Shaping the Subject of Policing: Autonomy, Regulation and the Police Constable

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto.

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0-612-27906-5
ABSTRACT
Shaping the Subject of Policing:
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Ph.D. Criminology, 1997
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This dissertation uses a 'governmentality' approach to show how changes in styles of policing have required adaptations in the orientations of its agents. The police constable, as one such agent, has been continuously 'retooled' to further and realize changing protocols of management and governance. Several of the tools or technologies which have been deployed to shape police constables are analyzed and the interrelationship between subjectivities, technologies and governmental logics is explored. It is found that while technologies are sometimes quite deliberately installed to reshape subjectivities, they are sites which also harbour counter-narratives which may stand opposed to top-down shaping interventions.

The dissertation provides an account of various policing reforms through the technologies by which they were made real. It assesses 19th century 'disciplinary' reforms in Ontario by contrasting enabling technologies, like appointment criteria and the oath, to shaping technologies, like drill, and comprehensive regulations on conduct. It then looks at early twentieth century occupational professionalization through a further package of people-shaping tools, including an emergent corpus of police knowledge and discourses, professional ethics, and in-house
evaluation mechanisms such as examinations. While the fee for
service constable had been encouraged to be enterprising,
disciplinary reforms worked in the direction of tight regulation
through individual supervision and surveillance, and through
institutional consolidation and normalization.

The police academy is taken up as a site in which a further
restructuring of the regulation and autonomy of the police
constable is seen. In the traditional training academy a
disciplinary shaping asserted itself through a depersonalization
of authority and disembedding strategies. But the constable was
also reshaped to understand his autonomy in the celebration of
personal power and charismatic authority. Post-disciplinary or
new managerial technologies are reviewed as a corrective to this
distribution of autonomy and regulation. These technologies 'of
the self' reframe government strategy as the outcome of personal,
enterprising action. They shape the constable through his or her
autonomy.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation has taken a number of years to complete, and a complete listing of people to whom I owe a debt of gratitude is not possible. Firstly, I would like to thank members of the O.P.P. for taking the time out of their busy lives to offer candour and insight in relating their experiences and views on their profession. I was struck by the good intentions and idealism of the young women and men who were just starting their careers as police officers. I would also like to thank senior officers in a number of police services in this province for their willingness to share their own concerns and hopes for policing. While the course of the project developed in directions which made it unnecessary to cite much of this material, the reader should know that there is no lack of intelligent, dedicated leadership in Ontario's police services.

The research would have been difficult if not impossible without the support of the Centre of Criminology. I would like to thank, in particular, Monica Bristol for helping me get the scholarships that kept me alive as a student, and Tom Finlay and Catherine Matthews, for 'shaping' a library which kept me alive as a researcher. The Centre's prolific scholarly activity forces its students to work harder than we might otherwise do, and I owe a special debt of gratitude to Kelly Hannah-Moffat for a number of great talks on Foucault.

I would also like to thank Clifford Shearing for believing in the project and my abilities to carry it through. Mariana Valverde, Carolyn Strange and Philip Stenning also provided support and positive, helpful feedback in a very timely fashion. I owe a special debt to Mariana for taking the time to subject the manuscript to her very sharp editing pen.

Finally, Vaughen, this is for you. I might have got this far without you, but the journey would have become empty and pointless. Thank you for your humour, love, and generous spirit.

Willem de Lint
Toronto, January, 1997
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INRODUCTION

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century in common law countries and colonies, policing used to be undertaken by citizens on a fee-for-service basis. The town or county constable was an average citizen who normally did constabulary work part-time. Toward the middle and late nineteenth century, however, police constables came to be hired as employees of the state. Today, there has been a return to a mobilization of citizens in the 'business' of policing. The question posed in this dissertation is: given that the police constable has been compelled to change with shifts in state power, what has been done to shape and reshape the constable as both a subject and an agent of emergent forms of governance? What can shifts in the regulation of these agents of governance tell us about changes in the operation of governance more generally?

We know something of macro-developments in policing from a number of institutional analyses of the police (Reiner, 1992; Johnston, 1992; Stenson, 1993). Work by Wright and Manning has also begun to look at the impact of hardware (Wright, 1978) and information technologies (Manning, 1992) in the shaping of the police institution. Literature ranging from the sociology of organizations to social psychology, and from Marxist and feminist structuralist to post-structuralist sociology has addressed key dimensions of this question of how individuals are made up as subjects and objects of governmental power. Work by Shearing and Ericson (1991) has brought sociological thinking about the transmittal of culture to our understanding of how tropes and stories are deployed in police officer 'ways of being.'

Policing literature is just beginning to problematize the narrative of police governance through a history of its practices and technologies (Websdale, 1991; O'Malley, 1993; Lacey, 1994). Less is known about how police constables themselves are continuously refashioned or shaped to accord with modes of regulation. This dissertation will focus on the constable in order to provide some detail on the restructuring of subjectivity against changing styles of governance.
We draw from the context of four 'moments' in policing in Ontario; these are, the mid-nineteenth century, the early twentieth century, the mid-twentieth century, and the late twentieth century. Exemplary themes and technologies for constable shaping are taken up in each of these moments in order to relate constable-shaping practices to themes or logics of governance. We also draw on a governmentality approach and its attention to practices and technologies. A brief word about both is in order.

GOVERNMENTALITY, PRACTICES AND TECHNOLOGIES

Literature has emerged recently which has linked the constitution of subjects to different modes of governance. 'Governmentality' concerns the practices or 'rationalities' by which societies are governed; it describes broad changes in the relation between people that are governed and the agents that do governing. Governmentality studies government as 'a form of activity aiming to shape, guide, or effect the conduct of some person or persons' (Gordon, 1991: 2).

Governmentality literature thus focuses attention on the bilateral relations of power between subjects and strategies of governance or logics of rule. This highlights how individuals are reconceived and conceive themselves according to shifting 'governmental rationalities' (cf. Burtchell, 1991). These reconceptions occur over long periods of time and they are not progressive: there is no unitary trajectory by which one form of individualization is always succeeded by another. Still, various writers in this area have theorized the emergence of the unitary or strong state after feudalism, the welfare state following laissez-faire liberalism, and current neo-liberalism following the welfare state. The transitions between modes of governance have in turn been linked to the limitations and opportunities of individuals as governed subjects.

Governmentality studies are distinct from historical sociologies in that they are not concerned with historical realism, but rather with studying how political discourses operate as 'intellectual machinery' (Rose and Miller, 1992). In this study, the term 'liberalism' and liberal governance relates to
technologies rather than philosophical principles or the contours of debates which concentrate on rights and matters of just and principled constitution. Liberalism as an activity (Foucault, 1990)—'art of government'—deploy the freedom and personal interests of the individual to identify her as a 'partner or accomplice of government' rather than simply its object (Burtchell, 1993: 127). Thus, liberal government is not about simply subjecting (or disciplining, or aggregating) individuals to (external, macro-political) governing forms; it needs the presumptively 'free' subject who can 'adopt particular practical relations to themselves in the exercise of their freedom' (134). A liberal rationality, then, depends upon the individual's ongoing, dynamic and enterprising existence as a free subject, and this is what is meant with the term 'governing through freedom.'

In providing a framework for analyzing the links between the way governments 'think' or conduct themselves, and the way citizens can be understood as subjects (Burtchell et al., 1991; Rose and Miller, 1992), Foucault's and others' work on governmentality has brought attention to the technologies that shape individuals to be ready for rule. Foucault has argued that prescriptive norms and values do not entirely colonize the 'self to self relation,' or the way individuals understand themselves as ethical entities (Foucault, 1986; 1988). As both a subject and an agent of government, the police constable offers a site for reviewing the fault lines between governmental rationalities or mentalities and the self-regulation or agency of the governed. This study is devoted to exploring that fault-line.

Governmentality research thus differs from traditional approaches in identifying the articulation of state and civil resources as critical to the liberal problematic. It also connects liberalism to technologies. The approach relies on the insight that practices are 'agentic' in their own right, carrying forth logics of governance from the 'ground up.'

Following Mauss (1973) and according to Johnson (1987), Scordas (1989) and a large body of research,1 human embodiment is understood to ground habits of the mind. Johnson says that the

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1On embodiment in this context see for example, Strauss, 1963; Jackson, 1981; Douglas, 1973; and Turner, 1984.
body is the cognitive ground of culture, that 'structures of our bodily experience work their way up into abstract meanings and patterns of inference' (1987: xix). The individual is also identified through practices and technologies which act more directly on the habits of the mind. Much work has explored this aspect of intervention on subjectivity, ranging from Elias's (1978) ground-breaking work on manners, to Bourdieu's work on symbolic power (1977), to recent explorations in moral regulation (Valverde, 1990; 1994; forthcoming).

In this study we will analyze the impact of practices and technologies on the subjectivity of the police constable. The uniform, drill, the beat, weaponry, and computer formats each centre a discourse which includes a proper ontological relation: how to 'be' in uniform, how to act in a troop, how to walk a beat, how to handle a gun, and how to interact through a computer. Each of these includes both a practice and an object in which those practices are inscribed which together act to shape police constable conduct.

For example, figure 1 represents part of a recent (albeit American) police qualification exam. The candidate is to look at this depiction of a city street corner and the activity on it for a few seconds and then attempt to recall as accurately as possible what he or she has seen. It is a simple recall test. But it is much more than this. What is depicted is a Hobbesian reality of each against all or a Machiavellian world of dark machinations in the daily commerce of public life. This test carries forth a discourse on governance and furthers the constable's standpoint as aligned with that discourse.

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2These structures take the form of mental schemata or images of abstract operations like compulsion. We think of compulsion in terms of the image of something being moved by force. Contrasting this to propositional logic, Johnson argues that the 'internal structure of the image schema exists in a continuous, analog fashion within our understanding, which permits it to enter into transformations and other cognitive operations' (Johnston, 1987: 4).

3Rose and Miller (1992) describe governmental technologies as 'the complex of mundane programs, calculations, techniques, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions' (175).
Similarly, when a police constable is assigned a handgun, he is not just being identified as an authoritative figure armed with deadly power, he is being called out or 'hailed' to think of himself into this position in a particular way. A handgun is also infused with a cacophony of discourses about its 'right' use, including the narrative that 'you' as its user have a certain sensibility. When an individual is 'tech ed up' to be a constable, conduct narratives embedded in technologies 'brush off' to shape the constable as a particular kind of subjectivity. Part of the process of becoming a constable is living up to the billing. As Donna Haraway (1991) has pointed out, technologies alter sensibilities. The idealization of the police subject may highlight one or more narratives, be it impersonal militarism, avuncular care, or businesslike regard. These highlights will shape the individual so portrayed, though not always completely and predictably.

Indeed, the constable's body is subject to a variety of shaping technologies. Each of these acts to contour the individual, exerting a more or less hegemonic discourse on the mannerisms, habits, and economies of the body, and instructing and compelling the constable on how to be within this contouring. McGahan (1984) and Holdaway (1983) have written about police territories and police environments in terms of their suasive force on individual police perceptions and on police culture as a whole.

Practices and technologies, then, offer a lens for viewing transitions in the way the constable is conceived as an agent of governance. The constable is one relatively constant figure who can be seen as made up, deliberately and accidentally, through

4According to Althusser, ideology functions for the individual by 'interpellating' her as a subject. Althusser means by this that individuals are made up as subjects in language. Althusser saw the 'hailing' or 'recruiting' of individuals according to bourgeois ideology. Ideology 'recruits' individuals and transforms them into subjects by a process of interpellation or hailing. Thus, ideology is 'a structure of recognition' by which the individual comes to see herself. This recognition is also--and this is where Marxist 'ideology' injects itself into Althusser's concept—a misrecognition. It is a misrecognition because the individual assumes that she is the author rather than the subject of the ideology calling her up (Weedon, 1987: 30-31). I will be using the terms 'interpolated,' 'hailed,' or 'called up' to refer to this process of the discursive constitution of subjectivity.
practices and technologies. As a consequence of the relative durability of the office of constable, it is possible to identify confounding and contradictory discourses at their point of application. In looking at the constable in terms of these emergent and persuasive technologies at particular historical periods, we get a snapshot of successive and contradictory strategies of rule.

The police constable does not hit the ground running. Although we may think of him (and now her) as a stable identity and permanent presence, positive steps have had to be taken to produce this icon of liberal self-rule and long-time fixture in our Western understandings of public order, security, and citizenship. This dissertation, in tracing variations in the constable’s shaping under different logics of governance, will tell us something more generally about how we in liberal societies accept the government of others.

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY
In order to gauge the influence on the constable as a reflexive individual, to see how the relationship between the constable’s autonomy and regulation has changed, and to highlight key transitions in the relationship, I have examined provincial and local reforms through the terms of practical technologies. What this produces is a narrative at the heart of which is a reading of constabulary agency or autonomy, and around which is his regulation. While this narrative begins very broadly in the earliest moment of constable professionalization, it is increasingly narrow in scope, concentrating on how the police constable is shaped through reforms in police training and selection.

This dissertation, although it looks at materials from different ‘moments’ in time of the police constable in Ontario, is not a conventional history of the police constable. Out of the effort to plot changes in the subjectivity of the constable, three ‘moments’ have emerged as times of transition in that subjectivity. The first such moment is in the mid-nineteenth century. Between the 1830s and the 1890s, a first wave of
professionalization according to disciplinary strategies is evident. The second moment is in the first couple of decades of the twentieth century. Here, it is an occupational professionalization according to a first wave of bureaucratic professionalization which re-structures constable subjectivity. A third moment is the most recent professionalization under new managerial strategies. In between this second and third moment, I have also examined the training academy as a problematic and a bridge between disciplinary and post-disciplinary shaping technologies.

My data on the first 'moment' is drawn from archives, commissions, and from secondary sources. The archival data includes material from the Public Archives of Ontario, the National Archives of Canada, the Metro Toronto Police Museum, and the Ontario Provincial Police Museum. The Commissions consist of two provincial and one municipal inquiry in the mid 1850s. These commissions documented key concerns about how policing was being accomplished, and advised its reform in a direction consistent with reforms which had already taken place in Britain. It is to be remembered, although I do not discuss it further, that Canada was a British Dominion, subject to instruction from Whitehall. Secondary sources for this first 'moment' include several articles and books written about policing in the mid to late nineteenth century.

My data for the subsequent 'moment' of occupational professionalization consists of Chief Constables' Association of Canada (C.C.A.C.) conference papers published in their Bulletin, contemporary policing texts, police manuals, and also secondary policing literature. In emphasizing professionalization according to the law enforcer, I have drawn heavily from American sources, particularly stressing August Vollmer, J. Edgar Hoover, and O. W. Wilson's influence. It is worth keeping in mind that in the early part of this century, Canadian police chiefs and administrators began to draw from the American experience and expertise on policing, particularly in keeping abreast of their advances in

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5One of these commissions is a 'Quebec' commission, but its recommendations are repeated almost in entirety in a subsequent Ontario commission.
hardware. Hoover and the F.B.I. were given much adulation in the chief executive circles of the C.C.A.C.

My data on the training academy forms a linking thread between early professionalization under disciplinary and early bureaucratic structures, and recent new managerial strategies. It runs from the 1960s through the 1990s and consists of interview data, archival data, and secondary research. The interview data is comprised of 23 interviews of police recruits between Ontario Police College and home-agency training (A1-A23); 8 follow-up interviews of police officers with 3 to 8 years on the job and coach officer experience (B1-B8); 6 interviews with police trainers (C1-C6); and 15 interviews with senior police administrators (D1-D7) and with government officials overseeing police services and/or working to develop police training and selection standards and technologies (E1-E8). These interviews ranged in length from 1/2 hour to 2 1/2 hours in length, with the average being about one hour. The interviews were structured around a set of written questions, although that structure was not religiously followed.

The archival data on academy training consisted of a search for material in the Public Archives of Ontario, the Ontario Provincial Police Museum, and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police library. This yielded information on policy regarding police training and professional development and on internal police regulatory procedures, including secondments, transfers, complaints, and reports on the discipline at the provincial training academy. Also at the Archives, I looked at Commissions of Inquiry reports on the police. The secondary research consisted of a number of books and articles on police culture and the police training academy.

Finally, my data for the current moment of neomanagerial professionalization is a number of government reports on training and selection, and also secondary sources on new managerialism and training. A number of these have been internationally recognized as leading-edge reforms, including Ontario's Police Learning System and recently adopted Use of Force Model, and R.C.M.P.'s 'problem-solving' training program.
I began this research with the question: how does the constable reveal transitions in governance? In narrowing down research, I began to see these mechanisms or technologies as instances of the enabling, shaping, and sorting out of the constable. I saw a general narrative fitting more or less along this trajectory. However, I advise the reader that this narrative is a compromise. Countless social and material technologies exist by which the constable is shaped into being as an agent of governance, and one's choice of starters is influenced greatly by the kind of story that one sees and believes enough in to tell. This may be less true with historical material, because of the limits which were in fact available for subject constitution (although I could have done much more to use contemporary sources to probe the contours of his discursive construction), but it is very pronounced with the progression of the office and profession of policing into the late twentieth century.

While technologies were not so many and varied and the reform discourses in the late nineteenth century and perhaps early twentieth century are somewhat amenable to a top-down prejudice, today one really is dealing with rather amorphous power-networks which consist of and generate a melange of enabling, shaping, and sorting technologies—and all of them at once. That they all occur simultaneously is something I wish to stress here because as the story that follows moves from a point 'a' to a point 'b,' and point 'c,' the reader will get the impression that the things done to the constable at point 'a' no longer occur at point 'c.' Indeed, they continue to occur. They can be taken for granted as occurring. Reform discourse moves ahead to tackle that which cannot be taken for granted.

In tracing those reforms, I chose and relied upon authoritative texts; texts which are 'how-to's' of doing policing and which have been influential about this exercise.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation is organized into seven subsequent chapters and a conclusion.

In chapter two, I outline the contours of what I call the citizen-constable. The citizen-constable was drawn from the list
of qualified voters and appointed to office on a yearly basis. In order to put him into office, there was enabling legislation, appointment criteria (developed from common law), and the swearing of an oath. These were the minimal available devices to enable self-rule, and we analyze their import on the police constable as an agent of governance. We then discuss what we call a discourse of disciplinary reform in the mid-nineteenth century. This reform discourse is aimed at producing major changes in the constable, intending to shape him for an emergent administrative bureaucracy.

In chapters three and four, I document how this process takes place within police shaping technologies. In chapter three, uniforms and drill are analyzed in order to reveal how they work to shape the disciplinarian or 'automatic' policeman. In chapter four, relatively distinct 'police spaces' in general, and the beat in particular, is analyzed according to how they, too, function to resituate the constable as a functionary of an emergent state administration. Working on the body and through space, both these sets of technologies stress a disciplinary governance over the whole of the police constable's time.

In chapter five, we discuss the emergence of an occupational professionalism and the expert and technocratic constable. Once constabulary privilege comes to define a corpus or 'academy' of knowledge, develop associational ties, and isolate a set of skills and tools central to a craft development, a new object and icon of reflexive subjectification is born. We note that the 'crime fighter' or 'law enforcer' is a constitution of the police constable which was the product of this professional development. We see in the depersonalized bureaucratic police constable a discursive elimination of individual affect and judgement, a move which has consequences for the development of subsequent police shaping strategies and technologies.

Chapter six explores the police training academy as a police shaping technology which springs from professionalization. In the training academy, there is a disciplinary governance, but its purview is not as total as may be expected. It also permits resistances in the neophyte constable which undermines instruction on a procedural ethic and appearance protocols. We contrast academy training to street training to find that constables are
shaped by the latter according not to the celebration of a procedural ethic and appearance protocols, but to the inverse values of informalism and secrecy.

In chapter seven, we review efforts to meld the street and the academy, particularly in judgement shaping drills and templates. Academy professionalism, a systems approach to training, and judgement or interpretation-shaping programs seek to integrate formal protocols and action-recipes, rather than leaving them distinct and oppositional. While under disciplinary governance, the constable made 'common sense judgements,' the structuring of those judgements was left to the purview of the street. Post-disciplinary judgement shaping practices begin to respond to the 'discovery of discretion' and make judgement an explicit target of intervention. Consequently, they act to shape the constable through his discretion, or autonomy and with his reflexive engagement in the responsibilities of rule.

In chapter eight, we look to new managerialism as a discourse spawning and reflecting emergent police shaping technologies. Dovetailing with neo-liberalism, new managerialism looks toward responsibilizing strategies to have police constables 'enterprise' themselves in 'learning organizations.' We take up a couple of exemplary technologies of new managerialist reform and note that what is occurring is a resubjectification of the constable according to a post-structuralist reading of agency. New managerialist technologies look past soul-shaping to competency profiles. In doing so, they dispense with 'individuality,' 'character,' 'common sense' and other concepts near and dear to the presumptively integrated individuality of the government agent.

The final chapter considers some possible implications for the constable as we enter into the next millennium.
CHAPTER TWO

THE CITIZEN CONSTABLE: ENABLEMENT AND REFORM

The constable is an historical office and there have always been mechanisms to install the office-holder into place. In this chapter, we will be looking at these mechanisms, which we will call 'enabling technologies.' Enabling technologies are those devices available to authorities to make up the individual citizen as an agent of governance. At the time of the mid-19th century reforms we will review in the second part of this chapter, these consisted of legislation, appointment criteria and the extraction of promises in the form of an oath. Enabling technologies offered mechanisms which were consistent with the mode of civil governance of the time, but they were to some extent adaptable as new agents were wanted.

Although there were variations between and within colonies before approximately 1840 in Upper Canada, the criminal justice system was based on the English system of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. At this time, private prosecution, supported by crown attorneys, served for law enforcement. The apprehension of individuals suspected of crimes was the responsibility of justices of the peace and their constables (and of sheriffs, where they existed). Justices, acting individually, in pairs, or in groups respectively, would hold courts of Petty and Quarter sessions to comprise courts of criminal jurisdiction for less serious crime, and the Court of King's Bench for more serious infractions.

Justices of the peace and parish or town constables constituted the main part of local governance. Justices of the peace were generally landowners and businessmen (Marquis, 1993: 15). As Marquis notes, the justice of the peace was 'often the only government official of any note in many a community' (ibid.). As well as by sitting in court, these officials dispensed justice personally and informally by dint of their high status in the community. And in addition to trying serious crimes and acting formally and informally on matters of petty crime, justices of the peace performed administrative tasks, overseeing constables and other amateurs like pound keepers and hog reeves in this capacity.
Finally, justices or magistrates also tried civil cases (Marquis, 1993: 16-17). Constables tended to be artisans, small businessmen, tradesmen and farmers. They were responsible, once appointed, for serving warrants, attending court and escorting prisoners on a fee for service basis. Because of their importance in governance writ large, the offices of justice of the peace and constable were consequently at the forefront of nineteenth century reforms in civic governance as urbanization and industrialization began to change the social world in some jurisdictions to a community of mobile strangers (cf. Marquis, 1987a).

As in England—although somewhat later—there emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century a need (more or less agreed upon⁶) to develop or adapt urban institutions to better deal with crime and disorder in the expanding towns and cities. Riots were frequent. In Toronto alone, there were at least 24 political or religious riots between 1839 and 1860 (Boritch, 1988: 4). There was also highly ‘visible’ social disorder in public drunkenness and immorality, as industrialization gave large groups of the new labouring ‘underclass’ a more instantaneous form of reimbursement in an emergent cash economy. In countering these expressions of social upheaval, municipal institutions needed to show themselves as impartial and ‘professional.’ ‘Order, progress and efficiency’ were consequently being cited in their ‘bourgeois’ reshaping (3).

In describing and analyzing enabling technologies, we will be following a process in which the notion of the state agent is being formed in contradistinction to the dutiful citizen. As we shall see, in pre-reform Canada both the constable (or citizen-constable, as we are calling him) and police regulations acted together in the defense of a foundation security structured on liberal principles: police regulations placed duties on individual householders to partake of their own regulation; and the enabling mechanisms we review below helped to install in place fee-for-service constables who are encouraged to ‘enterprise’⁷ their

⁶On this question of the perceived need of reform, see Reiner, 1985; Paley, 1989.
⁷I mean this in the sense articulated recently by Gordon (1991) in his account of liberalism.
services (although in a fashion which sets them against the ideals of civic duty).

Under new reforms, subsequently, the police constable was enlisted to do disciplining work, and the oath, for example, was deployed to reshape the constable not as a partisan and local citizen offering services to the justice of the peace, but as a professional employee of state interests. In aiding the government of civil society under a new administrative machinery, the constable became a key agent whose subjectivity was restructured according to emergent protocols of governance. With disciplinary reform, as we explore it towards the end of this chapter, we see a change in policing from an activity performed by citizens who act as local agents of governances, to one in which state agents emerge as distinct from citizens.

1. ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE CONSTABLE

Every high and petty constable is, by the common law, a conservator of the peace...; therefore, he is authorized, without any warrant, to arrest all traitors, felons, and suspicious persons, and all those whom he shall see upon the point of committing treason or felony, or doing any act which would manifestly endanger life.... In case of any breach of the peace committed, or one about to be committed, in the presence of a constable--as where violent threats or attempts are used by any person to beat or hurt another--the constable may arrest the party and carry him before a magistrate, or detain him till he can conveniently do so (Keeler, 1851: 182).

How government installs its agents and how they are deployed is a matter of historical context and historically available technologies. A governing authority in early nineteenth century Canada had very few mechanisms for defining and filling the constabulary office. There was legislation which permitted him to do so. There were also appointment thresholds which restricted eligibility for constabulary duty. Finally, there was an oath of office. The swearing of an oath certified the passage from citizen to citizen-constable. To officially set the constable on his way, legislation, appointment criteria, and the oath comprised the total tool-kit of resources which governing authority had available.

In this section, we will describe these devices and analyze how they operate to enable the constable. We ask the question:
what kind of subjectivity did these devices help to produce? In doing so, we will take a familiar trajectory, but I must caution the reader that the familiar may only be temporary: while here we will be reviewing legislation and assuming its import, we will be moving quickly away from a 'legislatively driven' account of the constable-shaping enterprise. We begin with legislation because little else existed in terms of formal mechanisms to get the constable off and running, and because it was exemplary of the strategies of governance of the time. We ask that the reader keep in mind that the legislative narrative in fact continues even if we do not follow it explicitly; later, it becomes one account among the increasing many.

Judge Gowan wrote in 1852 that,

it is a great mistake to view the office of constable as a post of profit; on the contrary, it may be looked upon as one of those burdensome offices which, in securing the objects of society, it is necessary for nearly every citizen, suited for it, to take in his turn (1852: 46).

Indeed, as the written law also suggested, the citizen was understood as already shaped to do constabulary work by virtue of his citizen status: only citizens who were inferior or superior to a 'default' citizenship could be seen as presumptively beyond the purview of this norm. Indeed, an 1836 Commission on County Rates in England inquired into the English parish constable and found that '[n]o inquiry takes place into his qualifications or fitness for the office.' (in Storch and Philips, forthcoming: 1)

Such inquiry awaited the transitions of the office and, it is being argued here, were made possible by it. While legislation, appointment criteria, and the oath enabled, there was no provision for positively shaping constables individually to suit the office: there was no pre-emptive shaping offered to them. No special training, no tests, no period of apprenticeship, and no probationary period was required.

A. Enabling Legislation

A justice of the peace in Canada at the beginning of the nineteenth century did not have to break into a sweat to produce government agents at the far reaches of his jurisdiction. As we have just mentioned, government agents already existed in the
citizens themselves: positive duties were placed on householders and others by law and custom to assist in the business of public safety and administration. In the second place, enabling legislation existed to augment government's needs. These served in the appointment of citizens to the constabulary office on a part-time, fee-for-service basis.

Legislation or legal enactment produces a certain kind of space of governance and a certain sensibility in those subject to its power. A discussion of the full characteristics of this space and sensibility is not possible, but one point is salient: the manifestation of the divide between public duty and private right. Police regulations still had a meaning which distinguished 'police' from 'constable.' Indeed 'policing' put positive duties on householders to participate in ensuring their safety and security while maintaining a public/private divide.

As Oesterich argues, 'police' in (pre-) modern states meant 'the regulation, discipline, and control of a community', 'civil administration,' 'public order' (Oesterich, 1982: 153). It covered 'the authority which the ruler arrogated to himself to issue commands and prohibitions' (157). Police were not individuals, but the 'regimentation' (156) of social life. They were measures ('police ordinances,' --detailed codes) which regulated every facet of social interaction. In England, this eighteenth century concept of 'police' found little legitimacy in public institutions. Nonetheless, continental practices did find some expression in New France and 'police regulations' were disseminated in Quebec towns (cf. Regles et Reglements de Police Pour La Ville et Les Fauxbourgs de Montreal, 1810) and also in the provisions noted in Upper Canada's Baldwin Act cited below. In police regulations we see at least the utilization of this vehicle of governance, if not the thrust of its import.8 Before (and after) the office of constable was imported to British North America with English common law in 1793, citizens were compelled to participate in the militia on one hand, and to engage in the positive duties described in police regulations, on the other.

8If 'police' meant to stand for the total administration of a population or inhabitants of a territory, Rose (1993) and Burtchell (1991) have noted with Foucault (1988) that governmentality is specified in opposition to it.
The first police regulations drafted in Canada by Count Frontenac already set the colonial precedent to place responsibility on individual townspersons or homeowners. Each citizen was required to 'equip himself with a bucket of water and attend any fire scene with the expressed purpose of rendering assistance in the case of emergency.' Each homeowner was also directed to 'possess a ladder suitable to reach the roof top in case of fire' (Talbot et. al., 1985: 27). In the 1810 Regles et Reglements de Police Pour La Ville et Les Fauxbourgs de Montreal, the positive duties on citizens extended from the disposing of wastes and garbage, to yielding the right of way to loaded carriages on the streets, to the prevention of opportunities for theft. Article 28 required proprietors and occupiers of houses and other buildings to keep cellar doors in good repair and closed, especially at night, so that the contents of cellars would not manifest an open invitation to thievery. They were to pay a fine if remiss in this duty.

Some of these traditional roles and duties were re-affirmed in The Acts for the Erection of Municipal Corporations and the Establishment of Police Regulations in Upper Canada 1850 (the Baldwin Act). This Act consisted of further regulations of this sort, including the positive requirement of householders to keep buckets handy, to keep ladders on the roofs of their houses, and additional duties relating to the prevention of fires and the disposal of rubbish (1850: 41-44). It was also provided that, where municipal councils of villages deemed there were sufficient numbers, 'Police Trustees' were to be elected annually, and that these Trustees were to 'execute and enforce, and cause to be executed and enforced' within the limits of such Village, the Regulations of Police herein and hereby provided and established for all such Villages' (ibid.).

As Oesterich claims, police regulations were a 'new structure of command and obedience' which furthered the demise of feudalism (1982: 157). With this system of regimentation there were positive duties on the part of citizens to literally 'put their own houses in order.' In addition, citizens were called upon to keep their private property distinct from common or public property. Public property and spaces were also subject to many restrictions, and
citizens were compelled to its care as well. In the small sampling of legislation here, we can see that policing was understood as the administration or regulation of public space or of property impacting on public space, and that that administration fell largely on householders. Citizens were compelled to be responsible for this policing under penalty of fines. The agency of this activity was dispersed over the whole community.

While police regulations put positive duties on householders, the constabulary office put special additional duties on appointed members of the community. Citizens were subject to appointment as constables and could be compelled to participate in the further government of fellow citizens according to the terms of the constabulary office. As Alan McDougall has written, with An Act to Provide for the Nomination of Parish and Town Officers within this Province. of 1793, 'the common law tradition of the amateur citizen constabulary was introduced into Upper Canada' (1971: 12). Its introduction appeared just following the official introduction of common law to Upper Canada, Introduction of English Common Law Act, (S. U. C. 1792, 33 Geo. III. c. 1), and was also coincident with the introduction of the commercial law of England (Jones, 1882: 20).

The 1793 law provided that Justices of the Peace could nominate and appoint within their areas of jurisdiction 'a sufficient, discreet, and proper person, to serve as the office of high constable' and 'a sufficient number of persons, as in their discretion will be necessary to serve the office of constable in each and every parish, township, reputed township, or place' (33 G. 3, c. 2, § 10-11). The act stipulated a period of reprieve of three years between which a constabulary appointment did not have to be undertaken. This was eventually repealed by the Appointment of Constables Act (S.C. 1860 23 Vict. c. 8.) which provided for the appointment of local constables by magistrates, as before, but authorized these appointments to continue year to year unless the appointee claimed exemption from serving. With this legislation,...

9The nightly watch, which we will discuss later, was added to this distribution of policing and security duty, only it enlisted volunteers who would be paid, if at all, under the renumeration schedule of constables.
a tradition of more than 5 centuries and which was very much of a
civilian character (Guth, 1994) was officially exported to Canada.

The constable's duties and rights were laid out by Keele
(1835a; 1835b). Among other observations, Keele noted that the
constable had no right to handcuff a prisoner unless he attempted
escape. The constable, further, had the right to imprison persons
who assaulted or insulted him, to 'abate an affray, to 'commit
affrayers to the stock on his own view,' (Keele, 1835: 18) to
break open houses 'to suppress disorderly drinking, or noise, at
an unreasonable hour of the night,' (18) to 'beat another in his
own defence,' (18) and to kill fleeing felons. With regard to the
latter, 'the utmost caution and prudence' was advised, 'since
nothing but absolute necessity will justify an officer in killing
the party he may be in pursuit of' (18).

In addition, the common law governing constables drew further
boundaries, both in terms of what we would now call due process
restrictions (the duty to bring the offender before a magistrate
as the soonest convenience, the duty to place the offender in
front of the same magistrate who endorsed the warrant authorizing
the arrest, etc.), and institutional parameters. With regard to
these institutional parameters, Keele reiterated that the
appointment of constable was made by justices of the peace, upon
whose authority he could also be removed. It was also noted that
the office is 'wholly ministerial' (19). This fact was taken to
permit the further delegation of authority, both by the high
constable in the 'superintendence and direction of all petty
constables,' (ibid.) and by the petty constables in the
appointment of deputies. With regard to the former, the high
constable was consequently viewed as responsible for the conduct
of petty constables, 'since he is bound to notice and present
their defaults; for the defect of which duty he is, in fact,
presentable himself.' (16) With regard to the latter, the petty
constable was viewed to carry liability for actions of deputies
which were not sworn: 'though, if duly sworn, the liability of the
principal is at an end' (20). In addition, the constable was
understood to have 'no power to execute a warrant out of the
jurisdiction of the justice who grants it--unless backed by a
magistrate of the district in which the offender is found.' The
constable had no obligation, but also no protection to execute such out-of-jurisdiction warrants, and indeed could be 'sued in trespass' were he to do so without authorization.

The common law office also afforded protections, punishments and rewards. Under the heading, 'indemnity and protections', the main thrust of the law was the protection of the constable acting on the basis of any warrant which is in the jurisdiction of the issuing magistrate. Actions brought against him would need to be brought in the same district in which the offence was committed, and the constable was not himself answerable for the warrant 'if he complies with the requisitions of that statute.' There was a statute of limitations of six months after the disputed act, of any action against a constable. Punishments were cited for the failure to serve when appointed, and for neglect of duty, 'either at common law or by statute.' The constable could be fined or imprisoned (or both) for the former and is indictable for the latter. He could also be fined for 'not endeavoring to pacify an affray in his presence' and for not returning a warrant. With regard to rewards, the reimbursement of the constable’s expenses were to be locally determined by the justices 'as the may think proper' (21). It was noted that no provision of general expenses had been made by provincial statutes. A typical schedule for remuneration included a set sum for an arrest upon warrant, serving a summons, mileage, attending the assizes, taking prisoners to gaol, etc. (Gowan, 1852: 48).

These, then, were the statutory parameters of the constable. The legislation made legal the convention that citizens were to partake of governing as a positive duty. Police regulations were specified in opposition to the constable in the way that liberalism consists of the twin dimensions of self-regulation and 'free' enterprise. Police regulations called upon citizens to regulate their social conduct and to keep the public/private divide manifest in everyday life. The office of constable, although stemming from similar duties, was also encouraged through monetary rewards, no doubt first intended only to lessen the burden of the office. These rewards, as we shall see, introduced enterprise into the office and set up a conflict with the value of civic duty. While police regulations reflected the positive duty
on the liberal citizen to match ideals of virtuous citizenship, the fee-for-service constable demonstrated the central place of free enterprise in liberal citizenship. The citizen-constable, although coming from the traditions of positive duty, was becoming an 'economic man' who 'enterprised' himself for the business of local governance.

Indeed, enterprise is a loose canon in the office of constable in another way. Until the office’s recontextualization under professionalizing reforms, there was no intermediary with which the regulations on the office and the requirements of the law could be interpreted: the emphasis was to enable the participation of the citizen as a constable and this enabling came to make the constable a profitable office. But once the constable became professionalized as an employee of the state, an intermediary interpretive structure did begin to develop and the enterprise of the constable could be shaped according to a burgeoning array of organizational interests.

B. Appointment Regulations

In the context of Judge Gowan’s thinking that the office was a positive civic duty, it was not uncommon for justices to reject petty constables’ requests for reimbursements on the argument that ‘constables are bound to perform their duties gratuitously’ (Sokil, 1991: 3). Here the law was 'interpellating' citizenship with positive social duties. Each townsperson or homeowner was required to be proactive in a ‘policing’ capacity; in addition, each townsperson could be further compelled to serve as constable. Against this tradition, the office of constable was amenable to enterprising, rather than dutiful, citizenship. In the appointments and the reimbursements of the citizen-constable, the co-presence of enterprise and duty eventually came to be viewed with suspicion as an unwieldy mix. By the end of the century, it was not more dutiful citizens who were being called upon to solve the problem of the office, but rather specialized ‘professional’ state agents which were being made up to do so.

The law in mid-century, although inclusive with respect to who was expected to partake in constabulary work, did set some parameters. In the main, these parameters were restricted to age, gender and class. Those appointed were to be men between the ages
of twenty-one and sixty, and qualified voters. For the rest, the emphasis was rather a case of who was exempted from having to do the duty, rather than who was permitted to do it.

Being a qualified voter meant owning or leasing property of a fixed minimum value. In the Town of Picton in 1837, this was set upward of £10 / annually (Taylor, 1994: 12). At the other end of the socio-economic scale, 'gentlemen of quality' could apply to the court for relief from serving (Keele 1835a: 15). Men from the upper classes who were appointed could also pass responsibility for constabulary duty on to a 'deputy.' The 'bottom' minimums and 'upper' maximums, then, were equivalent to setting a normative social standing for the office. By dint of the flexibility in the term 'qualified voter,' that standard could reflect local variability and preferences.

For most, avoidance of office depended on the availability and willingness of another. But for persons occupying other (high) 'public' offices, there was an automatic exemption. 'Barristers at law, attorneys, and other officers of the court of king's bench, were exempted from serving the office' (Keele, 1935b: 125). Professionals such as teachers, physicians, surgeons, military officers were also exempt from duty (Keele, 1835a), as were clergymen and magistrates (Gowan, 1852: 9), and other men who objected to some requirement of the office based on 'religious scruples' (Gowan, 1852: 5).

Persons appointed were also to be sufficiently intelligent and able-bodied. 'If a poor and ignorant person be chosen, he may by law be discharged, and an abler person appointed in his room' (Keele, 1835b: 125). Gowan added that 'persons of weak body, and (clearly) women, would not be liable to appointment' (1852: 9). Constables were further required to be inhabitants of the places in which they were to serve (Keele, 1835a: 15). Such was the suspicion of non-British immigrants that constables could not even be naturalized 'foreigners' (15). Finally, they were not to be publicans (Keele, 1835b: 125). No further requirements were given, but the law also suggested that the constable could be chosen blindly from the rolls.

The length of constabulary duty is not all that clear, and appeared to vary from county to county and between country and
town. On the whole, constables did not appear to serve long, although there were no term limits. Taylor (1994) found that approximately 95% of constables in Prince Edward County, Ontario served 5 years or less, while a handful served 2 or 3 decades (1994: 7). It may be, however, that while petty constables were often rotated, High Constables were rather permanent positions. In what became York County, High Constable William Higgins served from 1826 to 1872, a term of 46 years (Sokil, 1991: 3).

Taylor (1994) also found no cases in Picton in which the person appointed found a substitute or refused to serve. This may indicate that the appointment was not avoided in some jurisdictions at least, and/or, as Taylor suggests, that candidates for appointment were first sounded out by the justices. Recall that persons appointed were exempt from having to serve other civil positions for 3 years (Keele, 1835b: 126) and that this may have been of some value. This exemption was mitigated somewhat by the practice in many jurisdictions of placing other civic duties as add-ons to constabulary duty, which was done following the separation of government administration from the judiciary in 1842. Nonetheless, these added duties could themselves supplement the remuneration of the person filling the role, so it is not clear they were avoided. In the village of Berlin in 1854, the first constable was officially 'Town Constable and Inspector of Weights and Measures,' and received a remuneration of £20 per annum (Pike, 1989: 3). In York County, William Higgins received a remuneration of £20 per annum in 1819 (Sokil, 1991: 3). Taylor's analysis of constabulary duty in Prince Edward County suggested that the office was a lucrative source of cash and that those filling the office had 'prominent family names' (Taylor, 1994).

With the emergence of central authorities, appointments became a site of contest between local and extra-local power. Officials within central administrative bureaucracies continually sought to consolidate. In 1868 a police bill was drafted for a provincial police force, and this bill was key to a transition in the office because it provided for the central appointment of constables. The Police of Canada Act (S.C. 1868 31 Vict., c. 73) broke ground in that it provided for 'the appointment of a police
force that was to be deployed throughout the new confederation' (Stenning, 1981: 41). It also stated that constables were to be appointed either by or under the authority of the Governor in Council rather than simply by justices of the peace. Additionally, it provided for the appointment of one or more Commissioners of Police who were not only to have control and management of the police force, but also were to have all the 'powers and authority, rights and privileges' of municipal police magistrates and justices of the peace in the province in which they were employed. Under this Act neither constables nor justices of the peace were purely local offices. The constable was also no longer locally chosen (although, in fact he continued to be so selected in practice), but was to be appointed by and under the authority of the central government.

Even after the Police of Canada Act of 1868, constables continued in practice to be appointed on the basis of informal recommendation. This methodology appears to have persisted well into the twentieth century. Although the O.P.P. began operation in 1909, it was not until 1943 that the county constabulary was completely eclipsed (Higley, 1984). The counties had little interest in the expense and the loss to patronage opportunity of reforming the appointment process and resisted moves to centralize. Despite the intrusion of extra-local vetting, MPPs were made aware that in order to 'please' constituents, they would do best by facilitating the appointments desired by the most influential citizens. Typically, the office of the Attorney General would receive 'letters of support' from one or more members of a community (via their MPP) regarding the appointment of a constable for that local jurisdiction. These letters sometimes remarked on the proficiency of the preferred candidate, but also offered simple evaluations of local opinion as to the candidate's acceptability in the role. They also reflect the language of political patronage. In 1912, for instance, there are several letters of support of an applicant for appointment as Provincial Constable from which the following statements are drawn. 'He will make an excellent officer and you can certainly please us all by granting him his request, no doubt of it.' 'I think his appointment would meet with the approval of all our good
fellows.' 'I have great pleasure in recommending --- as a fit and proper person to fill the position lately vacated by provincial officer ---. 'We do not need to press upon you his qualifications, but we do wish to assure you that his appointment will be acceptable to all our friends here' (italics added, names represented by '---'). The persistence of the county jurisdictions to (at least attempt to) engage in patronage in constable and chief constable selection is evident in the PAO files well into the mid-1950s.

Although far from being objective on the subject, David Archibald, founding head of the Toronto Police Force Morality Squad, spoke disparagingly of the county constabulary at the C.C.A.C. convention of 1913, saying that it was the 'worst element in the community [that] practically controls the appointment of the rural constables' (C.C.A.C., 1913: 93). Archibald also made the statement that this 'worst element' controlled the movement of the constables and 'utilize[d] their services for personal advantage' (ibid.). As an example, he noted that county magistrates were sometimes directors of local fairs and that they collected their prize money from the 'revenue received from fakirs for the privilege of running gambling devices.' He added, 'and woe betide the unlucky constable who attempts to bring them [the fakirs] before the magistrate.'

In fact, the fee-for-service rewards of the office of constable made it, for the enterprising citizen, a lucrative source of cash income. By the late 19th century, abuses were quite common and typically involved overcharging so that both the fees per arrest and fees per court appearance could be maximized. Here is an example: 'George Hawkins, who had been arrested on September 30, 1892, for stealing a cow was subsequently committed for trial. On October 5th, he was re-arrested while in jail, for a similar offence, and again committed for trial. On October 12th, he was arrested again and again committed for trial' (in Sokil, 1991: 6). Chief Chamberlin noted that the fee-for-service system rewarded such activities as the prosecution (to the tune of $70 dollars in one day for one 'enterprising' constable).

10PAO, RG 33, Solicitor General, Series A-2 No. 19.1.
vagabonds found on railway property (C.C.A.C., 1913: 11). Archibald of Toronto concluded that, 'the whole system of appointing, paying, and controlling the rural police of the country is wrong, and this Association should insist on radical change' (1913:93). Archibald's remarks were supported by Chief Gordon, who noted that previous to the 1909 appointment of Joseph Rogers as superintendent of the O.P.P., 'nearly all appointments were political' (11). In their 1913 convention, the police chiefs roundly condemned the fee for service system, calling it antithetical to good policing.

The change in the appointment mechanism offered extra-local officials the means to counter such patronage. On numerous occasions the O.P.P. commissioner responded to MPPs' written lobbies for patronage appointments to the constabulary informing the MPP on the candidate's requirement to meet the standards not of local party politics, but of the O.P.P. itself. When these were in direct conflict, the commissioner cited the candidate's failure to meet these professional standards as justification for non-appointment.¹¹

In municipalities, even after the municipal incorporation of large towns such as Toronto, the constable was initially still interpreted as an instrument of municipal political will. In the 1834 incorporation act of Toronto, the Mayor and aldermen were given full power to 'order to be taken up or arrested all and any rogues, vagabonds, drunkards, and disorderly persons' (in Stenning, 1981: 50). When municipal corporations like Toronto and Windsor began to pay constable's salaries, they viewed the constable as accountable not just for discrete services, but for the whole of his time. The municipalities sought the services of police officer and peace officer, and viewed the latter as one of the handy roles this new agent could perform for them.

Indeed, as we see in the kind of activities of the constable as a subordinate officer of the municipal corporation, he was being viewed as its hired hand and jack of all trades—a kind of administerial janitor. In the village of Berlin (Kitchener)—as noted—the constable was hired as a 'Town Constable and Inspector

¹¹At least, so it was in the letters which survive. Although see, as well, PAO, Patrick Dewan's Papers, Series F 1432-3, Applications for Employment.
of Weights of Measures' (1854); in the village of Waterloo he was appointed as Town Constable and Overseer of Highways (1876) (Pike, 1989); and in Preston he was appointed as the Constable and Fire Inspector, Overseer of Highways, Lamplighter, and Sanitary Inspector (1886). In Toronto, he inspected bread (for size), inspected how hay was weighed and made sure there was no fishing at night with lights (Stenning, 1981). The subservient position of the constable can be gleaned by the duties of the constable in Galt, where he was to, among other things, see that the Council Room was 'comfortably heated and lighted' (Pike, 1989). As police officer subject to the bi-laws of the municipality, the constable lost the freedom to engage in the private pursuits. With the hire by municipal corporations of 'town constables and etc.,' the autonomy of the constable was on the verge of invasion.

As with the counties and later the province, the appointment mechanism in municipalities was restructured to meet the objectives of putatively less partisan, central administrative reform. The Municipal Institutions of Upper Canada Act of 1858 established police boards so that there was some insulation between partisan (and sectarian) affiliation and the holding of the constabulary office. The intermediary of the police board and the gradual recognition of the executive, specialist decision-making power of the chief of police began to distance the mayor and town aldermen from the power to appoint and remove the constable. Still, we see that central authorities became gradually more active in structuring appointments. Central state administration was not served by the traditional understandings of default or near-universal access to the constabulary office as it was iterated by Judge Gowan. In intruding into local partisanship, the central authority rather helped to distinguish the autonomy of the office from the enterprise of the constable, supporting the former by restricting the latter.

Notice again, then, the term 'citizen-constable.' The publicly serving police officer and constable is both an agent of state authority and private citizen. The conjunction between the terms marks this fracture between a juridical authority and emergent liberal rationality. The constable serves the administrative and coercive functions often attributed to the very
meaning of the state (Skocpol, 1979). But if 'constable' in this conjunctive individual represents the state, 'citizen' represents the freedoms of liberal citizenship--understood as that sphere of autonomy from the encroachment of the state. The irony, then, is that there was, in late 18th and early 19th century Canada a positive duty, punishable by fine and/or imprisonment, to play the role both of the free liberal citizen and the coercive and administerial state representative: in the interpolation of 'citizen-constable' we find conjoined the most basic institutional fracture between the juridical authority and the free individual of a liberal rationality (cf. Pasquino, 1991: 109).

What follows the reign of the citizen-constable is a most persistent effort to separate in body what is already understood as divided in principle and institution. Beginning in the early 19th century and completed in the mid-twentieth century, the body, mind and soul of 'constable' is separated from the husk of 'citizen'--and that sphere of civil autonomy--which served its incubation. Instead, the constable is identified ever closer with the state--and the institutional monopoly of coercion. The police institution emerges to protect and defend this division, first by understanding the constable within the purview of the state and denying him recourse to enterprising citizenry roots and citizenry rights, and then by reaffirming this division in the constable as the limits of his power. We will see that what follows this, ironically again, is a subsequent period in which the citizen-constable is again a sought-after amalgamation of state power and community autonomy.

C. The Oath

In addition to enabling legislation and appointment criteria, the oath was available as a means to install constables. It is with the oath that we see a mechanism for shifting citizen loyalties so that they are to the ruler and not to local interests. It is deployed to encourage the construction of the constable in a manner consistent with the interests of emergent authorities. The oath is in this respect an adaptable enabling technology; while it is easily used by justices of the peace to make up citizen-constables according to more local preferences, it is also easily
reshaped to infer the constable as a disinterested professional tied to the state.

An oath is a solemn declaration or promise of conduct which, as Websters defines it, is made 'with an appeal to God for the truth' of what is declared. By being a requirement to make a promise 'before God' and community, the oath deploys the self-to-self relation\(^\text{12}\) and the relationship to religious authority to compel allegiance to a sovereign tie. It works by way of offering a group of people a guarantee of the acknowledgment of and service to one administrative authority. It sometimes also explicitly requires the renunciation of others. An oath, in addition, is a promise that one’s future conduct will fall within some given parameters. When applied to an office, it is also a promise that conduct while serving that office will conform with current norms. It is in this latter capacity that the oath offers itself as an adaptable technology between the regime of the citizen constable and the emergent regime of distinct, paid duty state agents.

Oaths of allegiance were sworn by settlers to Upper Canada between 1800 and 1806. The earliest settlers in Upper Canada were required to swear these oaths of allegiance in order to qualify for a land grant. In addition to swearing allegiance to King George III, they were also to take an oath of supremacy denying the authority of the Pope in Canada, and an oath of abjuration renouncing the claims of the Stuart line to the throne of England. An example of one such oath, required of Quebec Roman Catholics, and penalized when neglected or refused is offered. It is one of three oaths reprinted in the section entitled 'constitutional acts' in Keele's 1851 edition of the Magistrates Manual:

I A.B. do sincerely promise and swear, that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to his Majesty King

\(^{12}\text{In 'Technologies of the Self' (1988), Foucault describes four major types of technologies, one of which (expressed in the title of his paper) concerns the way an individual acts upon herself as an individual. Under such slogans as 'the concern with self' or 'know yourself,' the individual transforms herself, whether through the operations of her body, her soul, her thoughts, or her conduct in order to attain an ideal state of existence (1988: 18). Here, the self-to-self relation refers to the status of this contract or pact between the individual and this idealized condition. This contract or pact attempts to reconcile authoritative discourses with the individual's unique commitments to the self. In this sense, the self-to-self relation is another way of saying 'ethics.'}
George, and him will defend to the utmost of my power, against all traitorous conspiracies and attempts whatsoever which shall be made against his person, crown and dignity; and I will do my utmost endeavour to disclose and make known to his Majesty, his heirs and successors, all treasons and traitorous conspiracies and attempts, which I shall know to be against him or any of them; and all this I do swear without any equivocation, mental evasion, or secret reservation, and renouncing all pardons and dispensations from any power and person whatsoever in the contrary. So help me God (in Keele, 1851: 190).

Note how the oath here centered on the assurance that the land claimant was pledging allegiance to one sovereign authority, and one sovereign authority only. He was to specifically renounce the claims of others. This requirement served the purpose of pervading the territorial claim with industrious individuals whose will was aligned to the interests of the sovereign. Now, while it is true that this oath was required at a time of some tumult in Britain in the matter of ascendancy, it is these very fractures (and/or their threat) which were nevertheless deployed to install a sovereign tie in citizens.

In addition to swearing out oaths for land grants, citizens of Upper Canada appointed to do constable duty had to take an oath of office. Refusal to take the oath upon being appointed was an indictable offence which could result in fine, or upon failure to pay, committal (Keele, 1835b: 126). Read out by the Justice of the Peace, the oath was as follows: 'You shall well and truly serve our sovereign---, in the office of --- for the --- of ---, for the year ensuing, according to the best of your skill and knowledge. So help you God' (ibid.). In Judge Gowan's *Canadian Constable's Assistant* of 1852, and Adam Wilson's *Constable's Guide* of 1859 this wording remained unchanged, pursuant to 33 Geo. III., chap. 2, Sec. 10.

The concern with the influence of sectarianism on the office of the constable was an issue of local politics in towns like Toronto (Rogers, 1984) and began to get explicit reference in the oaths of some municipal forces. In 1866, 29-30 Vic., c.52 s. 371 required the following oath of constables:

that I will to the best of my power cause the peace to be kept and preserved, and will prevent all offences against the persons and properties of Her Majesty's subjects: and that while I continue to hold said office, I will, to the
best of my skill and knowledge, discharge all the duties thereof faithfully according to Law, and that I will not connect myself with, or attend the meetings of any secret society, while I am a member of the Police Force.

Wilson (1859) noted that the Toronto the Board of Commissioners introduced a rule (presumably in 1858) which required of each new police appointee that he should 'declare upon oath, that, with the exception of the order of Freemasonry, he was not connected with any secret society' (in Stenning, 1981: 52). By 1875, the oath required of Toronto police officers was more generic in its requirements against political involvement by the police. The oath listed conditions including the restriction on the expression of political or religious opinion and involvement in 'secret society,' (in Momente, 1993: 22). The Toronto Police Regulations of 1890 reaffirmed this emphasis (Grassett, 1890: 28), as did the London Force of 1867 (cf. Addington, 1990).

This concern with sectarianism and partisan political influence was also apparent in the federal oath. In 1868, the introduction of An Act Respecting the Police allowed the central appointment of constables, and the oath cited in this act reflected both the concern for sectarianism and partisan politics, and the incursion of central political power on the office:

I, A.B., solemnly swear, that I will faithfully, diligently, and impartially execute and perform the office in the Police Force of the Province of Ontario, and all of the duties of said office, and will well and truly obey all lawful orders and instructions which I shall receive as such, without fear, favour or affection of, or towards any person or party whomsoever. So help me God.

Not surprisingly, this sectarian concern seemed weaker in the counties, as reflected in the County Constable's Manual or Handy-Book of 1882:

I, A. B., having been appointed constable for the county of ---, do solemnly swear that I will truly, faithfully and impartially perform the duties appertaining to the said office, according to the best of my skill and ability. So help me God' (Jones, 1882: 6).

With the emergence of professional policing, the police constable's oath to the Crown was also one of several mechanisms by which he was de-localized or estranged from partisan politics and patronage. We ought to emphasize again our contention that this technology of the governance of police constables is at this
formative stage primarily inundated with the question of whose authority. The impeachment of sectarian politics reflected in the mandatory promises of the new police takes it as a given that there is a position of political neutrality which can and ought to be occupied by constables. Wilson (1859) remarked that in Ireland, the confidence of the people was inspired in the police when an act of Parliament in 1836 provided that each man must declare an oath, upon his appointment to the new police, swearing that he was unconnected with any secret society, save for the order of Freemasonry (83).

In addition to the concerns for political and religious neutrality, its forceful merging of individual and political will and of individual and emergent professional ethics, one can see in the oath required as per the Toronto regulations a further interest. The first section of this oath articulated the commitment to rules and regulations of the force. The second section, again prominent by dint of its nominal order, read: 'I will devote my whole time to Police service, and will not be concerned in any business or trade, either through my wife or otherwise' (Grasset 1890: 28). Here, the oath required of constables of the Toronto Police force their separation from commerce and a restriction on the liberal freedoms enjoyed by others. The focus appears to have been on cultivating or gleaning the commitment of the whole man in the service of the administrative authority.

What does it mean, then, to rely on the oath to mobilize conduct? First, the oath works on the relation of self-to-self (or ethics). It mobilizes individual 'honour' directly to the service of an administrative authority. It deploys the individual's religious conviction in the service of governmental aims. Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism described an elective affinity between Protestantism and capitalism, and demonstrated how an ethics or positive affirmation about self-conduct could have an 'elective affinity' with a relation of domination. The oath, in being a public declaration ideally made in front of one's community members, also conscripts the vigilance of the community in these governmental aims.
The oath engages the individual as a subject, a community member, and pietist and thus works to overdetermine interpolations along a set axis of conduct. It is in this way a technology and expedient of government which is highly portable. The oath can be easily mobilized into service, and its contents can be easily changed to reflect emergent problematizations of governance. In this respect, the oath is a technology of 'action at a distance' (Latour, 1994). It reflects the continuity of the constable's office in terms of original authority as it was first established in the Statute of Winchester in 1285 and imported to Canada in the Parish and Town Constable's Act of 1793. In this respect, it enacted citizens as governmental agents; it affirmed, although in a class and gender-restricted way, positive social participation and self-government; it distinguished a more onerous obligation of citizenry on an individual. General constabulary duty was presumptively conceived as an obligation of community membership rather than a specialism belonging to a craft or profession.

