"BY VIRTUE OF BEING WHITE":

RACIALIZED IDENTITY FORMATION

AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTI-RACIST PEDAGOGY

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education
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ABSTRACT

"BY VIRTUE OF BEING WHITE": RACIALIZED IDENTITY FORMATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTI-RACIST PEDAGOGY

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Although a number of programs have investigated the existence of racism in educational institutions, the literature does not address how white identity is constructed so as to resist self-awareness following anti-racist programming. This research, which employs poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theories of identity, investigates processes by which whiteness is inscribed as a normative construction of Canadian national identity particularly as performed in the discourses of white pre-service teachers. The narrative of the innocent Canadian overlaps with white participants’ desires and identifications as ideal teachers. This narrative, which can be read in elite discourses as well as those of white research participants, is performed against loss of respectability as the non-legitimate abject other. The research examines ways in which the juxtaposition of the individual and the nation are narrated in the discourses of aspiring teachers who claim legitimacy as white citizen subjectivities.

The research is conducted as semi-structured interviews with teacher education students who have completed a compulsory cross-cultural course. The method of discourse analysis employed in this research assumes that language is
a performative act—both indicative and productive of the social and material identifications to which participants aspire regarding gender, race, sexuality, class, ability, and other normative identities. That participants have access to these discourses signals participant performance as legitimate, respectable white dominant identities and acceptable teacher candidates.

Participants’ conflicting desires acquired through various historic, social, and personal narratives include the myth of their racial superiority and innocence, and the idealization of equality. Participants’ access to respectability depends on 1) their successful reading of the social practices which identify them as teachers, 2) the construction and management of difference so that whiteness is reproduced as normative practice, and 3) the successful performance of their lives as examples of “how to live”.

The dissertation raises significant issues for teacher educators engaged in oppositional work. The shape-shifting by which dominant identifications maintain their innocence suggests the potential for whiteness to affirm itself, even as a virtue. This dissertation demonstrates processes by which the power of dominant groups remains uncontested and resistant to oppositional pedagogies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Part One: Introduction

Chapter One

MAKING OVERTURES

Statement of the problem

The complex forms in which racism exists in Canada require new and equally complex means of addressing the production of racism if anti-racist activity is to have any efficacy. The perception of whether racism is a problem, how it should be addressed, and who should be doing the addressing are questions that can appropriately be raised in the context of pre-service teacher education programs. This proposal is concerned with the context and identity formation of pre-service teachers which informs decision-making about whether or how to address racist activity in public education systems. The anti-racist method one chooses ultimately relies on what one considers race and racism to be. More particularly, it also depends on one’s self-perception as a racialized person. In a country like Canada, for example, what is a white teacher’s consciousness of her racialized status? How does her awareness affect her interest in anti-racist work? How does her racialization affect her assumptions about her potential to qualify as a teacher?

I am investigating the process or politics of the inscription of white bodies in the construction of Canadian national identity and the implications of this process for anti-racist pedagogy. Three significant questions follow from this:

1. What are some of the processes by which white identities are inscribed as normative in the construction of Canadian national identity?
2. How are these inscriptions performed in the discourse of white pre-service teachers?

3. What are some of the consequences and effects of these inscriptions for anti-racist pedagogy?

**Elaboration of the problem**

Simply, this study is about improving pedagogy. The study takes seriously the difficulty of teaching and learning about one's complicity in racism, particularly for white subject identities. From my teaching experience in an undergraduate teacher education program in which most of the students are white, I have wondered why attempts to make significant and lasting changes regarding race consciousness have met with various forms of resistance. Anti-oppositional or counter-hegemonic teaching which addresses issues of race, gender, sexuality, class, is by definition, to be teaching against the norm. The range of resistance I have encountered, especially in the uncovering of racism, however, suggests the need for a closer examination of what it is that makes such teaching and learning difficult to accomplish. Certainly, students exhibit a range of reactions to explicit teaching about anti-racist education, including acceptance, rejection, and denial; but most significantly, I have observed the difficulty of making a significant impression on white students regarding the salience of race issues for schooling.

Since these initial observations, I have learned that the issue is not only a problem of my teaching, but that the literature contains studies of other teachers who report the lack of significant or lasting changes among white students following instruction on race issues (Sleeter, 1993; Roman, 1993). Resistance appears most often as denial, a defence delivered by means of fierce debate or a refusal to engage in the issues at all. In my experience, students find it difficult to
question the myth of meritocracy which tells them they have arrived at their level of education by virtue of talent and hard work. It does not strike students as odd that enrollment in teacher education programs is 95% white, nor that white domination of educational institutions is the norm.

The education system in Canada, however, is only one public institution dominated by normative, white personnel and practices. The entrance of these education students in this research into these and other white institutions is made to appear natural as premised on at least three assumptions which also structure this research.

1) Canadian national identity is embodied as a white identification.
2) Whiteness is an identification inscribed as a process of social relations.
3) The inscription of whiteness is implicated in assumptions about the construction of "proper" teaching bodies.

Against an historical presence of Aboriginal Peoples and minority people of colour, assumptions about white skin privilege as the norm in the Canadian context allow whiteness to appear as an invisible, unmarked centre. In spite of the acknowledgement that Canada is also a land of immigrants, it is middle-class, heteronormative, able-bodied, Anglo life—as it is deeply embedded in language and the law—that has sedimented itself as the norm of Canadian identifications. The association that Anglo implies white is not a difficult step to make, as Paul Gilroy (1990) says: "To speak of the British or English people is to speak of the white people" (p. 268). This domination by white English language traditions is especially visible in government, business, and educational affairs. The 'normalcy' of certain practices—some legislated—becomes established and the naturalness of the historically imposed, Anglicized culture is linked to the white, English-speaking construction of the Canadian citizen. In the early days of the
"dominion", Canadian nationalism was not separate from British imperialism (Stanley, 1990).

The astute political reasons which named both French and English as founding cultures in Canada do not change the fact that the white body became the culturally organized site of Canadian nationalism and has come to represent what it is to be defined as a Canadian. The essence of English ways is embodied in whiteness; the white body reads as the semiotic for nationality. It is the white body that, along with some concessions to Native people and some slights of memory, has “always been here” in the nationalist state known as Canada. The political leaders of the country in naming the French and English as founding people did much to structure white bodies as dominant and symbolic of Canadian citizenship and nationality.

Nation formation evolves in particular ways in particular countries and serves a variety of functions including consolidation of individual and collective identities, the desire for naming oneself, and the drawing of boundaries against what one is not. According to Michael Ignatieff’s (1993) explanation of nationalism and the difference between ethnic and civic nationalisms, the state of Canadian citizenship is organized as the latter. In a civic nationalism, the imagined community consists of equal, rights-bearing citizens; an ethnic nationalism is based on “people’s pre-existing ethnic characteristics: their language, religion, customs and traditions” (Ignatieff, p. 4). The rational attachment to one’s nation that does not exist by virtue of common roots, but by law, ostensibly accessible to all, allows individuals to shape their community in accordance with their own needs. But insofar as racial constitution is part of one’s identity and part of what locates us as social subjects, it is part of the criteria for determining “who counts as in and who out” (Goldberg, 1993, p. 83). In spite of the putative differences between civic and ethnic nationalism, however, civic
nationalism ultimately resides in the social relations by which citizens are located in particular and shifting identities of race, class, geography, ethnicity, language of origin, religious group affiliation, sexuality, and so forth. The presumption of equal rights in the rhetoric of civic nationalism, therefore, is constrained and made possible by particular and shifting identities and differential access to power within constitutive social relations and traditions of nationalism.

The part played by education in promoting an ethnic nationalism can be seen in early examples in which imperialism is portrayed in schools as a moral enterprise. The system of white segregated schooling in British Columbia (Stanley, 1990), for example, draws a distinct line between “us” and “them” and sharpens the focus of who may be a citizen. The part played by education in transmitting “appropriate” cultural, civic, and national values is embodied in the person of the teacher whose “mission” of cultural reproduction supports ethnic nationalisms which parallel the imperialist project. There is no small irony in assuming that education, which for so long has served as a colonizing tool, will also be available to work against racism; first by supporting First Nations people in their efforts toward control of their own education; and second, by providing a site for the development of anti-racist pedagogy.

The concept of race is significant in this context of nationalism and public schooling as it interrogates the meaning of political constitution and community; it infers questions about “who is central to the body politic and who peripheral, who is autonomous and who dependent?” (Ignatieff). Ignatieff shows that even with the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms, however, ethnic nationalism prevails with its “pre-existing” characteristics of “language, religion, customs and traditions” (ibid, p. 4). Ignatieff laments that countries with extensive democratic traditions, including Canada, are not impervious to ethnic
nationalist or racist thinking. In this dissertation, therefore, I am not investigating material or statistical evidence in an attempt to show that racism exists in Canada. The under-representation of racialized minority people in the labour force especially in positions of authority, and their over-representation in low waged jobs in spite of qualifications would not be surprising to you. Although few people are unaware that racism exists, many Canadians imagine that it happens in some other community, country, or continent. Racism in Canada, presented as historical-material evidence, is often excused in some way or another; racism is often relegated to enactment by "illiterate louts" of working class origins; or it is excused as something which happens historically, or far away. On-going everyday racism, discursively produced in subtle and not so subtle experiences, is organized in ways which make white privilege seem largely invisible.

Methods vary concerning ways of making changes regarding racial dominance. Diana Meyers (1994) explains some of the difficulty inherent in this project:

...prejudice is not merely a result of individual cognitive malfunction, but ... it is culturally encoded and transmitted through figurations of socially excluded groups, including emblematic characters in stories and myths as well as pictorial imagery. These cultural figurations are exceedingly difficult to dislodge. Both because they enhance the self-esteem of members of the dominant group, and also because they are implicated in the culture's overarching world view, prejudicial figurations are inaccessible to critiques based on impartial reason. (p. 11)

One method of attempting to address the effects of racism assumes the presence of an autonomous, unified subjectivity, one to whom evidence and appeals to reason will be all that is needed to eliminate racism on the part of the individual and collectivity. Other methods examine the long history of immigration or the abuse of racialized minority peoples in Canada as examples of the ways in which hegemonic domination based on race is rationalized, naturalized, justified, codified, and defended. Neither an historical reclamation or an examination of
character types is the precise project of this proposal, however, which looks instead at how the identifications of white pre-service teachers position them in relation to anti-racist training. I am proposing an examination which looks at how identity is formed in the construction of the acting subject.

**Concepts and definitions**

**concepts of race**

Race is a dynamic, historical, and particular set of concepts; it is also context specific and located in a concept of culture that depends on a body of practices or ideologies that are neither finite nor self-sufficient. Omi and Winant say that “race used to be a relatively unproblematic concept” (1993, p. 3). Today, things have changed, and the unproblematic nature of the concept is seriously challenged. Solomos and Back (1994) make the point that work done on determining conceptions of race in the '50s and '60s is inadequate for theorizing the dynamic category of race, especially as political strategies are encoded within the theoretical debates. To illustrate some of the complexity of how the term race may be discussed, I offer some recent ideas of people working in the field.

Among the most precise and strict clarifications of the concept of race is the work of Robert Miles (1989). He traces the origin of the science of race to its early performative function as an explanation of European history and its use in the formation of imperialist nations. The discourse of race has been historically significant in many myths about national origins and as a way to legitimate the designation between self and Other.

Miles clearly outlines the history of failed attempts to locate the origins of race as an empirical fact. He therefore objects to the way in which race, as a socially constructed category is used as if it existed in the realist sense, independent of its construction. The assumption of race as an empirical fact
permits it to be used as the cause and/or effect of racism. Miles maintains that, in this way, racism and race have been conflated in a way that is actually racist. In spite of the latter day rejection of biological distinction among races, a discourse of race continues in common everyday parlance operating as if the scientific basis of race were true. The discourse takes the form of distinctions and negatively attributed characteristics based on the meaning given to signifying somatic features. The process is tautological in which a socially produced difference, race, is legitimated by social discourse about it. The facts of the origin of race are secondary to the meanings given to them and the uses to which they are put. The maintenance of distinctions serves the process of racialization and exclusionary practices and ideology. Race is not an inherently meaningful category except through its relations to power and processes of struggle (Frankenberg, 1993).

However, refraining from employing the term race analytically, as Miles suggests, is problematic when acknowledging the very rootedness of race relations in everyday life. Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1992) appreciate Miles' problematizing of the term race, but suggest that the communal differences that have been constructed cannot so easily be dismissed if we stop using race in our analysis. Asserting that race and racial difference are socially constructed is not to minimize the “real” social and political effects that “difference” makes.

The efficacy of Miles' position, however, becomes clear in anti-racist pedagogy in which, as Anthias and Yuval-Davis point out, “the discourse of racism is collapsed into the discourse of race” (1992, p. 158). The collapse is significant because teaching about racial identity is often confused with teaching about racism as if the one could stand in for the other. A similar conflation in which race is seen as a “problem” occurs in assimilationist and some
multicultural strategies. Over time, discomfort of speaking about race euphemistically elides into discussions about ethnicity and culture—categorizations with which now everyone can identify. The difference that race makes remains, however, along with unacknowledged preferences for certain ethnicities and cultures over others.

James Donald and Ali Rattansi (1993) claim that by continuing to look at the “truth” of certain arguments such as Miles’ and some anti-racist activists, one can “underestimate the resilience, malleability and power of race as a discursive category” (p. 3). A greater problem in describing race is the oversimplification of its complex construction in terms of its economic, social, geographic, and political relations. Though claiming not fully to endorse postmodern strategies and the recognition of endless multiple identities, Donald and Rattansi do approve of a conceptualization of race offered by Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1986) who describe race as “an unstable and ‘decentred’ complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle” (p. 68).

An elucidation of Omi and Winant’s theory of race (1993) may be useful. They describe the concept of race in terms of critical theory and claim that race is neither an ideological construct nor an objective condition. If race is treated as an ideological construct, as Miles claims, the historical construction of race is lost along with the part its construction plays in the shaping of identity. Race as an ideological construct encourages “colour blindness” which allows people to pretend that its material consequences can be ignored along with the way ‘race’ is regularly employed to mark a variety of distinctions. On the other hand, if race is treated as an objective condition, it fails to take account of the processes and relational aspects of race. An objectified approach anticipates race as an a-historical, accomplished fact, unproblematic and unchanging. That problem becomes that: “One simply is one’s race” (Omi and Winant, 1993, p. 6).
Omi and Winant claim that their location of an alternate suggestion in critical theory traverses the narrow path between race as either an illusion or as an objective fact. They propose a "critical, process-oriented theory of race" (Omi and Winant, 1993, p.6) that can be analyzed in terms of contemporary political relationships, in a global context, and across historical time (ibid., p. 7). Omi and Winant clearly locate their argument in the critical theoretical project of modernity and reject a poststructural framework for the elucidation of race theories. They insist on the importance of remaining in real time for a discussion of the real effects of domination. In their view, poststructuralism serves the purposes of domination in its lack of an historical approach to race and its denial that modernist subjugation still defines social relations. Later, Winant (1994) more clearly strikes a position between neo-Marxian viewpoints—in which race is treated as an epiphenomenon of class—and poststructural approaches which he criticizes for an enervating lack of strategy and action. He further elaborates on his racial formation theory whose final element typifies his overall concern for the very pragmatic formation of a radicalized pluralism.

Because Omi and Winant are concerned with poststructuralists who reject any distinction between ideology and truth, the critical theoretical stance of their racial formation theory supports a notion of truth which can operate to mount a critique of that which is not truth. On the other hand, Omi and Winant define racial formation as "an unstable and 'decentred' complex of social meanings

1 Contemporary political relationships of 'race' open up the choices of how 'race' may be conceived and performed. In its political nature the concept of 'race' engenders new alliances beyond the dualisms of "integration versus separatism and assimilation versus nationalism" (Omi & Winant, 1993, p.7). Contemporary political relationships reflect popular culture and new boundaries as well as new types of political domination and new types of resistance.

By the global context of 'race', Omi and Winant refer to "the movement of capital and labour [that] has internationalized all nations, all regions" (ibid., p.7). It refers to the effects of transporting cultural and material influences among and between more groups than ever before. The elision of boundaries marking racial specificity also elides the distinction between people of colour and the mainly unmarked status of whiteness.
constantly being transformed by political struggle” (1986, p. 68). A poststructuralist move is useful, however, because it creates spaces for both the abstract formulations of the ‘decentred’ complex alongside the specific and local parallels of class, race, and gender oppression in particular, historical locations. The tools of poststructuralist debates on race permit more questions to be asked about “how” race happens, how it shows up and what difference it makes, especially across individual and collective identity formation.

It is clear that there is little agreement among theorists on what race signifies and that a general theory cannot be based on the ideological and social contexts which produce the racial/racist effects (Fuss, 1989, p. 92). Theories of race must be wider than descriptions of how racism is enacted, even as they avoid following after essentialist uses routinely employed even by anti-racist workers who falsely presume a unity of their object of inquiry. Rattansi (1994) defends a poststructuralist analysis because it assists in the “decentring and desessentializing of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ that ... makes for a much more fruitful analytical engagement with these processes of flux, contextual transformation and dislocation, and the complex overlapping and cross-cutting of boundaries that characterizes the formation of ethnic and racialized identities” (p. 58-9). This is not to say that definitions of race are not necessary but to recognize, rather, that strict definitions, confounded by the exigencies of individual and collective identities, must be provisional and contingent.

A poststructural frame also assists in the constant deferral of definitions as constituted in language. Language as the “infinitely mobile signifier” (Rattansi, p. 24) is used as a tool of legitimation in which references are already organized in the shape of the dominant discourse. Because the discourse is bounded by what race is permitted to do and be, what can be thought or taught about race closely follows from how it is conceptualized. For example, a multicultural
program in which one simply "is one's race" often underscores the emphasis placed on prejudice reduction and facilitation of group processes. A program which fails to dessentialize and decentre race leaves identities in their same relative positioning as central or marginal to the discourse. Shifting identity formations permit questions to be raised about the invisibility of whiteness and the denial of imperialism that structure and shape the discourse. A poststructuralist response permits questions about the blank place where knowledge should be in discussions of whiteness.

**concepts of whiteness**

Philomena Essed describes white identity or whiteness as the taken-for-grantedness of racial privilege which appears as the unmarked norm and a source of privilege even if one attempts to divest oneself of the privileges accruing. Like all racialized categories, whiteness is an unstable category assumed to be based mainly on skin colour. From time to time it is also dependent on ethnicity, accent, religious affiliation, geographic location, occupation, ability, dress, education, cultural capital, and class. The category of whiteness is an ambivalent, shifting one, combining a multiplicity of identities including gender and sexuality. Although the construction and maintenance of white identity as a cultural norm can be traced through historical and material evidence in its dependence on comparisons between self and other, white identity lacks integrity; and much of it is "contradictory, fragmented, disintegrated, projecting itself onto series of imaginary dramas, narratives, scenarios" (Pajaczkowska & Young, 1992, p. 202).

Reflecting on my own experience, I know that I have learned to be white, to assume the privileges that the dominant group guards for itself, including seeing race as a "non-issue", ignoring it if I choose to; alternately, if I choose, I can

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2 Personal communication, October 3, 1994
take up the “issue” of race—without appearing to be self-serving. At an early stage of planning this dissertation, I first thought the title would be “Learning to be white in Canada”; and although I later abandoned this title, the aspect of learning still seems appropriate with respect to the process of becoming white. This learning process of whiteness as an effect of discourse is not different from, and is, in fact, implicated in, how other social identities are learned such as gender, sexuality, and class. In contrast to notions of a unitary subject, I argue in this thesis that subjectivities are organized by discursive relations in ideologically constructed social contexts. Presumably some identifications are more secure or require more direct intervention than others, for while growing up I was frequently admonished to “act like a lady”; but I never had to be reminded to “act white”, because in my family of origin, “being a lady” was already what it meant to be white, straight, classed, abled, gendered and all the other identifications that were constructed as normative and respectable in that context. In spite of the normative assumptions of how these identities will be performed, however, the precarious nature of subject identifications and the maintenance of differential power relations were and are in constant need of shoring up, of demarcation, and surveillance. Like other identifications, whiteness is not a static quality, an essence, or something one is, but rather a process under constant construction and in continual need of boundaries—and penalties for their transgression.

Talking about whiteness is a slight contradiction of its rules of operation because whiteness exists most successfully under denial of its existence. The assumption is that “other people”, not whites, are the ones who are racialized, who have a racial identification. In that whiteness operates as the normative standard for public and social situations, the tenets usually pass unquestioned, unmarked, and unremarked upon. The invisibility of the normative effects of whiteness obscures the processes of subordination on which whiteness depends;
and discussing whiteness as just another racialized identity hides the privilege of whiteness to mark the referential base line by which other identities are evaluated (Hurtado & Stewart, 1997). In discussions about racial issues and the problems of racism, white people typically avoid talking about whiteness; in the same discussions, however, differences between whiteness and racialized minority status are carefully maintained. Elizabeth Ellsworth (1997) wonders how whiteness can be described or even discussed without reinscribing it. Ellsworth explores an account by C. Carr (1994) who addresses whiteness as "a dynamic of cultural production and interrelation" (p. 260, original emphasis). This refocuses whiteness away from a constituting identity towards whiteness as social relation. She appropriately criticizes much academic work in its concern for naming, defining, and describing whiteness "without recognizing that the definitional process itself is part of the problem of racism" (p. 264).

**whiteness observed**

Dorothy Smith (1990) has been most helpful in showing how social forms of consciousness, particularly "femininity", "can be examined as actual practices, actual activities, taking place in real time, in real places, using definite material means and under definite material conditions" (p. 163). The discursive practices in which activities organize and are organized can be observed as on-going social actions, especially available as textually mediated practices. Although there are some differences, the work of Foucault is significant in understanding the archeology of social relations and the organization of discursive practices especially in regard to the themes and methods of thinking by which categories come to be organized at all. Discursive practices by which whiteness can be observed also include those things which cannot be said, by denials, projections, and movements away from taboo subjects and those things which are unsayable. Because identities are created relationally, the performance of whiteness is
predicated—some would say parasitic (Morrison, 1992; Weis, Proweller, & Centrie, 1997)—upon the discursive and simultaneous production of the other, which may be present in discourse even when it is marked by its absence (Morrison, 1992). The process of colonization, for example, by which whiteness stands in for normative space can only be accomplished by the unspoken presence of First Nations people who are judged as other and perhaps deviant. To examine the material and social conditions on which whiteness relies is to examine unfolding relations constructed dominance (Weis, Proweller, & Centrie, 1997).

**Significance of the research**

I am investigating the racialization of white pre-service teachers and the implications of this process of racialization on their reception of anti-racist pedagogy. The racialization process is formed in the context of Canadian nationalism in which white, heteronormative, able-bodied, middle-class identity is privileged and in which assumptions about meritocracy, property, and insider/outsider status remain unexamined because the unmarked centre reinscribes white identifications as normal and natural. It is one’s investment in and unconscious reliance on a white identity that makes it possible to ignore and deny one’s complicity in the racism that continues in an on-going, systemic fashion, in Canada. Making visible the experience of racism exposes the contradictions and complicity of our nation, but it does not expose the inner workings or logics by which racism is justified and normalized. We know racism exists, but what is less clearly understood are the regimes of power within which racism is produced and becomes effective, and how subjects are produced within racialized identifications so that normalization is a probability—rather, an
eventuality—and, some would say, a necessity, for the construction of domination.

My desire is not to reveal that the student/teachers interviewed have unusually raced approaches and expectations for their futures as teachers. Rather, I wish to indicate their acquisition and performance of “suitable” raced knowledges and assumptions of a self which already conform to expectations of who may be a teacher. These identifications both confirm the students in their roles as teachers and complicate their reception of anti-racist pedagogy. In this dissertation, I struggle to learn how any of us white teachers can become aware of the significance of our own racialized identifications and the implications for our coming to race consciousness. As Christine Sleeter, a white educator involved in anti-racist work among white teachers, cautions: “while I believe whites are educable, I have gained appreciation for the strength of our resistance to change” (1993, p. 168). It is processes for the construction of white selves and the implications for anti-racist pedagogy that I hope to uncover.

Questions and methodological issues

The research will proceed by means of interviews and the application of a discourse analysis to the conversations that emerge. I will later describe in more detail the method I have used which consists of interviewing white, pre-service teachers enrolled in the undergraduate education program at the University of Saskatchewan, specifically students who have completed a compulsory, one-term course in cross-cultural education.

In this research I am looking at how discursive practices are used to organize and inscribe subject positionalities; I am not interested in making definitional claims regarding the participants’ individual identities. Although subjects are created in discourse, I am less interested in examining the specific
subjective positions of the interviewees than in the organization, construction and uses of their discourses. In particular, I am examining how the discourses of white, Canadian, education students constitute their social relations and positionalities which confirm them in their teacher identities. How do discourses construct subject positions which are not equally open to everyone? How are subjects invested in racialized discourses within a racist society?

In spite of the indisputable evidence of racist actions and claims in Canada, it is not the occurrence of racism _per se_ that I am examining. One problem of pursuing a study which evaluates the extent to which certain people are racist has as its underlying assumption that racism is caused by the existence of a distorted representation of reality on the part of the participants—quite unlike a summary of the real facts which exist elsewhere. In claims such as this, the question of correspondence between what is racist and what is not becomes paramount for distinguishing between the distorted and the factual account. Adopting this representational stand or avoiding it has implications for both epistemological and methodological concerns. While a representational account has the benefit of appearing to avoid relativism that often plagues anti-racism efforts, analysis of the account assumes a clear distinction between true and false claims, as well as a divide in the abilities of the analyst and participant to known the difference. A representational account must assume a false consciousness on the part of participants who should know better, as opposed to the clear light of day revealed by scientific fact and the omniscient researcher.

Analysis may also proceed by examining the identities of the participants, their particular characteristics and personalities. This approach assumes that getting a picture of the individual “underneath” the interview will reveal motivation, tendencies towards prejudice and stereotyping, or the likelihood of an authoritarian personality. It is difficult to follow this route, however, without
some recourse to questions raised by representational analysis, such as the extent to which stereotypes may be "true" and the discovery of whether a participant may have some justification for holding a prejudiced view. Examining the individual identities of the participants requires an epistemological basis which adjudicates the morals and value judgements of the participants, a basis which would exonerate some participants while casting others to the realm of morally degenerate individuals.

Another approach for analyzing racialized discourse is to consider the social context of the participants as well as that of the interviews themselves. Indeed, it is impossible to do an analysis of racialized discourse without a social theory and without considering the social, historical, economic and material conditions of the participants and their contexts. This approach, which considers social contexts, is to be distinguished from psychological and individual approaches in more than simply the formation of the sample group size as either one or many. It is not an improvement to read social action as a function of psychological processes writ large as either affecting large groups of individuals rather than singular ones or by assuming that social behaviour can ultimately be traced to the influence of the psychological. Neither is it an improvement to assume that social contexts are determinate as some psychological structures are assumed to be. While it is important to consider the effects of social context, it is also important to note that social relations are neither "already in place" (Wetherell & Potter, p. 60), nor determinate in the constructions of participants' ideologies, histories, classes, races, genders. Another consequence is an essentialist notion of social and individual identity formation, that is, with social positioning as determinate as biology was latterly assumed to be. Even though participants' social positionings which permit them access to certain discourses is one area of investigation, it is not the particular social contexts of the participants
that I am investigating. I would rather investigate what the participants' claims reveal about their locations and about the legitimations, justifications, and rationalizations which support their positionings. These claims are not produced by the participants only, in their own subject locations; the claims also "belong" to the discursive practices of what is sayable in participants' social, material, historical contexts to which they have access. While participants are constituted in and through discourses, they are not without agency and are also "productive" of discourses as they "use" them. In these discursive practices, I am not assuming that participants' language is transparent, but that it is productive of and produced by social relations, including participants own histories and those of the nation.

The racialized constructions of subjects' identities are not only illustrated in discourse: the constructions are an effect of discourse. Language and discourse are used by the subjects to justify, sustain and legitimate those practices which maintain them in their relative positions of power and dominance as white, prospective teachers (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Language is not understood as an abstract system of signs separable from usage or context, but as specifically located discourse—performative and in action. Participant interviews are understood as performative speech acts which testify to their whiteness—this dissertation being a witnesses to their conscious and unconscious testimonies. It is also important to say that while identity construction is not an effect of language only, and that while material conditions and consequences, social organization, actions are also significant, it is discourse analysis for the performance of identities that I am examining. This research is not to be understood as a content analysis by which I might attempt to spot the racist remark or impute the racist motive. I am not looking for the construction of racism per se, nor am I analyzing functions such as what the subjects do or don't do according to what they say. For one thing,
their activities are not directly available to me for study. I am examining participant discourse for the processes by which white identifications are produced as signifying practices and for the trace of otherness which undermines and necessitates the production of whiteness. I am also examining the discourse to discover the practical reasoning about race by which white subjects "maintain asymmetrical power relations between the majority and minority groups" (Wetherell & Potter, 1988, p. 173), in effect, for how the white students establish and maintain their racialized supremacy. The discourse rationalizes and naturalizes the socially produced identifications of white subjects in relation to racialized minority groups; it confirms the status quo in which white identity is performed as dominant.

Questions of analysis

Interview material will be subjected to a discourse analysis following the work of Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter (1987, 1988, 1992, 1994) and others (Potter, Wetherell, Gill, & Edwards, 1990; Potter, Edwards, Wetherell, 1993; Belsey, 1980, 1994; Morrison, 1992). The work of Wetherell and Potter highlights the ways in which subjectivity, identity, and group affiliation are "defined, constructed and articulated through discourse" (1992, p. 59). Because racist claims are constitutive of the norms of discourse, this study is not simply a case of looking for these claims as "evidence" of racism. Instead, it is important to look at ideological assumptions that are permitted in the construction of social groups and subjectivities and, as Wetherell and Potter suggest, to look "at the relationship between power and discourse" in the interviews and conversations I conduct.

Discourse analysis, according to Wetherell and Potter, involves a double movement between what is "established" and what is "constituted". These are
not precisely separate from each other’s influence but their examination reveals how what is considered “real” and available for categorization in the social world informs one’s power to be seen as a credible witness: a power which is established by the participants in the process of the interviews. In this way, the work draws on both conversation analysis and ethnomethodologies. Whereas discourse is generally analyzed as a social practice in which the sense of talk and text are derived from their situated use and not merely from some abstract meaning or organization, similarly, the use to which the discourse is put is situationally specific, that is, the use is constituent of “the implementation of those discourses in actual settings” (p. 90). Therefore, because the discourse I am analyzing takes place in a specific context, I attend to social, material and historical processes by which the discourse is informed and constituted.

Wetherell and Potter (1992) employ the term “interpretive repertoire” to describe a way of understanding “the content of discourse and how that content is organized” (p. 90). Although grammatical and stylistic uses are also studied, the focus here is on the language, how it is used, what it achieves, and the nature of conversational construction which allows these achievements. Use of interpretive repertoires allows the double reading of the participants as constituted in discourse and of the ideological work that the discourse is performing. Interpretive repertoires permit an examination of the ways in which concepts such as “teacher”, “white”, “race”, “culture”, “nation” are mobilized as well as attending “to their construction and ‘rhetorical organization’” (p. 93). This is the double movement between what is considered “real” and how this facticity or “realness” constitutes ideological and social positions as well as power relations. I am not analyzing the discourses as either an “authentic”, or “inauthentic” portrayal of reality, but as a system of ideological representations which can be produced in that setting. The interviews, as pieces of popular
discourse, can be read for what participants claim to be true. The way the claims are made to be factual performs the "constitutive" aspect of the discourse, that is, the persuasive and rhetorical power to be believed that is generated in the process.

Wetherell and Potter point out that language is neither merely a mechanical device whereby a referential term can be considered to "construct" an object; nor is language fully transparent in a way which makes version of accounts "seem literal and not versions at all" (p. 95). Rather "realism is something that is achieved" (p. 95); versions being warranted through a variety of techniques that are found in everyday conversational discourse. As well as warranting versions of "reality", discursive accounts can be seen not only to warrant claims for something, but also against alternative claims. The analysis in this study pays attention to the way particular versions and claims are designed, as against an "absent Other". Toni Morrison (1992), in her discourse analysis of American literature, describes a similar de/formation of claims which constitute the sense of what is possible and right as assumed by the persona of white characters. The words and images are spoken against what the main characters in American literature are not: the not free and the not white. How discourse is used in this research study of identity construction will not be of more interest than discovering how identity of the other is also constructed, especially considering how identities are relationally, and in some cases—parasitically, constituted.

While this research cannot help reveal something of the individual participants, I primarily intend to investigate the ideological work accomplished by the discourses in which they are located and which they use. Although these two processes are by no means separate, the former tells something of participant identity construction, while the ideological work accomplished by the discourse
reveals some of the processes by which categories are organized and identifications legitimated.

The interpretive repertoires which are identified in discourse analysis and which are used to sustain different social practices are constructed out of a range of various rhetorical features, stylistic devices, and linguistic resources. These are the everyday processes by which claims in speech and writing are made warrantable. Speakers and writers use these detailed procedures to construct their versions and make them appear factual. To some extent, the difference between interpretive repertoires and the rhetorical devices by which they are constructed is an artificial distinction. Some of the means by which versions are made persuasive are also part of the interpretive repertoires used by the community of speakers. A speaker is not necessarily aware of using certain repertoires or the devices used to sustain the repertoires especially in incidents when there may be powerful constraints against the discourse that is being used. A tension exists to the extent that people are active users of discourse and that discourse also generates, enables and constrains its speakers. The use of interpretive repertoires, as described by Wetherell and Potter (1990) is that it provides a method of observing the construction of ideological frames of reference. It is a way of observing warranting procedures which make issues of ideology and exploitation "plausible or that 'fix' them as unproblematically factual" (p. 212). In these repertoires can be seen some of the ways in which people's discourse is organized in the conduct of social actions.

By what discursive processes are speakers' reports and descriptions constituted as factual? From this research, participant interviews yield a list of rhetorical devices frequently used. Subjects' reports are displayed as factual, true, or "right minded": they are concerned to present themselves favourably and their actions as normative. They accomplish this by a variety of discursive
devices which create exclusive categories for themselves and prevent confusion of the participants with any racist white folk. One device for accomplishing these reports as factual is the adoption of either a minority or a majority position. For example, one participant says that she is not prejudiced because, unlike most people, she hasn’t had any contact with Natives. Another participant discredits the professor of the class and says that most of the other students in the class felt the same way. In the first example, innocence and correctitude are implied through the participant’s differently located minority position. In the second example, the assumption is that the majority must be correct.

Another device is the rhetorically self-sufficient statement that cannot easily be questioned or debated and which has about it the patina of common sense with which “everybody” agrees. Rhetorically self-sufficient statements also serve other purposes: making statements about individuals and human nature—“that’s just what they’re like”; making epistemological statements—“I know there’s unfairness in the world and each person just has to deal with it”. Also included are a variety of claims which allow a speaker to make significant contrasts between self and other, to reference outside discourses as proof, to use historical events as evidence, to use extremism and moderation to show oneself as reasonable. Many other devices found in everyday conversations are available for the construction of interpretive repertoires: contradictions, metaphors, repetitions, disclaimers, details, figures of speech, and so forth. These devices are some of the means by which reports or descriptions given by participants are to be taken as factual accounts.

The method of discourse analysis in this research assumes that action is performed through discourse. The research examines the action performed by the discourse rather than inquiring into what can be known about participants’ cognition or behaviour. Because the action is on the discourse and not on any
putative correspondence between what a participant might say and what she might think or do, contradictions and variations within and among discourses are not a problem to be reconciled or explained. The point is not to resolve the variations, but to see what use is made of the differences. For example, how does a speaker’s knowledge of contradictions allow her to construct herself as an exception to the conversational and behavioural rules in which she participates? The interviews, as discourses, are available for examination for internal consistencies and, in spite of themselves, for incoherences, omissions, absences. In the contradictions and slippages found in the diverse topics of the text, the ideology and the unconscious of the text become apparent and available for reading and intelligibility.

The rhetorical devices I have been describing are only some of the means by which reports or descriptions given by participants are organized to be taken as factual accounts. Some of the action accomplished by these devices are as follows (Wetherell and Potter, 1993): 1) the participant provides credentials which entitle her/him to be held accountable, 2) alternatives accounts that are not spoken are undermined, 3) further questions are forestalled, 4) the participant is instantiated as a qualified, credible, non-racist speaker.

**Interview participants: Who are they?**

The main question of how white identity is inscribed and implicated in the formation of teacher identity can most directly be addressed in a qualitative study consisting of interviews and document searches. I conducted twenty-one interviews with students enrolled in an undergraduate program in teacher education. All students have completed a compulsory, one-term course in cross-cultural education. The University of Saskatchewan is a significant site for conducting this research because of the highly visible presence of First Nations
peoples, and their impact on the College of Education. In this context, in spite of the presence of many visible minorities, the term "cross-cultural" is generally interpreted as a First Nations/white encounter. It is in the acknowledgement of a First Nations presence in all aspects of the education system that a particular "cross-cultural" course is a graduation requirement for students in the teacher education program. Because the main focus of my study is on racialized identity formation in white students, my decision to interview students involved in courses listed as cross-cultural instead of anti-racist may seem at odds with this express interest in racialized identities. The fact that anti-racist courses are unavailable or not officially named on this site, and that race oppression is generally treated as a cultural issue is already to frame what can be allowed in the way of explanations and solutions for race-related issues at this university.

Even though I am interviewing only those students who have taken a certain compulsory, cross-cultural course, I am not suggesting a causal link between the course and various forms of race consciousness among students. The course which was completed between six months and two years before the interviews were conducted is, however, a common factor in each of the student histories. It presumes some common language and a reference point for addressing students as I begin an analysis of racialized identifications. Note that I am not investigating "what happened" in the course or in any way attempting to reconstruct or evaluate the events of the course. My interest is in the discourse of the teacher-education students and their performance as white pre-service teachers. The performance of these identities draws attention to their assumptions about teaching and their conceptions of themselves as suitable candidates.
Details concerning the material reality of the participants' lives was expertly provided in the remarks of Professor Sonia Morris\(^3\) in her capacity as Assistant Dean of Student Affairs at the University of Saskatchewan; from her in-depth knowledge of student populations, she commented generally on statistical details concerning students enrolled in the program from whom the particular research participants were selected. The participants are drawn from a cohort of students for whom a career in education is typically an upwardly mobile move. Most are from schools situated in lower socio-economic parts of the city and province. Their entrance into the professions is often from working class origins; most are already educated beyond the levels of formal education reached by their parents. Most participants are second or third generation Canadians and consider themselves to be white-identified. A gender comparison of all students in the program shows that female students are the majority; in comparing entrance averages, female students score higher than males. Among white-identified students, an a-typical education student is male, from an upper middle class background or higher, above average entrance marks, and from a long-established, well educated family. Although these a-typical students may be present, they are more often found in other disciplines of study and professional schools. The typical education student is a white female with above average entrance marks, from a lower socio-economic status, from a non-professional family. She may be from a rural or urban area. For many students, previous experience with children includes teaching Sunday school, church camps, and summer activity programs.

The research participants are in what is known as the post-academic program which requires them to have at least three years of university training; in this research group, all but one have a bachelor's degree. Subjects' ages range

\(^3\) Personal interview, June 20, 1996, University of Saskatchewan.
from twenty-one to forty-five years. The median age is twenty-five and the mean, twenty-nine. Of the eighteen interviews I eventually analyzed, all participants claim European cultural or ethnic origins; more than half name a cultural origin that does not include Anglo ethnicity. This doesn’t mean Anglo ethnicity is absent, but only unnamed. Four participants are male and fourteen are female.

I have not attempted to place many restrictions on the membership of this research group such as the grades or courses they hope to teach, their ages, life experiences, economic status, gender, etc. The main criteria necessary to this study are that participants are white-identified, Canadian, pre-service teachers. I conducted semi-structured interviews with twenty-one students who volunteered after being contacted by letter and a following telephone call. Students were given the option of being interviewed either in person or on the telephone. Only three people chose in-person interviews. Even though the research process invariably affects the response of the participants, I consider telephone interviews to be a satisfactory method of gathering information for this study. The faceless anonymity offers as much opportunity for personal remarks as do face-to-face encounters, especially considering the lack of a personal relationship between the interviewer and participant. Telephone interviews particularly suit the discourse analysis I employ as methodology in which the focus is on participants’ transcripts. Regarding the three interviews I conducted in person, I experienced not inconsiderable difficulty analyzing their discourses apart from the impressions made on me by their physical presentations. The meaning I made of one particular transcript changed considerably as the information I read from the participants body faded from my memory. Initially, I unconsciously “read” the participant’s demeanor as someone who is very sympathetic and supportive of Native issues. As time passed, the
words of the transcript became more sharply focused and I began to see them apart from the participant’s racialized body.

One complicating factor arises from the use of telephone interviews, however, in that the research design involves only white identified participants. To that end, I asked participants to name with which cultural, racial, or ethnic group they identified. Although I did not ask any participants directly whether they were white-identified, three participants indicated that they did not consider themselves in this category. Two identified as Cree and one as Mestizo and Hispanic. At first I wondered what assumptions I could make about whether the remaining participants were white-identified. Even though a dominant group prerogative is to remain unnamed, the practice is not exclusive; and just because the participants didn’t say they were white doesn’t mean they were. Neither are all their claims of European ancestry (Ukrainian, German, Scottish, etc.), Canadian citizenship, and birth in small town Saskatchewan certain proof of white identification. What eventually satisfied me that those remaining eighteen participants interviewed on the phone and in person were white identified—or took for granted their racial privilege (Essed)—is the way they spoke of racialized minorities and First Nations people. Racialized groups are singled out as others and individually named for their otherness; or racialized minorities are referred to as a fairly homogeneous group whose otherness does not include the participants, but whose presence provides an identity capable of holding up the other side of the “us” and “them” dichotomy. While this doesn’t guarantee that participants have white skin, it is their performance of dominant identifications that I observed among research participants whose interviews I included for analysis.

In this research of discourse analysis, I do not name the research participants individually; this is because I am examining the social construction
of white dominance and the pattern of interpretive repertoires which the participants are drawing on. On the other hand, I am very concerned to represent the words of the participants in a way which neither vilifies nor valourizes them, nor treats their words as if they are all the same and speak with one voice. The writing of Spivak and many others (Mohanty, Russo, & Torres, 1991) concerned with research ethics and representation is helpful here. Their writing warns about the pitfalls of colonizing "Third World" narrators and the dilemmas that occur in how voices may be "used". One problem is the fundamental taken-for-grantedness of "First World" theorising about a (non-existent) unified, autonomous subject; a second problem is the assumption that whiteness itself can remain unexamined. The same error can be perpetuated, even when all the participants are white and whiteness is under study, by assuming that subject identities occur in a vacuum and that their whiteness is so well known a category that no other light escapes from under its blanket coverage. Even though I am analyzing the discourse of people in positions of relative dominance in this country, I still have an ethical responsibility to represent them in as varied and nuanced a way as possible, as required both by good research practice and in order to be credible about the difficulty of coming to terms with race privilege. Without a nuanced representation of participant discourses, it would be easy and misleading to conclude that the participants are a monolithic group of inveterate racists on whom anti-racist work might be wasted anyway. A closer examination reveals that participants are not dominant in all their identifications, and one place for observing how domination works is at the edges of its authority. It is the subtle, often contradictory, positioning of participant identities that gives some indication of why anti-racist work is difficult, and at the same time, possible.
One final point about research participants is that throughout the analysis, I refer to them as "subjects". Even though this title appears to objectify the participants in the machinations of the research, I think the purpose of this naming justifies an otherwise de-humanizing process. In referring to participants as "subjects" I intend to call to mind the performance of their subjective identifications. As this performance is the focus of the research, I intend this naming as a way to respect their presentations of selves—as having agency and acting as subjects on their own behalf. Also, I wish to avoid a consideration of the participants in a way which allows their discourses to be attributed to very precisely configured persons at a particular time and place, thereby allowing readers to imagine that the remarks are the consequence of peculiar or extreme social situations. In addition, I wish to avoid any suggestions that participants' individualized experiences are the "cause" of their identification processes, and that participant discourses are other than what can be commonly heard as everyday practices among the social relations of white identified readers. More than simply being protective about how the participants are perceived, however, I believe it is their utter lack of exceptionality in the context of Canadian social relations that is most compelling in this research.

The researcher

In my role as researcher, I am well positioned to conduct interviews with these informants at this site. My personal history as a white, pre-service teacher is culturally and geographically similar to those students I interview; I have also conducted courses dealing with anti-oppression education, including anti-racist pedagogy, at the University of Saskatchewan. My familiarity with the community, both inside and outside the University, has facilitated my access to resources and interview participants. I have consistently drawn on my
experiences as a teacher and student in this community to design the study and to perform a discourse analysis on the interviews. I am also aware of some of the potential hazards of a researcher’s familiarity with her participants which can lead a researcher to assume a greater knowledge about her participants and their responses than is warranted. For example, while analyzing a transcript from a particular telephone interview, I realized that the participant had made several contradictory, tentative, perhaps racist, and nearly incomprehensible statements. The potentially racist nature of the remarks is especially surprising because I did not remember her words sounding that way in conversation. Nor did it seem necessary at the time to ask her for clarification. I suspect that the presumption of shared understanding contributed to the oblique entre nous nature of her remarks and to my unquestioning silence. On reading the transcript, I wonder:

What did she think she was saying? What did she want me to understand? What do I think she said? What was it that I heard? Whatever the answers, I received her tentative testimony with a presumed familiarity that, at the time, made clarification seem unnecessary.

I am sympathetic to the task that lies ahead of these participants as they begin their teaching careers and experience the challenges to their identities that anti-racist programming raises. On the other hand, I am dismayed by the racist things some of them say; and, taken individually, I don’t always like all of them. I want to paint them in lurid colours that, while often inappropriate, would allow me to distance myself from them and vent my annoyance at their racial assumptions. And this is perhaps where the learning begins. Why does their intolerance, at the least, interest me, and moreover, provoke my anger?

Part of the answer to why participant intolerance interests me lies in my being complicit in the belief system that makes their racist remarks sayable. I have been present when the same remarks are made by others. I know the codes.
I hold them myself. Their remarks expose some parts of me I would prefer not to see, that are not useful in this society, and that would be better left unsaid, unthought, unheard of. The positionings of the participants and me are not different. I also understand that ignorance is an act of resistance against knowledge of myself and others which I have been unable or unwilling to admit to consciousness (Felman, 1987). In this topic I hope to uncover some of those understandings which, up to now and including this research, I have a “desire to ignore” (p. 79). While this research is ostensibly about the process of subjects’ domination, it cannot help witness to my own positioning in this regard.

In the pages which follow, I describe the conditions for including information about my own positionality and involvement in this topic; this is a process which always matters in research projects and perhaps especially in one which investigates identity construction. I have included personal information throughout the rest of the dissertation where it seems most relevant and therefore what follows is not a confessional, but rather a consideration of the uses of self-disclosure and the ends which it might serve. My being white, straight, female, able-bodied, educated, of working class history all affect how I address this topic and conduct the research. Because I know that being white, and being seen as white, matters, I deliberately declared my white identification, among the other details I shared with participants, at the beginning of the telephone interviews. Because the position of the researcher matters throughout the entire research process, I elaborate on some of the effects of my whiteness for this research.

Frankenberg (1996) acknowledges that in white people’s efforts to provide narratives with as much detail as possible about ourselves and our complicity with whiteness, we almost invariably call upon the narrative of the other to tell-all, to secure our “clean slate”, to organize ourselves as “innocent”. No matter
how in-depth the narrative, however, the struggle to come to consciousness of white positioning invariably returns to this conclusion:

I have been performing whiteness, and having whiteness performed upon me, since before the day I was born. (p. 15)

Being dominant influences what and how we know; it also permits us to ignore the effects of domination if we choose. Frankenberg (1996) reminds me that uncovering whiteness is a lived experience. I have also observed that although theorizing is very helpful, learning about the process of racialization is dependent upon body knowledge that goes before and after theory as illustrated to me in the example of the “in-person” interviews.

Writing about whiteness has some of the same hazards inherent in the investigation of the bourgeois subjects which is the focus of much of this research. Stoler (1995) says that the bourgeois subject has often been treated as if it were something apart from the construction of empire and apart from the mechanics of the subject’s constitution. In some accounts, the complicity of the researcher, like that of the participants, can become transparent and not seen as an effect of the discourse. I am aware of the politics of taking up the issues of whiteness in the midst of a discussion that purports to address racism. Whiteness, like the liberal notion of the individual, can appear as an abstraction, an objective, non-involved positioning. On the other hand, the very real possibility of recentring whiteness calls into question how I position myself as researcher because, as I have said, in many ways I am not unlike the participants I have interviewed. In struggling to come to terms with my self-presentation in this research, I once related to a friend\(^4\) that my writing sounded as if it was untouched by human hands. I was extremely conscious of not wanting to be in the way of the work even though I know this is impossible as the writer always

\(^4\) Verna St.Denis
shows through even in her reluctance to affect the outcome. I told my friend of the numerous feminist conferences and events I have attended where protests are waged by racialized minority women who declare that the event does not include them, in spite of the "best efforts" of the white organizers. These protests and interventions have been very significant for me because they have made me realize how white my vision is and that, at the time of the protests, I really didn't understand what it was that these women said I didn't understand. I only knew enough to believe them when they said I didn't get it. How profoundly this is true is what I continue to unravel.

This is not some attempt to align myself with innocence through ignorance, because, in some ways at least, I am not ignorant. I have benefitted by reading and listening to what racialized minorities have said including many scathing critiques of white women inserting themselves and their standards as if they were the only possibilities. Neither is my attention engaged, however, in a reverse kind of valourization of minority women in which they as Native informants have the only truth and I am the anthropological onlooker. I know that dropping of critical faculties is equally unhelpful and, in fact, reinforcing of differences.

In learning from others, I have reflected on those experiences in my life when I am not the dominant identity. Those times of being non-dominant are perhaps few compared to many people, but the experiences are memorable. I think it is the memory of these experiences that has been useful to me in, first of all, coming to some growing understanding of the many ways that being a racialized majority isn't like being a racialized minority considering the significance of race in the society in which I live. Second, I am more and less aware of the multiple social identities which constitute my performance of self; I am occasionally aware of what it is to be fragmented, to be off-centre, to study
what passes for normal behaviour and to find myself being judged below
standard. I could describe the particular circumstances of my life where I have
been off-centre, but I wonder what use it would serve. Are the details as
significant as what I learned from them? Does anybody really need to hear the
life-story of yet one more white woman told for the purpose of "coming clean"
by revealing all? I am well aware of how the narratives of white people in regard
to racialization end up being about them. So what is to be served by going on
about this?

The first reason for being present on the page and describing something of
myself is that to do otherwise is to hide behind authorial obscurity and scholarly
privilege, codes which imply that only the intellect was used in this process and
not an embodied (white) self. The second reason is what my friend reminded me
of: that my point of view is already written all over this research and to pretend
it is untouched by human hands belies the personal experiences that have
influenced the conclusions. Leaving myself out might ignore some facts of
whiteness but it does secure an unmarked white point of view. Hurtada and
Stewart (1996) offer this:

The unintended outcomes of these studies on whiteness are the revelations of
the researchers themselves, thus making the results multilayered—that is, they
tell us more than the authors intended and more than the respondents knew
they were revealing. (p. 299)

Concerning the hazards of self-revelation versus the precarious nature of
acknowledging one's positioning, Spivak's (1994) quote of Derrida is apt: "we
must continue to know, and to make known, 'which is the least grave of these
forms of complicity'" (p. 25). To learn more about the construction of white
identifications, I have included parts of my own story in the dissertation in ways
that I hope will be supportive of the data and not distracting. Even if I try to
pretend that I have allowed the data to speak for themselves, I must
acknowledge that as an interested researcher, I have chosen what will be read aloud.

A final reminder of the danger of ignoring the significance of one’s identity was clarified for me at a summer institute I attended in 1996\(^5\). Professor Leroy Little Bear spoke about the blank spaces of people who do not know their own identity or culture, who cannot name themselves with any meaningful insight about the context and relevance of their attachment to the earth, to other people, and to the work they do. Concerning the self-knowledge of white people, Lee Maracle (1996) says “I am less concerned about your distortion of my [Native] history than your inability to hang on to your own” (p. 76). Leroy Little Bear explains that this lack of historical depth among white identified people is one of the most difficult aspects of Aboriginal people when negotiating with the dominant culture for respect and recognition. Homi Bhabha (1994, p. 5) also speaks of this: that the identity of the white Western male as the generic person is created as natural, normal, timeless—in relation to and with the dismissal of the identifications of all others such as women, racialized minorities, colonized peoples, all those who become dehistoricized and nameless in relation to the centre. The invisible power invested in this male figure normalizes the dominant identification and renders it unavailable for examination as anything other than the absent centre.

Professor Leroy Little Bear compares this inability to name one’s identity to the experience of playing hockey with players who were not very skilled. In a fast paced game, they lack the expertise to know where they are going and what moves they will make. Injuries are more likely to develop in a game against inexpert players than when playing with skilled opponents. He wishes that the

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\(^5\) SSHRC International Summer Institute, *Cultural restoration of oppressed indigenous peoples*, University of Saskatchewan, June 26 to July 6, 1996.
blank spaces, like the inexpert players, would learn something of themselves and the rules of engagement so that they would be able to negotiate without the arbitrariness and unpredictability of ones who may not even understand the purpose of the game. Professor Little Bear wished the others with whom Aboriginal people had to negotiate would gain some appreciation of their own origins and attachments to the earth so that the negotiations in which his people participated would be with informed, expert players.

This research is an attempt to name some of the processes by which social relations of white, pre-service teachers perform them as a generic identity. I address questions of how access to teacher identities are already in place and how the participants perform these social relations in accordance with their own desires. I think understanding the processes of dominant identity construction is part of doing one’s homework, getting up to speed, learning how the rules of engagement are already in process, and how to stop lurching from one arbitrary position to another. Surely this privilege of ad hoc rule making is hazardous for everyone. As Hurtado (1996) says, “privilege has the semblance of naturalness that defends itself from scrutiny” (p. 158); this work is an attempt to “problematize ‘the natural’ in white teacher identifications. The arbitrariness that structures racial domination also occurs to Frankenberg (1996) who describes her conviction to do anti-racist work by examining the conditions of whiteness: she says simply “things do not need to be this way” (p. 15, original emphasis). These words resonate with me at some basic levels, and I hope that this research joins with that of others to “point out the contradiction[s]” (Ellsworth, 1997, p. 264) in at least some of the ad hoc, arbitrary, long-established processes for how whiteness “works”.

To conclude

In this chapter, I have outlined my intention to investigate the racialized identifications of white pre-service teachers. These identities draw attention to their assumptions about teaching and their conceptions of themselves as teachers. I examine how participant discourse is used to legitimate, justify, and rationalize the participants in their raced, gendered, classed, sexually oriented, abled positions as teachers-in-training. Taking into account the locations of the speakers, this study is an examination of how discursive practices produce otherness and whiteness in this Canadian context.

The investigations of the claims that students make suggest some aspects of how the sense of a racialized self is considered, organized, permitted, and constituted. It is the investigation of what the students regard as true that reveals something of the social constructs with which their identities are implicated and produced. In this regard, accounts of “the social” are a topic for analysis rather than the resource through which the nature of the social is discovered. The participant accounts are performative aspects of society organized in discourse. This distinction helps to avoid common sense a priori notions of what society is, teachers are, and the assumption that Canadianness “happens”. In this examination of racialized subjectivities, I am interested in how discourse functions in the performances of participants’ racialized selves. What selves do these constructions permit? What do they prevent? On what are they dependent? What are the discursive means of operation by which racialized selves and others are produced?

The dissertation is divided into four sections of which this introduction is the first. The second section provides the theoretical context of the social, historical, and psychoanalytic fields in which the research is situated. I argue that discourses employed by participants are not exceptional, but productive of their
social relations and the identifications which appear as normative. Section three analyzes the data of research interviews according to a "domain of recognitions" described by Foucault. Participants present themselves at various times as agents, objects, and ethical subjects in their discourses which I analyze as performative speech acts. An analysis of their numerous desires as found in the discourses—for legitimacy, innocence, goodness, and the other—frames the discussion. The concluding chapter problematizes the development of ant-racist work considering participants' intense desires to establish themselves as not-other and instead to secure identifications as knowing and known subjectivities.
Part Two: Theoretical Perspectives

Chapter Two

SUBJECTIVITY AND SOCIAL FORMATION

A variety of strategies are available for analyzing race relations including some I have already mentioned: race as ideology, race as social construction. Other strategies include historical-material, a Marxian analysis, a critical theoretical model, feminist analysis, deconstructionist, and others. Although in scholarship on race relations, no single method is generally used to the exclusion of others, I discuss in the following section why and how psychoanalytic theory will be useful in the larger project that I have set out to research: the inscription of racialized identity and the construction of whiteness in the process of nation formation.

This section supports claims for a fragmented subject identity as both a social and national formation. In particular, the work of Lacan provides insight into the notion of the split self and the non-autonomous, always connected, always desiring subject. I also use the work of Foucault to emphasize the understanding of the self as a socially and materially organized construction. Both theorists support the notion of the performative aspect of the self which I employ throughout the methodology of this research. The theorizing of Lacan and Foucault makes possible the investigation of racialized identity at the level of construction as identity is situated and operative in both the unconscious and the social.
The uses of Lacan and Foucault are not unproblematic for these purposes as indicated by feminist and race theorists. To this end, I employ the work of Judith Butler and Ann Stoler to discuss these limitations and to comment on the possibilities and compatibility of the work of Lacan and Foucault when used in tandem. Using psychoanalytic and poststructural theorizing in the work of Butler, I argue that sex is neither determinate nor essentialist in identity formation and that race is inseparable from sex. I also describe the desire for a coherent identity and the continual necessity of disavowing the other in the performance of the (im)possible coherence. The chapter closes with a story of the unsettling effect of this impossible coherence and the mis/recognition of one’s inability to know not only the other, but also the self.

**Why use psychoanalytic theory?**

Two major reasons obtain, one structural and the other functional, for using psychoanalytic theory in the investigation of identity formation. First, the theorizing easily engages the poststructuralist frame with which I examine the nature of identities and processes of identifications. It supports the explanation of a number of the contradictions that appear as features of a non-unitary subject which provides insight into questions of difference with regard to sexuality, class, gender, and race. Support for the non-unitary subject contrasts with the modernist figure participating in the liberal, humanist discourse on freedom, rationality, and self-determination. This world of consistent subjects is a necessary fiction for the production of knowledge as fixed meaning and truth. The presumption of a coherent, knowing subjectivity is regularly used in the ideological production of what is reliable, testable, and predictable. In Western thinking, this available and knowable subjectivity is a common trope on which progress, control and the notion of perfectibility can be based. These assumptions,
which are perhaps prevalent in no field of study more than in educational studies, apply to both the subject and the Western society in which the subject is found. The link between power and knowledge which Foucault (1980) describes at length, is useful in the study of how Western domination is organized.

Psychoanalytic thought displaces the centred, rational subject with a decentred subject “whose unconscious desires ... constantly disrupt the conscious logic of intention and rationality” (Rattansi, 1994). The former rational subject is displaced by a subjectivity that is acknowledged to be neither entirely knowable nor autonomous. Unconscious desires and processes which tend toward coherence allow for considerable play of fantasy in the formation of identities and the operation of subjectivities. Attempts towards a coherent, knowable self are constantly enacted through narratives as representations and in which the impossibility of coherence can be read in the anxiety and slippage created around the failure to be a secure subject. Psychoanalytic theorizing supports the argument of a fragmented subjectivity in which identities are continually and contingently reiterated and materialized. For example, part of this research project in identity formation examines the gaze of the other and the dissembling that is at stake when the other looks back. For various subjects in this research, the instability created by the presence of the other is very deep. And, in psychoanalytic terms, the presence of the other is both necessary and threatening in the construction of the self.

Psychoanalytic theorizing contributes to thinking about expressions of race without having to establish a counter figure to traditional understandings; that is, it need not reimpose or debate notions of “real” categories such as race or attempt to discover the basis on which one’s reaction might be considered “reasonable” compared to some external correspondence. The debate is moved instead to questions of how subjective and external structures are mutually
implicated in the construction of identities and representations. The resilience of categorical definitions points to the investment in maintaining boundaries between self and other. And in case the Other reflected back is not different enough, conscious and unconscious structures are available to re-establish categorical assumptions.

A functional reason for using psychoanalytic theory is its prevalence in the field of critical race analysis particularly in the work of Homi Bhabha whose difficult, but rewarding, poststructuralist writings would be rendered nearly impossible without an understanding of at least some psychoanalytic theory. By this work, we come to a better understanding of the nation as constantly and incompletely articulating itself.

It is the visionary work of Frantz Fanon that Bhabha (1990a) and others (Pajaczkowska & Young, 1992; Rattansi, 1994; Said, 1993; Brah, 1992) credit with elaborating the significance of psychoanalytic theory to the study of the transaction between the psychic and the social in regard to race. For example, Fanon's analysis of colonial identity calls into question that which we think of as transparent in social reality, including what can be considered as human knowledge. Fanon relies on psychoanalytic theory to critique the assumption that reality is transparent by means of rationality and empirical disciplines, connected as they are in a linear way from the self to the external world. Fanon's psychoanalytic perspective indicates that racism is not merely an individual pathology nor simply a social event reflective of individual alienation. Fanon resists notions of cultural cohesion and historical rationality in which "Psyche and Society" (Bhabha, 1990b, p. 43) are assumed to mirror each other. Lack of social cohesion and the separation of Psyche and Society have been used to explain and support the evaluation of inferiority/superiority in colonial conditions. This is readily observed in the status of inferiority ascribed to First
Nations peoples for their “inability” to mirror dominant society. Assumptions about correspondence between the individual and society continue to authorize colonial conditions and render unthinkable the notion that social and psychic alienation are determinate and constitutive of social relations themselves. Racism is understood as originating in the immiscibility of inferior/superior states rather than “the constitutive conditions of civil social instinct itself” (Bhabha, 1990b, p. 186) in which subjectivity is a discursive construct. For example, in a self-fulfilling way, social, material and historical effects of racialization are mistakenly used to justify and normalize racism. It is perhaps the subject/social performativity which makes Lacan’s theorizing especially relevant for understanding the interrelatedness and dependence of one on the other as well as simply their simultaneous performance, a simultaneity which renders the performativity of the subject as social as separate entities only in symbolic representation on this page, but inseparable in practice and translation. The discursive nature of subjectivity can be read in desire of the subject for the social. Bhabha (1994b) links the work of Lacan and Fanon in this understanding: “Lacan’s location of the signifier of desire, on the cusp of language and the law, allows the elaboration of a form of social representation that is alive to the ambivalent structure of subjectivity and sociality” (p. 31-2, emphasis added). The emergent nature of psychic representation and social reality challenges a “transparency of social reality, as a pre-given image of human knowledge” (Bhabha, 1990b, p. 185). It also disturbs a concept of time as linear, historical, and recuparable— notions which I will explore further in the following chapter on the nation.

A number of critical race theorists such as Sander Gilman, Homi Bhabha, Ali Rattansi and Philip Cohen, to mention only a few, use psychoanalytic theory although not unproblematically as I shall explain later. Stoler (1995) suggests that
in spite of its frequent use, psychoanalytic theory such as found in Freudian analysis, for example, has been entrenched in the language and analyses of colonial discourse often without acknowledgement or full understanding. Stoler is not disputing the efficacy of Freudian theory for these analyses, but wishes to examine the way this language can be used, unreflectively, to "substitute for an analysis of historical depth". She says: "We need to be aware of the varied analytic work we expect them [psychoanalytic concepts] to do" (p. 169).

Discussions on identity which explain ideas with reference to terms like "the operations of splitting, desire, fantasy, pleasure and paranoia" (Rattansi, 1992, p. 38) as well as "imaginary", "symbolic", and "unconscious" are employing psychoanalytic concepts, acknowledged or not. Most often used in concert with other analytical methodologies, psychoanalytic theory enables a "reading" of ideologies not found elsewhere. I suggest it is also capable of tracing how racialized identity is articulated.

Bhabha (1990b) suggests that in the "traditional sociological alignment of Self and Society or History and Psyche" distinctions between subjective identity and social authority are over determined. In the tradition of Eurocentric thought, the rationality and autonomy of the individual is assumed to find its expression in the civil state and in structures of society, such as law or culture, structures which directly mirror the individual in a contained and totalized history. Psychoanalytic theory is available to analyze what the transactions between the self and the social can reveal about racism and about how deeply it permeates the institutions of society and the experience of ourselves as individuals. Pajaczkowska and Young (1992) rely on psychoanalytic theory to examine "the way in which our ordinary identities are mediated through symbolic categories that are themselves profoundly racialized" (p. 198).
One final reason for using psychoanalytic theory is the centrality of desire and its ambiguous functioning within subject formation. The theorizing which supports a split, fragmented subjectivity sheds light on the source and depth of the anxiety which is produced when subjectivity is unsettled. It also helps to explain the tremendous desire for the other and the simultaneous disavowal of both the other as well as the desire. Whether it is derivative or originary, the nature of desire and its performative function are important concepts in describing racialized identifications. A discussion of desire and how it can be understood follows in some detail later. First, I will briefly outline some of the problems found in psychoanalytical theorizing that will be addressed.

