WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT AND CHILD CARE POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES

by

Linda Ann White

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of Political Science
University of Toronto

© Copyright by Linda Ann White 1998
The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L’auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L’auteur conserve la propriété du droit d’auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-35368-0
ABSTRACT


This thesis analyzes the historical and contemporary development of child care policies and programs in France, Canada, and the United States. It explains why France developed a more generous system of child care than most European and North American countries. It also explains why Canada, considered to have a more generous welfare state than the United States, has much lower levels of child care than other western industrialized countries, including the United States.

The explanation offered links the literature on historical institutionalism and ideas, and focuses on the role of institutionalized actors as carriers of ideas. The thesis argues that the higher levels of child care programs in France and the United States results from the greater institutionalization of maternalist ideas. Maternalism connotes the exaltation of motherhood and the home, the promotion of "motherhood" values such as care and nurturance, and the application of those values in government, the community, and the workplace. The institutionalization of maternalist ideas legitimized state action in developing policies for women and children, and provided the basis for the later expansion of child care policies. Their lack of institutionalization in Canada, in turn, explains why it has meagre child care programs compared to the United States.

The findings highlight an important dichotomy between policy goal and policy effect in the three cases. Policy expansion in the United States and France occurred not within norms of
women's equality but within norms of maternalism. The process of institutionalization of ideas and policies proved to be both narrowing and transformative. While the original policies did not necessarily support women, the effect of implementing paternalist-based policies was to provide the normative basis upon which later programs such as child care could be built.

This thesis demonstrates the powerful role of ideas and norms in policy development, as well as the important interaction of ideas, institutions, and actors. It also refutes the feminist argument that the presence of maternalism, rather than its absence, is to blame for low levels of child care. It shows that maternalism provides a better normative base upon which to build child care policies than liberal feminism.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the help of a great number of people and organizations. First, I wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Ontario Government Scholarship program, and the University of Toronto for their financial support during my Ph.D. program. I would also like to thank the Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, as well as the Associates of the University of Toronto, for their financial support of my field research through a Sir Val Duncan travel grant and the Associates of the University of Toronto travel grant.

As I conducted the field research for this thesis, I was always amazed at how generous my interviewees were with their time and how willing they were to answer my questions. I am grateful to them all for this help. I also wish to thank the research staff of the many libraries and documentation centres upon which I relied for secondary information. In France, those centres include: la Bibliothèque Marguerite Durand, le Centre National d'Information et de Documentation des Femmes et des Familles (CNIDFF), le Centre de Recherche pour l'Étude et l'Observation des Conditions de Vie (CREDOC), l'Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE), la bibliothèque du Ministère des Affaires Sociales, de la Santé, et de la Ville, and the Centre de Documentation du Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale. I especially wish to thank Brigitte Cassigneul of l'Annuaire au Féminin who provided a great deal of help and contact information. I also wish to thank Antoine Math at the Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales who patiently answered my questions and provided me with many CNAF documents.

In Canada, my thanks and gratitude are extended to the staff at the Childcare Resource and Research Unit in Toronto, especially Martha Friendly and Chris Gehman, who gave invaluable assistance. In an era of shrinking government resources, the CCRRU remains a precious resource service to all interested in child care. I also wish to thank the many reference librarians in the government documents library at the University of Toronto who helped me dig up government documents.

I had the best dissertation committee anyone could ask for at U of T. My supervisor, Louis W. Pauly, provided unwavering support and encouragement throughout the dissertation project. He pushed me to think both broadly and deeply about my topic and, through rigorous
questioning, helped shape the thesis into the final product. My other committee members, Grace Skogstad and Liesbet Hooghe, provided the same sharp analysis and rigorous questioning. Grace Skogstad was especially supportive through the solitary process of research and writing, and proved to be a friend and mentor as well.

I also want to thank the readers of my dissertation, Ronald Manzer and Carolyn Tuohy, who scrutinized the final product and provided many insightful comments and criticisms, as did my external readers, Laurel MacDowell of the History Department, and Jane Jenson of the University of Montreal. I have benefitted greatly from their insights.

I want to extend special thanks to Rianne Mahon at Carleton University, whose common interest in child care led to a wonderfully fruitful exchange of ideas. Professor Mahon provided thoughtful comments and criticisms of some of my early thesis work and I benefitted from her insights as much as I was inspired by her interest in the issue. I was particularly fortunate to be able to read her work on child care, as she unraveled some of the puzzles of the Canadian child care field.

I must bestow my thanks and appreciation to the many friends and colleagues at the University of Toronto who were the most professional, dedicated, and yet fun-loving scholars I could hope for. I especially wish to thank Lisa Young, Jocelyne Praud, Lawrence Hanson, Carrie Hull, Darin Barney, and Shaun Narine, who not only were good friends but also insightful critics of my work. I also want to acknowledge the friendship and support of my colleagues and students at Mount Allison University where I spent a year teaching during the writing of this dissertation, particularly Penny Bryden, Raymond Blake, and Deborah Wills. I am especially grateful to Karen Bamford for organizing the works-in-progress series where I and many of my colleagues presented our ideas in a friendly and supportive environment. My colleagues in the Political Studies department were always encouraging. I extend special thanks to my colleagues in the Classics department—Angela Kalinowski, Dave McGee, and John Harris—who proved that political science and classics are indeed a marvelous combination.

No one could embark on a career as a graduate student without the strong support of her family. I wish to thank my parents, who have loved, nurtured, and supported me in all my endeavours, and did not blink when I announced I was going to graduate school. They taught me to believe in myself and follow the path I chose to its fulfillment.
I especially wish to thank Steven Bernstein, my partner and closest friend. Steven taught me to be more rigorous in my analysis, to look beyond the surface to the deeper meaning of things, and to think beyond boundaries. He proved to be my most insightful critic and editor, and offered his total support and encouragement along the way. This thesis would not be what it is without him.

Finally, I remember my dear friend, Ruth Harris Woolley, whose devoted work as a child care provider and educator was the inspiration for this thesis. Her love and caring for children exceeded her brief life. I dedicate this dissertation to her.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Acronyms</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I - INTRODUCTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Framework of the Thesis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Selection</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explaining Child Care in the Three Cases</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Influence of Maternalism</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dichotomy Between Policy Goals and Policy Effects</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Quebec Case</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Outline</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II - ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural and Functional Theories</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing Industrial Structure</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Economic Factors/International Economic Convergence</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Functionalism</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Marxist Functionalism</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Events</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Resources</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Downturns and Deficits</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Market Pressures</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary: Structural and Functional Theories</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Demand Theories</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist Political Parties</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Unions</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social (Feminist) Movements</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary: Social Demand Theories</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Theories</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong and Weak States</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of Ideas in Institutional Theory</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overview of Child Care and Family Policies

Child Care Programs
Pre-primary Programs
Federal Programs
Spending on Child Care and Other Programs
Public Opinion on Child Care

Explanation - Child Care Policy Development in the United States

Dominant Ideas
Key Institutions
Key Actors
Policy Development: 1800s-1930
Policy Development: 1930s
Policy Development: The New Deal and WWII Era
Policy Development: Post-WWII-1950s
Policy Development: 1960s-1990s
Conclusion

Chapter VI - CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings
Generalizability
Contribution to the Literature
  Contribution to the Feminist Literature
  Contribution to the "Ideas" Literature
  The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Institutions
  Ideas, Institutions, and Policy Change
Challenges to the Welfare State: The Impact of Current Socioeconomic and Structural Constraints
  Changes in Institutions
  Changes in Fiscal Capacity

Appendix - SCOPE OF CHILD CARE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Sweden
Germany
Britain
Italy

Bibliography

List of Interviews
LIST OF TABLES

1.1 Public Child Care Spaces in Selected Countries 31
1.2 Maternity and Parental Leave Programs in Selected Countries, 1991-1992 33
1.3 Pre-primary Educational Enrolment Rates in Selected Countries, 1987-1988 35
1.4 Pre-primary Educational Enrolment Rates in Selected Countries, 1990-1994 37
1.5 Percentage of Economically Active Men and Women in Selected Countries 39
1.6 Total and Economically Active Population by Age Group in Selected Countries, 1993 41
2.1 Public Expenditure on Social Protection as a Percentage of GDP Over Time in Selected Countries 80
2.2 Total Government Outlays as a Percentage of GDP Over Time in Selected Countries 81
2.3 Government Spending on Social Security 82
2.4 Expenditure by Social Security Branch as a Percentage of Total Benefit Expenditure on Social Benefits, France, Canada, and the United States 83
2.5 French Government Expenditure on Major Benefit Programs for Families in Millions of French Francs 85
2.6 Canadian Federal Government Expenditure on Child Care and Child Benefits 85
2.7 Government Expenditure on Family Allowances in France 86
2.8 Gross Public Debt as a Percentage of Nominal GDP Over Time in Selected Countries 87
2.9 General Government Financial Balances as a Percentage of Nominal GDP in Selected Countries 88
2.10 Labour Force Participation Rates for Men and Women in Selected Countries 89
2.11 Trade Union Density (Union Membership as a Percentage of Employed Wage and Salary Workers) in Selected Countries 90
3.1 Activity Rates for Women in France According to Number and Age of Children, 1992 173
3.2 Levels of School Attendance in Les Écoles Maternelles (Pre-primary Schools) by Age in France 174
3.3 Development of Child Care Arrangements for Children Under Age 3 in France 175
3.4 Types of Child Care Arrangements in France for Children Under Age 3 with Mothers Active in the Labour Force, 1990 176
3.5 Provision of Collective Care Services in France by Number of Spaces 177
3.6 French Opinion on the Number of Child Care Centres 178
3.7 French Preferences on Forms of Care for Pre-School Age Children, Evolution 1987-1993 179
3.8 Forms of Care Used by Parents in France Who Have or Have Had a Child 180
3.9 Breakdown of Expenses by the Family Fund of Social Security (CNAF/CAFs) on Child Care Programs in France 181
3.10 Total Expenditures on Pre-primary Programs in France, 1994 182
3.11 Expenditures on Major Benefit Programs for Families in France in Millions of French Francs 183
3.12 Male and Female Labour Force Activity Rates in France 184
Evolution and Division of Expenditures by the CAFs in France

