FEMINIZING PARTY ORGANIZATIONS:
THE CASES OF THE PARTI SOCIALISTE FRANÇAIS,
THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS AND THE ONTARIO NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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This thesis investigates the initiatives launched during the 1970s and early 1980s in three social democratic or left-of-centre parties, the Parti socialiste français (PS), Parti québécois (PQ) and Ontario New Democratic Party (ONDP), in order to increase women's share of local, intermediate and top party positions. While the PS has used positive discrimination (in the form of a quota), the PQ and ONDP have used affirmative action (in the form of support services for women aspiring to hold party office and numerical targets respectively). If one were to rank each party's approach to feminization from the most formal and compulsory to the least formal and voluntary, the PS would be first, the ONDP second and the PQ third.

More specifically, the thesis examines the circumstances surrounding the official adoption of these pro-feminization measures and, above all, the impact they have had on women's numerical representation. Overall, longitudinal statistics reveal that feminization in terms of numbers has been low in the PS, moderate in the PQ and high in the ONDP. In other words, the ONDP numerical targets have been the most effective in boosting women's involvement in party life, and the PS quota has been the least effective. Although more effective than the PS quota, the PQ support services have not had as tangible an impact as the ONDP requirements. To explain why these three initiatives have produced different results, factors identified in previous studies of women's representation in traditional political institutions are examined. Such studies tend to
consider factors both external and internal to political parties. External factors include: the discourse and activities of the second-wave women's movement with regards to the need for greater female political involvement and whether party support is stagnating/declining or expanding. The role that women's committees or secretariats play as female auxiliaries or feminist lobbies; how party men and women perceive the need for special measures to enhance women's share of positions; and the extent to which internal party structures (and, in particular, the selection process of officials) are centralized (or elite-controlled) or decentralized (or rank-and-file controlled) can be identified as internal factors. While the three cases highlight the crucial role of the women's movement in pressuring party organizations to take pro-feminization initiatives and in ensuring that these are carried out, they also suggest that internal factors account more directly than external factors for the low, moderate and high feminization of each party.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCPF</td>
<td>Comité de coordination des problèmes féminins</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Confédération des socialistes indépendants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERES</td>
<td>Centre d’études, de recherches et d’éducation socialistes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNF</td>
<td>Commission nationale féminine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDFS</td>
<td>Groupe des femmes socialistes</td>
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<td>GFS</td>
<td>Groupe féministe socialiste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mouvement Arc-en-Ciel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>Mouvement démocratique féminin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLF</td>
<td>Mouvement de libération des femmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>Mouvement républicain populaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P&amp;P</td>
<td>Politique et psychanalyse/Psychanalyse et politique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Parti communiste français</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Parti socialiste français</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFP</td>
<td>Réseau femmes pour la parité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>Rassemblement pour la république</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFIO</td>
<td>Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFCS</td>
<td>Union féminine civique et sociale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFF</td>
<td>Union des femmes françaises</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AFEAS</td>
<td>Association féminine d’éducation et d’action sociale</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPF</td>
<td>Comité d’action politique des femmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAPF</td>
<td>Comité national d’action politique des femmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Conseil du statut de la femme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSF</td>
<td>Comité provincial du suffrage féminin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFLQ</td>
<td>Fédération des femmes libérales du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLFQ</td>
<td>Front de libération des femmes du Québec</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRAPPE</td>
<td>Femmes regroupées pour l’accès au pouvoir politique et économique</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWLM</td>
<td>Montreal Women’s Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLQ</td>
<td>Parti libéral du Québec</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Parti social-démocrate</td>
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<td>PQ</td>
<td>Parti québécois</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Affirmative Action Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHCCW</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Committee of Canadian Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEW</td>
<td>Committee for the Equality of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPC</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFL</td>
<td>Ontario Federation of Labour</td>
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<td>OLP</td>
<td>Ontario Liberal Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONDP</td>
<td>Ontario New Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCPO</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Participation of Women (Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWJC</td>
<td>Toronto Women's Joint Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWLC</td>
<td>Toronto Women's Literary Club</td>
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<td>WPA</td>
<td>Women for Political Action</td>
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**Canada**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Co-operative Commonwealth Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCERPF</td>
<td>Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCSW</td>
<td>Royal Commission on the Status of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Reform Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPC</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Canada</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Despite the rise in anti-party sentiment and politics presently observable in many Western liberal democracies, political parties remain vital agencies of representation. To begin with, they aggregate various interests and issues in their electoral platforms. As blueprints for future government policies, these platforms help voters decide which party to support at election time. Political parties also recruit, prepare and select candidates and, by extension, government personnel. In other words, parties, which are often identified as one of the main linkages between citizens and governments, are essential to citizens' exercise of political rights, namely, voting, contesting elections and representing constituents. However, as women's perennial under-representation in the democratic institutions of Western liberal democracies suggests, the tendency of political parties to promote mostly men has in effect transformed women into second-class citizens who frequently vote, but are far less likely to run for office and represent constituents.

It is not surprising that male-dominated organizations such as parties recruit primarily men to legislative and government positions. Indeed, why would organizations whose internal governing bodies are predominantly male produce gender-balanced parliamentary groups and/or governments? Parties that have been promoting women to their internal decision-making organs for some time are more likely to champion equal gender representation in politics than parties that have not done so. *Det norske Arbeiderparti*, Norway's largest and most influential party, is a case in point. In 1979, this labour party adopted a quota of 40% women in all its governing organs and extended this rule to candidacies a year later. It did not take very long before Norway was credited with having one of the most feminized legislatures and governments in the world. Since the
election in May 1986 of a Labour government led by Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norway's first female Prime Minister, all Norwegian cabinets have included at least 40% women (Skjeie 1993, 231). Thus, to understand why women have been under-represented in democratic institutions and, above all, how this imbalance can be remedied, it is essential to examine the initiatives that political parties have launched in order to feminize their internal organization.

Bashevkin ([1985b] 1993, 108) and Lovenduski and Norris (1993, 13, 320) point out that parties of the left have been more willing than those of the centre and right to make special efforts to enhance women's presence in governing party bodies. In keeping with their respective conception of the state and what its role ought to be, the former parties have opted for interventionist measures such as quotas, numerical targets and support services while the latter parties have adopted a more laissez-faire approach consisting primarily of public statements in favour of gender equality. Therefore, just as Michels (1962) set out to study the democratic procedures of political organizations that were the most committed to democratic ideals, notably, the German Social Democratic Party and labour unions, it is appropriate to focus on the efforts of left-leaning (and generally more women-friendly) parties to feminize their internal organization.

This study examines the formal steps that three left-of-centre parties, the *Parti socialiste français* (PS), *Parti québécois* (PQ) and Ontario New Democratic Party (ONDP), initially took in the 1970s and early 1980s to increase the proportion of women in their local, intermediate and top governing organs. In 1974, the PS adopted a quota of 10% women in party bodies which it increased to 20% in 1979 and 30% in 1990. Since its establishment in 1977, the women's committee of the PQ has launched numerous initiatives designed to boost female involvement in party life. Lastly, in February 1982, the ONDP passed its affirmative action resolution which
urged riding executives and required provincial council delegations, the provincial executive and party committees to equally represent men and women. In brief, the thesis investigates how these initiatives were introduced and formally adopted by the PS, PQ and ONDP and to what extent they have feminized party organs.

Before expanding on the research questions, methodology and findings of the study, we shall review two relevant bodies of literature, those dealing with political parties and women in politics. We shall then begin with an examination of French and North American (including American, English Canadian and Quebec) treatments of political parties and women in politics.

**Literature Review**

**Political parties**

In her review of seven books on political parties, Lawson (1990) makes a useful distinction between works that look at parties "from the outside" and those that examine them "from the inside." The "outside" approach includes, for example, analyses by Duverger (1964), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and Sartori (1976) of party systems and Sorauf's (1984) book on American parties in elections and government. The "inside" approach, on the other hand, consists of works that examine parties as organizations. These studies are generally concerned with the internal structures of parties (the local, intermediate and top governing party bodies) and/or their personnel (the members, activists and leaders). Since the thirteenth research volume of Canada's Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (RCERPF) contains pieces on the distribution of power and selection of party leaders and candidates within Canadian federal parties and other internal party matters, it is accurate to say that it belongs to the inner party scholarship
launched in part by Michels (1962) and Duverger (1964). Overall, however, the party literature has paid considerably more attention to party systems, parties in elections and parties in government than to internal party organizations (Lemieux 1993, 43-44). The wide availability of election statistics and legislative records as well as the difficulty of obtaining reliable data from parties explain the dominance of the "outside" approach (Lawson 1990, 106-107).

Two main questions have driven the study of party systems: first, why do party systems take specific forms? And second, why do they endure or change? (Lawson 1990, 106). In Political Parties, Duverger (1964) argues that the electoral system of a country determines its particular type of party system. While proportional representation generates multi-party systems, single-member plurality tends to produce two-party systems. Subsequently, Sartori (1976) provided a more complex typology of party systems based on the number of relevant parties, the extent of polarization, and the degree of stability and representativeness. Sartori's (1976) typology is now widely accepted in the comparative party literature (Mair 1990, 19).

Up until the 1960s, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and other students of party systems highlighted the stability of party systems. Nevertheless, following the electoral volatility and new protest movements of the 1970s, some American academics became preoccupied with the declining appeal of established parties among voters and political activists and the extent to which this phenomenon altered party systems (Mair 1990, 11). For instance, Lawson and Merkl's (1988) collection of eighteen case studies from all over the world examines the conditions associated with the failure of parties to link citizens and the state and the emergence of alternative organizations to provide this linkage. Meisel (1979) was among the first to apply the "decline-of-party thesis" to Canada. Defenders of this thesis and party system transformation found support for their view
in the eclipse of the New Democrats and Progressive Conservatives by the *Bloc québécois* and Reform Party in the 1993 Canadian elections. As Ware (1995) points out, however, the major electoral upheavals that Canada, Italy and Japan underwent in the first half of the 1990s did not necessarily signal either the death of traditional parties or party system transformation. Along the same lines, Tanguay and Gagnon ([1989] 1996, 1-5) and Mair (1995) note that despite the failure of political parties to operate as representative organizations and the rise of anti-party sentiment and politics, it is premature to conclude that parties are withering away. Indeed, political parties do have an extraordinary capacity to adapt to social change and ensure their own survival (Mair 1990, 12-13; Wolinetz 1988, 312-314).

Studies of internal party structures usually focus on how power is distributed among party organs. More precisely, they seek to determine which bodies make and carry out significant decisions. These decisions involve the formulation of party policies, programs and strategies, and the selection of party officials and candidates. Since a textual analysis of party statutes tends to give an "idealistic" (as opposed to "realistic") view of power distribution, it is wise to follow Pelletier's (1991) example and supplement such an analysis with interviews and/or, as Schonfeld (1991, 274) suggests, participant or non-participant observation (Lawson 1976, 77-79).

Michels (1962), Duverger (1964) and Eldersveld (1964) treat power distribution within party organizations somewhat differently. After extensively studying the inner workings of the German Social Democratic Party, Michels (1962, 85-97, 107-114) argued that even in organizations committed to democratic ideals, power always ended up in the hands of a small group of oligarchs. In her review article, Lawson (1990, 113) notes that Michels' ideas are still popular among students of parties: "the more common pattern remains strong guidance from a
limited elite, and study after study redisCOVERS Roberto Michels' iron law." Duverger’s (1964) portrayal of inner party workings is a case in point. However, his presentation of the rules that enable members of mass socialist parties to restrict the power of the leadership suggests that he does not quite subscribe to Michels’ (1962) argument that ordinary members passively accept oligarchic control (Duverger 1964, 172-173). In his study of the structures and personnel of American parties, Eldersveld (1964, 8-10) proposes yet another view of party organizations. According to him, power is not concentrated at the top, but dispersed among independent oligarchic units that are present at all levels (or strata); hence, Eldersveld identifies the Democratic and Republican parties as "stratarchies." It is instructive to note that these three distinct analyses share the view that power is concentrated in the hands of elites rather than in the hands of the rank and file.

Studies of inner party life have dealt with not only the internal structures of parties, but also with the members, activists and leaders or, in Sorauf’s (1984, 87) words, "the living organizational realities of parties." To date, students of party personnel have paid more attention to the large membership of left-wing parties than to the smaller membership of conservative cadre parties. They have also covered some of the following issues: socio-demographic characteristics (such as age, gender, socio-economic status, religion or region), socialization patterns, motivations, political opinions and activities within the party organization (Lawson 1976, 9-10).

A close look at the North American and French literatures on party personnel indicates that neither has been very concerned with the role of women in political parties. Women are not mentioned in Rapoport, Abramowitz and McGlennon’s (1986) study of American state convention delegates and in McMenemy and Winn (1976) and Lagroye et al.’s (1976) analyses of the socio-
demographic backgrounds of Canadian and French party activists. Other works on party personnel contain a few lines and sometimes a few pages on women. Eldersveld (1964, 158, 171, 206, 234) provides succinct comments on women involved in the Democratic and Republican party organizations of Wayne County Michigan. Also, Beaud (1982, 243, 247-248) briefly mentions that women were under-represented in the executive bodies and parliamentary group of the newly-formed Parti québécois (PQ). While Rey and Subileau's (1990, 79-82) in-depth analysis of French Socialist activists gives a passing glance to party women, Bacot (1979) and Brechon, Derville and Lecomte (1987) devote half chapters to women active in the Parti socialiste français (PS) and the Gaullist Rassemblement pour la République (RPR). By contrast, Kornberg, Smith and Clarke's (1979, 186-216) analysis of party activism in Winnipeg and Vancouver as well as Carty and Erickson's (1991, 139-151) survey of Canadian party nomination procedures and activities pay close attention to gender.

Women in politics

The bulk of information about party women is not to be found in the political party literature, but rather in the women in politics literature. This fairly new literature mainly addresses the role of women in conventional political arenas, notably, elections, parties, legislatures and governments. At first, students of women in politics tended to investigate women's participation in citizen politics (which includes voting and interest in politics). Subsequently, they began to research female involvement in elite politics (which refers to more demanding activities such as party office-holding, running for and achieving public office). The following review concentrates on the North American and French literatures on women in elite politics since they are directly relevant to the present study.
Overall, these literatures have been concerned with women occupying visible top positions as candidates, mayors, legislators and ministers. While Kirkpatrick (1974) examines the socio-economic characteristics, recruitment experience and legislative performance of 46 American female state legislators, Darcy, Welch and Clark ([1987] 1994) and Carroll ([1985] 1994) investigate systemic and socio-economic factors affecting US female candidates. After the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (1970, 339-350) reported that Canadian women were under-represented in top positions, feminist academics such as Brodie (1977; 1985) and Vickers (1978) undertook to explain why so few Canadian women had been elected to public office. Brodie (1985) published a book based on a survey of 327 women who had contested municipal, provincial and federal office between 1945 and 1975. Four of the five pieces contained in the sixth volume of the RCERPF research studies, *Women in Canadian Politics: Towards Equity in Representation*, deal at length with the various challenges faced by female federal candidates and legislators (see Brodie 1991; Erickson 1991; Young 1991; Robinson and Saint-Jean 1991). The Quebec literature on women in elite politics includes Tardy’s (1982) study of female mayors; Spencer’s (1985; 1986) work on the career paths of provincial ministers; Maillé’s (1990) book on the emergence of a female political elite in Quebec; Tremblay’s (1992; 1993) pieces on the attitudes of Quebec candidates; and Tremblay and Pelletier’s (1995) detailed examination of the entry into politics, role performance and departure from politics of Quebec parliamentarians. The paucity of studies on French political women led Sineau (1988, 6) to analyze the situation of female deputies, senators, mayors and top party officials. Two years later, Pascal (1990) published a book on French women who had been elected to the National Assembly and Senate between 1945 and 1988.
Women holding less visible positions in party organizations do not appear to have aroused as much interest among North American and French researchers. The existing analyses of US party women largely deal with male and female delegates and the extent to which women’s socio-economic backgrounds, political orientations and aspirations differ from men’s (Jennings and Thomas 1968; Costantini and Craik 1972; Jennings and Farah 1981; Jennings 1990). The fact that American party organizations only come to life at election time partly explains this focus on convention delegates as opposed to party activists and officials. In the early 1990s, women in politics researcher Baer (1993) criticized her American colleagues for overusing survey methodology and neglecting the numerical gains made by women inside political parties. To date, only Burrell (1993a; 1993b; 1994) appears to have addressed Baer’s (1993) concerns.

North of the border, Bashevkin (1982; 1983a; 1985a; [1985b] 1993) is the only scholar who has devoted consistent attention to women active in English Canadian parties. After examining party data on women’s share of riding- and provincial-level positions in the Ontario New Democratic Party (ONDP), Ontario Liberal Party (OLP) and Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario (PCPO), Bashevkin (1982) pointed out that while decision-making positions were held mainly by men, conventional maintenance positions were held largely by women. In her survey of delegates to the 1982 ONDP and OLP leadership conventions and general meetings of the PCPO and its female association, she probed male and female respondents’ social background, patterns of participation and ambition as well as attitudes towards the modern Canadian women’s movement and affirmative action measures to feminize party organizations. Bashevkin (1983a) found that party women tended to be less well-off, less educated and less likely to be employed for pay than their male counterparts. In another article, she revealed that men and women in both the ONDP
and PCPO had similar levels of party involvement and motivation. With respect to attitudes towards the women's movement and internal affirmative action, larger gender disparities existed, with women being more inclined to have pro-feminist views than men (see Bashevkin 1985a). Bashevkin ([1985b] 1993) incorporated these findings in her book on women and Ontario, Manitoba and federal party politics. In the first and second editions of this book, she argued that although women were becoming more numerous in party organizations, they were still "toeing the lines," that is performing clerical (as opposed to decision-making) tasks (see Bashevkin [1985b] 1993; 1991).

The first works on Quebec party women appeared in the late 1980s. To explain why women did not participate in party life as actively as men did, Legault, Desrosiers and Tardy (1988) studied the socio-demographic, attitudinal and motivational differences between male and female PQ and PLQ (Parti libéral du Québec) activists. Gingras, Maillé and Tardy (1989) built on Legault et al.'s findings by evaluating Quebeckers' involvement in two provincial unions and three municipal parties.

More than a decade after Subileau (1981, 1045) highlighted the dearth of studies on French party women, only two pieces have appeared on this subject. While Appleton and Mazur (1993) provide a general overview of female involvement in French parties and political life, their 1992 piece focuses on PS and RPR initiatives to promote women to top party positions and as candidates.

Several studies have sought to not only document, but also explain the lack of female political elites. For example, Brodie (1985) assesses whether Kirkpatrick (1974) and Welch's (1977) three main theses regarding women's low level of political involvement can explain the
under-representation of women among candidates. In her view, neither the socialization thesis (which holds that women are socialized to be apolitical), nor the gender-role explanation (which contends that women are inhibited by their homemaker and mother roles) sufficiently explains the gender gap in the distribution of political power. She also rejects the structural thesis (which emphasizes that the socio-economic categories from which candidates are drawn include few women) on the grounds that it fails to consider how ascriptive characteristics such as gender or race limit access to the political elite (Brodie 1985, 6-10). In the end, Brodie (1985, 106-119) highlights the determining role parties play, through nominations and financial support, in the careers of aspiring legislative candidates. Such a conclusion cannot quite apply to American female candidates since US nominations are mainly decided by primaries. Nevertheless, like Brodie (1985), American researchers Carroll (1994) and Darcy et al. (1994) prefer to point to systemic factors rather than "women's deficiencies" when accounting for the low proportion of elected women.

In recent years, feminist researchers have tackled the question of whether women politicians can make a difference or, alternatively put, whether the increased presence of women in political institutions will bring about policy and procedural changes. Studies by Jennings (1990) and Brodie (1988) on American and Canadian convention delegates highlight the existence of a gender gap on certain policy options. In a similar vein, Tremblay (1992; 1993) and Tremblay and Pelletier (1995) reveal that female candidates and legislators in Quebec are more inclined than their male counterparts to believe that they have a special responsibility to represent women's interests. Following the 1984 and 1988 federal elections that brought many Conservative women to the Canadian House of Commons, Gotell and Brodie (1991) criticized other researchers for
being too preoccupied with numbers. In their view, the focus on numbers was misguided since numerical gains did not automatically ensure the passage of women-friendly legislation. It would be erroneous, however, to infer from this cautionary note that the increased presence of women does not have any impact on the political arena. Research by Tardy (1982) and Sineau (1988) indicates that female political elites in Quebec and France do not fulfil their tasks in the same way as their male colleagues. Furthermore, Thomas (1994) has shown that the greater the number of women in American state legislatures, the more likely they are to pursue distinctive policy priorities. At present, students of women in politics concede that while numerical representation does not automatically result in substantive representation, important legislative reforms cannot be achieved without numbers (see Brodie 1991, 36-38, 47-49; Bashevkin 1996, 480).

Four main points can be drawn from this review of the North American and French literatures on women in elite politics. First, researchers have tended to pay more attention to women occupying visible elite positions than to those in less visible party positions. Second, they have sought to explain why so few women have run for and achieved public office. Third, they generally agree that women's presence in political institutions is likely to bring about more women-friendly procedural and policy changes. Fourth, researchers have thoroughly documented the obstacles facing aspiring women politicians, but not the initiatives launched in political parties to help them overcome these obstacles. As highlighted in the following section, American academics began investigating such initiatives earlier than their Canadian and West European colleagues.
Party initiatives to boost female political involvement

The fact that American political parties were the first to take special measures to stimulate party women's involvement partly explains the early interest of US researchers in this topic. In the 1920s, the Democratic and Republican parties both adopted provisions ensuring the equal representation of men and women in their national committees and encouraged local and state committees to do the same (Jennings 1990, 223-224; Bashevkin 1993, 94). About four decades later, the criticisms of Democratic activists regarding haphazard delegate selection prompted the establishment of the McGovern-Fraser Commission on Party Structures and Delegate Selection. The Commission was to examine ways to open up the Democratic delegate selection process (which up until then had been in the hands of party regulars) to activists from a variety of backgrounds (Crotty 1984, 32). Eventually, the Commission required that state parties "overcome the effects of past discrimination by affirmative steps to encourage minority group [defined as blacks, women, and youth] participation, including representation of minority groups on the national convention delegation in reasonable relation to the group's presence in the population of the State" (in Crotty 1984, 123). Democratic delegates to the 1972 presidential convention were selected according to this guideline. By way of contrast, Republicans adopted resolutions that simply encouraged state party organizations to strive for proportionate representation of demographic groups (Jennings 1990, 224).

American scholars have dealt with specific aspects of the Democratic and Republican initiatives. For instance, Pomper (1980) and Crotty (1984) focus on the Democratic and Republican parties' introduction and adoption of new rules. They examine factors that led these parties to introduce new rules, the resolutions they passed and the differences between their
various initiatives. On the other hand, Kirkpatrick's (1976) study of delegates to the 1972 Democratic and Republican conventions is mainly concerned with the impact of changes to the Democratic delegate selection process. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of initiatives similar to those of the Democratic Party would have to address the specific phases examined by Pomper (1980), Crotty (1984) and Kirkpatrick (1976), namely, introduction, adoption and impact.

In Quebec and English Canada, only a few researchers have touched upon party initiatives to enhance female involvement in party life. Legault et al. (1988, 98-109, 139-149) and Gingras et al. (1989, 139-149) probe how Quebec party and union activists perceive women's political under-representation and "affirmative action" measures to remedy it. In Toeing the Lines: Women and Party Politics in English Canada, Bashevkin ([1985b] 1993) devotes one chapter to the means used in the three main federal parties and the ONDP to boost women's share of top party positions. Before presenting these means, Bashevkin (1993, 93) distinguishes two types of approaches: first, a formal "rules and regulations" approach including statutory numerical targets and quotas; and second, a more informal approach including female leadership campaigns, party funds for female candidates, searches for women to fill vacant positions, and political training sessions.

In the introduction to Gender and Party Politics, Lovenduski (1993, 8-11) proposes a slightly different typology of party initiatives to increase the proportion of women in governing party bodies and as candidates. "Rhetorical strategies" are efforts to insert women's claims into party platforms. While "positive or affirmative action" mechanisms include numerical targets, special training sessions, financial assistance and active searches, "positive discrimination" refers primarily to mandatory quotas for women. In Lovenduski's (1993, 8-11) view, feminization may
be more tangible in parties that have carried out "affirmative action" or "positive discrimination" measures than in parties that have simply endorsed the idea of gender equality.

Even though the PS has had a female quota for more than twenty years, very little has been written about it. Information on the PS quota is to be found in works about the PS, not in the women in politics literature. PS specialists often note in passing that the increase in female representation due to the quota was not sustained in the long run (Bacot 1979, 240-255; Ysmal 1989, 198-199; Rey and Subileau 1990, 81-82). Nevertheless, they fail to ask why this occurred. Even Appleton and Mazur's (1992) more substantial examination of PS and RPR initiatives does not explain why two different strategies produced a similar level of female representation among the national party officials and candidates of the two parties.

By contrast, the more recent adoption of female quotas by the German Green and Social Democratic parties and the British Labour Party prompted West European scholars to investigate this topic. In Women in West Germany, Kolinsky (1989, 233-254) examines the quota resolutions that the Greens and Social Democrats passed in 1985 and 1988 respectively as well as their rivals' views of quotas. Elsewhere, she analyzes the circumstances surrounding the adoption of female quotas by these two parties as well as the impact of statutory requirements on the proportion of women party members, officials, candidates and parliamentarians (Kolinsky 1991; 1993). A recent special issue of Parliamentary Affairs (1996) edited by Lovenduski and Norris contains two pieces on the efforts of the British Labour Party to feminize its internal organization and parliamentary group, notably, a quota of 40% women in party bodies and target of 50% female Labour MPs, both adopted in 1990. Labour MP Clare Short (1996) offers an insider's account of the internal campaign for quotas while Perrigo (1996) outlines the efforts by Labour women to carve a space
for themselves in the party organization. To date, the most comprehensive West European
treatment of quotas is Kolinsky's (1991) article on the adoption and impact of female quotas; yet,
even this piece is somewhat limited by the recency of the Social Democratic rule changes.

In conclusion, a comparative study of the introduction, adoption and impact of initiatives
to feminize party organizations would provide a useful contribution to both the party and women
in politics literatures. As noted earlier, women active in parties have been neglected by students
of parties and, to a lesser extent, students of women in politics. Furthermore, the latter have paid
more attention to the obstacles faced by women in elective politics than to efforts to promote
women within party organizations. Lastly, a comprehensive analysis of these efforts has yet to be
done.

The Research Project

Selecting the case studies and research questions

This thesis investigates efforts by the Parti socialiste français (PS), Parti québécois (PQ)
and Ontario New Democratic Party (ONDP) to increase women's presence in their local,
intermediate and top governing organs. In particular, it examines the introduction, adoption and
impact of the PS quota, the support services provided by the PQ women's committee and the
ONDP affirmative action requirements (or numerical targets). The period under consideration
extends from the 1970s and early 1980s, when parties first adopted these measures, until the mid-
1990s. The main components of the study, namely, each party's approach to enhancing female
involvement, the evolution of party women's numerical representation, and the factors accounting
for the low, moderate or high feminization of the PS, PQ and ONDP organizations are
summarized in the "Synopsis of the Study" (see 33-34). Before presenting the research questions, methodology and chapter-by-chapter organization of the thesis, we shall first explain how the three case studies were chosen.

The three case studies were chosen based on the comparable-cases strategy. This strategy selects cases that are largely similar except for the phenomenon under consideration. Apart from their respective approach to feminization, these left-of-centre or social democratic parties have several features in common.

To begin with, the PS, PQ and ONDP can be described as mass left parties operating in the comparable liberal democracies of France and Canada. They all formed outside the legislature --in 1969 for the PS, 1968 for the PQ, 1961 for the ONDP-- and relied initially on a large working-class membership that gradually became more middle-class (Murray 1976, 32; Cayrol and Jaffré 1980, 27-46; Bashevkin 1983a, 6-7). As mass parties, they attach considerable importance to the role of members in party life (Pelletier 1991, 276-277; Rey and Subileau 1991, 198-199). In the early 1970s, the PS, PQ and ONDP were considered to be the main social democratic alternatives in France, Quebec and Ontario because of their strong support of state intervention, redistribution of wealth and workers' rights (Landry 1990, 412-413; Portelli 1992, 109-112; Morley 1984, 238). While the PQ is more commonly identified as an independentist party than as a social democratic party, Latouche (1976, 24-25), Wiseman (1988, 804-805) and Bernard (1995, 115-116) maintain that the programs of the PQ and the policies of the first Péquist government during the 1970s were in keeping with social democratic principles. It was only following the winter of 1982-1983 that the second Péquist government moved away from some of the social democratic ideals presented in the party program, a change that the French Socialist
and Ontario New Democratic governments of the 1980s and early 1990s also experienced. Lastly, these three parties took formal steps to feminize their internal organization relatively early compared to the German Social Democratic Party and British Labour Party.

The idea of comparing two provincial parties (that are subject to federal and provincial influences) and one national party (that is not subject to such influences) may appear unusual at first. Upon closer examination, however, it appears that the PQ and ONDP are less subject to federal and provincial influences than other provincial-level parties. Indeed, the PQ, which considers itself to be a national party, did not have any federal counterpart until the formation of the Bloc québécois in 1992. As for the organizations of the federal and provincial NDPs, they are generally described as more closely intertwined than those of their Liberal and Conservative rivals. Given this organizational overlap, studies of the federal and provincial NDPs need to address how the federal party influences its provincial counterparts and vice versa. Yet, the ONDP's long tradition of initiating women-friendly reforms both inside and outside its organization suggests that in this area the ONDP is more likely to have influenced other New Democratic parties than to have been influenced by them. Of particular interest to the present study is the fact that in the 1940s, the Ontario Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, the forerunner of the ONDP, considered adopting quotas for female representation in some party organs (Beeby 1982, 262).¹⁰ In any event, this comparison of provincial and national parties represents a new approach to studying political parties that researchers may want to use in the future.

As noted earlier, the PS, PQ and ONDP chose distinct means to feminize their internal organization. In 1974, the PS adopted a quota of 10% women in party bodies which it extended
to candidacies three years later. The PS quota was then increased to 20% in 1979 and 30% in 1990. Following the 1977 PQ convention where party women obtained several changes to the PQ program, the PQ agreed to establish the Comité national de la condition féminine (or Comité). For the past two decades, the Comité has worked to boost female involvement in party life. It has organized campaigns to encourage party women to contest party positions and candidacies; set up information sessions and training workshops; and lobbied local, regional and national PQ officials so that they ensure that more women would be promoted to decision-making positions. In early 1982, the ONDP passed an "affirmative action resolution" urging riding executives and requiring the provincial council and executive and party committees to equally represent men and women. Seven years later, the equal representation requirement was extended to female candidates.

Lovenduski's (1993) distinction between "affirmative action" and "positive discrimination" strategies and Bashevkin's (1993) distinction between "informal" (voluntary) and "formal" (compulsory) means can be used to differentiate the PS, PQ and ONDP approaches to feminization. While the PS quota fits in the "positive discrimination" category, the initiatives of the PQ women's committee and ONDP affirmative action requirements fit in the "affirmative action" category. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the PQ and ONDP in the same category is problematic as their approaches are clearly different. Bashevkin's (1993) categories suggest that the ONPD used a more formal/compulsory approach, especially for its provincial bodies. Thus, if each party was located on a continuum representing its approach to feminization, the PS would be placed within the "positive discrimination" section and the PQ and ONDP within the "affirmative action" section, with the ONDP between the other two parties (see 33-34).

Three research questions have informed this study. First, how were the PS, PQ and ONDP
initiatives to feminize their internal organization introduced and formally adopted? Second, how have these initiatives shaped women's numerical representation within local, intermediate and top governing bodies? Third, why have they resulted in a low, moderate or high degree of feminization?

To provide a comprehensive account of party approaches to feminization, it is essential first to examine the events that impressed upon party activists and elites the need to take action. As Lovenduski (1993, 7) notes, the feminist agitation of the 1960s and 1970s resulted in a "feminist infiltration of parties." Feminist ideas were echoed by sympathetic party activists, some of whom were also (or had been) involved in feminist groups, which then paved the way for the formulation of proposals designed to improve the situation of women in all walks of life beginning with political parties. In other words, even though at first the French, Quebec and Ontario women's movements were not interested in boosting women's presence in political institutions, their activities and discourse led some party women to demand that their parties give more space to women and their concerns. Consequently, this study touches upon the resurgence of these three movements before examining the PS, PQ and ONDP statutory changes and, in particular, the passage of resolutions providing for the PS quota, the updating of several PQ policies related to women's condition, the PQ women's committee and the ONDP affirmative action requirements.

The thesis reveals that PS, PQ and ONDP women used different strategies to ensure the passage of these resolutions. For instance, French Socialist women bypassed rank-and-file activists and essentially made a deal with the party leader. By contrast, Péquiste women spent most of their time and efforts talking to local party activists about their proposal for the establishment of a national women's committee rather than to members of the party leadership who were opposed
to the idea. Finally, Ontario New Democratic women worked hard to educate both activists and
elites about their affirmative action resolution.

No account of initiatives to feminize party organizations would be complete without an
assessment of their impact or, to be more precise, the low, moderate or high degree of
feminization they have brought about. This assessment is based on the numerical gains women
have made since the PS, PQ and ONDP initiatives were first launched. Numerical gains were
selected as the main indicator of feminization because the initial goal of these initiatives was to
increase the number of women in decision-making positions. To evaluate the substantive gains
made by women, one would have to examine party programs, policy statements and resolutions
from the past twenty years. Unfortunately, such an endeavour is beyond the scope of this study.
As stated in the literature review, although students of women in politics warn that numerical
representation does not automatically result in substantive representation, they also recognize that
improvements in the situation of women cannot be realized without numerical gains.11
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that some of the most elaborate gender equality policies are
now in place in countries that have had a “critical mass” (or 25-30%) of women in legislative and
government bodies for quite some time, notably, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden
(Dahlerup 1988, 275-276, 297).

For the purpose of assessing the impact of the PS, PQ and ONDP initiatives, longitudinal
statistics on women’s share of local, intermediate and top party positions were compiled and
analyzed. These statistics specifically concern: first, the women holding the positions of
Secrétaires de section in the PS and riding presidents in the PQ and ONDP; second, the female
PS Premiers (secrétaires) fédéraux and PQ Présidents de région; and third, women’s
representation in the national or provincial convention as well as in the top legislative and executive party organs. If one were to rank the efforts of the three parties according to the high, moderate or low level of feminization they have achieved, the ONDP affirmative action requirements would come first, then the initiatives of the PQ women's committee and, lastly, the PS quota (see 33-34).

These findings throw new light on the argument put forward by Brodie (1991, 36-37; 1994, 93), Bashevkin (1993, 108) and Lovenduski (1993, 8-11) that formal mandatory mechanisms are more effective in boosting women's political representation than informal voluntary means. While a comparison between the ONDP and PQ cases corroborates this argument, a comparison between the PQ and PS cases does not. Nonetheless, this observation does not imply that the latter should be discarded. Rather, it simply cautions women in politics researchers and advocates against too rapidly dismissing voluntary means and endorsing compulsory quotas. As indicated by the PQ and PS cases, at certain times and in certain contexts voluntary means may produce more tangible results than compulsory mechanisms.

Studies of female representation in traditional political institutions (parties, legislatures and governments) have identified three sets of factors affecting women's access to top political positions. These are factors related to women themselves, factors internal to political parties, and factors related to the political system and thus external to parties. Early studies were primarily concerned with factors related to women. They argued that women's socialization, gender-role constraints and socio-economic position accounted for the dearth of female politicians. According to these studies then, women themselves were responsible for their virtual absence from the political arena.
Later on, researchers who were sceptical about these "blame-the-victim" accounts set out to focus on what Carroll (1994, 5) has identified as "factors external to women" or "political opportunity variables." For them, it was not "women's deficiencies," but rather their accurate perception that political institutions were tailor-made for men or those with male qualities, lifestyles and skills that explained the prevalence of men in elite positions. This argument shifted the responsibility for women's political under-representation from women onto the political system, its institutions and gatekeepers. It also suggested that pointing to the small pool of women capable and willing to hold demanding positions was a pretext commonly used by gatekeepers to maintain the status quo. Thus, for the pool of eligible women to begin expanding, it was essential that measures to promote women to decision-making positions be implemented first. In keeping with this argument, the thesis is more concerned with factors external and internal to parties that shed light on the impact of pro-feminization initiatives than with the characteristics of female activists themselves.

A number of factors external and internal to parties recur in the literature on female representation in politics. External factors include: political culture (Norris 1987; 1993; Bystydzienski 1988); the second-wave women's movement (Bystydzienski 1988; Maillé 1990); and whether popular support for the party under study is stagnating/declining or expanding (Sainsbury 1993; Bashevkin 1993). On the other hand, the role the women's committee plays within the party organization as a female auxiliary or a feminist lobby (Maillé 1990; Bashevkin 1993); how party men and women perceive the use of affirmative action to promote women to top political positions (Kirkpatrick 1976; Legault et al. 1988); and the extent to which internal party structures (the party policy-making and personnel selection processes) hinder or facilitate the
promotion of women (Lovenduski and Norris 1989; Matland and Studlar 1993) can be identified as internal factors. Let us examine how these internal and external factors elucidate the impact of the PS, PQ and ONDP initiatives.

According to Norris (1993, 312), political culture or "the dominant values and attitudes towards the role of women in society and in political life" helps to explain why women are well- or under-represented in legislatures and governments. While the egalitarian political culture of Scandinavian countries helps to account for the large proportion of female legislators and ministers, the traditional political culture of Anglo-American and South European countries helps to account for the lower proportion of women among elected officials (Norris 1987, 118-120). Along the same lines, it can be argued that the traditional political cultures of France, Quebec and Ontario have hampered the feminization of political institutions. It is difficult, however, to demonstrate that the broader political culture and the impact of PS, PQ and ONDP efforts to feminize their internal organization are empirically connected. A better alternative may be to show how the prevailing attitudes of party activists and elites towards party women's representation and initiatives to improve it have affected the impact of such efforts. Consequently, the issue of political culture or party culture is not examined as an external factor, but rather as an internal factor in the "party personnel" section which deals with the views of activists and elites on feminization. Nevertheless, in the conclusion we will signal the impact of the broader French, Quebec and Ontario political cultures.

The thesis that Bystydzienski (1988) puts forward in "Women in Politics in Norway" can be used to elucidate the impact of the PS, PQ and ONDP initiatives. In her view, the campaigns that Norwegian feminists organized in the 1960s and 1970s to bring women into the political arena
led to a significant increase in the number of female party officials, candidates and elected officials. These campaigns pressured political parties to take action so that more women would be promoted to top positions. In other words, feminist mobilization around the issue of female political representation prompted parties to take special measures to enhance party women's involvement and also ensure that these measures would produce tangible results. As noted previously, at first the newly-formed women's movements and, in particular, the French and Quebec movements, were not interested in remedying women's numerical under-representation in politics. Although their activities and discourse did not aim at increasing female political representation, they did inspire party women to pressure parties to give more space to women and their concerns. Furthermore, Quebec and Ontario feminists' greater preoccupation as of the mid-1980s with female presence in political institutions and French feminists' lack of interest and involvement in this issue until the late 1980s and early 1990s can explain the greater impact of the PQ and ONDP pro-feminization initiatives and the lesser impact of the PS initiatives.

In her study of gender and party politics in Sweden, Sainsbury (1993, 287) concludes that the efforts of four established parties to stimulate female representation should be interpreted as responses to electoral stagnation and decline. For Sainsbury (1993), women involved in stagnating or declining parties have a better chance to become top party officials, candidates and/or legislators than women involved in expanding parties. This parallels Bashevkin's (1993, 78) observation that the low proportion of female party officials may be linked to the competitive position of the party. One reason for this phenomenon may be that fewer men contest elite positions in stagnating or declining parties than in expanding parties. This explanation goes back to findings that male activists have tended to be more career-oriented than female activists.
any case, Sainsbury's (1993) contention that the pro-feminization efforts of parties are connected to their electoral strength can shed light on the impact of the PS, PQ and ONDP initiatives. Indeed, one may propose that such initiatives will produce more tangible results in periods of electoral stagnation or decline than in periods of expansion. To test this proposition, it is necessary to examine how each party’s share of the vote and women’s share of party positions have evolved since the 1970s.

As previously noted, studies of internal party life have concentrated on personnel and internal structures. Along the same lines, the following examines how party women’s special organs, the attitudes of elites and activists towards women’s political representation, and internal party structures (or, more precisely, the processes used to select party officials) have shaped PS, PQ and ONDP efforts.

Bashevkin (1993, 97-109) and Maillé (1990, 109-114) point out that in Ontario and Quebec, provincial parties were pressured by their women’s committees to endorse feminist policies and support initiatives to increase female numerical representation. This finding highlights the need to consider the role of women’s committees when explaining the impact of these initiatives. The presence of a "feminist lobby" (or a committee that challenges party organs and officials to promote women and issues of concern to them) may have made it difficult for parties to forget their commitment to feminization. By contrast, the presence of a "female auxiliary" (or a body that simply "addresses" issues of interest to women as prescribed by the party) may have made it easier for parties to do so.

In Kirkpatrick's (1976, 23) view, to understand the actions of political actors, it is necessary to know what their political opinions are since "distinctive perspectives lead political
actors to act in different ways" (author's emphasis). The link between "perspective" and "action" as well as the link between "perspective" and "inaction" can elucidate the impact of the PS, PQ and ONDP initiatives. More specifically, the views of party activists and elites on these initiatives are likely to influence their reactions to the feminization of party organs. Party women and men who are ambivalent towards them may decide not to get involved. Those opposed to them may create obstacles to their implementation while those in favour may do their best to ensure they are carried out. Thus, to test these propositions, one needs to follow Legault et al.'s (1988) example and analyze how rank-and-file and elite activists perceive female representation and measures to enhance it.