**Problems in the use of psychoanalytic theory**

One of the biggest problems of psychoanalytic theorizing is its essentialism wherein the sexed body is determinate of identity; maleness is defining, race is derivative, and homophobia rampant. Diana T. Meyers (1994) points out, "[psychoanalytic theorizing] does not provide a comprehensive explanation of the problem of male dominance" (p. 10). She also acknowledges that some psychoanalytic feminism has received just criticism for its insensitivity to differences among women. Stoler and others raise the question of whether, in using psychoanalytic theorizing as an explanatory model, the very terms of colonial discourse and everything else will be reduced to sex. She concludes, however, that the issues of sexuality, although very present, are metonymic of wider social relations.

Despite the widespread use psychoanalysis, one of the consequences of its premises are problems for the consideration of race theory. For example, for psychoanalytic feminists who claim that sexual difference is as primary as language, sexual difference is fundamental to other kinds of difference, including
race (Butler, 1993, p. 181). The assumption that sex is a primary difference could only be made by one who is not aware of the effects of racialization as an everyday defining factor, as if sexual difference is not also marked by race. Meyers (1994) suggests that it is inappropriate to focus on psychoanalytic theories of gender as explanatory theories, and that this theorizing is not to be viewed as “a universal empirical account of childhood development” nor as “speculative developmental psychology” (p. 11). According to Meyers, prejudice is not simply a result of “defective moral judgements” or misinformation, this time involving an errant unconscious.

Particular uses of psychoanalytic theorizing, as in the following example, result in essentializing identities which, however interesting the reading, can be reduced to psychologizing differences in modernist terms. Pajaczkowska & Young (1992), claim that the capacity for racism is innate and that the way this capacity is activated by society distinguishes whether or not the capacity will be destructive (p. 199). Perhaps a statement like this is what Philip Cohen refers to in his criticism of psychoanalytic theory which he says attempts to “establish principles of correspondence... without introducing any mediating devices” (Cohen, 1992, p. 100). Surely the inner life cannot be explained without reference to its social and material history.

In spite of these interpretations, I maintain that in psychoanalytic theory, behaviour is not reduced to a product of individual essences or unalterable “human nature”. Because psychoanalysis does not presume a concrete individual with a fixed subject, it cannot be read as a deterministic script with no possibility of revisions. Psychoanalytic theorizing provides ways of thinking about constructions and meanings of categories through which human beings are themselves implicated in the “precariousness of conscious subjectivity” (Belsey, 1980, p. 64), as indicated in Lacan’s conception of the unconscious.
While the use of psychoanalytic theory is not unproblematic, a particular use of it is very helpful to the research into colonial and racial discourse which follows. In the next section I deal with these objections to psychoanalytic theory and other objections which surely remain. First, I will briefly outline some of the concepts of Jacques Lacan and the thinking which renders the theorizing useful for this research project.

Basic Lacan

Besides *Écrits*, I discuss accounts of Lacan from other sources as I have found that interpretations of Lacan more illuminating than reading the original. Aside from the difficulty the work may present in itself, I view the use of Lacan's writing in a metaphorical sense and value the creative ways it is employed. Supporting documents and analyses are almost mandatory when reading Lacan because the writing of any text, especially that of Lacan, doubles back on itself and mimics the ways of desire, and according to Catherine Belsey (1994), "makes of the text itself an object of desire for the reader" (p. 54).

The work of Lacan centres on his systematizing of desire at the same time that he unfixes the performance by which desire can be known. This unstructuring is symptomatic or parallel to the way desire is played out in its quest for its true object. In psychoanalytic theory, subjectivity lacks an autonomous, unitary self in which individual consciousness is no longer seen as the origin of knowledge and meaning (Belsey, 1980, p. 60) as revealed in the child who has no sense of identity or of a self as separate from what is around it. However, during the "mirror phase" of development, a child sees its reflection

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and "recognizes" itself as separate from the outside world, "distinct from what is 'other'". The mirror image is not the child, of course, but nevertheless creates for the child, an image of the child as a unitary, autonomous self.

Language is central to Lacan's thesis of psychoanalytic development because it is in language that the child articulates that an "I" is a separate entity from a "you". Subjectivity is constructed in and through language across a range of linguistic and discursive practices. The difference or non-synchrony between the perceiving self and the reflected self is also present in language (the signifier). The second split, this time necessitated by language, reinforces the first (mirror) split; a difference is marked between the self represented in its own discourse and the one who speaks. The fact that there is that which can be represented is what makes possible the entry into or creation of a symbolic order. The entry into this symbolic representation of self simultaneously constructs the unconscious and the subject. The consequence of never being able either to image oneself completely or to speak oneself wholly exists as a constant source of potential disruption. The entry into the symbolic order of representation of the self is what permits (some would say compels) a child to participate in a social relationship.

As a self-conscious being, the child is capable of desire but because it is desire that is created or made possible by the symbolic order—that is by the split between imagined and imagining self—the desire in the unconscious can never be completely known. That which we demand can only be a metonymic representation of unconscious desire. Having consciousness and always being driven by the demands of the unconscious, the subject is a site of perpetual contradiction. In that "desire is a perpetual effect of symbolic articulation" (Lacan, p. viii), the articulation or representation of the subject is perpetually in a process of construction—in language—and always capable of change. Belsey (1980) says that in this crisis of incessant articulation, necessitated by "alterations in
language and in the social formation" (p. 50), lies the possibility of transformation because, in its constant state of representation and enunciation, "the subject is a process" (p. 50, original emphasis).

The subject may find itself located across a range of competing or contradictory discourses. In a desire for coherence, a subject experiences tension or pressure because the discourses, although incompatible with each other, exist within the realm of one's experiences of that which can be taken for granted. Belsey uses the example of Western women who are produced and inhibited in patriarchy as subjects of competing discourses. "Very broadly, they participate both in the liberal humanist discourse of freedom, self-determination and rationality and at the same time in the specifically feminine discourse offered by society of submission, relative inadequacy and irrational intuition" (p. 65). The desire for coherence between these competitive discourses—desire produced in the unconscious—creates pressure that can result in a range of allegiances and behavior including illnesses, anger, loss of self-esteem, and attempted compliance with one or the other of the discourses; but not without experiencing the tension created by their contradictions. Women's positions in society are far from isolated cases of people experiencing contradictions, but their examples briefly illustrate the impossibility of individual subjects as coherent, integral unities. What is underscored is that identity is expressed in and depends upon the relationship between subjects and the language in which they are constructed. That the subject, in lacking a unified identity, is always in process, "supports the possibility of deliberate change" (p. 66).

Butler explains
The work of Judith Butler (1992, 1993) is very instructive for setting out uses of psychoanalytic theory to avoid tendencies toward essentializing and determinism. Butler's (1993) project is not to defend constructivism as an alternative, but to "interrogate the erasures and exclusions that constitute its limits" (p. 12). Butler asks and answers questions basic to the argument in the critique of a constructivist account: "How can there be an activity, a constructing without presupposing an agent who precedes and performs that activity? How would we account for the motivation and direction of construction without such a subject?" (p. 7). Although constructivism may offer some appealing alternatives to the determinism of much psychoanalytic thinking, it brings its own difficulties such as its foreclosure on agency and perhaps even the reversion to a metaphysical beginning. Suggesting that subjects are simply as they "are" is no alternative either. Butler states that the choice between constructivism and essentialism is not a real choice because both miss the significance of the abject being, "the excluded, disruptive return within the very terms of discursive legitimacy" (p. 8). The problem lies, of course, in not being able to think outside the limits of even large categories of possibility and of imagining that a reversal is the only option. The inability to think outside the limits of categories is surely one of the dilemmas in conducting research on identity formation in which hierarchical relations are normalized and inevitably reproduced by those doing the investigating.

Among the many issues Butler's work examines are the organizing of exclusionary practices which "effectively constitute and naturalize" the identifications bodies reiterate such as subject, citizen, racialized minority, woman, lesbian, agent, unified self, partial identity, and many others. She examines the limits of these constructed identifications and the materiality of the effects of the subject so constructed. Butler understands that the subject is neither
constituted nor determined, that is, neither free nor fixed. Her "performativity of citationality" by which she refers to the reiteration of identifications is central to understanding how she escapes the interpolation of the subject into something beyond the binarisms that alternately deny metaphysics or materiality. "Performativity" is described as "a ritualized production, a ritual reiterated under and through constraint" (p. 95). Identifications are not determined in advance but are produced by continual iteration of their norms which constitute the materiality of bodies. Identifications based on the matter of bodies are not static but are produced as effects of power.

Butler offers a convincing argument that the subject is constructed by the citation of difference by which it is "distinguished from its constitutive outside", an outside which remains an unconstructed alterity, that is, the "not me" which the subject both desires and disavows and which Butler describes as "abject being". The formation of subjects requires the simultaneous construction and material regulation of those who remain outside as "abject beings", the "not yet 'subjects'" (p. 3). These beings inhabit the "unlivable" and the "uninhabitable" zones of social life populated by considerable numbers who do not enjoy the status of subjects. That the subject is prefigured by exclusions and de-authorized subjects, abjections, and "populations erased from view" (1992, p. 13) obscures, defers—and forgets—the materiality of the subject’s construction. The figure of the autonomous self is not even a possibility when it is recognized as a logical consequence of disavowed dependency, that is, the subject is dependent for its self-hood on what it disavows as the not-subject, not-self. By "forgetting" the constructedness of the subject, the illusion of autonomy is maintained. Constructivism is not simply the opposite of essentialism. It is "a process of reiteration by which both 'subjects' and 'acts' come to appear at all. The subject is always in process, even with its repetitive identity and the ever-failing fixity.
Butler understands that the continual failure of and constant disruption to social norms, however, is not a threat to the grounding of the sexed subject, but rather the continual repetition of normative assumptions is a “critical resource in the struggle to rearticulate the very terms of symbolic legitimacy and intelligibility” (p. 3). “There is no power that acts, but only a reiterated acting that is power in its persistence and instability”. Butler proposes “a return to the notion of matter, not as site or surface, but as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter” (1993, original emphasis, p. 9).

Butler acknowledges that “there are constraints that are unconscious” (1992, p. 85) but takes exception to the “fixity of the Law”. Butler, recasting the so-called a priori status of psychoanalytic theory and taking seriously the temporal nature of regulatory discourse, understands Lacanian theory as a “regulation of signification” (p. 22) operating in time. By this, Butler explains that the law of the father (sex as male or female and as belonging to the symbolic and as having a fixed form prior to its citation) does not have a separate ontology prior to its citation. Rather, as the law is a performative function, its meaning can reside only in a prior articulation of its iterative power. The law is not a fixed form, its autonomous assumption being contradicted by dependence on its citationality and performativity of that which precedes and exceeds the actions of subjects. That is, the law only works as the law because of its dependence on having been previously cited and performed by means of and in advance of the action of subjects under the law. Identity formation is not located at crucial developmental moments as much as it is constituted through iterative and reiterable effects of power (Butler, 1993, p. 22). Power is not only produced as constrained and reiterative, but also through the “foreclosure of effects, the production of an
outside". The domain of livability and identity is regulated by this "production of an 'outside'"—by the limits of what will qualify as a "body that matters".

Butler departs from an over determination of the Lacanian position and the structures which become unproblematically reified, especially some basic tenets of psychoanalytic theory which presume the "realness" of difference, such as the "realness" of sexual difference which is understood to be more fundamental than racial difference. In spite of the application of psychoanalytic theory to her work, Butler shows how psychoanalytic assumptions operating within parameters of "realness" can be taken apart. She demonstrates in her analysis of the movie Paris is Burning that what is real and performed as such is not fixed, including sexual and racial differences. The movie aptly demonstrates not only the fluidity of the categories "sex" and "race", but that the "order of sexual difference is not prior to that of race or class in the constitution of the subject" (p. 130). The symbolic in psychoanalysis which marks sex as the primary difference is an insupportable distinction in that "norms of realness by which the subject is produced are racially informed conceptions of 'sex'". That is not to say that there is no concept of the symbolic or dominant norm, nor that the desire for it does not exist. Butler points out that in Paris is Burning, desire and norms are, among other things, used as forms of resistance in the performance of "realness". There is no identification which predicates all others; instead, "these identifications are invariably imbricated in one another, the vehicle for one another" (p. 116), not separate categories or positions or axes of power. "What appear within such an enumerative framework as separable categories are, rather, the conditions of articulations for each other" (p. 117). The categories are not innate, determined, or separate, but, instead, originate "in the complex of racist, homophobic, misogynist, and classist constructions that belong to larger hegemonies of oppression" (p. 132).
Discursive performativities produce that which they name. They are always derivative of other cultural practices because there is no power in a discursive performance except that it is iterative of a previous performance. The "power to materialize subjectivating effects" (p. 106) consists in performative speech acts: "demands, taboos, sanctions, injunctions, prohibitions, impossible idealizations and threats", etc., which echo other conventions without which the speech acts cannot produce the effects of the performativity. For example, the performativity of the actions of a judge are only powerful by virtue of the conventions and authority that ground the judge's legitimating authority.

Reiteration of an identity permits it to be read as a particular citation of the identity it performs. What kind of identity can be "assumed" by a speech act? Lacanian theorizing indicates that an identification as "I" can only be secured by repeatedly assuming the identification which is not a singular act or event. It is a question of repeating a norm, "citing or miming that norm. And a citation will be at once an interpretation of the norm and an occasion to expose the norm itself as a privileged interpretation" (p. 106). Citation of a law brings into being the very authority that the law cites and then defers. The law of Lacanian theorizing is not originary, having been produced by the authority which it performs as its citation.

Homi Bhabha (1994) remarks on "the performative nature of differential identities: the regulation and negotiation of those spaces that are continually, contingently, 'opening out', remaking the boundaries, exposing the limits of any claim to the singular or autonomous sign of difference—be it class, gender or race" (p. 219). Butler (1993) also says these things about performative agency—that it is not established out or beyond a particular inscription or iteration, "but in the very modality and affects of that inscription" (p. 225). In this telling (tolling) of the remaking of boundaries, transparent assumptions of cultural
supremacy give way to possibilities of representation not yet seen or imagined. Indeed, this is one of the purposes of Butler's work: to explore possibilities for expanding what counts as valued and valuable (p. 22)

"Normative subject-positions...depend on and are articulated through a region of abjected identifications" (Butler, p. 112). Even though subject positions are not equally articulated because of differential distributions of power, hegemonic subject-positions are maintained by abjection as the desire and disavowal of what one is not permitted to desire or be. Positionality is secured through the rejection of abject positions and the assumption of normative heterosexuality as in sexed identifications, for example. Butler argues that it is not the law which prescribes sexed bodies, but that their assumption follows from the iteration and reiteration of normative heterosexuality. This identification is secured through the "repudiation and abjection of homosexuality". It is finally the force of the law which renders homosexuality illegitimate even as homosexual identification is rendered unthinkable and unlivable. For this abject identification to be disavowed, however, it must first be "entertained", that is, the heterosexual identification can only be made through that identification which one fears to make with the abject identity. The hegemonic reinforcement of normative positionings—race, gender, sexuality, class, for examples—begs the question of what it is that a body cannot bear to know. What is it that a normative identification must constantly disavow? Discourse around normative positionings silences and forecloses the erased positionalities and the various ways they are abject even as the power of normative discourses depends upon, institutes, and sustains the abject.

In psychoanalytic terms, to claim a coherent identity is to repudiate all the abject forms of identification by which one’s identity is articulated. The insistence on a coherent identity, one that is fixed and ready-made, requires the rejection of
abject identities and, ironically, a closer engagement with that which one abjects. The normative identity is legitimated through its rejection of that with which it has already identified. This is not the same as saying that a subject disavows that with which it identifies as in dialectical fashion, but rather that the subject is both instituted by certain exclusions and foreclosures, and destabilized by their “permanent or constitutive spectre” (Butler, 1993, p. 113). Neither is this the same as an Hegelian synthesis which has no exterior but which insists on an attachment to the rational as real and the real as rational\(^2\); the Lacanian subject as described by Butler may be legitimated by the law, but because the law is neither essentialist nor determinate, the subject can only be a body that matters through the reiteration of its identifications. The iteration of an identity relies on its previous citation and its passage into normative positions. It is never a singular identity but one that has been prepared by the designation of difference and its own repetition. The lack of fixity, which necessitates constant re-identification, remains in close engagement with that which must also be continually abjected. The reliance of the dominant identity position on the abjection and repudiation of the other continually places the coherence of dominant positions at stake. In the research which follows, we will see that a coherent identity is very much an object of desire for subjects who have been interviewed. Their interviews reveal that the desire for a legitimate, respectable, coherent identity continually evokes closer engagement with the abject other as a “necessary ‘outside’” by which whiteness and respectability are anxiously secured. This is one of the key points to be explored in this research.

\(^2\) Lacan explains that the subject cannot be understood as a phenomenology of mind or the concept of the “real” insofar as the subject cannot be conscious-of-self and subject at the same time. The real subject is that which cannot be apprehended because it is only through the symbolic that the subject is aware of itself. “The subject... is himself an effect of the symbolic” (Ecrits, ix).
Psychoanalytic theory is able to answer questions about identity in a way that questions both "individual and social authority as they come to be developed in the discourse of social sovereignty" (Bhabha, 1990b, p. 43). Without this approach, social manifestations of alienation and aggression such as madness, self-hate, treason will be "explained away as alien presences, occlusions of historical progress" or as humanity failing to recognize the extent of its humanness (p. 43). A psychoanalytic theorizing adds to our understanding of how and on what levels of consciousness racialized identification operates. It suggests some of the complexity of identity formation in which racism is not only able to be denied but to be operated in ways that are hidden even to consciousness. The "validity of violence", the imposition of stereotypes and the overdetermination of subjectivities based on race and sex continue to support the notion of superiority and privilege in the West. Sherene Razack says "Concretely, making sense of racism, one has to consider how whites come to perceive what they perceive, their actions and the procedures that enable them to act in ways that add up to a systemic domination of Blacks by Whites" (1991, p. 150). Anti-racist strategies are generally constructed in ways that suggest that white racism is mainly about a failure to recognize unpalatable truths about oneself and the effects of one’s privilege. While there is indeed much to be learned in this area, I am concerned that anti-racist strategies need to be more than simply exposing these unpalatable truths. That is why looking at racialization as a process of identity formation seems productive, especially as identities are acted out and governed by hegemonic social processes of racial hierarchization. The identification of images is of less interest than an examination of discourse practices in which the slippage between conscious and unconscious desire is visible; and through these liminal spaces, one can hope to
see the processes of subjectification including the necessity of the abject. Butler concludes

> It will be a matter of tracing the ways in which identification is implicated in what it excludes, and to follow the lines of that implication for the map of future community that it might yield. (p. 119)

**Subjects and objects of desire**

Desire plays a significant and ambivalent role in this process of subjectification in that it is “essentially eccentric and insatiable” (Lacan, p. viii). Unconscious desire speaks in the symbolic as in slips of the tongue, in dreams, in jokes, in art forms, or in expressions of the body. The desire in the unconscious ties together the signifying subject and the “lost but inextricable real... Its consequence is the indestructibility of unconscious desire” (Belsey, 1994, p. 64).

As Butler has shown, it is desire which reiterates an identification by which a subject performs and assumes her identity. The law, which is viable in terms of heteronormativity, assigns an identity whose desire is cited and contradicted in the continual consolidation and deconstruction of the law. Or, as Butler would say, the lack of fixity necessitates the constant repetition of the law by which subject identity is contingently consolidated.

In spite of the tendency of psychoanalytic theory toward essentialism and determinate heteronormativity, it is in the constructedness of the unconscious, subjectivity, desire, and the symbolic that psychoanalytic theory maintains its use as an explanatory feature in identity formation. With this in mind, therefore, it is also important to reflect on a significant point raised by Stoler (1995) on the distinction between the way desire is theorized by Lacan and Foucault. The addition of Foucault to this discussion provides another cautionary frame in the use of psychoanalytic theory.

The concept of desire, placed at the centre of Lacan’s theorizing, has the implications of continuous force and not just a wish to be fulfilled. Desire is
always "of" the Other, that is, that which is caught up with what is prohibited or repressed. The Other is represented by that which one lacks, such as the always incomplete knowledge of the self or by the "not-me" in the form of the constituted outsider. The difference, lack, or dissimilarity which produces desire arises first from the lack of repetition of identity—the lack which follows from one’s identity always "exceeding the knowledge of the identity" (Bhabha, 1994): at best, one only has a mirror image of self. The difference lies not between self and Other, however; it is a recognition of the otherness of the Self. In this desire for wholeness exists the myth that such things as "historical origination—racial purity, cultural priority" are not only possible, but have already been achieved. Bhabha, following Fanon, explains that the mythology of wholeness and similarity are met when these conditions are true: All ideal speakers have penises (as a form of identity), or "All [ideal speakers] have the same skin/race/culture" (p. 74). As stated in the previous section, the impossibility of the desire for wholeness (of the self) creates anxiety over its lack and is projected onto another. This desire for wholeness and disavowal of lack of wholeness locates an Other who will fill the role of being "not-me", "not-like-me". This lack becomes manifested when this recognition occurs: "Some do not have penises" and "some do not have the same skin/race/culture" (p. 74). An "identity" is formed which incorporates these contradictions as citations of desire: first, difference as an always incomplete personal image; and second, disavowal of the lack of coherence.

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3 The racial stereotype is produced by this difference and disavowal and is necessary for its fixed otherness; the lack of fixity on the part of the stereotyped object, however, requires constant readjustment or reworking of the heterogeneity in both the self and Other. Bhabha concludes: "The stereotype is not a simplification because it is a false representation of a given reality. It is a simplification because it is an arrested, fixated form of representation that, in denying the play of difference (which the negation through the Other permits), constitutes a problem for the representation of the subject in significations of psychic and social relations" (p. 75). The lack of fixity in the other undermines the possibility for constancy in self-representation.
In Lacan, desire is understood as the "lack", as that which motivates the law; desire is something to be repressed and regulated. In the telling of historical events, desire has been seen as the repressed instinct displaced onto an other and to which social controls are applied. In much of colonial history, even when Foucault is invoked, the notion of desire is presented as originary and repressive rather than desire as a social construct. Stoler points out contradictions in how desire is conceptualized among writers who claim a Foucaultian analysis in which desire is an effect but who also rely on Freudian theory in which desire is a cause. For example, Fanon, following Freud, is one of many who locates Western sexuality onto a "deep fear of the Black" (p. 169). Another, David Roediger contends that it is not sexual desire but rather, in the case of poor white, their longing for a rural past that is the nature of their desire. While racism is understood as an historical construct, its origins would appear to lie in repressive instincts and unexplained biological drives.

For Foucault, in contrast, desire is understood as "embodying productive and generative properties" (Stoler, p. 168). Desire is constructed out of law and discourses of sexuality where it is animated; it is an effect, one which looks to the cultural production and historical specificity of the notions of sexual pathology and perversion themselves. Desire is the incited effect, or product, of the law; it is the law that constructs, in that, "desire follows from, and is generated out of, the law, out of the power-laden discourse of sexuality where it is animated and addressed" (Stoler, p. 165). Foucault (1990) concludes:

One should not think that desire is repressed, for the simple reason that the law is what constitutes desire and the lack on which it is predicated. Where there is desire, the power relation is already present; an illusion, then to denounce this relation for a repression exerted after the event. (p. 81.)

On the other hand, whether social relations and identities are determined by the repression of instinct or by the law of desire is, in some ways, a semantic question because, as Butler has argued, the law does not originate desire because
it is itself produced by the reiteration of desire. Stoler relies on Butler to support her argument, and Butler does not disappoint: "The law that we expect to repress some set of desires which could be said to exist prior to law succeeds rather in naming, delimiting and thereby, giving social meaning and possibility to precisely those desires it intended to eradicate." (Subjects of Desire p. 218, Butler quoted in Stoler, p. 165)\(^4\). Butler’s work illustrates that the law is not originary but rather a material production of previously performed and ongoing desire. This supports Stoler’s questions concerning the determinism ascribed to theories in which colonial discourse and every other motivation can be reduced to sex as a consequence of repression. And is a theory large enough in which the desiring subjects are always and only men? Stoler suggests that the issues of sexuality, although very present, are metonymic of wider social relations, and that although “sex was invariably about power, power was not always about sex” (p. 170). For example, consider the way Native women are produced through a discourse of sexuality in racialized and class specific ways—as if Native women’s “downfall” is their “rampant” sexuality. The fact that assumptions about the generative qualities of sexual desire are applied selectively illuminates the power relations in play “in the production of the discourse of desire [which] differed by gender and class” (p. 177). The way sexual desire is ascribed to the other remains as a distraction from the way class and racial power are produced through discourses of sexuality. Discourses about the “inappropriate” sexuality of the other are reiterated, produced and sustained by asymmetries of power which also

\(^4\) I suggest that this is a selective reading and that to claim that the law is merely constitutive of desire does not preclude that desire is also constitutive of the law. Butler has already argued and rejected the notion that if subject identities can only be produced in a dialectical sense by the definition of the law, then this is already to limit what identity is not, in particular, in regard to the iteration of abject beings. Placing limits on the abject, as in the example of the stereotype, is to predetermine subject identifications. But also, to say that desire derived from the law is only productive seems to limit in which way identifications can be other, unlike the desire for the law which in its repression cannot fully specify what that other might be. The point is that desire is both before and after the law; it is both performative of the law and constitutive of it.
"created spaces" for inappropriate desire as bourgeois males "struggled to define what was racially distinctive about bourgeois sexuality" (p. 177).

This "self-affirmation of one class", therefore, is always at the expense of and in relation to the Other. It is not enough for the construction of one class to affirm itself as an effect of the law, but also to repress those constituents of the self it attributes to the other. The "social enemy" is derived from the enemy within as embodied by "irregularities, departures from the norm, anomaly and criminal deviations" (Stoler, p. 34). The creation of the "internal enemy" and the "dangerous individual" occur through entry into the social with its "normalization of power" and boundaries that mark "normality and abnormality, between bourgeois respectability and sexual deviance, and between moral degeneracy and eugenic cleansing".

The productive capacity of desire as described by Foucault is also supported in Butler’s explanation of a materialized construction. The notion of the law as constitutive supports the understanding of the constructedness of human bodies and the promotion of "body vigor, longevity, progeniture, and descent of the classes that 'ruled'" (1990, p. 123). Foucault describes this as something formed by a "political ordering of life", "not through an enslavement of others, but through an affirmation of self...it provided itself with a body to be cared for, protected, cultivated, and preserved from the many dangers and contacts". This is very useful for understanding the formations of white identity in which status is also bound to affirmations, as well as to the repression of self or other which has already and continues to be discarded. Under these terms, the social construction of a white racialized identity in areas of Western domination is affirmed, for example, as a form of property to be "protected, cultivated, and preserved" in a way that makes the normalization of power difficult to recognize for those who possess the property. Racialized discourses about the body and the employment
of disciplinary measures is generally experienced as a positive effect or an affirmation for white racialized bodies. From Foucault, we understand that normative identity is not about repression; it is an affirmation in which the economy of identification “produces power, truths, and pleasures”. Foucault adds that the normalization of power “is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself” (p. 86). White racialization is affirmed by public and private practices—not by negative social consequences—but by performative acts which normalize the actions of white heteronormative subjectivities against the “inappropriate desires” of the other.

It is not a question, then, of whether the law or desire is originary, especially in this postmodern frame. The “truth” of these desires is not the object of critique as both examples of repression and desire are fully present in social practice. For example, as the research subjects in this project affirm their positions as tolerant, sympathetic teachers of native students, many subjects are still looking for some specific rules that will tell them “how” to teach Natives as a way of repressing in themselves that which they see as other. Many are frustrated by a lack of regulation about precisely what they are supposed to be doing. In the process, they are accessing two means of self-identification, one repressive and the other affirmative. The first is the teacher who desires access to rule-based technologies for containing herself and her students through the creation of laws; the second is the person who is constituted as a good, benevolent handler of Native children according to the socially constructed image of the white teacher. In the first, desire follows from the lack of containment and desire for a prescribing performativity; in the second, desire produces an identification which is constitutive and affirming in the production of the white subject as teacher and as a body that matters—an identification provided against the necessary “outside”.
Psychoanalytic theorizing overlaps with poststructuralist theorizing in explanation of identity construction as relational, through a kind of mirroring of that which the perceiving subject is and is not when seen in the self-regarding and other-regarding gaze. Both subjects and the social are seen as de-essentialized, not given, but as "constantly under construction and transformation, a process in which differentiation from Others is a powerful constitutive force" (Rattansi, 1994, p. 29). There is no single causal principle of operation and determination, affirmation or repression, nor a single source of power or resistance. What this relational identity construction might mean in a teacher education classroom is not clear or determinate even when, as a class activity, the students are asked to examine the social and personal consequences of bodies inscribed with signs of race, class, gender, sexuality, age and so forth. The default position that is most easily assumed is the "popular and sentimental version of the bourgeois self. By definition, this self grants priority to an embodied subject over the body as an object" (Chow, 1993, p. 37; quoting Nancy Armstrong). Butler writes similarly of the hold maintained on the definition of who may be a subject—who is to be human—who is to be one of "us" (Butler, 1993). For white students, "studying" the other, even when the instructor is Other, is to be studying the silence of what the other is not, that is, a kind of "lack"—no matter how creatively the Other fills the space with his/her "authenticity". White students' experiences of coming to know the other, even after they have made some attempt to encounter themselves, will leave them in positions of translating the "the untranslatability of 'third world' experiences" (Chow, p. 38) into the students' own terms. Assumptions that the translation has been successful signal the silencing of further discourse.

5 On the dominating effect of First World translation on Third World experience, Homi Bhabha says: "However impeccably the content of an other culture may be known, however anti-ethnocentrically it
Rey Chow posits a very interesting idea about the subject status of the colonizer, a status which also fits the general description of the Western gaze. If Chow’s idea can be applied to the positioning and re-positioning of white students in anti-racist classes, we gain insight into the resistance, discomfort, and refusal which arises in many of these classes. Chow argues that instead of Western hegemony producing the active gaze and the native as passive object, it is the gaze of the native that produces the discomfort in the “looked at” colonizer (Western subject). She continues: “This gaze, which is neither a threat nor a retaliation, makes the colonizer ‘conscious’ of himself, leading to his need to turn this gaze around and look at himself, henceforth ‘reflected’ in the native-object... Western Man henceforth [becomes] ‘self-conscious,’ that is, uneasy and uncomfortable, in his ‘own’ environment” (p. 51). This argument is not dissimilar to the explanation provided in psychoanalytic theory which posits that encountering one’s racial other is symbolic of the self which remains continually unknowable. Not only is the desire to know always unsatisfied, but with the arousing of consciousness comes the self- and other-regarding gaze. Students entering into relational studies, which anti-racism courses cannot help but be, also find that their identities come loose from where they were once moored. The unconscious knowing which surfaces in studying the Other undermines the stable and conscious arrangement of the self. The following narrative illustrates this point.

The story of “Draupadi”

The destabilizing effect of the shifting gaze is illustrated brilliantly in an amazing story translated by Gayatri Spivak (1988) from the Bengali short story

is represented, it is its location as the ‘closure’ of grand theories, the demand that, in analytical terms it be always the ‘good’ object of knowledge, the docile body of difference, that reproduces a relation of domination and is the most serious indictment of the institutional powers of critical theory” (1988, p. 16; The commitment to theory; New Formations 5, 5-23.)
"Draupadi" told by Mahasweta Devi. The story can be read as an allegory and is appealing for its "approximation to the First-World scholar in search of the Third World" (p. 179). I find it relevant for inquiring into the process and desire by which white subjects—either voluntarily, or constrained by their program—study and become familiar with the culture of Native people. The story is a bit long, but I think it repays the telling by outlining some of the contradictory assumptions around the production of bodies and their control of knowledge.

Research subjects, as interested students and benefactors of colonialist practices, are positioned like the intellectual Senanayak in the story, who comes to know the revolutionary peasants so well that he can anticipate their moves, an ability which leads to the eventual capture of Draupadi, the main character of the story. The intellectual's theory and practice are combined at this negative point of Draupadi's capture; and although the intellectual has great sympathy for Draupadi, he can shed his guilt and take delight in the adequacy of his theorizing and knowledge.

Oversimplifying drastically, the relative positioning of Senanayak, the intellectual, and Draupadi appear as the highlights of the story. This simplification reflects my interests in observing the parallel positioning between white teacher and the other in her classroom, or between the white woman interested in race theory and her meeting and engagement with racialized minority women. Spivak brilliantly deconstructs the story and confesses that she cannot take it far enough. There always remains the tension between what cannot be excluded from the story and that which can never be told (recuperated). As white teachers engage with the other in their classrooms, there is mixed emotion about the way in which traditional educational programs coerce ethnic and racialized minority children into a white dominated existence in which the excess of who they are has no place.
Spivak's piece raises many questions which apply to First World/Third World engagement and to the destabilization of identities that follow from these "encounters". How can the First World intellectual know the Third World woman besides in theory? What is at risk in this knowing? The default form of knowledge is presumed to be either colonialist theory or other specialist's knowledge of the women. The inadequacy of knowledge, however, does not prevent the intellectual from excusing his/her own guilt and of becoming the magnanimous teacher. (Spivak refers to the teacher as Prospero, the book-learned man who taught Caliban how to speak.)

The excess of the other to which the intellectual never has access, however, is also the beginning of the undoing of the unified, separate being that the intellectual supposes herself to be. Undoing the separation between theory and practice—and other binaries such as self/other, First World/Third World, white/Native—provides the undermining of the formerly secure identity of the intellectual. The theoretical is always incomplete in the face of the other.

In the final section of the story in which the captive Draupadi insists on standing naked before the army officers, she destroys their identification and strips them of their honour because they cannot protect themselves against her lack of shame. They are dishonoured because they can neither protect nor contain her unprotected/unprotectable defeated and naked otherness. The army officer cannot even formulate the question to ask what this is that stands before him. These historical struggles between the known, the unknown, and the refusal to know have changed how definitions and their foundations can be formulated.

Learning about racism and sexism can have a similar effect on those who see the other as someone known in theory. This "encounter"—a code word in the story used to indicate death by police torture—between self and other breaks
the bond of the previously unknown identity of those whose identities had not previously "encountered" the other. These are the identities of "non-involved" intellectuals, teachers, and cultural workers who are implicated in the assumption that racism is a problem of the other which can be overcome when the other is "known". The security and the "self-adequate identity" of white students is broken and undone in a face-to-face with the other who has previously been only theorized and fictionalized. A stable identity is undone by recognizing the implications of that which one would prefer not to know—the abject—including the exposure of "unreasonable uncertainty" in Spivak's story found in Third World women; and for the white subjects, in their inability as teachers to "deal with" their "other" students.

In the end, Draupadi taunts the men with their impotence, further destabilizing their identities. She asks how they will be able to re-invent her to be a stereotype—a known thing—again. She reveals that, by her actions, she has exposed them to be other than the men, even the persons, they think they are. By exposing herself and making herself known to them, she has made them unfamiliar to themselves. The paucity of theory is revealed in the presence of the theorized. The positioning shifts and creates uncertainties between the knowing subject and the known. Some white students encountering and coming to knowledge of the other will find their foundational identities shifting, and some will be able to remain comfortable. Some will engage with the new knowledge of themselves; and for a time, some will be afraid to stand, like the army officer, before a classroom of "unarmed target[s]" where no amount of lesson plans will ever suffice.

The story dramatizes the way in which a formerly secure identity, that is, the soldiers as dominant, is destabilized by the return of the abject self. The dissolution occurs, not just because of the return of the abject but because of the
recognition of the abject as that which is continually disavowed. Recognition undermines the disavowal and it is the formerly secure self that becomes unfamiliar. Encountering the other can produce a failure of coherent self-knowledge that many do not willingly risk. Instead, the desire is for reiterative citation of normative identities as a process of masking the continual failure to fix the identity formation in self and other. Bhabha (1990b) concludes “The white man’s eyes break up the black man’s body and in the act of epistemic violence its own frame of reference transgressed, its field of vision disturbed” (p. 185). The dominant identity and, indeed personhood, is unwittingly linked to the stereotyped identity it has created of the other.

Conclusion

In Lacan, we see the desire for and the impossibility of a coherent self, a constant process which impels a subject into the social. According to Foucault, desire is not repressive, but rather a productive effect as it is read in the construction of various identities: bourgeois respectability, professional status, whiteness, heteronormativity, accomplishment of normative rules in “how to live”; and as illustrated in Spivak’s narrative, control over the abject other who continually returns a view of the self.

From poststructuralist theorizing, we already have support for a fragmented subject identity as an effect of power relations (Foucault, 1983). This fragmentation is a necessary assumption for the examination of identity formation as unstable and indeterminate. Unstable identity formation and the necessity of constant iteration is explained in psychoanalytic theorizing—not as some social category imperfectly realized—but as the entrance of the subject into the symbolic world of social representation. The formation of identifications is never complete, as in the example of sex which is never a simple fact or a static
condition. Lack of a stable identity is not a failure but, in Lacan's terms, a site of continual affirmation of one's participation in the social. The materialization of identity is incomplete and ongoing—compelled to a reiteration of an ideal construct regulated over time and through social practices.

In the performance of unfixed identity formation, one is also able to read the emergence of desire as a site of access into identity articulation. The emergence of desire is a powerful tool for looking at psychic and social relations that produce the role of the subject. It is in the slippage of conscious knowing that unconscious desire can be read. The insistent entrance into the symbolic is a site—beyond appeals to rationality and ideology—where the reading of desire may take place. It is this reading of desire as an affirming and constructive social and psychic production that supports this incursion, as organized in this research, into the psychic embeddedness of social reality.

The construction of dominant identities depends on the ever present abject other as well as the construction of and constant disavowal of its abjection. Foucault has already described how this process requires the masking of power through which power works so as not to bring to consciousness either the abject or its denial. Much of the research that will be shown later reveals the considerable investment in and effort on behalf of this denial of the other in the identification of a dominant self. As I struggle to describe this phenomenon, however, mere knowledge that a particular performance is in process is frequently insufficient to enable me to see or to read its effects in subject discourses and in my own writing about them. The performance of identities is always against what they abject and against what can be thought about, that is, against what the identifications are not.

Butler concludes that what has been foreclosed or banished in the production of conscious identity not only effects the working of the inevitable
law but is produced "as an enabling disruption, the occasion for a radical rearticulation of the symbolic horizon in which bodies come to matter at all" (1993, emphasis added, p. 23). That is why a process which is inherently capable of supporting change—at the level of subjectivity and discursive formation—is most significant. Consider, for example, how the failure to fortify the subjectivity and social norms of heterosexual, white, abled, male hegemony could be useful as a site of agency. The "possibility of deliberate change" mentioned earlier is what makes this perhaps overly brief detour into the complex world of psychoanalysis especially worthwhile.
Chapter Three

NATION FORMATION—THE CANADIAN NARRATIVE

Following the question on subject formation, this section addresses the process of nation formation which, in a similar way to the subject, can never completely articulate itself. The context for this investigation is Canadian in which I examine the normalization with which racism has become rationalized in collective and institutional moments in the definition of national identity. After some definitions of nation, I employ the theories of Homi Bhabha to engage a retelling of some of the salient points in the Canadian narrative particularly in regard to how the making of national subjects is a raced project. Bhabha’s work is significant for the way it shows that colonial authority is not hegemonic but a production of hybridization. This theorizing of the nation is supported by Bhabha’s reading of Fanon and Freud as well as production of the subject as described by Lacan. The ambivalence of nation formation parallels the continual lack of fixity in the process of subject formation and the continual necessity of articulation. The ambivalence in a nation’s discourse undermines the certainty of colonial authority and enables “discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds in intervention” (1994c, p. 97). In particular, I examine Bhabha’s notion of the Third Space which is narrated between the traditional, pedagogic enunciation of history and the day-by-day discourses found in performative aspects of the nation. To conclude the discussion, I describe the discursive practices of three particular sites where the Canadian narrative can be examined. These three sites which are productive of national identity are inscribed as interconnecting discourses of the land, First Nations peoples, and multiculturalism.
Some definitions

“Nations ... are something new in history” (Renan, [1882] 1990, p. 8). Compared to antiquity, the modern nation-state is a relatively recent invention. Benedict Anderson (1994b) argues that the possibility of imagining the modern nation is not necessarily caused by the development of political ideologies; the modern nation could not have happened without the occurrence of three historical events or concepts. The first was the difference in the apprehension of time brought on by the revolution in printing in the sixteenth century. Of the many effects of this water-shed event is the fixity of language and the consciousness of time from antiquity, both necessary to the idea of the nation. The other events that Anderson describes as central to the possibility of the modern nation were changes in the central positions in people’s lives occupied by religion and the monarchy. In the rise of secularism and individualism as products of the Enlightenment, the rise of nationalism occurs in tandem with “the ebbing of religious belief”, the “disintegration of paradise”, and the “absurdity of salvation”. As a way to create continuity and meaning in the face of fatality and contingency, Anderson suggests that few things were “better suited to this end than an idea of nation” (p. 11).

Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1993) examine a number of definitions of the concept “nation” and refrain from selecting a singular option. They distinguish between “nation” and “state”, the latter being a separate political distinction currently both claimed and disputed in many parts of the world. A nation may or may not be bounded by an internationally recognized border such as in Quebec, where many people would prefer that their borders had international recognition; typically, however, the boundaries of the civil and political societies are considered to have a high degree of overlap. “Nation” is a community
considered either to have evolved into or because of certain things held in common over time. The commonalities are expressed in various ways: "a stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up" (Stalin, 1972, p. 13; quoted in Anthias and Yuval-Davis, p. 26.); "common destiny" (Bauer, 1940, quoted in Anthias and Yuval-Davis, p. 26); a shared myth of "common origin" or "common solidarity".

On the contrary, in his definition of "nation", Ernest Renan (1990) rejects several assumptions that he says are neither essential nor sufficient for the conditions of nation: race, language, religion, common interests, geography. His definition points to intangibles: "A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle"; it is a definition which favours the complexity and lack of fixity in the concept "nation". Renan continues: "[A nation] presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life" (p. 19). The metaphor of the plebiscite is apt in places where definitions of "nation" are in violent dispute and ballots take the shape of bullets.

The ambivalence of defining "nation" is encountered by others. Hugh Seton-Watson, author of the comprehensive English-language text on nationalism Nations and States observes "... I am driven to the conclusion that no 'scientific definition' of the nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists" (p. 5). What is the ambivalence about the nation that stymies both science, Seton-Weston and many others? That the nation itself is an ambivalent project is acknowledged by Homi Bhabha: "The problematic boundaries of modernity are enacted in these ambivalent temporalities of the nation-space. The language of culture and community is poised on the fissures of
the present becoming the rhetorical figures of a national past” (1990a, p. 294). A
nation is not marked strictly by its sociology, history, or material practices even
though these disciplines provide insight into ideological practices of state power.
Bhabha’s emphasis is on the traditions of political thought and literary language
in which the nation as a narrative strategy emerges as a “powerful historical idea
in the west” (1990c, p. 1). The nation is always in the process of telling, a process
that does not easily distinguish between and easily slips into the use of
metonymic categories or analogies in reference to “the people, minorities, or
‘cultural difference’”. The continual slippage of categories as a way of describing
the nation produces the repetition of narrative performance.

Benedict Anderson’s (1994b) title *Imagined communities* is frequently
used, with or without acknowledgement, as a short-hand reference both to the
inadequacy of defining and to the desire to grasp the concept “nation”. Anderson,
taking an anthropological approach, simply says that a nation “is an imagined
political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”.
Nations are *imagined* because most people will never meet or hear of the other
citizens, and yet they hold each other in their minds and consider themselves to
form a nation. Anderson’s description of communities is equally fluid; he says
they “are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in
which they are imagined” (p. 6). A significant question for this essay is how the
nation narrates itself and inexorably reveals its imagined identity. Although the
imagining of communities is a collective endeavor, it is important to
acknowledge that certain images will have greater distribution and access to
public influence. These dominating images are the elite discourses as found in
public education, academic settings, business, media and government (van Dijk,
1993). Elite groups participate in the control of public discourse through their
access to and domination of symbolic and actual communications systems. These
elite discourses of imagined community are a major influence peculiar to each nation for articulating an image of what, in this case, Canadians imagine and desire themselves to be.

**The national subject**

One very significant part of the definition of a nation is the metaphorical and literal juxtaposition with which the concept of nation coincides with the self-perceptions of people who live there. This juxtaposition has the greatest congruence in a country whose national and civic boundaries most closely overlap and where the citizens regularly vote for who will govern them. The significance of the metaphorical and literal overlap of individual and nation is that, in the embodiment of both, there are direct and tangible consequences for the way they imagine/are imagined. Bhabha (1990a) calls this embodiment and identification a “double inscription” in which people are both the objects and the subjects of the nation. It is both on and by them that the nation is narrated. The continual slippage into analogous or metonymic categories of the nation, as mentioned above, such as “the people, minorities, or ‘cultural difference’” prevents the articulation of the nation from becoming a linear, historical telling and permits, instead, a telling based on “the temporal dimension of political and cultural identities”. That is, the juxtaposition of individual and nation underscores the story of the embodied individual in the “laborious telling of the collectivity itself” (Jameson quoted in Bhabha, 1990a, p. 292).

Others, such as Anderson, are less explicit about the significance of the overlap between nation and individual, but who, nevertheless, use the juxtaposition for theorizing and for metaphoric description. Anderson’s explanation of the rise in nationalism mentioned earlier also parallels descriptions of significant events in the development of the individual, such as
the role of the printing press on the interpretation of the word and the loss of exclusive influence on the part of the monarchy and the church. In his concept of imagined communities, Anderson sets his individual readers imagining their nation’s communities composed of other individuals whom they imagine in some way to be like them. It is as the fundamental unit of communities, as individuals, that we do our imagining. In this way we identify and are identified. Some of Anderson’s sub-headings such as “The origin of national consciousness” and “memory and forgetting” work at least on the level of metaphor in suggesting an embodied nation. In the final historical section called “The biography of nations”, Anderson concludes that “As with modern persons, so it is with nations”.

It is at this point that I begin to take exception with Anderson. In the previous chapter I established that the individual and the social are not transparently read from one another in spite of the desire for congruence and consistency. Anderson continues regarding the nation’s narrative: “Awareness of being imbedded in secular, serial time, with all its implications of continuity, yet of ‘forgetting’ the experience of this continuity... engenders the need for a narrative of ‘identity’”. In the non-linearity that is important to retain, the identity narrative is not only engendered by the forgetting, but is also constitutive of a culturally selective amnesia. It is the narrative that performs the nation to itself as well as the continual forgetting that exceeds the narrative. In the Canadian context, one significant “narrative of ‘identity’” is Canada’s experiences and self-consciousness as a settler country. Frantz Fanon (1967) writes that “The settler makes history and is conscious of making it” (p. 40). The settler and her narratives are not merely providing historical details; they are simultaneously performed and narrating themselves. The concepts of nation and the individual are not confined to words which describe them, but they
exceed the details of "secular, serial time" and are found in the cultural untranslatability of articulation, representation, and performance.

To conclude this section on the elision of individual and national identities, I return to questions posed by Anderson in which he wonders what it is that explains the 'attachment' people "feel for the inventions of their imaginations" (p. 141). I add: What is the basis of the communion that people imagine that they share with others in the same bounded nation? By what processes do identities get reproduced and changed? How do the processes of articulation and representation come to light?

**Bhabha on the nation**

The definitions of "nation" imply that it is anything but static, an understanding that resonates with the fluidity in Bhabha's performative concept of nation as something to be narrated. The *process* of articulation is significant in Bhabha's work because in the discourse of a nation "meanings may be partial", history is in the process of happening, and cultural authority is in the midst of composing itself (1990c). Avtar Brah (1992) echoes this: "Our cultural identities are simultaneously our cultures in process, but they acquire specific meanings in a given context" (p. 143).

The nation as a metaphor is a theme of national consciousness; but as a metaphor, it is never a simple explanation for what it is called to articulate. Bhabha (1990a) says that in the narrative of the "nation's modernity", the metaphor requires a "doubleness" in writing between "cultural formations and social processes" (p. 293). In spite of the paradoxical point that the nation "is not what it seems, and above all not what it seems to itself" (Gellner quoted in Bhabha, page 294), there is a demand for a coherent, representative vision of society, a demand for a coherent telling which, in Canada, some would call a pre-
occupation. This is a process not unlike the formation of the Western subject which, while it is never completely known to itself, emerges in the desire for wholeness and recognition and its continual demand to be known as an autonomous self-determining individual.

Anderson assists Bhabha in explaining the impossibility of narrating a coherent version of society by pointing out that nations “celebrate their hoariness” and “not their astonishing youth” (quoted in Bhabha, 1990a, p. 293). The ambivalence of nation formation is constructed from historical myths which do not take into account present conditions, but rather enunciate a tradition which can only be produced by forgetting part of the past. Bhabha continues: “In the production of the nation as narration there is a split between the continuous, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative” (p. 297, emphasis added). The pedagogical is based on the past, on the imagined history of what the country has been, on its “hoariness”. The performative is the “living principle of the people as a living process”, the up-to-date, the self-generating, that which ignores history and tradition. It is through this process of splitting that the conceptual ambivalence of modern society becomes the site of writing the nation. The nation “as” narration represents itself as the unity it is not. But in occupying a single nation-space, the contradictions are made and unmade. “The subject of cultural discourse—the agency of a people—is split in the discursive ambivalence that emerges in the contestation of a narrative authority between the pedagogical and the performative” (p. 299). The nation is a narrative emerging at the point of articulation, a practice that contradicts or ignores the part of national culture that claims to be the “true” past as found in “reified forms of realism and stereotype” (p. 303).
The conflict between the pedagogical (historical) and the performative (emerging present) is found in a Canadian example in which the concept of "nation" invokes Canadian society as a unified cultural community bounded by common time, territory and tradition. The notion of the "people-as-one" is reinforced by the presence "other" people or nations whose "minor differences" can be absorbed and reinterpreted for purposes of acting out the governance of a "distinct" Canadian formation (p. 300). This pedagogical enunciation of democracy, and the "people as one" tradition, exists alongside the performative, reiterative examples of overt, elite, systemic, and everyday racism, sexism and economic exploitation. Certain levels of social control are permitted for the way they support cultural nationalism and the image of Canada as a homogeneous, liberal plurality and opposed to "alien" or "immigrant" cultures. Considerable means of social control and cultural production are required to produce an image of homogeneous plurality; so that between the idea of Canadian nationalism and the occurrence of everyday racism in state formation emerges a contradictory, ambivalent national narrative (Parry, 1987). Ironically, by way of supporting the traditional narrative, discursive and material racist practices such as those found in immigration proceedings, are often asserted in the name of strengthening Canada as a nation (see Barrett, 1987; McKague, 1991; Satzewich, 1992; Smith, 1993). These images created in the construction of nationalism invariably rationalize or reinforce whiteness, also referred to the taken-for-grantedness of racial privilege, as a characteristic of what it is to be a Canadian.

How does the imagined community emerge into the symbol of narrative constructed from "two incommensurable temporalities that threaten its coherence" (p. 308)? How does this particular narration of what is "traditional" take place in Canada so that the "non-traditional" can be taken into account and still maintain an otherness of the past? Or as Bhabha might ask: How does
tradition take the "non-traditional" into account so that it can still maintain the pedagogical telling of the past as if it were the emerging narrative? Bhabha's analysis is apt: "It is this forgetting—a minus in the origin—that constitutes the beginning of the nation's narrative" (p. 310). The historical or Traditional narrative begins by forgetting, for example, that the people were never, and are not now, one. Further "It is through this syntax of forgetting—or being obliged to forget—that the problematic identification of a national people becomes visible".

The narrative is never homogeneous and never finished as it emerges as the utterance of a modern society. The "forgetting" is not a question of historical memory, however, but a construction of the social discourse that never completely performs the problematic tradition of the pedagogical. In reading that narrative of the nation, we read the performative as an incomplete representation, as metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche. The narrative tells more of the past which is not a "real" past but that which has passed into a tradition of what history has become. A forgetting of history must happen in order for tradition to function. Tradition also dominates the present in that the narrative of the imagined community does include the present conditions even though "Difference" is spoken of but is never taken up as part of what Tradition can bear. Difference always eludes language and attempts to translate itself into the narrative. It is talked about, but stands aside. "It is too often the slippage of signification that is celebrated, at the expense of this disturbing alienation, or overpowering of content" (p. 314). For example, it is easier to engage in the dress, dancing, and dinner of another but not so easy to share decision-making over things one once decided unilaterally.

The "nation speaks a disjunctive narrative" from the incommensurability of the historical, sedimented pedagogical time and the signifying process of the performative. It is from this disjuncture of incommensurable narratives that
difference emerges as the narrative of the nation. This is the question that Bhabha claims to be interested in and it is mine as well: What is the difference that emerges at this disjuncture of narrative—this difference which Foucault describes as the “over-familiar that constantly eludes one” (quoted in Bhabha, p. 312)? Bhabha states: “My interest lies only in that movement of meaning that occurs in the writing of cultures articulated in difference” (p. 312). Cultural difference emerges from the repetitious movement of the different tellings between the idea of history and the enunciative present. This entrance into the symbolic is the continual emergence of cultural difference which contests both cultural supremacy of the pedagogical and the priority of the performative. The frontiers of cultural difference are always belated in that their “hybridity is never simply a question of the admixture of the pre-given identities or essences” (p. 314). In Western nations, the liminality or Third Space, though unrepresentable, constitutes the discursive conditions for enunciating the continually opening subject of its narrative. Bhabha’s description of the ambivalent, enunciative Third Space can be understood in terms of Lacan’s description of the continually unfixed and reiterative entrance of the subject into the social. The opening space for re-examining newness and possibility is found in the liminality and slippage; it is in the ambivalence of traditional discourse that the production of hybridization occurs.

**Ambivalent narratives**

It is the process of telling from this space of forgotten identifications that the nation articulates itself. National identity is not what it says it is and not what is forgotten; rather it is the articulation, with its denials, resistance to denials, its embodied representations—the “astonishing present”—and what Bhabha calls the third space that is neither named nor identified. This third space
is also understood as the slippage or ambivalence in how the colonizer and colonized are positioned in relation to this inability to "fix" or name identities. Like the process of subject identifications outlined in the last chapter, the narrative of the nation is never unitary, self-contained or consistent. The articulation of the nation necessarily signals the loss on the part of the "authorizing subject of cultural knowledge", "subject of enunciation", and the consequent control over the reinscription of colonizer/colonized in a different relation of power. The significance of this liminal space is that neither essentialism nor pure constructivism is possible. Identities are neither essential in which a nation and a people are fixed "as one", nor are they non-self-referentially constructivist in which no collectivity is possible and no one can speak or be heard. Difference that arises from ambivalent identifications is articulated in the "third space" between the pedagogical and the performative, but is typically "reabsorbed" into that which already exists. The non-synchrony of time and culture in the "third space", however, maps the cultural difference inscribed as the "in-between", the "unrepresentable". Bhabha's use of psychoanalysis "makes possible a reading of the ambivalence operating within colonial authority" (Young, 1990, p. 155). It is the ambivalence that makes possible the process of the narrative by which the nation performs itself.

What does this work offer in the way of changes in how we might think of ourselves as subjects in both individual and/or collective identifications? Bhabha offers two possibilities: One, the on-going narrative of the nation—incomplete, forgotten as parts of it are—is the site of possibility of the emerging citation. The significance of historical details is not necessarily as evidence or proof of what has happened, "but as a history which is essentially not over, a history whose repercussions are not simply omnipresent (whether consciously or not) in all our cultural activities, but whose traumatic consequences are still
actively evolving" (Felman & Laub, p. xiv). Human agency in the form of political organizing and collective activity gather potential in light of articulations that are, by necessity, always on-going, partial and in flux. The nation's narrative—found in its literature, mythology, art, popular culture, any of its modes of telling—is the attempt of the nation to make tangible its imagined community. At the same time, these narratives which act as cultural references and the categories by which a nation witnesses to itself continually fail "both to contain, and to account for, the scale of what has happened in contemporary history" (p. xv).

The second possibility for re-examining collective and individual identifications offered by Bhabha's work is located in the im/possibility of transition and translation which comes together in the migrant—in the concern for "'survival' of migrant life" (1994, p. 224); the contradictory positioning of the migrant, as both necessary and disavowed, is evident even in the "untranslatable" reporting (communicating) of contestation and flux arising from the clash of the migrant and the traditional culture. The "survival" of the migrant at stake is against the threat of visibility with which the migrant serves to mark the traditional culture's difference so that the traditional is "not other"; against the migrant's being silenced, spoken for, and named in some ways it does not choose; and against the heresy of hybridity. Bhabha says that the interstitial and marginal do not only negate the reference points of the dominant culture as if they were always and only binary opposites, but they also negotiate the disjunction which will fragment and decanonise the original. It is by this process of "negation-as-negotiation" that "newness enters the world". Newness and negation move beyond the process of assimilation and past the "racist's nightmare" of being overwhelmed by the opened "flood-gates". The nation moves towards the ambivalent process of splitting and hybridity that is always
available to mark its difference, that is, its intersticial undecidability enunciated between cultural authority and performative practices.

Although Bhabha’s work is criticized for not taking gender into account and for lumping together and homogenizing a discussion of minority discourse (Grewal, 1996; Liu, 1994), I suggest that the very abstract nature for which it is criticized allows marginalized discourses, such as the positions of women in enunciating the nation, to be read through Bhabha’s theories. Although marginalized accounts appear in the heroic, traditional narrative only if they have been re-absorbed by that narrative, the narrative is still part of the performative activity which enunciates the everydayness of the nation and necessitates the repetition of the heroic narrative and the “people-as-one”. The charge that Bhabha’s work repeats the colonizer/colonized binary (Grewal, 1996) has some merit although it is the impossibly deferred integration and contrast between these binaries and other possibilities that Bhabha is problematizing; it is precisely the difference that difference makes that is under investigation. Although Bhabha does not take up the specifics of how “other people” come to “occupy a place of cultural undecidability” or “help establish the margins of the nation space” (Liu, 1994, p. 40), his theory offers insight into processes of uncertainty, re-absorption and hybridity, including the ambivalence of mimicry and agency. I suggest that these theories are sufficiently fluid so that no homogenizing of populations is necessary in order for the theories to work. That “other people” are not homogeneous is not contradicted or elided by Bhabha’s theorizing which establishes that history and identity are neither pre-authorized nor available to totalizing claims. This is a point made in the last chapter: “What is at issue is the performative nature of differential identities: the regulation and negotiation of those spaces that are continually, contingently, ‘opening out’, remaking the boundaries, exposing the limits of any claim to a singular or
autonomous sign of difference—be it class, gender or race" (Bhabha, 1994a, p. 219). Bhabha’s description of national discourse has its parallel in Butler’s work which emphasizes the performative present as the place in which agency and specific action can be read.

The question of cultural differences which emerge in national narratives can be examined as processes that “add to” but do not “add up” (1990a, p. 305) in the sense that they are both implicated in and outside the construction of the signifying system. The exposure of differences and the slippage between systems of cultural authority and performative practices constitute rich sites for the investigation of cultural contestation and for the incompleteness of symbolic systems of representation in a nation’s narrative. Indeed, an important part of this research studies the ways in which identities are produced by the repetition of contradictory discourses which construct both the subject and the social, particularly the processes of national identity which become signifying practices within a structure of repetition and enunciation. Bhabha’s description of the enunciated, narrated version of the emergent nation, especially the insistent necessity of the third space, is not unlike the description provided by Lacan and Butler in the previous chapter in which subjectivity is continually materialized in its “citational performativity”.

Allowing that notions of subjectivity and nation-construction are overlapping, Bhabha uses the repetitive and “ambivalent structure of subjectivity and sociality” in at least two ways. First, the entrance of the subject into the social appears as a linear event only in the telling. The simultaneous performance of the subject/social accomplishes Bhabha’s taken-for-grantedness of the inseparability of subject and nation. It also rejects any notion of there being a transparent social reality that is unequivocally knowable; and instead of a linear progression of historical time, the nation is constructed through the
subject and the social by means of material institutions and practices of power. Second, Bhabha's use of the liminal third space—between the pedagogic and the performative—can also be described in terms of the subject's entrance into the Symbolic which, again to quote Bhabha, is "on the cusp of language and the law". Such is the construction of the ambivalent subject/social that certain notions become untenable: an autonomous, self-determining subject; and "hierarchical claims to [an] inherent originality" (p. 37) of the nation or the "purity" of its people. Read through Lacan and Butler, the previous chapter emphasizes the subject of the subject/social performativity. This chapter, following Bhabha and Fanon, the social and especially the nation is emphasized.

In the next section I look at some of the impossible, ambivalent narratives that come from the subject/social spaces of ambiguity—narratives that have been made in the repetition of cultural authority and the instability of its narrative. Of the many possibilities, I have chosen to look at narratives of the land, First Nations people, and multiculturalism. This is by no means an exploration of these themes in anything that remotely resembles a full treatment. They are examined, rather, for their ambivalent tellings and for what may be read in the slippage of the national narratives in their process of forgetting. For, an understanding of that which a tradition has forgotten and why it has forgotten it is already to constitute an illuminating insight into the national narrative.

Three narratives

1. The land

Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of Canadian national narrative is the landmass that comprises the country's geography. Perhaps the image of the landscape at its most pristine and removed portion is found in the Canadian North. The image has been built to mythic status, and the relation to this landmass has been an extended and ambivalent topic for a considerable time
among writers, politicians, and poets. At times the symbol of Canada also includes the entire circumstances of natural geography found within Canadian borders inscribed by distance, natural features, and the weather. Whether Canadians have actually been north of the fifty-first parallel below which the majority reside is quite beside the point. The geography and space have been mythologized as defining images, not just of the landscape, but also of the social features. Rob Shields suggests that a social mythology based on North as signifier “will be seen to define central Canadian identity” (1991, p. 165) irrespective of personal images and experiences. This social mythology represents the pedagogic tradition and cultural background that stands in as “shared” history. The symbol of the North, however, is ambivalent and subject to banality when it is thought about at all in shopping malls and busy downtown streets. In some ways it seems as if the signifier of the Canadian “True North” has been constructed out of a need to say, at least, something about one’s nation as, for example, against a post-revolutionary country whose watchwords are “independence” and “freedom”. In some ways, Canada as “True North” is cliché and cause for embarrassment and jokes, but it also available in the Canadian psyche to inform the present day and historical use of landscape. Especially as it has been taken up by writers including Margaret Atwood and Northrop Frye, the North is imagined as other: pure, romantic, innocent, and terrible. “‘Fear of nature’ is an important ingredient in this ‘tradition’ of reporting on the Canadian character” (Shields, p. 183).

Shields argues that as a nation, Canada has built its cultural identity on the mythology of a “True North Strong and Free”, a mythology that is overburdened by what it is expected to portray. The landscape is imagined as a “masculine-gendered, liminal zone of rites de passage and re-creative freedom and escape” (p. 163). Shields describes the use of the North, as the metonym for wilderness, to be the defining symbol of things Canadian from both sides of what the land has
been made to represent: civilised-uncivilised and culture-nature. By means of this extensive, untamed, natural landmass, Canadians can ambivalently define themselves as civilized, a people of culture, and definitely not Americans.

The myth of the "True North" is not just a story; it also motivates and articulates a set of practices used over time, individually and institutionally enacted. Historically, one of the primary interests in the domination of the West was economic. The aggressive beginning consisting, not in some geographic romanticism or notions of equality, but in economic gain, exploitation, domination, and the holding of land. Therefore, there were only certain people who were deemed the proper inheritors of this conquering legacy, only certain people who could appreciate the difference between the wild and the tamed, the savage and the civilized: the Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking, common-law abiding person. Nationalist discourses are employed in the "West's representations of itself as possessing a knowledge and a moral authority that was its entitlement to exercise global power:...the divinely ordained task of Europeans to rule, guide and elevate backward peoples as a trust for civilization" (Parry, 1987, p. 54). This orientation to the land coincides with what Parry calls "...magniloquent self-representation, with its messianic notions of subjugation and its mystical conception of exploitation..." of the land.

Gaining control of the land politically, economically, and psychologically was made easier by regulating and controlling the conditions for designating who would be considered appropriate people to occupy the land, especially in terms of race. The process of the settlement in the West can be clearly seen through a "grid of intelligibility" marked by race, class, and gender. Identities emphatically coded by race secured the terms of citizenship and national identifications as well as the moral parameters with which to determine who was in and who was out. African Americans who immigrated to Canada
experienced overt racism including appeals to the Parliament of Canada to stop the “developing black (sic) influx” in order to preserve a “white west” by stopping the flow of African Americans and other racialized minorities (Shepard, 1991, p. 29). Great tracts of land were occupied by European immigrant owners while other immigrants from Asia, for example, were allowed to remain in Canada as visitors under the strictest of conditions: control over Chinese labour on the railroad and intense “discrimination in the labour market and the denial of equal rights” (Creese, 1991, p. 35). The list of racialized minorities who experienced intense discrimination in Canada is long; nor are the events only historical. Many groups, including Jewish, Japanese, and Ukrainian immigrants, were treated in ways intended to preserve the status quo of populating the West with “white” European immigrants.