As was suggested by Gowan, it was assumed of the citizen constable that he was dutiful and self-responsible. Wherever he stood the office of the constable, a symbol of local and self-governance. He would act on the basis of and according to a respect for that locus of liberal autonomy: free enterprise. In the meantime, he had little recourse to the suasive power of a distant authority, and was compelled to rely on all of the personal authority he could muster. Drawn out of the community he policed, he could only act authoritatively if he was able to mobilize the strength of his own reputation.

What was emerging in the place of the citizen-constable was the police constable. The police constable was an agent of the state whose citizenry, rather than being exalted, was rather restricted with the concept of 'whole time' duty. With full-time paid duty, the distinction of amateur and professional in policing became pronounced and began to define constabulary terms.13 In

13 In 1859, the Toronto City Council dispensed altogether with the 'special constables' that were available for special duties or to replace sick regular constables. It noted: 'when police service is required, it is too unsafe to trust in any raw, unpracticed help which can be had on the sudden' (in Boritch, 1988: 150). In this large urban centre, the reign of simple enabling technologies were coming to an end with this early concept of police and
coming to be a representative of an emergent administrative structure, the police constable bridged police administration and constabulary duties, came to represent more than himself in the state and its aims, and came to have a dutiful citizenship restructured as a duty to state authority. To be so reshaped, a proactive coaching had to be done, and this is what disciplinary reforms spoke to and disciplinary technologies made real.

2. DISCIPLINARY REFORM

In mid-nineteenth century Ontario, major changes began to take place in the constabulary office. The task of constabulary duty had been an expectation of every able-bodied and mentally competent male non-professional, but between the 1830s and the 1890s, the role of constable was becoming a full-time job paid by salary by town council or by provincial government.

In the previous section, we started to speak of a fracture which was beginning to show in the constabulary office. We argued that the constable was enabled through legislation, appointment criteria, and the technology of the oath. Here, I want to trace how a set of reforms demonstrate a radically new view of how the constable was thought of as an agent of rule, show how these reforms argued for a new set of technologies, and argue that these would and did dramatically change police constable subjectivity.

The fracture that was beginning to show in the citizen-constable was that line of mediation between the agent of extra-local government, and the agent of self-governance. The office of the citizen-constable offered adaptivity between, and also assumed consistency between, local and extra-local norms and interests. The power of governance fell on the shoulders of justices of the peace and constables as their agents. With the emergence of the intermediary of an emergent state bureaucracy, institutions and agencies, that line of mediation and that assumed consistency fell under a sustained scrutiny. While sectarian or partisan considerations no doubt aggravated out-groups during the reign of the citizen-constable, the absence of the intermediate vehicle of the state gave no forum for the articulation and constable division. Other jurisdictions would soon follow in realizing this principle.
political mobilization of these concerns. To this, it should be added that, in the period of reform we are considering, massive immigration of groups with a greater divergence of sectarian affiliations was taking place.

The emergent state thus made it possible and perhaps even necessary to think of the constable on new terms. Firstly, the question could now be asked, and asked from a common point of central governance, what are the common characteristics of the constable? What makes him useful to the interests of the state? From the point of view of this central administration, it became possible and useful to stamp the constable with its themes and protocols.

Secondly, the constable could begin to be seen, not as an obedient servant of the sovereign via the office of the lower judiciary—although, of course, he would continue to retain traces of this interpolation—but as a subservient government worker. Once he was on salary rather than paid of a fee-for-service basis, he became dependent not on his own initiative and enterprise in maximizing the market of his office, but on the enterprises of the municipality, county, or province. The intermediary of government bureaucracy came to stand between the constable and the constabulary office as enterprise.

Relatedly, as a salaried employee, the constable could now be thought of as a worker caught in hierarchical employer-employee relations. This had already begun with the subservience of the petty constables to high constables noted in Keele (1835) and was imported into subsequent legislation regarding militias. The subservience of the constable to municipal or county employers reached its most dramatic extreme right after the incorporation of towns, when mayors and aldermen viewed constables as bound to serve them personally.

In this section we will take up a disciplinary reform of the office of constable and the call to install police constables as

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14 As Foucault (1988) has pointed out, reason of state understands citizens as thinkable in terms of their utility or danger to the state.
15 See e.g. An Act for the Better Preservation of the Peace and the Prevention of Riots and Violent Outrages at and Near Public Works, while in Progress and Construction (S.C. 1845, 8 Vict., c. 6)
agents whose 'whole time' is colonized by an emergent administrative authority.

A. Disciplinary Discourse

Self-control is usually the result of a series of acts of obedience to authority and is a habit resulting from a training to obey. Without attempting to go into a careful analysis, my intention is to emphasize the need of adhering strongly to the principle of disciplinary training in our penitentiaries (Parole Officer Archibald, C.C.A.C., 1912: 40).

In the citizen-constable, we have noted an inchoate division in the citizen constable as a peace and police officer. With the emergence of an administrative apparatus (or a new machinery of rule), we see the re-spatialization of 'policing' in the police constable: 'policing,' rather than being thought of in terms of the duty of citizens to undertake preventative administrative tasks, comes to be identified with human agents or officials serving a new administrative bureaucracy. As such an official, the police constable was reframed as both an object and icon of this emergent administrative power. What occurred was the emergence of a middle man--because he is a man--the state agent. Rather than the administrative authority speaking across the vast distances of the new territory about consolidating its rule, the administrative authority began to stamp its rule more liberally and literally on the body politic, employing human agents to accomplish or deliver this stamping action as a special service.

In order to get this done, these human agents, these middle men, needed to be not only enabled but also shaped or (re)tooled. To achieve this retooling, a new set of technologies or techniques was deployed. These reflected new values: non-partisanship, standardization, and specialized service. Regularizing drill, a code of 'standard' regulations, a uniform and uniformed body of police men, and the supervised saturation of the police beat were each illustrative of this combinatory of values and practices.

These new technologies were installed under the slogan 'discipline.' The police constable served as an opportunity for the expression and dissemination of a new machinery of governance. The police constable was both a means and expression of this machinery, and consequently, came to be overdetermined through disciplinary technologies in the image of a neutral, objective,
machine-like figure. Disciplinary reform, consequently, was a call for a new logic in governance. It was aimed at implicating the protocols and interests of the central administrative authority in the practices of the police constable. As demonstrated by the abundant use of the term 'discipline,' it was of key importance in police reform talk and practices in the first hundred years of the 'new police' at least.

Like any other, a disciplinary discourse has its exclusions and prohibitions, its truths and conventions through which it operates to promote a way of seeing the world (Foucault, 1972). The disciplinary discourse of mid-nineteenth century Ontario interpreted the citizen-constable with some of the putative failings of local governance, including partisanship or a lack of uniformity in the delivery of their services, a lack of attention to appearances—tending to their (erroneous) indistinguishability from the general public—, and a lack of consolidation in their organization and control. In contrast, a disciplined governance and a disciplined police is presented as neutral and impervious to local partisan politics, uniform in its delivery, smart in its appearance, and responsive to one remote, superordinate point of control. With the mobilization of the concept of 'discipline' on the constable, the emergent central authorities could demonstrate their own fitness for office in the like fitness of the disciplinary constable. The reform proposals of the Lelievre (1854), Macnab (1855), and the Toronto Council Investigation (1855) were all similar: remove the constable from local social and political ties, place him in barracks, have him regularly drilled, make him subject to a code of regulations administered by his superiors, provide sufficient penalties and rewards, and ensure that the men appeared to the public as efficient, machine-like, disinterested: a uniform, impervious body of men serving a 'higher' interest: the interest of the rule of law as understood by the state.

This discourse of discipline emerged in the context of a liberal governmental rationality acutely sensitive to the freedoms of enterprising citizens. How to reconcile this rationality or logic and this discourse? The one insists on a proactive shaping undertaken by a new intermediate body of governors, the other on
protections from interventions by governmental authorities. We noted earlier that this split was evident in the citizen-constable, but that the lack of colonization of the constable by the state understated the divide. With the emergence of a disciplinary discourse promoting these state ties that understatement was no longer sustained. What occurred, instead, was a redefinition of the individual as a site bifurcated into spheres of legitimate and illegitimate interventions. This, of course, is the public/private divide. The police constable is re-articulated as an agent of civic power and this allowed his full colonization by a disciplinary governance. The police constable as a private citizen or as an individual out of the public view could still exercise some vestiges of enterprise, but this depended on how broad and deep the reach of the state was accepted to be.

I will illustrate this phenomenon in the 'talking policeman.' A clear trajectory can be traced over the space of more than a 100 years in which the policeman is first disembedded from civil society and retooled according to the protocols of an emergent state power and then rediscovered again for an individuality who can himself use his head to do remote shaping. In the problem of the talking policeman, it is obvious that the 'hailing' of the strong central state is seen in contradistinction to liberal enterprise and initiative.

In the Peelian reforms in England, as Paley notes, the new police were explicitly forbidden to 'enter into any conversation' (1989: 116). A key obstacle in installing Peelian reform were the extant power bases. The installation of a military command and the redefinition of jurisdictions were themselves insufficient to this installation if the police constables themselves re-enacted 'lateral' ties through 'entering into conversation.' The prohibition on talking was thus a central vehicle of the reconstitution of the police. The police reformer and once-mayor of Toronto, Adam Wilson picked up this thread, contending in a manual for police in 1859 that 'nothing can be a greater abomination than a talking policeman. All his duties should be quietly and promptly executed...' (Wilson, 1859: 81.).
A police reformer himself, Wilson also saw the need to wrest policing from 'traditional' lateral controls, and the codification of conduct in his handbook is a further means of installing a new vertical pillar of regulation. This prohibition on the constable against talking was not ungrounded in practice, as the Discipline Book of the Toronto Police Force demonstrates in its many recorded fines against constables for 'gossiping on the beat,' and in this note by Chief Constable Prince: 'Sergeant Major Ferris will communicate to PC Daly the determination of the chief of police, that in the event of anything again transpiring that point out neglect of duty on his part in any shape or form, especially talking on his beat with people, that he will suspend and bring him before the commissioners (Letterbook, July 19, 1859).

At the turn of the century, this conflation of police officer efficiency and police officer silence remained unchanged, as demonstrated in a letter to the Attorney General: '---'s usefulness as a Policeman could well be represented by ciphers. He talks too much. However, I don't suppose anything can be done about it. He is a nice old man but I wish you could find a place for him on the Detroit Force.' In 1912, a Detroit police manual reads like a lesson on manners by Norbert Elias in the way forward as a civilized police officer; it modifies the prohibition on talking somewhat:

Do not do anything that is ungentlemanly. Do not spit on the sidewalk, cough in anyone's face, chew tobacco or gum, talk loudly or too much, or make unnecessary noise. Mind your own affairs and do not meddle with or criticize business people or other persons passing over your post. Refrain from influencing the business of any person (Calahane, 1914: 5).

Approaching mid-twentieth century, the prohibition against talking was still active but weakened, as illustrated in this quote from an O.P.P. training notebook. 'Be civil to everyone, you are a servant of all classes of the community, irrespective of their social standing. Do not talk unnecessarily. Keep your eyes open, and your brain alert, to absorb of all that goes on around you' (O.P.P., 1937-1944: emphasis added). By 1959 the prohibition was exposed and openly questioned, tellingly by a counter-

16PAO, RG 4, Series 32, File 708, 1904.
discourse which had arisen within the policing institution itself: 'The sad truth is that the training of all too many Ontario police constables consists of the admonition 'read the Criminal Code, the Highway Traffic Act and the Liquor Control Act—and keep your eyes and ears open and mouth shut' (O.A.C.C., 1959).

The prohibition against the talking policeman was the work of a disciplinary discourse aiming to ‘hail’ police constable’s conduct in the direction of a unitary authority and away from what were understood as de-constitutive lateral ties. The prohibition demonstrates the hard work of installing the ‘new’ vertical channels of an emergent administrative bureaucracy, and of disembedding the police constable. Once the ties were secure, the prohibition could be lifted. The prohibition demonstrates the first-order constitutionality problem of opening up a new discursive space.

A central backdrop of this prohibition on talking in a discourse promoting the disciplinary constable is a cautious attentiveness to the freedoms of the enterprising liberal individual. He was to ‘preserve the greatest degree of order that is compatible with the smallest amount of interference on his part’ (Chambers Journal cited in Shpayer-Makov, 1990: 115). The police constable was not to interfere with businessmen, was to act in a zealous defense of the enterprising liberal individual taking freedoms in public discourse, and was himself to present no outward indications that he, too, partook of those freedoms.

In an excerpt from the London’s Quarterly Review we see how the constable is bifurcated along these lines of the enterprising private, but liberal and gentlemanly citizen on one hand, and the public authority on the other. This public authority, is not only prohibited from talking, but is seen as efficient and disciplined in the metaphor of an impervious, impersonal ‘machine’.

We all know him, for we see him day by day as we promenade on the streets. Stiff, calm, and inexorable, he seems to take no interest in any mortal thing—to have neither hopes nor fears, amid the bustle of Piccadilly or the roar of Oxford-Street. ‘P.C. X 59’ stalks along, an institution rather than a man. We seem to have no more hold of his personality, than we could possibly get off his coat, buttoned up to the throttling point (in Wilson, 1859: 82).
The metaphor of the machine indicates a neutral delivery mechanism: one devoid of emotion and personality. Wilbur Miller (1979) also argues that policing in Britain was reformed according to the organizational model of a 'well regulated machine.'

Through drill and discipline, as in the military organizations of earlier periods, the means were found of creating a sort of automatic policeman as a key element of impersonal authority (Miller, 1979: 39).

In Ontario the analogy is persuasive. William Miller told the C.C.A.C. that: 'the symbol of the machine is applicable to the functioning of the police department to a degree to which does not apply elsewhere...Discipline, and discipline alone can ensure that the force functions as a unit' (C.C.A.C., 1929: 65). Machine-like and disciplined are interchangeable. Both are equated with this impersonal delivery of policing. Marquis (1987b: 261) notes that just prior to WWII, the journal Jack Canuck blamed high attrition in the Toronto police on the practice of 'drilling [the men] until they functioned as machines.'

The Quarterly Review article went on to advise the reader that while the public face of the constable is impervious and machine-like, responsive only to the intermediate but penetrating controls of an administrative bureaucracy, the private face of the constable approaches that of the free and enterprising liberal citizen, whose liberties are taken up in a love of learning and culture:

Go...to the section-house...and enter the reading room, and you no longer see policemen, but men. They cast off their tight coats, as certain other unboiled lobsters at fixed intervals cast off their shells--they are absolutely laughing with each other! Some are writing--some are reading the morning papers--a group is grinning at the caricature of P.C. X. 202, in Punch; some are deep in the horrors of a romance, extended at full length along a bench, with their trousers tucked up--all are at their ease, taking rational amusement (in Wilson, 1859: 82).

The prohibition against the 'talking policeman' and the invocation of the metaphor of the machine signals how governance is to be done by disciplined agents. Discipline, here, is understood as consistent with a liberal rationality, and even essential to it. The police constable is divided in terms of a public pursuit and private pleasures, with the discipline
exercised in those public pursuits being key to the maintenance of the public discourse of a free, liberal individuality.

The term discipline is understood, then, not only as a discourse for the better regulation of the polity, but as a means to do the necessary shaping of these agents: discipline shapes citizens by forcing them up through a graduated authority. Practitioners of policing use the term 'discipline' as a 'training to obey,' 'the self-control [resulting from] a series of acts of obedience to authority,' (Archibald, C.C.A.C.: 1912) or the 'state of being under perfect command' (Barnes, C.C.A.C., 1936: 77).

Adam Wilson (1859) uses the term to suggest the channeling or directing of exertion and the evocation or improvement of self-command and 'propriety of conduct' (80). Thus, 'lounging, talking, and loitering' are considered as 'subversive of discipline' (32).

Montreal Police' Assistant Director Charles Barnes added that discipline is useful in perpetuating the systemic continuity of this hierarchical control of men: 'if foot drill is carried out by thoroughly competent instructors, it practically makes every member of the squad a potential instructor himself, as the ability to respond promptly and intelligently to command is the first step in the making of a finished instructor' (C.C.A.C., 1936: 78: emphasis added). Discipline, according to Barnes, 'teaches a man the value of being able to respond so quickly and intelligently to a command that it prepares him to be, in turn, in a position to impart to others the importance of instant obedience' (76).

We see here how 'discipline' was deployed towards the proactive shaping of constables, and that a training to obey came to be understood as a necessary mechanism for the practical manufacture of police authority:

[D]iscipline aligns the bodies and men along well defined tracks, so that although we may be built differently—and may think differently, we all have one important thing in common—namely, discipline....A correct understanding of what dignity really means may be summed up as being the consciousness of a well-trained, well-uniformed, scrupulously cleaned body, and of being afraid to lie and deceive, together with the knowledge that what one says or thinks is probably correct. Such a state of consciousness really constitutes dignity, and is inseparable from true discipline (77).
Discipline worked, therefore, by continuously and repetitively installing these 'good habits' on the body. It says: follow the knowledge of your well-habituated body to a more dignified state of consciousness. Indeed, it operated this way like a Calvinistic faith in the perfection of a higher power: it instructs: follow this program and make yourself up according to the appreciations (or evaluations) of the gaze on your body and you will be elected. The suggestion of Beruf is unmistakable in Barnes: 'Discipline fails if it does not promote a high sense of duty, unfailing devotion to one's work and an absolute courage in the problems of that work' (77). Disciplinary discourse built an obedience to authority in the highest and most ethical (or self-serving) aspirations of the new agents of the state.

B. Disciplinary Reform
As has been documented, there were numerous riots in mid-century Canada (Boritch, 1988; Rogers, 1988). To be sure, riots were still a primary form of political expression and served the end of testing the relative political advantage of established versus emergent sectional interests, but a blatant sectarian bias on their handling by the police themselves was becoming, also in light of the police reforms that had taken place in London and Ireland, increasingly unpalatable. The partisan role of the police in responding to these riots was becoming a powerful political issue (cf. Toronto: 1886). Newspapers of the period documented this concern and were often sharply critical of the police. In the mid-1850s, two commissions of inquiry were struck to look into the general organization of policing with an eye to instilling discipline into police organization and deployment. A central administration was being championed to address this issue of partisan policing, touting a reform which local government appeared for the most part unwilling or unable to accomplish: the disciplinary reform of the police.

Following a riot in a church in Quebec City which illustrated religious and sectional tensions, S. Lelievre, W. L. Felton and R. B. Johnson were commissioned to inquire into the general conduct and organization of the police. They were to ascertain if the police did what 'could be reasonably expected to prevent or guard against the riot,' that they were 'present in sufficient strength
of numbers,' and that they 'fulfilled their duty and did not demonstrate any misconduct.' They produced several observations and recommendations in the *Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Conduct of the Police Authorities on the Occasion of the Riot at Chalmer's Church* (Lelievre et. al.).

The Commission found that, indeed, the police did, in large measure, abstain from performing their duty. Instead of preventing rioters from entering Chalmer's Church and assaulting patrons, they stood 'passively' by the front doors while the melee went on inside. The commissioners reported that not one of the police received injuries, and that not a single arrest was made.

No amount of energetic opposition was offered to the rioters, either within or without the Church, by the Police, and the only persons who received blows in opposing the rioters belonged not to the Police but to the audience. After having effected their object, the guilty parties were allowed to retire unmolested and marched off in triumph from the scene of their violence; not a blow struck, nor an arrest made, to intimidate the unruly and prevent the recurrence of a similar outrage (Lelievre et. al., 1854).

The commission also found that the force was ineffectively administered. Its command structure allowed 'real influence and command' to be exercised by the Police Committee while the Chief Constable only exercised the 'nominal direction of the Police for ordinary duty.' It remarked that the 'immediate Officers of the Force could neither punish nor reward for good or ill conduct, and of course possessed no effective control over the men.' It found that the present administration rendered individual police constables incapable of being either disciplined or obedient. It characterized the resultant police force as being 'as little effective as a like number of the mob to which it was opposed' (ibid.). Indeed, the question for the commissioners was how police organization might enhance the effectiveness of police constables to give them a greater forcefulness than a like number of 'the mob.'

It was the emergent wisdom that the distinction of the police from 'the mob'--a mob full of sectarian and partisan political affiliations--was a necessary condition of police effectiveness. This depended on administration, particularly, a disciplinary administration. The Commission concentrated its energies not on
singling out individuals, but on articulating the need for the constitution of a relatively autonomous space governed by police administrators, who could then shape the conduct of police constables in a manner consistent with objective needs of justice administration.

To this end, the Commission reviewed the Acts and By-laws by which the Quebec City Police were established and concluded that these were 'vague' and 'conflicting,' leaving it open to question if the force was legally organized and its members properly empowered. In attacking this problem of the constitution of the police, the Commission advanced what it called 'the principle of consolidation.' It advocated the generous application of this principle and cited its use in the transformation of the Police of London and Dublin from 'proverbially useless bodies' into 'the most perfect instruments for the prevention of crime.' It encouraged the consolidation of the several monies then going to pay Constabulary and police into one general fund, and the consolidation of the Constabulary, River Police, Gaol Guard and Municipal or City Police into one force. It then recommended the division of this consolidated organization into 7 ranks.

In fleshing out the concept of a consolidated police, the Commission emphasized a number of principles. First, it stressed the rationalized devolution of the authority of the public trust via the transparent delegation of warrants or commissions. It recommended that stipendiary magistrates should be wholly unconnected to the police,' and only exercise a judicial power over it. Secondly, it emphasized the need for a readiness of the men; this readiness was to be ensured through the housing of the men in barracks, through their regular drilling, through their selection using criteria of 'honesty, steadiness and sobriety,' through the recruiting of a 'respectable class of labourers,' and through requiring their explicit abstinence from 'national, political or party union or association.' Thirdly, it stressed a rationalized governance through a 'complete code' drawn up by a superintendent of police. This code was to consist of 'regulations for the general government and discipline of the force,' including its classification, rank, distribution and inspection,' of the 'description of arms and accouterments and
other necessaries to be furnished them,’ and of a set of ‘rules and orders for the particular guidance of the sergeants, constables, and assistants.’ This ‘complete code’ was to be furnished in a portable form to each member of the force as a handy guide for their appropriate conduct. Fourthly, constables and constable assistants were to be instructed or trained up through this code, and the regulations of the code were also to contain chevrons or merit-marks and a scale of distinctions with ‘corresponding pecuniary rewards and privileges.’ Fifthly, the commission emphasized the need for the maintenance of ‘strict discipline’ and suggested the institution of ‘constabulary courts of inquiry’ to this end. Finally, the Commission recommended the purposive ‘generation’ of an ‘esprit de corps’ in the men to counteract the tendency toward participation in partisan community groups or sects.

The Commission envisioned this force as the ‘exclusive police for Lower Canada’ and recommended that Quebec City and Montreal should each get two divisions, that these be housed in barracks in these cities, and that the municipal corporations pay for maintaining their number. The Commission recommended that the remaining members of the force be quartered wherever they might be required for ‘municipal or public service.’ They added that ‘in cases of distribution of the force in small parties, the strictest discipline should be maintained, and the men kept in barracks, or quarters, under the immediate supervision of the Officers in command of the party.’ ‘The whole of the Warrant Officers, Constables, and Assistants should in all cases be kept in barracks, sufficiently spacious to contain the whole Force, and to afford proper accommodation for instructing and training the Force, among which a due provision of books of a suitable character should not be omitted.’

The ambitions of central administration were even greater the following year when a provincial commission headed by Allan Macnab and assisted by E. P. Tache, T. Edmund Campbell, and George Frederick de Rottenburg was struck to investigate the reorganization of the militia, to look at the system of ‘public defense,’ and to report on an improved ‘system of police. The Report of the Commissioners (Macnab et. al., 1855) also responded
to the partisan policing of riots, and made recommendations for 'one big police force' for the whole of the two Canadas. In the matter of police reorganization, the Commission recommended the division of the 'province' of Canada West and Canada East into 7 police districts each headed by a police superintendent. They added that while this recommendation would no doubt 'meet with some opposition from the municipal corporations who had hitherto had the appointment and control of the police,' it was nonetheless justified in light of the 'inefficiency of the police under the present system' and the 'deplorable events' of the past two years (the Circus Riot of Toronto and the Chalmer's Church Riot). They argued that 'it will scarcely be denied that the Police Force at present existing in different parts of the province is in anything but a satisfactory state' (Macnab et. al., 1855: 15).

Also in 1855, a City Council Investigation looked into policing in the city of Toronto. There too, a riot had occurred the policing of which prompted accusations that the police were too partisan to maintain credibility as neutral agents of law. Toronto City Council heard from police chief Sherwood that there was a lack of organization on the force, and that the problem was that 'there is no training, no drill, no organization in any shape or way. I have represented the matter both to the Mayor and the Police magistrate' (Globe, July 24, 1855). The police chief also mentioned that 'so long as the men depend on Council for putting them in and putting them out it will never be a force. I give orders and instructions to the force, but cannot get them obeyed' (ibid.) Of the circus riots and the performance of his men, the chief said, 'I did not say any of the force were backward in doing their duty, but they were not in that condition which men properly drilled would be' (Ibid.). In addition to the changes in the control of the men, Sherman suggested keeping the men together in a barracks so they could be ready at hand. Asked if any of the men should be fired, Sherwood responded by saying that he believed that the present constables 'generally, under proper drill and proper management would make a good force. I visit the station once a day, but all the rest of the day, the men are entirely under their own control, there being no sergeants recognized as having authority over them or directing them' (Globe, July 24,
That logic is consistent with the direction Toronto was to take in its own professionalization initiatives. If the Toronto city council was reluctant to act to give up direct appointing power, an emerging police institution saw the distance between the local councils and the police as a key objective of its own development.

These inquiries came to similar conclusions regarding the shortcomings of policing as it was then delivered, and made recommendations to install what we are calling here technologies for disciplinary shaping. The problem is seen to rest directly with governance, with the question of who controls both constable enabling and constable shaping devices. The control of appointing and compensation mechanisms is coming to be seen in terms of the raw constitution of the police force. The emerging view of those charged with the role of overseeing the conduct of the police is that there can be no 'real' police force unless this constitution question is addressed. As Sherwood stated it, the Toronto force 'will never be a force so long as the men depend on Council for putting them in and putting them out.' The commissions of inquiry share this view. The Macnab Inquiry criticized 'direct civic management', preferring 'a regular system of enlistment by the officers of the force.' The Lelievre Inquiry proposed a strict devolution of authority through the use of warrants or commissions, topping a relatively impenetrable vertical pillar of decreasingly superordinate ranks whose lowest levels would be not only institutionally, but spatially removed from the public at large.

Although the recommendations of the inquiries and the proposed legislation were viewed as going too far in a centralizing direction (and were in any case inefficient from a police delivery point of view) they nevertheless identified the mechanisms by which police would indeed be reformed, if not by the province, then by municipalities. Specifically, they identified

17The ambitious re-organization of the police envisioned in the reports of these inquiries were indeed opposed by municipal councils. John A. Macdonald, then the attorney general of the United Canadas, introduced legislation for a province-wide police force based on the recommendations of the Macnab commission. The Toronto city council denounced the bill by a vote of 19 to 3. (Rogers, 1984: 122-123)
how the police as an institution, and police constables in particular, could be subjected to disciplinary shaping. They also demonstrate an emergent view of the police in terms of a saturation logic. Note how the inquiries think of the police as disembodied agents of a distant authority, saturating remote jurisdictions with an impervious body of men, groomed, uniformed, drilled, and even schooled in barracks separated from the public at large.

CONCLUSION

It was no longer sufficient to have constables declare an oath and be on their way: intermediate administration appeared to become a necessity and the question 'who governs?'—always the first constitutional question—began to be superseded with 'how to govern?' It came to be understood by influential provincial and municipal leaders that it was no longer enough simply to provide for the appointment of a 'sufficient number' of constables, as the legislation had it, but that this 'sufficient number' needed, in addition, to be trained, or further shaped and molded to the proper objectives and missions of rule. Indeed, it was beginning to be felt that individuals could be shaped and that character could be changed through the restructuring of the habits.

There was thus an elaboration of thinking about the objects of rule as its means. The question 'how to govern?' assumes that government produces consequences through and on individuals who comprise the polity. These individuals, rather than seen simply as fixed bodies to be mobilized, come to be seen as wills to be guided. We see that correct training, regimentation, and coaching on obedience formed key elements in the perpetuation of the strength of states. It is not surprising that in seeking to bolster or indeed begin to make up a role for state agents in furthering state strength, reformers in Canada looked to military mechanisms like drill and explicit regulatory codes: here the direction was not that the state should adopt the devices of civil and local policing, but that policing should adopt the devices of a centralizing authority.

As illustrated by the quote from Archibald at the head of this section, discipline is both a discourse about the correct
Interest: the Interest of the rule of law as understood by the
and distrusts interest: a unison, preserved body serving a
and ensure that the men appear to the public as effective
and enforceability by its supporters, provide the sufficient penalties and
recommendations of this character, subject him to a code of regulations
reform and jurisdiction, place him in barricades, have them
social and political ties, remove the considerable from least
recommendations were all stimulated to remove the considerable from least
object and instrument of government. Although this argument has appeared, be both an
drawing criticism, could, as Stevens has argued, be both an
whose use by local authorities to promote partisan politics was
interests extracted by secret agents, concentrate. Whatever the practice
standardization and political neutralization of authority, one which could alter the discipline of the
administrators to demonstrate the utility and morality of the
administration of the state. The theory of technology to enable one to do administrative
is a move, then, by the governing authority to go beyond simply
the reform of the considerable through a discursive discourse

There, it comes to have a long term,

constable and the new police organization as a body of men,
constable and the new police organization as a body of men.

The lack of interest and the utility of the police
enjoy being important in thinking about the shaping of the police
administrative society and the shaping of citizens, discourse as
british. First hegemonic in thinking about a centralist
standardization and normative techniques of the new police, of
standardization and normative techniques of the new police, of
calls for an improved police shaped according to the
reforms and the judgments at this time, we begin to see a national
reforms with the utility of the administrative state. In the administrative
a discursive discourse comes to be determined more thoroughly
constable-constables, it is not until the mid-nineteenth century that
although traces are indeed discernible in the promotion of the
beyond the first statements in contrast to Justus’s humanism; but
constable. The elements of this discursive discourse reach back
constable, has, of course, been immersed in legal discourse, and a set of techniques designed to intervene in popularizations to promote such proper
approach to shaping proper conduct, and a set of techniques designed to intervene in popularizations to promote such proper
state. It is through these technologies that he could be made better equipped to promote governmental agendas.

In sum then, a disciplinary reform discourse gained hegemony in the mid-19th century, and dominated the subjectification of police well into the 20th century. These reforms demonstrated the feasibility of shaping protocols and practices, and also grounded these on the premise that liberal self-government requires such shaping in the service of freedom. This focuses attention on the specific ways in which individuals conduct themselves—their conduct (and subjectivity) needs to be calibrated to the necessities of rule, their self-understanding consistent with the forms that that rule was taking. Since liberal rule is not about simply subjecting (or disciplining, or aggregating) individuals to (external, macro-political) forms—it needs the presumptively 'free' individual in order to do its business of rule—a liberal political subjectivity depends upon the economic subject's ongoing, dynamic existence. Here we have shown how disciplinary discourses and reforms attempted to be understood as consistent with this principle. Yet, as we shall see, the new shaping mechanisms were themselves a means to demonstrate the regulation of men, and this led them astray of that dimension of liberal rule which recognizes and stimulates enterprise in the constable. Indeed, it became both reasonable and legitimate to say, 'give me the man, and I'll give you the police constable.'
CHAPTER THREE

TECHNOLOGIES OF DISCIPLINARY REFORM 1: SHAPING THE BODY AND SANCTIONING CONDUCT

In this chapter and the next, we take up the technologies of a disciplinary reform and discourse. We proceed by looking at a sampling of the technologies attending disciplinary discourses and reform in order to better appreciate the 'how' of the transition from constable enabling to his proactive shaping. In so doing, we will draw out the manner in which the constable is groomed for the state.

First, we assess the body of the constable as a site of intervention and vehicle of dissemination. The uniform, drill and regulations on conduct are the explicit foci. These devices realize the inclusions and prohibitions of disciplinary discourse. They remake the constable in the iconography of bureaucratic surveillance and state presence, they disembled him from the corrupting or unclean lateral ties vying for his attentions, and they intendedly cut him off from the cross-interference of individual expression or identity.

In the subsequent chapter, we look at shaping directed at the re-articulation of spaces in which that police constable is mobilized: there we concentrate on the redeployment of space and time in the police beat. Together this body and temporal shaping comprised the agent-making tool-kit available to reformers. They were the 'people-shaping devices' by which the individual, and the individual constable, could be shaped into an agent of governance.

Two broad objectives may be gleansed from the emphasis and organization of regulation on the constable, and attributed to government authorities as their 'logics', whether they acted for municipalities, provinces, or federal jurisdictions. The first of these is 'capacitation,' according to which the police constable is enabled, through the provision of various technologies, as a delivery vehicle of government in a relatively independent yet highly subservient role. The second is 'saturation,' according to which competent and comprehensive governmental coverage is promoted via the deployment of these capacitated agents.
1. SHAPING THE BODY

Bodies are subject to regimes (Giddens, 1991: 99; Foucault, 1984: 173), and a reconstitution of policing demands attention on how the body is to be re-invested with meaning. Conduct and dress are visible representations of the meaning of the body and thus constitute key areas of intrusion.

In Protestant writings like that of Wesley (Weber, 1958: 141), the habits of prayer and good works were understood as universally available devices which could increase the chances of feeling 'grace.' As much writing on mid to late eighteenth century urbanization informs us, working-class and plebeian intemperance and indolence were regarded among the most common vices. It was the implicit argument of evangelical social reformers that the poor could be made good if not tainted by these and other vices. During tumultuous industrialization and urbanization, the habit of moral and bodily cleanliness and of industry and hard work was also understood to underpin understandings of 'good citizenship.' There were thus habits of the body, like the act of prayer, physical labour, and hygiene, which alone could go a long way to building good character. Indeed, as Latour (1994) argues and Bourdieu (1980) and in another way Giddens (1986) has suggested, habits structure a compulsion of the will or the body. Habits, are a hybrid between nature and culture: they are not consciously chosen action, but they are also not naturally occurring behaviour (Valverde, forthcoming: 6). Habits of dress and conduct in a time before widespread cultural knowledge of 'the personality,' were thought to be a way of speaking about and positively shaping character, collectively and individually.

Disciplinary reforms sought to impose tight controls on the look and shape of the police constable and acted to do this through his body and bodily habits. They sought to deploy bodily appearance and demeanor in the service of discipline. Two technologies they used were uniforms and military drill.

A. The Uniform

It was often remarked by police reformers and persons critical of policing in the mid-eighteenth century that the lack of a uniform or lack of uniformity in constables' dress proved a want of
integrity. Conyngham Crawford Taylor dismissed the pre-reform Toronto police in terms emphasizing appearance: 'They wore a sort of uniform, but without uniformity, except in one respect--they were uniformly slovenly' (in Momente, 1993: 14). Because militarism stood for order and often also for the defense of a moral order, there was no more dramatic counter-point to military efficiency than the variety of dress which men lacking uniforms brought together.

Disciplinary reform recommendations like those of the inquiries we have discussed included the strong prescription to standardize the dress, deportment, and appearance of the constable: the standardizing narrative would reflect the ambitions of a central administrative authority. In 1876, Selby Smith bemoaned the lack of uniformity in N.W.M.P. dress and suggested that improvements in this would make them feel 'more becoming in their position in society' (in Horrall, 1976: 5). In Ontario in the mid-and late nineteenth century, it was at the boundaries of the province (in Niagara and Rat Portage) that provincial police were first seen in uniform (Higley, 1984: 52, 67). In Britain, as Dandeker (1990) says, the uniform indicated that police were 'functionaries of the state, rather than persons delegated by local communities for policing duties in the context of systems of indirect rule' (119). In the United States, the relative late adoption of uniforms indicated the strength, conversely, of decentralized or republican politics and the greater onus placed on individual freedoms. The constable in uniform, it was understood, could demonstrate the power of extra-local government; this might, as the disciplinary reforms had it, make the visage of

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18By contrast, in county forces in Canada, uniforms were rare. It was only in 1909 with the establishment of the OPP in Ontario, that regulations stipulated that all those to be appointed by the new force must be 'possessed of a respectable suit of clothing'. They still had no uniform. (Higley, 1984: 75)

19Even in the U.S., however, uniforms were adopted by the major municipalities between the 1850s and the 1880s. The New York police were uniformed by 1857, and most other major cities by the 1880s. (Walker, 1977: 13) It also reflected public opposition to the idea, and its association with England. Walker (1977) also suggests that 'opposition to the uniform was an expression of ethnic group conflict. (12) Since policing was an expression of local machine politics, the uniform was likely to be seen as political sloganeering. Monkonnen further links early adoption dates of uniforms to the urban size and police use as a militia, and late adoption dates to the lack of urban size and to decentralization (Monkonnen, 1981: 163).
a machinelike presence of the constable a palpable reality. The requirement on police constables to wear uniforms also showed that a narrative of rule could be inserted in the interstices of discourse between private individuals. The police uniform offered a way of claiming the constable for public duty and the means to exert this claim on the 'whole of his time.' Dressed in uniform and identified by number, the police constable had nowhere to hide, save in the company of his fellows out of public places. Even though uniforms were seen to represent subservient social status and were initially resisted by the men, the uniformed police constable quickly became the norm.

The original dress of the Peelian 'bobby' (named after Robert Peel) followed a principle of understatement in expressing police conspicuousness. In England, where the word 'police' was associated with the French gendarmes and with secret agents, it was necessary to walk a fine line between the appearance of too much militarization and too little visibility. The uniform of the 'bobby' was understood as a compromise. With militarization, the 'bobby' was a visible presence of state authority, but against militarization, his uniform under-emphasized a militaristic presentation.

The Peelian uniform consisted of a suit of blue cloth with a single breasted frock coat with white buttons. It also included a standup collar overtop of a leather stock around the neck, lending to a stiff appearance. There was an embroidered loop on the collar which registered the policeman's division. To 'top' it off, he wore a 1 pound 'chimney pot' hat with a glazed leather top and straps down each side (Smith, 1985:40). The uniform of the police constable in Toronto in 1890 consisted of the following:

- blue cloth tunic, with white metal Police buttons, two buttons on each cuff, with crown and 'police force' on them; standing collar, with the number of the constable in white metal on it; blue cloth trousers, with scarlet seam down side of the leg; helmet, white and blue with device in bronze. Winter cap, fur, wedge shaped. Greatcoat of Irish frieze, double breasted, with Constables number two inches

20It is not surprising that with the advent of an industrial modernization, where individual style and possessive individuality were both a premise of productivity and yet a bar on its achievement, that much attention was placed, rather, on self-restraint and on prohibitions against self-expression.
in length in white buff on right sleeve, above the cuff, buttons same as on tunic (Grasett, 1890:33).

Toronto Regulations stipulated that the identification number was always to be visible to the public, and that a police constable was to ensure that his clothing was neat and in good repair.

Although worn by an individual human, dress is a manifestation of institutional agency and influence. In this vein, the question about dress is not to see it as the public display of a human body and individual will, but rather to look beyond the individual as a mere vehicle or medium for the expression of institutional claim. Behind that, again, dress offers a vehicle for little resistances and counter-narratives.

To begin with the first point, dress expresses the instantiation of the individual by a third party, be it a state, sub-political organization, or some other institution. Dress serves as a tie-sign, to use Goffman's term, with (more or less) distinct social groupings or institutions. To use Gadamer's term, it serves as a material expression of the overlap of individual and group 'horizons.' In being an articulation of particular and special group affiliation, dress is a warning to some to beware or keep distant, and an invitation to others to join in. As Holdaway notes, the police uniform represents the 'stability of the political state' (1983: 46). As a sign which has been authoritatively affixed to an individual body, the police uniform overdetermines a reading of the individual according to the 'master status' of police office. The uniform fixes or 'stops' otherwise endless interpretation into the meaning of a thing: 'does the officer belong to us, or does he belong to them?' For the emergent state, the police officer in uniform is an iconic manifestation of an administrative authority's reach. The individual officer as a representative of an authority is primarily a flag waver. The Royal Irish Constabulary served in this way in Ireland. The N.W.M.P., as McLeod (1976) has shown, followed the Irish example to the secure state ambitions in Canada. At the end of the last century they metaphorically and literally placed the flag on the boundaries of the colonial state in anticipation of its settlement.
Police uniforms also deploy the space of the constable's body as a billboard in the advertisement of governmental programs (cf. O'Malley, 1993). It is through the uniform, among other devices, that the police officer's body is stamped with protocols of government. With the uniform thus acting to fix interpretation of an individual, the administrative authority is free to go about inscribing this sign with certain definite associations such as 'law enforcer' or 'disciplinarian.'

Indeed, the display of governmental authority on the strong bodies of individuals continually reaffirms the distinction-making capability of rule. It shows that people can be ordered, that inclusions and exclusions, distinctions and categorizations can be made by an authority. It demonstrates the validity of the view that such work is possible by the police officer you see. The police uniform is thus a sign of able and authorized conduct. Similarly, the individual constable in uniform can also be a stand-in for the self-restraint of state power. This restraint can be proved again and again in the discipline of the men. In showing, in their conduct and demeanor, a special reserve and inscrutability, police constables can demonstrate the tenability of emergent shaping protocols. Standing at attention, moving as one, dressed alike, they are a 'breed apart,' distinct, immaculate in the ideal. The uniform is demonstrated and cited in a defense against 'parallel' authorities seeking partisan privileges. The uniform is designed to make the constable impenetrable through his cloth and impervious to sectarian and partisan demands.

We noted earlier that character has been understood as consisting of traits, themselves visible in the habits of the individual. The uniform can offer a proof of character which is also a tool to make this proof real. Proof of character is given in the form of those character traits which the man in uniform displays: these are such things as neatness, tidiness, orderliness, and cleanliness. The uniform is a tool in that it compels the neophyte constable to find himself in the meanings that the cloth is already invested with. Manning's (1977) analysis of the police funeral, and Rubinstein's (1973) and Holdaway's (1983) rich accounts of the significance of the uniform as an almost sacred token illustrates how it catches the constable
up in its rich meanings. It is an extension of the (almost sacred) body of the state and now also of a fiercely guarded occupational solidarity. The 'touching' of the uniform, consequently, is a taboo. The uniformed constable is continually hailed by the rich significance and history of police remembrances of fallen comrades, meritorious service, exceptional courage, etc. In addition to this, the cut of cloth, the weight of the boots and the Sam Browne belt give the constable a certain walk, a certain swagger. The uniformed constable in the police organization is already a presentation of self structured along certain definite contours. There is a way of wearing the cap, of tilting the belt, and these are mannerisms which the individual learns in the re-adjustment of his own habits to the way of being as a uniformed police constable.

Indeed, the importance of the uniform and uniformity also extends to the shape of bodies who could reasonably, according to the primacy of uniform appearance and demeanor, be placed in them. One may look at almost any photo of policemen in uniform from the late nineteenth century up until the last three decades of the twentieth century to see how fully this is realized. One wonders, in looking at such photos, if there can possibly be much variation in the shape and size of the polity from which these exemplary figures are drawn. As Weaver (1990: 116) states it, speaking of the Hamilton police, 'the men stood shoulder to shoulder for the good reason that physically they were alike. From 1900 to 1945, most stood between 5'11" and 6' 1" and weighted between 170 and 190 pounds with chest measurements of 37 to 40 inches.' Weaver concludes that 'the notion that constables had to be certain physical type to maintain order remained....axiomatic' (ibid.). Indeed, even in the early 1970s, the R.C.M.P. had maximum height restrictions (6' 5"), one justification of which was the look of the whole troop together.

An individual's suitability in the uniform is thus used as an indicator of his suitability for the business of governing. An R.C.M.P. candidate must 'look good in serge.' Fitting in the uniform or looking good in it is thus a means test (one of many) of governability. In accomplishing this, one has demonstrated one's adjustment or adjustability to the mean. In this way also,
the uniform is an appropriate tool of disciplinary discourse. As well as serving as a vehicle for the distribution of sovereign claims, the uniform is a technology of the disciplining of individuals. The uniformed police officer is not only a comforting indication of the ubiquitous presence of the sovereign, but is also proof of the replicability of normalized conduct. Like the oath and like drill, the uniform implicates the proper government of the self to the proper government of others.

After the turn of the century, debate among Canadian chief constables about the variation in and genealogy of the dress of municipal police officers indicated how for them the uniform was a clear expression of sovereign rule. There were concerns expressed about the practice among police officers of some municipalities to don dress imported from the United States. William Stark said that there was 'something strangely inconsistent in Canadian Police Officers administering British law in a British colony clothed in what is practically a uniform of a foreign country' (in Marquis, 1993: 78) In 1926, the C.C.A.C. debated the value of standardizing uniforms across the whole of Canada. However, the hurdle of convincing municipal authorities as to the value of this initiative appeared to be the strongest impediment to the idea, and the subject was dropped by the C.C.A.C. members (C.C.A.C., 1926).

Finally, dress also offers a space for resistances and counter-narratives. Once identified with the state, the uniform can be fractured, reclaimed, or contested. Today, the R.C.M.P., for instance, has service uniforms, ceremonial uniforms, and specialized duty uniforms comprising some 43 different 'looks'. Regarding only the last of these, in the R.C.M.P. and major police organizations there is a specialized kit and uniform for the various specialty units and designed to maximize the constable's efficiency in the specific tasks of these units. In the R.C.M.P. there are 'kit issues' for aircrew and aircraft technicians, ATV operators, avalanche search and rescue, bicycle patrol, police service dog handlers, emergency response teams, explosive disposal and response units, marine duties, motorcyclists, operational forensic identification units, tactical intervention troops,
underwater search and recovery teams, and for special duty as United Nations Civilian Police.

The 'look' of the police reflects a process of increasing specialization and rationalization. The thread of a military discipline, which installs a habit of obedience and the masking of individual 'character' through devices like the replication of bodies in uniform, remains in the ceremony of dress, and, as we shall see in chapters six and seven, the practices of the police academy. Nonetheless, we also see in the proliferation of specialized uniforms and in the distinction between ceremonial, service, and special duty uniforms a fracturing consistent with the splintering of disciplines and knowledges (cf. Carriere and Ericson, 1994). Today, the R.C.M.P., under 91-100 B-18, also authorizes a Service Order turban, allowing the individual constable to express sectarian affiliations. Orders today also allow a special maternity wear issue for pregnant members. Once all molded into one suit, the men and women of police forces now wear uniforms and are given kit issues according to a growing multiplicity of specialisms and statuses of service. Like the oath, the uniform is an adaptable technology.

Technologies like uniforms can also be used for 'strategic reversals' against the narrative of uniformity and de-individualization. If, for example, a military numbering system is used to identify the individual with a permanent number, and this system (albeit with some irony) is initiated to build an esprit de corps, as it was in the O.P.P in 1922, what is done cannot be so easily undone. Indeed, military numbering, reflected in numbered collar badges on constables tunics, was introduced by O.P.P. Commissioner Williams (Higley, 1984: 136). This numbering graphically reflected seniority in that Patrick Kelly, who was the

21The uniform and police uniformity also stand for the availability for use by authoritative discourses of a Cartesian subject, a subject who could stand for the integration of epistemological, juridical, and agentic narratives. The police constable could be, altogether, an agent of truth, of right, and yet derive out of a care for liberal enterprise. He could stand in for the whole and show this representation in terms of a bodily form 'leveled' by the disciplinary apparatus of the state. He could be exemplary of a governing logic itself which seeks in the individual all the visible signs of rule. His embodiment consequently, is a sign of this exemplariness, wholeness and integration. This cohesion, seen in the uniform, unravels at the surface under diversity driven politics.

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first constable appointed, was also #1. The system was in place from 1922 to 1963, when Commissioner Silk, looking to more fully establish promotions based on merit, violated the military tradition that gave permanent identification of man and number. Silk reassigned number 2002, which was long since retired when a constable Gerald Banks left the force in 1956 (Higley, 1984: 430). The move was greeted with hostility by the men and a subsequent commissioner boosted the morale of the occupational culture by re-establishing the military tradition of retiring numbers.

What we see here, and as we have seen in other examples, is that a technology is deployed to capacitate the police constable and previous or embedded inscriptions of that technology may then be utilized by the constable in resistance to the re-inscriptions of reforms. Obdurate technologies like uniforms have meanings pushed into them, which then have a back-again reflexivity which can be deployed. The uniform advertises government strategies, but some of the advertisements it makes refer to government strategies long since abandoned or expressly renounced. The attempt to re-direct the constable in a top-down fashion can be stymied by the very success of former such attempts of inscription. Here a system introduced to promote an esprit de corps during one era of command came to acquire the meaning and significance intended of it, which was then mobilized against its discontinuance by a subsequent era of command. The constable, once conceived according to the status ascription of a military tradition of retiring numbers, can use the weight or strength of this tradition in a strategic reversal.

Indeed, the uniform, which as we have argued expressed a disciplinary inclination to shape the constable to standards naturally emanating from the state, can be reclaimed for autonomy by him. We noted earlier the meanings that police remembrances and funerals give to uniformed police officers. But here, the constable deploys the work that has been done to inject meaning into the uniform in the service of his own institutional autonomy. Constables may thus place their caps strategically to claim space which they have no right to or may march en masse in demonstrations against a policy of government, deploying the power of their uniformed cohesion as an impressive show of strength and
resolve. Today and in the past, dressing down or making alterations to standard dress comprise moderate forms of resistance by individual constables or by constables acting jointly. Such acts make a profound and visible statement on the limits of police constable availability; capacitated and shaped, constables can use the language and structure of their capacitation and shaping against specific measures of their regulation.

Indeed, because it implicates them with the visible presence of disciplinary authority, police constables follow a career path in which the uniform is first a symbol of a valued status change, and later a sign of status stasis. After working their way through the police academy to get into the police uniform, they subsequently strive to get out of it and into 'old clothes' or 'civvies.' The transition from uniformed duty to plainclothes is symbolic of the occupational acquisition of freedom and autonomy. Police occupational status is demonstrated in the secret power of the police officer who is not readily identified with this and other signs of the power of disciplinary authority. Just as lapses in dress or grooming come to signify lapses in discipline, police disguises and police in 'civvies' represent, to the police, the freedoms of the unsupervised body. Identified with discipline and regulation, police see getting out of the uniform as symbolic of autonomy and enterprise.

If disciplinary reforms sought to establish the ubiquity and power of non-partisan and extra-local administrative authority, they also required demonstration that such power could be practiced. That demonstration could find no better expression than the Peelian practice of putting men in uniform. The uniform could make it plain to whom the agent belonged and for whom he did his work. The uniformed officer was a dramatic 'proof' that the state could claim, re-mold, and put out agents according to its own agendas—agendas which the standardization of the uniform both conveyed and accomplished. In this, the police uniform represented an integration of both sovereigntist and disciplinary discourses. In the service of the former, the uniform widely distributed the sign of the sovereign and reaffirmed the hierarchical devolution of authority. In shoulder insignia, it
affirmed a graduated proximity to the (command of the) king or queen. It also acted as a symbol of authority separating the constable from other citizens.

The uniform also acted to further structure sensibilities in an identification of the good with the mean and the state. Proper dress, grooming, and the replication of look in the uniformed police officer was an active sign of the particular action of the state in its leveling capacity. It was a reassurance that although society could be full of variation and individuals unique, the state at least could bring out a standard and demonstrate the tenability of a rule through this standard.

The police uniform, once resisted by the police, has over time been filled with a variety of narratives—including counter-narratives of resistance against the residuals of the disciplinary discourse. Although initially intended to fix the meaning of the constable, the sign has play, and is a mechanism of continuous renewal.

B. Drill

All that is wanting is to apply a good system; to train the several fine corps formed of those robust, loyal, and hardy subjects, with as little inconvenience as possible to their other pursuits (A Brief System of Drill, York, 1808).

[On Foot drill] In other words, learning how to be a follower before you are a leader. There are many other traditional arguments one could offer such as quick obedience, learning how to move, but I think it helps to develop a feeling of unity and understanding. After having said all that, if I couldn’t find a better reason, I would defend it in our training curriculum based solely on the fact that the men like it. The only people that knock it are people that haven’t done it. (R.C.M.P. Superintendent William Macrae, Trainers Conference, 1975: 4).

The first quote outlines the intention of government officials for a program of drill for the militia in Canada West in the early 19th century. Little inconvenience and interference is offered to 'hardy subjects' so that they will be handy when the sovereign calls on them to assist in putting down riots or rebellions. Quite the opposite becomes the promise of a 'good system' of drill when the citizen-constable becomes a full-time servant of the

22In late-nineteenth century Canada, the uniform still indicated belongingness in lower status caste and officers, particularly detectives, wanted no such identifiers.
administrative authority. Drill, rather than being sold on its innocuousness, is advanced for its capacity to intrude and reshape conduct. Following a stormy season of riots and accusations that the police were partisan or otherwise unfit to deal with them, the Toronto Police Force began regular weekly drills in the 1860s (Letterbook; Toronto, 1886) as part of its professionalization under the military leadership of Chief Constable Prince. There were many believers in this technology for the shaping of constables. By 1886, the Toronto Force had done much reform (cf. Rogers, 1984), and published a booklet proudly documenting their achievements in which they celebrated the role played by their unique drills. On the federal plane and towards the turn of the century, drill was considered no less essential to constable shaping. The N.W.M.P. had a training centre in Regina where they instructed new recruits to the force through drill only 10 years after its founding. In the N.W.M.P., the military drilling of the men—even to the exclusion of taking them up through code—was understood as tantamount to readying them for duty. As demonstrated in the quote from Superintendent Macrae, a defense of the role of drill in the R.C.M.P.'s constable-shaping repertoire remained current until 1975, and indeed well into the 1980s. Drill, then, has been touted as a key technology for changing the citizen into the police constable. By deploying drill, ignorant, clumsy, and slovenly individuals could be changed into soldiers or police constables.

Oesterich (1982) points out that the neostoic values of constancy, action, self-control, and obedience were important to the tactical development of the modern army. Weber adds to the recognition of the contribution of Maurice of Orange (and his neostoicism) to modern military organization, the point that an 'ascetic principle of self-control' also made Puritanism a 'father' of modern military discipline (Weber, 1958: fn. 81p. 235). It is in any case in the 'modern' military that an ethic of the self came to be seen not as a purely inherited trait or the consequence of grace, but something that could be shown as achievable in the rigorous and reflexive harmonization of body,

23In the NWMP annual reports, training was drill.
mind and purposive activity. In the physique and conduct of the men of the army it appeared that the civilized individual could be an achievement of purposive shaping. Indeed, in the military bearing we often see an attribution of the rescue of these neo-stoic principles of civility from the 'looseness' and inconstancies of modernization. It was through disciplinary mechanisms like drill that an hygienic, respectable, constant, obedient and active student, citizen or police constable could be made up.

Drill is used as a noun to indicate training in procedures or movements and as a verb to refer to the act of carrying out this training by way of rigorous, continuous, and repetitious exercises. Through the rote repetition of discrete exercises, drill installs in the body and the mind a memory of rationalized, discrete bodily movements. These bodily movements are understood both at the level of the individual, in the rationalization of movements of marching, etc., and at the level of the squad, in the rationalization of the component parts of a series of formations. These movements have been separated, as for example, in the military innovations of William of Orange, so that they can be quickly and efficiently recombined for a variety of mobilizations. A somewhat similar process applies to the non-military use of the term drill, in that this time a body of knowledge or mental ability is learned through the breaking up of this knowledge or ability into a series of separate lessons which can be repeated until there is an automatic identification of signified and signifier, and can be combined in an accumulation of discrete 'knowledges.' Here the mind is treated like the body as an organ that 'remembers' these mental exercises and can carry them out on command.

Indeed, as Johnson (1987: xix) argues, mental schemata are grounded in bodily experience: 'structures of our bodily experience work their way up into abstract meanings and patterns of inference.' Drill embodies subjectivities, and in so doing, it arrests the play of significations available to that subjectivity. Drill installs a nomenclature of appropriate bodily signs: it provides a template for the slotting of oneself and others into categories. We noted that the uniform also acts this way to
contour the body according to pre-defined programs. Drill forces the body into these grooves. It works explicitly through the body in order to instill a sensation with a (provided) interpretation of that experience. It produces an interpretative technology by which it is also sustained. It intermeshes the signs of the body with slogans, aphorisms, truisms, and tropes which also link the satisfaction of individual bodily movement to the collectivity or troops and uniform, purposive, and coordinated action (cf. Katz, 1990; Eisenhart, 1975). Under the command of the drill sergeant, marching comes to harmonize a set of movements as signs denoting physical and combat readiness, alertness, neatness, orderliness, uniformity, and 'command presence' (D4). These referents stand opposed and are placed hierarchically above physical desuetude, sloppiness, and disorderliness—the latter being indications of individual, social, and governmental degeneration. A qualitative, hierarchical evaluation of aesthetic disposition is thus embedded in the trained glance from body to body.

In this way drill accomplishes what Foucault calls the hierarchizing of 'good' and 'bad' subjects 'in relation to one another' (1977: 181). The body, and drilled bodies of men, becomes a medium which is at the same time a message about the relationship between good form and capacity. Together these associations link might and right. Indeed, Marcel Mauss (1973) has noted that the techniques of the body are taught by prestigious authorities and always package social values and carry forward social forms: this he called 'prestigious imitation' (73). He has shown how swimming and marching are cultural artefacts of particular authority relationships (73). The way bodies are carried thus comes to be visible representation of that relation to authority, with the slouching, inattentive individual betraying less rigid adherence to a singular authority.

In mastering saying 'yes' in the actions of his body, the police constable also re-affirms the logic and legitimacy of the command. Once he has demonstrably offered this affirmation, he can move up the chain of command and begin to relay those orders to others. Saying 'no' is symbolically and instrumentally to undermine the trust which carries the institution forward. As we have seen also in the meaning of discipline, preparation for
authority is having ones body subjected to it. As Miller (1979: 40) described 'training up' through drill and discipline, 'he who has been accustomed to submit to discipline will be considered best qualified to command.' Indeed, Foucault reminds us that in the modern era it is this habit of obedience in the citizen which keeps power in the modern state legitimate. Whereas 'discipline' is a 'training to obey,' drill comes to be seen as a training in the means (learned through habitual obedience from the ground up) to give orders that will be followed.

