JOHN HENRY NEWMAN ON EDUCATION

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of English
University of Toronto

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ABSTRACT

John Henry Newman on Education was submitted by M. Jane Rupert to the Department of English at the University of Toronto for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1998.

In The Idea of a University, Newman’s gentleman followed the humanist tradition of Aristotle’s man of general culture who understands issues from a knowledge of the principles involved and approaches areas of truth only through the particular methods which make them properly accessible. Parallels between the Nicomachean Ethics and The Idea of a University establish this common ground. Newman’s own example illustrates the way a knowledge of fundamental principles and methods resolves ambiguities and links theories to their consequences: for example, his distinction between science and moral and religious truth in "The Tamworth Reading Room"; his differentiation between liberal and useful education in The Idea of a University; his description in the Grammar of Assent of the organon through which we know indemonstrable truth; his separation of religious formation from the cultivation of the intellect because religious formation pertains to conscience and is mediated through such channels as sacraments, preaching, and the model of others.

A comparison of Newman and Bacon, two arbiters of method, confirms the importance to both of applying methods only to those areas of truth which they serve to illuminate: physical science, social matters, and God. However, in The Advancement of Learning, in order to redirect learning towards useful knowledge and material well-being, Bacon dismisses speculative truth, the traditional field of humanist learning and the centrepiece of liberal education. This reorientation of learning influenced subsequent educational theories which increasingly recognized only the method of observation and experiment in all areas of learning including language.
As a first principle in education, Newman assumes an objective, intelligibly unified world. The similarity between Newman’s point of departure and traditional humanist education is evident in the commonalities between Quintilian’s *On the Early Education of the Citizen-orator* and Newman’s views on education particularly as described in *The Catholic University Gazette*. Unlike Baconian theories of education, liberal education for the man of general culture recognizes the distinction between the rhetorical mode of thought required by letters and methodical or philosophical reasoning from principles. Humanist training coupled with moral and religious formation develop the Christian humanist gentleman.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the generosity of the Metropolitan Separate School Board and the Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Association for a study leave granted to me in 1993-4. I am grateful for the guidance provided by my advisers: for the initial encouragement provided by the late John Robson, for Peter Morgan's generosity with his time, for the sound, practical advice provided by Heather Murray, and for the fine sense of language provided by Harvey Kerpneck who saw this project through to the end. I am also indebted to Chris Rupert, s.j. for his unflagging assistance with computer difficulties. I thank my family and my friends for their sustained encouragement during this project and their shared delight in its completion.
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Introduction

The clarity of thought and faculty for making discriminating judgments which John Henry Newman believed to result from a liberal education was to be achieved not only through a knowledge of first principles of branches of knowledge but also through familiarity with the methods associated with broad areas of truth. The intellect cultivated through a knowledge of principles and methods led to what Aristotle calls a man of culture and what Newman calls a man of philosophic habit or a gentleman. Culture for both Aristotle and Newman refers to a mind trained in first principles and cognizant of the importance of approaching any area of knowledge through the method suited to it.

In order to examine the emphasis placed by Newman on methods, I have located his thought in reference to two great arbiters of method to whom he frequently refers in The Idea of a University: Aristotle and Bacon. Aristotle, who fits Newman’s description in the Idea of a man who has mapped out the universe and knows "the relative disposition of things," describes the various methods by which we know: through the noetic faculty of immediate insight we know ultimate particulars and ultimate principles; through induction we proceed from particulars to universals in a manner suited especially to the operations of physical nature; through "habituation" we investigate the more complicated area of human affairs using dialectic and the topics discussed by Aristotle in the Organon. Bacon, in his Novum Organon, sought to refine the method of induction. He ardently promoted this method for the study of physical nature and the acquisition of useful knowledge. In The Advancement of Learning, where he reviews the state of learning up to his time, he observes that there are only four different kinds of proof applicable to specific subject matters: by the immediate consent of the mind and sense, by induction, through the syllogism, and through "congruity (which Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and not a notioribus)” (135).

Just as Bacon found the instrument of induction deficient in his time for the investigation of nature, Newman found Aristotelian logic inadequate and sought to articulate how we reason in matters which cannot be demonstrated in the way deduction proves a proposition in geometry or induction discovers or confirms a principle in the physical sciences. The organon that Newman describes in the Grammar of Assent is suggestive of Aristotle’s method described

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by Bacon as demonstration "by congruity" or "demonstration in orb or circle."² Newman states that in particular indemonstrable matters, we arrive at personal certitude through probabilities, none of which is in itself conclusive but which converge from various quarters to persuade us of the truth of a matter. Certitude may emerge, for example, "by objections overcome, by adverse theories neutralized, by difficulties gradually clearing up, by exceptions proving the rule, by unlooked-for correlations found with received truths..." (254). To explain this mode of reasoning, he takes the example of a polygon drawn within a circle so that its points touch the sides of the circle. If the number of the sides of the polygon is increased, the sides approach proportionately closer to the circle without ever actually becoming the circle.³ In this mode of reasoning, it is through the connection of parts that an idea is known. In theology, for example, the truth of one doctrine is established when we see its location in relation to other doctrines; it is their connections, mutually and as a whole, which constitute their truth.⁴

This manner of reasoning is similar to that used by the Roman orator trained through a rhetorical education for forensic pleading and for the deliberative rhetoric used in public life, for example, to weigh political problems. As the study of empirical science is conducted through the inductive method of observation, the study of language and literature as transmitted through the humanist tradition was conducted through a rhetorical pattern of thought similar to the organon described by Newman in the Grammar. The gentleman graduate of a liberal education was familiar not only with first principles of branches of knowledge but also with all modes of thought including particularly this rhetorical pattern. Through an intensive study of a few books conducted with a sense of the methods suited to literature and science, whether the science of logic and grammar or physical science, the graduate would recognize the misapplication of methods to areas where they could not be of use.

Newman's own characteristic habit of mind is to probe truth through a discrimination of methods and principles. As Plato's pedagogical method coincided with his method of

² The Grammar of Assent is a work contemplated by Newman before he was Rector of the Catholic University of Ireland. It was begun nineteen different times in many different ways and finally published in 1870. All citations are from Grammar of Assent (Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame P., 1979).

³ In the Grammar, Newman also compares this mode of reasoning to the method of proof used in modern calculus where conclusions are foreseen rather than actually attained. In a lemma, such as the one with which Newton opens his "Principia," a proposition is assumed preliminary to the demonstration of another. Explicit proof of such mathematical thought is sometimes provided only much later (253).

⁴ In "Imagination and Hermeneutical Theology: Newman's Contributions to Theological Method," David Hammond refers to this master principle of Newman in connection to John Coulson's observations in Religion and Imagination (note #36, 33).
research, as Aristotle employs in the Ethicsthe method described in the Organon, so Newman proceeds in his writings from a habit of mind familiar with elementary methods and principles, i.e., the habit of mind which is to be developed through a liberal education. My study of Newman's educational thought differs from previous studies not only in its emphasis on the importance Newman accorded to the gentleman's discrimination between methods and the area of truth to which they apply but in my examination of the nature of the cultivated intellect, the goal of liberal education described in The Idea of a University, through Newman's own example. I shall in particular consider the habit of mind that he demonstrates in the Idea (1852), in the Grammar of Assent (1870), and in "The Tamworth Reading Room" (1841), a series of articles written to The Times a decade before the Dublin Discourses on education.

To proceed from Newman's demonstration to his idea is particularly suited to Newman's mode of thought which typically arrives at ideas through the mutual connections of parts and communicates ideas through examples and illustrations. J.H. Walgrave states that reasoning for Newman means "showing the coherence of individual elements within a fundamental intuition of reality." Similarly in John Henry Newman, Educateur, Fernande Tardivel writes that Newman's great gift was to develop the highest truths while staying in intimate contact

5 H.-I. Marrou writes of Plato: "l'enseignement coïncide avec la méthode de recherche" (106). The active acquisition of ideas understood as external to the student involved making students work to discover for themselves first a particular difficulty, then the means of surmounting it.

6 In Ethics of Aristotle, Burnet states: "Dialectic is the subject of that part of the Organon called the Topics, and it is there that we shall find the theoretical justification of the method employed in the Ethics" (xl).

7 In "Newman on Faith and Reason," John D. Horgan finds that in A Grammar of Assent Newman's "diffuseness and wealth of illustration" is such that it obscures the main issue. What he describes as Newman's procedure in the Grammar is typical of Newman's reasoning in general. He states that Newman aimed primarily at inducing the right dispositions in the reader's mind "through a variety of references and illustrations, so as to suggest and insinuate truth rather than force it bluntly on the mind or prove it formally" (149).

In "The Living Mind: Newman on Assent and Dissent," Gerard Magill's description of the relation between the convergence of particular facts and a hypothesis in Newman's mode of reasoning explains the integral connection between the definition and the illustration of an idea. Magill reminds us of Newman's observation in the Grammar: "When the conclusion is assumed as a hypothesis, it throws light upon a multitude of collateral facts, accounting for them and uniting them together in one whole" (146). He cites from a letter of Newman's to Canon Walker (July 6, 1864) comparing a moral demonstration to a number of separate threads, each feeble, which together make a cable as strong as an iron rod (145-6). c.f. Wilfred Ward's reference to this letter in connection to response to the Apologia (The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman, vol. 2, 43).

8 Newman the Theologian, 365.
with particular cases (205). From another perspective, Martin Svaglic observes that "The Idea of a University began as deliberative rhetoric...and...proof by example was the most convincing mode of argument."9

Through Newman's own example, I shall test the viability of the claim that by training students to distinguish first principles and methods, one will help the graduate see clearly in the many particular instances encountered throughout his life the danger of murkiness of thought caused by a confusion of principles and methods. Just as the conscience, rendered attentive through religious formation, distinguishes right from wrong in the practical area of conduct, the trained intellect will acquire a habit of mind that distinguishes the misapplication of methods and clearly discerns the consequences of theories and principles.

It is through understanding the methods suited to a subject matter as much as through an understanding of its organizing principles that Newman's gentleman will recognize errors in procedure. Such errors lead to extravagant claims in areas of truth approached through the wrong method. He will recognize Aristotle's fundamental distinction between demonstrable truth, as in the empirical sciences, and indemonstrable truth in religion or in the human sciences where deliberation is required and choice is operative; he will acknowledge that different methods are required for these different kinds of truth.10 The cultured man will, like Newman in the "Tamworth Reading Room," recognize the fault in method in expecting religious formation through abstract scientific information or in expecting to arrive at revealed truth through induction from natural phenomena. Similarly, if in religion the heart and the imagination are engaged in a personal relation with God, the study of theology without a prior religious disposition will remain an abstract exercise. Like Newman in "Literature", his lecture delivered to the School of Philosophy and Letters in 1858,11 Newman's gentleman will not expect the same exactness of definition demanded by the physical sciences in the literary use of

9 Introduction to Idea, xvi.

10 Concerning the two kinds of truth and the different faculties of the soul on which they draw, Aristotle states:

Let it be assumed that there are two rational elements: with one of these we apprehend the realities whose fundamental principles do not admit of being other than they are, and with the other we apprehend things which do admit of being other. For if we grant that knowledge presupposes a certain likeness and kinship of subject and object, there will be a generically different part of the soul naturally corresponding to each of two different kinds of object. Let us call one the scientific and the other the calculative element (vi, 1139a). Nicomachean Ethics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962) 147.

11 Idea, 201-221.
language which seeks to express accurately the inner resonances of individual thought. Or if, as Newman maintains in Discourse ix, literature is a reflection of fallen human nature or if philosophy is theoretical, the cultured person will not expect literature or philosophy to effect moral reform. A cultured person will not confuse material civilization with intellectual culture or religious needs. Trained in method or "in a connected view or grasp of things," he will also recognize a shallow disregard of facts, uninformed opinion, facile views in journalism, and "parti-coloured ingenuities" which Newman describes in his Preface to the Idea as "one of the chief evils of the day" (xliii, xlv).

My claim that Newman believed a liberal education would develop a habit of mind capable of making discriminating judgments through the experience of various methods and knowledge of first principles joins the many different interpretations of Newman's view of the purpose of a liberal education. It is a rejection of the claim by some commentators who, in spite of Newman's own disclaimer in his Preface to the Idea, have assumed that Newman's educational aim was to produce gentlemen of leisure on an English model entirely unsuited to post-famine Ireland. In "The Godless and the Burlesque: Newman and the other Irish Universities," Kieran Flanagan complains that Newman's idea of a gentleman with no need to earn a living was "socially inappropriate to the Irish context" (260). In "Newman in His Own Day," printed in the most recent edition of the Idea (1996), Martha McMackin Garland states that the Irish could not be leisurely and that Newman's idea of a gentleman was "a luxury that a new educational system could ill afford" (272-3).12

My claim that a liberal education was useful in the powers of discernment that it developed is also a refutation of the persistent conjecture that Newman's idea of the training of the mind lacked practical purpose. More than forty years ago in The Imperial Intellect (1955) Dwight Culler questioned whether knowledge pursued, as Newman states, "for its own sake," does not become "a kind of mental gymnastic, a mere exercise of the mind" (216). In the most recent edition of the Idea, Martha McMackin Garland still wonders if Newman does not assume that the "mind works like a muscle" or that the purpose of a liberal education is merely to strengthen intellectual and logical skills in a kind of intellectual gymnastics (272). My approach provides a practical verification through observation of Newman's own procedure of...

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12 In the Preface, Newman states: "some persons may be tempted to complain, that I have servilely followed the English idea of a University, to the disparagement of that Knowledge which I profess to be so strenuously upholding; and they may anticipate that an academic system, formed upon my model, will result in nothing better or higher than in the production of that antiquated variety of human nature and remnant of feudalism, as they consider it, called 'a gentleman.' Now, I have anticipated this charge in various parts of my discussion..." (xxxvii-xxxviii).
the claim made by others, like Ian Ker, that the purpose of a liberal education was to train the student to think or was a training of the judgment; it is also a verification of the extension of this claim, specifying that a training in judgment involves an understanding of the principles of areas of knowledge and their methods and that this understanding has a practical application extending potentially to all areas of life. It provides a verification of the claim made by Jaroslav Pelikan, for example, in The Idea of a University (1992), where he maintains that Newman's first principles were not impracticable, that if they were sound they would work (25). Pelikan's comparison of the late twentieth century university with Newman's ideas is in itself a working illustration of the type of cultivated mind which begins with first principles envisaged by Newman and which I shall examine in Newman himself. Pelikan notes, for instance, the fault in procedure of the contemporary suspicion of metaphysics and underlying intellectual foundations, as in the priority given by William James to experience over abstraction or the raising of relativism to a first principle which threatens to bankrupt "the entire intellectual enterprise" (29). My approach also tests Martin Svanglic's statement in the introduction to his edition of the Idea, that the science of sciences, which Newman sees as a function of the University in harmonizing and discriminating between subject matters and methods, was also the goal of the student through learning "the basic principles of every subject we pursue" or through "special courses in logic and metaphysics" (xxi). My examination of the distinctions Newman makes between large areas of truth will support Ian Ker's rejection of the view that the science of sciences is the study of logic or a subject on the curriculum; rather, it is "the result of learning to think properly," and of "training the mind to be accurate, consistent, logical and orderly."13 In other words, discriminating among these several views, I shall demonstrate through the many distinctions Newman himself makes between methods and areas of truth that the kind of discernment of truth he intended to encourage through a liberal education was based on accurate definition of first principles and an awareness of methods in their connection to particular areas of truth; this foundation provided an enduring perspective for viewing entangled contemporary issues and confusions resulting from the misapplication of methods.

Newman was deeply aware of the incompatibility of scientific method and the path towards religious belief and considered it a pressing need for his age to recognize this.14 He

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13 Ian Ker, The Achievement of John Henry Newman, 8-9. Ker writes that the aim of education is not culture but the cultivation of the mind.

14 Wilfred Ward gives an account of the hostility to The Rambler and The Home and Foreign Review, periodicals with which Newman was associated and which sought in the late 1850's and early 1860's to reconcile scientific fact and historical criticism with theology. Some Church officials believed that Newman and the writers in these periodicals raised issues which few English Catholics were either aware of or troubled by. (Life, vol. 1, 501-67).
believed that there could be no contradiction between theology, scientific fact and historical criticism; however, the increasing monopoly by the method suited to science on other areas of truth was the kind of error in procedure recognized by Aristotle's man of general culture and Newman's gentleman. It is not surprising that those commentators who have approached Newman's thought from the perspective of science or theology have most clearly observed the vital practical importance attributed by Newman to the distinction between various areas of truth and the method suited to knowing them. In "Newman and Science," Francis X. Connolly notes specifically in reference to the Idea the importance for Newman of distinguishing between the just claims of science and its encroachments on religion, theology, and philosophy. He states that Newman's distinction between these areas of truth "was just as important and much less ambiguous, than his explanation of knowledge as an end in itself and of the philosophic mind as the animating principle of the ideal university" (114). Other commentators have observed the importance to Newman of distinguishing the various areas of truth and the methods suited to knowing them but have not connected this to his educational thought or perceived this capacity for distinction as the specific act of the kind of mind cultivated by a liberal education. In "Science and Mathematics in Newman's Thought," for example, Gillian R. Evans remarks that Newman sought distinctive methods to mark off sciences from one another, seeking likeness and difference of method and principle at the level of the fundamental operations of the human mind (259-60); Evans comments on Newman's "strong sense of methodological propriety" which marks off sciences such as algebra and geometry from one another (259, 266). Similarly, without reference to Newman's educational thought, in "Newman and Evolution" Stanley Jaki speaks of Newman's discernment in distinguishing in the contemporary reaction to Darwin's theory a confusion between two different areas of truth: materialist physical science and the "self-acting originating human mind" (22). From the perspective of theology, in Newman and his Theological Method, Thomas J. Norris refers to Newman's Grammar of Assent and its painstaking study of the mind and human method in order to delineate the frontiers of scientific reasoning, philosophy, and theology, and how we inquire, understand and believe (2).15

Critics of Newman who have located the origins of his views on education in classical thought tend to assume that Newman saw the cultivated mind as essentially distinguishing the

error in confusing subject matters and the methods suited to knowing them. In *The Imperial Intellect*, Dwight Culler makes reference to Greek ideas on education in his discussion of "The Circle of the Sciences" and in "The Uses of Knowledge," but he fails to make a cohesive connection between these chapters and his chapter on "The Man of Philosophic Habit," the product of a liberal education. Most important, Culler concludes that Newman himself lacks the philosophic habit of mind described in the *Idea*, "which represents all that he wanted to be rather than all that he was" (204). My point of departure is exactly the opposite, that Newman demonstrates throughout the *Idea*, as in his writings in general, a philosophic habit of mind which is not only a distinctive characteristic of his thought but is also the pattern of the type of mind to be formed by a liberal education. In "Newman’s Doctrine of University Education," Michael Tierney also traces the sources of Newman’s humanist views to their Greek roots. He concludes that the perfection of the intellect had practical implications for Newman’s gentleman, supporting his view with reference to Aristotle’s great distinction between *sophia* as contemplative and *phronesis* as practical (128). Walter Jost, who locates Newman’s thought in the history of humanistic education and rhetorical procedure, also pleads for the usefulness in the public forum of the kind of intellect trained by a liberal education. He concludes that "'Philosophy’ is less a specific set of subject matters or activities than the capacity for discovery and discrimination among particulars." These statements on the applications of the cultivated intellect are closer to the position which I shall maintain is Newman’s *desideratum* for a liberal education.

In the first section of this inquiry, I shall show the connection begun in *The Imperial Intellect* by Culler between the Greek man of culture and Newman’s gentleman graduate (202-34). I shall concur with Jost that this graduate is expected to have the practical "capacity for discrimination among particulars." Through observation of Newman’s own distinctions in particular cases between first principles and methods in areas of knowledge, I shall also test the separate claims about the goal of a liberal education made by critics such as Dwight Culler, Jaroslav Pelikan, Ian Ker, Francis X. Connolly, Gillian R. Evans, Stanley Jaki, and Walter Jost.

16 In connection to Aristotle’s view of a man of culture, Culler observes:

* A knowledge of the elements or first principles of things, however, is not the only means by which the man of philosophic habit can achieve a species of universality. He can also achieve it by a knowledge of the methodology of the sciences....It was Aristotle, however, who made this knowledge into the hallmark of general culture (202-3).

Newman's pedagogical methodology was concerned with training the mind to grasp the controlling first principles of subject matters, their subsequent boundaries or scope, and the methods which admit of approaching their particular truths. While Newman maintains that liberal education should enlighten the student about the limits and interconnections of branches of knowledge known through their first principles, the movement between intelligible principles and particulars according to the method suited to a particular subject matter is the basis of all Newman's pedagogical procedure. In his introduction to his edition of the Idea, Martin Svaglic comments on the connection between Newman's view of the aim of "liberal knowledge—a knowledge of first principles and relations rather than of mere facts" and Newman's Aristotelian mode of reasoning as defining "true knowledge in terms of its matter (facts, mere learning) and its form (order, the investing of fact with an idea)" (xx). Svaglic notes that in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines the truly educated person as "a mean between the man of mere information who generalizes nothing and the man whose 'viewiness' renders him impatient of fact and therefore unreliable in his assertions" (xx-xxi).

Without a grasp of this "organised, and therefore living knowledge" of "things in their relation to one another," education is sterile and unmeaning. The effect of the absence of an organizing principle on a subject matter is described by Newman in his impressions of Professor Buckland's lectures on geology which he attended as a youth in 1819. Geology, "at that time a new, interesting Science," had yet to define itself clearly as a science or system with an intelligible informing principle. Newman refers to "the very desultory way in which he imparts his information. For, to tell the truth, the science is so in its infancy, that no regular system is formed. Hence the lectures are rather an enumeration of facts from which probabilities are deduced, than a consistent and luminous theory, of certainties illustrated by occasional examples." The absence of system informing a course of study suffers from this same lack of


19 Newman, Ecrits Autobiographiques, 98, 126. Sir Charles Lyell (1797-1875), as a contemporary of Newman at Oxford, also attended the Buckland lectures. In 1830, he published Principles of Geology. The funeral oration for Lyell in 1875, delivered by A.P. Stanley as Dean of Westminster, distinguished between the study of creation in geological science and the second spiritual creation of mankind in Christ. "Sermons on Special Occasions" in Religious Controversies of the Nineteenth Century.

Harvey Kerpneck in "A Smattering of a Hundred Things," points out that Newman's view of order or wisdom is central to his "whole vision of reality, of the nature of the world man is circumstanced in" (23). Kerpneck states that in Newman's perspective "without order there can be no meaning" and he suggests that courses must have a central organizing principle rather than being "a smattering of a hundred things" (23, 25).
realities and meaning. Newman describes as "sorry and unsatisfactory" his own exhausting preparation for exams at Trinity where he was left on his own "to this or that course of study by accident or caprice." He states: "It is a great thing to have a routine prescribed, in which the student is obliged to move, without choice of his own."20

Coleridge, whose own interest in education and the "science of method" resembles Newman's, also describes the relation between organizing principles and particular facts. He refers to the futility of getting by heart a great number of terms in chemistry with "some ideas, very scanty in number" to attach to them.21 The absence of intelligible principles connecting facts is also aptly illustrated by Coleridge in the "uncultivated understanding" of the garrulous nurse in Romeo and Juliet and Mrs. Quickley in Henry iv, neither of whom can distinguish the essential in details; Hamlet's intelligence contrasts with these characters but tends too much in the opposite direction towards abstraction from the real or to what Newman calls the notional. Coleridge suggests that the right relation between the intelligible which enlivens the particular is illustrated in Shakespeare's own method in the creation of his characters, in "that just proportion, that union and interpenetration of the universal and the particular, which must ever pervade all works of decided genius and true science."22

Relatively little has been written about Newman's pedagogical practice for training the mind perhaps because, as Fergal McGrath remarks in Newman's University: Idea and Reality, "[d]etailed information as to his actual methods is comparatively rare" (432). In "Newman on Educational Method: Educating for Real Life," H. Francis Davis has indicated the possibility

20 Ecrits Autobiographiques, 120.

21 Alice D. Snyder, Coleridge on Logic and Learning, 26.


The intention of Coleridge and Newman was similar. Alice Snyder describes Coleridge's purpose as seeking to convince an age of theological and metaphysical truths and to support old venerable truths (Coleridge on Logic and Learning, 11). Both were interested in education and absorbed by post-Baconian problems of logic in reaching truth. Coleridge's unfulfilled proposal in 1825 for three lectures on the founding of the University of London in some ways resembles Newman's Idea. He considered defining the meaning of the term "university," describing its idea, the full tree and its branches (Coleridge on Logic and Learning, 41). For Newman, the rational principle was both objectively real and subjectively apprehended. In the Apologia, Newman refers to an article entitled "The State of Religious Parties" which he wrote for the British Critic (April 1, 1839) in which he praises Coleridge's contribution to the era by instilling "a higher philosophy into inquiring minds" but also criticizes him for indulging "a liberty of speculation" (203).
of writing on the subject of Newman's pedagogical method, suggesting that an important source of such a study would be found in the relation between abstract or notional knowledge and concrete particulars or examples which make the abstract real and convincing to the student (111). In spite of the scarcity of the materials, the attempt to characterize Newman's pedagogical method is important because of the light it will shed on Newman's aims expressed in the Idea.

The most readily available material for analysis of Newman's method is found in two essays in the second half of the Idea: "Elementary Studies" and "University Preaching." The first of these was originally written for the university newspaper as an example to students of an entrance exam. Martin Svaglic comments that this essay of Newman's "brings sharply home to the reader Newman's distinction between knowledge and learning" and "provides a vivid illustration of his own methods as a teacher."23 In "University Preaching," a guide to guest preachers at the University Church and originally published in the Gazette in 1855, Newman maintains that a sermon should be the illustration of only one idea. Fernande Tardivel comments that Newman's advice on preaching in this essay illustrates the perfect cohesiveness of Newman's pedagogy.24

There are other sources of material for a study of Newman's pedagogy which have not received much attention. While the Grammar of Assent was not written with a pedagogical purpose, Newman uses many illustrations in it from various branches of knowledge such as history, religion, grammar, poetry, and chemistry. In "Science and Mathematics in Newman's Thought," Gillian R. Evans draws on this source for illustrating from mathematics the importance Newman attributes to method and definition. The Catholic University Gazette (1854-55), the collection of issues of the University newspaper which has never been republished and is not readily available, is a valuable source of material for a study of Newman's pedagogical method. He provides many sample exams as well as advice to students about, for example, how to read intelligently, how to remember, how to organize time, and pitfalls to be avoided like self-absorption.

Valuable information on Newman's idea of pedagogical method is also available in autobiographical and biographical material describing Newman's years as Tutor at Oriel College which provided the formative experience for his pedagogical views. Newman has supplied material on this subject in his Autobiographical Writings; Fernande Tardivel, declaring that for

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23 Introduction to the Idea, xxiv.

Newman action was the form of his ideas on education,\textsuperscript{25} has studied these years and included testimony from Newman's students about his help to them; Fergal McGrath in Newman's University: Idea and Reality and Dwight Culler in The Imperial Intellect have also gathered valuable information about Newman's pedagogical approach as Tutor. That Newman's pedagogical method can be legitimately studied from these earlier years is made clear by Newman's own testimony in his "Introductory" to the Idea where he states that he has long held his views on university education which "have grown into my whole system of thought, and are, as it were, part of myself" (3).

I shall examine Newman's view of moral and religious formation at the Catholic University of Ireland in the final section of my study. Here I shall maintain that Newman grounded this formation in the development of conscience which he understood as not merely moral but as theocentric or as oriented ultimately towards God. The dual moral and intellectual enterprise of Christian humanist education was to train the judgment in a practical discernment of truth and to develop students' sensitivity to the practical moral dictates of conscience in relation to its source in God.

The central importance of conscience in Newman's religious thought has been observed in Argument from Conscience to the Existence of God (1961), a collaborative study by Adrian J. Boekraad and Henry Tristram.\textsuperscript{26} In their long introduction to Newman's study of conscience, Boekraad and Tristram refer to the deep personal mystery of our existence in its interplay with events, to the unitive centre of conscience and the creative, originating activity of spirit as the point of departure for Newman's spiritual vision. In The Concept of Conscience according to John Henry Newman, F. James Kaiser examines Newman's view of conscience which, with the intellect, is a factor in judgment. Kaiser states that for Newman conscience was a constituent element of the human mind like reason, imagination, and memory;\textsuperscript{27} free habitual obedience to a theocentric conscience orients the whole person to God.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 9.


\textsuperscript{27} c.f. "Proof of Theism" in Argument from Conscience to the Existence of God. After observing that we are aware of our existence through the exercise of sensation, memory and reasoning, Newman states that he includes conscience among "those primary conditions of the mind which are involved in the fact of existence." In the former, we are aware of our existence as connected to the external world but in Newman's theocentric view of the experience of conscience, we are aware of our being in connection to an Unseen Being. Newman's ideas on religious formation, as distinct from intellectual cultivation, are based on ways suited to fostering this vital relationship between the individual human being and a personal God.
Vincent Blehl’s discussion of conscience suggests a solution to the thorny problem of the way in which moral formation, which Newman maintains is distinct from intellectual education, works with the intellect in judgment. Because in the Idea of a University Newman presents his views specifically on intellectual cultivation rather than moral formation, it is not surprising that some critics are puzzled by the connection between intellectual and moral education.28 In "The Patristic Humanism of John Henry Newman," Blehl suggests that the moral discrimination effected through the dictates of the theocentric conscience in conjunction with the discriminations of the cultivated intellect together make the Christian gentleman of the Christian humanist tradition. That tradition was known to Newman, for example, through his immersion in the Church Fathers.29 The Christian humanist view is a coincidentia oppositorum (269) in which the vertical axis of the transcendental relation effected through obedience to conscience is coupled with the horizontal axis of the disciplined, cultivated intellect.30 Blehl suggests that it was under the influence of the Fathers of the Church that Newman saw the grave danger for the two distinct processes in the encroachment of secular reason on faith and of knowledge on devotion. He links Newman’s portrait in the Idea of the merely ethical gentleman who is motivated by appearances to Newman’s statement in Historical Sketches about the tendency of the intellect to find substitutes for the conscience in propriety, expedience and law.

28 For example, Daniel G. Mulcahy in "Cardinal Newman’s Concept of a Liberal Education," 97.

29 Blehl notes Newman’s reference to the Church Fathers in his introductory remarks of the Idea: "Those principles, which I am now to set forth under the sanction of the Catholic Church, were my profession at that early period of my life, when religion was to me more a matter of feeling and experience than of faith. They did but take greater hold upon me, as I was introduced to the records of Christian Antiquity..."(Idea, 3).

Blehl also refers to Newman’s remark in "Basil and Gregory" in Historical Sketches that Basil would make the monk to be the true gentleman (vol. 2, 64).

30 Blehl points out Newman’s distinction between the more rational moral sentiment and obedience to the dictates of conscience known in the feeling of having done right or wrong. The image of the rudderless or fatally drifting boat catches this idea of the absence of the vertical balancing polarity of the dictates of conscience. In J.A. Froude’s The Nemesis of Faith, Markham’s inattention in a drifting boat leads to the death of a child. The hero remarks that he realized that "obeying inclination, not controlling it" and attempting to separate morality from religion was madness (180-1). Markham’s religious dilemma was exacerbated by the differences in religious opinion of men of genius like Thomas Carlyle and Newman. At one point, he describes the latter as providing evidence of the soul of man as a "very living force, a very energy of God’s organic Will which rules and moulds this universe" (142) and he refers to the attraction of Newman to all at Oxford "who were not Arnoldized" (136).
Other critics have commented on Newman’s thought in the Christian humanist tradition but without reference to conscience as the religious and moral link. Fernande Tardivel speaks of Newman’s fusion of spiritual and intellectual excellence as proceeding from the example of Clement of Alexandria and St. Augustine. She notes Newman’s sermons as a source of his teaching on the need to christianize the intellectual heritage if civilization is not to be submerged by this heritage.31 In "Newman’s Doctrine of University Education," Michael Tierney considers Newman the "greatest among the pioneers of modern Christian Humanism" (122). He observes the sources of Newman’s humanism in Greek culture and notes the need for another polarity to counterbalance the defects of a liberal education. In "Newman, Christian or Humanist," H. Francis Davis characterizes Newman’s own intellectual integrity as "a kind of dialogue with himself in the presence of God" (525).

Mary Katherine Tillman has written of the connection in Newman’s thought between the moral consent of conscience and the intellectual assent involved in knowledge. She states that for Newman conscience is the prototype of the intellect’s concrete personal mode of knowing described by Newman in the Grammar of Assent.32 In "The Tension Between Intellectual and Moral Education in the Thought of John Henry Newman," Tillman notes the role of the imagination and personal influence in both the intellectual and moral orders, translating notions into images and making them real (332).

I shall maintain, as Vincent Blehl suggests, that for Newman a theocentric conscience was the religious axis of Christian humanist education. This claim has not been studied in relation to Newman’s activity at the Catholic University of Ireland. I shall extend the study of Newman’s views on education by examining the role of conscience in moral and religious formation from the perspective, first, of Newman’s own teaching on the subject in his sermons preached before the Catholic University of Ireland and, second, by showing the connection between Newman’s view of student discipline and the theocentric conscience.

In synopsis, in Chapter one, I locate Newman’s educational principles in the Aristotelian tradition of the man of general culture or education. This person of general culture, without the thorough knowledge of a specialist, can yet make sound judgments through a broad knowledge of subject-matters, through defining what can be expected of them, and

31 John Henry Newman, Educateur, 204-5.

Vincent Blehl remarks that many of Newman’s Oxford University sermons are saturated with patristic thought. He cites as examples: "The Usurpations of Reason," "Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth," and "The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion" (198).

through an awareness of the methods connected to them. As a knowledge of methods and the subject-matters to which they apply is the foundation of general culture, I briefly review methods and the kinds of truth with which they are associated as described by Aristotle. I contrast Newman’s organon for the investigation of indemonstrable truth with Aristotle’s. In this and in many other examples Newman demonstrates the characteristic habit of mind of the liberally educated gentleman who discriminates methods in connection with areas of truth.

In Chapter two, I consider Newman in relation to Bacon; both demonstrate the way in which a person of general culture, as described by Aristotle, distinguishes between broad areas of truth and the methods useful for their investigation. As Bacon had battled against the dominance of Aristotelian verbal method and speculative thought in order to promote induction for the investigation of physical nature, so Newman later himself resisted the unilateral application of Baconian induction to the exclusion of deduction and speculative and religious truth. While Bacon rejects speculative knowledge in order to promote science, Newman makes this knowledge of ideas, first principles, and abstract perennial truths the centrepiece of liberal education at the heart of the University.

In Chapter three, I consider the first principle of Newman’s pedagogy, i.e., the assumption of a universe that is objective, intelligibly unified, and ultimately grounded in God. I discuss the mode of thought associated with literature or rhetoric which is like the organon for indemonstrable matters described by Newman in the Grammar. From his articles in the university newspaper, I demonstrate that Newman’s curriculum for liberal education at the Catholic University of Ireland included subjects from the three broad areas of knowledge and I show that particularly in literature Newman follows the humanist tradition of rhetorical training.

In Chapter four, I consider Newman’s views on religious formation directed to the conscience, distinct from the cultivation of the intellect, and requiring a different method. As an elementary knowledge of principles and methods provides a broad basis for judgment of true and false in the intellectual realm, conscience directs judgments of right and wrong in the moral realm. Again, it is particularly through Newman’s own example of religious formation in the sermons delivered in the University Church in Dublin that I examine moral and religious development in the Christian humanist tradition as complementary to intellectual development.

This work contributes towards scholarship in Newman studies in its demonstration of the relationship suggested by A. Dwight Culler between Aristotle’s man of general culture and Newman’s gentleman. The comparison between Bacon’s Advancement of Learning and Newman’s Idea of a University clearly indicates Newman’s reasons for defending speculative truth traditionally associated with liberal education against the demands made for useful education in the Baconian sense. The similarities observed between Newman and Quintilian’s comments on
educational practice contribute towards studies of Newman as a humanist educator. Discussion of the rhetorical mode of thought traditionally cultivated through letters develops further the recent studies of Newman's rhetorical reasoning by Walter Jost and David M. Whalen by investigating the relationship between this kind of reasoning and educational procedure.

Much of this study is directed towards the perennial importance of methods and first principles. My examination of Newman's educational ideas meets Newman on his own ground and according to his own practice of assessing claims in the light of methods and first principles. It is on these terms that I examine his relation to Aristotle and the humanist tradition and to Bacon and the Baconian school of thought. Like Newman who considers the university in its idea, whether in Athens, in Paris during the Middle Ages, or in nineteenth century England, I have considered the elementary importance of methods and first principles rather than the particular issues which they might serve to illuminate in political matters in Athens, in directions in education in Bacon's era, or in religious matters in the nineteenth century. Where I have used references to particular historical circumstances, such as the realization of the university in Dublin, I have done so to illustrate principles. However, because the ultimate purpose of humanist training was particularly to provide clarity in public issues, I have located the principles of "The Tamworth Reading Room" in their historical context as one example of the "use" of a liberal education and of the habit of mind cultivated by it.

In his volume-long introduction to The Philosophical Notebook, Edward Sillem includes "hard-pressed thesis-writers" (17) in his advice on "How not to read Newman." Citing the guiding principles of Professor James Collins when making selections for Philosophical Readings in Cardinal Newman, Sillem suggests that the best way to avoid distortions of Newman's thought is to "learn gradually to walk at his own pace and along his own path....to reflect along with him on a few central questions....to focus upon Newman's own text studied for its own sake" (15). In tracing Newman's thought to two contrasting sources in Aristotle and Bacon, I have attempted to walk "along his own path." In my examination of Newman's educational ideas, I have focused on his views as proceeding from his central assumption of the fundamental unity of an objective, intelligible universe which is known to us through methods suited to its broad areas of knowledge. I have examined Newman's view of religious formation from the perspective of the theocentric conscience, another idea central to his thought. Throughout, I have attempted to allow Newman's own words to express his ideas. In accordance with the Greek concept of synesis, the understanding of what someone else has said, I hope that I will show that in these ways I have entered into Newman's thought.
Chapter 1

The Humanist Tradition: Newman’s Gentleman as a Man of General Culture

In Newman’s Inaugural Lecture as Rector of the Catholic University of Ireland, delivered to the School of Philosophy and Letters on Nov. 9, 1854, he traces the continuous development of a western educational ideal from its fountainhead in Greece. Similarly, in a series of articles intended to explain the idea of a university from an historical perspective to the students and the general readership of the Catholic University Gazette, Newman traces the sources of the university from the "Schools of Athens." 1 Newman remarks in his Inaugural Lecture that Greek civilization, "distinctive and luminous in its character, so imperial in its extent, so imposing in its duration," was vigorous enough to vivify and assimilate in succeeding ages even to the modern era the various social and political forces that threatened to stifle it. 2 The Greek idea was, in other words, a living idea which, as Newman explains in An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, must remain true to its roots even as it evolves if it is to flourish rather than wither and die. The idea of a liberal education defined by Newman in The Idea of a University, then, must be understood essentially in relation to its original sources in the Greek paideia (root of the English "pedagogy").

This word, as H.I. Marrou explains, describes a humanism that had for its goal the most complete blossoming or development of the individual’s personality; in Greek civilization, paideia (translated by Cicero as humanitas) assumed a resonance that evolved from referring simply to the technique for a child’s education to suggesting the most complete realization of the person as a person, the human ideal described in the word culture which for the Greek, unlike the modern German Kultur, had a personalist rather than a collective sense. 3 Paideia

1 These articles were published as Office and Work of Universities in 1856 and as "Rise and Progress of Universities" in Historical Sketches, vol.3, 1872.


3 In Truth and Method, Hans-George Gadamer uses the word Bildung to describe culture in the sense of the development of the person or "self-building" which proceeds from the external made internal, is its own justification, and comes from the desire to know (12-17).

Histoire de l’Education dans l’Antiquité, 142-4. Marrou writes: pour l’Hellenistique, l’existence humaine n’a pas d’autre but que d’atteindre à la forme la plus riche et la plus parfaite de personnalité....Se faire soi-même: dégager de l’enfant qu’on a d’abord été, de l’être mal dégrossi qu’on risque de demeurer, l’homme pleinement homme...telle est l’oeuvre de toute la vie (143). (For the Hellenist, human existence had no other goal than to attain to the richest and most perfect form of personality...for the individual to make himself: to disengage the fully human person from the child one first was, from the unformed being one risks continuing to be—such is one’s life-long work)

The Greek ideal of culture as the perfection of what is virtual in us is expressed by Newman in the Grammar of Assent where he refers to our sacred duty as human beings through our own personal efforts of advancing our own nature through our own personal efforts and developing our own perfection from the "inchoate and rudimental nature" with
referred to a most precious good, i.e., the full development of an individual's human potential realized through the cultivation of the mind throughout one's life. Marrou states that the ideal of personal culture as a most precious good was a formula continued by diverse inheritors of this tradition including Gregory of Nazianz with whom Newman was familiar (145). In the Christian humanist ideal, religious education remained separate from, but connected to, the cultivation of the intellect.⁴

According to Marrou, the conception of the human person and the cultural ideal of Greece as translated into an enduring humanist pedagogy is best represented in Isocrates (436-338 B.C.), the "Father of Humanism."⁵ The ethical educational aim of Isocrates is essentially the aim of Newman. Unlike Plato (427-348 B.C.), his contemporary, Isocrates did not seek to conquer truth through demonstrable rational science or to reach for the ethereal regions of abstract truth. Rather, Isocrates' goal was practical and connected to the problems of daily life where knowledge of theory was only partially helpful. The truly cultivated person, according to Isocrates, could find the best solution to a difficult situation under the circumstances. Marrou expresses the difference between Isocrates and Plato as the difference described by Pascal between an "esprit de finesse" and an "esprit géométrique." Marrou states that the goal of Isocrates was to develop in his students a faculty for practical decision, a sense of complex intuition and a perception of the imponderables which give a just estimate of things in the circumstances of daily life.⁶ This education, meant for the average intellectual Athenian, was also a defence against demagogues who might threaten the cultural heart of Athens. For Isocrates, the training of the student was especially literary or rhetorical on the grounds that the effort to express the right thought through the right word required the kind of subtlety needed to refine the sense of judgment in the domain of practical human affairs.

which we begin (274).

In "Growth the only evidence of life: Development of Doctrine and The Idea of a University," Philip C. Rule suggests that Newman's personal mode of thought which involves actively grasping ideas is connected to our development as human beings (120).

⁴ In "Newman's Personal Reasoning: the Inspiration of the Early Church," Gerard Magill states that Newman's philosophy of education was deeply influenced by the Fathers of the Church, especially by Clement's integration of Christian and hellenic cultures (308).

⁵ Histoire de l'Education dans l'Antiquité, 121.

⁶ Ibid. Marrou states: "Isocrate cherche à développer chez son disciple l'esprit de décision, le sens de l'intuition complexe, la perception de ces impondérables qui guident l'"opinion' et la rendent juste" (134).
Linking Newman's educational thought to possible Greek sources, Dwight Culler makes a number of suggestions about what Newman meant by the "man of philosophic habit" produced by a liberal education. Culler connects the "man of philosophic habit" to Aristotle's man of general culture who through "a knowledge of the methodology of the sciences" had the general ability to make right judgments. Culler refers to "famous passages in the Ethics, the Metaphysics, and the Parts of Animals," where Aristotle "declared that the ability to judge what degree of precision may fairly be expected in any inquiry is the mark of an educated man." As for including Newman himself in any interpretation of the "man of philosophic habit," Culler categorically concludes that "surely nothing could be farther from the truth." He declares that "Newman was a seminal rather than an architectonic intelligence, and therefore it is more likely that the man of philosophic habit represents all that he wanted to be rather than all that he was." I shall maintain that Aristotle's man of general culture who, like Isocrates' disciples, had a practical eye for broadly discerning the truth of matters, is in fact not only an apt description of Newman's "man of philosophic habit" but also a description of Newman's exercise of practical judgment in the important issues of his day. Through the clarity of his understanding of the methods and first principles of branches of knowledge, Newman as a man

7 Newman himself makes very clear his debt to Aristotle. In Discourse v of the Idea he says: "While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas before we were born. In many subject-matters, to think correctly is to think like Aristotle" (83).

In the Grammar, Newman acknowledges Aristotle as his master "as to the intellectual position from which I have contemplated the subject" of revelation (334).

In Edward Sillem's introductory volume to The Philosophical Notebook, he gives an account of the Aristotelian sources of Newman's philosophy. Sillem observes that Newman's references to Aristotelian are cautious in the earlier sermons and eulogistic in the Idea and the Grammar. Sillem states that the great themes of Newman's Discourses in the Idea "should lead us to associate Newman's name immediately and for ever with that of Aristotle." Such themes include "that knowledge is its own end, that the different sciences are interconnected in a harmonious system in which each has its proper place so that none can be omitted or suppressed without seriously damaging the whole, that there is a universal science of 'First Philosophy' above all the natural sciences" (160).

8 Imperial Intellect, 203.

9 Ibid., 205.
of general culture sought to distinguish error from truth. His own practice is testimony to the enduring need for the Greek model of liberal education.\textsuperscript{10}

Newman makes clear in the Preface to the Idea that by the culture of the intellect he does not refer to "the manners and habits of gentlemen," but to "the force, the steadiness, the comprehensiveness and the versatility of intellect, the command over our own powers, the instinctive just estimate of things as they pass before us" (xlii). This culture of the intellect is the declared aim of a liberal education and the goal of the "man of philosophic habit." The capacity for right judgment or the "instinctive just estimate of things as they pass before us" also characterizes Aristotle's man of general culture. In the introduction to his Greek edition of the Ethics of Aristotle, John Burnet states that the capacity for judgment is derived not only from a knowledge of Aristotelian logic which detects error in exposition, but more especially from a knowledge of right or wrong methods as applied to a given subject. Burnet writes that for Aristotle, "the man of culture is above all things the arbiter of method" (xxxii). Thus, a man of culture, although untrained in medicine, "will see at once through the quack's nostrum, even though he may be unable to justify his rejection of it on scientific grounds". Similarly, the man of culture

will at once distrust any talk upon such subjects which seems to suggest that good citizens can be made by theoretical instruction in the duties of citizenship, and any attempt to regulate the state on the basis of rigid and abstract formulas like the axioms of the mathematician" (xxxiii-xxxiv).

Burnet notes the "important warning" that the man of culture has for us in confusions of this sort:

It shows a total lack of culture to ask for mathematical accuracy in the discussion of human affairs. That is only to be looked for in sciences which deal with simple and primary truths (xliii).\textsuperscript{11}

Burnet explains, like Dwight Culler in The Imperial Intellect, that within this Aristotelian perspective, there are three sorts of people who have the right to judge in any

\textsuperscript{10} In John Henry Newman, Educateur, Fernande Tardivel writes that in the Idea Newman supports an Aristotelian Oxford (91) or an Oxford that is half medieval and half Greek (65). The purpose of this Aristotelian education was to develop the judgment (91) and to teach people to think and reason from elementary principles (51).

\textsuperscript{11} In the Grammar of Assent, Newman cites "the well-known passages of the Nicomachean ethics" where Aristotle states: "A well-educated man will expect exactness in every class of subject, according as the nature of the thing admits; for it is much the same mistake to put up with a mathematician using probabilities, and to require demonstration of an orator" (322).
branch of study. There are two sorts who are skilled in the subject itself. In medicine, for example there is the great physiologist or pathologist, to whom the practitioner is related as the builder to the architect. In politics there is the lawgiver who, like the great physiologist in relation to the practitioner, has an architectonic relation to the politician. But there is also the man of general culture to whom "[w]e must allow the right of judgment...as fully as to men of knowledge" (xxxiii).

Burnet also indicates Aristotle's practical reason for advocating training in the methods suited to the various branches of knowledge: Aristotle complained of the confusion in his own hearers, that people "dislike any method of exposition they are not accustomed to." Some will listen only to a lecture put into mathematical form, while others demand examples and illustrations, and others again require the evidence of some poet. One class want everything put with minute exactitude; others are annoyed by precision, either because they are incapable of connected thought, or because they think it is mean and petty (xxxiii).

Culture or right judgment based on the general knowledge of methods and of what can be legitimately expected of the various branches of knowledge is the remedy to all of this.

For the man of general culture, knowledge of methods in their connection to the first principles of branches of knowledge was both speculative and of practical importance. Through a knowledge of methods and first principles a gentleman of philosophic habit produced by a liberal education detects the confusion of the true and false in the issues of the day. In "Science and Mathematics in Newman's Thought," Gillian R. Evans remarks that "the definition of science was...a topic of immense contemporary interest" in the nineteenth century (255). Evans suggests that both John Stuart Mill and Newman saw the matter of definition on a grand scale and connected the philosophic method of a science to its definition (256). Certainly Mill's expectations of a liberal education resemble Newman's expectations of a gentleman and Aristotle's estimate of a man of general culture: all are conversant with methods. In his "Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews," Mill states that the University teaches the student to methodize his knowledge; he suggests that a recognition of "how every existing reality is a compound of many properties" of which each science is a part "includes a philosophic study of the Methods of the sciences" (219). Stefan Collini points out that rather than "pressing the claims of scientific and technological education," Mill's "case for

12 The Imperial Intellect, Culler, 201.
science is couched almost entirely in terms of its value as a training in method."13 That Newman had something in mind for his gentleman of philosophic habit very like the broad perspective on different subject matters and methods that Aristotle had in mind for his man of general culture is evident both in the latter half of his Discourses (v-ix) in which he discusses what is meant by a liberally educated gentleman and in the succeeding articles and lectures in which he describes the principles of a liberal education for the students at the Catholic University of Ireland. Newman remonstrates against the narrowness of knowledge in only one area. He observes:

Men, whose minds are possessed with some one object, take exaggerated views of its importance, are feverish in the pursuit of it, make it the measure of things which are utterly foreign to it, and are startled and despond if it happens to fail them (Idea, 104).

He approves the Oxford defense of humanist learning by Oriel College's Dr. Copleston in 1810. This learning is based on a principle of comparisons as "[j]judgment lives as it were by comparison and discrimination" (131-2). Humanist learning draws on several interrelated subject matters such as "religion (in its evidences and interpretation), ethics, history, eloquence, poetry, theories of general speculation, the fine arts, and works of wit" (132). Copleston states that any one discipline, such as history or poetry or philosophy by itself is too limited and needs to be corrected by others (133). He explains that ideas which fall in the general range of the faculty of judgment "act, not as solitary units, but by grouping and combination and...intertwine with and support each other" (131). He warns against too early specialization in a profession as it degrades the rational being; we need "other principles, which may serve as a check and counterpoise to the main force" (127).