The land occupied by the earliest white settlers in the West was initially as full of uncertainties and ambiguities as those the North eventually acquired. In spite of many uncertainties and hardships surrounding their personal circumstances, the white settlers came to occupy the land as products of colonialism. Their attachment to colonialism was secured by accepting specific allotments of land organized and marked by measurement and government rules. The land was ordered by a system of grid lines laid down by surveyors like those who organized the townships in Ontario a century before. The system was carried to the West where surveying and grid lines rationalized the landscape, providing mastery and control by means recognizable to bourgeois masculinity: individuality, knowledge and possession. Attachment to the land was mediated by the relation between the law and order of the Crown and the settlers as legitimate land owners. Imposing structure on the land, organizing it, producing deeds for it, selling it, and extracting its products all became signifiers of a
landscape domesticated by colonialism—signifiers which quickly passed into the authority of tradition.

The desire of the white settler for the land is a gendered experience with the object of desire being the “homestead” for which the figure of mother links the seemingly benign notions of “land” and “home”. The settler was expected to break the soil, plant crops and bring forth a yield. The homestead was something a settler had earned. It was his place of security and repose. Women participate as symbols of patriarchal assumptions about “land” and ownership in a way that is more than benign; it is also productive. The stories of the homesteaders, men and women alike, reveal that people worked very hard to produce a living from the land. Bhabha reminds us, however, of the constructedness of tradition and its openness to manipulation for purposes of a coherent telling. Settler experiences did not occur to the settlers as stories told in historical time. The lived experiences cannot be told as if they are the content of people’s lives read mимetically from the context and as if the telling and the facts are transparent. The facts selected for the narrative, however, become constructed as the history and tradition of what “happened”. Today, settler stories are often told to the accompaniment of considerable nostalgia about the suffering and very real hardships many endured. The selected facts construct the settlers as sacrificing and heroic: arriving in the West, breaking the land, enduring the weather are accounts which produce heroic images of pioneering people. In the selection and production of these images, accounts are produced which obliterate the colonial organization that underscored the settlers’ actions and which may even have been invisible to the settlers even as the colonial organization is largely invisible in the contemporary historical telling. With irony, Fanon (1963) says that “The settler makes history; his life is an epoch, an Odyssey. He is the absolute beginning: ‘The land was created by us’. He is the unceasing cause” (p. 51). The
settler and his narrative is portrayed as the beginning of a definitive Canadian tradition; purpose and the authority of historical time begin with the settler. He is the "new original".

The consequence of the settlers’ claim of original ownership is reflected in the following: The loss of Native lands is not seen as in anyway comparable to the threat felt by the contemporary colonizer when confronted by peacefully negotiated land claims or the use of passive resistance to reclaim a lost heritage and name. That the land was expropriated and that land claims are still outstanding in a majority of places is accommodated by the forgetting of these things in favour of the nostalgic, heroic and innocent, originary narrative of the settlement of the West. These nostalgic images forestall any polite questions of the culturally embedded practices of European land appropriation imposed on the North American continent. Nor are the descendants of settlers generally aware of or willing to acknowledge the extent to which their lives have been enriched by the actions of systematic and strategic colonization.

Racialization is not only marked in visually specific ways as recorded in the otherness of non-Anglo, Eastern and Southern Europeans. Historical accounts cite repressive regulations rigidly enforcing English as the language of instruction and communication, as well as the overt denigration of the original non-Anglo cultures of certain settler children. These and other social practices in the lives of early settlers contributed to the sacrifice and loss of ethnic identities. It is ironic, however, the extent to which any material at all can be pressed into service of maintaining domination. Indeed, examples of settlers’ sacrifices are regularly employed today to justify present day privilege of "properly" assimilated Europeans. The historic suppression of non-Anglo tongues and the image of settler as other also enable the narrative of hardship and heroism endured by those who were non-English speaking and white. While the
suppression of languages in schools makes for a sad but true story, now that most settlers’ grand-children speak only English and are integral to the definition of normative dominance, the history of abuse has become useful as another example of the endurance of European people and proof that anyone can make it. The subsequent narrative from racialized other to respectable, unmarked white citizen, is nothing, if not heroic. Regarding the intersection of identity and history, Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, and Crenshaw (1993) state the following.

Groups identity forms in a way similar to individual identity. Its potential exists long before consciousness catches up with it. It is often only upon backward reflection that some kind of beginning is acknowledged...Often it is not until one engages in a conscious reconstruction, asking what led to what else, that a history is revealed or, perhaps more accurately, chosen. (pp. 3-4)

In this process of choosing a narrative, the pedagogic tradition absorbs difference by splitting off a people’s loss while lionizing their ability to endure. They are rewarded for their common sense, characterized by their gradual loss of “difference”.

The area in which I grew up on the Canadian prairies is typical in many ways in that it still reflects the earlier European settlement which simultaneously included the systematic removal of the original Native Indians. The centrality of whiteness is reinforced by the history of the area, a history which partly accounts for its ethnocentricity if not its racism. The descendants of white immigrants occupy the land with no articulated memory of former inhabitants, but only a sense of control and authority which define the demographic and cultural landscape. The whiteness of the landscape, however, is not noticeable to most of the residents except for what is missing or in contrast to what it used to be. The familiarity and orderliness of the neighbourhoods has come to stand in as a definition of whiteness and as part of the legacy of the “settled” land. The notion of settlement itself stands in opposition to an imagined lack of order in the forgotten past when Indians roamed freely. The
historical terrain of the white settlers and present day inhabitants is shaped by the absent presence of the racialized First Nations people. The racelessness of white consciousness is premised and performed by racist acts (Morrison, 1993). The white body is performed and read as the semiotic of nationality; with generally only few concessions to Native people, the white body is narrated as the one that has “always been there”.

The “True North” is the “great national foundational myth” (Shields, p. 194) by which Canadians are portrayed as both humbled and heroic. Shields’ comments illustrate the contradictions that escape from the traditional, pedagogical story of Canada as the “True North”. In two senses of the word, this story of the land really is a myth, in that, on the one hand, it exists in the Canadian imaginary, in the mythology of the Canadian tradition; and on the other hand, its portrayal and performance does not encompass or contain the variety of ways that Canadian land is experienced differently and of the ways these unaccounted for uses also inform the definitions of who may be a citizen. For example, Shields draws a comparison between the romanticism of the “True North” and the way this myth covers and encourages exploitation of the land and the people who live there in what he calls the “Real North”. The mythology permits the social and cultural exploitation of the geography and the people, justifying it as “common sense”. A history of domination and fantasy are explained away: “That’s just how things are done”.

The romance and grandeur of the landscape endures as the traditional Canadian sign because it also represents the heroic image of the Canadian subject/citizen. Praised and invoked for its natural innocence, the landscape is also exploited as the metonym for the subject/citizen of Canada. For in the words of Neil Bissoondath, the landscape represents the “modesty for which Canadians
are justly known". In contrast to the heroic tradition, Shields finds it inconceivable that "such a vision of the North, an obsessive paranoia at the back of Canadians' imagination, could be credited as the unequivocal 'meaning' of Canadian history" (p. 183). Needless to say, the "meaning" of Canada, like the identities of its citizens is ambivalent and anything but fixed. But the myth of the Canadian landscape is that it represents the most significant piece of Canadian identity. Shields notes ironically that the traditional narrative attempts to overshadow anything human beings have done in delineating the "heart" of Canada. In spite of the numerous and sometimes contradictory and often unaccounted for uses of the landscape, as metonymic reminder of Canadian identity, the tradition of the land cannot account for and must ultimately "forget" the gendered, raced, classed differences that are not accommodated by this notion of an imagined Canada.

The national narrative emerges between the tradition of the land as the source of the humane, resourceful, strong Canadian identity and from the performative events of social control and exploitation by state processes. The desire in the narrative is that the myth, itself, be available as a symbol of identity—in spite of the slippage and excess, in spite of the ambivalence, in spite of the difference that emerges in its articulation.

2. First Nations Peoples

The second narrative is the contribution of the image of First Nations people to Canadian national identity. This is likely a different image than one that First Nations people would provide, although it is related to it. What the popular narrative consists of, instead, is the ambivalent and inconsistent

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1 Without a hint of irony, the article describes Canadian "modesty". The article summarizes: "There is a quality about Canada that is not to be confused with naiveté, for it cannot be condemned. It is heartening proof of how seriously we take notions of goodness and a confirmation of idealism". *Globe and Mail*, Saturday, May 27, 1995. From Neil Bissoondath. (1995). *Pieces of Sky: If You Love This Country*. Penguin.
positioning of Native people in their experience as other and as the backdrop for white Canadian identities. Because identities are produced by variable and shifting positions of race, class, gender, and nation, the production of boundaries has been necessary for the narration of cultural, racial, and economic differences. In the settler nation of Canada, the colonizing processes of entitlement, of First Nations peoples, and land ownership have become integral to the construction of white identity.

Toni Morrison (1992) has demonstrated the way in which the formation of a white identity in the United States can be read against the image of African Americans in the literary tradition of that country. She shows how African American presence is not only available in the national narrative, but how it is indispensable to the white identities that are celebrated and lionized. Major themes in United States literature, as those of any country, are derived from a country’s historic, economic, and social figurations. Morrison cites these U.S. themes as individualism, freedom, power and argues that they are indebted to the presence of the Black Other who was neither free nor powerful in the conditions of slavery; furthermore, these themes continue as “responses to a dark, abiding, signing Africanist presence” (p. 5). This abject identification is always present as the “social enemy” or the enemy within. It is those conditions and the presence of African Americans against which the nation defines itself; the abject other is a necessary part of every discourse by which a nation forms its narrative. While the presence of African Americans in the United States is the necessary basis for the definitive, autonomous, free individual, a white Canadian identity is dependent upon an abjected image of First Nations people compared to white settlers who became entitled to own the land. The identification of whiteness in both the United States and Canada is similarly dependent on an Other in order to define in relational terms who is free: that is the not-slave; or
in Canada, who is tolerant: that is, the already entitled\(^2\). These claims on freedom and tolerance are predicated on forgetting parts of traditions that do not add up to a heroic stature—parts of traditions that the national narrative would just as soon forget. As Morrison says: “Nothing highlighted freedom—if it did not in fact create it—like slavery”; to paraphrase for a Canadian context, nothing highlights land ownership—if it does not make it possible—like expropriation.

In the previous section, the hostility and wildness of Canadian landscape is inseparable from the native persona; the “savage” landscape is used interchangeably with the eponymous Native as that which is feminized, unexplored, and ready to engulf the male explorer, cartographer, and settler. In the process of colonization First Nations people were not only on the land as its original inhabitants, but they were also of the land in their unknown wildness and otherness. The constructedness and lack of fixity of European “civilization” must have contributed to the paranoia and fear of the unknown in the uncivilized, dangerous other. The loss of boundary and control experienced by the first Europeans reveals itself in the intense efforts to conquer the Native peoples as well as the land in which the act of conquering served to assuage any doubts about who was superior. Marginal states, between the known and the unknown, are the most uncertain and dangerous for dominant identifications; it is where liminal spaces and the people who occupy them fall prey to this colonial pattern—“dangerous marginality, segregation, reintegration” (p. 24). The “problem” of indigenous peoples in these “empty” spaces is solved in the

\(^2\)Unfortunately Morrison attributes the notion of America’s definitional whiteness entirely to the presence of African blackness. Her analysis completely covers over and minimizes the Native presence of the first peoples of the Americas. Morrison repeats a significant error by accepting that the Americas were a “blank page”, without history (p. 35), and available for the conquerors to do with as they pleased. By allowing only a single dynamic of the formation of white consciousness, Morrison also repeats the repression of memories that undermines the significance of Native Americans as the historical and present day other. This omission seems especially critical if Morrison is intent on moving towards a project which she insists is fascinating and urgent: developing a national literature that is historically and critically accurate (p. 48).
dominant discourse by their symbolic displacement as "anachronistic humans, atavistic, irrational, bereft of human agency—the living embodiment of the archaic 'primitive'" (p. 30). Along with desire for economic gain and aggrandized male militarism, paranoia and uncertain identifications contributed to the raping and massacring, the vilification and fetishizing of the other. Another method of control is the process of feminizing both the land and Natives—a process which is a "compensatory gesture, disavowing male loss of boundary by reinscribing a ritual excess of boundary, accompanied, all too often, by an excess of military violence" (McClintock, p. 24).

Even though Europeans depended on Aboriginal peoples to accomplish their primary interest in North America—that of resource extraction—state-building contributed to the decline of any "special status" Aboriginal peoples may have had (Dickinson & Wotherspoon, 1992). As European purposes in North America changed to plans for economic and political control through colonization, like the land against which white society could define itself as civilized, First Nations people entered the national narrative as part of the natural, wild, and unpredictable landscape. The contradictory status that Natives came to occupy in the national narrative has been mediated by treaties of land transfer; the abundant presence of settlers and missionaries as part of the civilizing offensive "supported by ideologies of Indians as inferior, primitive, and uncivilized" (Dickinson & Wotherspoon, p. 409); as well as state military infrastructure such as the Mounted Police and local authorities.

Dehumanizing Natives in North America is not different from processes that made possible white supremacy and acts of genocide in Europe. Ward Churchill (1994) draws forceful comparisons between events in Europe and in North America: the "conquest of territory belonging to the Poles, Slavs, and other 'inferior' peoples" (p. 245) in Europe not long after the American conquest
parallels the appropriation of 97.5 percent of all Native land (United States figures only). Similar is the comparison between eradication of the Jews in Europe and the “physical eradication of some 98 percent of the continent’s Native population between 1500 and 1900”. Churchill describes the resistance these and other comparisons evoke from people who would otherwise identify as activists, theorists, and Native sympathizers. They invoke the “narcissism of minor differences” to explain that words describing the effects of nazis actions, white supremacy, and genocide are descriptive of events in other places, but not in North America, and certainly not in Canada. It is hardly surprising that Churchill’s claims evoke enormous resistance including the suggestion that what he is saying is “misleading” or “oversimplified” (p. 245). His claims are an affront because they indict Canadian myths of innocence and compassion and contradict the notion that it is meritocracy and not violence that secures white domination. M. Nourbese Philip (1993), who makes a similar argument in regard to the treatment of Africans in the New World, also says that the inability to accept the truth of these charges about white supremacy is reflected in the “river of silence running through the knowledge systems of the West [which] begins in language. There is as yet no word in English—Canadian English—for what has happened to First Nations people” (Philip, p. 81). Philip continues that the treatment of Natives by the white supremacist society of Canada is the “benchmark for the treatment of all other peoples of colour coming to this land [as seen in] the attempted genocide of Native peoples by Europeans” (p. 128). Churchill says that in wanting to explain “what really happened”, many people suggest that Natives should be grateful for what has been done to them. This final expectation of gratitude is perhaps the most egregious and self-defining of the performance of the colonizer. Concerning white domination and entitlement, this presumption signals that “no more seamless ideological or psychic self-
ratification of an imperial status quo is imaginable” (p. 326). The construction of identity markers which follow these acts seem hardly surprising.

One exploited source of identity markers are found in the person of the “imaginary Indian” as the one who “functioned as a peripheral but necessary component of Europe’s history in North America—the negative space of the ‘positive’ force of colonialist hegemony” (Crosby, 1991, p. 269). As the term “Indian” refers to the mistaken assumption by Christopher Columbus that he had reached the Indies, this image of the imaginary “Indian” began as “White man’s mistake...became a White man’s fantasy” as a container of “hopes, fears, prejudices” (Francis, 1993, p. 5). The national narrative elaborates the stories of the projections of the colonizers’ fears onto the new World. On the one hand, in a positive image of North America as the new Garden of Eden, the Natives were the blessed innocents. When the land was portrayed as wild and threatening, the Indians, as part of the landscape were seen as savage and bloodthirsty. The Native man became the measure of the European man: alternately as the standard of virtue and manliness or as proof of the need for civilized society. The Native as part of the natural world—as indicated by some naming rituals, (historic) skills in the forest, attention to (ancient) culture—is an identity for which the colonial narrative is prepared. When it is not mourned as “lost” or “dying”, Native culture is lionized as either heritage or healer; or, when used by the colonizer, Native culture is exotic and praiseworthy in service of colonial exploitation (Emberley, 1993). The image of the exotic “natural” Indian is invariably used by the dominant culture as a measure and definition of who it is not (Crosby, 1991).

Prospective immigrants were encouraged to come to the West even though “in admitting the settler, [Natives] sign their own death warrants” (Grant, 1967[1873], quoted in Francis, p. 48). This remark was made, however, not
to discourage settlement, but, in an example of imperialist nostalgia, to lament what could not be helped. The historical narrative of nation-building establishes the legitimacy of the colonizer and necessitates the effacement of First Nations people. The originary violence of ‘real’ Canadian past realizes the “fundamental relations between Native and colonizer” (Emberley, 1993). For the most part, however, the national narrative “occludes the imperialist moment” of Canada’s ‘forgotten’ history in which Canada is a nation because of colonization. “Internal colonialism” refers to the separate legal status under the Indian Act and subjugation of First Nations people to special legislative programs including the settling in reserves. One of the effects of internal colonialism has been to force First Nations people “to the oceanic frontiers of the Canadian imaginary to the point of a virtual denial of their existence except as self-serving symbols in the Canadian-history enterprise” (Emberley, p. 17). If the identity of European-based people in Canada depends upon colonization and cultural imperialism, it is not hard to understand the necessity of denial and the “forgetting” of this history and to substitute what amounts to long term amnesia, latterly called an “identity crisis”.

The desire for the Other positions Natives as the subjects of both fear and longing among white colonizing society which expresses its desire in ambivalent responses. Crosby wonders whether the self-critique of the West regarding its historical depiction of “the other” isn’t just another form of desire and self-serving colonization in which First Nations peoples are a new topic for postmodern periphery/centre discourse. bell hooks (1992) describes the longing as the process of “eating the other” which adds spice to an otherwise bland and monochromatic life. Francis charges that through the process of appropriating Native symbols, collecting Native art,
unveiling yet another totem pole as a symbol of the country, non-Native Canadians are trying in a way to become indigenous people themselves and to resolve their lingering sense of not belonging where they need to belong. By appropriating elements of Native culture, non-Natives have tried to establish a relationship with the country that pre-dates their arrival and validates their occupation of the land. (p. 190)

Abundant evidence of the desire for the Other affords many opportunities to see the slippage in the traditional, heroic narrative.

More than "eating the other", however, the colonizing process also makes possible the opportunity to be "born again". It is not really the First Nations person that is desired, but rather the desire of the colonizer reveals the emptiness of the absent presence that traditional settler narratives can never completely satisfy. It is the desire of the colonizer "to resolve their lingering sense of not belonging where they need to belong". The process of indigenization on the part of colonizing people offers many possibilities for fulfilling the desires and fantasies of becoming the "new original" people. For example, Emberley, in her discussion of Native women's writing, critiques the process by which the dominant colonial literary apparatus attempts to "justify an internal process of patriation" (p. 132)—that of becoming indigenous by writing about indigenous people. The question is over what form Native women's writing and culture can take when a simulacrum of it already prevails in the writing about Native women's writing. How can it be discussed without reference to European forms and epistemologies or in advance of its arrival? And, in a similar way, how does the colonialist narrative function so as to inscribe the European culture and its discursive subjectivities as "indigenous"? Describing the landscape as empty allows colonists to see themselves as "'new people' forging entirely new cultures" (Churchill, p. 244). In Canada, the thesis of "vertical mosaic" and the presence of a multicultural policy suggests that Canada has produced a "wholly
new people, even while enforcing racial codes indicating the exact opposite” (p. 266, 69n).

Adopting the simulacrum of a position that one has helped to destabilize is, indeed, a kind of imperialist nostalgia which has the power to “transform the responsible colonial agent into an innocent bystander” (Rosaldo, 1989, p. 70). Innocence is a much desired position, and there is also great nostalgia over its loss; innocence and imperialist nostalgia come together in the narrative which describes, in terms of an oxymoron, the “new originals”—a latter day colonialist attempt to cover one’s complicity and the processes of domination. Attempts to rewrite history for the promise of a fuller account and more interesting roles for all around typically do so with pre-formed identities defined in the ideology of the dominant narrative. The “new subject” continues to define the old conceptual order of who can be a person and a subject, and who can be a stereotype.

Those images that cannot be contained in the nation’s narrative are like the ones which Toni Morrison examines in her discovery of a white literary imagination which for so long has been hiding the obvious in plain sight: “a real or fabricated Africanist presence was crucial to [the writers’] sense of Americanness” (p. 6). Applying these discoveries to the Canadian context, one might find these contradictions emerging from this nation’s narrative: the desire to identify as the other and the simultaneous, unremitting abjection of that identity; or the appropriation of an historically un/knowable other and the continual lack of closure on that history. These desires and this lack of closure are the creation of the liminal space, the Third space of which Bhabha speaks. “Textualized remainders”, such as acts of racism and genocide, are left over from the traditional narrative; these remainders which resist closure of the colonialist account are ambivalently employed, however, to assuage doubts of white
supremacy. These narrative remainders and incomplete closures are not observed as traditional heroic acts but as "a surplus of additional signs taken for waste" (Emberley, p. 102). They are accounted as superfluous in their inability to conform to the national narrative even though the dominant heroic narrative cannot close itself because of its dependence on the stories of the lives of Native people.

3. Multiculturalism

One of Canada's most popular and prideful narratives is the story of its multicultural history. The effects of racialism, historically and in the present day, however, contradicts the congratulatory rhetoric of multiculturalism. The desire that this multicultural story be constructed as positive and heroic conceals the object of the desire: a homogeneous culture with dominance reinscribed. This is the thesis of Evelyn Légaré's (1995) argument in an article to which I liberally refer.

The entrance of many groups into Canada is marked by measures of control that are racially coded, underscored as these measures are by European desire for and rejection of First Nations peoples—as I have described in the previous section. Dauvergne and Morton (1995) state

Canada, as a political, social, and economic entity in a particular geographical space, was founded on the notion that the western European settlers arrived at a place they have subsequently imbued with meaning. Clearly this ignores the presence of First Nations peoples and it legitimates the way the present day government continues to influence the construction of Canada partially through immigration law. (pp. 26-7)

Immigration law and the practice of multiculturalism are organized as sources of pride in the mythology of Canadian identity, at the same time that multiculturalism and its effects distinctly limit the face of the imagined Canadian community. Of early immigration law, one of the effects is that while white Europeans were actively recruited to settle the Prairies where they received free tracts of land, the Chinese were subjected to a head tax as well as low wages
on the railroad and other sectors in exchange for their labour (Stanley, 1990); Japanese and Ukrainian immigrants were subjected to internment some years after their first arrivals; and advertisements were withdrawn from southern United States when "too many" African Americans took up the offer of homesteading on the Canadian prairies (Shepard, 1991). From at least the '20s, Jews experienced quotas and restrictions on employment, residence, educational opportunities (Glickman, 1991); anti-semitism would appear to be increasing today (Barrett, 1992). The problem with mentioning a few examples is that it appears to trivialize the many other groups I have not mentioned and who meet racism as an everyday experience. Unfortunately, racism is not only historic, but it is alive—only too well—and at work in support of a hegemonic cultural system.

Canadian pedagogic history is interwoven with the denial of racism and the story of positive multicultural relations that work to sustain images of tolerant and peaceful co-existence among an internationally represented population. The "forgotten" past and present which are contrary to this harmonious image permit these and many other myths that enjoy wide subscription in Canada: "racism cannot exist within a democratic society" (such as Canada); "discrimination is a problem faced by everyone from time to time"; "racism is a result of immigration"; "racial conflict occurs because of racial diversity in society" (Henry, Tator, Mattis, & Rees, 1995, 21). Adrienne Shadd (quoted in McKague, 1991, p. 1) says that racism in Canada is a bedrock institution, one that is "embedded in the very fabric of our thinking, our personality". In more concrete terms, McKague (1991) says that, in Canada, the writing of national history and school curricula at all levels of education illustrate that the elimination of people of colour from positive forms of recognition is not just the phenomenon of a few prejudiced individuals; "it is
ingrained and reinforced in all the major and minor institutions of the society” (p. 4). Even more significant than the existence of racism in Canada is that, in the national narrative, racism generally exists under denial. When cultural figures and emblematic stories of society and the nation reflect a particular group, the cultural images are impervious to displacement. For one thing, the dominant group is flattered by its own reflection and easily justifies its point of view by ascribing it, by definition, to sensible people everywhere. Prejudice and racism are unassailable to critiques based on impartial reason, especially when one’s identity is inscribed in the national narrative.

Multiculturalism and immigration practices are foundational to the shaping of national identity “and to justifying the boundaries created by this identity” (Dauvergne & Morton, p. 20). There are many processes by which practices of immigration law and multiculturalism work to justify the boundaries of the imagined communities. For one thing, certain constructions of multiculturalism and immigration permit widespread acceptance of the shibboleth that “we are a nation of immigrants”—a phrase which simultaneously accomplishes the dispossession of Native peoples from their lands and establishes Europeans as the normative immigrant and the “new original”. Second, the management of multicultural and immigration practices supports power relations which continue to reinforce dominance and notions of superiority. Exclusionary policies act as signifiers of power, control and tolerance. For example, in the Canadian context, in which multiculturalism is based on an ideology of cultural pluralism, the ideal of an inclusive nation has a way of devaluing and controlling race by reducing it to the discourse of culture. The colonial conquest reasserts itself by valorizing culture and ignoring the effects of racialization in which the sign of difference is reduced to that of a raceless/white individual and all historical trajectories to the normalization of experience.
Multiculturalism is about the *contribution* groups can make to Canadian society. In exchange, they are offered the opportunity to be born again if groups will forget the historical forces that were integral to their identity in the first place. The past is dead and we are born again as individuals in the spirit of multiculturalism in an ideal Canada (McFarlane, 1995, p. 24). In the liberal democracy that is Canada, equality among individuals often equates to sameness. By means of multiculturalism, the attempt to construct equality out of diversity "effectively neutralizes the uniqueness" of historically and culturally different groups (Légaré). Political, economic and social agency is effectively reduced when the sign of difference is neutralized as cultural or ethnic difference. The reduction of difference to culture organizes it as an object or possession, one with which a group can claim unique peoplehood (Légaré, 1995, p. 351) as a product of a determinate culture. In this way, culture is also understood as something static, as heritage, as roots, as an ethnic identity belonging to things in the past, the arrival in Canada as a point of departure. While the imposition of assimilationist policies is resisted, groups bear a cost when they do not accept "folklorization", or when they make political demands on the present, or when a performance cannot readily be incorporated into the traditional and thereby remains in excess of Canadian identity. They are the ethnically identified Others, viewed with suspicion as if they must surely be opposed to Canadianness (Légaré, p. 353).³

While the sign of difference in artifacts and folkloric customs is prized, different identities are not. Légaré says, "To be tolerated, otherness, is and must

³ Just prior to his participation on the Canadian team in the 1996 Olympic games, Donovan Bailey twice entered into the Third space where cultural difference shows up as transgression. He first declared that Canada was as racist a country as the United States; and upon winning the gold medal in the 100 meter race, he said that he was, first of all, Jamaican. (*Globe and Mail*, Monday, July 29, 1996, C2). Even though Bailey later modified his remarks to say that he is Canadian as well as Jamaican, he had already cast doubt on his Canadianness. His first remark contradicts the Canadian denial of racism; the second shows a refusal to forget one's history and the transgression of divided loyalties: Bailey is ungrateful.
be encapsulated” (p. 353). Groups are seen as being outside the nation, as other, when they make demands on the state, for it is demands on the state which signal that assimilation is not happening—that the excess of the other has not been absorbed. To obtain privileges, the ethnic must remain ethnic and not stand out or “demand” notice as other. In Canada, identities known as ethnic, minority, and immigrant perform a very useful function. Smaro Kamboureli (1993) says that as Canadians, we need the foreignness of ethnics “to measure our own otherness. The ethnic as an other to us determines, tests, the economy of our tolerance, the subtleties of our speech, the elasticity of Canadian identity” (p. 145). The foreignness of ethnics is necessary: it justifies the construction of difference and the provision of tolerance.

Contradictions emerge between the promise of multiculturalism and the requirement of homogeneity in which differences are permitted in only limited ways. By means of assimilation, folklorization, reduction in agency, and identifications reduced to culture are supported by traditional structures in which differences, once again, “add to” but do not “add up”. No where are these contradictions more acute, however, than for First Nations people whose claims can only be made on the basis of having a distinct identity. In the normalcy of Canadian identity construction, however, remaining other is not only un-Canadian; it also sets First Nations people against other minorities who have lost their individuality under the guise of “equality = sameness”. Native cultural practices are identified against the backdrop of dominant white culture with the latter identity standing in for Canadian. Resistance to Native claims comes from, among others, various European cultural groups who have previously lost their own identities in numerous acts of assimilation. Aboriginal identity, however it is collectively defined, is therefore seen in opposition to individual rights of Canadian citizens. At least three consequences follow this resistance to Native
The most immediate consequence may be that when Native cultural specificity is posed against individual rights, the debate is refocussed away from a consideration of why the claims need to be raised at all, that is, the systemic racism and poverty exacerbated by the outstanding claims. Second, this construal of different treatment for Native people is seen as distinctly at odds with the notion of equality in a democratic state. Ironically, some people imagine that Native claims for justice and equality constitute Natives as oppressors—with "ordinary" Canadians losing out (Légaré, p. 359). Surely, this resistance follows from the resentment of people who have already given up much to the dominant Anglo culture of Canada, including those invisible minorities whose loss of cultural identity is still fresh. Non-Anglo settlers have been required to negotiate a new symbolic representation by repressing their mother tongue or by facing the prospect of becoming similarly abject. For the most part, they have "chosen" to adopt a "clean and proper language" in which they repress both their mother tongue and the mother, and accept instead, the law of the father (Gunew, 1993, p.14) as the law of the new country. Various languages within a nation are a threat because they emphasize the split within a nation's identity and its subjectivity. Non-anglophone languages within "a predominantly anglophone context function as the abject, as something which threatens meaning and subject-formation, including the notion a coherent national identity" (p. 17).

The third effect of Native claims made on the basis of having a distinct culture contrasts with the traditional, homogeneic understanding of multiculturalism. Since Native claims can only be made on the basis of a distinct culture and as something which cannot be homogenized, then culture comes to be read as a difference as distinct as race. In this way, Native culture can become deterministic in the way that discourses on race have been used in the past. Légaré says that culture is erroneously called upon to explain "structural
inequality, history, and people, rather than vice versa” (p. 358). The poverty and racism that Natives experience in Canada is sometimes interpreted as the legacy of a defective culture; and, ironically, being out of touch with traditional, historic and folkloric aspects of Native culture can mark Natives as defective Natives.

A paradox in Canadian identity formation is found in the discourse of multiculturalism which effectively neutralizes diversity in the attempt to identify Canada as a single national entity. At the same time, the rhetoric of multiculturalism is mobilized to show that one of the traditions of Canada is its diverse population. “The discourse about multiculturalism seeks to identify a singular entity, the Canadian nation; that is, it seeks to neutralize diversity and construct internal cultural homogeneity, even as it defines Canadianness in terms of that diversity” (Légaré, p. 351). In spite of the tradition of multiculturalism, “full inclusion within the nation demands sameness”. The national narrative of Canada and its subsequent liberal fantasies has, however, never been more indeterminate. Both the pedagogic narrative that insists on unity in identity and the performative impossibility of multiculturalism produce ample evidence of the constant flux, resistance, and struggle of the unlivibility of abject identities. Current representations of gender, class, race, and sexuality demand inclusivity not imagined in the historical, traditional Canada founded by the process of denial and forgetting. Like repressed memories, these images are back, this time as full bodied representations of their forgotten selves. One of the problems of a traditional history is that its privileged visibility is not as transparent as tradition would like to assume. Of the inability of tradition to fulfill its desires for unity, wholeness and transparency, Haran Sarup (1989, cited by Rosa Ho, 1993, p. 29) states that

4 The dominant gaze is ruptured/interrupted by many events of everyday and exceptional note. One stunning example is the exhibition by Gerald McMaster SAVAGE GRACES: “after images” at the UBC Museum of Anthropology, 1992 and later exhibited in various spaces across the country.
Our entire contemporary social system has little by little begun to lose its capacity to retain its own past; it has begun to live in a perpetual present. There seems to be a random cannibalization of all styles of the past. At the same time we seem increasingly incapable of fashioning representations of our current experiences. (pp. 144-5)

In this contradictory way, the present of national culture which narrates itself in ambiguity and difference is marginalized as if "history happens 'outside' the centre and core" (Bhabha, 1990a, p. 317). But that the nation's tradition can be called upon, however inadequate or provisional it may be to explain the emerging present, signifies the singularity of the "nation's cultural totality" and the presumptions of a privileged, accessible past.

The tradition in Canada that disavows its racism is employed as a defence against acknowledgement of a contradictory, ambivalent past and inaccessible present. The knowledge remains unconscious so that much racism is not only easily denied, but is enacted in the guise of virtue (Pajaczkowska and Young, 1992). "The emotional state produced by denial is one of blankness" and in that role, blankness sustains "White identity as normal and as 'undefined'" (p. 201).

Projection and the primacy of power relations allow elite discourses and citizens to imagine Canada as essentially a white country and to support this image by virtue of events such as official multiculturalism. Projection also offers a defence against unflattering knowledge with denial serving as "a powerful emotional defence against acknowledging painful, distressing or troubling knowledge" (p. 201).

The Human Rights Commission is on record with its claim that Canada is not a racist country\(^5\). While the veracity of this statement certainly cannot be

\(^5\) On the day designated by the United Nations as the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Canadian Human Rights Commission issued an article in which it said: "While diversity enhances Canada's social fabric, it can also increase the possibility of discrimination against those who are different. This is not to say that Canada is in any way a racist society: in fact, most racial discrimination is not deliberate or overt; it is the product of a lack of awareness about other cultures and subtle prejudices which need to be overcome". In *Prince Albert Daily Herald*, Thursday, March 21, 1996.
disputed simply by saying, like Donovan Bailey, that Canada is a racist country, the reaction to remarks like Bailey’s and those of other people who echo his sentiment suggests their remarks are a transgression of a significant traditional story. This charge is hardly a situation unique to Canada, but it is one that the traditional narrative has worked hard to marginalize. The narrative takes pride in the multicultural nature of the country and often congratulates itself for this success. The narrative desires a positive image, one of innocence, tolerance, goodness, and generosity. The desire for these qualities, however, can best be observed in their transgression and in the necessary narratives that are told to keep tradition and dominance in place.

**Conclusion**

Before closing, it is imperative to say that “forgetting” as the term that Bhabha uses to describe the process by which tradition reiterates its desired narrative is not so passive or benign as the term might suggest. Ideologies and state processes enact the “forgetting” through relations of ruling. It is an active process, not something passive. Although it is a loss, it is “an action directed against the past” (de Certeau, 1986). It is no small effort that goes into constructing heroes and, in retrospect, taking the day-to-day events of making a life and vaulting them into amazing feats of courage and self-sacrifice. An heroic past is accomplished by inventing what has gone before and by the equally important action of forgetting much of it. McClintock’s description of white South African construction of their past sounds very familiar in a Canadian context: Tradition becomes memorialized in demonstrations of out-dated technologies, period clothes, parades, and the re-enactment of historic spectacle. All the activities consolidate memory into a single linear pass, transforming it from a myriad of daily events into an economically unified stream of heraldic
activities. In Canada, there is a desire to create the hardships of settler lives as a space outside colonial and patriarchal formations; for although impoverishment and persecution were reasons for leaving their home countries, many settlers met worse privations in Canada than what they left behind. However, that they became settlers at all was through their participation in certain dominant discourses organized for political and economic purposes long before the settlers arrived, and for which purposes the white-skinned, largely working-class settlers were eminently suited. The purpose, then, is not to search for a transparent or “accurate” telling of the traditional narrative in these themes concerning the nation, but to examine the desires, processes, and conditions for the narration of the discourses in the way they have already been told. And to consider: What has been forgotten and alternately accomplished by that forgetting? What has been deemed necessary to include?

Walkerdine (1990) says that forgetting takes place because we take for granted the conditions of our construction; the conditions and their origination become normal and natural. In the national narrative, we desire that history with its forgetting is the source of our constitution. In psychoanalytic terms, “forgetting” can be identified as fantasy which is connected to the psychic organization of desire. The national narrative inscribes the country as tolerant and compassionate. The desire is to see oneself, as an individual and as a nation, as good—to the extent that fantasies are constructed to narrate this identity—with the fantasies covering over or “forgetting” parts of the narrative that do not coincide. The interest is very low for hearing about the details of the forgotten past compared to the interest that can be generated for the heroic fantasy narrative; the latter is rooted in desire and longing in a way that the uncovering of “real” contradictory histories cannot touch. The contradictory histories which would constitute an alternative realism—such as could be told about the racism
of immigration, the suppression of minorities and the denial of Aboriginal rights—are "based on politics of rationalism, of rational transformation, change through the imposition of the 'right line', the undistorted picture of reality. 'Reality' is not in this simple sense hidden or distorted" (Walkerdine, pp. 91-2). The fact remains that the "open secret" of these alternative histories—this "reality" which is neither hidden nor distorted—lacks circulation and popularity; the "right line" and the recuperation of what "really happens/happened" is neither preferred, nor desired, nor imagined in dominant discourses. The power of these forgotten histories, however, remains in their excess, in their contradiction of an "inherent originality" or "unity" of culture. The performance of this ambivalence and hybridity is what is always in the process of being forgotten in the telling of a unified tradition.

"Forgetting" occurs by means of a materiality of the fantasies created in the national narrative, as it is spoken, practiced, and lived. It is within a structure of repetition and ambivalence that the national identity is narrated between the pedagogic and the performative. The critical task is to affirm the possibilities of identities that remain as in the unconscious, the liminal, third spaces. These are the repetitive identities that are not yet cited as representative of the nation but which already participate in its formation and its narrative.
In the last chapter, I examine the necessity of nation building as a heroic activity. A national identity and the record of an imagined community are narrated and mythologized around events that are variously historical, up to date, and forgotten; but nonetheless narrated by individuals’ desires to see themselves as citizens, and their nation in a positive light. The role of education in this process of positive self-construction is immense and contradictory. Education is a positive force for nation building and foundational in shaping the identity of subjects and settlers as respectable national citizens. The process of education participates in the production of both normative citizen identity and the construction of the nation as good. In the previous chapter I have indicated some of the ways in which the concept of nationhood is a highly racialized event depending as it does on the reiteration of racial hierarchies for the production of the category, “citizen”. Further to understanding the process of education in nation-building, this chapter focuses on the construction of teacher identities. I use a poststructuralist analysis in this examination of the category, “teacher”; for as Valerie Walkerdine demonstrates, the category of teacher is organized to accomplish contradictory positionings such as powerful/powerless, as well as certain identities in circulation regarding correct teacher practice as informed by gender, race, sexuality, and class positioning. The regulation of teacher identity is accomplished by practices which are variously performed by people who take on this role.

The process of this observation of who can be a teacher need not always follow a straightforward look at who actually is a teacher. An empirical
observation easily clarifies that it is white women who appear to comprise the majority of public school teachers. In light of the discussion in previous chapters, I am not suggesting that there is a coherent, homogeneous subject identity who can stand as the universal teacher. Instead, I am examining how these various normative identifications have been organized so that they seem natural, taken-for-granted and necessary in the performance of a teacher identity. To this end it will be helpful to observe the slippage of this pattern, that is, what happens when the norms are not upheld and white, straight, working- and middle-class women are not the teachers? How do unspeakable norms continue to regulate practice? What is a teacher expected to do? These questions overlap in that who a teacher is often influences what one is permitted to do. Therefore, what is the nature of the teacher activity that is prefigured by a white female instructor? How are the norms of the role culturally organized? Particularly, how is the role of teacher produced as a raced category?

As teaching in public schools is largely a feminized profession and as it has played a significant role in this country toward the process of colonization, I focus on the way in which white women have participated and are interpellated as imperial subjects. I am especially interested in the positioning of women—as actors and victims, the marginalized agents—in colonial discourses authorized by men. In an attempt to avoid homogenizing all white women in their roles as teachers, I understand that contexts and history make a difference and that the concepts of teacher or white woman are not singular identifications. For this section, therefore, I use the process of a self-reflexive narrative of how I became a teacher. I offer it as an account that, while it cannot be representative, is not atypical and will have some resemblance to that of other white female teachers. I also tell my own story because it embodies the contradiction of any personal narrative: it is the story I know best, but I am unaware of the salience of the
considerable amount that I have failed to include. A second section presents a review of social and historical discourses concerning the social positioning of those qualified to fill this teacher role. It also historicizes the education and production of imperial subjects and the importance of this production to nation-building. Finally, I examine how white teachers participate in knowledge production and how this production is constrained by the teachers’ positionings. This coming to knowledge of oneself as a teacher also entails a refusal of knowledge in order to reiterate a teacher identity. In that the role of teacher is a production that must constantly be asserted and affirmed, this chapter concludes with questions about what a teacher can know and what she can refuse in the process of identity formation.

Who can teach?

Slippage and poststructural identities

The perfectly outlined shape on the brick wall that sometimes remains when a cartoon character explodes through it reminds me of the surety with which a teacher image is fixed. This is a fixity to which one must be able to conform if one is to be considered for the teaching profession. The outline in a brick wall is perhaps an overstatement, if only in the particulars of the shape, but it is, nevertheless, a reminder of what is at stake in the determination of fixed meanings for a stable and fundamentalist category such as teacher.

My first experience and “official” entrance through the shape on the brick wall is one I shall never forget. Standing in front of my own class on my first day of teaching was unlike any of the preparation I had undergone in practice teaching or internship. This was my first class for which I would be held accountable and for which I would be paid as a professional teacher. That first day as I stood before the class, I came perilously close to bursting out laughing—
hysterical laughter which I feared would never stop. The realization came crystal clear that all the lesson plans in the world didn’t make me a teacher. I stood before the children for what seemed an inordinate length of time, say nothing; they stared, waiting for something to happen. They did not question whether I knew what to do; they only wondered what it would be. At that moment, the expectation of my performativity as a teacher struck me as incredibly absurd. It had nothing to do with ability or formal preparation. The actual performativity of this production was something I had not anticipated even though it had been in preparation for a long time. I had presumed up to that point, that I performed myself in the singular role of Carol Schick—a role I had considered “natural”, even though it consisted in several identifications. I realized as I stood before the children as their new teacher that a role and the norms to accomplish it had already been prepared for me and by me; all I had to do was make it official. The children only expected that this official role had already been accomplished before I came to stand before them; as far as they were concerned this was my only identity. I realized in that moment of surreal clarity that the performance would begin officially as soon as I opened my mouth to speak. I was signifier and signified as teacher, and entrance into language was the sign that I had accepted my role. At that moment, however, it came to me that because I had not yet said anything, I could still remain silent and walk back out through the brick wall. I realized that speaking would be the beginning of the performance after which time my resistance to the role and its norms would only be judged as good teaching or bad teaching. At that moment, laughter seemed the only response to the unarticulated but vaguely understood absurdity of my debut performance. The children waited with their own performance, now impatient for the signal to begin. They knew what I was supposed to do and so did I. Quelling the hysteria, I broke the silence and became a teacher.
In many ways this narrative is a vast oversimplification of my entrance into a teacher identity as it recounts only a single incident. The process of my becoming a teacher had been established long before. I am not suggesting teaching was my destiny or anything like that. Rather, the norm of teacher is accomplished by a set of practices and discourses marked by identities within race, gender, class, sexual orientation—identities in which I most often participate as unconsciously as breathing. Teachers are "embodied enactments" (Britzman, 1991b) whose identities are organized through the particulars of life histories and already regulated social relations.

Britzman (1991a) describes four "chronologies" which constitute the process of becoming a teacher, described in terms of cumulative school experiences. The four consist of a teacher's early education and ideas about the nature of knowing, the post-secondary and teacher education program, experiences in schools as student teacher, and the newly minted teacher. These chronologies in combination with normative social forces perform a highly regulative socialization process which is "incapable of attending to the site of socialization as a contested terrain" (p. 56). Nuanced and alternating chronologies are hard pressed to compete with the "common knowledge", functionalist version of the socialization and construction of a teacher identity. Adding to the truncated version of my entrance into teaching told above, I will trace some of my own chronologies of the normative activities that made it "natural", i.e., invisible to me, to participate in my construction as a teacher.

Beginning with early education, my first day of kindergarten typifies an entrance into highly regulated social relations of class, race, and heteronormativity. Even before entering the school on that first day, I lined up with the other children in two rows from separate sides of the school yard and proceeded through separate doorways under stone-carved signs: Girls and Boys. I
arrived as a neighbourhood child from a working class family where education is valued especially for its job acquisition potential and access to a middle class lifestyle. It was a white, working-class neighbourhood in which the church group, school, playground and city sidewalks were almost completely occupied by white people like me. The only two exceptions I remember were an Asian man who owned a restaurant and an Asian girl who came to our school in grade five. There were no reservations nearby so there were no longer any Natives living in the area. Most children were first or second generation Canadians from European backgrounds—many from Eastern Europe. The school building that I attended from kindergarten to grade eight was almost fifty years old when I first began, and the name of the school carved in stone over the entrance both preserved the past and prepared for the future: the school was named Empire.

The iteration of identity belies its fixity, a process which is nevertheless necessary for identifications to have any meanings. The arbitrariness of whiteness, for example, gets made and unmade depending on the circumstances and social relations of power. My first example of the arbitrariness of whiteness occurred when I started school and learned that our family was different from those in my grade one reader. From my experience at home, a grandmother was a person who was hard to understand because she didn’t speak English like her grandchildren did. I was dumbfounded to discover that the grandmother in the reader spoke English to her grandchildren. Since my grandmother spoke German, I understood from this that my family was different. I was confused about what the difference meant, however, and so I asked my mother at home whether we were white, already realizing that this was a sign of difference. In retrospect, I can see two early lessons: that identifying with the dominant group mattered; second, patterns in public institutions, such as schools, are determined according to the in-group; and their normative patterns will define who is a
member. After that time, I learned to excel in the whitebread curriculum in the school called Empire.

My entrance into the teacher education program occurred after a few years of trying to avoid it. I told myself I had no interest in being a teacher; I was aware that my own self-interest was highly suspect given my socialization process and the assumptions about which careers were appropriate for educated, working class females. But, because I was continually under employed following a four-year bachelor’s degree, I entered a two-year program for teacher training. I felt as if I had landed there by default as teaching was something for which I had been eminently prepared even if I was convinced I didn’t like the job. With one degree already in hand, the training would not be long, and I would soon be able to apply for a job; and it was a job ("career") for which I was directly suited: female, working class, under-employed, needing to support myself and a partner who didn’t work, white, good student, "nice".

As a student teacher, I gained the insider view of staff rooms, teachers' associations and the construction of relationships among administrators, students, and their parents. Like many other public institutions, forms of authority and teaching areas were generally constructed along gender lines. In the classrooms, teaching was not just about instruction but something embodied by the teachers themselves: their identities distinctly marking their respective classrooms. A few times when something I planned as a departure from class routines did not go very well, I became aware that the shape on the brick wall also governed what was allowed to happen inside the classrooms and that, if I would listen to them, the internally persuasive discourses would lead me back to a normative way of completing my teacher training program. Observing teachers as potential peers for the first time, I saw more clearly than before how much they were like many other cross sections of white professionals, a number of
whom didn't really like the teaching situations in which they found themselves. The view from the staff room made it clear that their positionings as teachers were not fixed, but found in contradictory forms of subordination and domination. Disruptions to a smooth performance of teacher identity made clear that the iteration of teacher authorization is always in process in spite of the enormous energy that goes into shoring up a unitary, humanist notion of the self—in conformity with the shape in the brick wall.

The narrative at the start of this section in which I describe my official entry into the performativity of a teacher identity is by no means a single event nor one peculiar to me (except perhaps for the urge to laugh hysterically). Neither does the enculturation stop there. Teaching in public schools is nothing if not engaging, and many teachers are often satisfied just to survive the day-to-day pressures of curriculum, students, parents, and any other pressures of the institution in which they find themselves. Negotiating this terrain can become a teacher's main activity to the extent that there is no longer any self-consciousness about being a teacher or any outsider view of the role being performed—a view that is still sometimes available to student teachers. The competing conditions and practices available for the construction of the teaching "subject” organize teacher identifications in contradictory ways of becoming. The provisional and multiple identifications that are made and unmade daily in classrooms are in competition with the ideology of the unitary discourse of the completed teacher self as the one who is in charge; she is not the one who laughs hysterically; she is the teacher.

In spite of the supposed match between a “typical” teacher identity and someone like me who fits many of the social norms of class, race, and gender, sexuality, the slippage in these identities makes plain that school problems are not necessarily a matter of individual competence on the part of teacher and
student or one's "suitability" for the job. The required continual iteration of norms and identity shows the constructedness of the norms. Slippages in the constructions of gender, sexuality, race, and class, for example, are most noticeable in their contradictory positionings as the unspeakable norms that regulate practice.

Walkerdine describes the contradictory positioning of female teachers in which their institutional power as teachers is directly contrasted with a supposed powerlessness of females. She offers an account in which a kindergarten teacher becomes subject to the maleness of the boys in her class. She exchanges positions of power with them when they make sexual remarks about her in her hearing. She does not discipline them because in her role as a nurturing female teacher, she is expected to bring along the "natural" child and engage him in his own discovery of the rational way. The impossible expectation is that children, as examples of individuals capable of self-disciplinary control, will develop a pure rationality and sense of self-control, untouched by social factors. Although she has institutional power, her role is one of passive nurturer, a role which rationalizes the acceptance of abusive behavior toward females as females' correct conduct.

Walkerdine offers that on hearing of this account of the kindergarten boys' male aggression toward their teacher, some people find the teacher's passivity hard to believe. I think it is only a small example of the sexualization of female teachers who, knowing that their sexuality is a hazard in the classroom, try very hard to leave it at the door. Even though a female teacher pretends not to be sexual, however, does not mean that others have failed to notice. Evidence of this is found at all levels of education from Walkerdine's kindergarten example to the undermining and questioning of female authority compared to that of male authority in post-secondary classes. Harassment and violation of female
students at all levels is also a threat to female teachers. I know that it is very difficult for a female teacher to return the gaze when she has already been rendered naked at the front of the class.

Sexuality in education is regulated by its absence (Rockhill, 1993), that is, the separation of the intellect from the body in which the body and, therefore, sexuality is considered the realm of the private sphere along with women and the non-intellect. Successful women teachers are consequently denied embodied status as sexual beings when they find it is safer to neuter themselves, attempt to deflect the gaze, and pretend to leave their sexuality behind. The absent sexuality remains and, as it is female, is frequently characterized as heterosexual/a-sexual mother-figure. In spite of the fact that most teachers are women does not result in female normalcy for the profession, however. Instead, the male norm which informs teacher evaluation leads to a deficit model of female teachers (Troyna, 1994). While women are suitable guides for the youngest children, their numbers still decrease with the increased age of children and with administrative positions.

The constructed norm of teachers' sexual identities is most emphatically imposed as heterosexual. The author of "Miss is a lesbian" (1989) describes the norm of maleness in schools which is supportive of a pervasive heterosexist male ethos; it is a norm which controls both male and female sexuality. Sometimes gays and lesbians are tolerated in schools if they agree to pretend that they are "like everybody else" (Khayatt, 1992). The necessity of reiterating teacher authority is dependent on a variety of qualities, implicit in race, class, gender and personality of the teacher. Khayatt lists numerous qualities and means of assessing a teacher's legitimacy and credibility. These qualities, including self-confidence and the relative merits awarded to the subject taught by the teacher, combine to assert a teacher's identity as an expert who has the right to speak,
make claims, and gain respect. Teachers are hired “in conformity with an assumed standard” (Khayatt, p. 204) that is ultimately linked with normative behaviour. Since heterosexuality is normative, most lesbian teachers are aware of the negative behaviour that maintains this norm—loss of legitimacy and authority for those who come out (Khayatt).

The regulation of identities is more than a matter of inclusion as Britzman (1995) admonishes us in her essay against “reading straight”. She says that the “queer” in Queer Theory, as she describes it, is more about action than actors, and among other things, “insists on posing the production of normalization as a problem of culture and of thought” (p. 154). The forms of ignorance imposed by compulsory heterosexuality in educational settings place limits on conceptual foundations about what can be thought, the structure of one’s responses, as well as maintaining that which is unthinkable as always-already unthought. In the construction of teacher identity, heteronormativity constricts performativity as well as the performance of those things one cannot bear to know.

The fact that most teachers are white reinforces the assumption that whiteness is normal for intending and practicing teachers. Troyna (1994) speaks of the deracialized discourses of teacher education programs which help to produce “common sense” racism. Having relatively few racialized minority teachers applying to teacher education programs, however, is less of an issue for Troyna than the deracialization of the training processes and literature. He describes the normative patterns found in the writing on teacher education: “an enduring and discernible pattern in the exemplary sociological literature on teachers and the teaching profession ... promotes (and colludes with) deracialised interpretations of teachers and their profession” (p. 326, emphasis added). Because teaching is largely a white-identified profession, and since whiteness is
unmarked, the profession presents itself as racially neutral and normal. Because white domination has colonized the definition of what it means to be normal (Dyer, 1988), a "normal" teacher is white. That this is not more than a problem of representation is indicative of the success of the deracialization in which any teacher is essentially white and in which any subsequent cross-cultural training as an investigation of "oddness".

One consequence of this normalization of whiteness is the work of racialized minority women and men whose classroom activities are made problematic by the hegemonic positioning of white authority. Racialized minority women find themselves positioned in marginal areas within school systems so that their already second-class status fuels racism (Bangar & McDermott, 1989). As in other experiences, they are expected to speak for all racialized minorities within the system, or alternately, they are told that 'race' doesn't matter even though it is never really ignored. The point is that the expectations of who is qualified to be a teacher are already spelled out as are the assumptions about the curriculum and how it will be conducted. The resistance experienced by racialized minority teachers is some indication of the hegemony of classroom identities and practices, in terms of curriculum and personnel, to reproduce racialized, gendered, classed, nationalist norms.

In the context of the Canadian image, the split between the national identification as a tolerant, compassionate country as well as one that is profoundly racist is mediated in the denial of the split and rationalized by tradition. As patriotic citizens entering the helping professions, teachers are expected to be tolerant and compassionate. In the case of white teachers, whatever contradictions they meet between their identifications as "good" people and a racist rejection of the Other can be rationalized by the subjects in a variety of ways that maintain the popular production of themselves as "good"
people. Racism is pathologized in such a way that dissociating from it is necessary for the production of goodness. It is necessary to deny the split between racism and goodness in themselves in order to maintain their positive images which, by their definition as unitary subjects, admit no possibility of a split. Teachers who question the ideation of the teacher as tolerant and compassionate jeopardize their access to power by outwardly challenging the rules that the teacher identity upholds.

There are many other issues that I have not included as important in the list of categories, values, national assumptions, culturally organized practices that construct the image of the teacher which impels itself through the shape in the imaginary brick wall. The separation of categories as I have discussed them above is surely an artificial one—inseparable as are race, gender and sexuality from each other. One of the descriptions of myself as teacher that I named earlier, "nice", is part facetious and also part of the construction that emerges at the confluence of these categories as well as others I haven’t mentioned.

The identity of the public school teacher is also profoundly classed, caught as it is in the hope of upward social movement via the professions. The conflict or split between one’s working-class identity and the assumption of a professional designation is mediated by the construction of the teacher in the female role of self-sacrifice. In working-class terms, “moving up” can be justified by the conviction that one is “making a contribution”, “saving the world”, or “making a difference”. Each of these justifications is grounded in conservative values which describe qualities of both the teacher and the nation: goodness, tolerance, caring. The psychic effect of the teacher as the good and tolerant person is that intolerance is not available for examination. Instances of intolerance must be rationalized, denied, or repressed so that the teacher identity can remain. These negative qualities are not to be displayed or can be acknowledged only at
peril. Tolerance is thus actively produced as the result of an internal struggle which projects hostility or racist feelings onto others and suppresses them in the self. Therefore tolerance and selflessness become a virtue and teachers are the ones who do countless good deeds in attending to the needs of children in their charge.

The following is a brief summary of how the identification of teacher comes together in the normative expectations of gender, race and class. Historically, the feminization of teaching that began in urban centres in the mid-nineteenth century was an effect of material consequences as much as it was a presumption about women's natural abilities to nurture the young. Because school boards could pay women less than men's wages, the work of teaching was increasingly associated with working-class or lower middle-class women (Prentice & Theobald, 1991, p. 5). Even though the pay was low, other opportunities for paid employment were also limited; therefore, white women who might qualify as teachers were easily exploited. The power of the teacher in the classroom was ambivalently structured by outside authority and social conventions. That teachers were not considered to be "genuine professionals" (p. 13) was compounded by the fact that most teachers were women. Teachers occupied an ambivalent position within the labour force in that when opportunities arose for them to identify with labour movements, teachers were typically reluctant to identify with other "workers" in the trade unions. For contract negotiations, teachers perceived a difference in tactics for their representation as mental workers compared to those for manual workers. On the other hand, the public organizing and insistence on better working conditions taken on by more activist teachers were often viewed as signs of teachers' non-professional behaviour. Although teachers perceived themselves as poorly paid and not in control of their labour, their positions offered them something more
than a material exchange. Their ambivalent status in the public realm supported teachers' increasing allegiance and social acceptance as professional, respectable, white citizens.

For me and many other working class, educated women, teaching was, and always has been, a good compromise in upward mobility because, by becoming a teacher, I was still being loyal to what I learned about identifying as female, particularly the assumption of caring for others; I could also maintain my identity as working class because teaching as a profession does not carry the same weight as professions like law or medicine. These two identifications of class and gender, however, are more powerful images together than when separate as is consistent with lived experience compared to intellectual analysis: my notion of gender was integrally formed with working class female status. As a working class female, accepting the role of teacher indicated that I did not think of myself more highly than I ought. I knew my place and regulated my ambition in accordance with an assumed social audience. It was the perfect working class female gesture, for whatever else I might have chosen—and I have no specific ideas what that might have been, if anything—in choosing teaching, I was the deferential female, accepting her place. These words sound like something out of a Victorian novel but I think they are still alive and applicable to explain identifications in the somewhat less obvious social structuring that goes on today, abetted as it is with some of the same structuring tenacity. Perhaps the greatest factor that suited me for the teaching role, however, is one I did not even consider; yet, it is perhaps the single factor I have shared with ninety-nine percent of my teacher colleagues over the years. Never once did I question whether my racialized identity, my whiteness, was a factor in my applying to become a teacher. This whiteness that made me suitable for the job was so necessary a pre-condition that there was no need to notice it. It would have been
like checking to see if I had a pulse. The ambiguous kind of self-denial/self-affirmation produced in a working-class female like me is useful in the construction of racialized ends in that self-regulation and discipline prepare white women to be keepers of social consciences and social norms. White, female teachers understand and desire that their work is for the amelioration of society, for the construction of good citizens, and not for the purposes of radical social change. The continuation of white domination depends on such conserving behaviour as this, and on people who will do as is expected of them and who will keep others in line while they are at it. This is a normative position of working and middle-class white woman/mother in the public/private sphere of teaching. These are the women who can be trusted with the reproduction of social values and norms—norms which support their own desires to be socially respectable and upwardly mobile. Such is the conserving and conforming nature of public schooling that those who would effect major social changes are not generally employed as teachers. Instead, taking care of the other in gender appropriate roles is one way white women can escape some of the marginalization caused by patriarchy and participate in public life "legitimately" and with authority. White straight, working-class, educated women so easily fit the stereotype of the constructed teacher identity that it is hardly surprising that others have expected us to be teachers whether we wanted to be or not. That the position is also raced shows up in the fantasies of righteousness and goodness it produces in white pre-service teachers who dream that their love will save children in their care (Robertson, 1994). The notion that children and their communities are in need of saving is dependent on race and class hierarchies; and the intervening status of public schooling supports the assumption that teachers will correct the "deficits" in children’s lives caused by their "‘natures’, cultures, communities and/or families and especially [...] their
mothers" (Dehli, 1993, p. 13). The regulation and production of teachers supports white women in their conserving and nurturing roles which represent them as the good, passive facilitator or mother replacement.

In this section I have dealt with the slippages and circumstances of identity in the formation of white, female teachers primarily using my own history as one example. While this has been an investigation of how I and others like me are constructed as teachers, I would also like to investigate in more detail how the role of the teacher itself is produced to be a racialized category. As the implications of women's roles as wives, mothers, and teachers is considerable in the production of citizens and the nation, the next section examines the construction of women in roles that will serve state purposes by means of women's socially reproductive and conservative actions. Let us see how women's labour and the prior construction of gender difference is necessary for the reproduction of the nation and the representation of male national power (McClintock, 1995).

Education and the production of imperial subjects

Lydia Liu (1994) remarks that "The stakes involved in the process of becoming a national subject are very different for men and women" (p. 57). McClintock, whose work examines the interconnectedness of imperialism, domesticity, and the economic order, says that nationalism is unthinkable without a theory of gender power. She continues "Women are typically constructed as the symbolic bearers of the nation, but are denied any direct relation to national agency" (p. 354). How nationalism is raced, gendered, and classed comes together in an interesting examination of the role allotted to and taken by white women of all classes in England. This brief historical examination of these intersections is premised on the ambivalent power relations created by
English colonizing activity and the subsequent desire for the articulation of a national identity. Construction of English subjectivity through colonization required constant activity in demarcating the boundaries that supported difference, for when otherness cannot be wiped out, creating boundaries is another form of containment. Catherine Hall (1992), in considering these issues, begins with the premise that the construction of English identity as white was made easier through the vehicle of religion, in that, the two constructs of Christianity and civilization were equated in English discourse. Certainties in religion made it easier to be certain about other discursive terrain as well. For example, in relations that were constructed through imperialism and slavery, English supremacy was reinforced by notions of biological racism in which the evolutionary pinnacle was the Englishman. “Their ethnic identity as English was rooted in a series of assumptions about others” (Hall, p. 243). As the English were very anxious to define an identity which would distinguish them as a nation, particular colonial discourses were used not so much to explain the “eccentricities” of the other, but to claim the opposing traits as superior and English.

White women were (are) interpellated into the project of nationalism in ways which produce them variously as victims and agents. My interest, however, is in examining processes which made possible some of the conditions of their involvement, regardless of women’s specific motivations or circumstances. I examine how women’s positioning is implicated in what historic nations imagined themselves to be, and in the benefits accruing to those women who, wittingly or unwittingly, supported the hierarchical orderings of white bourgeois society. To distinguish themselves as the centre and the colonies as the periphery, the English applied to themselves what Stoler identifies from Foucault as the “return effect” (p. 75)—the process whereby the effects of life in
the colonies returned to Europe to exhibit a kind of internal colonialism. A racialized bourgeois order capable of governing social life was the mark of discrimination between the activities in the colonies and what was being done "at home". The mark of "whiteness" was a creation of the moral rectitude of bourgeois society formed against the bodies of "immoral European working class and native Other, [as well as] against those of destitute whites in the colonies" (Stoler p. 100). The self-surveillance of English social life supported the construction of the ultimate bourgeois project: "The right to intervene in making of life...in 'how' to live" (p. 83). The cultivation of the public and private life of this bourgeois self was productive of privilege, hegemonic positioning, and the bourgeois presumption that "how to live" was prescribed by one's own manner of living.

A significant metaphor for the nation was that of the family. For women, their participation as national citizens was mediated through family life and their relations with men. For middle-class women, parenting and motherhood were obligations and duties of empire and were seen as a "national service" (Stoler, p. 132). Charged with the role as keepers of middle-class respectability, women became custodians of these not inconsiderable discourses associated with bourgeois sensibilities: morality, men's vulnerability, national character. These sensibilities were dependent on the creation of boundary markers that would distinguish the bourgeoisie from "abnormals" and "enemies within"—all distinctions which were inextricable from nationalist and racial underpinnings. To defend itself against putative degeneracy, bourgeois life assumed a moral authority and a custodial, civilizing mission with regard to the Other, named as primitive and even savage. It is hardly surprising, then, that in the defence and reproduction of bourgeois liberalism and in the name of a moral mission, enormous energy was invested in the care of bourgeois children in order to
make them "into moral citizens and to attach those skills of self-discipline and the learning of civilities to the strength of the nation...and to the survival of a master race" (Stoler p. 143). The grammar of child-rearing in a bourgeois family implicated the child in certain codes of behaviour that came to distinguish the child as a member of that particular class and race—and not of others. These distinctions simultaneously "affirmed the virtues of whiteness and the moral high ground of bourgeois civilities" (Stoler, p. 151). Departures from white, middle-class figuration were a sign of degeneracy in which "poverty and social distress were figured as biological flaws" (McClintock p. 48). Conversely, the display of the distinctions that marked white, middle-class life became attributions of "personal character".