French Opinion on the Reconciliation of Work and Family Life

Unemployment Rates for Men and Women in France

Part-Time Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment in France

Employment of Women Working Part-Time According to Marital Status and Number of Children in France


Number of Licensed Child Care Spaces Relative to Children of Employed Parents by Age in Canada, 1993

Forms of Care for Children of Working Mothers in Canada, 1970

Forms of Care for Children of Working Parents in Canada, 1988

Distribution of Child Care Spaces by Province and Territory in Canada, 1993

Distribution of Day Care Centre Spaces by Auspice in Canada, 1993

Family Day Care Spaces in Canada and Regulations

Family-Related Leave in Canada, by Province, 1993

Total Federal Child Care and Child Benefit Expenditures in Canada

Federal Expenditures on Child Care and Child Benefits in Canada, Over Time

Percentage of Women Members in Trade Unions in Canada

Forms of Care for Children of Working Parents in Canada and the United States, 1988

Primary Child Care Arrangements Used by Employed Mothers of Children Under Age 6 in the United States

Pre-Primary School Enrolment in the United States, Over Time

Labour Force Participation Rates of Women in the United States by Presence and Age of Youngest Child


Primary Child Care Arrangements Used by Employed Mothers for Children Under Age 5 in the United States in 1991, Broken Down by Age

Primary Child Care Arrangements for Children Under Age 15 With an Employed Mother, by Marital and Employment Status of the Mother in the United States, Fall 1993 (in Percentage)

Primary Child Care Arrangements Used by Employed Mothers for Children Under Age 5, by Poverty Status of the Mothers in the United States, 1993

Regular Child Care Arrangements for Children Under Age 6 by Race and Household Income in the United States, 1995

U. S. Federal Government Expenditure for Child Care Over Time

National Social Policy Development in Selected Countries

Percentage of Economically Active Women in Selected European Countries, Ages 20-59 by Family Structure, 1988
## List of Acronyms

**France:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOSS</td>
<td>Agence Centrale des Organismes de Sécurité Sociale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFEAMA</td>
<td>aide à la famille pour l'emploi d'une assistante maternelle agréée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGED</td>
<td>allocation de garde d'enfant à domicile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJE</td>
<td>allocation au jeune enfant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMA</td>
<td>assistante maternelle agréée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>Association des Maires de France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANPDE</td>
<td>Association Nationale des Puéricultrices Diplômées D'État</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APE</td>
<td>allocation parentale d'éducation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>allocation de parent isolé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APJE</td>
<td>allocation pour jeune enfant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>allocation de soutien familial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Caisse d'Allocations Familiales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFDT</td>
<td>Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFTC</td>
<td>Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>Confédération Générale du Travail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLSH</td>
<td>centre de loisir sans hébergement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAF</td>
<td>Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAMTS</td>
<td>Caisse Nationale de l'Assurance Maladie des Travailleurs Salariés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAVTS</td>
<td>Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Vieilles des Travailleurs Salariés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNFF</td>
<td>Conseil National des Femmes Françaises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPF</td>
<td>Conseil National du Patronat Français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPE</td>
<td>congé parental d'éducation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREDOC</td>
<td>Centre de Recherche pour l'Étude et l'Observation des Conditions de Vie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSG</td>
<td>cotisation sociale généralisée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Force Ouvrière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICW</td>
<td>International Council of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INED</td>
<td>Institut National d'Études Démographiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSEE</td>
<td>Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASSV</td>
<td>Ministère des Affaires Sociales, de la Santé, et de la Ville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>Mouvement Républicain Populaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Parti Communiste Français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMI</td>
<td>Protection maternelle et infantile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Parti Socialiste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSAM</td>
<td>prestation spéciale assistante maternelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMI</td>
<td>revenu minimum d'insertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>Rassemblement pour la République</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAF</td>
<td>Union Nationale des Associations Familiales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFCS</td>
<td>Union Féminine Civique et Sociale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFSF</td>
<td>Union Française pour le Suffrage des Femmes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Canada:

BPW  Business and Professional Women
CAP  Canada Assistance Plan
CAW  Canadian Auto Workers
CCCF  Canadian Child Care Federation
CCED  Child Care Expense Deduction
CCF  Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
CDCAAA/CCAAC  Canadian Day Care Advocacy Association/ Child Care Advocacy Association of Canada
CCIF  Child Care Initiatives Fund
CHST  Canada Health and Social Transfer
CLC  Canadian Labour Congress
CPP  Canada Pension Plan
CRRU  Childcare Resource and Research Unit, Toronto
CTB  Child Tax Benefit
CUPE  Canadian Union of Public Employees
CUPW  Canadian Union of Postal Workers
EPF  Established Programs Financing
FFQ  Fédération des femmes du Québec
HRIF  Human Resources Investment Fund
NAC  National Action Committee on the Status of Women
NCWC  National Council of Women of Canada
NDP  New Democratic Party
NOIVMW  National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women of Canada
OCBCC  Ontario Coalition for Better Child Care (Coalition)
OFL  Ontario Federation of Labour
UI  Unemployment Insurance
WIS  Working Income Supplement

The United States:

ABC  Alliance for Better Child Care
ACF  Administration for Children and Families
ADC/AFDC  Aid to Dependent Children / Aid to Families with Dependent Children
AFL  American Federation of Labor
BPW  Business and Professional Women's Clubs
CACFP  Child and Adult Care Food Program
CCDBG  Child Care and Development Block Grant
CDF  Children's Defense Fund
CETA  Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
CIO  Congress of Industrial Organizations
CWLA  Child Welfare League of America
EITC/EIC  Earned Income Tax Credit / Earned Income Credit
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ERA</td>
<td>Equal Rights Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAP</td>
<td>Family Assistance Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSA</td>
<td>Family Support Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWA</td>
<td>Federal Works Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFWC</td>
<td>General Federation of Women's Clubs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOBS</td>
<td>Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LWV</td>
<td>League of Women Voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACW</td>
<td>National Association of Colored Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAEYC</td>
<td>National Association for the Education of Young Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAWSA</td>
<td>National American Women's Suffrage Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDURA</td>
<td>National Committee to Defeat the Un-Equal Rights Amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCL</td>
<td>National Consumers' League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLC</td>
<td>National Child Labor Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCM</td>
<td>National Congress of Mothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFDN</td>
<td>National Federation of Day Nurseries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOW</td>
<td>National Organization for Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWP</td>
<td>National Women's Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWPC</td>
<td>National Women's Political Caucus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWRO</td>
<td>National Welfare Rights Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent-Teacher Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBG</td>
<td>Social Services Block Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANF</td>
<td>Temporary Assistance for Needy Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Transitional Child Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAW</td>
<td>United Auto Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE</td>
<td>United Electrical Workers of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIN</td>
<td>Work Incentive Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCTU</td>
<td>Women's Christian Temperance Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPA</td>
<td>Works Progress Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTUL</td>
<td>Women's Trade Union League</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Key Terms:

Familism - ideology that promotes the family and (generally) policies to protect the family. Some supporters tend to favour large families; others encourage a particular moral order such as the separation of male and female roles, with husbands as breadwinners and wives as homemakers and mothers.

Individualist/liberal feminism - ideology that emphasizes the strict equality of men and women. Individualist feminist discourse promotes the equalization of roles and positions of men and women in society and emphasizes the sameness of men and women. Individualist feminists tend to minimize sexual differences between men and women and promote policies such as equal pay for equal work and nondiscrimination in law.

Maternalism - ideology that exalts motherhood, the home, and childrearing, promotes values of care and nurturance, and encourages the politicization of motherhood as a public policy, rather than a private issue. Maternalist discourse emphasizes the differences between men and women that motherhood brings and the idea of equality as "complementarity", not sameness. Maternalists argue for special policies such as mothers' pensions, to help women in their childbearing and childrearing roles, as well as policies to help reconcile work and family life, such as maternity leave.

