Sense: Orientations, Meanings, Apparatus. Ideological dimensions of select twentieth-century occidental texts devoted to technology, perception and reproduction.

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Centre for Comparative Literature in the University of Toronto

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ABSTRACT
The study tests the discursive limits of current models of the human sensorium; outlines the mapping of the eye/ear pair onto the mind/body dichotomy and how this constructs a passive sensorium and entrenches anti-intellectual and anti-erotic stances; calls for an examination of the dialectical interplay between sensation and cogitation through a re-valuation of the role of abstraction in acts of reading and perception; argues that unchallenged sensory biases are at work in dyadic models of reproduction; examines ethno-scientific assumptions underlying theories of social and biological reproduction; probes deployment of sensory organizations in theory-making about models of generation; traces the consequences of sensory organizations for theory-making about models of interpretation; presents a typology of dichotomist versus dialectical epistemologies; stakes the claim that models and material practices stand in a
dialectical relation to each other; posits, finally, that non-reductive functional approaches to narrative enhance the modelling of an interactive sensorium and open the way for non-trivial analysis of narratives coded in other than linguistic means.

for Douglas

amans amandus semper
Consciousness and discourse must remain heterogeneous, their reduction to the same is a return to metaphysics. Of this we must take care.

Ronald A. T. Judy
In *L’invention intellectuelle* Judith Schlanger suggests that noise, the sheer mass of popularisation which the French call "vulgarisation" contributes to significant breakthroughs. Each rearticulation of current knowledge is a displacing repetition and affects however slightly the paths open and opening to thinkers. Opting for more flash, Marshall McLuhan stated that breakdown leads to breakthrough. One could endorse such a historiography of crisis and rupture. However ways have been opened to do otherwise.

McLuhan’s way of telling stories was grounded in a faith where the past was good and the future would be better. Whatever alternatives were available to McLuhan at mid-century, one does well in this late twentieth century to attend to Ludwig Pfeiffer as he expresses the hope of moving away from "cultural nostalgia and technological euphoria" that have turned sour (*Materialities of Culture* 12). The past cannot be glorified and the future remains uncertain. The one is not here and the other not gone.

Thus one comes to do the careful reading of less than spectacular texts, to take up the essays,
meditations and theoretical accounts of less well known thinkers, to sift patiently and find the variations in the production of cultural paradigms. There can be no Pharaonic injunctions against straw since all this activity is of course keyed to intervention, repeated intervention, vulgar intervention, against dominant ideologies.

All this meddling is focused upon the repeated and varied question of the organization of the senses, in particular the possibilities of translation between sight and sound. The study before you is testing the discursive limits of current models of the human sensorium.

Each section of the study that follows examines how an organization of the senses affects theory making. The sections need not be read in any particular order. They may stand alone. Or they may be paired. The first section demonstrates that forms of sensory organization are correlated with models of reproduction. To test this correlation, the next section examines the sensory biases at work in models of reproduction. The next sections are concerned with sensory organizations in theory-making about models themselves. The first of these examines a critique of a model of the generation of narratives and there follows a section devoted to models of interpretation. The
following section stakes the claim that models and material practices stand in a dialectical relation to each other. There follows a metacommentary which explains why the boundary lines in the pairings perception-reproduction and generation-interpretation keep breaking up or down which ever direction you prefer.

There is no getting lost if you have patience with repetitions, tolerance for a bit of noise and stamina for a lot of vulgar recoding. Nothing novel. But worth repeating and refreshing. You will find the model of the cybernetic machine applied to human communication and perception. You will find the critique of the ideology of romance applied to the politics of reproduction. You will find critique and modelling combined.

You will not find a big bang. In the presentation, there is no moment of great disclosure. This choice arises not only from a historiographic suspicion of hastily claimed breaks with the past. The decision to arrange the presentation to allow for a variety of reading sequences also stems from epistemological considerations. A plot marrying reproduction and revelation would depend upon an initial separation of the knowing, the known and the knower. It would be senseless. The tool and the user are part of a system
of events. And it is through tools we come to sense the world, comprehend our selves, understand our work and know our tools but also such ways of thinking and practices of embodiment query the tidy relation between revelation and reproduction, a relation that is responsible in large measure for many a discursive move that conflates world, self and text, reducing the complexity of their interaction to a dull and deadening dyad.
Abstraction is good. Clear communication about abstraction better. One is of the life of the mind. The other, of the life of the mind in a body.

These boldly stated values are contagious. The propagation of stances that affirm both feeling and thinking is salutary for bodies and minds contending against anti-erotic and anti-intellectual forces, positions, and effects. Passionate theorizing fosters a culture of the question and such a culture cannot be disinterested, cannot be insensitive to the manner of posing questions, cannot neutralize inquiry. To remind oneself of this at the outset is also to remind oneself that passionate theorizing and adequate abstraction, like appropriate technology, contribute to clarity and action. Theory has consequences.

Abstraction transports one from the given to the possible. As abstraction moves away from an underlying reality, a putative last instance, it moves towards a form, a portable pattern, a template. Abstraction is akin to transcoding. In the succession of analytic and synthetic moments, in the movements of separation and recombination, a materialism is feasible, thought and
bodily patterns readable.

This is not a new way of being in the world. There are precursors. Andrew Hodges, about Alan Turing, has written that his "was a materialist view of mind, but one that did not confuse logical patterns and relations with physical substances and things, as so often people did." (291). Turing was an atheist. He was also a mathematician and homosexual. A story could be told of how this combination of ways of being in the world affected and shaped his world outlook, contributed to his refusal to reify logical patterns into empirical constructs.

Of course a variant of such a story would imply that the non atheist, non mathematician, non homosexual is more apt to reify tropes as empirical constructs especially if such a negatively defined way of being in the world comes with literary training. The classic case is Marshall McLuhan. The media guru thrived on metaphors. His cyclical view of history and his sharp periodization depend upon the figure of ever reversible dominance of eye or ear. It is a forgivable litotes to claim that McLuhan’s hyperbolic elevation of chiasmus to the status of explanatory principle was and remains influential. Not so forgivable is the claim that the purity of his discursive machine is maintained by his vitriolic condemnation of dialectic, a condemnation not
unrelated to his conversion to Catholicism and championing of sex-role stereotypes.

Regardless of its origins, McLuhan’s undialectical dualist division of the senses so aligns aesthetic and cognitive practices that rationality is set against sensation with no understanding of the mediating instance that is perception. Jacob Bronowski’s argument in a lecture entitled "The Mind as an Instrument of Understanding" offers another succinct example:

If you think of it, there are essentially only two groups of arts that human beings practice. One group includes arts which are mediated by the sense of sight, like sculpture and painting; the other group includes arts which are mediated by speech and sound, like the poem and the novel and the drama and music. Of the human senses these two dominate our outlook. The sense of sight dominates our outlook on the outside world, whereas the sense of hearing is used by us largely in order to make contact with other people or with other living things. There is a very clear distinction in the way in which most of the time we use vision to give us information about the world and sound to give us information about other people in the world.

I should just say in passing that, of course, other senses enter the picture. For example, it is said that Eskimos make those very small sculptures because they carry them and feel them. And one of the senses which is not even one of the five classical senses, the kinesthetic sense, is obviously part of our appreciation of dancing or moving. But by and large, this division between the arts of sight and the arts of sound (including music) is clear cut.

The world of science, however, is wholly dominated by the sense of sight. (Origins of Knowledge and Imagination 10-11)
Bronowski unwittingly offers memoryless pictures and sounds, a world void of stories. Perception in such an account is severed from dispositions to act in the world. The senses operate in a passive fashion.

However as Maurice Merleau-Ponty indicates "[b]efore becoming the symbol of a concept it [the sign] is first of all an event which grips my body, and this grip circumscribes the area of significance to which it has reference" (Phenomenology of Perception 235). Or as Harry Hunt states:

We do not notice the gap between the senses because their intersensory combinations are organized into a system of pragmatic, sequentially directed intelligence that allows the sight of something to be its "name" and that name to include an accent and emphasis that is also a postural readiness for various motoric "doings." (955)

To return metadiscursively for a moment to the eye-ear tradition of Bronowski and McLuhan, one can vouch that the habits of postural readiness, the bodily gripping, pro or con, induced by the invocation of a dualist division of the senses become CLEARER and LOUDER once that division is transcoded onto a gender grid (male science and sight versus female arts and hearing).

One suspects the division of the senses harbours a marriage scenario. Even without the gendering of the opposition, the dichotomy is essentialized, mediations blocked, and dialectic dies.

To rethink and to reassert the embodied nature of
knowledge, one comes to work upon and play with the production of texts devoted to technology, perception and reproduction. Attending to such a nexus permits one to critique the assumption of dyadic interaction in the construction of knowledge and the apprehension of signification. One can combine rhetorical and narratological analysis of these texts to not only catalogue dominant tropes and cardinal stories but also to read such a catalogue as a chronologically dense map that indicates the passages of forces shaping the production and reception of the text, in other words, its history and teleology.

If the organisation of the senses into somatic configurations is similar to the organisation of catalogues of figures and maps of stories, then the embodied nature of knowledge operates by means of a game of valences. Ideology is at home here. These organisations and configurations represent and enact axiological choices. Embodied knowledge in the form of experiences is discursively keyed to sensory modalities, stories or figures. According to how they are valued and keyed, experiences are differentially regulated. Also, the social regulation of perceptual and cognitive experience affects discursive possibilities.

Technology, perception and reproduction are
ideologically inflected. This itself is an ideological position. It is a position that claims that an apparatus orients meanings. It is also a position that redeploy points of departure in that meanings orient the apparatus. Of course, meanings and apparatus inflect the orientation. Such a shell game in a field of axioms, such a bending of metalevel relations, has material consequences for one's understanding and interaction with machines and systems.

Depending on how one constructs one's machines, one may be locked into two-player games and double-bind situations.¹ A dialectical understanding of the senses offers alternative games and a machine fuelled by its own activity.

A sensorium is a receiver and a dispatcher. A sensorium is a semiotic machine. Such a device is capable not only of sensation. It remembers; it perceives. Acts of perception as discrete somatic signals form a sequence. Sequences and their manipulation are the basis of sorting activities and of stories. The possibility of treating somatic signals sequentially also ensures that a sensorium can be its own translation device. One sensory modality can "inform" another. Indeed, cross-modal encoding acts as

¹ Double-bind situations are well elucidated by Gregory Bateson in Steps to an Ecology of Mind.
a material support for narrativity in cognition. An interactive sensorium permits a functional but non-reductive approach to narration. Narratives can serve a mnemonic function or act as an algorithm for problem solving.

For such a machine, perception is communication and furthermore the fundamental unit of human interaction is non-dyadic. Such design criteria pose a challenge to the reproductive and perceptual models of Marshall McLuhan, Walter Benjamin, Louis Althusser and Mary O’Brien. Adequate models of reproduction and perception require triangulation.

Sensory interaction is foreclosed by dyadic models of reproduction. Such foreclosed interaction skews theorizing about the experience of reading. To wit, Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic, Roman Ingarden’s phenomenological aesthetics and the feminist epistemology of dichotomy-oriented thinkers, Jane Flax, Susan Bordo and Dorothy Smith. However, a sensorium can be patterned on the feedback structures of self-organizing systems if cross-modal encoding is linked to narrativity defined as the potential of transforming any sequence into a story. Such a machine opens the discussion of reading to dialectics. Taking account of physiological midwifery and philosophical maieutics does much to problematize reductions of both the text-
reader relation and the parent-child relation to an overdetermined relation of producer-product. Once the accounting acknowledges the role of the witness or facilitator, the economic aspects of reproduction, reading and even perception can be abstracted.
Two

Proxemics and Prosthetics

Distance overcome by technological devices. The same headline could cover the very different stories Marshall McLuhan and Walter Benjamin tell about media effects. McLuhan tells the tale of an emerging global village enmeshed in the participatory mystique of acoustic space. Benjamin, however, is no prophet of returning neotribalism. For him, optical technologies bring objects closer to viewers and thus undermine the embrace of auratic art.\(^2\) Attached to these narratives are meditations on the power of tropes. McLuhan praises metaphor; Benjamin attacks symbol. Out of his critique of the symbol, Benjamin develops a typology of modes of experience. The less phenomenologically astute McLuhan opts for empirical reduction. For McLuhan, technology is a play of hypertrophy and atrophy of bodily extensions. The play is sealed in a cycle when he

\(^2\) The relation of auratic to aural is tellingly illustrated by Harry Zohn who in Benjamin's essay "Some Motifs in Baudelaire" collected in Illuminations translates "auratisch" as "aural" (188). This version is maintained in a revised publication, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, (148). The contingent paronomasia elegantly encapsulates how features and qualities of aural (acoustic) and visual (auratic) modes often cross over.
reifies metaphor as the motor of reversals. Benjamin would find this quite undialectical. Whatever contrary political positions they may take, both thinkers, however, depend upon the cultural investments grafted onto a dichotomous division of the senses, the same cultural investments that celebrate or demonize a putatively primitive past. Surprisingly or not, Jung will prove to be the key to liquidating those investments in both Benjamin and McLuhan (and to rewriting headlines).

McLuhan himself catalogues the effects of his most favoured tropes. In his frequent conflation of communication media and attitudes towards them, two tropes are employed. They are *hendiadys* and *chiasmus*. He devotes a section of *From Cliché to Archetype* to doublets yoked by conjunction (hendiadys). Eye and ear, hot and cool, print and tribal, are some examples of pairings invoked and explored by McLuhan.

He opens the section by claiming that L.P. Smith's *Words and Idioms* "draws attention to a mysterious property of language, namely, the ineradicable power of doublets" (Cliché 108). Smith is documenting habit. Therein may lie the secret of power. He certainly does not ascribe to words themselves any mysterious properties or ineradicable powers. Smith in lexicographical spirit lists as so many odds and ends,
habitual doublets of the English language. He also categorizes them according to emphatic usage by repetition (again and again), by alliteration (humming and hawing) or by rhyme (by hook or by crook). His final lists consist of doublets formed by contrast of two alternatives (heads or tails) and two alternatives joined to make an inclusive phrase (the long and the short of it) (Words and Idioms 174-175).

McLuhan stresses only disjunctive conjunction. His eye and ear represents a now-and-then or a here-and-there. Never a here-and-now. Heterogeneity is kept at bay as the dichotomy is mapped onto historical periods or onto geopolitical divisions. Furthermore, the temporal and spatial disjunction is necessary for the pairing to become set in a chiasmic structure. McLuhan accords this trope ontological status as a process of human history (Gutenberg Galaxy 277).

In McLuhan’s use of chiasmus to explain exchanges in sensory domination between eye and ear, the sequential element is elided and temporality foreshortened: one knows as one perceives. This allows tropes to be used to explain history. Barrington Nevitt exemplifies the expanded application of the rhetorical term. He claims "[A]ny process pushed to the extreme of its potential will break down or metamorphose or reverse its original effects by chiasmus." (Nevitt,
157). One can read Nevitt as providing three options: breakdown, metamorphosis or reversal. McLuhan insists on continuous reversal. For him breakdown is always breakthrough.

Faith in tropes never meets failure of fiat. Throughout the McLuhan corpus rhetoric is reified. Doublets and chiasmus not only describe reality; they are taken for real. Whether operating from a realist or nominalist position McLuhan, the rhetorician, would have perhaps benefitted from the discipline targeted for diatribe in his *Laws of Media*, that is dialectic or logic.

A more serene appraisal of the contributions of dialectic to human communication or its relation to grammar and rhetoric, the other arts of the trivium, might have led McLuhan to greater care in the creation and manipulation of his categories. Informed by dialectic, his rhetorical analysis might have turned more critically to the devices of his own discourse. For example McLuhan might have commented upon the tendency of his doublets to classify sensory phenomena and communication media in a dichotomous fashion. Hendiadys, doublets coupled by conjunction, underscore

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the complementary nature of the relation between two classes. Each is a unit of a whole. The coordination of pairs through conjunction hints at, without explicitly exposing it to scrutiny, a symmetry. Thus McLuhan’s description fosters his explanations in terms of the play of hot and cool media as well as his insistence on switches in eye and ear domination.

A connection between discourse and discovery need not lead in every case to a conflation of explanation with description. A drive to certitude does risk such a collapse. McLuhan’s emphatic and vatic style, full of bold assertions, lacking in qualifications or concern for nuance, displays such a drive. Yet it is an insufficient condition. The tangle of description and explanation results from more than the unexamined lodging of symmetries in McLuhan’s exposition.

For McLuhan certitude, an attitude towards knowledge, is joined with a narrative construction, closure, which for him is indispensable. It leads to completion of a successful and pleasurable act of perception by restoring an organism to equilibrium. What is stated in a speculative fashion and without reference to sensory extension in J.Z. Young, his source, McLuhan restates in a universalizing affirmation:

The inevitable drive for "closure," "completion," or equilibrium occurs both with
the suppression and the extension of human sense or function. (Gutenberg Galaxy 4)

Any disturbance, suppression or extension, leads to attempts to reinstall homeostasis. McLuhan's rhetoric enshrines a physiological phenomenon as an endorsement for a cyclical view of history. It is recourse to chiasmus that endows such a descriptive statement with explicative force.

Chiasmus will dramatize the descriptive doublets so that a medium is always paired with another in an agonistic relation and any redistribution of sensory ratio is a reversal. However, narratives of domination are not necessarily entailed by chiasmus. Chiasmus equally serves narratives of sensory coordination and collaboration. For McLuhan the trope yields only one story. Perfect predictability ensues; McLuhan’s model is overdetermined and foreclosed.

Favoured tropes may not always be the preconditions for original experiential insights. For McLuhan they are. As he states without chiasmus, without hendiadys, "rhetoric, the open hand; dialectic, the closed fist" (From Cliché to Archetype 160). In Erasmian fashion, the sceptic responds that the open hand can slap and the closed fist hold a seed. And if the avowal that discursive habits shape and are shaped by conceptual commitments be framed in an interrogative mood, it provides the space for other dialectics.
What do McLuhan's charged remarks concerning dialectic signal? Turning from the dialectic of the trivium against which McLuhan rails to that of German idealism about which he, in his writings on communication, is silent and which "extended the notion of contradiction in the course of discussion or dispute to a notion of contradictions in reality"\(^\text{4}\), one notes, a pattern structurally akin to McLuhan's "chiasmus". In McLuhan there is found the three elements of a classic idealist dialectic. All three are connected to his notion of extension. There is the transformation of quantity into quality in that the pivotal notion of extension starts as the repeated use of certain technologies and ends as a predisposition of the human sensorium. There is an identification of opposites as extension becomes amputation (Understanding Media 45). The claim that the content of a new medium is the previous medium expresses the negation of negation, the third element of the dialectic. This negation of negation is generalized after the collapse of media and message in the turn to language as the ultimate human extension.

From this comparison McLuhan emerges as a crypto-Hegelian substituting "technology" for the Spirit of

History⁵. If one is not oneself to replace Spirit by
"return of the repressed," one must turn to the moment
when extension is not conveyed by chiasmus, not yet
captured by dichotomies and not yet applied
universally. The moment is pre-McLuhan. It is in his
sources. It is also post-McLuhan: in a reading of his
reading of his sources.

The further probing and questioning of Mc Luhan's
reading habits retraces three elaborations of his
extension hypothesis. The first formulation of the
notion occurs in The Gutenberg Galaxy. Given his appeal
to authorities in this initial elaboration, Mc Luhan's
handling of his sources warrants scrutiny. Later, in
From Cliché to Archetype, extension is largely applied
to language. In this subsequent elaboration Mc Luhan
further advances his concept of acoustic space. Finally
in Laws of Media extension is expressed in the form of
the tetrad: enhancement, reversal, retrieval and
obsolescence. It is here that Mc Luhan's commitment to a

⁵ In a pre-Gutenburg Galaxy article, "James Joyce: Trivial and Quadrivial," Mc Luhan does nod towards Hegel. He likens a passage from Finnegans Wake to a gloss "in the style of Hegel's dialectic of the historic process". He quotes Joyce as writing: "From cenogenetic dichotomy through diagnostic conciliation to dynastic continuity." The style may be part Hegelian but it is fully Joycean satire. Mc Luhan misses any ironic intent for in his reading "Joyce uses the pun as a way of seeing the paradoxical exuberance of being through language." The Interior Landscape: The Literary Criticism of Marshall Mc Luhan 1943-1962, ed. by Eugene McNamara, (New York/Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 46.
historical frame of eternal return becomes clear.

The striking feature of acoustic space as he formulates it, its simultaneity, allows a transcendental moment to occur, the eternal return to be tamed. However, the simultaneous aspect of acoustic space operates so successfully in McLuhan's discursive universe only because the distinction between the instantaneous and the immediate is not taken into account, a distinction that threatens to undo the famous conflation of message and medium.

It is the notion of extension that permits the medium-message conflation. Donald Theall critiques McLuhan's lack of distinction between primary extensions such as housing and secondary or tertiary extensions such as print media (Rear View Mirror 82-84). Theall also exposes an absence of articulation between closure and extension, one being a brain activity, the other, a motor activity. Finally, Theall's reading draws attention to the addition of a third authority, Leslie A. White. A citation from White's *The Science of Culture* is meant to underwrite McLuhan's adoption of a definition of language as tool. The combination of elements from Hall, Young and White allows McLuhan "to treat print and phonetic writing as extensions affecting sensory balance" (Rear View Mirror 84).
Theall's objections are here directed at the syntagmatic aspects of McLuhan's discourse, at how he threads together his authorities. Simply, there are too many missing links in the citational collage. Furthermore, beyond these objections, the connection between citation and McLuhan paraphrase is tenuously forged. Only highly altered sources fit the McLuhan mosaic.

Prior to being strung, the citations are produced by a series of choices. For example, three passages in Edward T. Hall's *The Silent Language* refer to extension. McLuhan in the prologue of *The Gutenberg Galaxy* cites one, the one least likely to challenge the consonance of his own formulation. The first mention of extension occurs in passing. It is a passage where Hall enumerates the contents of the book:

> The next chapters (Five through Eight) specify and deal with the communication spectrum. Little is said about mass-communication media such as the press, radio, and television, which are the instruments used to extend man's senses. Rather these chapters are focused on one main aspect of communication, the ways in which man reads meaning into what other men do. (Hall 51)

There is no matching of a specific sense with a particular medium. Media are instruments for achieving extension not extensions in themselves. A simple assertion by Hall cannot persuasively underwrite a more complex assertion by McLuhan.
In an other passage Hall refers to skis as an extension of the foot. He is illustrating different learning environments. He uses an observer-dependent simile: "When one watched these people move about it was as though the skis were an actual extension of the foot, a highly adapted organ for locomotion" (Hall 87). From this observation, extension cannot be taken as a universal nor as an automatic process. Furthermore the link in Hall between extension and skill which implies cognitive awareness would cripple McLuhan’s assertion that changes in the human sensorium caused by technological extension happen unbeknownst to the human participants of the process.

The passage McLuhan does cite on page four of The Gutenberg Galaxy reads:

Today man has developed extensions for practically everything he used to do with his body. The evolution of weapons begins with the teeth and the fist and ends with the atom bomb. Clothes and houses are extensions of man’s biological temperature-control mechanisms. Furniture takes the place of squatting and sitting on the ground. Power tools, glasses, TV, telephones, and books which carry the voice across both time and space are examples of material extensions. Money is a way of extending and storing labor. Our transportation networks now do what we used to do with our feet and backs. In fact, all man-made material things can be treated as extensions of what man once did with his body or some specialized part of his body. (Hall 79)

In a preceding paragraph McLuhan prepares his particular reading of Hall with the statement that:
Man the tool-making animal, whether in speech or in writing or in radio, has long been engaged in extending one or another of his sense organs in such a manner as to disturb all of his other senses and faculties.  
(Gutenberg Galaxy 4)

Before McLuhan turns to cite Hall, disturbance is grafted onto the notion of extension. As well extension becomes centred on sense organs. The other faculties recede. McLuhan's total attention is on parts.

Based on the quotation from Hall, tools can be considered as extensions from two possible loci. They are extensions of "what man once did with his body [or part of his body]" or extension of "some specialized part of his body." McLuhan chooses the latter parsing. He does not analyse the crucial category of doing.

In all instances of The Silent Language including the one McLuhan cites, Hall's focus is upon the temporality of extension not its prosthetic dimension. Hall treats extension in terms of continuity of activity. What was once done by one means is now done by another. McLuhan in grafting disturbance on extension posits a shift not in duration but in kind of activity. Extension is narrowed to synonymity with prosthesis. As well it is construed as irritation.

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6 Later in Understanding Media (152) human agency is replaced by hypostatic technology, "The tool extends the fist, the nails, the teeth, the arm." The shift from nominal form (extension) to verb (to extend) also indicates a move from historical focus on the past to a concern with prophecy, reading the present as
through its association with disturbance. This combination, prosthetic disturbance, is erected upon a strict impermeability of sensory modalities.

The strict separation establishes a sensorium devoid of devices for self-regulation. Environment determines all. Sensory modalities and types of action exist in a one-to-one correspondence. His stimulus-response model positions some senses as tending to inertia, others, to motion. Sight pinpoints, takes up a point of view, stabilizes. Sound surrounds, penetrates, perturbs. For McLuhan, one is the sense of rational detached print culture; the other, excitable tribal involvement. Just as he argues some times from effects of the sense organ (sight) and at other times from those of the percept (sound), the parallel piling of sundry elements, so necessary for McLuhan’s evaluative statements and chiasmic substitutions, reiterates the founding tautology. Disturbance and extension are not only the marks of change; they are also its motors. Change leads to change. The world as perpetual motion machine offers endless chains of causation which in McLuhan’s case is really mimesis: sense imitating what is sensed.

Causation becomes more complex and predictability is impaired, if one turns to the identification of

continuing into the future.
disturbances in a universal flux. Such metacritical questions are foregrounded in the authority on disturbance cited in full by McLuhan, J.Z. Young:

The effect of stimulations, external or internal, is to break up the unison of action of some part or the whole of the brain. A speculative suggestion is that the disturbance in some way breaks the unity of the actual pattern that has been previously built up in the brain. The brain then selects those features from the input that tend to repair the model and to return the cells to their regular synchronous beating. I cannot pretend to be able to develop this idea of models in our brain in detail, but it has great possibilities in showing how we tend to fit ourselves to the world and the world to ourselves. In some way the brain initiates sequences of actions that tend to return it to its rhythmic pattern, this return being the act of consummation or completion. If the first action performed fails to do this, fails that is to stop the original disturbance, then other sequences may be tried. The brain runs through its rules one after another, matching the input with its various models until somehow unison is achieved. This may perhaps only be after strenuous, varied, and prolonged searching. During this random activity further connexions and action patterns are formed and they in turn will determine future sequences. (Gutenberg Galaxy, 4)

In Young's "speculative suggestion" stimulations disturb not limbs or sense organs but "unison of action". As in Hall, activity in its temporal dimensions is the category of analysis. The citation culled by McLuhan is in Young sandwiched between discussions of the learning child. As intersubjective process, learning takes place in the presence of a parent and is characterized as gradual, incremental and
open. Such a scheme is alien to McLuhan. As mentioned above, "closure" and "completion" are terms he introduces. Furthermore what he characterizes as an inevitable drive towards equilibrium between self and environment is in Young a tendency not a necessity: "we tend to fit ourselves to the world and the world to ourselves." This tentative telos is consonant with the intersubjective core of Young's discourse.

Pace McLuhan, Young offers dialectical formulations. In his model, rhythmic pattern is both recognized and established. Even within a biological process such as brain function, the confirmation of recognition permits the establishment of pattern. One person can do both but not at the same time. The two distinct procedures are what Young calls doubt and certainty. They govern knowledge production:

The brain is continually searching for fresh information about the rhythm and regularity of what goes on around us. This is the process that I call doubting, seeking for significant new resemblances. Once they are found they provide us with our system of law, of certainty. We decide that this is what the world is like and proceed to talk about it in those terms. Then sooner or later someone comes along who doubts, someone who tries to make a new comparison; when he is successful, mankind learns to communicate better and to see more. (Doubt and Certainty 11)

Proper use of analogies, for Young, serves learning and

7 "As the biologist sees it, our brains are so constituted that we have learned to speak always in terms of self and otherness" (Doubt and Certainty 9).
serves progress. Assured of its power to improve communication and produce knowledge, he privileges resemblance seeking. As implied by the metacritical accent heard if but sub voce in the hiatus between recognition and establishment, the identification of resemblance is but part of reasoning by analogy.

McLuhan makes analogies. He finds resemblances. However, to test an argument by analogy one also examines the terms of the comparison according to their unshared properties. That is one seeks differences. Unmaking analogies is not a McLuhan activity.