In Toronto, the N.W.M.P., and in large municipal forces, drill constituted, as Joyce (1990: 141) put it 'the first distinct form of training provided to the force.' Such an exemplary instrument in the retooling of the constable was drill that, as we have mentioned, the first reforms on the police constable are almost unthinkable without it (cf. Smith, 1985; Weaver, 1990). The police reforms of the 1850 inquiries (Macnab, Lelievre, and the Toronto Council Inquiry) all heard about the 'inefficiency' of the police in terms of their lack of discipline, their lack of proper military-style command, and their lack of commitment to state-supportive values, such as independence and justice. They each recommended the proper drilling of the police to effect their removal from the 'policed community' and their resocialization by a more unified and state-devolved administrative authority.

Drill thus served two purposes which were key to those reforms. First, it helped to disembed and insulate the constable from local and lateral ties, thus serving to remove what was seen as the main impediment to his efficiency. Second, it positively produced subjectivities oriented to those emergent sources of authority. But in disembedding and re-individualizing the police constable, it tilled ground which could then be further cultivated for the instantiation of counter-subjectivities which valued autonomy and enterprise in an emergent police culture.

Drill was instrumental in demonstrating the viability of the police constable as exemplary of the emergent rationalization of governance. In manifesting the results of drill in his bearing and imperviousness, the constable served as an icon for an emergent administrative authority. Drill is a disembedding device. Here, drill is not solely directed at the conduct of the
individual officer, but in intendedly insulating the constable from the encouragements and imprecations of local power and in this way disembedding him it is directed as well at the conduct norms of the polity as a whole. It acted as a wedge to re-install the constable as an officer of 'the state' and 'the law,' a person whose primary commitment makes him impenetrable to the occasional forays of interested residents and community members.

Drill also linked the objects of the new administrative authority with the discrete motions and movements of an iconic and charismatic authority. The analogy of turning men into machines—at least in their public representation—underplays the work that is done in this positive shaping. The references to the machinelike image of the police constable did not indicate a lack of character or charisma, but rather betrayed the hope that such character, individuality, and charisma could operate behind a public visage of impersonal and 'rationalized' authority, one already modeled in the military officer. Installing the military gentleman at the head of the force oriented this shaping in a favorable direction (cf. Clapson & Elmsley, 1994). After the Peelian practice, military men were installed in Toronto, Hamilton, and in the N.W.M.P. The military officer provided an authority who was both of and distinct from the ties of the community. The lesson was that this new face of authority was better than that which it replaced. The look and demeanor of the well-drilled man offered the police constable an accessible cover not easily shaken by local mores or conventions about proper governance. Instead of 'Harry Smith,' he was instead to be viewed according to that presentation of impersonal authority. With the icon of the military officer and the body shaping offered by drill, the police constable would have the means to gaze past the eye-contact of his social superiors and to show himself off as an agent carrying out impenetrable instructions.

We stated earlier that discipline was understood among police practitioners as a 'training to obey.' We will note shortly how training up through a code of regulations fleshed out the intermediary between the sovereign and the police constable in a structure of devolving 'ministerial' power (e.g. Wilson, 1859: 19). Drill emerged under a disciplinary discourse and in this
first professionalization of the police constable to prepare individuals to partake of that ministerial authority, and it worked with the assumption of the disciplinary discourse that understood public authority in terms of an iconic public servitude. Consequently, authority became not only the right to command or give orders, but the demonstrable capacity to do so. An emergent state, while capable of enabling its agents through legislation with this right, also needed to show that its agents had the capacity. Key here was the show of a transition in the police constable from passivity to activity. Whereas the parish constable was understood to be passive with the nature of his office (Storch and Philips, forthcoming), the disciplined constable wore all the signs of an active emergent administrative authority. Militarization offered one ‘proof’ of this.

The skirmish, as a public form of drill, is another demonstration of that capacity. It glorifies the servitude of the police constable to a laterally-impervious state authority:

The street skirmishing drill... is peculiarly a Police drill. The expeditious movement of sections or small detachments in close or extended order from point to point with the fewest possible words of command is the object sought to be attained. A section or any portion of a company can be extended or moved to cover a given point almost instantaneously on a single word of command, and as readily reformed, without any regard to the position occupied by the front or rear ranks. All movements are executed on the double, and have been studied out with a view to a more speedy and effectual suppression of riots and street disturbances (Toronto, 1886: 8-9).

The emphasis on the ‘single word of command’ suggests a fascination with the display of a unitary channel of command flowing downward from a single source to a unified body of men. The excerpt highlights the importance of the control of a body of men rather than individuals. The precise mode of regulation of the police concentrates on the body, and on the harmonization of bodies into a singular unit which is efficiently commanded. The police constable, in following orders, acts with the group in the service of the aims of authoritative command. This notion of the single utterance of a command activating a (singular) body of men shows off the superior efficiency of this authority-relation between an intermediate authority and government agent. It is
this relation of the proud, unified, and replicated police officer at one end, and the effortless command of the drill sergeants barking incomprehensible instructions at the other which is reinforced, to a spectating public, in its superiority.

The skirmish was a visible display of the utility of drill in ensuring the efficient command of the police. In early municipal policing another such demonstration was offered in the practice of leading men out to their beats. An officer called the 'roundsman' would literally march each of the men from the station through the city to their respective posts, and, following their tour of duty, back again to the station. This served the purpose, again, of proving the penetration of this hierarchically graduated police administration by an authority. Here, and with drill generally, the administrative authority expressed its capacity to ensure downward reach. The skirmish, and the rounding up of the men by the roundsman was a visible offering of proof of an efficient obedience to command.

So strongly does the skirmish and the practice of drill come to signify efficient command that a palpable dependence on this technology formed on the part of police executives. In 1925, Chief David Ritchie of Calgary recommended a uniform course of training 'for the whole Dominion' and added that instruction in military drill 'would be of great value in handling them when working as a body' (C.C.A.C. 1925: 113) Chief Ritchie added that he was not to be taken as recommending a 'policy to nationalize the police'--he recognized the value of local knowledges and divergent populations. Rather, it was the practice itself which was a great leveler of divergent knowledges. The O.P.P made this explicit in its own standing orders of 1947:

The purpose of drill is to provide the very foundation of morale and discipline....Proficiency at drill occasions confidence and self-respect in the individual, and induces in him a personality likely to command the respect and obedience of others.' (O.P.P. Standing Orders, 1947: 33)

One last feature of drill deserves mention. Drill overlays a figure of the mean on the individual. As Neiderhoffer has argued, drill training seeks to strip away an individual's previous identifications and values in a 'total institutional' control (Neiderhoffer, 1967: 51-57; Goffman, 1961). It does this by
detach individuals from familiar resources and from the comfort of familiar links and ties (cognitively and literally). Deploying the resources of a total institution, including the power to take advantage of the neophyte's need to make attachments and the vulnerability of bodily and psychological fatigue, drill provides the individual trainee with a new set of comprehensive and comprehensible ties, values, and activities. There is a hope that this vigilance is installed on each member.

By so strongly and rigorously establishing legitimate shaping with a disembedding technology, drill contributed greatly to what is known as the thick blue wall surrounding police agencies and the public police in general. While the practice, as we see with the Toronto skirmish, originally utilized iconic suasion to cultivate public support, it also served intentionally to isolate and seclude police constables from popular public contact. In this way it established a space in which a distinct police culture and its values could thrive and (alas) fester. Intimate and informal legitimation of police practices carried out on a day to day basis by the public was the ultimate victim. Disembedding practices like drill structured police agencies in the model of vertical pillars, whose hollow inner spaces housed police constables whose needs came to be immensely burdensome. In the heyday of the welfare state, during which police constables were infantalized or de-responsibilized from even the most basic self care, this was much in evidence. In pushing officers to link with the organization and to the in-group, and in using a strategy of deprivation and re-individualiation to accomplish this, police organizations and the institution as a whole contributed to the formation of an almost intractable culture, to a terrible burden of officer 'care', and to a constable who in many ways was preventing from 'growing up.'

With the uniform and with drill, the constable was capacitated or re-subjectified through an appreciation of the mean and the recognition of 'the good' in appearance protocols of the body. The disciplinary gaze was installed in constabulary self-regulation. As we shall see, the law enforcer is a professional idealization which draws on this structuring of the self.
2. SANCTIONING CONDUCT: REGULATIONS AND CODE

The Lelievre and Macnab Inquiries recommended the drawing up and distribution to officers of a strict code of conduct (Lelievre, 1854; Macnab, 1855). Comprehensive regulations were an important aspect of disciplinary reform. Such was the immediate impact of regulatory discipline that in Toronto between 1876 and 1900, Boritch found that the average number of men formally disciplined rarely fell below twenty-five percent (1988:161). In one year alone, 15% of the entire force was dismissed. This tight regulation through code was a means of inserting a supervisory control over men which had, it is recalled, a couple of decades earlier still been 'put in' (and out) by politicians, and had been subject to the sorts of horizontal interference which Chief Sherwood had disparaged, and which Chief Prince had subsequently worked hard to change. In deploying regulation and code to this end Toronto was merely, if belatedly, copying the Peelian military/bureaucratic model (cf. Paley, 1989; Smith, 1985: 49).

Rules and regulations are both pre-emptive and reactive: they set the constable in a legal context of permissions and prohibitions and thus re-orient the neophyte constable (if he is not so oriented already as a citizen) to policing as a legal terrain. Regulations are a body of prohibitions and positive requirements with respect to correct conduct and generally include the description of an action or conduct and a penalty for each failure to comply. Police orders, standing orders and regulations are schedules of the specific duties and sanctions which are determined and promulgated by police supervisory authorities. They are easily delivered across wide territories to remote agents. They are enacted by the authority of town, city, provincial, or federal governments in order to delimit and regulate the actions both of the police organization and of police officers individually. Their scope is circumscribed by the 'higher' enabling legislation of the provinces, and, ultimately, the parameters of policing jurisdiction laid out in the constitution.

More specifically, police orders are the communication of official information dealing with matters of the administration,
regulation, or control of the force. This includes information such as appointments, suspensions, punishments, resignations, retirements, transfers, promotions, commendations, equipment changes, awards, graduations, the establishing or closing down of units, detachments, or divisions, and clothing, equipment, and accouterments. Special orders or standing orders are the regular updates of force regulations, and may include much detail not only on proper conduct, but also on the reasons for changes in conduct requirements. Regulations, then, are the ongoing cumulative orders governing the organization's missions, deployment, and the conduct of its individual personnel. They are designed to promote and regulate both organizational and individual conduct, and consist of statements on the legitimate organization and mission of the police department. Like drill, uniforms, and the beat, these regulations and orders can contribute to the identification of the individual with the interests and values of the organization.

Here, it is not possible to do a complete history of police regulations, even if we were to limit this to Toronto or the Ontario Provincial Police. Rather, what is offered is some evidence of the comprehensiveness of early rules and regulations. We see this with the interest of an emergent administrative authority to 'prove' not only reach, but some capacity to shape conduct. In this we see the capture of what was the citizen constable by that administrative authority for what now becomes the police constable. The transition is marked by a claiming of private life of the police officer by the state. It is also marked by what may be called an infantalization of the constable in the care of the self. In this section then, we will focus on three themes: the comprehensive jurisdiction of the regulations, their onus on the authority relation, and their incursion into the full (private and public) scope of the police constable. To draw out these thematics, we will refer to some exemplary regulations both in Toronto and the N.W.M.P./R.C.M.P., focusing on the late nineteenth century.

A. Getting the Man Out
Studies on the early professionalization of the police in England have demonstrated that while there was a concern for his activity,
there was even a larger concern that that activity would bring the reforms into disrepute (Paley, 1989; Smith, 1985). Regulations were quickly quite onerous in order to ensure that this new police constable would not act too much against the wrong sort of targets. Indeed, in the London model, police were understood as 'primarily a force for deterring misconduct by their obvious presence' (Smith, 1985: 49). In the early regulation of professional forces in Britain and Canada, ensuring the coverage of posts and beats whilst at the same time keeping men from disgracing the new reforms is the theme evident in regulatory prohibitions and records of discipline (Smith, 1985; Rogers, 1984: 126; Weaver, 1990: 116).

In section V of the 1890 Toronto Police Force Regulations, (Grasett, 1890) it is stated that rules and regulations may not meet every case. '[S]omething must necessarily be left to the intelligence and discretion of individuals and according to the degree in which they show themselves possessed of those qualities, and to their zeal, activity, and judgement on all occasions, will be their claims to future promotion and reward' (Grasett, 1890, emphasis added). This disclaimer aptly reflects anxieties that police constables will be sufficiently active in duty. It also betrays a preference among governing bodies to do conduct shaping to the greatest degree possible through such rules and regulations.

That the aim is to cultivate or glean the commitment of the whole man is well demonstrated in the section entitled 'General Instructions.' The first three points made under this heading intended as rules and regulations for every member of the force are as follows: 1) 'He shall devote his whole time and attention to the business of the department.' 2) 'He must, although on duty only for certain allotted hours on ordinary occasions, be prepared to turn out on duty at all times when his services are required, the maxim being, that a Policeman is considered as always on duty.' 3) 'He must, although specially appointed for a particular locality, be ready to act wherever else he may be required, the sphere of duties being the whole City' (Grasett, 1890: 58, italics in original). The priority and the emphasis reflects the focus on making the constable an officer of the administrative authority.
and on securing the whole person and his whole time. Recalling the distinction between the tie to local authorities on a fee-for-service basis and the tie to emergent state administration, it can almost be added, 'while a constable may sleep or be otherwise occupied, a policeman is always on duty.'

The first priority, then, is establishing the police constable as a serviceable agent of the administrative authority: first, he must be there to use. The second priority is to ensure that there is a strict relationship between that authority and that agent, structured by a chain of command. The disclaimer about the limits of the purview of rules and regulations and the necessity of constable discretion and intelligence is in this context even less persuasive: it is obedience rather than intelligence that is wanted.

This hierarchy of values can be further interpreted from the section entitled 'constables' on page 23 and 24 of the Toronto Regulations. They are marginally noted as follows: 'Obedience,' 'civility,' 'truthfulness,' 'untruthfulness,' 'make notes,' 'arrests,' 'promptitude,' 'memorandum book' (Grasett, 1890). Obedience, as we have already noted in our discussion of 'training to obey,' is always front and centre in constable shaping. Civility is also in this context a deference to authority, to the schedules of status in society as a whole.24

Notice, next, how 'truthfulness' and 'untruthfulness' are considered important to police constable conduct. They are advised 'to speak the truth at all times and under all circumstances' (Grasett, 1890: 23). The emphasis on truth is an emphasis on the visibility or transparency of their knowledge. This is also demonstrated in the stress on making notes and keeping a memorandum book. In making what they know available, they are making themselves useful to higher ranking decision-making.25 Tools of interpretation do not figure into this concern.

24 As was also demonstrated in the Letterbook of Chief Constable Prince, constables were to know when and against whom to use force, and when and against whom to use discretion.
25 A further indication of this emphasis is to be found in the section entitled 'correspondence' in which it is stated 'Anonymous correspondence by Police is strictly prohibited.' Also, under the section 'general instructions' section 18, it is said that 'any Sergeant or Superior Officer borrowing money from any one below him in rank is liable to be dismissed, and any one lending money to
There is no regard for the substantive mechanisms of police work, the 'What would you do if?' Rather, by setting the police constable up as a functionary in a process what is being stressed is the utility and morality of administration and procedure. The very first requirement is obedience, the second reviewability. The constable is to be transparent with the up-channel of the authority relation.

From the section entitled 'conduct' in the alphabetized section entitled 'Instructions Related to Internal Discipline' more can be gleaned of the hierarchy of values relating to constable conduct. Here, the first point is a general reminder that individual conduct reflects upon the force as a whole, and that good conduct will be rewarded and bad conduct punished. The second point states that the Commissioners 'may discharge any Officer or Constable convicted of being unfit for duty from the effects of liquor, or being found asleep in the beat (37). In section 11 of Part 1, the duty of the Chief Constable with reference to constable conduct is made and it is noted that the Chief Constable is to prefer charges against constables 'for serious derelictions of duty, such as drunkenness when on or off duty, insubordination, incivility, disobedience to orders, and the like...' (2). From pps 16 - 20 in the sections describing the duties of the sub-inspectors and sergeants and patrol sergeants, it is impressed upon these superordinates that vigilance over and supervision of constable conduct must focus greatly on absences from duty: Sub-Inspectors 'shall report any absence from duty, also the length and cause thereof' (16); 'they shall examine into the cause of any absence of duty by visiting the man absent, or otherwise' (16); 'they shall enter in a book the time when they visit the beats, and if any be absent therefrom they shall report such absences to the Chief Constable' (16). Sergeants: '...any absentees are to be reported and the cause ascertained' (19); 'If at any time they find a Constable absent from his duty on the beat, they are immediately to ascertain the cause of the Constable's absence, and report it' (19). Patrol Sergeants: 'They will report all cases of misconduct, absence, and irregularity on

his superiors is to appear before the Commissioners to answer for his misconduct.' (60)
the part of the men on beat' (20). The Toronto Police Force Regulations of 1890 betrays an abiding concern for absenteeism on the part of force members. Again, the emphasis is not so much on what constables are doing in the line duty, it is on how they may not be readying themselves.

The Discipline Book of the Toronto Police Department (1867-1907) confirms these objectives of rule as they are impressed upon police constables. The overwhelming majority of the infractions concern tardiness or absences from the beat or are based on findings that a beat was not properly covered. Again, this reflects the emphasis both on the saturation of the city and on the restriction of lateral ties among police constables and citizens. The discipline on individual officers, which ranged from dismissal to admonishment to fines ranging between one and five days pay, were aimed at forcing the individual officer to meet and surpass extant benchmarks of saturation or coverage. Most frequently, disciplinary actions were for gossiping, loitering, and drunkenness. Dismissals were generally for insubordination, absence of duty, some form of immorality, and also drunkenness (Boritch, 1988: 155).

Although there is no doubt that these dismissals were based on arguments about morality, the understanding of moral action on the part of the police constable is suffused with the logic of a disembedded authority. The emphasis is on this dimension of showing the flag, of displaying the capacity of a disinterested authority in matters of civil governance. Transgressions are actions which fail to bring this putatively neutral flag to the site where intervention may be deemed necessary or expedient.

B. Controlling the Private Life and N.W.M.P. Marriage Regulations

In addition to the emphasis on 'getting the man out' and on securing a tight chain of command and transparency of constabulary actions, there is a drive to secure the whole time of the constable for the service of the state, including his private 'self'. Indeed, as we noted previously in our reference to the competencies of the constable today, that private self was being purposively stripped. Instead of being responsibilized, the police constable was being infantalized. Examples of disciplinary
infractions in Smith (1985) and Boritch (1988) confirms that early regulations on the police emphasized this colonization of the private by the public. Smith informs us that we get a 'good idea of the kinds of misconduct that would result in compulsory resignations from the London police' (49) between 1857 and 1860 in examples which include 'Inside a cow shed, and milking a cow while on duty.' and 'Marrying a common prostitute,' and 'continuing to live with his wife after reporting he had found another man in bed with her' (in ibid.).

In Toronto, this incursion was much in evidence. In subsection 15 of the Toronto Police Force Rules and Regulations it is stated: Constables are not to attend theaters or other places of amusement, even in plain clothes, without obtaining leave from the Officer in charge of their Division. Such leave will only extend to the particular time and place for which it is asked.' In subsection 22 of the same section, it is stated: 'No indulgence will be granted in giving time off to Constables on the plea that they have attended court in the morning, nor will that plea be accepted as an excuse for dereliction of duty. Constables neglecting to avail themselves of the time at their disposal for rest and sleep, and spending large portion of their time in walking about the streets are to be reported to the Chief Constable' (Grasett, 1890: 61). In subsection 3 of the section 'conduct,' it is stated that 'Officers or Constables found card-playing or drinking in public houses are considered unfit to belong to the force' (37). In the following subsection 4, 'any member of the Police Force found entering public houses, except on duty, or found frequenting shops where spirits are sold, or drinking there, will be liable to dismissal' (37).

The N.W.M.P. (later the R.C.M.P.) have pushed regulation of the 'private' life of the constable to its most extreme manifestations. Nothing demonstrates this more than the prohibitions on marriage which that force maintained for almost a century until 1974. The first marriage restrictions on constables appeared four years after the force was founded in 1873. But in 1877, the Commissioner noted that married men had up until then been taken on with the hope that their wives 'would wash, cook, and sew for the men' (Horrall: 1991: 7). However, it was deemed
that the 'experiment' was unsuccessful and that 'transporting and feeding families was too expensive. Consequently, it was ruled that married men would 'no longer be engaged in the Force' (ibid.).

There was no prohibition, at the time, against getting married when already engaged, but regulations made clear that men 'would have to provide quarters, rations, and transportation for their family at their own expense' (8). In addition, men were required to stay in their barracks from 'lights out to Reveille' and thus had to obtain permission to live out of barracks to sleep with their wives (8). In 1892, however, the commissioner wrote to Ottawa to suggest that married men not be re-engaged, the bar on re-engagement thus creating a device to rid the force permanently of married members. In defense of this proposal, he cited several reasons, including the argument that the presence of married men 'subverted' discipline 'as we practically have no control over them at night' (in Horrall, 8). He also appeared to suggest that married men let prisoners off easier 'from motives of pity for their families' (ibid.). As well as the lack of control married men presented, and their possible lack of neutrality, the commissioner added that there was no apparent means of sufficient support of the wives, the suggestion being that this posed further problems of discipline, control and commitment. In 1894 more punitive marriage regulations were indeed introduced, discouraging marriage for all but the most senior officers (ibid.).

While marriage regulations were relaxed during the first world war, in 1922 they were again firmed up. Once again, married men were no longer accepted for engagement. Also, those already in the Force were required for the first time to obtain the Commissioners permission before marrying. Moreover, constables were required to have 12 years minimum (and non-commissioned officers 8 years) service before their application to marry would be considered. According to Horrall (1991:7), marriage regulations were in their most stringent form in the 1920s. In 1932, financial standing is introduced as a further impediment to

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26Here also is an example of the mobilization by the Force of the unpaid labour of women. This mobilization of unpaid labour is key in many dimensions of policing.
marriage, it being required that the marriage candidate have at least $500 in cash or convertible assets. This requirement was pushed up to $1200 by 1957. In 1935, a further requirement was added in the establishment of a minimum age eligibility to be considered for marriage candidacy. In 1935 this age minimum stood at 27. That minimum age was subsequently reduced, and in 1957, the member could be 23 years old with 5 years service (R.C.M.P.: 1957: 12). In 1971, the marriage regulations were reviewed and found to be supportable but in 1974 they were abolished due to external pressures.

As Horrall states, it was a 'long-held belief' of the force 'that married men's loyalties were divided because they could not devote themselves, body, soul and mind to the Force if they had to worry about responsibilities at home' (7). The 1957 brochure states: 'The main reason for the policy is to maintain a flexible mobility of a certain portion of the mounted police; it also provides time for a young man to become oriented and acclimatized to the peculiarities and difficulties of service, while at the same time he acquires a background of experience and maturity' (1957: 12). As we have stated previously, these regulations demonstrate again the concern with disembedding and with the unrestricted surveillance and regulation of the police constable by the administrative authority. As with drill and the use of barracks, these regulations on the 'private' life of N.W.M.P./R.C.M.P. constables looks for a condition of total administration, a condition in which all the variables of the life-world of the constable are guided and shaped through top-down command.

We have mentioned that this logic of rule created a responsibility on the part of the administrative authority to then care for the whole person: that being the object of its purview. We can also note that a further off-shoot of this logic is the infantalization of the constable. As is well argued in studies of total institutions (Goffman, 1961), such a total administrative purview inculcates a loss of initiative and self-determination on the part of the controlled population. 'Total institutions disrupt or defile precisely those actions that in civil society have the role of attesting to the actor and those in his presence that he has
some command over his world--that he is a person with 'adult' self-determination, autonomy, and freedom of action (43).

In the marriage regulations of the N.W.M.P./R.C.M.P. we see a tension between the private life of the police constable and the public duty of a transparent and controlled police resolve itself in favour, during the ascendance of the welfare state, of the public duty. Enterprise is here a victim of regulation. As commentators on the public/private divide often note, it is precisely such utilizations of public and private space which keep the distinction 'alive.' Regulations on marriage and over the privacy of constables more generally seek to disembed the police constable from community life and its loyalties to force him out as a wholly public or civic subject; this redirecting of loyalties and priorities is expressed in the saying, 'married to the force.'

Without, for the moment, paying attention to the fact of social context, we see in the changes in the proliferation and centrality of the code of regulations an emergent recognition of the fact of the will of the police constable as an intermediary of governance. We see in these codes an increasing appeal to the independence and freedoms associated with this recognition of the will of the policing agent. (The will is a locus of resistance.)

Shaping through code is thus distinguished from shaping through drill in that while the latter works on the body to get at the habits, the former seeks to structure the will or conduct itself. With the proliferation of rules of conduct or regulations, the individual constable begins to be given reasons for the prescription or proscription of actions or conduct; first, infrequently and in passing as additional information, but eventually more centrally and engagingly. While drill utilizes the legitimacy of a military iconography and its insistence on displays of subservience and obedience to indicate willing participation, shaping through code utilizes the legitimacy of the rule of law to structure action to the extant contours of public life. Shaping through code is to posit that constables can and should alter their conduct and mold their behaviour to keep it within prescribed limits of (public) legitimacy. The technology of police rules and regulations is conceived and disseminated as a
template according to which to intervene on (structure and control) police constable action.

CONCLUSION
Through drills and the uniform, discipline acts on the body to arrest the play of significations. It is a technology of governance which deploys a preferred reading of the signs of the body (and of bodies of men) in order to capacitate them as obedient agents of an authority. In drills like the Toronto Police Force skirmish, as we have seen, constable action emphasizes an automatic response to the single bark of command. In training the constable according to an automatic reflex, and in supervising his public and private conduct, the automatic policeman is intendedly shaped. Disciplinary shaping of the body and its habits also structures policing as presumptively carried out by agents. Through a comprehensive body of rules and regulations, and through constant correction, reward and sanction, disciplinary technologies also work to contour the expectations of men to appreciate the satisfactions of the mean, and the utilities of a hierarchical command. These technologies promote a graduated responsibilization to a single authority. They work by first infantilizing and stripping to a common mean, and then working up individualities through a code of correct doing. Through both this work on the body and the soul, discipline acts to shape police constables as agents of governance. The agent of the administrative authority doing policing is a uniformed policeman's body or a uniform troop ready to act. Indeed, terms like 'strength' and 'force' refer to this understanding of policing as ready policemen's bodies. The medium doing policing is a standardized body of men and a man's body.

And this, indeed, alerts us to a central feature in the evolution of the public police. The citizen-constable fell under the control of an emergent administrative authority, and his autonomy, initiative and enterprise was relegated, through a disciplinary discourse and disciplinary practices, to a distinct, and at certain historical periods, officially almost non-existent, private domain. In public perception of police, the consequence has been the identification of autonomy and initiative with
unregulated police behaviour. In police constable perceptions, the consequence has been a quest for publicly invisible or inscrutable spaces and a nostalgia for a re-integration of enterprise and autonomy with self-control, rather than the control of these by a distant authority.

As this set of disciplinary technologies informs us, discipline is an insecure technology. Palpable in the regulations and in the rigorous work on the body is the fear that the reflexive participation of the will cannot be taken for granted. Discipline assumes a context in which the division of labour between the locus of the command and the locus of obedience is distinctly bifurcated. It seeks to operate, as indicated earlier, through bodies: it gets to the 'seat of the habits' through making the body accustomed to acting, as it were, without reflection. As Parole Officer Archibald puts it, 'self control is usually the result of a series of acts of obedience to authority and is a habit resulting from a training to obey' (C.C.A.C., 1912: 40). Indeed, the authority of authority is out of bounds of the conduct of conduct under a disciplinary regime: rather it follows the military analogy of the distinction between the policy matter of calling the war and the procedural matter of making that war a reality of men fighting men.
CHAPTER FOUR

TECHNOLOGIES OF DISCIPLINARY REFORM II: SHAPING THROUGH SPACE

In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault argues that while power under the ancien régime was arbitrary, personalized and focused on the body as a site for its rejuvenation, power under a disciplinary regime uses the body as a target of practices. We have just seen in our analysis of the uniform, drill and the tight control over the conduct of the constable, that the body of the constable offered itself as such a target. As we shall see in this chapter, the body is not the only vehicle for the expression of power. Bourdieu (1977: 163) has argued that there is always a rigorous policing on 'temporal forms' and 'spatial structures,' which 'structure not only the group’s representation of the world but the group itself, which orders itself in accordance with this representation.' Indeed, power over space, as Harvey (1990: 226) (citing Lefebvre) maintains, is a fundamental and all-pervasive source of social power in and over everyday life....The materializations and meanings given to money, time, and space have more than a little significance to the maintenance of political power' (226-227) Disciplinary shaping acts both on the body and through the (re)structuring of space and time. Individuals are located and subjectivities spatialized. We take up offices and barracks and, more importantly, the police beat as technologies which act in this capacity to shape the police constable.

Here we continue to ask how the constable is colonized with the tie signs of the sovereign and made the property of the state. In asking this question, we look into how the space for self-responsible and enterprising individuality is breached and delegitimated. It appears that in the subjectivity of the constable, that other foundation of liberal rule, the enterprising citizen, is targeted and annihilated by the emergent welfare state. However, while the disciplinary constable is shaped as an icon of administrative authority according to the technologies which that authority has at its disposal, he is also enabled or chosen because he is a good representative of exemplary, self-responsible citizenship and fits extant measures of what this
means. The irony is that fitness as a responsible citizen is undermined by this shaping process.

Even while the shaping technologies do their work the police constable continues to look for self-expression and freedom. Indeed, if a deployment of space and time can be utilized or structured by an emergent administrative authority to fix the constable, the constable can reclaim temporal and spatial dimensions in an obdurate resistance, deploying the very structures by which he himself has been placed.

1. OFFICES, BARRACKS AND OTHER SPACES

There shall be in each incorporated town a police-office, at which it shall be the business of the police magistrate, or the mayor, in case of his absence or sickness, to attend daily, & c., or at such times and for such periods as shall be necessary for the disposal of the business. (Municipal Act: 12 V. c. 81 § 69, 1850).

They shall be lodged in barracks provided by the province...they shall not without express permission of the proper officer leave same when not on actual duty. ....[there shall be] in addition to the barracks or quarters for the force (if any) doing ordinary duty there, a Police Force Depot, which shall have sufficient accommodation and ground for lodging, training, and exercising any recruits for the police, or reserve of men not doing training at any particular place ("Draft Bill, An Act Respecting the Police," 186827).

The inquiries we reviewed in chapter two, as well as emphasizing drills on the body and a training up through code, also encouraged the deployment of distinct police spaces. The citations from legislation above indicates two strategies by which space was to be deployed for police constables. As indicated in the first quote from the Baldwin Act, it was mandated that every town was to have an office set aside for police business. The requirement of a police office installs police business as a common denominator of governance. The town constable could now identify his occupation as an institutional domain which would be locatable in time and place. A police office orients the constable to the structure of activities taking place at an institutional and physical site.

27PAO: RG 4-32, file 1486, 1868.
As indicated in the second quote from a draft plan for provincial constables, barracks were seen as one means of articulating a dream of the state-representative government agent. The idea is to keep the men in barracks in order that they can be shaped according to the interests of the provincial government. An accompanying note by Allan Macnab indicates his hopes that the Attorney General will get the act passed: 'it is absurd the way we are placed now. The city council ought to have nothing to do with police matters....The police ought to be under the government.'

The institutional and infrastructural phenomenon of the police office does a number of things. For both police administrative concerns and for the police constable himself, it identifies the institution in time and space as a place of 'police' activity. The central administrative authority may then use this (now spatially concretized) distinction of the office to further rationalize its (the police office's) separation from local authority and the courts. The police constable, in turn, may now focus his activity to the contours of this office, rather than to the preferences and time-lines of its embodiment in an individual--such as the justice of the peace. It thus performs to give a non-human locus for the distribution of administrative duties, and acts to set parameters or boundaries to police interventions which are not equivalent to the scope or reach of single individuals, but are rather aggregations or overlaps. Consequently, it (re)structures what is doable and reasonable. If, as we quoted the London Quarterly earlier, the constable was perceived as 'an institution rather than a man,' that man could, with the emergence of the police office as a distinct entity in time and space, more conveniently understand himself according to immediate institutional objectives as they are materialized in a bureau.

The section-house, comprised of barracks and common rooms, is another police space. 'The biggest towns and cities had police barracks for young and unmarried men. These were often run by a serving officer and his wife or a pensioned officer' (Clapson &

28Although it is mediated by the proliferation of ranks and other constables too.
In London, where this convention of providing such spaces for urban police appears to have originated, 29 dormitory style sleeping arrangements were prevalent and were consequently noisy places in which to catch any sleep. In Toronto in 1859, Wilson recommended the establishment of barracks for the accommodation of the men at the respective stations to which they belong. Barracks should be constructed, affording a small house to every married man and his family; and a separate bed-room, but a common mess-room, for unmarried men. How much better this would be then having them scattered throughout the city, They should be always on hand, and always to themselves (Wilson, 1859: 105)

In the section house, the officers were subject to curfews, liable to sudden calls, and under 'constant supervision' (Shpayer-Makov, 1990: 120).

The section-house was generally at police headquarters, and housed various things besides sleeping quarters. In Toronto, Draper established a bagatelle, a billiard room and a library (Rogers, 1982: 128). Indeed, the Toronto force established the 'first if not only police library' in North America in 1878 before the organization of the City Public Library (Toronto, 1886: 12). In Manchester, a library was established for police officers in 1848 (and closed ten years later due to lack of interest) (Joyce, 1990: 141).

The creation of a library in police buildings is consistent with the reform aims of the Inquiries of the 1850s according to which the constable's need for recourse to the amenities of village or town life was to be restricted at the same time that the police organization itself would provide positive inducements for good behaviour. Adam Wilson and other reformers were well aware that in Britain the constable was being provided with these aids to better sustain him as an acceptable moral presence in urban society (cf. Rogers, 1982; Storch, 1975). As Wilson put it:

How different this would make the station-room and even the houses of the men! At present, what can the men on station duty do, but lie about, or trifle their time away?—and this not because they wish to do so, but because they have nothing else to do, and no encouragement is given to them

29The Irish Constabulary also had this convention.
to do anything else. The men would be delighted to have a chance of improving themselves, and it is the duty of those in authority over them to place every reasonable facility in their way for good a purpose (Wilson, 1859: 105).

Ostensibly, the libraries 'stimulated the academic attainment of constables' (ibid.). But they also served to shape the constable according to the likes and tastes of the British gentleman. They acted to bridge the gap between that gentleman icon as the locus of morality, and the working class constable as an instrument of legitimate authority. Notice how this link is quite implicit in the article in the London Quarterly Review we have previously cited:

In the common-room of every section-house there is a library; that in King-Street, Westminster, contains twelve hundred volumes; we give a few of their titles: Taylor's Holy Living, Macauley's Essays, Paley's Works, the Waverley Novels, Lane's Modern Egyptians, Annals of the English Bible, Alison's Europe, Byron's Works, Jane's Naval History, Tom Cringle's Log, Life of Mohammed by Mohun Loil, Bishop Heber's Journal, Washington Irving's Works, Colonial and Home Library (in Wilson, 1859: 82).

This list of titles is provided to the public as evidence that police constables are becoming learned men able to engage themselves reflexively in the art of living and not mere functionaries who are dangerous because of their ignorance. As Rogers says, these facilities had the aim of 'enhancing police solidarity and forging the perception of the police as a 'muscular Christian' force' (Rogers, 1984: 129). The intention of the reformers was to use separate, secure, occupational spaces to actively configure and reconstitute the police constable as a locus of morality.  

But we also see in the provision of these goods and services the development of a pastoral care of the policeman. In cultivating in the police constable this institutional attachment and dependence, administrative authorities began to assume responsibility for the needs of each individual as a whole person, not just for those needs which are directly and exclusively attributable to compensation for policing services. In detaching the individual recruit from direct community dependencies and

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30In Britain, as Clapson and Emsley (1994) argue, the effort was grounded in a Smilesian self-help ethos.
substituting itself in the role of 'care-giver' for the constable, the police department also forces itself into a role which cannot stop with mere discipline. It encourages the department to cultivate attributes which unthinking obedience to authority does not conveniently foster. Indeed, as Rogers describes the transition between Chief Constable Prince and Chief Constable Draper of the Toronto police department, Draper's establishment of the police spaces we have been describing (Rogers, 1982: 128) is attributable to his understanding that supervision alone along paramilitary lines is insufficient to build both gentlemanly morality and a police 'morale' or 'solidarity.' If constables are to be disembedded, their government must also recognize their 'whole' needs in its conduct-shaping strategy.

Although police discipline is cited in defense of the need for police barracks, police spaces like the section-house are also deployed as a relief from its rigors. With these occupational spaces, the police constable is rounded out as an individual, at least in his public representation, so that he may also retain, behind his machinelike neutrality, those features of liberal humanism which also moderate his conduct. But this dilemma between the cultivation of the disciplinarian on one hand, and the cultivation of the self-governing cultured gentleman on the other is not so easily resolved through the deployment of these spaces. Well into the middle of the twentieth century, there remains a tension between an ethic or rule which understands police neophytes as 'bodies' or raw material to be trained through the strict regimen of a total institution, and an ethic of governance which understands them as junior associates who need only the room to cultivate their talents and shape themselves into respected professionals. A century later a retreat from this policy of pastoral care was on its way. At the apex of such care in the 1950s and 1960s, the Ontario government also began to turn away from it. On Jan. 30 1962, O.P.P Commissioner W. H. Clark wrote to Ontario's Attorney General:

As you are aware, it is now contrary to Governmental policy to construct residences for occupancy by Ontario Provincial
Police personnel stationed in Districts throughout the Province.31

2. THE BEAT
To anyone familiar with the origins of patrol it is nothing short of astounding to realize that what was once clearly understood as a means of controlling police could grow to acquire a front-line role in the war on crime (Klockars, 1985:112).

The police administrative expert Elmer Graper (1921: 125) defines the police beat as 'the unit of police service;' it consists of 'a certain territory over which a patrolman walks back and forth during his tour of duty.' The police historian J. Daniel Devlin adds that the beat is 'the smallest territorial unit in the Police Service' (1966: 33, italics added). The police beat conceives policing as a question of the allocation of men to territorialized (or spatialized) jurisdiction. Graper notes that this division into patrol districts must take into consideration 'the character of the buildings and the purposes for which they are used; location of fires and fire hazards; location and kind of accident hazards; extent and character of vehicular traffic; distribution of population together with density and nationality; and the burglary hazard' (129). In general, the boundaries of the beat are determined by the police's interpretation of significant demographic, infrastructural, and natural features of the policed territory. With the technology of the beat, the domain of jurisdiction of the municipality (or county)32 is divided into police-equitable sections and individual police officers are installed in each one of them.33 In late 19th century and early twentieth century North American cities, roundsmen or patrol sergeants supervised this distribution into beats by marching the men out to their respective posts in a military fashion.

With Graper and Devlin, we see the police beat as a unit of police service. Indeed, the police beat changed the unit of police service. Recall that the units of police service under the citizen constable were the fees that they could expect from an

31FAO, RG 4, Series 4-02, file 188.1., 1962.
32Counties, as Devlin says, may be understood as divided into beats as well, but we are concentrating here on their application to municipal policing.
33In the Preamble of the Toronto Police Force Regulations of 1890, it is noted that the city is divided into divisions, and that the division is divided into beats, the patrol of which is the responsibility of constables.
arrest, from travel expenses in bringing a felon to court, from attendance at court, etc. The police constable’s time was paid for, but in a very generic way, with no attention to the actual time the individual service took to accomplish by the individual constable. The constable’s ‘whole time’ did not belong to a governing body. Rather, the constable, in being a citizen and probably a farmer, was expected to have other demands on his time and to structure his daily life around the requirements of his own subsistence and the sustenance of his family. The citizen constable was similarly unconstrained in a spatial sense. It was expected that he could be reached to attend to a call for service, but such communication depended on informal networks, and he was dedicated to the whole jurisdiction anywhere within which he could be expected to be. He could not be assumed to be at home or at any other fixed point of space.

Under professionalization, however, the whereabouts and the availability of the constable became paramount. These agents of the state were to be separated from territorial communities even as they manifested themselves as immediate and daily presences. While through this distancing act instructed to protect liberal freedoms and show themselves as disinterested enforcers of the law and keepers of the peace, they themselves were subject to a penetrating surveillance in their movements.

A. The Division of Enterprise and Discipline Between Day and Night

I propose that charge of the night police should be taken gradually. I mean that my system of police should be substituted for the parochial system, not per saltum, but by degrees (Robert Peel cited in Parker, 1891-99:40).

It is a bit of a curiosity, but two distinct modes of governance existed side by side in urban centres in the mobilization of citizens previous to the installation of the full time police constable. Previous to that amalgamation, night and day were bifurcated according to these distinct modes, and the citizen-constable enjoyed an autonomy consistent with this division.

By day, the security of the city was defended by the citizen-constable who was called upon and reacted to the need to make an arrest or to perform other duties where a peace officer was wanted. Citizen constables were instructed, for instance, that
'it is always safer for a constable to act under the warrant of a Justice of the Peace' (Gowan, 1852: 16). They were to be careful in respecting the liberties and freedoms of people engaged in public discourse. They also governed their own day to day movements as they carried out warrants or provided other services for set fees. The lower judiciary practiced only a remote supervision of the office.

Storch and Philips (forthcoming: 3) found that parish constables in England were passive, and they were accused of the same failings in the Inquiries we have reviewed. When they were not passive, however, they were often accused of being too enterprising in their pursuit of fees. Indeed, while more extreme than the Canadian experience, pre-uniformed American police have been described by Alan Levett in the terms 'entrepreneurial police' (in Tarr et. al., 1987: 67, emphasis added). By this term he intended police whose behaviour is not governed by a code or by rules and regulation—and we might add, supervised beat distribution.

The citizen constable was either too passive and could not be capacitated to perform for the polity, or he was too active and his enterprise too self-serving and unstructured. His shortcomings could be expressed in terms of swinging between the two polarities of activity and passivity, his work as an agent of rule in a consequent fickleness and arbitrariness. The citizen-constable's time and his place at any given moment was a feature of his self-responsible role in the provision of a public duty; cautioned against demonstrating a ubiquity of state power against liberal freedom, he was himself not ordered in time and place.

By night, in contrast, a different protocol of governance applied. The security of the city was defended by watchmen who were expected to proactively intervene and inquire into the business of persons found on the streets. At night the protocol of governance or mode of regulation expressed an active vigilance over the whole of public space. Watchmen were to be always active, to be always watching, and they were to be ordered and strictly supervised in terms of their own time and place: this was how they could be controlled, and this is how they were passively instructed in the control of others.
In what follows, we will sketch the transition from distinct day and night governance previous to disciplinary reforms and their merging subsequent to them. While we do this, it should be noted that with modernization and the lighting of the city and shift work, etc., the distinction between night and day gives way on its own accord. Nonetheless, we will see that by first distinguishing these two modes of governance, it is easier to see how they are maintained. We will see that with the night watch and then with night patrol, regulation and enterprise are eventually integrated. The protocol of the night watch carried over to nightly patrol, and the government agent's whole time fell under the disposal of the administrative authority. He could be seen as strictly supervised whilst at the same time being expected to be see without being seen.

The discipline of the beat already had a precursor or prototype in the supervision of the nightly watch. The Rules, Orders and Regulations for the Foreman, Deputy Foreman and Watchmen of the City of Quebec of 1827 (Quebec, 1827) provides an example of time-space organization under the nightly watch and provides a precursor and model of beat organization under disciplinary police reform. The nightly watch of Quebec City consisted of two watch houses, 10 watch boxes and watch stands, the foreman, deputy foreman, and 12 watchmen. It was to run from 10 p.m. all night to between daylight and sun-rise. The stands were to be held at fixed locations, and the foreman was to divide the streets of the city between these stands. He was also to determine a regular rotation of duty between these stands, under the stipulation that 'no watchman shall have the same stand twice in succession' (5). The foreman or deputy were also expected to 'go the rounds and visit every Watch House and every Stand two or more hours after watch setting.' They were further expected to be present at the dismissal of the watch, and to receive the reports for the night from the watchmen.

The head Watchman at each of the watch houses was expected to 'go the rounds of the Stands attached to his watch, once every hour, giving the hour of night to each Watchman' (6). Each watchman, in turn, was expected to patrol the streets, proclaiming the state of whether, and observe and test the safety and security
of the houses and shops. Chiefly, he was instructed to prevent mischief (6-7). When necessary, every watchman was further expected to 'arrest, apprehend, and take in charge all and every person or persons' who fit loose descriptions of the following: 'night-walkers, malefactors, vagabonds,' 'persons lying or loitering in any square,' 'persons emptying dirt into the street, and other loose, idle or disorderly persons' (8). For refusing or failing to carry out these duties, or for being absent from duty in one way or another, or disobeying lawful orders, the watchmen would face fines (11).

We can see from the description of duties with regard to arrest a very inclusive protocol. It is assumed that public space is more or less vacated by citizens whose sensibilities demand care and courtesy. Nightly rule can therefore presume to exercise tight restrictions on freedom and offer imposing surveillance on its agents. The time and place prohibitions act further to allow the structuring of the nightly watch and its agents according to a temporal and spatial grid (e.g. within the town, between dusk and dawn; e.g. at 'x' location at 'x' time). And since the problem of the watch was to ensure an adequate concentration of capacitated agents within these time-space grids, the whereabouts of the watchman could be a reason for disciplinary action.

All that was needed was the transfer of these supervisory mechanisms. The principles of tight supervision seen here in the nightly watch were adapted to the new police beats of cities like Toronto. What this hinged on was the transition of constabulary labour from the fee for service to full-time service model. Indeed, the earliest salaried constables were considered 'always on duty,' with this also meaning that the division for liberal enterprise was now an allowance which could be granted or withheld. With policing under disciplinary reform, then, there was a merging of this division (between the watchman and the citizen-constable) in the governance of security through the police constable. The principle of self-governance and the defense of the enterprising individual (which was more in keeping with the parish or citizen constable) was sutured together with

34 A similar phenomenon occurred in American cities. (cf., Rubinstien, 1973)
the temporal and spatial discipline of the Watch. Derivative police constables fell under the watchful eye of immediate supervision and came to be regulated through tight spatial and temporal divisions. The police constable was therefore a marriage of discipline and enterprise, with discipline very much the visible part of the embodiment. In their own insertion into the polity, police constables came to 'wear' and 'prove' their own full penetration by an administrative authority.

The Eclipse and Maintenance of Day and Night Governance

Consistent with the bifurcation of policing between the citizen constable and the nightly watch, a distinct separation in 'day' and 'night' is maintained in the patrol of the city by the police constable. Although, on one hand the legacy of the nightly watch offers emerging police bureaucracies supervisory practices which are very intrusive on constabulary autonomy, it also gives the constable, in the permissions of nightly intrusion and secret places, very powerful avenues for the recapture of his autonomy and enterprise in the craft of patrol.

Early on after professionalization, the separation between night and day protocols of governance is expressed in the temporal bifurcation of the beat. It appears, for instance, in the Toronto Police Force Regulations of 1890:

As a general rule, Constables on day duty are to walk near the curbstone or outer edge of the sidewalk; and in crowded and busy neighbourhoods, the beats are to be walked so that the right hand of the Constable is next the carriage way. By this arrangement, the Police will move the stream of passengers going in that direction; the object being at all times to facilitate the passage of persons through the streets (Grasett, 1890: 31).

Ss. 3 of the same Regulations adds: 'Constables on night duty are to walk on the inside of the pavement near to the houses after 10 p.m.' (ibid.).

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35 This suturing occurred in Toronto with the consequence that after professionalization round the clock coverage of the city was an initial victim. A Brief Account of the Toronto Police Force (Toronto, 1886) notes that 'the practice of leaving the streets without Police protection from 4 to 9 a.m. ...' was discontinued in 1877. Here we see that following the eclipse of the nightly watch, there was a lapse during which the new system sought to stretch its coverage.
In the Berkeley Police Department in 1908, even the uniforms reflected the permissions of the night patrol versus the restrictions on that of the day. The force was divided into two platoons of twelve hour shifts; the day shift was to wear a light, khaki uniform, while the night patrol was to use black uniforms (Carte and Carte, 1975). Here again, the distribution of governmental style is bifurcated and expresses a logic of the proper distribution of regulation in time: this regulation can be secretive and hidden with the camouflage of the dark uniforms at night; it must be light and visible during the day.

The separation is a mainstay of patrol regulation throughout the first two/thirds of the twentieth century. In Training Precis #1, published by the Chief Constable's Association of Ontario (C.C.A.O.) in 1956, the distinction is made and made even more explicit. According to this manual, in 'daylight patrol,' the officer is to be 'as obvious as possible' and 'stays on the street in plain view so that persons seeking his assistance can locate him.' He thinks of himself as 'the visible representative of the Department [and] therefore has a definite public relations responsibility' (C.C.A.O., 1956 emphasis added). Indeed, 'his conduct must be such as to impress citizens that their Police Officers are worthy of full trust and confidence' (2) In 'night patrol,' in contrast, the 'patrol situation is somewhat different.' Now, the officer needs to see without being seen:

On night patrol the Officer uses to his advantage the natural cover offered by doorways, shrubbery, back alleys, etc. Of particular value to the Beat man in a business district are the recessed doorways of stores. First, because the Officer can step back off the sidewalk and watch the entire street without being visible to pedestrians or vehicles. Secondly, the show windows of a recessed doorway make an excellent mirror to reflect what goes on behind his back (2)

In The Patrol Operation, published in 1972 by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 'day shift' patrol is also distinguished from 'night shift' patrol. During the day, officers are told to 'be conspicuous.' 'Walking next to the curb places you in the best position to be seen easily, and you can observe both sides of the street. You will be able to cross the street if needed' (I.A.C.P., 1972:61). On night shift patrol, officers are
to 'take advantage of darkness. Walk next to the buildings and spend some time in the shadows and darkened areas. Stop and listen from alleyways or store entrances. When you stop, stand back out of the light as much as possible' (62).

The division of the beat into a night and a day protocol allowed, with night patrol, for the re-emergence of enterprise. In the permission to walk close to buildings and hide in doorways, the patrolman regains the cover of secrecy he perceives as so essential to his unfettered efficiency; he then has the power of a presence unseen. The protocols of nightly patrol understand the beat in terms of the privileges of place in space, and since the constable is not only permitted but required to fix and understand himself as a public servant, employee, and craftsperson in terms of his governance over this space, he readily utilizes short-hand definitions of its occupation. These include, at night, the expectation of residency, and the expectation on transgressors of the regular urban rhythms that they provide a credible account for their deviation (e.g. Sacks, 1972). Craft-rooted understandings of patrol as an art take from this legacy of discovery through secret watching.

More recently, the division of day and night patrol into distinct modalities of governance is not so clear. Urbanization has continued to disembed, thus complicating the job of determining time and place regularities. Indeed, patrol is understood as divided between the functions of deterrence, apprehension, and the provision of service (Wilson, 1968; Schell et. al., 1977). The temporal bifurcation is lost or subsumed in a structural division of patrol into reactive and preventative modalities, both of which are seen to operate co-extensively. Gay et. al. (1977: 3), for instance, understand patrol as bifurcated between a readiness for radio-initiated service and a readiness for self-initiated service. The blurring of the division is also attributable to the emergence of 'dial-a-cop' practices (Shearing, 1984) by which citizens came to be relied on for the work of detection and the police came to be organized to respond to this
citizenry detective work. With 'stranger policing' and the subsequent emergence of special public order or paramilitary units, uniforms and protocols matched the paramilitary discipline and the penetrating licenses of the nightly watch.

After race riots in the 1960s in the United States, the National Advisory Commission rebuked 'stranger policing.' It saw 'aggressive preventative patrol,' for example, as counter-productive (1968: 8). The Kansas City Police Department/Police Foundation experiment tested the effectiveness of preventive patrol (Kelling, 1974) and found it to have little or no value. These events, and a trend away from technological solutions (cf. Ontario, 1974) swung the pendulum back. There was a resounding plea for the maintenance of beats not on the crime fighting principle, but on the principle of order maintenance or peace keeping. Instead of aggressive randomized patrol or 'stranger policing,' neighborhood policing, unit beat policing, and foot patrol were reintroduced. With them, day-time strategies were reintroduced back into the light of day.

The themes of a temporally bifurcated beat have structured constabulary understandings of the propriety of time and place, and their own proprieties in merging an enterprising detecting with a self-regulatory visibility. Although this division has been blurred, it is still appreciable in the permission of dark clothing, the decision-making of paramilitary deployment, and in the place-time justifications for aggressive street patrol. Even today in the downtown police station one hears the echoes of this narrative in the enabling shop-talk of patrol officers: 'The only people out at 3 a.m. are assholes and taxis' (C3).

After being legitimated through the division of governance between night and day, the technology of the beat was key in pushing enterprise from the exercise of constabulary agency. Tight rationalization of the constable's occupation of space and time provided the vehicle for pushing constabulary enterprise back behind supervisory lines. In the meantime, as we shall see in the next chapter, constabulary agency was taken up as a province of

36The association of detecting and night patrol consequently came to be less pronounced. The idea of detection becomes less relevant to night patrol, to the point that Reiss (1971) argued that detectives do not detect.
the chief constable; the discretion of the constabulary office was shunted to the head of the bureaucratic structure. We might ask if the consequence is that the police constable, in being so tightly supervised, was indeed discouraged from cultivating the habit of self-regulation, at least as a member of an occupational group.

B. Supervision, Disembedding and Individual Authority

We have just seen that the distribution of time was important in the development of a police beat, and that it divided both the polity and also the constable in terms of purviews of regulation and enterprise and discipline and autonomy. Also important has been the use of technologies in the instrumental supervision of the beat, and the deployment of a military and bureaucratic ethos in the constitution and maintenance of police-defined spaces.

In his book on American police administration, Elmer Graper noted that 'most patrol regulations stipulate the manner of patrol and the route to be followed' (1921: 125). So vigilant was the supervision of police constables in their beats that even their pace of walking was indicated. In Toronto in 1890, constables were to walk their beats 'at a uniform rate of about two and a half miles per hour' (Grasett: 1890: 31). When not marched out to their beats by the patrol sergeant or roundsman, constables were also to be kept from going to them together: 'Constables going to their beats will separate and proceed by different routes when practicable' (32). The Toronto Police Detective's Order Book provides an indication of just how explicit was this emphasis on the tight application of a space-time grid on the constable:

No. 15 beat will be worked as follows from tonight until further orders: Starting point: corner of Front and Yonge streets: thence round the Iron C+Block and Esplanade as at present marked, and thence along the East side of Yonge St. to Wellington St. returning by the West side to starting point' (Toronto: March 12, 1878).

Over time, the constable was gradually allowed some leverage and credited with some expertise in grounding what, at first, were deviations from this top-down pattern. In Training Precise No. 1 of the O.A.C.P., the officer is instructed that he may depart from patrolling a beat 'in the prescribed manner'-- that is, according to a schedule 'directing that they follow a definite route' (1956:
as long as he notifies the officer in charge and records the reason for the aberration in his duty book. The exception was gradually becoming the rule after the introduction of the two-way radio in Ontario in 1946. With instantaneous communication, 'absences' were not a physical departure from place, but an unavailability to the dispatcher. Beat supervision could in many cases dispense with the co-presence of the patrol sergeant, since monitoring could be done over the radio.

Meanwhile, the beat also organized the relationship between the individual officer and his office. The relationship is structured both through a disembedding and through a territorial responsibilization. While in the Treatise of the Police of 1829, Wade advocated that the chief constables and constables, at least, should reside in the district, 'in order to become well acquainted with the character of its inhabitants,' in Toronto, after 1858, a thoroughgoing militarization was being deployed. Policemen were deliberately recruited from outside the community, and especially from British police forces (Rogers, 1982: 136). By the twentieth century in England generally, there was an emerging convention that police were to be secured from outside the community in which they were to serve (Fosdick, 1921: 277). By the 1920s in Ontario a strategy of disembedding began to take shape in which officers were regularly transferred in order, as Commissioner Williams put it, to prevent them from having their 'usefulness' 'impaired.' (in Higley, 1984: 134). From the time of its earliest recruitments, the R.C.M.P., too, made this a practice. Members recruited from one part of the province were routinely shipped out to another part for their first tour of duty. This persisted well after WWII and is only recently changing: 'A member of the force may be sent to any place in Canada where his services are required. Generally speaking, it is the policy not to post a man to his 'home' province' (R.C.M.P., 1959: 31)

Such disembedding became the norm with police professionalization, but it competed with a countervailing deployment of the beat: the cultivation of the 'territorial imperative' (in Holdaway, 1983) on the part of the individual constable. Already in 1841 Montreal, city police sub-constables were told that they would 'be held responsible for the security of
life and property within his beat, and for the preservation of the peace and general good order during the time he is on duty' (Starke, 1841: 22). In the United States, the famous police reformer and administrator August Vollmer was most emphatic in preaching that his patrolmen were responsible for all that occurred on their beats, and he had no compunction about judging performance on the basis of the territorial security patrolmen could 'produce' (cf. Carte and Carte, 1975). Patrolmen in Detroit were advised by Detroit's Manual for the Government of the Police (1880s) that they were to get to know their beats and the people in them (in Schneider, 1980: 100).

Although territorialization still surfaced from time to time as a narrative of the craft professional, the disenchantment with machine politics and ward power in the United States (Fogelson, 1977) and the enchantment with the welfare state in Canada (cf. C.C.A.C. (1913-1959)) acted rather to push police idealizations towards the model of the impersonal, detached bureaucrat whose interests were not too closely linked with the policed community.