Newman, for his part, maintains that a university should as much as possible take in all branches of learning. There an "assemblage of learned men, zealous for their own sciences, and rivals of each other, are brought, by familiar intercourse and for the sake of intellectual peace, to adjust together the claims and relations of their respective subjects of investigation" (76). He insists that a contracted range of study inhibits the philosophic habit which enables the individual at least to be aware of "the great outlines of knowledge, the principles on which it rests, the scale of its parts, its lights and its shades, its great points and its little" (76). New-

13 Introduction to Mill's "Inaugural Address" in the Collected Works, iv.

Although Mill supports the need to study both classical literature and the physical sciences, he states that the physical sciences teach the "art of thinking" and of discriminating judgment based on observation and reasoning which are the only "two roads by which truth can be discovered." Mill states that in the physical sciences these two processes "have been carried to their greatest known perfection" (234).
man points out that the end of a university education is a "comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relation of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values" (77). This comprehensive view of Universal Knowledge is implicitly held by Newman's gentleman in all investigations:

"the mind never views any part of the extended subject-matter of Knowledge without recollecting that it is but a part, or without the associations which spring from this recollection. It makes every thing in some sort lead to every thing else; it would communicate the image of the whole to every separate portion, till that whole becomes in imagination like a spirit, every where pervading and penetrating its component parts, and giving them one definite meaning (103).

For Newman's gentleman as for Aristotle's man of general culture, his education gives him "a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them, and a force in urging them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant" (135).

Newman himself provides an example of the man of general culture conversant in methods and first principles during his long career spanning the nineteenth century (1801-1890). As a "man of philosophic habit" engaged in the battle of issues and ideas, Newman constantly exercised his judgment through an understanding of methods and the controlling principles of branches of knowledge. When Nassau William Senior delivered an Inaugural Address as the first professor of political economy at the University of Oxford in 1826, Newman rejected the ethical and moral claims made for this science. Without being adept in political economy, as a man of general culture, he pointed out that the "science of wealth", from its starting-point or first principle, its scope and method, not only cannot ensure moral well-being but may well attain the opposite. Newman comments:

"Given that wealth is to be sought, this and that is the method of gaining it. This is the extent to which a Political Economist has a right to go; he has no right to determine that wealth is at any rate to be sought, or that it is the way to be virtuous and the price of happiness; I say, this is to pass the bounds of his science (Idea, 66).

Similarly Newman discriminated between methods and first principles to counter the political weight of a speech made by Sir Robert Peel in 1841 on the opening of a reading room at a Mechanics' Institute in Tamworth. Peel's praise of experimental science as a source of moral and religious elevation is roundly dismissed by Newman in a series of letters to The

14 c.f. Dwight Culler's description of the controversial status of political economy in The Imperial Intellect, 250.
Times where he states that knowledge of science or literature cannot effect what religion claims to do, that we may as well "take chemists for our cooks, and mineralogists for our masons" as to "commence with scientific proof or lay any great stress upon it as the basis of personal Christianity."\(^{15}\)

In the report of one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools for the fledgling system of public schooling in the years 1848-50, Newman objected to the classification of religion with poetry and music under the category of sentiment. The Inspector claimed that religion consisted of pious feeling and that "the essential idea of all religious Education will consist in the direct cultivation of the feelings" (24). As an arbiter of method, Newman asserts that there has been an error of omission typical of a "wide-spaying school of thought" which assumes that "Religion is not knowledge" or excludes it "from a University course of instruction...because it is to be considered a taste, sentiment, opinion, and nothing more" (24).

The distinction of methods is also the subject of Newman's final Discourse of the Idea in 1852. Here Newman observes the increasing bias of his age towards induction, the method suited to the physical sciences and exclusive of those objects which are not demonstrable according to its criterion and do not fall within its range. Newman states that "Induction is the instrument of Physics" as "deduction only is the instrument of Theology" (169). He observes the strangeness of the latter method to "men whose first principle is the search after truth, and whose starting-points of search are things material and sensible. They scorn any process of inquiry not founded on experiment" (170).

If reliance solely on induction is an impediment to religious belief, access to the inner human world is also blocked by it. Newman states:

"Metaphysics" they even use as a by-word of reproach; and Ethics they admit only on condition that it gives up conscience as its scientific ground, and bases itself on tangible utility: but as to Theology, they cannot deal with it, they cannot master it, and so they simply outlaw it and ignore it (170).

Again in Discourse iii, Newman's description of a dystopian university which excludes human agency in favour of material science as the explanation of "everything on the face of the earth" is at the same time a view of the world seen solely through the method of induction. The Professor at such a university ascribes every work, every external act of man, to the innate force or soul of the physical universe. He observes that spiritual agents are so mysterious and unintelligible, so uncertain in their laws...that a wise man will have nothing to say to them. They belong to a different order of causes...and he confines himself to the tangible and sure. Human exploits, human devices, human deeds,

\(^{15}\) Essays and Sketches, vol. 2, 207.
human productions, all that comes under the scholastic terms of "genius" and "art," and the metaphysical ideas of "duty," "right," and "heroism," it is his office to contemplate all these merely in their place in the eternal system of physical cause and effect (42-43).

Newman’s perception of the perennial importance of the man of culture’s distinction between methods, as well as the enduring need for the training provided in a liberal education, is seen in his tribute to Aristotle in his argument. Newman cites from Aristotle’s Ethics at the beginning of this sketch to insist on the importance of the agency of man, and so, by analogy, of the spiritual agency of God.16 Newman then pays tribute to Aristotle’s philosophical distinction between broad areas of truth:

It is incredible that in the investigation of physical results he could ignore so influential a being as man, or forget that, not only brute force and elemental movement, but knowledge also is power. And this so much the more, inasmuch as moral and spiritual agents belong to another, not to say a higher, order than physical; so that the omission supposed would not have been merely an oversight in matters of detail, but a philosophical error, and a fault in division (40).

Newman goes on to lament the loss of Aristotelian influence in the nineteenth century, regretting that "we live in an age of the world when the career of science and literature is little affected by what was done, or would have been done, by this venerable authority" (40).

In the difficult task of framing the idea of a university, Newman discriminates like Aristotle between methods and principles of areas of truth. Indeed, as their several titles indicate, Newman is engaged in all nine Discourses in defining the limitations and the reasonable expectations of the branches of learning within the three great spheres of knowledge: the physical sciences, human affairs, and God. After the first introductory Discourse, the titles follow one another as: "Theology a Branch of Knowledge," "Bearing of Theology on Other Branches of Knowledge," "Bearing of Other Branches of Knowledge on Theology," "Knowledge Its Own End," "Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Learning," "Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Professional Skill," "Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Religion," "Duties of the Church Towards Knowledge." In Newman’s philosophical discrimination among the branches of learning and areas of truth, he is exercising the judgment of what Aristotle called a man of culture who "is above all things the arbiter of method." Like the fourth-century Athenian, Newman exercises his practical judgment to attempt to discern the errors in method in the jostling

16 Here Newman states: "The great philosopher of antiquity, when he would enumerate the causes of the things that take place in the world, after making mention of those which he considered to be physical and material, adds, 'and the mind and everything which is by means of man'" (Aristotle Ethic. Nicom., iii. 3; Idea, 40).
of ideas and claims in the nineteenth century: in an Inaugural Address at Oxford in 1826, in a prominent politician's speech at Tamworth in 1841, in the aims of the new universities, in the uneasy relations between religion and the developing sciences.

Because methods are the gateway to the various areas of truth and their initial principles or ideas, John Burnet emphasizes the importance of first principles or starting-points as well as methods to Aristotle's man of culture who discriminates truth through them. Martin Ostwald defines the Greek term *arche*: it "designates that which stands at the head or at the beginning, without which everything that follows would not be what it is." It denotes "any kind of SOURCE, BEGINNING, OR FOUNDATION." It may be the starting point of a foot race or of an argument, the basis of a conviction, or the "irreducible FIRST PRINCIPLE or FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE of realities apprehended by the intelligence," i.e., *nous*, the noetic faculty of immediate intellectual insight.17 With reference to Aristotle's man of culture, John Burnet explains the importance of these initial principles:

The first lesson we have to learn from our man of culture is that every science must have a starting-point (arche). Geometry, for instance, starts from certain definitions and axioms which define the nature of space, and we must have a similar starting-point for Politics (xxxiv).

The culture of the intellect described in the *Idea* involves this philosophical knowledge of starting-points or ideas from which everything else in a particular line develops. Definitions of the starting-points of sciences describe their nature and indicate their scope or potential development in accordance with the initial definition. Newman's definition of the idea of a university is the act of a man of culture or a man of philosophic habit disclosing through philosophical inquiry the starting-point essential to charting the course of the fledgling University in Dublin; this definition provides a guide for the regulation of pedagogical practice. Similarly, Newman seeks to explain the aim of the university by tracing its historical development for the readership of the *Gazette*.

The importance of starting-points for the discriminating intellect of the man of philosophic habit is illustrated in the value accorded them by Newman's associates at Oriel College. When Newman became a Fellow of Oriel College in 1822, it was just this non-specialized knowledge of starting-points that was the boast of the Members of the Oriel Common Room who familiarly styled themselves as "the Noetics." Their title refers to the faculty of immediate intellectual insight or *nous* described by Aristotle in Book vi of *The Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle explains that this noetic faculty "deals with ultimates at both ends of the

17 *Ethics*, 166, 303. All citations from the *Ethics* are from Martin Ostwald's edition.
scale" and "has as its objects primary terms and definitions as well as ultimate particulars" (1143a35, p.166). By means of the noetic principle, we may have immediate insight into both sensible and intellectual objects. We perceive the definition of a triangle immediately as a figure with three angles and three sides by looking at a triangle; "we must simply see that for ourselves" (Burnet, xxxvii). This definition or starting-point permits analysis and new conclusions.

The member of the Oriel group most representative of Aristotle’s man of general culture conversant with starting-points was Richard Whately, author of texts on logic and rhetoric, and an avid promoter of Aristotelian philosophy at the height of his influence in this period. It was Whately who advised Nassau William Senior to emphasize the importance of political economy in his inaugural lecture as its first professor at Oxford. Newman acknowledges Whately’s influence on him in the Apologia where he says that "he taught me to think and to use my reason….to see with my own eyes and to walk with my own feet" (133).

Dwight Culler cites Whately’s description of the kind of knowledge he valued:

My own learning [he admitted] is of a very singular kind, being more purely elementary than anyone’s I know. I am acquainted with the elements of most things, and that more accurately than many who are much versed in them, but I know nothing thoroughly, except such studies as are intrinsically of an elementary character, viz. grammar, logic, metaphysics, ethics, rhetoric (39).

Whately’s description of himself is also a description of Aristotle’s man of general culture:

I can explain the nature of mathematical reasoning better than some practised mathematicians….I know pretty accurately the peculiar character of each branch of study, the misconceptions of it which men are liable to form, and the errors in pursuing it, the faculties which it calls for, and habits it tends to cultivate, and there I stop...(203)

He perceived his usefulness as a man of general culture, "whose trade is to make instruments for others to work with, being occupied in training others to do more than I can do myself..."(203).

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18 I.T. Ker in “Editor’s Notes,” Idea, 598.

19 Similarly, in "Newman and Literature," Jeremiah Hogan states that "Newman can define literature better than literary men, who are inside it and cannot see the wood for the trees" (174).

Culler provides possibilities rather than a clear synthesis of Newman’s thought and his views on Aristotle’s man of culture remain unresolved. In citing Richard Whately, he associates general culture with the study of logic.

The importance of both initial principles and methods to Newman is seen in what he calls the architectonic science of sciences, or the formal philosophical inquiry into the relation of the sciences to one another from the perspective of their respective starting-points. Their ideas or elementary principles are the subject matter of the directing or architectonic science of sciences; the usefulness of the science of sciences is in its regulation of the sciences within the whole. In his discussion of the claims of political economy in the *Idea*, Newman states that

> the question of its 'rank' belongs to that Architectonic Science or Philosophy, whatever it be, which is itself the arbiter of all truth, and which disposes of the claims and arranges the places of all the departments of knowledge which man is able to master (68).

Similarly, in "Christianity and Scientific Investigation," a "Lecture written for the School of Science" in November, 1855, Newman refers to the "philosophy of an imperial intellect" exercised by the University whose true representative guards against the fusion of departments of knowledge and defines rather than analyzes:

> Taking into his charge all sciences, methods, collections of facts, principles, doctrines, truths which are the reflexions of the universe upon the human intellect....he recognizes the insuperable lines of demarcation which run between subject and subject; he observes how separate truths lie relatively to each other, where they concur, where they part company, and where, being carried too far, they cease to be truths at all....It will be his care to be familiar with the signs of real and apparent difficulties, with the methods proper to particular subject-matters, what in each particular case are the limits of a rational scepticism, and what the claims of a peremptory faith (346-7).

This due disposition of "all the provinces and methods of thought" may be effected through the several professors who "like the ministers of various political powers at one court or conference....represent their respective sciences, and attend to the private interests of those sciences respectively" (346). But more important in this lecture is the plea for an implicit recognition of the view held by the man of general culture. Because of the unity of all truth, the theologian or the scientist may equally and freely pursue truth in their own lines without being cramped one by the other on the grounds that in spite of apparent contradiction between them, their proper relations will eventually emerge.

Specifically as a man of culture, Newman's greatest achievement was in arbitrating a new *organon* or instrument of thought. In the shifting of intellectual foundations caused by the dazzling success of science, Newman perceived the peril particularly for religion in allowing the scientific method to intrude into areas where it was ineffectual. From his first university sermon in 1826 entitled "The Philosoplic Temper, First Enjoined by the Gospel," to his last book, the *Grammar of Assent*, Newman sought to discriminate between the methods and prin-
principles pertaining to the broad areas of physical science and religious belief. In this early sermon, Newman contrasts the Christian world of intelligible order with the capriciousness of gods in other religions and connects the investigation by science into the system of the universe with this ordered world. Years of correspondence on the subject of religious belief with his sceptical scientific friend, William Froude, led Newman to articulate in the Grammar of Assent (1870) the broad distinction between demonstrable truth in scientific method and the way we normally make decisions in indemonstrable matters where choice is operative, whether in the routine of daily life or in religious belief. The psychological observations on how we arrive at truth in the Grammar are a re-examination of methods themselves. The organon described by Newman in the Grammar is not only a validation of the way religious belief is reached but also of the "instinctive just estimate of things" that is the methodus of the man of general culture.

As an arbiter of method in the Grammar, Newman navigates his way through the strictures of Locke's and Hume's empiricism but he also finds inadequate the dialectical method of Aristotelian logic. Newman's role as a nineteenth-century arbiter of method becomes more clear through contrasting his view of methods with that of Aristotle. Edward Sillem describes Newman as being "very selective in what he took from" Aristotle's philosophy. Sillem states:

He seems to have considered Aristotelianism as incapable of coping...with the intricate problems of re-constructing philosophy in the mid-nineteenth century...to provide him with a realist theory of knowledge and a psychology of human thinking which could stand firm against the assaults of scientific rationalism" (Philosophic Notebook, vol. 1, 157).

Newman is in agreement with Aristotle that our ultimate or most fundamental first principles which are the elements of our thought are not known through formal reasoning. Newman states that fundamental first principles, such as those held by a sceptic or by a Theist, filter all thought and are often unconscious. Even the most ardent promoter of a particular rational method of thought does not arrive at his fundamental principles through this method. Newman remarks of Bacon, for example, that his separation of "the physical system of the

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21 Sillem states that Newman "accepts Aristotle's distinction "between the noetic faculty of first principles" and episteme (Philosophic Notebook, vol. 1, 163). Episteme or pure science is necessary truth or disinterested, objective and scientific knowledge. Aristotle states in the Ethics that this scientific knowledge has a "capacity for demonstration"; it "exists of necessity" or cannot be otherwise: it is teachable and proceeds from induction. Further, without a knowledge of the starting-points in these pure sciences, knowledge remains incidental. (150-1).
world from the theological" is an assumption. Similarly, Newman’s own premiss in the Idea that knowledge is unified and that God is its guarantor is an assumption.

Nor does Newman disagree with Aristotle about the method of induction so ardently promoted by Bacon in the interests of science in the modern era. Aristotle points out that the operations of nature which, unlike human affairs, do not involve choice, are apprehended especially through induction, "a word which literally signifies the citation of witnesses in a court of law." Induction is described in Aristotle’s Topics as

the procedure which leads from particulars to universals, e.g., if the best helmsman and the best charioteer are those who have knowledge, it is true as a general rule that in each particular field the best is he who has knowledge (I. 12, 105a13-16).

Burnet states that through induction "we must be made to see the truth of the immediate proposition by being called upon to recognise it in a number of instances adduced for the purpose" (xxxvii). Induction is "not a method of proof; for the propositions which we arrive at by its help are not capable of proof in the proper sense of the word." It is simply a method of "making us see for ourselves what we cannot know in any other way." Proceeding from particulars to universals makes induction the method suited to scientific procedure in its study of "the operations of nature."

Where Newman found Aristotle’s method wanting was his way of investigating truth in the more complicated area of human affairs which, unlike the operations of nature, involves choice. The kind of truth that is the object of this method is investigated in the various books of the Ethics: the good as the aim of action; moral virtue as the result of habits; man as responsible agent; the different kinds of justice; moral and intellectual excellence; friendship and happiness; happiness, intelligence and the contemplative life; ethics and politics. This method, which Aristotle calls "habituation," takes as its premises the received beliefs based on the experience of the wise or the majority and subjects them to a dialectical process of inquiry, i.e., the Topics described by Aristotle in the Organon. Burnet explains that the purpose of this is "to raise all the difficulties on both sides" in order to "more easily distinguish truth from error." Received beliefs are assailed from a number of points of vantage or topoi "applicable to

22 Grammar, 282.

23 Burnet, xxxvii.

24 Cited by Martin Ostwald in his "Glossary of Technical Terms", Ethics, 306.

25 Burnet, xxxvii.
every kind of subject, the positions of 'the more and less,' 'the essential and the accidental,' and so forth." In this way, apparent contradictions will be resolved as the opposing parties are led "to a consciousness of their real meaning" and to "see their fundamental agreement." They are led on from what is "true but not clear" to what is "true and clear" (xl-xli).

Once the definition has been thus determined, analysis of it continues through middle terms expressed in practical syllogisms.\textsuperscript{26} We are cautioned that the syllogism as applied to practical human affairs, such as to politics or to rhetoric, cannot have the precision of geometrical axioms as its premises and thus the conclusions can be only generally true. "As in medicine and navigation, we must always take into account the particular circumstances of the case, and these cannot be formulated or predicted."\textsuperscript{27}

The inability of dialectic to reach truth in particular matters makes Newman seek as a true arbiter of method the more subtle and elastic \textit{organon} described in the \textit{Grammar of Assent}. Here Newman states that as a method, logic has its use: "it suggests ideas; it opens views; it maps out for us the lines of thought; it verifies negatively;....It is the great principle of order in our thinking;....it catalogues the accumulations of knowledge; it maps out for us the relations of its separate departments; it puts us in the way to correct its own mistakes" (217, 228). But it is an abstract process whose claims to demonstration are valid only in the abstract. It cannot attain to the concrete and its "proofs" are in fact only probable. Newman argues that "for genuine proof in concrete matter we require an \textit{organon} more delicate, versatile, and elastic than verbal argumentation" (217).

To discern this more elastic \textit{organon}, Newman examines the very heart of the reasoning process in his final book, the \textit{Grammar of Assent}. This book has generated theological comment because it investigates how we believe. But Newman's \textit{organon} is also a validation of the discriminating process of the man of general culture associated with Isocrates: the man with a knack for practical decisions based on a sense of complex intuition and a perception of imponderables which guide and make accurate these decisions. The \textit{Grammar of Assent} is a defense of the man of general culture who judges accurately of matters in daily life through

\textsuperscript{26} Ostwald cites from the \textit{Prior Analytics} to explain the syllogism: it is "an argument in which, certain assumptions having been made, something other than these assumptions necessarily follows from the fact that they are true" (I.I.24b18-20). Ostwald states that "it involves, in its most fundamental form, two premises, at least one of which is a universal proposition, and a conclusion. E.g. all men are mortal. Greeks are men, therefore Greeks are mortal" (150-1).

\textsuperscript{27} Burnet, xlv.
wise hunches or impressions based on previous experience, through a sagacity that cannot be taught precisely because it deals with particular matters, although it can be formed through knowledge of methods and principles. Newman provides many examples of the cultivated intellect in action: the immediate and accurate textual decision of an experienced editor of Shakespeare who would have to elaborate at great length the many factors which came into play in this spontaneous decision; the veteran judge who would weaken his just verdict on a case by attempting to give reasons accounting for it; the person who takes a fresh view of a matter and finds a solution from an angle previously unconsidered.

Newman's description of the *organon* needed to reach truth about human affairs in the concrete also underscores the practical nature of the discriminating judgment associated with Isocrates' disciples. This practical element emerges philosophically in the way Newman adapts Aristotle's concept of *phronesis*. Newman states that this term for practical wisdom was used by Aristotle to describe the "faculty which guides the mind in matters of conduct" (Grammar 277). However, as an arbiter of method in his own period, Newman transfers this term from the ethical and moral register of the right and wrong to the intellectual register of the true and false, thus placing it in the realm of the discriminating judgment exercised by the man of culture. Newman observes this difference in a note where he states that "Though Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, speaks of *phronesis*...as being concerned generally with contingent matter...or what I have called the concrete...he does not treat of it in that work in its general relation to truth and the affirmation of truth" (277).28

28 Aristotle discusses *phronesis* in the Ethics (1140a-1140b) 152-4. The psychological approach taken by Newman in the Grammar is suggested in Aristotle's first comment: "We may approach the subject of practical wisdom by studying the persons to whom we attribute it."

Several scholars have commented on the relation between *phronesis*, Aristotle's term for right conduct, and Newman's transference of this term to the area of truth in what he called the illative sense. In "Economies of Reason: Newman and the Phronesis Tradition," Mary Katherine Tillman examines the connection in Greek thought between the individual's capacity for right judgment in conduct, as illustrated in the Meno, and the original unity of truth as related in the poem of Parmenides. In "Newman on Faith and Reason," John D. Horgan distinguishes between prudence, the Latin word for *phronesis* as pertaining to right and wrong, and Newman's illative sense as an intellectual power of good judgment allowing one to see through "the labyrinth of inference" (148). In "Newman on Conscience and Lonergan on Conversion: The Shadow of Plato," Edward J. Miller observes the kinship between knowing through the illative sense and St. Thomas' idea of the moral judgment of prudence. He compares the methods of Lonergan and Newman, noting that in both certitude of truth is reached through the cumulative, the implicit, the informal and through what is uniquely personal. In "Aristotelian Roots of Newman's Illative Sense," Gérard Verbeke suggests that Aristotle was also reacting against moral intellectualism in his own period.
The practical judgments of the man of general culture or of Newman's gentleman have much in common with Aristotle's view of practical judgment in conduct. In the Ethics, Aristotle observes that the most characteristic function of phronesis is deliberation: "that man is good at deliberating who, by reasoning, can aim at and hit the best thing attainable to man by action (157). Phronesis is both grounded in experience and operates from universals: "practical wisdom is concerned with particulars as well [as with universals], and knowledge of particulars comes from experience" (160, 1142a). Right conduct cannot be taught as it "cannot be attained by an applied science or art" (152, 1140a).

The organon proposed by Newman is the instrument used by the humanist man of culture in discerning the truth clouded in the contemporary "night-battle" of ideas and issues. The man of culture does not submit these ideas to the inquiry of Aristotelian dialectical categories. Rather, like the editor making a textual decision or the judge in court, he draws on probabilities from various quarters related to the particular matter under consideration. He arrives at the truth at that moment when these independent probabilities, none of which are convincing in themselves, converge to persuade him personally of the truth of this matter. In Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman, Walter Jost has examined Newman's adaptation of Aristotle's topics. Jost argues that Newman also uses received views themselves as his topics. Newman's organon is simply a formulation of the procedure we commonly use. It is the procedure used by Newman in An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine where he con-

Aristotle states: "If a man acts blindly, i.e., using his natural virtue alone, he will fail; but once he acquires intelligence, it makes a great difference in his action" (171. 1144b).

Similarly with reference to modern scientific method, T.H. Huxley states that Bacon did not invent the method: "it is nothing but the necessary mode of working of the human mind. It is simply the mode at which all phenomena are reasoned about, rendered precise and exact." (The Essence of T.H. Huxley, 47). Charles Dessain in John Henry Newman notes Aldous Huxley's acknowledgment of his debt to Newman for his acute and elegant analysis of the psychology of thought (148).

John Stuart Mill observes in his Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews: "Logic lays down the general principles and laws of the search after truth; the conditions which, whether recognised or not, must actually have been observed if the mind has done its work rightly." In reference to the demonstrable truth of mathematics and physics, Mill states that "Those sciences give the practice, of which Logic is the theory. It declares the principles, rules, and precepts, of which they exemplify the observance" (238).

Some of Mill's statements suggest that one purpose of education, as for Aristotle's man of culture and Newman's gentleman, is to discriminate methods. Mill advocates the study of elementary science for people will "never know what is certain and what is not, or who are entitled to speak with authority and who are not; and they either have no faith at all in the testimony of science, or are the ready dupes of charlatans and impostors" (233).
sidered the question of whether the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church was a corruption or a legitimate development from the early Church. The answer to this question, crucial to his decision to enter the Roman Catholic Church, was arrived at through examining probabilities from various quarters. In the Apologia he lists four of these independent but converging probabilities, including a religious source in "the analogy of the Old Testament and also of the New" and a source in doctrinal history where he finds traces in the early Church traces of the Roman Church's doctrines (286).

The procedure of viewing truth from various quarters is also the principle that animates Newman's view of the cultivation of the intellect in the Idea where he warns against the narrowness of the man of one idea "which properly means a man of one science" (57). His argument based on the fundamental unity of knowledge means that all the sciences "converge and contribute" to one another (35). Newman observes:

Men, whose life lies in the cultivation of one science, or the exercise of one method of thought, have no more right...to generalize upon the basis of their own pursuit but beyond its range, than the schoolboy...to judge of a Prime Minister" (57).

Newman's argument for the inclusion of theology in the University is only one application of this principle. He enlists several examples in its support. He suggests the folly of allowing the Antiquarian to control experimental science or the Metaphysician history. Or if a person's knowledge were contracted to a theory of gravitation, then capillary action would be denied. The man of general culture in the humanist tradition advocated by Aristotle and again affirmed by Newman in his century will avoid the pitfalls of "the devotees of any science, or family of sciences" which exclude others. They "necessarily become bigots and quacks, scorning all principles and reported facts which do not belong to their own pursuit, and thinking to effect everything without aid from any other quarter" (37). He continues, noting the dangerous consequences of knowledge from only one quarter:

Thus, before now, chemistry has been substituted for medicine; and again, political economy, or intellectual enlightenment, or the reading of the Scriptures, has been cried up as a panacea against vice, malevolence, and misery (37-38)

In a subsequent chapter, we shall see how Newman's distinction between methods and branches of knowledge, his view of the interconnection of the branches of knowledge, and his organon for knowing particular matters from independent quarters translates into a distinctive pedagogy which falls within a humanist tradition.
Chapter 2
Newman and Bacon: Arbiters of Method

As we have seen in Chapter one, Newman's own judgments are made from the perspective typical of the humanist tradition of Aristotle. In this tradition, issues are viewed from the vantage point of principles and methods in their connection to particular areas of truth. Newman scrutinized the logic of Aristotle, who like him was an arbiter of method, and revised it in the light of his own experience and his observations on the way we typically make decisions about concrete matters. Newman's views are also clearly illustrated in conjunction with Francis Bacon, another arbiter of method whose zealous promotion of science and induction gave impetus to the movement that by Newman's day led to the encroachment of this method into areas beyond its purview. T.H. Huxley, for example, stated that the subject matter of reasoning does not change the process of reasoning and objected to the claim that "reason and morality have two weights and two measures." In the tradition of Isocrates and Aristotle, Newman resists this leveling and discriminates between the method natural to a study of the physical sciences and the path to the religious life. He also makes a clear distinction between useful knowledge as championed by Bacon and the speculative thought he advocates as the centrepiece of a liberal education. A comparison between Bacon's Advancement of Learning and Newman's Idea of a University illustrates Newman's judgments as an arbiter of method in the common principles shared by both men, in their divergence regarding useful and speculative knowledge, and in the subsequent shift by the "school of Bacon" towards a homogeneity of method which Newman steadfastly resisted as a misapplication of method corrosive to religion.

1 The Essence of T.H. Huxley, 113. Huxley represents Newman at St. Mary's as preaching that Scripture alone is free from an "admixture of error." Huxley maintains that natural science concerning the origin of man contradicts Scripture (117-8). In "Newman and Evolution," Stanley Jaki describes Newman's approach through logic to Darwin's theory of evolution. Newman states that the human mind is distinct in creation as self-acting, originating and a citadel of theism; that chance is not cause, that what is accidental to us may not be so to God from the perspective of theology. Newman objects to scientific men who meddle with theology, assuming evolution is inconsistent with a Creator and Protector and concluding that there is no truth in religion. Although making no claims to close familiarity with the Origin of Species, Newman cautions against taking probable scientific theory, like evolution, for certainty as it might be refuted subsequently by other probable theories. In "Newman’s Idea of Science," Harold M. Petipas states that Newman recognizes too well the tendency that Huxley evinces to apply scientific method to all areas (501). A contemporary public debate on the differences in perspective between science and theology, particularly regarding conscience, is described by Ed Block in "T.H. Huxley's Rhetoric and the Mind-Matter debate: 1868-1874," Prose Studies, 1985.

In the nineteenth-century edition of the Works of Francis Bacon, Robert Leslie Ellis suggests in his introduction that Bacon came to believe that the method of induction was applicable to all areas but was to be varied according to the conditions of the subject (100).
The nineteenth century saw the great fourteen volume edition of Bacon’s works undertaken by Robert Leslie Ellis and James Spedding in 1846, just a few years before Newman’s Dublin Discourses, and completed in 1874. In The Philosophic Notebook, Edward Sillem observes the influence of Bacon on Newman. He notes that Newman was given The Works of Francis Bacon in eleven small volumes as early as 1818 at the age of seventeen while still a student at Trinity. He later received W. H. Scott’s four volume edition of Bacon’s Omnia Opera, printed in 1730. In his Discourses in the Idea of a University and in the following section, the articles prepared for the Gazette and the various lectures prepared in his capacity as Rector for the students in the School of Philosophy and Letters, the School of Medicine, and the School of Science, Newman refers frequently to Bacon. In his edition of the Idea, Ian Ker notes twenty-four references to Bacon or the Baconian method. Newman draws several quotations from Bacon’s Advancement of Learning, from its later Latin adaptation into the longer work De Augmentis Scientiarum, as well as otherwise making reference to Bacon and the Baconian method. Newman expressed his admiration for Bacon, referring to “the great mind of Bacon” in his lecture in 1855 to the School of Medicine on “Christianity and Physical Science” (Idea, 342) and to Bacon’s intellectual greatness in his lecture in the previous year on “English Catholic Literature” (Idea, 239).

In spite of Newman’s many references to Bacon and the Baconian school in the Idea and the connection acknowledged between these two arbiters of method, scant attention has been paid to the relation between Bacon’s views on learning and Newman’s views on education. In The Imperial Intellect, Dwight Culler makes some comparisons between Bacon and Newman, pointing out, for example, that while Bacon sought to enable scientists to translate concrete reality into abstractions, Newman sought “to enable the nonspecialist to reduce these abstractions into a true and balanced picture of reality” (187). However, these comparisons are relatively incidental to his work as a whole. To examine Newman in relation to Bacon, I have drawn on three sources: the still-valued observations on Bacon’s method by Spedding and Ellis in their nineteenth-century edition of Bacon’s Works; Benjamin Farrington’s Francis Bacon: Philosopher of Industrial Science (1951) where, as announced in the Preface, he interprets

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2 Edward Sillem notes Newman’s “regard and admiration” for Bacon who was an important source for his “ideas about the nature of the experimental sciences, especially of physics.” The Philosophical Notebook, vol. 1, 189.

3 The Advancement of Learning (1605) was extended and adapted before it was again published in 1623 as De Augmentis Scientiarum as part of Bacon’s great work, the Instauratio Magna which also included the Novum Organon.
Bacon's own conception of "what he tried to do and wanted done"; Paolo Rossi's connections between Bacon's method and rhetorical tradition in Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science (1968).

Newman had reason to admire Bacon for the same quality that Aristotle sought in the man of culture, i.e., the ability to distinguish between different kinds of truth and the methods appropriate to them. Bacon's clear distinction between the sacred and the natural as separate domains was, as Gillian R. Evans states, Newman's own first principle. What Newman deplored in the evolution of the Baconian method was the dissolution of Bacon's careful distinction between theology and physical science and the corrosive application of the method of the physical sciences to theological thought.

Newman and Bacon diverge in Bacon's exclusion of speculative thought, particularly as oriented towards human endeavour, in favour of fruitful or useful knowledge. Bacon, whom Newman calls the Prophet of the Philosophy of Utility, promoted progress in the physical sciences by devaluing classical speculative thought which he viewed as an impediment to his own great mission. Bacon's Advancement of Learning, a survey of the state of learning in his day, indicated its deficiency in the study of nature and blamed this deficiency on a disproportionate orientation towards philosophic matters. In charting the course for the Catholic University of Ireland, Newman included all sciences but insisted that the heart of the university was in liberal studies which were speculative rather than useful. All students at the university were to be trained in a liberal education for at least two years, putting them on the road to being men of general culture capable of distinguishing between methods and areas of truth.

Both Newman and Bacon explicitly state the primary importance of applying the right method to an area of truth. In the Grammar, Newman expresses in theocentric terms the connection between the nature of the mind, method, and the object that we seek to know. He states that

the laws of the mind are the expression, not of mere constituted order, but of His will.... It is He who teaches us all knowledge; and the way by which we

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4 Dwight Culler comments in The Imperial Intellect that "Bacon held that the unity of the sciences lay in their method" (181). This is echoed by Daniel G. Mulcahy in "The Role of the Disciplines in Cardinal Newman's Theory of a Liberal Education" where he claims that for Dewey and for Bacon the unity of knowledge was through the method of the sciences (51). In The Advancement of Learning, it is clear that Bacon distinguishes between methods and subject matters. However, the editors of Bacon's Works suggest that towards the end Bacon, like John Stuart Mill, came to believe that the method of induction could be applied to other areas of knowledge outside the physical sciences.

acquire it is His way. He varies that way according to the subject-matter; but
whether He has set before us in our particular pursuit the way of observation
or of experiment, of speculation or of research, of demonstration or of
probability, whether we are inquiring into the system of the universe or into
the elements of matter and of life, or into the history of human society and past
times, if we take the way proper to our subject-matter, we have His bless-
ing..." (275-276).

The way in which we inquire into religious and ethical matters, Newman continues, is
a particularly "rugged and circuitous" path, which is impossible without His blessing and
inflicts a discipline on our minds that itself prepares us for "due devotion to Him when He is
found" (276).  

Because Bacon believed that progress in the physical sciences had been frustrated
through a disregard for proper rigour in method, he also emphasizes the importance of applying
the method appropriate to a particular kind of truth. In the Advancement, at the end of his
survey of the "arts of Judgment, which handle the natures of Proofs and Demonstrations,"
Bacon finds deficient the important area of "the application of the differing kinds of proofs to
the differing kinds of subjects" (129, 134-135). He states:

there being but four kinds of demonstrations, that is, by the immediate consent
of the mind or sense, by induction, by syllogism, and by congruity (which
Aristotle callet demonstration in orb or circle, and not a notioribus;) every of
these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which respectively they
have chiefest use; and certain others, from which respectively they ought to be
excluded; and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs in
some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the more
remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and
hinderance to knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstrations,
according to the analogy of sciences, I note as deficient (135).

Newman and Bacon, as arbiters of method, also share common ground in their distinc-
tion among the three broad areas of truth. In their respective investigations into learning,
Bacon and Newman both divide knowledge into the three orders of the divine, the human and
the natural. In the Advancement, Bacon refers to the "three beams of man's knowledge: that is,
radius directus, which is referred to nature; radius refractus, which is referred to God, and
cannot report truly because of the inequality of the medium," and "radius reflexus, whereby
man beholdeth and contemplateth himself" (105). In his final Discourse in the Idea where
Newman considers the mutual relations of these three areas of truth, he refers to the "three great

6 In his discussion of revealed truth in the Grammar, Newman refers to the different
means of argument which it has pleased a Good Providence to give us. He supports from
Aristotle his view that "from probabilities we may construct legitimate proof, sufficient for
certitude" (320).
subjects on which Human Reason employs itself:—God, Nature, and Man" (166). Theology is the study of what we know about God; Science is the book of nature or the physical world "subjected to Human Reason"; and Literature is the book of man or the social world subjected to Human Reason (166).

It is particularly in their distinction between the sacred and the natural as areas of truth requiring separate methods that Newman and Bacon share a common first principle. Although his zeal is directed towards removing the obstacles that had hindered the study of cause and effect in the physical world, Bacon makes clear the distinction between divine revelation and the light of nature or between divinity and philosophy. Religious truth and moral conduct belong to different realms than natural knowledge. Remarking on the difference between these two kinds of truth in the final section of the Advancement, Bacon states that "sacred theology,(which in our idiom we call divinity,) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature" (209). Bacon also makes clear that not only the doctrine of religion but the "moral law truly interpreted....is not to be attained but by inspiration and revelation from God" (209-210). Knowledge of good and evil can be obtained through the light of nature "from reason, sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven and earth." In an argument similar to Newman's in "Natural Religion" in the Grammar, Bacon maintains that man can obtain moral knowledge through the "law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first estate." Bacon also clarifies that this is sufficient only "to check the vice, but not to inform the duty" (210).

In the final Discourse of the Idea, Newman quotes Bacon to indicate the limitations of approaching theology from the perspective of the physical sciences because the religious ground of moral life belongs to a separate domain. Drawing on a passage in De Augmentis (28) which corresponds to the passage just quoted from the Advancement, Newman cites Bacon:

Sacred Theology...must be drawn from the words and the oracles of God: not from the light of nature or the dictates of reason. It is written, that 'the Heavens declare the glory of God;' but we nowhere find it that the Heavens declare the will of God; which is pronounced a law and a testimony, that men should do according to it. Nor does this hold only in the great mysteries of the Godhead, of the creation, of the redemption...We cannot doubt that a large part of the moral law is too sublime to be attained by the light of nature; though it is still certain that men, even with the light and law of nature, have some notions of virtue, vice, justice, wrong, good, and evil (Idea, 171-172).

As delineators of areas of truth and of the methods suited to them, Bacon and Newman also share a common view of the use of reason in faith. Because of the difference between the orders of the divine and the natural, both Newman and Bacon insist that they must be
apprehended in different ways. Both argue that the believer is disposed differently towards revealed truth than towards natural truth. Bacon distinguishes between the use of reason in revealed truth and in natural truth. He states that because the word of God is divine rather than natural, our reason is to be subordinate to it. Just "as we are to obey His law, though we find a reluctance in our will, so we are to believe His word, though we find a reluctance in our reason" (209). Newman’s comments on approaching revealed truth from a different vantage point than natural truth are scattered through all his writings. Alison Wilson points to Newman’s statement in the Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine that in the search for the religious truth of dogma, "the mind is below truth, not above it, and is bound, not to descant upon it, but to venerate it."

Similarly, in "The Mission of St. Benedict," Newman writes that the frame of mind required by poetry as by religion "demands, as its primary condition, that we should not put ourselves above the objects in which it resides, but at their feet;...instead of fancying that we can comprehend them, we should take for granted that we are surrounded and comprehended by them ourselves. It implies that we understand them to be vast, immeasurable, impenetrable, inscrutable, mysterious."

Newman’s view of a particular relation between reason and faith, the subject of the Grammar of Assent as well as of many sermons, is also clearly discriminated by Bacon. Reason in religion is used first to apprehend God’s truths and, once they are apprehended, deductions may be made from them. Bacon writes that revealed truth differs from natural truth in that "the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason" (211). In revealed truth, our reason is used first to apprehend the mysteries of God. Bacon states: He "doth graft his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock". Secondly, once the articles and principles are apprehended, we may reason deductively, "to make derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction" (211). Bacon notes that this deductive reasoning from accepted grounds is applicable in "many knowledges, both of greater and smaller nature," such as in law or games of chess. It is the only method of reasoning used in religious doctrine and dogma. Because of the intrusion of the inductive method used in the physical sciences into the realm of theology in his day, Newman states categorically in Discourse ix: "Induction is the instrument of Physics,

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8 Historical Sketches, 387.
and deduction only is the instrument of Theology....Revelation is all in all in doctrine;...the inferential method its sole instrument, and ecclesiastical authority its sole sanction" (169-170).

Following from their common first principle of the separation of divine and natural knowledge are further commonalities on the question of the continued development of doctrine, a matter Newman investigated in An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. In his survey of the knowledge of his day, Bacon notes as deficient "the true limits and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic" (212). He also notes the need to distinguish "with piety and wisdom" between the given, fundamental points of religion and those that continue to develop:

what points of religion are fundamental, and what perfective, being matter of further building and perfection upon one and the same foundation; and again, how the gradations of light, according to the dispensation of times, are material to the sufficiency of belief (213)

In the matter of "how far forth the Church is inspired," Bacon raises issues related to faith and reason, between secular knowledge and religious knowledge, that are important to Newman's view of the boundaries of both and figured as an important factor in his decision to convert to the Roman Catholic Church.

Because of their common first principle in separating the domains of Revelation and natural truth, both arbiters of method agree that the principle of inquiry used to investigate physical phenomena cannot be applied to Scripture. Bacon insisted that the Scriptures, being given by inspiration, should be treated differently from all other books by the expositor. He condemned "that interpretation of the Scripture which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a profane book" (218); he cautioned against pressing with reason too far into the mystery and suggested the limitations of forcing Scripture through methods like "scholastical divinity" (214). He further warned against pretending, as the school of Paracelsus did, "to find the truth of all natural philosophy in the Scriptures....to seek temporary things amongst eternal," confusing what is used in Scripture for illustration of moral and divine matters for literal truth (216-217).

From his perspective more than two centuries later, Newman's condemnation of the misapplication of the inductive method to Revelation is evidently a condemnation not of Bacon but of the exclusive use of the method ardently promoted by him for the investigation of natural phenomena. Newman laments that

Protestantism treats Scripture just as they [the school of Bacon] deal with Nature; it takes the sacred text as a large collection of phenomena, from which by an inductive process, each individual Christian may arrive at just those religious conclusions which approve themselves to his own judgment (171).
If a method suited to the natural sciences is used for Scripture, faith becomes "a mere modification of reason, as being an acquiescence in certain probable conclusions till better are found" (171).

Bacon insisted that the right use of the knowledge of physical nature was charitable, "referred to the good of men and mankind" (6). However Newman observes that Bacon, as if with a prophetic misgiving of the tendencies of his philosophy to "depreciate, or to trample on Theology," went out of his way to insist on his philosophy as "the instrument of that beneficent Father, who, when He came on earth in visible form, took on Him first...the office of assuaging the bodily wounds of human nature" (Idea, 89). In the next section, I shall examine in "Christianity and Physical Science" and "The Tamworth Reading Room" Newman's view of the uneasy relations that developed between science and religion with the increasing unilateral dominance of the Baconian method. Newman's procedure in both cases illustrates the practical importance of the liberally educated intellect capable of discerning what may rightly be expected of the various areas of knowledge. My purpose in this section is to demonstrate through Newman's example his expectations of the gentleman or man of general culture as described by him in the Idea. It is the relation between science and religion that Newman takes as his subject in his Lecture in the School of Medicine which opened during the second year of operation of the Catholic University of Ireland in 1855. As a man of general culture, Newman clearly and explicitly resists the blurring of the lines of demarcation between Revelation and Physical Science. He defines the principles of these two fields of knowledge, indicates the methods suited to their respective kinds of truth and the fallacy of applying to one the method suited to the other. In other words, Newman proceeds in this lecture, "Christianity and Physical Science," as a model of the liberally educated gentleman conversant in first principles and methods, one who is not a slave or a child because he knows "the relative disposition of things" and has "mapped out the Universe" (Discourse v, "Knowledge Its Own End," 85).

Newman begins his lecture by discriminating broadly between the idea of the natural and the supernatural. Nature is "that vast system of things, taken as whole, of which we are cognizant by means of our natural powers." The supernatural world is "that still more marvellous and awful universe, of which the Creator Himself is the fulness, and which becomes known to us, not through our natural faculties but by superadded and direct communication from Him" (323). Newman emphasizes the distinctness of the two ideas and fields of knowledge. Physics is the philosophy of matter; it knows this world through the senses, cataloguing, comparing, and arranging "the complexity of phenomena into simple elements and principles" at which point "its mission is at an end" (324-5). Its questions concern efficient rather than
final causes; "With matter it began, with matter it will end" (325). Theology begins at the opposite pole, not with nature but the Author of nature. It systematizes "what He Himself has told us of Himself; of His nature, His attributes, His will, and His acts" (326). It contemplates not matter but mind: "the Supreme Intelligence; souls and their destiny; conscience and duty; the...dealings of the Creator with the creature" (326).

It is as a man of general culture conversant in the three broad areas of truth that Newman defines the principles of Theology and Physical Science. These definitions allow him to observe the relation between the two fields of knowledge. Like Bacon who had observed that there is no "enmity between God's word and His works," Newman invokes the principle of non-contradiction to make the same statement: "it will be found, on the whole, that the two...kinds of knowledge respectively are separated off from each other; and that, therefore, as being separate, they cannot on the whole contradict each other" (323). Bacon warned of the vanity of seeking God's Nature and Will revealed in our inquiry into sensible and material things, unwisely commingling the book of God's word and the book of God's works. Newman insists because physical science treats of a different subject than theology, it can say nothing at all on the subject of theology. He underscores the importance of this distinction between theology and physical science in a reference to the comment made by "the recent French editors of one of the works of St. Thomas," who state that St. Thomas "made an alliance, not with Plato, but with Aristotle," avoiding the commingling of the natural and divine which, according to the editors, "had been the source of the worst errors of other philosophers, and especially of Plato" (324).

After defining the principles of theology and physical science, Newman proceeds, like Aristotle's man of general culture, to distinguish their respective methods, stating: "I observe, then, that the elementary methods of reasoning and inquiring used in Theology and Physics are contrary the one to the other" (331). He notes that the verbal, syllogistic or argumentative "method of Theology is that of a strict science, such as Geometry, or deductive." This is natural because it proceeds from just what is revealed from above and nothing more; deductions can be made from the original doctrines which "the Apostles were inspired to deliver....but, as

9 Advancement, 217.

10 Advancement, 8.

11 Newman refers to De Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra Gentiles seu Summa Philosophica (Nemauri: 1853) i. The editors were P.-C. Roux-Lavergne, E. D'Yzalguier, E. Germer-Durand.
the conclusion is ever in its premisses, such deductions are not, strictly speaking, an addition" (331). The method of Physics is the one natural to an empirical pursuit, i.e., induction. Its method is the reverse of theology's; physics "has hardly any principles or truths to start with, externally delivered and already ascertained." It advances to new truths distinct from the "exuberant sylva of phenomena" from which they originate. Physical science is experimental, progressive, and "has visions of the future"; theology is traditional, stationary, exact, and "loyal to the past" (332).

Newman’s clear observations on the principles and methods of theology and physical science then allow him to make judgments in the long-standing humanist tradition on the nature of the relation between the two areas of knowledge. He is particularly concerned with the fusion of theology and physical science in "Natural Theology" or "more properly, Physical Theology" (338). Works like William Paley’s *A View of the Evidences of Christianity* (1794) drew inferences about God from the design in His works; in the *Bridgewater Treatises*, scientists were commissioned to show the power, wisdom, and benevolence of God through the evidence of their various branches of science such as geology, zoology, or botany. However, Newman cites Macaulay’s *Essays* to point out that natural theology, unlike natural science, is not progressive, that the individual in the nineteenth century had "just the same evidences of design in the structure of the universe which the early Greeks had" (328).

Because Bacon’s observations on natural theology as a particular branch of knowledge proceed from the same first principles as Newman’s in distinguishing clearly between the divine and natural, his statements in this area are consistent with Newman’s. In his survey of the state of knowledge in his day, Bacon examines natural theology or divine philosophy not under divinity but in a earlier section of the *Advancement* as a category of philosophy. He distinguishes the object of this truth from the way in which it is known: this knowledge may "be truly termed divine in respect of the object, and natural in respect of the light." He indicates clearly the limitations of approaching the divine through natural lights. As the works of any workman "show forth the power and skill of the workman, and not his image," so the "works of God...show the omnipotency and wisdom of the Maker, but not His image." According to the Scriptures, the only other image of God is man. Bacon states that in his judgment it is not safe "to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith" through "the contemplation of nature or ground of human knowledge." We should not "draw down or submit

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12 Newman states of the argument from design in the universe that "Socrates makes precisely the same use of the statues of Polycletus and the pictures of Zeuxis, which Paley makes of the watch" 339.
the mysteries of God to our reason; but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the
divine truth." Noting that there is no deficiency in natural theology but rather an excess, he
cautions against mixing together religion and philosophy "because of the extreme prejudice
which both religion and philosophy have received and may receive, by being commixed
together" (88-89).

Because, as Newman remarks, "that old teaching, founded on the deductive
method...was in honour and in possession at the time when Experiment and Induction com-
menced their brilliant career" (337), Bacon's insistence on the separateness of divine and natu-
ral truth was not a struggle against the current as it was for Newman in the nineteenth century
when the application of the Baconian method to theology resulted increasingly in the fusion of
natural and divine truth. Bacon represents a watershed in the diminishing of the deductive
method and the ascendancy of induction. Newman's defense of Physics and Theology in their
respective domains and his resistance to their being "commixed together" in natural theology is
conducted on the grounds of their distinctly separate methods. He remarks of the historical
quarrel between the two:

each of them has a method of its own; and in this, I think, has lain the point of
controversy between the two schools, viz., that neither of them has been quite
content to remain on its own homestead, but that, whereas each has its own
method, which is the best for its own science, each has considered it the best
for all purposes whatever, and has at different times thought to impose it upon
the other science, to the disparagement or rejection of that opposite method
which legitimately belongs to it (331).