Analogies lead to laws of media. Their legitimation is founded upon the generative powers McLuhan grants metaphors. He equates them with technologies. The principle of extension is central to this process:

[A]ll human artefacts are extensions of man, outerings or utterings of the human body or psyche, private or corporate. That is to say, they are speech, and they are translations of us, the users, from one form into another form: metaphors. (Laws of Media 116)

The relation between technology and metaphor is itself a metaphor but not one of substitution, either species for genus or vice versa. For McLuhan, "all metaphors have four components in analogical ratio" (28). The four terms in McLuhan's formulation are technology, metaphor, extension and translation. How are they to stand in relation to each other? The succinct
declaration "technologies, like words, are metaphors" (Global Village 8) suggests the terms, technology and metaphor, belong to separate ratios of the proportional equation and the analogy is to be read as: artefact is to extension as metaphor is to translation.

If the analogy were to stand alone, his project, the translation of artefacts (into media into senses) through the extension of metaphor would be obliged to contend with a counter-motion: the restriction of metaphor. The analogy -- as artefact stands to extension so does metaphor to translation -- can not be read back into the relation of artefact to extension. Analogy (or metaphor) is not an artefact. As a ratio, it is a relation.

Etymology comes to the rescue. Relying on the Latin term *translatio*, McLuhan insists that it is in the nature of metaphor to move and metaphor is unavoidable8 and likewise, is constant extension.

Bolstered by etymology, McLuhan's conception of metaphor tends to tautology: an extension is a translation is a metaphor is an artefact is an extension. McLuhan does characterize the arena of technological development as a closed system. (Gutenberg Galaxy 5) The constraining circularity

8 "Language is Metaphor in the sense that it not only stores but translates experience from one mode into another" (Gutenberg Galaxy 5).
confirms the implied determinism. Since it locks the domain of techne into that of logos, it also can vouchsafe the privileged position of the artist. In particular, poets as wordsmiths offer vis-a-vis new technologies emulatable attitudes. As McLuhan explains in *From Cliché to Archetype*, in their capacity as technicians of the word, poets are capable of recuperating and refurbishing old means and meanings.

By combining a cyclical view of technological extension with an expressive theory of language, McLuhan deflects the difficulties posed by any consideration of the role social organization plays in the mediation between language and technology. This is particularly evident when the extension analogy is accompanied by the onomatopoeia "outering/uttering". Technology like speech arises magically, inevitably. In McLuhan's universe discursive dilation is akin to technological expansion. However the kinship does not explain the premise of an uncontrollable urge to speech.

Again, rhetorical analysis explains much in McLuhan's moves. Puns, etymologies and their similar operations are examined by Jean Paulhan who outlines the generation of proof by etymology as follows: attention to sound without regard to meaning; discovery of a neglected meaning; projection of discovered
meaning as the origin and the common bond of words so processed (La Preuve 72-73). Ironically McLuhan confounds etymology with aetiology. 9

Outering and uttering bespeak another pair: transformation and transmission. The play of prefixes and the implicit etymologies involved affirm a link subtending McLuhan's notion of extension, a link between communication and creation. In Understanding Media, he writes "just as a metaphor transforms and transmits experience so do the media" (59).

The storage function of language, McLuhan derives from Leslie A. White. Its power to alter reality is a commonplace that he himself refigures. Discontinuity 10, speed 11, competition 12, mark McLuhan's thinking about the transformation of experience. None of these concepts are in the passage

9 "Our concern in this book is etymology and exegesis. The etymology of all human technologies is to be found in the body itself: they are, as it were, prosthetic devices, mutations, metaphors of the body or its parts" (Global Village 34).

10 In McLuhan's discourse the axiom of experiential discontinuity results in the related positions of the impermeability of sensory modalities and the unavoidability of metaphor. The device to translate sensory modes and ensure experiential continuity is metaphor reified into an entity not merely of discourse but also of actuality.

11 "All media are a reconstruction, a model of some biologic capability speeded up beyond the human ability to perform" (Global Village 87).

12 "Speech entails competition" (Global Village 93).
from White that McLuhan draws upon. Indeed in White experience implies sharing and continuity. Like J.Z. Young he narrates the evolution from trial and error learning to reasoning:

Man began his career as an anthropoid who was just learning to talk. He was distinguished from all other animal species by the faculty of articulate speech. It was this faculty which transformed the discontinuous, non-accumulative, non-progressive process of tool-using among the anthropoids into a continuous, cumulative and progressive process in the human species. Articulate speech transformed also, the social organization of this gifted primate, and by the inauguration of co-operation as a way of life and security, opened the door to virtually unlimited social evolution. And, finally, language and speech made it possible for man to accumulate experience and knowledge in a form that made easy transmission and maximum use possible. [our emphasis] (White 240)

Prefacing it by a remark about language as tool McLuhan incorporates only the portion italicized above into his discourse on transformation and transmission.

Through language all things are possible, for McLuhan. Transformation is but the alternation of storage and retrieval hence transmission is transformation. Humans are said to "possess an apparatus of transmission and transformation based on [their] power to store experience. And [their] power to store, as in language itself, is also a means of transformation of experience" (Gutenberg Galaxy x).

From Cliché to Archetype is devoted to this
dynamic. Just as the dynamic of storage and retrieval rings the tones of Augustine's solution to the problem of free will and determination, so the omnipotence accorded language echoes the mystery of a word made flesh:

Language is a technology which extends all of the human senses simultaneously. All the other human artifacts are, by comparison, specialist extensions of our physical and mental faculties. Written language at once specializes speech by limiting words to one of the senses. Written speech is an example of such specialism, but the spoken word resonates, involving all the senses. (Cliche 20-21)

Like Donne, Traherne and Herbert, authors treated in Rosalie Colie's work on Renaissance paradox, a work upon which McLuhan relies extensively for From Cliche to Archetype, he comes close to identifying creator with created. The paradoxes of negative theology figured in the English poetic tradition inform McLuhan's understanding of acoustic space in Laws of Media (102).

He states his argument most clearly in an interview with Bruce Powers:

The imagination is most creative in acoustic space. Acoustic space has the basic character of a sphere whose focus or "center" is simultaneously everywhere and whose margin is nowhere. A proper place for the birth of metamorphosis. (Global Village 134)

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13 Richard Kostelanetz likens McLuhan's conversion of metaphor into identities to transubstantiation ("A Hot Apostle in a Cool Culture" 221).
What undoes McLuhan is not the terms but the argument. He contrasts Euclidean (script and print) space with acoustic (oral) space. In McLuhan's principle source on the properties of acoustic space the term itself does not appear. Indeed, F.M. Cornford in "The Invention of Space" writes "the essential property of Euclidean space is that it had no centre and no circumference" (Cornford 219). The infinite space of Euclidean geometry is very like a paradox of negative theology.

However no centre is not a centre everywhere. Acoustic space for McLuhan is finite. Where McLuhan goes astray is in his gloss on his quotation from Cornford's remarks on Parmenides's sphere of being:

We naturally ask, what is outside this finite sphere of being? Parmenides does not raise the question; apparently it did not occur to him that such a question could be asked. (Cornford 228)

McLuhan strongly suggests that Parmenides ear-dominated oral culture did not allow him to ask. "There is no infinity: to the ear faculty, the question is unintelligible" (Laws of Media 35). However, the silence of Parmenides may be scripturally induced rather than determined by oral context. Plato, the recorder, might have a hand in it. Paradoxically, though not uncharacteristically, McLuhan maintains a muteness concerning alternative explanations, in particular that of his authority on paradox, Colie:
But not even Parmenides, as Plato's dialogue so ironically suggests, could legislate about speculative subjects: for minds of the dialectical habit, once 'being' had been postulated, 'not-being' and 'nothing' inevitably came to attention. (Colie 220)

As unasked questions rattle about the perimeter of McLuhan's acoustic space, at its epicentre clinks a masked question. McLuhan brings metaphor into the ambit of acoustic space with the statement that "while common-sense acoustic space held sway, the cosmos was perceived as a resonant and metaphoric structure informed by logos" (Laws of Media 37). To say metaphor's terms are discontinuous yet in ratio to each other is equivalent for McLuhan to saying "that the basic mode of metaphor is resonance and interval -- the audile-tactile" (Global Village 29). McLuhan cites a passage from De Anima to claim Aristotle pointed out this discontinuity:

It follows that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is a tool of tools, so the mind is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things. (De Anima III, viii, 432a)

The same Aristotelian passage in From Cliché to Archetype "points to the analogy between art and knowledge" and McLuhan adds:

By way of resonance and repetition, "The soul is in a way all existing things." As the hand, with its extensions, probes and shapes the physical environment, so the soul or mind, with its extensions of speech, probes and orders and retrieves the man-made environment of artifacts and archetypes.
The Aristotelian text does read "The soul is in a way all existing things." However, it continues for several clauses and concludes "in what way we must inquire" (431b). The answer is not things in themselves but their forms. Only then, follows the hand-soul analogy. However doctored, Aristotle cannot be made to mention extension. That a tool is an extension is a McLuhan axiom. He introduces it as he says "by way of resonance and repetition". Of course, he cannot say his way includes an invisible silence. He admits no disappearance nor indicates with suspension marks, ellipsis.

Since McLuhan mixes an anti-visual with an anti-rational bias, the basis for his reification of resonance is the repression of conceptual work. (Global Village 187, n. 14; Cliché 82) In particular McLuhan's reading of quantum mechanics elides the role of abstraction. He ignores the fact that mathematical representations of resonating vibrations are abstractions applicable to either visual or acoustic media. He invokes the technical term "harmonic oscillators" as proof positive of the primordial centrality of sound. He attributes to Linus Pauling the insight of "acoustic and mimetic resonance as the essential structure of matter" (Global Village 187).
McLuhan skips a page from the history of science -- that wave function equations build upon the Hamiltonian analogy between optics and dynamics. Furthermore he neglects the warnings against empirical reduction given by Pauling who writes in The Nature of the Chemical Bond, "It has become conventional to speak of a system as resonating between structures" (10) and he is very clear as to the ontological status of these structures:

A substance showing resonance between two or more valence-bond structures does not contain molecules with the configurations and properties usually associated with these structures. The constituent structures of the resonance hybrid do not have reality in this sense. [emphasis in original] (408)

To document more of McLuhan's silent cuts risks redundancy. Only two other cases require comment. Both, again, in regard to extension. Unlike McLuhan's treatment of the Pauling text, they do not operate on a principle of empirical reduction. The following authorities, Hass and Emerson, constructed by McLuhan's citational practice, operate in his discourse less to establish the validity of the concept of extension than to dress a pedigree for it.

What bits and pieces (Laws of Media 94, 97) McLuhan quotes sometimes indicating ellipsis, sometimes not, from Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay "Works and Days" do lend some credence to the claim that "the notion is of respectable age". The title of the essay, an
allusion to Hesiod, certainly adds to the impression of antiquity. However, the figure of Hesiod does not function in Emerson's essay to justify work and tool use as the primordial essence of human nature but to reawaken forgotten appreciation for days, to harken to a golden pre-industrial past. Emerson writes "you must treat the days respectfully, you must be a day yourself" (Emerson 180). Each day, each human is to be special. This celebration of the uniqueness of the moment and of the individual points to the possibility of extending holidays rather than technologies, increasing the time of being human over the duration of toiling in order to achieve a finer equilibrium between labour and leisure.

The emancipatory dimension is evident in the opening paragraph. It figures a constellation of Aristotelian notions somewhat differently than McLuhan's reading of the philosopher's text on the soul. Drawing on a commonplace in regards to the measure of all things, Emerson does consider the human body as the template for the development of tools. He cites the passage from De Anima referring to the hand as the instrument of instruments and the mind as the form of forms. However, unlike McLuhan, he treats extension strictly analogically. The creation cannot usurp the creator, in whole or in part. "Machines can
only second, not supply, his [man's] unaided senses" (167). McLuhan stops short of quoting this sentence. In his subsequent reference to Emerson, he omits "If you do not use tools, they use you" and fails to indicate the ellipsis. Where he does indicate the ellipsis, the restoration of Emerson's sentence ("The political economist thinks 't [sic] is doubtful if all the mechanical inventions that ever existed have lightened the day's toil of one human being") challenges not only the utopian tone of McLuhan's formulations but also his presumption of the natural inevitable drive to technological innovation.

Whether or not for McLuhan all tool use is work, he cannot draw attention to Emerson's separation of work from days as the separation addresses the issue of the control of technology in a fashion diametrically opposed to his own. Emerson puts technology in the sphere of human control; McLuhan, outside. If in Emerson humans compel others to use tools, in McLuhan the compulsion and its attendant negative connotations are interiorized. "To put it briefly, man cannot trust himself when using his own artefacts" (Laws of Media 95).

The singular universal human being, lacking the grace of control, is figured as incapable of inhibiting unwanted aggression. In this particular instance,
McLuhan aligns his tale in order to appropriate into his discourse Konrad Lorenz who in *On Aggression* speculates that human aggression is a product of the ability, through tools, to act at a distance and thus not suffer the consequences of body to body contact. For Lorenz distance is the prerequisite of desensitization which enables uncontrolled aggression.

What McLuhan forgets even as he cites his own authority to this effect (*Laws of Media* 96) is that Lorenz does supply a control mechanism. McLuhan does not distance himself from the Lorenz statement that "inventions and responsibility are both the achievements of the same specifically human faculty of asking questions." Asking questions sounds a lot like the activity of dialectic. However McLuhan collects authorities rather than asks questions. McLuhan does not investigate where or when this capacity to ask questions, this power of dialectic, can be inhibited. Unless, one is to conclude, as McLuhan wishes, that technological innovation itself triggers an atrophy of reasoning and questioning.

Despite Lorenz who posits an innate human ability to ask questions, the evolutionary epic as told by McLuhan leads to the disappearance of this very faculty. Such a plot allows McLuhan to state about another of his authorities:
One thing Hass overlooks is the absence of biological or psychological means of coping with the effects of our own technical ingenuity. (Laws of Media 95)

Hans Hass in The Human Animal sets the beginning of the development of what he terms "artificial organs" in a prehistoric anthropoid past. With Emerson, McLuhan garners in his terms "a respectable age" for the concept of extension itself and with Hass he gains an immense temporal span for the phenomenon to which the concept refers. It is no coincidence that the 19th century Emerson bridge to the ancient Hesiod is discussed in a footnote just prior to the introduction in the body of the text of the 20th century Hass bridge to the prehistoric. However, what McLuhan in his economical clipping fails to reap from either Emerson or Hass is precisely what he claims Hass overlooks: means of coping.

Hass indicates in The Human Animal that control is acquired and it rests partly with the brain (107). The ability to produce tools and the control of this ability hinge on experience (108). Experience is built out of the temporary nature of extensions. Since "possession of artificial organs may be temporary" (106), the possibility of a comparative judgement exists. It is this temporariness that enables experience to be built up, shared and judged. Experience is comprised of a before, an after and a
during. This triangulation escapes McLuhan. It is far
too akin to a dialectic for his dichotomous
formulations to accommodate it well.

Experience is dialectically structured from out of
moments whiled away with tools and those, without
tools. Furthermore it lives in expression: experience
communicates the differences between moments. It
mediates between the body and the mind. It remains the
great untheorized category in McLuhan's body of work.

For Hass we are "the creature with artificial
organs. Our intellect was crucial to this peculiarity,
but so were our hands, our power of imagination, and
our persistent curiosity. Only the combined effects of
all these enabled us to transcend the limitations
imposed on our bodily organs" (108). This statement
implies that mere unconscious physical extension cannot
by itself repeat the feat of this magnificent
combination. If transcendence of the limitations of
parts of the body (note not the body itself) lies by
way of this particular combination, it is noteworthy
that this combination is taken up reflexively by humans
as experience. Given the temporal discontinuities and
the complexity involved in the combination, the chances
of repeating the combination seem slight. Since Hass
with his emphasis on combination is tending towards an
ecological and systems theory framework, it is but a
short step to introduce feedback (a term and concept alien though available to McLuhan) to explain, as Gregory Bateson does in *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*, social and psychological development. This leads us to establish an axiom: experience may not be repeatable but it is reapplicable. Experience permits conscious reproduction.

If the combination at the core of human evolution is not by substitution equatable to experience or by some means accessible to experience, then McLuhan's antirational pronouncements stand. McLuhan's setting the irrational at the heart of the human condition is perhaps clearest in his statements on biological reproduction.

Theall reads the statements about sexuality and procreation, in particular about the pill, as instances where McLuhan's conservative Catholicism appears (Theall 44, 60, 226). Although a technological product, the pill, a synthetic hormonal agent, poses problems for McLuhan's characterization of the extension of organs as the sine qua non of technological evolution.

Catholicism aside, McLuhan's schema copes with a human product that is ingested rather than extended by reading the pill as a regression. It is a technology, for him, that makes man into a 19th century machine (*Culture is Our Business* 176). Earlier in a 1969
Dewline newsletter he is adamant:

The pill promises to turn all people into precise machines, absolutely guaranteed and determined. It is not only a mechanizing force of 19th century intent, but promises to deprive us of one of our few remaining vestiges of humanity. (Dewline 17)

He was more ambivalent in 1967 when he discussed the pill in terms of its consequences for women. He claimed that the pill made women into bombs:

Just as the Bomb instantly wipes out all the separating boundaries essential to conventional war, the Pill erases the old sexual boundaries in a flash. The Pill makes woman a Bomb. She creates a new kind of fragmentation, separating sexual intercourse from procreation. She also explodes old barriers between the sexes, bringing them closer together. Watch for traditions to fall. (Look 58)

The angst is cathetced to a "new kind of fragmentation". Syntagmatically in this text, fragmentation of sex in terms of erotic activity leads to the collapse of sexual boundaries in terms of gender. The story could be told the other way: challenges to gender result in a redefining of sexual activity.

Whatever the direction of the narrative, this erasure of boundaries should be recuperated by McLuhan's usual rhetorical topoi as a return to a putatively primitive stage of society. However, despite his knowledge of such anthropological works as Mead's Male and Female displayed as early as The Mechanical
Bride (62), McLuhan in his neotribalism advocates in not so many words the maintenance of sex-role stereotypes. The story he weaves is flawed. He can not foresee the collapse of boundaries as a moment preceding the realization of greater and more equal unity and an overcoming of old fragmentation (gender roles).

Although one may disagree with his initial description and the route his narrative takes, his stance is not internally contradictory. It is traditions that fall. It is tradition that cements the aural tribal culture. It is tradition that 19th century machines threaten to undo, to fragment.

The archetype of the fall is echoed in a stated personal inclination for homeostasis:

I am not by temperament or conviction, a revolutionary; I would prefer a stable, changeless environment of modest services and human scale. (Playboy interview cited by Theall 45)

If McLuhan's hankering for tradition has antecedents, there are no direct citations to prove a link between McLuhan and Jung, between the former's conception of a rag-and-bone shop of clichés and archetypes and the latter's collective unconscious.

However the rapprochement is to be made in the homologous structure of hypertrophy and retrenchment that both men describe, one in physical, the other in
psychic terms. McLuhan claims that an overinvestment of time and attention in one sensory modality leads to its extension and to unbalance that is rectified through amputation:

Any invention or technology is an extension or self-amputation of our physical bodies, and such extension also demands new ratios or new equilibriums among the other organs and extensions of the body. (Understanding Media 45)

Likewise Jung posits balanced equal development as a desideratum and considers that overinvestment of time and attention in one psychological function requires compensation. The form this takes is amputation:

In so far then as every man, as a relatively stable being, possesses all the basic psychological functions, it would be a psychological necessity with a view to perfect adaptation that he should also employ them in equal measure. [...] Through a one-sided (typical) attitude there remains a deficit in the resulting psychological adaptation, which accumulates during the course of life; from this deficiency a derangement of adaptation develops, which forces the subject towards a compensation. But the compensation can be obtained only by means of amputation (sacrifice) of the hitherto one-sided attitude. [emphasis in original] (Psychological Types 28)

Furthermore McLuhan's simultaneous acoustic tribal space possesses the features of the archaic time when there was no individuality, that time Jung describes when he often turns to Lévy-Bruhl to claim that the effacement of ego boundaries is no new phenomenon and that it is related to participation mystique evinced in
"our own barbarian element with its primitive collective mentality" (Psychological Types 106). Accord the aboriginal some form of rationality or remove the stable unchanging female principle, Jung’s and McLuhan’s systems of rigorous dichotomies and reversals disintegrate. At stake is the value of dialectic, in the materialist sense of history and in the rhetorical sense of dialogue, dialectic as explanation and practice.

Both Jung and McLuhan encourage an aesthetic depoliticized response to historical change. Both manage the combined spectre of the primitive and of woman, conventional markers of the irrational and the uncontrollable, by situating these in the realm of the timeless and the unchanging. This conjunction of a fetish for the irrational and a fascination for participation mystique is the very target of a sustained critique by Walter Benjamin, a critique essential for Benjamin’s meditations on the nexus of technology, perception and reproduction.

In McLuhan’s embrace of the participatory mystique, technologies appealing to an aural modality reduce distance. In Benjamin’s approach to auratic art, technologies that bring artefacts closer to viewers undermine participation and enhance critical distance. In their accounts, the eye-ear contrast is inflected
differently. McLuhan works the contrast over an oral-
scriptural divide of the verbal. Benjamin contrasts the
pictorial and the verbal. Benjamin values the
disintegrating allegorical mode of the word over the
symbol as engrossing image that assembles and unites.
Despite the different histories they construct, for
both thinkers the historiographic text pivots on an
iconoclastic test. As well, sexual politics affect the
manner in which the sensory mapping is applied to
historic periodization.

Benjamin, unlike McLuhan, does not engage in
admiration for the blessedness of the past. McLuhan's
celebration of oral tribalism is of a piece with his
ascription of pre-pill sexual relations to a pre-
mechanized world.¹⁴ Benjamin was working well before
the advent of mass-manufactured oral contraceptives.
However, the division between sexuality and procreation
that McLuhan in the 1960s trumpets as a new phenomenon
is in the 1930s endowed by Benjamin with a reasonable
age. Benjamin during this period is working on 19th
century Paris -- the very century condemned by McLuhan
for what he claims is a move toward mindless
mechanization.

¹⁴ In the passage from Culture is Our Business, he
classifies those who oppose the Pope with those who
cannot abide the new sensory environment which is for
McLuhan a return to a pre-print sensorium.
Sexual politics are intricately meshed with Benjamin's refinement of the question of "experience" in an environment saturated by the technological development of media. These considerations are interwoven in Benjamin's critique of the aauratic art object which is in part a polemic against Jung or rather ideas generally in circulation and rearticulated in Jung for Benjamin never completed his intended critique of the Swiss psychologist. Benjamin's notion of experience will hinge upon the relation of reason (mind) and ecstasy (body) specifically in the production of knowledge. As well he tackles the analogy between the function of the symbol as container and woman (soul) as vessel.

In mining the collection of citations and commentary that is Benjamin's Passagen-Werk to find a passage to juxtapose with Jung's appropriation of Marianism for a universal structure of the psyche (Psychological Types 287) one turns in spirit of contrariness to seek a Magdalene figure in Konvolut O, the file pertaining to prostitution and gambling and

15 Benjamin's intentions to critique Klages and Jung follow a 1935 letter from Adorno critiquing Benjamin's own use in the Arcades project proposal of a concept of collective unconscious. Adorno not only holds that it is difficult to distinguish such a concept from a similar one in Jung but also that such a move ignores the role of commodity production in the shaping of dialectical, as opposed to mythic, images.
one finds there a citation from a pamphlet by Emmanuel Berl:

As if the laws of nature, to which love is subjected, were not more tyrannical and more odious than those of society! The metaphysical meaning of sadism is [found in] the hope that human revolt will take on such intensity that it will cast nature into the position of changing its laws -- that women no longer willing to tolerate the travails of pregnancy, the risks and pain of childbirth, and of abortion, nature will be compelled to invent some other means for man to perpetuate himself on earth (Passagen-Werk 0.2.3. 616-617)

Note an intervention like abortion is located well within the sphere of nature. Berl does not set nature over and against society. Human suffering is notennobled by its source. A similar sentiment is detected in the call for sexual and social responsibility in Benjamin's comment:

Indeed, the sexual revolt against love, rises up not only from fanatic obsessive sexual desire, it also is intent on making nature submissive and adequate for that [desire]. (Passagen-Werk 0.2.3. 617)

For Benjamin these tensions are even clearer in the case of prostitution especially when its cynical turn-of-the-century Parisian form is viewed "less as antithesis than as the decay of love" (weniger als Gegensatz denn als Verfall der Liebe). Benjamin keeps in tension desire and its consequences. Neither is relegated to unconscious process. In the background here is the anarcho-feminist equation of marriage with
prostitution.

Jung's erotics are quite different. Jung builds his Psychological Types upon a basic dichotomy between extrovert and introvert. The reification of these two postures towards the world into types leads to atemporal and hence antithetical formulations. The play of opposites structures the psyche. Their union signals health. Consequently tension is resolved in the form of a symbol or mythic image. In Jung, rational considerations (the consequences of desire) and bodily urges (desire) are placed in an antagonistic relation. Their interaction threatens the psyche which itself is construed as a unifying symbol. The resolution by union may be patterned on marriage as institution for channelling disruptive forces since Jung casts the narrative of coming into being of the balanced psyche as the withdrawal of libido from erotic wish and its direction to social task (282).

Body and intellect are held in check. The psyche becomes a container, a passive receptacle. It is telling that Jung concludes a discussion of realism and nominalism as respective examples of extroverted and introverted attitudes with the image of a middle way that holds the balance:

To the "esse in intellectu" tangible reality is lacking; to the "esse in re" the mind. Idea and thing come together, however, in the psyche of man which holds the balance between
them. What would the idea amount to if the psyche did not provide its living value? What would the objective thing be worth if the psyche withheld from it the determining force of the sense impression? What indeed is reality if it is not a reality in ourselves, an "esse in anima"? Living reality is the exclusive product neither of the actual, objective behaviour of things, nor of the formulated idea; rather does it come through the gathering up of both in the living psychological process, through the "esse in anima." Only through the specific vital activity of the psyche does the sense-perception attain that intensity, and the idea that effective force, which are the two indispensable constituents of living reality. (Psychological Types 68)

In his call to intensity, an animating interiority is to infuse life into objects be they ideal or material. The mechanism of the middle way is placed "in ourselves". Out of the mingling of idea and thing in this place images come into being.

Images for Jung are like containers. He devotes much attention to vessel-symbols which are invariably associated with the feminine and edification:

This symbolization by means of a mysterious image must be interpreted as a spiritualization of the erotic motive evoked by the service of woman. (291)

Like a romance tale, Jung's imperative, the achievement of balance, reads unidirectionally:

Against the power and temptation of the temporal, therefore, he must set the joy of the eternal, and against the passion of the sexual, the ecstasy of the spiritual. (280)

The temptation of the temporal is also that of the relentless movement of thought, asking questions,
refusing contemplation as mystical union.

Faced with either an introverted movement towards ideas or an extroverted movement towards things, the structure of Jung's symbols or mythic images remains fragile:

An effective symbol, therefore, must have a nature that is unimpeachable. It must be the best possible expression of the existing world-philosophy, a container of meaning which cannot be surpassed; its form must also be sufficiently remote from comprehension as to frustrate every attempt of the critical intellect to give any satisfactory account of it; and, finally, its aesthetic appearance must have such a convincing appeal to feeling that no sort of argument can be raised against it on that score. (291)

The symbol's vulnerability results in a dual task. It must resist intellectual scrutiny and exert physical fascination.

Keeping the body in and the mind out, the image, the living symbol, is not only a seductive idol it also is inadequate to the symbolization of a psyche that gathers into itself, in the same psychological process, both esse in re and esse in intellectu. If one is to be in and the other out, there is no gathering together.

On similar grounds, Benjamin from his Trauerspiel study onwards challenged the transcendental claims of the symbol. What further distinguishes Jung's anti-intellectual attitude to myth from Benjamin's "quasi-magical cognitive attitude to historical matter" is a temporal opposition, as Susan Buck-Morss expresses it,
between allegorical expression (eternal passing) and symbolic expression (fleeting eternity) (Dialectics of Seeing 13;19). The latter is mute. Citing Creuzer's treatment of symbol and mythology, Benjamin explains that in the wake of the symbol "all that remains is speechless wonder" (Trauerspiel 164).

The arrest of time. The absence of language. Death hovers here. The vessel may be a tomb. In a 1934 essay on Bachofen, Benjamin suggests that the structure of the symbol is related to matriarchal notions. He stresses that Bachofen came to his study of mother-right through that of funerary symbols. He says that "what led Bachofen onto the path from which he would not stray were neither his studies nor his acquaintances but a turning point in his life as a solitary traveller" ("Bachofen" 36). He then cites Bachofen on the subject of the latter's first contacts with ancient tombs. All the markers of mythic mystery are found: immutable stability, plenitude, the insufficiency of speech and total reliance on the symbol to express experience.

