Love and the Will:
Hegel on the Spiritual Basis of Modern Politics

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of Political Science
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Abstract

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The dissertation is an examination of the ontology underpinning Hegel’s social and political thought, and his attempt to comprehend how this ontology is realized in modernity, through the modern principle of will. Hegel’s thought generally is seen to fall within the Rousseauian and German Idealist aspiration to articulate a general will at the foundation of a uniquely modern political community that can harmonize individual freedom with social unity and a sense of belonging. Hegel’s ontology of the general will is identified as being of a religious or spiritual nature, deriving from Holderlin’s notion of an Identity that exists in Being, and manifest in human existence in the experience of love. The dissertation traces Hegel’s legacy in terms of his encounter with the problem of the antagonism between the experience of love on the one hand, and the modern principle of reflective rationality and will that have come to dominate the secular world on the other, and his subsequent attempt to work out how these two principles could be reconciled. It is argued that, for Hegel, in spite of the will’s self-alienation from love, its drive to assert itself in the world around it is ultimately rooted in the subconscious knowledge of love, and that this experience of love is re-encountered in achievements of moral action and forgiveness. It is further argued that this
expression of love through the will is at the root of the objectification depicted in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, in the valid laws and institutions of the modern state. The failure of Hegel’s state to find historical realization is explained from within Hegel’s own terms, in the notion that the colonizing impulse of reflective rationality could eclipse the consciousness of the divine upon which objectification depends. In light of this, the need to cultivate a consciousness of the divine, or of love, is identified as the most pressing issue of our age. Overall, the study seeks to illuminate Hegel’s invaluable contribution to our understanding of the existential tension between love and the will, and of the role that philosophy must play for moderns in vindicating the experience of love.
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Introduction:

HEGEL IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERNITY
The age of modernity is the age of abstract freedom, the shaking free of the bonds of traditional community, of the natural ties of birth, and the stepping forth into the world as an individual equal in worth to all. It is this feature that is fundamentally determinative of the meaning of modernity, and it is with the implications of this feature that thinkers have sought to grapple since the beginning of its emergence in history.

In political theory, Hobbes constitutes a major marking point for the category of the modern, precisely because it is the modern individual that he takes up as his subject. The individual with which the discussion of the Leviathan begins is the individual torn from the context of community, ripped out of the existing structures of identity, and considered side by side with other, similarly abstracted individuals. This was no misguided intellectual exercise; Hobbes was writing after the time of the religious civil wars when individuals had, on a mass scale, begun to abstract themselves from the community and to assert themselves as individuals. His philosophy is a reflection of what was happening in life. And in recognizing this emerging reality, Hobbes begins to chart, with powerful precision, the profound implications of the modern principle of subjectivity for human existence.

The "war of all against all" that Hobbes depicts in the Leviathan must be understood fundamentally as the struggle of the modern for identity. For while the traditional individual was given an identity at birth, situated in a particular class, a particular gender, a particular vocation, according to the idea of nature, the modern is given nothing by nature; what she becomes she must make herself into. And this requires the effort to gain the recognition of others. That is why the category of "glory" figures so prominently in Hobbes. Glory is defined as "Joy, arising from the imagination of a man's own power and ability" (Hobbes
1985:124-25). But power and ability are not, generally speaking, objective qualities. For power in a complex society entails most essentially the power to influence others, the power to add others' influence to one's own (Hobbes 1985:150). And this power only exists in the medium of recognition. The individual who seeks power thus seeks the qualities that will influence others, seeks to cultivate an identity that will sustain them in the world. But because the qualities that go into making an identity are always relative, because in order to be regarded as intelligent or handsome one must be measured against one who is less intelligent and less handsome, the seeking after recognition is fundamentally antagonistic. There is no solid ground of identity upon which one can rest secure. Rather there is a constant process of struggle to acquire and sustain one's identity in relation to others. Furthermore, opting out of the pursuit of identity is not possible, for identity is tied to survival. One needs others to survive, and so one needs qualities that can influence others. And these qualities only exist, only sustain their power, through the medium of recognition.

Hobbes' depiction of the freedom of modern subjects in terms of the desperate pursuit of an ephemeral identity, and the dynamic of antagonism bound up with that pursuit, is a depiction of the problem that has, in one way or another, preoccupied thinkers of modernity since. The shattering of the bonds of trust upon which traditional community depended, the undermining of the security and stability of that world, and the condition of alienation, insecurity and war into which moderns have thrust themselves in their struggle for individual freedom, constitutes the paradox of modernity. The principle of subjectivity is the hallmark of the modern age. But what Hobbes teaches us is that this very principle itself binds us into a condition of unfreedom. As Rousseau was later to articulate: "Men are born free, but
everywhere they are in chains."

Hobbes had his own solution to this problem, in the humbling of the individual through a confrontation with their own mortality at the hands of another, and the enforcing of the wisdom that results from this experience through the unified powers of an Absolute sovereign. But this was a notoriously unsatisfactory solution, since it appears to crush the very freedom with whose conception it had originally begun. One can trace the history of modern political thought in terms of the various attempts to address this problem, first outlined by Hobbes, in a more satisfactory manner. Locke's republic, Rousseau's social contract, and Hegel's idea of the modern state, are all responses to the crucial condition of modernity, all ways of trying to accommodate, and in some cases transcend, the paradox of being modern.¹

Within this history, Rousseau and Hegel constitute key participants in a strand of modern thinking that has held that the principle of subjectivity, while it does put us into the position of alienation and loss that Hobbes describes, also contains within it the seeds of a higher realization, towards a new kind of community and a new kind of identity. In

¹ While Marx certainly has a concept of transcendence, his revolutionary ideal does not fit within this construal of the problem. Alienation for him was indeed tied to the principle of subjectivity, in the sense that it is rooted in the original separation of mental and material labour, and the division into a ruling and producing class tied to that distinction. This division, which began originally in the family between the man and the woman, was the basis of all future exploitation and alienation. But it was a division that began in prehistory, according to him, and all future history is an extension of it. Hence the idea that one can find a sharp dividing line between traditional and modern in the terms discussed here flies in the face of a Marxist analysis. Modern subjectivity was, for him, a product of the modern bourgeois economy, and to comprehend it one must look to its materialist basis, rather than taking it on its own terms.
Rousseau and in German Idealism, we find the notion of a genuine authenticity or deeper truth to the self, an essential substance of freedom which, within the context of the struggle for recognition that Hobbes describes, must find its own expression. This is a substance that is to be realized in and through modern subjectivity, in harmony with the modern principle of will. The general will in Rousseau, practical reason in Kant and Fichte, substance become subject in Hegel, all these are expressions of this ideal.

We can situate Hegel more specifically within this ideal, and outline the originality of the project that he undertook, by looking at his relationship to the generation of German Idealists and Romantics of which he was a part. Hegel began, in his earliest writings, as a kind of political Kantian, seeking in the Kantian principles of moral reason the basis of a new society of freedom that could counteract the rigidity and heteronomy of the religion and the society of his day. But in addition to this, he shared with anti-Enlightenment Sturm und Drang figures the concern with sensuous spontaneity, for the satisfaction of feeling and imagination, and, with his contemporaries at the Tubingen seminary, the longing for a rejuvenated communal life along the lines of the ancient Greeks. It was to a renewed and rationalized Christianity, a Christianity that preached the Kantian message of autonomy, that he looked in these earliest days to provide the foundation for a living political community that could satisfy all of the above requirements.\(^2\) While Kantian moral Reason \(\text{Vernunft}\) 

\(^2\) See Taylor (1975) for a detailed discussion of the intellectual context within which Hegel’s concerns were shaped.

\(^3\) This is manifest in his “Tubingen fragment,” in “The Life of Jesus,” and in “The Positivity of the Christian Religion.” Both Knox and Kroner (1971) emphasize the Kantian nature of Hegel’s thought here, while Harris (1970) and Henrich (1971) paint a
was to provide the content out of which the new society would be shaped, religion was to play the role of “persuasion.” Christian love was that which could serve Reason, aiding its realization in the world not as a “pathological” motive, but as containing something analogous to reason within it. As Harris describes: “[i]t seeks out and harnesses every impulse that supports Reason, so that our inclinations harmonize with Reason and the imperative aspect of Reason disappears from view” (1993:29). Against the asceticism of Kant, all aspects of the self could be harmoniously integrated in this new “religion of freedom,” which would thus provide the motivating force for a modern, rational, and fulfilling political community.

But in 1796, with his move to Frankfurt, Hegel fell more under the influence of the Romantics, particularly his friend Holderlin, and it is here that we see a significant shift in his thinking, as evidenced in the “Spirit of Christianity” essay. Both Harris (1993) and Henrich (1971) describe this shift as rooted particularly in Hegel’s encounter with Holderlin’s developing “Identity theory.” Here, instead of the rational society being something that was to be constructed from abstract principles of Reason, with the knotty problem of how to bring sensuous being in after the fact, that society was to be borne out picture of undoubtedly much more accurate complexity, referring to the individuality of Hegel’s appropriation of Kant, and pointing out the influence of other figures such as Mendelssohn, Lessing, Spinoza, Rousseau, and, most notably, the young Schelling. Harris, as I indicate, also points to Hegel’s concern with the principle of Christian love as having been evident from the beginning, instead of emerging merely with the “Spirit of Christianity” essay as Kroner seems to argue. Nevertheless, what is essential here is that all seem to be in agreement about moral Reason as forming the essential core of Hegel’s ontology in this period, as the basis for individual autonomy and political community, whether it be in the Kantian sense of subjective moral consciousness, or in the Fichtean sense of the individual’s participation in a larger moral Reason. And all recognize the shift in this conception when Hegel came under the influence of Holderlin.
from a broader ontology of Being, from a primordial Identity of the subjective and objective world from which we had become ruptured, but to which we inherently strive to return. The significant issue here is that humans already had the capacity for access to this deeper reality, not in the sense of deriving the postulates of Reason from the concept of moral autonomy, but through an "intuition of the divine life," a primordial experience of unity with the objective world (Harris 1993). This is no longer an abstract conception which must bring sensuous being in after the fact; it is in itself already a unity of reason and sensuous existence, a contacting of them in their unity as they were prior to separation. And it is this intuition of a primal unity of thought and being that comes to form the core of Hegel's new ontological conception, and new political vision.

Thus in the 1797 "Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," it is no longer Kantian Reason per se that is to be realized, but the intuition of Identity, an intuition that already has a basis in the individual's being. And, in Hegel's understanding, as we shall see, that intuition comes to consciousness in humanity in the experience of Christian love. In a dramatic reversal then, love becomes the true substance of subjectivity, the true consciousness of autonomy, not as an aid to Reason, but as itself the very seed of the new community.

It is this shift that is key to situating Hegel within the tradition of German Idealism and Romanticism. The ontology of Identity, as experienced in love, retains the Kantian ideal of autonomy, but puts Hegel closer in line with the Romantics and the earlier Sturm und Drang figures in the emphasis on sensuous spontaneity and harmonious selfhood. His embracing of this ontology, as Taylor (1975) argues, thus constitutes the basis for a happy synthesis of these apparently competing concerns.
While we may more clearly situate Hegel within German Idealism and Romanticism by this understanding, his true originality and what will constitute the legacy of his thought lies beyond this. In his subsequent, lifelong attempt to work out how modern reason might be reconciled with the deeper knowledge of the truth of Being, with the "mystical certainty" of love. For as I shall try to show in Chapter One of what follows, the conceptualization of Holderlin’s theory of Being, which for the Romantics would constitute the end of their philosophical journey, for Hegel is only the beginning. The "intuition" of the Identity that Hegel sees in Christian love encounters a problem unique to the modern subjectivity—that of alienation by reflective thought. While Schelling would look to the singular experiences of artistic genius as the place of overcoming of this alienation, Hegel will cling to the more widespread experience of love, historically manifest in the early community of Jesus, even in the face of its loss, and will seek to comprehend how it might be realized in and through the modern principle of will and reflective thought. Love, for Hegel, as a knowledge which resides within all of us, and to which he believes we can all come back, even in the midst of our alienation from it, will continue to provide for the modern subject the seed that can flower into a fully rational human community, a community that integrates all aspects of the self in a genuine and complete freedom. This is the gargantuan effort that underpins much of Hegel’s subsequent phenomenological, historical and political studies. And it is this effort that the dissertation seeks to trace, from Hegel’s articulation of love as the true experience of self and community in “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate,” to his statement of the

4Kroner (1971) refers to Hegel’s existential encounter with the “mystical certainty” of love.
problem it encounters in the sphere of modernity with the principle of reflective thought, to an examination of his mature system as an attempt to comprehend how the problem is resolved in the history of the modern human will, through to his final confrontation with historical failure, and the message that this failure yields to us today.

The focus on love as the continuous foundation at play in Hegel's understanding of the social and political development of modern self and society, situates the interpretation that follows squarely within the tradition of the "Hegelian middle" (Fackenheim 1967:ch.4). This is an interpretation which comprehends Hegel's project neither as an attempt to establish the truth of the finite world purely from the perspective of the abstract logical Idea (the right-wing Hegel), nor as a limiting of all knowledge and being to the finite human (the left-wing Hegel), but as finding a basis of infinity within human experience, which must perpetually be actualized in the finite secular world, in order to achieve the rise to the philosophical consciousness that vindicates it.\(^5\) Love is this human experience of the infinite, and the insistence here is that, in spite of his confrontation with the antagonism between love and rationality, Hegel never abandons the former in favour of a more abstract kind of knowing and willing. Rather he seeks to comprehend how the intuition of love itself comes to be developed in human secular existence, in and through the principle of will and reflective rationality, in a manner that ultimately renders it transparent to philosophical knowing. Hence love is the constant, existential basis of Hegel's philosophy that is never

\(^5\) See especially Fackenheim's discussion of the "crucial assumption" of the Hegelian middle.
ultimately repudiated or replaced, but is rather vindicated and preserved in his logical system.

Such an interpretation is fully compatible with, and draws much inspiration from, that of Emil Fackenheim in *The Religious Dimension of Hegel’s Thought*. It differs from the latter, however, in its emphasis on the political, rather than the religious, implications of Hegel’s ontology. The approach of the Hegelian middle generally reveals a Hegel who is not only a hard-nosed, logical rationalist, but a richly mystical and existential thinker who resists many of the dominant criticisms made against him in social and political philosophy. For example, the view of Hegel as constructing a philosophical system that absorbs and reduces all otherness (Connolly 1988), fails to be so compelling when we consider Hegel’s emphasis on love as a foundational knowledge which itself strives towards self-expression, but which even in doing so always points us towards a reality that far exceeds the merely human. Hegel’s intent is indeed to bring love into a transparent conceptual whole, but this is not to tame, reduce, replace or colonize it, but to vindicate and preserve it in its living context. This becomes very clear in the discussion in chapter four, where Hegel expresses enormous concern over the possibility of the loss of this living knowledge, and indeed holds that possibility to be at the core of any failure of his synthesis. Thus Derrida’s suggestion that Hegel fails to recognize loss in the movement from experience to philosophical knowing (1992) seems similarly questionable. And Hegel is also resistant to the feminist criticism of him as leaving out the feminine principle of “blood and hearth” (Benhabib 1996) or “reproductive continuity” (O’Brien 1996). For it is precisely the principle of love in Hegel

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6 See Heidi Ravven’s article in the same volume (1996) for a much more sensible and scholarly reading of Hegel on women, which nevertheless does not quite address the
that can be seen to constitute this "feminine" principle that must be cultivated and preserved. Charles Taylor, in spite of a generally lucid, scholarly and appreciative reading of Hegel, ultimately accuses him of seeking to satisfy the deeper yearnings of the human spirit merely by pointing to the rationality of the real (Taylor 1975: 544). But it is only because Taylor sees Hegel as locating the ultimate truth of human existence in the abstract realm of his logic, rather than in a human experience of love that is merely supplemented and preserved by that logic, that he can come to such a conclusion.

If Hegel ceases to be read as an abstract, right-wing theorist, it will not be necessary to abandon him in the name of our left-wing, existential concerns. Similarly, if he ceases to be read as a purely secular philosopher of finite human knowing and willing, it will not be necessary to repudiate him as closed to all radical otherness. The conviction here is that Hegel's thought in fact shares and accommodates many of the concerns of the critics noted above, and that a reading of him from the Hegelian middle can reveal just how valuable he concern that O'Brien in particular espouses.

More left-wing, secular readings of Hegel's concept of spirit seem to me to be more vulnerable to the kinds of critique offered above. Harris, for example, sees the breach between nature and spirit as decisive, after which point "substance" cannot be grounded in intuition but in language, which can express nothing more than the "transcendental structure of subjectivity" (Harris 1984:30). And Williams, while he attends to the role of love in Hegel, reduces it to the logic of mutual recognition. Both cases seem to me to neglect the whole question of "the body," and to close themselves to the notion of a radical other that the theorists above are pointing towards.

Fackenheim himself, while appreciative of Hegel's resistance to claims such as those made above, himself ends up repudiating Hegel's synthesis for historical reasons (see especially the discussion in To Mend the World, 1994, on Hegel's "Constantinianism"). My own analysis in chapter four allows me to avoid the conclusion to which Fackenheim comes.
continues to be in our pursuit of these concerns.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter, "Modernity, Love, and Dismemberment," examines Hegel's idea, in "Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," of love as an experience of a deeper spiritual source of the self, and the problem of alienation from that experience that moderns encounter due to the principle of reflective rationality that has come to dominate the secular world. The second chapter, "From Separation to Unity: the journey of reflective thought," looks at Hegel's idea of how moderns may come to re-connect with this experience of the divine, through the immanent movement of reflective rationality in its engagement with human experience. This is a study of the "Spirit" section of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The re-connection with the divine is achieved with moral consciousness, in particular the experience of conscience, and its final reconciliation with others around it in the experience of forgiveness. The reconciliation however turns out to remain in tension with reflective thinking, for it has the character almost of an experience of grace, involving a kind of suspension of the reflective principle of thought and will. While on the one hand the dialectic of conscience gives some answer to how a divinity might be realized through human action in the secular world, on the other hand it turns out not to be a real reconciliation with reflective rationality. Hence we remain with the original problematic.

The third chapter, "Philosophy of Right: the final reconciliation?" argues that the experience of the divine at the level of conscience is the key to understanding Hegel's Philosophy of Right. For what Hegel is capturing philosophically in that book is a divine that
gets realized in modern history through the activity of the will, that gets objectified in the form of laws and institutions, and rationally embraced by modern individuals. The experience of conscience and the communal understanding achieved in forgiveness stand at the root of this movement in actuality. For reflective rationality, however, it is the philosophical standpoint of the Notion which captures the inherent rationality of the movement, and thus that is to provide reflective rationality with the final reconciliation with the divine. But as I argue, the whole project rests on an assumption about the nature of the will, which can only be vindicated if the religious substance that is argued to be the true and ultimate source of the will has indeed been realized in secular life, in the modern state. This vindication runs into difficulties at the level of subjective reconciliation, in the transition of the individual from the consciousness of "civil society" to the consciousness of the "state", or the achievement of the rational emotion of patriotism, and is particularly manifest in the failure of objective institutions like Hegel's "corporation" to be realized.

The fourth chapter, "Hegel on the Possibility of Failure of the Will," looks at Hegel's own explanation for why his idea of the will may have failed to realize itself in the modern political community. After looking at Hegel's notion of the "cultus," and his idea that the practices of ethical life represents the most genuine cultus, the chapter explores Hegel's occasional allusions, in Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, to the possibility that reflective rationality could eclipse the consciousness of the divine upon which genuine ethical practice depends.

The fifth and final chapter, "The Notion of Will and the Task of Philosophy" looks at two significant philosophical departures from Hegel's Notion of the will, Kierkegaard and
Marx, in their attempt to come to grips with the failure of Hegel's project to have realized itself in life. Both directions are seen as problematic, and it is argued that Hegel's own diagnosis of the failure provides the key to the philosophical task before us, one which remains within his own conception of the Notion of the will. The most pressing task in light of this diagnosis is seen to be the cultivation of a consciousness of the divine in an age of its eclipse. And the task of philosophy in relation to this is to vindicate rationally experiences of the divine that individuals do achieve.
Chapter One

MODERNITY, LOVE AND DISMEMBERMENT:

"The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate"
Introduction

In Hegel's mature political philosophy, love is described as a consciousness of the Absolute, of one's unity with the other, experienced at the level of the physical, in the form of feeling (PR §158A). In love, the individual has "surrendered" her personality, her exclusive individuality, and devoted herself to the whole. But while love in the Philosophy of Right is seen actually to constitute a knowledge of the Absolute, and while it thus occupies a fundamental position in the ethical life of the individual, its role there nevertheless appears to be markedly restricted. Indeed, Hegel devotes no more than several paragraphs to the discussion of love per se, and only twenty-three paragraphs to the family as the ethical institution wherein the bond of love is located.

The most obvious reason for this is that love is not final or ultimate in the quest for truth and self-realization. Rather, it is only a "moment" or side of one's life, one which remains ever inward, intuitive, un"actualized" (PR §166). Individuals (individual men at least), while they experience love in the family, must experience also separation, must give free play to their particularities, to aspects of themselves which might only be asserted outside of unity. They must enter the world of "civil society," of atomistic relations, where no immediate sense or consciousness of an overarching unity exists. They must experience rather the loss of or the going beyond that unity in order to realize it again, not to find it, as in the intuition of love, but to be educated up to it, in a rational form.

The necessity of movement away from unity and through civil society was a logical necessity for Hegel. He saw it as rooted in man's rational nature, as a self-impelling drive which could not rest satisfied in the tranquil union it found in love. And the reunification
he envisioned—through the institutions of the modern State—was to be a better one, higher, more self-conscious, and compatible with individual freedom. One is to recapture the spirit of community, the emotional intensity of the unity of love, but in a rationally justified form.

The restricted and apparently subordinate role that Hegel attributes to love in his mature philosophy may have contributed to the obscuring of its importance in his overall philosophy of human spirit. Love seems to be a mere episode in the life of the individual, after which it is left behind for a higher form of existence and knowledge. By turning back to an examination of Hegel’s early theological writing, “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate” (SC), however, this chapter seeks to promote a different view, to begin the task of developing a deeper and more accurate appreciation of the place of love within Hegel’s mature ethical conception, and how it was that he arrived at this conception. “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate” constitutes an essential step in this task, for not only does it constitute Hegel’s most detailed elaboration of his idea of love, but it is here that he is working out for himself exactly what it is about modernity and the modern self that makes a community of love so difficult, and hence why and how we must seek beyond that. In this essay he views love as the highest possible experience of unity, towards which moderns must find a return. But in examining the early community of Jesus, an actual, historical community that sought to base itself on the immediate knowledge of love, Hegel must come to terms with the failure of that community, with why the knowledge of love could not, in its immediate form, be the ultimate bond of unity in modernity. In following him in this journey then, we follow him in coming to terms with the predicament of being modern, and we begin to understand the pathway that his future thought will take, and the role of love
Christian Love: The Context

Love is the "Spirit of Christianity," for Hegel, its true and substantial principle. For the early Christians, love was a coming back to the self, and to one's relation to the other, from a period of loss and despair. Christianity emerged at a time in history when individuals had become separated from their substantial reality, from commitment to an ethical order of which they were a part. Love was a re-finding of that lost unity, and it was as such that it acquired its ethical significance.

It is the experience of division that situates ethical love as uniquely relevant to the modern individual. For separation is the defining feature of modernity, according to Hegel. With the historical principle of self-reflection came the loss of unity, the radical split between thought and nature. The whole task of modernity has been the overcoming of the atomism that has resulted from self-reflection. And it was in love that Hegel saw the ground of such overcoming. In contrast to the earlier experience of unity that Hegel finds in ancient Greek society, any modern form of unity will be marked by the separation, and the principle of freedom implicit therein.

In ancient Greece, according to Hegel, the ethical order had been built upon the natural morals and sentiments of the individuals; it was an extension of their being, and so their commitment to it was implicit and unreflective. It was this "customary morality," this "inescapable connection of thought with actual life," (PH 270/329) that Hegel refers to as the individual's "ethical substance." Substance is the being of the self not as mere nature, but as
a nature which has been molded and transformed by custom. Hence it still exists as sensuous being but, in its partial overcoming of nature, has acquired an ethical character. And it is by means of the individuals’ development within the society that they attain it. This is not a self-conscious cultivation towards a chosen end, but is a product of practical engagement in roles to which they have been assigned. Not simply the mind, but one's entire being is molded by the social practices in which one engages.

In this notion of ethical substance we can see how the two axes of unity with which Hegel was so concerned—the identity between self and physical being, and between self and community—come together. Ethical substance is the physical being of the self that was at the same time social, the locus of shared union with others. But what is significant about this customary morality is that there has been no fundamental break with nature; it is rather a building upon, a sculpting of that nature. Hence, Hegel says, the Greek spirit is the spirit of the "plastic artist" (PH 239/294). Reflective thought has not broken free from the compelling forces of social nature—there is no free will in Greek society. Still fundamentally bound to the nature which had nevertheless been transformed and imbued with an ethical character, the Greek individual did not choose the action she was to do; she knew it, unquestioningly.

Sophocles Antigone is the paradigmatic case, for Hegel. The natural fact of being male or female in Greek society had acquired also a spiritual significance. Responsible for two different social spheres, male and female had developed two different but interdependent moralities. Because their different ethical laws are bound to their nature as male or female, Hegel says, "ethical consciousness ... is essentially character" (PS §466/252). In the case of Antigone, this means that she knows what is right, knows what she must do, implicitly.
There is no moral conflict, no torment within the soul, because there is no choice. The divine law simply is, and Antigone feels it with her whole being.\(^9\)

But with the injection of the Socratic principle of reflective thought into the fabric of society, the human spirit acquired the fundamental character which is the precursor to all modernity—the radical separation of self from nature. This is the beginning of the legacy of the unhappy consciousness, the beginning of modernity. And Hegel's elaboration of this principle in the historical context of Rome and the Jewish people reflects the experience of separation that characterizes the whole pathway of abstract rationality.

Subject became separated from substance, the abstract thinking ego set over against concrete individuality. This "abstract Ego" became the new principle of right under the Roman world, a principle separate from nature, external to the actual being of the individuals. Nature was no longer accorded a place in the moral order, as rights developed on the basis of this "unfeeling, non-spiritual unit" (PH 288/351).

In this new "atomistic" world, shared sentiments were insignificant, even, claims Hegel, at the familial level: "Rome was from the very beginning, of artificial and violent, not spontaneous growth" (PH 283/344). Rome's founders, Romulus and Remus, grew up in isolation from family affection. Neighbouring communities were pillaged for wives. Every relation in the development of Rome took on this "unnatural" character. In marriage, and towards children, Roman private life was dominated by contractual, property-style relations...

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\(^9\)This view of Antigone opens the question of why her sister, Ismene, did not follow the urgings of her nature in the same way. A modern view of her would focus on the element of choice or free will. But in keeping with Hegel's view of the Greeks that this principle was absent in the Greeks, her failure of "will" can also be explained in terms of the Greek notion of "akrasia"—incontinence or lack of self-control.
which "perverted and demoralized" these most "fundamental relations of ethics" (287/349). If even in the family there was no substantial unity, the principle which bound people together had to be purely external—the "abstract universality" of the state. Only the severest discipline, the other of nature, pure will, could form a community from such conditions. Founded on force, Rome was sustained by it.

In spite of a period of republicanism wherein the principle of equality among citizens—-inherent in the notion of abstract ego—was established, Rome throughout its history had "no spiritual centre which it could make the object, occupation, and enjoyment of its spirit" (311-12/378). It was this that constituted the fundamental contradiction of the Roman world and determined its history, according to Hegel. Because it lacked a centre, a substance in which individuals could find unity, Rome could only sustain unity against an other. Once peace had been attained within, she had to find a common enemy without, in the creation and securing of the empire.

The sole virtue of the empire—valour—was no emanation from the heart of the individual, but a pure willingness to sacrifice concrete individuality in the name of the universal. As the empire cared nothing for the natural existence of individuals, but only their abstract existence, so individuals must show their indifference to their own nature in order to prove their dedication to the principle of Rome.

It was only after the establishment of the Empire, in the period of peace, that citizens began to become fully self-conscious of the emptiness of their universal order. Because Rome had no roots in the hearts of the people, when individual idiosyncrasy no longer needed to be sacrificed, it began to assert itself. At the political level, this meant rampant
corruption as political institutions came to serve purely private interests. Only by the emergence of "colossal individualities"--the Emperors--"instinctively impelled to restore that political unity which was no longer to be found in men's dispositions," did Rome perpetuate itself longer (310/376-377).

It was this experience under the Emperors that the citizens needed to feel fully the contradiction of the empire, and the true emptiness of their own existence. Abstract subjectivity had become fully realized as "personality" in the universal recognition of "Private Right."

Private right, viz., is this, that the social unit as such enjoys consideration in the state, in the reality which he gives to himself--viz., in property. The living political body—that Roman feeling which animated it as its soul—is now brought back to the isolation of a lifeless Private Right. (PH 317/384)

In private right individuals found their existence, the recognition of their personality, but the "filling" of that personality was merely given, as passion and caprice, while itself being afforded no spiritual recognition. In reality, individual idiosyncrasy meant everything, but formally, meant nothing, was afforded no protection. The actions of the Emperors brought home in the most blatant and violent manner the contradiction of such a situation. The basic entitlement of their life was in fact no entitlement, since its fulfilment was fundamentally subject to the all-powerful Emperor. And that Emperor was subject to no principle himself but that of Abstract Subjectivity "raised to infinity," filled only by passion and caprice: "the Person of Persons lays claim to the possession of all these individuals, so that the right assumed by the social unit is at once abrogated and robbed of validity" (PH 320/387-88). It was in the face of this reality that Roman citizens truly felt their own nothingness.
In such a context, the individual found two paths of life open to him, according to Hegel:

He either recognized his destiny in the task of acquiring the means of enjoyment through the favor of the Emperor, or through violence, testamentary frauds, and cunning; or he sought repose in philosophy, which alone was still able to supply something firm and independent: for the systems of that time--Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism--although within their common sphere opposed to each other, had the same general purport, viz., rendering the soul absolutely indifferent to everything which the real world had to offer. (PH 318/384)

Yet such philosophy was only, according to Hegel, "the counsel of despair to a world which no longer possessed anything stable," (PH 318/385), and it was thus to be in Christian love that a higher reconciliation, a living one, was sought.

**Hegel's Idea of Christian Love**

For Hegel, the full wretchedness of the Roman empire was only genuinely appreciated by the Jewish people (PH 321/388). Rather than seeking to escape or disavow the importance of reality, like the Stoics, the Jews knew that reality as fundamental to existence, and felt the pain of its nothingness in the face of Rome. In the Jews, the fundamentally divided and discordant self of the Roman empire, the separation of self and substance, had become fully self-conscious. And it was in the consciousness of "Evil" that we see the expression of this self-consciousness. Subjectivity has returned into itself, has abstracted from its own individual idiosyncrasy, and judged its own individuality as nothing. Unable to reconcile the universality of its own self with its own nothingness, it projects universality outside itself onto an external God. Unlike the Roman mind, which focused
only on the universality of abstract subjectivity, the Jewish consciousness held together universality and particularity, re-conceived as God and man, and felt most keenly the disparity between them. And it is in this consciousness, and the suffering and longing it entailed, that the possibility of reconciliation between substance and subject existed. But it was to be in the Christian principle of love that the actual achievement of reconciliation could be found, according to Hegel.

Christian love was to constitute a reconciliation of subjectivity with physical being, of self with another, and of human with divine. One could, Hegel hoped, recapture the harmony of the Greek citizen, but at a higher level of self-consciousness. Because one was coming back to unity out of the suffering of di-erence, it was to be a unity of acute awareness, and this awareness is precisely what "love" is. Love is the self-consciousness of the unity, a self-consciousness which is felt. And as self-consciousness achieved after separation, love was to be compatible with the principle behind that separation, the principle of freedom implicit in reflective thought.

In its negative sense, thought had been the principle by which the individual had become broken from ethical substance. But in its positive sense thought was the principle of freedom. No longer bound by nature to their ethical substance and accepting its demands in an unreflective manner, individuals had to find a rational confirmation of Right and Morality. For the Romans this had been the commitment to the universal that lay over against their natural self, the abstract Ego, and to the equally abstract universality of the state that held them all together. But for the Christians it was to be a finding of the Right in their own self, not as the Abstract Ego, but as a higher unity of the universal and finite being. And
love was the consciousness of this higher unity. As this unity, and as the transcendence of the contradiction behind the entire history of the Roman Empire, love was to be the ultimate realization of the principle of freedom.

For the Jewish people, because the principle of separation remained paramount, laws were necessarily external, handed down to them from an alien God. It was the overcoming of this separation between self and God, and of mere obedience to God through a finding of the law in one's own self, that Hegel saw in the teachings of Jesus. But his notion of the principle of freedom implicit in Christianity extends further, to a repudiation of the Kantian view of morality as based on a fundamental cleavage within the self.

For Kant, if one's actions are to be moral they must be motivated purely by a respect for a self-prescribed duty, rather than from feeling and inclination. Such a morality, while overcoming blind adherence to the mores prescribed by religion or society and substituting self-determination, nevertheless recapitulates the command structure within the soul, with law issuing forth from the rational will and according no validity to the rest of the self but that of subjugation. Thus, as Hegel argues, the apparent progress of Kant's position is simply one of a transition of the master from the outside, to the inside of the soul.

...between the Shaman of the Tungus, the European prelate who rules church and state, the Voguls, and the Puritans, on the one hand, and the man who listens to his own command of duty, on the other, the difference is not that the former make themselves slaves, while the latter is free, but that the former have their lord outside themselves, while the latter carries his lord in himself, yet at the same time is his own slave. (211/266)

What is significant about both the Jewish and the Kantian views of moral authority is that they were products of the modern principle of reflective thought which, in abstracting
from the self, created a division it could not overcome. A moral authority founded on this division would always be an authority of domination, of mastery. The law would always be conceived as a higher order imposing itself on a lower. Love, contrarily, is the overcoming of an authority that sets itself over against actual being, and the transcendence of a morality founded on mastery. It is rather a higher unity of reason and emotion, law and being. And it is in Christian "virtue" that we can see the ethics of such a higher unity of self.

Hegel finds in Jesus' Sermon on the Mount a notion of virtue as a "modification" of the subjective disposition of love. Rather than ignoring or repressing the sensuous side of the individual, in virtue this is to be raised up into a higher unity, while the moral rule in turn becomes something living. Thus it is not a subservient response to a "command" coming either from outside or within the self. Instead one is pulled toward the virtuous action with the whole of one's being.

While indeed the Christian virtues are expressed in command form by Jesus in Sermon on the Mount, as in "Thou shalt not kill," this is only because the language of reflective thought is inherently incapable of adequately expressing the kind of unity that virtue represents, and that the actual individual experiences. It was the figure of Jesus himself that was the inspiration for Christian virtue. For he was the concrete embodiment of it. Thus it was not in obedience to his commands that one was to practice virtue, but rather because he himself "evoked love and a spontaneous desire to imitate" (Harris 1972:402).

In Jesus, the disposition of love is the unity that grounds the action, just as in traditional morality the law is the ground. But unlike the abstract, external nature of law
which simply imposes itself on particular circumstances, love "modifies" itself to respond to the particularity of the context. This is no domination, no response to an external command, for the action emanates from a unified self, at peace with itself. The sensuous side of the self is not repressed in the name of moral fulfilment but is engaged as precisely the motivation for that fulfilment. Fidelity in marriage, for example, is not rooted in mere respect for duty independent of one's desires. Nor is it based on a particular inclination for one person, making the fidelity dependent upon constancy of desire. Nor indeed is it a question of a fortuitous correspondence between the moral rule of fidelity and particular desire for one person (an accidental balancing of the universal and the particular). Rather the action must emanate from a higher synthesis of the self, from a disposition of "love:"

this sanctity alone makes a man capable of checking any one of his many aspects which may wish to make itself the whole or rear its head against the whole; only the feeling for the whole, love, can stand in the way of the diremption of the man's essence. (217/270)

Love integrates any competing desires, and thus resolves moral conflict.

Love furthermore overcomes the inevitable clash of duties which emerges under rule-bound morality. For if moral rules or commands are considered as absolutes, in the multifaceted reality of concrete situations, we will be faced with the paradoxical situation of having a plurality of absolutes. If this is dealt with by ranking specific duties as to which is most important, the lower duties take on the status of vices. Love, on the other hand, is "the one living spirit which acts and restricts itself in accordance with the whole of the given situation" (245/294). Against the elevation of particular duties as absolute, we have love as a "living bond of the virtues," their "all-pervasive soul":
[1] It does not set up a determinate virtue for determinate circumstances, but appears, even in the most variegated mixture of relations, untorn and unitary. Its external shape may be modified in infinite ways; it will never have the same shape twice. Its expression will never be able to afford a rule, since it never has the force of a universal opposed to a particular. (246/295)

The root of the virtues is thus not their universality of form, but the unified self, the self of love, from which the virtues emanate as love "modifies" itself according to its context. It is this love, this unity of self, which informs the practice of virtue, which allows for the many-sidedness of the situation and calls forth an action. Rather than consciously invoking one absolute and imposing it on particular circumstances, thereby destroying other absolutes that might also find some rights therein, the virtuous action represents a fusion of the universal and the particular in life.