Internal party structures involve the processes by which a party makes policies and selects officials. Depending on the respective influence of elite and rank-and-file activists over policy-making and personnel selection, the internal structures of a party can be identified as centralized or decentralized. The wishes of elites tend to prevail in a centralized organization while those of the rank and file are likely to prevail in a decentralized organization. According to Lovenduski and Norris (1989, 533) and Matland and Studlar (1993, 2), centralized parties, where personnel selection is controlled by elites, tend to nominate more women candidates than decentralized parties, where personnel selection is controlled by the rank and file. As a logical corollary, this proposition renders the problematic assumption that party elites are more supportive of women than rank-and-file activists. Nevertheless, the linking of personnel selection and female representation helps to explain the impact of PS, PQ and ONDP efforts to feminize. For instance, a centralized selection may have enhanced the impact of such efforts while a decentralized selection may have limited it.
Overall, the three case studies reveal that internal factors have more explanatory power than external ones. Because of contradictory evidence, it is difficult to determine how changes in electoral support have affected PS, PQ and ONDP initiatives. The mobilization in the mid-1980s of Quebec and Ontario feminists around the issue of women's political representation (compared with the lack of interest of the French feminist movement in this matter) helps to explain the more extensive feminization of the PQ and ONDP organizations. Nevertheless, feminist discourse and agitation do not appear to have affected the three parties as directly as internal factors have. In the end, the lack of influence of the PS women's secretariat, the ambivalence of party activists and elites towards the quota and the faction-driven selection of PS officials mitigated the effect of the quota. On the other hand, the somewhat greater influence of the PQ women's committee and the centralized system of national elite selection explain the moderate degree of feminization in the PQ. Lastly, the constant lobbying activities of the ONDP Women's Committee, rank-and-file and elite activists' support of affirmative action requirements and the centralized selection of top party officials allowed these requirements to produce an almost fully gender-balanced organization (see 33-34).

Before presenting the methodological tools used in this study, some comments need to be made about the explanatory model presented above and, in particular, the distinction it makes between external and internal factors. First, the main purpose of the external/internal distinction is to highlight the different forces at play in the feminization of party organizations. It is not to suggest that external and internal factors are totally unrelated. In fact, the previously mentioned connection existing between extra- and intra-party feminist agitation indicates that in the real world external and internal factors are linked. Second, the explanatory model does not seek to determine
whether external or internal factors explain the feminization of the three parties. Rather, it seeks to determine which factors account more directly for feminization.

Methodology

Schonfeld (1991, 268) and Baer (1993, 550) recommend that studies of internal party life use a variety of methodological tools instead of simply the survey method. In keeping with their recommendation, we decided to rely on statistical and document analysis as well as on semi-structured interviews with PS, PQ and ONDP members. Two types of statistics were compiled and analyzed: each party's share of the vote at election time and data on the proportion of female local, intermediate and top party officials. Election results were used to assess whether party support was ascending, declining or stagnating. Statistics on party women's representation were obtained from secondary sources, women's committee documents and party officials.

The files of the PS, PQ and ONDP women's committees and personal papers of activists connected to these organs gave insights into women's efforts to carve a place for themselves within the three party organizations. At the Office universitaire de recherches socialistes, the Paris archival library of the PS, the papers of Michel Pachkoff, a long-time supporter of PS women, party documents and back issues of PS publications were consulted. Chantal Mallen and Christiane Monarque, two former presidents of the PQ women's committee, provided documents including correspondence with party officials, minutes of meetings and annual reports. The papers of Marianne Holder, the president of the ONDP Women's Committee in the late 1970s and early 1980s, revealed critical information on the role the Committee played in the introduction and adoption of the affirmative action resolution. An assessment of its more recent activities could be made thanks to the documents of Anne John-Baptiste, the Committee's president in the early
Interviewees were selected according to the snowball technique. Party insiders were asked for the names of potential interviewees, who were in turn asked for other names. An effort was made to ensure that the groups of French, Quebec and Ontario respondents include an equal proportion of men and women (eight men and eight women in each case) as well as new and long-time party activists and elites. Ontario New Democrats were interviewed in early 1994 in Toronto, Péquistes in July 1994 in Montreal, and French Socialists in June and July 1995 in Paris and Lyon. The interviews, which lasted on average one hour, addressed the following themes: the introduction and official establishment of the PS quota, PQ women's committee and ONDP affirmative action requirements; the selection of local, intermediate and top party officials; the role of the party women's organ; female under-representation in party bodies; and measures to remedy it. Appendices A, B and C contain the questions that PS, PQ and ONDP respondents were asked. In order that interviewees remain anonymous, a code was assigned to them. PS men are identified in the text as "PSm1," "PSm2"... and so on until "PSm8," and the women as "PSf1," "PSf2," etc. The codes "PQm" and "PQf" designate Péquiste male and female respondents and the codes "ONDm" and "ONDf" refer to Ontario New Democratic male and female interviewees respectively. In addition to the 48 interviewees, eight other informants were contacted to clarify certain points. For example, "PSf9" commented on the PS quota while "PSf10," "PSf11" and "PSf12" provided information on the new French movement for gender parity in decision-making positions. "PQf9," "PQf10" and "PQf11" elaborated on the role of the PQ women's committee and "ONDf9" on the possible link between the simultaneous adoption of affirmative action by the ONDP and the Ontario Federation of Labour.
Overview of chapters

Chapter One touches upon the ideas of Western political philosophers regarding women's role in the political sphere. In so doing, it demonstrates how these ideas evolved from a total rejection to a certain acceptance of women as political actors. It ends with an examination of what appears to be the next logical step of this intellectual evolution, namely, feminists' arguments for special measures to feminize democratic institutions.

The following chapter reviews French, Quebec and Ontario women's efforts to challenge the prevailing view that women were unfit for politics, a view which ancient and classical political philosophers helped to foster. More specifically, Chapter Two considers their initial attempts at political activism, campaigns for political rights, and political involvement in the postwar period. This chapter reveals that left and right parties hampered women's active participation in political matters up until at least the 1970s.

The idea of including these two background chapters was inspired by Women, Elections and Representation, Darcy et al.'s ([1987] 1994) work on American women's involvement in the electoral process as voters, candidates and elected officials. The authors chose to preface their empirical analysis with an examination of the history of female political participation prior to the suffrage, their campaign for political rights as well as the views of political theorists on the role of women in politics. This philosophical and historical preface usefully clarified the complexities of the issue of women in politics as well as those of the American political and historical context.

As noted earlier, the PS took formal steps to feminize its internal organization in 1974. The PQ followed suit in 1977 and the ONDP five years later. Consequently, the first case-study chapter deals with the PS, the second with the PQ and the third with the ONDP.
Chapter Three reveals that despite the 23-year old quota, the PS organization remains largely male, especially at the local and intermediate levels. More specifically, this chapter highlights that the quota has functioned primarily as a minimum threshold and a maximum ceiling. The lack of interest (until recently) of the women's movement in female involvement in the political arena and, above all, the lack of influence of the women's secretariat within the PS organization, the persistent ambivalence of party activists and elites towards the quota and the faction-driven selection of party officials explain the limited impact of the quota.

As demonstrated in Chapter Four, the PQ women's committee has been more effective than the PS quota in feminizing the internal party organization. Nonetheless, this chapter also indicates that the pro-feminization initiatives of the committee have mainly maintained the representational gains women made in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Had party activists and leaders been more actively supportive of the idea of feminizing the internal organization, these initiatives may have had a more tangible impact.

The last chapter proposes to explain why the ONDP affirmative action requirements have enabled Ontario New Democratic women to hold a greater share of party positions than their French Socialist and Péquiste counterparts. Overall, the lobbying activities of their feminist committee as well as party activists and elites' support of affirmative action for party positions account for the higher degree of feminization observable in the ONDP.

Finally, the conclusion reviews the main findings of the study and speculates on what they mean for political parties and women in politics.
Synopsis of the Study (Part One)

Approaches to feminizing party organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rhetorical strategies</th>
<th>Affirmative action</th>
<th>Positive discrimination</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>support services</td>
<td>numerical targets</td>
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<tr>
<td>PQ</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<td>ONDP</td>
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<td>PS</td>
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Impact of the PS, PQ and ONDP initiatives*

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<tr>
<td>Local level</td>
<td>n.a.-14%</td>
<td>3-23%</td>
<td>9-31%</td>
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<tr>
<td>(convention)</td>
<td>12-19%</td>
<td>20-33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
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<td>Top level</td>
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<tr>
<td>(legislative)</td>
<td>4-25% [30%]</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>28-35%</td>
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<tr>
<td>(executive)</td>
<td>0-22% [25%]</td>
<td>0-33%</td>
<td>39-51%</td>
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Feminization

|        | low    | moderate | high   |

* This table includes the earliest data from the 1970s and the latest data from the early 1990s.

n.a. = not available
Synopsis of the Study (Part Two)

Explaining the impact of the PS, PQ and ONDP initiatives

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>low feminization</td>
<td>moderate feminization</td>
<td>high feminization</td>
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**External factors**

*The second-wave women's movement*
The women's movement has actively promoted the need for increased female representation in politics

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*Party support*
Party support is stagnating or declining

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**Internal factors**

*The women's committee of the party*
The committee is a feminist lobby

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*Party personnel*
Party activists and elites are supportive of initiatives to boost party women's numerical representation

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*Internal party structures*

The personnel selection process is centralized:

- (local) X X X
- (top) / / /

/ = proposition is confirmed

X = proposition is disconfirmed

/X = evidence is mixed
ENDNOTES

1. See these pieces in Bakvis (1991).

2. See the special issue of the European Journal of Political Research (1996) on anti-party sentiment and politics that Thomas Poguntke and Susan E. Scarrow edited. See also Amyot (1996) and Lyon (1996) on political parties and democracy. While the former denies that parties are crucial to democracy and supports their disappearance, the latter argues that without parties, democracy would be substantially impoverished.

3. Students of women in politics are now devoting more attention to female involvement in less conventional arenas, notably, community projects and new social movements.

4. Burrell's (1993a; 1993b; 1994) research, however, pays considerable attention to the recent efforts of American parties to recruit and support female candidacies.

5. According to Kirkpatrick (1976, 294, 297), the Democratic convention accurately mirrored the proportion of women, blacks and youth in the general population, but not that of the elderly, socio-economic classes, and some religious and ethnic groups. She added that the Republican convention represented the political views and values of rank-and-file Democrats much better than the Democratic convention. In consequence, the Democratic rules had engendered a political elite that may "have resembled the face of America, [but] did not think, feel, reason, and act like the American electorate" (Kirkpatrick 1976, 297).

6. In 1985, the Greens adopted a quota of 50% female party officials, candidates and parliamentarians. Three years later, the Social Democratic Party passed a resolution providing that 40% of all party officers be female by 1994 and that candidate lists and parliamentary representation comply with the quota requirement by 1998 (Kolinsky 1993, 130-131).


8. The US Democratic Party was excluded from the study for two reasons. First, it cannot be consistently identified as a social democratic party. Second, unlike Canadian and French party organizations, American parties are virtually dormant between elections.

10. Latouche (1976, 24) even notes that by the 1970s, "it [the PQ program] closely resemble[d] the program put forward by the French left-wing coalition of socialists and communists."

11. During this time, the Ontario CCF also adopted a resolution outlining a broad range of policies for women and introduced the first equal pay for equal work bill in the Ontario legislature (Beeby 1982, 266, 268). Because of strong divisions among women with regards to quotas, the party resolved to simply ask the chairs of executive committees to include at least one woman representative in their committees (Azoulay 1995, 84).
11. Throughout the text, the term "representation" refers to "numerical representation."

12. The PS does not have riding presidents, but rather Secrétaires de section. These Secrétaires head the basic organizational unit of the PS, namely, the "section" (or cell) which can be established by at least five people from the same workplace or neighbourhood. To avoid confusion, the French term of Secrétaire (which in French refers to a top party position) is used instead of the English term of "secretary" (which in English refers to a secondary party position). It should be noted that the ONDP organization does not have an intermediate level as the PS and PQ do.

13. Bashevkin (1993, 78) suggests that there may be a link between the governing or opposition status of a party and its proportion of female officials. She proposes that the governing position of the Manitoba NDP and Ontario Progressive Conservative (PC) organizations in 1982 may have generated a competitive internal environment that was not conducive to higher levels of female involvement in the party hierarchy. Conversely, the opposition status of the Manitoba PC and Ontario NDP organizations may have created an internal environment that was more conducive to elevated levels of female involvement.

14. On this point, see Kornberg et al. (1979, 199).

15. Being in Paris at the time of the 1995 municipal elections made it difficult to find party activists who had time to be interviewed. Fortunately, long-time activist Renée DuFourt from Lyon very generously offered to set up interviews with three male and one female activists from Lyon. Consequently, PS interviewees included five men active in Paris or the region surrounding Paris and three men active in Lyon as well as seven women from Paris and one woman from Lyon.
CHAPTER ONE

WOMEN AND POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP: EXCLUSION, INCLUSION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR WOMEN IN POLITICS

According to British sociologist T.H. Marshall (1965, 78-79), political citizenship is the ability "to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body." If today women do not fully exercise their right to represent voters (as their under-representation in democratic institutions makes painfully clear), it is in part due to political parties. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Two, the enduring reluctance of parties to present female candidates has prevented women from enjoying their right to represent and become full-fledged political citizens. It should be no surprise that party organizations, whose legislative and executive bodies have always included a majority of men, have recruited primarily male candidates. This observation implies that women first have to be equally represented in party bodies for the proportion of female candidates and legislators to increase significantly. The recent efforts of left-of-centre parties to feminize their internal organs indicates that some of these gatekeepers may now be willing to facilitate women's exercise of their right to run and represent citizens. In consequence, efforts to feminize party organizations can be identified as an important and necessary condition for women's access to full political citizenship.

This chapter briefly examines how the views of Western thinkers on women's relation to political citizenship have evolved over time from a total rejection to a certain acceptance of women as political actors. Feminist proposals to remedy the gender imbalance of democratic institutions
(for instance, the implementation of affirmative action measures such as financial assistance, child care arrangements, quotas, numerical targets and gender parity requirements) constitute the latest development in the historical debate about female involvement in political life.\(^3\) Specific examples of affirmative action initiatives, notably, those launched in the *Parti socialiste français*, *Parti québécois* and Ontario New Democratic Party, are presented in Chapters Three, Four and Five. In short, this survey of ideas aims at locating these case-studies in the historical debate regarding women's rightful role in the political arena and, by the same token, highlighting the importance of studying efforts to feminize political institutions generally and, in particular, including party organizations.\(^4\)

Bearing this in mind, we begin with a chronological review of the arguments advanced by Western political philosophers to first deny and then extend political citizenship to women.\(^5\) Then, we examine feminist proposals to address the shortcomings of the liberal model of citizenship. Since the three case-studies are in effect examples of the affirmative action option, we devote considerable attention to feminist arguments for the use of affirmative action to feminize democratic institutions. This section is largely based on the two most recent and elaborate defences of affirmative action for women in politics, namely, Canadian political scientist Janine Brodie's (1994) "Women and Political Leadership: A Case for Affirmative Action" and the two special issues of *Nouvelles questions féministes* on the current French debate about gender parity.

**From Non-Citizens to Second-Class Citizens**

**Justifying the exclusion of women**

Plato and Aristotle offer distinct analyses of women's role in the *polis* (the realm of
politics) and the *oikos* (the realm of production and reproduction). In his account of the ideal state in *The Republic* and of the second-best city in *Laws*, Plato argued that women could be involved in the *polis*. By contrast, in *Politics*, Aristotle confined women to the *oikos*. In brief, Plato conceived that women could be political citizens while Aristotle did not. As Coole (1993, 19) notes, Aristotle's view prevailed among political thinkers well into the eighteenth century.

In Plato's ideal/just state, the sources of discord that plagued Athenian society, namely, private property, marriage and the family, no longer existed. Women did not have to perform domestic tasks within the confines of the home since living and breeding arrangements were communal. Each member of the ideal state performed the function for which he or she was innately best suited. Those whose souls were dominated by reason [as opposed to spirit (courage) and appetite (physical urges)] became guardians or rulers while the others became either soldiers or producers. Given that natural ability (rather than sex) determined one's function, women could be guardians and participate in the running of the ideal state (Okin 1979, 38-40; Coole 1993, 21-22).

Before praising Plato for the broad-minded views he expressed in *The Republic*, it is important to note the role he envisioned for women in both his ideal state and second-best city. In the ideal state, highly rational women were able to join the ruling class mainly because they were free from domestic and childrearing responsibilities. This limited the opportunity for participation in public life solely to upper-class women. Thus, for Plato, only women who exhibited the same characteristics as male rulers (that is a high degree of rationality and freedom from domestic duties) could become guardians. His account of the second-best city confirms this argument. The persistence of private property, marriage and the family in the second-best city
meant that female residents remained primarily private wives. Despite their greater autonomy than Athenian women, their status as private wives curtailed significantly their involvement in public affairs (Okin 1979, 46-49; Coole 1993, 22-28). Plato's idealistic conception of guardians/citizens can be identified as male-centred since it extended to women who were in a sense "male equivalents."

According to Aristotle, only a few exceptionally rational men were intended by nature to be active in the polis and rule over the less rational segments of the population (women, slaves and children). In the oikos, women or "incomplete, defective males" were to reproduce and look after men's progeny while slaves were to meet the daily subsistence needs of household members (Saxonhouse 1991, 35). Freed from reproductive and productive tasks, men endowed with superior capacities for reasoning could engage in civic activities. Because of their reproductive function and irrational (or emotional) propensities, women were naturally inferior to men and thus destined to be ruled by them (Okin 1979, 76-86; Jones 1988, 12-13; Saxonhouse 1991, 34-35, 38, 48; Coole 1993, 29-33). Though Aristotle generally appears less sympathetic to women than Plato, his ideas, in contrast with those of his predecessor, did not imply an obliteration of all things female.

Unlike ancient thinkers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke argued that authority relations were founded on convention rather than nature. In other words, they denied the existence of a natural hierarchy of power and privilege that justified some individuals' ruling over others (Jones 1988, 14-15). Nevertheless, in the end, they largely subscribed to Aristotle's conclusion that women could not be political citizens.

For Hobbes, in the state of nature, men and women were free and equal individuals. At
times, however, individuals consented to submit to somebody's authority because it was in their best interests to do so. For instance, women contracted themselves into a relationship with a man in return for his protection. Similarly, in civil society, women entered into a marriage contract for self-interested reasons. In so doing, they also subordinated themselves to their husbands. This then entitled the latter to represent their wives' interests and those of the family in the public arena. In short, when women married, they relinquished the opportunity to act as political citizens (Jones 1988, 14-15; Pateman 1991, 55, 60-62; Coole 1993, 54-63).

In keeping with Hobbes, Locke perceived women to be as free and equal as men in the state of nature and yet subject to the man they married in civil society. More specifically, he argued that by entering a marriage contract, women forfeited control over their property and thus their credentials to exercise civil and political rights in the public arena. Locke attributed women's abandonment of their property and, in a sense, their self-exclusion from the public realm to their inferior rationality. Yet, he also denied that women were naturally less capable of rational thought than men. For him, it was the familial role and status to which they were naturally destined that prevented them from fully developing their rational capacities. Thus, submitting themselves to the authority of their more rational husbands was the wisest choice for women (Coole 1993, 71-76). Despite his rejection of the idea that women were inherently less rational than men, Locke still appeared to adhere to traditional assumptions about women's natural suitability to the private realm and unsuitability to the public realm.

The eighteenth-century French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau agreed with Aristotle that nature intended different roles and spheres for men and women. While women were to submit to the authority of their husbands and perform domestic and childrearing duties within
the confines of the home, men were to participate in the conduct of public affairs. To justify women's subordination in the family, Rousseau invoked three reasons: one final authority should be responsible for deciding family matters; women's periods of physical inactivity due to pregnancy prevented them from fulfilling this role; and men had to be sure that their children were theirs. Rousseau pointed to women's reproductive function and natural ineptitude for abstract reasoning to explain their confinement to the home and exclusion from the public realm. Because of their innate ability to be domestic, shameful, modest, shrewd and submissive, women were well-suited to perform the role of homemakers, wives and mothers and ill-suited for the rational exercise of citizenship rights in the public arena. Coming from a thinker who was concerned with the extent to which an individual's environment and education determined his achievements, these arguments were somewhat peculiar. In his famous educational treatise, Émile, Rousseau devised a series of rules to mould the young Émile into a citizen free of prejudices. Nevertheless, these rules were not to apply to Sophie whose education aimed at turning her into Émile's perfect wife (Okin 1979, 114-115, 125-131; Lange 1991, 97-101; Coole 1993, 78-85). As Okin (1979, 154) lamented, "[f]or this generally egalitarian philosopher, sex was the only legitimate ground for the permanent unequal treatment of any person."12

Liberal arguments for the inclusion of women in political citizenship

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, liberal thinkers such as Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill challenged the common assumption that women's reproductive function and confinement to the home justified their exclusion from civil and political citizenship. Their calls for equal citizenship for women inspired many European and North American women to fight for their civil and democratic rights. Both Wollstonecraft and Mill, however, failed to see that the
persistence of the sexual division of labour and the private/public divide would significantly curtail women's ability to exercise their new rights. Indeed, following the extension of civil and political rights, women became second-class (as opposed to full-fledged) citizens, that is citizens who could not fully enjoy their newly-won rights.

In *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, Wollstonecraft refuted Rousseau's argument that women's natural ineptitude for rational thinking made them unfit to exercise civil and democratic rights. For her, it was not nature, but rather the faulty education and socialization that women received, that accounted for their lesser rational faculties. With adequate education and nurturing, women could achieve the same level of rationality as men. Given women's equal faculties for reasoning, it was profoundly unfair, in her view, to deny them access to education, paid employment, property and participation in politics. Nevertheless, Wollstonecraft did not expect that once endowed with civil and political rights, women would turn away from marriage and motherhood and devote their energies to a professional career (Gatens 1991, 113-123; Bryson 1992, 22-26; Coole 1993, 91-101). Rather, she thought that these new rights would enable women to perform their domestic duties in a more rational manner: "[m]ake women rational creatures and free citizens, and they will quickly become good wives and mothers" (Wollstonecraft in Coole 1993, 95). In other words, the extension of civil and political rights to women would not only benefit women, but also society as a whole, since rational and educated mothers were likely to raise better citizens. John Stuart Mill put forward this same utilitarian argument in *The Subjection of Women* (Okin 1979, 203, 209).

Mill agreed with Wollstonecraft that the differences in character and intellect observable between the two sexes did not justify the exclusion of women from citizenship. In his view, these
differences, which stemmed from the distinct treatment and education of men and women, would wane when women became legally entitled to the same educational, professional and political opportunities as men.\textsuperscript{15} For example, suffrage would develop women's intellectual capacities through participation in public decision-making and enable them to contest male-imposed injustices concerning child custody and control over one's earnings. By enhancing women's freedom to fulfil themselves and putting them on an equal footing with men, the legal emancipation of women would bring society closer to the liberal ideals of freedom and justice (Okin 1979, 203-225; Shanley 1991, 164-172; Bryson 1992, 55-60, 64; Coole 1993, 110).

Feminist theorists have highlighted a number of weaknesses in Mill's view of women. To begin with, they have identified him as primarily concerned with women from the economically privileged strata of society, a criticism that could also be directed at Wollstonecraft. Although Mill recognized the awful plight of working-class women, he did not address the economic roots of their oppression. According to feminist critics of Mill, his liberal agenda for women's rights was to benefit first and foremost upper- and middle-class women. Feminists have also stressed Mill's failure to acknowledge how the sexual division of labour maintained women's subordinate position in the private and public realms. In his view, even with the options of marrying and raising a family or pursuing a career at their disposal, most women would opt for marriage and family (Okin 1979, 226-230; Shanley 1991, 166, 174; Bryson 1992, 65; Coole 1993, 111-112, 117).

Nevertheless, Mill's constant efforts to put his feminist views into practice should be acknowledged. While a member of the British House of Commons, he put forward a proposal to include women's suffrage in the 1867 Reform Bill for the enfranchisement of urban workers. Although defeated by 123 votes, Mill's proposal still received the support of 73 Members of
Parliament (Bryson 1992, 63).

European and North American women who, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, agitated for their political rights to vote, run for office and represent constituents, generally invoked liberal arguments of equality and justice and/or essentialist arguments about women's inherent moral superiority and nurturing qualities. Alternately put, political rights were demanded on the grounds of equality and/or difference, just as the denial of rights had been earlier. For many, the fact that women were rational and autonomous individuals entitled them to the same political rights as men. On the other hand, some also believed that women's inherent female moral qualities would reform and purify the political arena. Because of the public's resistance to equality/justice arguments, activists came to resort more frequently to essentialist arguments (Hedlund 1988, 79; Bryson 1992, 39-42, 48, 87-89; Brodie 1994, 81).16 As highlighted in the second section of the chapter, this "equality versus difference" debate has recently re-emerged in Europe and North America with respect to female representation in democratic institutions.

By the late 1940s, women in most Western liberal democracies had won formal political rights. Their inclusion in political citizenship, however, did not affect the composition of elected assemblies which remained predominantly male. Even today, the proportion of women legislators and government officials is still very low. Only Scandinavian countries can claim having gender-balanced legislatures. At present, the Swedish Riksdag includes 40.4% (141/349) women while the Canadian House of Commons has 18.3% (54/295) women (Statistics Sweden 1995, 406; Makin October 27, 1993, A17). France has one of the least feminized legislatures in the European Union with only 10.7% (62/577) women in its National Assembly ("French Vote Brings Gains for
for Women[,] June 7, 1997, A17; Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE) 1995, 203). In any event, the large gender imbalance observable in the elected assemblies of the industrialized world indicates that women have not had the opportunity to fully exercise their political right to run for office and represent citizens. Thus, it is appropriate to identify them as second-class, as opposed to full-fledged, political citizens.

To recapitulate, this section has reviewed how Western political thinkers have justified first denying and then extending political citizenship to women. Aristotle and Rousseau, for instance, pointed to women's performance of reproductive, childrearing and domestic tasks within the confines of the home as well as their inherently inferior rationality to account for their exclusion from citizenship. On the other hand, liberal thinkers such as Wollstonecraft and Mill demanded that women be granted the same civil and political rights as men on the grounds that their lesser rationality was not innate, but caused by a faulty education and socialization. Unfortunately, the granting of suffrage rights to women did not transform them into full-fledged political citizens. Let us now examine how feminist theorists propose to remedy this unjust situation.

Towards a Full Political Citizenship

Feminist alternatives to the liberal model of citizenship

In contrast with earlier political thinkers, feminists have not held women and their female characteristics responsible for men's dominance of democratic bodies. Instead, they have criticized the liberal model of citizenship for being tailor-made for men and thus exclusionary for women. More precisely, they have denounced the prevailing liberal model of citizenship as extremely difficult, if not impossible, for women to conform to. In their view, the universalizing and
abstracting features of this model and, in particular, its blindness to the disadvantages women have faced because of the private/public split and the sexual division of labour have impeded women's exercise of their political rights (see Pateman 1989, 14; Young 1990, 117, 131; Brodie and Chandler 1991, 10-15; Phillips 1991, 3, 6, 149).

Feminist scholars have proposed two ways of addressing the shortcomings of the liberal model of citizenship. While some have highlighted the need to replace this model with one that would recognize the obstacles women and other disadvantaged groups encounter in society, in other words, a model of differentiated citizenship, others have emphasized the need to implement affirmative action measures to enable women to exercise their political rights effectively in existing structures. Affirmative action generally includes support services (such as financial assistance and child care arrangements) as well as numerical devices (such as quotas, numerical targets and gender parity requirements). These two alternatives are not necessarily antithetical. Admittedly, advocates of a differentiated citizenship may dismiss affirmative action initiatives as a means to legitimize an unjust political system. Yet, they may also support them on the grounds that the exercise of liberal citizenship by a majority of women may eventually alter it in fundamental ways. Before elaborating on the affirmative action alternative, which is the main concern of the thesis, we shall briefly present two examples of the differentiated citizenship option.

According to Pateman (1989), those striving to integrate women's specific qualities and tasks into the liberal model of citizenship face what she calls the "Wollstonecraft dilemma." This dilemma contains two horns: first, women must become like men in order to be full active citizens; and second, this requirement makes it impossible to include women's attributes, capacities and activities into the liberal model of citizenship. The only way to solve this dilemma is to elaborate
a "sexually differentiated" citizenship that would recognize women's capacity to give birth as a criterion for full citizenship just as men's willingness to fight for their country is. In brief, the model of citizenship proposed by Pateman encompasses two types of individuality, one male and one female, and accords equal value to their corresponding tasks (Paternan 1989, 14; Mouffe 1992, 374-376).

Like Pateman, Young (1990) argues that liberal citizenship is based on the public/private distinction which views the public sphere as the realm of universality and homogeneity, and the private sphere as the realm of difference and heterogeneity. The blindness of liberal citizenship to sexual, ethnic and economic differences has resulted in the exclusion of not only women, as Pateman points out, but also visible minorities, natives and poor people from the realm of citizenship. It has also created a homogeneous public whose members leave their differences behind and express a more homogenized point of view. According to Young (1990), the substitution of a "group differentiated" (as opposed to simply "sex differentiated") citizenship for the present liberal model of universal citizenship would validate citizens' specific differences and identities and thus engender a heterogeneous public (Young 1990, 121-129; Mouffe 1992, 379-380).

**Affirmative action for women in politics**

The affirmative action alternative has its roots in the contemporary debate about the affirmative action measures and programs designed to help disadvantaged groups (such as women and ethnic minorities) to take advantage of the same educational and employment opportunities as white middle- and upper-class men. According to this option, concrete measures, including support services and numerical devices, must be implemented in order that a greater number of
women gain access to democratic bodies. In this section, we first outline the arguments that are generally put forward to either invalidate or justify the use of affirmative action and, more specifically, affirmative action means to feminize democratic institutions. Then, we focus on Brodie’s (1994) systematic examination of these arguments as well as the two recent issues of the feminist journal *Nouvelles questions féministes* on the current French debate about gender parity in elected assemblies. As mentioned earlier, these works represent the most recent and elaborate justifications for the use of affirmative action to feminize the political arena.

In “Identifying and Assessing Theoretical Presuppositions: The Case of Affirmative Action,” Hawesworth (1988) provides a clear overview of the arguments generally advanced in support of or against affirmative action. According to him, opponents of affirmative action generally view individuals, and not their environment or experiences caused by sex, class, race or other factors, as the main determinants of their social position. Individuals who fail to achieve a high-status position should blame themselves and their ill-advised educational and professional choices while those who succeed should congratulate themselves and their judicious choices (Hawesworth 1988, 96, 102, 120). For opponents of affirmative action such as Knopff (1985, 88) for example, measures that impose artificial numerical results in order to correct instances of representational imbalance are highly problematic (Hawesworth 1988, 103). To support this perspective, they refer to the perverse effects of such measures, notably, their propensity to hurt innocent parties, promote incompetent people and undermine the rule of merit (Knopff 1985, 91; Hawesworth 1988, 105).\(^\text{18}\) When probed about possible remedies for representational imbalance, opponents of affirmative action stress time and education (Hawesworth 1988, 103).

In Hawesworth’s (1988, 96-97) view, supporters of affirmative action like himself do not
subscribe to the view that individuals are the main determinants of their position in society. They point out that sexist, classist and racist biases prevailing in society result in the discriminatory treatment of women and ethnic groups, thus limiting their ability to fulfil themselves. For instance, supposedly impartial criteria of talent, effort and merit generally benefit privileged groups and discriminate against disadvantaged ones, hence the former's over-representation and the latter's under-representation in high-status professions (Hawesworth 1988, 111). For supporters of affirmative action, the extent of discriminatory attitudes and practices is such that it necessitates the implementation of strong counter-measures. In Stanley Fish's (November 1993, 130) words, "[s]trong illness, strong remedy: the formula is as appropriate to the health of the body politic as it is to that of the body proper." More specifically, they maintain that affirmative action measures must be imposed so that the unfair treatment previously suffered by disadvantaged groups is corrected and a more balanced distribution of rewards is achieved (Hawesworth 1988, 96,115; Fish 1993, 130-132).

Similar arguments have been put forward for and against the use of affirmative action devices (or numerical requirements such as quotas and targets) to enhance women's political representation. According to Phillips (1991, 150-155), calls for such requirements often meet with resistance because they contradict two founding principles of liberal democracy, liberty and equality. By dictating that a specific percentage of women be elected as representatives, these requirements impinge on the electorate's sacrosanct freedom of choice. Furthermore, they can lead to the arbitrary and unequal treatment of candidates, with competent males being passed over for less competent females. By way of contrast, supporters of affirmative action for women in politics like Phillips (1991, 150-155) and Brodie (1991, 48-49;1994) generally argue that both the
"neutral" rules of liberal democracy and persistent sexist attitudes and practices have marginalized women in the political arena and created unrepresentative (and thus undemocratic) male-dominated legislatures. In their view, numerical devices can produce truly democratic bodies that mirror the citizenry, an ideal that liberal democracy has never come close to realizing. To validate the use of such devices, they maintain that women must be compensated for their historical exclusion from politics and that political power must be distributed fairly and equally between the two sexes.

Before presenting her case for affirmative action for women in politics, Brodie (1994) points out that three distinct, though not mutually exclusive, arguments are generally advanced to validate the use of affirmative action for women in politics: basic justice, women’s special interests and perspectives, and their superior qualities. While the first argument emphasizes the need to put women on an equal footing with men, the other two emphasize the need to incorporate women’s differences from men in democratic institutions. The basic justice argument holds that since half of citizens are women, it is only fair that half of elected representatives be female. According to the "special interests and perspectives" argument, women will bring their particular expertise and concerns in the political arena and correct the distortions in representation and policies caused by men’s long-lasting dominance of this arena. The last argument can be identified as essentialist since it suggests that women have superior caring and cooperative abilities that will improve democratic bodies and the quality of representation (Brodie 1994, 81).

In Brodie’s (1994, 82) view, the two differentialist rationales carry important liabilities for women politicians as well as those supporting the use of affirmative action to increase their numbers. For instance, the essentialist argument that women’s superior caring and cooperative qualities will transform the political sphere into a gentler and kinder world is clearly obsolete. It
resonated with early twentieth-century voters and politicians who perceived women as the saintly guardians of the hearth. Today, however, it is unlikely to have the same echo since thanks to second-wave feminists, this monolithic perception of women no longer prevails, except perhaps among Carol Gilligan's followers. The main problem with the essentialist argument is that it assigns only one possible role to female politicians, that of the caring and cooperative representative. In so doing, it reinforces the problematic patriarchal construction of men and women's roles (Brodie 1994, 84).

This same criticism can be raised against the other differentialist argument that women will bring their particular interests and perspectives to male-biased legislatures. Indeed, the "special interests and perspectives" rationale implies that women, because of their childbearing and rearing activities, have a unique knowledge of or interest in issues concerning reproduction, the family and child care that will inform their performance in the legislature. In other words, such a perspective essentially allots exclusive responsibility for so-called "women's issues" to female politicians. Women who do not intend to have children and address issues related to motherhood do not come into the picture. At the same time, this rationale also frees male politicians from the obligation to speak on these questions (Brodie 1994, 83).

The "special interests and perspectives" argument can also be criticized for assuming that women share a common perspective on "their" issues. Given the cleavages of race, class, age and ability that run deeply among women, a common perspective on "women's issues" is not achievable. As Phillips (1991, 77) notes, "women are not homogeneous and do not speak with one voice." Consequently, it is not simply women, but rather women in all their diversity, who must gain access to democratic bodies (Brodie 1994, 83-84).
After outlining the shortcomings of the two differentialist rationales, Brodie (1994, 84) concludes that claims for the feminization of democratic institutions via affirmative action should be made solely on the grounds of basic justice. In her view, the argument that the equal political representation of men and women in all their diversity will enhance democracy is most likely to resonate with voters and political leaders and thus bring proponents of affirmative action closer to their goals. On the other hand, the two differentialist rationales and, in particular, their contention that women will improve the defective representation of male-dominated bodies is, according to her, not "sustainable empirically or strategically politically" (Brodie 1994, 84).

Let us now turn our attention to the lively debate that gender parity requirements for all elected assemblies have recently prompted in France. While the arguments for parity are reminiscent of the points mentioned by Brodie (1994), those against it highlight the limitations of the justice rationale.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, women's organizations began demanding that the proportion of women in France's traditionally male-dominated elected assemblies be dramatically increased. The enthusiasm and activism aroused by the issue of gender parity (or "l'égalité parfaite des femmes et des hommes dans la représentation démocratique") was such that pro-parity organizations soon came to be referred to as the movement for gender parity (Gaspard 1994, 32). Two factors explain the emergence of this movement: first, French women's anger at their perennial exclusion from democratic bodies; and second, their perception that the legitimacy crisis shaking the representative institutions of Western liberal democracies could provide an opportunity for French women to break through the political sphere. The main goal of the movement for parity has been the passage of a law guaranteeing the equal representation of women in elected
assemblies. To date, the French public as well as political parties on the left have responded positively to the movement. When asked whether gender parity was a "political gimmick" or an efficient measure to increase women's representation in politics, 31% of respondents selected the first option and 59% the second one (Cayrol 1994, 27). Furthermore, several left-leaning parties presented gender-balanced lists for the 1994 European Parliament elections. By contrast, the more conservative elements of the French polity have identified it as an attack on traditional republican and universal values (Gaspard 1994, 37; Viennot 1994, 65, 76-77, 79; Varikas 1994, 2, 77; Lipietz 1994, 48; Halimi 1994, 16).  

Gender parity in France has been justified on many of the same grounds as affirmative action in North America. Gender parity is generally described as a means of enhancing equality between the two sexes and fostering justice and democracy (Gaspard 1994, 42; Viennot 1994, 71; Lipietz 1994, 46). High-profile feminist and parity advocate Françoise Gaspard subscribes to this position. For her, the prime objective of gender parity is not to have women legislators represent issues of special interest to women, but rather to bring about equality between men and women. In her words,

[L]a mobilisation [pour la parité] […] n'a pas pour objectif de faire que des femmes, dans les assemblées élues, représentent les femmes.

[…]

La conquête de la stricte égalité des femmes et des hommes dans les assemblées, qu'elles soient nationales ou locales, est symbolique. (Gaspard 1994, 42)

A number of parity advocates, however, also invoke differentialist arguments. Some argue that gender parity will bring women's concerns and specific ways of dealing with issues into the legislative arena (Viennot 1994, 84; Astellara 1994, 126; Lipietz 1994, 55; Sineau 1994, 75-77).
Others advance essentialist reasons (Gaspard 1994, 41). For instance, in the view of Solange Fernex (in Sineau 1994, 76), a Member of the European Parliament from the French ecological party *Les Verts*, gender parity is not just a way of enhancing justice, but also a way of saving the world: "[a]près des millénaires de patriarcat et au-delà d'une existence élémentaire de justice, de démocratie, la parité (hommes/femmes en politique)... est un moyen de sauver le monde." The multitude of existing justifications for gender parity may have given the impression that the parity project was somewhat confused, leading to criticisms against it (Varikas 1994, 3; Trat 1995, 131-132).

Feminist critics of the French parity project are mainly concerned with the strict justice position of Gaspard (1994) and, more specifically, its view of the legislature as "the mirror of the nation." According to Gaspard and other justice advocates, a legislature should reflect the fact that the population is composed of two sexes and include an equal number of men and women. Only a legislature whose members have the same physical and social characteristics as citizens can be identified as a true mirror or symbol of the nation. Parity critics, however, find the representation entailed by "the mirror of the nation" highly problematic as it is based on appearance rather than substance. What is important is what representatives are like, not what they do. A greater number of women must be elected to the legislature so that they "stand" (and not "act") for women. This leads parity critic Le Doeuff (1995, 52-53) to equate such a representation with the illusory representation that takes place on a theatre stage. In sum, critics question the contention of justice advocates that the achievement of gender parity in democratic institutions will be symbolic, as well as their reluctance to speak of the changes that the equal presence of women legislators might cause (Le Doeuff 1995, 17, 24, 47, 50-53, 63, 69; Varikas 1994, 7, 9, 11).
Conclusion

This chapter has sketched how Western ideas about women and, in particular, their relation to political citizenship, have evolved with time. One can distinguish three main phases in this development. First, the Aristotelian view that women were to be excluded from the realm of citizenship prevailed well into the eighteenth century. Second, thanks to liberal thinkers like Wollstonecraft and J.S. Mill, this view was successfully challenged, and women finally obtained the same liberal civil and political rights as male citizens. Third, in recent years, feminist theorists have blamed the abstract, universal and male-centred model of liberal citizenship for women's inability to fully exercise their right to run and remedy this unfair situation. Some of them have suggested that this flawed model be replaced by a new model of (sex or group) differentiated citizenship. Others have proposed that affirmative action measures (including support services and numerical requirements) be implemented in order to facilitate women's exercise of their right to run and represent. The most recent and compelling defences of the affirmative action alternative have been advanced by Canadian scholar Brodie and French parity advocate Gaspard.

Overall, this brief survey reveals that feminist arguments for the feminization of democratic institutions constitute the latest contribution to the long-lasting historical debate about women's rightful involvement in politics. Even though the case-studies presented in Chapters Three, Four and Five do not deal with the feminization of national legislatures (but rather with the feminization of party organizations), they are nonetheless directly relevant to the larger project of feminizing the political arena. Indeed, the historical reluctance of political parties to nominate women candidates has prevented women from exercising their right to run and represent. It is not
surprising that party organizations, whose legislative and executive bodies have always included a majority of men, have recruited primarily male candidates. Only when women hold a significant share of party positions, will there be more pressure for parties to nominate large numbers of female candidates and will women be able to fully enjoy their right to represent. The steps that left-of-centre parties took in the 1970s and 1980s to enhance female presence in their internal organs indicate that left-leaning parties may now be ready to facilitate women's entry into the political arena. These efforts may boost the proportion of women party officials and candidates and enable women to at last become full-fledged political citizens. It is therefore crucial that such efforts be thoroughly investigated. Before turning to the initiatives launched in the Parti socialiste français, Parti québécois and Ontario New Democratic Party to feminize internal party bodies, we shall review the history of French, Quebec and Ontario women's involvement in politics.
1. In *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*, Marshall (1965, 92) outlines the history of citizenship or the "status bestowed on those who are full members of a community." For him, the three elements of citizenship, namely, civil, political and social rights, emerged and flourished sequentially. Civil rights such as freedom of speech, thought and faith were obtained in the eighteenth century and political rights in the nineteenth century (Marshall 1965. 78-79). The twentieth century witnessed the development of rights to a variety of social services, programs and benefits. Marshall's piece is not an uncritical praise of the advancement of citizenship. Indeed, he stresses that in capitalist countries such as Britain, the development of citizenship rights brought about a limited reduction (rather than the elimination) of social and economic inequalities. He even points out that in certain respects, citizenship helped legitimize these inequalities (Marshall 1965. 77-91, 127-134). It is worth noting that throughout the text, the term "citizenship" refers to "political citizenship" or, as Marshall (1965, 78-79) stresses, the exercise of the political rights to vote and represent.

2. "Democratic institutions" are generally defined as the political bodies that are directly elected by the citizenry. In the text, this term refers mainly to national legislatures.

3. The term "affirmative action" encompasses affirmative action measures (which are defined in the introduction as child care arrangements, financial assistance, and numerical targets) as well as quotas (which are identified in the introduction as the positive discrimination measure *par excellence*).