The processes of schooling and rearing the young may be thought of as "contact zones", described by Inderpal Grewal (1996) as sites of colonial encounters. Grewal demonstrates how M.L. Pratt’s (1992) notion of "contact zones" may be employed more widely than merely as sites where "disparate cultures clash in highly asymmetrical power relations" (Pratt); contact zones may also be thought of as occurring in the metropole and not only in the colonies as Pratt suggests. Teaching and rearing the young would qualify as contact zones in that these acts are supportive of the effects of imperialism in ways which seem, at first, to be unrelated to it. Another characteristic of contact zones is that subjects are constituted by and through each other in ways that do not suggest only conquest or domination. As women in traditional Victorian times supported a gendered and raced notion of national identity through their association with children, they appear to be both passive recipients of male expectations and also filled with agency. Teaching and rearing the young represent sites of contestation in which a culture makes every effort to introduce and indoctrinate its young into the ways that are necessary for the reproduction of the culture. The task is
one of representing the culture and its values in such a way that one’s particular way of life appears both normative and universal.

The family came to represent what was considered the proper ordering of society in which middle-class white women participated as boundary keepers against the degeneracy of the periphery. Maintaining boundaries of all types such as between normalcy and deviance, metropole and colony, English and other, was necessary to save oneself, one’s family and the empire from contamination: the family itself became a “contact zone”. Women were placed not only as boundary keepers, however, but also as boundary markers: working as “nurses, nannies, governesses, prostitutes and servants” (McClintock, p. 48). While middle-classes were utterly dependent upon this women’s labour, the work and those who performed it marked the edges of respectability. In cases where skin colour was an imprecise marker of deviance, other groups such as the Irish, Jews, working-class, and domestic labourers fit into the imperial hierarchy as part of “domestic degeneracy” (McClintock, p. 48). While the considerable responsibilities of female domestic workers made possible the maintenance of middle-class life, the women who performed this work were less than respectable because their labour was waged—a sure sign of degeneracy among women. This is not to say that white middle-class women did no labour in their homes; in not receiving wages for their work, however, they were able to uphold the domestic ideal of leisured monogamy. Perhaps no figure embodied the contradiction between waged labour and white female domesticity than the white governess. While she was charged with doing women’s important work of rearing the young, she was unlike the proper woman of the house in that she received wages for her work; although she was of the serving classes, she was white and educated. The white governess was a threshold creature who “embodied some of the most abiding contradictions of the colonial economy of
female labour. In this sense, the white governess, like the African maid, is an abjected figure: rejected but necessary, the boundary and limit of domestic colonialism” (McClintock, p. 277).

Women who were employed for the purpose of educating children represented a twofold risk to bourgeois civility and morality. In comparison to bourgeois life, unmarried females who worked for wages were closer to the contagion of the under-classes; but in the performance of their duties, these women approximated the manners and sensibilities of their employers. Because their social positions were ambiguous and their responsibilities great, the lives of these single, working women were under the greatest surveillance; the behaviour of early teachers was closely scrutinized to guarantee the reproduction of whiteness in all forms including through control over the teachers’ morals and principles. The expectations placed on such women were that they would uphold white, female, bourgeois respectability and be the embodiment of goodness and innocence; modelling self-discipline and self-control, these working women were relied upon to reproduce bourgeois sensibilities. Their positions and the embodiment of their persons are examples of contact zones in which women teachers are hired expressly to uphold the markers of difference and to eliminate systematically the spectre of the other. The production of the teacher/governess is not only dependent on but enabling of bourgeois family ordering as well as a raced and gendered notion of the work that white women were expected to do in the private/public sphere.

The social situation of the governess in Victorian England has many historic parallels with that of white, female school teachers in Canada. Historically, women teachers in Canada needed to be single; their wages were low; their morals were strictly observed and prescribed by local authorities; many of them even lived with families whose children they taught. Although they
wielded great power over their charges, their power was superseded by male authority over their public lives and conduct. The extensive control over the working conditions and morality of white teachers was necessary for guarding these teachers’ socially reproductive capacity; after all, these women, by acting “properly” and in their places, and by symbolizing the purity of the white ‘race’, helped to secure the domination of white patriarchal ordering. Perhaps the greatest parallel between a governess in England and a teacher in the colonies is that their tasks were no less than Anglicizing and converting patriots for the empire. Although this conclusion in no way accounts for the power and resistance that women also possessed, it is through their not insignificant performance in this public role that women also participate in the raced, gendered, classed project of nationalism.

Another antecedent for female independence and public employment was through travel brought on by imperialism and expansion of the empire. Middle-class white women asserted their growing access to public power in various ways such as by travelling and/or by making demands for women’s enfranchisement. In like counterpart to their sisters at home, and in exchange for these public privileges formerly accorded only to men, Victorian middle-class women who wished to travel were to carry the unique responsibility of bringing “civilization to the uncivilized” (Ware, p. 127). English women’s support for imperialist expansion eventually included their own desire to travel to the colonies to act as teachers and missionaries (Hall, 1992; Grewal, 1996; Pratt, 1996; Sharpe, 1993). The philanthropic work that women in England conducted among the poor continued but, “as the ideology of Empire developed, her sphere of influence was expanding to wherever the British flag was flying” (Ware, p. 128). The Western education that the colonized were deemed as lacking could best be ameliorated by
those who had the most to offer in this regard: white middle- and upper-class women.

Middle-class women participated in the Empire through race, gender, and class-based notions of refined English motherhood; the assumed superiority produced them as "invincible global civilising agent[s]" (p. 128). Women were motivated to travel to the colonies out of a sense of sacrifice and knowledge that the world needed what they possessed readily and in abundance. These women would not only supply the tenets of Christianity and knowledge of English ways, but they would continue to do their work for which they were best suited at home. However, as white, middle-class women ventured beyond the private sphere and into public life, the insecurity of their identities is revealed as the codes of white femininity are easily broken and status lost in the always-in-process identity formation. To secure a new identity, the women would directly support the domination of white men and the concomitant ideologies of nationalism based on patriarchy. The concept of English superiority—an always insecure identity—could not have occurred, of course, without the debasement of colonized peoples; and it was particularly colonized women who were often portrayed as victims of their cultural practices. Hindu women in India were frequent targets of this condescension and "largesse", and it became the work of English women and contact with Western civilization that would help the native women escape from their own tyrannical customs (Ware, 1992).

Contact with native women was used by women in England to push for their own emancipation from English cultural and legal practices which discriminated against them. Women's emancipatory movements in Europe and America received impetus from the comparative analysis provided by their glimpses of other cultures. In their push for social and legislative reform, the white women borrowed heavily from any analogies that could be drawn with
other women: Western women referring to their own conditions as slavery and claiming solidarity with women in colonized countries whose treatment was considered unquestionably barbaric. British women "were able to exploit the power of the slavery analogy" (Ware, p. 109) and use their contacts with racialized, enslaved women to construct images of their white women's gender oppression. As Western women's rights toward enfranchisement progressed, however, powerful references to slavery could continue to be made without further reference to the peoples enslaved by imperialist practices.

Whether or not white women who participated in colonial matters were imperialists in intention may be less interesting than noting that their access to greater personal liberation and the performance of their white selves in colonial situations was made possible by their access to the role of citizen, an identification normally reserved for men and one which is predicated on imperialist terms. It was through colonialist discourses that white women were interpellated as citizens and subjects. This notion of who was eligible to partake of the civilizing mission, "to help others", was judged on the basis of whose values and norms were the ones considered worth emulating. In anti-slavery speeches by English missionary women, they were made into righteousness itself as compassionate, active savers. English ways putatively came to embody kindness, generosity, and pity for those less fortunate than themselves. As the movement towards anti-slavery progressed and as the assumption of biological superiority of whites over blacks became less apparent, then the boundaries of subject identification had to be redrawn along other premises. Ready at hand were the civilizing texts of women's work which became extremely useful in euphemizing the domination of imperialism. Notwithstanding their extensive practices in slavery: "England was celebrated as the land of the free and the giver of freedom" (Hall, p.266). As imperialist practices required grateful, admiring
subjects, instruction in English practices was necessary; educated by imperialism, former slaves learned the necessity of expressing great thanks for their freedom. The project of the imperial empire was one of domesticating, taming, and civilizing the natural world consisting of animals, women, and colonized peoples; and the realm of domesticity and the civilizing practices of the middle-class English home were cornerstones in building and supporting the intentions of imperial projects. For their participation in showing the other “how to live”, imperial women—including those of marginalized status—increased their access to the masculine domain of public citizenship.

In the performance of their duties as nurses, teachers, and missionaries, women risked transgressing boundaries that marked the spaces between health and degeneracy, civilized/uncivilized, saved/damned. It is important to note that women’s entrance into the public space was a significant risk to their respectability and by no means a smooth transition nor the result of a rationally concerted trade-off. This cross-over from private to public is a serious threat to male domination as “pure” and “impure” women are positioned as boundary markers between respectability and degeneracy, a separation on which the superior positioning of the bourgeois male depends. However, through the nature of their work—that was so necessary to the cultural reproduction of the empire—middle-class white women gained access to the political and public space of the empire in ways which affirmed their class positions.

**The making of Canadian subjects**

The overlap of race and national identity in early schooling practices in Canada is dominated by an ideology which promoted British imperialism as a moral enterprise, and which worked to produce “subjects” as students in white segregated schools who could “share in the responsibility for this imperial
mission" (Stanley, 1990, p. 148). Historically, public school education was viewed as a colonizing function in Canada, especially with the arrival of non-English-speaking Europeans and their children. The desire was that the new comers should become loyal to the crown and conform to Anglo ways as soon as possible. It was assumed that while the background of the immigrants would hold the children back, the state in the form of public education would set them free. At school the children would learn to be loyal subjects and to develop the character, customs, and language, not to mention the "patriotism" and "morality" that so marked citizens of the empire (Stanley, 1990, p. 151).

In the history of the white, female-dominated teaching profession, it would appear that "whiteness" was more than neutral; it was a necessary qualification for those who aspired to help others (Hall, 1992; Ware, 1992). Helen Harper and Sheila Cavanagh (1994) use the work of Honor Ford Smith to describe the construction of white female teachers as those expected to reproduce society by passing onto others the educative and "civilizing" norms of white social values. The female teacher role follows from the image of "Lady Bountiful", who in imperial times, was the embodiment of class and racial superiority. She is the one who, either with incredible arrogance or obligation, is expected to know how things can be improved and to fix them. Performing selflessly, white female teachers replicate the image of "Lady Bountiful" who knows and cares for the needs of her charges. Like numerous historical examples cited by Harper and Cavanagh, early efforts to "Canadianize" immigrants occurred through classes in language and culture; and teaching was more successful if the white women could learn the backgrounds of the culturally "different" children. "Lady Bountiful is produced in this appeal. In her 'bountifulness' she will emphatically get to know her minority/immigrant
students—to hear their frustrations and their dreams, to sympathize with and support these 'more needy' children” (Harper & Cavanagh, 1994).

Harper and Cavanagh show that, unfortunately, these colonizing attitudes are not merely historic sentiments, but appear as citations in recently published textbooks. While maintaining an unmarked white norm, these texts in current use encourage teachers to “collect” facts about their Other students. Because teachers are exhorted to know the students and their families, short introductions to non-white ethnic groups appeal to certain efforts to support multicultural education by means of the unhistoricized, individualistic stories found in some current textbooks. The prefigured identity of the white, female teacher positions her to perform the role of helper and reinforcer of the dominant culture, specifically: as arbiter of cultural differences among her students and as negotiator of access (and its terms) to the dominant culture.

The performance of “Lady Bountiful” is an example of what Foucault (1983) describes as “pastoral power”, a form of power relations much favoured by modern Western states for the production of the individual. The spread of pastoral power and its mutual formation occur in a number of western institutions such as medicine, the family, psychiatry, and education. Both student and teacher are implicated in the performance of this power, the teacher as the one who acts as leader or guide on behalf of the student who must be educated, brought along, and “saved”. Women are much valued in their performance as teachers because this pastoral role also demands sacrifice. That women in our society are expected to be selfless and devoted suits the needs of public school education and, in a paradoxical way, gives women publicly sanctioned leverage from which to wield this benevolence called pastoral power—in the persona that Harper and Cavanagh would suggest is “Lady Bountiful”.
Within the feminized profession of public education, Judith Robertson's (1994) research indicates that white teacher identities operate within gendered, classed, and racialized codes which perform them as "proper bodies in teaching" (p. 231). In the normalizing aspect of these desexualized, deracialized "proper bodies", "...our participation in and marking by racism disappears" (Flax, 1993, p. 68). The pastoral power of which Foucault speaks can be seen in the social identification ascribed to white public school teachers whose pastoral innocence provides access to ways which "potentially mask and perpetuate asymmetries" (Robertson, p. 7). As agents for the dominant white culture, teachers can be trusted to name and control the social condition as it is organized through public education, to define its limits, and to render it comprehensible. In their role, white teachers may assume a certain kind of power as ones who "properly embody the desire to dominate" (Robertson, p. 8).

From historic colonial times, white teachers have participated in the construction and continuation of imperialism, and there is no innocent space outside the patriarchal formations inherent in this construction. Teachers see themselves as supporting the growth and learning of children; their work, however, is also articulated in relation to a racist curriculum and by the norms and standards of a white dominated patriarchy.

While there are many other circumstances and motivating factors in women's teaching history than I mention, what is common in teaching is the possibility it provided a woman to step alone into public spaces and to earn a wage without having her morality suspect. Women teachers depended on their being seen as respectable, white, and distinct from those they taught. Teaching requires white women to be respectable as much as the status of white women teachers requires it to be so. As boundary markers of middle-class virtue they are produced as much as they produce the effects of their status. This brief
description of white women's entry in teaching is intended neither to reify nor to ironize their participation, nor to question the women's sincerity or motivation. Rather, teachers are produced by discourses which designate spaces said to be in need of white women's ministrations. With their middle-class "self-restraint, self-discipline, [and] managed sexuality" (Stoler, p. 178), and in attending to the needs of others, white women performed themselves as respectable subjects, a performance for which whiteness is both required and affirmed. I conclude with a summary of the terms and conditions which have rendered this white female positioning historically consistent through the present time with regard to the domination of white patriarchy.

The first point is one that I have already articulated: that teaching is a threshold experience, a contact zone, in which differences in power are used to construct "normal" behaviour and processes and to designate degenerate behaviour and otherness. Here is where contemporary working-class, educated women can obtain the threshold of respectability by entering the strata of middle-class professions. In keeping with gendered expectations, they perform a role of nurturing children: only this time they get paid for it. Their historical counterparts gained access to the exclusive citizenship status of men by similarly performing their women's work in public. This access to the public sphere, however, also brings with it a certain amount of ambiguity around the threshold status of teaching. While the role of the teacher is sometimes that of saviour or hero, the work of saving the other from ignorance or self-destruction leads back through the principles of the dominant society. Any threshold or heroic breakthrough that teachers achieve with their students is through conservation and reinforcing of normative social values. The most heroic actions of teachers typically result in bringing order out of chaos and in finding some niche for their students in dominant society. This is the work performed in the contact zone of
teaching: encouraging the construction of normalcy and containing the self and other. Of course, "normalization" is not always accomplished, and in spite of a tendency toward homogeneity and fixed determination, fragments, slippages and incompleteness remain. While it may be too bleak a prospect to imagine that there are no alternative narratives, perhaps possibility resides in the "Third Space" described by Bhabha, between the pedagogic and the performative, even though the effects may be contained and labelled as deviant and other.

Second, the practice of teaching continues under intense scrutiny over what is taught and over teachers' compliance with normative behaviour. Biklen (1995) suggests that because public schooling is such a normative part of people's experiences, most of us have difficulty seeing teachers in any objective way outside of our personal assessment of those experiences. Because of this common access, teaching sometimes lacks a degree of autonomy in decision-making that is a mark of professional status. Teachers frequently feel vulnerable to criticism from parents and society, at the same time that they are subject to curriculum and school changes. In Biklen's (1995) study, teachers do not feel they have control over their working lives which they attribute to their low status as teachers. Intense control over teachers' lives historically and to a lesser extent today indicates the very specific expectations placed on teachers: that they will be regulated by community-held, moral, and social standards which teachers will reproduce in the children in their care. On the other hand, from students' perspectives, teachers have immense power; and a demonstrable lack of teacher control in classroom situations will shorten one's career.

A third commonality exists between historical and present day teaching conditions which renders the category teacher a racialized position: the gendered work of white, middle-class women is required for the continuation of white patriarchy. The contradiction stands, however, that it is by participating in this
gendered and raced work that escape from patriarchy is made to seem possible. The role of teacher is so thoroughly a racialized category that teachers need not have white skin in order to produce a racialized effect, but only a taken-for-granted notion of white as superior and white as helper. White women perform their subordination/domination by alternately striving toward and accepting the role of teaching with its ambivalent marginal/professional status.

Liu’s remark about the differential process for men and women as they become national subjects is demonstrated in the production of teacher identities. As defenders in times of war for example, or as governors in times of peace, men’s performance of nationalism grants them subject positions and the right to dominate; the female counterpart of nationalism is the job of attacking ignorance, of preserving cultural attitudes, of presenting oneself as a model of citizenship and morality. Not only does teaching conform to the character and community building aspect of women’s work. It also enhances or confirms their womanhood at the same time. And so white female teachers are rewarded socially for wielding their pastoral power and for performing their reproductive roles as white individuals who are good, caring and tolerant. The historical work shows that white women escape their marginalization in patriarchy and gain access to the authority, citizenship and participation in public life by taking care of the other. The bluntness of white domination appears less obvious when whiteness is performed and feminized as an act of benevolence.

Desire and knowing in teachers

The work of how identities are organized in complex relations with others directly implicates questions of power and knowledge: How is knowledge organized? Who has the power to decide? How is the dissemination of knowledge authorized? Who can know? Stoler, quoting Foucault, says that “The
battle is not between knowledge and ignorance as most accounts of the Enlightenment would have it, but rather over which forms of knowledge could lay claims to truth-values about the contemporary social order” (p. 77). I have indicated that the success of the bourgeois project is its control and power over the construction of “how to live” as well as “the certified knowledge and jurisdiction over the manner of living” (p. 83). In the construction of teacher identity this knowledge of how to be a teacher shows itself in practices regarding what it is that teachers are expected to do. In pedagogical practices, knowledge circulates and functions as a form of legitimation and power which consolidates the subject identities of those who teach and those who are taught—the personalities involved then becoming available for their naming as teachers and students and subsequently evaluated for the performance of their roles: from good ranging to bad, for example. Becoming a teacher requires a self-discipline and self-surveillance by which one turns/is turned into a teaching “subject”. Foucault describes this process of subjectification in which “the effects of power [...] are linked with knowledge, competence, and qualification” (Foucault, 1983, p. 212.) (These words are not unlike the watchwords in educational fads: excellence, effectiveness, mastery). Foucault’s description of the relation of knowledge to power, that is, the régime du savoir, is most clearly articulated in the search for certainty and the possession of knowledge in public school classrooms and teacher education programs. In the section which follows, I discuss the implications of resistance to oppositional and critical pedagogy for the insight it provides into the nature of identity formation in teacher education students. I highlight an example provided by Fabienne Worth (1993) to emphasize the use of psychoanalytic and poststructural theorizing in understanding identity formation especially as it applies to white teachers.
The norm of teaching is to know: to make knowledge unproblematic; to present knowledge as knowable, to present knowledge as if were knowable. Britzman (1991b) speaks of the unleashing of unpopular things in teacher education as a means of addressing stereotypes and meanings that have been fixed, legitimated and made essential. The undoing of fixed meanings in texts, however, can have the effect of unfixing the authority and knowledge of the teacher whose job it is to know. The desire for stability in the classroom would seem to be at odds with a type of learning which continually seeks to re-examine pre-existing meanings and categories. The desire for stability in the classroom, however, is congruent with “fundamentalist grounds of categories like masculinity, femininity, sexuality, citizenship, nation, culture, literacy, consent, legality, and so forth; categories that are quite central to the ways education organises knowledge of bodies and bodies of knowledge” (Britzman, 1995, p. 152).

Shoshana Felman’s (1987) reading of Lacan is a source of considerable enlightenment regarding what she calls the “impossibility of teaching” (p. 69). She compares the coming to know through pedagogy to the same process in psychoanalysis. The speaking subject, contending as it does between the conscious and the unconscious, cannot ever completely know itself. It cannot ever have complete access to that which it represses or refuses information about. This dynamic act of negation is not so much a lack of knowledge as a “resistance to knowledge”. That which one desires not to know is in itself revealing of identity construction. It may also be the most instructive site to begin learning. For example, identities of white students and teachers have something at risk in acknowledging that their privilege is not based on personal achievement or individual worth and that the differences between their bodies and ones that don’t matter is a socially constructed materiality. Ignoring the performativity and the effects of one’s central position, for example, “is nothing
other than a desire to ignore"; the nature of ignorance "is less cognitive than performative" (Felman, p. 79). The assumption that a student can gain complete control of a body of knowledge not only delimits, in practical terms, what can be considered worth knowing, but it also assumes a consciousness transparent to itself. Felman points out, however, that the impossibility of this transparency is what makes the learning of oneself and anything else, for that matter, an "interminable task". In my experience, teachers are produced in ways which attempt to reduce the uncertainties of the classroom by effectively terminating the "interminable task".

In teacher education programs, students' desires for certainties is a reflection of what many teachers consider to be their major task of re-asserting control of their identifications. Students' desire for control is not surprising given the methodologies of many educational institutions; one of the effects of schooling is surely to produce the notion of mastery in students. Indeed, mastery learning is a specific type of pedagogy designed to terminate the "interminable task". Teachers who do not support the norms surrounding teacher control and the production of unitary subject identities can expect to be on the receiving end of a fairly forceful re-socialization process often initiated by the students in the classroom. Pedagogical norms produce the knowable, unitary identity of what and who a teacher "should" be. Unfortunately, the conserving nature of schooling practices can easily be an obstruction to learning. Felman and Laub (1992) charge that

if teaching does not hit upon some sort of crisis, if it does not encounter either the vulnerability or the explosiveness of a (explicit or implicit) critical and unpredictable dimension, it has perhaps not truly taught (p. 53).

Teachers are authorized by discourses which position them as authors of their choices in the classroom. That these are not only personal choices but ones organized before their entry into the class are hidden from view and made to
seem like the natural work of teachers with their students. Authorization of teacher discourses renders the discourses and practices as unitary and unproblematic while it simultaneously obscures their complex organization.

**Desire in opposition**

In a previous section, I examine teacher identities that can be read from the slippage which occurs when the teacher is not white or straight. In a similar way, teacher identities and desires can be read in the slippage or ambivalence that occurs in white dominated classrooms when the knowledge that is presented does not support hegemonic identities. Some indication of student and teacher desire may be found in the reception of multicultural education as it is offered in teacher education programs. Some of my own experience with resistance in “unleashing unpopular things” has occurred in teacher education courses comprised of white students where the homogenizing effect of several years of public schooling pushes students toward “unitary and stable meanings” (Britzman, Santiago-Valles, Jiménez-Muñoz, & Lamash, p. 88). For bright young students like the ones I have taught, school is a positive experience for most. The education system has worked for them; and they are its success stories. Their own success bolsters their faith in the meritocracy of school and society. Their interest in technical rational solutions combined with their fragmented, nascent positions as young adults makes them resistant to discussions that would further question and destabilize their self-identifications. Resistance arises in a variety of ways including students’ overwhelming concern with “how-to-construct” lesson plans and the rudiments of classroom management and control. Their desire for stable, non-contradictory knowledge leads students to a variety of conclusions: they attribute racism, sexism and homophobia to simplistic notions of bad attitudes and negative social positionings; racism and sexism are intellectualized
as if they have not touched the lives of the students; many resist the notion of structured inequality in the social order or the privilege in which their own lives are invested. The desire for specific strategies is in some ways a response to the destabilizing effects of oppositional teaching. Requests for packages of information and lesson plans about "how to teach from a multicultural, antiracist perspective" receive much more emphasis than "why" (Solomon, p. 57).

The desire to produce unitary subjects is particularly upset by the destabilizing of knowledge claims by oppositional education groups. Resistance to oppositional education is some indication of the degree to which the production of teachers and students is taken as natural along with the assumption that there is "no privilege growing up white, middle class and male, nor any oppression growing up poor, or a male or female of color" (Brandt quoted in Solomon, 1995, p. 49). Authoritative knowledge that is frequently assumed in the classroom comes under scrutiny in teacher education programs through the practices of critical pedagogy such as anti-racist, anti-homophobic, and feminist. Another purpose of these practices is to support students in understanding their own positionings as customarily taken-for-granted and to acknowledge the contradictory desires they hold in maintaining their claims to these positions.

Sleeter and Grant (1994) and McCarthy (1994) describe the inadequacies of programs which imply that prejudice management in the form of cultural information and sensitivity training in human relations will "correct" the attitudes and values of social actors understood as "individuals" (McCarthy). Power differentials will be unaddressed and remain mostly as they are as will the notion of whose problem this is and how "individuals" are implicated in the immanent critique of systemic distortions. With no real redefinition of what
constitutes knowledge, the same people will be considered knowers and, in spite of pluralist curriculum, others will continue as the known. Another form that resistance takes may be the process that McCarthy describes concerning the gradual take over of transformative themes such as multicultural education by their absorption into the dominant culture. They are “quietly rearticulated into just another reformist set of discourses...and appropriated by a dominant humanism” (p. 82). In this way, the actual implementation of oppositional emancipatory education among education faculties “has been effectively deferred” (p. 83). This is an example of the way in which the “desire to ignore” mentioned above is not about a “lack of information: it is an active dynamic of negation, an active refusal of information” (Felman, 1987, p. 79).

The problems experienced by oppositional education are not only supported by the intransigence of the identities that are challenged by oppositional knowledge, however. Others have pointed out (Ellsworth, 1989; Gore, 1993; Worth, 1993) that desires of the student/teacher are not necessarily the same as those desires attributed to them by critical educational enterprises. That is, the alliance between one’s investment in the dominant and popular culture and the pleasure of deconstructing master narratives is not unproblematically compatible; one’s familiarity with and use of popular culture is not necessarily subversive nor a precondition to critical language. Fabienne Worth (1993) questions the expectations and the potential for student identities to be continuously stable constructions within critical pedagogical classrooms. While theoretically, stable identities may be at odds with the critical enterprise, inadvertently, critical pedagogy may ultimately be productive of coherent and continuous self-identities by appealing to students’ desire for power over “feelings, conditions and destinies” (p. 9). This accounts for the aberrant readings
in Worth’s classroom experience in which U.S. student desire did not include dismantling the master narrative in the text of Third Cinema.

Like Elizabeth Ellsworth (1989), Worth critiques the theorizing of Giroux and McLaren following her experiences of applying critical and anti-racist pedagogy in the classroom. In a class on Third Cinema taught in the United States, Worth did not anticipate students’ emotional resistance when the class addressed itself to film texts for which the class was not the intended audience. The analysis moved toward a deconstruction of personal and national identifications, that is, toward “a relationship of non-identity with one’s subject position” (Worth, p. 10, quoting Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991). Worth had anticipated neither the widely differing subject positions students would hold in relation to U.S. popular culture nor the “ideological surgery” that is required when using Third World texts “that deride U.S. popular culture”. Worth notes that border pedagogy does not take place “from decreeing an abstract political agenda, but through the pedagogical process of mapping out the many ways in which affect and narratives merge in everyday life to construct a sense of continuous and stable identity” (p. 9).

Even though homogeneous, undivided identities are the continuous construction of certain established institutions—primary schools, mainstream film industry, far rightists, some minority groups—postmodern theorists do not generally explore the emotional resistance to “the actual fragmentation of the self”. Knowing about the theory of the fragmented self does not mean that a student will want to become such a self. The desire and emotional attachment for a coherent self, as nurtured by public education for example, is not easily yielded. Perhaps the achievement of a coherent self is the desire at the heart of the “pedagogy of possibility” or the “utopian mode” of critical theorizing. Worth echoes these assumptions about postmodern theorists: “[They] have little interest
in exploring emotional resistances to the actual fragmentation of the self. They seem equally disinterested in acknowledging that the theoretical contradiction between the humanist and the postmodern construction of identities may have a contiguous emotional reality that can in the classroom lead to anger and, eventually, to epistemological shutdowns” (p. 9). Worth, as a postmodernist, had assumed that students in her class would be able to don any identity demanded by a film and that the pedagogy and classroom setup would have prepared students “to develop another kind of reading strategy” (p. 18). The demonstration of students’ abilities to cross ideological boundaries when watching Hollywood films, however, were not evident when students were confronted with Third Cinema.

Students became more than observers when integral parts of their identities were held up for critique in Third Cinema, in films in which those receiving the text are not the intended audience. As the specific subjects of the critique, the students as U.S. citizens were implicated in the lesson in very tangible ways—the course material denying certain students the right to participate as mere spectators. In this new, discomforting, and sometimes traumatic experience, students become witnesses; their classroom remarks become their testimony of student fragmentation. Worth’s classroom descriptions are reminiscent of anti-racist classrooms in which white students recognize the complicity of white skin privilege in the construction of racism. In these classes, the readings of the texts are anything but neutral; instead, the readings are very personal and sometimes aberrant. As in Worth’s classroom, the intellectual analysis disappears, frozen by students claiming the right to stand on their experiences. In response, Worth advises that more attention be paid “to each individual’s sense of identity and how it was formed...to develop a double
focus that [takes] into account the construction of the subject as well as the
construction of the object of critique” (p. 18).

Examining the construction of the subject, of course, has its own pitfalls. A
postmodern dilemma easily arises in the decentring of identities whereby a
student retreats into a kind of relativism and non-advocacy in which all
positions are equal. An alternative, essentialist position finds that the white
student, by virtue of skin colour, is the uninformed observer of complex
subjectivity while the person of colour, the “native informant”, can be known
according to a stereotype. Decentring identities has its risks, one of the most
likely being that privilege reasserts itself in the very act of choosing to be divested
of it—the autonomous, unified subject remaining in tact and in control.

The permeability of a postmodern “frame” is useful here in moving
toward an acknowledgement of the needs, materiality, and desires of the flesh
and blood subjects. The a priori relativistic stance of postmodernism is
inadequate for this aspect of subject identities and anti-racist practice. The
concrete, non-abstract subject experiences the other in a material world in which
difference still has to be negotiated in practical, political, ethical, and relational
terms. Neither an old-fashioned humanist self nor a “utopian multicultural
self” will do. And it is a false binary to imagine these are the only choices.

Are students conscious or unconscious of their desire to resist becoming a
decentred identity? What might be the limits to the transference of knowledge—
particularly of the other? These epistemological questions that will not
adequately be answered by numbered co-ordinates or relativistic statements are
important to ask, however, as a way of framing expectations beyond what we
have already considered in meeting and coming to know self and other. Worth
asks what kind of pedagogy will obtain if one accepts that knowledge may not be
transferable as argued by critics such as Gayatri Spivak, Trinh T. Minh-Ha, and
bell hooks. These critics understand that, in spite of the decentred postmodernist model, "certain spaces cannot be understood from certain positions" (p. 9). As I have indicated, Worth sees the failure of postmodern pedagogues, not as a failure to erase the distances between spaces and positions, but as a failure to examine the emotional complexities that keep hegemony in its place. This half-light of knowledge has also been described by Donna Haraway (1991) as "situated knowledges" and as "wounded knowledge" in Patti Lather's (1995) discussion of Walter Benjamin. Lather describes this knowledge as not being in charge of itself, as knowledge that cannot claim "heroic" status. The coming to knowledge of self and other is not a "victory narrative" but one that may be characterized by hysterical responses and disavowal. Education projects should also be able to discuss the "ruins of knowledge" as well as the heroics. From psychoanalytic discourses we understand that our will to knowledge is often tempered by the fear of knowledge. We need to ask what it is that we are afraid to know. For example, what is it that the white subject is afraid to know that the white self cannot know if it is to remain as it is? The classroom is a place fraught with danger in the unsettling of identities. In psychoanalytic terms, the fear of knowledge is evident in the white self recoiling at knowledge of its racialized self. It is the fear of knowledge that keeps things as they are.

The non-autonomous, desiring self clings to the assumptions that it has been allowed, even encouraged, to make in school experiences: that subjectivity is unified and self-determining. Texts and classroom experiences which contradict these assumptions by not only decentring one's subjectivity but by suggesting that it is fragmented are cause for student resistance, anger, and a retreat response motivated by fear. Worth documents the difficulty white audiences experience, when by virtue of their status as unintended audiences,
they find that "whiteness loses its basic characteristic as 'norm'", and they have become "imperfect spectators" (p. 25). Worth concludes:

We need to ask questions that do not take for granted the viewer's centrality or the viewer's need to be central, yet we must also acknowledge the emotional difficulty involved in such a displacement. In other words, we need a very different theory of spectatorship than the ones we have devised up to now (p. 26).

**Conclusion**

Desire in psychoanalytic terms is revealed as the desire for safety, rationality, centredness, autonomy, closure—all of which are challenged by oppositional teaching. Evidence of the resistance to this teaching is documented by many; it could not be otherwise if learning—understood as a traumatic event of defamiliarization—is to take place. Resistance can be read in tense classroom situations and in aberrant readings which are mounted in support of a centred, autonomous, unitary self. This is one failing that most oppositional works do not consider, that although students of anti-racist and oppositional pedagogy can do deconstruction and activist work, this work of reconstructing identities on the basis of rational terms may not have nearly the appeal as the sense of self grounded in psychoanalytically rooted desires of fantasy and identification.

The positive, optimistic positioning of identities in teacher education programs and the resistance to oppositional education is accompanied by "splitting and denial which this [contradiction] engenders" (Walkerdine, p. 124). Walkerdine's comments, regarding the identities of "woman" and "child" equally apply to those of "teacher" and "student":

Uncovering the fictions of our formation is about examining our inscription within those fantasies. In that sense 'woman' and 'child' in all their guises are impossible fictions, yet fictions invested so powerfully in the practices which make up the veridicality of the present social order. (p. 124)

Teacher identity, constructed as the one who knows, is contrasted with the identity of one who fears not knowing as well as with the identity which is
perceived as not knowable. A secure, knowable identity is contingent on a continually changing set of unknowable other; therefore, the iteration of the fictional teacher identity requires constant assertion as the one who knows and can be known in particular raced, gendered, sexualized and classed ways. The split—between knowing and not knowing, between desire and dis/identification—is covered over by claiming the certainties of knowledge and identity. The scarcity of this identity of “teacher” is powerfully invested as an impossible fiction.

One fiction of our formation is visible in the outline on the brick wall of teacher identification. Normative teacher identities supported my entrance and that of many others like me into the teaching profession; normative constructs helped us consolidate our performance of raced, classed, and gendered identities. In many ways the identifications are a place of comfort and security where desire is fulfilled and not thwarted. Entrance into respectable citizen status is no small reward in exchange for one’s performance of a known, knowable subjectivity whose terms are predicated on a hierarchical social order. Even though teacher identity is an impossible fiction, the desire to know and be known is fulfilled, at least initially, for many of the new entrants through the brick wall.
Part Three: Analysis and Discussion

Chapter Five

WHO CAN BE A TEACHER?

Who can be a teacher, or a Canadian, or a white-identified person? How are the terms of these identities negotiated and understood? How are they interdependent social constructions? This is the first of three chapters in which I examine the words of interview subjects for their performance of these identifications. I show how the research subjects establish themselves, first of all, as agents, as having agency, and as being the ones who employ their dominant positioning to identify themselves and others. As the performance of these subjectivities is central to this research, I refer to the research participants as subjects in keeping with the always-in-process subject identifications I am discussing.

Research subjects are situated in the historical, economic, cultural, and functional norms already in place which constitute the role of teacher in public school education. The subjects are interested in performing these norms even as they imagine their performance to be new and original. Their expectations for their roles may or may not coincide with the experiences of teachers in the field, but subjects perform themselves in the role of teacher which they anticipate. Even if they are not sure of precisely how they will accomplish this role, they are sure about the role of teacher as they imagine it. Images of what and who the teacher is and what he/she will do are well formed by the subjects, by their experiences as students, by their teacher education project, and by normative expectations concerning the benefits of an educated public. Expectations of
teachers are prefaced by their role in the nation's history and the "civilizing" role played by public education in forming citizen identities and national allegiances.

Foucault describes a "domain of recognitions" (1990) which he understands as a type of normativity established for how a thing may be thought of or come to be noticed. This chapter considers the "domain of recognitions" which subjects constitute as the specific knowledge of being and/or becoming a teacher. This role of the teacher, already in circulation, is situated in historic, material, and social conditions in which participants are also located as acting subjects. Participant responses indicate some of what they understand as functions and norms of the role of the teacher in public education. Subjects positively establish themselves as thoroughly acceptable teacher candidates who lack only official certification; they perform themselves through the telling of stories, anecdotes, ideas, and brief histories as the citing of normative actions which gain approval through the telling. That subjects feel compelled toward these positive self-presentations during the interview is partly revealed by the interview schedule which lists only one question which elicits these self-assertions: "What qualities do you have that make you think you will be a good teacher?" These seemingly necessary, mostly unbidden, subject claims of positive self-representation come at various points in the interviews, as testimonies that witness to the subjects' qualifications as teacher candidates: the holding of acceptable beliefs, the performance of normative behaviour, and the performance of themselves as agents.

After a brief review of some of the methodological features of this research, I examine the processes whereby subjects establish themselves as normative, dominant identities. Subjects are aware of the significance of the positive identities to which they lay claim and are careful to establish and maintain these distinctions by the relative positionings of others. Processes by
which subjects perform their various identities as citizen, teacher, and desiring subject constitute the substance of this chapter.

**Methodology matters**

For fifteen of the eighteen interviews, I was an invisible researcher, talking to subjects by telephone, authorized by an educational institution to ask questions which the institution had approved. The institution had previously indicated, by prescribing subjects’ attendance at a certain course, that a teacher must have some knowledge of cross-cultural education. Subjects who wish to present themselves as good teachers, therefore, must also hold, as a minimum, certain knowledge of racialized minorities and Native concerns. There are normative expectations that these potential teachers will be informed and, in the best possible scenario, hold positive attitudes toward cross-cultural issues. Indeed, an educated middle-class adeptness includes positive attitudes toward multicultural issues and negative sanctions against overtly racist remarks and actions. The role of the teacher is firmly bound with the image of the good citizen who, in a Canadian context, shows “tolerance” and support for minority issues. Although subjects in research situations are free to voice any opinions or views to a researcher whom they will likely never knowingly encounter again, if these subjects hold overtly racist views, they are not directly stated. I suggest that subjects have an agenda and use the research interview for purposes of their own, one of which is this: even though their remarks are not specifically targeting my approval, in my capacity as a faceless person with some vague attachment to the university environment, the subjects use the occasion of the interview to witness to the construction of their positive self-images as citizens and teachers as organized by the role of the liberal teacher in Canadian society.
The interview provides subjects with an opportunity to fantasize and rehearse their role as teacher as well as to stage its actual performance.

Subjects' performances can be read through a discourse analysis which traces the functional aspect of language to perform subject identifications. I examine participants' words in their descriptions of themselves and others whereby they rely upon normative constructs of their social, economic, historic locations. Subject knowledge of the role of teacher is described in terms of who the subjects are and who the students are whom they hope to teach. Canadian identity figures prominently in this positioning as subjects identify with and espouse what it means for them to be Canadian. Subjects use their nationality in their identity construction and in their assumptions of what constitutes a person. In the discourse, we see the subjects performing themselves as white teachers and white Canadians.

In the discourse, I look for patterns in what subjects say about themselves and others. That is, as they respond to roughly similar interview questions, what form or content do the answers take and what is the consistency within responses; also, what features are shared across subjects' accounts? I consider what functions or effects are fulfilled by the discourse and what the subjects accomplish in their speaking. What does their discourse say? What processes and rhetorical devices are employed? Subjects' overwhelmingly positive self-representation is traceable to two interconnected discursive moves. Discourse practices and the intelligibility of the speaker rely on the use of rhetorical devices and techniques whereby subjects are able to present themselves as credible speakers. Control of these methods also reveals the social practices to which they have access in warranting claims that will be considered positive. That is, subject remarks employ certain conversational methods by which they are positively positioned; this positive positioning is an indication of subject access to what
may be said by subjects so positioned. Subject discourse both indicates and performs the social relations which are in play and by which their remarks are made intelligible.

What is sayable by these white research teacher candidates in the performance of their racialized identities is the focus of the analysis. While subjects actively organize their discourses to perform themselves in certain ways, it is important to note that discourse also generates, enables, and constrains the identities of speakers (Wetherell & Potter, 1988). Through discourse analysis of subjects’ constructed and constructive identities, we have a method of observing the ideological frames of reference by which these constructions are sayable. In the pages which follow, we can observe the warranting procedures, also understood as the processes by which the subjects achieve credibility, by which issues of ideology and exploitation are made plausible, or by which their normative use “fixes” them as fact. I use these methods to investigate: Who will be a teacher? What will she do? What ideological work is the subjects’ discourse performing as subjects situate themselves as white, Canadian, teacher candidates?

Subjects: historically/personally/culturally

Even though previous sections have already named some of the social parameters of the interview group, further elaboration is necessary to indicate how the subjects are located as citizens.

The fact that many subjects are not Anglo-identified is important for consideration. The subordination of white, non-Anglo cultures and languages is only a few generations past for many students in this part of Canada, and secure attachment to the dominant group of white English speaking society is not something many students enrolled in this teacher education program can
necessarily take for granted. For some families, their student's enrollment in education is the first entry into a professional career. The sacrifices and heroic efforts of subjects' settler ancestors as well as present economic conditions form part of subjects' own histories to the extent that leads some of them to identify as the other in comparison to the dominant culture. One participant in particular describes experiences of marginalization of his family of origin based on their ethnic minority status, their large family size, and their relative poverty. When encountering racialized minority groups, the recent memories and stories of family hardship allow white subjects to access the myth of equal disadvantage—a positioning which erases many differences among white subjects and the students they hope to teach. Differences are erased, for example, among a working class white student who leaves school early; an Aboriginal child who grows up in the inner-city; or two ESL students, one a minority, the other white. One of the tensions of this research is to note the consistencies and deviations by which subjects present themselves. There are what appear to be many contradictions in subjects' descriptions of themselves; for example, while some claim solidarity with "average" Canadians, they will, in their next breath, claim uniqueness. While the contradictions are not a problem for this study but rather germane to it, the uses made of these contradictions to claim distinct status or even disadvantage are more important to trace. While it would not be helpful to organize a hierarchy of disadvantage, it is important to note that for many historical, social, and economic reasons, subjects differ in their access to privilege. For two reasons that I can think of, it seems obvious, but nevertheless important, to claim that subjects have great variety in their social positions and experiences. Stating this simply acknowledges their diversity and the breadth of their personal, historical experience. The second reason for mentioning their diversity, however, is that from time-to-time subjects also position themselves
to speak for other white subjects; they claim great commonality and make definitional statements about their presumed sameness including their access to mainstream society. A theme reiterated many times through the testimony of subjects’ words is their ideological construction of and participation in social relations which they describe as typical, normal, and central in Canadian society. Even though most identify themselves according to their ethnic backgrounds and various other features, a dominant theme among some subjects is a lack of a distinct, personal identity. This absence, which is described as typical and normal and that which provides participants with a way of fitting in, is a lack which claims no particular identity. This move provides subjects with a process by which they erase their own differential access to power based on class, gender, sexual orientation. What they have in common, however, is their white skin privilege, and so their qualifying claim to be a generic human being is inherent in their whiteness. Claiming that this is a typical and normal identity not only masks their own differences and privileges but also, by claiming their identity as lack, erases the differences between themselves and others. With no point of comparison, and with normal identity as a lack, the identity of the other is erased.

In addressing the question of who the subjects are, the subjects themselves provide a great deal of information about their lives. Because people often find it difficult to describe themselves, however, I asked the subjects to describe people in their lives who were most like them and with whom they easily identify. The bases for affiliation with others include ethnicity, recreational activities, class, education, political orientation, age, ability, religious affiliation, hopes for the future. Typically, subjects see themselves (and others like them) as a broad-minded, open lot; they are people whose widely differing friends reflect their own tolerance and diversity of experience. One woman offers her friends as
proof, "They're all quite different. I've got these two best friends who are absolute opposites to each other". Her proof of their diversity is that

One is Mennonite, very Mennonite and the other one is Catholic and grew up in the city. The other one's from [a small hamlet in Saskatchewan]. So you know, very different types of people. (F605-6)

In that her idea of extremes is represented by two Christian groups and two differently-sized communities in Saskatchewan indicates not only her own positive identification as white, Christian, female. It also indicates that the range of difference which circulates within the parameters of her close associations is attributable to variations within Christianity and community size. This woman has travelled widely and lived outside the country for extended periods of time. Therefore, it is not because this participant is typical or unusually limited in her experiences that this quotation has been included. The enormous variety across participants' life experiences is not a reliable predictor of what they consider to be markers of difference. Many have travelled extensively, worked, lived and socialized with those they consider different from themselves. Though they name it in varied ways, they are very clear that they understand what difference is—even those who say they have had little experience with others because they grew up in all-white towns and went to all-white schools. Regardless of varied perceptions of what constitutes proof of this claim, all participants find it necessary to illustrate their ability to discern difference when they see it. Their awareness of and ability to name and appreciate difference constitutes participants as self-defining agents.

Subjects' self-descriptions show them to be like the larger, white, education student population in a number of important ways. One subject's upwardly mobile status finds her and her friends to be very interested in "nice clothes, new things, newer vehicles, buying homes" (F814). For another, she and others most like her are
Canadians. White Canadians. Middle-class. People my age, in their twenties. That's pretty much it. White, my age, middle-class, probably students because, being a student I can relate to them a lot. (F105)

The participant is so insistent in stating her claim as normal that one might assume that racism, homophobia and sexism can consider themselves at home.

Subjects indicate that they are differently located with respect to class and that the effects of class and race are closely linked. They are cognizant of social formation and are aware that social positioning counts in how they and others experience the world.

My parents weren't very financially well off. So we didn't have what everyone else had. (M015)

I had been the secretary [on the Indian reserve]. And it wasn't my first choice for whatever I was supposed to do for the rest of my life, you know. (F415)

Really the university is almost its own little culture and you're pretty much, you know, it seems like you're white middle-class and that's about all who gets into the university. Yes there's other races there, but they're not as evident. (F412-3)

Self-identification is a struggle for a number of students as one of the most distinctive patterns of cultural identification appears as the absence of identity when subjects' racialized identity is white. It seems that "normal" is hard to describe and not particularly interesting. One subject indicates an awareness of ethnic hierarchy, however, as the distances measured from the "normal", Anglo-Saxon centre when she claims Norwegian as a positive difference. These quotations capture the dilemma of more than one subject who is not only white, but Anglo-Saxon:

I'm basically white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant. And I like to look at, I like to look at, kind of, the other things that make up who I am. Like I'm half Norwegian so I like to tell people I'm Norwegian because it just sounds more interesting than being Anglo-Saxon, I guess. So I don't know, I think that says something interesting about me too...

and
I don’t really, I don’t really have, I can’t really think of anything specifically, just sort of normal. Not necessarily normal, just your regular upbringing, I don’t know. I’m not sure if I can say anything necessarily. (F431)

The privilege of not having to name oneself and being able to call oneself “normal” can only be constructed against a racialized otherness. One woman constructs herself as separate from ethnicity and skin colour altogether and consequently, without a particular identity. “Like I just don’t fit in with any one colour, that’s for sure” (F6611). By adopting a raceless identity as normative, the subject disavows the effects of racial difference. By containing and trivializing the importance of racial identity, participants dismiss the effects of being other and produce themselves as normative, self-determining, bourgeois subjects (Goldberg, 1993). Typically, in the subjects’ identifications and regroupings, it is education, whether acquired through life experience, travelling, studying or a logical mind that is the common bond which many subjects claim to share with others rather than common ethnicity and physical origins. Education is understood as the leveler, as the symbol of equality to which everyone has access. This notion of meritocracy supports the participants’ positions as successful, self-producing agents and forestalls any questions about differential access to education and privilege. Here, in the realm of learning and the life of the mind, subjects imagine that they occupy no particular place wherein their embodied selves will go unnoticed.

Although subjects find it difficult to describe themselves at first, when they finally begin, the descriptions are most positive. People who are most like the subjects have many fine qualities: open-minded, tolerant, caring, respectful, and compassionate are the most frequent characteristics of those with whom subjects identify. This positive self-description is the second of two main repertoires subjects establish in their discourses. This absence or loss of identity
constitutes an important interpretive repertoire in which subjects position themselves as "normal" and "typical":

I consider myself part of the norm, not extreme in any way. I surround myself, and I am surrounded with people the same as me, the typical. (F105)

Discourse which performs participants as normal forestalls any alternatives, including challenges to heteronormativity and able-bodiedness. The semiotic of race, as the signifier of difference in others, stands in as the opposite of the generic "typical" state, as the designation of acceptable/unacceptable.

If there were any doubt about the strength of subjects' desires to present themselves in a positive light regarding their attitudes toward racial issues, this doubt is easily dispelled. The interviews are replete with discourses which describe scenarios or incidents in participants' lives which, in some circles, might be considered as laudable, or praiseworthy, or somehow indicative that subjects are intelligent, empathetic, "good" people. These incidents might include subjects' annoyance with racist acts, their support for Native initiatives, their willingness to take on a career that might involve sacrifices. Wanting to present oneself in a positive light is hardly unique. It is important to note that this overriding concern of subjects for a positive self-construction follows an experience with a required university course that at the least, challenged, and in other cases severely disrupted, some fundamental, positive, subject identities. Reclaiming and consolidating a positive identity would seem to be an important agenda item for subjects.

It is important to note that credentials offered by subjects that support them in a positive light are not necessarily descriptions of heroic actions or claims of undying devotion; nor are they claims that I am suggesting the subjects consciously construct. Indeed, such are the sanctions against certain kinds of racialized discourse that elaborately circuitous routes are available to keep subjects from saying anything that would cause them to confront directly their
own complicity and racial privilege. Subjects do not need to be consciously aware of the positive effect of the factual versions they organize in order for them to make use of these constructions of liberal rhetorical discourse. The subject claims perform the position in which the subjects are located as either positive or value-free, or at the least, as subjects who do not have negative attitudes toward Natives. Without being asked, subjects describe themselves as not-prejudiced, informed, co-operative, educational workers. They are the liberals who are armed with various degrees of cultural awareness, tolerance and good intentions. Subjects are also aware of the most effective ways of presenting themselves in a positive light regarding their racial awareness. They understand that the more indirect they are about their claims, the more likely they are to be convincing. For example, it would be more effective to describe casually some of the wonderful things they have done or thought about rather than to announce "I am a wonderful, racially aware, human being" (Wetherell & Potter, 1987, p. 32). Therefore, subjects' states of awareness are attributed to a variety of experiences and personal qualities and performed through various rhetorical strategies which warrant subjects' sincerity. Here are three examples of several by which subjects explain their positive self-presentations:

I think I've taken, maybe it's cause a lot of education courses post secondary, but I don't think I'm a typical Canadian. I think I have more awareness than most Canadians do, just from talking to other people. I don't like that idea, but I wish I was typical but I don't think I am at least in that area. (F6612)

And it should be an important part of education if we're going to continue to live this way and to foster good attitudes. Because not every kid is learning at home the same way I did. I know that very much. My parents were very tolerant. (F088)

I've talked with several Metis people and they say themselves that Saskatchewan is an exceptionality. We have a lot of Native Studies courses that other universities in Canada just don't offer. They don't have the background and don't have the Native people taking them that we do here which I mean you can be proud of too. (F663-4)
Subjects call on their knowledge of normative positions which accomplish positive identities. A teacher is expected to be an enlightened cultural worker who has some awareness of her own limitations and place in society. They are advocates for justice and the underdog. By accessing a repertoire of claims about equality or by describing what they’ve learned in cross-cultural courses, most subjects create themselves as people who are culturally aware. Another repertoire similarly defends subjects’ positive liberal positioning but by a different method, one which I suggest is available only to a racially dominant group. The subjects in this group declare an unaligned status, one that positions them either as completely neutral and therefore not-prejudiced, or beyond typical white interests and not like others with whom they would otherwise identify. Here are two examples of subjects’ liberal stance which depends on their holding unaligned, neutral positions:

Like I haven’t had any really negative experiences with any other cultural groups to make me prejudiced, you know. And I think that maybe if someone did, that then that would influence their teaching. But I really haven’t had anything like that at all. And I’ve never viewed First Nations People as anything negative, so I guess that has a big impact on maybe why I didn’t get as much out of the course. I don’t know. If I’d had kind of a closed mind then maybe that would have been a really eye opening experience. (F17)

I’ve had some contact, and I’ve been with people of other cultures, but it’s never been an issue. It’s never been something that’s been discussed. It’s never been a problem or concern. I don’t remember there being anybody but white kids when I grew up in elementary school, very few, and it isn’t, race really isn’t an issue with me. Like I’m concerned if it means I have to teach in a different way. But interacting, I treat all people the same. So it’s not, it doesn’t matter. (F102)

These are the reflections of unaligned, a-typical subjects:

I view myself as not necessarily, I am white but I don’t view myself necessarily as white. I like to view myself more as somebody that is multicultural, if you understand me. I’m not, like I’m white, but I’m sure if you traced back far enough you’re going to find that I’m not totally white, you know, and my family itself, I mean I have an aunt who is Taiwanese, so I mean how do you really look at that. My cousins are half Taiwanese, half white, so I mean as far as I’m concerned, how does that make me pure white some way down the line? I don’t think that anyone can really say that they’re white. (F6612)
I learned that I actually have a broader base than a lot of the people I know. As far as experience, as far as, I come from a pretty non-traditional family too, so that helps me to see past the Eurocentric kind of culture and past that community. And to learn also that I need to look to make sure to look at myself and see that I'm not doing things that are going to cause my students to be held back or that I don't have personality traits that will conflict with them and if I do I've got to work them out. (F604)

These are "positive" statements on the part of the subjects—assessed as positive not because I either disapprove of or admire them, as they stand as claims irrespective of how I judge them. Neither are they positive because they actually convince the listener/reader of their intent as purposed by the subjects. These are the credibility claims or warrants which participants call upon to construct for themselves a sympathetic, positive identity with regard to racial and cultural awareness. By these claims, subjects show that they are agents in the production of their own identity—and not objects, not one of "them".

Two other strategies, that seem at first to be opposites, are posited as proof that subjects are positive and not prejudiced people. First is that they are either too naive and too innocent to hold negative opinions. Second, other subjects claim to be above average in awareness and beyond others in their understanding of racial issues. Both rhetorical strategies, of being either too innocent or very knowledgeable, position subjects beyond prejudice and as the holders of attitudes and opinions which accomplish them as good teachers. That the two methods—that subjects either know more than average or less than average—seem to contradict each other only attests to the variability in discourse intent on the main goal of establishing the subjects as liberal, right-thinking, proper bodies for teaching. Subjects' responses reflect their awareness of normative attitudes appropriate to their roles as teachers.

It must also be explained that these repertoires for establishing positive identifications are not linked intrinsically to these subjects as a social group. It is quite reasonable to assume that these repertoires are available to people with
many different group memberships. Beyond the criterion of white-identified teacher candidates, I saw no methodological need to engage in the exercise of identifying natural group boundaries for the purposes of this research. I am not trying to make distinct claims about these subjects’ particular social groupings. The desire to establish oneself and one’s professional status in a good light is hardly peculiar to this group of subjects, these students, this university, this course, this province, or this profession. In an example from another profession, ninety percent of the longest serving judges in Ontario\(^1\) believe that white and racial minority people receive the same and equal treatment in the courts. At this level in the judicial system, these professionals are also concerned to present both themselves and their profession in a good light. Judges in this study produce this positive effect by calling on yet another rhetorical strategy to establish their credibility: the evidence of their long-time service and experience. Like the teacher candidates, they identify with and defend their profession against any suggestion of racism. Defenders of the public good, whether they serve in the legal or the teaching professions, are very interested in defending themselves as publicly good.

**Subjects as Canadian citizens**

When asked to discuss the nature of Canadian identity, subjects initially find this hard to do. Their responses typically describe Canada as a remarkably homogeneous place in spite of its over-arching diversity. Although anyone may have difficulty describing one’s country without entering into clichés, I suggest that part of the difficulty of this description for subjects arises from the parallels between being white and being Canadian. In a pattern similar to their definitions of themselves, subjects describe Canadians as having no particular identity,

either racial or cultural. Canadian identity, according to one subject, does not even depend of having citizenship status; and according to another, citizenship status alone is not a guarantee that one is Canadian. In these descriptions, which are, at first, exceedingly bland, Canadians would appear to be among the most disinterested, disaffected body of individuals who find themselves linked by common geography and accidents of birth or (im)migration. Subjects declare that there is certain lack of ideology in Canada, no particular outlook, nor any other distinguishing traits. It is the depiction of the absent centre.

Some subjects define Canada in that favoured Canadian way—by comparing it in positive terms to other countries, especially the United States. It seems an image of other countries is more readily available than one's own, especially if one identifies strongly with the country and considers oneself part of an invisible centre. One subject cites Canada as having been recognized as the second best country in the world and a great place to come from if you're travelling. Other countries available for comparison are Third World countries against which Canada appears as safe, prosperous, peaceful, and happy.

Tentative definitions emerge, many still cast as a negativity, an absence. "Being a Canadian is being whatever make you feel comfortable describing yourself a Canadian" (M710). "If you view yourself as Canadian, I think, basically you are" (F6611-12). One subject describes Canada in very post-modern terms as something without any unity, a central ethos, an ideology, or any clear definition of what Canada is. Nor does he think the lack of unity, as he describes it, is much of a problem, except that some insist on making it an issue. Even though subjects say that being Canadian is hard to define—it's intangible, it's too varied—they eventually settle on a list of very positive individual traits by which they mean to describe Canada and Canadians in glowing terms: polite, tolerant, appreciative of many cultures, accepting of people from all over the world, promoting
heritage languages. If there is anything negative, it is as a result of this tolerance and openness. In all respects, the subjects are nothing, if not loyal to and protective of the goodness of their country with its self-deprecating tolerance. They have a strong identification with this positive image of Canada, and it is hardly surprising that their image of a neutral, non-committal country parallels their previous description of the typically unmarked nature of whiteness.

The imagined Canadian community described by the subjects is clearly created in their own image. And while it may not be unusual for people to describe their country in a way that mirrors and flatters them (van Dijk, 1993), the outlining of the reflected image is worth noting. Self-praise and pride for one’s country are not only a way to claim positive national traits; such claims are also an opportunity to forestall criticism or the possibility of doubts or negative attributions. In a Western democracy like Canada, for example, characteristics such as tolerance, openness, and respect for the other are highly valued and constitute high praise when applied to and claimed by its citizens. Such rhetoric is not necessarily applied because of historical facts (Bhabha, 1994), however, but because of the “selective, rhetorical uses made of such facts” (van Dijk, p. 74). The rhetoric of Canada as tolerant, open, respectful of others is easily conjured and has smoothly passed into the traditional, pedagogical description of the country. The laudatory words describing Canadian nationalism can only be contemplated against the “forgetting” that Bhabha describes and against the presence of the other that hovers at the limits of national imagination (Morrison, 1993). I have described some processes which construct Canadian national consciousness including how a “settled” country stands in for an assumed lack of order encountered by Europeans in the “new” land. Similarly, the tolerance, openness, and respect that subjects cite as characteristics of Canadian identity forestall suggestions of intolerance, a closed society, or disrespectful treatment—
characteristics which are reserved to define the other. The traditional narrative is
a coherent unity in which positive traits are attributed to European
"civilization", while negative traits such as the lack of tolerance, a closed society,
and disrespect for others—all traits which are also part of the European history in
Canada—are most often omitted (McKague, 1991). Morrison suggests that
citations of a coherent national identity in the United States exist in contrast to
some unsettling disunity provided by African Americans. In the Canadian
context, the negative qualities that undermine national unity are projected onto
others including poor and working-class people, racialized and ethnic minorities,
and First Nations peoples. By the projection and vilification of the other,
negative attributes are distributed along class and race lines and reinforced by
assumptions that the differences are innate. In contrast, the identity of who can
be a "true" Canadian is restricted to those who can offer "tolerance", generosity,
and magnanimity to all.

Language such as this constructs the national narrative in complimentary
and restrictive fashion. Morrison explains that this coded language is employed
to deal with the "racial disingenuousness and moral frailty at [the nation's]
heart" (1992, p. 6). The construction of national identity which she describes in
American terms can easily be paraphrased for a Canadian context. Morrison
continues that by this language and its "omissions, startling contradictions,
heavily nuanced conflicts...one can see that a real or fabricated [First Nations]
presence was crucial to their sense of [Canadianness]" (p. 6).

The veracity of the remarks about the openness and respect as part of
Canadian identity are not easily open to testing although evidence to the
contrary is abundant. This widely distributed rhetoric about Canadian
nationalism accomplishes the Canadian image as "naturally" positive; and it
simultaneously removes from popular discourse the open and frank discussion
of racism and discrimination in Canada. Negative events are relegated to the incidental, the historical, or the other. Because of the "naturalness" of these positive national qualities, the discussion of racism and discrimination in Canada in elite discourse and popular media is played down and excused. Because of the positive nature of Canadian identity construction, charges of racism, especially systemic, are up against the tolerant community as imagined. One subject concludes:

We're so multicultural because we accept people from all over the world into our country. We're considered maybe stupid or slow and lovable. And nobody, I don't think has a real problem with Canada ever. Because we're not evil. (F105)

The absent centre of Canadian identity is ringed with positive traits which support the notion that Canadians, by nature, could not possibly be racist.

The impossibility of racism is maintained even in the exceptions by which subjects attribute racism and intolerance to the past. The assumption is that things are better now than before and that progress and enlightenment are among us.

We're trying to break away from our elitist mentality. Because we know that many visible groups have been oppressed and taken advantage of. Now here's our way to kind of, let's even up, straighten up the mistakes that were made before. (M011)

Subjects' sophistication and racial awareness are offered as proof that discrimination is an aberration that happens in exceptional circumstances. Relegating racism and intolerance to the past is the action of the redeeming of history (Benjamin, 1955), an act in which the subjects regularly engage. For Canadians generally, and for white Canadian subjects in this research, the psychic effect of their identification as the good and tolerant person is that intolerance is not a possibility. Instances of it must be rationalized, denied, or repressed so that the subject and her national identity can remain. These negative qualities are not generally available for examination and can be acknowledged only at peril.
Tolerance is thus actively produced as the result of an internal struggle which projects hostility or racist feelings onto others and suppresses them in the self. Therefore, as good Canadian citizens, tolerance and selflessness become an identification of who teachers are; and as indicated in the voices of this research, teachers in Canada are the ones who do countless good deeds for children in their charge. Their professional obligation of showing others “how to live” is also a technology by which teachers are produced as citizens able to participate in governance.

**subjects in relation to other**

One question I asked all subjects was about their experiences with people whom they consider to be different from them regarding cultural or racial origin. Among the responses, racial variation is the most often cited difference; some religious and ethnic differences are also noted including that found among marriage partners and grandparents. Most subjects cite considerable involvement with those they consider other, either through the schools they attended, their work experience including teaching ESL, through travelling, or their personal lives. They offer unsolicited evaluations of these relationships; typically, subjects have been “enriched” by their encounters.

I always looked at people from a different culture as being different, but not below or above me, more of an equal. And just kind of curious about them, like why are you different, what's different about you. Why, and I'd always look at it as a learning adventure. We'd find out. Like if I meant someone from a different religious background, let's just have a chat and see what our differences are and where our common ground is, sort of thing. (F083)

I think it's someone who would have to be, who like to draw from, on the riches of other cultures, to be able to draw other cultures into their lives. I think another person who is like me culturally, that's a tough question, I think it would have to be someone who likes to learn as well. ... (F417)

Subjects mark their privileged status by being allowed to be curious about cultures they consider different from their own. Trinh T. Minh-ha (1989) says this interest is a desire for “for what we can't have and to divert us from the
monotony of sameness” (p. 88, original emphasis). It is a way to be exotic and to collect trophies as in the case of game hunters or badges of accomplishment as girls and boys collect in Brownies and Cubs. At issue is that this “drawing from” and being enriched by others is the prerogative of the dominant culture to make these selections. The subject continues: “I know that culture is whatever we make”; and arriving at a point where one is “more diverse than others” would seem to carry its own caché of sophistication and learning without necessarily having to leave home.

Subjects consider the connections they make to be either neutral or positive although this is not necessarily the case for the designated other especially in the face of class differences which favour the white subjects.

Across the back alley from our school was the reserve. It was that close. But we never had any contact, and so when the Native children started coming to the school there was some really nice kids there and I became friends with them. Unfortunately, the drop out rate was such that by the time I was in grade ten there were no more Indian students left and you know they sort of fade from your life because you’re not in daily contact with them and you know there was also social differences. (F413)

Some subjects’ remarks are in defense of the other or to express mild outrage against racist actions or words of other white people. Subjects use their responses to offer versions of an understanding, worldly, idealized self. Their positive or neutral remarks establish them as reasonable people whose experiences with the other qualify them as reliable witnesses for whatever judgements they may wish to make.