If one method becomes an habitual mode of thought, a conscious effort has to be made
not to use it where it is inappropriate: "minds habituated to either of these two methods can
hardly help extending it beyond its due limits, unless they are put upon their guard, and have
great command of themselves" (332). Newman observes the unfairness of precluding the physi-

cal inquirer from "that process of examination which is proper to his own peculiar pursuit"
(334). He remarks that it was against such dictatorial formulae that Bacon inveighed and so
exerted "himself for a great reform in the process of inquiry, preaching the method of Induc-
tion, and...getting provoked for a time...with Theology itself." However this "unintentional
and long obsolete interference ...on the part of Theologians" has been replaced by far more
serious incursions into Theology by the method of the experimental school (334). Newman
objects that "the history of the last three centuries is only one long course of attempts, on the
part of the partisans of the Baconian Philosophy, to get rid of the method proper to Theology
and to make it an experimental science" (335).

In spite of the warnings of theologians made "before these experimentalists started, that
it was nothing more than a huge mistake to introduce the method of research and of induction
into the study of Theology at all," men have worked through Scripture, Antiquity, and Nature "with the method of instrument of Bacon in their hands," reaching contradictory conclusions (336). Newman laments their error in method:

What a singular break-down of a noble instrument, when used for the arrogant and tyrannical invasion of a sacred territory! What can be more sacred than Theology? What can be more noble than the Baconian method? But the two do not correspond; they are mismatched. The age has mistaken lock and key. It has broken the key in a lock which does not belong to it; it has ruined the wards by a key which never will fit into them (337).

Newman maintains that contemporary Protestant trends which would draw religion logically from Scripture only, or from Historical research into the Primitive Church only, or unduly emphasize the evidences of "natural" theology, err in two ways: through the intrusion of the "Baconian empirical method in a department not its own" (340) and in approaching the circle of theological doctrines from one quarter only, rendering a partial and therefore a false view.

To clarify how natural theology falls short of religious truth on which theology must be based, Newman proceeds as a man of philosophic habit to define broadly what is essential to the idea of Religion. "Religion is more than Theology" because it involves not abstractions but a personal relation: "it is something relative to us; and it includes our relation towards the Object of it" (341). The argument from design reveals three of God’s simplest attributes: Power, Wisdom, and Goodness. It is "dumb almost as regards the moral attributes of the Creator." It says little of His "Sanctity, omniscience, justice, mercy, faithfulness." Physical theology cannot tell us anything of the elements of Christianity: death, judgment, heaven, and hell. In fact, it undermines the "essence of the idea of a Revelation," i.e., miracles which involve the suspension of the laws on which the argument from design is based. The three simple attributes of God disclosed through the argument from design are, declares Newman, closer to the God of the Pantheist and degrade God by identifying Him with His works (341-2).13

13 In Discourse ii, "Theology a Branch of Knowledge," Newman observes that by abandoning the distinction between divine and natural truth, the word "God" as traditionally understood "according to the teaching of Monotheism," shifts in meaning to signify nothing more than what the design of the universe reveals to a mind who still believes in the "Great Architect of Nature" (26-27). If, as Hume maintains, our knowledge of God is simply commensurate with our knowledge of the material and moral phenomena of Nature and the world, "it is only a question of words whether or not we go on to the hypothesis of a second Being, not visible but immaterial, parallel and coincident with Nature, to whom we give the name of God" (30). The word "God" may mean nothing more than "a generalization of phenomena" and divine truth may be simply "Nature with a divine glow upon it" (28-29). The word "God" may mean little more than material things and abstractions from them. Piety based on the "pageant of experiment or abstract reasoning...is nothing more than...an ornament of lan-
Newman concludes his lecture to the School of Medicine by denying any fault in Bacon, the great arbiter of method, for the fusion of science with theology:

Do not for an instant suppose, Gentlemen, that I would identify the great mind of Bacon with so serious a delusion: he has expressly warned us against it; but I cannot deny that many of his school have from time to time in this way turned physical research against Christianity (342).

Newman observes incidentally in the lecture that because the theological information obtained through the inductive inquiry into nature is meagre, inquirers have "closed the inquiry itself" and announced "that nothing can be known on the subject at all" (336-7). Bacon had anticipated this problem at the beginning of the Advancement where, justifying the study of nature and second causes, he counters the claim made by jealous or zealous Divines that knowledge was the original temptation of man, that "learned times have been inclined to atheism" and that "the contemplation of second causes derogate[s] from our dependence upon God, who is the first cause" (4). Bacon states that the temptation consisted in man's proud knowledge, "an intent in man to give law unto himself, and to depend no more upon God's commandments." Man was made for knowledge: "God hath framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass, capable of the image of the universal world." Man's mind was made not only to take delight in " beholding the variety of things and vicissitudes of times," but also to discover their general laws, "the ordinances and decrees, which throughout all those changes are infallibly observed" (5). The study of nature, where God works only in second causes, may at first "induce some oblivion of the highest cause" but, in proceeding to greater knowledge, the dependence of causes is seen. It will be easily believed "that the highest link of nature's chain is connected to the divine or "must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair" (8).

Newman ends his Discourses, as Bacon began the Advancement, with reference to the old quarrel between religion and physical science. He states that although there can be no contradiction between physical science and religious truth as "Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation, come from the same Divine Author" (Idea, 167), nonetheless there has been an historical "jealousy and hostility between Religion and physical philosophers," and he finds evidence of the tendency towards atheism that Bacon mentioned as characteristic of learned times in figures prominent in modern science such as La Place, Franklin, and Humboldt. He cites examples of the antagonism between religion and physical science in the middle ages and refers to Bacon's testimony to this old quarrel in antiquity:

the hostility between experimental science and theology is far older than Christianity. Lord Bacon traces it to an era prior to Socrates; he tells us that,

language" (29).
among the Greeks, the atheistic was the philosophy most favourable to physical discoveries, and he does not hesitate to imply that the rise of the religious schools was the ruin of science (168).

Like Bacon, Newman states that the pursuit of knowledge "to its furthest extent and its true limit" will lead "to the Eternal and Infinite" (165). But unlike Bacon, who was pleading for the legitimacy and advancement of the physical sciences, Newman points out that from the perspective of their study in the mid-nineteenth century there is a very good likelihood this convergence in the Divine will not happen. In pursuing either liberal or useful studies, the tendency is to measure divine truth "by an earthly standard" (165). The demands on the intellect made by university studies require a different disposition than faith. Newman speaks of

the tendency of that Liberal education, of which a University is the school, viz., to view Revealed Religion from an aspect of its own,—to fuse and recast it,—to tune it, as it were, to a different key, and to reset its harmonies (165).

In this confusion of the orders of revealed knowledge and knowledge of the world, we make ourselves "our own centre, and our minds the measure of all things" (165). We reject in revelation what is embarrassing to our intellect—"tenets under which the intellect labours and of which it is ashamed," such as the doctrine of grace or the mystery of the Godhead (166).

The application of induction to theology had repercussions in education, leading to the exclusion of theology as a subject from Universities such as London University. It is as a misapplication of method that Newman perceives this exclusion of theology on the grounds that little could be known about God through induction. The philosophical error of its exclusion is the subject of Discourses ii, iii, and iv: "Theology a Branch of Knowledge," "Bearing of Theology on Other Branches of Knowledge," and "Bearing of Other Branches of Knowledge on Theology." In Discourse ii, Newman casts his argument in the form of a syllogism, the verbal mode of reasoning refined by Aristotle but of little use in the study of the physical sciences. Insisting afterwards to his audience that his argument is no matter of words, he proceeds:

A University, I should lay down, by its very name professes to teach universal knowledge: Theology is surely a branch of knowledge: how then is it possible for it to profess all branches of knowledge, and yet to exclude from the subjects of its teaching one which, to say the least, is as important and as large as any of them? I do not see that either premiss of this argument is open to exception (14-15).

In the final Discourse, Newman grounds his argument again in the confusion of methods. He states that theology is ignored or outlawed by the school of Bacon because it is "a subject-matter...in which their favourite instrument has no office" (170). Newman states "that Catholicism differs from physical science, in drift, in method of proof, and in subject-matter."
Because of this, he asks how it "can fail to meet with unfair usage from the philosophers of any Institution in which there is no one to take its part" (172) and indicates that it is the duty of the Church to ensure a bona fide recognition of Theology in the University as Theology is in the special keeping of the Church.14

In his lecture in the School of Medicine and throughout the Discourses, Newman, like Bacon, insisted on the distinction between the divine and the natural and the methods suited to knowledge of them. Like Bacon, Newman also maintained that moral law "truly interpreted" and moral conduct were grounded in the divine. In "The Tamworth Reading Room," a collection of seven letters Newman wrote to The Times between Feb. 5-27, 1841, under the pseudonym of "Catholicus," he exposes what he considers the error in method then current in certain educational circles of seeking to sustain moral conduct through intellectual means. I shall examine Newman's procedure in these letters as another illustration of the liberally educated gentleman in the humanist tradition who enters the fray of battling ideas as an arbiter of method. I shall provide a sense of the historical context of this battle of ideas in the case of these letters to show how Newman proceeded from a first principle in his judgment of popular opinion. The letters were written during a final turbulent year for Newman in the Oxford Movement in response to an inaugural address, Jan. 19, 1841, by Sir Robert Peel on the opening of a reading room and library for a Mechanics' Institute in his constituency at Tamworth.15

14 In "Newman's Infallible Instincts: The Argument for Elbowroom," Joseph A. Komonchak states that Newman perceived the role of the Church as protecting the objectivity and internal consistency of divine revelation. To subject religion to consensus or to the latest scientific research to be "proved, understood, experienced," is to apply what is good for liberalism to the principles of religion (445-6).

15 In 1829, the Protestant Newman opposed Peel when, as member of Parliament for Oxford University, Peel changed his position and supported concessions to Catholics. In 1841, the year of the "Tamworth" speech, Peel (1788-1850) won a strong majority as leader of the Conservative Party. In 1845, it was Peel's bill that established the secular, non-denominational Queen's Colleges in Ireland, six years prior to the establishment of the Catholic University of Ireland where Newman became Rector. Peel also earned the ire of Protestants in England by greatly increasing the grants to the Irish Catholic seminary in Maynooth.

Wendell V. Harris has studied the historical background to the exchange between Peel and Newman. Peel's speech was published in The Times on Jan. 26, 1841 and later in pamphlet form as An Inaugural Address, Delivered by the Right Honourable Sir Robert Peel, Bart. M.P., President of the Tamworth Library and Reading Room (London: James Bain, 1841). Sir Robert Peel had overcome objections to the founding of the subscription library (one shilling per quarter) for the relatively small community of Tamworth and had contributed one hundred pounds to it. By 1850 when the government began to fund libraries, there were about six hundred Mechanics' Institutes, mostly with libraries. By then, the idea of a scientific library had been replaced in favour of a collection of fiction, biography, travel, and a separate news room where, contrary to the policy in 1841 in Tamworth, political information was admitted. Religious materials were available in church and Sunday School Libraries. "Newman, Peel, Tamworth, and the Concurrence of Historical Forces," Victorian Studies 32.2
Sir Robert Peel’s speech served as a point of departure for Newman to distinguish what he believed the fundamental error of confusing moral and intellectual truth in education. Wendell V. Harris describes Peel’s speech as pertaining to many other matters: library regulations; the selection of a book committee; the value of practical information made available, such as reports on the draining of land, deep ploughing, diseases of wheat; the possibility of fame through scientific knowledge and the reassurance that scientific knowledge was not harmful to religious belief. Charles Frederick Harrold, editor of these letters in Essays and Sketches, suggests that Newman was unduly severe in his treatment of Sir Robert Peel’s speech.16

The letters are a response to a movement in public education which believed that instruction in science and literature, avoiding the wrangling of the various religious denominations in education, could effect moral improvement and social stability among the large populations of the great manufacturing towns.17 Like Aristotle and Bacon, Newman recognized as a


16 Newman, Essays and Sketches, vol ii, (New York: Longmans, Green, 1948) xiv. However, Newman suggests throughout the letters that Sir Robert Peel’s "profession and life give the lie" to the philosophy expressed in his speech (191).

17 James Kay-Shuttleworth (1804-1877), physician, founder of the Manchester Statistical Society and reputed as a social scientist, Assistant Commissioner of the Poor Law Board (1834) and a pioneer in the education of pauper children, Secretary of the Committee of Privy Council (1839-1849) established to distribute grants for education, and founder of the first English Training School for teachers at Battersea (1839), provides a good perspective on the issues in Robert Peel’s speech in the town hall at Tamworth. Kay-Shuttleworth’s own retrospective view on the development of education in Four Periods of Public Education indicates its roots in social concerns. His statistical survey of Manchester included factory working conditions; information on the squalor of housing with the stench of pigs kept in common yards; the mortality rate of children; the number of men, women, and children entering a gin house per hour (346) on a Saturday night; crime and its costs; and the state of education. Education was perceived as essential to prevent social anarchy or revolution, to teach the populace "to love that which they know to be right" and to foster the virtues of frugality, industry, self-control, and forethought (62). Measures for educating the labouring classes included: the provision of public libraries by capitalists; public parks; the teaching of reading and writing so that labourers might enjoy rational rather than licentious amusement; lectures and cheap treatises on the exact sciences connected to workers’ occupations made available, for example, in Mechanics’ Institutes with artisan involvement; instruction in political science through journals to provide political information and make the workers responsible.

The Minutes of the Committee on Education for August and December, 1846, provide a retrospective view of the religious and social interests in education at about the time of Robert Peel’s speech to the Mechanics’ Institute in Tamworth. The mutual suspicion reflecting the old quarrel between divine and secular knowledge is evident. The Established Church is criticized for giving little thought to secular education, perhaps through suspicion of the secular knowledge promoted by politicians or the belief that it was inadequate to raise public morality. The politicians are described as promoting the exact sciences to create harmony and avoid the dissensions and rancour of religious sects. Young minds should examine laws of the material world as evidences. Kay-Shuttleworth notes that the Committee omits even the his-
man of general culture that abstract knowledge belonged to a separate domain from religion and morality and that the former could not do the work of the latter. Newman gives his own account of his intention in these letters to *The Times* in a passage of the *Grammar* where he cites from these much earlier letters. Here he states that he wrote to protest against a dangerous doctrine maintained, as I considered, by two very eminent men of that day, now no more—Lord Brougham and Sir Robert Peel. That doctrine was to the effect that the claims of religion could be secured and sustained in the mass of men, and in particular in the lower classes of society, by acquaintance with literature and physical science, and through the instrumentality of Mechanics’ Institutes and Reading Rooms, to the serious disparagement, as it seemed to me, of direct Christian instruction (88).

Although Bacon clearly cautioned against the mingling of moral or religious truth with secular knowledge, the fusion of social and scientific concerns with moral values in fact follows from his justification of the study of physical science as charity through its usefulness in the temporal benefits it provided for mankind. Lord Brougham (1778-1868) was a representative of man “which surely must in a higher degree exhibit a natural revelation of that great first and benignant Cause” (496). James Kay-Shuttleworth, *Four Periods of Public Education*.

18 Newman cites from these letters to contrast notional and real as asserts *Grammar*, 88-92.

19 Wendell V. Harris points out that Brougham and Peel were long-time political antagonists; Brougham enjoyed popularity in the twenties and thirties but by 1841 he had been discredited. Harris states that “Catholicus” would be immediately recognized by readers of *The Times* in 1841 as a High Anglican and probably a tractarian. He suggests that by linking Brougham and Peel, Newman was able to pit the views of the Established Church on the education of the masses against the proponents of their secular education (193).

20 W.H.G. Armytage traces the path of secularization in English education with its orientation towards social and scientific concerns in *Four Hundred years of English Education*. In its earlier phase in Mandeville’s *The Fable of the Bees* (1723), good or evil actions are defined by their hurt or benefit to society. Mandeville’s perspective on education is given in his *Essay on Charity and Charity Schools*. The chemist, Joseph Priestly, in his *Essay on a Course of Liberal Education for Civil and Active Life* (1765), influenced education with his view of the “religion of humanity” as did Jeremy Bentham with his utilitarian doctrine of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Bentham’s *Chrestomathia*, a day-school for the middle and higher classes, was based on vocational training through science, through experiments and working models. It was assumed that all knowledge had a social purpose and that the classics were only for the learned professions. In the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1818), where secularist views were given philosophical form, James Mill states that universal education is historically a new need made necessary by evolving democratic government and expresses his associationist belief in the molding power of education. The view of the importance of education for all and the secularist belief in man’s progress in knowledge and happiness are connected to the founding of the Mechanics’ Institutes (1824) to provide lectures and libraries for workers. In the wave of initial enthusiasm, the Mechanics’ Institutes grew to number one hundred and four in two years before slowing down because of the difficulties of teaching physical science to the untutored, shortages of money and of lecturers, and the fear of
tive figure in the educational movement which fused morality and science. In a Forward to a contemporary edition of his writings, published in the same year as "The Tamworth Reading Room," he is described as riding on the enthusiasm of his age for science, a man with no new ideas but making the word "science" have a magic significance, giving credibility to anything coupled with it. He advocated the great cause of public education "as the ultimate panacea for all the evils to be feared from the extension of popular influence." In one of his many speeches, he extolled the glory of the schoolmaster who will open "to the light all the recesses of ignorance, and turn up by the roots the weeds of vice." The subversive effects of education as well as suspicions of propaganda. The University of London was also an expression of secularist enthusiasm. Armytage also suggests that the impetus given to useful or technical knowledge in France by Napoleon for military reasons influenced the development of higher institutes of science in England just as the commercial needs of the East India Company led to the establishment of its training colleges (85-89). The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (1826), a secularist counterpart to the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, was founded in 1826. In the 1830's and 1840's, the Universal Society of Rational Religionists with members like G.J. Holyoake and other disciples of Robert Owen, established secular dioceses centred on Halls of Science.


22 Ibid., 19. In 1802, Lord Brougham was one of the original contributors to the Edinburgh Review, founded by members of the Edinburgh Academy of Physics. In 1816, he secured the appointment of a select committee to investigate the "state of the education of the lower orders of the metropolis" of London (Opinions of Lord Brougham, 7). In the same year, he visited Pestalozzi's school in Yverdun, Switzerland.

In Four Hundred Years of English Education, W.H.G. Armytage outlines Brougham's connections to education. In 1818, he and James Mill established the first infant school in London similar to Robert Owen's in New Lanark. In 1823, with Dr. George Birbeck, he was involved with the formation of the first Mechanics' Institutes. In 1825, he was appointed Rector of the University of Glasgow, making an Inaugural Address to which Newman refers in Discourse ii of the Idea as well as in "The Tamworth Reading Room." In 1826, he helped found the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, described by Armytage as a by-product of the Mechanics' Institutes, preaching salvation through science in tracts and a penny encyclopedia. As President of the Society, he wrote a Treatise on the Objects, Advantages, and Pleasures of Science. In the same period, Brougham was one of the founders of the University of London. Initially, the university was mostly a centre for medical studies and in its early struggles made failed attempts to establish chairs of mineralogy, engineering, design, and education.

23 Liverpool Speech, July 20, 1835, Opinions of Lord Brougham, 292.
Newman warns that the confusion of the two kinds of truth, of morality and faith, on the one hand, and science and literature on the other, is a fallacy and a pretense. His concern about the failure to distinguish between them is indicated in the titles of the letters in "The Tamworth Reading Room": 'Secular Knowledge Not Religion,' 'Secular Knowledge Not the Principle of Moral Improvement,' 'Secular Knowledge Not a Direct Means of Moral Improvement', 'Secular Knowledge Not the Antecedent of Moral Improvement',24 'Secular Knowledge Not a Principle of Social Unity,'25 'Secular Knowledge Not a Principle of Action,' 'Secular Knowledge without Personal Religion Tends to Unbelief'.26

Newman states that it is simply the nature of our constitution that faith is the principle of moral action rather than knowledge. In his fifth university sermon in Dublin, "The Secret Power of Divine Grace," Newman preaches that the moral motive proceeds from the conscience grounded in God; in "The Tamworth Reading Room," he warns that if Christianity can never "regain the organic power in human society which once it possessed," nonetheless it is futile "to attempt by philosophy what once was done by religion" (203).

Newman clearly distinguishes between the path towards faith and scientific procedure.27 Faith reaches towards its fountainhead in God through impressions made directly on the imagination through particular people and particular events:

The heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and

24 T.H. Huxley maintains that improvements of natural knowledge profoundly altered modes of thinking and views of right and wrong: "natural knowledge, in desiring to ascertain the laws of comfort, has been driven to discover those of conduct, and to lay the foundations of a new morality" (Essence of T.H. Huxley, 40).

25 In his introduction to Ideal Commonwealths, Henry Morley comments that in the ideal world of the New Atlantis (1629) Bacon makes science "the civilizer who binds man to man, and is his leader to the love of God" (vi).

26 T.H. Huxley represents this last perspective. He asks why we should trouble ourselves about matters, no matter how important, if we can know nothing of them. He states that only two experimentally verifiable beliefs are necessary to fulfil our plain duty of leaving a corner of the world less ignorant and less miserable: that the order of Nature is ascertainable by our faculties to an almost unlimited extent and our volition counts for something in the course of events (Essence of T.H. Huxley, 58).

On the other hand, the truth of science is general, abstract, and neutral. The promoters of science in education claim that it "is a kind of neutral ground, on which men of every shade of politics and religion may meet together, disabuse each other of their prejudices, form intimacies, and secure co-operation" (174). Newman maintains that morality grounded in religion involves a personal relation with God through conscience rather than the impersonal, abstract truth of science:

The essence of Religion is the idea of a Moral Governor and a particular Providence; now let me ask, is the doctrine of moral governance and a particular providence conveyed to us through the physical sciences at all?....Can the problems and principles they involve be expressed in the differential calculus? Is the galvanic battery a whit more akin to conscience and will, than the mechanical powers? (212)\(^28\)

In fact, nature may be regarded either as a work or as a machine. Newman concludes that "The truth is that the system of Nature is just as much connected with Religion, where minds are not religious, as a watch or a steam-carriage" (211).\(^29\) To speak of Almighty God as the architect of nature is like speaking of the spring as the god of a watch or steam as the creator of an engine. This architect of nature is a principle "subjected to laws, and it is con-natural and co-extensive with matter" (211).

A key difference Newman distinguishes, then, between scientific truth and moral and religious truth is that the latter requires personal assent. This means that there will be differences amongst religious groups. Newman states:

\(^{28}\) In "Newman and Science," Harold Petitpas states that "physico-mathematical methods...are inapplicable to such deeper, more personal provinces of truth as the religious and the literary" (502). He also comments that the more a subject-matter is attached to nature and demonstrative method, the less it suffers from the exclusion of theology; conversely, the more personal the subject-matter and the more it is related to accumulated probabilities, the more it will benefit from the inclusion of theology (505).

\(^{29}\) The shift from a sense of nature as purposeful to a view of it as mechanical, is caught, for example, in the fourth book of Emile, ou L’Education. Rousseau’s character, the "vicaire savoyard," denies any suggestion of a final cause discernible in the order of the world. He compares himself to a person who sees the workings of a watch for the first time, admires it, sees that there is a connection between all the pieces, but has not seen the dial and does not know its purpose although he can admire the maker in the details of the work. Voltaire, in his Cabales, goes a step further, dropping the idea of the watchmaker or first cause: "L’univers m’embarrasse et je ne puis songer / Que cette horloge existe et n’ait point d’horloger." (The universe embarrasses me and I cannot but think / That this clock exists but without a clockmaker). The Age of Enlightenment, Otis E. Fellows and Norman L. Torrey ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1942) 569.
Christianity is faith, faith implies a doctrine; a doctrine propositions; propositions yes or no, yes or no differences. Differences, then, are the natural attendants on Christianity, and you cannot have Christianity, and not have differences (197).

To exclude religion for the sake of social harmony may be politically expedient but it removes what "Ere now...has been the life of morality" (199). Newman refutes Robert Peel's claim that demonstrable scientific truth will lead a person to religious assent, that

\textit{struck with awe} by the manifold proofs of infinite power and infinite wisdom, [he] will yield more ready and hearty assent—yes the assent of the heart, and not only of the understanding, to the pious exclamation, 'O Lord, how glorious are Thy works!' (210).

Rather, by its nature faith in Revelation has never "been a deduction from what we know: it has ever been an assertion of what we are to believe" (207).

Because religious assent and consent to conscience belong to a different domain than the impersonal, external knowledge of science, it follows that to know what is right does not necessarily mean to do what is right. Newman writes:

To know is one thing, to do is another; the two things are altogether distinct. A man knows he should get up in the morning,—he lies a-bed; he knows he should not lose his temper, yet he cannot keep it (180).

Knowledge may distract us from temptations or sorrows like "Digestive pills half an hour before dinner and a posset at bedtime"; it cannot effect an inward change which belongs to the province of religion or harmonize the chaos within us (183). Cicero sought consolation through literature on the death of his daughter, Tullia; Johnson's Rasselas in similar circumstances vainly sought solace in philosophy. For both it was a matter of change of outward objects rather than inward change.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{30} In the \textit{Idea}, Newman refers to the life of Bacon to illustrate the disparity between knowledge and moral practice. The man of great intellect "played false to his own professions," but "without any prejudice to the theory of induction" (89).

In his "Essay on Bacon," Lord Macaulay states: "In his library, all his rare powers were under the guidance of an honest ambition, of an enlarged philanthropy, of a sincere love of truth....Far different was the situation of the great philosopher when he came forth from his study and his laboratory to mingle with the crowd which filled the galleries of Whitehall." Lord Macaulay, \textit{Miscellaneous Essays} (London & Glasgow: Collins, 1889) 366.

In his discussion of rhetoric in the \textit{Advancement}, Bacon himself observes the difference between rational knowledge and action. He makes reference to the "continual mutinies and seditions of the affections" which "beholdeth merely the present" and the use of imaginative eloquence so that reason which, "beholdeth the future and sum of time," may prevail over "the revolt of the imagination." He cites Ovid's \textit{Metamorphosis}, vii, 20: "I see and approve better things; I follow a meaner way" (147-148).

Although Newman writes in "The Tamworth Reading Room" in response to moral claims made for physical science, he also makes clear that neither literary knowledge nor philosophy can effect moral change.
Because the province of religion and morality is inner and personal, true moral excellence is wrought "through personal struggles and sufferings" in relation to a Moral Governor and personal providence. Newman states that it is a "chief error of the day" to believe that excellence comes from without, or follows "upon a passive exposure to influences over which we have no control." He suggests that if morality depends on diversions from temptations, then teachers of morality will have to be in incessant search "after stimulants and sedatives" because "diversions cease to be diversions if they are constant" (183).

Newman describes the results to be expected from the error of confusing methods and expecting moral improvement through science or literature:

If we attempt to effect a moral improvement by means of poetry, we shall but mature into a mawkish, frivolous, and fastidious sentimentalism;—if by means of argument, into a dry, unamiable longheadedness;—if by good society, into a polished outside, with hollowness within, in which vice has lost its grossness, and perhaps increased its malignity;—if by experimental science, into an uppish, supercilious temper, much inclined to scepticism (190).

He concludes: "I say, you must use human methods in their place, and there they are useful; but they are worse than useless out of their place" (189-190). In Discourse vii of the Idea, Newman argues that the legitimate contribution of "the practical benevolence of the day... in supplying the masses of our town population with... libraries of useful and entertaining knowledge, scientific lectureships," etc. is in rescuing man "from that fearful subjection to sense which is his ordinary state" (Idea, 143, 140). But he disagrees with Sir Robert Peel's claim that knowledge of physical science is not only a pleasure superseding "the indulgence of sensual appetite" but it will make the individual "feel the moral dignity of his nature exalted" and contribute "to the intellectual and moral improvement of the community" ("Tamworth," 179). In the first instance, Newman questions whether the moral dangers in learning are not as great as in sensuality, whether exchanging coarse jests and bad language for the intellectual objects of science might not involve the exchange of "a gross fault for a more subtle one" (189). He detects pride in Lord Brougham's assertion that "One of the most gratifying treats which science affords us is the knowledge of the extraordinary powers with which the

31 In his discussion of morality in the second book of the Advancement, Bacon states: "For men of corrupted minds presuppose that honesty growth out of simplicity of manners, and believing of preachers, schoolmasters, and men's exterior language: so as, except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality" (165). The function of moral philosophy is to direct attention to divinity: "And if it be said, that the cure of men's minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true: but yet moral philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid" (167).
human mind is endowed." (210). Newman comments: "So, this is the religion we are to gain from the study of Nature; how miserable! The god we attain is our own mind; our veneration is even professedly the worship of self" (211). This self-contemplation was a danger that Bacon had anticipated, advising that only charity, i.e., referring knowledge "to the good of man and mankind," prevents the "ventosity or swelling" in knowledge that "bloweth up." 32

Newman demonstrated, then, in letters, lectures, and discourses the discerning judgment of a man of philosophic habit conversant with principles and methods. Although Newman does not disagree with Bacon's first principle, i.e., the separation of divine and natural knowledge, there is a sharp divergence between these two arbiters of method in Bacon's re-orientation of learning away from what he called the radius reflexus or knowledge of mankind, towards the radius directus or knowledge of nature. In Discourse v, "Knowledge Its Own End," Newman describes Bacon's mission as "the increase of physical enjoyment and social comfort," a design which he remarks had been "most wonderfully, most awfully ...fulfilled" (89). Translated into pedagogical terms, Bacon's reorientation of learning towards the physical world was the antithesis of the Greek cultural ideal of the paideia, the humanism described by Marrou as having as one of its goals the most complete blossoming or development of the individual's personality or the most complete realization of the person as person (Histoire de l'Education dans l'Antiquité, 423). It is a redirection of learning away from humanist education and speculative thought which was perceived as at least partially helpful in discriminating truth from error in the contentious issues of an age. Indeed, the whole thrust of the Baconian philosophy was away from this realization of the fully human person conscious of principles, studying instead the laws of the material world with a view to their use. It is this redirection of knowledge associated with him that remains of primary importance. 33

Because Newman and Bacon shared common ground in their clear distinction between divine and natural truth, Newman could also approve of the great success of the inductive method promoted by Bacon when directed towards its proper object in the physical sciences. In "Knowledge its own End," Newman refers to the indebtedness of almost everyone in the period to the Baconian method for "his daily food, his health, and general well-being" (89). Where Newman found a grave philosophical error was not in the method associated with Bacon.

32 Advancement. 6.

33 T.H. Huxley remarks that at the revival of learning knowledge was divided into the knowledge of nature and the knowledge of man and that there was an antithesis or antagonism between nature and man (Essence of T.H. Huxley, 38).
but in its misapplication by the Baconian school to religious and moral matters. Here I shall simply indicate the thrust of his method. Bacon's hopes for his method were boundless, although in fact his elaborate method in itself had little effect on the progress of science. He believed that the progressive deciphering of the abstract laws governing the particular phenomena of the physical world would allow for diverse applications which would relieve the temporal sufferings of mankind.

To redirect learning towards scientific discovery, Bacon had noted in the Advancement that previous philosophy had erred in a too great mistrust of the senses and in paying too little attention to particulars essential to the inductive method. As Benjamin Rossi indicates, Bacon believed that his novum organon or new logic for the study of cause and effect in the physical world would "suffice to obviate the deficiencies of sensory perception" (137). He believed that the certainty obtained through reforming the "remiss proofs" in the method of induction had enormous potential for human control of the material domain. Knowledge of uniform laws would

enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects...For physical causes give light to new invention in simili materia; but whosoever knoweth any Form, knoweth the utmost possibility of super-inducing that nature upon any variety of matter (Advancement, 96)

Proceeding from an observation of simple natures in causes and effects, forms or laws could be reached through tables of exclusions. In the Advancement, Bacon explains the study of simple natures in connection to the second step, the reaching of forms or laws:

if the cause of whiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and it be rendered thus, that the subtile intermixture of air and water is the cause, it is well rendered; but, nevertheless, is this the form of whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, which is ever but vehiculum formae (95).

34 In "Newman and Science," P.J. MacLaughlin notes that from the perspective of Greek learning, Bacon's promotion of the inductive method meant a slave method had became fashionable again (316). He states that Newman esteemed both Aristotle and Bacon as he appreciated different men and the different methods of different sciences, "each in its place" (317). In "The Classics," Henry Tristram observes that Newman deplored the decline of Greek which countered the genius of utilitarianism. He believed that when Greek ceased to be the badge of a gentleman it would disappear from the schools.

35 In his preface to "Bacon's Philosophical Works," Robert Leslie Ellis suggests that Bacon uses the word "form" in the sense of law. "For instance, the Form of heat is a kind of local motion of the particles of which bodies are composed, and that of whiteness a mode of arrangement among those particles. This peculiar motion or arrangement corresponds to and engenders heat or whiteness, and this in every case in which those qualities exist (29).
As Ellis, an editor of the great nineteenth-century edition explains, through his method of exclusions which involved a progressive elimination of what was not essential in the preliminary observations, forms or laws could be attained which would extend human knowledge and power.36 Once these forms were attained, as Farrington states,

It ought to be possible, for instance, not only to make glass unbreakable but to make anything unbreakable. It ought to be possible not only to make iron rustless but to exempt every material from the tendency to decay on exposure (121).

Bacon was confident that the number of these laws was limited and that within a few generations all of them would be known. Spedding, the other editor of the Works, concludes that Bacon clearly believed that through the application of his rules certitude could be reached in demonstrable matters independent of personal ability.37

Bacon’s redirection of intellectual effort involved a movement away from the human area involving choices such as the moral, ethical, political, legislative, and religious concerns of previous learning. In contrast to the personal orientation of Greek learning, Bacon’s method directed towards physical science is impersonal, a collective enterprise rather than individual.38


37 "Absolute certainty, and a mechanical mode of procedure such that all men should be capable of employing it, are thus two great features of the Baconian method" (Works) 23-24.

38 Macaulay notes Bacon’s underestimation of the personal element involved by the user of the method of induction; the user must judge the kind of instances needed for observation and determine when there is sufficient evidence for a conclusion. ("Essay on Bacon," 438-40). T.H. Huxley also points out that Bacon’s empirical method condemns the "anticipation of nature," neglecting the role of hypothesis in scientific investigation (Essence of T.H. Huxley, 42).

In the Grammar, Newman contends that the illative sense of personal judgment plays a role in experimental science whenever abstract method or reasoning is applied to the particular. He states that "in no class of concrete reasonings, whether in experimental science, historical research, or theology, is there any ultimate test of truth and error in our inferences besides the trustworthiness of the Illative Sense which gives them its sanction" (281). He observes that "there is a multitude of matters, to which mathematical science is applied, which...require that reasoning by rule should be completed by the living mind" such as in navigation or engineering. He states that "Newton’s perception of truths mathematical and physical, though proof was absent" is a demonstration of the illative faculty as "nothing short of genius" (262). In fact, Newman finds a parallel for the illative faculty of judgment in concrete reasoning in "the method of proof which is the foundation of modern mathematical science" (253). He explains that "the conclusion in a real or concrete question is foreseen and predicted rather than actually attained." This is similar to the pattern of a regular polygon inscribed in a circle which, as as its sides are diminished, tends to become that circle without ever in fact coinciding with it (253-4).
His proposed Encyclopedia of Nature, "The Parasceve," and the "List of Particular Enquiries" which come at the end of the Instauratio Magna, is a guide to the compilation of data which must precede the "interpretation" of nature. This information could be gathered by various individuals in various places in more than one generation. In the fourth aphorism of the "Parasceve," Bacon indicates the orientation of this information towards the physical world and away from the classical orientation of learning towards humankind. Farrington states:

we are cautioned that the information...must be...adapted to the measure of the universe, not of man. 'For the world is not to be narrowed down till it will go into the understanding, which has been the practice hitherto, but the understanding must be stretched and expanded to take in the image of the world as it is discovered' (136).

In the largest category proposed in the list of particular histories, "man's accomplishments in the field of nature," Rossi sees a "refutation of rhetorical culture" (218). Here, Bacon emphasized the importance of "the history of the arts, mechanical and illiberal though it may seem. And here we must prefer the arts which expose, alter, and prepare natural bodies and material; such as agriculture, cookery, chemistry, the manufacture of glass, enamel...." In this section Rossi states that Bacon "saw the realisation of the 'intellectual revolution' that was basic to his philosophy" (218).

Newman resists the philosophical fault in Bacon's too exclusive reorientation of learning towards human usefulness. This is the subject of the second half of his Discourses where he begins his discussion of the University's role in relation to its students. At the outset of Discourse v, Newman states that he will proceed to "the second question, which I proposed to discuss, viz., whether and in what sense its [the university's] teaching, viewed relatively to the taught, carries the attribute of Utility along with it" (75). He later adds that the use of the education he proposes "will constitute the main subject of the Discourses which are to follow" (77). In Discourse v, Newman rejects the exclusion or neglect of humanist learning by the advocates of useful knowledge. In so doing, he contrasts the perspectives of Aristotle and Bacon, the two great arbiters of method in the classical and modern periods. Newman cites Aristotle's definition of liberal knowledge as a perennial or archetypal idea by which all succeeding eras have defined what is liberal in their own periods; he refers to Cicero's praise in

39 In On the Idea of a University, James M. Cameron remarks that if Newman's lifespan had been doubled he would have seen in the spread of a global industrial society "the great achievements of the mind represented by those subjects that make up liberal studies...come under attack" (22).

40 Cited by Farrington, 137.
the Offices of the search after truth for its own sake as "a condition of our happiness" (79). The view of these humanists is contrasted with Bacon's Philosophy of Utility which Newman describes as "simply a Method whereby bodily discomforts and temporal wants are to be most effectually removed from the greatest number" (90).41

Newman's finest skills in discerning method are again called into play as he charts the course of the Catholic University of Ireland amongst the various contemporary philosophical currents that would influence pedagogical direction. As a contemporary commentator reflecting these currents, Lord Macaulay in his Essay on Bacon (1837) describes the conflict between speculative knowledge favoured by the humanists and useful knowledge championed by Bacon.42 Macaulay describes Bacon as a leader arising in a period in which the intellectual world had ceased to be awed by "Antiquity, prescription and the sound of great names" such as Aristotle. He states that the impulse given by Bacon was "in a diametrically opposite direction" from the bent of speculative philosophy which had predominated since Plato (414). To illustrate his point, Macaulay contrasts the different value accorded by Plato and Bacon to mathematics. He states that for Plato, the "study of the properties of numbers...habituates the mind to the contemplation of pure truth, and raises us above the material universe." The real use of mathematics is "to lead men to the knowledge of abstract, essential, eternal truth." The application of geometry to "any purpose of vulgar utility" was a degradation of "a noble

41 In The Imperial Intellect, Dwight Culler remarks that Newman advocates the theoretic life which Plato and Aristotle make into a conscious philosophic ideal. However, Culler does not develop this idea adequately and finds it puzzling. He states: "It was all very well for Plato or Aristotle to say this, but for Newman, living as he did after the rise of the Baconian philosophy, it would sound 'strange.' And yet this is exactly what he did say" (213).

42 In Discourse v, Newman refers in a note to Macaulay's Essay, remarking: "It will be seen that on the whole I agree with Lord Macaulay in his Essay on Bacon's Philosophy. I do not know whether he would agree with me" (Idea, 89).

In the Grammar, Newman describes speculation as "mental sight, or the contemplation of mental operations and their results as opposed to experience, experiment, or sense." Speculative assents are the highest kind of notional assent: "the most direct, explicit, and perfect of their kind, viz. those which are the firm conscious acceptance of propositions as true." They include "assent to all reasoning and its conclusions, to all general propositions, to all rules of conduct, to all proverbs, aphorisms, sayings, and reflections on men and society...mathematical investigations....legal judgments, and constitutional maxims, as far as they appeal to us for assent....the determinations of science...the principles, disputations, and doctrines of theology." 75-6.

With reference to the speculative learning of liberal education, James M. Cameron speaks of the "passionate curiosity unaffected by any desire for practical results" which "does in fact produce, without aiming at it, results that are useful by the standards of the world" (On the Idea of a University, 15).
intellectual exercise into a low craft." Macaulay comments that, by contrast, Bacon "valued geometry chiefly, if not solely, on account of those uses, which to Plato appeared so base" (415-416). In the Advancement, Bacon remarks that mathematics best satisfies that part of our nature which "to the extreme prejudice of knowledge" delights "in the spacious liberty of generalities in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity" (99). Macaulay notes that in the alterations to the Advancement that Bacon made twenty years later in De Augmentis he no longer included the use of pure mathematics in the training of the intellect, insisting exclusively on applied mathematics. Macaulay observes:

He was afraid of using any expression which might have the effect of inducing any man of talents to employ in speculations, useful only to the mind of the speculator, a single hour which might be employed in extending the empire of man over matter (417).

Certainly Bacon himself perceived that the thrust he gave towards the study of material nature was largely a new departure for learning from the areas of truth which had been previously considered. His Instauratio Magna was intended to effect a restoration or renewal of the first estate of Eden before man "lost the dominion over the creatures which was its highest privilege" and to provide relief for his suffering since from "want, sickness, and death." He believed that Greece and Rome occupied "the middle part of time," as "two exemplar states of the world for arms, learning, moral virtue, policy, and laws." In De Augmentis, he writes of his own period as a time "in which learning seems to have now made her third visitation to men" which "might far surpass the Greek and Roman in learning."46

Bacon's zealous reorientation of knowledge towards a largely undeveloped kind of truth involved dissuading others from the pursuit of traditional speculative learning. William Rawley, Bacon's secretary, remarks that Bacon "first fell into the dislike of the philosophy of

43 On the other hand, in Aristotle on Education Burnet states that it was because the Greeks in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. were not interested primarily in practical applications that they made more rapid advances in geometria (meaning "land-surveying") than the Egyptians and Babylonians over a long period of time. He says: "The study of geometry began among the Greeks in the first half of the 6th century B.C. By the end of the 5th century, the greater part of plane geometry, as it was afterwards codified by Euclid, appears to have been quite familiar, and by the end of the 4th century Solid Geometry and Conic Sections were already born, while the problem of incommensurability had been faced and a theory of infinitesimals established" (137).

44 Ellis, Works of Francis Bacon, 58.

45 Advancement, 74-75.

46 De Augmentis, vii. Cited by Farrington, 41-42.
Aristotle" when still a student at Cambridge. This dislike was based not on "the worthlessness of the author, to whom he would ever ascribe high attributes, but for the unfruitfulness of the way; being...only strong for disputations and contentions, but barren of the production of works for the benefit of the life of man." In the Advancement, Bacon's characterization of the difference between Plato's intention and his is essentially a criticism of Plato's failure as an arbiter of method to separate divine and natural truth:

"Plato, in his opinion of Ideas,...did descry, that Forms were the true object of knowledge; but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by considering of Forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion upon theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected. But if any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon action, operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and take notice what are the Forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and important to the state of man" (94).

Bacon perceived that the dominance of verbal methods suited to inquiry into indemonstrable truth, such as the syllogism as developed by Aristotle, was an impediment to direct inquiry into the operations of nature. Farrington remarks that Bacon's denunciations of Plato and Aristotle proceeded from his belief that "the type of philosophy for which they stood was the great obstacle to a divinely promised revolution in human affairs" which, as expressed in a prayer of Bacon, was to unseal "again the refreshing fountain" of God's mercy "for the relief of our sufferings." Rossi maintains that Bacon believed traditional philosophy was good in its place, such as in civil business or in matters of opinion, that it was "quite capable of preserving and transmitting sciences and teaching man to follow and exploit known truth or the art of inventing arguments to outwit others in a discussion." He refers to Bacon's statements in the New Organon that "anticipations and dialectic...are good for sciences based on probabilities, that is, where the aim is to control opinions not nature." However, the traditional verbal methods of logic were unavailing in the investigation of physical nature, "when instead we wish to overcome not opponents but nature, and to achieve not well-turned, convincing theories, but sure, demonstrable instances, not to invent probabilities, but arts and accomplishments."  

Bacon's zeal to promote useful knowledge through the study of physical science, leads him to dismiss as an impediment to this goal the speculative wisdom which Aristotle distin-

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47 "Dr. Rawley's Life of Bacon," Works of Francis Bacon, 4.

48 Farrington, 147.

49 Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon, 189-190.
guished as our highest intellectual good. To the man of general culture who includes all areas of truth, this exclusion of speculative wisdom represents an error in omission.\(^50\) In the final book of the *Ethics*, Aristotle describes speculative wisdom as a divine element within us, "small in bulk" but surpassing "everything else in power and value." He states that "One might even regard it as each man's true self, since it is the controlling and better part." He suggests that through speculative activity we "become immortal as far as that is possible"; this is for our own happiness in fulfilling our nature and because the gods "rejoice in what is best and most akin to them" (290-4). In Book vi, weighing the relative value of theoretical and practical wisdom (*phronesis*), Aristotle states that of the two kinds of wisdom theoretical wisdom is "the better part of our soul" (1145a, p.172). It surpasses practical wisdom in authority, "because that which produces a thing rules and directs it" (1143b, p.168). Using an analogy which Newman draws on in his justification of the end of a liberal education, Aristotle describes the use of theoretical wisdom as a formal rather than an efficient cause of a desired end, i.e. the good life. He says that theoretical wisdom produces happiness "not as medicine produces health, but as health itself makes a person healthy" (1144a, p.168).\(^51\) Unlike practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom risks being called useless because, while practical wisdom deals with matters helpful to us, theoretical wisdom concerns not only pure science but "things which by their nature are valued most highly" and seeks a good which is not human but divine (1141b p.157).

Bacon's battle against speculative thought, which he perceived as dominating learning for two thousand years, was a new variation on the quarrel concerning the relative merits of the active life and the contemplative life or *theoria*. Ostwald explains that *theoria*, which Aristotle most closely associated with *sophia* as theoretical wisdom, means literally in its verbal form "to inspect or to keep one's gaze fixed on." *Theoria* "is a contemplation of nature in its widest sense, in which man, as a detached spectator, simply investigates and studies things as they are without desiring to change them" (315-6). In Book vi of the *Ethics*, Aristotle describes theoretical wisdom as including "not only what follows from fundamental principles" but also "true knowledge of the fundamental principles themselves" (1141a17 p.156). Aristotle

\(^50\) The polemical character of Bacon's promulgation of useful knowledge is represented in Newman's description of the warfare of ideas in *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. Here Newman refers to ideas which invade a community, strive for mastery over other incompatible ideas, and throw off whatever they cannot assimilate (38-9).

\(^51\) c.f., *Idea*, 93-4, 122.
distinguishes *theoria* from the other domains whose aims are action and production: it is distinguished from practical wisdom or *phronesis* which tends to wisdom in action and from *techne*, or applied science, which is concerned with production. Martin Ostwald defines *techne* as the term "used not only to describe, for example, the kind of knowledge which a shoemaker needs to produce shoes, but also to describe the art of a physician which produces health, or the skill of a harpist which produces music" (315). For Aristotle, both the practical and the theoretical are desirable in themselves because both are parts of our rational humanity, or, as Aristotle states in Book vi of the *Ethics*, because "each one of them is the virtue of a different part of the soul" (1144a, p.168).52

In his battle against the great arbiters of method in antiquity, Bacon promotes corporate good over the Greek ideal of personal good. He rejects Aristotle’s view of the contemplative life as higher than the active life on the grounds that the contemplative life is private, making no contribution to the good of the greater body. In the *Advancement*, he points out that all the reasons Aristotle "bringeth for the contemplative are private, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a man’s self, (in which respects, no question, the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence)” (156). Bacon cites Old Testament examples of physical wants supplied, effectively rejecting Aristotle’s claim that speculative thought most nearly approached the divine. His conclusive declaration is that the highest motive for knowledge is "for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man’s estate" (35). For this there is no need of what is merely personal or "useful only to the mind of the speculator.”

Bacon made room for the useful learning of science by dislodging speculative thought from the dominant position it had occupied in learning for two thousand years. While Newman is typically inclusive in perceiving the university as a place for teaching all branches of knowledge, he takes the stone rejected by Bacon in the interests of modern science and reclaims it as the cornerstone of the University. In his Inaugural Lecture to the School of Philosophy and Letters, he states at the outset that "in spite of the special historical connexion of University Institutions with the sciences of Theology, Law, and Medicine, a University, after all, should be formally based (as it really is), and should emphatically live in, the Faculty of Arts." He states that "the studies which that Faculty embraces are almost the direct subject-matter and the

52Sillem comments on the influence of Aristotle on Newman’s thought. (vol.1, 161). He cites Newman’s quotation from the *Ethics* in the *Grammar* (322) which argues that the appropriate proof and method must be used for any subject matter and that what suits mathematics will not suit rhetoric. As Sillem says, Aristotle "contends that "each science has its own proper kind of intelligibility…each demands and forms its appropriate mental habits (161).
staple of the mental exercises proper to a University" (Idea, 187). A mere two hundred and fifty years after the publication of Bacon’s Advancement of Learning, the signal success of science had been such that Newman spends the second half of his Discourses defending speculative learning too easily dismissed as useless. As an arbiter of method he resists the mutilation of the circle of learning through the exclusion of what Aristotle had considered its most precious part. Newman refers to the low aims of the Philosophy of Utility which would exclude the whole area of speculative thought (89); while Bacon as the Prophet of Utility "was the divinely provided minister of temporal benefits to all of us," he nonetheless typified "the intellectual narrowness of his school" (89-90).

Newman also rejects professional training which would eliminate liberal learning as useless; he says that he would solve "the fallacy, for so I must call it, by which Locke and his disciples would frighten us from cultivating the intellect, under the notion that no education is useful which does not teach us some temporal calling, or some mechanical art, or some physical secret" (126). This form of utility predates Baconian utility and was part of a much older

53 Ironically, this Faculty was the least successful at the Catholic University of Ireland. Newman wrote in a letter to John Hungerford Pollen (Nov. 26, 1857) that the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters was the most lame, prospering less than Medicine and Science because it had not attracted Irish youths. Letters and Diaries, vol. 18, 187.

54 In "Newman and Science," T.S. Wheeler points out that Newman was not against utility and attempted to establish applied science at the Catholic University of Ireland. Science may also be studied from a liberal view. Medicine studied from a liberal aspect would treat of why rather than how an operation was performed.