Paternalism - in general, a system, principle, or practice of governing or managing individuals, companies, states, and so on, in the manner of a father dealing with his children. In this thesis, paternalism is used to mean an ideology which promotes men as heads of households who should protect and provide for their spouses and children under their care.

Pronatalism - ideology that supports and promotes the increase of the birth rate.
Programs in France:

Aide à la famille pour l'emploi d'une assistante maternelle agréée - benefits to cover the costs of hiring a registered childminder

Aide à la scolarité - school aid grant

Aide au logement - housing allowance

Allocation au jeune enfant - young child's allowance

Allocation d'orphelin - orphan's allowance

Allocation de frais de garde - child care allowance

Allocation de garde d'enfant à domicile - allowance for child care in the home

Allocation de la mère au foyer - mothers' allowance

Allocation de parent isolé - single parent allowance

Allocation de rentrée scolaire - school allowance

Allocation de salaire unique - single-wage allowance

Allocation de soutien familial - family support allowance

Allocation familiale - family allowance

Allocation parentale d'éducation - child rearing allowance

Allocation pour jeune enfant - young child's allowance

Assistante maternelle agréée - registered childminder

Caisse d'Allocations Familiales - social security agency

Centre de loisir sans hébergement - before- and after-school facility

Complément familial - supplementary family benefits

Congé maternité - maternity leave

Congé parental - parental leave
Cotisation sociale généralisée - tax used to finance the social security regimes

Crèche - day care centre

Crèche collective - collective day care centre

Crèche familiale - family day care centre

Crèche parentale - parental day care centre

École maternelle - pre-primary school

Halte garderie - part-time day care centre

Jardin d'enfant - nursery school

Maison maternelle - maternity home

Nourrice - nanny

Prestation spéciale assistante maternelle - special mother's helper allowance

Protection Maternelle et Infantile - mother and child welfare association

Puéricultrice - early childhood care nurse

Quotient familial - family size-based tax deductions

Relais assistantes maternelles - child care support services for independent childminders

Revenu minimum d'insertion - guaranteed minimum income
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

This thesis analyzes the historical and contemporary development of child care policies and programs in France, Canada, and the United States. It explains why France developed a more generous system of child care than most countries in Europe and North America. It also explains why Canada, considered to have a more generous welfare state than the United States, has much lower levels of child care than other western industrialized countries, including the United States (see table 1.1).

The evidence reveals that policy history is crucial in accounting for the development of child care programs and services in the three cases under investigation. The way child care programs were originally constructed, developed, and entrenched determined the extensiveness of child care provision, locking governments into a particular policy direction and institutionalizing certain norms regarding the role of the state in the provision of child care. I apply an historical institutionalist analysis in order to explain these differing policy trajectories. I use the methodology of a structured focused comparison, tracing the development of policy making over time in these countries.

A growing comparative literature focuses specifically on child care programs and services.¹ This literature consists mainly of cross-national surveys or country-specific case studies that describe the scope of policies or their evolution over time, but offer little explanation or analysis of the political factors driving child care policy development. Many of the studies

that do attempt to explain the development of child care in individual countries do not address
the issue systematically and across countries.²

Moreover, most cross-national analyses neglect the gender aspects in early welfare state
developments.³ Historians only recently have begun to mine the rich historical data on programs
that were established for or directed towards women and children.⁴ By looking at child care, this

²One exception is Vappu K. Tyyskä, "The Women's Movement and the Welfare State:
Child Care Policy in Canada and Finland, 1960-1990," Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Sociology,
University of Toronto, 1993. She does analyze competing explanations of why the programs in
the two countries developed as they did. See also the concluding chapter by Moncrieff Cochran,
"Public Child Care, Culture, and Society: Crosscutting Themes," in International Handbook of
Child Care Policies and Programs, ed. Moncrieff Cochran (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood
Press, 1993), 627-58. Also, Alfred Kahn and Sheila Kamerman in their latest research do touch
on these issues. See Social Policy and the Under-3s: Six Country Case Studies (New York:

³The vast majority of cross-national analyses of welfare state programs neglect to
consider programs for women. Scholars often conceive of the welfare state as encompassing
workplace-based programs for men, such as sickness and accident insurance, old-age insurance,
disability insurance, unemployment insurance, and compensation for inadequate wages. Viewed
separately from those programs (and often neglected in these studies) are programs for
"dependents", such as mothers' pensions, as well as maternity provisions, family allowances, and
so on. See, for example, Peter Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the
European Welfare State 1875-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Peter Flora
and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981); Abram de Swaan, In Care of the State:
Health Care, Education and Welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1988). Research by Theda Skocpol in Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The
Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1992), and others cited below provide an important corrective to this inadequate history.

⁴For France see Elinor A. Accampo, Rachel G. Fuchs and Mary Lynn Stewart, Gender
and the Politics of Social Reform in France 1870-1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1995); Anna Cova, "French Feminism and Maternity: Theories and Policies 1890-1918"
in Maternity and Gender Politics: Women and the Rise of the European Welfare States, 1880s-
1950s, eds. Gisela Bock and Pat Thane (London: Routledge, 1991), 119-37; Jane Jenson,
"Changing Discourse, Changing Agendas: Political Rights and Reproductive Policies in
France," in The Women's Movements of the United States and Western Europe, eds. Mary
Fainsod Katzenstein and Carol McClung Mueller (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1987), 64-88; Jenson, "Gender and Reproduction: Or, Babies and the State," Studies in Political
Economy 20 (Summer 1986), 9-46; and Jenson, "The Liberation and New Rights for French
Women," in Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars, eds. Margaret Randolph
Higonnet, Jane Jenson, Sonya Michel, and Margaret Collins Weitz (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1987), 274-75; Seth Koven and Sonya Michel, "Womanly Duties: Maternalist
thesis aims to broaden our knowledge of gender issues in welfare state development. More specifically, it fills a gap in the Canadian welfare state literature, which contains few studies on the gender aspects of social policies in Canada, and still less on Canada in a comparative context.5


The thesis also contributes to the scholarly field of public policy, which has not sufficiently linked ideas, actors, and institutions. It shows that the nature of the interaction among all three is crucial. This thesis takes ideas seriously and argues that ideas are necessary and independent factors in policy development. In each of the three cases, it traces through the policy histories to demonstrate how ideas regarding social reproduction shaped the development of the welfare state, and, once institutionalized as policies and norms, determined the extensiveness of child care and related social policies.

Key actors, such as trade unions, employers' associations, and women's groups, carry ideas in the policy process. Such actors help to persuade governments to adopt a particular policy course. Ideas, once institutionalized, can establish a policy trajectory and lock governments into a particular policy path. However, ideas are also enabling in that they provide the basis upon which later policies develop.

The political structure and institutions of each country also play a crucial role in the development of child care policies. Political and administrative structures such as federalism, corporatism, and cabinet parliamentary government, can determine which ideas have saliency in the first place. They also play a role in constraining and transforming the policy process. Actors within these institutions play important roles as carriers of ideas.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS

Institutions, in combination with ideas and actors, provide the most compelling explanation for the wealth of child care programs and services in France and the comparative paucity in North America, and account for policy differences between Canada and the United

---


6For a critique of the institutionalist literature on this point see Mark M. Blyth, "'Any More Bright Ideas?' The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy," Comparative Politics 29, 2 (January 1997), 229-50.
States. I consider other explanations, such as socioeconomic factors and social demand factors, but reject them as not fully explanatory (see chapter two).

The original impetus for this project was to understand differences in welfare state development among western industrialized countries and, in particular, to understand differences in women's labour market participation and policies to help women participate in the labour market. Sweden, for example, has many policies to help women participate in the labour market, whereas Canada and the United States do not. Many of the Swedish policies, such as maternity leave and public child care programs, enable women to work while rearing children.

What is the precise connection between active labour market policies—that is, policies to encourage women to participate in the labour force—and child care policies? Must governments be committed to both in order to ensure high rates of labour market participation by women? And can one say that the degree to which child care policies and programs exist in a country depends on the degree to which women are integrated into the workforce and the degree to which governments strive to promote women's labour market integration? My preliminary hypothesis is that labour market and child care policies are related: child care policies develop where a government perceives women's employment as important; where the government accepts and emphasizes the equality of men and women in the labour market; where a government accepts the linking of labour market and social policies and implements active labour market policies; and where society and government accept high levels of government spending in general.