My question about the subjects’ experiences with those whom they considered different from them regarding ethnicity, culture, or race requires a final comment. My question, like the cross-cultural course taken by the subjects and any other spaces made available for information sessions or consciousness raising, succeeds in making differences both visible and invisible. At these particular interventions, the other is made visible in terms of race and class
while, for the most part, the dominant discourse, that is, that of the subjects, remains unidentified and unnamed, in spite of the fact that almost all the interview questions were specifically about them. Participants' reporting styles place them in a variety of roles—anthropologist, imperial traveller, interested observers—roles for which they feel eminently qualified, judging by the liberty and range of their observations. For example, the subjects are nothing if not perceptive in reporting on race/class differences. When a subject is asked whether there were any First Nations students attending her school, she explains that, no, it was a middle-class school. The sites of the centre and the outside have been prepared to the extent that race and its semiotic, class, are employed as a means of immediate identification of who does and does not belong. By default, subjects positively identify themselves as the central point of comparison throughout the interviews.

Because lower and working class status is indicative of being outside the centre, this identification of other presents a dilemma of self-interest for those subjects who claim minority status by means of their ethnic identity and/or class background. One subject from a poor family distinctly identifies as the other and cites his family poverty as a reason for persecution as a child. His identification as a minority is thrown into confusion, however, when he experiences the unequivocal effect of white skin privilege.

In '91 I had the privilege of going to the Philippines for about six weeks. I noticed that even though that's their country they still felt inferior to us because we had white skin, and that was a really strange experience, being almost like elevated to a god because I have white skin ... I found it very uncomfortable because there were people almost twice my age calling me sir and I looked at him and says 'I think I should be calling you sir'. It's just really uncomfortable. (M013)

The subject has entered the teacher education program and, presumably on the basis of equal accessibility, claimed his right to participate in governance and citizenship. His discomfort arises, however, with the public acknowledgement of
the difference whiteness makes, underlining that there is more to his claim on citizenship and governance than equal accessibility. Although other subjects also come from working class and ethnic minority backgrounds, the question of who is the other to their subject-selves, however, is ultimately accomplished by the process of racialization. All subjects rely on specific racialized minority groups to be distinctly other to their white identified selves.

**subjects of desire**

I have said that subjects' descriptions of themselves in relation to the other is in the guise of the interested anthropologist because of the way many subjects struggle to explain any contact they have had with Natives which may have been problematic. That is to say, I was not prepared for the expressions of participants' desire for Natives and others. This expression of desire is explained in the work of Judith Butler featured earlier in the study. She explains the way in which the construction of a subject identity requires the citation of its constitutive outside—an outside which remains an alterity, an exclusion and an abject other. This lack of "populations erased from view" (1992, p. 13) constitutes the object of participant desire for wholeness and completion. Although evidence of the desire for the other is hardly a surprising observation, I could not have anticipated participants' need to offer a justification for their desires. Many participants feel the need to explain themselves, as if this desire for the other which has caught them off guard is somehow embarrassing, or illicit, or a confession of weakness. bell hooks (1992) explains that white desire for the other is rendered problematic because of the "ever present reality of racist domination" (p. 28). Subjects have been trying to distinguish themselves as agents—as opposed to objects—in the process of identity formation, and this desire for the other needs to be explained in some way. For, if they desire to possess or identify with the other, how are they to be distinguished as agents of their own
production? How will they retain their qualifications for knowing and marking difference? Without distinctions, what will remain to mark the difference between what is clean and what is degenerate (McClintock, 1996)?

Because of their intense desire for self-production, subjects have an overriding interest in what Natives should do or be. Therefore, their dependence on Natives and what Natives can offer the subjects is strictly controlled and limited. For example, when knowledge is offered by the other in the education course in which subjects were enrolled, it can be routinely ignored if the privileged learner chooses not to see any immediate connection to him/herself. Subjects demand that knowledge must be in their terms for it to be interesting. Many subjects criticize the theoretical sections of their course as irrelevant and exclaim that contact with live Native bodies is what they need: subjects reveal their desire for Natives themselves, as well as the desire that Natives will help whites be better whites. Even though subjects’ greatest desires are for continual accessibility to the other, in a modern day version of colonialist presumption, the purpose of Native bodies remains in their service to dominant populations.

At first, subjects explain their desire for the other as a wish for greater understanding of those whom the subjects see as unlike them, as a lack (Chow, 1993); on closer examination, however, subjects’ desires are continually linked to that which the other is presumed to have—a sense of self and an awareness of one’s own identity. Evidence to the contrary, “the Native” is assumed to be fully present, transparent and knowable. Subjects imagine that “the Native”—in spite and perhaps because of her oppression—is in touch with her essential self, a self which the oppressor has exchanged for progress and supremacy.
In a funny kind of way, I've often thought the courses that I did take. You know they have, Natives have a very rich heritage and I really feel like I missed out on that. I'm not really religious, I don't go to church, so I feel that there's sort of that connection with, I don't know, your spiritual side or whatever, it has always been kind of put to the side because, well Christmas or Easter are the only times, you know, that I've really paid attention to sort of a structured religion or whatever. You know, finding out about a lot of the things that Natives do and believe in, I just was amazed at how rich, you know, that their culture really is. (F814)

I think that we need, that we need to get that Native, or that cross-cultural component into more education classes. I think, like I said before, they have to mix more Native and non-Native students together in the classes, so we're not isolated doing our own little things because it perpetuates the illusion that we're separate and different. Or that we should be separate. And more Native instructors, or more different cultural instructors. It doesn't always have to be Native. To see that as role models, and they can also tell us a lot about what's happened to them. (F088)

The benefit is is that if something that we've been using in our own culture or race doesn't really, doesn't really seem to be working then maybe we can look outwards and look how other cultures deal with it. We end up with increased ability to be diverse. (F731)

I think [the discussion of multiculturalism] comes up a lot more when we have somebody of a different race or culture in our class who's often a minority in our society who will speak. That's nice because sometimes somebody like me doesn't bring it up because I don't think to ... I need to know what language is appropriate or inappropriate to use. I need to learn about traditions in classrooms, or just cultural traditions so in my classroom I might not offend somebody without intending to but, because I don't know, I may have. (F422)

Whereas the contemporary version of colonialism would disavow the overt desire for dominant/subordinate roles, rather, in the present day, the other is required for the production of nostalgic and salvific benefit to the subjects. Renato Rosaldo (1989) calls the subjects' desire "imperialist nostalgia" in which they regret and mourn the passing of that which their culture has helped to destroy. In spite of the imperialist connections in which this nostalgia is rooted, subjects expressions of this desire are offered as something positive, as proof that subjects value and are conscious of those good things the indigenous other has to offer. Also gleaned from the Native presence is an increasingly expanded white consciousness, one which will stop being only white, when, as in #3 above, subjects will achieve the "increased ability to be diverse". Subjects construct a Native persona in possession of a sense of self that subjects can admire and
desire; the embodied existence of this idealized persona is irrelevant. Subjects desire and create an ideal Native, one who possesses a strong sense of self that can be roundly admired and imitated. Desiring this wholeness for themselves, subjects appropriate, what is in effect, a simulacrum, their own fantasy.

The exploitation of the other that was historically rooted mainly in economic gain has modified to become a longing for a spiritual or psychic wholeness, a process of "eating the other". Subjects' desire is for things Native such a spiritual awareness or connections that will assuage feelings of deprivation and loss felt by white subjects (as in #1 above: "Natives have a very rich heritage and I really feel like I missed out on that"). Ward Churchill (1994), whom I have quoted earlier, describes this desire of white subjects as a process for forgetting and denying the privileges that follow from colonization. Desiring the other is a way of dissociating from the revulsion of genocide and colonization and feeling good about themselves in the process. Sometimes the desire is for Natives themselves to be available in cross-cultural classes—embodied and present—as cultural guides and Native informants to describe their experiences of the everydayness of being the other (#2 "They can also tell us a lot about what's happened to them"). If Natives were present in subjects' classes, it is presumed they would be available to help white students identify, in concrete terms, what is expected of them as well as what they need, as in #4, in order to do what is right, that is, "not offend somebody". Subjects also reason, that with guidance from a Native presence, then how Natives view the world would be less of a mystery; and subjects, who identify their greatest hunger as intellectual curiosity, would be sated (#3 "We end up with increased ability to be diverse"). Their taste for the exotic will not be satisfied by just any culture, however. One subject declares
...so I've had lots of experience with Native people, some experience with French people. But I don't, I've never really considered [French culture] that different from my own culture so I'm not really that interested in it. (F665)

Subjects' desire is revealed in what the Native informant is expected to do and be. The desire also reveals that the privileged may remain ignorant of those with whom they are in unequal daily relationships; and then ask the other to guide them through a landscape which, for the privileged, remains exotic and uncharted. The particular quest cited above is not just for any Native bodies, but for those of Native education students, the subjects' institutional counterparts, to be put at the service of white education students. That the Native students who are enrolled in a parallel, separate program may not benefit equally from this exchange does not occur to the white students. Even in times of uncertainty, white subjects assume that it is their desires that are paramount as they maintain their place as identity keepers and definers in the lives of their students, Natives, and others. The subjects remain the explorers in search of a culture or a people of whom they might approve and selectively appropriate. They are waiting to discover the exotic.

In spite of subjects' statements of desire, there are at least two indications that their longings will never be satisfied by the methods they prescribe. First, direct contact with Natives is not something that subjects lack considering their declaration of how many Natives and others are their friends with whom they have contact at will. And in a province in which the Native school population is fast approaching 50 percent of the total, it would be hard to miss the presence of Native bodies. Even if a subject manages to live a completely monochromatic existence, however, she could not have failed to notice that the professor of her cross-cultural course is Aboriginal. As with the course itself, subjects are divided on their reception of the professor. Some praise her willingness to share her experiences with the class; others say she was biased and lacked credibility. In
many ways, in an issue discussed in a subsequent chapter, it is the everyday presence of the Aboriginal professor which signals the extent to which real live bodies will never quite be good enough to satisfy the desire for a fantastic, idealized version of the other.

Subjects’ desire is a clear case of eating the other, not just to enliven the self, but in some cases, to become the other, to become exotic, romantic, more spiritual, less materialistic. On the other hand, the bodies of real Natives are not particularly interesting unless they are compliant, exotic, and willing to serve the purposes of the dominant agenda. One subject in particular openly desires students whose interface with dominant culture is explosive and troubled. She is curious about how children on reservations fare when they come to the city.

Like those ones are curious to me how they fit in, the ones that lived on the reserves and maybe their parents split up or they got taken away from their family or something like that. (F6610)

But when I ask her whether there were many First Nations children in her class, she says there were not many and those that were didn’t seem to have any trouble “fitting in”. Later, she contradicts herself, however, when she revises her estimate and concludes that they fit in so well because there are so many of them. Because they seem to lack a crisis or they fail to need the white expert help, the high population of Native students fades from consciousness.

Subjects’ desire for the other is destined to remain unfulfilled for a second reason. When thralls of desire fade, subjects recoil from their former fantasies and express the wish that Natives would remain invisible, or at least not expect any “privileged” status.

I don’t think I had any bad feelings particularly toward them or anything in that way. I just looked at them as other people. And I still think that’s the best way to do it. I don’t think Natives and other people should be given privileged status. I think they should get all the help they need. If there’s a big language problem or a learning style problem. (F087)
This subject is otherwise the most vocal in seconding Native education students to be present in her class. She fantasizes that they and their knowledge will be available for her use. In her ambivalence, however, she also recognizes them as “the other” and moves quickly to cover over her dependence and desire. She switches roles, abandoning the image of herself as the one who needs help: instead, she projects Natives as the ones who “should get all the help they need”. The subject further covers her desire by rejecting Natives and re-casting them as the ones who are desiring and dependent. Many subjects have moments in which they express their need for the other; they also seem to recognize that they must disavow this need if they are to become self-defining agents. The methods for acquiring the things of the other follow from the colonial hangovers in which the Native is on earth to satisfy the European. In muted but discernible ways, subjects reveal their fantasies: the Native as the one who can fulfill both psychic and material desires—even as the subjects simultaneously recoil from their desire and its objects. The psychic and social identifications of white, Canadian subjects continue to depend on the abject presence of First Nations peoples.

Subjects as teachers:

who are their students?

Who are the subjects preparing themselves to teach? Who do they think their students are? At the time of the interviews, all subjects were participating in a four-month internship program at various urban schools. Under the supervision of their full-time, co-operating teachers, subjects assume increasing responsibility for their assigned classes. Becoming more comfortable in their roles, subjects gradually take on the talk of a full-time teacher and, not surprisingly, begin to speak of “my” students, “my” class. Their talk about
students performs the subjects in their anticipated roles and quells the hysteria, or at least the uncertainty, that accompanies new identity formulations.

While the education of children and teenagers comprises much of the focus of the subjects' professional training program, the children and teenagers, themselves, are largely objectified in these education processes. With schooling as a site of behaviour modification and the application of technical rational methods, students remain as individualized, psychologized objects. Individual students are identified according to school categories and organizational norms and their visibility is generated on school terms such as grade level and results of school tests. Sally Westwood (1994) says of discourses like this, in which the regime of power is constitutive of subjects, that visibility is generated “on another’s terms and invisibility via objectifications” (p. 262). Objectified in this way, a student becomes in/visible as an accumulation of needs to be met or a problem to be solved, as difference.

Subjects show a ready facility to dis/identify and make in/visible those groups whom they consider not like them. In their discussion of groups and interests, subjects depict both their students and others outside school as groups whose existence can be explained as naturally occurring phenomenon: “I’m not sure if he had Native blood in him as well” (F084); “Some people have more cultural diversity than others” (M012). Subjects’ identification groups, on the other hand, are formed on the basis of interest or good fortune, as accidents of birth. Others, including the students they teach, are objectified as the inevitable and inexorable: “There were always different immigrant groups coming [...which have...] always been a problem” (F082). Subjects in their role as teachers position themselves opposite an other who may be objectified in a variety of ways that signal difference to the subjects, including being a racialized minority student,
taking ESL, having a disability and/or having any kind of problem that needs to be solved.

Students are not the only ones who become invisible and objectified, however; in the schooling process the teacher simultaneously disappears as a disembodied, deracialized, and desexualized person. This is part of the scientific legacy in the history of education in which the legitimating process succeeds by distancing itself from the suggestion of education as a feminized profession. The legitimacy of women in this public role requires a desexualized presentation of self in what is a masculine role. The success of the female teacher becomes highly dependent upon her performance as a desexualized, deracialized administrator of individual, psychologized solutions, regardless of how lovingly and carefully applied. Whereas a child becomes in/visible through objectification and difference, the teacher too disappears into the neutral application of masculinized technique, where a teacher’s individual racial and sexual identity are presumed not to interfere.

The white subjects disappear behind two complementary norms: the naturalness of whiteness and the teacher as the administrator of normalcy. Whiteness and normalcy come together as one subject explains: “Being that my classes are predominantly Caucasian students, I haven’t had to come across any issues that would involve different cultures” (M015). Teachers’ jobs involve regulating both the other and themselves; for female teachers, this means that they are no longer women but respectable, bourgeois agents who clearly know the difference between “us” and “them”.

**who are teachers and what do they do?**

The “domain of recognitions” which I mention at the beginning of this chapter refers to the accumulation of repertoires for how a category may be considered and observed. The performance of a category, such as teacher, can be
recognized as the functions and reiterative practices which are said to comprise it. In various ways, participants perform themselves in their white, straight, teacher identities as deracialized, desexualized and "normal".

In this final section subjects further demonstrate the domain of recognitions which constitute the specific knowledge of being/becoming a teacher. Subjects desire is almost palpable as they perform themselves as having a specific character and disposition they attribute to teachers; that this desire is also embodied is shown in subjects' understanding of the teacher role as natural (white, straight) and in spite of their desexualized identities, as engendering. The second domain of recognition by which subjects insert themselves as teachers is through their desire to influence children, accompanied as the influence is by the maintenance of power.

Subjects were asked to describe both their own qualities as teacher candidates and the qualities of good in-service teachers; the responses are not dissimilar. The overlap in lists is not merely a flattering self-estimate: the lists are an indication of subject constructions of teachers. These idealized descriptions of teachers indicate subjects' fantasy for a white, straight, middle-class identification. And in spite of the highly idealized and limited versions of these representations, subjects indicate that they have accepted the im/possibility of being a good teacher, an identity which Walkerdine describe as a powerfully invested fiction (Walkerdine, 1990). Participants' conflict between desire for and fear of the other is resolved in the construction of an ideal self whose conflict is resolved in fantasy. In the following pages, I describe the ways in which participants perform themselves as both "benevolent" towards children and also controlling and hostile towards them. They express their contempt for the other while maintaining a position of strength in the construction of their ideal teacher selves expressed in discourse (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 55).
At the time of the interviews, all participants are engaged in an internship program which will constitute a major part of their program assessment. Subjects have a stake or interest in the recitations of ideal teacher qualities, and I understand that the participants' positive responses are for their own edification and assurance as much as they are responses to my questions. In their discourse, subjects perform themselves as competent teachers, ones about whom no one, including the subjects, would have any doubts. The characteristics offered as positive teacher traits are based on what subjects think ideal teachers should do and be, as well as how the subjects themselves conform to this teacher image. Through patterns of institutional discourse as the symbolic capital of practitioners, subjects demonstrate their practical competence in teacher knowledge. Any suggestions that subjects may not be unquestionably fine teacher candidates are undermined by a variety of discursive devices by which subjects warrant their claims.

An interpretive repertoire emerges around subjects' "natural" entry into teaching. Two seemingly contradictory sets of qualifications verify the participants as "naturals". On the one hand, they possess certain identifiable traits or qualities which make them perfectly suited to this career and, on the other hand, they find themselves inexorably drawn to the role. Teaching is like a calling for some subjects: the choosing is not available for questioning or debate. The choice is like a predestined role to which one must submit.

Subjects want to do a good job; they are passionate about doing well. They demonstrate their enthusiasm, hopes and desires that they be recognized as teachers through certain definable skills and qualities which they claim: they are knowledgeable and up-to-date in their subject areas, familiar with teaching practices, well prepared and organized. One subject suggests that, beyond official education requirements, teachers also have an obligation to address
“differences”. There appears to be a high degree of conformity in the job they hope to do and some notion that things are done “properly”. This proper role is accomplished when teachers “work hard” and “get the tools to do it well”. Overall, however, teachers will care about their students.

Most subjects identify themselves as nurturing and supportive. For ideal teachers, the three most popular traits, cited with equal frequency, are as follows: subjects are organized, patient, and caring. There is only one reference to rules and structures which are also an integral part of public schooling; the presumed absence of disciplinary structures is frequently lamented by outsiders to the system as well as by in-service teachers. Heedless of those concerns for structure and discipline, subjects focus on an idealized state and go out of their way to describe how caring, supportive, and loving they are. Demonstrating their overwhelming empathy for children is a characteristic of an ideal teacher subjects consistently perform.

The role of teacher is idealized as caring, loving, supportive; and participant access to this ideal character state is declared as natural. The naturalness and seeming inevitability of a career in teaching is expressed by many subjects.

- it feels very right (F085)
- the natural extension (M545)
- something that keeps pushing me toward education (F332)
- just part of something that’s been in me (F812)
- the most logical thing to do (M795-6)
- that was always something that appealed to me (F6612-13)
- different people have told me that I should be a teacher (F433)
- I think its something I always was anyway (F023).
The performance of teaching as a natural process for participants is, I suggest, not just about individual career choices but also about solutions to both conscious and unconscious decisions facing participants. I have already discussed how participant idealization of the teacher role permits them to resolve the conflict of desire and fear of the other. Through fantasy they see themselves as benevolent and supportive towards others whom they both desire and fear and who may need participants' help. To look further at this, I examine what is considered "natural" in this context and what has been naturalized. The first of two processes in the naturalization of teaching among these participants is the social mobility and negotiation with unconscious self that the entrance into teaching affords. Second is the performance of the teacher's loving, benevolent self which is called upon as the fulfillment of the imperial dream.

Walkerdine (1990) offers that the notion of the "naturalness" of teaching supports a fiction which denies the power and inequality that accompanies teaching practices and identities. For example, the perception of the inevitability of subjects' choices does not entertain or question why this "natural" process occurs more frequently among white, working class students of second or third generation Canadians, and more often among women than among men. The silence of the unconscious in these decisions supports subjects' conscious reasonings. Their justifications and explanations of themselves and their motivation regarding the "naturalness" of teaching warrants them as knowing subjects in control of their own production. Their explanations not only confirm them as proper teachers but people who are in control of the social relations which govern them. That they and others remain unconscious of many of these social relations is necessary for the legitimation of subjects' choices.

Historically, the teaching process has provided settings of major impact for those aspiring to fantasies of domination and service or, as discussed in the
previous chapter on teachers and as described by Foucault: providing subjects with access to pastoral power and confirming them as agents. I have already described how teaching in Canada has been used as a method of “improving” the working classes and non-Anglo groups, including their transformation into loyal British subjects. Schooling practices have been significant among the various social organizations in taking on the instruction and homogenizing of middle-class norms and customs regarding child-rearing, cleanliness, respect for law and order. Teaching, which has functioned as a serviceable tool from imperial times for those with a willingness to serve and to save, continues to function today as an entry level profession for many working-class and second generation, pre-service education students. The profession of teaching is a respectable career providing up-ward mobility for many subjects in this study.

Women and working-class subjects take advantage of the image of the white teacher that has been prepared for them, along with the expectation and sense of duty that theirs will be the desire to save. The expectation and duty found in teaching is actually a useful burden for working-class subjects in resolving the split at their entrance into a middle-class field. Their movement into a middle-class occupation and away from working-class loyalties is modified by subjects desire to serve and “to make a difference”. The burden of expectation in teaching also helps female subjects resolve the split at their entrance into professional, paid work force—so long as female subjects continue their desire to be found in the service of men and children.

White teaching subjects who are marginalized by their gender, class, ethnicity require that the profession of teaching continue to be a white racial formation, for it is one process whereby they gain respectability and escape marginality. Their access to legitimacy through teaching depends on the profession being an almost exclusively white entitlement. Working class females
need the exclusivity of teaching in order to become privileged as teaching is something for which their white normativity is not only suited: it is required. Despite class and gender based exclusions, white subjects “adhere to whiteness as their badge of deservingness” (Fine, 1997, p. 63). In return for the exclusivity provided by the quintessential whiteness of the profession, those who become teachers understand their duty to help others achieve success in the way they have achieved it—through the transmission of white, normative culture. They will prove their qualifications to their white profession by reproducing it.

Judith Robertson (1994, p. 7) writes extensively about the “dream of love in teaching” as a particular “pattern of felt experience” which she identifies in beginning female teachers. It is the “fantasies of dominion and mobility” that beginning primary teachers use in their everyday experience through which they struggle to create themselves as proper teaching bodies. Robertson describes the “dream of love” as a structure of feeling which functions as “a romantic re-casting, a strategizing for power, a bid for a particular kind of social identification—self-effacing, classified, engendered, racialized—that might properly embody the desire to dominate” (pp. 7, 8). In most ways, this construct also describes the formation of “emergent occupational identities” that I have been observing among subjects in this study, particularly among working-class women and ethnic minority participants. Whereas Robertson claims that the dream is a quest for the “‘purely feminine’”, I suggest that the dream of love as a way of securing power, completion and respectability is also visible among male subjects in this research study who struggle with class issues and other subjugated identifications that would separate them from “the typical”. While I would not dispute the differing effects of socialization on male and female subjects, other social factors among research participants contribute to similar
expressions of the dream of love in this male and female study compared to Robertson's female only study.

One aspect of the subjects' "dream of love" finds its expression in the children they will teach. The second most frequently cited justification for choosing teaching, after its naturalness, is because subjects like, love, or enjoy children. Both negative and positive school experiences promote subject desires to be role models. Recalling their own experiences, some subjects wish to repeat positive student-teacher relationships of their youth; others recall negative experiences and would replay the scenario—this time participating in productive experiences for themselves and others, knowing that they are "saving" or protecting children. Participant responses to loving children is shown in their desire to teach them. While love for children can be expressed in many ways, the highest offering by which these subjects can manifest their love is to influence children as role models, leaders, and ones who can be counted on to "be there" for students. Teachers' love and desire for others performs them as loving, caring people who are authorized to be in charge of others and to transmit their own values to those in their care as discussed in the chapter on teaching. Teachers, as reliable colonial stewards, can be trusted with this important task of rearing the young. What single quality do these participants share that is their semiotic qualification for dispensing goodness and love? All of them can offer the substance of their whiteness as their suitability for teaching. Empathy for the other is seen as the ultimate demonstration of generosity as it simultaneously demonstrates goodness. As generosity can only come from those who have something to give, these white teachers are eminently qualified to give their goodness.

Expressions of commitment and "feelings for children" are explained in a variety of ways. Typically, these teacher actions are seen as commonly occurring
traits or so well ingrained as to be natural or self-engendering. For example, the inevitability of the following educational shibboleth reaches near-biological proportions because it is more determining than parental nurture: "I always believed that you teach the way that you’ve been taught, and luckily maybe it’s just that I’ve had people that have always got me thinking about differences and things like that". On the other hand, there is a certain amount of self-engendering that has been able to overcome the influence of bad teaching: "I got lucky with teachers that really, that got me thinking, not necessarily in a positive way. They might have been racist people that I didn’t agree with, and that didn’t make feel good about the way that they were acting yet they got me thinking". The subject as agent is a combination of nurture/nature and will now attempt to influence other students by another near-biological event of teaching: "a lot of time you’re, you’re like those kids’ parents, I mean you’re teaching them, I mean they see you as much as they see their parents. And I mean you can make a great impact on them". Her sense of responsibility and personal efficacy is enormous as she takes on the role of (re)birth mother who will fill her children with good things: "whatever way you believe, that’s what you’re going to emphasize. So that’s why I’ve always tried to get good things into my head maybe and good backgrounds and good values, so that’s what I’m going to pass on" (F6612-13).

This is perhaps the most forceful expression of the link between the naturalness of teaching and the biological process of passing on genes from ancestors to their progeny. This particular subject is anxious about getting good training and "good things into [her] head" including "good backgrounds and good values" so that she well have these positive traits to "pass on" (F6612-13). This preparation of one’s embodied self is reminiscent of women who take care to eat well during their pregnancies so that they will be "passing on" good health to the children who will come from them. The participant doesn’t suggest why
the children in her care will need intervention so extensive that it approximates rebirth through her. Her assumption, however, follows the role expected of teachers in earlier times of colonization to give children those things which the racialized other mothers lack. In this process, she performs the identity of the rebirthing “natural” mother in relation to the abject (m)other.

Giving of oneself is very much a part of the motivation for entering teaching for both male and female subjects. One subject states his reason for entering teaching is that “people have told me I’m a very giving person” (M014-15). Another subject (F416) sees her role as that of someone who will, if necessary, step in to save the children even when the other parents cannot. This is the heroic act of the outsider who is, again in Canadian mythology, more “successful” than the natural parent and/or the original inhabitant of the land.

One subject sums up the statements of many concerning why they would be teachers: “to be able to make a difference in [students’] lives” (F433). Loving and influencing children are predominant “reasons” for desiring to teach. It would seem that one expression of love is the transmission of values and the influence one can bring to the adult person the child eventually becomes. The desire to love and influence children is so predominant that it would seem to be a common sense goal that would readily mark the successful teacher. If this goal is accomplished, that is, if children accept the teacher’s love and submit to her influence, then the children have enabled the teacher to perform her role. The teacher’s love is ready at all times for those children whom the teacher will reward when she is allowed to accomplish herself as a teacher. This presumption of the right to influence students appears as so natural that its contradiction of many notions of good teaching practices goes unnoticed. It appears that practices which promote child development as a natural process—and not one to be
interfered with by private agendas—can be ignored when teachers are able to assume that private and public agendas coincide.

Subjects submit that because they love children, they want to influence them by becoming role models. Because student response in culturally appropriate ways is a measure of teacher success, power resides in students to accomplish teachers in their roles. To be confirmed in their teacher roles and to maintain power are two of the subjects' desires that would seem to be at risk when teaching Natives and those whom the subjects consider other. The assumption is that Native students—because of their culture—cannot be influenced by white teachers the way white students can and in ways which white teachers project as positive. Subjects generally do not anticipate that they will be confirmed as teachers through positive student responses when teaching those who are unlike them. In desiring completion through the other, the teacher will not see her own white face reflected back to her in the face of the Native child. The teacher's identity does not exist prior to that of the student, and without the performance of the ideal students, the ideal teacher is similarly unconfirmed. Instead, the dream of love fades as on waking and subjects anxiously inquire about mechanisms of control for "dealing with" Native students.

Another measure of a successful teaching career is whether students can be made to care about being in school. Taking on this major responsibility is surely applauded in some quarters and makes for fine movie scripts\(^2\), and it also supports the image of teacher as hero and miracle worker. Students' social, economic, racial positionings, as well as gender, interests, abilities, or sense of self are obliterated by the teacher's overwhelming responsibility for and ownership of the outcome of students' successes. In this expression and others, subjects

\(^2\) for example, *Stand and Deliver*, *Dead Poets' Society*, *To Sir with Love*. 
indicate their desire for power that circulates through their commitment and sacrifice:

If I could be a role model there, you know, what would happen if I would be able to go into a classroom for a whole year. And just think, and just hope that, if when they were having teachers that they couldn't see eye-to-eye with and sort of make that experience worthwhile. (M545)

I've had teachers make a great impact on my life which is one of the reasons why you do want to be a teacher is, if you have, like, one or two teachers that are just so awesome that you know you want to be like them or do things like them. (F6612-13)

It's too great a responsibility to just be a job. (F022-3)

Subjects acknowledge that even though teaching is difficult, it does have its rewards—even if they are deferred "...it's rewarding but it's more that you might not necessarily know the reward until later on and things like that. You might not see it for years on end, but I think that it's a rewarding profession, that's for sure" (F667). The overt discourse around this desire to save others and sacrifice oneself remains unspoken, although it is anticipated; it also remains unconscious. Therefore, the rewards cannot be overtly described or acknowledged. Subjects are overwhelmed by the work load and responsibilities with their internship assignments. Their remarks about the amount of work they have to do at the time of the interviews attests to their sacrifice and their anticipation that it is all worthwhile. The subjects' accounts of their elaborate preparations, inserted into the conversations, testify on their behalf that the subjects are performing teacher work, and that the stress and sacrifice are their badges of proof. The sacrifice and its deferral are sources of satisfaction and fulfillment, in no small part for their completion of the image of teacher as hero. Subjects relate a variety of stories about the heroic interventions of teachers in the lives of students, fantasizing that teachers save lost children, care for the unlovable, work miracles when others would give up.
The teacher that I work with, I consider to be a very good teacher, has students that are registered as full time students and attend one class during the day and that's his class. He's had a student do a complete turn around...he's not exactly like me, but he has certain things I really admire in the way he does things and he's a successful teacher and the students like him.

The "dream of love in teaching" is easy to see in the offering of teacher's love and sacrifice for students. In the quotation above, however, the subject projects himself into the role of teacher and by witnessing to this image fantasizes about the payoff in teaching: that he will be empowered by students' love for him. In that "speech is unwittingly testimonial" (Felman, 1992, p. 15), the subject's words bear witness to the desire for seduction and power in a teacher's dream of love: to love and be loved. As seen throughout their interviews, subjects are in love with their roles and their performances of domination by which they impose their desires on others. Of course, the idealized projection of dominion over the loved other must be concealed if it is to be successful in its dream of confining and conforming of self and other.

The idealized vision of teacher as hero is supported by the imperial dream of "discovering" and saving the other through education and missionary work. In colonial situations greater personal liberty was afforded to white European women through their part in "civilizing" the empire. It is an appealing proposition for marginalized subjects who are recruited to perform a function indispensable to the reproduction of dominance: the demonstration of "how to live". Access to greater social respectability and upward class movement is made possible through the performance of white identities in roles necessary for the continuation of white domination. The fantasy of the ideal loving teacher covers the subjects' desire for and fear of the other, the disdain covered by loving-kindness. Participants are in positions to wield their whiteness as kindness and
benevolence, an authorization for which they are rewarded with respectability and public approbation for their sacrifice, as well as citizenship and agency.

Finally, among the qualities of an ideal teacher, subjects most prize those qualities which can only be described as ineffable. These are the qualities that transcend organizational skills and that can’t be pinned down although everyone has an idea what they are and may even have seen them in operation. Although these ideal qualities are supported by dreams and traits already named, the ideal qualities transcend strict definitions.

Some people are just good at it. (M797)

Someone who will do that little extra or always has that little smile or pat on the back. (F813)

...have an affinity for teaching. (F086)

[Teaching is] different for every personality type that can achieve that level. (M797)

What these statements of the ineffable have in common is that they are rooted in the person. Skill alone is not enough; according to one subject, a good teacher is also a good person. “In order to be a good teacher I feel I have to be a good person. So it not only helps me in the classroom but it also helps me in society as a whole. And to me they’re integrated” (F331). The qualities of an ideal teacher are a reflection of those qualities admired by society as belonging to a person of good character. This is the individualized, non-aligned, generic, good person. It is the identity that needs no further description than to say it is the typical, normal, absent white centre.

The contradictory and unconscious split between the embodied natural teacher who loves children and the pure space of transcendence (“some people are just good at it”) disappears in the normalization of teacher identities as performed by white subjects. Teacher identities are normalized and rationalized within the bounds of ideology and social conformation to the extent that desire
and the will to dominate disappear into "the typical" unmarked centre. The recognition of teacher bodies as loving and heroic makes possible the transcendence or escape from the body to an ideal, an ideation of the perfect absent centre occupied by the pure, white, omnipotent body.

The ideal teacher identity and the identity of the "typical" Canadian both assume a neutral white centre. The processes of these identity formations are not merely parallel, however. That the ideal Canadian is (ideally) white prepares subjects for their performance as proper teaching bodies. It establishes the myth of meritocracy as an unquestionable "fact" that can be read as "proof" of white supremacy under the performance of white benevolence and caring. The impossible fiction of this ideal white teacher covers over the myth of meritocracy and the unflattering outcomes that are affected by the structural inequalities of the Canadian society in which they are practiced. Through their discourses, subjects warrant claims which indicate their understanding of the role of teacher in Canadian society. That they can make these claims enables subjects to participate in their construction as properly racialized (white) teaching bodies. Their access to these claims is also an indication that their performances are not merely a private affair, but meet with desires approved and anticipated in Canadian social life. Subjects have indicated their knowledge and competence "over the civilities, conduct and competencies that prescribe 'how to live'" (Stoler, p. 83); specifically, subjects have indicated their knowledge of the norms and functions of how to be a teacher. Subjects understand that, in the social order of Canada, the value of this knowledge performs them in their claims of power and privilege.
Chapter Six

"WHAT MUST I DO TO BE SAVED?"*

SCHOOL RULES TO MANAGE AND CONTAIN DIFFERENCE

This chapter, the second of three to discuss research findings, is about rules, boundary formations, and the construction of subject identities. In the previous chapter, I address the role of the teacher as it is prepared—nationally, historically, and in the present day—and performed by subjects in the functions and norms of their coded identities as white, straight, educated and able-bodied. The ability of subjects to access these identity codes is some indication of the extent to which the role of teacher in Canadian society is anticipated and known. This chapter follows the conflicts and rules whereby subjects perform and maintain their needs and desires for a secure teacher identity as it has been coded. The subjects are anxious to know the rules, to keep them, and to enforce them as they participate in the organization and normalization of activities and discourses of public school education. In securing their identities as teachers, there is perhaps no more important process than that the subjects mark the distinctions between themselves and from others who are not white, straight, educated, and able-bodied. As educated people about to graduate and launch new careers as teachers, the subjects are certified, poised, and disciplined. In the pages which follow, I show the desire of white subjects to identify themselves as competent knowledge workers and the use that is made of the regulation and discipline of bodies—their own and others—in the process of identity formation. Subjects are produced and perform themselves on this site of regulation for the

instruction of would-be teachers, where groups and individuals are distinguished; where imperatives, sanctions and beliefs of public education in Canada are upheld.

In the next few pages I continue the explication of my teaching experiences—begun in previous chapters—as they apply to the disciplinary formation of teacher identities. Reflecting on my own example, I see how "becoming a teacher" is a social act of formation that both includes and extends quite beyond individual histories, social positionings and individual choices. Following this discussion and before entering into substantive discussion of data analysis, I devote the first part of this chapter to the theoretical work which supports the analysis. More than the individual event, teacher identity is rooted in bourgeois subject formation of Canadian society. Crucial to the production of the liberal self is the formation of difference, supported by the discipline and regulation of this difference "across a firm and visible border" (Alcoff, 1996, p. 75).

When I was a public school teacher, I was often aware of performing myself in the role of teacher. I was aware of using the role to accomplish my authority in the classroom in a way which would not otherwise have been available to me. At other times, I felt restricted by the role but performed it anyway in willing compliance with some of the expectations that accompanied my performance. I eventually left the teaching profession because I was aware of enacting a role I felt to be too restricting and which was supporting neither my aims nor, I presumed, those of my students. In spite of many positive experiences in the classroom, when I first heard the title of Foucault's text *Discipline and Punish*, I automatically assumed it must be about educational institutions rather than prisons. It seems that all of education is about discipline—discipline of teachers by students, students by teachers, teachers by
other teachers, teachers by their social practices, not to mention parents and the
general public. This disciplinary function is a productive activity, that is,
productive of certain subjectivities that have their roots in the history of
education and in the need for an educated workforce and an (in)formed
citizenry.

On the assumption that the regulation and discipline of bodies is requisite
for acquiring and teaching the control of the mind, schooling practices depend on
the participation of teachers and students in the construction of normative
behaviour and self-surveillance. Regulation and discipline of bodies make
possible the kind of conformity needed for participation in a civil society which
requires adherence to social roles and knowledge of the differences between
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. Schooling also makes possible various
types of identity formation; schools welcome and participate in the production of
"bodies that count" (Butler) as well as those of "abject beings".

In claiming a certain degree of self-consciousness about my role as a
teacher, I hasten to acknowledge that I am aware of only a small portion of the
social practices and ideological positionings that occasionally made this a very
comfortable role for me for the better part of twelve years. Neither was my
enactment of the role new or unique, as Butler reminds us that the mythological
closet from which we presume to draw any identity we choose is stocked with
choices that are less than original. Subject discourses which are analyzed in this
chapter, therefore, are not particularly new or surprising given the high degree of
regulation required for the status and conformity subjects have already achieved.
The section to follow relies on the work of Michel Foucault and his discussion of
the "analytics" of power which perform the participants as bourgeois subjects in
this regulation and discipline of bodies.
**Formation of bourgeois subjects**

In nineteenth century Europe, the rise of the middle-class paralleled the decline of the aristocracy with its sinecure of “bloodlines” as proof of legitimacy. The middle classes—a structuring inherited by twentieth century democracies—achieved legitimacy through the imprimatur of themselves as “citizen”, a process based on hierarchical social relations of race, gender, class, sexuality, language, religion, regionality, ethnicity, nationality, and so forth. Citizen identity afforded respectability and access to a way of life associated with privilege, governance of the populace, and devotion to one’s duty to uphold standards of morality as practiced by the middle-classes. The process of respectability depended entirely on the construction and demarcation of boundaries between what was considered degenerate/healthy, disciplined/undisciplined, and self/other as reinforced by the bourgeois “way of living” (Stoler, 1995). The construction of respectable identities is also dependent upon the varied constructions of other groups such as colonized peoples throughout the empire and those at home who were produced as “degenerate” classes, and whom McClintock describes as follows:

> the militant working class, the Irish, Jews, feminists, gays and lesbians, prostitutes, criminals, alcoholics and the insane—who were collectively figured as racial deviants, atavistic throwbacks to a primitive moment in human prehistory, surviving ominously in the heart of the modern imperial metropolis. (p. 42)

Processes of exclusion as a mode of structuring what was acceptable from what was repudiated operated through endless discursive practices and strategies in the most private, intimate relations as well as in the most public, and shaped identities on all sides of demarcation. Ironically, those who were marginalized, who did not belong in polite company, and who were considered a threat capable of undermining the standards of respectable society, were also essential to the very formation of respectability. The first of two reasons is that the wealth and
ease of the middle classes depended on the often invisible labour of those at home and in the colonies, as well as on the considerable resource extraction from across the empire. Second, even though the fixation of otherness is heavily invested in the material consequences of empire (Said, 1993), discursive practices and hierarchical relations which create otherness are also necessary for the marking of difference which produces bourgeois identity. Stoler claims that racialized bourgeois order in colonial time was a precarious thing and that the activities in the colonies had no small part in delineating the concerns for firm distinctions being made at home. "Whiteness" was also a creation of the moral rectitude of bourgeois society formed against the bodies of "immoral European working class and native Other, and against those of destitute whites in the colonies" (p. 100).

As I have argued in an earlier chapter, the law of the father by which subject identity is formed is not only repressive: it is also productive. For bourgeois subjectivity, the presence of the other—as a disregarded or absent presence—is entirely necessary, not merely for the rejection of that which one is not, but for the production of that which the bourgeois represents politically, economically, historically. As proper bourgeois life depended on the regulation and control over what was considered degenerate and unrepresentable in all aspects of social life, it also dependent on the operation of all systems of oppression for the demarcation and performance of the respectable bourgeois self. According to Stoler (1995) the marking of difference is entirely necessary to the process of laying claims which describe the "truth-values about the contemporary social order" (p. 77). Laying claims to truth is a form of intervention that allows certain knowledges to be disqualified and others to be valourized. Stoler states that this validation of bourgeois forms of knowledge and way of life is the ultimate bourgeois project; it is a process which constitutes
the power "to intervene in making of life...in 'how' to live". It is "central to the cultivation of the bourgeois self" including the claiming of hegemony, privileged positioning, "certified knowledge and jurisdiction over the manner of living, over the governing of children, over the civilities, conduct and competencies that prescribe 'how to live'" (p. 83). Access to spaces of domination depend on access to the technologies of its re/production which support the continuation of economic, social and moral authority. These legacies of domination have been learned and reproduced so that "how to live" has become the common sense model of today's morality.

Examined further by Foucault, this bourgeois claim on power and knowledge produces a powerful form of domination in which the tactics of power for disciplining the individual and for the regulation of the social intersect in the production of normative behaviour, normalizing communications, and the creation of hierarchies of knowledge (Stoler, p. 77). It is Foucault who describes his examination of the term "sexuality" as not being necessarily the "reality to which it refers". Rather, it describes "an effort to treat sexuality as the correlation of a domain of knowledge, a type of normativity and a mode of relation to the self" (1984, p. 333). The complex experience in this domain of knowledge is one which conjoins a field of study which Foucault describes as follows:

a collection of rules (which differentiate the permissible from the forbidden, natural from monstrous, normal from pathological, what is decent from what is not, etc.), a mode of relation between the individual and himself (which enables him to recognize himself as a sexual subject amid others). (p. 333-4)

The domain of knowledge is made intelligible through a "collection of rules" by which the individual comes to know his relation to the self and to others.

Although Foucault describes his "repressive hypothesis" in terms of the relations of power with sex, this representation of power is examined, not so much to develop a "theory" of power, as an "analytics" whereby Foucault (1990)
moves toward a "determination of the instruments which make possible [the] analysis [of power]" (p. 82). This analysis of power, supported by the "technologies of sex", indicates how the repression of sex is not primarily for the control of other (lower) classes but rather for the control of those who make the rules. That is, desire is not represented by interest in sexuality alone, but by interests in its effects on the body—its "vigor, longevity, progeniture, and descent of the classes that 'ruled'" (p. 123). Stoler argues persuasively that

the discursive and practical field in which nineteenth-century bourgeois sexuality emerged was situated on an imperial landscape where the cultural accoutrements of bourgeois distinction were partially shaped through contrasts forged in the politics and language of race. (p. 5)

Foucault describes the ways in which the efforts to gain mastery over sex, to control it at the level of language, and to expunge sex from free conversation resulted in the fulmination of the opposite effects. That is, what was needed to be held in check became enlarged to the extent that the efforts and subsequent inability to subjugate embodied sex led to desire itself being named a transgressive act. Therefore, the self-censorship required to examine one's thoughts, senses and memory for lingering traces of sexual awakening turned sex into anything but an obscure discourse. In Western European history, the scheme by which sex is transformed into discourse is supported by monastic life and normalized for every good Christian. Even though the words about sex and desire are neutralized through confession, the acts of confession elaborate the technologies for discussing sex including all forms of sexual thoughts, touchings, longings, and, of course, all acts. The consequences of this process of subjugation and control are twofold: a discourse of sex is rendered morally acceptable; and the discourse becomes "technically useful" to the policing and surveillance by the pastoral elite. The point is not that the discipline of sexuality gave rise to perversions and pathologies of the sexual instinct. Rather, at issue is the type of
power that discourses and institutions "brought to bear on the body and on sex" (p. 47) so that the performance of sexuality is not excluded, but managed.

In similar processes, the research subjects, as postulants of the new pastoral elite, are involved in the articulation of power which regulates discourses of bodies. These discourses, constructed for the purposes of their teacher education, are not designed to raise barriers but to allow increased access and lines of "indefinite penetration" on the part of the powerful with respect to the control of cross-cultural effects in classrooms. Raced identities are not excluded from these education processes, rather they confirm the particular identifications by which individuals may be considered racialized. Neither do these discourses seek to avoid racialization; on the contrary, here is an opportunity for racialized identities and practices to be examined, discussed, and evaluated in ways which provide pleasure and reinforce positions of power over the discourses. Here, in the racial discourses of the compulsory course taken by the subjects, is an opportunity for white identity construction to be confirmed as managers.

This discourse of racialization outlines the terms of engagement with the topic of racial identity construction in ways which limit it and keep it away from more dangerous, perhaps more "damning thoughts, touchings, longings". Subjects have acquired some formal, professional language in which desire of the other will be performed, contained, and released as discourse while references to subjects' abject racialized identities, which they simultaneously rely upon and reject, are strenuously avoided. Their own identities are not open for examination but are always in use for marking the boundaries of individual and social control.

The discourse of race the subjects are learning during the process of their professional education is of a particular type: it provides a set of images and
meanings for managing the talk about Native culture. It also objectifies the process of racialization, for example, implying that it happens to other people, that it is an anthropological feature, and that it is an effect of cultural pluralism. Their discourse normalizes subject talk as the language of teachers, and renders their expressions and interests morally acceptable. Now that racialization has become a concern that is germane to their consciousness as professional teachers, it is something they can legitimately talk about. It also constructs the self-examination of their desires as a performance of specific acts, good intentions, and pastoral concern. Subjects also possess technologies with which to judge the sufficiency of another's awareness and the ability to know a racist act when they see one. Acquiring this discourse gives the new pastoral elite a useful technology for discerning the particular failings of others: this is the process which criticizes the paucity of teaching materials and provides numerous assessments on the behaviour of classmates and the professor. For the performance of themselves as dominant, subjects need to regulate the processes of their own production as well as the bodies of others including students and other teachers. As they become managers of difference, subjects indicate markers which will confirm their own status and designate that of others.

The last chapter was a study of what constitutes the identification which subjects call "teacher". In examining their discourses, I describe the processes by which subjects perform their knowledge of who teachers are and the work they will do. Their perceptions of teachers can be read in their descriptions of themselves which prescribe the functions and norms of teacher identity. In this chapter, I investigate more specifically how identities are confirmed by calling to attention and examining the rules, regulations, and that which Foucault calls: "rational forms, technical procedures, instrumentation through which to operate" (1984, p. 338). Equally important are the disruptions of these formations
and procedures by which power is alternately stabilized and reversed. I have already indicated the social positionings of subjects and noted that the hold on their identifications as respectable bourgeois subjects is not necessarily secure. While the formation of the bourgeois subject may define a way of living, it also defines the lives of the marginalized, some of whom aspire to follow the rules and disciplinary practices which will designate their status as respectable. The subjects themselves are produced in these regulatory procedures, and the process is neither straight forward nor guaranteed. The contradictions and norms that appear in public education and teacher identities are surrounded by a body of rules "which are both a limitation of the conflict and a result of it" (Foucault, 1984, p. 357). Subjects are as aware as anyone of how tenuous their grasp on respectability may be. There is a great deal at stake for the subjects, and their discourses emphasize their continual efforts to perform themselves as newly authorized teacher identities against the haunt of the ever present bodies of the abject other. In the analysis which follows, I consider: What are the rules which subjects perform and which confirm them as bodies that count in this site? What disciplinary procedures do they enact to secure this site as their subject identification?

**Teachers as managers of difference**

Public schools are sites in which structures of dominance, including racial and gender hierarchies, are co-existent with the operations of liberalism and its rhetoric of equality. Underlying this commitment of equality for all, however, is the image of the individual, white male who, by possessing rationality, has become the model for all humanity. The greatly admired traits of rationalism and individualism, as signals of equal entitlement, are embedded in particular versions of personhood defined by white, bourgeois males. It is a paradox of
liberalism that the rational man—by possessing these particular traits of race, class, and gender—simultaneously becomes the indispensable measure by which one could be considered equal. Historically, exclusive access to these defining categories was guarded by technologies and practices which designated personhood and the status of citizenship. Access also depended on guarding the definition of “rationality”. The “liberal paradox” is that the principle of liberal equality is something to which only white, bourgeois males had access. The Enlightenment ideal of the rational man as the *sine qua non* of equality persists as a marker of difference in these present times. While race is said to be irrelevant in the rhetoric of equality, it is so relevant as to be fundamental to the definition of equality itself.

Because the “liberal paradox” of equality is dependent upon the boundaries between “normality and abnormality” (Stoler, 1995), implicit norms are available to mark irregularities, departures, and differences between bodies that matter and abject beings (Butler, 1993). In this regard, subjects have been prepared by their teacher education program to observe departures from the norm—departures euphemized as “differences”. Even though a subject describes differences as “another point of view”, the use that is made of this designation indicates that “difference” is understood as a handicap. Throughout their interviews, subjects variously describe “differences” as embodied by ESL students, Natives, immigrants, and students with learning disabilities and impairments.

In their concern to effect equality and inclusive practice, subjects often appear conflicted as they vacillate between recognizing their students as individuals versus their students as cultural signifiers. Neither do they get any support from discourses of liberalism in which the other is less likely to be recognized as an individual and more likely as a cultural identity, the latter over-
determined by stereotypes and a monolithic otherness. Unidentified, but fully operational, the dominant culture provides the basis for assessing other cultures; the dominant culture is invisible to subjects to the extent that they typically see themselves as individuals apart from culture and their achievement outside biology or “race”. Collective differences are what others have such as particular learning styles, First Nations identity, “different cultures”, “the wide variety of the students”, and “cultural differences”. The embodied subtext of difference, however, is First Nations students even if they are not specifically named as in the following example.

The subject has been describing her encounter with a Native Cree speaker who has to “overcome the barriers of language” in order to progress. She also implies that Native children cannot be expected to be at school on time because punctuality, as she knows it, isn’t in their culture. Whether it is or not, the value of punctuality performs a strong disciplinary function in white, middle-class teaching situations. Accepting another’s cultural standards does not make relations equitable if one regards those standards as inferior to one’s own. The subject remarks that she doesn’t have the same expectations for all her students, especially those whose cultures “may make them act or behave or react a certain way”. These are bare euphemisms, couched in a semblance of teacher jargon, that do nothing to conceal her low regard for Native students who are first referred to generally as “some cultures”, and in the next sentence as “they”. The students as individuals are not to be held responsible for their actions because, as non-agents, students are dominated and victimized by their deficient culture which also prevents them achieving status as individuals and from fulfilling the higher expectations that the subject might have for other students. Given these
low expectations, it would be unlikely for Native students or others to achieve the highly prized, normative identification of the autonomous individual—as the fundamental definition of personhood—if one continues to assume that students simply are their culture. The subject warrants her claim by demonstrating her knowledge of teacher jargon and learning styles. Unfortunately, she is misled in her assumption that Native children are a homogenous group, an assumption not uncommonly found in teaching literature. Lowered expectations are supported by cultural stereotyping as in the following:

In math and science we were talking about Native people, a lot of the time they need hands on manipulative, to do things with their hands. They're more concrete learners. We were told that if you're going to teach math or science to a Native, perhaps use more hands on experiments because the concrete might be easier to learn from. Then move to the abstract. (F102)

This stereotyping supports the dominance portrayed by at least three binaries: individual versus culture, abstract versus concrete, and self versus other. It would seem that stereotyping sustains itself even in a fact free zone such as the following:

the Native people will not look you in the eye, necessarily, because it's a sign of disrespect. So don't demand that a Native child look you in the eye if you're talking to them...I don't have a problem with them not looking me in the eye because they do make the eye contact, so I think they've lost that from their heritage. (F101)

When the subject does not find the stereotype she has anticipated and finds, instead, that Native children do look her in the eye, she interprets that lack of a stereotype as something Natives have lost from their culture. Low expectations for Native students can attribute even the absence of a stereotype as failure or loss on the part of Native culture. A simple form of explanation which takes over from the determinations of race, culture, as determinate, also bears the responsibility for many "flaws" which stand even in the face of contradictions to stereotypes.
In their on-going discoveries about teaching Native children, the subjects continue to look for a unique Native teaching/learning strategy.

...well we learned that they are more global thinkers and that sort of thing, but we didn't really, like I said, when we found, like when we were talking about teaching strategies they seemed like they were good for all kids. I thought that maybe I'd learn a little more specifics about different ways of teaching. (F812)

Even when the stereotype—that Native children have ways of learning that are quite separate from other children—doesn't seem to hold, the subject cannot revise her expectation to locate the precise technique that will be the clue to Native education and control. In spite of the individualizing thrust of many teacher education programs, Native students are seen as products of their culture and as homogenous as if their sameness were genetically ordered. Surely this reliance is fostered both by stereotyping as well as the objectification which hovers over many educational endeavours.

The large, defining, not readily understood notion of culture is resolved in another way by subjects. One resolution is that cultural differences are seen to break down to individual differences after all.

It reminded me to try and look at people as individuals which I try to do anyway and that there's, everybody has a different way of looking at things, which is good to remember. (F313)

The subject concludes that similarities are more common than differences and that learning from one another across various cultural groups will promote a mutuality that will expand all our horizons. It is a variation of the theme that we are all so different that we are all the same after all. Another subjects adds, “I never realized that they’re seeking solutions to the same problems just like we are” (F731). Cultures are made equal by dissolving them to units of common problems. In spite of enormous power differences, the subject holds all cultures equally capable of informing all others. The subject doesn’t imagine the cost that this comparable mouse and elephant combination would be for the mouse. The benefits are one way: “We end up with increased ability to be diverse” (F731).
This conclusion about culture is a variation on individualism in which the unit of comparison is self-defining, individual cultures—all equal, all respected. The subject warrants her claim by offering that white culture has something to learn from others. The subject also understands that this seemingly liberal view must by couched in terms of its utility to answer the question: Why should we bother to be interested? Or, what’s in it for me?

The separate and overlapping repertoires of individual and culture found in subject discourses attest to the subjects’ confusion and uncertainty when encountering the other in the classroom. Although culture and categorical identifications are the basis of difference, subjects conclude that their containment and management of difference will operate at the level of the individual. From their recent pedagogical studies and from their perceptions of themselves as autonomous individuals, it is easy for them to conclude that difference inheres in the person; and it is at this level that the subjects anticipate they will manage. As one subject says, “when the [unacceptable] behaviour has stopped and kids are paying attention and everything else, then you can start dealing with differences” (F6610). She wants to “fix” students’ differences and imagines that they are separate from behaviour, academic progress, and cultural contexts, including her own. Although subjects do not anticipate that they will manage the culture of the other, and expect that their greatest impact will be on the individual level, they do not seem prepared to recognize students as anything but homogenous, objectified, and culturally determined identifications. It is hardly surprising that expectations for the other are low when the other is seen only in relation to one’s culture, even when cultural stereotypes don’t hold. Confusion and uncertainty clearly emerge in subjects’ accounts as they encounter Natives in ways that go beyond what they think Natives should do and be.
For their part, subjects steadfastly maintain their identifying status as individuals and not as members of cultural groups. Wetherell and Potter (1992) say of white people that "their identity lies in the way the world happens to be now rather than in their distinctive blood" (p. 127). As a dominant culture works best by declaring itself "natural", subjects have a great deal invested in not seeing how they are regulated by their own culture and how its normative effects shape their estimations of themselves as individual and self-determining, a process and distinction they anxiously safeguard. Some of the contradictions in subjects’ distinctions between culture and the individual are found in the notion that while the other is essentialized as being her culture, the subjects are individuals, even when subjects’ own culture remains as the unacknowledged referent. Claiming individual identity allows one to take full credit for any successes without having to acknowledge the presence or influence of one’s culture. For this subject, status as an individual is clearly more desirable than group affiliation.

I’m proud to be a Canadian, but I’m also, it’s more individual. I’m more proud of who I am and what I do. (F175)

As represented in subjects’ discourses and supported by much of their pedagogical studies, the identity of the other is frequently homogenized and objectified in the notion of culture as heritage. The identity of the other is presumed to be fairly fixed, existing from time immemorial and frozen at the point of contact to become the instantly ancient other. Actions which are perceived as variations from this static notion of heritage are viewed mainly as loss or departure from cultural formation. The identity more highly prized in Western cultures, that is, the distinctive, individualized, self-determining individual, therefore, is only that of white subjects to lose. For white subjects, autonomy as difference is the signifier of domination. It is a distinction to be maintained by discipline, regulation, and self-surveillance. It seems, therefore,
that subjects' enormous concern for their distinct status as individuals is well
founded if the loss of it means that, otherwise, they may fail to be distinguished
or to make themselves known. Without this status as individuals, they risk
being engulfed by and rendered indistinguishable from the other and,
consequently, no longer recognizable as white subjects. The necessity of
containment and management cannot be over-emphasized as tactics which
produce and sustain differences between white teacher selves and student others.
The next section describes some strategies by which subjects clarify their own
positions and manage the differences of the other.

making a difference

I have indicated in the previous chapter how the performance of
dominant teacher identities is available for scrutiny in subjects' expressions of
their "dream of love". The greatest challenge or threat to the power that accrues
with this gift of love which teachers would like to bestow, and which otherwise
confirms teachers in their identities, comes particularly from Native students
and others. Subjects do not expect that the culture of the other has taught them
how to respond in white schools to white teachers in ways that teachers desire.
That is, the other is not expected to accept the ministrations or love of white
teachers, a process which is necessary to confirm the white teachers in their roles.
Subjects begin from the time of their training programs, therefore, to prepare a
strategic offence which will rationalize some of the difficulties they might have
in performing themselves as successful teachers.

Teachers are typically concerned about maintaining control in a classroom
including control of behaviour and knowledge. The possibility that "they" might
not "know the way we do things" (F081) is perhaps less likely of Native students,
for example, than it is of teachers who do not know Native ways. In context,
however, the above quotation secures that difference is something that teachers
must “deal with” and that difference is found in non-white students.

some people have more cultural diversity than others. And my school’s
practically all Caucasian. There’s the odd student who is not but I would think
of an intern who is doing a school that is, more than half is of a different culture
and they’re the ones who really notice the differences. (M012)

The fear and desperation around differences follow from the possibility
that differences can’t be controlled or predicted. As a mitigating solution, teachers
place themselves more firmly in the centre of activity as a way of controlling it. It
is the presence of racialized minorities that makes teachers’ jobs difficult.

And you can think about being sensitive to one culture, and you think you
have that in the can until you realize that there are six others that you have to
deal with as well and you have to deal with, I mean you can think of a class
with twenty white kids and then, you know and then, six other cultures. And
you have to make sure everybody sees, it’s just, it just shows the reality of
how hard a teacher’s job can be. (M546)

Difference is from the outside, from “other cultures”, who will place an
extra burden on the teacher’s situation and efforts to be sensitive. The presence
in the classroom of the unknowable other allows subjects to regard the other as a
mystery never to be fathomed but, at best hope, a body to be controlled. Managing
difference is an extremely important tactic which allows subjects both to perform
whiteness and to avoid being engulfed by otherness. The everydayness of power
relations is a major concern in teacher/student interaction and many ways are
available to the teacher to maintain this (im)balance.

Besides noting differences as deficiencies, as I have already discussed,
subjects find a variety of ways to establish and control power relations in the
performance of their own identities. Subjects typically rely on technical-rational
“solutions” in their encounter with difference in the classroom including
“adapting” their lessons and looking for “alternatives to regular teaching
methods” (F811). Subject desire for knowledge and control is frequently
expressed as a desire for specific teaching plans and classroom management strategies.

Let's talk about issues and how we can do things in our classroom. I really wanted some information on what can I do. What should I do to make things better if there's all these problems?...I need to know what language is appropriate or inappropriate to use. I need to learn about traditions in classrooms, or just cultural traditions so in my classroom I might not offend somebody without intending to but, because I don't know, I may have. Classroom management strategies, I guess I learned a bit about sentencing circles and that whole circular process with the Native community, but I don’t know enough about it still and just more...using the materials and saying, here, I've done it when no, I really haven't. I don't know. I need somebody to help me out in that area, somebody who's a bit more of an expert in this field to say, these are some of the things you can do in the classroom. (F426)

The considerable anxiety is expressed around this matter of classroom control suggests that subjects understand the difficulty of maintaining and marking the difference between themselves and others. In the above quotation, it is the subject's mastery that is at stake and that she is most anxious to restore. It would seem subjects appreciate the power of instrumental action and expert lesson plans to construct and maintain the identities of both students and themselves.

By various means, subjects have been made aware of the imperative to establish something approaching more equitable relations between themselves and others. They also understand that, institutionally, this charge is typically left to the individual teacher to interpret and to determine what the nature of these relations might be. As insiders to the education system, subjects properly understand that these issues are not likely to be taken up as wide-scale processes any time soon. And as before, they also understand that control is available to them at the level of the individual teacher. They have also been prepared to promote change in a variety of areas if the education rhetoric around “making a difference” is to be anything more than idealism. Some subjects describe their concern with taking action that is consistent with their concerns with improving
a much-in-need education system—a concern which drew many subjects toward teaching in the first place.

In the following quotation, the subject describes his efforts to promote change in an area that receives little concern from other teachers. He clearly understands that his views are not commonly held. This subject struggles with positionality about how he is to interact with an underachieving Native child.

...he's there and he's sitting in his desk, but he's getting nothing done and he's very unmotivated. And I'm always, always in the back of my mind I'm thinking, you know, in what ways is this situation culturally charged? And I don't want to become the white guy who's been every white guy ever coming down on him because he's not doing his work, and everything else...how can I make sure that I'm not doing something out of line, you know. And especially for this kid so I don't, you know, come off as the person, you know, oh yeah, he's just like the rest of them telling me what to do and they, just because they don't understand me. I want to understand, but I don't always know how... (M547)

The subject has a demonstrable desire to do what he can for the student. He also fears he will repeat what "every white guy" has done before to alienate the student. The subject sees the problems caused for aboriginal students by white teachers like himself and wants to be the one who will do it better than the last one. This is in keeping with the self-surveillance of education students who desire to be the ones who will "make a difference". It is this individualistic approach that surrounds many teachers' efforts to promote changes in their classes. Teachers are told and simultaneously want to believe that they are exceptional individuals who will be able to carry out the perfectibility of society one individual at a time.

In this last example of white subjects working very hard to control and maintain their identities as dominant, a subject anxiously anticipates a situation in which her racial dominance is not an asset. She resists the attempt by Native leaders to provide their children with Native teachers when it means that she will be out of a job. The subject claims this attempt on the part of Native leaders is idealistic, a position which she equates with being unrealistic. Her remarks are
couched in phrases of concern for Natives as she simultaneously wonders about
the use of her own qualifications and sympathies. The loss of identity control on
her part has material consequences and other effects for her.

...in an ideal world, all the Native people would be taught by Native people,
but this isn't going to happen and if it happens, it's not going to be for a long
time, so why not try to educate me as much as you can on what you would
like to see happening [...] in an ideal world you could say, well you know
there's no place for white people in Native, to teach Native kids because we
want Native people teaching Native kids, but idealistically I mean that's not the
way it's going to go. Realistically that's just not the way it is. (F6613)

Throughout her interview, the subject indicates her history of enrolling in
several Native Studies courses and her appreciation of Native issues beyond the
level generally found among her cohort. She has a great desire to teach Native
children. She also understands First Nations initiatives to redress the numerical
imbalance between First Nations and white teachers by educating and hiring
Native teachers. Her dilemma of interest exists on at least two levels: first, the
resulting material consequence that by supporting the proposed Native hiring
practices, she reduces her own chances of finding a job. Part of the dilemma is
that she has gone out of her way to inform herself about Native issues; at odds
are her efforts as a racially dominant person to overcome her ignorance of the
other and her understanding that she may be rejected on the basis of skin colour.
White people in Canada are generally unaware of instances in which they may
be rejected because of their whiteness and, like the subject, find their rejection
especially unfair if they have made some effort to make themselves
knowledgeable about race issues. Even though no job applications have yet been
sent or no rejection slips received, the subject's sense of entitlement is doubly
rebuffed. She is surprised to run up against "a lot of roadblocks", especially
because she has tried to be the exception among white people in her effort to
develop a non-racist image beyond what is typical. In her attempt to claim a
separate, distinguishing identity, the subject is also surprised to discover a rare occasion when "good intentions" and white identity are not privileged.

