice and of no necessity, that in the beginning our nature and angelic nature sinned and were able to serve sin." Understandably, the student fails to comprehend. The teacher endeavors again:

Because the apostate angel and the first man sinned by their own choice which was so free (liberum) that it could not be compelled by any other thing to sin, each of them sinned by free choice. Therefore, each of them is justly blamed because in spite of having this freedom of choice, each sinned freely (sponte) and out of no necessity and without being compelled by anything else. However, each sinned by his own choice which was free (liberum) but neither sinned by means of that in virtue of which his choice was free. That is, neither sinned by means of the ability in virtue of which he was able not to sin and not to serve sin; but each sinned by means of his ability to sin, and this ability neither helped him towards the freedom not to sin nor compelled him into the service of sin.

Anselm's response might be clarified in hope of conveying what I think is his implicit and most important emphasis on the rational being's ability to will vis-à-vis that 'ability to keep' which is always distinct from the ability to sin:

Both Satan and Adam had the natural 'ability to keep' and, as Anselm leaves it to be understood, they too had the ability to will and to choose in deference or not to that which they aptly had in their possession, namely, rectitude of the will. But the will of Satan and Adam desired and chose against rectitude and in spite of their 'ability to keep' it. The will did not choose by virtue of this special ability, which, like all other
voluntary aptitudes and movements, is subsumed under the will's own inalienable strength, ⁵⁴ but rather by virtue of its own ability: To the point, the will desired and chose without compulsion or constraint (i.e., voluntarily, naturally freely, independently: *sponte*) to forsake that rectitude which none, not even God, ⁵⁵ could force it to abandon. In essence, owing to whatever motivation, ⁵⁶ the will chose not to keep or hold any longer that which it was keeping. In short, it was not the 'ability to keep' that failed Satan and Adam; rather, it was the will willing not to hold that failed the natural ability. ⁵⁷

Both Satan and Adam naturally had this 'ability to keep,' and, right up to that crucial moment when they willed and chose to abandon rectitude, they had the rectitude which they ought to have had. Their natural ability was actualized and effected. Their possession of rectitude rendered them and their choices truly free. That is, from an ethical perspective, they were in a position such that they could have willed and chosen otherwise than they did: ⁵⁸ They could have desired and elected not to abandon that rectitude of the will which they possessed simply because they possessed it. They could have willed, in other words, not to sin. Right up to that crucial moment, the fact of their being able to choose voluntarily between two alternative moral states of being was owing to the fact that they had the rectitude which they were naturally able to keep. For, without this rectitude of the will, their wills and all of their choices would have been indentured to a state of sinfulness; and without the very 'ability to keep,' there would have been no ground on which to establish the moral accountability of their wills and choices because they simply would not have had the aptitude for bearing the grace of moral rectitude. In virtue of having this 'ability to keep,' Satan and Adam were able to will and to choose to preserve rectitude. Instead, they both used their naturally free wills for an end which was diametrically opposed to the end ⁵⁹ for which they and their wills had received this 'ability to keep' ⁶⁰ -- this ability which rendered them capable of a moral
union with God: a union signified by the inhering rectitude of the rational will so long as their wills so desired its inherence or they a moral relation with God.

Anselm's second explanation convinces the student, but he still wonders how it is that both Satan and Adam were able to retain their 'freedom of choice' or 'ability to keep' without rectitude. Incorrectly, the student thinks that the 'ability' should go the way of forsaken rectitude. For he fails to understand precisely how one who has voluntarily rendered oneself into sinfulness, as in the case of Satan and Adam, can still have 'freedom of choice' or the 'ability to keep' when in fact one does not have that which ought to be kept. At issue here is his failure to see that one's having an ability to do something, be it natural or acquired, does not necessarily entail that one is always able to use or actualize it. Even an ethically-significant ability such as 'freedom of choice' can lie idle simply because it is not able to be used. Indeed, it is the very idleness that points up an unethical way of existing that ensues upon a "fall" (casus).

B)

'Freedom of Choice' in Terms of Anselm's Concept of Ability

Anselm's concept of 'ability' (potestas) is quite undeveloped and fragmented. Nevertheless, what he says about it in De potestate is not only instructive but formative in understanding Anselmian libertas. There is more to his concept of ability than what is suggested by his one-line definition of it: an 'aptitude for doing' (aptitudo ad faciendum) with 'doing' sufficing as a predicate-variable open to all finite and infinite verbs. Subsequent remarks on an 'aptitude to do' (aptitudo faciendi) and an 'aptitude at doing' (aptitudo in faciendo) suggest that he has in mind a concept of ability that roughly approximates the structure of a cause-effect relationship.

First, there is for Anselm the raw 'aptitude to do' that
suffices as a causal ground: This is the ability or power considered in and of itself. Second, there is the actualization of this raw aptitude: This is accomplished a) by the employment of instrumental factors which are different from the raw aptitude and its effects, and b) by the absence of any factor that can, but does not, impede the raw aptitude's actualization. And third, there is the effect or deed of the actualization: This is the attestation that something can indeed be done aptly or that there is indeed a raw aptitude that can and has been actualized vis-à-vis certain instrumental factors. Although Anselm never made these conceptual identifications, based on what he claims in DLA, c. 3, about the four conditions (potestates) of an ability and given what little he says about the three aptitudinal degrees in DP, I have no reason not to think that his idea of an 'aptitude to do' is that of a raw ability not yet in operation; of an 'aptitude for doing,' as an actualization of that raw aptitude; and of an 'aptitude at doing,' as that 'aptitude for doing' viewed from the perspective of its realized effect.

All conditions or aptitudinal degrees must obtain in order for any ability to obtain. If any one condition or degree is missing, then, as Anselm puts it, "the other three [conditions or two degrees] are not able to accomplish anything either singularly or collectively." And hence, the raw ability is of no avail. No 'aptitude to do' suffices in and of itself for the realization of its operation or expected effects and deeds. It is one thing to say that one has the 'aptitude to do' something and quite another to show uncontestably that one has it by using one's ability and producing an effect with it. Every 'aptitude for doing' is an 'aptitude to do,' but not every 'aptitude to do' is an 'aptitude for doing' or an 'aptitude at doing.' A distinction can and must be made between an ability and the use of it.

For example, one might have an acquired 'aptitude to play' the flute. If one has the necessary instrumental factors,
namely, a flute or piccolo, and either sheet music, a player's ear, or a memorized repertoire, then one's 'aptitude to play' can be actualized. This is so under one other condition: that nothing impedes the flute-playing that is able to do so, for instance, labial swelling, dental trauma, or belligerent neighbors. If an instrumental factor for actualizing the raw ability is wanting or an obstructive factor is present, then, so to speak, that 'aptitude to play' lies dormant or merely potential. It cannot thus be said that the one who has the 'aptitude to play' also has the 'aptitude for playing' or 'aptitude at playing.' An 'aptitude to do' need not always be actualized; it can lie in potency, so to speak, until the auspicious occasion when, given the appropriate mediating factors, the 'ability for doing' obtains and gives way to the 'ability at doing': that is, when cause gives way to effect.

As it is in the case of flute-playing, so too in the case of 'freedom of choice.' The raw ability or the 'aptitude to do' is the 'aptitude to keep rectitude of the will for its own sake': Each and every rational being has it by nature. Several instrumental factors, however, must obtain in order for it to be actualized. In addition to having the virtue of perseverance and patience, Anselm deems two other factors to be necessary: first, one's ability to reason by which one is able to recognize or ascertain (cognoscere) rectitude, and, second, one's ability to will by which one desires and chooses to hold and to observe (servare) rectitude if one so wills to do so. Additionally, one must possess that which is in fact the very end for which one has the natural ability in the first place. But in order to have rectitude of the will, one must receive it, and this point indicates that there is another instrumental factor: the operative grace of God present in the rational creature. Given all of these instrumental factors one is poised 'for doing' or 'for keeping' that which one is said to be able to keep. But, as in the case of the aptitude to play the flute, if any instrumental factor is wanting or obstructing, the 'ability to
keep' lies dormant. For example, if one does not possess that rectitude which must be kept, then one is not able to use one's 'ability to keep'\textsuperscript{10} for the very simple reason that one does not have that which must be kept. Or, even if one does have rectitude, if one does not care to persevere with it, then the 'ability' eventually becomes as good as useless. In such cases, though, the ability itself is never extinguished. It simply lies in potency for the more auspicious occasion when, given its actualization by all necessary instrumental factors and barring the only possible impeding force, namely, the will itself, it is employed and becomes an aptitude-at-keeping.

Anselm's concept of 'freedom of choice' as ability clearly evidences the interplay of other natural abilities. When God is said to have given to the rational creature not only the 'ability to keep' but also the 'ability to use' it, Anselm has in mind reason and the will.\textsuperscript{11} They are of instrumental importance in freedom's actualization\textsuperscript{12} and, hence, to the rational creature's participation in an 'ethics of being.'

C)

Anselm's Concept of the Rational Will:
A Key Ability Undergirding the Natural 'Ability to Keep'

The created rational being has but one will (voluntas) which is a distinct and permanent instrument (instrumentum) or power (vis) of the soul (anima).\textsuperscript{13} It remains essentially one and the same regardless of how often, in what respect, or to what degree it operates.\textsuperscript{14} Its function is to be directed towards willing, that is, towards desiring or choosing either this or that.\textsuperscript{15} Towards actualizing this function,\textsuperscript{16} this instrument that empowers all voluntary and bodily movements moves itself by virtue of its natural and acquired affections (affectiones) or inclinations.\textsuperscript{17} When it moves to will, the instrument manifests its power, acts, and the effects thereof through the senses and members of the body.\textsuperscript{18}
Like the soul's other instruments or powers, the will can be considered in three equivocal senses: in distinct terms, that is, of its essence, aptitude, and use. Respectively, Anselm speaks of the 'will as instrument,' the 'will as affection (affectio for aptitudo),' and the 'will as use (usus). Given that he considers the will to be an ability, such expressions are suited to the terms of his concept of ability: The 'will as instrument' can be considered the raw 'aptitude to will,' and the 'will as affection' and 'will as use' together as the 'aptitude for willing' or the actualization of the raw aptitude. The 'aptitude at willing' can be considered in terms of the two possible ends of any use or act of the will.

1) 'Aptitude to Will': the Raw Ability or Essence of the Will

Much of what little Anselm has to say about the 'will as instrument' or the will as viewed from the perspective of its essence has just been presented. Two additional points, however, should be considered: They prove germane to understanding how it is that the will opts to use or not to use its 'ability to keep' and thus positions the individual for participation or not in an 'ethics of being.'

If Anselm were asked what the will is, he would respond that it is both a power of desire and a power of choice: respectively, an appetitive power and a rational (deliberative) appetite.

There can be no mistaking the point that Anselm sees the will as being both concupiscence and desire. It clearly underlies his idea of the 'will as affection.' What escapes clarification, though, is his juxtaposition of the words 'concupiscencia' and 'desiderium': It is somewhat arresting because both words bear the sense of 'desire' or 'longing for.' There could be two explanations for his usage: First, in contradistinction to 'desiderium,' 'concupiscencia' could have
meant for Anselm an intensification or fullness of desire, or, perchance, the melding or joining of desires. This would be explained by the Latin prefix 'con.' On the other hand, he could have inclined towards the view which one generally sees in sacred scripture's use of the two terms: 'desiderium/desideratum' bearing the sense of a good desire, and 'concupiscientia' bearing the sense of an evil, sinful, or depraved desire. It is highly unlikely that Anselm, versed as well as he was in scripture, did not have this biblical distinction in mind. However, if he intended such in his use of these terms, then such needs to be reconciled with his claim that there are good and evil 'concupiscientia' and good and evil 'desiderium.' Lack of clarification and reconciliation notwithstanding, Anselm does see the will as essentially desire.

To understand the essence of the will as a rational appetite, one needs to focus only on what Anselm says about the 'will as use.' Consideration, however, of an indirect course in DLA, cc. 5-9, constitutes a more philosophically-interesting approach.

At the start of DLA, c. 5, it appears that one will be informed by a continuing discussion and development of the definition of 'freedom of choice.' The student's querying sets the tone: In what sense is the choice of the will free in virtue of this 'ability to keep,' given that one is frequently lured or compelled by temptations, situations, and difficulties to abandon rectitude unwillingly (nolens) or against the will (invitus)? The question, I think, is answered indirectly. For what actually unfolds in cc. 5-9 is a dialectical digression on a very related point: that is, on the essence of the will.

As the dialogue proceeds in c. 5, it becomes perfectly clear that Anselm is staking unrelentingly a monolithic stance on the will: The will, being a power of the soul, is to be understood as an ability (potestas) for choice or determination (arbitrium): an ability for assent and dissent in the face of alternatives. And it is simply not the case, as the student thinks, that the
will, owing to whatever external force, oftentimes wills unwillingly that which it wills. Though one might unwillingly encounter the lure of strong temptations, or be unwillingly situated under compelling circumstances whereby one has to choose between alternatives, or be unwillingly faced with the difficulty of doing something or ceasing to do something, one is never compelled to will what one wills. The will's choice is never externally necessitated. The will does not succumb and cannot be subjected to any external force, whatever or whoever it be, unless it, the will, consents to the external influence and suggestion. Such a consent arises from the will itself and not by virtue of nature or any antecedent necessity. When the will wills, it wills that it will, and it cannot be the case that when it wills, it does not will to will what it wills. In the face of any temptation, compelling situation, or perceived difficulty, one does not will unwillingly or against the will, because one does not will unless one is willing to will. One who wills wills that one will.

Anselm's position is clear: He is determined to maintain the inviolability of the will as ability (potestas) for willing or choosing. His position is corroborated in c. 6 where the student entertains the idea that the will sometimes experiences (experiri) a powerlessness (impotentia) owing to the external force of temptation. What one feels, Anselm holds, is not powerlessness but rather the difficulty of warding off temptation's suggestions. This difficulty does not undermine the power (potentia) of the will: The choice of whether to succumb or not is still the will's own. Now, what happens ever so quickly during this brief exchange is philosophically interesting, though lacking philosophical argumentation.

The movement from talking about the will as 'ability' in c. 5 to talking about its 'power' in c. 6 involves a shift in vocabulary -- respectively, from 'potestas' to 'potentia.' One might expect this shift in a discussion of two distinct properties of one and the same being. In point of fact, however,
the Latin text suggests that Anselm does not see a distinction between the 'potestas' which the will is and the will's 'potentia.' The ability of the will is the power of the will and the power is the ability. The evidence for such a view is found in the student's words. At the beginning of c. 6, in which the discussion redounds clearly on the student's presumption of a powerlessness of the will in the face of irresistible temptation, he places one demand on Anselm: that he render consistent his position in c. 5 on the ability of the will, as the student puts it -- on the 'potentia' that he proves therein, with the 'impotentia' that we oftentimes feel.108 Nowhere in c. 5 does Anselm use the Latin word 'potentia' to speak of the will as ability: The employed word is always 'potestas.' And yet, in c. 6, the student not only understands but calls the 'ability' of the will the 'power' of the will. The context of c. 6 clearly suggests that the sense or meaning of 'potentia' is that of 'force, might, or strength.' This is confirmed by Anselm's speaking of the will's 'fortitudo' (strength) in c. 7 where he is clearly furthering his position in c. 6. According to him, the soul's power (vis) for willing, in itself an ability (potestas) for willing, has an inalienable and unvanquishable strength.109 Its strength (fortitudo) is its power (potentia).

The text of c. 6 suggests to me that Anselm wants to understand an essential correlation or identification between the 'potestas' and 'potentia' of the will, such that the essence of the will is ability (potestas) for desiring and choosing (willing), and the ability is power (potentia) understood as an insuperable strength (fortitudo). The point appears to be simple enough. It even has a foundation on the divine level: The one and simple being (essentia) of God, which 'includes' the will, is the power of God.110 But upon closer examination this point appears to be philosophically fecund and somewhat astounding: There is the suggestion that this power that is strength, this power that is ability, is also freedom -- the freedom of the will (libertas voluntatis), i.e, the natural freedom which so
concerned me above in holding that Anselm understands a distinction between it (liberum arbitrium) and libertas. In two instances in c. 6, Anselm patently uses the word 'freedom' (libertas) in lieu of 'power' (potentia) as if the two words were semantically equivalent. If my understanding is correct that Anselm sees an essential correlation between ability and power at the level of the rational creature, the imago dei, then the more astounding philosophical position is this: that the essence of the will is ability, the ability is power of an insuperable magnitude, the power is freedom. In short: The essence (quod est) of the will, of the instrument or power (vis) of the soul, is freedom -- freedom for desire and freedom for choice. The Anselmian will is freedom.

In light of this stance on the essence of the will, the opening query of c. 5 can receive a cogent reply which speaks to any rational creature who either stands in rectitude or falls from it: The choice of the will is free in virtue of one's 'ability to keep,' because it is in fact most free or truly free when rectitude inheres in the will -- an inherence which no external force, including God, is able to remove from the will or to compel the will to abandon unless the will desires and chooses to do so. In Anselm's view, this power of the soul that is called the 'will' is that able, that powerful, and that free. "(N)othing is more free than an upright will, whose rectitude no alien force can remove."

The will, as essentially freedom, opts either to use or not to use its 'ability to keep' rectitude. It is important, I think, to ward off confusing the essence of the will as freedom and Anselm's special definition of 'freedom of choice.' Indeed, the former is integral to the actualization of the latter, but the two are not indistinct from each other. The distinction is best seen in the effect that the 'ability to keep,' when actualized, has on the naturally free will itself. In return for its integral instrumentality in the actualization of 'freedom of choice,' the essential freedom of the will moves towards
perfection, as it were, by virtue of its fundamental option to keep that which it has a natural ability to keep. Such a perfection is not without ontological and ethical significance: By aligning itself to rectitude and, thereafter, accordingly determining all of its choices in deference to rectitude itself, the will of the created imago dei becomes more like the will of God. The created will becomes a truer sign of the creator's will\textsuperscript{116} whose power and freedom is ever an expression of the one and simple God who is rectitude per se. An imago dei becomes a greater similitudo dei: A created rational being grows gradually in essential freedom towards the perfection of that freedom.

2)

'Aptitude for Willing': the Actualization of the Raw Ability

How the rational creature moves or not from the essential freedom of the will to the perfection of that freedom via the 'ability to keep' is a question of how the will wills. Like all raw abilities, the 'aptitude to will' requires the aid of instrumental factors in order to be actualized. Use of the will is primarily a function of the will's affections and the soul's power of reasoning.

The affections of the will are the "instruments of the instrument" which constantly modify or dispose the 'will as instrument' towards actually desiring or willing.\textsuperscript{117} There are two affections:\textsuperscript{118} the will's aptitude or inclination for the beneficial (affectio ad commodum)\textsuperscript{119} and its inclination for justice (affectio ad iustitiam).\textsuperscript{120} If the will were without these affections, that is, if it were not inclined by them, then the will would will nothing beneficial or just.\textsuperscript{121}

By virtue of its natural and inseparable\textsuperscript{122} affection for that which is beneficial and advantageous (affectio ad commodum) and by the grace of the Creator-God who bestows this affection on the will,\textsuperscript{123} the will moves itself\textsuperscript{124} in desiring and, ultimately perchance, in choosing that which is conducive to the well-being
of the individual. This natural affection seems to be the foundation of all willing: Every instance of the will, of desiring or choosing this or that, reflects the will's natural inclination for happiness. All rational creatures naturally desire that which Anselm understands as consisting of benefits and, ultimately, as being a surfeit of benefits without any need. The rational creature must needs desire the beneficial, be it lofty or base or betwixt the two. He cannot desire that which in fact is unbeneﬁcial or disadvantageous: He cannot pursue unhappiness.

Possession of the natural affection, however, does not entail that every creature who desires or wills the benefical enjoys happiness. The affection in and of itself is not happiness: The affection is not that to which it is directed. Furthermore, and more importantly, possession of this inseparable inclination does not ensure that every willing, that is, every use or act of the will, is in fact beneﬁcial or advantageous. Anselm notes rather cryptically that ignorance or intellectual error can affect the will and its use: The creature might be mistaken in that which is willed and done: Incorrectly one might think something to be advantageous or right, when in fact it is not, and then will on the basis of that error or ignorance.

Here, an important point should not be overlooked. When the will moves itself by virtue of its natural inclination in desiring and willing something, it does not do so haphazardly or without aid. The desires of the will, which always bespeak the will's natural inclination, arise from the correspondence between the will and the intellect. As far as I can see in Anselmian thought, every instance of desiring and willing of the will arises in cooperation with the intellect: That is, the will moves itself in response to the intellect. For, in fact, and notwithstanding the subtlety of Anselm's thinking, that which the will desires and chooses as being beneﬁcial is ﬁrst conceived in the intellect as being such. What the mind thinks to be conducive to the realization of the happiness of the individual,
the will (apparently upon the intellect's presentation) desires proportionately\textsuperscript{133} to have either immediately or at the appropriate time.\textsuperscript{134} The intellect presents the object to be desired and, perchance, pursued by the will in choice and deed.

The intellect's involvement is not simply limited to conceiving of and presenting that which is beneficial and advantageous. Its role extends right into the very use or act of the will -- the will willing to do and doing that which it desires:\textsuperscript{135} the will moving from having the desire for something to willing or nilling that thing.\textsuperscript{136} The 'will as use' obtains only when the will 'thinks' about that which it desires.\textsuperscript{137} The operative word here is 'thinks' (cogitare). The will does not always 'think' about that which it desires or that towards which it is inclined. But, when the will does, it seems as if Anselm has in mind a more pointed correspondence between the will and the intellect.

An understanding of the will as 'thinking' can only be rendered speculatively.\textsuperscript{138} Anselm's position is undeveloped and evidence of his own understanding is at best scant. Given that he speaks of the will as a 'rational will,'\textsuperscript{139} that he thinks the rational creature ought to will rationally and nothing irrationally,\textsuperscript{140} and that he calls the will's choice (arbitrium) a judgment (judicium),\textsuperscript{141} he probably understands a deliberative process into which the will enters in order to determine (determinare) what it will do with respect to its desire. Reason is at the root of the naturally free choice:\textsuperscript{142} Textual evidence suggests\textsuperscript{143} that the process involves correspondence with reason and the weighing of its counsel and dictates before it, the will, renders unto itself a choice and causes or does what it wills. Ideally, the will defers to the instruction and rule of reason: the natural ability for distinguishing between good and bad, true and false, better and worse, and just and unjust. By virtue of reason, the will is able to keep to a proper moral ordering, and by virtue of the gift of understanding rectitude, the mind knows what ought to be done.\textsuperscript{144}
However, in the actualization of the will, reason is oftentimes overruled and preempted by the will. It is, Anselm thinks, the will's prerogative to accept or to reject the counsel of reason and, implicitly, what the mind innately and intuitively understands. Such a position indeed reemphasizes the unvanquishable power or freedom that the will is essentially: Not only is it that no external force can prevail upon the will's choice unless the will wills it, but now, no accompanying internal power can prevail upon it either. Such a stance indeed undermines the power of reason. In its rejection of reason's moral instructions the 'rational' will patently manifests itself as essentially unfettered desire and concupiscence.

But, in view of the significant role that Anselm affords to reason, it might be asked why reason is able to be toppled by the will when it ought not to be? Why is it not the case that in its actualizations the will always defers to reason? If such were the case, would not the rational creature's 'ability to keep' always be used or be always in possession of rectitude? Would not the will, being thus subservient to reason, always yield to reason's counsel, dictates, and discernments? Put otherwise: Why does Anselm conceive of the will as being so essentially powerful and free in its actualization?

It seems to me that if Anselm wants to hold to the Christian tenet that the rational creature is an image of God, an image which manifests itself in the natural abilities of the soul, then he must uphold his monolithic stance on the essence of the will. He must do so even to the extent of undermining the power of reason vis-à-vis the will.

The will of God is omnipotent. In a rarefied sense, so too is the created will: It can will whatever it desires, even though such unfettered willing does not necessarily mean that the will always effects what it desires. For the individual could very well lack some instrumental capacities for actualizing and effecting its will for something, or something that is able to impede its actualization might do so. If the created will were
subservient to reason and its moral discernments, then the will would suffer a diminution of its own essence, that is, a lessening of its power or freedom. In fact, the will would become internally compelled or constrained by the accompanying power of reason, and consequently it would always will in deference to reason's counsel and dictates. Were such the case, it would not image the will of God. Surely, the created will would be ever upright, as is the divine will, but it would be so by virtue of necessity and not freedom. Whereas, the divine will is essentially both free and upright. It is true that the will of God, being of the one and simple divine essence, always accords with the rectitude that God is per se. But, such an accordance in God is not to be construed as being antecedently or internally necessitated: The harmony of the will, reason, and rectitude of God is of the essence of the one and simple God. Nothing compels or constrains God. Thus, if the will of the rational creature is to be a true image of God, then it will be so in these two respects: One, it will be free from both internal and external forces, as is the will of God; and two, it will be free to possess or keep by its own choice the rectitude that God is.

This Anselmian interpretation seemingly clarifies the role and purpose of the affection for justice or inclination towards God. Or, at least, it lends another possible explanation of it. The ethical importance of this affection includes but goes beyond being simply the means by which every good and meritorious deed arises. It seems very likely that this God-given and non-natural affection aids the reason in its correspondence with that power that is so much stronger than itself: In short, the affection for justice supports reason in its key role of morally counseling and instructing the naturally free will. It counters the will, which is moved by its natural affection, by inclining and moving it towards moderation in that which it desires and chooses. Justice governs, commands, and tempers the will in accordance with the will of God.
doing so it complements the role of reason; it does not displace or subvert it. The affection for justice helps to effect the harmony between the will and reason -- a moral and psychological harmony which bespeaks both a keener image of God in the rational creature and the fullness of the creature's truth of being.

This complementarity between the affection for justice and reason does not enslave the 'will as instrument,' nor does it render it powerless. The will, being essentially the power of desire and concupiscence as well as freedom, can effectively silence and dismiss the acquired affection along with the counsel of reason. In effect, it can negate the effect of justice and abandon the affection itself; it can disregard reason; and it can render its own natural 'ability to keep' idle. And it does so by virtue of that which it is essentially. The affection for justice, which is justice or rectitude itself, is separated from the will by virtue of an inordinate desire and choice of the naturally free will, which is moved by its natural inclination and which strives against the spirit (spiritus).

By maintaining the separability of the affection for justice, Anselm preserves the essential freedom of the will. His reasoning, if it were ever expressed by him, would not be dissimilar to the reasoning which I presume underlies his stance on the power of the will vis-à-vis the power of reason. If the acquired affection were permanent, as is the natural affection for the beneficial, and if the affection for justice were to maintain its role of inclining the will towards the mean and of governing and commanding it with deference to rectitude, then again the will would suffer a diminution of its power and freedom. Justice, being the indwelling grace of God, would not simply goad the will, check the natural affection, and aid the reason; it would appear also to wield a certain constraining and compelling influence over the will. The affection for justice serves to effect in the will a truer image of God -- a will that is both free and just. But the acquired affection does not do so at the expense of the essence of the will itself: God does not,
nay cannot, tamper with the will that was created as essential freedom in God's own image. If God were to do so, it would be nothing less than God's own violation of the rectitude of creation or of the rectitude that God is.

3)

'Aptitude at Willing': the Effect of Actualization

The effect of any willing, be it just or unjust, can be discerned from several perspectives: in view of 1) its orientation to its object, 2) its four types of willing, 3) its twenty-four possible modes of willing or of effecting that which it wills, and 4) its degree of using its own strength or natural freedom. Anselm's fragmented consideration of the use and effect of the will amounts to a scanty theoretical structure for explaining the act and deed of a will that always moves with the natural affection and either proceeds with or without rectitude by keeping or abandoning it.

Anselm's lie/die example in DLA, c. 5, illustrates the two possible orientations of the will with respect to its object. An important distinction is made between willing something for its own sake (aliquid propter se) and willing something for the sake of something else (aliquid propter aliud) which may or may not be evident to a spectator. This latter use of the will approximates that of an intermediary willing -- a voluntary means or step, as it were, for ultimately attaining something else which lies beyond the object immediately willed. The upshot of the example of the man faced with the alternative of either lying and saving his life or telling the truth and dying is ethically significant: It indicates that in both distinctions of willing one can lose one's ability to use one's natural 'ability to keep.' The man can desert rectitude of the will either by willing something for its own sake which is contrary to rectitude, as in the case of he who lies for the sake of the lie itself, or by willing something for the sake of something else,
as in the case of he who wills to lie in order to save his life. In both cases he lies willingly, as one might say -- either directly or indirectly, and thus violates the rectitude of his will. The importance of these orientations of the will is enshrined in Anselm's conception of justice: Justice is rectitude of the will desired and kept (willed) for its own sake, that is, for the reason or purpose of justice itself. When it is desired and kept (willed) for the sake of something else, it is not praiseworthy justice. It is not willed as an end in itself.\footnote{160}

When the will 'thinks' that which it desires, its choice or judgment effects itself in deed in one of four types of willing -- all of which imply varying attitudes and degrees in the strength of willing.\footnote{161} Anselm speaks of efficient, approbative, concessive, and permissive willing.\footnote{162} Respectively, that which one wills efficiently, one directly causes or effects to be; that which one wills approbatively is not caused or done efficiently, though it is able to be so, but the occurrence of the deed via someone or something else is fully approved; that which one wills concessively, one neither efficiently nor approbatively wills but merely wills insofar as yielding or granting pardon or exception to something or someone by allowing something or someone else in its stead; and that which one wills permissively, one neither wills efficiently, nor approbatively, nor concessively, but merely tolerates the occurrence of a deed by not preventing it from happening. What distinguishes one's permissive willing from the other three is its lack of desire for the attainment of a particular outcome.

Further consideration of the will's actualization in deed redounds upon Anselm's theory of action or linguistic analysis of the verb 'doing' (facere).\footnote{163} Willing is a form of 'doing' and thus can be construed in terms of the four general sentential forms of 'doing': a) to cause to be (facere esse), b) to cause not to be (facere non esse), c) not to cause to be (non facere esse), and d) not to cause not to be (non facere non esse). 'A'
and 'b' are affirmative and contrary to each other, and each has a corresponding and interchangeable subaltern ('c' for 'b' and 'd' for 'a') which are negative and contrary to each other. Contradictions obtain between 'a' and 'c,' and 'b' and 'd.' Under each general form Anselm accounts for six modes or predication-possibilities for a total of twenty-four. Given any one sentential form of the verb 'willing' -- a) to will to be, b) to will not to be, c) not to will to be, and d) not to will not to be -- one can deduce one additional direct or proper mode of willing which in fact is the subaltern of the primary mode represented by the general sentential form itself, and four indirect or improper modes of willing. The two proper modes of willing signify that the will directly or efficiently causes that which is willed and done. The four indirect modes signify that the will indirectly causes that which is willed and done: It does so when the agent of the will either effects or fails to effect something else which either causes or does not cause that which is under consideration.

Anselm's analysis of the predication-possibilities of facere and velle affords the possibility of speaking about and attributing direct and indirect causal and moral responsibility to rational agents. It is incontestable that he does not clearly and systematically consider the topic of responsibility in his theory of action. That he does not carefully treat it, as would a contemporary ethicist, is no indication, however, that he would not assent to its ethical importance.

The imputation of direct or indirect moral responsibility to an agent generally correlates with that agent's direct or indirect causality of whatever it is that he did or failed to do. Some sense and degree of willing underlies most instances of agential causality. And, although Anselm analytically and conceptually parallels 'willing' and 'causing' in his Lambeth fragments, he seems sensitive to the need for distinguishing between the two. For the sense of moral responsibility -- that is, of having to answer and account for one's acts of commission
or omission and having to do so before oneself, others, and ultimately God as moral judge -- exceeds that of causal responsibility in that the imputation of moral responsibility, though grounded in one's efficient or instrumental causality, depends very much on consideration of sundry factors.

Many points weigh heavily in determining whether the causal agent and his willed effects are morally accountable or unaccountable, praiseworthy or blameworthy, rewardable or punishable. The rational agent is not simply morally responsible for something because he is the direct or indirect cause of it. He might be the efficient or instrumental cause of something and thus, *ipso facto*, be either directly or indirectly causally responsible for it. But, whether he is morally responsible for it, either directly or indirectly, depends upon a careful consideration of his obligations and his deference to proper motivation: Both of which speak clearly to his having the affection for justice and letting it be his will's principal motive in willing and causing whatever. Equally important is consideration of his intentions, knowledge, conscience, and the integrity of his voluntariness at the time when he did or failed to do whatever. The attitude with which he willed to do or not to do something also bears considerable importance: For willing something either efficiently, approbatively, concessively, or permissively bespeaks willing to cause whatever either directly or indirectly in the case of efficient willing, and indirectly in the case of approbative, concessive, and permissive willing. The underlying attitudes of each type of willing are different and so too are the willing agent's intentions.

The agent's act or use of the will varies in intensity: that is, the constant strength of the will is used variably depending on the extent to which the will inclines towards or desires a certain object. The will wills strongly one thing and not so strongly another: When it wills something more strongly than something it has, then the will chooses to forsake what it has in order to obtain what it does not have.
Conversely, when something is presented to the will which it
wills less strongly than something it has, then it wills to keep
what it has and rejects what it does not have. This is, in
short, the point of Anselm's troubling bull/ram example in DLA,
c. 7. Therein, he neglects a crucial point which is quite
necessary for fully understanding how the will uses its strength
more or less strongly. The solution, I think, lies in his
concept of the two affections of the will.\textsuperscript{167} The will wills
something more or less strongly because the will is either
strongly inclined towards that thing or it is not. The
affections wax and wane; in doing so, they effect the will's use
of its own strength vis-à-vis the object of its desire and
choice.\textsuperscript{168} Furthermore, it seems to me that the will's variable
use of its strength is not simply owing to its inclinations and
desires.\textsuperscript{169} It seems that reason's ethical discernment plays a
role along with knowledge. And several of Anselm's letters
strongly suggest the role of one's intentions.\textsuperscript{170} What has no
significance for the will's use of its strength are the
circumstances of the performance which one wills to do. Such
circumstances are considerable in explaining why one either
succeeds or fails in effecting what was willed, but not in
explaining why one wills in the first place to do whatever and
wills to do so either strongly or not.\textsuperscript{171}

Ideally, no matter what form, type, or mode of willing is
manifested in the use and effect of the will, the affection for
the beneficial which naturally moves the will ought to manifest
itself in harmony with the affection for justice. It is a
harmony which bespeaks the well-being of the creature who,
responsibly, is to be perfected in justice.\textsuperscript{172} When the ideal
obtains: when the two possible ends of all willing, namely,
happiness and justice,\textsuperscript{173} are united,\textsuperscript{174} then ethically-
significant suggestions abound: foremost, the will's keeping
of the indwelling grace of rectitude, that is, its use of its
'ability to keep,' and thus, the subordination of the will's
natural affection to its acquired and 'kept' affection;\textsuperscript{175}
second, the subordination of the will to the moral dictates of reason; and, third, the subordination of the created *imago dei* to the God in whom happiness (*beatitudo*) and justice are essentially one⁷⁷ and in whom the will never fails to act reasonably.⁷⁸ That which the ideal suggests is simply the morally-responsible rational creature's 'ethics of being' -- the locus and crux of which is the ability to will and the ability to use the will.⁷⁹

D)

Anselm on Virtue: the 'Ethics of Being' Truly Free

'Freedom of choice,' justice, and the underlying moral psychology of reason, will, and memory suggest all too clearly the deontological bent of Anselmian ethics. Ideas of duty are especially discernible in the view that one's moral actions are right if they signify that which ought to be done and if they proceed from a will that wills what it ought to will.⁸⁰ But the will can only will as such if it possesses that justice which it is naturally able to keep and ought to preserve. To pause indefinitely on this deontological emphasis is tantamount to abbreviating the ambit of Anselmian ethics. Or so I think. For the 'way of existing' which Anselm envisions for the rational creature who endeavors towards the fullness of the truth of being does not merely include the objectivity of duty -- of subordinating the rational will out of obligation to the will of God; it too embraces the subjectivity of virtue -- of qualitatively supporting the rational soul, the *imago dei*, in its ascending journey⁸¹ towards God. The path of living in justice, of 'being truly free,' is the path of being virtuous.⁸²

One's possession of rectitude of will suggests immediately that one is aligned with God. It also suggests that one is truly free and, paradoxically, obedient.⁸³ For, in order to have and to retain rectitude of will, one must will that which one ought to will, and that which one ought to will is that which God wills one to will. One's strength for living virtuously rests upon
one's being truly obedient, that is, upon subordinating oneself voluntarily to one's superior. Ultimately, whether one be a monk, cleric, nun, or layperson, the Creator-God is that superior. Failure to live obediently according to God's will expunges rectitude from the will and obliterates the prospect of living virtuously. Consequently, lack of obedience impedes or retards the will's perfection of its own natural freedom. For true freedom arises out of one's obedience to one's obligation to subordinate one's will in word and deed to the just God.

Upon closer examination, it seems that Anselm's understanding of obedience as one of two essential pillars of virtuous living reflects the idea that obedience itself is grounded in virtue. Indeed, as the Anselmian sources see it, the mother of virtues, the ground from which the tree of virtue grows and bears the fruit of good deeds, is humility (humilitas).

To be obedient to anyone presupposes a certain degree of self-abasement. To be humble is, in short, to have nothing but a complete and sincere recognition and acceptance of one's own contemptibility in the face of others. The idea of lowering one's own estimation of oneself in respect to others, that is, of not thinking of oneself as being better than, equal to, or just as good as any other being, captures the Anselmian sense. In the face of God one's humility translates more precisely into one's recognition and acceptance of one's own existential contingency and dependency upon the Creator-God for what one is, that one is, and all that is good in one's life. The translation manifests itself genuinely in the fulfilled obligation of a heteronomous will vis-à-vis the divine will: the will of the creature subordinated to the will of the Creator. Without humility, the ground is tilled for the sprouting of an autonomous will (propria voluntas) deeply rooted in pride (superbia). In the absence of humility, pride obtains; in the presence of pride, obedience is wanting; in the lack of obedience, true freedom is either compromised or abandoned. To be truly free means being humble and obedient before one's God: True freedom
is rooted in the ground of humility and is anchored to the pillar of obedience.

Humility and obedience may both be necessary virtues for being truly free, but they are not sufficient. True freedom, for Anselm, demands the sufficiency of four cardinal virtues which flourish only in one's love of God and love of neighbor.

Prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, as if excellences, manners, or good habits of the soul, qualify or set in order (digerere) the spiritual fortress of reason, will, and memory. In one respect, these principal virtues, given their grounding in humility and obedience, support and contain all other virtues; in another respect, they armor the rational soul against the onslaughts of temptation and tribulation which abound on its ascending endeavor towards perfection in the truth of being. They fortify the fortress or rational soul in understanding what ought to be believed and done, in willing what is understood in conformity with the divine will, and in remembering the precepts of God. And, perchance, they might even be better discerned as fortifying the soul against itself, that is, as strengthening and supporting reason and memory against the inalienable strength of the will.

In Anselmian thought, prudence, seemingly understood as the 'virtue of reason,' guards the portal of the fortress: It discerns what should be desired or disdained and what should be received or rejected; it advises that evil things should be spurned and good things procured and retained. In this role, prudence is aided by the virtue of fortitude: As an excellence of the soul it is deemed to repel the external forces which attempt to besiege the spiritual fortress and also to enfeeble its ascending endeavor towards perfection. With fortitude the soul securely holds to its contemning of evil and adversity and to its inclining towards those things which are truly beneficial. As a complement to the good habit of fortitude, the excellence of temperance positions itself among the thoughts and desires, and the senses and actions, of the soul: Here it
restrains all from excessiveness and immoderation. And in the midst of prudence, fortitude, and temperance stands justice -- the good quality by which the soul assigns to each and all that which is due and fitting.

These cardinal virtues of the soul do not obtain by strength of the rational creature alone, but rather in virtue of the interaction between the naturally free will and the grace of God as realized in the actualization of the creature's 'freedom of choice.' Once the indwelling grace of divine justice obtains in the will, the rational being is equipped for cultivating these interior virtues in the ground of humility and obedience. Only then is the rational will able to beget those good deeds which bespeak the flourishing presence of virtue. In doing so it evidences his fundamental resolve for existing virtuously and for endeavoring towards perfection of being. If it be the voluntary intention of any rational being to remain faithful to that resolve and to grow hopefully towards "purity of heart" (munditia cordis) in the mode of being truly free, then one must needs endeavor ever more towards perfection in the virtues. The task is not easy: One can easily fail and regress when faced with daily temptation and tribulation. Thus, as Anselm counsels, one must persevere: One must endure: One must be patient.

Ranked exceeding high among the virtues is patience: In fact, in Anselm's view, it is the pillar that complements obedience. Together, obedience and patience buttress the spiritual fortress of the rational creature living virtuously until the realization of the goal for which it and he were created.

In spite of the fact that Anselm considers patience to be utterly important in a life properly orientated towards God, he unfortunately fails to deliver a precise sense or definition of it. Based, however, upon my examination of the word in all of its occurrences, its meaning seems to approximate that of 'steadfastness' and 'endurance' in the short-run. Patience is...
always understood in view of external, adversarial forces. More importantly, it complements and nears the Anselmian sense of 'perseverance' as 'steadfastness' and 'longanimity' in and for the long-run with a view of a certain goal or resolution. I think Anselm's advice to a troubled and afflicted monk encapsulates these points rather concisely:

...you need only the attainment of the virtue of patience, which you have already held onto manfully for a long time. In no way will you more effectively, or, as far as you are concerned, more honorably or more usefully, achieve peace of mind or placate him or overcome the hidden enemy who assails you with this very tribulation, and so receive the crown of victory. For 'nobody' will be crowned 'except' the one who 'fights according to the rules.' And one only fights according to the rules who has persevered to his or his assailant's end. For it is written that 'patience has a perfect work.' And 'in your patience you will possess your souls.'

"According to the rules" ultimately implies obedience to the precepts or will of God. In this sense, patience is seen to be the perfection of that obedience which is grounded in humility and bespeaks the presence of rectitude in the will. Patience strengthens and, together with the four cardinal virtues, protects the rational soul against the darts of temptation and tribulation which abound in life's ascending journey towards perfection with God. Without patience in the short-run or perseverance in the long-run, humble obedience is compromised and so too are the virtues which grow out of it: Life's journey begins to descend into sinfulness; true freedom begins to diminish: The 'ability to keep' begins to fall into disuse and out of actualization. It is only through patience that the truly free existence of the rational creature is brought to perfection in virtues. And, in short, this is only the case because the rational creature, in spite of every temptation and tribulation, patiently and perseveringly holds to the "resolution of a good will."

For Anselm, rectitude of the will makes for a good will. It attests to the obedience of a humble creature before his God.
And the attestation marks the creature's truth of being. With patient and persevering resolve in and for the sake of rectitude alone, the creature advances towards the fullness of that truth. The ascending endeavor is that of being virtuous -- of the trinitarian soul of memory, reason, and will being prudent, fortitudinous, temperate, and just: It is that of being truly free for one's Creator and God.

Conclusion

There is plenty of room in Anselmian scholarship for at least one additional and burgeoning interpretation of Anselm's concept of 'freedom of choice.' The view, which I have presented in this essay in a fragmentary, notebook-like manner, neither blurs nor confuses the distinction between the natural freedom of the will and 'freedom of choice.' Rather, it seeks to appreciate the latter as the natural ability that it is and, when actualized, as the means by which the former is gradually advanced towards meaningful perfection. Such an advancement is nothing short of being an ethics -- an ethics which pervades and effects the essential and existential dimensions of one's being: an ethics which concerns not only 'what one does' but more fundamentally 'who and what one is.' I call it an 'ethics of being': I consider it to be (and I believe Anselm would) the rational being's way of fully effecting the signification of the truth of his being.
Early dialogues such as *De casu diaboli*
...are particularly rewarding
for the reader whose interests are logical and philosophical. True, the terminology and turns of expression may, at certain points, carry difficulty with them, and may even mislead the superficial reader. The policy of assuming oneself to be ignorant of the author's understanding until one is certain that one has understood his ignorance is essential here as in all studies of the history of philosophy and logic. After all, words are the means of our communication with Anselm; as he never tires of reminding us, words often conceal rather than reveal the truth which their author intended.

Desmond P. Henry
*The Logic of Saint Anselm*
Introduction to Part II

As it is in part I, so too in part II: The idea of relation between God and creatures is prominent; only now it is distinctly negative: Between God and rational creatures the moral relation has gone awry. The creature has fallen out of an 'ethics of being' and has become evil: He fails to signify fully the truth of his being. Part II focuses on the problem of evil: At issue is the origin of moral evil and the challenge of explaining it vis-à-vis the Creator-God who is believed to be all good, just, and powerful. In De casu diaboli, Anselm grapples with the problem. With understated philosophical facility and circumspection, he proffers a terse justification of God in the face of it: In sum, he holds that God is not the author of moral evil; the creature of a free and rational will is. His effort is not that of a 'free will defense': He is not simply presenting a possible explanation of the problem. In his own estimation, he is presenting the explanation and, implicitly, the solution: His effort is that of a 'free will theodicy.'

The following critique of De casu diaboli will expose the dialogue as the theodicean effort that I think it is. A rigid structure should facilitate such a consideration and assure my deference to brevity and, I hope, clarity:

First, the dialogue has been divided into fifteen sections — the numerical sequence of which perfectly respects the dialogue's sequence of chapters and, thus, its literary integrity: From c. 1 to c. 28, some chapters stand singly and are considered alone, others are grouped and considered together. My division of the chapters is based solely on my judgment of where the many sub-arguments break naturally or where significant shifts occur in the perspective of the two interlocutors.

Second, each section, from four to eighteen, is treated alike. The issue or sub-thesis of each is identified to the extent that it undergirds and contributes to the greater issue or thesis of the dialogue as a whole, that is, to an Anselmian
theodicy. The identification (A) is complemented by an interpretative analysis (B) of the argument which Anselm puts forth in order to clarify and to support his stance. The breadth, depth, and style of each expository analysis in 'B' will vary according to the section under consideration: Some are patently more philosophically fecund than others and lend themselves more easily to the philosophical task. A critical reflection (C) follows each analysis: It elucidates a point or issue that arises from the argument and either strengthens or weakens Anselm's theodicean effort.

Each section of part II supposes and, to whatever extent possible, reflects my interpretative analysis and synthetic exposition of Anselm's presuppositions in part I. Consideration of previously unremarked Anselmian points occur appropriately, as do discreetly placed references to and discussion of Anselmian scholarship.

Not so discreet is my attempt to substitute, whenever possible, Anselm's specific references to good and bad angels by general references to good and bad rational creatures. This I have done with the certainty of not having compromised the spirit of the text. For there is no reason to think that Anselm, who has no angelology of which anyone can credibly speak, is exclusively concerned with separate substances. A man or woman can be as much of a devil as is any fallen angel (cf. CDH, I, c.18; S.II,83:10-12)! By considering the problem of evil from the perspective of the angel alone, Anselm astutely avoids many complex theological and non-theological issues which surround the fall and rehabilitation of man. These he considers much later in CDH, MRH, and DCV. With very few exceptions (and I note them in my ensuing critique), the issues and claims of De casu diaboli are as applicable to human beings in the explanation of moral evil and justification of God as they are to the angelic hosts.
Section 4

DCD, c. 1:
God, not the Proper Cause of Evil and Not-Being

A)  
Anselm points up the theodicean focus of the dialogue which he purports to be a study in sacred scripture. Scripture speaks of God as causing evil (malum) and not-being (non esse). Its veracity is not to be undermined. But, as if he were a biblical hermeneutist, Anselm is neither remiss nor daunted by the challenge of clarifying it. There is the need to grapple with expressions employed by human transmitters of divine revelation: There is the need to confront, as he would put it, the improprieties of verbal expressions which, owing to whatever linguistic peculiarities or circumstances of the human author, obscure rather than elucidate the truth of the divine author. Scripture has it that God causes evil and not-being, and Anselm, while holding firmly to his belief in an omnibenevolent God, has a clarification. It is the sub-thesis of this section -- indeed, it is the thesis of the whole philosophical dialogue -- that God is not the proximate and efficient, that is, the 'proper' (propria), cause and source of evil and not-being. God's causal role is only remote and indirect, that is, it is only 'improper' (impropria).

B)  
The student's query on the Pauline question -- "What do you have that you have not received?" -- initiates Anselm's defense of his sub-thesis as well as his clarification of scripture. His effort comprises three terse arguments linked by one counter-argument. Each of the three presupposes an appreciation of his position on either divine aseity, causal agency, or divine simplicity. His thesis that God is not the proper cause of evil and not-being is based on the minor, but supporting, claim of each: that the aseitic and per seitic Creator is the cause and
source of all beings; that causality can be discerned as either proper or improper; and that all beings are good by virtue of having been created by the Creator who is always and simply the supreme good and supreme being.

Anselm is clear on the point: "No created being has anything from itself." All that human and angelic creatures have they possess from God (S.I,235:14-15), except for not-being which includes moral evil or not-being just. This claim arises out of Anselm's very first argument which intimates his ontological distinction between the aseitic and perseitic Creator and contingent beings. It proceeds accordingly (S.I,233:8-18):
1) A being that does not exist from itself is unable to have anything from itself. 2) Of all beings, there are only the Creator and creatures: Nothing else is able to exist. But, 4) creatures can only exist from the Creator, and the Creator can only exist from the Creator. Therefore, 5) only the Creator has from the divine self whatever the divine maker has; whatever creatures have they have only from the Creator. And so, 6) creatures have only something (non nisi aliquid) from God and only nothing (non nisi nihil) from themselves. God is the proper cause and source of all beings.

The inference is essential: It constitutes the conceptual foundation upon which Anselm distances God from not-being, whether it be ontologically or ethically construed. But, the argument is considered problematic by Anselm's student (S.I,233:19-234:5): For if 'that and what a thing is' is only because God causes it to be, then, he reasons, 'whatever is not' or 'whatever is caused not to be' is so because God either does not cause it to be, or causes it not to be, or causes it to move (transire) from being to not-being. Or so it seems to be the case.

Anselm is not convinced. He rejoins with an elucidation on causal agency. Such is the concept that he understands in terms of four general sentential forms of 'facere' which devolve into four subalternate expressions of proper causality and sixteen
expressions of indirect causality. In citing the example of the despoiler (S.I,234:9-14), a man who is able to restrain the despoiler, and the man who is despoiled, Anselm indicates how God's causality of evil and not-being can be understood to be indirect or improper. Like the man who is able to restrain the despoiler who properly or directly causes yet another man to be made naked, but does not restrain him and by not doing so improperly or indirectly causes the other man's nakedness, so too is God to be understood (S.I,234:15-17) as causing a creature's not-being or causing the many other things which God is said to do only improperly. The divine ability to do something, though able to be employed, is not used; in effect, something else is indirectly caused to be or not to be.

The same point is used against the student's astute claim that God causes things to move from being to not-being, even if they do not fall completely into nothing (nihil). God does not directly cause created beings not to be. God merely ceases (desinere) to conserve (servare) the being of those creatures: That is, God does not do that which God is able to do. By the unemployment of God's ability to conserve, or by God's reclamation of the existence that was bestowed in creation, created beings simply return to their original state of not-being which, as Anselm claims, they have from themselves before creation and not from God (S.I,234:17-26).

Anselm's third attempt to distance God from direct causality of evil and not-being is owing to the influence of Augustine and to his own understanding of divine unity and simplicity. On this conceptual basis, a key argument arises (S.I,234:29-235:5): 1) From the supreme good (sumnum bonum) comes only good (bonum). 2) Every good is from the supreme good. Likewise, 3) from the supreme being (summa essentia) comes only being (essentia). 4) Every being is from the supreme being. 5) The supreme good is the supreme being. Thus, 6) every good thing is a being, every being is a good thing. Therefore, 7) nothing (nihil) and not-being (non esse) are not goods inasmuch as they are not beings.
(essentia). And thus, 8) nothing and not-being are not from the Creator from whom there is only good and being. The argument simply enhances this section's first inference and further intimates the ontological distinction between Creator and creatures. It too suggests why Anselm later claims that every creature qua being is good. The being and goodness of the creature mirrors the being and goodness of the Creator from whom all esse and essentia originate.

C)

If DCD, c. 1, is the "veritable prolegomenon" that E. Briancesco says it is, then there is the need to understood why and to what extent. Given that DCD is unequivocally concerned with the ethical, it might be asked what reason Anselm could have had for intellectually distancing God from direct causality of the negative ontological extreme, that is, from not-being, nothing, or evil. Why is the emphasis of this section ontological when the dialogue's is primarily ethical?

Speculation abounds on a few points: Anselm could have been merely seeking to link De casu diaboli conceptually with his previous works. The Monologion and De veritate are foremost because of their metaphysical and ontological bents. Or he could have simply been desirous of anchoring his ethical and theodicean reflection to his Augustinian roots: In a world that is believed to have but one governor and creator who is the supreme being, there is but one contrary to that being: It is 'not-being.' Or it could have been that, owing to his penchant for literary brevity, he was positing a philosophical position ripe for interpretation of evils other than moral evil -- should one be so inclined to interpret.

De casu diaboli does not focus on metaphysical, natural, and physical evils. It is unlikely, though, that Anselm is either unaware of the seeming balefulness of natural disasters and physical sufferings or is insensitive to the need to
understand God vis-à-vis these forms of evil. His patent understanding of the diminishment of created being -- of the attrition and demise of 'that and what a thing is' into not-being or nothing -- is broadly suggestive of such an awareness and sensitivity.

Presumably, the diminishment of any created being into not-being, be that creature animate or inanimate, entails change of a destructive or degenerative mode. Its ramifications and effects oftentimes bear hardships and pains for the being suffering diminishment, if sensible, and for those beings perceptively near enough to be affected by it. Might Anselm's remarks on the indirect causality of God vis-à-vis a creature's ontological passing from being to not-being be his justification of God in the face of natural and physical evils? Might it be if one grants that such evils involve 'essential' change and diminution of some degree or other? In all cases, the Creator-God, as conservator, could still be thought of as ceasing to conserve created being. In doing so, God would be indirectly causing that being's diminution or cessation of being, and indirectly the hardships and pains which accompany or follow it. God's reason for ceasing to conserve a creature is unknown, but Anselm is clear on the point that the divine will does nothing without a reason. Speculation has it, and so too would Anselm, that the reason probably respects the eternal plan of the God of love who creates purposefully and fashions creatures with a purpose.

Anselm's position, however, is problematic on one point. It centers on his claim that creatures, after not being essentially conserved by God, have 'not-being' from themselves. That is, they have only 'nothing' from themselves which is just the way it was before they were created. But this position cannot stand or be accepted at its literal face value; otherwise, a fundamental metaphysical tenet of the Monologion, if not the whole meditation, fails.

It is Anselm's Monologion stance that before the creation of anything and everything there is in the eternal mind of God the
true existence of creation." Created beings might very well be obliterated in time, but they always exist outside of time in divine eternity. If Anselm wants to hold this stance, and I trust that he does, then he can only do so if he means to construe 'not-being' particularly: not 'not-being' as the contrary of the true existence of every creature in the mind of the eternal God whose knowledge is divine essence, but rather 'not-being' as the contrary of that 'participated' existence of the creature which is merely an image of true existence.

There are two senses of being in Anselmian thought: necessary and contingent, and of the latter there is a bifurcation: the mirroring of true existence and the true existence itself which is the supreme being. If Anselm's understanding of creatures as having 'not-being' from themselves implies 'not-being' as the absolute contrary of true existence itself, then the Monologion collapses in toto and with it Anselm's vision of the one and simple God who is supreme existence with an eternal idea of creation. His understanding must refer to the creature's ontological mirroring. This is the point on which to understand this chapter's ontological emphasis on 'not-being' and God's indirect causality of it.

Indeed, DCD, c. 1, does figure as a veritable prolegomenon: It subtly sets forth the skeletal rationale for understanding God's causal role in evils other than the moral. In doing so, it lays the metaphysical-ontological groundwork for subsequent consideration of God as not being the direct cause of a rational creature's passing from 'being truly free' to 'not being truly free.' Anselm's God is neither the direct cause of metaphysical, natural, and physical evils, nor the like cause of moral evil. Every conceptual strand of 'not-being' is contrary to God.
Section 5

DCD, cc. 2-4: 
On the Fall of the Rational Creature: The Will to Desert
God's Gifts of Perseverance and Justice

A)

Anselm's study of scripture continues: His Pauline 
hermeneutic in c. 1 affects in cc. 2-4 his exegesis of the 
Johannine reference to the angel who did not stand in the truth.1 
His analysis, which focuses on the rational creature who ceased 
to 'be just' or to 'be truly free,' is not strictly biblical 
exegesis. For immediately it devolves into a philosophical 
consideration of the origin of moral evil. Anselm's dialectical 
consideration begins with an implied and significant question.

The belief that one angel stood in the truth, when another 
did not, becomes the question of whether the angel who did not 
stand had received from God what was received by the angel who 
did stand and was necessary for standing. The question centers 
primarily on the issue of God's gift of perseverance and the 
rational creature's receipt and acceptance of it. Did the angel 
who failed to persevere in being truly free fail because he did 
not receive the virtue and did not receive it because God did not 
give it, as the student thinks?2 Anselm's negative and complex 
response is significantly theodicean.

In cc. 2-4, his thesis is burgeoning rather clearly: The 
direct cause of moral evil among God's rational creatures is not 
theo-logical but rather psycho-logical. Anselm's focus on the 
fall of the angel isolates the origin of moral evil not so much 
in the rational creature's neglect of the aretaic but rather in 
the fundamental psychology that underlies it. Moral evil is 
attributed to a free will that waxes autonomous, desires and 
wills inordinately, and subsequently bespeaks the rational 
creature, the imago dei, as likening himself to or equating 
himself with God.
B)

Anselm argues the foundational points of his theodicean stance in three phases. He does so only sketchily as a propaedeutic to fuller considerations given later in the dialogue. Throughout, his dialectical partner disingenuously assumes the role of devil's advocate: The student inclines towards attributing the fall of the angel to his not receiving either perseverance, or the ability and will to persevere, or the ability and will to keep the justice in which he ought to have persevered. And, more importantly, his inclination includes the stance that the angel did not receive because God did not give (S.I,235:22-27).

First Phase
At the beginning of c. 3 (S.I,236:12-237:7), Anselm considers what seems to be a minor point; in fact, it is not. He corrects the student's failure to distinguish between real and logical causality, a failure which is evident in his own words:

...if giving is the cause of the good angel's receiving, then not-giving is the cause of the evil angel's not-receiving; and if not-giving is postulated, I see it to be a cause from which not-receiving follows logically.\(^4\)

The positing of one thing might cause one to infer another thing, but this logical causality need not always parallel the real causality of the matter. As Anselm puts it: "Indeed, the fact that one thing is the cause of another thing is different from the fact that the positing of a thing is the cause of what follows logically from it."\(^5\) When the student hears the claim that the angel did not receive perseverance, he logically infers the not-giving of perseverance; but, incorrectly he thinks that not-giving is the real cause of the angel's not-receiving. He confuses logical and real causality. Mistakenly, he thinks that the cause of anyone's not-receiving something is always the not-giving by someone else. Thus, he thinks that the angel did not receive perseverance because God did not really give it.

In the emendation, Anselm concedes that every instance of
one's receiving something is caused by an instance of someone else's giving it: Giving is always the proximate and efficient cause of receiving. If one does not give, then another certainly does not receive. But, it does not follow that one's not-receiving something is always and really caused by another's not-giving it, even though the positing of not-receiving logically causes one to infer not-giving. It can be the case that one does not receive something from someone else not because the other does not give, but rather because the recipient does not accept that which is being offered (S.I,236:21-23); or, maybe, accepts it and then rejects it later. This is the case with the angel who did not stand in the truth: He did not receive perseverance because he did not accept God's offering of it. And God is thus said not to have given perseverance because the angel did not receive it.