Benjamin links such mystical aspects to fascism ("Bachofen" 38). He credits Alfred Schuler with this appropriation. Schuler introduced Ludwig Klages to the mother-right material. Klages adopted the chthonic elements to a fascist ideology.
This is how Benjamin in the Bachofen essay characterizes the work of Klages:

In reconstituting the mythic substance of life, the philosopher empowers "originary images" (Urbilder) by saving them from condemnation to oblivion. These images while laying claim to the exterior world are however different from representations. Representations are mixed with the utilitarian perspective and usurpatory claims of mind or feeling [esprit]. Whereas the image exclusively addresses the soul which embracing [the image] in a purely receptive fashion enriches itself through the image's symbolic content. ("Bachofen" 38-39)

Benjamin often pairs the names of Klages and Jung. Unlike their predecessor Bachofen, Klages and Jung sever the chthonic realm of mystery, source of mythic images, from the order of culture. True to the derivations of mystery, they seal lips. Silence marks the hiatus between eternal nature and passing culture. Language, particularly in its interrogative form, is a foe. It is a non-receptive mode of apprehension. It seizes. Destroys. Deactivates.

In this destructive guise, language is the instrument of an awakening. It is an instrument of allegory. It expresses eternal passing. In Benjamin's reading of Bachofen, death is the key to all knowledge. Benjamin describes Bachofen as a prudent mediator between nature and history. Death is the point where the natural crosses over into history and the historical into nature.
In such a dialectical conception, the alignment through the figure of the vessel of the life-giving feminine with nature cannot hold. In Benjamin there is no marriage of alternating opposites, no silent partnership. The vessels are broken. Woman is not inert. She walks. She is of history. In his texts relating to the decline of the aura, female figures signal elusiveness. Because they are fleeting, they provoke curiosity rather than contemplation.

In his discourse, Benjamin's encounter with photographs of women trigger the elaboration of his musings on aura. In "A Small History of Photography" two descriptions precede the text's statement regarding the discovery of an "optical unconscious" (242-243). They are of photographs. Benjamin contrasts painted pictures with photography. He writes of the urge to narrate, to tell the story of the subjects: this is "something new and strange" that is encountered more in the viewing of photographs than that of paintings. With painted pictures interest in the subject fades and "if they [the paintings] last, they do so only as testimony to the art of the painter" (242). Whether such a distinction can be sustained by a formalist appeal to the medium or more readily ascribed to the hermeneutical orientation of the beholder matters little since for Benjamin either route would lead to
this other nature, this optical unconscious.

For it is another nature that speaks to the camera than to the eye: other in the sense that a space informed by human consciousness gives way to a space informed by the unconscious. (243)

The ekphrasis that sets in place this conclusion, this revelation of another nature, is that of two photographs of female subjects. What one glimpses in this 1931 essay, as well as in the 1934 Bachofen piece and the early entries in the Passagen-Werk such as the citation from Berl, texts predating Benjamin's declared intention to critique Klages and Jung, are the organizational outlines of material which will permit a reformulation of the category of experience in more materialist terms.

The 1931 text "A Small History of Photography" cannot be read as response to Jung and company except in the manner Benjamin himself reads photographs. He is not seeking the silence of the symbol but "the inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that long-forgotten moment the future subsists so eloquently" (243). The first function of the female figure in Jung's account is to trigger erotic stirrings. Similarly, Benjamin sees the Newhaven fishwife's "seductive modesty" as "something that cannot be

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16 A chronology of the entries can be found in Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing, 48-52.
silenced, that fills you with an unruly desire to know" ("Small History" 242). It is the name and the live woman, he wants to know. Both Jung and Benjamin universalize this desire. However, if for Jung this desire is caught up by the vessel-symbol which is the second function of the figure and through which the happy ending of conducting sexual energy to social task ensues, this is not so in Benjamin. His second subject recalls the catastrophe that awaits real historical subjects if the erotic, that fanatic obsessive sexual desire, faces an unmodified nature. That which cannot be silenced is the catastrophe:

Or you turn up the picture of Dauthendey the photographer, the father of the poet, from the time of his engagement to that woman whom he found one day, shortly after the birth of her sixth child, lying in the bedroom of his Moscow house with her arteries severed. Here she can be seen with him, he seems to be holding her; but her gaze passes him by, absorbed in an ominous distance. (243)

For Benjamin, unlike Jung, there is no eternal Mother. There is no bosom enfolding timeless moments. Just as in the mind of the photograph viewer the represented couple cannot hold together in an unnegated unity so too the relation between viewer and photograph is dialectical. The apparatus mediates that relation.

Benjamin’s gesture is one of interpretive mimesis. His approach recreates the workings of the technical apparatus under scrutiny. The photograph enlarges
segments of reality. Cinematic slow motion even segments reality into hitherto unnoticed parts. They bring reality closer. Likewise to restore time to the photograph is to bring it closer.

It is perhaps more appropriate to characterize this play of proxemetics in terms of unlocking time or cutting time free since in this essay Benjamin in his definition of aura sees time as strangely woven into space to create the appearance of distance. Whatever the characterization, it is movement through space that destroys the timeless aspect of aura ("Small History" 250). Aura arises out of observer immersion in the phenomenon. Later in the Artwork essay17 Benjamin will stress the role of cultic practices in maintaining the contemplation necessary to sustain aura. However here in "A Small History of Photography" he accentuates the atmosphere-like quality; aura is breathed in (250). This quality is related to the factor of enfolded time -- the moment or hour becoming part of the appearance.

How aura as atmosphere can be related to enfolded time is not at all clear from Benjamin's text. In later

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essays, he drops from the discussion all direct mention of these two elements. The correlation between time and atmosphere passes through a mechanism of identification similar to the vessel-symbol of the Jungian soul. Whether Benjamin had read Jung at this point, it is clear that the auratic fusion of viewer and object places his discussion in the orbit of exponents of mythic images like Klages.

The Artwork essay is marked by the traces of the work on Bachofen and mother-right. Benjamin compares early photography to the cult of remembrance of the dead ("Artwork" 226). As well, although without reference to grave robbing, he refers to the destruction of aura when objects are pried from their shell ("Artwork" 223). These passing references evoke less Bachofen’s narrative of his first experiences upon encountering ancient graves than Schuler’s story of his own first encounter with unearthed artefacts.

Schuler observing objects lifted from an archaeological excavation notes that as they come to light they loose their aura (der Hauch). It evaporates. Schuler claimed that a fluid, a film of life matter, was possessed not only by relics and cult objects but also by all ancient objects. (Fuld 361-362). Benjamin could not refer to a written source for Schuler’s lectures and fragments were published posthumously by
Klages in 1940. However, it is the type of material that would circulate widely as anecdote. The evidence is compelling that Benjamin had contact with the Munich circle around poet Stefan George of which Alfred Schuler was a celebrated part (Fuld 360). Indeed in the Bachofen essay Benjamin refers to George’s dedication of Porta Nigra to Schuler ("Bachofen" 38).

The Schuler story perhaps did not influence Benjamin directly. Its key element, however, the fragility of the aura in the context of unearthing the past anticipates Benjamin’s insistence on displacement in the destruction of aura. It also illuminates the perplexing combination of aura’s source in ritual and in natural phenomena. It is upon the cult of the dead that mythic claims to a people’s belonging to the land are founded. Without symbols such a cult is endangered. It is unable to envelop the departed, those now belonging to nature, and those belonging to history, the living, into one cognitive space. The past is not one with the present.

Likewise, estrangement disarms myth. It disrupts the link between human beings and their surroundings. ("Small History" 251). Benjamin points to the photographs of Atget. They are of deserted streets and locales. They are void of any human figures. Benjamin notes that this makes them unlikely to provoke mythic
or auratic phenomena. Identification appears to be the key for the production of aura. Furthermore the success of the identificatory movement relies on the suppression of consciousness.

The question of consciousness will gain importance in Benjamin's later essays that broach the topic of aura after he has been called upon to distinguish his position from that of Jung. The Swiss psychologist defines the soul in two ways: as a relation to the unconscious and as a personification of the contents of the unconscious (Psychological Types 306). The privileged personifications are feminine. For Jung the earth in the mythic form of the mother is the source of all power (302). He also claims that phantasy is the mother of all (69).

Upon viewing photographs, especially those of female subjects, Benjamin's stress is on the desire for narration which arguably can slip if not into personification proper then into identification. Of course as a new and strange optical unconscious is opened up by the camera there is nothing inherent in the apparatus to prevent personification, however muted, to drive the storytelling. The pregnant pause of the still shot, especially read as continuing past and future, does not envelop but does capture, in Benjamin's case mesmerize, the viewer.
Adorno's critique comes to mind. A 1935 letter from Adorno critiques Benjamin's use in the Arcades project proposal of a concept of collective unconscious. Adorno not only holds that it is difficult to distinguish such a concept from a similar one in Jung but also that such a move ignores the role of commodity production in the shaping of dialectical, as opposed to mythic, images. Benjamin will reformulate the category of experience in more materialist terms. Such a move is accompanied by the eclipse of female figures in his discourse.

In a later essay Benjamin acknowledges that "experience of the aura thus rests on the transposition of a response common to human relationships to the relationships between the inanimate or natural object and man" ("Motifs" 188). It is in this transposability that Benjamin grounds a distinction between types of experience, between Erlebnis and Erfahrung. He sets as contrary impulses the opposite movements of the transposition: the inclination to objectify the human against that of anthropomorphising the world. Benjamin's investigation comes to rest in this dichotomy. To go beyond would be to examine and

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confront transposability itself.

A similar move is discernible in the Artwork essay where the aura of historical objects is explained using the same examples from the realm of nature (mountain range and shadow of a branch) as found in "A Small History of Photography" but the factor of enfolded time is now absent ("Artwork" 222-223). Distance is the only operative term to remain. Also absent -- a possible effect of Adorno's critique of Benjamin's similarity to Jung -- are female figures.

They will reappear after the personification-objectification problematic has been displaced by the Erfahrung-Erlebnis dichotomy. Woman is a striking figure of the uncontrollable in Benjamin's Baudelaire essays. For example, the figure appears in a single sonnet as the "vase de tristesse", the fleeing one, the ornament of the poet's nights. Benjamin reads the figure as a challenge to love "sated with the experience of the aura" ("Motifs" 189). However this description is oddly like the figure of woman taken up by mythographers like Klages and Jung for whom it is both natural object and human being and in this combination outside rational grasp. The difference lies in the ascription of function. For the one position such figures are the markers of the shocks served by life in a modern metropolis; for the other, the
potential to cushion them.

Shock is the point of departure for Benjamin's distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung ("Motifs" 163). Erfahrung is experience as part of the self. Like aura in an age of technical reproduction it is waning. It is related to practice in artisan manufacture. This is contrasted with greater emphasis on drill in mechanized work settings. Erlebnis, as experience disconnected from the self, experience lived through, is a response to modern urban conditions as thematized by the jostling crowd.

Experiential modes constrained by conditions of perception in the sphere of productive activity can be aligned with those modes created by consumption. To render the relation between self and world, cultural consumption in Benjaminian discourse employs its own vocabulary: distraction and concentration.

At the conclusion of the Artwork essay the absorption of the viewer by the object is expressed in terms of the concentration of the gaze. Distraction is the alternative mode. To explain it, Benjamin turns to the perception of architecture and haptic habit where the object is absorbed. In this discourse optical perception cannot be habitual as it may be in older ray theories of vision. It is not clear whether the assumption of the untranslatability of sensory modes
grounds itself in the distinction of modes of experience or vice versa.

The unbridgeable gap between sensory modes maintains the undialectical treatment of the problematic of absorption. It radically dichotomizes the relation between human self and environment.

When determinism and dichotomy are discursive partners, the truism that experience is made and it is affected by environment can lead to accounts of the relation of technology to perception where mimetic response is the sum total of experience. However, humans have the capacity to change their environments and themselves. Both Benjamin and McLuhan recognize this. At times they both forget it. It is the points where the sexual politics of biological and social reproduction surface in their work that offer places from which to begin to judge how fully each integrates this intuition into the dialectical relation of nature and history.

Furthermore the absence of that elusive conversion device hinders theorizing about interaction. Be it transposability of personification-objectification in Benjamin's play of proxemics or McLuhan's prosthetic metaphor recycling and chiasmic reversals, in limiting the possibility of sensory transcoding, both thinkers approach movement and change in a dichotomous fashion.
The division between the temporal and spatial arts stands unmoved. So too, remain unchallenged the sensory biases at work in the dyadic models of reproductive politic.
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Certain models of reproduction tend to privilege dyads as the basic units of interaction. The dyad in turn is locked onto one sensory modality. This structure generates a closed system and guarantees the model's explanatory power. It makes an elegant story with perfect pretensions to scienticity. No extraneous details or third parties to complicate matters.

For example, the relationship between State and citizen-worker, in Louis Althusser’s examination of social reproduction, is sealed in a structure of specularity. Not all cases offer themselves so transparently. Mary O’Brien, for one, does not foreground sensory modalities when she links reproductive and temporal consciousness. However, her materialist account of biological reproduction does rest ultimately upon an insufficiently critiqued idealist moment of fusion. That moment is cast in the idiom of a single sensory modality, touch. Since both the idiom and the moment are imported from Hegel, one could speak of discursive contamination. However her susceptibility is not so much a function of
insufficient critique of her German pretext as related to her rhetorical adoption of Christian myth.

First, O'Brien reads differences in reproductive consciousness off differences in anatomy. This incipient determinism is circumvented by an appeal to history. According to her, developments in contraceptive technology have supplied conditions under which women's reproductive consciousness no longer differs from that of men. This movement registers in her discourse as the story of a fall.\textsuperscript{19}

If O'Brien's is a Miltonic pattern, Althusser's is Dantesque. Movements of ascension mark Althusser's discourse on social reproduction. In his paradigm case, schooling is designed so that at each level a number of students enter the workplace to occupy places in the hierarchy of class. However, it is not only the analogy with a static series of circles that renders the comparison with the divine comedy model salient. There is also the disposition of the argument. Althusser carefully culminates his exposition if not with a beatific vision then with the solemnisation of a formal structure for all ideology. The particular dynamic of the sensory modalities played out in this general

\textsuperscript{19} She herself explicitly recognizes such a Christian theme. In a passage where she alludes openly to the Adamic narrative, she writes of men's "very real "fall" from reproductive process at the moment of alienation of their seed." \textit{(The Politics of Reproduction, 1981).}
structure owes much to Althusser's choices in the exemplification of the general form of ideology, in particular his recourse to Christian trinitarian dogma.

A stark ascetic streak permits Althusser to arrive at this point. He neglects relations of consumption. He favours analysis of the reproduction of the relations of production. His concern is the making of workers. Hence, in Althusser's discourse, ideology is set the task of dominating bodily drives. This design stems not only from Christian residues in his thought but also from a selective importation of psychoanalytic elements. The project of the care of a child is envisaged by Althusser as a story of progress through repression. For him, it is bringing an animal being into the human condition: "the extraordinary adventure which from birth to the liquidation of the Oedipal phase transforms a small animal conceived by a man and a woman into a small human child" ("Freud and Lacan" 189). Social reproduction has the form of a conversion narrative, a being called.

Name giving and recognition become central to the workings of ideology. The fluid operation of these functions relies on a synchronization of the senses. The essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" assumes a congruence between hearing and sight. As interpellation discursively shifts to specularity, the
ideological game becomes one of namer naming the (already) named. Althusser is of course highlighting the role of ideology in constraining heterogeneity, limiting options and naturalizing existing conditions. This leaves little conceptual space for a counter-hegemonic ideology. One place to begin is to question his projection of a visual dyad onto the hearing situation and to examine how such a visual dyad is constructed through his privileging of a mirror metaphor.

Althusser's essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" was first published June 1970 in La Pensée. The piece consists of two sections. The first and longer section is dated January-April 1969. This section describes the two types of state apparatus, repressive and ideological (in that order) and explains the workings of interpellation and specularity (in that order). The order contributes to the progressively deterministic tone of the presentation for if the activity of state repression is conceived as intermittent, ideology is not. The ordering also facilitates movement from intersubjective to intrapsychic phenomena. This sequence should not necessarily generate a greater degree of determinism. However, as Althusser moves from examining groups, specifically classes in conflict, and their
interactions with state apparatus to examining how an individual is constructed as a subject, his discourse skids on a static structure, a non-dialectical dyad. Althusser's specular dyad derives from his particular understanding of the Lacanian mirror stage. As such it partakes of the one-way vector found in the Oedipal narrative of psychoanalysis where it is axiomatic that a child seek to resemble a single parent.

As well the deterministic tone and thrust of Althusser's formulations stem from the relationship his essay cultivates with the discourse of psychoanalysis:

If eternal means, not transcendent to all (temporal) history, but omnipresent, trans-historical and therefore immutable in form throughout the extent of history, I shall adopt Freud's expression word for word, and write ideology is eternal, exactly like the unconscious. (Lenin & Philosophy 152)

A post scriptum dated April 1970 contributes an important modulation of the deterministic pronouncements of the earlier section. Rereading himself a year later Althusser highlights the schematic nature of his set of theses. He points out that they are obviously abstract. Criteria for abstraction vary. In some regards Althusser's theses are insufficiently abstract for they do not translate specularity out of its sensory encasement. To do so would reveal the circularity of the specular model and such a formalization would expose its tautological status.
However, Althusser does not view abstraction as a move to greater mathematical or logical formalism. His focus is upon abstraction as a move away from, in his case, an underlying reality, a final instance, a first cause:

The *total process* of the realization of the reproduction of the relations of production is therefore still abstract, insofar as it has not adopted the point of view of this class struggle. To adopt the point of view of reproduction is therefore, in the last instance, to adopt the point of view of the class struggle. (171)

Accompanying the repeated mention of class struggle in the post scriptum is an emphasis on the plural nature of ideologies. "It is only from the point of view of the classes, i.e. of the class struggle, that it is possible to explain the ideologies existing in a social formation." (*Lenin and Philosophy* 172)

Althusser also stresses that ideologies are not born in the Ideological State Apparatus (ISAs) but in social classes. He concludes his post scriptum thus:

ideologies are not "born" in the ISAs but from the social classes at grips in the class struggle: from their conditions of existence, their practices, their experience of the struggle, etc. (*Lenin and Philosophy* 173)

In his English version Ben Brewster maintains the prepositional shift of Althusser’s French. Ideologies are not born in *dans* ideological state apparatuses but from *de* classes in conflict. The parameters of the reproductive problematic have been refashioned: class struggle is the interaction in which class
becomes a parent.

The metaphor of birth that closes the post scriptum complicates the to and fro implications of abstraction that opens the post scriptum. The assessment of truth and error recedes. Furthermore, a functionalist and structuralist focus is displaced by a genealogical perspective.

The prepositional relation is not symmetrical; in is not the opposite of from. This is not mere reversal. In marking the difference between born in an apparatus and born from a social class, Althusser avoids simple negation of place of birth. A simple assertion -- not here, there -- will not do for Althusser is justifying his own discursive paternity both as progenitor and progeny.

In Althusser the question of correct analysis is never remote from considerations of the ownership of a brain child. He often exploits the resonances of the French idiomatic expression "naître de père inconnu". The fatherless child in Althusser's discourse figures an epistemic break, the coming into being of the radically revolutionary. Not only do the nuances generated by the prepositional shift bear the trace of Althusser's preoccupation with epistemological ruptures and breaks evident in his insistence on the splits between the early and late Marx, the young and mature
Freud, they also situate Althusser's own double-dated remarks within a similar narrative scheme with all its triumphist connotations.

Never explicitly cast in the eschatological contours of a messianic scheme, the figure of the fatherless child nevertheless partakes of a conflation of epiphanic and redemptive moments. Its deployment by Althusser brings an epistemological discovery into the ambit of an ethical stance.

This gesture of epistemological-ethical fusion situates both the discoverer of the break and the break itself in the figure of the fatherless child. Althusser is trying to occupy a place equivalent to that of Marx, a place combining both moral and epistemological power. The figure of the fatherless child flits between the object of study (Marx) and the subject conducting that study (Althusser). Its hovering movement is enhanced by its placement in apposition:

Dans le cas de la théorie marxiste, l'événement dénommable "coupure", tel que je l'ai défini plus haut, se trouve en effet produit, comme un "enfant sans père", par la confluence de ce que Lénine a appelé [...] (Éléments d'autocritique 99)

Placed in such a medial position, the use of the fatherless child comparison troubles some readers. For example, Grahame Lock's English version:

In the case of Marxist theory, the event which can be called a "break", as I defined it above, in fact seems to have been produced
like a "fatherless child" by the meeting of what Lenin called [...] (Essays in Self-Criticism 149)

The apposition is lost. The tense is shifted from the historical present to the past. The break is found in English to have been produced whereas in the French the break finds itself to be produced or being produced. Lock introduces a modal of doubt (seems) for Althusser's verb of discovery (finds). Lock's resistive rendering foils identification between the subject of enunciation and the enunciating subject. It smashes the textual mirror play. The rendering also suppresses Althusser's idolatrous tendencies. 20

When Althusser is most wont to idolize, the figure of the fatherless child surfaces. For example in the exuberant opening of "Freud and Lacan' an ample unfolding of the fatherless child figure serves to praise three unexpected children of the nineteenth-century, Marx, Freud and Nietzsche, in the quite unMarxist evocation of the maverick thinker as individual genius. At the outset of this text Althusser dramatizes the analogy. Possession of the "natural child" is contested:

"When a young science is born, the family circle is always ready for astonishment,

jubilation and baptism. For a long time, every child, even the foundling, has been reputed the son of a father, and when it is a prodigy, the fathers would fight at the gate if it were not for the mother and the respect due to her. (Lenin and Philosophy 181)

Having served the function of ensuring decorum, no further mention of the mother is made. Althusser lapses into the monoparental mode. He stresses the rupture, the unexpectedness of the radical thinker. For him, Freud's destiny was "to be himself his own father" (182). The entrepreneurial tenor of this celebration of the self-made man becomes explicit when Althusser states "[t]heoretically, Freud set up in business alone" (182). Althusser's diction generates the uncanny return of bourgeois individualism.

In a variation on the epistemological-ethical fusion, Althusser assumes the self to be co-terminous with its intellectual productions. In the fantasized postnatal welcome, epistemological break, radical thinker, and new science all reflect each other. Likewise when the narrative syntagm of the postnatal scene becomes the basis for the general form of ideology in the ISA essay, the subject of ideology and the self are made congruent.

The syntagm of the fantasized scene is composed of two moments. Expectation is followed by baptism or naming. The first can be related to the anticipatory moment of hailing or interpellation. The second,
baptism or naming, is a key element of the specular structure of the subject. Focused on the function of ideology, Althusser models reproduction as conversion. This emerges most clearly when Althusser illustrates interpellation by the example of a one hundred and eighty degree "turn". Be it Christian or secular, in conversion an authority claims a body just as fathers claim a child. The general form of ideology as explicated in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus" replicates a story focalized by Althusser's investment in heroic images of knowledge production and his stake in the Oedipal game of the name of the father.

As one reads a narrative syntagm first out of the phantasmatic scene of birth/baptism and then across the detached "notes to an investigation" which together compose the ISA essay, one abstracts from the texts of the Althusserian corpus a peculiar pattern and one is able to trace the conversion of rhetorical resources into cognitive patterns.

There are textual indicators justifying such a reading practice. The narrative nuggets found in the notes are not self-contained. Althusser composes by application of an algebraic technique. In the ISA essay, following what he calls a "reshuffle", he carefully lists which terms disappear, survive and
appear (*Lenin and Philosophy* 159). Later in the same essay in his treatment of the three examples of interpellation, he is reshuffling but silently and without explicitly naming terms.

Of the three examples, the first is the most complex. Althusser will reduce the number of variables in the examples that follow. In this first example Althusser asks readers to imagine friends fond of playing guessing games. Someone knocks at the door. A question is posed. Who’s there? "Me," comes the answer. The door is opened; a friend has been recognized. The door opening closes the sequence. It confirms the recognition:

> And we recognize that "it is him", or "her". We open the door, and "it’s true, it really was she who was there". (*Lenin and Philosophy* 161)

In this example, the interpellation (the knock), the moment of recognition and that of confirmation (opening the door) remain separate. However, Althusser does not regard them as analytically distinct. In his other examples these moments are fused. For Althusser, interpellation combines the recognition by a hailing of a subject with the hailed individual’s response, a recognition of being a subject. Althusser does not consider these as different recognitions. Schematically, an ideological apparatus functions successfully when the emission of a message is met by
both the reception of a message and the emission of a new message confirming reception. However, in arriving at his circular structure of the specular subject of ideology, Althusser elides any distinction between recognition, confirmation and interpellation.

His circular structure is dyadic. This structure is expressed as a relation between reflected and reflection that leaves untheorized or rather unanthropomorphized the role of the reflector. A triadic approach also understands ideological interaction to be circular but not symmetrical. Alongside the hailer and the hailed stands the witness. Or, in terms of the transmission schema: emitter, receiver and confirmee. Of course, the confirmee may assume the interrogative of interpellation - a who's there in reply to a knock.

Althusser implies that if an answer can take the form of a question then a response can be a call. The premise conflates form and function. It does invite considerations beyond the hailed/hailer dyad. If the response to one is a call to another then social reproduction can be examined according to the workings of split address and multiple interpellation. As a modelling system, an ISA creates an interaction that is designed to be overheard or observed. Each hailer-hailed dyad calls out to another potential subject.
Bilateral questioning delays final confirmation of the specular dyad. Indeed the movement towards dyad formation is highly sensitive to disruptive questions and so ideology as a language game is aimed at the control of questions. Of course, some ideologies would construe the prolongation of bilateral questioning as worthy of imitation. Again control of questions is the key.

Interpellation, especially in this first example, hinges upon interrogation. The play of sensory modalities is posed as a problem in verification. The second modality confirms the findings of the first. Visual recognition corroborates aural recognition. The order from hearing to sight in this example recapitulates at the local level the sweep from aural to visual that marks the global structure of the essay. Unlike the other examples, however, an exchange of questions is central to the door knocking narrative. The knock indicates the desire to know if any one is there. The counter question demands to know who is asking.

The counter question as answer is a confirmation. As question, it is also an interpellation. It is a troubling element for Althusser. Counter questions complicate the completion of the ritual of recognition.

In Althusser’s examples, questions provoke
narrative delay. They add peripetia to the game of anagnoresis. Thus they complicate the phenomenon of recognition. As exchanges between subjects, all questions occupy ideological space but some shape it, some crease it, so that recognition in a particular ideology cedes to recognition between ideologies. The specular structure favoured by Althusser collapses ideology’s interpellation of a subject into its interpellation of its subject. As a consequence, Althusser conceives of interpellation less as a type of interrogation or a form of invitation than as recognition, less the projection of an expectation than its fulfilment.

The link between closure and sight is evident in each of his examples. The narrative of the knock achieves closure upon visual contact, more precisely face-to-face positioning once the door is opened. The second example culminates in mutual recognition expressed by the hand shake greeting. The third hinges on the accomplishment of the one hundred and eighty degree turn to face the source of a hailing-from-behind. In these two as in the first example, the final response is organized around the hegemony of sight.

The articulation between closure and sight stems from the influence of Lacanian psychoanalysis. As Althusser mobilizes such concepts as the mirror stage
and the Imaginary, he also imports a particular figuration of the parameters of familial ideology:

Everyone knows how much and in what way an unborn child is expected. Which amounts to saying, very prosaically, if we agree to drop the "sentiments", i.e. the forms of family ideology (paternal/maternal/conjugal/fraternal) in which the unborn child is expected: it is certain in advance that it will bear its Father's Name, and will therefore have an identity and be irreplaceable. (Lenin and Philosophy 164)

To set up a relation of reflection to a subject, ideology grasps a body. Interpellation is a species of nomination aimed at recognition. In short, ideology seizes and names. It creates a relation of belonging. In this drama, to bestow a name is to lay a claim. The paradigm case is the fatherly appropriation of children.

If interpellations are repeated baptismal operations they may be connected to the uncertainty of paternity. As second births into the circle of ideology, interpellations would figure a reproductive consciousness. Althusser's point that interpellation constrains a specular subject would not be unconnected to what Donna Haraway describes as a "regulatory fiction" basic to Western concepts of gender [which] insists that motherhood is natural and fatherhood is cultural: mothers make babies naturally,

21 "Belonging" represents a complex semantic field in which adhesion, membership, possession, and ownership criss-cross.
biologically. Motherhood is known on sight; fatherhood is inferred. (Haraway 135)

The gendered distinction between nature and culture, itself an ideological product, if read back into Althusser's theorizing about ideology leads first to the psychologistic claim that specularity is a compensation mechanism for unseeable paternity. Secondly, such reading back of the gendered distinction leads to a structural insight, namely, that continuity is aligned with reversibility.