This hypothesis does not hold. Women's labour market participation rates are high in Canada and the United States, but both countries lack an extensive child care system. Women's labour market participation rates are lower in France than in Sweden, but France possesses a near-universal child care system, as good, if not better than Sweden. A consensus or normative emphasis on women's equality and women's labour market participation does not exist to the

---

Wilensky and Turner define an active labour market policy as the "direct government action to shape the demand for labor by maintaining or creating jobs; to increase the supply and quality of labor via training and rehabilitation; and to encourage labor mobility via placement, counseling, and mobility incentives." Harold Wilensky and Lowell Turner, Democratic Corporatism and Policy Linkages (Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies, 1987), 3. An active labour market policy can be contrasted with more passive policies such as unemployment insurance and social assistance.
same extent in either the French or North American cases; indeed, governmental and societal norms connote ambivalence regarding the role of women in the work force. The French and North American cases thus raise puzzles. Where no policy consensus or similar normative emphasis on women's equality and women's labour market participation exists, how and why do these child care policies emerge?

Furthermore, one of the questions driving the research is the possibility of policy change and policy learning. The question, then, is not only which countries have the best policies for children, but which have policies that could be most appropriately applied to Canada, or might it be likely to adopt. Political cultural ideas and values in the United States are similar to Canada and, in the case of France, to the province of Quebec. Thus, the lessons learned from the United States and France may be more easily applied to Canada than lessons learned from Sweden.

Institutions in combination with ideas explain the particular policy outcomes. Institutions are defined as "established patterns of human interaction" with "recognized relationships of authority and responsibility." Institutions, broadly conceived, include not only the formal structures of government, such as the executive, bureaucracy, and the courts, but also the rules, norms, and principles which underlie these structures and explain actors' actions. North defines institutions as "the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction." Institutions can include formal rules, procedures, organizational standards, and governance structures, and they can also include conventions, customs, traditions, and even culture. They thus can be both

---


structural and normative. Institutions are not a black box which simply translates actors' preferences into policies. Political and administrative structures, as well as rules and norms, play an independent role in the policy process.

Ideas also play a two-fold and independent role in the policy process: at the policy development stage, and after they become institutionalized as policies and as norms. "Ideas", defined as beliefs held by individuals, can encompass ideologies, policy paradigms, public philosophies, cultures, issue-area doctrines, and so on. Ideas regarding social reproduction mattered in the formation of the welfare state. Governments designed policies to respond to and regulate home life as well as work life. This thesis argues that the extent to which "maternalist" or "maternal feminist" ideas regarding social reproduction came to dominate in each of these countries affected later child care policy development.

Ideas are necessary but not wholly sufficient as an explanation for child care policy development. It not only matters which ideas were present in the formation of the welfare state, but whether and how they were institutionalized, that is, successfully transmitted to and addressed in government policy circles and thus "embedded" in political institutions.

---

11 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3. North distinguishes between institutions, which are the rules, and organizations, which are the actors or players e.g. parties, trade unions, the Senate, and so on. He argues "Institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic theory, determine the opportunities in a society. Organizations are created to take advantage of those opportunities, and as the organizations evolve, they alter the institutions" (North, 7). I do not confine institutions to just norms and rules and include bodies like the Senate. North narrows the definition of institution too much by excluding structures of government.


14 Goldstein and Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy," 3. Researchers have argued that ideas may be translated into policy simply because certain interest groups or other actors dominate the policy process. Ideas may also be carried and promoted by experts who diffuse their ideas to the policy community and who also become part of government institutions. Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46, 1 (Winter 1992), 1-35. Ideas may be influential simply owing to their appeal and support in society.
must be carried by actors. Key actors in the child care policy process include trade unions, employer associations, women's groups, and other actors and organizations concerned with family policy, such as demographers and doctors. These actors also must be institutionalized, that is, be part of the policy process or policy network, in order for their ideas to have influence. Institutionalization implies interaction that has become patterned or routinized.

Thus state structures and state-society relations such as corporatism, the political orientation of the governing party and its relations to social movements and interest groups, and the degree of organization of interest groups themselves and their avenues for lobbying are important to observe. The degree of organization and influence of these state and societal actors often depends on the political and administrative structures within which they must work. Structures of government, such as federalism, and formal rules, such as constitutions, will often influence the way actors lobby governments and which ideas will gain saliency. These institutions can constrain and shape both the actors and ideas that exist.

Once incorporated into policy, ideas continue to have an impact as policies and as norms. Embedded policies themselves shape future politics and future policy development in that they establish boundaries within which future action can be taken. This process of institutionalization

---

15 Actors with potential influence include government policy makers in the executive, legislative, and bureaucratic branches, as well as non-state actors such as interest groups, social movements, and interested individuals and, most broadly, society. All actors or potential actors "who share a common policy focus and who, with varying degrees of influence shape policy outcomes" are referred to as the policy community. William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad, "Policy Communities and Policy Networks: A Structural Approach," in Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A Structural Approach, eds. W. Coleman and G. Skogstad (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990), 25.

16 A policy network links up various actors in the policy community to the state. Coleman and Skogstad, "Policy Communities and Policy Networks," 26.

17 For example, one would need to consider the organization of the child care lobby cross-nationally to scrutinize its influence on policy. How are child care lobbyists connected to the policy process and in what ways are they part of the structures of decision making? Are child care lobbyists connected to trade unions or other powerful interest groups or do they lobby from the outside of decision making circles? Do their organizations have a degree of coherence or are they fragmented and weak? Can they focus on one entry point to government and thus concentrate their efforts, such as in a unitary system of government? Or do they have several possible entry points to the state, such as in a federal system, but under which the chances of policy cohesion are less?
is considered both narrowing and transformative (or constraining and enabling). Weber suggests that ideas are "switchmen" [sic], "turning action onto certain tracks rather than others,...[and] obscuring the other tracks from the agent's view."\(^{18}\) Krasner describes this as path dependency; that is, that "past choices preclude certain strategies or make them costly."\(^ {19}\) A certain policy choice, once taken, constrains radical shifts in direction. Weir develops the idea of "bounded innovation", where ideas not incorporated into policy over time become increasingly unlikely to influence policy.\(^ {20}\) Success in introducing new ideas into the policy process thus depends on the ideas already there. Accepted policies may also influence what interest groups form and how they frame their demands. Entrenched ideas become gatekeepers of other ideas and policies.\(^ {21}\)

Ideas accepted and embedded as policies also establish norms: principles of right action or "standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations."\(^ {22}\) Norms can also shape the agenda, limiting how policies are conceived, and shape outcomes, limiting the alternatives seen and pursued. They establish a legitimate behavioural claim, a "sense of ought, of how an actor [government, individual] should behave."\(^ {23}\) They provide "moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action" to which actors respond, and not just stable sets of rules, routines,

\(^ {18}\)Goldstein and Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy," 12.
\(^ {19}\)Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics 16, 2 (January 1984), 240.
\(^ {21}\)Jane Jenson uses the term "universe of political discourse" to describe a "universe of socially constructed meaning resulting from political struggle." Jenson, "Gender and Reproduction," 26. The concept of universe of political discourse (UPD) is similar to that of a norm. The universe of political discourse, like norms, constrains outcomes. However, while Jenson's work attempts to explain \textit{why} certain ideas constrain, I am more concerned to explain \textit{how} they constrain, that is, the process of constraint. Jenson's work emphasizes more the agents or actors involved in establishing the parameters of discourse and action, and not so much the independent effect of ideas as norms (that is, as institutions) in the formation of policies. Institutional analysis, in turn, focuses more on structures and structured relations among actors (the network), rather than exploring \textit{why} certain actors dominate.

and procedures. Noms shape which government actions and policy directions are considered legitimate. For example, the norm of free enterprise could prevent governments from considering a policy of nationalization.

Majone distinguishes between the core of a policy and the periphery. The policy core, which includes certain principles or strongly held ideas (norms), and which implies a policy consensus, is more stable. Changes in the core occur gradually and continuously. The policy periphery, in contrast, is more flexible and adaptable. Incremental changes or changes to the periphery do not affect the core, except through their cumulative influence. For example, Majone points out that governments in the United States have made many peripheral changes to the social security system, but these changes have been incremental and have followed certain core principles: the system should be universal, compulsory, national, and contributory.

Majone also argues that "The closer some particular activity is to the core, the greater the pull to retain it and the sense of discontinuity when it is abandoned." Changes to policies closer to the core will encounter more resistance because the policy core is most deeply embedded. Those policies become so "conventional or taken-for-granted that they escape direct scrutiny..." They are, in effect, the most institutionalized. Following Hall and Taylor, I argue that these "[i]nstitutions are resistant to redesign ultimately because they structure the very choices about reform that the individual is likely to make."

While institutionalized ideas constrain future policy development, they also can be transformative. Institutionalized ideas do not just narrow the range of options, but provide the basis for future growth along the institutional paths set previously. Ideas which become embedded in institutions can influence policy "even after the interests of their creators have

26Majone, Evidence, Argument and Persuasion, 154.
27Majone, 150-1.
28Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," 8.}
changed."29 Institutionalization provides the basis upon which later policies can develop, but not necessarily as the original actors envisaged or intended. Thus, the goals of the original policy makers and the effects of the policies themselves can be quite dichotomous. As demonstrated in subsequent chapters, policies designed to encourage women to leave the labour market, such as generous maternity leaves in France, also legitimated government action in the area of employment and family policy, and provided the basis for later policy development to reconcile work and family life.