Love, then, as the fusion of law and inclination, is meant to overcome the abstract form of theories of moral law, without transgressing the rational content of that law. The notion of virtue as a modification of love finds a way to reconcile sensuous being with ethical action. It humanizes the morality of Kant, without compromising the moral seriousness of his project, the seriousness of what he expected from us as rational beings. The moral law is fulfilled, not out of mere obedience, but willingly, with one's whole being. This, says Hegel, is the most genuine "fulfilment" of the moral law. The rational content of law is no longer set over against being. Rather it now exists as the real harmony of reason and being that love represents.

But the unity of love goes beyond its overcoming of the hierarchy within the self between reason and emotion that had been established with modernity. Hegel also sees in it an overcoming of the atomism of the abstractly rational self, towards a new political
community. Christian love, for him, is the higher unity within which both of these fundamental antagonisms are overcome.

It was upon Jesus' command to "Love one another" that Hegel develops his notion of a community based on love. For this "command" contains the idea of a virtue of "reconcilability," a modification of love that is to govern one's relations to others. Reconcilability constitutes an escape from the inherent divisiveness entailed in rights-based justice. For rights-based justice is the logical bond of a society of fundamentally atomistic individuals who have been separated from one another by being separated from their own ethical substance. As in Hegel's discussion of the Roman empire, the unity here is a conceptual one only, a putting together of a multitude of individuals according to a principle of right that is external to nature, that exists purely in thought. One does have obligations towards the other in such a context, but it is always a fulfilling of that obligation against one's own interest. One limits one's own rights in order to respect the rights of the other. This may indeed constitute a kind of ethics, based on a unifying principle of equality, but it is only an "equality of enmity." Reconcilability, on the contrary, is an annulling of all such enmity. In reconcilability, if one asserts one's right against another, there must be no hostile reaction in act or feeling. For reconcilability "even anger is a crime" (216/269). For to feel anger is to feel wronged, and to want to do wrong in return, or to assert one's rights in the face of the other. Reconcilability on the contrary wants to give up the notion of a right as something held against another. Only then can one treat the other from a disposition of love; only then can one feel the true bond with the other that transcends the atomistic relation.

A heart thus lifted above the ties of rights, disentangled from everything
objective, has nothing to forgive the offender, for it sacrificed its right as soon as the object over which it had a right was assailed, and thus the offender has done no injury to any right at all. Such a heart is open to reconciliation, for it is able forthwith to reassert any vital relationship, to re-enter the ties of friendship and love, since it has done no injury at all to life in itself. On its side there stands in the way no hostile feeling, no consciousness, no demand on another for the restoration of an infringed right, no pride which would claim from another in a lower sphere, i.e., in the realm of rights, an acknowledgment of subordination. (236/286)

If one continues to assume one's place in the competitive world regulated by a system of rights, then one will always be involved in an "injury" to life, to the fundamental unity with the other. But if one withdraws from this system of justice, from the profanity of the public world, if one stops making claims on others, then there will no longer be feelings of resentment, hostility, and pride to deal with. By clearing the self of these emotions, the way is opened up to love, to the "sensing of a life similar to one's own" (247/296), that takes us back to the truth of our life, and to the real bond of community with others.

This posing of love against the rights-based morality that only externally unites individuals similarly entails a rejection of the notion of punishment that accompanies such a morality. For as an abstract unity, or rule, law stands over against the actual and concrete instances in life that it groups under itself. And in the case of a violation of the law, it must reassert itself against the violator. Law must be "clothed with might" (226/278); the individual must be punished according to the law's universal terms. The problem with law as punishment, in Hegel's view, is that the law is then experienced as an alien master to which the trespasser is subjected. Hence there is no possibility of reconciliation. Even if the individual recognizes rightness in the law, even if he internalizes it as bad conscience, the fact of his action remains, and thus one remains in one's particular identity as a trespasser
in face of the judgement of the law.

Against the punishment inherent in law, in Hegel’s conception of love, punishment is posited as “fate,” a punishment with which one can be reconciled. Fate goes beyond the sphere of law. We are all subject to it, in that we are all broken from the primordial unity of the Absolute Identity. In Hegel’s terms here, we are broken from “life”; we have done injury to it. “Vice” is the separation from life in this sense, a breaking away from the whole of life and allowing a part to dominate. This happens in the trespass against laws. But it includes further the servile obedience to laws, even self-given ones, which coerce the sensuous side of the individual. Hence we have in this notion of vice the most demanding expectation, the most extended sphere of moral freedom; one is either with “life” in one’s entire being, or against it; one practices either “virtue” in Hegel’s sense, or one practices “vice.” Abiding by the letter of the law is no sign of virtue if it is done in a subservient and divided manner.

In this conception, then, “fate” is the punishment that inevitably accompanies vice, or separation from life. That part of life that one has injured returns as the enemy. But unlike law, one can be reconciled to fate. Whereas law is an elevation of a “fragment of human nature,” an abstractly rational idea of right, into an Absolute that is meant to be independent of, and above, the particularities of the individual, fate is understood to be that part of life from which we have broken. It is not elevated to be an absolute, independent of our concrete selves, but is seen as that aspect which we have lost or repressed, and which comes back against us. The difference is enormous, for where law is “a whole, an absolute, then the criminal would be only a criminal” (238/288); his action would always subsist separately from and independently of the self-subsistent law. Thus there can be no
possibility of atonement. In fate, on the other hand, the enemy is recognized as having come from one's own self, from one's own severed life. The individual may think he has committed the crime against another, destroyed merely the other's life, "but he has only destroyed his own, for life is not different from life, since life dwells in the single Godhead" (229/280). Yet one can be reconciled with the hostile life, the wound can be healed, the trespass annulled. Ultimately, one must sense one's enemy as life, and this sensing of life is love. In love, one is reconciled with fate. And justice has been satisfied "since the trespasser has sensed as injured in himself the same life that he has injured" (232/283).

This conception of love, then, as a reuniting of the life from which we have broken, a reuniting which reconciles us with ourselves, with others, with our own sensuous being, constitutes Hegel's conception of a genuine unity and autonomy within the sphere of modernity. But how was such a love, such a reconciliation with self, other, with "life," to be achieved? Hegel believed that historically it had been, in the early community of Jesus. And it is to an examination of this that we must now turn.

**The Achievement of Love**

Historically, for individuals who became conscious of a lack in their lives, it was in the figure of Jesus that they found the image of what they were seeking. Jesus was a "pure soul," a truly virtuous person at peace in the harmony of desiring and knowing. It was in Jesus that the first Christians could have faith, because he was the presence of the divine implicit in themselves, the image of the whole from which they were broken. And "Faith" was the fundamental intermediary step toward the achievement of reconciliation with that
whole.

Faith is “a knowledge of spirit through spirit” (239/289), a sensing of the divine in the other. This was not a rational conviction that Jesus was the son of God, but an implicit recognition, manifest in the love of Jesus, of what the true divinity was—the unity of the divine and the human. But such a recognition, such faith, was also a sensing of the divine in oneself. For faith was “only possible if in the believer himself there is a divine element which rediscovers itself, its own nature, in that on which it believes, even if it be unconscious that what it has found is its own nature” (266/313). Jesus is the concrete embodiment of an ideal which is separated and over against us, and yet which is implicit within us. Unlike the rational ideal of Kant which remains forever an unattainable “ought,” the ideal of Jesus exists. And it exists not in abstraction from life, not in thought only, but in reality and in feeling. The significance of the flesh and blood of Jesus for Hegel is to signify the inherent oneness of the human and the divine, the reality of God within us, not as an abstract being over against us. We overcome trespass and fate, we come back to the harmony with ourselves that is the beauty of soul, by recognizing the ideal, by loving the pure soul at first outside ourselves, and then finding it also within us. Love of the ideal, of the beautiful soul, is the means by which we lift ourselves up to this ideal, by which we better our own selves

Those who were converted, who genuinely achieved the faith, comprehended the true message of Jesus, recognized the absence in their own lives and understood him as the pathway toward wholeness. This was not a procedure of the rational understanding; rather the individual must “grasp the communication with the depths of his own spirit” (256/306). There must be something deeper in us than merely our rational understanding, that is inspired
by the image of Jesus. And those who had felt more strongly the loss of life, their brokenness from it, were more capable of being inspired by his image.

We see an example of this return to life through faith in the repentant action of Mary Magdalene. Mary is driven by her guilt to a self-effacing action in front of the Pharisees with whom Jesus is eating. "Her heart drives her through this company to Jesus: weeping, she walks up to his feet, washes them with her tears and dries them with the hair of her head; she kisses them and anoints them with ointment, with pure and costly spinekard." Some of the Pharisees objected to such an action for "[t]he ointment might have been sold for three hundred pence and the money given to the poor" (243/292). But her action was an expression of her suffering, and her recognition of the life from which she was broken, albeit a life she still senses as outside herself in Jesus. The self-righteous Pharisees were unable to see the moral beauty of her action, described by Hegel as "the self-expression only of a woman whose heart is full of love," for they remained at the merely rational; they had not found the true connection to the divine (243/293). But Jesus recognizes in her suffering and her loving action a genuine approach to life, and absolves her of her sins.

Beyond this intermediary step of the love of Jesus, the discovery of one's own connection to the divine, the individual must achieve a life where the spirit of God animates one's whole being, where "divinity has pervaded all the threads of one's consciousness, directed all one's relations with the world, and now breathes throughout one's being" (266/313). This final stage is an achieving of independence from the objective existence of Jesus. Jesus went against the notion of himself as a "personality," an "individuality," "for the ground of such an individuality would be an absolute particularity of his being in opposition
to theirs" (271/316). The living link of faith that must be strengthened is one that allows of no exclusive individuality, no difference. The culminating relationship which Jesus sought with his friends was that of a true oneness, a complete overcoming of the subject-object separation in love.

The culmination of the unity with Jesus is captured in his exhortation to "become as little children." For the child is the child of the divine, as is everything living, "but the child carries the unity, the connection, the concord with the entire harmony, undisturbed though undeveloped, in itself" (273/318). The return to childhood is a return to the unity but now as a self-produced and known unity. Similarly, it is in the unity of individuals in love, where they once again find a complete harmony within themselves and with that around them, that Jesus considers himself to find the culmination of existence, not in the separateness of his individual body. "Where two or three are united in my spirit ... then I am in the midst of them, and so is my spirit" (271/316).

A further example of this notion of unity is found in the unity of lovers. The joining of the two persons is not a conceptual unity but a becoming as one. "[i]t is a living link that is said to be something divine" (271/317). They are separated only in the sense of their individuation as mortal bodies, but even this they strive to overcome in the act of love.

What we see in this notion is that a complete love requires the moment of separation and difference, which must be worked through if love is to achieve its highest development. In his "Fragment on Love," (which Harris [1993] argues Hegel intended as part of the "Spirit of Christianity" essay) he expresses this most clearly. Love entails the encountering and overcoming of differences in the other, a mutual giving up of personality. The more
differences, the more particularities the lovers encounter in one another, the more aspects of themselves they can reunify and the deeper love can become:

"it seeks out differences and devises unifications ad infinitum; it turns to the whole manifold of nature in order to drink love out of every life. What in the first instance is most the individual's own is united into the whole in the lover's touch and contact; consciousness of a separate self disappears, and all distinction between the lovers is annulled." (FL 307/380-81)

But to accomplish this culmination of faith, this attainment of true unity with the divine among the community of believers, it was necessary for the individual self of Jesus to perish. For "[o]nly after the departure of Jesus' individual self could their dependence on him cease; only then could a spirit of their own or the divine spirit subsist in them" (272/317). The disciples had to attain independence from the individuality of Jesus in order to come to consciousness of the divine in themselves.10

The "Kingdom of God" is the term that was to signify the fellowship of men who achieved this "culmination," who were filled with the Holy Spirit and lived together in God. This was not to be a common quality, a distinguishing feature which separated them off from others, but a "living bond," a "feeling of unity of life, a feeling in which all oppositions, as pure enmities, and also rights, as unifications of still subsisting oppositions, are annulled"

10Hegel seems to sustain here the necessity of the death of Jesus because of the peculiar dependence that the disciples had on his individual personality. However, the overcoming of the physical difference among community members appears, in his thoughts here on love, to be more immediately achieved through the act of love. At one point he acknowledges this logical consequence of his thought for the community as a whole when he says that, if that community had had enough purity and courage, the charge against them that they had a "community of wives" would not have been seen by them as shameful (280/323). Of course, to be truly consistent this principle would have had to include the principle of homosexual love, but undoubtedly Hegel was not prepared to confront this.
(278/321). It is a "friendship of soul" which can only inadequately be described in the language of reflection as an "essence" or as "spirit" (278/322).

Hegel asks of this Kingdom of God: "Is there an idea more beautiful than that of a nation of men related to one another by love? Is there one more uplifting than that of belonging to a whole which as a whole, as one, is the spirit of God whose sons the individual members are?" (278/322). But then asks: "Was there still to be an incompleteness in this idea, an incompleteness which would give a fate power over it?" (278/322). It is to an addressing of this question that we must now turn.

The Fate of Love

Although the unity of love depicted above is meant to be total, the bringing of all aspects of the self into the whole, it faced its limit in private property. The reason for this is complex, and reflects a fundamental feature about Hegel's conception of love which must now become apparent. We have already discussed in the Introduction how love for Hegel was a consciousness of the Absolute Identity that had come to be conceived by Holderlin, a consciousness to which we return after having been reflectively separated from it. And for the Hegel of this time, the unity experienced as love, and expressed as virtue, could never find adequate conceptual expression, reflective thought could never capture it, because reflective thought always necessarily poses a subject over against an object. But the Identity is precisely the unity of the subject and the object. In abstracting from the object, then, reflective thought thus always leaves out one half of the unity. Even Schelling's idea of Nature, which was perhaps the best attempt to conceptualize the Absolute Identity in life, is
subject to this limitation (FS 310/346-47). The concept of Nature itself is merely a bare universal, the Absolute crystallized by reflection, which sustains the distinction between the manifold of life and its unity. Hence reflective thought will be ever driven beyond its idea of the Absolute, to try and encompass that by which it is conditioned. But since it always thinks in such opposites, an abstract universal over against a particular, it will never find rest.

It is hence only in life that we find a transcendence of the position of reflective thought, a true knowledge of the Identity. And that knowledge is found in love, according to Hegel. This is far from saying that love is irrational. On the contrary, love is the fusion of being and thought, of consciousness and existence. But it speaks in the language of emotion, rather than in the language of concepts. Thus the recognition of the virtuous disposition in another, or of one's unity with another, is a "sensed" recognition, a judgement of the whole of one's being that cannot find conceptual expression.

But the corollary to the inability of love to express itself conceptually is its inability to express itself in the world of private property relations. For property is precisely the mode by which the Abstract Ego of self-reflection expresses itself in the world. It puts its particularity, its separate individuality, into the world in this manner. Thus to find unity again love must go behind the separative principle of reflective thought and its expression in private property. Love, it turns out, is a mystical union. Unlike the unity of individuals in Greek society, in the shared ethical substance which constitutes their being, the unity of love is implicit, lying behind the actual existence of individuals in the world of property.

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11 It is Kroner (1971) who attributes Hegel's discussion of Nature in the 1800 "Fragment of a System" to Schelling's philosophy.
relations.

Love in its highest form does indeed have a developed character, which entails the encountering of the difference, the particularity of the other, and the transcendence of that. Harris (1993) cites this idea of a developed love as the first incidence of the mature notion of Aufhebung, or sublation, in Hegel's thought. But it is clearly not a complete Aufhebung. While love overflows itself and seeks to pervade all aspects of the others difference, to bring it all within the unity, the difference it cannot overcome is that which expresses itself in property. For it is only idiosyncrasy that can express itself in property, an absolute particularity of self in relation to the other. Even if common possession is posited--"community of goods is still only the right of one or other of the two to the thing" (FL 308/382). What the lovers genuinely share as a unity cannot be the relation to the external, dead objects that belong to them. Love, a living relation, cannot penetrate the lifeless world of things. Seeking to find its relation to the other, it encounters the impenetrable wall of property, the boundary of the other's ego in which it can share nothing, and retreats.

At the same time, however, love insists on being a total unity with the rest of life, and "recoils if it senses an [exclusive] individuality in the other" (SC 279/322). To attain the unity of love, then, is necessarily to strip away the world of property that hides and smothers the true relation to the other. And because the world of which the followers of Jesus were a part was so completely dominated by property relations, because there seemed to be no space for love to express itself there, opposition to that world became a fundamental feature of the community. The purity of the mystical union could only be preserved by withdrawal. Rather than its development so that it lived in all aspects of existence, it had to cut off the whole
sphere of existence that was determined by the notion of property. Hence "Jesus required his friends to forsake father, mother, and everything in order to avoid entry into a league with the profane world" (SC 236/286).

Thus the achievement of reconciliation with life is at the same time an escape from it. In order to overcome fate and achieve harmony, one must escape the entire world of property relations and of right. For to engage in that world is necessarily to perform injury to life. A whole spectrum of life's relations are thereby cut off.

But this was clearly not the development of love in life, the divine in existence, that had been Jesus' ideal. Rather it was trapped in the same one-sidedness and destitution of life that Hegel had perceived in the spirit of Judaism, in the insurmountable gulf between God and man. Like the Jewish people the Christians "saw mundane realities in every relationship of self-developing and self-revealing life" (288/331). The only difference now was that they "disdained the riches for the sake of which the Jewish spirit served" (288/331). Furthermore, as an opposition to the world, the Christian community of love would always be conditioned by that world. By dismissing it as polluted, they ironically gave it tremendous importance. They lived in "dread of contact" with it. In relation to themselves this meant a severe asceticism, and in relation to the world it carried the potential of turning into a raging fanaticism.

Hegel at first seems to blame the Jews as they existed under Roman law for de-spiritualizing life to such an extent that love required such withdrawal, leaving it little space
in which to develop. Hence in the "Spirit of Christianity" essay he appears to regard the withdrawal according to contingent factors, perhaps because he believed in the truth of love, and wanted to believe that it could have worked, if circumstances had been different. This would also explain his visceral rejection of what he sees as the Jewish principle here, in contrast to the more neutral accounts of his mature Phenomenology of Spirit and Lectures on the Philosophy of History. But it is also evident in "The Spirit of Christianity" that he finds the problem with love to be more intrinsic than such historical contingency would suggest.

The early Christians did have a positive life, limited as it was by the necessity of communal property. But within this constraint there was the potential for love's development. The failure of the Christians to achieve this development reflects another fundamental problem with love—the problem of size. For in the intensity and completeness of a developed love it is exclusive and indifferent to others; it necessarily restricts itself to a small number of people. Yet the task of the Christians was to extend the love to others, to proselytize and bring more people into the spirit of the community. A large group can live a shared life and experience a "common spirit." But it is not the spirit of love; rather it depends on similarity of need, a common sharing of objects and a striving after common goals. And the early Christians would not compromise the spirit of love as the principle of their community by engaging in activities outside love's boundaries. Thus their avoidance

\[\text{\footnotesize 12It is against the Jews that Hegel compares the Christian endeavour in "Spirit of Christianity." The Roman context is implicit but it is only in his mature lectures on Philosophy of History that he brings this context to the fore. As I shall discuss, this singling out of the Jews is central to the ambiguity of the analysis he makes here, regarding the fate of the Christian community.}\]
of the world was indeed because such a world was antithetical to the spirit of love, but it was also because of love's inherent fragility. Engagement with life entailed an encountering of the differences of individualities, in the face of which love can only "recoil." As the group expanded there could be no hope of working through such individuality, of developing the unity through learning to surrender personality. "For the sake of a petty interest, a difference of character in some detail, love would have been changed into hatred, and a severance from God would have followed" (281/323). The only way for them to ward off this danger, says Hegel, was "by an inactive and undeveloped love, i.e., by a love which, though love is the highest life, remains unliving" (281/324). Rather than being "surrendered," particularity must simply be removed from the possibility of expression.

In spite of this, the early Christian fellowship of love was a genuine achievement of mystical unity, an experience of the divine Identity of life, albeit a fragile experience which could suffer disruption at any expression of difference. Negatively, the community was defined by common ownership of goods, and hence by retreat from the world around them. But the love of Jesus that bound them together did provide a basis for a positive life, which expressed itself in the single activity of spreading the faith, with its shared pleasures in praying, believing and hoping. And yet, the community remained "incomplete."

It is when Hegel recounts the incompleteness of this "Kingdom of God on a small scale," that we can see most clearly the full ramifications of reflective thought, the spirit of modernity, for love. We have already considered how love was a rational emotion, a transcendence of the position of reflective thought because it is a real capturing of the unity of life, of which reflective thought had been incapable. Nevertheless, it is in its relation to
reflective thought that love finds its incompleteness.

In the eyes of reflective rationality, love is merely an emotion, something subjective, the other of thought. As Hegel says in his 1800 Fragment, the relation of reflection to emotion, however divine that emotion may be, "is only consciousness of feeling, in which reflection reflects on emotion but each is separate from the other" (FS 314/349). The reason imbedded in love feels this inadequacy, feels that it is conditioned by reflective thought in this way. If it is to be a true knowledge of the whole, then it knows that it must bring reflection into the experience of the unity. Reflective understanding, with all the oppositions it entails, is a part of the truth of life, and must be accounted for. Thus there is a fundamental need to objectify the feeling of the divine, of the unity, to render it a knowable object. Otherwise, love's knowledge will always be in competition with the knowledge of the intellect that cannot grasp it. To truly harmonize feeling and intellect then, the divine must appear, "the invisible spirit must be united with something visible" (291/333). This, says Hegel, is "the supreme need of the human spirit and the urge to religion" (289/332). Religion, not philosophy, is to be the completion of the knowledge of the Absolute.

Religion is a rational objectification of the experience of the divine in life. But we are dealing in religion with a different kind of reason. It is not the same as a conceptual abstraction. It is not the reason of reflective understanding for which every object is a thing which can be united with others only under an abstract category, by means of a barren universal. The religious object is constructed "by means of fancy" (SC 289/332), by reason in its imaginative use, a higher form of reason (inspired by Kant's Vernunft) which transcends the categories of the understanding. It is through the intellect in its imaginative use that the
separation between reflection and emotion is overcome, and that the truth of the religious object can be comprehended.

For the first Christians, the religious object was an immediate objectification of the feeling of love, a symbol of the unity of life. While they could not attain such objectification in the world around them, in relations that had been so de-spiritualized, according to them, they did achieve it in religious worship. It was in the figure of the individual Jesus that they initially found such an object. He was the image of the unity, of the pure life in which believers implicitly felt the truth of their own life. And it was through their imaginative faculty that they could recognize him as such, that they could, even if it be unconsciously, know the unity between themselves and him.

But the object was inadequate, because they focused on the fact of his separate individuality, on that which was irrelevant to the truth of Jesus. By their understanding they saw him as separate from their own selves, but by love they felt his true reality as the unity of God and human, law and being, self and other. Thus with his death they were devastated by the understanding's belief that "He had taken everything into the grave with him" (291/333). But by the intuition of love they felt his truth persisting after death amongst them, and it was in the resurrected Jesus that they found their true religious object, that "love found the objectification of its oneness" (292/334).

The resurrection of Jesus was a sign of the genuine union of spirit and body, the overcoming of the finite human form as a fundamentally exclusive particularity. The real truth of Jesus was his unity with life, the unity of the finite and the infinite, of this life with God. And he achieved this truth in the living bond of the finite human community. The
finite Jesus *had* to die, for it was not he himself that was the unity of God and human, of spirit and body; rather he only *represented* that. The personal, individual Jesus was not in the end what was to be immortalized, but his existence as the unity of love, the spirit of the whole which transcends the form of separate individuality (a form indeed imposed by reflection), and which goes on living in the finite community of which he had been a part. And with his death and resurrection, the individuals of the community could come to comprehend this. The resurrected Jesus was a better sign of the unity that Jesus represented, of his real existence as the love of the finite community, which enabled the members of his community to make the final transition to the higher truth, to the fully developed knowledge of love.

But the love of the Christians was not living. It had remained undeveloped, an intuition, a mere "sensing of a life similar to one's own." And so as the group enlarged their love became more and more fragile, less and less alive. "Love itself did not create a thoroughgoing union between them, and therefore they needed another bond which would link the group together and in which also the group would find the certainty of the love of all" (SC 294/336). This bond was the "mundane reality" of the factual Jesus which they continued to read into the purity of the symbol, "hanging on the deified one like lead on the feet and drawing him down to earth" (293/335). They remained attached to the memories of the individual, his activities and his death. They could not sustain the certainty of the truth of love without clinging to the historical, factual reality of Jesus as the criterion for the recognition of their love. The harsh opposition between spirit and body which the resurrected Jesus was meant to overcome, remained, in the tendency to regard the sign as a
"vague hovering," "midway between heaven's infinity, where there are no barriers, and earth, this collection of plain restrictions" (293/335). Rather than simply the love uniting them, they found in the religious object a factual reality, a common master and teacher, to bind them together. The divine was something given to them, an alien spirit, an external master, not what they themselves had become, not the true realization of freedom.

Hegel's recounting of the failure of the early community of Jesus, the failure truly to express the harmony of the divine and the human in a religious symbol, only serves to confirm the deeper problem love had faced all along, and the reason why it had been unable to objectify itself in life. Love could not exhibit itself and survive, because of reflective reason. The community's love never externalized itself in specific forms of life "because every form of life can be objectified by the intellect and then apprehended as its object, as a cut-and-dried fact" (288/331). For love the "greatest enemy was objectivity" (288/331). Reflective reason could not see love in life because of the nature of reflective reason itself.

And yet this reason could not be denied. While at one moment Hegel appears to blame the "Jewish spirit," it is clear from his mature writings that that spirit is fundamentally the spirit of modernity, the spirit of abstract rationality, of separation from the immediate bond to nature and community. Reflective thought had separated self from substance, man from god. But in that separation lay the possibility of freedom, of self-determination. What Hegel refers to as the Jewish spirit was significant in understanding how remote from the true realization of that freedom we were, how separated was our concrete existence from the real
truth of ourselves.\textsuperscript{13} And love was to be a realization of freedom, a refinding of the life from which we were broken. As a refinding it was compatible with the principle of freedom implicit in abstract subjectivity, it was a conscious and self-produced\textsuperscript{14} reconciliation with one's ethical being, rather than a determination by nature. But in another way it proves to be a retreat from the world of freedom. For it was necessarily a retreat from the expression of particularity, of individual idiosyncrasy, in property. And while there may be limitations to the realization of freedom through property, Hegel in the end could not deny it as a fundamental feature of the modern age, as a fundamental means of self-expression in a world of reflective understanding. A modern community must include relations of private property.

But reflective thought proved to be the nemesis of the Christians not merely in that they had to deny themselves a life in the world around them, but also in their own religion. The early Christians did find the objectification of their love in the resurrected Jesus. They were capable of understanding the truth of that symbol as their love given shape. The crudeness of the union between divine and human in the symbol, a seemingly direct

\textsuperscript{13}Fackenheim (1973:111ff.) acknowledges the element of truth in Hegel's view of the Jews, but says that he ignores the whole Jewish response to divine-human separation from the Middle Ages onwards, their own "dialectical" responses which make Judaism still a competitor with the divine-human unity that Hegel understands to have come into being with the Christian gospel. As Fackenheim suggests, the "Christian" truth of Hegel's philosophy, its assertion that it has transcended the one-sidedness of both the Greeks and the Jews by discovering a reconciliation of human and divine after separation, is something which by Hegel's own acknowledgement must be demonstrated. The rest of this dissertation will be taken up by an examination of how Hegel envisions the divine-human unity to demonstrate itself in life, in light of the problem that it encounters here in the early community of Jesus.

\textsuperscript{14}It is self-produced not in the sense of bilden, the rational cultivation of the self, but in the sense of the suffering and recognition involved in finding one's unity with the other.
connection between Jesus' actual body and the ascendance, was compensated for among the early Christians by the fact that they were less intellectual than we. "They were breathed upon by the oriental spirit; the separation of spirit and body was less complete for them; they regarded fewer things as objects and so handed fewer things over to intellectual treatment" (297/334). They were less determined by the objectifying power of reflective thought, which cannot comprehend the unity of finite and infinite, and so the crudity of the symbol was less problematic for them. Their imagination was more capable of finding in the resurrected Jesus the true unification of spirit and body, feeling and objectivity. But even for them the cleft in the symbol between God and man was there, and so the grasp on the unity was very tentative. The longing for religion, for a completion of the sense of unity with life, remained:

even in its highest dreams, even in the transports of the most finely organized love-breathing souls, it is always confronted by the individual, by something objective and exclusively personal. In all the depths of their beautiful feelings those who felt this longing pined for union with him, though this union, because he is an individual, is eternally impossible. (SC 300/341)

The continuance of the opposition between God and man experienced by the early followers of Jesus, has plagued the entire history of the Christian church, who in their consciousness, if not in their feeling, have seen God variously as friendly, hating, or indifferent to the world, but always as opposed. And as we grew more intellectual, the incapacity to see any spiritual truth in life was extended to our incapacity to see it in the religious object. The opposition between God and human in the symbol was deepened by the imposition of reflective thought, until that, too, became simply a spiritless object.

Thus, the knowledge of love was ultimately at odds with reflective thought, and as a living reality could only meet its demise in the face of that thought. As a mere stripping
away of the particularity of self and other within a system of individual entitlements, in order to find the underlying mystical unity with the other, without then being able to develop itself in the world, it would always be conditioned. The expression of its truth in the religious object would always be subject to misconstrual by the crystallizing power of the reflective understanding that had come to dominate the world, with its imposition of the harsh opposition of spirit and reality. Love, in a world of property relations, had to remain undeveloped, and so its reality could not be validated in the religious object. Love could not accommodate a fundamental truth of the modern age, the truth of reflective reason and its expression in property, and so it could not be the principle of community for that age.

But Hegel's abandonment of love was not, in the end, to be an abandonment of its content as truth, but an abandonment of its form. It was not to be as emotion that humanity could develop its unity and overcome atomism, for Hegel. Rather that emotion was only the beginning point. To reclaim life, to actualize its fundamental unity, was to be a task of reflective thought in its activity as will. The immediacy of love, the found unity, must once again be ripped apart. But armed with love's intuition of unity, the self-dirempted self must embark on the conscious actualization of its implicit unity, on the task of Bildung. In his mature philosophy, Hegel will no longer regard reflective thought as constructing a static manifold which it is then incapable of bringing together, but as inherently dialectic, and as fundamental to the achievement of the self's unity.
Chapter Two

FROM SEPARATION TO UNITY:
The Journey of Reflective Thought
Towards a Philosophy of Unity: Hegel and the Transcendental Intuition

In the 1800 Fragment, Hegel holds that reflective thought can never comprehend a unity such as love, and that love can only find objectification in the religious symbol. By the time of his 1801 *On the Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy*, he is engaged with Schelling in an attempt to develop a *philosophical* comprehension of the Absolute. This movement reflects Hegel's growing appreciation of the significance to the modern of the impulse to rational conceptualization, and thus the necessity that this impulse be satisfied. For we have already seen in "Spirit of Christianity" how reflective thought was immanently linked to the demise of religious faith and the impossibility of a community based on love. The harmony of law and being, mind and body, experienced in love, is totally disrupted by this consciousness. It *loses* the truth that love had discovered in being. Thus, by 1801 he has come to consider that, if there is to be any possibility of a spiritual life for modern individuals, of something beyond the relations of dead objectivity and ethics of mastery that are implicitly tied to reflective thought, it must have a philosophical comprehension that can transcend the standpoint of that thought and its negative implications. In an age of reason, philosophy must illuminate the richness of life, show the individual the significance of her particular individual experiences by relating them to the Absolute. And it was through Fichte and Schelling that Hegel drew his hope that philosophy, a "new philosophy," which consisted not in mere fixed and abstract concepts divorced from existence, but in a systematic movement of concepts in connection with existence, could provide for the genuine, rational grasping of the infinite in life. Like the poetry of the Greeks, and the resurrection of Jesus for the early Christians, philosophy must cognize for
the modern the unity of self and world.

In the *Difference* essay, Hegel conceptualized this new philosophy as based on "transcendental intuition," which he defines as "an activity of both intelligence and nature, of consciousness and the unconscious together" (D 110/28). As in his understanding of love, the transcendental intuition is something which, in being conceptualized by reason, should not thereby be seen as an object over against that reason, but as a unity of subject and object. That is, the conceptualization must not be made from the reflective standpoint, for that would see the knowledge that exists in being, the knowledge of love, as a merely subjective and finite experience. The concept is not something different from the experience of being, which conditions and dominates it. Rather, in the "transcendental standpoint", the concept and being are seen as one and the same. Thus one begins philosophizing from the intuition itself, from "the identity of Idea and Being" (D 112/30).

One gets a sense of what Hegel means by this transcendental standpoint in his

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15 This idea of the Absolute as known through intuition is derived from Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*. Fichte, following Kant's "transcendental deduction," had conceptualized the Absolute Identity as Ego, as a subject which comes to be an object through its own self-positing, and thus as unconditioned by any more fundamental cause. Although for Fichte the Absolute Ego is a primordial subject-object unity and thus is prior to, and the condition of, ordinary consciousness, we do have access to it through what he calls "intellectual intuition," in the idea we all have that it is *we* who think and *we* who act. At the same time this is not an immediate knowledge of ourselves as self-positing subjects, for then the intuition would be an object conditioned by the knowing subject. But the Absolute is the unconditioned. Thus Fichte conceives the intuition not as a consciousness of self as object, or consciousness at all, but as an aspect of the coming to be of consciousness, as the *postulated condition* of self-consciousness. It was this idea of the intuition as a postulate rather than an actual knowledge, as well as the reflective standpoint from which Fichte constructed his system to try and show the truth of that postulate, that Hegel objected to. The "transcendental intuition" reflects what Hegel saw in Schelling as the corrective to Fichte's defects, as we shall see.
examination of Fichte's conflicting statements about the relation of the Ego to nature. We experience nature in ourselves as "drive" according to Fichte, versus the Ego which acts according to a "concept of purpose" (136/48). For Hegel, the genuine synthesis or knowing of this opposition between the Ego and its drive is "feeling". But, as in love, when the Ego separates itself from feeling and views it reflectively, it appears as a merely subjective and finite emotion. The Ego's relation to its own drive from this reflective standpoint is one whereby they are different, "one is the condition of the other, one dominates over the other" (D 137/49). The Ego is asserted to be the Absolute and must bring the emotion under its sway. This tends to be Fichte's standpoint. But there is another possibility, the transcendental standpoint, whereby "Ego=Ego; freedom and drive are one and the same" (D 137/49). Here, the I does not need to regard its objective being as the antithesis to its freedom, as that from which it must act completely independently, but as that which contains the same truth as itself, a truth which exists in sensible form. According to Hegel, Fichte seems at moments to take up the transcendental viewpoint, as when he says: "[m]y drive as a natural being and my tendency as pure spirit are the same basic drive (Urtrieb.), the drive that constitutes my being)" (D 137/49). But he inevitably slips back into the reflective stance, separating the Ego from its drive and advocating a relation of command to its own being. For Hegel, on the contrary, one must begin by taking up the transcendental standpoint.

"Feeling," then, is an example of the transcendental intuition, of a knowledge which includes being, but which has a conceptual expression. It is not an abstract reflection on the Absolute as object. Rather the philosopher actually engages with the experience of the
Absolute, because that experience is the knowledge, just as we have had with love before. Thus it is "an activity of both intelligence and nature."

Philosophizing from the standpoint of "feeling," however, does not seem very different from the philosophizing which Hegel had undertaken in his earlier attempt to comprehend the spiritual significance of love. But whereas love constituted the highest standpoint of knowing, for Hegel the transcendental intuition is merely the beginning. The transcendental intuition is not a final standpoint to be arrived at, but is conceptualized explicitly in terms of Fichte's idea of Ego or "activity," an activity to be understood in terms of a teleological drive toward self-knowledge, and that is vindicated in a complete system of knowledge. Furthermore, unlike with love, conceptual thought is not seen as something separate from the Absolute which distorts it by giving it the appearance of being conditioned. And the Absolute is not seen to find intellectual fulfilment solely in the religious consciousness. Rather the side of conceptual thought is seen as a necessary aspect of the Absolute's goal of self-consciousness. And it is philosophy as a system which fulfils this necessary aspect.