Althusser ties the principle of continuity to a reversible structure through grounding the reproduction of the specular subject upon the Oedipal scenario. As does the psychoanalytic drama, the ideological interpellation of the individual as subject depends upon the passage between two domains. Dyadic specularity is both the narrative outcome of this passage and the means for its accomplishment. The act of interpellation is a return of recognition. The hailing and hailed not only mirror each other, they cause each other to be. Structure and effect interlock in a perpetuum mobile.

This perpetual motion machine is fancifully rendered by the mechanical illustrations that accompany E.P. Thompson's disquisition on Althusser in "The Poverty of Theory". Digressing further into the delights of explicating Thompson's ekphrasis of the
"orrery of errors" will not unfortunately unravel the tangle of twos.

When gendered distinctions are considered, the construction of a specular relation replicates in its form a previous dyadic structure. The shift from maternal to paternal identification assumes the fundamental unit of human interaction remains (if it ever was) the dyad. Recall the opening fable of "Freud and Lacan". The expectation of a prodigy is marked by the central presence of many competing fathers but only a single mother.

The assumptions present in this unique scenario are applied by the philosopher to more than exceptional cases. Althusser reduces the tension of multiple interpellations in the story of the subject of ideology by appeal to a dyad. The mother-child dyad belongs to the domain of nature, the domain of animal being. The work of culture creates a second dyad in the name of the father, a dyad placed in the space of ideology.

Haraway suggests that the "naturalness" of the mother-child dyad can be called into question. The dyad in both domains, culture and nature, is an imaginary construct of ideology.

An impervious mother-child dyad also inhabits the theorizing of Mary O'Brien. Her investigations into the social relations of biological reproduction are as
strongly marked by the regulatory fiction described by Haraway as are Althusser’s into social reproduction. She as he does stresses appropriation in the name of the father. Like his, her work links continuity to reversibility. However, instead of the evil eye of specularity, one finds the magic of connective touch. Whatever sensory modality it may be grounded upon, superstition founds both their material analyses. It is, as any superstition, sophisticated. It is an ethnoscience of perception. It is not unconnected to an ethnoscience of reproduction.

O’Brien imports her sensory bias from a text she otherwise examines most critically -- a passage in Hegel’s early theological writings. Mention of Hegel’s fragment on love appears in a bibliography of suggested readings concluding an essay published in 1976 “The Politics of Impotence”. The following year, under the auspices of the Group for Research On Women (GROW) of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education,

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22 The relation between ethnoscience and reproductive models is suggested by John A. Barnes, "Genetrix : genitor :: nature : culture?" in The Character of Kinship, ed. Jack Goody (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). It is also a very useful concept for bridging the domains of perception and reproduction.

appears a study of Hegel wherein the fragment on love is discussed at length. Just over a decade later, the GROW paper is reprinted with slight revisions in *Reproducing the World*, a collection of essays by O’Brien.

Her treatment of this text is the basis from which she develops her exposition of the dialectics of reproduction. Hegel is a pretext to her own model. What she finds in Hegel is a description of a process. What she discovers he lacks is a description of the gendered consciousness that is conditioned by that process.

Description and its correction, her key rhetorical move, generates the scientificity of the account. Evidence indicates that the corrective she offers is actually the filter through which the description attributed to Hegel is initially constructed. The heuristic value of her model may remain undamaged; the power of its persuasiveness, not. The whole appeal to an authority now corrected and updated following the world-historical advent of universally available contraceptive technology becomes untenable. It is through a particularly vulnerable periodization of the historical conditions of the relations of reproduction that she reads Hegel. It will come as no surprise that O’Brien’s periodization is conditioned by a dyad or more precisely is animated by dyadic designs.
Despite her appeal to dialectic, she reifies the couple, most notably in her reading of the German philosopher. In a nutshell:

Hegel notes that reproduction is a process of "unity, separated opposites, reunion." What he is referring to is the unity of the man and woman in copulation, which he discreetly calls "love," and the separation and reunion of the respective seed of the lovers, creating a new entity that is both part of but separate from its progenitors. The new seed both is and is not the unity of the parents. ("Feminist Theory and Dialectical Logic" 105-106)

Many items in this description are not to be found in the Hegelian fragment from which they are said to derive. The vocabulary of newness is not in Hegel. His outlook is retrospective. Indeed, in the translation used by O'Brien, one finds a note immediately after the statement concerning the nature of the process that O'Brien claims refers to reproduction. The note indicates that Hegel had added then struck "The child is the parents themselves." (Knox 308) The paradoxical statement can be explained by the sentence that follows where Hegel states "the lovers separate again, but in the child their union has become unseparated."^{24}

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^{24} Knox avoids repetition consistently and thus reduces the constant stress on union. "Die Vereinigten trennen sich wieder, aber im Kind ist die Vereinigung selbst ungetrennt worden." (Nohl 381) The English is rendered by an adverbial phrase ("After their union the lovers separate again"). Hegel's terms interlock. "The united" [die Vereinigten] is the lovers and "what has been united" [das Vereinigte] is the child. The later term is once rendered as "unity" (Knox 307) thus perhaps
In shifting emphasis from the term "union" to that of "unity" O'Brien has glossed the moment of the lovers' embrace as an exchange of genetic material or seeds. However such a mixing of materials implies two notions that Hegel takes pains to remove from his account of the interaction of the lovers. The separation of seeds as envisaged by O'Brien introduces a moment of loss. This she will emphasize by referring to such a separation as an alienation. Hegel in the fragment on love explicitly states that in giving there is no loss. Giving between lovers results in enhancement, acquisition of the "wealth of life". In O'Brien's reading the lovers remain distinct entities. Hegel's lovers embrace in a union that sublates all differences into a whole without distinctions. From the philosopher's formulation it is difficult to derive the necessary distance between the lovers to found a moment of exchange.

In Hegel's description there are no seeds that mingle. Generation is a result of the full union of the lovers. A living child does, as Hegel indicates, "come into existence." However, O'Brien misses the intercession of a third party. "God has acted and created. What has been united is not divided again. [text transposed]" (Knox 307) Divine agency is never leading O'Brien to anachronistic Mendelism.
discussed by O’Brien.  

Also, despite what O’Brien alleges, Hegel never generalizes such a union as the basis for all human reproduction. The tripartite process is not that of reproduction. In the paragraph referring to the process being one of union, separation, reunion, Hegel is describing the development of the seed:

Everything which gives the newly begotten child a manifold life and a specific existence, it must draw into itself, set over against itself, and unify with itself. The seed breaks free from its original unity, turns ever more and more to opposition, and begins to develop. (Knox 297)

O’Brien takes this breaking free as birth, overlooking Hegel’s assertion that "[e]ach stage of its development is a separation". O’Brien privileges birth. She brings the seed’s development into the ambit of production.

The alignment of the domains of reproduction and production allows O’Brien to articulate a relation between social and biological reproduction. As well,

25 There are other signs of a hurried reading. Although she records her "immeasurable debt" to H.S. Harris, Hegels Development: Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), she seems to have skimmed. In her GROW paper O’Brien ascribes the fragment on love to Hegel’s Tübingen period. ("Hegel: Man, Physiology and Fate" 25). This error is rectified by striking the sentence in the revised version appearing in Reproducing the World (180). Her skimming is governed by her focus on reproduction. Careful attention to Harris would have avoided the conflation of love with copulation. Hegel is not just being "discreet". Considerable theological considerations govern his discourse on love.
this alignment allows her to enact her gesture of supplementation. What she finds lacking in Hegel is an account of the labour, specifically female labour, in the process of bringing beings into the world. For her the infant does not simply break free. It is produced.

This fundamentally recasts the telos of unification. If Hegel's focus is upon the union of lovers, O'Brien's is upon the relation of parent to child. The synchronic union is converted into a diachronic unity. Throughout O'Brien's discourse unity is keyed to a temporal mode, or rather a dichotomy based in the different valorization of temporal modes, a difference itself rooted in a theoretical approach that regards the oppressor class as diseased. She adopts a discourse of pathology stating men necessarily develop "ideological modes of continuity over time to heal the discontinuous sense of man the uncertain father." (The Politics of Reproduction 131)

Continuity is her prime concern. For O'Brien relation to a child constructs relation to species continuity. Men produce no children of their own. Men mediate their relation to species continuity through the creation of political institutions that enforce paternity rights -- physiological paternity being uncertain.

Species continuity is the translation into
biological terms of her concern with social continuity.

One crucial dimension of political activity is the creation of stability over time, of permanence beyond the individual life span. Political institutions, at least from the perspective of those who uphold them, are able to do what their human content cannot. They defy death by auto-regeneration. ("The Politics of Impotence" 149)

While recognizing that the organic metaphors and the "[m]ale and sexual" imagery of political theory are "modes of expression" she insists they are "something more". Indeed verbal expressions signal something more. However in her move from organic metaphors to empirical constructs O'Brien elevates the generative function of political activity. She unhinges drives towards destruction from political praxis. Operative in her formulations concerning reproductive consciousness is a birth/death dichotomy mapped onto woman/man.

O'Brien does not crudely restate or invert an axiology derivable from such a dichotomy. She uses periodization. Two events cause changes in reproductive

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26 This axiological move is cast as a corrective to male death drive and is most often expressed in O'Brien's hostility to existentialism. Its zest leads to some philological blunders. In the Politics of Reproduction (67), she puns upon Heidegger's Dasein with Das Man [sic]. French is equally Englished. In reference to a Beckett character she serves up a hormonal interpretation to Estragon's name without a hint of the herb namesake. The character from Waiting for Godot "has appropriated in thought the feminine creative principle, the female sex hormone." ("The Politics of Impotence" 162) These flourishes accentuate the tenacity of the dichotomy which generates them.
consciousness. The first is the discovery of the principle of physiological paternity. Second is the invention of contraceptive technology.\(^27\) O'Brien's

\(^27\) O'Brien admits her periodization is shakey. "Of course modes of contraception have existed for a long time, and many feminists have argued that these have been deliberately suppressed by men. In Hegelian terminology these have been particular modes of contraception, and only contemporary technology can realize universal contraception." ("Hegel: Man, Physiology and Fate" 18, n. 1) O'Brien will nuance in Reproducing the World (201, n. 12). The remarks end with a reformulation. She writes "but contemporary technology can realize "universal" contraception, a fact which profoundly transforms the social relations of reproduction." O'Brien could be reacting to a possible criticism of her dichotomization of Hegel since she leaves out of the play of particular and universal the intermediary term \textit{Individualität}.

Whatever the case, there is no doubt that in the intervening period the work on modes of contraception by the "many feminists" and others gains greater currency. Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English had earlier acknowledged The Manufacture of Madness (Delta, 1971) by Thomas Szasz especially his chapter on "The Witch as Healer" (\textit{Witches, Midwives, and Nurses: A History of Women Healers}, (Old Westbury, N.Y.: The Feminist Press, 1973), 42). The figure of the witch-healer is popularized in the work of such thinkers as Starhawk and Mary Daly whose strands of feminism do not mesh well with O'Brien's materialism.

Recent work unavailable to O'Brien challenges the bases of her periodization more thoroughly. Angus McLaren notes "Most [histories of the regulation of reproduction] serve the unintentional purpose not so much of providing an understanding of past cultures as of applauding our own" and he goes on "Women in the "bad old days" of the pre-industrial world, such works commonly argue, were plagued by repeated unwanted pregnancies; in rational modern societies reliable contraceptives assure control of one's body." \textit{A History of Contraception: From Antiquity to the Present Day} (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). His work shows that such effective measures as prolonged lactation to spread out pregnancies were well known in pre-industrial Europe. Ironically in O'Brien's dialectics of reproduction, breast feeding would belong to the moment of nurture which she claims to be "genderically
periodization contains an implicit narrative. One recognizes a union, separation, reunion, pattern. The historical dialectic that O’Brien would discern in this transformation of reproductive consciousness and the relations of reproduction registers as the history of a dyad: the establishment of asymmetry between two protagonists of opposite genders and the overcoming of that asymmetry.

The dance of the dyad is staged within an economy. A commodity logic rules the operations of O’Brien’s dyads. Producer meets appropriator. The assumption here is that women make babies. Such an assumption rooted in an ethnoscience of reproduction is not universally held. Feminist anthropologist, Marilyn Strathern notes that

maternal work presents itself to Western industrial and market minds in terms of its natural status as the prime source from which all else comes and as a resource to be valued. (Gender of the Gift 316)

She stresses the difference with Melanasia where

Women do not replicate raw material, babies in the form of unfashioned natural resources, but produce entities which stand in a social relation to themselves (316)

and "Children are the outcome of multiple others."28

shared" (Politics of Reproduction 47).

28 Not only recent anthropological investigations challenge the basis of O’Brien’s work. So do longstanding debates within socialist feminism over grounding theories of oppression in relations of
If an ethnoscience of reproduction is sensitive to the number of players, so too is an ethnoscience of perception. The shift need not be in the number of sensory modalities at play. Significant consequences stem from varying the unit of interaction. Descriptions based on non-dyadic units stage dances not only nuptial in nature.

The operation of O'Brien's conjugal dyad is cemented by tactility. It is not possible to argue uncontroversially that O'Brien locks the dyad onto this one and only this one sensory modality. She never cites in full the passage in Hegel's fragment on love concerning the fusion of the lovers, the passage upon which so much rests. It reads:

What in the first instance is most the individual's own is united into the whole in the lovers' touch and contact; consciousness of a separate self disappears, and all distinction between the lovers is annulled.

(Knox, 307)

In O'Brien's other access to the German, the touch and contact is rendered by phrasing that suggests more than reproduction. See Olivia Harris and Kate Young, "Engendered structures: some problems in the analysis of reproduction" in J.S. Kahn and J.R. Llobera, eds., The Anthropology of Pre-Capitalist Societies (London: Macmillian, 1981) and, contemporaneous with O'Brien's work on Hegel, Felicity Edholm, Olivia Harris, Kate Young "Conceptualising Women" in Critique of Anthropology 3:9-10 (1977). In particular their call for caution in applying models of conjugality to the understanding of the construction of gender difference can certainly be set against O'Brien as she reifies the couple in her reading of Hegel.
a simple physical encounter. Harris gives "in mutual contact and shared feeling" (309). The lovers are in a state; they are in der Berührung, in der Befühlung, in the touching and in the contacting. The weight of the preposition is lost on O'Brien. Her focus is the between.

Whether O'Brien is following Knox or Harris or some mixture of both, it is possible to argue that a commodity logic is at work when O'Brien reads this tactile and affective meeting as an exchange. As Strathern points out:

What commodity logic promotes is a perceived diversity and complexity not in relationships but in the attributes of persons as selves and agents. (312)

This is the perfect basis for conceiving contacts as exchanges. Relationships become a matter of swapping attributes, assembling a unity, rather than formulating interactions, being united.

O'Brien conflates the two different products of the process. She equates two entities: the unity resulting from the union and the union itself. Or rather she proceeds by excision. She disregards Hegel's fundamental focus upon union in itself and she neglects the type of economy in which it is embedded.

Two economies are discernable in Hegel's text. The first is an economy of the gift in which the act of giving does not diminish the person giving. The second
is an exchange economy where each party stands to lose. This second economy does appear in the final paragraph of the Hegelian fragment "which is devoted to proving that two individuals cannot really have common property." (Harris 310) From this conclusion O’Brien’s model of the alienated seeds takes its cue. And the moment of touch is conceived in terms of exchange.

Hegel’s haptic thematics need not be soldered to the conjugal mode. Two is not the ultimate number of love. What happens when there is an orgy or in any case including prolonged masturbation where being touched and touching meld? The limit experience, Hegel’s Bewußtlosigkeit, contact to the point of loss of consciousness, is reproducible without engendering any child.

Rethinking the inevitable naturalness of the obligation to reproduce whether biological or

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29 O’Brien positions nonreproductive sexual activity in a negative constellation. Ancient Greek society based on slave labour is for her "imperialist, racist, sexist and quite often orgiastic" (Politics of Reproduction 140) She also claims that the Greeks had created measures "effective enough to create wives so deadly dull that prostitution and homosexuality flourished" (124). Whatever the link between orgies and imperialism, O’Brien’s rhetoric is based on an axiology that values production above consumption. Yet no conditions exist a priori to found species continuity on production. One can call to mind the prisoner of war in Montaigne’s essay "Des Cannibales" who taunts his captors by claiming that they will eat the flesh of their ancestors; he having previously feasted, their substance still clings to him. Species continuity and genetic continuity need not be congruous.
ideological invites heraclctic formulations: reproduction without unification, continuities without reversibility. In a contrary fashion, as if children of Parmenides, O'Brien and Althusser offer closed cycles as they struggle, their theoretical descriptions emmeshed in base-superstructure relations, with chicken and egg problems.

Rethinking levels of description, rethinking premises, rethinking the articulation of interlocking patterns, in short asking metadiscursive questions, needs to be more often factored into theory making.

What is it to ask how a question is asked? It is to practice maieutics. To discover in Althusser's text hints that an ideological apparatus controls a game of questions. To grasp from O'Brien the temporal character of value conversion. To understand how differently valued temporal modes discursively feedback into the creation of value: reproductive consciousness reproduces itself. O'Brien herself claims in The Politics of Reproduction to be "labouring to give birth to a new philosophy of birth." (13)

To practice maieutics in a culture of the question is to find replication and reproduction to be variants of emulation. As conservation and shuffling of genetic material, replication and reproduction are carry over operations -- future directed. Emulation is conformance
to a pattern be it of the past, the present or a
projected future ideal. Emulation operates not with
substance or things but with patterns and relations. It
is not the basis of social reproduction. It emulates
social reproduction and through metadiscursive
movements does so nondyadically, does so dialectically.
Asking a question is akin to telling a story. Drawing a picture is like telling a story. Both, drawing pictures and asking questions, are ways of orienting. Both focus attention. Of course telling stories is a way of orienting. The circularity of these assertions depends not upon the equivalency of the products, question, picture, story, but the activities, asking, describing, telling.

As ways of orienting, all are moments of a relentless semiosis, all rework representations, all participate in some measure of transcoding. These ways of doing are readily framed as the potential of an object. What can be described becomes narratable and open to interrogation; what is askable has a story. Actions and objects correlate; praxis bears on semantics.

This slippage between doing and meaning is the central point of Ricoeur’s critique of Greimas’s narrative grammar. At stake is the adequacy of transcodings. Also at stake are the bases of formalization: permissible degrees of abstraction,
legitimate limits to the role of reduction and extrapolation in interpretation. In short, hermeneutics confronts semiotics over the proper use of tools.

Ricoeur expresses reservations about the equivalence of metalanguages and about the conversions that turn an achronic taxonomy of logical relations into the syntactic operations of a narrative structure. In short Ricoeur is troubled by the generative trajectory traced by Greimas, a trajectory that according to Ricoeur depends upon the mixed nature of its fundamental structure.

For Ricoeur, this mixed nature of the model conditions its applicability and so he claims in his concluding statement:

to explain to readers of works stemming from this school why the semiotic square sometimes seems to have a true heuristic value, and sometimes to be simple transcription, which can be more or less elucidating but sometimes corresponds to a more or less forced understanding of narrative which proceeds not according to the logical component, but according to the praxico-pathetic component of the mixed model. ("Greimas's Narrative Grammar" 28)

What could be attributed to skill is vested by Ricoeur in the appropriateness of the tool. However the square is not for Ricoeur just an anthropomorphized error prone machine. He takes great pains to demonstrate that the machine part, the logical component, cannot alone generate narratives; a body needs to be imported into
the model or must be present from the outset. Machine and body are not Ricoeur's terms. In his discourse, logic is set against doing and feeling. This opposition is temporally figured as the difference between static taxonomy and dynamic narrative.

It is through this set-up that Ricoeur reads Greimas. However, there is a glitch in Ricoeur's motion detection device. Ricoeur introduces alongside the Greimassian nomenclature two Aristotelian terms, dianoia and mythos ("Greimas's Narrative Grammar" 23) which are said to conform to Greimas's "heterotopic spaces". In Frye who is Ricoeur's authority here, the difference between the two Aristotelian terms is related to a division of the senses, a division of labour for the eye and the ear (Anatomy of Criticism 77). The ear is matched with narrative or mythos; dianoia or meaning, with the eye. The coupling of this sensory mapping with the dynamic/static binary affects Ricoeur's evaluation of Greimas's model. In particular, his judgement on its ability to bridge the taxo-narrative hiatus is overdetermined by his yoking of the static with the visual.

What A.J. Greimas designates as the elementary structure of signification has come generally to be known as the semiotic square. Greimas himself does not reduce the elementary structure to its graphic
incarnation. He states that the square is a visual presentation of a relational network ("Entretien" 21). In an 1984 discussion with Ricoeur, he states that "As to the semiotic square, it could be a square or a cube or a circle. The shape is of no importance whatsoever. It was necessary to formulate a minimum number of relational tools, and in this case, a fundamental structure of discourse that was as simple as possible" ("On Narrativity" 554-555). The two criteria, a minimum number of tools and simplicity, only appear to be unrelated to shape.

Certain geometries are precluded from Greimas's list. His enumeration contains aught but closed figures. Furthermore each of the closed figures is symmetrical. The range of choices is not without consequences.

Simplicity can be quite complex. Semiotic formalization, if it is like that of mathematics, attempts to meet Hilbert's three basic requirements: consistency, completeness, and decidability. Ricoeur works the tension between completeness and consistency. His critique retraces the moments where elements are, he claims, added or introduced at each subsequent level of the generative trajectory. His critique terminates with the declaration that Greimas's point of departure must be heterogeneous. The model possesses a mixed
nature. One recognizes the dilemma: either incomplete, in need of additions at every stage, or inconsistent, mixed from the outset.

Ricoeur wishes to determine the consistency of the procedures that guide the transformation of a semantic binary into a series of narrative utterances. Ricoeur's critique centres on the satisfactory passage from a static morphology to a dynamic syntax. It is the temporalization of taxonomy or the narrativization of the fundamental structure of signification that concern him.

Connected to his either-or staging of the semantic-syntactic opposition is a cardinal axiom. Ricoeur posits the eternal stasis of a taxonomy. His evidence is culled from "Elements of a Narrative Grammar". In this text Greimas explains that Lévi-Strauss's 1955 structural analysis of the Oedipus myth "resulted in the construction of a simple achronic model." (67) and furthermore "such a model accounts for the achronic apprehension of the signification of the stories that could possibly be generated by a given microuniverse" (68). However, Greimas continues "if one considers it [signification] as an apprehension or production of meaning by a subject" one can represent the taxonomic model dynamically (68). Ricoeur transfers to Greimas himself attributes that Greimas affixes to
Lévi-Strauss. This referential migration of the adjective "achronic" accrues a certain force when the adverbial qualifier "rigorously" is attached. Ricoeur on Greimas:

"Semantically speaking -- or to say the same thing differently, from the point of view of morphology -- the model is rigorously achronic. It is a taxonomy, that is a system of unoriented relations. But one can represent the model dynamically. You just have to move from the morphological point of view to the syntactic one, that is, treat the constituent relations of the taxonomic model as being operations. ("Greimas’s Narrative Grammar" 5-6)

The French text gives the impression that the model is a semantics:

En tant que sémantique -- or, ce qui est synonymique, du point de vue morphologique -- le modèle est rigoureusement achronique. C’est une taxinomie, c’est-à-dire un système de relations non orientées. ("La grammaire narrative de Greimas" 7)

One copula is missing in the chain of statements: the model is achronic, a taxonomy is achronic, the model is a semantics, a taxonomy is a system of non-oriented relations. Is a taxonomy always and only a semantics? And is a syntax always an add-on?

The answer hinges on the distinction between achronic and atemporal. If achronic is taken as synonymous with synchronic, then the moves between semantic and syntactic dimensions, indeed their very mutual implication, cease to be wondrous. Greimas, himself, at the end of the section treating the
narrativization of taxonomy, invites readers to note that the "so-called achronic apprehension of myth is an unstable instance [...] its "dogmatic" structure is capable, at any moment, of turning into a story" ("Elements" 68). Exploiting the suggestion of instabilities and responding to Ricoeur's critique, Jean Petitot (1983) has demonstrated that the semiotic square, schematized according to catastrophe theory, does possess a temporality.  

Petitot, like Ricoeur, discredits the generative powers of logic. It is banished from the explicative framework. In Morphogenèse du Sens he carefully distinguishes between topological schematization and logical formalization. The pretensions to logicity of the taxonomy are displaced by the application of sophisticated mathematical tools. The question of conversion is for Petitot not one of equivalence between metalanguages but one of "double reading"  

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10 Petitot explains that the schematization of the square reveals "there exists a "temporality" internal to the structure, a temporality which, without paradox, can be qualified as "synchronous". Linked to the dimensionality of the structural space in question, it accounts for the canonical linking of the sequences proposed by Greimas (the "figure eight" trajectory of the object of value at the level of the anthropomorphic syntax). Consequently, in the catastrophe schematism, axiology is polarized in the external space of the dual butterfly, a polarization which governs its "synchronous" temporality" [original emphasis] ("Catastrophe Theory" 195-196).
This double reading is a "covering of paths" in a mathematical representation of the semiotic square. Plots can be generated from taxonomies. Petitot's work however lends credence to positions like Ricoeur's that to do the trick, logic alone does not suffice.

When pictures are made to tell stories or graphs to sing tales, magic is afoot. Certainly topological schematization has affinities with prelogical thought as characterized by Lévy-Bruhl:

The concrete categories of position, location and distance are of such paramount importance to the conception of rude nations as are to us those of time and causality. (Lévy-Bruhl 150)

As well, topological schematization requires a stratified space or a space that is not uniform.

A similar condition exists for prelogical thought. According to Lévy-Bruhl, spatial representations have a bearing on cognitive moves and what types of linkages are possible and permissible:

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31 "Now one of the principle interests of E.C.'s [Elementary Catastrophes] as models of paradigms is that it is very easy to carry out syntagmitizations of them. All one has to do is to cover paths in the external spaces, the crossings of the various catastrophic strata being interpreted as events making actants interact among themselves. This is Thom's actantial graph method allowing us to construct scenarios from E.C.'s." ("Catastrophe Theory" 196).

32 Lévy-Bruhl is quoting from A. Gatschet The Klamath Language (Contributions to North American Ethnology ii, I) 306.
The condition of our abstraction is the logical homogeneity of the concepts which permits of their combination. Now this homogeneity is closely bound up with the homogeneous representation of space. If the prelogical mind, on the contrary, imagines the various regions in space as differing in quality, as determined by their mystic participations with such and such groups of persons or objects, abstraction as we usually conceive of it becomes very difficult to such a mind, and we shall find that its place is taken by the mystic abstraction which is the result of the law of participation. (Lévy-Bruhl 121)

The law of participation is posited to explain "mental activity [which] is too little differentiated for it to be possible to consider ideas or images of objects by themselves apart from the emotions and passions which evoke these ideas or are evoked by them" (Lévy-Bruhl 36).

In this prelogical alloy of feeling and thought one recognizes an equivalent to Ricoeur’s pathemic dimension. However the pejorative laden discourse of Lévy-Bruhl on primitive mentalities has been, through the linguistics of Viggo Brøndal, purged. It is through Greimas’s encounter with Brøndal’s work that the law of participation is implanted into the fundamental structure of signification. Ricoeur contends of course that the Greimassian taxonomy partakes of a mixed nature and hence is not purely logical. On genealogical grounds, his charges stand substantiated.

The semiotic square maps a relation between
complex and neutral terms. These designations are derived from Brøndal’s morphological studies. After explaining the characteristics that define positive, negative, neutral and complex terms, in that order, the Danish linguist remarks in reference to the last of the terms explicated:

L’existence ce cette espèce de termes ambigus ou synthétiques sera d’un intérêt capital pour la logique (je n’ai qu’à évoquer le grand nom de Hegel), elle sera avant tout importante pour la solution du problème à la fois sociologique et linguistique de la mentalité ou des mentalités, problème toujours actuel depuis les études de M. Lévy-Bruhl. (Brøndal 16)\textsuperscript{33}

The existence of this kind of ambiguous or synthetic term will be of capital interest for logic (I have but to evoke the great name of Hegel), it will be above all important for the solution to the both sociological and linguistic problematic of cognition or ways of thinking. It is, since Lévy-Bruhl’s studies on mentalités, a problematic still with us.

Brøndal reformulates Lévy-Bruhl’s "collective representations" that peculiar amalgam of emotion and idea. It receives a new designation as complex term. Brøndal places the complex term in systematic relation to three other terms: the positive and negative terms that are its components and the neutral term that is

\textsuperscript{33} “Structure et variabilité des systèmes morphologiques” was given as a paper in Rome in 1933. A summary appears in Atti del III Congresso Internazionale dei Linguisti, Roma 1933. A version of the paper was also given in Copenhagen in 1935 and appears in Scientia August 1935 p. 109-19.
its antithesis. It thus enters into the orbit of logic. So dialectic lurks at the edges of the semiotic square.