4. Nowadays, the view that women are innately adverse to politics is obsolete. Nevertheless, support for pro-feminization measures remains moderate. Many object to the implementation of pro-feminization measures and contend that with time, democratic institutions will become more feminized. This comparative study of efforts to feminize party organizations does not subscribe to such a view. Rather, it subscribes to the view that gender-balanced democratic institutions are a worthwhile goal to strive for and that specific steps must be taken in order to achieve it. Thus, instead of questioning the usefulness of these steps, the study seeks to determine what types of measures are the most effective in boosting women's presence in political parties.

5. The review deals with authors who have been the focus of feminist commentaries, namely, Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and Mary Wollstonecraft (see Okin 1979, 7; Pateman and Shanley 1991, 2). This selection approximates that made by Darcy *et al.* ([1987] 1994, 18-24) at the beginning of their empirical study of women and elections.

6. These realms have also been identified respectively as the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity.
7. The distinct natures of Aristotle and Plato's respective projects account for their different views. While Plato undertook to design an ideal political system, Aristotle undertook to explain the nature of social and political life (Okin 1979, 73).

8. However, Saxonhouse (1991, 38) points out that for Aristotle, women's emotional propensities (and not their reproductive function) explained their subordination. She also suggests that Aristotle valued the childrearing and education activities that women performed in the oikos (Saxonhouse 1991, 50-51).

9. In Coole's (1993, 62) view, women's subordination to men implied that men possessed a natural advantage over women, which contradicts Hobbes' premise that men and women were equal individuals in the state of nature.

10. Feminists have criticized Hobbes for failing to explain why equal women would enter a marriage contract that inevitably disadvantaged them (Coole 1993, 56, 60-61; Pateman 1991, 55). This criticism can also be raised against Locke (Coole 1993, 73).

11. According to Butler (1991, 90-91), Locke believed that with the proper education, women could become as rational as men.

12. Nevertheless, for Rousseau, women's role in nurturing affective relationships within the family was essential in the development of future citizens (Lange 1991, 103-106; Coole 1993, 91).

13. Although Wollstonecraft attacked Rousseau's treatment of women, she still supported his vision of an egalitarian community (Coole 1993, 101).

14. Wollstonecraft even suggested that women should have representatives in government (Gatens 1991, 121; Coole 1993, 100).

15. According to Shanley (1991, 175), Mill argued that marital friendship, rather than equal opportunity, would put an end to women's subjugation. Equal opportunity was a means to achieve marital friendship, not an end in itself.

16. This shift caused some political rights activists to support the exclusion of particular groups from the franchise on the grounds that they did not own property (as was the case in Britain) or that they were not white (as was the case in the United States) (Bryson 1992, 89-90).

17. This is the argument advanced by Varikas (1994). She deplores the fact that numerical devices mainly aim at "mending" rather than "re-building" democracy.

18. In Roberts' (1979, 91-92) view, affirmative action may also bring about two types of unintended consequences. These include the distortion of recipients' self-image and the degradation of relations between recipients and non-recipients.
19. This discussion of affirmative action for women in politics focuses on numerical requirements because they are more controversial than support services.

20. In Scandinavia, calls for increased female representation have been justified on similar grounds. Norderval (1985, 84) has identified them as follows: "democratic justice," "resource utilization" and "interest representation." We have already explained what the justice position entails. According to the resource utilization argument, women would bring valuable resources, namely, their particular values, experiences and expertise, into the political sphere. The interest representation position highlights the need to represent women's specific interests which are often at odds with those of men (Norderval 1985, 84; Hedlund 1988, 79; Phillips 1991, 62, 75).


22. For a more detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the French movement for gender parity, see Chapter Three.

23. For Gaspard (1994, 41) and Viennot (1994, 77), the fact that women are present in all social categories of class, age and ethnicity justifies their demand that elected assemblies be gender-balanced.

24. In her study of Democratic and Republican delegates to the 1972 presidential conventions, Kirkpatrick (1976) proposes a different interpretation of the "mirror of the nation" argument that allows her to refute claims for descriptive or demographic representation. According to her, when John Adams wrote that a legislature "should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them," he meant that legislators had to mirror first and foremost the opinions of their constituents, not their physical traits (Adams in Kirkpatrick 1976, 285). It is this interpretation of the mirror which, in her view, has informed democratic practice. The use of a quota by the Democratic Party to increase the proportion of women, black and young delegates to its 1972 presidential convention was inspired by a different view of representation, one based mainly on demographic characteristics. As Kirkpatrick's survey data indicate, the 1972 Democratic delegates held views that differed significantly from those of ordinary Democrats and voters generally. This leads her to conclude that the quota failed to produce a truly representative convention (Kirkpatrick 1976, 283-292, 328-331). Interestingly, Kirkpatrick went on to become a prominent American neo-conservative and one of the highest ranking women in the Reagan circle.
CHAPTER TWO

FRENCH, QUEBEC AND ONTARIO WOMEN'S INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

As we saw in the previous chapter, many traditional Western thinkers believed that women were inept and unable to engage effectively in political activities. However, historical evidence from France, Canada and other countries clearly undermines this view. In the nineteenth century, a small group of women ignored the legal exclusion of their sex from political citizenship and voted, ran for office and joined political parties.

This chapter provides an overview of French, Quebec and Ontario women's involvement in politics from the nineteenth century until the 1960s. More specifically, it assesses to what extent party organizations, that is the main gatekeepers to the political arena, supported women's initiatives to participate in politics. Overall, the political histories of France, Quebec and Ontario indicate that left and right parties blocked women's access to the political arena until at least the 1960s. This finding helps to explain why female activists pressured parties so that they took steps to facilitate their full inclusion into the political sphere. After examining women's political activities in the pre-enfranchisement period, we investigate how women's political involvement evolved in the immediate postwar decades.

Women's Involvement in Politics prior to Gaining Political Rights

Voting, running for office and party activism

Long before they won formal political rights, French, Quebec and Ontario women voted and contested public office. In the wake of the 1789 and 1848 revolutions, French women formed
their own political clubs and agitated for economic, civil and political rights. On both occasions, however, the authorities eventually outlawed female political clubs and added women to the list of legal minors who could neither vote nor run for office. Undeterred by these restrictions, a few women resolved to publicize their fight for political rights by trying to vote and run as candidates.

In the fall of 1892, after five socialist parties turned down its request to present at least one female candidate, the socialist women's group *Solidarité des femmes* presented its own candidates. About twenty years later, the *Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière* (SFIO), the socialist party formed in 1905, became the first political organization in France to nominate women candidates (Albistur and Armogathe 1977, 300-305; Rabaut 1978, 195-196; Adler 1993, 15-39).

In British North America, women first voted in the early nineteenth century and began running as party candidates about a century later. According to the 1791 Constitutional Act, which divided Canada into the territories of Lower and Upper Canada (presently Quebec and Ontario) and established a representative assembly in each territory, only persons who fulfilled certain property qualifications could elect representatives. Noting that property and not sex determined one's right to vote, propertied women and, in particular, those living in Lower Canada, voted several times from 1809 through the early 1830s.¹ Women stopped going to the polls when the legislature of Lower Canada passed a bill explicitly denying women the vote. Despite Britain's disallowance of this law (for reasons unrelated to female suffrage), women did not return to the polls. In 1849, a Reform government made it illegal for women of the two Canadas to exercise the franchise. Almost seventy years went by before a woman broke the law again by exercising a political right she did not have. In 1902, Margaret Haile ran in the Ontario provincial election as a candidate of the Canadian Socialist League. She was reportedly the first woman in the British

Women's involvement in political parties also predates their acquisition of political rights. In France and English Canada, the mass socialist parties that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the first to accept female members. While French women were mainly active in socialist parties, English Canadian women were active in socialist parties as well as in some of the separate female associations that Liberal and Conservative parties set up after 1900. The absence until the 1950s of strong left-wing organizations in Quebec meant that in the early twentieth century, women's party activism took place mainly in the Liberal and Conservative female clubs located in Montreal and Quebec City. Given the paucity of historical research on Quebec women's party activism prior to their enfranchisement, the following concentrates on French and English Canadian women's involvement in political parties.

A few women joined French and English Canadian political parties in the pre-enfranchisement period. More often than not, they were the wives and daughters of party activists. In Les femmes et le socialisme, Sowerwine (1978, 286) estimates that during the Third Republic (1870-1940), 2-3% of French socialist party members were female. According to Newton (1995, 15), the proportion of women involved in prewar Canadian socialist organizations was probably 10% or less. The female membership of Canadian Liberal and Conservative parties was likely very small in the years prior to women's acquisition of political rights. As noted earlier, these parties required men to join the main party organization and women their female association. Since these associations were in their infancy at the time, it is unlikely that they included many women.

One could argue that the willingness of socialist parties to accept female members in their
main organization attests to a greater commitment to gender equality. However, this commitment does not appear to have drawn women to socialist parties. In fact, the strict norms about gender roles that prevailed at the turn of the century made women hesitant about joining male-dominated socialist parties. Furthermore, the insistence of these parties on a class-based agenda and close monitoring of any perceived attempt to deviate from this agenda (including the establishment of socialist women-only groups) dissuaded women from joining.

Fearing that female locals would bring dissension within their organization, French socialist parties, with the help of stalwart members like Louise Saumonneau, tried to bring these groups under their control and transform them into female auxiliaries, that is bodies that simply "addressed" issues of interest to women as prescribed by the party. In 1899, CSI (Confédération des socialistes indépendants) members Élisabeth Renaud and Louise Saumonneau set up the Groupe féministe socialiste (GFS). This group aimed primarily at educating working-class women, improving their lot and enrolling them in the socialist movement (Albistur and Armogathe 1978, 95-96). By 1901, however, the GFS appeared more concerned with fighting against "bourgeois" feminists than with improving the condition of working-class women. The decision of the CSI to require new female party members to join one of its (masculine) sections before getting involved in the GFS and, above all, Saumonneau's support of this decision effectively transformed the GFS into an auxiliary of the CSI. The GFS disappeared in 1905, when the newly-formed SFIO turned down its request to join the party. Eight years later, SFIO members Élisabeth Renaud and Adèle Toussaint-Kassky created the Groupe des femmes socialistes (GDFS), a socialist women's group with similar objectives as the GFS. The GDFS did not have time to assert its autonomy from the SFIO. At the first organizational meeting, Saumonneau managed to pass a resolution providing
that only women affiliated with the SFIO would be able to join the GDFS. Then, she forced GDFS members interested in collaborating with feminist activists out of the group. In 1931, the GDFS was replaced by yet another female auxiliary of the SFIO, the Comité national des femmes socialistes, which failed to achieve its two goals, namely, recruiting and educating new female members and drawing the attention of the party to issues of concern to women (Sowerwine 1978, 86, 108, 114, 150-152, 161-162, 169).

Although Canadian socialist parties do not appear to have had quite the same urge as their French counterparts to control socialist women's groups, they did not wholeheartedly support party women's efforts to organize their own units. Established in the early 1890s in British Columbia, the Socialist Party of Canada (SPC) opposed separate female and ethnic branches on the grounds that they deflected party members from the class-based socialist agenda. Despite the opposition of the SPC, female and ethnic branches were nonetheless formed. Its successor, the Social Democratic Party of Canada (SDPC), was somewhat more accommodating of female members' need to have their own groups. For instance, it did not try to sabotage the Women's League that SDPC women founded in 1914 in Ontario. The League was open to all progressive women who were interested in promoting socialism through the organization of lectures, study sessions and fundraising events. The clear socialist orientation of the League as well as the invaluable support services it provided to the SDPC explain why the party did not attempt to take it over (Newton 1995, 4-5, 45-46, 157).

Campaigning for political rights

Late nineteenth-century feminist Hubertine Auclert was instrumental in launching the French suffrage movement. While working at the feminist newspaper Le droit des femmes (also
known as *L'avenir des femmes*), Auclert grew critical of French feminists — many of whom were well-off Protestant women like herself — and their emphasis on civil and economic equality and neglect of political equality. In 1878, two years after founding the association *Droit des femmes* (or *Suffrage des femmes* as of 1883), she denounced the exclusion of political rights from the program of the first international congress for women's rights by publishing the speech she was to deliver at the congress under the title *Le droit politique des femmes, question interdite au congrès des femmes de 1878*. Then, she managed to have the 1879 workers' congress adopt a resolution recognizing that women should have the same social and political rights as men. In 1880, she decided to leave the paper *Le droit des femmes* and apply her energies to campaigning for women's political equality. In her mind, political rights were the key to women's civil and economic emancipation. It took two decades of agitation on the part of Auclert and her association, including petition drives, demonstrations, a taxation protest, and the publication of the monthly paper *La citoyenne*, for feminists to acknowledge the validity of her claims. Following the passage of a pro-suffrage resolution by the 1900 international women's congress, several suffragist organizations were established (Albistur and Armogathe 1977, 376-381; Evans 1977, 124-133).

French authorities were even more reluctant than "bourgeois" feminists to endorse women's rights to vote and run for office. Shortly after the end of World War I, suffragists managed to have a suffrage bill introduced in the National Assembly. Passed by the Assembly but not the Senate, the bill never became law. During the interwar years, the Senate and, in particular, its Radical (republican) members, who feared that women voters would favour clerical forces, defeated four other suffrage bills. It was not until the end of World War II that in recognition of women's involvement in the *Résistance*, the provisional government of Charles de Gaulle finally
passed a decree allowing women to vote and run for public office (Albistur and Armogathe 1977, 381-383; Evans 1977, 134).\(^5\)

In Quebec, anglophone women were the first to tackle the issue of female suffrage. Around the mid-1880s, the Montreal branch of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union included demands for the vote in its platform. The Montreal Local Council of Women followed suit in 1909.\(^6\) Four years later, anglophone women established Quebec’s first suffrage association, the Montreal Suffrage Association. Realizing that its largely English-speaking support base significantly mitigated its impact, the Association disbanded after six years of operation (Cleverdon 1974, 217-222, 226-227; Maillé 1990, 24-25). By contrast, francophone women became actively involved in the campaign for political rights in the early 1920s, that is only after Ottawa and all the provinces except Quebec had passed their suffrage bills.\(^7\)

French- and English-speaking women’s first joint attempt to mobilize for political rights was rapidly quashed by the Catholic Church hierarchy. At the initiative of Marie Gérin-Lajoie, the president of the Fédération nationale Saint-Jean-Baptiste (Quebec’s umbrella organization for Catholic women’s groups), francophone and anglophone women came together to form a new suffrage association. The Comité provincial du suffrage féminin (CPSF) was officially established in 1922. Its suffragist activities caused several prominent members of the Catholic Church to make public statements against women’s vote. The anti-suffrage stand of the Church then forced the Fédération to withdraw its support of the CPSF and Gérin-Lajoie to resign the French presidency of the Comité. In the following years, the CPSF kept a low profile until Thérèse Casgrain, a well-known women’s rights activist, revived it in 1928. The formation a year earlier of the Alliance canadienne pour le vote des femmes du Québec by McGill professor and former CPSF member
Idola Saint-Jean may have prompted Casgrain to take over the CPSF (Cleverdon 1974, 214-264; Prentice et al. 1988, 185, 203, 283-284; Maillé 1990, 26-27).8

The Comité (or Ligue du droit des femmes as of 1929), the Alliance and other suffragist and pro-suffrage organizations spent the next decade trying to convince the Quebec public and elites of the validity of their claims. For instance, the Ligue sent annual delegations to the provincial government, launched education campaigns and supported attempts to introduce suffrage bills. Saint-Jean lobbied the legislature, wrote numerous articles for mainstream and suffragist papers and even ran as an independent candidate in the 1930 federal elections. Her candidacy generated considerable publicity for the suffrage cause. This period of intense franchise activity paid off in the late 1930s, when the Quebec Liberals changed their stand. Following an overwhelming defeat in the 1936 elections, they invited forty Quebec women's rights advocates, including Casgrain, to attend their 1938 convention as delegates. For Cleverdon (1974, 252-253), three factors prompted the Liberals to take this step: the need to project a more modern image of the party, pressures from the Liberal administration in Ottawa, and Casgrain's close ties to Liberal circles (her husband was the Speaker of the House of Commons at the time). In any event, women delegates won the inclusion of female suffrage in the 1938 Liberal platform. Shortly after their return to power, the Liberals and, more precisely, Adelard Godbout, the new Quebec Premier, introduced a bill granting Quebec women full political rights which became law on April 25, 1940 (Cleverdon 1974, 234-260; Prentice et al. 1988, 283-284; Maillé 1990, 28-29).

English Canadian women began mobilizing for political rights around the same time French suffragist Auclert launched her campaign for the vote. In November 1876, Dr. Emily Howard Stowe and a small group of Toronto women, who were concerned about women's limited
educational and professional opportunities, founded the Toronto Women's Literary Club (TWLC). During its six years of existence, the TWLC organized social and intellectual events, educated its members and the public about women's condition and the need for social reform, and won passage of a provincial bill allowing unmarried propertied women to vote on municipal by-laws. In 1883, TWLC members decided it was time to reveal their suffragist colours. They disbanded the TWLC and established the Canadian Women's Suffrage Association as well as a Toronto branch called the Toronto Women's Suffrage Association. In the following years, several other suffragist organizations emerged across Canada (Cleverdon 1974, 19-21; Prentice et al. 1988, 175-176).

Ontario suffragists used tactics similar to those of their French and Quebec counterparts while campaigning for the provincial franchise. They organized demonstrations and petition drives, sent delegations to the provincial government, supported various municipal and provincial suffrage bills and pressured political parties to add female suffrage to their platform. Just before the opening of the 1917 legislative session, the Ontario Liberal Party (OLP) officially endorsed women's right to vote. As the opposition party, however, the OLP could not do much about legislating female suffrage, especially since the Conservative government was against it. Fortunately, times were changing. The Prairie provinces had just granted political rights to women in 1916, and the federal government's enfranchisement of Canadian women was rumoured to be imminent. To the astonishment of many, Conservative Premier William H. Hearst publicly endorsed the female suffrage bill introduced in early 1917 in the Ontario legislature. He explained that women's heroic role during the war had caused him to reconsider his initial opposition to female suffrage. Ontario women obtained the right to vote provincially in April 1917, five months before Canadian women with a relative in the army were enfranchised at the federal level.9 They
became eligible for public office two years later (Cleverdon 1974, 39-43; Bacchi 1983, 138).

Given the similar socio-economic background, outlook and tactics of French, Quebec and Ontario suffragists, it is intriguing that they achieved their goals more than two decades apart. French, Quebec and Ontario suffragists were generally well-educated, upper- and middle-class white women and men concerned about the social havoc caused by industrialization and urbanization. They saw the vote as a means to implement social reforms. Unlike British suffragists, they rejected the use of violence. One common explanation for the late enfranchisement of French and Quebec women (and the early enfranchisement of Ontario women) emphasises the cultural and religious make-up of the societies under study and, in particular, the fact that Catholic France and Quebec were much less open to new conceptions of gender roles than Protestant Ontario. According to this explanation, in Catholic societies, the vigorous opposition of clerical and political forces to feminists and suffragists' challenges to their traditional conception of women's role hampered the adoption of pro-women reforms. The prevalence of a more liberal conception of women's role in Protestant societies resulted in clerical and political forces reacting somewhat more benevolently to the demands of feminists and suffragists. The suffrage histories of Quebec and Ontario and, more specifically, the fierce opposition of the Quebec Church hierarchy to it and the fairly smooth reversal of Ontario parties on this issue, give credence to this argument. As for the French case, it is somewhat more tenuous. In France, opposition to the vote was both clerical and anti-clerical. It should be noted, however, that the French Catholic hierarchy, in contrast to its Quebec counterpart, was not unanimously against the suffrage. Some elements of the French Catholic hierarchy even supported it (Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau 1981, 113). Furthermore, in the end, it was anti-clerical Senators who kept rejecting the
suffrage bills passed by the National Assembly out of fear that newly-enfranchised women would support clerical parties.

To recapitulate, French, Quebec and Ontario women did not wait for formal permission to engage in political activities. Long before they officially acquired political rights, a few women were voting, running for office and joining political parties. In light of suffragists' persistent efforts, it is certainly more accurate to say that women won (rather than were granted) political rights. Let us now investigate female involvement in politics in the immediate postwar decades and, more precisely, their partisan leanings, party activism, and share of candidacies, legislative seats and cabinet positions.¹¹

Women's Involvement in Politics in the Postwar Period

Partisanship

Before examining the partisan leanings of French, Quebec and Ontario women, it is important to note that the voting behaviour of French women is better documented than that of Quebec and Ontario women. While data on female voting were collected as early as 1945 in France, such data were first collected about two decades later in Canada either by individual parties and academics or in the context of the 1965 Canadian National Election Study.

On the whole, electoral data reveal that in the postwar period, French, Quebec and Ontario women preferred centre-right and right parties to left-wing formations. Already in the November 1946 legislative elections, French women were not as supportive of the left as men voters; 52.7% women and 64.8% men cast their ballot in favour of a left party. Five years later, women's support of the left had dropped to 46.8% (Dogan and Narbonne 1955, 88). During the 1950s and
1960s, the electoral base of the centre and right remained largely female while that of the left was largely male (Charzat 1972, 25-35). Data from the 1965 Canadian National Election Study indicate that in Quebec, 64.6% women identified themselves primarily as Liberal supporters. Only 17.5% and 13.1% women considered themselves to be respectively Conservative and New Democratic supporters (Bashevkin 1993, 155). Turning to Ontario, women voters appear to have been slightly more inclined to support the Conservative Party and just as inclined to disfavour the New Democratic Party. According to Drummond (1975, 309), in the 1967 Ontario elections, 27% women voted for the Conservatives, 22% for the Liberals and 9% for the New Democrats. Havel's (1966, 68) analysis of Sudbury voters' behaviour during the 1963 federal elections also highlights the tendency of Ontario women to favour Conservatives and disfavour New Democrats.

Why were female voters more favourable to conservative parties than to left-wing formations? For several French researchers, it was not "women's conservative nature," but rather social and economic factors that explained their propensity to support the right and centre-right. As Dogan and Narbonne (1955, 90-92, 97-102), Michel (1965, 70-73) and Charzat (1972, 39-55) point out, in the 1950s and 1960s, the social and economic categories most likely to support conservative parties, notably, the elderly, religious and non-workers, included a majority of women. The gender gap phenomenon of the past decade, which has female voters on the progressive side and male voters on the conservative side, validates this argument. Some of the social and economic developments of the 1960s and 1970s, for example, the intensive secularization of French society and feminization of the workforce, prompted many women voters to adopt less conservative views and support left-leaning parties.

In "Les Françaises et la politique," Michel (1965, 75-80) proposes yet another explanation
for the conservatism of French women: the manner in which political parties treated women voters and issues of concern to them. For her, the strictly economistic discourse of the SFIO accounts for its lack of appeal among female voters. Conversely, the concerted efforts of the centre-right Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP) to promote reforms in the areas of family allowances and social security explains women's steady backing of this party at election time.\textsuperscript{13} Bashevkin (1983b, 155-158) makes a somewhat similar argument with regards to Quebec women. In her view, the 1938 alliance that suffragists made with the provincial Liberals partly explains Quebec women's Liberal sympathies. Not surprisingly, women who came of age politically in the late 1930s and 1940s ended up supporting the party that granted political rights to them. Along the same lines, one could propose that the familialist discourse of the Conservatives and Liberals resonated with Ontario women better than the economistic discourse of the New Democrats. As demonstrated below, left-leaning parties were largely oblivious of women not only in their electoral rhetoric, but also in their internal organization.

**Party activism**

Through the 1950s and 1960s, the membership of French political parties remained primarily male. For instance, the MRP, SFIO and Parti communiste français (PCF) included 16\% to 18\% women in 1951 (Dogan and Narbonne 1955, 137). By 1960-1961, the proportion of women in the SFIO had dropped to 10\%. In its 1961 report, the national women's commission of the SFIO noted that the party clearly lagged behind its German and Austrian counterparts which had 33\% and 45\% women members respectively (SFIO 1961, 62-63). At the end of the 1960s, female representation reached 25\% in the PCF, 17\% in the socialist party (or Fédération de la gauche démocratique socialiste), and 10\% in the Gaullist Union des démocrates pour la
république (Charzat 1972, 58-60). After presenting these data, Charzat (1972, 62) concluded that "l'engagement des femmes dans les partis politiques reste un phénomène exceptionnel."

The situation in Quebec and Ontario parties was not much different. As noted previously, Liberal and Conservative parties at provincial and federal levels relegated women to separate female associations. Some of these organizations, especially the Liberal ones, grew significantly during the postwar decades. Established in 1950 as the successor to the Club Wilfrid Laurier, the Fédération des femmes libérales du Québec (FFLQ) had forty constituent clubs at the end of the 1950s and more than seventy in the 1960s, including about twenty thousand members (Lévesque 1993, 339, 349). At its fiftieth anniversary meeting in 1964, the Ontario Women's Liberal Association included 110 constituent clubs (Bashevkin 1993, 118). Nevertheless, the fact that these associations principally provided support services to the main party organization and had little or no influence on party affairs attests to the secondary status of women in established Quebec and Ontario parties. Estimates by Beeby (1982, 261) and Azoulay (1995, 85) that the Ontario Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) had about 15-30% women members in the 1940s and 25-30% in the 1950s suggest that female CCFers had probably more influence on party affairs than female Liberals and Conservatives.

From the end of World War II until the mid-1960s, no more than two women served simultaneously in the top executive bodies of French, Quebec and Ontario parties. In the early 1950s, the MRP Bureau national had no women, the PCF Bureau politique had one, and the SFIO Comité central contained one or two (Dogan and Narbonne 1955, 143; Duverger 1955, 107). In Quebec, except for the four FFLQ representatives who were appointed to the PLQ Conseil supérieur in 1967 and Thérèse Casgrain who led the Quebec CCF [or Parti social-démocrate
(PSD)] for six years (1951-1957), women were absent from the leadership of political parties (Lévesque 1993, footnote 28, 343).\textsuperscript{17} It should be noted, however, that in the postwar years the Quebec CCF was a very marginal player in provincial politics. With its small membership and weak organizational base, the Quebec CCF looked to Trofimenkoff (1989, 147) "as much of a hopeless cause as did woman suffrage in the interwar years." The comment of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (RCSW) (1970, 346) that "[a]part from ex-officio appointments guaranteed by reason of their position in women's associations, few offices are held by women at the constituency, provincial and national levels of the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties" reveals that women's absence from the leadership of Canada's two main parties was not specific to Quebec.\textsuperscript{18} In Ontario, only the CCF included women in its top governing organs. Female representation in the Ontario CCF top executive positions, about 15% in the 1940s and 20% in the 1950s, appears to have been on a par with that of French parties (Beeby 1982, 262; Azoulay 1995, 84).\textsuperscript{19}

Unlike the SFIO, which had only its internal women's commission striving to attract female voters and members, the PCF and MRP had women both inside and outside their organization doing so. The dual recruitment strategy of the PCF towards women and the primary interest of the MRP in boosting female votes (rather than the number of female members) may explain why the PCF was the only party to increase its proportion of women members in the postwar decades. During this period, the PCF women's commission and the pro-communist organization \textit{Union des femmes françaises} (UFF) conducted outreach work among women on behalf of the party. The UFF published a weekly newspaper, \textit{Femmes françaises}, and a monthly magazine, \textit{Heures claires}, that merged in 1957. Catholic organizations such as the \textit{Union féminine civique et sociale} and the \textit{Ligue
féminine d'action catholique performed similar propaganda work for the MRP while its national women's committee coordinated local branch activities and studied problems faced by women (Duverger 1955, 109-110; Duchen 1994, 46-47, 169).

In 1945, the SFIO set up a national women's commission, the Commission nationale féminine (CNF). Its mandate was to educate women about socialism, recruit new female members and keep the party informed about issues of concern to women. As its annual reports (1949-1967) reveal, the CNF encountered considerable difficulties trying to fulfil this mandate. The CNF often began each report by recapitulating its mandate, perhaps to dispel the distrust of SFIO members. Its repeated complaints about the failure of SFIO departmental bodies to help it set up local branches or compile statistics on party women as well as the fate of its main instrument of propaganda, the monthly Journal de la femme socialiste, confirm that the CNF was not well-accepted within the SFIO. Lacking both financial and moral support from the party, the Journal de la femme socialiste folded in 1959. It was then replaced by the bi-monthly Femmes which also disappeared in 1967.

Consequently, it is accurate to identify the French women's organizations and party commissions mentioned above as female auxiliaries. Their main function was not to make parties more women-friendly. Rather, it was to attract female members and, above all, voters. In other words, these "organs of propaganda" or "transmission belts," to use the terms of Duverger (1955, 111) and Michel (1965, 65), existed to convey party stands on issues of possible concern to the female electorate. For Duchen (1994, 48), these commissions were in fact a way for parties to "avoid taking on any far-reaching implications of women's political rights and push women's political activity into a corner labelled 'women's issues.'"
The Liberal and Conservative women's associations and CCF women's committees that operated in Canada in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s were also female auxiliaries whose members performed social, clerical and fundraising tasks for the main party organization. It is doubtful that these essential, yet largely merely supportive, activities enhanced the profile and influence of party women. In its 1970 report, the RCSW (1970, 348) identified Liberal and Conservative female associations as a "deterrent rather than an asset to women who wish[ed] to contribute in more significant ways" and recommended that they "be amalgamated with the main bodies of these parties."

In his article on the FFLQ, Lévesque (1993) portrays the Fédération as an autonomous organization with an extensive network of local and regional branches where women learned the ropes of party work. However, a close reading of this article reveals that the FFLQ, just like its counterparts in other provinces, also provided auxiliary-type services to the Parti libéral du Québec (PLQ). In a footnote, Lévesque (1993) quotes a passage from a report FFLQ members wrote following the 1966 provincial elections that leaves no doubt as to the auxiliary status of the organization:

Généralement on a compté sur les associations de femmes pour réviser les listes électorales, aider, préparer les réceptions après les assemblées, organiser les autobus, des séries d'autos pour escorter le Chef et les ministres qui visitaient les comtés, faire des appels téléphoniques pour inviter les gens aux grosses assemblées populaires ou leur rappeler leur devoir d'aller voter, le 5 juin. Bref de tous ces rapports se dégage une impression claire, nette, sans équivoque, comme toujours les femmes ont rempli les rôles obscurs, secondaires mais généreuses sans limites [...] (FFLQ in Lévesque 1993, footnote 35, 345)

Passing mention of FFLQ members' "obscure and hardly rewarding tasks," fundraising, organizing, stuffing envelopes and making sandwiches confirms that the Fédération was indeed
a non-influential female auxiliary to the PLQ (author's translation; Lévesque 1993, 336, 346). Realizing that the external position of the organization prevented women from engaging in more substantive party activities, FFLQ leaders began contemplating amalgamation with the PLQ. In 1970, as the PLQ was busy reforming its statutes, the FFLQ agreed to integrate into the party in exchange for guarantees concerning female representation. Following the passage by the 1971 PLQ convention of resolutions requiring that all riding delegations be gender-balanced and that at least two women be present in riding executives and permanent commissions, the FFLQ became one of the party's eight permanent commissions (Lévesque 1993, 341-342; Maillé 1990, 111-113).24

The Liberal and Conservative women's associations and even the CCF women's committee that operated in the postwar period in Ontario were clearly female party auxiliaries. Organizations such as the Toronto and Ontario Women's Liberal Associations and their Conservative counterparts organized meetings, social and fundraising events and performed routine chores during election campaigns (such as canvassing, stuffing envelopes and driving voters). While Liberal associations either anticipated or promptly responded to the call of the RCSW for amalgamation, Conservative associations resisted the movement towards integration (Bashevkin 1993, 118-120, 127-132). To respond to CCF feminists' demand that the party pay more attention to women's concerns and also to attract new female voters and members, the Ontario CCF established its Women's Committee in 1942.25 As a standing committee of the provincial council, the Committee was to have a say in party affairs. Right from the beginning, however, the usefulness of a women-only group was challenged by influential party members, including the first two presidents of the Committee. The constant questioning of the Committee's usefulness as well
as internal conflicts between feminist and more traditional Committee members made it difficult for activists to operate as an influential feminist lobby, that is a body that constantly and vigorously challenges party organs and officials to promote women and issues of concern to them. By the late 1940s, the Committee had evolved into a female auxiliary, whose activities (notably, politicizing housewives, training election workers and organizing fundraising events) resembled those of Liberal and Conservative women's associations (Beeby 1982, 269-279; Bashevkin 1993, 122-126; Sangster 1989, 215-222; Azoulay 1995, 67-73). The Committee continued to perform educational, organizational and social functions at least through the late 1950s. Azoulay (1995, 60-61) disagrees with Beeby (1982) and Sangster's (1989) contention that the male leadership deliberately channelled women into menial supportive tasks. In Azoulay's (1995, 61) view, this "sexual division of labour was as much self-imposed as it was super-imposed": many CCF women were more comfortable with providing support services that the party desperately needed than with assuming executive positions.

Women candidates, legislators and cabinet members

The following assessment of women's share of candidacies, legislative seats and cabinet positions in the postwar decades is primarily based on Table 2.1 (see 84). This table contains data on the total (including all minor and major parties) proportion of women who ran in the French legislative elections and the Quebec and Ontario provincial elections that took place in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s as well as data on the total proportion of women who were elected to the French National Assembly and the Quebec and Ontario legislatures. Given the virtual absence of women in the postwar governments of France, Quebec and Ontario, it made sense to list the names of these women. Lastly, because this study focuses on France and the provinces of Quebec and
Ontario. Table 2.1 does not include statistics on female federal candidates, legislators and ministers from Quebec and Ontario.

Very few French, Quebec and Ontario women ran for public office in the postwar decades. In France, the average proportion of female candidates dropped from 11.7% in the 1940s to 7.1% in the 1950s and 3% in the 1960s (Table 2.1). Overall, the PCF appears to have been the most supportive and the SFIO the least supportive of female candidacies. In the November 1946 legislative elections, the PCF nominated 110 women while the MRP and SFIO nominated 75 and 72 women respectively. Five years later, the number of PCF female candidates (102) was more than double that of the MRP (43) and the SFIO (37) (Pascal 1990, 49). By way of comparison, in the 1940s and 1950s, less than 2% of Quebec provincial candidates and 2-4% of Ontario provincial candidates were female, compared to 7-12% of French legislative candidates (Table 2.1). As Lévesque (1993, 342) and Beeby (1982, 261) note, Quebec and Ontario women often ran under the provincial banner of the CCF or some other third party.

How do we explain, first, the higher proportion of women candidates in France and, second, the limited overall numbers of female candidacies in all three cases? Once the war was over, France chose to elect its representatives according to proportional representation. Thus, instead of presenting one candidate per constituency as parties operating in single-member plurality systems such as Quebec and Ontario did, French parties presented a list of candidates in each constituency. The higher number of candidacy positions available to French parties made it easier for them to nominate women. Following the switch in 1958 to a single-member plurality system, the proportion of French female candidates plummeted. When explaining women's poor share of candidacies, it is necessary to consider not only the electoral system, but also the attitudes of
political parties towards women. Accounts by Duverger (1955, 78), Lévesque (1993, 347) and Beeby (1982, 263) indicate that throughout the postwar period, French, Quebec and Ontario parties did not think that women could win seats. As a result, women were usually nominated in lost-cause ridings.28

Given the reluctance of political parties to present female candidates in more winnable constituencies and the adverse impact of single-member plurality systems on female candidacies, the very small presence of women in the French, Quebec and Ontario legislatures is not surprising. After reaching about 5-6% in the 1940s, female representation in the French National Assembly gradually declined to 2-3% in the 1950s and 1-2% in the 1960s (Table 2.1). Left parties and, in particular, the PCF, were more inclined than parties from the right and centre to promote women to legislative positions. As Pascal (1990, 66) notes, of the 141 women who sat in the National Assembly between 1945 and 1986, 54 were Communist, 42 Socialist, seventeen Gaullist and fifteen centrist.29 Compared to Quebec, France almost appears as a champion of women's legislative representation. From the end of World War II until the late 1960s, the Belle province elected only one woman, Claire Kirkland-Casgrain, to its legislature. In the next decades, however, Quebec caught up to France. At present, the proportion of Quebec female MLAs (18.4% or 23/125) is almost twice as high as that of French female deputies (10.7% or 65/577). The election in 1943 in Ontario of two female MPPs, CCFers Rae Luckock and Agnes Macphail, did not foreshadow the immediate feminization of the provincial legislature.30 Luckock and Macphail were both defeated along with three other female candidates in the 1945 election. Macphail, however, went on to win the 1948 by-election in the York East riding. From 1951 until the election of Conservative Ada Pritchard in 1963, no woman sat in the Ontario legislature. Pritchard
joined by NDPer Margaret Renwick in 1967 (Elections Ontario 1994).

Not surprisingly, the membership of French, Quebec and Ontario cabinets remained largely male throughout the postwar decades. In the 1940s, Socialist Andrée Vienot was Under-Secretary for Youth and Sports, and MRP Germaine Poinso-Chapuis was Minister for Public Health and Population. Between 1949 and 1959, French cabinets, regardless of their political affiliation, did not include any women except for Jacqueline Thome-Patenôtre who briefly served as the Under-Secretary for Reconstruction and Housing in 1957. For instance, the members of Socialist Guy Mollet's 1956-1957 government were all men. When asked about the promotion of women to government posts, Charles de Gaulle (in Duchen 1994, 53) responded "What, appoint an under-secretary of knitting?" After Nafissa Sid-Cara's three-year (1959-1962) service as State Secretary for Algerian Social Affairs, no woman held a cabinet post until Gaullist Marie-Madeleine Dienesch became State Secretary for Education in 1968 (Pascal 1990, 75). Although slightly more women made it to cabinet in France than in Quebec and Ontario during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, it is important to note that French women were usually appointed as Under-Secretaries (rather than Ministers) and assigned typically feminine "social affairs" portfolios. Claire Kirkland-Casgrain, the first woman to be elected to the Quebec legislature in 1961, became Minister without portfolio the following year. It took over a decade before another woman was promoted to the Quebec cabinet.31 As for the personnel of Ontario cabinets, it remained male until 1973, when Premier Bill Davis finally kept his 1971 pre-election promise to appoint a woman to his cabinet and named Margaret Birch Minister without a portfolio.32
Table 2.1: Women Candidates, Legislators and Cabinet Members in the Postwar Period in France and the Provinces of Quebec and Ontario (all Parties) (%)*

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<td><strong>Candidates</strong></td>
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<td>50s</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<td><strong>Legislators</strong></td>
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<td>40s</td>
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<td><strong>Cabinet members</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>40s</td>
<td>A. Vienot (1946-48)***</td>
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<td>G. Poinso-Chapuis (1947-48)</td>
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<tr>
<td>50s</td>
<td>J. Thome-Patenôtre (1957)</td>
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<tr>
<td>60s</td>
<td>N. Sid Cara (1959-62)</td>
<td>C. Kirkland-Casgrain (1961-73)</td>
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<td>M-M. Dienesch (1968-74)</td>
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Sources: Pascal (1990, 48, 55, 75-76); Drouilly and Dorion (1988, 44, 47, 76); Elections Ontario (1994).

* Neither federal data, nor by-election results are included in this table.

** "_" means "0"

*** In 1936 Léon Blum appointed three women Under-Secretaries to his cabinet.
Conclusion

This overview of French, Quebec and Ontario women's struggle for political involvement from the nineteenth century until the 1960s indicates that political parties initially hampered women's entry into the political arena. If today women have a greater share of political power than in the past, it is largely due to their persistent efforts and those of their foremothers. As previously mentioned, a few women were voting and running for office long before they obtained formal political rights. Furthermore, it was women, and not party organizations, who first launched the campaigns for political rights. In Quebec and Ontario, political parties endorsed women's right to vote only after years of suffragist agitation. The acceptance of women members by parties did not enhance women's presence in the political arena. While the socialist parties' requirement that women join their main male-dominated organization helped to keep women away, the Liberal and Conservative parties' requirement that women join their separate female associations ended up confining women to valuable, yet also exclusively supportive, functions. In short, during the period under consideration, women active in socialist and conservative parties were viewed primarily as support workers rather than as men's equal partners, hence the very small number of female party officials, candidates, legislators and cabinet members. This view was in keeping with the prevailing norms about gender roles prevailing in France, Quebec and Ontario at the time.

As will be shown in the following three case-study chapters, in the 1960s, French, Quebec and Ontario women began to challenge their secondary and supportive roles both inside and outside parties. This challenge forced political parties to change their attitude towards female activists and issues of importance to them. Bearing this in mind, we now turn our attention to the efforts of French Socialist women to feminize their party organization.
ENDNOTES

1. In his history of the Papineau family, L.O. David mentions that in the 1809 Lower Canada elections, an elderly woman came to a polling station in Montreal. When asked for whom she wanted to vote, she responded: "[f]or my son, M. Joseph Papineau, for I believe that he is a good and faithful subject" (Cleverdon 1974, 214-215). Ironically, Papineau's Parti canadien became one of the main forces behind the initiative to take the vote away from women (Collectif Clio 1992, 142).


3. Bashevkin (1993, 116-119) and Lévesque (1993, 349-350) suggest that in the pre-enfranchisement period, the membership of female party associations in Quebec and Ontario was quite small.

4. See the text of this resolution in Albistur and Armogathe (1978, 68).

5. According to Adler (1993, 135), General de Gaulle was wrongly credited with "liberating" French women. Granting political rights to women was not his idea, but rather that of the Conseil national de la Résistance. De Gaulle simply went along with it.

6. The francophone members of the Montreal Local Council of Women had transferred to the Catholic and nationalist Association Saint-Jean-Baptiste in 1902 (Maillé 1990, 24).

7. The 1883 launching of the first Canadian suffrage association by Toronto women helped to inspire English-speaking women all across the country to take on the suffrage cause. The perception that the vote was chiefly the preoccupation of English Canadian women may account for the later mobilization of francophone women around this issue.

8. Casgrain and Saint-Jean differed in terms of tactics, arguments and constituencies. To begin with, Casgrain preferred to "seduce" her opponents while Saint-Jean preferred to confront them. Furthermore, Casgrain often referred to the importance of women's role in the family to justify her demands; by contrast, Saint-Jean demanded political rights for women on the grounds that women and men were equal (Lamoureux 1989, 58-59; 1993, 44-63). Lastly, Casgrain's Comité attracted anglophone and francophone middle- and upper-class women while Saint-Jean's Alliance attracted francophone working-class women (Cleverdon 1974, 231-233).

9. All Canadian women obtained the right to vote in 1918 and the right to run for office in 1920.

10. For instance, the Catholic Church supported the suffrage bill that was introduced in the French National Assembly shortly after the end of World War I (Albistur and Armogathe 1977, 381).
11. The second section follows the same structure as Duverger's (1955) second chapter on "The Part Played by Women in Political Leadership."