In making this seemingly minor point Anselm has put to rest a traditional misunderstanding that the angel did not receive because God really did not give (S.I,236:5-9). Furthermore, he has anchored his burgeoning theodicean stance to scripture, that is, to the Pauline position: Among all other things, the rational creature did receive from God that which would have enabled him to remain 'standing in the truth' or to persist in 'being truly free.' Having done so, Anselm is free to look elsewhere for the explanation of the moral fall. The failure of the creature is not owing to a failure of God to give (S.I,240:7-8).

The preceding distinction, however, does not fully appease the student: He seems bent on finding and attributing such a deficiency. He still wants for an understanding of why the angel did not receive or accept perseverance. Was it because he 'could not' or 'would not' receive it? His demand forces Anselm into the second phase of his theodicean stance and brings him one step closer to establishing the will as the origin of moral evil. In the process, he implicitly conveys his greater interest in the modality (quomodo) of the will that leads to evil rather than in
the object (quid) of such a will.  \(^7\)

**Second Phase**

The dialogue continues with the devil's advocate attempting to argue that the angel 'could not' receive perseverance: He did not have the ability or will to receive it: 1) If the angel did not have the ability or will to receive, then God did not give it. For, 2) if God had given the ability or will, then the angel would surely have had the ability or will. Therefore, 3) given that the angel did not receive perseverance, God must not have given the ability or will to receive (S.I,237:15-19). With one unargued counter-claim, Anselm summarily dismisses the inference: God gave both the ability and the will to receive perseverance, and the angel received and possessed them (S.I,237:20-22). Thus, Anselm leaves us and his student to suppose or believe that the angel 'could.'

But the student's subsequent and incorrect rejoinder -- that if he had the ability and will to receive, then he received and had perseverance (S.I,237:21-24) -- indicates his failure to understand Anselm's concept of ability. He fails to see precisely the distinction between having an ability and using that ability or, more precisely, to see that certain instrumental factors obtain in the actualization of any raw ability. The angel had the ability and will to receive perseverance, but the ability was unactualized or de-actualized. \(^8\)

What transpires at this troublesome point in the argument is nothing short of a cryptic attempt on Anselm's part to explain why the angel's ability to receive was de-actualized. More precisely, he attempts to tell why the angel, who received and had the ability and will to receive perseverance, went from having perseverance, and persevering, to not having it and not persevering. At the heart of the matter is the issue of the will, as is suggested in the question which he puts to the student and which marks the beginning of his explanation: "Have you ever begun something with the ability and the will to complete it, but nevertheless failed to complete it because your
will was changed before the thing was finished?"\(^{10}\)

An affirmative response is rendered. But the devil's advocate is hard-pressed to explain why he had gone from having first willed to complete something to not willing it later: that is, why he went from willing to persevere in something to not persevering in willing that same thing. His only explanation is that he did not will. His response, though, is problematic, as Anselm immediately indicates: For as long as he willed to persevere in something, he willed to persevere in willing (S.I,237:34-238:5). In other words, Anselm is implicitly steering him away from a violation of the principle of non-contradiction: He could not have willed to persevere and, at the same time, not willed to persevere. Hence, he ought not to say that he did not will to persevere in willing because he did not will to persevere in the willing of the willing.\(^{11}\)

Unfortunately, Anselm's suggestion of what he should say is no clearer:

when you are asked why you did not persevere in an activity in which you willed to persevere and were able to persevere, you can reply that you did not persevere in willing. But if you are then asked why you did not persevere in willing, you must give some other explanation regarding this failure of will than that you did not persevere in the willing of this willing.\(^{12}\)

The other explanation which he has in mind arises in his understanding of what it means 'to persevere.' In a word, it connotes 'perficere' or to do something completely. And so, 'to persevere in willing' means 'to will completely or thoroughly.' Anselm coins it 'perville' (S.I,238:23-28). When the student is asked the question again, he can reply that he did not will completely. And so too on behalf of the angel who did not stand in the truth: In spite of the fact that he had the ability and will to receive and had at one time the will to persevere in the truth, in the long run he did not accept or have perseverance because he did not will completely to stand in the truth.\(^{13}\)

The explanation does not seem to make any great difference.
An important question still remains and the devil's advocate puts it: Why did he not will completely? The fact that Anselm uses the word 'will' (velle) equivocally makes it more difficult to understand his point and so much easier to miss it altogether.

The key to clarification lies, I think, in appreciation of his tripartite concept of the will. Recall that this power of the soul is not simply a volitional power; it is also essentially desire. Every use (volition) of the 'will as instrument' springs from an affection or inclination of the will. Desire of the will founds and undergirds every choice of the will. The affection for something gauges the degree of strength with which the 'will as instrument' wills and chooses and with which the individual carries the willing into action.

On Anselm's behalf, a more technical answer can be given to the student's question -- why did he not will perseveringly?: The rational creature's switch from having the ability and will to persevere and actually persevering, to not persevering and not using his ability, can be explained in terms of the will as simply desire (when one might be inclined to think of it only in terms of volition). The de-actualization of the angel's ability is due to the one and only instrumental factor that is able to impede its actualization: This is the very will itself of an inalienable strength which desires through its own natural affection for the beneficial or acquired affection for justice. As long as one wills, that is, desires or is inclined to persevere in something, one wills (desires) to persevere in willing, that is, in carrying out one's volition in action. If one's desire for something which one has already willed either wanes or ceases, then so too does the willing of it and the will's effectuation in action.

At the next step in this phase it seems as though the student has finally apprehended Anselm's distinction and point. And yet, once again, he demands to know why the angel did not will completely:

For when you say that what he willed he did not will
completely, it is as if you were saying that what he willed at first, he did not will afterwards. Therefore, when he no longer willed what he willed at first, why did he not will it except that he did not have the will? I am not talking about the will [desire/inclination] which he had at first when he did will, but about the will [desire/inclination] which he did not have when he did not will.18

For what other reason did he not have or receive this will to persevere than that God did not give it (S.I,239:5-7)? The devil's advocate persists.

In God's defense, Anselm reoffers the same response: God did not give, because the angel did not receive. But, when he is asked to explain his reiteration, Anselm, perhaps jaded by the doltish inquirer, very quickly and rather surreptitiously shifts his argumentative focus: He moves from emphasizing perseverance and the will to persevere to talking subtly about that in which the angel ought to have willed perseveringly. In doing so, he introduces the student to a critical notion which I introduced and developed in s. 3: It is the 'ability to keep' and will to keep.

T:/ [The angel] freely lost the will which he had [i.e., the will, inclination, affection, or desire for justice]. And just as he received the possession of whatever he had [namely, perseverance and justice], so he was able to receive the permanent keeping of what he deserted [namely, justice and the state of being confirmed in it. He was so able because he had the natural 'ability to keep' the justice which he received and possessed at creation]. But, because he deserted [justice] he did not receive [or have it or come to possess it indefinitely by the confirmation of God]. Therefore, since he did not receive the [permanent] keeping [of justice] because he deserted [it], it is not the case that he did not receive [it] because God did not give [it]; rather God did not give [it] because he did not receive [it].19

Given this response, the student incorrectly answers his own question inasmuch as thinking aloud that the angel willed to desert because he did not will to keep. And, like a most persistent advocate, he reasons that 'not willing to keep' always precedes 'willing to desert'; one wills to desert because one does not will to keep. And, thus, why else did the angel not
will to keep than that he did not receive from God the 'will to keep' (S.I,239:16-20)?

In defense of God, Anselm once again wards off any suggestion of a deficiency owing to God's failure to give. He maintains, as if it were an article of faith, that the angel received and had the ability and will to keep.²⁰

In response to the student's position, he argues a point which secures his key point that the angel fell because of an efficiency of the will and not a deficiency: It is not always the case that 'not willing to keep' always precedes the 'will to desert.'²¹

First, 'not willing to keep' does precede 'willing to desert' in cases where one does not will to receive and have something which one does not already possess. Anselm's example of the 'burning coal in hand' is illustrative of the point (S.I,239:23-27). But the 'will to desert' does precede 'not willing to keep' in cases where one possesses something and desires and wills to have something else but can only have it if one first deserts that which one already has. Anselm's example of the 'miser and bread,' though analogically problematic, is also illustrative of the point: The miser has to desert or spend a little cash in order to get or have a little bread (S.I,239:27-240:2). In the case of the angel who received and had the will to persevere and the will to keep that which he ought to have kept, namely, justice: He had to give up justice (his 'cash') in order to obtain what he desired and willed and what was presumably contrary to justice (his 'bread'). His 'will to desert' preceded his 'not willing to keep.' The angel had a "good persevering will" (bonam voluntatem perseverantem): He stood in the truth inasmuch as willing to keep justice perseveringly; yet, he had to forsake justice first before he could obtain what was unjust. And in forsaking justice, he simultaneously chose not to persevere any longer in it. By willing, that is, by desiring and then choosing, what he ought not to have willed, he forsook what he had in consequence of a
"supervening evil will" (mala superveniente).  

By the end of this phase, the student has made three unsuccessful attempts to pinpoint the fall of the angel to a deficiency owing to God's failure to give either the virtue of perseverance, or the ability and will to persevere, or the ability and will to keep that in which he ought to have persevered. From this point, the argument presses onward with greater focus on the modality of the angel's will.

**Third Phase**

In c. 4, Anselm addresses himself to the student's hesitation about why the angel willed to desert that which he received and possessed. Unless the devil's advocate knows why, he is not likely to accept Anselm's reasoning that the angel's 'will to desert' preceded his 'not willing to keep.' The student wants to know what (quid) the angel willed that he did not have and, in order to get, required his desertion of what he already had, namely, perseverance and justice? (S. I, 240:18-21)

Furthermore, he wants to know how (quomodo) the angel fell? The manner (quomodo) in which the angel fell is directly considered: He failed to keep justice perseveringly, that is, he failed to will it completely. The argument is this: 1) The angel would not have fallen if he had perseveringly kept justice. But, 2) one only keeps justice by willing what one ought to will. And, 3) one only deserts justice by willing what one ought not to will. Therefore, 4) the angel deserted justice and thus fell (sic peccavit) by willing something which he ought not to have willed when he willed it (S. I, 240:22-241:5). He both freely departed from willing what he ought to have willed and justly lost what he had because he freely and unjustly willed what he did not possess and ought not to will.  

The answer to what (quid) the angel willed, though obviously suggested above, is less explicitly conveyed below. It follows interpretatively (S. I, 241:6-21): First, it is established that the angel should have willed what he had in his possession, that
is, what he had received from God. He could not have fallen by willing any of this. So, it is inferred that he fell by willing something which he did not have and should not have willed before God willed it for him, that is, before God gave it to him.

Immediately, Anselm makes a point that speaks to his position on the two affections or inclinations of the will: The angel could only will (desire or be inclined towards) what he thought to be just or beneficial, that is, what he thought to be conducive to happiness (beatitudo). He could not have fallen by willing something that was both just and beneficial. Thus, he fell by willing something that was beneficial and was thought to be capable of increasing his happiness; but, it happened to be something that he did not already have and should not have willed before God willed for him to have it.

Anselm's response to the 'quid' question is nothing if not evasive and unsatisfactory: He does not specify the 'quid,' nor does he ever. Nevertheless, he does manage to suggest something more about the modality of willing in the angel's fall. Understanding how the angel fell lies in seeing the will not only as essentially desire and freedom, but also as being naturally inclined towards benefits and happiness.

The angel extended his desire or will for benefits beyond justice (S.I, 241:22-23); fundamentally, he willed to have something which he had not already received from God: He willed to have more than what he ought to have had. In doing so, he willed inordinately (inordinate): The angel extended his own will beyond God's will for him: "for he placed his will above the will of God." In doing so, he willed as if his will were autonomous or independent (propría voluntas), that is, as if his will should not have been subjected or subordinated to God's. With his will waxing autonomous, the angel was effectively willing inordinately to be like God: to be of an autonomous will. But, it is not the case that he fell because he willed to be like God; nay, he fell because "he willed inordinately to be like God." For, inasmuch as willing to persevere in keeping
justice by virtue of his natural ability to do so, the angel would have been willing to be a rational being created as an image of the God who is justice.\textsuperscript{27}

At the end of phase three, Anselm has set forth the foundational points of his theodicean stance, and perchance in contradistinction to Augustine:\textsuperscript{28} He has pinpointed the psychological origin of moral evil in the efficiency of the rational creature's free will.\textsuperscript{29} In doing so, he has rejected several attempts, and implicitly every attempt, to ground its origin in a deficiency of the creature which might be construed as owing to God's failure to give. The proper cause of moral evil is not theo-logical.

C)

In spite of his resolve not to peg the origin of moral evil to a deficiency in the rational creature, there is one point in Anselm's argument which suggests the possibility of doing just that. I have in mind an intra-psychological failure or desertion, that is, a deficiency, that is due to the will itself.

The point can very easily be missed if one is not fully sensitive to and critical of that section of the argument where Anselm "shifts argumentative gears." His claim that the angel received and had the 'ability and will to keep' is a very subtle reference to De libertate arbitrii and an undisputable link to the points of his ethically-significant concept of libertas. His claim in DCD that the angel had the 'ability to keep' is nothing less than the claim that the angel had the natural ability to keep rectitude of the will for its own sake or, as I have interpreted it, the ability to be truly free. If the idea of Anselmian libertas is to be understood at this point in DCD, then so too is Anselm's position that this natural ability, qua ability, is partly discernible in terms of instrumental factors which aid and abet or stymie its actualization. These instruments are the abilities to reason and to will.\textsuperscript{30}
The upshot of this is rather precise: If, as Anselm maintains, the angel had the 'ability to keep,' or the ability to be truly free, then the de-actualization of this natural ability was not simply a function of the will alone. When the angel willed to desert that which he had and that in which he ought to have persevered willingly; when the efficiency of his 'will to desert' preceded and effected his 'not willing to keep,' then, the will of an unvanquishable strength and inalienable natural freedom prevailed over reason. The power of reason was trumped, so to speak, in its primary role of ethical discernment and instruction by the power that is essentially desire for happiness. In 'not willing to keep' the angel's reason failed vis-à-vis his will. Or did it not?

To answer the question, I think it is necessary to keep in mind the logic of Anselm's discussion on giving and receiving in the relation between God and the angel. I want to suggest that the same reasoning holds in understanding the relation, or better yet, the fall-out, between reason and the will.

At least in respect to ethical matters, it seems plausible to hold that when the will 'thinks' about the benefit or object which the intellect presents to it as being conducive to happiness, the will deliberates on it and does so in conjunction with reason. Reason with its access to innate moral knowledge, a knowledge which images that of the divine mind, also gives to the will the proper ethical instruction it needs before it chooses and acts on what it 'thinks' to be beneficial. In the process, the will receives what the reason offers: Reason's counsel is presented to the will, in other words. But the presentation and its receipt by the will does not necessarily imply the will's acceptance or continued possession of what it receives. The will is able to refuse what reason gives. Just as the angel refused to accept or to possess God's gift of perseverance, so too the will refused to accept reason's ethical discernment and counsel.

It does not seem proper to suggest, nor is there any textual
evidence to maintain on Anselm's behalf, that, in the fall of the angel, reason failed to do what it should have done for the will. So, wherein lies the possibility of the deficiency which I have suggested? Gilbert Crispin, Anselm's monastic brother and intellectual companion, gives an important clue.

In *De angelo perdito*, which Crispin might have written as a tribute to Anselm or as a partial interpretation of *De casu diaboli*, he treats the fall of the angel with a slightly different emphasis: He firmly holds to the Anselmian position that the angel did not will truth perseveringly and that he willed inordinately (DAP, 104:29-31; 105:24). But he, unlike Anselm, explicitly considers the status of reason in the fall; in fact, he sees the fall of the angel as fundamentally bespeaking a misuse of the ability to reason. The angel was able to use or to misuse reason, and was able to persevere or not. In not willing to persevere in the truth, the angel, in effect, did not will to keep a rightful ability of using reason. In other words, either he or his will misused it. Crispin also speaks of it as a misuse of a rightful ability of free choice.

Anselm did not take such a line of argument, at least not directly and explicitly. But, the logic and implications of his own position on the fall, especially in light of his conception of *libertas* which includes the ability to reason as a key instrumental factor in freedom's actualization, suggests that he would not have cause for disputing Crispin's interpretation. In fact, in *DCD*, c. 5, he indirectly suggests that the angels who stood in the truth preserved rationality; thus, it follows that rationality was not preserved by those who did not stand.

In short, I think it is fair to say on Anselm's behalf that there was an underlying deficiency in the very efficiency of the will that led to the fall of the angel. It figures almost paradoxically as a deficiency owing to the efficiency of the will which gave way to the further efficiency of the will at the origin of moral evil. When the angel deliberated on that which he desired and ought not to have willed; when he willed to desert
justice because that which he was desiring exceeded its bounds and could not be obtained unless it be forsaken, there was either a prior or simultaneous desertion or failure of the will in relation to reason. There was an intra-psychological deficiency inasmuch as the will refused to reckon reason's ethical discernment and counsel which were rendered to it in its deliberation on that which it was desiring inordinately. In effect, the will of the angel misused reason, as Crispin correctly interprets, and efficiently caused the moral fall in virtue of a deficiency owing to itself.

Anselm's psychological explanation of the origin of moral evil is more complex than he acknowledges or, perchance, ever cared to acknowledge. And, although this critical reflection does not suggest any taint of Anselm's explanation, it does nevertheless raise an interesting question which Anselm might have anticipated and dodged: Why did the angel not receive from God a power of reason that could have withstood or countervailed the will's inordinate force?
Section 6

DCD, cc. 5-6:
On the Fall of the Rational Creature:
The Free Choice not to Be Truly Free

A)

Anselm's psychological explanation of the origin of moral evil continues, and in the process exonerates God altogether of any direct causality. In juxtaposing the good and bad angels, Anselm very subtly claims that the fall was not due to any necessity in the created will but rather to the will being naturally free: The angel's 'not willing to keep' or 'will to desert' justice was a free choice of his will. Such a choice entailed demerits and losses.¹

B)

Development of Anselm's claim begins with a question put at the start of c. 5: "Do you think," asks the teacher, "that the good angels were likewise able to sin before the evil angels fell?"² The answer lies in the following argument which I outline with a running interpretation. There are two parts to the argument -- the first is based in c. 5, the second in c. 6.

The first part clearly builds upon Anselm's emphasis in s. 5 on the mode of willing.

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1) It is certain, Anselm argues, that "if the good angels were not able to sin, then they kept justice not by their ability but by necessity."³

Here, Anselm is not simply claiming that all angels before the fall had both the ability to sin and not to sin. Given his fuller understanding of the will as essentially a power of choice and determination that is also freedom, and given his principle that the 'will to do' underlies every 'ability to do,' his claim is far greater: Before the fall, all angels, including the good ones who stood in truth, had the natural freedom of the will to
choose to realize either their abilities to sin or not to sin or, respectively, their abilities not to keep justice or to keep it. This is the point that underlies the remark on 'necessity' which Anselm wants to reject as pertaining to the angels before the fall. And, thus, the argument continues.

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2) It would follow [given the truth of 1] that the angels who stood in the truth, while the other angels fall, would not have merited grace either because of standing or because of preserving rationality which they were not able to lose.4

That is, grace is not merited in virtue of doing something necessarily. Grace (here most probably the gift of eternal beatitude) is awarded to those who freely choose to persevere in keeping justice and who will to use properly the natural ability of reason.

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But 3), given the scenarios 1 and 2, these angels "would not even correctly be called just."5

Here, Anselm is undoubtedly thinking of his concept of moral justice which he develops in DV, c. 12.6 In not correctly being called 'just,' the angels would not be called 'just' in the praiseworthy sense of the word. Such a predication is only made of those creatures who do what they ought to do freely and voluntarily, not necessarily or instinctively.

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Therefore 4), "if the angels who fell had not sinned when they were able, then to the degree that they would have been truly just [or truly free] and would have merited grace from God, to that degree they would have been better than the good angels."7

And thus 5), either a) elect human persons "would eventually be better and greater than the good angels" or b) the fallen angels "would not be perfectly restored since the human persons who would assume their places would not be such as the reprobate angels would have become."8

Once again, Anselm points up the significance of the choice of the naturally free will. He does so hypothetically: Assuming
that the good angels kept justice necessarily, that is, that they were not able to sin: If the bad angels, who had the ability to sin and not to sin, had not sinned when they were able not to sin, then these very angels would have been more meritorious than the good angels who were not able to sin. The explanation is simple: They would have been so simply in virtue of the fact that they would have shown themselves to be truly just. That is, in being truly just, they would have shown themselves to have freely chosen not to use their ability to sin; they would have freely chosen to do what they ought to have done. Their merit would have stemmed from such a choice.

The good angels must have been able to sin or not to sin, just like the bad angels. This is Anselm's claim. If they were not, then one of two disjuncts would obtain: a) that elect human persons with free choice of the will would be greater than the good angels who were not able to sin. This disjunct is unacceptable because Anselm most probably considers angelic nature to be superior to human nature. In any case, it points up implicitly his greater appreciation of a rational being doing something freely rather than necessarily. The other disjunct is also unacceptable: b) that the reprobate angels would not be perfectly replaced by elect human persons because these persons are not able to assume positions greater than the angels. If, perchance, they were replaced by humans, then the men and women who freely chose to keep justice and who were confirmed by God in their free choices for keeping it and for being truly free would be greater than those angels who kept justice simply in virtue of not being able to do otherwise. In effect, at the end of time and at the consummation of the world, these elect humans would find themselves, vis-à-vis angels, at least one step higher on the hierarchy of being than they were at the beginning of time when angels were at least one step higher vis-à-vis humans. The ontological order of God's creation would effectively be altered and rendered contrary to God's original plan.

With both disjuncts denied, Anselm concludes:
Therefore, 6) "the good angels were able to sin before the fall of the evil angels: [and,] as shown, they were not different from those who sinned."\textsuperscript{11}

All of the angels were, so to speak, on equal footing: All were equally free to will to keep justice or not to keep; all were naturally free in respect to their ability to choose to sin or not to sin.\textsuperscript{12}

The upshot of this part of the argument is simple: Moral evil arose not from necessity, but out of voluntary freedom. In Anselmian thought, the idea of free choice is most significant in understanding the will and its mode at the origin of moral evil.\textsuperscript{13} It is the linchpin, as it were, of his 'free will theodicy.'

The second part of this argument continues in c. 6. The emphasis shifts, however, from the mode of willing freely to the effects of willing freely -- effects which are positive for those angels who chose to stand or to persevere in the truth and negative for those who chose not to stand.

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Thus, 7) "the angels who preferred justice [that is, who willed to keep justice] which they possessed to the something more which they did not possess received through the reward of justice the good which they lost as if on account of justice...."\textsuperscript{14}

Furthermore, 8) "these angels remained truly secure about the good which they already had."\textsuperscript{15}

In other words, after the angels fell for willing something which they did not have and which justice dictated that they ought not to have when they willed to have it, the good angels were rewarded with that which they did not seek. They were rewarded with "the good which they lost as if on account of [keeping] justice." They got what the bad angels desired and willed but did not get.\textsuperscript{16} And in the final analysis:

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Therefore, 9) these good angels "were exalted to the point
that they obtained whatever they were able to will, and they no longer see what more they can will."17

In their exaltation they are not able to will benefits outside of the bounds of justice18 because they have attained to a sufficiency of all benefits. That is, they have obtained happiness in contemplation of God:19 They now have all that they could ever possibly desire or will in their happiness of beholding the God who is supreme beatitude.20 In virtue of having merited eternal participation in the divine light, they now have all that they could ever possibly will for their own benefit.21

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But, 10) "as for the angels who preferred the something more which God did not yet will to give them, and who preferred it to standing in the justice in which they had been created: Through the judgment of justice [that is, God], they did not at all obtain that good on account of which they despised justice, and they lost the good which they already had."22

By not willing perseveringly to keep justice, by not freely willing to be truly free, the angels who willed inordinately beyond the bounds of justice lost in the end not only justice but also that to which they aspired.

This second part of the argument concludes on a point which bespeaks the ultimate effects of willing and not willing to keep. It indicates, on the one hand, what results in being truly free in union with God and, on the other, what results in not being truly free inasmuch as having an autonomous will in a state of disunion with God.

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Therefore, 11) the angels were thus separated: a) "those who adhered to justice [or stood in truth] are able to will no good in which they do not delight."23

In other words, in their full union with God, the possibility of their willing benefits or goods is simply exhausted. There is no good which they can will and in which they do not already delight. Such is the benefit of beholding God; such is the
creature's perfection of beatitude: to enjoy a sufficiency of benefits without any need while in union with the self-sufficient and supreme source of happiness.

A slightly different appreciation of this union can be gained from Pros., c. 25. Although, in context, Anselm is concerned with human persons, what he says is not without relevance to the angels. For, as he sees it, humans seeking eternal beatitude are aiming to be like those angels who are now confirmed. Humans who are to be confirmed in justice and who are to reap the benefits of communion with God shall finds themselves in a harmony (concordia) of wills. Their wills shall be one: They shall have one will: They shall have no will except for the will of God. Whatever they shall will shall be willed through the will of God. They, who will be called "sons of God" or "gods" (S.I, 119:13), shall will nothing other than what God wills; and God nothing other than they.

It is not -- or at least it seems philosophically and theologially implausible -- that confirmed human beings will actually lose their wills once they have entered into this harmony. For if they lose this power of their souls, then they also lose their psychological image of God and, thus, the likeness of God to which they justly aspired throughout their temporal lives. Hence, Anselm probably means a concord of wills that approximates a moral unity in the sense of 'e pluribus unum.' In their earthly existences, those who endeavor to be truly free are those whose individual wills are ordained to God's. In their future experience of being confirmed by God as faithfully just creatures, theirs will be the ultimate realization of moral unification with the divine will. It will be nothing less than the very goal towards which they freely endeavored in time and hoped to experience in eternity.

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and b) "those who deserted justice [or did not stand in truth] are able to will no good of which they are not deprived."
In other words, they can will nothing good at all or will anything more than what they already have after the fall. Being in a state of disunion with God, they have nothing: They have lost every good, for they have severed their relation with the supreme source of all goods. Particularly, they have lost justice, and are not able to will it. Without the will for justice they are estranged from the Creator-God who is justice, and they are deprived of obtaining the true benefits which only accrue when one enjoys a moral relation with God.

By the end of this two-part argument, which complements and extends the arguments of ss. 4 and 5, Anselm has put forth the basic points of his theodicean stance.

C)

The rational creature's 'not willing to keep' justice is a choice of the naturally free will. Anselm's claim is subtle. Its theodicean significance is fairly patent. But what is not as evident is the greater implication of such a choice: Indeed, it directly begets moral evil, but it also directly effects a rift in the relation between the rational creature and his Creator. Critical reflection on this section recalls the notion of Anselmian libertas as presented in s. 3.

Ultimately, the claim of this section with its seemingly tangential emphasis on the gains and losses of the angels implies that Anselm wants to understand the fallen angel as having voluntarily desisted from 'being truly free.'

I do not know what it was [Anselm answers when finally asked about the specific benefit that the good angels gained and the bad angels lost]. But whatever it was [he adds] it suffices to know that it was something toward which they could grow and which they did not receive when they were created, so that they might attain it by their own merit. 

In freely willing whatever and in doing so inordinately, the angel in effect ceased growing in relation with God towards the goal for which he was purposefully created and could have
merited. He freely departed, in other words, from an 'ethics of being' in which he the rational creature was morally ordered towards his Creator and, hence, was in a state of becoming truly free. In the final analysis, his naturally free choice effected a free departure of himself and his will from existential and virtuous growth towards the perfection of true freedom.
Section 7
DCD, cc. 7-9:
A Clarification of the Rational Will:
Ontologically Good; Morally Good or Evil

A)

What troubles the student is not Anselm's claim that the angel's desertion of justice is owing to an immoderate desire of the will. This he accepts as being clear. He does, however, have a problem in understanding the very source of this inordinate will: When the angel fell, was his will good or evil? That is, did the immoderation arise out of a will that was essentially morally good or evil? Either way, the implication of the student's problem is unfavorable to God and to Anselm's theodicean effort. For if the immoderation is linked to the will's being essentially morally good or evil, then there arises the suggestion of a blunder on the part of the God who creates all beings (essentiae), which includes the will. As the student might have put it: If essentially morally good, then why or how did the angel sin? If essentially morally evil, then why was the angel damned on account of a will which was nothing inasmuch as being evil (S.I, 244:18-19, 26-27)?

Anselm sets him straight by clarifying the rational will as a 'being' or 'something' that is essentially good but only accidentally morally good or morally evil. Interestingly, he puts the clarification in the words of the student who thus seems to be offering the very solution to his own quandary:

But suppose we say that the will is a kind of being and so is something good, and that when it is turned to what it ought to will, it becomes a good will, but when it is turned to what it ought not to will, it is called an evil will. Clarification enables Anselm to defend and to further his theodicean position.
B)

In c. 7, the student sets forth his problem in two hypothetical scenarios. They are reduced interpretatively to their most important points: First, if the angel's will or turning of the will were good, then he fell because of a good will and a good turning of the will. If they were good, then the angel received them from God. Seemingly, then, the angel fell by virtue of willing what God gave him to will (S.I,244:16-20). Second, if the angel's will and turning were evil and were something, then they were from God who is the source of all being. Thus, it would seem that God gave an evil will to the angel. But, if the angel had from himself this will that is something, then it is not the case that every being is good and that every being is from God (S.I,244:20-27).

Evidently, the student has learned his lesson well. He clearly remembers Anselm's principle of s. 4 which holds in effect that God is the source of all being and that all being is good. But he seems to overlook the point that the principle is primarily ontological. Consequently, as is evidenced in his two scenarios, he fails to distinguish what seemingly needs to be separated: ontological goodness on the one hand, and moral goodness and evil on the other. With this being the case, it is understandable why he is hard-pressed to see how the angel could have fallen from a great good to a great evil because of a good will, or how he could have sinned with a good will which was given to him by God. He wants to think in terms of the ethical, but all the while he is mired in the ontological. Consequently, he blurs or confuses both.

When speaking of the will and its turning as either good or evil, the student is primarily thinking in terms of their being either essentially morally good or essentially morally evil. If he were correct in thinking so, then his scenarios would be well taken and be quite damaging to Anselm's theodicean effort. But, he is not, as Anselm suggests in c. 8: Moral goodness and evil
are not essential properties of either the will or its turning: They are accidental properties of the will that is ontologically or essentially good.\(^6\)

It cannot be denied that the will and its turning are something (\textit{aliiquid}). They are not something in the Aristotelian category sense of substance (\textit{substantia}), as Anselm readily admits. But, insofar as being 'beings' (\textit{essentiae}) they are something. For there are beings that are not properly called substances (S.I,245:21-24): The will is a case in point. It is not an individual or subject that suffers an array of predicaments, but it is a power of desire and choice belonging to the soul. As such it is something that can be spoken of by name and is able to be conceived of in the understanding and in reality.\(^7\) Hence, both the will and its turning can properly be called 'something' for they both exist in the understanding and in reality.

As beings created by the God who is supreme being and supreme goodness, both the will and its turning are, \textit{ipso facto}, ontologically good: As noted in s. 4, what the Creator creates is essentially good. A will is always essentially good irrespective of its being either morally good or morally evil. The essence of the will is neither more nor less a will because of its moral stature (S.I,245:24-27). In Anselm's mind, there is clearly the idea of an essential identity or indifference between a good will and an evil will: The essence or being of one is no different from the essence or being of the other. For "a good will is not anything more than is an evil will; and an evil will is not something evil more than a good will is something good":\(^8\) A will is a will is a will:

...and when the will is just, it is not any more or any less that which it is essentially than when it is unjust.

Thus...in the case of all good wills and deeds, God causes both what they are essentially and the fact that they are good; but in the case of all evil wills and deeds, God does not cause the fact that they are evil but causes only what they are essentially.\(^9\)
And thus there is an important distinction which the student overlooks, and most probably so, because he is mindful of Boethius who seems to countenance the opposite point of view. In deference to Boethius, Anselm would readily admit that the dispositions of wills can differ with respect to how they exist, that is, to their existing either justly or unjustly, either in undiminished or diminished harmony with God. But he would not admit to any essential differences, if this is in fact what Boethius wants to hold. Anselm never abandons this stance. In fact, he furthers it in s. 12 and reemphasizes it much later in DCV, c. 5, and, most especially at the very end of his life, in DC, I, c. 7, and III, c. 14. In doing so, he anticipates and altogether agrees with Aquinas who, in the reply of ST, Ia, q. 48, a. 4, delivers a threefold perspective on how evil can and cannot be said to effect particular goods: It resonates with Anselm and is founded on Augustine.

According to Anselm, but contrary to what the student thinks, the will and its turning are not essentially the moral good or moral evil in virtue of which they are called 'good' or 'evil.' If the will and its turning were essentially evil, then, given the customary understanding of evil as nothing (nihil), such a will would be nothing. Furthermore, given the essential indifference of a good and evil will, if the evil will were essentially the evil in virtue of which it is called and made evil, then the good will would be the good in virtue of which it is called and made good. But, the essence or being of the two wills is indifferent: Hence, if the evil will is nothing, so too is the good will. But, as Anselm points out, it is contrary to belief that a good will and the very good that makes it such are nothing.

What is it then that makes the essentially good will accidentally morally good or morally evil? What is it that enables the rational creature to be called either 'good' or 'evil' in a morally significant sense? This is what the student needs to know in order to solve his quandary.
Contendedly, Anselm lets two points suffice: The rational creature, his will, and its turning are called 'morally good' in virtue of having justice; they are called 'morally evil' in virtue of a privation or absence of this very justice in the will. Justice is the good which make them morally good; injustice is the evil which renders them morally evil. But, the will and its turning are not in and of themselves either just or unjust: Nothing in itself -- be it a substance or a being -- is just or unjust except justice or injustice. Be it called or made just or unjust, the will which is truly a being and the rational substance to whom it belongs never lose their ontological status of being essentially good. And so it is by virtue of having been created by the good God who is supreme being. But they can lose their ethical and accidental status of being morally good.

The upshot of Anselm's clarifying response is this: The angel, his will, and its turning are essentially good. Before the fall, the angel's will, which is both a power of desire and choice and a being of essential freedom, happened to be morally good. It was, as Anselm puts it, created upright (S.I,246:26-28): It had justice at the moment of creation; it was turned towards justice or to that which it ought to have willed. But, the angel had from himself the fact that his essentially good will lost the justice in virtue of which he and it were called 'morally good.' It happened by virtue of his immoderate desire and choice, that is, by an immoderate turn of his will, which exceeded the bounds of justice: By turning towards that which he ought not to have willed, he willed not to stand or to persevere in the justice which was originally his. Such a turn effected the privation, absence, or loss of justice in his will: It effected injustice which has no being (nullam essentiam) (S.I,246:30-247:3) or, in other words, it effected the lack of moral goodness which the will and rational creature ought to have.

In short, it is Anselm's claim that it was not the moral
goodness or justice of the will which led to evil: It was the
will in and of itself. Furthermore, God did not give a morally
evil will to the angel, as the student hypothetically suggests.
God gave an essentially good will which freely turned itself from
one accidental status to another, that is, from moral goodness or
justice to moral evil or injustice.

The student might think that he has established the reason
on which God can be directly implicated in the fall of the angel,
but Anselm's clarifying distinction between the ontological and
ethical
obviates the possibility. In the final analysis, this
distinction enables Anselm to locate once again the origin of
moral evil squarely in the domain of the will alone. The will in
and of itself effected the moral evil by which it and the
rational creature are called 'evil.'

C)

Justice is what makes the rational creature morally good
(S.I,246:20-23).

One could very well take exception to the claim if one tends
to see justice as a virtue merely in its particular sense of
being distributive or commutative -- of being the virtue of
rendering what one owes to one's equals or unequals. It cannot
be denied that Anselm appreciates this sense. But he does so in
addition to the more general and defined sense of being that
which bespeaks one's obligation in being what one ought to be and
doing what one ought to do. One's obligation is always
understood in terms of God's will. If full appreciation is to be
given to the justice which makes one morally good, then it must
be understood in terms greater than those of the aretaic. It
must first be understood theo-logically. For the justice which
makes one morally good is precisely and more importantly the
justice which is of God, which inheres with the rational creature
as the 'virtue of the will,' so to speak, and which marks and
finds a moral relation between God and rational creatures.
Anselm speaks of justice as that which alone is just in and of itself. He also speaks of it as a 'being': That which is identical with the good is really something. It can be named; it can be conceived of in the understanding; it can be discerned in reality. If justice is a being and is properly called 'something,' then, in accordance with Anselm's ontological principle of s. 4, justice must originate from God along with all other beings. But, upon closer examination of Anselm's theology, it is very unlikely, if not impossible, that he would ever think of it as originating from God in the same way that rational and non-rational creatures do.

Anselmian theology holds that God is justice ex se and per se. Justice is the very essence of God: It is of the unity and simplicity of the divine being. On this point alone, the sense in which Anselm wants to understand justice in and of itself as a being or as truly something is very much different from the sense in which he understands an angel and a man. Justice is a being uncreated: It is something eternal: It is divinity in and of itself: It is God. When Anselm speaks of justice alone as being just in and of itself, he is thinking and speaking of God.

For the rational creature, the justice which he possesses originates from God, as do all beings, but not as something created especially for the purpose of possession. It originates from the eternal uncreated source as a grace. What the rational creature comes to possess is the gift of the Indwelling God who is justice eternally. It is the gift of this justice -- of the very God who is the absolute standard of goodness -- that enables the rational creature, his will, and its deeds to be made and called 'morally good.' It is the possession of this grace which bespeaks the alignment of the rational creature and his will to the will of God: It bespeaks nothing less than a moral relation. To have or to lose justice freely, as Anselm speaks of it, is to be freely in the presence of this grace or to fall freely away from it -- to fall in or out of relation with God.

As rightly remarked many years ago by an able expositor of
Anselm, Anselmian justice exceeds the particular justice of Aquinas and the general Aristotelian conception which one finds in the Nichomachean Ethics. In its greatest sense, the justice of which Anselm speaks in DCD and elsewhere is supernatural.
Section 8

DCD, cc. 10-11:
On the Signification of 'Nothing' and 'Evil':
The Privation of Being in General and in Particular

A)

There is more to this section than Anselm's apparent subscription to the privation theory of evil. There is his equally apparent but fundamental effort to come to terms with the idea, meaning, and talk of 'nothing' and, thus, of moral evil which is considered to be nothing. 'Nothing' is to be understood as much in terms of privation as is evil: It is but the privation of being in general, whereas moral evil, being an expression of nothing, is but the privation of being in particular. Be it nothing or evil, it is always construed relatively to being and never absolutely in and of itself.

Anselm's effort arises in response to his student's refusal to assent to historical arguments which contend, as he concedes, that evil is nothing. A linguistic and argumentative stance is assumed by the devil's advocate: He claims that if the word (vox) 'evil' is a name (nomen), then insofar as being such it must be significative; if it is significative, then it must signify something; if 'evil' signifies something, then it is not nothing but rather something. Until Anselm delivers a refutation, the advocate is unable to assent, except in faith, to the historical position. And so, he must scurry to buttress his theodicean position, because the implication of his student's perspicacious challenge is as negative as it is damaging: Given the ontological principle of s. 4, if evil is something in the proper sense of the term 'something,' then the being of evil, as presumed by the student, is to be attributed to the God who is the ultimate efficient cause of all beings.

B)

Anselm delivers a twofold correction in order to defend his
theodicean stance: First, he explicates the manner in which negative words such as 'nothing' and 'evil' signify both something and nothing (or signify and do not signify something). Second, he clarifies how that which is signified by these words is said to be both something (albeit improperly) and nothing.

Anselm's first attempt to address his student's argument is actually his foiled attempt to sidestep it. He wants to know how he the student can claim that evil is something on the basis that the name 'evil' is significative, if he is not mad enough to say that nothing is something when he knows that the name 'nothing' is significative (S.I,248:4-7). For attempting to solve one difficulty with another, Anselm is rightly rebuked by the student who confesses that he does not know what 'nothing' is. At this point, what seems to be a diversion is not: The abrupt shift from the word 'evil' to the word 'nothing' is nothing less than an indication of Anselm's belief that an understanding of moral evil is to be had via an understanding of 'nothing.' It makes good heuristic sense to set forth the idea in general and, thus, lay the foundation for grasping it in particular.

The advocate does not know what 'nothing' signifies. But he does knows that it is a name, that it signifies, that no one admits that nothing is something, and that everyone admits that nothing is nothing. Herein lies his difficulty which approximates his problem with the word 'evil': If the word 'nothing' is significative, as it must be if it is a name, then that which is signified is unable to be nothing and seems to be something. But if the name indicates something rather than nothing, then it might be asked how the name truly signifies nothing. For, indeed, if one speaks truly of nothing when uttering the word 'nothing,' then one's utterance must truly signify nothing. And, hence, if one's use of 'nothing' signifies something and not nothing, then it signifies untruly or improperly.

The difficulty here is a problem of signification. It can be neatly summed up in a question: "How...is it that this name..."
'nothing' does not signify nothing, but something, and does not signify something, but nothing?\textsuperscript{8} In asking, the student's intuition suggests a paradox in thinking that one word can signify both something and nothing. It seems as if it should be a clear case of exclusive disjunction. Anselm thinks otherwise. He shows it by having his troubled student offer two disjunctive solutions which he (Anselm) accepts as conjunctive. First, his dilemma is resolved in recognition of the ambiguity of signification (diversa significationis) in negative names: It points up the way in which negatives can be said to signify both something and nothing. And, then, it is resolved in appreciation of distinct linguistic modes: Both point up the way in which the referent of a negative name can be said (thought) to be both something and nothing.\textsuperscript{9}

The first solution is found in the following argument (S.I,249:6-22) which I present interpretatively: 1) 'Nothing' is identical in sense to the word 'not-something' (non-aliquid). 2) The signification of 'nothing' is that which is indicated in the signification of 'not-something': "that absolutely everything and all that is something should be removed from the understanding, and that no thing whatsoever nor what is at all something should be retained in the understanding."\textsuperscript{10} But 3), in order to effect the removal of anything from the understanding, one must simultaneously have in mind the very signification of that thing that is being removed. Therefore 4), 'not-something' necessarily signifies something in the very process of negating or destroying (destruendo) it. But 5), in removing (auferendo) that which is something, 'not-something' signifies no being (nullam essentiam) which a hearer must retain in the understanding in order to think of its removal: That is, it does not signify something in the proper sense. As Anselm puts it in Ep. 93: it signifies no being or essence which the understanding retains as if it were existent.\textsuperscript{11} Therefore 6) 'not-something' somehow signifies something and does not at all signify something: It signifies negatively by removal (removendo) of
something; it does not signify affirmatively by constituting or positing (constituentando) something.\textsuperscript{12}

And thus, it is shown how the word 'nothing' signifies something and how it is not necessary that nothing be something just because its name signifies something.\textsuperscript{13} The argument suffices just as well for particular expressions of nothing: It is not the case, as the student thinks, that moral evil is really something just because the name 'evil' is significative of something. In fact, it is significative, but only insofar as indicating the removal or negation of something: In the case of moral evil, it is the removal of justice. In light of this negative mode, it is necessary that evil be nothing and not properly something, just as it is necessary in the same light for nothing to be nothing.\textsuperscript{14} 'Evil' is not significative insofar as positing or constituting the reality of something (S.I,250:1-3).

A problem still remains,\textsuperscript{15} notwithstanding Anselm's clarification of the ambiguity of signification: For that which is signified by the word 'nothing' in the mode of negation is not named 'nothing.' When the word 'nothing' is heard, no one accepts it as being appellative of the very thing that is negatively signified by it. What troubles the student here is how to understand that thing for which the name 'nothing' stands and what to understand when the name 'nothing' is heard. For as he sees it, it is the case that 'nothing' properly signifies that thing: That is, 'nothing' is a name because it is significative of that thing and not because it signifies that thing in the mode of negation. But the thing thus signified is called 'nothing.' And, if it is properly called 'nothing,' then how is it something? But, if it is nothing, then how does its own name signify something? Simply put: How, if at all, can the referent of a negative name be both something and nothing?

The solution to the student's second dilemma is rather straightforward (S.I,250:17-251:16). It rests upon a distinction which points up an impropriety in ordinary language-use. It clearly bespeaks Anselm's own position on the oblique (per aliud,
improper) signification that words have in virtue of their ordinary use in varied circumstances versus the precise (per se, proper) signification that they have in and by themselves and irrespective of the circumstances of the usus loquendi.\textsuperscript{16}

For Anselm, something can be said (thought) to be something according to the form of speaking (secundum formam) or according to the fact or the thing itself (secundum rem).\textsuperscript{17} The two do not always agree: Impropriety arises when that which one says according to the customary use of language in one's linguistic milieu does not bespeak the fact of the matter. Many a thing, in other words, is said according to the form of speaking as if it were really something or really the case, but in fact is not the case.\textsuperscript{18} Such is the linguistic perspective from which Anselm solves the student's second dilemma.

Negative words such as 'nothing' and 'evil' are said to signify something, and what is signified by them is said to be something -- not truly or properly something but only "as if something" (quasi aliquid).\textsuperscript{19} Negative nouns signify something according to the form of speaking, but they do not signify something according to fact. Anselm refers instructively to the privative noun 'blindness' (S.I,250:23-251:2). His instruction is applicable to the words 'nothing' and 'evil.'

In our customary way of speaking, we use the word and tend to think of 'blindness' as if it were properly something. Often we speak of someone having blindness as if it were just as appropriate for him to have it as it is for him to have eyesight. But, according to fact, blindness is not something: That is, it is not a being in and of itself. Rather, blindness is 'not-something'; it is nothing: That is, it is a privation -- an absence or lack -- of sight which is appropriate or suitable to a being. Be it agreeable or not, this is the way Anselm wants to see it.

As in the case of 'blindness,' so too in the case of 'nothing' and 'evil': That which they signify is often thought to be really something according to the form of speaking, when,
according to fact, it is only quasi something. Such is the case with other negative nouns as well. What is signified in all such cases is not something according to fact, that is, something real, but only something according to the form of speaking, that is, something as if it were really something (or something that is only improperly said to be something). 'Nothing' properly signifies the privation or absence of things which were really something; 'evil' properly signifies the absence of good where the presence of good is appropriate to particular beings. The absence of something is not 'something' in the proper sense of the term: It is, rather, truly nothing or not-something or privation of something. And yet we often speak of it as if it were something real, for we often speak obliquely or improperly, instead of precisely or properly.

In sum, both 'nothing' and 'evil' signify something in two respects: precisely, in the mode of negation or removal, and improperly, according to the form of speaking. Likewise, in two respects, they do not signify something -- neither in the mode of constituting nor in the mode of speaking according to fact. All in all, Anselm's twofold correction suffices defensively: He manages to tell how evil need not be construed as something in the proper sense of the term simply because the name 'evil' is significative of something. And this is all he needs to do in order to disprove the student's linguistically-focused and theodicy-damaging contention.

C)

It is worth considering why Anselm equates the precise signification of 'nothing' with that of 'not-something' -- to the very point of defining 'nothing' as 'not-something.' Is it not the case, especially in light of the ambiguity of signification of negative names, that he troubles his conception of 'nothing' by confusing or by not distinguishing between 'nothing' in the pure sense of 'not-being' and 'nothing' in the privative sense of
'not-something'? In other words, does Anselm's sense of 'nothing,' as defined, run afoul of Aquinas who maintains that 'not-being' as purely negative does not require a subject?

I want to suggest that he does not.

An appreciation of Anselm's worldview is perhaps the surest way to secure an understanding of his conception of 'nothing.' There is something philosophically and theologically noteworthy which points up the fact that he did not subscribe in any ontologically-meaningful way to a pure sense of 'nothing.' He could not have done so.

The Anselmian corpus generally attests that Anselm's world is as theo-centric as it is wholly indebted to the supreme being and Creator for 'that it is,' 'what it is,' and 'all that it is.' In Anselm's view, there is but the reality of the one uncreated and eternal being and the multitudes of created beings: There is but the real hierarchy of participated beings topped by the transcendence of one unparticipated being.

Ideally, this view should be juxtaposed with Anselm's position on creation ex nihilo which one can find in the Monologion, cc. 6-9: Although it might seem as though he understands 'nothing' as if it were pure negativity, in fact, he does not. The context of these chapters warrants very careful consideration, for it suggests that 'ex nihilo' might best be understood as meaning 'from not-anything material, substantial, or instrumental.'

Mon., c. 9, clearly suggests that 'ex nihilo' does not bear the sense of pure negativity. Creation ex nihilo is in fact creation from something. Anselm does not deny the principle of sufficient reason: He says so in Mon., c. 8, inasmuch as claiming that it is false to say that something can come from nothing, for it is the case that nothing comes from nothing. So, it might not have been creation from anything material, substantial, or instrumental, but it was creation from an idea or thought in the mind of God.

Furthermore, Anselm's very focused consideration of
'nothing' in Mon., c. 19, harks back to c. 8 and clearly affords no real ontological status to nothing or not-being: Nothing is not a real being or 'kind of being' that occupies the lower extreme of an ontological spectrum and, thereat, contrarily parallels the supreme being of God who is the higher extreme. Nor is it really something that precedes or succeeds God: It is not some existential void or sheer and utter nothingness ever-ready to be filled or informed; nothing is not anything absolute or in and of itself. Nor is it the radical negation of a real being and the very ground of the possibility for that being as existent: It cannot be such, as Anselm sees it, for the very possibility of any being is eternal in the mind of God and in respect to the power or ability of God whence every being derives. The real or logical ground of the possibility of anything is not nothing; to the contrary, it is something that is very real.

For Anselm, the idea of 'nothing' and talk about it are always relative. That is, they are relative to the reality of a created being or something that can be understood to be properly something. This conception can be pinpointed in Mon., c. 19, in toto. There, it is tersely suggested in a linguistic example that Anselm offers in order to rail politely against the idea that 'nothing' precedes or succeeds God and, implicitly, against the suggestion thereof that 'nothing' bears an ontological emphasis or status of its own. For he is clearly opposed to such an idea and he makes it clear where it counts the most -- in the theistic context of the Monologion.

Similarly, if I were to say 'Nothing taught me to fly,' I might construe this [statement to mean] that nothing itself (in the sense of not-anything) taught me to fly -- which would be false. Or [I might construe it to mean] that it is not the case that something taught me to fly -- which is true.

By negativing the second construal in order to convey the correct sense of 'nothing,' Anselm implicitly asserts his denial of an ontological nothing (which the first construal suggests) and,
then, conveys the relative sense in which 'nothing' is to be spoken and understood. The relativeness of 'nothing' to something is to be understood precisely in terms of the absence, lack, or loss of that thing or something pertaining to it. And this relativeness, as already seen, is the very point on which the significance of 'nothing' rests.

Indeed, something rather paradoxical obtains in this understanding of 'nothing' as being relative to something and as never being absolute: That is, there is always a "positive" side to Anselm's talk about negatives and one's correct interpretation of it. Be it 'nothing' in general or 'evil' in particular: Being is always the fundamental and "formal element" for appreciating and understanding both.35

Anselm's theology and worldview cannot allow for any other interpretation: The limits of his philosophical position on nothing are dictated, first, by his understanding of the eternal God as the supreme being ex se and per se and, then, by his understanding of the world as the created handiwork thereof.

This interpretation gains corroboration in light of s. 4, where Anselm insists that not-being is not due directly to the causality of God but only indirectly or improperly: Creatures have from themselves only nothing, and from God only something. That is, creatures are directly responsible for their own privations. It is almost as though Anselm wants to say that to speak of a direct relation or connection between the supreme being and not-being is tantamount to speaking contradictorily. And, if this is the case, then in the world of beings created by the supreme being it is unlikely that 'nothing' as a purely negative phenomenon has any real ontological status or meaningfulness.

'Nothing' and 'evil' are, respectively, general and particular privations of being. Being is always the subject of both. It is not the case that Anselm confused the privative and pure senses of 'nothing' when defining 'nothing' as 'not-something.' He was too aligned with Augustine to suffer that
problem and too anticipatory of a modern view to which he would most likely have given assent: "Nothing, in short," writes P. Heath, "is given only in relation to what is, and even the idea of nothing requires a thinker to sustain it."36
Section 9

DCD, cc. 12-15:
God's Creation of the Rational Will:
A Hypothetical Explanation of Its Inordinate Turning,
but in the Best Possible World?

A)

The student's concerns in c. 7 resurface. If the angel willed what God gave him to will, then how did he fall? Whence the evil turning of his will?:¹ In order to respond to these queries and to the idea that evil is something, Anselm offers a hypothesis on God's creation of the will. In doing so, he puts forth an additional conceptualization of the will which he initiated in DLA with talk of its two equivocal senses -- the 'will as instrument' and the 'will as use.'² The third equivocal sense, which I presented in s. 3 as the 'will as affection,' is introduced here as the 'two wills' (voluntates): They are nothing but the two affections (affectiones) or inclinations, as they are later called in DCV and DC, of the one will that is the instrument of the soul and is essentially freedom and a power of desire and choice.

Anselm clearly thinks that his theory on the two wills explains the inordinateness or source of the will's evil turning. After all, they are, as he sees them, the very instruments which enable the will itself to function: Without one of them it does nothing; because of both of them it is understood as desire. Furthermore, his theory substantiates the sense of his claim in s. 5 that the origin of moral evil is to be found in the efficiency of the will. Throughout, he presupposes his understated claim in s. 6 for the natural freedom of the rational will as manifested in its power of choice.³ As the theodicean effort proceeds in this section, which climaxes the psychological explanation for the origin of moral evil, Anselm continues to maintain God's distance from it.
Anselm's hypothetical creation of the will, or thought-experiment, unfolds in four stages: first, with a focus on the notion of ability in c. 12; second, on the natural will for happiness or the beneficial in cc. 12 and 13; third, on the separable will for justice in c. 14; and, finally, on God's joining of the two wills in creating the one will as an instrument of the soul. The salient points of each stage, as presented here, have been considered in other contexts in ss. 1 and 3. Reference to them will spare repetition and permit the following abbreviated and interpretative analysis.

The starting point is hypothetical (S.I, 252:8-10): God is thought to be creating piecemeal the angel whom God intends to be happy (beatus). He has been created to the point of being adapted for having a will, but he is not yet willing anything: That is, he is not desiring or choosing anything. With this first piece in mind, Anselm puts an important question to his student: "Then, do you think the angel would be able to will something by himself?" Would he, in other words, be able to will "by means of that which he already has" (which, quite simply, is his being capable of having a will)? The query casts much of c. 12 into a discussion of ability and the improprieties which often abound in the usus loquendi when talking about something that is able or unable to be.

When the student answers that the angel "is able if he ever wills," he errs: He fails to account for the distinction between a raw ability and an actualized ability, that is, between an ability that precedes an occurrence and one that accompanies it. Anselm admits that if something 'is,' then the ability to be can be predicated of it. But it is not the case that "everything that is was able to be before it was." When the student says that if the angel wills, then he is able to will, he is thinking about an ability which accompanies an occurrence. Necessarily, if one wills, then one is able to will. But Anselm
is not asking about an ability that is actualized; rather, he is inquiring about a raw ability, that is, an ability prior to its actualization and, in this case, one that would enable the angel to move towards willing. As he puts it: The angel is adapted for willing and does not will: Thus, is he able to will? Does he have the inherent capacity to will?

The student's further response betrays his familiarity not only with the improprieties of speaking but also with a tradition that considers it proper to assert a raw ability of something, for instance, the ability to exist, before the thing actually exists; his conclusive remark is indicative: "[A]nyone who is able to will because he already wills must have been able before he willed." And, aside from again missing Anselm's point that the angel has only been created up to the point of being capable of having a will, but not yet in possession of one, he misses the seemingly paradoxical way in which one thing can be said to be able and unable, or possible and impossible, to be. The finer point that he neglects to see is that no contingent being has from itself the ability to be, either before it is or when it is.

At this point, Anselm's immediate reply about the origin of the world might seem to be somewhat out of place. But, in fact, it is instructive on the very point of the will which he wants to make and to present as an answer to his own question about the angel. In point of fact, his digression simply reemphasizes the important ontological principle of s. 4 and much of what has been said in s. 1: A distinction must be made between the transcendent supreme being whence all being and good derive, including abilities, and the hosts of contingent beings who have only nothing from themselves.

The world as Anselm sees it was 'nothing' before it was created and, as such, it was not able to be or to have any ability at all: From its own perspective or that of anything that did not have the ability to make it exist, it was impossible to be. But, when it was not, it was able to be or possible to be
from the perspective of the eternal God who had the ability to make it exist.\(^5\)

What is true of the world is true of all creatures in it: At once, it is impossible for it per se to exist before it is and yet, before it is, its very possibility for existing is in the very power of God. Thus, and ever so seemingly paradoxically, it can be said of the world and other creatures before they exist that they are both possible and impossible to be.\(^6\) God does not lack the capacity for making them existent, but they do lack the capacity for existing until the moment when they are. And only when they are, can it be certainly said of them that they enjoy certain competences or abilities. Only in virtue of an ability can they be said to be able or competent, for only then do they possess an inherent capacity.\(^7\) Thus, after having been created, the world and creatures are said to be able to be in virtue of the fact that they are.\(^8\) But, the very fact that they are and that their respective abilities obtain ought not to suggest that they had in their own right the ability to be or to do before they were or could do. All ability is generated from the power of God.

What holds for the world holds for the will as an ability. As such, it is a being and, like all other contingent beings, it is indebted to God for the possibility and fact of its existence: It is the work and gift of God.\(^9\) And thus, the angel whom Anselm hypothesizes as simply being adapted for having a will is unable to will anything unless he has first received a will from God who alone is able to give it and make it exist. It is an ability which, upon being received, will enable the angel to will to move himself from the state of not willing something to that of desiring and choosing something (S.I,254:25-31).

From this very point on ability (complemented as it is by s. 3), Anselm's hypothetical creation of the will continues onto the second stage.

God is thought to have given to the angel his first will. It is a natural will for happiness or benefits (commodia): It is
an inclination and desire natural to, if not identical with, the 'will as instrument' or power of the soul. By virtue of it, the will moves and turns itself to all other willings, but it does so somewhat determinately. For this first will of the rational creature is always naturally inclined towards that which is thought to be beneficial or conducive to the creature's well-being; it is ever naturally adverse to that which is and is thought to be disadvantageous (incommodum). In creating the rational creature with this natural will for happiness, God's objective in creating him is partially realized. For, as Anselm sees it, one cannot be happy unless one wills happiness (S.I,255:2,13-14). But, more importantly, as he really wants to see it, because it really matters to him, one ought not to be happy, that is, truly happy in a supernatural sense, unless one is just and wills justly.

If the angel, as hypothesized, has only this natural will, then he is only able to desire and choose for whatever benefits he understands to be conducive to his well-being (S.I,256:26-257:7). He is solely inclined to pursue his own happiness "in proportion to his recognition that a greater happiness is possible." He wills of necessity. Hence, given this will alone, neither he, nor his will, nor the actions thereof, could ever be called just or unjust in any praiseworthy or morally-significant sense. Like the will of some irrational animal, the angel's will would simply move naturally, albeit with choice, in one direction: towards the maximization of his own well-being. And he could not be faulted for doing so either. For he would not be able to desert this will or to will otherwise than in accordance with his natural inclination, whether it be for happiness directly or indirectly (S.I,256:13-25) or for lesser and baser benefits when greater and truer ones are unable to be obtained (S.I,257:22-25). For it is the only will that he has thus far been given.

The more astounding implication of having only this natural will is this: Given the understanding that God is supreme
happiness (beatitudo), the angel could not be faulted for willing to be like God (S.I,257:8-15). For it is, at least hypothetically, the ultimate terminus of the only will that he has thus far received.

It is precisely on this point about willing to be like God that Anselm pushes his hypothesis onto its third stage. As he continues in c. 14 with his introduction of the will for justice, it seems as though he is intent upon curbing the natural will for happiness or the will of the creature to be like God. In short and in view of s. 1, he seems bent upon upholding the ontological and moral distinction between the one transcendent being who is goodness and justice per se and rational contingent beings who are good and just by imaging essentially and by being morally.