While the foundation of this philosophy of the Absolute Identity is Fichtean, it is Schelling's developing system of philosophy which Hegel, in the Difference essay, sees as holding forth the most promise for rationally cognizing the Absolute in existence. For Fichte had conceptualized the Absolute as coming to self-consciousness through a primitive act of self-division into the subject world and the object world, and thus as a ground behind being and experience, behind the subject-object relation of ordinary consciousness, rather than existing in experience. Furthermore the object world was for Fichte simply the other posited
by the Absolute against which it could begin to come to self-consciousness, and thus it is the side of the subject that is privileged in his system; the subject must prove its underlying identity with the object-world by a one-sided process of mastery. In Schelling's idea for a philosophy of nature Hegel saw, on the contrary, a recognition of the Absolute as positing itself in the world of appearance, in that the natural world is seen as an actual existence of the Absolute. Key here was the idea that Hegel and Schelling had derived from Kant's "Idea" of "teleological judgement" in the Third Critique, that nature, like the self, must be conceived fundamentally as a self-striving activity (Beiser 1993). But whereas for Kant this was merely a regulative judgement in order to comprehend our experience of the organicism of nature, and did not necessarily tell us anything about nature "itself," Schelling and Hegel insisted it must also be seen as constitutive of nature. Nature is not dead being, inert matter, but also the movement of subjectivity, purposive self-overcoming, albeit at an unconscious level. In Hegel's terms, it is an "objective subject-object." In Schelling's idea of a philosophy of nature, one begins with this objective world, examining and understanding its movements and its patterns as fundamentally teleological.

But how could Schelling assume such a view of nature without falling into the problem of dogmatism that all the post-Kantian idealists were so aware of, of claiming knowledge of an objective being without accounting for the contribution of consciousness to that knowledge? The answer is that knowledge for Schelling is not something foreign, added on to Nature, but an emanation of nature itself, is indeed the very telos of nature. As he says in the 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism: "Nature's highest goal, to become wholly an object to herself, is achieved only through the last and highest order of reflection,
which is none other than man” (6). Hence we have here a genetic treatment of the
development of nature and intelligence, as the self-positing of the Identity in existence
towards its own self-consciousness. This is opposed to the loss of the Identity in the
postulated act of self-division by which Fichte’s system begins and where, in the project of
reconstructing the Identity for consciousness, the objective world comes to take on a
subordinate position. It was in this idea of a genetic tracing, then, that Hegel saw the
potential for comprehending the Absolute in the experience of ordinary consciousness.
Hence it was in the carrying forth of Schelling’s project that Hegel believed we might find
a genuine verification of the Absolute in existence.

If the Absolute is self-positing, if it posits itself in an objective and a subjective form,
in nature and in intelligence, toward its own self-comprehension, then, according to Hegel.
philosophy can trace this self-unfolding, can trace the Identity as it exists in each moment,
and situate each moment in relation to the Absolute as a totality. One accompanies the
Identity in its own self-positing, first, following Schelling, in its visible form as nature. The
manifold of nature is comprehended as the striving of the Absolute toward reflection on itself
in visible form, and thus there is an evolutionary development of being from its first
existence in inorganic nature, toward an increasingly centralized self-striving in the organic
activity of plants, then in the self-feeling of animals, and finally in the consciousness of the
human, the being who reflects nature to itself and thus begins to bring the Absolute to self-
consciousness.

At first humans do not find their unity with nature but, from the subject-object
division which characterizes consciousness, take nature as something separate and distinct.
It is in self-consciousness, in reflection away from nature and back onto their own self, that we have the beginning of a rational reunification with nature. Through the experience of its own self as activity, as subject, self-consciousness will gradually come to find itself as the conscious activity which precisely parallels what has gone on unconsciously in nature. The Absolute as self-consciousness emerges out of the unconscious Absolute of nature, and wills its own existence. It will construct consciously the rational structure of itself. And it will find that structure mirrored in nature. Nature is thus the ground and confirmation of the Absolute as self-consciousness. And self-consciousness in its self-unfolding consciously constructs what in Nature had been unconsciously working therein.

What this presupposes is that the Absolute ultimately achieves its goal of self-knowledge, ultimately comes to know itself both in self and in nature, and thus is its own rational self-grounding. The philosophical system, then, is the final emanation of an Absolute which seeks rational self-comprehension. The philosopher follows the unfolding of the Absolute in both these worlds of nature and humanity, and comprehends the unity of both of them in the Absolute as a totality. And the "transcendental intuition" is the key to this philosophical engagement. The transcendental intuition is precisely the Absolute in the moment of its existence, the conscious expression of an unconscious activity, which then goes beyond itself and finds its ultimate verification in its relation to the whole.

The transcendental intuition, then, is at the basis of Hegel's conviction that there is a way to philosophically cognize the Absolute. In taking up the "transcendental standpoint," in comprehending the subject-object identity as it exists in each moment, this philosophy can show each moment in its relation to the totality of the Absolute, thus conceptualizing the true
infinity of each moment in a self-grounding system. In this cognizing, nature is rescued from its status as dead objectivity in relation to a modern subjectivity that is inherently alienated from it and can accord it merely instrumental value, because that nature is known, experienced by human consciousness, as the genuine existence of the Absolute. Within the individual's own self, the transcendental intuition implies a harmony between reason and inclination, between law and self-interest, that can achieve a philosophical comprehension and justification.

Hegel spent a number of years in Jena, through lecture courses and in co-ordination with Schelling, working out the details of this philosophical system. But in what is known as his "phenomenological crisis" of 1805,\(^\text{16}\) came the crystallization of what had been a growing uneasiness with Schelling's system of philosophy, and ultimately with his own work based on the transcendental intuition. The democratic intent which he had believed to be implicit in their philosophy, the intent to give credence to the world of experience by revealing it as the Absolute in existence, seemed marred by an increasingly evident elitism.

In Schelling's work this was more blatant in that, for him, the true comprehension of the subjective and objective worlds, the Absolute Identity in its full self-consciousness and ultimate self-verification, was an experience that could be achieved only by those who possessed the appropriate "poetic genius." But a unity of subjective and objective worlds which lay ultimately and only in the capacity of the artist to lose himself in the mystic identity, was one which left behind the whole experience of ordinary consciousness and its ambiguous relations with the world. Hegel's own work certainly did not relegate the truth

\(^{16}\text{The phrase is Rosenkranz's, and it is Harris (1993) who dates the crisis at 1805.}\)
of the Absolute to the privileged artist, but sought to be a philosophy accessible to everyone and which could bring to light the true significance of the world of appearance.\textsuperscript{17} But it must have dawned on him that this philosophy itself relied on a privileged standpoint, the standpoint of the transcendental intuition. For the standpoint of ordinary consciousness, for whom Hegel believed philosophy to be so essential, was precisely the standpoint of reflective thought, of alienation from unity, of fixed and rigid categories, and hence of an incapacity to conceive any genuine identity.

In focusing on unity in experience from the transcendental standpoint, Hegel seemed to have forgotten the fundamental problem characterizing the modern consciousness--the radical breach between self and nature. The fact was that even if the experience of unity could have had a conceptual expression that would satisfy the modern individual of its truth, that individual was alienated even from the experience of the unity by the standpoint of reflective thought that had come to dominate her. It is not that this consciousness was incapable of experiencing a unity such as love, or the knowledge of the transcendental intuition, but that in its reflection it became alienated from that unity. To come back to that experience for the modern thus required a reflective overcoming of the experience of separation. The birth of *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the true introduction to Hegel's philosophical system appears to have been the result of the final crystallization of this idea. The taking up of the standpoint of modern consciousness and its separation from being must be the initiating point for the system. And the task of a *Phenomenology*, the "science of the

\textsuperscript{17} This is most evident in citations Rosenkranz provides in his biography of Hegel from some now lost 1804 lecture notes (Rosenkranz 260).
experience of consciousness," would be to trace that experience of reflective overcoming.

**Phenomenology of Spirit: The Journey of Reflective Thought**

In *Phenomenology*, the task is to build a "ladder" from finite consciousness, which is in the position of reflective thought, to the "transcendental standpoint." While before Hegel had presumed this latter position, now he must show how reflective consciousness is immanently driven there, in the search for its own truth. In the method of *Phenomenology*, thus, we begin with reflective consciousness, which has a particular idea of the truth according to which it operates. We merely observe how this consciousness, through its experience with this idea, discovers the flaw or contradiction therein and moves on to a new view of the truth which incorporates the previous insight. Thus the method is meant to illustrate a *logical necessity* in the movement of reflective consciousness.

In following the journey of this consciousness we must thus chart the logic of the experience by which it is driven forward, until it finally arrives at the standpoint of unity, or the overcoming of the subject-object division. As we shall see, it is in the experience of conscience and forgiveness that this re-connection is finally established. It is here that we will find a re-connection with the deeper truth of love, the knowledge of the Absolute Identity, but it will be one that is established in and through the movement of reflective rationality.

The idea that this process is governed by an inner necessity, that consciousness is driven by the logic of its own experience towards such a unity, itself provides the basis for a rational justification of the position to which it will attain in conscience. However, as I
shall argue, there is a peculiar presupposition that Hegel makes about this reflective consciousness at the beginning of its movement, a presupposition which must be attended to if we are to understand the trajectory upon which it is launched. And this is that the consciousness is driven *implicitly* by the knowledge of love, by a subconscious knowledge of its unity with the objective world which drives it forward towards the realization of that truth. This knowledge is implicit, because it is not taking place at a conscious level, and hence cannot be brought to the forefront of the phenomenological presentation (which only deals with the conscious idea of consciousness about its truth). However, at a crucial point it becomes necessary to acknowledge the presence of this subconscious knowledge, in order to explain its very drive to unity. And it is this knowledge that will become explicit, become *for* consciousness once again, at the end of its journey, in the experience of forgiveness. Hence the whole movement that we will be tracing begins and ends with the knowledge of love.

It will not be necessary for our purposes here to engage with the entire series of movements of consciousness which the *Phenomenology* traces, for the major purpose of our investigation is to see how a reflective consciousness which has, *in history*, become separated from the experience of unity with its own self and with the cultural world around it, might re-engage with such an experience. Hence we may begin with the section where consciousness has come to take full account of its historical context, the section on "Spirit." Specifically, we shall take up consciousness in its experience of the Roman Empire, what Hegel calls "the world of legal right," for it is here that we encounter reflective consciousness in history for the first time. And as we see at the beginning, this is a consciousness which
must first *learn* of its own loss of unity before it can begin the struggle to overcome it.

I. The Knowledge of Separation

While the reflective consciousness of the world of legal right takes its immediate, natural being to be its truth, it must still be understood according to its separation from nature, according to the fundamental subject-object dichotomy of reflective thought. For in this standpoint it understands its own being only as finite, particular being, with no larger spiritual significance. Its universality here is the "empty unit of the person," the abstract self of legal personality which is purely external to its natural being. Its nature is merely the insignificant filling of its legal personality, a filling which is accorded no recognition in this world.

Nevertheless, at first this self-consciousness occupies itself with its natural being, and lives according to its immediate impulses. It is only with the resulting experience of chaos into which such a world is immanently driven, that this consciousness will direct its attention away from its immediate, finite reality, toward its perceived universal. For the reality of being free, of being reflectively separated from community and expressing one's own particularity, leads to the most tremendous contradiction—the necessity for an absolute, external authority. Like Hobbes before him, Hegel comprehended this paradox of a freedom that must be paired with subjugation. The immediacy of the particular self, expressing its own desires and recognized in private right, implies a complete absence of social substance that would knit individuals together and provide the basis for an harmonious existence. An absolute, external control could be the only answer.
The early Christians had attempted a way out of this situation, but it was one founded on retreat. To find a genuine unity, they had to separate themselves from the principle of reflective thought, from expression of particularity, from the fundamental feature of modernity. Yet the being of the modern had been fundamentally changed by this principle, and retreat could not be the answer. Modern consciousness must press forward.

For reflective consciousness in the world of legal right, the violence and devastation which emerges in that world is fundamentally educative. It learns, in that experience, the nothingness of its own natural being, the being it had taken as its true reality and by which it had lived. Having confronted its own nothingness, this consciousness "is driven back into itself from this actuality" and "ponders this its inessential nature". The truth which it now acknowledges "consists in the fact that this universally acknowledged authority of self-consciousness is the reality from which it is alienated" (PS §483/263-264). Its truth is the authority of the emperor, but that is a truth over which it has absolutely no control. Without this authority it is nothing, but that authority is external to and capable of destroying itself. Hence consciousness comes face to face with its own alienation from itself, with the separation of itself from its own essence. Its new object of truth is no longer its natural self, but a universal which stands outside it.

In the direction of its attention beyond itself, this consciousness leaves behind for a long time to come the idea that it can find the truth of itself in its own being. It will only be at the end of a long trajectory of experience that it will fully return to the truth that resides in its own being, the truth that love had known.
II. The Journey Through Separation

We encounter here the "noble consciousness," the consciousness which understands the lesson of chaos, the nothingness of its own existence, and turns its attention to its new truth—"the universally acknowledged authority" that holds the society together. Historically this consciousness manifests itself in the French ancien régime, in the fidelity of the nobles to a "state power" that could sustain order: "this power is in part the established law, and in part government and command, which regulates the particular activities within the action of the whole .... The individual thus finds therein his ground and essence expressed, organized, and manifested" (PS §498/272). The noble consciousness devotes itself to this "universal," and seeks to render its own being in conformity with what it sees as the real truth of itself. What Hegel calls "culture" (Bildung) is the means by which it conforms to the universal. This is the negating of its own natural, particular desires, the desires which it now sees as nothing and as the source of its previous chaos. It must alienate itself from its natural being, become "one who voluntarily renounces possessions and enjoyment and acts and is effective in the interests of the ruling power" (PS §503/274).

And yet the direction which the noble consciousness takes up, its self-negation towards unity with a truth that lies outside itself, is not self-evident. Indeed, there would seem to have been a number of responses available to the reflective consciousness who has experienced the chaos and corruption of a state of nature. One, which Hegel saw the Stoics as doing, would be to retreat into the universality of thought, abandoning sensuous existence. Or, for the Jewish consciousness as Hegel viewed it, more aware of its embeddedness in the finite world, the knowledge of alienation from universality takes the form of sorrow and
yearning, but at the same time of a resignation to living in the actual, finite world. The idea that one could attain unity with the truth outside oneself, and that by one's own activity, seems to presuppose something more.

It is here that we encounter the Christian presupposition of this consciousness. For it is only with the absorption of the Christian gospel, which holds the conviction of the implicit identity of the finite self with the universal, of human and God, that we begin to see this principle of mediation of the natural self towards its own truth. The Christian consciousness as Hegel understands it, seems to be in possession of a kind of knowledge which, since it is not an entirely conscious knowledge, since consciousness does not have before itself as object the full idea of what it knows, cannot be brought to the forefront at this stage of the dialectic. For we are dealing in Phenomenology only with consciousness' idea of its truth. If there is indeed a kind of intuitive knowledge driving consciousness here, it must come to an awareness of that of its own accord.

It is in Philosophy of History that Hegel is more explicit about the significance of Christianity for the movement of the modern reflective consciousness at this stage, for it is in the Christian religion that "that the unity of Man with God is posited" (PH 324/392). And this idea of unity is furthermore what pushes "him who is a partaker of the truth, and knows that he himself is a constituent [Moment] of the Divine Idea, to give up his merely natural being," precisely the activity that we see undertaken by the noble consciousness.

That this movement takes the form of a subconscious impulse, rather than a conscious knowledge of unity, is evident from Hegel's statement in Philosophy of History that "[t]his implicit unity exists in the first place only for the thinking speculative consciousness" and
that "for the sensuous, representative consciousness" it becomes present only in the form of an external object, the figure of Christ. And yet we know already that it is the "witness of one's own Spirit" (PH 326/294), and not reflective consciousness, which recognizes the real truth of Christ. Or, as Hegel said earlier in the "Spirit of Christianity" essay:

Faith in the divine is only possible if in the believer himself there is a divine element which rediscovers itself, its own nature, in that on which it believes, even if it be unconscious that what it has found is its own nature. (SC 266/313 [my emphasis])

Hence it is the recognition of the truth of Jesus on a subconscious level by Christians--the experience of genuine faith, the sensing of one's unity with the divine--that becomes the immanent force of history.

But to bring that subconscious knowledge to consciousness will entail, first, the "abstraction from all that belongs to reality, even from [natural] moral ties...only by stripping himself of his finiteness and surrendering himself to pure self-consciousness, does he attain the truth" (PH 328/397). For the truth is yet placed outside the self for reflective consciousness, in the figure of Christ, or the idea of the good. The negative process by which one approaches this truth is conceived as a "disciplining":

"Zucht" (discipline) is derived from "Ziehen" (to draw). This drawing must be towards something; there must be some fixed unity in the background in whose direction that drawing takes place....A renunciation, a disaccustoming, is the means of leading to an absolute basis of existence. (PH 320/388).

It is this process, this "disciplining" by its own hands, which we see commencing with the noble consciousness. This is a long and arduous process in the Phenomenology, the process of Bildung, or "Culture," although it will be traced quickly here. At the end of it, with the attainment of "pure self-consciousness," the separation of consciousness from the
object of its truth will be partially overcome. But even then it will have to go through a long learning process before it will be able to come fully into the presence of its higher truth, of the subconscious knowledge of unity that has been driving it all along.  

In the section of *Phenomenology* on "Culture," the truth which consciousness sees as external to itself and for which it sacrifices itself, takes on a number of different shapes through the course of its experience. And as it does so, the consciousness itself changes shape. At first, as the "noble consciousness," it sees the truth of itself as state power, and adopts a negative attitude to its own ends in obedience to that power. Indeed, it completes this self-negativity by abasing its very being-for-self, its very sense of itself as an 'I,' in the activity of flattering the monarch. Flattery is the true sacrifice of the self, the debasement of any vestige of being-for-self. The irony is that in doing so, the noble receives back wealth from the monarch. This is because the monarch is in fact dependent on the nobles for recognition. Indeed, it is only through the recognition achieved in flattery that the very being of the monarch as an actual, self-conscious state power can exist. Through their flattery, he "knows that the nobles not only are ready and prepared for the service of the state power, but that they group themselves round the throne as an ornamental setting, and that they are

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18 This view of a subconsciousness at work in *Phenomenology* seems to me to find support in Hyppolite's discussion, "Hegel's Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis," where he suggests that there is a knowledge at work which consciousness does not yet recognize, but which is at the basis of the itinerary of experience (1971). Also, Taylor's article, "The Opening Arguments of Phenomenology," argues that there is a kind of "transcendental deduction" going on whereby consciousness moves forward to new ideas of the truth in order to explain what it already "knows" (Taylor 1976).
continually *telling* him who sits on it what he *is*" (PS §511/277). The monarch implicitly acknowledges this reality by imparting wealth to the nobles in return for the recognition. And thus the noble discovers that state power, or the monarch, is not in fact the truth for which he sacrifices himself. Rather, in the end, the sacrifice turns out to be for money. Its new object of truth is money.

But in order to save its idea that it is still working for a higher truth, and not for itself, the noble consciousness takes upon itself to distribute its wealth for the benefit of others. However, it remains in a contradiction because the criteria by which it imparts its money are "independent and arbitrary" (§519/281). It is its "contingent personality," precisely what was supposed to count for nothing to this consciousness, that is the fundamentally determining aspect of its activity. It is up to the "base consciousness," however, the consciousness who supplicates himself to the noble in order to gain wealth, to expose the real truth of this situation.

The base consciousness degrades itself before the noble in order to get money, just as the noble consciousness had done with the monarch. But only the base consciousness faces up to what it is doing. For the base consciousness has nothing to lose by confronting the truth, as does the noble. Indeed, in its confrontation lies a resentment and inner rebellion at its situation, which Hegel sees portrayed in Diderot's *Rameau's Nephew*. And this resentment entails an implicit taking back of its self, its dignity. It is aware of the inessentiality to which others are hypocritically devoting themselves, and, although it itself engages in such devotion, in its flattering behaviour it harbours a secret mockery and despising by which it retrieves its own being-for-self. In its witty talk it externalizes this
mockery, shows itself the real power over the situation, the power over every object—state power, wealth and benevolence—which had before been taken as the given and the true.

The real insight to which the base consciousness attains is that it is not the objects of wealth themselves that are the real truth of the situation, but the individual subjects. The truth of the whole movement of culture is the recognition by the self that its real truth and universal does not stand outside itself, in state power or wealth, but in its very own being. Everything is in fact done for its own self. It thereby overcomes its alienation, and returns once again to its own self.

But this is not a return to itself as a natural self, what we had with the self of the Roman Empire. On the contrary it is the "pure self", the self purified of any self-subsistent content, "determined neither by reality nor by thought" (§526/286). In knowing the vanity of the objects of wealth and power, it knows itself as their truth, knows itself as the power of negativity and the truth of the world. Its former content and substance have "turned into something negative....The positive object is merely the pure 'I' itself, and the disrupted consciousness in itself this pure self-identity of self-consciousness that has returned to itself" (§526/286). Its object is itself as a pure abstraction, a pure 'T'.

With itself as object, consciousness appears implicitly to have come to a harmony with its object, to have overcome its own alienation from its truth. And yet this is clearly not the return to the intuition of love that we have been waiting for. Rather, it is the rational self of the Enlightenment, which holds that the truth does not lie in some external authority, but in the rationality of humans, that being attains its true validity and verification in human self-consciousness. This self as the object of truth has indeed progressed beyond the Abstract
Ego of the Roman Empire, which acted according to the truth of its contingent, particular self, and beyond the noble consciousness that did not recognize its self as the truth of its own activity. But in seeing its rational essence as the truth of things this new consciousness nevertheless remains in abstraction from the world, from the unity of Being. Hence it has a significant way to go before it realizes its own limitation. And we must watch it unfold its notion of itself a bit further before the "journey through separation" can be said to be over, and a more genuine unity can be found.

For itself, this consciousness still has a conflict. For although it knows itself as the truth of the world, that world still appears as a reality and an 'other'. To realize its knowledge of itself as the truth and power over the world, it must show itself as such. It must show itself as the might of negativity, "which eliminates everything objective that supposedly stands over against consciousness, and makes it into a being which has its origin in consciousness" (§529/288). The entire story of the Enlightenment is the actualization of this idea, first against the content of faith, then in the positive concept of "utility," then against the very form of being in the French Revolution, and finally against its own sensuous being in the moral consciousness of Kant.

Now the object of faith has been around all along for consciousness, but the "actual consciousness" of the world of culture did not concern itself directly with that. For actual consciousness knew the world as its present reality, a reality which it must come to terms with. But at the same time, alongside that consciousness we had the consciousness of faith, the belief in God, Jesus and the Holy Ghost. These two realities coexisted peacefully in this consciousness, one concerning only this world, the other the world beyond. But pure insight
will have none of this other worldly truth. It knows itself as the truth of everything, and hence must seek to show itself as the truth of the object of faith.

The object of faith is, in truth, a construct of consciousness, an object it makes for itself in order to symbolize the inner knowledge that exists in the form of love. It recognizes in the object an expression of its inner truth, and in that recognition is the truth of the object (although the believing consciousness does not recognize its own role therein). The problem with faith, as we have already seen in chapter one, is its inability to become a living reality in a world that is dominated by reflective consciousness and its relations of private property. Thus it has a tendency to fixate on the physical reality of the object, as something external to and foreign from itself. The obsession with the physical Jesus, his life, works, and death, is the sign that the knowledge of love—the unity of law and being, self and other, human and God—has failed to become a living reality for individuals. Hence they depend instead on the actual Jesus, and respond to his teachings as to an external authority. It is this limitation of faith, the positive character of its belief, that proves key to its downfall in the face of Enlightenment attacks. For it is precisely these positive characteristics that Enlightenment targets.

First, Enlightenment attacks the idea that the object of faith—God—is an intrinsic being, by pointing out that the belief in the Absolute is brought about by the activity of the believer, by its own obedience and action, and in the service and worship it performs in the religious community. Secondly, Enlightenment charges that the objects of faith’s worship exist merely in the form of things, of sensuous objects. It condemns these objects as constituting the essence of the absolute Being of faith, and thus faith as being superstitious.
Thirdly, Enlightenment attacks the ground of faith's knowledge as being merely "a fortuitous knowledge of fortuitous events" (§554/300). It charges faith "with basing its certainty on some particular historical evidences" which suffer from the inaccuracies of lost information, the vagaries of recorders, and particular interpretations of surviving texts (§554/301). And finally, Enlightenment attacks the actions of devotion and sacrifice as being hypocritical, of representing merely a token gesture which does not truly accomplish the renunciation of pleasure and property as ends in themselves, towards some higher good.

The Enlightenment is successful in these attacks, because of the fact that the religious consciousness is living by two different kinds of knowledge—the religious or "slumbering consciousness", and the "waking consciousness which lives solely in the world of sense" (§572/310). And the "waking consciousness" is what it in fact shares with Enlightenment consciousness, and why it cannot refute the charges made against it. Its deeper religious consciousness cannot answer to these charges, which in fact in the world of the Enlightenment turn out to be true. The "waking consciousness" thus takes over the slumbering consciousness; it "has monopolized every distinction and expansion of it and has vindicated earth's ownership of every portion of it and given them back to earth" (§573/310). Thus does faith lose its content to the Enlightenment.

In destroying the content of faith by interpreting it in terms of merely finite attributes, what Enlightenment has left in terms of a positive content is the world around it. But this is now a world of "particularity and limitations" rather than something infinite. The immediacy of objects which confront it in the world have, once again, become its truth (§558/303). This is so because Enlightenment has shown to itself and others the
"nothingness of everything that lies beyond sense-certainty" (§558/303). Thus pure insight has constructed for itself an immediate, actual world as its reality, and a beyond of that world which is a void. Even that void is seen as existing only in relation to consciousness, only as an abstraction of thought, the other of being. Hence both this world and the beyond find their identity and their truth in relation to consciousness. They are, in being for it. The true identity of the objective world is thus its "utility." Or, as Hegel facetiously says, "everything exists for his pleasure and delight and, as one who has come from the hand of God, he walks the earth as in a garden planted for him" (§560/304).

In utility, pure insight has extended its idea of itself as the truth of the actual world to the point where it now has widespread acceptance in the philosophy of utilitarianism. By this achievement, insight appears to have fulfilled its imperialistic mission. It has done away with the object of faith as other to it. In doing so it has shown to all self-consciousness that it must rely on its own perception and reason (the reason of reflective thought) in order to judge what is true. And since this reason is at work in everyone, since we are all creatures of reflective thought, this argument of Enlightenment cannot be denied. Furthermore, it has shown that there is no reality that is self-subsistent and independent of itself, but that all reality exists only in relation to it, attains presence and actuality only through its own sense-perception and knowledge. Hence it is now generally believed that the truth of reality is the pleasure it can give to man. Enlightenment here would seem to have no more antithesis with which to engage; it appears finally to have become at home with itself in the world, a world that is fully anthropomorphized. And yet, the truth of insight, of the pure self, is only now about to reveal itself to consciousness. For it still has not completely realized itself.
There is an enormous social consequence to the Enlightenment. For once individuals grasp its ultimate message—that they are all equal in being able to reflectively consider the world, that they are all "pure selves" (for it is from the position of the pure self that they "rationally" consider the world)—they will no longer accept the place in the hierarchy to which they have been consigned, according to some supposed difference in their being. The resentment and inner rebellion of *Rameau's Nephew* has here become generalized, and that inner rebellion shows itself to have been the foreshadowing of the actual rebellion of the French Revolution. In their self-knowledge as pure selves, the objective structure in which individuals are placed reflects only their false, inferior status. And they have no investment in that structure, the way that Rameau's nephew did in the vanity of his special knowledge, for it is a knowledge they now all possess. Thus they must do away with this structure that defies their real truth. The abolition of the *ancien régime* is in itself a joyous event, entailing freedom from an oppressive structure that has shown itself no longer to have any rational validity. It is in the aftermath of this event, however, that we see the contradiction which plagues it.

Once it has abolished the existing structure, this consciousness must create a new kind of social organization, a new division of political power, organization of labour, and so on, which expresses its true nature. But doing so would entail the apportioning of individuals again to particular spheres. Even if this new structure would be their own creation, and even if the apportioning were done according to the principle of choice, it would mean that the individual would no longer be in the position of the universal self. They would go back to being particular selves, being defined, that is, by their particular job, their
talent, their social group and so on. But they no longer see themselves in this way. They are no longer willing to be defined by any such particularities; they will accept only an objective structure that is a reflection of their pure self. But an objective structure that is a reflection of their selves is in fact not an object, but must be a subject. To find themselves in that structure they must actually be the self of that structure. They must be the will, a government that is the will of all in their truth as pure selves—a "general will".

But if this general will must always show itself to be the truth of the object it might create, to be the self of the object, then it can never abide the form of objectivity of the structure. "[I]t lets nothing break loose to become a free object standing over against it" (§588/318). For it would then again lose its own self in the object, lose sight of the truth of the object as self; that object would become a self-subsistent reality that would have some power over and resistance to the self. It is only through the negation of objectivity, then, that the general will knows itself as the truth of it. The reality of the general will thus shows itself to be purely negative—"it is merely the fury of destruction" (§589/319). This becomes finally apparent not in the abolition of the old regime, but in the terror that follows.

The terror undertaken by the governing faction after the French Revolution is thus regarded by Hegel as a logical culmination of the idea of the pure self in its realization as will. The truth of will is to do away with any objectivity confronting it, in order to realize itself therein. Once it has done away with the existing structures of the regime, it withdraws again into its self-consciousness as will by becoming a government, and the only object which still confronts it is the actual existence of other individuals who have been left out of the governing faction. To show itself the power over this object, the will can only negate it.
By this experience, consciousness as general will learns the truth of itself. In the terror of death, it sees that it is the very negation of its own physical existence.

The problem with the pure self in the French Revolution has been that individuals have sought to actualize their truth immediately, by putting their actual selves in the position of universality, and relating to being from this position. But this kind of relationship to being by the pure self turns out only to be a relationship of death. By this terror, consciousness learns the impossibility of the immediate realization of the general will, and thus is again willing to submit to social and political structures. But this is not simply a pragmatic retreat and a return to a new cycle of history that will repeat the same dynamic. For consciousness has gained more than this in the experience; it has fully realized its own certainty of itself as negativity, as the other of being. It has reduced being to nothing, seen itself as pure negativity, as death, and retreated back into itself with this knowledge.

This is the "moral consciousness." While it is now willing to accept being as necessary to its own continued existence, it still accords that being no significance, but is concerned only with itself as pure self. It has achieved the full reflection into itself and out of being that was its implicit goal from its beginning as "pure insight." It no longer needs to be part of a particular faction, or a revolutionary government, or to play the role of an anarchist. It merely needs to look into its own actual self to find its deeper truth. It has reduced the antithesis between its actual self and its pure self to "a transparent form" (§595/323). Its object is now its own certainty of itself, itself as "pure knowing and willing" (§594/323).

The moral consciousness is no longer threatened by the form of being, because it no
longer has that being as its object, no longer finds an antithesis between its idea of the truth and that which confronts it. Now, its object is its own certainty of itself as a universal self. It has confirmed its own rejection of being determined by nature, and continues on in the certainty of its own radical freedom. This certainty, because it has traversed the realm of being in order to prove itself, because it has been "purified by absolute negativity," is now immediately present in it. It is "the intuited pure certainty of itself" (§597/324). 19

This moral consciousness thus recognizes only what it finds in its pure, rational self. It defines itself according to its characteristic as free from all sensuous determination, is guided then only by the form of reason or universality in its actions. In Kant this is termed the "categorical imperative," the idea that only if one could universalize the maxim of one's action is the action a morally good action. It is thus only this universality of abstract reason, only "pure duty," which is to be the guide and source of action for the moral consciousness.

The moral consciousness is also a consciousness of being; it is a sense-consciousness. But this sensuous self is really the other of its truth, that to which duty is necessarily opposed. For duty finds its very identity in this opposition; it is only when one acts against one's sensuous being that one can be assured that one is acting in the name of the moral law, and not to satisfy particular appetites.

We see here once again the fundamental characteristic of the modern achievement

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19 The reference here is to Fichte's "intellectual intuition" in the second Introduction to The Science of Knowledge, where Fichte says that everyone must look into their own self to find this truth. Hegel is suggesting in this movement that what Kant and Fichte took to be the universal subjectivity of all rational beings, an inner knowledge of their freedom, is actually a knowledge that presupposes the whole process of historical disciplining that we have witnessed.
of rational self-consciousness--after the disciplinary detour of the feudal regime--in the abstraction of itself from all sensous being, and the relating to that being as something over against it. This was true with the Enlightenment concept of utility, with the French Revolution in its activity of terror towards all that stood opposed to its self-conscious position of will, and it is repeated here in the separation of the moral law, as the ultimate object of truth, from sensuous being. And yet while this rational self is the achievement of this consciousness, it is also what binds it up in a contradiction. For in abstracting from its sensuous being and positing its rational self as Absolute, it at the same time is conditioned by that sensuous being. The self of the French Revolution had sought an escape from this by retreating into the self of morality, into its inner certainty. But this self of morality must now confront its contradiction head on. And it is in Kant's enumeration of the "postulates of practical reason" in *Critique of Practical Reason*, that Hegel sees this confrontation taking place. A consciousness which takes pure duty as its truth must also be driven to embrace these postulates, according to Hegel. And yet a consciousness which is honest with itself will also discover, in the end, that these postulates are what it cannot believe, and thus that the position of an abstractly rational morality must be transcended, in a genuine unity of self and being. Thus the Kantian moral self, as Hegel here interprets it, is the final and the highest stage in the journey of the reflective self through separation, towards the achievement of the standpoint of unity, the transcendental intuition. And it is this transition that we must now examine.

The moral world view begins with the presupposition of moral consciousness, of self-certainty, which has in fact been gained from its previous experience. And because this self-
identity is a negative one, is defined by its abstraction from all sensuous being, there exists for this consciousness also this other against which it defines itself—"a Nature whose laws like its actions belong to itself as a being which is indifferent to moral self-consciousness, just as the latter is indifferent to it" (PS §599/325). The relationship between these two realities "is based, on the one hand, on the complete indifference and independence of Nature towards moral purposes and activity, and, on the other hand, on the consciousness of duty alone as the essential fact" (§600/325). That is, in acting morally one is to be concerned only with the moral law as one's purpose, rather than with any consequence to one's happiness. And it is the intention, the respect for the law, that is so important, not simply the act of abiding by the law. This is the realization of autonomy, for Kant, in that we are guided by our reason, and not by our sensuous nature. Similarly, "Nature" is presupposed as free from morality, in that the acting moral consciousness which focuses only on duty and not on the consequences its action may realize in the world, may find that its action accomplishes nothing, while being unpleasant for its own self. Thus it is denied "the happiness of performance and the enjoyment of achievement" (§601/325). Meanwhile, the non-moral consciousness which concerns itself with its own good may well find itself realized in the world and achieve happiness.

Now the moral consciousness finds an injustice in this, and realizes that it cannot forego its own happiness, in either the sense of seeing its purpose realized, or of satisfying its inclinations more generally. Indeed, to act, it must believe that it could realize its purpose in the world, and thus that Nature is not so indifferent, but could be brought into conformity with morality. It furthermore must believe that it could be rewarded with happiness in so
acting, in order not to become embittered with its task. Thus moral consciousness postulates the harmony of morality and nature, and of a happiness accompanying virtue, as something that must be possible.

This is what Kant calls the "highest good," the idea that necessarily becomes the ultimate purpose of a will determined by the moral law. It is not the motive for the will, but emerges as the idea of what must be realized by a will that makes the moral law its motive. It is thus derivative of the moral law. This idea is not something empirically demonstrable but is necessarily entailed in the moral law, cannot be established as impossible, and thus is "postulated," is demanded by reason if we are to act according to the moral law as our truth. Thus the highest good is the first postulate of the standpoint of pure morality.

When it acts according to the moral law, moral consciousness does indeed see the "production of an actuality determined by the purpose, or of the harmony of the moral

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20 Kant asserts this in the following way, by saying that happiness is a necessary aspect of the ultimate good to be realized "even in the judgement of an impartial reason, which impartially regards persons in the world as ends in themselves" (CPracR 117).

21 Kant gives some consideration to the possibility of a link between virtue and happiness, but nevertheless asserts that we could never know it in the sense that we can have knowledge of causal relations in nature (CPracR 120-126).

22 Although Hegel presents Kant's highest good as the first postulate, Kant himself does not specify it as such. It is rather freedom, the capacity to act independently of inclination and in accordance with the moral law, that is his first postulate. Nevertheless the highest good as an object to be produced by the will is derived from the principle of freedom. We must believe in the possibility of the achievement of virtue, and its combination with happiness, as that which would be produced by freedom of the will. Since, then, the concept is derived from a priori grounds of knowledge, it is not a real misrepresentation to refer to it as a postulate, or demand of reason in its practical use.
purpose and actuality itself" (§618/333). And it is aware of this unity, sees in the "accomplished deed" its own actualization as a particular consciousness, and experiences enjoyment. But at the same time it experiences this actualization as a problem. For it is to be motivated by the moral law alone, and not by the consequences such a law would achieve. Yet it needs the idea that it could realize the moral law in the world, in order to act at all. It deals with this by making the postulated harmony of morality and actuality as something to be achieved in the remote future. But it has just produced an actuality that is an expression of harmony, and thus "proclaims through its deed that it is not in earnest in making its postulate, because the meaning of the action is really this, to make into a present reality what was not supposed to exist in the present" (§618/333). It achieves now what it said must be achievable, and what it ought to achieve although not yet.