12. The 1965 Canadian National Election Study did not specify the level of government (provincial or federal). The data that are quoted here include French and English Quebec residents. For men, the breakdown was as follows: 61.3% identified with the Liberals, 20.6% with the Conservatives, and 9.1% with the New Democrats (Bashevkin 1983b, 151, 155).

13. Michel (1965, 73-75) also argues that the religious education of French girls explained women's propensity to favour the MRP. Had French girls received the same lay education as French boys, they would have probably been less inclined, when of age to vote, to support Christian parties such as the MRP.

14. Established in 1965, the Fédération de la gauche démocratique socialiste included the SFIO, François Mitterrand's political club, the Convention des institutions républicaines, and the Parti radical.

15. Comparable data for Conservative women's associations operating in the postwar period in Quebec and Ontario were not available.


17. In her memoirs, Thérèse Casgrain (1971, 195) states that at that time, Quebec's established parties would have never put a woman in a top party position. In 1951, she became the first woman to lead a party in Canada and Quebec. Casgrain held other important positions in the federal CCF-NDP. For fifteen years (1948-1963), she was the party's national Vice-President. Between 1959 and 1961, she was also the only female member of the national committee for the NDP (Trofimenkoff 1989, 146). In the end, Casgrain was replaced by labour activist Michel Chartrand as leader of the PSD. While Casgrain (1971, 214) and Trofimenkoff (1989, 154) attribute her replacement to the fact that she was a woman, Comeau (1993, 290) alludes to Casgrain's federalist convictions preventing an alliance between the PSD and nationalist unions. Casgrain's age, 65 in 1957, may have also been a factor in her replacement.

18. On the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the RCSW, see Chapter five.

19. In 1934, the provincial council of the newly-formed Ontario CCF had three women (8.3% or 3/36) including Agnes Macphail (Stewart and French 1959, 172). By way of comparison, the proportion of women in the governing bodies of the Saskatchewan CCF sometimes reached 30% in the 1930s (Sangster 1989, 103). Azoulay (1995, 84-85) estimates that between 1947 and 1961, Ontario CCF women held about 26% of the positions in the provincial council.

20. I thank Harvey G. Simmons for lending me his collection of SFIO reports. See SFIO (1950, 84; 1954, 72; 1960, 64; 1961, 64; 1963, 48).
21. See SFIO (1949, 76; 1951, 79; 1958, 57; 1959, 64).

22. See SFIO (1949, 78; 1952, 75; 1953, 73; 1954, 73; 1959, 64; 1960, 65; 1967, 48). By 1967, the CNF was contemplating replacing *Femmes* with a bulletin (SFIO 1967, 48).

23. Dogan and Narbonne's (1955, 142-145) portrayal of party women's commissions and committees is much less critical than Duchen's. See Dogan and Narbonne (1955, 142-145).

24. With regards to these resolutions on female representation, see Chapter Four. Because of allegations that it was a female ghetto, the PLQ women's commission disbanded in 1985 (Maillé 1990, 113).

25. Six years before the establishment of the Ontario CCF Women's Committee, a group of CCF feminists created an autonomous committee, the Toronto Women's Joint Committee (TWJC) in order to address "social problems, particularly those of women and act as a training school for CCF women" (TWJC in Sangster 1989, 112). During its brief existence, the TWJC helped establish a summer camp for inner-city kids, supported actions by the unemployed movement and organized a boycott of non-union dairies. As a way to give women political experience, the TWJC rotated the chair among its membership. Debilitated by conflicts with the party leadership over its participation in events and activities sponsored by the Communist Party, the TWJC eventually disappeared after five months of operation (Manley 1980, 110-117; Sangster 1989, 111-113).

26. According to Azoulay (1995, 78), the main ideological divide existing among CCF women in these years was not so much between feminists and non-feminists, but rather between the pragmatic "organizers" who favoured fundraising activities and the idealistic "purists" who favoured constant discussion of socialist ideas. In contrast with Beeby (1982) and Sangster (1989), Azoulay also denies that gender equality was the main concern of CCF women.

27. PSD leader Thérèse Casgrain ran without success in eight federal and provincial elections between 1952 and 1963 (Darsigny 1993, 9). Agnes Macphail contested federal office as a United Farmers of Ontario candidate in the 1920s and 1930s and provincial office as a CCF candidate in the 1940s. According to Beeby (1982, 261), from 1937 until 1951, more than 50% of all female candidates in Ontario elections were CCFers. Apparently, several of the Ontario CCF women who ran in the 1948 and 1951 elections had taken over the candidacy from their husbands (Azoulay 1995, 80).

28. The comments that the *Commission nationale féminine* of the SFIO made in its 1967 report with regards to the SFIO women who ran in the 1967 legislative elections are unintentionally quite telling. Indeed, the *Commission* commended the four female candidates for receiving more votes than previous SFIO candidates in these very difficult constituencies (SFIO 1967, 50).

Taylor's (1985) study shows that even Saskatchewan CCF women encountered tremendous difficulties when seeking nominations.
29. Among the other women who sat in the National Assembly between 1945 and 1986, two belonged to the *Parti radical*, six to the centre-right *Union pour la démocratie française*, one to the centre-right *Parti républicain de la liberté*, and one to the far-right *Front national*. Three deputies were representatives from Algeria (Pascal 1990, 66).

30. Agnes Macphail was the first woman to be elected to the House of Commons. She sat in the House as the United Farmers of Ontario representative for the rural riding of South-East Grey for nineteen years (1921-1940) before being defeated because of her pacifist stand. See Macphail’s biographies by Stewart and French (1959) and by Pennington (1989).

31. Lise Bacon was appointed Minister for Social Affairs in 1973.

32. In 1975, Birch and two other women were included in Davis’ cabinet. While Birch was promoted to the position of Provincial Secretary for Social Development, Margaret Scrivener and Bette Stephenson were appointed to head the Ministries of Government Services and Labour, (Hoy 1985, 234).

The “over-representation” of men among cabinet members was observable across Canada, both at the provincial and federal levels (see RCSW 1970, 340). Only two women became federal ministers prior to the resurgence of feminism in the mid-1960s; Conservative Ellen Fairclough was appointed in 1957 and Liberal Judy LaMarsh four years later.
CHAPTER THREE

THE PARTI SOCIALISTE FRANÇAIS

In May 1969, several non-Communist left-wing groups came together to form a new political party, the Parti socialiste français (PS). Under the influence of François Mitterrand, who was elected party leader at the historic 1971 Épinay convention, the new PS became the largest party of France and acceded to power in the spring of 1981.

Three years after Mitterrand took over the party, a convention was held in Suresnes in order to reform PS statutes. Some new provisions that were incorporated into the PS statutes aimed at enhancing female representation within the party hierarchy and as candidates. More precisely, section (or cell), federation (or departmental) and national governing bodies and lists of candidates (running in proportional representation elections) were required to comply with a minimum quota of 10% women. As stated in the PS statutes:

Article 6 -- Les élus de toutes les listes doivent obligatoirement comprendre un pourcentage minimum de 10% de femmes à tous les degrés de l'organisation: Comité directeur, Bureau exécutif, Fédération, Section. Le pourcentage minimum sera révisé lors de chaque Congrès national, pour tenir compte de la proportion réelle des femmes au sein du Parti.

[...]

Article 49 -- [...] Les listes de candidats aux élections au scrutin de liste doivent comprendre un pourcentage minimum de dix pour cent de femmes. (PS in Bacot 1979, 337, 345).

At the 1977 Nantes convention, the quota was increased to 15%, and a special party organ designed to defend the interests of women in society and the party, the Secrétariat à l'action féminine (Secrétariat-femmes), was established. The quota was increased to 20% at the 1979 Metz
convention and 30% at the 1990 Rennes convention. Overall, longitudinal data on PS women's numerical representation at the section, federation and national levels of the party indicate that the quota has only brought about a limited feminization of the PS organization.

After examining the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the PS quota and Secrétariat-femmes, we explain why the quota has had limited success in feminizing the internal party organization. Overall, archival and interview materials reveal that internal factors (the Secrétariat-femmes, party men and women's attitudes towards the quota, and the personnel selection processes of the PS) have more direct explanatory power than external factors (the second-wave women's movement and party support fluctuations).

Recognizing Women's Presence in the Party

This section outlines steps the PS took in the 1970s in response to party women's demands that they and their specific concerns be formally recognized. More precisely, it examines how the quota and Secrétariat à l'action féminine (Secrétariat-femmes), the first PS structure for women complete with budget and offices, were launched. The discourse and activities of the second-wave women's movement undoubtedly prompted PS women like Marie-Thérèse Eyquem, a close friend of Mitterrand, and Yvette Roudy, Eyquem's protégée, to demand that the party include a 10% quota for women into its statutes and create the Secrétariat-femmes. Aided by Eyquem and Mitterrand's friendship, Eyquem, Roudy and their feminist colleagues had their demands met. In the end, however, neither the quota nor the Secrétariat-femmes proved to be very effective in enhancing party women's involvement.
The idea of the quota

The second wave of the French women's movement began with the two major women's rights campaigns of the 1960s. Thanks to the lobbying of traditional women's organizations such as the Catholic Union féminine civique et sociale (UFCS) and the Communist Union des femmes françaises (UFF), the marriage law was reformed in 1965, albeit in a timid way. Around the same time, some of the less traditional groups that supported the reform of the marriage law, notably, the Protestant Jeunes Femmes, the Association maternité heureuse (also known as the Mouvement français pour le planning familial), and the Mouvement démocratique féminin (the left-wing club founded in 1961 by Marie-Thérèse Eyquem, Colette Audry and Simone Menez), became actively involved in the campaign to repeal sections three and four of the 1920 and 1923 laws concerning information on birth control and availability of contraceptives (Duchen 1994, 165-178). Unlike the UFCS and UFF, these groups challenged the idea that women could only be wives and mothers; hence, Duchen (1994, 170) identified them as precursors of the new liberationist groups that emerged after May 1968.4

The May 1968 revolt of French students helps to account for the emergence of liberationist groups that preferred to use unconventional means of action. Many of the women active in the May movement resented not being treated as equals by male participants. Their negative experiences led them to set up autonomous women-only groups where they could freely develop their own analyses of oppression and exploitation focusing on gender rather than (or in addition to) class. In August 1970, a group of women was arrested for putting a wreath on the tomb of the unknown soldier in Paris for the person who is even more unknown than he, his wife. Connecting this event with the actions of the US women's liberation movement, the French press referred to
the women the police arrested as members of the *Mouvement de libération des femmes* (MLF). The MLF was officially born (Garcia Guadilla 1981, 28, 30; Kaufmann-McCall 1983, 283-284; Duchen 1986, 5-8; Rémy 1990, 35).

During the first half of the 1970s, the MLF consisted of a multitude of groups that had their own analyses of women's oppression and ways of organizing (or not organizing) and came together periodically for certain actions and events. Liberationist groups generally identified with one of the three main streams of the MLF: *Psychanalyse et Politique* (P&P), *Féministes révolutionnaires* and *Lutte de classes*. In P&P, the group founded by psychoanalyst Antoinette Fouque in 1968 at the University of Vincennes, women studied the writings of Lacan, Derrida and Foucault and sought to replace the "masculine femininity" internalized by women's unconscious with a true femininity, a "feminine femininity." Thanks to the generous donations of some of its wealthy members, P&P launched a publishing house, several bookstores and a magazine that were all called *Des femmes*. The *Féministes révolutionnaires* stream encompassed radical feminist groups such as Simone de Beauvoir's *Ligue du droit des femmes* which viewed women as a social class that was primarily oppressed by patriarchy. Some of the women that far-left organizations sent to MLF meetings developed an analysis emphasizing that women were oppressed by capitalism and patriarchy. Proponents of this perspective were part of the *Lutte de classes* stream. While *Lutte de classes* groups often adopted the traditional hierarchical and leader-centered form of organization prevailing in left groups, P&P and *Féministes révolutionnaires* groups, in keeping with the May 1968 spirit, rejected any form of organization and leadership (Garcia Guadilla 1981, 37-45, 48-50, 90-93; Jenson 1990, 131-136; Duchen 1986, 27-47; Rémy 1990, 38-39, 43-53, 101-103).
How did this rich and diverse movement composed of reformist and liberationist groups become "the most divided women's movement in Europe," to borrow the title of Anderson's (1991) piece? Already in the 1970s, the movement was split between reformist feminists involved in parties and unions, on the one hand, and autonomous reformist and liberationist women's groups agitating outside such institutions, on the other. With respect to relations between these two camps, long-time PS activist Yvette Roudy (1985, 114-115) noted in her autobiography: "[d]ire que nous ne communiquions pas est une manière aimable de dire que nous nous détestions cordialement." Later on, other splits occurred, this time among liberationist groups. In the fall of 1979, P&P registered the name *Mouvement de libération des femmes* and the logo MLF as its own property. Identifying this action as an attempt to present itself as the only voice of the MLF, liberationist groups then began referring to themselves as the MLF-*non-déposé*, and P&P as the MLF-*déposé* (Kaufmann-McCall 1983, 287-289; Jenson 1990, 133-134; Rémy 1990, 103). Other conflicts that broke out subsequently among liberationist groups further weakened the MLF. As French feminist Françoise Ducrocq (1982, 675) noted, by 1981, "the movement seem[ed] to be at a standstill and very much divided."

It would be erroneous to infer from liberationists' distrust of traditional politics and the gap between the latter and party and union feminists that the second wave of feminist agitation was unrelated to the introduction of the PS quota. First, three PS women who lobbied for the quota, Marie-Thérèse Eyquem, Yvette Roudy and Colette Audry were formerly involved in the *Mouvement démocratique féminin*, one of the precursors of the new feminist groups that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Even though these women did not formally interact with autonomous feminist groups, they often discussed issues raised by the feminist movement, which,
in the view of one long-time PS activist, was "un mouvement porteur très important" (PSf2). While it is doubtful that the idea of using a quota came from autonomous feminist groups, it is probable that their discourse and activities encouraged PS women to push for such a measure. As the following quote by a PS insider suggests, feminist agitation also impressed upon PS elites and activists the need to open the party to women and issues of concern to them:

[...] sans le petit noyau de féministes et de ses "excès," ni les partis, ni les syndicats [...] n'auraient bougé. C'est seulement quand, gens en place, ils ou elles ont vu l'impact réel des questions posées par le féminisme qu'ils ont [...] commencé à s'y intéresser. (Boris 1982-1985)

Only two of the five interviewees who joined the PS in 1971 responded when asked where the idea of the quota came from. Although different, their versions are not mutually exclusive. One interviewee suggested that the American system of quotas for blacks inspired the women who lobbied for the quota: "On s'était inspiré des États-Unis, des quotas pour les noirs, c'est là que l'idée de discrimination positive a été lancée" (PSf2). The other interviewee referred to "le modèle des pays nordiques" (PSf4). Both versions are plausible. Indeed, Yvette Roudy, one of the proponents and defenders of the quota, became very knowledgeable about American society and politics in the course of translating Betty Friedan's *Feminine Mystique*. Furthermore, just two years prior to the adoption of the PS quota, parties in the US and Sweden took radical steps to enhance the involvement of their female activists. In 1972, delegates to the presidential convention of the US Democratic Party were selected according to a new affirmative action rule providing, among other things, that both genders be equally represented as convention delegates, and the Swedish Liberal and Communist parties adopted the principle of at least 40% female representation in all their elected delegations (Phillips 1991, 84; Bashevkin 1993, 95). These
initiatives probably strengthened or at least influenced the belief of PS women that only a quota would boost women's presence in the internal party organization.

The adoption of the quota proposal

Between 1972 and the establishment of the Secrétariat national à l'action féminine in 1977, two bodies were set up to advise the PS on ways to improve women's condition in society and the party. In September 1972, the legislative organ of the party approved the establishment of a Comité de coordination des problèmes féminins (CCPF) whose mandate was to coordinate the actions of PS commissions to enhance women's condition, propose programmatic changes and bring the party to increase the proportion of women in its governing bodies and as candidates. A few months later, the CCPF asked the Secrétariat national aux élections to explain why the top executive officials of departmental party organizations (or federations) had found only nine women (out of 440 candidates) to run in the 1973 legislative elections despite the party's explicit recommendation to seek out female candidates. When the Secrétariat national aux élections failed to comply with the CCPF's request, Marie-Thérèse Eyquem resigned her position as head of the committee (Eyquem May 1973, 21). Following Eyquem's resignation, Mitterrand created the positions of Délégués généraux who were to be accountable to him only. As Mitterrand's Déléguée générale à la condition féminine, Eyquem was to make party members aware of the specific problems faced by women in society and the party organization (Eyquem December 1974, 15). According to one interviewee, Délégués généraux and their teams lacked legitimacy within the party because they were appointed by and accountable only to Mitterrand (PSf3).

The women who played a major role in the inclusion of the quota into the party statutes, notably, Eyquem, Roudy and Audry came from the Mouvement démocratique féminin (MDF), the
reformist feminist group that merged with the PS in 1971. It was probably their concern with the
dearth of female party officials and candidates, lamented in two articles published in the mid-1960s
in the magazine of the MDF, *La femme du 20ème siècle*, that led them to promote the quota
("L'engagement" August-September 1965, 1; Eyquem April 1966, 7). As early as 1972, Eyquem,
Roudy and Audry organized meetings where various ways of increasing the proportion of women
national PS officials and candidates were discussed (Guéraiche 1992, 718). One interviewee
present at these meetings pointed out that at first, Eyquem and Audry had doubts about the quota
(PSf2). Nevertheless, participants in the discussions eventually came to the conclusion that only
a compulsory quota would put an end to the virtual absence of women in party organs (PSf2-PSf4).

The formal proposal to adopt a quota was launched after the nine PS women running in the
1973 elections were all defeated. In a piece that appeared in the PS newspaper *Le Poing et la rose*,
Eyquem emphasized that the *Comité directeur* (national legislative organ) included only four
women while the *Bureau exécutif* (national executive organ), *Secrétariat national* (top national
executive organ) and parliamentary group did not have any women. This situation, in her view,
was extremely unfair since 15% of the party membership was female (Eyquem December 1974).
In January 1974, Eyquem and Dominique Taddei, a member of the *Secrétariat national*, presented
a document proposing that each executive organ at all levels of the party organization include one
person responsible for addressing issues of concern to women and that a 10% quota be adopted
(Guéraiche 1992, 716-718). At the end of the 1974 convention, Eyquem and Taddei’s proposal
was briefly debated and passed (PSf2; PSf5; PSf6). The main arguments that were addressed
during the debate concerned, on the one hand, the quota’s infringement on the notion of equality
and, on the other hand, the need to take strong measures to remedy a profoundly unequal situation
Interviews with five activists who witnessed how the quota proposal was introduced and adopted reveal that PS members had doubts about the quota. Three interviewees noted that the quota proposal was resisted by men and women at the national and local levels (PSf2-PSf4). While men thought that the quota was unjust, women felt diminished by it and preferred to be promoted because of their skills (PSf2-PSf4). These concerns as well as the goals and implications of the quota were not thoroughly debated before the quota was passed (PSf2; PSf5; PSf6). Therefore, in 1974, the attitudes of PS members towards the quota were mixed, with a (probably small) majority backing it at voting time, and a significant portion of the membership having concerns about it that were not really addressed. Nonetheless, the swift adoption of the quota was not surprising. Indeed, a proposal that was publicly supported by the party leader, who was a close friend of Eyquem, and his Secrétariat national was unlikely to be defeated. The following quote by Mitterrand (in Choisir 1981, 98) corroborates this point: "À l'intérieur du parti socialiste, j'ai... je dirais presque imposé... enfin obtenu (c'était d'abord avec Marie-Thérèse Eyquem) un système déplorable mais nécessaire qui est celui du quota..."

The Secrétariat-femmes

The ties of friendship existing between Eyquem and her protégée Roudy and Mitterrand also facilitated the establishment of the Secrétariat national à l'action féminine. At the 1977 Nantes convention, the Délégation générale à la condition féminine proposed that a special party structure for women be created and that the quota be raised to 20%. The announcement by Pierre Mauroy, one of the high-profile men of the PS, that the quota would only be brought to 15%, was not well-received by female activists. About three hundred women gathered in the main room of
the convention to protest Mauroy's announcement. To prevent this from happening, Mitterrand met with Roudy and promised her that the party would create a Secrétariat-femmes and hold a national PS convention on women's rights. Roudy then managed to convince party women not to protest the 15% quota (Guéraiche 1992, 792-794).

As the first initiatives of the Secrétariat-femmes indicate, the "deal" struck by Mitterrand and Roudy did not produce a feminist lobby, but rather a female auxiliary that had slightly more power and autonomy than its predecessors. At the Paris women's rights convention hosted by the Secrétariat-femmes in January 1978, participants discussed, amended, rejected and/or passed resolutions submitted by PS federations. The resolutions that were passed were synthesized and incorporated into a document called the Manifeste socialiste sur les droits des femmes (Carle November 1985). In the Manifeste, the party explained where it stood regarding four areas: "women and freedoms," "women and the family," "women and employment," and "women and activism" (author's translations; PS June 1979, 32-41). According to Jenson (1980, 41-42), the document's recognition of the need for an autonomous women's movement constituted a major departure from the Socialists' historical distrust of feminism. Nevertheless, the timing of the women's convention and the publication of the Manifeste less than three months before the 1978 legislative elections suggest that these two events did not just aim at clarifying the party's stands on women's rights. Several journalists suggested that the convention was held to ensure that the PS would not lose female voters to the Parti communiste français (PCF) as a result of the breakdown of the Union de la gauche, the 1971 alliance that united the PS and PCF behind a program of substantial reforms called Le programme commun (Guéraiche 1992, 795-798). Following the convention, the Secrétariat-femmes strove to enhance party women's involvement
by ensuring in 1979 that the quota was raised to 20% and by offering information and training sessions to party women. At information sessions organized by the Secrétariat-femmes (or Secrétariat national aux luttes des femmes as of 1979) and its federal representatives, participants discussed issues such as feminism, socialism, the PS, unions and the situation of Parisian women (Fédération de Paris du PS February, 2-3, 1980; PSf2; PSf5). With respect to training, the Secrétariat made arrangements with the Secrétariat national à la formation so that the latter set aside one day of its summer seminars to teach female activists about public speaking, municipal administration and other relevant subjects (PSf4). In short, during its first years of existence, the Secrétariat-femmes was a party organ designed to improve women's situation in society and the PS within the boundaries set by the PS. Its position during the feminist rebellion that shook the PS in 1978 and 1979 demonstrates that it was indeed a female auxiliary.

Early in 1978, dissatisfied with the party's timid concessions to women, a group of women (including Édith Lhuillier, Cécile Goldet, Anne Le Gall and Paz Espero) decided to form a feminist faction inside the PS. Since the majority Mitterrand faction was known as the courant 1 and the minority CERES (Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation socialistes) faction as the courant 2, the press referred to the feminist faction as the courant 3. Shortly after the women's rights convention, courant 3 members chose Françoise Gaspard, a young rising star of the PS who had just been elected mayor of Dreux and sat in the Comité directeur, as their leader. When the courant 3 started to gain momentum, the Secrétariat-femmes publicly disavowed it. In a newspaper article published in May 1978, a member of the Secrétariat-femmes identified the courant 3 enterprise as a female ghetto and underlined that the PS and its leader were very open to women's concerns. Two months later, Roudy, the head of the Secrétariat-femmes at the time, also
denounced this "stratégie du ghetto" in another newspaper article. Other criticisms were put forward by high-profile PS women Colette Audry and Gisèle Charzat. Nevertheless, criticisms did not stop courant 3 members from rocking the PS boat. In June, they began circulating a petition calling for 50% female candidates on the PS list for the 1979 European Parliament elections (while the Secrétariat-femmes was calling for 30% women on the PS list). Finally, late in 1978, Gaspard presented an amendment to the Bureau exécutif proposing that the PS European Parliament list includes 50% women. The amendment was rejected by three votes, three female votes according to Gaspard (in Piat 1981, 130). Following this defeat, the courant 3 disintegrated.

Goldet and Gaspard re-entered the traditional PS factions. On the other hand, Lhuillier and other women presented a "motion" (that is a text outlining the general orientation of a faction) at the 1979 Metz convention, the "G" motion (hence the other reference to the PS feminist faction as the courant G) that failed to obtain the 5% of the vote necessary to become an official faction. Courant G members then put their energies into writing humourist critiques of the PS for their magazine, Mignonnes allons voir si la rose... (Duchen 1986, 109-116; Guéraiche 1992, 812-833).

In short, the behaviour of the Secrétariat-femmes during this feminist rebellion casts some doubts on its ability to launch sweeping initiatives to enhance women's situation in society and the party. This point will be further explored in the section explaining the limited impact of the quota. Before doing so, we shall first demonstrate that the PS quota did not significantly enhance women's numerical representation at the section (or cell), federal (or departmental) and national levels of the party organization.
The Impact of the Quota: A Limited Feminization

Since the quota is to apply to section, federal and national governing organs (excluding the national convention and Secrétariat national), one would expect the following assessment to rely solely on longitudinal statistics concerning the gender of section, federal, Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif officials. However, given the paucity of early data on section and federal officials and the failure of the party to compile such data (or reluctance to make them available to the public), other statistics have to be considered; these include the proportion of women holding the top section position of Secrétaire de section and the top federal position of Premier (secrétaire) fédéral. Furthermore, a comparison between the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif and the two national organs that are exempt from the quota requirement (the national convention and Secrétariat national) can shed considerable light on the impact of the quota. To provide a thorough evaluation of the PS quota, it is also necessary to examine how women have been represented in the national bodies of the PS and those of its main left and right rivals, the Parti communiste français (PCF) and Rassemblement pour la république (RPR). After studying the proportion of PS women holding the positions of Secrétaire de section and Premier fédéral and sitting in the national bodies of the PS, PCF and RPR in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, it must be concluded that the quota has only brought about a limited feminization of the PS organization.

Section and federal data

It is difficult to assess the representational gains, if any, made by PS women at the section level. The high number of PS sections (over four thousand) and the difficulty of keeping track of them may account for the dearth of statistics on female involvement. Even Bacot's (1979) very complete account of PS women's numerical representation does not provide section-level data.
Nevertheless, in July 1995, the PS contended that 595 of its 4,118 sections were headed by a female Secrétaire. To put it in another way, women held 14.4% of these top section positions, which is not particularly impressive considering that women constitute over 30% of the membership.

PS women have also had considerable problems reaching the top federal office of Premier fédéral. In the first seven years of the party's existence (1969-1976), all PS federations were headed by men. Finally in 1977, Marie-Thérèse Mutin became the first female Premier fédéral, which brought female representation in this position to 1% (1/96) (Philippe and Hubscher 1991, 228). Comparable PCF and RPR figures from the early 1980s suggest that women's under-representation at the helm of departmental party organizations was not specific to the PS. In 1982, the RPR comprised 3.3% (3/90) female departmental heads while the PCF top departmental organs included 13% women (Le Monde dimanche March 7, 1982, v).16 By 1990, 7% (7/100) of federations were headed by a woman and, by 1994, only 9.4% (9/96) were (Philippe and Hubscher 1991, 228; La Lettre de vendredi December 9, 1994, 3).17 Consequently, in seventeen years, the proportion of female departmental heads in the PS rose more than nine-fold, but to a high of under 10%.

It is unclear whether the governing bodies of federations (and, in particular, the Commissions exécutives fédérales) have respected the quota requirement. On the one hand, Bacot (1979, 241-242) suggests that the adoption of the 10% quota probably forced the numerous Commissions exécutives fédérales that had less than 6% female members in 1974 to recruit women in order to comply with the quota. The statutory requirement (voted at the same time as the quota) that each governing organ of the party organization include one person responsible for addressing
problems raised by women's condition may have helped federations to conform to the 10% quota. since this person was likely to be a woman. On the other hand, statements by the PS feminist faction indicate that Bacot's (1979) suggestion may have been incorrect, at least in the Paris region. Commenting on the proportion of women present in the early 1980s in *Commissions exécutives fédérales*, the courant G noted:

Dans les commissions exécutives fédérales, c'est [la représentation des femmes] exceptionnel, deux membres titulaires dans les Yvelines, deux membres titulaires dans les Hauts de Seine... et deux observatrices dans le Val d'Oise (Mignonnes, allons voir si la rose... 1981-1982, 18).

In any event, given the clear over-representation of men in the top executive office of federations, it is somewhat doubtful that 30% of *Commissions exécutives fédérales* members are presently women.

**National data**

In light of Perrineau's (1991, 222) data on female delegates to national PS conventions between 1973 and 1990, one may suggest that women have generally been better represented as national delegates than as top section and federation officials. Yet, it should also be noted, that unlike PCF conventions, PS conventions have never included (at least until 1990) more than 20% female delegates. In the 1970s, the proportion of PS female delegates grew slowly from 12% in 1973, to 15% in 1977 to 16% in 1979. In subsequent years, the proportion of PS women delegates peaked at 20% in 1981, then dropped to 14% in 1985 and rose again to 19% at the 1990 Rennes convention which raised the quota to 30%. Overall, with respect to women's presence at national conventions, the PS appears to be on a par with the RPR and trailing behind the PCF. According to Ysmal (1989, 191, 207), the RPR 1978 and 1984 conventions comprised 11% and 20% women
delegates, while the PCF conventions of 1976, 1979, 1982 and 1985 all included more than 30% women.

Data on female representation in the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif (the two national bodies required to comply with the quota rule) indicate that female representation increased in the 1970s, stagnated in the 1980s and rose again in the early 1990s. Given the absence of women in the Bureau exécutif and Secrétariat national and their under-representation in the Comité directeur (1.6% (1/61) in 1969, 3.7% (3/81) in 1971 and 4.9% (4/81) in 1973) during the pre-quota period, the call of Eyquem and her team for a compulsory measure to correct this "profoundly unequal situation" is not surprising (author's translation; Carle November 1985). In 1975, the year following the adoption of the 10% quota, the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif had 11.4% (15/131) and 11.1% (3/27) women respectively. It is important to note that these two bodies were enlarged to ensure that they meet the quota requirement (PSf3). The representational gains that women made at the 1977 and 1979 conventions indicate that the quota did initially boost women's presence in the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif. Indeed, the 1977 convention raised the quota to 15% and elected 13.7% (18/131) women to the Comité directeur and 14.8% (4/27) to the Bureau exécutif. Similarly, the 1979 convention raised the quota to 20% and elected 20.6% (27/131) and 18.5% (5/27) women to these organs. During the 1980s, however, the quota did not further enhance female representation. This stagnation and the refusal of the party (until 1990) to comply with the repeated requests of the Secrétariat-femmes to raise the quota to 30% suggest that a few leaders and activists may have perceived the quota as a minimum threshold under which female representation should not drop. This view certainly differed from the perception of the Secrétariat-femmes that the quota should be primarily a means to boost the proportion of female
party officials.

After remaining around 20% through the 1980s (except in 1981 and 1987), women's share of Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif positions began to increase following the decision to bring the quota to 30%. For instance, between 1990 and 1993, female representation in the Comité directeur (or new Conseil national) and Bureau exécutif (or new Bureau national) went from 21.4% (28/131) to 25.5% (52/204) and from 18.5% (5/27) to 21.8% (12/55). In 1994, the Conseil national included 29.4% women (60/204) and the Bureau national 25.4% (14/55). To explain these gains, one needs to refer to several factors, including the quota increase, the enlargement of new national bodies and, above all, the action of some PS men and women. In the spring of 1994, a group of party men and women who were dissatisfied with the proportion of women national party officials sent a registered letter to PS leader Henri Emmanuelli threatening to sue the PS for not respecting its own statutory requirement of 30% women. Shortly afterwards, the Liévin convention of November 1994 increased female representation to almost 30% in the Conseil national and Bureau national and more than 30% in the Secrétariat national (Gaspard 1995, 4). In light of this event, Gaspard (1995, 5) noted that the quota had functioned as a ceiling rather than an instrument to boost female representation: "[l]e quota a fonctionné, mais comme un plafond; il n'a pas été dépassé."

How has female representation evolved in the top national executive body of the PS that is exempt from the quota rule? The data presented in Table 3.1 indicate that since 1975, when two women, Eyquem and Roudy, were finally included in the men-only Secrétariat national, women's representation has fluctuated. At the 1981 post-victory PS convention, the proportion of women holding Secrétariat national positions dropped to 6.2% [1/16, from 15.4% (2/13) in 1975]. In the
second half of the 1980s, the top executive body included 12.5% (2/16) women. After dropping to 7.7% (1/13) at the 1990 Rennes convention, female representation in the Secrétariat national rose again to 21% (4/19) in 1993 and to the unprecedented level of 33.3% (9/27) a year later. The restricted number of Secrétariat national positions (less than twenty until 1994) and the role of the party leader in appointing members from his own faction to the Secrétariat national, account for these fluctuations. Mitterrand, the PS leader from 1971 until 1981, wanted to appear committed to promoting women to top party positions, hence the higher proportion of women holding Secrétariat national positions during his tenure. Conversely, other PS leaders, for instance, Lionel Jospin who took over from Mitterrand in 1981 and Pierre Mauroy who was party leader in 1990, may have been less concerned at the time about what one interviewee called "l'effet d'affichage" (PSf3).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Comité directeur/Conseil national</th>
<th>Bureau exécutif/Bureau national</th>
<th>Secrétariat national</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1.6 (1)</td>
<td>— *</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3.7 (3)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4.9 (4)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>11.4 (15)</td>
<td>11.1 (3)</td>
<td>15.4 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>13.7 (18)</td>
<td>14.8 (4)</td>
<td>18.7 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>20.6 (27)</td>
<td>18.5 (5)</td>
<td>18.7 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>19.8 (26)</td>
<td>14.8 (4)</td>
<td>6.2 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>19.8 (26)</td>
<td>22.2 (6)</td>
<td>18.7 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>19.8 (26)</td>
<td>22.2 (6)</td>
<td>12.5 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>17.5 (23)</td>
<td>7.4 (2)</td>
<td>12.5 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>21.4 (28)</td>
<td>18.5 (5)</td>
<td>7.7 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>25.5 (52)</td>
<td>21.8 (12)</td>
<td>21.0 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>29.4 (60)</td>
<td>25.4 (14)</td>
<td>33.3 (9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Bacot (1979, 245, 247); Vendredi (December 17, 1993, 46); La Lettre de vendredi (November 25, 1994, 2); La Lettre de vendredi (December 9, 1994, 1); Jenson and Sineau (1995, 359).

* "__" means "0"

In order to determine whether the PS quota has made a significant difference to women's share of national party positions, it is necessary to compare PS data with equivalent PCF and RPR data from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Overall, the PS quota appears to have positively distinguished that party from the RPR, but not from the PCF. In 1977, the quota did not appear to give PS women a significant edge over RPR and PCF women, as female representation in counterparts to the PS Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif was fairly comparable. The PCF legislative organ had 18.3% women, and the PS and RPR legislative bodies both had about 13%. The executive bodies of the PCF, PS and RPR respectively included 9.5%, 14.8% (4/27) and 12.5% females. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the PCF did not have any women in its top executive organ while the PS and RPR had 18.7% in theirs (Charlot 1980, 180; Table 3.1). In 1985, the proportion of women holding national legislative and executive positions in the RPR was much lower than in the PCF and PS. For instance, the RPR included 11.1% (19/170) women in its legislative organ, 7.1% (2/28) in its executive body and 5.0% (1/20) in its top executive organ whereas the PCF and PS included around 20% women in their legislative and executive organs and 12.5% (1/8 and 2/16) in their top executive organ (Sineau 1988, 4). Data from 1994 (excluding the significant increase in the proportion of female national officials that took place at the November 1994 Liévin convention of the PS) point to a somewhat similar situation. The representation of women in the national legislative, executive and top executive bodies of the RPR [18%, 6.7% (3/45), 0%] trailed behind that of women in the PCF [21% (29/138), 21.7% (5/23) and 14.3% (1/7)] and PS [25.5% (52/204), 21.8% (12/55) and 21% (4/27)] (Gaspard 1995, 4-5; PCF statistics; Table 3.1). In short, the quota has not enabled PS national organs to achieve a higher degree of feminization than occurred without quotas in their PCF counterparts.
To summarize, PS women have made limited representational gains since the adoption of the quota, more than twenty years ago. Indeed, women’s share of top section, federal and national officials has progressed by less than 15%, less than 10% and around 20% respectively. Furthermore, since the proportion of female section and federal officials has seldom conformed to the quota requirement and that of the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif officials has never exceeded it, it may be suggested that the quota has functioned primarily as a minimum threshold and a maximum ceiling. This helps to account for the limited feminization of the PS internal organization. Lastly, PS women’s irregular and fairly poor representation in national bodies exempt from the quota suggests that the PS may have remained a largely male organization without it.

Explaining the Limited Impact of the Quota

Let us now assess to what extent external factors (the second-wave women’s movement and party support) and internal factors (the Secrétariat-femmes, party personnel and internal party structures) account for the restricted impact of the quota. Overall, internal factors and, in particular, the reluctance of the Secrétariat-femmes to act as a feminist lobby, the ambivalence of party men and women towards the quota, and the PS methods of selecting party officials, shed more light on the limited feminization of the PS organization than external factors.

External factors

The second-wave women’s movement

When examining the discourse and activities of the French women’s movement from the early 1980s onwards, it is necessary to distinguish between two periods. While the 1980s
witnessed the waning of spectacular (liberationist) feminist agitation, the early 1990s witnessed the targeting by established as well as newly-formed women's associations of gender parity (or equal representation of both sexes) in elite bodies. The following overview of feminist activism suggests that the absence of parity-type pressures through the 1980s may have indirectly limited PS women's representational gains.

As noted earlier, by the late 1970s, the women's movement was very divided. The boost that the 1981 PS victory gave to the movement did not last very long, in part because of the establishment of a brand new Ministry for Woman's Rights headed by Roudy, which, in Picq's view (1993, 332), "substituted itself for the women's movement" (author's translation). The funding of women's groups and projects by the Ministry posed a serious moral and strategic dilemma to feminists who distrusted and criticized the efforts of previous (conservative) governments to improve women's condition (Duchen 1986, 131-135; Picq 1993, 331-332). In the end, the failure of various public initiatives for women highlighted for many feminist activists the need for their movement to act as an autonomous watchdog of both left and right governments.30

On March 8, 1982, President Mitterrand announced that the government would introduce seventeen measures for women, including a 30% quota for female municipal candidates. This measure was originally proposed by Françoise Giroud, the first Secrétaire d'État à la condition féminine in the previous government. Her successor, Monique Pelletier, presented a bill in 1979 requiring all political parties to include a maximum of 80% candidates from the same sex on their lists for municipal elections in towns with over nine thousand inhabitants. This bill, which was passed by the National Assembly in November 1980, did not make it to the Senate before the 1981 elections and thus never became law. Under pressure from Gisèle Halimi, the president of the
reformist women's organization *Choisir* and newly-elected PS deputy, and other women favourable to a quota for candidacies, an amendment was made to the municipal law providing that a maximum of 75% candidates from the same sex be present on municipal lists. Halimi's version was passed in 1982 by the National Assembly and Senate. However, a group of opposition parliamentarians submitted the amendment to the Constitutional Council, which invalidated it on the grounds of violating the constitutional principle of equality of all citizens before the law (de Cordon 1987, 138; Gaspard *et al.* 1992, 132-141; Jenson and Sineau 1995, 306-311; Picq 1993, 325-326). One wonders whether the quota amendment would have been so easily annulled had the women's movement at the time been more unified and committed to the advancement of women in traditional political institutions.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the issue of female representation in political institutions stimulated a new wave of feminist agitation. More specifically, a number of new women's associations began promoting the concept of gender parity in elected assemblies and decision-making bodies. According to former *courant* 3 leader Françoise Gaspard (1994, 32), this concept was first launched by feminists involved in the *Mouvement Arc-en-Ciel* (MAC) which between 1986 and 1988 sought to gather far-left activists and ecologists. In keeping with the wishes of its feminist members, the MAC ensured that all its bodies comprised an equal number of men and women. After the dissolution of the MAC in 1988, *Les Verts* made their entrance into politics and included gender parity in their statutes. In the fall of 1989, picking up on the idea of parity, the Council of Europe organized a colloquium entitled "La démocratie paritaire — 40 années d'activité du Conseil de l'Europe." A network of European experts was subsequently set up to reflect on the issue of women in decision-making (Apri 1994, 47-48; Gaspard 1994, 32-35). At its first
meeting in November 1992 in Athens, the network drafted a document endorsing gender parity and urging European and national elites to adopt measures to remedy the dearth of women in top positions.\footnote{Fourteen prominent female politicians signed this document (Gaspard 1994, 35).} Partly inspired by the European discourse on gender parity, new women's associations and initiatives were then launched in various countries of the European Union; their main purpose was to impress upon political elites and citizens the need for greater female involvement in the public sphere.\footnote{Following the emergence of gender parity associations, the AFD established the Club Parité 2000.}

In France, the Bicentennial of the French Revolution in 1989 prompted women into action. Instead of celebrating the two hundredth anniversary of a democracy where women were excluded from decision-making bodies, Antoinette Fouque, the founder of P&P, and other women decided to create a new association, L'Alliance des femmes pour la démocratie (AFD), designed to feminize and democratize France's state and society. Their first public initiative was a conference on the status of women in France and other countries in March 1989 at the Sorbonne (see États Généraux des femmes 1990). Since 1989, the AFD has been active on many fronts. For instance, it has issued public statements on new governmental measures and policies affecting women; organized information sessions on specific topics (such as the importance of the Maastricht Treaty for women); participated in electoral campaigns by presenting candidates or publicly supporting specific candidates (Lionel Jospin in the last presidential elections); staged demonstrations (against, for instance, a judge's decision to acquit anti-abortion activists); and published a quarterly newsletter (AFD "Résumé des actions lancées entre 1989 and 1994;" April 1995; PSf10). Following the emergence of gender parity associations, the AFD established the Club Parité 2000.