C. Bureaucratic Icons and Individual Authority
We noted in our last chapter the importance of the cultivation of the police constable as a neutral, impartial agent of a legitimate administrative authority. To find a model for such an agent, the military officer was not only cited, but also deployed as a reality to head professional police organizations. As we suggested in our section on drill, the military officer was an apt expression of the disciplinary discourse: he was understood for restraint, self-control, and civility at the same time that he stood for the mobilization of efficient, civil defence. Behind this military officer lay the themes of neostoicism, and therein we see the military officer as also an expression of humanism--liberal humanism. But while the icon of the military officer was deployed to further the installation of policing agents as neutral yet responsible, that icon had too little behind it: although the image was used, little more than brawn substantiated the constable as a real person.

Taking from the practice of the watch, there was a very strong suggestion in the first beat protocols that visibility or presence itself was sufficient for the task, and that individual
expression was to be strictly curtailed. Manuals on the beat instructed officers to make suspicious persons aware that they were being watched: in this way they encouraged a show of regulation to maximal effect. If there were persons of bad character, the officers were to learn their faces and watch them: 'in such manner that it will be evident to said persons that they are being watched, and that certain detection must follow the attempt to commit crime' (in Schnieder, 1980: 100) In London, Ontario, the Committee on Police Report stated that constables were to be 'active, sober and intelligent men' who would prevent crime in part by presenting themselves as such on the street:

Crime is often prevented by the mere apprehension on the mind of the criminal of such men, when on the other hand if persons are selected of indolent and careless habits it acts as an encouragement for the commission of offences, from the belief that they will escape detection (in Addington, 1991: 7).\(^{37}\)

We see at least the remnants of the view that constables were to be used representationally. Their 'mere presence' was understood, much like the bildoe,\(^{38}\) to perform as a deterrent to crime and disorder. In reality, the police constable did not live up to this billing. Too often he was drunk or absent from the beat. In addition, beat supervision undermined the faith that the icon of impersonal authority could be replicated in the men in uniform. The style of supervision eroded the trust of personal honour, substituting administrative regularity for the mechanisms of charismatic authority (cf. Bordua and Reiss, 1966).

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37 Supervision, which began as a demonstration to townspeople of the controls on the constable, indicated this move to a more instrumental exercise. Already in London in 1829 and before, reformers like Wade had been arguing that this practice of calling out the hour only served to apprise thieves of [the watchman's] approach and was also of little use "as a check afforded to the inhabitants over him." (1972 [1829]: 362) Rather than this rote display to townsfolk that legitimate links between community, law, and the sovereign were manifest in the proof of the voices calling out through the night, Wade pushed for less demonstrative mechanisms of upward reportability; he suggested using 'the uncertain rounds of an inspector through the different watch stations.' (id)

38 A bildoe is an iron cage in which the rotting corpses of executed felons were kept. It was hung from a tree at the outskirts of town to demonstrate, especially to visitors or strangers, the costs of transgressing the town's laws. The principle was to mark territories and saturate jurisdictions: the corpse of the punished in the bildoe leaves a stench the memory of which is meant to define and exceed the temporal and spatial parameters of the government agency.
Between the idealization of the military officer and the reality of the working class men in uniform, the practical exigencies of walking the beat required a demonstrated, interested, and immediate 'presence of mind.' Installation and responsibilization to the beat forced the constable to manifest an immediate authority rather than merely to show it off; he needed, beyond a care for imagery, to exert himself ontologically and 'be' with the task. He needed to prove that he was substantial beyond the uniform and to practice the art of looking into, and not past, the eyes of the polity. Thus, while the remote administrative authority wanted to display itself with the iconography of a depersonalized figurative police constable, the manifest, daily governance of beat territory required the re-instantiation of those submerged features of individual authority.

Indeed, the beat officer became an icon with an iconic lineage, and his charismatic authority traces back not to the watch but the citizen-constable. Even if he did not measure up in fact, the citizen constable was to have been an exemplary citizen endowed with a certain minimum of charisma or individual authority, without which he was bound to be ineffective. The watchman, by contrast, was not reliant on his exemplariness as a citizen or on his charisma, it was not anticipated that he would need to deploy his individual authority. What the watchman did in the calling out of the hour and the weather was not an illustration of the efficient protection of residents, but rather a demonstration of an authority claiming, rather than proving, its effective reach (cf. Giddens, 1985). Even in this way, and as satirized by Shakespeare, the men of the watch were often only seen as icons of governance in the terms of pastiche.

The disciplined police constable, then, was to take from the citizen constable if he was to find a model for individual authority. Yet, in the early colonization of urban space by police constables, the disciplinary discourse downplayed the individual authority of the constable to emphasize, instead, the power of the administrative authority through bodies of men operating in machinelike fashion. This, as we have mentioned, occurred in the skirmish and in the marching out of the police constables to the beat. Here, the police constable was understood
in his iconography to be a vehicle for the distribution of remote authority, and his figure and presence is overdetermined as standard, uniform, replicated, machinelike: he is not to talk and is preventing from showing his humanity.

In the context of his depersonalization as a patrolman and the exigencies of his craft, the police constable developed at best caution, and at worst an extreme scepticism toward formal structures and procedures. He began to question the value and utility of his own regulation through the grids of supervisory devices such as drill, the beat, and dress. Failing to find anything of substance behind the military icons and presentations, he began to see them, rightly, as aimed at quashing that part of his identity honed on liberal enterprise. Indeed, we begin to see the seeds of an unintended consequence: the cultivation, through disciplinary technologies and practice, of undisciplined enterprise in police culture.

D. Modern Compression of the Beat
In our analysis so far we have emphasized the continuity of enterprise and regulation, of permission and constraint. We have attempted to show this theme in the temporal bifurcation of the beat, but also in the redeployment of the constable in the image of administrative neutrality. We have suggested, agreeing with Klockars, that the development of the beat under disciplinary reform can be understood in the development of enhanced supervisory tactics. Here, we provide the briefest of overviews of some of the technological changes which have sought to contain the dynamism of the constabulary office. The administrative dream of the total control of both the constable and the polity has been represented in these technological innovations. In the constable, at least, they have been greeted with derivative resistances.

In Boston and New York in 1855, the telegraph was introduced as a means to link police stations and headquarters. In the following year Philadelphia installed a similar system. Tarr et al (1987) note that the 'primary purpose of the police telegraph was to provide for better coordination within the police force and particularly to make large numbers of reserve police available for action against riots...The telegraph system solved the problem of
supplying...special squads with early alerts about potential riot situations and therefore ensuring quick action’ (61).

In 1867, the Gamewell Company introduced a police telegraph system which went beyond the links between stations and headquarters. It introduced police call boxes or electric signal booths which could be placed at strategic locations in the police beats, and were hard-wired to the police stations. These allowed the patrolman to indicate, by turning a dial, what kind of service was required, be it patrol wagon, ambulance, or backup personnel.

In 1882, a combined telegraph and telephone system was introduced in Chicago (Flinn, 1973: 397) Under this system, either the patrolman or ‘any responsible citizen’ (who would then need a key to open the booth) could pull a lever to send a signal to the central police station which would then indicate the number of the call box from which the message was sent. At the station, a patrol wagon would be despatched back to the location. The patrolman also had a second option. He could use a telephone either for direct communication with the station or for other options, namely, ‘thieves,’ ‘riot,’ ‘test of line,’ or ‘fire.’ In Toronto, the constable had the option of making a slow or a fast call for the wagon (Grasett, 1890: 75). The introduction of the telephone on the beat in this way facilitated a two-way communication between the police supervisory level and the patrolman. Obviously, it also greatly enhanced the amount of information that could be passed back and forth between police management and the front line (Leonard, 1938: 15-17). Patrolmen were also controlled on the beat by being required to make regular visits to these boxes and proving their presence on their rounds by pulling at these levers.

Resistances were legion. To counteract the constraints imposed on constable freedoms by the telegraph system, one officer would be given keys to all the boxes, and he would walk from box to box pulling them on schedule while the rest of the men played cards or otherwise absented themselves from duty (Rubinstien, 1973: 17). Demonstrating the tension between supervision and an emergent ground-up beat knowledge, virtually the entire Hamilton force protested against the reorganization of beats claiming that insufficient time was allowed ‘to thoroughly
examine doors, windows, and gratings' (in June 1896, Weaver, 1990: 119). With the change from the signal box to the call box, another method of resistance came in the form of leaving the phone off the hook; since all phones were hooked in a series, such an action by one patrolman would put the whole network out of service. Other means of sabotaging the call boxes were to short them out by splashing water on their cables or cutting their wires (Rubinstien, 1973: 17).

The next major technological innovation for the beat was the automobile. August Vollmer, fielded the first fully motorized patrol fleet in Berkeley in the 1920s. Note how one of his 'students', O.W. Wilson, saw the patrol car as a new way of compressing space:

[A]n effort has been made to render adequate patrol service to outlying business and residential sections by increasing the strength of the mounted (in automobiles!) patrol. On a basis of arrests made for all thefts, the mounted officer is six times as effective as a foot patrolman, and instead of protecting two to four blocks, he covers an area of over three square miles (Wilson in Larson and Cahn, 1985: 11)

Toward the end of the 1920s, Vollmer also successfully integrated the two-way radio into patrol usage. He saw this innovation in the following terms:

[W]ith the advent of the radio equipped car a new era has come...Districts of many square miles...are now covered by the roving patrol car, fast, efficient, stealthy, having no regular beat to patrol, just as liable to be within 60 feet as 3 miles of the crook plying his trade--the very enigma of this specialized fellow who is coming to realize now that few moments may bring them down about him like a swarm of bees--this lightning swift 'angel of death (in Rubinstien, 1973: 20).

With continuous radio communication via the patrol car, police administrators began to be able to discover absences through self-initiated contacts. As Rubinstien put it, they now had a way of directly supervising what the policemen are doing. Higher officials can listen to the radio whenever they wish... This extension of central control has deprived the districts of considerable autonomy and increased the effective control of the department's directors in a fashion that Colonel Rowan would have approved most heartily (Rubinstien, 1973: 23).
The patrol car offered a way of maintaining instantaneous supervision. The patrolman could be checked up on without warning.\(^{39}\)

In 1855, Philadelphia's mayor Robert Conrad greeted the arrival of the telegraph by claiming 'now the entire police force has but one soul, and that soul is the telegraph' (in Tarr et. al., 1987: 62). The hope was not only that time and space could be remobilized to contain the object to be intervened upon, but that the agent of governance, too, could be similarly fixed; the state, in the person of the rationalized police constable, could be a coherent, calculated subject that Foucault (1979) saw in raison d'état. Indeed, the quest for the unification of police through communications technology has constantly rekindled the modernist dream of matching an accurate representation of the social world with a legitimate means of intervening on it.\(^{40}\) Underneath the imagery of the 'soul' of the telegraph and more modern technologies is the hope in the truth of the correspondence theory of knowledge or picture theory of nature (Rorty, 1979) Underneath it as well, is the hope of the modern epistemological subject (always only one) to recover the world through correct representation.

The dream begins to unravel with the introduction of the emergency number or 911. It is found that a calls-for-service mobilization itself increases the workload of the patrol officer. The dream did not anticipate the back-again relationship of crime

\(^{39}\)Resistances continue to match and often trump technological forays today. Cain (1971) and Holdaway (1983) describe how police are able to go out of service, using 'mump holes' and 'easing practices.'

\(^{40}\)Note also how the modernist dream is expressed in Vollmer's words:

If the assumption is made that patrol work is important and that the patrolman should be distributed by areas in proportion to the amount of work to be done, it should be possible to state a universal hypothesis. This hypothesis is that the normal expectation of police duties on any beat can be indicated with a reasonable degree of certainty because of the regularity in the occurrence of crimes and of other police duties. The further hypothesis is necessary that time units can be discovered for the routine operations of patrol. If the normal number of operations to be performed and the average time required for each can be determined, the amount of time required to cover a given territory can then be calculated. In other words, it should be possible on this hypothesis to allocate patrol duty so that no patrolman will have an impossible task to perform and all patrolmen will have a definite minimum duty requirements' (Schell et al, 1976: 36)
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Disciplinary reform and technologies performed three significant functions: they cultivated loyalties to the organization via the group, they set up the pre-eminence of organizational missions in the form of codes of regulations, and, in drills and in the routines of the work, they also cultivated a respect for built forms or enduring traditions. The skirmish, drills, and the importation of military organization and command each contributed to a re-evaluation of the police as 'a new engine of order.' They helped to change the image of the police from being seen as partisan political hired hands to being seen with some respect as depersonalized agents of a state defined law and order. In each of these, the liberal individual is the template for the conventions of training; it is the liberal individual with his admixture of public restraint and private enterprise which is to be defended.

Because the liberal individual is both an object and a tool of reform, the disciplinary reforms have also have had spin-off repercussions which cannot have been foreseen. While agencies of police administration and regulation provided to the police an effective insulation from the incursion of parochial and lateral ties, they also started to make themselves responsible for his care. In arrogating more responsibility to themselves, administrative agencies took decision-making responsibility from the constable.

What occurred following the installation of central administrative apparatuses (including the police constable), however, is a transition from nineteenth century liberalism to late nineteenth and early twentieth century welfare liberalism. At stake in the initial retooling of police for the services of putatively depoliticized administrative authorities was the legitimacy of direction from the centre: the police could prove both the efficacy and morality of such rule, they could be the most visible embodiment of successful reform by being walking proof of the shaping and guiding power of the centre (cf. Rose, 1993). In showing this, it was not their authority in themselves which was promoted, but their authority by extension.

The earliest disciplinary regime itself became the reflexive object of liberalism. Under welfare liberalism the police constable would come to be recognized by the state as an office
CHAPTER FIVE

TECHNOLOGIES OF PROFESSIONALISM: SHAPING THE CRIME FIGHTER

In the early twentieth century, policing in North America began to come into its own. In large measure successful in having the police conflated with its interests, administrative authority sought a further legitimacy by ensuring the autonomy of its experts. It promoted the independence of the office of the constable through licensure and institutional separation (i.e. bureaucratization) (cf. McDougall, 1971, Boritch, 1988). The mission of police professionalism and the cultivation of an attendant police expertise could and did take shape. 'The profession' emerged as a sub-political locus or third party between the police constable and administrative control by political authority.

Technologies for the immediate shaping of police constable conduct were consequently maintained, adapted, or discontinued according to the values, interests, conventions and validity measures of an emergent corpus of formal and informal police knowledge. The expertise of the police profession came to have a life of its own. Its truths became quite distinct from and sometimes oppositional to the norms and objectives, not only of immediate political masters, but even sometimes of the polity as a whole. Indeed, with so much work being done to distinguish the police, they were so meant to be.

In practice, however, the deployment of bureaucratism and militarism, the legacy of disciplinary practices, the lack of an educational corpus, and the persistence of status divisions in society made the development of policing as a profession

41Professionalism in the policing context has been said to include: a common role which all members practice (Banton, 1964), technological monopoly and institutional insulation (Fosdick, 1921; Vollmer, 1936; Westley, 1971; Wilson, 1970; McDougall, 1971), a code of ethical standards (Vollmer, 1936; McDougall, 1971), a high value on client service (Banton, 1965), and a distinct body of expert knowledge and skills (Martin, 1995). The process of establishing a profession has been said in policing to have depended on the establishment of a professional association, a change of name to assert a technological monopoly, the development and promulgation of a code of ethics, and the use of political agitation to attain and maintain occupational barriers. (McDougall, 1971) Police professionalism has also been seen ideologically to further institutional monopoly (Carte and Carte, 1975).
problematic for the constable. If he was a professional, he was not treated as such in his own organization; and if he was an expert, that expertise offered little by way of a convincing account of itself. Thus there was a tension between the autonomy of the institution, and the autonomy of the front-line constable. Disciplinary technologies, although they may have taken legitimacy by claiming to shape men according to the traits of neostoic military gentlemen, did not in fact deploy the devices (class, ascribed status, university education) by which gentlemen were mostly known to be made. Although the liberal (humanist) personality was used for modeling, both indirectly, in the icon of the military officer, and directly, in the inspiration and aspiration of the private world of the policeman at leisure, in practice the technologies hollowed rather than fleshed out a rationale of appropriate affect. Disciplinary technologies left much room in which the person of the police constable could be spoken.

Whereas earlier we were interested in the impact of disciplinary reform and its attendant technologies, here, then, we will focus on the dynamics of professionalization and expertise as productive of distinctive police subjectivities in their own right. We define professionalism as consisting of a set of skills, a body of knowledge, a further discursive understanding of the relationship of these skills and knowledge to institutional divisions in society, and an attitude of care regarding the intervention of one’s work in the social world. Together with this attitude, then, professionalism includes specialized skills, expert knowledge, and an institutional reflexivity. In this chapter, we will document some features of the development of a police knowledge set, skills ownership, and associational ties.

Indeed, a corpus of police knowledge began to emerge in publications like the British Police Review, in a handful of accounts of the history of police forces, in the dissemination of handbooks and manuals, and in the written accounts of technical knowledge communicated at occupational conferences. Additionally, a package of distinct methodologies or protocols for such things as police constable selection, training, promotion and reward was also emerging in the early twentieth century. Specialist books
like Leonhard Fuld's *Police Administration* (1909) began to appear not only to discuss in explicit detail the fine points of these methodologies, but also to give reasons—rooted in police discursive concerns—for their utility and morality. A third distinctive technology promoting both an emergent police subjectivity and authority was associationalism. This also grounded (another kind of) disciplinary power by emphasizing the reference to occupational and professional conditions and by strengthening the lateral tie among police agencies. These technologies or vehicles, then, began the work of forging out a police constable as a particular kind of expert, craftsperson, and professional.

The *kind* of authority that these technologies envisioned for the police constable was one which officially turned away, in large measure, and over the course of the early decades of the twentieth century, from that icon of the liberal humanist personality. Set by the context of its disciplinary or discursive emergence in the early to mid-twentieth century, we see policing in the USA in particular, and in North America generally, as predisposed towards technocratic solutions: towards a version of police constable subjectivity grounded not, even indirectly, in an individual authority, but in the bureaucratic authority of the 'specialist type of man' or impersonal 'expert.' The police came to deploy a model of authority which valued technocracy, scientism, and transparency. The police constable, it begins to become a truism, was to match and trump the technological strength of the criminal by staying technologically superior to him in a race between the forces of order and the forces of chaos. The model of the teched-up crime-fighter police officer was thus promoted by the emergent profession's own most influential spokespersons. It acted to shape police subjectivity to fit the value of technocratic solutions. As we shall see, although constable-shaping technologies came to serve the maintenance of the profession in its claim of service in a distinct and essential societal role, those technologies also structured spin-off sensibilities according to reclamatory counter-narratives. These emphasized an oppositional authority: personal power, self-
reliance or self-sustenance, and makeshift or spontaneous solutions.

1. EXPERT KNOWLEDGE: MANUALS AND EMERGENT POLICE DISCOURSE

One of the features of a profession is the existence, ongoing development, and practical use of a body of knowledge. This, in the way defined by Foucault, consists of a discursively delimited field of objects, rules and categories, and the vetting and maintaining of legitimate perspectives (cf. Foucault, 1972). A distinct body of knowledge is indispensable to the aspirations of a profession because it forms the substance and informs the method by which the neophyte is inculcated, thus affirming, in the neophyte's passage, the continual relevance of the knowledge resource and its discursive methodology.

A body of expert knowledge in the police profession in Canada first consisted of the writing up of statutes and common law in documents such as Keele's Brief View (1835a). Documents like this synopsized relevant law about the constabulary office. Another vehicle for the dissemination of a common 'expert' knowledge was the historical treatments of individual departments. In 1886, the Toronto police force, for instance, published a 'brief account' of its history from the time of its reorganization in 1859 (Toronto, 1886). Magistrate's manuals were the primary medium for the formal passage of expert knowledge on the administration of the criminal law, and included sections on the responsibilities, penalties, and rewards of the office of constable. Toward the end of the century in England, there emerged a distinct police forum with the publication, in 1893 of the Police Review. This journal 'mediated between public service, private self-improvement, and the career structure' (Clapsley and Emsley, 1994: 6). This was followed in the United States with the publication in 1910 of the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science. In Canada, the earliest regular publication was the R.C.M.P. Annual Reports, beginning in 1886, and the Canadian Police Bulletin (1913) and the R.C.M.P. Quarterly (1933). Previous to the development of these police or police-related journals and subsequent to the magistrates manuals in Canada, police manuals
offered the constable information on the duties, responsibilities, regulations and rewards of his office.

Finnane (1989) has researched the role of manuals in the development of police autonomy in Queensland, Australia. In the United States, Walker (1977) has argued their importance in demonstrating changing thematics in police administration. In this section, we will concentrate on their impact to constabulary subjectivity. We want to further the argument that police manuals, like police offices and spaces, offer discursive avenues to police constables. As such they structure his autonomy and (self-) regulation. Going back just prior to the mid-century disciplinary reforms, this discursive space of the manual was adaptive and reflective of how the constable was viewed. Relatively autonomous prior to disciplinary reform, that constable was interpolated to be a reflexive decision-maker. After disciplinary reform, we see a streamlining of the substance or contents of the manuals, even as they begin to be authored by police themselves. Here, as in other areas of professionalization we will take up in this chapter, ‘expert’ knowledge and the development of a canon has the initial impact of appearing to take, rather than to give, to police constable reflexivity as he assumes the lowest rank in a hierarchical organization.

**Police manuals**

A manual is a ‘small book’ of ‘instructions or orders’ that may be ‘conveniently handled’ (Websters). It is a blueprint, a how-to for doing a particular set of tasks. A constable’s or police manual is therefore a booklet on how to do peacekeeping and policing. Like each of the technologies we have been taking up, the manual acts with its own distinctiveness in shaping constable conduct and sensibilities. We will begin by looking at the context and some content of two of the earliest manuals in Canada, Judge Gowan’s *Canadian Constable’s Assistant* of 1852, and police reformer and Toronto Mayor Adam Wilson’s *Constable’s Guide*. We will then look at some illustrations of later manuals in order to contrast their approach. As we shall see, while it must be remembered that today innumerable instructional devices and how-to books dot the occupational trade landscape and leave manuals relatively lesser purchase, changes in their authorship and
content continue to alert us to transitions in the protocols of constable shaping and guiding.

Manuals present a picture of the social world for which they posit a proper attitude and conduct. As Finnane (1989: 98) puts it, they transmit 'the norms of police work, with much emphasis on the boundary distinctions to be drawn in deciding to intervene in everyday social life....' These norms build off of many assumptions about the role of governments and the distribution of goods and labour. Manuals presuppose the parameters of the craft or profession in the service of which they disseminate information. They actively sponsor thinking about a set of tasks in terms of a specific social function or role. They then promote the integrity of this social function for this 'you.' They often include (particularly in the preface) remarks about the utility and morality of the social function the assumed reader is or will be engaging in. In this way they claim and promote a discursive field for a particular subjectivity, a special kind of 'you'. A police manual, after all, is a book, a book intended to be read by the police officer engaged in what the manual itself begins to presume to be the craft of policing. In this respect, the police constable's relationship with the police manual fosters a dynamic, a kind of idealization of good intentions, which promotes the constable as a certain self-responsible individual (cf. White, 1984)

Let us consider the role of the constable's handbook in the promotion of the constabulary office. Up until the late 1840s, the duties of the constable had apparently not been such as to warrant a distinct discursive or occupational field. Before the first manual published for constables in Upper Canada, individuals doing constabulary duty had to rely on the information given to them by justices of the peace or handed over from previous appointees. In some jurisdictions, there were regulations as provided by statutes, but there did not exist explicit statements addressed to the constable on how to fulfill all the duties of the office.

For instance, there were magistrates manuals such as that of Keele (1835, 1843, 1851) and Gurnett (1844) which included sections on the powers and duties of constables. There were also
regulations of the police published by approval of magistrates or judges (Regles et Reglements de Police pour la ville et les Faubourgs de Montreal, 1810; Regles et Reglements de police [Quebec], 1811; and Rules, Orders and Regulations for the Foreman, Deputy Foreman and Watchmen of the City of Quebec, 1827; and Regulations for the Governance of the Police Force, (Starke, Montreal: 1841). But these were not written explicitly for constables with their reading central to the purpose. Indeed, what existed instead to shape the constable was, i) a set of reactive, punitive sanctions, ii) public scepticism toward the competence of role-occupants, and iii) a convention of keeping constables dependent on justices of the peace and in the dark about their place and duties. This was the situation when Judge Gowan addressed a grand jury at the 1852 April Sessions and treated them to a long treatise on the office of constable which the Barrie Herald reproduced as the Constable's Assistant.

In that address the Judge noted the 'changing nature of the office' and the sheer numbers of constables (2800 in Upper Canada) among the reasons compelling him to make 'known the important duties of constables' (1852: 3). Included also in these reasons was the reliance on the reactive, negative sanction. The judge noted that it is obvious and necessary that the constable must remain responsible for his actions, but he added that 'the punishment of the officer will not repair the mischief produced by his improper conduct' (2). The editors of the Herald added in a footnote that '...it does seem a hardship to visit a constable with severity for failing to perform onerous and important duties at Common Law and by Statute, which have not directly been made known to him' (ibid. fn. a). The negative, post hoc sanctions of law were no longer considered a sufficient regulation of the office by either the Judge or the editors: the office, it was argued, must offer some positive informational resources to constables.

A second issue taken up by the judge was that of the state of the office's public image. The judge noted that 'there seems to exist a stupid and absurd prejudice against the office of constable--an office as old as the monarchy of England--the cause of which in this country it is difficult to understand' (3). To
this widespread sentiment he responded that constables are no different from the general polity:

These useful agents...are not a class apart from the inhabitants at large; they are appointed from amongst the people, and continue amongst them, and are identified with the people....They are engaged in no less respectable profession than the soldier who opposes foreign aggression' (3).

He added that 'it is manifestly in the interest of all to uphold the office in a respectable position, as to correspond to the great and extensive authority the law has annexed to it.' To this end, the judge saw his address as educational not only to constables, but to the polity in general from which constables are drawn, whose appreciation and respect for the constabulary office would be consistent with a healthy interest in good government.

This third issue of keeping the constable in ignorance was apparently imported from England. Moriarty noted that the 'promise' in the Magna Charta that no constable would be made 'but of such as know the law of the realm' appeared not to have been kept in the time of Blackstone (Moriarty, 1929:1). In Book I., chapter 9 of his commentaries on the Laws of England, Blackstone had commented on the very large powers of constables by saying: 'considering what manner of men are for the most part put into these offices, it is perhaps very well that they are generally kept in ignorance of the extent of their powers.' Apparently, this state of affairs was not much changed in mid nineteenth century Canada. Judge Gowan made the remark that constables 'are not always selected for fitness, and they are in general grossly ignorant of their duties' (2). He also referred to the consequences of the state of ignorance in which the constable was generally found: 'The want of a proper knowledge of his business must leave a constable without confidence in his own acts, and unfit for efficient service in the suppression of crime and detection of offenders.'

In 1859, seven years after the publication of the Assistant, Adam Wilson of York also made reference to the ignorance of the constables and explicit reference to the Blackstone citation in his manual for constables, The Constables Guide: 'It has long been complained of that such powers [of the constabulary office as
related in Wilson] should be committed to constables, and it has been said, that it is better they should be kept in ignorance of them, than know what they are' (Wilson, 1859: 24). Wilson, in presenting his arguments for the Guide, sided with the editor of the above-cited edition of Blackstone's Commentaries: 'If their powers are dangerous, they ought to be curtailed by the Legislature, but surely every officer ought to know the extent of his duty and authority' (cited in Wilson, 1859: 24).

While it may be impossible to determine as a matter of empirical fact what may have lain behind this notion of keeping the constable in ignorance, its practice forced the constable into a relationship with his office in which he was dependent on his superiors for an interpretation of the legality of his actions. He remained dependent on the justice of the peace or the magistrate and only received indications of the parameters of his authority from this intermediary after the fact. Governance of the office is installed by creating this dependent relationship through information denial: information denial is, according to a reading of this traditional view of the practice, a check on constabulary powers. Lacking sufficient knowledge himself, the constable could do no more than accept the judgement of those with that knowledge.

But these handbooks were intentionally aimed at assisting the constable in his articulation to the office. They offered interpretive devices serving to enable the constable's integration of real world experiences to formal requirements. The manual opened up a space, a discursive and institutional space, which would become occupied by countless later handbooks, all devoted to the constable's more perfect relation of duty to performance. In opening this space, these guidebooks also signaled a change in the power relations between the remote and subordinate agents of government: rather than being seen as mere functionaries who needed the close supervision of justices of the peace in order to come to correct decisions, constables, with the aid of these books, would now be in the position to ascertain for themselves the best course of action within the purview of their office. There appeared to be a transition in the practices of governance from one which purposely restricted function-relevant knowledge
from the agent, to one which deliberately provided the agent with this function-relevant knowledge. With the publication of constable manuals, a field was cleared for a more independent (from the magistracy) cultivation of constabulary power. Indeed, it may be better to say the field was merely being reclaimed after a long period of direct subordination to the lower judiciary: In a later manual, the *County Constable's Manual or Handy Book* of 1882, J.T. Jones made the point that 'law-writers' who have examined the question of whether constables pre-dated Justices of the Peace or 'came in with' them, found that constables 'existed as subordinate conservators of the peace long before Justices of the Peace were made by the 1st Edward iii., A.D. 1327' (1882: 20, emphasis added).

With the publication of the *Herald's Guide* and Wilson's *Handbook* remote or subordinate agents began to be seen as having to do more than merely follow instructions: they were to interpret their own roles into the networks of power. While the traditional view saw them as mere functionaries, whose 'low manner' required that they be rendered static and dependent, the emerging view began to see them as active in calibrating themselves in the terms of their office to these networks of power: they were to know what to do, without having to ask. They were to be capacitated as reflexive agents.

The reader may well be asking, how can these manuals be doing this? We have just seen how disciplinary reforms rather struck down the autonomy of the constable's office, or at least, relegated that autonomy to the chief constable and the organization as a whole. How could it be that at the same time that the constable was being drilled and put into barracks and installed into the beat, manuals like Gowan's and Wilson's were emerging to offer the constable a reflexivity with the role?

Indeed, it is precisely because disciplinary reforms allowed power to be arrogated to chief constables in an insulation of their office and also began to have police constables hired under 'whole time' commitments, that constables lost autonomy even while the office was subjected to the kind of discursive treatment that these manuals gave. While the office of constable was gaining ground as a reflexive field of expert knowledge, it was at the
same time being subject to power consolidation under disciplinary reforms. Indeed, we will see that the contents of these first manuals differs markedly from those published subsequent to the reforms, with the transition being toward the reduction of the interpretive purview offered the constable. We will look at the early manuals, and then some examples of later manuals to plot this change.

The table of contents of the Constable’s Assistant is organized as follows: I. Preliminary Observations on the Office of Constable in Canada; II. The Office of Constable (divided into ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ duty); The Constable’s Powers and Duties; The Constable’s Renumeration; Protection to Constables; Conclusion. The following quote, related to the constable’s authority as conservator of the peace, will provide some sense of its tone and contents:

With good-tempered firmness, he [the constable] will rarely fail in securing submission to his authority. Thus, if persons are about to commence a fight, on some sudden quarrel, or are assembled together with an intention of assisting each other against any one who will oppose them in the execution of some illegal act, or for the purpose of creating a riot; or are encouraging a riot, by word, sign, or gesture, or if a person in anger manifests any intention to injure the person of another; or even in case of threats to do any bodily harm to another; or to burn the house of another; or indeed to commit any crime against the Queen’s peace, if the party seems to be on the point of carrying out his threats---in all of these cases the offending parties may be laid hands upon and restrained, or be arrested by the constable, and kept in custody in some secure place till the affair is past, or their heat and passion is over; or they may be brought to the nearest Magistrate to find Sureties of the Peace, or be otherwise dealt with as he may deem right and legal (1852: 16)

As can be seen from the above, a great deal of ground is covered quickly. The section on the constable’s powers and duties, from which the above is taken, comprises the bulk of the manual, and lists the various contingencies under which arrest may be made. Sprinkled throughout, Gowan suggests how the constable should act and exert his authority:

Where possible, let a Constable make know his office by word of mouth and call upon parties in the Queen’s name to submit to his authority. Let him be cool and forbearing, nevertheless, let him spare no pains but be strenuous and intrepid in the discharge of his duty (1852:17).
On at least one occasion, Gowan steps into his narrative. After defining a riot, he distinguishes the details of duty and the general outcome the constable should be seeking:

I know not what suggestions to make of the details of duty; but were I acting as a constable, on such an emergency, I would incline to this course—to endeavour to check the tumult in its infancy, by reasoning if possible with the ringleaders, or some of them, and endeavoring to dissuade them their purpose; and call upon all peaceable persons to separate from them, and then, if remonstrances failed, and my party strong enough, I would arrest and secure the ringleaders at once. I would take no notice of irritating language addressed to me. I would pass by impertinence of every kind, carefully avoiding individual quarrel or altercations, of giving word for word; and I would keep together with my party as much as possible.

Here, the Assistant promotes the understanding that an interpretive terrain--based on reasonableness--is to a fair degree in the subjective hands of the constable. Judge Gowan places himself in the rhetorical place of a constable in a move denoting an equivalency between the two offices. Note also the dimensions of the space the constable is being offered: there is a presumptively wide range of decisions which may be taken by the reasonable constable: he has only to exercise that reasonableness.

Adam Wilson's Constable's Guide, published seven years later for the Toronto police, does not differ from the Assistant in much of the law covered, but while the Assistant is intended for county constables operating on a fee for service basis, the Guide is intended for city constables under the disciplinary reforms. Wilson includes sections on the arrangements of beats, the benefit of photography, and on the provision of pensions, barracks, and libraries for the men. In addition, he covers the discipline and conduct of 'the force.' For the constable's leisure reading and edification, he also includes appendixes from Dickens's 'Household Words.' In the Guide Wilson relies on the wisdom of the July 1852 Edinburgh Review and on the July 1856 London Quarterly Review to set the attitudes which he has in mind for the constable-reader. While Gowan has made no mention of training, Wilson is emphatic on the subject, arguing that while we may 'teach men thoroughly in the law relating to their department, without this further training, although they me very good lawyers,
they would be very wretched policemen.' Wilson then says that before the training of a policeman is complete, he will have learned military drill, the police regulations, and he will have attended the police court.

Like Gowan, Wilson refers to a pedagogical convention the articulation of subjectivity to office. But already, we note a difference in approach. Where Gowan offered to put himself in the place of the citizen constable, and work out 'what he would do if...' in the case of a riot, note Wilson's treatment of this problematic, as he cites the London Quarterly Review:

Drawn up in line, a sergeant or inspector questions them as to their duties: 'Supposing you saw two men fighting, what would you do?' 'If you were to discover a house on fire, how would you act?' Sometimes the constable addressed answers the question, but more generally his interrogator does it for him. When drilled and catechized to the full pitch, he doffs his plain clothes for a uniform and comes out in the full bloom of a policeman (Wilson, 1859:81)

Wilson is not a stand-in for the police constable. Here we see this convention, 'what would you do if/how would you act?' as a top-down catechism. While Gowan speaks of discretion in terms of a default reasonable man and appears to be speaking office to office in a collegial fashion, Wilson presents the neophyte constable not as reasonable, but rather as raw, untrained, and needful of a constant, relentless, drilling. He presents discretion as something to be tamed, controlled, indeed drilled. 'What would you do if?' is here now another mechanism for controlling the constable, it now derives from an obedience to command.

Indeed, while notably absent in Gowan's book, subsequent texts began to stress obedience as the first requirement of office. They also underplay constabulary discretion. And they do not offer the kind of authorial relation which Gowan and even Wilson deploy: the language itself is more commanding and matter-of-fact. Most subsequent manuals take the form of an alphabetized listing of concepts, under which is a short definition of the term, a citation of the law, and, in some cases, a prescribed action. Jones's The Constable's Manual, for instance, begins with a short preface followed by the first alphabetized concept, 'abduction.' Under 'constables' this manual begins, 'a constable
the Peace, coroners, and officers placed over him by the General Sessions of the Peace' (Jones, 1882: 19). The 'room' or space for professional self-definition offered by these handbooks was not developed as quickly as might have been expected. As late as the 1930s, there were still handbooks published in the catechismal form (e.g. T.W. Parsons, A Catechism on the Criminal and Penal Law of Canada, 1934; see also Fuld's (1909) complaint on the practice). One hundred years later, the publisher Carswell's manuals have continued the alphabetized format, with a lawyer (Gary Rodrigues, in the 1982 edition), authoring the manual: the legal influence is evident in what appears before 'abduction:' 'a fortiori,' 'a posteriori,' 'a priori,' 'ab extra,' 'ab initio,' and then 'abandon,' and 'abandon child' (Rodrigues, 1982: 1). While interpretive privilege and professional knowledge was being granted with the interpretive formats offered by Gowan, police organizations like the Toronto police force reinforced precisely the kind of reactive regulation which Gowan disparaged as inadequate. Even Wilson made more reference to the independence of the constabulary office than do immediately subsequent constable and magistrates manuals, including those of Keele (1851), Dempsey (1860), and Jones (1882) (cf. Stenning, 1981).

The process of developing the discursive space first carved out by Gowan in 1852 was slow, (and uneven between town and country). Within the N.W.M.P./R.C.M.P., efforts were underway by late 1890 or early 1891 to have a constable's manual exclusively for the use of that force prepared. However, it was not until 1921 that an R.C.M.P. manual was being prepared in-house, rather than adapted from external sources. The O.P.P., similarly, did not have an in-house manual until about that time. But formal expression of craft and expert knowledge remained slow to develop under a disciplinary governance. Over one hundred years after the first manual was published, police manuals were still being written by lawyers or, as before, magistrates.

In the mid 1950s, this began to change. In 1956, Training Precise #1, was written generically for the education of Ontario patrol officers. This document contributed to the consolidation of police professional standards which were not immediately derivative of legislation. Indeed, the Precise represented the
culmination of the efforts of a handful of very committed senior police executives in the dissemination of a craft knowledge. By the early 1960s, we see a more deliberate celebration of the cultivation of the craft by police constables themselves. In the foreword of *A Manual on Arrest for Peace Officers*, by O.P.P. staff inspector Albert Bird, the Canadian historian, Desmond Morton, commented on the emerging practice to have manuals authored by police themselves:

This is an unusual book in that it is about a very important aspect of criminal law, and yet is written by one who is not a lawyer by profession. Indeed, there may be the more conservative among legal ranks who would condemn it on that score. To such, if any, I would point out that it is in this very fact that the work is of significance beyond even its excellent content. It is my hope that this Manual of Arrest by Staff Inspector Bird marks the acceptance of a concept which has been surely taking hold: that police officers, lawyers, and even judges engaged on the criminal side, are to a substantial extent colleagues, if not yet full partners, in the ordering of society; that their objectives should be common objectives; and that the colleagues should have a great deal to say to each other about the attaining of their common goals.

The author is a senior police officer of great experience both in police work and in teaching. Too often in the past, manuals for police officers have been composed by 'A Barrister,' who contented himself with setting down, in a 'their's not to reason why' fashion, a series of oversimplified and hence utterly meaningless rules by which the reader was to order himself. The present work, written by a man who knows what may actually happen when an arrest is contemplated, sets the rules in comprehensible form and in real life settings.

...I hope that there will be many other books like this one. It is high time that police officers committed their knowledge to print (1963)

The *Assistant* and the *Guide* represented the first instances in Upper Canada of the development of a common curricula for the instruction of constables. They offered a convenient vehicle for the distribution of a constabulary knowledge. With such a vehicle in place, the office could be regularized around discursively powerful readings of constabulary duties, and values, ethics, and a canon could begin to take shape. In crediting sources for his manual, J.T Jones acknowledged both the *Assistant* and the *Guide* (the other source being the Toronto Police Force Rules and Regulations) (Jones, 1882: iii). Here was a technology which could bring a uniform interpretation of the office directly into
the hands of all practicing constables. Once opened up, the room of this discursive space, it may be added, was one which did not need to be immediately dependent on occupationally external power.

Indeed, despite the containment of their potential dynamism, manuals provide a vehicle for reflexive self-monitoring. By establishing the parameters of an office, by pulling together a common curricula, and by providing an analytical toolkit or interpretation medium, handbooks foster a dynamic relationship with substantive problems which internalizes the authority relation and clears the way for reflexive self-regulation. The police manuals encouraged a relation of self to self in the practice of government. The constable can use the fact of the manual as a pivot, and use his relation to it as a 'craftsperson' or 'expert' in the delineation of ethical professional conduct. What Wilson, Gowan, and Jones begin to do instead of following the traditional wisdom is to outline for the constable so he can know them, precisely what his powers are. He will cater his actions to the specific capacities he has: the rights, responsibilities, and powers which Gowan and Wilson have painstakingly laid out. When he is challenged on an arrest, he will now state the action in terms which refer to understandings of his legal jurisdiction. He now enters into the discourse about the right interpretation of the rules, rather than merely remaining anterior to that discourse as a functionary who, as a matter of rote procedure, applies what he thinks he has been taught by others. A field for the cultivation of police professionalism and an autonomous police discourse is established. He may now apply rules prospectively, involving himself individually in the definition of office. Indeed, it can be expected that he will do so. No longer is a mentality of unreflexive rule wholly subscribed to. Rather, the constable may now know his office and calibrate his powers to the necessities of it.

For Ontario at least, these handbooks were prototypes, and with them constables were given a way of interpreting the world for the contours of their office: many of the rules by which these new texts were created could be adapted, altered, expanded; the substantive focus could also be altered to keep pace with changing understandings of the role. Moreover, these handbooks become part
of a whole new methodology of police-making by which potential officers may begin to learn many elements of their craft from a manual. Today, there are hundreds of books intended for constables so that they can measure their knowledges, skills, and mentalities against the requirements of increasing specializations. In another way, these manuals are the precursors of various other instructional technologies which routinely employ the 'you' of the constable as an object to be changed.

These handbooks contributed to the opening of a space for the cultivation of a relatively distinct 'police' subjectivity. A handbook creates a relation to a text in which the reader is instantiated as a police officer, as a 'you' who, it is expected—and even demanded—sees the world according to certain moral and instrumental understandings. This space can be further shaped, and conventions and traditions of 'right' understandings can begin to take, or argue for, places. This space can also be colonized or occupied by extant discourses—such as law and medicine, eugenics and social Darwinism. But the most persistent domination of the space, once it is defined as one for police development, is by practitioners: their specialized knowledge stemming from or oriented to their institutional role(s) comes to be the dominant occupant of this space. Occupational interests of the police officer will intersect with his constitutional exigencies. In occupying the space created by the Guide and Handbook, constables come to have ready at hand a combination of values and interests—a community—quite distinct from any other. And with reference to and support from that community, the constable can begin to self-consciously take part in the reflexive process of rule.

The development of the police expert depended and depends on the active engagement of the individual constable with a body of knowledge and a set of rules about proper action. This development suffered, however, under the coincident regime of disciplinary reforms and the rationalization of the office under the purview of more independent police executive offices. Following disciplinary reform, and as police executives sought to better assert their own control over constables by 'placing' them as front-line obedient subordinates and by deploying highly hierarchical, bureaucratic organizational methods to do so. The
style and content of the manuals for the most part appeared to err on the side of caution with regard to constables’ reflexive participation. The manuals gradually removed a narrative voice in the presentation of material: Gowan entered into the narrative with a speculative, ‘what I would do.’ Although emerging with such discussions of ‘how to be,’ they began to concentrate on the police constable as a figure of law rather than on the peace officer as a figure of civil society. In general, they began to present a less open-ended picture of the craft of interpreting law and applying decisions and of making oneself up as a police constable. In the transition from the citizen-constable to the ‘automatic’ police constable and then to the ‘professional’ expert, there was a streamlining in the role of the constable which rather stultified discursive space and narrowed subject-constitution to officially posit the constable as a technocrat rather than a craftsman.

2. PROFESSIONAL SELF-DEVELOPMENT: ASSOCIATIONALISM, ETHICS AND THE CRIME FIGHTER

It is not for our pleasure, it is to gain knowledge that these conventions are held, and let me tell you that we do gain considerable knowledge from an interchange of experiences. We are sworn to uphold the law in our splendid Dominion, and we meet together to discuss ways and means of doing so, both to the advantage of ourselves and the general public (Montreal Chief Carpenter, C.C.A.C. 1912: 4).

Chief Carpenter stated very clearly the purpose of police association meetings. Police executives met to gain knowledge, they met on the basis of their common duty, and they met to further their craft and profession. Associationalism offered a vehicle for the promotion of policing as a science and art or craft: it circulated to an audience of police practitioners and policy-makers the latest technologies and practices and was a forum which facilitated consensus-building in their adoption. As Marquis (1993) put it, professional association offered a mechanism for a national police consciousness in the form of a ‘practical criminology.’ As Deakin (1988) commented, it ushered in an era of ‘practical police professionalism.’

Although professional associational links were rightly understood as important to the development of a the police constable’s practical skills and identity, it is the substance of
that identity which would be most important: what sort of constable was posited by the leaders of the profession? How was the constable understood in the conferences and in the recommendations of the profession's leadership? As we shall see, by the time constables developed their own rank and file associations, much of the substance of that identity had been concretized. In this section, we will see how an agenda by police executives to streamline the police office intruded on the autonomy of the constabulary office. The shift from the disciplined police officer to the crime fighter maintained the administrative purview over the office, whilst keeping it distinct.

A. Associations and their Mandate
In 1893 in the United States and in 1905 in Canada, national police associations were founded. Municipal police reformers in the United States, armed with the Lexow Commission findings and the professional interests of the National Chiefs of Police Union (1893), sought to empower police chiefs and to insulate them more effectively from partisan politics (Fogelson, 1977). The very first organizational meeting of the American chiefs42 raised among its concerns police selection uniformity, police chief job tenure, political non-partisanship, and the interference to police business offered by the 'moral wave' of social hygienists (Carte and Carte, 1975: 12-15; Deakin, 1988: 36-38). The chiefs' concerns were neatly summarized by Dilworth (1976:6) as being concerned with 'improving the tools of their trade.' This agenda was further bolstered by an emerging body of academic police literature (Fuld, 1909; Fosdick, 1921; and Smith, 1960). Other 'tools' given early attention by the I.A.C.P. were the National Police Bureau of Identification, used for sharing Bertillon records, and subsequently, the Uniform Crime Reports. The I.A.C.P. also developed The Police Chief's Newsletter (which became the Police Chief). It eventually facilitated the offering of training to foreign police officers and specialized courses to U.S. officers under its Training Division, struck in 1955 (Deakin, 1988).

42A meeting between American police chiefs took place in St. Louis in 1871 attended by 112 officials, but no subsequent meeting took place until 1893 with the founding of what became the IACP. (Deakin, 1988)
The Canadian Association of Chief Constables (C.C.A.C.) was formed in 1905 to encourage uniform police administration, improve the condition of police service and forge better ties amongst them, and to promote legislation that would suppress crime and preserve law and order (Marquis, 1993: 54).

While executive associationalism was more or less immediately successful (cf. Deakin, 1988), occupational or labour association failed early on. The consequence of police strikes in Toronto, Montreal and Winnipeg—as well as in other parts of the English speaking world—set back occupational associationalism in policing. The Police Association of Ontario (P.A.O.) was founded in October 11, 1933 with a regional meeting of twenty Ontario chiefs organized by Chief Draper at the Royal York Hotel. It was established, in the main, to regularize the standards of policing and in order to 'meet the challenge' that new technologies in law enforcement brought to policing (O.A.C.P., 1986). It was not until 1944 that the P.A.O. emerged as a rank and file organization serving Ontario (McDougall, 1971: 74) The executive police association, the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (O.A.C.P.), splintered from the P.A.O. in 1959, dividing occupational from executive association in the province. The O.A.C.P. credits the P.A.O. as being the 'paramount voice' of the police service in Ontario between 1944 and 1959. Indeed, it offered an account of itself promoting 'new consciousness in the police service' of a 'police profession in Ontario.' They added that the Police Association would act as a 'symbol of the intention of policemen' to act 'with a greater sense of common identity' (O.A.C.P., 1986: 8). By 1944, the P.A.O. came to have a concern with police salaries, pensions, and training (McDougall, 1971: 74-75).

As the state strove after legitimation through expertise, police associationalism offered a new locus in the augmentation of governance. As Martin notes, specialists 'generated ministries and offices specific to their specialization,' (Martin, 1995: 150) and these, with more complex administrative bureaucracies, formed relatively impervious policy communities (150-151). With the tendency of bureaucracies to expand in reach, these policy communities tended to shift policy upwards (151) to the state, and
where possible, the federal level.\textsuperscript{43} Together with a rationalization of administration under 'scientific management' and the influence of police chief reformers' advocacy of police chief empowerment, associationalism facilitated information sharing at the executive level. The I.A.C.P. 'initiated many of the cooperative programs in law enforcement that are now operated or funded by the federal government' (Deakin, 1988: 33). Indeed, associations served as the only available schooling in public management; the formal technical education of managers was something that began only after WWII (Bray, 1955).

What was occurring in the last years of the nineteenth century in Canada, and in the early years of this century in both Canada and the United States, was an effort at self-definition by the police themselves, which they did in contradistinction to the authority claims of middle class 'agitators,' social reformers, muckraking journalists and 'moral crusaders.'\textsuperscript{44} Indeed, in the United States, Canada, Australia and Britain, police executives were very often on the defensive in gatekeeping the emerging profession from questions about police practices and priorities which threatened their executive credibility. In the United States, the editorial of the debut issue of the National Police Magazine complained that 'one of the heaviest crosses that the policeman has to bear...is the interference of the so-called league of reformers--the short-haired woman and the long haired man who want to tell the police just how to run their business, how to do police work, and how to conduct the city.' (in Walker, 1977: 103). The most influential texts on policing referred explicitly to the need to allow the chiefs to have power and to the negative impact of social reformers (Smith, [1920] 1960; Fosdick, 1921; Vollmer, 1936). In Australia, police executives like W. G. Cahill in Queensland, worked hard to 'establish a well-regulated distance between police and magistrates' (Finnane, 1989: 102)

\textsuperscript{43} In police work, however, there were profound limits on the upward mobility of policy dissemination.
\textsuperscript{44} Whose organization, education and zeal made them very powerful occupiers of civic consciousness.
In Canada, the C.C.A.C. waged its own garrison defenses. In the early years, the C.C.A.C. promoted the police profession enlisting the discourse of hygiene and scientific population management. As Secretary Treasurer of the C.C.A.C.'s Bulletin, William Stark was perhaps the most zealous pursuer of associational values. He promoted a 'free and clean and discreetly conducted journal' devoted to police interests and its administration (1914: 11). During wartime, Colonel Sherwood of the Toronto force added patriotism to the discourses favouring a central association, suggesting that a consolidated association would present a 'solid front' against 'the forces that are at work to undermine the foundations of our national existence?' (1915: 12) By 1920, Chief Bruton went even further in this linkage between police association and the interests of good and proper government, condemning the 'derogatory influences' on a failed system of municipal forces and suggesting a provincially controlled system in its place (C.C.A.C., 1920: 16). Citing another strong theme favouring enhanced professional standing through associationalism, Bruton also worried about losing the best men to other professions (ibid.) William Stark, as secretary treasurer of the C.C.A.C. up until 1916, made it his business to monitor the public image of the police. In 1913, the C.C.A.C. Bulletin contains a long series of correspondences between Stark and 'police critics' in which he takes them each to task and holds them to account for their statements about alleged police indiscretions and incompetencies. The message: 'Keep your nose out of police business. You are not competent to comment.' Policing was becoming more self-referential; taking from the work that had been done earlier to disembed policing, police executives themselves could and did come to speak for institutional claims.

But what were the emerging profession's distinct traditions, truths, and icons substantively? According to which knowledges and strategies, and according to which idealizations were the

45It seized on various 'social agitators.' One of these was the World's Purity Foundation and its claims that as many as 15,000 Canadian girls were being sold annually as white slaves. This figure was irksome to the Canadian chiefs because it meant, as William Stark calculated, that forty women each day were disappearing from their homes and into prostitution in the USA: it was a claim undermining of the most basic police intelligence, in both senses of the word. (CCAC, 1915)
police to know their duty and their calling? As documented by Walker (1977) and Deakin (1988), this was a question which was very much on the minds of police chiefs battling hard for their institutional self-definition. If the police were to be relatively autonomous in setting the agenda, that agenda had to take among practitioners and had to give them a moral purpose, otherwise the institution would show itself to be too amorphous, divided, unclear. If the profession was looked towards to ground the police constable, that grounding needed to be secured on a viable platform and needed to project a clear image of who the police constable was to be. In the early part of the century, this came down to a question between seeing the constable primarily as a peacekeeper or crime fighter.

Indeed, this was a question which was both debated in the early conferences--explicitly or indirectly--and which occupied the thinking of August Vollmer. Vollmer, police chief of Berkeley, California from 1905 to 1932 and innovator of a host of police practices (cf. Carte and Carte, 1975) was up until the ascendancy of J. Edgar Hoover, the most powerful spokesperson of North American police professional self-definition. In this role, he found himself in a dilemma between an institutional concern to delimit policing and to promote the police officer as invested with a certain indisputable expertise, and an organizational predisposition to take policing away from the military model and understand it as operating more like a business in public service. Throughout Vollmer's writings, these twin concerns dominated.

B. The Social Worker vs. the Crime Fighter

Inadequate emphasis on the professionalization of law enforcement is one of our Nation's critical shortcomings in the fight against crime...More universities and colleges should be initiating and increasing courses of study oriented toward the development of a career police profession (J. E. Hoover in Deakin, 1988: 208).

Beginning with the latter concern to make policing more like a business guided by management principles, Vollmer was among the first police executives to see himself in this role. He exchanged his chief's uniform for a business suit and sought to idealize the police officer as a craftsman. While he was the first police executive to apply the principles of scientific management to police work in a time-and-task analysis (which he then used to
rationalize the distribution of human resources), he also innovated on a form of instantaneous peer review in the form of 'crab' or 'bull sessions,' which presided over the appropriateness of patrolmen's daily conduct, particularly the decision to use force.

Innovative and participatory management practices were consistent, to Vollmer, with a definition of the police officer as a craftsperson modeled on the liberal humanist. Above all, Vollmer's police officers were to be 'humane.' They were to take food to the poor, and they were to do so discreetly, not for publicity, but for ethical satisfaction from good works. Police officers, he also insisted, were not to see themselves as individual 'authorities,' nor to wear their coercion on their sleeves and lecture citizens or stand in judgement. They were to respect to the utmost the privacy and dignity of others, while at the same time coming to know, to the limits of their beats, every individual and every individual's patterns and schedules as and at the boundaries of that privacy.

In order to keep those boundaries clear and defended, Vollmer took from nineteenth century British aspirations for the profession, insisting that his men hone their craft not only through a technical proficiency, but also in an understanding of institutional contexts, limitations, and the 'larger' responsibilities to their profession and society. To this end, he insisted that his police develop their understanding of others by reading from works of sociology and psychology, as these disciplines developed. They were to use their minds and a knowledge of the human sciences in understanding themselves in their role. He was also active himself as a role model in this capacity, lecturing at universities, writing police science articles, and helping to found criminology departments in Los Angeles and Chicago. He encouraged his 'college cops' to do the same. His 'college cops' or 'social worker cops' were grounded on liberal humanist ethics (Carte and Carte, 1975; Deakin, 1988).

Finally, Vollmer was police work's first great networker, reaching wide audiences and bringing an impressive variety of well-informed individuals to the door of the chief's office. Vollmer forged links between the Berkeley department and a great
number of local and more remote disciplines and experts. In doing so, he managed to elevate professionalism not through the simple exclusionary principle (leave this to us the experts), but through augmentation (let us decide to use this, or that, expertise). Vollmer saw, articulated, and materialized a space for police professionalism which subjectified the police constable according to post-disciplinary practices and a liberal humanist ideal, a space in which the constable could be seen not as a functionary within a militaristic power structure who strove for a machinelike neutrality and derived authority from a show of obedience, but rather as a messenger for and of the good of the polity, one who, as it happened, recycled the practical logic of an emergent corporatist mentality and derived authority from a reflexive relationship with policing itself. Indeed, Vollmer's 'college cop' was an attempt to bring the enterprise of the citizen constable forward into the purview of rationalized policing.

There was a dilemma in the profession during the early part of the century. It wanted to consolidate and it needed an idealization of the police constable around which to do so, but it was reluctant to adopt the social worker cop. The profession was attempting to define itself in contradistinction to the aims of many social reformers who were seen to compete with the police in staking out an expertise and a jurisdiction over marginal populations. Lacking in the idealization of the social worker cop was a clear difference between the mandate of the police and the mandate of social reformers themselves. Rather, the social worker cop offered himself up to reformers whose schooling and education gave them leverage in the how-to of the care and control of populations. It was they, not he, who could more conveniently mobilize 'cultural capital' in the claim of stewardship over the marginalized. Many police executives and experts (Fosdick, 1921; Fuld, 1909; Smith, 1960) were also uncomfortable with the variety of tasks which the police were expected to do, and with the demoralizing features of the peacekeeper role. Thus, the agenda

46Vollmer himself advocated the narrowing of the police mandate. (Vollmer, 1936: 2) Like many other chiefs, both in the United States and in Canada, Vollmer wanted to better streamline the mandate of the institution in order that it could mobilize its resources effectively to gain its own hegemony over a 'police business.'
of institutional consolidation was pitted against one version of the police officer as a craftsperson: the social worker cop. Indeed, it appeared to be the growing consensus that a more manageable idealization of the police officer was needed, one which was consistent with consolidation and which could rebuff the incursions of social reformers and partisan politics.