Moral consciousness tries to get out of this by asserting that it is not really actualizing the harmony of nature and morality, but only an individual deed with contingent results. It discounts its deed as not really achieving anything good, because it is so limited. It focuses instead on the idea of the highest good as "a final purpose going far beyond the content of this individual deed, and therefore to be placed altogether beyond anything actually done" (§619/334). This is a problematic way of dealing with its difficulty, however, for in genuinely moral action what is done is the fulfilment of pure duty. It is not the consequences, but the intention behind the action, which is the real basis of judgement. Hence it cannot claim to have acted morally and at the same time to have done nothing good. But then, since its good action takes place in Nature, it turns out again that it cannot really have been concerned with pure duty, "for the fulfilment would really have as its purpose, not
pure duty, but its antithesis, reality" (§619/334). Thus it remains inescapably affected by what its good action accomplished in the world.

Now Kant insists that what morality realizes in the world must not serve as the motive for the will, even though it is to be the ultimate object achieved by its actions, and thus that the idea of an achievable good is compatible with action from pure duty. Hegel, on the contrary, is asserting that moral consciousness cannot avoid the consequences of its action (and thus the satisfaction of its sensuous being) from becoming involved in its motive. The sign of this is in the movement we have just witnessed, whereby in order for consciousness to sustain for itself the purity of its motive it must constantly shift back and forth in what it takes to be its essential object. It starts first with pure duty, then sees duty fulfilled in the outcome of its deed, then sloughs this off by shifting to the idea of the highest good as something different and more substantial than its individual deed. And it is in this final object that we see a real crystallization of its contradiction. For if the highest purpose really were fulfilled, then nature would be in accordance with the moral law. But then moral action could not exist, "for action takes place only on the assumption of a negative which is to be set aside by the action" (§620/334). Thus it turns out that "what it really holds to be most desirable, to be the Absolute, is that the highest good be accomplished, and that moral action be superfluous" (§621/335).

But moral consciousness continues on in its contradictory movement, and in doing so must "of necessity again dissemble this suppression of moral action" (§622/335). It seeks to act from pure duty, independently of its own sensuous purposes. But in acting, in actually realizing morality, it finds that it is its sense-nature which "is the instrument or organ" of
realization. This is true at least in the sense that one must act against sensuous being in order to be moral. And because it needs sense-nature to actualize morality, it "is not, therefore, in earnest with the elimination of inclinations and impulses" (§622/335). This cannot be the object of its own goal in becoming virtuous and achieving virtue in the world. Thus in its relation to its own self, the ideal of moral perfection toward which moral consciousness strives must be cast not in terms of elimination of sensuous inclination, but of "conformity" or "fit."

This goal of perfection is indeed outlined by Kant in Critique of Practical Reason as the necessary object to be striven toward by moral self-consciousness in terms of its relation to its own nature as a sensuous being (CPracR 87). This conformity is the goal toward which it must strive, the ideal of perfect virtue which is essentially tied to its own efforts at realization of the highest good in the world. In this ideal there would no longer be a conflict between one's sensuous being and the moral law. One would no longer be under it as a "command," but would fulfil it with gladness (CPracR 87). Thus there would be no sacrifice involved, or temptation to transgress the law. One would always fulfil it with certainty and serenity. Of course this perfection does not exist at the beginning, for it is precisely the antithesis of reason and sensuousness that constitutes the task of morality, and thus the idea is something to be brought about.

But it is unclear, says Hegel, how moral consciousness could ever bring about this conformity, for "impulse is not in fact merely this empty shape which could have within it a spring of action other than the one it is, and be impelled by it. For sense-nature is one which contains within itself its own laws and springs of action" (PS §622/336). Kant himself
acknowledges this ambiguity in his explanation of why such a perfect fitness is not achievable for a being that inhabits the sensuous world:

since he is a creature, and consequently is always dependent with respect to what he needs for complete satisfaction with his condition, he can never be wholly free from desires and inclinations which, because they rest on physical causes, do not of themselves agree with the moral law, which has a totally different source. (CPracR 87)

It is really because of this difficulty in comprehending the unity of morality and sense-nature, says Hegel, that moral consciousness must postulate it, as something to be achieved "in a nebulous remoteness where nothing can any more be accurately distinguished or comprehended" (PS §622/336). Or, as Kant says, the perfect fit "can be found only in an endless progress to that perfect fitness" (CPracR 129). Thus it is this "practical progress" which becomes "the real object of our will" (ibid. 129). And this infinite progress is possible only under the presupposition of immortality of the soul. Hence it is this which becomes the second postulate of practical reason. Without such a postulate, says Kant, moral consciousness would either lapse into despair of its goal, and give up the idea, or it would have fanatical delusions that it has achieved perfection, both of which hinder the realization of the moral law (ibid. 129).

But consciousness encounters the same problem with this object that is ever-to-be achieved, as it had with the realization of the highest good. For it is only by struggling against sense-nature that morality exists. If there were a complete conformity of sensuous being to law, then there would be no distinctively moral action. Thus it is not really in earnest about perfection, and this is evidenced by its shifting the goal away into infinity, and focusing instead on "practical progress."
But the idea that morality is an "intermediate state of imperfection" in which there could only be a "progress towards perfection" remains a dissemblance, "for to advance in morality would really be to move towards its disappearance" (PS §623/336). The problematic nature of the goal upsets the very notion of making progress in the here and now. Furthermore, one cannot think of morality as a matter of degree, or quantity, for morality by its own standards consists in "pure" duty, and so either one is pure, or not. There can be no in-between.

Since moral consciousness turns out necessarily to be imperfect, the idea of its achieving happiness in connection with its virtue (the first postulate), also becomes ambiguous. For one can never be clear just how virtuous one is being, how close to "perfection" one comes. Thus it cannot demand happiness as a just dessert; it can ask only that it "be granted as a free act of grace" (§624/336). Thus we have the third postulate--God.

In truth, Hegel is not really fair in his derivation of Kant's third postulate. The need to postulate God is present even before the encountering of the imperfection of moral consciousness, is implicit already in the idea of the highest good. For the fulfilment of the moral law does not necessarily have a causal link to happiness for the sensuous being, even though such a link cannot be established as impossible (CPracR 131). And yet happiness is an essential aspect of the good that is to be brought into being by adherence to the moral; it is necessary to postulate "a cause of the whole of nature, itself distinct from nature, which contains the ground of the exact coincidence of happiness with morality." (CPracR 131). Thus the original postulate of the possibility of the highest good, specifically of the link between morality and happiness, must include also the postulate of God.
But even if Hegel does misconstrue the logic on this point, it is nevertheless true that the imperfection of consciousness does cause it problems in terms of achieving happiness. For in this idea of imperfection, the very distinction between the moral and the immoral consciousness has become meaningless, since there has turned out, in actuality, to be no truly moral consciousness. And since we cannot even distinguish on the basis of degree, the implicit judgement moral consciousness earlier made in its complaint that the immoral consciousness becomes happy while it does not, also falls away. "For since morality is imperfect, i.e. morality in fact is not, what can there be in the experience that morality fares badly?" For the moral consciousness that has come to face its own imperfection, this judgement shows itself to be only "an expression of envy which covers itself with the cloak of morality" (PS §625/337). Happiness ceases to be an issue of justice for this consciousness and that is why Hegel construes that it must be considered now only in terms of the grace of God.

Because moral consciousness has turned out to be imperfect, and morality is only as perfect, it projects onto God the idea of a perfect willing of duty. But then it has turned out that "[m]orality itself thus exists in another being than the actual consciousness" (§626/337). It has abdicated the very position of morality with which it began.

It does this not only in regard to the idea of acting from pure duty, but also in terms of the specific duties it must carry out in any concrete moral situation. For moral consciousness discovers, in the face of a particular case, that it is not an issue of simply applying the form of universality, since there are many aspects to the case which must be considered, each of which could be given the form of a universal rule, and thus which
compete with one another. In other words, in any one case there will be many duties. "The moral self-consciousness at the same time, however, holds these many duties to be unessential; for it is concerned only with the one pure duty, and the many have no truth for it in so far as they are specific duties" (§627/338). But at the same time, these many duties are necessary, in order to carry out the moral law in a complex actuality, and thus they must have a basis of authority. Hence moral consciousness projects the authority outside itself, onto another consciousness—"a holy lawgiver."

The necessity to postulate God in order to sanctify particular duties is another case of bad faith. For the moral self-consciousness with which we began "is its own Absolute, and duty is absolutely only what it knows as duty" (§626/337). It cannot suddenly abdicate its own position of freedom and knowledge—"what is not sacred for it is not sacred in itself, and what is not in itself sacred, cannot be made sacred by the holy being." And in not abdicating its position it then also cannot be "in earnest about the holiness of this other being" (§626/338).

Now Kant himself never attributes such a role to the postulate of God in Critique of Practical Reason, nor does he do so elsewhere. For he indeed thinks that specific duties are derivable from the categorical imperative. He does use the term "holy lawgiver" for God in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.21 But such references, which may also be found in Critique of Practical Reason, seem to have to do with the notion that duties should be

21 Walsh claims that it is to this text that Hegel is referring regarding this point (1969). He then goes on to suggest, unfortunately without any elaboration, that "Hegel's presentation of this point seems to me both arbitrary and singularly difficult to connect with any live issue in current philosophy" (1969:31).
respected absolutely as guides to right and wrong, and not because of the consequences they would produce (CPracR 136). He at all times specifies that duties are commands of reason.

Thus Hegel's attempt to show the sanctification of specific duties as logically necessitating God does not explicitly find support in Kant, and would seem rather to be an extension of his more well-known criticism of the categorical imperative as empty, as incapable of providing any concrete guidance in its requirement only that the maxim of an action be universalizable (PR 135R). Kant does attempt to illustrate the application of the categorical imperative by the following example:

I have, for example, made it my maxim to augment my property by every safe means. Now I have in my possession a deposit, the owner of which has died without leaving any record of it. Naturally, this case falls under my maxim. Now I want to know whether this maxim can hold as a universal practical law. I ... ask ... whether I could, by the maxim, make the law that every man is allowed to deny that a deposit has been made when no one can prove the contrary. I immediately realize that taking such a principle as a law would annihilate itself, because its result would be that no one would make a deposit. (CPracR 27)

But Hegel argues that this universalization really presupposes something more—the acceptance of the given institution and practices of private property (PR §135). This implicit reliance on actuality as the source of the determinate content of duty, must be what Hegel means in Phenomenology when he says that "morality, when it is posited in consciousness as actual, stands in relation to an 'other', to an existence, and therefore itself receives within it otherness or difference, giving rise to a whole variety of moral laws" (PS §626/337). It is in its relation to actuality that moral consciousness finds the real substance of duty. Hegel is presumably arguing here that the moral consciousness, because it does not recognize actuality as the source of any truth, and is at the same time unable generate specific duties
from the formal principle alone, must project their source beyond its reality, onto God.

Even if the argument that there is a projection going on here may be questionable, moral consciousness must still recognize God as the being in which "only pure duty has validity" (§627/338). For this is the only place where pure duty alone has validity, given that it itself is an imperfect moral consciousness. It thus holds God up as the perfect moral being and the model toward which we strive, as Kant explicitly does (CPracR 87). And yet the reality of morality was supposed to be its negative relation to nature, as Hegel suggests:

The pure moral being, on the other hand, because it is above the struggle with Nature and sense, does not stand in a negative relation to them. Therefore, in fact there remains only the positive relation to them, i.e. just what a moment ago was, qua imperfect, held to be immoral. (§628/338)

Since morality necessarily involves thinking and willing, which requires a negative relation to nature, this pure morality is really only "an unconscious, unreal abstraction" (§628/338) and cannot be sustained.

Thus in reality, according to Hegel, these postulates reveal the "dissemblance and duplicity" in which a moral consciousness that fixates on pure duty independently of nature must engage. It makes these postulates in order that it may even begin to try and act from pure duty; the postulates are practically necessary beliefs. And yet it discovers that it cannot believe in them, for they undo the very nature of its task in the here and now.

The real significance of all of the above is in fact to show that in the postulates, pure consciousness discovers that it cannot remain separate from and indifferent to "Nature." Walsh's argument against Hegel regarding the postulate of the ultimate good is revealing here. Walsh notes that on an empirical level Hegel might be right about moral consciousness
not really wanting to achieve its goal: "witness Graham Greene's story of the nuns in Africa who had spent their lives in combating a particular disease and had mixed feelings when the disease was eradicated by modern medicine" (1969:33). Walsh argues, however, that a Kantian moralist is not interested only in that goal, but in the more immediate, concrete results of moral struggle in the here and now, and that this struggle is not undermined by the ambivalence surrounding the ultimate goal. And yet this is, I think, precisely the lesson which Hegel sees consciousness as learning here. A consciousness which focuses only on pure duty cannot acknowledge the satisfaction and achievements of moral struggle in the present. For that achievement involves its sensuous being, precisely what it does not recognize as important. Its sensuous being is involved in moral action—both negatively in going against inclination, and positively in the cultivation of virtue or conformity of inclinations to the moral law, in seeing concrete results and feeling satisfied, and in assessing what is to be done in each case (the many duties). The nuns who combat disease might well be engaged in sacrifice of their own interest to a higher cause, or they may find such devotion comes easily and their inclinations follow gladly in its fulfilment. At any rate they will experience some joy or satisfaction in seeing the positive results of their labour. But the idea that they must postpone their satisfaction until the disease is finally conquered is simply a false attempt to preserve a false purity. And yet this is precisely what the consciousness of pure duty must argue; it cannot acknowledge that it gets anything out of its moral action in the here and now, or that its sensuous being is involved in any way in its action. Thus it projects that aspect into the beyond—as future happiness, future perfection, as God.

The collapse of the postulates for Hegel, then, is not meant to signify the lack of
reality of moral action, the way Walsh seems to suggest. Rather it is to force consciousness to acknowledge to itself the presence and necessity of sensuous being in moral action. And moral consciousness does finally have to admit this when it designates itself as "imperfect." But then it still holds up an ideal of some purity in the beyond, as the real morality. And yet upon examination that real morality is not real; what is real is the struggle in the now. When it finally comes to this conclusion, consciousness must acknowledge that its two sides, consciousness of pure duty, and the imperfect, actual consciousness, are both essential aspects of morality. And in order to act, it must give its attention also to the satisfaction of its own sensuous being in the now, instead of pushing it off into a beyond. When it does so, we have the self as "conscience."

III. Conscience: The Return to Unity

In Kantian morality we have the expression of a formal subjectivity that has fully developed itself, that can separate itself from its own natural being and make choices independently thereof. But in this separation it discovers that it has no content for its choices, and no way to act out pure duty in the concrete world while remaining pure. The postulates it makes in order to try and sustain its idea of pure duty only serve to highlight its fundamental contradiction. Thus it realizes that its complete truth is not the abstract self of self-reflection, the pure self which has been developing itself through the whole movement of rational insight above. For that is precisely the self which has found its own limit, which cannot sustain its one-sided idea of the truth any longer, and now seeks for it elsewhere—in the unity with its own sensuous being.
This is the self of conscience. While pure duty is the self of morality, conscience has accepted that "the self of consciousness is being and actuality" (§632/341). It no longer separates actuality from the truth, but sees pure duty in terms of the relationship to the world that it has through its sense-nature. The content of its duty is a content which exists, which is immediately there for consciousness, for it "is the doer's own immediate individuality" (§637/343). The truth according to which it acts, the truth of "conviction," it finds in its own being, and heeds this truth. Conviction thus is the unity of self and being; it is law no longer in abstract form that stands over sensuous being as something alien that commands it, but law in existence, in the form of being, expressed through individuality.

Conscience furthermore experiences particular moral situations in terms of this unity with its being. Before, pure duty would encounter a concrete moral case in terms of its many particular aspects, and relate to this reality by applying a duty or principle to it in an external fashion. In conscience, the actual case is related to not by rationally analyzing it into its various properties, and considering the various duties which might be brought in and applied. Rather the case is experienced "in the sense-certainty of knowing" (§635/342). Conscience knows the case through its sense-certainty, and in this relationship feels what it must do. It is a knowledge which it finds in its being and accepts with certainty.

This is conscience as "conviction," as the certainty that one is right, that this is what one must do in a situation. Conviction is "the universal medium in which it [the individuality] exists" (§646/349); it is what gives it the status of a duty. Conscience thus elevates its particularity by this mode of self-validation; the substance of its action is verified simply in the knowing of it, in giving it the form of conviction.
It is in conscience that we finally get a content for the pure self, "for the previously empty duty" (§633/342). In giving up the internal division between its natural self and its pure duty, a true unity of self and being has been achieved. the antithesis has been overcome. After the entire trajectory of finding its truth outside sensuous being, in conscience we finally have a return to unity with being as the fundamental substance of its truth.

It is this going back to the sensuous self and willing spontaneously from there that is the key to the genuine realization of autonomy, and the attainment, finally, of the "transcendental standpoint." Kant indeed had achieved that standpoint with his establishment of the unified subject in "The Transcendental Deduction" (D 79/5). But he then proceeded, like Fichte, to conceptualize that unity reflectively, instead of taking up the transcendental viewpoint implicit in the deduction. Existentially, it is the standpoint of conscience that achieves this overcoming of reflection, that spontaneously wills from a unity of mind and body. It is conscience that has achieved the reality of a free, self-authorizing being, a being who no longer enslaves itself to a law alien to its self in any sense, but spontaneously heeds the call of its own self.

If, then, the standpoint of conscience is the achievement of the transcendental intuition with which we began the discussion of this chapter, it would seem that the Phenomenology of Spirit has completed its task, that reflective thought has finally overcome itself, and that we may begin to regard the unfolding of the intuition within the framework of Hegel's philosophical system. And yet the Phenomenology does not close here. Rather, Hegel goes on to trace the dialectic peculiar to this standpoint, and it turns out that this is necessary because, in spite of being a re-experiencing of unity, a re-experiencing that has
been arrived at in and through the experience of reflective rationality, conscience is nevertheless inadequate as a final philosophical standpoint. It fails to constitute the end of the journey of reflective thought. And this is because there yet remains an element of reflective rationality that is outside it. We see this manifest in the problem of judgement.

While with the moral consciousness actions were regarded either as pure or impure, as good or evil, this is not the case with conscience. Because there is no such thing as a pure duty, because it is always being which gives content and reality to duty, the former way of distinguishing between actions in terms of law versus being or happiness, becomes ineffectual. Now, "[e]very content, because it is determinate, stands on the same level as any other" (§645/348). This includes content that seems to will for "the general good," for that good could go against the good of an individual, a good which can stake the same claim to legitimacy as the general one. One furthermore cannot refer to existing law and right for what "is valid on its own account independently of the individual's knowledge and conviction .... [for it is] precisely against the form of that duty that morality in general is directed" (§645/348); it is precisely willing from one's own self that constitutes the principle of autonomy that has been attained.

This problem of judgement is the fundamental problem with the standpoint of conscience, and what shows that it has still not fully accommodated the principle of reflective rationality. For it is reflective rationality that poses the question of judgement. Like the early Christians, then, conscience has merely retreated into the unity of its own self, away from the desiccating power of thought. But as a phenomenological consciousness, it will have to confront this inadequacy. Reflective rationality will rend once again the
harmony that has been achieved. And as we shall see, it will be in its relations with other individuals, who put the judgement before it, that this rending will take place. But this is a necessary rending, and it is through it that the deeper truth and substance of conscience will come to light.

The Dialectic of Conscience

Although for conscience its validity is simply in its self-certainty, when one acts from conscience, the content of one's conviction becomes objective; it becomes a reality external to the individual consciousness. In acting it shows "that this content is the self of consciousness, and so consciousness's knowledge of itself, its identity with itself" (§648/350). But this reality is then out of the hands of the acting conscience, in the sense that the action, its consequences, and the motivation behind them, can now become subject to the judgement of others, others whose conscience may heed a different duty, and hence who may judge the acting consciousness negatively. They could take that existence as "an ordinary reality, and the action ... [as] the fulfilling of one's pleasure and desire" (§650/350). That is, they would deny the good intent of the actor and insist that the latter was acting from purely self-serving motives. Indeed it is in their interest to do that, says Hegel, there is a necessary impulse to judge the other as evil, because in conscience one is convinced of one's own truth, and the action of the other may not reflect that truth. This other is thus a threat, a threat they must "nullify ... by judging and explaining it" (§649/350).

It is in the light of this experience that we must understand the tendency of the standpoint of conscience to become a "beautiful soul." This is an individual who experiences
the truth of conviction, the harmony of her being with the call of duty, but becomes terrified of action because of the vulnerability it entails. This conscience attempts to avoid its entrapment in a particular content which can become subject to the judgement of others, by insisting that the deed and its consequences are not its objective reality. It focuses on duty solely in the moment of selfhood, solely on its own good intentions, and not on the act itself. That is, it emphasizes the form of conscience, of its own self-certainty, rather than the substance of what it believes and does.

It is thus only in language (rather than deeds) that this conscience can actualize itself, can objectify itself as a good intention, without losing control over its truth in the deed. Thus it "declares" for others its own conviction, and "this declaration is the true actuality of the act, and the validating of the action" (§653/351). That is, in declaring its conviction, in declaring that it really believes this to be right and good, this consciousness absolves itself of responsibility for the consequences of an action, and posits its intention explicitly in order to try to prevent others from pathologizing its motives. Such a conscience will find others who are receptive to its assertion, who will believe and validate it, because these others are themselves self-consciousnesses who believe in their own truth. Thus the formal element of selfhood, in abstraction from the actual content of what is declared, is something these consciences do share with one other, and becomes the basis of mutual recognition.²⁴

²⁴ Thus it does not seem necessary to share the same opinions to constitute such a community. For example, academic communities would seem to have this character; individuals may hold different ideological positions, but they all agree to respect one another's right to their opinion. But such a harmony is only possible if the differences remain at the level of verbal declaration and do not translate themselves into differences in concrete action.
But the reality of this conscience in its community with others thus reveals itself to be, as Hegel mockingly says,

the mutual assurance of their conscientiousness, good intentions, the rejoicing over this mutual purity, and the refreshing of themselves in the glory of knowing and uttering, of cherishing and fostering, such an excellent state of affairs. (§656/353)

It is a completely solipsistic reality, whereby all existence, including its own being, has been brought for it into the contemplation of itself as 'I', has resolved itself into an "absolute certainty" of its own self (§657/354). Nothing else counts but the world and being as it views it, in its own self-certainty. Unwilling to let the deed go free as the expression of itself in the world and for others, this conscience clings to itself as a self-contained self-knowing, which in this form can only be validated by other self-consciousnesses who are the same as itself. This is the poverty of the beautiful soul. The reality of its conviction, its declaration, is in fact "changed immediately into a sound that dies away" (§658/354).

This retreat into the purity of the beautiful soul, however, is only one direction in which conscience can go. The other direction is indeed to find its actualization in action, and to hold to the element of conviction in the action, to insist on it as a response to duty. Now in action, the actual content of conscience, derived from one's individuality, becomes expressed in a concrete manner for the world to see. But the individualism of this conscience, the idea that it determines what the universal principle is, meets with opposition. For others will interpret the moral principle differently. And they will reflectively divide up the unity of the action into its universal and particular components. In other words, they will accuse the acting conscience of being "evil," of really acting from a selfish motivation, rather
than from principle. And they will furthermore charge the acting conscience with hypocrisy, because that conscience insists that its action is "duty and conscientiousness" (§660/356), and does not admit its particular interest.

The acting conscience, however, in the face of judging conscience, declares what it wills to be a duty, something it believes it must act in accordance with. And since duty is self-defining for conscience, the judging consciousness cannot deny that the acting conscience holds this as a genuine conviction. Nevertheless, rather than focusing on this aspect of conviction, on "the doer's knowledge of it, that this is his duty" (§665/358), the judging conscience focuses on the particular aspect, on the selfish "intention" involved in the action. So, for example: "If the action is accompanied by fame, then it knows this inner aspect to be a desire for fame," if the action shows the talent and abilities of the individual such that it could advance its station in the world, then intention is judged to be ambition, if the action gives a person the feeling of their own self-expression and development, then the true motivation is viewed as "the urge to secure his own happiness, even though this were to consist merely in an inner moral conceit" (§665/358).

There is indeed a truth to the judgement that is made. For all willing requires a motivating force, and that force is found in the individual's sensuous being, the locale of particularity. Thus, while the idea of what is to be done may not be particularistic, the carrying out of the idea must entail that. Or, as Hegel says in Philosophy of History, "[i]f I am to exert myself for any object, it must in some way or other be my object" (PH 22/36). But according to Hegel this does not mean that the content of the action can be entirely reduced to the self-interest of the acting conscience; it does not mean that something higher
and greater is not being enacted—and this is what the judging consciousness is unwilling to see. Indeed, in his criticism of the judging consciousness as a "moral valet," who sees in the heroic individual only "one who eats, drinks, and wears clothes" (PS §665/358), Hegel clearly points to the idea that something more than merely individual interest is being realized through acts of conscience, and that the beautiful soul blinds itself to that higher perspective.

But if the retreat into the self is a retreat into individuality, into particularity, how are we to understand the genuinely moral action, the action which wills something beyond satisfaction of the individual's particular interest? What is the ultimate source of such an act? Why does phenomenological consciousness encounter a universality such as this which, Hegel asserts, it will inevitably have to recognize, even if, like the beautiful soul, it initially resists such recognition? What is it about an action or an individual that would compel such recognition? There seems to be a strange insertion in the logic of Phenomenology at this point, almost a leap of faith, which must be taken if we are to follow the remainder of the dialectic. Hegel seems to be inserting something which does not logically follow, which is not clearly necessitated—the idea of a true moral substance which must inevitably triumph, which must inevitably be recognized. But we must pursue the dialectic to the end, in order to comprehend this.

As long as both sides cling to their interpretation of the action, there is no way to reconcile. However, in the judgement of the action Hegel sees the beginning of a movement toward unity. The judging consciousness, who criticizes the acting conscience as being guilty of self-interest and thus of hypocrisy in its purportedly moral action, by its very
criticism reveals *itself* as hypocritical, "because it passes off such judging, not as another manner of being wicked, but as the correct consciousness of the action" (§666/359). It sees *only* the particularity of the action, and in this lies its own wickedness. This implies not only that there is genuine moral action, but that the judging conscience knows that there is and nevertheless represses that knowledge to preserve its own self-identity as pure and good. But what it really preserves is its own conceit, the idea of itself as superior to the acting consciousness, as in touch with some higher truth, while it at the same time, in the case of the beautiful soul, it shows itself incapable of action at all. Thus by this judgement it reveals its own self as base and wicked, as concerned with its own individuality as fundamentally as with duty.

According to Hegel this revelation has a liberatory effect on the acting conscience. In seeing the evil in the other, it enables it to give up its insistence that its own action was pure; it is liberated to see the particularity that had been involved in its action. The acting conscience expresses this recognition of sameness with the other by "confessing" its particularity, by admitting that there was indeed an aspect of its deed that concerned only its own self. This confession furthermore "is not an abasement, a humiliation," for it is the expression not of its inferiority to the other but of their identity (§666/359).

This movement may seem odd. For in the face of the harsh criticism of the judge, it would seem more likely that the acting conscience would remain intransigent itself, out of self-protection. But we must remember that this is a consciousness that is driven by truth; if it is truly honest with itself, it will admit its commonality with the other (that both are motivated by self-interest), and will try to get confirmation from this other of the truth. It
looks for an acknowledgement.

The judging consciousness, however, "repels this community of nature," for it wants to sustain its view of itself as pure and superior. Because it cannot actualize itself in a purely universal form in action, it sustains its identity only negatively, against the other whom it judges (§667/359). And yet there is a necessity for it to act, for action is involved in the very self-concept; it understands itself as "the absolute will of duty, as a consciousness whose determining comes solely from itself" (§664/357). But it determines nothing. Furthermore, it is mired in its own self-interest, and cannot get out of that by mere denial. The only way out, then, according to Hegel, is for it to reciprocate the acting conscience, to admit its own self-interest in the judgement, and to acknowledge that action is necessary if duty is to have any real actuality.

By this mutual exchange, suggests Hegel, there is a movement beyond the self-interested aspect of the action and judgement, and the attainment of a true unity of the two. In the acting conscience positing its individuality as a moment of the action, and in the judging conscience seeing its own unreality and acknowledging action as good, both "exhibit the power of Spirit" over the element of particularity and attain to a genuine unity with one another in the universal (§669/361).

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25 This contradiction is seen by Hegel as essentially self-destructive, as the following pointed comment, supposedly directed at Novalis, suggests:

this 'beautiful soul', then, being conscious of this contradiction in its unreconciled immediacy, is disordered to the point of madness, wastes itself in yearning and pines away in consumption. Thereby it does in fact surrender the being-for-self to which it so stubbornly clings; but what it brings forth is only the non-spiritual unity of [mere] being. (§668/360)
The universal, then, is what comes to light in the element of mutual recognition once the particularity involved in the realization of the universal is shorn of its significance, merely through being acknowledged. What is left after this process is the truly substantial nature of the moral achievement. The real bond with the other turns out to be rooted not in the merely formal self of conscience, nor in the fact of self-interest, but in a universal substance, the substance of morality that attains expression in the deed. The faith at work in this section of *Phenomenology* thus reveals itself to be in this notion of an underlying unity, a deeper, implicit bond that is the true reality of moral action. For "the duty that is known to be such is fulfilled and becomes a reality, just because what is essentially a duty is the universal for all self-consciousnesses" (§640/345). It is a dark essence that is the real substance of genuinely moral action, one known by all but enacted only by some, and it is this essence which must ultimately enter the daylight of mutual recognition through the process that we have just witnessed.26

26 The major signification of this dialectic, that the universal must be realized in and through the particular, is fairly clear and is well-articulated by Taylor (1975) and Hyppolite (1974). The question that is less often raised at this point in the text is just what this universal is. (Jamros (1990) is an exception.) But it is this question of the content of the universal that constitutes the nub of Hegel interpretations. For Hyppolite, the question of the meaning of the universal is recognized as the issue in interpreting Hegel; he is aware at the end of his interpretation of *Phenomenology* that one could read Hegel in either a mystical or an anthropological manner (1974:542). He rejects the Feuerbachian complete reduction of the divine to the human (543), yet in his subsequent work on Hegel he seems to shy away from the religious implications of Hegel's thought and focuses instead, in keeping with other French thinkers of his generation, on the concern with consciousness of death (see Hyppolite 1993). Taylor is closer to my own view in taking the universal as a self-positing cosmic spirit. But he does not point here to the *experience* of love or divinity, seeming to regard the dialectic as a rational unfolding. Although Jamros does pose the question at hand, he himself seems to reduce the universal to something grounded merely in "human likeness" (1990:365). Fackenheim is the
It seems, then, for Hegel, that human unity is achieved by the recognition in one another both of the common element of "evil," of enmeshment in particularity, and of a common divinity which is realized through that particularity and which takes us beyond it. It is thus to both an ethic of forgiveness, and of wonder that he appeals, and which he believes to be possible. The recognition of this, the achievement of universal self-consciousness upon this basis, is the realization of true community, "God manifested in the midst of those who know themselves in the form of pure knowledge" (§671/362).

Discussion of the Dialectic

The argument that Hegel is implicitly relying on a mystical truth that exists in our being, in the development of phenomenological conscience, on a dark inner knowledge which comes to presence in the experience of mutual recognition described above, finds more explicit support in his other texts, the Philosophy of Right, and Philosophy of History. It is here that he makes clearer admissions about the universal basis upon which any genuine acts of conscience must ultimately rest.

In Philosophy of Right Hegel refers explicitly to a "true conscience" which "is the disposition to will what is absolutely good," versus the merely formal conscience of self-certainty (PR §137). While the formal principle expresses the right of subjectivity "to give closest to my interpretation, in arguing that the two figures of conscience come into contact with a religious Substance that already is, and "in recognizing and accepting what already is, the moral self turns religious" (1968:66). Robinson (1977) seems to take a purely communitarian reading of Hegel's universal, one which renders Hegel much more conservative than he is, and which ignores the whole Protestant basis of Hegel's thought on subjectivity as revealed in Philosophy of History.
recognition only to what it thus knows as good," it leaves open the question of whether the content of its conscience actually is good. The "sheer inwardness," the "deepest inward solitude" (§139R) into which one withdraws in order to search for the right and the good, is only one side of the truth of conscience.

Once self-consciousness has reduced all otherwise valid duties to emptiness and itself to the sheer inwardness of the will, it has become the potentiality of either making the absolutely universal its principle, or equally well of elevating above the universal the self-will of private particularity, taking that as its principle and realizing it through its actions, i.e. it has become potentially evil" (PR §139)

This self-determination, determination from within one's own being and the possibility to do either good or evil, thus presupposes a dual reality within the self. Or, as Hegel says:

The origin of evil in general is to be found in the mystery of freedom (i.e. in the speculative aspect of freedom), the mystery whereby freedom of necessity arises out of the natural level of the will and is something inward in comparison with that level. (PR §139R).

That is, there are the natural desires and impulses, and then there is "the inwardness of the will," "the universal as inner objectivity ... which comes on the scene as the opposite extreme to immediate objectivity, the natural pure and simple, as soon as the will is reflected into itself and consciousness is a knowing consciousness" (PR §139R). The "mystery of freedom," thus, is the existence in conscience of an inner knowledge of the good, a reflective comprehension of a content within the self other than that of mere sensual impulse. This is not the abstract law of Kant, which Hegel has already disposed of as an empty formalism which can justify any action (PR §135). Rather the actual content of the good as an "absolute universality" is to be found in the unity of thought with sensuous being. It is an objective good that resides within us.
In *Philosophy of History*, Hegel discusses this notion of the moral truth within as coming to religious self-consciousness in the Lutheran idea of grace. "Luther's simple doctrine is that the specific embodiment of Deity—infinite subjectivity, that is true spirituality, Christ—is in no way present and actual in an outward form, but as essentially spiritual is obtained only in being reconciled to God—*in faith and spiritual enjoyment*" (PH 415/494). It is the subjective aspect of faith which Luther insists upon—"the subjective feeling and conviction of the individual is regarded as equally necessary with the objective side of Truth" (PH 416/496).

This idea of a deeper objective truth in our being, or of an experience of grace, that serves as the root of genuine acts of conscience, seems to be the re-experiencing of love, of the ethics rooted in love, that we examined in chapter one. But there is a crucial difference here. For while the early Christians found a deeper truth in love, they could not reconcile it with the principle of will, of reflective thought, that had come to dominate the secular world. And so their love remained an impotent feeling that could only exist in retreat from the world. And because it could attain no objectification, they fell back on belief in positive doctrine to guide them in actual life. It is in contrast to this that we can see the real significance of the achievement of autonomy in the standpoint of conscience. For conscience has overcome the position of positivity; it has travelled through the whole discipline of history, subjectivity has come finally to rely on its own self as the author of truth, and thus is freed of external authority.

This movement is reflected also in the history of faith, in the practical disillusionment with the search for Christ as a positive object that occurs both through the experience of the
Crusades, and in the face of Enlightenment attacks on faith's positivity. Like the eighteenth century Romantics who turned to conscience in the face of the sterility of abstract duty, the Christian reached the conclusion "that man must look within himself for that definite embodiment of being" (PH 393/472).

Thus, the whole pathway consciousness has traversed seems to have been necessary merely for it to come back to what Hegel in "Spirit of Christianity" believed to be Christ's real teaching—the truth of the divine as spirit, as a non-temporal reality that dwells within us. It has been that truth as a subconscious reality which has driven consciousness forward, in the development of abstract subjectivity, until it can come back to itself in a conscious form, as conscience.

And yet, we have already seen the tendency of conscience to deny particularity, to become a beautiful soul who retreats into the depths of its being to seek the good, but becomes terrified of action because it may lose therein the idea of its purity, and thus relies on its negative judgement of others in order to sustain its own inner truth. Precisely the same dynamic is reflected in the Lutheran pursuit of grace, as Hegel recounts it in Philosophy of History. This pursuit entailed, first, the idea that individuals must "force upon their souls the consciousness of their sinfulness and to know themselves as evil," and second, "that man should attain the consciousness that the good Spirit dwells in him—that Divine Grace has found an entrance into his soul" (PH 424-25/504-505). For "it was deemed indispensable that the entire process of spiritual transformation should become perceptible to the individual himself" (PH 425/505). Hegel furthermore links with this "self-tormenting process" of "minute and painful introspection," the tendency to construct a radical separation between
good and evil. The latter was conceptualized as "a vast power the sphere of whose malign
dominion is the Secular" (PH 425/505), a secular which included, of course, the individual
will. This radical separation between God and the devil, good and evil, grace and the human
will, is construed by him as part of the general attempt by Christians to confront the question
of knowledge of the good in one's self, by defining it against its purported other. That the
witch trials of the sixteenth century can be seen as a concrete manifestation of this mode of
self-definition (PH 426/506), signifies the real danger posed by judgments in the mode of the
beautiful soul. The attempt to establish an inner unity with the divine in this way leads at best
to inaction, and at worst to the persecution of otherness.27

It is not, then, in the end, an issue of finding the truth in oneself as an abstract given
through a process of individual self-reflection, although this is indeed an essential moment.
Conscience must indeed retreat into itself to find the substance of its autonomy and to
actualize anything. But it is only in the community's judgement of its self, of its self as it
reveals itself in its actions and the consequences they produce, that it can finally come to a
real certainty of and reconciliation with its deepest truth. The inner truth of conscience must
meet the demand of modernity that it will its truth in the secular world, and find its
vindication there.