55 Walter Jost refers to Alfred North Whitehead’s statement concerning the usefulness of education in The Aims of Education (New York: MacMillan, 1929) 3. Whitehead writes: "But if education is not useful, what is it?...It was useful to St. Augustine, and it was useful to Napoleon. It is useful, because understanding is useful" (Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman, 277). Jost also refers to the statement by Bruce A. Kimball in Orators and Philosophers (230) that "until the eighteenth century, the usefulness of knowing classical languages and writings for studying the professions was so self-evident as not to require extended comment" (Rhetorical Thought, 277). In "Newman and the Uses of Knowledge," Dwight Cul-ler claims that education concerns the means for activities which society wants, but Newman seeks ends which society ought to want" (269). In "Cardinal Newman’s Concept of a Liberal Education," Daniel G. Mulcahy suggests that for Newman the general cultivation of mind was the best aid to science and professional study and that in the use of one’s knowledge in the conduct of life "lies the true value of such an education" (94, 96). John Burnet points out that for both Plato and Aristotle the good of education involves not only the training of character in its connection to the practical requirements of the community, but "the highest function of education goes beyond the practical life." The Greeks in this period were interested "in the problems rather than in their practical applications." It was because they loved knowledge for its own sake that they generated brilliant and fertile ideas of permanent value. Aristotle on Education, 136-137. In "Newman’s Doctrine of University Education," Michael Tierney recognizes that Newman’s gentleman, like his Athenian counterpart, was "necessarily an active member of a given society" (128). He states that the Discourses represent a theoretical definition of the
controversy in education. Burnet states that in the fourth century B.C. the idea of culture was commonly contrasted with professional knowledge or skill or *techne*. Thus, for example,

"In the Protagoras of Plato the young Hippokrates actually blushes at the suggestion that he is going to take lessons with any other view than to get that unprofessional culture which alone becomes a gentleman" (xxxii).

In Discourse vii of the *Idea*, Newman undertakes this discussion of "Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Professional Skill" within the context of his own century. It was specifically a response to a review of Richard Lovell Edgeworth's *Essays on Professional Education* (1808)\(^56\) that sparked the controversy between the defenders of Oxford’s literary education and the Edinburgh promoters of applied or useful knowledge.\(^57\) Newman cites John Davison (1777-1834, elected a Fellow of Newman's beloved Oriel College in 1800), who criticizes Edgeworth for his "very contracted view of life" and for "comparatively neglecting or excluding the more liberal and enlarged cultivation." He states that in following Edgeworth's recommendations for early professional training, "a man is to be usurped by his profession. He is to be clothed in its garb from head to foot...and the whole man to be shaped, pressed, and stiffened, in the exact mould of his technical character" (129).\(^58\) Newman defends liberal learning by turning to the *paideia* and the classical ideas of antiquity dismissed by Bacon as impediments to progress in University as imparting knowledge and suggests that prudence or *phronesis* with its practical moral connotations completes the gentleman. John D. Horgan further refines Tierney's view by noting that what Aristotle calls *phronesis*, a sense of right and wrong in moral conduct, is an analogue in the speculative judgment to what Newman calls the illative sense, or the "power of right speculative judgment in concrete matters." The illative sense is simply the intellect judging, a perfection of intellect which sees through the "labyrinth of inference, of various principles" (*Newman on Faith and Reason," 148).

\(^{56}\) Edgeworth argues that once the particular talents of pupils are discerned, the sooner their professional training begins, the better. In the introduction to his *Essays on Professional Education* (London: J. Johnson, 1812), Edgeworth issues the disclaimer that a boy's education should not be exclusively for a particular profession. Edgeworth also collaborated with his daughter, Maria Edgeworth, the novelist, in the writing of *Practical Education* (1798) which is in the empirical vein of Locke.

\(^{57}\) cf. I.A. Ker, *Idea*, 612. This exchange between the defenders of the classics and the advocates of applied knowledge took place in 1810. The Edinburgh group included Sydney Smith (1771-1845), "first editor of the Edinburgh Review, where in his review of R.L. Edgeworth’s *Essays on Professional Education*, he had deplored an exclusive emphasis on classical studies in schools and universities."

\(^{58}\) Davison’s use of the word 'technical' suggests the Greek *techne*, professional skill or knowledge.
physical science. At the beginning of Discourse vi, he notes the regrettable absence from English of any word that corresponds satisfactorily to the Greek word for a particular intellectual disposition achieved through the exercise and training of the mind or intellectual culture. Newman states:

"It were well if the English, like the Greek language, possessed some definite word to express, simply and generally, intellectual proficiency or perfection, such as "health," as used with reference to the animal frame, and "virtue," with reference to our moral nature....Every one knows practically what are the constituents of health or of virtue; and every one recognizes health and virtue as ends to be pursued; it is otherwise with intellectual excellence" (93-94).

He draws on the analogy of the healthy state of the body which Aristotle uses in the Ethics to explain the usefulness of theoria in relation to phronesis or practical wisdom. Aristotle states that theoretical wisdom produces happiness "not as medicine produces health, but as health itself makes a person healthy" (1144a, p.168). Newman asks

if a healthy body is a good in itself, why is not a healthy intellect? and if a College of Physicians is a useful institution, because it contemplates bodily health, why is not an Academical Body, though it were simply and solely engaged in imparting vigour and beauty and grasp to the intellectual portion of our nature? (122)

To clarify what he means by a liberal education, he uses Aristotle's definition of liberal and useful: "Of possessions, those rather are useful, which bear fruit; those liberal which tend to enjoyment. By fruitful, I mean, which yield revenue; by enjoyable, where nothing accrues of consequence beyond the using" (82). In fact, Newman's use of Aristotle's definition is itself a demonstration of the arbiter of method's connection to theoria as speculative thought dealing in irreducible or permanent starting-points or principles. As these principles are perennial, Newman remarks that in "many subjects-matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle" (83). He contends that Aristotle's definition is an "archetypal idea"; it is "founded in our very nature" and attested by its longevity in a "continuous historical tradition" (83). This essential definition is applicable to all pursuits and to all subject-matters in all ages. Through this

59 In "Newman's Infallible Instincts: the Argument for Elbowroom," Joseph A. Komonchak argues that the cultivation of the intellect, the necessary and sufficient aim of a liberal education, is needed to withstand opinions and values "inadequate to the human condition" (446).

60 In spite of his own liberal use of authorities, Bacon's rejection of the permanent truths of theoria in the interest of progress in the physical sciences is suggested in his denial of longevity as a test of truth. He states in the Advancement that it was an erroneous "conceit that of former opinions or sects, after variety and examination, the best hath still prevailed and suppressed the rest" (32).
ultimate definition, the discerner of method in every age can consign to its proper place what is useful or liberal as having no end beyond itself. Thus "racing, which was a liberal exercise in Greece, forfeits its rank in times like these, so far as it is made the occasion of gambling" (82). Medicine although an intellectual art is not liberal because it is applied. The two broad areas of liberal and useful learning also cross over within the same subject-matter, depending on whether it is applied to an end outside itself. Theology used for preaching or catechesis is useful; theology cultivated for contemplation is liberal. The kind of truth pursued in the Baconian philosophy is specifically tied to the useful. Newman says: "the Baconian Philosophy, by using its physical sciences in the service of man, does thereby transfer them from the order of Liberal Pursuits to, I do not say the inferior, but the distinct class of the Useful" (82).

Gillian R. Evans' comments are helpful in clarifying the relation between *theoria* and the discerner of method. Evans comments that Newman was interested in the methods and principles of different disciplines in themselves rather than in their relation to the disciplines. For example in the Grammar, Newman compares geometry with algebra, stating that geometry relates to space and algebra to quantity. Evans observes that Newman's deep sense of "compatibility or incompatibility of concepts" was "at the root of all his arguments about the spheres of the sciences" ("Science and Mathematics," 264). In other words, it is from the standpoint of underlying laws or *theoria*, the foundation of liberal knowledge, that Newman himself proceeds throughout the Idea, which is about the "principles of Education" (Idea, xlv).

Aristotle's validation of *theoria* in Book x of the Ethics includes the enjoyment experienced by those who pursue it: "activity concerned with theoretical knowledge, is thought to be of greater value than the others, aims at no end beyond itself, and has a pleasure proper to itself" (290). This enjoyment is derived from the fact that in the pursuit of speculative thought we are simply fulfilling the intellectual part of our humanity. Aristotle states: "what is by nature proper to each thing will be at once the best and the most pleasant for it" (291). Newman elicits the testimony of Cicero in The Offices as familiar to his nineteenth-century audience. Cicero advises that the pursuit of truth is a delight, a "condition of our happiness," to be enjoyed in the leisure when the physical wants of our animal nature have been supplied and our duties fulfilled (Idea, 79).61 Newman adds after Cicero's praise of speculative truth

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61 Cicero, The Offices, Book 1, iv.

Quintilian remarks that for the teacher true gain is "from his own mind, and from contemplation and knowledge, a gain which is enduring and independent of fortune.... For divine providence has granted this favor to mankind, that the more honourable occupations are the more pleasing" (On the Early Education of the Citizen-orator, 88).
that "strange as such a procedure is to those who live after the rise of the Baconian philosophy,... The idea of benefiting society by means of 'the pursuit of science and knowledge' did not enter at all into the motives which he would assign for their cultivation" (79-80).

The goal of the Greek paideia, of the Roman humanitas and of Newman’s liberal education is personalist, a fulfilment of the person as person in the activity of the soul engaged in contemplative or speculative thought. This speculative knowledge of starting-points or principles is a pre-condition for the practical judgments made on the controversies of the day. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty describes the contemplative thought or theoria of Aristotle’s Ethics as a fulfilling of an essential potentiality of the soul. In "The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ethics," she refers to

the proper exercise of the essential potentialities of the soul, actualized for their own sakes because actualizing them just is living the life of a human being.62

Similarly, in the Preface to the Idea, Newman emphasizes the personal aim of knowledge, that the University is for the sake of the students, rather than for the "sake of the Sciences, which are to be the matter" (xxxviii). It is for the formation of the students, for "their exercise and growth in certain habits, moral or intellectual" (xxxix). He cites Cardinal Gerdil who says: "Les Universités sont établies pour enseigner les sciences aux élèves qui veulent s’y former" (xi). (Universities are established to teach sciences to students who seek their development there). Like Aristotle, Newman states that in seeking liberal knowledge as an end in itself, "we are satisfying a direct need of our nature in its very acquisition." He says that this is how we realize or actualize ourselves:

our nature, unlike that of the inferior creation, does not at once reach its perfection, but depends, in order to it, on a number of external aids and appliances. Knowledge, as one of the principal of these, is valuable for what its very presence in us does for us after the manner of a habit, even though it be turned to no further account, nor subserve any direct end (78).

Again, just as Aristotle distinguishes the activity of the speculative intellect as the highest thing in us and an end in itself, Newman refers to the discipline of the intellect in a liberal education as "its own highest culture" (115). Aristotle says that theoretical wisdom is "the better part of our soul" (1145, p.172). It surpasses practical wisdom in authority, "because that

which produces a thing rules and directs it" (1143b, p.168).63 Similarly, in the Idea, Newman speaks of "two ways of using Knowledge," and "two methods of Education;...the one rises towards general ideas, the other is exhausted upon what is particular and external." The former, i.e. liberal or philosophical knowledge, is the "principle of real dignity in Knowledge, its worth, its desirableness." This theoria or philosophic knowledge is an end in itself because there is no further end beyond this highest activity which deals in first principles and leading ideas which contain the germ of all that develops from them.

The culture of the intellect which Newman as an arbiter of method distinguishes from scientific utility and professional usefulness is the ideal of Greek humanist learning as a personal good. Newman describes the philosophic knowledge of the gentleman as "an acquired illumination,...a habit, a personal possession, and an inward endowment" (85). It is a "state or condition of mind" and "something individual and permanent" (86). Like the conditioning of the body, it is by nature a personal exercise putting the mind in order to work. The training of the intellect which actualizes what is highest in us is a training in personally making intelligible connections through the simplest definitions of first principles and ideas which most completely link particular facts together and so provide the most commanding view of a whole. Contrasting this method of liberal education which "rises towards general ideas" with the method of Useful Knowledge which is mechanical and "is exhausted upon what is particular," Newman states that liberal knowledge "in proportion as it tends more and more to be particular, ceases to be Knowledge" (85). He describes the culture of the intellect, the aim of a liberal education, as the training of "intellectual eyes." Through "research and systematizing" (95), through analysis, comparisons, and discriminations, the mind reduces matters "to order and meaning" (101), seizing on the strong point in a subject, reaching out to truth and grasping it. He contrasts the command of knowledge given through training in intelligible connections with several examples of random or unconnected knowledge. Newman describes the uneducated sailor who makes no comparisons between the various parts of the world he has visited, for whom "one thing is much the same...as another" and who "has no standard of judgment at all" (103). Similarly Newman says that those "who generalize nothing, and have no observation in

63 Amélie Oksenberg Rorty argues that for Aristotle theoria may include a contemplation of the practical life, that only in a corrupt polity will there be a conflict between the two. She suggests that in the Ethics, the "discussion of friendship in Book 9 helps show what contemplation can contribute to the comprehensive practical life" and "the discussion of contemplation in Book 10 is meant to show that one of the aims of a statesman is the reconciliation of the contemplative and the practical lives" (378).
the true sense of the word" 64 may abound in information but cannot be said to have "attained to any great culture of the intellect or to philosophy" (102). Antiquarians, annalists, naturalists are "useful in their own place" but do not have "what specially deserves the name of culture of mind, or fulfils the type of Liberal Education" (102). He explains by negation that the knowledge of the gentleman of philosophic habit is neither random, nor mere sense without mind, nor applied, useful, or mechanical. It is a grasp of illuminating ideas reached through mounting above a field of operation. Like the Greek paideia, it is a training for a lifelong habit of reassessing one's views and judgments in the light of new information that enlarges one's basis of comparison. Newman provides several examples to illustrate this: a villager arriving in a great metropolis or the individual first glimpsing the heavens through a telescope both attain a new perspective because of an enlarged basis of comparison; the perspective acquired by a student of history gives the power of judging past events; the new perspective of religious converts gives them a fresh estimate of the significance of events so that they "have their own estimate of whatever happens to them...and compare the present with the past; and the world...is a various and complicated drama, with parts and an object, and an awful moral" (101).

The Greek term logos is also helpful in understanding the field of speculative truth or theoria which is the object of a liberal education and it is helpful in understanding Newman's aim in education which is to train the mind to view particulars through intelligible principles or ideas. Logos refers both to objective rational principles and to the individual's perception of them. In the glossary of terms in his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, Martin Ostwald describes logos in its wider application as a "RATIONAL PRINCIPLE or REASON underlying a great variety of things." Secondly, it pertains to the mind which perceives rational principles that are a guide to right judgment or good conduct. Ostwald states:

*Logos* is also used in a normative sense, describing the human faculty of REASON which comprehends and formulates rational principles and thus guides the conduct of a good and reasonable man (310).

Plato's aim of reaching the intelligible idea as the true reality and Isocrates' and Newman's goal in education of training the mind in making right judgments are both connected to

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64 Martin Ostwald defines the verb *theorein* as "that activity of the mind...in which the mind CONTEMPLATES or STUDIES or OBSERVES the knowledge of universal truths which it already possesses* (Nicomachean Ethics, 315).
the *logos*.\(^65\) *Logos*, as Ostwald explains, has also the fundamental meaning of "SPEECH, STATEMENT, in the sense that any speech or statement consists of a coherent and rational arrangement of words" (310). As Newman points out in "Literature," his inaugural address to the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters in 1858, the Greek language uses the word *logos* to mean both "idea" or "rational principle" and the verbalization of the idea.\(^66\) *Logos* is at once the principle of intelligibility in the world, the human understanding of rational principles, and the articulation of these principles in words.

*Logos* includes both intelligible principles that are demonstrable or necessary and the intelligible principles of human action. In his edition of the *Ethics of Aristotle*, John Burnet states concerning human action that Aristotle "rates experience very high indeed for practical purposes," as in the practice of medicine. "Nevertheless experience does not reach the level of Art or Science....till the universal implicit in experience is made explicit." It is when we "reach the stage of intellect" that the fully human level is attained (67). The good life "which is peculiar to man is the life of rational activity, that is the life which knows the ground (*logos*) of its activities and can give an account of them" (3).

Burnet explains that *logos*, which is translated into Latin as *ratio*, carries the idea of a mean or the ratio between opposites.\(^67\) It is the ground of all being; Burnet observes that it is the cause of all becoming as the "form which is the cause of all becoming is always a ratio (*logos*) or a mean between the two opposites" (Burnet, 71). Burnet also states that both moral and intellectual goodness or excellence in the sense of judgment according to the right proportion are connected to the *logos* or ratio, the first through appetite and the second through

\(^65\) Plato's view of the value of mathematics indicates his goal in the intelligible. Marrou states that Plato favoured mathematics as training the mind to proceed from the sensible to a conception and thought of the Intelligible, the only true reality, the only absolute truth: "leur étude...entraîne l'esprit à se dégager du sensible, à concevoir et à penser l'Intelligible, seule réalité vraie, seule vérité absolue" (115).

\(^66\) In his Inaugural Address to the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, just prior to his final departure from the university in Dublin, Newman distinguishes between the use of language to represent things in the scientific sphere and the use of language to articulate thought in philosophy and letters. Newman defines *logos* to make his point: "Call to mind, Gentlemen, the meaning of the Greek word which expresses this special prerogative of man over the feeble intelligence of the inferior animals. It is called Logos: ....it stands both for *reason* and for *speech*....It means both at once...because they are in a true sense one." Language is the "instrument of expression" and the double of a person's reason (Idea, 208).

\(^67\) The latinate word, "rational", retains this sense of the right proportion. Burnet indicates that the Greek word for the mean "does not mean only or even primarily the arithmetical mean: it is the oldest word for a proportion of any kind and however determined" (69-70).
sense. In moral activity, for Aristotle, the mean between opposites or ratio of goodness is arrived at by a "more and less." Choice in human action involves the more good or the less good. Burnet explains:

Quality is a category that admits of quantitative determination or degree, 'the more and less' as the Academy called it: it is continuous and therefore infinitely divisible, at least potentially. Now feelings and acts, which are the matter of goodness, being qualitative motions, are continuous, and the degree of feeling which is right for a given person in given circumstances may therefore be quantitatively expressed (69).

Thus the degree or ratio of anger appropriate in a given situation or the right degree of generosity is the mean of goodness.

In intellectual excellence, both Aristotle’s logic and Newman’s organon as applied to complex assent are meant to lead to clarity concerning rational principles (the idea of the logos). Burnet cites from Aristotle’s Metaphysics to explain the purpose of his dialectical method:

It is thus that all learning takes place....This is our real task, to turn what is more known to us into what is more known by nature, just as in action it is to turn what is good for us into what is good universally. What is first known to a given person is often very feebly known; but for all that it is from things known to oneself, however inadequately, that we must try to apprehend universal knowledge, shifting our ground and advancing step by step" (xli).

The purpose of dialectical logic is not just as an intellectual exercise, nor just to be able to discuss with those who do not agree with our premisses, but "above all it is of use for the discovery of the first principles or starting-points of the different sciences, since it is impossible for any science to give an account of its own starting-point. That can only be dis-

68 Aristotle, like Newman in the "Tamworth Reading Room," makes a clear distinction between moral and intellectual goodness.

69 Received beliefs are taken as premisses for the dialectic syllogism, differing from the demonstrative syllogism which has scientific truths for its premisses (Burnet, xl). In Discourse ii, Newman laments a lack of recognition for received beliefs. He speaks of a "state of society such as ours, in which authority, prescription, tradition, habit, moral instinct, and the divine influences go for nothing" (28). He also comments on the reasoning process, adding that "patience of thought, and depth and consistency of view, are scorned as subtle and scholastic...free discussion and fallible judgment are prized as the birthright of each individual" (28).
discussed in the light of received beliefs on the subject" (xi). Similarly, complex assent involves reaching clarity concerning principles. Newman suggests that the purpose of complex assent "in proving what we already believe to be true", i.e., in providing a certain kind of rational basis for our belief, is "in order to fulfil what is due to ourselves and to the claims and responsibilities of our education and social position." We also have to do this "when we take on ourselves to convince another on any point in which he differs from us" (Grammar, 158-159). Newman’s purpose in An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine was to consider intellectually the principle of doctrinal development which he felt to be true. By approaching it from several vantage points, he proceeded from what was "true but not clear" to what was "true and clear."

For both Newman and Aristotle, there is a personal element in how we arrive at the logos or rational principles. Burnet states that goodness is identified neither with an outward act or a feeling, but is in the soul or is a condition of the soul. Just as the health of the body depends on the right proportion between the opposites of, for example, warm and cold, so "the formula or ratio of this proportion exists in the soul of the doctor....It is exactly in the same

70 Burnet notes that the dialectic method is said to take "our first principles on trust." However, he reminds us that in Aristotle's system starting points were the object of immediate insight perceived through the noetic faculty. We simply "see" the truth of a definition without being able to prove it to anyone else (xli-xlili).

In the Idea, Newman remarks that in defining political science, "Political Economy must not be allowed to give judgment in its own favour." Objections against the claims that it makes for itself "cannot receive a satisfactory answer by means of the science itself" (68). Burnet states that in Plato's "hands [dialectic] became the only instrument of all philosophical thinking" (xxxix). The syllogism was Aristotle's further contribution to this instrument or organon. It was only when this method was elevated to become an end in itself that it degenerated into sophistry.

71 Plato's dialogue, the Meno, considers the question of whether virtue or goodness can be taught, a question that is pertinent to Newman's distinction between the teaching of theology at a university and the fostering of a religious life through personal influence, the sacraments, etc. Socrates concludes in the Meno that "virtue is seen as coming neither by nature nor by teaching; but by divine allotment incomprehensibly to those to whom it comes" Great Dialogues of Plato, (New York: Mentor, 1984) 67-68. Mary Katherine Tillman notes Socrates' reference to the tradition that "what is most true about reality lies buried and sleeping deep within our souls. This privileged but shadowy knowledge or 'sense' of what is true and good, if we diligently seek to draw it out, can tacitly guide us in our search for excellence, becoming ever more clear and explicit as it is 're-collected' again and again, remembered and energized in human discourse and action." She connects this "sense" with Newman's illative sense which is operative in all judgments of inference, i.e., in the register of the true and false rather than in the register of the right and wrong. "Economies of Reason: Newman and the Phronesis Tradition," Discourse and Context, 46, 50.
way that the lawgiver has in his soul the formula or *logos* of goodness, and it is the efficient cause of goodness in others" (72). Newman, for his part, calls the personal element which weighs the various factors of inference the illative sense and the further act of personal affirmation of this judgment he calls assent. The *logos* as judgment according to the right proportion is thus connected to Newman’s view of the illative sense and to education as training in right judgment.

The field of speculative truth or *theoria* which is the object of a liberal education may also be understood through Newman’s explanation of what he means by the word "idea" in his Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. Newman’s view of an idea is similar to the Greek *logos*. In the Development of Christian Doctrine, Newman states that ideas are intellectual entities of varying complexity which implicitly contain what is later made explicit as different aspects of them emerge in the context of their often tumultuous historical development. In the Discourses, Newman describes how a student may arrive at an idea through its particular manifestations, "learning to leaven the mass of facts and events with the elastic force of reason" (104). In the Development of Christian Doctrine, he depicts the reverse procedure in his description of how an idea itself originally develops:

This process, whether it be longer or shorter in point of time, by which the aspects of an idea are brought into consistency and form, I call its development, being the germination and maturation of some truth or apparent truth on a large mental field (38).

He distinguishes ideas which relate to mankind from demonstrable mathematical ideas "and other abstract creations, which, like the soul itself, are solitary and self-dependent" (186). Newman states that "doctrines and views which relate to man are not placed in a void, but in the crowded world, and make way for themselves by interpenetration, and develop by absorption" (186); they live in minds, arresting and possessing them and becoming an "active principle within them, leading them to an ever-new contemplation of itself, to an application of it in various directions....[and] may be looked at on many sides and strike various minds very vari-

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72 Walter Pater’s praise of Newman’s Idea of a University as "the perfect handling of a theory" (c.f., Ker’s introduction to the *Idea*, xlii, and Martin Svaglic’s introduction, vii) suggests the connection of the Greek *theoria* or speculative knowledge with what Newman means by "idea."

In La Philosophie religieuse de John Henry Newman, Maurice Nédoncelle remarks that the *Idea* presents ideas found in Newman’s other books hidden behind a facade (266).

73 Newman states that an idea, such as Gnosticism, may be subjective only. He suggests that in "proportion to the variety of aspects under which it presents itself to various minds is its force and depth, and the argument for its reality" (34).
ously" (36-7). He provides as examples of these living ideas the "doctrine of the divine right of kings, or of the rights of man, or of the anti-social bearings of a priesthood, or utilitarianism, or free trade, or the duty of benevolent enterprises, or the philosophy of Zeno or Epicurus" (36). The historical or intellectual expression of these ideas as systems of government, as codes of ethics, as social policy, as philosophical systems, etc., have their source in the one idea of which they are the applications or from which they evolve. Newman says that, unlike a formula, "a living idea becomes many, yet remains one" (186). Thus, in the Idea Newman states that "the word "liberal as applied to Knowledge and Education, expresses a specific idea, which ever has been, and ever will be, while the nature of man is the same." Although the subjects that are considered liberal vary with the age, the idea "varies not itself" as would be the case if it were "a mere generalization" from the subject matters (83).

The separation of the arts and sciences into branches of learning in their own right with distinctive principles is itself an illustration of the development of the ideas which govern these branches of learning. In the Idea, for example, Newman describes the evolution of painting from an inchoate science into "the fulness of its function as a simply imitative art" with "an end of is own" and says that "Nature is its pattern, and the object it pursues is the beauty of Nature" (59). In literature, Shakespeare's delineation of Hamlet or Walter Scott's gradual enucleation of Dalgetty as the story progresses proceed from the contemplation and development of an idea. In theology, creeds and dogmas are developments proceeding from the contemplation of the thought of God, experienced as "an impression on the Imagination" by the religious mind. Newman says:

Creeds and dogmas live in the one idea which they are designed to express, and which alone is substantive; and are necessary, because the human mind cannot reflect upon that idea except piecemeal, cannot use it in its oneness and entirety, or without resolving it into a series of aspects and relations (Christian Doctrine, 53).

Ideas often become apparent after their development. Newman provides the example of the external pressure of events or the force of principles leading members of Parliament to come to conclusions "they do not know how." It is only when they have to speak of the matter that they look for arguments: an article on the subject may subsequently appear "in a Review, to furnish common-places for the many" (Christian Doctrine, 45). Conversely, ideas may be made explicit prior to their development. Newman provides the example of Locke's philosophy which was a "real guide, not a mere defense of the Revolution era, operating forcibly upon Church and Government in and after his day" (Christian Doctrine, 45).

Newman's description in the Development of Christian Doctrine of how we know ideas is connected to his pedagogical method. The goal of the man of philosophic habit is both to see
unity in the multifarious through a grasp of principles and to understand an idea in its fullness through the mutual relations of the instances through which it develops. In the Idea, Newman states that "we must generalize, we must reduce to method, we must have a grasp of principles, and group and shape our acquisitions by means of them" (105). Or again, he says that the dignity in Knowledge "is this germ within it of a scientific or a philosophic process." It is "something intellectual...which sees more than the senses convey; which reasons upon what it sees, and while it sees; which invests it with an idea" (85).

In the Development of Christian Doctrine, Newman describes how the facets of an idea develop over time and he alludes to how ideas are subsequently understood by others. Rich, living ideas, especially social, political, or religious, are elucidated through their various facets or aspects in a dialogue with the events of history, for example, and in contention with other ideas. Newman refers to these ideas as "having aspects many and bearings many, mutually connected and growing one out of another, and all parts of a whole, with a sympathy and correspondence keeping pace with the ever-changing necessities of the world, multiform, prolific, and ever resourceful" (56). In a description suggestive both of his pedagogical principle of "development and arrangement from and around a common centre" (Idea, xlv) and of Aristotle's demonstration in orb or circle, Newman describes how an idea is "brought home to the intellect as objective" through the variety of its aspects; "like bodily substances, which are not apprehended except under the clothing of their properties and results, and which admit of being walked round, and surveyed on opposite sides, and in different perspectives, and in contrary lights, in evidence of their reality" (Development, 34).

Newman's pedagogical principle that intellectual training involves "the idea of science, method, order, principle, and system" (Idea, xlv) is also suggested in his description of the evolution of ideas in the Development of Christian Doctrine. As definitions and descriptions through which we conceive ideas multiply and their mutual bearings in relation to the ideas are understood, the idea is, as it were, "thrown into a series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other, and with more or less exactness approximating, as they accumulate, to a perfect image" (55). Aspects of ideas resolved into a system are the basis of learning and teaching. Newman writes: "it is a characteristic of our minds, that they cannot take an object in, which is submitted to them simply and integrally....We cannot teach except by aspects or views, which are not identical with the thing itself which we are teaching" (55). It is through the mutual relations of these aspects that the fuller reality of the idea may be grasped, like the sketch of a portrait which is gradually filled in. And, as in the Idea Newman emphasizes the need to remember implicitly that any branch of knowledge is only part of the whole circle of knowledge and cannot be taken as the measure of the rest, so in the Develop-
ment of Christian Doctrine Newman states that no one aspect or "leading idea" can exhaust the contents of a "real idea" which is "commensurate with the sum total of its possible aspects" as presented to various minds (34-5). Fertile and intellectual facts or systems of thought like Platonic philosophy, or the idea of Christianity, cannot be reduced to leading aspects to the exclusion of others which are also a part of them.

In the following chapter, I shall examine Newman's pedagogy for the training of the man of philosophic habit. Its intention was to cultivate his understanding through ideas according to the method suited to the subject-matter, allowing him to distinguish underlying principles and the use of appropriate methods in the issues of his day. Newman states that the training of the intellect was to give the mind "power over its own faculties"; such a mind is characterized by freedom, equitableness, wisdom, "method, critical exactness, sagacity...eloquent expression" (92). Like Aristotle's man of general culture or Isocrates' disciples, the gentleman of philosophic habit so trained is to be an arbiter of method able "to exercise the degree of trust exactly due to every science respectively, and to estimate precisely the value of every truth which is anywhere to be found" (77).
Chapter 3
Newman's Pedagogy

Newman's pedagogy is aimed at training a man of general culture to see the intelligible principles or ideas connecting facts and, implicitly, to discern the methods appropriate to areas of truth. The gentlemen graduates, like Isocrates' disciples, were trained in a habit of mind to be exercised in any area of public or personal life, allowing them to discern confusion in methods and to see the salient idea or principle in any issue. Newman's pedagogical perspective contrasts diametrically with pedagogies proceeding from various empirical schools of philosophy. For example, in Jeremy Bentham's school of thought, as described by Newman in the "Tamworth Reading Room," the individual admits only "things which he can see, hear, taste, touch and handle," and refuses to acknowledge "the existence of anything which he cannot ascertain for himself." Any pedagogy based exclusively on this first principle is, from the perspective of the Greek logos, simply irrational. This would include the eighteenth-century educational views of Rousseau or the more recent ideas of the pragmatist William James (1842-1910) who both value experience over abstraction. The first of these two opposing camps in education is occupied by the humanist ideal emanating from the Aristotelian principle of a unified, external world in which matter is understood in relation to form or, in Thomistic terms, matter "is that through which a form becomes actual and has undivided being" (Consolation of Rhetoric, 109). The other camp is occupied by the champions of a materialist view of the world experienced in sensation; for them, the objectively intelligible field of opera-

1 "Tamworth Reading Room," 185-6.

2 Marrou remarks that, while education normally is a collective technique to initiate youth into the values of a civilization, illogical societies exist which impose an absurd education on their youth with the result that initiation into the real culture takes place outside the official educational institutions (17).

In Newman and His Theological Method, Thomas J. Norris describes Newman's view of how we reason in contrast to the "massive deculturation through the deformation of reason" as expressed by Eric Voegelin (10).

Edward Sillem discusses the influence of Idealist and Empirical philosophies on the developing educational system in the nineteenth century in which Locke, Hume and Bentham came to be regarded as the prophets of a "liberal world." Their unchallenged assumptions were that "all thinking...is conscious, scientific, methodical argument" and "all men are equally well endowed by nature with the gift of reason" (Philosophic Notebook, vol. 1, 28). Sillem remarks on the roots of Newman's thought in ancient Greece and in the Fathers of the Church as standing in contrast to the value placed on abstraction in rationalist thought and demonstration as demanded by the inductive method and empirical thought.
tion of humanist education simply does not exist as it is excluded by their understanding of matter as a first principle.

An article by Walter Ong on Newman's view of the development of ideas indicates the philosophical underpinnings of the role of the idea in relation to particulars in Newman's pedagogy. In "Newman's Essay on Development in its Intellectual Milieu," Ong comments that Newman's view of the development of ideas challenges the monistic explanations of reality, idealistic or materialistic, bringing such errors "to bay...at the point where the intelligible rises out of the material" (49). Ong says that "Newman reduces the question of first principles directly to an issue of the origin of the intelligible out of material being" and that this characterizes his opposition to the positivist-materialist mind (49). He states that the connection between the intelligible and the material in Newman's view of development countered the static at the core of the idealistic tradition as defined by its peculiar view of the intelligible and matter. The positivist mind conditioned by the method of the physical sciences also risks antagonism "to the first principles of metaphysics...to the first principles of a still higher knowledge" (45). Father Ong notes the traditional connection between the Roman Catholic Church and liberal education as the latter fosters a familiarity with "principles educed at various levels from matter—a familiarity which is acquired by allowing the mind to range at large over the entire field of being," thus saving it "from the cramping which pinches the positivist outlook on life" (45).

Because the man of general culture is to be conscious of principles, an examination of Newman's pedagogy must begin with the idea which Newman recognizes as the guiding principle of his views on education. The foundation of all Newman's fundamental ideas of education lies in the assumption that the universe is objective and intelligibly unified. This grounds his view of the accessibility to the human mind of the first principles and laws, or theoria, which illuminate particulars. It is the justification of the place of theology in a university curriculum because of this subject's primary contribution to an understanding of intelligible order. It underlies Newman's resistance to subjective or emotional responses in religion which neglect the intellectual Object of these responses. It is the basis both of the principle of non-contradiction between science and theology and of the interconnection between the various

3 In The Victorian Sage, John Holloway refers to Newman's idea of reality as a great ordered system with the Creator as its apex; all that exists is from God: the natural world, the Church, the state, the human world, each individual—all are created on a similar pattern of order, each with its proper nature and purpose. From the perspective of metaphysics, the whole universe is one integrated system (159).
branches of knowledge. It validates the need both for a science of sciences and the person of
general culture who distinguishes between different areas of truth with the understanding that
different methods apply to these various areas. It is the source of Newman's view that a
university is "a place of teaching universal knowledge"; that the idea of the unity of knowl-
edge must be implicit in all particular intellectual pursuits and that it is unphilosophical to
apply the principles in one area to all the rest. Newman's organon for reaching insights in
indemonstrable areas of truth is based on converging probabilities from various quarters which
are parts of an intelligible whole. The need for system and method in pedagogy proceeds from
the assumption of an intelligible universe. This includes the three great areas of knowledge:
physical science, human affairs, and the knowledge of God. Newman's assumption of an objec-
tive, intelligibly unified world is also the source of his assertion that the well-educated gradu-
ate will not merely follow the vagaries of fashionable opinions but will be consistent in his
thought because it is grounded in ideas.

In "Educational Method: Educating for Real Life," H. Francis Davis emphasizes New-
man's view of the objective nature of knowing. He states that the mind does not make but dis-
covers the inter-relatedness and unity of the real cosmos (104). In "Newman, Christian or
Humanist?" an early critique of Dwight Culler's Imperial Intellect, Davis also suggests that
Culler's failure to appreciate Newman's view of truth as objective is the source of his confu-
sion about how knowledge for its own sake can yet "give us a useful knowledge about the
external world." Davis states that Newman's view was Aristotelian, that man's true purpose is
the contemplation of objective truth which is subjective only as "all knowledge is a subjective
possession of something objective" (523).5

4 Preface to the Idea, xxxvii

5 Failure to appreciate Newman's sensibility in regard to truth as objective has skewed
more recent scholarship. David M. Whalen praises Walter Jost's seminal study, Rhetorical
Truth in John Henry Newman, but observes his slighting of Newman's "entire idea of certitude
[that] rests upon the mind's actual grasp of an objective reality—truth" (Consolation of Rhetoric
in John Henry Newman). Sara Castro-Klarén, a contributor to the most recent edition of The
Idea of a University, also misses Newman's idea of certitude based on a grasp of objective
reality. For this reason, she makes several assertions that are antithetical to Newman's views
on education: that Newman's education was a passive reception of knowledge from a teacher
(323); that Newman sought to stem the "whole thrust of human subjectivity," to "stem the
challenge of science and of time,—that is, of change itself" (331); that Newman inhibits critical
thought although at the same time he appeals to it (332). Similarly, because Newman's aim is
to grasp external reality, the edge cannot be given to pedagogical process as being "more
important than academic content...in Newman's scheme," a position that Edward Jeremy Mil-
Newman's sermons, his writings on education and on theology are all grounded in the primary principle of an intelligible universe as the object of our knowledge. In the context of formal inference in The Grammar of Assent, Newman argued for the intelligible unity of the universe from examples of interconnections in knowledge: the experienced zoologist who can reconstruct "some intricate organization" of an animal from "the sight of its smallest bone"; the antiquarian who can interpret mythical traditions from an inscription. Through such examples Newman concludes, "That which the mind is thus able variously to bring together into unity, must have some real intrinsic connection of part with part." And he continues: "But if this summa rerum is thus one whole, it must be constructed on definite principles and laws, the knowledge of which will enlarge our capacity of reasoning about it in particulars" (210).6

In the Idea, while defining truth as the object of knowledge, Newman affirms this intelligible unity. He says:

All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system of complex fact, and this of course resolves itself into an indefinite number of particular facts, which, as being portions of a whole, have countless relations of every kind, one towards another. Knowledge is the apprehension of these facts....And, as all taken together form one integral subject for contemplation, so there are no natural or real limits between part and part; one is ever running into another; all, as viewed by the mind, are combined together, and possess a correlative character one with another, from the internal mysteries of the Divine Essence down to our own sensations and consciousness (33-4).7

6 Other illustrations of Newman's assumption of the world as objective, intelligibly unified, and accessible to the mind are found in the Grammar and in the "Proof of Theism." In the Grammar, to illustrate simple assents given as unconditional, although "short of intuition and demonstration," Newman gives as examples our belief that we exist, and "that our own self is not the only being existing; that there is an external world; that it is a system with parts and a whole, a universe carried on by laws; and that the future is affected by the past" (149). Similarly in "Proof of Theism," Newman says in response to W.G. Ward's book On Nature and Grace: "I would draw a broad line between what is within us, and apply the work "faith" to our reliance {certainty} of things without and not within us" (Argument from Conscience to the Existence of God, 71). Tristram and Boekraad make the editorial comment on this statement that "for Newman the basic division is between mental acts concerning what is internal and mental acts concerning what is external to the mind" (69).

7 In "Economies of Reason: Newman and the Phronesis Tradition," Mary Katherine Tillman begins her discussion of original unity from which partial human perceptions proceed with an account of the poem of Parmenides. The inquirer is taken up into the region of the Sun and has revealed "to his direct perception the motionless heart of well-rounded truth, wherein to think and to be are one and the same. Being appears to him 'like a sphere in space / perfectly round and balanced / from every perspective / in precise equipoise.' On his return to the earth, the young man is to retain the fullness of the vision of the eternal truth amid the fractured order of the world "where opposites harmonize and clash, where partial understandings seem to rule the day" (45).

The entries on "Being" and "Truth" in the Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi, also refer to the poem of Parmenides. Johannes Lotz refers to
To reinforce the idea of the unity and intelligibility of the objective world, Newman uses the image of a monumental structure that the mind can take in as a whole only by views in part from various angles. He observes:

as we deal with some huge structure of many parts and sides, the mind goes round about, noting down, first one thing, then another, as it best may, and viewing it under different aspects, by way of making progress towards mastering the whole. So by degrees and by circuitous advances does it rise aloft and subject to itself a knowledge of that universe into which it has been born (Idea, 34).

The tension between the recognition of the unity of objective reality and the necessary constraint of seeing only parts of it is a cornerstone in Newman’s idea of education. The various branches of knowledge are parts of a whole through which we have knowledge of the objective world. Newman says that these branches of knowledge or sciences are "various partial views or abstractions, by means of which the mind looks out upon its object" (34). Sciences tap into the intelligible principles of the universe; they proceed from an aspect or view of their object which links separate phenomena in an intelligible system. Newman states that sciences "arrange and classify facts; they reduce separate phenomena under a common law;...sciences are forms of knowledge, they enable the intellect to master and increase it" (35).

If truth, defined as things as they are in themselves or in relation to others, is the aim of the sciences, then the relative importance of a particular science may be gauged according to the measure that it contributes to this knowledge of things as they are and so contributes to an understanding of the intelligibility of the whole through the internal relations of the sciences. Newman writes:

it is not every science which equally, nor any one which fully enlightens the mind in the knowledge of things, as they are, or brings home to it the external object on which it wishes to gaze. Thus they differ in importance; and according to their importance will be their influence, not only on the mass of knowledge to which they all converge and contribute, but on each other (35).

Parmenides’ view of being: "as the one all it is at once all things." And "As regards man, his thinking is most intimately identical with being" (81). Similarly, Waldemar Molinski begins his entry on "Truth" with reference to Parmenides. He remarks that "the goddess teaches the way of truth, which is contrasted with opinion." He continues: "To recognize that being is and that non-being is not is knowledge of the truth" (1771-2).

8 In Newman: The Contemplation of Mind, Thomas Vargish states, for example, that subjective knowledge of an objective religious system existing in itself is simply that part of the objective truth that we apprehend (63).
In their own relations to the intelligible universe, "sciences are complete in their own idea and for their own respective purposes" (38). But in relation to "the one large system or complex fact" (33), they are all interconnected and incomplete portions of it. Newman observes that "they at once need and subserve each other" (38) and one science is the completion and correction of others (45).

The metaphysical substratum of Newman's view of education is found then in the first principle of a unified, intelligible universe. In the Idea, Newman presents this principle from a philosophical perspective, stating in his introduction that "the philosophy of Education is founded on truths in the natural order" (4). In his final Discourse, he again remarks that he has treated the subject "as a philosophical and practical, rather than as a theological question," acknowledging his debt to the "lessons of antiquity, the determinations of authority," for providing "authoritative principles" as the "rules and instruments of his science" (162). However, Newman's assumption concerning the intelligible basis of knowledge is grounded in a religious view of life. Theology studies the Source and the Guarantor of the intelligible unity of all.9

Newman's Discourse on the "Bearing of Theology on Other Branches of Knowledge" reveals a theological perspective on truth which sustains his philosophical view of truth as objective, intelligible and unified. Newman brings to the theological view of truth the eloquence with which he expressed the invisible world in sermons. He indicates that theology, like any other science, proceeds from one idea as a coherent, intelligible system. As an arbiter of method, Newman defines theology, making clear that theology is not just acquaintance with the Scriptures read with religious feeling. Rather, like all sciences, it is a reflection of an intelligible, objective reality viewed from the particular perspective of a single, unifying principle or idea. Newman states that by theology "I simply mean the Science of God, or the truths we know about God put into a system; just as we have a science of the stars, and call it

9 c.f. Newman's early university sermon, "The Philosophical Temper, First Enjoined by the Gospel" (1826) is about the order in the universe posited by the Bible. Newman's University Sermons.

In his introduction to Newman Today (vol. 1), Stanley Jaki remarks on Newman's unreserved commitment to the sacred as the unifying force of the universe and that Newman, as educator, was really Newman, theologian and shepherd of souls (13). In his essay in this collection, "Newman's Assent to Reality," Jaki emphasizes Newman's view of external reality and objective truth as opposed to subjectivism and mechanistic thought. In contrast to Kant, Newman argues that we reason to enlarge our knowledge of matters that do not depend on us for what they are (204). Jaki states that although personal features colour assent, the assent is made to a truth and "the truth of things" is the starting point of reasoning (203).
astroonomy, or of the crust of the earth, and call it geology" (46). Theology is "precise and consistent in its intellectual structure"; it is "one idea unfolded in its just proportions, carried out upon one intelligible method, and issuing in necessary and immutable results...the evolution, not of half-a-dozen ideas, but of one" (50).

As the science of what we know about God, theology surveys the intelligible coherence or consistency of the truths we know about the Source of all truth. While theology is a science in its own right or within its own circle, it is also implicated in or touches at some point all the other branches of knowledge within the circle of the sciences. It is because of its contribution to the intelligibility of the whole complex system of knowledge that theology is the "foremost" of the sciences (18), its subject matter being "far wider and more noble than any of those which are included in the circle of secular Education" (27). In Discourse ii, "Theology, a Branch of Knowledge," Newman speaks passionately of God as the source of the unity and coherence of knowledge. He argues

\[ \text{Admit a God, and you introduce among the subjects of your knowledge, a fact encompassing, closing in upon, absorbing, every other fact conceivable. How can we investigate any part of any order of Knowledge, and stop short of that which enters into every order? All true principles run over with it, all phenomena converge to it; it is truly the First and the Last (19).} \]

He claims that "The word 'God' is a Theology in itself, indivisibly one, inexhaustibly various, from the vastness and the simplicity of its meaning". And he adds: "In word indeed, and in idea, it is easy enough to divide Knowledge into human and divine, secular and religious, and to lay down that we will address ourselves to the one without interfering with the other; but it is impossible in fact" (19).\(^1\)

\(^1\) John R. Griffin comments: "I do not think it is too much to say that theology was hardly regarded as a science by any of the leading Victorians, including Newman's old friends in the Oxford Movement." He also suggests that "For the Irish, theology meant either devotion or a tool of devotion; or a weapon to be used against Protestants" A Historical Commentary on the Major Catholic Works of Cardinal Newman (70).

\(^1\) In "Imagination and Hermeneutical Theology," David Hammond notes, with reference to John Coulson, that the system of theology is an example of Newman's master principle: the truth of one doctrine is established when we see its location in relation to other doctrines; it is their connection, mutually and as a whole, which constitutes their truth (33).

\(^1\) In the 1852 Appendix to the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education, Newman notes that "though there were Universities in the middle ages, without the theological faculty, yet theological truth was always professed and assumed as true in the secular teaching which was actually given, it entered as truth into the subject matter of all the knowledge which was actually taught there, and thus was ever implicitly present, and absent only accidentally" (375-6). Also Idea, ed. I.T. Ker, 438.
As a man of general culture cognizant of his first principles, Newman explicitly describes the religious warrant of his view of education as grounded in the intelligible unity of all the branches of knowledge. In his final Discourse, Newman had noted that there are "three great subjects on which Human Reason employs itself:—God, Nature, and Man" studied in the three broad branches of knowledge, i.e., theology, science or the physical world, and literature or the social world (166). In his discussion of theology in the earlier Discourses, Newman indicates the interconnectedness of these three orders with God as the source of their rational truth or of their intelligibility.

Of the three broad areas of truth, theology, as the science of the supernatural, includes our knowledge of God Himself and His attributes as an "invisible, intelligent Being," as an invisible Agent: not only "behind the veil of the visible universe....acting on and through it, as and when He will," but also as "absolutely distinct from the world, as being its Creator, Upholder, Governor, and Sovereign Lord." Newman speaks of God as all-sufficient, all-blessed, a Being who is the Supreme good; "all wisdom, all truth, all justice, all love, all holiness, all beautiful...ineffably one...and such that we do not know and cannot even imagine of Him" (Idea, 46-7). God is not a mere anima mundi or collective humanity, "or an initial principle which once was in action and now is not" as Newman cautions in the Grammar (95). Rather, He is separated from creation by an "abyss, and is incommunicable in all His attributes" (Idea, 47).

As Creator, He is also the Source of the unity and intelligibility of the world. Newman writes: "His are all beings, visible and invisible, the noblest and the vilest of them." If truth means facts and their relations, then God is the Source. The warrant for theoria or speculative truth is in the eternal Logos. "The laws of the universe, the principles of truth, the relation of

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13 In "Literature," a lecture to the School of Philosophy and Letters in 1858, Newman uses the term "literature" in a different sense. There it describes a method or an approach to any subject matter which draws on the ressources of personal knowledge and experience.

14 In the Appendix to the original fourth Discourse, "The Branches of Knowledge Form One Whole," Newman cites an "eloquent writer" in the Dublin Review who gives an account of a Tract of St. Bonaventura. The writer describes St. Bonaventura's position: "From God, the Fontal Light, all illumination descends to man." The Divine Light is divided into four kinds as the source of all human science. The first, the inferior light illuminates our knowledge of sensible things; the second, or external light illuminates the arts of man that are directed to supplying his bodily needs, such as navigation, medicine, works concerning clothing and food; the "third, or interior light, is that of philosophical knowledge; its object is intelligible truth." It concerns "three sorts of verities, truth of language, truth of things, and truth of morals." The fourth kind of light concerns grace and the Holy Scriptures. Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education (1852) 389-90. Also Idea, ed. I.T. Ker, 448-9.
one thing to another, their qualities and virtues, the order and harmony of the whole, all that exists, is from Him." Material creation, the object of the physical sciences, can be investigated according to intelligible principles because of an intelligent Creator. Thus "electricity, magnetism, gravitation, light, and whatever other subtle principles or operations the wit of man is detecting or shall detect, are the work of His hands." 15 So, too, "His are the tribes and families of birds and beasts, their graceful forms, their wild gestures, and their passionate cries" (48).

As Creator or invisible Agent, God is the source of intelligibility not only in the order of Nature but also in the order of mankind or what Bacon called the radius refractus. Newman states: "And so in the intellectual, moral, social, and political world, Man, with his motives and works, with his languages, his propagation, his diffusion, is from Him" (48). Viewed from the perspective of Providence, the intelligibility of the science of history is from Him:

The course of events, the revolution of empires, the rise and fall of states, the periods and eras....not the incidental sin, over-abundant as it is, but the great out-lines and the results of human affairs, are from His disposition (48-9).