The first association for gender parity was founded in March 1992 by Régine Saint-Cricq, a former PS activist and author of a report on the situation of PS women which helped to raise the
quota to 30%. Dissatisfied with the very small proportion of female candidates running in the 1992 regional and cantonal elections, Saint-Cricq quit the party and founded a non-partisan association, Parité, whose main objective is to pressure all political parties to present more female candidates and educate the public about the need for greater female political representation (PSf11).23 Shortly after the creation of Parité, Roudy set up a similar association outside the PS, L’Assemblée des femmes, which gathers female activists determined to push for women’s access to all decision-making institutions.24 On April 23 and 24, 1994, in keeping with the revolutionary spirit of the Bicentennial, L’Assemblée des femmes and thirty other groups held Estates General on women and politics to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the vote. At these Estates General, academics and elected officials discussed women’s marginal position in the political arena while parity activists analyzed the responses that women all across France had provided to a series of questions (Maury May 1994, 46; L’Assemblée des femmes 1994, 3-5; PSf5). Also founded in 1992, Elles aussi is a non-partisan umbrella organization including six women’s associations that support gender parity in elected bodies.25 Elles aussi travels across France to provide information sessions and training workshops to women interested in getting involved in municipal politics. As noted earlier, the movement for gender parity also involves established women’s organizations such as the UFCS and the Conseil national des femmes françaises (Gaspard 1994, 5; L’Annuaire au feminin 1995, 24, 26). Gisèle Halimi and her organization Choisir have also been actively promoting gender parity. In 1993, Choisir held an international conference on "La démocratie paritaire pour les femmes: un pouvoir à partager"; and in 1994, Halimi presented a bill on constitutional gender parity in elected bodies and called for a national referendum on this issue (Alia July 13-20, 1994, 38-39; Saux July 22, 1994, 7). In short, the early 1990s saw the emergence of a diverse movement
for gender parity that attracted both established and new women's associations.³⁶

One wonders whether continued agitation by parity activists and associations will put an end to the perennial under-representation of women in the National Assembly and cabinet. After dropping from about 5-6% (30-40/586-617) in 1945 and 1946 to less than 3.7% (18/491) from 1951 until 1978, the proportion of female deputies returned to its post-war level in 1981 (5.3% or 26/491) (Jenson and Sineau 1995, 369). At present, 10.7% (62/577) of deputies are female ("French Vote Brings Gains for Women" June 7, 1997, A17).²⁷ Since the victory of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in the 1974 presidential elections, women have been slightly better represented in cabinet (with 10-15% of positions) than in parliamentary positions.²⁸ While the 1974 and 1986 Chirac governments and the 1976 Barre government included between three and four women (one Minister and two or three Secretaries of State), Socialist governments from the 1980s and early 1990s generally included six women (three Ministers, including the first female Prime Minister, Édith Cresson, in 1991-1992, and three Secretaries of State) (Spencer 1985, 169-171; Jenson and Sineau 1995, 355-357).²⁹ For Adler (1993, 164, 190-192), Mangin and Martichoux (1990, 12-15) and others, the desire of Giscard d’Estaing and Mitterrand to promote women to top positions in order to appear sensitive to women’s concerns explains the slightly greater proportion of female cabinet ministers.³⁰

As recent events suggest, the movement for parity may accelerate this top-down process of feminization. For the 1994 European Parliament elections, left parties, notably, the PS, PCF, Trotskyist Lutte ouvrière, Les Verts, and former CERES faction leader Jean-Pierre Chevènement, presented lists with equal numbers of male and female candidates. The lists of Lutte ouvrière and Les Verts were headed by a woman. Eight women, including high-profile parity activists Halimi
and Fouque, were second on their list ("La percée des femmes" June 8, 1994, 11). Overall, about 30% of French European Parliament candidates were women. The proportion of female MEPs representing France increased by 7.4% from 22.2% (18/81) in 1989 to 29.9% (26/87) in 1994 (Appleton and Mazur 1993, 95; Jenson and Sineau 1995, 372). During the 1995 presidential campaign, PS candidate Lionel Jospin and Les Verts candidate Dominique Voynet endorsed gender parity (PS 1995a; 1995b; Les Verts 1995). In one of his electoral pamphlets, Lionel Jospin pledged to take measures to enhance women's political representation:

Je veux rénover la vie démocratique, réduire le mandat présidentiel à cinq ans, limiter le cumul des mandats, accroître les pouvoirs du Parlement, reconnaître le rôle des associations et favoriser l'élection des femmes à tous les niveaux de responsabilité. (Emphasis in original; PS 1995a)

Jospin received enough votes to remain in the second round of the elections, but not to win against RPR leader Jacques Chirac. Chirac's new Prime Minister, Alain Juppé, appointed nine more women to cabinet than his conservative predecessor, Édouard Balladur, thereby boosting women's share of cabinet posts to twelve (four Ministers and eight Secretaries of State) or 28.6% (12/42) (Jenson and Sineau 1995, 357-358; Aulagnon May 20, 1995, 9; Le Monde May 20, 1995, 9). Since Chirac's record with respect to female representation was unimpressive, the significant increase in the proportion of female cabinet members was likely linked to the movement for parity. Unfortunately, a November 1995 shuffle left only four women in cabinet (two Ministers and two Secretaries of State out of thirty-two members or 12.5% women) and highlighted yet again the need for feminists to keep pressuring political leaders and parties (Parité December 1995). At present, the newly-elected government of Lionel Jospin comprises eight women out 26 ministers (or 30.8% women) ("Le gouvernement Jospin: huit femmes sur vingt-six ministres" June 5, 1997,
To recapitulate, the intensity of feminist agitation and the level of female representation in political institutions appear to be linked. When in the late 1970s and through the 1980s the women's movement was weakened by internal fights and disinterested in the under-representation of women in top political positions, the proportion of women in the National Assembly and cabinet remained abysmally low. Moreover, as highlighted in Table 3.1, women's share of national PS positions first reached 25% in 1993. It is still too early to determine whether the movement for parity will significantly boost female representation in political institutions. Nonetheless, recent events such as the inclusion of twelve women in the first Juppé government, the presentation of several gender-balanced lists during the last European Parliament elections, and the significant increase in the number of top female PS officials that occurred in November 1994, suggest that the movement for parity may very well accelerate the feminization of the French political arena. For this to happen, however, it is imperative that parity activists maintain constant pressure on political parties and elites.

**Party support**

For the sake of consistency, this analysis of party support relies on the percentage of the vote that the PS obtained in the first rounds of the past four legislative elections. These statistics indicate that support for the PS has not remained stable. After dropping from 37.6% in 1981 to 31.6% in 1986, it rose again to 34.8% in 1988. In 1993, it plummeted to 20.3% (Ehrmann 1983, 220; Cole and Campbell 1989, 136; Ysmai 1989, 293; Ouest France March 23, 1993, 1). If party support fluctuations do enhance or hamper the impact of the PS quota, one may observe the following changes in the proportion of female party officials: a drop (or at least a stagnation) in
numbers of elite women during the early 1980s as well as in the late 1980s (when public support was high) and an increase in elite women around 1986-1988 and 1993-1994 (when the PS was out of power).

Since longitudinal statistics regarding female section and federal party officials are not available, it is necessary to refer to data on women in the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif. Overall, such data both confirm and disconfirm the pattern proposed above. On the one hand, women's share of Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif positions did drop at the Valence convention, four months after the 1981 victories of the party, and increase in 1993 and 1994 when the party was in disarray. As well, while women's greater propensity to support left parties through the 1980s coincided with no rise in the proportion of female top PS officials, their desertion of the PS in the 1993 elections was followed by a significant growth in female elites (Rémy December 1986, 26; Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau May 5, 1988, 15; Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau August 18, 1993, 7; Table 3.1). On the other hand, the electoral failure of 1986 did not positively affect women's share of Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif positions. In 1987, women's representation in these two bodies even decreased, by 2.3% (or three positions) and by 14.8% (or four positions) respectively. Furthermore, expanded support for the PS in the late 1980s did not lower the proportion of female national officials; this figure was around 20% in 1990 (see Table 3.1). Given this mixed evidence, it is not possible to conclude that party support fluctuations elucidate the limited feminization of the PS organization.

**Internal factors**

*The Secrétariat-femmes*

In light of the activities that the Secrétariat-femmes organized in the 1980s, it is more
accurate to identify it as a female auxiliary than a feminist lobby. As demonstrated below, its reluctance to take strong action and force the party to give more responsibility to female activists partly accounts for the restricted impact of the quota.

Through the 1980s, the Secrétariat-femmes sought to enhance women's position in the party and society, not by launching new sweeping initiatives, but by organizing similar activities as in the late 1970s. For instance, it continued to offer information sessions on topics of concern to women and organized, in conjunction with the Secrétariat national à la formation, training workshops on how to conduct a meeting and run as a municipal candidate (Brocas July 2, 1981; Secrétariat national aux luttes des femmes circa July 1981; *Le Poing et la rose* January 1990, 27; PSf2; PSf4; PSf5). At each national convention, the Secrétariat-femmes also requested, without success, that the quota be raised.35 To limit the growing dissatisfaction of female activists (whose request to boost the quota to 25% was turned down yet again at the 1987 Lille convention), the PS agreed to let the Secrétariat-femmes host a second national convention on women's rights in 1988 ("Femmes: déçues" April 6, 1987; Z.E. April 6, 1987, 60). In the fall of 1987, the Secrétariat-femmes prepared for this event (which was to take place on March 12 and 13, 1988 in Châtellerault, Édith Cresson's municipal "fiefdom") by holding several public meetings across France on issues of concern to women (D.E. October 20, 1987). At the women's convention, participants criticized the party for its insensitivity towards women. They demanded that the quota be raised to 25% and that a special party body responsible for ensuring the respect of the quota requirement be established (Chombeau March 15, 1988, 14; Bazin March 16, 1988, 5). Before inferring from the strong signals the convention sent to the PS that the Secrétariat-femmes was a feminist lobby, one needs to take into account the timing of both its convention and campaign "for
the promotion of equal gender representation and women's access to political power" (author's translation; D.E. October 20, 1987). These two initiatives took place just before the 1988 presidential elections, which indicates that the Secrétariat-femmes was first and foremost a female auxiliary mainly designed to attract women voters to the PS (PSm1; PSm7).

The organization of feminist actions in 1986 and 1990 by party women who were not involved in the Secrétariat-femmes reinforces this point. For the 1986 legislative elections, France's traditional two-ballot single-member plurality system was replaced by a proportional representation (PR) system. Many PS women expected that the new electoral system would finally boost the proportion of PS female candidates and National Assembly deputies since the party statutes required that 20% of the candidates running in PR elections be female. However, after finding out that the PS list included less than 10% women in winnable positions, cabinet members Roudy and Edwige Avice as well as female party activists went into action. Roudy made clear that this situation was unacceptable to national PS leaders while Avice submitted a petition protesting the exclusion of women candidates from winnable seats to Martine Buron, the head of the Secrétariat-femmes, as well as to PS federations. About forty female activists also publicly denounced the cavalier attitude of national party elites vis à vis women. ("Yvette Roudy sonne la révolte des `paillassons' du PS" July 10, 1985; Asch August 1, 1985, 6; "Les femmes se rebiffent" September 1985). These actions did not cause PS federations and national elites to revise the ranking of PS candidates. Instead, at the 1985 Toulouse convention, party insiders put forward a proposal to remove the quota for female candidacies from the statutes. Warned in advance, Roudy, Avice, Cresson and some one hundred and fifty party women interrupted the meeting and presented a counter-proposal that eventually saved the quota (Mangin and Martichoux 1990, 236-
Notably, the Secrétariat-femmes did not initiate any of these initiatives.

The Secrétariat-femmes also failed to play a major role in the 1990 quota increase to 30%. At their January 1990 meeting, women from the Fédération nationale des élus socialistes et républicains (FNESR), a satellite organization of the PS, lamented the fact that the PS had not responded to demands from the last 1988 women's convention, elaborated on by FNESR member Régine Saint-Cricq in her report Une autre place pour les femmes ("Rencontre des femmes élus de la FNESR" January 20, 1990, 9-18, 29-30). Some of the report's recommendations included raising the quota to 30%, establishing a special body responsible for promoting women within the party hierarchy, and providing training workshops on specific topics and child care arrangements (Saint-Cricq, 1989, 6-10). In the end, it was this report and the determination of FNESR members not to let it fall by the wayside that explain the high number of resolutions presented at the March 1990 Rennes convention supporting increased female involvement, the increase of the quota to 30%, and the creation of a mixed Commission nationale de promotion politique des femmes ("Contributions du Congrès de Rennes" 1989-1990; Saint-Cricq and Prévost 1993, 167). In short, the 1985 events and 1990 quota raise confirm the argument that the Secrétariat-femmes was not a feminist lobby, but rather a female auxiliary.

Lastly, the moral and financial crisis that shook the PS in 1992-1993 was a crushing blow to the Secrétariat-femmes. Several interviewees noted that the organ was now a body with very limited influence on party affairs (PSm1; PSm3-PSm5; PSm8; PSf1; PSf3; PSf5; PSf7; PSf8). Some even asked who officially headed the Secrétariat-femmes (PSm4; PSm6; PSf1; PSf8; PSf9). As the following comments by two long-time female activists indicate, the Secrétariat-femmes has
been quiescent in recent years: "Après 1988, ça s’est effrité" (PSf3); "Tout ça est tombé en désuétude; il n’y a plus grand chose ces derniers temps" (PSf4).

Party personnel

How do male and female PS activists and elites perceive the quota? Their views on this matter may have strong explanatory power as to why the quota has not significantly increased the proportion of female party officials. More specifically, their general ambivalence towards the quota may account for its limited impact.

Before analyzing how PS men and women perceive the quota, it should be suggested that when asked to evaluate female representation in the internal party organization, all interviewees except one noted that few women held party positions. Despite their awareness of PS women’s under-representation, however, interviewees did not readily endorse the quota. Their opinions of the quota were as follows: four supported it (PSf4-PSf7); nine were somewhat favourable to it (PSm1-PSm7; PSf2; PSf3); and three opposed it (PSm8; PSf1; PSf8). A generational split existed among women, with long-time activists supporting the quota and younger activists rejecting it.

Furthermore, the comments of those somewhat favourable to the quota (that is more than half the interviewees) indicate that it is not well-accepted. Some described it as "une contrainte" (PSm1), "un garde-fous" (PSm2), "un illogisme" (PSm5), "un mal nécessaire" (PSm6). Others also noted that:

Les quotas sont réducteurs pour les femmes mais mieux vaut un quota que rien du tout. (PSm4)

C’est le moins mauvais moyen. (PSf3)

C’est une règle brutale mais nécessaire. (PSf9)
Men who were lukewarm supporters of the quota wondered about the competence of women promoted by the quota (PSm1-PSm4). According to interviewees, this ambivalence towards the quota came from men and women and from rank-and-file activists and elites (PSm1-PSm3; PSf1-PSf6). However, even though the quota does not enjoy broad support within the party, only one interviewee called for its elimination (PSm8).

Why are PS men and women still ambivalent towards a measure that was first adopted more than two decades ago? The attachment to republican ideas, especially among men, partly accounts for this ambivalence. In treating women differently from men, the quota violates the republican principle that all citizens should be treated equally (PSm2; PSm3; PSm7; PSf6). As previously mentioned, party members' concerns about the quota were never addressed in a thorough debate, which may also help to explain why a general ambivalence towards the quota has persisted for so long.

Internal party structures

Since decentralized (or rank-and-file-controlled) selection processes have been identified as detrimental to women and centralized (or elite-controlled) selection processes as beneficial to them, it may be proposed that the PS decentralized approach to selecting party officials accounts for the limited feminization of the party organization. Yet, in the case of a structurally factionalized party such as the PS, it is necessary to assess not only the respective input of rank-and-file and elite activists in the selection of top officials, but also the effect of PS factions on the selection process, the implementation of the quota and female representation. Overall, the following analysis highlights two main points. First, the selection of section and federal officials is decentralized while that of national officials is centralized. This finding supports the proposition
that centralization is beneficial to women, since they are better represented in national party bodies (especially the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif) than at the helm of sections and federations. Second, the structuring of the party in factions appears to have limited the positive impact centralization and the quota were to have on female representation in national party bodies and accentuated the adverse impact of decentralization at section and federation levels.

The top executive officials of PS sections and federations are usually selected by local activists. Although support from federal and/or national elites may be useful when the Secrétaire of a large (and thus electorally important) section or federation is to be selected, it is not determining. To become Secrétaire de section or Premier (secrétaire) fédéral, the recognition and appreciation of activists for one's involvement is more important than one's connections with the upper echelons of the party. Consequently, the decentralized selection of Secrétaires de section and Premiers fédéraux as well as the necessity for these party officials to belong to the dominant faction of their section or federation appear to have restricted women's access to these positions.

Faction leaders and their close advisers control the selection of national party officials. The influence of national delegates is only indirect since they vote on the motions (or the texts outlining the general orientation of factions) presented at the convention. Motions obtaining at least 5% of the vote become official factions. These then receive a percentage of Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif positions corresponding to the percentage of the vote they each obtained. Interviewees' accounts reveal that national officials are chosen via "elite slate-making." Each faction leader puts forward a list of candidates for the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif. When putting the list together, faction slate-makers pay attention to criteria such as geography, youth and gender. Persons ranked at the beginning of each list are more likely to obtain positions than those ranked
The quotes below indicate that Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif officials are selected according to a very centralized process:

Plus on monte, plus on est co-opté. Dès qu’il y a des enjeux de pouvoir, le jeu démocratique est plus restreint. (PSm2)

Il y a désignation par le chef de courant plutôt qu’élection. (PSm3)

En règle générale, plus on monte dans l’appareil, plus la relation avec un chef de courant est nécessaire. (PSm6)

Les jeux sont faits avant formellement. (PSf3)

Il faut appartenir à un certain cercle restreint autour d’une personne (PSf8).

The selection of Secrétariat national members is even more centralized since the party leader chooses, among the high-profile members of his faction, those who will sit in the top executive organ, "comme le Premier ministre choisit ses ministres" in one interviewee’s words (PSf2). In the end, two observations can be made about the promotion of women to national party office. On the one hand, the significant role party elites play in the selection of top officials may explain why the proportion of women in the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif has generally conformed to the quota. On the other hand, the irregular representation of women in the Secrétariat national highlights the dangers for women of relying solely on party elites for promotion. Indeed, women’s share of Secrétariat national positions dropped significantly in 1981, when Mitterrand left the office of party leader to become President of France, and again in 1990, when rumours of his imminent retirement triggered a war of succession among PS faction leaders.

Therefore, it appears that a decentralized selection process helps to account for the low proportion of female Secrétaires de section and Premiers fédéraux while a more centralized selection process helps to account for the slightly higher proportion of female national party
officials. When explaining the limited feminization of the PS organization, one also needs to consider the structured factions of the party. The importance of faction membership over gender as a selection criterion appears to have restricted women's access to top section, federation and national positions. Had the PS not been divided into factions or at least had the central leadership been more committed to enforce the quota, national party bodies would probably have been more feminized. As a result of mounting criticisms that factions were divisive for the party, the PS disbanded them in the early 1990s. The significant representational gains women made after the elimination of factions in the new expanded national bodies validates the argument that the latter restricted the positive effect centralization and the quota were to have on female representation.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have analyzed the circumstances in which the PS quota was introduced and officially adopted as well as the reasons for its limited success in feminizing party organs. The resurgence of the women's movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s prompted party feminists like Eyquem and Roudy to think about ways to open the male-dominated PS organization to women. Thanks to their efforts and close ties to the party leader, a quota of 10% women in almost all PS bodies was inserted into the party statutes in 1974, and a special party organ for women, the Secrétariat-femmes, was established three years later. Overall, however, the quota and the Secrétariat-femmes have timidly altered the gendered division of power existing in the PS organization. Longitudinal data on section, federal and national party officials reveal that in the long run, the quota has functioned less as an instrument to enhance female representation than as a minimum threshold and a maximum ceiling. Similarly, the Secrétariat-femmes has not acted as
a feminist pressure group, but rather as a female auxiliary.

Overall, internal factors shed more light on the limited impact of the quota than external factors. On the one hand, the reluctance of the Secrétariat-femmes to launch innovative initiatives and the persistent ambivalence of male and female activists and elites vis-à-vis the quota have restricted its effect. PS factions have also limited the impact of the quota, especially at section and federation levels, where the selection of officials is more decentralized than at the national level. On the other hand, the waning of feminist agitation in the 1980s may have indirectly hampered the feminization of PS organs during this same period. Lastly, the relationship between patterns of party support and female involvement in the PS is difficult to determine because the evidence points in contradictory directions.

We shall now turn our attention to the Parti québécois, a party which has used less formal means to feminize its internal organization.
ENDNOTES

1. I am grateful to Laurent Bouvet, Renée DuFourt, Cécile Goldet, Amy Mazur, and Jean-Luc Perdriel for providing names of potential interviewees.

2. The PS women's Secrétariat has changed names several times since its inception. In 1979, it became the Secrétariat aux luttes des femmes, and, in the mid-1980s, the Secrétariat aux droits des femmes. At present, it is known as the Secrétariat femmes-mixité. To avoid confusion, the term Secrétariat-femmes is used throughout the text.


4. As Garcia Guadilla (1981, 28) points out, some liberationist groups formed before the official birth of the MLF in 1970; these included the mixed Féminin-masculin-avenir, the lesbian group Les petites marguerites, and the women of the far-left group Vive la révolution.

5. Garcia Guadilla (1981, 38-39) notes that since 1973, the official name of this group has been Politique et Psychanalyse. In the literature on the MLF, however, the group is usually referred to as Psychanalyse et Politique or Psych et Po. To avoid confusion, the acronym "P&P" is used to identify this group.

6. On this point, see Ducrocq (1982).

7. The absence of a thorough debate about the quota may explain why the repeated requests of the Secrétariat-femmes that the quota be increased always stirred trouble at national conventions. As Gaspard (in Trat and Vigan 1993-1994, 9) notes, "[c]ela [le quota] a toujours été un enjeu de fin de congrès, réglé en quatrième vitesse, et généralement dans le drame, les crises, les hommes essayant toujours de rabioter 5%." 

8. Subsequently, the main elements of the Manifeste were included in the PS electoral program, Projet socialiste: pour la France des années 1980 (see PS 1980; Rochette Ozello 1983).

9. In the following quote, founding members of the feminist faction explain why they resolved to form such a faction:

   Une femme promue individuellement ne peut l'être qu'en récitant le discours des hommes ("militantes suivez nos cours de formation politique et vous mériterez des responsabilités") [...] En revanche lorsque nous nous posons dans le parti en terme de pouvoir, en disant "on créé un courant," brusquement la presse, le parti se met à parler de nous. Avons-nous visé si juste? ("Le courant III aujourd'hui?" 1978)

10. Gaspard wrote a book about her experience as the first female mayor of Dreux (see Gaspard 1979).

12. A section can be formed by five PS members working in the same company or living in the same neighbourhood. A federation gathers all the sections present in a French département. The PS currently has over four thousand sections and one hundred federations. At convention, section and federal activists elect a governing body reflecting the balance of power between the various factions. This body then designates the top executive official (or Secrétaire) who will head the section or federation. This official usually belongs to the dominant faction of the section or federation (PS 1992, 44-45).

Every two years, the PS holds a national convention in order to determine the general direction of its general policy orientation and elect the officials of its national legislative and executive bodies, namely, the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif. The 131-member Comité directeur implements the general policy orientation adopted by the national convention. The 27-member Bureau exécutif is responsible for the administration of the party, and the Secrétariat national (whose membership has varied between thirteen and sixteen), implements the decisions taken by the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif. At the national convention, delegates vote on the motions presented. Motions receiving more than 5% of the vote are officially recognized as PS factions. Each faction presents a list of candidates to the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif. The proportion of the vote obtained by each motion determines the proportion of seats each faction will have in the Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif. The Comité directeur selects among its members those who will be part of the Bureau exécutif and, among Bureau exécutif members, the leader of the faction with the largest support as party leader. The latter then appoints several members of his faction to the Secrétariat national (PS 1992, 46-47).

The national party organization has recently undergone a number of changes. Renamed Conseil national, the Comité directeur now includes 204 members elected by the national convention as well as the one hundred Premiers (secrétaires) fédéraux. The Conseil national elects the party leader and the 55 members of the Bureau exécutif or Bureau national. The Secrétariat national now has 27 members who are still designated by the party leader.

13. Section governing bodies are usually called Bureaux de section. A federation usually has three governing bodies, a Commission exécutive fédéral (legislative body), a Bureau fédéral (executive body) and a Secrétariat fédéral (top executive body). Secrétariat fédéral members are appointed by the Premier (secrétaire) fédéral. Since the only federal-level statistics available concern the Commissions exécutives fédérales, this analysis solely refers to female representation in these bodies.

14. To avoid confusion, the French term of Secrétaire (which in French refers to a top party position) is used instead of the English term of "secretary" (which in English refers to a secondary party position).

15. Comparable data from other political parties were not available.

16. Whenever percentages are not followed by corresponding nominal figures in brackets, this means that the latter were not available.
17. In 1993, 9% (9/100) of PS Premiers fédéraux were women (Vendredi December 17, 1993, 48).

18. See Bacot (1979, 337).

19. More recent data were not available.

20. Between 1981 and 1986, the Ministry was active in many different areas. First, it sponsored a national campaign of information about contraception. Then, it set up 140 Centres nationaux d'information sur les droits des femmes throughout France to provide free advice and counselling to women in areas such as professional training, wife-battering and prostitution. In an effort to fight against sexism, the Ministry also started a project to eliminate stereotypes of women in textbooks. However, the Ministry's battle against sexism was not successful. Its anti-sexist bill, which would have permitted women to sue magazines and advertisers presenting degrading images of women, was strongly criticized by the media. It was finally lost in the National Assembly as left and right legislators joined forces to bring it down. On the other hand, the National Assembly did not create major obstacles to pass the Loi sur l'égalité professionnelle that the Ministry drafted in order to enhance women's salaries and employment opportunities (Northcutt and Flaitz 1985, 58-62; Duchen 1986, 128-129, 140; Picq 1993, 321-332).

21. See the text of this document in "Les actrices en présence" (Fall 1993, 25).

22. During the 1991 Belgian elections, women launched a campaign designed to encourage voters to back female candidates (the "Campagne démocratie paritaire -- votez femmes"). Also, in early 1994, a debate including an equal number of male and female parliamentarians was held in the Portuguese Parliament to discuss the idea of gender parity (Apprill 1994, 47-48).

23. For the past three years, Parité has engaged in numerous activities. For instance, it has: issued press releases (to protest the absence of women in the electoral reform commission presided over by George Vedel and the PS decision not to nominate long-time deputy Denise Cacheux as a candidate in the 1993 legislative elections); compiled statistics on French women's representation in elected assemblies and decision-making bodies; conducted a study of municipal female councillors and mayors; and published the responses of the 1995 presidential candidates to its questionnaire in its bi-monthly newsletter (Parité June 13, 1992; June-July 1993; February 1995; April 1995).

Parité's ten demands include: creating an equality of opportunity office attached to the Prime Minister; passing a law for the gradual implementation of gender parity in assemblies elected according to proportional representation and decision-making bodies; imposing financial sanctions on parties failing to respect the parity law; publishing the male-female breakdown of electoral results; implementing European directives regarding women's presence in decision-making organs; organizing publicly-funded campaigns to highlight women's contribution to political life and encourage women to embark on a political career; ensuring that both genders are equally represented in examination juries; limiting the number of elected mandates one may hold; and ensuring that employers accommodate employees in elected office (Parité circa 1992). The
French government recently met Parité’s first demand. On August 24, 1995, Colette Codaccioni, the Minister for Solidarity between Generations, announced the establishment of an office for gender parity (Parité September-October 1995).

24. Recently, Roudy also founded the *Institut politique européen de formation des femmes* which offers training workshops and information sessions on various topics (for example, employment equity, bioethics and public opinion) to women interested in embarking on a political career (*L’Annuaire au féminin* 1995, 30).

25. It was also in 1992 that Gaspard et al.’s book, *Au pouvoir citoyennes: liberté, égalité, parité*, was published. *Elles aussi* includes, for instance, the UFCS, ADF and *Femmes d’Alsace*, the women’s list constituted in 1992 by centre-left and -right women that unexpectedly obtained one seat in the regional council of Alsace (Réka May 1994, 43).

26. In January 1993, an informal network was set up to coordinate the actions of these various associations and facilitate the exchange of information among them. Shortly after its inception, the new *Réseau femmes pour la parité* (RFP) put forward a manifesto signed by 289 women and 288 men (the total number of signatures (577) being equal to the number of seats in the National Assembly), the *Manifeste des 577 pour une démocratie paritaire*, demanding that a law providing for the equal representation of men and women in all elected assemblies be adopted. The RFP also organized a roundtable among women from different political backgrounds at the National Assembly, a protest in front of the National Assembly (against "l’Assemblée nation-mâle") and a summer seminar to refine the argument for gender parity, and published the newsletter *Parité-infos*. The network eventually dissolved at the end of 1993 because it did not function as a network, but rather as another organization (Gaspard Fall 1993, 23; "Les actrices en présence" Fall 1993, 22; Trat and Vigan 1993-1994, 11-12). Nevertheless, the dissolution of the RFP did not put an end to coordination initiatives. In 1994, several women’s associations (notably, the UFCS, *Conseil national des femmes françaises*, *La clef*, and *Elles aussi*) decided to set up a national association called *Coordination nationale “Demain, la parité”* in order to coordinate the activities of parity associations during the 1995 presidential and municipal campaigns ("Demain, la parité" November 1994).

27. The proportion of women sitting in the Senate (whose members are either elected by departmental electoral colleges or appointed) has remained very low, namely, 6.7% (21/314) in December 1946 and under 4.3% (14/321) from 1948 until 1992 (Jenson and Sineau 1995, 370).

28. French women made their first entrance in government in 1936, when Léon Blum appointed three female Under-Secretaries of State to his cabinet, Irène Joliot-Curie (for Scientific Research), Suzanne Lacore (for Public Health) and Cécile Brunschvicg (for National Education). In 1974, Simone Veil became the first French woman to hold a ministerial portfolio, that of health (Spencer 1985, 169-171; Adler 1993, 120-127).

29. For accounts on the experience of Édith Cresson as Prime Minister, see Schemla (1993), Saint-Cricq and Prévost (1993, 49-51), Adler (1993, 213-238), and Jenson and Sineau (1995, 331-
30. In France, the promotion of women by powerful men is generally referred to as "le fait du prince" (or having a patron).

31. While Halimi ran on Chevènement's list, L'Autre politique, Fouque ran on that of controversial left-wing businessman, Bernard Tapie, Énergie radicale.

32. The 1981, 1986 and 1993 data include the votes received by the Mouvement des radicaux de gauche, a small left party close to the PS.

33. Statistics on female representation in the Secrétariat national confirm some of the party support propositions. For instance, the proportion of women in the top executive body of the party decreased in 1981 and 1990 and increased in 1993 and 1994 (see Table 3.1). However, since this body (which is exempt from the quota requirement) only had between one and three women until 1993, it is excluded from the analysis.

34. The 1981 drop, however, was mainly due to the fact that the newly-elected bodies included one woman less than in 1979 (see Table 3.1).

35. According to one interviewee, the inability of the Secrétariat-femmes to plan the necessary steps to ensure that its requests for a quota increase be met accounts for its repeated failures (PSf6).

36. Saint-Cricq was involved in this new party organ from 1990 until 1992. When the time came to select candidates for the 1992 regional and cantonal elections, the Commission proved unable to promote women, which led Saint-Cricq to resign and create a non-partisan association for gender parity outside the PS, Parité (Saint-Cricq and Prévost 1993, 167).

37. Interviewees who opposed the quota made the following comments:

C'est une absurdité qui va à l'encontre du but recherché, c'est à dire la promotion des femmes. (PSm8)

Je suis à priori contre les quotas, ils servent à réduire les femmes à du bétail. (PSf1)

C'est humiliant. (PSf8)

38. At its last convention, the Mouvement des jeunes socialistes decided that its sections and commissions would not implement a quota for women or other marginalized groups (PSf8).

39. Two opponents of the quota were also concerned about the competence of women promoted to party positions because of this requirement (PSm8; PSf1).
40. Saint-Cricq's (1989, 35) report also highlights PS women's mixed feelings about the quota: 59% of her female respondents thought that the quota was still needed, 28% did not, and 13% did not respond; furthermore, 36% of respondents favoured the replacement of the quota with another system, 25% did not, and 39% did not respond. These statistics led Saint-Cricq (1989, 36) to conclude:

Les réponses à l'ensemble de ces questions manifestent une certaine insatisfaction à l'égard du système du quota accompagnée d'une grande incertitude sur ce qui pourrait le remplacer. Il apparaît comme un premier garde-fous dont on ne souhaite pas la disparition, tout en ayant conscience de ses défauts.

41. This finding corroborates the argument made by Piat (1981, 122, 138), Rey and Subileau (1991, 81-82), Saint-Cricq and Prévost (1993, 103), Jenson and Sineau (1995, 321) and others that the PS structured factions have restricted women’s access to top party positions. When deciding who should be promoted to a top executive position, factions consider first and foremost one’s allegiance to the faction and its leader, and, then, if they are open, the need to meet the quota requirement. Consequently, a woman aspiring to ascend the party ladder must belong to one of the main factions and be close to its leader.

42. Two interviewees noted that support from federal and/or national elites can sometimes hurt activists aspiring to become Secrétaire de section (PSf8; PSm8).

43. Six interviewees stressed the necessity for section and federation top executive officials to belong to the dominant faction of their section or departmental organization (PSm1; PSm6; PSf3; PSf4; PSf7; PSf8).

44. As one interviewee noted, "les dirigeants se rendent compte qu’il est irresponsable de ne pas avoir de femmes" (PSf3).

45. Several interviewees pointed out that factions still exist albeit in an unofficial way (PSm8; PSf1; PSf3; PSf5).
CHAPTER FOUR

THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS

In 1977, the nine-year old social democratic and independentist Parti québécois (PQ) formally agreed to the creation of a body designed to address issues of concern to party women and enhance their involvement within the organization: the Comité de la condition féminine (or Comité). For the past two decades, the Comité has revised the sections of the PQ program dealing with women's condition and provided support services (including information and training sessions) to women aspiring to ascend the party ladder and/or run as candidates. Nevertheless, longitudinal data on women's share of riding, regional and national party positions reveal that overall, the initiatives of the Comité have brought about a moderate (rather than high) feminization of the PQ organization.

This chapter addresses two main issues: first, the Comité and its efforts to boost female representation; and second, the moderate gains women have made as a result of these efforts. After examining how the Comité was established and the activities it has organized since the 1970s, the chapter analyzes statistics that point to the moderate feminization of the PQ organization as well as factors that may explain it. In the end, factors internal to the PQ and, in particular, the ambivalence of party activists and elites towards increased female representation and the PQ's methods of selecting party officials, shed more light on the moderate representational gains of party women than factors external to the party.
The PQ Women’s Committee

The beginnings

The 1960s and 1970s witnessed an increase in political discontent among male and female French Quebeckers whose expectations had been raised but not met by the Quiet Revolution. The nationalist and feminist movements were two of the movements that many of these discontented men and women joined. Some have argued that the nationalist movement reached its height when the Parti québécois — into which the three largest independentist organizations, the Ralliement national, the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale, and the Mouvement souverainé-association, had merged in 1968 — won the 1976 provincial elections (Bellavance 1972; McRoberts 1988). Meanwhile, Quebec women were joining reformist women's organizations as well as liberationist groups.

The resurgence of Quebec feminism can be traced to the creation of two reformist women's organizations: the Fédération des femmes du Québec (FFQ) and the Association féminine d'éducation et d'action sociale (AFEAS). To celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Quebec female suffrage, Thérèse Casgrain, the well-known women's rights activist, invited representatives from provincial women's organizations to a conference on the legal status of Quebec women. At the end of the conference, participants agreed to set up an umbrella organization to which Quebec women's groups as well as individual members would be able to affiliate. The lay FFQ was officially born in 1966.3 That same year, the Union catholique des femmes rurales merged with the Cercles d'économie domestique to form the AFEAS (Prentice et al. 1988, 343; Collectif Clio 1992, 463-464, 468).4

In the following years, the activities of the FFQ and AFEAS mainly consisted of informing
Quebec women about their rights and pressuring the Quebec government to improve women's condition. The two organizations worked together closely, with the FFQ concentrating on urban women and the AFEAS on housewives and rural women. The first demands of the FFQ concerned women's working conditions, pay equity, public childcare services and the reform of the Code civil. In the late 1960s, the Fédération endorsed the brief of the Committee for the Equality of Women calling for the establishment of a Royal Commission on the Status of Women (RCSW).  

Shortly after the release of the RCSW report in 1970, the FFQ published a discussion guide that was used by numerous Quebec women's groups. Under pressure from the Fédération to comply with the recommendation of the Royal Commission to create an official, publicly-funded advisory body on women's status, the Quebec government established the Conseil du statut de la femme (CSF) in 1973. Five years later, the CSF published the Quebec counterpart to the RCSW report, Pour les Québécoises: égalité et indépendance, which inspired the first PQ government's policies to improve women's condition. In 1976, the AFEAS created a group for women working in family businesses and released a study on women's work in the home (Prentice et al. 1988, 345-346, 352; Maillé 1990, 92, 94-95; Collectif Clio 1992, 464, 468, 471, 479).

Some of the other women's groups that sprang up in Montreal at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s aimed at liberating women from capitalist and/or patriarchal oppression. Late in 1969, anglophone female students from McGill University and Sir George William College launched the Montreal Women's Liberation Movement (MWLM). Together with the McGill Student Society (the publisher of the illegal Birth Control Handbook) and some francophone liberationists, the MWLM provided abortion referral services at McGill University until 1975. In November 1969, some two hundred nationalist and leftist women were arrested for
protesting against the banning of demonstrations by the Montreal municipal government. A couple of months later, these women organized themselves as the *Front de libération des femmes du Québec* (FLFQ), which, in its two years of existence, fought for abortion rights; protested against Montreal's *Salon de la femme* (woman's fair) as well as the exclusion of women from Quebec juries; and began publishing the feminist newspaper *Québécoises deboutte!*. At first, the FLFQ was composed of radical and socialist feminists from the French and English communities. However, the strong commitment of francophone members to Quebec nationalism led them to expel the anglophones and sever links with English feminists inside and outside Quebec and Canada. As their *Manifeste des femmes québécoises* highlights, FLFQ members wanted to fight for women's liberation from capitalism and patriarchy *within* the independence movement (*Un groupe de femmes à Montréal 1971, 12*). In sum, for them, as the popular feminist slogan of that time went, women's liberation could not be achieved without Quebec's liberation and vice versa ("Pas de Québec libre sans libération des femmes! Pas de femmes libres sans libération du Québec... "). Following disagreements between its radical and socialist members, the FLFQ disappeared late in 1971. Subsequently, some of its former socialist members formed the *Centre des femmes* which continued to publish *Québécoises deboutte!* and established the publishing house *Éditions du Remue-ménage*, the *Théâtre des cuisines* and a women's community health group. Upon the dissolution of the FLFQ in 1975, socialist feminists returned to mixed leftist and nationalist organizations. However, this did not put an end to liberationist agitation. Throughout the second half of the 1970s, feminists who did not consider Quebec nationalism to be a paramount issue (for instance, the radical feminists who founded the Montreal newsletter *Les Têtes de pioche* and the lesbian feminists from the group *Coop-femmes*) were particularly active (Collectif Clio
Although the women who launched the PQ women's committee were not former feminist activists (but according to two of the founding members, mothers who were interested in issues related to motherhood), one cannot deny that the Comité was in a sense a product of the broader feminist agitation of the 1960s and 1970s (PQf3; PQf11). This is what six of the seven interviewees active in the PQ in the late 1970s suggested when asked where the idea of establishing a women's committee came from. One man and two women mentioned that 1975, the International Women's Year, gave a boost to party women who wanted the PQ to make room for female activists and issues of concern to them (PQm2; PQf3; PQf11). Two other interviewees pointed out that the party simply responded to a general pro-women trend when it sanctioned the establishment of the Comité: "[p]olitiquement, c'était chic de créer ça" (PQf2); "[c]'était une mode, une vague... pour être bien vu" (PQf5). This parallels the Comité's (less critical) version of the circumstances in which it was formed:

À partir du début des années 1970, à travers le monde, la sensibilisation des peuples envers la cause des femmes s'est beaucoup accentuée et de nombreux organismes ont été fondés pour travailler à cette cause. Le Parti québécois répondait donc avec justice et en temps opportun à un mouvement évolutif qui prenait place à l'échelle de la planète. (CNAPF July 1993)

In sum, the women's movement not only prompted PQ women to set up their own committee, but also impressed upon the party that it was time to make room for women and issues of concern to them.

The women's committee of the PQ was started early in 1976 by a group of party women from the Montréal-centre region who felt that the sections of the party program addressing
women's condition needed to be substantially revised. As soon as the regional executive approved the establishment of the *Comité de la condition féminine* (or *Comité*), these women moved into action. First, they invited PQ and non-partisan women activists as well as PQ leaders to a symposium on women's condition entitled "Solitaires ou solidaires." In workshops on the family, education, justice, politics, health, and employment, participants discussed the particular problems faced by women and the means to remedy them (Rowan March 24, 1976, 2; March 29, 1976, 2; Région Montréal-centre du PQ March 1976).

Then, at the 1977 PQ convention, party women from the *Montréal-centre* region put forward a lengthy resolution calling for maternity leave, public child care services and free abortion. Despite the strong opposition of René Lévesque and other national executive members to the section on free abortion, the resolution carried. Anticipating the resistance of the national executive (which at the time only comprised one woman) towards their resolution, the *Montréal-centre* women spent the months prior to the convention building support for their proposal at the local level. They went to numerous riding and regional meetings and educated activists --many of whom were going to be delegates at the 1977 convention-- about the resolution. In the end, their efforts to reach out to the rank and file paid off since the resolution passed and four women, including two young feminists, Louise Thiboutot, one of the founders of the *Comité*, and Denise LeBlanc, were elected to the national executive in spite of the objections of national elites (PQf3; PQf11; Fraser 1984, 119-120).

At the national council meeting that followed the 1977 convention, the now more feminized national executive presented a resolution providing for the creation of a *national* *Comité de la condition féminine* which was to defend the interests of Montreal women as well as those of
women from all the other regions. The resolution did not encounter any opposition and passed easily (PQf3; PQf11). Consequently, as of September 1977, the PQ had a women’s committee that was to suggest policy stands on issues of concern to women and reach out to women outside the party:

[Le] Comité national de la condition féminine […] verrait […] à:

a) promouvoir et coordonner l’action décentralisée des régions et des comtés tant au niveau de l’actualité que du programme et de l’action politique

b) faire connaître et améliorer le programme en ce qui concerne la situation de la femme

c) suggérer au Parti, après l’établissement des priorités, des prises de position:

i) concernant les problèmes de la femme;
ii) concernant les actions et/ou les projets de loi du gouvernement

d) sensibiliser les femmes du Québec à la question du référendum et sur l’indépendance.