The practical foundation for the idealization of a police generalist grounded in the care of the community faltered. As Walker (1977) recounts, the debate was in full swing in the I.A.C.P. Proceedings of 1908 in discussions about a ‘golden rule’ and an ‘iron rule’ policy. The social work cop was characterized by the golden rule policy of Chief Kohler of Cleveland. It comprised of a set of recommendations to the police officer: turn juveniles over to parents for parental corrections instead of state jailing; be kind in easing ‘friction and ill-temper between man and man;’ and use a reprimand instead of a criminal sanction as much as possible (in Walker, 1977: 97). In contrast, the ‘iron rule’ policy was pushed forward in the rhetoric of Frank Cassada of New York: ‘There is no man more liberal than I am, but I want to tell you every chief of police ought to make every man take his hat off and respect the law. When we arrest a man we are too lenient...Put the ‘iron rule; on them--not the ‘golden rule.’ Knock their blocks off’ (ibid., 104). Over the course of the next few decades, and in the context of the visibility of the ‘gangster’ crimes of prohibition, the cast-iron rules, if not the cast-iron practices of the crime fighter emerged as victor.

The debate was also manifest in Canada. It was reflected in the efforts by the Committee on Moral and Social Reform of the Women’s Council of Peterborough to get a ‘woman with full police powers’ hired by the police commission of that city in 1914. Citing a petition which said that one half of the population consists of women and girls, that many of them are a part of the working world, and that as such they are entitled to ‘effective’ police protection, the Women’s Council argued that a police woman could be an authority figure and more effective than a police man in bringing pressure to bear to ‘secure proper conduct of ‘wayward daughters’ and of ‘women and girls who are involved in
questionable and guilty' behaviour. Their effort was endorsed by the Peterborough Medical Society, a 'large number of' women voters, 'businessmen,' local doctors, the Nurses Alumnae Association, the Men Teachers Club and men's Bible Classes, and by journalists. Although having support also from police magistrate Dennison and Staff Inspector Gregory of Toronto, and the Chairman of the Police Commission in Ottawa, the petition was angrily rebuffed by the Chairman of the Peterborough Police Commission, who labeled the move to direct an unsolicited appeal to him directly improper.

The controversy in Peterborough (the Women's Council then asked the Attorney General to intervene and rule on the appropriateness of their request) illustrated the mobilization power of the reformers, but more importantly indicated the dilemma in policing between the urge towards institutional consolidation and the maintenance of the peacekeeping function as the constable's primary idealization. As the Women's Council put it in their letter to the Chair of the Peterborough Police Commission, peacekeeping (particularly preventative work against 'vice') was a role ideally suited to the 'finest womanly qualities' (Ibid.).

The 'blurring' offered by such a woman constable was anxiously received as threatening to the consolidation of the office. It was precisely such vagueness and lack of definition which a professionalizing police institution sought to avoid. Both the social worker and the female police officer were for this reason, and according to the language of efficiency and rationalization, easier left outside of the margin of police work. At a time when it was national standards which were being sought, the difference of police women was anathema.

Under the auspices of Hoover and the FBI, the relative simplicity of the crime fighter won out over Vollmer's more rounded social worker cop as an idealization for the police constable (Vollmer, 1936; Carte and Carte, 1975; Deakin, 1988; Walker, 1977). To many police executives, the tripartite emphasis

47PAO, RG 4 S. 32, file 530, 1914.
48PAO, RG 4 S. 32, file 530, R. Rollins to the Attorney General, Rec'd March 21, 1914

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in the crime fighter model on scientific crime detection, fingerprinting, and police training (Deakin, 1988; Chief Peiper, C.C.A.C., 1938) together with the purchase power of the public image of Hoover, offered leverage with the local funding bodies for the most advanced technologies. It also mobilized a common discourse on which to articulate horizontal police executive links, further insuring the unassailability of police executives as experts with a useful and popular mission.

Nor was the crime fighter resisted at the rank and file level. In addition to its ready ingestion by the media and by police executives and policy-makers in their institutional consolidation, the crime fighter appealed to the values and predispositions of an emergent front-line occupational culture. Although Vollmer may have wished it otherwise, police officers had already for some time been subject to the application of a disciplinary authority in which nonconformity was seen as willful disobedience or negligence (cf. McNamara, 1968: 179). They were thus predisposed against the 'blurring'—both of their mandate and to their idealization—that 'social worker(s)' and social work offered. Given the characteristic of the average (rather than the educated Vollmerian) police officer of at least the first two thirds of the century (particularly when recruitment drives came up short), it was asking too much, as Bittner has written, 'to expect that [police officers] could always be both swift and subtle' (1970: 9).

The push to structure the police institution in contradistinction to other offices and social roles served as a backdrop to an early twentieth century battle for the subjectivity of the constable. The dilemma of reform was that if the peacekeeper was to provide the icon for police officer subjectivity, that icon was too easily threaded through with the grays and shades of discursive interventions from non-police sources. As we have argued, agreeing with other analyses of this development (e.g., Walker, 1977; Deakin, 1988; Marquis, 1993), by the mid-1930s the dilemma was resolved in favour of an institutional consolidation and crime fighter subjectification. One consequence of this institutional simplifications of policing
discourse was the forcing underground of the interpretative terrain of the constable as craftsperson.

The subject of police professional associationalism and its cultivation of an idealized police officer has given us an opportunity to highlight our thesis regarding the enterprise and regulation of the constable. In our last three chapters, we saw how the constable began to be brought into a tight regulation on his 'whole time.' We saw that as he was turned into an 'automatic policeman' and regulated even in his private life, his enterprise and autonomy found little by way of legitimate expression. This narrative has continued to unfold. However, in the early twentieth century, it is framed in terms not of the benefits of the citizen-constable on one hand, and the police constable on the other, but rather in terms of the peacekeeper (or social worker cop) versus the crime fighter. Here, it is not fee-for-service enterprise which is endangering to the polity, but rather the very indistinctness of the social worker cop or peacekeeper.

C. Professional Ethics

Outside of the various sworn oaths, and what the constable could glean from the odd normative prescription in manuals and the prohibitions on conduct in the regulations, policing did not evolve codes of ethics for constables until 1928 when W.O. Wilson was the first North American police officer to publish such a document. Called the 'Square Deal Code' and consistent with Vollmer's earlier work, this code reflected a 'philosophy of service' Wilson wanted to demonstrate to the public and to instill in the members of his Wichita Police Department. It pledged his police to 'high moral and ethical behaviour,' 'promised professional service,' affirmed the primacy of the rule of law, the practice of restraint even under provocation, and affirmed the intention on the part of the police for scrupulous honesty' (Bopp, 1975: 74-75). The Square Deal Code was the forerunner of the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics of the I.A.C.P., adopted at its 1957 convention (Bopp, 1975: 75) The latter is cited here:

As a law enforcement officer, my fundamental duty is to serve mankind; to safeguard lives and protect property; to protect the innocent against deception, the weak against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against
violence or disorder; and to respect the Constitutional rights of all men to liberty, equality, and justice.

I will keep my private life unsullied as an example to all; maintain courageous calm in the face of danger, scorn, ridicule; develop self-restraint; and be constantly mindful of the welfare of others. Honest in thought and deed in both my personal and official life, I will be exemplary in obeying the laws of the land and the regulations of my department, Whatever I see or hear of a confidential nature or that is confided to me in my official capacity will be kept secret unless revelation is necessary in the performance of my duty.

I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, animosities or friendships to influence my decisions. With no compromise for crime and with relentless prosecution of criminals, I will enforce the law courageously and without fear or favour, malice or ill will, never employing unnecessary force or violence, and never accepting gratuities.

I recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of public faith and I accept it as a public trust to be held so long as I am true to the ethics of the police service. I will constantly strive to achieve these objectives and ideals, dedicating myself before God to my chosen profession...law enforcement (I.A.C.P.. 1957).

The substantive content of a code of ethics, although intendedly universal and timeless in scope, imports both narrow strategies and overarching logics into its wording. We noted in our discussion of the oath in chapter two that it was portable and adaptive. It worked the self to self relation (ethics) into the self to authority relationship (domination), implicating the fulfillment of obligation to the latter with practice of the former (cf. Foucault, 1988). We also noted that the oath attempted to assert this service to an administrative authority. A code of ethics like the one above works this accountability to the moral self and enjoins it to the self to authority relation. However, the professional code of ethics also restructures this relationship, idealizing the profession and its institutional privileges and responsibilities rather than the duty to a particular sovereignty. While in the oath, conduct is grounded in an individualization by the state, in the professional code of ethics, that grounding is in the discipline and privilege of the professional license.

In addition, the code of ethics stands in juxtaposition to a training to obey. In contrast to the need for demonstrative allegiance and a disciplinary regulation, the professional code of
ethics begins off the mark with the assumption that the individual will regulate her conduct according to a self-interest which overlaps rather than stands against the regulatory aims of governance, broadly conceived. Like manuals, which also enabled the police constable as a professional according to discursive principles forged between the law, the interpretation of text, and the application of interpretive skills in decision-making, the code of ethics requires an instantiation of the police constable as a decision-maker: it is he alone who, faced with a decision, must make this decision to accord with his understanding of the promise of professional duty, or in despite of this understanding or promise. Consistent with a trajectory in policing from a reform emphasis on capacitation and the enabling of bodies, to shaping and soul-work, there is today more focus on ethics and moral education (cf. Tyre and Burstein, 1992).

Again, however, the power of the promise to the idealized profession which is contained in the law enforcement code of ethics and also in subsequent such codes, suffered under the regime of the law enforcement professional. Although the space for autonomy was there in principle, several practices undermined the individual police constable's utilization of the promise, among them loyalty to his fellows, loyalty to his organization; and protectiveness about the reputation of both. It can be argued that this is why ethics is emerging now, especially in the mission statements of police organizations, in the attempt to bring into play what has lain fallow.

In reviewing police constable subjectification according to early to mid twentieth century narratives of police professionalism, we have analyzed transitions in a distinctive police corpus in the instance of police manuals and now also the idealization of the constable in debates in executive associational meetings. Professionalization is also distinguished in that it develops its own methods in a skills ownership. We turn next to see how in-house examinations and evaluations, too, act to shape the constable according to a delimited reading of his subjectivity as an authority.
3. SKILLS OWNERSHIP: THE EXAMINATION, EVALUATIONS AND THE REDEFINITION OF AUTHORITY

To the trained anthropometrist the measurements of the human body and the various anthropometrical indices deduced therefrom furnish the best obtainable picture of the physical qualifications of a candidate for appointment. The number of professional anthropometrists in the country is, however, small and most find positions in our higher educational institutions. The work of performing physical examinations is accordingly performed quite generally by physicians who lack the highly specialized knowledge ....(Fuld, 1909: 325)

Today it still seems surprising that one of the first and most cited books on police administration would have been so enamored with the measure of the body that it would recommend the use of an 'anthropometrist' or measurement specialist. But, indeed, this is what Leonhard Fuld strenuously advised. If we recognize that a significant transition was taking place in terms of how individuals were seen in their subjectivity, the apparent strangeness begins to dissipate. We are helped in this if we recall that there has been a gradual transition away from thinking of the good as the ideal to a thinking of the good as the mean (Hacking, 1991). What Fuld has done above with his advocacy of an anthropometrist, is smuggle in an ideal of the individual to preemptively form the basis of the mean. In this he has merely followed early conventions in the use of social statistics and examinations: the verification of extant social categories with emergent measurement tools.

In looking at the appointment and the oath, we argued that the governmental logic before the growth of the administrative state saw policing as a duty of the default version of the citizen--a citizen invested with basic common sense. The Peelian principle that police were to be 'of the people' maintained, in large part, this conception of who was to do policing. In chapters three and four on police constable shaping, we also noted that the subsequent position had it that enabling was not a sufficient technology, and positive shaping needed to take place. Coincidentally, disciplinary reforms made arguments for these methods. As Fosdick put it, '[p]olice recruits are raw material to be molded and shaped into efficient police officers' (Fosdick, 1921: 298). As a citizen-constable taking from the ancient
office, the constable had been preconceived as deliberately average and therefore representative.

Disciplinary regulation further utilized this notion of the mean in building the force up through the deployment of codes of regulations, the tight supervision of men in their beats, and the repetition, replication, and stripping procedures of drilling. There was no celebration of men in their individuality; they were rather a target, and individual differences were removed through the effort to shape the whole. According to a traditional view, once selection was accomplished to ferret out those who did not have the innate (bodily and mental, for the most part) characteristics, an apprenticeship system was sufficient to advance men and to pass on to them the craft knowledge. If entrance selection was adequately done, the craft can be learned and abilities and qualities acquired through trial and error. In the USA, as Fosdick reported in 1921, the traditional view saw 'classes and text-books [as having] little value.' Police jurisdictions holding this view turned out police with little previous preparation beyond 'a little preliminary practice in patrol in company with an older officer. Occasionally this so-called instruction goes hand in hand with physical drill' (Fosdick, 1921: 298). This was the style of most smaller police forces in Ontario up until relatively recently.49

With the establishment of a police institution and its own relatively autonomous discourse and practices, the emergent view was that policing is an expertise which includes a mix of innate and acquired abilities or qualities. The emergent profession holds that many people do not have and cannot get the required expertise. Policing would be a profession which must have standards preventing all but the most capable from entering into it. Entrance selection, and its control, therefore became paramount. Such selection would need to accord with the preferences of police executives and the priorities of the

49 Even in the mid-1950s, the practice still persisted in some large departments in Ontario to put men on the street without training. In May 1955, Frank Chauvin stopped by the Riverside Police Department after finishing a round of bread deliveries because Chief Bryce Monaghan had asked him to come by. 'That's when they handed me a gun, a holster, a Sam Browne belt, a pair of pants, and a shirt. And the next day I put these on and I was working for the Riverside Police. Just like that. No training.' (Gervais, 1992: 147)
emergent profession, rather than the non-specialist knowledges of external bodies: only police knowledge can evaluate the presence of inchoate police knowledge.

However, in keeping with the concern for institutional legitimacy, selection and training methodologies were seen as insufficient if they also did not come up to the standards of extra-institutional practices—such as those developed in the military, in education, medicine, managerial sciences, psychology, and in the civil service. Nevertheless, reserved for police executives was the most important role in the selection, promotion, and removal of personnel. Practically, the view encouraged text-book instruction, the use of university course material and instructors. It also encouraged the cultivation of a curriculum or corpus, on which instruction was to take place. In the United States, the departments in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, St. Louis, Newark, Louisville and Berkeley, acknowledged that there was a need for 'thorough-going instruction by classes with a prescribed curriculum of studies related to police methods and procedure' (Fosdick, 1921: 298). In Canada, the R.N.W.M.P. gave the best example of this view. Selection standards and preferences were articulated top-down. As early as 1902, the N.W.M.P. offered a special training class in which officers were drilled and tested on various skills, and the results sent to Ottawa. This view, however, still maintained the position that qualification or initial training and instruction was central in the professionalization of the individual, and that this centrality implicated the state as a partner in its provision. In 1959, the O.A.C.P. represented this view of the function of training in saying that the 'object of recruit training is the transformation of the inexperienced civilian into a police officer.'

In the early twentieth century two languages coexisted, the one, a reformist language of civic management and public ownership, the other a eugenics language of population control and distribution. In policing, these languages expressed themselves in one of the first issues of self-definition for the police as an inchoate profession: the police officer as social worker or the police
officer as crime fighter. While a social worker cop could respond to problems of social hygiene in a generic fashion and could use his own interpretive skills to determine dispositions, as it were, in a case by case manner, a crime fighter cop needed a population already conceived as divided between criminal and non-criminal in order to best access and dispose of the former without receiving interference, or himself interfering too much, with the latter. While a social worker cop needed to be sensitized to the blurry areas between the stark divisions of the law, the crime fighter needed rather to see inside the blurriness to find those stark divisions, just beneath the surface. Conveniently, examinations of individuals in population cohorts emerged to confirm that much of the order maintenance or peacekeeping task (contemporary words for 'social work' policing) could indeed be re-interpreted according to the clear divisions needed for crime fighters. Indeed, the body and the mind gave evidence that the binaries of good and evil were stamped on it. One only needed expert scientific methods to reveal them in their stark 'reality.'

A. The Examination

There are none of us so blind as not to visualize the necessity of making our respective departments the best that we possibly can, and place it upon the highest dais possible in the estimation of the public. Besides police Curriculum, there are other abstract things that play just as important a part in bringing about this much desired condition, and Personality is one of them (Hamilton Chief Goodman, C.C.A.C. 1937: 113)

By the early 1900s, the technology of the examination and of social statistics had taken off in North America. The uses of the mental examination and physical examination were being promoted as a means of governing through science. These technologies were being hailed by a new class of scientific experts as useful for, among other things, distinguishing between worthy and unworthy citizens. The examination could, like a knife, split the confusing mob of the social into those who can self-govern, and those who cannot. The unhealthy and sick body, the deformed and deviating individual, the ignorant or 'feebleminded' person was, science could confirm, more likely criminal.

In the early 1900s, Helen MacMurchy, one of the first government paid 'health inspectors' in Ontario popularized the use
of the medical exam in schools as a means of discovering 'mental defectsives.' These people, also known as feebleminded, were defined by her as 'those who cannot make or help make a home' (in MacLaren, 1990: 51) Feeblemindedness was 'an evil' because, by definition, it signaled those who could not self-govern and were therefore a bane on the industry of those who could. Dr. Eadie, Chief Medical Officer of the Toronto Police Force, merely reiterated the interchangeability between feeblemindedness and criminality when he told a gathering of Chief Constables in 1919 that 'one of the most serious aspects of this matter is the fact that these unfortunate persons, if allowed to stay at large, may bear children and thereby become another source of a never-ending supply of criminals' (C.C.A.C., 1919). Frank Egerton Hodgins, chair of a subsequent commission inquiring into feeblemindedness, added that the 'normal population' has a pressing need to ascertain 'the mentally defective and determining their future' (Ontario, 1920: 11). Everywhere there was a concern with social hygiene, and the concepts of statistics and positive science were emerging to manipulate the government of populations according to hygienic values. The mental examination began to be used to confirm that feeblemindedness was related not only to social dysfunction, but also to criminality—which was not perceived as a way of saying the same thing. During the period of police professional formation between 1905 and the 1930s, it is primarily the unhealthy, deformed, or deviating body by which criminality was perceived; and an emergent positivist criminology confirmed the hypothesis by using social statistics to link criminality to visible bodily and to hidden mental characteristics.

The use of the examination in the determination of population management and in police selection gained from the work of the U.S. Army during WWI. Those tests assigned intelligence rating to every recruit on the basis of an examination, streamed the more intelligent men into advancement or special assignment, identified men too inferior mentally for military training and made possible special training groups on predictions of ability to learn, and

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50 Indeed, the physical examination was used by the early Lombroso and phrenologists like Galton and anthropologists like Hooton to link bodily features directly to character.
allowed the building of troops or battalions of men of 'uniform mental strength (Ontario, 1920: 14). The intelligence test was celebrated as a means of enhancing the utilization of 'brain power' while also taking advantage of what was called the 'group method' of matching intelligence to industrial needs (15). Commissioner Hodgins added that 'the war has worked a miracle for what may properly be called mental engineering by precipitating expectations, surmises, and desires which have long sought expression' (15).

In the USA, intelligence tests were first used by psychologists with the view that what was being tested was a fixed and inborn trait, one which could be passed on and therefore could spread like a weed in society. The I. Q. test came to be marketed, notably by American advocates rather than Binet himself, as means of dividing the population into feebleminded and normal. This division could then be used to institutionalize and sterilize 'subnormals' and prevent the 'infestation' of the whole society. The intelligence test, then, was a technology for making a clean bifurcation between worthy and unworthy citizens. Such a technology offered the language of population control and distribution scientific legitimacy and practical demonstration.

The marriage of the physical and mental examination with a new use of statistics brought forward by 'moral science' (Hacking, 1991) offered new techniques which were previously unavailable. It was not that the science of statistics had not been around for some time—it had. It was also not that statistics were not already used in order to articulate, as Hacking has argued, the concept of normalcy—a concept by which people came to be understood in terms of their relation to others on a bell curve, and which Quetelet had argued was a law for the distribution of human, social and biological traits (Hacking, 1991: 188). Rather, it was that the examination was now more popularly understood as a device for doing a moral science, by which knowledge in the form of numbers offered its own reason for governmental interventions.

**the Matron's examination: an illustration**

If criminals deviated from the bodily and mental mean (also conflated with bodily health and 'I.Q.'), police candidates obviously could not. The connection between criminality and
variations from the mean became a strong feature of police selection. Nevertheless, this 'mental engineering' was surprisingly slow to develop.

Detroit was apparently the first large North American city to conduct intelligence tests on police officers. William Rutledge, Commissioner of the Detroit Police, was assisted by the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research and a psychologist in developing tests for the selection and promotion of patrolmen. An Army Alpha test was given to 358 officers and they were found to have 'average' intelligence. Rutledge argued in front of the C.C.A.C. in 1931 that while these tests indicated to him that native intelligence was not itself enough to determine the presence of a good police officer, the tests were a 'good way of excluding the unfit.' He added to this that 'science can work hand in hand with police work' (C.C.A.C. 1931: 49).

It took literally decades before psychologists were attached to police forces to augment the aptitude test with the personality test. It was not until 1945 that psychological testing came to be deployed as a means of assessing mental ability and personality. The R.C.M.P. imitated the army both by founding a personnel department and by instituting psychological screening of applicants sometime near the end the WWII (Marquis, 1993: 212) Indeed, they were to reach a notorious extreme in their testing with experimental trials of a 'fruit machine,' which was developed to test whether individuals were homosexual (cf. Kinsman, 1993).

In the meantime, the medical examination was being used to probe into the bodies of recruits, and prior to the direct testing of personality (after its 'discovery' by the police in the 1930s!) the body was probed for signs of character. A police surgeon or

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51 Literature on testing is sparse, with two articles previous to the war.
52 Police departments have used the services of psychologists for more than two decades. In the 1980's, police psychology began to be recognized as a distinct field, with psychologists' activities expanding beyond screening job applicants to include a broader range of psychological support services. These included counseling to help officers cope with the unique stresses inherent in police work, training in human relations and general stress management, debriefing after traumatic incidents, and such operational interventions as forensic hypnosis and assistance in negotiations with hostage holders or barricaded persons. Psychological support services for officers who used lethal force were more prevalent than interventions for managing non-lethal, excessive force.
medical officer was attached to the Toronto police force since at least 1886 and had the authority to peremptorily reject candidates. As indicated by the Toronto records of 1909, the line between rejection on the basis of physical characteristics and moral evaluations was very blurry indeed: the medical officer was not restricted to a judgement of the former, but could reject the candidate for either (Toronto Police Force, Application Register).

Fuld's *Police Administration* (1909) gives us a sampling of how the medical exam was deployed to unearth the signs of faulty character. As we noted earlier, Fuld wished that more anthropometrists were available to measure the bodies of police candidates. We take up his description of the application procedure of police matrons in New York. Police matrons were attached to police departments so that female prisoners could be handled, and to offer maternal discipline to young women and girls. The examination of the police matron gives us an illustration, not only of what was wanted in female matrons, but of how the examination revealed character (whether in females or males). The focus in male candidacy was the deviation of the candidate from the idealized male mean. In female candidacy this mean is moralized according to the signs of sexual 'integrity.' In the examination of police matron candidates, we get a view of hygienic alterity, by which we mean the distinction of the individual as a subjectivity through the prism of hygenics.

The examinations of candidates for police matrons held by the Municipal Civil Service Commission of New York consisted of a physical and medical examination, with the physical examination comprising a weight and height measurement, a vision test, and strength measurements. If the candidates passed the physical exam, they were given a medical exam, consisting of a 'general inspection of the candidate as to her personal habits with regard to the use of stimulants,' of an examination of the mouth and teeth, 'of skin eruptions and scars,' 'of the neck and breasts,' and of 'a search for hemorrhoids' (Fuld, 1909: 539). An examination of the heart and lungs, the abdomen and 'lower extremities,' including an inspection of the genito-urinary tracts followed. Fuld noted that the 'physical defects' most frequently found were 'laceration of the perineum in varying degrees' (which
is described in Webster's as the 'inferior surface of the trunk of the body from the anus to the external organ.'), 'hernia, hemorrhoids, tumors of the breasts or evidence of chronic inflammatory condition of these glands,' abdominal tumors, varicose veins and flat feet. Candidates were rejected for 'evidence of alcoholism or the drug habit, venereal disease, and a long list of other 'defects.' Fuld cited 'marked varicose veins, flat foot, hemorrhoids' in an example of a candidate who was given 70% for physical condition and rejected.

Fuld describes the examination as a moral test. An ideal of grace or purity is hidden in the universal, standard body and can be discovered through scientific techniques. Women below five feet are too short, women with flat feet are below the standard, even a double dental plate is mentioned as a bar against selection. Women were even tested on their ability to lift dumbbells and throw balls, even though their jobs as police matrons were not regular police duty, and generally consisted of attending and tending to female prisoners. Fuld exalts in the 'discovery' of a great link between the standard body and its hidden signs (which can be revealed by expert examination), and moral purity.

Self-mastery in the matters of dress, bearing, and cleanliness, were here linked to a freedom from infestation of disease and corruption. Individuals could be read by the new measuring devices as supportive of themselves, and therefore, as supportive of the public sphere of civil society. As Inspector Kennedy of the Toronto Police's Morality Department put it, 'the body politic is like a human body in that infection in one part causes the whole to suffer' (C.C.A.C. 1912: 30). R. B. Graham, Police Magistrate of Winnipeg, said similarly:

Modern criminologists insist that crime is a disease. The weakness of many of them is that they consider crime as a disease of the individual, whereas it is really a disease of the body-politic, of which disease of the criminal is merely the active and malevolent symptom--the pernicious tumour which must be removed by medical treatment of the surgeons knife if the body politic is to be restored to life (C.C.A.C. 1931: 19-20).
Devices like New York's matron's exam helped experts to govern through sorting out and separating those who could support the social from those who could not.

B. Department Evaluations

Above we noted the usefulness of new 'scientific' police examinations to the idealization of the crime fighter. Professions are understood to develop by adopting emergent truth-discovering practices to their own mandates and truth needs. Professional shaping according such technologies as examinations above was augmented by departmental evaluations designed to structure accountability to senior officers. These were also adapted so that in now using statistics and the mean, they persisted in rewarding 'good character' in police constables.

There is an important transition evident in declining versus emergent personnel evaluation. An example is clear in the difference between the N.W.M.P. report on personnel in 1875 and the St. Louis Merit system of 1905. On Nov. 27, 1875, Selby Smith reported to his superiors that the constables and subconstables are an 'able body of men,' 'of excellent material, and conspicuous for willingness, endurance, and, as far as I can learn, integrity of character' (in Horrall, 1975: 16). Reporting on the two principle officers, he states: 'what I have said in my confidential report has been expressed in all candour, and my long military experience of character gives me confidence in the accuracy of my conclusions' (16). Selby, in evaluating the N.W.M.P. officers, grounds his findings on his own personal character. Typically, evaluating the character of subordinates was done on the reputation of superordinates: Selby cites his own reputation in assessing the character of others. Likewise, speaking to the C.C.A.C., Chief Robert Birrell of the London (Ont.) Police Force said of recruit selection, 'You can tell instantly from his manner and appearance whether or not he would be the type of man you require' (C.C.A.C. 1926: 81).

The direct citation of reputation and the practice of informal 'eye-balling' begins to be backgrounded with scientific administration. Note the contrast between the St. Louis Merit System and Smith's evaluations. In the St. Louis Merit System, according to Walker (1977), a patrolman would get 750 points upon
entering the St Louis police department. He could then earn additional merit points: 25 points for a particularly good arrest, 25 points for a display of bravery, 2 points for a record of efficiency, and 2 points for each year of service. The officer could also lose points, and if he sank to 600, he would be subject to a charge of general inefficiency and sent to the Board of Commissioners for trial (74). The legitimation of personnel evaluation based on the character of the authority was gradually replaced by a legitimation of personnel evaluation based on the truth of statistics.53

There is a similar change in the annual report, also noted by Walker (1977). In the 19th century these were 'long, detailed, anecdotal accounts emphasizing the exploits of individual officers' (65). But these, too, are adaptive in the direction of the new-found legitimacy based on the impersonal authority of author-less facts. Precinct reports are reduced 'to one page statistical compilations. Efficiency demanded facts presented in an impersonal manner, and not colorful episodic accounts of individual men' (ibid.). In both individual personnel evaluations and in the annual report we see this move from a charismatic to a de-personalized authority. Instead of being told to believe a report based on the reputation or honour of the writer, a police audience is being told to believe in the authority of the facts and figures themselves.

the police survey
As we have noted generally, professionalism involves the ownership of a field of intervention according to in-house or intra-institutional criteria. An important innovation in the application of a managerial 'science' and social statistics to police work was August Vollmer's police department surveys. The police survey offered a vehicle by which police executives themselves could paint an authoritative statistical portrait of police departments.

The police survey was a detailed administrative analysis of a police department and recommendations for its improvement. It

53Walker makes the general point of this contrast between 19th century and 20th century evaluations.
measured the efficiency, and particularly barriers to that efficiency. In many of the surveys Vollmer did, he concentrated on external barriers (like the judiciary in Detroit, some of whom he roundly condemned) (Carte and Carte, 1975: 62), and in others on the need for improvements in internal areas, like personnel training or education (e.g. Los Angeles). Vollmer conducted the first such survey on the San Diego police, in 1917. He then did twelve more; including one on Los Angeles in 1924, Havana in 1926, Kansas City in 1929, Minneapolis and Gary in 1930, Santa Barbara and Portland in 1934, Piedmont in 1936, Syracuse in 1943, Dallas in 1944, and Portland, Oregon in 1947 (Carte and Carte, 1975: pp. 125-134).

Vollmer trained others in this technology, and although it did not take off immediately, it strongly influenced W.O. Wilson's Police Administration, and it was often seized upon by practitioner-reformers as ammunition for their intended reform direction. It also helped Vollmer, the man, become a leader in the development of the 'science' of policing and police administration, and to make policing a subject of higher learning (Carte and Carte, 1975: 63).\textsuperscript{54} Vollmer had spearheaded the idea of the police survey, and this technique offered a mechanism for the ongoing reorganization of police agencies according to a police-informed and controlled management tool.

Previous to the use of statistics, and the harnessing of the normalizing power of the statistical average and the understanding of the mean as the good, governmental understandings were oriented towards the ideal (or the real in the Platonic sense) (Hacking, 1991). Thus, while the old technique grounded the recruitment of men according to a vision of the ideal, the new technique grounded recruitment according to clusters around the mean. This is an essential change in the move from a charismatic and iconic authority to a disciplinary authority. These two ethics, of course, follow Weber (1958).

Weber had argued that the 'cultivated man' formed an educational ideal which was either a 'chivalrous or an ascetic

\textsuperscript{54}Indeed, in 1930, Vollmer published an article in The American Journal of Police Science entitled, 'The Scientific Policeman.'
type,' 'a literary type,' 'a gymnastic-humanist type,' or a 'conventional type.' Weber used the Anglo-Saxon gentleman by way of generic illustration. A liberal knowledge was thus a 'gentleman's knowledge' (Hunter, 1991). The contrast was the bureaucratic expert, idealized on the increasing importance of 'expert and specialized knowledge' (ibid.). The specialist or expert is grounded not the cultivation of manners and bearing, but rather on the impersonal 'truths' of a body of knowledge. In the examination and by the examiner, the impersonal mean and impersonal expert authority come together to produce a moral good in a scientific 'truth.' In the police candidate, the 'ideal' is no longer an iconic figure of the gentleman whose real features are always hidden behind a mystique, it is rather the fat part of a curve. However, the method liberally allowed the smuggling of the old ideal as key features of the new representation.

The 'other' of the police constable is unhealthy or unsound, and unhealthiness and unsoundness is through eugenics, Lamarkianism, and social Darwinism related to problems of disorder and crime. One needed to ensure mental and bodily normalcy not only to guarantee appropriate role selection and to deter the promulgation of bad genes, but also to ensure that one was not selecting criminality itself for service in the police department. Since both bodily and mental measurements were thought to reveal or point to the presence of criminality and moral depravation, testing and measuring reaffirmed hard and distinct moral and social bifurcations.

The hard binaries which science could discover beneath surfaces, and indeed within surface appearances, were useful to the consolidation of the police office. The language of population management coloured by a contamination fear of hygenics strongly influenced the professional development of the police according to the clean lines of the crime fighter. The examination could be mobilized to shape constable subjectivities according to these binarisms and against the dangerous view that things may, after all, be blurry 'all the way down.'
CONCLUSION

A transition takes place between the earliest modern policing model of selection and recruitment and a middle period of selection: this transition is enabled by the application of a battery of psychological devices or interpretive mechanisms which provide the function, in Rose's words, of making the individual knowable as a subjectivity. Once a subjectivity is knowable by calculation, it can be allocated with greater precision according to the tasks of governance. Thus the principle of measuring Guardsman by the yard was replaced by the principle of matching the man to the job and the job to the man (Rose, 1990: 40-41). On the surface, what is lost is shaping to an ideal. The examination, as we have indicated, was key to initiating governance through sorting. First enabled, then shaped, the police constable could now be fashioned, at least hypothetically, through the application of sorting technologies.

The idea that personality and attitudinal traits need not be subject to examination and quantification and made part of a managerial knowledge came under the consistent fire of a new science of the soul. This science of the soul was of a piece with the newly acquired license of the expert police executive, and with emergent managerialist, and later neomanagerialist literature. The science of selection offered police executives another mechanism to prevent lateral interference with their control of personnel. We noted earlier that O.P.P. Commissioner Rogers was able to finesse police fitness requirements in responding to political pressure to make political appointments. The science of selection served to distance the executive decision from looking to outsiders like a personal one.

This science, as we will see in chapter eight, also came to be seen to have a certain power. The technology of evaluation could make the composition of police forces a matter for third party experts. This was a great benefit of the American Civil Service exams when they, in their ideal, operated without political interference (cf. Fogelson, 1977). However, professionalism is usually understood to include the control over entrance, or at least the specific measures used to assess qualification, and North American police forces have long sought
and re-acquired ownership of this expertise. One way of doing this has been by bringing psychologists in house.

Selection and assessment technologies have another power. Once understood, as Rose puts it, to discover the soul, these technologies come to be used not in a discovery of what is there already, but in its proactive construction. Once a cluster of 'competencies'—as the term for character or qualities is used today—is pulled together to form the basis of what may be termed as an ideal profile of a police officer, a new mechanism for 'making up people' is available. Sorting, once the criteria are known, encourages reflexive and pro-active subjectivity-construction on the part of police candidates according to this ideal. But the real power of the examination and of this technology is in the disaggregation of the individual according to his putatively constitutive traits or competencies. In being a power of subject-constitution it is also a power of subject-fragmentation. Once this is accomplished, discursively and in practice, the 'ideal' ceases to refer to the intangibles, essences, or hidden power of a personal authority. The measure, rather than being an act of discovery into the hidden truth about the subject, rather makes him or her up according to the truths of its own discrete, measurable qualities. The measure, as subsequent analyses would come to argue, constructs subjects, and constructs them according to the belief that intangibles cannot build you up to match the profile; only those measurable institutional traces can define you. Indeed, applicants to policing today involve their every effort in making themselves up according to the perceived measures of the selection process, and according to the expediency of building a profile according to verifiable institutional 'deposits.'

There were starts at professionalization both in the mid-nineteenth century, and in the early twentieth, but the first was the straight application of military technologies to a reorganization of the police under a military type command, whereas a second occupational professionalization secured greater operational autonomy for the executive of the police organization through a lateral association. Since this occurred in the early decades of the twentieth century, it took from the narratives of
scientific management. This term connoted the suturing of a disciplinary authority to an emergent professional license. Consequently, a new subjectification of the police constable according to a scientific expertise began to take shape (cf. Ericson and Shearing, 1986: 133).

In forging ownerships over curriculums, institutional networks and evaluative mechanisms, there was then an early push by the executives of police organizations to simplify a crime-fighter idealization as the quintessential police subject. At the same time as generating a new legitimacy for the office, scientism, organizational rationalization, and executive empowerment therefore denuded this crime-fighter idealization as a dynamic agent for those aspiring toward it. While professionalism according to scientism and bureaucratic rationality, and selection according to the norm instead of the ideal, enhanced perceptions of police organizations as professional, these devices did little, at least purposely and formally, by way of maintaining enterprise and agency on the part of individual police constables. Police departments operating according to principles of scientific management reduced the police constable’s purview as an independent agent. We noted that with the depersonalization of the constable the icon and the ideal was itself undermined in favour of the average—a direction which was consistent with what had for some time been occurring with drills.

Indeed, the law enforcement or crime fighter expert was consolidated, ironically, as the police constable was still undergoing extensive decision-making deskilling under the auspices of the most influential police management texts such as O. W. Wilson’s Police Administration, and its emphasize on ‘efficiency, hierarchy, and bureaucratic regularity’ (in Deakin, 1988: 216). The subjectivity based on the icon of the British gentleman, the ideal of the cultivated man or the prestigious personality which was aspired to in police socialization up until the first world war (and which was so evident also in the articles of the Police Review and the R.C.M.P. Quarterly) was pushed into the background by this counter-subjectivity rooted to an emergent police expertise. Ironically, although this ‘expert’ could end the endless play of significations on the binary law violation or not
(at least, most of the time), his own play of signification was 'stopped' at 'crim fighter' and the restrictions on his enterprise that this entailed.

With the advent of increasing specialization and the need for technical knowledge—not only in policing, but in all walks of life—that space of discretionary action and informal decision-making declined with the formalization of the professional discourse. Written formal evaluations, tests of technical knowledge, and performance measures continually pushed up against the realist, empiricist terrain of 'common sense' evaluations. In addition, once established as a normative object, the requirements of the impersonal and specialist crime-fighter came to be endlessly cited in the quest for more resources to policing. This was what police professionalism had produced, so this is what it had to maintain with its own relative institutional strength (Klockars, 1985: 312). Arguments for more efficient policing came to mean arguments for more efficient crime-fighters on the strength of empirical proof of the persistence of more efficient criminals.

What we have seen in this chapter is the breaking of ground for a new sort of constable who could have been, as Vollmer might have wished it, a networker, local problem-solver, and exemplary citizen: Vollmer's educated 'social worker' cop was an ideal the profession debated pursuing. What we saw, however, was how the various professionalizing technologies came down, rather, on the side of regulating the individual police officer through his technical expertise. The manuals, in removing a narrative voice in the presentation of material, and in also eliminating discussions of 'how to be' as a figure of law, began to present a less open-ended picture of the craft of interpreting law and applying decisions and of making oneself up as a police constable. The debates at associations worried about the incursions of lateral knowledges on a newly tilled turf and veered in the direction away from Vollmer's social worker, preferring quick and clean consolidation under the crime fighter to the nebulous and questionable professional entitlements of the peacekeeper. Finally, newly emerging people measuring techniques placed the police constable applicant against a context which played up the
binaries of bad/good and worthy/unworthy. This, too, lent power to viewing police candidates in terms of an hygienic alterity, and the police constable could be easily perceived as someone who was to be both a proof and a mechanism for discovering people according to hard distinctions.
CHAPTER SIX

THE TRAINING ACADEMY, INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY UNDER DISCIPLINARY GOVERNANCE

The basic purpose of training here at the Academy is not to produce fully operational police officers (R.C.M.P., 1988). Having reviewed the constable's enabling and shaping in two moments of professionalization, we will now continue our analysis of the technologies which structure and shape constables by focusing on training. Especially in discourses about it in the late 1960s and 1970s, the training academy has been about the education of the police constable and has utilized at least the specter of the liberal humanist in this cause. But, set up under a disciplinary regime, the police academy also became a near-total institution for the shaping of habits and conduct. Although the training academy has depersonalized police constables, recently ethics, judgement, discretion, character, have come back into play to see the constable again as an individual formally understood to make subjective decisions. In taking up the training academy we will be stepping back to a disciplinary governance and shaping logic and pushing through to its inversion.

Several books and papers on (or related to) the police academy have shared the conclusion that the academy has been used as an opportunity to inculcate the values of the police culture and is thus involved in shaping the will (Westley, 1970; McNamara, 1968; Rubinstien, 1973; Harris, 1973; Hopper, 1977; Van Maanen, 1985; Little, 1990; Martin, 1995). The irony we wish to consider here is the attendant fact that police constables routinely devalue the academy in their own orientation to the profession. Successive waves of police recruits have also been told by experienced police officers that academy training is something to be unlearned, its substance in every way inferior to what is available on the job. As Jennifer Hunt (1990) says, the police phrase 'it's not done on the street the way that it's taught at the academy' illustrates this contradiction between the teaching environment of the street and academy. The curriculum of academy training is immediately located or marginalized by the occupational culture as a rite of passage which the neophyte
police officer must simply endure. At the same time recruits are informed, and many pass on the belief, that while the substantive part of academy training may be relatively secondary, the training environment is one in which they will make lasting friendships and collect memorable experiences (e.g. R.C.M.P., 1960). While the substance of the formal training has often been belittled, the experience itself is often lauded as a time in which an individual can finally realize a long held dream and can mold his or her own self-interpretations to those of respected others.

The police training academy or college is, then, a strange institution in a couple of senses at least. Firstly, much like a boot camp, it deploys the personal authority of individual trainers. Secondly, although character and judgement shaping is an implicit aim of academy training practices, judgement has in general been excluded from the formal curriculum of these academies as an object in itself. Appropriate judgement has been left to be an object of informal practices and has been only belatedly targeted directly.

This curiosity is resolved somewhat if we take the training academy as placed between the statutory requirements of the office and the practical exigencies of on-the-street policing. Indeed, the academy can be seen to be a loose compromise between a version of the office understood in terms of formal protocols, legal directives and sanctions, and a version of it understood in the personal authority of the badge. Shearing and Ericson (1991) have argued that while the academy shapes the ‘doing of accounts,’ the street shapes the ‘doing of policing.’ To smuggle in the fact that the badge must be backed up by the will of an individual, the style of training at the academy deploys the personal authority of instructors, permitting and indirectly encouraging their informal interaction with recruits after classes and off the cuff. To remain true to the object of putting out a faceless state agent who enforces the law dispassionately, the will of the individual in his personal judgement and discretion is, to a large degree, erased from the books.

The traditional division between street and academy training comes at a cost, as we shall see. In the academy character is seen as a combination of acquired habits: the police constable is
understood to have no pre-discursive essence, to be rather a combination of regulations on the self. On the street, in contrast, character is seen to stem out of an essence, spirit, or 'grace.' 'Attitude' or 'authority' is a melding of this spirit with the badge, it is a self-discovery under the dominion of the badge. Academy training, in imparting good habits and in stemming from the ambition of making police constables out of raw recruits, also passes on further assumptions about the how-to of the care and control of the self and others. That structuring operates through appearance protocols or the sanctions on affect. But this style of disciplinary governance in the college or academy sets up inversions on the street. Not only do appearance protocols need to be breached, it comes to be understood that effective policing or 'real' police work is achieved through this breach. As we shall see, this continually takes the ontology of the constable out of the purview of top-down administration and allows the in-group the main part of the constable shaping agenda.

This chapter will contrast traditional formal academy training and street training in order to pursue how 'character' is treated in each. Our data comes from interviews, archival material, and from scholarly texts on police colleges or academies. The interview data is current and restricted to Ontario, but our archival material dates back to the 1960s and includes Ontario and R.C.M.P. material. The secondary material is primarily from the 1960s and 1970s and is mostly American. While there are diversities we are eliding, the secondary materials comport with the view of leaders in the field who have told us that academy training has been very consistent in its methods up until very recently (E3; D1).

1. PERMISSIBLE SPACE AND DISCIPLINARY GOVERNANCE IN THE RESIDENTIAL POLICE TRAINING ACADEMY

It must be remembered that the mind of the average recruit requires to be developed. It has probably lain fallow since his schooldays, while he has been engaged in earning his living and has had neither the time nor inclination to improve his education (Moriarty, 1929: 457).

Good character, education, and physique, though essential, are not now sufficient for a constable; he must also be well instructed in his duties before he is allowed out on his own to deal with the public (Moriarty, 1929: 1).
It is interesting to note that this continuous training proves beneficial to the general health of the recruits. All recruits are weighed at the time of joining, and the last 247 recruits were weighed when they left the police school. The figures show that 193 men put on an average weight of nearly 8 lbs. per man, and only 35 lost weight to an average of 4.6 lbs. each (Moriarty, 1929: 4).

Disciplinary regulation, executive police power, and the bar against occupational association stymied front-line occupational identification around the badge until the second half of the century in Ontario. By mid-century Ontario this power did begin to unfurl, and required changes in the way police officers were understood as manageable beings. What emerged was the need to see past the capacitated body to the willing individual.

What Moriarty is referring to above is this transition in the shaping of the police constable. While at a previous moment, selection standards were thought more or less sufficient to separate citizen from police officer, and the police officer, in any case, was only a citizen with ‘common sense’ ‘street smarts’ who knew how to fight and had the stomach for police work, (Bittner, 1990; Brogden, 1991; Mark, 1978), Moriarty argues that what was needed in the England of the late 1920s was a constable well instructed in his duties: It was no longer enough to get bodies into gear; minds needed to be developed, having ‘lain fallow.’ In suggesting that continuous training is beneficial to the size and physique of recruits, it is also implied that training schools are an important vehicle or technology of this police officer shaping.

Police training has been very slow to standardize across Ontario, even to the degree that a period of preparatory training has been required at all.55 Although a stab at establishing a

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55In 1934, the Police Association of Ontario lobbied the Attorney General for the establishment of a central police school. In 1935, the Ontario Provincial Police Training School and the Toronto Police School were combined and opened to all experienced policemen in Ontario as the Ontario Provincial and Municipal Police Training School. It continued to operate through to 1944. However, in 1937 the school was only being used by a half dozen departments (Marquis, 1993: 182), and in 1944 only 4 of 16 persons enrolled were members of smaller forces. The combined school waned between 1944 and 1948, leaving smaller forces without recourse for the training of their members. In 1949, a new attempt was made to establish a provincial school, and the Ontario Police College was established at Ajax. The school taught both recruits and experienced police officers, and for the first time, offered living
provincial training academy to this end was made a few years before WWII, a residential police college for training municipal police and Ontario Provincial Police officers (the Ontario Police College) did not finally open until 1963. Previously, recruits were taught wholly according to the variety of resources individual forces could muster. Much police associational activity at both the executive and the rank and file levels culminated in the opening of the Ontario Police College (O.P.C.). It was particularly the Police Association of Ontario, in having the ear of the Attorney General of the day, which was instrumental in delivering to the police of Ontario this symbol of occupational professionalism.

The residential police academy or college is typically a building and grounds devoted to the intensive delivery of a course of instruction to a group or groups of neophyte police constables. Typically, such a course of instruction lasts from 8 to 13 weeks. It is (ideally) designed to produce, out of men and women with diverse backgrounds, values and interests, police constables who make evaluations and distinctions (judgements) which are consistent with institutional aims and knowledges. In this respect, the academy is, as Goffman describes 'total institutions,' a 'forcing house' for changing persons' (1961: 12).

Deviating somewhat from Goffman, we will see academy training as a near-total institution employing the following devices: a accommodations and messing facilities to those attending. In 1950, it was resituated to 291 and 293 Sherbourne Street, Toronto and was renamed the Ontario Provincial Police College. However, very few municipal forces sent their members. During the late 1950s the Police Association of Ontario and the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police began to lobby the government on the need for the establishment of a truly central police training school, citing among other reasons, the fact that only 40 of 297 municipal forces offered any training to their uniformed personnel. It was not until 1960 that the Police Act was amended to contain the clause 'there shall be a police college for the training of members of police forces over which the Attorney General shall preside and have charge.'

56 At the OPC and in provincial training colleges generally, experienced officers also come for shorter periods of 'refresher' training.
57 The longest course of instruction in the country is the one offered at the RCMP training depot, which is 6 months in duration.
58 Goffman's features of a total institution are the following. Firstly, 'all aspects' of the recruit's life 'are conducted in the same place and under the same single authority.' Secondly, 'each phase' of the recruit's 'daily activity is carried on in the immediate company of a large batch of others,
stripping and rebuilding, a correction under a gaze (which is not perfect and complete, but only partially so), a reliance on the in-group (for the direct inculcation of conduct norms consistent with institutional ends), and a visible status-dependent authority. We will explain each of these and demonstrate how they create a disciplinary governance for constable shaping at the training academy. We will be emphasizing that while it is indeed the effect (and may be attributed as the purpose) of police training academies to shape judgement, in the disciplinary training academy judgement training is a part of the form of learning and style of regulation, rather than an explicit part of the curriculum.

A. Stripping and rebuilding
We noted in our introductory comments that in the academy, education through the dissemination of a liberal humanist corpus is dogged and overshadowed by the felt need for disciplinary shaping. At the residential police training academy, the nineteenth century reform of disembedding the constable is made more rational by what Goffman calls 'trimming or programming.'

all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same thing together.' Thirdly, 'all phases of the day's activity are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged time into the next, the whole sequence of activities being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials. Finally, the various enforced activities are brought together into a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution' (Goffman, 1961: 6).

A residential police training academy is also not a total institution in the way Goffman uses the term. Although it fulfills the four key operations Goffman attributes to a total institution, other features rather make it a near total institution. Firstly, it acts as a rite of passage. The neophyte is engaged in a rite of status change, and although the 'rite' is near total, the fact of 'passage' delimits the ontological purview of the institution. The neophyte is also being informed within the academy that what is to follow successful completion is seen as more ontologically 'real.' Second and relatedly, attendance is voluntary. The fact of voluntary attendance also delimits the options of supervision in that attrition rates and failure rates are brought back as an issue of governance. (C4) In short, the residential police training academy is a near total institution because it leaves strategic spaces for subject-constitution. Time and space governance is not total, and allows free time for extra-curricular activities. The institution is near total because there is a specific length of time in which it is to occupy the near full attentions of the neophyte. Unlike a mental institution, the time limit allows the neophyte to look ahead beyond the walls.

59In Goffman's words: '[T]he new arrival allows himself to be shaped and coded into an object that can be fed into the administrative machinery of the establishment, to be worked on smoothly by routine operations. Many of these procedures depend upon attributes such as weight or fingerprints that the individual possesses merely because he is a member of the largest and most
This denotes a re-identification process. As one graduate put it, referring to the practice: 'you're all on the same team' (A5). Accordingly, new residents are told to wear their uniforms at all times. At the O.P.C., arriving recruits are given uniforms with an O.P.C. insignia.

In a 1974 'orientation' booklet entitled 'Welcome to Depot,' prepared to help the recruit 'make a quick adjustment to [his/her] new environment,' the recruit is told that,

making your bed in regimental style is a daily requirement and you should learn this technique as soon as possible...Study the photographs on plates 1 & 2 [the only photographs in the booklet!] which indicate the proper layout of your equipment for inspection (R.C.M.P., 1974).

He or she is also informed that,

short haircuts are part and parcel of a military life, and to ensure compliance with this requirement, a barbering service is provided...All recruits are required to have their hair cut at least every ten days. A specific date and time is allocated for each troop by the head barber (Ibid.).

At the O.P.C., in 1967, regulations stated with regard to beds that, 'the bed will be made in the manner prescribed in the order posted on the bulletin boards in the dormitory.' At Depot Division, the R.C.M.P. training academy, new recruits are immediately instructed on the emphasis placed on dress, deportment, and presentation. They are to adapt their dress and deportment to match institutional standards.

In a 1988 film entitled, 'A Day in the Life of an R.C.M.P. Recruit,' by Depot Division, the film's narrator says that the recruit will become a member of a group known as a troop, and that he will be assigned to a 32 bed dormitory, given a kit, and will learn to care for this kit. The care for the kit is a demonstration of the care of the self. The accompanying shots are of a recruit receiving bedding, entering a dormitory, and being 'shocked' by the (minimal/military) decor of this domicile. The narrator says that entering the dorm for the first time 'marks the beginning of the transition from the civilian lifestyle to that of

abstract of social categories, that of human being. Action taken on the basis of such attributes necessarily ignores most if his previous bases of self-identification' (Goffman, 1961: 16).

60PAO, RG 23, C-12, Box 2, file 2.1.(Ontario Police College, 23-2118), 1967
the paramilitary system under which the force operates.' He continues by saying that each recruit is expected to maintain their particular area of the domicile according to high standards of performance. During this narration, we see one of these senior troop members demonstrating how to make a bed properly. The fact that the senior troop member is the immediate 'supervisor' of the junior troop member builds individuation up as a function of troop identification (R.C.M.P., 1988). At the O.P.C., the emphasis on grooming has the desired effect on a recent graduate:

In myself, I've noticed, and other people have noticed—who I haven't seen much since going to police college—is that I have a lot more self-confidence that I didn't necessarily have before. I sort of put more on myself to ask that stupid question in class that I thought was important to know and worth asking. When you put on that uniform, you do walk with your back straight, your posture is better. You sort of assume a different air. Not a pompous attitude or a bad attitude, but you feel...good. It goes back to grooming. I do remember a day when I looked down and suddenly realized that 'oh my God,' I had put a shirt on that I didn't iron. I went, 'oooh'. It was a big deal to me. So I guess that's a big change. Just more aware of things, I guess all the time (A2).

We see here the standardizing structuring of the near-total institution. Hair is cut—precisely every ten days at Depot—and this moves toward the elimination of the wearing of hair as an individual identifier. Beds are made in a military fashion, and this, too, is a way of getting the individual to change his habits to meet the norm. Uniforms are worn, and a kit is kept—all practices aimed at removing individual difference. And the onus is not on to the recruit to decide to keep his hair reasonably trimmed or to take time to make his bed; the institution takes on the onus of this decision-making through scheduling it in its government over routines. The fact that this regimen is something forced on each and all, without reference to individual differences is key. The individual's manner of dress, grooming, and relaxation are each circumscribed by standardizing regulations. This is stripping.

Stripping, then, first deploys the expeditious removal of identifiers or the shaving of ties so that nothing but the vulnerable and naked soul is left; it is mortification work in the
efficient production of retooled souls. A recent graduate of the O.P.C. describes the attendant vulnerability:

The instructors at Aylmer play some really mean mind games with people. They do make you feel that you are basically nothing. It depends on your instructors. The instructor we had after exams, he would love to do that to us. It was just like, 'let's see how low they can actually go, and then bring them up when they actually get their marks.' ...It is really demeaning to a person, when they aren't sure, because they aren't sure, because they were a bit leery going into it as far as the knowledge. One instructor came out after the exam saying, 'I've got a job in sixty days, I don't know about you people' (A6).

While the recruit is de-individualized (shorn of previous identifiers), he knows that the relinquishing of institution-external ties are part of a process of gaining a new status: that of the police constable. Since this status is a master status, the recruit enters into the training academy expecting the stripping (and rebuilding) to be profound (indeed, he often desires it; willingly offering himself up to both peer and instructor). Eventually, the recruit is unable to get satisfaction in relating the conflicts of his world to his external family and friends. Values or norms which he has learned in the police academy cannot satisfactorily be subjected to the scrutiny of external others (e.g. back up your brother officer). Outer ties (to family, to other institutions) are also made physically more improbable.

Although stripping is a process of undermining individual identifiers, it is also a constructive process. In utilizing the notion of the mean and the standard and holding out the possibility of a re-individuation through in-group identification, it also understands subjects as 'raw material' rather than essences. Once external ties are dramatically reduced, the recruit begins to seek identifiers in the nearest available objects: objects which are, in any case, representative of the status he aspires to attain. The recruit is given life jackets in the form of the ready-to-hand technologies for self-shaping: the new uniform, the troop of like others, information about the craft of policing: all materials by which the body and mind can be retooled. The recruit is given access to shoe polish, laundry, the gymnasium, etc., and is encouraged to make himself up with
these, and according to the meanings they are accorded. The photographs in the R.C.M.P. orientation booklet—of the bed and the kit—is the outline into which the recruit is to fit. The successful recruit strives to make himself over by learning to use these devices and embedding himself in their associations.

In chapter four, we noted how rules and regulations under disciplinary reforms argued their place in the governance of the whole time of the police constable. Here, in the traditional residential training academy, we see a continuation of that total jurisdiction. Under the regime of the training academy, the recruit is subjected to a comprehensive regimen in which the time to engage in reflective or processing work is limited and in which the cultivation of a private life is restricted and restructured. The academy encourages verbal communication, friendship-building, and the consulting of instructors and trainers on personal matters so that private matters, too, are police business. At the R.C.M.P., for example, the recruit is told,

the commissioned officers of the Force constitute the senior portion of the chain of command, and through them each member is enabled to obtain guidance and assistance in problems pertaining to his duties. Should he be confronted with a serious matter of a personal or private nature, the Divisional and Personnel Officer is available to counsel him (R.C.M.P., 1957:9).

Earlier, too, we noted that disciplinary shaping intended to redeploy the police constable by disembedding him, and then drilling and regulating him up through code. Notice here how stripping and rebuilding re-conceives judgement as a habit. The judgement of the recruit follows from a habituation to routines. The military analogy has it that the individual can be made to measure through the devices of academy training; the academy itself can produce constables through this regulation of the habits of the recruit.

One of the main purposes of the police academy seemed to be to develop uniform behaviour within the department in order to lessen the member’s need to depend on his own judgement...Standardized behaviour seemed to have two consequences for the department: it lessened the number of decisions that an officer had to make, and it protected the department from public criticism (Harris, 1973: 160).
This thinking has profound consequences. It undermines the individual as a prior status to the constabulary status. Near-total institutional training is designed to rupture the identity of the individual, to make the habits of the police constable discontinuous with the habits of a 'prediscursive' individual. The implication is that whatever he may have been before he became a police constable is dispensable wherever it conflicts with the achieved status. Here, as we have seen with the oath and with professional ethics, the self-to-self relation is colonized by the self-to-authority relation. The consequence is a loss of continuity with the self and of perspective, a consequence aggravated by the academy's structuring of in-group loyalty.

B. Reliance on the in-group
While stripping works to alter and standardize the individual through his habits (how he wears his hair, how he makes his bed), it also positively promotes his re-individualization within the in-group: like things are happening to all, and this forms a common basis for rebuilding. In the training academy, the in-group is utilized extensively not to augment conduct or judgement shaping, but to do the main part of this work. At the R.C.M.P. Training Depot even today, the trainee is immediately assigned to a troop, and in many cases she will stay with this troop throughout the training period until graduation. We can learn a little about how views of the use of the troop in the 'normalization' of the recruit have developed by going back to a comment in the Lelievre Inquiry (1854) and to N.W.M.P. Commissioner Irvine's comments in 1883.