It is in the full dialectic of conscience that we see the meeting of this demand. This

27Or, as Hegel remarks in the following passage from Philosophy of Right:
The degradation into which philosophy has thus sunk appears doubtless at
a first glance to be only an affair of supreme indifference, an occurrence
confined to the trivial field of academic futilities; but the view necessarily
makes itself a home in ethics, an essential part of philosophy; and it is then
that the true meaning of these theories makes its first appearance in and is
apprehended by the world of actuality. (PR §140R)
entails most significantly the resolve to embrace one particular aspect of its being. For we must recall that particularity has acquired its reality, its demand for satisfaction, in and through the reflective thought that separated the individual from its bond with community. Particularity is the content and motivation of the will, and it is thus only through particularity that anything can be actualized in the modern world. Particularity may indeed be at odds with the truth of love; it may in any one instance will "evil," will against the universal. But the answer is not to retreat from it, but to educate it up, to harmonize it with the universal. For at the same time as particularity may be separate from the good, it is capable also of identifying itself with that, with something higher than its merely immediate self-interest. It is capable of genuinely moral goals.\(^{28}\) And conscience is capable of this actualization through the medium of particularity, for with the development of its formal self, it grasps hold of its particular content and wills it in a deed. And it then participates in the reflective and dividing experience of judgement and overcoming, which is necessary to the establishment of its inner truth in the medium of mutual recognition.

But while the unfolding of conscience does appear to entail the realization of a higher moral truth in the world, is the final achievement of mutual recognition really a reconciliation with rationality? Does it really solve the philosophical dilemma with which we began? For it has already been argued that this recognition appears to have the character of an encounter

\(^{28}\)See *Philosophy of History*, p.33:

Human beings least of all, sustain the bare external relation of mere means to the great ideal aim. Not only do they in the very act of realizing it, make it the occasion of satisfying personal desires, whose purport is diverse from that aim—but they share in that ideal aim itself; and are for that very reason objects of their own existence. (PH 33/50)
with a mystical truth, rather than with a logically self-evident universal. As such, it is really an experience of religious revelation, a revelation of that substance in which the two sides of conscience find their unity. It is, thus, an affair of the heart, as much as of the head. Hence the knowledge that Hegel asserts the two consciences gain, and which achieves its reality in the world, is not evident to the rational, reflective consciousness looking on. That observing consciousness cannot see any universal, but only the mutual confession of self-interest. Thus in spite of the achievement of the standpoint of conscience, by the end of the dialectic it remains something other to reflective consciousness. Reflective consciousness still has not been fully accommodated. 29

This poses an enormous problem. For reflective consciousness, standing on the outside of the experience of mutual recognition, can easily disrupt or spurn the truth that has been encountered, in the name of its own rationality. Hence even though conscience represents a modern re-connecting with, and willing of, the deeper knowledge of love, after the whole trajectory of experience of reflective consciousness it does not appear that it has come any closer in the end to a genuine reconciliation with this rationality. It does not appear that it has got beyond the problem of love.

29 Hyppolite points out this problem with the religious consciousness that is the end product of the experience of forgiveness (1974:568-69). For it, substance has not yet become subject. It must come to see substance as the work of the community, in order to attain the full identity of human and divine—"a divine humanity which temporally poses an eternal truth" (570). This does indeed lead into Hegel’s philosophy of history and politics, as Hyppolite acknowledges, but he sees nowhere in the subsequent philosophy where the perfect community is achieved—"History presents us only with nations which live and die" (570). In contrast, I believe that in The Philosophy of Right Hegel seeks to portray such a community, and it is thus to this work that I turn in the next chapter.
The real issue here is that, in spite of all expectations, neither conscience nor its culmination in mutual recognition constitute the philosophical standpoint that has been the entire goal of Phenomenology, and that can truly vindicate the knowledge of love. This is not, however, because conscience does not constitute the transcendental intuition towards which reflective consciousness has implicitly been striving. On the contrary, it is this intuition, it is the achievement of the unity of "intelligence and nature." But Hegel has come to rethink, and to the reject, the intuition as the basis for philosophy, precisely because of the problem encountered above. The encounter with the deeper substance of morality in the experience of mutual reconciliation is implicitly rational, even though it is not yet rational in form. And to reveal that rationality in a way that will satisfy reflective thinking, requires a higher standpoint—the standpoint of "the Notion." In a dramatic departure from his earlier notion of the transcendental intuition, Hegel's philosophical standpoint will no longer seek to take us back to the experience of the Absolute Identity, to the knowing of the Absolute in the moment of its own self-positing. Rather it will presuppose that experience, and will seek to illuminate and vindicate its intrinsic rationality with the reflective power of logic. It is in the final chapter of Phenomenology on "Absolute Knowing," that Hegel explains how the standpoint of the Notion has already implicitly been accomplished, and the task that it must yet undertake.
Chapter Three

PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT:
The Final Reconciliation?
The Philosophical Standpoint--From Intuition to Notion

The reconciliation of the two figures of conscience in *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the realization of the universal in and through the particular willing and judgement of individuals. It is a universal that emerges in and through the particular, an infinity that manifests itself in the realm of the finite. For Hegel, this movement reflects the mode by which the Absolute realizes itself more generally. But it is only with the unfolding of conscience that this realization happens in a self-conscious fashion.

We have already explored the pathway by which consciousness comes to identify itself with the Absolute. First, consciousness understood its ultimate truth as an external object to which it devoted itself, in state power and wealth. Then, it came to see that it itself was the real truth of things, in "pure insight" and Enlightenment thought. And yet this 'I' turned out to be abstract and empty; it could not realize its Absolute status in the world except by destructiveness. It is only with conscience that it finds a truth within itself which it can actually assert in the world--the truth of conviction.

Conscience must assert this inner truth, as we have seen, because there remains an other outside itself which threatens and conditions it. It is impelled to seek the recognition of this other in order to vindicate its inner certainty. And it is in the movement by which its truth is realized--in action, judgement, and mutual recognition--that we finally see, according to Hegel in the final chapter of *Phenomenology*, the Absolute realizing itself in a self-conscious form. For the object of truth remains throughout in the mode of knowing, rather
than as an external thing. Thus on the one hand conscience has overcome the idea of the Absolute as external to itself, since it finds it within, in the form of an inner certainty. And, on the other hand, this is a certainty which is active, which realizes itself in the world.

It is only with conscience, then, that we have the real experience of the Absolute, the self-conscious knowledge of unity with being that we have been seeking all along. In this sense conscience does constitute the "transcendental intuition" of the Difference essay, the direct connection with the divine in its own self-positing, upon which Hegel had earlier sought to base his philosophical system. But the difference that we see here is that Hegel no longer thinks, if he ever did, that this achievement could be an ultimate transcendence of the reflective standpoint, and the basis for an immediate connection with the Absolute in all its forms. For in the final chapter of the Phenomenology, "Absolute Knowing," it becomes apparent that it is not the experience of conscience per se which can know itself as the Absolute (although it might assert itself as such), but the philosophical consciousness that stands beyond it, and encapsulates retrospectively the logical trajectory of experience which has brought consciousness there.

There are two points to be considered here. The first is that, without the

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30 This occurs first with immediate conscience, whose object is its own certainty of what must be done. Secondly, it acts and opposes itself to another self-consciousness which also exists as a knowing. Here, action is merely the extension of its conviction outwards, while the reality of that action remains in the form of conviction. And the other self-consciousness who opposes it has as its object the knowledge of pure duty. They both exist for the other as a knowing. And finally these two overcome their opposition to one another by the recognition of their unity, a unity which exists in the form of their mutual knowing. Granted the truth they encounter does still seem external to them, as a religious substance. And this will be the principal reason why Hegel goes beyond it, to the Notion, as the standpoint for philosophy.
developmental view of consciousness' relation to its object, the very idea that conscience contains the truth within it remains merely a subjective assertion. Only we who have been following along with the journey of consciousness can rationally comprehend the truth which emerges from its experiential movement—the truth that the Absolute resides within. And secondly, even if conscience were to assert its knowledge and its right independently of Hegel's philosophical proof, in any one instance the certainty it protests may be subjective and misguided. If it tries to overcome this subjectivity by gaining the recognition of others, it may turn out to be a beautiful soul who actualizes nothing. Or, if it acts, it loses the unity of its intuition, as the latter is dichotomized by reflective judgement into the poles of universality and particularity. Thus the realization of intuition in the world entails its engagement once again with the reflective thinking that it believed itself to have transcended. Indeed, one of the main revelations of the dialectic of conscience is that the intuition can only realize itself through this confrontation and fragmentation, that it is only in and through the particularizing force of the modern will and reflective thought that the Absolute can be actualized in human history.

Thus, the ultimate standpoint by which the Absolute is to be cognized cannot be the intuitive knowing of conscience, an intuitive knowing which it cannot even sustain, but a logical knowing, separate from and over above actual experience. Only this logical knowing can encapsulate both the movement of consciousness into the knowing of the moral subject, and the movement of division and overcoming inherent to the actualization of that knowing in human history. It is Hegel's philosophical consciousness, the final phenomenological consciousness, which gathers into a totality the movement of knowing from which
conscience logically emerges, and through which it actualizes itself. And that totality is "the Notion."

But if conscience is indeed the self of a self-positing Absolute, as the standpoint of the Notion tells us, we remain with a fundamental problem. For it is yet unclear what the content of that self is, what it is that it actualizes. As I argued in the previous chapter, the truth which is actualized, and in which the two consciences find their substantial unity, was not comprehensible to reflective consciousness looking on. Rather the parties involved seemed to come to it as a kind of religious experience which, as Fackenheim suggests, "points to a truth which is religious" (1968:66).

We have encountered this idea of an Absolute substance before, in the early Christians' unity of love, in the unconscious conviction of unity which drives forward the noble consciousness, and in faith. But it always remained in a fundamental sense outside the consciously active, secular will. Ever an inner knowledge, it expressed itself only symbolically, only in the form of "picture-thinking." The modern, reflective consciousness remained separate from this consciousness of substance, and accepted as true only what presented itself to it in the form of its own self-certainty. Substance was still outside this certainty, "still self-less being" (PS §801/428). Only with conscience does substance come together with the active, secular will, in the intuition of a divinity that realizes itself through moral action. And yet, in the final reconciliation of the two consciences where that divinity comes into the light of day, there remains a division. The religious substance which is at the basis of mutual recognition has not yet taken on the shape of selfhood; although intimately present to the two self-consciousnesses in experience, in form it remains still other to them.
a divine essence over against their reflectively rational selves.

It was because of this that I argued that the reconciliation does not follow an explicit logic. The experience of overcoming is an experience of grace, which reflective consciousness may witness, but not comprehend. Hence, it is an experience which remains problematic to a rationality that yet stands outside it. After the entire, painful history wherein thought seeks to come together with the ultimate truth of existence, we find, at the end, an ongoing discordance. Consciousness does indeed find its truth, but it does so with a leap, that leaves reflective rationality, and the philosopher, behind.

And yet, the religious essence is inherently rational, according to Hegel. But it must yet display its rationality in form; it must be actualized in a manner accessible to reflective consciousness. And it is in the chapter, "Absolute Knowing," that he explains how this is to come about, and that we begin to comprehend the real task of the Notion.

In "Absolute Knowing," Hegel acknowledges that the abstract moments of the unfolding of conscience represent only one side of the actualization of the truth. Conscience is the "form of Self" which "accomplishes the life of absolute Spirit" (PS §796/425). It is the Absolute's activity of self-positing and self-realization. We have already come to this through our journey in the Phenomenology. But the other side of the truth is precisely the content of the will, the Absolute substance. What Hegel asserts here is that it is through the activity of conscience, or of the will in our understanding of it as the self of spirit, that substance comes to be objectified in the secular world in a manner that will be accessible to reflective consciousness. The will as the self of spirit brings forth its true substantial content in the secular world—in valid laws and institutions. Substance must not remain in murky
otherworldliness, but must be realized in the secular realm. And it is precisely with our present understanding of conscience that we can see how this is to happen.

But this objectification of substance by the will is not something which begins with the arrival at conscience. On the contrary, in the journey of the Phenomenology that we have already examined, the will, as the self of Spirit, has been an existent reality all along. It was the subjective principle of will that came into tragic conflict with the law of the community in Greek society and that was responsible for that society's demise. And it was the self as will in its most primitive, natural form—in the immediate separation from the ethical substance of community—that formed the foundation of Roman society. The actualization of substance by the will in the form of law is thus something which has been happening throughout this movement of history, even though the will has not comprehended itself in this way, even though the will has not been conscious of its own immanent content.

What Hegel is asserting in this view of the will is that its activity is ultimately to be comprehended as the objectification of its own religious core in life, for reflective consciousness. The will's movement of objectification is at base the movement to know its own true substance. It actualizes its own substance precisely in order to know it. And this is reflected in history. "Time," says Hegel, is "the destiny and necessity of Spirit that is not yet complete within itself, the necessity...to realize and reveal what is at first only inward" (PS §801/429). The striving of the will to know itself is the striving of history. And the legal structure which develops and preserves itself from the Roman Empire onwards is the objective instantiation of this inward Spirit.

It is Hegel's arrival at the Notion in Phenomenology, where the will is comprehended
as the self of Spirit, that enables him to make this assertion about the will. But the will itself, in the moment of forgiveness, does not have the rational self-consciousness of the truth, for it is religious in character. It is, rather, the Notion which attains this rationality. The Notion is the retrospective gathering of the logical necessity of the objectification of the will in history. This objectification, viewed according to the logical necessity of the Notion, displays explicitly the rationality intrinsic to religious substance. That is, it displays precisely the content of the will that had remained so mysterious at the end of Phenomenology. By this, the true content of the will ceases to be mysterious, and becomes instead that with which reflective consciousness is fully at home.

To begin this final reconciliation of reason with religion, of subject with substance, we need only to take up the standpoint of the Notion of will, of the idea that the will is the mode of realization of the inner Spirit, and that this realization happens in a logically necessary manner. With this standpoint we can then go back, to the most immediate form of the will that expressed itself historically in the Roman empire, and re-read or re-collect that historical experience in order to express the real truth of what has gone on there.

This is the pathway of the Philosophy of Right. There, the will's immanent content, the universality it realizes in the world, is comprehended as "Right"--"[a]n existent of any sort embodying the free will" (§29). If Hegel is right in his Notion of the will, then this tracing of the actualization of the religious substance in terms of its rational necessity promises to provide the ultimate reconciliation of modern, secular consciousness with the divine. And this, as from the beginning, must be the crucial point of interest in the investigation that follows. We must see how a divinity from which the will had separated
us, actually comes to be expressed in secular life, by the activity of will, in a manner by
which its intrinsic rationality can now be retrieved.\textsuperscript{31}

I say "if Hegel is right in his Notion of the will," because there does remain a
difficulty with the enterprise. For if the will is indeed the mode of realization of religious
substance, and if its ultimate impetus is the impetus to know substance in a rational form,
that impetus itself can only be vindicated at the end of history. Only at the end of history has
objectification been fully established for reflective consciousness. And only when self-
knowledge has been fully achieved does the will to knowledge establish itself as having
been rational from the beginning. But if self-knowledge of the religious substance is not
achieved in history, then this whole understanding of the enterprise of the will becomes

\textsuperscript{31} Thus the \textit{Philosophy of Right} should definitely be seen as a theory of human self-
actualization, as Wood (1990) argues. But there are many versions of this, centring
around just what is to be actualized. Laurence Dickey, in a lucid article which draws on
Toews' work, situates the historical Hegel with his Christian immanentism against the
emergence of a "new-left" Hegelianism that breaks altogether with the notion of
substance, in favour of a purely human construction of the social world "governed by a
procedural commitment in which the end of human action and the substance of human
emancipation emerge out of the collective decision-making process itself" (1993:329).
As I argue in Chapter five, this non-religious basis of human creativity is carried forth in
Marx, where it proves problematic. A more contemporary appropriation of Hegel along
secular lines, but of a more communitarian or traditionalist nature, is found in Wood's
reading of the \textit{Philosophy of Right}, which relies on a notion of "historicized naturalism,"
a realization of an historical conception of the human good that purports to reject Hegel's
rational metaphysics (see Wood ch. 1). It is not clear that Wood can succeed in this
distancing of himself from what he sees as Hegel's outdated metaphysics, however. For
the very drive to self-actualization presupposes a will to truth that is bound up with
Hegel's larger notion of an Absolute substance. If one rejects \textit{that}, then it seems unclear
how the drive to self-actualization might be understood. It was Nietzsche who brought
the will to truth into radical question, by seeing it as a peculiar perversion of a deeper will
to power. Hence if one wants to reject Hegel's metaphysics it seems that one must
confront the challenge of Nietzsche, rather than moving so easily into a mild-mannered
"historical naturalism."
suspect. Hegel's philosophy hence must presuppose that the objective instantiation of the substance of the will has already been achieved, such that the will can come to harmony with itself in its objectivity, in the laws and institutions of the modern state. If this has been achieved in life, then the philosophical capturing of this objectification is only the final aspect of that reconciliation, required to confirm the essential rationality and truth of the objective expression of the will. But if, by the end of the journey, self-knowledge has not been achieved, then Hegel's Notion of the will, and hence his whole understanding of modern history, may be thrown into question.32

Thus there are two objectives in the following examination of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. The first is to see what, following the philosophy of the Notion, the substance of the will is as it reflects itself in secular life. This has, in the first instance, an historical dimension, for the first two sections on "Abstract Right" and "Morality" parallel what we have already examined in the "legal world order" of the Roman empire through to the experience of conscience. The difference from Phenomenology is that we now have the presentation in a different form, one which (while it relies on the phenomenological reality) emphasizes instead the moments in their objective aspect, the universality that is realized in the world, in the form of Right. In terms of this first objective, it will be in the third section on "Ethical Life" that the main interest and focus of the investigation lies, for this is where

32The idea that Hegel's philosophy by its own standards must have fidelity to the real, and thus that it lives or dies by whether the rational actually has become actual, is also one of the main thrusts of Fackenheim's interpretation (1968). But whereas for Fackenheim the failure of Hegel's Germany leads him to abandon altogether the philosophical notion of the unity of the divine and human, in my own view the historical failure does not force such an abandonment.
we leave behind the realm of history, and enter into the project's philosophical comprehension and vindication of a present, existing spirituality in the life of a political community. And it will be through this aspect of the examination that we may come to satisfy the second objective here, which is to see whether a spiritual substance has indeed been fully realized in the modern world in a form that can be rendered transparent by Notional philosophy. Hence the second objective is really to test Hegel's Notion of the will, of the idea of an Absolute that realizes itself in and through the human will in history, following along with its unfolding to see if it does indeed vindicate itself at the end.

This understanding of Hegel's philosophy of the Notion may seem anticlimactic, in light of his earlier emphasis on love, and on the transcendental intuition. For although with conscience we have an achievement of oneness with the Absolute in the moment of its existence, the philosophical consciousness of it as such is retrospective. And the idea of an intuitional relationship to nature, to the absolute's self-positing in nature, seems to be definitively overruled here. The philosophy of the Notion is a process of recollection, of comprehending the Absolute's self-positing after it has already realized itself unconsciously in nature, or with partial consciousness, in human history. There is to be no submergence in the Absolute, no ultimate oneness with the divine in its own self-positing. If Hegel had indeed intended, in the Difference essay, such a direct connection with the Absolute as the basis of philosophizing, we can see to what extent he has departed from it now.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{33}This conclusion is thus in accord with both Beiser's (1993) and Harris's (1993) emphasis on a dramatic break with intuitionism in the development of Hegel's thought. However, I believe that Hegel continues to rely on intuitive knowing as the existential
While I have already discussed the necessity of this transition to a philosophy of the Notion above, before embarking on the task ahead of us we may yet pause to consider the explicit remarks he made about intuitive philosophy in the wake of his own abandonment of it, in order further to appreciate the turn he has made.

In the Preface to *Phenomenology*, written after the completion of the work, Hegel's hostility to the Schellingian approach to the Absolute is clearly expressed. Instead of satisfying the cognitive impulse, an intuitive philosophy seeks to take us back to the level of mere feeling. Hegel reproaches this view as a weak-willed nostalgia which, in the face of "that lost sense of solid and substantial being" that characterizes the modern world, seeks not to go forward with insight, but to retreat to a superficial form of edification (PS §7/12).

The Spirit shows itself so impoverished that, like a wanderer in the desert craving for a mere mouthful of water, it seems to crave for its refreshment only the bare feeling of the divine in general. By the little which now satisfies Spirit, we can measure the extent of its loss. (§8/13)

While one may sympathize with such attempts at edification, says Hegel, the approach fails to capture the depth and richness of actual spiritual existence. Rather than constituting a genuine pathway out, it signifies rather an attempt at escape from a modern existence that appears, to ordinary consciousness, immanently condemned to finitude.

Hegel himself had come to see that the real retrieval of spirituality in the modern world could only be accomplished through the reflective thought which has, ironically, alienated us from that spirituality. For it is only by reflective thought that we see the world matrix which his philosophy captures logically. Hence the philosophy of the Notion is not a substitute for intuitive knowing, but a different kind of knowing. And both types of knowing are mutually necessary in modernity.
in all its differences and distinctions. A submergence of self in the being of the divine, a unity with the actual, temporal self-positing of the Absolute, turns its back on reflective, finite consciousness, and all the wealth of its distinctions. This is why such an approach to the Absolute ends up as "a night in which all cows are black." For an older, more sober Hegel, who has come fully to grips with the essentiality of the modern, reflective impulse, such is not the pathway forward. Reflective knowing must rather be understood as the medium in which the Absolute reveals itself, although it is a revelation which only comes to its full truth in the philosophy of the Notion. From the larger perspective of the Notion it is seen that the distinctions made by reflective thought are ultimately not separate from that which they reveal, that the determinations of thinking are the determinations of the true being of the thing, but that these determinations are only partial truths which supersede their own limits to reveal a larger whole. And this whole process of supersession, reflected in the full light of its immanent logic, is the philosophy of the Notion. Only by the Notion can philosophy hope to contain--yet go beyond--reflective thought, to retrieve the spirituality of the modern world in all its fullness and substantiality.

Thus we can see that, in his break with Schellingian intuition and his development of the idea of the Notion, Hegel has definitively overcome the attitude of mere resignation to the reality of reflective thought which we witnessed in the "Spirit of Christianity" essay, and has fully embraced that thought in its self-realization as Notion. He has confronted the profound loss of spirituality experienced by the modern world and, in the face of it, has overcome his own nostalgic yearnings, to strike out on a new, and starker path. That path is the path of the Notion--"the cold march of necessity in the thing-itself" (§7/13).
And yet this cold march of necessity is not one that takes place in abstraction from lived actuality, and this is the second point that must be emphasized here in considering Hegel's turn to the Notion. For while the Notion is indeed a lifting above existence, it nevertheless depends on that actuality as the basis of its cognition. Hegel never denies the validity of intuitional, representational, or any form of phenomenal knowledge. These are, for him, the self-manifestations of the Absolute. The problem is that they cannot, in these forms, be vindicated in their truth and significance. Only through the Notion can this be achieved. The task of the Notion is not a separation from these forms of knowing in order to assert instead a one-sided and formal schema as the real truth of things. On the contrary, its labour is the labour of recollection, of rereading the previous experiences of consciousness, in terms of their logical necessity in order that they can be won back and preserved in their truth. Actuality is thus the basis, the material, which feeds a cognition that can be nothing without it.

In this outline of a mode of absolute cognition based on the mediation of rational thought, rather than on any immediate knowing of the truth, one may yet foresee a loss. The intensity and immediateness of existence will not be captured by its "elevation" to the Notion.\textsuperscript{34} Hence the experience which Goeschel describes, "a disembodied, weird, ghostlike feeling," may well capture the nature of the philosophical journey upon which we are about to embark (cited in Fackenheim 1967: 192-3n.). For while it relies on the lived actuality and is nothing without that, philosophy itself exists in another realm—the purely conceptual and

\textsuperscript{34}Hegel himself admits that the freshness and immediacy of sensation and imagery is lost in its elevation to representation and to the Notion (Enc. §452R).
rationally self-moving realm of the Notion, which hovers over the realm of finished actuality in order to reflect the truth embodied therein. Hegel's philosophy, then, may indeed seem ghostlike. But it is, for him, the ghost of necessity, the ghost of reflective thought. It was only after a long struggle with the reality of reflective thought that he came to the Notion as the only possibility for philosophic life.

*Philosophy of Right: "The Cold March of Necessity in the Thing Itself"

In order to comprehend the movement of the *Philosophy of Right*, we do not need to have the higher perspective of the will as the self of the Absolute that we gained from *Phenomenology*. For Hegel bases his understanding of the movement of the will upon its actual, historical self-understanding, and traces the logical implications of this understanding, just as we have had with *Phenomenology* before. Thus, in the first section on "Abstract Right," we encounter the will as it first emerges in the Roman empire, which acts according to its own immediate impulses, freely expressing its own particularity, as well as doing what is necessary for its own survival. The self-concept which corresponds with this existence and which is reflected in the legal and political philosophy that emerges out of it, is that of the abstract Ego, the self of "mere self-reflection," which has reflected out of its oneness with community and has the character of "sheer independence," able to abstract from every aspect of its natural self (PR §34A). It is based upon this notion that it is accorded any worth, and recognized as being the bearer of rights. The process of the *Philosophy of Right* is the process of tracing the logical implications of this abstract self-concept as it seeks to assert itself in the world, and the problems and limitations it encounters by which it is forced to
modify its self-conception to achieve a more developed or complete concept of itself. In Hegel’s terminology, the “in-itself,” the deeper, implicit truth of the will, must gradually become “for-itself,” or self-conscious (PR §10R, 32A). Thus by the end of the logical unfolding we should see the self-concept of the actual, historical will come together with our own philosophical notion of it as the self of a higher Absolute.

Abstract Right

Historically, then, we first encounter the modern will in the Roman Empire, and it is reflected in law in terms of the notion of the Abstract Ego. In this self-understanding, it is convinced that it is the ultimate truth of things, and its behaviour is driven by this conviction. Abstracted from nature, it must show itself as the truth of that nature, and this is what the entire movement of the section on Abstract Right is about. The rights that we will see emerging here all derive from this conviction it has of itself as the truth of being.

The impulse to private property is the most immediate means by which this will, in its most primitive and abstract self-concept, objectifies its certainty of itself. For as reflected out of its immediate bond to community and that community's relationship to nature, it now finds itself over against the world. That world confronts it as an apparently independent entity, making the ego appear as a subjective truth. Thus it "struggles to lift itself above this restriction and to give itself reality, or in other words to claim that external world as its own" (§39). The will tries to appropriate the external world in order to show that the latter "has no end in itself and derives its destiny and soul from his will" (§44).

Contract is a higher objectification of the inner certainty of will than mere physical
appropriation, for in contract the will enters the medium of mutual recognition, thus bringing in the will of others to confirm it in its idea of itself. In contract I do not alienate a thing merely to show to myself my power over it, but in order to exist explicitly as a property-owner in the eyes of the other. In contract I give up a property and thus cease to be an owner, but at the same time I take up another's property and thus I remain an owner. My will does not exist here merely in the thing, but more ultimately in the medium of recognition. The other recognizes my will as the power over and truth of the thing which I choose to alienate.  

And yet contract turns out to be an insecure and contingent expression for the reality of will. For the parties rely on one another to carry out the agreement. And in their natural individuality they are in fact capricious and arbitrary. Either party could violate the contract, make a mockery of the other's expression of will in the thing, efface its reality. And this will inevitably happen; we will see the violation of contract, the doing of "Wrong".  

In wrong, the assertion of the truth of the will in property and contract is revealed as a mere show. This comes to be more and more explicit with the increasing severity of the wrong done. The most severe wrong, "Coercion," is a direct negation of my will as the truth of the external thing. Coercion is "crime," in that not only is my property—the embodiment of my will—violated, so is the very principle that I have a right to such embodiment at all. Here, there is absolutely no respect for right; crime does not come about as a mere deception of my will, as in fraud, but in direct defiance of it.

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35This, of course, is the understanding of the will that emerges logically from its abstract concept of itself (the Notional understanding). For the actual parties "all they are conscious of is that they are led to make contracts by need in general, by benevolence, advantage, &c" (§71R).
But the will reasserts itself as something absolute, as something which cannot be nullified this way, in punishment. It is the crime itself which is really the nullity, which goes against the reality of the will: "it is an expression of a will which annuls the expression or determinate existence of a will" (§92). The criminal cannot legitimately assert the reality of his own will while denying the reality of others. The will is not something which is the privilege of particular individuals, for it is precisely the abstraction from all particularity, the abstractly universal will. It is the defining feature of all individuals, and hence in negating it in others, the criminal negates it in himself.

Because crime is essentially this negative activity, it itself must be negated, by punishment. Philosophically, punishment is to be understood not as deterrence or reform, but as the reasserting of the truth of the will in the face of its violation, the reasserting of right in the face of wrong. By punishment the criminal is brought back to unity with its truth as will, a truth in which it now finds a unity with others.

At the level of the acting will, however, where we are dealing with atomistic individuals, the annulling of crime will take the form of revenge rather than punishment. Revenge contains justice; it is the reasserting of right. But as "an act of a subjective will" it may go beyond the principle of justice and serve the particular interest of the avenging party. Furthermore it will be seen by the other party as a merely particular will, rather than as universal (§102). Hence there arises "the demand for a justice freed from subjective interest and a subjective form and no longer contingent on might, i.e. it is the demand for justice not as revenge but as punishment" (§103).

With both crime and revenge, the abstract will's embodiment of its inner certainty in
property and contract comes to be seen in its contingent and problematic aspects. Indeed, what is revealed hereby is the condition of a will which has a conviction of itself as universal, as the truth of things, but which is embodied in a finite, natural individuality whose particular impulses may drive it to go against its own truth. The abstract will comes to self-consciousness of itself, in the terms of Hegel, as "at once the sublime and the trivial" (§5A).

But the response is not to deny the reality of the universal principle of will, but to affirm it explicitly: "it determines itself in its existence as a will, so that it is a free will not only in itself but for itself also" (§104R). Instead of merely behaving according to impulse, according to an inner conviction of itself as free and as the truth of things, it grasps self-consciously this idea of itself, within an awareness of its finite existence, and seeks to actualize this idea self-consciously. We move here into a new and higher notion of the will, which reflects the knowledge that it has gained from its previous experience. And yet what has been achieved above in terms of self-objectification of will is retained—the rights of private property and contract, the right of punishment, and the necessity for an impartial person to administer punishment.

**Morality**

It is interesting to note that, in *Phenomenology of Mind*, the experience of wrong in the Roman empire did not lead consciousness directly on to the idea of morality, to the idea of the individual as morally self-determining. On the contrary, what emerged from wrong and its resulting chaos was the idea of an external force to control the behaviour of people,
and subsequently the development of a devotional relationship to those powerful figures that could sustain order--the feudal relation. It was only after a great deal of experience that consciousness could come to the idea of morality, to the idea that it determines things from out of its own universal self, in spite of its finite passions, rather than some external truth already given. In *Philosophy of Right*, on the other hand, we avoid this elliptical, historical movement because we cling to the logical unfolding of the notion of will. The idea of individuals as bearers of abstract rights leads us directly on to the logical implication that they must be capable of moral self-determination.

Thus the moral will knows now that it determines things, according to its truth as inherently universal. But it knows also, from its experience in crime and revenge, that it resides in a singular individual, full of particular desires and passions. It still has as its content only the contingency of its given nature, is furthermore conditioned in how it will act by its limited knowledge of the circumstances with which it is dealing, and translates its action into a world governed by external necessity and by the interpretations of others. Thus, its struggle to realize its conviction of itself as a universal is now a struggle to come to terms with its finite condition, and these are the dynamics we shall witness.

In the first place, it deals with the finite content of its will in its passions and inclinations by acting according to the formal notion of purpose. It will no longer allow itself to be bounced around by its passions and inclinations, as had the earlier self; instead it will reflect on them and will only be determined by that into which it self-consciously puts itself. Even the need to eat must not be seen as an absolute compulsion. The will must self-consciously put itself into eating; it must decide to eat in order to satisfy its hunger, or to stop
itself from dying.

And yet it must act out its purposes in a world that is governed by external necessity; its actions when translated into this world will "become the prey of external forces which attach to it something totally different from what it is explicitly and drive it on into alien and distant consequences" (§118). It deals with this reality by taking responsibility only for those effects on the world as are an expression of its original purpose. Furthermore, the action of the moral will depended on its knowledge of the situation it was dealing with, so it will not take responsibility for aspects of which it was not aware. Thus while the ancient Greeks held Oedipus responsible for patricide, even though he did not know that it was his father whom he had killed, under the modern concept of will he would be culpable only for murder.

But secondly, the moral will, as a will which can reflect on its actions, is also thereby rational, and hence there would be some inevitable consequences for which it must take responsibility. For example, if I set fire to the hay in my neighbour's barn, I cannot say that it was not my purpose to burn down the whole building. Rather, my awareness of this general character of the action reflects my real intention. I intended to carry out not just that immediate action, but its necessary consequences as well. Thus I intended to burn down my neighbour's barn. Similarly, if I stab someone with a knife, I cannot say that I meant to injure only a piece of flesh, for what is really injured thereby is "life itself" (§119R); my intention was to murder.

Here, however, the moral subject realizes and must come to terms with the fact that when it acts, it puts itself forth into the realm of the subjectivity of others; they constitute the realm of objectivity in which its intention is realized, and hence it needs their recognition in
order to realize the truth of itself. As Knox writes, "there is no morality in writing on a piece of paper, the morality consists in the fact that the cheque is to pay for someone's education, and this fact is not in the situation but in someone else's consciousness and will" (p.337, n.8). Moral objectification implies the recognition of others in order for it to exist as moral at all.

While subjectivity further determines itself in intention, and in seeking the recognition of others, this is not a fully adequate expression of the truth of itself. There must also be a recognition of its particular motivation, its particular aim in carrying out the action. Nobody murders for the sake of murdering, or commits arson for the sake of arson. Even if I murder for the sake of pleasure, my particular motivation is that of pleasure. Murder is a means to that end. Similarly, in the pursuit of ends of great worth there must be a particular motivation.

But the particular motivation for a will which is formal and abstract can be found "only in its own natural subjective embodiment, i.e., in needs, inclinations, passions, opinions, fancies" (§123). And yet this is not a will that is simply driven by its passions. On the contrary, as self-determining, over against its desires, it formulates a general idea about the satisfaction of its passions, the idea of its happiness or welfare, and it self-consciously strives to realize that. Hence its particular purpose is to further its own welfare, and this must be considered alongside the general character of intention.

The recognition of welfare as an essential aspect of the truth of the moral will, however, also reveals the identity of the individual subject with others around it. For welfare is not something that belongs only to the individual as a singular will. On the contrary, it is a universal category, a general idea of happiness or satisfaction which must apply to all. We
are dealing here with a will which understands itself as universal, and hence which cannot restrict the realization of its truth (i.e., its welfare) only to its own self. Rather the discovery that it realizes its truth in terms of the notion of welfare must entail the furthering of welfare generally, and this is reflected in utilitarian theories.

The aim of welfare, however, logically cannot be considered as absolute. For it is derived from the will's status as a universal. It is only under the notion of the individual as free and self-determining that the importance of welfare emerges at all. Thus in this notional view, welfare cannot be singled out to justify the violation of property rights, the way it is in utilitarian theories.

And yet private property rights must similarly have a limit, for they are the objectification of the truth of a universal will which turns out to be embodied. And what that embodiment entails is a basic concern for welfare which, in some cases, will limit the rights of others. Thus, for example, if I must steal in order to eat, this cannot reasonably be considered an ordinary theft. For the expression of the truth of the will in rights first depends on there being a life. Hence "[t]o refuse to allow a man in jeopardy of his life to take such steps for self-preservation would be to stigmatize him as without rights" (§127A). The confrontation with a case of distress will reveal just how meaningless rights are as an expression of will if the finite individuals who embody that will do not have a basic livelihood, a basic physical capacity to exercise those rights.

What the above considerations reveal is the one-sidedness of the will's attempt to realize itself solely in terms of welfare or solely in terms of rights. They reveal, then, the fundamental inseparability of right and welfare. It is with this coming together of right and
welfare for moral consciousness that there emerges the notion of the good. The moral will comes to see that it is not enough merely to act according to a formal idea and according to the formal rights of self-determination, repudiating unintended consequences and pursuing its own welfare according to its given desires and caprice. Its actions instead must realize a more universal object, that which is captured in the idea of the good.

Because the good turns out logically to be the real truth of the moral will, it "has absolute right in contrast with the abstract right of property and the particular aims of welfare. If either of these moments becomes distinguished from the good, it has validity only in so far as it accords with the good and is subordinated to it" (§130). The good is conceived as something objective, which supersedes and yet encompasses all individual goods and rights. Individual rights turn out to be aspects of the larger, objective good and thus are not absolute, but must always be considered in reference to and as conditioned by that larger good.