(Conseil national de Sherbrooke September 24-25, 1977)

The Comité's initiatives to increase female representation

Although this resolution did not mention the role of the committee in increasing party women’s involvement, this was, in the view of two founding members, one of their main objectives (PQf3; PQf11). Some of the initiatives launched by Comité activists in the late 1970s confirm this. As previously noted, their 1976 symposium included a workshop on women and politics. Furthermore, the riding and regional women’s committees that they helped to set up through the late 1970s aimed at stimulating the involvement of party women. These committees were intended to gather female activists interested in raising issues that women faced in their particular ridings and regions (Comité national de la condition féminine October 17, 1977; February 1978). The experience women were to gain from their committee involvement was to
prompt them into contesting riding or regional executive positions. When members of the national
Comité travelled to ridings and regions, they provided advice on how to establish a women's
committee and also held workshops on party structures, policy-making and office-holding (PQf3;
PQf11). The efforts of Comité members were fruitful since by 1979, 106 PQ ridings (out of 110)
and eleven regions (out of thirteen) had a women's committee (Rowan October 17, 1979, 2).

Shortly after the 1980 referendum campaign, the women's committee decided to alter its
official mandate and name. In order to rally Quebec women to the yes side, it set up the Comité
des Québécoises pour le Oui and organized two large demonstrations, one whose message was "La
politique c'est l'affaire de toutes les femmes" and the other to commemorate the fortieth
anniversary of Quebec female enfranchisement (CAPF August 11, 1980, "Lettre aux responsables
des comités..."). These initiatives, however, were overshadowed by the Yvettes rallies of the PLQ
which received extensive press coverage. As one journalist (who spent a lot of time with Comité
members at the end of 1980) wrote, the Yvettes episode forced the members of the women's
committee to re-examine their goals: "[l]es femmes du comité avaient [...] été ébranlées par
l'affaire des Yvettes et sentaient le besoin de rassembler leurs idées" (Guénette 1981, 28).
Realizing that the chronic absence of women in the decision-making positions of the party
hampered their actions, they decided to change the official mandate and name of the committee
(Guénette 1981, 28). In August 1980, the co-ordinator of the recently-renamed Comité d'action
politique des femmes (CAPF) sent a letter to regional presidents to inform them that from now on
the official mandate of the Comité would include getting more women involved at all levels of the
à l'élaboration et la promotion des actions du Parti et plus spécifiquement sur les conditions de vie
des femmes et leur représentation au sein du Parti" (author's emphasis; CAPF August 11, 1980, "Lettre aux présidents...}). Many of the initiatives the Comité launched subsequently aimed at fulfilling this new mandate. For instance, to sensitize party men and women to the poor level of female involvement in party affairs and the need to remedy such a situation, the CAPF organized several colloquia (CAPF March 24, 1982; April 26, 1982; PQf3). The Comité also offered training workshops on the functions of PQ bodies, the party policy-making process and how to contest party positions and prepare a speech (Legault et al. 1988, 113; PQf3).

Given the concern of the CAPF for female under-representation within the party organization, its behaviour during the 1985 leadership campaign was somewhat surprising. For the first time in the history of the PQ, two women, Pauline Marois and Francine Lalonde, came forward to contest the party leadership. Although the Comité saluted their candidacies, it chose not to support any of the candidates (Mallen August 12, 1985, 6; Beaulieu and Rowan September 9, 1985, 2). The president of the CAPF justified the Comité's decision by saying that "on ne peut pas dire 'votez pour une femme parce que c'est une femme;' ce serait une insulte pour les autres" (Beaulieu and Rowan September 9, 1985, 2). Instead, it asked candidates to provide written comments on three areas: female employment, the role of the state, and women and power (Mallen August 12, 1985, 6). Out of the six leadership candidates, four (Luc Gagnon, Pierre-Marc Johnson, Pauline Marois and Francine Lalonde) complied with the Comité's request. According to journalists Carole Beaulieu and Renée Rowan (September 16, 1985, 2), the most concrete and innovative responses came from Marois and Johnson. Yet, with respect to women and power, Marois appeared to be more substantive than Johnson. While the latter emphasized the need to encourage women, the former pledged to prevent ridings without a PQ incumbent from holding
their nominating convention until they find at least one woman to contest the nomination (Beaulieu August 31, 1985, 3; Beaulieu and Rowan September 16, 1985, 2). It is somewhat peculiar that the committee which, since its inception, had sought to stimulate party women's involvement, did not get more actively involved in the leadership race.

After the 1985 Quebec elections, the Comité undertook to promote the issue of female representation more forcefully. The small number of female PQ candidates (twenty, or only four more than in 1981) and the cancellation of the leaders' debate on women's condition account for the more vigorous approach of the Comité. The debate was cancelled because of PLQ leader Robert Bourassa's refusal to participate in it. What angered the Comité was not so much Bourassa's refusal, but rather the PQ's lack of reaction to the cancellation of the event. In the CAPF's view, this would not have happened had more women been in top party positions:

Le manque de femmes aux hauts niveaux de décision du parti s'est fait sentir à plusieurs reprises. Un seul exemple parmi d'autres: si le PQ n'a pas "utilisé" le refus de Bourassa de rencontrer les groupes de femmes, c'est en bonne partie, parce qu'on ne "sentait" pas l'importance de ce dossier, et ceci depuis le début de l'organisation du débat. Les seules personnes qui en voyaient l'importance ont été des femmes même non impliquées dans le "féminisme," mais elles étaient trop rares au niveau décisionnel. (CAPF February 1986)

In the post-election period, the CAPF was determined to increase party women's representation. Many of its 1986 documents listed as the priorities of the Comité, first, increasing female representation at all levels of the party; second, collaborating with other non-party women's groups; and third, preparing for the 1987 party convention (CAPF circa 1986; Summer 1986; September 27-28, 1986; PQ(9). Furthermore, in May 1986, the committee invited high-profile and less-known PQ women to discuss strategies to improve female representation within the party hierarchy (CAPF May 24, 1986).
The initiatives that the CAPF launched in the second half of the 1980s were directed at two groups within the PQ: elites and female activists. For instance, the Comité lobbied riding and regional presidents (by telephone and in writing) to recruit women to serve in their executive and as delegates (CAPF January 1986; June 1986; September 27-28, 1986; January 31, 1987; PQf9). The following is an extract from a letter sent to party elites by the Comité to remind them about the need to promote women:

Dans vos comtés, dans vos régions et au niveau national, on procède à une réorganisation et en particulier on comble plusieurs postes vacants. Parmi les critères qui vous guident dans ces choix, nous voudrions vous en rappeler un: la nécessaire et normale présence des femmes.

[..] Par conséquent, nous faisons appel aux femmes et aux hommes qui militent au Parti québécois: il est non seulement juste mais également rentable que les femmes soient plus présentes à tous les niveaux du parti. (Emphasis in original; CAPF January 1986)

The national leadership was not spared the CAPF's lobbying, hence its pledge to present at least 50% women candidates in the 1989 elections (CAPF circa December 1988; Normand August 26, 1989, B7; PQf6). During this period, Comité members also undertook to provide party women with the tools necessary to become more actively involved. Consequently, they held training workshops called *A moi la parole* in different ridings and regions (CAPF circa 1986). The workshops, which had been modelled on the public speaking sessions of the newly-created organization *Femmes regroupées pour l'accès au pouvoir politique et économique* (FRAPPE), dealt with public speaking, the functions of party bodies and the PQ program (CAPF November 1986; circa 1986). Lastly, just before the 1989 elections, the CAPF reached out to aspiring female candidates by organizing information and training sessions, meetings with former PQ candidates.

In the following year, the Comité continued to lobby party elites and offer support mechanisms to women interested in ascending the party ladder and/or contesting a nomination (CNAPF July 1993; Winter 1993-1994; May 1994; PQf10). Since 1990, the CAPF has also undertaken to find a woman in each riding and region willing to act as the Comité’s local representative (CNAPF July 1993; PQf6). These representatives are expected to remind their executive about the need for greater female representation at all levels of the party; compile data on the number and position of women in riding and regional executives; and establish links with women’s groups potentially interested in the PQ program and propose additions and changes to it (CNAPF July 1993; Winter 1993-1994). In April 1991, 65 ridings (out of 125) had a representative, and, in the spring of 1993, this number increased to 82 ridings (CNAPF Winter 1993-1994). This informal network was partly formalized at the August 1993 convention when delegates passed a resolution calling on each of the fourteen regional executives to include a CNAPF representative. Elected by regional conventions, CNAPF representatives sit in their regional executive and have speaking and voting rights at national council meetings (see PQ 1994, section 2 d) i) ii) iii), 247). In light of this new initiative, it is more accurate to identify the present strategy of the Comité to increase female representation as somewhat more formal than in the 1970s and 1980s.

This analysis of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Comité and the Comité’s activities highlights the central role of party women in forcing the PQ to recognize their presence and concerns. Inspired by the discourse and activities of the second-wave women’s movement, PQ
women demanded and obtained that a special party committee for women be established. For the past two decades, this committee has actively promoted issues of concern to women, including the need for a more gender-balanced division of power within the party organization and the larger political arena. Let us now examine the representational gains party women have made since the establishment of the Comité and the factors that explain why these gains have been moderate.

Impact of the Comité's Initiatives

A moderate feminization

The following assessment mainly relies on Tables 4.1 and 4.2, which contain data on the female local presidents and national executive members of the PQ, as well as on supplementary CNAPF and PLQ (*Parti libéral du Québec*) statistics. These data reveal that female representation increased significantly right after the creation of the Comité. Since the early 1980s, however, it has remained stable. On the whole then, the Comité and its initiatives appear to have brought about a moderate feminization of the PQ organization.

Women's representation in PQ riding executives is not particularly impressive. It is true that the percentage of female riding presidents increased almost ten-fold between 1978 and 1981 [from 3% (3/100) to 29%].\(^{11}\) Nevertheless, since the mid-1980s, it has remained at 23-25%. In 1993, 23.2% (29/125) of riding presidents and 28.8% (36/125) of riding vice-presidents were women (Table 4.1; CNAPF statistics). Data on local riding treasurers are slightly more encouraging. The proportion of female treasurers rose gradually from 21.8% (24/110) in 1978 to 34.4% (43/125) in 1993 [Conseil du statut de la femme (CSF) 1978, 316; CNAPF statistics]. As for secretarial positions, women still hold over half of them (CSF 1978, 316; CNAPF statistics),
which indicates that the pink-collar ghetto uncovered by Bashevkin's ([1985] 1993) study of English Canadian parties is also present in the PQ.

Table 4.1: Female Riding Presidents in the PQ, 1978-1993 (%)

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<td></td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>29*</td>
<td>24*</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>23*</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/100</td>
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<td>27/116</td>
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<td>32/125</td>
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Sources: CSF (1978, 316); CAPF (June 1986; January 1986); Legault et al. (1988, 114); Richer (1991b, 19); CNAPF statistics.

* only percentages were available.

The limited availability of PLQ statistics somewhat restricts the present comparison of PQ and Liberal women's representation in riding executives. Before analyzing PLQ data, we should note that since 1971, Liberal riding executives must reserve one vice-presidential position (out of two) and one youth position (out of two) for women (Legault et al. 1988, 62; PLQ 1991, section 14, 4). Despite these requirements, men have been holding the reins of riding executives. The PLQ had no female riding presidents in 1978 [against 3% (3/100) in the PQ]. Twelve years later, only 17% of Liberal riding presidents were women (against 23% in the PQ) (CSF 1978, 316; Richer 1991b, 19; Table 4.1). In 1992, 37% (815/2201) of Liberal riding positions and 32.5% (415/1277) of PQ riding positions were occupied by women (Desrochers 1993, 64; CNAPF statistics). In short, the PLQ's two designated female positions in riding executives do not seem to have given Liberal women a significant edge over PQ women.
Regional presidencies continue to be a male preserve. Given that the percentage of women regional presidents has actually decreased since 1981, one wonders what it will take to change this situation. Women held 23% (3/13) of regional presidencies in 1981, 15.3% (2/13) in 1985, none in 1987, and 7.1% (1/14) in 1991 (Legault et al. 1988, 114; CNAPF statistics; CAPF January 1986; June 1986). As of June 1993, all PQ regional presidencies were held by men (CNAPF statistics).12

How has the proportion of women national delegates evolved since the founding of the PQ? Very few women were present at the first PQ conventions: only 16% and 20% of delegates to the 1969 and 1973 conventions were female (Bellavance 1972, 15; Beaud 1982, 247). Between 1977 and 1981, the proportion of female delegates significantly improved from 25% to 38% (Beaud 1982, 247; "38% des délégués étaient des femmes" December 7, 1981, 2). In other words, by the 1980s, the following portrait of the typical PQ delegate as "un mâle, montréalais, âgé de 30 ans, pratiquant la profession d'enseignant et qui se fait le plus souvent accompagné au congrès par une jolie femme..." was outdated (Bellavance 1972, 15). At the time of writing, recent data on the proportion of PQ female delegates could not be obtained. Yet, given that members of riding executives (32.5% of whom are women) also serve as convention delegates, it may be suggested that 30-40% of delegates to the 1993 national PQ convention were women. In any event, this convention probably comprised fewer women delegates than the latest Liberal convention since the PLQ statutes require that convention delegations be gender-balanced while the PQ statutes lack such a requirement (Legault et al. 1988, 62; PLQ 1991, section 28 B) b) c), 9-10).13

Female representation in the national executive of the PQ has evolved in a similar way. In 1973, the election of two women to the previously male executive brought female representation
to 18.2% (2/11). The following year, it dropped to 6.7% (1/15). However, the 1977 convention not only passed the Comité's first lengthy resolution, but also elected four women to the national executive which increased female representation to 26.7% (4/15). Since then, the top executive body of the PQ has comprised an average of about 35% (4-5/11-15) women, except in 1987, when it included 41.2% (7/17) women (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: Women in the National Executive of the PQ, 1973-1994 (%)

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<td></td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
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Sources: Beaud (1982, 243); Léger (1986, 343-345); Legault et al. (1988, 114); Maillé (1990, 110); Richer (1991b, 19); CSF (1993, 64); CNAPF statistics.

When examining Table 4.2, one wonders why most PQ national executives since 1979 have had about 35% women (4-5/11-15). One interviewee suggested that PQ elites wanted to ensure that women's share of these visible positions would not drop to an embarrassing level. In order that CAPF members support the 1987 changes to the party internal structures (namely, the transfer of national committee presidents from the national executive to the less powerful national bureau), Jacques Parizeau pledged to seek out female candidacies for the national executive. According to the interviewee, Parizeau kept his promise (PQf6). In other words, the commitment of national elites to promote women to top positions helps to account for the fairly steady level of representation women have enjoyed in the national executive since the late 1970s. We will explore
this idea further when we examine internal party structures and, more specifically, the selection of national executive officials.

Comparable PLQ data suggest that Liberal elites may not be as concerned with the promotion of women to top party positions as their PQ rivals are. Between 1978 and 1992, the percentage of women in the PLQ executive committee was always about 10% lower than that of women in the PQ executive. Women held 14.3% (1/7) of the PLQ executive committee positions in 1978 [against 26.7% (4/15) in the PQ], about 14% in the late 1980s (against 35-40%), and 27.1% (13/48) in 1992 [against 36.4% (4/11)] (CSF 1978, 316; Legault et al. 1988, 65; Desrochers 1993, 64). In other words, the two positions the PLQ reserves for women in its thirty-three-member executive committee (one vice-presidential position and one youth representative position) did not significantly increase the number of women holding top party positions (see PLQ 1991, section 35, 13).

What do these statistics tell us about the impact of the women's committee and its initiatives to stimulate female involvement? The establishment of the committee appears to have triggered the dramatic increase in female local presidents, convention delegates, national executive members and, to a lesser extent, regional presidents, that took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since then, however, the initiatives of the Comité have mainly sustained (rather than improved) the proportion of women occupying these posts. One of the remarks the CAPF made about the stagnant proportion of women who ran as PQ candidates between 1970 and 1981 captures how women's representation has evolved; in the Comité's words, "[t]ous ces efforts ont permis... à peu près un statu quo" (CAPF February 1986). Seeing that PQ women's representation has generally remained at a higher level than that of Quebec Liberal and French Socialist women
(for whom certain party positions are reserved), it is appropriate to say that the initiatives of the CAPF have brought about a moderate feminization (as opposed to a limited feminization as in the case of the PS) of the PQ organization.

**Explaining the moderate feminization of the PQ: external factors**

*The second-wave women's movement*

In the mid-1980s, the Quebec women's movement or, more specifically, Quebec women's organizations, began tackling an issue which they had generally ignored in the previous two decades: the dearth of women in political institutions. Consequently, the second half of the 1980s witnessed the launching of numerous initiatives by the FFQ, AFEAS and the new non-partisan organization FRAPPE designed to raise people's awareness of female political underrepresentation and bring more women into politics. For instance, the FFQ and AFEAS each organized conferences on Quebec women and politics (notably, "Femmes et pouvoirs politiques: une greffe impossible?" and "Femme et pouvoir politique") as well as training and information sessions for women interested in a political career. The local political clubs established by the AFEAS have also offered support services and information sessions. As for FRAPPE, since its inception in 1985, it has provided training workshops, networking opportunities and support to women contesting nominations (Maillé 1990, 92-101; Rowan March 3, 1985, 5). In short, by the end of the 1980s, aspiring female politicians from Quebec had a range of support mechanisms at their disposal.

The preoccupation of Quebec women's organizations with female political representation coincided with an increase in the proportion of Quebec women in provincial elite politics. To begin with, women's share of PQ and PLQ candidacies improved steadily through the 1980s. In
the 1981, 1985 and 1989 Quebec elections, respectively 11.9% (29/244), 15.2% (37/244) and 21.6% (54/250) of Péquiste and Liberal candidates were women (Drouilly and Dorion 1988, 60-61; Leblanc July 30, 1994, B5). Furthermore, between 1981 and 1985, the percentage of female MLAs more than doubled from 6.5% (8/122) to 14.7% (18/122)) and reached 18.4% (23/125) in 1989. This upward trend, however, was halted by the 1994 elections which returned the exact same proportion of women to the Salon bleu (18.4%) (Alleyn September 14, 1994, A4). As of 1994, the Quebec National Assembly was the fifth most feminized provincial legislature. Since the lonely days of PLQ ministers Claire Kirkland-Casgrain (1962-1973) and Lise Bacon (1973-1976), the proportion of female ministers has increased gradually from about 15% (3-4/24-28) in the first PQ and Bourassa cabinets to about 20% (6/28) in the last Liberal governments (Spencer 1986, 92-93; Prévost 1988, 4; Richer 1991b, 18). In 1994, Jacques Parizeau’s cabinet included 30% (6/20) women; three of these women were in the seven-member inner cabinet (D’Amours 1995, 16). Since Lucien Bouchard became Premier in early 1996, the proportion of female ministers has dropped to 25% (5/20) (Séguin January 30, 1996, A7).

One could argue that the activities of the FFQ, AFEAS and FRAPPE to promote women in politics partially account for these representational gains. By providing support mechanisms and publicly advocating greater female representation in political institutions, these organizations probably prompted more Quebec women to embark on a political career. Their initiatives and discourse may have also impressed upon political leaders that their team should comprise more women. The pressure to promote women was possibly stronger in the PQ (whose women’s committee members attended many of the FFQ, AFEAS and FRAPPE events) than in the PLQ (which does not have an active women’s committee). This pressure may explain why the
proportion of PQ women in visible positions (or as candidates and national executive officials) improved in the second half of the 1980s. On the other hand, external pressure does not seem to have been sufficient to boost the proportion of PQ women holding less visible party positions, which remained stagnant throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.

**Party support**

During the past four elections, voters' support for the PQ did not remain constant. After stagnating in the first half of the 1980s (at 48-49%), it declined in the second half (to 40%). Popular support picked up again in the early 1990s (to about 45%), hence the PQ's victory in the 1994 elections (*Le Devoir* December 3, 1985, 1; September 26, 1989, 1; *The Toronto Star*, September 13, 1994, A1). Consequently, the initiatives of the Comité to stimulate party women's involvement may have had a greater impact in the 1980s (when party support was stagnating/declining) than in the early 1990s (when it was expanding). For this proposition to be validated, the proportion of female national executive officials, regional and riding presidents, delegates and candidates would have to have increased through the 1980s and decreased in the early 1990s.

Only data on women candidates supports this proposition. As we saw earlier, women's share of party positions has not dramatically changed for more than ten years. The proportion of female candidates, on the other hand, rose by about 10% (from 16.3% (20/122) to 26.4% (33/125)) between 1985 and 1989 (as support was shrinking) and decreased by about 9% (from 26.4% to 17.6% (22/125)) in 1994 (as support was expanding), which lends some credence to the proposition that the level of popular support may have affected the impact of the Comité's initiatives (*Drouilly and Dorion 1988, 60-61; Leblanc July 30, 1994, B5*). Yet, since the
proposition does not shed much light on our chief concern, namely, female representation within the party organization, we have to disregard it and consider other factors.

**Explaining the moderate feminization of the PQ organization: internal factors**

*The Comité*

It is difficult to identify the CAPF from the 1980s as solely a feminist lobby or a female auxiliary. During this period, the *Comité* actually appears to have been both. On the one hand, its behaviour during the 1985 leadership race and its reliance (up until recently) on informal strategies to boost female representation would qualify it as a female auxiliary. On the other hand, the *Comité* also appears to fit the "feminist lobby image" at certain times. In 1984, it stopped the release of the PQ program on the grounds that it did not comply with the 1982 resolution requiring that all PQ texts be written in gender-neutral language (PQf10). At the 1993 convention, a resolution calling for the elimination of this requirement was narrowly defeated thanks to the energetic intervention of two *Comité* members.18 Furthermore, throughout the 1980s, the CAPF remained active on three fronts (corresponding to the three parts of its mandate, notably, the recommendation of policy stands, collaboration with women's groups, and stimulation of party women's involvement).19 The *Comité* not only launched several initiatives to stimulate party women's involvement, but it also established links with the FFQ, AFEAS, FRAPPE and other similar organizations. These contacts inspired some of the *Comité* 's efforts to boost female representation and revise the sections of the party program dealing with women's condition. During the year following the June 1987 convention, the CAPF met several times with representatives from women's organizations to discuss issues such as female employment, violence against women, pay equity, child support and immigrant women (CAPF February 13, 1988;
February 27, 1988; May 1988). These discussions enabled the CAPF to put together a document containing 107 proposed changes and additions to the PQ program. At the national council meeting of November 1988, the majority of the Comité’s recommendations were incorporated into the program and became the new chapter on women (Lortie June 16, 1988, A25; see PQ 1988-1989, chapter 16, 231-238).

The content and fate of the two proposals that addressed female representation in the party and public institutions shed some light on the identity of the CAPF. Proposal 106 recommended that the PQ, via the CAPF, provide training to party women aspiring to hold top party positions; increase the number of women in the decision-making positions of the PQ; seek out as many female candidacies as possible for the upcoming elections; provide support to female candidates (in the form of training, childcare and financial assistance); and establish close links with ridings, regions and the national executive (PQ 1988, 45). This recommendation was not particularly radical since it essentially listed some of the activities the Comité had been involved in for some time. According to Proposal 107, a PQ government would have to substantially increase the proportion of women in the bureaucracy, judiciary, ministries (other than social and cultural ministries), commissions of enquiry and boards of Crown corporations (PQ 1988, 46). In the end, only the second proposal was included into the PQ program as the last section of the chapter on women, which begins as follows: "[l]es femmes représentent actuellement 52% de la population. Il serait donc normal qu’elles occupent une part proportionnelle à leur nombre dans les postes de décision au sein de la société" (PQ 1988-1989, 238; PQ 1994, 219).

One wonders why Proposal 106 did not make it into the program while Proposal 107 did. On the one hand, the former may have been dropped for practical reasons. The inclusion of a
resolution stating what the CAPF was already doing may have appeared less imperative than the incorporation of resolutions that clearly aimed at modernizing the stand of the PQ on women's condition. On the other hand, some party activists and leaders may have feared that the inclusion of Proposal 106 in the program would have put the onus of increasing the number of women in executive party positions and as candidates not just on the Comité, but also on party personnel. A situation could have subsequently arisen whereby the CAPF would have invoked this particular resolution to oblige party activists and leaders to actively stimulate female representation. All this suggests that the reticence of party personnel towards the issue of increased female representation may explain why in the 1980s, the Comité was not more aggressive in claiming party positions for women.

Party personnel

We shall now analyze how male and female party activists and elites perceive initiatives to enhance women's involvement and, in particular, those launched by the CAPF. Our purpose is to evaluate to what extent their views explain why the efforts of the Comité have mainly brought about a moderate feminization of the PQ organization. In short, the ambivalence of PQ men and women towards the CAPF's initiatives may partly account for their moderate impact.

In keeping with Legault et al.'s (1988, 139-143) findings, PQ men and women were well-aware that women tended to hold low-status positions at the local level rather than high-status positions in local, regional and national executives (PQf1; PQf6; PQf7; PQm1-PQm8). Given the interviewees' awareness of this gendered division of power, the general comments they made about the efforts of the Comité were somewhat puzzling. The majority of interviewees did not have much to say about them except that they were a good thing. Before making too much of party men
and women's positive attitude towards the initiatives of the Comité, one should keep in mind that these did not seem to be of particular interest to interviewees.

The responses that the issue of formal measures (such as reserving positions for women or quotas) aroused were quite insightful. Overall, PQ men and women appeared less comfortable with quota-style measures than with informal solutions. The results of our small survey were as follows: two supported reserved spots for women (PQm1; PQm8); six were somewhat favourable to them (PQf6-PQf8; PQm4-PQm6); six opposed them (PQf1; PQf2; PQf5; PQm2; PQm3; PQm7); and two did not have an opinion (PQf3; PQf4). One wonders whether the six interviewees who were somewhat supportive of the idea of quotas would endorse a resolution calling for female quotas in party bodies. Indeed, four of them noted that even with reserved spots, only the women who were at least as competent as the best male candidate should be chosen ("À compétence égale, priorité à la femme") (PQf7; PQf8; PQm4; PQm6). As for opponents of quotas, their main concern was that such mechanisms would promote incompetent women to positions of power (PQf2; PQf5; PQm2; PQm7).

It is unlikely that the PQ will adopt quotas in the near future. While support for quotas is weak, opposition to them seems widespread among different segments of the PQ, notably, men, women, the rank and file and elites (PQf1; PQf2; PQf7; PQm1; PQm4; PQm6). The resistance of interviewees to the idea of reserving positions for women may stem from their strong adherence to the notion of equality of opportunity. Several interviewees mentioned that "l'égalité des chances" (or equality of opportunity) was a very important principle in the PQ (PQf7; PQf8; PQm1; PQm4; PQm6). Understandably, quotas would undermine the prevailing notion that PQ members have equal opportunities to ascend the party ladder. In light of the fairly extensive
opposition to quotas for women, the ambiguity of those favourable to them and the significance of "l'égalité des chances," it is not surprising that the CAPF's discussions about reserved positions for women never led to a concrete resolution (Gingras et al. 1989, 230; PQf10).

To summarize, the support among PQ activists for increased female representation appears to be limited to informal, non-quota based initiatives launched by women themselves. Even though PQ activists and elites are aware that few women hold top party positions, they do not seem interested in actively recruiting and promoting party women. The fact that many interviewees pointed to party women and/or the Comité to explain the small proportion of women in executive positions suggests that they do not perceive boosting female representation as their responsibility, but rather as that of party women and the Comité. To a certain extent, this perception helps to explain their dislike of reserved positions for women. The adoption of female quotas would oblige local, regional and national personnel to play a more active role in the recruitment and promotion of female activists. In the end, PQ men and women's mixed feelings about increased female involvement may have deterred the Comité from resorting to more energetic means and mitigated the impact of its initiatives.

Internal party structures

Interviewees' accounts of the PQ internal structures reveal that the selection of local riding officials (and, in particular, riding presidents) and convention delegates is decentralized (or in the hands of rank-and-file activists) while the selection of the national executive is centralized (or in the hands of national elites). In some very competitive ridings, activists interested in serving on the executive usually run in teams. Each team presents a slate of persons willing to fill the different positions in the executive, from president to secretary. Party elites do not get involved
in riding elections which are the preserve of riding members. In any event, the latter would not tolerate attempts from above to influence the outcome of elections. Furthermore, as one woman suggested, a person contesting an executive position may think twice before invoking his or her national connections, as these are more likely to turn off riding activists than to appeal to them: "Ça te dessert au lieu de te servir... C'est un couteau à double tranchant" (PQf2). Riding activists also freely select convention delegates. It should be noted, however, that delegate spots (which are usually filled by local executive members and other very active riding members) are never as hotly contested as riding executive positions or candidacies.22

Some of the comments interviewees made when explaining how riding executive members and national convention delegates are recruited are worth quoting as they support the argument that they are selected in a decentralized manner:

Au Parti québécois, la démocratie est monnaie courante (PQf4).

C'est le parti des membres, le Parti québécois (PQm1).

Le Parti québécois n'est pas autoritaire. Il est très démocratique dans son organisation interne... Il reflète ses membres (PQm6).

En bout de ligne, ce sont les membres qui décident (PQm7).

One interviewee provided a slightly more critical view of the PQ internal organization by saying that "[i]l y a une différence entre le PQ qui est au pouvoir et le PQ qui n'est pas au pouvoir... Comme le PQ n'est pas au pouvoir, il demeure à l'écoute de ses bases" (PQf5).

Internal party democracy appears to be more centralized when one examines how national executive members are selected. First, serious national executive candidates need to be known by riding, regional and national activists and leaders and have an extensive support network.
Although the PQ leadership does not put together an official slate of the persons it wishes to see win executive positions, this does not mean that party elites are totally removed from the selection process. Usually, national elites come out in support of particular candidates when the latter are campaigning on the floor of the convention. For the majority of interviewees, this public show of support helps (rather than hurts, as we saw in the case of local executives) aspiring executive members. Some activists even noted that elite support was essential to be elected as, in their words:

Les jeux sont presque faits (PQf1).

Plus tu as de personnes haut placées, mieux c'est... Il y a un slogan de Monsieur Lévesque qui traîne toujours dans le parti: "je préfère un fou que je connais à un fou que je ne connais pas" (PQf2).

Idéalement, ça devrait aller du bas en haut mais ce n'est pas souvent ce qui se passe (PQf8).

On the other hand, two interviewees mentioned that on a couple of (rare) occasions, delegates elected candidates lacking elite support (PQf1; PQm4). In any case, the involvement of party elites in the selection of national executive officials attests to its centralized character.

To recapitulate, interviewees' accounts of the PQ internal structures confirm the proposition that decentralized selection processes hamper female involvement while centralized processes stimulate it. The power of local riding activists in selecting riding executives and, more specifically, riding presidents, helps to account for the low proportion (about 25%) of women holding riding presidencies. Conversely, the important role of the leadership in the selection of national executive members explains the higher proportion (about 30-35%) of women in the top executive organ of the PQ. Nevertheless, the commitment of national elites to having a few female
national executive officials should be viewed with caution. To quote a former Comité member, this commitment has been largely self-interested: "[I]es dirigeants relativement facilement [...] voyaient combien ça pouvait être favorable d'avoir des femmes, pas par idéalisme, mais parce que ça faisait bien" (PQf10). Furthermore, it appears to have certain limits since women's share of national executive positions has almost never exceeded the 35% threshold, which has been described by sociologist Jean-Guy Lacroix (in Paradis 1995, 16) as "la proportion alibi": in his words, "...c'est bien d'avoir des femmes et [...] tout le monde est content tant que ça ne dépasse pas 35%. En haut de cette marque, les hommes se sentent envahis et réagissent très fort." Lastly, as with all informal promises, it could evaporate at any time.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to explain why the PQ women's committee and its initiatives have had a moderate impact on female representation in party organs. After documenting the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Comité and the initiatives it has launched since the late 1970s, factors that account for this moderate feminization of the PQ organization were examined. Overall, statistics, interviews, and women's committee documents indicate that factors internal to the PQ have more direct explanatory power than factors external to it.

External factors may have boosted women's share of visible positions (candidacies and national executive office), but not their share of less visible party positions. The efforts of Quebec women's organizations to increase female political involvement undoubtedly inspired the Comité to claim candidacies and party positions for women in a more vigorous manner. In the end, however, the activities of women's organizations and the Comité appear to have mainly impressed
upon party elites the need to include more women in visible positions --hence the rise in the late 1980s in the proportion of female candidates and national executive members and women's stagnant representation in lower-level party positions. Similarly, only candidacies appear to have been affected by party support fluctuations.

Internal factors and, more specifically, party activists and elites' perceptions of efforts to enhance female involvement and the PQ selection of local and national officials, provide a somewhat more compelling explanation of the moderate feminization of PQ organs. Although aware of party women's chronic under-representation in decision-making positions, rank-and-file activists and elites view the promotion of women as the responsibility of the Comité and party women, not theirs. While the decentralized selection of local riding executives and convention delegates has hampered women's access to these positions, the centralized selection of national executive officials has maintained female representation at about 35%. In short, the selection processes of the PQ as well as the ambivalence of party members toward increased female representation may very well explain why the Comité has resorted (until recently) to informal, non-quota strategies and why these have had a moderate impact. It will be interesting to see to what extent the Comité's new formal network of regional representatives will affect PQ women's representation.

For the time being, the representational future of PQ women does not appear to be bright. When asked about the potential impact of the new generation of activists on party women's representation, most interviewees replied that it is likely to be small or nil. Two reasons account for this pessimistic forecast. As one woman noted, "[Il]es jeunes hommes réussissent à se reproduire très bien" (PQf1). Statistics about female involvement in the youth organization of the
PQ confirm this: in 1994, only 22.2% (2/9) of national executive positions and 21.4% (3/14) of regional presidencies were held by women (Youth Committee statistics). Furthermore, young PQ women do not seem to view their gender as a disadvantage. As a result, they shy away from the Comité and integrate into party structures as individual members, which also means that they do not work collectively to improve female representation (PQf6; PQf7; PQm1; PQm4; PQm8; Richer 1991a, 13).23

Let us now examine to what extent the numerical targets contained in the 1982 affirmative action resolution of the Ontario New Democratic Party have stimulated party women's representation.
ENDNOTES

1. I thank Christiane Monarque and Chantal Mallen for their invaluable help.

2. Since the committee changed its name twice, first in 1981 to the Comité d'action politique des femmes (CAPF) and then in 1993 to the Comité national d'action politique des femmes (CNAPF), we refer to it as the Comité, the CAPF or the CNAPF depending on the period under consideration. The competition between the national committees of the PQ, namely, the youth, women's, ethnic and ecological committees, led the CAPF to add the adjective "national" to its name and call itself the CNAPF. This change was made after the national convention of August 1993 (see CNAPF June 28, 1994).

3. The Cercles des fermières did not join the FFQ because of its lay character (Collectif Clio 1992, 468).

4. In 1973, a smaller reformist women's organization was founded, the Réseau d'action et d'information pour les femmes (RAIF) (see Maillé 1990, 97-98).

5. For more details on the establishment of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, see Chapter Five.

6. FLFQ members refused to work with English feminists even if they spoke French because the latter were in a dominant position vis-à-vis francophone feminists (Lamoureux 1986, 104). As a letter of the FLFQ to American feminists indicates, the former was suspicious of both English-Canadian and American feminists. In the letter, the FLFQ warned that any attempt by English-speaking feminists to participate in the organization of the feminist conference that was scheduled to take place in Montreal would be interpreted as another evidence of colonialism. In the FLFQ's (December 12, 1970, 79) words, French-speaking Quebec women were oppressed "non seulement en tant que femmes mais aussi en tant que Québécoises francophones, colonisées par les capitalistes anglo-américains."

7. On March 9, 1980, Lise Payette, the Quebec Minister responsible for the Status of Women, gave a pro-independence talk to PQ supporters which was to have unexpected consequences. Asked about PLQ leader Claude Ryan, she declared: "C'est justement le genre d'homme que je hais... des 'Yvettes,' oui, il va vouloir qu'il y en ait plein le Québec... il est marié avec une 'Yvette'" (Dandurand and Tardy 1981, 22). In other words, Payette identified Ryan's wife with the Yvette of the Quebec schoolbooks whose main ambitions in life were to do housework, cook meals, and be submissive and helpful to others. Two days later, Le Devoir editorialist Lise Bissonnette magnified Payette's blunder by interpreting it as an insult to all Quebec women. PLQ organizers then used the Yvette blunder to their advantage. They organized two rallies of Quebec women opposed to independence who were proud to be "Yvettes." These events were extensively reported in the Quebec press (Dandurand and Tardy 1981; Jean et al. 1986). For more information on this topic, see the more recent pieces by Black (1993), Hamilton (1993), Tardy (1993) and Dumont (1993) as well as Payette's (1982, 79-86) version of the events.
8. It should be noted, however, that in 1986, the Comité sent letters to the jury of the annual Salon de la femme recommending that Francine Lalonde and Pauline Marois be considered as two of the ten top women of the year (CAPF March 18, 1986; circa March 1986).

9. Several of the strategies put forward by participants were actually used by the Comité: for instance, educating men and women about the need for more female involvement; providing information and training sessions to party women; and lobbying executive members so that they recruit more women (CAPF May 24, 1986).

10. I am grateful to Christiane Monarque for pointing this out to me.

11. Whenever percentages are not followed by corresponding nominal figures in brackets, this means that the latter were not available.

12. In June 1993, the fourteen regional executives of the PQ included: two female vice-presidents, seven female treasurers, and five female secretaries (CNAPF statistics).

13. Female delegate spots that are not filled cannot be passed over to men.

14. Like the FFQ, FRAPPE provides assistance to aspiring female politicians no matter their party allegiance (Rowan March 3, 1985, 5; Maillé 1990, 98-101).

15. In 1994, with regards to female legislative representation, Quebec came after British Columbia (25.2%), Prince Edward Island (25.0%), Ontario (22.0%), and Manitoba (21.1%) (Brodie and Chandler 1991, 6).


17. The fairly low representation of female candidates during the 1994 campaign led one journalist to predict that "[l]e prochain Parlement québécois ressemblera à s'y méprendre à celui de 1989: une assemblée dominée par les hommes francophones de vieille souche, avec une trentaine de femmes et une dizaine de québécois de nouvelle souche" (Leblanc July 31, 1994. B5).

18. See the text of this resolution ("proposition 782") in the PQ's book of resolutions (PQ August 20-22, 1993, 341). See also the letter written by Rémillard (July 27, 1993, 12) in defense of the resolution as well as Monarque's (August 19, 1993, 12) response to this letter. It should be noted that the program and statutes of the PLQ are not written in gender-neutral language.

19. See the Comité's mandate in the PQ statutes (PQ 1994, section 1. a) b) c), 216).

20. In one of its pleas for more women in top party positions, the CNAPF (July 1993) actually did invoke the last section of the chapter on women (namely, the pledge of the PQ to promote more women in public institutions).
21. To be on a winning slate does not secure one's election to a particular position. Sometimes, local riding executives end up being composed of persons who ran on different slates.

22. Having learned from cases such as the Shefford riding that activists will not work for a candidate they do not support, PQ elites have refrained from parachuting candidates. As one interviewee noted, "les dirigeants ici sont bien conscients, ils sont bien habitués à une culture au Parti québécois qui fait en sorte que quand les militants se sentent lésés, ils lâchent tout..." (PQm1). Thus, even the names that party elites propose to ridings that have difficulty finding a candidate are not automatically accepted by the local executive and activists [or in the words of one interviewee "les forces vives" (PQf5)]. According to one woman, the case of the Mercier riding in 1994 (where the national executive came out in support of a candidate who was not the one backed by the riding executive) was very exceptional (PQf8). In the end, the riding candidate won the nomination and his seat in the National Assembly.

23. According to Boileau (1994, 26-27), this reluctance to identify with feminism is fairly common among young Quebec women.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE ONTARIO NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY

In February 1982, the Ontario New Democratic Party (ONDP) passed a resolution designed to enhance female representation in local and provincial party organs. According to the so-called "affirmative action resolution" passed at the 1982 convention, the party was to address policies of concern to women during and between elections; develop a leadership training program for women; recruit more women candidates; and ensure that women would be equally represented in the local and provincial governing bodies of the party. More specifically, the resolution urged riding executives and required provincial council delegations, the provincial executive and party committees to include at least 50% women (ONDP February 5-7, 1982, 93-94).

While the first three components of this package aimed at encouraging women to contest top party positions, the fourth component required that more women be immediately promoted to the ONDP governing bodies. In this chapter, we focus on the 50% targets (which, in the text, are also referred to as the "affirmative action requirements") as their impact is more readily observable than that of the other three components. Overall, these targets appear to have been quite effective in feminizing the ONDP organization, since by the mid-1980s, the provincial executive comprised 50% women while local riding executives and provincial council delegations included about 35% women. Thus, compared with the PQ and, above all, the PS, the ONDP organization has achieved a fairly high degree of feminization.

Before explaining why the ONDP affirmative action requirements have had such a positive impact on party women's involvement, we examine the ONDP's responses in the 1970s and early
1980s to the demands of young party feminists. In particular, we analyze the events surrounding the establishment of the ONDP Women's Committee in 1973, and how the idea of affirmative action for women eventually became party policy. Then, we turn our attention to the factors that account for the fairly high feminization of local and provincial organs. Archival materials and interviews reveal that internal factors and, more precisely, the presence of a feminist lobby in the party, male and female activists' positive view of affirmative action for party positions, and the ONDP methods of selecting local and provincial officials, have more direct explanatory power than external factors.

The ONDP's First Steps towards Feminization

Addressing the concerns of new party feminists

During the 1960s and 1970s, traditional women's organizations and new liberation groups began to denounce women's marginal position in the private and public realms of Western liberal democracies. In Canada, this resurgence of feminist activity took place primarily in urban centres such as Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. In 1966, Laura Sabia, the President of the Canadian Federation of University Women, called together thirty long-established national women's organizations to form the Committee for the Equality of Women (CEW). One of the first initiatives of the CEW was the submission of a brief to Prime Minister Pearson requesting that a Royal Commission on the Status of Women (RCSW) be established. Headed by the well-known journalist Florence Bird (Anne Francis), the RCSW (1970, vii) was to "report upon the status of women in Canada and to recommend what steps might be taken by the Federal Government to ensure for women equal opportunities with men in all aspects of Canadian society." After holding
public hearings across Canada, the Commission presented its report to Prime Minister Trudeau in December 1970. The report highlighted how women were discriminated against in the workforce, education, the family, political parties and public life, the bureaucracy, and the law, and made 167 recommendations to improve the condition of Canadian women. The following year, the CEW evolved into the National Ad Hoc Committee on the Status of Women. In addition to established women's organizations, this new committee included new status of women groups (whose main concern was that all provinces comply with the recommendations of the RCSW) as well as women's liberation groups. By 1972, the Ad Hoc Committee had become the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) (Black 1988, 85-89; Prentice et al. 1988, 345-351).