In the earliest days of pre-professional policing, an unsupervised body of men gathered together was a worrisome thought. In the 1850s, as we have noted, political expression often meant a group of men gathered in public without 'authority.' In the Lelievre Inquiry, the commissioners wrote about establishing a Force for all of Lower Canada and expressed a reluctance about the distribution of such a force into small parties as needed by municipal or public service: 'but in all cases of such distribution of the Force in small parties, the strictest discipline should be maintained, and the men kept in barracks, or quarters, under the immediate supervision of the
Officers in command of the party' (1854: 2). The lowest ranks of men gathered together was seen as a recipe for the kind of undisciplined and unsanctioned behaviour which, or so the authorities thought, was demanding a revamping of policing in the first place. After the first ten years of the N.W.M.P., a similar view was expressed by Commissioner Irvine:

[A] large number of undisciplined men, associated together for a considerable length of time, naturally formed intimacies which were objectionable, for on arrival at the post, they thus formed a distinct clique, apart from the older men. The change of life which they experience, their surroundings, their discipline, the arduous duties they were called upon to perform, gave rise to imaginary grievances, which were nursed and talked over among themselves, not mixing with the older hands, who would otherwise have imparted a desirable influence, they became dissatisfied (in Horrall, 1975: 18).

Here the peer group or in-group is seen as destructive to the cultivation of good habits.

At the same time there is developing a technology of training which seeks to allow the group to mediate between the individuality of the trainee and the uniformity of the troop. As Rose (1990) has commented, in 'modern warfare' we see the development of the idea that in order to win a war, it is imperative to motivate soldiers by providing a 'higher' principle (higher than the life of the state itself) around which they could justify their death. Rose reports that Stouffer's massive analysis of soldier's opinions discovered that the motivation of the individual was not sustained by the remote principles, but rather by the bonds and loyalties of the primary group and its leader. Here again, it became imperative to deal directly with the motivations of the constable in the group, and while at first the view was that the predilections of the in-group tended toward the errant and would need to be constantly shaped and pounded with drill, the emerging view came to be that the motivations of the group were consistent with that of its supervision, and needed rather freedom to find and express that consistency. The in-group became not a thing to be feared, but a thing to be exploited.

After the turn of the century, we see in Calahane's manual for Detroit police officers the use of the term 'teamwork' to express the explicit cultivation of in-group loyalty:
Be loyal. The success of a squad, precinct or district depends greatly on the even teamwork of all its members. You should be for and not against the accomplishment of the functions of the Department, giving your most earnest and hearty support to those in authority. You cannot be loyal and be a knocker, a grumbler or a shirker. Just one man of this type in a command is a nuisance and a centre of dissatisfaction. You should, therefore, discourage such tendencies in yourself and in those with whom you come into contact (Calahane, 1914: 1-2).

The motivations of the in-group are not hostile to the aims of the supervised organization, but are here explicitly cultivated as consistent with those aims. In the O.P.P., one of the earliest surviving documents from their police academy, 'Loose-leaf Notebook: Academy Notes' (1939-1942), states:

Cooperation as it applies to the Ontario Provincial Police force, is on a high plane. It is your duty, therefore, to further develop that spirit and bring it up to perfection... Be loyal to the force to which you belong. A member who is dissatisfied, and is continually grumbling, is useless, he is better out of the force, both for his own good and the good of others... No organization can exist and function satisfactorily without control, and it is by/through unswerving loyalty and obedience to orders that such control is maintained.61

The C.C.A.O. also promoted the in-group. As we have noted earlier, it published a booklet for constables entitled Training Precise #1 as part of its overall aim to professionalizing the police.

A police department acts as a unit of a Dominion-wide law enforcement body. To operate as a successful unit there has to be cooperation and discipline. Learn to cooperate at all times with your brother officers of junior and senior rank. Respect and obey the senior Officer. There are times when orders given to you may appear entirely wrong but [follow?] the orders. Remember, that your senior Officers will gladly discuss any [order?] with you and will try to help you (C.C.A.O., 1956).

By mid-century in the R.C.M.P., the in-group had already begun to have a long history as a vehicle of conduct shaping. In a recruiting booklet in 1957, the Force also desists from exploring or bringing under a rational gaze the specific means by which esprit de corps functions:

61O.P.P. Museum. File 982.2.2
Many recruits feel homesick during their early weeks at 'Depot' Division, and this is something to be expected. For many members, this is their first real break from home, and it takes a while to acclimatize to the new surroundings, responsibilities, and way of life. The Force recognizes this, and you should too. The best way to get over this feeling is to face up to the problem and make a determined effort not to let it get you down. During this period, you may feel you have made a wrong career choice and decide to leave the Force. This could be unfortunate as it is impossible to determine what active police work is like until you have experienced it personally. By persevering, you will be giving yourself a chance to experience the job satisfaction inherent in police work, and no doubt develop strong bonds of loyalty and friendship which are difficult to describe (R.C.M.P., 1957:14, emphasis added).

In the orientation booklet, 'Welcome to Depot,' the recruits are informed of the overall goals of the program: a) to instill a strict sense of discipline and esprit de corps; b) to develop good co-ordination of mind and body; c) to provide some basic knowledge which is required to perform effectively as members of the force (R.C.M.P., 1974). The prioritization in this list of goals places discipline and the cultivation of an esprit de corps ahead of the learning of a craft. The tripartite relationship of the care of the kit, initial orientation, and the socialization to the group is also clear in the 1988 orientation film. Here, the requirement to keep one's kit in order and bed made to standard is 'justified' with the argument that:

these types of daily activity help to develop a feeling of closeness which can be associated to that of a member of a family and is perhaps summed up in the term esprit de corps. During the first few days when everything is so new, senior troop members are available to help the troop members settle in, showing the troops how to polish boots, wash and wax floors, iron clothes, and make beds in a regimental fashion' (R.C.M.P., 1988).

The bonds and esprit de corps are a selling point of life at the training academy. The in-group, far from being a threat, becomes one of the strongest and most acceptable features of the landscape of police socialization. Importantly, this feature is still seen as more or less out of the range of explicit supervisory rationalization: it is 'difficult to describe' because its utility is seen as depending on being to some extent left to do its own work.
This 'space' of the in-group then, first seen as a danger, and later as a tool, comes to be colonized more explicitly by the values and interests of the occupational culture and its take on craft professionalism. The recruit learns that while adherence to rules, regulations, and procedures are the surface story of exemplary or acceptable conduct at the training academy, it is according to his adherence to in-group hierarchies and in-group norms by which his conduct and judgement is most immediately and routinely assessed. This lesson is of paramount importance. The formal mechanisms of the training academy deploy the in-group so that the constable can be shaped, so to speak, where he lives. Promoted in the academy and by the organization as a whole, group loyalty is placed at the very heart of what it means to be a police constable. Regulated through the norms of the group, it becomes second nature to the constable to act with one eye on the prohibitions and expectations of group solidarity.

C. Visible status-dependent authority
At the disciplinary training academy two characteristics of authority stand out. The first is that the status differential between staff and trainees or recruits is made highly visible, and is reinforced in homage requirements like the salute, standing at attention, dress, and salutations. This status differential is constantly reinforced through instantaneous correction. Through stripping, even entitlement to recruit status is held in doubt, further drawing the neophyte to the mean. Recall the instructor who told the class of recruits following one of their examinations, 'I've got a job in 60 days, I don't know about you people.'

The second is that this status differential is continually cast in the binary: authority is a power over, the object of authority is the compliant and obedient body. Resistance is error; the effort at its overcoming either establishes a new authority or reaffirms the status quo. Since authority is right, the establishing of a new authority either means the achievement of a false rule or the usurping of a false rule—the falseness of which may, upon review, not have been perceived.

As we noted earlier, the recruit learns via this binary: either he is a status subordinate, obedient, and unquestioning or
challenging of authority, or he acquires the role (in graduations) of the authority, and holds authority over others. The in-group is utilized to facilitate practice in this, giving recruits the opportunity to practice and more firmly entrench in their minds and their bodies this relation of power-over and obedience. We also noted that this conception, otherwise called discipline, is quite explicit in the analyses of training done by police executives and trainers: one learns how to conduct oneself by being obedient to authority: this is how one learns how to be self-disciplined, and also how one learns how to give orders: one is subjected to them.

We may make the further point here that in this sequence, decision-making autonomy is something gained through and flowing from a proof of self-regulation. Under a disciplinary governance of the training academy, the neophyte is again and again given the message that enterprise devolves to him through a chain of command. Self-expression as a legitimate capacity is gained through a demonstrable willingness and ability to subject oneself fully to disciplinary regulation. But while legitimate action is here understood to stem from the permission of an authority, the neophyte is at the same time reminded that the in-group structures action in terms of the permissions of space.

D. Correction under an imperfect gaze
In all areas of his waking life, the recruit is seen in terms of deviation from a mean. In his manner of walking, of talking, of grooming and dress, and in his presentation of knowledge, the recruit is judged and evaluated, both by institutional staff and by his peers. The recruit may never come to know all of the precise regulations by which he has felt himself governed, but he will have internalized the logic and propriety of this hierarchical disciplinary governance and will be learning to subject his private thoughts and emotions to this 'gaze.' As Goffman writes,

In a total institution, minute segments of a person's line of activity may be subject to regulations and judgements by staff; the inmate's life is penetrated by constant sanctioning interaction from above, especially during the initial period of stay before the inmate accepts the regulations unthinkingly. Each specification robs the
individual of an opportunity to balance his needs and objectives in a personally efficient way and opens up his line of action to sanctions. The autonomy of the act itself is violated (1961: 38).

Disciplinary power is demonstrated in the fashioning of bodies according to an agency without agents (Foucault, 1977; cf. Fraser, 1989) Foucault notes that a disciplinary power implies an 'uninterrupted, constant coercion' which supervises the 'processes of the activity rather than the result,' and which is focused on 'movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body' (1984: 181). We have noted in chapters three and four on drill and on the early regulations of the police, that, indeed, an insecure power attempted to assert itself in terms of intensity, having established some reach (cf. Giddens, 1985) We mentioned also that even the private lives of police officers were subject to this pressing gaze (Grasett, 1890). The R.C.M.P. marriage regulations, while intendedly fostering in-group and organizational commitment, were also exemplary of the intensity of this gaze.

Even by the 1930s, however, strict rules on the private or leisure life of police officers began to be more 'practiced in the breach' (Marquis, 1987b: 270). In the training academy, the gaze never has been complete. Indeed, as is demonstrated in the report on discipline at the O.P.C. (below), it can be seen as a breached practice. Shaping through the gaze is imperfect. Indeed, it must be since nothing is more true in police work than the simple statement, 'rules were made to be broken.' Again, this acknowledgment furthers the legitimacy of informal action protocols to fill those spaces and govern conduct at the end of the purview of the disciplinary gaze.

Note how Sir Robert Mark describes the reach and breakdown of the gaze during his 13 week police training experience at Manchester's fire station:

The method of teaching was to spend most of each day dictating laws, orders and regulations to be painstakingly copied in longhand and learned each evening... The Manchester force was dominated by a philosophy not unlike

62Sir Robert Mark was appointed commissioner of Scotland Yard in 1977. His book, In the Office of Constable, recounts his experiences in the training academy in Manchester.
that of Victoria's army. There was no suggestion of leadership by example. Seniors battened on and bullied juniors and the force as a whole did the same to that part of the public not able effectively to look after itself....The system was harsh, unimaginative, unintelligent, and ruthless (Mark, 1978: 19-20).

At the final stage of their training, the trainees were given model answers before a dictation test began and all they had to do was write their names on them. One of my own interviewees described a similar incident: recruits were given a test, but they were also given the answers to fill in at the appropriate places (A3) Excessive ritual and proceduralism is only too familiar to police recruits and academy administrators, and its presence merely reaffirms the limits of the disciplinary gaze.

Harris (1973), Rubinstien (1973), and Little (1990) offer some pithy examples of how the mess hall and the time after classes are used as an opportunity to build up the iconic authority in contradistinction to impersonal authority. My interviewees as well described the most powerful learning experiences in terms of one-to-one's with the instructors after classes. The majority mentioned that 'real training' takes place outside of the curriculum and outside of the academy (A1-A23).

E. Judgement Training in the Corridors

Although nowhere or very minimally in the academy is judgement training a curricular topic, the academy's disciplinary devices are explicitly aimed at judgement in what is called character building.

In the C.C.A.C. convention of 1937 Assistant Director of the Montreal Police Force Robert Barnes noted that the development of character was greatly stressed at the Montreal police school. Barnes continues:

These are the qualities that are absolutely essential to either a policeman or a fireman, and which must be developed before he can acquire the moral strength necessary to sustain him in the performance of his duties. He must be morally as well as physically fearless on all occasions. It is the development of the moral strength that instills him with forbearance and gives him the courage think and act in times of danger. Development of character, as applicable to physical training, engenders prompt and respectful obedience to a superior's command (Barnes, C.C.A.C., 1937: 33).
While Barnes spoke of good character as invested with the particular attributes of courage, respect, and obedience, he saw its development as achievable through—shall we say—the inherited mechanisms of the training academy. Barnes concluded his paper by describing self-defense exercises, fire-arms training, and swimming, each of which, he argued, were amply suited to this end. He went further: ‘[the] police training school is the foundation of discipline and morale throughout our department' (Ibid.).

At that C.C.A.C. convention, character was also the explicit focus of a subsequent paper by Chief General Draper of Toronto. Entitled ‘Building Character into Police Personnel,' Draper hinted at a different tack: finding character, recruiting it: ‘The police are in constant touch with the great body of citizens and have a unique opportunity to impress the value of character upon a world that is harassed too much in the problems of getting and spending' (1938: 43).

In the C.C.A.C. convention of 1938 Chief Goodman asked, 'what is personality?' and the question appeared to stand out as prescient. Goodman explored 'personality in police work' by dividing it into three dimensions: mind, language and appearance:

There are none of so blind as not to visualize the necessity of making our respective departments the best that we possibly can, and place it upon the highest dais possible in the estimation of our public. Besides Police Curriculum, there are other abstract things that play just as important a part in bringing out this much desired condition, and Personality is one of them' (C.C.A.C., 1938: 113).

In the 1930s especially, police managers began to be aware of police constables 'in their individuality' and began to see the need to think about the concept of 'personality.' What they sought to do, however, was to deploy the old methods on this new terrain. As seen in Barnes, character was thought to spring out of obedience to authority and the notion of a sacrifice of the self to the commonweal or civic duty. In Goodman, however, there was a shift. Goodman understood personality as working on the organization (and personnel) in a way which placed it beyond the purview of the curriculum.

The distinction between police curriculum on one hand, and 'personality' on the other was precisely the division which we see in the disciplinary training academy. It cuts right through, so
that, as we noted, the curriculum of the O.P.C. in 1989 could still reserve so little time to the explicit focus on judgement training. Instead, it is in the academy's corridors and after hours bull sessions that the question 'what is personality?', 'what is the personality of a cop?' becomes the explicit focus.

Indeed, even in the late 1980s when sociologist Robert Little participated in recruit training at an American police training academy, he still found this division. 'A great deal of information was being transmitted from instructors to recruits via 'war stories' and anecdotal comments' (1990: 165). Calling this a form of anecdotal socialization, he noted that anecdotal lessons were presented as 'pure truth, not mere opinion.' He found that 'recruits seemed hungry for them and regarded the best story tellers as valuable sources of information about 'real' police work. They also held the best story tellers 'in high esteem' (ibid.). Again, it is the location of these lessons which is important. They were presented in the corridors, after classes, in drinking sessions, and in impromptu gatherings. In my own interviews, this was confirmed. When asked about ethics training, subjects said that ethical questions were not addressed much in class but are taken up 'in impromptu drinking sessions after class. That's where you learn the mentality and why, the reasons why they have this mentality' (A7).

In the corridors of the academy eyes and ears are on the lessons of the street. It is on the street, it is said, that a police constable is made or broken. As we have noted, this leaves much of the ontological work of subject-constitution in the space and time settings and their interpretation by the norms and interests of the occupational culture. As Westley, (1970), Rubinstien (1973), Cain (1970), Shearing (1981) and Holdaway (1983) have shown, these norms and interests are strongly promotional of in-group solidarity, on-the-street interpretive hegemony, and of a Hobbesian view of the social world as divided between a weakened, threatened order and increasingly powerful disorder only barely held in check by overtasked police officers.

Although judgement and subjective interpretation are not formal subjects at the training academy, these are nevertheless learned. The neophyte learns that there is a hierarchy of values.
in police work, that this hierarchy enlists 'the good' in the service of 'the real,' and that survival as a police officer depends first and foremost on one's demonstrations of support for one's peers against out-group incursions. What the recruit learns at the training academy is the three s's of silence, secrecy and solidarity (Martin, 1995; also Westley, 1970: 181; Niederhoffer, 1967). Far from being a place or technology for police shaping which is ineffective with regard to judgement shaping, the training academy does indeed shape the interpretations of the neophyte, but it does so in the 'secondary observations' of the drill sergeants or instructors (Katz, 1990), in the informal discussions after and between classes, and in being itself a contained, isolated architectural structure where 'the good' of police work is formally right and informally useful.

F. Autonomy: the shape of resistance

The strategies of disciplinary governance at the residential police training academy structure self-expression. In doing so, they also shape resistance. Individuality comes to be understood in the terms of regulation.

In 1967, a confidential report on the discipline at the Ontario Police College\(^{63}\) found that students 'often appear disheveled and dressed in all sorts of garb,' that they 'stroll along' out of step with the troop, that stragglers have to adjust their uniforms on the march,' that there is 'tardiness and absenteeism, and that classroom 'decorum and dress' is dependent on the 'whim of the individual instructor,' with many students having unbuttoned tunics and loosened or removed neckties.

With respect to the relation of the student to authority, the report found that class leaders had 'very little control over their various groups,' that students do not always sit to attention when the instructor arrives for class, and that there is no general requirement to stand when answering questions. Finally, the requirement to salute the director and deputy director of the college was 'seldom complied with.'

\(^{63}\)PAO, RG 23, C-12, Box 2, file 2.1.(Ontario Police College, 23-2118), 1967.
These lapses in discipline were cited as contributory to the general state of disarray under which the college was said to labour, especially after hours. There was regular lateness after curfew, much horseplay in the dormitories—'upset beds, water and pillow fights have resulted in considerable property damage and occasional bodily injury'—and a regular routine of partying in town followed by a procession of cars arriving back at the campus with their occupants in a boisterous, drunken, state. Empty beer and liquor bottles continually appeared along campus streets, and the local citizens complained about the driving habits of the students exiting and returning from the college.

The problem of the conduct of trainees at the college was understood as a lapse in discipline, rather than a product of disciplinary governance. Because the authority was thought to stem from the commanding officer, in this case the director of the academy, this is where the report found fault. The Sergeant of Detectives writing one of the reports described the director as a 'very fine person and a gentleman in the purest sense of the term.' He was a 'genuinely kindly man and exercises his authority in a most democratic fashion' and was 'scrupulously fair in his judgement,' 'abhor[ing] tyranny or harsh discipline,' and believing that a police training institution could 'be operated in much the same way as a civilian university.'

I believe that he hopes to instill a sense of responsibility in the recruits by making them largely self-governing. This indicates imposing as few restrictions as possible. The Director has described 'professionalism' as being largely matter of attitude. I think he feels that if an adult atmosphere of freedom from petty restrictions is created, the recruits will respond with a mature attitude.64

The director, as is evident here, took the view that the environment could enhance 'professional' police subjectivities, through viewing recruits as nascent professionals who were already responsible and mature.

The argument advanced in the report is that this reading of the police recruit was misplaced or erroneous. Firstly, the recruits were not 'university material'. They had an average education of grade eleven. 'I regret to report that quite a few

64 PAO, RG 23, C-12, Box 2, file 2.1. (Ontario Police College, 23-2118), 1967.
of them can scarcely read or write with any degree of ease.' 'I am afraid that the record show many of these recruits to be 'industrial' as well as high school drop outs.' Secondly, they were not highly intelligent—again the argument of the report-writer. The report noted that the average I.Q. was 108.

Both these points were cited in defense of the position that the police recruit is already a certain kind of individual, and that the kind of individual he is already predisposes him towards certain ends, and that the kind of regime necessary is not the 'permissiveness' of a 'civilian' or professional school advanced by the director, but rather 'an atmosphere of semi-military discipline.' The fact of relative impoverishment with regard to educational status and mental acuity is used to justify a more disciplinary regime of governance: one which would be more coercive, more hierarchical, and less egalitarian in its structure.

The icon of the gentleman, once very large on the horizon of police subjectification, was here deliberately removed from it. While it was nice to have a true gentleman around, it was of questionable value for the purposes of recruit training. Rather, what was wanted, both in the substantive content and in the manner of training or education, was a more 'practical' sort of man well-versed in disciplinary techniques. Formal training was not to present the icon of the liberal humanist to neophyte police constables.

To solve this 'discipline problem' therefore, the Sergeant of Detectives made ten recommendations which were aimed at re-establishing disciplinary governance. They suggested a fuller use of the in-group, more attention to the cultivation of the binary authority relation (the visible distinction between a supervisory and recruit status), and an deepening and broadening of the 'gaze,' even to places outside of the academy. Not broached as a solution to difficulties with training delivery was a deliberate shift of the onus for learning on to the trainee.65

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65The report concludes by suggesting that the college be moved so that many of the students could live at home during basic training. 'After almost three years of watching the effects of barrack life on police discipline, I think our recruits would benefit from living at home during their initial training.'
Drill, examinations, routines and procedures, prohibitions on private life, and also the residential police academy serve complicated conduct shaping ends. The first and most obvious is the shaping of the self they do or attempt through working on the habits of individuals. Judgement, as these disciplinary devices understand it, is a habit that can be promoted in the individual’s desire to be recognized in the norm. The second, and less obvious, is the permissions and counter-narratives which the academy structures through its devices. These, as we have seen, are oppositional; but seek to match the strength of the initial intervention. While the academy and formal training structures conduct according to the contours of disciplinary tensions, it also facilitates counter-spaces of informal conduct-shaping, and perhaps more inadvertently, an oppositional narrative of constable autonomy. The practical jokes and horseplay, the witticisms under breath at the back of the class, the knowledge-gathering on rule-shaping, the grouping around the icon with the rough language and tales of individual courage: these too are products of the academy.

It is according to this resistance that the neophyte police officer is shaped as distrusting of visibility, as given to avoid formality or formal protocols, as susceptible to the sacrifice of ethics to group norms, and as exalting of individualism, heroism, and demonstrative, iconic authority. This counter- or parallel discourse, while ostensibly undermining of disciplinary governance, ought to be seen as nicely recycling it as a need. It fosters resistances ‘against’ which it must be re-imposed as a corrective. Still, it would not be long, in relative terms, before this reflexivity between discipline and undisciplined conduct would be exposed as endlessly futile.

To note that the academy influences on the street police subjectivity is to reiterate its objective—-it is intendedly a constable shaping device. We want to be specific, however, in emphasizing two features of this contribution: the procedural ethic and the appearance protocols of justice. In the academy the tools of the trade are learned in a setting which instructs on the importance of justice as a visible accomplishment. If justice must be seen to be done, the police officer must be seen to be just.
In targeting, from the outset, his habits and demeanor, the traditional training academy immediately orients the recruit to the importance of appearance management. He learns that the management of the self in the eye of the public is paramount: it is a demonstration of self regulation. In providing instruction which highlights the importance of appearances and of what is seen to be done, the academy also predisposes police constable thinking to see the world as a series of masks, and himself as an essential participant in the dramaturgy. 'Keeping the lid on it' is police business and what policing is about; and one of the first lessons in the shaping of the body and the grooming of appearances is that the 'lid' is essential. When police constables take off their own 'lids' in a dressing-down protest, they are formally embarrassing the administrative authorities by revealing the vulnerability of those appearances. This, it is thought, is the preface to chaos. At the training academy, the recruit learns how to do things 'by the book.' He learns of his accountability to the legal norm.

2. STREET TRAINING

You can read all the crap you want, but I'm telling you now, the best knowledge you can gain is on the street (D1).

When we last left the working field of the front-line public police officer, we saw how he was being placed in the space of the beat by an emergent administrative authority. This administrative authority, we argued, first sought to show its capacity through deploying the police constable as an icon in 'shows' like the march out to the posts, and later attempted to prove this capacity by seeing the work of the constable as a measure of its influence. We also noted then (and will argue again) that this structuring according to a disciplinary governance engendered complementary resistances. We now turn again to the street as the everyday context or working environment of field training structured by the realist discourse of the occupational culture. Street training consists both of the conditioning of the constable to the meaningful or value-laden working world and 'exchange rates' of the occupation, and of the formal tutelage of the neophyte under a coaching or training officer. The 'street,' as we shall see, is structured by an occupational discourse which often identifies itself in contradistinction to an administrative authority.
Practitioners on the street structure time and space and interpret reality according to occupational references, and while these are to some extent derivative of the style of administrative oversight, they are also set against or oppositional to formal truths, prohibitions and rewards.

A. Street Methods
Out of the academy and assigned to a detachment or police division, the probationary officer or ‘probbie’ is placed in the immediate supervision of a coach officer. The probbie spends anywhere from 3 weeks to 3 or 6 months on the road under the direct tutelage of this more senior officer. Coach officers have job experience which may vary from only 3 or 4 years to a number of decades, depending on the availability of willing officers. Apart from status and intrinsic benefits, rewards to the coach officer vary between departments, but until recently have been quite limited (Kean, Hess and Ungerleider, 1994). The coach officer-probbie relationship is very much an apprenticeship training: it is personal, one on one, and it allows for the passing down of some of the ‘intangibles’ of the craft.

In the past the protocol for the trainee under coach officer tutelage was one of ‘watch and learn.’ In this it reflected the ‘training to obey’ of disciplinary governance. In the late 1940s, for example, Westley asked 40 experienced officers how the rookie should act in their probbie status and he was told that they should ‘follow suit’. Westley (1970) summed up the role of the rookie as that of an inactive listener. Today, such a response on the part of an experienced officer would indicate a lack of readiness for the role.

In my own interviews, one 5 year officer described his experience with his coach officer in a small town as a ‘disappointment’ because, among other things, ‘he wanted me under his thumb... because that’s the way I [meaning, the coach officer] was trained’ (C4). Similarly, another recruit described his training under a coach officer in a big city as unhelpful because it reverted to the former protocol and because it took too much of the passivity of formal training to the street:

When I left the college I figured okay I have a pretty good working knowledge of all this stuff. And they put in for a
three month training period with an officer; they just send you to any division in the city basically. I ended up at 23 division. My experience there was, I was just starting and everything, you're with a senior guy—you know, I'm gonna just sit back and watch and see what happens. Don't take control or anything like that and just try and evaluate. I guess I was being a bookworm [other officer laughs]. But that isn't what they want at all. They want you to get in there and take a piece out of it and see what's going on, roll with the flow, and see what happens, and stuff. They just want to get in and experience, and then he'll [coach officer] will direct you, depending on what happens.... They have to see how you're acting in order to evaluate, and how you use the tools that they've provided to you before hand (B3).

As this officer stated, coach officer training is now properly not inactive, but decidedly active. It is a time to make mistakes and learn from them. Coach officers, not probbies, are to 'hang back' and intervene only when a minor fault pas threatens to become a big mistake which may have career repercussions.

What a good coach officer does—and mine was—is that he'll let you make mistakes.... He's tell me exactly what I should have done. And a couple of times I remember he says, don't ever position yourself in a car like that. You know, after the fact. You know, you left yourself open...no room, so forth (D1).

According to the protocol today, the coach officer is to defend the uniform and the career of the probbie, but also to allow him or her to find his 'groove' as a police officer and absorb the intangibles of policing. Indeed, even at the training academy, a chief instructor said in interview that he preferred a curriculum where the recruits could spend the last 3 weeks 'making mistakes.' (C1)

b. Street Lessons
Perhaps the first lesson that the neophyte police officer learns upon trading his status as a recruit for that of a probbie is that policing, although often understood as granting a high degree of autonomy or interpretive or decision-making independence, is a team sport. Trained on adapting himself to the mean and to show his acceptance and subordination to the in-group, he must now act unhesitatingly in the defense of his brother and sister officers and follow and uphold the 'code of silence' which attends its practical range. Very early as a probbie in the big city streets, he is tested on his use of confidential information and on his
ability to apply 'normal force' (Hunt, 1990). He is given opportunity to make the mistake of leaking information and thus making himself a security risk, and is given opportunity to 'back his brother' officer and to ward off perceived threats to the 'uniform.' He learns of the very high stakes which are put on this defense of the uniform and in-group information integrity, that failure will draw the 'freezing out' sanction:

T: You get ostracized. You just end up on the outside. You don’t know anything. You don’t get involved in any of the plays. When you call up units for back up, you don’t end up calling the guy who’s ostracized cause you’re worried about them screwing up (B4).

If he is wise and a realist (Shearing, 1978), he need not himself experience this value of the defense of the in-group and the ultimate penalty of ostracisation to recognize its importance: stories are regularly told reinforcing and reconfirming it (Harris, 1973; Shearing and Ericson, 1991).

As Manning (1977) and Reiss (1971) among others have also argued, the prime commodity in police work is information. The objective of street training is to learn the value of information: 'that’s number one' (B5). The police officer’s worth is seen in terms of the degree to which he or she has access to people with information, and the alacrity with which he or she can turn this information into 'good' arrests. Consequently, respect from one’s peers is earned according to the degree to which one is assumed to have full access to police-relevant information and is capable of deploying this access into both a respectable arrest record in the station, and a formidable or 'authoritative' presence on the street. Learning how to get such access is the first requirement of street training.

It’s funny because when you see a guy coming right out of the college, he does not know how to talk to somebody. Of course. We’re all from middle, middle-upper class homes, and all of a sudden we’re out on the street and we’re dealing with a guy who’s been out on the street since he was sixteen years old. And all he understands is what do we have on him, and aggressive talk and stuff like that. So you get this forum where this kid’s talking to you--you’re 21--and you’re talking to this kid who knows all about the world, and it’s really obvious. And they pick up on that right away. [You lose control?] You’re way out of control. And there’s nothing you can do about it. He’s in control.
And that's the difference between the book training and the street training (B4).

The probbie fresh out of the training academy is unable to obtain access using some elemental devices of the shaping that has already been done on him. The prostitute, a prime access point of information, sees the stamp of 'by the book' procedure on the probbie with the shiny shoes and the well-groomed appearance.

T: When you get out on your own.... Even the prostitutes know how long you've been on the street. They look at your boots, and they look at your uniform and if they're all shiny and polished, they'll go 'Rookie' and you're done.
N: They'll ride you.
T: You're done. They won't tell you a thing. In fact, they'll just jerk you around and lead on goose chases. Which is funny because our brass, our inspectors and all that, want you to look shiny and polished, but if you go out on the road to do what you've got to do, with spit and polish, you won't get anywhere (B4).

The coach officer sees impediments to street efficiency.

T: I got into the car and my training officer went, 'Look at you. Leave your hat there. Look at your boots. Come on, you're blinding me.' And I was taken through it.
N: [Same for you?] Yeah.
T: [training officer isn't wearing hat, advises to leave hat off] Next thing you know you're in a foot pursuit and your hat's flying off (B4).

Sometimes called 'reality shock,' the probbie enters the street 'green' or 'fresh' attempting to structure his conduct through the formal rules of academy training and 'book learning.' He has been selected, in most cases, on the basis of a reading of his honesty or forthrightness, and now also on his sensitivity to the use of language and his ability to appreciate diversity; he has, in short, been pulled through middle class sensibilities. But on the street in the inner city, or where the action of policing is most intense, he is only as good as the actions his peers attribute to him: and this evaluation is not grounded in middle class sensibilities, but rather according to the street commodities of information and personal authority.

To meet the primary objective of gaining access to information (and to 'bodies,' we ought to add) what is called 'book training' is seen to be wholly inadequate. Because information is often denied and because, further, the uniform does
not act independently to confer access to that denied information, the probbie is immediately placed in a conundrum. He is expected to show panache in getting information, and he must also make himself known to 'police property' by demonstrating his willingness to express himself in contradistinction to the public image cultivated at the academy. Unable to meet the challenge of the task by using the principles of the formal rules to prescribe his conduct, the probbie turns to the intermediary norms of the occupational culture where attaining and maintaining respect for the uniform is a core value in police work (Westley, 1970). To make himself up as a personal authority, he explicitly breaks formal codes of dress and behaviour. To be effective, he breaks with his formal training.

You realize right away that your uniform really means nothing. It's all a question of how you're going to interact with this person. What you're going to be able to hold over him. What you're going to be able to prove to him you know, whether you really know it or not. It's all perceived...And whether he knows it or not, we're going to control the situation. We're going to win. But when you have the guy right out of the college--

N: He's still trying to put his grounds together, he's hesitating, 'will you do this?' [laughs] and everything else. Whereas you've got to go in there and say, well, I've got this on you, you're going down. Start talking, or whatever you gotta do.

T: And that changes the whole thing. And you get that respect (B4).

Indeed, information and access are understood to depend on coercing or manipulating this respect from 'police property'; and officers who lapse at ensuring that the uniform is not subjected to visible disrespect are seen to be jeopardizing the effectiveness of all (cf. Holdaway, 1983; Rubinstien, 1973). On the street, the protocols of formal training and the regulations of legal procedure are now recast not as determiners of conduct and interpretive choices, but rather as presentational values (Shearing and Ericson, 1991). They now comprise a knowledge about the look and defensibility of the written account (cf. Ericson and Baranek, 1982).

Book learning is located and contained as a circumscribed terrain of knowledge, and in the reality of the street such knowledge is useful to the degree that it satisfies the primary
objectives of information attainment and the good pinch. The criminal law and municipal bylaws and the (albeit eroded) monopoly on coercive force are understood as prime enablers (Shearing and Leon, 1976), and the police officer is now to learn how to master the ability to make all his deviations from the standard disappear from the official record. This is well described by a staff sergeant with 12 years experience and an experienced constable:

There's two things, there's policies and procedures and the way things go down on the street. It's like a funnel. The funnel is wide at this end (the top), and you do all sorts of things which aren't within procedures and everything else, but by the time it hits the memo book and its in the court, its right within procedures. That's sort of an interesting concept. You broke this little rule, you broke this little rule, but now you've got the bad guy, and how do we get it from here to there (motioning intake to output) so that when the guy falls out of the hole at the bottom into the court, you got him. That's how police operate. We have to. I'm not saying its right or wrong, (but) we're talking about police procedure: 'do this, do that, do that.' You can't. It's a whole different ball of wax out there (D1).

The biggest idea in our training is to at least expose the officer to everything so that once he gets out on the road he can be put with someone who knows how all these things are to be interpreted and put into practical use. You see he's able to go with an experienced officer and be able relate to what he's talking about, It's [formal training] just to give a slight stepping stone, just to give you the tool (B4).

It is the unwritten assignment of the coach officer to assist the probbie in bridging this gap between the written rules of police oversight and the unwritten rules of the team sport of street policing. And despite the fact that this book training is understood to provide a necessary cover for actions which are unpalatable to the sensibilities of official sanction, the street-wise officer re-interprets the motives of formal training as colonized by an exculpatory or absolving (procedural) ethic:

We had that new use of force training. It's again that whole systematic thing where they bring you in and push you through the stuff and say, now you're ready. Okay, if anything happens, we're covered. And they say it to you, they're very blunt about it. They'll say it to you. If you're using your baton, where don't you hit where? Head, kidneys, knees, things like that. Which are obvious. But they'll just say, if anything ever happens and you do hit someone like that, what do you say.? [Laughs] You say, you (meaning I) lose.
T: Gimme a break. If I get to the point where I have to use my stick it's a sellout fight anyway. You're not worried about minding your p's and q's.
T: It's all a joke.
N: The way I look at it is the stuff I learn on the road, it's other officers looking out for me, it's for my own good and it's to get me through. Whereas the flavour I get from what I'm taught by the force and all this regimented stuff, is that they're just covering their own ass. They're not worried about me. Whereas the people I'm working with, their worried about me, and obviously about themselves as well. And I think, that source of information and training and directing is much more effective than the actual administrative end of it.... I'd be much more interested in getting criticism from G--- than from anybody else. Or from [formal] training. He's got a stake and we can work it out....
T: You've got to be there (B4).

Hard distinctions are made between the mind-set the police constable must have to work on the street, and the mind-set attributed to the administrative protocols. The term 'sellout fight' and its contrast to 'minding your p's and q's' indicates a vigilance on the constable's space of action against the illegitimate (because unconcerned) encroachment of formally sanctioned use of force. The probbie has learned the primacy of information and access, proper street appearance, the reframed utility and scope of 'book learning', and the ineffectiveness of middle-class sensibilities on the street.

While depersonalization is the methodology at the training academy, it is an active personalization of authority which is used on the street. One of my interviewees was trained on the intangibles of the craft through the pedagogical device of 'Kelly's Law':

Kelly's Law: You never let anyone have the last word. If you're in a car and there's a group of people and they make a motion, like that, of shooting you, you never let it go. (N: He's got to leave with you in the car.) And if anyone's really mouthing off to you in front of a bunch of people, Kelly's Law: that person goes. You want him. In numerous situations, that's how he taught me. He'd make his point by saying, that's Kelly's Law (B4).

'Kelly's Law' is the occupational correlative of the training academy's disciplinary regimen. Notice that it is self-consciously particularistic and individual. It is a juxtaposition to formal legal rationality, bureaucratic authority, and impersonal expertise. Kelly's Law is a celebration of the
charismatic authority privileged by the occupational culture. With ‘Kelly’s Law’ questions of license, privilege and manifest intervention so important to the early professionalization of the police have been absorbed as a key orientation of the in-group structuring by the occupational culture. The coach officer’s own individuality is used to underscore the lessons of the street.66

What street officers are learning on the street is that not only is their work highly individualized, contingent, and irregular, but that it ought to be understood as right that it is so. Remember, it is the law of one respected officer named Kelly which is being enforced, not the law as a neutral, abstract force. On the street officers are learning that they ought to deploy their individuality, their individual judgement—they ought to find or discover their own ‘rule of thumb’ or style of police work which matches personality, knowledges and skills. In being taught this, to underscore it again, a highly iconic and charismatic authority is deployed: one resting not on neutral expertise, but on individual style and ontological comfort. In contrast to being trained up through the de-individualized authority of code, they are being trained up through individualistic judgement. In chapter eight we will see that these elements come to form the basis of formal training as well.

In being socialized to the street, and in that the street is placed so loftily in his socialization, the neophyte police officer is also given the message that the appearance management and procedural ethics, which includes formal, written, discipline-dependent curricula, a military appearance or bearing, and objective, transparent criteria, is only the dressing of action. The occupational space or backstage of ‘real’ decision-making includes informal and tropological and context-dependent curricula, individual ontology, and subjective, arcane, knowledges and viewpoints (cf. Goffman, 1961). Appearance protocols and the

66To this might be added the observation that ‘everybody’s got their own rule of thumb,’ (B3) and the acknowledgment that ‘normal force’ and ‘normal enforcement’ vary across the districts of a large city: what’s considered excessive in a bedroom community may well be ‘normal’ in the inner city. (Hunt, 1990)
procedural ethic, the constable also learns, is one end, but it is not the means that law books and police analysts like Skolnick (1966) and Lustgarten (1986) would like it to be: he now learns that academy training or ‘book learning’ is about justifications whereas street learning is about the ‘ways and means.’ While the object of the academy is appearances and what can be broadly justified, ‘Kelly’s Law’ is about individual authority and what can be brought to bear in the moment. Thus, the curriculum of the street is devoted to capacitate the officer’s access which the curriculum of the academy is reinterpreted (and the interpretation is only strategic) to have stymied.

3. GRACE OR THE SPIRIT OF POLICE WORK

s. 43. No person shall be appointed as a police officer unless he or she, d) is of good moral character and habits (ch. 10, Statutes of Ontario, 1990).

Despite the fact that police are unique among occupations in that their conduct is described by statute, we have been arguing that disciplinary conduct-shaping re-enables an ethos of street training by which procedures and regulations are seen as anathema to the ‘substance’ of the work. A probbie learns that a good police officer is not just an individual who knows the regulations and the law, the legal use of force, and a host of other things taught at the police academy. Rather, he is informed on the street that a good police officer is an officer who has the ‘right’ attitude about police work and towards the ‘craft’ of policing. He learns that the best policing is an art, and that there is a ‘spirit’ captured by this art which is intendedly passed along in the oral traditions of the culture. Here, I want to head towards an argument that conduct-shaping, whether disciplinary or managerial, in attempting to work on the self-to-self relation through the self-to-authority complex, is stymied by the immediacy between self and craft: that immediacy and intimacy is the ‘other’ of such regulatory attempts, and forms a wall of resistance.

With regard to craft professionalism, Reiss (1971) maintains that at the core of professionalism is the devotion to an ideal that the ‘client’s interest more than personal or commercial profit should guide decisions when the two are in conflict’ (122)
The craft includes the practice of making decisions about a client's future, the authority to use coercive force, being sworn to duty at all times, and operating with the guidance of a code of ethics. Banton (1964), states similarly that 'the activities of the professional man are turned outward to the client he serves, rather than inward toward his own values' (107). We see a distinction, in craft professionalism, between the object of decision-making (the well-being of the client), and the possession of special knowledges and skills. But I want to argue with regard to the client-centredness of craft professionalism in police work that this craft is problematically about serving a client because the determination of the client (who is the client?) is very often a large part of the skill. Problem-solving, community policing, and the concept of the constable-generalist are each recent terms in policing which make this determination an explicit part of the skill of police work.

Skolnick (1966) recalls Weber in arguing that the policeman's self-conception as a 'craftsman' militates against the 'seeming irrationality of procedural requirements' (235). Weber had argued that a charismatic authority was based on a 'personal gift of grace,' whereas a legal authority was based on 'rationally created rules' (1958: 79, emphasis in original). Rather than revisiting this 'grace' or simply ceding to bureaucratic efficiency, Skolnick sees the solution as one of injecting due process or democratic principles of legality (rather than those of administrative efficiency) more deeply into the concept of police professionalism. Reiner (1985) as well, understands the solution to some of the problems of policing as rebounding back to a professionalism which embraces 'traditional legal' ideals 'embodying a universal and impartial authority' rather than 'democratic control through elected authorities' (xii).

67Banton added that one of the characteristics of a profession is the relatively shallow hierarchy of ranks, the 'common role which all members practice', and the 'lack of variation in skills' leading to an egalitarianism in the organizations (1964: 106). Indeed, the constabulary office, enjoyed by the probbie and the chief constable alike, confers this status equality by statute and in the peacekeeper's role. However, police officers, like some other professionals, exercise 'the obligations and the privileges of the constable's office', but yet remain 'independent of the person for whom they act' (108).
Skolnick’s distinction is important. Here, we maintain a heavy line between the craft on one hand, and what we are calling a procedural ethic, on the other. Unlike Skolnick, however, we do not see the procedural ethic as colonizing the craft of police work in the form of due process affirmations. Skolnick’s view is too much top-down: from the viewpoint of the officer on the street, such due process procedures cannot be allowed to colonize the craft because, indeed, this is understood as disempowering of the ‘service’ ethic. Rather, due process, as Leo (1992; 1994) has also shown and Ericson (1981) argues, is made a tool of the craft. Martin (1995) defines the craft of police work as ‘apprenticeship, word of mouth indoctrination, and minimal deference to authority’ (1995: 70). ‘You’ve got to be there,’ is a mantra on the street, and philosophically police are closest to the scepticism and realist roots of symbolic interactionism. With regard to the last point, I would suggest that authority is indeed deferred to, but that it is the authority of the immediate, iconic presence of the police officer himself—the police officer’s body, as Manning (1977) and Holdaway (1983) have written—which is exalted.

Indeed, we may be forgiven for forgetting that constable shaping has been an ongoing project from within the occupational culture, and that it uses devices and technologies which are sometimes not easily brought up to formal scrutiny. After all, the thin blue wall also refers to the limits of such formal, after-the-fact re-interpretation. However, for the constable on the street, he is constantly reminded that there is a proper way to do policing and a proper attitude to take to police work. If formal training attempts to impart (or verify the imparting of) the skills and requisite knowledges of police work, street training, learning, or simple experience (the school of hard knocks) attempts to pass on the much more inchoate features of craftspersonship; it seeks to give voice to the attitudes and imaginations of police craftspersons, precisely as it is done in the apprenticing tradition.

Grace is an attitude of respect and care in an unassuming personal power. By grace we mean a moral ethic, a professional ethic and a practice. The police officer with grace is one who does not become inured to the overwhelming human suffering he
faces daily. A police officer who practices this attitude of respect and care knows what to say or do to reach out to bereaved individuals, alienated youth, or even the harried rush-hour commuter. He uses silences and a sensitive ear, picks from a wide stock of communicative stances and roles, and, most often, relies on dry humour and unassuming mannerisms tending towards status equalization.

This professional ethic or craft sensibility is one which champions innovation and the elegant use of environmental or circumstantial conditions towards a best case resolution. There is a strong undercurrent in police work which looks dimly on its endless teching up, seeing in this an alienation from elements of humanity. The solutions of Skolnick's due process ethics and Bittner's (1970; 1990) liberal educational ideal are seen as equally wrongheaded: knowledge and law are always only tools, and can never substitute for an attitude about police work; indeed, they are exactly wrong when they are cited to do this.

While many of the skills and knowledges are gained by experience and some of them can be imparted in formal academy training, the proper attitude cannot. This attitude consists of a respect and even awe of the power and responsibilities of the job, a bona fide desire to help or assist people or do good in civil society, and a raw talent or intuition about the motivations and hidden secrets in people and territorial places. Finally, this attitude is one which privileges personal honour or integrity, and is therefore often set against an ethic of proceduralism in which such personal honour is disassumed. For the neophyte police officer, these elements of the craft of policing are of great ontological import. A police officer is not only a uniform, a baton or nightstick, a gun, a badge, a way of walking, and a package of knowledges and skills. A police officer is also an attitude: and this element completes the police officer as a craftsperson: without it, he or she is a mere functionary, furthering a procedural ethic, and de-individualizing and de-humanizing justice.

On the street, the probbie learns that police work is about personal authority, but that personal authority does not reside in status claims. His uniform and polish further his capacity to
exert his will, but are also constraints on it, when the primary commodity becomes information. A probbie thus learns also to distrust the soundness of the relationship between the true spirit of the craft and its basis in the inchoate injunctions to help people and to find good resolutions, and the means of making police accountable for good work: once a desire to do good and to find good outcomes is made an explicit focus of the formal reward and sanction the probbie learns, then the true spirit of police work is replaced by emptied out ritualism (cf. Merton, 1968). On the street therefore, he must find a line of action for each event which best mediates between organizational and cultural ties and his view of himself as a good person (cf. Merton, 1968; Taylor, 1989).

CONCLUSION

All organizations live two lives; there is the structural life--and then there is the culture. The structure is formal and represents the reality of what is supposed to happen. Culture is informal and represents the reality of what actually does happen. Make no mistake about it, it is the culture that runs things.... The culture is at the root of the worst problems in policing. That culture is at odds with the mandate of consent policing (Braiden, 1994: 312-313)

If academy training appears on the surface to be devoted to the development of a common, transparent, formal curriculum and thus to be shaping police officer motivations to be consistent with the standard account, in both the devices that it uses and in the spaces that it offers it allows the recruit to learn that alongside uniform appearances and knowledges there is an equally or more important culture of realist informalism at the 'heart' or in the 'spirit' of police work. Traditional police interpretations are done on the street, are right for the moment, are evaluated according to ready-to-hand occupational norms, and are proper if they are made to fit appropriate legal and administrative protocols after the fact. They depend on things like 'instinct', a 'sixth sense', 'common sense,' 'street smarts,' and excellent 'verbal sparring' techniques. These are neither universal qualities inherent in all persons--even police officers--, nor are they formally teachable, especially out of the context of the on-the-job environs. The disciplinary academy serves
functionally to perform barrier work between this terrain of the occupational culture and the formal and constitutional requirements of occupational professionalism.

Enabled as we have described it, this police culture has had to yield little and been able even to gain something with the development of formal training institutions. The traditional disciplinary police college or academy leaves the constable’s autonomy intact as an agency for street shaping. As the quote from retired police superintendent Christopher Braiden suggests, this is a condition which has been viewed by some practitioners and analysts as the heart of the problem for consent policing. The solution, as we shall see subsequently, has been to re-inject attributes assigned to the street into formal methodologies, and also to re-assess constable autonomy not as the limit of formal regulation, but its explicit target.

It has been argued that the training academy has been key to the development of the in-group and esprit de corps in policing. The in-group is understood as a terrain for the cultivation of police solidarity at the occupational (rather than executive) level. While the association offered lateral ties to executives, the training academy has contributed to the contours of a distinct occupational police culture. Occupational police self-understandings or subjectivities have been thus forged along the definite lines familiar to those who have studied police culture, and according to the oppositions of a disciplinary governance. Indeed, structures of police shaping operate around police constable autonomy. Let us review this process and summarize what we have learned in this chapter.

The ‘school of the street’ preceded the police training academy as a place in which the craft of policing has been learned. The street and the reflections of experienced officers provided the setting for an occupational policing discourse. The street as a place and a discourse has been presented to the neophyte as the real proving ground or rite of passage. The prohibition on the talking policeman early on helped to seal off this discourse so that it was not highly transparent and formal. Instead, it was a site of secret expression, and it had to express itself in a ‘private’ language. The prohibition on talking also
restricted police from rewards for peacekeeping, negotiating through communication skills, and forging formal networks (in the interstices). Added to this, disembedding strategies further served to isolate the constable in the manner of an occupying army. Tools for peacekeeping were consequently informally encouraged, but provided outside of formal administrative purview.

Emerging occupationally more or less in the latter half of the nineteenth century and under its philosophical realism, police constables have, in addition, a 'natural' scepticism about the ability both of formal categories and analytic reasoning to 'mirror' the real and the true. Close to the dynamism of unfolding phenomena, they see first hand the contrasting interpretations of witnesses, the brute force of formal write-ups, and the simplifications of most social scientific analyses. Consequently, they come to have the strongest faith in their own senses. On the street they learn, too, that phenomena are multi-layered, unique, differentially contexted, and processual.

Difference and nuance are a fact of the street. But under a law enforcer idealization of police work, there has been no more interest in having this fact play up to reconfigure the curriculum of the academy, than there has been in forcing it down to the street from academy viewpoints. At the traditional training academy, the technologies of the code of regulations, the curriculum, drill, and the emphasis on appearance protocols rather work to simplify or remove the nuance of facts. Indeed, the academy, as part of institutional self-definition, regularizes, standardizes, and also acts to positively minimize interpretive diversity: a mean is constantly worked and reworked, and this is done by a continual driving towards it. And until very recently, this disciplining to the mean has been at the core of academy training.

We have contrasted academy routines and protocols and street-based conventions. The distance between the two early on and the original emphasis on disciplinary regulation left on the street discourse to develop in opposition, and to be relied on by frontline officers when they brought the 'reality' of the street to the regulations of the office. The fact that the street preceded the academy as a police shaping device has therefore contributed to
the realism, empiricism and informalism by which occupational police discourse is still today identified. The relatively late intrusion into the policing landscape of the police academy prevented it from having first go at the interpretive protocols on the street. Street discourse, in turn, has been counterposed to the abstract principles, ideal categories, and formal rules and regulations by which policing has been legitimated as a distinct institution. Street to academy professionalization (rather than the inverse) has in general served to reproduce the reality of the street, rather than to produce new realities for the constable; it has placed the street (or kept it, since it is the academy that has 'moved in') in the corridors and open spaces of the near-total institution as an incessant chorus to the academy's verses. The ethological leaning of the academy has consequently been to mimic the realism of 'the street' and to offer something more like vocational than professional instruction.

68 Although this argument of late intrusion cannot be sustained in the case of the RCMP, it is the general profile: although the associations, both executive and occupational, sought to ground ethics, training and standardization in their championing of the police academy, the academy itself has been marginal and reflective, rather than central and constitutional.
CHAPTER SEVEN

AIMING INTERPRETATION AND STRUCTURING JUDGEMENT

The individuality of each man must be carefully studied in order to make him efficient. Once the individual training of the man is accomplished, the question of the collective training of the troop or squadron is made much easier. Men must be taught to act independently as well as collectively and initiative should be fostered, so that, in cases of emergency, members of the Force do not 'fall down' owing to the fact that there is no Officer or N.C. officer present to instruct them as to what should be done. This individual training must be applied to all members of the Staff. Because a man is specially employed is no excuse for him being indifferent an horseman or un-trained.69

We argued in the last chapter that ethics and judgement training have not been an explicit focus or at the core of the formal curriculum of the training academy, but was rather ceded to the in-group and the street. At the training academy, conventional wisdom appears to have been that you cannot make 'common sense' or judgement itself a curriculum subject. Rather, this is best left between the lines of formal scrutiny and on the curbside. While in the academy, an appearance protocol was enforced through drills on habits which disallowed individual deviation, on the street a 'way of being' was the individual discovery of the neophyte matching self to role. Through 'Kelly's Law' the neophyte officer resolved this division between the formal and appearance protocols of the rule of law, and the skill of turning out the street commodities of information and arrests.70

Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s there has been pressure on the traditional approach to training and this distribution of formalism and informalism. We can see at least three sources of attack. Firstly, there is a populist and academic critique of the canons and methods of bourgeois, anthrocentric, racist Western traditions. Earlier we saw the police constable being shaped according to a logic of replication.

69PAC, A. Bowen Perry to 'All Officers Commanding,' re: 'Individual Training,' May 5, 1920.
70Even in the late 1980s, the presumption lingered that while the instilling of habits was a reasonable objective of the training academy, judgement shaping belonged under the purview of the occupational culture and on-the-job experience. The Naismith Report (1988) suggested a revised recruit training program in which, out of 180 90 minute periods, only 6 periods would be devoted explicitly to 'crime prevention,' ethics and race relations.
Under an anxious emergent administration, what was wanted was a saturation of the polity with replica police constables, all predictable in their actions, all alike in their appearance. We posited that the liberal humanist in the military officer offered a mold out of which to cut these replicas, a mold which was subsequently streamlined in the idealization of the law enforcer. Made to measure, the constable, it was hoped, would act accordingly. By the 1960's, however, for many inside the Academy, particularly those studying the humanities and social sciences, a liberal humanist education was itself coming to be identified with the tyranny against which it had so long been celebrated as a reprieve. At the same time that some eloquent police academics again began to tout a liberal humanist education for the police constable, liberal humanism was being thwarted.

Pressure to adapt or change the curriculum and the methods of the police academy also came with the development of knowledge about the concept of 'personality,' with an emerging human resources research, and with labour, feminist, and socialist rights discourses. 'Personality' gave license to a plurality of acceptable norms in the way that character did not. 'Personality' generically, and personality tests in particular, allowed the discovery of benign differences; personality gave the subject legitimate interiors which could be structured. Indeed, people had aptitudes and personality traits, and tests revealed tremendous variation in these. In doing personality testing, police agencies had to face the fact that they were looking for candidates to approximate a profile which reflected a particular rather than generic police image.

With regard to human resources research and organizational sociology, studies such as Hawthorne's (cf. Bramel and Friend, 1981) began to see the motivation of the individual not as a power to be controlled, but rather as a force to be deployed. The social context of labour was one object of human rights discourses emerging strongly in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These challenged the right of employers to unilaterally establish conditions of work and conditions of entry (cf. e.g. Milliband, 1978). With regard to the police officer as a symbol of power, feminist and left discourses saw in his white masculinity a
predisposition to reproduce class, race, and gender divisions in society. The gender and the race of the police very quickly became a political and human rights issue, forcing police agencies to begin hiring women as full-duty police constables. Especially in the United States, and in response to urban race riots, much research began to be done on the contribution of police officer socialization to poor police/public relations at a minimum, and to police deviance at the extreme. Ethnographic accounts stressed how paramilitary indoctrination and in-group solidarity cultivated a 'siege mentality' which reinforced untenable class, race, and gender divisions. This, too, put pressure on the clean divisions between the police and community, and the academy and the street, and on the image of the police constable as an impersonal, indifferent decision-maker.

Finally, a third locus of pressure on the division of academy and street training was the rediscovery of the fact that, despite (or because of) the idealization of the law enforcer as a technocrat, police constables used discretion. If the law enforcer celebrated the technical application of the law in the division of the polity into law-abiders and law-breakers, all that was needed to undermine him was the finding that something other than law was involved in the division. That came in a spate of academic papers and judicial rulings in the 1960s. Articles by Jerome Goldstein (1960), W. La Fave (1962) and H. Goldstein (1963), and subsequently, books by Jerome Skolnick (1966) James Wilson (1968), Herbert Packer (1968), and Kingsley Davis (1969) placed the executive functions of the constable on the forefront of problems of police administration. These demonstrated that the efforts by police reformers to depict front-line police as de-individualized technicians and neutral functionaries were less than accurate. Concurrently, ethnographic studies like those of Westley (1970), Banton (1964), Neiderhoffer, (1967), Cicourel (1976), Bittner (1970), Reiss (1971), and Cain (1973) began to sketch a reality of a police culture in which behaviour and action was promoted according to values and interests which were
relatively autonomous from or even oppositional to those which were fostered under the administrative purview.\textsuperscript{71}

When police discretion and 'low visibility' police action began to be exposed not as peripheral, but rather as central to police work, the idealization of the law enforcer could no longer serve to justify inattention to police decision-making practices or judgements. Whereas formerly police discretion could be understood as a sort of no persons land which was formally ignored and informally utilized, and which was understood as a residual of the administrative structuring of police constable action, subsequent to the public scrutiny of legal rulings and academic analysis, it had to become a more or less explicit object of proactive top-down intervention. The space of police interpretations was becoming a contested terrain, contested not only through the account-giving requirements of supervisors, but also through the scrutiny, now again, of judicial and academic interrogation.