The constitution of the elements of the human mind is also of God's creation: "To Him must be ascribed the rich endowments of the intellect, the irradiation of genius, the imagination of the poet, the sagacity of the politician." 16 Speculative truth known in proverbs, "the majestic precepts of philosophy, the luminous maxims of law...betoken His original agency, and His long-suffering presence." The moral life of humankind is also grounded in this Source: "His are the dictates of the moral sense, and the retributive reproaches of conscience," and the moral world in its "elements and types and seminal principles...in ruins though it may be." He, too, is the ground of religion in its place outside of Revelation, of natural wisdom, and of the intimations of literature as in Greek tragedy, "the heathen dramatist in his denunciations of injustice and tyranny, and his auguries of divine vengeance upon crime" (49).

15 In the Apologia, Newman describes his view of the laws of nature from a particular religious perspective. He states that he owes to the Alexandrian school and to the early Church his belief in angels as not only "the ministers employed by the Creator in the Jewish and Christian dispensations," but "the real causes of motion, light, and life, and of those elementary principles of the physical universe, which, when offered in their developments to our senses, suggest to us the notion of cause and effect, and of what are called the laws of nature" (146-7).

16 In the Grammar, Newman also states that the laws of the human mind and the methods through which we know specific subject-matters are the expression of God's will. He says that we have God's blessing "if we take the way proper to our subject-matter" whether of "observation or of experiment, of speculation or of research, of demonstration or of probability" (275-6).
Newman sums up the religious principle which grounds all knowledge in God as the first and final cause:

Self-dependent, All-perfect, Unchangeable Being: intelligent, living, personal, and present;...who created and upholds the universe; who will judge everyone of us, sooner or later, according to that Law of right and wrong which He has written on our hearts....and...has relations of His own towards the subject-matter of each particular science which the book of knowledge unfolds...(27).

Newman's view of the unity of truth, its grounding in God, and the interlinked connections of truth with truth is also found in the Church Fathers whom he began reading "in the Long Vacation of 1828." 17 In "Newman, the Fathers, and Education," Vincent Blehl specifically describes the aim of education in the ante-Nicene period of Clement of Alexandria (b. ca. 150 A.D.) in which all is subsumed in the Logos who "constitutes in Himself the unity of truth" and Who, as the Educator par excellence, gathers His disciples through progressive stages of knowledge of Himself (199, 201). Greek learning and the entire progressive cycle of the secular sciences, i.e., grammar, poetry, rhetoric, and mathematics, are ultimately oriented towards philosophy and finally theology, the culminating point in the cycle or curriculum. All are pressed into the service of Christ to distinguish the false from the true, to defend Christianity from subtle adversaries, and as a preparation for the higher truths of Christianity (202). Similarly, in "Newman at Nicea," Michael Novak has described the educational ideal of the Church Fathers as based on an encyclopedic inclusiveness of all knowledge which converged and was linked together as part of a whole. For them, Jesus Christ was the fullness of all; Greek philosophy, for example, was understood as a preparation for the higher understanding needed for the Christian era.

In the second Discourse, Newman indicates the effects of the loss of belief in God as objectively real, leading to a loss of the essential idea of intelligible coherence. In this Dis-

17 In the Apologia, Newman describes the impression made upon him by this reading. He writes that "some portions of their teaching,magnificent in themselves, came like music to my inward ear, as if the response to ideas, which, with little external to encourage them, I had cherished so long." He makes reference to their mystical or sacramental principle in which "Nature was a parable: Scripture was an allegory: pagan literature, philosophy, and mythology, properly understood, were but a preparation for the Gospel" (145-6).

Several of Newman's works are drawn from this period: a contribution to the Encyclopedia Metropolitana in 1824 published in Historical Sketches, vol 1; his annotated translation of St. Athanasius, The Arians of the Fourth Century, and the novel, Callista. His understanding of the analogy between the relation between the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England in modern times and the relation between the Church and the schismatic Donatists in the time of St. Augustine featured prominently in his decision to "go over" to the Roman Catholic Church.
course, Newman refers to the "old Catholic notion" of faith as an act of the intellect with an intelligible object. He observes that "Faith was an intellectual act, its object truth, and its result knowledge" (21). As an illustration, he finds this notion still operative in the Anglican Prayer Book where there are definite *credenda*, the results of the understanding of faith reached by the intellect searching an intelligible Object. Newman traces to Luther the movement away from religion as objective. Instead of requiring "an acceptance...an act of the intellect" (21),

Religion was based, not on argument, but on taste and sentiment...nothing was objective, everything subjective in doctrine...Religion was nothing beyond a supply of the wants of human nature, not an external fact and a work of God (21).

If theology is severed from its own object in God, it cannot function as a science. Newman states that if religion is only subjective, "it is as unreasonable of course to demand for Religion a chair in a University, as to demand one for fine feeling, sense of honour, patriotism, gratitude, maternal affection..." (22). If the man of general culture’s faith in God as Object falters, then the keystone is lost for the distinction between the two great areas of secular and sacred truth made by such arbiters of method as Newman and Bacon. Newman cautions: "You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge, if you begin the mutilation with divine" (20). This mutilation disturbs the "internal sympathy" of the areas of knowledge; it unsettles "the boundary lines" between the sciences and destroys "the harmony which binds them together" (75).

As a man of general culture whose domain is all knowledge, Newman surveys the result of the loss of the intelligible ground linking the three domains of knowledge: God, man, and nature. The arbiter of method who is to discriminate between various areas of knowledge finds that the omission of the principle of intelligible coherence leads to fusion where there should be distinction. Without the religious sensibility that distinguishes and keeps separate the large areas of the sacred and the secular, the political economist will trespass onto ethical and religious ground, claiming that the accumulation of wealth leads to the happy and moral life. Boosters of physical science in Mechanics’ Institutes will suggest that knowledge will effect moral regeneration and religious devotion. Through the loss of the intelligible unity of the three domains of knowledge and through habituation to a single method of inquiry, some who take the physical sciences as their dominant field of study will exclude religion. Men of letters

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18 In "Exemplum meditandi: A Model Meditation upon the Reason of Faith; Anselm's model for Christian Learning," K.M. Staley describes in the thought of St. Anselm this old Catholic notion of faith seeking fuller understanding through reason.
will invest literature with ethical, moral, or religious expectations. Conversely, the narrow cleric will seek to limit the study of literature to what is religiously edifying through a misunderstanding of the nature of literature as a prism of natural man. A philosopher like David Hume will identify knowledge of God with nature by restricting the field of the knowable to the visible world in which the inductive method predominates.\footnote{Newman refers to Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and summarizes Epicurus as saying that as God is "known only through the visible world, our knowledge of Him is absolutely commensurate with our knowledge of it...is nothing distinct from it,—is but a mode of viewing it" (Idea, 30).} Theories of education will exclude the whole range of speculative thought that Newman would place at the centre of a liberal education as part of an objectively intelligible universe.

In his recent study, The Consolation of Rhetoric (1994), Whalen has observed the significance of Newman's affirmation of an intelligibly unified reality by placing it in its philosophical context. Whalen notes the absence in the nineteenth century of the Thomistic school of thought which asserts that knowledge of things is the grasp not only of their sensory data, but also of their intelligibility and of the being underlying the grasp of any of their specificities (107). An individual habituated to this kind of thought will "treat universals yet remain cognizant of the reality of things" (108). The "personal intellect integrated with all the features of soul, mind, and body" contrasts with the "non-personal, abstract and 'disembodied' technique (such as mathematical method)" (108).

Newman's view of the universe as objective and intelligibly unified, the foundation of his educational thought, is counter to the currents of modern philosophy which Whalen describes. He suggests that the philosophies of Descartes, Locke, and Hume have as their common consequence the dismissal of a perception of the world as objectively real. Descartes begins with thought as the point of departure for knowledge rather than beginning with things known first through the senses and then abstracting their intelligibility through the agency of the active intellect. The mathematical paradigm that exacted geometrical distinctiveness and clarity in ideas shrank what is knowable to the strictly demonstrative, eliminating other vehicles of higher indemonstrable truth. Whalen suggests that the disjuncture of the abstract and the real, evident in earlier mechanical methods, is intensified and "would in time become unconscious habits of thought for an entire culture. Many of the presumptions about knowledge against which Newman would fight originate here" (118). He cites Stanley L. Jaki's comment on the post-Cartesian world view: "Things, objects and entities are not inherently intelligible for the
simple reason that the mind has no access to them" (116). Whalen does not suggest that Newman's convictions regarding personal assent and certitude originated in philosophy. As the real can only be personally grasped, Whalen states that "Newman's intellectual mission was largely an attempted restoration of the highly personal modes of rhetorical knowledge and discourse" (127).

The loss of the real was increased further in Locke's empiricism which Whalen observes was only an apparent reconnection to the real because it still assumes that we know ideas rather than participating in an objective universe; these ideas which constitute knowledge are derived from our subjective experience of our sense-perceptions. 21 Whalen cites A.D. Nuttall on this point: "Locke's philosophy is an empiricism founded on the subjective experience of the perceiver" (Whalen's italics). 22 Whalen observes that although it might appear that Locke had a solid grasp of the real, tangible world through experience, "this is hardly the case," as in Locke's empiricist system "one experiences one's senses, not things." It is from one's own perceptions, which cannot be validated, that those ideas are derived which constitute knowledge. Despite appearances to the contrary, like Descartes and his idealist predecessor (Plato), Locke is trapped in the subjective (121-2). This subjective severance from the real described by Whalen explains the otherwise puzzling affinity between empirical and rationalist

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20 Whalen also refers to Jaki's comment that the verb, especially the verb "to be," is lost, leaving nouns to be endlessly re-arranged (125). Whalen cites from Jaki's Cosmos and Creator (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic P., 1980, 92). In "Newman's Assent to Reality, Natural and Supernatural" in Newman Today, Jaki also provides a philosophical context for Newman's view of knowledge. Martin R. O'Connell, another contributor to Newman Today, refers to Newman's affirmation of reality as objective. He cites Newman's biglietto speech in Rome on being made cardinal (May 12, 1879) in which Newman states that liberalism did not view revealed religion as a positive truth but as a matter of opinion (88-9). O'Connell suggests that the perduring contest in philosophy is between the realism of Aristotle and the idealism of Plato (79). In the same vein, David Whalen finds that the "different shades and types of philosophies can be 'boiled down' roughly to two basic varieties: idealism and realism—the ancient debate between Aristotle and Plato continues" (Consolation of Rhetoric, 115). Similarly, Walter Ong refers to idealism as constituting "a persistent aberration of human thought" in "Newman's Essay on Development in its Intellectual Mileu" (37).

21 During the summer vacation of 1818, Newman first read Locke; Whalen states that Locke was as influential as Aristotle in the early nineteenth-century intellectual environment (121).

schemes of education such as Rousseau’s and Herbert Spencer’s. Whalen observes that Hume’s ultimate empiricism did not “make ideas the reality” but “forsook reality altogether,” denying causality and “making all mental activity a matter of simply greater and lesser vivacity of impression,” rendering “experience a genuine, unconnected stream of consciousness.” The result was a world without coherence or intelligibility, a fragmented world known in a “series of discreet experiences” (124). This view of the world is far removed from the Greek logos or idea. In Aristotelian terms, form or the “living idea or soul of the thing...which determines the purely passive first matter” has lost its “informing function” (109).

Whalen comments that after Descartes, problems in philosophy result from leaving aside being as “the beginning of inquiry” and introducing thought or feeling as a principle. He says that without being, the formal means of knowing is impossible and “Philosophers who banish being find themselves in a curious world of existence-less-ness” (125). He suggests that in this world deprived of coherence and intelligibility, material science is a refuge and the cultivation of intensity of experience is “a kind of psychological compensation for distrust of reality” (128). He also suggests that Newman was unaware of the full implications of the “principles behind the cognitional de-personalization of his time.” (127).

Newman’s view of a unified, intelligible universe thus runs counter to empirical and rationalist foundations in pedagogy. Because in his view this intelligible universe is accessible

23 In Rousseau’s Emile ou l’éducation (1762), originally entitled Matérialisme du Sage, Emile learns only through his own sense experience; when he is about fifteen, through manual labour he will begin to learn ideas which Rousseau defines as a comparison of sensations or judgments on sensations (480). Rousseau influenced Pestalozzi in Switzerland who in turn was a model consulted by influential nineteenth-century educators such as James Kay-Shuttleworth, a guiding force in shaping educational directions in England in the first half of the nineteenth century. In Education, Intellectual, Moral and Physical (1860), Herbert Spencer acknowledges his debt to Pestalozzi and, with rationalist aplomb, asserts that any lack of continued success in Pestalozzian schools was due to poor teachers “who will fail even with the best methods” rather than to any weakness in Pestalozzi’s educational theory (115).

24 In “Newman and the Empiricist Tradition,” J.M. Cameron states that the inwardness of Newman transcends Hume’s empiricism. He says that what is inward is the primary reality and saves what is from without from absolute unintelligibility, but the outward must be first experienced so that the inward can show its power to rescue the world from disorder (94, 87).

25 Newman’s awareness of the loss of the objectively real was acute in the religious domain as suggested in his biglietto speech made at the age of seventy-eight in Rome. Here he refers to his life-long struggle against the spirit of liberalism which considered revealed religion to be merely personal and individual, “a private luxury” not to be obtruded upon others. Wilfred Ward cites this letter in The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman, vol. 2, 461; Fergal McGrath cites it in My Campaign in Ireland, 395.
to the human mind, the facts in all areas of truth, i.e., truth of God, of mankind, and the natural, physical world, are really known in conjunction with the intelligible principles which unify them. The same pedagogical principle applies to all areas of truth: to religious knowledge, to letters, and to physical science. In his account in the Idea of the public exchange in the Edinburgh Review between the Edinburgh promoters of useful education and the Oxford defenders of the classics, Newman argues that the benefits claimed by the giants from the North for a useful education are precisely what he would claim "is a principal portion of a good or liberal education". The declared aims of training in speculative knowledge and the aims of Baconian education are the same. This includes the "talent for speculation and original inquiry," the invaluable "habit of pushing things up to their first principles," and the cultivation of the understanding through reasoning on facts (123). In his Preface to the Idea, Newman also states that the goal in training a student’s mind through grammar and through mathematics is the same, i.e., to give "a conception of development and arrangement from and around a common centre" (xlv).

However, it is also axiomatic to Newman’s way of thinking, as to Aristotle’s, that the way in which first principles are reached varies with the subject matter. In the Grammar, Newman cites Aristotle’s statement in the Nicomachean Ethics about the need to discriminate between methods for the probable and for the demonstrable: "A well-educated man will expect exactness in every class of subject, according as the nature of the thing admits; for it is much the same mistake to put up with a mathematician using probabilities, and to require demonstration of an orator" (322). Newman makes the point in the Grammar that scientific method, whether induction as used in the experimental sciences to make connections between particulars and intelligible principles or the too rigid verbal science of Aristotelian logic, is not the natural instrument of reasoning in areas of indemonstrable truth. This discrimination between the approach suited to the rhetorical and the mathematical and between the probable and the demonstrable is of fundamental importance to Newman’s view of the need to respect divergent modes of thought and the distinctive pedagogical value of both letters and science as methods of reasoning.

26 The language in which Newman describes this conflict suggests the warfare of ideas. In the first paragraph of his "Introductory," he describes the "political adversaries" of Oxford who "assailed" its system of education and the "repulse" of this assault through the medium of treatises and pamphlets (2). Later, in Discourse vii, Newman notes in mock heroic terms that Oxford "found her defenders within the walls" of Oriel College. The earlier reforms at Oriel "had first put itself into a condition to be her champion" (118).
The pattern of thought trained through letters is much more difficult to describe than scientific procedure. It is like the mode of reasoning through congruity which Aristotle called demonstration in orb or circle, and not a notioribus. Newman illustrates this humanist rhetorical procedure of reasoning around a centre suited to subjects like English or Latin composition through his own example in the Idea. Here illustrations both of what a university is and what it is not are marshalled around the central idea in order to define the university. In this kind of reasoning, it is both through the mutual connections of these illustrations with one another and as a whole that the idea becomes clear. Similarly in the Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, the central idea of doctrinal development emerges from particular instances in various quarters which converge towards this idea or principle of development. Unlike induction, which educes a single aspect from things, in rhetorical thought a rich and fertile idea is developed in its many facets.27 In both the Idea and the Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, one idea remains itself yet is known in the relation of the several parts which illustrate it.

In The Gutenberg Galaxy, Marshall McLuhan describes this mode of thought as reasoning in a mosaic field in which the whole is known through the interplay of parts.28 Here he cites from Experiments in Hearing by Georg von Bekesy:

It is possible to distinguish two forms of approach to a problem. One, which may be called the theoretical approach, is to formulate the problem in relation to what is already known, to make additions or extensions on the basis of accepted principles, and then to proceed to test these hypotheses experimentally. Another, which may be called the mosaic approach, takes each problem for itself with little reference to the field in which it lies, and seeks to discover relations and principles that hold within the circumscribed area (55).

Von Bekesy elaborates:

When in the field of science a great deal of progress has been made and most of the pertinent variables are known, a new problem may most readily be handled by trying to fit it into the existing framework. When, however, the framework is uncertain and the number of variables is large the mosaic approach is much the easier (56).

The kind of logic required to see one branch of knowledge in relation to others and as part of a whole is not reductionist but open and inclusive; it does not involve induction or a

27 In "Did Newman have a 'Theory' of Development?" in Newman and Gladstone, Nicholas Lash states that investigating the many aspects of the historical development of an idea requires a literary view with its logic of analogy and metaphor rather than rationalist clarity which admits only of single aspects (162, 173).

28 McLuhan's Ph.D thesis, The Place of Thomas Nashe in the Learning of his Time, was connected to education.
relation between cause and effect. Rather, it is like the logic required by theology in which the truth of one doctrine is known through its mutual relations to others and in relation to the whole. It is the kind of reasoning taught in the literary humanist tradition through amplification of maxims in which the parts of the amplification lead towards real knowledge of the initial idea; Cicero's forensic pleading drawing on evidence from many areas to prove a case exemplifies humanist training in this mode of thought.

Newman also illustrates this rhetorical mode of reasoning in an article in the Gazette (July 6, 1854) written for the information of students who would write the university entrance exam. In "Mr. Brown's Prose," later published in the Idea as part of "Elementary Studies," he provides a "Specimen of Youthful Inaccuracy of Mind," a rambling English composition in which the student read the title carelessly and failed to take it as an informing principle guiding his elaboration of it. Rather than developing the central idea that "Fortune Favours the Brave," ("Fortes Fortuna Adjuvat"), Mr. Brown seized on the first word, writing on fortune in general, stating that it is a good thing to be fortunate, that fortune is uncertain, and he gives examples of fortunate men. In another article in the Gazette almost a year later (May 3, 1855), Newman connects the accuracy and exactness of mind which is the special goal of deductive thought in geometry with the writing of good prose, suggesting that if Mr. Brown had studied Euclid, "from the mere habit of mind that such a study would have tended to create" (432) he might have written to the point in his composition with a clear view of what he was saying. Euclid, the prince of geometers, teaches a student "what it is that he has got to prove" and to remember this all the way through the problem (432). This, says Newman, is the foundation of all convincing reasoning and he praises geometry for removing mistiness of ideas, vagueness of thought, indistinctiveness of definition, and want of attention to the subject.

However, while the foundation of all convincing reasoning for good learning and good teaching, for hearers and speakers, is the same, rhetorical reasoning traditional in the humanities differs in part from the geometer's in its personal element. Newman points out in the Gazette that speakers such as preachers must consider not only the proofs or explanations that they themselves require before presenting truths and conclusions, but also what the hearers know already or what they will grant (433). In the Grammar, Newman also emphasizes the personal nature of thought in the area of indeemonstrable truth. He observes that we reason spontaneously in our daily thought as "we are ever instituting comparisons between the manifold phenomena of the external world....thereby rising from particulars to generals" (44). Similarly, we understand history and literature in relation to our own experience. Newman writes: "Thus it is that we live in the past and in the distant; by means of our capacity of interpreting the statements of others about former ages or foreign climes by the lights of our own
experience" (42). In reading poetry, the schoolboy who may think that passages of Homer, Horace, or Virgil are "but rhetorical commonplaces" will find that they "at length come home to him, when long years have passed, and he has had experience of life, and pierce him, as he had never before known them, with their sad earnestness and vivid exactness." The lines of Virgil give "utterance, as the voice of Nature herself, to that pain and weariness, yet hope of better things, which is the experience of her children in every time" (78-9). In his discussion of informal inference in the Grammar, Newman describes the personal way in which we read works like Pascal's on religion: "Do we not think and muse as we read it, try to master it as we proceed, put down the book in which we find it, fill out its details from our own resources, and then resume the study of it?" He also asks: "Has it never struck us what different lights different minds throw upon the same theory and argument, nay, how they seem to be differing in detail when they are professing, and in reality showing, a concurrence in it?" In communicating ideas, "[i]t will be our wisdom to avail ourselves of language, as far as it will go, but to aim mainly by means of it to stimulate, in those to whom we address ourselves, a mode of thinking and trains of thought similar to our own, leading them on by their own independent action" (245).

The personal element is a particularly important factor in the kind of logic described by Newman in the Grammar for matters that cannot be demonstrated, i.e., especially in human and religious subjects.29 In this mode of thought, intelligible principles connecting particulars may be explicit or remain largely implicit, as in a judge's verdict or editor's decision. Both involve personal recognition of the truth through what Newman calls the illative sense.30 The individual must decide when the accumulated probabilities from various quarters have converged to point to a decision or to be convincing of a particular truth under consideration.31

29 Walter Jost states that Newman "provides a unique perspective on the human element" that is present to some degree in all knowing and thinking (Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman, 211).

30 Mary Katherine Tillman comments in "The Personalist Epistemology of John Henry Newman" that the illative sense or the personal exercise of judgment that grasps an originating idea by viewing it from various sides is essential to the enlargement of mind of liberal education (238).

31 In "The Tension Between Intellectual and Moral Education in the Thought of John Henry Newman," Mary Katherine Tillman describes the interplay between abstract knowledge and concrete thinking or between the notional and the real in the cultivation of the intellect. She states that in the Idea notional knowledge is to be balanced by concrete reasoning and personal insight attained through the medium of the illative sense acting on converging probabilities as described by Newman in the Grammar. Tillman says of this mode of thought that the "work of the scientist, the artist, and the scholar owes its silent beginnings and its tacit continuities to such reasoning and assents" (329).
What Newman calls complex assents involve a deeply personal, profound kind of knowing in which we are convinced of the grounds or principles of our knowledge of a particular matter; we know that we know. Complex assents give relief to what we already know but without intellectual clarity. An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine provides an example of this mode of thought which involves a personal affirmation based, like all reasoning, not only on the pattern of development and arrangement from or around a common centre but also on the mutual connections of part with part revealing the whole. In the Apologia, Newman describes his accumulation of information from various quarters such as the Old Testament in comparison with the New Testament, early Church history, the state of the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England in the nineteenth century. From these independent sources, through a process of inference and the exercise of personal judgment, he reached the certitude critical to his conversion, i.e., that Church doctrine had not remained static but had developed.

Newman's definition of complex assent in the Grammar indicates both the personal element essential to this kind of indemonstrable knowledge and the objective reality which he assumes as its starting-point. Newman writes:

> let the proposition to which the assent is given be as absolutely true as the reflex act pronounces it to be, that is, objectively true as well as subjectively:— then the assent may be called a perception, the conviction a certitude, the proposition or truth a certainty, or thing known, or a matter of knowledge, and to assent to it is to know (162).

Newman emphasizes that this knowledge is not merely subjective but also objective and marked by consistency. In the Preface to the Idea, he describes the "connected view or grasp of things" of the educated individual who has "realized the truth which he holds" from a

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32 In "John Henry Newman and the Relationship between Catholic Belief and Learning," Peter Cataldo writes that for Newman the nature of learning was founded on "a conformity of the mind with being" (145). Drawing on Newman’s sermon "Unreal Words," David M. Whalen states that "If truth is the 'adequatio rei et intellectus,' the proper relation of mind to things," then in a fallen world our challenge is to make things real "relative to ourselves." In this mode of thought referred to by Whalen, it is through the mutual relations of various parts that an abstract idea is made real and complete. In a comment that supports Newman's pedagogical insistence on clarity of definition, Whalen says that through the proper exercise of intelligence and imagination we endeavour to overcome the "wedge of unreality" driven between us and the world evident in minds numbed by fashionable, vague, and "vacuous phraseology."
sound and thorough training. He contrasts this disciplined intellect with poorly-trained intellects who have "brilliant general views about all things whatever" with "new and luminous theories" on every subject, satisfying the increasing demand for a "reckless novelty of thought." Newman takes as an example journalists "whose intellects are to be flaunted daily before the public in full dress, and that dress ever varied and spun, like the silkworm's, out of themselves!" (xliv-xlvi). In his religious comment, Newman cautions against private judgment which picks and chooses from Revelation what is personally appealing rather than revering the whole as object. In an article entitled "On Keeping Diaries" written for students in the Gazette (Feb. 15, 1855), Newman advises against the overly subjective from another perspective. He first notes in reference to keeping a diary that the two heads of the subjective and objective are "familiar in recent philosophy" (354). He suggests that students record under the objective head the essentials of conversations and reflections which might be forgotten "instantaneously" if not recorded. In the subjective category, he suggests that there is a danger of too much introspection, of pain and harm from "too nice an investigation" of the mind's processes (355). He recommends a rather objective approach to the subjective record, limiting it to the results of a student's advancement: the amount of work done, the hours spent on each subject, a rigid accounting of the use of time, and the results attained; a record of difficulties, such as rising in the morning, and the progress made in overcoming these difficulties.

The personal way in which truth is grasped in religion and in the broad area of the humanities as contrasted with the demonstrable truth of the physical sciences follows in a long rhetorical tradition which Newman exemplifies in his own work. While critics have long analyzed Newman's rhetorical style, more recent criticism has been directed towards Newman's mode of knowing as characteristically rhetorical. His rhetorical mode of thought and his

33 Newman notes the danger in one of his own works of the absence of connection to the real or external facts. In his prefatory notice to "Lectures on the History of the Turks, in their relation to Europe" in Historical Sketches, vol.1, Newman remarks that he has attempted nothing more than to group old facts in his own way; and he trusts that his defective acquaintance with historical works and travels, and the unreality of book-knowledge altogether in questions of fact, have not exposed him to superficial generalizations (xi).

34 In The Consolation of Rhetoric, David Whalen states: "The psychological, reflexive resonance of 'certitude' and 'assent' belong intimately to rhetorical modes of knowing. They are what the rhetorician strives for" (128). Whalen suggests that to categorize Newman in a particular school of philosophy is "essentially a misappropriation of Newman's thought" which is rhetorical and draws on an eclectic reading of philosophy (8). He states that scholars like Edward Sillems, A.J. Boekraad and Walgrave "often come teasingly close to locating Newman's thought in the rhetorical mode" in wedding psychology with phenomenology (7).

Others, such as Walter E. Houghton in The Art of Newman's Apologia, have broached the topic of Newman's rhetorical habit of thought. In "Literature and Theory: did Newman have a Theory of Development?", Nicholas Lash comments on Newman's literary approach to
pedagogy particularly for the study of literature and composition are simply a reflection of how truth is normally made real to us in certain areas. Three scholars in particular have argued that Newman's connection to the rhetorical tradition is not only through his style but in his very mode of thought. In "Some Rhetorical Lessons from John Henry Newman," Edward P.J. Corbett has observed that the Grammar of Assent "is mainly about the cognitive process involved in one's arriving at a position of assent" (409); it describes a specific rhetorical way of reasoning and is a rhetoric text "in its province and its method" (402). He claims that Newman describes an "informal, popular method of reasoning and arguing" (411) in which we subjectively apprehend the concrete or real which exists outside our minds as opposed to the abstract, general concepts of the notional which exist only as constructs created by our minds. He reminds us that for Newman the personal illative sense is the "sole and final judge" of the validity of inference in a concrete matter (405). Walter Jost sees Newman's theology, suggesting that it is "more suited to the subject-matter of Christian theology than are more formal, or theoretical, modes of reflection and explanation" (162). In his introduction to the Grammar, Lash links the mode of thought described there with the "rationality of aesthetics" and with twentieth century philosophy like Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method (21). He suggests that its lack of theoretical systematization makes Newman's thought, like Augustine's (who was a teacher of rhetoric), a stimulus to the reader to discover and reflect. Fergal McGrath notes incidentally in The Consecration of Learning that both Newman, the apologist, and Cicero, the rhetorician, have perfected "the art of approaching a subject from all sides, examining and re-examining it" (118).

35 Similarly with reference to modern scientific method, T.H. Huxley states that Bacon did not invent the method: "it is nothing but the necessary mode of working of the human mind...rendered precise and exact." The Essence of T.H. Huxley, 47.

Edward Sibley suggests that "Newman's vision...is composed not of a logical chain of ideas, but of persons and concrete entities" (Philosophical Notebook, vol. 1, 10). He states that "Newman regarded philosophical reflection as a means of effecting the closest possible union between the self and the real things he knows, and not as a means for constructing an abstract system of ideas" (11). The individual begins with the experience of existent realities and may penetrate to a deeper understanding or realization of them through abstraction of their aspects, through recognition of patterns in comparisons with other examples, through logic, through associations, but the goal is always in the reconnection with the original entity. Through the complex activity of the imagination, memory and reason, and through the action of the illative sense, the individual personally enters into the truth and mystery of existential reality.

In "Affectivity, Imagination, and Intellect in Newman's Apologia," David M. Hammond remarks that the word "unreal" was used as an epithet of scorn by those in the Oxford Movement (note 7, 275).
whole cast of mind as essentially rhetorical in character. 37 Jost concludes that "'rhetoric' in both senses, as a narrow art of literary excellence and as a general faculty of judgment and discrimination, is for Newman the centerpiece of liberal education" (197). David Whalen’s more recent work, The Contemplation of Rhetoric, argues persuasively that Newman’s mode of thought is essentially rhetorical.

Newman provides a description of this rhetorical and personal mode of reasoning in which insight is obtained through confirmation from seemingly disparate sources. In a university sermon entitled "Implicit and Explicit Reason," he describes the rhetorical methodus or path towards truth:

The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication, another on a probability; then availing itself of an association; then falling back on some received law; next seizing on testimony; then committing itself to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory; and thus it makes progress not unlike a climber on a steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot, ascends how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by practice, rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and unable to teach another....And such mainly is the way in which all men, gifted or not gifted, commonly reason, --not by rule, but by an inward faculty (Newman’s University Sermons, 257).

The way in which we are clearly persuaded of an idea obscurely known as described by Newman in this sermon does not dismiss order but involves an ordering around a centre through the coherence of individual elements connected to it. The idea constellates around itself particulars from seemingly diverse sources and reveals their vital connection. In Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer, whose thought has been linked with Newman’s, contrasts scientific procedure which corroborates "a regularity from which predictions can in turn be

37 c.f. David Whalen’s comments on Jost’s study in The Consolation of Rhetoric, 4-5, 205-16.

In The Art of Newman’s Apologia, Walter E. Houghton analyses Newman’s rhetorical prose style but also anticipates studies of rhetoric as Newman’s mode of thought. He notes Newman’s inclusion of recollections simply because they were valued as experience or because of the intensity of feeling associated with them. This allowed him to feel towards the significance of impending events whose meaning became clear in retrospect. He compares this approach to Keats’ negative capability, of staying in doubt, or mystery without reaching for a fact or reason (33). Houghton observes that the Apologia is a record of life in the concrete, of successive states of mind, catching the clash of ideas in their original context, rather than a logical analysis of the development of Newman’s religious opinions and he reminds us of Newman’s statement in "The Tamworth Reading Room": "the heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by description."
made" with the humanist tradition in rhetoric which has a logic of its own and is oriented towards the particular or concrete (6).

The affinity between traditional rhetorical aims and methods and Newman's description of how we reason in indemonstrable matters through the convergence of probabilities from various quarters may be observed through his account of Cicero's rhetoric in an article prepared at the request of Richard Whately in 1824 for the Encyclopedia Metropolitana; this project was instigated by Coleridge to provide an intelligibly connected rather than a disconnected, alphabetical view of all knowledge.39 Marshall McLuhan connects the pattern of reasoning in orb or circle with Cicero's rhetoric. In The Gutenberg Galaxy, he suggests that Cicero's rhetorical procedure is "a method of explicitly spelling out of information" in contrast to the more abstract "scholastic technique of aphorism" favoured by Bacon in The Advancement of Learning. McLuhan cites Bacon's description of this method as carrying "a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another" and "fit to win consent or belief" (127).

Newman's comments on Cicero's method reveal the orator's procedure of drawing support from diverse quarters for the purpose of persuading his audience. Particularly in laudatory orations and judicial cases, in support of the single cause he is representing, Cicero brings in "[h]istorical allusions, philosophical sentiments, descriptions full of life and nature, and polite raillery" which "succeed each other in the most agreeable manner, without appearance of artifice or effort" (Historical Sketches, vol. 1, 292). Master of intelligibly connecting particulars, in his judicial arguments Cicero "adroitly converts apparent objections into confirmation of his argument, connects independent facts with such ease and plausibility, that it becomes impossible to entertain a question on the truth of his statement" (293). Then, towards the conclusion of his speech,

he goes (as it were) round and round his object; surveys it in every light; examines it in all its parts; retires, and then advances; turns and re-turns it;


Edward P. J. Corbett notes Newman's affinity with Cicero and states that he might "aptly be dubbed 'the Cicero of the nineteenth century'" ("Some Rhetorical Lessons from John Henry Newman", 411). Corbett also observes that Newman's first published article was on the subject of rhetoric and he claims that Newman's last book, the Grammar, is also on this subject (411).
compares and contrasts it; illustrates, confirms, enforces his view of the question, till at last the hearer feels ashamed of doubting a position which seems built on a foundation so strictly argumentative (293-4).

Cicero's typical mode in his dialogues, in his forensic pleading as in his "laudatory orations," is to examine a single question from many sides, using, as Aristotle stated in his Rhetoric, "the available means of persuasion" (24). Like Newman illustrating an idea through multiple examples from various quarters in his sermons, in his dialogues on matters beyond controversy Cicero gives "relief to what is clear" (276). In dialogues on particular controversial questions, such as speculations on the soul or the gods, opposite arguments are "forcibly and luminously" represented (276). In Cicero's dialogues, Newman refers to

The majesty and splendour of his introductions, which generally address themselves to the passions or the imagination, the eloquence with which both sides of a question are successively displayed, the clearness and terseness of his statement on abstract points, the grace of his illustrations, his exquisite allusion to the scene or time of the supposed conversation, his digressions in praise of philosophy or great men, his quotations from Grecian and Roman poetry (277).

In his account of Cicero's rhetoric in the Encyclopedia Metropolitana, Newman also examines the controversial question as to whether the methodus of rhetoric is separable from the truth it investigates. Cicero distinguishes between the claims of philosophic truth and mere eloquence as the goal of the orator, separating an abstract approach to truth from rhetoric as a mode of reasoning in its own right. In the first century A.D., this issue had been discussed by Quintilian who laments the division between philosophy and eloquence which should be one; he states that the topics claimed by philosophers, such as justice and the operations of nature, belong to all, especially to orators. Quintilian adds that the division has abandoned morals to

40 In his introduction to the Idea, Martin Svaglic observes "that The Idea of a University began as deliberative rhetoric" (xvi).

41 Commenting on Newman's sermon, "Unreal Words," David M. Whalen speaks of the healing intent of rhetoric in making things real to us, reinvigorating words and restoring "to us our terms for dealing with reality." "John Henry Newman: The Rhetoric of the Real," The Literary and Educational Effects of John Henry Newman, 230. Similarly, Charles Frederick Harrold in John Henry Newman states that for Newman the unseen world was real and it was this that he sought to mediate in his sermons to his listeners (324).

42 Newman's novel, Loss and Gain (1845), is a prolonged dialogue presenting the various religious positions during the heated controversy of Newman's Oxford days. Unlike Cicero who "is not obliged to discover his own views" in his dialogues ("Marcus Tullius Cicero," 276), Newman's hero discusses the various viewpoints, but when there is sufficient evidence for his own decision proceeds to convert to Catholicism.
the less robust intellects. 43 In his encyclopedia entry, Newman finds unconvincing Cicero’s loud assertions that “truth is the great object of his search,” while he in fact inconsistently and expediently selects from opposing philosophers, depending on the nature of the case he is arguing (272). Finally, Newman considers another question traditionally associated with a rhetorical education and connected to his contention in the Idea that a University is “a place of teaching universal knowledge” (xxxvii). 44 He notes the range of subjects involved for the ideal orator “whose characteristic it is to express himself with propriety on all subjects, whether humble, great, or of an intermediate character” (282), although Cicero simply debates inconclusively the matter of whether the whole circle of arts is needed or whether skill in eloquence suffices (280).

The connection between reasoning as a development around a common centre as modelled in Cicero’s rhetoric, or in Newman’s sermons, or in the habit of thought cultivated through a liberal education, falls within a long humanist tradition. Walter Jost links Newman’s gentleman with a continuous educational ideal: with Cicero’s orator “who had mastered, not all things, but the arts of discovery and invention of intellectual principles and methods necessary to address and eventually take up any calling” (192); with Quintilian’s orator “as generalists capable of handling all subjects, locating values, making connections, resolving ambiguities” (176); with the practical wisdom of the sixteenth-century Christian humanist ideal in Juan Luis Vives’ De Tradendis Disciplinis; and by anticipation with twentieth-century works like Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method. Similarly, David M. Whalen, who summarizes and comments on James J. Murphy’s Rhetoric in the Middle Ages in the Consolation of Rhetoric (73-86), observes the continuous tradition of rhetoric. He states that the Ciceronian rhetorical tradition transmitted to European education through what survived of Quintilian also “provided the educational pattern in which most Church fathers were schooled” (77). 45 Whalen suggests that

43 On the Early Education of the Citizen-Orator, 6-7.

In his brief allusions to the various philosophic schools studied by Cicero, Newman anticipates at the age of twenty-three the subject dealt with forty-six years later in the Grammar of how we believe what we cannot explain. Newman says that the skeptic, Carneades, allowed “that the wise man might sometimes believe though he could not know;” and that in doing so “he in some measure restored the authority of those great instincts of our nature which his predecessor appears to have discarded” (271).

44 Newman’s italics.

45 Samples of the cumulative style of the Fathers are found in Historical Sketches. In “Primitive Christianity,” of volume 1, Newman cites from the letters and sermons of St. Ambrose in Milan during the Arian crisis and from the fifth-century tract of Vincent of Lerins.
although Newman was familiar with both Patristic and medieval educational practice, his own mode of thought developed more through affinity with these antiquarian studies than as a product of them. Newman's rhetorical mode of thought was a response to the need to "restore the free play of the whole of man's intellect" and to resist "the encroachments of a narrowing materialistic and an avowedly dogmatic 'demonstrativism'" (74).

Newman's own rhetorical cast of mind and the value he ascribes to this mode of thought in pedagogy are, like his defense of *theoria*, counter to important currents in the age and the character of mind which relied increasingly in all areas of truth on the inductive method traditionally associated with empirical science. Walter Jost suggests that, while Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Rhetoric* had been important texts in the old Oxford curriculum, rhetoric was already fighting "a failing rear-guard action" (10). He says that "Newman could hardly have failed to consider the near-contempt in which rhetoric was held by many of his contemporaries" (12). He refers to Newman's perception of himself as the rhetorician among the members of the Oxford Movement (12), but suggests that Newman uses the term in the popular sense of persuasiveness rather than as indicating a mode of thought. In "Literature," his lecture to the School of Philosophy and Letters, Newman uses "rhetorical" in its pejorative sense of style disconnected from substance in his description of a "rhetorical and ambitious diction" (*Idea*, 209).

Certainly in the exchange between the Oxford defenders of the classics and the Edinburgh promoters of science in 1810, the Edinburgh camp views classical education, the field of the rhetorical tradition, as merely gratifying taste, cultivating feelings, and inflaming the imagination. They claim:

46 Martin J. Svaglic remarks in "Classical Rhetoric and Victorian Prose" that Richard Whately laments the decline of the formal study of rhetoric in his *Elements of Rhetoric* although rhetoric was still known by readers of the classics (271).

47 Jost refers to Newman's comment to Hurrell Froude in 1836: "You and Keble are the philosophers, and I am the rhetorician" (12).

In "Classical Rhetoric and Victorian Prose," Martin Svaglic refers to Newman's own definition of rhetoric in *Essays Critical and Historical*, vol. 1, *Works*, 288-9, where he describes it as "the reproduction of reasonings, in themselves sound, into the calculus of the taste, opinions, passions, and aims of a particular audience" (269).

48 The Oriel defenders of the classics wrote in 1810, shortly after a much needed reform at Oxford. In "Newman's Doctrine of University Education," Michael Tierney refers to the cultural disaster of the decay of the Athenian ideal of education into a merely literary procedure. He refers to the testimony of Gibbon about eighteenth-century Oxford and its elaborate discipline of Latin prose and verse. In *Liberal Education or the Methods of Acquiring Useful and Polite Learning* (1795), Vicesimus Knox deplored the state of learning and of morals at Oxford, its straying from the original intention of universities, and the need for reform. He maintained there was a need for a literary education but vigour had to be restored to the proper
The present state of classical education cultivates the imagination a great deal too much, and other habits of mind a great deal too little, and trains up many young men in a style of elegant imbecility, utterly unworthy of the talents with which nature has endowed them...The matter of fact is, that a classical scholar of twenty-three or twenty-four is a man principally conversant with works of imagination. His feelings are quick, his fancy lively, and his taste good (Idea, 122-3).

They urge that "[n]othing would so much tend to bring classical literature within proper bounds as a steady and invariable appeal to utility in our appreciation of all human knowledge" (122). And they deny that a training in the classics effects the intellectual discipline cultivated through studying matter and subduing it "to the use of man" (122). In fact, they claim for useful science and deny to the classics precisely what Newman would claim as the virtues of a liberal education which might include a study of Aristotle, Thucydides, and Tacitus. The Edinburgh group says of the classical scholar: "Talents for speculation and original inquiry he has none, nor has he formed the invaluable habit of pushing things up to their first principles." Newman makes the counter-claim: "a principal portion of a good or liberal education" involves "the cultivation of the 'understanding,' of a 'talent for speculation and original inquiry,' and of 'the habit of pushing things up to their first principles'" (123).

The quarrel between educators who value rational method or science for cultivating the mind and those who value literary or rhetorical channels is as old as the divergent aims and procedures of Plato and Isocrates whom Marrou describes as the two pillars in educational tradition (135). Isocrates rejected as too lofty Plato's utopian ideal of the conquest of truth through rational method in a long and difficult course of studies. He gave preference instead to a literary training which refined the sense of judgment. This refinement of the judgment had a practical purpose connected to the skills needed in the affairs of daily life which are not subject to scientific method. Isocrates based the training of judgment on the Logos, on word and modes of education, for example through a "long and close application to letters" (268). In Newman's University: Idea and Reality, Fergal McGrath describes the degenerate state of education at Oxford in the early nineteenth century when the classics predominated and were studied from a literary perspective to the exclusion of philosophical and historical views. He states that Newman's defense of the classics was a defense of a reformed teaching of them as a mental culture. In "Newman in His Own Day," Martha McMackin Garland describes eighteenth-century Oxford as offering a watered-down medieval trivium and quadrivium. She suggests that Newman's attempt to "exact intellectual rigour" as a tutor at Oxford was in contrast to British universities which remained essentially "expensive clubs designed to change boys into gentlemen" (268-9).
thought as inseparable. The subtlety required in literature in finding the right word to express a thought adequately involves a sense of nuance which is often beyond the range of conceptual thinking. Marrou observes that Isocrates' claim that the apt word was the surest sign of accurate thought had perhaps greater significance than even he realized and that Plato's own subtle and beautiful writing itself justifies Isocrates' claim for the value of studying poetry. Isocrates judged a literary education to be a useful education.

Newman perceived that the attack on the classics from the perspective of science was an attack not just on the classics but on literature itself as representing a particular kind of verbal reasoning different from the mode of thought of science. He states: "Professedly indeed, they are aiming at the Greek and Roman classics, but their criticisms have quite as great force against all literature as against any" (Idea, 202). Newman sought to defend this whole large area of truth and the kind of reasoning associated with it. He considered literature, as part of the School of Philosophy and Letters, an important part of the training of the mind in a university education. Ideally, all students were to spend two years in the School of Philosophy and Letters before specializing or embarking on a career. In "Literature," his inaugural address to this faculty, Newman speaks as an arbiter of method or as a practitioner of the science of sciences in defense of literature which contrasts with science as a particular mode of thought, is valuable in its own right, deserving of dignity and, implicitly, of pedagogical importance. He states that it will be his business to discriminate between truth and falsehood in the common bias of science against literature (204). Newman defends literature, typically, by defining the idea of "letters" which figures into the title of the School of Philosophy and Letters. He discriminates between the mode of thought of literature and that of science through the logos, between the literary use of language and its scientific use. In the humanist tradition which maintained that the mind is trained through matching word to thought, Newman observes that in its literary use language is moulded by the individual who "subjects it withal to his own pur-

49 Marrou states that Isocrates places a hymn to the Logos in two of his books, Nicocles and Antidosis. The hymn praises the word as what distinguishes the human from the animal and as the condition of all progress whether in law, the arts, or mechanical inventions (124).

50 Marrou cites Isocrates: "La parole convenable est le signe le plus sûr de la pensée juste" (135). He remarks that Pascal, whose "esprit de finesse" he compares to Isocrates, dismissed Descartes as "inutile et incertain" (133). In "Newman and the Empiricist Tradition," James M. Cameron states that "Newman was a master of l'esprit de finesse in contrast to Hume's esprit de géométrie (94).
poses" (Idea, 207). His description of this personal use of language resembles both his account of Cicero's rhetoric and his portrayal in his sermon of how we normally reason on a subject as "the mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward...passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication, another on a probability...". In "Literature," he describes thus the experience of a writer engaged in connecting word to thought:

The throng and succession of ideas, thoughts, feelings, imaginations, aspirations, which pass within him, the abstractions, the juxtapositions, the comparisons, the discriminations, the conceptions, which are so original in him, his views of external things, his judgments upon life, manners, and history, the exercises of his wit, of his humour, of his depth, of his sagacity, all these innumerable and incessant creations, the very pulsation and throbbing of his intellect, does he image forth, to all does he give utterance, in a corresponding language, which is as multiform as this inward mental action itself and analogous to it, the faithful expression of his intense personality, attending on his own inward world of thought as its very shadow: so that we might as well say that one man's shadow is another's as that the style of a really gifted mind can belong to any but himself. It follows him about as a shadow. His thought and feeling are personal, and so his language is personal (Idea, 207-8).

Literature contrasts with science particularly in its personal element. Newman states that science deals with "matters, not personal, not subjective to the individual, but which, even if there were no individual man in the whole world to know them or to talk about them, would exist still" (206). Science is concerned with necessary truths, universals, with things as "they exist in themselves, not by virtue of our understanding them" (206). This distinction corresponds to Aristotle's differentiation in the Ethics between the scientific and calculative elements as generically different parts of the soul. Aristotle states that through the scientific element we "apprehend the realities whose fundamental principles do not admit of being other than they are, and with the other we apprehend things which do admit of being other" (vi, 1139a, p. 147).

Just as the same subject can be treated as liberal or useful, so the same subject can be treated as literature or as science. If history is a chronicle or chronology, it is treated scientifically; if coloured by the mind of the historian, it is literature. In the Grammar of Assent, Newman provides detailed examples of the contrast in results and the wrangling contentions when

51 In "Newman and the Mystery of Christ," Roderick Strange refers to the creative tension between "the words used and truth in view." He states that the struggle to express ambiguity in human experience is "creative and stimulates development" (334).

52 Hans-Georg Gadamer refers to the rhetorical way of knowing as involving the free play of the imagination and understanding in a subjective relationship that exhibits the reason for the pleasure in a object. Truth and Method, 40.
the same period of history is studied by historians who proceed from empirical, rationalist or religious perspectives; their first principles do not admit even of agreement as to what is acceptable as evidence. Similarly, the words of the Creed treat scientifically the subject of who God is and the essential dogmas of the Church. Sermons, on the other hand, delivered by a particular person to a particular audience, are literary in nature. When a subject "makes use of words as the mere vehicle of things," it "is thereby withdrawn from the province of literature. Thus metaphysics, ethics, law, political economy, chemistry, theology, which may be taught as literature, cease to be literature in the same degree as they are capable of a severe scientific treatment" (206). Aristotle's works, for example, approach the character of a science because he treats things not as the thought of his own mind but as "real and true" (206). The pattern of thought in literature as described by Newman involves reasoning through congruity; it is a development and arrangement around a centre. Scientific treatment of a subject is linear, involving development from a centre.