The argument that policies can develop along paths other than originally intended by societal and governmental actors further specifies how institutions can remain relatively autonomous from societal actors. As Krasner argues, "once new institutions are in place they can assume a life of their own, extracting societal resources, socializing individuals, and even altering the basic nature of civil society itself."30

This thesis builds on what some women historians of welfare states have recently uncovered: conservative welfare policies should not be seen as regressive in their effects.31 In France, child care policies have emerged on the basis of earlier policies that were essentially conservative and pronatalist. Whether by effect or design, these early policies did subordinate women's rights to other goals such as increasing the birth rate; however, the development of these policies provided the basis upon which a woman-friendly welfare state could more easily emerge later on. Ironically, women-friendly policies such as child care emerged more easily in a conservative country such as France, than they did in liberal countries such as Canada and the United States, countries with strong women's movements.

This argument parallels observations about the reformist capacity of the capitalist welfare state. Social reform, even if achieved under a conservative government, changes the political landscape. It alters the balance of power by shaping norms, encouraging the development of political and administrative institutions to perpetuate policies, and provides the basis upon which future actors can press for reforms.

30Krasner, "Approaches to the State," 240.
31See literature on maternalism, op. cit. n. 4.
Once institutionalized as policies and as norms, ideas become entrenched and are relatively difficult to change. And institutions, once established, change slowly. However, change can occur, through changes to the institutions themselves and through the introduction of new ideas. Because institutions are socially constructed, as ideas and actors change, policy change can occur.

Sources of institutional change include shifts in political power, such as changes in the governing party; shifts in the socioeconomic context, such as changes in industrial structure; or the introduction of a new level of governance, such as the European Union. Change can also occur as a result of some significant historical event, such as war. Some researchers have argued that change can also occur when learning takes place within the institutions and among the actors themselves, causing a shift in beliefs and ideas. Finally, and most importantly for this thesis, change can occur because of shifts in the structured relations between interest groups and governments.

The literature on ideas is weaker in identifying the factors that determine which ideas are selected, and the process of selection of new ideas over others. Some researchers, analyzing the environmental policy arena, suggest that when certain societal actors, such as scientists, become members of the bureaucracy, they carry their ideas with them which then influence the policies chosen. I argue that the process is more complicated in the social policy arena. Hall argues, for example, in the economic arena that for new ideas to get onto the policy agenda they not only must be supported in the bureaucracy and government, they must make economic sense and be acceptable to organized interests involved. That is, the ideas must have economic viability, administrative viability, and political viability. Economic viability refers to the apparent capacity of these ideas "to resolve a relevant set of economic problems." Administrative viability refers to the extent to which new ideas "fit the long-standing administrative biases of the

---

33 Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination."
relevant decision makers and the existing capacities of the state to implement them.\textsuperscript{35} Political viability refers to "the fit between the new ideas and the existing goals and interests of the dominant political parties" as well as the presence and perceived interests of groups, the implications in terms of other issues on the political agenda at the time, and so on.\textsuperscript{36}

I argue that ideas must have societal viability as well, especially in the area of social policy, where certain policy ideas may be considered quite controversial. For example, despite political support in Congress and his own initial endorsement, President Nixon ended up vetoing the \textit{Comprehensive Child Development Act} in 1971. Reasons for the veto included the expense of the proposed legislation (lack of economic viability) as well as tremendous opposition from the Moral Majority and other right-wing groups (lack of political viability). However, in announcing his decision, Nixon argued that the Act supported communal approaches to child care rather than family-centred approaches, which clashed with societal views on child care.\textsuperscript{37} The perceived violation of societal norms or conventional beliefs and ideals about the nature of childrearing speaks to the lack of societal viability of the legislation.

\textbf{CASE SELECTION}

This thesis distinguishes between child care, child development, and family policies. It considers child care policies in the context of this broader range of policies that affect the family and women's role within the family and labour market. The broad focus on both child care and family policies is necessary to understand the interplay of ideas, institutions and actors. Child care includes any care other than by parents, such as non-profit and commercial day care centres, regulated or unregulated care for children in the home by childminders (family day care) or nannies, as well as occasional care centres and care by relatives. This form of care is primarily but not exclusively designed to serve a custodial function. Early childhood education and development programs, like kindergarten and nursery school, may also be considered child care

\textsuperscript{35}Hall, "Conclusion," 371.
\textsuperscript{36}Hall, "Conclusion," 371, 374-375.
services. The goal is the education and development of children, but the effect is to provide care for children during the day and allow parents to participate in the labour market.

Family policies, in contrast, include programs such as maternity and parental leave policies, family allowances and dependent care allowances. These policies are not labour market in their orientation but rather are designed to help parents take care of their own children. They may provide beneficial labour market effects if they allow parents to temporarily exit the labour market to care for children, and then return without penalty. Often, though, child care and family policies can be contradictory in that family policies often encourage women to remain at home with their children whereas child care policies allow or encourage them to leave the home.

In order to test the theory that child care policy developed as a result of the interaction of ideas, institutions and actors, as opposed to other explanations, I adopt an inductive, historical approach. This approach allows me to test these factors against the weight of historical evidence. In order to account for variation observed in child care policies, I adopt the comparative case study approach. I selected France, the United States, and Canada because of their variation in levels of child care and variation in institutions and ideas. France has one of the highest levels of child care provision among industrialized countries; Canada and the United States, in contrast, have very low levels of child care provision. The selection of the North American cases allows an exploration of the reasons for their relatively low levels of child care provision compared to France, and of the reasons for the variation between them. Specifically, Canada's relatively low level of child care provision compared to the United States requires explanation, since in other areas of social policy provision, Canada's programs surpass the United States'.

The two sets of cases vary in terms of their systems of government. France has a relatively centralized and unitary system of government, whereas the United States has a relatively decentralized federal system. Canada's political system is also characterized as decentralized because of the existence of two levels of government, but relatively centralized within those levels of government (see chapter two). Assuming a high degree of centralization facilitates policy development, one would expect France's child care system to be most highly developed, followed by Canada's, and lastly the United States'. This is not the case. Thus, other factors must be considered.
The two sets of cases also vary in terms of the political values upheld. France's political culture is largely collectivist in orientation. Care for various groups in society is considered a community or collective responsibility. The principle of solidarity connotes a duty or responsibility of the wealthy to help the poor, the young to help the old, and so on. Policies are not governed by the idea of "deserving versus undeserving", as in North America. Although not always successful, the state does attempt to redistribute benefits across income levels, class, and age, and to families with children, regardless of family form.\footnote{For a discussion of the distributive aspects of the French welfare state see David R. Cameron, "Continuity and Change in French Social Policy: The Welfare State Under Gaullism, Liberalism, and Socialism," in The French Welfare State: Surviving Social and Ideological Change (New York: NYU Press, 1994), esp. 85-90.} Scholars consider French political culture more statist. The French regard state action as more legitimate in the area of social and economic policy and consider the state as a principal agent to aid in the practice of solidarity.

In Canada and the United States, in contrast, the culture of individualism, and the attendant norms of deserving/undeserving form the basis of many welfare programs. Canadians and Americans consider state action as generally illegitimate in the realm of economic and social policy. They consider the market a more efficient distributor of benefits. These societies tend to value free markets and less state interference. Some state involvement is tolerated to help those most disadvantaged by the market. But comprehensive social programs tend not to develop. Social problems in both Canada and the United States are largely considered an individual responsibility to be dealt with in the private sphere—by the family or the private sector—and only in certain cases by the state. Most social programs are targetted to the most needy.

Individualism is tempered somewhat in Canada. Some social programs, such as health care, and until recently, family allowances, are universal in scope. In Canada, state involvement in the social and economic sphere in comparison to the United States is more common. In the latter country, it is commonly argued that much more societal resistance to the idea of state interference exists. Thus, one would predict that Canada's tempered liberalism would lead to greater development of child care policies. Again, this is not the case.\footnote{This study is not the first to observe that Canada's welfare state is not as developed as Canadians like to believe. See, for example, Carolyn Tuohy, "Social Policy: Two Worlds," in...}
The two sets of cases also vary in terms of their belief in pronatalism; that is, promotion of the birthrate. Demographic concerns throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in France led successive French governments to adopt policies to increase the birthrate and decrease the rate of infant mortality. Pronatalism, rather than immigration, was, and in some ways still is, the favoured policy solution to the problem of depopulation. In both Canada and the United States, in contrast, immigration was and is the preferred policy option to counteract population decline. The American and Canadian governments generally have shown less concern over increasing the birth rate. In fact, both Canadian and American policies are notable for their distinctly anti-natalist basis throughout most of their history. While both countries adopted policies to help prevent infant mortality, societal or governmental support for large families is not as strong, and widespread societal disapproval of policies that would encourage the birthrate among low income earners exists.