Notwithstanding Brøndal's invocation of the name of Hegel, substitution of dialectic for logic cannot and will not advance analysis of Ricoeur's argument. Ricoeur terminates a long note reviewing the work of Alain de Libéra on the logical status of the semiotic square with the question "But is this logic Aristotelian, Hegelian or ... other?" He offers no answer ("Greimas's Narrative Grammar" 30 n. 11).

Ricoeur is pursuing two tasks. He is destabilizing the logical status of the semiotic square and he is attempting to demonstrate the case that logic proves fallow. The passage from logical relations to syntactic operations, from the contraries and contradictions of the semic dimension to the disjunction and conjunction of the syntactic dimension, is delineated by Ricoeur as the passage from a paradigmatic axis of selection to a syntagmatic axis of combination. It can also be delineated as the passage from a list to a sequence. Ricoeur stakes his critique upon the non reciprocal convertibility of lists and sequences, syntagms and paradigms. This is not unrelated to the fact that he describes less a passage than a takeover:

Greimas's topological preoccuppations can be seen as an ultimate attempt to extend the paradigmatic as far as possible into the heart of the syntagmatic. ("Greimas’s
Narrative Grammar" 26)
The preoccupations can be seen otherwise, as the depth-surface representation of the model indicates, as an attempt to uncover paradigms beneath syntagms or to link an immanent level with a manifest level. Whatever the assessment of the threat of conquest, Greimassian transcoding and the generative trajectory are impossible without two-way conversions.

The difference between the two thinkers is partially explained by the variance of their aims. The object of Greimas’s concern is narrativity:

the generation of meaning does not first take the form of the production of utterances and their combination in discourse; it is relayed, in the course of its trajectory, by narrative structures and it is these that produce meaningful discourse articulated in utterances. [original emphasis] ("Elements" 65)

Ricoeur’s object is narrative; he attends the birth of new stories. His concern is with the production of narratives. He expresses himself in biological terms ("Greimas’s Narrative Grammar" 20). Greimas does not.

Ricoeur couples the image of birth with the motif of newness. This discursive conjunction signals the doctrinal investments of a reproductive politic. Since the dichotomous relation of static machine to dynamic body drives Ricoeur’s discourse, his reproductive politic may be summarized by the axiom that novelty cannot arise out of a machine.
Ricoeur's argument depends upon the parallels he traces between selection and calculation and between combination and creation. For him calculation is barren. In deploying this asymmetrically valorized dichotomy, he serves the preservation of the mystery of creation. He also divorces the play of analytic and synthetic faculties from the act of creation.

In Ricoeur's discourse logicity is not compatible with creativity:

[...] if it is true that the topological syntax of the transfers, which functions in conjunction with the trajectory of the logical operations of the semiotic square, "organizes narration as a process creating values". How can this reduplication account for the passage from the syntactic operations, which in the taxonomic framework were "predictable and calculable" to "process creating values"? Of necessity, logicity must somehow be inadequate in relationship to creativity, which characterizes narrative. ("Greimas's Narrative Grammar" 23)

In Greimas's order of presentation, Ricoeur reads an order of execution. The syntactic operations are first the object of calculation and in the second instance they organize, they are the subjects of an action. Ricoeur establishes a syntagm with a vector that runs from calculation towards creation. The validity of the generative trajectory's conversions is made to depend upon whether calculation gives rise to creation.

Furthermore this condition, Ricoeur implies, is to be met with a logic purged of Hegel.
It can be done.

Ricoeur’s use of Frye discloses a way to a logic of the machine of the elementary structure of signification.

Ricoeur construes the generative trajectory in terms of a movement from theme to plot, from dianoia to mythos. Greimas’s claim to progress *ab quo ad quem* certainly facilitates this. However, Greimas is mainly interested in the via of the to and fro. Nevertheless, Ricoeur finds no Aristotelian terms to name this middle. The blame cannot be laid upon Frye, his referenced authority on the "systematically coupled" typologies of mythos and dianoia ("Greimas’s Narrative Grammar" 23).

Surely Ricoeur cannot fail to register that Frye’s account is not dyadic. Frye’s exposition is strongly triadic. Rhetoric is for him the middle term between grammar primarily understood as syntax or "right (narrative) order" and meaning or logic primarily understood "as words arranged in a pattern of significance" (Anatomy of Criticism 244-45). Ricoeur represses any mention that, there, mediating between logic and grammar, meaning and narrative, is rhetoric.

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34 This alignment in Frye between logic and meaning explains the tendency in Ricoeur to reduce logic to semantics. It does not explain Ricoeur’s reluctance to grant the logical relation of contradiction productivity.
In Frye’s reading of Aristotle, dianoia and mythos are combined with ethos. A very topological category, ethos is permeated with concepts of position and location. The category of ethos consists of characters and setting. It is "between and made up of mythos and dianoia which are verbal imitations of action and thought respectively" and it is "between event and idea" (Anatomy of Criticism 243).

Frye’s typology yields sites. Frye’s typology does not yield practices or processes. Ricoeur operates according to a principle which assigns to different sites different processes. He like Frye subscribes to a division of spatial and temporal arts. This division presents itself in the alignment of eye/ear, static/dynamic and logic/story dichotomies. But the polarity is not mobile. This is most evident when he compares an anatomy and its discrete parts with a more "physiological" model of the process of signification. Frye classifies products of sense; Greimas models the production of sense.

Ricoeur’s comparison deserves revisiting from a process-centred perspective. Signification works on three senses of "sense," three senses analogous to Frye’s Aristotelian triad. Signification produces meaning (dianoia). Within the parameters of Ricoeur’s contrast between mythos and dianoia, signification
induces orientation which is commensurate with plot or mythos. Ricoeur’s analogies invite a third. Comparable to ethos, set or setting, is the work of signification on an apparatus. When sense is taken as equivalent to a faculty of perception, a machine made to perceive, the Aristotelian triad is most friable.

It is the pressure point that Ricoeur avoids. In his account Ricoeur abandons the sensory modalities. Eye and ear do not appear. Perception is precisely what is to be understood when Greimas discusses the production or apprehension of sense by a subject as the basis of a narrativization of the taxonomy. This is anything but a passive sensorium. Imprinting theories and passive sensoria upon which depend static/dynamic qualifications of visual and auditory acts of perception are alien to this conception of the productivity of perception.\(^{15}\)

It is simple for Ricoeur to leave behind ethos. There is nothing comparable to characters in Greimas. The level of the actants comes closest. But even if this Proppian-derived level of roles and functions were

\(^{15}\) In a review, Greimas contrasts structural linguistics with its predecessor, historical linguistics. He describes the newcomer as "a linguistics of perception, not of expression" ("La Linguistique statistique et la linguistique structurale" 57). He goes on to examine the import of cybernetics for structural linguistics. Throughout the review he stresses that for linguists of his generation the shift was arduous.
to correspond with the category of characters and setting in Frye’s typology, Ricoeur would still be calling for an accounting of conversions.

If one accepts the elementary structure of signification as a translation machine, it becomes easier to comprehend how it works. With an apparatus, reduplication is creative. Without one, reduplication remains mysterious and unaccountable. Passages from one metalanguage to another remain inexplicable. Answering Ricoeur’s how-does-it-work involves refining the conception of what is imagined to be at work. Ricoeur resists the machine. For him, applications of the semiotic square represent "a more or less forced understanding of narrative which proceeds not according to the logical component, but according to the praxico-pathetic component" ("Greimas’s Narrative Grammar" 23).

The machine nature of the semiotic square need not be set in sharp opposition to a putative body. Thought, feeling and doing are connected by feedback loops which a machine model can emmulate.

Before developing the studies that led to the formulation of the generative trajectory, Greimas had demonstrated interest in approaches to communication based in theory of information. In particular, he exploited the insights offered by the problems of developing machine translation ("La linguistique
statistique et la linguistique structurale"). Traces of these preoccupations remain. For example, the strong thesis of Greimassian semiotics, in the words of Herman Parret, holds that all "meaningful structures and constellations [...] display programs and performances transforming states of being" (Paris School Semiotics xi).

The terminology of programs and performances recalls cybernetics. It also recalls the work of a British mathematician on Hilbert's third requirement - decidability. Alan Turing while working on the Entscheidungsproblem produced "a model in which the most complex procedures could be built out of the elementary bricks of states and positions, reading and writing." His biographer, Andrew Hodges, continues

Alan had proved that there was no "miraculous machine" that could solve all mathematical problems, but in the process he had discovered something almost equally miraculous, the idea of a universal machine that could take over the work of any machine. And he argued that anything performed by a human computer could be done by a machine. So there could be a single machine which, by reading the descriptions of other machines placed on its "tape", could perform the equivalent of human mental activity. [original emphasis] (Engima 109)

Too bad Ricoeur in his assessment of semiotic formalisation neglects mathematical history and the fate of Hilbert's programme. For even if he would have difficulty agreeing with the possibilities of machine
emulation of human faculties, he would have found an interesting fashion of relating the syntatic and semic aspects of the fundamental grammar of the Greimassian generative trajectory. Hodges explicates Turing’s two different arguments about machine configuration:

From the first point of view, it was natural to think of the configuration as the machine’s internal state - something to be inferred from its different responses to different stimuli, rather as in behaviourist psychology. From the second point of view, however, it was natural to think of the configuration as a written instruction, and the table as a list of instructions, telling the machine what to do. The machine could be thought as obeying one instruction, and then moving to another instruction. The universal machine could then be pictured as reading and decoding the instructions placed upon the tape. Alan Turing himself did not stick to his original abstract term "configuration", but later described machines quite freely in terms of "states" and "instructions", according to the interpretation he had in mind. [original emphasis] (Enigma 107)

In Turing’s model the moves are simple. A symbol being scanned can be changed, erased or remain unchanged; the machine can move to observe another segment (square); the machine can remain in the same configuration or change to some specified configuration. Like the semiotic square, past moves determine future moves; a state may also be treated as an instruction.

Ricoeur might plead ignorance of Turing’s work. However, since his own critique of the Greimassian generative trajectory targets its completeness and consistency, one suspects Ricoeur of capitalizing on
echoes with the work of a mathematician who demonstrated the impossibility of Hilbert’s formalist programme. Kurt Gödel tackled the completeness and consistency criteria of Hilbert’s programme and proved the incompleteness of the axioms of arithmetic. Ricoeur repeatedly claims that Greimas’s model is incomplete and inconsistent.

Gödel’s proof, however much it may bolster Ricoeur’s rhetoric, raises the spectre of the machine. Gödel showed "how to encode proofs as integers, so that he had a whole theory of arithmetic, encoded within arithmetic." (Hodges 92) From a semiotic perspective Gödel numbers have a very interesting property for we can take the number apart like a machine, see how it was constructed and what went into it; which is to say we can dissect an expression, a proof, in the same way. (Nagel and Newman 1690)

Certainly Ricoeur is not inclined to encode the elements of the generative trajectory into the fundamental structure of signification or the square into itself. He does come close. He does discuss the square in terms of mathematical formalizations.

As the notes to his article indicate, he is well aware of comparisons between the semiotic square and a mathematical structure called the Klein group. In a non-technical discussion of the Klein group, appearing in 1966 in Les Temps modernes, Marc Barbut explains
that two representations of the Klein group

constitute interpretations of it in two
distinct languages (endowed with semantics),
and therefore they allow a faithful
translation from one to the other; the syntax
is the same, only the meaning of the words
has changed. (Barbut 376)

In this case, syntax acts between two semantics.
However, in Ricoeur’s reading of the semiotic square
and the generative trajectory, the equivalence of
metalanguages is a question of the relation of a
semantics to a syntax. Ricoeur approaches the problem
in terms of the investment of a form with content.
Greimas’s terminology of levels encourages Ricoeur’s
discursive collapse of the question of the adequacy of
metalanguages into the problem of fitting investments.

Mathematical translation, like conversion in the
Greimassian generative trajectory, is a function of
isomorphism and depends upon a requisite degree of
abstraction. Barbut explains:

It is these translations that are called
isomorphisms: two groups (what we are saying
here about groups may be said of any kind of
structure whatsoever) are isomorphs if they
are two representations of the same abstract
group; further, one might add: if they have
the same structure. This means that their
elements may be placed in one-to-one
correspondence, such that the image in the
second group of the combination of any two
elements from the first group is the same as
the combination of the images of those two
elements. Isomorphism, the word itself, is
plain enough: the form, the "syntax", the
"structure" are the same; the differences
lie, not only in the symbols used to write
down the elements - this is trivial - but
also in the meaning to be given to the elements; and one may equally well give them, provided one keeps to the rules, whichever of the possible meanings one wishes. [original emphasis] (377)

Abstraction makes possible the synonymity between structure and syntax.

Abstraction also enables the comparison of discursive formations including those of mathematics and semiotics. For example, the Klein group and the semiotic square are not isomorphic. The Klein group is generated by two rules of combination: transformations are commutative and each transformation is involutive\(^6\), that is repeating it twice consecutively changes nothing. The transformation that changes nothing is represented by an operator and results in one interesting difference between the graphic representation of the Klein group and the semiotic square. The former represents non-change by a loop at each vertex of a square (Barbut 376). However this operator and its graphic representation are absent from the semiotic square. Although he stresses differences between Greimas's semiotic square and the Klein group, this point is not raised by Ricoeur since he works from Piaget's cognitive psychology interpretation of the group. Piaget's like Greimas's square does not graph

\(^6\) In other nomenclature this is referred to as idempotence. \( aa = a \)
operators that produce no change. Insufficiencies of logical formalization may stem from not enough abstraction, rather than from too much as Ricoeur contends.

Within an idiom of algebraic structure, logical formalization is not so far away from topological schematization. The Klein group operation resulting in no change corresponds to paths that do not cross catastrophic strata in Petitot's elementary catastrophe representation of the semiotic square.

Whether or not this overlooked isomorphism between representations of the Klein group as a table of operations and as a square-shaped diagram resolves the logical/syntactic binary that informs Ricoeur's discourse, it opens a new vista. Both the Klein group comparison and Petitot's schematization demonstrate that the generative trajectory with some adaptations may be able to account for steady states, those stretches of discourse where no events are said to happen. The narrative may be at a standstill and the narration carries on. Thus, the nuance between no events and nothing happens.

Often the affinity of narrative doing to moments of stasis turns on this subtle distinction. For example, in a work appearing the same year as his study of Greimas's generative trajectory, Ricoeur postulates
that the complexity of narrative activity arises from its power to combine sequence and configuration. This he characterizes as a competition:

   tout récit peut être conçu comme la compétition entre sa dimension épisodique et sa dimension configurationnelle, entre séquence et figure. (Narrativité 21)

any narrative can be envisaged in terms of the competition between its episodic dimension and its configurational dimension, between sequence and figure.

What if the dimensions were not irremediably set in opposition? What if one considered sequence and figure to collaborate? One would face a machine. Every description as a state of being (configuration) possesses indexes translatable into questions for configuration’s transformation (sequence). The nucleus of a narrative would be a description plus a question.

   Just as a Turing machine’s configuration can be interpreted as states of being or as instructions, a story can be considered an apparatus processing descriptions and questions, figures and sequences.

   The locus of configuration has shifted. Or rather it has expanded. Configuration is not only an attribute belonging to the narrative, to the story. It also belongs to narrative structure and to narrativity.

   A story is at once product and apparatus of production. It is an autopoetic structure. It will take a picture, a question, a description, an imperative and
transform either it, itself, or both. A story is a
machine that learns. It emulates a model of the human
nervous system, especially that described in his 1970
essay "Biology of Cognition" by Humberto Maturana:

Learning is not a process of accumulation of
representations of the environment; it is a
continuous process of transformation of
behavior through continuous change in the
capacity of the nervous system to synthesize
it. Recall does not depend on the indefinite
retention of a structural invariant that
represents an entity (an idea, image, or
symbol), but on the functional ability of the
system to create, when certain recurrent
conditions are given, a behavior that
satisfies the recurrent demands or that the
observer would class as a reenacting of a
previous one. (Maturana 45)

This is closely akin to Greimas's statement on
transcoding.37 For him it is possible to summarize the
complementary activities of coding and decoding by the
notion of "un algorithme de démarches qui, à partir
d'instructions initiales, se développent comme des
règles d'un savoir faire implicite qu'il s'agit de
formuler" [an algorithm of procedures which develop
like the rules of an implicit know-how which must be
formulated from initial instructions] (Du Sens 245).

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37 A similar point could be made by reference to the
work of Teresa de Lauretis. "If the modification of
consciousness, the habit or habit-change, is indeed the
meaning effect, the "real and living" conclusion of
each single process of semiosis, then where "the game
of semiosis" ends, time and time again, is not exactly
in "concrete action" as Eco sees it, but in a
disposition, a readiness (for action), a set of
expectations" (Alice Doesn't 178).
The recreation of behaviour and the generation of stories are not only isomorphic. They are also linked by feedback and reduplication. Not only is storytelling a type of behaviour, it also emulates behaviour. It is both the real thing and a rehearsal. By enabling observation, it permits desire. In his analysis of the modelization of the actants in terms of wanting to do, knowing how to do and being able to do, Greimas begins with wanting to do. It is possible to begin elsewhere.

Maturana in his introduction links the ability to observe and the capacity for desire. "If human beings were not observers, or capable of being so, the stabilization of their properties would not appear to matter because they would not be able to desire something else" (xxxviii).

As a signature of desire, a question might modify a description, might modify itself or change nothing. It's that banal. Just as Ricoeur concludes, applications of semiotic squares are hit and miss. Some seem more or less forced; others yield true heuristic value. Like all autopoietic structures, the semiotic square is sensitive to initial conditions.\textsuperscript{38}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{38}Fredric Jameson reminds readers of the importance of finding the right starting point. In a forward to a collection of Greimassian texts, he writes: "the inaugural decision, not merely about the terms of the binary opposition to be expanded and articulated in the square as a whole, but also, and above all, the very order in which those terms are arranged; it makes a}
Likewise, the transcodability of the story told, the picture drawn and the questions asked, all depends on where one begins. Eye or ear. Child or parent.

fundamental difference" (On Meaning xv).
The discursive formations exemplified by the classic eye-ear case such as dichotomous categorizations, frozen hierarchies, and cyclic reversals lose legitimacy if mind and body are considered as mutually interactive. Recursivity, especially in its cybernetic manifestations, provides an analogy for that interaction. It also provides a discursive mechanism that can generate rhetorical moves that do not pit hearing against sight or slight other sensory modalities.

Recursivity marks the relation of mind and body: to know, to be a body that knows, to be a body that knows its knowing. From successive recursivity, dialectic, the possibility of reasoning, the potential for asking questions, emerges. The leap from recursivity to dialectic is managed by three premises. First, the body is a medium. It is material, tool and repository of repertoire (habit). Second, sensory modalities are open to transcribing. Such transcribing is related to powers of abstraction. Third, nondyadic models of embodied consciousness and text handling best
explain conceptual play and discursive practice. The key in this cursory and condensed precis is, of course, sensory transcoding. It permits one to model the thinking body by analogy with textual interaction and account for the semiotic intersection of different ways of knowing.

Using the analogy between the relation of reading subjects to texts and the relation of thinking bodies to themselves one can profitably reread Ricoeur’s notion of appropriation and Ingarden’s, of concretization. With the analogy between a thinking body’s relation to itself and a text’s relation to a reading subject, the theorizing of text handling becomes less embroiled in sensory bias. Likewise the excavation of sensory bias in some versions of feminist epistemology aids the exploration of embodied consciousness. The exercise aims to discover discursive repressions and limitations that impinge on the imagining of thinking, feeling subjects.

The names that follow are rarely uttered in the same breath. Less rarely, they are found in the same library. Dorothy Smith’s cartography of the modes of consciousness is cousin to the phenomenological literary aesthetics of Roman Ingarden. Susan Bordo and Jane Flax share a common intellectual heritage with the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. He and they draw on
psychoanalysis. He, for his notion of appropriation; they, in conceptualizing repression of maternal bond and the role of detachment in intellectual activity. All the thinkers gathered here are golden fodder for critique but they are not entirely made of pale yellow straw. All slight in some fashion either the body or the mind. To do one or the other is to neglect the social aspects of technology, perception and reproduction. Indeed theoretical consideration of this nexus depends upon privileging neither mind nor body. Furthermore, placing body and mind on par amounts to accepting both mental and bodily experience as social and rational.

The genesis of ways of knowing is entangled with intellectual and erotic ways of being. In some languages, the intellectual and the erotic share the verb "to know". Often the struggle to disentangle sexuality from biological reproduction has been characterized by the adversaries of feminist positions as the imposition of reason on nature. This argument also plays a role in the conceptualization of the relation of technology to perception. This is the case for McLuhan. Ironically, the same argument, reason dominating nature, inflects certain feminist epistemologies. In some cases, social reproduction veers deterministic when sexuality is not sufficiently
distinguished from biological reproduction. Such discourse has difficulty articulating homosocial let alone homosexual phenomena. Investigations are limited to cross-gender interaction.

However mere attention to same-sex interactions without a radical requestioning of the centrality of dyads would be no guarantee against the recurrence of dispositional explanations and the spectre of determinism. Such dichotomizing feminist work seeks "to explain why objectivity as detachment and noninvolvement is the epistemological stance to which men are predisposed" (Arnault 204 n. 7). The work rests on the construction of a pathologized target. This is possible because a dichotomous category of participation (involvement and non-involvement) is positioned within a polarized relation of gender and valence: men and women; bad and good. Truth-values aside, accounts based on the construction of predispositions remain unreflexive.

This pattern is not representative of all feminist epistemologies. Stanley and Wise interrogate the relation between theory and experience within the production of feminist knowledge. Their epistemology comes out of dialogues within British feminism. They develop their work partially in response to their own experience of Marxist-feminist currents within British
academic feminism. Perhaps since they do not target an entity called Cartesianism, they avoid adopting dualist formulations. For them positivism and scientificism are not the sole preserve of men. They stress differences between women as much as those between men and women. They refuse to pathologize even the oppressor class.

A feminist developmental theory that can explain neither feminism nor difference between groups of women (and men) except as the product of malfunctioning should be anathema to feminists [...] (Stanley and Wise 1993, 7)

Consequently their epistemology can not bolster moral superiority or nostalgic longing for an integrated body and mind. In their thinking, theory is an activity. It is of the domain of practice. Mind-body relations are constructed out of social interaction. This primacy of the social ensures that in their discourse mere reversal is never lodged as a fulcrum, never left unquestioned.

The ethnomethodological and interactionist-inspired work of Stanley and Wise does not find a place in the typology of feminist epistemologies offered by Lynne Arnault. All the various thinkers she groups together are said to be concerned with masculine predisposition to "objectivity as detachment and noninvolvement". Within this common design, Arnault explains that "some feminists make recourse to feminist
revisions of "object-relations" theory. [...] Less psychoanalytically oriented feminists account for the gender specificity of the Cartesian ideal in terms of a post-Marxist theory of labour and its effects upon mental life" (Arnault 204). Of her examples, Susan Bordo and Jane Flax are users of object relations, Dorothy Smith, a user of labour theories. These thinkers will draw closer examination.

Compared to the work of Stanley and Wise, the feminist theory represented in Arnault's typology suffers. Stanley and Wise are very sensitive to the power of the telling of stories. Despite psychoanalysis being a discipline devoted to the interpretation of narratives, Bordo and Flax do not display in the deployment of their tales such self-reflexivity.

Likewise in reference to the worlds generated by discourses, the epistemology of Stanley and Wise will not privilege access to an unmediated objective world. Their discussion of Popper's three world model for example makes this clear39. Smith's standpoint

39 "[130] In our approach these three "Worlds" overlap and are inextricably interwoven; and even for analytic purposes we feel that there is little justification for so separating them. We believe that what are material things, what is subjectivity, what is knowledge, all overlap; and what these are seen to be will differ. The notion that only "encoded knowledge" is knowledge, and that anything which isn't encoded doesn't count, we reject. [131] We do so on experiential grounds. We all of us treat as "knowledge" a great many things, a great many of which aren't "encoded", in Popper's used of
epistemology evolves out of responses to the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz, responses that can be read as a reversal of the hierarchal relation between Schutz's categories of paramount reality and scientific domain. Measured against Stanley and Wise, Smith's epistemology would appear insufficiently dialectical, insufficiently prepared to begin again.

Obviously, the present comparative examination esteems dialectical thinking and self-reflexivity as positive values. It is a bias. A style.

Let us see what it can do. Following Patricia Meyer Spacks on Simone de Beauvoir and masculine standards of accomplishment (Spacks 19), Stanley and Wise state:

We are uncomfortably aware that similar remarks can -- and should -- be levelled at our own style of presentation and mode of argument, as well as that of many other feminist writers. Words, sentences, writing styles, ways of presenting arguments, arguments themselves, criticism, all these are part and parcel of masculinist culture. They are among the artefacts of sexism, and their use structures our experience before we can even begin to examine it, because they provide with how we think as well as how we write. We are in a circle [...] Of course it isn't quite like this. The social world is neither so determinate nor so relentlessly sexist as this -- but that it is presented as

this term. But this doesn't mean that they aren't encoded and treated as having objective and material existence by people in our everyday lives." (Stanley and Wise 1993, 130-132).
such is an important feature of the means by which sexism is perpetuated. (Stanley and Wise 1993, 179)

Fears of contamination bred from an us-them division of discursive property, a simply bipartisan distribution of the terms and styles of argumentation can hamper the transfer of critical theory into political action. As the example of Stanley and Wise demonstrates, dialectical thinking potentially generates complication. At every turn, inertia, set ideas, frozen interpretative frames are eluded. Yet, paradoxically the mind’s movement can question the goodness of overcoming inertia. The value of recursivity is radically contextual.

Dialectic is not a forte of other feminists. Determinism and dyads mark analyses like those of Jane Flax that stem from Nancy Chodorow’s The Reproduction of Mothering. The latter’s position has been caricatured as blaming the mother for the production of sexism. One easily reads such deterministic stances from her text, if one is not careful to remark that parenting and its ideological constructs are only claimed as one site of struggle among others:

An ideology of women as mothers extends to women’s responsibilities as maternal wives for emotional reconstitution and support of their working husbands. Assumptions that the social organization of parenting is natural and proper (that women’s child care is indistinguishable from their childbearing, that women are for biological reasons better
The text in its use of plural forms intimates that there may be other grounds for the articulation of the resistance to change. For example, the sartorial industries, the producers of wedding gowns and sex trade accoutrements, certainly do not advocate restructuring the social organization of gender. Attitudes towards parenting are not an explain-all and Chodorow never claims to build a totalizing theory.

Ironically, deterministic postures in their psychoanalytic guise evolve from Chodorow’s account. This is the case of Jane Flax. She focuses on the male child’s relation to the mother to produce a single narrative of separation. It is a narrative where she emphasizes the inevitability of the developmental outcome:

He must become male. In order to do so he must become not female, since under patriarchy gender is an exclusionary category. [original emphasis] (Flax 246)

Absent here are a differentiation between gender and sex or an acknowledgement that patriarchy

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40 For a feminist critique of the totalizing model of patriarchy see Sheila Rowbotham Dreams and Dilemmas (London: Virago, 1983) especially "The Trouble with Patriarchy" which first appeared in New Statesman, 1979. The piece also appeared in People’s History and Socialist Theory ed. by Raphael Samuel (London:
capitalism is very pliant (Gender roles often shift in war economies). Note under patriarchy in Flax's version man becomes, woman is. Flax's account seems to replicate the existence of an eternal feminine used to define historical male subjectivity. How then will patriarchy be dismantled? The solution rests on the alignment of several psychoanalytic postulates: the eternal-feminine-coupled-to-male-subjectivity structure depends upon the repression on the part of men of infantile dependence and since this repression is equivalent to an investment of frustrated energies in the figure of the mother which is then cast out and since any woman can signify the mother figure, the

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 364-9. Flax's footnotes display an awareness of socialist feminist thought but not of British writings such as Rowbotham's work that would challenge directly both the monolithic construction of "patriarchy" and ascription of a single cause to women's oppression. All the references throughout Flax's one hundred and ten notes bear American publishers except for the single non-English language reference, a Merleau-Ponty preface (Flax 280 n. 107). One cannot fault Flax for being unable to address debates outside her discipline and country and occurring almost contemporaneously with the composition of her article. However the lack of engagement with the work of Stanley and Wise in three works on feminist epistemology cannot be ascribed to factors of discipline, time or distance. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter eds., Feminist Epistemologies (New York and London: Routledge, 1993); Jane Duran, Toward a Feminist Epistemology (Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Little, 1991); Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt eds., A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays in Reason and Objectivity (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). Stanley and Wise have placed the word "epistemology" in the revised edition's title. This might assist in ameliorating acknowledgment of their work.
structure will be dissolved when men cease repressing feelings of dependence and powerlessness, cease investing energy in figures to be cast away and cease reading all women as incarnations of the Mother figure. Baldly stated the argument suggests that if men did not grow up, they would not demonize women. The argument rests on shaky universal premises: all women are mothers; all men desire mothers. One might perhaps recognize here the twin premises of heteronormativity. Psychoanalytic convolutions aside, even an unanxious relation to parent figures is no guarantee against adoption of a cognitive style to which someone somewhere will object because it appears to lack emotion in its commitment to reason.