The second, and perhaps more significant, effect of the subject's dilemma of interest is at the level of identities which are dangerously unfixed themselves in this context. The white subject is caught in the dilemma of supporting the efforts of Native achievement in formal educational processes and at the same time observing the erosion of a fixed positionality for Native identity as the ones cared for. White identity is undermined by Natives acting as agents in control of their own education as well as by the lack of permanence in the Native image as ones in need. This erosion of positionality has implications for the ones who perform themselves as the care givers.

Fanon (1963) says that decolonization, represented in this research by initiatives in Native staffing, is a terrifying experience for the colonizer/settlers who owe the very fact of their existence to the colonial system (p. 36). Fanon has anticipated the subjects' (and colonialists') reaction to learning that Natives intend to staff their own schools with Native teachers; it is the colonialists' worst nightmare: "They want to take our place" (p. 39). Fanon describes the terror initiated by colonized people when they perform perfectly those functions which the dominant group imagines it performs as distinguishing features of its dominance. It is not simply one's redundance as a group which appalls, or as in the case above, missing out on a job. Rather, what is shocking is discovering that dominance is not innate or an automatic entitlement, and further, that racial superiority is a social construction dependent upon those whom one has named other.
Containing identities
controlling interests

Two parameters which all research subjects have in common is their enrollment in a two year teacher education program and the completion of a compulsory cross-cultural course. I wanted to engage subjects in discourses from which I would be able to analyze something of how they regard and think about themselves, especially in terms of their racialized identities, in relation to students they will be teaching. While the cross-cultural course is a very useful point of reference, it is not integral to the data I was interested in collecting. It did, however, provide students with a common, formal experience for discussing themselves and their prospective students. The point I would like to make very plain is that the course is part of the subjects' background context; the course itself is not the focus of the research. I have made this point elsewhere and it bears repeating because the focus needs to remain on the subjects and not on any presumptions about the “effectiveness” of the course. This is in contrast to a direction that has already been anticipated in educational research which often enjoys outcomes-based answers to how courses can be delivered more effectively. This study, therefore, is not examining the behaviour or activities that can go towards planning more “effective” outcomes, but rather, the study addresses the dearth of knowledge in understanding the identity formation of white teacher education students who will be expected to deliver education programs which are multicultural and inclusive.

Christine Sleeter (1993) is a strong advocate for fundamental changes in schools in order to “reverse rather than reproduce” structures of oppression and inequality for all students. Following her extensive studies and reconstructive work with white teachers, Sleeter struggles as a white educator with how these teachers and their students can be educated past their Eurocentric view of the
world. While she has seen some transformations and believes "whites are educable", as I have stated earlier, she has gained appreciation "for the strength of our resistance to change" (p. 168). I have indicated elsewhere in this research the insight into "our resistance to change" offered by psychoanalytic and constructivist theories of identities. The effect of white subjects coming to study and "know" the other can be a destabilizing and decentering experience for them as I describe in Chapter Four. In encountering the gaze of the other, the subjects become the focus of their own investigations in their realization that they cannot translate the experience of the other as they had desired. The gaze that the white subjects thought they controlled undermines the stable and conscious arrangement of the subjects' sense of self and others. As subjects become aware that the other is not knowable as had been presumed, the other—representing that which the subject desires and lacks—draws attention to the always incomplete knowledge of the self. The desire for wholeness is thwarted when the subject meets the otherness of the self in the returned gaze of the one who has been designated other (Chow, 1993). Trinh T. Minh-Ha (1989) describes the subjects' desire and anxious yearnings as "The possibility of a difference, yet a difference or an otherness that will not go so far as to question the foundation of their beings and makings" (p. 88, emphasis added). Dangers in coming to know the other undermine the "foundation of their beings and makings", that is, the essential, knowing, self-determining, autonomous agent of the so-constructed Western subject. While gaining social, intellectual, and physical control of student bodies is something for which teachers are highly prized, subjects struggle to contain a commodity at least as important if not more: control of their self-knowledge.

This section examines at length the ways in which subjects position themselves in response to their cross-cultural course. Subjects make various uses
of the course to re-claim their positions of dominance which are, at the very least, subtly undermined by the very presence of the course at all. They contain the effects by dismissing the course material as inappropriate, manipulative, and alternately, of little effect because the subjects claim to have previous knowledge of what the course was trying to teach. Subject evidence for these claims is found in the language they use to describe their reactions: intellectual and moderate; whereas the material with which they take exception is emotional and exaggerated. Foucault’s words used earlier mark a useful distinction I would like to stress about the process of this research; that is, the research is not an examination of the “theory” of power, so much as it examines the “analytics” of power—the processes by which identity is insisted upon and sustained. The question is not necessarily about how power is manifested, but by what means it is exercised (Foucault, 1983). To that end, I discuss the discursive and social processes by which subjects reiterate and perform their identities as they attempt to manage the effects of the course.

One of the interview questions I asked subjects was what worth or value the course had for them as potential teachers. Even without this question, subjects frequently remark at length on the experiences of the class. Their responses indicate that the course is salient to the teacher training program even though the effects of the course are sometimes negative. The compulsory nature of the course implies that its knowledge is significant requirement in a program leading to a Bachelor of Education degree. The subtext is that students in the program need the knowledge this course offers. Given the subtext of racial and cultural difference implied by the course, how do subjects account for its necessity and how do they control for its effects?

Subject response to the course is indeed varied, both among subjects and in the ambivalence and contradiction evident within individual transcripts.
Among the most frequently cited effects is the change in subject awareness, an effect which particularly appeals to the subjects as knowledge workers with their interest in and desire for knowledge and information. Clearly, subjects took many different learnings from the course, which if a reconstruction were attempted, would place the course curriculum variously in any of the five models outlined by Sleeter and Grant (1993) in their typology of multicultural programs¹. Emotional reactions to the course, both positive and negative, are real enough; and there is no attempt here to suggest a lack of sincerity in subject responses or that some other, more “authentic” reactions are “more appropriate”. None of these is the purpose of the investigation. As Wetherell and Potter (1992) have suggested in one of their studies, the issue remains: “to what ends are these emotions harnessed and what other possibilities may be silenced in the process?” How are identity formations realized and what uses are made of them?

Some of the ideological assumptions emerging from the initial hopes for the course are that cross-cultural education is a process of learning about the other in what is primarily an intellectual exercise. Learning is accomplished by

¹ (1) The human capital theory is based on the difference and presumed deficiency of students. Teaching focuses on helping students “catch up” and assimilate with the mainstream.
(2) Based on the development of positive human relations, this model relies on cognitive information to reduce prejudice as well as group processes and skills training to promote positive interaction between groups.
(3) The Single-Group Studies approach generally focuses on the history, group culture, and contemporary issues of particularly oppressed people. By ignoring the interconnectedness of identities and their locations of power, however, Single-Group Studies are liable to reassert their own hierarchies of heterosexism, classism and racism.
(4) Multicultural Education is one which involves a complete reform of the entire education system including curriculum, instructional practices, staffing, testing, administration, and the like in order to respect and support diversity (p. vi). From a critical theoretical perspective, however, multicultural education is most often criticized for failing to examine relations of power and justice.
(5) Sleeter and Grant support an educational experience which they understand as “multicultural and social reconstructionist” (p. 209) for which the societal goal is to “promote social structural equality and cultural pluralism” (p. 211). The following is a list of alternative terms provided by Sleeter and Grant for the model they advocate: “emancipatory pedagogy (Gordon, 1985), critical teaching (Shor, 1980), transformational education (Giroux, 1981), multicultural education (Sizuki, 1984), antiracist teaching (Carby, 1982; Mullard, 1980), socialist feminism (Jaggar & Struhi, 1978), culturally responsive teaching (Irvine, 1991), and decision making and social action (Banks, 1988)” (p. 212).
instructional techniques and, therefore, the subjects as teachers will require a repertoire of instructional techniques if they are to accomplish learning in their classrooms. It is with these assumptions that the course is evaluated. What other ideological assumptions are at work in subjects' identifications?

In estimating the purpose and worth of the course, positive responses centre on the raised awareness experienced by many subjects. What subjects became aware of varies: some didn’t realize “that the numbers were that high for immigrant and native students” (F086); and that “even though I knew it would be there, I didn’t realize how much it would be there”. Some became aware of “how to adapt our lessons to these people” (F086). Learning “about” cultures other than their own is a common occurrence that serves to make the course relevant. Learning how “to be sensitive” to other cultures is mentioned frequently. Subjects also express the worth of the course in negative terms. For some there was nothing new learned on the topic that their life experiences had not already taught them. Not only was the course not relevant, it produced some hostile reactions.

Regardless of their reactions, subjects are resolutely positioned in the centre of this discussion about the course they took. Although they realize their lack of knowledge or understanding about whom they might deem as “the other”, there is no recorded acknowledgement that differences are so judged because of their contrast with subjects’ positionalities or that the creation of differences is itself a study in coming to know both self and other. Subject responses to their lack of knowledge about the other is to learn and “become aware” of differences.

Well it certainly opened my eyes to a lot of misconceptions that are prevalent in, I guess, white society towards Natives and what they’ve been through in the last two hundred years or in the last hundred fifty years or whatever. I think it was relevant in that way as in teaching strategies and teaching Native children...it has educated me in being a little bit more sensitive towards their needs I suppose. And just where they’re coming from, more or less. (F811)
Subjects cite a variety of ways in which the course has raised their awareness. The variations fall in two categories: first, learning about the other—including knowledge of Native issues, the need to teach from an Aboriginal perspective, learning that teaching is culturally charged; and second, learning about the self—how many things a teacher has to be aware of, awareness of one’s own biases, responsibility of the teacher to make changes.

What are the consequences of this raised awareness? This knowledge is generally understood as a form of right thinking which the subjects feel obliged to follow with right action. One says, "...the awareness makes me try harder" (M546); in learning how to "treat multicultural people", one subject would respond in more lenient ways to differences that collide with conventional patterns. For many subjects, the awareness is a focus for anxiety about "proper" teaching methodologies. Subjects continually lament the lack of teaching methods and specific lesson plans.

I think maybe how we could actually approach, like how we could, like teach them exactly. A lot of it was really arbitrary and really kind of, I don't know, maybe assumed or what, but if we could have, like definite strategies, you know, definite methods that we could use to teach them. Like when it comes right down to making a lesson plan or making a unit plan, like how you would teach them. I think would really be helpful, you know, really being that specific and being that targeted, rather than just being general. (F433)

The prospect of teaching Natives at all is a threatening prospect for those subjects who fear they may be revealed as less than a good teacher, that is, not benevolent enough, or even as prejudiced. Lesson plans are an instrumental strategy for keeping both the teacher and the students under control. The plans are a formula or a map to lead these subjects as teachers through something potentially dangerous—as in Spivak's story analysis described in Chapter Four—the revelation of themselves.

The main consequence of the "increased awareness" is a subject's self-consciousness and the self-surveillance to which it gives access. Teachers are
known, and in some places, valued, for their regulating/regulatory functions in society. And it is little wonder that one of their first concerns in the application of self-discipline is how this awareness can be translated into better teaching. Following the awareness, the question arises “How am I doing?” Awareness or right thinking is something subjects desire in their positioning as successful teachers and moral agents. There is even some pleasure in the self-examination and the opportunity for soul-searching, especially with the possibility of being better aligned with right action and moral justification. For example,

If anything, I've found some materials that open our eyes to maybe some of the biases that we hold. I kind of found out where those biases could have started and just how to reflect upon them and to ask ourselves: When do I do this am I offending someone?...A lot of materials were handed out and quite a few of them I really enjoyed because it challenged us to listen to our hearts when we were reading and to say: “Am I doing this?” (M011)

Some subjects enjoy the self-scrutiny and appreciate “increased awareness” as the development of criteria with which to assess their own actions, as well as for the assessment and discipline of others. In their own needs, subjects easily move to recognizing the needs of others for similar consciousness raising. Subjects express concern for the cultural awareness of other teachers and their classmates as in the following.

...it should be an important part of education if we're going to continue to live this way and to foster good attitudes. Because not every kid is learning at home the same way I did. I know that very much. My parents were very tolerant. (F088)

Another subject offers

I think it's really important even if it's not hitting home with everybody, it's hitting home, or making enough people sit back and take a second thought about their approach to life and I think if it can get even a few people doing that then that's doing something. (F826)

Subjects are quick to move from self-surveillance to the scrutiny of their colleagues' need for cross-cultural knowledge, some subjects not appearing to bother with the first move. Another remove from the personal is found in this subject's oblique response: “Perceived need” when asked why this course is
included in the education program. The subject suggests there is a lack of cultural awareness training in other courses and a need to fill that niche with this course. Whose need this course will fill is not stated, only that other courses lack cultural awareness training. He objectifies the process by removing any acting characters from the scene, including himself.

Why this course has been included in their program elicits interesting responses from subjects. One interpretive repertoire is based on changing demographic patterns in Saskatchewan and another on "fairness".

the population of Native kids is going to be huge in the future. (F602)

there's an ever growing Native community. That population has different needs than ours. (F021)

especially in Saskatchewan, I'm doing my interning now and I would say that seventy percent of my class are not white. (F821-2)

I believe it has a lot to do with the high population of students of Aboriginal background. We're moving away from the white, Anglo-Saxon situation. We're moving towards a more multicultural climate. (M011)

About fifty percent of our classrooms will be, will have different, like cultures in them, like being that Native or, like Aboriginal, or whatever. So just to be aware of that fact and to modify things a bit and incorporate their, well things that they're familiar with into your lessons. (F431)

The repertoires of "fairness" and demographics come together in subjects perception of teachers as moral agents.

to be fair to all people it's something teachers should take. Probably just, it would probably be a slap in the face if you didn't include something like this with the growing multicultural population. They say by the year two thousand, over fifty percent of our students will be Native in Saskatchewan. (F103)

Teachers should not be unprepared for the presence of Native children in their classes because, as objective facts and numbers indicate—"If you're going to teach in Saskatchewan, that's the reality". The subject continues:

people are sometimes, they neglect to realize that and they don't want to face it, especially if you're going to go out and, you know, if you're going to teach up north. If you want to have employment you sort of have to apply everywhere and if that means you're going to work on a reserve, you have to realize what's going to be there. (M5410)
What is "it" that is "going to be there"? The subject doesn't specify what he calls "the reality" or the objective facts which teachers should understand so they will not be shocked. What is implied by this "reality" is presumably something that others would prefer to ignore; it is not a pleasant prospect, but a "reality" that teachers will discover when they want employment and are willing to apply "everywhere", even "up north" and "on a reserve". If there is any doubt that the "reality" is a potentially negative event, the subject concludes: "I guess if those people had such feelings they wouldn't go there in the first place". Subjects who report that the course was worthwhile generally cite the practical necessity of learning to teach growing numbers of Native students. Subjects admonish others in their group to gain some insight about the other, and not to disregard the course, or to imagine that the experience of teaching Native students "will never happen to them" (F088). Another subject explains,

I don't know if some of these nice little white girls just couldn't, you know, couldn't grasp it. [...] I just felt like saying, you know, this is reality. Wake up. (F815)

I would hope that everybody would want to take that class because they should want to be aware because if they think they're not going to be dealing with any minorities when they get out in the classroom, they're crazy. Like they're absolutely crazy. (F669)

Some subjects are anxious that other students may be unprepared to encounter Natives in the classroom, a fate which they see as inevitable. These anxious subjects position themselves like Cassandras who correctly tell of impending doom to people who will not listen to them. The subjects tell about being prepared for teaching Natives in a manner similar to the delivery of other prevention messages; it is as necessary as wearing a seat belt or being ready with a condom. Just as you never know when you will be so unlucky as to be in a car accident or be at risk of infection or unwanted pregnancy, you might also end up having to teach Natives. Those who do not take precautions are in denial and believe that these things "will never happen to them". The subjects are
exasperated with other students in their class who do not appear to heed the prevention messages and fail to take the course seriously. In preparing for this “reality”, subjects identify with teachers as moral agents.

...Canada's multiracial, in schools it's multiracial so they want teachers to be the best that can be and so if it means taking this class. And so if it means to equip them and teach them how to teach other cultures, the better teacher we will be. So I think that's why it's included. (F102)

what I understood was that it reflected Canada's policy in multiculturalism and our own province's stand on multiculturalism. Education teachers should be the first to be reflecting this, otherwise when is it going to be, sort of, when will, if people don't get exposure to multiculturalism in school, when are they going to get it? (M542)

The necessity for cross-cultural education is expressed in two overlapping ways, both of which position subjects as in control of themselves and others. Both necessities are framed as prevention messages, one which expresses concern for Natives in white dominated schools and the other as a way of preparing white teachers for their jobs of containing the difference by which Natives are recognized. This containment operates in a way that is ambivalent about who or what is contained, however. In the next quotation, the subject is alternately talking about subjects' need for the cross-cultural course and the obligation of teachers to act as role models.

I think it's important all across the country. I think it's important that people realize that cross-cultural education is a reality and that has to be taught. It can't just be learned by osmosis, or some way that people figure it's going to happen. I think it's important that this has been brought up and it's been started. And it should be an important part of education if we're going to continue to live this way and to foster good attitudes...I think that tolerance is important and it is learned at home. You have to have some kind of a role model and if home is not providing it then the school should. So the teachers have to be modelling it. (F089)

The focus is switched from subject as learner of tolerance to subject as equity advocate and role model. The switch is done in a way which forestalls questions of what the subject actually knows about race and cultural issues. It is enough that she accepts her social mandate to be a role model of liberal values. The subject escapes scrutiny by switching roles from learner to teacher; she
adopts the discourse of the liberal teacher as the one in the know, as the one who is entitled to scrutinize others and offer them pastoral direction. The subject accomplishes another important move in not specifying the identity of the ones who will be doing the learning about tolerance from these subjects as teachers. To whom will subjects be teaching and modelling their new found tolerance? The new learner and recipient of pastoral concern is not specified. It is possible the learners will be white children although they have been mentioned very little up to now. The learners could be other colleagues and teachers whom subjects will teach and guide. The learners could also be those who have been seen all along as the ones in greatest need of teacher ministrations: Aboriginal children. Perhaps the subjects will model and teach tolerance to them. In this quotation, the subject has moved from the unstable position of learner to the absent, normative centre, as the one who already knows. The performance of herself as knowing, white and tolerant is the substance of what she will be teaching others.

In many examples, subjects perform themselves as knowledgeable teachers in cross-cultural issues; their role-model image is only enhanced as they become the “owners” and disseminators of liberal, cross-cultural knowledge. This identity becomes part of the civilizing mission of public school education which historically controls bodies by promoting cleanliness, health, and proper citizen behaviour. Colonialism continues, in that, for the sake of untutored others, teachers are obliged to take over where the home fails, this time in promoting benevolence and understanding of the other, even when the other and the learner are the same person. Social issues will be solved through the function performed by teachers’ offering of discipline and education.

School is where children spend the majority of their time and that’s where most of the learning takes place, so that’s where I think education about cultural issues is primarily the best place to take place. (F421)
I think that tolerance is important and it is learned at home. You have to have some kind of a role model and if home is not providing it then the school should. So the teachers have to be modelling it. (F089)

Schools perform a powerful function in their unique offering of something—a thing akin to mother’s love or vitamins—that may not be available anywhere else. By self-discipline, role-modelling and sterling character formation, subjects accept and anticipate their roles as the ones who will promote progressive education. Beyond simple information giving, subjects recognize that teacher identity is an embodied, engendering process by which teachers give birth to tolerance. Through the performance of their respectable teacher roles, subjects understand and enact themselves as indigenous to the modern liberal nation.

This section signals many versions of white identity formation occurring in something other than a linear fashion. The identity of white teacher subjects as moral agents is evident in subjects’ desire to love others by imposing subjects’ “better way” even as moral agency follows from subjects’ desire for self-surveillance and self-correction. Subjects’ delight in their “increased awareness” of the other is not to be doubted or viewed lightly even though it is quickly processed and incorporated into teacher work as lesson plans and managing tolerance. The self-awareness of the course appeals to the subjects who treat it as information about correct behaviour. It is part of their teacher role to perform as credibly as possible in regard to those who are designated as different. The practical necessity for cross-cultural awareness as described by the subjects sounds much like preparedness training for situations which everyone would prefer not to have happen. Subjects in their role as teacher respond to the need for this training as moral agents acting out of sense of duty and responsibility, actions which perform their moral authority. Many subjects appreciate the opportunity for self-surveillance the course provides. Becoming aware of the ways they have
offended others by means of unintended cultural differences, subjects can use their knowledge to examine their actions for evidence of the offending assumption, word or gesture. The act of self-surveillance is familiar to those whose religious practices require a similar kind of self-examination and confession. Salvation is at hand through knowledge and “increased awareness” of the other.

In a way which avoids examining and undermining one’s own subject position, subjects move from encountering the other to becoming advocates, teachers, and knowers. Subjects use their knowledge of correct behaviour to inform their surveillance of the actions of others whom they presume are less knowledgeable. Subjects in the role of teacher will be the ones who engender an appreciation for tolerance by promoting cultural understanding as therapy for uncivilized behaviour and ignorance wherever it is found. Subjects secure their distance from the other, first, by establishing themselves as the superior helpers and guides to Native people, and second, by separating themselves from other white people who are uninformed and unsympathetic to cross-cultural issues. White subjects are very concerned that they will lose their “toehold on respectability” (Fellows & Razack, in press) which is secured by “marking the distinction”—however it can be constructed in terms of a liberal discourse—between white aspiring teacher subjects and those other white folk “who can be labelled degenerate” (p. 26). If they lose their moral correctitude, subjects’ “toehold on respectability” is liable to a slip that would otherwise confuse them with those whose whiteness comes in shades of grey. Described in various ways by subjects, this less-than-respectable, off-white shading is characterized as working class, of lower education levels, red-neck, homophobic, non-liberal, parochial. Subjects, in contrast, warrant their positions as knowledgeable,
sympathetic insiders by distancing themselves from these white people who will not be disciplined.

In the next section, I address the further efforts of subjects to control the effects of the raised awareness introduced by their cross-cultural course. The fact that the course is a topic in an interview and that subjects have so much to say about their reaction to the course would seem to indicate that something unusual happened during the course delivery—something that the term "raised awareness" only hints at. From the various and ambivalent descriptions of subject awareness, I suggest that it is awareness of the self that is most disturbing for subjects. If their response to the course is any indication, subjects' attempt to embrace an awareness of themselves as dominant while simultaneously maintaining a positive, sympathetic image—a move that would seem to require some words of explanation to reconcile their competing desires.

mediating effects

Besides the variations of self-awareness I have already discussed, subjects employ at least two other repertoires which permit them some measure of control over what they have heard in their course. In the range between interested participation and open hostility, subjects, at times, locate themselves as indifferent and unmoved by the events of the course. The reactions are not separate and discreet but vary in degree between subjects and within individual transcripts. This flux is hardly surprising because neither are subject positionings fixed across sexuality, racialization, levels of ability, and many other identity constructions. Subjects' dominant racial positions are not secure but require constant adjustment and affirmation to be maintained as such—especially in the challenge of the cross-cultural course.

One student response to the flux of identities, both their own and that of the other, is to fix First Nations people along clearly laid lines demarcating
racialization and class. Native culture is employed, alternately, to establish
differentiation, the site of a fixed identity, the reason for failed assimilation, or
the remedy for Native issues if only “they” would apply themselves to it.
Cultural and racialized identities of First Nations people are seen as determinate
and determining of positioning, job aspirations, friendship groups, class
structures. Subjects fix the cross-cultural information they receive by objectifying
it and applying it like a method whereby Natives might improve their
“Indianness” much as one might improve one’s skill in mathematics or
language acquisition. Teaching in public schools lends itself to this process with
its emphasis on individual learning and behavioural change.

By distancing themselves from the learning, subjects are able to contain it.
Their show of disinterest affirms their power over the course as does their
treatment of it in an off-hand way as just another agenda item in their program.
One cites “political correctness” as the reason for the course; others say they
didn’t learn anything because they already knew most of what was being taught.
The lack of specific teaching strategies which subjects earnestly desire contributes
to their disinterest. Although the knowledge of the course is, at times, highly
emotional, subjects frequently reduce it to the level of fragmented anthropology
about Natives. They also compare it to anthropology courses they have taken.

I found that all it did focus on was Native people and it could have focused on
some other cultures and cultural issues much better. It just didn’t do it. Like I
found my anthropology class dealt with differences a lot better than that one
did. (F666)

It was very Native focused which is good in the sense that that is one of the
major cultural groups that we have to contend with in Saskatchewan. (M795)

As an anthropology course, the references to the other can be contained as
course material and regulated as such.

It was very culturally specific to Native and Inuit groups and I mean, I found it
very fascinating and interesting but it’s not going to do me a lot of good if I
went to Calgary and was exposed to a far different mix of cultural groups.
(M799)
The anthropological approach will gain the subject’s approval if the display is “fascinating and interesting”. Churchill (1994) describes white interests in Indianism—in the Indian as exotic spectacle—and the contrasting absence of interest in the everyday lives of Native peoples. The spectacle and fascination fade and the subject longs for a “far different mix”. Other subjects express the same dilemma as they seek to satisfy their need to know “about” the other.

...to me it wasn’t a multicultural class. It was Indian Education. And it would have been good to deal with, perhaps other cultures such as Hutterites or even, like I know that there’s some groups who have their own school, you know, perhaps, maybe not necessarily in our city, but in other cities. I know that the Islams (sic) have their own school and you never know, you might end up in a position where you’re teaching them. I have a friend who’s teaching in a private Jewish school and he’s not Jewish. Those kinds of other cultures, their education and their ways of thinking and their expectations maybe should have been brought in as well but were completely limited to being, this was an Indian Education class. I mean that’s the focus of it. That was all that came through. It wasn’t the multicultural class that is was said to be. (F414)

In hoping for anthropological coverage, subjects find the cross-cultural course to be inadequate. One reason is that interest in Natives has been excessive and has taken away time that could have been devoted to others. The interest the subject has for the study of others would appear to be a limited commodity and, therefore, must be allotted carefully. Whether they are supportive or not, subjects have been made aware of the significance of Native issues to the education system in Saskatchewan. And yet, in spite of the changing demographics, subject reactions seem to imply that Natives have gone well beyond prudence in offering an entire course about themselves. The subject deflects any criticism of her remarks about Natives by becoming the defender of other racialized minority interests. This quotation clearly shows the subject interest in containing the effects of the other if one looks at which of the groups—Native, Hutterite, Islamic, Jewish—is most likely to unsettle white dominance. Championing non-Native, religious, and ethnic minorities as the subject does is a safe tactic because ethnic and racialized minority immigration in
Saskatchewan does not come close to challenging Anglo-white domination in the way that Native interests do from time to time. Native critical mass and their history in colonialism positions Natives in radically different ways compared to any minority or majority immigrant groups in Saskatchewan; but all racialized minority groups are necessarily othered as that which the white subject is not. In true liberal, multicultural fashion, white subjects can become the defender of the “neglected” groups and support a homogeneity based on an assumption of like treatment for all others. In this way, racialized minorities remain of anthropological interest, and learning about them is considered a skill which will equip the conscientious teacher (Churchill, 1994). The defence of other cultures establishes the subject as a sympathetic person whose rejection of the course cannot be questioned on grounds of prejudice because she has “defended” her position with logic and empathy. Grouping together all racialized and ethnic minorities as the subject above has done, including other immigrants and Natives, accomplishes two moves which support the borrowed authenticity of white Anglo-domination. It conveniently contains and rejects Natives as other; and it changes the notion of immigrant and newcomer to that of not-quite respectable outsider. In the process, “immigrant” is used to describe ethnic and racialized minority groups and is no longer meant to include the entitled, white, citizen majority whose immigration is only recalled as part of the heroic national past. Controlling discourse about who is other establishes the boundaries and justifies the central positioning of the absent centre of white Canadian identity.

Subjects are both attracted to and repelled by their “increased awareness” of Natives, and one way of safely containing this awareness is to reduce their knowledge of Native people to an Indianism of museum quality. In the

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2 Following Morrison’s example that national identity in the U.S.A. is organized against an Africanist presence, I argue that it is against a backdrop of First Nations signification and identity that European settlement in Canada has consistently organized itself.
Canadian national narrative, Natives are expected to uphold and produce a heroic image of their past in a museum-like quality which even whites can admire and be proud of. This is the pedagogic past, the past made out of a history which “forgets” the colonization and degradation brought on by contact. There is room for nostalgia and grief in the tradition; but the grief is over the loss of an idealized, unsullied age. Natives are expected to be faithful keepers of their history as it is imagined in the traditional narrative. On the other hand, the up-to-date version of the Native—as the one who makes demands on the state—is received with hostility. This performative version of Native peoples contradicts the narrative of a static, historic Native culture as well as a heroic past and an ancient other; the up-date-version is also a reminder of the country’s on-going engagement with colonialism. Subject patterns of resistance, which include marginalizing all “others” as museum pieces for white teachers to study, effectively allows subjects to partake of course information without acknowledging the complicity of their positioning. Their “desire to ignore” the historical implications is performed against the risk of their own uncertain identities. However Natives are constructed, the discursive relations are also productive of positive white identifications.

**Signs of struggle: broken rules**

The knowledge of the subjects’ cross-cultural course is characterized in three main ways: suitable for creating awareness; no improvement on what the subject already knows; over-the-top unreasonable. This section, which is one of the most complex, addresses the third description and includes students’ negative reactions to the course. In permitting the interviews, the main agenda of subjects is to maintain positive images regarding their understandings of and sympathies towards cross-cultural issues. In some cases, subject reports seriously
challenge these positive self-images. In describing the course, many negative emotions surface when discussing the content, its delivery, and what the subjects thought the course should be. Subjects cite several grounds for dismissing the course and employ a variety of rhetorical procedures to warrant their claims. It is important to stress that this analysis is not concerned with the truth correspondence the subjects' remarks may have with what happened in the class. As I have stated previously, I am examining the words and phrases through which the subjects position themselves in relation to a course which does not directly depict the subjects' culture except, perhaps, as oppressor, a positioning subjects struggle to refuse.

Reasons for dismissing the course are numerous, sometimes contradictory, and often qualified. I am interested in the responses of these racially dominant subjects when placed in a situation in which they or their culture are not the central focus and in the subsequent negative reactions expressed by the subjects as they maintain their dominant group identification. What claims are made to justify their negative reactions? How are the claims made, and by what rhetorical features, deferrals, and disclaimers? How do these claims support a positive self-image? How do these claims produce white domination?

It is important to note that in this analysis of subject remarks that the subjects as students of education are more than students only. In this course, and perhaps in all others as well, they act as participant evaluators of the pedagogy: its methods, content, and general teacher deportment. The students are both the subjects for whom the course is intended as well as the objective observers and evaluators of the procedures. While this constant course evaluation surely happens in many disciplines, education students are particularly alert to the pedagogical techniques being applied to them. The constant evaluation that goes
on places the students at both the centre and at the periphery as they simultaneously participate in the class and attempt to observe the effects it is having on them. Some of the remarks reflect the objectification and evaluative tone that may be typical of education classes.

The following remarks offered by seven out the eighteen subjects describe the failings of the course. These statements stand out as the most pointed and specifically negative expressions. I would like to emphasize again that I am not analyzing these texts for their truth correspondence with what the course was actually like. This would be an impossible task given that the course is in the past and that many subjective judgements are involved in the question of what is appropriate action in any class. Because these remarks are among the most negative, however, they clearly reveal the effects of subjects’ contradictory locations. That is, the subjects are faced with the dilemma of how they can criticize this cross-cultural course while maintaining their appearance as ones who would lend their sympathy and support to non-dominant social groups. Their struggle is two-fold: to affirm their identities as non-prejudiced individuals, and to defend themselves against the implications of the cross-cultural course, specifically as those implications arouse subjects’ guilt, anger, uncertainty. As subjects struggle to legitimate their criticisms and maintain their liberal credibility, there is an absence of entirely negative responses, and instead, many examples of simultaneous criticism and support.

The course was possibly content-wise not what I was expecting. But I think that the idea of that course is very useful. (M791)

The professor at the University was not liked by our class as a whole. We didn’t like her because we felt she didn’t like us. It was a negative experience to be in the class, but I do believe there were some positive things from the class. (F101)

Critical remarks are justified or explained by various discursive techniques and rhetorical strategies: objectifying the discourse, suggesting that other people
agree, switching to discourses of concern for practical methods, modifying the criticism, blaming the delivery, claiming victim status, blaming the teacher or the College.

Because it is entirely possible to be critical about an activity that one actually supports, these negative remarks about the class are not taken as evidence that students are racist or do not support non-dominant groups. To examine the methods by which subjects make their claims, I focus on some of the rhetorical strategies used in discursive practices throughout the interviews. In that the course was unsettling for some subjects, the negative remarks about the course are delivered in ways which re-assert subject positionalities as competent teachers and central players. Through these strategies, subjects offer their versions of events in ways which relate to competing alternatives. That is, their remarks are made as a way to forestall suggestions that subjects are other than the non-prejudiced, central players they desire. At one level, a competing alternative which subjects’ positive presentations helps them to disavow is that they have racist attitudes which make them unsuitable as teachers of Natives or non-Native children. The success of these positive presentations disavows an even more unsettling alternative: that subject whiteness and respectability is not secure and the benevolence subjects offer is not theirs to give away. So undermining are these unspoken alternatives that subjects employ a number of methods against anything which might compete with their positive self-presentation as people in charge.
**being reasonable**

One rhetorical strategy\(^3\) employed by subjects stands out as the most productive of a positive identity: subjects as utterly reasonable people, as ones who understand the necessity of civility, rationality, and self-control. They have an interest in claiming these identities because logic and reasoning are not only highly prized in the teaching profession, but they are also markers of civility and the right to govern. Subject claims intend to create a division between "us" and "them" around the ownership and distribution of emotions and intellect. As subjects see themselves possessed of intellectual control, they justify any negative remarks on the basis of their own rationality and moderation. Their performance as rational and reasonable people also accomplishes their claim as non-prejudiced supporters of tolerance. Subjects employ a variety of methods whereby negative remarks about the course can be offered, not as biased opinions, but as statements of reasoned fact.

In the same way, course information is undermined by the suggestion that it is biased and self-seeking. That the course knowledge implicates white subjects in a racist history is given as evidence that the information is questionable. The revised history undermines subject positions as neutral players; it calls into question such issues as who holds knowledge, what constitutes knowledge, and what constitutes legitimate knowledge in their course. Subjects' conclusions lead them to believe that the "facts" of the course, which do not necessarily present a flattering image of racially dominant people, are merely a point of view or a particular slant; they are not facts whose conclusions need to be taken as accepted.

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\(^3\) Found within a range of discourse analyses as described by Wetherell and Potter (1992), subjects' rhetorical strategies include reporting the reactions of classmates, objectifying self and other's reactions, making disclaimers, claiming credentials as a feminist sympathizer, offering evidence of supportive actions, extensive qualification of negative remarks, changing the focus within the interview, making rhetorically self-sufficient statements, offering factual accounts, and many other methods of warranting claims to support their credibility.
It would appear that from the very beginning, the compulsory nature of the cross-cultural course is an affront to some subjects even though it is by no means the only required course in the subjects' programs. The mere presence of this particular one suggests that the subjects are not sufficiently informed about a major social issue, and their common sense assumptions may not be up to the task of their desire to be good teachers. Many view cross-cultural matters as a private affair and therefore resent the suggestion that they require some public preparation before they encounter their racialized other in the classroom. The compulsory nature may also be at odds with subjects' identifications as Canadians whom they describe as laissez-faire people with no particular ideology except that we allow each other to live with our differences. Wetherell and Potter (1992, p. 189) indicate that "To define something as compulsory is, in terms of the liberal discourse of freedom and human rights, to define it negatively. Compulsion is automatically rhetorically bad". I have suggested that subjects like to treat the course as an intellectual exercise akin to mathematics and language instruction. Their negative responses to the effects of the course, however, indicate that subjects actually have very little success at maintaining objective distance, suggesting instead, the extent to which this is more of a moral and ethical issue for many subjects.

Subjects report that issues were forced on them, either by means of materials or by the professor's methods. Some hold that it was mildly coercive and others that is was outright manipulative.

I didn't like what the class was doing to me because it was changing how I felt and it wasn't changing it in a really positive manner. (F414)

I don't know if it kind of just brushed over topics or were they just trying to incite our minds to think about this stuff. (M017)

This class was very much directed at trying to get you to believe, focus on cultural ideas and make you think those ideas. (M793)
The expression “make you think those ideas” may be an intellectual impossibility, but it suggests some kind of coercion at work. Subjects defend themselves against the implications of the course by describing it as something forced on them, further evidence of its emotional, irrational, and unreasonable premises. Both presentation and course material are suspect: “the Native focus was a little too Native” (F313)—the phrase “too Native” implying abandonment of all that is rational and civil while retaining the potential to go Native, a prospect that must be guarded against.

Even though the course is seen as unfairly emotional and irrational, the subjects’ hostile reactions are seen as completely justified and reasonable because they have been provoked.

I really thought that [the course] was a travesty in many ways because I thought there was some really, I felt, some really uncalled for situations that we were placed into. (F414)

Subjects’ justifications for their emotional responses signals their assertion of dominance in that, in this situation, even though their emotional response is a deviation from reasonableness, their knowledge about when deviations may occur is performed with impunity. Rejecting the course is already to declare some authority or superiority over it; similarly, subjects’ performance of a credible, dominant self includes the authority to pronounce that their own extreme actions are reasonable. Citing that others were similarly affected is further declaration of one’s credibility. Here are some expressions of instances in which subjects feel violated and provoked. Subjects warrant that their feelings of alienation and problems with the class are justified by the unreasonableness of others.

Well, I really felt alienated in that class. And I think most of the students did because we would come out, a lot of times very angry for being made to feel like we were inferior for being white. In some senses we were attacked not directly, but very indirectly, very subtly. (F414)
the way the course was set up was seen by some students in all the sections when I was taking it to be almost a form of forced reverse discrimination ... Many students felt that they were being persecuted through the course content because of, you know, simply by virtue of them being white and, you know, there's validity to what they say. ...it was unfair that they were being constantly pigeon-holed as being a certain way simply because they were white and European. (M7911-12)

But some of the other students were starting to complain. Why is this being shoved in our face all the time? (F083)

I really went in with an open mind and I was walking in thinking, I'm going to learn something about this other culture because I feel I need to. And I found that I ran up to a lot of roadblocks against the other side, being a white person. Like they didn't want to learn a lot about how I viewed them. Like I was very open-minded and I think to take those classes you have to be open-minded. And I find because, and I don't want to say that they're racist because that's not the way it is cause they have a right to think that way. They've been put down, they've been, you know oppressed whatever. But at the same time I felt like I was coming up against a roadblock being a white person because they didn't really want to admit that I was going to be out there. (F6613)

... I was penalized for being white. And to me it didn't create any good feelings, and yes I know there's unfairness and things like that and I think that's something that each person has to deal with. But the class really slammed it in my face and made me very uncomfortable. (F411)

For subject purposes, these projected acts of violence serve as examples of the others' extreme behaviour and evidence for why the other is discredited. In contrast, the subject in the last quotation is the model of moderation in conceding that, yes, things are unfair for some people. She continues that this "unfairness"—a euphemism for racism—has to be dealt with individually. The description of systemic racism that is part of the course content becomes a generalized "unfairness" meted out at the individual level. The acknowledgement of unfairness, that is, racism, is balanced by her experience of being made to feel "very uncomfortable". Her accountability is increased compared to the events of the course which are portrayed as extreme: "the class really slammed it in my face". By discrediting the events of the course in this way, she is justified in the negative feelings and the cause of her discomfort is explained beyond further questioning.
Subjects have been seriously shaken by their experiences as indicated by their depictions of violence: they were "attacked", "persecuted", "shoved", "slammed". There is a great deal at stake for subjects as the structures of domination are deconstructed; and considering the violence that can follow threats to or the interruption of dominant racial positioning, subjects fear and rage are hardly surprising. Up until this point, subjects mainly refer to culture, rarely referencing racialized identities; now, the fear of the other is more obvious and subjects prepare to defend their positions "by virtue" of their whiteness. Rage and white anger are visible when white entitlement feels threatened and out of control and when otherness can no longer be contained.

The Aboriginal professor poses a dilemma for many subjects, and some of the greatest hostility is reserved for her. She is a site of conflicting desires such as authority/subordination in regard to the professor/student status and equality/condescension regarding individual/teacher performances. Some subjects find it confusing and some reassuring that even though at a distance they reject the professor's authority, they find her agreeable one-on-one. Subjects display a distinct lack of control, however, in that they both desire the professor for her difference and are repelled at their attraction.

Subjects gain some measure of control over their dilemma by depicting the professor in negative ways. Her behaviour is variously described as errant, egregious, and exaggerated; she is made to look petty, biased, and incompetent in failing to control the other students in the course whom one subject describes as "unruly". The subjects, in contrast, establish credibility by being reasonable in rejecting the professor and her claims. In various ways, the resistance to the course is justified by finding fault with the professor who is seen as threatening and destructive to subjects' good will.

...before the class I had, I think I had a lot, I had respect for the Native culture and I understood the issues and I understood why for the issues. But after the
class I felt resentful in some way. It wasn’t a, to me it wasn’t a, it wasn’t a growing experience. To me it was a diminishing experience because I felt I became more narrow-minded. And since I’ve taken that class I’ve tried to put the class out of my mind because it wasn’t a good experience. And I think a lot of it had to do with the professor. (F414)

One subject both rejects and anticipates the presence of the Aboriginal body as it is positioned to provide her with an experience of Western culture that is not otherwise available to her. For others, however, the smooth objectification of cultural knowledge is continually interrupted by personal relations.

The professor at the University was not liked by our class as a whole. We didn’t like her because we felt she didn’t like us. It was a negative experience to be in the class, but I do believe there were some positive things from the class ... She herself was [Aboriginal] and so if anybody’s going to talk to us about how to treat other people and how to, you know, treat multicultural people, it was coming from somebody who had experience with it. And she could give us insight on different cultures and things that in Western culture you don’t think about.... It wasn’t enjoyable to go to class because of the instructor. We challenged what she had to say. We didn’t accept everything she said word for word. We spoke our minds and I don’t think she liked that much....we’d leave that class and go: give me a break, or, I don’t believe that. (F101-4)

Subjects’ rejection of the professor is warranted as reasonable because it is in response to the professor’s unreasonableness. That subjects don’t accept “everything she said word for word” employs a rhetoric of extremism whereby subjects indicate that they are discerning and rational—not slavish followers of what any body tells them. The final “give me a break” is a rhetorically self-sufficient statement of closure and complete dismissal against which it is hard to mount an appeal or continue the discussion.

The course was clearly unsettling although subjects cannot always explain why. One subjects’ efforts to explain what was amiss include the following:

I don’t know if it was the professor that was teaching the class or if it was the angle that the College took in creating the class, but it. I don’t know if it kind of just brushed over topics or were they just trying to incite our minds to think about this stuff, especially with the way the society is moving .... Because I know for the class I was in there were a lot people who had a lot of problems with the way some of the issues that were brought up. (M017)

Six possible reasons for disapproving of the course, starting and ending with the professor. Later, he offers that “I can talk to her one-on-one after class
and, you know, very personable person. But I guess in the class, maybe it's just
the way it came out that I had a problem with it” (M0110). His remark that he can
distinguish between a personality and the role a person plays warrants the
subject's claim as a reasonable person. It does something more, however, in that
it also indicates that his objection to her is connected to her role as professor with
its considerable symbolic power compared to the personal power which he
wields with more success. His "problem" with her disappears when their
identities are performed at the level of the individual where the white male
subject can regain some of his authority.

One final move in which subjects rely on their version of rationality and
controlled emotions to warrant their credibility as reliable teacher candidates is
their use of time. Subjects find certain course claims about historical events to be
exaggerated or at least immoderate—claims which implicate the subjects in their
privileged status. Past injustices of government agencies and teaching practices
are seen today for the mistakes they were. Armed and enlightened with this
historical knowledge, the subjects suppose that their teaching practices will be an
improvement. For example, they will not be like teachers in the past who taught
with only one method, but will vary their practices in accordance with students’
needs. As for government activities, subjects see themselves as individuals who
are not responsible for these initiatives taken on their behalf. “I mean we felt
bad, but in a way we couldn’t because we didn’t drive the Natives onto
the
reserves. It was people many many years before us” (F106). History, even
students’ own, is othered and forgotten; it has nothing to do with this present
enlightened state and the capabilities of these heroic saviours who claim the
power to make all things new.

One subject is pleased to be part of the new generation at the education
college compared to older teachers who are “coming back”. Another subject
acknowledges that in the past, some people were oppressed and taken advantage of. He sees the opportunities of the present as a way to “straighten up the mistakes that were made before” (M011). This expressed desire to make amends establishes the subject as a non-racist, fair-minded person. For him, being fair means that everybody has the same opportunities. His proof that the mistakes of the past have been overcome and that people today have equal chances is the implementation of affirmative action, the latter providing some evidence that the correction has even gone a little too far. Finally, one subject defends European history and aggression by generalizing injustice everywhere, implying that it is just the way of the world; in the process, atrocities become downgraded to “cultural insensitivity”.

The things that have happened, not just here but around the world, it always does seem to be in venues and everything in history books that it is the European colonizers that come in and wreak havoc. I know historically that that’s not the case. In present day that’s not the case. Every culture does it. Every culture, historically, every culture and civilization has committed atrocities related to cultural insensitivity. (M7911-12)

As subjects reflect on the complicity of white people in the treatment of Natives, they at first feel bad about the situation and then indignant as they relegate the historical actions to a time that does not involve them and disavow any present day involvement in perpetuating racism. Drawing the curtain of history across those things they disclaim is an act endemic to the Canadian narrative. The othering and managing of history is a significant act of self-preservation that the dominant can assume.

**managing tolerance in Canada**

Subjects separate themselves from the past by declaring that the narrative of the nation is now. Some of the indignation is a defence against the subtext of oppression and racism implicit in the course, as well as the unacceptable descriptions of white Canadians as oppressors. White subjects continue blameless for any untoward behaviour or actions including their own emotional
responses caused by others. The idealized nation is how and when the subjects manage and define it—as a good and benevolent place where white guilt has no part.

Embodiment of cultural variety and diversity in Canada is a source of both pride and annoyance among the subjects. On the one hand, subjects are extremely proud that “Canadians appreciate many cultures, many ways of life, and religion” (M548), “Overall Canadians are very tolerant...we have a lot of different races” (F088), and “We’re so multi-cultural because we accept people from all over the world” (F105). Evidence of the success of cultural diversity in Canada is found in the following passage in which the subject takes pride in the treatment of Natives in North America compared to elsewhere.

...the situation that the Aboriginals have been in Australia for about the same amount of time and the real struggle...they’re having a much harder struggle to accept the changes in their lives than the Natives in Canada or the States have. (F813)

The statements of pride are mixed with the conditions under which this pride is bestowed; that is, our Natives are doing better under our oppression than the Australian Aboriginal people are doing in Australia. There is great pride in the “management” of people: “We have a lot of different races and we do manage to live basically side by side” (F088). The benefits of this management are these: we settle things differently; people can speak up and be heard; we are concerned for all groups and not just our own ethnic group; we promote the maintenance of languages; Canadians are those who work at making Canada better.

On the other hand, there are limits to tolerance, and guidelines exist for how it may be meted out and practised.

People have the freedom to live their way of life as long as it doesn’t infringe on others... letting people practice those things that allow them to be who they are, yet not allowing them to tell others that their ways are better than someone else’s. (M016)
To adjudicate tolerance, liberal notions of equality emerge to argue that all people be treated alike. Focusing on individual groups is a drawback such as in hyphenated identities—like Chinese and Canadian—in which the subject suggests there is a risk that Canadian identity may not be dominant. The strong identification with ethnic status is a source of intolerance among unidentified others.

Canadians run the risk of being in danger of becoming intolerant of other groups because of other ethnic groups, because of such a strong need to identify with our ethnic groups. (F418)

For this particular subject, at least, the change of status from tolerant to intolerant Canadian has been caused by ethnic groups, thereby putting her tolerance at risk and thrusting formerly tolerant people like her into the role of victims.

In a way similar to the responses to the cross-cultural course, negative responses about the status of being Canadian depict the subjects as victims of unreasonable claims and behaviour. Just as subjects feel they have been victimized for their being what they essentially are, that is, white, Canada is being victimized by means of its essential character of claiming no particular identity, a move which supports whiteness by masking the existence of difference and the other. Subjects find that having a tolerant nation can be hazardous to the nation’s health, especially if national identity depends on unacknowledged racialized dominance; in a similar way, subjects “increased awareness” and knowledge of the other undermines their construction of selves as individuals positioned to be tolerant. Therefore, the variety and open vulnerability of Canada is seen as a source of potential danger and something which requires management. There are limits to tolerance which are threatened by “people” an defended by “us”.

The range of distinctions that can be made within the nation are those things which the dominant social body defends itself against. Racism does not arise as a reaction to universal principles on which the modern liberal state is founded. Rather, racism is a foundational fiction within it (Stoler, 1995). It is the "internal enemy" that is the source of vulnerability. Racism depends on exclusionary principles integral to the foundation of nation states and is affirming of national identities. In Canada, racism not only creates internal divisions, it is also productive of identities separated by "us" and "them" binaries. Those separate from the dominant social body are deemed to lack an ethics of "how to live" and are consequently seen as threats to "the rest of us". There are a variety of ways in which discursive practices are used to "work up" or "assemble" various forms of racism, such as through strict adherence to the tenets of individualism and the belief that people can be whatever they want to be. Cross-cultural training which supports the notion of liberal teacher identities is received as a method of containment through "progressive" educational activities. The institutional gesture of providing for the course would seem to be as important as any follow-up interest in what is taught or whether it succeeds. The mere threat of this liberal gesture is countered by subjects who accuse the course of the worst possible outcome: that it made them more racist than when they started.

While most claim willingness to have their consciousnesses raised, the course events clearly cross boundaries and break rules that the subjects feel should not be transgressed. Subjects’ frustration, resentment and anger are evidence that some sense of fair play has been violated. I take these reactions as signs that rules regarding cultural engagement have been broken and positions unsettled. The remarks concerning these conflicts reflect the subjects’ desire to evade, dominate, or find solutions which will appease the contradictions
between the course events and their sense of appropriate social action and rule keeping.

Emotions erupt at breaks in the norm or at some challenge to the status quo. The quotations in this chapter which display emotion are clues about what subjects consider normative. Subjects are also anxious not to disrupt their own images as tolerant and caring and use their emotions to show righteous indignation at the extremes of others. Anger mounts at the possibility that others could control subjects' access and entitlement to their desires, and they begin to make conflicted claims on their control of history, definitions of equality, and privilege.

I could probably go on forever here, but I went to the teachers' conference last March... and [the head of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations] gave a speech or a lecture or whatever you want to call it. I found it quite frustrating because he got up there and he was saying basically that we wouldn't want, ... [...] that they, the FSIN, that they don't want non-Native people teaching Native ways because it's just not their right. (F815)

I don't know if it was just because we thought it was getting forced down our throats, but there were some people who had a problem with this class simply because they thought, Whoa! Why are they telling us we got to give to them? We have to give up this so that they can have this? Aren't we supposed to be living in a society where everyone is considered equal and everyone has the same opportunity for the different jobs, lifestyles, etc? (M017)

Subjects' reactions in this chapter indicate something of what happens when subjects' perceive that their power organized by means of the technologies of dominance has been disrupted. In subjects' unsettled positions, they perceive that the rules which maintain their racialized dominance have not been perfectly kept; and that the unsettling of their positions is the unsettling of their dominance. Their emotional responses indicate that a great deal is at stake in the rupture through which ideologies are exposed and assumptions of their entitlement come to light. The ruptures are evidence that whiteness is not innate, but rather a precarious identity whose performance and production depends on the demarcation of difference and the maintenance of rules.
The stability and entitlement of white supremacy is undermined when its "logic" is questioned, a "logic" which operates most "successfully" when it remains unexamined. Subjects understand that defending the "logic" of whiteness is more important than defending the white supremacy which depends on its "logic". While the processes of white domination are quite safe from the effects of the course, subjects react to examining the logic and hegemony by which domination is produced. Their defensive reaction is not about abstractions or principles; subjects have been personally affronted by this examination of dominance because their own passage to respectability is not secure enough for them to ignore the scrutiny of the course. Their access to respectability has been through the teaching profession in which their care of the young is exchanged for middle-class status and equal, generic whiteness. Their reactions indicate what subjects have at stake and are afraid of losing: job opportunities, a positive teacher image, control over history and over the rules that will mark them as white as possible. Subjects' dilemma is that they cannot support whiteness and its right to domination as an innate capacity because this would disqualify them as good liberal thinkers and teachers. Their own claims to equality and respectability depend on the construction of dominance and its claim to rationality, generosity, and doing one's duty. Their anger is reserved for the course which has let out the tremendously de-stabilizing "secret" that is hiding in plain view, that there is more to dominance than meritocracy—a revelation which threatens to undermine not only whiteness, but more important for the subjects, their access to its regulation.
Conclusion

It is by the rules which support white domination that research subjects participate in the discipline and regulation of themselves and others; they are invested in this process and the practices I have described which construct and maintain the markers of difference between "bodies that matter" and abject beings. The subjects are, on the one hand, the embodiment of teachers, helpers, investigators, seekers, concerned persons—people who make things happen, people in charge. When they are encouraged to see those identifications examined from another point of view, another gaze, the identifications begin to loosen. Some subjects become uneasy. Some become open to alternative views. Letting go of a subject identity, however, continues to involve the "other" whose subjectivity remains available to assist in the new identifications. For the most part, the movement is not beyond some of those already described thoroughly elsewhere such as Said's discussion of how the west exoticizes the other or bell hooks' description of "eating the other". Whatever the description of these relational identities, the effect is the control of bodies, including one's own as these subjects first discipline themselves into the shapes of suitable teacher subjects. The ideological work performed by subjects discourse situates subjects as white, Canadian, teacher candidates. The assumptions that perform the subjects as dominant can be read in their knowledge of the rules, their interest in supporting them and their anxious reaction when the rules are not kept or prove neither to be "fixed" nor "unproblematically factual" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 212).

That subjects are not just reacting to the slippage of their individual identities is demonstrated in their uses of national and historical rhetoric to reclaim the status quo. While subjects are careful to describe themselves and their achievements as individual success stories, a collective identity quickly
reasserts itself when subjects feel under attack and need to relocate their positions as social actors. In subjects’ struggle to maintain the rules of dominance, the luxury of the individual identity is the first to go (Fanon, 1963, p. 47). Social identifications are ready at hand, not only for purposes of subjects’ defence, but for that which needs defending: the rules which support their entitlement and privilege. When the un/knowable other emerges, then the identities are asserted as “us” and “them” and reinforced in unmistakable ways as seen in the discursive practices to which subjects have access. The self-affirmation of whiteness relies on the control and strengthening of its “differential value” (Foucault, 1990, p. 123) through white embodiment and technologies of nationalism. In Canada, the construction of white, middle-class identity requires and employs the other in perhaps no way more than in the management and defence of Canadian identity as a white construction.
Chapter Seven

TECHNIQUES OF THE SELF:

RACIAL MARKERS OF DOMINANCE AND INNOCENCE

In the previous two chapters, I refer to Foucault’s designation of the history of thought as a domain in which forms of experience can situate themselves (1973). I have employed three organizing premises—to which Foucault refers and by which thought can be described—to organize the discussion chapters of this dissertation. In Chapter Five, the first domain or axis is described as the play of true and false in which the human being persists as a subject of learning and has understandings of a certain type. The subjects in this research participate as agents in the “domain of recognitions” by which they signify themselves and others as having and performing teacher knowledge. This process of identifying as teachers occurs discursively through subjects’ social, economic, and historical contexts. Chapter Six takes up the “the organization of a normative system built on a whole technical, administrative, juridical, and medical apparatus...”. This is the basis for accepting or rejecting rules which humans use to participate as social and juridical subjects, rules by which their identities and others will be regulated and disciplined. These are the normative practices which support the designation of some people as teachers and not others.

This final discussion chapter is congruent with Foucault’s third axis “...the definition of a relation to oneself and to others as possible subjects of madness [and racialized identity]” (1994, p. 336). The third domain, the discussion of which follows in this chapter, is what establishes the relation with oneself and with
others, constitutes the human being as ethical subject, and forms certain modes of consciousness of oneself and others. This relation to and governance of the self is not only a theoretical formulation, but one that can be analyzed in every manner of speaking, doing, or behaving. I have argued elsewhere for the notion that discourse is performative, but Foucault goes further in arguing that the organizational domains which we reference in examining forms of experience is already to perform the organization as fact. "In this sense, thought is understood as the very form of action" (p. 335). The perspicacity and aptness outlined by Foucault's three domains as well as the performative nature of the categorizing makes this theorizing especially applicable to this research. The axes for consideration in this research—the play between types of understanding, forms of normality, and modes of relation to oneself and others—are not to be considered as discreet structures shaping the status of significant experiences. In this research the considerable overlap of these axes of thought is evident across three chapters; for example, the theme of Chapter Five on how knowledge of teacher identity is organized is repeated in Chapter Six on how this identity is normalized through regulatory practices.

The organization of subjectivity is described as "agents, objects, subjects" in each of the three respective axes. It is the third axis or domain in which research subjects establish themselves as "subjects" which is the focus of this chapter. It is perhaps ironic that in the language of research, the appellation, "subject", overlaps with and presupposes the formation of the ethical subject, that is, individuals constituting themselves in roles recognized from other discourses and experiences. In these performances, as outlined in this section, the individuals establish themselves as self-conscious teacher "subjects"—a self-consciousness which, fortunately for me, permits me to enter into a relation with them as research subjects. While self-consciousness supports one's
performance of self, it does not complete or restrict it. In this chapter I note the presence of silent discourses of unconscious knowledge which inform and support subjects’ access to language and behaviour. In the sections that follow, I briefly describe how “techniques of the self” is understood as a mode of ethical formulation. The chapter is a description of subject access to certain moral positionings and specific sites by which they establish a mode of relation to the self. In particular, the concept of innocence is a primary moral “site” which subjects access in their performance as white, middle-class teachers. After tracing a process by which subjects establish an ethical self, the majority of the chapter discusses of how concepts of innocence and redemption are a seemingly necessary process for the performance of whiteness as organized by research subjects and described by others writing in field.

**Ethics: techniques of the self**

Foucault’s genealogy of ethics leads to a consideration of two questions, the first one of which has been already posed: it is a question of “how to live” (1984, p. 348) followed by “which technē do I have to use in order to live as well as I ought to live?” Through the practices they consider integral to the work they do, participants perform themselves as ethical subjects. They take on and are implicated in sociological practices and relationships which they recognize and intend as performative of themselves as ethical, moral agents. The elaboration of the relationship to oneself entails mastery over the self; and following the Enlightenment, the reason for the mastery is “because you are a rational being” (p. 358). Because others are also rational, the new ethical relation is a reciprocal one. It is not simply a symbolic system of reciprocity, however, or contemplation about what one might do with “one’s available freedom”. The subject is also “constituted in real practices—historically analyzable practices. There is a
technology of the constitution of the self which cuts across symbolic systems while using them” (p. 369).

Subjects become conscious of their constitution as suitable teacher candidates in the examination and judgement of their actions, motives, desires. In the desire to perform themselves as “good”, they look for evidence in actions they consider of positive value. Both their conscious and unconscious conformity to practices which perform them as teachers are one more way in Western tradition of identity construction whereby, following Foucault, “the self is not merely given but is constituted in relationship to itself as subject” (p. 372).

In the previous chapter, I emphasize the rules and norms by which identities of subjects and those around them are disciplined and regulated. As this domain of thought has relevance for each discussion chapter, certain notions such as innocence and Canadian identity are repeated with varying emphases. In this chapter on the subjects’ relation to themselves, I show how they employ intensive self-policing as a primary technology for the constitution of the self.

Silent discourses

One of the premises under which the cross-cultural course operates is that having cross-cultural knowledge is necessary for becoming a good teacher. At least two themes precede this: one, cultural and racial positioning of students and teachers affects students’ chances in school; two, subjects do not have enough knowledge about the culture of others and would be insufficiently prepared without it. A further layer of excavation exposes an even deeper assumption in the organization of the cross-cultural course—that racism exists. This subtext of racism, which is both simple and confounding, is continuously and implicitly addressed in subject responses. It is invariably part of their answers, even though it is not directly stated, and even though racism is
euphemized to cultural differences. Subject discourse is profoundly shaped by the basic assumption that racism exists, that it affects others, that it implicates subjects in their identifications as citizens and as teachers. That racism exists presupposes many of the subject responses that I have already described: resistance to the compulsory nature of the course, subject descriptions of their individual responses, the enormous efforts on the part of subjects to show themselves as “good” people, the comparison between self and other students, attempts to do the right thing, frustration with not doing it. It is against the subtext of the existence of racism that subjects who earnestly desire to be acceptable teaching bodies simultaneously claim knowledge of race issues while attempting to hold themselves above the fray. In their responses to this course which precludes certain assumptions about racism, subjects have devised a variety of moves to separate and distance themselves from any accusations or complicity on their part. In this section, I illustrate how white privilege is manipulated to warrant claims that are rhetorically self-sufficient and appeal to a kind of common sense racism about what is reasonable to expect and what is counted as extreme. Other processes include factual versions which attend to agency and accountability in the reported events and in the current speaker’s actions. Examples such as, subjects reporting of their good relations with racialized minorities, their support for Native issues, how much subjects like the class are taken as factual versions which support subjects’ agency and the accountability of their claims. A process frequently accessed by subjects for distancing themselves from any accusations or complicity with racism is lengthy referencing of how other people reacted to the course.

The process recurs many times throughout the interviews that, in shoring up their self-images or in offering their best selves, subjects almost always accomplish this by comparing themselves to other people. This is hardly a novel
observation but the occurrence is frequent and in some ways, not unfamiliar, if we recall that definitions of Canada are often done in relation to what it is not. Almost all subjects describe their positioning on cross-cultural education by describing the reactions of student colleagues enrolled in the same course who are always less understanding or more antagonistic than the subject.

The question of how others in the course reacted was never raised as part of the interview schedule. But when subjects respond to the question of what they got out of the course, they frame their answers by describing the responses of others. The subjects invariably place the others’ reactions on the margins, finding these reactions to be more extreme, less understanding, biased, and “crazy”. The subjects own responses to the course, which are almost always less fully described, only need appear as footnotes or by implication; other student reactions contextualize the subjects in a way which establishes them as reasonable and supportive; their reactions are normative and desirable. The subjects always re-state their criteria in ways which locate them in the centre of what they define as good. The criteria frequently shift to show that each is not racist and has as positive an attitude toward Natives and others as can reasonably be expected within the norms they reference. Contradictions in what constitutes central positioning are expected when subjects are pinning their images on a shifting construction of themselves as innocent. The centre will move to wherever it is required to maintain a positive self-image for each individual. The process is very relational, however, and no one makes a move without repositioning oneself at the centre and the others in their outsider status. Many insider techniques such as the following rhetorically sufficient statement are typically used to maintain each subject at the centre. A woman suggests that because she has experienced a range of cultures, “there are many things that I appreciate that perhaps other people do not” (F418). This is a non-debatable
statement in which the subject intends that her factual accounts can be held as credible and reliable. The positioning of the centre is always in flux and always in readiness to change as rapidly as in the space of a single sentence as follows:

When I encounter other people who had that ignorance that I had, it frustrates me now, because we get such a negative mind set that it's really hard to change peoples' thinking. (F813)

She admits her ignorance and recovers from it by suggesting that this change, which was possible for her, will be “really hard” for others.

Subjects go to considerable effort to establish both the credibility of their claims as well as their power and justification when pronouncing on racial issues. Negative remarks are quite possible if the subject has firmly established her power and agency to make them. Subjects distinguish themselves from others who subjects say do not hold their liberal views. They compare themselves favourably to other student colleagues, some of whom also participated as interview subjects in this research; unwittingly, in the privacy of an interview situation, research subjects negatively reference other research subjects, as well as classmates not interviewed, as proof of their credibility.

An extensive repertoire is organized to establish subjects as innocent. I have described the repertoire of reason and moderation by which subjects represent the views of others as unrealistic. If readers accept this claim, the subject has established some rapport by implying that she is the realistic one whom the reader (researcher) can trust. Subjects describe how the other students' reactions were extreme: “people are being unrealistic”; “they took the class as a joke”; “they became more uptight than they were before”; “they were getting quite antagonistic”. In contrast, subjects position themselves favourably in regard to the discipline of the course: “I appreciated it”; “I enjoyed it quite a bit”; “I think the class helps”; “I was one of the students who participated in the class, who
looked forward to it". Others who did not like the class were unreasonable and unlike the subjects who now speak of it favourably.