Again, differences between Canada and the United States can be observed. Governments in Quebec have also been concerned with birth rates in order to ensure a continued francophone presence within Canada. One could predict that a government within Canada that promotes pronatalism could cause some policy differences to emerge within Canada, and in comparison to

*Governing Canada*, 275-305. Canada has a large number of means-tested programs, more so than a number of European countries, and is increasingly moving towards means-testing. Furthermore, Canada's overall spending on social programs as a proportion of GDP is consistently below the average of OECD countries, as well as the G7 countries which include some of the lowest-spending countries: the United States and Japan (see table 2.1). Tuohy (283) observes that in the United States, 93 per cent of income transfers to single parent families are in the form of means-tested transfers; in Canada 69 per cent; but in United Kingdom, only 63 per cent; 45 per cent in Sweden; and only 16 per cent in Germany.

40 The anti-natalist philosophy of Anglo-Saxon countries generally can be traced back to (Protestant) liberal philosophers such as John Stuart Mill who wrote: "The fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life. ...And in a country either over-peopled, or threatened with being so, to produce children, beyond a very small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of labour by their competition, is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their labour." He goes on to declare, "The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of State...are not objectionable as violations of liberty. Such laws are interferences of the State to prohibit a mischievous act—an act injurious to others, which ought to be a subject of reprobation,
the United States. While some differences can be observed between Quebec and other provinces, they are not as significant as the differences between Canada and France. And again, they do not boost the level of child care significantly. The Quebec case is discussed later in this chapter.

One important socioeconomic difference between the two sets of cases also can be observed. Women's employment outside the home was more common in France than in North America until very recently. By the turn of this century, France had a very high rate of female economic activity. Of seventeen European and North American countries surveyed by Sullerot, France had the second highest rate of women's economic activity, following Austria, and a much higher rate than the United State and Canada (see table 1.5).41 Jenson states, "By 1906, one in every three workers in [French] industry was a woman."42 Women's labour market participation rates in Canada and the United States, in contrast, did not increase significantly until after the Second World War, with some exceptions. In Canada and the United States especially, lower income women, especially black women, have always worked outside the home. Indeed, black women's labour is often tolerated and even encouraged.

One can predict that increases in women's labour market participation would lead to the development of child care programs to respond to the needs of working women. In these three cases, historically, that was indeed the case. France developed child care policies earlier than the North American cases. Notably, both the Canadian and American federal governments responded to labour shortages in World War II with federal child care programs to allow women to work in wartime industry but dismantled these programs after the war. Differences in labour market participation rates, however, cannot account for variation in child care policy today. Of the three cases, the United States has the highest level of women's labour market participation, not France (see tables 1.5, 1.6). Thus, variation in labour market participation rates is not fully explanatory.

---


EXPLAINING CHILD CARE IN THE THREE CASES

The Influence of Maternalism

The key factor that varies in the three cases is the extent to which maternalist ideas have been institutionalized as policies. Koven and Michel define maternalism as "ideologies and discourses that exalted women's capacity to mother and applied to society as a whole the values they attached to that role: care, nurturance, and morality."43 Kornbluh defines maternalism as a "political philosophy that describes a relationship of mutual obligation and respect between mothers and their governments."44 As Kornbluh argues, maternalists were those reformers at the turn of the century who believed that motherhood was a legitimate basis for women's citizenship, that women as mothers deserved a return from their governments for the socially vital work they performed by raising children and/or that governments had a special responsibility to ensure the health and welfare of children.45

Maternalists advocated policies that recognized the needs of mothers and women's rights as mothers. They also focused on the welfare of children. Maternalists were concerned about the conditions of child labour, child health, and child education. They were thus known both for their politicization of motherhood and their demands to make child welfare a public responsibility, areas thought to be neglected by men. Maternalists believed they had an obligation, and not just a right, to participate in larger society, to bring attention to these issues, and ensure the state acted upon them.46

Maternalist ideas were very influential in France and the United States especially at the formation of the welfare state, but less influential in Canada. The institutionalization of maternalist ideas, primarily in the first two cases, resulted in a number of policies for women and children: sex-based protective labour legislation, child welfare benefits, health and education

43Koven and Michel, "Introduction: 'Mother Worlds'," in Mothers of a New World, 4; see also Koven and Michel, "Womanly Duties," 1079.
programs for mothers and children (that is, educating young women on how to be mothers), and policies to promote maternal employment or "mother-work": for example, maternity allowances and widows' pensions. Materialists also supported policies, including child care, to reconcile work and family life for mothers who did need to work.

The institutionalization of maternalist ideas as policies served to legitimate the state's role in the construction of policies to help women raise children. They thus provided the basis upon which future child care policies could develop under the guise of maternalist concerns to reconcile work and family life. The absence of maternalist-based norms and policies in Canada, even relative to the United States, meant the absence of an institutional base upon which to build child care programs as the welfare state expanded after World War II. Some policy exceptions exist--family allowances, for example--but these do not comprise the preponderance of social policies. A widespread belief in or acceptance of early childhood education programs for young children, for example, is absent in Canada. While public kindergarten programs for five-year-olds are near-universal in Canada, public developmental programs for younger children are not. Instead, policies developed primarily along welfare lines. Public child care programs and services are directed mainly to the most needy in Canada.

The United States, in comparison, has overall higher levels of child care programs and services, including kindergartens, and child care for single parents receiving welfare (see tables 1.1, 1.3-1.4). Not all of the programs in the United States are ideal in the eyes of child care advocates. For example, the United States has a lot more commercial care. Still, child care programs are more extensive than in Canada. The greater dominance of maternalism explains why the United States has developed child care and family policies further than Canada, and accounts for the extensiveness of child care programs and services in France.

Use of the Term "Maternalist"

Scholars of maternalist welfare policies use this term in different ways. All agree that maternalism promotes the notion of sexual dualism, of the complementarity of the sexes, and the nuclear family as the basic unit of societal organization. Maternalism emphasizes the idea of

47"Mother-work" is used by Ladd-Taylor to mean "women's unpaid work of reproduction
equality in difference, or equality as complementarity. Maternity and maternalism make women different from men and policies therefore should recognize those differences. Complementarity should thus be the basis of women's rights, not sameness. "Maternal feminists" or "relational feminists", therefore, can be contrasted with individualist feminists who minimize differences between women and men.48

Some scholars, though, have debated whether maternalists can even be considered feminists. Cott argues that maternal or relational feminism is a problematic concept in that feminism is a term of recent vintage. Women's movements in the nineteenth century cannot really be called feminist as that term connotes values of "individualism, liberalism, and rights-consciousness".49 Furthermore, maternalists often refused to define themselves as feminists.50 In their contemporary manifestation, maternalists would be regarded as conservatives.

These scholars also make a distinction between women advocating maternalist policies and men advocating paternalist policies. They do not label men advocating on behalf of women and children as maternalist because they are suspicious of their motives. For example, they argue that protective labour legislation in France initiated by men was an attempt to regulate the labour market and keep women out.51 However, women struggling to advance maternalist goals such as compensatory benefits for mother-work in the United States, would be regarded as progressive. Cott makes the strongest dismissal of the idea of maternal or relational feminism as feminist. She argues that women and men who struggled for sexual parity and complementarity were "dissident voices speaking within a much larger universe of belief favoring the relational

---


50 Koven and Michel, "Womanly Duties," 1091; Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work, 3.

set-up for its *continuation* of male domination."52 Scholars such as Cott thus regard maternalists as maintaining existing conditions for women, rather than improving them.

American scholars tend to emphasize the domestic side of maternalist discourse. Even though they say maternalists were concerned with public policy and issues of citizenship, their scholarship tends to emphasize the voluntaristic, charitable aspects of maternalism and the politics of domestic life. Thus, maternalists are those who believed:

1. that there is a uniquely feminine value system based on care and nurturance;
2. that mothers perform a service to the state by raising citizen-workers; (3) that women are united across class, race, and nation by their common capacity for motherhood and therefore share a responsibility for all the world's children; and
3. that ideally men should earn a family wage to support their "dependent" wives and children at home.53

This definition applies more to maternalists in the United States and Britain, perhaps, but less so to those in France.

The main concerns of maternalist women and organizations in the United States were to promote religious activism via charity work and domesticity via cultivating womanhood within the home.54 As noted by Ladd-Taylor above, maternalists usually supported the idea of a family wage to allow husbands to be the breadwinner and wives to stay at home.55 Because they were concerned with promoting the domestic sphere, maternalist advocates in the United States resisted the idea of day care centres for working mothers as they promoted women's labour outside the home. Maternalists advocated more policies such as mothers' pensions which would allow low-income women to leave the workforce and remain at home with their children and receive compensatory benefits for doing so.56

---

52Cott, "Comment," 204. Emphasis in the original.
54Koven and Michel, "Womanly Duties."
55This male breadwinner model was not always typical of those women who advocated maternalism. Maternalists were not only volunteer women who were supported by their husbands, but also middle class professional women who worked in the areas of social work, health visiting, and nursing.
Scholars writing on Europe, however, tend to label all activists concerned with the welfare and rights of women and children and all who were concerned about motherhood, as maternalists. It is in this sense that I use the word maternalism or maternal feminism. This definition of maternalism is similar to Black's definition of social feminism. Black labels social feminists those groups which "derive a public role for women from a conviction that women's private roles are distinctive and of primary importance." She argues "Women's groups should be considered feminist if their activities on behalf of women produce a greater degree of female autonomy." Thus, all actions and policies to protect mothers and children can be considered maternalist—and feminist.