When the repression thesis is applied to the adoption of cognitive styles difficulties arise. Flax asks what is repressed in philosophical discourse. She invokes the Oedipal plot and its outcome, the repression of dependence and powerlessness, to find that philosophical discourse represses "the interactive character of early human development" (251). The connection is not clear unless one fantasizes that the boys doing philosophy are liable to feel threatened if they recognize interaction (read "involvement" according to Arnault’s typology) as a valid philosophical topic or as an important factor in
philosophical exchange.

The existence of philosophers of the male gender who discuss emotion and cognition, reason and passion, in non-exclusive terms before feminist critiques became widespread leads one to question how "philosophy" is constructed in Flax's discourse. It is telling that her analyses are organized by name not by theme. This is not attachment to the names of the fathers. This is the discursive practice of case studies. They deal with lives not bodies.

The use of case studies presents the problem of induction. However Flax's mode is not one of generalization from particulars. The case studies illustrate theory. They do not generate or modify theory. Within her psychoanalytic framework, case studies have no impact on theory. Every case is a life. Every life is marked by the same crescendo organised along the dynamics of the Oedipal plot. In Flax this is marked by the attribution of unsurpassed intensity to infancy:

This period [infancy] is marked not only by physical and emotional dependency but by an intensity of experience which will never be repeated except in psychosis and perhaps in altered states of consciousness such as religious or drug experiences. Precisely because it is prerational and preverbal, it

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is difficult for the infant to screen, sort and modify its experience. (Flax 254)

In this paragraph Flax juxtaposes three elements: infant difficulty displayed in handling experience; equation of reason and language; marginalization of intense experience. Flax seems unaware that altered states of consciousness are mightily repeatable. Furthermore, a bit of dialectical thinking would force a bit of modification in the relation of adults to childhood experience. Questioning the distinction between altered and non-altered states invites a reassessment of margin and infant and the intensity ascribed to them.

Taking up Flax’s points one notes that difficulties in screening, sorting or modifying experience also happen in verbal behaviour. It is not a set of activities that is mastered once and for all. Recognition of this would challenge Flax’s topography of the ego.

Indeed, elsewhere in the same text she assumes similarities between verbal and preverbal stages. There is a slippage in Flax’s text from "infancy", "infantile drama" to "child" and "child within" (247). Infantile and childhood memories, the child elements of the ego, are deemed repressed and difficult to access. They are inside. They are cathected to internalized objects. Intrinsic to this stress on internalization is an
equation of repression with a "keeping in" rather than a "keeping from". What does this entail for the place of reason?

The characterization of the infant as prerational explains the difficulties in processing experience. However the equation between reason and language contradicts the innateness of reason posited earlier in Flax's text. As she points out, object relations theory is itself a questioning of Freud's instinct theory and the place of reason within his theory. Object relations theory according to Flax sees reason as an innate potential capacity rather than a faculty painfully acquired through the internalization of the authority of the father and as defense against frustration and threats from the external world. (249)

If reasoning capacity is innate, how can the infant's engagement with experience be prerational? The potential capacity can be activated before the acquisition of verbal skills. Indeed it must be for those skills to be acquired.

The preservation of an inner prerational core depends finally upon the marginalization of intense experiences. Flax claims religious and hallucinogenic

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experiences occur rarely. It seems, for her, erotic activity registers no intensity. If however one considers that experience is constructed and in a constant state of construction then its handling poses problems not only for the infant who is a being in a state of verbal impotency but also for adept language users. Intense difficulty in sorting, modifying or screening -- tasks that construct experience -- are also the lot of reading subjects. From Flax one does reach for intriguing metaphors. As a child before the text, the reader is demanding, querying. As an infant before the text? The parental analogy reaches a limit. Objects bob in a force field of drives. Zones.

These metaphors play with the distinction between the speaking child and the extra-linguistic infant and do introduce the drives of Freudian theory. Of course, the mother is not a text. However the comparison has heuristic value. The reading subject’s relation to a text is best not patterned on a one-to-one dyad. Memories of other texts hover and the reading subject is traversed by competing desires. Field faces field.

Likewise the developing human’s relation to sources of nurture or the human’s consciousness of those sources need not, on empirical or conceptual grounds, be theorized as dyadic. Since an ideology of the couple is basic to object relations theory, it is
forced to assume separation in terms of break-up. Thus the developmental stage of recognizing objects as independent of the self, the stage when the infant recognizes that temporally discrete percepts may constitute apprehension of the same object, the stage at which the mother emerges as a distinct object, produces anxiety. Only anxiety. There is no possibility for cognitive joy.

The game of losing and finding the object of desire is in object relations theory a stage that breaks up the blissful dyad. Divorce is traumatic. But equally so for both parties? Posited in the theories drawn upon by Flax and her intellectual heirs is the essential unity of infant self. That unity confirms the status of identification as a key category in gender role formation and authorizes interiorization of the infantile drama. The preeminence of identification and interiorization is a consequence of the reification of the couple. The reliance on dyads becomes even more perplexing when explanations move from individual to collective development.

In Flight to Objectivity, Susan Bordo extrapolates from the ontogenic story of individual human development offered by object relations theory to phylogenetic explanation of changes in historical consciousness. The psychocultural history outlined by
Bordo rests upon two coordinations. As in object relations theory, a relation to one's body is embroiled in a relation to one's mother. It is also through this nexus that one's relation to the world passes.

For Bordo the gendering of nature is considered in universal rather than historical terms. She accepts a mapping of the physical world unto the figure of the mother. This allows a second coordination between the rise of the scientific method and denial of separation anxiety. Since a cognitive style is coordinated with a developmental theory, Bordo can characterize the rise of modern science as a turning away from the maternal body towards the paternal mind:

The change may also be described in terms of separation from the maternal -- the immanent realm of earth, nature, the authority of the body -- and a compensatory turning toward the paternal for legitimation through external regulation, transcendent values, and the authority of law. [original emphasis] (Bordo 58)

The mind-body opposition is left intact. Moreover, when Bordo's stress on the gendering of the opposition is amalgamated with the psychological defense mechanisms against separation anxiety, she opts for a narrative which terminates in the exemplary dream of knowledge "imagined as an explicit revenge fantasy, an attempt to wrest back control from nature" (Bordo 75). The concentration on power struggles is vivid but not accurate. Bordo chooses to focus on a single defense
mechanism. She explicitly recognizes that psychoanalytic theory has described three responses to separation from the mother (Bordo 106). They are denial, longing and mourning.

It is possible to maintain the reading of ontogenic separation anxiety onto a phylogenic frame, without privileging the response of denial. For example, Jacquelyn N. Zita, in a review of Bordo’s book, refers to work by Genevieve Lloyd and proposes a different conjecture:

The ontological separation of mind from body could thus be seen as a way of making physical differences between the sexes less significant and asserting the equality of the sexes in rationality and will. (Zita 647)

With this interpretation of dualism, Zita does not demonize Descartes. She considers biographical elements, his epistolary exchanges with women, the early death of his mother, and his decision to write in the vernacular (few women read Latin). Descartes is figured as a creature of longing. Bordo nowhere tackles the ambiguities in the Cartesian corpus. She mentions Lloyd only once, in passing. The mention is subsumed in a list of other names (Bordo 4). To move beyond a dyad, she would have to account for the role of sisters and other siblings, as well as mothers in the development of individual and collective consciousness.

Related to the lack of consideration for intra-
generational or horizontal relationships is a presumption that the past is a parent. Medieval mother confronts the scientific age father. The neglect of theology leads Bordo to favour epistemic breaks over continuities. Even a strong adherence to a narrative of rupture does not preclude some problems in periodization. For example, the medieval period itself can be the point at which separation anxiety arises. This is a feasible scenario if, forgetting about charitable care of thy neighbour’s body, Christian mortification of the flesh is compared to a previous pagan era’s putative celebration of the body and of nature.

In the familial drama approach to history, any event can be interpreted as result or as motive. Not all emplotment is caricature. For example, the rise of the scientific method can be read within the context of a reaction to the wars of religion (Toulmin). The entertaining of counter arguments and alternative narratives is facilitated if historical periods are not personified as parents.

Despite a tendency to homogenize historical periods, Bordo is not a total zeitgeist enthusiast. An inkling of the concept of hegemony appears in her discourse when her psychocultural account grafts developments in the visual arts onto changes in the
conception of space. The evidence may point to another story. Bordo claims

it is only after the conventionalization of linear perspective in art -- and, according to Karsten Harries and others, largely as a result of its influence -- that the homogeneous, infinite space "implied" in the perspective painting becomes the "official" space of the culture. (Bordo 68)

In the note to this section of Flight to Objectivity, the "others" represent only one other source⁴³. Furthermore, in the article cited by Bordo, Harries suggests Rhenish mysticism and hermetic tradition as other possible factors (Harries 31 n. 1) and announces a forthcoming treatment of these in a study on Nicolaus Cusanus. In this later article ignored by Bordo his position is clear:

It would be misleading to place too much weight on this reflection, which leads from a consideration of perspective to the infinity of the cosmos. (Harries 1975, 7)

Harries unlike Bordo discusses the matter in terms of correlation rather than causation:

Historically and conceptually central perspective, which was given its theoretical foundation by Brunelleschi and Alberti, and the objective space of the new science are closely related forms of description. (Harries 1975, 7)

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⁴³ The others are an unpublished paper by Mario Moussa, "Infinite Space, Perspective Space" from which Bordo cites. The use of personification in the passage perhaps explains its appeal for Bordo: "Straight lines shattered the spheres of the medieval universe." (Bordo 123, n. 5).
"Closely related forms" of description suggests a complex genealogy. Other possible influences, such as the Kabbalah, on the development of the idea of infinite space are traced by Max Jammer\textsuperscript{44} whose complementary study seems unknown to Harries at the time of the appearance of these articles.

For Harries art is only one locus, one expression, for "the rising awareness of and interest in the phenomenon of perspective [...] that goes hand in hand with the emergence of the objective conception of space which is presupposed by the new science" (Harries 1973, 30). The wide currency gained by speculations on the nature of perspective is adduced by a circa 1530 Nuremberg woodcut which indicates that the "sixteenth century was ready for the discoveries of Tycho Brahe and Galileo" (31). Harries describes the figure in the illustration as "breaking out of the shell of the cosmos" (31). Bordo no doubt was seized by his ekphrasis.

The evidence offered can alternatively be taken to illustrate the question of Archytas who asked whether it would be possible at the end of the world to stretch out one's hand or not. This ancient philosopher's

challenge to the Aristotelian cosmology is preserved in a commentary on the *Physics* by Simplicius. Reservations about circulation of early manuscripts and of thirteenth century Latin translations notwithstanding, the commentary became, just prior to the period in question, widely current. In 1526, four years before the date attributed to the Nuremberg woodcut, is published by the Aldine press in Venice an edition of Simplicius. Four years is enough time for story or book to cover the distance, an engraver to work, proofs be pulled, yet not too much time to elapse before discounting any possible direct connection or influence. However, the common Renaissance practice of using the same illustration for different texts mitigates against conclusive interpretations.

Nonetheless, the printing press does play a role in the rise of ideas about infinite space as much as it does in the circulation and production of any intellectual property. It is not however a necessary cause except perhaps in a tale of detachment. And so Bordo claims:

> the ability to "discover reality" in the perspective painting requires visual skills - the ability to adopt a detached point of view and to scan a static frame -- that are developed, McLuhan argues, only through experience at silent, private reading of the printed page. (Bordo 66)  

One would have thought that the experience of trying to
draw would teach one about how to see. Bordo uncritically adopts McLuhan's assumption of universal literacy and thus disregards collective viewing accompanied by oral commentary as a means of passing on the visual skills necessary for the appreciation of perspectival painting. McLuhan's eye-ear dichotomy serves to authorize not only Bordo's spacial categorization of cognitive activity into private detached and participatory public but also her privileging of participation over detachment.45

Regardless of the validity of the medium/message collapse, participation in its various guises46 does not curry full favour with all of Bordo's sources. Enumerating several writers, she enlists their authority to claim that "The subject/object distinction

45 Print is not inherently anti-participatory. In the period Bordo discusses, madrigal books appear designed in such a fashion that different parts can be sung by readers sitting face to face. The case of maps casts similar doubts on any causal link between the rise of print technology and the development of perspectival rendering. Be it madrigals, maps or entirely verbal artefacts, reading is not necessarily a private activity. Furthermore, the lone silent reader is as much a topos supporting a dubious dichotomy (detachment/participation) as an existential entity resisting that very dichotomy.

46 The list of interchangeable terms in the glossary of one of Bordo's sources reads "archaic tradition, esoteric tradition, sympathy/antipathy theory, Hermetic tradition, Homeric or pre-Homeric mentality, mimesis, animism, totemism, participation, original participation, gnosticism, doctrine of signatures, and participating consciousness" (Berman 343).
has, at the very least, hardened over time" (Bordo 48). One of her sources patently says the opposite. Owen Barfield credits modern physical science and philosophy since Kant for recognizing participation of the human mind in the creation or evocation of the phenomena of the familiar world (Barfield 12).

She quotes from Morris Berman who describing a break in ancient Greek epistemology summarizes Eric Havelock’s work (Bordo 48; Berman 71). She does not apply herself to Havelock’s work directly. She does not recognize that the ethics of instrumentality are no purer in cultures governed by participation. Havelock writes: "To control the collective memory of society he [the reciter] had to establish control over the personal memories of individual human beings" (Havelock 145). To this effect, Havelock makes note of Marcel Jousse’s description of verbomoteurs, the inhabitants of oral cultures, as mnemotechnicians. As evidenced by Havelock’s and Jousse’s instrumental vocabulary, technocratic motives are observer-dependent. Equally so are observations on contact with a maternal realm. Approached from the pole of performance, participatory cultures are far from bonding with the mother. Participatory cultures have their own technologies.

The objection may be raised that telling stories is not reasoning, not objectifying the world. The point
here is that knowledge production of whatever sort passes through social relations. There is no unmediated access to a world. Access, by participation or by detachment, involves power.

In situations where the ethical argument holds, where appeals are made to the character of a speaker or interpreter, be they in book-learning or oral cultures, mnemonic devices are never very far from the person of the knowledge producers, the epistemic interlocutors. Such tools are important attributes of all persons involved. Havelock's lone rhapsode may equally be controlled by collective constraints. Indeed his account by stressing agonistic features acknowledges the claims of counter-memories.

Just as counter-memories imply counter-narratives or in less polarized accounts, variations, the paradigm stories of psychoanalytic discourse itself are subject to variant readings of its own condensations and displacements, its own dreamwork tropes. A space is opened for rhetorical analysis.

The Oedipal paradigm centres on the acquisition of language. It matters little if separation anxiety as postulated by object relations theory precedes or follows the achievement of linguistic ability. In one case it is a reaction, a result; in the other, motive or cause. Language is like a fence against denied
psychic content or like a knife cutting off the repressed content, instituting the denial. These similes highlight the axiomatic status within object relations theory of an instrumental concept of language. Object relations theory itself does not employ these similies of knife or fence. In psychoanalytic narratives of separation anxiety or stories of castration menace, language does things. Language acquisition is comparable to the grasping of a tool to cut and contain. But language is also done.

Language as material product is worked upon. Language is practised. Language also refers to the site where practices and products meet. Technical vocabularies attempt to control this polysemy. For example, the structuralist terminology of language, langue and parole corresponds to faculty, rules and acts of expression. These distinctions work well in considering the relation of system to performance. They work well in theorizing the actualization of potentials. They offer points of departure and arrival.

They do not alleviate tendencies to conflate place and means when language is considered as a medium. The conflation is inevitable. A place is a means. Places are prepared. Wisdom of sacred sites. The uncanny energy of domestic arrangements. The house of language. The analogies are potent and have consequences for
thinking language’s relation to the body.

If language is a tool for the fashioning of self and the construction of an other, it is the body and its zones that facilitate the entry into language. Is the body, this means to an end, a tool? An instrument upon which the infant plays? A tantalizing alignment ensues: text as instrument, text as infant.

The jump from language to text through those teasing unvoiced dentals and their alliteration (text tantalizing infant instrument) issues from the seduction of the signifier. Already the rearrangement implies text as agent of a pleasurable irritation, on the infant-instrument, of the infant-instrument, in the infant-instrument. The difficulty in ascribing a preposition matches the difficulty of ascribing agency: the text? the infant?

With Flax is reached the limit of the infant as patient. With Bordo, the limit of the agency of the instrument. It is the limit of insertion that guides Dorothy Smith’s discourse. Unlike the feminists inspired by psychoanalysis, Smith does not invoke interiorization as a developmental mechanism. In fact, her standpoint epistemology is not developmental. However the dynamics of inside/outside structuration shape her claim for the suppression of bodily consciousness upon entry into the "abstracted
conceptual mode" (Smith, 1977)

Following Marx and Engels, in particular The German Ideology, Smith relates consciousness to what people do, not what they are. The social division of labour places constraints on action and hence on consciousness. The ways people think about and express themselves depend upon their embeddedness in an everyday world. When Smith grafts phenomenological sociology on to this materialist base, her analyses shift towards meditations on spheres of activity. Consciousness becomes spatialized. One enters a cognitive mode. As well she also situates both practices of knowledge production and spheres of activity in a sexual division of labour.

Grossly, her argument depends upon a mapping of private and public space onto physical and conceptual activity respectively. This mapping is mediated by an implicit reading of social reproduction as woman's work and management or ruling as men's. Women by analogy are in a position similar to the working class47. The limits of the analogy remain unexplored. When she further argues that the arrangement's perpetuation depends upon its unacknowledgement by those whom it

47 Smith positions intellectual and manual labour as activities typical of ruling and working classes respectively. Gramsci would have been useful in developing a more reflexive relation than a one-to-one correspondence.
benefits, that is, the ruling class, her epistemology, like that of psychoanalytic feminists, hinges upon repression as a prerequisite for abstract reasoning.

Although she makes no explicit reference to the difference between class consciousness and class analysis, between knowing one's place in a system and knowing the system, it is such a distinction that informs her assessment of material and conceptual labour as epistemological stances. The values she assigns are of course informed by considerations of gender. What she calls acting in the "abstracted conceptual mode" is associated with ruling. The physical labour that supports this mode is "done typically by women" (Smith 1977, 165). The one is ignorant; the other, all-knowing.

Her appeal to Hegel confirms the class-gender-knowledge schema. Drawing on the master-servant narrative in The Phenomenology of Mind, she explains:

That organization [of the relation between master and servant] itself is not visible from the standpoint of the master. Within the consciousness of the master there is himself and the object and a servant who is merely a means. For the servant there is the master, the servant's labour producing the object, and there is the simplicity of the relation between the master and the object. The totality of the set of relations is visible. (Smith 1977, 164)

Undoubtedly, Hegel's narrative can be read as depicting the relation of particular social classes. However,
Hegel does not particularize consciousness in terms of vision. As a consequence of Smith’s visual idiom, in a move Hegel cannot underwrite, unmediated experience is poised against a conceptual mode. Smith states that the "abstracted conceptual mode of ruling exists in and depends upon a world known immediately and directly in the bodily mode" (Smith 1977, 165-166).

Oddly, within the perspective of standpoint epistemology, the bodily mode of knowing appears centred on a single sensory modality: sight. Smith links total knowledge to visibility. This affects her reading of Hegel. As an automatic consequence of position, the servant is conscious of the totality of relations between master and servant. The servant is no agent. No work is necessary to access consciousness. This is certainly not what Hegel’s text indicates to be the case. One suspects the equation of agents to standpoints depends on a possible confusion in Smith between sensation and perception thus assigning an unqualified measure of passivity to sight. Smith seems to forget that most bodies are conferred locomotion.

Standpoints are either points of view or blindspots. The characterization depends upon which world a subject occupies. Smith builds upon a distinction imported from phenomenological sociology:

Beginning from the standpoint of women locates a subject in a material and local
world. It shows the provinces of meaning described by Schutz not as alternatives -- a paramount reality on the one hand and the scientific domain on the other -- but rather as a bifurcation of consciousness, with a world directly experienced from oneself as center (in the body) on the one hand and a world organized in the abstracted conceptual mode, external to the local and particular places of one's bodily existence. (Smith 1977, 169)

Why bifurcation? This still keeps two worlds: body vs abstracted conceptual mode, world experienced vs world organized.

She continues:

The abstracted mode of the scientific province is always located in the local and material actualities. Participation in the "head" world is accomplished in actual concrete settings making use of definite material means. (Smith 1977, 169)

This poses no problems. Except it suggests a type of nesting almost like that of interiorization. Headwork is done inside a setting. Such a suspicion is not allayed when she continues by moving from many settings to a singular one:

Suppression of interest in that setting is organized in a division of labor which accords to others the production and maintenance of the material aspects of a total process. (Smith 1977, 169)

A possible plurality of settings and means is lost. Without this discursive move the link between the suppression of interest and division of labour could not be so strong. The concrete and abstract would not confront each other across a divide.
From the suppression of interest, she argues for the emergence of greater consciousness on the part of those employed in material work:

To those who do this work, the local and concrete conditions of the abstracted mode are thematic. But women's standpoint locates a subject in the fundamental "item" of the two fold basis of knowing the world. The organization which divides the two becomes visible from this base. It is not visible from within the other. (Smith 1977, 169)

Smith implies rulers are blind to the system as the ruled are not. Somehow the agents get lost.

Consciousness is read off structure.

To exist as subject and to act in this abstracted mode depends upon an actual work and organization of work by others, who make the concrete, the particular, the bodily, the thematic of their work and who also produce the invisibility of that work. (Smith 1977, 166)

There is no mention in this passage or elsewhere of the vagaries of exchange value and the participation of the ruling class in determining comparable worth. Smith implies that docile labour and self-denial on the part of those that do material work produce its invisibility.

Oddly, the same qualities of bad faith are applied to the conceptual mode of action.

It is a condition of anyone's being able to enter, to become and remain absorbed, in the conceptual mode of action that she does not need to focus her attention on her labors or on her bodily existence. The organization of work and work expectations in managerial and professional circles both constitutes and
depends upon the alienation of members of this class from their bodily and local existence. (Smith 1977, 166)

One need not dream up golfing doctors and surfing lawyers to recognize that these circles too are not so alienated from the body and its impact on job performance.

Replace "conceptual" by "physical" and Smith's account reads like a description of factory work:

The structure of work in this mode and the structure of career assume that individuals can sustain a mode of consciousness in which interest in the routine aspects of bodily maintenance is never focal, and can in general be suppressed. It is taken for granted in the organization of this work that such matters are provided for in a way which will not interfere with action and participation in the conceptual mode. (Smith 1977, 166)

Indeed, the whole difference between manual and intellectual labour collapses.

In her later work, the sharp division between abstract and concrete modes inadvertently limits the permeability of textual zones. Smith's unintended legitimization of the mind-body opposition results from her constitution of text as an implement of a ruling apparatus. In a preface to a collection of essays Smith outlines her project. Again a shift from plural to singular is notable and leaves its imprint on her take on text:

Texts are analyzed to display what the subject knows how to do as reader and what
the subject knows how to do in reading, and in so doing also displays the organizing capacity of the text, its capacity to operate as a constituent of social relations. (Smith 1990, 5)

In this scheme, text is a site that is entered or an institution that governs a series of practices. This rich notion of text is not a matter for quarrel. However, the syntax here betrays a one-way movement from text to reader.

Smith's uni-directionality neglects the metalinguistic possibilities of verbal semiosis. Questions about the boundaries of a text can be elicited from subjects demonstrating both their know-how in reading and their ignorance. The handling of a text, especially in metalinguistic matters, does not always stem from knowledge. Theories of the text cannot be based solely on the communicative function of verbal sign systems. Theory aiming to deconstruct dichotomies cannot afford to expunge the interpretive function. Theory making must account for interstitial spaces.

In Flax, Bordo and Smith some form of interiority operates: an epistemic subject is inserted into a mode (Smith), the intensity of infant phases is interiorized and repressed (Flax), it is in participation that non-Cartesian subjects are immersed in a world (Bordo). Something is in the subject or the subject is in something. Mediation slips out of the picture. A
thematics of release scored for a pas de deux 
choreographs all movement as motion away from or 
towards the other. Liberation discourses, however, can 
also imagine repositionings between other others, in a 
choreography of an esprit de corps.

Although still performing with dyads, Paul Ricoeur 
thorizes what passes between the hermeneutical 
players. For him the aim of interpretation is not to 
recover access to the mind of an author or the 
historical context of an original audience. Its aim is 
the disclosure of modes of being-in-the-world, the 
revelation of possibilities.

Ricoeur characterizes understanding as an act that 
makes the other, the world projected by a text, one’s 
own. This is appropriation:

To understand is not to project oneself into 
the text; it is to receive an enlarged self 
from the apprehension of proposed worlds 
which are the genuine object of 
interpretation. ("Appropriation" 87)

The enlargement of self is an increase in 
potential. Reading gives power. However, the 
acquisition is not without cost. The acquiring of an 
"enlarged self" is accomplished by an exchange. 
Something or rather some part of the reading subject is 
lost.

The reader is rather broadened in his 
capacity to project himself by receiving a 
new mode of being from the text itself. Thus 
appropriation ceases to appear as a kind of
possession, as a way of taking hold of...It implies, instead, a moment of dispossession of the narcissistic ego. [...] It is the text with its universal power of unveiling, which gives a self to the ego. (97)

This is a hermeneutics of compulsion. The text gives. It does not simply present or offer. The unveiling by the text of a self or a structure of being cannot be equated with a reader's acceptance of that self. Display does not equal the conclusion of barter. At least this is so if one considers the interaction as occurring in a market economy. However, for Ricoeur interpretation culminates in appropriation. It must. An imperative is lodged in the indicative. The description is a prescription. Here, there is no sales pitch. The very structure of Ricoeurian textual interaction is shaped by the social obligations of a gift exchange economy.

Economic formulations such as "Reading is an appropriation-divesture" (95) recur often in the essay but belie the unidirectional movement: readers give before they get. In Ricoeur's discourse there is a strong correlation between dispossession and emancipation. A text "can procure new readers for itself" (96) since in Ricoeur's terms it escapes from the authorial situation and its original audience. All

48 One thinks here of Althusser's interpellation which collapses invitation and acceptance let alone the vocative with the optative.
evangelism is elided. It is not a reader or readers who bring readers to a text. A text, once released into the world, attracts. Such textual autonomy is required to cement Ricoeur's analogy between self and text.

In proverbial (something lost, something gained) double entry bookkeeping, Ricoeur tabulates a net gain for every admission into a textual economy. Loss of author, gain of readers. Loss of ego, gain of self. What lends his argument credence is the disposition. First, gain is accounted from a text-based perspective; then, that of a reading subject. As text receives so too the reader. The analogy remains implicit. If Ricoeur were to question the parallels constructed between subject and text, the universal unveiling power of text would be in need of much particularization.

For the link between revelation and appropriation to be operative the reading subject must be susceptible to the game of exchange and accumulation. This type of subject is found implanted in specific narratives. Ricoeur assigns such a reader two tasks: growing up and finding a home. These are the stories respectively of a Freudian and of a Christian subject. Their stories are found in a previous Ricoeur collection, The Conflict of Interpretations.

What has become in the essay on appropriation a vocabulary of Self, in these earlier writings was one
of consciousness. In these essays, the hermeneutical player is set the task not of dispossession of the ego but mastery of the libido of the ego. Mastery evokes maturity and so Ricoeur expresses the opinion that the question of consciousness seems to "be bound to the other question of how a man leaves his childhood behind and becomes an adult" ("Consciousness and the Unconscious" 109). Ricoeur's hesitancy is telling. In the French version (Conflit 110), the phrases "sortir de l'enfance" and "être en proie à l'enfance" evoke perhaps more strongly the design of a release from infancy. It is a pursuit-and-escape narrative or a story of temptation overcome that he presents. But Ricoeur hedges. He does not unequivocally link this narrative to the question of consciousness.

The tentative tone signals his resistance or ambivalence. At the very moment of advocating acceptance, submission to the unveiling power of a text, Ricoeur is challenging the temporal orientation of psychoanalytic discourse. Ricoeur reverses the analyst's question. As the translator, Willis Domingo, stresses, it is the analyst "who shows man subject to his childhood" ("Consciousness and the Unconscious" 109). If Ricoeur's resistance itself is reversible, it is not a prospect envisaged explicitly.