While the organizations of the CEW were busy with the RCSW, new women's liberation groups were beginning to emerge in major Canadian cities. Their origins, analysis, organization and strategies were different from those of the groups affiliated with the CEW. Liberationist groups were started by young women who were dissatisfied with the way the leftist student movement treated women and issues of concern to them. For instance, in 1967, women active in the New Left Caucus of the University of Toronto rebelled against the chauvinism of their male colleagues and formed Toronto Women's Liberation, one of the first women's liberation groups in North America. Over the next two years, similar groups were created in Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Halifax and the main Ontario cities. By the early 1970s, liberationists adhered to either one of the two main perspectives on women's oppression: radical feminists linked women's oppression to biologically determined gender roles, and socialist feminists to patriarchy and capitalism. Organizationally and strategically speaking, however, radical and
socialist feminists were quite similar. Both groups set up small unstructured groups and organized events such as the 1970 Abortion Caravan that travelled from Vancouver to Ottawa to raise public awareness of the abortion issue (Prentice et al. 352-354, 357). It should be noted that at first, old and new women's groups coexisted fairly peacefully under the umbrella structure of the newly-created NAC and even came together for collaborative action (Prentice et al. 364; Vickers 1991, 75, 91; 1992, 42-43).

Already in the early 1970s, a number of English Canadian feminists were concerned with the absence of women in elected office. In 1972, activists from Voice of Women --a grass-roots women's organization created in 1965 to oppose nuclear testing and weapons-- and the Ontario Committee on the Status of Women --the new status of women group established in 1971 to implement the recommendations of the RCSW in Ontario-- founded the Toronto-based Women for Political Action (WPA). This group aimed at electing independent feminist candidates to the House of Commons. For this purpose, WPA members developed their own policy stands and held workshops to familiarize women with all aspects of campaigning, notably, speeches, interviews, policy debates, and canvassing. Nevertheless, discouraged with the poor results obtained by their candidates in the 1972 federal elections, many WPA activists ended up joining the provincial and federal New Democratic and Liberal parties (Bashevkin 1993, 24; Macpherson 1994, 177-181; ONSF). In her memoirs, Kay Macpherson (1994, 181), one of the best known members of WPA, explains that for her, "[t]he only party that appeared a practical choice was the New Democratic Party [...]." According to Adamson (1982, 309-310) and Adamson et al. (1988, 8, 124), around the same time, other women whose thinking had been moulded by feminism chose to champion women's rights within New Democratic parties. Following this influx of feminists
into party organizations, special party organs were set up to address their concerns. For instance, both the ONDP Women's Committee and the Women's Liberal Commission of the Liberal Party of Canada were officially established in 1973.

The involvement of the female members of the Waffle—the group which between 1969 and 1972 pressed the federal and provincial New Democratic parties toward a left nationalist critique of US control of Canada—in the establishment of the new ONDP Women's Committee indicates that the latter was indeed a product of feminism. Many of the Waffle women were also involved in liberationist groups. During these three years, they sensitized their male colleagues to issues of importance to women and drafted several feminist resolutions on child care, abortion rights and equal pay. After the exclusion of the Waffle from the mainstream NDP, Waffle women who stayed in the ONDP and the party women who had been radicalized by their feminist discourse launched the ONDP Women's Committee (Smart and Morey 1989, 2; Burstyn 1990, 176-180; Bashevkin 1993, 126). At the December 1972 ONDP convention, a resolution was passed that called on the party to create an official organ for women with access to party resources; it would be empowered to pursue educational activities, support women's groups and encourage women to run for office (see ONDP December 1972). Then, in December 1973, one hundred ONDP women met in Bolton and formally agreed that the new organ would include representatives from nine areas in Ontario as well as nine members of the provincial executive. However, distance, party commitments and the lack of travelling expenses made it difficult for Committee members to meet regularly. Consequently, four chaotic years later, ONDP women came together to elaborate a more workable structure for the Committee. The constitution of the Committee was adopted in April 1977 in Toronto and amended at its first and second annual conferences in 1978 and 1980.
According to this constitution, the purpose of the ONDP Women's Committee was:

1. To increase the participation of women in the Party at all levels.
   To educate women in the NDP in all aspects of political activity.
   To develop policy recommendations.
   To monitor and influence legislation according to Party policy.

2. To participate with women outside the Party in areas of mutual interest, and encourage these women to join the Party and work with the Party.
   To assist the Party in developing a strategy to attract the female vote.

The finding that Waffle women were the first to introduce the idea of gender parity into the party is of particular interest to this study. In an article marking the twentieth anniversary of the Waffle, Smart and Morey (1989, 2) point out that female Wafflers impressed upon their male colleagues the need to feminize the Waffle as well as the party organization. As a result, the group ensured that all its committees comprise an equal number of men and women (Whitaker 1990, 169). Furthermore, at the 1971 leadership convention of the federal NDP, Waffle candidate Jim Laxer, supported the Waffle women's resolution that called on the party to reserve half of the federal council positions for women:

   We must be prepared to change the structures of the NDP where necessary to allow our members to participate fully in the work of our party. To that end, the goal of parity for women on the party’s governing bodies will advance the cause of democracy within the party. (Laxer in NDP 1971, 45)

In 1971, however, the party was not ready for such a proposal; the resolution was defeated after one of the "most bitter debates of the week" in one observer’s words (Cross April/May 1971, 4). Despite the eight year-break between the exclusion of the Waffle and the time the Women's Committee started to take a close look at the affirmative action option, it is not too far-fetched to
propose that Waffle women essentially sowed the seeds of affirmative action in the party (ONDf5).
In a sense, the simultaneous adoption of affirmative action by the ONDP, the federal NDP and the Ontario Federation of Labour suggests that the idea of affirmative action did originate inside (rather than outside) the ONDP.

At first glance, the fact that the federal NDP passed an affirmative action resolution four months before the ONDP indicates that the provincial party followed the lead of the federal party. Yet, upon closer examination, it appears that the ONDP probably inspired the federal NDP to replace its "voluntary compliance affirmative action plan" with the same requirements as the ONDP (Participation of Women October 15-17, 1982). Incensed with the failure of the federal voluntary plan to boost party women's involvement, the Participation of Women (POW) Committee went into action. In October 1982 (nine months after the ONDP had adopted its affirmative action resolution), POW presented a resolution requiring that the federal executive "examine the barriers within the party structure which are impending the achievement of parity [...] and report to the next federal council with recommendations to solve the problem" (POW Committee October 15-17, 1982). Six months later, the Affirmative Action Committee (AAC) that was in charge of studying the specific barriers to gender parity reported back to the federal council. In its report, the AAC noted that the slate-making process which selected the members of the provincial executive did not accord gender the same weight as regional representation, experience, availability, and influence in a constituent sector of the party (AAC April 29-May 1, 1983). This was a blatant reference to the clandestine "Committee A" that had been putting these slates together for years (see MacDonald 1988, 180-181). In the end, the AAC recommended that constitutional amendments and resolutions be passed in order to ensure the implementation of
gender parity (AAC April 29-May 1, 1983). Shortly before the 1983 convention, Committee A was brought into the open and given the responsibility to put forward a gender-balanced slate (Chair of the Convention Nominating Committee May 7, 1983). The 1983 convention not only passed amendments requiring that half of the federal executive and council be female, but also increased female representation to 50% (from 25%) in the federal executive and to 60% (from 40%) in the federal council (MacDonald July 31, 1983, F2).10

Therefore, the decisive push for affirmative action more likely came from the ONDP than the federal party. It is true that the federal NDP adopted its voluntary affirmative action policy four months before the ONDP passed its compulsory affirmative action policy. However, while the latter immediately established equal male and female representation in the provincial council and executive, the former failed to do the same in the corresponding federal bodies. Reflecting on the federal party's first affirmative action policy, MacDonald (July 31, 1983, F2) commented that it "was more rhetoric than reality." In short, "the instantaneous feminization" of the ONDP top legislative and executive bodies probably caused the federal party to formalize its policy.

In November 1982, the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) formally acceded to the demand of its women's committee that five of the 21 vice-presidential positions in the executive be reserved for women.11 Given the networking that was taking place at that time between ONDP and OFL women, it is plausible that one group inspired the other to bring in affirmative action requirements and/or that the two groups consulted each other on this issue.12 Two key women who were respectively involved in the drafting of the ONDP and the OFL's affirmative action policies denied that any of this happened. According to the ONDP woman, "the idea [of affirmative action] didn't come from labour or the OFL even though labour women were more supportive of it than
party women" (ONDf5). The OFL woman simply stated that "the two incidents [the adoption of affirmative action by the ONDP and the OFL] happened aside from each other" and that the two women's committees worked on affirmative action independently from each other (ONDf9).

Moreover, the fact that the ONDP Women's Committee was the first to design a more far-reaching affirmative action policy than the OFL Women's Committee suggests that it was probably more encouraged than inspired by its OFL counterpart. In any case, even though the ONDP Women's Committee did not introduce the idea of gender parity into the party, it should be credited for drafting the affirmative action policy and getting the ONDP to adopt it.

The adoption of the affirmative action resolution

Through the late 1970s and early 1980s, the new ONDP Women's Committee was involved in a variety of projects including the promotion of women to local and provincial party organs.13 In preparation for the 1977 leadership convention, the Committee drew up a list of questions regarding women's role in society, politics and the party that its members were to put to leadership candidates. It also established a delegate committee to urge women to go to the convention and sought out female candidates for positions in the provincial executive (ONDP Women's Committee November 10, 1977). After the convention, the Women's Committee set up an affirmative action policy group whose tasks were to collect data on female participation, put forward proposals to achieve the equal participation of women and discuss how to gain support for these proposals (ONDP Women's Committee circa 1980-1981). This group drafted the affirmative action resolution which the ONDP formally adopted at the 1982 leadership convention.

In the months prior to the convention, the Women's Committee worked hard to secure the support of elite and rank-and-file activists for its resolution.14 Its argument that affirmative action
would increase the party's share of the female vote resonated particularly well with ONDP elites. Three interviewees pointed out that the Committee had persuaded top party officials that the resolution would attract female voters to the party (ONDf4; ONDf5; ONDm2). In the words of one woman, the Committee had "convinced some very influential people in the party that they would get female votes. This was how any breakthrough was made. If it was good for the election, it was bought" (ONDf5). Moreover, the letter that the ONDP president and secretary sent to all riding presidents right after the convention highlights the electoralist motives of the party leadership: "A main purpose of the [affirmative action] program is to improve our standing at the polls. [...] By showing that women are equal members in the party, we are making our policies more credible to female voters" (ONDP Women's Committee et al. March 1982). Already at the leadership forum (scheduled to take place at Queen's Park the day before the Women's Committee conference), it was obvious that party elites supported the affirmative action resolution. In their speeches, the three leadership candidates (Bob Rae, Richard Johnston and Jim Foulds) all endorsed the resolution (ONDP Women's Committee November 1981).

In contrast with French Socialist women, who solely relied on their connection to the party leader to get their quota proposal passed, the ONDP Women's Committee made concerted efforts to bring not only party elites, but also the rank and file on side. After some riding associations objected to being "required" to have 50% of women in their executive, the Committee changed the wording of the resolution. The final version "urged" ridings to implement affirmative action (Bashevkin 1993, 98). In a final effort to convince the rank and file to approve the resolution, the Committee made a fact-sheet available to convention delegates that provided statistics on party women's involvement and explained that the resolution would ultimately increase the ONDP's
share of the female vote:

We believe that the adoption of the resolution will set us on the road to reaching this important constituency of women which has eluded us for far too long. That is why the resolution is concerned with the participation of women at all levels in our party as voters and members, as party officers and candidates for public office. (Emphasis in original: ONDP Women’s Committee 1982)

The efforts of the Committee to educate elite and rank-and-file activists about the affirmative action resolution prior to the convention as well as its "careful planning and [...] quick-footed strategy on the convention floor" paid off (Fear February 8, 1982). According to eyewitness accounts, the resolution passed fairly smoothly. The fact that among the 61.8% of delegates favouring the resolution, about a third expressed strong approval led Bashevkin (1993, 99) to conclude that the resolution "was supported by a majority of voting delegates on the convention floor, and opposed by a relatively small but vocal minority."

Interviewees' recollections of the convention corroborate her account. All of them noted that the resolution encountered little opposition and, according to some of them, much less opposition than "Policies for Equality," the 1984 resolution for free-standing abortion clinics, or even the 1989 resolution to extend affirmative action to legislative candidates (ONDf2; ONDf4; ONDf7; ONDm7). Moreover, even those interviewees who mentioned that some delegates associated with labour, the old guard and northern ridings objected to affirmative action denied that these elements formed a sufficiently cohesive group to stop the passage of the resolution (ONDf1; ONDf3; ONDm3; ONDm5; ONDm7; ONDm8).

During the thirty-minute debate on affirmative action, a number of arguments were made for and against. Proponents of affirmative action brought up issues such as: the ineffectiveness of voluntary targets, the credibility the party would gain with regards to women's issues, and the
pressing need to address the under-representation of women in executive positions. On the other hand, opponents of affirmative action argued that gender would prevail over merit, ability and experience; that women were already treated as equals in the ONDP; and that a closer examination of the resolution was needed (Bashevkin 1993, 98-99). Interviewees put forward these same arguments as well as two other ones. For four male supporters of affirmative action, the resolution was in keeping with the party's long-standing concern for disadvantaged groups (ONDm5-ONDm8). Three other interviewees mentioned that opponents were concerned about the undemocratic character of the resolution (ONDf1; ONDf4; ONDm6). One female opponent also noted that women like herself "who could hold their own" did not feel the need for affirmative action (ONDf4). Finally, newspaper accounts of the convention reveal that the women opposing affirmative action wanted to be promoted because of their abilities rather than their gender (Fear February 8, 1982; "Affirmative Action Policy Upsets Women" February 8, 1982).

In brief, the second wave of feminist agitation appears to have caused the ONDP to take steps to feminize its internal organization. During the late 1960s and 1970s, young women who had been exposed to liberationist ideas and activities joined the ONDP. These feminists, many of whom were also involved in the Waffle, had a strong impact on the ONDP. As former Waffler Varda Burstyn (1990, 177-178) points out, because of them "the Waffle became the conduit through which the radical women's politics of the late 1960s entered and profoundly moved the NDP[...]" Waffle women first introduced the idea of gender parity into the party and helped to launch the ONDP Women's Committee. A decade after the exclusion of the Waffle, the Committee revived the idea of gender parity and worked hard to secure the support of party elites and rank-and-file activists for its affirmative action resolution. We shall now examine to what
extent this resolution has enhanced female representation in the ONDP organization.

Impact of Affirmative Action on Women's Representation

A fairly high degree of feminization

While data on the proportion of women riding presidents are compiled in Table 5.1, data on the proportion of female members of the provincial council (the governing body of the party in-between conventions) and the provincial executive (the main administrative body of the party) are compiled in Table 5.2. Given that since 1989 delegations to the provincial convention (the supreme body of the party) must be gender-balanced, the following analysis also takes into account the proportion of female convention delegates. In an effort to thoroughly evaluate the impact of affirmative action, ONDP statistics are compared to those of the Ontario Liberal Party (OLP) and the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario (PCPO) (which do not have numerical targets in place). Overall, these data indicate that the affirmative action requirements of the ONDP have been fairly effective in enhancing female involvement within the party organization. As a result, the ONDP is presently more feminized than the PQ and, above all, the PS.

Female riding presidents and treasurers have traditionally been more numerous in the ONDP than in the OLP and PCPO. Over the past decade, however, the proportion of female presidents and treasurers has improved in the OLP and PCPO and stagnated somewhat in the ONDP. Between 1981 and 1994, the percentage of Liberal and Conservative women presidents increased by about 10% [from 20% (25/125) to 30% (39/130) in the OLP and from 14.4% (18/125) to 25.4% (33/130) in the PCPO] while that of ONDP women presidents remained around 30% (28.8% (36/125) in 1981 and 30.7% (40/130) in 1994). Similarly, the proportion of female
treasurers improved by about 4% in the OLP and PCPO [from 29.6% (37/125) in 1981 to 33.1% (43/130) in 1994 in the OLP and from 12% (15/125) in 1981 to 16.9% (22/130) in 1990 in the PCPO] and decreased by 7% in the ONDP [from 41.6% (52/125) to 34.6% (45/130) in 1994]. Notwithstanding the peak figure of 1981 (41.6%), the percentage of ONDP female treasurers has been 30-35% since 1985 (Table 5.1; Bashevkin 1993, 69; OLP statistics; ONDP statistics; PCPO statistics). In brief, affirmative action does not appear to have helped ONDP women break through the ceiling they reached in 1981 with respect to top local riding positions.

Table 5.1: Female Riding Presidents in the ONDP, 1973-1994 (%)

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<td></td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(10/117)</td>
<td>(36/125)</td>
<td>(38/125)</td>
<td>(33/130)</td>
<td>(45/130)</td>
<td>(40/130)</td>
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Sources: Bashevkin (1993, 69); ONDP statistics.

Despite the extension of affirmative action requirements to convention delegates at the end of 1989, the percentage of female delegates to ONDP conventions has not improved since 1982. After concern was expressed at the 1987 convention over the virtual absence of female, ethnic and aboriginal delegates, the provincial council took action. In December 1989, it passed a motion requiring that ridings entitled to more than one delegate have gender parity in their delegation and that affiliated bodies "work towards a delegation that reflects the gender composition of their membership" (ONDP December 1989 "Provincial Convention..."). At first glance, the motion does not appear to have had much impact on the proportion of women delegates: 40% and 38.9%
of delegates attending the 1982 and 1992 conventions were female (Bashevkin 1993, 75; ONDP statistics). These figures do not differ dramatically from those of the OLP whose 1982 and 1992 delegations included 39.2% and 34.3% (256/746) women (Bashevkin 1993, 75; OLP statistics). However, the motion appears more effective when the proportion of female union and riding delegates is considered. Indeed, 51.6% (391/758) of riding delegates and only 17.3% (46/265) of union delegates who attended the 1992 ONDP convention were female (ONDP statistics). In other words, riding associations complied with the motion while unions did not, which helped to keep women's representation in convention delegations at the same level as in 1982. One wonders whether the low proportion of women among union delegates is due to the reluctance of unions to designate female delegates and/or to the predominance of men in the membership of unions.

How have women fared in the other two provincial party bodies (the provincial council and executive)? Overall, Table 5.2 indicates that the ONDP affirmative action policy has been more effective in enhancing women's representation in the provincial executive than in the provincial council. Between 1981 and 1985, the proportion of women in the provincial executive rose by 10.7%, from 39.3% (11/28) to 50% (14/28). Since then, women have been equally represented in the ONDP executive (see Table 5.2). By contrast, in early 1994, the OLP and PCPO executives included 33.3% (6/18) and 30% (6/20) women (OLP statistics; PCPO statistics). As for female representation in the provincial council, it has remained at 35% after experiencing a 7.5% increase [from 27.9% (41/147) to 34.9% (37/106)] in the first half of the 1980s (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2: Women in the Provincial Council and Executive of the ONDP, 1981-1994 (%)

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<tr>
<td>Provincial council</td>
<td>27.9 (41/147)</td>
<td>34.9 (37/106)</td>
<td>37.1 (63/170)</td>
<td>26.3 (91/346)</td>
<td>34.8 (60/172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial executive</td>
<td>39.3 (11/28)</td>
<td>50 (14/28)</td>
<td>48.3 (15/31)</td>
<td>50 (15/30)</td>
<td>51.4 (18/35)</td>
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Sources: Bashevkin (1993, 77); ONDP statistics.

Considering, on the one hand, the significant increase in the proportion of women in the provincial executive and, on the other hand, the stagnant proportion of women holding top riding and (council and convention) delegate positions, it is appropriate to identify the ONDP affirmative action policy as "fairly effective." Before pointing the finger at local riding associations for failing to comply with the 50% rule, however, one should note that the latter are often desperate for volunteers to serve in their executive and that the affirmative action resolution only "urged" them to elect gender-balanced executives. Also, arguments that ONDP riding associations are generally reluctant to promote women should be treated with caution. As noted above, when required to produce gender-balanced delegations to the 1992 convention, they did just that. It is possible that unions not only reduced the total proportion of women convention delegates, but also the numbers of female delegates to the provincial council. The fact that 36.3% (45/124) of riding delegates and 11.4% (4/35) of union delegates present at the provincial council meeting of spring 1983 were female confirms this proposition (ONDP Women's Committee Spring 1983). Given these various
obstacles, the affirmative action policy has indeed been fairly effective. In the words of a Women's Committee member,

It [the affirmative action policy] is satisfactory in the upper structures. There is no token power there. It is a bit different at the riding level. Labour affiliated bodies are mostly male. It is unrealistic to expect that it will be perfect throughout the party. The situation has come a long way. (ONDf2)

Let us now determine which factors, those external or those internal to the ONDP, best account for the feminization of the ONDP.

Explaining the fairly high feminization of the ONDP: external factors

The second-wave women's movement

The rise of anti-feminist groups (such as Real, Equal, Active, for Life (REAL) Women) in the 1980s did not mitigate the intensity of feminist agitation. Not only did feminists actively participate in the main debates of the day (the Charter, free trade and Meech Lake), but they also made concerted efforts to feminize the political arena.¹⁹ For instance, in preparation for the 1984 elections, NAC invited the three federal party leaders to come and discuss issues of importance to women at a nationally-televised debate. Around the same time, several groups seeking to boost the proportion of women involved in politics, notably, the Toronto-based Committee for 94 and the Quebec group Femmes regroupées pour l'accès au pouvoir politique et économique (FRAPPE) emerged across Canada. Some of the arguments NAC put forward against the Charlottetown Accord highlighted the growing interest of feminists in female political representation. NAC opposed the Accord on the grounds that it would weaken social programs and the equality rights of the Charter and that the plan to ensure more seats for women in the new elected Senate (through proportional representation or quotas) had been dropped from the final version (Speirs September
While Canadian feminists became more vocal about women's political representation, the proportion of female political elites increased. Of the 27 women who were elected to the House in 1984 (or twice as many as in 1980), six were awarded cabinet positions. In 1988, the number of female MPs rose to 39 [or 13.2% (39/295)] and six women were again appointed to the cabinet. A year later, Audrey McLaughlin made history when she became the first woman to lead a federal party, the New Democratic Party. In the summer of 1993, Canada was governed by a female Prime Minister, Kim Campbell. Turning to Ontario, two years after the newly-elected ONDP government of Bob Rae appointed a record number of eleven women to his 26-member cabinet, the Ontario Liberals chose Lyn McLeod as their provincial leader.

Recent events reveal that New Democratic or even Liberal circles are generally more open to women than Conservative circles. In 1995, the federal NDP selected another woman, Alexa McDonough, as its leader. Furthermore, the landslide victory of the federal Liberals in 1993 helped to boost the number of female MPs to 54 [or 18.4% (54/295)] (Makin October 27, 1993, A17). By contrast, Kim Campbell was promptly dismissed from the Progressive Conservative leadership after the crushing defeat of her party. Moreover, following the victory of the Ontario Conservatives in the 1995 elections, the proportion of female MPPs dropped from 22.3% (29/130) to 14.6% (19/130) and that of female ministers from 42.3% (11/26) to 21% (4/19) (Harvey June 9, 1995, A18; "Tory Cabinet Smallest in Thirty Years" June 27, 1995, A7).

In a nutshell, feminists' insistence on greater female involvement in politics likely pressured parties to promote women to top positions through the 1980s and early 1990s. Canadians' growing support of female politicians may have also caused parties to take steps in that
direction. According to a 1989 poll, 80% of respondents (up from 78% in 1983) declared that the female sex of a party leader would not influence their decision to support her party; 15% (up from 11%) said they would be more inclined to back it; and 4% (down from 9%) said they would be less inclined to do so (Boyd 1984, 64; "Poll Says 80% not Swayed..." February 6, 1989, A8). Thus, the feminist discourse about female political representation and Canadians' receptiveness to it may have impressed upon party men and women the need to ensure that the requirements produce more tangible results.

**Party support**

Between 1981 and 1987, support for the ONDP rose gradually from 21% in 1981 to 24% in 1985 to 26% in 1987 (Drummond 1990, 242). It is unlikely that this small progression prompted a large number of men to join the ONDP and contest executive positions and candidacies. A more plausible scenario may be that stable support for the ONDP throughout the 1980s generated an internal atmosphere that was less competitive than that of the OLP and PCPO and thus more propitious to the enforcement of affirmative action. To a certain extent, statistics on female provincial party officials confirm this argument. As noted earlier, in the first half of the 1980s, women's share of provincial executive and council positions rose by 10.7% and 7.5% respectively. Nevertheless, the fact that in the second half of the 1980s, the proportion of female council members remained at about 35% somewhat weakens the stagnating/declining-support explanation.

Let us now determine whether party support and the implementation of affirmative action were more strongly linked in the early 1990s. Increased support for the ONDP resulted in the New Democrats winning the 1990 elections with 38% of the vote, the OLP and PCPO receiving 33%
and 24% of the vote ("The NDP's Victory" September 7, 1990, A1). This period of expansion did not last very long as by June 1991, support for the ONDP had slipped to 34% while support for the OLP and PCPO was at 36% and 23% (Maychack June 27, 1991, A1 and A28). If female representation was affected at all by party support fluctuations, one should be able to observe a drop in the proportion of women ONDP officials in 1990 (when the party was on the rise) and an increase thereafter (when the party was declining).

Once again, evidence is mixed. On the one hand, the 10.8% drop in female council members (from 37.1% (63/170) in 1988 to 26.3% (91/346) in 1990) supports the argument that expanding support may have restricted the ability of the party to meet its affirmative action requirements. On the other hand, evidence suggests that when in expansion, the ONDP's commitment to affirmative action did not diminish. To begin with, the provincial executive has been gender-balanced since 1985. Furthermore, almost half of the ministers in the first ONDP cabinet were female. While commenting on the 1982 affirmative action resolution, two interviewees referred to the appointment of these women as "a commitment to real power" (ONDf4) and "something that grew out of what the party had been talking about for a long time" (ONDf2). Lastly, during the 1992 referendum campaign about the Charlottetown Accord, the ONDP government pledged to set aside half of Ontario's seats on the new elected Senate for women (see Speirs September 19, 1992, C5; Caplan September 15, 1992, A25; "I Wouldn't Run. Carney Says" September 15, 1992, A25).

Overall, external factors do not convincingly explain why the ONDP targets have been fairly effective in feminizing the party organization. Because of contradictory evidence, definitive statements about the role of party support cannot be made. Thus far, it can only be proposed that
the discourse and activities of feminists with regards to women's political representation probably impressed upon ONDP men and women the need to comply with affirmative action requirements.

In consequence, to better understand why affirmative action has been reasonably effective, we now turn to internal factors.

Explaining the fairly high feminization of the ONDP: internal factors

The **ONDP Women's Committee**

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Women's Committee strove to boost party women's involvement in politics. For instance, it organized several conferences on the obstacles faced by women politicians and strategies to overcome them. At election time, the Committee actively searched for female candidates and set up training workshops and support groups for women interested in running. As these efforts did not prove sufficient, the 1987 conference of the Women's Committee passed a series of resolutions calling on the party to extend its affirmative action policy to candidates (ONDP Women's Committee April 24-25, 1987; May 24, 1987; July 19, 1987). After considerable lobbying on the part of the Committee, the provincial council adopted affirmative action guidelines for nomination and candidacy in December 1989 (ONDP Women's Committee September 10, 1989). To ensure that these guidelines were respected, the Committee pressured the party to hire a women's organizer. Although since 1980 party policy had been to "hire a women's organizer immediately," the position had only been briefly filled in the early 1980s despite repeated "annual calls from the women of the party" (ONDP Women's Committee March 1990). The women's organizer was to liaise with women's groups outside the party, target groups within the party and the Minister Responsible for Women's Issues; organize training workshops on seeking nominations, running and developing policies; find and train
affirmative action candidates; and evaluate the effectiveness of affirmative action guidelines (ONDP Women's Committee 1992). The idea recently fell by the wayside because of funding difficulties. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Women's Committee also worked hard to highlight the contributions that women had made to the CCF-NDP. For instance, it started publishing a calendar featuring female party activists and hosting an annual dinner at the end of which the Agnes MacPhail award was presented to a long-time female activist.

In the past decade, the Women's Committee also endeavoured to bring women from diverse backgrounds (as opposed to simply white, middle-class heterosexual women) into the political arena. In preparation for the 1987 elections, the Committee asked riding associations to set up candidate search committees that would "make a special effort to identify and encourage potential candidates who are women and/or reflect Ontario's multicultural reality" (Sandeman 1987). Prior to the adoption of the affirmative action guidelines for nomination and candidacy, it drafted a document that identified the party's commitment to "seeking women from all backgrounds [to] run and win seats" as the first principle underlying these guidelines (ONDP Women's Committee 1988-1989). Moreover, one of the workshops included in its 1992 Women in Politics conference dealt with the "additional barriers faced by women of colour, aboriginal women and women with disabilities" who chose to run for office (ONDP Women's Committee March 1992). Lastly, as indicated in recent issues of its newsletter, A Woman's Place, the Committee has echoed feminists' present preoccupation with the need to acknowledge the specific concerns of ethnic women (see ONDP Women's Committee June 1993, 2, 3-5; April 1994, 4, 7).

In brief, for the past ten years or so, the Committee has acted as a strong and effective feminist lobby determined to claim top positions for women from diverse backgrounds. Not only
did it strive to recruit female candidates, but it also successfully lobbied the party executive to have a woman take over from the outgoing male secretary in 1990 (ONDp Women's Committee September 10, 1989). The presence of this feminist watchdog undoubtedly ensured that the various levels of the party would do their best to comply with affirmative action requirements.

*Party personnel*

The positive attitude of ONDP activists and leaders towards the 1982 affirmative action resolution, which stems in part from the activities of the Committee, helps to explain why it has been fairly effective in feminizing the internal party organization. As previously mentioned, in 1982, about two thirds of convention delegates already supported the resolution. Furthermore, the majority of interviewees stated that the enforcement of the 1982 affirmative action requirements had been reasonably smooth. By way of comparison, four women identified the implementation of the 1989 affirmative action guidelines for nomination and candidacy as much more controversial (ONDf2; ONDf5; ONDf6; ONDf7). This suggests that ONDP men and women may not be as comfortable with the concept of affirmative action as one may have first thought.

The responses of interviewees to the question "should the 50% rule be decreased or eliminated?" reveal that ONDP members are somewhat ambivalent towards affirmative action. One woman and three men said that they could not foresee a time when affirmative action would no longer be necessary as, in their words, attitudes change slowly (ONDf6; ONDm3-ONDm5). Four other interviewees pointed out that the idea was eventually to get rid of it (ONDf5; ONDf7; ONDf8; ONDm8). A long-time Women's Committee activist even noted that "there is a limit as to how much you can give somebody an advantage to compete in a man's world; you can only go so far with the quota style of affirmative action" (ONDf5). It remains to be seen how this
ambivalence will affect the implementation of affirmative action guidelines for nomination and candidacy.

*Internal party structures*

Interviews indicate that the selection of provincial executive officials is centralized (or in the hands of the leadership) and that of riding presidents and treasurers and delegates to provincial council meetings and conventions is decentralized (or in the hands of riding associations). These findings then validate the proposition that a centralized selection process has facilitated the enforcement of affirmative action requirements while a decentralized process has hampered it.

It is unusual for party elites to influence the affairs of riding associations and, in particular, the designation of riding officials and provincial council and convention delegates. Because riding associations are often desperate for volunteers, whoever is willing to give his or her time becomes the riding president or treasurer. People are commonly pressured to fill these positions. Riding officials often end up acting as provincial council and convention delegates. Here again, whoever is ready to contribute time and fund their way to provincial council meetings and conventions (especially in poor ridings) usually represents the riding.\(^\text{24}\)

Even though the selection process of the provincial executive is more transparent than in the early days of the party, it is still quite centralized. Up until the 1970s, influential party and labour members used to draw up a list of candidates for the provincial executive behind closed doors. Back then, it was virtually impossible to break the slate. Since the 1980s, however, the provincial secretary now consults with the regional, labour, women, ethnic, and gay and lesbian caucuses before putting the slate together. As a result, all the "interests" of the party are represented on the slate. At the convention, provincial executive members encourage delegates to
vote for this official list. To get on the slate, one needs to be fairly well-known in the party, have a broad base of support inside and outside his or her riding and be able to give time to the organization. Nevertheless, one woman also noted that it sometimes helped "to be in the good graces of the powers that be" (ONDf1). All the interviewees mentioned that it was possible, though quite rare, to break the slate. In short, the slate-making process used to select provincial executive members, which one woman identified as an instance of "managed democracy," is not entirely democratic (ONDf2).

Consequently, the respective input riding associations and party elites have in selecting local and provincial party officials sheds light on the fairly high feminization of the ONDP organization that has occurred since the adoption of affirmative action requirements. The decentralized selection of riding top officials and provincial council and convention delegates has hampered the positive impact affirmative action was to have on female representation. Conversely, the centralized selection of provincial executive officials has guaranteed the equal representation of men and women in the top executive organ of the party. The cases of the provincial council and executive are particularly telling in this respect. Riding associations, which are often desperate for volunteers, and labour affiliated bodies, whose membership is primarily male, are less likely to ensure that parity be respected than a small group of top party officials committed to gender equality. Nevertheless, the female breakdown of riding and labour delegates to the 1992 convention [respectively, 51.6% (391/758) and 17.3% (46/265)] suggests that labour organizations have played a greater role than riding associations in keeping the proportion of women council and convention delegates under 40%.
Conclusion

After reviewing the first steps the ONDP took to feminize its internal organization, we explained why its numerical targets have been fairly effective in enhancing female representation in local and provincial party organs. If it had not been for the feminist resurgence of the late 1960s and 1970s, it is doubtful that the ONDP would have set up a women's committee and adopted affirmative action requirements on its own initiative. In the early 1970s, a number of young feminist activists joined the ONDP and proceeded to bring feminism into the party. Notably, the feminists who were involved in the Waffle played an important role in the establishment of the ONDP Women's Committee; they were also the first to introduce the idea of gender parity into the party. A decade after the exclusion of the Waffle, the Women's Committee carried on the tradition of feminist activism started by Waffle women by convincing rank-and-file and elite activists to pass a resolution providing for the equal representation of men and women in local and provincial organs.

As for the fairly high feminization of the ONDP organization, internal factors have more direct explanatory power than external factors. Because of mixed evidence, one cannot determine whether party support fluctuations have affected ONDP women's numerical representation or not. Feminists' demands for greater female involvement in politics beginning in the mid-1980s have probably impressed upon ONDP men and women the need to ensure that affirmative action requirements be met. Yet, it is unlikely that this indirect and external pressure has been the sole determining factor. Interviews and archival documents reveal that internal factors have played a more direct role in the feminization of the ONDP. The presence of the Women's Committee, the feminist lobby and watchdog of the ONDP, has forced the party to increase (rather than withdraw)
its support for affirmative action and women. Party men and women's fairly positive attitude towards affirmative action requirements for party positions also account for their reasonably smooth implementation. Lastly, while the centralized selection process of the provincial executive has facilitated the enforcement of the affirmative action policy, the decentralized selection process for local riding officials and provincial convention and council delegates has hampered it.
ENDNOTES

1. I am grateful to Sandra Clifford, Jill Marzetti and Anne John Baptiste for providing useful information about the ONDP.

2. In the section "Participation of Women in Public Life," the Royal Commission assessed women's involvement in citizen and elite politics. One of the Commission's main findings was that a wide gap existed between women's level of participation in citizen politics and their level of participation in elite politics. Even though in the late 1960s women voted and appeared interested in politics in almost the same proportion as men, they remained under-represented as candidates, legislators, cabinet members, government agency members and judges at the federal and provincial levels. The Commission also identified two main impediments to women seeking nominations: the reluctance of male party officials to nominate female candidacies and the reticence of women's party organizations to support them (RCSW 1970, 339-355).

3. In 1971, the first new status of women group, the Ontario Committee on the Status of Women, was established in Ontario. By the end of the decade, most provinces had a similar committee. The activities of these new status of women groups mainly consisted in pressuring provincial governments and bureaucrats to set up publicly-funded advisory bodies on the status of women. The Ontario government set up its Advisory Council on the Status of Women in 1973. Frustrated with the Council's lack of power, Sabia resigned her position as chair three years after its inception (Prentice et al. 1988, 350-351).

4. From then on until 1979, WPA primarily sponsored conferences and organized schools for women aspiring to public office. The short-lived Feminist Party of Canada (which was formed in 1979) had even less impact on female political representation than WPA (Bashevkin 1993, 24-25).

5. Although strong Waffle sections were active in British Columbia and Saskatchewan, the Ontario and federal parties remained the centre of the group's most important activities (Bullen 1983, 198). For a history of the Waffle, see Bullen (1983), and for the text of the Waffle Manifesto, see The Decline and Fall of a Good Idea (1969, 43-47). The ONDP expelled its Waffle faction in 1972. Not everybody agrees that the Wafflers were expelled. According to former ONDP leader Donald MacDonald (1988, 77), there was not any purge since the majority of Waffle supporters remained active in the party after 1972.

6. I thank Vi Thompson for giving me the text of this resolution.

7. The new executive of the Women's Committee was to include five table officers (the president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary and communications coordinator), ten members-at-large, the chairs of the local action committees and three ex-officio members (the provincial executive liaison, Participation of Women representative, and NDP caucus representative) (ONDP Women's Committee circa 1980).
8. Burstyn (1990, 178), a former member of the Waffle, also notes that gender parity "occasioned the ugliest reaction" from the party leadership. In her view, this was not surprising since parity directly "challenged, both symbolically and practically, the power of the established and male-dominated leadership."

9. At the 1981 Vancouver convention, the federal party passed a resolution providing that "[w]hen party committees, convention delegations, etc. are being formed, every effort should be made to achieve male-female parity in the membership" and that "[t]he women's committees of the party are to monitor the success of this voluntary compliance affirmative action plan" (Participation of Women October 15-17, 1982).

10. When no nominal figures are provided, this means that they were not available.

11. The OFL was the first union in Canada to adopt an affirmative action policy for its female members. Unions such as the Canada Employment and Immigration Union, the Canadian Labour Congress, the Canadian Auto Workers and the Alberta Federation of Labour then followed its example (see Acheson July/August, 1984; Walker and Mantle July/August 1984; Richmond November 1984; Cuneo 1993, 126-131).

12. In the late 1970s, the Women's Committee strove to reach out to union women. Two women involved in the planning committee for the 1978 conference emphasized the importance of inviting union women who were "easier to reach than feminists" and suggested that they would contact feminists even though there was "probably less potential there" (ONDP Women's Committee circa 1978). According to Sarra (1983, 351-352), the presence of union women at the 1978 conference and the appointment of an ONDP Women's Committee coordinator to the OFL Women's Committee formalized the links between ONDP and labour women and, in particular, OFL women. Shortly thereafter, the Committee consolidated its links with union women by actively supporting the women striking at Fleck, Inco, Puretex, Blue Cross, Radio Shack, Bell and Stelco (ONDP Women's Committee President April 12-13, 1980).

13. During this period, the Committee also undertook to revise the ONDP policies on issues of concern to women. At its first annual conference in November 1978, "The Economic Facts of Life," the Committee resolved to put together a comprehensive program to enhance women's equality in the family and the economy. Two years later, the ONDP convention agreed to replace the party's outdated policies on women's issues with the Committee's lengthy program "Policies for Equality." This document mainly dealt with the economic rights of women, pensions, health, day care, housing and education (Executive Liaison with the ONDP Women's Committee December 9-10, 1978).

14. Given the considerable influence of the leadership over the policy-making process, it was imperative that the Women's Committee secured the support of party elites for its resolution (see Praud 1995, 220-221). As a Women's Committee member noted, "the chance to get a resolution to the floor that doesn't fit in with the wishes of the elite is slim" (ONDf5). In other words, most resolutions that make it to the convention have the support of the leadership. This was certainly
the case of the 1982 affirmative action resolution.

15. This was not the first time that the Committee used this argument to persuade party elites to approve women-friendly measures. In a meeting with party leader Mike Cassidy, representatives of the Women's Committee recommended that the party begin emphasizing policies of concern to women in its platform. According to them, this would go a long way to attract female voters to the party (ONDP Women's Committee April 5, 1978).

16. 57.5% of male delegates and 66.2% of female delegates supported the resolution (Bashevkin 1985a, 413).

17. As the supreme body of the ONDP, the provincial convention (which takes place every two years) has final authority over matters of principles, policies, constitution and program (ONDP 1992, section 8.02). It includes the provincial council, delegates from riding associations and affiliated bodies (such as unions), Ontario members from the federal and provincial caucuses, and delegates from local labour councils and the OFL (section 8.07). In between conventions, the provincial council, which meets three times a year, is the governing body (section 11.02). It comprises the provincial executive, Ontario members from the federal and provincial caucuses, delegates from riding associations and affiliated bodies, the president of each area council and representatives from special sections (for example, men's and professional sections), the Ontario New Democratic Youth, Women's, Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Committees as well as one delegate from the OFL and one delegate from each labour council (section 11.01). Lastly, the provincial executive administers party affairs on a day-to-day basis. It includes ten provincial officers (the leader, the president, six vice-presidents, the secretary and the treasurer), sixteen members-at-large, two federal council delegates, and two youth, women, ethnic and gay and lesbian representatives (sections 9 and 10).

18. I thank Jill Marzetti for pointing out this phenomenon and making these statistics available to me. The union delegations present at the 1981 federal NDP convention did not include many women either (see Bashevkin 1985b, 63-64).


20. Feminist academics Gotell and Brodie (1991) were not impressed by these numerical gains. In their view, the increased presence of neo-conservative women in top political positions did not translate into concrete policy gains for women.

21. Women's share of ministerial posts remained the same following the August re-shuffling (Rusk August 17, 1996, A10).

22. I am grateful to Sandra Clifford and Anne John-Baptiste for providing the information contained in this paragraph.
23. These affirmative action guidelines provided that 50% of all ridings should have women candidates who would be entitled to run in 60% of winnable ridings. They also stated that 75% of winnable ridings should go to affirmative action candidates, namely, women, visible minorities, the disabled and aboriginals (ONDP December 1989, "Affirmative Action Guidelines..."). The federal party adopted this same policy in 1991. The provincial council meeting that took place in April 1994 added gays, lesbians and francophones to this list of affirmative action groups (ONDP April 1994).