The hypothesis continues: The natural will for happiness is temporarily put out of mind. God is now thought to have given to the angel only a will for justice, that is, only an inclination to desire and choose that which is fitting (convenire). If the angel is created with this will alone, his choices and actions would not be praiseworthy in any morally-significant way for the very same reason that they would not be if he is thought to have only a will for happiness. It would simply be the case that his desires and choices (which, I speculate, could very well overlap some of the content of the desires and choices of the will for happiness) would not be able to be anything but fitting and fittingly willed: He would not be able to will anything outside the limits of justice because he would not have the will or desire for doing so (S.I,258:8-16). He wills of necessity.

Anselm seems to be very concerned in this section with understanding how the rational being makes morally-significant choices. One cannot be called 'just' or 'unjust' in any meaningful way -- that is, with any sense of merited praise or blame -- simply because one has either a will for happiness or a will for justice. Nor, as he wants to see it, can anyone be truly happy without simultaneously willing to be happy and willing justly (S.I,258:18-21). Hence, on the next and final
stage of the hypothesis, God is thought to have joined the natural will for happiness and the will for justice. The intention, be it divine or simply Anselm's interpretation of the divine, is to establish in the moment of God's creative act the idea of the creation of a just will for happiness: of an originally tempered and regulated natural will for creaturely well-being and being like God. It is the basis for thinking in terms of moral accountability and morally-significant choices.

In the created union of the two wills: The will for justice is thought to moderate and temper the natural will to some mean (modum) or equilibrium so that, as the rational creature pursues his well-being in proportion to that which he thinks is beneficial to him, he does not will unfittingly, unprofitably, or excessively (S.I,258:22-23; 259:7-8). In a certain sense, Anselm wants us to see the will for justice as a limiting factor on the strength and freedom of the creature's natural will in pursuit of being like God. This will, however, being of unvanquishable strength and freedom, never suffers a diminution of its own power insofar as being joined with the will for justice: It can freely yield or not to the efforts of justice in checking its excessive desires to be well-off and to be like God (S.I,258:23-25). If, by virtue of its own strength and essential freedom, it arbitrarily exceeds the fitting mean set forth by the will for justice (which it is always able to do), then its immoderation or excessiveness becomes offensive and errant: It becomes inordinate in a morally-significant way. It deserts the justice with which it was created and with which it ought to remain. But, if the natural will does remain freely within the bounds set by the will for justice, then it subsists justly and with justice. The creature of such a will "could and should be happy," that is, truly and perfectly happy. By desiring and choosing what he ought or ought not to will, he and his natural will stay within or depart from the bounds of that justice which is nothing other than the will of the God in whom true happiness is found.
Given what has been presented in ss. 1, 3, and 8, it seems plausible to hold that Anselm's intention in hypothesizing the union of the two wills is much greater than what meets the eye. It seems very much to be the case that he envisages a relation of two ontologically-distinct beings.

In view of God's purpose for creating rational beings, it might be thought that the harmony of wills, as instituted at the moment of creation, is, in Anselm's mind, an alternative expression -- a microcosm, as it were -- of the proper harmony that he wants to see between the one transcendent being and all contingent rational beings. The rational creature's harmony of two wills is but the psychological expression and truest sign of the union of two ontologically-distinct orders with the lesser of the two (angels and humans) being morally-aligned with and teleologically-focused on the greater (God).

In view of the natural will for happiness, which is a being that is something 'good,' created and harmonized with the will for justice, which is a being that is something "exceedingly good" (valde bonum [S.I,259:13]), there is the further Anselmian view of the harmony of a good and just creature with the supremely good and just Creator: The uncreated being endeavors in creation to accompany and to aid the rational creature of a free and natural will towards a moral and eternal telos. The succor is signified in the gift of the 'exceedingly good being' of the will for justice which is the grace of God. The gift, though, can be abandoned: For there is always the potentiality of the freedom of the natural will for rendering this harmony nil and for causing the creature to become morally unaligned and teleologically unfocused.

C)

There is no reason to think that Anselm's hypothetical creation adds much to his theodicean effort. In fact, it seems to render it problematic if only in giving way to the question of whether God, who is "omnipotent in simple goodness," created
the best of all possible worlds. Unless it can be argued on Anselm's behalf that this world is the best that God could have created, moral evil will not be explained and the Creator will not be defended. And, even then, there will still remain the question of whether God could and would have refrained from creating such a world, be it the best, while knowing all the while that moral evil would prevail in it.\(^9\)

The Christian theist's appeal to the idea of a best possible world has its problem: It is often thought to be a meaningless and incoherent concept and, thus, an unsatisfactory one for justifying God in the face of moral evil. Would Anselm the Christian theist agree?

First, it might be asked if one can ever be certain that one has or can exhaustively consider the characteristics, degrees, and ranks of all possible beings when trying to conceive of a best possible world. Given the supposedly best possible world, \(n\), is it not the case that one can think of an additional increment to any being in that world and thus conceive of a world better than the one originally supposed to be the best? It would be \(n+1\), and so on into infinity. It is this prospect of an infinite series that troubles the concept of a best possible world and, thus, renders it meaningless and incoherent, as B. Reichenbach argues:\(^{10}\) One cannot possibly account a priori for every state of affairs which could obtain in a best possible world and would contribute to "the sum total of utility, benefit, or good in the world."\(^{11}\)

Trying to grasp the idea of a best possible world becomes all the more troubling if one's perspective of the world shifts. One can move from thinking of God's creation as being all that it can ever become, as if all of its possibilities have been realized, to thinking of creation as a dynamic reality, as if all of it ever unfolds in its own inherent and manifold capacities and those of its inanimate and animate members. Given a world that evolves towards a telos, can anyone ever be certain that \(n+1\) has not already been realized in the vast expanse of time
past, or that it is not presently realized elsewhere unbeknown to oneself and others, or that it never will be realized in the future which exceeds one's own lifetime? The world as one knows it in one's own finite perspective is but a minute fragment of the same world that God knows in God's infinite perspective. What is more, the 'n+1' world that one might imagine to be the best in contrast to the world of one's limited experience might not be the best as God understands and sees it when all of its temporal, sundry, and unfolding actualizations are collapsed into one eternal perspective.

Even though Anselm is silent on such points, he would partially agree: He would hold that the concept of a best possible world is indeed difficult for finite minds to grasp, if in fact the world is subject to such an infinite series. He would not agree that it is completely meaningless and, thus, a worthless point of theodicean concern. If given the opportunity, he would probably argue that it is coherent in the perspective of the being who is infinite and omniscient. And perhaps this is how the idea of such a world should be appreciated, if in fact it includes an infinite series.

In moving towards such an appreciation, one might assume the fact and argue in an Anselmian spirit:

If God is an infinitely perfect being and if God eternally knows the divine self to be such; if God is the supreme being from whom the possibility of all contingent beings derives and of whom such beings are expressions of what the divine mind eternally knows and understands, then the infinite God must know in all eternity the actualized and unactualized possibilities of all contingent beings. If there be an infinite series in the best possible world, it must needs be subsumed under the infinity of the omniscient God in whom, as Anselm claims, all things are contained and from whose knowledge the possibility of any and all finite beings obtain. Otherwise, they are simply not possible to be because God does not know them as possible beings.

The idea of a best possible world, be it troubled or not by
the implication of an infinite series, is not an incoherent concept when taken from the perspective of divine knowledge which is itself infinite and the very source of the possibility and actualization of contingent beings. For if God does not know all actualized and unactualized possibilities of the world, then there is something that God does not know.

Now, what Anselm might consider to be incoherent is all of this talk about a best possible world with an infinite series. He has a startling point of view which he renders in his replacement theory of the fallen angels by elect humans (CDH, I, cc. 16-18).35

The world as we know it -- the one that we from our limited perspectives consider the best or not -- is not a world of infinite possibilities! The created world is definite: Its possibilities, all of which derive from the Creator-God who works purposefully, are limited! The world is not some 'open-ended' product of a divine artisan with a definite beginning but no definite end: It is not some picture or sculpture, as it were, to which more and more can be added later and later, thus rendering it perpetually incomplete. Anselm's God is not an artisan whose handiwork knows no limits and remains ever unfinished.

When God created, it was undertaken with reason and purpose, and it was done fittingly and perfectly, that is, completely (S.II,75:2-3,18-19). It was effected definitely: For God created sundry natures to the precise number that would suit God's reason and purpose for creating -- neither more nor less would obtain than that which God knew to be required (S.II,75:20-75:3). The perfection and definiteness of creation lies in this number of natures (S.II,77:20-78:2), not in the instantiations or actualizations of natures in individuals over time (cf. CDH, I, c. 18, in toto). In respect to its constitutive natures, creation is of a definite dimension; it is also dynamic: dynamic in its definiteness, but definite in it dynamism: For creation, as conceived and made possible by the divine artisan, and most
probably all at once in respect to its natures (S.II, 76:27-77:2), unfolds progressively in time (cf. S.II, 77:16-18; 78:7-8, 11-12; 82:26-83:2, 12-16). This it will continue to do until the beings of all natures reach their calculable and perfect numbers as determined by God: This it will do until the hour in which all rational natures are consummated and confirmed, and the physical world is transformed (S.II, 79:28-80:6): presumably, that is, when the beings of all natures arrive at the goal for which they were created and at the divinely appointed hour of the world's renewal (renovatio mundi).

The created world is not infinite in itself or even with respect to its possibilities. For Anselm, it would be incoherent to think and to speak of it as such.

Now, what Anselm might also consider incoherent is the query that frequently underlies the question of whether God created the best possible world, that is: When God created, did God choose and create from an array of options -- an infinite array of possible and sundry worlds?

On Anselm's behalf I think it is quite fair to hold what K. Rogers has already argued quite capably: that not only is this world the best possible world that God created, it is, contra Leibniz, the only world that God could have created! There does not seem to be any other view for a man who conceives of creation as an expression of the one and simple being of God! It is a point that is very much established in s. 1.

In short and at the risk of sounding repetitive of s. 1: Anselm holds that God is an infinitely perfect being whose essence of great-making properties and psychological/operative powers is one and simple: The essence of God is power, and the power is the essence. All that God is essentially, God remembers and understands eternally: God knows the divine self to be supreme goodness, truth, and rectitude: to be an eternity of the absolute plenitude of excellences. What God remembers and understands, God loves and wills eternally. And from the power of the will of the God who is love and who seeks in eternity to
love and to be loved, creation obtains. But it cannot obtain as
one of many options open to the Creator-God: The option must be
singular: It must be the best. For, in Anselm's eyes, God is
the immutable best -- the very embodiment, as it were, of the
principle of perfection -- who creates from one and the same word
by which God's understanding of the divine self is eternally
expressed.

A theo-logical problem arises if this singular option is
denied.

If it is held that God could have created other than God
did, or could have created better than God did, then in the mind
of God, either before or after creating, there would have been at
least two utterly distinct ideas: first, that of a world which
God could have created for actualization in time, but did not,
and, second, that of the world which God in fact created for
actualization. The mere prospect of such a distinction, not to
mention its realization, speaks too clearly against the unity and
simplicity of God as Anselm understands it. Likewise, in an
Anselmian spirit, if creation is truly an expression of what God
knows and thinks in the unity and simplicity of the divine
essence, and if it is an expression and image of the true
existence that God is essentially with everything else that God
is, then, given the denial of the singular option, God could then
be said to have two distinct conceptions or expressions of the
divine self.

In the same vein, if God's knowledge is eternally that of
knowing the divine self as the immutable standard of goodness and
absolute source of rectitude; if God creates that which God knows
and if creation is truly an expression or image of the divine
Word which is the understanding of God and all that God is, then
creation would seem to be the best expression that God could have
and would have put forth. Otherwise, God, the absolute good,
would have created something as an inferior expression or an
image contrary to that which God knows and understands the divine
self to be. And this does not resonate too well with the
Anselmian claim for the supremeness of God. Nor does it obviate the Anselmian position that creatures are but created images, temporal imperfections as it were, of what they truly are in the mind of God. If God were to create anything less than God is able to create as an expression of the Divine, then such a creation would suggest a God who is not fully expressive, a God who performs below expectation and, thus, a God who is not necessarily supreme goodness, rectitude, and wisdom. Given such a being and a creation, one could easily think in the spirit of the Proslogion of a greater being, namely, of one who always and maximally does that which is able to be done and ought to be done.

So potentially damaging are the implications of questioning the Anselmian scholars' claim that God created the best and that the intention of God's creative will was singular. And yet the claim that this is the only world that God could have created is in no way damaging to the idea of God's omnipotence and freedom.

In Anselmian thought, the power, ability, and freedom of both God and rational creatures are considered to be properly such only in terms of rectitude or what is fitting and advantageous. The omnipotence of God always accords with the rectitude of God for the power of God is the essence of God. God does not do less than or other than what rectitude demands. And this does not make God less free or powerful: Nay, in Anselmian thought, this makes God perfectly free and most truly omnipotent. For no one is able to corrupt God or to cause God to violate God's own rectitude or God's very own being.

But, even if God must have created the best world and could have created only one, should this force the view that there is one? That is, is the best world that God created actualized as the best? Hardly it is in light of moral evil caused by the free wills of rational creatures! As readily as sinfulness must be acknowledged, so too must it be asked if it would not have been more reasonable, perhaps even better, if the good and omnipotent God had refrained from creating this best world that has been
actualized with moral evil. Would it not have been better if God had created the world without free and rational creatures? It is a tall question that has been anticipated in s. 1. In the three Anselmian views of God, a theo-logical explanation is set forth for why God created the world and, then, populated it with free and rational creatures. This is really the tall question so simply put. Its complex answer has everything to do with understanding God as freedom and love.

If the God of love did not create free and rational creatures -- images of God -- who could respond to God in love, then God would be solitary, as even Gilbert Crispin suggests. The love of God would be stymied in respect to ad extra relationality. In creating rational creatures with free wills, the omniscient God knows that some will stray from loving God. But, importantly, the love of God remains undaunted, though tested, and the goodness and omnipotence of God prevails. For, in God's eternal knowledge of creation's morally-erratic actualization: of its failure to love as it should, God provides for a loving remedy. There is a divine solution to moral evil in the best world that God could have created: It becomes in time the redemptive grace of restored justice, the gift of merciful justice. In effect, God aids the reharmonization of the two affections of the will and, all the while, leaves inviolate the natural and voluntary freedom of the rational creature who is, as such, an imago dei.

Would that the almighty God had chosen to create and to love creatures who were somehow programmed or disposed for choosing only the morally good. Then, not only would creation's morally-erratic actualization have been averted, so too would God's salvific restoration of it. But if such a programming were to have obtained, the very meaningfulness of God's love-relationship with such creatures could be called into question, along with the very idea of a God who is love. For wherein would lie the mutuality of loving response between likes? The loving God, it would seem, would have been 'loving' ethical automata --
angeloids and humanoids, that is -- and not imagines dei whose freedom always and importantly bespeaks, as it does in God, the possibility for unconstrained and externally undetermined morally-significant choices. Can love ever obtain meaningfully between those who are unlike? The query strikes at the heart of Crispin's point: God would be solitary if free and rational creatures had not been created. For love is not solitary; it is inter-personal: It is communal.
Section 10

DCD, c. 16:
The Rational Creature's Debitum, nay, Debita:
Essential and Moral Obligations to the Creator

A) With the psychological explanation of the origin of moral evil all but complete, Anselm takes one further step to exonerate God of any direct involvement. The rational creature is now thought to have incurred an obligation (debitum):1 It comes in virtue of having been created with the will for justice as the moral regulator of his natural will for happiness. He is obliged to be and to do particularly: In sum, he is morally indebted to God and the divine will. Fulfillment of this obligation marks the moral stature of the imago dei, as does the failure thereof.

B) This section continues the train of thought of s. 9: that the 'will as instrument' has been created with two affections -- the will for happiness and the will for justice. It also reestablishes the import of Anselm's succinct remark in c. 15 of s. 9 that the will for justice is 'something.' The question that begins this section secures its connection with s. 9: "Before the will received this justice, was it under obligation to will and not to will in accordance with justice?"2

The query betrays the need for a simple, but important qualification. In place of argumentation, simple questions and answers establish the belief that one's receipt of justice entails the receipt of an obligation (S.I,259:21). It is precisely the obligation to have justice and to will with respect to it. Before receiving the will for justice the rational creature was not so indebted, but upon receiving it he became perpetually obliged to have it and to will justly. 'Always' (semper) is the key word here (S.I,260:4,6): Both Anselm and his student agree that even if the rational creature by his own free
power should choose to desert the grace of justice and to shirk the debt which he has incurred in virtue of having received it, his obligation to have justice persists indefinitely along with his natural will for happiness. It remains even though justice itself or the will for justice does not (S.I,259:28-260:7; 261:11-13).

Emphasis on obligation underscores the deontological character of Anselm's ethical thinking. It also clarifies the broad perspective from which one can envision him speaking of the morality or immorality of a rational creature.

The interlocutors are agreed: Justice and one's perpetual obligation to have it adorn the will and render its nature praiseworthy. Not to have that which one is obliged to have mars the person and marks him blameworthy (S.I,260:14-15). The obligation in and of itself does not mar, nor is it in itself blameworthy; rather, in itself, the obligation betrays the worth of the nature that has received it. It makes beautiful the rational creature (S.I,260:18-22). As terse as it is without any supporting philosophical argumentation, their agreement grounds the deontological basis for discerning a rational creature's moral stature: One is morally good or morally evil, respectively, in terms of one's fulfillment of one's obligation to have justice and to will justly or in terms of one's failure to do so. Simply put: One's moral stature is discernible in terms of having or not having justice in the will. It does not get any simpler than this.

Furthermore, emphasis on obligation serves importantly in the clarification of 'injustice.'

Anselm's student is somewhat mistaken, if only for lack of precision, when he claims that that which is blameworthy in the will is the fact of injustice or the absence of justice being in the will. In his own words, he puts it thus: "What I blame in that will is nothing at all other than the absence of justice, or the not-having of justice."

Injustice or moral evil, which is nothing, that is, 'not-
something' or, rather, the absence, lack, or privation of 'something,' is not simply the absence of justice in the will. If this were the case, then the rational creature before receiving the will for justice would have been unjust or would have had injustice simply in virtue of not having what he did not yet receive. Here, the importance of Anselm's qualification moves to the fore: The injustice or moral evil which is nothing is more precisely the privation or lack of required justice (absentia debitae iustitiae [S.I,259:15]) -- of the justice, that is, to which one is always indebted (S.I,261:26-31). If it were otherwise, then those creatures that ought not to have justice and do not have it would be morally blameworthy for not having something which they never received from the Creator. And this would even include rational creatures in the process of being created and before receiving justice.

The absence of required justice is that which is morally blameworthy in the will. And, thus, because only the rational creature ought to have justice in the will, it is fair to say on Anselm's behalf that only the rational creature can be called 'morally blameworthy' for not having it or 'praiseworthy' for having it. Only the being of a rational will can be a meaningful player on the field of morality.

So terse is the dialogue of this section; so scant is the argumentation in which the foregoing points are conveyed. One can easily overlook the fact that Anselm is very subtly reflecting upon the significations of 'nothing' which he presents in s. 8. His discussion of 'injustice' gives him the opportunity to elucidate the 'reality' of a point he previously argued, that is: that something, namely, injustice, which is in fact 'nothing' (secundum rem), is often imprecisely spoken of (secundum formam: according to the form of speaking) as if it were something (quasi aliquid).

In the last part of this section (S.I,260:25-261:25), the linguistic imprecision is highlighted. The student speaks improperly: He speaks of injustice as if it were really
something: Injustice is in the will, he says; he blames nothing else in the will except for injustice (S.I, 260:25-33). All the while, he knows and acknowledges that injustice is nothing (S.I, 261:7-10). The logical inconsistency of his imprecision is revealed in a small portion of the text:

T:/ But before [the will] had justice, it was not unjust and did not have injustice.
S:/ Agreed.
T:/ Therefore, when justice departs either injustice is not in the will and the will is not unjust or else injustice and being unjust are nothing.
S:/ Nothing is able to appear more necessary.
T:/ But you have conceded [as indicate just above] that the will has injustice and is unjust after it has deserted justice.5

Anselm triumphs heuristically: The student see his own inconsistency and accepts the conclusion that "injustice and being unjust are nothing." (Here, one is undoubtedly called upon to understand 'nothing' in the sense of s. 8.) In the end, he exclaims with that very sense in mind: "What I earlier believed without knowing [that is, that the words 'nothing' and 'evil' signify and, thus, signify something and are something], you have [now] caused me, still believing, to know [,by my manner of speaking, the specific way in which the references of 'nothing,' 'evil,' and 'injustice' are said to be something]." They are 'quasi something.'

C)

There might be more to this short section than what meets the eye. Anselm leads us to think that the creature is simply indebted to God for having justice in the will.9 His own words in CDH confirm it: "This is the sole and complete honor which we owe to God and which God demands from us."10 But, the Anselmian position is generally and more precisely otherwise.

In virtue of having been created, and for no other discernible reason, that which the creature owes to the Creator is nothing less than that which the creature has received."
That is, he owes all that he is, all that he knows, and all that he can do. Anselm's reasoning here is clearly anchored in scripture: The creature is not his own, as Paul reminds us in I Cor. 6:19-20; the creature is the possession of the Creator, as Anselm asserts: "...you are not your own...; rather you are...[a servant] of one Lord and have...been created by him out of nothing." And just as one would think that one's own possessions should be subject to oneself, so too should the possessions of God be subject to God. In sum, this is Anselm's rationale for maintaining the creature's obligation or duty to God.

But its rational tenor sounds more than a singular obligation which obtains in virtue of the creature's having received a will for justice. It speaks to the point that every aspect of a creature's being is a point of departure for discerning the creature's obligations (debita) to God: The entire creaturely self and nothing less is indebted to the Creator. And what is more, as Anselm tells us: The creature owes it all because God commands it.

In view of this broader Anselmian perspective of creaturely obligation (which simply does not appear in DCD), there is reason enough to think that the rational creature is as much obliged to God and commanded by God to will to be happy by virtue of his natural and inseparable will, as he is to will justly by virtue of having received a separable will for justice. After all, the natural will is a being and, as such, it is something good. In virtue of its having been received from God, the rational creature is indebted to God with respect to it. He is obliged to do with it that which it has been ordained to do: to will benefits, to will creaturely well-being, to will happiness (if only at the mundane level). And what is more: This will can never fail in its obligation because, as Anselm tells us, it cannot will other than what it was created to will in conjunction with the intellect that presents to it that which is conducive to creaturely well-being. With or without the will for justice, the
natural will always does what it ought to do and, hence, in the 'broad sense' of the word, it is always just. But what matters most to Anselm is that this natural will be just in the 'narrow sense' of the word, that is, that it be praiseworthily just.17 And this he construes as an obligation of paramount importance: as the moral duty of the will, as the ethical imperative.

The duty of the creature as per his natural will for happiness is not his only obligation to the Creator.

What the rational creature actually incurs at creation is the superimposition of one obligation on another. A moral duty is added to the natural, essential duty: The moral obligation to will justly is joined to the essential obligation to will for happiness. In the harmonious fulfillment of the two there becomes the fullness of the creature's truth of being;18 there becomes the creature's transit from mundane happiness to supernatural happiness -- if it should ever become. For God's very making of a naturally free will with two voluntary affections and corresponding obligations is nothing less than the making of a creature who is ever-poised with the possibility of a conflict of obligations.

The possibility of ethical conflicts is not a foreign idea to Anselm.19 He holds that one's perspective of a state of affairs can admit of its being at once that which ought to be and ought not to be:20 For instance, it might be the case that a rational creature ought to will 'A' and ought not to will 'A.' He ought to will 'A' because his intellect suggests that it is conducive to his well-being. If he does in fact will 'A,' then what he wills ought to be. But, at the same time, it might be that he ought not to will 'A' because the will for justice dictates that it and such a will for it disagree with the will of God. If 'A' is willed and effected, then it can be viewed simultaneously as that which ought to be and ought not to be. From one perspective, the will with its natural affection is obliged to will in respect to the creature's well-being, while God permits the willing thereof; and, it is obliged not to will
in respect to its acquired affection which is the grace of justice. Thus, there is a conflict of obligations.

A question of theodicean import arises: How can such a conflict between the will for happiness and will for justice be averted or resolved?

Anselm would most likely answer, because he has declared, that the will for happiness is obliged to an obedience which is the foundation for living a good and virtuous life. From the first moment of being created, it has been ordained by God to be used by the 'will as instrument' to the end of obedience -- that is, to holding unwaveringly or perseveringly to justice and truth in word and deed. So stern is this obligation that Anselm even holds that the will ought not to will anything at all without justice. But the imposition of another moral obligation -- to be obedient as well as just -- on the will for happiness does not seem to be the requisite measure for averting or resolving a conflict. Rather, it only seems to compound it.

If Anselm's theodicean effort is to prevail, then his psychological explanation of moral evil needs to go beyond his heretofore primary emphasis on the voluntary. Remarks which smack of deontic logic direct attention to the intellectual. For critical reflection on the creature's experience with conflicting 'oughts' begets an epistemological question: Does he have the knowledge to enable himself to judge and to choose that which is right and fitting? Does he have the knowledge necessary for stemming a conflict of obligations which could result in his will for happiness being triumphant over obedience and justice and, thus, being plunged into injustice? Does he know his obligations or, precisely, that which ought to be willed and done? If the rational creature lacks the knowledge that serves well in averting and resolving conflicts of obligation, then Anselm's theodicean effort is in trouble.
Section 11

DCD, cc. 17-18:
Justice and Injustice in the Creature's Rational Will:
The Direct and Indirect Causality Thereof

A)

There is an echo of the fundamental claim of s. 4 that God is not the direct cause of 'not-being.' But here Anselm sounds a specification: God is not the direct, proper, or proximate efficient cause of the rational creature's injustice or of his 'not-being just': "...God can in no manner cause anyone to be unjust except by not causing someone who is unjust to be just, although able to do so." The exception is important: It points up the Anselmian claim that God can be understood as the indirect, improper, or remote efficient cause of injustice, while the rational creature alone is considered its direct cause. And, concerning a creature's possession of justice, God alone is considered its direct cause, while the rational creature can be understood as its indirect cause.

B)

Development of this stance begins in c. 17 where Anselm and his student endeavor to understand why the fallen angel is unable to return to justice. Only when this chapter is considered alongside c. 18 does its full import become clear: Basically, Anselm wants to hold that the rational creature is unable to have justice directly from himself. He is not, in other words, the proximate efficient cause of his possession of it.

Before the angel received justice at creation, at which time he had only the natural will for happiness, he was unable to have justice because of the condition of his nature (conditione naturae), that is, because he was not yet adapted for having it and had not yet received it (S.I,262:15-16). After receiving and then falling from justice, he was unable to have it because of his merited fault (S.I,262:15-16). Henceforward, he has been
unable to return to it by himself. But why -- because of this demerit? The student's concluding remark in c. 17 renders a more satisfactory explanation than that which Anselm gives: Because "he," as the student claims with Pauline sensitivity, "ought not to have anything from himself."²

Anselm's underlying rationale in c. 17 for why the angel is unable to return to justice by himself points to his fundamental claim that all being derives from God. And this includes justice which can only be had if it is given by God. What Anselm seems to be saying in c. 17 is that the direct efficient cause of a creature's having justice in the will is the just God who deigns to bestow it upon the creature.³ If the angel is unable to return to justice after falling from it, it is so, presumably, because God does not deign to re-bestow it.

Chapter 18 complements c. 17. It puts forth the idea that the rational creature is not altogether devoid of a causal role in his own possession of justice. The point is suggested in the question that is asked of the student: "Is it not the case," Anselm queries, "that in some way, even when [the angel] had justice, he was able to give it to himself?"⁴ The student's interrogative response -- "How could he have?"⁵ -- sets forth the need for an explanation which Anselm does not sufficiently give (S.I,263:7-16).

Basically, as Anselm wants to see it, the rational creature was a remote or indirect efficient cause of his having justice when he had it. This is precisely the point that he has in mind when he notes that 'to cause' can be spoken of in many modes, some of which indicate proximate or direct causality, others remote or indirect causality.⁶

In order to explain how the angel indirectly caused himself to have justice, Anselm first specifies the angel's state of being. When the angel received justice at creation, God at once endowed him with both the ability to remove justice from his will and the ability not to remove it: Respectively, he was given the ability to forsake justice and the ability to keep it (S.I,263:9-
10.12-13), or the ability to sin and the ability not to sin. This specification is the basis on which the rational creature can be understood to have indirectly given himself justice: He did so insofar as not causing himself to remove or to forsake it:

T:/ And so, because the evil angel was able both to remove justice from himself and not to remove it from himself, he was able in this manner to give justice to himself -- even as the angel who stood steadfast in the truth in which he was created did not (when able to) cause himself not to have justice, and so gave himself justice, and received this entire gift from God.9

From a positive angle, the angel indirectly caused himself to have justice in the will (that is, was able to give justice to himself), because he willed and did something else: That is, he willed to keep that which he had received and was obliged to have.

This specification of the angel's ability to keep and to forsake justice is important in two respects:

First, it is only because of the rational creature's ability to forsake justice that he is said to have been able to give justice to himself in the first place, if only indirectly:

T:/ God gave this latter ability so that they [the angels] would be able in some manner to give justice to themselves. For if they were in no manner able to remove justice from themselves, they would in no manner be able to give justice to themselves.10

Without the ability to forsake, the creature would have been necessitated with respect to being just and willing justly: He would have willed of necessity. And so it seems that Anselm wants to underscore nothing else but the will's natural freedom as a power of choice: nothing other than the will's essential wherewithal for making a choice of moral import.

Second, Anselm's mention of the 'ability to keep' is an important qualification of his understanding of the rational creature as an indirect cause of his having justice. It is only because of this ability that he can be an indirect cause. The
ability is natural and God-given. To a certain extent, then, even the creature's ability to cause himself indirectly to have justice is owing to the Creator-God. As Anselm puts it: "...he who in this manner gave justice to himself received from God the fact that he gave justice to himself." Whether his possession of justice be discerned from the perspective of God's direct causality or his own indirect causality, the focus is always on the Divine.

In ethical matters, however, the rational creature has a direct causal role. By virtue of having received the ability to remove justice, he is able to cause himself to be unjust or not to have justice in the will: He is able to become, as per the naturally free choice of the will, the proximate efficient cause of his injustice: "...no one becomes unjust except by willingly deserting justice." Nothing ad extra, including God, mediates in the instance of the will causing itself to be unjust: Its efficiency is proper and direct.

God does not escape involvement in the creature's causality of his own injustice.

The fundamental claim of s. 4 stands, but Anselm now admits to God's indirect causality. God causes the rational creature not to have justice, not because God directly causes it with an efficient will, but only because God does not will to do something that God is able to will and to do. If God were to will and to do it, God would make the creature just. Divine indirect causality extends to this point: God does not give anew the requisite justice or does not cause the unjust being to be just: "...God causes the evil angel to be unjust by not returning justice to him, although able to do so."

C)

The extent to which Anselm understands God's indirect causality of injustice is unsatisfactory. He thinks that it only extends to God's willing not to return justice to the fallen
angel. His point might suffice for understanding God's indirect role after the fall. But, if the intention of DCD is to explicate the origin of moral evil, then it remains to be seen how God's indirect causality figures just before or at the precise moment of the fall when the angel had justice in the will? when the strength of his natural will for happiness was only beginning to wax inordinate and autonomous and, eventually, in violation of justice? and when the eternal God foresaw it happening? How does God's indirect causality figure from this perspective? It would seem nonsensical to hold that, before or at the fall, God was willing not to return justice to the angel: There would have been no need for God to return it and absolutely no reason for God to will not to return it because the angel had it.

A fuller explication of God's indirect causality might lie in the answers to some related questions: Is it not the case that God, at the origin of moral evil, indirectly caused the rational creature to be unjust or not to have justice simply because God willed not to interfere with or to violate the natural freedom of the rational will in its choice to abandon the grace of justice? Is it not the case that God indirectly caused injustice because God did not cause the rational creature to be altogether unfree? Otherwise put: Could it be that God is the indirect cause because God willed and caused the rational creature to be free?

Perhaps the fullest theodicean explication lies in understanding whether or not God could have willed otherwise in respect to the created imago dei. Could the Creator have done so without violating the very rectitude that God is ex se and per se?

These questions do not damage or overturn Anselm's thesis on God's indirect causality of injustice. They only shift his perspective in deference to a fuller clarification of his theodicean effort.
Section 12

DCD, c. 19:
"Let us Return to Considering the Will
and Let us Remember...";
The Rational Creature's 'Will to be Like God'

A)

In view of sections 9, 10, and 11, the will might have gained a reputation that needs to be righted. This is apparently Anselm's reason for pausing recollectively: He sees the need to exonerate the will in the very process of expounding his exoneration of the God who created it. His pause implicitly reenforces his theodicean stance that the origin of moral evil is psycho-logical, not theo-logical nor onto-logical.

This short section is a terse and partial compendium of ss. 9-11. In it, though, Anselm is primarily reflecting on s. 7 and reemphasizing his stance on the ontological goodness of the will. He is also maintaining his distinction which respects both the will and its deeds: that is, the distinction between their always being ontologically good and their being called 'morally good' or 'morally evil' depending, respectively, upon the presence or absence of justice in the will. Reflection bends back even farther to s. 4: For he is still upholding his crucial ontological principle and the Creator on whom it focuses.

The thesis is straightforward; the theodicean import obvious: No created being, qua being, is evil. This includes not only the will with its natural affection, but also the will's actualizations, and particularly, its 'will to be like God.' And the rational will that lacks justice by its own free choice is, consequently, the only thing (res) that is called 'evil' aside from those things which obtain because of it. That is, it is called 'evil' or is evil relative to this lack or privation of justice. A being 'is' (esse) and a being 'is called' (dicitur): These marked expressions bespeak, at least implicitly, the aforementioned distinction which bears unequivocal theodicean significance.
The complete argument of Anselm's recollection follows with a running interpretation. It commences thus:

1) Before it received the will for justice, the [natural] will for happiness is not something evil but is something good, and it is so irrespective of what it wills.³

Evil is said to be 'something,' but only improperly: It points to something called by name, but it is not something that is conceivable in the understanding or in reality.⁶ If the will, which is believed to be a being,⁷ were 'something evil,' then, by Anselm's own reasoning (as per his analysis of 'aliquid' and his claims in s. 8), it would be at once a reality and a non-reality: a being and a not-being: a violation, in other words, of the principle of identity. For Anselm, the being of the will cannot be essentially evil or be something evil. If it were, it would not be a being. Thus, God, who is the Creator of being and good things only, is cleared of having created an 'evil being' or 'something evil' which one might mistakenly take the will to be. **

For this reason, 2) it follows that when the will deserts the justice which it received, if it remains the same being that it was before it deserted the required justice, it is something good in respect to that which it is.⁸

Anselm implicitly underscores here the distinction of s. 7. With or without the affection for justice which grounds the moral goodness of the will, the creature's natural will for happiness always remains essentially good. Insofar as being a creature of God, the 'will as instrument' with it natural affection is always good.

Anselm's presumption of the truth of the conditional — "...if it [the will] remains the same being that it was before it deserted the required justice...." — is important (albeit questionable). It intimates nothing less than his understanding that justice is not an essential part of the will. The grace of justice simply qualifies the essence of the will in a morally-
significant way. The qualification is not essentially-significant, but it is existentially-significant: Justice does not alter the very essence of the natural will, but it does affect its actualization to the extent of effecting the fullness of the truth of its signification.9

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But, 3) with respect to the fact that justice, which was in it, is no longer [there], the natural will for happiness is called 'evil' and 'unjust.'10

The point is straightforward: Given the rational creature's breach of his obligation to have justice, as presented in s. 10, the will is called 'evil.' However, this does not mean that justice freely forsaken by the will renders the will essentially evil. It always remains a good, stays essentially good, in virtue of its created being. And yet it is called 'evil' or 'unjust' because of the absence of required justice.

There is, however, far more meaning to this appellation than that which Anselm proffers in DCD: Without indwelling justice, the will is called 'unjust' because it fails to signify the moral rectitude that bespeaks the creature's proper relation with the Creator. Its being called 'unjust' is no different from its being called 'estranged from the Creator' to whom it is obliged to exist in harmony and with gratitude.11 As indicated in ss. 3 and 9, this harmony is witnessed foremost in the union of the will's natural affection with the separable affection for justice.

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For certainly, 4) if willing to be like God were evil, the Son of God would not will to be like God; or, if willing whatever basest pleasures were evil, the wills of brute animals would be called 'evil.'12

But, 5) the will of the Son of God is just, not evil; the irrational will [of the brute] is not called 'evil,' because it is not unjust.13

Anselm immediately shifts here from talking about the 'will as instrument' to talking about its 'use' or specific willings, for
example, its 'willing to be like God' or 'willing basest pleasures.' The shift bears particular theodicean import.

Not only the will as a power of the soul, but also each desire and choice or willing thereof is considered a being: one that originates from God, and, hence, one that is essentially good. It is such whether it be the willing of a rational or irrational creature. No willing of the will is essentially evil. And this includes the 'will to be like God' which was presented in s. 5 as a constitutive factor in the rational creature's fall.

Like the rational will itself, particular willings can be called 'unjust' or 'evil.' What makes any one desire and choice of the will evil, specifically the 'will to be like God,' is the fact that it arises in and proceeds from a will which, owing to its being essentially freedom, countervails the regulating mean set for it by the affection for justice in consort with the moral discernment of reason. The rational creature's 'willing to be like God' in contradistinction to justice or the will of God justifies its being called 'evil' or 'unjust.' The appellation does not, however, render that willing of the will essentially evil or unjust.

Anselm's reference to the Son of God's 'will to be like God' is instructively relevant to an understanding of the rational creature and his fall: It underscores the point that 'willing to be like God' is not evil in and of itself, nor need it ever be called 'evil' or 'unjust,' provided it proceeds from a will that has justice.

In the case of the Incarnate Son of God: of the person who is of the God whose essence is one and simple, the will of his human nature, which was assumed into a unity with the second divine person, accords freely and obediently with the will of his divine nature, which is essentially justice. Hence, Anselm is able to say that the Son's 'will to be like God' is just; it is not simply called 'just' as is the creature's when he has justice in the will. The God-man or the 'man as assumed by the Word' freely willed to be like God: to be obedient to justice. He was
ever just in doing so.\textsuperscript{15} The rational creature's 'will to be like God' would have been just as just if his will had contained itself within the scope of justice which is none other than the spirit of God itself.

Anselm's reference to the Son of God is instructive in one other respect: Would that the created rational will's ensured for itself that harmony of the natural and acquired affections which is seen paradigmatically in the order of the human will and divine will of the God-man. The wills for happiness and justice can co-exist peaceably and beneficially: They can be one. In the Christ, there is proof; there is also the example, par excellence, of what it means 'to will to be like the God' who is essentially the unity of happiness and justice.

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From which it follows that, 6) no will is an evil thing, but a will, insofar as it is, is something good, because it is the work of God.\textsuperscript{16}

The theodicean import is rather clear with respect to God's being the Creator of the will. Morally evil the will might be; essentially evil it can never be. In regard to its essence, it is not only the work of God, it is also the image of God. As such, it is good.

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And, 7) the will is only evil insofar as it is unjust.\textsuperscript{17}

That is, it is only evil insofar as it is called 'unjust.' That is, it is evil without the presence of justice or the affect of justice on its natural desires and free choices. The rational creature's image of God is diminished when the created and natural will is rightly called 'unjust.'

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Two concluding points speak to the thesis of this section and, hitherto, to the theodicean effort of DCD:

And, 8) seeing that no thing is called 'evil' except for an evil will or something which obtains on account of it..., nothing is clearer than that 1) no thing is evil and 2) evil
is nothing else than the absence of justice forsaken in the will or in some thing which obtains because of an evil will.\textsuperscript{18}

C)

In light of the foregoing interpretation, there is no reason to think that Anselm holds that the angel fell because he 'willed to be like God.' As suggested in s. 5, sub. B, the rational creature fell because he 'willed inordinately to be like God.' That is, unlike the Incarnate Word who 'willed to be like God' with free obedience and deference to justice, the created image of God 'willed to be like God' beyond the scope and influence of the justice that is both God and the will of God. By willing autonomously, the rational creature arrogated to himself a false likeness to God\textsuperscript{19} instead of a true likeness rooted in true freedom that germinates and grows in persevering and patient obedience to God.
Section 13
DCD, c. 20:
The Inordinate 'Will to Be Like God':
On the Indirect Causality of God's Permissive Willing

A)

Sections 11 and 12 coalesce in this section which culminates Anselm's psychological explanation for the origin of moral evil. Here he presents a further explication of God's indirect causality. As seen in ss. 5 and 9 and reviewed in s. 11, the rational creature's inordinate will to be like God is due to the efficiency or direct causality of the creature's will. But, in a world that is created and governed by a good and just God, a world in which absolutely nothing escapes the purview and will of God, Anselm must account precisely for the evil of the creature's ontologically good will vis-à-vis the divine will. This he does with his notion of permissive willing. God's indirect causality of moral evil proceeds from God's permissive will.

B)

Development of Anselm's stance begins with his student's admission that the reasoning in s. 12 is clear and true. He also admits that something is left to be implied. One is not told precisely what it is, but it is, as he thinks, something of which one dare not speak and ought to deny.

The opening argument of s. 13 is paraphrased below. It scarcely intimates that which the student considers implicit in the arguments of ss. 11 and 12:

1) If the will to be like God is something and thus a good, then its existence is attributable to the supreme source of being.
Therefore, 2) if the rational creature only had what he received, then what he had, he received from God who gave it.
But, 3) the rational creature received from God what God gave.
Therefore, 4) if he had the 'will to be like God,' then he
had it because God gave it.²

The argument assumes the instruction of s. 12 and harks back to s. 5. What the student now has in mind is the positive flip-side of what he argued thrice and unsuccessfully: that the origin of moral evil lies in a deficiency of the will that is owing to God's failure to give either the virtue of perseverance, the ability to keep it, or the will to keep it. Can it now be thought that the rational creature fell not because God failed to give something which was needed for standing in the truth, but rather because God in fact gave something? Be it something good: Be it the 'will to be like God.' Could it be that the God who gave the very will by which the rational creature fell is more than indirectly causally involved in the moral fall?

The student's mindfulness of s. 5 impels him and Anselm to concern themselves with the question of how the rational creature, who received all that he had from God, received from the good and just God a will that eventually became evil. Simply and more cogently put: How does God give an evil will?

The simple answer -- "...God gives an evil will by not preventing it when God can -- especially since the ability to will anything at all comes only from God"³ -- is but a variation of the claim presented in s. 11: that God causes to be unjust because God does not cause to be just. But the more significant point lies in the unasked question: How does the giving of this evil will figure as an instance of indirect causality, and how does it bespeak the divine will which underlies it?

The underlying rationale of Anselm's simple answer comes to light only in light of what he presents elsewhere and presupposes here of his readers: He has in mind his analysis of 'facere' (doing) and his parallel analysis of 'velle'(willing); all in all, he is mindful of his account of the direct and indirect modes of causality, not only in terms of 'doing' or 'causing to be,' but also in terms of the 'willing to do' that importantly founds the actualization of every 'ability to do.'⁴ Elucidation
of four distinct types of volition complements his exegesis of 'velle' and, implicitly, 'facere': It enables one to see the forms of direct and indirect willing in view of the volitional attitude or frame of mind that underlies them. Moreover, Anselm seems once again to be aware of the improprieties that seep into and abound in the vulgar use of language: generally, for instance, in speaking of things in a manner that does not always reflect the full extent or fact of the matter. All of the above constitute and underlie his simple answer: All are suggested in the claim that immediately follows his student's assent to the fittingness of his (Anselm's) simple response:

T:/ Therefore, if there is no giving without a receiving, then just as someone who willingly concedes and also someone who permits, though disapproving, are commonly said to give, so someone who receives what has been conceded and someone who dares to take forbidden things are not incorrectly said to receive.7

There can be no doubting that every instance of receiving necessitates a corresponding instance of giving. Another truth, though, is not as readily certain: It is that not every instance of receiving obtains solely because something has been given directly and efficiently. Undoubtedly, it is the very point that dwells on Anselm's mind; certainly, it is the point that his student once again fails to comprehend fully. There is an echo here of s. 5.

Given that the notions of 'giving' and 'receiving' are substitution-instances of the predicate-variable 'facere,' they can be understood in terms of both direct and indirect modes of 'doing' or 'causing something to be.' And, because Anselm sees 'willing to do' as presupposing every 'ability to do,' the direct modes of 'giving' and 'receiving' can be understood or expressed in terms of direct modes of willing and can thus be interpreted as a kind of efficient willing. Indirect modes of 'giving' and 'receiving' correspond to indirect modes of 'willing to give' and 'willing to receive' which can be interpreted as types of approbative, concessive, and permissive willing.
The common way of speaking about 'giving' might or might not reflect these distinctions. Probably, as Anselm himself might have thought, the idea of indirectly giving and receiving something is eclipsed by the mistaken idea, grounded in the usus loguendi, that all instances of giving and receiving are direct. In fact, they are not.

Anselm wants to hold that something can be given indirectly. What needs to be appreciated, though, is the sense of the will that underlies this act of giving. More precisely, what needs to be appreciated is the frame of mind or voluntary attitude of the giver. To the point:

Is the indirect causality undergirded by an efficient willing that suggests one's desire to effect the outcome of whatever it is that is being willed and effectively caused? Or is it supported by an approbative willing that suggests that the one who wills, though able, does not aim directly to effect the occurrence of whatever, but, nonetheless, desires and approves of its happening via something or someone else? Or is it grounded in a concessive willing that suggests that the one who wills neither seeks to effect, nor approves of a certain outcome, but, in whatever temperament, merely concedes something in place of something else which is preferred, owed, or stipulated, and, upon having been conceded, enables the outcome to obtain? Or, finally, is it undergirded by a permissive willing that suggests that the one who wills neither desires to effect the outcome of whatever, nor approves of it, nor concedes anything to bring it about, but simply tolerates its undesired occurrence with displeasure and in spite of the fact of having the ability to prevent it?

According to Anselm, God indirectly gives an evil will to the creature to this extent: that God does not interfere with or prevent the creature's own direct or efficiently-willed abandonment of required justice or deviation from the will of God. In other words, God permissively and tolerantly respects the creature's efficiency of will and its free choice to abandon
the gift which it received in creation and ought to have preserved indefinitely. God respects whatever the created will desires and chooses for itself in the freedom that it is essentially. To this very point Anselm has written: "...that when the devil willed what he ought not to have [willed] he received this willing from God because God permitted it..."."

Presumably, God's permissive will conceives nothing to the creature who desires and chooses inordinately or evilly: Nothing is particularly given in lieu of something else and in order to aid and abet the outcome of the creature's inordinate will. Moreover, there are reasons to think that the indirect causality of God's permissive will is not also approbative: for 1) to be so would be contradictory to the essence of God which is absolutely contrary to evil, and 2) to be so would imply that what God approves, God is able to effect directly. But, the good and just God, who is truly omnipotent and free, is unable to cause evil efficiently insofar as being unable to will evil efficiently. God's failure to halt the desertion of justice cannot suggest that God approves of such a will to desert or that God conceives anything to effect it -- and least of all that God desires and wills it efficaciously. The permissive will of God is neither an efficient, nor an approbative, nor a concessive will.

God permits. And, thus, the creature receives: He receives the ability to will or to move his will, be it morally good or evil, by permission of the God who creates all natures. Indeed, even in the case of a morally evil creature, he is such only because God permits it. But, insofar as God does not approve of what God permits the creature to will evilly, it is the case that he does not receive from God, but rather receives from himself.

It is the creature alone who directly gives to himself and receives from himself an evil will. More precisely, what is given is neither the being of the will itself, nor the being of its turning (moventis), nor the being of its actions
For it is God who efficiently wills and directly causes and gives the being of the will qua will: "For insofar as the will and its turning, or movement, are something, each is a good and is due to God." They are had from the God who creates all natures (naturas), be they substantial and accidental or universal and individual (S.I,265:24-25). That which alone is given directly by the creature to himself and only indirectly by God is the fact that something that is ontologically good and attributable to God becomes something evil or comes to be called 'evil.'

God only permissively wills and indirectly gives rein to the free will's departure from justice. When the will, its turnings, and its deeds become evil, inordinate, or autonomous, it "is due to the one who wills, or who moves his will," that is, to the creature who wills efficiently and freely. The rational creature wills and gives directly to himself the evil or, more precisely, the fact of the absence of justice in the will. Through it all, God merely tolerates it all: God does so simply out of respect for the freedom which God bestowed reasonably upon the creature's will. Either reason or respect dictates against God's efficiently willing interference with freedom's actualization.

It is in the preceding context that Anselm holds that "nothing...seems to be opposed to the truth" when it is said that the rational creature willed what he ought not to have willed and yet received this willing from God -- from a God who permits that which God is able to prevent.

C)

Anselm's conception of divine permissive willing is problematic. I concur with his point that God's indirect causality of moral evil is an instance of God's willing not to prevent or interfere with the occurrence of inordinate willing. But, I do not agree with his further point -- a qualifier -- that God is able to prevent that which God willingly does not
prevent. My disagreement, I trust, is Anselmian. In the rough, it is thus:

The rational creature was created in the freedom of God. He, the imago dei, was created naturally free, to be truly free, and to grow virtuously in relation with God towards the perfection of true freedom. The natural freedom of the creature, of the will as a created being, is an expression of the rectitude of creation and of the God who creates purposefully.

If God were truly able to prevent the naturally free will from willing inordinately, then God would be able to violate the rectitude of creation. If God were truly able to violate the order of creation as known and willed eternally, God would be able to violate the divine essence. For the rectitude of creation is not something other than the rectitude that God is. Be it metaphysical or moral rectitude: It is but an image or expression of supreme rectitude itself.

Moreover, if God were to prevent the inordinate willing which arises from the natural freedom of the will with its natural affection for happiness, then God would effectively violate that freedom, or the very essence of the created rational will, which was bestowed upon the creature for a significant reason: that he be able to choose in a morally-meaningful way either to keep or to forsake the justice that secures the true freedom that is found only in the God who is the justice that is true happiness. Again, such an act of prevention would amount quite simply to a divine violation of the rectitude of creation.

A further violation would occur if God were to arrange the life, circumstances, and affairs of a rational creature so as to ensure that he always and certainly chooses the good and just. Though the idea of such an arrangement sounds attractive because it would probably secure an ethics, it is neither prospective nor plausible in an Anselmian frame of reference. It simply runs counter to what I understand to be Anselm's hard-core, libertarian-like conception of the will: that is, of the will as a radically and wholly free power of opposites with but one
qualification imposed upon it by its own natural affection for happiness.

An ethically-suitable arrangement of things, if it ever were, would suggest nothing less than an undermining of the will as a true power of opposites -- that is, as a very real power inasmuch as being able to choose meaningfully between 'A' and 'B' and not in some rarefied, attenuated, or conveniently construed sense of being able to choose ever certainly between 'A' and 'A primed' or 'A primed' and 'A double-primed,' et cetera. In such an arrangement, the creature's will would be subtly determined towards a certain direction and with a certain disposition. And, for this to be the case, God would have to be involved in at least one of two creative scenarios: one, by making the reason more powerful than the will and thus making it able to prevail upon the inordinate will; or, two, by making the affection for justice an inseparable inclination with a governing influence that would ever aid and abet the power of reason over and above the power of the will. In s. 3, sub. C (2), reasons are given for the unacceptability of both scenarios: All in all they would wreak havoc on the idea of the creature having been created in the image of the God who is freedom.24

Furthermore and summarily, such arrangements would figure quite nicely as a form of antecedent or causal necessity in the life of the created and voluntary moral agent. Simply put, it would be a form of divine determination. As such, and as Anselm even suggests in the second question of DC, such a determination would clearly counter his own understanding of God's 'fore'-knowledge and 'pre'-destination vis-à-vis rational and voluntary creatures. In no way will he allow the voluntary power and actions of the rational creature to be unfreely driven, destined, or determined by an external and antecedent causal force called 'God' or effected by God. And, in no way will he concede anything but an innocuous (that is, a non-efficient and undetermining) subsequent or logical necessity to redound upon the free and rational will. This sense of necessity he must
concede, first, in light of God's knowing in an eternal present what the created will desires and chooses to do, and, second, in light of his claim that what the eternally present God knows cannot fail to be the case if God's knowledge is always true and certain. Indeed, it is the case that what God knows, God wills; and what God wills, God causes. But, with respect to the will and actions of the rational creature, God knows them to occur voluntarily and freely. And God wills either efficiently or permissively that they do so. When God knows and wills them as such and sees them happening as such in God's eternal present, they are destined to be as they are known to be. For what God knows to be in an eternal present cannot not be even if it occurs in time: And this is the gist of the logical necessity -- the only necessity and the only sense of determination -- that Anselm allows to redound upon any rational creature's free will vis-à-vis God.

In sum and with respect to the rational creature and his inordinate willing, Anselm's qualifier is untenable. His view of the Creator, of the God of rectitude, will not allow it to stand.

But, assuredly, in his own defense, Anselm would say that, at least in theory, the omnipotent God is able to prevent the inordinate willing which God merely permits. In practice, though, God is not able. Every ability to do something presupposes a will to do it. But, because the will of God is unable to be separated from the rectitude that God is, that is, because of the unity and simplicity of God's essence, God is not able to do in reality what God is supposed to be able to do in theory. God cannot interfere with the evil willing of the rational creature who was created naturally free. God cannot do so even if it means that God must permit and, thus, tolerate moral disorder in creation while making way and means for its moral restitution.

Disagreement with Anselm's qualification does not undermine his theodicean effort or, in particular, the theodicean
significance of his concept of permissive willing. His conception still lends itself to his exoneration of God vis-à-vis moral evil. This it does insofar as excluding the notion of efficient willing. Furthermore, the concept provides him with a balanced complement to his emphasis on the efficient will of the rational creature at the origin of moral evil. If, indeed, all of creation falls within the purview and will of God's governance, as Anselm believes, it is a balance that must be struck. In striking it, he manages to bring even evil under the control of God. For, as Anselm sees it, the moral evil which God permits to transpire via rational creatures is redirected by immutable wisdom towards the original rectitude and beauty of creation as it exists most truly and eternally in the mind of God. The permissive will of God notwithstanding, the efficient will of Incomprehensible Wisdom ordains evil things for good.
Section 14

DCD, c. 21:
Knowledge of the Future Fall Thrice Denied;
Freedom of the Rational Will Thrice Upheld

A)

Given Anselm's strict understanding of 'foreknowledge,' his denial of creaturely and divine foreknowledge of the fall can only be taken as confirmation of one thesis: that the rational creature was not necessitated to sin or compelled to will inordinately. To this denial he adds two others: that the creature could not even think or suspect that he would fall before he did. All three stances enable him to underscore his key claim for the sole efficiency of the will at the origin of moral evil. In doing so, he upholds its natural freedom.

B)

This section begins with the student's inquiring demand: Is it the case that the rational creature foreknew that he would fall? It continues with Anselm's three attempts to answer negatively.

First. If the student wants to talk about the rational creature's foreknowledge, then he must clarify what he means by knowledge. Anselm offers him assistance that seemingly echoes Boethius: Either he understands 'knowledge' to be that which is certain and true, that is: knowledge of something understood with rational certainty or, more simply, knowledge of truth, or, he understands it to be simply thought, estimation, or opinion. If he holds to the former (and he does), then, in an echo of s. 9, Anselm's pointed response to his query is this: "(W)hat is able not to be, cannot at all with rational certainty be inferred to be." In other words, that which "is able not to be is altogether unable to be known." That is, it cannot be known with certainty and the preponderance of truth unless and until it actually is. For until the very moment that any
contingent being actually is, it is possible that it not be actualized.⁴ Such is Anselm's position with respect to the contingent being of the will and the contingency of its act.

The being of the will and its choice is contingent, not necessary. Before a choice obtains, it can very well be the case that it might not: meaning, that is, that if it does not, then so it is and not by necessity. For, as noted in s. 3, there is nothing that externally compels the will to will or prevents it from willing. Hence, Anselm wants to hold that the rational creature could not have known his fall with foreknowledge: That is, he could not have foreknown his fall with certainty or with the knowledge of truth.⁹ If he had, then his willing would have occurred out of necessity. For, it is the case that "what is foreknown is not able not to happen in the future;"¹⁰ and, if perchance it is able not to happen, then it is not properly a matter of certain and true knowledge of a future event. Now, if there were something that be able not to be, such as a choice of the will, and if it were foreknown to occur, then it would be knowledge of a future contingency that must occur. And this is precisely the problematic and paradoxical situation that Anselm must avoid with respect to the contingency of the will and its choices. The rational creature "was not able to foreknow his fall, the future occurrence of which was not necessary."¹¹

Anselm cannot hold to foreknowledge of the fall, if such a knowledge suggests that what will occur, must occur. For, otherwise, the 'free' in his free-will theodicy would be expunged and so too would his theodicean effort. God would be rightly and directly implicated in the inordinate willing of the creature, at least insofar as having created a being who would necessarily will autonomously or sinfully in the future.

The student's rejoinder to Anselm's first negative response betrays him once again as the devil's advocate. He is reminded, as he says, of the celebrated question of divine foreknowledge and free choice. At this point, there can be little doubt that what seems to be an irrelevant digression is, in fact, very
relevant to the dialogue, provided it is appreciated as Anselm's theodicean effort. For he might have successfully explained away the rational creature's foreknowledge of his fall, but what about God's? If God's knowledge is always true and certain, and if God foreknows all future events, then is it not the case that God's knowledge of the creature's future inordinate willing necessitates its occurrence? It is very much the question that the student has in mind: For, as he puts it: "(A)lthough it is evident that there is divine foreknowledge of all things done by free choice and that none of these deeds occurs of necessity, nevertheless what is foreknown seems to be able not to happen in the future." Anselm's unacceptably brief reply is but an anticipation of what he offers much later and more thoroughly in the first question of De concordia: God's foreknowledge is not properly called foreknowledge. For the one to whom all things are always present does not have foreknowledge of future things; rather God has knowledge of present things. Therefore, since foreknowledge of a future event is a different notion from knowledge of a present event, divine foreknowledge and the foreknowledge about which we are asking [creaturely foreknowledge] need not have the same consequence.

The point is crucially important to his theodicean effort. Thus, it needs to be expounded.

In light of the Boethian-inspired claim that divine foreknowledge is a misnomer, Anselm wants to hold in a Boethian spirit that God's foreknowledge does not always entail what one might think: that whatever God knows to be going to occur will happen out of necessity or by necessity, that is, by an antecedent or causal necessity. It is not always the case, even though it is always true that whatever is foreknown must be going to occur. Divine and creaturely foreknowledge are not of the same consequence, as Anselm tells us. For what is foreknown by a rational creature must occur: It will necessarily occur if, in fact, it is truly and certainly foreknown. But, God's foreknowledge of things about to occur in time is actually a
knowledge of things happening all at once in God's eternal present. It is a critically important point.

God's "foreknowledge of a future event" is, properly speaking, nothing but God's "knowledge of a present event." God "does not have foreknowledge of future things; God has knowledge of present things." In the eternal present of God, God knows that some things occur by an antecedent and causal necessity, for instance, an event of physical nature; and, with the same certainty and truth, God knows that other things occur voluntarily. Not only the causally necessary occurrence, but also the voluntary one, must occur -- undoubtedly will occur -- because God sees them occurring in God's eternal present.

Quite distinctive is this necessity that obtains in virtue of God's eternally present knowledge of voluntary and temporal occurrences: It is simply a subsequent or logical necessity. It is not the necessity that either internally or externally compels or prevents a thing from happening; it is not a causal force which precedes and determines a thing's occurrence. It is, rather, the necessity that follows logically in virtue of the fact or reality of a thing as known in the present. The sense of this necessity is worth expounding.