But so far this good is merely an idea; it remains abstract, external to the particular being of the finite subject. The subjective will does not immediately correspond with it, or will it spontaneously. It merely sees that it should will it. The will remains in its natural state, and may desire to will something contrary to the welfare of others or in contravention of right. But the idea of the good that has emerged before it is its own idea, being the expression of the will's own self, and thus the will feels compelled to conform to it; it regards the good as its duty (§133).

But alongside this consideration of the good as the duty of the moral will, is implied also a right of insight: "that whatever it is to recognize as valid shall be seen by it as good,
and that an action ... shall be imputed to it as right or wrong, good or evil, legal or illegal, in accordance with its *knowledge* of the worth which the action has" (§132). This right of insight is implied for the same reason as above, because the good has emerged logically as the will's own good, as a product of the will's own immanent rationality. If an idea of the good were to be imposed on it from outside, then it would be under no obligation to conform to it, for it would not be a realization of its own truth.

To act according to the good, then, the will must decide what the good is. But "nothing is so far available except: (a) to do the right, and (b) to strive after welfare, one's own welfare, and welfare in universal terms, the welfare of others" (§134). The idea of the good remains extremely abstract. *What* is right, and *what* is in the universal welfare must be specified.

We are here at the level of Kantian moral philosophy, but Hegel rejects Kant's solution, the specification of the good by means of the moral law, as "an empty formalism" which ends up justifying any content at all (§135R). Phenomenologically, the moral consciousness which succeeds in willing according to the idea of the good is not Kant's moral consciousness, but "conscience." Conscience is "the subject's absolute inward certainty (*Gewissheit*) of himself" (§136), the certainty not only that it must be the determinant of what is good and right, but of *what* is right and good in any one instance. Conscience "establishes the particular and is the determining and decisive element" (§136); it self-consciously seizes or grasps at a particular aspect of the case and asserts that as its duty and as the good.

There is, however, a problem with conscience as the determinant of the good, a problem which is intrinsic to the whole existence of will as finite subject, which it has sought
to overcome in various ways, but which emerges here once again. And that is the 

incongruence between the universality of the moral self, and its finite condition in the world. More specifically here, it has before itself the idea of an objective good according to which it must act, but it determines subjectively, based on its own natural self, what that good is in any one case. And its mere assertion that it is willing the good is inadequate, says Hegel (§140). For what it may really be doing is willing against the universal, or willing evil.

And yet there is also the possibility that it could will the good, the universal. The standpoint of conscience is the real, culminating standpoint of morality, the capacity to will either good or evil (§140). Hence we encounter once again here, as we did in Phenomenology, the mysterious insinuation that conscience contains within itself the universal, the objective good. The difference now, however, is that because we have had experience with the unfolding of the notion of will, there is an answer to this mystery. Conscience does have the universal within it, but not as an objective, pre-existent essence, the way it seemed in Phenomenology. The universal is rather the will's immanent content, a content which must be developed out of it according to the logical movement of the Notion that we have already been witnessing. "[J]ust as subjectivity evaporates every content into itself, so it may develop it out of itself once more" (§138A). Ultimately, the will must act, and then it must decide on a determinate principle according to which to act. And that principle cannot be an arbitrary one; rather one must "demand its deduction from the concept of free will" (§138A).36

36Thus Hegel agrees with Kant that we have the universal within us. He merely objects to how Kant understood that universal.
What this means is that what the will realizes objectively as its truth, and as vindicated by Hegel’s philosophy of the will, is what conscience must conform to in any one case. Up to now, this has included the rights of private property, the rights of punishment, the right to an impartial judge, the rights of self-determination, including the right only to be responsible for what is rationally intended, the right to pursue one’s own happiness or welfare, the obligation towards the welfare of others, balanced by the requirement to respect the rights of others and to enjoy that care and respect in return, and finally the right of conscience—that one determines from within oneself in one’s universal capacity what is the good in any one case. But this last, in turn, requires adherence to the good as it has been objectified historically in valid laws and institutions.

What has emerged here is the idea of a subjectivity which realizes its infinity objectively, and which adheres to that objectivity. What has emerged is the notion of a will that is in harmony with the valid laws and institutions that constitute the objectification of its inner truth, the idea of a unity of subjective with objective existence. This unity is captured in the notion of “ethical life,” the transcendence of the concept of morality. In the concept of ethical life that we have now attained to, we will see not only the rights and obligations that have emerged up to this point, but the full objective structure that constitutes the truth of the will, and wherein these rights and obligations find their enshrinement and preservation.

Ethical Life

What happens with the notional transition from conscience to ethical life is that the
laws and institutions of family, civil society, and the state which constitute ethical life on its objective side, and which previously have not been recognized as the truth of the will, now come fully into view as its truth. It is not that this objective order is suddenly created by the activity of will. The will has indeed brought it into being, but over a long course of history. The point here is rather that it already exists because of this historical development and that, in its harmony with subjective willing, it can now achieve philosophical vindication as the real and ultimate truth of the will. "Ethical life" as the notion or concept of the truth of the will at this stage connotes this unity of conscience with the objective good. Hegel defines it as "a subjective disposition, but one imbued with what is inherently right" (§141R). Or, in another formulation, it is "the good endowed in self-consciousness with knowing and willing and actualized by self-conscious action" (§142).

The unity of subjective conscience with the objective good finds its actuality, according to Hegel, in the modern political community. While on the one hand the objectification of the universal in the laws and institutions of the modern community means that they stand over against the individual as something alien, on the other hand they are not alien, for "his spirit bears witness to them as to its own essence" (§147). In relation to them the individual "lives as in his own element which is not distinguished from himself" (§147). "[T]he ethical order is the actual living soul of self-consciousness" (§147R).

With substance fully objectified by the will in the secular institutions and laws of modern ethical life, it is no longer, as it was for conscience in the Phenomenology, a mysterious religious other. The character of being found as already present, that we saw with conscience, is here overcome. For the will has brought this objectivity into being out of its
own self, following an immanent logic. Substance has become subject. Hence the previously disruptive element of reflective thought, which threatened to spurn the religious encounter, is now accommodated, for it finds here an ethical world rather than a mysterious other, a world that has been brought into being by the activity of its own self. The truth has now come into the “spiritual daylight of the present,” and thought can find its harmony with it.

We see, then, how the notion of ethical life is the culmination of the unfolding of the notion of the will, the point where the “in-itself,” the truth of the will as the self of the Absolute, comes to be “for-itself,” where substance fully comes to be subject. The substance of will has become fully objectified in the ethical order and the individual embraces this objectivity as her ultimate truth, a truth which is in harmony with her own reflectively rational self, which thus finds no objectivity or divine essence still remaining as other. She knows herself as the self of the larger order, and this is, in effect, the achievement of the true, spiritual self-consciousness.

But there is still a journey to be gone through before this harmony is fully realized. The moment of reflective thought still has not been fully accommodated. To the extent that the rights of property and the moral self have been revealed in their logical necessity, they have achieved a certain level of validation, although they still rely ultimately on the presupposition of the will as the self of the Absolute, a presupposition which has not been fully vindicated. And we know at a very general level what substance is for Hegel as it is objectified in the secular realm—the institutions and laws of modern ethical life. Yet these must still be examined in more detail, in order to comprehend how they are rational, and thus
how subjective conscience—which includes the moment of reflective rationality—finds its harmony therewith. For indeed Hegel has merely brought us to the idea of the unity of the subjective with the objective realm. We must yet explore this idea in its actuality and in the logic of its unfolding.  

i) the family: ethical idea in its immediacy, or spirit's feeling of its own unity

The idea of ethical life, of a harmony between subjective conscience and the objective order, does find an "immediate" actuality in the life of the individual, says Hegel. And this is in the family. The family is the "immediate" existence of the ethical idea because the child merely finds her unity with it, rather than bringing it about rationally. She is immediately a "member" of the family, is immediately participant in this larger reality. And she experiences this unity as love. There is no separation; she does not as a child find the institution to be an alien imposition upon her, but experiences a harmony therewith which is manifest as love. Thus love is the real existence of the ethical idea, the self-consciousness of the unity of the subject with the objective institution (§158).

But while for the child the unity with the family is merely found, for the parents it is in fact brought about by the activity of their will, through marriage. Marriage is in essence the free decision or consent of two parties to bring the ethical unity into being—"to renounce their natural and individual personality to this unity of one with the other" (§162). And in

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37Hence it is not any institution or law with which the subject is in harmony that Hegel's philosophy endorses, but only that which can be established as rational. It is because of Hegel's continual emphasis on the necessity of showing the rationality of the actual, that we do not need to accept the left-wing criticism of him as a reactionary who merely accepts what is. See also Fackenheim's discussion of the "rational is actual" statement (1970).
that unity, in the abdication of their natural individuality, the individuals achieve "their substantive self-consciousness," the real truth of their being as part of a larger reality.

The emphasis here must be on the will. It is not an issue merely of falling in love, or feeling the necessity of being with this one person, but of deciding to build a unity with this person and sticking with it. In Hegel's terms, "it is precisely a contract to transcend the standpoint of contract" (§163R). The love that is achieved in the family, then, is not a romantic flight, but is a solid and ongoing experience, the product of this activity of their willing. And it is through the achievement of this kind of love that the partners find their harmony with the institution of marriage. Their love is the experienced unity of individual conscience with the institution of marriage.

And yet love remains a substance for the couple in terms of the relationship of their reflective rationality to it. As Hegel says, love "is the most tremendous contradiction" for the Understanding, or reflective thought (§158A). The parents feel the achievement of their unity but cannot rationally grasp it. Thus, just as subject has had to will its "substance" in history in objective form, so the parents must will their unity objectively in order to know it as the truth of their selves. This is done initially in ceremony, where there is the recognition by the community of the marital agreement. The decision itself is thereby "crystallized out of its physical and subjective mode and lifted to the thought of what is substantive" (§164R). But this thought of what is substantive must, like the will of the Abstract Ego, assert its truth objectively—in property. Unlike the abstract will however, the property of this substantial will must reflect not merely the caprice of individual desire, but its reality "as a universal and enduring person" (§170). Its property must be "permanent and
secure." The family must have capital.

In family capital, the arbitrariness and contingency of the purely abstract will, its "particular needs," "the selfishness of desire," is "transformed into something ethical, into labour and care for a common possession" (§170). Capital is the embodiment of their substantial unity, of the real essence of their will. Particular needs and desires are satisfied therein, but are elevated, given significance as something ethical, because through this meeting of needs the larger unity is sustained and developed as an end in itself.

While the unity of the family attains objectivity in capital, the subjective unity achieved in marital life attains its highest objective affirmation in children. Children are different from objectification in property for the parents because "[w]hile in their goods their unity is embodied only in an external thing, in their children it is embodied in a spiritual one in which the parents are loved and which they love" (§173A). Because love is a living bond, it is more adequately reflected in children than in things.

But children also constitute a further vindication of the universality of the family, because through them the infinity or universality of love is realized objectively in the infinity of time, in the continuity of the human race. This extends backwards as well as forwards, for the existence of the parents presupposes the family that brought them into being, and so on. But the child is herself "potential freedom," asserts Hegel, and must develop her own self as will and actualize herself, perhaps by generating her own family (§175). That is, the child is implicitly a free subjectivity, who can separate from the unity of the family and think and decide for herself. She is implicitly a modern individual. But she must be educated to that capacity, to that separation. Thus education is the chief function of the family in relation
to the children.  

This education entails, on the negative side, the task of disciplining the child away from his instinctive, physical inclinations, to realize his independence or "freedom of personality," and, on the positive side, "of instilling ethical principles into him in the form of an immediate feeling for which differences are not yet explicit" (§175). What this latter implies is that ethical behaviour is instilled in the child within a context of "love, trust, and obedience," so that he is habituated to such behaviour without having it rationally justified to him (§175).

In coming to achieve the principle of free personality, of reflective separation from the unity of the family, the individual may marry and create a new family of her own, carrying on the spirit of the "Penates," the life of the family in its bond of unity. But implicitly what has emerged thereby is "a plurality of families, each of which conducts itself as in principle a self-subsistent concrete person and therefore as externally related to its

\[\footnote{Hegel suggests that this teleological truth of children is actually felt by them "as their own feeling of dissatisfaction with themselves as they are ... as the longing to grow up" (§175R).}

\[\footnote{Hegel does limit the achievement of abstract personality, the basic unity of civil society, to males, considering females to be capable of exercising their free will only to the point of creating their own family (see Pateman's article (1996) which points out the contradiction here). Unlike Pateman however, I see nothing in Hegel's philosophy which inherently restricts the movement into civil society to males, and hence I have felt free to substitute the female pronoun to correct what I think is merely a personal chauvinism on Hegel's part. There is, of course, the question of the division of labour, of someone having to look after and nurture the children. But history itself would seem to have shown Hegel that a sharing of the division of labour between men and women is both possible and desirable. Some may wish to argue, on the other hand, that contemporary women have lost something of their nurturing capacity in their entrance into the competitive and individualistic realm of civil society.}
neighbours" (§181). While before the individual had been immediately identified in her consciousness with the family, which was for her "the primary thing, the divine, and the source of obligation" (§181A), by her separation she comes to refer to her own self as the determining factor. And what she finds within her own, separate self are her particular needs and interests, or the interests of her own individual family. Hence in the relation of singular families or independent individuals to one another, we have now the loss of an ethical consciousness, and find instead a condition of atomism where each refers only to her own self and finds no essential identity with the others. This is the condition of civil society.

ii) civil society: the ethical idea divided, or spiritual self-consciousness lost

In civil society, the individual has lost the harmony with the ethical order that she had experienced in the family. With reflective separation, that order is now merely present before her, a found order which she does not experience as her truth. Even the institution of the family may now seem to her like an alien and oppressive one. What we must here observe, then, is how she comes rationally back to a harmony with that order, and in doing so reveals explicitly to herself what the rationality of that order is. Her reflective self, which has here emerged in its reality, is the immanently disruptive force in the actual realm of ethical life, that which must yet be accommodated. This self is the origin and actuality of what will be the final philosophical tracing of the unfolding of the substance of will by the subject. In following the individual through the realm of civil society, the realm where she sees the ethical order as alien, in order to see how she gradually comes to an embracing of

40We may recall that it was with the break from ethical substance historically that particularity became the source of the will, as in the Roman empire.
the rationality of its features, Hegel's philosophy is thereby revealing that rationality and satisfying the reflective thought that seeks to make objections against the order. He is embarking on the final stage of the unification of subject with substance, bringing in the final disruptive element of reflective thought that had plagued the standpoint of conscience in Phenomenology.

What should become apparent here is that the whole history of disciplining which phenomenological consciousness went through in order to reestablish its deeper truth, in the modern ethical order is to be achieved within the life cycle of the individual. In the family, the negative side of education is discipline toward "freedom of personality," or reflective rationality. With this the individual comes no longer merely to dwell in the harmony of love, but is separated over against it. It is not that the child stops loving the family, but that she feels the division which has emerged within her. This is a parallel development to Phenomenology. There, it was the eruption of the principle of personality that broke up the immediate unity of Greek ethical life, and which subsequently tore apart the Christian community of love. However, just as the Christian consciousness found that it had merely become estranged from the knowledge of love, and that love was ultimately the basis of its own true willing, so the child becomes separated from the immediacy of the bond of love, but carries it within her still, as "the foundation of an ethical life" (§175). The individual is driven forward on this journey by the feeling of unity she has experienced in the family—the spiritual self-consciousness of love. Just as with conscience, where the knowledge of love must be understood to be developed and objectified in a rationally necessary manner, in order to satisfy reflective rationality, so the child educated to independence must come to terms
with her own true substance by rationally expressing and finding it in the objectivity of the social and political world.

The difference from *Phenomenology* is that the ethical context within which an individual's convictions must be situated is here brought to the fore. The child's deepest ethical convictions are instilled in her in the early stages of her education, in the context of the love of the family. She has not yet learnt rationally to articulate and justify these principles, but nevertheless they are present within her, and we can analyze where they have come from. It is in civil society that she will have to find a way to explicate what she already impulsively feels, or to abandon her earlier education. But because of our knowledge of the family and education of the individual, we can situate more clearly the individual of civil society than we could the earlier phenomenological conscience 41

This indicates a further insight into the spiritual self-consciousness that Hegel sees as being realized in ethical life, and which was not apparent at the phenomenological level of conscience. Whereas for phenomenological conscience there was a coming back to the unity of the infinite with the finite self, that finite self was not clearly an educated self. Rather in conviction there was a mere grasping on to a particular content of the self. Hence

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41 Both Harris (1995) and Robinson (1977) emphasize the situated nature of conscience in *Phenomenology*, its position within a particular culture or society. They are right that conscience is situated in this respect, as its position in the "Spirit" section of *Phenomenology* would indicate, for all of the discussion of Spirit presupposes an awareness by consciousness that it is dealing with a concrete, historical/political context. (See also Stewart (1995), for a helpful discussion of the architectonic of the *Phenomenology*). Furthermore, in *Philosophy of Right* the "situated" nature of conscience becomes more apparent in the dialectical transition to ethical life. But both Harris and Robinson neglect, or reject, the deeper knowledge of love that is realized in and through this situated self.
there remained the tremendous possibility of evil, of willing against the universal. The valid and true ethical context within which individual conviction could be educated to conform with what truly is good was not clearly apparent there, had not yet clearly been established. And hence the unity in goodness that was achieved at the moment of forgiveness was merely momentary, and was characterized more by a suspension of the will, an act of grace, rather than a harmony with the will. But here, in ethical life, we clearly have an educational context for the will. Hence here we can see and understand the development of a more complete and less momentary experience of reconciliation of the finite with the infinite self, of particular conviction with the objective good.

Following Aristotle, Hegel understands the political community of modern life to provide the context within which the natural will can be cultivated, worked on, to be in conformity with its inner, universal nature. Referring to the story of the father who sought to educate his son in ethical conduct, Hegel cites the response of the Pythagorean: "Make him a citizen of a state with good laws" (§153R). A truly ethical subjectivity is the product of being raised and living in a context that provides the opportunity to practice virtue on a daily basis. It is this context which is necessary for the individual truly to become good rather than, like the ambiguous condition of conscience, merely to reside in the possibility of goodness.

In tracing the movement through civil society, then, where the individual begins opposed to the ethical order, we must trace this cultivation of the finite self, which the individual now engages in consciously and rationally, towards a harmony with the objective good. To begin with, the individuals or families in civil society are concerned only with their
own selves. They have no sense of any deeper unity with others around them, or with the objective laws and institutions, but see these latter as a restriction on their particular activities, albeit perhaps a necessary restriction for order and stability. Private needs are their most basic concern, and they try to satisfy these by means of things and by means of work (§189).

But the needs which individuals pursue in their self-striving turn out to be not merely the basic, physical needs which animals have. Rather they become multiplied by the factor of intelligence. Intelligence is able to articulate "distinctions" in basic needs, for example between raw and cooked food, which an animal would not sustain except by instinct (§190A). In other words, intelligence makes judgements, based on "taste and utility," so that one does not merely require food, but particular kinds of food, prepared in particular ways. Hence as needs multiply, so do the means of satisfying them. And the means to meet needs themselves become needs.

Because intelligence can engage in these distinctions endlessly, "multiplication goes on ad infinitum; taken as a whole, it is refinement, i.e. a discrimination between these multiplied needs, and judgement on the suitability of means to their ends" (§191). There is no natural desire for more and more comfort and convenience. Rather a particular need, such as for a faster computer or a better deodorant, "is suggested to you by those who hope to make a profit from its creation" (§191A).

Needs and the means of realizing them inevitably come to involve others, because I cannot satisfy all my multiplied needs by myself. And in order to get some of my needs met from others, I must have something to give in return. Hence "I am compelled to produce
means for the satisfaction of others" (§192A). In the system of exchange which develops here, I become dependent on others for the satisfaction of particular needs, while they become dependent on me in terms of what I provide. Because we are dependent on others in this way, we are compelled to accept what they have to offer in the way of meeting needs, and certain social conventions arise, such as shopping hours, the types of food we eat, and the clothes we wear. It is in this sense that Hegel says needs become "concrete," or "social" (§192).

But the conventionalization of needs and means is the basis for a further expansion of needs. For the "bourgeois" individual of civil society desires not only to do as well as others, to have as much, but also to distinguish himself as particular (§193). Hegel here is relying on the Rousseauian insight that the bourgeois, while he is concerned primarily with his own self and his own particularities, nevertheless only gains security about his particular identity and well-being by comparing himself to others.

While on the one hand the proliferation of needs is liberatory, according to Hegel, in that it lifts us out of our animal-like enslavement to purely natural needs and causes us to dwell in a more "ideal" realm, on the other hand the satisfactions achieved in the meeting of more refined needs remain particularistic. One simply desires more and more goods that will satisfy one's individualistic desires. This is furthermore the basis for an increasing division among individuals of civil society. For just as more needs may be met in this situation, so there are more needs that can go unmet. Just as needs increase ad infinitum, so "dependence and want increase ad infinitum" (§195). Even if certain goods, like TVs and telephones, become widely available and take on the status almost of basic needs, new goods emerge
which only a few will be able to afford, and these will then be considered luxury goods. Such goods depend on the fact that only a few can have them, in order to sustain their status and thus their desirability.

The satisfaction of needs through things itself presupposes the work that produces things. Our needs become so specialized that they cannot be met by nature in its raw form. Rather "[t]hrough work the raw material directly supplied by nature is specifically adapted to these numerous ends by all sorts of different processes" (§196). The same process which led to the multiplication of needs leads to the subdivision of the production process necessary to meeting needs, or to the division of labour. People focus on different aspects of the system of needs, and hone their skills in one area. This division of labour creates a greater interdependence of individuals on one another.

Indirectly, then, because of this interdependence in the system of needs, "subjective self-seeking turns into a contribution to the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else" (§199). We see a concept of the universal emerging here for the individual in her relation to the whole, but it is not a concept she makes the source or intention of her will, which remains particularistic. It is a seemingly accidental by-product of self-seeking. This universality is more concretely conceptualized as "the universal permanent capital," the general wealth of the society or the economy as a whole "which gives each the opportunity, by the exercise of his education and skill, to draw a share from it and so be assured of his livelihood, while what he thus earns by means of his work maintains and increases the general capital" (§199).

In spite of the fact that this universal capital is the general environment in which all individuals are caught up, individuals relate to it from different positions, because of the
personal capital with which they begin (their family situation), and because of their different capacities. The latter are determined not merely by the capital which one might need to develop capacities, for example the money required for education or training, but also by natural aptitudes and early life influences. Hence there emerge "disparities of individual resources and abilities" (§200). To try to assert that there should be equality in this sphere "is a folly of the Understanding," says Hegel, for we are dealing in civil society precisely with the expression of human particularities, "where inequality is in its element" (§200R). Inequality is necessarily the product of a situation where particularity asserts itself as the supreme principle.

While such inequalities and differences seem to be a result of the contingencies both of nature, of one's situation of birth, and of individual caprice, they are nevertheless immanently rational, according to Hegel, and this rationality finds its expression in the development of a class system—"an organic whole with different members" (§200R). Class encapsulates not merely the status and income level associated with one's occupation, but the whole cultural ensemble of expectations, desires, education and means associated with that position (§201). Thus the articulation is organic in the sense that one can witness a harmony between expectations and means to satisfy those expectations within each class, and also in that each class is dependent on the others in such a way that they form a functioning whole.

Class really represents, then, the elevation of the finite particularity of individuals--their natural being--to an explicitly rational form. Human nature in its immediate form is raw and uneducated. But it is implicitly rational. And it is through the development of the system of needs that this nature is trained and educated in different ways and expressed as
Class is, thus, the substance of the individual realizing itself in the realm of her finite nature, the cultivation of that nature into a particular form.

The expression of substance as class takes three forms, in accordance with the three moments of the will in its self-objectification in history, in the system of needs. First is the agricultural class, as the principle of will realized itself most immediately in the taking and working of land. The culture associated with this moment of the will is the simplest, because in their self-expression as will, these individuals have not really gained a full sense of their own separation from and power over nature:

The member of this class accepts unreflectively what is given him and takes what he gets, thanking God for it and living in faith and confidence that this goodness will continue .... This is the simple attitude of mind not concentrated on the struggle for riches. It may be described as the attitude of the old nobility which just ate what there was. So far as this class is concerned, nature does the major part, while individual effort is secondary. (§203A)

The consciousness of this class would indeed undergo change with the introduction of greater agricultural technology, says Hegel, developing a greater idea of its own power over nature. But he seems to imply almost a corruption or loss thereby (§203A), for the attitude of control signifies a disruption of the harmony found in the farmer who attunes himself to the exigencies of the natural environment. It is precisely that harmony which constitutes the ethical mindset, the spirituality, of the agricultural class at the level of civil society. Hence these individuals seem almost to have the character of the Greek or pre-modern consciousness, in that there has been no dramatic, reflective separation from nature, but a putting forth of one's will in the manner of what Hegel has previously called "the spirit of the plastic artist." And one's relationship to one's activity remains in the mode of faith and
intuition.

The business class emerged historically out of agricultural society in the development of the system of needs. And what defines it most fundamentally is that it knows itself as the power of will: "what this class produces and enjoys, it has mainly itself, its own industry, to thank" (§204). It "adapts" raw materials, and "mediates" the different needs and work of individuals. This includes craftsmanship, mass production, trade and commerce. Hence it is an enormously productive class, and represents the will in the moment of its self-reflection, of its separation from and manipulation of nature. But like the self we encountered at the beginning of the section on morality, it merely knows itself as the form of will, without having any consciousness of its true, ethical substance, of its connection to the larger whole. It focuses instead on its finite, particular needs and desires as its real truth.

The "universal class" of civil servants is the third class that emerges historically in the system of needs. This class works in the "universal interests of the community," which as we shall subsequently see is identified as the "general authority" (polizei). This class is "relieved from direct labour to supply its needs" (§205); individuals receive a salary from the state. These individuals represent the will in the moment of its universality, its rational embracing of and concern for the good of the whole, as opposed to the finite self-striving of the business class. And they are cultivated to concern themselves with that universality.

Individuals can only identify themselves with one class; they must cultivate themselves to accord with the skills, aspirations, tastes, and character of one. Ultimately, says Hegel, the final determining factor of what class one ends up in is "subjective opinion and the individual's arbitrary will" (§206). If individuals are truly to accept a class as their
own, and thus to find in it the truth of themselves, they cannot be assigned to it by an external authority. Rather they must be free to migrate into that which suits them best. While certainly their own class background will influence them in their decision, this is not a negative restriction on their liberty since they achieve their substantial reality partly in and through the cultivation they receive in their family. But that the choice must ultimately be the individual's own does necessarily entail that class mobility be a feature of the modern political community. However, each class is equally valuable in Hegel's understanding. For each class constitutes a necessary moment in the unfolding of substance by subject within the realm of human particularity. The activity of each class and the culture associated with it is a manifestation of the consciousness of the Absolute in a different moment of its own unfolding, a different mode of knowing of that Absolute. And each knowing depends on the others to form the functioning whole of the community.

Overall then, participation in a class entails attaining the background and activity by which one is cultivated towards unity with a wider sector of the community, a sector that has been developed in and through the activity of will and intelligence. We can see how significant class is as a spiritualization of the secular life of the individual for Hegel, in his assertion that it is only by participating in a class that an individual realizes his "substantive being"—"[a] man with no class is a mere private person and his universality is not actualized" (§207A). Class is the objectification of the inner universality of the will in finite nature, and is catalyzed by the proliferating system of needs in modern life.

And yet only the agricultural class can actually be said to have an ethical consciousness, to know themselves as part of something larger, and this in their relationship
to nature rather than in relation to the larger society. For in the development of the class system as a whole, and in the choice by individuals to enter into a job or profession that will make them part of a class, "the paramount thing is reflection on one's doings, and the quest of happiness and private wants, and ... the contingency in satisfying these makes into a duty even a single and contingent act of assistance" (§207). Even the "universal class" only works for the universal because therein its "private interest finds its satisfaction" (§205). Hence even though class is an essential root for the individuals in civil society, an essential mode for achieving a heightened ethical consciousness, the individuals may not themselves perceive this. The achievement of "class consciousness" in the universal class, and especially in the business class, is something which must yet be examined.

The unity of subjective conscience with the wider ethical order that does attain real existence at this stage of civil society is to be found in the respect in which individuals hold the principles of abstract rights, and the system of justice that supports this. For it is by their interdependence in the system of needs that individuals come to relate to one another in a more impersonal manner, come to see one another as somehow fundamentally identical--as "persons." "A man counts as a man in virtue of his manhood alone, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, &c." (§209R). And here in the concept of ethical life, where the objective actuality has also come into view, this subjective comprehension finds its counterpart in a legal code with an administration to judge and enforce it. A legal code in essence is this objectification of a knowledge of a people which has achieved the level of thought and can be written down or expressed in judgements. This legal code, then, and the harmony of conscience with it, also includes the necessity for punishment of crimes (§218),
for an independent judiciary (§219), and for due process of law (§222). The harmony between conscience and this order of justice must furthermore be reinforced by a system of publicity regarding legal proceedings, for "it is through publicity that the citizens become convinced that the judgement was actually just" (§224A).

It is in the administration of justice, then, that the individual of civil society rationally finds her unity with the universal. But this is only a partial identity, concerning only the protection of property or person, and its violation in particular cases, rather than relating to the individual's welfare more generally. And yet individual welfare also logically cannot be left out of the universal concern, as we have seen earlier.

Individuals learn the logic of welfare, and the necessity for state intervention to deal with this set of concerns, through their own experience in civil society: "since I am inextricably involved in particularity, I have a right to claim that in this association with other particulars, my particular welfare too shall be promoted" (§229A). Because particularity has a logical right to satisfaction, it is not only necessary "that accidental hindrances to one aim or another be removed, and undisturbed safety of person and property be attained," but also "that the securing of every single person's livelihood and welfare be treated and actualized as a right" (§230).

Practically what this entails is some sort of general authority to regulate the activities of civil society in the name of a common good. For as individuals act out their own interests in civil society, their actions might unintentionally impinge on others in an injurious or wrongful way. The activity of individuals in the system of needs thus necessitates regulation in areas where individuals will not adequately regulate themselves, to achieve an identifiable
common good, such as public health and safety. Thus Hegel gives examples of public utilities, price-regulation for consumers, and public health regulations, as fulfilling this principle (§236A).

But beyond the assurance of welfare in the sense above, the individual may be faced with particular circumstances, or require particular skills and capital in order to subsist, which subject it to contingency. The family cannot be relied upon to supply this basis for the individual, or to look after her if she is disabled, for civil society in coming into being "tears the individual from his family ties, estranges the members of the family from one another, and recognizes them as self-subsistent persons" (§238). Because all are drawn into civil society and must participate in it, they may all claim certain rights from it. Hegel emphasizes particularly the necessity of state-regulated education (§239).

But more than public education is required, for the contingencies of civil society contain the tremendous potential of reducing individuals to poverty in particular circumstances. Because private property rights have become so formalized in civil society, and it is no longer possible for individuals merely to go out and make their living from the soil, and furthermore because the family can no longer be relied upon as a stable source of support, it is civil society which must take responsibility for the poverty it produces. This includes addressing not only the most basic needs, but also the culture of poverty which Hegel describes as "laziness of disposition, malignity, and other vices which arise out of their plight and their sense of wrong" (§241). Charity, or what Hegel calls "subjective aid," has its place here, but cannot be relied upon as a general means of addressing the problem of poverty, because it is "dependent on contingency." It is the general authority which must
address this issue, "by discovering the general causes of penury and general means of its relief, and by organizing relief accordingly" (§242).

The tendency toward poverty for some must be comprehended within the terms of a civil society driven by the desire to amass wealth. For this leads to the greater articulation of general needs and an organization of production to meet these needs on a mass scale. Workers, while they might find employment in this system of mass production, become restricted to very particular aspects of the process, i.e., to a place on the assembly line. Not only does employment become de-skilled and monotonous, but the very lack of skill entails that workers become extremely dependent on the particular employer, their place in the contingencies of the market, and the vagaries of technology which might quickly render them redundant. There is thus the tremendous possibility here of the creation of a mass of unemployed people who would fall below the level of subsistence, and whose most basic demands and expectations from civil society would not be met.

It is in light of this condition that we may understand Hegel's earlier sociological statement about the poor. Frozen out of the system of entitlements, they develop an inner resentment against the basic structures of the society, lose any commitment to the "universal" principles of justice which have failed to provide for their most basic subsistence, and threaten the development of class war (§244A). 42

These dynamics of civil society have indeed been borne out by history, along with the accompanying development of a welfare state to address them. But the welfare state, as Hegel himself recognized, was bound to be inadequate, inclining people towards dependency

42Wood (1990:ch.14) has an excellent analysis of this section of Philosophy of Right.
or, in the case of makework projects, causing an excess of production (§244). It is this endemic problem of poverty, and the ongoing inability of the modern state to resolve it, which Marxists have pointed to as the crucial point at which the whole architectonic of a rational civil society comes tumbling down, and upon which is based their critique of Hegel's idea that a real universal could ever be found by the mediation of civil society. Indeed, the critique is powerful when one considers that Hegel's own hope for a solution lay in the founding of new colonies, an idea which now can only be dismissed. In his idea of the corporation, however, we may seek a more meaningful response to the Marxist critique, as I shall discuss.

While the public authority which attends to some of the common concerns in civil society does represent a kind of common good, says Hegel, it nevertheless "takes the form of an external system and organization for the protection and security of particular ends and interests en masse" (§249). That is, even for individuals who are educated enough to see the necessity of a welfare state, that state nevertheless is seen as addressing individual interests in an aggregated way. The welfare state is still experienced as an external necessity rather than as a real content of the will wherein one finds one's unity with others. This is particularly true for the members of the business class. The class of civil servants "has the universal explicitly as its ground and as the aim of its activity" (§250). Hence even if they do not initially have an ethical consciousness, Hegel here seems to suggest that this will develop through the course of experience. They work with the concerns of the whole and will gradually come to a genuine identification with that whole, according to Hegel. The agricultural class also "has directly within itself the concrete universal in which it lives"
§250: it is identified with the larger activity that it realizes and serves, as discussed above. But members of the business class are focused on their particular interests, and it is only by the mediation of the corporation that they may come to transcend their self-seeking and find a higher good as the true object of their willing, that they come to gain a real class consciousness.

Hegel's idea of the corporation is a logically necessary one in terms of the realization of a spiritual self-consciousness in modern secular life, but we can see already here that the recognizable character of his philosophy is beginning to break down in favour of prescription. Nothing exactly like his idea of the corporation existed in his time or has materialized subsequently. And yet the idea of it is essential to his theory. The corporation organizes the division of labour within the enormous realm of the business class, so that while an individual goes about trying to make a living, she ends up doing so as a member of a corporation. The particular corporation with which she becomes associated pursues a larger goal in which she becomes a contributor. According to Heiman (1971:125), Hegel's idea of the corporation referred to "legally recognized, state-sanctioned organizations derived from the usual trade and vocational groupings within the community," and found its basis of actuality in extant aspects of Roman law that recognize groups as legal persons. Its function is quite encompassing in the life of the individual, acting as "a second family" in the realm of civil society in that it attends more closely to the particular needs of its members than the remote, "general authority" is capable of (PR §252). The corporation promotes its own interest in civil society by recruiting the members it needs to function, by protecting members "against particular contingencies," and by providing "education requisite to fit others to
become members," as in job-training or apprenticeship (§252). In return, the tradesperson or individual becomes a member of the corporation "not for casual gain on single occasions but for the whole range, the universality, of his personal livelihood" (§252R). Members receive job security, a stable income, and recognition for their skill and contribution to the whole. This status liberates the individual from the condition of "mere self-seeking" and from the need "to try to gain recognition for himself by giving external proofs of success" (§253R). For it is through the corporation that the individual gains a real class consciousness, an ethical substantiality. The desperate pursuit of wealth is the sign of an individual who has no class, who has no sense of contributing to a larger whole and receiving recognition therein (§253R). Thus the limited common good realized through the activity of particular individuals, with which they come to identify, and wherein "particular welfare is present as a right and is actualized," constitutes the essence of Hegel's corporation (§255).

Hegel undoubtedly hoped that corporations would help to deal with the problem of poverty caused by the vagaries of the business cycle, that they would take responsibility, even in the most difficult times, for the individuals and families who had worked for them and thus prevent any major segments of the population from becoming radically disaffected. Furthermore, in the idea that these corporations were to delegate representatives to speak in their interest at the state level (PR §308ff.), is implied some idea of worker democracy.43 Such democracy also could be a means to address the tendency towards de-skilling, monotony and alienation entailed in mass production, by allowing the workers to engage in

43The reference is quite ambiguous, as Hegel seems to be promoting an elitist, Burkean conception of the representative. Nevertheless it opens up some avenue for worker interests to express themselves.
the design of the productive process, and to achieve pride in their work and recognition of their contribution.