It is important to say a few things about process at this point. I have stated repeatedly that I am not examining subjects' discourse for its veracity or its positioning on a scale measuring racist utterances. Perhaps this section best illustrates this point in that, compared to most of the references up to now, some of the quotations which follow might "qualify" as supportive of anti-racist work and sympathetic of racialized minorities. Although this may very well be the "meaning" for the subjects, assessing their support for anti-racist work is also not my concern. Indeed, I would consider it unlikely if their desire to assist in anti-racist work were not the expressed position of many subjects. The research is not searching for the readily available and easy to observe racist remarks; but rather, it is a search for the warranting procedures within liberal discourse regarding "how" white racialized positioning is evaluated, justified, and performed. To that end, seemingly supportive, sympathetic remarks are not referenced in this section as if they are ironic or as if the subjects are insincere. Indeed, I understand the seemingly contradictory remarks of subjects as some indication of the ongoing and necessarily insecure nature of identity construction. Therefore, I continue to use these race positive remarks as I have the others: to illustrate what it is that subjects are interested in accomplishing with respect to the parameters of this research. The subjects in this study are interested in mitigating their complicity in historic and present day racist acts and in performing themselves as innocent of racist practice. They are interested in affirming their subject positions as qualified teachers whose liberal goodness includes being non-prejudiced. The veracity of the students' claims about their racial positioning, whether the claims might be called racist or not, should receive less attention
than “the process whereby these claims become communicated as ‘fact’ and empowered as ‘truth’” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 59).

Subjects establish differences between themselves and their student colleagues by citing the others’ negative reactions and by declaring their own positive responses. They quote at length the extreme repertoires they attribute to other students.

I appreciated it and I thought it was good. But some of the other students were starting to complain. “Why is this being shoved in our face all the time?” (F083)

I heard what people were saying that were taking that class, and having to take that class, and very racist comments coming out. Like saying, “I don’t know why I have to take this stupid class and learn about you, like how are you any different than me?” (F668-9)

I just shook my head and some of the comments that they had about the professor and her way and, you know, it was really quite sad because it was a real good indication of the lack of understanding towards that way of thinking. I thought, geez, we’re in for, you know, big trouble. (F815)

The reaction that a lot of people had was, “Okay, is there anything that we did right? Everything we do is wrong then?” I really felt that people were missing the point and they were getting quite antagonistic towards the purpose of the thing, [...] others were [...] quite uptight, and, oh, “Why do we have to change everything for them?” And it’s “us and them”, you know, those borders. It’s quite scary to see people reacting that way. (M542)

All of these subjects and many others not cited establish themselves in similar ways as supporters of the course. At other times, as you have read earlier, many of these same subjects also offer negative evaluations about some aspect of the course or the professor. The curious part is the extent to which they rely on the negative attributions of others and quote them directly; in this way the extreme negative reactions performed by the subjects can be attributed to the words of others. The subjects speak through their classmates without having to own the most negative reactions themselves. The next quotation is perhaps the extreme version of uninvolved reporting in which the subject doesn’t comment on the substance of others’ remarks except to say they had “validity”. High praise indeed.
They felt, a class largely taken by white European origin students, to some degree, many students felt that they were being persecuted through the course content because of, you know, simply by virtue of them being white and, you know, there's validity to what they say. (M7911)

After all the tension that the class generated, the subject remains as arbiter of fair treatment—as an objective, uninvolved observer. His reasonableness makes him credible. The usefulness of this kind of referencing—which removes the subject from direct statements by making comments on someone else's version—establishes the subject as an objective, fair judge of how one might reasonably be expected to react to a compulsory cross-cultural program. By various means, subjects draw on the discourses of other students, even though they are not ever invited in the interview to do so, and project their negative reactions onto their classmates so that the subjects remain innocent.

A number of subjects report their frustration over the resistance of other students in coming to an understanding of the importance of the issues. "I just felt like saying, you know, 'This is reality. Wake up'" (F815). Emotions erupt at breaks in the norm or at some challenge to the status quo. These quotations which reference others and are often emotional provide clues about what subjects consider normative. Subjects are also anxious not to disrupt their own images as tolerant and caring and use their emotions to show righteous indignation at the extremes of others. Yet another subject reports his disappointment and surprise at evidence of racism among his cohort. Note that even though he thinks that the other students in his class were extreme, he defends them by saying that other classes were worse.

All I'm saying is that, I mean, I saw a lot of dissension and some of it I felt was valid, some of it was, I felt, like it was coming from ten year old children who were being deprived of candy or something, you know, Jesus. [...] Our class wasn't so bad, there were other classes that felt that there were major problems that they couldn't contend with. (M7914)

I have included a number of direct quotations in which subjects judge each other's responses, and many more exist than I have indicated. Subjects go to
considerable effort to distinguish themselves from others whom they say do not hold the subject's liberal views. For example, some subjects cite their age—whatever it happens to be—as the reason for their own enlightened stances; ironically, forty-year-olds champion their relative age and twenty-year-olds claim their relative youth as the explanations for their liberal views. Subjects attribute their enlightenment to their own philosophies, to a personal quality, or something in their past: to the influence of good teachers, the negative example of bad teachers, vast personal experience, oppression, working-class background, extensive travelling outside Canada, liberal parents, logic, university training, being twenty, being forty, having good character, being reasonable. By whatever means it has been acquired, subjects understand that liberalism is a claim on privilege and social esteem. Their production as liberals is an individual achievement for which subjects are careful to take individual credit by separating themselves from other people's actions of which they disapprove. Racism remains rooted as individual acts perpetrated by other people. Most subjects find some way to indicate that whatever resistance to the cross-cultural course they felt personally, other students took even greater exception. The resistance to the implications and effects of their course are assigned to others so that subjects can maintain the fantasy of their innocence.

Referencing other students is a very important rhetorical feature in establishing credibility and innocence; it is also one of the most consistent themes throughout all the interviews. When I began analyzing the data, I first thought the referencing was simply another discursive device for showing oneself as reliable. But because the use is pervasive and completely unsolicited, I realize it plays a much larger part in the production of the innocent subject. Subjects do not reference each other, for example, when they are describing what made them decide to become teachers or when they list their personal qualities.
that will enable them to be successful. Neither does anyone ever say, "I caught on to the tenets of math instruction right away, but others just couldn't get it", or any other such comparison about their suitability for teaching. Patterns of discourse in which subjects justify their innocence are the discourses which elicit the greatest emotion, and the referencing of others functions as subjects' testimony on their own behalf.

Before I consider the question of why most subjects reference each other, it is important to consider how subjects have colonized a particular part of the discourse for their own purposes to comply with the images of themselves as concerned and good teachers. Subjects have merged their professional interests with social, economic, and historical incitement to talk about racialization and culture of the other. Like specific discourses of sexuality, the discourse of race is available to take race "into account"; or as some subjects say, to "deal with" it as an "issue" or "problem" to be managed. The technologies and the control of racial discourse are productive of a racialization that is "economically useful and politically conservative" (Foucault, 1990, p. 37). Technologies of racial discourses are also productive as a means to exercise the power to talk about racialization. That is, the talk legitimates those who exercise the authority to talk about it. By means of their formalized teacher education process, subjects have been given official access to a specific way of describing racial differences—in terms of children's education—and of affirming their teacher identities by using the professional talk. That they can talk about race in this fashion is an illustration and exercise of their power as teacher candidates. Other ways of speaking about racial difference, however, are not necessarily silenced, but function alongside the things that are said.

For some subjects, new criteria for engaging in racial discourse provides them with different ways of talking about race as well as ways which avoid
talking about it as they did before. As Foucault suggests, the talk and the silences are not binaries, but both shape who is authorized and which forms of discretion will be required. "There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses" (p. 27). Invited to discuss racial differences, research subjects represent themselves as innocent, objective teacher candidates through their professionally organized racial discourses. Because their positionings as teachers are limited and new, because racial discourse is not a fixed form, and because the subjects occupy many roles, other discourses also emerge—most notably one whose text is never stated directly even though it is referenced by all subjects. I suggest that this referencing of others relies on unspoken referencing to which subjects have unacknowledged access. The explanatory remarks in which subjects attempt to distance themselves from their classmates constitute another technology in their domination as white subjects.

**truth-telling**

What is the unnamed subtext which subjects use to evaluate their peers? Subject naming of each other relies on some common knowledge, or understanding, or dis/consciousness, or mechanism of power relations that remains unnamed, but is continually accessed and held as a standard or measure of accountability. This is an example of what Hurtado (1996) describes as the "maintenance of structural power" (p. 149). She continues:

> Whether individual whites use these mechanisms or not is irrelevant to the outcome of the white group's superiority, and certainly the studies conducted so far suggest that most whites are socialized to employ them, whether or not they actually do. (p. 149, emphasis added)

This section examines the tacit knowledge of the mechanisms of whiteness which subjects "are socialized to employ", recognize in each other, and unwittingly share.
I have observed in earlier chapters that various shades of whiteness are layered through class, sexual orientation, immigrant history, and the entry codes by which subjects claim their positionality as innocent teacher candidates. I have also observed that the security of this unstable white identification is not under threat from racialized minorities because as teachers, the subjects have an already prescribed role in their relations with Natives as care-giver, helper, teacher, and so forth. Racist whites, on the other hand, are more threatening to a white self-image which secures itself by identifying as a non-racist, white liberal; especially threatening are those white people who are overtly racist or who don’t have an appreciation of Aboriginal culture like the appreciation the subjects claim to have. Subjects’ greater fear is for what white racists say, for their unenlightened, unmitigated racism; subjects doubt they can silence them (F66). Other whites demonstrate the ease and potential with which subjects might access their own racism. Subjects need to separate themselves from these scenes of innocence lost. Because subjects’ self-image is based on the construction of their identities as non-racist, innocent helpers, the possibility that this construction might not be true is the shadow that subjects are so keen to deny. The cross-cultural course and the presence of First Nations people can be a threat to white subjects’ self-image if they sense that, in the process, they might meet their racist selves. The fear in the shadows is our own racism. The shadow, the abject self that must always be denied, is the knowledge of our racist selves. This is the vagueness and disavowal of what subjects say they “need to know” or “be aware of” as a result of their course. This is the knowledge which meets with so much resistance and which subjects reference in their evaluation of their classmates’ untenable remarks. Subjects understand that their white identities are linked to their innocence; they also understand that they have a great deal at stake if they lose it: control over privilege, history, job opportunities, a good name, positive teacher
image. The common understandings which support subjects' racial positionings are never mentioned even though the technologies of dominance remain as a silent discourse to which subjects make reference when they judge each other.

The point that by discrediting the actions of others, subjects secure innocent identities for themselves is not an end in itself. What is worth noting is that these elaborate processes of truth-telling and discrediting rely on all of the subjects having access to and making use of a silent, perhaps unconscious, discourse which supports and references their dominant racialized selves. By identifying other students' insider knowledge of how racism works, subjects reveal their own insider knowledge; and their own knowledge is considerable. From their own perspectives, subjects know a lot about racism and about living in a racist society, and they are more than capable of commenting on racist moves they recognize in others and to which they themselves have access. As far as this research is concerned, subject remarks about racially charged situations are important, partly because subjects spend so much time making these unsolicited statements, and also because in these comments can be seen the processes whereby subjects establish their dominance. Perhaps the most significant use of these comments is that they reveal what the subjects hold to be true concerning racialization; these are the subjects' truth statements. Because subjects intend that their words will establish a positive, credible identity, the statements subjects make are true and important to them. That the statements perform identities is predicated on the assumption of the performative function of speech acts as in discourse theory described by Wetherell and Potter (1987, 1988, 1992, 1994,); Potter, Wetherell, Gill, and Edwards (1990); and Potter, Edwards, Wetherell (1993).

Whether the subjects intend their remarks to be credal statements or not is irrelevant. What their remarks do reveal is their awareness and participation in racialized differences, that is, how white people are implicated in the process of
racialization, the need to secure a position of innocence for themselves, and the vast potential, that is, the inevitability, for white subjects to be not innocent, but rather, complicit in racialized domination. Subject truths do not stand as the only or last word on the topic; but they are an indication of the subjects' awareness of racialized dominance—their access to it and use of it, their descriptions of it, its excesses, consequences, and predictions for the future, as well as the potential for subjects' complicity with domination. The way subjects frame their knowledge is typically self-preserving in that domination is understood as something to which they have access, but which, as self-determining individuals, they can also refuse if they wish. Irrespective of whether they are successful at creating an innocent self or not, subjects' collective knowledge reveals considerable awareness of the consequences and the effects of their racialization; and it is this knowledge which produces the subjects as they are produced by it. The truth statements performed by subject discourses expose their unconscious reliance on racialized dominance. Ironically, in attempting to perform themselves as innocent, subjects rely on power/knowledge to which they only have access through their complicity with constructed dominance.

The "truths" subjects tell should be seen as internally consistent with subjects' logic, regardless of whether the texts of the interviews provide all the logic steps. For, whether I agree or disagree with subjects' conclusions, the statements, in providing access to how racism "works", might also provide some insight for reframing anti-racist possibilities. The following statements are a sample of the content of subject discourse.

1) Concerning the effects of placing white students in predominantly Native classes: students will not easily accept their assignment to teach Natives; students will be unprepared for non-white experiences; subjects can see how problematic their negative attitudes will be on reserves.
2) Subjects describe the effects of cross-cultural courses on themselves and others like them: more talk about one's own culture is desirable in multicultural courses; subjects became more narrow minded as a result of the course; levels of privilege affect how people accept cross-cultural information.

3) Subjects know how the university fails in its equity role: university does not model equity issues; university efforts are inadequate and responsible for negativity; university undermines justice issues by not addressing them.

4) Subjects remark on several other topics affected by racialization: subject is capable of judging racist events and being appalled by them; situations of injustice threaten the nation; subject finds it difficult to fulfill the expectations of being a teacher; reversing discrimination is not a solution.

In their conflicted status as innocents and racist insiders, subjects adjudicate on the workings of their cross-cultural course and negotiate their self-perceptions. The truth statements comprise more than a list of what subjects know. The statements also accomplish the subjects as knowers, as informants, as ones who can describe how racialization works from a white perspective. In their performance as knowers, subjects reveal the processes of racialized identity formation and how insider status is secured. These processes can be observed in subjects continual offering of racialized scenarios in which they are innocent, that is, either victims or uninvolved whites in comparison to the negative actions of other whites. Subjects trade their knowledge of white domination for what they hope will be a secure position of personal amnesty. In the next section, I wish to say more about securing sites and possibilities of innocence which I have identified as a very present desire on the part of research subjects.
Places and positions

The designations of space and place are significant to the history and formation of Canadian identity. The claim that we are a nation of immigrants affords national and political meaning to the act of immigration as the seminal event in the definition of who is entitled to occupy Canadian space. Who would continue to qualify for Canadian identity is further shaped by changing immigration laws which clarify and control insider/outsider status. The control over this space-allotting process and the intense interest accompanying the means of qualifications contributes to the silence which surrounds First Nations people who are mainly ignored in the centrality which is attached to immigration. The mythological status of immigration as Canada’s founding act supports historic Anglo entitlement and the notion of Canada as a white space in which Aboriginal land claims need not be taken seriously.

In Chapter Three I have described the importance of space and place in the national narrative, in the causality of space in identity formation, and in the relationship of space to notions of ourselves and everyday practice (Shields, 1991). At the same time that concepts of space in the Canadian identity have something of the aura of formative destiny, the ability of space to fix Canadian identity is undermined by recognition that space varies with relations over time. Even though the designation of space is a sign of belonging (Harris, 1993), the dynamic of social relations suggests that the belonging is never fixed. On the one hand, the dynamic potential of identity construction contradicts any notion of a fixed Canadian society; on the other hand, the flux of privileged space makes sense of the regulatory function of boundaries and gives some hint as to why space—and its identity formation—are carefully guarded. For the regulation of Canadian identity, the Immigration Act stands as a powerful border process for delineating the spatialization, in literal terms, who is in and who is out. The
collective imagination of those protected by this act, that is, the already imagined insiders, defines the rules of who may or may not qualify to enter. Definitions of and limitations to citizenship status construct the space even as the space is constructed by identities of an imagined Canadian community (Dauvergne & Morton, 1996). Access to immigration "space" constitutes and is constitutive of identity formation, for example, as in subjects who can describe themselves as "typical" because they understand that their always-in-process Anglicized identities are definitional of what it is to be Canadian.

The mutually constitutive interaction of identities across spaces is described by Sherene Razack (1997) in her discussion of the spatialization of prostitution. Razack examines the effects of interlocking systems of oppression as they occur in physical and metaphorical sites. These spatial configurations of oppression, as well as other sites, are typically disguised as that which simply emerges as naturally occurring phenomenon. Space defines the site of oppression, such as prostitution, even as it is defined by the oppression. Alternative spaces operate to define both the areas which form the borders of oppressive sites and the sites where the oppression is said not to reside. Containing the site and the social relations which converge therein are also productive of identities considered outside the space. Markers of difference within and without depend on containing the site as well as the nature of the oppressions which constitute it. The advantage of containing the site is the production of difference accruing to identities that seem to be marked as outside the particular system of oppression. The use of space to examine the simultaneity of social relations converging in specific sites of oppression, as Razack has done, also marks out sites of privilege and elite formation maintained by continual surveillance against the possibility of loss of elite privilege.
As Razack states, the marking of acceptable spaces "needs" unacceptable spaces, the differences marked as places of racial and moral significance. In literal terms, the contrast between spaces in Canada is starkly provided by the differences between ownership of private property and the collective rights of Native reserve land. Historically, the purchase of private property was the restricted prerogative of middle-class, white, male citizens, their ownership a signifier of their entitlement. This prerogative of ownership and entitlement is contrasted with collectively assigned Native reservations which exist as a type of "no-man's" land where private property is not held. The spaces are distinctly marked by differences in racialization, class, and gender; and it is hardly surprising that the borders of this "feminized" space of reserve land are still under considerable negotiation and sometimes outright hostility.

The significance of place is indeed strong in spaces which are rationalized and controlled by survey lines, deeds, boundaries, purchase prices, and mortgages as signs of ownership and belonging. In Saskatchewan, immigration activities and settlement practices that sustain racialized distinctions have been central to the population and development of Western Canada. The experience of the land also continues as a metaphor of belonging; with industrialized expansion of Western cities, landless descendants of people who once lived off the land, both Europeans and Natives, now meet in the cities where spatialized differences continue to mark and naturalize variations in racialized status. The prairie experience is perhaps not more significant, however, than the very rooted claims of six or seven generations of Maritime folk, both descriptions which are some of the experiences reported by research subjects. Following the legacy of imperialism and colonization, all subjects hold the sense of whiteness as property and entitlement (Harris, 1993). White supremacy as place is considerably beyond the stage of metaphor.
In this research, subject identities are affirmed in those sites where subjects act as agents according to their desires and, alternately, undermined in other sites where their identities are most threatened. Subjects have a lot at stake as they make their way toward the relative security of a teacher identification and to potential employment, perhaps with greater financial security than they've had before. Furthermore, involvement with Natives seems to be an unsettling experience for some subjects as the control of their identifications—who they are as prospective white teachers, what is expected of them, and what they are permitted/expected to be—comes into question when the centre cannot be clearly separated from the periphery. I have described in the previous chapter how identities are regulated and disciplined in the organization of teacher identity. Failure or inability to regulate identities is a source of anger and confusion among subjects as they experience the unsettling of their own identities in the discovery that Natives are not what, who, or where, subjects had assumed. It is perhaps at white educational institutions that subject identities are most threatened and undone by Native presence and a Native gaze.

One repertoire subjects frequently employ is the metaphor, “fitting in”, as if there were a specific place for people, harking back to the hierarchical model of God at the top followed by man, woman, and then other people of non-European origins whose identities are not completely described by the generic terms “man” and “woman”. This model, which follows from nineteenth century development of evolutionary biology and natural selection, establishes a place for the speaker which depends on a hierarchy of races, “a set of subdivisions in which certain races are classified as ‘good’, fit, and superior” (Stoler, p. 84).

One subject in particular who wishes to teach in Native schools continually wonders how she and racialized minority figures “fit in”. Her concern for these contested spaces and for this problematic “fitting” implies a
knowledge of identifications separated by formerly clear boundaries that are now shifting and changing. During her interview, the participant repeats the phrases "fitting in" and "fit in" fifteen times. By means of common linguistic strategies, Toni Morrison (1992) describes how she recognizes a writer's engagement with the "serious consequences of blacks" (p. 67) such as is found in "patterns of explosive disjointed repetitive language". This research subject is indeed someone who in engaging with the "serious consequences" of racialized people. Her excessive repetition of the phrase "fit in" suggests that she has lost some sense of objectivity and control to the extent that she is no longer occupied with how this will sound in the text/interview. This particular subject, through her own reading and not inconsiderable studying, has come to the realization that the boundaries of identity are not secure. From other parts of her interview, it is clear that while she might welcome this ambiguity, it also represents the "encroachment of the other"; she indicates repeatedly that her own identity is undermined, not to mention her confidence in claiming the place where she will "fit in".

The surveillance of whiteness extends to the site of the intellect, a space that is similarly coupled with racial supremacy. The function of education as a way of marking place is firmly attached to white educational institutions. At these institutions of public education, including universities, converge the power of the state, normative sexuality, replications of the social, reproductions of knowledge (Stoler, p. 11). Teaching and educational practices function as sources of knowledge as well as purification of students as they arrive at school in their undisciplined forms. The site does not constrain identities; rather, it is the place of convergence and support for identity formation. That is to say, that the place is not determinate of power; it is only a site for bourgeois, racialized identity formation. Subject discourses indicate that educational institutions work
to their advantage and to the formation of their entitlement; in these central places of education and learning, subjects attempt to distinguish themselves from "other" ways of life which are "out there".

That sites produce identities can be seen in the polarities between the two extremes represented by white universities and Indian residential schools. For what more starkly contrasts with the voluntary, white, up-to-date, elite space of higher learning than the abusive and compulsory Native residential schools of Canada's past. Both sites are productive if not formative of the identities of those who attend(ed) each site. In these starkly contrasting images, the signifier becomes the signified, and each institution becomes the semiotic to which its respective constituents are entitled. Even though Natives are the victims of the abuse that was inflicted in residential sites, the shame and indictment of the events are typically constructed as signifiers of Native space, a space that retains the outline of the abject. The containment of Native peoples, however, either in residential schools, on reserves, or in specific sites of public inner-city schooling, makes alternate spaces safe for white heteronormative values and renders as natural the presence of white, straight bodies. One method of containment is the overwhelming presence of white teachers, including in inner-city schools. The spaces for Native education become naturalized and marked in particular ways, the contradictions of which are observed by some subjects:

My mom taught at a school at a few blocks down from mine which had a really high Native population. They call it an inner city school now. They didn't then, they just called it a tough place to teach. (M543)

Whether it is called "inner city" or "a tough place to teach", the reputation of this site is dependent on the understanding that it is a place with a high Native population. Having control of the spaces by means of white educational practices secures and affirms the construction of white, middle-class citizens even in the absence of white middle-class students.
Separation from Native spaces are often so clearly marked as to render physical boundaries unnecessary.

While the school was being constructed, I spent my grade four going to school on the reserve with all the rest of the students who were in grade four. That was sort of the first contact that I had had with the Native children even though across the back alley from our school was the reserve. It was that close. But we never had any contact... (F413)

The social relations which are bounded by particular sites are also explained as class differences. One subject indicates that it is the poverty of Native students that kept them from mixing and finishing high school with white students. Later as an adult, the subject finds employment as a secretary on a reserve prior to her entrance into the teacher education program. Even though she lived, worked and enrolled her child in school on the reserve, it is understood that her aspirations are to be fulfilled elsewhere.

I had been the secretary. And it wasn't my first choice for whatever I was supposed to do for the rest of my life, you know. (F415)

The subject also understands that the social relations of this site—including race and class—will construct her identity differently from the Natives who live there. Clearly, it is not the site which constrains, but the social relations within and without, for although it is a Native site, the white subject retains her agency status and avoids the poverty that she has associated with the reservations of her childhood. The subject’s social and ideological positionings are indicative of and marked by particular discourses to which she has access. She also understands that as she becomes a normal part of the Native-identified workplace, there is a limit to how long she can remain in that site if she is to maintain a distinctive white identity.

Subjects earnestly desire to establish themselves as credible witnesses who are also non-racist. By what they say and how they say it, they support themselves as liberal thinkers in favour of fairness and equality. The rhetorical devices they employ in the pages which follow, however, find subjects in
seemingly contradictory places. Some subjects claim their liberalism on the basis of their experience and worldly-wise status while others make the same claim on the basis of their naiveté and innocence. These seemingly contradictory means are employed towards the same end—that of performing subjects as liberal thinkers, an identity capable of supporting their claims as reliable witnesses. Liberalism—by whatever means it takes to establish it—is important to subjects because it underwrites their credibility. In examples which follow, subjects rely on their liberal rhetoric and the credibility it warrants to draw distinctions between themselves and racialized others and also between themselves and other white students and teachers who hold attitudes that are designated as "out there". In comparison, the subjects position themselves in a relatively pure space in which they are alternately wise or naive, but always innocent. This physical, moral, and intellectual space allows subjects to draw distinctions about themselves and to be indignant about the racist attitudes of other students. Their discourses on place reveal the formations of their racial dominance and the assumptions on which subjects can rely to warrant themselves as acceptable teacher candidates.

How angry I got at these other kids really surprised me, and the attitudes out there really surprised me. But then I thought, well this is good for me to know. ... sometimes my own being a bit naive is bad, because I don't think it that way, and I don't think other people think that way, so it surprises me when it happens. (F086)

Her naive state is set apart from "the attitudes out there" which are "not in here" and therefore "not me". Subject's surprise and naiveté provide access to a self-definition as pure insider, a position from which the subject can justify anger and indignation. In the following quotation, it is the subject's experience which qualifies him as an insider. His factual account and rhetorically self-sufficient statement is not arguable and must be taken at face value; its strong
assertion not only undermines any alternatives, it has the effect of securing for
the speaker a position as victim.

...having come from a background where people shunned us because we
were different, I am more, I don't know if it's sympathetic or more
compassionate towards other people who are being oppressed because
they're different. Having had it done to me, I have a problem doing it to
someone else. (M012)

Another subject warrants her sympathetic and informed identity for
cornerstone with others.

Like I always knew that I should be polite to people ...But I think for other
people that there are, I mean, you have to really open your eyes and realize
there are people out there that don't respect other cultures, and that it's not in
their culture to do so or not in their upbringing. (F663)

The thing that scares me is there are so many of them [in-service teachers] out
there that aren't going back to take these classes and that don't realize, like,
that those are the ones that probably are going to be teaching for quite a while
because they are the ones that hold down the jobs right now. (F663)

Taken together, subjects offer a great deal of evidence for favourably
comparing themselves with other white teachers and people who don't respect
other cultures the way the subjects do. Even those subjects who have criticized
the cross-cultural course elsewhere later use it as proof of their insider status.

I can't talk with people that are ignorant basically, so people that fit in with me
definitely are not ignorant. They're usually caring like I am, really worried about
where things are going in our society. (F6611)

Subjects desire that their original intentions come from a protected,
innocent place and that the inner circle from which their desires originate has
these descriptors: caring, worried about other, aware of differences, not ignorant.
These are qualities that belong to those who, like the subject, "fit in". It is an
elitist centre, with its own "regime of truth". Subject positioning is based on their
approximation to middle-classness, whiteness, ability, normative sexuality, post-
secondary education, up-to-date training, possession of cross-cultural knowledge
(politically correct attitudes), assumptions of moral superiority, idealism, and
innocence. Even the "real" world of teaching is seen as "out there". The subjects
adopt so rarefied a positioning that they become central to the definition of all that is right/eous.

Place is represented by the positioning of subjects in the inner circle of credibility according to their experience, rationality, knowledge, and their attachment to the very physical space of the university. From their panopticon vision, subjects judge other white people regarding the correctness or awareness of cross-cultural issues including that of their class-mates and in-service teachers; and many are found wanting. Place is a major metaphor in subject identity formation as indicated by the repeated expression "out there"—the dark, scary place under the stairs where the unpredictable, potentially harmful, outdated and contrary knowledge resides. Subjects are very much aware that "that kind of knowledge is out there" (F086) and take great care to keep their identities separate and safe so that they, themselves, are not "outed".

In the examples of discourse quoted above and in many other examples, subjects establish themselves as credible, non-racist witnesses through repertoires which reveal them in control of a particular space marked by knowledge and rationality. The control of this space establishes subjects as persons of privilege; and, in stunning circularity, having established this privilege, they have proof of the centrality of their place, rationality and knowledge. Nowhere are knowledge and rationality more integrally linked to space than through the iconic status of the university.

Subjects cling tenaciously to the status of the university for their proof of belonging and legitimacy. The university is the source of white bourgeois legitimacy as it represents the establishment and practice of that most distinguishing white male trait: rationality. The university is the home of official white rationality and knowledge—the markers by which a taxonomy of difference may be established and where "different from" means "unequal to".
Here is the mythological, safe, pure place of abstraction and objectivity—a world of knowledge and theory—a place for the mind. Subjects deny or are unaware of the university as a site of power relations. The assumption is that knowledge and intellectual teachings, in particular, are objective and neutral. One sign of unreasonableness is that issues did not remain objective but became political.

I know there's problems that go beyond the university class. Like there's problems with politics and things like that and I think that those are being brought into the classroom rather than being sort of left at the door, and we were all people, looking for a better, some sort of a solution. But those problems weren't left at the door, they were brought in. (F412)

Subjects powerfully resist the real world politics of gender, culture, or classroom management. If this intrusion ever happens, such as when a course on cross-cultural issues becomes too personal for comfort, subjects employ their indignation to re-establish their dominant identities and central positions. The space must be maintained; the identities of who is in control and who is not cannot be confused. Who is acting and who is acted upon must always be separate.

It is hardly surprising that subjects desire identification with the university. To say that the university is a white, elite, male dominated place is not belied by the attendance of people who fit none of those categories. Indeed, the point of interest is how these hegemonic European values are maintained in spite of the presence of others who are neither male nor European. Criticism of its elitism is typically managed by suggesting that such arguments are one sign of the university's legacy of liberalism and rationalism as evinced in its capacity for tolerance and open debate. A subject describes one of the attractions of the university in comparison to other places:

If I took this class and I went back to work at [...] trucking I wouldn't be able to go in and say, "You know, you can't really call the, you know, the Hispanic janitor, you know, a spic. You can't do that. That's bad". That part wouldn't go over very well in the coffee room full of, you know, huge stereotypical truck drivers. University you can discuss these things and talk about them... (M7913)
Subjects are very interested in associating themselves with the university; they look to it for the legitimating function it offers to those who do not necessarily come from the ranks of the socially elite. In exchange, the speed with which subjects are able to comply with the normative values and requirements determines how well they are prepared to “fit in” with university life and performance. For the subject above and following, university is a place of privilege where learning takes place with intellectual types who are his equals.

You get spoiled at university, I find, because you’re with a certain type of people all the time. (M7913)

University is a rational place where differences on issues of race and gender can be discussed as intellectual topics. The social, economic, and intellectual gulf between the truckers’ coffee room and the university is well marked; it is not reasonable to expect that the former can accommodate what subjects consider the same high standards of behaviour as the pure space of the university. The subject performs himself as a liberal thinker to the extent that when I ask him whether the ideas in the cross-cultural course should be taught across disciplinary lines, he suggests that this should be the practice for all such ideas.

Actually I’m saying that every course should be happening across the disciplines but this course in particular because we’re talking about it; because when you step out in the street in Canada you can’t get away from issues of culture or gender. They’re all around you so to not integrate them I think is an injustice to the very ideas. (M792)

As the subject has previously indicated that he is a moderate in all things, he is willing to discuss “culture and gender” which he assumes are part of what he will meet “out in the street in Canada”. He identifies this street venue as separate from where he now resides. This meeting on the street will not be voluntary, but forced; and in a place which lacks order and control such as the street, one will have to expect such irrationalities as “culture and gender”. In the pure white space of the university, these issues can be discussed as intellectual
topics so as not to do "injustice to the very ideas". In his position as a privileged insider, he can assume that these are disembodied "ideas" which do not touch him personally and are separate from the life he now lives.

Although I have not singled out individual subjects for discussion, I am going to quote further the subject whom I have already quoted at length. Throughout his fairly lengthy interview, he consistently positions himself as an intellectual, abstract, dominant, liberal. His discursive strategies are worth noting for the way they confirm his place as rational observer whose objectivity legitimates his authoritative claims. His performance accomplishes him as a self-conscious agent, as a subject, whose elite identity correctly occupies university space. In a singular performance, this subject embodies the spatial difference of the university site.

Early in the interview he establishes himself as a liberal. In response to what he got out of the course, he says:

basically my own personal philosophies and politics lead me in that way anyways. I'm very left-wing and tend to be, say whatever I like. I'm not terribly timid. I try and respect people's feelings but I don't have a lot of respect for people who don't stand up for what they believe in. (M793)

There were some complaints about the course and I didn't see those problems myself and I think that was more because I agreed with the teacher, or the person [Aboriginal woman] teaching the class, at the beginning. (M793)

I find that the people that I identify best with are people who are not intellectuals, but are strong independent thinkers...it has nothing to do with culture, I mean, when I look at my group of friends, they're from every socio-economic and ethnic background that you can imagine. (M7910)

I was, I found myself, I guess I was a lot more sheltered and naive than I ever like to think I am. And so that's always a shock to find that out...that the views that you've spent your entire life developing and that you've worked out to be the most common sense, rational approaches to life, are not shared by people who you thought would. Little glimpses of racism from people that I never thought had it in them, but do. (M793-4)

And I mean, I get on well with everyone in the class but, you know, I think those are the kind of things that people don't want to hear, that they're in charge of their own destiny and things like that. People don't want to hear that sort of thing. (M7912)
In the previous chapter I discuss the rhetorical strategy used by subjects in which they warrant their credibility by aligning themselves with reason and moderation. This subject's performance of the innocent, rational, and moderate person is perhaps one of the most extreme and consistent. His statements establish his innocence, first by warranting that he is rational; second, others are less rational in comparison; third, his rhetorically self-sufficient performance forestalls questions to the contrary. His statements are not open to questioning, supported as they are by his claim that his point of view has been arrived at objectively, with common sense and rationality.

The subject offers himself as innocent naïf when he is shocked to learn that his level of self-determination is not experienced by all people in his class. Although he is perhaps even more naïve in his ignorance than he would care to claim, he is proud of his arrival at liberal thought and the level of control and autonomy he experiences. He finds himself in a dilemma of interest, however, by indicating that he believes this liberal, autonomous outlook characterized by these traits: "say whatever I like", "common sense, rational", "strong, independent thinkers", "in charge of their own destiny"—is not unique nor similarly available to all. On the other hand, these qualities are his personal possessions, his property, his warrants with which he is able to exact his position of privilege. These are the possessions that mark his dominance and of which he is proud. His expression of surprise that these are not widely available or in general use does not completely cover his pride that his control of these possessions affords him a unique and powerful status. His dilemma is in trying to appear both humble about his elite claim of spatial difference and, at the same time, generous about the putative accessibility of these possessions which, in the end, afford him much privilege because they are not widely distributed. He resolves his dilemma by claiming innocence and naïveté as well as by
referencing his associations with other people from across cultures to refute any notion that his access is culturally enhanced. Aída Hurtado (1996) suggests that “most [whites] can detect when whiteness is being questioned and its potential privilege dismantled” (p. 149). The response is to de-emphasize its function as a group while at the same time universalizing its privilege by saying that “anybody” could achieve merit (Harris, 1993), pretending that the value attached to being white does not exist.

The contradictions in subjects’ discourses are most interesting for the use subjects make of them and the tensions subjects produce by holding these conflicts. This subject struggles continually, by many rhetorical devices mentioned above, to keep himself in a good light which is defined by objectivity, rationality, the life of the mind, an uninvolved stance separate from gender and culture. He is the “anti-imperialist” “seeing-man” (Pratt, 1992) who claims to be supportive of the cross-cultural course because it fits his liberal philosophy. He has figured out the “correct way” to think about otherness in the abstract and knows what an anti-racist stance should sound like. Maintaining this particular identity as a sympathetic white male enhances his credibility in and entitlement to this dis/embodied white space. The university site recuperates whiteness and accomplishes the very successful performance of this subject identity in a way that cannot easily be questioned.

This extensively quoted subject, and many others, position themselves at the centre of a place-knowledge-privilege repertoire of self-definition. This repertoire occurs most often in the distinctions subjects make between “here” where the subject is and “out there”. “Here” typically refers to a university environment which is mainly white, middle-class, elite, straight, privileged, and often liberal in rhetoric if not in action. “Here” is a protected, enlightened and enlightening place in the middle of raging storms of prejudice, unrealistic
claims, and misinformation. By definition of quantity, "here" may be considered a minority position; but in these circumstances, adopting a minority position works as a rhetorical device which marks the exclusive rather than the excluded. This exclusive access supports subject claims in the performance of their roles as reliable witnesses in which various life circumstances have provided them with unique and unclouded perspectives. These unique positions are contrasted with illustrations of how others have failed to be rational, moderate, knowledgeable and fair. When this self-referential place-knowledge-privilege cycle is interrupted by experiences such as found in the cross-cultural course, the subjects react to re-establish their central positions. It is the disruption of the cycle that makes visible the norms which support it. In the examples which follow, I indicate sites of contestation in which white privilege is neither exclusive nor secure and where the "in here" place of the university is not completely pure, having among its members, some aberrant character types.

The things that happened in the course I think are a reflection of character...for good or for bad. [...] When you go into the washroom and you see somebody scrawling some racial or gender slur on the wall, I'm actually a little bit surprised about that because you think, geez, I mean, in university and they didn't even spell, you know, that word right. What's going on? Oh, they didn't flush the toilet either, that doesn't surprise me. But when you get outside the walls of this institution you're exposed to it everyday. I think I'm going to see it. (M7913)

That the university space has been invaded and contaminated by unreliable characters is an indication that white privilege and its power to exclude and define is continually under siege. The contamination is an exception in this place where the walls typically act as borders between space that is rational and the space "out there" where disorder cannot be contained. With the subject's suggestion that it is not rational to be racist and sexist, the negative attitudes raised in the university about race issues would seem to be a problem of irrationality and individual, bad character.
The next subject who reacts to contested spaces has portrayed herself as credible and sympathetic by means of her personal interest in cross-cultural issues as well as her voluntary enrollment in a number of Native Studies courses. Her remarks which follow presume the allocation of discreet spaces for the construction of identities. The metaphor of place is found frequently throughout her interview in which she speaks of "out there", "coming back", and, as mentioned previously, wonders where she and others "fit in".

Like those ones are curious to me how they fit in, the ones that lived on the reserves and maybe their parents split up or they got taken away from their family or something like that. (F6610-11)

She is a keen observer of that which could be described as hybridity, for example, as experienced by her Canadian friend of Asian parentage. She wonders how her friend "fits in" with her family's Chinese culture and the identity of being Canadian. She resists the notion of singular forms of identity but seems locked into her metaphor of discreet spaces. She is also anxious to claim an identity for herself that goes beyond white. This next quotation, which I quoted previously, is useful in this context to illustrate the subject's anxiety with discreet identities, especially since she has some awareness of the fluidity of her own desires across cultures.

I view myself as not necessarily, I am white but I don't view myself necessarily as white. I like to view myself more as somebody that is multicultural, if you understand me. I'm not, like I'm white, but I'm sure if you traced back far enough you're going to find that I'm not totally white, you know, and my family itself, I mean I have an aunt who is Taiwanese, so I mean how do you really look at that. My cousins are half Taiwanese, half white, so I mean as far as I'm concerned, how does that make me pure white some way down the line? I don't think that anyone can really say that they're white. (F6612)

She desires access to the other by dissolving whiteness even while she would retain the agency required to perform such a transformation. Although she is interested in differences, she doesn't want to be considered so different herself that she loses her privileged status even though she is finding that it is
occasionally a liability. I have previously mentioned her dilemma on hearing that white teachers are not wanted for Native schools. She affirms that although she is unfamiliar with reservation life, she is well qualified to teach Natives students about living in the city, a space which she considers her own.

I think I'm just as capable of teaching kids about city life as the next person, you know, and I think that you can really get caught up if you are too fine to differences... I think that's one of the problems that I have from taking those classes is that, I was still walking out going okay, well now where do I fit in? (F6613-14)

The subject is caught in a dilemma of her own making. Throughout the interview, she has been a supporter of Native issues and what she calls "differences". But now that Natives are claiming the sites of their children's public education for themselves, the subject suggests that differences don't really matter that much. At the same time as she doesn't want her whiteness to be held against her or to exclude her from a job, she continues to rely on her white privilege for access to space that has never belonged to her but which has only recently been denied. She is very confused about her "place" and finds that answers to the question of where she fits in are not easily forthcoming. Finally, her greatest concern appears toward the end of the interview:

even after the information I'm seeking it out, there's people out there that are saying well you don't fit in. Like I've had profs where I've asked that question to Native Studies or otherwise and got told well we don't want you help. [...] And as far as I'm concerned I have to try to fit in, and I mean maybe one day I'll be the minority. You know, I want to fit in. I don't want to be, I don't want to have no rights like you [Natives] had no rights. Like if one day I'm to come to Saskatchewan and you [Native] people make up the majority of the population which could very well be, I'd like to know that I'm going to fit in somewhere. I don't want to be treated the way you've been treated, you know. (F6614)

The circle of benefits leads back to white control even when the sense of place is not clear or is subject to change. As a criterion for judging the worth of anything, the dominant culture must be seen to benefit from it. The question "Where do I fit in?" must be answered so that white identity, as a condition of its privilege, will be secure. There is a strong sense of place in describing the "pure"
and the “impure” and the question is how white dominant people are to “take their place” “out there” in areas where white privilege may be less secure than in the white space of the university, for example. Even at times when sense of place may be uncertain, white subjects assume that they will maintain their place as identity keepers and definers in their own lives and those of Native people.

The discourse of one final subject is particularly helpful for exploring the notion of contested space; in this example, the subject, himself, is the contested site. The subject was raised as a white ethnic minority in a rural area surrounded by another historically antagonistic ethnic group; neither group was French or English. As the family was targeted for its ethnicity, poverty and large family size, the subject frequently expresses his solidarity with the oppressed.

When you see someone else getting stepped on, you kind of like, your heart goes out to them because you know, hey, I've had it happen to me. (M015)

At other times, however, his identity as defender of the oppressed conflicts with his delight in the privileges of his educated, white, male identity. He can hardly conceal his pleasure, for example, when describing how surprised he was to be called “sir” by elders in a trip to the Philippines. He suggests that it is others who are elitist, but this is also a position that has become available to him as an adult educated white male. The subject is aware that he and others will be looking for jobs in a few months; he expresses indignation about affirmative action calling it reverse discrimination. He is resentful when others claim rights as subordinated groups which is a position he also claims from time to time. He vacillates between being a defender of the oppressed, a victim of ethnic persecution, and a victim of lost privilege by means of hiring practices which he considers unfair. In dialogue, he says the following:
M: ...that's almost like reverse discrimination because nowadays the people who are at the bottom are the white males, because we were, up until twenty years ago, we were at the top of the totem pole. Because ladies were always under them and then other cultures were under them and now it's kind of like a flip flop.

C: Have you experienced that in your own life?
M: Not yet, but there's always that possibility. And in April and May when we're looking for jobs, that's the reason why we may not get a job is because I'm white and I'm a male. And I have a problem with that. I would have a problem with that. (M018)

In taking this stand against affirmative action, his identification slips many times. Beginning in the plural, his references wander from first person to third, back again to first person plural, and then end in first person singular. His unstable positioning as a subject is reflected in the contrast between his status as an educated, able-bodied, white male and his non-privileged status as an ethnic minority. He experiences a loss of identity as his working-class, subordinated ethnic status no longer reliably identifies him as the innocent victim; instead, he finds himself on the side of power as an educated, white male. Yet, in terms of affirmative action, it is his white maleness that jeopardizes his victim status. Needless to say, he would prefer to lose the affirmative action.

The subject directs his anger towards those whom he suspects would rob him of a sympathetic identity. He addresses his concluding remarks to racialized minorities; the projection of elitism is worth noting.

It's more like I want people to be on the other side. You know. Walk a mile in someone else's shoes. If you're going to tell someone else, "I deserve this because I'm this way", well how about being in my shoes. See it from my point of view, and then maybe your idea may be slightly different. You may not be so, I'll use the word, elitist. (M019)

Although the subject has just been talking about his interaction with the female Aboriginal teacher of the course, it isn't entirely clear whom the subject is calling upon to have this common sense experience of empathy. The larger sequence would seem to suggest that the Aboriginal professor is the one who is advised, in an expression borrowed from Native culture, to walk in the subject's shoes so that she might become more empathic and reasonable by looking at
things from his point of view. In the confusion and mixing of identifications and boundaries, the subject desires clear "sides". Whatever side the woman is on, it seems important for his identity to mark some distinction between himself and the Native woman by being “on the other side”. Who is the deserving “I” in, “I deserve this because I’m this way”? Is the “I” deserving because of privilege or non-privilege? His anger over the confusion of site allocation has been exacerbated by his discovery that an Aboriginal woman professor is in a position of intellectual, institutional, and moral authority over him. Ultimately, his speech is addressed to himself as he works out his confused positioning as the one whose point of view has gone unacknowledged, the “I” who is deserving, the one who should not be so elitist, as well as the one whose shoes are available for walking anytime. He directs a final invective towards the Aboriginal professor who challenged him in class:

 Maybe it's because that's happened to me when I was younger that it is almost like I want to get back at you. I want to let you feel like what it's like to be in a minority so you'll think twice about doing that to someone else. (M019)

 How is this subject situated to feel this ambiguity and hold these contradictions in which he can suggest that a female Aboriginal professor needs to feel what it is like to experience discrimination as a minority? What is noteworthy about this fairly commonplace type of reversal is the context into which it can enter as “logical”. The biographical details of the subject indicate his experience with some of the consequences of historic and economic events in Canada in which the lives of certain ethnic minority immigrants are undermined as less than bodies that matter. The coercion of assimilation practices has also exacted a heavy price on white ethnic identification and the variable degrees of whiteness to which they might aspire. Invoking the repressive immigration histories of white ethnic minorities in Canada does not
mitigate the remarks of the subject, but it does demonstrate the way in which the groundwork for exploitation in Canada is seen as plausible and normative.

How do subjects construct racial privilege when they are constrained by ethnic and class subordination (Hurtado, 1996)? Disenfranchised white classes are not necessarily defenders of others who are disenfranchised by race (Roediger, 1991; Weis, Proweller & Centrie, 1997). Desire for respectable citizen status confirms that the vertical alliance with white skin privilege which is available to subjects has more appeal than any horizontal solidarity with the "other" across ethnic or class lines. White ethnic and working-class minorities on the periphery of whiteness can easily project their "difference" onto racialized minority groups. As the security of white identities is dependent upon subjects' construction of themselves as "not-Other", white ethnic minorities claim entitlement by moving closer to the centre of white norms and values and by claiming a "toehold on respectability" (Fellows & Razack, in press) by means of "dominance through difference" (p. 29, ms). The effort which goes into securing white identities and spaces attests to the "elasticity" of subject locations (Agnew, 1993) and contradicts secure ideological frames of reference surrounding subject identities. This last subject is distressed to find that the system of racialized identification is more fluid and less secure than he thought; his anger betraying his knowledge of and dependence upon racialized positionings and the uses of the Other in the construction of his white skin respectability and privilege. Variable positioning of this subject and others finds them clambering, with varied degrees of success, to spaces which support secure, white self-images as identities in which they have considerable material investment.

The notion of secure spaces for the production and control of identities is a myth and an impossibility. This is supported by Foucault's claim that the law is productive of identities and not repressive of them. He provides an example of
this false assumption that identities can be controlled or limited in regard to sexuality: that is, that sexuality learned within the family is normative, proper, and "safe". The family, however, is the site where sexuality is learned, where it acquires social meaning, where we begin to identify as sexual beings and that rather, the family is not a haven from "sexualities of a dangerous outside world, but [is] the site of their production" (Stoler, p. 110). I suggest that the same is true regarding white populations of the kind that inhabit small, relatively homogeneous towns across Canada including white ethnic minorities. The notion is often expressed by those who live there that, in the absence of racialized minorities, these homogeneous places are free of racialized tensions commonly found in big cities and the outside world. It is on this basis that some of the subjects claim innocence and naiveté with regard to their knowledge of racialized identity formations. Like the familial context, however, these nearly homogeneous white places are the site of the production of identities in which codes and expectations of proper white behaviour are vigorously enforced by reiterative, normative practice. It is in these homogenous white spaces that the performance of whiteness is most thoroughly embodied and reinforced. Sexuality, class, ability, ethnicity are learned through whiteness as the embodiment of what the other is not. Here is the site where white identity coheres—in the "unsettled and unsettling" (Morrison, 1993) population of absent others.

An assumption that presupposes the contradictions and dilemmas of these three subjects quoted at length is that cultures and identities are significantly separate and real. Subjects rely on this realist approach when it supports their entitlement to attend the clean-well-lighted space of the university, or when they wish to secure the teaching job of their choice, or when they would continue unearned privilege in hiring practices. In contrast, they
eschew the notion of separate and divided identities when they explain their need for further entitlement to space to which they may not have ready access. They assume that their privilege need not be a barrier to access because, with privilege, comes the ability to change at will the significance of their embodied status. Subjects assume that they can transform their identities as needed by performing themselves, in chameleon-like fashion, as "not really white". When meeting the walls of contested space, white subjects imagine they will accomplish their desire to pass through the walls by leaving their bodies behind.

**Claiming innocence and re-asserting dominance**

The division of identities into site-specific locations supports a "grid of intelligibility" (Stoler, 1995, p. 53) through which a white, bourgeoisie comes to define itself. Subjects' access to white identified spaces does not necessarily follow from particular racist practices on the part of research subjects, nor from "the conjuncture of events" or from a "chronicle of racist confrontations". Rather, access is traced through "historical discourse as a strategic weapon of power" (Stoler, 1995, p. 54). Class and race specific education sites, for example, are one tactic in the separation of Canadian society such as at universities which are instrumental in the production of white identities. The assumption that society must at all times be protected from the biological dangers of its ever-present "sub-race" produces an "internal racism" requiring "constant purification" as one of the fundamental dimensions of social normalization (Stoler, 1995). In this

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1 Rick Hesch (1994) describes the process of social reproduction in a teacher education program for Aboriginal students attending a prairie university. Hesch states that in spite of the affirmative nature of the program, Aboriginal student experiences are racialized, gendered, and classed in ways that contribute significantly to their overall problem of staying in the university. Describing student decisions to leave as a "choice" is ironic considering the exclusionary nature of the institution. Hesch continues, however, that even the successful completion of the program—constrained as it is by a university environment—"both enables and limits the possibilities for the development of aboriginal teachers" (p. 210). At the same time, the affirmation of white identities in this site continues apace in that any lack of success Aboriginal education students may have in the university system leaves those jobs they might have filled still available for white prospective teachers.
research, the ideological frame of reference which surrounds subject desires and responses is their requirement of “incessant purification” which I refer to as their claim to innocence.

Although subject responses in this research appear as reactions to a cross-cultural studies course, as I have tried to make clear, I am not investigating subjects’ individual racist actions per se. I am examining their discursive practices as constitutive and performative of their subjectivities including the tactics by which their situatedness is justified. Stoler explains the ways in which current discursive practices are used to “work up” and “assemble” older forms of racism already in place. Following Foucault, Stoler (1995) provides this understanding of racism:

> racism is more than an ad hoc response to crisis; it is a manifestation of preserved possibilities, the expression of an underlying discourse of permanent social war, nurtured by the biopolitical technologies of ‘incessant purification’. Racism does not merely arise in moments of crisis, in sporadic cleanings. It is internal to the biopolitical state woven into the weft of the social body, threaded through its fabric. (p. 69, emphases added)

Subjects “preserved possibilities” were in place long before they participated in their cross-cultural course which for some subjects was a moment of crisis. The “preserved possibilities” are the rights of white subjects to reject or access anything they choose such as the knowledge of cross-cultural teachers, positions in Native schools, or proprietarial status at a university. Expressions of subject desire for “‘incessant purification’” are manifested in the rejection of the abject other and performed as an endless striving toward wholeness, self-justification, and innocence. Endless technologies are employed for this purpose of endless purification including schools, prisons, social practices, buying power, and site specificity. But the processes of purification and justification are already in place in the countless social practices in which subjects have invested on their way to becoming teachers and in the many practical steps which they have consciously taken to comply with this teacher identity; considering the self-
surveillance and discipline to which they have already submitted, it may not be surprising to note that teacher discourses focus heavily on claims to innocence. The practice of innocence in the interviews is established through numerous arguments and rhetorical strategies which justify and legitimate subject positions of entitlement and privilege.

One strategy subjects have established for performing themselves as innocent involves a variety of repertoires for explaining the origins of prejudice and racism. According to Wetherell and Potter (1992) prejudice is narrowly defined in two specific ways: the individual—as some short-coming of character including rigidity and adaptive inferiority; and the universal—the tendency toward pre-judgement which all people have, given the range of information with which we must deal. All explanations of prejudice locate the problem within the psychological make-up of the individual and quite separate from “power relations and the conflicting vested interests of groups” (p. 208). Observing that most people do not want to be seen as prejudiced, Wetherell and Potter (1992), from their research with white New Zealanders, have outlined five discursive moves developed by speakers to avoid being described as prejudiced.

1) admit the offence but offer mitigations or excuses
2) deny the offence and claim that one is wrongly accused
3) accept the blaming in its entirety and perhaps intensify or expand on it by giving other examples
4) undermine the accusation itself by renegotiating the nature of the offence, recategorizing it as something less negative and more excusable
5) redirect the accusation to another group of people, carefully separating or distancing oneself from the accusation. (p. 212)

These discursive moves, frequently combined, are employed to cope with a negative evaluation of the speaker concerning prejudice. Subjects make use of these discursive moves to deny any accusations of prejudice and to claim for themselves a space of innocence and moral superiority. I have discussed subjects’ uses of rhetorical strategies to protect themselves from the effects of the course which they feel overtly and implicitly accuses them of being prejudiced. Subjects
employ the moves listed above to separate themselves from accusations of prejudice, as follows: prejudice is a moral failing, whereas subjects as teachers are prepared to sacrifice for the betterment of all; subjects are intellectual and moderate, whereas course material with which they take exception is emotional and exaggerated; prejudice is historical and results from ignorance, whereas the subjects are modern and informed.

Most subjects attempt some explanation for the origins of prejudice and racism, their expectations generally composed of items 4 and 5 on the list above. In the first repertoire, subjects assume personally naive positions in reporting on sources of prejudice and racism by describing discreet, empirical events: things we might say or do which we should stop saying or doing once we find out that it is wrong or has a negative effect on others. The cognitive theme supporting this explanation emphasizes misinformation or misjudgements in information processing which conforms to item 4: "undermine the accusation itself by renegotiating the nature of the offence, recategorizing it as something less negative and more excusable". Note how one subject renegotiates the nature of biases as part of human nature:

...even though you have biases doesn't mean you're a bad person. But recognize the fact that they are there and take that into consideration when you're acting. (F822)

Subjects state that being biased is a natural phenomenon, a fact supported by evidence that Natives also show prejudice. This is not something for which subjects feel they can be held personally responsible as being biased puts a person into the largest majority of all. This helps to relieve some individual guilt and also implies that the problem can't be that serious. Holding responsibility for being biased is the equivalent of being responsible for original sin. The response to this inevitable human characteristic is to understand our biases and make choices accordingly.
Well in my cross-cultural class I learned that everybody's racist to a certain extent and everybody has racist views, but it's what you do with them and if you act on them. Because before I used to think, well I'm not racist or, you know, I'm not prejudiced against certain people, but I realize that, yes, I do have certain prejudice. But it's what I do with them, and if I act on them, or make a choice, like to act on them. (F334)

They definitely opened our eyes to how we think. It challenged us to look at our views and to see, could someone have a problem with my belief system? (M012)

I guess it would depend on how you would look at it. Because it's true there are going to be times when we are going to have a problem with another person's culture or the way they live their lives. But I would think that would be normal because we're so different. Too often we judge someone else's practices before we actually realize why they do it. So I don't know if it would be discrimination or maybe just lack of education. (M016)

Subjects undermine any possibility that their prejudice and bias are anything more than an effect of being human. Although they are not going so far as to say that their being biased is irrelevant, subjects take solace and avoid personal responsibility by knowing they are located among a similarly afflicted majority of humanity. The solution to these naturally occurring tendencies is to reflect on them and do some soul-searching. Not surprising among this group of would-be teachers, subjects' solutions include calls for reasoning, choosing the right actions, and more education.

A second repertoire in reporting on the origins of prejudice and racism is the behaviour of others and Natives. White subjects portray themselves as reasonable and even supportive of Natives until the subjects are limited in their reasonableness by other cultural groups whose actions and customs will have the effect of making the subjects become prejudiced. Racism of white subjects is seen as the fault of Natives with their unreasonable demands and immoderate lives. Victims of racism are clearly seen as bringing racism on themselves.

I've got a friend who's teaching on a reserve right now and, you know, she's really having a rough time. It's a really sad situation. ... you know, it's a wonder we become prejudiced, you know, when you see how they treat themselves, and, you know, what they do with their lives and everything. You feel sort of helpless. (F815)
Subjects have already staged an escape from culpability for themselves by using human nature as the default liability. They accept that the onus is on them to effect a cure from racism by self-discipline and vigilance over discreet empirical acts. This second repertoire goes further to secure innocent status for subjects by redirecting the offence and transferring onto subjects the role of victim. More than simply "blaming the victim", however, this repertoire holds Natives and other others responsible for the slide of the hapless white subjects from tolerance into intolerance. If white subjects are to be called racist, then the discourse has been prepared in which the other is named as the uncontrollable source of the white victim's fall into damnation. The on-going self-surveillance in which subjects engage is available to verify and secure their identities as innocent victims.

Subjects' remarks describing sources of racism in their own lives, particularly following their course, parallel the remarks they make concerning racism and intolerance in Canada generally. I have described how pride about the diversity of the country is covered by conditions about how diversity might be practiced. Real Canadians are ones who love the country, care about Canadian problems, and realize that Canada is a great place to live. At first, as barriers to access are overcome by love, it would seem that Canadian identity is readily available. The innocent, open sentence, "If you love this country that should qualify you as a typical Canadian" (F734), however, is a double-edged sword. Subject discourse further indicates that the condition of that love is culturally specific and not accessible to everyone. As innocent victims and loyal citizens, subjects make various demands on racialized minorities for proof of love. Some of the conditions include forgetting their history, placing their loyalty to Canada above all others, being grateful, not saying that racism exists, and not demanding anything approaching equitable treatment. One subject offers that some
immigrant groups are not looking where they’re at in the world or why they came to Canada. The notion of equitable treatment is described in the following way:

That everyone receives the same fair shakes. And everyone receives the same knocks. And that some people aren’t given special rights or special privileges because they’re a particular ethnic group. [...] I see that [receiving privileges beyond what everyone else receives] as a fault rather than as something that’s going to benefit the country. (F419)

Subjects assert racial dominance by making demands for compliance and by being annoyed by perceptions of non-compliance. Despairing that the other will ever sufficiently meet the simple demands of love places subjects, once again, in the position of being victims of their own tolerance. Implying as it does, “the largesse of the powerful” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 210), tolerance is a moral quality that doesn’t have to be accounted for and is characterized by avoidance. This passive-aggressive streak in the national psyche—as performed by subjects—finds that the country is made vulnerable by its excessive tolerance.

We’re considered maybe stupid or slow and lovable. And nobody, I don’t think has a real problem with Canada ever. Because we’re not evil. (F105)

I look around at Canada and the problems it has and I think, is there a real point? It seems that the path we’ve chosen which is to constantly self-examine ourselves and pick ourselves apart and look at our faults hasn’t gotten us very far. (M793)

What first defines Canadian belonging as tolerant, innocent, and disinterested turns into insistent loyalty and a specific type of performance as a formulation of Canadian identity. The “us” and “them” language used throughout subject discourses never clearly defines who these collective identities are. But it is “we” who do the “letting” and “allowing” and “they” who receive these actions. That subjects can make these demands and position themselves as victims of the others’ transgression performs subjects as “we Canadians” in the dominant centre of Canadian identity status.
Innocence is one repertoire employed to maintain the dominant white centre as a site which white subjects occupy, settle, and colonize with indignation and impunity. The process which succeeds in creating certain identities as dominant also requires and employs others in its own construction. The other of white Canadian nationalism provides the means of redemption in a complex move in which whiteness is inserted as the victimized identity. The abject other is continually present to define what the centre constructs for itself. Projecting its fears and desires onto others, the white imagination suggests that other and Native bodies are the ones who ask too much, thereby defining the givers as a generous people. It is no small irony that land which was originally obtained from Native peoples with poor, little, or no compensation is now used as the basis for claiming that Canada is a generous country. The claim of generosity on the part of white domination is the appropriation of one more quality which originated with Natives. Negative acts of appropriation in the ongoing project of nation building are displaced with positive national rhetoric about being a generous, innocent people.

I refer elsewhere to the post-modern openness and absent identity which is typically the first response from most subjects when asked about Canadian identity. Later, however, the terms of identity slip from the disinterested space of not having to name oneself to a position that is considerably different. In contrast to the disinterested space, subjects' later responses indicate that they are very much *interested* identities—in managing them as well as guarding access to the privilege of being at the disinterested centre. I have indicated that the notion of innocence is the ideological frame of reference which performs subject identities. It is also a significant overlap in the discussion of protected sites and protected status as found in subject discourses on national identity. To contradict the notion of Canadian innocence is to undermine claims of nationalism and
superiority. To the extent that innocence is racially and culturally ascribed, contradicting white innocence is to contradict inherent white superiority.

Redemption and regeneration

Jane Flax (1993) suggests that in the face of evidence to the contrary, rather than abandon grandiose beliefs about oneself, we regain our innocence by looking for others on whom to project "our finite and flawed humanity" (p. 32). This explanation is consistent with the Lacanian notion in which our desire for wholeness is predicated on our encounter with our mirrored self and by the split between the "mé" and the "I". The desire for innocence is also part of the wish for universal positions as described by Enlightenment theories which include the fervent belief that there is some knowledge or truth available, if only we can find it, which will set us free. I suggest that the intelligibility of the claim to innocence operates as an unspoken assumption and as an ideology that is fixed by the notion that redemption is available.

In this section, I examine some of the assumptions surrounding redemption which most assuredly supports subject desire. It may seem out of linear time to discuss redemption following the previous discussion of subjects' appropriation of innocence as redemption would seem to be necessary only in the case of failed innocence. But subject desire for and seeming preoccupation with affirming innocent status leads me to examine the assumptions about redemption as expressed in subjects' ideological statements. I am especially interested in how redemption is employed in various contradictory ways and how it is performed and implicated in the identifications of those who construct themselves as innocent.

A very compelling theory of redemption is provided by Walter Benjamin (1955) who suggests that an understanding of domination can be explained by
tracing the effects of historical materialism. He also allows that not all things can be reduced to an economic basis and, therefore, draws on the services of what he calls the no longer popular theology. As far as human nature is concerned, Benjamin explains that we are not jealous of the past or the future, but that our conception of happiness is coloured by the time to which we have been assigned. This is our desire for the present over what has been, with the potential of the present to make good on the promises of the past. "Our image of happiness is indissolubly bound up with the image of redemption" (p. 256). The past has anticipated our coming on earth. The assumption is that actions taken in the name of future generations will be redeemed when the time comes, when we in the present, as the future of the past, come to redeem those actions. "Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim" (p. 256). We see the present as the fulfillment of the promises of the past. We imagine that we are what the dreams of the past longed to create.

The concept of work, understood in a secularized form of the Protestant work ethic, is intended to relieve the anxieties of want and to provide a measure of control over one's life. It was assumed that work would accomplish that which no redeemer would be able to do (p. 261), including the irresistible progress of humanity and its infinite perfectibility. With this belief in progress, workers understand themselves as redeemers of the hopes and promises of a past built on hard work and sacrifice. For example, education workers imagine that the present system is the fulfillment of the sacrifice and hard work of their ancestors—in their individual families, in society, and in the nation. Subjects as teachers are aware of their responsibilities to keep the traditions, build on them, and bring to fruition the improvements that have begun. In a previous chapter, I have indicated how subjects desire to perform this role of changing education for
the better and their conflict aroused by the contradictions contained in the shibboleth that they will teach as they were taught. Subject discourse also indicates that the past is the place of the other, of everything that the subject is not. The past is unenlightened, responsible for acts of racism, and in the eyes of these prospective teachers, the past is guilty of using discredited teaching methods. For subjects, negative historic events ceased with their arrival and do not implicate them in any way. The errors of the past are not connected to those who will work hard to redeem the past by transforming it into the present hope.

Benjamin quotes Josef Dietzgen who says that "the savior of modern times is called work" (p. 261). The subjects do not expect that their teaching assignments will be easy. Many do anticipate that with hard work and some sacrifices on their part, they will accomplish the social function of their roles: fitting the young for their places in society. The progress of civilization and the perfectibility of humanity are legacies of Western tradition which are very much present in contemporary classrooms. The teaching profession is especially imbued with the salvific role, indeed the responsibility, to bring about personal happiness here on earth through the banishment of ignorance and the calling forth of the best in us all. Reason and hard work will perform this redemption of the past, and to this end, teachers perform like secular priests, admonishing their flock to follow and do good.