What the creature sees in terms of past, present, and future, God sees in an eternal present. And whatever God sees happening, then necessarily it happens: For when something is or when something occurs, necessarily it is or occurs. Be it tautological or not, the point holds equally well of what God knows in the divine present and of what rational creatures know in their fleeting present. Subsequent or logical necessity merely reenforces the universal principle of non-contradiction: that something cannot be and not be at the same time, or, as Anselm puts it in terms of occurrence: "...what will occur will not be able not to occur at the same time." If the God who knows all things at once in an eternal present truly sees something happening, then indeed something must be happening when God sees it. If not, then God suffers from divine illusions.
In the case of the rational will, when God sees all of its
temporal willings at once and sees them happening before they
actually happen in the creature's temporal experience, then they
must happen as God sees them. Otherwise, God's knowledge of them
is not true and certain. Subsequent or logical necessity in what
God sees in the perspective of an eternal present does not, in
the case of rational and voluntary occurrences, impose an
antecedent necessity upon them. For it is the case that God
eternally sees that some things occur by virtue of a causal
necessity and still others by virtue of the free choice of the
rational will. When all occur -- however they occur --
necessarily they are just as God sees and knows them to be.

Second. Anselm's claim against the creature's foreknowledge
of his fall is taken one step further so as to exclude not only
knowledge (scientia) but even the creature's estimation/thought
(aestimatio) or suspicion (suspicio) of his fall (S.I,267:23-24).

Anselm argues disjunctively (S.I,267:26-27): If the
creature had foreknown, thought, or suspected the future
occurrence of his fall, then he would have done so either
willingly or unwillingly. If he had foreknown and was willing
that which he foreknew, then his would not have been a case of
foreknowledge. For, at the precise moment of knowing and willing
his fall, he would have in fact fallen. All futurity would
have been lost in the immediacy of the present. However, if he
had foreknown and was not willing that which he foreknew, then he
would have been overcome by sorrow. And, to the very extent that
he could have been happy in knowing that he would persevere in
justice, to that same extent he would have been miserable with
knowledge of his future fall (S.I,268:6-13). In Anselm's
estimation, if this scenario were really the case, it would be
unfitting (non convenit). He gives no explanation. In light of
ss. 1 and 3, however, it could be judged unbecoming in view of a
world created by the God who is rectitude and who created
purposefully.

The idea that the rational creature might know, think, or
suspect the future and unwilled occurrence of his fall -- in short the necessitation of his fall -- simply begs the contrary of belief in a Creator who is omnibenevolent and just, and who created the rational being to be just and to endeavor lovingly towards confirmation in that justice. If a creature were to fall unwillingly or unfreely, he would simply be one who must needs fall. The very prospect of a moral prevarication that is compelled to happen is simply impossible to maintain from Anselm's perspective. This is especially so given his stance on the inalienable and unvanquishable strength of the will whose essence is freedom. And, if perchance the prospect were to be realized, then it would simply riddle his conception of God beyond his own Christian recognition.

Third. Anselm intensifies his claim against the rational creature's foreknowledge. His extent is somewhat radical: In no way (nullo modo), he maintains, did the creature even think (putare) of his future and moral prevarication (praevaticat) (S.I,268:28-29).

Again, Anselm argues disjunctively. If the rational creature were to have thought of his fall beforehand, then he conceived of it as being either compelled or voluntary (S.I,268:29-30). That he considered it to be compelled is summarily rejected. Most likely it is the reason just given above: Anselm's conception of the will does not allow for its external compulsion. On the other hand, the creature could not have thought that his fall would be voluntary: For "as long as he willed to persevere in the truth, he was in no way able to think that by his own will alone he would desert the truth." For it is the case, as Anselm continues, that "as long as he had an upright will, he willed to persevere in this will." And if he were willing perseveringly, then he would not have been thinking of a fall. If he were thinking such, then such would have suggested his will to fall. Thus, Anselm wants to hold that, while standing ever so perseveringly in the truth, the rational creature could not have suspected, let alone have
thought or known, that he, barring "any other cause," would freely (sponte) and voluntarily (voluntate) desert justice.\textsuperscript{36} This argument, we are told, is not meant to deny that the creature knew all along that he was able to change (mutare) his will from persevering in justice to not persevering.\textsuperscript{37} What is not denied is the natural freedom of the rational will for choice.

Given Anselm's three negative responses, we, so we are told, should be inclined to see, provided we have closely understood, that the creature did not know or think or suspect beforehand that he was going to fall. What we might also be inclined to see is a burgeoning and strict voluntarism in the Anselmian account of the origin of moral evil.

C)

While standing perseveringly in justice, the rational creature could not have known beforehand that he -- "nulla alia accedente causa" or "omni alia cessante causa" (S.I,269:2,5) -- would willingly desert justice. Just what it is that Anselm means or intends by these two qualifications -- "when no other cause was drawing near" or "when every other cause was at rest" -- is not too clear and, to a certain extent, suspiciously misleading.

It has already been claimed in s. 5 that there is but one cause of the fall of the rational creature: It is the efficiency of the power of desire and choice itself: of the self-moved will that turns inordinately. What "other cause" could Anselm have in mind, be it only a remote or indirect cause? Is it perhaps the intellect itself and that which it presents to the will as beneficial to creaturely well-being? Anselm does not say so anywhere. But what else could this cause be: As long as the creature stood perseveringly in justice he was presumably content with what he had and who he was. He did not know or think or suspect that he would fall. There was no reason or motive
(causa) for him to think so. He was epistemologically complacent in willing justly. But, when the will was riled from its contented harmony with justice, why so, except that the soul's other power to which the rational will ought to be harmoniously aligned held before the will an appetible object which, in the scheme of God's eternal plan, was inopportune and inappropriate?

Although Anselm admits that the intellect is less powerful than the will,8 he does not implicate the intellect or reason in the origin of moral evil -- at least not explicitly. Such a forward move would have been too contrary to his Augustinian tradition and too anticipatory of Stephen Tempier's condemnations of A.D. 1277: To say that error or weakness in the intellect preceded error or weakness in the will would have been too unconscionable to speak. But was it so to think? Might thought have inadvertently seeped into Anselmian writing?

Heretofore, Anselm has not delivered a substantive motive for why the will -- nay, the rational will -- of the creature waxed inordinate. And, indeed, hereafter he delivers none. If there was a motive (and intuition suggests that there must have been, if only in the split instance of utter spontaneity), could it have been rendered by any other power than the intellect to which the natural will for the beneficial is, according to Anselm, always linked in operation?

If the intellect is implicated in the origin of moral evil, then Anselm's theodicean effort is riddled. Indeed, it might now be held suspect until he who seems to have anticipated this criticism clears himself of suspicion. This Anselm attempts to do in the next section.
Section 15

DCD, cc. 22-24:
Knowledge and Ignorance before the Fall:
Favorable and Unfavorable (?) Theodicean Implications

A)

A relationship holds between the will and the intellect: It necessitates Anselm's consideration of the latter power vis-à-vis the creature's fall. The devil's advocate thinks as much when he pushes the dialogue into a consideration of the creature's pre-fallen knowledge. What transpires in this section is nothing less than an ambivalent but significant thesis in Anselm's theodicean effort: On the one hand, he wants to hold that the rational creature had the necessary moral knowledge that would have enabled him to stand perseveringly in justice, if he had only willed to do so. Such a knowledge would have enabled him to realize the perfection of his freedom in justice. On the other hand, he wants to maintain that the rational creature was inculpably and importantly ignorant before the fall. For the particular knowledge that God withheld from him secured the natural freedom of his will, while moral knowledge readied it for teleological perfection. Knowledge and ignorance work hand in hand towards the same moral goal.

It is not in spite of this epistemological ambivalence that Anselm thinks that he has buttressed his claim for the sole efficiency of the rational will at the origin of moral evil. And this implies the strengthening of his exoneration of God in the face of it. His supposed effectiveness, however, can be questioned to the very point of undermining his theodicean effort.

B)

There is a beginning inquiry: Did the rational creature know that "he ought not to will what he willed in transgressing"? Anselm's affirmative response recalls s. 2: He
had to know simply in virtue of being a rational being. He could not have been ignorant of that which he ought and ought not to have willed and done. In other words, he had to know his moral debitum; what is more, he had to know it if he was going to keep justice of the will. But 'how' did he know and 'why'?

The reason 'why' is delivered very tersely in c. 22 and is best viewed in light of s. 2:

For if...[the rational creature] had not known that he ought not to will what he unjustly did will, he [as Anselm claims] would not have known that he ought to keep the will which he deserted.

Without knowledge of that which he was obliged to will and to do, or not to will and to do, the rational creature's actions would have been no different from, neither morally better nor worse than, those of a stone doing what it does naturally or of a horse doing what it does instinctively and seemingly necessarily by virtue of a non-rational will. Neither his will nor his voluntary actions would have been just or unjust in any morally significant sense: They would not and could not have been praiseworthily just or blameworthily unjust. For it is the case that without knowing and being able to discern the morally acceptable limits of willing, the rational creature "would not," therefore, "have been just by keeping, nor unjust by deserting, the justice which he would not have known." Without knowledge of that which he ought to will and to do in justice, he would have been unable to will to keep from willing more of that which he already had and that which he was naturally inclined to will. He simply would not have known any better. In the absence of moral knowledge -- and this seems to be Anselm's unspoken point -- the choice of the free and rational will is compromised: What makes a choice morally significant is knowledge.

Whence the moral knowledge that supposedly made possible the moral discernment and choice of the rational creature; whence that which the creature needed in order to know that he ought to have kept justice? Anselm is silent; but, one need not be for
him. For if the effort in s. 2 is plausible, in spite of its philosophically speculative nature, then the question might very well be answered in terms of innate moral knowledge. This would at least partly explain 'how' the creature knew that which Anselm claims he had to know.

God provides the rational creature with moral reason and, thus, with the inherent and fundamental wherewithal for discerning his moral debitum: One knows how one ought to live if one is able to discern between good and evil in the understanding of one's mind. And one who has a complete knowledge of good is one who knows how to discern good from evil. Such a knowledge is nothing less than one of the four necessary criteria which establish that narrow or praiseworthy sense of justice which Anselm envisages in DV, c. 12, and I, for him, in s. 2: It is rectitude of the will perceived by the mind alone: It respects the will of the rational being alone. Praiseworthy justice secures the relationship between the intellect and the will: Having a just will is linked to having knowledge of one's moral debitum; having this knowledge is due to God: And so it is that God importantly assists the rational creature in being praiseworthily just or truly free.

At the very least, Anselm's student seems satisfied with the arguments for 'why' the rational creature had to know and 'how' he knew. But, he sees a problem: It arises from the perceived link between moral knowledge and the will. Clear it is that the creature knew what he ought and ought not to have willed: He knew that he ought not to desert the justice which he received and possessed. And, because he knew, as the student further reasons, he too must have known that he ought to be punished for transgressing his moral debitum (S.I,269:28-29). But, how so, he inquires: How could the ever rational creature with a natural and inseparable inclination for happiness desire and choose freely and knowingly that which would effectively cause him to be unhappy (S.I,269:21-25)?

He could do so because he was ignorant: This is Anselm's
claim. It begets epistemological ambivalence.

As advantageous as it was for the rational creature to know his moral debitum -- for in honoring it he effectively propelled himself towards the goal for which he was created --, so too was it advantageous for him to be ignorant of punishment. In short, it was beneficial for his will, as an essentially free power of choice, not to know beforehand that he would in fact be punished and, thus, be made unhappy for willingly transgressing his moral obligation: "(H)e ought not to have known that he would be punished if he sinned."9 Knowing with certainty that which he only thought to be something that ought to happen would have adversely affected the natural freedom of his will: Knowing that punishment would in fact be rendered would have compelled him to will and to choose in deference to justice. With such being the case, it would have been unlikely that his deference to justice would have been of the purest and singular motive. Thus, he would not have been praiseworthily just.10

In order to maintain and to justify this ignorance, or to explain away the ambivalence, Anselm proffers, first, a hypothetically-fortified reason and, then, a twofold argument.

First. His reason for maintaining the rational creature's ignorance gets no simpler than this: Even though he was so rational and nothing could prevent him from knowing the truth,11 he was unable to penetrate the depths of God: He, the contingent being, could not have known the ways and judgments of the Divine Transcendent (S.I,270:4-6). For whatever reason beyond the obvious, Anselm considers it necessary to expound this point which could have been easily accepted as an echo of s. 1 and, thus, as a sufficient explanation of creaturely ignorance. In view of s. 1, he can only be intending to strengthen his thesis on the division between contingent and transcendent being: that is, to underscore epistemologically the ontological distinction. And what he supposes in doing so, he considers fitting.

As Anselm puts it:12 Suppose someone should say that before the rational creature fell he could not have perceived or
believed that a supremely good God, who created out of goodness, would damn God's own creatures. Furthermore, suppose that he could not have believed this for two additional reasons: 1) He knew of no previous instance in which a transgression of moral debitum was punished by justice or God; and 2) he would have thought that God created a certain number of rational creatures for enjoyment of the Divine and that this number was fixed in God's eternally present knowledge which determines that which is known. He certainly knew that God's work could suffer no imperfection — be it an increase or decrease in the number fixed at creation. But, he would not have known that, if he had fallen, God was going to substitute another creature in his stead. Rather, he would have believed that anyone who fell was going to be restored to his rightful place by a supremely good God. And he could not have even supposed that God was going to create some other creature in order to replace him.

Second. To further his claim for the creature's ignorance, Anselm puts forth the following complex argument of c. 23. He is the principal locutor:

1) The creature ought not to have known that he would be punished for moral transgression.
2) If he had known, then, while possessing and willing happiness, he would not have been able freely (sponte) to will what would have caused him to be unhappy. Therefore 3), he would not have been just by not willing what he ought not to have willed, for he would not have been able to will it.
But 4), even on account of this reason, consider whether he ought to have known about that which you inquire. For 5), if he had known, then he either would have sinned or would not have sinned.
6) If, after having foreseen such a great punishment, he would have sinned with no need or with nothing compelling, then so much the more would he have been deserving of punishment. Therefore 7), this foreknowledge was not advantageous to him (to him who truly was going to sin).
But 8), if he would not have sinned [even with foreknowledge of punishment], then he would have kept from sinning either because of a good will alone or because of fear of punishment.
But 9), by his deed itself, he has shown that he did not
avoid sin on account of justice alone. But if he had avoided sin because of fear, he would not have been just. [Therefore], it is well-known that in no way ought he to have known that his own sin was about to result for him in an imposed punishment.  

In short, Anselm wants to claim that possession of particular knowledge before the fall would have adversely affected the will as a free power of choice. To the point: A bit of particular knowledge would have enfeebled the will to the point of disempowering or necessitating it. And, thus, in his estimation, ignorance in at least one respect does not diminish the will; to the contrary, it enhances it by securing that which it is essentially. Furthermore, Anselm wants to claim that which he never tires of emphasizing: that one must do one's duty for the sake of justice itself -- and for this reason alone -- if one is to do it truly and be praised for doing it. For, again, in his estimation, foreknowledge of punishment opens up the possibility for not willing with the proper motivation and, thus, as indicated in premise 210, for not willing truly justly. Anselm's position here is elucidated in the argument of c. 24 which complements that of c. 23. 

In the argument of c. 23, premise 27 should not be taken as a denial of the advantageousness of foreknowing punishment. For, in c. 24, Anselm makes it quite clear that such a knowledge not only could not be disdained by its bearer but, owing most probably to its being knowledge of the truth, it ought not to be disdained. For along side the motivation for not sinning on account of one's love of justice there would be the reason for not doing so on account of one's aversion to punishment. The latter motivating fear would suffice just as well for not willing inordinately as would the former motivating love. 

As intimated in premise 28 of the argument of c. 23, it is the simultaneous juxtaposition of these motivations (causae), of 'love of justice' and 'aversion to punishment,' that Anselm clearly wants to avoid. His reason is a bit understated. As the
argument of c. 24 indicates, he considers 'aversion to punishment' to be a dishonorable (non honestum) and useless (inutilem) inducement (causa) for not sinning (S.I,271:27-272:1): Dishonorable it is because of its impurity or because of its not being solely directed towards God, as one's voluntary motivation should be. And it is useless not in the sense that it does not suffice for keeping one clear of sinning (because Anselm admits that it does), but rather because it contrasts so very much with the honorable effectiveness of not sinning out of deference to the will of the God who is justice. Where 'love of justice' alone suffices, 'fear,' Anselm claims, is unprofitable (S.I,272:1-2).

Aside from his theologically-rooted preference for 'love of justice,' Anselm's rejection of 'aversion to punishment' as an acceptable motivation is best appreciated when paralleled with his rejection of pre-fallen knowledge of punishment. To this he speaks in premises #2 and 3 of the argument of c. 23. Just as he thinks that knowledge of punishment would seize the will with respect to its power of free choice, so too in the case of aversion. As he puts it interrogatively in a comparison of the two motivations: "When that reason for persevering is seen alone to be what is honorable and useful, because free [because it is freeing], is not the perseverance of the creature much more explicitly pleasing than if that reason which is dishonorable and useless, because it is understood [to be] a necessity, were to reveal itself?" Foreknowledge of punishment is believed to induce fear and, consequently, to necessitate the will and its choice: The consequence is reason enough to justify rejection of that which entails it. In contrast to necessity wrought by foreknowledge and fear, there is 'love of justice:' When tempered by a little ignorance, it ensures the will's freedom -- both its natural freedom and, with the benefit of innate moral knowledge, the true perfection thereof.
Three minor points are worth reckoning initially and critically.

First, the moral knowledge that concerns Anselm, like all other things possessed by the creature, is due ultimately to God's grace. This point resonates with s. 5. It might be asked, however, if ignorance of punishment, which the creature experienced before the moral fall, should also be understood as a gift from God. If so, then ignorance, which is the absence of knowledge or, as Anselm would put it, 'not-something' or 'not-knowledge' seems to originate from God. But, if so, then what seems to be the case clearly renders inconsistent his claim in s. 1, as complemented by s. 8, that only being arises from God, while not-being springs from the creature. As far as the mind's eye can see, there is neither explicit nor implicit evidence for claiming that the creature's ignorance of punishment is not due to the fact that God withheld knowledge from him.

Second, as already noted, this ignorance of due retribution does not adversely affect or diminish the will. Rather, it enhances it with a view towards its teleological purpose. But, upon closer examination, it seems to be the case that the will is indeed diminished: It is so by the very knowledge that is lacking in the very ignorance that is being asserted. Premises #2 and 3 in the argument of c. 23 lend credence to the point. With this being the case, Anselm either wittingly or unwittingly undermines his conception of the will as he initially presents it in DLA, cc. 5-8, and carries forward into DC: He wants us to think that nothing compels or prevents the will from willing, not even God." But, knowledge of punishment does precisely that insofar as enfeebling that power of the soul that is essentially desire and freedom for choice. A little bit of knowledge prevents the will from willing as it might have or compels it to will as it might not have. Strangely, Anselm sees knowledge of punishment affecting the will in such a way that not even God can
rival its effects.

And, third, if knowledge, properly speaking, is always knowledge of the truth, as Anselm thinks, and if God is the supreme source of all truth, then it remains to be seen how any truth, be it of the good or bad, can be disadvantageous at any time or in any respect to anyone who possesses it. Furthermore, if knowledge of punishment is knowledge of the truth, and if this knowledge does in fact enfeeble the will, as Anselm suggests, then it remains to be seen how he squares his position with the Johannine claim to which he subscribes: "...and you will know the truth and the truth will free you." It too remains to be squared with his own related claim that he who does not know the truth causes himself to fall; that he who sees or knows the truth, yet hates or disdains it, causes himself to fall. At this point it might be best to stop and to ask rhetorically if truth, according to Anselm, includes the rational creature's knowledge of God's punishment of moral transgression.

From these minor points critical reflection advances to one that is major:

The two additional reasons in Anselm's hypothetically-fortified reason for pre-fallen ignorance do offer an explanation for the creature's failure to believe or to suspect divine punishment for moral transgression. Anselm's reference, though, to the creature's belief in God's goodness is troubling: For what is really at issue, so it seems, is that the basis of his claim for the creature's ignorance is not simply that he was not able to foreknow divine punishment, but that he incorrectly reasoned on the basis of his knowledge of God which was less than thorough. There is no explicit mention of God's justice in the hypothetically-fortified reason. Perhaps there should be.

The pre-fallen creature was so rational: This is clearly Anselm's position. But was he rational enough to harmonize the sense of God's justice with God's goodness and the mercy which proceeds inexplicably from the latter which flows from the former? Did he know of the unity and simplicity of God's
attributes and of the difficulty of untangling its conceptual tangle, as even Anselm speaks of it in his famous address to the very God whose attributes they are?\(^{21}\) Could it have been the case that if the rational creature only knew God as a supremely good being, then he was not only unable to know that God would punish him for moral transgression, but he was also unable to reason otherwise? After all, why should he have ever thought, if he could have, that an all-good God would punish? Other pointed questions could easily abound for expressing the one and only key point: that the rational creature's ignorance at the origin of moral evil might have been greater than Anselm cares to acknowledge. For it seems that if he had known at least the conceptual tangle between God's being both justice and goodness, then he might have opted other than he did during the volitional stage of 'thinking.' He might then have been able to calculate better the imminent fact or near likelihood of being punished, while knowing all the while that he ought to be punished.

But, did the pre-fallen rational creature have to do any calculating at all? Did he really not know (as asserted in premises \#1 and 11 of the argument of c. 23) that he would be punished for willing inordinately to be like God?

Assume on Anselm's behalf that the rational creature understood what Anselm himself understood: that God is both supreme goodness and supreme justice. And assume, furthermore, that the creature was aware of the difficulty of conceptually reconciling these two divine attributes which are essentially one. Given these assumptions and the rationality of the creature, and, most importantly, given the fact of a certain theological position, it must be the case -- contrary completely to what Anselm claims in DCD -- that the rational creature not only knew that he ought to be punished, but he knew that the good God, in virtue of being justice, would necessarily exact punishment or demand redress. What Anselm claims in his hypothetically-fortified reason about the ways of God being unsearchable does not square so well with what he propounds
theologically. *Cur Deus homo,* I, cc. 12-14, speaks clearly to the point -- so clearly that it renders his position on pre-fallen ignorance suspicious and almost untenable.\(^{22}\)

When Anselm speaks of the creature as having known that he ought to be punished and not having known that he would be punished, he undoubtedly wants us to think that God could have responded to the creature's moral transgression either by punishing it or not. The creature just did not know beforehand what God would do. And, so, he had to gamble, as it were, on the divine response to his moral infraction. The thought is misleading.

If the pre-fallen creature was *so rational,* as Anselm wants us to believe, then it seems reasonable to suppose that he had to be able to discern with certainty at least what Anselm himself was able to reason about God: that the good God who is justice cannot fittingly let any injustice pass by unpunished or unredressed! It would be, according to Anselm, intolerable to think otherwise: Insufferable it would be for God to be unjust to the divine self: to allow the creature's dishonor of God to prevail over and above justice itself. "Nothing," claims Anselm, "ought less to be tolerated in the order of things than that the creature remove the honor owed to the Creator and not repay what he removes."\(^{23}\) Either punishment or redress is an order, and of this Anselm is unwaveringly certain: "It is necessary...either for the honor that has been removed [from God by sin] to be repaid or else for punishment to result."\(^{24}\) Moral disorder must be righted,\(^{25}\) and there are only two ways of doing it. Thus, there can be no question, as Anselm misleads us to think, that God could have not responded with justice to the morally errant creature.\(^{26}\)

And, the preceding reasoning can be complemented and corroborated.

Anselm's God is under no obligation to do anything; the Creator is indebted to no person or thing.\(^{27}\) But, there is something about Anselm's view of God that suggests that God's
ways are more predictable than he cares to admit. Consider: If it is true, as he purports, that the rational creature ought to be punished for doing that which he ought not to have done in a world governed by the Divine; and if this 'oughtness' is grounded in a sense of what is fitting and right, as it is in his conception of justice or moral rectitude, then it seems that the God who delivers the punishment that ought to be given is more likely the God who must needs punish or demand redress. Again, CDH in toto testifies to the point. Anselm's God is the supreme justice and, more importantly in this context, the supreme rectitude: If God were not to punish when punishment ought to be rendered, because fitting and right, then God would effectively violate that which God is: the absolute standard and essence of moral fittingness and rightness. Disorder would then obtain in God's governance of the world: Its moral beauty would be diminished. As one Anselmian scholar puts it similarly and convincingly:

there is...[Anselm's] crucial claim that God will not allow the order and beauty of the universe to be violated. Sin must be answered either by satisfaction or by punishment because otherwise it would introduce ugliness into the goodly order.29

It might very well be said that Anselm's position is stressed. Perhaps, it is even somewhat contrived with unspoken intention. Whatever it be, little more can be said of it by way of critical reflection than this:

First, if the creature indeed had knowledge of impending punishment before falling and fell in spite of it and his excellent rationality, then he was truly reprehensible. Premise #6 of the argument of c. 23 would be confirmed. And to Anselm's thesis for the sole efficiency of the will at the origin of moral evil could be added the wickedness of the will: of the voluntary power that operates contrary to knowledge of the truth; of the unvanquishable power that overrules the dictates of moral reason and sides with its own inordinate desires. But, this is the psychological scenario that Anselm wants to avoid inasmuch as
asserting pre-fallen ignorance of punishment. He must avoid it if he does not want to undermine or to create tension in his conception of the naturally-inclined 'will as instrument.' For, as he sees it, if the creature who fell had prior knowledge of impending punishment or of the demand for redress for willing whatever inordinately, he would have effectively desired and chosen something that was going to cause him unhappiness: He would have willed against his natural inclination for happiness. But such a willing is impossible: One cannot will unhappiness or that which will knowingly cause one to be unhappy.

But, second, if the rational creature truly did not know the certainty of punishment, then could it not have been the case that, when he desired and chose inordinately to be like God, he truly thought and reasoned that he would not be punished? If so, is it not also the case that a defect of reasoning or absence of understanding -- an intellectual error -- preceded his will at the origin of moral evil? And, thus, might it not also be the case that a more thorough moral knowledge could have and would have made the moral and intellectual difference in the choice of his rational will before the origin of moral evil? Reflection on these and other like queries might best begin with a rumination. The cud, so to speak, is Anselm's very own: It is a claim that unquestionably undermines the very thesis of this section:

(I)gnorance [, claims Anselm, while speaking specifically about the human nature assumed into the divine person of the Christ, generally] is never useful but is always harmful....For even if ignorance would never be harmful in any other respect, it would be harmful merely in that it would prevent the benefit of knowledge. 29

And so it is that Anselm has backed himself into a corner. To move out of it he apparently needs to clarify and to settle more than a few points. He might best begin by demonstrating convincingly that knowledge of punishment in the case of the pre-fallen creature would have restricted his freedom of will. He needs to do so all the more because such a knowledge does not evidently hamper the will of post-fallen creatures. A posteriori
reflection might have informed Anselm's a priori effort.

Furthermore, because he thinks that this knowledge would have undermined the only proper motivation of the creature's will, and for this reason holds that God did not give it, he needs to tell why it is that the creature was not able to love justice for the sake of justice itself and simultaneously know that he would be punished by an essentially just God if his volitions went astray of it. He needs to do so all the more for this reason: Although in DCD he thinks that complete moral knowledge compromises either potentially or actually the will's single moral motivation, the spirit and ethical tone of some of his epistolary efforts suggest otherwise: Fear of God's wrath is often pastorally instilled in those who endeavor to be upright but, nevertheless, tend towards moral waywardness in deeds that are either current or about to happen.

There is more mystery in this section than what proceeds from the mysterious ways of God. But its content, unlike God, might be penetrated and clarified: If so, then it might best begin with a view of Anselm as one who might be trying surreptitiously to fashion or to skirt something -- a position, perhaps -- that accommodates both Platonic and Augustinian traditions: both intellectualist and voluntarist stances on the origin and cause of moral evil. It is a suggestion whose theodicean implications are too suggestive and, perhaps, too damaging.
Section 16
DCD, c. 25:
Knowledge of Punishment Differentiated:
Suggestions of the Eschatological and Aesthetic Aspects of a Free Will Theodicy

A)

This section marks the summit of Anselm's epistemological explanation. In it there arises a striking parallel with s. 6: Therein, he discerns the rational creature's rewards in terms of the naturally free will that either ordinately or inordinately desires and chooses: of the free will that either perseveres with justice or not. Here, the same rewards are recast and understood anew in terms of knowledge, specifically knowledge of punishment: It is differentiated by the way it is acquired, that is, either by example or experience; it is further distinguished eschatologically as either knowledge of confirmation and merit or knowledge of damnation and demerit. The gift of knowledge is bestowed on those who persevere willingly, knowingly, and virtuously in justice, as it is on those who do not.

Not only does section 16 echo s. 6 epistemologically and eschatologically, it also reiterates its thesis. Anselm is nearing the end of his theodicean effort: He is summing things up.

But, not too quickly: For near the end of this section, when he seems to be struck by tradition,1 he delivers a cursory remark on God's greater ability to turn evil into good. In doing so, he is nothing less than desirous of setting forth another issue or thesis: He wants nothing less than to strengthen his free will theodicy with an aesthetic aspect:2 The psychological and epistemological explanation of his theodicean effort is to be complemented in view of God who is supreme beauty.3 God works as a good and loving Creator should in order to restore morally-deformed creatures to their original order and to redirect them towards their original and rightful purpose: Beauty works to re-beautify.
The eschatological and aesthetic aspects of this section suggest that Anselm has a solution to the problem of moral evil. In DCD, it is simply quiescent; elsewhere, it is soteriologically pronounced. Its beauty, however, is supposedly marred by the ugliness of infinite punishment and the difficulty of seeing how a good and loving God can impose it.

B)

Though this section reads argumentatively, its spirit is more clearly contemplative. Anselm begins reflectively by picking up on the last point of s. 14: that the creature who stood perseveringly in justice, while the other one did not, now unfailingly has the same knowledge of punishment that the other one has and that both originally lacked. Qualifications are to be made; differentiations are to be importantly detailed in two respects: first, with regard to the cause (causa) of this knowledge or, better, the reason why creatures obtain it; and, second, with regard to its effect (finis).

First, there is the matter of cause: Anselm reflects on the creature who knows that punishment is certain because of his personal experience in not willing perseveringly with justice. His persevering counterpart, however, has learned by the other's example and because he himself did persevere. Here, the idea of causality is a bit understated solely in terms of persevering and not-persevering. For the sense of both can be expanded beyond that which is conveyed in s. 5: beyond the sense of simply willing something either thoroughly or not. It can expand to embrace the sense of the aretaic.

In Anselmian thought, it is the case that the rational creature defers obediently and humbly to the will and ways of God inasmuch as willing justice thoroughly. Simultaneously, he nurtures the virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice in order to propel himself towards his divinely ordained telos. Perseverance is always coupled with obedience. Both are
always grounded in denigration of oneself before the God to whom one is utterly obliged for all that one is and can become: for all that one is as the image of God and can become in the true freedom of being the likeness of God. Both obedience and perseverance with the flourishing of virtues -- the integration of them all -- is made possible by the grace of justice dwelling harmoniously in the soul.

When the sense of the aretaic complements the matter of causality and perseverance, the ground is provided for moral evaluation of the epistemic: Blameworthy is knowledge of punishment that is gained by one's experience in freely willing unvirtuously. Laudable it is when learned by example and attributed to one's own experience of free and virtuous willing.

Second, there is the matter of the ultimate and everlasting effect: The result of such a knowledge tells why it is blameworthy or praiseworthy. In the case of him who comes to know by the experience of failing to persevere with justice, what accrues to him is the inability not to sin: an eternal inability to recover forsaken justice. Conversely it is for him who learns by the shameful example of the one who is morally aberrant: What accrues to him because of his good will is the inability to sin: an eternal inability to forsake justice. The complete sense of both inequalities is expressed by Anselm in s. 6. What he intends to convey here, as in s. 6, is the same eschatological sense of God's confirmation of the rational creature in eternal merit or demerit. Either by the glorious or infamous desires and choices of his will, the rational creature acquires certainty of either the meritorious reward of enjoyment in the presence of God or the demeritorious reward of unhappiness in being removed from God.

Whether it be knowledge by experience or example, whether it be of eternal demerit or merit, the creature acquires it in virtue of the status of his naturally free power of desire and choice. But he does so neither simply nor directly in virtue of it. For it is God, the source of all being, who gives knowledge of confirmation and damnation and with respect to that which the
creature has freely willed himself to be and to become. This is the fundamental point that Anselm must make perfectly clear in responding to the following challenge of the devil's wan ing advocate:

S:/ Your reflections upon the good...

The theodicean implications of this counter-argument are precise, if not potentially damaging.

If the persevering creature acquired his knowledge of merit simply because the other one did not persevere, then there would be reason to question the significance of his having persevered at all. Furthermore, his meritorious knowledge, in itself a being and a good, would seem to be due to a source other than God who is the source of all being and goodness. Moreover, there would seem to be a direct link between goodness and something evil, at least insofar as the former would appear to arise out of the latter. Anselm would agree that this last implication is precarious: For it stems not only from the unconscionable thought of something good proceeding from something evil, but also, and more basically, from the thought of something arising out of nothing -- of a 'being' being directly begotten from the absence of being or required being. Of the former implication which suggests a source other than God, its precariousness is rooted in its own utter contrariety to the theo-logical bent of Anselmian metaphysics. And of the initial implication: It is too grave to think that God would award something good simply on the basis of evil and not on the ethics of having kept the justice that one is obliged and able to keep.

With the preceding implications in mind, one could rightly expect Anselm to be more direct and thorough than he is in responding to his student's challenge:

T:/ You ought not to say that the good...
this knowledge" because the evil...[creature] sinned; rather, you ought to say that the good...[creature] gained this knowledge" by the example of the falling...[creature] because he sinned."

The significance of his response lies hidden in its grammar and syntax: that is, in his use of the causal subordinated clause' and the ablative of cause that joins a causal subordinated clause". Anselm intends to convey the distinction between direct' and indirect" causality: Ultimately, he wants to deny that the experience or fall of the unjust creature is the direct (efficient) cause of, or even the primary reason for, the steadfast creature's acquisition of meritorious knowledge.

Anselm's phrase "by the example of one who falls" (exemplo cadentis) identifies the just creature's mode of acquisition. It, however, does not effectively enable him to stem his student's challenge. For it seems to be the case, as even the student suspects, that the creature's fall is at least the very occasion by which the steadfast creature acquires his knowledge of merit and confirmation at the 'hands' of God. It seems undeniable. Thus, at the very least, Anselm should see the fall of the unpersevering creature as an instrumental causal factor in God's efficient bestowal of knowledge of punishment. For it clearly was the omnipotent God's response to the fall, and not the fall in and of itself, that caused and effected it. As Anselm himself puts it: "God used the example of [the creature's] fall to teach the good...[creature] what God was going to teach [sooner or later]":9 The creature who was the proximate, efficient cause of his own fall became God's heuristic means for efficiently imparting the being and goodness of the knowledge of impending and eternal punishment for moral aberration. He, too, was the means for God's giving the certainty of everlasting glorification to those who willed steadfastly with justice.

Anselm offers assurance that God's instrumentally-achieved efficiency was not, as such, necessarily realized: "For if
neither [creature] had sinned," he claims, "God would surely have given this knowledge in some other way -- on account of the merit of perseverance, and without the example of someone's falling." 10 God freely responded efficiently to the natural freedom of the creature. Nor was God's efficiency realized because of some divine inability to do otherwise: For, according to Anselm,11 God's efficiency and use of the fall as a means for bestowing knowledge of merit and demerit upon morally-ordered and -
disordered creatures bespeak the
greater ability by means of which God was able to make good come from evil, so that not even evil would remain unordered in the kingdom belonging to omnipotent wisdom.12

In the final assurance, there is nothing less than a conceptual shift of emphasis: Anselm has moved from the eschatological to the aesthetic. Beauty lies in the epistemic distinction and eschatological confirmation of the meritorious and demeritorious.13 Until the moment of this very confirmation, beauty is manifested in the restorative effort of providential love14 and goading grace15 among wayward rational creatures who are naturally free to accept or reject it.

C)

What can be said about the beauty of Anselm's foregoing distinction? Wherein lies the beauty -- or the fittingness -- of a just and loving God who eternally damns to Gehenna those renegades of justice who were created for the most sublime purpose of contemplating and loving God? Does not such a punishment evidence a degree of ugliness -- or unfittingness -- in a universe purported to be governed wisely by the omnipotent God from whose will nothing escapes?16

A correct Anselmian answer builds especially upon a few theistic points.

It cannot be denied that Anselm's God is a strict judge: the evidence of his corpus is indisputable. But, what is equally undeniable is this: that he envisages a divine judge who is both
good and merciful.

As indicated in s. 1, God's justice is not simply strict or retributive: That is, it is not only the justice of due proportion. Rather, in light of the unity and simplicity of God's essence, the justice of God is always the justice from which the goodness of God flows and begets the mercy of God. God is never one without being the other. To speak properly of any one of God's essential attributes demands at least an openness to seeing its relation to the others. Anselm never loses sight of this point, even though his emphasis on God's strict justice seemingly suggests that he does. For almost everywhere in the corpus, especially in the orations, meditations, Cur Deus homo, and Proslogion, where he speaks of or intimates the harsh justice of God, he does so either in the context of discussing, or in the range of discerning, God's salvific effort in and among rational creatures. This can only mean that the justice of God is never simply an aside of the goodness of God, or vice versa.

The aforementioned theological points begin to speak to the beauty of that which is thought to be the ugliness of God's infinite punishment. So, too, does insight into the operation of God's love.

Before the just God wields the gavel of strict justice, the good God benevolently extends opportunities for redemption and restoration to estranged and wayward beloveds: "And because God has done all these things in this way, God has manifested how much God loves us." This is how Anselm sees it. And what he also presumably sees in God is nothing more than what any genuine lover would be expected to do, provided the love of the lover genuinely bespeaks, as it ought, the lover's selfless and unflagging endeavor for the good of the beloved: God works to salvage and to rebuild a love-relationship with fallen creatures. Every effort of the just and good God to do just that, be it ever so miraculous, demonstrates, in Anselm's words, "the greater degree of God's love and graciousness towards" rational creatures. Divine love bespeaks the justice and goodness of God.
Love, justice, and goodness bespeak the beauty of God.

Although it can be safely said of Anselm that his vision of the loving God is that of one who is ever faithful in love, the same cannot be said of rational creatures who were created to respond in love and to ascend justly and virtuously in it. It is a most important point. For there is a crucial factor in God's beloved creatures that is able to quell the love of the God who seeks restoration, that is able to obviate the goodness of the God who wants to grant mercy, and that is able to render God's strict justice the very last recourse for fittingly responding to the creature's waywardness. That factor is none other than the rational creature's essentially free will.

God's beloved creature is naturally free: He is free to say 'yes' or 'no' to, or free to accept or to reject the loving prodding of, or free to retain or to dismiss the presence of the indwelling God who loves him. In spite of having an innate ability for realizing the perfection of his will's natural freedom with the grace of justice, the creature can opt against it. In doing so, his wayward desire and choice of the will -- his freedom -- becomes vastly significant and relevant: It becomes the crucial point for securing an understanding of the beauty or fittingness of God's infinite punishment.

In order to get to that point, it needs to be asked what the God of love should do when faced with the negativity of the beloved creature's free and fundamental option for autonomy. What is Love to do when the beloved does not respond in the mutuality of love? When the beloved ceases to love Love? Would it be fitting or just for God to force the creature into submission, into adhering to the ways of justice? Would it be fitting or just for God to violate the creature's freedom so as to force him back into a love-relationship? How can a good God respond to the freedom that God bestowed and do so in a way that fittingly accords with God's nature?

When one looks at Anselm and see what he propounds -- a God of love who damns the rational creature to the perdition of
Gehenna -- one's intestinal reaction is to question disparagingly the justice of this loving God: One asks why. Why and how can a loving and good God do such a thing? Is not the very idea repugnant to what it means to be good and loving? In asking, one might be too emotionally disposed and thus bent on seeing God as a sadist who wills creatures to suffer endlessly for their rejection of a life in and with justice. But, might one not be better disposed if one's estimation of God were tempered by a bit of unemotional objectivity? Might there not be the alternative view of God as the loving Creator who, with a permissive will alone, merely acquiesces to the freedom of the wayward creature? This point gets straight to the point: To what extent must the beloved's natural freedom of the will be respected by God;\(^{19}\) and more to the point, to what extent must the beloved stand responsibly before the respectful Creator to whom he is obliged for his freedom and to whom he is accountable for the choices and the consequences thereof?

Anselm's loving God wills to respect the creature's freedom: And, indeed, it might be asked whether this God who is rectitude per se can ever will to do otherwise. But, assuredly, this ever-loving God respects only reluctantly: It is, most probably, the very point that Anselm has in mind when he ruminates prayerfully:

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\text{Lord, I am indeed the sinner. What is it that forces you to do what you do not will, in handing me over to death? If you will that the sinner 'be converted and live,' what prevents you from doing what you will, that is, converting me that I may live? Can the hugeness of my sin force you to do what you would not and prevent what you would, when you are the omnipotent God?}^{20}
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God's almightiness is not a power for doing just anything: It excludes any violation of rectitude. Nor is God's freedom, which is essentially God's power, a license to do just anything. And, for the God who is love, love is at once an expression of the freedom that is the omnipotence that bespeaks, because it is, the whole of what God is in an essential unity and simplicity of being. The being of God is rectitude. Thus, Love has its own
essential content and limits; it is not a groundless, reasonless, and undirected yearning. If divine love were to disrespect the creature's natural freedom of will, it would be tantamount not only to a violation of Love itself, but also to a violation of the rectitude of Love's creation. And this is something that no one is able to make the almighty and ever-loving God do who wills fittingly that all be converted and live, and yet knows that all will not be so because of their own choosing.

The just, good, and loving God respects the natural freedom of the rational creature. And what is more, God respects it even to the extent of allowing the creature to assume responsibility for his choices and the consequences thereof. Voluntary freedom and responsibility: They go hand in hand. Anselm would agree unhesitatingly. The creature is answerable to God for the deeds of his efficient, approbative, concessive, and permissive free will. And he would also agree that unless he makes satisfaction for his voluntary offenses that dishonor God -- the very possibility of which is lovingly extended to him by God -- then he becomes liable for an ultimate penalty. Nay, he becomes responsible for the infinite punishment that God justly delivers only upon request of its having been freely chosen. For, fittingly, God responds as justice demands when the merciful goodness of love, through no fault of its own, fails to prevail. And, reluctantly, the just and good God of love respects.

Is there not a tension here between justice and love? Are they not in conflict? No: In CDH, I, c. 20, Anselm suggests that the principle of justice most operative in his thought is precisely the law of charity which one finds in Mt. 7:12. One hears it too in the law and in the prophets of the Hebraic testament: It is the law which nature -- ultimately, the supreme nature -- teaches us: "(D)eal with your fellow servant...as you would want to be dealt with by him." Respect implicitly underlies this principle that serves the demands of both love and justice: The idea of it alone is a scripturally-sensitive sine qua non (I Pt. 2:17; Rm. 13:7-9).
The foregoing Anselmian view is not as unconflictive as are the principles of justice and love. For, in maintaining the beauty of God's punishment on the idea of divine respect for creaturely freedom, I have put myself at odds with two Anselmian scholars.

F. Brown questions eternal punishment and sees the hint of its ugliness. For him, its uncomeliness is especially so because eternal punishment creates an imbalance or lack of harmony in the very domain that God is supposed to govern beautifully. As he sees it, such a punishment "remit[s] in double payment for the sin involved: first through the satisfaction provided by Christ's atoning sacrifice and second through the punishment of the sinner." It creates a "grotesque redundancy and gross disorder in the design of things."²²

Now, there is an immediate response to Brown's point: For if it were the case that Anselm considers the atoning sacrifice of the Christ to be a punishment, and if it were not the case that Anselm considers punishment to follow only upon the creature's free choice to reject the opportunity for making satisfaction through participation in the salvation of the Christ, then Brown would be correct: Punishment would indeed be a redundancy. It would also be a distortion of God's beautifully ordered and balanced world. But, as Anselm sees it, satisfaction is not redundant with eternal punishment, or vice versa. To the contrary, satisfaction is the divinely gracious means made available to the creature for cleansing himself of the guilt of sin; by voluntarily partaking of this means, he enables himself to pay the debt of sin and thus avoid punishment.²³ According to Anselm, the creature, upon having sinned, finds himself in a disjunctive situation and not a conjunctive one: Either he makes satisfaction which the justice of God demands or he suffers punishment.²⁴ He does not do both.²⁵

Satisfaction and punishment are not redundant; they do not upset the balance and harmony of the world as ordered by God. Sin alone does that: only the insubordination of one's will.²⁶
Satisfaction and punishment are, rather, the corrective measures that the just and loving God provides. Both restore order to God's kingdom. Some evil creatures return to good by freely rendering satisfaction; others do not. Those who do not are justly and necessarily punished. The choice is theirs. But, it is one that is imposed upon them by God: They must choose either way, for God who is rectitude must restore order to the world. Sinfulness can neither remain in, nor forever mar, the creative expression of the supreme being who is supreme rectitude. Sin cannot prevail over God's domain, nor can God prevail over the freedom of the will. There is no violation of the naturally free choices of the will, not even if God sees that some creatures will prove recalcitrant, reject satisfaction, and choose to go their separate ways towards punishment.

Punishment for injustice, like confirmation in justice, is infinite once it is conferred by God. But, as such, it seems problematic because God, who is guided by the reason of justice, seems to be violating a principle of justice which dictates that retribution should be commensurate with the offense. As indicated, Anselm does subscribe to the idea of strict justice (districta iustitia) by which to each is render that which is due: The idea governs his position on satisfaction and punishment: Both should be equal to the extent or magnitude of the sin. For, if they are not at least up to par with the offense, then sin will not be effectively righted and ordered and, thus, God's kingdom will remain marred by the presence of moral evil.

More so than Brown, M. Adams questions God's justice in rendering infinite punishment to finite rational creatures for finite offenses. In her estimation, such a punishment exceeds the bounds of justice as conceived in terms of due proportion. Furthermore, she knows of no principle of justice that could allow it to obtain. Like, Brown, her incisive criticism clearly positions her, contra Anselm, for seeing the unfittingness of eternal punishment. Now, aside from the fact that God's
justice is not to be discerned simply in terms of strict justice, even if one cares to consider it as such, its strictness itself remains very much open to questioning and interpretation. For just how strict is strict justice in Anselmian thought?

When one looks closely at the text of CDB where Anselm begins to focus on the nature of sin and satisfaction, one sees that he is rendering an important, and perhaps crafty, qualification to the idea of strict and retributive justice. The medieval philosopher-theologian prefigures the Philadelphia lawyer. For, not only should satisfaction for wrong-doing be of equal magnitude to the wrong itself, it might also demand of the malefactor that he compensate the wronged party with something more than is required! Complete restitution of a malefaction ought to include additional compensation for personal damages to the person who suffers at the hands of the maleficent perpetrator. Anselm's own words are straight to the point:

For example, if someone who injures another's health restores it, his doing so is insufficient payment unless he also gives some compensation for the painful wrong that was inflicted. Similarly, he who violates another's honor does not sufficiently repay this honor unless, in proportion to the injury caused by the dishonoring, he makes some restitution which is acceptable to the one whom he has dishonored.

Now, when the rational creature sins he effectively dishonors God insofar as robbing God of that which is owed to God alone, namely, rectitude of the will. But, something more is owed to God and, presumably, to anyone else who suffers an injustice: It is, as Anselm tells us, something which could not be exacted from the malefactor if he had not perpetrated a wrong-doing in the first place.

Let the preceding adversative claim be emphasized. The additional damage wrought by sinfulness could very well have sufficed in Anselm's mind as justification alone for God's infinite punishment of a creature's finite offense: as justification alone for what might seem to us to be a violation of strict justice. Justice rendered can exceed the standard of
due proportion. Anselm, however, never tells us exactly such nor by exactly how much.

What he does tell us in CDH, I, c. 21, is that there are two ways of discerning the gravity of an offense: One can see it simply in itself or as an action contrary to the will of God. This distinction just might be the further point needed for justifying God's infinite punishment of finite offenses.

In itself, the sinful act of a creature might very well be trifling and finite. From our finite perspective of the scheme of finite things, how could it be considered otherwise. Experience tells us that rational creatures have the uncanny ability to exceed or not the enormity of their own and each other's immoral deeds. But Anselm wants to challenge us to look beyond ourselves and to bear in mind not only what sin really is but also, it seems, how it fares in the far greater scheme of things from God's perspective! For, in spite of the trifling offense qua trifling and finite, in the truly significant scheme of things it is basically a constitutive violation of God's infinite will. And this seems very much to be the point that Anselm has in mind when he speaks of sin -- regardless of how trifling it seems to be -- as "something extremely grave and comparable to no loss." And, again, when he commands: "Do not think that any sin is small, although [from our perspective] one may be greater than another. Nothing done by disobedience -- and that alone drove man out of paradise -- should be called small." Sin, be it of whatever magnitude from a finite creature's perspective, reverberates upon the infinite -- upon the infinite God, that is -- and hence renders it apt that it be punished infinitely. Augustine grounds the rationale: "And since that which is loved [namely, the creature] necessarily affects with itself that which loves [namely, God], it follows that what is eternal, loved in this way, affects the soul with eternity." All sins, no matter how great or small, have the same effect from the eternal God's infinite perspective. And, for this reason,
Anselm wants to hold that if satisfaction is not freely rendered on account of them, then condemnation of them is to be alike: alike in that no unrepentent, freely choosing sinner is to be admitted into the infinite kingdom of the eternal God.\(^{40}\)

There is another complementary angle from which to justify God's infinite punishment and, thus, to secure its beauty in Anselm's solution to the problem of moral evil.

Sinfulness, for Anselm, bespeaks the creature's inability to keep justice because he does not have the justice which ought to be kept. But what is this justice which he calls rectitude of the will but the indwelling grace of God. Though justice is separable from the natural will for happiness of the finite creature, justice of the will, as indwelling grace, is in itself infinite because the God who is justice is infinite. Thus, it seems that the creature's rejection of justice is a rejection of the Infinite. And, thus, in strict justice, such a rejection ought to suffer a punishment that casts one away from the Infinite.

Infinite punishment is commensurate with the slightest, finite sin. In sinning, one offends God. In the full divine scheme of things, one effectively "removes from God whatever God had purposed to do."\(^{41}\) The slightest sin reverberates against the infinite God, and it counters the course which the eternal God has planned for rational creatures: a course with a beginning in creation, no doubt, but one planned to have no end in the enjoyment and contemplation of God. If the creature freely chooses not to participate in and to experience the completion of such a course, then his finite and sinful choice, upon completion of his temporal existence, becomes infinite! For in the infinite mind of God, where the existence of a creature is true, and is truly and eternally known, God knows that creature as having refused in time the restorative efforts of providential love and goading grace. Call it infinite punishment: Better yet, call it the just and loving God's respectful confirmation of that which the naturally free creature chose for himself and for
which he now bears responsibility without end. He bears it in
the mind of the infinite God.

Infinite punishment does not mar the beauty of God's domain
or the beauty of Anselm's theodicean solution to the problem of
moral evil. It secures both. Nor does it counter the idea of a
just, good, and loving God who renders it. It helps to explain
it.
Section 17

DCD, c. 26:
Evil Distinguished:
A Final and Noteworthy Theodicean Point

A)

Anselm's theodicean effort is well established in his view of moral evil as nothing, not-something, or simply the absence of a required good. His effort, though, would be noticeably unsophisticated if he were to conclude without considering what seems to be the stark reality of evil. Experience, as anyone might say, indicates all too clearly that evil is something. The very point is made by Anselm when he distinguishes or classifies evil. In doing so, he leaves one further point to be deduced: that whatever evil is recognized as being something, to the very degree that it is something, it involves God as the ultimate cause of its being, as the permitter of its evilness, and as the one who reworks it in order to move rational creation towards fulfillment.

All in all, not much is new in this section. Anselm is simply concluding his theodicean effort which he and the devil's advocate consider satisfactory and complete.¹

B)

Evil and God's involvement with it are further considered in Anselm's attempt to answer two questions put by his student. The nearly jaded devil's advocate wants to know first what it is that one dreads upon hearing the word 'evil,' if evil is nothing. Furthermore, he wants to know what causes the works or effects of injustice which is itself evil and nothing.

Anselm's response to the first query recalls a distinction that he made in s. 9 (S.I,255:4-8). There he is concerned with two goods (bona): One is justice, the other is benefit (commodum). For each good there is a corresponding affection or inclination of the will. Each also has a corresponding evil

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(malum) that opposes it and its appropriate affection: In the case of justice, it is injustice; in the case of benefit, it is disadvantage (incommodum). Here Anselm wants to build upon this earlier distinction. For in answering the first query he tells us that there are two classes of evil: first, the evil that is nothing, like the moral evil of injustice or the non-moral evil of blindness; and, second, the evil that is disadvantage (incommoditas). Of the latter, there is a further sub-classification: first, the disadvantage that is either nothing or not-something, like the non-moral evil of blindness; and, second, the disadvantage that is something, like being criminally assaulted, pain-ridden, or mad.

Thus, on the one hand, there is the evil that is injustice and always nothing; on the other hand, there is the evil that is disadvantage and either nothing or something.

In thinking of evil as something and disadvantageous, Anselm undoubtedly has in mind the effects -- the actions, deeds, and results -- that follow from the moral evil that is nothing or the non-moral evil that is nothing and disadvantageous. In his view, it is these effects that we dread when hearing the word 'evil.' These constitute the stark reality of evil. These we experience; at these we are horrified and averse. Almost naturally, we pause and cringe at the disadvantageous effects caused by injustice and the diminutions of being. And we do so because they oppose our will's natural inclination and desire for well-being (commodum).² Evil effects make us unhappy in the mundane sense and, in some cases, it might be supposed, they even retard our potential and drive for realizing the perfection of happiness in the supra-mundane sense.

In addressing himself to the second query, it seems as if Anselm would have done well enough by simply reiterating aforementioned theses. As seen in ss. 5 and 13, particularly, and in DCD, generally, it is clearly his position that injustice and the works which reflect it are directly effected by the free will of the rational creature. In the case of moral evil, as
indicated in s. 7, it is the will itself which directly causes a thing to be called or made 'evil.' And, as indicated in s. 13, especially, it is the permissive will of God that allows that will to do what it does and, thus, further allows some other thing, whose being is good and indebted to God, to be made and called 'evil' by the will's own injustice.

But, Anselm's response indicates a peculiarity in speaking about the causality of those evils that are something and disadvantageous. He speaks in terms of negativity or negative causality. This does not mean that he considers 'nothing' to be the cause of evil effects. It is not the absence of something that causes or effects something else. If this were the case, then it would also be the case that nothing begets something. And this would contradict the claim of s. 8 that from nothing comes nothing. Rather, negative causality means that if something were present, then something else would have or would not have occurred. As Anselm puts it:

(W)hen we say that injustice [moral evil] causes robbery or that blindness [a non-moral evil that is nothing] causes a man to fall into a pit, we should not at all understand that injustice and blindness cause something. Rather, we should understand that if justice were in the will and sight in the eye, then neither the robbery nor the fall into the pit would occur.

This emphasis on negativity enables Anselm to elucidate more fully the role of justice in the will. He is able to set it in relief, so to speak.

Relief becomes prominent in explanation: It is accomplished when Anselm likens justice in the will to the rudder or helm of a ship and the bridle of a horse. Both instruments lend the means of direction and security for a proper course. Without them, a ship would float aimlessly and erratically; a horse would run wildly. Justice in the will can be similarly construed: It sets and directs the individual and his will on a course destined for a moral goal. Without its presence and directional assistance, the rational creature would stray and err immoderately. He would
become unethical: He would do so not simply in the sense of doing things unjustly. In a far greater sense, he would become unethical in virtue of not being who and what he can be in relation with justice; he would become unethical in virtue of not striving for the perfection of that very being in relation with God.

Negative causality is also purported with respect to non-moral evils and their disadvantageous effects. Once again, it is not the case that nothing is being construed as the begetter of something. If, as claimed in s. 4, a rational creature has only one 'thing' from himself, namely, 'not-being,' then, effectively, he not only causes the non-moral evil which pertains to himself and is nothing, but he is also the cause of its disadvantageous effects which are something. In every instance thereof, as in those of the unjust will, the permissive will of God is supposed.

If the disadvantageous effects of moral and non-moral evil are truly something, as Anselm thinks they are, then God must be their ultimate cause. Thus, God is involved with something evil. But, on this point, s. 4 must be immediately recalled for its ontological principle; so too must s. 7 for its important distinction between something being ontologically good and being called 'evil.' In view of both, God's involvement with the effects of moral and non-moral evil can be understood without undermining Anselm's theodicean effort.

God's involvement is limited. It extends to the being of the effects of moral and non-moral evil: For "God does cause all actions and movements because God causes the things by which, from which, through which, and in which they are produced, and, unless God grants it, nothing has any power to will or do anything." Qua being, these effects are good. And they are ontologically good no matter how morally evil or disadvantageous they are or become. That they are either morally unjust or non-morally disadvantageous is due first to the will of God that permits them to be such, and, second, to either 1) the unjust will that directly effects them as such or 2) to the absence of a
non-moral good that a creature should have: In the first case, it is clearly the effect of an unjust will: The effect is morally evil, just like the will from which it derives; in the second case, it is the effect of a non-moral evil that is nothing and disadvantageous: Clearly, the effect is ontologically good. But it is quite uncertain if its evilness can be understood in any significant way. For the effects of blindness and deafness, et cetera, are not morally evil as are the effects of injustice. They do not proceed from an unjust will. So, are they evil in any sense other than the broadly privative?

This section begins with two questions and, then, answers both. Owing to interpretation, it ends with another that points up Anselm's need to further clarify or distinguish evil.

It might have been better if Anselm had not called the effects of non-moral evil 'evil.' It might have been best if he had used the term more descriptively and restrictively, and less neutrally and generally. For, as conveyed in s. 4 and all subsequent sections, it is very much the case that moral evil is the only evil that is of significant gravity. Others -- namely, metaphysical, natural, and physical evils⁴ -- do not impel him to consideration, even though he does occasionally speak of pain and suffering as being caused by God in order to purify and render creatures incorruptible.⁹ The finitude of being and its inherent limitations are certainly implied in his view of the hierarchy of being, as conveyed in s. 1: That he never considers or calls them 'evil' is certain. The inclemencies and diminutions of nature can certainly be considered a part of his experience, but his calling them 'evil' cannot. Be they moral, metaphysical, natural, or physical evils, Anselm clearly thinks that the effects of all are reworked by God into good which propels creation towards the goal for which it was designed and expressed by the mind of the supreme being.¹⁰ For Anselm the theocist of an aesthetic eye, all evil, no matter how it is distinguished, is ultimately reordered to good by the Good.¹¹
C)

The effects of moral and non-moral evil: the evils that are something and disadvantageous are not contrary to the Faith. It is a very tall claim to make. For nothing else seems more capable of obliterating faith, increasing agnostic tendencies, and strengthening atheistic theses, than the sheer existence of the effects of moral evil, pain, suffering, and the harsh and devastating effects of nature's regular and cataclysmic courses. How is it that this stark reality of evil and one's existential experience of it is not contrary to the Faith and ultimately to God? If Anselm's theodicean effort aims for satisfaction, then the crucial question needs to be addressed. A brief and collective Anselmian response to three other queries might help to satisfy the crucial need, if only partially and introductorily: Whence the sufferings of evil? Why does God allow evil effects to be experienced by rational creatures? And how is the plausibility of a good and loving God to be maintained in view of such an allowance?