But in spite of the possibility and the need for such a model of the corporation, it has failed to materialize. Today's western "corporation" does not provide this kind of security to the individual, nor, increasingly, does the individual show much loyalty to her corporation. If anything, contemporary society is witnessing a growing polarization of "the business class." It is trade unions which have historically proved themselves to be the greatest promoters of worker rights and security, and have done so largely in confrontation with corporate leadership—far removed from Hegel's functionalist, harmonious ideal. Consequently, the deals struck between these opposing parties reflect more the crystallization of power relations, than they do some genuine common interest.44

Unions themselves might be considered to be corporations in Hegel's sense of the word, providing individuals with greater security and recognition, and thus acting as a "second family." But most trade unions, even after the achievement of basic security issues for workers, have continued to focus on wages, benefits and job security, at the expense of principles like worker democracy. It is perhaps this narrowness that has been the cause of a widespread, continuing atomistic consciousness among the majority of union workers, while an adherence to these less material principles might have brought people together in

44 Japanese corporations may indeed have attained a temporary harmony between workers and owners. But this has been achieved through the feudal roots of these corporations which turned out, temporarily, to be highly functional in an emergent capitalist nation. However, the antagonism between workers and owners has more recently begun to reveal itself as job security declines and worker disillusionment commences.
a more sustained fashion. Furthermore, with globalization of the economy, the capacity of unions to protect even the most basic material interests of workers is being undermined. This is compounded by the fact that national governments are increasingly unable or unwilling to place limits on corporate interests in the name of a larger public good. Overall, then, Hegel's idea that corporations would provide the mediating "ethical root" for the individual of civil society, and that they would find an appropriately subordinate place in the life of the nation as a whole, seems to have been naive. Before we assess the philosophical implications of this failure of actualization, however, we must see first whether the ultimate realization of this Notion in Hegel's idea of the State finds any greater actuality than does his corporation.

iii) the state: ethical idea rationally re-established, or spiritual self-consciousness regained

Hegel's State was to be the real transcendence of bourgeois individualism and the non-spiritual unity of civil society. As such, it was to be the full regaining of spiritual self-consciousness—the unity of subjective disposition with objectivity—after its separation and loss in the individualistic realm of civil society. In the idea of the State, the universal is no longer seen as an external necessity to be put up with for the sake of individual interests, but as an end in itself, where individual interests find their higher truth.

On the subjective side, this experience of the State as the ultimate end is experienced as "patriotism"—"assured conviction with truth as its basis...and a volition which has become habitual" (§268). The individual acts consciously and yet spontaneously, on a day-to-day basis, according to the rational ideals and principles of her community, and does not feel this to be in conflict with her own particular interests, but finds her own self realized thereby. Here the educative process by which the individual, in her finite embodiment, comes to
harmony with the higher end, is complete; she finds emotional satisfaction in the service of that end, and ceases to adhere from mere obligation.

On its objective side is the constitutional structure of the State, which is also the context within which patriotism is developed and sustained. Here individuals are mediated up to their higher unity through political representation of their corporate or class interest (the "Estates"), which then plays its part in articulation of the common good in the legislature. The true articulation of the "general will" is to be achieved in this corporate structure of the legislature, according to Hegel, which finds its formal moment of decision-making with the Crown, and is carried out by the Executive. Hence the whole, rational structure according to which the true substance of will is to be explicitly articulated and realized is laid out as an object for consciousness in the constitution.

But again, it turns out that we are dealing only with Hegel's idea here, an idea which does not find its actuality in history. On the contrary, it has been the system of representative democracy, which Hegel spurned as atomistic and abstract, treating individuals as "an unorganized aggregate" rather than in their real truth as members of groups (§304R), that has achieved historical vindication instead. And patriotism of the sort that Hegel envisioned is clearly not a widespread reality; individuals seem to have remained largely at the level of civil society, focused on their own particular interests as their real truth and reality. Hence Hegel's State, which was to be the final vindicating moment, the embodiment and fulfilment of all that went before, and thus the definitive establishment of the political community as the real truth and substance of the will has indeed failed to materialize.

The significance of this for the Notion of will is enormous. For the State, as the unity
of the emotion of patriotism and the convictions of individuals with the objective constitutional order, was to be the ultimate instantiation of the Notion of the will, the Absolute fully and rationally articulated in the finite world of human secular existence. It is in Hegel's idea of the State that individuals come rationally to recognize "their own substantive spirit" (§260), not in a partial or limited way, but in its full and ultimate truth. And thereby the earlier modes of existence of spirit, in family and civil society, are sustained in the truth, and find their ultimate vindication. For we must recall that the individual was implicitly driven on this journey towards reconciliation, and had the capacity to achieve it, because of the experience of love in the family. Love is the deeper truth which seeks to realize itself, to prove its truth to reflective rationality, and finds its ultimate satisfaction in the State, where the full experience of unity is once again achieved in the form of patriotism. Patriotism is rationally vindicated in that it is come to reflectively, according to Hegel, having behind it the whole ethical substance as experienced and articulated by the individual in her journey through civil society. Thus in patriotism we have the re-experiencing of the love of the family in a rationally explicated fashion, and it is here that love achieves its final vindication as a genuine knowledge of the Absolute.

With this achievement, the investigation here could finally reach its goal, the goal that has been driving it all along, to comprehend how a harmony between thought and existence could be achieved, how a reason which had alienated us from our own truth, which had divided and differentiated life, stripping it of all spiritual significance, could become a reason that recaptures the unity of life in its immanent differentiation, that illuminates the infinity in existence. Hegel's State thus had to be the end of the journey from which we began, the
point at which the antagonism between thought and existence is overcome in the life of the actual individual, and which needs Hegel's philosophy merely to vindicate its movement.

But if we never ultimately reach this end point, if individuals do not "pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal" (§260), what does it signify for the striving of reason, for the striving of will as Hegel understands it? On the one hand, the failure of the mediating institution of the corporation to be realized in the way that Hegel had envisioned, and hence individuals' inability to come to a full embracing of ethical institutions as rational, and to experience the accompanying emotional satisfaction in class consciousness and ultimately in patriotism, leaves the entire structure of the ethical realm, and the historical rights of property, conscience and so on that it embodies, in question. If modern ethical life has not materialised in such a way as to provide for the deeper spiritual needs of individuals, and if it does not satisfy them of its rationality, then the whole Notion of the will, the whole idea that individuals can develop and find their inner truth and harmony with the world in the secular life of the modern political community, threatens to break down. And the spiritual substance that is understood to be at the source of the movement, known in the form of love and conscience, is left wide open to the skeptical repudiation that we see realized with Marx.

On the other hand, one might suggest that the task simply remains undone, that the will has not yet fully worked out its truth in life, and that it is merely an issue of time and effort. Hegel's own political writings themselves provoke such a conclusion (Brudner 1976). And so does the fact that the institutions, as Hegel lays them out in the Philosophy of Right, clearly step over the boundary of the philosophical description of an embodied Absolute, into the forbidden territory of prescription. Hegel's model of the modern State was indeed that--a
model--but one which he optimistically presumed would be realized in the new Germany.

But those more historically informed may alert us to how much the reality of Germany so quickly departed from Hegel's ideal (Nicholson 1992, Wood 1990:13). And any more general optimism may well not be able to stand up in the face, not only of the ongoing failure of history to realize its supposed truth but, more seriously, to the horrors perpetrated in its stead. Historical hindsight thus may indeed cause us to look askance at Hegel's optimistic notion of the dawning of a new age, and may hasten us to abandon the whole Notion of the will as the self of a larger Absolute that realizes itself in the modern, secular community.

And yet, before we jump to this conclusion, Hegel himself must be allowed to speak on this issue. For in spite of his own optimism, there are to be found in certain moments of his latter writings the intimations of a lurking pessimism, a fear that the society in which he held so much hope could fail to realize its deeper possibilities. Thus before we pass our own judgements on the nature and significance of the failure considered above, it is necessary to examine Hegel's own assessments.
Chapter Four

“THOUGHT ATTACKS THE CONTENT OF GOD:”

Hegel on the Possibility of Failure of the Will
I have argued in Chapter three that the unfolding of the Philosophy of Right is the unfolding of the religious substance of conscience into the full light of day. At the end of chapter two, it was suggested that the two figures of conscience came into contact with the religious substance in their experience of reconciliation. But the experience of truth remained inaccessible to reflective consciousness looking on. For that thought to come to harmony with the substance of conscience, the substance had to be rationally objectified in secular existence, in laws and institutions. The whole movement of Philosophy of Right is the movement to realize this deeper substance in an objective, rational form.

I also argued that the logic of this movement is imbedded in the history of the will. For the fundamental rights to private property, to punishment, to self-determination, to welfare, and to freedom of conscience are realized in the experience of history, and preserved in modern ethical life, according to Hegel. Furthermore, the logical transition from "conscience" to the notion of "ethical life" presupposes as already in existence the ethical institutions that embody the substance of will, and which have been realized through the activities of generations of individuals. The individual born into these institutions confronts them as the truth of her own world, inherits them, works within them, and passes them on to the next generation.

Hegel, however, far from what Marxists so fondly assert, does not advocate the thoughtless embracing of mere custom in this transition to ethical life. For the institutions of ethical life—in the family, civil society and the state—contain their own self-vindicating rationality, which we have sought to examine. The institutions of ethical life, in their proven rationality, are the Absolute in secular, everyday existence. In Phenomenology, the
disciplinary movement of modern subjectivity through the course of history ended with the leap of forgiveness, the re-experiencing of the bond of love, but as an obscure and shadowy experience. But in modern ethical life, the individual encounters its deeper substance in a much more concretely articulated form, in custom, law and institution, and re-experiences its harmony with the larger whole in patriotism.

But as we have seen, the reconciliation that is to vindicate the ethical whole is only partially achieved, and for some not at all. Objectively, the corporation as a crucial mediating institution failed to develop in the form Hegel predicted. And class interests, particularly that of the working class, fail to find the kind of political representation he imagined. Correspondingly, individuals remain, at the subjective level, largely atomized and individualistic; there is little sense of an overarching whole to which one can commit oneself wholeheartedly, and find one’s unity with others. The radical doubt into which this failure of reconciliation casts Hegel’s Notion of the will has already been discussed at the end of the previous chapter. What we must address here is Hegel’s own answer to this historical failure.

"The Most Genuine Cultus"

In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel never seems to confront the possibility that the unfolding of the divine inner substance could fail, or be found incomplete. The process rather seems to be an inevitable one, a matter of the passage of time, the effort of will, and the crystallization of reason. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, however, he gives us a startling clue as to the possibility of failure.
In his discussion of the role of the "cultus" in the Lectures, Hegel has occasion to elaborate his argument about the function of ethical life in the realization of the Absolute at a subjective level. The "cultus," for Hegel is the instruction and set of practices by which the individual comes to experience God at the level of feeling, at the level of subjective particularity, so that she knows herself "as this individual included in and within God" (LPR 191/3:332). While individuals could achieve such contact with the divine through an experience like conscience, Hegel says that this is a reconciliation of the heart only; it is momentary—"a bare condition or single experience" (LPR 194/3:334). The same thing is true for the experience of the unio mystica, "the self-feeling of God, the feeling of God's immediate presence within the subject" (LPR 479/5:260), which he sees as the ultimate achievement of religious training and practice. Both are moments of transcendence in the individual's life, after which she lapses back into ordinary, mundane, secular existence. But in ethical life, this harmony with the Absolute becomes thoroughly elaborated in the process of the individual's life, so that the entirety of her being is elevated to the good and the true. One's particular, subjective personality, the passions and inclinations, which in conscience achieved a momentary, spontaneous harmony with the universal, in ethical life are disciplined and educated to achieve that harmony in a stable and predictable fashion. Ethical life is the experience of God in our everyday lives. It is because of this that Hegel says, "ethical life is the most genuine cultus" (LPR 194/3:334). It is the practices and training of ethical life that elevate us, in our subjective particularity, to God.

In the Encyclopedia, Hegel goes further, in saying: "Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think" (Enc.§552). One
does not achieve the genuine consciousness of the divine in oneself by participation in a religion which stands outside ethical life, but by participation in ethical life itself. One must be educated as part of a good state, in a truly ethical environment, to come to such a consciousness. The religious consciousness is what the ethical consciousness achieves by "retiring upon itself out of its empirical actuality," by stepping back from involvement in its everyday concerns, and reflecting on the fundamental core of those concerns. There, "in its faith and in its conscience" it finds not some otherworldly divinity, but "only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality," only its own commitment to the fundamental principles of its own ethical life. This ethical conscience, says Hegel, is the real religious consciousness, "the divine spirit as indwelling in self-consciousness," "the state retracted into its inner heart and substance" (Enc. §552).

Hegel has previously said that religion is at the foundation of the state (Enc. §482). We see here that it is also its ultimate product. In Hegel's "genuine religiosity," the "in-itself," the substance and true source of the will, becomes "for itself." No longer a momentary intuition, it has become elaborated in the fullness of secular existence, and in reflecting out of that existence the religious truth is most explicitly affirmed.45

This was indeed the idea behind the Philosophy of Right, the way in which Hegel

45 The developed state here corresponds to the stage of the "Absolute Idea" in the Logic, where Hegel provides a particularly illuminating illustration of the point at hand: the absolute Idea is to be compared with the old man who utters the same religious statements as the child, but for whom they carry the significance of his whole life. Even if the child understands the religious content, it still counts for him only as something outside of which lie the whole life and the whole world. (Logic §237A).
understood religious substance as coming to harmony with the reflectively rational will, to be preserved and vindicated not as a mere aspect of our existence, but as the foundation and vital truth of the whole. Furthermore, it is clear in *Philosophy of Right* that the superiority of ethical life over religion as cultic practice is not merely its more elaborated status. It is also that it incorporates the challenge of reflective rationality, the very rationality that Hegel, in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, had depicted as destroying religion (PS §541-581/293-316). Ethical life is meant to permit the individual to come rationally to a harmony with the laws and institutions wherein she finds her deepest truth, and thus to incorporate and preserve this truth in and through Enlightenment rationality. Ethical life, then, is also the place where modern, intellectual individuals who have become disaffected with positive religion will find their alternative spiritual existence.

But if we assume that this idea failed to reach its conclusion in life, that individuals failed to achieve the kind of reconciliation that Hegel had envisioned, then we must explore the question of what, from within Hegel's own perspective, might have gone wrong. And it is again in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* that we find our clue. For when Hegel asserts there that "ethical life is the most genuine cultus," he adds a significant caveat—"but consciousness of the divine must be bound up with it" (LPR 194/3:334 [my emphasis]). With this caveat Hegel opens up the startling possibility that, while ethical life is to be the crucial arena for cultic practice for the modern, reflective individual, those individuals could lose touch with the very consciousness that they are meant to cultivate, the religious consciousness of God at the level of feeling. How this could happen is a further question, and it is in a subsequent statement in LPR that we find the answer.
"Thought Attacks the Content of God"

The individual may indeed come rationally, through her experience, to be at home with the laws and institutions that constitute the objectification of her inner substance. But, Hegel says, in a discussion of the realization of religion: "[o]nce the laws of the state are known as universal laws, thought attacks the content of God too, requiring that it must stand the test of thought" (LPR III:374/5:289).\(^4\) I believe that this statement holds the key to Hegel’s own understanding of the possibility of failure, for in it he points to the danger that remains at the heart of his project with ethical life, and which informs his conviction of the importance of his own philosophy.

We know from the *Phenomenology* that the religious truth is the real source of the universality realized in law and ethical institutions. And while the will does indeed produce the truth of things for itself in its historical realization in the world, and come to understand it rationally, the substance and source of the will is at the same time something given to it. This was clear in the examination of conscience, where it came to its truth as an experience of grace. Thus the subject must never attack or repudiate that source, but must know and acknowledge that its content "is objective, having being in and for itself," that while on the one hand it produces the truth, on the other hand "it recognizes this truth as at the same time

\(^4\) The statement is from Strauss’s lectures notes from the 1831 lectures which, in fact, are regarded to have been a paraphrase, however accurate, of Hegel’s actual words (see Editors Intro., LPR I). Whether or not this is a direct quotation from Hegel, I believe it captures the spirit of his concern, as expressed in all three of the 1821, 1824, and 1827 lectures, about the need for the realization of religion in actual life, about the inevitable collision of thought with the content of religion, and the subsequent need of genuine philosophy to reconcile thought with religion (see LPR III, third parts of section C).
not produced, as the truth that subsists in and for itself" (LPR 487/5:267). In other words, it must recognize the otherness of the divine, the real source of its will, which cannot wholly be absorbed into universal law, without once again being lost.47

What this means at the level of individual experience is that the rational recognition of the truth of law must be informed and sustained by a kind of religious reverence or respect. Reflective thought can come to an abstract sort of understanding of the need for certain kinds of laws and institutions, of the universal principles these embody. But this is a lifeless understanding if it does not have an intuitive comprehension alongside it. Furthermore, in gaining its abstract understanding in the first place, abstract rationality is dependent on its concrete history. Through the lived experience of the actual individual of civil society, the reflective rationality that dominates in this realm comes gradually to see the universality of law. But it does so not in abstraction from life, but precisely in and with life, in and with the embodied self in all of its moral experience, as we saw in Hegel's depiction in Philosophy of Right. Thus the knowledge of universality is derived from concrete moral subjectivity and remains dependent upon it. And the "cult" of ethical life is meant precisely

47 Fackenheim sustains this point against left-wing Hegelians for whom, he suggests, "the secular aspect had so totally appropriated the religious ... as to produce the death of God and become itself divine--whether in the form of one particular actually existing order or in the form of an actually existing historical movement from one such order to another" (1970:221). For Hegel, he says, "the distinction between the "true" and the actually existing state remains, as does that between state and religion, even though their root is one .... [citing Hegel] "the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) of the state and religious spirituality are mutually warranting" (Enz., sect. 552, italics added); i.e. the state cannot be "ethical" if, appropriating the religious dimension, it becomes totalitarian" (1970:221). Thus Fackenheim speaks of a "creative diversity" in Hegel in the relationship between the state and divinity.
to bring these two kinds of knowledge—the religious and the rational—together in a mutually sustaining manner.

Nevertheless, reflective rationality by its very nature abstracts from its embodiment and expresses its conclusions in abstract terms. And this separation will inevitably entail, as Hegel suggests, that it will turn its gaze back upon its own self, upon its moral convictions, feeling and intuitions. For reflective thought is inherently restless, subject to the "bad infinite" that Hegel speaks of in the Logic. It takes its own categories as given, and seeks to conquer the realm beyond their boundaries to infinity. In this case, achieving its abstract universality, it seeks beyond this realm, turning back on its own concrete, moral understandings. It is this concrete subjectivity to which Hegel refers when he suggests that "thought attacks the content of God too," and it is reflective rationality that is the "thought" which does the attacking.

In separating abstract universal principles from intuitive moral knowing and feeling, reflective thought essentially separates the public and the private. Embodied moral knowing comes to be seen as private, as separate from rationality, and in being so regarded is inevitably reduced. For this reduction to "mere subjectivity" is the beginning of the dessication of that moral substance—of "the content of God." Reflective thinking chops conviction up, confuses and obscures it, questions and reduces it. It comes to be seen as mere opinion, as particular and contingent, as inessential.

Thus ironically, the very achievement of ethical life carries with it the possibility of its own self-destruction. The will in its self-realization, in seeking to realize and grasp its own substance in the transparent realm of secular existence, has the negatively infinite
tendency to turn on and attack its very own source. It turns its abstract, reductionist categories onto that source, and cannot do justice to it. It will deny any existence of a divine in life, will reduce anything it encounters to its own, limited framework. And the result of its immanent activity, its "bad infinite" allowed to run unchecked in ethical life, will be the eclipse of the very divine upon which it depends.

That Hegel viewed the consciousness of divinity as actually having been obliterated, or at least dissipated, in his time, is indicated in a number of places in his writings. In the 1821 Manuscript for his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, he speaks of "the so-called signs of the times," comparing the state of modern decadence to the period of the Roman Empire. Then, he said, when all religious truth came to be seen as a merely human projection, when "the universal unity based on religion had disappeared, along with a universal political life," people took refuge in their own private existence. So in our time, he says:

the quest for private welfare and enjoyment [is] the order of the day; moral insight, [the basis] of personal actions, opinions, and convictions, [is] without objective truth, and truth [is] the opposite. I acknowledge only what I believe subjectively....the teaching of the philosophers has corresponded....: we know and cognize nothing of God, [having] at best a dead and merely historical sort of information. (LPR III:159/5:95)

The flip side of this privatization and subjectivization can be seen in the character of the public realm. Hegel notes that while the principle of freedom has gained supremacy in places like France, it has done so only in an abstract manner, by opposing itself to the subjective knowledge of the truth, to conscience and disposition (PH 444-52/526-535; Enc. §552; LPR I: 457-60/5:344-347). Towards these the state is indifferent; they are put on one
side as something purely private. The only knowledge of universality that is seen to count is the universality of abstract individualism.

This tendency to relegate subjective knowing to the realm of the private, as if it were all mere opinion, and to assert abstract principles in the realm of the public, indicates the incapacity of a society that has become dominated by reflective rationality to grasp the deeper truth of the public order. Reflective thought has repudiated any more ultimate basis of existence than that which it can abstractly comprehend. Individuals are meant to understand and pay respect to the law not out of the deeper knowledge of conscience, but merely by consistently observing their abstract rationality.

And yet, as we saw in Hegel’s critique of Rousseau and of Kant in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the knowledge of abstract universality cannot produce anything positive by itself. It ultimately does rely on the concrete realm of particularity for its own articulation, and the positive expression of this is to be found in Hegel’s discussion of “ethical life.” But the particular is precisely what gets reduced and stripped of any spiritual meaning when reflective thought turns its gaze back upon it, and thus the knowledge of universality that has once been achieved, the concrete history out of which it has emerged, is lost. The whole authority of the public order is left to stand upon merely abstract assertions or dominant prejudices.\(^48\)

Furthermore, individuals cannot sustain their truth in something that is purely abstract

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\(^48\) This is evident in the difficulties being confronted by contemporary social contract theories. Rawls, for example, in face of communitarian criticisms of the liberal order as historically contingent, will now acknowledge that his whole idea rests on the widespread values and sentiments of Americans, and has no deeper authority beyond that.
and intellectual. They must know it at the level of the "determinate and particular"; they must feel it with their being. But reflective thought cannot vindicate this determinate knowing, precisely because it is particular. Hence it also cannot provide an adequate foundation from which to justify the cultivation of such knowing, the foundational principles of citizenship, and the institutions within which cultivation might take place. And if that aspect of individuals that is most their own, their personal feelings and intuitions, is not cultivated and recognized at the public level, then they will indeed express that self in the only way they know how—in "the quest for private welfare and enjoyment."

It is according to this analysis that we may understand Hegel's statement that "you cannot have a revolution without a reformation." It is the deeper, subjective knowledge of conscience that is essential to ethical life, but which is not recognized or vindicated by reflective rationality. The true ground of the state is lost to view with its relegation to the realm of the private, and the rule of abstract right sustains itself on an increasingly fragile basis. Thus it is that Hegel speaks of the division between conscience and the political realm as "the problem ... with which history is now occupied, and whose solution it has to work out in the future" (PH: 452/535), as "the monstrous blunder of our times" (Enc.§552), and as "the contradiction, and the prevalent unawareness of it ... [that] our age is suffering from" (LPR I:460/3:347).

In the Philosophy of Right Hegel never contemplates the possibility that individuals could become so alienated from the divine source of their will, that they could so diminish their inner convictions and truth. But in these other moments he confronts it head on, not just as a possibility, but as a present, existing reality. Furthermore, it is clear from Hegel's
diagnosis above that the alienation is a *product* of abstract, reflective thought. Thought *has* turned on God, not only in terms of the conflict between the Enlightenment and positive religion, but more significantly, because thought has become capable of repudiating its own subjectively experienced, moral understandings. In the confrontation within the self, between reflective rationality and the deeper substance of moral experience, reflective rationality may well have emerged as the tragic winner.\textsuperscript{49}

Thus against those who would assert that the unfolding of the Absolute in history is viewed by Hegel as an inevitable fact, what we see here is his own, nuanced comprehension of the tenuous and fragile nature of the project, of its real possibility for failure. In spite of his optimism, Hegel was dimly aware that the modern world might continue to stray onto the fatal course that he saw glimmering within it, the atrophy of moral conscience in the face of its relegation to the private realm of opinion. Such a condition would not only leave individuals to find their way in an atomistic individualism, but might furthermore explain their susceptibility to demagogic figures who could fill the vacuum of conscience and satisfy

\textsuperscript{49} It is possible to construe Hegel in a more conservative fashion as locating the loss of religious knowing ultimately in the loss of positive religion (see LPR III:160-161/5:96). From such a perspective, with the demise of religion there is no way to retrieve any spiritual meaning in existence. This may indeed have been Hegel's feeling, in the famous expression of despair in the 1821 Manuscript (LPR III:161-2/5:96-97). But it remains inconsistent with his whole idea of ethical life as a way of preserving spirituality in and through reflective rationality. Furthermore, his idea that philosophers might remain keepers of the truth while "common people" are left to themselves is by its own admission only "partial" (*ibid.*). For philosophers *themselves* require a cultic life; philosophy cannot perform the function of elevating subjective feeling to the Absolute. It merely keeps the truth conceptually. Life itself must furnish the filling of that truth. See also Jaeschke (1981), who argues against a reliance on the 1821 Manuscripts on the grounds that Hegel's thought on the relationship between religion and the state underwent subsequent development.
the communal longing, in no matter how dangerous a fashion. The events of the twentieth century may indeed constitute the realization of some of the worst fears that lay latent in Hegel's diagnosis.

Hegel's own answer to the colonizing and destructive tendency of reflective rationality is his philosophy of the Notion. For Notional philosophy, particularly as we have examined it in the *Philosophy of Right*, reveals how reflective rationality is immanently driven beyond the abstract category of will with which it begins, ultimately towards the notion of ethical life as the unity of subjective conscience with the objective realm. Notional philosophy thus reveals how the separation of the abstract universal from the finite particular, of the subjective from the objective, the private from the public, is immanently overcome. And the truth of this unified realm, the realm of ethical life, is to be found not merely in abstract principles, not in a philosophy abstracted from life, but in the developing rational experience of actual individuals as they exist in and move through ethical institutions. Hegel's philosophy of ethical life is a reflection of this whole process, a logical capturing of its movement. And the final subjective harmonization with the objective realm in its proven rationality, in the State, is what ultimately vindicates the concept of ethical life, thus preventing reflective rationality from turning on the unity that is represented therein, from separating once again the universal principles of the objective order from the subjective knowing of conscience, and thereby "attacking the content of God."

The cold march of necessity that we examined in the *Philosophy of Right* is an attempt to demonstrate the eternal truth of law and the subjective knowing that lies at its basis, to show conviction and the truth it objectifies in law as something not merely made
by human hands, but as embodying "the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness" (Enc.§552). The notion of ethical life, as the unity of conscience and law, can halt the bad infinity of reflective thought, can prevent its abstract divisiveness, its skepticism and reductionism. And in doing so it can help teach us to listen and to heed the call of our conscience, even as we remain aware of our own fallibility. Thus does Hegel's philosophy seek not to replace, but to preserve the truth of subjective religiosity—the real "witness of the spirit."

And yet, as we have seen, Hegel's philosophy of the Notion failed to achieve the proof to which it aspired. In this chapter we have examined what I think would have been his own explanation of the failure—the problem of the alienation of modern consciousness from its own experience of the divine, the eclipse of the divine within due to the disintegrating effects of an omnivorous, reflective rationality. But this very eclipse signifies that the practical condition of the vindication of the philosophy—the subjective achievement of harmony with an objective, rational realm—has not arrived.

Ironically, this very explanation itself means that subjective harmony becomes ever less likely to arrive. For without vindication at the level of life, Hegel's philosophy itself can be repudiated as speculative nonsense. Thus reflective thought will not only refuse to be silenced by such philosophy, it will continue to "attack the content of God," progressively obscuring its substance, slicing away at its source, cutting itself off from its truth, and—in the end—creating its own solitary wasteland.
Chapter Five

CONCLUSIONS:

The Notion of Will and the Task of Philosophy Today
Hegel's Notion of the will, of a divine that realizes itself through the will in secular life, forms the core of his understanding of the project of modernity. This divine is the ultimate source of the family, the institutions of civil society, and the state. It lies at the basis of the possibility of any genuine solidarity among citizens, and of the moral principles that bind the state together in a way that makes it more than a contract of mutual self-interest, more than a tenuous Hobbesian covenant of peace. With this concept of the divine, then, rooted originally in the vision of Holderlin and understood to be experienced by moderns most primally in love, Hegel offers us his own conception of the ontological basis of the Rousseauian general will. It is this ontology, and his systematic working through of how it is to be realized in modernity by modern individuals, of how love and the will are to be reconciled, that forms the legacy of Hegel's project. And it is his Notion of the will that embodies his final answer to this question, and that we saw being worked out in *Philosophy of Right*.

But the Notion of will was never fully realized in life, as the modern state that was to be the full instantiation and vindication of this Notion failed to materialize in the way that Hegel had envisioned. And this failure throws the entire concept into radical question. But in spite of his own confrontation with the possibility of the failure of the Notion of will to realize itself in life, Hegel himself never came to question that Notion itself, never came to doubt its fundamental premise. Indeed, he could not doubt it without doubting his entire philosophical vision, that which he had pursued since the beginning of his collaboration with Schelling in 1800. Instead, as we examined in chapter four, he saw the eclipse of the divine by a reflective rationality run unchecked to be the real source of the failure, and the principal
problem confronting our times.

Others, however, saw Hegel's philosophical Notion of the will as itself linked to the problem of the absence of unity and meaning in contemporary existence. Marx, on the one hand, while he saw the human will and reflective rationality as the mode of realization of the truth of existence, repudiated the Hegelian notion of substance, of a religious essence working its way out through that will. Indeed, it was the Hegelian Absolute, and all previous forms of religion, that he saw as preventing the oppressed proletariat from clearly seeing the rational pathway forward, towards the revolutionary transformation of the prevailing system of production. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, while he sustained the idea of a religious foundation of the self, rejected the idea that we could attain unity with that source, or the realization of it in our lives, through the mediation of reflective rationality and the will. Like the early Hegel, he saw reflective reason as that which separated us from God. But he regards Hegel's speculative philosophy as merely another attempt to obscure and pass over the real, existential dilemma of the divided individual. Historically, then, these two thinkers constitute the splitting up once again of the two principles that Hegel had sought to bring together in his Notion of will—that of substance and subject, of the divine and human activity. Each repudiated a fundamental aspect of this Notion as the path towards a unified and truthful existence. Kierkegaard in turning away from reflective reason and the will, and Marx in rejecting religious substance.

But neither pathway represents a philosophical necessity. Indeed, we have already seen that Hegel himself points us in a different direction, towards the problem of eclipse, and the need to transcend the reflective rationality that is the cause of it. From Hegel's
perspective, then, these two thinkers do not so much represent alternative philosophical pathways, either of which might take us towards a solution to the problem that he articulates, so much as they are *symptomatic* of the problem itself. We can see this in Kierkegaard’s *Either/Or*, which is a meticulous working through of the Hegelian notion of ethical life, of a divine that is lived in and through the ethical, only to conclude, in the end, the ultimate emptiness of its meaning for the existing individual who cannot find faith (1944:274ff.). If there ever was a divine in ethical life, for Kierkegaard at least, it has fled. And the only pathway back to it he sees is the solitary, searching struggle for genuine faith that is the legacy of his project. In Marx, on the other hand, we see a grappling with the eclipse of the divine in his confrontation with the logic of an industrial rationality run rampant, cut loose from any deeper social concerns. In the face of this concrete reality, however, and the obvious misery associated with it, Marx could not see the problem as a question of ethics, or an obscuring of moral substance. Rather he could only repudiate the Hegelian notion that any mediation towards a genuine universal could be achieved in the atomistic realm of civil society, and called instead for a radical restructuring of social relations.

We may understand the directions of both these thinkers, then, as a confrontation with and response to the eclipse of the divine in life, and as a rejection of what they saw as Hegel’s conservative approach. But neither of them is philosophically necessary. The

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50 Neither Marx nor Kierkegaard recognized Hegel’s own concerns with the failure of integration and unity. Rather both saw him as falsely asserting a philosophic unity at the expense of the existing individual. Hence their explicit relationship to him was largely polemical in nature.

51 Fackenheim, on the contrary, regards the historical failure of Hegel’s Notion of the will as
real problem with each, however, and the reason why neither constitute a tenable pathway forward, lies in the philosophical and ethical dilemmas that they encounter, dilemmas which, furthermore, are directly tied to their respective departures from Hegel's Notion of the will.

*Kierkegaard: faith beyond reason*

In an age and a subjectivity where God had become absent, Kierkegaard sought a different approach to faith, in the realm beyond rationality, in an individual encounter with God beyond anything reason could ever comprehend. Perhaps in face of Hegel's apparent failure in locating a harmonization of faith and reflective rationality in the realm of ethical life, he gives up on the idea that rationality could be harmonized with faith at all, and sees faith as the other of reason. In this sense Kierkegaard, long before the current fashionable appreciation of the limitations of reflective reason, sought to address the problem of the eclipse of God in life by stepping forth in a new direction, not by accommodating reflective reason and seeking to transcend it in a higher, speculative standpoint, but by *stopping* it.

Kierkegaard repudiates the notion that Hegel's philosophy constitutes a higher standpoint than reflective rationality (1993). Instead, like Marx, he interprets Hegel as achieving reconciliation merely through philosophical fiat, leaving the realm of life and the

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the definitive sign of its untenability, and sees Kierkegaard and Marx as the philosophical reflections of this, of the *necessity* that the unity of God and human willing fall apart once again (1968, 1994).
struggling individual behind. While this may be seen as a misreading of Hegel, it is his rejection of speculative philosophy as a genuine way of dealing with the problems of reflective rationality that stands at the root of his alternative philosophical direction.

For Kierkegaard, reason can and must be halted in order to achieve and sustain faith, and it is in and through faith that this can be achieved. Kierkegaard was not an irrationalist, who sought to go back to pre-enlightenment faith; rather he thought that modern rationality, in its own striving, inherently reaches its limits, and it is only then that it borders on the religious truth. This religious truth is the absolute paradox, the paradox of the god-man, the immediate unity between the finite and infinite (1964:ch.III). This paradoxical relationship reason cannot comprehend; it is the very downfall of reason, and it is only in and through this downfall that the qualitative leap into belief is achieved (1964:ch.III). The leap can never be rendered comprehensible to reason; it can never retrospectively be subsumed into a philosophical system, wherein the intrinsic necessity of the movement might be revealed. Rather it will always be the "absolute paradox," the direct connection between the individual and God, that must be known at the subjective level in order to be known at all. It is an inner, subjective experience of unity which is the true vindication of the Absolute, and no system of rationality can have access to it. "[O]nly the truth which edifies is truth for you"; this is the persistent theme of Kierkegaard's epistemology (1944:294).

Kierkegaard's faith is thus on the other side of modern rationality. Reason is quieted

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52 It is based on Kierkegaard's failure to see the importance in Hegel of the movement of faith at the level of particularity, the latter's concern with cultic practice, and the reliance of the philosophical movement of reconciliation upon that movement already happening in life.
forever in the encounter with the incomprehensible paradox of the god-man. And it is quieted because it yields to that higher reality; only then is "the understanding consummated in that happy passion ... [and] when I am but happy, I ask for no more" (1964:67). Thus is established a permanent equilibrium between reason and faith, and a permanent transformation of the self.

The fact that reflective rationality has no access to faith means that the realm of reflective rationality—civil society—is not the place to achieve faith, for Kierkegaard. Indeed, the discussion of the "knight of resignation" in Fear and Trembling, and as a mirror of Kierkegaard's own life, suggests that abstaining from ethical existence is a necessary preparation for the achievement of faith. While Hegel saw the public realm as one where, through participation, individuals could come gradually to a rational unity based on the seed of love they already carried within them, Kierkegaard in his own life sought the movement of faith in solitude and religious contemplation. Kierkegaard's psychological writings—Sickness Unto Death and The Concept of Dread, and his discussion of reason's encounter with the "absolute paradox" in Philosophical Fragments—are meant to take one through the psychological movements that lead up to the brink of faith, even as they cannot go beyond. And the portrayal of Abraham as the father of faith in Fear and Trembling is meant to humble and astonish the one who stands outside the experience. All of Kierkegaard's later works are works of religious edification, sermons meant to prepare the soul of the individual for the gift of grace.

If individuals do achieve the movement of faith, it is then that they can go into ethical life and achieve an equilibrium and serenity in this realm of reflective rationality. The image
of the tax collector as the "knight of faith" in *Fear and Trembling* is of one who participates in civil society, at peace with himself and the world around him. The crucial factor is that, in doing so, he remains perfectly at home in the world; he manages to realize the truth of faith—"absolutely to express the sublime in the pedestrian" (1968:52).