The basis for Newman's validation of literature as a way of thinking is similar to Isocrates' justification of a literary education. Like Isocrates, Newman observes that the Greek word logos expresses the "special prerogative of man over the feeble intelligence of the inferior animals" (208). He states that a great author is a "master of the two-fold Logos, the thought and the word, distinct, but inseparable from each other" (219). Noting that the Greek word "stands both for reason and speech" at once, he writes: "When we can separate light and illumination, life and motion, the convex and the concave of a curve...then will it be conceivable that the vigorous and fertile intellect should renounce its own double, its instrument of expression, and the channel of its speculations and emotions" (208). In the humanist tradition of Quintilian, Newman rejects the division between philosophy and eloquence. In his preface to Whalen's Consolation of Rhetoric, Dennis Quinn writes of this rhetorical tradition in which there is a connection between learning and eloquence: "the truth is itself generative of eloquence," or as the "Roman Cato put the matter bluntly: Rem tene, verba sequentur" (ix). In an "Ancient Quarrel in Modern America," Marshall McLuhan notes that the "origin of this important claim for the inseparable character of eloquence and wisdom would seem to lie in the familiar doctrine of the Logos" which connects society, "the external world, the mind of man and, above all, human speech." Newman writes that it is a fault in a literary person to be "set on words, to the neglect of thoughts or things" which should be one (213). As instances of

this, he refers to the Sophists and to the example provided by Isocrates, and Dr. Johnson when "his style...outruns the sense and the occasion" (Idea, 213).54

Newman's defense of the rhetorical or literary habit of mind as an important part of the training of the mind in the University's School of Philosophy and Letters is also a defense of the *logos* in all senses of the word: as idea or *theoria* and as verbal truth. In "Literature," Newman describes the particular method of rhetorical thought as expressed and encouraged by literature. Unlike the movement in experimental science which proceeds inductively from external particulars to a single abstraction, the rhetorical mode described by Newman proceeds from the inner, personal resonance of an experience, a feeling, an idea, or a speculation to its development in words. In *Religion and Imagination*, this rhetorical pattern of thought is characterized by John Coulson as a magnetic field in which parts accumulate in relation to a whole (118-20). It is the method of the orator whom Marrou describes as enlarging his subject by a progressive amplification in order to attain universals, fine feelings and ideas common to all (132). Newman comments that the classics in any language express what "is common to the whole race of man" in language so personally moulded by authors that they "alone are able to express it" (220). He states that as the painter or sculptor represents in a particular medium the conception in his mind of, for example, "the Madonna and Child, or Innocence...or some historical character," so the "great prototypical ideas which are the contemplation of a Plato or a Virgil" are wrought in words which are instrumental to the ideas (Idea, 213). He defines this literary mode of thought: "the Art of Letters is the method by which a speaker or writer brings out in words, worthy of his subject, and sufficient for his audience or readers, the thoughts which impress him" (219). To illustrate his point, Newman cites from Shakespeare. In a passage from *Macbeth* which Newman characterizes as more oratorical or declamatory than poetical, the single idea that a disturbed mind cannot be ministered to by medicine is developed in the six lines of a "many-membered period":

Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased,
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,
Raze out the written troubles of the brain,
And, with some sweet oblivious antidote,
Cleanse the foul bosom of that perilous stuff,
Which weighs upon the heart? (Idea, 211)

54 In *The Victorian Sage*, John Holloway remarks that their own words are essential to the Victorian sages, like Newman, who had insights into a whole which cannot be revealed in a rational style, but is embodied in their words, metaphors, examples, etc.. He suggests that their task was "often of awakening or reawakening something, not of transmitting information" (16-17).
So too the "copious, majestic, musical flow of language" of Cicero's orations is "the development of the inner man" (212); like every great writer who "has the right word for the right idea, and never a word too much" (220), Cicero's language "is never out of keeping with the occasion or with the speaker" (212).

Newman's emphasis on the importance of literature to the circle of sciences in the university is an affirmation of a personal mode of thought which is congenial as well to religion. 55 In Religion and Imagination, John Coulson remarks on the "strong therapy of the old classical education" in connection to a literary ethos in theology. He observes that the Oxford Movement with members like the poet John Keble had an especially literary quality;56 he notes Newman's attraction during this period to the early Fathers as literature. He cites Mark Pattison who remarks in his Memoirs (1885) on the "sudden withdrawal of all reverence for the past" at Oxford in 1845 after Newman's departure. Pattison wrote that "Oxford repudiated at once sacerdotal principles and Kantian logic [and] for more than a quarter of this century Mill and nominalist views reigned in the schools" (35).

The protection of a rhetorical mode of thought in the circle of sciences as distinct from the method of induction is important both to literature and religion. Literature is also impli-

55 "Educational Method: Educating for Real Life" (110). In the same decade as Davis' articles, F.R. Leavis made the distinction between the literary mode and the philosophical, the kind of distinction expected from Newman's cultured gentleman. Leavis wrote that in reading a poem we are invited to "feel into" and "become—to realize a complex experience that is given in words" (212-13). Rather than abstractly analyzing, like the philosopher, the literary critic maps out patterns of one concrete and another. "Literary Criticism and Philosophy," The Common Pursuit (Chatto & Windus, 1952).

In The Victorian Sage, John Holloway comments on the essentially personal nature of any religious argument (173).

In Newman: The Contemplation of Mind, Thomas Vargish comments that the apprehension of religious truths is inseparable from the words which express them (45).

56 John Keble's book of devotional poetry, The Christian Year (1827), which enjoyed ninety-seven editions during Keble's lifetime, oriented its readers towards the presence of God in their daily lives through meditation on particular texts suited to important days in the liturgical year such as Pentecost, Palm Sunday, or Easter. It is mentioned in various novels: Maggie Tulliver reads it in George Eliot's Mill on the Floss (1860) and Catherine Elsmer in Mrs. Humphrey Ward's novel, Robert Elsmere (1888). In the Apologia, Newman describes his response to the deep religious teaching of Keble's poetry which reinforced his sense of "the Sacramental system;...that "material phenomena are both the types and the instrument of real things unseen." However, Newman remained dissatisfied with Keble's fideism based on probability because it did not go "to the root of the difficulty." Newman takes the problem of faith as his subject in the Grammar of Assent, i.e., that absolute rational certitude was possible in religious matters. At the heart of Newman's own method is this certitude which is "the result of an assemblage of concurring and converging probabilities...both according to the constitution of the human mind and the will of its Maker" (Apologia, 138-40).
cated in Newman's observations as an arbiter of method in the Idea on the consequences for theology, metaphysics, ethics, and mathematics for those who reject "any process of inquiry not founded on experiment" and "whose first principle is the search after truth, and whose starting-points of search are things material and sensible" (170).57

In "Literature," Newman declares simply: "Literature is one thing, and...Science is another" (218). He centres his argument for the value of the distinctive mode of thought of literature on the logos, on the difference between the scientific and the literary use of language. Science uses words to represent things; literature uses words to represent thought. John Coulson makes this distinction, referring to the univocal use of words, as in management English, in contrast to words used with a simultaneous effect.58 This difference in the use of language makes literary work appear to be merely verbiage from the perspective of science. Newman himself had encountered a similar difficulty in his initial reading of the Church Fathers. He relates his bewilderment in approaching their rhetorical works from the perspective of the science of logic which, as he notes in the Grammar, functions by allowing a word to "stand for just one unreal aspect of the concrete thing to which it properly belongs," draining words "of that depth and breadth of associations which constitute their poetry, their rhetoric, and their historical life" (214-15). In "Newman on Nicea," Michael Novak refers to Newman's account of his initial difficulty in reading the works of the Fathers: he began by cataloguing doctrines and principles, analyzing their works on principles of division, seeking through this procedure what was not there because he did not know what to look for in them.59 Novak observes that the methodology of the Church Fathers was based on an appreciation of the limitations and ambiguities of language as a vehicle for divine truth, on a reverence for Scripture, and on an awareness of human knowledge dissolving in mystery. He says the Church Fathers saw it as their business as seekers after truth to listen to the primary meaning of Scripture through a

57 Here Newman wrote: "the Mathematics indeed they endure, because that science deals with ideas, not with facts...; and Ethics they admit only on condition that it gives up conscience as its scientific ground, and bases itself on tangible utility: but as to Theology, they cannot deal with it, they cannot master it, and so they simply outlaw it and ignore it" (Idea, 170).

58 Coulson refers to the imaginative use of language which demonstrates a reality other than the empirical and destroys single-mindedness in providing diverse levels of interpretation (151-2).

study of contexts, of figure and fulfillment, of symbols and facts. By contrast, Novak describes the logical science of the Arians whose polemical, dialectical method left Scripture behind to find reasons supporting their own way of taking the texts (447-8). Novak suggests that the heresy of the Arians was inherent in their methodology as it shaped their view of Scripture; similarly, the rhetorical method of the Fathers was shaped by their view of their subject matter. In *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*, James J. Murphy also refers to the rhetorical use of language by the Church Fathers. He describes Augustine's view of words in connection to the "doctrine of signs." Murphy states that, according to this doctrine, for Augustine words were signs which conveyed only a small measure of a speaker's thought (288).

In his address to the School of Philosophy and Letters, Newman defends the literary mode of thought while acknowledging that it will be depreciated by those who have "their own idea of it," understanding words as representing only things. Citing from a sermon of Lawrence Sterne, Newman suggests that for such people language used in its full compass will appear to be ornament without substance or "an over-curious and artificial arrangement of figures, tinselled over with a gaudy embellishment of words, which glitter, but convey little or no light to the understanding" (203). An increasing monopolisation of method by induction diminished the acceptability of alternative modes of reasoning; allowing words to stand only for things endangers the educational status of letters amongst educational theorists. In *Studies of the History of Education* (vol.1), G.H. Bantock comments that the battle in education since the Renaissance has been waged on the difference between the word understood in connection to things and the word understood in connection to thought. He remarks that "Things not words became a major—perhaps the major—cliché of advanced educational thinking for a long time to come" (170). The separation of reason from literature is suggested in *The Advancement of Learning*, for example, where Bacon assigns poetry to the imagination and contrasts it with reason which "doth buckle and bow the mind into the nature of things" (83). Although he commends poetry, like the orators' harangue, for wit and eloquence, and suggests it surpasses philosophers' works for "the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions, and customs," he considers that "it is not good to stay too long in the theatre" and passes to "the judicial place or palace of the mind" which is to be approached "with more reverence and attention" (85). Fur-

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60 In the *Apologia*, Newman's reference to the mystical or sacramental principle of the Fathers illustrates this idea: "that the exterior world, physical and historical, was but the outward manifestation of realities greater than itself". Thus, Newman explains, the Greek poets presaged unwittingly the Gospel; sacraments are "only a symbol of those heavenly facts which fill eternity;" the Church's "mysteries are but the expressions in human language of truths to which the human mind is unequal" (145-6).
thermore, Bacon perceives the observation of nature as requiring a mind freed from those personal associations and resonances which are the very life of a literary mode of thought and for the reasoning through congruity on which religious belief rests. As David Whalen suggests in The Consolation of Rhetoric, the rhetorical method boasts of being influenced by factors which "it is the boast of scientific knowledge to exclude" (27).

In J.A.Comenius and the Concept of Universal Education, John Edward Sadler provides an historical perspective of the Baconian influence on language. The zealous application of the inductive method to language is evident in the decades after Bacon’s death (1626). The London group associated with Samuel Hartlib\textsuperscript{61} suggested the possibility of an artificial international language, a Lingua Franca, which might be based on mathematical symbols. Comenius, an influential Czech educator who was briefly associated with the Hartlib group while in exile in London, sought a meeting with Descartes to discuss this possibility. Similarly, in his Introduction to the Universal Language (1653), Thomas Urquhart considered the possibility of each letter of the alphabet corresponding to a well-defined characteristic or aspect of things, such as white, in order to designate any particular through its properties. In The Art of Signs (1661), George Dalgarno wrote of a new rational language of a universal character which would remove redundancy, rectify anomalies, and take away all ambiguity, contracting primary words to a few. Newman’s comments in "Literature" that science uses words as symbols of things (206) and that for the purposes of science "all languages are pretty much alike" (215) are applicable to this seventeenth-century group of projectionists. Not sur-

\textsuperscript{61} Hartlib published Comenius’ book, A Reformation of Schooles (1642), and was also the person to whom Milton addressed A Tractate on Education which was published in 1673 but written in 1644. In A Reformation of Schooles, Comenius acknowledges his indebtedness to Bacon, the great Lord Verulam. He suggests that in education studies are too prolix and that the “chaffe” should be eliminated. This included pagan mythology, the rules of grammar, and the circumlocutions and windings of expression (6). Comenius remarks that although grammar and rhetoric are directors of reason and speech, they are not oriented towards life and must be rejected. Comenius’ introduction of pictures into a primer which was widely used for two hundred years is an indicator of the tendency towards visual observation favoured by science in contrast to the oral mode favoured in humanist tradition. In The Contemplation of Rhetoric, David Whalen comments on Newman’s emphasis on oral instruction. Finally, the equation of words with things which are accessible to all, rather than with ideas, is connected to the belief that all may be equally well educated. This connection is evident in the ways Comenius’ educational thought has found favour: in the nineteenth century, he was singled out by Karl Van Ranmer in his History of Pedagogy (1842) as the real founder of the science of education, a term favoured by Lord Brougham, for example; in a publication of his works by UNESCO in 1955, Piaget praises him in the introduction as a symbol of socialist and humanitarian hopes that all children might be given a general education without discrimination of sex, social origin, or property.
prisingly, these advocates of a universal language also sought to dismiss as unnecessary gram-
mar, logic, and rhetoric which had been the very foundation of the study of language in the
seven liberal arts of the humanist tradition. The Gresham College group, which promoted Real
and Useful Knowledge, stated that there was to be no meddling with "Divinity, Metaphysics,
Morals, Politics, Grammar, Rhetoric, or Logic" (148).

Newman’s defense in education of a verbal mode of thought in an age of scientific
method, which finds poetry in particular incomprehensible, is also an old battle fought anew.
In the fourth century B.C. in Greece, Plato rejected poetry in his educational scheme in The
Republic, giving preference to the rational science of dialectic as a mode of thought. Plato
argued that as art represented things, it was one step removed from sensible things which
themselves are "embodiments (with many accidental features) of the real Form, the object of
knowledge."62 In a splitting of reason from emotion which does not occur in the personal mode
of rhetorical thought, Plato also finds that dramatic poetry appeals to the emotions, but not to
the reason. It is to be rejected because reason is to rule emotion. In the seventeenth century,
Bacon’s anti-rhetorical reorientation of learning away from verbal thought towards things is
reflected in Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693) which Newman cites in Dis-
course vii. While Newman values the study of language as tending towards a “general cultiva-
tion of mind” (121), Locke perceives the study of Latin as useless, asking

Can there be any thing more ridiculous than that a father should waste his own
money, and his son’s time, in setting him to learn the Roman language, when
at the same time he designs him for a trade, wherein he, having no use of
Latin, fails not to forget that little which he brought from school, and which
‘tis ten to one he abhors for the ill-usage it procured him? Could it be
believed...that a child should be forced to learn the rudiments of a lan-
guage...and neglect all the while the writing a good hand, and casting accounts
which are of great advantage in all conditions of life...(Idea, 120-1).63

62 Francis Macdonald Cornford’s introduction to "The Quarrel between Philosophy and
Poetry" of The Republic, Part v, Book x, 323.

63 The anti-rhetorical bias particularly against poetry in empirical educational theory is
evident in Rousseau who would not allow Emile to read Aesop’s fables until he was older
because as a child he could not literally equate the words to his own experience. When finally
allowed to read “The Crow and the Fox” for example, the moral was to be omitted because
Emile was not to learn from authority but to proceed from the facts in the fable to his own con-
clusion.

Coleridge, on the other hand, describes the intoxication of poetry for the child who
cannot yet understand it. Coleridge on Logic and Learning, (46). In contrast to Rousseau,
Newman suggests that a parent’s assurance about the truth and beauty in a passage from
Shakespeare is sufficient authority for a child who memorizes it but does not yet understand it
(Grammar, 34).
Newman also observes that Locke, whom he sees as a predecessor of the "Edinburgh Reviewers," states that verse-making is to be avoided on the grounds that poets seldom discover "mines of gold or silver on Parnassus" (120). By contrast, in "Christianity and Letters," Newman traces the development of liberal education from its fountainhead in the poetry of Homer. He observes that Homer "was invested with the office of forming the young mind of Greece to noble thoughts and bold deeds." He writes that Horace decided that the Iliad and the Odyssey "taught the science of life better than Stoic or Academic" (194). As "other poets were associated with Homer in the work of education," tragedians like Aeschylus and Sophocles taught "the majestic lessons concerning duty and religion, justice and providence...which belong to a higher school than that of Homer." Newman then describes rhetoric as emerging as a separate art from poetry and oratory (194).

The antipathy towards the rhetorical mode of thought particularly as represented by poetry in rationalist and empirical schemes of education is consistent. In the "Tamworth Reading Room," Newman notes that Bentham despised poetry (Essays and Sketches, vol. 2, 190). In the autobiographical account of his intellectual formation, John Stuart Mill states that, with some exceptions such as Milton, his Benthamite father "cared little for any English poetry." In Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical (1860), Herbert Spencer relegates the arts to the domain of feeling fit to occupy the leisure part of life and so also "the leisure part of education" (75). He proclaims that "the highest Art of any kind is based upon Science," and connects poetry to the laws of psychology (75). He states that "there must result certain corresponding general principles on which alone art-products can be successfully framed" (79). Finally, Spencer declares that science is itself poetic, although he may have in mind a wordless variety. He states that the elegance of snow crystals and the wonder of a drop of water are poetic (82-3). Like the Edinburgh Reviewers in 1810 and like John Stuart Mill in his "Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews" (1867), Spencer declares that the inductive method of science is superior to language learning or literature in training the mind. He writes: "The constant habit of drawing conclusions from data, and then of verifying those conclusions by observation and experiment, can alone give the power of judgment correctly" (88). The dominance of the method of induction meant that the old method of abstract

64 Marrou refers to the Homeric education as inculcating through the stories of heroes an ideal type of person to be realized such as actualized in Alexander. This person was resourceful and motivated by glory to be the best in his area (34-6).

65 Autobiography, 12.
teaching was to be replaced by the new method of the concrete. Transplanting the inductive method from its proper area in the experimental sciences to the areas of mathematics and language, Spencer declares that the multiplication table is to be taught experimentally rather than by rote and the old mechanical way of learning the alphabet is condemned by "[a]ll modern authorities" (103). For similar reasons, Spencer advocates the "abandonment of that intensely stupid custom, the teaching of grammar to children" (105). This contrasts with Newman's approval of beginning with grammar according to the general principle for training the mind by giving the pupil the "conception of development and arrangement from and around a common centre" and "to impress upon a boy's mind the idea of science, method, order, principle, and system; of rule and exception, of richness and harmony" (Idea, xliiv-xlv).

Rousseau's insistence that the moral at the end of Aesop's fable should be discovered by Emile rather than learned from the author is typical of empirical pedagogy. This view is in polar contrast with Greek thought which begins with the wisdom based on the experience of the wise and the elderly as the point of departure for the dialectical method. Similarly it is the opposite to training in rhetoric through the amplification of maxims. Methods and rules for teaching reading are dismissed by Rousseau as nonsense; the teacher has only to awaken the desire to read in the pupil.

In his "General Report for the Year 1861," in Reports on Elementary Schools 1852-1882, Matthew Arnold remarks in the capacity of a School Inspector who supported verbal training: "Many objections have been raised against the teaching of grammar in our elementary schools, and I believe that there are even inspectors who somewhat discourage it. But I confess that I should be very sorry if this study should be discontinued, or should be suffered to decline." He states that "[w]ith the tendency to verbiage and to general and inexact answering to which all persons of imperfect knowledge are...so prone, it is a great thing to find for their examinations a subject-matter which is exact." Arnold suggests that grammar is even preferable to arithmetic for training the pupil in exactness because "it also compels him, even more than arithmetic, to give the measure of his common sense by his mode of selecting and applying, in particular instances, the rule when he knows it" (84–5).

In his "General Report for 1878," Arnold refers to the problems of new methods based on generalities and new "doctrines" such as the "doctrine" mentioned by Spencer of teaching in the concrete. He says that "the question is, how is a sensible teacher likely to effect most practical good. Is it by betaking himself to the scientific teachers of pedagogy, by feeding on generalities,...by learning that we are to "disuse rule-teaching, and adopt teaching by principles," that we are to teach things "in the concrete instead of in the abstract," as suggested by Pestalozzi? (189) He observes that these new doctrines require new methods some of which are ingenious but that "their apparent conformity to some general doctrine apparently true is no guarantee of their soundness" (189). Similarly, in Culture and Anarchy, Arnold refers to Jacobinism's violent indignation at the past and its "abstract systems of renovation applied wholesale...which make it hostile to culture (66).

Even Macaulay, an exemplar of oratorical skill, dismisses the study of grammar, logic, and rhetoric in his Essay on Bacon (436).
Newman's articles in the Catholic University Gazette (1845-55) informing students of the nature of the entrance exams as in "Elementary Studies" and offering advice to them clearly follow the humanist tradition extending from Isocrates through Quintilian to the nineteenth century. This time-tested tradition was finely honed in antiquity for the training of the citizen-orator in precisely that mode of thought defended in the modern era by Newman in the Grammar of Assent. In his introduction to Quintilian's On the Early Education of the Citizen-Orator, James J. Murphy observes that the resurgence of interest in Quintilian's pedagogy in the fifteenth century, when a missing portion of his work was found in Switzerland, continued in the literary training in English schools for four hundred years. Richard Whately made use of Quintilian in his Elements of Rhetoric (1828); he was read by Disraeli and Macaulay; John Stuart Mill praises Quintilian in his Autobiography, stating that "I have retained through life many valuable ideas which I can distinctly trace to my reading of him even at that early age";^69 Murphy adds: "It might be noted also that Quintilian would have approved readily of John Henry Newman's proposal for "Elementary Studies" in his Idea of a University (xxv).

The aims of education for Newman and Quintilian are similar. Murphy refers to Quintilian's Institutio oratoria as having for its subject the liberal education of a "man of discretion." He says that Quintilian aims to "develop the minds and talents of young men who can themselves decide their own actions in the public arena". Rhetoric which, as Quintilian says, must be adapted to each "individual case, the time, the occasion, and necessity itself" was merely the "tool of the broadly educated citizen who is capable of analysis, reflection, and then powerful action in public affairs" (xx). The primary subject matters through which the discriminating intellect was to be cultivated for the citizen-orator are also similar to Newman's. In the Gazette, Newman informs prospective students that the university entrance exams will include, besides the matter of the Gospel of Matthew and one expanded catechism, the following subjects: construing and parsing in one book in Latin and Greek grammar; Mathematics (Euclid, Book 1); Arithmetic; a general knowledge of Greek and Roman history (2).

The foundation of the humanist rhetorical education of Quintilian was the science of grammar. Quintilian advises that those "are not to be heeded who deride this science as trifling and empty; for unless it lays a sure foundation for the future orator, whatever superstructure you raise will surely fall....Alone of all departments of learning, it has in it more service than show" (29). He distinguishes the two parts of grammar: "the art of speaking correctly, and the

^69 In his "Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews," Mill comments that Quintilian provided a repertory of the best thought of the ancient world on all subjects connected with education (229).
interpretation of the poets," with collateral information in other areas such as music, philosophy, and astronomy needed for the reading of the poets (28). Newman also defines the "grammar" to be tested by the entrance exam as the "art of using words properly." He distinguishes it from literature with which it was "almost synonymous" in the middle ages. Providing a model for students in using words correctly, Newman cites Johnson's definition to further define grammar as comprising "four parts—Orthography, Etymology, Syntax, and Prosody" (Idea, 250). Like Quintilian, Newman affirms that grammar is suited to the first level of education. Newman states in the Preface of the Idea: "I hold very strongly that the first step in intellectual training is to impress upon a boy's mind the idea of science, method, order, principle, and system; of rule and exception, of richness and harmony. This is commonly and excellently done" through a careful and accurate teaching of grammar (xlvii).

Both Quintilian and Newman state that correctness is first to be expected in the study of grammar and elegance or eloquence is its final excellence. Quintilian observes:

Since all language has three kinds of excellence, to be correct, perspicuous, and elegant....and the same number of faults, which are the opposites of the excellences,...let the grammarian consider well the rules for correctness which constitute the first part of grammar (35).

Newman describes the standard for the exhibition (scholarship) exam in original composition as demanding a demonstration not just of correctness, as the entrance exam, but also of elegance, a sensitivity to idiom, and a copia verborum.

Quintilian and Newman both emphasize that the study of grammar requires minuteness and accuracy. Quintilian, for example, writes: "Let boys in the first place learn to decline nouns and conjugate verbs, for otherwise they will never arrive at the understanding of what is to follow" (32). They are to know the parts of speech and "those changes which declension and preposition introduce" (30). In the letters of Latin words, the pupil will "learn what is peculiar in letters, what is common, and what relation each has to each" (30). He observes that language is studied through reason in analogy and etymology, through its use in antiquity, through authority in its use by orators and historians, through custom where it has the "public

70 In his "Report for the Year 1861," Matthew Arnold suggests that the "true aim of a boy's mental education—to give him the power of doing a thing right" is best followed in grammar by limiting the field, keeping the rules brief and intelligible rather than metaphysical (86-7).

The higher science of grammar is illustrated by Newman in the opening of the Grammar of Assent where an interrogative sentence, a conditional sentence and an assertive sentence introduce the ways we may look at truth, i.e., through questions, through probabilities, through assertions and assents.
stamp," and through the agreement of the educated as opposed to the majority (49). Newman demonstrates through a sample oral exam in the Gazette, later published as "Elementary Studies" in the Idea, the exactness required of students in Latin and Greek grammar. He states that the student will show whether he understands "how the separate portions of a sentence hang together, how they form a whole, how each has its own place in the government of it...the precise meaning of its terms, and what the history of their formation" (250). The examiner’s questions on Xenophon’s account, the Anabasis, focus on the meaning of the single word in the title both from its grammatical sense and from its use in the historical context of a Greek-Persian conflict in Asia Minor. The examiner goes around and around the word "Anabasis," attempting to verify the student’s understanding of its meaning through its derivation, its prefix and root, its relation to its verbal form. He questions the implications of the prefix, ana (up), in the context of the movement of Alexander’s troops in Asia Minor, asking the student for geographical information about the countries along the coastline that the troops passed, about the historical background to the conflict, the name of the Persian King, the extent of his domain, the date and manner of Persia’s conquest of Asia Minor. The single word "affords matter for a sufficient examination of a youth in grammar, history, and geography" (251). Without this collateral information of chronology and geography, as Newman remarked in the Preface to the Idea, "History...is otherwise little better than a storybook" (xlv). Similarly, the narrowness of grammar is avoided through the complementary study of history and geography.

Following this same principle, in his defense of humanist learning at Oxford, Dr. Copleston maintained the fundamental importance of one discipline being completed by another: by "grouping and combination" they intertwine with and support each other (Idea, 131). Underlying this humanist approach is the assumption of a unified intelligible universe. Newman states in Discourse iii that while "sciences are complete in their own idea and for their own respective purposes," in fact, one science is the completion and correction of others; "they at once need and subserve each other" (38).

In both the Greek grammar exam and the Latin exam which follows, the study is laborious, methodical, and exact. In the Latin exam, the student is asked to compare Cicero’s usage with that of Virgil, to identify whom Cicero corresponds with in his letter, and to note the tone in the letter through a comparison of Latin and English equivalents. In both exams, grammar, or "the art of using words properly," is examined through the nuances of language, awareness of roots and cognates, and through analyzing how a particular writer in a specific context gives shape to his meaning through words.
Quintilian’s method for the study of the poets required a similar detailed analysis of texts. He explains that "the grammarian must attend also to minor points....after taking a verse to pieces, he may require the parts of speech to be specified, and the peculiarities of the feet....It is likewise useful, among the first rudiments of instruction, to show in how many senses each word may be understood" (66-7).

In this humanist tradition, both Quintilian and Newman perceive education as a progressive cycle or course. This view also proceeds from the first principle which assumes a connected, intelligible universe. In the first issue of the Gazette, Newman states that education "is the same in kind from the first to the last" (5); it is based on fixed principles, building up, part by part, methodically, towards a definite end. He explains that the purpose of an entrance exam is to ensure that students can profit from lectures by having an elementary knowledge on which to build. If there were a desultory approach to education, there would be no such need for an entrance exam. Similarly, successfully mastering Book 1 of Euclid enables the student to progress to the next Book. Failure to master fractions before studying square roots will lead to frustration (7). In a later article (May 3, 1855), Newman remarks that, conversely, delaying progress is misguided; one thousand sums in long division do not advance further than one hundred (431). In like manner, Newman advises that merely to read the classics without mastering any of them is not only useless but hurtful (Idea, 255). Quintilian complains of advancing boys to the study of rhetoric before the foundation has been laid. He states that the grammarians...do not deem it sufficient to have taken what has been left them...but encroach even upon...suasory speeches. Hence...it has happened, that what was the first business of the one art has become the last of the other, and that boys of an age to be employed in higher departments of study remain sunk in the lower school, and practice rhetoric under the grammarian (89).

As Quintilian’s student progresses to the study of rhetoric, he proceeds "by degrees to higher efforts." This includes the typically literary way of weighing issues and understanding matters through comparing things which F.R. Leavis describes as mapping out patterns of one concrete and another and Adrian J. Boekraad depicts as reasoning from wholes to wholes.71 Quintilian refers for example to "Theses, which are drawn from the comparison of things, as

71 In The Personal Conquest of Truth, Adrian J. Boekraad describes Newman’s sense of the deeply personal way truth is grasped in the concrete. He remarks on the increasing rejection of tradition in Newman’s period, the depersonalizing of thought, the neglect of the "more subtle activities of the mind" (74) as in reasoning from wholes to wholes. He notes that personally mastering truth requires labour, effort and time and is grown into; he refers to the incommunicableness and uniqueness of the person whose humanity lies in freely possessing truth.
whether a country or city life is more desirable, and whether the merit of a lawyer or a soldier is the greater" (103).

Similarly, Newman states that in the exam for the classical exhibition, through a "painstaking and accurate manipulation of...ordinary materials" (Gazette, 96) the student might be asked to compare Horace and Virgil on the same subject, such as country houses, or to examine similes learned from Homer by Virgil. As before, students may be asked to explain the mythology, history, and philosophy connected to certain passages as one branch of learning sheds light on another. Newman states that the questions are to elicit the student's taste or literary judgment and his power of criticism.

Newman's sample of a poorly written English composition as one way of explaining expectations for the entrance exam also follows a traditional humanist method of instruction. Quintilian remarks:

Nor is it without advantage, indeed, that inelegant and faulty speeches—yet such as many, from depravity of taste, would admire—should be read before boys, and that it should be known how many expressions in them are inappropriate, obscure, timid, or, mean, affected or effeminate" (108).

The original composition entitled "Fortune Favors the Brave" follows the traditional humanist method of a pupil in the later stages of the first subject of the trivium in which, after "reworking the ideas of other men," he uses "his own ideas in the amplification of weighty aphorisms (sententiae) and in the development of maxims (chriae)" (xv). The training in thought in these compositions is similar to that used in the declamations in the more advanced stages of rhetoric. In the fictitious court case (contraversia) or the imaginary political or deliberative problem (suasoria), the persuasive arrangement follows the pattern of the organon described by Newman in the Grammar in which converging probabilities are made personally persuasive.

In original composition, whether Latin or English, Newman emphasizes the connection between thought and word, the two-fold logos in the broad field of literature which contrasts with the scientific use of language to represent things. In the character of Mr. Black, Newman offers this advice to students: "The rule is, first think, and then write: don't write when you have nothing to say; or, if you do, you will make a mess of it." He suggests that if the student is not trained to use words as the shadow of his thought, then as an adult called upon to make a speech or write a letter for the papers, "he will look out for flowers, full-blown flowers, figures, smart expressions, trite quotations, hackneyed beginnings and endings, pompous circumlocutions...but the meaning, the essence, the solid sense, the foundation, you may hunt the slipper long enough before you catch it" ("Elementary Studies," Idea, 270-1). Quintilian, while not referring directly to this issue, quotes Horace's view from the Ars poetica on the connec-
tion between eloquence and truth: "verbaque provisam, rem non invita sequentur" (And words, not unwilling, will follow provided matter)." 72

The use of words by the student, shaping word to thought, was the essential idea of rhetorical training. In "Old Mr. Black's confession of his search after a Latin style," Newman recounts how his own study of Latin was a labour of years that "came to nothing" until he realized that it did not consist in memorizing Ciceronian language without knowing why it was good or in collecting good phrases, but in an analysis of the structure peculiar to the language, to the "idea of Latinity" as different from English, as well as to a sense of language used by an individual to express his own thought. Mastery of the Latin language involved an awareness of patterns in structure and idiomatic expression as the way word expresses thought in another tongue. From this central starting point or idea he was then able to make Cicero's writings "the materials of an induction" and form "a science of Latinity—with its principles and peculiarities, their connection and their consequences." He states that "rules and remarks...in works on composition, had not led me to master the idea," explaining that his new understanding of Latin structures and their use came from the example of modern lectures in Latin delivered by the Oxford Professor of Poetry to express his own thought in his own style for a particular audience, thus involving "a new development and application" of the powers of the language.73

The entrance exams in Latin and English composition test the personal connection between thought and word. Newman states that the exhibition exams in Latin and in English composition test how the student has thought over what he has read; it is not a question of memory, or quickness of apprehension, but of thoughtfully disposing of a few questions in which one branch of learning throws light on another (Gazette, Aug. 17, 1854, 96). It is especially in composition that truth converges from various quarters in a kind of magnetic field. Newman's description of the expectations in composition resembles the criterion for the Oriel Fellowship exam which he tried in 1822, writing a composition on "Know Thyself". Dwight Culler cites Mark Pattison's description of this exam as posing the perennial problems of

72 Quintilian, 35.
73 "Elementary Studies," Idea, 276-7). In 1822 as preparation for his Oriel exam, Newman read these lectures by Edward Copleston in the Quarterly Review, 1811. c.f. Ker, Idea, 645.
morals and logic in such a way that "a candidate, who had thought more than he had read, was inevitably impelled to pour out his very self upon it." 74

Newman’s preamble to the grammar exam in Greek follows the humanist tradition in the importance given to the exact use of language. Newman refers to the misty, inexact use of language in public meetings where speakers declaim about "large and enlightened views" or about "freedom of conscience"; or about "the Gospel," or any other popular subject of the day" (Idea, 248). In a memorable passage in Sesame and Lilies, Ruskin also refers to words used without definite meaning and without a sense of their Latin and Greek roots. He refers to

masked words droning and skulking about us in Europe just now,—(there never were so many, owing to the spread of a shallow, blotching, blundering, infectious "information," or rather deformation, everywhere, and to the teaching of catechisms and phrases at school instead of human meanings).

Ruskin continues, stating that these chameleon words "which nobody understands, but which everybody uses" are more deadly than poisoners. "Whatever fancy or favourite instinct a man most cherishes, he gives to his favorite masked word to take care of for him. The word at last comes to have an infinite power over him,—you cannot get at him but by its ministry" (66).

In the tradition of Plato, Isocrates, and Quintilian, Newman also values for its formative value the training in deductive thought through a study of geometry. Isocrates praises the study of mathematics as an abstract and difficult study that exercises and sharpens the mind, habituating it to sustained work.75 Quintilian refers to the commonly accepted respect for geometry in the early years of education as people "allow that the thinking powers are excited, and the intellect sharpened by it, and that a quickness of perception is thence produced" (77). Newman remarks in the Gazette (May 3, 1855) that nations of intellectual excellence gave a conspicuous place to geometry in their course of study (430). He commends mathematics for disciplining the mind through developing the judgment and reasoning powers (Gazette, 102); he speaks of the "exercise in logical precision...to understand and enunciate the proof of any of the more difficult propositions of Euclid" (Idea, 378). He describes geometry as encouraging thought and the habit of connecting principles to facts; the mind is compelled to understand in order to arrive at the fact disclosed. He states that in geometry we are thrown more on our

74 Culler, Imperial Intellect, 26, 34.

75 Marrou, 127.

In Discourse vi, Newman remarks that the development of moral habits is a condition of a boy’s acquisition of knowledge: "the moral habits, which are a boy’s praise, encourage and assist this result; that is, diligence, assiduity, regularity, despatch, persevering application; for these are the direct conditions of acquisition, and naturally lead to it" (97).
own resources and our ingenuity is more taxed because we proceed less by fixed rules (Gazette, 431). It is because the purpose of geometry is to make the individual an acute thinker that geometry should be studied before algebra which he describes as a labour saving instrument which can work out geometric conclusions, operating by rule like a machine or long division (431). He notes that Cambridge had temporarily replaced the method of geometry with modern mathematics and algebra but had decided to return to geometry (431).

Quintilian, like Newman in his observations on Mr. Brown's rambling composition, also observes the connection between reasoning in geometry and eloquence in composition. He asks: "Order, in the first place, is necessary in geometry, and is it not also necessary in eloquence? Geometry proves what follows from what precedes, what is unknown from what is known, and do we not draw similar conclusions in speaking?" (78). The connection between the science of logic and deductive reasoning in geometry is also made. Quintilian states: "you may find more persons to say that geometry is allied to logic than that it is allied to rhetoric." Although orators occasionally prove their points logically, in syllogism or enthymeme, geometry and oratory are connected in that both involve proof: "of all proofs, the strongest are what are called geometrical demonstrations—and what does oratory make its object more indisputably than proof?" (78). Similarly, in the annual report submitted for the year 1856-1857, Dr. Dunne, Professor of Logic at the University, complains of the lack of logical training in the students, suggesting that the study of Euclid's geometry concurrently with metaphysics would keep their minds in form.76 Even in his own preparation for the Oriel fellowship exam (1822), although Latin composition was the principal thing and "a metaphysical turn ...a great advantage," Newman made the study of mathematics "his principal subject" because of the general strength it imparts to the mind.77

The importance of theoria, of ideas and principles is evident in Newman's explanation to candidates for a scholarship (exhibition) in mathematics who are expected to demonstrate that they have mastered not only the rules and operations of algebra or arithmetic but also the principles of the rules (Gazette, Aug. 17, 1854, 101-2). In general, the value attributed to the study of mathematics in the humanist tradition is a measure of its distinctness from empirical educational theory. In the Grammar, Newman distinguishes between knowledge obtained directly by sense, and knowledge obtained indirectly by reasoning from previous knowledge. He refers to the sciences of geometry, algebra, and logic as records "of the system of objective

76 My Campaign in Ireland, 195.

77 Autobiographical Writings, 59-61.
truth" and as making available rules for interpreting its phenomena (211). Newman sees geometry as developing individual judgment through reasoning logically from principles known through a common heritage. By contrast, Rousseau holds up as an ideal Robinson Crusoe and the noble savage who meet the material challenges in the contingencies of the day. Emile's occupation is to be a skilled cabinet worker whose mind is attuned to matter. Newman's graduate is to be a gentleman of philosophic habit whose discerning judgment distinguishes the confusion of methods and principles in the issues of his period.

The value accorded to memory also distinguishes the humanist tradition from empirical educational practice and the monopoly of the inductive method. Quintilian states that in the early stages of education memory "is almost the only faculty that can be improved by the aid of teachers" (18). In the later stages, during the study of rhetoric pupils "will accustom themselves to the best compositions, and they will always have in their memories something which they may imitate, and will, even without being aware, reproduce that fashion of style which they have deeply impressed upon their minds" (114). 78 Newman observes that in the earlier years of education, before a student can exercise reason on knowledge and because the memory "is one of the first developed of the mental faculties," learning involves an active storing up of things in the memory, imbibing information of every kind but in a way that is relatively external (Idea, 96). In the Grammar, Newman refers to a child memorizing a passage from The Merchant of Venice although yet incapable of understanding its meaning. In the Preface to the Idea, Newman also recommends metrical composition for the student reading poetry in these preparatory years "in order to stimulate his powers into action in every practicable way, and to prevent a merely passive reception of images and ideas which in that case are likely to pass out of the mind as soon as they have entered it" (xlv).

Newman's sample entrance exams test the student's acquisition of facts, especially in areas like history. The entrance exam in ancient history is largely factual in an effort to ensure not only that the philosophic habit of mind has something to build on, but also to obviate the frustration expressed by the Professor of Ancient History in the annual report of 1856-7 in

78 In reference to the difficulty of reading Shakespeare, Newman also raises the issue of the education of the masses. Matthew Arnold remarks on the paucity of vocabulary in the school children in his inspectorate. In his report for 1874, he notes that in a school of seventy children, not one knew the meaning of the word "feeble" (155). In his report for 1878, he praises the formative power of memorizing poetry as "acting by itself and in a way managed by nature, not through the instrumentality of that somewhat terrible character, the scientific educator." But he cautions that recitation is futile unless "the meaning of what is recited is thoroughly learnt and known" (187).
which he states that his students were unaware of "such elementary truths as that Jerusalem is not in Africa."\(^7^9\) The seven years of plenty, as Newman characterizes the earlier years of education when the memory is retentive (Idea, 96), are tested in questions involving the dating of a list of events, or naming and dating the principal colonies of Greece in Southern Italy and Sicily, drawing a map of Rome, defining terms like *imperator* and *consul*.

The importance to the student of memory is also indicated in an article Newman wrote for the *Gazette* entitled "On Artificial Memory" (Jan. 11, 1855, Feb. 1, 1855). Here he remarks that different minds retain different things, some having a capacity for poetry and others for facts "corresponding to reality" (324). He refers to different techniques for remembering: Cicero's use of concrete objects, such as an anchor, and places, such as rooms in a house, to remember ideas; and a recent technique which Newman suggests may involve an intellectual juggling of truths at the expense of the imagination (267-8). James J. Murphy observes that memory, as one of the five parts of rhetoric along with invention, arrangement, elocution, and delivery, included both natural and artificial means of recall.\(^8^0\)

The value of memory and the personal retention of knowledge in the literary humanist tradition contrasts with "scientific," empirical educational theory which recognizes only the method of observation and experiment. The diminishing importance accorded to memory is apparent in *The Advancement of Learning*. Bacon stated that the collective accumulations of scientific observations of nature were to be tabled in writing. Macaulay whose own memory was prodigious, points out that Bacon set little value on the "powers of the memory" because "without the help of writing," we "can do little towards the advancement of any useful science" (419-20). He suggests that Plato accorded less value to writing because without it "[m]en would have been compelled to exercise the understanding and the memory, and, by deep and assiduous meditation, to make truth thoroughly their own" (419). Matthew Arnold's comments as poet and school inspector contrast the empirical method with the old literary method considered valuable particularly in the early years of education. He states in his report of 1878: "Learning by heart is often called, disparagingly, learning by *rote*, and is treated as an old-fashioned, unintelligent exercise, and a waste of time" (186). He states in the same report that the scientific teachers of pedagogy recommend the disuse of "'rule-teaching'" in favour of teaching things "'in the concrete instead of in the abstract,'" following Pestalozzi's ideas of the "'natural process of mental evolution'" (189). Arnold comments that the "worst of such doc-

\(^7^9\) *My Campaign in Ireland*, 202.

\(^8^0\) Preface to *Early Education of the Citizen-Orator*, 8.
trines is that everything depends upon the practical application given to them, and it seems so easy to give a practical application which is erroneous" (189). He gives as an example a teacher holding up an apple in a gallery to a group of little children for their personal observation, saying: "An apple has a stalk, peel, pulp, core, pips, and juice; it is odorous and opaque, and is used for making a pleasant drink called cider" (189).81

Arnold's own formation in the humanist tradition of nineteenth-century English Public Schools like Rugby was based on a concept of human nature which considered happiness and dignity to reside in what in Culture and Anarchy he calls "sweetness and light." This ideal was based on the two-fold logos, on the transmission of the best of what has been thought and said. The view of an intelligible universe accessible to mankind, as well as the retention of methods long associated with the Greek paideia, stand in contrast to the philosophical materialism of the Baconian school and its recognition of a single method based on observation and experiment.

The empirical orientation towards the visual and external contrasts with the humanist oral orientation towards retaining the perennial. In The Advancement of Learning, Bacon points out that science advances in time: useful knowledge, such as sailing and printing where "many wits and industries have contributed in one," has been refined over time. On the other hand, knowledge where the "wit of some one" is involved, such as that of Aristotle, if "exempted from liberty of examination," will not "ascend higher than the level of the first springhead from whence it descendeth" (30). Arnold, for his part, defends the old rhetorical method as a "lesson of which the subject matter is not talked about, as in too many of our elementary schools, but learnt ("General Report for 1861," 88).82 He praises the recitation of

81 Similarly, in Dicken's Hard Times, Bitzer's definition of a horse in the Gradgrind school of "facts" is based on learning through external observation. Bitzer states that a horse is a "Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too..." (3).

82 The unsuitability of the method of observation and experiment to other areas is suggested by many commentators. In "Newman and Science," Harrold M. Petitpas remarks that literature and religion suffer most from the application of scientific method (503).

Because "a personal, real, literary, human" approach is suited to theology and to humanistic sciences," in "Educational Method: Educating for Real Life" H. Francis Davis notes the importance in the teaching of religion of the illative sense, i.e., the personal exercise of judgment that spontaneously grasps an originating idea by viewing it from various sides (110-11). Charles Dessain suggests that in the teaching of religion there is some wisdom in simply allowing the illative sense of the student to work on the concrete in the Scripture, the lives of the saints, and in Church history rather than engaging in logical argumentation ("Cardinal Newman and the Theory and Practice of Knowledge. The Purpose of the Grammar of Assent, 14).
poetry as having a "formative power," enlarging pupils' vocabulary. In the humanist tradition of the two-fold logos, he adds that "with their vocabulary their circles of ideas" is also increased (188). For Newman, knowledge personally retained by an active memory in the earlier "years of plenty" was later truly made one's own in ideas reached through the exercise of reason on it.

Training in a rhetorical mode of thought which continued into the nineteenth century through the teaching methods of the classics was being eroded. Newman includes an extract in the Gazette of an article from the University of Turin which suggests a movement in education away from language, literature, and religion along with the methods associated with them. The article complains of the abandonment of Greek and Latin for a more popular and commercial education, creating "an infinity of methods of instruction," one more difficult and dangerous than the other, each person being at liberty to teach "what he pleases and as he pleases," providing neither Latin nor religion enter into it (262). Similarly, an article on "Public Instruction in Belgium" provokes comment on the proliferation of subjects on the continent, on abridgments and manuals that pretend to teach everything replacing a profound knowledge of a few great works which are the sources of literature and science. Because of the attention paid to form rather than matter, a glossary is needed to understand public debate on education in Belgium. The suggestion is made that at least ideas borrowed from the old traditional education which produced the mighty scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries might be "engrafted on the less fruitful tree which now occupies its soil" (340).

Unlike the inductive method of the experimental sciences which abstracts from particulars, the rhetorical method sought what Newman called the real, i.e., a knowledge of the concrete or particular, the full circumstances of an historical event clustered around an idea, for

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83 David Whalen comments in The Consolation of Rhetoric that in the rhetorical tradition "imitation was regarded as the earliest and most natural way to learn" but that "[e]ducational mimesis was not meant to inculcate a slavish copying of the master, but to trigger the assimilative powers of the soul, to initiate, as Augustine notes, a cumulative comprehension of manners and matters" (61). James J. Murphy observation that Augustine's view of language as evocative, conveying only a small measure of a speaker's thought, excludes in education the possibility of the passive transfer of knowledge. Rhetoric in the Middle Ages (288-9). In the Idea, Newman complains of the passive mode in education in which there is nothing individual: "What the steam engine does with matter, the printing press is to do with mind" (108).

84 In his reflections on Newman's Idea of a University, James M. Cameron refers to our contemporary "debased rhetoric that goes with much public talk about education" (33). He describes this discourse as "para-sense" or a seeming sense, as a solemn pantomime, and an acceptance of unreality. His examples of "parasense" illustrate the loss of connection between word and thought in the "two-fold logos" (On the Idea of a University, 33-34, 48-52).
example, or the ideas of a writer emerging through an exact reading and connection of part with part. Hans-Georg Gadamer contrasts this rhetorical tradition as a way of knowing the particular or concrete with the method of the social sciences and experimental science which corroborates "a regularity from which predictions can in turn be made."85 The rhetorical mode seeks to make words real, as David Whalen suggests in "John Henry Newman: the Rhetoric of the Real."86 Edward Sillem is also describing this rhetorical mode of thought in his description of Newman's goal of "effecting the closest possible union between the self and the real things he knows" (11). The characteristics of the rhetorical mode of connecting ideas to their development are expressed in the dictum "a little, but well" ("Elementary Studies," Idea, 251), in Newman's advice to professors to narrow their field of inquiry, and to students to made good their ground as they proceed.87

In addition to the traditional humanist subjects of Greek and Latin, the liberal education of students at the Catholic University of Dublin included science, modern language and literature, and religious knowledge. In an article in the Gazette (Dec. 14, 1854), Newman anticipates for the first year students what they might expect by the end of their second year. He indicates that the examinations will include literary, scientific, and religious studies. While it is impossible to study all branches of knowledge, Newman ensures that a liberal education will include a few from different areas of learning studied carefully according to their different methods. At the end of the second year, students were to be examined in Religious Knowledge and in a book from three of the following: a Greek text, a Latin text, one science, and one modern language and literature. The word "science" does not refer to a subject-matter but to methodical reasoning from the perspective of principles or ideas. "Science" corresponds to "philosophy" in the title of the School of Philosophy and Letters and contrasts to rhetorical

85 Truth and Method, 6.

86 In "John Henry Newman: the Rhetoric of the Real," David Whalen suggests that in religious understanding it is through less talk or less explanation that the individual is able to "make something one's own, inwardly, and to bring the object of thought into a state of apprehension immediate and imaginatively striking" (228). In Religion and Imagination, John Coulson remarks that to explain or to state plainly is a modern need. He refers by contrast to the simultaneous meaning of words and metaphors in literature and religion which convey all their separate meanings at once, enlarging our sense of reality and reordering it. He suggests that literature does not break with the past even when society claims to have done so; it conserves what philosophers and theologians have lost the art to verify.

87 In his introduction to Quintilian's Early Education of the Citizen-Orator, James J. Murphy states that Newman's principle of "a little, but well" is in the tradition of rhetorical education transmitted through Quintilian (xxv).
reasoning in letters which involves arrangement around rather than from a centre. The selection in the sciences includes eight categories: Philosophy, Criticism, History, Geography, Chronology, Mathematics, Logic, and Modern Science. Because these subject areas are studied as the matter of sciences in a liberal education, the samples of books that might be studied include works related to the idea of the subject itself or to principles within it; this is in keeping with Newman’s definition of a liberal education as involving the understanding of principles in order to cultivate a philosophic habit of mind that characteristically pushes things up to first principles and is useful in all professions. The texts in Modern Science include Whewell’s History of the Inductive Sciences and his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, books intended to provide an understanding of method. To encourage an understanding of principles, the texts for Mathematics include Doctrine of Curves; the category of Logic includes Murray’s Compendium of Logic; Geography includes Adam’s Summary of Geography and History; History includes Bossuet’s Universal History and Schlegel’s Philosophy of History; Criticism includes Horace’s Art of Poetry, Cicero’s de Oratore or Orator, and Burke on the Sublime and the Beautiful; Philosophy includes Fénélon On the Existence of God and the Bridgewater Treatises which deal with scientific evidence of religion. Because some of the books were in Latin or Greek, the same text could be presented as the matter for science and as a Latin or Greek book and for science. The broad range of material within the various categories also allowed for differences in interests and talents among the students who were all to follow this program for two years before specializing, entering other faculties, or beginning their careers. Several different combinations are suggested and the observation is made "that the list can be adapted to the classical student, the ecclesiastic, or those who are intended for engineering, for business, etc.."^{88}

The importance Newman accorded to physical science is evident in his attempts to establish it as a separate Faculty, although this met with little success.^{89} In the Report of 1856-

^{88} Gazette, 227. Quintilian observes regarding different talents that it "is generally, and not without reason, regarded as an excellent quality in a master to observe accurately the differences of ability in those whom he has undertaken to instruct, and to ascertain in what direction the nature of each particularly inclines him." He continues: "It has also been thought advantageous by most teachers to instruct each pupil in such a manner as to foster by learning the good qualities inherited from nature" (116).