Like the Pauline community, Anselm espouses the idea of monogenism and sees a causal link between sin and death, pain, and suffering: The latter entered the world because of sin, nay, because of the natural freedom of the will that grounds a creature's injustice: Because of this deprivation of justice, which entails a loss of happiness, creatures in this exile of a life "are exposed to, and subject to sins and miseries which constantly befall them everywhere, attacking them on all sides...." However unscientific Anselm's position might be from contemporary perspectives and those, particularly, of a Teilhardian bent, it is still nonetheless a tenet that arises from his scripturally-sensitive faith. What also springs from that faith is an interpretation that sets the disadvantageous effects of sinfulness and evil into a soteriological-eschatological perspective and resolves them to good purpose and end.
It is important to behold the Anselmian view that rational creatures were not created to exist merely in this life, but rather to advance from it to the perfection of life with God. It is the crucial background for appreciating God's handling and resolution of evils. The evils of tribulations, adversities, and miseries abound in this life, and they are permissively willed by God in order to test the spirit, as it were, of advancing rational creatures. In the spirit of the Christian testament, they are the means by which personal character is developed and strengthened, while the soul advances to its telos.16

The effects of moral and non-moral evil: the evils that are something and disadvantageous altogether constitute a wholesome discipline: They are used by God to test and to strengthen the creature and his virtues during his journey from this temporal life to the eternal other.17 They try and build endurance which attests to a faith that grounds hope for the realization of that other life for which he was created.18 They sharpen his perception of this world and render his longing for the other all the more desirable.19 And, to a certain extent, they might even be experienced as just payment and retribution for his own sinfulness.20 In all, the evils that are something and disadvantageous serve instrumentally: They are ordered to good purpose. But, the ordering has its limit: For Anselm is keen to point out, with scriptural sensitivity,21 that God never allows a creature to bear such disadvantages beyond the measure of his ability to do so.22 Presumably, God knows each creature's threshold of tolerance better than the creature himself. A wholesome discipline is not an unreasonably taxing one: It is not counterproductive to a good and loving God's intention to aid the creature's fulfillment.

As indicated in s. 1, the goodness and love of God vis-à-vis creatures is manifested most clearly in the merciful justice of God. For the God of love who, in the depth of divine freedom, creates in order to love and to be loved is not the God who abandons love or, for that matter, is ever able to abandon it.
The manifestation of this love is most clear in God personally: in the Second Person of the Trinity who condescends lovingly to creation in order to make anew the moral relationship between God and rational creation. In doing so, God alone sets the standard of suffering: Alone, God becomes the paradigm par excellence of forbearing the onslaught of evils for the sake of the justice that is God! If the example of the suffering and crucified God-man has but one point of affective significance, it is this: It shows the creature how to handle and to live with the effects of his own natural freedom so as to effect for himself and with the grace of God a reordering and perfection of that freedom. The loving God suffers for nothing less than the redirection of the beloved creature to the comfort of redemption (II Cor. 1:4-7). Suffering is not only formative, purgative, and restorative; it is also god-like. For those of strong faith in the merciful justice of God, it is also hopeful.

All in all, it might still be truly difficult to accept the idea of a good and loving God who allows creatures to suffer in the first place. But, then again, it might be just as difficult to conceive of that same God who is justice and rectitude failing to respect the freedom of those creatures who were created free in the divine image and who were intended to become a greater likeness of it. It is a counterbalance that must be struck if due respect is to be given to the Anselmian conception of God, as is given to the idea of freedom.

The ground of most suffering is natural freedom: It is creaturely freedom that has set a painful, wicked, and, at times, horrible course for itself. And yet, the ever-loving God who permits its occurrence is the very same God who responds justly and intervenes correctly and hopefully: God has personally shown in the God-man's own experiences of poverty, rejection, dejection, temptation, humiliation, torture, and bodily death, and in his direct experiences with the sinfulness, struggles, and marginalizations of others, that suffering can be a positive means for achieving the status of 'being truly free.' For this
alone the creature was originally intended; for its realization, every creature has the innate ability. To become truly free he must needs suffer perseveringly and responsibly the disadvantageous effects of evils wrought by free choice and nature's diminutions of being. What is more, he will do so in the company of a suffering God: in union with divine love that suffers, as love often does, for the sake of the beloved.

The method of 'faith seeking understanding' founds the theodicy-supporting response to the crucial question. Thus, the very tall claim is supported; the crucial need is preliminarily met, and fortunately so: For a strictly philosophical response would be quite difficult to found and to justify as Anselmian. Even if it could be established, it would be unlikely that it could ever afford a grander vista of the aesthetic and eschatological aspects of an Anselmian theodicy than the faith that gradually seeks the fullness of understanding by reasoning and the illumination of grace.
Section 18

DCD, cc. 27-28:
Anselm's Theodicean Conclusion:
On Why the Rational Creature Deserted Justice

A)

Anselm is concerned with one critical question: Why did the rational creature who was created just desert justice? What was the cause or reason for his doing so? All in all, his concern suggests his desire to reemphasize major theses heretofore presented: first, as given in s. 5, that the will of the creature is the sole efficient cause of moral evil: It alone effects its desertion of justice; and, second, as given in ss. 11 and 13, that God merely causes the erratic and inordinate use of the creature's essentially good ability to will by willing it permissively. God, from whom all being derives, gives such a use only insofar as allowing the occurrence of something essentially good, namely, the ability to will, to be made morally evil. To these two theses can be added a third, as given primarily in s. 8: the equally significant emphasis on the internality of moral evil and the fact that it, being domiciled solely in the rational will, is both nothing and significative of the absence or lack of something required.

A brief reflection on the interpretative analysis of Anselm's reply to the critical question suggests that his reemphasis of the first thesis (which is really the key issue in this section) is somewhat short-shrifted: His focus on the ability to will at the center of his psychological explanation of moral evil must consider the full scope of this ability qua ability. Only then can the efficiency of the will be fully appreciated in the theodicean context and, in turn, Anselm's theodicean effort in the context of DCD. For only then do questions arise which might or might not trouble the effort in whole or in part.
Reemphasis of the third major thesis occurs in Anselm's confrontation with his student over the ill-put question that begins this section: "(W)hence did evil which is called 'injustice' or 'sin' first come to the...[rational creature] who was created just"? A greater sensitivity to the arguments of s. 8 and a weaker inclination for expressing thoughts in terms of the usus loquendi would have enabled the student to avoid putting the question less offensively. For it is not the case, as otherwise suggested in the question, that evil comes to or approaches anyone. This is so even though it is commonly said to do so whenever the absence or departure of justice is commonly considered. The reason is simple, and Anselm makes it simply clear: Nothing neither comes nor goes, and this holds true for the injustice that is nothing. It is not something or something external and objective which, if it were, would make it conceivable as something that approaches. Rather, injustice is 'not-something' and is internally affective on the created rational will.

Anselm has little tolerance for linguistic impropriety. It becomes altogether clear, once again, when he immediately chides his student for thinking that justice departs from a rational creature. Usus loquendi aside, speaking and thinking of such, as such, simply misses the philosophical point of s. 5. Justice, which is freely given, remains in the will until it is dismissed. Justice does not depart: It is not an active subject; it is passive: Justice is deserted. A slight point it is which seems unworthy of being noted. But, much to the contrary, it undergirds Anselm's key claim for the efficiency of the will at the origin of moral evil. Justice does not 'get up and walk away' from the will: God does not abandon the creature! Rather, the creature and his will 'walk away' from justice: The creature abandons God!

Thus, if the student cares to express himself properly, his
question must be about the desertion of justice: Why was it deserted by a rational creature who was created just? Anselm delivers this interrogative rebuke along with an answer to it. It echoes s. 5: He deserted "by willing what he ought not to have [willed]."3 As in s. 5, so too here: It is not exactly clear what he willed. Hence, we should assume most probably what is claimed in the earlier section: that whatever it was that he willed, in willing it he likened himself to God with an inordinate and autonomous will.

The critical issue of this final section arises precisely in view of what seems to be the student's dissatisfaction with this response. In spite of his just being told why justice was deserted, he insists on asking again why the rational creature deserted it. Once again, Anselm's clarification and elaboration echo s. 5, wherein he considers the 'quid' and 'quomodo' of willing inordinately; only now he speaks of the 'cur' and 'quomodo': In saying that justice was deserted by willing what ought not to have been willed, he is giving (as he claims) both the reason 'why' justice was deserted and the 'manner in which' it was so: "For [the rational creature] deserted it because he willed what he ought not to have willed; and he deserted it in this manner, that is, by willing what he ought not to have [willed]."4 This so-called clarification would be clearer if Anselm's regard for a precise and technical philosophical vocabulary were as strong as his insistence on linguistic propriety. This is especially so with respect to the will and its equivocal senses: In the explanation just quoted, it might be asked of Anselm what precisely is to be understood by the underscored 'willed' and 'willing.'

In telling 'why' the creature deserted justice -- that he did so simply because he willed -- Anselm needs to be clearer and more telling. Conceivably, 'willed' could be understood here as meaning volition or a choice that has been effected. And this would speak to Anselm's sense of the will as 'use.' Better, though, would be an appreciation of his sense of the will as
'affection' along side the 'will as use.' In this case, 'willed' would bear the sense of 'desired.' For it seems very much to be the case that the rational creature 'willed' or chose to desert justice only because he first desired something out of sorts with the justice that he possessed: He 'willed' what he ought not to have desired. This point is in s. 5, as well as in s. 3.

In telling of the 'manner in which' the creature deserted justice, Anselm clearly has in mind his sense of the 'will as use,' that is, of the actualization and effectuation of the ability to will. By 'willing' what he ought not to have willed: Anselm's understanding here is definitely that of choosing that which he ought not to have chosen or, more fully, that which he ought not to have desired and chosen. It is the case, again as presented in ss. 3 and 5, that one does not choose per the will without first desiring that which is chosen. Choice is not contentless, nor is it lacking the drive of appetite. It seems so simple and straightforward a point, but it is nevertheless one that is easily missed in Anselmian thought and should not be if there is the slightest intention of understanding 'why' and 'how' the creature deserted justice.

The reason the rational creature deserted the indwelling grace of justice is that he desired to do something which countered justice. And this desertion was furthermore effected, and ultimately so, by his will's choice -- his willing -- to realize his own unjust desire.

The need to come to terms with Anselm's equivocal senses of the verb 'to will' becomes all too clearly evident in his student's rejoinder to the clarification. Another instance of imprecise language-use arises: "Why," asks the nearly defeated devil's advocate, "did he [the rational creature] will what he ought not [to have willed]?

Now, is he asking why he desired what he desired, or is he asking why he chose to realize that desire which he ought not to have desired? In either case, it seems very much to be the case that the advocate is pushing hard for a substantial reason -- an underlying cause (causa) -- for
the activity of the will as either a radically free power of
desire, of choice, or both.

Anselm's reply that the only cause or reason is that he was
able to will is not altogether satisfactory: "No cause preceded
this will [that is, preceded the choice of the will in realizing
its desire] -- except that he was able to will."\(^7\) What Anselm
means to say here, and most probably in an Augustinian spirit, is
that there was nothing external to the will which efficiently
caused it to desire and to choose what it did.\(^8\) Powered by its
own natural inclination for what is beneficial, the free will in
and of itself was the very efficiency that underlay its desire
and choice and, thus, partly explains both.

This reply also fails to be completely satisfactory: The
student suggests that the creature might have willed simply in
virtue of being able to will. Suggestively, he proffers the
ability itself as the cause of the inordinate desire and willing.
Immediately, his offer is rejected by Anselm's counter-appeal to
those creatures who did not desert justice and yet had the very
same ability to will as those who did. This ability to will in
itself did not move them to will and to choose inordinately.
Another reason or cause must be found for someone's desiring and
choosing, and it must be other than the fact of his simply being
able to do so. For "it is not the case," Anselm claims, "that
what someone is able to will he wills because he is able, and for
no other reason...."\(^9\) Upon being pressed for that other reason,
he simply and quite unsatisfactorily replies that the creature
willed what he ought not to have willed "[o]nly because he willed
[it]."\(^10\) "For," as he continues, "this willing had no other
cause by which in any respect to be driven or drawn; rather, it
was an efficient cause of itself -- if this can be said\(^11\) -- and
an effect."\(^12\) End of consideration.

This section and Anselm's theodicean effort terminate after
a brief reemphasis of points which speak to the second major
thesis: first, that the goodness and being of the ability to
will is due to God, as too is its use; and, second, that the
permissive will of God, and not God's efficient will, gives way to the evil use of something that is essentially good.  

C)

In responding to his student's final demand for an explanation, Anselm puts himself and his theodicean effort in trouble. His problem is twofold: First, he contradicts himself. In his final reply, he claims that a cause or reason must accompany the ability to will, and yet before this reply, he claims that there is no cause or reason for the will's desiring and choosing -- not one that would suffice as an explanation of its willing (which includes desiring). And, second, for whatever unknown reason, he overlooks one of his own philosophical concepts which is perfectly relevant to his conception of the will as ability and definitely apropos to the question of the will's 'cause.' By not overlooking it, he would have enabled himself to pinpoint and to deliver a more substantial reason for 'why' the will willed inordinately whatever it willed.

The only reason the creature willed what he ought not to have willed is that he willed it -- he desired and chose it. The "willing has no other cause by which in any respect to be driven or drawn...." This claim is misleading, if not simply wrong, in view of Anselm's own concept of ability!

The will, like any other ability, is the subject of instrumental factors which render its actualization possible. In its case, such a factor is the unitary soul's other significant power -- the intellect or reason. Anselm's talk about their being no other cause seems to miss (or intentionally avoids) this point along with his own intimations elsewhere of the relation between the intellect and the will. There might not be any external cause that drives or draws the will towards what it ought or ought not to will: This much can be granted to Anselm who most likely defers to Augustine on the very point. But,
aside from the will itself, there does seem to be an internal cause: The will only chooses that which it desires, and it only desires that which the intellect presents to it as being appetible and conducive to the individual's well-being and happiness. Thus, it can be asked: Is it really the case, as Anselm wants us to think, that the will is not drawn or driven to its willing?

In his own defense Anselm might very well concede the point that the will is so moved by virtue of its own natural inclination, thus explaining its internal causality. But, the will itself has been cast aside. And, furthermore, his concession cannot suffice in obviating or silencing his own point about the intellect's role in every instance of the rational will's actualization. His own philosophy will not allow it.

The theodicean effort that began as a hermeneutics of scripture concludes in this and the preceding section with a sense of satisfaction and completion. At least it does from the perspective of DCD's interlocutors whose efforts have been more patently philosophical than strictly hermeneutical. In the final analysis, though, this supposed satisfaction can be considered a bit wanting.

Anselm's response to the critical question rests greatly on his first thesis. However, what transpires in his reply serves better to undermine his major theodicean point rather than to support it. His own concept of ability presents the problem for his philosophically-wrought and scripturally-incited theodicy: It seems that he should have frankly and thoroughly considered the role of the intellect along side the ability of the will at the origin of moral evil. Perhaps, then, he might have found himself in need of considering the possibility that the intellect -- that instrumental cause that is always operative in the will's actualization -- might have or could have erred in its presentation of an appetible object to the will that is always inclined, and thus always self-driven, towards that which is conducive to happiness. If, in fact, the intellect did err at
the origin of moral evil when the will efficiently deserted justice, then it might very well be asked of Anselm whether God's having created the intellect error-proof (at least in respect to presenting morally-significant appetible objects) would have made the moral difference. It seems a fair point to raise to the medieval theodicist who presents himself as a strong voluntarist, but whose writings attest to his being at least an equally strong intellectualist.

Anselm the theodicist is able to respond: Even if the intellect did err in its presentation, he could argue effectively and defensively: When the will of the rational creature was 'thinking,' that is, when it was corresponding with reason in discerning the rectitude of that which was presented to it as being beneficial, and when the same will gradually moved towards a choice either for or against what it desired, it knew what it ought and ought not to do. The creature's innate moral knowledge or moral intuition of his debitum would have indicated the moral error in the intellect's presentation: It would have been a safeguard, so to speak, against the error. And, what is more, as Augustine puts it and most probably with Anselm's assent: The fact that a rational creature thinks something is good or conducive to happiness does not mean that he ought to pursue it. Unless he ought to pursue that which is good and beneficial, he errs. He who seeks what ought to be sought does not err. And, according to Anselm, the creature knows innately what is right and wrong: what ought and ought not to be desired and chosen.

Even so, might it not be the case that the very success or failure of innate knowledge to gain a hold or a hearing in the will's moral discernment of what it desires depends upon the strength of the soul's intellect? It is certainly not a point which bears upon the angels who were so very rational, as Anselm clearly asserts in s. 15; but, it does bear upon human beings who have been and are variably-gifted intellectually. Now, if the intellect presents an inappropriate appetible object to the rational will but, in spite of its access to memory's store of
innate moral knowledge, lacks even minimal prowess and acuity of reason to make good of such a store in the moral discernment of the will, then is not moral error more than the possibility that it always is simply in virtue of the will's being naturally free? In the case of those who are intellectually challenged, does not possibility unfairly approach probability?

That God creates rational creatures with the possibility of moral error and desertion presents no formidable challenge to Anselm's theodicean stance. In light of free choice, there is always the chance: Indeed, there must always be as long as finite rational beings exist in time. God grants the opportunity for meaningful choice and an informed one at that. But, when possibility nears probability, when chance becomes likelihood for those creatures who, through no fault of their own, lack the intelligence to guide and to abet the right and informed choices of their free wills, then Anselm's free will theodicy might be called into question. A general reexamination would be warranted: Particular focus would have to be put on God's motive for creating such challenged individuals with such a susceptibility to moral falls.

Anselm's theodicean effort is hardly refuted on the basis of this critical reflection. It is, however, challenged -- if only by a representative of those who are intellectually challenged and, perhaps, of those who 'fall' for want of being able to know any better.
Part of the attractiveness of Anselm's thought resides in its resistance to exhaustive analysis; there is always more behind.

Gillian R. Evans
Many of the pieces of an Anselmian theodicy have been collected in sundry ways and elucidated in varying degrees. Some are philosophical -- being points of metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, psychology, linguistics, and ethics. Others are theological -- being points of soteriology, eschatology, and theology. Each and every one is grounded in the important context of Anselm's Christian faith and the Weltanschauung which it bespeaks and he espouses. For Anselm is never solely the philosopher or the theologian; he is ever the philosopher-theologian who is utterly imbued with a theistic faith that is always endeavoring towards greater understanding of what he believes and what scripture teaches. With sensitivity to this context, I have undertaken the collection and elucidation; with like sensitivity, I have partially corrected the scholarly oversight of how Anselm handles the problem of evil and the challenge that it presents to Christian faith in a good, just, and loving God.

To a certain degree, Anselm has made the undertaking easy: De casu diaboli is indeed a treatment of the problem of moral evil: It explains its origin; it offers a justification of the good God in the face of it; it tells how the just God permits it; and it alludes to the loving God's solution to it. However, it fails to be free of difficulties: Noteworthy are its lack of thorough consideration of the intellect vis-à-vis the will and its want of plausibility on knowledge vis-à-vis ignorance. In these and in other respects, he has made the task difficult. For De casu diaboli lacks furthermore what it presupposes in its readers: Much philosophy and theology is assumed to be known and understood. In my essays on God, justice, and freedom, most of what is presupposed has been presented. Admittedly, neither they, nor my critique, are exhaustive; nor were they ever intended to be. For the undertaking has been but a series of preliminary steps towards the systematic and definitive articulation of an Anselmian theodicy. With most of the pieces front and center, and difficulties notwithstanding, further steps
might very well be taken: The task might very well be completed. But how so? G. Evans' remark, quoted at the beginning, cannot be taken too lightly: It might suggest the end. For not only is it true that Anselm is resistant to exhaustive analysis, at times he seems downright elusive and evasive in what he teaches and argues. Frequently, what he propounds inspires so many questions that go unanswered and exhibits so much insight that remains untapped. That this is the case is owing to his masterful brevity and eloquence in philosophical and theological expression. That he was not the prolific and verbose writer that Augustine was, nor the methodical and exhaustive scholastic that Aquinas was, may be unfortunate; in a sense, it is not detrimental, but beneficial. For, as peculiar as it might sound, it is owing to his mastery that Anselm is able to provide the medieval philosopher, the philosopher of religion, and the theist of the Christian tradition with flexibility and openness in their interpretations of his thoughts. He gives them room, so to speak, for 'philosophical play,' provided that they 'intellectually recreate' within his crucial context. Nothing less is afforded than the opportunity to find 'what more there is behind' when it might seem that there is nothing else or, if there is, that it is unable to be retrieved.

Thus, the effort of piecing together the pieces of an Anselmian theodicy might very well proceeds 'playfully.' There is one promising prospect:

Altogether, the pieces suggest the feasibility of neatly articulating such a theodicy in terms of its philosophical and theological dimensions. With further textual exegesis and research preceding, the articulation could unfold systematically: first, in terms of the metaphysical-ontological complemented by the theo-logical; second, in terms of the ethical-teleological followed by the psychological and epistemological; and, third, in terms of the aesthetic expressed by the soteriological and eschatological. Ideally, retrospective and prospective forays into the history of medieval philosophy and theology would
complement each dimension. A historical and theoretical assessment of the problem of evil with its logical, evidential, and existential foci would suitably preface and ground the entire effort, as would a discussion of the motivations and intentions of a Christian theodicy. An Anselmian theodicy might very well be the classic instance of *fides quaerens intellectum*: A reflection on the possibility or reality would prove to be a fitting conclusion to the articulation, as well as a deserving tribute to the man who bequeathed fame to the philosophical-theological method.

It is only in retrospect that this prospect is envisioned. It is only with the effort in hand that there stands any chance of its being realized as a contribution to Anselmian scholarship. If it should ever come to fruition -- *Deus volens efficierter* --, it would fully redress the state of the scholarly problem. It would also us in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to come to terms with the magnificent doctor of the eleventh and twelfth.
Quod rogo, ne putet aliquis me praesumpsisse quasi fortitudinem fidei Christianae meae existimem indigere defensionis auxilio. Quippe si ego contemptibilis homuncio, tot sanctis et sapientibus ubique existentibus, ad confirmandum fidei Christianae firmamentum, quasi mea indigeat defensione, aliquid scribere tentarem: praesumptor utique iudicari et ridendus videri possem.

St. Anselm
Epistola de incarnatione verbi, c. 1 (S.II, 5:4-10).
1. Cf. Keith Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1982), pp. 139-140: At this point Ward writes: "The mistake the Scholastics made was to suppose that, since God could have been totally self-sufficient, he always is so, even when he has actually created a universe. The Divine power to bring about beings other than himself could have remained unrealized; the Divine love, the sharing of Divine life with others, could have remained one of the many unrealized and non-compossible properties of God." On p. 41, Ward holds that self-sufficiency precludes any real relationships between God and creatures. On p. 73, he intimates that self-sufficiency casts a shadow over the divine reason for creation.

2. Ibid., pp. 86, 144, and 147.

3. Ibid., p. 141.

4. Cf. Douglas Pratt, "Aseity as Relational Problematic," Sophia (Australia), 28 (1989), p. 16. Also, see p. 13. On p. 19, Pratt posits that aseity is one of the "categorical assumptions ... taken as precluding authentic interrelatedness and genuine ontological interconnectedness between the divine and the human, Creator and created."

5. Ibid., p. 20: Love is the "fundamental mode of all relating ad extra."

6. Ibid., p. 17. Emphasis is added to the second phrase because I think Pratt's use of the word "being" is suggestive of the essence of God. Presumably, he holds to the identity of God's essence and existence. Also, see p. 20.

7. Ibid., p. 17.

8. Ibid., p. 20.

9. Ibid. Pratt does not address the radical implications of this claim for the necessary relationality of the nature of the Creator-God who loves. Specifically, he does not consider divine immutability and impassibility. Furthermore, he might have given some clarification of his sense of necessity: Is it an antecedent necessity which bespeaks the presence of an internal or external, proximate or remote efficient cause or is it a subsequent, logical necessity which obtains simply in virtue of something having been effected either freely or determinately. Simply put: How does this idea of God being necessarily expressive of relationality hold vis-à-vis the idea of divine freedom?


12. Cf. R. Le Trocquer, "God (Nature of God in Philosophy)," NCE, 6 (1967), pp. 558f: Divine Aseity is the formal constituent of the divine essence; it is "the fundamental perfection from which all others can be logically deduced." Divine aseity explains the nature of God; the notion is a logical determination of the divine essence.


14. Cf. John Hick, "God as Necessary Being," Journal of Philosophy, 57 (1960), pp. 730-734: Aseity for Anselm, as Hick contends, is not the foundational base for understanding the logical necessity of God's existence but rather the factual necessity. Anselm's positions on contingent and necessary being are entrenched in his experience of reality and, to this I might add, his experience of faith. To speak of God's necessity as being factual is not to speak of it as one fact lost in a shuffle among countless others, but, as Hick would contend, as the ground on which all other facts depend: This is precisely Anselm's position. I think a sensitive reading of Pros., cc. 2-4, in harmony especially, though not exclusively, with Mon., cc. 1-4, 31, and RE, ss. 4 and 8, supports these points of view.

15. Although Anselm endeavors here sola ratione, his consideration and argumentation are launched from the perspective of faith and belief. Clearly, as can be seen in the first two sentences of Mon., c. 1, he has in mind a being to whom he wants to ascribe an understanding of it as supreme goodness and greatness, as the highest of all existing beings and the highest nature. "There may be someone," he writes, "who, as a result of not hearing or not believing, is ignorant of the one Nature, highest of all existing things, alone sufficient unto itself in its eternal beatitude, through its own omnipotent goodness giving and causing all other things to be something and to be in some respect good. And he may also be ignorant of the many other things which we necessarily believe about God and His creatures." (S.I, 13:5-10: Si quis unam naturam, summan omnium quae sunt, solam sibi in aeterna sua beatitudine sufficientem, omnibusque rebus aliis hoc ipsum quod alicuod sunt aut quod alicuomodo bene sunt, per omnipotentem bonitatem suam dantem et facientem, aliaque perplura quae de deo sive de eius creatura necessarie credimus, aut non audiendo aut non credendo ignorat....)

16. These arguments are simply too complex to rehearse and elucidate here. Furthermore, the task of doing so is not considered germane to the topic under consideration. There is an

17. Understand "good" in terms of "usefulness" and "excellence"; "great" in terms of "excellence" or "being better" or, more descriptively, in terms of intellectual and moral worth. Cf. Mon., c. 1 (S.I, 14:25-28) and Mon., c. 2 (S.I, 15:19-20), respectively.

18. Cf. Mon., c. 31. Mon., cc. 7-9, 29, 30, and 32-36 provide the context.


20. Mon., c. 6 (S.I, 18:23-25: Et quoniam id quod est per se ipsum, et id quod est per aluid, non eandem suscipiunt existendi rationem...). Also, for terse indications of the ontological difference between Creator and creature, cf. the following: Pros., c. 24 (S.I, 118:3); Mon., c. 26 (S.I, 44:11-17), c. 27 (S.I, 45:4-5), and c. 28 (S.I, 45:25 - 46:3). Cf. Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), p. 81.

21. See Mon., c. 31 (S.I, 49:24 - 50:13). What is expressed is the idea that, given a necessary being and contingent beings, among the latter there are varying levels of existence depending on the extent to which they either exist at the bare level, or exist and live, or exist, live and perceive, or exist, live, perceive and reason. With the Word as "true and simple Existence" contingent beings ascend or descend in their degrees of existence and excellence to the extent to which they approximate or imitate the supreme word or Creator.

22. S.I, 18:9-11: Sed liquet posse dici quia quod est ex aliquo, est etiam per id ipsum, et quod es per aliquid, est etiam ex eo ipso....

23. This point -- "cause of its being" -- is most problematic with respect to God. I shall deal with it shortly.

24. Cf. John Morreall, "The Aseity of God in St. Anselm," Sophia (Australia), 23 (1984), pp. 35-36: "...it seems reasonable to interpret esse ex se and esse per se as causal notions." In point, what Morreall should be saying is that the general notions of esse ex aliquo and esse per aliquid, from
which Anselm derives the specific notions applicable to God alone, are causal notions. In Mon., c. 6, Anselm manages to show that the specific notions (esse ex se and esse per se), when said of God alone, do not hold a precise sense of causality or even self-causality. This point explains the differing sense which holds with respect to the notions when they are said of God and creatures. Anselm alludes to this point in the beginning of this chapter.

A consideration of Latin sources clearly suggests that the accusative preposition 'per' can convey the sense of causality. A. Ernout notes that aside from the prominent senses of 'through' (à travers) and 'during' (pendant), it does bear the sense of 'by means of' (par l'intermédiaire de, au moyen de), 'because of, on account of' (à cause de), and 'by' (par). In this respect 'per' is stretched to replace (a tendu à remplacer) the ablative of the instrument or means, and the sense of 'per' is hardly different from the ablative preposition 'a.' Cf. Alfred Ernout and A. Meillet, Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue latine: Histoire des mots, 3rd edition (Paris: Librairie C. Klincskieck, 1951), pp. 2, 880. For partial agreement, see Alois Walde, Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, Universitätsverlag, 1938, 1954), v. 2, p. 284. More precisely this use of 'per' denotes the ablative of the 'way by which': cf. Charles E. Bennett, A New Latin Grammar (Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, Inc., 1994), pp. 145f; also, Henry J. Roby, A Grammar of the Latin Language (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1903), v. 2, pp. 89, 417, who notes that when the instrument or means is a person it is generally replaced by 'per' with the accusative.

My understanding of Anselm's use of 'ex' in the expressions 'esse ex se' and 'ex al quo' is that of the ablative of source which designates origin, parentage, or station, and which regularly takes 'ex' with a pronoun and means 'from, 'springing from,' or 'arising out of.' Cf. Charles E. Bennett, op. cit. supra, p. 143; Henry J. Roby, op. cit. supra, v. 2, p. 390; and W.E. Plater and H.J. White, A Grammar of the Vulgate... (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), p. 100. A. Ernout's instruction on 'ex' clarifies my understanding of Anselm's use of 'ex' as an ablative of source which bears the sense of causality: "Le sens premier est: hors, hors de (avec la nuance 'de l'intérieur de').... Sur le sens de 'hors de' se sont greffés différents sens dérivés: 1° en quittant, à la suite de (sens temporel), à partir de; 2° à la suite de (sens causal), conformément à ..., du fait de, d'après, selon; 3° 'de,' marquant de quelle matière un objet est fait ou tiré ...." (op. cit. supra, p. 363). In discussing the existence of trinitarian persons, Anselm uses 'de' instead of 'ex' to express the ablative of source: cf. DPSS, c. 10 (S.II, 205:18-21) and Ernout, op. cit. supra, p. 1, for distinct senses of 'de' in contrast with senses of 'ex' and 'a.'

25. Cf. Anselm in C [PF], passim.
26. Cf. Mon., c. 6 (S.I, 18:27 - 19:1). Also, cf. C [PF] (ENUW, 41:9-11): Here, one is able to interpret him as holding that all beings, excepting the world at its creation, have more than one cause and that there is a chain of causality whereby the created world and everything in it is ultimately linked to God as ultimate cause. Also, cf. DCV, c. 11 (S.II, 153:14-18), with Augustine in DeCD, V, 9-10.

27. Cf. Mon., cc. 13-14, 28: In these chapters, the point is that beings existing per aliquid are ultimately sustained in being by the supreme nature that is the "Creating and Sustaining Being."


29. G. Schufreider in Confessions of a Rational Mystic: Anselm's Early Writings, p. 39, holds a similar point of view.

30. Mon., c. 6 (S.I, 18:27 - 19:1: Cum igitur constet quia illa est per seipsam quidquid est, et omnia alia sunt per illam id quod sunt: quomodo est ipsa per se?).

31. The fundamental sense of these questions is established in DPSS, c. 14 (S.II, 214:7-12).


35. G. Schufrieder, p. 39, is agreed: "... and thus the account we must give of what exists through itself is measured by a different standard of being, of what it means for it to be, than are those things that exist through another."

36. The sense of God existing per se means that God is self-sustaining in existence: This sense is implicit in Anselm's discussion of creatures as existing per alium and thus having to be sustained by another. Cf. Mon., c. 28 (S.I, 46:16-18). Cf. Augustine, DT, V, 1.2.

In Pros., c. 22 (S.I, 116:17-20; 117:1-2), Anselm presents a concise overview of what God as a necessary being means. The sense of self-sufficiency is emphasized: God's self-sufficiency is discerned foremost in terms of God's not having begun to exist from not-being, not being able to be thought not to be, not
inclining towards not-being, and not being sustained in existence, like creatures, through something else.

For Anselm, the meaning of "sufficiency" is basically the following: not being in need of something which ought to be possessed: cf. DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 285:20-21); CDH, I, c. 21 (S.II, 89:10) and I, c. 24 (S.II, 93:7-8). The suggestion of independence which arises out of the idea of God's self-sufficiency is but an alternative way of expressing and emphasizing God's ontological uniqueness as a necessary being in contradistinction to contingent beings. Of the latter, existence is dependent upon and sustained by the Creator who alone exists truly, simply, and absolutely (cf. Mon., cc. 13-14, 28 passim). Also, cf. Mon., c. 18, passim; Pros., c. 3, passim; RE, s. 4, passim. See Augustine, DT, V, 1.2.

38. Mon., c. 28 (S.I, 46:22-24: ...et quidquid ipse est non sit per aliud quam per se, id est per hoc, quod ipse est: nonne huius esse merito solum intelligitur simplex perfectumque et absolutum?)

39. In "The Aseity of God in St. Anselm," pp. 39f. I should also note that W.N. Clarke in "Aseity (Aseitas)," p. 946, tends towards disagreement. To a certain extent I see J. Hopkins disagreeing implicitly in Anselm of Canterbury, v. 1 (Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1976), p. 147, note #15: "Anselm makes no distinction -- either here or elsewhere -- between existing and subsisting. In most places 'subsistere' can be translated as 'to exist'." My review of all conjugated forms of 'subsistere' secures my agreement with Hopkins' claim. That Anselm did not make an explicit distinction is certain enough; but, that he did not understand the distinction or that he simply presumed such an understanding of his readers is not, however, as certain. For a review of the forms, cf. A Concordance to the Works of St. Anselm, v. 4, edited by G.R. Evans (Millwood, NY: Kraus International Publications, 1984), p. 1493.
41. In Confessions of a Rational Mystics, p. 39. However, I do not see that he explicitly claims what I am asserting.
43. That Anselm uses analogical reasoning to do so respects his fundamental tenet in Mon., cc. 65-66: We are not able to speak and know precisely about the nature of the supreme, ineffable, and transcendent being; we can only do so imprecisely and indirectly. It is a difference between precise
signification and oblique signification, respectively, between precise expression in words or thoughts of what a thing is and imprecise expression of what a thing is either because it cannot be expressed properly (definitively) or because one does not want to express it so. With respect to oblique signification: It is a case of knowing that oftentimes one cannot properly 'see' a thing (the object as it is in itself), but can only 'see' it, as it were, through images or likenesses. Indeed, Anselm chose the light-being analogy because in his mind, at least, the reality of light presented an image or likeness closely approximating the ineffable reality of the being of God: "Therefore," he writes in Mon., c. 66, "since it is evident that something about this Nature can be perceived not with respect to its reality but only obliquely, it is certain that one more closely approaches a knowledge of it through that which more closely approximates it in likeness." (S.I, 77:7-9: Cum igitur pateat quia nihil de hac natura possit percipi per suam proprietatem sed per aliud, certum est quia per illud magis ad eius cognitionem acceditur, quod illi magis per similitudinem propinquat.)

In spite of the ineffability of God and the limitations of natural language signification, one can still reason, if only analogically, to a limited understanding of God. And the truth of one's reasoning is not any less significant because the transcendent referent of one's consideration confines one to oblique signification, provided that one is sensitive to the very reason for such a confinement. Cf. Mon., c. 65 (S.I, 76:17-24).

44. S.I, 20:13-19: Nisi forte eo modo intelligendum videtur, quo dicitur quia lux lucet vel lucens est per seipsum et ex seipsa. Quemadmodum enim sese habent ad invicem lux et lucere et lucens, sic sunt ad se invicem essentia et esse et ens, hoc est existens sive subsistens. Ergo summa essentia et summe esse et summe ens, id est summe existens sive summe subsistens, non dissimiliter sibi convenient, quam lux et lucere et lucens.

The analogy is weak: Efficient and instrumental causality can be discerned in the case of light, which one is supposed to understand here as existing without cause; but in the case of God, one is not permitted to see such causes. Anselm's view of esse per se bars the possibility of such. God is not causa sui.

Caveat lector: In this quotation the word 'subsistens' does not indicate the philosophical stance which I am claiming for Anselm. Of the twenty instances of 'subsistere' in its various verbal and participial forms none indicates that Anselm is clearly and precisely distinguishing between 'existing' and 'subsisting being.' See note §39.

45. S.I, 43:3-4: Sed haec essentia quam patuit omnimode sibi esse eandem substantialiter....

46. Though the sense of this claim is implicit in Mon., c. 16, it is explicit at the end of Mon., c. 17 (S.I, 32:1-3). Also, cf. Augustine, DT, V, 10.11, 11.12.

48. This bears the sense of the principle of divine perfection which Anselm expresses in Mon., c. 15 (S.I, 29:17-21: ...sicut nefas est putare quod substantia supremae naturae sit aliquid, quo melius sit aliquomodo non ipsum, sic necesse est ut sit quidquid omnino melius est quam non ipsum. Ila enim sola est qua penitus nihil est melius, et quae melior est omnis quae non sunt quod ipsa est.) Compare with a variation of the same principle in Pros., c. 5 (S.I, 104:11-17, especially lines 15-16) and RE, s. 10 (S.I, 139:3-4); also, cf. Pros., c. 11 (S.I, 110:1-3). The upshot of all forms is this: God is whatever it is better to be than not to be, and God is such supremely. 'Better' (melius) respects the sense of moral and intellectual worth.

In both the Monologion and Proslogion this principle is preceded first by Anselm's attempt to understand the existence of God ('that God is') and then followed by his attempt to discern the attributes of God ('what God is'). See note #52. Also, even in view of Mon., c. 15, Anselm is not clear on just how the principle is to be employed. Is it a singular or collective function of reasoning, intuition, faith, innate knowledge, divine illumination, et cetera? I tend to agree with T. Morris that discernment of divine perfection is a function of intuition guided and checked by faith. But the whole theological method of fides quærens intellectum suggests that reason must have a role. Cf. idem, "Perfect Being Theology," Nods, 21 (1987), pp. 23-25.


50. Mon., c. 16 (S.I, 30:13-17, 27-30: ...quod est, omnino per se est, non per aliud. Si igitur non est iusta nisi per iustitiam, nec iusta potest esse nisi per se: quid magis conspicum, quid magis necessarium, quam quod eadem natura est ipsa iustitia; et cum dicitur esse iusta per iustitiam, idem est quod per se; et cum iusta per se dicitur esse, non aliud intelligitur quam per iustitiam?.................................

Deinde, quoniam de illa suprema essentia idem est dicere: quia est iusta, et: quia est existens iustitia; et cum dicitur: est existens iustitia, non est aliud quam: est iustitia: nihil differt in illa sive dicatur: est iusta, sive: est iustitia.)

Note: Emphasis was added to the translated text.

51. Anselm has set the parameters of such an analytical predication: He tells us in what way something can and cannot be predicated: first, by faith in and understanding of God, and, second, by the principle of perfection (cf. note #48).

52. W.N. Clarke in "Aseity (Aseitas)," p. 946, maintains that Anselm predicates existence of the essence of an infinitely perfect being and, in doing so, leaves the impression that the divine essence is at least conceptually prior to the divine
existence or at least causally related to it. My argument heretofore establishes the contrary. Clarke is aligned with Morreall: He does not want to see before Aquinas the idea, no matter how imprecise or untutored, that God's essence is identical with God's existence or that God's existence is the philosophical starting point for understanding God's other perfections.

That Anselm attempted to analyze the attributes of God from the perspective of an infinitely perfect being, as Clarke maintains, is evident in the Proslogion beginning at c. 5, where he sets forth the principle of perfection and, continuing up to cc. 14-15, where he admits that he is unable to discern the essence of the God who is 'that than which no greater can be thought.' Subsequently, from c. 16 onwards, he asserts the transcendence of the God 'who is greater than can be thought.' Clarke overlooks an important point: that before undertaking the 'quidditative inquiry' between Pros., cc. 6-14, and before ascribing the c. 2 notion of 'that than which no greater can be thought' to the God of his faith in c. 3 (at S.I, 103:3), Anselm offers in c. 3 (at S.I, 102:6 - 103:2) a qualification of the type of existence which this 'being in the notion of c. 2' must enjoy. In c. 3 Anselm holds that 'that than which no greater can be thought' exists truly (vere esse: to exist truly or necessarily) -- a claim which he later clarifies in RE, s. 4 (S.I, 133:21 - 134:19). In c. 5 he begins his endeavor to understand the essence of the God who is believed to exist per se, that is, who exists necessarily. His understanding of the aseity of God constitutes his starting point in the 'quidditative inquiry.' The same understanding marks the beginning of his attempt to understand the divine essence in the Monologion. It, like the Proslogion, begins on the point of God's existence (cc.1-6) and, before addressing the finer points of divine essence (cc. 16-28), sets forth a principle of perfection (c. 15).

Anselm's meditation and address are roughly conceptually parallel and this can be seen in the compositional structure of each. In both the Monologion and Proslogion, irrespective of their distinctive methodologies, Anselm first endeavors to understand 'that God is' before attempting to discern 'what God is.' That is, he seeks first to understand the existence of God before the other finer points of the essence of God. In both works the philosophical starting-point is divine aseity. This does not support the claim that divine essence in Anselmian thought is conceptually prior to divine existence.

54. Mon., c. 16 (S.I, 31:7-8). The list is abbreviated because not all of the said attributes are derived from verbs. 'Iustitia' is an example. In order to express 'justice' in a present participial form, Anselm would have to employ the present participle of sum or existo with the adjectival or adverbial form, as he does in the quoted illustration.

55. 'Ens' (being), used as a present participle, denotes an essential predicate of God alone. The sense is that the essence and existence of God are one or that the one implies the other. Cf. Dagobert D. Runes, ed. The Dictionary of Philosophy, 4th ed. (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1942), p. 36.

56. J. Hopkins holds that 'essentia' can substitute for 'existentia' (in "Monologion 1-4: The Anatomy of an Interpretation and Translation," p. 49). I see this in my reading of Mon., c. 31. Therein, while developing his idea of a hierarchy of beings (essentiae) vis-à-vis that of a supreme being (summa essentia), Anselm reasons that the Word of the supreme nature is the truth of existence or true existence (veritas existendi). In referring to the consubstantial Word, he clearly uses the word 'essentia' at S.I, 50:7-13 to convey the sense of the Word as true existence: this sense is expressed at S.I, 49:3-4 where he uses the genitive of the gerund of 'existo.' A reading of Mon., c. 44, evidences this same linguistic point: Anselm juggles 'essentia' and 'esse'/subsistere not as if they were semantically identical but, most certainly, as if semantically complementary; cf. also, DPSS, c. 6 (S.II, 197:8-25). Also, that 'essentia' and 'existentia' are interchangeable terms is clearly evidenced in DV: In the context of discussing the truth of beings in c. 7, Anselm uses 'essentia' for 'being' (at S.I, 185:7, 18), and in c. 10, he uses 'existentia' (at S.I, 190:9-10).


57. Cf. Aquinas, ST, Ia, q.3, a.4, reply (first example therein).

58. See note #45 for Latin text of Mon., c. 25.

59. Cf. Pros., c. 12 (S.I, 110:6 especially, then lines 6-8). What God is God is "per [se] ipsum": God is essentially the life by which God lives and so on for other predicable attributes. In this two-sentence chapter I presume that Anselm
has in mind the attributes listed in Mon., c. 16 (see note f53). Here he lists only three of those cited in c. 16. If my presumption is correct, and if I may emphasize the intensive pronoun which strengthens the accusative personal pronoun 'se' of the preposition 'per,' then my point that Anselm's God is ipsum esse subsistens is strengthened: The 'essentia [esse, existentia]' listed in c. 16 can be understood, in view of Pros., c. 12, as meaning that God is the being/existence by which God exists.

60. Cf. Mon., c. 28 (especially S.I, 46:2-9, 22-24):
Herein Anselm emphasizes the distinction in the modes of existing between the Creator and creatures. The sense is that the immutable Creator is being/existence itself unqualified, and creatures, who enjoy qualified existence, are deemed to exist scarcely at all in comparison with the Creator. In short, it is another way of emphasizing the distinction between necessary and contingent beings. Cf. G. Schufrieder, pp. 76-93. Also, cf. Mon., c. 44 (S.I, 60:21-11); and Pros., c. 22 (S.I, 116:20-23). The Proslogion discussion of God's eternity, omnipresence, and ubiquity extends from c.18 through c. 22; it parallels the Monologion discussion in cc. 18-24.

61. Ex. 3:14: "Dixit Deus ad Moysen: Ego sum qui sum. Ait: Sic dices filiiis Israel: Qui est, misit me ad vos."

62. Cf. Pros., c. 23: Emphasis is given to the necessary being as one who is essentially "supremely simple unity and supremely singular simplicity" (S.I, 117:18: ...summe simplex unitas et summe una simplicitas...).

63. An abbreviated form of the argument is in Pros., c. 18.


65. Cf. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Absolute Simplicity," Faith and Philosophy, 2 (1985), pp. 354-355: Being clearly focused on Aquinas, they remark that the doctrine of simplicity confirms the identity between divine essence and existence, between 'what God is' and 'that God is.' I hold the same view with respect to Anselm: If existence is not identified with God's essence and the unity thereof, then God has at least one part and, therefore, is not simple and independent in being.

66. For disagreement, cf. Thomas V. Morris, "Dependence and Divine Simplicity," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 23 (1988), 162, 172-173. The following three paragraphs in the text constitute my terse response to Professor Morris who claims that asety does not entail simplicity. In developing his interesting argument he refers to Anselm. To the extent that his argument depends overall on his expressed misunderstanding of Anselm (see pp. 169-171) to that same extent
his argument fails.

I want to point out that it is simply not the case, as he thinks it is, that Anselm holds to an "ontological egalitarianism" between God and creatures. One can read Mon., cc. 3–4, 6, 26–28, and 31, in order to gain an immediate sense of the ontology which Anselm slowly and so meticulously unfolds between cc. 1–36: In short, it bespeaks the ontological difference between a necessary being and contingent beings. In DPSS, c. 9 (S.II, 202:6–7), Anselm expresses the point in one sentence: "For whatever has been created is not identical with God but is different from God." (Quidquid enim factum est, non est idem deo sed aliud ab eo.) It is clear in Mon., c. 17, that Anselm compares the effects of God's being a composite being, were such the case, to the effects of compositeness in contingent beings. But this comparison should not have impelled Morris to assert of Anselm the idea of an "ontological egalitarianism." In fact it should have alerted him to Anselm's acute awareness of the mind's limitations in thinking and talking about God. Refer to Mon., cc. 65–66, and Pros., cc. 6–24, passim, for Anselm's awareness of this limitation (also, Mon., cc. 33, 42, 57, 62–63 for hints of this awareness). See DPSS, c. 16 (S.II, 217:17 – 218:7) and c. 9 (S.II, 204:22 – 205:7) for Anselm's explication of trinitarian persons by way of comparison with human persons and natural phenomena. Cf. Aquinas in ST, Ia, q.3, a.3, ad 1 to see that he and Anselm are not at odds in talking about God in terms of composite things.

Furthermore, a closer reading of the Monologion should have alerted Morris to the infeasibility and impropriety, at least in Anselm's view, of arguing against divine simplicity by appealing to ideas of spatial and temporal simplicity. For Anselm, God bears no spatial or temporal extensions: the eternal God is not subjected to the laws of space and time (cf. Mon., c. 22, passim, and surrounding chapters; DIV, c. 13 [S.II, 31:6–7]; DPSS, c. 9 [S.II, 204:23]); the eternal God is outside of all time (cf. DPSS, c. 8 [S.II, 200:3]).

Furthermore, I think that Anselm would differ with Morris' claim that between God and God's ontologically distinct properties there is but a "mutual logical dependency." (p.164) Any suggestion of dependency, be it the accompaniment of a real or logical distinction, compromises the persity of God and hence the idea of God as a necessary being. (This point should be considered vis-à-vis Mon., cc. 3–4.) What Morris needs to clarify is the sense of "logical dependency": how does it significantly speak against the claim for divine simplicity, as does the idea of a real distinction and dependency between God and the divine attributes?

70. Cf. Mon., c. 17 and Pros., c. 18.

71. Cf. Augustine in DeCD, XI, 10, and DT, VI, 4-8 — the readings of which should be complemented by a reading of DT, V, passim. Also, cf. Boethius, Trin., 2-3, and Aquinas in ST, Ia, q.3, a.7, and SCG, I, cc. 18, 20, 22.

72. Cf. Augustine in DeCD, XI, 10, and DT, VI, 4-8 — the readings of which should be complemented by a reading of DT, V, passim. Also, cf. Boethius, Trin., 2-3, and Aquinas in ST, Ia, q.3, a.7, and SCG, I, cc. 18, 20, 22.


77. Cf. Augustine in DeCD, XI, 10, and DT, VI, 4-8 — the readings of which should be complemented by a reading of DT, V, passim. Also, cf. Boethius, Trin., 2-3, and Aquinas in ST, Ia, q.3, a.7, and SCG, I, cc. 18, 20, 22.


80. Cf. Mon., c. 58: Three persons of the Trinity have exactly the same essence, wisdom, and strength (virtus).


82. Cf. Mon., c. 48 (S.I, 64:5-8).


84. In the trinitarian psychology of the Monologion, Anselm does not refer to the Third Person as the will (voluntas) of God. He speaks of the Holy Spirit as Love (amor). Cf. DPSS, c. 4 (S.II, 192:25-27): Herein, the Holy Spirit is associated with the divine will. That Anselm understands 'will' as both desire and choice in his use of 'love' is inferred from several points: 1) affinity with Augustine on the mind as an imperfect image of the Trinity; 2) Augustine's use of both voluntas and amor/dilectio in referring to the Third Person (cf. DT, X, 11.17 [CC, 50, 329:10 - 330:15] and XV, 6.10 [CC, 50a, 474:88-90] respectively); 3) Anselmian textual evidence which bespeaks explicitly or implicitly the human will in terms of loving and choosing, for instance: DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 286:4-5); CDH, II, c. 1 (S.II, 97:8-11, 14-16, 18-19); Mon., c. 68 (S.I, 78:14-20; 77:6-9), c.
69 (S.I, 79:13-15, 17-20); and 4) testimony of an Anselmian fragment (cf. MA [AF, #3], SS. 306:1-5): There are three distinctions of the soul: memory (memoria), intellect (intellectus), and will (voluntas); in respect to the creature before God, all three distinctions harmonize: What one understands about God, one loves; what one loves, of that one is mindful. But this fragment contrasts slightly with MA [AF, #13] (SS, 308:3-6): The three distinctions are reason (ratio), will (voluntas), and the carnal appetite (appetitus carnalis). See also, MA [Chapters of Unknown Origin in De similitudinibus, c. 181] (SS, 298:8-14). For agreement on this interpretation of love and will, see Charles Filliatre, La philosophie de Saint Anselme: Ses principes, sa nature, son influence (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1920), p. 77; also, Marcia L. Colish, The Mirror of Language: A Study in the Medieval Theory of Knowledge, revised edition (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 99.


86. Per se with the emphasis on self-sufficiency: cf. DPSS, c. 4 (S.II, 193:6-8). See note #36.


88. Cf. Mon., cc. 57-59, passim.

89. Cf. Mon., c. 25: 'Relation' can be predicated of God without it denoting a change or happening in the divine substance. The Trinity is an example: Relations in the Godhead are not accidents; relations among the divine persons do not admit of contingency. The Triune Godhead is an eternal and immutable relationship of distinct persons in one substance: There is one God who begets, who is begotten, and who proceeds. Distinctions respect only the relational properties of unbegottenness, begottenness, and procession, which are signified respectively by the relational names 'Father,' 'Son,' and 'Holy Spirit'; the distinctions do not respect the substance of simple deity which is signified by the name 'God.' In God there is an 'indivisible unity' and an 'irreducible plurality': plurality arises out of relations, unity out of substance. Cf. DPSS, c. 1, passim; also, Augustine, DT, V, 5.6, 7.8, 11.12. Also, cf. J. Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, p. 95.

90. In Mon., c. 47 (S.I, 63:4-5), Anselm abbreviates what follows at length in the text and speaks to his thoughts in c. 17. The substance of God, who is spirit, is understanding,


93. Cf. Mon., cc. 9-12, passim, cc. 29-36, passim: Herein, in toto, Anselm establishes what approximates a theory of divine exemplarism. For instance, in Mon., c. 34: The Spirit speaks itself and creatures eternally. Creatures are always in the Spirit and therein they are what the Spirit is, rather than what they are in themselves as mutable creatures in time. Creatures in the immutable reason of the Creator who is existence are "primary Being" (prima essentia) and "primary true Existence" (prima existendi veritas) (cf. Mon., c. 34; S.I, 53:21-26). Mon., c. 9, is the crux of this theory. When considered closely along side c. 10, wherein Anselm emphasizes his point on natural words, it becomes clear that what God knows is basically the definition of all creatures.

94. Mon., c. 9 (S.I, 24:14-16: Patet itaque, quoniam priusquam fierent univcrsa, erat in ratione summae naturae, quid aut qualia aut quomodo futura essent.) Also, see S.I, 24:17-20: the point being that creatures before they were made were nothing (were not something material and concrete), but they were not nothing (were something) with respect to the thought of God.

95. Mon., c. 33 (S.I, 53:11-12: Uno igitur eodemque verbo dicit seipsum et quaecumque fecit); cf. also, DPSS, c. 9 (S.II, 202:29-31).

96. Mon., c. 36 (S.I, 55:4-6: ...quia omnis creatua substantia tanto verius est in verbo, id est in intelligentia creatoris, quam in seipsa, quanto verius existit creatrix quam creatua essentia....). At Mon., c. 35, we read: "Therefore, whatever was created -- whether it lives or does not live, or however it exists in itself -- exists as life itself and truth itself in the supreme spirit." (S.I, 54:8-10: Quidquid igitur factum est sive vivat sive non vivat, aut quomodocumque sit in se: in illo est ipsa vita et veritas.)

97. In DPSS, c. 10 (S.I, 205:21-26), Anselm makes it quite clear that the Trinity does not denote a plurality of creators. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are to be understood as the one source of creation. They are such in virtue of the unity of divine substance and not the Trinity of divine relations.


99. Cf. DCV, c. 23 (S.II, 163:1-19). There is a striking parallel between what I see in Anselm with respect to God and creatures as existing most truly in the mind of God and what Anselm holds with respect to Adam and the existence of Adamic progeny: In Adam "they [as if seeds of Adam] were not distinct from Adam; and thus they existed [in Adam] far differently from the way they exist themselves." (S.II, 163:18-19: Sed -- sicut dictum est -- in illo fuerunt non alii ab illo, et ideo longe aliter quam sunt in se ipsis.) See Mon., c. 34 (S.I, 53:22-24): The point is this: Before creatures were made, and even during their temporal existence and after ceasing to exist temporally, they are what the supreme being is, rather than what they are in themselves as creatures in time (semper in ipso sunt, non quod sunt in seipsis, sed quod est idem ipse). The further upshot is this: The true existence of a creature is in the mind of the eternal God and, as such, it is not distinct from the supreme existence of the God whose existence is divine essence. True creaturely existence is not in time; it is in eternity.


100. Cf. Mon., c. 60, for Anselm's position on the self-sufficiency of each consubstantial person of the Trinity. His point is that there is no dependency in the Trinity of God. It is not the case that the Father only understands and loves through the Son and Holy Spirit, or that the Son only remembers and loves through the Father and Holy Spirit, or that the Holy Spirit only remembers and understands through the Father and Son.
The Trinity is a "relation of identicals," as Boethius puts it (cf. Trin., 6); as Anselm would put it: Each person is wholly and simply the one God (cf. Mon., c. 59, passim; Mon., c. 60 [S.I, 70:30 - 71:5]).

101. "Transcendental" suggests what I think is Anselm's position: Strictly speaking, the ten (nine) Aristotelian categories are not predicable of God: God is above all predicaments; God is supra-substantial. One can speak of God as a substance but one should do so only insofar as the term generally connotes 'being' (essentia). See Mon., cc. 26-27, 79. As I noted above, a quality is said of God only in a refined sense: God does not have the quality; God is the predicated quality. Anselm's stance on speaking of God in terms of relation is equally refined and suggestive of the transcendental sense. See Mon., c. 25. His entire meditation on the Trinity in Mon., cc. 46-62, indicates that 'relation' can be predicated of God without any entailing suggestions of an accidental change in the substance of God. Cf. Augustine, DT, V, cc. 1-2, 4-8, 11, 16; VII, c. 5; and Boethius, Trin., 4. Also, cf. Walter Kern, "God-World Relationship," Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology, 2 (1968), pp. 404-405.

102. As I see it: There are two perspectives from which to view the connection between God and creatures. One is taken from the side of eternity and before God creates; the other after God creates. The former connection is a noetic and transcendental one: It is between the eternal God and what is known by God, between the knower and the known. It is a relation in the mind of God. Before creation, the relation between God and the truth of the existence of creatures can only be viewed from this perspective. Importantly, it is not one in which the known creatures are able to respond meaningfully to the knower. Thus, it is a uni-perspectival relation. However, after God creates what is eternally known, that is, after effecting in time the truth of rational creatures, the connection between God and creatures becomes bi-perspectival. That is, it is no longer and simply a relation in the mind of God, but one that is realized in time. Now, there is the eternal God in relation with individual creatures who exist in time and who, importantly, can respond meaningfully to God. Actually what redounds in virtue of creation is a relationship or bi-perspectival relation: one proceeding from God to creatures and from creatures to God. There is, in other words, the mutuality of correspondence between the transcendent and the contingent, and thus, two points of view from which to discern the connection between the two beings. For senses of 'uni-perspectival' and 'bi-perspectival': Cf. Constantine Cavarnos, The Classical Theory of Relations: A Study in the Metaphysics of Plato, Aristotle, and Thomism (Belmont, MA: Institute for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 1975), pp. 20-21.

104. That this works for Anselm is clearly seen in his trinitarian theology. Cf. Augustine, DT, V, 5.6, 16.17.

105. The expression is Boethius', but it is one that Anselm would not have difficulty accepting. Cf. Trin., 6.


108. Cf. Mon., c. 33 (S.I, 52:1-3). Also, a parallel in Mon., c. 53: "In fact, if there never had been a creature -- i.e., if nothing had ever existed other than the supreme spirit... nonetheless, the Father and the Son would still have loved themselves and each other." (S.I, 66:5-7: Denique si nulla umquam creatura, id est si nihil umquam aliud esset quam summus spiritus pater et filius: nihilominus seipsos et invicem pater et filius diligerent.) Also, cf. Mon., c. 32 (S.I, 51:4-6).


110. On this sense of necessity, cf. CDH, II, c. 17, especially at S.II, 125:8, 9 but within the context of Anselm's discussion of antecedent and consequent necessity at S.II, 125:8 - 126:2. Cf. Boethius, CP, V, 6, prose.


112. Cf. Mon., c. 50 (S.I, 65:5-6), c. 68 (S.I, 79:5-6). Given the claim that one cannot love/will without remembering and understanding, it seems that what the intellect proffers to the will is, in fact, a necessary condition (though not a sufficient condition) for the use of the will. If there be a reason for undermining the claim that Anselm is a staunch voluntarist, it would be his trinitarian psychology as analogically akin to
human/angelic psychology. He evidences an intellectualist bent: His conception of the will is that of its being a rational will. Anticipate considerations of the intellect vis-à-vis the will in ss. 5, 15, and 18.


115. Cf. Augustine, DT, IX, 2.2, also 12.17-18; also, Plotinus, Enneads, III, 5.2.

In Mon., cc. 46-63, 77. A complementary view is in DPSS, cc. 1-2. A terse interpretative exposition follows.


117. Or. 18 (S.III, 72:43: auctor et dator caritatis).


120. Mon., c. 49 (S.I, 64:18: ...mutui amoris affectum.).


124. Cf. DT, IX, 2.


127. Cf. Or. 12 (S.III, 45:5-6; 45:16 - 46:1, 40-41; 48:86-87); Or. 18 (S.III, 71:9-11; 72:40-41). The salvific event of the Christ is an instance of God's love for man: cf. Anselm in MRH, passim, as an abbreviated reading of CDH; in the same vein, but more prayerful, Or. 4, passim. See Paul, Rm. 5:8.
128. Cf. Mon., c. 57 (S.I, 68:14-18): The Love of the Father and the Son, that is, the Third Person, being of one supreme being, is uncreated and Creator. Per se it creates.