24. The influence of the party leadership on candidacies is also limited. Once the nomination meeting of the riding association (which is, according to one interviewee, "the great equalizer in the final analysis" (ONDm7)) has selected a candidate of whom the leadership disapproves, the latter cannot do much about it. It should be noted, however, that the decision to extend affirmative action to candidates has somewhat eroded the autonomy of riding associations. Before holding a nomination meeting, the latter must conduct a thorough search for women, ethnic, disabled, aboriginal and now gay, lesbian and francophone candidates. If they are unable to find at least one target group candidate, they must present acceptable reasons to the Election Planning Committee (ONDP December 1989 "Affirmative Action Guidelines...;" April 1994; ONDf4; ONDf7; ONDm5).
CONCLUSION

This thesis has investigated the initiatives launched during the 1970s and early 1980s in three social democratic or left-of-centre political parties, the Parti socialiste français, the Parti québécois and the Ontario New Democratic Party, in order to increase women's share of local, intermediate and top decision-making party positions. These three parties were initially selected because of their different approaches to feminization or, to be more precise, the promotion of women within the party hierarchy. Since the PS mainly relies on a quota of 30% women in various party bodies and lists, its approach to feminization can be identified as "positive discrimination." Consisting of somewhat less intrusive measures, including special support services for women aspiring to hold party office in the case of the PQ and affirmative action requirements in the case of the ONDP, the PQ and ONDP approaches can be described as "affirmative action." It should be noted, however, that the ONDP approach is more compulsory than the PQ approach.

Overall, the thesis has accomplished three tasks. First, it has documented the three parties' first official steps towards feminization and, in particular, the passage of resolutions providing for the PS quota, the updating of the PQ policies concerning women, the PQ women's committee (or Comité) and the ONDP affirmative action requirements. Second, it has assessed the extent to which these initiatives have feminized party organs. Third, it has explained why they have brought about a low, moderate and high degree of feminization in the PS, PQ and ONDP organizations respectively. Let us review the main findings of the study and speculate on what they mean for political parties and women in politics.

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Summary of Findings

To begin with, the events surrounding the introduction and adoption of measures designed to feminize party organizations highlight the central role of the second-wave women's movement and female party activists. If it had not been for the strenuous and often courageous efforts of the women's movement, one must seriously wonder whether parties would have taken steps to feminize their organization and tackle issues of relevance to women. Shortly after the resurgence of feminist agitation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of female party activists began demanding that parties pay more attention to women and their concerns. Some of these women had previously been involved in the women's movement. For instance, the women who lobbied for the PS quota were part of the reformist Mouvement démocratique féminin, and the women who first introduced the idea of gender parity in the ONDP had ties with liberationist groups. Interviews with two founders of the PQ women's Comité revealed that they and the women close to them did not come directly from the women's movement. There is no doubt, however, that their thinking had been strongly influenced by reformist feminism. Interestingly, the more liberationist roots of the ONDP Women's Committee may account for its assertive behaviour while the more reformist roots of the PS Secrétariat-femmes and the PQ Comité may account for their somewhat less assertive behaviour.

The sections on the passage of resolutions providing for the PS quota, the updating of the PQ program, the PQ women's committee and the ONDP affirmative action requirements highlight the distinct strategies Socialist, Péquiste and New Democratic women used to ensure their inclusion into party statutes: PS women by-passed the rank and file and made a deal with the party
leader with whom they were personally connected; aware that the leader and his team were opposed to their resolution, PQ women applied their energies to convincing local riding activists to support it; ONDP women spent considerable time persuading local riding activists and the party leadership about the need for equal gender representation in all governing organs. Clearly, the distribution of power existing within each party at the time—Mitterrand's firm hold over the new PS and the significant role of PQ and ONDP rank-and-file activists in party life—helped to mould the distinct strategies of PS, PQ and ONDP women. In the end, these strategic differences shed light on the attitudes of the rank and file vis à vis pro-feminization initiatives. Given the exclusion of the rank-and-file in the decision to adopt the PS quota and the absence of a thorough debate about it, it is not surprising that many PS men and women are still ambivalent towards it. Conversely, the efforts of PQ and ONDP women to bring the rank and file on side appear to have resulted in a greater level of acceptance for the PQ Comité and its initiatives as well as for the ONDP affirmative action rules for party positions.

To assess the impact of the PS, PQ and ONDP efforts to enhance party women's involvement, longitudinal statistics about women's share of party positions were analyzed. Such statistics reveal that feminization has been relatively low in the PS, moderate in the PQ and high in the ONDP. Alternatively put, the ONDP requirements have been the most effective in accomplishing their goal, and the PS quota has been the least so. Although the initiatives of the PQ women's committee have been more effective than the PS quota, their impact has not been as tangible as that of the ONDP numerical targets. In short, while a comparison between the ONDP and PQ cases confirms the argument that formal mandatory means are more effective in boosting female political representation than voluntary means, a comparison between the PQ and PS cases
disconfirms it.

As revealed in the case-study chapters, internal factors (the women's committee or secretariat, party activists and elites' perceptions of the need for feminization, and processes to select party officials) are more useful than external factors (the discourse and activities of the second-wave women's movement and changes in party support) to directly explain the low, moderate or high feminization of each party. For instance, the auxiliary role of the Secrétariat-femmes, the persistent ambivalence of party personnel vis-à-vis the PS quota and the faction-driven selection process help to account for the low feminization of the PS organization. The continuous efforts of the PQ Comité to educate male and female activists about the need for greater female involvement, the passive support of party activists and elites for the committee's initiatives, and the centralized selection process of national PQ officials have brought about an organization that is moderately feminized. Lastly, because of the assertiveness of the ONDP Women's Committee, the fairly wide support of party activists and elites for affirmative action for party positions, and the use of a slate to determine the composition of the top executive organ of the party, the ONDP organization has become highly feminized, especially when compared with the PQ and, above all, the PS.

A number of comments need to be made about the explanatory factors which, for the sake of clarity, were identified as external and internal factors. In all three case studies, the evidence concerning the positive effect of stagnating/declining support for a particular party (or the negative effect of ascending support) on women's representation was weak. This does not mean, however, that women in politics studies should totally disregard this explanatory variable. Indeed, changes in party support may very well have a more tangible impact on women's share of candidacies,
which are more visible and hotly contested than executive party positions. The findings that in the second half of the 1980s declining/stagnating support for the PQ coincided with a rise in PQ female candidacies and that in 1994 ascending support coincided with a drop in PQ female candidacies appears to corroborate this proposition. Thus, in the future it may be useful to investigate to what extent changes in party support influence the outcome of initiatives designed to boost the proportion of female candidates.

The efforts of the women's movement to increase female representation and the degree of feminization achieved by the three party organizations appear to be linked. In the mid-1980s, English Canadian and Quebecois feminists began tackling an issue that they had ignored in the past, namely, the dearth of women in democratic institutions. A number of organizations were established across Canada with the specific objective of feminizing the political arena, notably, the Committee for '94 in Toronto and FRAPPE in Montreal. Their discourse and activities impressed upon English Canadian and Quebec citizens and party activists the need to increase women's representation in top political positions. In France, the opposite happened. The lack of interest through the 1970s and 1980s of the conflict-ridden women's movement in the promotion of women in politics meant that during this period, there was no significant external pressure on political parties to feminize their organization and parliamentary group. Thus, if to date the PS quota has only had a minimal impact on party women's involvement, it is in part due to the absence of organized feminist agitation for greater female political representation. In brief, the three case studies highlight how important external feminist pressure is for the feminization of party organizations to be optimal. The gender parity movement that emerged in France in the late 1980s may force French parties to increase the proportion of women in decision-making positions.
Although the activities of the French, Ontario and Quebec women's movements go some way toward elucidating the minimal impact of the PS quota and the greater impact of the PQ women's committee and ONDP requirements, it would be erroneous to refer solely to this indirect and external pressure when explaining the feminization of internal party organs. Consequently, to provide a more comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon, it is essential to consider other factors and, in particular, factors internal to parties.

To begin with, the role that women's committees or secretariats play within their party organization (as female auxiliaries or feminist lobbies) appears to have significantly influenced the outcome of the three pro-feminization initiatives. More precisely, the case-study chapters confirm the proposition that female auxiliaries — bodies that tackle issues of concern to women as prescribed by the party — are much less able to significantly alter the internal gendered division of power while feminist lobbies — bodies that constantly and vigorously challenge party organs and officials to promote women and issues of concern to them — are able to do so. After examining the activities that the PS Secrétariat-femmes and ONDP Women's Committee have engaged in for some twenty years, one can easily identify the former as a female auxiliary and the latter as a feminist lobby. As for the PQ Comité, it is difficult to assert that it is one or the other. Since its inception, the Comité has acted as a female auxiliary at times and a feminist lobby at other times. Interestingly then, the party with simply a female auxiliary is the least feminized; the party with a feminist lobby is the most feminized; and the party with a female auxiliary/feminist lobby is moderately feminized.

In the introduction, we explained that the study would not examine the broader political cultures of France, Quebec and Ontario, but rather the sub-cultures of the PS, PQ and ONDP (and,
more specifically, party activists and elites’ perceptions of party women’s representation and means to improve it) and how these sub-cultures can shed light on the degree of feminization achieved by each party. It is nevertheless important to signal that the impact of the broader French, Quebec and Ontario political cultures. Beginning with France, the elite-driven, top-down process by which the quota was included into the PS statutes is reminiscent of Jacobinism, the "highly centralized rule by a small elite, supposedly incarnating the national will." one of the political traditions to emerge out of the French Revolution (Hanley, Kerr and Waites 1984, 102). As highlighted in the PS chapter, a number of respondents invoked the republican principle that all citizens should be treated equally to justify their ambivalence to the quota, a device that in their eyes goes against this principle. Also, the aversion of the early women’s movement for institutional politics and its repeated appeals to the courts to settle internal disputes may partly stem from French citizens’ ambiguous relationship to the state; that is, their tendency both to distrust and also expect a great deal from the state (Ducrocq 1982; Ehrmann 1983, 11-14).

In Quebec, the cultural changes brought about by the Quiet Revolution appear to illuminate certain aspects of the PQ case study. For instance, the rejection of hierarchical authoritarianism and the emergence of what sociologist Marcel Rioux has called “the ideology of participation and development” (or the identification with worldwide socialist movements for decolonization and liberation) could be connected to the nationalist sympathies of the new francophone women’s liberation groups as well as to the rank-and-file-driven, bottom-up process that forced the PQ leadership to accept women’s demands. Furthermore, the influx of liberal ideas that occurred in the 1960s was in a sense echoed by PQ respondents’ references to the importance of “l’égalité des chances” (equality of opportunity) when asked about the need for female quotas (Wiseman 1988,
Ontario's political culture has been described as "conservative with a progressive component" or "red tory" meaning that conservative ideas (such as elitism, hierarchy and order) prevail while progressive ideas (such as democratic egalitarianism and reform) exist but do not prevail (Wise 1990, 44-47). Within the ONDP, which, according to MacDonald (1994, 39), is the "most committed champion of the enduring progressive element in the Ontario political culture," progressive ideas are likely to be as, if not more, important than conservative ideas. Indeed, the involvement of elite and rank-and-file activists in the adoption of affirmative action requirements appears to combine conservative and progressive elements of the Ontario political culture, namely, elitism and democratic egalitarianism. One may also suggest that the tory and socialist principle of equality of condition helps to account for party members' smooth acceptance of affirmative action rules for party positions. Lastly, Ontario feminists' early involvement in electoral politics could be connected to the high levels of political trust and efficacy that Ontarians exhibited in the 1970s (Simeon and Elkins 1974, 415).

In any event, the views of party activists and elites on female representation and measures to enhance it also help to illuminate the impact of the PS, PQ and ONDP measures. Where party personnel have been largely ambivalent towards the means used to boost female involvement, as in the PS, feminization has been minimal. Conversely, where party personnel have been generally supportive of such means, as in the ONDP, feminization has been optimal. In the end, PQ activists' acceptance of the Comité and its initiatives as well as their perception that increasing female involvement is primarily the responsibility of the Comité appear to have somewhat restricted the impact that the Comité and its initiatives were to have on party women's
representation, hence the moderate feminization of the PQ organization.

Finally, the three case studies validate the proposition that a centralized (or elite-controlled) selection process enhances the impact of pro-feminization initiatives while a simply decentralized (or rank-and-file-controlled) selection process restricts it. Overall, PS, PQ and ONDP women are better represented in top party positions (which are usually selected by party elites) than in intermediate and local positions (which are usually selected by the rank and file). In the PQ and ONDP, centralization has clearly enhanced the outcome of pro-feminization measures while decentralization has limited it. In the PS, however, the importance of faction membership in personnel selection has restricted the positive impact of centralization and accentuated the adverse impact of excessive decentralization; as a result, the PS organization is not as feminized as the PQ and ONDP organizations.

Despite these findings, it is important to question the proposition that centralization is beneficial to women or, alternatively put, that in terms of women and their concerns, elites are more enlightened than the rank and file. Certainly, this is not always the case. As revealed in the chapter on the PQ, it was rank-and-file support for the resolution of the regional women's committee that forced the national elite of the PQ to agree to the establishment of an official national party organ for women. Furthermore, there may be other reasons, apart from the supposed conservatism of local activists, for their resistance to initiatives such as those investigated in this study. For instance, the elites' failure to consult extensively and develop consensus with the rank and file about the need for pro-feminization measures before implementing them may have justifiably aroused the suspicions of party activists. The PS quota is a case in point. In a sense, PS activists' long-lasting ambivalence towards the quota is somewhat understandable
considering that in the past twenty years they were never given the opportunity to thoroughly debate the advantages and drawbacks of this device.

Implications for Political Parties and Women in Politics

The study has addressed a number of issues that may be of interest to those who are concerned with the current state of party organizations and, in particular, social democratic or left-of-centre mass parties. For the past two decades, activists and voters have been deserting these parties for interest groups and new conservative parties, respectively. Several factors account for this phenomenon: the general failure of parties to function as vehicles for relevant and meaningful policy alternatives at election time and the insulation of the left party establishment from the grass roots, especially when the party is in government. Unable to provide a solid alternative to the dominant right-wing agenda of deficit and debt reduction and reconcile the often divergent aspirations of party elites and rank and file activists, left-leaning parties have seen their membership and share of the vote shrink significantly in recent years. In the 1993 federal election, some long-time NDP supporters went as far as backing the conservative and populist Reform Party. At this point in time, parties of the left have no choice but to thoroughly reform both their program and internal decision-making procedures if they want to regain activists and voters and survive.

The study and, in particular, its analysis of the passage of resolutions providing for the PS quota, the PQ women's committee, and the ONDP affirmative action requirements echo this need for internal party reform. As noted earlier, the case studies reveal that the educational and consultative process that occurred prior to the adoption of the ONDP requirements helps to explain
why affirmative action for party positions has been well-accepted by ONDP activists. Conversely, the decision of PS elites to insert a quota in the party statutes without prior consultation with the rank and file accounts in part for party activists' persistent ambivalence towards it. In brief, these two examples suggest that left-of-centre parties have to replace their archaic, top-down decision-making process with a truly consultative one. Parties could set up permanent structures where party activists and elites would regularly come together to discuss the selection of officials and policies. These discussions could also be open to social movement and interest group activists and even ordinary citizens who have a stake in the selection of a particular party official or policy. Such a process is more likely to bring in fresh blood and policy alternatives than the old, elite-dominated decision-making process. To put it bluntly, only internal procedural and structural renewal will bring about the substantive programmatic renewal that social democratic parties are very much in need of.

Students of parties have a role to play in these renewal initiatives. Instead of constantly rediscovering Michels' iron law of oligarchy as Lawson (1990, 113) put it, they may want to turn their attention to efforts to renew and democratize party structures and in effect bend Michels' iron law. More specifically, they could analyze how the renewal process was conducted; the new structures it put in place; whether these new structures led to programmatic renewal; and the impact that newly-democratized structures have had on party membership and electoral support. Such studies would not have to focus exclusively on present efforts and could include earlier attempts to reform parties, such as the renewal process that took place in the late 1980s in the PQ. As a methodological comment, studies including several case studies may bring to light a variety of patterns and thus be more insightful than studies focusing on just one case.
For example, it would be useful to compare the initiatives of the Reform Party (RP) to enhance intra-party democracy with the initiatives of social democratic parties to democratize their internal organization. In the end, the RP may very well appear as an example that parties striving to renew their internal structures may want to avoid rather than follow. Since its inception in 1987, Reform has endorsed a number of measures designed to "increase citizens' input" in the political process including referenda, recall of MPs, free votes in the House of Commons, etc. The party has also been very enthusiastic about the potential of electronic technology such as touch-tone telephones which would permit citizens to instantaneously convey their views on policy proposals to politicians. At its last convention, partly as a way to highlight its commitment to democracy, the RP showed off the electronic device that delegates were to use to register their vote for or against each resolution. One should be cautious, however, before inferring from this automatic but non-deliberative "consultation" of the rank and file that the Reform champions democracy. In fact, the argument could be made that the democracy practised (and advocated) by the RP is at best minimalist. Delegates (and citizens) are not invited to extensively deliberate on policy proposals and meaningfully revise their content, they are simply asked to cast a vote for or against them.

Given their tradition of periodically sounding the membership and keeping a watch on their leaders, left-of-centre parties may be better equipped to bring about genuine democratic structures and processes that emphasize consultation, deliberation and consensual decision-making. Instead, in English Canada, the Reform Party has been allowed to appropriate the discourse on democracy. It is time that the NDP re-appropriates it and re-invents it.

Understandably angered with the perennial exclusion of women from the political arena and, at the same time, encouraged by the successful use of quotas and numerical targets by several
Scandinavian parties, observers of women in politics have argued that only similar, formal means can immediately produce gender-balanced political institutions. As previously mentioned, this dissertation suggests that researchers and advocates be cautious before dismissing more voluntary means and endorsing compulsory quotas. While a comparison between the ONDP and PQ cases confirms the argument that mandatory means produce better results than voluntary means, a comparison between the PQ and PS cases disconfirms it. All this points to the need for further comparative research on parties that have resorted to quotas, for instance, the British Labour Party and the German Social Democratic Party, as well as parties that have resorted mainly to non-quota based means. Researchers should strive to investigate the promotion of women not only within the party hierarchy, but also as candidates, especially since many left-leaning parties have extended their pro-feminization efforts to candidacies.

With reference to the PS, the thesis challenges the argument commonly advanced by observers of French women in politics, namely that the PS quota has never been respected and that it has failed. According to the PS statutes, the only two national organs that the quota is to apply to are the Comité directeur (or Conseil national) and the Bureau exécutif (or Bureau national). The other two national bodies, the national convention and the Secrétariat national, are essentially exempt from the quota. Longitudinal statistics indicate that the proportion of female Comité directeur and Bureau exécutif officials has generally conformed to the quota while that of female convention delegates has not. Although observers of French women in politics are wrong when they say that the quota has never been respected, they are right to point out that female representation in these two organs has not generally exceeded the quota. The existence of two divergent interpretations of the quota seems to explain this confusion. For the PS establishment
and a large portion of the membership, the quota is a minimum threshold under which female representation cannot fall as well as a maximum ceiling that female representation cannot exceed. On the other hand, for the Secrétariat-femmes and women in politics advocates, the quota is a mechanism designed to boost women's representation. However, it appears that the former's interpretation (rather than the latter's) made it into the statutes and, in particular, into the section concerning the quota. Section six specifies that "[l]e pourcentage minimum [du quota] sera révisé lors de chaque Congrès national, pour tenir compte de la proportion réelle des femmes au sein du Parti" (author's emphasis; PS in Bacot 1979, 337). Alternatively put, women's representational gains are to determine the level of the quota, not the other way around, as the Secrétariat-femmes wished. In light of these facts, it is not surprising that the quota has largely functioned as a minimum threshold and a maximum ceiling.

Some Final Considerations

In the end, how does this study of women's struggles to force the PS, PQ and ONDP organizations to officially recognize their presence and concerns contribute to the two bodies of literature that inspired it, the political party and the women in politics literatures? To begin with, the original comparative and historical perspective of the study must be emphasized. In contrast with Canadian studies that have tended to compare either provincial or federal cases and refer to the most proximate case study (the United States), the thesis includes two Canadian provincial parties and one national West European party. Furthermore, thanks to extensive background research including tracking down long-time party activists and archival documents (many of which are not available in libraries), the thesis has reconstructed the PS, PQ and ONDP's first official steps towards
feminization as well as the almost lost history of party women's recent and ongoing struggles.

Furthermore, this examination of party efforts to feminize internal organs represents an important contribution to the political party literature which has paid more attention to party systems than to internal party organizations. In a recent review article, Lemieux (1993, 43-44) even noted that "research on party organizations ha[d] not expanded since the classical works of Ostrogorski, Michels and Duverger" (author's translation). This comment clearly applies to the French, Quebec and Ontario party literatures. In any event, the thesis and, in particular, its account of the adoption of pro-feminization measures, the role of women's committees, party activists and elites' views on feminization and internal structures, provide a window into the inner workings of the PS, PQ and ONDP. Furthermore, it suggests that Michels' iron law of oligarchy no longer accurately describes internal party dynamics, especially after two decades of female party activists' efforts to impose themselves and their interests. Indeed, two of the three cases, the PQ and ONDP, do not conform to the Michelsian pattern of a limited elite ruling over an apathetic rank and file. Even the PS rank and file, whose ambivalence towards the quota partly accounts for its limited impact at the section and federal levels, cannot be identified as totally subordinate to the PS leadership. All this points to the need for more detailed studies of how power is distributed within party organizations.

The thesis also contributes to the women in elite politics literature which, to date, has mainly examined the obstacles faced by women aspiring to fill the visible positions of candidates, legislators and ministers. This thesis is indeed the first comprehensive study of the introduction, official adoption and impact of measures designed to remedy women's under-representation in internal party bodies. As such, it lays the foundation for a new research area that can be of interest to women in politics researchers. More specifically, the thesis suggests that there is no miracle measure or device
that will instantaneously feminize party organizations. As noted earlier, the three case studies question the argument "the more compulsory the pro-feminization means used, the more extensive the feminization (or the more voluntary the means used, the less extensive the feminization)."

Alternatively put, the substance of pro-feminization measures does not necessarily determine whether they will have a limited, moderate or strong impact. In fact, the study indicates that one of the essential conditions for pro-feminization measures to produce optimal results is to ensure that all affected parties, elites and non-elites, be involved in the decision to implement them. This conclusion is relevant not only to the feminization of party organizations, but also to that of the larger political arena.

In closing, the study puts forward two general points concerning the feminization and democratization of the political arena. First, as long as party organizations are dominated by men, women will only make limited gains in representative assemblies. It is somewhat incongruous to assume that organizations where men hold more than 50% of the decision-making positions will ensure that men and women are equally represented among their candidates and legislative representatives. As the examples of Sweden and Norway indicate, parties that have almost corrected the gender imbalance in their internal bodies are able to produce feminized parliamentary groups. Therefore, the feminization of parties is essential if women are to become full political citizens, that is citizens who can fully enjoy their rights to vote, run and represent constituents.

Second, the argument that non-democratic means and processes can be rightfully used for the purpose of feminizing and thus democratizing political institutions is debatable. For one thing, it is erroneous to quickly equate "feminization" with "democratization" in order to justify the use
of compulsory means and processes. A feminized institution is not necessarily a democratized institution, especially if the decision to launch pro-feminization initiatives was taken at the top and imposed on the rank and file without thoroughgoing information, consultation and debate. Admittedly, the decision of the Liberal Party of Canada to give its leader the power to appoint (male and female) candidates and Jean Chrétien's naming of women candidates in order to achieve the target of 25% female candidates in the 1997 federal election may have helped to feminize the Liberal caucus. Yet, this move may have also further undermined the already weak democratic procedures of the Liberal Party. Moreover, the example of France reveals that despite more than two decades of a "féminisation par le haut," the French National Assembly remains one of the least feminized legislatures of the European Union with only 10.7% of women representatives.

For a feminized institution to be democratized, the process leading up to the decision to boost female representation must be open to all the interested groups and individuals, no matter whether they are part of the elite or not. As noted earlier, it is essential that this process not simply be consultative, but also deliberative. In other words, all the interested parties must be given the opportunity and time to present their position publicly and deliberate on the various views advanced. This would go a long way toward educating the different groups and individuals about their respective positions. A consensus may then develop on the best means to enhance female involvement. Endorsed by most, if not all, pro-feminization measures are likely to have an immediate and tangible impact on female representation. Furthermore, the process of presentation, deliberation and education will probably ensure that these gains are permanently consolidated and at least advance the principle of meaningful, deliberative and democratic involvement.

Finally, the feminization of political institutions need not be a non-democratic operation.
Obviously, the ideal democratic process of feminization described above is bound to be time-consuming and difficult. However, as the Toronto Days of Action and Citizens for Local Democracy and the French and Quebec protests of the past two years against government cutbacks demonstrate, a growing number of citizens now have strong reservations about the minimalist, top-down and expeditious "democratic" practices of their elected representatives.
ENDNOTES

1. Some of the observers who have put forward this argument include Saint-Cricq and Prévost (1993, 113), Sineau and Tardy (1993, 104), and Appleton and Mazur (1993, 103).


3. Between 1993 and 1997, the proportion of female Liberal MPs increased from 20.3% (36/177) to 25.2% (39/155) (Young 1997, 83; "Elections 97" June 3, 1997, A19-A20).
APPENDIX A: PS INTERVIEWS

N.B.: Leading questions are in bold
        Probes are not in bold

Avant de commencer cet entretien, je voudrais mentionner que toutes vos réponses resteront confidentielles.

Cette étude examine le quota que le Parti socialiste français (PS) mit en place dans les années 1970 afin d’augmenter non seulement la proportion de femmes siégeant aux Bureaux de section, aux Commissions exécutives fédérales et aux instances nationales du Parti (Comité directeur, Bureau exécutif et Secrétariat national), mais aussi la proportion de candidates socialistes aux élections législatives. Les trois thèmes que je voudrais aborder sont: 1) les structures internes du PS; 2) le Secrétariat-femmes et les initiatives qu’il lança afin d’augmenter le nombre de femmes présentes dans les diverses instances du PS (principalement l’adoption et l’augmentation du quota); et enfin 3) la représentation des femmes au PS.

Renseignements Personnels

Depuis combien de temps militez-vous au PS?

Quel(s) poste(s) occupez-vous actuellement au PS?

Depuis combien de temps occupez-vous ce ou ces poste(s)?

Quel(s) autre(s) poste(s) avez-vous occupé au PS? Si oui le(s)quel(s)?

Vous êtes-vous déjà présenté(e) comme candidat(e) socialiste? Si oui, en quelle année?

[Femmes] Militez-vous ou avez-vous milité dans un groupe de femmes non-partisan? Si oui, lequel?

Structures Internes

J’ai lu les statuts du PS. Je connais les règles qui régissent la sélection des Bureaux de section, des Commissions exécutives fédérales, des instances nationales et des candidat(e)s. Cependant, n’ayant pas milité au PS, je ne suis pas en mesure de déterminer si, dans la pratique, ces règles sont bien suivies.
Par exemple, comment devient-on le ou la Secrétaire d'un Bureau de section?

L'appui des militants de la section suffit-il ou bien faut-il aussi avoir l'appui de personnes haut placées dans le parti?

Qu'arriverait-il si ces personnes étaient opposées à la nomination du nouveau ou de la nouvelle Secrétaire de section?

Cela est-il déjà arrivé? Si oui, comment ces désaccords furent-ils résolus?

Comment devient-on membre d'une Commission exécutive fédérale?

L'appui des militants des sections de la fédération suffit-il ou bien faut-il aussi avoir l'appui de personnes haut placées dans le parti?

Qu'arriverait-il si ces personnes étaient opposées à la nomination d'un nouveau ou d'une nouvelle membre d'une Commission exécutive fédérale?

Cela est-il déjà arrivé? Si oui, comment ces désaccords furent-ils résolus?

Comment devient-on délégué(e) au Congrès national?

L'appui des militants des sections et des fédérations suffit-il ou bien faut-il aussi avoir l'appui de personnes haut placées dans le parti?

Qu'arriverait-il si ces personnes étaient opposées à la nomination d'un nouveau ou d'une nouvelle déléguée nationale?

Cela est-il déjà arrivé? Si oui, comment ces désaccords furent-ils résolus?

Comment devient-on membre du Comité directeur?

L'appui des délégués nationaux suffit-il ou bien faut-il aussi avoir l'appui de personnes haut placées dans le parti?

Qu'arriverait-il si ces personnes étaient opposées à la nomination d'un nouveau ou d'une nouvelle membre du Comité directeur?

Cela est-il déjà arrivé? Si oui, comment ces désaccords furent-ils résolus?

Est-ce qu'une liste des personnes que les dirigeants souhaitent voir siéger au Comité directeur est généralement distribuée aux délégués du Congrès national?
Dans quelle mesure vos remarques sur le Comité directeur concernent-elles aussi les membres du Bureau exécutif?

Dans quelle mesure vos remarques sur le Comité directeur concernent-elles aussi les membres du Secrétariat national?

Comment devient-on candidat(e) aux élections législatives?

L'appui des militants de la circonscription suffit-il ou bien faut-il aussi avoir l'appui de personnes haut placées dans le parti?

Qu'arriverait-il si ces personnes étaient opposées à la nomination d'un nouveau ou d'une nouvelle candidate socialiste?

Cela est-il déjà arrivé? Si oui, comment ces désaccords furent-ils résolus?

Le Secrétariat-femmes et le Quota

J'aimerais que nous discutions des initiatives telles que le quota qui furent mises sur pied par le Secrétariat-femmes dans les années 1970 afin d'augmenter la proportion de femmes siégeant aux instances locales, fédérales et nationales du PS.

[Femmes impliquées au Secrétariat] Quelles initiatives furent organisées par le Secrétariat-femmes lorsque vous y étiez impliquée?

Comment le Secrétariat-femmes est-il (ou était-il) perçu par les militants et les dirigeants socialistes?

[Militantes de longue date] D'où est venue l'idée d'instaurer un quota pour les femmes?

Est-il possible que les activités des groupes féminins et féministes de l'époque aient influencé le PS?

Est-il possible que les activités d'autres partis politiques en faveur des femmes aient poussé le PS à adopter un quota?

Quelle fut la réaction des militants et des militantes lorsque le quota fut mis en place?

Y'avait-il des groupes qui étaient tout à fait contre l'utilisation d'un quota pour promouvoir les femmes? Quels étaient leurs arguments?
Y'avait-il des groupes qui étaient favorables au quota? Quels étaient leurs arguments?

Quel fut la réaction des militants et des militantes lorsque le quota fut augmenté en 1979 (20%) et en 1990 (30%)?

Comment le quota est-il généralement perçu par les militants et les militantes? (Justifiez votre réponse).

Représentation des Femmes au PS

À votre avis, est-ce que les femmes sont bien représentées dans les différentes instances du PS (Bureaux de section, Commissions exécutives fédérales, Comité directeur, Bureau exécutif et Secrétariat national)?
Quels facteurs expliquent cela?

Qu'en est-il du quota?

À votre avis, est-ce que le quota est toujours nécessaire?
Devrait-on l'éliminer?
Devrait-on l'augmenter (50%)?

D'après vous, quelles autres mesures pourraient vraiment améliorer la représentation des femmes?
Le PS pourrait offrir des sessions de formation, des aides financières, des garderies, etc. aux militantes voulant s'impliquer plus à fond dans le parti.

Que pensez-vous de l'idée de créer un courant spécifiquement pour les femmes?
APPENDIX B: PQ INTERVIEWS

N.B.: Leading questions are in bold
Probes are not in bold

Avant de commencer cet entretien, je voudrais mentionner que toutes vos réponses resteront confidentielles.

Cette étude examine les initiatives qui furent mises en place au Parti québécois (PQ) vers la fin des années 1970 afin d'inciter les militant.es à participer en plus grand nombre à tous les niveaux du parti (organes locaux, régionaux et nationaux). Je fais plus particulièrement référence à la création, en 1977, du Comité national de la condition féminine (qui maintenant s'appelle le Comité national d'action politique des femmes (CNAPF)) et à l'organisation par ce comité de campagnes de sensibilisation et d'information et d'ateliers de formation pour les femmes du parti. Les trois thèmes que je voudrais aborder sont: 1) les structures internes du parti; 2) la mise en place de ces initiatives; et enfin 3) leur impact sur la représentation féminine dans les divers organes du PQ.

Renseignements Personnels

Depuis combien de temps militez-vous au PQ?

Quel(s) poste(s) occupez-vous actuellement dans le parti?

Depuis combien de temps occupez-vous ce ou ces poste(s) ?

Quel(s) autre(s) poste(s) avez-vous occupé au PQ? Si oui, le(s)quel(s) ?

Vous êtes-vous déjà présenté(e) comme candidat(e) du PQ? Si oui, en quelle année?

[Aux femmes] Militez-vous ou avez-vous milité dans un groupe de femmes non-partisan? Si oui, lequel?

Structures Internes

J'ai lu les statuts du PQ. Je connais donc les règles qui régissent la sélection des conseils et des exécutifs locaux, régionaux et nationaux, des délégué.e.s au Congrès national et des candidat.e.s. Cependant, n'ayant pas milité au PQ, je ne suis pas en mesure de déterminer si, dans la pratique, ces règles sont bien suivies.

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Par exemple, comment devient-on membre d'un comité exécutif de comté (et plus précisément, le ou la président(e), vice-président(e), trésorier(e), etc.)?

L'appui des militants du comté suffit-il ou bien faut-il aussi avoir l'appui de personnes haut placées dans le parti?

Qu'arriverait-il si ces personnes étaient opposées à la nomination du nouveau ou de la nouvelle président(e), vice-président(e), trésorier(e), etc. d'un comité exécutif de comté?

Cela est-il déjà arrivé? Si oui, comment ces désaccords furent-ils résolus?

Comment devient-on délégué(e) au Congrès national?

L'appui des militants du comté suffit-il ou bien faut-il aussi avoir l'appui de personnes haut placées dans le parti?

Qu'arriverait-il si ces personnes étaient opposées à la nomination d'un nouveau ou d'une nouvelle délégué(e) d'un comté?

Cela est-il déjà arrivé? Si oui, comment ces désaccords furent-ils résolus?

Comment devient-on délégué(e) au Conseil national?

L'appui des militants du comté suffit-il ou bien faut-il aussi avoir l'appui de personnes haut placées dans le parti?

Qu'arriverait-il si ces personnes étaient opposées à la nomination d'un nouveau ou d'une nouvelle délégué(e) au Conseil national?

Cela est-il déjà arrivé? Si oui, comment ces désaccords furent-ils résolus?

Dans quelle mesure vos remarques sur le Conseil national concernent-elles aussi le Conseil régional?

Comment devient-on membre du Conseil exécutif national?

L'appui des délégués suffit-il ou bien faut-il aussi avoir l'appui de personnes haut placées dans le parti?

Qu'arriverait-il si ces personnes étaient opposées à la nomination d'un nouveau membre du Conseil exécutif national?

Cela est-il déjà arrivé? Si oui, comment ces désaccords furent-ils résolus?
Est-ce qu'au Congrès national une liste officielle des candidat(e)s aux postes du Conseil exécutif national est distribuée aux délégué(e)s?

Dans quelle mesure vos remarques sur le Conseil exécutif national concernent-elles aussi le Conseil exécutif régional?

Comment devient-on le ou la candidat(e) d'un comté?

L'appui des militants locaux suffit-il ou bien faut-il aussi avoir l'appui de personnes haut placées dans le parti?

Qu'arriverait-il si ces personnes étaient opposées à la nomination du nouveau ou de la nouvelle candidat(e) d'un comté?

Cela est-il déjà arrivé? Si oui, comment ces désaccords furent-ils résolus?

Mise en Place d'Initiatives Visant à Augmenter la Participation des Femmes du Parti

J'aimerais que nous discutions des initiatives qui ont été mises sur pied depuis les années 1970 afin de stimuler la participation des femmes du parti.

[Aux personnes déjà actives au PQ dans les années 1970] D'où est venue l'idée de créer un Comité-femmes?

Est-il possible que les activités des groupes féminins et féministes de l'époque aient influencé le PQ? Si oui, de quelle façon?

Est-il possible que les activités des femmes du PLQ aient influencé le PQ?

[Aux personnes déjà actives au PQ dans les années 1970] Dans quelle mesure la création du CNAPF fut-elle endossée par les membres du parti?

Y avait-il des groupes qui étaient tout à fait contre l'établissement d'un comité pour les femmes? Quels étaient leurs arguments?

Quels groupes étaient favorables à l'établissement d'un comité pour les femmes? Quels étaient leurs arguments?

[Aux personnes déjà actives au PQ dans les année 1970] D'où est venue l'idée d'organiser des campagnes de sensibilisation et des ateliers de formation afin d'inciter les femmes du parti à participer plus activement?
Est-il possible que les activités des groupes féminins et féministes de l'époque aient influencé le PQ? Si oui, de quelle façon?

Est-il possible que l'établissement de quotas féminins par le PLQ afin d'assurer une représentation plus équitable des femmes dans les organes du parti aient influencé le PQ?

[Aux personnes déjà actives au PQ dans les année 1970] Dans quelle mesure l'organisation de ces campagnes et de ces ateliers fut-elle endossée par les membres du parti?

Y avait-il des groupes qui étaient tout à fait contre de telles initiatives? Quels étaient leurs arguments?

En plus du CNAPF, quels autres groupes étaient favorables à ces initiatives? Quels étaient leurs arguments?

[Aux femmes qui sont ou qui ont été membres du CNAPF] Au cours de ces dix dernières années, quelles autres initiatives ont été organisées par le CNAPF afin de stimuler la participation des femmes du parti?

Est-ce que le CNAPF (ou des membres du parti concernés par la sous-représentation des femmes dans les exécutifs du PQ) ont déjà envisagé d'établir un quota féminin?

Qu'est-il advenu de cette idée? Pourquoi?

Quels groupes étaient opposés au quota féminin? Quels étaient leurs arguments?

Quels groupes étaient favorables au quota féminin? Quels étaient leurs arguments?

Impact

À votre avis, est-ce que les femmes sont généralement bien représentées dans les conseils et les exécutifs locaux, régionaux et nationaux du parti?

Y-a-t-il certains moments dans la conjoncture politique où les femmes sont mieux représentées que d'habitude aux conseils et aux congrès nationaux?

Si oui, comment-expliquez vous ce phénomène?

À votre avis, est-ce que le CNAPF a toujours une raison d'être?
À votre avis, est-ce que les initiatives dont nous venons de parler sont toujours nécessaires? Devrait-on les éliminer ou bien en introduire d'autres? Lesquelles?

Pensez-vous que l'établissement d'un quota féminin pourrait améliorer la représentation des femmes dans les organes du PQ? Pourquoi?
APPENDIX C: ONDP INTERVIEWS

NB: Leading questions are in bold
Probes are not in bold

Before we start the interview, I would like to mention that all your comments will remain confidential.

This project examines the affirmative action requirements that the ONDP adopted in February 1982 in order to increase the proportion of women in local and provincial party executives. The three main themes that I would like to cover are: 1) the internal structures of the party; 2) the adoption of the affirmative action resolution; and 3) its impact on the proportion of women party officials.

Personal Data

When did you first join the ONDP?

Are you (or have you been) also active in the federal NDP? If yes, what position (s) are you holding (or have you held) in the federal NDP?

What position(s) are you currently holding in the ONDP?

How long have you been holding this (or these) position(s)?

What other position(s) did you previously hold in the ONDP?

Have you ever run in a provincial election as an NDP candidate? If yes, when?

Have you ever run in a federal election as an NDP candidate? If yes, when?

[Women] Are you or have you ever been involved in a non-partisan women's group? If yes, which one?

Internal Structures

I read the statutes of the ONDP. I understand how major decisions such as the designation of local and provincial party executives and candidates and the elaboration of party programs and policies
are supposed to be made. However, because I am not a party activist, I do not have a sense as to how these decisions are arrived at in practice.

For instance, how does one become the president or treasurer of a local riding?

Is the support of local party activists sufficient or do you also need the support of provincial party officials?

What would happen if party officials disapproved of a new constituency treasurer or president?

Do you recall such an occurrence? If yes, how were these disagreements resolved?

How does one become a member of the provincial council?

Is the support of local party activists sufficient or do you also need the support of provincial party officials?

What would happen if party officials disapproved of a new council delegate?

Do you recall such an occurrence? If yes, how were these disagreements resolved?

How does one become a member of the provincial executive?

Is the support of local party activists sufficient or do you also need the support of provincial party officials?

How prevalent is the use of slates?

What would happen if party officials disapproved of a new member of the executive?

Do you recall such an occurrence? If yes, how were these disagreements resolved?

How does one become the candidate of a riding?

Is the support of local party activists sufficient or do you also need the support of provincial party officials?

What would happen if party officials disapproved of a new candidate?

Do you recall such an occurrence? If yes, how were these disagreements resolved?
Adoption

I would like to focus on the affirmative action resolution that the ONDP Women's Committee drafted in the early 1980s. This resolution, which was adopted by the party in 1982, set four goals: 1) to emphasize policies relevant to women during and between elections; 2) to include "at least 50%" of women in riding executives, provincial council delegations, provincial executives and party committees; 3) to set up a leadership training program; and 4) to recruit more women candidates in strong ridings and assist them with childcare and household management costs.

Where did the Women's Committee get the idea of drafting an affirmative action resolution for women?

Apparently, in the early 1970s the Ontario Waffle stressed the importance of significantly increasing female representation in executive party positions...

In the 1970s, some ONDP women were in contact with feminist organizations such as NAC and the International Women's Day Committee (IWDC) in Toronto...

In the mid-1970s, ONDP women began interacting with labour women who were addressing women's issues such as affirmative action in employment...

What were the main reasons why the NDP eventually adopted affirmative action?

Was the ONDP's adoption of affirmative action primarily a response to external pressures [pressure from the federal NDP; the ONDP's low level of support among female voters at election time; greater support for women's issues on the part of Ontario men and women in the early 1980s]?

Was the ONDP's adoption of affirmative action primarily a response to internal pressures [lobbying efforts of the Ontario NDP Women's Committee; party activists' perceptions of affirmative action]?

How did party activists and leaders react to the 1982 affirmative action resolution when it was first introduced?

Were there certain groups within the party that were strongly opposed to affirmative action? Which ones? What were their arguments?

Besides the Women's Committee, what other groups were supportive of affirmative action? What were their arguments?
Impact

Do you think that women are generally well-represented in the decision-making structures of the ONDP (as local treasurers, presidents, provincial council members and provincial executive members)?

What do you think about the party's requirement that women comprise 50% of local riding executives and the provincial council and executive?

In your opinion, is the 50% requirement still necessary?

Should it be decreased?

Did you [if interviewee is a woman] or anybody you know benefit from this requirement? If yes, how was her promotion received by party workers?

Were you [if interviewee is a man] or anybody you know denied a party position because of this 50% rule? If yes, how did you react to this? How did other party members react to this?
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**Conclusion**