With the developments noted above in the 1960s and early 1970s, including research on the police role, police managers reviewed their approach to the fact of front line interpretations by the constable. The police academy and training more generally was one area in which executive attention could be focused. There were two general directions (and a hybrid between them) which were followed.

Despite the erosion of the core curriculum and liberal humanist mentioned above, the first of these was to see police training in the image of a professional school education, more or less slavishly copied. If the police used discretion, let their training shape them in the image of others who were already known to do so. Here, the professional school model, which places a baccalaureate degree in a liberal arts education prior to a professional school degree, was the most ambitious option, and also credited with the greatest possible dividends in professionalization or professional image (cf. Bittner, 1990)\textsuperscript{A}

\textsuperscript{71}In addition judicial rulings in America like Escobedo v. Illinios (378 U.S. 478, 1964), and Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966) highlighted illicit police practices and brought them into the public eye. In Canada, the passing of the Bill of Rights in 1960 set the stage for a decade of rights-consciousness.
lesser option was to demand a full liberal arts baccalaureate degree, and to follow that up with the traditional training academy. A further alternative would be a mixed or hybrid model which requires or adds liberal arts 'foundation' courses to the curriculum of the academy or police college. A weak version of this hybrid was to 'soften' the rigidity of the police officer with human relations, race-relations, and public relations courses. In either the full-fledged professional or hybrid model, judgement shaping would occur through intercourse with liberal educational principles, prohibitions, exclusions, and truths--either through direct access to disciplines already under its canopy, or to the secondary interpretation of these within the training academy.

But if the space of police constable interpretation was the contested terrain, the liberal humanist education was not the only means for its achievement. From a managerial point of view, police constables were already being shaped through the rewards and penalties the organization could bring to bear. If these were inadequate, and if the organizations could not attract candidates to the profession who already had an undergraduate liberal education and tap into its putatively positive effects this way, they could still get at judgement by subjecting personnel to technologies tailor-made to instill police institutional values. A second general direction therefore took from pedagogy's own disenchantment with the canon of liberal education to bring the realism of the street to the recruit, instead of the recruit to the idealism of the Academy.

Judgement shaping drills were designed to do precisely this. They could augment the training curriculum to serve the need to do something (or be seen as doing something) about police constable decision-making. The drills would structure decision-making in the controlled environment of the police school in the hope that this decision-making, even if instantly reactive, could be consistent with the appearance protocols of a liberal (if not humanist) governance. Indeed, judgement shaping drills and human relations courses were the general outcome of this scrutiny on police education, socialization and training.
In chapter six, we saw that a disciplinary governance was attended by a counter-governance in the occupational norms, and that the autonomy of the police constable, undermined in formal training, was preserved under cover of informal norms. In this chapter we will argue that subsequent to the re-‘discovery’ of discretion and the interpretive license of the peace officer, judgement becomes an object of regulation, rather than its foil. Judgement begins to be seen not as anathema to discipline or regulation, but rather as a force which can offer new access to the individual. Now, as was hoped by R.C.M.P. A. Commissioner Perry in 1920 in the quote at the head of the chapter, men could be trained ‘in their individuality.’

We will take up two variants of judgement drills after placing them in the context of the other approaches to the ‘training/education problem’ we outlined above. We do this emphasizing the theme in this chapter that the focus on judgement fractures, blurs, and problematizes the split between formal and informal training and the clean idealization of the constable as a subject in a world of objects.

1. ACADEMY PROFESSIONALISM
Academy professionalism sought the professionalization of the constable through, not training and administrative proficiency, but education and a commitment to deeper institutional values. In the 19th century, we noted how through the colonization of police spaces some attempts were made to instantiate the learned, liberal humanist cop—a figure which was copied from an idealization of the British gentleman. Reformers like Adam Wilson saw the free time of the police constable as an opportunity and place for this intervention. We also noted how in the early twentieth century August Vollmer gave a clear expression to the humanist or social worker cop as an educated craftsman whose primary responsibility was the care of community and prevention of crime.72

We saw also that regulation of the constable under a disciplinary governance and in the idealization of the crime fighter or law enforcer depended on a narrowing of role, on an

72 Indeed, in promoting the liberal humanist cop, Vollmer helped to establish the first university police training courses at Berkeley in 1916.
increasing dissemination of rules and regulations, and on the constable’s isolation from the community through practices restricting the development of (non-police) external ties, such as marriage, early recruitment or cadet programs, and transfers. 'Academy professionalism' re-emerged in the changed and charged contexts of the 1960s with such advocates as the academics Jerome Skolnick and Egon Bittner, and with the backing of National Commissions in Britain and the USA such as the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police in Britain, the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice and, later, the 1973 National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: Report on Police in the United States. Skolnick argued that the constable could not professionalize through a 'managerial efficiency,' through being a 'bureaucratic machine possessing technical expertise' (1966: 235). He said that because the policeman is an especially 'non-mechanical' official, the rule of law would be continuously frustrated when police organizations operated 'mainly on grounds of administrative efficiency' (1966: 238). Consequently, professionalism must be based:

on a deeper set of values than currently prevails in police literature (238)...The needed philosophy of police professionalism must rest on a set of values conveying the idea that the police are as much an institution dedicated to the achievement of legality on society as they are an official social organization designed to control misconduct through the invocation of punitive sanctions’ (238-239).

The police must understand that in a liberal democracy the 'main purpose of law is, in fact, to make (the police) task more difficult' (239)

Such an understanding, Skolnick continued, requires that police constables do know, from a meta-institutional vantage point, their role. In keeping with this position and in a response to the reports of police practices in the context of

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73 In 1962, the O.P.P. wanted a new cadre of recruits in the form of Cadets, and they saw hiring radio communications personnel as a means of initiating this program. They had to turn away disabled war veterans who also lobbied to do the work.

74 O.P.P. Commissioner Clark notes, for instance, that between January 1 and November 8 of 1961 there were 86 transfers of O.P.P. officers (PAO, R.G. 4, Series 4-02, File 166.8, 1961).
anti-Vietnam war protest, urban unrest, and race riots, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967 2: 279) recommended that all police departments should aim to employ only personnel with baccalaureate degrees and noted that, 'the complexity of the police task is as great as that of any other profession. The performance of this task requires more than...physical prowess and common sense.' In 1973, the American commission, the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: Report on Police put this on a timetable, recommending that 'every police agency should require immediately, as a condition of initial employment, the completion of at least 1 year of education at an accredited institution.' It further recommended that by 1975 this minimum should be 2 years of college or university; 3 years minimum by 1978; 4 years by 1982. It said: 'the high school level of education is a questionable standard for the selection of police officers.'

Bittner (1970; 1990) took this theme to its logical conclusion and argued that police officers indeed needed a broad liberal education, but that it ought to be followed by professional school training, much the same as that received by doctors and lawyers. This, he argued, would ensure that police educators also would have a commitment to scholarship, and that police professionalism will be linked to the academy (1990). Sherman (1981) similarly argued that the teaching of a liberal arts or professional curriculum requires educators with at least two years of post-graduate education.

Despite the focus of national commissions in the United States, academy professionalism faltered. A number of discourses competed against it. As we saw in chapter six, the occupational culture already had a long lineage and foothold in a craft professionalism (and vice versa) and craft professionalism was understood as generated out of an oral tradition and a realist informalism, rather than formal schooling. This lineage stood opposed to the efficacy on the job of 'book learning' and the legitimacy of external institutions. The will of some reformers was not sufficient to uproot this rich tradition of police shaping, especially when national interventions were themselves jurisdictionally challenged, given the local, or at best,
provincial or state, responsibilities for most policing. Secondly, empirical studies on the relative performance of college-educated cops as against their non-university educated counterparts began to be undertaken to confirm the occupational view that there were few benefits, that these were likely outweighed by costs, and that there were in any case few significant differences in performance (Carter et al, 1989). Lastly, as we have mentioned, the faith in a core humanism was beginning to falter. No longer was it an uncontested wisdom that a liberal, humanist personality could or should be cultivated. Academy professionalism is even today, consequently, a rather extreme model of police training and education.

But if a change in the general attitude and role orientation in the police constable is what academy professionalism sought to achieve, that movement towards standardization and a technical proficiency could also look to police judgements, interpretations, or attitudes as an object. So, at least, went an alternative view. Here, instead of prioritizing the importance of education to the shaping of judgement, it was instead held that judgement shaping needed to be prioritized in police training and education. If judgement was indeed the object, then perhaps training could get at this directly. Such a strategy also had the lure of allowing training and education to remain more fully under police institutional purview.

2. THE HYBRID SOLUTION IN A SYSTEMS APPROACH

If academy professionalism was too much centered outside of the police institution, and if, in any case, judgement shaping was the object, this could be achieved in re-centering the police college curriculum. If in addition to the law enforcement officer or crime fighter, a peace officer and indeed a problem-solver needed to be provided with a curriculum of courses and/or drills designed to prepare him, then police agencies and police training academies could augment their course offerings and their methods of presentation accordingly. The hybrid solution is thus this offering of courses in an augmentation to the standard law enforcement curriculum.
In the 1940s in Toronto and other municipal forces in Ontario no time was explicitly devoted to the instruction of 'human relations training' or to anything approximating that description. Through the 1950s, the golden age of the law enforcer, changes to curriculum content reflected technological advances in crime fighting. By the late 1960s, however, the link was beginning to be made between what was taught at the training academy, the role that was presented to police constables, and the social consequences of civil unrest. In the decade of the 1960s, there was a slow erosion of the law enforcement idealization. The hybrid solution was not to go outside the academy, but to present 'public relations,' 'human relations,' and subsequently 'race relations' courses as add-ons to the main curriculum.

The 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Justice was very explicit in finding police training courses 'unsophisticated and incomplete,' pointing out that recruits have too little background in the nature of community and the role of the police: in two large departments that offer 10 weeks of training, less than two days are devoted to police minority relations' (in Das, 1985: 150).

In Canada, the Canadian Committee on Corrections also sent a wake-up call to police administrators on the subject of training. It stated:

The nature of police work tends to produce in the police officer a sense of alienation and to set him apart from the community. Police policy which requires him to be selective in his associations, while necessary, accentuates this isolation. This tendency towards isolation involved in police work must necessarily involve some loss of sensitivity to the psychological processes and the problems of different groups in society which produced rapidly changing patterns of behaviour. To counteract this tendency towards isolation.... We consider that there should be greater involvement in police training programs of social and behavioral scientists, judges, magistrates, criminologists, correctional workers, and lawyers. The exposure to the thinking of other professional groups and resulting dialogue will promote effective law enforcement by the utilization of the resources of the behavioral sciences, and by developing a better understanding of the role of the

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75 Based on the Arthur Moss's report, October 27, 1947, on the state of police training in Ontario (PAO, RG 4, File 2.33.2).
police, the courts, and the correctional agencies in the entire criminal process (Ouimet, 1969: 414).

This ‘exposure’ approach was boosted with James Q. Wilson’s celebrated book, Varieties of Police Behaviour. Wilson found that police spend only 10% of their work time on law enforcement. If police spend little time doing the role they base their authoritarian rigidities on, then perhaps their fortress could be stormed. Indeed, by 1973, Badalamente et al. could refer to the deficit of the popular conception of the police which stressed fighting crime, and they could cite a growing literature in support of the finding that very little of the police officer’s time was spent on law enforcement.

In the 1960s ‘human relations’ or ‘public relations’ courses began to be introduced at police academies as a response both to ‘presentational’ and ‘instrumental’ needs of police legitimacy. In the United States by the early 1960s, Chicago was ahead of most forces, but still only devoted 19 of 455 hours to non-criminal topics including psychology, human relations, minority relations, and press relations (Das, 1985: 149) By the 1970s pressure mounted to improve what was being provided. In 1973, the National Advisory Commission of Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended basic minimums for the training of police officers which included a human relations component. Campbell and Formby (1977) also used Wilson’s (1968) work to argue that while 10% of the patrol officer’s time is spent on the law enforcement function 37% of training (in a survey of departments) was devoted to the teaching of traditional law enforcement skills (while another 24% went to physical and use of force training). Meanwhile much real police time was spent on community service related tasks, and only 19% of the training time was devoted to it. These authors suggested that either the training on human relations needed to be enhanced to approximate this job analysis, or that only individuals with a college education in a discipline that encompasses social service intervention should be selected to police agencies.

In a task force report to Metro Council of Toronto in 1977, Walter Pitman (Pitman, 1977) recommended that Metro Council request a strategy from the Toronto Police Commission for
extending an intensive program of racial and cross racial understanding to every member of the force. It also advised that more emphasis be placed, in academy and in-service training, on racism and racial tension as a problem for policing in Metro. It recommended using files from complaint bureaux and consultation with the Human Rights Commission in order to produce suitable instructional films. And in 1979, the Carter Report also addressed race relations training, recommending that no officer should be graduated until 'he has perceived this problem and has been given a very sound basis for the justice and lack of discrimination which should characterize our Force.' This report also recommended that minority representatives address the police candidates. By 1989, the Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force (the Lewis Report) positioned race relations training at the heart of the reform agenda, arguing that systemic causes of discrimination require systemic solutions (Ontario, 1989: 27) including a training agenda 'to change the various attitudes which produce racism in all of us (94).

We see here the relationship between a reconceptualization of the office of the constable and a reform drive to reshape the constable according to the emergent terms of political engagement. Relatively quickly the rigidity of the law enforcer begins to be attacked as anathema to the relationship with diversity and nuance which both a peacekeeper and a person less given to racial (and gender) discrimination must have. With 'public,' 'human,' and 'race relations' training the role consolidation of the law enforcer and the isolation and rationalization of training programs is reviewed. At the same time, however, that a holism in training is advanced, a complementary disaggregation of the police constable occurs via task analysis technology.

The Systems Approach and Task Analysis of the Police Role
Stemming from management studies in the late 1960s and early 1970s (cf. Senge, 1990), systems thinking has a lengthening history in managerialism and adult learning (Knowles, 1990; Senge, 1990; Morgan, 1993). By the 1974 and 1975 Ontario reports a systems approach is seen as a solution to the problem of police discretion. A systems approach is one which takes account, to the highest degree manageable, of the component elements of a feedback
A feedback system is comprised of several elements, each having a direct or indirect causal effect on the other. Thus, innovations in one department have impacts on other departments and on the inputs and outputs of the organization as a producing and consuming entity within markets. Actions must therefore be seen as part of the dynamism of the ‘organic’ organization.

At the same time that ‘whole systems’ were being problematized in an organizational holism, individual decision-making was being pried apart into discrete actions. The Ontario reports referred to above also cited the Californian Project STAR, which had done pioneering work on dividing the police constable into discrete and trainable competencies. Project STAR and the Social Development Corporations’ Manpower Study (SDCMS) for the Fremont, California Police Department brought a task-skill analysis model to police training reform discourse in Ontario and other progressive jurisdictions in North America. Project STAR and the SDCMS were oriented to an understanding of the police officer as a package of manipulable competencies and to a methodology of the disaggregation and re-aggregation of the work of the police officer. As the Report on Police Training in Ontario (Ontario, 1975a) noted, this task analysis signaled a transition from police training based on status, to police training based on performance. It also began the work of entering into and colonizing constable judgement.

Project STAR divided the police officer into thirteen roles, where role was defined as ‘the personal characteristics and behaviour expected in a specific situation of an individual occupying a position’ (in Ontario, 1975b). Some examples of these roles were: ‘provides public assistance,’ ‘analyzes and communicates information,’ ‘enforces law impartially,’ ‘maintains order,’ ‘protects the right and dignity of individuals’ (ibid.). Project STAR also identified 52 tasks, a task being an activity accomplished within the definition of a specific role (e.g. ‘booking and receiving inmates,’ ‘managing inter-personal conflicts,’ ‘patrolling,’ ‘preparing reports,’ etc.) The tasks were analyzed to see which knowledges and skills were required. This information was then organized in the form of terminal performance objectives. Project STAR produced a 'Police Role
Performance Training Package' based on the identification and description of police roles, police tasks, and performance training objectives. It described its approach to training as 'role training,' which is the development of attitude and behaviour in accordance with an ideal.

Role training does not try to teach tasks or skills per se, but rather emphasizes activities that enable the trainee to interact with others in meaningful ways. Role training provides examples of real tasks, e.g. 'making an arrest', and allows the trainee to reflect upon and analyze his actions and attitudes in the performance of that task (1975: 8. emphasis added).

After decades of rationalizing and standardizing the delivery of policing, what re-emerges here is an interest in meaningful interaction. The affect of the individual was becoming a target of managerial strategies. Let us take a look at an example of an outcome of Project STAR:

TASK: Making an Arrest
TASK DESCRIPTION: Determines existence of probable cause, identifies, and takes suspects and offenders into custody.

In the performance of this task, the Police Officer:

1. Is able to make arrests in a manner which does not produce unnecessary fear in the mind of the person arrested and others who may be involved and gains respect for the officer, law enforcement procedures, and the criminal justice system. Performance evaluation may involve criteria such as the extent of unnecessary fear generated, the type and degree of respect developed for the officer, for law enforcement procedures, and the criminal justice system, and frequency injury to or death of the suspect, officers, and bystanders (at 19, 20).

'Unnecessary (public) fear' is introduced as an important variable in the determination of officer conduct. Somehow, the fear generated will be measured and the officer will be appraised accordingly. Equally, feelings carrying over from a former arrest of the same suspect are to be ignored. Notice, too, the strong interactionist undercurrent. The officer is to interact in 'meaningful' ways; he is to 'reflect' upon his 'actions and attitudes,' and he is to enforce the law 'situationally.' Affect, both of the subject officer and the 'other' is made a criteria of performance evaluation. Here with the systems approach of Project STAR, we can see a bridging taking place between the rational and emotional of police work. With the division of the role into tasks, each of which themselves are to draw out a particular
affect, reason and emotion are threaded together as a function of work assignment. It is the marriage of task analysis and holistic human resources management, and the integration of judgement and affect in a rationalization of role which is here the true innovation.

Initially however, reforms like Project STAR, which married holistic approaches to the training of the role (focused around the teaching of public relations, human relations, and/or race relations) to a scientific rationalization of the discrete competencies needed, did not take. Programs which were add-ons to the daily job were also luxuries few agencies wanted to invest in. As Harris put it: 'They did very little to counter the attitudes toward the public that the recruit learned from his fellow recruits' (Harris, 1973: 145). One of my own interviewees made the comment that there was a strategic distancing from the subject matter introducing 'race sensitivity' or 'human relations' training by the manner in which it was taught, and its subordinate place on the curriculum (A15). Rubinstien similarly recalled that when a psychologist visited the academy to teach a human relations lecture the supervising sergeant slumbered openly in the back of the room. The sergeant only began to become agitated when the men all stated how they would avoid responding to or ignore personal epithets. And when a recruit stepped away from this apparent formal expectation and said, 'I don't care what anyone call me, spick or anything, just as long as they don't touch my body. They touch my body, I care, I care a lot,' the sergeant bounded up and said: 'That's a policeman talking. I want you in my platoon boy. Keep your hands off my body, I like that' (in Rubinstien, 1973: 277).

In recent reforms in Ontario, there has again been a great deal of emphasis on subjecting the constabulary role to the scrutiny of task analysis and further quantifications, thereby to better govern the person by pre-emptively calibrating individual to office, role to training, and promotion to performance. While even as late as the early 1970s there may have been a lingering belief that 'the human element' could not be subject to such certain quantification, that belief has all but been extinguished by the early 1990s (Ontario, 1992) Today, human resources
management is a very sophisticated undertaking, and a great deal of study can now be cited, if not reliably, in defense of the relationship between discrete variables and performance measures (Coutts, 1990; Cortina, 1992; Feltham, 1988). In the comprehensive human resources management approach in the 1990s, task analysis is only the first step in identifying competency profiles, and it is these competency profiles which are to be used in selection, training, and promotion. The individual looks for employment sensitized to the prescriptions of competency evaluation. She is now given to understand herself in the terms of verifiable competency measures. Indeed, it is no longer a question of the acquisition of competency, but the ongoing demonstration of competency and the continual presentation of self as consistent with organizational missions.

If a problem with both the role and the standpoint of the constable had been identified with the rigidity of the law enforcer and the narrow curriculum of the training academy, one solution appeared to be a review of the role through its systematic analysis and a broadening of curriculum through an emphasis on context, feedback, and the organizational whole. The systems approach, in particular, began to see training as an organizational enterprise, and the individual trainee in a constant flux with a dynamism internal and external to the organization. A holistic approach to the training of the constable is consistent with the pressure to integrate the constable back into the community and to emphasize the necessity of his adaptability to a variety of governmental tasks. The systems approach allowed a broad-view sensitivity to contexts and relationships while also providing formats for specific drills or lessons: in this way it offered a solution to the problem of academy training, a solution which did not require the more dramatic response of academy professionalism.

Holistic and organizational learning also decentres the police craftsperson. In highlighting context, interpretation, nuance, and subjective experience, a systems or holistic approach to the shaping of the constable also works toward making formal and transparent the craftsperson's interpretive domain. The systems approach discursively occupies each of the tasks of the
craftsperson, losing the agency of the constable in profiles of discrete competencies, each of which is filtered through political legitimacy and tested according to extant validity measures. The presumption of the integrated police man and the idea of the organization as many such men, begins to be disrupted.

3. JUDGEMENT SHAPING DRILLS AND TEMPLATES
We feel considerable more emphasis needs to be placed on judgement skills (Ontario, 1974: 20)
Under the pre-eminence of practices like drill, both of the body and of the habits, it was understood as possible to ‘force’ the soul by shaping the body and its predispositions. This is reflected in the concentration early on, not on ‘self-discipline’ or ‘self-control’, but on ‘discipline.’ Discipline, under this earlier construction, assumed an authority relation which was presumptively vertical and which posited an authority to which and by which the actions of the individual body could be shaped. Gradually, in the late nineteenth and throughout the first half of the twentieth century a focus on training on the law emerged to rival and eclipse the time spent on drilling. By the late 1960s, and through to the 1990s ‘practicals’ or ‘role plays’ become the emergent focus of training resources. The latter came to be called, in Ontario at least, judgement training.

A. The Call to Reform
We begin to see a focus on judgement training in the Task Force on Policing in Ontario (Ontario, 1974). In this document, there is a stark shift in approach in the understanding of the role of the constable and to the shaping of his/her conduct. Firstly, there is the call for a move from a disciplinary model of conduct shaping to a model emphasizing managerial governance. Secondly, there is a call to pay more attention to judgement, and to shape it preemptively with organizational missions and continuous formal training. Thirdly, there is a movement towards the responsibilization of the constable. Finally, there is a shift from the glorification of the standard practices and remote missions and of disembedded policing, to a call for re-embedding and for the use of local missions in structuring police practices. In general, there is an implicit question: how to do conduct
shaping without a reliance on discipline and the dissemination of standards? The Task Force stated that:

police judgement has received little attention in Canadian jurisprudence: police officers have not talked about it since its existence is not formally recognized; lawyers have not argued it since it is not a basis for defence; and Judges have not rationalized it since it plays no role in reasoned judgements (Ontario, 1974: 15).

But it also warned about the formalization of judgement training. In the shadow of interactionism and its suspicion of forms, it suggested training for judgement making and the taking of steps to make judgement more transparent:

police judgements not to proceed could become a hidden power, whereas decisions made by other officials in the judicial process (the Attorney General, Crown Attorneys, Justices of the Peace) exercise a more public power of judgement in respect of which some reviewable record is prepared. We are of the view that discretion in the application of law is best exercised where such judgements are open to review. Yet we stress that the power of judgement in the hands of the individual officer is an important aspect of the police role. Barring exhaustive study, we can see little advantage and many dangers in systematic attempts to codify criteria for the exercise of that judgement (15).

Such a framework provides the grounding for specific technologies aimed at judgment drills. Key here in the articulation of judgement training, is the fact that 'common sense', which was once and still is much referred to as the basis of 'good' policing, becomes emptied out in a rationalizing process--despite the warnings against such a move by the Task Force. Good judgement or common sense comes to be interpreted, not as the residuum of formal training or selection--an intangible that cannot be measured--but rather an explicit object which is broken up into component, quantifiable pieces or affects.

With judgement training or practicals, the constable is subjected to repetitive drills or role plays. The most common of these involve a subject officer and one or more object 'civilians.' Judgement drills require the resolution of an intervention according to ethical, legal, professional and occupational standards and principles. The subject officer is to balance each of these in selecting a course of action. A successful exercise is one which maximizes the chances of a
favourable outcome while correctly prioritizing these standards and principles. The elements of the interaction between the subject officer and the 'civilian(s)' become key in formal evaluations. Indeed, this brings the informal training between coach and recruit officer structured around 'what would you do if?' into the purview of the training academy. But rather than being based on prospective actions, the practical offers a vehicle for virtual real-time responses. Practicals seek to colonize that soft-spot of discretion which had earlier been offered to 'the group' to socialize.

B. First Generation 'Practicals': The Rationalization of Judgement

An early illustration of 'human relations training' according to a judgement drill is a simple role-play exercise cited in the Report on Police Training in Ontario (Ontario, 1975a) working paper. In an experiment pioneered by Dr. Melvin Le Baron of the USC called 'operation empathy,' police officers were prepared 'for the changing police role' (14) and trained to identify with the experiences of certain police targeted groups. During the experiment, Covina, California police officers spent time on 'skid row' as 'bums' or in the local jail for 24 hours. The working paper noted that 'the Covina police was very pleased with the results and noted that arrests have gone up, assaults on officers greatly reduced' (14).

This early exercise reflected the problems of first generation judgement drills. The output measure (an increase in arrests and reduction of assaults on officers) reflect occupational police values, not the balancing of the various other values of ethics, legalism, and professionalism. The novel educational methodology is deployed in the furtherance of conventional output objectives. There is also no accounting for reflexivity, resistance or colonization. Despite the context in which the judgement drills were first advanced and the problems they were generically touted to address, the police object (the criminal, the image of the criminal) is still used to legitimate police officer actions.

Certain features of first generation judgement drill still persist in recent technologies. One example is Two-Way Streets.
Two-Way Streets

Two-Way Streets is a product of Ontario's Race Relations and Policing Unit (RRPU), an agency created following one of the recommendations of the Lewis Task Force Report of 1989 as one means of improving interactions between the police and minority communities. The RRPU undertook a mandate to provide 'deliverables' in three broad areas of policing: race relations training, police-community relations, and employment equity. On being created, it began the work of 'assessing, developing and implementing' training programs, such as Two-Way Streets. The technology itself emerged in an 'organic' developmental process. This began with a literature review on race relations training contracted out to Equal Opportunity Consultants. The conclusion of Equal Opportunity Consultants was that race relations training ought to be integrated in the wider context of training—a conclusion first appearing in the literature in the early 1970s, as we have seen.

Two-Way Streets is an interactive instructional device consisting of a computer, a laser disc player, a computer monitor, a television monitor, and a keyboard. The main program\textsuperscript{76} is a series of short video dramas of motor vehicle stop interactions in a variety of settings (rural, multi-lane, and urban). The dramas involve a subject officer in a single officer car and citizens in the cars which the subject officer pulls to the side of the road. The persons stopped by the on-screen subject-officer are Asian, Black, or Native Canadian. The trainee watches a short piece of video on the television screen which is programmed by the computer software to stop at a given point. Then the trainee is given three options on the computer screen. These choices are then inputted via the keypad and guide the sequence of events following. For example, in greeting Native Canadians in a car in a rural stop, the trainee is given the choice of having the subject-officer say, 1) 'how are you today? '2) 'how's it going there, Chief,' or 3) 'may I have your license, ownership and

\textsuperscript{76}Two Way Streets includes an exercise in face recognition called 'Ident-a-face,' designed to develop recall ability in identification, as well as what is called 'bias-free descriptors' which are compatible with CPIC. There are other mini-programs in the data base as well.
registration.' Each decision provides an evaluative measure, because one answer is the best and the other two are not, with one being a poor response. At the end of the session, the 'user' or trainee receives feedback on his race relations sensitivity, based on this decision-making, including an assessment of excellent, good, or needs improvement. The running time for a complete session (exhausting all three scenarios and all programs) is 3 1/2 hours, but a session need not last this long.

In a Two-Way Streets session then, the user selects one of the vehicle stop settings and launches the video. The video runs and stops when the officer speaks, asking the user which remarks he wants the subject-officer to state. Typical examples of wrong remarks would be to make any reference to the civilian's place of origin, or to use terms like 'boy' in addressing Blacks, and terms like 'chief' in addressing Natives. Wrong responses lead to hostile reactions from the civilians, and escalating responses from the subject-officer. The race-sensitivity accomplished is not much deeper than this.

The technology indeed provides race relations training in conjunction with other organizational objectives and training considerations, such as officer safety, awareness of police vehicle operations, communication skill-development, and Highway Traffic Act training. The device is also portable, engrossing, and demand-flexible: it is located at various police stations and the constable can engage the device whenever she or he has the time for it or is considered by superiors as needing time on it. The actor playing the subject-officer is engagingly expressive, adding an ironic tension to the dramas. Consistent with distance- and learner-centered instruction or education (of which more to follow in the next chapter), Two-Way Streets is not to be understood as a lecture tucked into hardware, but rather as a 'practical,' which is to say a mode of learning which maximizes the presentation of 'reality' for the dynamic engagement of the individual.

With Two-Way Streets the user or learner is encouraged to understand herself to be 'actively engaged' (Ontario, 1992b), and to expect that her 'active participation in real-life situations [will make] a lasting impact' (ibid.). Despite the appellate,
Two-Way Streets does not link the front-line police constable in the kind of two-way discourse that interactive media market themselves as providing. It bills itself as 'interactive' laser disc training, but the meaning of interactive is sharply curtailed in a number of respects. For instance, unlike in some interactive devices, the input of the 'user'—as subjects of computing are called—is quite restricted. In some such interactive programs, the user is given an iconic screen 'presence', addressed by name, or 'fused' with the actions of a screen character. In this fusion, the screen character would be given the user's name and sex, for example. In Two-Way Streets however, the user is not asked to submit biographical data such as age, ethnicity, and sex. The user punches in the answers to the questions, and it is according to these answers that feedback is returned. The 'you' to which this feedback is applied is thus made up according to an aggregate score, be it excellent, good, or needs improvement, etc.

Under the ideal working conditions of the technology, the user is very much a test-taker, who challenges himself to get a perfect score, thereby demonstrating to herself and others her normativity in communications skills, race relations protocols, knowledge of officer safety procedures, highway traffic statutes, and basic vehicle operation. The prioritization of race relations training programming within government by consensus also reproduces a version of individuality which is consistent with a procedural ethic—a version of the subject of rights. But seeing the constable in terms of rights does not allow for a concept of the individual as a social member which understands community as more than an arena of rights which must be respected. Both in restricting the 'user' and in making her up as a subject of rights, the interactionism of this technology is constraining.

What is being done or attempted here is the colonization of that self-to-self space in which judgements are made. The device is purposively directed not at permitting dynamism, but rather at 'fixing' constable judgements according to a political policy and a set of training principles noted above. The constable is given information on the human rights code, but she is given no options on how to interpret this code in light of her own understandings, and in light of several conflicting institutional pressures, to
intervene on the unfolding drama. Rather than there being
dynamism in the interaction, there is the presumption that the
agency of the officer is manipulable according to the precepts of
a procedural ethic, the substance of which is not available to
debate. In short, this is a judgement drill which does not
regulate the constable through his or her own autonomy.

Remarking on how constables at one police agency use the
technology, a police constable stated that ‘they go in and see how
they can screw around with it.’ He added that police officers
‘are the most cynical people there are’ and that they responded to
this technology by deliberately giving ‘wrong’ answers in order to
‘see how it ticks’ (B5). The constable also remarked that the
technology now sits in a division office at this police service,
unused. In short, instead of allowing themselves to be ‘shaped’
through this distant action, constables attempted to get the
better of the technology. They tried to demonstrate mastery over
the interpretive terrain objectified in it, and they tried to do
this by getting behind the programming. Idle at the police
station, the technology looks very much like ‘conquered’ goods.

Indeed, police officers are resistant to the top-down re-
socialization of Two-Way Streets. It does not privilege the
ontology of on-the-street understandings, rather taking these up
as one viewpoint among many. Constables demonstrate their
resistance to match the portability and diffusion of the
technology, matching it with trifling ‘counter-games.’ In taking
this stance, the user-trainee attempts to get at or make
accessible to herself the programming or deep grammar according to
which the drama plays out--and by which s/he, the trainee-user, is
to be re-confirmed as competent. She does this in order to
exercise mastery not over the rules, but over the meta-rules on
which rules of engagement are grounded. Two-Way Streets, although
a technology of the 1990s, is a first generation judgement drill
because it disallows the active engagement of the trainee in terms
of the meta-rules or templates according to which judgement is to
be structured, which can therefore only be accessed in resistance.
As we shall see, next-generation judgement drills do invite access
to the meta-rules and templates and in this way enhance the user’s
or trainee’s reflexive engagement.
C. Second Generation Judgement Drills: Use of Force and the Sculpting of Judgement

Despite the fact that Two-Way Streets is as ‘current’ as Ontario’s new use of force protocol, for reasons discussed above it is quite dated in its approach to the structuring of police decision-making and judgement. A second generation of judgement drills takes more thoroughly from an understanding of the current context of police constable decision-making. While the first generation of judgement drills understood the constable in a context in which his individual opinion was as good as his rank and which, therefore, rather undervalued his integrity as a decision-maker, second generation judgement drills understand the peacekeeping role under community policing as standing at the forefront of practice and principle, thus idealizing the police constable as a front-line decision-maker whose opinions and craft knowledge is paramount and highly prized. The ‘learning organization’ is a context designed to privilege the police constable not only as a decision-maker, but as the crucial and most important decision-maker. Judgement drills are thus contextualized as part of the cultivation of a craft knowledge which can be acquired in the structured environment of the training academy or police station. The main features of second generation drills are the systems approach to training, the integration of affect into the decision-making event, and a recognition of the relativity or context-dependency of meaning.

Here, we take up a use of force protocol as a second generation judgement drill. Second generation judgement drills consist of ‘judgement templates,’ which is a recipe of action, much like police stories and tropes are recipes for action disseminated in the police subculture (Shearing and Ericson, 1991). The judgement template structures decision-making through formal training and yet also invites the installation of the individual officer and his affect into the dynamics of this structuring. It allows the subject to think about that action in a reflexive engagement of his or her own ontology in the context of somewhat open institutional aims.
Ontario Use of Force Response Options Model

Officer survival training and use of force training simulations like Firearms Training Simulator (FATS) have proliferated rapidly and are also now the object of a growing literature assessing their efficacy. Research by Fyfe (1988) has concluded that training in enhanced violence reduction has been substantial and positive. But despite the popularity of judgement training on the use of force and firearms especially, there is still little research on how it influences police officer attitudes regarding such dimensions as the prudence of restraint (Geller and Scott, 1992; cf. Snell and Long, 1992). Here, it is not our purpose to argue the effectiveness of the use of force training model we discuss below. Rather, we want to discuss the style of its operation in structuring police constable decision-making. This section describes the emergence of a new use of force model in Ontario and begins to analyze the implications of the new protocol as a paradigm shift both in use of force training, and more generally in the judgement drill.

Training on the proper deployment of deadly force has up until recently focused on habituating the body and the mind to optimal responses (cf., Geller and Scott, 1992). The longer the duration of time the body and mind could spend drilled on optimal responses, the better the training. In addition, traditional use of force training could be characterized in terms of a ‘shoot/don’t shoot’ bifurcation (Fridell and Binder, 1992; Hoffman, 1993). Although also considered determinative of conduct, police attitudes and schematas associated with use of force decision-making has only recently become an explicit focus of reform. In this respect, use of force training is illustrative of a shift towards judgement and discretion in a deployment of the autonomy of the constable. As we suggested at the end of the previous chapter, that deployment, rather than skirting around the interpretive autonomy of the constable, rather seeks to operate through it.

Previous to reforms on the use of force in Ontario in 1992, the state of its police training was considered substandard. This was understood in terms of hours of training. Ontario was giving recruits 36 hours of use of force training, split equally between
handguns and less than lethal force options. On average, recruits were firing 300 rounds of live ammunition. This compared to a national average of about 120 hours, to R.C.M.P. figures of 250 hours of use of force training, and to an FBI figure of 500. In addition to this relative deficiency in recruit training, refresher training, supposed to happen every five years, was in fact occurring every ten (D5; E6). These reference points made Ontario's numbers considerably substandard.

In the summer of 1992, a number of events occurred and Ontario’s Ministry of Corrections and Policing Services struck a working group of industry leaders to redesign a training program in the form of new standards. When that working group met, it considered a number of alternatives to the problem of deadly force training, and came to the conclusion that simply adding to the numbers above would not constitute a sufficient reform. Indeed, it was a matter of consensus within the working group that training could not remain exclusively technical, and that matters of judgement and ethical, legal and social issues needed to be integrated into all training programs, including the use of force. The working group drew both from the Lewis Report (Ontario, 1989), and from the Police Learning System (Ontario, 1992), the final report of which was published in September of 1992. As a consequence of integrating these latter variables into new standards, a new protocol was produced, termed a paradigm shift by police trainers.

Indeed, whereas previously training was measured in terms of bullets and hours, now the emphasis was on judgement and systems. In trying to integrate baton training and pepper spray training into a comprehensive program the working group came to the

77This included a couple of high profile shootings by police of Blacks, and a subsequent 'riot' in Toronto in May of 1992.
78In mid-July of 1992 in Ontario, before new legislation on the use of force had been announced, it was already becoming clear that the introduction of judgment training and the aerosol spray would require modifications to then-current training methodologies. Two Ministry bureaucrats were entrusted to put together a working group to determine a new use of force protocol. They were commissioned to develop that training methodology in standards and guidelines in as much detail as possible in the few weeks leading up to the intended announcement of the new legislation. This working group, consisting of some of the more innovative trainers in Ontario, pulled together the draft standards of regulations, including a Treasury Board summation. The funds were approved, and the standards went out on October 1st.
conclusion that doing so required a systems approach to training. Trying to work with the mental schemata on the use of force known as the stair step model, they found it impossible to 'place' 'pepper spray.' Specifically, they could not definitively locate it before or after the use of the baton.

As the Peel model shows (figure 2), there is a movement up from 'officer presence' through 'verbal direction,' 'empty hand techniques,' 'intermediate weapons,' to 'deadly force.' However, the officer may need to jump ahead to intermediate weapons from officer presence. In addition, although 'pepper' or 'capsicum spray' is located in Peel's model after empty hand techniques, it may well be used after verbal direction.

Figure 2
Peel Regional Police's Force Model

An officer can maintain control by either escalating or de-escalating up and down the force model, according to the amount of resistance encountered.

LEVEL I
- Officer's demeanor, attitude and right to be there
- Verbal Direction
- Officer Presence

LEVEL II
- Dynamic counter tactics
- Stunning Techniques
- Officer's verbal skills can either escalate or de-escalate a potentially resisting subject

LEVEL III
- Pressur e point Techniques/Joint Locking/Takedowns
- Empty Hand Techniques
- To deal with passive or defensive resistance

LEVEL IV
- Deadly Force
- Intermediate Weapons
- Monadnock/Baton
- To deal with active or aggressive resistance

LEVEL V
- Any method likely to cause great bodily harm or death

*Previous to adoption of Ontario's Use of Force Response Options.
Reproduced by the author.

79 Even a British Columbia pie-chart model, which they considered, was in the end seen as a stair-step model forced into a pie-chart.
Meanwhile, the working group considered it essential that the instructor of empty-hand techniques needed to be well-versed, if not expert, in firearms and hard and soft impact weapons training. They arrived at the conclusion that it was essential that the instructor of hard and soft impact weapons ought to be very knowledgeable on empty-hand techniques and firearms. They were of the opinion that it was not a well-thought out practice which had trainers selected on the basis of, as one government official put it, 'who's the best shot,' or 'who happens to have a black belt in karate' (E6). Rather than being chosen in this way, they wanted trainers selected in terms of teaching criteria and to be use of force generalists. Trainers in each area of specialization, they concluded, should see their training in the context of the full range of force options; they ought to be well-versed in the legalities of these options, as well as their limitations. An organizational knowledge and systems thinking was introduced to the heart of training reform. The emergent paradigm needed, it was felt, to see judgement as ongoing; it was not something which could be compartmentalized or placed always prior to action.

Unable to find a place for pepper spray or to plot judgement as an ongoing process on the stair-step model, a sub-group of the working group endeavored to solve the problem and ultimately developed a model which placed judgement at the centre of concentric circles (see figure 3). The heart of the new model thus consists of the 'situation' encircled by the three terms 'assess > plan > act': these continually chase each other, with 'act' being followed by 'assess', and the whole cycle starting again. Judgement was now a pivot placed with the constable in the figurative centre of a situation.

The schemata depicts three circles encircling the constable. The first consists of the 'assess, plan, act' of the situation. The second consists of interpretations of the affect or aggression of the 'suspect'. These move up from 'compliant,' to 'passive resistant,' to 'active resistant,' to assaultive,' to 'serious bodily harm or death.' The third consist of the use of force options, which have no starting point, but which offer options from 'officer presence' to 'disengage', with deployments building clockwise through 'tactical communication,' 'empty hand
techniques,' 'impact weapons (soft),' 'aerosol spray,' 'impact weapons (hard),' and 'firearm.' Neither of the outer two circles are fixed with the other, although they tend toward natural resting places which would link 'compliance' with 'officer presence,' and 'risk of serious bodily injury or death' with 'firearms' or 'disengage.'

The disengage option is perhaps most central to the attribution of the new model as a paradigm shift. Again previously, the reigning convention on the use of force understood the officer as responsive to the level of threat of a suspect, and depicted him as a stand-in, figuratively, for the totality of state intervention. The officer either went up or down the stairs to deadly force, but once he had 'escalated' to it, he could not 'back down' from the suspect. The working group rejected this powerful belief that disengagement was illegitimate. Instead, they came to the belief that rather than needing to be tacitly rejected, the disengage option had to be positively taught. The disengage option represented, figuratively, a reprieve; but it is a reprieve, in a fundamental way, from a way of thinking about policing.

Officer-Centered Use of Force
The new schemata placed a constable at its centre, offering him or her access points to a range of interpretation and actions. It is very much a constable-centered model. By seeing the position of the officer, 'small' things which were not actionable before became central. One such 'little' thing was that the stair-step model created a dissonance when it offered the constable a staircase to go up and down: figuratively it had her de-escalate from the revolver to the baton; but this was not something the officer often did in fact: he did not put away his gun and take out her baton. In training him to this linear movement, the old model tried to force a structure on the constable's interpretive habitus which was inconsistent with the mode of decision-making taking place.
The officer selects the most reasonable option relative to the situation.

*Chart reproduced by the author.*
Yet, in placing the officer in the centre, and privileging officer-judgement in training, what emerges is a new drill which makes this subjective relation objective: this new drill is called judgement training. Instead of being drilled exclusively on the body—doing holds, shooting at targets, memorizing and practicing the application of pressure points, etc.—the officer is drilled on her interpretation of suspect behaviour and her selection of use of force response. Judgement training explores how suspect intention is registered in bodily signs. How is compliance registered? How does one distinguish between active and passive resistance? It highlights 'impact factors,' consisting of external but also subjective readings. Impact factors include such things as weather conditions and the size of the subject officer, but must also take into consideration the affect of the officer and her level of comfort with a particular course of action. The officer is not to remove her own self-understanding; indeed, she is to understand how her preferences, knowledges, and affect are also part of the use of force dynamic. Indeed, comfortability with choice of weapons has been found legitimate (within obvious parameters) by the courts, and has often been cited by constables themselves as determinative (E2). Those elements which were ignored, unseen or marginalized under the old use of force model become the central planks of the new model. The move to make a new drill of judgement training represents a seemingly inexorable drive to objectivize those features of police practice previously unproblematised.

There are a number of ways of interpreting this shift beyond what I have noted already. Perhaps the most important for our purposes is how this new mental schemata on the use of force recasts the authority relation. I suggested a relationship between the disengage option and the question of state action. The old model, the stair-step, saw the use of force relation as a miniaturization of state capacity. The burden was therefore on the constable to relay the full authority of the administrative authority: the imagery presented the use of force situation as a microcosm, in heuristic totality, of the capacities of the state. Figuratively, the constable's disengagement meant the relinquishing of authority by the state. Nothing was posited
outside or beyond the use of force interaction--there was nothing off of the page. That nothingness was presumptively identified with capitulation to non-governance or chaos.

The new schemata, rather than playing the use of force interaction up to the vertical authority of the state, instead digs inside of it and spreads it out horizontally. It also posits a multiplicity of relationships, rather than a unilinear succession of events. The constable is now visible rather as a hub, a hub which can be cranked towards violence and oriented towards sovereign claims, certainly, but also one which can be removed from this orientation or reading. One must see the disengage option at 11 o’clock as a passageway through which this hub can slip out of the wheel socket or out of one set of circumstances, and into another. This analogy can be seen clearly if we take some real situations in which the disengage option can be used. In 1990 in Quebec, there was a confrontation between Mohawk Indians and the Surete du Quebec and later the army known as the ‘Oka Crisis.’ The original confrontation appeared to assume that one can only respond to perceived escalation of threat by an equivalent counterforce, thus bringing the situation to a crisis in which massive counterforce is posited against the threat. One may negotiate, but only in an attempt to de-escalate, and so bring the situation to less violent resolution. Disengagement, however, provides an entirely new view; and it is a view of contingent authority: the Oka challenge is to the authority of the state, as almost any threat can be read, but it is still for the state to decide how or whether to take up the challenge. If, instead, the crisis is reframed, if the hub is transposed into another wheel, then it is possible to see the situation in terms of politics and economics—as, for instance, an opportunity for creating partnerships in the management of diverse interests. In any case, the disengagement option ought to be seen as offering a figurative and a real option of re-engagement on different terms, and from a different locus.

The paradigm shift between these mental schematas on the use of force suggests a movement from a presumptively fixed authority relation, to a running, shifting context; a movement from a constabulary authority posited against a fixed template to one
which, rather than being a mini-replication of sovereign authority, is, like emergent governmental authority, diffuse and negotiated. To put it simply, the constable is not to look at a situation in terms of schedules of immanence of force alone. Rather, she is to interpret these schedules in a context of subjective and environmental variables. In thus locating herself and the situation more holistically, she is able to relativize the value of a deadly outcome in a way that hitherto may not have been possible. Now she may be looking across situations, at least conceptually, for similarities and differences in terms of the disengage option, rather than for ways to 'force' closure (either going to the top or bottom of the stairs). Instead of being an author who must bring a tale to completion according to a given formula, she may view herself as part of team of screenwriters in a night-time TV soap. Under the new model, the constable no longer represents, iconically, the total resources of the administrative authority.

As Hunt (1990) and Rubinstien (1973) have shown, use of force is heavily influenced by the sanctions of the occupational culture, and any programmatic technical change is vetted within the playing field of the working environment. There are the conventions to 'take care of number one' and to 'back up your brother.' These are first order conventions which are the cultural equivalent of formal selection criteria. 'Taking care of number one' means doing whatever has the least chance of leading to unfavorable outcomes, such as being 'cooled out' or being brought before a tribunal or brought up on charges. 'Backing up your brother' is consistent with 'finish your shift' in that the emphasis first and foremost, despite contrary rhetoric, is the defense of the uniform (cf. Westley, 1970; Rubinstien, 1973; Holdaway, 1983).

In the empirical world of the constable in the context of the norms of the working culture, the disengage option may not have the weight that it appears to be have as a black and white position at 11 o'clock on a training schemata. In the real world of the cultural landscape, use of force is a fine line between outcomes, demanding the most of the ability to make an account palatable to both the culture and the police administrators (Hunt, 1983).
1990). Indeed, a sovereign discourse pervades the occupational culture, and altering practices means something more than restructuring, top-down, a mental schemata and a training philosophy. State-saying, or authority-saying is built into concepts like ‘officer presence’ and in (perhaps) derivative concepts like ‘finish the job’ and ‘back your brother.’

However, in the new use of force training model or protocol in Ontario, we have seen that judgement shaping is consistent with the call in the 1920 memo of R.C.M.P. Commissioner Perry to ‘train men in their individuality.’ Indeed, the constable is now made responsible for choices and judgements which previously went under the nebulousness of the ‘gut decision.’ The transparency is immediate. What began as an exercise to recognize the realism and dynamism of this heartland of the constable ends by exposing decision-making more directly to those structuring protocols which undermine agency. Now a mental schemata and a justificatory language made consistent with the current landscape of governance structures, more deeply than before, the action of the constable.  

In doing this training, verticality is eschewed for a horizontal model which is, as has been the call for more than two decades, ‘officer centered.’ Needless to say, this has

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80 What is still missing from this reform is the direct tie to cultural values. How does the disengage option engage these values? That it needs to avoid disengaging them is obvious.

81 In another example of this horizontal tendency, at the Police Learning Centre in Durham Region, officers enter into a program dedicated to the ‘continuous improvement of the individual.’ One of the unique innovations of this program is that every Wednesday from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. there is a ‘get to know your police’ session, which invites the public into the Centre in order to see first hand the training that officers receive. Even use of force training sessions are subject to this form of public observation.

Typically, accountability means a requirement to present an account of one’s action. At the bottom of a vertical pillar is the individual agent and at the top is a government official invested with oversight responsibilities. Accounts move up the bureaucracy and the action of the individual agent is sanctioned or legitimated in a top-down manner: ultimately, a minister is responsible for acting on the actions of the individual agent. The structure of complaints against the police is exemplary of this verticality of accountability. At the Learning Centre, however, we see a lateral or horizontal structure. Instead of seeing access to decisionmaking integrity ex post facto in a column of the complaint mechanism, this new mechanism works preemptively by granting access to the community to witness first hand the judgement and body shaping of the constable. Instead of deploying the schemata of the parallel columns bridged only at the top, it opens windows at the ground floor. Practices are legitimated, and legitimated ongoingly, and this legitimation is achieved through subjecting the minutia of practices to low-level public scrutiny. The citizenry is responsibilized, and
implications for the constable as an agent of governance. To some extent, it lessens her burden as an icon of sovereign authority. Instead of representing sovereignty in its totality, she is one part of a team whose role can be quite limited. She may think about the resources of the team and of her own abilities and powers in the context of this total picture. She can think organizationally.

At the same time, use of force discourse retains its capacitation talk: it is understood that a police constable is a primary agent of governance who continues to require enabling. In policing, that core is the question of using coercion and also the question of the license, right and scope of the police constable as an agent at the regulatory foundation. In a use of force model, while we have (re)engaged the constable’s agency, we are also at the core of the regulatory onion, by which we mean the constitutional question ‘whose government?’ Rather than framing questions of the legitimacy of action with the interior nomenclature of the office, the new protocol demands a participatory reflexivity making questions of the legitimation of authority ongoing, dynamic, and foregrounded.

While a first generation of judgement drill or training may be characterized as taking the street into account and also of working to shape the interpretation of individuals in, especially, race relations training exercises, this first wave does not integrate the real-time affect and differences of the constable into the training exercise as the learning object. A second generation or model of judgement training using training templates does incorporate a back-again reflexivity to encourage the constable’s active engagement. With second generation judgement shaping we begin to see the regulation of constables through their autonomy.

**CONCLUSION**

If the space between the informal norms and action protocols of the street and formal rules and presentational protocols of the

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academy was an object of intervention, academy professionalism and judgement drills have been two distinct methods of structuring this space. One version of the latter, the judgement template, appears to reflect the state of the art of such interventions. Decisionmaking on the use of force is at the heart of the craft of policing and therefore offers the most direct avenue for a marriage of formal protocols with craft-centered action-recipes. Here, we have reviewed a judgement drill and template to understand these as attempts to rework the once sacred ground of 'common sense.' These devices are vehicles for subject-shaping which intrude into this terrain of front-line interpretation.

Drills worked on the habits of the body and catechisms on the habits of the minds of police constables. Judgement drills begin to focus on how constables interpret. If disciplinary drills also shaped the constable through a training to obey, judgement drills recognize the interpretive license of the constable while nevertheless structuring his interpretations. Judgement templates, as we have just seen in our example of the use of force model, regulate the constable through his autonomy. Judgement training thus offers another stab at shaping the constable. That stab leaves behind academy professionalism and it attempts, rather than to structure interpretation or norms through the in-group, to get at interpretation straight off. In judgement training, the constable's self-to-self relation is constantly called up to interface with the formats and protocols according to which actions are to be structured. In judgement training, decision-making mechanics and values become the object of judgement-shaping drills and of the utilization of templates or schemata.

What judgement drills do not leave behind is questions about the favoured idealization of the constable. We promised that we would show that the police constable was being dislodged from the nice illusion of the subject in a world of objects. Recall that in chapter four, this was indeed the threat posed by the social worker cop. The nuance and difference of a social worker orientation was problematic. While the judgement drill allows the constable a place and a responsibility to act in particular ways and thus affords the individuality of a point of view, task analysis and the development of a systems approach to training
works rather in the opposite direction. The fragmentation of the constable into roles is prefatory to the competency profiles which we will take up in the next two chapters. These recognize the constable as always an aggregation of such competencies, selected faithfully around the missions of a learning organization. As we shall see, the constable can no longer be idealized without being fractured or fragmented as only an asymmetrical piece of the whole: an object in a world of organizational subjects.
CHAPTER EIGHT

RECAPTURING THE AGENT AND REFRAMING AGENCY: NEW MANAGERIALISM IN POLICE TRAINING

In this chapter, we take up the thread of sorting technologies we left dangling in chapter five. We do so in the context of an emerging regulatory regime which, instead of concentrating reform energies on the shaping of constables, begins to understand agencies not in terms of individuals, but rather organizational components known as competencies. Under new managerialism 'the individual'--or what is left of the integrity and unity of this entity--is fragmented into competencies (skills, knowledges, and abilities) at the same time that she is responsibilized to stand in for missions of the whole organization. This latest articulation of organizational objectives offers a new wedge into constable agency.

We begin by offering a short account of the discourse of new managerialism and its treatment of the subject. We then review the treatment of the constable in some key reform documents of the 1970s, concentrating on the Task Force on Policing in Ontario. This document, in particular, sets the stage for constabulary responsibilization under new managerialism. We then take up reforms in police training as set out by Ontario's Strategic Planning Committee on Police Training and Education (Ontario, 1992) and by the R.C.M.P. in their recruit training (RCMP, 1992; Himmelfarb, 1991). Finally, we assess a new police technology called the Constable Selection Project, and conclude on what new managerialist reforms portend for the constable as a governed agent and agent of governance.

1. NEW MANAGERIALISM

New managerialism rests on a number of premises or assumptions. The first, which is sometimes the least obvious, is the privileging of the product producing organization--assumptively a corporate and for-profit organization--as the root unit of society (Enteman, 1993). A further, related, assumption of a managerialist discourse is a de-emphasis of the state. In new managerial literature, there is a stress on organizational missions, teams,
network-building, organizational learning, and indeed, learning organizations (cf. Senge, 1990, Morgan, 1993; Dixon, 1992). As Enteman argues, the 'social decisions' produced by managements of organizations are not oriented to the furtherance of a national ethos (1993: 159). Rather, they are aimed at global markets, clients, or consumers. We want to add to this that new managerialism takes a post-structuralist view to the continual (flexible) reproduction, not of individual agents and social institutions, but of organizations themselves. It follows the view that individuals and essences are not the foundation of society, but these are rather discursively produced for the ends of the organization in the interplay between organizational decisions and emergent markets. Key to the transformation of police agencies according to a new managerialist ethic is the importance placed on missions and competencies both at the organizational level and at the level of the individual (cf. O.P.P., 1995). New managerialism understands the organization in terms of dynamic change or 'learning,' and individuals in terms of the competency profiling the organization needs.

Important in this context of subjectivity under neomanagerialism is its development in contradistinction to the bureaucratic organization. Whereas bureaucracies stress adherence to procedure, personal detachment, and the rational separation of public/private, personal/official, objective/subjective, new managerial structures centralize initiative, responsibility, entrepreneurship, involvement, and personality (du Gay, 1994).

The manager in the bureaucratic organization is seen as impersonal, detached, and knowledgeable: an expert. He is understood to be objective, and dispassionate. He is insulated by rules, by rank in a vertical hierarchy, and through clear delineations of diminishing authority passing down through this vertical hierarchy. The manager legislates or commands (Bauman, 1987) The worker in the bureaucratic organization, as du Gay explores with reference to Peters and Waterman (1982), is separated in his work and life, is bifurcated into reason and emotion and between pleasure and duty, and knows very clearly the limits of his authority, knowledge and competence. The
consequence of these features of bureaucracy's 'foundational exclusions' and 'constitutive splits' is a worker who lacks initiative, and identification with and commitment to the missions of the organization.

In contrast, the manager in the new managerialist organization is, 'calculatingly charismatic' (du Gay. 1994). Rather than being seen as a commander, he is seen explicitly as a people- and organization-shaper. Managers in new managerialist organizations reconstruct 'the conduct and self-image of employees...encouraging them to acquire capacities and dispositions that will enable them to become enterprising persons' (du Gay, 1994: 677). The worker in a new managerialist organization is made up to be responsible, empowered, and personally interested: she is made whole again through work-based participatory technologies such as work teams, continuous learning, and peer review procedures. The worker is understood to find 'pleasure in work' rather than pleasure through work (Donzelot, 1990); she is to be responsibilized to care for the self and take pleasure by making herself a project or enterprise.

Under 'pleasure in work' individuals are 'enterprises' or 'enterprisers of the self' (du Gay, 1994; Gordon, 1987) who are given to understand themselves as free to negotiate working conditions, and to continuously adapt their competencies to changing demands in quickly saturated markets (Harvey, 1989). The individual's status represents a coalescing of the subject and 'the order of the social relations of production', a coalescing by which the subject is not a priori more true than these relations, but is only ever located and a sum of her capacities (Donzelot, 1991: 276).