129. At least this is the reason for creation as discerned from the perspective of created rational creatures: Cf. Mon., c. 68 (S.I, 79:1-5); c. 69 (S.I, 79:17-18); c. 70 (S.I, 80:21-22, 26-29); c. 77 (S.I, 84:10-11): the end of man towards which man should strive in love is the Triune God; CDH, II, c. 1 (S.II, 97:14-15); DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 285:15-16; 286:4-5). And by way of interpretation: CDH, I, c. 9 (S.II, 61:29-30). The reason can be seen less directly in what Anselm calls the two ways of the love of God, to which one and all should aspire: 1) to love God as one ought to love God, and 2) to be loved by God to the extent of one's needs. See Or. 12 (S.III, 45:16 - 46:1).

130. Anselm classifies 'freedom' (libertas) under the genus 'ability' or 'power' (potestas): cf. DLA, c. 13 (S.I, 225:15).

131. Cf. DP [PF] (ENUW, 44:1).


133. Technical and complementary views on potestas can be discerned in DLA, c. 3 (S.I, 213:16-25), and DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 252:23-31).

134. Loc. cit.; cf. alongside DV, cc. 4-5, passim.


137. Cf. Boethius, CP, IV, 2, prose; and Plotinus, Enneads, VI, 8.4, 10: Powerlessness lies in not moving towards one's good; the fullness of power is to be found in the "absence of declination" from the Good.

138. Cf. CDH, II, c. 10, where Anselm highlights an important distinction between the ability to act and the ability to will. The point is this: that all 'doing,' be it free, presupposes the will to do: the ability to will underlies the ability to act. Ability follows upon willing, otherwise the ability is really a necessity. There is a very rarefied sense of necessity that holds in respect to God: It is that which flows, as it were, from the freedom of God understood as being aligned with rectitude and that which is advantageous or fitting. Cf. A.E. McGrath, "Rectitude: The Moral Foundation of Anselm of Canterbury's Soteriology," Downside Review, 99 (July 1981), p. 209. Also, cf. Boethius, CP, IV, 2, prose: the distinction is
drawn between ability and willing.

139. Cf. DV, c. 12 (S.I, 196:1-5): Rectitude and the will of God are construed as one and the same.

140. Cf. DLA, c. 8, passim. This chapter supports my claim insofar as Anselm argues that God cannot will to remove rectitude of the will from any rational creature. God cannot violate rectitude, for to do so would be an affront to the nature of God. Also, cf. CDH, I, c. 12 (S.II, 70:5-12): Again, the point is that God's freedom of will and action harmonizes with the nature of God. See A.E. McGrath, "Rectitude: The Moral Foundation of Anselm of Canterbury's Soteriology," p. 209; A. Koyré, L'Idée de Dieu dans la philosophie de saint Anselme, p. 53; and William J. Courtenay, "Necessity and Freedom in Anselm's Conception of God," Analeipta Anselmiana, 4, No. 2 (1975), pp. 43, 55-56, 62. Also, cf. Aquinas, ST, Ia, q.25, a.3, reply.


142. CDH, I, c. 12 (S., II: 70:13: A:/ Libertas enim est nisi ad hoc quod expedit aut quod decet.....).

143. Cf. CDH, II, c. 5 (S.II, 100:20-26): In no way is God compelled to do or restrained from doing anything by externs. The proper sense of 'necessity' does not pertain to the God who alone wills and determines all that is in fact necessary and impossible (cf. CDH, II, 17 [S.II, 122:26-30]).

144. Cf. MRH (S.III, 86:62-63): The will of God is identified with the goodness of God. Divine will is always good.


In juxtaposing the words "act" and "life" I am not intending a Plotinian reading of Anselm. Interestingly, though, Plotinus speaks of the Good as both Act and Life while upholding God's freedom and railing against those who suggest that God, who acts according to divine nature, is necessitated: "...the Act, the Life, so to speak, cannot be held to issue from the Being; the Being accompanies the Act in an eternal association: from the two (Being and Act) it forms itself into the Good, self-springing
and unspringing." (Cf. Enneads, VI, 8.7.) Likewise, he writes: "...a simplex Activity, where there can be no difference of potentiality and act, must be free; there can be no thought of action 'according to the nature,' in the sense of any distinction between the being and its efficiency, there where being and act are identical. Where act is performed neither because of another nor at another's will, there surely is freedom." (Cf. Enneads, VI, 8.4.) At least in spirit, Anselm is not far from Plotinus.


148. Cf. Aquinas, ST, 1a, q.25, a.1, ad 2.


150. Anselm did not use this later scholastic phrase (potentia ordinata dei) for denoting a logical distinction in God's power. However, subtle traces of its signification can be found in his thoughts. Cf. CDH, II, cc. 5 and 17, together and passim. The following brief consideration of this concept is based on these two chapters. Also, cf. G. Roxburgh, "Omnipotence," NCE, 10 (1967), p. 688; W.J. Courtenay, "Necessity and Freedom in Anselm's Conception of God," pp. 41, 55-62, and "The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages" in Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives, edited by T. Rudavsky (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), p. 245; Richard P. Desharnais, The History of the Distinction between God's Absolute and Ordained Power and Its Influence on Martin Luther (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilm, Inc., 1966), c. 1; and Aquinas, ST, 1a, q.25, a.5, ad 1.

151. This is contrary to R.P. Desharnais who claims that the rudiments originated in Hugh of St. Victor: cf. The History of the Distinction between God's Absolute and Ordained Power and Its Influence on Martin Luther, pp. 39-40, 47. Hugh (b. very late 11th cent.; d. 1141 A.D.) is contemporary with Anselm's writing of Cur Deus homo (1098), but is far enough removed in time with respect to his intellectual development to ensure that credit be given to Anselm. The same rebuttal can be delivered to M. Grabmann in Die Geschichte der katholischen Theologie seit dem Ausgang der Väterzeit (Freiburg: Herder, 1933), p. 288, whom Desharnais cites for agreement.

152. For agreement on this point, though not specifically with respect to Anselm, cf. W.J. Courtenay, "The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages," p. 247: In the first half of the 13th century, the emphasis of potentia ordinata dei shifted from divine inability to a positive view of divine relations with the world -- relationships grounded in commitment
and covenant which arise out of the freedom of the voluntary. Also, cf. R.P. Desharnais, p. 71: All in all, the distinction between God's absolute and ordained power had precise philosophical implications for the early scholastics' theological consideration and discussion of justification.

153. Cf. DCV, c. 11 (S.II, 153:14 - 154:15): Herein, Anselm classifies powers and the corresponding orders of events (cursus rerum) in terms of the miraculous (mirabilis), the natural (naturalis), and the voluntary (voluntarius). God's power is miraculous not only in the initial act of creation but also in working within creation when and where natural or voluntary powers do not suffice for effecting something (e.g., the virginal birth). The upshot of this: Miracles can be understood in terms of God's potentia ordinata. It is an open question, though, whether they can be understood, and if so in what sense, as transcending God's potentia ordinata or God's willed and active commitment to creation. Given that potentia ordinata and potentia absoluta are only logically distinct, it would seem that God's power in and of itself, as well as its actualizations in time, is always 'miraculous' (from 'mirabilis' meaning 'marvellous, amazing, admirable, wonderful').

154. CDH, II, c. 5: A:/ And, nevertheless, by creating man by God's own goodness, God freely bound the divine self, as it were, to accomplish the good which God had undertaken. (S.II, 100:19-20: A:/ ...et tamen bonitate sua illum creando sponte se ut perficeret inceptum bonum quas obligavit.)

155. CDH, II, c. 17: A:/ But this kind of necessity [i.e., subsequent necessity] does not compel a state of affairs to occur; rather, the existence of the state of affairs causes the existence of the necessity. For there is a necessity which precedes and is the cause of a thing's being the case; and there is a necessity which succeeds and is caused by the thing's being the case. (S.II, 125:6-9: A:/ Huiusmodi autem necessitas non cogit rem esse, sed esse rei facit necessitatem esse. Est namque necessitas praecedens, quae causa est ut sit res; et est necessitas sequens, quam res facit.)

156. Anselm holds that no necessity can be said to follow when the free will is involved. The claim holds for man and God. Cf. CDH, II, c. 17 (S.II, 124:14-19). Also, see CDH, II, c. 5 (S.II, 100:2-5) for a complementary point of view. Cf. CDH, II, c. 10: In discussing the ability to act vis-à-vis the ability to will with respect to whether the Christ could or could not have sinned; in claiming that all ability presupposes a will; and in noting that the Christ was unable to will to sin and, hence, was not able to sin, Anselm concludes that there is a certain 'necessity' respecting God. However, it is one that flows from the true freedom of divine power or essence. Note my points on true freedom at the end of sub. B. See note #138.

158. Cf. CDH, II, c. 5 (S.II, 100:6-7).

159. Ibid. (S.II, 99:18-19; 100:21-26).

160. Cf. CDH, I, c. 9 (S.II, 61:29-30); also, see references in note #129, among which the preceding is listed. Cf. Pros., c. 25, *passim*, for Anselm's reflection on the status of this reward as yet to be realized. See Ep. 112: Anselm recommends c. 25 as an elaboration on the fullness of beatitude.

161. CDH, II, c. 5 (S.II, 100:26-28).


163. Cf. DV, c. 12 (S.I, 194:26); also, DCV, c. 3 (S.II, 143:7), c. 5 (S.II, 147:1-2).


165. CDH, I, c. 15, tersely presents Anselm's emphasis on rectitude and God as the governor of the world. It also clearly suggests Anselm's *Weltanschauung*: the vision of a world that is obliged to be entirely ordered ontologically and morally to its Creator. When it is not, it is still unable to escape from God's governance: In the case of rational creatures, they either willingly traverse under God's directive will by submitting to God's ordinances, or they err from that will by virtue of God's permissive will and in doing so fall under God's punitive will (cf. S.II, 73:14-17). See also CDH, I, c. 13 (S.II, 71:15-17, 19). Eugene Fairweather correctly notes the idea of "right ordering" in his own exposition of Anselm: The rectitude of order which pervades all dimensions of the world is the justice of God: cf. "'Justitia Dei' as the 'Ratio' of the Incarnation," SB, p. 330. Also, cf. R.D. Crouse, "The Augustinian Background of St. Anselm's Concept 'Justitia'," p. 114.


167. Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* and *Meditatio redemptionis humanae* provide the theological background and answers to these questions. My intention is not to elucidate and discuss the
details of Anselmian Christology and soteriology. Such, if it were realized, would take me well beyond the scope of this essay. I realize, however, that such an elucidation is germane to the wholistic Anselmian theodicy towards which I am endeavoring in this dissertation.

168. Cf. CDH, I, cc. 12, 14, 20, 23-24; Or. 6 (S.III, 15:10-12); Or. 10 (S.III, 33:11-12; 34:16); and especially Or. 13 (S.III, 50:19 - 51:30; 51:38-41). Also, DVM (S.III,77:34-35).


172. As a Benedictine monk, Anselm would have chanted the entire Psalter over the course of a week, every week: cf. Benedict of Nursia, The Rule of Saint Benedict, c. 18, p. 67. This is a significant point for establishing the roots of Anselm's conception of the justice of God as justification. The Psalter evidences copious and influential remarks on God's justice (cf. A.E. McGrath, "Justice and Justification: Semantic and Juristic Aspects of the Christian Doctrine of Justification," Scottish Journal of Theology, 35 (1982), pp. 411-412): All in all, the general sense is that of justice in terms of covenantal fidelity, of covenantal relation between God and man: between an ever-faithful and unerring God of kindness and truth who defends, saves, nurtures, and directs the people who abide by divine decrees. It is a different view from that of the just God viewed as a strict judge and tormentor (cf. CDH, I, c. 14 [S.II, 72:11-14]). Cf. Psalms 17(18), 42(43), 49(50), 67(68), 110(111), 118(119), 142(143), especially though not exclusively.

A close reading of Anselm's nineteen orations and three meditations, in conjunction with Schmitt's accompanying critical apparatus, evidences Anselm's reflection upon or citation of fifty-eight psalms*. Of these, twenty-seven** include significant remarks on justice (iustitia) or justification (justificatio), in sum betraying the sense which I mention above. Cf. Novae concordantiae Bibliorum Sacrorum iuxta Vulgatam versionem, ed. by B. Fischer (Stuttgart: Frommann Holzboog GmbH & Co., 1977), entries: 'iustitia' and 'justificatio' (various case-forms subsumed).

*Psalms 3-5, 7, 9, 12, 15-18, 21, 24, 26, 29, 30, 34-39, 41, 44, 49, 50, 54, 57, 61-62, 68-69, 71-73, 76-77, 79, 83, 88, 90,


175. Cf. CDH, I, c. 6 (S.II, 53:5 - 54:1).

176. Cf. CDH, I, c. 24 (S.II, 94:12-13): Divine mercy is an ultimate mercy, that is, that which renders happiness unto man after this life. Cf. also, CDH, I, c. 25 (S.II, 95:24 - 96:2).

178. Respectively, cf. DC, III, c. 3 (S.II, 266:21-23), c. 6 (S.II, 272:18-19), and c. 8 (S.II, 275:11-12). Anselm does not use the expression 'actual grace.' Its sense of being a movement of the soul bestowed by God for the sake of doing good is, however, appropriate to him. For Anselm, grace is simply either prevenient or subsequent. Precise classifications of grace are foreign to him. However, if one reads his texts closely, one can see that their senses are not.

179. Cf. DC, III, c. 6 (S.II, 271:11-15; 273:4-6); also, c. 4 (S.II, 268:1-4).


181. Cf. DC, III, c. 6 (S.II, 271:8-9).

182. Cf. Or. 2 (S.III, 7:27-28): The context suggests that justice is an indwelling grace, an 'inspired' grace in the soul.

183. Cf. DC, III, c. 6 (S.II, 271:13: ...et rectitudo volendi gratia est.); also, c. 4 (S.II, 268:1-2): the gift or grace here is justice. That justice is a grace is clearly conveyed at the end of DC, III, c. 3, where Anselm speaks of one keeping that which has been received, namely, justice or rectitude of the will, and perchance meriting increments of it. The increments are deemed to be "fruits of the first grace, and are 'grace for grace.'" (S.II, 266:28 - 267:1: ...haec omnia fructus sunt primae gratiae, et 'gratia pro gratia'...." [Anselm is referring to Jn. 1:16.] Also, cf. DLA, c. 3 (S.I, 210:28-30). See Rm. 5:1-2, 15, 17, 21; 8:9-11; Augustine, DT, VII, 3.5. Cf. Y. Cattin, "Dieu d'amour, Dieu de colère: Justice et miséricorde dans le Prologion (ch. VI-XI) d'Anselme de Canterbury," pp. 282-283; and Jean Rohmer, La finalité morale chez les théologiens de saint Augustin à Duns Scot (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1939), p. 144 including note #1. For a summary appreciation of justice as a grace, see P. de Letter, "Justice of God (in Theology)," NCE, 8 (1967), p. 76.

Understanding justice as an indwelling grace of the aseitic God is crucial, I think, for fully appreciating Anselm's developments on the will's separable affection or inclination for justice. This is so especially in De casu diaboli and much later in De concordia. The crux of an Anselmian ethics, if there be one in any recognizable form, is justice of the will. Accordingly, the theo-centricity and God/man relationality of Anselm's ethical thoughts move straight to the fore. The
indwelling grace of justice in the will as an affection or inclination attests to the morally-ordered relationship between Creator and creature: man directed towards and subordinated to God. The will's affection for justice waxes and wanes, comes and goes, as the creature chooses freely either to maintain or to forsake his relationship with and obligation to his Creator.

184. Cf. Or. 4 (S.III, 12:52-53); Or. 7 (S.III, 19:39-40); Or. 8 (S.III, 26:20-21; 29:82-84); Or. 9 (S.III, 31:49-50); and Or. 14 (S.III, 61:180-181). Cf. also, MCT (S.III, 80:7-9).

185. Cf. Or. 3 (S.III, 10:3-5, 10-11); Or. 4 (S.III, 12:27-29); Or. 6 (S.III, 15:20-23; 16:26, 29-30); Or. 7 (S.III, 20:59-60). MRH speaks concisely of this point; cf. the first half of this meditation up to S.III, 88:129, but note especially 84:3-5, 13-16 and 87:103 - 88:105.

186. Cf. Or. 7 (S.III, 20:67-68): The context suggests that the lost inborn dignity (amissa congenita dignitate) of which Anselm speaks is justice.

187. Cf. CDH, II, c. 20, passim. Also, cf. George S. Heyer, Jr., "St. Anselm on the Harmony between God's Mercy and God's Justice" in The Heritage of Christian Thought, ed. by R.E. Cushman and E. Grislis (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 39. That Anselm is aware of this point in the Proslogion is evidenced c. 8 (S.I, 106:12-13) and c. 10 (S.I, 109:3-6). Heyer has taken exception to Anselm's Proslogion consideration: In sum, he thinks that Anselm does not achieve harmonization of justice and mercy but merely a juxtaposition of the two (p. 34). In effect, Anselm drives a "wedge between God's being and action" (p. 35) and presents two senses of justice in God (p. 34). Aside from the fact that Heyer does not show appreciation of Anselm on the unity and simplicity of God's essence, his problem is that he does not fully appreciate that which Yves Cattin and I do: Anselm's emphasis on God's justice secundum se and God's mercy secundum nos which are fundamentally one and the same but logically distinguished from the perspective of the creature who experiences in salvation history the just and good God who is impassible. This problem could be owing in part to the fact that Heyer tends to see mercy as a "perfection" in God (p. 34). But, Anselm's position is this: God is merciful from our experiential perspective, God is not merciful per se (cf. Pros., c. 8) -- per se the impassible God is just and good. What we experience in salvation is the goodness of the just God; for us, the goodness translates into the mercy of the God who loves. (Cf. Y. Cattin, p. 273.) Furthermore, he does not see that Anselm is indeed soteriologically-focused, though not greatly, in the Proslogion (cf. textual references above). Correctly, though, he notes that the harmony is achieved in the soteriological context of Cur Deus homo (pp. 37-38).


190. Ibid. (S.I, 108:3-5). This point is entrenched in the concept of the unity and simplicity of God as presented in sub. B.


195. There is neither tension, nor paradox, nor contradiction between God's justice and mercy if one bears in mind the unity and simplicity of God. For agreement, cf. Y. Cattin, p. 282.

196. A sensitive reading of Anselm in MCT at S.III, 82:84 - 83:116 suggests that which I have just stated. The context clearly focuses on the justice and mercy of God. Consider one section -- S.III, 83:96-98: Si ergo non vis [i.e., God] peccatoris mortem: quid te cogit quod non vis, ut me tradas ad mortem? Si vis ut convertatur peccator et vivat: quid te prohibet facere quod vis, ut me convertas et vivam? To each of these two questions, might not the free will of the rational creature be cited as that alone which stymies the will of God in showing mercy to fallen creatures?


199. Pros., c. 9 (S.I, 108:2-3: ...difficile sit intelligere....).


201. Understand 'omnipotence' as considered in sub. B: ability/power is true and correct when respectful of rectitude: of what ought to be and what ought to be done. The power of God
is, by virtue of the unity and simplicity of the divine essence, totally aligned with God's being rectitude. With respect to Pros., c. 9 at S.I, 108:10-20, these points should suffice in explaining how it is that Anselm can speak of God as justly working so powerfully (potentius) in the merciful endeavor that is salvation. God does what God does, particularly spares the wicked and hews good folk out of bad, because God's power or activity (divine will) is one and eternal with God's being per se rectitude, goodness, and justice: What God wills is just, what God does not will is not just (cf. Pros., c. 11 [S.I, 109:18-19]). In short, Anselm's understanding of the justice of God as extending mercifully as per divine goodness beyond retributive justice (that is, by sparing the wicked, et cetera) elucidates both the signification of the name which he ascribes to God -- "that than which a greater cannot be thought" (id quo maius cogitari non potest [Pros., c. 4; S.I, 104:2]) and the principle of divine perfection (see note #48).
Section 2

1. It is a fusion of linguistic theory and epistemology. When emphasis falls upon natural words (verba naturalia) in Anselm's linguistic theory, metaphysics and ontology enter the fusion -- metaphysics with respect to natural words being universal, ontology with respect to their being images of the eternal expression of the transcendent and supreme being.


3. Anselm does not discuss the truth of words in DV. Discussion of the correctness of a linguistic term usually occurs in his discussion of its precise and oblique signification (meaning) or, respectively, its proper and improper linguistic use. In Mon., c. 31, however, he does consider the truth of a word which is mentally spoken or thought. This truth is gauged by the degree to which the word images that thing for which it is a word. "For all such words by which we mentally speak of objects (i.e., by which we think [cogitare] them) are," according to Anselm, " likenesses and images of those objects for which they are words. And every likeness and image is true in proportion to the exactness with which it imitates the thing whose likeness it is." (S.I, 48:18-20: Etenim omnia huiusmodi verba quibus res quaslibet mente dicimus, id est cogitamus: similitudines et imaginis sunt rerum quarum verba sunt....) My reason for mentioning the truth of a word is relevant to the philosophical consideration which lies below in sub. C. Therein I shall present, as I think Anselm would, the voluntary rational action as a sort of moral word. This I shall do in an effort to reach some understanding of an Anselmian moral epistemology via Anselm's verbal epistemology.

4. Cf. DV, c. 10.

6. Cf. DV, c. 11 (S.I, 191:19-20: M:/ Possumus igitur, nisi fallor, definire quia veritas est rectitudo mente sola perceptibilis.). Anselm's claim that truth is perceived by the mind alone is not without agreement, at least in principle, with Augustine. In DT, IX, 6.11, Augustine claims that the truth by which one judges things is "perceived...through the eye of the rational mind." (CC, v. 50, 303:56-72: ...et illam cernimus rationalis mentis intuitu.) All people can behold the truth for it is one and same for all (DT, IX, 6.9). In DDQ, #9, Augustine maintains that truth is not perceived by the bodily senses. His reasoning is that the bodily senses deal with things that change (a position which he softens in Retr. 1.26). If a thing is not stable, then it cannot be perceived because "that is perceived which is grasped by knowledge, but that cannot be grasped which changes without ceasing." (CC, v. 44a, 16:7-8: ...illud enim percepitur quod scientia comprehenditur; comprehendi autem non potest quod sine intermissione mutatur.) The senses can present false images of objects and may not be distinguishable from the true. Truth, for Augustine, is "grasped by the intellect and the inner mind." (CC, v. 44a, 17:25-26: ...id est veritatem quae intellectu et interiore mente capitur....)

In DV, c. 6, Anselm takes a different position. He argues that the truth of senses can be perceived by the mind and that the senses do not deceive. They do what they ought. In those cases in which it seems that the senses deceive, it is actually the mind's judgment that is deceiving: "the fault is not with the senses, which report in accordance with their natural powers, but must be attributed to the soul's judgment (iudicio), which does not discern what the senses can and ought to do." (S.I, 184: 29-31: M:/ ...non culpa sensum est qui renuntiant quod possunt, quoniam ita posse acceperunt, sed iudicio animae imputandum est, quod non bene discernit quid illi possint aut quid debeant.)

When it is a matter of discerning the rightness of corporeal things, i.e., an issue of visible rightness which is distinct from the other forms of rectitude discussed in De veritate, rectitude is apprehended first by the bodily senses or sensory perception and then followed by reason's discernment. Only in respect to the rectitude of corporeal things does sensory perception precede mental perception. All other instances of rectitude are perceived solely by the mind via rational reflection. Cf. DV, c. 11.

7. Cf. DV, c. 13 (S.I, 197:4-5: M:/ Constat quia in quacumque re sit veritas, non est alius quam rectitudo.).

9. There are some salient points about debitum: Every sense of it is to be understood in view of God as creator and redeemer. Every creature owes to God the completion or fulfillment of that which he, she, or it was created to be. In the case of man, as conveyed in CDH, I, c. 9, he was created for "the purpose of being happy in the enjoyment of God." (S.II, 61: 29-30: A:/ ...ut deo fruendo beata esset....) When this purpose is realized, God is duly honored and obeyed. Man owes to God all that he is, all that he has, and all that he can do (cf. CDH, I, c. 15). In MRH the same point is conveyed less dogmatically, but more prayerfully, with the rationale that all is owed to God because God created and redeemed. When the debitum of man is viewed from the perspective of the Fall and corruption of human nature, Anselm claims in DCV, c. 2, that there is the obligation to return to the original status: It is "an obligation to have the perfect and pure justice it had received and an obligation to make satisfaction for having deserted justice." (S.II, 141:17-18: Remansit igitur in ea debitum iustitiae integrae sine omni iniustitia quam accepit, et debitum satisfaciendi, quia eam deseruit....) And when man's debitum is understood from the perspective of the will, Anselm claims in CDH, I, c. 11: "The will of every rational creature ought to be subordinate to the will of God." (S.II, 68:12: A:/ Omnis voluntas rationalis creaturae subiecta debet esse voluntati dei.) Fundamentally, the subordination and alignment of the human will with the divine will is the moral debt that every man owes to God. The same point can be said of the angels.


11. Cf. DV, c. 10 (S.I, 189:31: M:/ Summam autem veritatem non negabis rectitudinem esse.).

12. Ibid. (S.I, 190:6-7).


14. By implication, justice is construed as a species of truth. In c. 13, Anselm considers truth as the genus of justice (S.I, 196:29-30: M:/ ...quoniam de rectitudine mente sola perceptibili loquimur, una res significatur quae genus est
iustitiae...).

15. Cf. Imelda Choquette, "Voluntas, Affectio and Potestas in the Liber De Voluntate of St. Anselm," Mediaeval Studies, 4 (1942), p. 68. She asserts, and I agree, that justice for Anselm is the very debitum that man owes to God: Man's debt to God is complete submission of his will to the will of God.

16. Cf. M. Adams, "Saint Anselm's Theory of Truth," p. 372. In view of Anselm's claim that truth is the genus of justice and that the terms 'truth,' 'rectitude,' and 'justice' are interchangeable (cf. DV, c. 12 [S.I, 192:3-8]), I assume and attach an ethical sense to Adams' clear assertion that truth for Anselm is a "normative notion," a "metaphysical value theory." Also, in view of his own brief discussion of the rule-deontological character of Anselmian ethics, G. Stanley Kane in "Elements of Ethical Theory in the Thought of St. Anselm," Studies in Medieval Culture, 12 (1978), pp. 63-64, lends support to my view of the ethical normativity of Anselmian justice. By 'ethical normativity' I understand the regulatory factor, principle, or standard which grounds one's ethical endeavor towards an ethical ideal. Ultimately, this standard or norm is God who, for Anselm, is not only supreme truth and rectitude but also supreme justice. Justice as an ethical norm is an unconditional ethical mandate. Anselm's insistence that justice or rectitude of the will be kept for its own sake delivers the semantic force of this unconditionality. This point will be clarified when I introduce Anselm's 'cur' condition in the course of an abbreviated and interpretative reading of DV, c. 12. This reading follows immediately in the text.

17. Concerning this identity, cf. DV, c. 12 (S.I, 192:3-5: D:/ In summa namque et simplici natura, quamvis non ideo sit iusta et recta quia debet aliquid, dubium tamen non est idem esse rectitudinem et iustitiam.). Also, see DV, c. 10 (S.I, 189:31).

18. The focus is still on DV, c. 12. An important complementary reading is DV, c. 5. For the sake of clarification: When Anselm speaks about the truth of actions, he prefers to speak of 'necessary truth' and 'non-necessary truth' instead of 'natural truth' and 'accidental truth.' My reason for using 'natural' and 'accidental' in discussing the truth of actions is to maintain a uniformity of terms. This uniformity will prove beneficial when I present the parallel of DV, c. 9, between Anselm's view of the truths of statements and the truths of actions. When speaking about the truth of statements, he uses 'natural' (naturalis/naturaliter) and 'accidental' (per accidens/accidentaliter). My preference for uniformity does not in any way distort Anselm's sense. In this case, the terms are considered semantically equivalent and interchangeable.
19. In the case of an irrational being that has a will, such as Anselm’s cited example of a horse: A horse’s action, such as eating, is voluntary inasmuch as proceeding from an equine will. However, Anselm suggests that the will and action of this irrational being are not effected by deliberated choice. Indeed, the horse wills to eat, but can the horse will not to eat? Can the horse, or any other irrational creature with a voluntary power, will not to do that which it ought to do? In my view, Anselm is not clearly or definitively certain on the matter; however, his point is understood: A distinction between wills is being presented — an irrational will and a rational will. Justice, in the fully qualified Anselmian sense, pertains only to a rational will. Within the overall context of DV, the actions of a horse, or even of a stone, are 'just' (more properly, true or right) in the extended sense of being that which ought to be done. Anselm, however, does not want to call them 'just.' 'Justice' in his qualified moral sense is that which is praiseworthy and, as such, pertains only to the being and actions of a rational will with the ability to choose. Cf. DV, c. 12 (S.I, 192:20-33).

20. These remarks on natural and accidental truth, and natural (necessary) and accidental (non-necessary) actions, are not based on a reading of DV, c. 12, but rather on a reading of cc. 2 and 5 in light of c. 12. In anticipation of my concluding point on the prominence of Anselm’s theory of language in DV, I should note that Anselm draws a parallel between the natural and accidental truths of actions and those of a statement.

21. DV, c. 12: "if a thing which does what it ought does not will what it does, then it is not just." (S.I, 192:20-21: M:/ ...quia non est iustus qui facit quod debet, si non vult quod facit.) And also, "I said that whatever does not do willingly what it ought is not just." (S.I, 192:24-25: M:/ ...sed dixi non esse iustum qui non facit volens quod debet.) Furthermore, in DV, c. 12: "Therefore, the rightness which brings praise to a thing which has rightness is present only in a rational nature, which alone perceives the rightness we are talking about." (S.I, 193:1-2: M:/ Rectitudo igitur quae tenenti se laudem acquirit, non est nisi in rationali natura, quae sola rectitudinem de qua loquimur percipit.) Also, cf. DCV, c. 3 (S.II, 143:7-10).

22. This sense of praiseworthy justice is also applicable to angelic beings. Cf. DCD, cc. 14 and 16.

23. S.I, 194:26: M:/ Iustitia igitur est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata.

24. The other two necessary conditions are not treated in DV. They are 1) the operative presence of free choice of the will and 2) the prevenient and subsequent grace of God. Anselm considers the first in detail throughout DLA and partly in DCD.
He treats the second in DC, III. These conditions will not be considered in this essay.


27. Ibid. (S.I, 192:30-33).


29. In DC, I, c. 6, Anselm makes it clear that discussion of a just and unjust will either in oneself or in another is relevant only if the possessor of such a will has reached the age of understanding or reason (the age is not specified). At this stage of life, knowledge and understanding can be obtained. This point marks Anselm's emphasis on the importance of knowledge in securing justice of the will and in satisfying one's moral debitum.

30. Cf. DV, c. 10 (S.I, 192:6-10: M:/ Habes igitur definitionem iustitiae, se iustitia non est aliud quam rectitudo. Et quoniam de rectitudine mente sola perceptibili loquimur, invicem sese definiunt veritas et rectitudo et iustitia. Ut qui unam earum noverit et alias nescierit, per notam ad ignotarum scientiam pertingere possit; immo qui noverit unam, alias nescire non possit.). Other references have been made to DV with respect to this claim.

31. In the third question of DC, c. 6, Anselm moves close to offering a moral epistemology. His perspective, though, is more theological than philosophical. What might suffice as a fledgling epistemological process more properly figures as a process leading to faith or perhaps a theological epistemology of faith. However, the second point in this process does allow for philosophical exploration: At this point Anselm maintains that the Word of God which one hears must be conceptualized in the mind. That which one hears one must come to understand; in understanding, one grapples with the meaning or signification of the words. This second point must obtain before the third point when one wills to believe that which one conceptualizes. That which I shall present as a speculative construction of Anselm's moral epistemology will be an edification of this second point.

In light of DC, III, c. 6, it is instructive to note that Anselm holds to an epistemic basis of belief and faith. The fideist is an intellectualist too. One does not simply will to believe whatever without first thinking about or conceptualizing
the content of belief or that to which one will assent (cf. S.II, 270:28-30; 271:6-8). This instruction proves beneficial in the face of questions which seems to undermine the effort of answering the unanswered question about moral knowledge. Such are the queries: Why is it that one must know that which one ought to do or know that which is true and correct? Why is it not simply enough that one believes something to be the correct thing to do or believes that it is one's obligation to do? Anselm, I think, would reply that it is enough (cf. aforementioned citations along side DC, III, c. 2 [S.II, 265:5-12]: Willing rightly can be based on believing rightly or understanding rightly; either one must obtain.). But, he would be thinking all the while that belief is not rooted in intellectual inactivity or emotionalism. Belief is epistemic: It is knowledge with assent. When the grace of rectitude is added to that which is conceptualized with assent, faith (fides) is produced (cf. S.II, 271:8-9).

32. In DV, c. 4 (S.I, 181:4-6), Anselm alludes to that which one ought to will. The implicit reference is to keeping (servare) rectitude of will: Rectitude of the will is preserved if one wills that which one ought to will, that is, if one wills the end which God has set aside for man or if one wills the end for which reason alone man has received a will. The moral end of man is the supreme truth, namely, God. Also, see DLA, c. 8. In CDH, I, c. 11 (S.II, 68:12-16), Anselm claims that the basic requirement for inherence of justice in the will is that "every inclination of the rational creature be subject of God." (S.II, 68:12: A:/ Omnis voluntatis rationalis creaturae subjecta debet esse voluntati dei.) This point is complemented by a similar view in DC, I, c. 6: Justice, he asserts, is present in the will of any person "only when he wills what God wills for him to will." (S.II, 256:26-27: ...cum ipse vult quod deus vult eum velle....)


34. Cf. Ep. 63 (S.III, 178:21 - 179:39). Although this letter basically concerns ecclesiastical relations, it does in fact reveal Anselm's ethical emphasis on a single-minded concentration. In one place he advises Prior Henry that the best remedy for trials and tribulations with others is to be focused on and directed by God.

35. Cf. Ep. 420 (S.V, 365:6-7): Scripture in toto teaches how one ought to be and what one ought to do. Also, see Ep. 112.

36. DC, III, c. 6 (S.II, 270:12-13: ...quaeritur cur hominem invitat ad recte volendum....).


39. Ibid. (S.II, 271:28 - 272:7). Herein, Anselm expresses the point that scripture is the standard for judging the truth or falsity of reason. All rationally-derived truths are to be measured accordingly. But, more importantly, he acknowledges that reason might arrive at points that are not addressed explicitly or implicitly by scripture. In this case scripture still has authority: It affirms the findings of reason clearly with correlations from its own texts if there are any, or it affirms the findings by seeing that nothing in reason is contradictory to the Word of God. Scripture can be totally silent on a particular finding of reason, and reason can still stand firm in truth by the affirmative silence of scripture or the absence of scripture's overt denial. For agreement, cf. P. Michaud-Quantin, "Notes sur le vocabulaire psychologique de Saint Anselme," SB, pp. 26-27.

40. Only one Anselmian scholar gives sufficient attention to DV, c. 9. Desmond P. Henry recognizes the parallel that Anselm draws between statements and actions. My interpretation generally agrees with his, but I have chosen to ignore Anselm's obscurity and to venture a claim. Cf. idem, The Logic of St. Anselm (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), s. 8, pp. 230-239.

41. Refer to discussion on natural and accidental actions of creatures. It conveys the basic points of DV, cc. 5 and 12. They will not be repeated here. Refer to note #18 for an important point on terminology.

42. DV, c. 9 (S.I, 189:2-7: M:/ Videamus ergo quam lata sit veritas significacionis. Namque non solum in iis quae signa solemus dicere, sed et in aliis omnibus quae diximus est significatio vera vel falsa. Quoniam namque non est ab aliquo faciendum nisi quod quis debet facere, eo ipso quod aliquid facit, dicit et significat hoc se debere facere. Quod si debet facere quod facit, verum dicit. Si autem non debet, mentitur.). Emphasis has been added to the translation. Anselm's other attempt at S.I, 189:20-25 focuses on thought and willing.

43. Cf. DV, c. 9.

44. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 189:10-14).

45. DV, c. 13 (S.I, 198:13-14: M:/ ...sed quia significatio tunc fit secundum rectitudinem quae semper est....). In the same chapter, Anselm states: "the rightness in terms of which the signification is called correct, or right, neither exists through nor changes with the signification, regardless of
how the signification changes." (S.I, 198:18-20: M:/ Rectitudo
igitur qua significatio recta dicitur, non habet esse aut aliquem
motum per significationem, quomodocum que ipsa moveatur
significatio.)

46. The following concise presentation is based on my
interpretative reading of cc. 9-12. Confer.

47. This accent can be seen in a parallel that Anselm
probably intended to make. There is a corresponding
epitomological process to each of the three levels of speaking
with their corresponding types of words. On the first level of
speaking one externally speaks words (verba) which are
perceptible and perceptibly employed. The corresponding
epitomological level is sensory perception. On the second level
of speaking one silently and mentally speaks or thinks about the
first-level word or perceptible sign and its signification or
meaning. The corresponding level is cognition and reasoning. On
the third level of speaking one is not dealing with perceptible
words as on the first and second levels. Rather, on this highest
level, one is imagining or beholding (mentally seeing) things in
themselves, that is, viewing with the keenness of the intellect
the reality or essence of things. This is the level of natural
words. The corresponding epitomological process is intuition
and probably contemplation/understanding. Cf. Mon., c. 10,
passim.

Anselm is most probably indebted to Augustine for his levels
of speaking and types of words. There is resemblance between
their positions. In DT, IX, 10.15, Augustine writes: "For we
use the term 'word' in one sense, when we speak of words which
fill a determined space of time with their syllables, whether
they are spoken or simply thought; in a different sense, when
everything that is known is called a word impressed on our mind,
as long as it can be brought forth from our memory and
deefined...." (CC, v. 50, 306:6-9: Aliter enim dicuntur uerba
quae spatia temporum syllabis tenent siue pronuntientur siue
cogitentur; aliter omne quod notum est uerbum dicitur animo
impressum quamdiu de memoria proferi et definiri potest....)


49. Cf. Mon., c. 29: "...this Expression can be understood
to be nothing other than the understanding (intelligentia) of the
supreme spirit by which the supreme spirit understands all
things." (S.I, 47:19-21: ...ut haec summi spiritus locutio, cum
creatura esse non possit, non sit aliud quam summus spiritus.
Denique haec ipsa locutio nihil aliud potest intelligi quam
eiusdem spiritus intelligentia, qua cuncta intelligit.) Here in
the Monologion, Anselm begins to forge his trinitarian theology:
He now begins to consider the conceptual expression of the divine
mind, which he introduces in c. 9, as the one supreme expression
or eternally begotten Word or Second Person of the Trinity. In
Mon., c. 33 (S.I, 51:24 - 52:1), he considers this expression to be identical with the Divine. The Divine speaks itself.

50. Perchance they are implanted via divine illumination. Anselm does not explicitly address the point. Cf. Pros., cc. 1-4, 14, 16, and 18 for hints of Anselm's espousal of a theory of divine illumination. Hints outside the Proslogion are few and not very informative: Cf. especially, Ep. 198 (S.IV, 89:50-52). This paucity of information precludes any possibility of a meaningful epistemological and philosophical interpretation; it also precludes a meaningful Augustinian reading. In my view, the best interpretation of Anselm on illumination would be delivered from a theological perspective. When the Proslogion references are read in consideration of the fact that the treatise is the classic instance of fides quaerens intellectum, Anselm's perspective on illumination assumes a sense in addition to the usual epistemological sense: It seems that illumination is more properly one of grace that affects and goads the redeemed soul that has been restored to justice via baptismal faith. There is the suggestion that Anselm's position on illumination might best be considered in view of his soteriology.

51. Anselm does not use the Latin verb 'innascor' or the adjective 'innatus.' Instead, he prefers to use the Latin adjective 'naturalis' and adverb 'naturaliter.' He does so in sixty-five instances. Cf. A Concordance to the Works of St. Anselm, v. 2, edited by G.R. Evans (Millwood, NY: Kraus International Publications, 1984), pp. 908-909. There is no explanation and only one conjecture for his preference: See note #55. References to Augustine will be made below when I consider his position on memory in order to speculate on Anselm's.


55. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 24:27-18: ...non cum voces rerum significativae cogitantur...). The point is that natural words are not images or likenesses of objects in the strict sense which applies to words as alpha-betic signs, thoughts, or sundry perceptible signs. Anselm could have very easily made the distinction between natural words and words in the ordinary sense clearer if he had chosen to call natural words 'innate ideas' or 'innate knowledge.' I think that his reason for not doing so is that his theory of language and verbal epistemology proceed from and are discussed within the context of his trinitarian
theology and logos theology (concerning the Second Person of the Trinity as the Word of God and as the understanding of the Father who is eternal memory). It is important to call them natural words because Anselm links the creature's soul to the Trinity insofar as being an image of this Trinity of memory, understanding, and love/will. Natural words in the soul are an expression of the divine understanding, of the Word eternally begotten from the paternal memory.

The preceding points are based entirely on an interpretative reading of the Monologion, as are those points on the trinitarian soul presented at the end of this essay. They have been gleaned from many chapters in this treatise, from beginning to end. For this reason, it is difficult to document precisely that which I am expressing here. In general, the sense can be confirmed in a reading of Mon., cc. 29-69. Cf. s. 1, sub. B.

56. Cf. Mon., c. 10. With reference to natural words, Anselm remarks: "no other word seems so similar to the object for which it is a word, and no other word so expresses that object, as does that likeness which is expressed in the acuteness of the mind as it conceives the object itself." (S.I, 25:19-21: ...his nullum aliud verbum sic videtur rei simile cuius est verbum, aut sic eam exprimit, quomodo illa similitudo, quae in acie mentis rem ipsam cogitantis exprimitur.)

57. See note #1.


60. This point is stressed in the Monologion and most clearly in c. 32: "Without doubt, every word [or image] is a word [or image] of something; accordingly, had there never been a creature, there would have been no word [or image] of a creature." (S.I, 50:20-21: Nempe omne verbum alicuius rei verbum est. Denique, si numquam creatura esset, nullum eius esset verbum.) Also, cf. Mon., c. 63, where Anselm claims again that every verbum is a word, thought, image, or likeness of something. Every word is a sign, and every sign has a reference. If there is no referent, then there is no sign or word. Cf. Mon., c. 10 (S.I, 24:27-28). Also, cf. DG, s. 17 (S.I, 162:25-26), and Pros., c. 4 (S.I, 103:19-19).

61. These various senses of 'verbum' are conveyed either explicitly or implicitly in Mon., cc. 31-33, 48, 63.

63. Cf. Mon., c. 10 (S.I, 24:30 - 25:1: Aut enim res loquimur signis sensibilibus, id est quae sensibus corporeis sentiri possunt sensibiliter utendo....).

64. The following speculation is based on interpretation of Mon., cc. 33, 48, and 62; respectively, S.I, 52:15-23; I, 63:20-22; and I, 72:12-18. Chapter 62 is most important. In these three chapters, Anselm presents key points on the epistemological process. Confer. I emphasize 'speculative.' Anselm's epistemology is so scattered, fragmented, and unexplicated that it remains virtually impossible to proffer a definitive view of it. (Cf. P. Michaud-Quantin, "Notes sur le vocabulaire psychologique de Saint Anselme," p. 23.) In my estimation, a relatively sound, though limited, approach to understanding Anselm as an epistemologist is to view him as a Christian Platonist in the Augustinian tradition. For the most part, this is what I have done. For agreement, cf. Katherin A. Rogers, St. Anselm of Canterbury on Divine and Human Ideas (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1982), pp. 140-180.


67. Anselm thinks of 'mens' as the equivalent of 'ratio.' Cf. DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 286:10). Also, cf. P. Michaud-Quantin, pp. 25 and 27, who on the latter page interprets Anselm thus: "Mens représente l'ensemble de l'âme spirituelle et rationnelle [that is, of the whole personality of the rational being]: on peut appeler l'esprit [spirit, mind] mens ou raison, la parole du mens est celle de la raison."


At this point it should be noted that the epistemological process need not always involve a concrete, sensibly perceived object. Mon., c. 62, suggests that there is space for considering an intellectual knowledge, that is, a cognitive pursuit without employment of the senses. Such would be the case, for example, if one were to think of absolute qualities or abstract concepts such as justice. In this case, the epistemological process would seem to involve reason and memory alone. Anselm can be read as asserting that one's thought of an immaterial object would be delivered from an image or likeness of
the object retrieved from memory. But this could not be a sensory image stored in memory. The only remaining possibilities are that the mind has formed a mental image or that Anselm has placed the natural words in the memory and that these in fact are what is tapped.

Anselm allows for examples of the mind forming a mental image or thought of something immaterial or intra-mental. The first is purely theological and not located in any one place in the *Monologion*: The Word of God, the Second Person of the Trinity, is the perfect mental image (thought or understanding) of the First Person. The second example can be found in *Mon.*, c. 33 (particularly at *S.I.*, 52:12-20): The mind, reason itself, is capable of forming a mental image or thought of itself not via the senses or anything extra-mental but solely "from an impression of the mind" (ex eius impressione formam).

This interpretation is based exclusively on what I see as another subtle parallel in which Anselm juxtaposes words or thoughts centering on extra-mental and intra-mental things. This construction occurs precisely at *S.I.*, 72:12-15. It must be read in consideration of *Mon.*, c. 62, in its entirety.

69. Primary and secondary research has focused on amassing substantive points on Anselm's view of the epistemological process of reasoning. That is, what precisely happens in the mind when reasoning. My effort has been to no avail. I see no explicit Anselmian appreciation of Augustine's *De ordine* or his other three Cassiciacum dialogues. While using primarily the *Monologion* and *Proslogion*, Stephen Gersh offers a fair appraisal and outline of the many categories or senses of 'ratio' in Anselmian thought. He mentions the epistemological sense of ratio but does not develop it. Cf. *idem*, "Anselm of Canterbury" in *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, edited by P. Dronke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 255-278.

70. There is agreement with Augustine that all knowledge is attained via judgment: cf. *DeLA*, II, 5.43; also, *Conf.*, VII, 17.23. Also, see *DM*, 13.41 (CC, v. 29, 199:1-13): Here, recognition is given to the senses, but it is emphasized that they do not give way to learning or knowing. Knowledge rests on a judgment and the judgment is effected in tandem with the mind's reference to an internal standard, an inner truth, which resides in all rational beings.

71. This point has been confirmed in Anselm's definition of truth as being that which is perceptible to the mind alone. Reason moves one to a knowledge of rectitude.

72. Cf. K.A. Rogers, *St. Anselm of Canterbury on Divine and Human Ideas*, pp. 165-167 in particular. She also emphasizes the importance of memory for Anselm; rightly, she garners support from Augustine. Cf. P. Michaud-Quantin, p. 27: He opposes its
importance without giving any edifying explanation.

73. This point is based on my interpretation of Mon., cc. 48 and 62. Interpretation of Mon., c. 48, is not direct: It rests on my juxtaposition (to be presented shortly) of that which Anselm is saying about the First and Second Persons of the Trinity and his claim that the soul and its abilities are an image of that Trinity -- an image of memory, understanding, and love or will. Anselm's claim is that whatever the Second Person understands or comprehends (intellecere/sapere) it does so by remembering the eternal knowledge and truth of the First Person. With the soul being an imperfect image of the Trinity (clearly presented by Anselm from a psychological standpoint), it stands to reason that the understanding of the soul is achieved in every instance with reference to its own memory. This point is put forward by Anselm when he claims that every word (or thought) is born from memory: The image of a thing under consideration is somehow brought forth from memory. The implication here is that there is no direct link between sensation and reason: Sensory images proceed to and from memory before entering the reason. As will be indicated shortly, when the mind turns to its own recesses, it is not only tapping images of sensible or immaterial things, but it is also tapping the natural words -- those innate images in the mind which are likenesses of the idea, standard, and principle in the divine mind.

74. See note #68.


76. Cf. Augustine, DDQ, #46, ex toto, and s. 2 especially.


79. Cf. Augustine, DeLA, II, 12.130 (CC, v. 29, 260:4-6: ...sed omnibus incommutabilia uera cernentibus tamquam miris modis secretum et publicum lumen praesto esse ac se praebere communiter.).

80. Cf. Augustine, DT, IX, 7.9, 12.

81. Cf. Augustine, DeLA, II, 8.20, 14.38. In DT, X, 1.1 (CC, v. 50, 311:12-14), he indicates that the inner truth that is present to all in the mind's recesses affords the mind access to knowledge of virtues. In knowing truth, one knows the virtues.

82. Cf. Augustine, DeLA, II, 12.134 (CC, v. 29, 260:34: ...interiores regulas ueritatis....).

84. Cf. Augustine, DeLA, II, 2.9. This point is conveyed and developed throughout book two.

85. Cf. DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 279:17-22). There are two references to memory (memoria) which suggest, though barely, its epistemological function. Both are translated by J. Hopkins and H. Richardson as "mind."

86. Cf. Augustine, DT, IX, 6.10 (CC, v. 50, 301:19 - 302:25): Here he asserts that all knowledge is born from memory. Perception of corporeal things are drawn into the mind and enter memory. Then, he continues to say that, by those rules (i.e., innate knowledge, inner truth) which are wholly different from memory itself, perceptions are judged approvingly or disapprovingly. Cf. Mon., c. 48 (S.I, 64:4-5): Here Anselm is very close to holding this Augustinian position of separation in the memory. He claims that some things exist in memory but do not belong to memory itself. Also, cf. DT, IX, 12.18.


88. Cf. P. Michaud-Quantin, p. 26: Concerning the 'ratio,' he notes: "...sa valeur particulière est alors d'ordre dialectique ou logique, elle juge et garantit la vérité des connaissances acquises et engendre la conviction chez celui qui en fait usage."

89. Cf. DIV, c. 1 (S.II, 10:1-2: ...ratio, quae et princeps et iudex debet omnium esse quae sunt in homine....). Also, cf. Augustine, DeLA, I, 8.61, 65, and II, 18.190.

90. Cf. DCD, c. 23; also, DC, I, c. 6.

91. Cf. DC, I, c. 6. Also, cf. Mon., c. 66.

92. Mon., c. 68 (S.I, 79:1-3: Nihil igitur apertius quam rationalem creaturam ad hoc esse factam, ut summam essentiam amet super omnia bona, sicut ipsa est summum bonum....). In Mon., cc. 74-75 and 77, Anselm presents more fully his view of the moral end of man. In sum, man should believe in the Triune God and strive towards the supreme being in every thought and deed. He makes it quite clear that in believing and striving one is driven by a love to understand and to remember God.

93. Mon., c. 68 (S.I, 78:21-23: Denique rationale naturae non est aliud esse rationalem, quam posse discernere iustum a non iusto, verum a non vero, bonum a non bono, magis bonum a minus bono.). Cf. P. Michaud-Quantin, p. 26, for the moral importance of reason.

94. Cf. CDH, I, c. 1; also Mon., c. 68.
Cf. Mon., c. 68. The following point is relevant not only to the textual point accompanying this note but also to the following development on the trinitarian soul: If the mind does not have at least a modicum of understanding of the truth, justice, and goodness of God, then the soul would not have the wherewithal or the basis for employing it ability to distinguish morally between the true and false, the just and unjust, the good and bad, and the better and worse. Hence, the soul would not be able to attain to the end for which it was created by God.


I understand this ability as including or subsuming the ability to reason. This is not explicitly claimed by Anselm. However, it can be deduced from the parallel which he seemingly draws in the Monologion between the Trinity and the human soul. The Second Person of the Trinity, the Word, is understanding, specifically the understanding of the First Person. In Mon., c. 46, he expresses a fuller sense of the Word as that which understands, cogitates, knows, and comprehends the perfect knowledge and wisdom of the Father (S.I, 62:17-20: Liquet enim filium esse verum verbum, id est perfectam intelligentiam sive perfectam totius paternae substantiae cognitionem et scientiam et sapientiam, id est quae ipsam patris essentiam intelligit et cognoscit et scit et sapit.).

These natural abilities of the soul correspond to the powers of the soul as recognized by Anselm. They are the memory, intellect, and will.

Mon., c. 67 (S.I, 78:7-10: Omnino autem cogitari non potest rationali creaturae naturaliter esse datum aliquid tam praecipuum tamque simile summae sapientiae, quam hoc quia potest reminisci et intelligere et amare id, quod optimum et maximum est omnium.).

Cf. Mon., c. 66.

Cf. Mon., cc. 68-69; also, cf. Augustine, DT, XIV, 12.15.

Cf. Mon., c. 68.

Cf. s. 1, sub. B: re: trinitarian psychology.

This harmony and relation also includes the soul's natural ability to love and will. This ability is the most important factor, that is, the most ethically significant factor, in the relation. It will be considered in s. 3, sub. C, and throughout part II.
Section 3


John Courtney Murray (trans.) in Augustine, *Admonition and Grace*, FOC Series, v. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1948), p. 285, note #111, concisely notes the distinction: "The word 'liberty' (libertas) in St. Augustine is used to designate the will's power to adhere to good of the supernatural order; it is a supernatural endowment. The will's power of free choice, of evil as well as good, is connoted in the simple term 'will' (voluntas), or at times in the term 'free will' (liberum arbitrium)."


5. On this point Anselm's *De concordia* can be cited almost in its entirety. In particular, though, emphasis on the will and its choices as being naturally free, that is, uncompelled, unconstrained, or unnessessitated, is most evident in the first question, c. 1 (S.II, 246:3-4, 11-13, 22-23), c. 2 (S.II, 247:14 - 248:2), c. 3 (S.II, 250:31 - 251:2; 251:3-10, 20-25), cc. 4-5, c. 6 (S.II, 257:2-3, 11, 16-23), and the third question, c. 6 (S.II, 271:13-15). With pointed references to sin, the ability to sin, and the will's power vis-à-vis external forces:
6. That Anselm at least understood a distinction between liberum arbitrium and libertas (the distinction as indicated in the text) is suggested in the whole context of DC, I, c. 6 beginning at S.II, 255:31 - 256:2: Sed quoniam non in omnibus liberum habemus arbitrium, videndum est ubi et quae sit illa libertas arbitrii, quam semper habere creditur homo, et quod sit illud arbitrium. Non est enim idem arbitrium et libertas qua liberum dicitur [my emphasis]. Also, cf. DLA, c. 2 (S.I, 209:27-29; 210:2-10 especially), c. 3 (S.I, 211:27-30), c. 6 (S.I, 218:6-7, 10-11), c. 10 (S.I, 222:5-9), and c. 13 (S.I, 225: 6-9, 10-12, 24-27). See the citations in note #5; they emphasize the idea of liberum arbitrium. N.b.: I am only suggesting that Anselm understood a distinction and not that he had or used consistently any precise and technical vocabulary to convey that understanding. That Anselm lacks such a vocabulary becomes all too torturously apparent in reading the Latin texts of DLA and DC -- and this notwithstanding his occasional use of the Latin adverb 'sponte' to signal the natural freedom of the will and its choice. Note, however, that 'sponte' is used to bear the sense of 'freely' in a soteriological context: cf. Or. 6 (S.III, 16:26) and CDH, I, c. 8 (S.II, 60:12-13).

Cf. Mary T. Clark, *Augustine, Philosopher of Freedom: A Study in Comparative Philosophy* (New York: Desclée Company, 1959), pp. 160, 174; Jasper Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), pp. 156-158; and Maurice Huftier, "Libre arbitre, liberté, et pêché chez saint-Anselme," in *La normandie bénédictine au temps de Guillaume le conquérant* (Lille: Facultés Catholiques Lille, 1967), pp. 501-503, 522, 526-527. These scholars tend to see Anselm as aligned with Augustine on freedom. As indicated in note #1, G.S. Kane does not see the distinction, and his failure to do so has led him to interpret Anselm's one definition of freedom rather peculiarly and erroneously. According to him, Anselmian freedom, which he considers a generic freedom, encompasses both a freedom of self-perfection (basically, the idea of libertas) and a freedom of self-determination (basically, the idea of liberum arbitrium). Given this duality, Kane maintains furthermore that, in view of human existence, Anselmian freedom must take the form of an ability to sin and not to sin, or as he puts it "to do or not to do what is unjust" (cf. idem, *Anselm's Doctrine of Freedom and the Will*, pp. 126-127, 152ff, 170ff). This claim blatantly contradicts DLA, c. 1. Basically, Kane's problem might be that he speaks to Anselm in the process of interpreting him, rather than letting Anselm speak to him: For instance, he insists that freedom must be a power of choice between opposites, true freedom must be choice between moral

7. Cf. DLA, c. 13 (S.I, 225:30-32): M:/ Dic ergo si quid vis amplius de libertate hac, propter quam imputatur illam habenti, sive faciat bonum sive faciat malum. De hac enim sola nunc noster est sermo.) Also, cf. DC, I, c. 6 (S.II, 256:5-11, 18): Anselm makes it clear that his concern is not with the natural freedom of the will and its choices but only with that freedom which he defines in DLA (cited in DC) and which he here acknowledges to be soteriologically-focused. In DC, this focus is emphasized; in DLA it is not. Undoubtedly, though, by his own admission, he had the focus in mind when he wrote DLA. See Praefatio to DV, DLA, and DCD (S.I, 173:1 - 174:7): He conveys his intention in writing DLA: to define and distinguish freedom of choice, to determine if one always has it, to show the will's natural strength for keeping that rectitude which it has received, and not to show how the will needs the assistance of grace in order to keep it (cf. S.I, 173:10-15). Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, "La concordantia libertatis chez saint Anselme" in L'homme devant Dieu (Paris: Aubier, 1964), p. 34.

8. Cf. DV, c. 7 (S.I, 185:11-13, 18-19).


10. Ibid.


12. Cf. DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 286:28-29: Hoc igitur modo voluntas instrumentum, creata bona inquantum habet esse....); DC, I, c. 7 (S.II, 259: 14-19). Also, DCD, c. 8 (S.I, 245:21-24): Anselm admits that the will and its turnings are not substances (sobstantiae) but they cannot be proven not to be beings (essentiae); and c. 13 (S.I, 257:30).


15. My movement from the 'truth of being' in DV to the idea of an 'ethics of being' in DLA is not groundless. R. Campbell in "Freedom as Keeping the Truth: The Anselmian Tradition," pp. 300-301, supports it insofar as maintaining that the starting-point and context for understanding DLA is DV. Also, H.U. von Balthasar, "La concordantia libertatis chez saint Anselme," p. 27, writes: "Le De veritate met en lumière le facteur éthique que comporte la vérité; le De libertate arbitrii en trace l'esquisse...." Anselm himself lends support in his Praefatio to DV, DLA, and DCD (S.I, 173-174) -- being three treatises that are integrally-connected. Anselm evidently thought so himself for he ordered his contemporaries and posterity to bind and publish the dialogues in the abovementioned order.


17. Although R. Campbell does not hold this claim, he does recognize the very problem that Anselm creates for himself in DV, c.7. He also thinks that Anselm is aware of it and that he even tries to skirt it in c. 8 with his digression on the senses of something that ought and ought not to be done. Cf. idem, "The Systematic Character of Anselm's Thought" in Les mutations socio-culturelles au tourner des Xe-XIIe siècles (Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984), pp. 557-558.

18. In the 'Introduction to Part I,' I give a concise overview of freedom -- true freedom vis-à-vis natural freedom -- in the Anselmian perspective. Confer for it complements what follows in the text. In this and the following subsections, it is not my intention to interpret critically De libertate arbitrii or the doctrine of freedom. Admittedly, though, such an effort is gravely needed. My consideration is limited to whatever extent Anselm's doctrine bears import for the exposition of a holistic Anselmian theodicy.

19. Cf. DC, I, c. 6 (S.II, 256: 18-19: In quo etiam ostensum est quomodo naturaliter et inseparabiliter sit in homine haec libertas,...); DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 286:28-29); and DLA, c. 3 (S.I, 210:28). Also, cf. DLA, c. 3 (S.I, 212:29-30: M:/ ...non tamen rationalis natura minus habet quod suum est.) with c. 4 (S.I, 214:9-10: D:/ ...potestatem hanc servandi rectitudinem voluntatis rationali naturae semper inesse,;) c. 11 (S.I, 223:10-11: M:/ Semper enim naturaliter liber est ad servandum rectitudinem si eam habet, etiam quando quam servet non habet). See DLA, cc. 1 and 14, passim, for Anselm's point that this defined freedom pertains basically to the set of rational beings (God, angels, and man), and that it does not pertain indistinctively to each group within the set. Cf. M. Huftier, "Libre arbitre, liberté et péché chez saint-Anselme," p. 533, note 32, for the sense of 'natural' in 'natural ability to keep.'
20. DLA, c. 3 (S.I, 212:19-20: M/: ...illa libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem.)