^{89} Fergal McGrath points out that in "Oxford, the commissioner of 1850 had just given a definite status to scientific studies by the setting up of a School of Mathematics and Physical Sciences. Prior to that reform, the study of the natural sciences had been little better than an elegant pastime" (330).
57 in My Campaign in Ireland, the Dean of the Faculty of Science reported that he had consulted universities in France, Belgium, and Austria in order to set up a program. The Report for 1857-58 drawn up by the Professors of science urged the immediate establishment of Chairs of Botany and Zoology, of Geology and Mineralogy, and the fitting up of a scientific laboratory. The Atlantis was established in 1857 as a university journal to advertise the University and publically establish it, to encourage scientific labours and to form the faculty, making its members work together. In March, 1858, Newman refers to the Atlantis as giving scope to Professors of science who as yet had no classes. An attempt to establish a Faculty of Civil Engineering also met with little success. However, Newman did establish an observatory and the Medical School prospered. In the Report of 1856-57, Newman indicates that there were forty-three students in the Medical School for which he had acquired facilities, a five thousand volume library from Munich, and a chemistry laboratory.

The modern languages and literatures at the University included French, Italian, Spanish, and English. In "Newman and Literature," Jeremiah J. Hogan remarks that when Newman established a Chair of English at the Catholic University of Ireland, there were no others except at King’s College, London, and in Scotland. Hogan states that Thomas Arnold, whom Newman hired as Professor of English, wrote a History of English Literature which was a model for all subsequent manuals (177). Newman’s criterion for the selection of texts for the English Literature course was in the humanist tradition in which language was of primary importance. Authors were selected who shaped the English language including Milton, Addison, and Gibbon. In "English Catholic Literature," published in the Gazette in August and September, 1854, Newman describes how the style of the literature of England, of Shakespeare, the Prayer Book, Swift, Pope, Gibbon, and Johnson has become part of the familiar idiom of English; it "has seized upon the public mind...and...is a living voice...which daily thrills upon our ears and syllables our thoughts...and dictates when we put pen to paper"

90 The title of this journal echoes Bacon’s New Atlantis. It was intended in part as a forum for the exchange of scientific information linking the University with other learned bodies. In confirmation of Newman’s views on the difference between the scientific and the literary use of language, the relative brevity of the scientific articles led to supplementing the periodical with literary contributions.

Wilfred Ward describes the purpose of the Atlantis (Life, vol. 1, 429-30).

91 c.f., Fergal McGrath, 368-73. In "Newman and His Medical School," William Doolin describes the evolving state of medical studies in the period, the acquisition of the Cecilia Street property that became the medical school of the Catholic University of Ireland, and the success of the School. In "Newman and Science," T.S. Wheeler refers to Newman’s attempt to develop applied science at the University as well as liberal studies (192).
(234). In the Grammar, Newman gives some suggestion of how English literature should be taught. He refers to the "question whether it is any advantage to read Shakespeare except with the care and pains which a classic demands, and whether he is in fact read at all by those whom such critical exactness offends" (219). On the other hand, as Anthony Kearney illustrates in "T.H. Huxley and the Oxford English School," when English was established as a subject in the subsequent decades at Oxford, complaints were made by people such as T.H. Huxley that it was studied from the narrow perspective of philology rather than as literature.

In religious knowledge, by the end of their second year students were expected to have an exact knowledge of a larger Catechism and the four Gospels, with a general knowledge of ancient history, chronology, geography, and principles of composition. Here too the need to approach a subject from various quarters is apparent. In Biblical knowledge, they might know "some general facts about the canon of Holy Scripture, its history...the languages of Scripture, the contents of its separate books..." ("Elementary Studies," Idea, 282). In Church history, they might know "its great eras...the list of its Fathers...what language St. Ephraim wrote in...[w]ho were the Nestorians...who the Albigenses...something about the Benedictines, Dominicans..." (282). His definition of Truth in the Idea as "facts and their relations" (33), and the root meaning of "intelligent" as "inter between, within + legere to bring together, choose, read, etc." express the purpose of the courses in Religious Knowledge, as well as in other courses. Newman's practicality is evident in his insistence that students write an exam in this subject, stating that if Religious Knowledge "is to have a real place in their course of study, it must enter into the examinations in which that course results; for nothing will be found to impress and occupy their minds but such matters as they have to present to their Examiners" ("Elementary Studies," 280).

Because personal faith in God and religious formation belong to the separate province of the Church, as Newman strongly maintained in the "Tamworth Reading Room," the role of the University in this area of liberal education is simply to provide general religious knowledge. Newman seeks to provide lay students with an intelligent, connected outline of their religion, a general, factual overview which implicit religious belief itself does not necessarily entail.92 Newman describes the religion courses as "Christian knowledge in what may be called

92 In the Grammar of Assent, Newman undertakes to show that we can believe what we cannot explain.

In "The Mission of St. Benedict," Newman refers to the three phases of Christian education. In the first "poetic" phase, represented by the Benedictines, religious belief does not involve comparisons which were the foundation of the second "philosophic" phase represented by the Dominicans. The religious education that Newman seeks to provide belongs to this second phase but as a theology for the laity. The third phase of Christian education, represented by St. Ignatius Loyola, indicates the "apostolic" life Newman hoped the educated laity would
its secular aspect, as it is practically useful in the intercourse of life and in general conversation" ("Elementary Studies," Idea, 283). In "Newman and the Laity," Paul Chavasse refers to Newman's controversial article in the Rambler (July, 1859) where he maintained the vital importance to the Church of the laity, both educated and uneducated. Newman stated that the educated laity, engaged in worldly affairs and intellectually disciplined, should also have a clear conviction of revealed doctrine. The educated laity were not to be reduced to implicit faith, nor was indifference to religion to be encouraged either by dealing with subjects removed from their "real" belief or by imposing doctrines without indicating their roots in the tenets of Christianity (56-64).

In My Campaign in Ireland, Newman begins by describing the purpose of the Catholic University of Ireland as not only providing a professional and liberal education to various classes of the community but also as providing students with philosophical defences of Catholicity and Revelation, of influencing the general education of Ireland and of giving a Catholic tone to society. The purpose of the courses in Religious Knowledge is also suggested elsewhere. In "Newman's Catechism in a Pluralistic Age," Günter Biemer states that Newman learned from his study of the Early Church that catechisms enabled Christians through an understanding of God's economy to "identify elements of truth in other philosophical and religious systems within a pluralistic society" (111) or wayward trends within their own. The catechism in the Early Church was a "qualification for the battle between orthodox and heretical representatives" (111). That this faculty of discriminating the truth in religious positions was also Newman's view is evident in his "Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England addressed to the Brothers of the Oratory" (summer, 1851). Here, as Biemer points

lead. Essays and Sketches, vol. 3.

In Ecrits Autobiographiques, Newman refers to this desire to improve the intellectual position of Catholics (394, 396). This, too, is part of his rationale for a general religious education which will put the students on a par with Protestants in their community.


94 In The Life of John Henry Newman (vol. 1), Wilfred Ward describes Newman's view of the need for an educated laity which led to his support of The Rambler in the years immediately following his rectorship in Dublin. Newman writes: "The great point is to open men's minds, to educate them and make them logical. It does not matter what the subject-matter is...If you make them think in politics, you will make them think in religion" (505). Ward refers to Newman's sense of the urgent need which was not perceived by the Bishops for "educating Christians and making them able to understand the bearings of their own theology and hold their faith intelligently in a secularist civilisation" (495).
out, Newman states that he expected the laity "to enter into their religion,...to know their creed,...to understand how faith and reason stand out to each other." The need for both intellectual and religious clarity in the educated middle class is also expressed by Newman towards the end of the Apologia where he speaks of the bewilderment caused by the "enlargement of the circle of secular knowledge" in his age and of the need to meet the question of adjusting "the respective claims of revelation and of natural science" (335). A long series of articles in the Gazette featured a description of the courses offered by the Jesuit College in Rome. Newman describes as superb their course in philosophy which not only informs students of current philosophies but examines their weaknesses.

Günter Biemer observes the similarities between Newman's views on religious instruction and catechesis in the early Church. From the Arians of the Fourth Century, he notes Newman's admiration for the continuous path or systematic method of religious instruction found in the Early Church, particularly in the Church of Alexandria. Here, Newman wrote of the catechumens receiving "elementary information" as "correct outlines" of the Christian message for a real "grounding in faith" (Biemer, 110). The guideline of the Oral Apostolic Tradition found in the Creed was balanced with the Written Tradition in "reading Holy Scripture where the truths of Christianity are contained in a more unsystematic but living shape" (120). That this had also been Newman's own approach is confirmed in the Apologia where he describes making "a collection of Scripture texts in proof of the doctrine "of the Holy Trinity and drawing up "a series of texts in support of each verse of the Athanasian Creed" before he was sixteen (128).

Newman believed that the personal element in teaching was very important, particularly in inindemonstrable matters. In "Newman and Lonergan," Carla Mae Streeter speaks of the demise of culture without personal thought (182). In "The Personalist Epistemology of John

95 Biemer, 112.

96 Marrou provides an example from St. Chrysostom of the way fathers can lead their sons and mothers their daughters to intelligible connections in the stories of Scripture: after a child has retained the stories of Abel and Cain and Essau and Jacob, presented initially as the stories of two families, the parent would on another occasion ask for the recitation of the "story of the two brothers." If the child began with Cain and Abel, the parent would ask for the story of the other two brothers without giving the names, but sketching a few important details of the story. The child would fill in the story and the parent would continue it (417).

97 Bernard Lonergan, whose own method is indebted to Newman, has emphasized the importance of the knower which is dropped in the scientific method. He discusses this, for example, in "Self-affirmation of the Knower," in Chapter 11 of Insight.
Henry Newman, Mary Katherine Tillman remarks that secular reason is not of a personal nature and she speaks of the need for reason to return to its home in the human person. He concludes his remarks on "General Religious Knowledge" with the reservation: "Whatever students read in the province of Religion, they read, and would read from the very nature of the case, under the superintendence, and with the explanations, of those who are older and more experienced than themselves" (Idea, 285). In all subjects, not only can the teacher match an idea to the student's experience, but through a grasp of the principle of a discipline, the teacher can more readily teach to the student the relation of particular parts to the controlling idea. This instruction will not lack, like Buckland's lecture at Oxford in 1819 on the fledgling science of geology, a "consistent and luminous theory" connecting the enumeration of facts.

As Mary Katherine Tillman remarks in "The Tension Between Intellectual and Moral Education in the Thought of John Henry Newman," the notional is translated into the real in both the moral and intellectual orders through the personal influence of teachers and others who allow us to see as they have seen.

The role of the teacher in this personal way of learning belongs to a long rhetorical tradition. Marrou refers to the deep personal influence exercised by teachers in the schools of Athens on small groups of students; indeed this personal influence was fundamental and there could be no real teaching without it. David Whalen refers to the triad of "teacher, author, and conversation" to effect understanding in the rhetorical tradition. The similarity between Newman's view of the personal way an individual knows objective truth and the views of the Church Fathers is evident in parallels to St. Augustine (354-430). Newman's statement in the Grammar that "there is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony born to truth

98 Autobiographical Writings, 54-5.

99 Marrou states: "Isocrate a su...exercer sur ses disciples cette influence personnelle et profonde sans laquelle il n'est pas d'action pédagogique réelle" (129).

100 The Consolation of Rhetoric, 78.

101 At nineteen, Augustine was stirred by the reading of a now lost treatise of Cicero to pursue philosophy and the vita contemplativa. Augustine was a teacher of rhetoric in Carthage, Rome, and Milan prior to his conversion. Three of his works, De doctrina christiana, De magistro, De catechizandis rudibus deal with the nature of learning. Like Newman, Augustine's thought was personal rather than systematic. Sillem remarks in The Philosphic Notebook that "Newman's love for the Fathers was the direct outcome of his conviction that a person embodies in his life and personal habits of thinking the truth he holds in an inward personal vision of concrete things in a way no argument, process of reasoning or abstract system can possibly do" (vol. 1, 95).
by the mind itself" (275) is in the vein of Augustine as well as Socrates and Aristotle. Like Socrates who through a train of questioning led a youth to see that he already knew answers in mathematics, for Augustine too the function of the teacher is to help the pupil discover truth for himself.102 Attentiveness to the "magister interior" or inward teacher, like Newman’s illative sense, enables the pupil, as James J. Murphy suggests, to balance what he hears with his own interior truth.103 While truth is subjective, Augustine also illustrates the objective nature of this knowledge; the individual is led on by a teacher to recognize truths in mathematics and ethics which are accepted by all minds alike.

The personal element in learning has implications for the role of the teacher particularly in areas like religion. In Augustine’s view, the role of the rhetor is as personal as that of the hearer who balances what he hears against his own interior truth. In catechizing, it is through the rhetor’s sensitive use of signs that truth is evoked in the hearer. Just as Aristotle had defined rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion," so Augustine’s catechizer must find the signs that will reveal the particular truth to the learner.104 In catechizing, as in any rhetorical subject, the rhetor must match didactic intent with learning capacity (Murphy, 291). The personal nature of this relationship means that there is "no possible rhetorical technique or skill that can be learned (or taught) that will equip one human heart to speak to another heart" (Murphy, 191). Only the theological virtue of love (caritas) can supply this connection. It is from Augustine that Newman drew his motto as Cardinal: cor ad cor loquitur. Sillem states that because of the personal way in which truth is held for Newman,

we learn to think deeply and seriously when we commune, cor ad cor, with a person we know and understand, who has thought deeply and seriously along the lines on which we are feeling our own way. Such a person makes an abstract argument vivid to us, and enables us to apprehend really what we might otherwise have apprehended only notionally; he makes us refer a system

102 "Meno" in Great Dialogues of Plato, 48-49. In his preface to this work, W.H.D. Rouse explains that "Socrates himself described his object as that of a midwife, to bring other men’s thoughts to birth, to stimulate them to think and to criticise themselves, not to instruct them" (lx). Edward Sillem finds a parallel between Newman and Socrates in their ability to make people re-examine their accepted positions particularly in the light of experience (19).

Aristotle in his Rhetoric states: "The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities" (22).

103 James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, 288.

of ideas to relations between facts and convert a notional gaze into real vision (95).

Quintilian describes the relation between the teacher of rhetoric and his pupil as like that of a parent. He refers to the personal impression made by teachers and their moral influence:

Let him adopt, then, above all things, the feelings of a parent toward his pupils....Let him neither have vices in himself, nor tolerate them in others. Let his austerity not be stern, nor his affability too easy, lest dislike arise from the one, or contempt from the other....Although he may point out to them, in the course of reading, plenty of examples for their imitation, yet the living voice, as it is called, feeds the mind more nutritious—especially the voice of the teacher, whom his pupils, if they are but rightly instructed, both love and reverence (92-3).

Newman's views of the importance of personal instruction is evident in his ideas on the role of the tutor at the University. Fernande Tardivel traces the dispute in the period about the role of the tutor from the quarrel between Oxford and Edinburgh in the Edinburgh Review (1810). In opposition to those who would abandon the collegial system, Dr. Copleston maintained the importance of college tutors. They monitored a student throughout his studies and assured the habit of precision and methodical progress which professional lectures could not provide. Guidance by erudite tutors led inexperienced students towards a depth of knowledge through emphasizing what was important, pointing out subtle allusions in texts, and evaluating the accuracy or the bias in critics. Copleston praised the method of the tutor as the most efficacious way of communicating knowledge in literature, philosophy, and religion.106

Amidst some controversy, when Newman became Tutor at Oriel in 1826, he sought to fill this position in the spirit described by Copleston at the beginning of the previous decade.107 Fernande Tardivel cites the testimony particularly of Newman's students concerning his method. Mark Pattison states that Newman was among those who excited students by teaching them to think and reason from first principles (51); he recalls Newman's rigour in verbal training, remarking that in any exercise Newman's first concern was to ensure that a student understood what he meant to say and the meaning of the words he used. Tom Mozley recol-

105 Tardivel, 33-4. Newman refers to this difference of opinion on colleges and tutors in "Professors and Tutors," Historical Sketches, vol.3.

106 In "Newman and Science," Harrold M. Petitpas remarks that literature and religion suffer most from the application of scientific method (503).

107 Newman discusses the controversy in Autobiographical Writings, 86-107. c.f. also Tardivel, 29-71; Culler, Imperial Intellect, Chapter 3.
lects Newman's comment that in compositions what an author judges to be his best work is often the worst; he also recalls Newman's friendship. F. Rogers, who became Lord Blachford, recalls Newman's astuteness, his lack of bias, the helpfulness of his simple remarks, his attentiveness and generosity with his time. 108

Newman's conviction about the value of the personal element in tutorial methods shaped his views on collegial tutors at the Catholic University of Ireland. As at Oxford, Newman understood the tutor as attending to both the moral and intellectual well-being of students. He considered his role as tutor at Oxford to be pastoral. 109 In the Gazette article later published as "Professors and Tutors" in Historical Sketches, vol. 3, Newman contrasts the system of colleges and college tutors with the impersonal professorial system. 110 The former "was taken to mean a place of residence for the University student, who would there find himself under the guidance and instruction of Superiors and Tutors, bound to attend to his personal interests, moral and intellectual" (182). The tutor offered a steadying influence to the young student in the college house where they both lived. He also supervised his academic work. Newman describes the intellectual benefit of the tutor to the student:

his diligence will be steadily stimulated; he will be kept up to his aim: his progress will be ascertained, and his week's work, like a labourer's, measured. It is not easy for a young man to determine for himself whether he has mastered what he has been taught; a careful catechetical training, and a jealous scrutiny into his power of expressing himself and of turning his knowledge to account, will be necessary, if he is really to profit from the able Professors whom he is attending; and all this he will gain from the College Tutor (190).

Newman favoured even in lectures the active, personal stimulus of what he called the catechetical method, expecting students who had been prepared for the lectures by their tutor to answer questions, gaining an intellectual poise in the process. 111 Newman attributed his own

108 Culler gives examples of the connected and large questions that Newman asked as a tutor. Imperial Intellect, 78.

109 Autobiographical Writings, 95. Fernande Tardivel, 44.

110 Culler contrasts with personal methods Bell's impersonal, utilitarian method of a student dispensing information to large numbers without necessarily understanding it himself. Imperial Intellect, 225.

111 Quintilian writes of this method used for comment on good and poor models of speeches: "Nor will the preceptor be under the obligation merely to teach these things, but frequently to ask questions upon them, and try the judgment of his pupils. Thus carelessness will not come upon them while they listen, nor will the instructions that shall be given fail to enter their ears. Thus, they will at the same time be conducted to the end which is sought in this exercise, namely that they themselves may conceive and understand" (109).
increased confidence at Oxford not only to Dr. Whately but to the "catechetical lectures" on topics in religion in 1823-4 of the Regius Professor of Poetry, Dr. Charles Lloyd of Christ Church. In his Autobiographical Writings, Newman states that attending these lectures helped bring "him out of the shyness and reserve which had at first perplexed his electors" as a Fellow at Oriel (69). With a class of eight students, the scholarly Lloyd "made the lecture catechetical, taking very little part in it himself, beyond asking questions, and requiring direct, full, and minutely accurate answers" (71). Newman describes Lloyd as taking a personal interest in his students and as having a lasting influence even though Newman felt "constrained and awkward" in his presence (71). The advantages of the catechetical, Socratic, or dialogistical method is also discussed in an article by a Professor of Moral Theology reprinted in the Gazette in the issue of Feb. 22, 1855.

In an article in the Gazette (Dec. 6, 1855), as the university entered its second year of operation, Newman was delighted to write that the examination for the East India civil appointments was based on the kind of liberal education so recently established at the Catholic University of Ireland. He states that the exams for East India appointments recognized the indirect effect of studies that disciplined the intellect for pursuits apparently the most remote from them; the mind of one who has grasped the history of Thucydides will "become far more completely master of any professional study than one who...has only been taught to run in the narrow groove of a particular line" or along the "confined idea of education expressed by the exploded Edgeworth school" (488). The examination included combinations of Greek and Roman literature, Mathematics, English literature, French, German and Italian literature, Sanskrit, Arabic, and Natural Science with marks weighted according to their importance, the greatest proportion being accorded to the classics. Newman also approved that no marks should be granted if a candidate did not have competent knowledge of a subject. In this way, there could be no smattering, sham, or pretence of knowing which implied "less knowledge than no knowledge at all" (499).

At the Catholic University of Ireland Newman sought to provide for all students two years of liberal education which included languages and literature, science, and religion. He clearly distinguished between science and literature as two different ways of reasoning. Science involves methodical reasoning from principles and an impersonal view of the necessary or the universally true. The study of a branch of knowledge as a science in a liberal education means a systematic examination of it from the perspective of its idea or its principles. Literature involves a personal mode of thought like Aristotle's reasoning by congruity or demonstration in orb or circle. This manner of reasoning, described by Newman in the Grammar as the organon commonly used in indemonstrable matters, is the kind of reasoning developed through
traditional humanist pedagogy. In antiquity, an orator was trained not only in clarity of definition and in the exact use of words, but in the means of persuading others of what he himself was persuaded and according to the same method. If the orator was persuaded of the truth of a matter through the convergence of truth from various quarters, he convinced others of its truth through the same mode of reasoning. In that part of the curriculum which deals with language and literature, Newman's pedagogy follows the long humanist tradition which trains the judgment through language in its full diapason; language is connected to thought through an accurate understanding of words and through a range of resonances connected to the context in which the word lives. Because religious formation was not a province of the University, the teaching of religious knowledge was intended to provide simply a connected view from various perspectives of the broad outlines of religion. The intellectual life of the student developed through the university was completed or steadied by the moral and religious life provided by the Church. In the final chapter, I shall consider Newman's views on the moral and religious formation of students.
Chapter 4

Religious Formation

Newman’s demonstration of the man of culture’s distinction between areas of truth and methods suited to apprehending them is most sharply defined in the separation of religion from all other truth. Indeed, religious formation is so distinct that it is nurtured in a separate institution: religious and moral formation is not the province of the University but of the Church. In the final Discourse, Newman speaks of the University as “acting as the representative of the intellect, as the Church is the representative of the religious principle” (163). Moral and religious formation involve an inward, personal relation to God known through the conscience when it is understood as theocentric. This religious and moral axis orders and steadies the intellectual life. At the beginning of his Preface to the Idea, Newman clarifies both these distinct roles and the relation between the University and the Church. He explains that a university

is a place of teaching universal knowledge....Such is a University in its essence, and independently of its relation to the Church. But, practically speaking, it cannot fulfil its object duly, such as I have described it, without the Church’s assistance; or, to use the theological term, the Church is necessary for its integrity. Not that its main characters are changed by this incorporation: it still has the office of intellectual education; but the Church steadies it in the performance of that office (xxxvii).

When Newman cites this passage from the Idea in “Professors and Tutors” in the Gazette, he makes clear that the duty of the Church is to offer religious and moral formation for the student, particularly through small residential colleges, just as the University exists for the sake of the students’ intellectual development (Historical Sketches, vol. 3, 183). In this article, Newman defines the theological term, “integrity,” in a way that is suggestive of grace: the “integrity” of anything is “a gift superadded to its nature, without which that nature is indeed complete, and can act, and fulfil its end, but does not find itself...in easy circumstances” (180).

Newman’s views on the distinct but related domains of the religious and intellectual life belong to the Christian humanist tradition. In La Philosophie Religieuse de John Henry Newman, Maurice Nédoncelle describes the Idea as a chart of Christian humanism in its distinction between the areas of knowledge: between religious formation, the knowledge of

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1 In On the Idea of a University, James M. Cameron observes the distinction between moral formation and intellectual education: liberal education is a good thing, not as such conducive to the moral virtues but a part of the virtue of civility." He states that while prudent judgments cannot be made in a fog of ignorance, "knowing the limits of liberal education is itself a virtue of the liberally educated man just as he does not require of any particular subject of discourse a degree of precision that cannot belong to the subject" (17).
mankind, and physical nature. On the one hand, this Christian humanism respects the autonomy of everything in its own sphere, as having its specific good or as connected to the Absolute. On the other hand, things are also defined in their relation to other things. The Church and State are unique in their own sphere but also related; the various branches of science are distinct in their principles and methods but are also connected. Secular knowledge involves a progressive, free examination through human effort; in the human domain, the development of personality involves individual collaboration. The function of Christianity is to help nature without absorbing it ("le Christianisme doit aider la nature sans l'absorber," 266).

In Marrou's observations on the acceptance by Christianity of hellenistic humanism in the early stages of education, he suggests that the moral and religious plane of Christianity requires first a human maturity, that the Early Church found ready-made in hellenistic humanism an admirable technique for perfectly developing an individual's humanity. This classical humanism which prepared the individual versatiley according to his talent or desire to be contemplative or active, philosopher or orator, was equally good as preparation for the supernatural or added gifts of grace and faith (423). Certainly a view of the world as unified, intelligible and objective was common to both hellenistic humanism and Christianity.

Newman's Christian humanist insistence not only on the distinction between religious formation and the cultivation of the intellect but on their unity had become an important issue to him as an arbiter of method in his day. He resisted both their confusion, as observed in the "Tamworth Reading Room," and the exclusion of theology from the University by the Queen's Colleges in Ireland, for example, and London University which were established on this principle. The Catholic University of Ireland was founded on the principle of the unity of the religious and intellectual life. Newman records in My Campaign in Ireland that the building of a University Church, which he had in mind "as early as, or earlier than, any other work," symbolized among other things "the great principle of the University, the indissoluble union of philosophy with religion" (290). In his first Sunday sermon after the opening of the University Church (May 1, Ascension Thursday, 1856), Newman refers to the unfortunate separation and rivalry of the mind's intellectual and moral operations after the loss of supernatural grace in the fall. He states: "the object of the Holy See and the Catholic Church in setting up Universities...is to reunite things which were in the beginning joined together by God, and have been put asunder by man....I want the same roof to contain both the intellectual and moral discipline," each to range with the utmost freedom. He maintained:

I want to destroy that diversity of centres, which puts everything into confusion by creating a contrariety of influences. I wish the same spots and the same individuals to be at once oracles of philosophy and shrines of devotion....I want the intellectual layman to be religious, and the devout ecclesiastic to be intellectual.\(^3\)

Newman frequently maintains the need for both religious formation and intellectual cultivation, for the Church and the University. From a practical perspective, the Roman Catholic Church in England, as well as many of the clergy with whom Newman was associated during his years in Dublin, suffered from a lack of the kind of education afforded by Oxford University from which they had been excluded for religious reasons. Similarly, Newman's dissatisfaction with the religious views of John Keble, whom he loved and admired, was based on Keble's neglect of the role of the intellect. Newman states that although Keble's faith was beautiful, "it did not even profess to be logical" (139). Keble emphasized "the living power of faith and love" in the "assent which we give to religious doctrine" rather than the "probabilities which introduced it" (Apologia, 139-40).

Conversely, Newman believed that rationalism suffered from its neglect of religion. Newman observes of himself that while a Tutor at Oriel College he found himself "beginning to prefer intellectual excellence to moral" (Apologia, 135). The danger of the humanist plane without the religious and moral axis is also expressed in Newman's description of Abelard in Historical Sketches. Newman states in "The Strength and Weakness of Universities: Abelard," that in Abelard "we read, as in a pattern specimen, what a University professes in its essence, and what it needs for its 'integrity'" (192). Brilliant, anticipating and taking "a principal share in bringing...into operation" the scholastic method "of which Saints and Doctors were the teachers," Abelard spoiled "by his own self-will what could have been done well and surely under the teaching and guidance" of the Church (194-5). Not only was Abelard tempted by sensuality "under the guise of intellect" in Eloisa but fuelled by ambition, he "mixes up spiritual matters with temporal, and aims at a bishopric through the medium of his logic," joining together things incompatible (201, 198). By contrast, Newman cites the examples of St. Anselm and St. Thomas as showing "how sanctity is not inconsistent with preëminence in the schools" ("The Schoolmen," Historical Sketches, 176).

The rivalry between the religious principle and the intellect of which Abelard is made an emblem is described in Discourse ix of the Idea. Here Newman points out the natural tendency of the intellect to exclude or modify the "highest and most momentous disclosures" of

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\(^3\) "Intellect, the Instrument of Religious Training," Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 12-13.
religion, resting in the temporal and making "present utility and natural beauty the practical test of truth, and the sufficient object of the intellect" (165). Newman demonstrates that the disposition appropriate to the method of analysis of cause and effect in science and that needed for knowledge of the discrete acts of God as the First Cause cannot easily be entertained at the same time. Unless the religious grounding of knowledge is held implicitly, like the implicit recognition of its unity, "Knowledge, viewed as Knowledge, exerts a subtle influence in throwing us back on ourselves, and making us our own centre, and our minds the measure of all things." He states that the tendency of Liberal Education is "to view Revealed Region from an aspect of its own...to tune it...to a different key" (165).

The difference between the simple religious mode, viewing things in relation to God, and the more complex intellectual mode of thought which sees things in their relations to one another is expressed in the "Mission of St. Benedict," an article later included in Historical Sketches vol. 2, but first published as "The Benedictine Centuries" in the the Atlantis (Jan. 1858), the University periodical. Here, Newman's description of three ages of Christian education clarifies the relation between the intellectual and religious life as well as the practical aim of religious education at the University. Benedictine sanctity in the first age of Christian education views everything in relation to God and is the model of faith and religious formation. The history written by the monks was not an intelligible systematization but simple facts, biographies and contemporary events written by men who recorded what they saw, heard, and knew (419). In his reading of Scripture, the monk found supernatural truths standing "forth as the trees and flowers of Eden, in a divine disorder...which he enjoyed the more because he could not catalogue its wonders"; in his reading of the Fathers, he found an "ungrudging profusion and careless wealth of precept and of consolation"; in his own compositions he passed "from subject to subject with little regard to system" (427). Viewed from this perspective of the monks' religious faith, Scripture, the Fathers, deeds and events reflected "as in a faithful mirror, the words and works of the Almighty" (428). It was a devotion based on undifferentiated simplicity rather than on the complex unity of theology.

This theocentric view of life sees all that happens in relation to God as particular discrete instances without regard for internal consistency among these events. In the Grammar,

Newman refers to the effect on lives led according to this religious principle: "When men begin all their works with the thought of God, acting for His sake, and to fulfil His will...and see Him in the event;...they will find everything that happens tend to confirm them in the truths about Him which live in their imagination, varied and unearthly as those truths may be" (106-7). In "Newman's Life--an Illustration of his own Theory," Alison Wilson suggests that attention to God as the centre point in Newman's own life links its many seemingly disparate phases as he extracted from all milieux what subserved "attention and loving adherence to God" (160). She traces the way in which Newman's religious life evolved around God as centre: from the early influence of Walter Mayers, a classics teacher at Ealing with a Calvinist perspective, Newman came to understand religion as an individual relationship with God and to appreciate its affective nature (c.f. Écrits Autobiographiques, 54); from his collegial acquaintance at Oriel with Richard Whately, Newman came to appreciate the importance of thinking for himself (another way of describing the Grammar of Assent); Newman's involvement in the Oxford Movement was a declaration of the absolute objective truth of what we know about God through Revelation.5

The second era of Christian education emerged from the first as the monks began aligning comments of the Fathers with Scripture and the reason, once cultivated, "begins to combine, to centralize, to look forward, to look back, to view things as a whole...practises synthesis and analysis," discovers and invents (Historical Sketches, vol. 2, 375-76). This second era is represented in the Dominican systematization of truth in theology, a science which Newman assigns to the University as its responsibility. Newman describes the two eras of Christian education, which he characterises as poetry and science, as coexisting within the Church but belonging "respectively to two modes of viewing things, which are contradictory of each other" (386). The undifferentiated type of Benedictine sanctity, which is the ground of

5 The particular and discrete in the Benedictine religious life, connected not to each other through abstract aspects in cause and effect, but as wholes converging to a First and Final Cause, provide a pattern of movement around a centre that is typical of moral and religious writing. For example, typological interpretation in patristic writing links the discrete points of God's action in human affairs; the historian, Herodotus, sees historical events as a number of moral instances (Gadamer, Truth and Method, 183); Newman's retrospective view in the Apologia of the ever-deepening providential or formative patterns in his life reflects this mode of thought. Walter Houghton analyses Newman's rhetoric in the Apologia as a recounting of life in the concrete, of successive states of mind (Newman's Apologia).

Edward Sillem describes the effect on Newman of reading the Greek Fathers of Alexandria as leading him to "see that the development of ideas in theology is connected more with the mystery of divine economy than with a system of logic" (183). c.f. Alison Wilson, "Newman's Life--an Illustration of his own Theory," 167.
theology and the model of religious formation, is antagonistic to the model of thought which knows through comparing and analyzing, i.e., the philosophic mode advocated in the Idea.

The religious formation of character, a function of the Church rather than of the University, is differentiated from theology by Newman eighteen years later in the Grammar of Assent. Here he states that "Religion has to do with the real, and the real is the particular; theology has to do with what is notional, and the notional is the general and systematic" (122). Belief or Real Assent leads to action as it does not live in the abstract but in real objects or images have "the power of the concrete upon the affections and passions" (86-7). The ground of religious formation, as in the early monastic phase of Christian education, is in the particular that can be imaginatively apprehended: in the testimony of Revelation "which is addressed far more to the imagination and affections than to the intellect" (117); in the dogma of the Creed, when each proposition is considered separately "for its own sake only," and so "appeals to the imagination quite as much as to the intellect" (117). The function of theology is to make clear religious truths, showing the cogency of the "doctrines contained in the depositum of revelation," protecting them by putting the imagination and affections "under the control of reason" (127, 109). Belief or Real Assent, on the other hand, "leads the way to actions of every kind, to the establishment of principles, and the formation of character, and is thus again intimately connected with what is individual and personal" (87).

In two sermons delivered in the Oratory at Birmingham on the occasion of its first anniversary (Jan. 15, 1850), the year prior to his connection with the Catholic University of Ireland, Newman also spoke of the three phases of Christian history, referring to the indissoluble unity of philosophy with religion in the second phase. This second phase aimed

6 In "Imagination and Hermeneutical Theology: Newman’s Contribution to Theological Method," David Hammond points out that in the science of theology, as contrasted with religious practice, logic operates characteristically on notions. Rather than imaginatively grasping revealed realities in themselves, theology uses revealed realities to deduce conclusions or find consistent relations among them based on the principle of non-contradiction (19). In "Newman’s Personal Reasoning: the Inspiration of the Early Church," Gerard Magill observes the contrast between the logical mode of reasoning of the Schoolmen and the personal mode of faith based on the convergence of cumulative probabilities towards a centre. He remarks that Newman found the Schoolmen cold or lifeless as they wrote as logicians, disputants, and systematizers of theology (306-7).

7 Newman dates his first connection with the University project in Ireland as April 15, 1851 when Dr. Cullen wrote "to ask me to advise on the best way of setting about it, and invited me to deliver a set of lectures in Dublin against Mixed Education." Cited by Fergal McGrath in Newman’s University from Robert Ornsby’s Memoirs of James Robert Hope-Scott (London, 1884).

Newman attests to his longstanding convictions on the subject of the relation of religion and education in his remarks in the "Introductory" to the Idea. Here he indicates that the "views to which I have referred have grown into my whole system of thought, and are, as it
magnificently to "form the whole matter of human knowledge into one harmonious system, to secure the alliance between religion and philosophy, and to train men to the use of the gifts of nature in the sunlight of divine grace and revealed truth." The cultivation of the intellect through the branches of knowledge studied at the University in union with the "contradictory" mode of religious belief fostered by the Church was the ideal of Newman’s University.

The third phase of Christian education corresponds to the kind of religious lives Newman hopes the graduates of the University will lead. This era was characterized by St. Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556), founder of the Jesuit order and a contemporary of St. Philip Neri, founder of Newman’s order. It saw "a violent effort ... in progress, on the part of the powers of evil, to break up this sublime unity, and to set human genius, the philosopher and the poet, the artist and the musician, in opposition to religion." The challenge of the modern era whose "issue...is still to come," was in Newman’s day, as for St. Ignatius and St. Philip, not to retreat from the world but "to carry out the Church into the world" with the "single aim of subduing this various, multiform, many-coloured world to the unity of divine service." Newman describes this era as practical. Just as the cultivation of the intellect has the practical goal of training graduates in a habit of mind that will allow them to discriminate principles and methods in contentious issues, religious training develops an attentiveness to conscience and a habit of viewing all aspects of professional, private and social life in their relation to God.

The cultivation of the discriminating faculty of the intellect depended on a knowledge of starting-points and methods. In philosophic terms, religious formation or belief in God involves a knowledge of the First Principle of first principles. Belief in God, like knowledge of any first principle, offers a vantage point for judgment of particulars. In the Idea, Newman were, part of myself....Those principles, which I am now to set forth under the sanction of the Catholic Church, were my profession at that early period of my life, when religion was to me more a matter of feeling and experience than of faith....and my sense of their correctness has been increased with the events of every year since I have been brought within its pale" (3).


In the final Discourse of the Idea, Newman writes of the danger of the University becoming "the rival of the Church with the community at large in those theological matters which to the Church are exclusively committed" (163).


describes as an enlargement of mind the experience of converts who meditate for the first time "on death and judgment, heaven and hell" and who "seem to become, in point of intellect, different beings from what they were." He states that

Before, they took things as they came, and thought no more of one thing than another. But now every event has a meaning; they have their own estimate of whatever happens to them; they are mindful of times and seasons, and compare the present with the past; and the world...is a various and complicated drama, with parts and an object and an awful moral (100-1).

In the Grammar, Newman describes this belief, a personal relationship between the individual and God, as known through the sanction of conscience which is "the creative principle of religion" (101). Newman's ideas of religious formation must be understood in connection to his views of conscience. These views on conscience are found in his novel, Callista (1855), in which the Greek heroine believes that the dictates of conscience intimate the presence of God within her heart; in Newman's sermons such as "The Testimony of Conscience" in Parochial and Plain Sermons, vol. 2, and "Dispositions of Faith" (1856) preached before the Catholic University of Ireland (Sermons Preached on Various Occasions); in "Proof of Theism," (a philosophical exploration of conscience begun soon after Newman's return from Ireland in 1859 and reworked until 1868) published first in The Argument from Conscience to the Existence of God and later in The Philosphic Notebook (vol. 2); in the Grammar of Assent under "Apprehension and Assent in the matter of Religion" and "Natural Religion."

The methodus or path towards faith experienced in conscience involves a disposition antagonistic to the vantage point of the intellect which seeks to master things or to mount above them; rather, the way to a personal relationship with God in conscience is through obedience. In "Private Judgment," Newman describes the religious disposition as one in which we put ourselves in God's hands and only ask what "wilt thou have me do?" Faith in God through conscience involves a relationship between an individual's immortal soul and One who is an unseen Divine Being; it is a personal relation between a particular individual subject and

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12 Essays and Sketches, vol. 2, 137-70. Günter Biemer also states in "Newman's Catechesis in a Pluralistic Age," that the condition of learning faith lies in first principles often unconsciously held: "the moral status is an important help or obstacle on the way of entering into the Christian truth" (119). He cites Newman's remark that the "rejection of Christianity" arises "from a fault of the heart, not of the intellect; that unbelief arises not from mere error of reasoning, but either from pride or from sensuality." In Loss and Gain, Charles Redding's remarks to his fellow-traveller on the train that the impediment to religious belief is in the individual's assumption that the "ultimate standard of truth is not the Scripture, but, unconsciously to himself, some view of things in his mind which is to him the measure of Scripture" (261).
God as Object. Newman's sermons describe the nature of this living relational life. In "The Individuality of the Soul," Newman reminds his listener of the infinite abyss of existence within, of the distinct soul of every person who "is as whole and independent a being in himself as if there were no one else in the whole world but he." In "The Thought of God the Stay of the Soul," preached at St. Mary's in June, 1839, Newman speaks of the immortal soul unique in each individual, "made for the contemplation of its Maker," and finding its happiness only in relation to God who is its ruling principle. Newman says: "As the body is not complete in itself but requires the soul to give it a meaning, so again the soul till God is present with it and manifested in it, has faculties and affections without a ruling principle, object, or purpose." Or again, in a sermon preached six months later (Dec. 22, 1839), Newman states that when a person is alone "that is his real state...left to himself and to his God"; one is "never less alone than when alone." A person is less alone when with the Alone because to none besides his Maker "can the whole heart in all its thoughts and feelings be unlocked and subjected."

Newman describes in the Apologia his own experience of this primary relationship between himself and God after his inward conversion at the age of fifteen which confirmed him in his "mistrust of the reality of material phenomena," and made him "rest in the thought of two and two only supreme and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator" (127). Shortly before his conversion he states that "It is face to face, 'solus cum solo,' in all matters between man and his God" (284-85). A little later, he comments: "if I am asked why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe in myself, for I feel it impossible to

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13 In "Newman and the Laity," Paul Chavasse contrasts Newman's view of conscience as obedience in relation to an Object known through Revelation with its counterfeit in what Newman called "private judgment" (73-4).

14 Parochial and Plain Sermons, 132. Newman refers to the incommunicabile of the soul or personality in various places. He begins Loss and Gain with the comment by Charles Redding's father that "[t]he heart is a secret with its Maker; no one on earth can hope to get at it or to touch it" (5). In "Literature," Newman refers to the personal element in literature as "the charm of an incommunicable simplicity" (219-20).

15 Newman at St. Mary's, 191-91.

16 Ibid., "Equanimity," 161.


18 In The Consolation of Rhetoric, David Whalen says of this statement that it is "experiential to the point of being a particular, rather than a philosophical remark" (127).
believe in my own existence (and of that fact I am quite sure) without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience" (287). Newman experienced this most luminously real, inward relationship with God as the very ground of his own reality.  

The direction of this path towards God is made clear in Newman’s philosophical reflections on conscience where he states that he does not argue that there is God who is a Lawgiver and that therefore we have a conscience, but just the reverse: "there is a God, because there is a moral obligation."  

In "Proof of Theism" in The Argument from Conscience to the Existence of God, as the title given by the editors suggests, the movement is from conscience towards God. Newman states that we are conscious of our existence through the experience of various faculties or states such as sense, reason, memory and conscience. Through reflection on these experiences, we can draw one act of nature into two propositions: "the consciousness which I possess that I exist may be drawn out into two propositions: 'I am for I feel,' 'I am for I remember,' 'I am for I think'" etc. (106). By emphasizing that it is through our experience of our faculties, such as sensation, that we know we exist, Newman roots notional reflection in the real and, in fact, the two are seen as one complex act. While Newman includes conscience among "those primary conditions of the mind which are involved in the fact of existence," there is an important difference between conscience and the acts of reasoning, sensation and memory. In the latter we are aware of our existence as connected to the objective external world but in Newman’s theocentric view of conscience, we are aware of our being in connection to God as Object. Newman states "that the external fact of the existence of God is an object of faith, and a primary object....it is more intimately connected with the nature of the human mind than anything else" (109).  

Religious formation for Newman, then, always included the conscience as the personal inward centre of faith in God. In "Newman's Catechesis in a Pluralistic Age," Günter Biemer

19 Karl Rahner describes grace as "the free relation of the Absolute communicating himself," making "man share in the very nature of God." He states: "Here we really reach the heart of the Christian conception of reality." Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi, 588.

20 "Proof of Theism" in Argument from Conscience, 103.

21 In the Grammar, Newman describes the deeply personal nature of conscience: "Conscience is a personal guide, and I use it because I must use myself; I am as little able to think by any mind but my own as to breathe with another's lungs. Conscience is nearer to me than any other means of knowledge....it is adapted for the communication to each separately of that knowledge which is most momentous to him individually" (304).
remarks that "Newman would insist on a religious instruction" which includes "a steady education of the conscience as the principle of religion and serious introduction to the real mystery of God" (116).

In his fifth sermon in the University Church in Dublin, Newman explains to the students and the assembled congregation the methodus or path by which the experience of conscience may lead to personal faith where we are alone with the Alone.22 He speaks of the authoritative Voice of conscience, a "commanding dictate," which "raises our minds to the idea of an unseen Teacher"; just "as a knocking at our doors at night implies the presence of one outside in the dark who asks for admittance."23 The "inward Guide" reveals Himself as Teacher, Governor, and Judge; the voice of conscience suggests a tribunal over which the individual has no power, bidding him to "do certain things and to avoid others" (64). The individual who "tries to obey his conscience," aware of how imperfectly he does so and of the difficulty in distinguishing the dictate of the inward Guide from mere earthly sources, seeks revelation of what conscience "does not itself fully supply," knowledge of a personal, divine Presence, the Unseen Lord.24 Newman states that the very existence of conscience "carries on our minds to a Being exterior to ourselves...and to a Being superior to ourselves...its very existence throws us out of ourselves and beyond ourselves, to go and seek for Him in the height and depth, whose Voice it is" (65). The desire of the soul to know God and the con-

22 In John Henry Newman, Charles Stephen Dessain comments on Newman's view that our only true refuge is being in God's presence; he states that this is a first principle for Newman and that this fact which frees us is invisible (49). He observes that Newman sought in his sermons to lead his listeners towards practice of their religion.

23 Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 64-5.
The personal nature of the dictate of conscience is revealed through the imperative mood. In the Grammar, Newman states that command or assertion "both carry with them the pretension of being personal acts" (26).
In Newman's novel Callista, the intellectual Greek heroine drawn towards Christianity finds that the dictate of her conscience suggests a divine person: "You may tell me that this dictate is a mere law of my nature, as is to joy or to grieve. I cannot understand this. No, it is the echo of a person speaking to me. Nothing shall persuade me that it does not ultimately proceed from a person external to us. It carries with it its proof of its divine origin" (314).

24 Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 66.
Newman's view of the theocentric conscience is similar to Pascal's view of thought. J.M. Cameron cites Pascal in "Newman and the Empiricist Tradition": "l'ordre de la pensée est de commencer par soi, et par son auteur et par sa fin." (the order of thought is to begin with oneself, with one's author, and with one's end). Similarly in "Imagination and Hermeneutical Theology," David Hammond refers to Newman's theological method as persuading "by the internal authority of his reflections" (22).
sciousness of moral infirmity are the ground of religious formation, feeding "the flame of faith."  

As empirical science follows an inductive *methodus* or path of transit, moving from the particular to the abstract, so the path towards God through conscience follows in its own way a pattern. Individuals are aware of an inner sanction dictating right or wrong in particular circumstances. They live through the experience of being unwilling to do what they know is right or of being incapable of doing so, an experience contrary to rationalist claims which equate knowledge of what is right with doing right. This claim, rejected by Isocrates, by Aristotle, and by Bacon who distinguish between intellect and appetite, is also vigorously rejected by Newman in "The Tamworth Reading Room." In the Idea, Newman also rejects the confusion of knowledge with virtue. Stating that "good sense is not conscience," he declares: "Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason to contend against those giants, the passion and the pride of man" (91). In the Idea, Newman speaks of suffering as a "providential antagonist against our inward disorders," referring to suffering as "God’s instruments, not ours" (141). The distress of moral infirmity and the desire to know the source of the personal voice of conscience are connected to the movement towards a personal relation with God known through other sources such as Revelation. Knowledge of God then leads individuals to love and faith. God’s grace gives them power to overcome moral infirmity and, as the Thought or Image of God becomes their central point of reference, their lives are guided accordingly.

Newman’s teaching on conscience belongs to a long tradition. In "The Divine Light Within: Reflections on the Education of the Mind to God in Augustine, Anselm, Bonaventure, and Newman," Robert L. Fastiggi speaks of the illuminationist tradition to which these four people belong. In this tradition, the human mind, turning in upon itself, can discover the immediate presence of God as the divine light of the soul. The theologian, Rudolf Hofmann, writes that in the New Testament "conscience has a central significance (the inward moral attitude)....The Christian knows himself to be confronted with the demands and judgments of God, which makes him conscious of the commandments and the grace of God (2 Cor 1:12) and is the guiding line for a life lived in the sight of God." Newman’s distinction between what

25 Ibid., 73.

26 *Faith Seeking Understanding*, 197.

he calls the sanction of conscience, the magisterial "dictate of an authoritative monitor," and the judgment of the reason in the judicial office of conscience is connected to traditional teaching on conscience (Grammar, 99). This teaching distinguishes between synteresis, the nucleus of the conscience and the habitus of the primary moral principles, and conscientia which is concerned with particular judgments. It is in the sanction of conscience "conveyed in the feelings which attend on right and wrong conduct" (Grammar, 98) that Newman finds the direct immediate relationship "between the soul and something exterior...superior to oneself" ("Proof of Theism," Argument from Conscience, 113).

The role of the conscience in the path towards faith shaped Newman's understanding of the responsibility of the Church towards students at the University. The incommunicability of the human person, the uniqueness of personal experience, the singularity of the person in relation to God through conscience, make religious formation a personal matter which touches upon an inner centre of freedom and assent. Those involved with the cure of souls in the colleges of the University recognize that the personal nature of the individual’s relation with God is such that the whole constellation of the students’ prior experiences, upbringing, associations, reading, etc. (what Newman calls antecedent probability) are an important basis of their real appropriation of truth. In "Newman on Faith and Reason," John D. Horgan’s observation that Newman distinguishes in the Grammar between what is true and what is true to us (140) applies particularly to religious formation. The teaching itself is relational, a rhetorical act of finding common ground between two individuals forming the triad described by David Whalen of "teacher, taught, and conversation" (Consolation of Rhetoric, 78). If, as James J. Murphy suggests in connection with St. Augustine, the hearer balances what he hears against his own interior truth, the rhetor’s role is to find signs that evoke truth in the hearer. Indeed, such connections are often made in an unexpected, personal way. Alison Wilson reminds us of how Newman, extracting from his milieu what subserved his "living adherence to God," was personally persuaded of the integrity of the Roman Catholic Church which he was then considering by his reading in 1839 of the Monophysite controversy of the fifth century and by an article on the Donatists by Cardinal Wiseman in the Dublin Review in which the phrase Securus judicat orbis terrarum became a beacon to him of the truth of the issue.