But because the knowledge of faith is experienced subjectively, and is outside of and higher than ethical life, it is always potentially disruptive and ultimately incommunicable. The picture of Abraham is of one who was able to follow the higher truth known only to him individually, and who had the courage to repudiate all ethical duties in the name of that higher, ultimate truth. By ethical standards Abraham would have been a murderer, but for Kierkegaard he was the true father of faith. Hegel also raised up as heroes certain individuals who acted according to their own conscience in the name of something higher, and against the world around them. But while for Hegel such an individual pushes the existing ethical order towards a more just condition, and thus presupposes that the action is ultimately comprehensible to those around the individual, for Kierkegaard no-one will ever understand Abraham. The truth he achieved, the genuineness of his encounter with God, is not to be vindicated in secular life. It will remain a solitary knowledge. This also means that it will not become the foundation for ethical life, will not infuse ethical life with its truth, will not be enshrined as law.

For Hegel the kind of encounter that Abraham had, which is expressed as a particular moral action, must—eventually—become recognized and actualized in ethical life. It must be intuitively communicable to others. And it is communicable ultimately because it is rooted in the common experience of love. Modern individuals have the possibility to renew that
knowledge, to achieve the movement of communication in their adult life, in the midst of the divisiveness of civil society. This experience of moral unity is the basis for building or improving the ethical life, for developing the context within which individuals will develop and act. And with the building up of the truth of faith into the secular world, into ethical institutions, is developed the context that will nourish and sustain the moral conscience of the individuals of a society. Thus the original moral insight becomes elaborated in the ethical life of the community.

But for Kierkegaard, it seems that even in a developed political community any achievement of higher conscience is achieved outside ethical life. It is always unsituated, and receives no sustenance from its ethical context. Because of this separation, the tension between faith and the ethical, which is also present in Hegel, in Kierkegaard has no foreseeable resolution. The ethical will never become the full embodiment of the substance of faith; the former will always be a finite, fully human creation, and faith will stand outside it.

This disruptive potential in faith, its ultimate and ongoing independence from ethical life, is at the heart of his difference from Hegel. And it is when the philosophical foundation for this difference in the two thinkers is explored, that Kierkegaard's direction shows itself to be a troubling one.

For Hegel, the knowledge that the individual comes to in the experience of faith is the knowledge of love. It is a memory of the primordial unity of "life," a coming back to a
truth that already exists primitively within us (SC).\textsuperscript{53} Love is the way by which the modern subject can experience this unity, in contradistinction to earlier forms of subjectivity which had never become separated from the knowledge, but found it immediately in their relationship with the world around them.\textsuperscript{54} Hence for Hegel love is not a new knowledge, but an ancient one. And Christ as the embodiment of this knowledge is the maieutic teacher who inspires the remembrance, in the modern subject, of this ancient knowledge.\textsuperscript{55}

But Kierkegaard, by his own description, seeks to define the knowledge of faith as the entry into the world of a truth that did not previously exist—the Christian truth. Thereby the role of the teacher is not that of "merely seconding and assisting, but is creative, giving a new being to the learner" (1962:38). Thus with Christ a new knowledge and a new way of being is "begotten." And it is precisely the content of that faith, as a new and absolute knowledge that the individual encounters from outside, that renders it so problematic. For the notion that Christ was an actual figure, embodying the paradox of the god-man, given by God for the first time in history, sets up a fundamental separation between those who come to receive this knowledge and those who do not. It sets up a separation between Christians and non-Christians. All previous knowledge and faiths fall short of this absolute

\textsuperscript{53}Even though Hegel expresses this view of love most clearly in his "early theological writing"—"The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," he never departed from it with his mature work. Rather what he did was to reconceive the relationship of reason to love.

\textsuperscript{54}Hegel saw the Greeks in this light.

\textsuperscript{55} It is Kierkegaard who analyses Hegel as subscribing to the Platonic doctrine of remembrance (1962). This may be one of the only places where what he says about Hegel is actually right.
knowledge, this ultimate belief in Christ as Kierkegaard represents him. Hence Kierkegaard's insistence that the man of faith might be known partly by his non-sectarian behaviour (1968:90), is belied by the intrinsically sectarian nature of the knowledge such a man possesses.56

Placing God beyond the realm of secular existence and reflective rationality was the way that Kierkegaard sought to deal with the eclipse of God by rationality. But as we have seen, his approach entails that God can be experienced only in a solitary and subjective way, and cannot then truly be integrated with the realm of secularity and reflective rationality. Such a direction does indeed address the problem of the inherent reductiveness of reflective rationality, preserving a higher truth beyond that realm. But the fact that this religious knowledge, once attained (if it can be attained), can never be communicated, ultimately renders it a sectarian knowledge. The elite who might achieve it will not be able to transfer it to others, to be understood by others, or to have their knowledge vindicated in the world.

56Fackenheim (1994:123) makes the same point with regard to the ahistorical nature of the knowledge of faith: "if faith is not of history, and is in history only in the form of isolated 'knights of faith,' then the truth of faith is one and absolute or not at all." Fackenheim himself, however, continues to pursue a Kierkegaardian path in the sense that, in his own thinking, he gives a central place to the notion of faith as "immediacy after reflection," while at the same time trying to avoid the dangerous isolation of the knight of faith (1973:ch.2). But his modification of the Kierkegaardian pathway of faith nevertheless encounters similar problems, in the sense that his faith also ultimately remains beyond the questioning of reason, and thus sectarian. This is most evident in his response to Gregory Baum's moral objection to the notion of the "Jewish return to Jerusalem" (1992). Fackenheim sees the Jewish return to Jerusalem as rooted in an essentially religious inspiration (see 1994:328). And instead of addressing Baum's concern on this issue, which is undoubtedly centred on the Palestinian question, he responds by appealing to an emotional astonishment over the Jewish return that puts reason in its place (1992:289). Such "astonishment" is the core of Fackenheim's Kierkegaardianism, and illustrates just as does an investigation into Kierkegaard's 'knight of faith,' the inherently problematic nature of an appeal to a faith beyond reason.
around them. Such knowledge will never become a basis for a more just society, but will remain the privilege of an order of priests who, while they might participate in ethical life, nevertheless remain fundamentally untouched by it and thus superior to those who must bear its burdens.

**Marx: the anthropomorphization of the Absolute**

Marx, in taking up the other pole of Hegel's Notion of will--reflective rationality and human secular activity--and repudiating the religious source of the will, encounters an ethical and philosophical difficulty of a different sort. And this difficulty lies in the relationship to nature that his merely human Absolute establishes.

In breaking from Hegel on the question of the Absolute, Marx breaks from the idea of an Absolute that transcends the human and is embodied also in nature. For Hegel, human self-striving is merely the self-conscious, creative articulation of what already lies implicit in nature. It is a mirroring of nature in its self-conscious form. The world of nature informs the human creative process; it is the substance that gives itself up to the human will, not to be stamped by the latter's abstract powers, but to have borne out freely, in self-conscious and explicit form, what already lies implicit within it. Hence Hegel's Absolute is prior to and transcendent of the human, not in the sense of constituting an otherworldly being, but in the sense that it is a larger truth in which humans play a particular role. It is precisely this idea of an Absolute in nature that subsequently gets attacked by the left Hegelians, culminating in Marx's charge of "pantheistic mysticism." Nature, and human nature as well, is to be regarded from the "scientific" perspective of *The German Ideology*. Here, "substance" is not
a larger, *a priori* truth which merely gets articulated in a self-conscious and objective form by the human will. On the contrary, it is described as deriving from the history of productive relations:

This sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse, which every individual and generation finds in existence as something given, is the real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as "substance" and "essence of man" (1978:165).

We see here that Marx abandons the *a priori* status of substance, and regards it as a purely human creation, developed by the human will in its collective, productive strivings with the available material at hand. Substance is to be *made*, not found, *created*, not born. For Hegel also the Absolute is expressed in and through history, and thus its manifestation will depend at any one point on the material conditions constituting the historical moment. But in him, unlike in Marx, the activity is really a manifestation of something larger and is implicitly guided by that larger Absolute. Marx skeptically whittles this Absolute away until it becomes, not something larger than humans, but the human productive drive itself.

In spite of his polemical, "scientific" standpoint against the German Idealists, then, Marx himself remains with an Absolute, albeit one that has been reduced to the merely human. This is evident in his assertion that:

*mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part (1978:150).*

It is the mode of production, the human relationship to nature at any one stage of history, that is the defining quality, the spiritual element of existence for humans. This is the core of Marx's humanism, which relies fundamentally on a truncated version of Hegel's Absolute.
We get a deeper philosophical comprehension of Marx’s human Absolute as expressed in the *German Ideology* by turning back to his earlier *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. For it is here that he more clearly articulates why mode of production is so peculiarly human, why it constitutes the essence of humanity. Here, Marx speaks explicitly of the human “species-character,” of “the universality of man,” of “free, conscious activity.” For Marx, this species character is that in humans which is *over against* nature. Humans are creatures of nature in the scientific sense. Subjectively, they have impulses, natural powers and capacities. Objectively, they are situated in a world of things which cause them desire and suffering. But beyond this natural condition, they have a peculiarly human quality in that they are self-conscious. While animals are completely immersed in their life-activity, humans take that activity as the object of their thought (1978:76). And it is this consciousness that fundamentally constitutes the species-character of humans, that distinguishes them from animals. For humans, in expressing their impulses, in suffering and seeking to overcome their suffering, do so in light of their species-character, their self-consciousness. Imbedded in their drive to self-preservation, then, is also a drive to know themselves, to know their inner powers as an object of their consciousness. Hence they must make those powers into an object, by transforming the world around them to be a sign of that power.

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57 The reliance here on Marx’s early *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* is based on the conviction that there is a real continuity between this work and that which comes later, including *The German Ideology*. This analysis may be sustained by the whole stream of thinking in the English-speaking world that has gone into trying to prove such a continuity, such as Fromm (1966), Kamenka (1972), and Tucker (1972).
This is how we may understand Marx's statement in *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* that, for the human, neither her own subjective, internal capacities, nor the external world of sensuous existence, exists in an "adequate" form (1978:116). Neither is adequate in terms of the human quality of being for self. The world is not yet made over into a humanized object. And our inner powers have not yet developed and expressed themselves. This "inadequacy" is experienced in humans as "passion," the passion and need to manifest their essential powers, to transform the world, and thus to find themselves in it (*ibid.*). This is the act of the coming-to-be of the human species-character, the act of history. History is the history of "productive life," the expression of the "essential power," the "essential being" of humans. And because this activity emerges both from their "natural" being, as corporeal, sensuous, and passionate, and from their "human" being, as self-conscious, Marx says: "history is the true natural history of man" (1978:116-17).

Marx's "humanism," then, is an anthropomorphic reduction of the Absolute, which comprehends the development of our natural, given powers and capacities in terms of the human quality of self-consciousness. The drive of the *human* being becomes the drive to realize herself, her natural powers, in terms of her species-character, the drive to know herself objectively in the world. Whereas for Hegel the will to knowledge is part of the will to knowledge of a deeper substance, and the human drive is to be comprehended in terms of this substance, for Marx the will to knowledge becomes a peculiarly human trait, grounded merely in the *fact* of being-for-self, the *fact* of self-consciousness, which he takes as given. And it is this human characteristic that must be realized—the human must *come to be*
human.\footnote{This interpretation of Marx would seem to be supported by John Toews' (1993) analysis of "Hegelianism," where he suggests that Marx ends up relating finite human existence to "supra-individual structures and powers." Toews suggests that in doing so, Marx lost the earlier attempts of Young Hegelians to get away from any reliance on a transcendental subjectivity and to conceive a purely finite immanentism as a basis for liberatory expression. The implication is that the efforts of individuals such as Bauer, Feuerbach and Stirner to articulate an "analytic of existence" that truly relies on the finite, contingent human individual may escape the criticisms of Marx made here.}

But it is precisely here, in this departure from Hegel's ontology, that we encounter the ethical dilemma with Marx's pathway. For it is because the substance that is to be realized in Marx's humanism is restricted to human powers, and because these powers must be realized \textit{externally}, over against the individual, in order that consciousness of one's "humanity" may be attained, that nature takes on the status that it does in Marx. Nature is described, in the \textit{Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts}, as the human's "\textit{inorganic} body" (75), as "the material of labour" (85). It is merely, for this human, the dead material to be worked "up", the realm in which one objectifies oneself, the means to one's own self-realization. Marx indeed confesses that these are the two premises with which we begin--"man as the subject," and nature as "the material of labour" (85). This "material," this "inorganic body," only becomes alive and meaningful when it is worked over by humans, only when nature "becomes man." \textit{Then} it can take on a more positive meaning as "the life-element of the human world," "\textit{the foundation} of his human existence" (85). While Marx does object to using nature merely as a means to human physical existence, a means merely to the meeting of physical need, his objection here is based on the idea that that would reduce humans to the level of mere nature, not because nature itself might thereby be violated
(1978:77). Truly human activity is rather when the individual "produces even when he is free from physical need" (76). If human beings, then, are defined in their most spiritual essence in terms of the quality of self-consciousness, then the whole of the material world, the whole of nature, becomes separated off as the "other" of that self-consciousness, and is regarded as devoid of spiritual worth except insofar as it becomes the place wherein "human" self-objectification occurs.

And yet, Marx is not advocating a utilitarian relationship to nature. He criticizes the notion of "possessing," or "having" the world, as being tied fundamentally to the world of private property and its consumptive mentality, as poverty-stricken and one-dimensional (1978:89-90). In fact, through human self-alienation in the world, the ultimate goal is to transcend the utilitarian relationship, to relate to the world humanly, with all of one's sense—in "seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, being aware, sensing, wanting, acting, and loving" (87). There is an idea of cultivation of the senses here, whereby one does not have to possess something in order to be in a true relationship with it. On the contrary, the human relationship to the world is an active, productive relationship, where the individual experiences her own connection to the object through the act of transforming it, of bringing it into being as a human object, and experiences her own humanity by the full development of her own powers to relate to that object in its cultivated sense. It is this relationship to the object that constitutes the ultimate state, the ultimate realization of the human species-being.

59 Here we see clearly the parallel with the statement in the German Ideology that mode of production "must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals," but as "a definite form of expressing their life" (1978:150).
This is "the consummated oneness in substance of man and nature ... the naturalism of man and the humanism of nature brought to fulfilment" (85).

The achievement of this fully human relationship to the world, however, entails that we have first gone through the stage of relations of private property, with its contradictions, its exploitation of the working class, and its dominating, instrumental relationship to nature. As Marx says: "The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in order that he might yield his inner wealth to the outer world" (87). Industry, as the mode of production tied to capitalist relations of private property, is the objective expression--the "exoteric revelation"--of humanity's essential powers, albeit in an estranged fashion (90). For it is industrial production, with its enormous productive capacities, its extension of the division of labour to produce a fully social, interdependent condition, that can achieve the full humanization of the objective world, the total overcoming of the otherness of nature, so that it is "everywhere for man in society the world of man's essential powers" (88).

For Marx, the final overcoming of the alienation from our own nature, the re-enchantment with the objective world that has been made over in our own image, is to happen in and through reflective rationality and the human will. While Hegel had sought outside or beyond reflective reasoning for a basis of resistance and for a vision of an alternative--in conscience, religion, art, and speculative philosophy--Marx remains within it. For it is in the embodiment of reason and human power objectively in the system of production, and subjectively in the self-consciousness of the working class, that he sees the basis of transformation. Capitalism does achieve the development and extension of human productive power. But as a system, it ultimately reaches its own limit and becomes
irrational. The social condition of the mode of production is ultimately at odds with the private ownership of the means of production. And the working class is the class that both feels the misery of this contradiction and is most capable of seeing its irrationality. Thus it will be the agent of revolutionary change, towards establishing a communist society that will overcome its estrangement from the objects of its labour and the one-sided and impoverished relation to the object that characterizes this estrangement.

But Marx is very unclear about how communism will facilitate such a re-enchantment with the world, and his mature writings explicitly shy away from such speculative analyses to rely instead on the more scientific basis of existing material contradictions. The real reason for this ambiguity in his thought, however, may be found in the ontology with which he begins. For with human self-consciousness as the defining spiritual reality, there is in nature no deeper substance than what is humanly made, no hidden essence that constrains and directs the human activity. Hence nothing can be clearly envisioned outside of the prevailing historical mode of production. While the working class in this condition might theoretically be supposed to gain insight into the truly social character of the mode of production, it remains unclear how the recognition of this social reality necessarily entails the overcoming of the instrumental relationship to nature that characterizes the industrial mode of production.

Marx's mature thought provides a basis, in scientific rationality, from which to criticize the injustices of capitalism and the irrationalities that result from its development. But because the edifice of his thought rests ultimately on the human quality of self-consciousness, it remains committed to the technological powers that have developed as the
objective expression of that self-consciousness. Hence it provides no place from which to criticize a technology that runs rampant, and practices of production that show no respect for nature.

This difficulty in Marx's thought has become manifest with the historical failure of revolutionary communism and the doubts and disillusionment that have grown up around the modern subject in its instrumental relationship to nature. In particular, the deeply pessimistic analysis of Horkheimer and Adorno in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is a powerful expression of this limitation in Marx's thought. For it is Marx's ontology that forms the philosophical underpinnings of the analysis in this work, and thus which lies at the root of the pessimism to which they come.

When Horkheimer and Adorno wrote *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the critical basis upon which Marx had founded his mature system—the contradiction between the forces and relations of production—had become contained. Informed by Pollock's analysis of the entrenchment of state capitalism, Horkheimer and Adorno see the modern condition as one where all significant sectors of the population have been integrated, and no revolutionary force exists (Jay 1984, Postone and Brick 1993). Without this force as the material basis of critique, to be realized in revolutionary action, the human subject, which under capitalism has developed into a fully instrumental relationship to nature, can now run amok, unthwarted. This is the precisely the story they portray.

In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the single constant, which develops itself historically, progressively purifying itself of content along the way, is the abstractly rational subject. All content, both within in terms of human nature, and all nature without, becomes sharply
divided off, and construed according to the homogenizing, dominating categories of this subject. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, nothing on the other side of this subject, whether it be nature or metaphysics, will be able to withstand its colonizing tendency. Even ideas like freedom and dignity become construed as metaphysics and myth; the rational subject is incapable of comprehending them in any other way. And since its inherent nature is to do away with myth, to demystify, to render transparent and comprehensible all that had previously filled humans with terror and awe, even the apparently secular notions underpinning liberalism become "exposed" as mere superstition. Hence, conclude Horkheimer and Adorno, the Enlightenment is fundamentally self-destructive; it destroys the very foundations of the freedom that it set out to win. And all that is left to replace it is the value of self-preservation, measured purely in quantitative terms.

While such an analysis represents an extended consideration of the dynamic that Hegel had already observed in the Enlightenment (PS sects. 538-581), the fear of which lay at the heart of his own moments of pessimism, in Hegel we have the knowledge of the Absolute as something that resists and renders subordinate the instrumental rationality of the Enlightenment, that remains always present within us, and that achieves its conscious expression in life through conscience, love, the practices of ethical life, religious worship, and art. And while for Hegel there remains the possibility that modern, intellectual individuals can lose contact with the consciousness of the divine in themselves, that divine itself can never be destroyed; there is always the possibility of renewing it in our lives. In Marx, however, it is not clear what can resist instrumental reason. For that reason, and the activity of willing tied to it, is the very mode of human self-realization, the mode whereby
we demonstrate our human powers to ourselves in the objective world. There is not clearly any kind of knowing outside of it, any substance beyond what the will constructs for itself historically. The only thing that can transform the alienation that is the product of this reasoning in its development in capitalist society is an internal contradiction within this reasoning itself, between the social character of the forces of production and the private ownership of the means of production.

As they see the material contradiction that could have changed the situation become largely contained and obscured under modern state capitalism, Horkheimer and Adorno can only come to a pessimistic conclusion about the fate of the modern subject, now dominated by its instrumental relationship to nature. While in Marx's communist ideal they had a vision of a totally different way of being, they can now see no hope for the transformation that was to bring that ideal into reality. Their Marxist ontology offers them little to contain this pessimism. With no notion of an inner moral substance, they can see little basis for resistance to the powerful dynamic of control into which the subject has hurtled itself. Both exhibit a much greater sensitivity to nature than Marx, but both remain trapped by their attachment to Marx's ontology of the human will.

Horkheimer's subsequent attempt to carry on the project of critique continues to be marked by this difficulty, and further illustrates the dilemma with the Marxist ontology. In *Eclipse of Reason*, he attempts to salvage the notion of a "voice of Nature" as that which resists, which expresses a protest against the rampant drive of instrumental reason. This expression may be seen, he argues, in the older ideals of reason that characterize philosophical thought from the Greeks through to Kant and Hegel:
Distorted though the great ideals of civilization—justice, equality, freedom—may be, they are nature’s protestations against her plight, the only formulated testimonies we possess. (1974:182)

Thus while Horkheimer follows Marx in rejecting the notion that these ideas could be free from the historical conditions under which they were articulated, they nevertheless do contain a relative truth, according to him. “Nature’s protestations” as expressed in these ideals are rooted, for Horkheimer, in the experience of suffering. The drive of instrumental reason, because it is geared towards greater and greater productivity for its own sake, and requires more and more repression and loss of control by individuals who must fit themselves into such a system, has failed to issue in the realization of human happiness. Thus latent in this system remains the injustice and suffering that has been repressed in the name of a productive order which is purportedly beyond human control, and it is this experience, this nature, that is given a voice in the older ideals of reason.

But Horkheimer goes beyond this in identifying in the older principles of reason a prescriptive truth, a symbolic meaning that can now be interpreted in its ultimate light:

The conscious or unconscious motive that inspired the formulation of the systems of objective reason was the realization of the impotence of subjective reason with regard to its own goal of self-preservation. These metaphysical systems express in partly mythological form the insight that self-preservation can be achieved only in a supra-individual order, that is to say, through social solidarity. (1974:176) [my emphasis]

Horkheimer calls the systems of thought that embody these transcendental ideals “objective” reason, since they base themselves on the notion of an objective order within which humans are situated and which reason can come to recognize and respond to. This is in contrast to instrumental reason, which he calls “subjective,” and which recognizes no such objective order but reduces everything to its utilitarian categories.

It is statements like these, as well as his discussion of the role of language and philosophy
Thus the truth of objective reason is to be found in the dialectical end-point of the drive of instrumental reason as Marx had conceived it, in the recognition of the interdependent character of the world of human production, and the establishment of a communist society whereby we could live in harmony with that reality. This, then, is the ultimate meaning of, and answer to, the protestations of nature.

But because it is impossible to achieve revolutionary transformation under the existing conditions of integration, “we are driven, by the principle of negation, to attempt to salvage relative truths from the wreckage of false ultimates” (1974:183). The task is no...

in “calling things by their right name” (1974:179ff.), that may allow us to distinguish the later Horkheimer from Adorno, in spite of their allegedly united perspective in Dialectic of Enlightenment. In adhering to the notion that philosophy, in its attachment to a dialectical movement of history, has the role of revealing the ultimate truth of the “mimetic impulse,” Horkheimer remains fundamentally an Hegelian Marxist. Adorno, on the other hand, is convinced that even dialectical philosophy is mired in an “identitarian” thinking that will always do violence to the material other that it seeks to represent. Hence Adorno does not hold the faith in philosophy that Horkheimer does, and looks instead to the realm of art for the expression of a non-violent relationship to nature. His pessimism is thus theoretical as well as empirical in nature. That is, he sees an inherent flaw in the concept of the dialectical project itself, rather than simply in its successful historical unfolding. I disagree, then, with Habermas in his lumping together the later Horkheimer with Adorno (Habermas 1981), although his exposition and critique of their later thought is most illuminating in other respects. Horkheimer, in my view, remains fundamentally a Marxist in Eclipse of Reason, although his essay on Schopenhauer in the later Critique of Instrumental Reason may suggest a subsequent shift. Adorno, if it is true that he repudiates the notion that nature, as expressed in the term “mimetic,” could be brought finally into the transparent realm of ethical life, seems to depart significantly from the Marxist framework. Thus his later work has been excluded from the discussion here since I believe that it requires treatment separate from a discussion of Marx. Habermas also, in seeking to avert the problems that he sees both Horkheimer and Adorno encountering, breaks with Marx’s reliance on productive activity as the ultimate locus of human truth, seeing it as tied to a reductive “philosophy of consciousness.” Instead, Habermas sees the roots of a universal reconciliation and a limiting of reflective rationality in the complementary realm of intersubjective communication. Habermas also, then, in representing a secular Hegelianism of quite a different sort than Marx, requires separate treatment.
longer to try to show the proletariat the revolutionary way, as it was in Horkheimer’s earlier programme for critical theory, but to hold up the ideals of the existing society and show how that society fails to conform to its own standards (1974:182). The task is to undertake an immanent critique, and thus to try to salvage the element of truth contained in the old ideals of reason that are under siege by instrumental reason. At the same time, however, philosophy must show the relativity of these ideals, by showing the historical context in which they emerged, their relationship to an evolving history as a whole. “Philosophy takes existing values seriously but insists that they become parts of a theoretical whole that reveals their relativity” (1974:183). And the most pressing task in this regard is to undermine the absolute status to which subjective, instrumental reason has attained in our time. It is this philosophical enterprise that characterizes Horkheimer’s subsequent essays, represented in *Critique of Instrumental Reason*, the last major work he was to produce for publication (1994).

Thus Horkheimer does turn to nature as the ultimate source of critique—“the cries of the miserable and disinherited,” “nature’s protestations against her plight” (1974:182), “the longings of the oppressed and the plight of nature” (179), by attempting to preserve their expression in the old ideals of reason. Furthermore, his statements about the function of language in relation to nature appear almost Hegelian in nature, as he suggests that philosophy can help language “to fulfil its genuine mimetic function” in bringing nature in, in recognizing and preserving her truth at the level of experience and memory (179). But it turns out that this reconciliation, and the quasi-mystical language which Horkheimer occasionally uses to describe it, is ultimately tied to Marx rather than to Hegel. The problem
with instrumental reason’s relationship to nature is that it has “made nature a mere object, and that it failed to discover the trace of itself in such objectivization, in the concepts of matter and things no less than in those of gods and spirit” (176). Instrumental reason has made its own system of facts and science into an absolute which now threatens to overpower completely the autonomy of the subject, because that subject fails to see that it itself participated in the construction of such a world of “facts.” The task is to take charge of this reality as something itself historical, as something produced by humans in their struggle for survival and development, and thus to see that we can go beyond it, that we can criticize and limit it in the name of a more human reality that more fully satisfies the needs of the human spirit. This kind of criticism allows the repressed nature, the suffering and the misery, to be given expression in language, and thus the “potentially nihilistic energies” of that nature can now “work for reconciliation” (179). And the concrete meaning of this reconciliation, this moving beyond the fixations of instrumental reason into the ultimate dialectical truth of the whole historical movement, as Horkheimer admits, is the realization of some version of Marx’s communist ideal, the achievement of human self-preservation through a “supra-individual order...social solidarity.”

The ultimate vision of reconciliation, then, insofar as it is articulated, entails humans taking charge of a world of their own making. The human quality of self-consciousness is the crucial factor as humans come to recognize the condition of the world as the product of their own historical relationship to it. With this recognition, they cease to be alienated from it in the sense that they make sure that it now serves rational purposes, namely the elimination of the suffering and misery of the majority. That humans are in a position to
eliminate suffering, of course, is due to the technological advances of industrial society. Furthermore, with this elimination, all humans can begin to undertake the exploration of an alternative relationship to nature that previously had been restricted to only privileged sectors, at the expense of the rest (1974:103-4). Thus, while Horkheimer remains convinced of the possibility of this alternative relationship to nature, its realization, like Marx’s, relies on humans first having worked that nature over to their own purposes. Once the “voice of nature,” the expressions of suffering, have been relieved, however, it is not clear to what voice Horkheimer’s individual will respond.

The secular, post-Hegelian philosophical direction taken by Marx, in reducing the Absolute to human self-consciousness and its strivings with a godless nature, reveals its limitations most clearly in this later disciple, who himself struggled with a much more sensitive concern for nature, but was nevertheless unable to articulate an ethic that adequately heeded its voice. Neither, within a framework that reduces ethical substance to the historical being determined by the material conditions of production at any one moment, was he able to comprehend the living human resistance to the phenomenon of domination that so concerned him, let alone philosophically to vindicate that resistance. Instead, the basis of resistance that Horkheimer articulates remains fragile and fraught with tension.

*Hegel: the Notion of will and the task of philosophy*

While both the flight beyond reason into faith as represented in Kierkegaard, and the elimination of the religious component of Hegel’s Absolute by Marx, may be seen as philosophical responses to the eclipse of spirituality that had concerned Hegel in his later
years, neither are satisfactory pathways. Kierkegaard sought in the experience of faith a haven of truth immune from the desiccating and alienating powers of reflective rationality. But his rejection of Hegel’s philosophical system, of the ultimate ability of reason to render the experience of faith transparent, results in an epistemological standpoint that is individualistic and sectarian. The knight of faith cannot share his knowledge with others; it is an unprecedented experience of transformation in the inner depths of the individual’s soul, which cannot subsequently be communicated. And because others have no basis for such an experience, unless they too are one of the blessed ones, there is no way that they can understand the knight of faith. Hence this knowledge cannot become the foundation of a shared ethical life, and indeed can only find an expression in that life through the presence of these isolated knights of faith. Marx, on the other hand, was able to eliminate the religious core of Hegel’s thought as ideological obfuscation, because he saw in secular, reflective reason the seeds of its own self-overcoming, of a movement beyond the reifying, instrumental relationship to the world that had been established under capitalism. But the result is an incapacity to see in nature, including human nature, anything other than a sphere for the objectification of human self-consciousness in its productive strivings. The sole source of spirituality is the activity of self-consciousness in its self-objectification. Tied to this is Marx’s incapacity to recognize in human beings the very substance and source of resistance to the rampant drive of technological reason. For if the only genuinely human activity is productive activity towards self-objectification, then technology is the natural extension of that process of self-objectification. There is no place in this framework for the recognition of human love and conscience as alternative kinds of knowing, as constituting
a knowledge of something other than human productive activity.

But if we are unable to follow Marx in abandoning a source of the will that goes beyond merely ourselves and our human capacities, or to follow Kierkegaard in rejecting the notion that this religious substance can be willed in the human community as the basis of a modern ethical life, and be rationally understood, then we have not gone beyond Hegel. The historical failure of completion of his project, his attempt to unite religious substance with secular human willing, does indeed leave Hegel’s Notion of the will open to skeptical repudiation. This is the pathway taken by both Kierkegaard and Marx. But Hegel’s own considerations, in facing up to the possibility of failure, urge our attention away from this skeptical pathway, towards a more immediate and compelling problem—the problem of the eclipse of the divine in the modern consciousness.

Contrary to Kierkegaard’s and Marx’s charge that Hegel seeks a false reconciliation to the modern condition by means of philosophical fiat, leaving the realm of life itself still mired in contradiction, Hegel’s final message in fact directs us away from philosophy per se, and back to life. For it was life that he saw as failing in his own time—the decay of religion in its capacity to cultivate a consciousness of the divine, and more essentially, the turning of reflective thought on the substantial achievements of conscience, as well as on the ethical context that nurtures and sustains that conscience. It is here, then, in a reflective rationality that attacks its own subjective moorings, that Hegel’s final concern may be seen to lie, and the place where he directs our attention.

There is much to indicate that Hegel’s final reflections were right. It is our own century that has witnessed the terrors of a breakdown of ethical consciousness, the atrocities
in which the atomistic masses can become capable of participating, and the horrors that can accompany the drive of a technological reason that is unchecked by deeper moral concerns. And it is the phenomenon of the progressive de-spiritualization of life that is illuminated, from a secular perspective, by Marx, Weber, and the members of the Frankfurt School. But in spite of the fact that these thinkers go beyond Hegel in charting the dynamics of this phenomenon in a manner still relevant to the contemporary world, it is Hegel more than any of them who, in his Notion of the will, of a deeper moral substance with which moderns can come into contact and cultivate in their lives, provides us with a foundation from which to think the response to this reality.

For Hegel, the task in face of us does not become the charting of a new philosophical direction. It is rather to examine how an approach to the divine can best be cultivated in life. It becomes the question of "edification" which, since the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, he had explicitly disavowed as the domain of philosophy.\(^6^2\) If, then, we are to confront the problematic with which Hegel left us as the problematic of our time, it is to this question of edification that we must turn our attention.

It was in ethical life that Hegel himself placed the most hope for practices of edification. The moral cultivation of children in the familial environment of love, the practices of commitment entailed in the institution of marriage and the lasting bond that he believed to be its result, the pursuit of one's own good in civil society and the moral experiences encountered therein, the growing awareness of one's interdependence with others, the commitment to the principles of justice and social welfare that result, the choice

\(^{62}\)See chapter 3, introduction.
of vocation and the development of class consciousness through participation in that vocation, the identification with the general will that comes with the seeing of one's class interests expressed politically—these are the crucial bases of edification for the modern individual.

But philosophy, and moral and political philosophy in particular, also have a role to play in this task. And this is to capture and rationally to vindicate the knowledge that results from practices of edification, and the institutions that provide the framework within which such practices are found. Philosophy must provide us with the conceptual vocabulary to express and preserve the spirituality that does exist, against the assaults of reflective rationality. For without the fulfillment of this task, we end up with a reduction of moral convictions and subjective knowing to the status of mere opinion.63

Hegel's own concept of ethical life, which comprehends the institutional order as finding its vindication only in and through the achievement of harmony with subjective conscience, is of great significance here. For it offers us a genuine alternative to the current sterile debate in North America between liberals on the one hand, who seek a purely procedural justification of justice that reflects precisely the separation from and reduction of subjective conscience that Hegel saw as so dangerous, and communitarians on the other, who respond to the liberal abstraction by retreating to a premodern notion of self that cannot

63 Or, as Andrew (1995) suggests, to the current fashion of the language of "values," which finds its origins in the objectifying practices of the market economy and which thus becomes bound to the trivializing logic of individual consumer choice rather than to the notion of universal binding principles that could truly sustain what is most important to us.
accommodate the principle of individual autonomy.\(^{64}\) In Hegel’s notion of ethical life, we comprehend how individuals go through the moment of separation from community and achieve expression of their individuality in the realm of civil society, and how through this experience they may come back to unity with the institutional order (if that order does indeed allow for the expression of their deeper identity and embodies the experience of their rationality). In particular, Hegel’s tracing of the dialectical link between the individualistic conception of human freedom and the necessity of a welfare state, provides a powerful philosophical weapon against the current rise of rightist politics that seeks to turn back the clock of human experience. Furthermore, his interpretation of human self-realization as entailing fundamentally the commitment to a vocation, provides us with the conceptual basis for understanding the identifying root that might take individuals of civil society beyond the merely rational acceptance of the necessity of the “external” state. For individuals, in a state that genuinely realizes freedom, do not merely find themselves in a vocation and a class but choose that class according to what they believe will suit them best. And it is in and through this expression of their individual freedom that they will find, suggests Hegel, a true unity with others based on the community of recognition tied to their vocation, and the common interest that now binds them together. This unity, furthermore, if developed consciously, will be expressed as class consciousness. And it must find political expression in the

\(^{64}\) Gutmann’s claim (1985) that communitarians like Unger and Sandel are relying on a Hegelian notion of the self seems very problematic, in light of Hegel’s enormous concern with the principle of abstract personality as the basis of civil society, a principle that Sandel rejects in *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*. And the Hegelian notion of *Sittlichkeit* which has achieved some popularity, is not a found historical reality but one that comes to be rationally embraced by the individual of civil society.
representational structures of the state. For it is only when the crucial identifying expressions of individuals' will are accounted for at the universal level of the state, that can we envision the genuine realization of the common good. Hegel's political philosophy, then, provides us with the rational arguments for the convictions we hold and the institutions we believe in, and thus protects these from the reductive reasoning of a merely reflective rationality. As well, it points us towards the institutional principles that must yet be fulfilled as a prerequisite to the genuine realization of a general will.

The dilemma that Hegel's project confronts in the antagonism between spiritual experience and reflective rationality may also mean that we need to go beyond Hegel in seeking new methods of exploring contact with the divine, and understanding the positive relationship of reason to it. Heidegger's attempts to articulate an alternative mode of revelation of "Being" harboured within the approach of reflective rationality or "enframing" (1977), and Charles Taylor's examination of modern experiences of "epiphany" that could provide an "affirming power" for modern moral principles (1989), are two such examples. Such explorations, however, in identifying the eclipse of the divine in life as the problematic of our time, in exploring the examples and possibilities of human contact with a divine, or with "being," and in insisting on a positive relationship of rationality to such experiences, in spite of the accompanying danger, do not represent so much a departure from Hegel as a taking up of his legacy. For they continue to have, at their core, the fundamental tenets of

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In the contemporary global economy, the articulation and realization of the interest of different classes must undoubtedly push us beyond the national boundaries that Hegel had envisioned as the arena for the expression and satisfaction of those interests.
the Hegelian Notion of will, of a divine at the source of the will that realizes itself in secular existence.\textsuperscript{66} It is to the preservation and development of this project, in light of the problem of eclipse that it now faces, that I believe we must continue to devote our present philosophical efforts.

\textsuperscript{66} Granted, Heidegger would reject this characterization since he reads Hegel as subordinating Being to the will. But in my reading there is a continuity in the attempt of both to find a mode of thinking that can do justice to Being.
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