21. Ibid. (S.I, 212:22-23: M/: ...arbitrium potens servare rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem.)

22. Cf. M.T. Clark, Augustine, Philosopher of Freedom: A Study in Comparative Philosophy, pp. 169-170, 174-175. She expresses the same point in similar terms: "(M)an is only potentially free" when the naturally free will subsists alone without the accompaniment of justice or rectitude. With rectitude, the free will and its choices are perfected inasmuch as fulfilling their ultimate purpose which is to keep rectitude: They become actually free in the company of the grace of God.

23. N.b.: Hereafter I shall use the expression 'ability to keep' as an abbreviation or shorthand for the full expression or definition of 'freedom of choice' -- "the ability to keep rectitude of the will for the sake of that rectitude itself."


25. Cf. Richard W. Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 193: He inclines towards the view that this indicates a "renunciation of free choice," that is, of one's naturally free choice. 'Renunciation' is a bit strong and textually incorrect, for Anselm would admit that even when one possesses rectitude of the will, one always has the naturally free choice to abandon it, as was the case with Satan and Adam (cf. DLA, c. 2 [S.I, 210:2-10]). If by 'renunciation' Southern means that one effectively and freely chooses initially to determine all of one's subsequent volitions to the rectitude of the divine will, then I think Anselm would agree at least in spirit, if not also in expression.


27. Cf. M. Hufrier, p. 518: "Dans la mesure où nous tendons vers Dieu pour lui-même, dans cette mesure nous sommes libres parce que nous sommes dans la vérité de notre être et uniquement préoccupés du terme vers lequel elle tend...." Also, see Jean Rohmer, La finalité morale chez les théologiens de Saint Augustin à Duns Scot (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1939), pp. 165-166, for emphasis on freedom from the perspective of the will's affection for justice. To the contrary, D. Ogliari in "St. Anselm's 'de libertate arbitrii,'" p. 268, holds that Anselm's defined freedom connotes "autonomy." I hold that nothing can be farther from the fact of Anselm's position: cf. DIV, c. 10 (S.II, 27:1-16); DCD, c. 4 (S.I, 242:3-6); and MA [AF, #20] (SS, 309:28-35; 310:1-10): re: autonomous will (propria
28. Cf. R. Campbell, "Freedom as Keeping the Truth: The Anselmian Tradition," pp. 298, 301, 303: He sees Anselm drawing a sharp distinction between free choice as the ability to choose between opposites and freedom which suggests the orientation of one's being and choices to a certain telos; and, especially, M. Huftier, p. 521: "C'est la liberté d'une créature, pouvoir d'orientation, de don de soi, en vertu duquel l'homme peut reconnaître la finalité de son être, la direction qu'y a mise Dieu en le créant, et la ratifier volontairement en se mettant dans ce sens, en y situant sa vie." Also, see R.W. Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape, pp. 173, 218.


30. Cf. O. Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, p. 154. Also, cf. Aquinas, ST, Ia, q.83, a.2, ad 3: "A man is said to lose his liberty of decision by sin, not in the sense that it takes away the liberty he has by nature, for only coercion does that, but in that it takes away his freedom from guilt and unhappiness."

31. Cf. DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 286:31-32: Infirma quoque modo facta est ad volendum iustitiam desertam; and 287:3-6: Voluntas...post desertam iustitiam manet...necessitate iniusta et ancilla iniquitae....). Also, DC, III, c. 3 (S.II, 266:5-7).


33. Cf. DV, c. 12 (S.I, 193:17-32): Anselm offers a few examples for discerning the rectitude of one's will and deeds. They suggest in his view that an action might appear to be right objectively, but subjectively, that is, as viewed from the perspective of the doer's inner disposition, it might not be right. The agent might lack knowledge of his moral debitum or fail to have the proper motive in acting or even fail to have rectitude. Thus, his deed is not to be considered just in any 'praiseworthy' sense. Cf. s. 2, sub. A: re: 'quid' and 'cur' conditions.

Anselm frequently speaks of the "inner man" or "interior man" (interior homo). By this he means the spirit (spiritus) of the individual: This is what I mean by "inner disposition." For instances, see Ep. 67 (S.III, 187:6); DC, III, c. 12 (284:25-27); DCV, c. 4 (S.II, 144:16-18); and, to a certain degree, Ep. 189 (S.IV, 75:38-40). Also, cf. DHM, introduction to c. 91 (SS, 77:12-22), and c. 193 (SS, 98:12-14, 99:31-33, 100:21-22). See
DCIH (SS, 355:2 - 356:21). Spiritus is mind or reason: in this section, cf. note #159; in s. 2, see note #67.


36. Cf. DLA, c. 10 (S.I, 222:10-13).

37. Cf. DC, III, c. 3, passim (especially, S.II, 266:15-19, 21-23). Also, see M.T. Clark, p. 171. R.W. Southern, p. 217, is incorrect in claiming that Anselmian libertas has no foundation in the naturally free choice of the will. He sees the foundation as "a loving acceptance of the creature's limitations within the created universe." (p. 277) Anselm's claim that 'freedom of choice' consists of the ability to will, an ability that includes uncompelled and unconstrained volition, implicitly refutes Southern's position (cf. DLA, c. 4 [S.I, 214:6-7]). Furthermore, in DC, III, the soteriologically-focused discourse on the harmony of grace and free will dispels Southern's position.

38. Cf. DC, I, c. 6 (S.II, 256:10). See DCV, c. 8 (S.II, 149:25-27; 150:2-4). Anselm does not specify the age, nor is it likely that he intends this condition to be applicable to angels.


41. Cf. DLA, c. 3 (S.I, 211:9-11; 212:15-18).

42. See s. 2, sub. A: re: moral debitum.


His understanding of this concept includes the idea of virtues and that of maintaining them. He, however, offers no explanation for what seems to be his collapse of a virtue-ethics into a deontological ethics. If he means to apply this understanding to Anselm, and in fact he does, then he needs to develop the idea and role of virtue in an Anselmian ethics which, as he claims, is to be quite accurately characterized as "based entirely on rules." Given this stance, to which I am not inclined, I am left asking where the virtues lie and operate. I acknowledge that Anselm's ethics contains the idea of duty, but I do not incline towards Kane's view that the ethics is rule-driven. His view is a bit strong and not at all substantiated by textual references. (One can certainly turn to Anselm's epistles, especially those addressed to monastic communities, and find many references to monastic rules. A few general references are made to God's precepts.) Furthermore, his view effectively shifts Anselm the Christian theologian from the Christian
testament to the Hebraic: from the Christian covenant with its emphasis on spirit, life in the spirit, and freedom in the Christ who reduced the many laws of the Hebraic testament to the one twofold rule of love, to the Hebraic covenant and Judaic sects with their observance of the law for the sake of the law. But, with all of his emphasis on rules, I are befuddled by his subsequent and correct claim that "Anselm formulates no categorical imperative and provides no catalogue of moral rules"! (p. 64) Truly, as he notes, Anselm did not have to compile such a catalog because of sacred scripture. But where does this emphasis on sacred scripture leave me in the task of understanding Anselm's ethics as very rule-oriented, as a "rule-deontology"? Again, is Kane's Anselm in the Hebraic or Christian testament?

Furthermore, Kane correctly notes that a sharp distinction is oftentimes made by contemporary ethicists between deontological ethics with its stress on rules and utilitarian ethics with its stress on happiness. But how correct is his claim that Anselm does not distinguish between the two but rather melds them (p. 64). I am hard pressed not only in putting together the pieces of an Anselmian ethics, but even more so in trying to discern in it any semblance of a utilitarian ethics or calculus. That both Anselm and the utilitarians stress happiness is certain, but, unless Kane is thinking only of Anselm's affection for the beneficial (a natural desire for happiness) and not eternal and supernatural happiness, then I do not see the identity, which he supposedly does, between the utilitarian and Anselmian concepts of happiness. If Kane does mean only the happiness associated with the natural affection of the will, then his claim amounts to a subtle distortion of Anselmian ethical thought which, by his own previous (pp. 62-63) and subsequent (p. 69) admissions, rests squarely on the concept of justice or the will's acquired affection for justice which orders and regulates the natural affection.

44. The point is well-grounded in the Christian Bible, especially in the Pauline epistles and the moral exhortation of the Epistle of James. In speaking about Anselm's conception of freedom, M.T. Clark states that which I understand to be generally pervasive in Christian theological reflection on freedom: "(a)ll Christian life is actually a growth in freedom" (p.175), as Anselm would put it: in the "freedom of truth" that is Christ (cf. Ep. 117 [S.III, 254:56]). Freedom as the 'ability to keep' is conducive to the grace of justice which one receives in Baptism, but this justice waxes and wanes in one's life. One's freedom in the spirit of Christ increases with one's gradual perfection in justice and the virtues towards union with God. This point can be discerned in many of Anselm's epistles which were written as moral exhortations: See, for example, Epp. 37, 51, 63, 96, 112, 118, 131, 143, 183-185, 189, 199, 403, 413, and 420. Consider all passim.
45. In Ep. 231 (S.IV, 137:33-35), Anselm suggests that duty and obedience found the good and virtuous life. For this reason one should strive for the good of obedience. Otherwise, I somewhat owe this idea of discerning the unity and complementary of a duty-ethics and virtue-ethics to Gregory Trianosky in "What is Virtue Ethics All About?" American Philosophical Quarterly, 27 (1990), pp. 335-344 (especially pp. 343-344). In general, duty-ethics brings to virtue-ethics the objective and foundational principles and rules which virtue-ethics seemingly lacks; virtue-ethics brings to duty-ethics the subjective and personal content of character and its development which a duty-ethics seemingly skirts.


47. This consideration, which only highlights key points, is indeed complemented by ss. 5-7 in particular and the whole of part II in general.


49. Cf. DLA, c. 1 (S.I, 208:14-25, especially 18-21) with CDE, I, c. 12 (S.II, 70:13). Anselm works with two rather distinct senses of the words 'freedom' and 'free': the pedestrian sense of 'not being compelled and constrained' and his peculiar sense of 'being fitting and advantageous.' Anselm conceptually links his peculiar sense of 'freedom' to that of 'rectitude' (cf. S.I, 208:14-16). It is a point worth bearing in mind when considering DLA. Indeed, it explains why in c. 1 he refuses to acknowledge that freedom of choice and free choice include the ability to sin. Sinning, as Anselm understands it, is always unfitting and disadvantageous (S.I, 208:23-25); it is as such the antithesis of moral rectitude. Such a pointed sense of 'freedom' enables Anselm to define 'freedom of choice' so that it is applicable, with differences (cf. DLA, c. 14), to God, who by divine essence, and the good angels, who by confirmation, are unable to sin and yet are believed to be free. Cf. s. I, sub. B and C: re: the freedom of God.

50. DLA, c. 2 (S.I, 209:27-29: M:/ Et per potestatem peccandi et sponte et per liberum arbitrium et non ex necessitate nostra et angelica natura primitus peccavit et servire potuit peccato;...). Cf. Augustine, DeLA, II, 1.1, 5-7.
51. DLA, c. 2 (S.I, 210:2-10: M:/ Per liberum arbitrium peccavit apostata angelus sive primus homo, quia per suum arbitrium peccavit, quod sic liberum erat, ut nulla alia re cogi posset ad peccandum. Et ideo iuste reprehenditur, quia cum hanc haberet arbitrii sui libertatem, non aliqua re cogente, non aliqua necessitate, sed sponte peccavit. Peccavit autem per arbitrium suum quod erat liberum; sed non per hoc unde liberum erat, id est per potestatem qua poterat non peccare et peccato non servire, sed per potestatem quam habebat peccandi, qua nec ad non peccandi libertatem iuvabatur nec ad peccandi servitutem cogebatur.).

52. This point is made in contradistinction to J. Hopkins' attempt (cf. Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, p. 144) to explain Anselm on how one simultaneously has free choice and the ability to sin. He claims that the ability to sin is an accidental feature of free choice. (Presumably, Hopkins understands 'free choice' as defined by Anselm in DLA and not simply as the natural freedom of the will to choose.) Moreover, he argues that having this accident implies that one has the ability not to sin. If one has the accident of a nature, then one has the nature; but having the nature does not necessarily mean having the accident. And, thus, on this point, Hopkins tells us, Anselm is able to maintain that both God and rational creature are free in their choices: God's free choice does not have the accident, and the free choice of angels before the fall and that of humans does. I appreciate Hopkins' point but I wonder to what extent Anselm would. For, in DLA, which he proffers as his definition and division of 'freedom of choice,' nowhere does he even hint that 'free choice,' as defined in c. 2 and understood with 'free' meaning 'fitting and advantageous,' is associated with an ability to sin -- be it accidental or not. Sin is antithetical to freedom of choice because sin is antithetical to rectitude and freedom of choice is conducive to moral rectitude.

The quoted passage is difficult to understand. My interpretation in the text offers a decisively different view. It does so because I have focused on the will as the prime ability under which two other distinct abilities are subsumed. And I do so without losing sight of two points: 1) that Anselm sees the will as always naturally free; and 2) that the 'ability to keep,' called 'freedom of choice' when actualized, orders and perfects that natural freedom of the will to the truth, goodness, and justice that is God.

53. Cf. DLA, c. 2 (S.I, 210:13-16). The rich man/poor man example is instructive on the point.


55. It is the thesis of DLA, c. 8, in view of which Anselm holds that nothing is more free than a will with rectitude because no external force can remove it from the will (cf. DLA, c. 9 [S.I, 221:18-19]).

56. It is a point that befuddles Anselm to the very end of De casu diaboli. See DCD, c. 27. His inability to give a full account of the motivation (or, perhaps, his reluctance to point accusingly at the intellect, as would a Platonist) points up the slightly unsatisfying title of the dialogue. In s. 15, sub. C, and s. 18, sub. C, anticipate my questioning of Anselm's lack of accounting for the role of the intellect when trying to discern how and why the rational creature fell.

57. Cf. DC, III, c. 10: "Surely, one abandons rectitude of the will not because the ability to keep it fails him (which ability constitutes freedom of choice) but because the will to keep it fails him. The will to keep rectitude is not deficient in itself but ceases because another willing expels it (as I said)." (S.II, 278: 22-25: ... deserere. Quod certe non facit deficiente potestate servandi eandem rectitudinem, quae potestas est ipsa libertas arbitrii, sed deficiente voluntate servandi quae per se non deficit, sed alia voluntate illam, ut dixi, expellente.)


60. That end being rectitude of the will kept for its own sake, or willing what ought to be willed and what is fitting and advantageous to will: cf. DLA, c. 3 (S.I, 211:5-9).


64. This is Anselm's point in DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 287:5-6). That which is idle (otiosa) is the natural 'ability to keep' and it is so because rectitude of the will is wanting. In this respect, the will is said not to be free (libera) in the full and true sense of freedom -- freedom in terms of alignment with moral
rectitude. Anselm is not saying that the will as a power of the soul ceases to be naturally free in its choices.


66. Also, cf. CDH, II, cc. 10, 17; DCD, c. 12; and DLA, c. 3.

67. Cf. DP [PF] (ENUW, 44:1-2). Also, see DV, c. 5 (S.I, 182:10-12) and Fac. [PF] (ENUW, 25:14-16).


69. Cf. DP [PF] (ENUW, 44:14-16), and DLA, c. 3 (S.I, 212:30 - 213:1, 22-23).

70. Cf. DLA, c. 3 (S.I, 213:17: M:/ ...alia in medio, id est neque in vidente neque in videndo). But, in c. 4, Anselm presents a contradictory position: that the effect or that to which the raw ability is ultimately directed can be an instrumental factor or condition which aids the actualization of the 'aptitude to do.' This point arises in his example of 'seeing a mountain': The mountain is the effect or the end to which the aptitude to see is directed; yet, the mountain aids in seeing or directing the raw aptitude. For if there were no mountain, then a mountain would not be seen. (S.I, 213:30-31: M:/ Potestas autem videndi lucem non nisi in tribus rebus est, quia tunc est idem et quod videtur et quod adiuvat.) The same point arises in the case of the 'ability to keep': Rectitude is the end, but it is also an instrumental means. One must have rectitude in order to keep rectitude.

71. Cf. DLA, c. 3 (S.I, 213: 1-3, 18-19). In c. 4, Anselm speaks of this condition as being an improper capability. It is such because, when it is able to impede but does not, it gives way to the actualization of the raw ability. It does so only because it (the said condition) does not do that which it is able to do (cf. S.I, 213:28-30).

72. Cf. DP [PF] (ENUW 44:16-19). Also, see DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 252:24-25: M:/ Nam omne quod est, eo ipso est potest esse.). The very fact that something 'is' denotes that it is 'able to be.' In other words, the raw ability finds confirmation or attestation in its realization or effectuation.

73. Cf. DCD, c. 12: The student speaks: "I know that there are two abilities: one which is not yet operative, and a second which is already operative. (S.I, 252:30-32: D:/ Scio duas esse potestates, unam quae nondum est in re, alteram quae iam est in re.) With respect to the first, it is a 'potestas
quae praecedit rem': an ability which precedes an occurrence; to
the second, a 'potestas quae fit cum re': an ability which
accompanies an occurrence. Cf. S.I, 252:23-24, 26-28. Also, see
Desmond P. Henry, "The Scope of the Logic of Saint Anselm," in
L'homme et son destin, d'après les penseurs du moyen âge
(Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1960), pp. 377-378; and idem,
138-140, 158: The cited distinctions reflect the influence of
Boethius in his lesser commentary on Aristotle's De
interpretatione.

74. Cf. Imelda Choquette, "Voluntas, Affectio and Potestas
in the Liber de voluntate of St. Anselm," Mediaeval Studies, 4
(1942), p. 75.

75. DLA, c. 3 (S.I, 213:21-22: M:/ ...quarum si una
quaelibet desit, aliae tres nec singulae nec omnes simul aliquid
possunt efficere;....).

76. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 212:30-31).

77. DP [PF] (ENUW, 44:11-14).

78. Cf. DLA, c. 4 (S.I, 214:4-8). In c. 12, in place of
'reason,' Anselm speaks of one's aptitude to understand (aptitudo

79. Anselm does not explicitly mention the role of grace.
It was not his intention to do so in DLA. Cf. Praefatio to DV,


83. Cf. DLA, c. 7 (S.I, 219:8, 11-12); DCV, c. 4 (S.II:
143:27-29); and DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 279:2-3, 5, 15; 280:25 -
281:1).

84. Cf. DLA, c. 7 (S.I, 219:11-13, 32-34).

85. Cf. DLA, c. 7 (S.I, 219:1-3); DCV, c 4 (S.II, 143:27-
29); and CDH, II, c. 18 (S.II, 128:13-15). See note #179.

86. Cf. DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 280:4-5): The will is not
always used; it can lie idle.


90. Cf. ibid. (S.II, 279:13-14: Aliud est enim instrumentum volendi, aliud affectio instrumenti, aliud usus eiusdem instrumenti.)

91. That Anselm considered 'willing' (velle) to be a form of 'doing,' that is, to be a substitution instance of the predicate-variable 'facere,' can be confirmed in DP [PF] (ENUW, 44:2-8) and DV, c. 5 (S.I, 182:18-23). Also, cf. Fac. [PF] (ENUW, 26:5-7) with VV [PF] (ENUW, 37:29-31). Cf. G.S. Kane, Anselm's Doctrine of Freedom and the Will, p. 22.

92. Cf. DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 279:15; 280:4-5).


95. Cf. ibid. (S.II, 281:7-12).


97. Cf. DCD, c. 7 (S.I, 244:27 - 245:3: D:/ Quod autem dico de voluntate, hoc ipsum dici potest de concupiscientia sive desiderio, quoniam et concupiscientia et desiderium voluntas est; et sicut est bona et mala voluntas, ita est bona et mala concupiscientia et bonum et malum desiderium.)

98. In Biblia vulgata, cf., for instance, Ps. 41:2; 118:20, 131; Is. 26:9; Mic. 7:17; Lk. 22:15; Rm. 1:11; 8:27; II Cor. 9:14; I Tim. 3:1, Phil. 4:19; I Pt. 1:12.

99. In Biblia vulgata, cf., for instance, Tob. 3:16; Rm. 6:12; 7:7-8; Gal. 5:24; Col. 3:5; I Jn. 2:16-17; II Pt. 1:4; 2:10; 3:3; Js. 1:14-15; 4:1, 3.


Sacred scripture is not always consistent in using the two
words distinctively.


102. It also digresses on the use of the will. Cf. c. 7.


107. Cf. DLA, c. 6 (S.I, 218:1-4, 6-7).

108. The sole indication is found in c. 6 at S.I, 217:14: Quaproprier nisi illam potentiam quam probas....

109. Cf. DLA, c. 7 (S.I, 219:32-33: M:/ Sic intellige voluntatem quam voco instrumentum volendi, inseparabilem et nulla alia vi superabilem fortitudinem habere....).

110. Cf. s. 1, sub. B: re: divine simplicity and the omnipotence of God.

111. One might take exception to my position and claim that this cited freedom is not really the natural freedom of the will but rather a reference to that special freedom which Anselm defines in DLA. One might also proffer the beginning lines of cc. 5 and 9 as evidence that the context of discussion is this very 'ability to keep.' Indeed, this is the context. But I want to maintain my position that in cc. 5-9 Anselm is actually digressing. In doing so he is attempting for the first time in his writing career to articulate a concept of the will. That Anselm is aware in these chapters of the will as being free in a sense other than that respecting the 'ability to keep' is evidenced by his use of the Latin adverb 'sponte' in c. 9 (S.I, 221:21-24).

Furthermore, one might want to consider DLA, c. 13, in which one will find the student asking whether or not he and Anselm should add a clause to the definition so as to emphasize "that this ability [i.e., the 'ability to keep' or 'freedom of choice'] is so free that it cannot be overcome by any force." (S.I, 225:8-9: D:/ ...quod illam potestatem tam liberam esse designet, ut nulla vi superari possit.) In light of this question I want to claim two points: First, it seems inconceivable that the student wants to qualify the 'ability to keep,' which has already
been defined as freedom, with an additional note on its being 'free.' The effort of doing so would seem redundant, unless the student has in mind another sense of 'free.' I think he does.

Second, at the end of c. 13, one reads a rather obscure passage: "Therefore, since in this definition there is nothing which is not necessary for encompassing the freedom of choice of a rational will and for excluding other things, and since freedom is adequately included and other things are adequately excluded...." (S.I, 225:24-27: M:/ Quoniam igitur nihil est in hac definitione, quod non sit necessarium ad concludendam libertatem arbitrii rationalis voluntatis et ad alia excludenda, et sufficienter illa includitur et alia excluduntur....) What is this sense of 'freedom' that is included in the definition of freedom, that is, in the definition of the "freedom of the choice of the rational will"? I think it is the case that one idea or sense of freedom is nested in that of another. I also suggest that it is that freedom (power, ability), namely, the will itself -- that very ability which subsumes the 'ability to keep' and, with the aid of prevenient grace and reason, determines by itself whether or not 'freedom of choice' will be actualized.

112. Cf. DLA, c. 6 (S.I, 218:6, 8-11).


114. Cf. DLA, c. 8, passim.

115. DLA, c. 9 (S.I, 221:18-19: M:/ ...nihil liberius recta voluntate, cui nulla vis aliena potest auferre suam rectitudinem.)


117. Cf. DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 279:10, 17-19; 281:2-3, 5-6, 10-12).

118. Cf. ibid. (S.II, 281:5-7: ...ita instrumentum volendi duas habet aptitudines, quas voco 'affectiones.' Quarum una est ad volendum commoditatem, altera ad volendum rectitudinem.).

119. Anselm also calls this affection the 'will for happiness' (voluntas beatitudinis). Cf., for instance, DCD, c. 13 (S.I, 256:10) and DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 285:18) In DCD, Anselm introduces the idea of the 'will as affection' into his developing concept of the will. However, in DCD, he does not speak of them as 'affectiones' but rather as 'voluntates.' The term 'affectio' is first used to speak of the second equivocal sense of the will in DCV and then later in DC.
120. By which affection, Anselm understands rectitude itself or truth of the will as discussed in DV, c. 4. Cf. DC, III, c. 12 (S.II, 284:20-21).

121. Cf. DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 287:12-14: Unde non absurde possumus dicere affectiones eius voluntatis, quam instrumentum animae dixi, quasi instrumenta eiusdem instrumenti esse, quia illa nihil nisi istis operatur.); and c. 11 (S.II, 284:6-7: ...qui [God] facit naturam et instrumentum volendi cum affectionibus suis, sine quibus idem instrumentum nihil facit.).

122. Cf. DC, III, c. 12 (S.II, 284:11-12); DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 254:25).

123. Cf. DCD, c. 12, passim, and c. 13 (S.I, 255:23-25; 257:27). This chapter which digresses on the concept of ability points up the position that the will is able to will because God in creating the will gives to it its first willing or the natural inclination by which the will is able to move itself to will.

124. Cf. DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 254:23-26, 28-29); and DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 284:3-4).

125. Cf. DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 280:12-13); also, DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 255:2-4). In both citations the sense of happiness vis-à-vis the natural affection is that of a natural happiness or state of being well situated or existing well. It is a happiness which is pursued by both the just and unjust.

126. Cf. CDH, I, c. 24 (S.II, 93:8); DCD, c. 4 (S.I, 241:13-14); DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 285:19-21); and DBP, introduction (SS, 274:10-12). Also, see Mon. c. 1 (S.I, 13:12-13): All individuals desire (appetere) to enjoy those things which they consider good.


129. Cf. DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 281:8-10: Quidquid enim aliud vult, aut propter commoditatem aut propter rectitudinem vult, et ad has [affectiones] -- etiam si fallitur -- putat se referre quod vult.). Also, cf. CDH, II, c. 15 (S.II, 115:13-18): concerning the sin of those who crucified the Christ: It was willed and done in ignorance and, thus, is not to be judged as severely as if it had been done knowingly.

ethical mandate of doing that which one ought to do. To the contrary, and in addition to the preceding citations from DC and CDH, Anselm's texts do suggest in various places that, all in all, he places much emphasis on the importance of knowing that which one ought to do if one is to do that which one ought to do. Cf. s. 2, sub. A: re: question of moral knowledge.


131. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 256:13-14: M:/ Nonne si putat prodesse aliquid ad adipiscendum beatitudinem, potest se movere ad volendum illud?) and (S.I, 257:1-5, 8: M:/ ...sed responde mihi adhuc si potest non velle beatitudinem quanto maiorem eam intelliget, qui nihil nisi beatitudinem vult et non potest non velle beatitudinem. D:/ Si non tanto magis vellet beatitudinem quanto meliorem ac maiorem illam putaret.... M:/ Vult ergo esse beatus quanto altius hoc esse posse cognoscit.). In this one context, note the three underscored words which clearly bear an epistemological sense.

132. Cf. DCD, c. 4: S:/ "...for we will nothing unless we think it just or beneficial." (S.I, 241:15-16: D:/ In nobis hoc possimus cognoscere, qui nihil volumus nisi quod iustum aut commodum putamus.)

133. Cf. DCD, c. 13 (S.I, 257:8). For Latin text, see note #131.

134. Cf. DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 279:17-20: Affectio huius instrumenti est, qua sic afficitur ipsum instrumentum ad volendum aliquid -- etiam quando illud quod vult non cogitat --, ut si venit in memoriam, aut statim aut suo tempore illud velit.). N.b.: The parenthetical comment refers to the 'will as use.' This is confirmed at S.II, 279:27-28. The 'will as use' fails to obtain without correspondence with the intellect: I shall elucidate this point in the next paragraph of the text.

135. Cf. DLA, c. 7 (S.I, 219:9-10).

136. Cf. DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 280:10-20). Cf. I. Choquette, "Voluntas, Affectio and Potestas in the Liber de voluntate of St. Anselm," p. 70: The 'will as use' brings into perspective both the 'will as instrument' and the 'will as affection' -- in other words, the will with a desire that bespeaks its inclinations.

137. Cf. DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 279:27-28: Usus vero eiusdem instrumenti est, quem non habemus, nisi cum cogitamus rem quam volumus.) and (S.II, 280:23-24: ...ita velle est uti voluntate quae est instrumentum volendi, et usus eius est voluntas, quae non est, nisi quando cogitamus quod volumus.)
138. Reconsider s. 2 in its entirety and especially sub. C and D: re: speculation on Anselm's moral epistemology.

139. Cf. DLA, c. 13 (S.I, 225:24-26).

140. Cf. DCV, c. 10 (S.II, 152:3-6).

141. Cf. DC, I, c. 6 (S.II, 257:13).


143. Cf. DC, I, c. 6 (S.II, 257:13-16); III, c. 13 (S.II, 286:9-11: that the 'will as instrument' is instructed by reason); CDH, I, c. 1, passim; Mon., c. 68, passim; and DCV, c. 4 (S.II, 144:16-21).


145. Cf. DC, I, c. 6 (S.II, 257:16-17).


147. This point can be discerned in Anselm's claim that the will's affection for the beneficial frequently and extensively impedes the mind in its understanding of what is right. Cf. DCV, c. 23 (S.II, 165:1-3).


149. CDH, I, c. 22 (S.II, 90:9-13): In fact, this passage does not explicitly speak of justice or the inclination for justice. But the context implies that when Anselm speaks of Adam in paradise as being positioned before God ("...quasi positus est pro deo...”) and being able to ward off the devil's inducements, he understands Adam as having justice of the will or the inclination/affection for justice. This point lends support to my claim that Anselm's concept of justice needs to be appreciated for its theological bent. The will's affection for justice implicitly bears the sense of a moral relation between God and the rational creature. Cf. s. 1, sub. C: re: the justice of God and merciful justice.


152. Contrary to the claim of G.S. Kane in Anselm's Doctrine of Freedom and the Will, pp. 76-77, who might have been influenced by J. Rohmer's error in La finalité morale chez les theologiens de saint Augustin à Duns Scot, p. 173, there is
absolutely no basis in the Anselmian corpus for construing or understanding the will's affection for justice as something 'natural' to the will or as an essential feature of the rational being. Kane's rationale is that it is to be considered 'natural' in view of the purpose for which the rational being was created or, as he puts it, in view of the being's "essential nature" which he understands in these terms: "what is essential to a thing is whatever belongs to its ultimate purpose or to what it ought to be." Simply put: I do not find Anselm saying what he, Professor Kane, understands by "essential nature." Furthermore, I do not see Anselm anywhere confusing the essence of a thing with the purpose of that thing. In point of fact, and in agreement with Jasper Hopkins, I find Anselm distinguishing, as in the case of the will, among its essence, aptitudes, and uses, that is, between 'what it is' and 'what purpose and function it serves.' Cf. J. Hopkins, "Anselm on Freedom and the Will: A Discussion of G. Stanley Kane's Interpretation of Anselm," pp. 475-476.


157. The points in this paragraph are grounded in DCD, cc. 13-14, 16. Confer.

158. Cf. DC, III, c. 12 (S.II, 285:3-5). In DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 286:11) Anselm's sense of 'spirit' (spiritus) is that of 'mind and reason.'

159. At S.I, 215:2-5. Cf. also, DC, III, c. 6 (S.II, 257:8-13).


161. Cf. E.F. Serene, "Anselmian Agency in the Lambeth Fragments: A Medieval Perspective on the Theory of Action," pp. 147-148. Additionally, she interprets these types of willing as suggesting varying attitudes of the agent towards that which is willed. In particular, in concessive willing, the agent's attitude is either neutral or negative towards the situation; in permissive willing, the attitude is negative. Efficient and approbative willing bespeak a positive attitude towards the occurrence of whatever. I agree: The tone of VW supports this interpretation. An interesting development of this point might be the extent to which these attitudes bear significantly upon interpretations of ethical agency, especially with respect to the
Serene holds that each type of willing implicitly bespeaks a degree of moral responsibility: The agent is liable for what he does or fails to do. In general, I agree. However, I see that her position suffers unwittingly when she focuses on permissive willing: Her claim is that such willing should be ascribed to anyone who should prevent the occurrence of something when one is morally obliged to do so. But, she does not grasp the point that Anselm frequently speaks of God's permissive willing vis-à-vis the occurrence of moral evil among rational creatures. Does she want to hold on Anselm's behalf that we can ascribe moral responsibility to God for moral evil? The answer depends on whether or not God 'should prevent' moral evil.


165. Cf. DLA, c. 7 (S.I, 219:33-34; 220:4-5).


167. My reasoning rests on an interpretation of DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 279:10-12: Affectum quippe est instrumentum volendi suis aptitudinibus. Unde dicitur hominis anima, cum vehementer vult aliquid, affecta esse ad volendum illud, vel affectuose velle.). Anselm might have understood a correlation between the variable use of the will's strength and the variation of intensity in the will's affections: cf. DCD, c. 13 (S.I, 257:1-8): re: natural affection; and DC, c. 11 (S.II, 280:15-17: re: acquired affection.

168. Cf. Robert F. Brown, "Some Problems with Anselm's View of Human Will," AS, 2 (1988), p. 336. On pp. 337-338, Brown isolates a supposed problem in Anselm's position on the variable use of the will's strength. He argues against the idea that the choices of the will admit of varying degrees, an idea which he correctly attributes to Anselm and holds to be owing to Anselm's real or apparent confusion of the two senses of 'velle': desiring and willing (choosing). Conjugated forms of 'velle' are difficult to translate in Anselm because one must be especially
attuned to his context and be sensitive to whether he is using 'velle' in the sense of the 'will as affection,' which would be that of 'desiring' or 'wanting,' or in the sense of the 'will as use,' which would be that of 'willing' or 'choosing and doing'. Indeed, there is a real fusion of the two senses in the 'will as use' only because the will's choice of anything presupposes first that the will desires that same thing or is inclined towards it. See note #179.


170. Cf., for instance, Epp. 101 (S.III, 234:51-55), 131 (S.III, 274:6-7), 132 passim, 185 (S.IV, 70:24 - 71:33), 189 (S.IV, 75:35-39), 313 (S.V, 240:1-6,8-9), 347 (S.V, 285:14 - 286:2), 373 (S.V, 315:7-9), 403 (S.V, 347:17-19; 348:29-30), and 414 passim, but note the isolated use of 'propositio' at S.V, 361:53 and the use of 'voluntas' in the surrounding context. The Latin words translated by the English noun 'intention' or verb 'to intend' are 'propositum,' 'intentio,' 'voluntas,' 'velle,' and 'proponere.' The sense of 'intention' is understood to be that of 'purpose' or 'reason' in the context of a plan that aims for the realization of something. Also, see DHM, c. 193 (SS, 101:14-20, 23-25): Intention (intentio) is deemed to be foremost in the inner man or spiritual 'soldier'.

E.F. Serene in "Anselmaian Agency in the Lambeth Fragments: A Medieval Perspective on the Theory of Action," pp. 144-146, rightly notes that Anselm's fragments do not dwell on the issue of intention. On this basis, though, she incorrectly infers that the issue does not enter into Anselm's ethical thinking and position on moral agency. Elsewhere, as indicated above in his letters, Anselm does adduce the importance of intention. Unfortunately, his consideration is just as fragmentary as the Lambeth fragments themselves.


174. Cf. G.S. Kane, "Elements of Ethical Theory in the Thought of St. Anselm," pp. 66-68: a fine and agreeable consideration of the harmony of the will's inclinations for happiness (the beneficial) and justice. The acquired affection
is not incompatible with the natural affection. One's natural will for the beneficial is ideally brought into line with one's acquired inclination towards justice or God. With such an alignment being realized, the individual is poised for true and supernatural happiness.


179. It is important to bear in mind that Anselm uses the Latin 'velle' to convey two distinct senses of 'willing' or two functions of the will as the instrument of the soul. The meaning of the term depends upon which of two equivocal senses of the will he has in mind when using it. Both of these senses fall under the rubric 'aptitude for willing.'

'Velle' (to will) in its conjugated and participial forms can mean the English 'desiring' or 'wanting,' in which case Anselm has in mind the 'will as affection.' Note here that the meaning is only that of 'desiring'; it does not include the sense of 'choosing.' (Cf. DC, III, c. 11 [S.II, 279:17-20].) 'Velle' can also mean the English 'willing' in the sense of the will not only desiring but also 'thinking about (cogitare),' 'choosing,' or 'acting' with respect to what it desires. In this meaning Anselm has in mind the sense of the 'will as use' or the later medieval sense of 'volition.' (Cf. DC, III, c. 11 [S.II, 279:27-28].) Note here the dual sense of 'desiring' and 'choosing' under 'will as use': It seems that every act or use of the will presupposes that the 'will as instrument' desires something which becomes the focus of its choice and action. I do not see, however, that every desire of the will is translated into the process of choice and action. In other words, it does not follow that if the will is desiring something, then necessarily it is choosing with a view towards acting; but, indeed, if the will is choosing, then it is necessarily desiring. Choice with a view towards acting presupposes desire, but desire does not necessarily entail choice.

Anselm does deliver the sense of this distinction when he speaks of the two predications of 'velle.' See DC, III, c. 11 (S.II, 282:5 - 283:2) and c. 13 (S.II, 287:8-11). As noted, the Latin 'voluntas' is subjected to triple signification, and its use should be understood accordingly in context.

I have endeavored sensitively to express these distinct meanings of 'velle' and 'voluntas' in the following discussion on
the will as ability and throughout part II. I have done so after reading and interpreting the Latin texts and comparing my findings with cited English translations. Hereafter, when I use the English noun 'will,' I always mean Anselm's sense of the 'will as instrument' -- the soul's power for willing.

180. Cf. DV, cc. 4-5, passim.

181. Cf. Ep. 420 (S.V, 365:9 - 366:28) for a concise sense of life as either an ethical ascent or unethical descent -- the steps of which are either good and virtuous or bad and viceful deeds.


183. Cf. CDH, I, c. 10. Also, see R.W. Southern, pp. 216-221.


191. Cf. DHM, c. 8 (SS, 41:2-10).

192. Cf. DHM, cc. 6-7 (SS, 40:19-27, 30-36).


194. Cf. DHM, c. 3 (SS, 39:26-28), and appendix (SS, 95:21-23). Ideally, if my focus were theological, emphasis would be given to the theological virtues -- faith, hope, and love.

195. Cf. DHM, cc. 133-135, passim. Key words: 'qualitas,' 'habitus,' 'mors,' 'virtus,' and 'consuetudo.'
196. Cf. MA [DSC] (SS, 332:27-28). Also, cf. Augustine, DeCD, XXII, c. 24: He speaks of the mind, when it is capable of knowledge and learning, as being ready for acquiring the said virtues in order to ward off and overcome evil.

197. Cf. DHM, appendix (SS, 95:21-36), and c. 96, passim, for a distinction between interior and exterior virtues.

198. Cf. MA [DSC] (SS, 332:29-33); also, DHM, c. 3 (SS, 39:23-26).

199. Cf. DCIH (SS, 356:8-10); also, MA [DSC] (SS, 332:37-38).


201. Cf. DCIH (SS, 356:11-13); also, MA [DSC] (SS, 333:2).


204. Cf. DHM, c. 97 (SS, 80:2-8), also c. 98 (SS, 80:10-19).

205. Cf. DHM, c. 2 (SS, 39:17-21). The point is expressed analogically.

206. Cf. Ep. 185 (S.IV, 70:24-71:33). "Purity of heart" consists of the "beauty of the mind" (pulchritudo mentis) and the "nourishment of the virtues" (nutrimentum virtutum).


209. Cf. Ep. 63 (S.III, 179:40-53) for Anselm's clearest position on this point. It is anchored in sacred scripture: Cf. Lk. 21:19; Rm. 5:3-5; I Tim. 2:5; and especially Js. 1:2-4.

210. Ep. 73 (S.III, 195:19-20: ...ut totius vitae vestrae status his duabus nitatur columnis, scilicet oboedientia et patientia.)


Cf. Augustine, DCG, cc. 10, 20, 22; and DeBP, cc. 3.6, 6.10. Also, see Aquinas, ST, 2a2ae, q. 137, a. 1, reply and ad 2; a. 3, reply and ad 1: It seems to me that Aquinas is striking at the same temporal distinction between the constancy that is patience and perseverance.


218. Cf. Ep. 73 (S.III, 194:14 - 195:1). For a similar position, cf. Tertullian, De patientia, c. 4: Obedience is understood to stem from the highest virtue (cf. c. 1) which is
patience. With patience so understood, Tertullian sees the full realization of one's obedience to God as being manifested in virtue. Patience anchors the relationship between God and creature: No one can fulfill the will of God or do good and pleasing works without patience (cf. c. 1). Anselm is not far from this position, though I do not see him explicitly declaring or even intimating that patience is the highest of all virtues. For him, love, tempered by faith and hope, fills this pre-eminent position. For the view that patience is not the highest virtue, but rather one that is inferior to the theological and cardinal virtues, see Aquinas, ST, 2a2ae, q. 136, a. 2, reply.

219. Cf. DHM, c. 3 (SS, 39:27) with MA [Chapters of Unknown Origin in De similitudinibus, c. 185] (SS, 299:31 - 300:1).

220. Cf. MA [AF, #1] (SS, 305:3-7). The idea that patience works in conjunction with the other virtues in order to buttress the soul against sin can be traced to Cyprian: cf. De bono patientiae, cc. 15, 17.


222. This view nears that of Tertullian and Cyprian. Both thinkers deem impatience, and implicitly the lack of virtue, to be the origin of evil and sinfulness, which, for Anselm, is defined as the absence of justice in the will and represented as the rational creature's dispossession of true freedom and his inability to actualize the natural 'ability to keep.' Cf. Tertullian, De patientia, c. 5, and Cyprian, De bono patientiae, c. 19.


224. Ep. 138 (S.III, 284:17: ...in propositio bonae voluntatis....).
Section 4


2. By 'not-being' (non esse) Anselm generally means 'the denial of that which is understood or spoken': Cf. C [PF] (ENUW, 41:36-37). Anticipate s. 8 and, especially, sub. C thereof for further appreciation of Anselm's understanding: It speaks to his idea of evil as 'not-being' or 'not-something.'


4. Cf. DCD, c. 1 (S.I, 235: 8-12 with emphasis on lines 10-12: Sed non tantum debemus inhaerere imprietati verborum veritatem tegginti, quantum inhiare proprietati veritatis sub multimodo genere locutionum latenti.).

5. DCD, c. 1 (S.I, 233:6: D:/ ...'quid habes quod non accepisti'....). Cf. I Cor. 4:7.

6. Respectively, cf. s. 1, sub. A; s. 3, sub. C (3); and s. 1, sub. B.

7. DCD, c. 1 (S.I, 233:8: M:/ Nulla creatura habet aliquid a se.).

8. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 234:6-9). Also, cf. Fac. [PF], passim, and note #164 in s. 3. Anticipate s. 11, sub. B.

9. I think that Anselm's sense here, as per his theory of causality, figures as the fourth mode of the affirmative general form -- facere non esse: God (indirectly) causes a creature not to be, because God does not cause a creature to be conserved. To a certain extent it might be read as a fifth mode of the same form: God (indirectly) causes a creature not to be, because God causes a creature not to be conserved.

10. Cf. Augustine, DNB, c. 19; DeLA, III, 7.70, 13.126-131; and DeCD, XII, c. 2. Perhaps there is also the influence of Boethius in De hebdomadibus, lines 117-150.


12. Ibid.

13. This paragraph and the next are complemented by s. 17, sub. C.

Section 5


2. Cf. DCD, c. 2 (S.I, 235:24-25: D:/ ...sic ideo non habuit perseveranceam quia non acceptit, et ideo non acceptit quia deus non dedit; and 236: 5-8).


4. DCD, c. 3 (S.I, 236:1-3: D:/ ...si bono angelo datio est causa acceptanceis, puto non-dationem esse malo angelo causam non-acceptiois, et si ponatur non-datio, video necessariam esse causam ut sequatur non-acceptio;....).

5. Ibid. (S.I, 236:25-27: M:/ Aliud est namque rem esse causam alterius rei, aliud positionem rei esse causam ut sequatur aliud.).

6. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 237:14-15: D:/ ...quaero cur non acceptit: aut quia non potuit, aut quia non voluit.).


8. This interpretation is based on DCD, c. 3 (S.I, 237:25-28). Cf. s. 3, sub. B, including all notes: re: the distinction between having and using an ability.

9. That is, DCD, c. 3 (S.I, 237:29 - 238:34). It is troublesome because Anselm, I think, is actually thinking of and speaking in terms of his equivocal senses of the will without immediately and clearly owning up to them in c. 3. If he had, he would have made the interpretation of his argument easier. Furthermore, in this section it is quite difficult to determine with any certainty whether he means 'want/desire' or 'will' when he uses a conjugated form of the Latin 'velle.'

10. DCD, c. 3 (S.I, 237:32-33: M:/ Incepisti umquam aliquid cum voluntate et potestate perficiendi, quod tamen voluntate ante finem rei mutata non perfecisti?).

11. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 238:13-14: M:/ Non ergo debes dicere: ideo non volui perseverare in voluntate, quia non volui perseverare in voluntate huius voluntatis;....).

12. Ibid. (S.I, 238:14-19: M:/ ...sed cum quaeritur quare non perseverasti in actione in qua voluisti et potuisti perseverare, respondere potes quia non perseverasti in voluntate. Quod si iterum quaeritur quare non perseverasti in voluntate,
alia causa reddenda est, unde scilicet contigerit defectus illius voluntatis, quam quia non perseverasti velle voluntatem.)

13. Cf. *ibid.* (S.I, 238:32-34: *M:/* Ita ergo dic quia diabolus qui accepit velle et posse accipere perseverantiam et velle et posse perseverare, ideo non accepit nec perseveravit quia non pervoluit.)


15. See note #179 in s. 3.

16. Cf. s. 3, sub. C (1-3), including all notes: re: the will as ability.

17. That is, DCD, c. 3 (S.I, 239:1 - 240:6).

18. DCD, c. 3 (S.I, 239:1-5: *D:/* Cum enim dicis quia quod voluit non pervoluit, tale est ac si dicas: Quod voluit prius, postea non voluit. Quando ergo non voluit quod prius voluit: quare non voluit, nisi quia non habuit voluntatem? Non dico voluntatem quam prius habuit cum voluit, sed quam non habuit cum non voluit.). It seems to me that what the student is really trying to understand is why the angel shifted in his desires.

19. Cf. *ibid.* (S.I, 239:11-15: *M:/* Sponte dimisit voluntatem quam habebat, et sicut accepit habere quousque habuit, ita potuit accipere semper tenere quod deseruit; sed quia deseruit non accepit. Quod ergo ideo non accepit tenere quia deseruit, non ideo non accepit quia deus non dedit, sed quam non habuit cum non voluit.). When Anselm wrote this quoted text, I think he had in the back of his mind s. 6 or cc. 5-6 of DCD. My interpolations are clarifications in light of it.

20. Cf. s. 3, sub. A and B: re: *libertas* or 'freedom of choice' as ability to keep.

21. Cf. DCD, c. 3 (S.I, 239:21: *M:/* Non semper prius est non velle tenere quam velle deserere.).


23. DCD, c. 4 (S.I, 242:12-15: *M:/* Iam igitur tibi manifestum esse puto ex rationibus supra positis diabolum sponte dimisisse velle quod debebat et iuste amisisse quod habebat, quia sponte et in iuste voluit quod non habebat et velle non debebat.)


26. Ibid. (S.I, 241:29-30: M:/ ...voluit inordinate similis esse deo.).

27. Anselm did subscribe to the idea of deification (deificatio) -- the rational creature becoming God-like: cf. DBP, c. 12 (SS, 284:12-21). He expressed it, though, in western terms of justificatio and sanctification.

28. Cf. Augustine, DeCD, XII, cc. 6-9; and DeLA, II, 20.204-205. See s. 18, sub. C in part, and note #11: re: Augustine on the efficiency/deficiency of the will.

29. This point about efficient causality is not mentioned in this section but it is in DCD, c. 27 (S.I, 275:31-33).

30. Cf. s. 3, ex toto.

31. Cf. s. 3, sub. C (2): re: will as use, actualization of the will.

32. Cf. s. 2, sub. D: re: psychological image in rational creature. The latter portion of sub. C is also relevant.

33. Cf. DAP, 106:5-6: Angelus, inquam, perditus se ad utrumlibet habuit, quia uti et abuti ratione potuit.

34. Cf. DAP, 105:11: Diabolus igitur quia potuit perseverare et non perseverare....

35. Cf. DAP, 106:6-7: Quia igitur concessam potentiam utendi ratione non voluit servare....

36. Cf. DAP, 105:28-29: ...sed concessa liberis arbitrii potestate abusus peccavit.... Anselm would probably speak of it as the misuse of the ability to make choices that are in keeping with the justice that ought to be kept and willed for its own sake. Basically, it is a misuse of one's natural 'ability to keep.' See s. 3, sub. A, 'The Overview.'


38. I have answered this question to some degree in s. 3, sub. C (2). Confer.
Section 6

1. Cf. DCD, c. 3 (S.I, 239:11: M:/ Sponte dimisit voluntatem quam habebat, et sicut accepit habere quousque habuit, ita potuit accipere semper tenere quod deseruit; sed quia deseruit non accepit.). Translation appears in text of s. 5.

2. DCD, c. 5 (S.I, 242:26-27: M:/ Putasne bonos angelos similiter potuisse peccare, antequam mali caderent?).

3. Ibid. (S.I, 242:29 - 243:1: M:/ ...quia si potuerunt peccare, non potestate sed necessitate servaverunt iustitiam.)


5. Ibid. (S.I, 243:3-4: M:/ Sed nec iusti recte, si bene consideres, dicerentur.).


7. DCD, c. 5 (S.I, 243:6-8: M:/ Illi ergo qui ceciderunt si non peccassent cum possent, tanto meliores essent quam isti, quanto et vere iusti essent et gratiam a deo mererentur.).

8. Ibid. (S.I, 243:8-10: M:/ Unde sequitur quia aut electi homines meliores et maiores erunt angelis bonis, aut reprobi angeli perfecte non restaurabuntur, quoniam non tales erunt homines qui pro illis assumentur, quales illi futuri erant.).

9. This point does not mean that angelic and human natures are not similar: They are; both are rational natures. Cf. DCV, c. 3 (S.II, 143:12-13). But, later in DCD, Anselm claims that the angel's rationality is greater than man's. For another similarity, see CDH, I, c. 19 (S.II, 84:9-13). Cf. Augustine, DGL, XI, c. 2, and DeCD, XI, c. 16: on the superior nature of the angels. See DeLA, III, c. 11.114, for a contrary view: Man is unequal to the angel in function, but equal in nature. Also, on the superior nature of the angels, cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, c. 4, 1-2 (177C - 180B), and c. 2, 4 (144B).

10. Cf. DCD, c. 5 (S.I, 243:11: D:/ Haec duo penitus neganda existimo.).

11. Ibid. (S.I, 243:12-13: M:/ Potuerunt igitur boni angeli peccare ante casum malorum, nec aliter quam sicut ostensum est de illis qui peccaverunt.).

12. Cf. Augustine, DeCD, XXII, c. 1: Angels bore the power of free choice — a power which enabled them to abandon God and the felicity derived from communion with God.
13. This interpretation approximates Gilbert Crispin's position. Cf. DAP, 105:27-29: (Concerning the fallen angels:)
Et quia non ignorans sed sciens, nec nolens sed volens, nec uilla
necessitate coactus, sed concessa liberi arbitrii potestate
abusus peccavit, propterea peccavit peccato inexcusabili.

14. DCD, c. 6 (S.I, 243:17-20: M:/ Illi itaque angeli qui
magis voluerunt iustitiam quam habebant, quam illud plus quod non
habebant: bonum quod quasi propter iustitiam, quantum ad
voluntatem pertinuit, perdiderunt, iustitia retribuente
acceperunt....).

15. Ibid. (S.I, 243:20: M:/ ...et de illo quod habebant in
vera securitate permanserunt.).

16. Anselm does not specify the benefit gained by the good
angels and not obtained, yet sought, by the bad. Cf. DCD, c. 6
(S.I, 244:1-3).

17. DCD, c. 6 (S.I, 243:21-22: M:/ ...sunt pro vecti, ut
sint adepti quidquid velle potuerunt, nec iam videant quid plus
velle possint;....).

18. In fact, the wording could also be that the exalted
angels, subsequent to the fall of the angels, are no longer able
to sin. They are confirmed angels, and this is the reason why
they are confirmed in a state of not being able to sin: "...by
virtue of having been able [to sin] but having willed not [to
sin] they merited their present state...." (CDH, II, c. 10 [S.II,
107:19-20: Sunt utique, quia hoc quod modo non possunt,
meruerunt per hoc quod potuerunt et noluerunt.])


cum angelis participatem.).

22. DCD, c. 6 (S.I, 243:22-26: M:/ Illi vero angeli qui
maluerunt illud plus quod nondum deis illis dare volebat, quam
stare in iustitia in qua facti erant: eadem iustitia iudicante
et illud propter quod illam contemperunt nequaquam obtinuerunt,
et quod tenebant bonum amiserunt.).

23. Ibid. (S.I, 243:26-27: M:/ ...ut adhaerentes iustitiae
nullum bonum velle possint quo non gaudeant....).

24. Anselm leads me to think that it cannot be the case
because of what he says a bit later in Pros., c. 25, about the
security (securitas) of those who are or will be confirmed (S.I,
119:15-19). They will never be able to lose it of their own free
wills; God will not be able to take it against their wills; and nothing more powerful than God will ever be able to separate them from God against their wills. Clearly, if Anselm can talk about free wills here, he cannot mean an actual loss of them in his idea of a harmony of wills.

25. DCD, c. 6 (S.I, 243:26-28: Sic ergo distincti sunt angeli, ut adhaerentes iustitiae nulla bonum velle possint quo non gaudeant, et deserentes illam nulla velle queant quo non careant.).

26. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 244:3-5: M:/ Quid illud fuerit non video; sed quidquid fuerit, sufficit scire quia fuit aliquid ad quod crescere potuerunt, quod non acceperunt quando creati sunt, ut ad illud suo merito proficerent.).

27. This interpretation might be considered a bit liberal if one is thinking only of DCD. However, I think my interpretation is well grounded in Mon., cc. 68-70. Confer. Also, cf. s. 2, sub. D, and s. 1, sub. C: re: points relevant to the interpretation.

28. Cf. s. 3, sub. A and D: re: libertas as an 'ethics of being.'
Section 7


2. Cf. DCD, c. 7 (S.I, 244:15-16: ...non parum me movet unde ipsam inordinatam habuit voluntatem.).

3. Ibid. (S.I, 245:4-6: De: Quod si dicitur quia voluntas aliqua essentia et ideo bonum est aliquid, sed conversa ad hoc quod debet velle fit bona voluntas, ad id vero quod non debet conversa dicitur voluntas mala....).


5. I suggest that it is: Cf. S.I, 244:16-27, while bearing in mind DCD's ethical focus and the ontological bent of s. 4. Each scenario, as delivered by the student, begins on an ethical note -- "If the will was good...," (S.I, 244:16: Si enim bona fuit...) that is morally good, and "if the will is evil...," (S.I, 244:20: ...si mala est...) that is, morally evil. But, at some point and in some sense, each shifts to and fro the ontological emphasis on God as the creator of all being and on the goodness of all being qua being. See, especially, S.I, 244:21, 23-26.

6. This is basically the point which I interpret Anselm as saying in DCD, c. 8, ex toto. It is corroborated by the first lines of c. 9 (S.I, 246:22-25). Cf. Augustine, EFSC, cc. 11-13.


8. DCD, c. 8 (S.I, 245:24-25: M:/ Denique bona voluntas non magis est aliquid quam mala voluntas, nec est ista magis malum quam illa bonum.). Also, see DC, I, c. 7 (S.II, 259:14-16: Nec magis nec minus est hoc quod est essentialiter cum est iusta, quam cum iniusta est voluntas.....).

9. DC, I, c. 7 (S.II, 259:14-20: Nec magis nec minus est hoc quod est essentialiter cum est iusta, quam cum iniusta est voluntas, per quam dicitur aut substantia aut actio iusta vel iniusta. Sic itaque facit deus in omnibus voluntatibus et operibus bonis et quod essentialiter sunt et quod bona sunt; in malis vero non quod mala sunt, sed tantum quod per essentiam
10. Idem, CP, IV, 2-3, prose. But, cf. D e h e b d o m a ~ u s ,
lines 160-175. Boathius seams to be taking a stance similar to
Anselmls: All that exists is good in virtue of having been
created by a Being who is good. All creatures are good in virtue
of their being. While being, they can be just or unjust in
virtue of their acts. For being and action are not identical in
creatures who are composite by nature, vhereas in the one and
simple God they are one and the same. God is good and just;
creatures are always good in being and either just or unjust in
act.
11. Cf. DC, I, c. 7 (S.11, 259:5-10).
This point about the
will is adduced analogically in Anselmls reference to one's use
of a sword or tongue: They are not one thing when used correctly
and another when they are used incorrectly. So it is in the case
of the will when it exists or is used either justly or unjustly.
Either way it is the same will. Cf S. 11, 259 :10-14.

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C.

12. For the following interpretative analysis, cf. DCD,
8 (S.1, 245:28
246:6).

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13. Cf. DCD, c. 8 (S.1, 246:6-8:
M:/ Itaque mala voluntas
non est ipsum malum quod malos facit, sicut nec bona voluntas est
Also, see S.1, 246:15-17.
ipsum bonum quod bonos facit.).
Pseudo-Dionysius makes a similar point with respect t o the fallen
angels: They were not essentially evil for they were created by
God. They are not called 'evilt in respect to their being. Cf.
idem, The Divine Names, c. 4 (725A, 7 2 8 C ) .

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14. Cf. DCD, c. 9 (S.1,
(S.11, 143:29
144:2).
15.

Cf. DOT,

C.

246:22-26).

Also, see DCV, c.

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16. Cf. DC, 111, c. 13 (s.11, 286:28-29:
re: the vill:
...
creata bona inguantum habet esse....m).
Also, D m , c. 4:
mFinally, every being comes from God, from whom there is nothing
Therefore, in itself no being is unjust.'
(S.11,
Denique omnis essentia est a deo, a quo n i h i l e s t
t45:30-31:
hi-.
Quare nulla essentia est iniusta per se.) The textual
point is Augustinian-Boethian: See notes #I0 and #18.

unjust.

17.

Cf. DCV, c. 5 (S.11, 146:25-26).

18. On this distinction, see DC, I, c. 7 (S. If, 258 :14-16)
The point a r i s e s out of Anselm1s discussion of God as the cause
of all beings, including the deeds of the will. Also, cf. DCV,
c. 5 (S. If, 146:24-25, 21-28)
See Augustbe, DeCD, MI, c. 3:
A nature is evil insofar as it has been vitiated, but insofar as
being a nature it is good. See note ill in s. 18.

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19. Cf. DC, I, c. 7 (S.II, 258:5-6: ...si prius cognoscitur bonum, quod est iustitia, vere aliquid esse...; and S.II, 258:20-21: Iustitia namque aliquid est....). This point is raised contrary to G. Stanley Kane in his argument against Anselm. Cf. idem, Anselm's Doctrine of Freedom and the Will (Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1981), p. 133. He thinks -- incorrectly -- that Anselm inauspiciously hypostatizes rectitude or justice of the will, that is, inauspiciously thinks of rectitude as if it were something. I think the Anselmian texts speak for themselves against Kane's misinterpretation. In sum, Anselm does not, nor did he ever have to, hypostatize or reify justice. For him, justice is already something very real and objective. Justice is 'the objective' inasmuch as being of God, and it becomes 'the objective-subjective' when it dwells within the rational creature as the immanent and sanctifying grace of the transcendent Creator and thus establishes a moral relation between both. For slight agreement with me, cf. Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), pp. 154-156. However, I think that there is more to understand about Anselmian rectitude or justice of the will than simply its being a function of the will that continually wills uprightly (p. 156). Furthermore, I find myself in disagreement with Hopkins' exception to Anselm's reification of rectitude because, as he puts it, it "leads him [Anselm] to speak as if a man had an ability which he lacked the opportunity to exercise." (p. 155) Hopkins is referring to Anselm's concept of the 'ability to keep.' I think his argument against Anselm is precisely the point that Anselm wants to make. On this point I have said enough in s. 3, but, in short, I can reiterate: The 'ability to keep' is precisely an ability that can be actualized or not. Rectitude or justice is not in itself the 'ability to keep.' The ability is the power to keep. What is kept or not kept is the grace of the Indwelling God, that is, the grace of rectitude or justice of the will. In the absence of this grace or justice (i.e., in the 'presence' of injustice), the natural ability remains unactualized.