The Church Fathers, with whom Newman was so familiar, also emphasized the personal element in religious teaching. This is clear in Augustine’s view of the teacher as helping the pupil discover truth for himself, of the pupil’s attentiveness to the *magister interior* or inward teacher enabling him to balance what he hears with his own interior truth.\(^{30}\) As in Newman’s views of religious formation, what is important is the personal understanding of truth which is objective. In “Newman on Nicea,” Michael Novak observes that objectivity needed to enter into truth is “no swift achievement” (453); in the Fathers’ methodology of catechesis, entering into the mystery is a gradual process involving a solid, slow, growing comprehension. The goal was to provoke personal understanding rather than to demand conformity. This method involved "pedagogical restraint" (446) based on the principle that the mind does not grasp everything at once, that what is too high for it must be approached gradually, mounting slowly from reality to reality and that even when the core of an idea is grasped, the mind needs time for it to work its way deeply into a person’s pattern of judgment; until the idea becomes habitual, there will be inconsistencies and blind spots (445). With Newman’s views in mind, Novak sums up the approach of the Fathers: "[i]t is of the nature of the human mind to see things only partially; to move gradually from vantage point to vantage point; to court first one extreme and then the opposite, back and forth, in climbing the ascent of wisdom" (452). In a recent article, "Newman's Personal Principle at its Source," Marie Brinkman describes this personal way of knowing truth, both in intellectual and religious formation as the "principle of realization." \(^{31}\) The mind which is not a mechanism reaches through both intellect and imagination what is too deep and personal for words.

The religious reality of being alone with the Alone is sufficiently incommunicable that it is at least as much mediated as taught. It is for this reason that Newman attributes such importance in moral and religious teaching to what he calls personal influence (*influere*-to flow in). One person’s intangible relation with the Unseen is simply recognized by others. Biemer indicates the importance of the personal element in moral and religious teaching. He cites from Newman’s sermon "On Personal Influence": "There is an 'attraction, exerted by unconscious holiness, of an urgent and irresistible nature' even over the 'thoughtless or perverse multitude,' let alone 'over that select number...who have already in a measure, disciplined their hearts after the law of holiness'" (Biemer, 112).

\(^{30}\) James J. Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*, 287-88.

\(^{31}\) *Personality and Belief*, 79.
The personal element which Newman valued in intellectual education was even more essential as a methodus or "path of transit" in religious formation. At the University in Ireland, as at Oxford, Newman considered two ways in particular as effective channels of mediating faith through personal influence: the sermons in the University Church and the communal life including tutors and students in the small colleges or houses which were separate from the students' academic life of the university and yet connected to it.\(^{32}\) In fact, Newman explains this manner of effecting religious formation in the last two sermons that he preached in the University Church in Dublin in 1857. In his earlier sermon entitled "Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth" preached at Oxford in 1832, Newman had stated that it was through individual people that religious truth had been transmitted over the ages and that these people were "at once the teachers and patterns" of religion.\(^{33}\) In his final two sermons in Dublin, Newman takes St. Paul as an example of personal influence exercised both as a model or pattern and through his teaching. This model follows the pattern of conversion to vital faith in God through conscience. In "St. Paul's Characteristic Gift" and "St. Paul's Gift of Sympathy," published in Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, Newman emphasizes two aspects of the path all must follow in the movement from conscience towards God: awareness of moral infirmity and life lived in grace conferred. A saint like Paul, aware of his own natural infirmity without God's grace, a grace which does not destroy his human nature but spiritualizes and perfects it, places himself "on that footing of human infirmity which is common to him and his hearers and converts" ("St. Paul's Gift of Sympathy", 111). By divesting himself of his greatness, his lack of affectation and his simplicity allowed him to love others and to "inspire great love towards himself" ("St. Paul's Gift of Sympathy," 112-3). It is in part through their humility, through their understanding and compassion for individual souls, that saints like Paul foster personal faith in God. Secondly, it is the life of grace in such saints as Paul and St. Philip Neri that draws "souls to them by their interior beauty" ("St. Paul's Gift of Sympathy," 120). Newman cites from St. Paul where God says: "My grace is sufficient for thee, for power is made perfect in infirmity" and St. Paul's response" "Gladly, therefore, will I glory in my infirmities that the power of Christ may dwell in me" (112). The idea of personal

\(^{32}\) The importance Newman attributed to personal communication between preacher and congregation is attested in Charles Frederick Harrold's comment that in an age where published sermons had the appeal that novels have in the twentieth century Newman showed unusual reticence in publishing his sermons, "divulging to the world at large what had passed between him and his congregations." John Henry Newman, 318-19.

influence is expressed in the text with which Newman began his sermon: St. Paul's life is in God "Who comforteth us in all our tribulation, that we also may be able to comfort those who are in any distress, by the exhortation wherewith we also are exhorted by God" (2 Cor. 1:3-4).

Newman's *methodus* or way in religious formation is like that of St. Paul or St. Philip Neri. At the end of his Discourses, Newman states that "whether or not I can do any thing at all in St. Philip's way, at least I can do nothing in any other" (Idea, 181). Newman's purpose, like his "way", is the same as St. Philip's. He states that such lovers of souls as Philip Neri and Paul who had the gift of loving common humanity without any "spirit of party," directed their efforts towards the practical end of the "sanctification of ordinary men" ("St. Paul's Gift of Sympathy", 117-8).

Newman's University Sermons to the students in Dublin follow the pattern of Paul in mediating a life lived in reference to God through the path of conscience. In his comments on Newman as preacher, Ian Ker remarks on his sermons as encouraging self-examination and as being severe and psychologically penetrating. He states that Newman recognized that the Spirit worked through ordinary human channels, such as the conscience.34 His sermons are an enactment of his cardinalate motto, *cor ad cor loquitur*, taken from St. Augustine. One heart in relation to God speaking to another heart in its relation to God is descriptive of conscience speaking to conscience.35 Rudolf Hofmann writes that the Old Testament usually uses other words such as "heart" or "reins" to describe the experience of conscience.36 Newman says of the preacher in "University Preaching" that through a self-forgetting "gazing at the object which he

34 *The Achievement of John Henry Newman*, 83-88. Ker cites William Froude's testimony of Newman as preacher: "He seemed to be addressing the most secret consciousness of each of us, as the eyes of a portrait appear to look at every person in a room" (88).

35 In *Nemesis of Faith*, James Froude speaks of Newman's subtle reasonings and his complete understanding of the hearts of his Oxford listeners. Froude connects a sense of sin to those drawn to Catholicism; he refers to Newman's emphasis on strength drawn from Divine power within individuals and to his strength and courage in speaking to a Church that was worldly and comfortable. He states that Newman's genius was evidence of the soul of man as a "very living force, a very energy of God's organic Will which rules and moulds this universe" (142).

must reach, and ruling himself by it," he awakens in others the image he himself possesses.\textsuperscript{37} In the advice provided in this article by Newman as a guide to guest preachers at the University Church, he writes: "what is powerful enough to absorb and possess a preacher has at least a \textit{prima facie} claim of attention on the part of his hearers."\textsuperscript{38} As heart speaks to heart in the rhetorical tradition when thought and word are one in the speaker, Newman reminds those who would preach in the University Church that "[t]hought and word are one in the Eternal Logos and must not be separate in those who are His shadows on earth" (320).\textsuperscript{39} Newman also refers to Aristotle's claim in his \textit{Treatise on Rhetoric} that "personal traits of an ethical nature evident in the orator" were the most authoritative (306). Such communication is not just a question of technique; James J. Murphy states that for Augustine, for example, there is "no possible rhetorical technique or skill that can be learned (or taught) that will equip one human heart to speak to another heart."\textsuperscript{40}

Newman speaks in his sermons from his own relation to God in conscience to awaken this relation in others.\textsuperscript{41} He had told his congregation at St. Mary's in 1839 that a good conscience is "the habitual consciousness that our hearts are open to God, with a desire that they should be open." It is "to be reminded of God by our own hearts...to be led thereby to look up to Him, and to desire His eye to be upon us through the day."\textsuperscript{42} Like his model, St. Philip, Newman observed the connection between this inner orientation towards God and grace. In "The Mission of St. Philip," Newman writes: "Philip bore with every outside extravagance in

\textsuperscript{37} Idea, 306. "University Preaching" was originally published in the University Gazette (1855) and was later included in the second half of the Idea. Newman emphasizes the preacher's unaffected eloquence resulting from his own convictions and real connection to his object. He will leave deep within others "what he has brought home to himself" (309).

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 305.

\textsuperscript{39} In Newman, Owen Chadwick describes Newman in his sermons as disappearing into the reality of which he spoke, "as though he must get out of the way" (21). He suggests that conscience does more for truth than intelligence (25), that Newman sought in his sermons to raise the standard of religious practice, and to recall the Church to its own principles (19-20).

\textsuperscript{40} Murphy, \textit{Rhetoric in the Middle Ages}, 191.

\textsuperscript{41} In "Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating the Truth," Newman remarks that the task of an Apostle is "to raise the dead." Newman's University Sermons, 87.

\textsuperscript{42} "The Thought of God the Stay of the Soul," Newman at St. Mary's, 195-97. In the \textit{Concept of Conscience According to John Henry Newman}, James Kaiser describes conscience as the "habitual orientation of the whole man to God" (47-8).
those whom he addressed, as far as it was not directly sinful, knowing well that if the heart was once set right, the appropriate demeanour would follow" (Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 236).

Newman also recognized that effecting an inner change of heart involved not only the intellect but the imagination and the affective life. In "University Preaching," Newman speaks of the aim of "imprinting on the heart what will never leave it" and cites St. Francis: "Necesse est ut doceat et moveat" (308). Similarly in the Grammar, Newman emphasizes that religion addresses receptive minds "both through the intellect and through the imagination" (379). To effect a change of heart through the imagination meant dealing with particulars, such as one proposition of the Creed at a time. In Newman's memorable passage in "The Tamworth Reading Room" he contrasts the method of science which reaches towards abstractions with the path of religion:

This is why science has so little of a religious tendency; deductions have no power of persuasion. The heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us.  

In his advice to guest preachers at the University Church in Dublin, Newman suggests that only one definite point should be treated in a sermon and that all a preacher's skills and resources should aim at attaining it like a marksman aiming at a bull's-eye (Idea, 304-5). Newman states that "common-places are but blunt weapons; whereas it is particular topics that penetrate and reach their mark" and "may touch the heart and conscience, or may suggest trains of thought to the intellect" (Idea, 314).

As all of Newman's university sermons in Dublin, like St. Paul's teaching, are a call to the path or way towards God through conscience, his numerous references to Scripture in these sermons are also in relation to conscience which "Revelation does but enlighten, strengthen, and refine" ("Athenian Schools: Influence," Historical Sketches, vol. 2, 79). In fact, in his Dublin university sermons, Newman uses in relation to conscience the same elements as the services in St. Philip's Oratory in sixteenth-century Rome. These services, according to a visitor, involved "discourses on the gospel, or on the virtues and vices, or ecclesiastical history, or the lives of the saints" ("The Mission of St. Philip," Sermons Preached on Various Occasions

43 Essays and Sketches, vol. 2, 204. Newman cites this earlier writing in the Grammar (89) to contrast real and notional assents.
the objective and the Company (214). In The supply of fuel for the inflammable imagination," a habit give for the student as he treats of the intellectual temptation to exclude the inner life of faith and morals. He finds in the early Augustine the pattern of youth in every age "with his young ambition, and his intellectual energy, and his turbulent appetites" and his rejection of a religious life. He traces for the student temptations that he might encounter as his "mind began to open" to go against his conscience, knowing what it was not good to know, then "bantering on the subject of sin, supplying fuel for the inflammable imagination," a habit lasting through life; joining with bad company which "creates a distaste for good"; losing delight in his home; then reading "what is

Occasions, 239). Newman elicits a comparison between the listener's conscience and the facts of early Church history, as in "The Secret Power of Divine Grace"; between the conscience and the lives of saints, such as St. Augustine and St. Monica in "Intellect, the Instrument of Religious Training," or St. Paul as exemplary mediator of divine truth in the last two sermons.

Fergal McGrath conjures up the image of Newman delivering his first Sunday sermon in the University Church "looking from his pulpit on the upturned faces of his little band of undergraduates, almost lost among the fashionable throng who had come to hear the famous Tractarian convert preaching in his new church." Sunday, May 4, 1856, fell on the feast of St. Monica, mother of St. Augustine, the rhetorician who taught of the magister interior and of the catechizer's role in finding signs that would carry the hearer towards an objective by balancing what he heard against his own interior truth. Seeing in St. Monica's prayers for St. Augustine an emblem of the union of Church and University, Newman says that "there is something happy in the circumstance, that the first Sunday of our academical worship should fall on the feast of St. Monica" (Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 4). For his first sermon, Newman chose the topics he had suggested a year earlier in "University Preaching" as suited to students. There he said: "The temptations which ordinarily assail the young and the intellectual are two: those which are directed against their virtue, and those which are directed against their faith...as youth becomes the occasion of excess and sensuality, so does intellect give accidental opportunity to religious error, rash speculation, doubt, and infidelity" (Idea, 313). Newman appeals particularly to the inner Teacher in "the little band of undergraduates" as he treats of the intellectual temptation to exclude the inner life of faith and morals. He finds in the early Augustine the pattern of youth in every age "with his young ambition, and his intellectual energy, and his turbulent appetites" and his rejection of a religious life. He traces for the student temptations that he might encounter as his "mind began to open" to go against his conscience, knowing what it was not good to know, then "bantering on the subject of sin, supplying fuel for the inflammable imagination," a habit lasting through life; joining with bad company which "creates a distaste for good"; losing delight in his home; then reading "what is

44 In "The Theology of Conscience," Joseph Crehan remarks that Scripture, tradition and the teaching authority of the Church represent external law, in contrast to the inward law (214). In The Concept of Conscience According to John Henry Newman, Kaiser emphasizes the objective norms, such as Scripture and tradition, to which the true conscience conforms (183-209).

45 Newman's University: Idea and Reality, 413-14.

46 James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, 287-8.
directly against religion" and following the path "to scepticism and infidelity; forming his "own ideas of things," restless seeking truth until he abandons the search, declaring that "there is no such thing as truth" (9-11). In this way, Newman seeks to evoke in the conscience of the students a recognition of the intellectual temptation to reject religion; in St. Monica's prayers for her son he finds the pattern of the Church which steadies the life of the University.

In the next two sermons, "The Religion of the Pharisee, the Religion of Mankind" and "Waiting for Christ," Newman leads his listeners to attend to their inner promptings of conscience, calling them towards fidelity to the inwardly held Thought or Image of God. In both these sermons, Newman portrays the opposite habit of mind oriented towards external standards, in which we form our judgment of things by what others say, "admire what they admire," instinctively reverencing "the world's opinion" (33). Newman, like St. Paul, includes himself in this temptation towards worldliness:

But we, my Brethren, who are in easy circumstances, or in a whirl of business, or in a labyrinth of cares, or in a war of passions, or in the race of wealth, or honour, or station, or in the pursuits of science or of literature, alas! we are in the very men who are likely to have no regard...for the true bread of heaven and the living water (44-5).

The Pharisee in his giving of alms and public prayer represents the tendency to be satisfied with external performance in religion. Newman says of Christian profession that he fears that "the great mass of men in fact get rid of all religion that is inward" (24).

In contrast to this worldliness, Newman reminds his listeners of who they are when alone with God the "Lord of conscience" (23). In "The Religion of the Pharisee, the Religion of Mankind," Newman describes our moral infirmity before the presence of God known in our conscience. Like the soul called to account in Newman's poem *Gerontius*, saints see themselves as in the sight of God and so recognize their own sinfulness both as the human religious condition and the distinctive mark of the Christian.47 With pulpit eloquence, Newman says:

Yes, my Brethren, it is the ignorance of our understanding, it is our spiritual blindness, it is our banishment from the presence of Him who is the source and the standard of all Truth, which is the cause of this meagre, heartless religion of which men are commonly so proud. Had we any proper insight into things as they are, had we any real apprehension of God as He is, of ourselves as we are, we should never dare to serve Him without fear, or to rejoice unto Him without trembling. And it is the removal of this veil which is spread between our eyes and heaven, it is the pouring in upon the soul of the illuminating grace of the New Covenant, which makes the religion of the Christian...(26).

47 Edward E. Kelly suggests that *Gerontius*, which Newman wrote eight months after completing the *Apologia*, may be "an appended finale" to the *Apologia*. "The Dream of *Gerontius*: An Appended Finale to the *Apologia*?"
In "Waiting for Christ," Newman emphasizes the Lord of the conscience in grace, i.e., the absorbing presence of the Thought of God, a divine gift known in habitual attentiveness or in "looking out for the Lord." The axis of conscience deep within us is vitalized by the Thought of God with the result that "our citizenship, and our social duties, our active life, our daily intercourse, is with the world unseen" (38-9).

Just before and just after Newman’s fifth sermon during the week before Christmas in 1856 in which he explicitly teaches about conscience, he preaches two sermons on the subject of grace. These sermons, "The Secret Power of Divine Grace" and "Omnipotence in Bonds," concern the divine source of the inner religious life which makes moral life possible and confers significance on all endeavour including the study of philosophy or science at the University. In "The Secret Power of Divine Grace," Newman preaches to the congregation in the University Church of the supernatural influence of God’s grace within us as our true happiness which was forfeited through Adam’s self-will. He preaches of the early Church where this divine inward gift beyond outward observation, restored to humankind in the New Testament, took an internal hold on the hearts of many individuals. Newman explains that preaching was only an outward instrument of this supernatural gift; the kingdom of Christ "came by an inward and intimate visitation...really by God’s own agency" (49). This sermon on grace makes clear the distinction between the role of the Church and the University. Newman states that what Christ loves in the Church as "a collection of souls brought together in one by God’s secret grace" is "not human nature simply, but human nature illuminated and renovated by His own supernatural power" (57-8). The ideal envisaged by Newman at the Catholic University of Ireland was that of the Church, the outward instrument fostering the "secret power of divine grace," in alliance with the intellectual life of the University. Together they would train "men to the use of the gifts of nature in the sunlight of divine grace and revealed truth."48 Newman says that "it is not philosophy or science, letters or arts, which will make us dear to God" and a great University "is...but foolishness and vanity in the sight...of the little ones of Christ" (58).

Finally, in "Omnipotence in Bonds," Newman reminds the students of the disposition needed to lead this life of the theocentric conscience. He provides his listeners with a model for obedience to conscience in the incarnated God who, although "omnipotent...fixed in His own centre, and needing no point of motion or vantage-ground out of Himself," nonetheless spent his earthly life in subordination to the human condition from womb to tomb. In this

model of Christ, Newman sees "the most awful antagonism to the very idea and essence of sin" as insubordination and self-will (77-8, 88).

A second important channel for formation of faith through personal influence was in the small colleges or houses attached to the University. In "Discipline and Influence," an article written for the university newspaper, Newman alludes to the collegiate system in which religion "is embodied" (74). In another article entitled "Professors and Tutors," he refers to the Colleges as "the direct and special instruments, which the Church uses in a University, for the attainment of her sacred objects" (Historical Sketches, 183).49 The small residences of no more than twenty students with a resident dean, a chaplain, and tutors provided a locum for the moral and religious formation of students through the kindness, the vigilance, and the model of those charged with this responsibility. Newman emphasizes the need for the smallness of these houses in "Professors and Tutors." He observes that neither large nor small bodies of students are easy to manage but "if I must choose between the two, I would rather drive four-in-hand, than the fifty wild cows which were harnessed to the travelling wagon of the Tartars" (191). The sagacious appointment of Deans and Tutors was also a key element in the establishment of houses if the theocentric conscience of students was to be developed through personal influence. In a letter to Dr. Cullen in 1852, Newman refers to the importance of such positions which comprise the working body of the University and of the difficulty of his making them because he does not know many people.50

As when he was a Tutor at Oxford, Newman believed that the pastoral role of Tutor did not simply mean responsibility for the thorough and methodical intellectual preparation of the student; it also meant responsibility for the student's expanding moral and religious life. While the ultimate goal of religious formation was the life of conscience based on an awareness of the need for God's grace, Newman recognized that at the beginning many of the sixteen-year old youths would arrive at the colleges as hereditary Christians. In "Professors and Tutors," Newman describes students arriving at university "under no definite obligation to be better than their neighbours, only bound by that general Christian profession, which those

49 In a letter in July, 1852 to Dr. Moriarty, Newman states: "I do not think that a University has to do with morals...nor do I think the Church employs a University for morals...but I think she uses small bodies in the Universities, Colleges, Halls, etc etc. as the preservation of morals, more naturally." (Letters and Diaries, vol. 15, 136).

50 This letter is cited by Fergal McGrath, 190-1. McGrath also relates the problems Newman experienced in exercising the right to make appointments. The first dean of St. Patrick's House was appointed by Dr. Cullen whose role in relation to Newman as Rector was not clearly defined (Newman's University: Idea and Reality, 341-2).
neighbours share with them." Or they may be secularized, "so little weaned from the world that their very studies are perhaps the result of their ambition" (184). In the same article, he comments on the need of youths for moral guidance such as is provided by the college houses. He observes that when youths first leave home, there "are few people whose minds are not unsettled on being thrown out of habits of regularity; few who do not suffer, when withdrawn from the eye of those who know them, or from the scrutiny of public opinion" (184). And a little later, he states that "regularity, rule, respect for others, the eye of friends and acquaintances, the absence from temptation, external restraints generally, are of first importance in protecting us against ourselves" (189). He argues that in small communities, the student's "better thoughts will find countenance, and his good resolutions support." He will find "his heedlessness forewarned, and his prospective deviations anticipated" (189-90).

In another article in the series, "Athenian Schools: Influence," Newman explains to his student readers the value of rules which externalize moral principles. He writes that in the divine order of things, Conscience and Revelation are internal and external monitors from the same Author, but

man,—not being divine, nor over partial to so stern a reprover within his breast, yet seeing too the necessity of some rule or other, some common standard of conduct...looks about him how he can manage to dispense with Conscience, and find some other principle to do its work. The most plausible and obvious and ordinary of these expedients, is the Law of the State, human law; the more plausible and ordinary, because it really comes to us with a divine sanction, and necessarily has a place in every society or community of men (Historical Sketches, iii, 79).

Newman recognized the need for rules. He lists, for example, the degrees of disciplinary sanctions that the Rector or Head of a House might apply: an admonition, prohibition from the town, confinement to the house, the imposition of a fine. However, his pastoral concern was to encourage through personal sympathy the inward life of conscience in the way of St. Paul or St. Philip Neri. In "The Mission of St. Philip Neri," Newman refers to the saint's reputation for drawing "souls as the magnet draws iron" and he speaks of St. Philip's tender and ardent love of each individually (Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 237). Similarly, in "The Mission of St. Benedict," Newman provides a model for religious education in the method of moral suasion of the second abbot at Wearmouth who corrects by Rule, but wins in an unaffected, gentle, and kind manner so that others desire not to repeat an offence (Historical Sketches, ii, 403).

51 My Campaign in Ireland, 121.
In his first Report as Rector, Newman observes that the youths at the University, neither still boys nor yet men, "were in that most dangerous and least docile time of life." He cautions that "nothing is more perilous to the soul than the sudden transition from restraint to liberty" and proposed as a guiding principle...that the young for the most part cannot be driven, but on the other hand, are open to persuasion, and to the influence of kindness and personal attachment; and that, in consequence, they are to be kept straight by indirect contrivances rather than by authoritative enactments and naked prohibitions.

Fergal McGrath suggests that Newman’s guideline says "about all that is worth saying of the difficult and ever-recurring problem of combining liberty and discipline in adolescent education." However, in the light of Newman’s religious view of conscience, his appeal to kindness and moral suasion in his report has a theocentric resonance.

Newman hoped that a religious and moral influence would be exercised by Tutors as it had been when he was Tutor at Oriel. In My Campaign in Ireland, Newman says of Tutors that where there is private teaching, there will be real influence. He suggests that the way to the heart of bright students is through their studies as they are most nearly interested in them. In "the intercourse of mind with mind," (114) sitting through the difficulties of philosophy and thought from the pagan past will become an occasion of Christian advancement. The constant work of the Tutor will also include dealing with the defective knowledge of the backward student and persisting with the idle. With neither academic authority nor right of discipline, the Tutor is to be a student’s friend and guide, providing a union of intellectual and moral influence, "the separation of which is the evil of the age" (120).

Newman hoped that personal influence would be exercised not only by Tutors and Deans but also by students somewhat in the manner of Arnold’s sixth form boys at Rugby. He suggested awarding exhibitions by concursus or competition, claiming that generally "the most studious are the best principled and most religiously minded." These students would be granted certain privileges such as "having a separate table in the refectory, admittance to the library, an entrée into the Dean’s and Tutor’s rooms"; they would serve Mass and help in the preparation of the reading list for students. Without "having a shadow of jurisdiction over the rest," they

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52 My Campaign in Ireland, Report for the year 1854-55, 36.

53 Newman’s University: Idea and Reality, 338.
would "constitute a middle party between the superiors and students" and become centres of influence.\textsuperscript{54}

In contrast to rules and external restraints, the development of conscience requires individual measures. To suggest the interplay of rule and discretionary action in guiding conduct, Newman alludes to the distinction between equity and law. He remarks:

It is easy enough to make your rule and keep it; but it is quite a science...to maintain a persevering, gentle oversight, to use a minute discretion, to adapt your treatment to the particular case, to go just as far as you safely may with each mind, and no further, and to do all this with no selfish ends, with no sacrifice of sincerity and frankness, and with no suspicion of partiality.\textsuperscript{55}

In keeping with this kind of superintendence, Newman comments in "Professors and Tutors" on the wisdom of wisely channeling energies and interests rather than forbidding them: "it has always been considered the wisdom of lawgivers and founders, to find a safe outlet for natural impulses and sentiments, which are sure to be found in their subjects, and which are hurtful only in excess; and to direct, and moderate, and variously influence what they cannot extinguish" (Historical Sketches, 190). Acting on this principle, Newman had the stables behind the college residence converted to a billiard room for students in order to deter them from patronizing a Dublin establishment.

Newman's description in his first Report as Rector of moral responsibility towards students at the University suggests the path through conscience and the medium of personal influence such as is exercised in the Colleges. He writes of this responsibility as that

of a kind Mother, an Alma Mater, who inspires affection while she whispers truth; who enlists imagination, taste, and ambition on the side of duty; who seeks to impress hearts with noble and heavenly maxims at the age when they are most susceptible, and to win and subdue them when they are most impetuous and self-willed; who warns them while she indulges them, and sympathises with them while she remonstrates with them; who superintends the use of the liberty which she gives them, and teaches them to turn to account the failures which she had not at all risks prevented.\textsuperscript{56}

The final important contribution of the church towards the student at the University was in its provision of devotions and sacraments. In these the student was \textit{solus cum solo}, alone with the Lord of Conscience. In My Campaign in Ireland, Newman states that students were to give to the Head of their house the name of their Confessor at the beginning of the ses-

\textsuperscript{54} My Campaign in Ireland, Report for the Year 1854-5, 40.

\textsuperscript{55} My Campaign in Ireland, 38-39.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 339.
sion. They were expected to frequent the sacraments, to attend the University High Mass, and devotions appointed for them by the Head (118). In "The Mission of St. Philip," Newman observes that the "instrument of conversion" of the tireless founder of his order was the sacrament of Penance, i.e., in the conscience of the individual in relation to God (234). In his sixth Dublin University sermon, "Omnipotence in Bonds," Newman makes reference to the sacrament of communion as a channel of God's presence, cautioning against its profanation. At the conclusion of the Grammar of Assent, Newman also refers to communion with the unseen elicited through the "rites and ordinances" of the Church, above all in "His literal presence" in "the Holy Mass" and "His personal abidance in our churches" (376). He states that through devotions and sacraments "He brings Himself before us" and lives "to our imaginations...with a practical efficacy" (377). In his third Dublin university sermon, "Waiting for Christ," Newman directs the attention of his listeners to the channels provided by the Church for nurturing an "energetic, direct apprehension of an unseen Lord" (40). He describes the devotions of the Church, evolved over the ages, which survey "Him, feature by feature," fixing the "gaze more fully upon the person" of the unseen Lord. The Image or Thought of God is made real through devotions which engage the imagination and emotions by meditating on one concrete feature at a time: "His Five Wounds...His infancy...His agony, His scourging....the cross" ("Waiting for Christ," 40-1).57 As Newman states in the Grammar, this teaching of religion both through the imagination and the intellect "speaks to us one by one, and it is received by us one by one, as the counterpart, so to say, of ourselves, and is real as we are real" (379). The role of the Church at the University is to provide for the student those personal channels which awaken the life of the theocentric conscience.

Just as Newman's validation of speculative thought was against the current of Baconian utility, his emphasis on conscience as the creative principle of religion was counter to the scientific argument from design. Arguments for the existence of God from the physical world, such as Paley's Evidences or the Bridgewater Treatises, met science on its own territory where knowledge of God was limited both by the terrain and the methods associated with this knowledge. In his argument to the existence of God from conscience, Newman brought back the argument to the broad field of religious truth known in the relation between God and individu-

57 In the Apologia, Newman comments on "Mariolatry," saints, devotions, etc., as directing the individual towards God. He states "I know full well now...that the Catholic Church allows no image of any sort, material or immaterial, no dogmatic symbol, no rite, no sacrament, no Saint, not even the Blessed Virgin herself, to come between the soul and its Creator. It is face to face, 'solus cum solo,' in all matters between man and his God" (284-5).
als and ultimately through Revelation. In "Proof of Theism," Newman states that he was led to this doctrine "not only by its truth, but by its...appositeness in this day....as a proof common to all....carried about in a compact form in every soul" (121). He observes that "it is intimately combined with practice. It is not some abstract truth wrought out by the pure intellect, or wrought out theoretically, as that from design. It goes to the root of the matter, and is the source of practical religion as well as speculative" (122).

The importance of the religious development of conscience is emphasized by Newman in his portrayal in the Idea of the "ethical character, which the cultivated intellect will form, apart from religious principle" (160). This gentlemanly product of the University is an upright, well-adjusted citizen for whom pride is "the motive principle of the soul, [although] it seldom comes to view." Pride becomes the very staple of the religion and morality held in honour in a day like our own....it is the very household god of society, as at present constituted, inspiring neatness and decency in the servant girl, propriety of carriage and refined manners in her mistress, uprightness, manliness, and generosity in the head of the family....it tills the field, it stocks and embellishes the shop....It breathes upon the face of the community, and the hollow sepulchre is forthwith beautiful to look upon (157-8).

J.A. Passmore discusses this slide towards utilitarian ethics in "The Malleability of Man in Eighteenth-Century Thought." He cites St. Augustine who states that if "virtues" are not all referred to God, they lose their true goodness and incur vainglory. He observes that for the Augustinian, men act well only when they act out of caritas, defined by St. Thomas Aquinas as "friendship for God" (27). Certainly this contrasts with Bacon's appeal to charity as "referred to the good of men and mankind" (Advancement, 6). Here, "charity" is understood not in the sense of caritas or "friendship for God," but broadly as service rendered for the physical well-being of others. Although Bacon uses religious arguments for this service to others, as in Christ's cure of bodily ailments, there is a different polarity that tends towards

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58 Passmore's article is in relation to eighteenth-century education. He states that morality cannot be inculcated by education if caritas, understood as friendship for God, is essential to it (26-32). What is vice in theology becomes a virtue in the ethical realm. Passmore refers to Locke's recommendation in Some Thoughts Concerning Education that children be generous to friends for the good esteem in which they will be held with the added incentive that those who are well liked usually are given the most (27).
Bentham's greatest happiness for the greatest number. 59 In the Idea, Newman states that Bacon made no claims to moral instruction in his philosophy, remarking that "[m]oral virtue was not the line in which he undertook to instruct men." Newman states in terms suggestive of utilitarian ethics: "His is simply a Method whereby bodily discomforts and temporal wants are to be most effectually removed from the greatest number" (89-90).

Passmore states that in a transvaluation of values in the eighteenth century the sights for virtue were lowered. Without a theological reference, virtue operates on a second level, that of "civic" virtue, or the "well-adjusted citizen," or accommodation to the opinions and rules of others in a world well-regulated by vanity or self-love (30). As Newman states in the Idea, the "embellishment of the exterior is almost the beginning and the end" of philosophical morality (155). Conscience becomes propriety.

In Newman's vision of the Catholic University of Ireland, the cultivated intellect was reunited with moral discipline, training people, as he said in "The Mission of St. Philip Neri," to the "use of the gifts of nature in the sunlight of divine grace and revealed truth" (Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 221). In the Christian humanist tradition, the Church in alliance with the University forms the Christian gentleman. As Vincent Blehl suggests, this Christian humanist view was a coincidentia oppositorium in which the vertical axis of the transcendental relation effected through obedience to conscience is coupled with the horizontal axis of the disciplined, cultivated intellect.60 It is through the conjunction of the theocentric conscience and the cultivated intellect that graduates will distinguish between the broad areas of truth of God, mankind, and physical nature. Through their liberal education, they will develop the habit of examining matters from first principles, appreciating that methods applica-

59 G.H. Bantok notes Bacon's equation of the improvement of man's mind with the improvement of man's lot and suggests that "Dr. Basil Willey is not far out when he urges that Bacon wished to free natural knowledge from any imputation of being forbidden or esoteric and that his prayer that 'things human may not interfere with things divine'...was perhaps urged in the interest of science rather than of faith." (Studies in the History of Educational Theory, vol. 1, 169).

Dr. Rawley in his "Life of Bacon" published in 1657 defends Bacon: "This lord was religious: for though the world be apt to suspect and prejudge great wits and politics to have somewhat of the atheist, yet he was conversant with God, as appeareth by several passages throughout the whole current of his writings. Otherwise he should have crossed his own principles, which were, That a little philosophy maketh men apt to forget God, as attributing too much to second causes; but depth of philosophy bringeth a man back to God again." Works of Francis Bacon, 14.

ble to one area are dangerous when misapplied to another. Like Newman, they will be able to distinguish between knowledge useful for physical well-being and the knowledge of *theoria*, described by Aristotle as "small in bulk" but surpassing "everything else in power and value" (*Ethics*, 291); they will recognize religion and philosophy as contradictory modes, and that, whereas conscience requires obedience, the intellect requires mastery. In moral issues they will be attentive to right and wrong; in intellectual matters, they will be put on the road to distinguishing true from false, observing the tenacious imbalances in the issues of their day and what has been omitted from popular arguments.
Conclusion

Newman's characteristic mode of thought is to exercise judgment according to the lines of demarcation between areas of truth, branches of knowledge, and the methods through which they are known. In so doing, he illustrates the "philosophic" habit of mind encouraged through a liberal education which is inclusive of all branches of learning known in relation to their ideas, i.e., as *theoria* or liberal knowledge. From a knowledge of the various broad areas of truth and the principles and methods associated with them, the graduate will be prepared both to look for the intelligible idea behind facts and to resist opinions unsubstantiated by facts; he will be alert to errors of omission in the assumptions of his age and wary of inflexible dogmatism resulting from any single method assuming ascendancy over all others. Newman's reasoning is a pattern of this habit of thought in his separation of religious and moral knowledge from other areas, in his defense of speculative truth and of the literary-rhetorical mode of reasoning which were at risk as a result of the increasing dominance of the Baconian method.

The contention between methods is like the warfare of ideas described by Newman in the Development of Christian Doctrine. Here he refers to "ideas under their various aspects striving for the mastery, each of them enterprising, engrossing, imperious, more or less incompatible with the rest, and rallying followers or rousing foes" (39). Newman's validation of a rhetorical-literary mode of reasoning fits into a context of a longstanding struggle which erupts when either rationalist or rhetorical schools seek exclusive domination outside their own area. His struggle finds parallels in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and in ancient Greece. In her chapter on the "Humanist Critique of Scholastic Debate," Erica Rummel's account of the Renaissance counter-claims on behalf of rhetoric against the exclusive claims of logical dialectic reveals arguments similar to Newman's in his resistance to the intrusion of rationalist-empirical methods into areas where they were inadequate. The Renaissance rhetorical-humanist school observed that it dealt with belief and probability; like Newman in the Grammar, it argued "that formal and informal modes of inference must be placed on an equal footing."1

Taking the same argument for utility claimed by science in the nineteenth century, the humanist school maintained that scholastic debates had no use in their application to life (183) and that, while logic was useful as a tool, taken on its own it had disabled many and damaged souls through contentiousness. Formal Aristotelian logic with its specialized terms was a fiction; by contrast, humanist pedagogy, moving away from an authoritarian approach and the

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1 Erica Rummel, The Humanist-Scholastic Debate in the Renaissance and Reformation, 168.
mechanical reproduction of material taught, provided a "more sympathetic approach to learners," encouraging its students to internalize learning and use it creatively (190).

In the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E. in Greece, a similar confusion of methods is evident in the historical jostling for position by the three subjects which were eventually to become the trivium. A harmonious relationship between the science of logic and rhetoric is expressed in the trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric perceived as a cycle or curriculum (literally "run through"). Plato condemns poetic tragedy as inconducive to morality because in tragedy reason did not dominate over the emotions; he dismisses poetry as imitating particulars rather than reaching towards universals and as being once removed from the form in things themselves; he finds fault with rhetoric on the grounds that its practitioners disregard truth although he later acknowledged the service of rhetoric to philosophy in adjusting "the philosophical argument to different kinds of people." This is counter to the fifteenth and sixteenth-century humanists who claimed that rhetoric was more suited to morality than to dialectics." Friedrich Solmsen suggests that Aristotle calls poetry and rhetoric "two forms of human activity whose aims are set high" before the tribunal of philosophy and that both obtain their legitimacy from this perspective. He remarks that Aristotle’s philosophic rhetoric provides a more scientific approach to rhetoric with its formulation of syllogisms and of types and underlying ideas in what previous teachers of rhetoric may have simply provided as material for mechanical memorization. As described by Solmsen, Aristotle’s rhetorician resembles the person of cultivated intellect depicted by Coleridge for whom "method" is a habit or Newman’s gentleman who sees the idea uniting particulars. Friedrich Solmsen says of the Aristotelian type:

Here lies the difference between a hack-rhetorician unable to rise above the practical details and a man with philosophical training who has learnt in Plato’s school to look for the form and principle common to many individual specimens.

2 It is precisely on the grounds of its concreteness that F.R. Leavis justifies poetry as a mode of thought against the normative and abstract expectations of philosophy. To approach poetry from the perspective of philosophy, like Plato, is a fault in method. "Literary Criticism and Philosophy," The Common Pursuit.

3 Friedrich Solmsen in his introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics.

4 Ibid., xv.

5 Ibid., xiv.

6 Ibid., xvii.
Hans-Georg Gadamer in *Truth and Method* also speaks of the clash between two different modes of thought, referring to the antithesis "found at the very beginning of philosophy" in "Plato's critique of sophism." Gadamer notes the "new valuation of rhetoric" in the "revival of the classical languages" and the fight with scholastic science which could not reach the ideal of human wisdom attained through rhetoric. In the seventeenth century, the "methodological awareness" of the sciences made "this old problem...more acute," raising the question "of whether in the humanistic concept of Bildung [culture] there was not a special source of truth" (18).

Marshall McLuhan in three essays, "Edgar Poe's Tradition (1944), "An Ancient Quarrel in Modern America" (1946) and "The Southern Quality" (1947) in *The Literary Criticism of Marshall McLuhan 1943/1962* provides a comprehensive historical perspective on the pedagogical differences between the humanist rhetorical approach to truth and the rationalist approach. He connects the dialectical method championed by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle subordinating rhetoric to the abstractions of logic with the twelfth and thirteenth century subordination of metaphysics, theology, and politics to logic by Abelard and Ockham. He further connects scholastic method with Calvinist theology transplanted to America which applied method to efficient production, "scientific" scholarship and business administration and in a "fault of method" also applied method to metaphysics, ontology and the rhetorical truth of Scripture. He states that "...James, and Dewey could never have been heard of had they not been nurtured in the Speculative tradition of the scholastic theologians Calvin and Ramus" (215). The atomized heart-head split is analytical rather than contemplative; it is doctrinaire and morally aggressive, characterized by pedagogical earnestness and a faith in social planning. On the other hand, the rhetorical school of the humanists extends from the maligned Sophists through the pervasive influence of Cicero in western education, in St. Augustine’s *De Doctrina Christiana*, and in the many manuals of education such as More’s *Utopia*, Castiglione’s *Courtier*, Ascham’s *Scholemaster*, and Erasmus’ *Education of a Christian Prince*. The humanist tradition emphasized encyclopedic knowledge, eloquence proceeding from wisdom, and the spiritual energy of the whole man engaged in a universally accepted passionate view of life and history, aiming at making each person a "complete musical work" rather than "a note in the musical score of society" (224-5).

The volley exchanged towards the beginning of the nineteenth century at Oxford between the defenders of a classical, literary education and the advocates of science in Edinburgh, to which Newman alludes in the *Idea*, is yet a further instance of the uneasy relations between the rhetorical-humanist mode of thought and the rationalist-philosophical-scientific
mode. In this context, the quarrel between the defenders of literature at Oxford and the champions of science in Edinburgh becomes more than "a rather disappointing collection of competing quotations" from earlier squabbles largely forgotten by Newman’s listeners.

In his Memoirs, Mark Pattison describes the opposing parties in nineteenth-century Oxford as opposite camps in logic, the one espousing *a priori* logic and the other nominalist forms of logic such as Richard Whately’s version of Aristotelianism in the earlier part of the century and John Stuart Mill’s logic after mid-century. Edward Sillem cites Pattison:

> Ever since 1830, at least, there has been among us an ebb and flow; one while of nominalistic, another while of *a priori* logic. Logic appears to a superficial observer to be merely used in the Oxford schools as material upon which questions may be framed. In spite of this appearance there is always a prevailing or accepted logic asserting itself as true over the opposite system, which it denounces as false....When Tractarianism had made the clergy aware of their own strength, and high sacerdotal doctrines were openly proclaimed, we fell off from Whately, and vague, indefinite, realistic views under the influence of Coleridge and Sir William Hamilton slowly occupied the schools....Coincident with [Newman’s secession], was the appearance of Mill’s great work, and Oxford repudiated at once sacerdotal principles and Kantian logic (Philosophical Notebook, vol. 1, 168).  

Pattison states that for more than a quarter of a century Mill’s views reigned in the schools until the Franco-Prussian war when there was a fresh invasion of sacerdotalism imported from Germany.

Newman sought to ensure that religious knowledge, literature, and science in connection to the methods associated with their study were included in the curriculum of the Catholic University of Ireland. His interests and background disposed him towards an appreciation of the full spectrum of scientific and rhetorical reasoning as represented in the trivium in logic and rhetoric. Through the influence of the Aristotelian logic of Richard Whately and through his immersion in the works of the Church Fathers after 1832, Newman could value both


In *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, Wilfred Ward also refers to Mark Pattison’s comments in the context of theology and science at Oxford. Ward suggests that after Newman’s secession in 1845 "with dramatic suddenness theology went out and science came in as the ruling principle of the academic mind." He cites Pattison’s comment that the great discoveries of the last half-century of chemistry, physiology, etc. were unknown to them and that science "was placed under a ban by the theologians who instinctively felt that it was fatal to their speculations" (307).
approaches. That Newman was relatively well grounded in mathematics is attested by the list of books that he prepared for exams at Trinity in 1820, by his testimony concerning his study of math as preparation for the Oriel fellowship, and statements made in 1830-1 concerning his study of "analytical or 'modern French' mathematics." His interest in modern science is indicated by his attendance in the summers of 1819 and 1821 at Buckland's lectures in geology and mineralogy as well as lectures in Natural Philosophy. In a memorandum around 1821, Newman mentions chemistry as one of his "chief studies."

J.A. Froude states that at Oxford Newman was "interested in everything which was going on in science, in politics, in literature. Nothing was too large for him, nothing too trivial, if it threw light upon the central question, what man really was, and what his destiny." Newman's interest was from the perspective of a man of general culture or of the liberally educated gentleman; it was connected to the broader questions, in distinguishing the principles of geology, for example, or the nature and range of geometry in relation to algebra. This is the perspective described by Newman in the Idea where he describes truth as the object of knowledge:

All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system of complex fact, and this of course resolves itself into an indefinite number of particular facts, which, as being portions of a whole, have countless relations of every kind, one towards another (33).

The liberal education at the heart of Newman's university considered branches of learning such as modern science, philosophy, mathematics, and history as sciences or according to a logical development of ideas; language as an important part of the curriculum was in the humanist tradition such as transmitted by Quintilian to train students in connecting word to thought or idea. While the pedagogical principle of "development and arrangement from and around a common centre" is common to all areas, the method of the broad field of literature was clearly distinguished from the logic of science. In other words, Newman observed the

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10 Argument from Conscience, 32.
11 Ibid., 33.
12 Ibid., 33.
13 Cited in Argument from Conscience, 34. cf., Dwight Culler in The Imperial Intellect, 116.
14 James M. Cameron states in reference to this European cultural tradition that "We are what the seven liberal arts have made us, and if we were to forget them we should be undone. We should be like men who had forgotten their names and where they were born" (On the Idea of a University, 23).
important connection between method and subject-matter maintained by Aristotle and by Bacon, two great arbiters of method. Newman expressed the importance of this connection in the Grammar where he comments that if in our pursuits we take

the way of observation or of experiment, of speculation or of research, of demonstration or of probability, whether we are inquiring into the system of the universe or into the elements of matter and of life, or into the history of human society and past times, if we take the way proper to our subject-matter, we have His blessing (275-6).

The way of religion, described by Newman as the most rugged and circuitous, was also followed under the auspices of the Church as adjunct to the University to complete the humanist training in the Christian humanist tradition. In religious formation, development of the theocentric conscience was encouraged through sacraments, sermons, and personal relations.

Wilfred Ward’s biography of Newman provides ample testimony to the mode of thought typically exercised by Newman. Ward cites Father Ryder, one of the priests at the Oratory in Birmingham, who wrote of Newman’s method in controversy and in his writings in philosophy. Father Ryder states that Newman’s method was marked not by linear development of thought but by a wider pathway. This is suggestive of the converging probabilities described by Newman in the Grammar. Father Ryder observed that Newman’s controversial method was certainly the very reverse of that of the logical metaphysician....Not that his treatment is not full of logic, but it is logic in solution where the reader finds himself pursuing an argument almost unconsciously. He does not care to project himself along a single line or many single lines of logical thought along which at best the mere logical simulacrum of his reader, not the whole concrete man, will follow him; but he would fain make a wide pathway wherein a traveller may move rejoicing, carrying with him all that is his. He sometimes seems to shrink from abstractions as from attenuated truths and endeavours to frame his argument from concrete to concrete (vol. 2, 357-8).

This method is the organon described in the Grammar; it is simply the psychological law of our minds reaching towards indemonstrable truth. We are certain through a spontaneous judgment of mind based not just on probability but on an accumulation of probabilities. Newman’s organon, like Aristotle’s, was intended particularly for human matters which require deliberation and a harmonizing of seemingly disparate facts and views.

As the testimony provided by Ward suggests, this organon was applicable not only to the way an individual arrives at certainty but also to the way truth is wrought out in collegial and theological bodies. Ward cites a letter from Newman in 1863 to Ormsby, one of the Professors engaged by Newman for the Catholic University of Ireland. Here Newman states that truth "is wrought out by many minds working together freely" (vol. 2, 49). Ward points out that one
of Newman's ideals in establishing the Catholic University of Ireland was to provide a forum for "research and discussion of the questions of the day" (vol. 2, 50) similar to the vehicles in the Middle Ages which allowed for the sifting of theological truths. Ward cites Newman's deep regret that no such forum existed in England for testing various theological views and for accommodating scientific facts and facts of historical criticism into traditional theology. In a letter to W.G. Ward, Newman wrote:

I suppose, in the Middle Ages, (which have a manliness and boldness, of which now there is so great a lack) a question was first debated in a University, then in one University against another, or by one Order of Friars against another;—then perhaps it came before a theological faculty; then it went to the Metropolitan; and so, by various stages and through many examinations and judgments, it came before the Holy See" (vol. 1, 560).

Newman's description of the work of a College of Theologians is similar to his view of the University which brought all areas of learning together and the voices of the several professors in the different branches of knowledge. He states that the Church is a community, not a philosophy (vol. 2, 296), that individuals have played an important role in Councils of the Church which meet for the purpose of deliberation and sit until they agree. To reach theological truth is the work of many years, "the gradual operation of the learning and knowledge of the Church as a whole" (vol. 2, 287), using methods in which typically the extreme points of view of schools of thought are eliminated and they become one "because the truth to which they converged was one" (vol. 2, 297). The function of a theologian is to know how many opinions there are on every point, to trace the history of doctrines in successive centuries, and apply the principles of the past to the present (vol. 2, 281).

Newman's concerns in his last years as described in a memorandum by Father Neville, a companion at the Oratory, were for the educated laity and the need for intellectual defenses of Christianity which did not reject the principles of science. In a memorandum to Wilfred Ward, he urged "the necessity of drawing up a systematic statement of the main points on which there was a divergence between the conclusions generally received among men of science, including the Biblical and historical critics, and the generally received opinions in the theological schools" (vol. 2, 475).

The kind of mind that considered truth converging from physical science, historical criticism, and theology and was familiar with methods in their application to these different areas of truth was the kind of mind trained in a liberal education—a mind with internal resources, strengthened through vantage points in speculative thought. It was a mind "perfectly
imperturbable in its basis of intellect." In his views on education, Newman was at once in a long tradition and counter to the currents of his age. Marrou remarks of Plato's educational aims that, as often happens in the quirks of history, what is retrieved from the past becomes a means of advance towards the future. Newman asserted the value in education of speculative thought neglected in the Baconian era. He demonstrated the need for what Aristotle called a man of general culture who, broadly familiar with areas of truth and an arbiter of method, was far-seeing through his understanding of theories and their consequences. In an age which was increasingly to give credence only to proof obtained through induction, Newman sought to describe the organon through which we know indemonstrable truth. His habitual practice of distinguishing between methods and first principles as demonstrated in the Idea, in his sermons, and in the Grammar of Assent is in itself testimony to the enduring need for the kind of education which provided training in first principles and various modes of thought.

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15 Marrou writes: "L'histoire est coutumière de tels relais: ce qui était chez lui une sur-vivance du passé révolu se trouve être en même temps un jalon vers l'avenir" (105).
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