Scholars of European welfare states, particularly French scholars, point out that maternalists were focused on policies to reconcile work and family life, not just on policies to preserve the domestic sphere and allow women to engage in "mother work". Some activists did advocate state recognition and funding of mothering as work. But owing to the larger numbers of women working outside the home in France, maternalists emphasized policies to help women balance their employment and family duties, not simply to relegate women to the home. (Maternalists in the United States did so as well but much more grudgingly). Maternal feminists in France advocated policies to protect women workers, the banning of night work for women, and maternity leave for women factory workers so that women could leave employment to have children, without fear of getting fired, and then return to the job. Policies that were designed to impose a "family ethic" on women, to forcibly relegate women to the home, and to

\[\text{\underline{Scholars writing on Europe, however, tend to label all activists concerned with the}}\]
\[\text{welfare and rights of women and children and all who were concerned about motherhood, as}}\]
\[\text{maternalists. It is in this sense that I use the word maternalism or maternal feminism. This}}\]
\[\text{definition of maternalism is similar to Black's definition of social feminism. Black labels social}}\]
\[\text{feminists those groups which "derive a public role for women from a conviction that women's}}\]
\[\text{private roles are distinctive and of primary importance." She argues "Women's groups should be}}\]
\[\text{considered feminist if their activities on behalf of women produce a greater degree of female}}\]
\[\text{autonomy." Thus, all actions and policies to protect mothers and children can be considered}}\]
\[\text{maternalist—and feminist.}}\]
\[\text{Scholars of European welfare states, particularly French scholars, point out that}}\]
\[\text{maternalists were focused on policies to reconcile work and family life, not just on policies to}}\]
\[\text{preserve the domestic sphere and allow women to engage in "mother work". Some activists did}}\]
\[\text{advocate state recognition and funding of mothering as work. But owing to the larger}}\]
\[\text{numbers of women working outside the home in France, maternalists emphasized policies to}}\]
\[\text{help women balance their employment and family duties, not simply to relegate women to the}}\]
\[\text{home. (Maternalists in the United States did so as well but much more grudgingly). Maternal}}\]
\[\text{feminists in France advocated policies to protect women workers, the banning of night work for}}\]
\[\text{women, and maternity leave for women factory workers so that women could leave employment}}\]
\[\text{to have children, without fear of getting fired, and then return to the job. Policies that were}}\]
\[\text{designed to impose a "family ethic" on women, to forcibly relegate women to the home, and to}}\]

57 I attach the word "feminism" to maternalism in line with Offen's argument that feminism to Europeans means more "the rights of women" than "rights equal to those of men". Those who advocate policies for women to emphasize their positive differences from men can be considered feminist as well, although not "liberal" or "individualist" feminist. See Offen, "Defining Feminism," 128.

58 Black, "Social Feminism in France," 218.

59 Michel in "The Limits of Maternalism," does acknowledge as much, although I suspect she would hesitate to apply the concept of maternalism broadly to both.

60 Cova (123) documents the work of Aline Valette, for example, a militant socialist who also supported maternal values and the idea of women's work and maternity as a social function. Cova writes, "an expert in female workers' rights, she denounced their double exploitation in domestic as well as in extra-domestic work. But she believed that only through the latter could emancipation be reached" because it allowed women to become independent.
confine their role to social reproduction could be labelled "familist" not maternalist; that is, enforcing male dominance, rather than women's rights as mothers. These scholars would also agree that some men could be maternalists, or advocate maternalist policies.

The extent to which maternalism meant mother-work in the United States is clear from the fact that few policies developed to reconcile work and family life in the United States. Indeed, the U.S. federal government only recently implemented legislation regarding unpaid maternity leave (see table 1.2). The lesser labour market participation of U.S. women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries compared to other western industrialized countries, and, more specifically, the lesser labour market participation of white women in the United States at that time, compared to black women is reflected in table 1.5.61

Since most of the women advocating maternalist policies in the United States were middle class and white, they tended to uphold the domestic sphere. Black women tended to participate in the labour market much more, but not reap the benefits of maternalist policies. Widows' pensions and AFDC for a long time, through strict eligibility criteria, excluded most black women, some immigrants and "women with lax standards of sexual morality."62 Support for maternalism, that is, mother-work, was mainly a white, middle class phenomenon. Maternalism became less fashionable as women, especially white women involved in promoting maternalism, themselves joined the workforce. As white women's labour market participation became more common in North America, individualist feminism, which demands a strict equality between men and women, became the predominant ideology in the women's movement in the United States. Feminist goals and demands shifted greatly in the United States just before and after World War II and white women's organizations, and society as a whole, increasingly rejected maternalism. Indeed, Kornbluh argues that "maternalism seems to have ceased to attract white

61At the turn of the century, only 17 per cent of white women in the United States were in the labour force, compared to 41 per cent of non-white women. Esther Peterson, "Working Women," in The Woman in America, special issue of Daedalus 93, 2 (Spring 1964), 684. Even by 1963, "although there were far more whites and far fewer nonwhites among women workers, the proportion of nonwhites with a job was still a fourth greater than the proportion of whites." Married black women with children were also more likely than white women to work outside the home; hence the greater need for child care and other mechanisms to reconcile work and family life.

bourgeois adherents at least partly because nonwhite women tried to make the doctrine work for them."

The Dichotomy between Policy Goals and Policy Effects

Maternalist ideas were not and are not particularly progressive from a liberal or individualist feminist perspective. Nor did they necessarily lead to particularly progressive policy developments at first. The effect of the institutionalization of those ideas, however, was to provide the basis upon which child care could be built through legitimizing policies for women and children and legitimizing state activity in these areas. In turn, the relative lack of development of maternalist policies and maternalist norms in Canada meant the lack of a basis upon which child care programs could legitimately be built.

This thesis tells an important tale about the dichotomy between policy goals and policy effects, or the intended versus the unintended consequences of policy history. Policy makers in France, for example, did not originally intend to establish labour market policies specifically, nor did they promote a vision of women's individual equality. At root, the policies were pronatalist and educational, emphasizing child health and protection, and encouraging women to have babies. Certainly some labour market policy goals existed, but more to reconcile work and family life for single mothers, women forced to work because of poverty, or women whose spouses were not employed. However, by implementing policies to respond to these goals, these policymakers provided the basis upon which child care could later expand. Policies to reconcile work and family life could be seen as legitimate and later actors could press for expanded child care services.

Ironically, individualist feminism has not been as successful in promoting policies for children in the United States or Canada. First, individualist feminism, with its demands to socialize the costs of child care, does not fit easily within the norms regarding the family already established. In both the United States and Canada those norms included the idea that child care was a private responsibility, except in cases of families who were poor, in trouble, or otherwise

---

disadvantaged. As argued above, those values were tempered in the United States with maternalist ideas and policies that allowed the state to intervene in other circumstances. Governments and societies in neither country, however, have embraced the idea that child care is a collective responsibility.

Second, individualist feminists paid less attention to policies for families, concentrating instead on improving women's position in the workplace and society. Maternalists understood women's rights through the lens of motherhood; that is, what made them different from men. Individualist feminists, in contrast, argue that women's rights should be defined on the basis of women's roles as workers and citizens, not as mothers. The difficulty with individualist feminists' focus on achieving equality between men and women via arguing the sameness of the sexes means it is difficult for them to factor in children. Individual or liberal feminists thus have achieved greater economic independence for women and individual self-fulfillment, but offer few ideas on how to resolve parental responsibilities. Instead, they have focused on ways for women to leave the home and achieve independence in the public sphere.64 As a result, individualist feminists see a conflict between a "woman's desire for freedom and self-fulfillment and the demands of their children." And, seeing that "'the care of the baby is the weak point in feminism,' feminists tried to transform the family,"65 and remove women from obligations of child care, for example, via proposals to socialize the care of children, rather than demanding policies to reconcile work and family life.

Contemporary liberal feminists view child care as instrumental to achieve equality in the workplace; they promote child care as a workplace policy rather than a family policy. However, lobbying for child care in this manner fits less well with dominant norms in society which still see women primarily as mothers or predominantly responsible for child care. I argue that maternalist discourse has been more successful at persuading governments to implement public policy on child care than individualist feminist discourse, even in the United States where liberal feminism is strong. This is true even today.