Under neo-liberal strategies of governance, a subjectivity is encouraged which, as Gordon puts it, 'reactivates choice' as the 'fundamental human faculty' (Gordon, 1991: 44). It is through this re-articulation of choice that the individual is interpolated as an enterprise, an enterprise, moreover, who is presumptively seen to care for her own self. The individual optimizes herself as an enterprise by deliberately deploying capacities and characteristics which organizations value: individuals freely choose to shape themselves according to organizational imagery,
and, as du Gay puts it, partake in a 'reflexive self-monitoring' on their progress (1994: 673). Work is redefined as the translation of innate and learned competencies and skills into value as an enterprise. The individual, here, is not made up by others—as we have seen in our chapter four—but makes up her or himself (choice) as a producer and consumer who is constantly attentive and responsive to environmental (economic) shifts (Gordon, 1991: 43-44). There is an overlap of neo-liberalism and new managerialism in the making up of subjectivities.

New managerialism, then, rescues spirit, initiative, enterprise, and charisma as qualities belonging not to the individual standing opposed to organizations and their collective thinking, but rather as virtues which individuals acting within organizations may partake of. New managerialism offer an antidote to the problem of the 'individualist' straining against a disciplinary regime. It does this by aligning all the virtues of autonomy and enterprise with the character of the mission-driven 'learning organization.' Today, one is most likely to encounter words like 'iconoclast' or 'rebel' in the marketing or promotion of organizationally-aligned individuality.

In the following, we trace these themes in exemplary discourses on police training reform. There is in these documents, as we hope to show, a responsibilization to enterprise and organizational mission which takes the constable out from under the purview of a disciplinary to a new managerial governance.

**Discipline to Managerialism in Policing**

In 1974, the *Task Force on Policing in Ontario* reviewed the methodology of reinforcing 'appropriate behaviour' on the part of the constable. It noted that the 'military personalities and military structures' (1974:20) of the military tradition influenced policing in Ontario. It credited the military tradition with facilitating uniformity and improving standards, and also with contributing to the 'forced objectivity on the part of police officers.' It also 'gave forces the ability to deploy men swiftly and efficiency to meet crisis situations' (ibid.). The Task Force argued, however, that there were 'new requirements today' which were inconsistent with the military tradition and its
assumption 'that the important decisions are taken at senior levels.' It also noted that motivation under the military tradition was generally 'negative,' it stressed sanctions while under-utilizing positive motivators. Deploying an evolutionary model of policing, the Task Force concluded that while the military tradition was useful in its time, it was no longer consistent with 'modern requirements' (ibid.).

Concurrently, in the Report on Police Training in Ontario (Ontario, 1975a) and in the I.A.C.P.'s Major Recommendations for Management of Effective Police Discipline (I.A.C.P., 1976) the term discipline was being revised according to similar profiles. In the former, the concept was divided according to two distinct 'sets of circumstances.' According to the first of these, it was understood that there was a continuing need to have police officers 'act as one body' and obey orders 'without question' (Ontario, 1975a: 61.). Under the conditions of large demonstrations, for instance, a public order policing mobilization still prevailed, and 'discipline, training and good leadership' (ibid.) was understood to ensure that optimum force would be used. According to the peacekeeping function, however, the term 'self-discipline' best described the 'self-control' and appearance management which was necessary to individual to the 'job at hand' (ibid.).

In the report by the I.A.C.P., it is only this latter 'discipline' which is seen, but it not understood as a 'technique to prevent negative behaviour on the job.' Rather, discipline is given a positive spin and recast as a 'much needed management tool' which can 'replace a system which too often acts to reduce morale and motivation, and which strains police-citizen relations' (1976: 6). The IACP noted, in the same way the Task Force did, that the military model is unsuited to these police-citizen relations. They say that the military has different sources of motivation and control, and different patterns of work and working environments. In a clear break with this 'past' they noted that, indeed, the police have more in common with business. '[B]oth police and business exist to deliver a service or a product to the same market--the public' (7).
Discipline' is further subjected to managerialism. In a 1991 R.C.M.P. discussion paper by Queens University management professors, 'positive discipline' is discussed as aimed at 'educating the employee,' in contrast to the 'punishment and deterrence' focus of 'negative discipline.' It recasts rules and regulations as 'responsibilities' which are 'of benefit to all' (R.C.M.P., 1991:4-5). The Discussion Paper cites B.B. Boyd, who argues in Management Minded Supervision that 'discipline is the training and development of the cooperative workforce striving together for the realization of management goals.' It adds that 'punishment has no place in thinking about discipline' (in 1991:5).

We begin to see a movement from a grounding of conduct shaping in disciplinary authority, to one looking to the management practices of business. 'Discipline,' though still too much a central feature of police administration to be suppressed altogether, is recast as part of an administrative and human resources arsenal, rather than its central weapon: it is something exercised by the individual employee in the furtherance of managerial goals. The earlier version of discipline is shunted to the less visible (to reform discourse) arena of public order policing. And while the craft of policing is being colonized by action-structuring technologies like judgement drills and templates, supervision is also being reconceived. the discipline of trainees is well under way to no longer being considered a management problem.

Responsibilizing the Constable

The Task Force was quite clear and explicit in articulating a new direction for police management. Called 'constable-centered management,' the approach recommended placing 'the greatest onus on the individual constable' (1974: 20). In describing the new model for 'professional management' the Task Force stressed the

What is not clear is how, in light of the fact that the military tradition is credited with key transformations in policing, attributes like uniformity and objectivity will fare under the new philosophy. Although, as we see in the Report on Police Training, there is to be a concurrent operation of militarism and a new 'constable-centred' philosophy, there is still no discussion of how militarism (or command and control discipline) can co-exist with an officer-centred approach. Taken at its face, the implication is that uniformity, objectivism, and efficient deployment will get short shrift.
need of providing to constables skills, knowledges, and incentives, and placed the responsibility on constables themselves to participate in their accumulation. Not only were individual officers to have ‘good judgements’ (20) and ‘understanding’ (21), they were also now encouraged to ‘bring forward recommendations for policy change’ (21). Terminology describing this new constable-centered approach, included ‘flattened hierarchies’, ‘greater delegation’ and ‘shortened communication channels.’ It argued that whatever the factual distribution of tasks (more social work, more law enforcement), it is constable decision-making which is the key to the re-conceptualization of the role. Here, the fact of constable judgement not only became an object of formal recognition, it became the rationale for a new managerial technique to structure constable conduct.

With a responsibilization of the constable’s office, police discretion, rather than remaining a problematic force, becomes a rationale for self-management on the part of the constable. Constables are encouraged to do the role of management—not only to ‘row the boat,’ as Osborne and Gaebler have recently put it, but also to take part in the steering (Osborne and Gaebler, 1994). Even the vehicles to promote this new responsibilization are beginning to take shape: ‘clearly defined...purpose’ or missions on one hand, and ‘preparation’ or training (and selection) on the other.

Responsibilization, particularly for learning or training, had become even more pronounced in a 1987 report on police training by a serving O.P.P officer. The Naisthmith Report argued that ‘training philosophy’ ought to place more responsibility on students in the formal training process. It criticized current practice as putting too little emphasis on ‘student initiative’ and too much onus on the instructor. It cited the comments of graduates themselves, who saw themselves as being ‘spoon-fed.’ It recommended that the Ontario Police College ‘accept students as equal partners in the teaching and learning process’ and that

83 This, despite a context in which the IACP noted that there was at that time little evidence (in the USA at least) of active solicitation of line officer input.
84 It noted that, indeed, 80% of the constable’s time is engaged in non-law enforcement activities.
students ought to be required to engage in independent study on College directed assignments (1987: 16). The term 'responsibility' is with Naismith used in the context of a shifting onus for training and learning. Indeed, it is used a number of times in the Report to emphasize an onus on the part of the individual learner to take more initiative.

The I.A.C.P. had put it that 'training should indoctrinate officers on management expectations.' Indeed, responsibilization is making up the constable by idealizing the manager. In a recent book on police administration called simply Police Management, the rationale of 'policing by objectives' (PBO) is clarified with explicit reference to this managerial responsibilization. Butler (1984) explains that it may appear to superficial observation that the PBO methodology of moving from 'corporate place' to 'goals' to 'objectives' to 'action plans' may be a laborious undertaking when in the end result one implements a plan to pay special attention to juveniles on the street during school hours. He notes, however, that what is different is that 'constables should be able to stop and reflect on the principles underlying the activities they are performing,' among which is that they 'should know how any particular police activity fits into the overall mission of the force as it strives to meet community expectations,' and 'exactly what their contribution will be to the mission' (172). Furthermore, they should 'know the results they, as individuals and the group of officers to which they belong, are achieving' and 'they should know that, if there are no benefits being achieved from a particular activity, it will be changed or abandoned.' (ibid.). Clearly, it is management functions which are being uploaded to the constable: not only must the constable perform the specific task or undertake the intervention, she must be able to reflect on the 'whole picture' or context of her intervention and be able, further, to demonstrate the value of the intervention in the terms of organizational missions.

'Constable-centered' policing is therefore management-dispersed policing in that rather than being responsible for delimited, delegated assignments, the constable is now to read him or herself into the responsibilities of the whole organization and to act both as worker and as manager: she is a member of a
learning organization, and missions, competencies and their continued re-assessment are key devices authorizing this dispersion.

**From Remote standards to re-embedded Missions**

Although police are uniquely reliant on enabling rules and legislative enactments, what we see beginning to take shape in police reform discourses in the early 1970s in Ontario is a disenchantment with solutions rooted in the call for new legislation and more standards. Just emerging, is a post-Keynesian economic thinking which doubts that more state intervention will solve social problems (O'Malley, 1993) After decades of working in the direction of an administration from the centre, society on the whole and police administration in particular, began to show signs of tiring with the automatic call for more and more comprehensive law.

Already in the *Task Force* we see the advocation of a community-centered approach to police governance reflected in this disenchantment with solutions which continually search out the broadest possible standard and the most ‘objective’ measure:

> We believe each force needs to be closely tuned to the particular set of problems facing that community. This is an argument against uniformity and in favour of difference. Specifically, we are advocating that each force in Ontario actively search for approaches and methods which are responsive to the objectives judged to be of highest local importance (Ontario, 1974: 22).

Here, after decades of striving towards them, it begins to be recognized that the state-enhancing mechanisms of objectivity, neutrality and standardization are no longer sacrosanct. The remote standard, once so eagerly sought after--remember calls for a single police uniform throughout the province, and earlier calls for one big police force--was here in the early 1970s beginning to be challenged as a defunct proposition.

In support, in what it reports as the 'technological trap' (25), the *Task Force* argues that technology 'has tended to widen the gap between the citizen and his police force' and also structured organizational variables around the performance measures are 'most easily quantifiable,' including crime and clearance rates, arrest statistics, and other law enforcement.
variables. It argue that this predisposition with 'teching-up' (not their term) has shifted police activity too far from the peacekeeping role and isolated it too much from the community and less tangible measures of police performance (25). Technologies were beginning to be reviewed not according to whether they effectively standardized police interventions, but according to how they pushed forward the missions of policing organizations.

Although these themes comprised leading edge reform talk of the mid 1970s, for the most part they failed to take as a matter of practice. Neo-liberalism had not sufficiently penetrated public discourse. Nor was there a political will within police agencies themselves of sufficient strength. Remember, the climate was still one in which, to report the findings of the Report on Police Training, many police chiefs still did not acknowledge the existence of police discretion, let alone understand how such recognition demanded a shift of managerial onus (1975b: 278).

With the proliferation of a neo-liberal ethic in public discourse in the early 1980s, the stage was set for a new paradigm in police training, and indeed, policing management. Ontario's 'police learning system' and the R.C.M.P.'s 'problem-solving' cadet training make new managerialism the legitimation of police practice. 85

2. POST-DISCIPLINARY OR NEW MANAGERIAL CONSTABLE SHAPING

We saw that disciplinary governance at the training academy has been characterized by stripping and infantilizing, correction and gazing, promotion of the in-group, and the use of an authority relation which privileges status over demonstration. The residential police academy offers spaces and places for a vibrant counter-narrative to the kind of disciplinary governance visibly promoted. This has structured an informal, rule-breaking, iconic authority.

85 The private sector embraced new managerial principles to build organizational flexibility and undermine the oppositional language of labour relations in the context of reduced markets. For public police services the draw has not been one of maximum organizational expansion, as previous to the 1970s (cf. Harvey, 1989), but rather the ongoing legitimacy of service; it is the felt necessity to keep public policing cogent by constantly re-articulating service provision in the language of emergent terms of reference.
What we will be seeing at the academy in the most current reforms, is a utilization of a post-disciplinary governing logic. Ontario's 'police learning system' and the R.C.M.P.'s 'problem-solving' recruit training are two recent examples of constable responsibilization under new managerial principles. The police learning system is the product of the most exhaustive review of the state of place training ever undertaken in Canada. The R.C.M.P.'s 'problem-solving' police training, under which the first batch of recruits was being trained in Regina in 1994, has been called the most major training reform in the R.C.M.P.'s 120 year history.

These two technologies are consistent with a post-disciplinary training or learning. Under post-disciplinary training, several dramatic changes are implemented which break with the key features of disciplinary training we have mentioned. In short these are: responsibilize the learner, make in-group evaluations integral and transparent, make 'practical' authority accessible and de-privilege the role of iconic and status authorities, and, finally, make the assessment of judgement a formal and integral part of the curriculum.

A. The Police Learning System
As we noted in the last chapter, in 1989 Ontario was out of step in training provision. This applied not only to use of force training, it was the general consensus, but to police training on the whole. In the fall of 1990, terms of reference were drawn up and work began by the Strategic Planning Committee on Police Training and Education. After extensive research into police training, a new model for police education, termed the 'Police Learning System' (PLS), was outlined in the Final Report of the Strategic Planning Committee in 1992 (Ontario, 1992). The Police Learning System is a model of police training and education based on the concept of 'organizational learning.' As well as reflecting on the state of the art of police training, it offers an amalgamation of neomanagerialist and community policing discourses.

The PLS is a comprehensive plan and methodology covering police training, education and development. Governed by a Police Learning System Board as a central governing authority, its
mandate is to direct all the learning requirements of the public police from 'police foundations' (two years of a PLS certified liberal arts education provided by community colleges and universities) through to the Executive Development Institute (managerial training for police executives). The PLS's oversight includes the formal and informal learning of police trainees or learners, and conceives the learning jurisdiction as including the workplace, the community, and educational institutions. PLS recasts training as 'lifelong learning' and utilizes not only existing educational facilities and teachers in this learning provision (through equivalency), but also co-workers, supervisors and managers as adjuncts to O.P.C. and in-service trainers. The PLS operates on the basis of a mission statement and PLS principles, which stress fairness and accessibility, learning relevance, accountability, co-operation and community involvement, innovation and creativity, research, and sensitivity to diversity.86

It is the requirement of the PLS that a two semester course of 'police foundations' consisting of courses in social sciences be completed in an accredited community college or university. This course would be taken prior to hire by a police agency and be followed by a period of training on police procedures, 'application of knowledge and skills training program,' at the Ontario Police College. Immediately subsequent to the academy course, recruits would still receive local procedures training in their 'home' agencies, in which jurisdiction their 'directed work assignment' is also to take place. This latter consists of not less than forty hours in a community agency in which she is to perform not as a 'security officer for the organization' but rather to 'walk in the shoes' of the agency staff and 'understand the organization, its operations and the people it serves' (Ontario, 1992: 224). Finally, 'learners' would be required to

86To date, a Police Learning System Unit has been established at the OPC to facilitate its implementation, a deputy director has been hired at the College to liaison with the Advisory Committee and to facilitate implementation, the Advisory Committee has been appointed, learning equivalencies are being developed, the Executive Development Institute is being created and manager and executive courses developed, a number of computer-based training modules are being pilot tested, and a Research and Evaluation Unit is being established.
perform a second 10 day academy course within twenty four months of their initial academy training, and this course would be individualized with respect to their unique performance assessments.

The police learning system is a logical extension of the systems approach to training. It posits the constable in a matrix of the police organization and the organizations of the policed community. This is achieved through a re-conceptualizing of ownership for constable shaping. This re-conceptualization redistributes responsibility for police training and education back on the constable and the community.

The foundation of the Police Learning System is the concepts of organizational learning and the learning organization.

Organizational learning refers to learning at the system level rather than the individual level. Organizations are created because the task is too large or complex for one individual. To accomplish this greater task, each individual within the organization must have a level of competence; likewise the organization as a whole must have a competence (Ontario: 1992: 252).

Practically, there are a number of steps which the PLS sees as promotional of a learning organization. This includes lateral transfers and secondments and instruction to recruits on the three levels of organization: the immediate agency, the provincial ‘organization’ and the ‘total system’ (254). It also includes the creation of mission statements and the regular meeting of ‘cross-functional teams.’ ‘Outsiders’ are to be brought in to carry out research and development, and new knowledge and risk-taking is further to be enhanced through the research of new ideas, feedback from new employees, and exit interviews. Benchmarking, police/community newsletters, networking, and a proactive front-end involvement in regulatory processes are other new managerial mechanisms which the PLS uses. The PLS also provides methods of promoting positive organizational memory, the ‘unlearning’ of ‘bad organizational memory,’ and the continuous use of planned policy and procedural reviews. Finally, it suggests the continued use of roll-call, debriefing, customer surveys, and the direct relationship of promotional rewards with valued pre-organizational behaviour. The PLS also suggests the continual use of the ‘why’ question (Ontario, 1992: 254–263).
In emphasizing teamwork, feedback systems, organizational knowledges, and organizational learning the PLS takes a systems approach. In reconceiving police training as organizational learning, the PLS also takes up the thread of task analysis. Accordingly, to determine what the learning requirement is to be depends on validating the tasks for which the constable can be seen to need to demonstrate a competence. These competencies are contrasted to a simple delineation of tasks. They consist of those qualities and attitudes deemed most consistent with, especially, the community police officer or problem-solver. Eight essential competencies were identified with the constabulary status. They are: achievement orientation, relationship building, analytical thinking, flexibility and dealing with diversity, self-confidence, communication skills, physical skills and abilities, and self control.

Organizational knowledge and organizational 'competence' comprise the root value by which less complex and 'essential' individual knowledges and competencies are measured. Under organizational learning, the individual works in 'natural teams', 'critically reflecting upon organizational issues and questioning assumptions and practices' (Ontario, 1992:253). The organization itself, meanwhile, 'demonstrates that it values this questioning:' Organizational learning, accordingly, strives to 'develop individuals committed to their own personal improvement and that of the service they provide to the community' (251) The self-development and motivation of the individual is a pre-requisite of the model.

Individuals thus must see themselves in organizationally-reflexive terms: they must know how their own knowledges, skills and abilities (KSAs) can be useful at an organizational, rather than an individual level (252). Consequently, individual decision-making is reconceived not as anathema to organizational objectives, as it tends to be cast in earlier models of management, but as predisposed to serve the organization. Indeed, organizational learning does not need to make special mention of the inverted decision-making hierarchy of the police organization:

Research suggests that, in future, decision-making will be driven down to the front line. Front-line officers will
require knowledge about the whole organization if their
decision-making is to be holistic and based on information
obtained throughout the system (252: emphasis added).

Recall how the concept of 'individual training' became
popular with the focus on personality. Now 'individual training'
is reconceived as 'organizational learning.' Learning is an
activity dispersed across the networks of the 'learning-focused'
organization, and it is the individual herself and the community
(in partnerships) which is to share in its activation. Under
'learning,' moreover, personal and organizational objectives could
be better understood as common or shared; individual and
organizational agency lose their distinctiveness.

With 'organizational learning' the individual is not feared
as negating or opposing the idealized organization, but is
reconceived positively as working to see his own activity or
enterprise as linked to flexible and adaptive organizational means
and ends. As the emphasis on 'unlearning' suggests, this systems
thinking is really meta-organizational because it has the
individual know his work by idealizing a perfect organizational
harmony or holism which the manifest organization may not be
living up to. In contrast to a subjection to occupational or
professional ethics, the systems thinking of organizational
learning has the individual officer engaged in an idealization of
the meta-organizational values of organizational learning and
systems thinking.

The PLS can be seen as the result of a series of incremental
changes in the way the constable is viewed. We noted that the
task analysis of Project STAR suggested a shift from viewing the
constable in terms of status, to viewing him in terms of
performance. With the PLS, performance is not a static measure,
but a dynamic one, and the constable himself is responsibilized to
ongoingly re-calibrate himself to its changes. In looking at the
constable this way as always coming up to standard, we can see him
as only as good as his last evaluation: and because he is only
prospectively or retrospectively competent, he is always
contingent: he becomes a contingent agency which pieces him or
herself together in an ongoing attempt to reflect the real
dynamism of the organizational ideal. Thus, he or she shapes him
or herself according to emergent competency profiles and mission
statements, always being only a fragment of the idealized organizational whole. New managerialism shifts understandings of essence and character, articulating these terms not in the context of the idealized individual and individual authority, but in the light of the idealized organization and organizational knowledge.

B. R.C.M.P.'s CAPRA 'Problem-solving' Police Training

In 1990, the R.C.M.P. began its own review of its basic recruit training. It came up with its own innovation in police training and education, which it called the CAPRA problem-solving model (see figure 4). Accordingly, 'c' stands for clients, 'a' for acquiring and analyzing information, 'p' for partnership, 'r' for response, and 'a' for assessment. 'Clients' consist of citizens, communities, the public interest, taxpayers, agencies, and departments and the onus on the individual decision-maker to recognize, balance and integrate the 'full range' of 'competing interests' (Himmelfarb, 1992: 8). 'Acquiring and analyzing information' consists of the 'effective and efficient collection, organization, analysis and documentation of information to specify and address problems' (9). 'Partnership' consists of the identification and utilization of partnerships and 'strategic alliances' (10). 'Response' does not only concentrate on enforcement (11), but also sees service, crime prevention, and protection in the orientation of action. Himmelfarb notes that education on principles guiding the use of discretion must round out training on 'police duties, responsibilities, and powers' (ibid.). Finally, 'assessment' refers to a systems model feedback loop, and is the requirement of a continuous review of the 'commitment of each member' and of the organization as a whole to continuous learning and change (12).

Throughout the program, there is an emphasis on learner-centered teaching methodologies like practicals. The stress in the 6 month basic recruit program is not on drills and presentation, but on team problem-solving, negotiation and consensus building, and moral reasoning (24). A case analysis methodology gives teams situations to handle, which they tackle using the CAPRA model as a guide.
C. From infantalization to responsibilization
Responsibilization in policing management works at two levels. On one hand, it is characterized by an off-loading or load-shedding on the part of the state of policing responsibilities; these are handed back to local jurisdictions and to private or voluntary sectors. (cf. e.g. Johnston, 1992). Justificatory discourses like 'public choice' place the onus on individuals to act proactively as consumers. Consumers are to buy security individually and collectively, and to purchase those forms of policing which have little or no bureaucracy.
On the other hand, responsibilization in policing focuses attention on shifting managerial responsibilities for interventions and decision-making on the individual police constable. It dovetails with professionalism in positing the individual officer as, again, the primary unit of service provision. The responsibilized police constable is self-selecting, takes the onus for her own learning or education, manages her own career choices, makes 'executive' decisions for which she is accountable, and has or is expected to get direct consent for her activities, rather than being dependent on bureaucracies and rules in a top-down relation. Finally, she is expected, rather than to follow an authority, to both question extant authorities, and to make herself up as an authority by, in many cases, forging appropriate alliances and networks.

Post-disciplinary training, rather than assuming that the recruit enters into an organization in which there is a bureaucratic insulation, instead prepares the recruit for the 'real' demands that 'real' clients will place on him or her. The learner is no longer the functionary of earlier interpolations, but is understood as a networker and problem-solver with responsibility over nodes.

The PLS and CAPRA offer systems which distance the organization from having direct responsibility for police learning; they also step away from the premises of the total institution and its disembedding and re-socialization mandate. The recruit (now 'learner') is responsibilized to the requirements of problem-solving policing through the dissemination of missions and the assessment of competencies. Learners are to be 'driven to excellence and self-improvement, guided by values, at ease in teams, adaptive to changing circumstances, and able to inspire others' (Himmelfarb, 1994: 4-5).

The 1992 report stressed that this was a step towards a 'learning culture' 'in which all members of R.C.M.P. would share responsibility for their own development and for the development of the organization.' Bringing it home, the 1995 Cadet Training Handbook states, 'You will be responsible for your learning and for meeting the program requirements...failure to do so could result in dismissal' (R.C.M.P., 1995: 13)
D. Re-colonizing the In-group
We have suggested that the in-group has been a primary force in constable socialization, and we have seen how the traditional police training academy has left the cultivation of action-recipes very much in its purview. In the meantime, human relations theorists following Hawthorne have promoted the infiltration of informal systems of primary groups in order to nullify a worker self-understanding ideologically opposed to management (Anthony, 1977: 224). In the 1970s and 1980s, policewomen (cf. Linden and Minch, 1982), judgement training exercises, and human relations courses have been promoted with the (re)-introduction of affect to police agencies. New managerial discourse follows this trajectory of re-colonizing the in-group.

In the disciplinary training academy, infiltration or colonization of the in-group was restricted according to a bifurcation of street and book knowledges. The Task Force had begun the work of breaking these oppositions. It stated that constables must dialogue with their peers and engage in 'group problem-solving' to determine objectives, to derive methods, and to come up with ways of evaluating those methods and objectives (21). In the R.C.M.P.'s training academy, learners are now subject to continuous formal evaluation of their attitudes and behaviour, even in the corridors and after classes. Team-building is complemented--and the in-group colonized!--by making self-assessment and peer-assessment a part of the learning experience and its evaluation. The space of resistance is undercut through learner responsibilization. One of the final practicals in initiation training is a lesson on how to meet one's first departmental assignment with a questioning attitude as to why things are done as they are (A5, A9, D3).

The recolonization of the in-group is also achieved through the competency profiling. The R.C.M.P., like Ontario, conducted an analysis of the competencies it saw as essential in the performance of the basic job function of the constable. Together with missions, these competencies were understood as 'key for the future.' As Frum Himmelfarb of the R.C.M.P.'s Training Research Section put it, 'training is shaped by the R.C.M.P.'s vision of community-based, problem-solving policing and is based on an
analysis of the core competencies for effectiveness' (Himmelfarb, 1992a: 5) Both curriculum and delivery methods were adapted in light of these competencies. It is not rules and regulations which seek a target, but competency evaluations which continually seek expression: the evaluation of competency and the fitting of the particular problem to mission--these are ongoingly practiced as a new drill. Now, what formerly was an advantage to informal realism--the inability to quantify the special competencies of the craft professional--is its weakness. Competency profiles do exactly this quantifying work, and the space of retreat is overtaken. Since these 'drills' are themselves the object of evaluation, peers are doubly implicated in the supervisory process: they are managerialized.

E. De-individualized or nodalized authority

Training...will have to...enhance the recruits ability to work with victims and the community, avoid conflicts, resolve and mediate disputes, provide knowledge on crime prevention strategies and technical information on what works, enhance knowledge of human behaviour, and promote greater interpersonal and communication skills (R.C.M.P., 1992: 25).

Disciplinary governance did shaping by instilling a highly visible status-dependent authority in a hard binary between the power-over and the compliant and obedient servant. One trained up through code and, in gradual increments of permission, played the role of the power-over, always understood as a status role, and in terms of the division between the order-giver and the order-taker. Disciplinary training, consequently promoted iconic or charismatic authority. A glorification of individuality and personal authority operated under cover of the presentations of bureaucratic and depersonalized practices. Even in the academy itself, stories of personal exploits and on-the-spot decision-making ran an ongoing counter-narrative to endless correction to the mean.

The post-disciplinary model of learning re-evaluates personal or individual authority. The displays of deference (such as

87 '[T]he core competencies which shape training throughout the RCMP are derived not from the traditional task analyses or discipline-based approaches, but from an analysis of what constitutes quality service to the community--client centred problem solving partnerships.' (Himmelfarb, 1992: 35)
saluting), the personal knowledge of instructors, and the presence and charisma of instructors is devalued. In deconstructing the individual into representative competencies, and analyzing action is according to consistency with organization-constituting missions, neither icons nor charisma remain to have much force. Instead, authority is reconceived as nodal: it belongs not to an individual, but rather to a reading of relationships and texts.

This reconception is quite explicit in the PLS's and R.C.M.P.'s instructions to recruits to question authority, and in the R.C.M.P.'s case-analysis approach to training as a 'new drill.' Learners are told that the key is not to rely on the opinion of experts or authorities (as expertise is attached to individuals) but to develop analytical skills, research skills, and assessment skills so that each unique situation can be the responsibility of the individual 'case manager.' The McMaster University evidence-based approach to the teaching of medicine, from which the R.C.M.P. program has borrowed (A4), argues that its new paradigm puts 'a much lower value on authority.' Instead, the emphasis is on gaining skills to make 'independent assessments of evidence, and thus evaluate the credibility of opinions being offered by experts' (McMaster, 1996: 3) Both in the principles of the PLS and under CAPRA training, much emphasis is placed on the development of critical and analytical thinking, 'problem-solving,' and on gathering and assessing the evidence necessary to resolve 'problems.'

3. FROM SHAPING TO SORTING: THE CONSTABLE SELECTION PROJECT

These are dangerous days. To say what you feel is to lay your own grave. (Sinead O'Conner)

A great deal of research is now being done into police selection, and sophistication into candidate evaluation has been termed 'the new driving force in the labor markets of the 1990s' (Falcone, 1994) The behavioral interview (Overman, 1995; Herriot, 1993; Motowidlo, 1992; Green, 1991; Desatnick, 1987), recruitment prescreening and self-assessment (Yarborough, 1994; Layne, 1988; Pynes, 1989), and assessment centres (Coulton, 1995; Feltham, 1988), have been touted as efficient, reliable, and cost-effective
in their abilities to link candidate performance to successful career variables.

Although interviews and other selection devices have existed in policing for almost as long as drill, it is relatively recently that reform has focused so strongly on pre-emptive human resource tailoring. There is a very simple logic to this. If scientific methods of selection can validly and reliably predict police constable behaviour on the job, and if resources expended on removing or neutralizing bad behaviour or on shaping good behaviour are the more costly alternative, then good selection technologies make good business sense.

Here, we will analyze a feature of one of these new selection strategies in order to evaluate the meaning of this movement. Again, we will be concentrating on the impact to candidate and constable subjectivity of this shift in reform emphasis.

A. Constable Self-Selection
A recent constable selection initiative, Ontario’s Constable Selection Project (CSP) produced detailed descriptions of the ‘essential tasks’ of police constables. The project identified the ‘core competencies’ of police officers, a list of 19 ‘essential abilities’ police candidates must possess. Eight of these ‘personal characteristics’ it regarded as being expected of candidates before they can be hired. A further 11 competencies were identified as required for continued employment as a police officer. All 19 competencies were tested and found to be related to police work.

The 8 core competencies are: self-control, physical skills/abilities, communication (including understanding, listening and responding, and written communication), self-confidence (including self-assurance, and accurate self-assessment), flexibility/dealing with diversity, analytical thinking, relationship building, and achievement orientation. The CSP evaluated each of these on a four point scale from +3 to -1. In doing its pilot projects, the CSP determined that the level of competency for the constable candidate is best set at ‘2’ for each of the 8 competencies. Candidates not meeting this threshold are to be considered below standard. Ideally, competencies are to be tested at all phases of the selection process. In keeping with
holistic and systems approaches, continuous evaluation and feedback on as many measures as manageable is the ideal.

Below is a self-assessment questionnaire to be used as the CSP's first piece in self-selection. This self-scored paper and pencil job knowledge and competency assessment questionnaire is designed to 'help potential applicants form accurate views of a police constable' (Ontario, 1993: 23). The CSP wants 'only those applicants who are attracted and properly motivated to the real nature of the job' (ibid.) to apply. 'In this way, a certain percentage of unsuitable candidates will screen themselves out of the selection system and, therein, save themselves and the system time, effort, and money' (ibid., 24).

'If you want to become a police officer,' the attending literature states, 'you should be able to answer 'yes' to all of these questions (or 'not applicable' to question number seven)' (Ontario, 1995: 2). The first few questions ask about legal status including criminal conviction, driving license, education, and ability to meet the physical demands and willingness to work shifts.

1. Are you a Canadian citizen or permanent resident?
2. Are you legally entitled to work in Canada?
3. Do you have a valid driving license with full driving privileges and no more than six demerit points?
4. Are you at least 18 years of age?
5. Have you successfully completed four years of secondary school, or the equivalent?
6. Can you meet the physical demands of police duty?
7. If you have ever been convicted under a federal statute, or if you have received a discharge related to a finding of guilt, have the records been sealed by the R.C.M.P.?
8. Are you certified (or will you be certified) in CPR and First Aid?
9. Are you willing to work shifts, including weekends, nights, evenings and holidays?

The last eleven questions follow up this probing into the candidate's mere capacity. The questionnaire now seeks answers demonstrating self-awareness:

10. When you make plans, do you think ahead about the obstacles you might meet and how to deal with them.
11. When you make a decision, do you consider all your options, and weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each one.
12. Do you have enough self-confidence to be assertive when necessary?
13 Can you make necessary decisions when you are uncertain?
14. When you are talking to someone, do you check to make sure you understand their concerns, feelings or needs?
15 Do you equally value people from various cultures that are different from yours?
16. Do you make an effort to learn about cultures that are different from yours?
17. Can you deal with stressful situations in a calm and constructive way?
18. Are you comfortable in different social situations and in establishing rapport with others?
19. Do you try your best when you have a task to complete?
20. Do you assess your strengths and weaknesses objectively, and try to improve yourself?

This is what makes it a self-selection technology. It seeks to align the self-to-self relation with the domination of the self by remote others. We saw earlier how the oath does this too. We noted then how what Weber described as the elective affinity of a Protestant ethic and the 'spirit' of capitalism was also such a mechanism. With the CSP's self-selection questionnaire an external subjectifying agent is discursively and in some cases instrumentally removed. It achieves its purpose by appearing to 'trust' the candidate to make her own evaluations. In so deploying trust, it metaphorically gives the candidate responsibility for the decision as to her candidacy for the constabulary.

What is required of the candidate here is that he affirm a commitment to multiculturalism, to high achievement, to accurate self-assessment, and the other competencies identified by the CSP as essential to constable competence. She must affirm this not for any external evaluator, but for her own good. It is her own interest which is served, and she herself who has been given the (heuristic) authoritative position (the specialized knowledge of the self) from which to make the determination.

Behind these questions there is a preoccupation on the part of selection architects: 'has the candidate done her soul work? has she finished the homework of the soul? Because that's not our business anymore.' The requirement on accurate self-assessment, in being built right into the core competencies of the constable, offers a vehicle with which to move the onus of hiring and firing--of making up the constable--back to the court of the officer
herself: she is to prepare the self: the supervisory role is the offering of instruments for her use in this regard.

B. Quantifying Competence

We begin to see the latest culmination of task analysis. Previously, the behaviourist psychology undergirding Project STAR was informed with the redistribution logic of the state, and the fragmentation of constabulary work into discrete tasks was aimed at building a better, unified whole out of the sum of these parts. With recent selection technologies behaviourist psychology links with human resources management and neo-managerialist themes. The power in new devices is their utility in disaggregating and then recombining tasks within organizations. The rationalization of the constable into discrete capacities or competencies offers a vehicle with which to create not a whole person in the constable, but rather risk-reduced employees which are verified in threshold competency profiles.

The previous convention in police recruitment and selection was to keep candidates in the dark not only about their status in the process, but also about the specific criteria on which they were being judged—on what the recruiter was looking for. According to this methodology, which fell under the purview of a 'stress training' approach (cf. Kean, Hess and Ungerlieder, 1994; Eisenhart, 1975; Hopper, 1977), recruiters disclosed little about either the time-frames of the process or how the testing mechanisms related to the specific character-profiles sought. Indeed, they used information deprivation as one means of doing pre-selection, which is to say of discouraging all but the most motivated from staying in pursuit of the career. In the meantime, a counter-narrative was offered to some desired candidates: intermittent and informal reassurances were given (Van Maanen, 1973). In interviews under the 'stress training' strategy, recruiters used shock and surprise: they asked unexpected and pointed questions, questions which could not be answered with applicant knowledge, and questions which were framed in an interrogation mode. With this methodology, recruiters sought to look through the errors, obfuscations or discomfort of applicants in order to find—as one police officer put it—the 'intangibles' of 'police character' (C3). Catching an applicant off-guard,
recruiters attempted to assess whether an applicant's reaction indicated a character consistent with police work (or with hiring preferences). The process itself was used as a 'hard technology' to get behind the presentation and affect of the applicant (cf. e.g. Overman, 1995).

Recent selection techniques like that of the CSP, abandon the methodology of 'stress training.' Rather than looking through presented behaviour to what lies behind it, the recruiter looks within presented behaviour to determine if its structure is consistent with sought-after values (cf. e.g. Falcone, 1994). Rather than seeking to get behind presentation, this technology actively evaluates the police neophyte's careful performance of presentational skills, and her knowledge of them. The transparency of the process makes it incumbent upon applicants to master the language of values represented in the key competencies (e.g. dealing with diversity, relationship building, achievement orientation) -and this is what it takes to become a police constable. In interview, a member of the core working group of the CSP acknowledged that a candidate for policing would be right in wanting to have, for preparation purposes, the findings and reports of the CSP itself.

One of the goals we have is that applicants should know up front what they're being asked...If people are going to prepare themselves in being a police constable, let them know. 'Just tell us what we need so that if I don't have it I can get on with my life.' So that was one thing, and we would encourage them to use this (E3).

The CSP follows quite a different line with regard to the constable-shaping enterprise. One of the architects of this program told me that it does not matter if the applicant merely 'plays the game' and provides the answers which are obviously wanted (the questions would be trickier if it did matter). Playing the game, she said, is part of being a good police officer: after all, the police officer is always translating from the particular into the general when the specific interaction is pushed into police forms. Indeed, self-selection technologies asks those who might truthfully (or ethically) answer, no, they do not always try their best when they have a task to complete (sometimes they question the task), or, no, they do not assess
their strengths and weaknesses objectively (they may feel that, objectively, they underrate themselves) to nevertheless 'say' yes. This thereby asks for a demonstration, in a first big leap of faith, of a commitment to the 'game.' It is on the level of a proceduralist ethics, and not substantive ethics—even at its cost—that the police officer is vetted.

The value being propounded here is the commitment to a suspension of value-judgement. The CSP rejects the view, which had, of course, been waning for decades, in a 'ground zero,' or prediscursive self which the department can reshape to fit institutional preferences. Instead of doing deconstructing and reconstructing work, the selecting and training technologies focus on fine-tuning character-measuring devices in order to choose those 'pre-socialized' individuals: individuals who have already done what is now the 'homework' of the soul.

CONCLUSION
The Mission of the Ontario Provincial Police is to provide a sensitive, community oriented service that promotes an environment in Ontario in which all people will be secure in their pursuit and enjoyment of all lawful activities (O.P.P, 1995: 2).

Under disciplinary governance we saw that 'individuality' became heuristically associated with a form of resistance, whether mild or more undermining to the administrative authority: the 'soft' colonization of the soul depended on the in-group, and the hard delineations of space demanded 'out spaces' like the mess hall or academy corridors. These provided the setting for counter-narratives in a disciplinary administration. While the disciplinary administration attempted to work at assuring a sure and certain control of action through keen attention to territorial spaces and a utilitarian dispensation of pain or deprivation (disciplinary regulations), a counter-narrative modified the aims or goals of these practices, 'real' action was the result of authoritative expression vetted on subcultural norms. Real expression always needed cover and stood opposed to procedural regularity. Personal authority, reputation, and 'instinct' were identified with the informal means of doing good police work. Even in the alterations to standard dress, 'true' authority was found in a resistance to prescribed conduct.

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A managerial governance is an answer to this problem of the reliance on resistance in the discursive promotion of individual action. We noted that managerialism sees the organization as the fundamental unit of society. This understanding of managerialism as privileging the organization and de-privileging the individual appears at first to run counter to its prizing of initiative, character, and entrepreneurship, and its exaltation of management gurus as high priests of an enterprise culture. However, it is within managerialist discourse that there is a high premium on individuality: managerialist texts incessantly celebrate the innovations of individuals, individuals who are heuristically 'free' to imagine better organizational worlds (Morgan, 1993). Managerialist discourse deploys the metaphor of 'continual transformation' and 'ongoing change' to posit initiative, innovation, and inspiration with the most fundamentally pro-organizational attributes. Individuals are understood off the top with managerial aims because managerial discourse already assumes a readership of managers and a life-world consisting of management problems. It is the creative manager which is interpolated in managerial texts. Personal charisma, creativity, innovation, risk-taking are all features both of dynamic organizations and of productive managers. Managerialism has in this respect been a way of speaking the individual without assuming the limits of the organization. The use of mental schemata, the emphasis on innovation and responsibilization over rule-following and office holding, the focus on constant learning, and the efforts to produce and reproduce pithy organizational missions are all oriented to the reproduction of the organization in what becomes the heuristic device of 'the individual.' Organization and individual are blurred in the ongoing drafting of missions and capacities.

It is important to underline what is occurring here: while the democratic state interpolates individuals with universal suffrage as heuristic equals who must be factually contended with, new managerialism interpolates only those individuals who are 'yous', only those persons who further the corporation, and, even more, only those individuals who are real decision-makers in the organization: this is what Enteman means when he argues that
managerialism sees the organization as the root unit of society. Managerial texts utilize some of the most abstract sociological concepts in the furtherance of a selectively inclusive interpolation of subjectivity.\(^8\) Note how the self-to-self relation of the individual is subsumed by enterprise culture in the way that Donzelot (1990) describes. The value of the individual is not in the for-itself (an interpolation which leaves the individual with a constituting dynamism which is not presumptively linked to organizational goals), but in the for-enterprise (an interpolation which intervenes to shape the self-to-self according to the pleasure in work).

A changing logic of governance is quite discernible in constable shaping philosophy. Previously, it was enough that the neophyte constable or trainee could be drilled or tested for his absorption of the competencies or knowledges of the craft. In demonstrating that competence or knowledge, it was thought, the constable was making his amenability to capacitation by an administrative authority plain as the shine on his badge: he passed or failed, he dressed and looked smartly or did not. What he did in his mind to bring himself up under the training eye of superiors was not a matter of explicit concern. Once the body was dressed and the habits drilled and responsive to command, it was assumed that one also had all that was necessary of the self-to-self relation.\(^9\) To put it in a short form, the ontology of the constable was housed in the corpus of the ready and available troops. In the earliest regulatory regimes, of primary importance

\(^8\)In new managerialist texts like Morgan's Imaginization what we get is a management discourse which leaves interpretive power with managers, which encourages innovative and creative thinking for the furtherance of organizational objectives, and which, in negotiating between flexible methods and fixed objectives, is rhetorically inclusionary but factually exclusive. Constable-centred policing and the network managing constable is a rhetorical coup. Managerial reform talk is a discourse which, it almost goes without saying, presupposes the reader as a manager of an organization. The PLS recommends, for instance, that middle managers be provided 'with more in-depth education and training on the theory and approaches to organizational learning.' (Ontario, 1992: 263) Constables, it is to be assumed, will get the theory second-hand. They are not directly interpolated by this reform talk. Indeed, they are out in the field with limited access to the total system.

\(^9\)However, although declining as an object of reform, the training philosophy which concentrates on the body and which employs the replication of authority and discipline over self-discipline and self-control (or self-management--in its latest variant) in fact continues. It continues, however, in the form of a stabilizing counter-narrative.

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was evidence that these men were indeed ready and available--and available for the broadest legitimate administrative authority. Those constables who showed themselves to be fearful or 'cowardly,' as Chief Constable Prince succinctly put it, were useless.

Indeed, this body shaping and habit drilling was augmented with the utilization of the group we have discussed. The informal working group of peers offered a structuring or re-evaluation of remote decision-making (commands), and rather than being seen as dangerous to the integrity and control of remote authorities, the informal values of the group came to be viewed as enabling of disembedding and facilitative of normalization. The informal working culture was supported and cultivated as distinct and insulated from parallel local non-police authorities: part of this approach was a rough and ready segregation policy, but it also included what may be called a soft colonization of the mind as evidenced in the concern for reading materials and leisure. The group thus situated and fine-tuned the self to self relation of the constable on the contours of the readiness as a force and the willingness to use force. These became the ontological values of safety and stress.

We have seen, however, how the ethos of this in-group came to insulate the action-recipes of the constable, and oppose him to the intrusions of remote command. While this had been useful in allowing the maintenance of the oppositions of the law enforcer, which also served to distinguish the profession and its objects, that utility wore down with the exposure of what was seen as unstructured discretion. Subsequently, the self-to-self relation and the 'individuality' of each became an explicit object in the various manifestations of judgement training. It was no longer the working group or in-group which was to structure affect and broker a truce between action and permissions, rather, 'learning' would work through that affect and bring it up with the reflexive engagement of the individual to forge transparent case by case resolutions.\footnote{Indeed, in discussing a methodology for the teaching of human relations training, the \textit{Report on Police Training} working paper argued that the lecture method (or the 'chalk and talk') was not a good instructional technique for}
implicit importance in training methodologies, but today self-awareness and self-knowledge has become an explicit object.

Two things have thus occurred. First, then, the interior evaluative terrain of the individual is no longer presumptively relinquished to the normative work of the peer group. As we have seen in the (re)discovery of discretion, the structure of front-line decision-making, rather than being left invisible, becomes an object of administrative governance. This makes it no longer administratively sufficient to depend on the distribution and enforcement of rules, leaving their interpretation at a 'low visibility.' Rather, the focus off the top is on how interpretation is structured. And because discretion and judgement has become an explicit administrative object, police administrations can no longer view the dispensation and delivery of body shaping and habit inculcation as sufficient to an organizational refreshment undertaken top-down. Since constables make executive decisions and (most visibly) deliver the product of policing or security, the resources of the organization are to be restructured from the point of view of that product-delivering constable (e.g. O.P.P., 1995).

Second, the movement towards horizontal organizational models is also a shift in the responsibility for training delivery. There is a demand that officers are responsible for their own training, (Sawyer, 1980; Ontario, 1992; R.C.M.P., 1992; O.P.P. 1995: 39) and come to know their needs in a constant attentiveness to their own status as individual 'enterprises' (Donzelot, 1991).

Once the neophyte constable begins to be problematized not as a kind of tabula rasa which needs inscribing but as an 'equal partner' in a transactional process, constable shaping becomes not a problem of the replication of authority, but a problem of its ongoing reproduction. Whereas replication understood the problem in terms of the fashioning of the new according to the stable form of the old, reproduction now sees the problem in terms of a continual quest for legitimacy, a quest in which the continuously revitalized constable is set against a shifting context of human relations training, emphasizing that a trainee 'needs to know what his own response will be in a given situation, and needs to observe and evaluate those responses in that situation.' (Ontario, 1975: 14)
destabilized authority relations, and in which the constable herself is required not only to produce a service, but to know and to show how that production is consistent with missions.
CONCLUSION

PASTICHE POLICING?

This study has examined the subjectification of the constable in Ontario under key moments of reform to discover how he (and now she) has been articulated as an agent of governance. We began with the earliest instantiation in the nineteenth century, and found that he was enabled or capacitated through the oath, legislation, and appointment criteria. The constable's mid-nineteenth century 'professionalization' occurred under disciplinary reforms. Attendant technologies like codes of regulations and the structuring of the beat tried to take the 'citizen' out of the constable by moving to govern the whole of his time according to a recolonization of urban space. In the early twentieth century, professional association again reshaped constable idealizations. Manuals, associations and police-authored technologies began to shape the constable as an expert law enforcer. In the training academy, we found that this idealization did not hold. We noted conflicts between a discourse of disciplinary governance and its emphasis on appearance protocols, and a discourse of realist informalism generated out of street practices. Judgement drills and templates and, subsequently, new managerial reforms were two instances of a further recolonization of the interpretive terrain of the constable. In analyzing these, we found that while early mechanism like drill attempted to shape the constable through his habits, judgement shaping templates began to shape him through his discretion and autonomy.

In our analysis of changes in the shaping of the constable as an agent of governance, we have taken the view that a regulatory space is like an onion. At the core of the onion is the right of the administrative authority to rule. In an emergent state, or when there is a rotten spot in the onion where layers are fused or punched out by ethnic conflict, this right to rule is sometimes exposed and vulnerable, at which point coercive and dramatic displays intending to prove that right take place. In most societies and under the hybridization of regulation today, some administrative tasks are more exposed than others, thus compelling
a resort to demonstrations of coercive display which 'prove' the
presence of the will to rule. 'Proving' displays intend to
consolidate core values and interests within territorial and
institutional boundaries. Beyond the constitutional core and with
emergent consensus, the display and proving wanes and more
instrumental forms of administration begin to take place. Objects
(other than proving the right to rule) may be pursued by an
administrative authority seeking now not merely to show off, but
to 'do.'

Under liberal rule, once foundation security is no longer
under immediate threat, governance can take on the task of
strengthening through disciplining and through the disciplines,
and simultaneously, through rewarding individual endeavours and
stimulating motivations or interests. Particular principles of
governance are installed usefully and implicated profoundly in the
economy of individuals' lives and in the protocols between
institutions. Policing and the police partake in this achievement
in the very style in which they regulate others and are regulated
themselves. Consequently, we began our narrative with legislation
and spoke of constabulary enablement.

Gradually, as institutions consolidate according to a reading
of foundational principles and norms, the conceptualization of the
police constable moves away from the logic of territory-saturation
or polity-capacitation to concerns which rather take these as raw
material givens. With deep institutional and normative
accumulation on the core of a foundation or sovereign authority,
the business of governance can be allocated, and experts can begin
to do their own relatively autonomous interpretations of the
proper governance of distinct jurisdictional domains. We turned
to the institution and the profession and looked at a few examples
of how the constable is shaped to meet professional objectives.
This, too, is consistent with the methodology of liberal policing
and its, at least discursive, separation between policy-making and
operational functions. We chose material which appeared to be
most characteristic and reflective of the predisposition towards
professional consolidation under the law enforcer, but we might as
easily have concentrated on how emergent hard technologies
themselves operated as a forcing-house of police subjectivity. We
also looked inside the training academy as a miniaturization of this evolution in the formats of the occupational terrain, and saw that disciplinary governance produced a subjectivity which was modified under post-disciplinary technologies.

Today, public police have begun to buy into neomanagerial propositions (cf. Ontario, 1995; Ontario, 1992). Rather than playing up state grounding or the sovereign tie, the police have become increasingly inclined to cultivate horizontal linkages or 'partnerships' with civil institutions. Consequently, the constable, rather than being seen as a state agent or local representative of sovereign authority, comes to see herself and to be seen more pronouncedly as a networker, problem-solver or institution liaison worker—a person who interprets the jurisdictions of multiple state and civil authorities. The transition in constable-shaping technologies reflects this change of view from constable as state agent to constable as authority-worker or network manager. In this vein, we noted how the CAPRA program reconceived authority as useful interpretations of relationships and texts. The degree to which an office grounded in an 'original authority' can be made self-consciously relativist about authority is open to question.

In this study, we have also highlighted the effects of shaping narratives through the prism of the constable's autonomy and regulation. In assessing the operation of practices and technologies like drill, the mobilization of beats, and judgement templates, we have seen that the constable's autonomy or agency has been the object of various regulatory approaches, and that each has helped to shape him, even if the consequence may have made further regulatory 'solutions' appear appropriate. In a reversal of the logic of constitutionality, we have seen how different training or shaping strategies have acted as templates to structure not only action, but, indeed, legitimacy. New

91 Whereas Foucault had stated famously that the state concerns itself with individuals insofar as they are useful or threatening to it, since managerialism sees the root social unit as the organization (Enteman, 1993), individuals only exist as they are useful to these organizations. It is a discourse which takes organizational integrity and health as the presumptive end and means of social organization, and it is a discourse which makes no reference to an 'outside' or margin of organizationally de-linked individuality.
managerial responsibilization technologies, for example, structure action through a merging of necessity and legitimation at the point of their application.

In contrasting autonomy and regulation, we have also been saying that liberalism consists of the twin principles of self government (or the duty to govern the self) and individual enterprise (or the right to enterprise the self). One question which we have addressed is how we can have regulation at the same time that we give room to enterprise and autonomy. Two strategies have revealed themselves through our analysis: governance through discretion and governance through sorting.

To take up the first, professionalism, as we saw, has come to mean not only the freedom from external constraint, nor only an expression of the duty to self govern, but also the responsibility to 'enterprise' one's work. The training academy was put on the map as a place to do police constable shaping as a result of an articulation of a professional right. Under a disciplinary governance and the purview of that right, police constables were trained to obey, subject to detailed codes of regulations (even over their private lives), and had their habits and conduct shaped through drills and tight bureaucratic oversight. But individuality under liberalism has turned the self into an enterprise, and revitalized individual responsibility, making it the 'learner's' responsibility to acquire skills, knowledges and abilities. In training reforms under new managerialism, it is constabulary enterprise rather than constabulary rights and regulation which offers a discursive re-centering of the constable. Rather than being rhetorically and practically evaded as an object of direct regulation, the interpretive autonomy of the constable has become central. With judgement templates and responsibilization protocols the constable is governed through her decision-making autonomy. In thus regulating through discretion, new managerialism not only offers the possibility of restructuring the role of the police constable as responsibilized, but also offers a mechanism for undermining the meaningfulness and tenability of sub-cultural resistance.

Governance-through-sorting technologies have also been advanced, and these too appear to regulate whilst respecting
autonomy. By allocating individuals according to formally recognized competencies they are giving a predefined space or license in which to act 'creatively' while retained tight oversight through ongoing evaluation of competency profiles. It is not the individual who belongs with these licenses or spaces, but rather a set of competencies which may be found in one individual or which may be packaged together from the individuals in which they are found. A governance through this sorting is one which sees the unified subject as an ongoing construction. There is no generalizeable icon or idol, there are only specified spaces and packages of competencies which may occupy them.

The trouble for the public police constable as a distinct or 'untouchable' continuity is that her enterprise and autonomy appears to find no avenue for forward progress outside of the formal appreciations of the organization. In being identified with enterprise, in being expected to be creative, in being stripped of the distinction between herself and the business of management, and in coming to know herself in terms of missions and competencies (which also colonize the in-group), the police constable's regulation seems to be more thorough now than under the most rigorous disciplinary practices.

Indeed, the constitution of the front line police officer has been moving in two directions simultaneously. Specialization continues apace, and there is an increasingly arcane schedule of knowledges and practices, practices which make sense to experts, but which are often puzzling and sometimes even offensive to lay persons. We have all seen evidence of the consequences of greater and finer specialization. The constable's specialist interpretation of compliance and resistance show up in such events as the Rodney King beating (cf. Koon, 1992). To laypersons (and perhaps generalists in the profession), specialist readings of, for instance, 'text-book use of the baton,' and the 'swarming technique' only confirms the width of the gulf between specialist and non-specialist understandings. As a professional and specialist, the police constable becomes selective to institutional and organizational values, goals and constraints rather than to broader constituencies: indeed, this has been one of the purposes of police professionalization.
The institution of public policing, as we have seen, has offered its own corrective to this condition. The generalist constable is a deliberate rejection of the specialist in the offering of front-line policing. The generalist constable and community policing offers a re-embedding of the constable as an agent of governance and a re-engagement of policing in the normativity of the social. A turn away from the arcane interpretations of specialist policing is obvious in the delayering of the organization, in the idealization of the generalist constable of community policing, in the increased use of volunteers and expanded civilianization, and in the horizontalization or greater accessibility of agencies to the public. These have all contributed to the message that the public police are returning to Peel's rhetoric that the 'police are the public and the public are the police.'

Although the discourse of the generalist offers to recapture an idealization of exemplary and normative citizenship, the method does not always comport with the object, and the object is not easily discerned on the horizon. A danger of a community policing under new managerialism is that the holism advanced refers to nothing more than the ongoing learning or refreshing of organizational missions and interests, whatever these may be for now. Despite its discursive references to holism and whole systems, new managerialism has deployed its own rationalisms on agents of governance. The constable is pulled apart as a package of competencies, and is prospectively sutured together as a temporary marriage of competencies and organizational missions. Competency profiles flatten the constable into numerous attributes which can be institutionally reported. Whatever remains beyond the quantifications of the competency readings is not an organizational fact because it cannot be measured with any degree of validity or reliability. 'Character,' 'agency' or 'essences' become nostalgic terms.

O'Malley (1996) has reviewed the argument that policing is essentially modern (Reiner, 1992, Dandeker, 1990) and has asked whether in that context policing reform has shifted according to the disintegrations and dispersion of postmodernity (real or imagined), arguing instead that a neo liberal and new
managerialist political rationality provides an accounting for recent trends in policing.

Certainly fragmentation and dispersion are readings consistent with postmodern accounts of the social condition. Baudrillard (1988) has written that American culture is characterized by the unattached sign. Dean (1996, 211) has underscored the dispersion of authority, arguing that today, 'a multiplicity of authorities, movements, and agencies come into play.' Other writers have thematized postmodern culture (as opposed to postmodernity) similarly. Jameson (1984) emphasizes its pastiche forms.

Pastiche policing is policing which makes empty or parodying reference to this condition of an absent order. Historically, it is only relatively recently that God, science and the state have lost their force to secure legitimations and ground conduct. When the constable wears signs borrowed from a past which she herself believes to be irrelevant, or from an authority which she believes is weak or irreversibly compromised, or contested as one among many, it is a blank parody on policing which she can and does offer. Pastiche policing is thus a continual self-conscious referencing to grounds and legitimations which are deployed in disbelief of their being anything but expedients. The 'weak' or ritual grounds uttered by constables merely reflects the reality of a lack of faith in the fit between any action and its legitimation.

The future? We already see a collage of signs on private security and community police officers referencing the state, the organization, the community, and the corporate interests which come to use their bodies like advertisers use sportscars and athletes. If today an integrated individuality according to an idealization of liberal humanism is no longer a possibility either for people in general or constables in particular, something must fill the vacuum sucking after its departure. Here, we can look forward to a cascading multiplicity of 'weak' references, empty rituals, and vacuous slogans, none of which attach to anything we may (nostalgically) perceive as solid. Perhaps it will be in the play and give between multiple authorities that a new agent of
governance will arise. If so, the professional constable may very well cease to carry on as an exemplary form of its realization.
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OPPM Ontario Provincial Police Museum
PAO Public Archives of Ontario
MTPM Metro Toronto Police Museum
NAC National Archives of Canada

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