20. These are the criteria which, if fulfilled, enable something to be properly called 'something.' See note #7.

21. The context is in s. 1, sub. A: re: the distinction between a necessary being and contingent beings.

22. Cf. s. 1, sub. B: re: the unity and simplicity of God; the justice that God is.


Section 8

1. H.J. McCloskey in God and Evil (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974) rejects the Christian theist's privative account of evil as a response to the problem of evil (cf. pp. 25-41). He dismisses it as not even suggesting a problem of evil but rather a problem with God and the worship-worthiness of such a being who creates others who are capable of suffering privations of "natural being." There is much that can be said by way of response to McCloskey's trenchant criticisms. I shall address only one of them. More precisely, it is Anselm addressing McCloskey who claims: "The contention that equating evil with privation amounts to equating it with nothing clearly needs more argument. There would seem to be an obvious difference between nothing and the absence of an appropriate good." (p. 30) I hope to show in this section that Anselm gives the additional argument which McCloskey demands; he also gives reason enough not to think that there is an "obvious difference."

2. Cf. DCD, c. 10 (S.I, 247:9-10). Of these arguments and those that hold that evil is privation of good, the student could have in mind the following: Augustine, Conf., VII, c. 12; Episc, c. 11; DNB, cc. 4, 6; Boethius, CP, IV, 2, prose; and Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, c. 4 (716D, 728A,C).


4. Cf. Aliq. [PF] (ENUW, 42:23-26). A perusal of the brief sections which follow this citation and outline the improper senses of 'aliquid' would be beneficial. There are three improper senses -- the second is applicable to Anselm's concept of nothing, evil, and injustice. See ENUW, 42:31 – 43:13.

5. Ibid.

6. Cf. DCD, c. 11 (S.I, 248:10-11: D:/ ...si vis me docere quid intelligam esse malum, doce me prius quid intelligam esse nihil....). 

7. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 248:15-30). The student's argument has been reduced interpretatively.

8. Ep. 97 and DCD, c. 11 (respectively, S.III, 226:40-41 and I, 248:28-30: Quid itaque est quia hoc nomen, videlicet nihil, non significat nihil sed aliquid, et non significat aliquid sed nihil?).
9. Cf. DCD, c. 11 (S.I, 249:1-4; at lines 3-4: M:/ ...et diversa scilicet significations consideratio in hoc nomine, et eandem rem esse aliquid et nihil?).

10. Ibid. (S.I, 249:8-10: M:/ ... omnem rem penitus et omne quod est aliquid intellectu removendum, nec omnino ullam rem aut penitus quod aliquid sit in intellectu retinendum....). Cf. Ep. 97 for a slight variation: At S.III, 226:49 it reads "aliquid sit ponendum" instead of c. 11's "aliquid sit in intellectu retinendum."

11. Loc. cit. (S.III, 226:52-54: ... vero auferendo omne quod est aliquid nullam significat essentiam, quam audientis intellectus quasi existentem retineat....).


13. Cf. DCD, c. 11 (S.I, 249:22-24) and Ep. 97 (S.III, 227:63-65). Anselm's position on the signification of 'nothing' could very well be his response to Augustine who was unable to explain it. Cf. Augustine, DM, c. 2.3.

14. Cf. DCD, c. 11 (S.I, 249:24 - 250:1: M:/ ... sed potius necesse est nihil esse nihil, quia nomen eius significat aliquid hoc modo; and 251:8-9: M:/ Malum igitur vere est nihil et nihil non est aliquid....).

15. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 250:4-16). The student's argument has been reduced interpretatively.


et grammatici aliud dicunt secundum formam vocum, aliud secundum rerum naturam.\).


19. Cf. ibid. (S.III, 227:68: ...sed non vere aliquid, sed quasi aliquid.).


24. Cf. Aquinas, ST, 1a, q.48, a.3, ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum quod non ens negative acceptum non requirit subjectum. Sed privatio est negatio in subjecto, ut dicitur in Meta., et tale non ens est malum."


26. At S.I, 23:13-16: Alia significatio est, quae dici quidem potest, vera tamen esse non potest; ut si dicatur aliquid sic esse factum ex nihilo, ut ex ipso nihilo, id est ex eo quod penitus non est, factum sit; quasi ipsum nihil sit aliquid existens, ex quo possit aliquid fieri. Quod quoniam semper falsum est....

27. Cf. s. 1, sub. B: re: creation as expression of the Word of the God who is love. In particular, cf. Mon., c. 34 and surrounding chapters, for Anselm's sense of divine exemplarism.

28. In Mon., c. 8, precisely at S.I, 23:15-16, but in view of the surrounding context, I understand Anselm to be denying real ontological status to 'nothing' -- "...quasi ipsum nihil sit aliquid existens...." Nothing is not an existing thing; it is not something existing (with 'something' here understood in the proper sense of the term).

29. Cf. Mon, c. 19 (S.I, 33:27 - 34:14). In this chapter, Anselm might have been responding to Fredegisus of Tours (circa 8th-9th cent.) who wrote Epistola de nihilo et tenebris. This successor of Alcuin claims that nothing is something existent insofar as claiming that the word 'nothing' signifies something that exists. F.S. Schmitt is convinced that DCD, c. 11, was influenced in part by Anselm's reading or hearing of Fredegisus'


32. These points are further explicated in s. 9, sub. B.

33. Cf. Augustine, DeCD, XII, 3, and EFSC, cc. 13-14. These sections are suggestive of the very point that is being attributed to Anselm interpretatively.

34. Mon., c. 19 (S.I, 34:22-24: Veluti si dicam: nihil me docuit volare, hoc aut sic exponam: quia ipsum 'nihil,' quod significat 'non aliquid,' docuit me volare, et erit falsum; aut: quia non me docuit aliquid volare, quod est verum.).

35. My view is grounded in a critical and sensitive reading of the entire Anselmian corpus and especially the Monologion. I confess that it is unordinary and, perhaps, a potential spark of scholarly controversy. But, there is at least one Anselmian scholar who agrees with me: P. Anselm Büttler speaks of there being a "positive" interpretation apropos Anselm's concept of 'nothing' (p. 46): 'Being,' he claims, is the "formal element" in Anselm's concept (p. 44). If anything at all, I see Büttler as being supportive of my claim that 'nothing' in Anselmian thought is always relative to being: 'Nothing' always has a subject or a reference point in reality which grounds its proper meaning as 'not-something.' Cf. idem, Die Seinslehre des Hl. Anselm von Canterbury (Ingenbohl, Switz.: Theodosius Druckerei, 1959), pp. 39-50, especially, pp. 44-46.

Section 9

1. Cf. DCD, c. 7 (S.I, 244:18-19; 245:7-9).

2. Cf. s. 3, sub. B: re: the will.

3. This point on the natural freedom of the will is treated in s. 3. Confer. It is made perfectly clear in DC, III, c. 13 (S.II, 286:6-8): The original state of the rational creature included the will for happiness, the will for justice, happiness, and the free choice of the will by which the creature was able to keep justice.

4. DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 252:12: M:/ An ergo putas quod ipse angelus per se possit velle aliquid?).

5. Ibid. (S.I, 252:15: M:/ ...per hoc quod iam habet.).

6. Ibid. (S.I, 252:20: D:/ Puto quia potest, si aliquando vult.).


8. Ibid. (S.I, 252:25-26: M:/ Non autem omne quod est, potuit esse priusquam esset.).

9. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 252:31 - 253:3, also 253:19-24, and 254:3-5). Re: Improperies in speaking about ability and inability. Boethius is representative of the tradition: Cf. Desmond P. Henry, *The Logic of Saint Anselm* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 139-140. Here, Anselm will make an important qualification to the Boethian position on antecedent capacity or, as I have been calling it, the raw ability. Its very possibility of being and for being possessed by a person or thing lies ultimately in the power of God who bestows it.

10. Ibid. (S.I, 253:1-3: D:/ ...quia qui ideo potest velle quia iam vult, necesse est prius eum potuisse quam velle.).

11. The student's failure persists until the very end of this first stage of Anselm's hypothetical creation of the will. See DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 254:10-16): At line 16, Anselm makes it clear to him that they are hypothesizing about someone who lacks a will: "Nos vero de illo qui nullam habet voluntatem loquimur."

12. Cf. Ex. [PF], ex toto. It seems paradoxical. But, as I shall indicate shortly, and as Anselm suggests in DV, c. 8, it is not. See note #20 in s. 10.

14. Cf. DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 253:4-19) for the argument about the world. It is summarized in the next paragraph.

15. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 253:32 - 254:2: M:/ Ita ergo quidquid non est, antequam sit sua potestate non potest esse; sed si potest alia res facere ut sit, hoc modo aliena potestate potest esse.). Anselm's position, as I interpret it, anticipates Aquinas in ST, Ia, q.46, a.1, ad 1: Before the world existed, it was possible for it to be by virtue of the active power of God.

16. E. Serene offers an interesting resolution of this Anselmian paradox as it appears in DCD, c. 12, and Ex. [PF] (cf. idem, "Anselm's Modal Conceptions" in Reforging the Great Chain of Being: Studies of the History of Modal Theories [Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981], pp. 133, 143). She places it in the context of Anselm's semantic theory and emphasizes his conception of 'aliquid' as a subject-variable that admits of proper and improper senses. Thus, there really is no paradox, as she contends, because the future world as the subject of the proposition is semantically improper: It is not really something for it does not exist and, hence, is not really of a capacity. And, furthermore, one cannot be properly ascribed to it. But, as interesting as her resolution is, she completely misses a fundamental point of Anselmian metaphysics: Even when a thing does not exist in time, it truly exists in the eternal mind of God. The temporal existence of anything is but an image of that true existence. So, the world as a future contingent, as a non-existent possible, is grounded in existence. It is something real in the mind of God and, hence, is able to be. And so, contrary to Serene, Anselm is not simply ascribing a capacity to a non-existent possible insofar as saying that the world could be before it actually was. This non-existent possible is something more than the logically necessary condition for the world's becoming, as she understands it. The real necessary condition for the existence of anything in time is not its non-existence, though this is logically plausible, but rather its true existence -- its being -- in the God who is the source of all being. This is metaphysically plausible and, I trust, more to the Anselmian point.

17. Cf. Ex. [PF] (ENUW, 23:8: D:/ ...quod potest, potestate posse.).

18. Cf. ibid. (ENUW, 23:11-12: D:/ In eo namque, quod non est, nulla potestas est.). The point resonates succinctly in Redegisus, Epistola de nihilo et tenebris (PL, 105:752C: Ex hoc etiam probatur non posse aliquid non esse.).

19. Cf. DCD, c. 13 (S.I, 257:26-27: M:/ Voluntatem tamen ipsum...constat esse opus et donum dei....).

21. Cf. DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 255:17: M:/ Nec beatus debet esse qui non vult iustitiam.); also, c. 13 (S.I, 258:1-3: M:/ Sed non debet esse beatus, si non habet iustam voluntatem. Immo non potest esse perfecte nec laudabiliter beatus, qui vult quod nec potest nec debet esse.).

22. DCD, c. 13 (S.I, 257:8: M:/ Vult ergo esse beatus quanto altius hoc esse posse cognoscit.).


24. DCD, c. 14 (S.I, 258:26: M:/ ...et sic iustam habens beatitudinis voluntatem possit et debeat esse beatus.).


26. DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 253:30-31: M:/ ...sic est omnipotens in simplici bono....).

27. The question is anachronistically put before Anselm. To some extent, though, I think even his student wants to know about that which most contemporary philosophers of religion who are interested in the problem of evil consider in some way or other, either directly or indirectly: It is the issue of a 'best possible world' and whether or not God created it. Philosophers have Leibniz to thank for it and their consideration of it. Alvin Plantinga is no exception, nor is he with respect to his take on the issue: What concerns him is not whether God created the best possible world (for he is hard pressed in seeing what a 'best' possible world would be) but, rather, whether God could have created just any possible world God pleased (as Leibniz premised in arguing that God did create the best possible world). This, according to Plantinga, is the "crucial" concern of free will defenders and theodicsists; I am inclined to partial agreement (cf. *ibid.*, God, Freedom, and Evil [New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974], p. 34; see note #36, last five lines). Many angles can be taken on the issue, such as the Anselmian one that I present in the body of the text. It is sparked by Anselm's own subtle angle: Consider what his student is asking and suggesting in DCD, c. 7: "...why did God create the nature, which He had exalted with such great excellence, to be such that it could turn its will away from what it was supposed to will and towards what it was not supposed to will...? For it seems that such a creature from such a creator ought much rather to have received the ability to do the good for which it was created than the ability to do the evil it was created to avoid." (S.I, 245:10-16: ...cur videlicet deus talem fecerit illam naturam
quam tanta excellentia sublimaverat, ut de eo quod debuit velle, posset convertere voluntatem suam ad id quod non debuit...; cum multo magis videatur potestatem debuisse talis creatura a tali factore accipere faciendi bonum ad quod facta est, quam faciendi malum ad quod vitandum est facta.) Another medieval angle is evident in Gilbert Crispin: In DAP 106:27 - 107:5, 107:11-29, he, in his consideration of the fallen angel, sees God as the best Creator who did what was better and right in creating a being who could fall.

28. Cf. H.J. McCloskey, God and Evil (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 80: He considers this point to be representative of the atheistic constituency in its adversarial dialogue with Christian theists. Evil, according to him, is not justified by the claim that this world is the best possible world.

29. Ibid. This question is inspired by H.J. McCloskey's affirmation of the very same point.


32. This is basically the position of D. Basinger who stands opposed to B. Reichenbach. Cf. David Basinger, "Must God Create the Best Possible World? A Response," International Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1980), pp. 339-341, especially p. 340. I agree with Basinger that the concept is problematic with respect to finite minds but not with respect to an omniscient God.

33. Cf. Mon., cc. 35-36, ex toto.

34. Cf. Pros., c. 19 (S.I, 115:14-15: ...tu autem, licet nihil sit sine te, non es tamen in loco aut tempore, sed omnia sunt in te. Nihil enim te continet, sed tu contines omnia.).

35. I am indebted to Prof. Calvin G. Normore of the University of Toronto for bringing this point to my attention.

36. Cf. A. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, p. 33. Plantinga takes exception to Leibniz's 'best possible world' argument, precisely on the Leibnizian premise that because God is omnipotent, God could have created any world that God wanted to create. I trust that what I shall say hereafter and what I have already said in s. 1, sub. B, will underscore the weakness of Leibniz's premise and will buttress my Anselmian claim that this
is the only world that God could have created. All in all, an Anselmian theological explanation is brought to Plantinga's point that "...central to a free will defense [or theodicy] is the claim that God, though omnipotent, could not have actualized just any possible world He pleased."


38. N.B.: At this point and hereafter, I am relying on the reader to recall and to bear in mind the arguments of s. 1, especially sub. B: My Anselmian interpretation of God the Creator is the foundation of my present argument on the best world created by God. If the reader is not acutely sensitive to s. 1, then much of what I argue at this point and hereafter will be considered weak. I have chosen not to repeat the relevant points and complex arguments of s. 1 here in s. 9, sub. C. Note, furthermore, that there is an echo of my present argument in Gilbert Crispin, Anselm's intellectual companion. Cf. DAP, 106:27 - 108:6, especially 107:23-25 and 107:32 - 108:3.

39. Cf. DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 253:28-29: M:/ Hinc est quod dicimus deum non posse aliquid sibi adversum aut perversum, quoniam sic est potens in beatitudine et iustitia, immo quoniam beatitudo et iustitia non sunt in illo diversa sed unum bonum...).)

40. With this question in mind, refer to and reconsider s. 1, sub. A and B, ex toto.


42. Robert M. Adams in "Must God Create the Best?," *Philosophical Review*, 81 (1972), holds a philosophically interesting point of view which is theologically unconvincing in one respect. Adams argues that the Christian theist is not required to maintain that the perfectly good God had to create the best possible world but only that God's creation is good (p. 317). If there be such a best possible world, God could have created another, as Adams holds, and in doing so would still be perfectly good. God's creation of a less than perfect world could be justified in terms of God's grace which Adams understands to be "a disposition to love which is not dependent on the merit of the person loved" (p. 324). Basically, he wants to hold that God's not creating the best possible world could be viewed as an expression of a moral virtue (i.e., grace) and not an expression of a defect in character (p. 324).

If, indeed, his view is not foreign to Judaeo-Christian
theological ethics, as he maintains, and if Anselm is a suitable representative of that very Judaeo-Christian tradition, as I suppose, then Adams' view might very well be foreign to it and to Anselm. Grace, for Anselm (as far as I can see), is a remedy for the foibles of rational creatures, not an excuse for that which God could have done better, but did not. And the God who is the infinitely perfect and immutable being is not the being who is occasionally (at the moment of creation) less than perfect: If God were less than perfect, then it would seem that this God of a diminishable stature would be the very being whose greater could be thought in terms of another being who would be undiminishably perfect at creation.

Furthermore, if it is true that God's not having created the best possible world can be justified by its making way for God's loving expression of grace among creatures, then the collapse of Anselm's conception of evil vis-à-vis the permissive will of God is imminent. So, too, is his whole justification of God in the face of it. For is it not the case that, if God did not create the best possible world that God could have created, but opted instead for a lesser world that would become a staging ground for the manifestation of loving grace, then God has been doing more than merely permitting the occurrence of evil? Is it not the case that God has been intending evil all along? Intending with a reason! This very point is raised by John Hick in Evil and the God of Love, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1977), p. 105. Anticipate ss. 11 and 13 for consideration of God's permissive willing and the direct and indirect causality of evil.

Cf. Michael Levine, "Must God Create the Best?," Sophia (Australia), 35, No. 1 (March-April 1996), pp. 28-33: His argument against Adams is different from my own; but, he moves towards a similar conclusion: that Adams' basic thesis is "not only counter-intuitive but plainly mistaken" (p. 28).
Section 10

1. As a complement to this section, cf. s. 2, sub. A and notes #9 and 15: re: moral debitum.

2. DCD, c. 16 (S.I, 259:16-17: M:/ Antequam acciperat hanc iustitiam: voluntas illa debeat velle et non velle secundum iustitiam?).


4. DCD, c. 16 (S.I, 260:20-21: D:/ Omnino nihil aliud ibi reprehendo quam absentiam iustitiae, sive non habere iustitiam.).

5. Ibid. (S.I, 261:15-22: M:/ At inusta non erat nec iniiustitiam habebat, antequam haberet iustitiam. D:/ Non. M:/ Ergo aut recedente iustitia non est in illa iniiustitia nec est iniiusta, aut nihil est iniiustitiae vel esse iniiustum. D:/ Non potest videri aliquid magis necessarium. M:/ At iniiustitiam illam habere et esse iniiustam post desertam iustitiam concessisti.) Emphasis was added to translation.

6. Ibid. (S.I, 261:23: D:/ Immo non possum non videre.).

7. Ibid. (S.I, 261:24: M:/ Nihil igitur est iniiustitiae vel esse iniiustum.).

8. Ibid. (S.I, 261:25: D:/ Credentem me fecisti scire quod nesciens credebam.).

9. Cf. DCV, c. 2 (S.II, 141:17-19) for sense of importance given to the debt to justice. Even though the context is focused on the human person, its central point is just as relevant to the angel.

10. CDH, I, c. 11 (S.II, 68:14-17: A:/ Hoc est debitum quod debet angelus et homo deo, quod solvendo nullus peccat, et quod omnis qui non solvit peccat. Haec est iustitia sive rectitudo voluntatis, quae iustos facit sive rectos corde, id est voluntate. Hic est solus et totus honor, quem debemus deo et a nobis exigit deus.).


12. Cf. CDH, II, c. 18 (S.II, 128:11-12: B:/ ...praesertim cum creatura debeat deo totum quod est et quod scit et potest?).
13. CDH, I, c. 20 (S.II, 87:19-20: A:/ ...quoniam nec tu tuus es, nec ille tuus aut suus qui tibi fecit iniuriam, sed unius domini servi facti ab illo de nihilo estis;...). Also, CDH, I, c. 9: A:/ ...what someone has from God rather than from himself he ought to speak of as more God's than his own. (S.II, 63: 19-20: A:/ Nam quod quis non habet a se, sed a deo, hoc non tam suum quam dei dicere debet.)


17. Cf. s. 2, sub. A, and note #19 thereunder: re: broad and narrow senses of 'justice.'

18. Cf. s. 3, introduction: re: creature's fullness of the truth of being. Section 3 is focused on this very point.


20. In DV, c. 8, Anselm presents the point from two perspectives: first, that of the Creator and creature, and second, that of the agent and patient of an act.

In the second perspective, the case of an 'ethical conflict' can readily be seen, as Anselm's example of giving and receiving a beating illustrates in DV, c. 8. But, in the first perspective, which is a case of 'conflicting oughts,' it is questionable whether such a case connotes an ethical conflict in an individual or even one at all.

In the first, when Anselm speaks of something as being simultaneously that which ought to be, because God permissively wills it, and that which ought not to be, because justice demands it, the 'ought' in the 'ought to be' does not bear ethical weight or the sense of ethical compulsion: It does not carry the weight of a command with the force of some antecedent or causal necessity which presents itself as a compelling ethical reason
for an agent before he acts. Rather, this 'ought' bears the sense of that which must follow upon one's willing something: In other words, it bears Anselm's sense of a subsequent or logical necessity: If something is, then it ought to be because it is. On the point of the will: "Thus, when a creature wills to do what it is his prerogative to do or not to do, we say that he ought to do it, since what he wills ought to occur." (CDH, II, c. 18 [S.II, 129:3-5: A:/ Ita quando vult aliqua creatura facere quod suum est facere et non facere, dicitur debere facere, quia quod ipsa vult debet esse.]) On the point of subsequent necessity, cf. s. 1, sub. C, and notes #154, 155, and 156 thereunder.

When Anselm speaks of conflicting oughts from the perspective of the Creator and creature, or when he speaks of an unethical act as something which ought not to be from the creature's perspective but ought to be from God's, he is not implying that what is ethically wrong for the creature is ethically right for God. From the perspective of God's permissive will, a creature's unethical act ought to be, not because God effects it or approves it or concedes anything to bring it about, but simply because God sees in eternity that the free choice of the creature inclines towards the unethical and God willingly respects the freedom thereof. And, furthermore, it is the case because nothing is unless God causes it or permits it to be. What the creature decides to be will be, and, hence, ought to be when it is.

In fact, what ought to be from the perspective of God's permissive will might very well be understood as something that ought not to be from the perspective of God's efficient will or divine being. The reason why God permits the occurrence of evil deeds via creaturely free choice, thus granting the status of 'ought to be' to them, lies in the wisdom and goodness of God (cf. DV, c. 8 [S.I, 187:27-31]). Anselm is reluctant to cast doubt or aspersion upon it.

25. And this he does in s. 15. Cf. s. 2, sub. A: re: on the question of moral knowledge. The idea of being obliged, even in Anselm's eyes, calls for knowledge of it and what is required in fulfilling it.
Section 11

1. DCD, c. 18 (S.I, 263:26-27: M:/ ...deum nullo modo posse facere iustum, nisi iustum non faciendo iustum cum possit.). Emphasis was added to the translation.

2. DCD, c. 17 (S.I, 262:19: D:/ Non debet aliquid habere a se.).

3. The point needs to be softened with respect to man and redemption. In his consideration of fallen man's return to justice via the Christ, Anselm holds to the harmony of free choice and the grace of God. But, it is quite clear that of the two harmonizing elements he affords greater importance to the initiative of God: It is God who first offers redemptive grace to the rational creature who is free either to choose or to reject it; then, it is God who subsequently bestows a supportive grace upon he who is redeemed. Cf. DC, III, cc. 4-5, especially; also, s. 1, sub. C: re: grace vis-à-vis the creature without justice.

4. DCD, c. 18 (S.I, 263:5: M:/ Nonne aliquo modo vel cum haberet potuit ipse sibi dare iustitiam?).

5. Ibid. (S.I, 263:6: D:/ Quomodo potuisset?).

6. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 263:7-8). Also, cf. Fac. [PF] and C [PF]. The first and second modes of doing/causing, be they affirmative or negative, indicate proper, direct, or proximate causality. Modes three through six, be they affirmative or negative, indicate improper, indirect, or remote causality.

7. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 263:17). This indicates the fourth mode under the affirmative, general sentential form -- to cause to be (facere esse).

8. Ibid. (S.I, 263:9-12: M:/ Hoc itaque modo potuit ipse dare iustitiam sibi, quia potuit sibi auferre eam et potuit non auferre, quomodo ille qui stetit in veritate in qua factus est, non fecit cum potuit ut eam non haberet, et ita ipse sibi eam dedit, et totum hoc a deo accepit.).

9. This indicates the third mode under the affirmative, general sentential form -- to cause to be (facere esse).


11. Ibid. (S.I, 263:15-16: M:/ Qui ergo hoc modo sibi eam dedit, hoc ipsum a deo accepit ut sibi eam daret.).
12. Ibid. (S.I, 263:28-29: M:/ ...et nullus...fit iniustus nisi sponte deserta iustitia.).

13. It is an instance of the first mode of the negative, general sentential form — to cause not to be (facere non esse).

14. DCD, c. 18 (S.I, 263:30-31: M:/ ...ita deus malum angelum facit iniustum non reddendo illi iustitiam cum possit.). It indicates the fourth mode of the affirmative, general form of 'to cause to be' (facere esse).

15. These temporal distinctions are made for the sake of argument only. They are not to be taken as really applicable to God: They cannot be because God is eternal.

16. Cf. Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), p. 184. In speaking about Anselm on God's indirect causality of injustice, Hopkins expresses the point that "God could have permitted Satan's willing had He chosen to." His subsequent and adversative qualification underscores my position in this critical reflection. He writes: "But Anselm implicitly suggests that God could not have chosen to, because to have done so would have been to violate Satan's freedom. Since this freedom was a good, the removal of freedom would have been an injustice — and God can do no injustice."
Section 12

1. DCD, c. 19 (S.I, 264:3: M:/ Redeamus ad considerationem voluntatis et reminiscamur....).


3. Cf. s. 7, sub. A and B: re: the distinction as mentioned.

4. This distinction between simple evil and relative evil actually arises in s. 13. N.b.: Being called 'evil' refers to being relatively evil and not absolutely evil. Cf. s. 8, sub. C.

5. DCD, c. 19 (S.I, 264:4-5: M:/ ...voluntatem scilicet beatitudinis quidquid velit non esse malum sed esse bonum aliquid, antequam accipiat iustitiam.).

6. At least it is so from Anselm's perspective and in light of his subscription to the privation theory of evil.

7. Anselm offers no a priori proof for the existence of the will or of its being free. He assumes its existence a posteriori and in deference to tradition.

8. DCD, c.19 (S.I, 264:5-7: M:/ Unde consequitur, quia cum deserit acceptam iustitiam, si eadem essentia est quae prius erat, bonum est aliquid quantum ad hoc quod est;....).


10. DCD, c. 19 (S.I, 264:7-8: M:/ ...quantum vero ad hoc quia iustitia non est in illa quae fuit, dicitur mala et iniusta.

11. In view of the last portion of c. 18 in s. 11 and what Anselm propounds in s. 10, it is clear that he considers the rational creature's obligation to have justice to be a debt of gratitude to God. What the creature owes is thanks for the justice that is happiness. Cf. DCD, c. 18 (S.I, 263:19-24). In God, justice and happiness are one and the same: They are one good. Cf. DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 253:29-31).

12. DCD, c. 19 (S.I, 264:8-11: M:/ Nam si velle esse similem deo malum esset, filius dei non velit esse similis patri. Aut si velle quaslibet infimas voluptates esset malum, mala diceretur voluntas brutorum animalium.).
13. Ibid. (S.I, 264:11-12: M:/ Sed nec voluntas filii dei est mala quia est iusta, nec voluntas irrationalis mala dicitur quia non est iniusta.).

14. DIV, c. 11 (S.II, 29:22: ...assumptus a verbo homo....). By this I understand the Incarnate Son of God, Jesus, who assumed a human nature with distinguishing properties, and not another person, into a unity with his divine person, and not with his divine nature. In the one divine person of the Incarnate Word there are really two distinct natures, one divine and the other human. Cf. DIV, c. 9 (S.II, 24:9-12, 19-21), c. 10 (S.II, 28:9-10), c. 11 (S.II, 28:24-25; 29:3-12, 19-26).


16. DCD, c. 19 (S.I, 264: 13-15: M:/ Unde sequitur nullam voluntatem esse malum sed esse bonum inquantum est, quia opus dei est;....).

17. Ibid. (S.I, 264:14-15: M:/ ...nec nisi inquantum est iniusta malam esse.).

18. Ibid. (S.I, 264:15-18: M:/ Et quoniam nulla res dicitur mala nisi mala voluntas aut propter malam voluntatem -- ut malus homo et mala actio --: nihil est apertius quam nullam rem esse malum, nec aliud esse malum quam absentiam iustitiae derelictae in voluntate, aut in aliqua re propter malam voluntatem.).

Section 13


2. DCD, c. 20 (S.I, 265:1-6: D:/ Nam si velle esse similem deo non nihil nec malum sed quiddam bonum est, non nisi ab eo a quo est omne quod est haberi potuit. Si ergo angelus non habuit quod non acceptit: quod habuit, ab illo acceptit a quo habuit. Quid autem ab illo acceptit quod ille non dedit? Quare si habuit velle esse similem deo, ideo habuit quia deus dedit.).

3. Ibid. (S.I, 265:8-10: M:/ ...eum dare malam voluntatem non prohibendo eam cum potest, praesertim cum potestas volendi quidlibet non nisi ab illo sit?).


5. Cf. s. 3, sub. C (3), and notes: re: Anselm's analyses of 'facere' and 'velle,' and the four types of volition.

6. Cf. s. 8, sub. B: re: linguistic impropriety; speaking secundum formam and secundum rem.

7. DCD, c. 20 (S.I, 265:12-15: M:/ Si ergo datio non est sine acceptione: quemadmodum non inusitate dicitur dare et qui sponte concedit et qui non approbando permittit, ita non incongrue dicitur accipere et qui concessa suscipit et qui illicita praesumit.).

8. Cf. WV, ex toto, for textual basis of the following paragraph of questions.


11. DCD, c. 20 (S.I, 265:17-18: M:/ ...cum diabolus voluit quod non debuit, hoc illum a deo et accepisse quia deus permisit....).


13. Cf. DCD, c. 20 (S.I, 265:23-24: M:/ ...quoniam nec velle aliquid nec movere potuit voluntatem nisi illo permettente....). There is one point which must be borne in mind when confronting Anselm's claim that every ability to will obtains through the permission of God: In the case of the creature's ability to will which, when actualized, is morally good, the permission of God obtains along with God's efficient will that the ability be actualized as such. It is God, after all, who gives justice directly to the will. Furthermore, an
efficient will or volition presupposes approval, concession (if applicable), and permission. But, in the case of the creature's ability to will which, when actualized, is morally evil, the permission of God obtains alone. Permissive willing does not presuppose efficiency, approval, or concession. Cf. vv, ex toto.


15. Cf. DCD, c. 20 (S.I, 265:17-10: M:/ Quid ergo dicitus contra veritatem, si dicitus cum diabolus voluit quod non debutit, hoc illum a deo et accepisse quia deus permisit, et non accepisse quia ille non consensit?).

16. Anselm's concluding remark adduces his understanding that an action is a being and, hence, is caused by God. Given his adherence to the convertibility of being and goodness, the being of an action, notwithstanding its moral wretchedness, is, qua being, something good -- it is "really something" (vere aliquid). Cf. DCD, c. 20 (S.I, 266:3-10); also, DCV, c. 4, passim, but especially S.II, 145:29-31.

17. Anselm frequently uses this word interchangeably with 'being' (essentia).

18. DCD, c. 20 (S.I, 265:28: M:/ ...non dei sed volentis sive moventis voluntatem est.).

19. This idea of respect is only implicit in Anselmian thought: It is especially so in DC where he considers the relation between grace and free will. The idea is not peculiar to me alone: Cf. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1977), p. 179. Emphasis on respect will reappear in s. 16, sub. C.


21. See note #3 and translation in the body of the text.


25. It might be tenable with respect to natural evil and physical evil.

26. Cf. CDH, II, c. 10, in toto, for the basis of my view.


Section 14

1. Note #17 contains an important clarification of this point about God.

2. DCD, c. 21 (S.I, 266:15: D:/ Sed vellem scire utrum idem desertor angelus ista de se praesciverit.).


4. DCD, c. 21 (S.I, 266:18: M:/ ...nisi cum certa ratione aliquid intelligitur....).

5. For Anselm, knowledge, strictly speaking, is only of the truth: "...quia scientia non est nisi veritatis." (DC, I, c. 2 [S.II, 248:7].)


7. DCD, c. 21 (S.I, 266:19-20: M:/ Quod enim non esse potest, nequaquam esse certa potest colligi ratione.)


9. Cf. DCD, c. 21 (S.I, 266:21-22: M:/ Quapropter constat nullatenus illum quivisse praescire casum suum, quem necesse non erat esse futurum.)

10. Ibid. (S.I, 266:24-25: D:/ ...nec posse non esse futurum quod praescitur.)

11. Ibid. (S.I, 266:21-22: M:/ ...nullatenus illum quivisse praescire casum suum, quem necesse non erat esse futurum.)


13. Cf. DC, I, c. 1 (S.II, 246:8: ...qui praescit omnia futura.)

14. This question is not put by the interlocutors. It is, however, left to be implied by the reader, especially after the preceding consideration of creaturely foreknowledge and the claim that a creature's will is not necessitated.

15. DCD, c. 21. (S.I, 267:4-6: D:/ Cum...constet divinam praescientiam esse omnium quae fiunt libero arbitrio, nec aliquid horum sit ex necessitate: nihilominus videtur posse non esse futurum quod praescitur.). Also, cf. DC, I, c. 1 (S.II, 246:14-16).
16. Confer, in particular, cc. 1-3. Chapters 4-5 are important Boethian-inspired [cf. CP, V, 6, prose] complements which focus on the eternity of God with remarks on the knowledge of God.

17. DCD, c. 21 (S.I, 267:7-11: M:/ Praescientia dei non proprie dicitur praescientia. Cui enim semper omnia sunt praesentia, non habet futurorum praescientiam, sed praesentium scientiam. Cum ergo alia sit ratio de praescientia futurae quam de praesentis rei scientia, non est necesse divinam praescientiam et illam de qua quaerimus eandem habere consequentiam.).

It is in view of this clarification that I maintain at the very beginning of this section that, strictly speaking, God does not have foreknowledge of the creature's fall.

18. Cf. Boethius, CP, V, 6, prose; and, to a certain extent, Augustine at the end of DeCD, V, c. 9, where he focuses on the sense in which the rational will is foreknown by God: It is determined as knowledge, as certain and true, in the mind of God. God knows infallibly, and as such determinately, that which will occur voluntarily. God's knowledge of the voluntary is determinate inasmuch as being infallible.


20. Cf. DCD, c. 21 (S.I, 267:10-11: M:/ ...non est necesse divinam praescientiam et illam de qua quaerimus eandem habere consequentiam.).

21. Ibid. (S.I, 267:8-10: M:/ ...non habet futurorum praescientiam, sed praesentium scientiam.).

22. Cf. DC, I, c. 3 (S.II, 250:13-20) for the general expression of this point. It is not explicitly expressed with respect to God, though implicitly it is applicable to God.

23. Cf. ibid., ex toto.


26. Ibid. (S.II, 249:8-9 [without ellipsis]: Non enim aliud significat haec necessitas, nisi quia quod erit non poterit simul non esse.).

27. Cf. ibid. (S.II, 250:25-27: Quapropter cum dicimus quia quod Deus praescit futurum necesse est esse futurum, non asserimus semper rem esse necessitate futuram, sed rem futuram necessitate esse futurum. Non enim potest futurum simul non esse futurum.).
28. Cf. DC, I, c. 2 (S.II, 247:14 - 248:2) and c. 3 (S.II, 250:31 - 251:2).


31. Cf. s. 1, sub. B and C: re: respectively, the Creator as the God of love and the merciful justice of God.


33. The following explanation details Anselm's afore-mentioned claim that the rational creature could not have willingly foreknown his fall. See note #29 and the text.

34. DCD, c. 21 (S.I, 268:31-32: M:/ ...nec quamdiu voluit in veritate perseverare, ullo modo putare potuit se sola voluntate illam deserturum.).

35. Ibid. (S.I, 268:33 - 269:1: M:/ ...quamdiu rectam voluntatem habuit, in hac ipsa voluntate voluisse perseverare.).

36. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 269:1-3: M/: Quapropter volendo tenere perseveranter quod tenebat, nullo modo video unde potuisset vel suspicari nulla alia accedente causa sola se illud deserturum voluntate.). N.b.: The remark on 'freely' (sponte) is grounded in S.I, 269:5.

37. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 269:3-4: M:/ Non nego illum scivisse quia potest mutare voluntatem quam tenebat...).

38. Cf. s. 3, sub. C (2): re: relation between intellect and will; on why the intellect is less powerful than the will.
Section 15


2. DCD, c. 22 (S.I, 269:12-13: D:/ ...se non debere velle quod praevacaricando voluit.).

3. Ibid. (S.I, 269:19-20: M:/ Denique quoniam ita rationalis erat, ut nulla re prohiberetur uti ratione, non ignorabat quid debere aut non debere velle.).

4. Ibid. (S.I, 269:14-16: M:/ Si enim nescisset se non debere velle quod iniuste voluit, ignorasset se debere voluntatem tenere quam deservit.).

5. Ibid. (S.I, 269:16-17: M:/ ...nec iustus esset tenendo, nec iniustus deserendo iustitiam quam nescisset.).

6. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 269:17-19: M:/ Immo nec poterat non velle plus quam habebat, si nesciebat se debere esse contentum eo quod acceperat.).


9. DCD, c. 23 (S.I, 269:29: M:/ ...ita quia puniretur si peccaret scire non debuit.).


11. Cf. DCD, c. 23 (S.I, 270:1-3). This claim does not hold with respect to the human being who is burdened by a corruptible body.

12. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 270:4-18). I have paraphrased the argument with deletions of Anselm's references to angelic and human natures. Though interesting, they are not very germane to the point he wants to convey here. By deleting them I have secured my reading of DCD as Anselm's broad theodicean effort -- one that is readable in terms of angelic beings or human beings or both.

13. Cf. DC, II, ex toto.

14. I have inserted clarifying phrases into the translation. They are textually sensitive. DCD, c. 23 (S.I, 270:20 - 271:14: M:/ Redeams ad hoc quod dixeram, illum scilicet hanc non debuisse habere scientiam. Si enim scivisset, non posset volens et habens beatitudinem sponte velle unde miser esset. Quare non esset iustus non volendo quod non deberet, quoniam non posset velle. Sed et hac ratione considera utrum
The last dialogic instance might not be a conclusion even though the translation reads as if it is. It might not be if the argument of c. 24 is an integral extension of c. 23. Without access to the manuscripts, I am hard pressed to determine whether the argument of c. 24 continues c. 23. F.S. Schmitt's critical apparatus does not indicate that the first part of c. 24 is found as the ending of c. 23 in any of the manuscripts used by him. If it were found, then I would have reason to think that the argument of c. 24 is indeed an integral extension of c. 23. (I reasonably suspect that Schmitt would have indicated it, if it were, notwithstanding the fact that he does not cite, as J. Hopkins claims, all of the variant manuscript readings which he had before him). One might argue convincingly that the contents of both chapters are so related that they should be considered an argumentative unit anyway. For Hopkins' appraisal of Schmitt's apparatus, see "Appendix III: Addenda and Corrigenda for F.S. Schmitt's Sancti Anselmi opera omnia, Vols. I and II" in Anselm of Canterbury, v. 4 (Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1976), pp. 174-175.

15. This claim is put forth by Marilyn McCord Adams in "Ockham on Willing Evil," p. 17 of section 2 -- a paper presented to the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in the University of Toronto on March 25, 1994.

16. DCD, c. 24 (S.I, 272:4-7: M:/ Nonne multo nitidius placet eius perseverantia cum illa sola perseverandi causa videtur in illo quae utilis est et honesta, quia spontanea, quam si simul illa sese ostenderet quae inutilis et inhonesta, quia necessaria intelligitur?).


18. Jn. 8:32: ...et cognoscetis veritatem, et veritas liberabit vos.


20. Anselm's remark that there is no example of justice punishing injustice is understood by me to be an understated reference to God. Cf. DCD, c. 23 (S.I, 270:9).
21. Cf. Pros., cc. 9-11; also, s. 1, sub. C: re: the merciful justice of God; the harmony of justice, goodness, and mercy. I suspect that I might be inadvertently sounding a soteriological tone by using the word 'mercy.' It does not sound in DCD, and it is not supposed to sound either.

22. Agreement on this point can be found in F.B. Brown's consideration of Anselmian aesthetics in CDH. He writes: "That Anselm trusts God to be reasonable and orderly is indicated by Anselm's very confidence that God's ways are in some measure accessible to rational analysis. Although God's reality transcends what our own reason can know, divine orderliness and rationality permit faith to search for an understanding...." Cf. idem, "The Beauty of Hell: Anselm on God's Eternal Design," Journal of Religion, 73, No. 3 (July 1993), p. 334.

23. CDH, I, c. 13 (S.II, 71:7-8: A: Nihil minus tolerandum in rerum ordine, quam ut creatura creatori debitum honorem auferat et non solvat quod aufert.).


26. A contrary point of view is presented by George Schedler in "Anselm and Aquinas on the Fall of Satan: A Case Study of Retributive Punishment," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 56 (1982), pp. 61-64. Based upon his reading of DCD alone (as evidenced by his endnotes), he holds that Anselm has a 'deontological' view of punishment. By this he means that there is no logical or metaphysical connection between punishment and sin; conceivably, sin could pass by God unpunished or unredressed. I readily agree with Schedler that Anselm does give a 'deontological' impression in DCD. But he does so only in DCD. In light of the whole Anselmian corpus, Anselm's view of retributive punishment is more clearly the 'natural law' position which Schedler sees in Aquinas: that is, that moral transgression is in itself punishment, that moral disorder must be righted, and that punishment is restorative.


29. CDH, II, c. 13 (S.II, 113:9-13: A: Ignorantiam vero non poterit assumere sapienter, quia numquam est utilis sed semper noxia, nisi forte cum per eam mala voluntas, quae numquam in illo erit, ab effectu restringitur. Nam etsi aliquando ad aliiud non nocet, hoc solo tamen nocet, quia scientia bonum aufert.).
Section 16

1. I have in mind the Augustinian tradition on the so-called aesthetic aspect of evil. Cf., for instance, Augustine, EFSC, cc. 96, 100-101; Conf., VII, c. 13; DeLA, III, cc. 10-13; and DeCD, XI, c. 23. Also, see Plotinus, The Enneads, III, 2.17; and Boethius, CP, IV, 6, prose.

2. It would be foolish to look for an Anselmian aesthetics: One does not exist. Thus, my speaking as if there were one might very well be inappropriate. Pertinence obtains, however, and justifiably so, in light of Anselm's use of a few words which, in their proper context, suggest singly and collectively that the idea of metaphysical and moral aesthetics was not foreign to him. His spare use of the Latin 'pulchritudo' in various case-forms and parts of speech is accented by more frequent employment of the noun 'convenientia,' the adjectives 'conveniens' and 'decens,' the adverbs 'convenienser' and 'decenter,' and their negatives. Use of 'decere' and the impersonal verb 'oportet' is also prominent. All speak to some sense of an Anselmian aesthetics: 'Pulchritudo' as 'beauty' speaks for itself, if only in a most pedestrian sense of a judgment of something that is intellectual, moral, or physical and indicative of the depths of one's feelings. It is because of the other words that Anselm's sense of the aesthetic gains whatever precision and intelligibility it has: Beauty can be finely distinguished in terms of order, rightness, harmony, and fittingness. These senses abound throughout the Anselmian corpus and, most especially, throughout CDH. Therein Anselm's idea of beauty is best expressed synthetically in terms of metaphysical order and balance, ethical rightness, soteriological fittingness, and loving harmony.


The true basis and parameters of beauty -- of the aesthetic dimension of the metaphysical, ethical, and soteriological realms -- are found only in God. In order to envision the beauty of any one: in order to behold the beauty of the universe, the comeliness of the personal and moral agent, and the loveliness of the sinful world's restoration, it is necessary to seek and to understand the God who is the beauty of the fittingness that is rectitude, the rightness that is justice, and the harmony that is love. Anselm can be marshalled with neo-platonic thinkers insofar as holding that God is beauty and all that is beautiful is so in accordance with the transcendent, supreme, and
For God is the absolute measure of beauty and the quintessential standard for perceiving it in anything and everything.


5. For the next three paragraphs, cf. DCD, c. 25 (S.I, 272:15-273:2).


7. DCD, c. 25 (S.I, 273:3-6: D:/ Valde pulchra esset huius scientiae atque impotentia ista tua contemplatio, si quemadmodum asseris ideo bono angelo eadem scientia et impotentia quia perseveravit contigissent. Non enim eas adeptus esse videtur quia ipse perseveravit, sed quia desertor non perseveravit.). Also, cf. S.I, 273:13-14: D. challenging M:/ ...tanto magis necesse est ut ostendas istum non ideo adeptum esse scientiam de qua agit tur quia ille peccavit.

8. Ibid. (S.I, 273:15-17: M:/ Non debes dicere ideo bonum angelum ad scientiam hanc profecisse quia malus peccavit, sed bonum angelum ideo profecisse ad hanc scientiam exemplo cadentis, quia ille peccavit.).

9. Cf. ibid. (S.I, 273:21: M:/ ...exemplo eius istum docuit quod docturus erat....).

10. Ibid. (S.I, 273:17-19: M:/ Si enim neuter peccasset, utrique daturus erat deus eandem scientiam merito perseverantiae alio modo sine alicuius cadentis exemplo.).

11. For similar expressions of the point about to be quoted, cf. CDH, I, c. 7 (S.II, 57:12-13) and c. 15 (S.II, 73:17-19, 20-21); also, Ep. 169 (S.IV, 49:76-78).

12. DCD, c. 25 (S.I, 273:22-23: M:/ ...sed maior potestia qua de malo bonum facere potuit, ut nec malum inordinatum in regno omnipotentis sapientiae remaneret.).

13. Cf. DCD, c. 6 (S.I, 243:29, in preceding context) and, to some extent, c. 25 (S.I, 273:3-5).

14. Cf. CDH, I, c. 3 (S.II, 50:31 - 51:3) and c. 6 (S.II, 53:5 - 54:1).

15. In addition to DC, III, cc. 1-6, which instruct on the point, cf. DCV, c. 11 (S.II, 153:24-29: Solius quippe voluntatis dei opus est...cum noxiae voluntates a suo impetu sola gratia regente ad hoc quod prodest convertuntur, cum alia multa fiunt, quae nec creatura nec eius voluntas per usitatum cursum suum operaretur.).

17. CDH, I, c. 6 (S.II, 53:11 - 54:1: B:/ ... et quia haec omnia hoc modo fecit, ostendit quandom nos diligeret....).

18. CDH, I, c. 3 (S.II, 50:31 - 51:3: A:/ ...quia quanto nos mirabilius et præter opinionem de tantis et tam debitis malis in quibus eramus, ad tanta et tam indebita bona quae perdideramus, restituit, tanto maiorem dilectionem erga nos et pietatem monstravit.)


20. MCT (S.III, 83:95-101: Peccator sum ego, domine, peccator sum ego. Si ergo non vis peccatoris mortem: quid te cogit quod non vis, ut me tradas ad mortem? Si vis ut convertatur peccator et vivat: quid te prohibit facere quod vis, ut me convertas et vivam? An immanitas peccati mei cogit te quod non vis et prohibit quod vis, cum sis omnipotens deus?). On the whole, this meditation should not be read just as an Anselmian lament over the loss of physical virginity and the gain of illicit sexual intercourse (over Anselm's own experience?). It lends itself very easily to such a reading. In my view, virginity and fornication are Anselmian metaphors: The former bespeaks the purity of a soul in the grace of justice and with the virtues that grace founds; the latter signifies its impurity.

21. CDH, I, c. 20 (S.II, 87:15-17: A:/ Et natura te docet, ut conservo tuo, id est homo homini, facias, quod tibi ab illo vis fieri....).


25. There is one exception to this claim: After making satisfaction and sealing it sacramentally, the creature might slip recidivously and reject thereafter every prodding of God's grace to move him towards moral reformation before the end of his life. As such, he is a candidate for punishment. The sense, but not the letter, of this exception is conveyed in Anselm's epistles to individuals and religious communities to whom he offers moral and spiritual advice.
26. Cf. CDH, I, c. 11 (S.II, 68:10). In short, according to Anselm, this is what sin is.

27. This is contrary to John Hick in *Evil and the God of Love* (London: Macmillan and Company Limited, 1966), p. 95, who maintains that if all evil is not returned to good, then God's creation is forever marred. His claim is directed at Augustine and most certainly at those, like Anselm, who follow in the Augustinian tradition.

28. Cf. DCV, c. 6, ex toto.

29. Cf. CDH, I, c. 24 (S.II, 94:8-10).


34. For the sense of this obligation in the context of Anselm's reference to someone stealing something from someone else: cf. CDH, I, c. 11 (S.II, 68:22-23: A:/ Nec sufficit solummodo reddere quod ablatum est, sed pro contumelia illata plus debet reddere quam abstulit.).

35. CDH, I, c. 11 (S.II, 68:23-27: A:/ Sicut enim qui laedit salutem alterius, non sufficit si salutem restituit, nisi pro illata doloris injuria recompenset aliquid: ita qui honorem alicuius violat non sufficit honorem reddere, si non secundum exhonorationis factam molestiam aliquid, quod placeat illi quem exhonoravit, restituit.).


37. CDH, I, c. 21 (S.II, 89:4-8: B:/ Cum considero actionem ipsam, levissimum quidem video esse; sed cum intueor quid sit contra voluntatem dei, gravissimum quiddam et nulli damno comparabile intelligo.).

38. Ep. 403 (S.V, 348:24-26: Nolite putare aliquod peccatum esse parvum, quamvis alius alio sit maius. Nihil enim quod fit per inoboedientiam -- quae sola eiecit hominem de paradiso --, parvum dici debet.).
39. *Idem, DDQ, #35 (CC, v. 44a, 52:56-58: Et quoniam id quod amatur afficiat ex se amantem necesse est, fit ut sic amatum quod aeternum est aeternitate animum afficiat.).*

40. *Cf. DCV, c. 23 (S.II, 165:28 - 166:1).*

41. *CDH, I, c. 23 (S.II, 91:5, 8: A:/ Quid abstulit homo deo, cum vinci se permisit a diabolo? ...Nonne abstulit deo, quidquid de humana natura facere proposuerat?).*
Section 17

1. Cf. DCD, c. 26 (S.I, 274:25-26: D:/ Sic mihi de malo quod est iniustitia satisfecisti, ut iam omnis in corde meo quae de illo inesse solebat quaestio sit detera.).

2. Cf. DCD, c. 12 (S.I, 254:25-26). Rational creatures have a natural inclination for the beneficial and for avoiding the disadvantageous.


4. Cf. DCV, c. 5 (S.II, 146:11-13) in the context of lines 3-19. It is a clearer and more precise restatement of the very point of DCD, c. 26, that is being considered here.

5. DCD, c. 26 (S.I, 274:16-19: M:/ Cum autem dicimus quia iniustitia facit rapinam, aut caecitas facit hominem cadere in foveam, nequaquam intelligendum est quod iniustitia vel caecitas aliquid faciant; sed quod si iustitia esset in voluntate et visus in oculo, nec rapina fieret nec casus in foveam.).


7. DC, I, c. 7 (S.II, 259:2-4: Qui tamen facit omnes actiones et omnes motus, quia ipse facit res, a quibus et ex quibus et per quas et in quibus fiunt; et nulla res habet ullam potestatem volendi aut faciendi nisi illo dante.).


9. Cf. DCD, c. 21 (S.I, 268:22-23). Also, see DC, I, c. 7 (S.II, 258:26-27). Anselm considers some pain to be the regular effect of certain states of affairs: Pain and suffering can be that which ought to be in virtue of the nature of the thing experiencing it. See. DV, c. 8 (S.I, 187:33 - 188:4).

10. At least with reference to natural and physical evils, cf. Augustine, DeCD, XII, cc. 4-5. The mutations of animate and inanimate beings can be inconvenient. For this reason, they might be called 'evil.' But Augustine prefers to see them in their own right as parts of and contributions to the development and fulfillment of God's creation. Simply put: In the scheme of
the divine plan, they have a raison d'être. Also, cf. DeCD, XI, c. 23: re: on "apparent evil" in the universe.


12. Cf. DCD, c. 26 (S.I, 274:29-30: D:/ De malo vero quod est incommoditas, si aliquando est aliquid, nihil video rectae fidei obviare.)

13. That is, the idea that the entire human race originates from the same two parents: Cf. DCV, c. 10, in toto.

14. Cf. Rm. 5:12; 8:10. Also, cf. DCV, c. 2 (S.II, 141:8-15), c. 7 (S.II, 148:21-25), and c. 22 (S.II, 162:11-13).

15. DCV, c. 27 (S.II, 70:21-23: Per quas duas nuditates in huius vitae exilio expositi sunt, et patentes peccatis et miseris incessanter ubique occurruntibus et undique irruentibus....)

16. Cf. Heb. 12:1-12; Rm. 5:3-4; and II Cor. 12:7-10.


25. Cf. MRH, in toto. CDH also speaks to the point.

26. For the foundational sense of fides quaerens intellectum, cf. Pros., c. 1; DIV, c. 1; and the preface to CDH: Commendatio ad Urbanum Papeam II.

Section 18

1. This consideration is more expository than I would like it to be. The claim that I want to make is very entwined in the dialogue. Thus, I am compelled to follow and explicate the text as closely as possible. And because this section is Anselm's summary conclusion, much of my explication will sound repetitious. Even the point that concerns me is repetitive: It focuses on Anselm's sense of the 'will as affection' and the 'will as use.' These I explicated in s. 3. In this section, I reemphasize the distinction between the two as it appears unclearly in this section. It is crucial to do so with respect to the point that I raise against Anselm in sub. C. Elucidation of the will as affection and desire forces one to see the will's connection with the intellect. It is a connection that Anselm tends to understate. His tendency, I think, should call into question the frankness and thoroughness of his consideration of the will as the sole efficient cause at the origin of moral evil.

2. DCD, c. 27 (S.I, 275:5-7: D:/ ...unde primum venit malum quod dicitur iniustitia sive peccatum, in angelum qui factus est iustus.).

3. Ibid. (S.I, 275:17-18: M:/ ...sed ipse deseruit eam volendo quod non debuit.).

4. Ibid. (S.I, 275:21-23: M:/ Nam ideo illam deseruit, quia voluit quod velle non debuit; et hoc modo, id est volendo quod non debuit illam deseruit.). N.b.: Emphasis was added to the translation in order to draw attention to the distinct senses of the will as Anselm understands and uses here.


6. DCD, c. 27 (S.I, 275:24: D:/ Cur voluit quod non debuit?).

7. Ibid. (S.I, 275:25: M:/ Nulla causa praecesset hanc voluntatem, nisi quia velle potuit.). Emphasis was added to the translation.

8. Cf. Augustine, DeCD, XII, cc. 6-7. The point about there being no external cause is made clear. It is quite difficult not to believe that Anselm carefully read and considered these two chapters, plus cc. 8-9, when he penned DCD.

9. DCD, c. 27 (S.I, 275:28: M:/ Nam nullus vult quod velle potest ideo quia potest, sine alia causa....). Emphasis was added to the translation.

10. Ibid. (S.I, 275:31: M:/ Non nisi quia voluit.).
11. This parenthetical point bespeaks Anselm's sensitivity to Augustine's attempt to understand the "efficiency" of the will. Augustine's effort led him instead to speak conclusively, though not very clearly, of its "deficiency." For him, there was no efficient cause; there was only the will's defection from loving God. Augustine clearly denies any external efficient cause with respect to the will, but it is uncertain whether he rejects an understanding of the will as an efficient cause in and of itself. Based on DeCD, XII, cc. 6 and 9, I think that he does not reject such an understanding, even though he does not explicate it. He must account for the will's defection in terms of causality: He does not do so and, furthermore, he admits that he is unable to do so: "To try to discover the causes of such defections -- deficient, not efficient causes -- is," he says in DeCD, XII, c. 6, "like trying to see darkness or to hear silence." (CC, v. 48, 362:4-7: Causas porro defectionum istorum, cum efficientes non sint, ut dixi, sed deficientes, velle invenire tale est, ac si quisquam velit videre tenebras vel audire silentium....) Augustine's sense of deficiency pertains only to creatures: They are capable of experiencing deficiency and corruptibility because they were created from nothing (cf. DeCD, XII, c. 8; DNB, c. 10). This view, I think, unfavorably implicates the God who created ex nihilo and who, it would seem, ontologically positioned creatures from the very start for the possibility of incurring moral deficiency. It is not simply a point of the freedom of the will, as Anselm sees it, but now, as Augustine either wittingly or unwittingly suggests, of the corruptible being of the creature who has such a will. If this is Augustine's position, then it bespeaks either his confusion of the ontological and ethical or his failure to distinguish clearly between the two. (However, he might be distinguishing in DeCD, XII, c. 3, when he says that a nature is evil insofar as it has been vitiated, but insofar as being a nature it is a good. Also, see DNB, cc. 4, 6; and EFSC, c. 12.) More importantly, it and the implication suggest to me why Anselm so adamantly rejects any sense of deficiency in s. 5 and in s. 7 so clearly distinguishes between ontological goodness and being morally good or evil.

12. DCD, c. 27 (S.I, 275:31-33: M:/ Nam haec voluntas nullam aliam habuit causam qua impelleretur aliquatenus aut attraheretur, sed ipsa sibi efficiens fuit, si dici potest, et effectum.).

13. Cf. DCD, c. 28, ex toto.

14. The claims are underlined in the nineth and tenth paragraphs of sub. B. Confer.

15. Cf. s. 3, sub. B (first part thereof) and all accompanying notes: re: concept of ability.

17. Cf. s. 5, sub. B and C, especially; also, see s. 3, sub. C (2), and s. 14, sub. B and C: re: the same point.


19. Cf. s. 2, ex toto: re: the same point.


21. As opposed to existing most truly and eternally in the mind of God. Cf. s. 1, sub. B: re: the same point.
In oboedientia
totus vigor bene vivendi construitur,
in eius negligentia destruitur.

St. Anselm of Canterbury
Epistle 231
(S.IV, 137:34-35).
PRIMARY SOURCES

Anselmian Works

Texts:


*De humanis moribus per similitudines*. In *Memorials of St. Anselm*, 39-104.


Translations:


N.b.: Except for the Anselmian memorials, all translations of Anselm's works are based on F.S. Schmitt's critical edition. The author of this dissertation is most grateful for the excellent translations of scholars cited above and below (for non-Anselmian works). Occasionally, slight changes were made to them in order to effect a literal translation; at times, words and explanations were interpolated in brackets for the sake of clarification and precise understanding. Most of the Memorials of St. Anselm were translated literally by the author of this dissertation.

Non-Anselmian Works

Texts and Translations:


(Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide et spe et caritate, CC, v. 46.)

(De gratia et libero arbitrio, PL, v. 44: 881-912)

(De genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, CSEL, v. 28.)

(De libero arbitrio, CSEL, v. 74.)

(De bono perseverantia, PL, v. 45: 993-1034.)

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