In Ricoeur's account there is no realm of freedom
outside the child-adult pair. For him sublation is inapplicable to the child-adult dialectic, adulthood remains an incomplete project. If Ricoeur were to entertain the negation of a negation, an identity not child and not adult, the division of age would not be internal to the subject of enunciation but a function of the enunciating subject. This location would expose the child-adult pair to greater reflexivity. For example, there is a discursive position free from either end of the telling of a life story. The listener so-positioned of such a tale would not, except by accepting a discourse’s invitation, identify with either child or adult.

At least two factors destabilize Ricoeur’s concept of appropriation: readers who test the trajectory of the escape from childhood or narratives which project modes-of-being and worlds undominated by teleologies of growing up. Both are hesitant interpretants of journey narratives couched in a therapy frame, in particular a frame that situates loss at the beginning and at the end, gain. Ricoeur’s concept of appropriation rests on his overdetermination of a path he attributes to Freud.

As expressed by Ricoeur, Freud’s will is open to limitation. Ricoeur declares that

What Freud wants is for the patient to make the meaning which was foreign to him his own and thus enlarge his field of consciousness, live better, and, finally, be a bit freer
and, if possible, a bit happier. ("Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Culture" 150)

First, acceptance is independent of revelation. Second, constant revelation might best be coupled to some active forgetting, else the reading subject is bloated with passivity. Finally, at what limit does expansion no longer coincide with health? On the way to substituting enlargement of field by enlargement of self, Ricoeur does not stop to pose the question. Based on the figure of the analysand, the reader is pathologized or deemed in need of instruction. Contra Ricoeur and based on the figure of the analyst, the reader as therapist offers a cure for the text. The paradigm case is that of the critical editor as reader. Such readers are aware that changes in the materiality of the text affect the projected world of the work. Ricoeur assumes a text without variants.

With their investments of labour and libido, analyst-readers offer a basis for pride in interpretation or at least an assertion of ego in choice. However Ricoeur’s reader in need of instruction leads to the scenario of the humiliation of the ego ("Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Culture" 152-153). It is not quite clear how Ricoeur attains an ascesis of denial, figured as the gamble of ego dispossession for the promise of an enlarged self, from the scene of
analysis's recapitulation of the classic injunction to know thyself. The clue is perhaps to be found in the wandering character of such a reader.

In the "Preface to Bultmann" Ricoeur writes of Christian hermeneutics.

this appropriation [of the Biblical text, of the Christian kerygma] is only the final stage, the last threshold of an understanding which has first been uprooted and moved into an other meaning. (397)

cette appropriation est seulement la dernière étape, le dernier seuil d'une intelligence qui s'est d'abord dépayisée dans un sens autre. (Conflit 389).

Wandering is the prerequisite to appropriate appropriation. Closure comes with appropriation which is the last step of an understanding unsettled in an alien sense. Even if appropriation is only remotely a prodigal homecoming, there is no denying Ricoeur's stress on reorientation. Migrant readers, nomadic interpreters, have no need of enlarged selves. The text is not a refuge. It is a way.

One holds a way, one is possessed by it. The way may be a home and search for it, pointless. The game of appropriation, shorn of its home-finding, need not appear as an inexorable cumulation of surplus. Ricoeur's secular formulation of appropriation bears repeating:

The reader is rather broadened in his capacity to project himself by receiving a new mode of being from the text itself. Thus
appropriation ceases to appear as a kind of possession, as a way of taking hold of... ("Appropriation" 97)

What do those suspension marks mean? They are those of Ricoeur's text. Indeterminacy? Are they, these marks, a gesture? Or simply the space between the event of speech and the written text since this piece was first presented as a lecture. Are they to be read as hesitancy, lack of assurance that appropriate interpretation is a being held, a being possessed. Or are they not a mode of letting go, a pause offered for reflection upon the metaphors of ownership and dispossession.

They are, those marks, a hold. They are a space for the hook of questions. They become only meaningful through the labour of an interpreter. Readerly work is possible because texts are manipulatable and their projected worlds analysable. Work-centred notions of reading and especially rereading thrive on recursivity. Their own workings enter into the play of interpretation. Not so Ricoeur's model of appropriation which shares with the models of interiorization deployed by some feminist epistemologies a masking of the labourer. For the former, the labourer is libidinally invested in the products of interpretation

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49 According to Valdés "Appropriation" was first given as a lecture in Toronto in October 1972 (Ricoeur Reader, x).
thus incapable of dispossessing of the ego, incapable of appropriation and understanding. For the latter, the labourer is of the domain of culture, is an instance of instrumental reason, a rejection of the mother. Others arrive at a similar condemnation of instrumental reason by reinscribing the intellectual and manual labour distinction onto gender.

The alignment, child of psychoanalysis, labourer of sociology, reader of hermeneutics, is suggested by their common concern with transformation. And, no matter the discursive object, from child to reader, the relation between techne and consciousness pivots on the key question as to whether the transformer is transformed. Is the user of tools changed by their use? Of course to answer such a question requires the application of critical tools.

At a metadiscursive level "tool" and "question" are apt to become equivalent. However before 'answer' is made analogous to "consciousness" it must be recognized that questions solicit addressees as tools do not. Another angle is possible. Access to consciousness occurs through language. In language according to Karl Bühler’s analysis of the triangulation of communication one addresses someone about something. Likewise it could be said one is conscious of something for some reason. That tool use
should transform tool users unconsciously should not deter one from at arriving at similar conclusions. As one speaks so one remains silent vis-à-vis someone about something; one is unconscious about something for some reason.

Whatever the truth-value assigned to the link between language and consciousness, there exists a structural homology between the position of interlocutor in language and that of reason or motive in acts of consciousness. For someone, for some reason, something is said, something is the object of consciousness.

How does a link between tool use and asking questions relate to reading? First, the analogy is not between text and tool but between tool use and reading. A tool-use environment has three components. They may be described as the tool proper, the instruction, directives or demonstrations of tool use and the material on which the tool is used. Directive and tool are often conflated in the concept of techniques. Regardless, effects of transformation should be ascribed to a combination of proper directives, competent tools and pliable material.

Second, like a tool-use environment, a reading environment can be composed of three parts. Sometimes the term "text" covers all three: instrument, directive
and material. Text can be a tool proper. In the case of Ricoeur it is a means to access projected worlds and to reveal modes-of-being. A text can also offer a set of directives although these may more often belong to the discourse that takes up a given text. A text presents material to be worked upon. Reading presents a case where the relation between techne and consciousness is potentially recursive.

In such situations questions proliferate. Questions raise questions. In such ways are texts mined for more than one mode of being. Through such practices, reading becomes a species of translation.

Elmar Holenstein, drawing on Roman Jakobson’s elaboration of information theory’s communication model, considers that the code-switching capabilities inherent in metalinguistic function place at the disposal of the interpreter a "whole system of regularly alterable patterns" (235). The implications for the encounter with texts prove triumphal:

If a situation is structured verbally it can also be reflected. To each linguistic production belongs the possibility of metalinguistic reflection. Every child learns language by relating new expressions to the ones already known and by contrasting them with each other. Each linguistic utterance can be paraphrased, i.e. translated into ever new contexts. (Holenstein 236)

Sharing Holenstein’s unshakable faith in translatability, a sceptical interpreter, like a
language learner, will return repeatedly to metalinguistic reflection in the action of comparison. There appears to be no end to the recursive activity of paraphrase, translation or metalinguistic application.

Never ending but not beyond control. The metalinguistic moment can be self-reflexive and self-regulating to the extent that it asks about the parameters of its own applicability. The moment is curtailed in the reading of texts -- if the material presence of an interlocutor is posited as a prerequisite for triggering metalinguistic reflection.

This is how that quasi-passive acceptance of a world presented by a text becomes Ricoeur's paradigm case for reading and interpretation. His discourse bars transcoding and hence metadiscursive moments. The resources of the metalinguistic function are lost to theory and to reading if between oral and graphic realizations of verbal forms too strong a distinction is made. For example, Ricoeur sets the possibility of operating metalinguistically solely in the context of oral contact, reserving hermeneutics for written expression. He declares "hermeneutics begins where dialogue ends" (Interpretation Theory 32).

Notwithstanding the differences between listening and seeing, in face-to-face communication cultural codes may block any and all metalinguisitic or metadiscursive
statements. Interlocutors may not wish to appear rude. Interlocutors may fear expressing ignorance. Interlocutors may not possess the competence to frame meta-statements. Dialogue, oral or written, can find itself impeded. Ricoeur recognizes this. However, for him there is no mechanism in the handling of written texts equivalent to metalinguistic statements in speech events. He does not to consider such parallels possible. Rereading remains untheorized.

Other thinkers relying on eye-ear dichotomies do not always and inevitably block consideration of the phenomenon of rereading. They do however assign it a peculiar place outside aesthetic experience. For example, although he also opts for favouring a single sensory mode, Roman Ingarden in his phenomenology grants a place to rereading. Unlike Ricoeur, his choice to privilege hearing involves no necessary humiliation of the reading subject. Like Ricoeur, a teleological dimension centres on an individual reader who is to adopt a proper attitude. In this model literary works of art are not received via revelation of an inscribed word. They are fulfilled via concretization.

In Ingarden’s aesthetics, the literary work is a schematic formation which contains places of indeterminacy. Individual concretizations remove these places of indeterminacy only partly. Other
concretizations always remain possible. The literary work is composed of four strata: sound formations, meanings, represented objects and schematized aspects of those objects. Because the first stratum of the literary work of art is sound formation, the model generates a tendency to consider (though not explicitly) indeterminacy as equivalent to silence. But this indeterminacy, this silence, is not the space for a hook of questions. According to Ingarden the aesthetic concretization is disfigured by interrogative approaches such as rereading.

Ingarden's description and not so veiled prescription is based on a dualist typology of texts. Ingarden's literary aesthetics introduce a dichotomy between sonorous aesthetic concretization and visual scientific actualization. His point of departure, the sound formation stratum, correlates with the cognitive attitude and reading practices he deems proper to aesthetic concretization and the realization of aesthetic value. Richard Shusterman explains why Ingarden overlooks the graphic dimension of verbal artefacts.

I think part of the explanation is in an unsatisfactory and unnecessarily constrained picture of aesthetic appreciation, one that

is too much enclosed in a singular temporarily progressive and ephemeral experience of concretization where proper recognition is not sufficiently given to the funding effect and superimposition of previous experience of the work. (Shusterman 145)

The injunction against rereading is clear in Ingarden’s text:

Lengthy interruptions in reading, the repetition of certain parts of the work during reading, referring back to parts which have already been read and have sunk into the phenomenal past -- all this disfigures the aesthetic concretization of the literary work of art and its aesthetic value. (Cognition 165)

The reading habits that disfigure are those that prolong. They are also those that test. They relate more to the cognition of a scientific work.

Ingarden states that

An essential feature of the scientific work is that it is intended to fix, contain, and transmit to others the results of scientific investigation in some area in order to enable scientific research to be continued and developed by its readers. (Cognition 146)

Whereas

The literary work of art does not serve to further scientific knowledge but to embody in its concretization certain values of a very specific kind, which we usually call "aesthetic" values. It allows these values to appear so that we may see them and also experience them aesthetically, a process that has a certain value in itself. (146)

Unlike Smith’s abstract and material modes of cognition, approaches to the scientific work and to the literary work of art are not reducible one to the
other. Smith's modes both contribute to the same end: social reproduction. Ingarden's discursive objects each serve different purposes and intend different values.

Others have engaged Ingarden's ontology of values. Tempering Ingarden's objectivism, such work stresses the relational and decisional grounds of values. In a parallel manner, the enlargement of aesthetic experience is possible. Activities proscribed by Ingarden can be admitted.

For example rereading is a proper aesthetic activity. Indeterminacy in Ingarden's model is a function of incompleteness. Undecidability and cruxes also play a role in the appearance and experience of aesthetic values.

A brief example will illustrate the need to recast Ingardian concretization if unvoiced textual elements enter the aesthetic experience. A character in Salman Rushdie's novel Shame expresses herself thus:

"Who is to understand the brains of those crazy types?" asked Munnee-in-the-middle, in tones of final dismissal. "They read books from left to right." (36)

The tense of "read" is not indeterminate. It is

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undecidable. The consequences are significant. Books with sentences reading left to right need not themselves be read continuously from left to right. The persistence of past practices is a theme of the novel. Depending on the tense one selects, one can play with, in this passage, either consonance or contrapuntal tension between the situation of enunciation and the subject of enunciation. Both choices produce an aesthetic value very much in accord with an Ingardian axiology of harmony. However it is a value that can only be arrived at through rereading locally, of the sentence, and globally, of the book.

Rereading prevents the decay of dialectic.

Rereading brings one closer to the desiderata of a model for embodied knowing. The model is haptic. The sheet of skin’s touch is recursive. It senses itself, the world and its own sensing. Its recursivity like that of language is enhanced by multiple contact and regulated by interplay. When sight and hearing act like touch, a common sense is possible and transcoding can lead to metacommentary.
With its techno-erotic jingle, the telephone company invites consumers to reach out and touch someone. The corporation promises an encounter perhaps only realizable in the audio-tactile universe of a McLuhanesque global village where talking and touching are commutable. However, as with all effective advertising, cognitive dissonance inhabits the telephonic slogan. Seductive aurality suspends itself upon the delectable pain of hearing your party talk and an aching for the touch of their touching. The telephone company of course has no interest in mentioning that the infliction or experience of such a state is possible without technological mediation nor that its equipment provides functions equivalent to the services of a dominatrix.

Striking analogies aside, the ache is the kernel of an implied narrative. The substitution of talk for touch follows a bodily state of talk with touch. The sequence need not unfold in this order. Nostalgia can be inflected in a future tense and the wish for
contact, directed towards strangers. Whatever the case, talk with touch is highly desirable. Touch here functions as a synecdoche for fuller bodily contact including smell, sight, taste. But the wisdom of the telephonic cliche resides in the counter desire to avoid sensory overload. The coiners of the saying astutely recast McLuhan: one reaches out to touch someone, not the world.

Even as telecommunications technology repeatedly places persons in contact, a phone call is no Hegelian Bewuβtlosigkeit of lovers nor is it blessed maternal-infant bliss. A chat is not a caress. Material limits do apply to the figure of total touch in the McLuhanite myth of the uttering/outering of man [sic] in language. Nevertheless, much discussion of language and technology continues to invoke metaphors of touch. Unfortunately, non-verbal modes of cognition tend to be mystified in these explorations.

George Steiner, for example, has written "[w]e know no exit from the skin of our skin" (After Babel 299). Skin is here a metaphor for language. Earlier in his book, Steiner speculated that "[i]f coition can be schematized as dialogue, masturbation seems to be correlative with the pulse of monologue or of internalized address." (40) His conceit is developed further:
There is evidence that the sexual discharge in male onanism is greater than it is in intercourse. I suspect that the determining factor is articulateness, the ability to conceptualize with especial vividness. In the highly articulate individual, the current of verbal-psychic energy flows inward. The multiple, intricate relations between speech defects and infirmities in the nervous and glandular mechanisms which control sexual and excretory functions have long been known, at least at the level of popular wit and scatological lore. Ejaculation is at once a physiological and a linguistic concept. Impotence and speech-blocks, premature emission and stuttering, involuntary ejaculation and the word-river of dreams are phenomena whose interrelations seem to lead back to the central knot of our humanity. Semen, excreta and words are communicative products. (40)

One wonders if the production of female cyprine is greater in masturbation or intercourse. One wonders about the inwardness of flow, about its relation to an articulateness and why articulateness determines ability to conceptualize. Thinking and speaking are linked without justification.

There is one suggestion that can be salvaged from Steiner's rather speculative exercise. If one were to mop up the fluid, one would find that articulations are very much like folds of skin and such folded skin possesses different temperature as well as moisture zones. If, in the comparison of sexual activity with linguistic performance, liquid production is not accepted as the prime comparator, touch metaphors can be activated in a less totalizing and less dichotomous
fashion. Activity with oneself, masturbation, cannot be so readily opposed to intercourse, activity with others.

Indeed, as Vygotsky argued contra Piaget, children acquire capacities for ego-centric speech after passing through a stage of speech for others. Such a developmental scheme stems from the metadiscursive dimensions of language. Furthermore, avoidance of Steiner’s phallic-based dichotomies permits one to draw an analogy between the self-sensing capacities of skin and the self-referring possibilities of verbal sign systems.

Skin like language can be sensitive to its own workings. The tactile and the metalinguistic both act as transcoders: the one of languages, the other of sensory modalities. The power of touch to translate is celebrated by Michel Serres in Les Cinq Sens. He proposes touch as the common sense:

Les choses nous baignent des pieds à la tête, la lumière, l’ombre, les clameurs, le silence, les fragrances, toutes sortes d’ondes imprègnent, inondent la peau. Nous ne sommes pas embarqués, à dix pieds de l’eau, mais plongés. (72)

We are from head to toe bathing in a sea of things, their light, their shadows, their silence, their fragrances; all kinds of waves flood, saturate our skins. We are not floating ten feet above the waters, we are submerged.

Although he situates touch as the common sense, Serres
places its operations in a tacit, silent dimension. In concluding an extended ekphrasis of the medieval unicorn tapestries, Serres relates the enigma of the mythical animal to "le secret de la subtilité: l'emprise tacite du tactile" [the secret of subtlety: the tacit hold of the tactile] (60). This perhaps explains why despite the prodigious power of touch, Serres places the sensory in opposition to the linguistic:

Il faut sentir ou se nommer, choisissez. Le language ou la peau, esthésie ou anesthésie. La langue indure les sens. (74)

One must name or sense, take your pick. Language or skin, the bodily or the non-bodily. Language dulls the senses.

For Serres language is noisesome. It generates, in his words, dialectic and battle. He values quiet since for him it is the condition for creativity. However the initial opposition drawn by Serres does not remain absolute. Battle, political or intellectual, linguistic or bodily, leads to thick skins. Serres recommends making one’s skin delicate and sensitive, rendering it attentive to things and to others, ready for the birth of the work and the man (74-75). Perhaps the gender exclusivity in Serres’s invocation of the venerable commonplace of giving birth to oneself by being in contact with the world explains the bloodless, screamless parturition.
However, shorn of reproductive mystique, the apparatus of self-sensing skin retains its role as mediator between self and the world. As Daniel Putman writes "[t]he learning that occurs through skin receptors has a reference, the disposition of the person or the texture of the object being touched" (Putman 61). Any acknowledgement of cognitive attention divided between two foci, a sensory apparatus and an object of perception, forces a revision of McLuhan's metaphors of touch and language. There is no exit from the skin of our skin, no exit from language, because we are never in language, never in our skins. We inhabit a space of inbetweens, a space of transcodings and metamoves. It is a reticulated conceptual space for language itself is between. A dyad will never suffice to stage its dialectic.

Nondyadic dynamics as well as dialectical distinctions are made possible by the double articulation of language. As demonstrated by Émile Benveniste in his essay "Sémiologie de la langue", the sign system of verbal language possesses not only a communicative function, it exists also in a relation of interprétance to other semiotic systems. He links the metalinguistic element of verbal language to its ability to form interpretative relations between semiotic systems.
The interpretative function requires a system to be doubly articulated. As Benveniste explains, "la langue comporte à la fois la signification des signes et la signification de l'énonciation. De là provient son pouvoir majeur, celui de créer un deuxième niveau d'énonciation, où il devient possible de tenir des propos signifiants sur la signification. (65)

Verbal language is comprised of both the signification of signs and the signification of enunciation. Which explains its great power for creating a second level of enunciation from which it becomes possible to make significant statements about signification.

Verbal systems are not the only ones to possess double or multiple articulation. Metadiscursivity is not merely metalinguistic, it may well be an effect of narrative and narration.

From a cybernetic perspective, metadiscursivity can be considered as a specialized form of feedback capable of converting noise into information. Within "the economics of cognitive organization", human elements as components of a communication system according to George Miller discover new ways to transform, or to recode, received information (Miller 13;49). Miller calls this practice "chunking" or "recoding". Basically, a bit of information is tagged

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or labelled. A set of tagged bits can itself be grouped and tagged.

Just as sets form sequences, cybernetic recoding generates the possibilities of metadiscourse. The theoretical space between recoding and metadiscursivity is occupied by narrativity or the potential conversion of sequence into story. In this space, verbal signs and their enunciation are on par with other types of signs and their presentation. The linguistic need not be privileged. Once tagging itself becomes taggable, the possibilities of metacommunication emerge.

Metacommunication involves comparison and as such the recoding it performs is a type of transcoding. Fredric Jameson likens transcoding to mediation:

as the invention of a set of terms, the strategic choice of a particular code or language, such that the same terminology can be used to analyze and articulate two quite distinct types of objects or "texts," or two very different structural levels of reality.

(Jameson 40)

Jameson in this passage from The Political Unconscious goes on to stress the stakes in making comparable what a hegemonic discourse and ruling apparatus does not wish to be so. It is possible to translate the spirit of Jameson's remarks into the current discussion of the bodily sources for narrativity.

When the discrete compartmentalization of the sensory modalities is questioned, the limits of
sentient being become problematic for the connection between CONSCIOUSNESS and VERBAL LANGUAGE becomes tenuous when exclusive control over metacommunication is no longer a linguistic affair.

Just as recoding operates within a same semiotic system, transcoding operates between different systems. Once one treats the individual perceiving body as a social entity, it becomes evident that cross-modal encoding serves metacommunication. For example, imagine visual and aural objects transcoded by tactile sensations. The body with its multiple sensory modalities is a great comparator and arguably a storyteller even before the speaking subject arises.

In the realm of the human, whatever else it may be, the need to compare is a social need. Anywhere signifying practices are open to rereading and to question, interpretive relations abound. Jerome Bruner lists a striking range of such behaviour:

The perpetual revisionism of historians, the emergence of "docudramas," the literary invention of "faction," the pillow talk of parents trying to make revised sense of their children's doings -- all of these bear testimony to this shadowy epistemology of the story. Indeed, the existence of story as a form is a perpetual guarantee that humankind will "go meta" on received versions of reality. (Acts of Meaning 55)

Of course, all the moments here are verbal. Other modes exist for ordering, sorting or transmitting sequences. As Bruner tells the story, these other modes are
fundamental for human linguistic development:

Once young children come to grasp the basic idea of reference necessary for any language use -- that is, once they can name, can note recurrence, and can register termination of existence -- their principal linguistic interest centers on human action and its outcomes, particularly human interaction. [Bruner's emphasis] (Acts of Meaning 78)

Bruner's tale suggests that abstract powers such as the recognition of sequence and variation are the necessary precursors to a phase of anthropo-centrism. Indeed, he earlier stakes a claim that "[n]arrative structure is even inherent in the praxis of social interaction before it achieves linguistic expression" (Acts of Meaning 77).

The parallels with Greimas's generative trajectory are striking. For the Paris semiotician, the generative trajectory is the equivalent of an anthropomorphic investment in the fundamental structure of signification and its semic positions. For both Bruner and Greimas, narrative need not be linguistic. When human interaction is recognized as the ground of cognition, then not only is narrative structure non-verbal, certain narratives are non-verbal.

A case for the separation of narration from verbal language can also be made on neurophysiological grounds. Howard Gardner in Frames of Mind offers the conjecture that "sensitivity to narrative, including the ability to communicate what has happened in a
series of episodes, seems more closely tied to the
pragmatic functions of language (and thus proves more
fragile in cases of right-hemisphere disease) than to
core syntactic, phonological, and semantic functions"
(89).

Pragmatic functions relate to bodies in motion. Such functions and dimensions point to systems other
than the linguistic. Sources of non-linguistic
narrative are rich and varied. One can consider the
Javanese shadow puppets and the Inuit string games that
appear as narratives in Kay Armatage's film
Storytelling (1983) or how in Australian aboriginal
culture visual design becomes song. Wherever there is
marking and action, notation and performance, there is
some capacity to predict pattern and this pushed to the
limit is the core of narrative. Narrative occurs where
there is the reproduction of a sequence.

If the core of narrative is reduced to sequence,
reproduction and reportage meld. For example, the
repetition of a performance of nonsense syllables or
tapped rhythms certainly displays the ability to
"communicate what has happened in a series of
episodes". But narrative is not solely reproduction.
Narrative is also a redoing. It involves sequence and
variation.

It is like the re-represented behaviour that
Richard Schechner explores in both his performance theory and theatrical production. He examines how "strips of behaviour" are decontextualized and processed in the "twice behaved" behaviour of ritual or performance. (Between theater and anthropology) Strips of behaviour can be slowed down, speeded up, juxtaposed. Narrative can reach great complexity through multiple track variations, through operating on many sequences.

The pathways between perception and narration are particularly evident in non-linguistic narrative. Set in the context of general semiosis, narration crosses sensory modalities. This does not explain how a series of events becomes a sequence. Sequences arise from learning. They develop from bodies attempting to preserve and process knowledge. Sequences disentangle synaesthesia. For example, teaching children to count aloud on their fingers is enhanced by the introduction of slight pauses. The teacher touches the child's finger, pauses, voices a number, pauses, and makes eye contact with the child, pauses, makes eye contact with the touching fingers. The pattern which consists of tactile sensation, oral marking, aural sensation, and concludes with an invitation to shift to a visual mode, can of course be varied. With two or more teachers the potential for variation increases: sequences can be
assigned either solo or group performance and can be distributed according to sensory modality. One teacher voices, an other points, the child connects.

This example is offered not to suggest that sensitivity to narrative is conditioned by mastering the art of counting but to stress that narrativity may have strong ties to multi-sensory multi-player situations in that both are instances of coordination games. Furthermore, sequences incorporate adequate redundancy into learning and communicative situations.
The episodic character of sequences (something happened at a certain time) creates expectation. As well, the choric potential of sequence manipulation provides for intersubjective participation in knowledge production.

As a coordination game, narration has two functions: memory work and problem solving. The story can serve as a template whose slots allow for the addition of more bits of knowledge. The story becomes a key for typological readings. Interpretation produces a grid for storing and recalling information.

Approached as an algorithm, the story is a series of steps for developing a solution to a problem. The story models the movement between a source and a target, between current conditions and desired outcome. Interpretation is construction.

Conceiving story as storage and story as algorithm
is the key to imagining a sensorium that is more than merely receptive, to theorizing one that is interactive in regards to its modalities and its environment. The stumbling block in imagining such a sensorium has been proper theorizing of the means of translating from one modality to another. Verbal language seemed to be the best candidate. However it privileged sight and hearing, the distance senses, over those of closer contact: smell, touch, and taste.

In re-evaluating the closer contact senses, especially their action under conditions of distress or extreme pleasure, one discovers that the sensorium not only is a receiver but also a dispatcher of information. The senses are not only receptors. The senses also transmit. By their operation the senses provide events for interpretation. The blinking of eyes, the cocking of an ear, the flicker of a tongue, all signal.

The human senses, whatever their number and relations, produce events. Events can be connected. This production of events can be experienced, can be induced, can be guided. Memory plays a major role in this process. Attention can be alternatively devoted to percept and to the act of perception. The possibilities for metacommentary are connected to the possibilities for memory. Cognitively this allows humans to preserve
the trace of something happening at a certain time. Events connected in a series of episodes lead to narratives. The transformation of discrete somatic signals into sequences begins to explain cross-modal encoding.

Although not dealing with sequences, Alexander Alland drawing upon the work of Charles Laughlin and Eugene d'Aquili, *Biogenetic Structuralism*, suggests that anatomical and physiological factors enhancing cross-modal association are responsible for the emergence of conceptualization ("Roots of Art" 13-14). Developing an anthropology of art, Alland posits an aesthetic-cognitive function for which he offers the term transformation-representation. His notion is allied to narrative or sequence processing. He argues:

Art is an emotionally charged and culturally central storage device for complex sets of conscious and unconscious information. Structure guards information in well-ordered and easily retrievable forms. It also allows for a certain amount of variation (transformation) without loss of total information or organization. Transformation is something that is likely to occur by accident, but it is also likely to be part of the aesthetic game in which playing with form is a major element. Transformation without significant changes in over-all structure keeps the game exciting at the same time as essential information is guarded. (Artistic Animal 41).

As form is to storage and circulation, sequence is to narrative and narration.