The centrality of white innocence found in subjects' discourses on race, the justifications of their actions, the victim status that is assumed as a defence against allegations of possible racism all work as powerful moves for maintaining dominating relations over racialized minorities. The resumption of innocence contributes in no small way to the positioning of whiteness at the centre of imperialism and European/Western dominance. Only a major contributing narrative of Western mythology could account for the unshakable,
ideological positioning of white skin privilege as found in the subjects’ accounts. While Benjamin largely secularizes the discourse which imagines history progressing toward a just and better world, I suggest that theological references which he mentions only briefly have played a greater part in the mythology of redemption, and in a way peculiar to North American experience.

The Western esthetic of progress and perfectibility is firmly supported by a white-identified, Christian, religious tradition. The various tenets and manifestations of Christianity inform the unconscious of Western traditions to the extent that they are firmly rooted and almost unreachable for their entrenched status. It isn’t necessary, of course, to identify as a Christian in order to be affected by the tradition or to recognize the underlying sense of superiority that supports the Christian commission to spread the word—accomplished by proselytizing the world and broadcasting the word’s fleshier version in the form of white settlers and colonists. The movement of Christianity has been constructed in a way which designates Western, European, white Christians as a people who are not only chosen by God; but also, full of agency and capable of doing their own choosing of God, or not. This act of agency situates white privilege and white redemption as both ordained and self-actualizing.

The story of Christian succession and domination is simple and has been repeated in endless variety. Redemption comes through the Jews whose traditional religion is the foundation of Christianity. Christians are encouraged to believe that, as a new faith, they turned the corner at the right sign, and that the Jews kept on with their straight line from antiquity to now as the originary, however interesting, relic. McClintock (1995) describes this process of othering through time as the creation of “anachronistic space”. It functions as a regulatory technology by which groups relegated to the periphery are dismissed and disavowed as “prehistoric, atavistic and irrational, inherently out of place in the
historical time of modernity” (p. 40). Othered in this way, peripheral groups are finally constructed as “irrevocably superannuated by history”. When Christians deferentially describe the Jewish religion as “the ancient Hebraic tradition”, they don’t just mean that it has a long history worthy of much respect. The implication is that the practice of modern Judaism continues to be ancient even today, having become instantly ancient at the point of contact, as it were, at the beginning of Christianity. Readers of Christian doctrine are invited to interpret Christianity as something new, as the improved version made possible through redemption, regeneration, and resurrection from that which is old and passed away. In Christian mythology, the born again are now redeemed and innocent; they have become ordained as the new originary people.

This story is easily portable to the European “discovery” of new lands inhabited by non-European, non-white, indigenous populations. By means of imperialist expansion, the project of salvation and redemption is carried out on “new” continents found to be in the possession of “ancient” civilizations and the “temporally different” (McClintock). European populations, now the bringers of salvation and modernity, experience redemption yet again through the sacrifice of the people whom they deem to be ancient. The sacrifice is often physical and most always cultural in European colonial activity which gained control of the land by various forms of cultural appropriation and domination, including genocide of the original people.

The historical materialist view of redemption outlined by Benjamin and this view supported by religious tradition are not dissimilar. Both can be understood as systems of redemption through progress, renewal, future hopes, Western rationality; and in North America, the simultaneous arrival of Christianity, capitalism, and European populations. The notions surrounding the process of redemption are important to observe considering the uses of the
discourse and the work it is required to do. On the one hand, Western domination in North America has been and continues to be made possible at the expense of Native peoples and their traditions. The white European opportunity to be born again in a new land with the potential to fulfill one’s hopes for the future has been dependent on the knowledge and sacrifice of Native peoples. In terms of Christian mythology, someone has to die so that others could be born again; and consequently, the slippage of identities occurs around who has (been) sacrificed for whom and who has been redeemed by these acts. The ambiguity of this redemptive process and the contradictions that arise in the telling of the national narrative can be observed in various liminal spaces: resentment towards Aboriginal peoples when they refuse assimilation and insist on continuing as self-determining, modern people; the annoyance of white dominant groups towards subjugated peoples for being a living reminder of white domination and a source of guilt; and the unfulfilled expectation of gratitude on the part of Native people for having been “redeemed” by white domination. The more popular narrative—that Western civilization has appeared to Native peoples in the role of saviour—does not dismiss the relation that once again the positive fulfillment of Western identity continues its dependence on Native presence. The “dream of love” continues: Western European civilization will save Native peoples if only they will co-operate; if only they will accomplish Europeans in the role as redeemer.

I have indicated that the redemption narrative is significant for what it is required to do. For example, regarding guilt and individual culpability, the Christian process which promises grace and a complete pardon whets the appetite for the possibility of absolution and innocence. Consequently, following full and heart-felt contrition one can expect to be completely pardoned for discreet acts of racism. The notion of systemic complicity has much less popular
appeal than the on-off binary of innocence and guilt. Redemption narratives also support white Europeans as the bringers of hope and light with their “discovery” of the Americas even though, in many unspoken ways, it is the Europeans who are saved in the process. Questions of redemption and who is redeemed by whom are curiously blurred in the cross-cultural course taken by subjects who rely heavily on their relations with first Nations people to position themselves as innocent. For white subjects, redemption is available through the presence of Native bodies, in that, in the process of teaching Native students, white subjects will redeem themselves as proper teaching bodies. Questions of physical and cultural domination are smoothed over by the rhetoric of pastoral duty and obligation to Native people. Redemption discourses silence the conquest narratives and replace them with promises of “civilization”, “rationality”, and the potential of rebirth. These discourses are available to subjects who, even though they disagreed with the course, are able to reposition themselves as innocent parties and even as victims. The notion of systemic complicity is completely absent as subjects assume that innocence is possible by individual right actions. Using Foucault’s terms, the relations of domination are not legitimated by the power of sovereignty or force, but by the discourses of pastoral power which operate through educational and religious institutions.

Contradictions around who is redeemed by whom are also prefaced in the discussion of subjects desire and the fulfillment of self through the other. In this research, perhaps the most obvious recognition of the variable and shifting positions of power are found in the subjects’ simultaneous desire for and rejection of their female, Aboriginal professor. Leslie Roman (1997) suggests that “white fantasies of identification” are not merely narratives which delight in the “exotic” other or one’s love for the other. Rather, these fantasies of identification
are to be read as an effect of "institutionally produced redemption discourses" (p. 272). Roman explains:

By this I mean the residual and emergent ways colonial and neocolonial power relations attempt to impose their own limits on everyday discursive practices through forms of consciousness and conventions of representation, signification, and pedagogy that more generally characterize liberal education institutions and liberal humanism. (p. 272)

Her reading of redemption discourses as a fantasy of redemptive identification is most useful in describing the "variable position of the subject, whose reality shifts between dominance and submission" as illustrated in the shape-changing that occurs during white subjects' contact with their Aboriginal professor. I suggest the lack of clarity between redeemer/redeemed is an effect of shifting identifications in which subjects fantasize themselves variously as victims, sympathizers, and the absolved. Fantasies of redemptive identification produce the desire for a "benevolent white redeemer" (p. 275) to be located in the white self and retold in heroic, victory narratives.

Contradictory relations and imperfect "provisional effects" of redemption are not just an effect of white subjects' psychoanalytic states—a point that can be illustrated by the complex designation of socially organized spaces, especially those spaces whose implications are of national significance. How does space work in terms of innocence and redemption, for example, with the "settling" of the prairie? What is it that could "unsettle" this space made pure by white habitation? How is "settlement" maintained? Even though the intention was to contain the "impure" on Native reserves, the identifications of the "pure" were/are anything but clear cut or secure. The unstable and precarious nature of race, class, and gender hierarchies are organized through technologies which were already in place on the prairies when settlers arrived as seen in the hierarchies of whiteness that plagued many Eastern Europeans and other white-skinned, non-English speaking people of European origin. The construction of
the colonizer cannot be a taken for granted category as if the construction of the bourgeois subject were something apart from the construction of the empire or as if the matter of a self-determining identity had already been "settled" once and for all. Stoler (1995) claims that racialized bourgeois order in colonial time was a precarious thing and that the activities in the colonies had no small part in delineating the concerns for firm distinctions being made in the home countries of Europe. "Whiteness" was a creation of the moral rectitude of bourgeois society formed against the bodies of "immoral European working class and native Other, [as well as] against those of destitute whites in the colonies" (p. 100). Because few settlers in early homesteads on the prairies actually enjoyed a life of middle-class privilege, European identity on the prairies was even more precarious and in a state of flux for many people. Historically, the "narcissism of minor differences" among white ethnic groups plays a role in distinguishing shades of whiteness on the prairies. For, as far as white identification was concerned, the Native child could never be anything but Native; but for Europeans, whiteness was theirs to lose considering the significant risk incurred in not upholding the markers of the bourgeoisie and the production of their values as normative. The competition between shades of whiteness are not only historic, of course, as seen in the ways research subjects shore up their claims to whiteness and innocence by drawing comparisons between themselves and other white students.

George Lipsitz (1995) points out that in the United States especially following W.W.II, through numerous political acts bearing significant material consequences, the differences among whites of various ethnic origins became less significant than differences based on racial identities. The language of liberal individualism reinforced a notion of homogeneous white identity in the guise of an "everyman" who could access the privileges of a socially democratic society.
In Canada, even before official multiculturalism, a certain homogenizing effect among European ethnic groups was inexorable after strict enforcement of English as the language of instruction in schools in Western Canada. Although the identities of white ethnic groups are hardly homogenous, from pioneering days, the sense of common struggle and the advantages made available to white settlers enabled the identification of “us” white pioneers; it is an identity which locates them and their ancestors as the “original and deserving citizens of the nation” (Roman, 1997, p. 274).

Lipsitz (1995) describes what he calls the “possessive investment in whiteness” created for the benefit of European settlers in North America as well as for their present day descendants. By deliberate means, employing cultural expressions and political activity, this investment has pervaded public policy and inscribed systemic racism within social democratic structures. The possessive investment in whiteness, like Cheryl Harris’ (1993) depiction of whiteness as property, depends on white solidarity on issues of economic advantages, the denigration of affirmative action, selective history of colonization, nation building, and property rights. This sense of entitlement makes redemptive discourses possible through everyday practices, forms of consciousness, representation and signification (Roman, 1997). In the discourse of research subjects, for example, expressions of white entitlement and superiority are evident in subjects’ surprise and annoyance that through the cross-cultural course they came to experience feelings of guilt. They are indignant that their guilt comes from their being white, and they suggest that such associations between skin colour and complicity are statements of discrimination based on racialization. This attempted escape to a neutral space of no colour is impossible, of course, as the neutral space is already defined as the white corner. The greatest contradiction for subjects and the greatest disruption to their sense of social order
is that the privileging of whiteness is being attacked, when all along, they have been able to call upon the investment in their whiteness as their underlying defence. This subject is doubly indignant.

Many students felt that they were being persecuted through the course content because of, you know, simply by virtue of them being white and, you know, there’s validity to what they say.[...] You know, I’ve often felt myself that why simply by virtue of being male, why do I have to pay retribution? Why do I have to pay for these past injustices? And that’s the defensive shell that you get into whenever you find yourself being attacked. (M7911-12)

The subject takes umbrage with the suggestion that his offence is in being both white and male, two identities that he has experienced as sure signs of his entitlement and privilege. The cross-cultural experience has not only been a contradiction of redemption discourses for this subject, but it is also a contradiction in that the causes of his offence—the subject’s whiteness and maleness—are characteristics he typically experiences as virtues.

One final point following Lipsitz’s “possessive investment in whiteness” is that in spite of the availability of redemptive discourses to create an imagined white community, whiteness is experienced differently across various identifications. I have described how subject discourses indicate that differences are predicated on access to various shades of whiteness, premised on distinctions of class, ethnic background, personal experiences, public and private histories, liberal attitudes, education, gender, sexual orientation, and other associations that can be constructed in socially redeeming ways. The possessive investment in whiteness is, after all, an investment and, as such, involves some risks. Some research subjects understand very well that the shifting nature of their dominant identifications are not necessarily attached to an investment that is secure. A process of domination that is available to them, however, is the performance of anti-conquest strategies (Pratt, 1992) “whereby European bourgeois subjects seek to secure their innocence in the same moment as they assert European hegemony” (p. 7). Subjects are careful to perform themselves in solidarity with
the oppressed and as innocent with respect to others in their cohort and to the past. Their redemption and their whiteness are secured by performing themselves as giving, sacrificing teachers “whose imperial eyes passively look out and possess” (p. 7); the redeemed identity depends on the display of self-effacement in appearance if not in fact. Subjects see themselves positioned in time, prepared to do something of lasting and historical significance for the future of their country. This investment in whiteness positions them both to redeem the otherness of the past and to secure their positive identities.

I have explained some of the ways in which the issues of innocence and redemption are tied to race and why they are performed so insistently in this setting of teacher education. The performance is connected to what Stoler (1995, p. 91) describes as “an insistent desire for knowledge about the other” which is linked to the nostalgia of lost innocence and a search for redemption. Roman explains that the desire to “come to know and be at one with the ‘racialized other’” (p. 274) invokes redemption fantasies in which the other is accessible and knowable. Subjects imagine they will improve themselves by coming to know the other, either by improving their white selves or by becoming less like how they used to be. Desire to know the other also works as an anti-conquest narrative in which gaining knowledge of the other is an updated version of the colonization process of possessing the other. By whatever process, redemption discourses and fantasies lend considerable support to the possibility of being born again, of being metamorphosed into a new originary people. Vine Deloria (1980) explains subjects’ seemingly contradictory desires which would both reject and possess a Native other:

Underneath all the conflicting image of the Indian one fundamental truth emerges: the white man knows that he is alien and he knows that North America is Indian—and he will never let go of the Indian image because he thinks that by some clever manipulation he can achieve an authenticity which can never be his. (p. xvi)
White subjects desire an authenticity that would perform them as "original and deserving citizens of the nation" (Roman, p. 274); as the "new originary people", they are modern, self-engendering and absolved from their history and its complicity with racism. Morrison similarly explains how dominant identities are borrowed and performed as an absence, as a projection of the opposite of what the other is imagined to be: "not helpless, but licensed and powerful; not history-less, but historical; not damned, but innocent; not a blind accident of evolution, but a progressive fulfillment of destiny" (p. 52).

Roman suggests that the "desire for knowledge about the other" leads us to what may be the real appeal of redemptive fantasies—"the desire not to know the stories of (white) complicity with various forms of colonial and neocolonial oppressions" (p. 275). Claims of innocence and redemption allow an imagined solidarity and divert us from knowledge of how educated, white, middle-class identities are necessarily formed in relation to the other in unequal and disadvantageous ways. I have already discussed how ignorance, which Shoshana Felman (1987) describes as the "desire to ignore" (p. 79), is a performative act with the potential to affect one's consciousness and stability; and the desire to know the other accommodates the aversion to knowledge of one's own complicity. The desire not to know is not just an individual psychoanalytic event. It is reinforced systemically and prepared in white identified positions such as that which is accomplished in subjects' performance of themselves as innocent, sacrificing teachers.

Finally, the redemption discourses which appear to give subjects licence/obligation to know the other also creates some anxiety for the subjects about when redemption might be revealed. When will subjects desire for the

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2 As a teacher and workshop leader, I have been disciplined many times by students who would prefer to hear about Natives and their customs than about the unequal distribution of power to which the students have access through their whiteness.
other be fulfilled? In the moral space provided by the sense of obligation associated with being white teachers, subjects want to know more about the techniques of handling Native children and other racialized minorities—partly for their practical concerns about class control—but also because they desire some limit to the moral responsibility they are obliged to assume. Subjects wonder how their own redemption/desire can be negotiated so that coming to know the other will not jeopardize the subjects’ own white identity.

In this research I have observed subjects’ engagement in some understanding of the other as they enter into the prospect of teaching Native students. I have also observed that the processes for undertaking this teaching effort work to keep in place a series of relations encountered by subjects: relations with ethnic minorities, working-class students, Native women and men, white women and men, members of straight and homosexual communities, Native students, and other racialized minorities. In the midst of these identifications, the teaching of white supremacy and the containment of Native education safeguard the place of white teachers as moral agents in both white and native schools in which whiteness is accomplished as fact. The education of all students and all teachers is less about formal knowledge than it is about the control of bodies, disciplined and in their places as ordained by God, the nation, capital interests, white patriarchy and claims to innocence and redemption.

For the effective governing of subject selves and for constructing ethical relationships, subjects work at accomplishing what Foucault describes as a “permanent political relationship between self and self” (1984, p. 363). The technologies of self-surveillance which support the development of this “relationship between self and self”, as I have discussed in this chapter, include the politics of belonging, positive identification in particular spaces, the organization of what is considered ethical behaviour, and a system of evaluating
self and others concerning the accomplishment of ethical performances that signal belonging. For white selves, control and governance of the technologies for producing ethical subjects also includes access to and performance of innocence. In the process of the interviews, white subjects do not so much strive to prove their innocence as to demonstrate it as a badge of their whiteness. For research subjects, innocence is a sign of privilege—a consequence of self-control and racial dominance.
Part Four: Final Words

Chapter Eight

CLOSING POSSIBILITIES AND OPENING THEM UP

The focus of this research is the identity construction of white pre-service education students in the context of their desire to produce themselves as public school teachers in Canada. Throughout the research, subject desire for these identifications is nearly palpable as they perform themselves as credible witnesses, forestalling any alternative interpretations to the contrary. From the opening chapter, I pose questions about the processes by which white identities are inscribed as the semiotic of national identity in Canada, and how these inscriptions are performed by white pre-service teachers subjects. I consider how the performance of these identifications supports their resistance to pedagogies of inclusion. With this direction and with these statements of purpose—which are really questions, I now consider the particular effects of constructed whiteness and how this particular version further illuminates the questions of this dissertation, if not its answers.

Becoming teachers for many of these white subjects is not only a career choice, it is also a performance of their belonging, their entrance into formal social respectability in which the demonstration of their power/knowledge is a requirement of their anticipated positions as teachers. Subjects have been produced in educational processes of discipline and regulation, in embodied practices which subjects now call affirming. Their desire for and their ability to perform “normative” identities is a definite asset in subject reception into the teaching profession. The lack of permanence of these identifications, however,
and the need for continual reiteration of these normative and dominating subjectivities is a source of subjects' considerable anxiety and rage. This dissertation has investigated processes in the construction of white identification in which the desire to produce a secure identity as dominant and not-other is resistant to anti-racist pedagogies in which unfair privileges associated with whiteness are called into question.

**Supporting literature**

I have relied on psychoanalytic and poststructuralist discourses to illuminate some of the historic, social and unconscious effects which inform subject positions. Throughout the research, I employ the notion of a non-unitary, always in process, subjectivity in contrast to that of a modernist figure characterized as autonomous, rational and self-determining. I also explore the social construction of subjectivity by which identity is produced by the constant reiteration and citation of itself as a performing subject (Butler, 1993). A socially acceptable identity of "a body that matters" is reiterated through the organizing of exclusionary practices which constitute and naturalize its performance, as well as through the continual projection and rejection of a socially organized other. This "normative" identification is organized in contrast to that which is abjured as unlivable and uninhabitable and as that which marks the limits of acceptable subjectivity: the "not yet 'subjects’", those outside markers, the "abject beings". Yet, those beings are not so much marked as they are "populations erased from view" (Butler, 1992) within a framework which is dependent on their disavowed status to create an identity that is legitimate and intelligible.

The desire for wholeness arises from the always unfulfilled desire for and "of" the other. Foucault supports the contention that desire is productive of identities as they are materialized and affirmed by power-laden discourses
surrounding identifications such as race, gender, heteronormativity, class, age, and so forth. The desire for identification and wholeness as a desire for the other—as the not-I, that which is repressed and rejected in the self—always exceeds itself and remains forever unfulfilled and forever desiring. The desire for the affirmation of self, therefore, also in/cites the abjection (repression) of the "not-I", the other. The desire for and the impossibility of a coherent self is what impels a subject into the social. In the midst of the insatiable desire, the desire for the other is disavowed.

Butler describes the "process of materialization" established over time by which differences are constructed and stabilized. The affirmation of difference is reiterated by social practices and given the effect of "realness" by which boundaries are fixed and differences evaluated. Materialized and embodied differences are productive of notions of superior/inferior which valourize the self and trivialize the other: a distinction entirely dependent on the always present, disavowed other and the denial of the salience of the other for the production. The abjected other, and the subject's dependence on it, must be disavowed for the distinction to remain. For example, as slavery waned in the European empire, the hegemony of white domination reasserted itself as the source of civilization, liberalism, and freedom. In the days of the empire, the construction of white bourgeois identity relied on firmly kept boundaries to mark distinctions between the bourgeois self and degenerate others. Maintaining the construction of white bourgeois identity as dominant requires the continual reiteration of bourgeois practices as naturally occurring, innate, normal and superior.

The production of identity as a process of domination depends on "disappearing" from active consciousness the part played by the abject other whose presence otherwise denies the dominant identity its "natural" and
"innate" superiority. Homi Bhabha describes the way in which "forgetting" is employed in the telling of a nation's narrative so that the nation and its people can perform a history of domination and the image of themselves as heroic. Canadian identity and its collective history is in a constant process of narrating itself as a site of multiple and partial imaginings. As in the process of identity construction offered in psychoanalytic theorizing, the nation can be understood as a fragmented subject in constant desire to narrate a coherent self. The process of "forgetting" enables the country to narrate a heroic tradition even as the narrative of the performative present contradicts the coherent telling of a non-unitary past.

The performance of nationalism is marked by ambivalent, non-unitary identities which are not merely textual constructions, but are also identities which are profoundly racialized, sexualized, gendered, classed, and embodied by all manners of difference by which bodies may be articulated. National narratives reinforce and are productive of taken for granted boundaries that need not be explained but which effectively organize social relations. The taken for granted whiteness of Canadian national identity, for example, is easily traced to the historical actions taken to populate and educate the nation with white Europeans who could be taught to speak English and become loyal British subjects. The history is of the imposition of European concepts of land and property ownership and the regulation of the immigrant populations by white British customs and norms. Deep divisions were marked by class, language, religious differences. Differences that marked skin colour were regulated by laws. It is the routine, everyday activities, as much as any particular apparatus of repression, which accomplish the daily consequences of national identity and state formation. From these processes, the imperial mission of the British Empire remains in the institutional fabric of the nation as well as in the imaginations of
Canadians who position themselves as potentially tolerant in the face of the Other. Legacies of these colonial beginnings continue to support the white identification of Canadian nationalism as natural and normal. The claim that early immigrants are now the "new originals" legitimates and justifies the naturalness of white domination even as it effaces the always already present Aboriginal others.

Research subjects' historical and geographical context is significant as the site in which subjects words are uttered and said to have meaning. Many subjects have direct access to pioneer stories and local victory narratives in which the development of ancestors' agency and subjectivity overlaps with the development of the nation. In Chapter Three, I have described three familiar tropes in the Canadian national narrative: the land, First Nations peoples, multiculturalism. Each trope reflects the ambivalence between a traditional telling and the narrative of the up-to-date present. The heroic narratives which characterize the nation's past have required that certain other histories have been "forgotten" if they do not coincide with "tradition". When contradictions with the performative present cannot account for traditional narratives, the ambivalence which follows is visible in signs of rupture, anger, denial, as well as opportunities for newness (Bhabha, 1994a) and affirmation. Ambivalence, hybridity, and that which cannot be accounted for remain in the narrative of the nation as the unconscious, liminal present, the differences which will "add to" but do not "add up". For those interested in reading the formation of citizens' subjectivities—such as how citizen identity became inscribed as white—there is rich detail in the construction and much-mythologized version of the national narrative.

Historically and in the present, public school education has been an important agent in the construction of the national narrative as well as in the
production of the nation’s citizens. Education has been a reliable method of transmitting the dominant culture through its values, curriculum, and the strict enforcement of English, in areas outside Quebec, as the language of instruction. For many people, the choice of teaching as a career is an entry level move into the status of the professions. It is often the first opportunity for a family in accessing legitimacy and middle-class respectability. For most research subjects who are second and third generation Canadians, becoming a teacher is an upwardly mobile move. Against arbitrariness, instability and perhaps loss of legitimacy, subjects can escape any possible mis/identifications as the other, and instead, become identified as those who can transmit dominant cultural values.

Employing self-surveillance from within, discipline and regulation from without, teaching is produced as a highly scrutinized profession. Indeed, one of the attractions of teaching is the opportunity if not the necessity to consolidate an acceptable, normatively-referenced identity. The performance of the teacher status is much valued for the way it secures marginalized identities and replaces them with the modernist figure of the dominant culture: autonomous, rational and self-determining. Teaching status fulfills many desires toward a positive identity construction, not simply as a particular career but as one who is known, as the consolidation of the respectable not-other. In this research context, the identity of the always present but rarely mentioned other is Aboriginal peoples who, when they are mentioned at all, are the recipients of white subjects’ process of othering through the administration of pastoral power and the consolidation of their own identities. On the topic of racism in Canada, First Nations peoples are invariably present in the national unconscious as the studiously ignored other, even when the topic seems not to be about them at all. The need for the continual assertion of white domination in the construction of Canadian
national identity is historically undermined by the ever present desire for and ambivalent rejection of First Nations peoples.

Discussion of findings

At times like this, I am relieved that I did not set as my task the definition of whiteness or commit myself to describing variations of race consciousness. These are not only huge tasks requiring a different methodology; they also belie the nature of identity construction which is a continual, reiterative process, constantly in need of an other, and always unstable, contradictory, and becoming. Ellsworth (1997) also suggests that the definitional process can unintentionally lead to "various double binds of whiteness" and the further frustration of antiracist work. In the analysis of the research, I have considered these issues: How does subjects' thinking about themselves—their roles as teachers, their positions as white Canadians, the students they will teach, whom they consider their other—all contribute to the limits of what can be thought about these topics? In the sections which follow, I describe two of the points that seem most salient following the research: 1). a consideration of how the desire and performance of subjects secures and limits their identities. 2). how identity is produced as part of domination.

Instability of whiteness

The notion of who and what teachers are is intelligible to these research subjects as a certain ideological positioning. The position of the teacher—as the subject in and of the ideology of whiteness—interpellates the subjects of this research as it addresses itself to them and offers them a series of social relations in which the performance of the teacher is most intelligible. Their desire is for a credible performance of this identity so as to admit no alternative which might otherwise be unintelligible and uninhabitable. Subjects in this research take great
care to perform themselves as teachers because, for many reasons—not the least of which is the tenuous nature of identity construction—their hold on this white, Anglo, professional teacher identity is not entirely secure. When they describe who they are, at first they can recall no other identifications than "normal" and "typical". This is the performance that is constantly iterated against the prospect of its instability. When pressed to elaborate, subjects describe themselves alternately as individuals or as members of groups populated by people who are intelligent, empathic, "good". By various contradictory means, subjects defend their achievement of normative status as they simultaneously project the dominant, in-charge identity of the teacher as that which is typical. In spite of and across the variety in their backgrounds, subject histories have been elided and forgotten in subjects' desire to perform themselves as normal and dominant.

In a similar fashion, subjects at first describe a Canadian identity as having no particular distinguishing traits; but they eventually settle on positive attributes such polite, tolerant, appreciative of other cultures, et cetera, again a depiction of the absent centre in which intolerance is impossible and consequently projected onto others. In the midst of their performance as autonomous agents, subjects allow that they desire certain aspects of the other, especially in regard to Native spirituality and the desire for Native bodies who will show the subjects how to be better teachers. Ultimately, however, subjects recoil from the objects of their desires and suggest that Natives are the desiring ones.

Many subjects have described how their choice of teaching as a profession amounts to what could be described as a calling. The subjects already understand a certain reading of the position of the teacher, a reading by which they make this positionality intelligible. Their decision to become a teacher has been called a
natural process, but one which,as 1 have previously suggested from my own
experience, is "natural" only if one considers the dass, ethmc origins, race,
gender, sexuality, education levels and several other social relations in which
subjects find themselves. While no one says that she views her entry into
teadiing as her chance to disseminate the values of the dominant culture, many
desire to teach diildren because they love them and want to share with children
their positive educational experiences. Subjeds will engender diildren, love
them, and be loved reciprocally. It is a "dream of love" (Robertson, 1994) which
supports subjectç desire for legitimacy, authority, and power "that they might

properly embody the desire to dominate" (pp. 7,8).Finally, subjects describe their
entry into teadung as something which cannot easily be described, but which
coinades mith the quality of one's character and being a good person. While it is
hardly surprising that subjects c m o t fully explain their desire for dioosing
teadiing as a career, their assumptions about what teachers will do, who the
students will be, and subjects' suitability for the job suggest that public education

is in no danger of disrupting its long term effects of social reproduction. The
space that the subjects daim-that

of middle-class, objective, non-political,

educated, individualistic, self-determining agents-is

an idealized image of

consistent subjects who are the source of meaning, knowledge and action.
Subjects perform their teacher identity by depicting themselves as part of the
absent white centre and as part of domination. In their allegiance to white
values, their claim on whiteness, and their interest in reproducing it, subjects are
able to perform their suitability as teachers.
Subjects' (in)abilities to secure their identities reflects the instability of
identity construction which continually relies on the "production of sameness
and othemessm-the aeation of 1 and not-1-

(Britzman, 1995, p. 165) and on the

matenality of difference reiterated in practice. Social and historicd examples


confirm the changeable nature of whiteness which subjects are now experiencing; that subjects are capable and poised at this time to exploit the flux of identity production attests both to the plasticity (mutability) of identity production and the predictable social effects of its construction. Elizabeth Ellsworth (1997) variously describes whiteness as “always more than one thing”, “[insistent] on stable meanings”, and, in what seems like a paradox, “repetitive”, and “never the same thing twice”. In spite of the numbing regularity of the repetition of whiteness and its consequences, however, the insecurity of it might explain what George Lipsitz (1995) calls the “progressive investment in whiteness”, calling to mind the positive effects accruing to those with the “capital” to make the investment as well as the nature of risk in an investment which is not secure. The investment which secures dominance also performs the disavowal of otherness of the self. This otherness can be read in subjects’ conscious and unconscious desires for a legitimacy which now eludes them. Ironically, the disavowal of otherness, the “investment in whiteness”, and the desire for certainties all serve to limit one’s understanding of a self and others. Subjects’ desire for certainties and their attempts to achieve it by ignoring otherness limit the identity of who a teacher may become. In teaching jurisdictions where the performance of whiteness is much desired, the denial of otherness necessarily limits a teacher’s ability to see and value the otherness in herself and her students. The certainty of such identifications ignores all beyond normative constructions. In describing Queer Theory, Britzman (1995) says that ignorance is an effect and the limit of knowledge. Further, resistance to knowledge is “not outside of the subjects of knowledge or the knowledge of subjects, but rather as constitutive of knowledge and its subjects (p. 154, emphasis added). Resistance to knowledge is performed by projecting otherness and
disavowing it in the self; resistance is thereby reiterated in the construction of the self and knowledge.

In this analysis, I am not suggesting that this rejection of the other in the construction of self is a simple binary or a stroke of false consciousness that can be undone by a rigorous application of consciousness-raising. The research interviews suggest that subjects are complex, nuanced people whose whiteness is not their only identification; neither does it preclude subjects from identifying with non-dominant positions or from making firmly held anti-racist remarks. Subjects hold these subject positions, as contradictory as they may be, because they need them; these identifications, however the subjects negotiate them, are necessary for the subject's psychic survival (Lather, 1991). Lather suggests that an appropriate pedagogy is not a matter of disturbing subjects' self-satisfaction or wrenching from them their certain knowledge. Rather it is those places of uncertainty, dissatisfactions, doubts—where identities are not secure—which are the places where possibilities for exploration and change reside. I have tried to indicate how subjects' fantasies and racist remarks also indicate their own struggles against aggression—historical, economic, present, latent, manifest. Walkerdine (1990) similarly advocates this approach of looking at subject fantasies as spaces "for hope and for escape from oppression" (p. 200). She guards against "being obsessed by the illusory tropes of an oppressive ideology" (1990, p. 200). In keeping with that refusal, this research which is ultimately about processes of pedagogy, is not about developing "more efficient transmission strategies" (Lather, 1991, p. 143). Rather it is to help us

...learn to analyze the discourses available to us, which ones we are invested in, how we are inscribed by the dominant, how we are outside of, other than the dominant, consciously/unconsciously, always partially, contradictorily. (p. 143).

An interest in the construction of racism is not just a vehicle to investigate conditions of the psyche for its own sake or as a way of relativizing
oppression. On the contrary, it is an examination of discourses for the manner in which repressive mechanisms such as denial, repression, rationalization, are mobilized to cover over the contradictions that racialized domination requires. The need to defend oneself against the charge racism, for example, may be required if one is to maintain a fantasy as protector of the underdog. The contradiction between the desire both to dominate as well as protect the other may be cause for anxiety and for the continual need to support—or iterate—the fantasy of the empathic self. I am struck by subjects' desires for self-preservation and wholeness and the potential for their desires to become a source of something positive. The question remains: how can fantasy and desire be addressed to present different outcomes? How can we come to know our own desires and fantasies and use them as sources of hope? The next section traces some of the processes by which subjects inscribe themselves in the dominant and in their desire to master differences as a way of securing their self-preservation.

**Consolidation of whiteness**

I have argued that it is subject desire for security and the repetition of sameness which place limits on teacher practice and identification. In the desire for security, expressed as mastery, possibilities for change are sabotaged, accommodated, and sidelined in ways which perform the subjects as innocent. The ideology of white supremacy regulates encounters in classrooms and other sites of contestation by working through material practices on real bodies. These educational practices of repetition and sameness produce the effects of subordination and domination as normative. The ideology of white supremacy is not only an effect of the subject citizen produced as innocent. It is also produced in the use, construction, and mobilization of oppressive forms of
power and exploitation. The effects of ideology should not be underestimated in the construction of citizen subjects. Belsey (1985) argues that

People 'recognize' (misrecognize) themselves in the ways in which ideology 'interpellates' them, or in other words, addresses them as subjects, calls them by their names and in turn 'recognizes' their autonomy... Ideology interpellates concrete individuals as subjects, and bourgeois ideology in particular emphasizes the fixed identity of the individual. 'I'm just like that'—cowardly, perhaps, or aggressive, generous or impulsive. (p. 49)

Subjects in this research are anxious to foreclose an identity for whom the performance of whiteness is fixed as innocent and "natural"—they are just like that—in a way which similarly supports the ideology of white supremacy as just another naturally occurring phenomenon. This section which follows describes specific processes uncovered in the research by which the ideology of white supremacy works through material practices of discipline and regulation and the processes of foreclosure, repetition, and mastery.

Subjects typically view themselves as individuals and not as products of a particular culture. In contrast, Native students they will teach are viewed as homogeneous and largely defined by presumptions about Native culture. Stereotyping along cultural lines may be one of the most efficient steps in the process of othering, as a way of discounting and producing a not-I. Subjects are very insistent, therefore, that there must be particular lesson plans for teaching Native students. They are convinced of the power of lesson plans to contain the stereotype in the event that it should come undone. Subjects are also resistant to Native staffing in Native dominated schools, a process which breaks the stereotypes of dependent Natives and white teacher saviours. Subjects interpret the role of the teacher in such a way that affirms them as moral agents whose self-discipline and sterling character formation qualifies them to be role-models.

Subjects are ambivalent about the compulsory cross-cultural course all of them have completed at least six months prior to the interviews. Some resent that Native issues are of sufficient importance as to require an entire course; or
alternately, they resent the implication that they may not have already achieved a satisfactory level of cultural awareness or moral perspicacity. Subjects carefully manage the knowledge they receive in the course, either by turning it into a commodity whereby they will know more "about" Natives, or by wielding it as a tool for the surveillance of self and other student colleagues. More than anything, learning "about" Natives is seen as a practical preparation for the inevitability that one might be required to teach Natives. Submitting to the course knowledge is rendered as a common sense, practical act, or a way of preparing for the deluge or for some potentially dangerous situation that needs to be controlled if safety and security are to be maintained.

For most subjects, their interactions with the course place them in contradictory positions which they struggle to explain: they defend their subjectivities against the implications of the cross cultural course and the anger and uncertainty it arouses; they affirm their identities as non-prejudiced, liberal individuals. They support their liberal identities by claiming their responses are rational and unemotional, quite unlike the responses of anyone with whom they might disagree. Subjects justify their own emotional responses by implying that it is only what reasonable people would do when provoked by the unreasonableness of others. Subjects heavily rely on a particular understanding of rationality and emotional control to mark them as self-determining individuals. Regardless of their own conduct or that of others, it is their description of the events which performs subjects as insiders and demonstrates their control of the definition of rationality which is, perhaps, the single, most highly prized feature of the bourgeois subject.

Subject interests in rule-keeping supports their relation to power and the techniques accessible to them for governing others and for circumscribing their own conduct. The eruptions of anger and frustration reveal instances of rule
breaking and the underlying assumptions about which norms have been violated. Performing themselves as dominant and white is important to subjects because they rely on these identifications to legitimate their citizen teacher status. By keeping the "rules" that support white supremacy, they gain access to respectable and secure identities of their own. There is much at stake in rule-keeping.

It is in the performance of mastery over themselves that research participants most elaborately affirm their identifications as ethical subjects. Opportunities for self-mastery find support in the concept of space which designates between sites of respectability and disorder, the designation of which is very useful to research subjects in confirmation of their legitimacy. A most notable site for the most exclusive performance of identity is the university where intellectual Western and European thought is the *sine quo non* of white patriarchy. Subjects employ the university as a site to which they rightfully belong and as evidence of their own performance of abstract thought and intellectual ability. Site specific acts also confirm insider and outsider status in the wider sphere of Canadian identity, for example, in which immigration control has long ago affirmed white, Anglo identifications as bodies that matter, as the new originals, and the definitional image of the Canadian citizen. White identifications confirmed through immigration procedures and university life are maintained by qualifying regulations and strict control over accessibility. Subjects are very careful to distinguish between and align themselves with spaces that are "in here" where order and whiteness reign as opposed to "out there" in a place of presumed disorder and chaos, where the other resides. That public schools in which they will teach are designated "out there" positions prospective teachers to perform the role of saviour and missionary.
Stoler (1995) refers to processes of “incessant purifications” as the technologies by which a permanent social war is waged through discourses and the manifestation of “preserved possibilities” (p. 69). These processes accurately describe a repertoire consistently employed by subjects in their performance as innocent helpers. Subjects’ “preserved possibilities” are the countless social practices in which subjects are invested and interested in preserving including discourses of innocence and redemption. Typically relying on a narrow understanding of racism as a moral failing or a result of misinformation, subjects cultivate an image of themselves as knowledge workers in possession of liberal attitudes. Where racism emerges, it is excused as a failing typical of humanity, typical even of those oppressed by it. Prejudice which subjects may perpetrate is blamed on the immoderate actions of the recipients of racism so that otherwise non-prejudiced Canadians, for example, are helplessly provoked toward a racist thought, word, or deed. In similar fashion, it is the other of national Canadian identity who provokes the occasional lapse in the otherwise commonplace traits found among true Canadians: tolerance, generosity, and innocence.

Eventually, the majority of subjects reference the ideological failings of their student colleagues in their responses to the course as proof that the subject is more liberal and more innocent than other ostensibly liberal, white people. Subjects find that various shades of whiteness depend on their access to normative identities regarding race, class, sexuality, ability, attitudes, and many other positions. They also understand that liberal attitudes positively correlate with high education levels and access to respectability. By discrediting the actions of others and generally separating themselves from white identified individuals who are overtly racist, subjects secure “very white” identifications. There is a great deal at stake in losing access to these identities. In describing the illiberal reactions of others, however, subjects demonstrate their insider knowledge of
how whiteness is performed and, more importantly, what this identification must deny if it is to secure things as they are.

The construction of innocence is an integral part of white domination which both denies culpability outright and uses the association between whiteness and innocence to support the tautological reasoning that the whiter one becomes, the less likelihood there is for detractions such as racism or prejudice. Claims of innocence serve many purposes including an imagined solidarity with the other. These claims also position subjects in the ambiguous role of saviour/saved by which their identity is blurred with the other of their desire. Discourses of innocence and redemption preserve the notion of equality and the dissolution of stigmatizing differences. Redemption discourses allow white subjects to claim solidarity with and space as original people.

This desire to replace or take on the identities of the other is not at all new (Crosby, 1991; Churchill, 1992; Francis, 1992). The continual study and accumulation of things Natives actually supports the surveillance of the other through the employment of stereotypes, images and representations that often do little more than reinforce postcolonial discourses. Dominant identifications are materially dependent on practices which essentialize and commodify Native identity as a resource. Appropriation of those things which belong to Natives, from names for sports teams to writing "Native" fiction, reflects a desire to possess the other and somehow to "know" the other; at the same time, these practices lead away from "the desire not to know" (Roman, p. 275) the stories of white domination, complicity, and oppression. This desire on the one hand and refusal on the other is one of the most significant means by which the limits of identities also limit knowledge production. Knowledge of the other as an item of exchange replaces self-knowledge and supports the securing of dominant identities, maintained at all costs.
Identifications of whiteness performed by subjects in this research contain difference through their refusals and the limitations they exert on information sessions on the other. Subjects mask their complicity by focusing on knowledge of Natives—their learning styles and cultural diversity—and away from an examination of power relations. When practices which support white domination come under scrutiny, enormous resistance is mounted, diversions created, and boundaries reasserted. As demonstrated in this research, subjects exploit their domination to limit what can be thought and said in order to keep things as they are. They exploit their domination to support the continuation of white supremacy as ideological practice.

Implications for pedagogy

limiting pedagogical discourses

Desires for white supremacy and the "naturalness" of its reproduction are "fixed" by an assumed link between whiteness and innocence. Subjects in this research have shown how practices of white supremacy are reinforced by links which are both fixed and elastic—as others have observed all too clearly: "The master narrative could make any number of adjustments to keep itself in tact" (Morrison, p. 51). Without a major interruption, the master narrative of whiteness will indeed keep in tact its performance of dominance and virtue in the midst of and perhaps because of anti-racist teaching. Whiteness and innocence are ideologically fixed to the extent that the normalizing functions on which they rely, such as the exploitation of race, class, and gender hierarchies, are plausible as good teaching practices; this reproduction of whiteness also accommodates anti-racist teaching which is easily re-interpreted and/or performed in ways which support white domination. This research demonstrates that one of the effects of whiteness is subjects' access to various
ideological practices with which to escape uncomfortable identifications and which invariably rely on the abundant use of many others to retain ideal selves. This very significant effect by which subjects secure whiteness is a contributing factor to the limitation of antiracist discourse.

In her work which examines "how relations of domination and subordination stubbornly regulate encounters in classrooms and courtrooms", Sherene Razack (in press, ms., p. 15) points out that social change is not just about more or better information, but about examining and disrupting power relations without which, the ideology of power evasion supports white power as normative. Fine (1997) argues that unless academic inquiry fails to notice the way the performance of whiteness is structured, built into and encouraged as normative within institutional practice, then those scholars studying only the effects of racism on minorities will be contributing to the science and spread of unfair advantage. Fine continues that because white supremacy relies on the denigration and opposition of other, antiracist practices that do not interrupt the process of white supremacy actually reproduce its effects. In subjects' interaction with the course, they created and made use of their numerous opportunities to affirm white privilege. An effect of whiteness, subject desire for certainties—including the desire not to know—is supported by many levels of educational endeavour and is, perhaps, a confounding factor in what Ellsworth (1997) calls "double binds of whiteness". She continues

In other words, no-win relations to whiteness become paralyzing double binds for academics when we fail to question the racialized paradoxes produced by certain academic practices. These include academic attempts to define whiteness in the name of antiracism without recognizing that the definitional process itself is part of the problem of racism. (p. 264)

The effect of whiteness which allows subjects to escape uncomfortable identifications plus the in/stability of whiteness and subsequent desire for
certainties contribute together in no small way to the limitations of antiracist work.

A third limiting factor which this research only hints at is the material reality of subjects as they enter the schools. The expectations they and others have for what the subjects now know as a consequence of the cross-cultural course are integral to the possibilities of retrenching whiteness. One of the expectations is that subjects now understand how to "deal with" Aboriginal students. Combined with the continuing function of the teaching profession in the formation of citizenship through normative social relations, this qualifying knowledge of the other easily supports an exclusive, superior positioning for teachers. Having been instructed in cross-cultural ways gives the impression that new teachers are now equipped to rid schools of prejudice and racist practice. Notwithstanding the lack of success of these programs (Sleeter, 1993), expectations are created that racialized minorities—especially Natives—will have equal opportunities and will no longer be subject to racism. Since only some of the rhetoric has changed and very little in the way of institutional practices, however, Native students will not be any better off than before and the separation in levels of achievement that will continue to occur will be attributed once again to merit and its absence. Fine (1997) argues that studies and interventions which would seem to support disadvantaged students, and I would add the intervention of anti-racist programming, can have disastrous effects which will return to punish the victims of racism.

Interventionist programs are unwittingly dangerous when they do not take seriously the systemic nature of racism and, consequently, succeed only in reproducing it. Neither is this a simple matter of a misguided curriculum focus or failure of individuals to say or do the right thing. Plans for outreach efforts and courses on race education which fail to take into account how teacher
education programs support the ideology of white dominance are already structured in racist ways. The research subjects understand very well how their cross-cultural course was a rarity of its type within the university. That they chose to trivialize the course further is hardly surprising. The rest of their curriculum including their education in public schools does little to suggest that this anti-racist initiative should be taken seriously. Subjects are aware that problems of restricted resources divert attention from and exacerbate the decisions that get made around equity issues. In spite of well meaning gestures that they have heard concerning diversity needs in pre-service programs, subjects are not alone in the "management" thrust with which they approach racial issues and their propensity toward technical rational solutions. In the absence of support for diversity initiatives, subject concerns for "getting what they need" focuses their attention on structural functional skill development. Furthermore, job shortages for recent graduates have implications for what students think is important to learn in their pre-service programs. Consequently, in anticipation of meeting the particular dictates of hiring committees, education students are very interested in acquiring skills and abilities of all descriptions—a process in which anti-racist "training" is a competing commodity.

The functionalist focus extends beyond specific skill development, however; it can also be traced to the assumption that minorities are exceptions whose differences must be "accommodated". If teacher education participants assume, or have somehow arranged, that they will not be teaching in multicultural setting, they presume that learning about issues of racialization is unnecessary for where they are going. In this research, few subjects indicated any knowledge their own power or participation in the effects of racism. No one questioned the possibility that the "success" of their normative schooling experiences was also limiting in many regards. On the contrary, their school
experiences had naturalized the racist treatment of Native students and reinforced the subjects as ones who could "help" the other. Without interrupting such power relations, the opportunity is enormous that interventionist programs will reify similar racist notions of entitlement, privilege, and domination.

Beyond the vicissitudes of curriculum planning, however, perhaps one of the most serious problems facing interventionist programs is the capacity for white identified participants to deny their own entitlement and privilege in these programs and elsewhere. The subjects in the research are not exceptions; they are well-intended white teacher candidates whose remarks are often similar to the speech of other liberal citizens who depend on the notion that minorities are exceptions apart from the norm. This research demonstrates ways in which whiteness insists on the invisibility if not the naturalness of its entitlement; consequently, the significance of racial privilege in shaping the outcome of the school experience is greatly underestimated. The maintenance of this entitlement finds its support at many levels of association and social interaction including historical, legal, economic, national, and particularly at the level of the psyche. I suggest that at all levels, the insistence on stable meanings and identifications supports the notion of the stability of identity, including the privilege of whiteness.

**opening pedagogical discourses**

I have argued that the limits of identity such as those desired and performed by research subjects set limits on knowledge and on the curriculum. In a reciprocal manner, what may be understood as knowledge, especially that which is organized and inscribed as overt and covert curriculum, is a problem of ethics in that, as Britzman (1995) points out, the limits on the curriculum set limits on identity. This concern for identity and identifications is perhaps what is
least considered in antiracist programming; and although this research is not devoted to the particular study of programs, articles on program planning which take up the profound effects of identity formation invariably report on the problems unleashed when identities are unsettled (Ellsworth, 1989; Felman & Laub, 1992; Worth, 1993; Britzman et al, 1991; Britzman, 1995). I have described some of the underlying problems inherent in critical pedagogies which reassert stable identities even as they engage in deconstructive analyses. When confronted with the prospect of disidentification, learners in oppositional courses can engage in various strategies of resistance whose end result it to return and secure dominant subject positions. Especially interesting in this research is subjects’ seemingly contradictory performance of innocent, liberal identifications by which they insulate themselves against the uneasiness aroused by the experiences of their cross-cultural course. The rage which accompanies even the threat to subjects’ secure identities is not only a defensive reaction but also an offensive one: the rage and indignation are tactics which reassert and affirm dominance and which only the dominant can enact effectively. Neither is a pedagogy which insists on a new orthodoxy of dis/identification or which presumes to know what is good for students much of an improvement over pedagogies which seem to produce only tenacious resistance and the reification of whiteness. How may pedagogical practices be thought in ways which support instability and flux as emergent and productive, and not as repressive acts of dis/identification?

The construction and limitations of who can be named as subjects and the formation of rules for how subject status can be performed are implicated in the theoretical and embodied considerations of pedagogical discourses. This is not only a problem of pedagogy, of course; as I have indicated, problems of dis/identification arise in scholarship in general, as noted especially in those
attempts to do otherwise (Ellsworth, 1997). Academics who investigate the
collection of whiteness in ways which make it allowable as a topic of scholarly
discussion typically concern themselves with definitions, parameters and
analyses. Ironically, in the production of antiracist scholarship, adhering to
certain scholarly prescriptions can be another way of effectively reproducing the
"double binds of whiteness". I am aware, for example, of the way in which the
production of this dissertation has every potential to benefit me far more than it
does to contribute to the elimination of structures of oppression. Refering to the
desire of many practicing white people to address the effects and implications of
whiteness, Ellsworth's admonition: "to leave the field, or point out the
contradiction" (p. 264) is a bold challenge. Like the interview participants and
academics whose scholarship and identities are dependent on the reproduction
of safe spaces, I also find it very difficult to get beyond rule following and
engaging in explanations which will keep the analysis of my own identity safe
and at a distance. One of the double binds of whiteness with which I can identify
is its production of a paralyzing effect whereby whites are reinscribed either as
"guilty perpetrators" or "unimplicated bystanders" (p. 263). Making sense of my
own performance and that of other white identified people involved in
antiracist work is fraught with the ambiguities of choice and the politics of
un/involvement. Subject desires for secure racialized identifications are perhaps
not more tenacious than the desires of other dominating subjectivities with
vested interests in the privileges of their positioning.

Providing support for instability and flux in curriculum knowledge and in
identifications, as mentioned above, are major issues when considering the
effects of antiracist work on teacher education programs as well as on anti-
-oppressive scholarship and theorizing. I have described some of the ways in
which pedagogical discourses may be closed or opened by the ethical relations
which arise in the mutually implicating constructions of identity and the curriculum. Armed with knowledge of some of the actions and theories of anti-racist work which have the reiterative potential to make things worse without making them better, this research continues wearily to examine the effects of domination in which resistance and the closing down of possibilities seem all but inevitable. I return the focus to the subjects in classrooms—as teachers and as students—to see the processes whereby knowledge is controlled and often terminated in that setting.

What is at stake for many subjects in this research is their inability to secure for themselves privileges accruing to white identifications while simultaneously acknowledging their dependence on the other for the construction of their dominance. To various degrees, subject reactions to this dilemma, especially as produced in their cross-cultural instruction, can be characterized as terror and rage. The enormous trauma and dissonance produced in this particular cross-cultural setting is not unusual, however, as numerous examples of resistance can attest; nor, do some suggest, could learning be otherwise. Felman and Laub (1992) wonder whether there is “a relation between trauma and pedagogy” (p. 1). They continue, “Can the process of the testimony—that of bearing witness to a crisis or a trauma—be made use of in the classroom situation?” This research has produced numerous examples in which subjects both testify to their own trauma and bear witness to that of others. I have cited the elaborate rhetorical processes organized in the discourses to protect subjects from insecurity and loss. Felman and Laub suggest that being interviewed can be like the experience of giving testimony. But to what are these white subjects bearing witness? And what losses are they facing?

I have concluded that subjects are bearing witness to at least two related processes: to the effects of their domination, and to the potential that it may be
lost with respect to racialized minorities and illiberal whites. The raised awareness subjects attribute to the course but which is never fully articulated, I suggest, is the awareness of their entitlement and the greater loss of their innocent selves in regard to the privilege and respectability they desire. The incongruence and dissonance following these personal discoveries are surely cause for trauma on the part of white subjects who have gone out of their way to construct themselves as innocent; neither have they been allowed to ignore the historical and present day realities of public racism in Canada. The actualization of racism in the country with which they identify has been made a public matter—there are no subjects who can act as observers separated from racist practices; none are outside the testimony of these interviews. There are no dominant racialized identities that have not been “uncompromised” and “unharmed” by being witnesses to how racism in Canada is insidiously constructed as normative practice. Subjects’ acknowledgement of their own complicity not only threatens their innocence, but it asserts the necessity of the other in the organization of their dominance. The research also describes a third process in which the interviews are very clearly enacted as performative events: when the interviews witness to subjects’ truth telling about the effects of whiteness. These are the events in which subjects secure innocent spaces for themselves by testifying about the racism of other student colleagues. In this context, an external reference or verification of the truth of subject statements is much less important than subjects’ access to that truth about their racialized identities. In the interviews, subjects witness to the truth of their colleagues dominance and, unwittingly, to their own access to its production.

In an earlier chapter, Felman and Laub conclude that teaching, like psychoanalysis, takes place only through some sort of crisis if the purpose of teaching is to produce change. They continue that teaching is a performative, and
not just a cognitive event, "insofar as both [teaching and psychoanalysis] strive to produce, and to enable, change" (p. 53). This helps to explain why classroom interventions and ameliorative attempts to disrupt white dominance are frequently ineffective. When whiteness, in all other respects, is continually celebrated and performed in the classroom, then opportunities for change are restricted to further elaboration on the power of whiteness. If change occurs only through some sort of crisis, such as the flux and uncertainty in identities which are otherwise normatively foreclosed in traditional pedagogies, how may the possibilities of change be held open so that change can occur? How can flux and change be understood as productive of identities and not only destructive?

Felman and Laub respond: "The question for the teacher is, then, on the one hand, how to access, how not to foreclose the crisis, and, on the other hand, how to contain it, how much crisis can the class sustain" (p. 54).

Subject discourses indicate how they work very hard to perform themselves as acceptable teacher material and to forestall any identifications by which these identities may be repudiated and excluded. Subjects become cheer leaders for the teaching profession and for themselves, pouring considerable energy into a single-minded performance and citation. Therefore any suggestion of the return of repudiated and abject selves is a source of trauma and crisis in their learning. The resistance, fear and rage at this decentring process are evidence of the cracks in the armour/mirror of the self of subjects' desire. The significance of these reactions, however, cannot be overemphasized as they provide access to the excessive, liminal spaces, the shifts in identity which, while traumatic, inherently support the possibility of the undoing of culturally specific identities of liberal humanism. In a description of the subject, Belsey (1980) says that it is "perpetually in the process of construction, thrown into crisis by
alterations in language and in the social formation, capable of change. And in the fact that the subject is a process lies the possibility of transformation (p. 50).

It is not always and only rage and aggression that results from the processes of testifying and witnessing to changes in oneself and others; neither are subjects' reactions uniform in this regard. I suggest that the recognition of students' trauma is important to their learning; and, of course, many teachers provide this recognition instinctively, if only out of necessity for the smooth continuation of a class. Felman says that a teacher's bearing witness to students' trauma addresses it as the serious event that it is. This process avoids foreclosing on the crisis and, instead, provides some way of interpreting and reintegrating the crisis of identity into a form that has meaning.

This discussion of the effects of witnessing and testifying is not included here as a pedagogical solution or a prescription for practice. For one thing, providing specific strategies is not the express intent of this research; and even though psychoanalysis and teaching may have some parallels, my attempt to understand only one of them is more than sufficient. The insight provided by psychoanalysis, however, is that this trauma and rage are themselves witnesses to the possibility of change. This is not to suggest that one must antagonize students and try to provoke a crisis; but when these occasions happen, herein comprises the very expressions of what subjects cannot bear to know. These uncertainties are the sites of change if we can stand and bear witness at these often contentious times. A less traumatic occasion for examining points of rupture is the discovery of contradictions found in subject discourses such as used in this project. As an instrument for anti-racist practices, the power of discourse analysis resides in its ability to identify the contradictions and dilemmas that arise in the processes in which white dominance is legitimated. Charting the "fragmented and dilemmatic nature of everyday discourse [is
important], because it is at those points of fracture and contradiction that there is scope for change and the redirection of argument" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 219). In particular, the processes whereby the dilemmas are explained and legitimated may be productive sites for change, for in many ways, it is the appearance of normalcy in the conversations of would-be teaching subjects who intend to "make a difference", which gives racism its license.

These processes which take seriously the testimonial and contradictory aspects of student identities underline the necessities and some of the difficulties for keeping open the production of identity formation. What these processes suggest, however, is that at times like these, when dominance starts to become unsettled and repressed identities threaten, that the production of identities may be available for re-examination and become the subjects of discourse. If, as Foucault claims, the relations of power are productive, then the social phenomenon which repression seeks to prohibit also produces the occasion that may inadvertently "enable, refigure, and proliferate" (Stoler, p. 118) the very phenomenon of repudiation. Of course, recognizing the contingencies of identity production is not a solution in itself, but it does support the thinking about how to "live with rather than foreclose contradictory impulses" (Flax, 1993, p. 29) just as it lends support against the disillusionment that change is impossible.

Accessing those spaces which exceed the limits of thinking and what may be thought seem to be necessary steps for raising questions of concern for education, identity formation, and knowledge production. Other significant questions consider how one can identify differently while retaining an identity "as a state of emergency" (Britzman, 1995). Examining one's own ethical relations, Britzman suggests, might allow for the discovery of meaning one has vested in normative practices. While it is surely a risk of the self to explore what
one cannot bear to know concerning one's relation to the dominant social order, it is this risk of uncertainty that is a source of possibility.

Working towards the opening of pedagogical discourses, in some ways, would seem to be profoundly anti-educational, going as it does against the possibility of certain knowledge. This desire for certainty, however, is itself problematic in its attempt to "fix the unfixable" (Flax, p. 25). Truth and certainty are very seductive qualities for the subjects of this research, for it is by these securities that their innocence is guaranteed and their accountability fulfilled. And, I volunteer that these subjects are not alone in the seduction of their desire for certainties. Flax concludes: "It is extremely difficult for us to accept and live such unstable and painful ambivalence. However, these junctures are exactly where responsibility beyond innocence looms as a promise and a frightening necessity" (p. 147).

Summary remarks

The concluding remarks for this dissertation are no less plagued by my desire for certainties than those desires I have identified in subject discourses. Although definitive statements are not readily forthcoming, I would be ungrateful if I did not appreciate the validating effect of subject discourses to make obvious what they and I have been afraid to know. The elaborate process of interviews and data analysis has produced information that, in many ways and at some levels, has always already been available to me and to the many others who write and think about processes of racialization, whiteness, pedagogy, national identifications.

Britzman suggests that reading or theorizing a situation follows from reflection on how one has embodied it. In this research process on the effects of racialized domination, the question again returns of how to embody knowledge
and understanding of whiteness; is domination always necessary; and what does this embodied ethics look like? While it may seem like a contradiction to say that it is difficult to make definitive statements about this research, and on the other hand, to declare that I and others have known about these processes of performing whiteness all along, I suggest that this is the situation in which I now find myself. In some ways I long for the objectivity in scholarly research of which I complained earlier. For it is my lack of distance and objectivity with this topic and the difficulty of separating myself from it that confound my closing remarks. I do not think I am exceptional in this dilemma regarding those who try to witness a personal characteristic which, to them, has been made to seem as natural and necessary as breathing. While typing these words and pages, I have been startled many times to find that I have typed “whiteness” for “witness”. On some level, there is no irony in this at all. The conclusions that can be drawn from this work, both by me and others, have already exceeded what I had intended to say. At the same time, they fall short of those other understandings that remain unsaid and still need to be spoken aloud.

These summarizing remarks do not necessarily reflect notions that have never before seen the light of day. Nor do they dismiss other conclusions that I am not mentioning. The points I have included here are salient because of the force by which they have yet again been made obvious through the research. For example, that racialized dominance is organized and iterated at the level of subject identity is not news; but recognizing that loss of identity is what is at stake in some pedagogical practices provides at least a partial explanation of classroom events which involve some rearrangement of students’ self-understanding. Taking seriously the depth of un/conscious knowledge which comprises student learning, especially in regard to anti-racist programs, is better preparation for a teacher of oppositional knowledge than assuming that a negative student
reception is simply a matter of intellectual ability, student's psychological
makeup, biological inheritance, factors in students' environments, or somehow
attributable to students' character or lack thereof. Without pedagogical practices
which will support and facilitate students' critical needs as they become aware of
the effects of their dominance, teachers easily feel overwhelmed by the student
resistance to their course material. I have observed immense antagonism in anti-
oppression classes to the extent that teachers hurriedly rewrite and reduce those
parts of the course outlines which so inflame students. Opening up the
possibilities to change self-identities meets with enormous resistance as students
refuse knowledge that is threatening to them. Having some appreciation for
student desires and fantasies may be useful to anti-oppression teachers in
preparing for the emotional reactions of students and the strength of their
resistance.

Subject desire for status and legitimacy is productive of identities in
individual bodies and in national identifications. The constant necessity and
impossibility of fixing identities is performed, through various discursive
practices, against the possibility of the abject self and other. At risk of abjection,
subject desire for legitimation calls on various historic and social relations to
produce a normative self—a normativity which is unquestionably produced as
dominant. In Canada, national identity is produced as a white identification
against a backdrop of abject First Nations peoples. In this necessary process of
forgetting, white identified Canadians are produced as new original people
whose attachment to whiteness is constantly secured in various forms of identity
and, simultaneously, constantly under threat from various shades of whiteness.

Against the debilitating possibility that subjects in this research may be
other than legitimate, self-determining agents, subjects are passionate to perform
themselves as "bodies that matter". The height of their awareness of and the
intensity of their desire for a legitimating subjectivity can be read in subject fantasies for ideal teacher status. The historic positioning of teachers as the embodiment of white practices offers some security to which subjects might not otherwise have access considering normative social indicators such as ethnic status, sexuality, class, gender, ability, language, appearance, and so forth. In the looming possibility that their status is not secure, subjects allow little room for nuance; against competing alternatives, they perform themselves as liberal, white, and especially as innocent. Analysis of subject discourse implies the strength of their desire for a positive identification with whiteness and innocence—no matter how it is justified and in the face of numerous contradictions. Occasions for discussing racial identifications, including antiblack pedagogies, invariably provide opportunities for white subjects to reconfirm their whiteness as dominant by reconfirming whiteness as innocent. For, like godliness and innocence, whiteness appears as a virtue. This dissertation returns to questions of pedagogy and a re-consideration of the value of anti-racism and other oppositional work which may, due to the virulence of dominating ideologies, support the retrenchment of oppressive discourses.

In the many-layered everydayness of subjects' lives, hierarchical relations both support and are enabled by the provisional, uncertain, and ideologically laden nature of teachers' identity formation, especially their claim on whiteness. Subjects' desire for certainty in these hierarchical relations and their fear of finding it in ways which do not flatter their self-images place limits on the transformative possibilities of anti-racist pedagogies. The reiterative processes by which subjects perform their identifications can be read in the language of their interviews: the desire for the other and the fantasy of "becoming" are imbricated with fear of the other and subjects' terror of engulfment. Themes of innocence and redemption are paramount in subject discourses on Canadian identity in
which subjects can never completely perform as saviour because their dominant identities are always already dependent upon the other for salvation.
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APPENDIX

Student Interview Schedule

A.

1. How old are you?
2. Where were you born?
3. Did you attend high school in an urban or rural area?
4. What languages do you speak?
5. What was your first language?
6. What cultural, racial, or ethnic background do you identify with?
7. Are you a Canadian?

I am interviewing you and other students because of your experience in EDFDT 335.3 First Nations and Cross-Cultural Education: Introduction. Now that the class is over, I am interested in how you think about yourself especially regarding your role as a teacher.

B.

1. How relevant do you think this course EDFDT 335.3 First Nations and Cross-Cultural Education: Introduction is for you as a future teacher? for now?
2. Why do you think this course has been included as an education course?
3. What did you get out of it?
4. When do race and culture come up in other classes you have taken? Why do you think these issues don’t come up more often?
5. What experiences have you had with people from cultures different from your own?
6. What experiences have you had with people from races different from your own?
C.

1. What made you decide to become a teacher?

2. What qualities do you have that make you think you will be a good teacher?

3. In your mind, picture a good teacher. Describe this person.

4. What did you learn about yourself in the course?

5. Has the course changed how you view other cultures or races? Please explain.

6. Has the course changed how you view yourself as a teacher? Please explain.

________________________

D.

1. Describe some of the characteristics of the people who are culturally most like you.

2. How are these characteristics the same as or different from characteristics that you would use to describe other Canadians?

3. How would you define a Canadian? How are you the same or different from other Canadians?

4. In as much detail as possible, describe what you consider to be a typical Canadian.
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<th>self-identification</th>
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