It is worth keeping in mind the explanatory power
of circulation and narration while examining a more recent account of evolution and cognition. Coupling biogenetic anthropology with models of self-organization in far from equilibrium systems, Alex Argyros attempts to construct an "affirmative theory of narrative". Argyros implicitly embeds narrative in verbal language ("Narrative and Chaos" 665). He equates narrative with the discursive representations of chains of causation.

it [narrative] allows for the constitution of a representational structure whose basic unit is the causal frame: actor-action-object. The essential feature of narrative is that it maps the world causally. Given the universality of narratival structures, both in everyday discourse and in the myths, cosmologies and fictions generated by all human cultures, we must assume that the world is sufficiently causal to offer a species able to represent it in narratival forms a selective evolutionary advantage. (662)

As the neologism indicates, narratival structures are not the same as narrative structures. If Argyros had not implicitly embedded narrative in a verbal form of discourse, his paradigm case would not resemble the subject-verb-object formula of Indo-European sentences\(^5\). Furthermore, evolutionary advantage is a

\(^5\) The narratival structures outlined by Argyros do not provide a model logically powerful enough to explain the equivalency between events and objects. In Australian aboriginal visual designs and storytelling, Nancy Munn reports

[T]here is no clear distinction between actor-action and actor-object constructions, and it is convenient to link them both in one
contested concept likely to generate competing narratives. In a bid to rescue narrative from those whom he perceives as its detractors, Argyros's blocks cross-modal interaction. The causal frame, actor-action-object, is built up out of the transformations of states of being and the observation of these transformations. However, narrative does not depend on the question "why?". Narratives are not always accounts of causation. Stories are not to be equated with causal frames.

In Alland's terms narrative as a form of art is founded upon a faculty of transformation-representation or as Argyros writes "narrative is a remarkably efficient information processing strategy whose function is to store, manipulate, and create the tremendous range of information constitutive of the world of human beings" (667).

Narrative and narration also explain how objects yield events and events become reified or, in more technical terms, how a syntagm can be labelled and function as an actant. The self is not a sign, it is a story machine and its acts of abstraction subtend both overarching figure type with a general meaning that can be stated as 'actor (in relation to)-item' ('actor-item'). (Walbiri Iconography 81).

As a category "relationship" opens up more phenomena to narrativity than that of "action".
the reconstructive and the recall dimensions of information processing or transformation-representation. Memory work draws upon powers of abstraction to make knowledge portable. Problem solving draws on a capacity for situation anticipation to make knowledge applicable. With applicable and portable knowledge, one can begin to think the embodiment of knowledge.

Pedagogical situations are sensory. They are also interpersonal. Because they are sensory this makes even learning by oneself interpersonal. Egocentric speech is like a dialogue between the senses. In Vygotsky’s and Luria’s experiments, children placed in problem-solving situations that were slightly too difficult for them displayed egocentric speech. One could consider these as self-induced metadiscursive moments. The self in crisis will disassociate and one’s questioning becomes the object of a question.

Not only is the human self as a metabeing both fracturable and affiliable in itself, it is also prone to narrativity. That is, the human self will project its self-making onto the world in order to generate stories from sequences and to break stories into recombinant sequences. Its operations on signs are material practices with consequences for world-making.

The fracturable affiliable self calls for
reproductive models suitable to the interactions of multi-sensate beings, models that render dyads dialectical, questionable, answerable. Narrativity understood dialectically does not merely mean making sequences or strings of events into stories but also stories into things, strung together for more stories. From such an understanding, emerge non-dyadic narratives of reproduction, narratives where a thing-born transforms itself into an event, comes to understand itself as a process.

The historical possibility of such narratives owes much to the metacommentary of one man upon the work of another. Here is a segment of Marx's critique of Hegel's dialectic:

To be objective, natural, sentient and at the same time to have object, nature and sense outside oneself, or to be oneself object, nature and sense for a third person, is the same thing. (Marx 207)

To be and to have for oneself are the same thing as to be oneself for a third. It's a good place to start making sense of sense.
A body beginning again to trace the intertwining of reproduction, technology and perception might begin again with a quotation from an account of the social and psychological impact of cybernetics. That body might settle upon a single and simple statement by Sherry Turkle and find within that statement a ruling syntagm. The body does begin again. The body does query one preposition in a statement by the author of The Second Self:

There is passion behind theory construction. (Turkle 31)

That body in its typical Erasmian fashion and with a flair for philology asks about the positioning and wonders if there can be theory construction behind passion. This body is not content with mere reversal for it is being keen on the synchronicity of cognitive modes. The body wonders if there does not rustle here in the statement by Turkle a bias that takes the emotional to be more primitive than the rational. The body knows the bias comes to the fore if the spatial marker, the preposition, also encodes a temporal relation. The behind may operate as a before.

This body wonders for this body is apt to conceive
of the expression of passion as a way of testing the world. The body fashions theory construction as a mode of passion. What labyrinths close readings open when they concentrate on the relation of the rational and the emotional and what tangles these readings create when they judge the passionate and the theoretical to be both constructed through expression.

This body would take such an insight into the constructed and expressive nature of the passionate and the theoretical and read again Marshall McLuhan and his dichotomous division of hot and cool mediums, a division likely pilfered from Lévi-Strauss who ranks whole societies by temperature. The body would stop, steal a moment, pause, take its own temperature. The body would again be puzzled as to how McLuhan could graft visual and aural onto hot and cool. The body would persist. The body might perspire. The body would above all compare and carefully read for rhetorical and narratological ploys and deploy its own expressive strategies. It does. It did.

The body did tackle McLuhan. The body did compare McLuhan with Benjamin and found the one to deal with prosthetics and the other with proxemics and both to truck with the question of reproduction. The body restless, some would say in labour, strove to understand what sensory bias informed the stories of
biological and social reproduction as told by Louis Althusser and Mary O’Brian. In its striving the body came to ask how it was that dyads came to rule not only the stories of reproduction and their sensory bias but also the very act of questioning, an act which the body took and takes to be the basis of producing stories.

The body was not content to find reproductive stories in texts dealing with technology and perception and conversely in texts dealing with reproduction to find stories about technology and perception. Somehow this particular ring of associations or set of linked stories was grasped as a single model generated by a shared epistemology and thus the body became concerned with autopoetic structures, semiotic squares and the complexities of emulation.

The body found itself thinking of bodies including itself as a machine. The body found that those thinkers that stick to building models out of dyads have great difficulty with machine-like entities and, as well, such thinkers are likely to fetischize a particular sensory modality. However, the body did not desire to pathologize these thinkers. They obviously had found an intellectual niche and belonged to the ecology of ideas. The body set out to examine their habitat often referred to as the hermeneutical circle. The body wanted to count. The body wants to know how many
players they permit in their games of interpretation.

The body found that two was not too many. Indeed, it was not enough. The body found itself storing and sorting, punctuating, once more, readings, perceptions, sequences and stories. The body found again itself as some body. The body knew any body would listen for the unhurriedness of the unheard at play and any body would find the beginning to end again where Gertrude Stein begins A Novel of Thank You: "How many more than two are there." Anybody then knew the tense risking at work and praise of the folly of bodies and the queer story risky praise and praised risk make. Odd couples like these:

No equation to explain the division of the senses [...] drawn by the whispering shadows into the mathematics of our desire.

Fred Smith and Patti Smith\textsuperscript{54}

Tell a story of a virus.
Of greed ambition and fraud
A case of science gone bad
Tell a tale of friends we miss
A tale that's cruel and sad
Weep for me, Scheherazade.
Weep for me, Scheherazade.

John Greyson and Glenn Schellenberg\textsuperscript{55}

In deed and in story how many more than two are there.


\textsuperscript{55} "Scheherazade (Miss HIV)," Zero Patience, A Musical about AIDS, Milan Entertainment and Zero Patience Productions, 1994.
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Pauling, Linus. The Nature of the Chemical Bond and the Structure of Molecules and Crystals. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1939.


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Excurus

The following works, although not cited, have contributed to my reflection on matters sensory and reproductive. Many yield a bon mot.


Ackerman, Diane. A Natural History of the Senses. New York, Random House, 1990; Vintage, 1991. "Our senses, which feel so personal and impromptu, and seem at times to divorce us from other people, reach far beyond us. They're an extension of the genetic chain that connects us to everyone who has ever lived; they bind us to other people and to animals, across time and country and happenstance." (308)

acknowledge that he or she makes it work, and that the surface is no longer still but tells the story of its making. That is what narrativity does to a work of art, be it visual or literary." (4)


Black, Max. Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962. "Perhaps every science must start with metaphor and end with algebra; and perhaps without metaphor there would never have been an algebra." (242)


Boone, Elizabeth Hill and Walter D. Mignolo, eds. Writing

Bruce assigns feedback to oral context:

> Ces mécanismes verbaux et non-verbaux fonctionnent comme une sorte de ‘mécanisme de contrôle en retour’ (angl.: feedback system), car les locuteurs peuvent, à tout moment, revenir sur les propos déjà énoncés.

I think such attributions of feedback to oral situations without similar attribution to written situations resides in a presupposition of body to body communication, that is encased consciousness. Group mind applied to oral situations would complicate the application of a point-to-point telegraphic model to communication situations. Broad band broadcasting as an other model changes the relation between noise and
message.


Colie, Rosalie L. *Paradoxica Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox*. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1966. "In most situations of ordinary life, words are by convention regarded as adequate, are taken as "matching" reality, and verbal language is usually regarded as the proper medium into which experience is to be translated or transliterated. Love questions all these assumptions: love forces us back upon the fundamental autonomy of experience, subject to its own rules and inexpressible in any other medium." (97)


form constructed as the love song, and concerned with social or political satire; these songs broadcasted by jongleurs were passed from mouth to mouth, and, as what we call 'news' was scarce and slow in transit, exercised a considerable influence upon general opinion. The political sirventes of Bertran de Born are well known; the personal sirventes of Guillem de Berguedan rival the best efforts of Dr. Goebbels." (130) Interesting to juxtapose these remarks against McLuhan's on Hitler and radio.

Coste, Didier. *Narrative as Communication*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. Introducing his section on "Narrative through Non-linguistic Media" he writes "Although our operational theorization cannot proceed pictorially or musically, it does acknowledge that operations of pictorial and musical narrative cognition are not the same as linguistic operations and are not necessarily mere preliminaries; they share certain structures and processes of dissociation, association, comparison, transfer, and so forth, that permit transposition up to a point, but require a particularly careful comparative approach." (275) Going from narrative to communication Coste clings to sensory divisions which would be impossible if the syntagm were reversed: theorize from communication to narrative.
Davidson, Mark. *Uncommon Sense: The Life and Thought of Ludwig von Bertalanffy Father of General Systems Theory*. Los Angeles: J.P. Tarcher, 1983. "A system is a manifestation of something intangible, but quite real, called organization. A system, like a work of art, is a pattern rather than a pile. Like a piece of music, it’s an arrangement rather than an aggregate. Like a marriage, it’s a relationship rather than an encounter." (27) Davidson pushes his dichotomy a bit far. Organization, pattern, arrangement and encounter can all be similar. Encounters can be and usually are systematic.

Delany, Samuel R. *The Mad Man*. New York: Richard Kasak, 1994. "Thoughts are *never* not clothed in language --- or, rather, that’s not the relation between thought and words: the relation between a body and a suit of clothes. Thought is part of language. But everything we perceive, either through our senses, or through our bodily feelings, or through sitting in the dark with our eyes closed, remembering or thinking or figuring, is the "meaning" part of language. So a thought doesn’t come "without words." It comes first as simple language --- simple meanings, if you will. Then, what we call "thinking about it" is just the arrival of more complex language that elaborates on it --- that’s all. Once the elaborated language has come, we remember the simpler
language as somehow prelinguistic." (305-306)

Delany, Samuel R. *Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand.* New York, Bantam Books, 1984. For a peculiar problematization of the couple and perception, see especially the chapter entitled "A Dragon Hunt" where two characters, Rat Korga and Mark Dyeth, project themselves into the phenomenological space of an other species and the whole interaction is witnessed by a third.

Dissanayake, Ellen. *Homo Aestheticus. Where Art Comes From and Why.* New York: The Free Press, 1992. Driven by a narrative of evolution as a story of seeking greater control over uncertainty, she neglects the aspects of creativity related to the generation of problems or the making of uncertainty. Her argument is almost ruined by this onesideness. Such a narrative also influences her take on orality/literacy questions. "Writers cannot presume shared knowledge, so they must be explicit where a speaker is implicit; precise and careful where a speaker can be careless; streamlined and sparse where a speaker can be redundant." (205) François Rabelais and Thomas Pynchon spring to mind as counter examples. There are also some odd genderings of the word/image dichotomy. She claims "traditional women's arts tend to be diagrammatic and geometric, showing the networks of social relationships in which women participate, while
men's arts are narrative and descriptive, showing their roles as warriors, hunters and adventurers." (236, n. 21)

Eagleton, Terry. Walter Benjamin or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism. London: NLB, 1981. He notes that Eliot and Leavis cast a contrast between Donne and Milton in terms of an auditory and visual dichotomy. (4)

Eco, Umberto. The Limits of Interpretation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990. "[t]he double metaphor of the world as a text and a text as a world has a venerable history. To interpret means to react to the text of the world or to the world of a text by producing other texts." (23) Or I might add to react by refusing to produce other texts. See de Lauretis on action versus disposition for action.

Frankel, Hans F. "Poetry and Painting: Chinese and Western Views of their Convertability." *Comparative Literature* 9:4 (Fall 1957). 289-307. "Naturally, the arduous technical training required in calligraphy, with its disciplined control of brush strokes and lines, was also an excellent preparation for painting." (302)

Freud, Sigmund. *Civilization and its discontents.* Trans. J. Strachey. New York: Norton, 1961. "With every tool man is perfecting his own organs, or removing the limits to their functioning ... Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God." (37-39)


Gonzalez-Crussi, F. *The Five Senses.* San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989; rpt. New York: Vintage, 1991. "I believe that the autonomy of the senses would not be so dear a concept to us if our scheme of perception had been derived from Huichole sources. But Huicholes are not neurophysiologists. Peyote to them is a sacrament, not a botanical specimen belonging to a system thick with species, classes, and genera. Consequently, our theoretical scheme of sense perception was entirely
built by somewhat jejune whites, skeptical in outlook, rational, distrustful of the senses, and systematically suspicious of any experience that could not be reduced to words and abstractions. Which is why we have been living by a watered-down idea of the life of the senses: a scientific-rational formula that cannot recognize the intercommunicating nature of perceptions [...]" (29) Whatever the origin of the compartmentalized senses, there is no doubt about the consequences for cross-cultural communication.

Grimsted, D. "The Purple Rose of Popular Culture Theory: An Exploration of Intellectual Kitsch" American Quarterly 43(4) 541-578. Sharp aphorisms such as "The opposite sides of intellectual coins commonly tend to be equally flat" (557) would have pleased the media guru but perhaps not the edge of satire "No one has done more to call attention to the mass media than Marshall McLuhan. But McLuhan's cleverness has led him toward such heavy-handed and -headed put-ons as The Medium is the Massage --- and [Woody] Allen to his amusing put-down of the media sage's pundity in Annie Hall." (558). Others might miss the bite. Mrs. McLuhan's account of the filming is glowing in Sanderson and Macdonald.

Halverson, John. "Goody and the implosion of the literacy thesis." Man 27 (June 1992) 301-317. "Only if a conversational model is presupposed for the oral medium
is immediacy distinctive, but such a model is hardly justified since a great deal of important oral discourse (such as story, myth and ritual) is not in that mode." (304) "Goody's view conflates what we think about and how we think; only the later is the concern of cognitive theory." (313) "One unassailable point emerges, and this is that reading can radically alter one's thoughts, emotions and behaviour." (313)

Haraway, Donna. "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" in Coming to Terms: Feminism, Theory, Politics. ed. by Elizabeth Weed (London, New York: Routledge, 1989). "Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves. This is a dream not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia." (204)

Hewitt, Marsha. "Is Sexism Genetic?" Our Generation 16:2 (Spring 1984), 7-14. A critique of Mary O'Brien. "What is wrong here is that O'Brien assumes time-consciousness to be linear; yet there are cultures which do not and never have understood time in this way. So then how can time-consciousness said to be determined by biology?" (10) "Families create women and men who view each other in terms of dualistic antagonisms, a necessary fiction which the social order fosters in order to maintain itself." (12)

Hiss, Tony. The Experience of Place. New York: Knopf,
1990. "While normal waking consciousness works to simplify perception, allowing us to act quickly and flexibly by helping us remain seemingly oblivious to almost everything except the task in front of us; simultaneous perception is more like an extra, or a sixth, sense: It broadens and diffuses the beam of attention evenhandedly across all the senses so we can take in whatever is around us -- which means sensations of touch and balance, for instance, in addition to all sights, sounds, and smells." (xii-xiii)

Holub, Robert C. *Crossing Borders: Reception Theory, Poststructuralism, Deconstruction*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992. For a succinct statement of the stakes in policing the question of which objects are to be perceived by whom. "The issue separating them here is thus really one of epistemology as much as of literary theory. Perception of any sort is for Fish a mediated activity; it is never "innocent of assumptions," while for Iser, it would appear, there are some things that simply exist and must be perceived by all viewers." (26) And for a gorgeous phrase, "the sophistry of the radically skeptical antitheoretical position" (36)

but always and in all circumstances we are by
ourselves. The martyrs go hand in hand into the arena;
they are crucified alone. Embraced, the lovers
desperately try to fuse their insulated ecstasies into
a single self-transcending; in vain." (11)

 Interfaces 5. 1994. Dijon: Centre de Recherches Image Texte
Language, Université de Bourgogne. This issue is a
selection of papers from a 1993 conference on theory of
the relation between image and language. Michel Baridon
contributes an annotated bibliography.

Jay, Martin. *Downcast Eyes: The denigration of vision in
twentieth-century French thought*. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1993. A magistral survey that
traces "the detranscendentalization of perspective",
"the recorporealization of the subject" and "the
revalorization of time over space". (187)

Jay, Nancy. "Gender and Dichotomy," *Feminist Studies* 7(1)
Paul noting the distinction in addressee for appeals
based on contradiction versus those based on
contraries.

Joyce, Michael. "Notes Toward an Unwritten Non-linear
Electronic Text, "The Ends of Print Culture"." *Postmodern Culture* 2:1 (Sept. 1991). "We can re-embod
reading if we see that the network is ours to inhabit.
There are no technologies without humanities; tools are
human structures and modalities." Odd Heideggerian overtones here. If prefer to reverse the syntagm: modalities and structures are tools, no humanities without technologies. Furthermore, who is the "we" that disembodied reading in the first place?


"The art that is designated as a natural-sign art, when the arts are viewed as forms of representation, is different from the art considered closest to nature, when the arts are viewed as modes of human expression" (107). Krieger points to the Longinian versus the Horation traditions as opposing views on the dependence on external materials and implements. He continues In the latter consideration [expressionistic view], nature itself, as it realizes itself in the expressions of human nature, dictates that what otherwise was called the natural-sign arts be consigned to the category of artifice dependent upon external materials and implements." McLuhan would represent a contrary movement - the naturalization of tools.


"semiosis specifies the mutual overdetermination of meaning, perception, and experience, a complex nexus of reciprocally constitutive effects between the subject
and social reality, which, in the subject, entail a continual modification of consciousness; that consciousness in turn being the condition of social change." (184)


Lloyd, Genevieve. The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy. London: Methuen, 1984. Certainly helps one distinguish between the text of Descartes and Cartesianism. "In the Sixth Meditation he acknowledged that the inferior senses, once they have been set aside from the search for truth -- where they can only mislead and distort -- are reliable guides to our well-being. To trust them is not irrational. He does not maintain that we are rational only when exercising arduous pure thoughts, engaged in intellectual contemplation and assembling chains of deduction. Indeed, he thinks it is not rational to spend an excessive amount of time in such purely intellectual activity." (49)

Markham, Sheila H. "Islamic Calligraphy." Antiquarian Book
Islamic literature delights in the image of the reed as pen for the calligrapher and instrument for the musician, both revealing man’s inner thoughts to the different senses." (12) The balance is lost in the sentence immediately following: "There would be general agreement with Walter Pater’s remark that "all art constantly aspires towards the condition of music."


Mitchell, W.J.T. Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986. "The point, then, is not to heal the split between words and images, but to see what interests and powers it serves." (44)

interesting final chapter which revisits Eisenstein's introduction of movement as a category uniting visual and musical modes of signification.

Ong, Walter J. *Ramus: Method, and the Decay of Dialogue. From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason.* Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 1958. rpt. 1983. McLuhan seems to have missed Ong's distinction between the personalist and corporationalist role of the teacher (152). Ong sets a difference between two types of knowledge as a move from one to the other although he admits they continue to cohabitate. One does not entirely replace the other. Whatever one thinks of historiography according to dominant modes, the medium does not solely dictate the paths of change. The institution may be a greater shaper than the medium.


Perron, Paul. Jan Gordon and Marcel Danesi. "Commonplaces and Situations: The "Subjective" Nature of Discourse Revisited." The Toronto Semiotic Circle Bulletin 2:1 1994. "It is our view that commonplaces point to an inherent feature of cognition that can only be described as an extension of visual sensory experience into the domain of abstract thought. In other words, they appear to reveal a tendency to fix abstract modes of thinking in a kind of "mind-space" which is itself an iconic model of the world of sensation." (4-5) Why do they privilege the visual mode? Perhaps they have opted for focus versus attention. There may be some link between iconic model and indexical foreclosure in their statement "The experientialist approach sees abstract meaning structures as end-products rather than points-of-departure. The starting point is, of course, the level of bodily sensations and emotional feelings captured by basic signifying processes (e.g. indexical and iconic signs). The progression from sensory to conceptual thought that an experientialist approach to meaning would posit makes it clear that there is a link between eog-states, perception and conception." (8) End products vs points of departure -- abstraction is here pitted against physical embodiment of emotion and sensation but emotion belongs with abstraction not sensation because both emotion and abstraction depend
upon memory and its testing in prediction. Emotion is a configuration.

Pronger, Brian. *The Arena of Masculinity: Sports, Homosexuality, and the Meaning of Sex*. 1990; rpt University of Toronto Press, 1992. "When the physical and mental come together in sexual activity, they are intensely and pleasurably merged. This is a process in which the abstract nature of thinking becomes incarnate in actual physical experience." (42) "[T]he homoerotic paradox is twofold. It is a paradox by being outside the orthodox erotic interpretation of gender myths. It is also a paradox in the stricter sense of being a self-contradiction; homoerotic desire both reveres and violates masculinity." (72)

Robinson, Douglas. "Dear Harold." *New Literary History* 20:1 (Autumn 1988). "Mere temporal priority does not make writers parents, we [critics] do. If we want to. If we allow ourselves to be victimized by institutionalized culture worship, if we surrender to the parental images our civilization generates of its precursors." (245)


Ronnell, Avital. *The Telephone Book: Technology,*
Schizophrenia, Electric Speech. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989. "it [telephony] is a place without location from which to get elsewhere" (305)

Rothenberg, Jerome. Shaking the Pumpkin: Traditional Poetry of the Indian North Americas. Revised Edition. New York: Alfred Van der Mark, 1986. This along with the anthology Technicians of the Sacred offer examples of Rothenberg's concern with what he calls "total translation," a term he uses "for translation (of oral poetry in particular) that takes into account any or all elements of the original beyond the words." (xxi)

"Each moment is charged: each is a point at which meaning is coming to surface, where nothing's incidental but everything matters terribly." (xix)

Compare with Hermetic Imagination.


I myself now tend to avoid speaking of the oral, writing, print and electronic "media." "Medium," something in-between you and me, suggests a kind of pipeline transfer of units of "information" which, even with feedback loops, is hardly adequate as a description of verbal communication among human beings. I prefer to speak now of oral communication and of the technological transformation of the word by writing, print and electronics, remembering that human beings interiorize their technologies by making them a part of
themselves. We have interiorized writing and print so deeply that we are unaware of them as technological components of our private thinking processes, and we are engaged in rapidly interiorizing the computer in a similar way. (31)

Total emphasis on interiorization is of course no less problematic than extension.


Stein, Gertrude. *Narration*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935. The third lecture opens "Narrative concerns itself with what is happening all the time, history concerns itself with what happens from time to time. And that is perhaps what is the matter with history and that is what is perhaps the matter with narrative." (30)


Silko, Leslie Marmon. *Storyteller*. New York: Arcade, 1981. "The story ends there./ Some of the stories/ Aunt Susie told/ have this kind of ending./ There are no explanations." (42)

together a magical assembly of stories to cure the suffering and evils of the world by the retelling of the stories." (316) Read this in conjunction with Jack Weatherford.

Stonum, Gary Lee. "Cybernetic Explanation as a Theory of Reading." New Literary History 20:2 (Winter 1989). 397-410. "[N]oise and information are both instances of variety in the signal and hence not phenomenally or logically distinct." (403) "Discriminating between information and noise may not be difficult in a given situation, but the discrimination can never be certain." (403)

Strang, Barbara M. Metaphors and Models, an Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Newcastle on Tyne on Monday 12 October, 1964. Newcastle: University of Newcastle on Tyne, 1965. "[T]he direct connection between theory and description means that we need large numbers of people working in the field. Quite apart from the fact that languages need to be redescribed because they change so quickly, there will always be a need for re-description in terms of different metaphors, models and theories." (19) This leads me to consider the effects of description and offer a three-fold typology: reticulation (networks spreading out) as opposed to reiteration (implies going over same route) versus iteration (treading water). Relate this to
Judith Schlanger's use for the noise of popularization in *L'invention intellectuelle*.

Sullivan, Michael. *The Three Perfections: Chinese Painting, Poetry and Calligraphy*. London: Thames and Hadson, 1974; rpt. NY: George Braziller, 1980. "We can only understand the Chinese attitude if we can see the picture as the Chinese do, not as a complete artistic statement in itself, but as a living body, an accretion of qualities, imaginative, literary, historical, personal, that grows with time, putting on an ever richer dress of meaning, commentary and association with the years." (20) Is this a fair description of the European emblem book as well?


Thompson, E.P. *The Poverty of Theory and other essays* London: Merlin Press, 1978 "[I]t is exactly in conditions when a theory (or a theology) is subject to no empirical controls that disputes about the placing of one term lead on to theoretical parturition: the parturition of intellectual parthenogenesis." (216) You do not have to value empirical controls to value "attentive disbelief" (221).

Thompson, Robert Farris. *Flash of the Spirit: African and*

Trinh, T. Minh-ha. "Grandma's Story" in Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. "The structural activity that does not carry on the cleavage between form and content, but emphasizes the interrelation of the material and the intelligible, is an activity in which structure should remain an unending question [...]" (143)

Vail, Leroy and Landeg White. Power and the Praise Poem: Southern African Voices in History. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia: 1991. Opening chapter does much to demystify the constructions of "oral man". Their notion of metaphor seems akin to the operations of symbol. However without the timelessness and ahistoricity. "Metaphors, by fusing abstract concepts with concrete images, have the characteristic of uniting physical and metaphysical elements into a rich compound of meaning. Like theory, they transcend empiricism, but in an open manner, cherishing complexity and receptive to fresh expression and interpretation." (71)

sorte déphaser" (68)


Engels inspired by Iroquois Confederacy and kinship structures. Worth examining this material for part of the Euro-history of sensory organization and trace its epistemological consequences.

Wellek, René. "The Concept of Evolution in Literary History" in *For Roman Jakobson*. Morris Halle et al. compilers. The Hague: Mouton, 1956. "We are expected to forget that novelty need not be valuable or essential, that there may be, after all, original rubbish." (659)

Wellek, René. *Four Critics: Croce, Valéry, Lukács, and Ingarden*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1981. On Ingarden, "He elaborately distinguishes between different kinds of reading: passive, mere enjoyment, for amusement; and active reading, which assumes two forms -- reading which has as its aim an investigative, intellectual grasp of the work, or, finally, reading which submits to the aesthetic qualities. Much ingenuity is spent in differentiating between these different kinds of reading, although, I think, it would be difficult in practice to keep them apart, to prevent their mixing and our shifting between them." (65)

Wellek, René. "The Parallelism between Literature and the
The various arts -- the plastic arts, literature, and music -- have each their individual evolution, with a different tempo and a different internal structure of elements. No doubt they are in constant relationship with each other, but these relationships are not influences which start from one point and determine the evolution of the other arts; they have to be conceived rather as a complex scheme of dialectical relationships which work both ways, from one art to another and vice versa, and may be completely transformed within the art which they have entered." (61)

Wellbery, David E. *Lessing's Laocoon: Semiotics and Aesthetics in the Age of Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. "Lessing's most important theoretical writing after the *Laocoon*, the *Hamburgische Dramaturgie* (1767) describes the locus of this convergence [between poetry and painting]: 'The art of the actor occupies a middle position between the plastic arts and poetry'" (136)

implicitly or explicitly assumes that all behaviour is communication." (110)


Wilson, Alexander. *The Culture of Nature: North American Landscape from Disney to the Exxon Valdez*. Toronto: Between the Lines, 1991. "A rhetorical rejection of science, however, with no attention paid to oppositional currents within the discipline, amounts to little more that anti-intellectualism." (69)
IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (QA-3)

1.0  1.1  1.25  1.4  1.6
  2.5  2.2  2.0  1.8

1.0  1.1  1.25  1.4  1.6
  2.8  2.5  2.2  2.0  1.8

150mm
6"

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