64Ladd-Taylor argues, "Rather than try to change society to accommodate mothers, as some of their foremothers had done...they [liberal feminists] equated wage earning with freedom and concentrated on removing the legal obstacles to work outside the home." Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work, 126.
Admittedly, maternalism in the United States reinforced gender roles by arguing that the state should provide in the absence of a male breadwinner. On the other hand, maternalism advocated the directing of public resources to women and children, and not just to male breadwinners. Maternalist policies like mothers' pensions, as well as day care for working mothers, provided valuable supports to single-parent families and meant women did not have to fear as much the death of a spouse or divorce. In contrast, women's organizations abandoned the fight for day care early on in this century, and individualist feminists have only recently seen it as a priority.

These outcomes refute a central hypothesis of the women in politics literature, that agency is the key causal factor in changing policies to be more favorable to women. In particular, the literature assumes that political mobilization of women must be along liberal feminist lines. These scholars emphasize the importance of political developments such as the attainment of voting rights for women, improvements in the civil rights and the civil status of women, women's mobilization and organization, and the percentage of women in government and the bureaucracy. This literature assumes that women's agency is necessary to ensure progressive policy outcomes for women; otherwise policies will be oppressive.

This thesis demonstrates that agency alone is not the key factor in child care policy development. Institutionalization of actors, including women's organizations, but other groups as well, in policy networks, and the embedding of their ideas in policies, is crucial. The involvement of women and women's organizations was very important in building the early welfare state in the United States. Women's organizations were important in promoting maternalist ideas and persuading governments to adopt maternalist policies. But the key causal

---

65 Ladd-Taylor, 107.

66 See, for example, Joyce Gelb, Feminism and Politics: A Comparative Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Barbara Hobson, "Feminist Strategies and Gendered Discourses in Welfare States: Married Women's Right to Work in the United States and Sweden," in Mothers of a New World, esp. 400; Koven and Michel, "Womanly Duties"; also introduction in Mothers of a New World; Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur, eds., Comparative State Feminism (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage, 1995).
factor was the embedding of those ideas as policies. Thus, what matters is not only or solely the presence of women's organizations per se but rather, organizations that promote policies for women, including trade unions, business organizations, and family groups.

In France, maternalist ideas were not always promoted by women's groups but rather trade unions, business organizations, and family groups. Corporatist structures in France provided points of entry into the policy process which enabled these groups to promote policies that ultimately benefitted women, even if mainly men initiated those policy changes. The key was the formation of policies on a maternalist basis. These observations refute the argument made by some critics of Scandinavian welfare states. These critics suggest that the welfare state has strengthened women's subordination in the public sphere while freeing them from the private sphere, because the welfare state strengthens corporatist structures dominated by men. In France, that was clearly not the case. In Canada, women's organizations promoting maternalism existed, but their lack of institutionalization in policy networks explains the absence of strong child care policies. Child care emerged as a federal policy via the efforts of federal and provincial bureaucracies who incorporated a welfare vision of child care more favoured by social workers and other professionals.

The Quebec Case

Quebec has a different political cultural dynamic than the rest of Canada. The provincial government's emphasis on the preservation of francophone language and culture has meant that Quebec shares with France a concern for pronatalism. As in France, the Quebec government has been more concerned about birthrates (among francophone Canadians) than have governments in the rest of Canada, going so far as to institute a baby bonus. Johnson argues that Quebec can

67Koven and Michel argue, for example, that female reformers in France "were more likely to be effective when their causes were taken up by male political actors pursuing other goals, such as pro-natalism or control of the labor force." "Womanly Duties," 1080.


be described as a more corporatist state than the rest of Canada, but he describes it as liberal corporatist as opposed to social corporatist like France.  

The province, however, is subject to similar institutional pressures as other provinces in Canada, such as federalism, the party and electoral system, and strong cabinet government. Quebec provides an excellent future test case of the hypothesis that both ideas and institutions matter. Though beyond the scope of this thesis, I offer a preliminary assessment.

If child care policy is determined by ideas solely, Quebec's child care policies will resemble France's. If institutions and institutional history in addition to ideas matter, then one could expect fewer differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada, than between Quebec and France. The Quebec case supports the argument that ideas, in combination with institutions, determine policy outcomes.

Some maternalist-based policies exist in Quebec, as in France, given the government's concerns regarding birth rates. Day care centres were first established in Quebec in the 1850s. In recent years the government has worked to implement a more expansive child care system. However, federal institutions have acted as constraints. Child care policies and programs have largely developed as they did in the rest of Canada: in a piecemeal fashion. Even though recent governments have been committed to expanding child care, current levels of child care spaces per population of children are similar to those in Ontario and a number of other provinces, and indeed are lower than those in Alberta (see table 4.6). And while levels of commercial care are lower in Quebec than, for example, in Alberta, they are not much lower than Ontario, and are

---


71 The Quebec government has recently implemented full-day kindergarten for five-year-olds, and $5 per day child care for four-year-olds, with the plan to extend subsidized care gradually to cover all children. It also plans to increase benefit levels for parental leave. See Margaret Philp, "Child-Care Plan Makes Quebec Distinct," The Globe and Mail, 17 June 1997, A1, A9.
higher than Saskatchewan and Manitoba (see table 4.7). The Quebec case thus speaks to the fact that institutions are powerful in mediating ideas.72

CONCLUSION

This thesis scrutinizes the role of ideas, actors, and institutions in order to explain the particular development of child care policies in France, Canada, and the United States. It argues that ideas about who is responsible for children, ideas about the family, and ideas about women's role in the state and society are crucial to our understanding of how welfare policies develop. More specifically, the degree to which certain ideas were institutionalized as norms affected later policy development and accounted for the scope of programs in each of the countries. Once institutionalized, ideas establish a policy trajectory which has the dual effect of narrowing the range of potential policy outcomes but also enabling the development and expansion of policies consistent with the original policy choices.

Comparative analysis from the three cases reveals that support for child care policies is enhanced by the presence of maternalist ideas. Child care policies cannot easily form without a maternalist basis and policies develop only insofar as these ideas are present. The greater institutionalization of maternalist along with pronatalist ideas in France and more conservative maternalist ideas in the United States provided the basis for the later expansion of child care policies. Ironically, the expansion of child care in France and the United States occurred not within a norm of women's equality, as might be assumed, but under the norm of maternalism (and pronatalism in France). The thesis thus highlights the dichotomy between policy goals and policy effects, or the unintended consequences of policy history.

Ideas are necessary but not sufficient as an explanation of policy development. Institutions and institutionalized actors prove crucial in determining which ideas become embedded and constrain future policy development. The thesis demonstrates that the greater

72Symmetry of analysis is a problem in these cases. Quebec is a province under Canadian authority federally, while France is an autonomous country. Some aspects of divided authority now affect France, for example, the European Union, but from the earliest stages of welfare state development it has had much more autonomy to develop its own policy. Controlling for this factor is difficult. However, this France-Quebec contrast also speaks to the fact that institutions are extremely powerful in mediating ideas.
levels of child care in France and the United States, compared to Canada, can be explained by the interaction of ideas, actors, and institutions.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

This chapter has outlined the theory and cases explored in this thesis. The next chapter tests alternative explanations and explains why historical institutionalism is chosen. The three empirical chapters that follow detail developments in France, Canada, and the United States. The final chapter explores the conclusions that can be drawn from analyses of all the cases and makes suggestions for further research. It reviews the findings and briefly tests the generalizability of the argument to other cases. It also reflects on the future of child care policy development in Europe and North America in light of current restructuring of the state and political economy. Child care is a relatively "new" policy area, in North America at least. Understanding the factors that account for the emergence of child care policy may thus allow one to understand better its likely future development in an era when states increasingly face economic and fiscal constraints.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>&lt; 3 years</th>
<th>3 years to comp. schooling</th>
<th>age of comp. schooling</th>
<th>length of school day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1990-92</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>95+</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1990-92</td>
<td>58 b)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1990-92</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>97+</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1990-92</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>65-70</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55d)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1990-92</td>
<td>6d)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1990-92</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6-(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55-60</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50-55</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>65-70</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden&lt;sup&gt;d)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1990-92</td>
<td>29e)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1990-92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43f)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>1990-92</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>71a)g)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a)</sup> Variation in hours of opening depending on day. For Canada, pre-primary schooling is offered 2.5 hours/day five days a week or six hours per day on alternate days. For Germany, the figures are for largely part-day programs, as are the figures for the United States. School hours
vary in the U.S.A. by state. For Sweden, schools can decide how long the day is to be, but in grades one to two, it can be no longer than six hours, and no longer than eight hours for older children (including lunch).

b) This figure is for children from age six months (when the basic maternity leave ends) through two years.

c) School day increases by age.

d) Discrepancy in data from another source. For Ireland, Joshi and Davies (1992: 556) report a level of provision at 35 to 40 per cent from children ages three to school age; for Italy, a level of 20 per cent for children under three; and for Sweden, reported levels of 31 and 79 per cent for 1987.

e) This figure is for children zero to three years. Parental leave is paid fully for the first year and partly paid for the subsequent three months, only children ages one and two are in care. The "real" coverage rate thus is approximately 48 per cent.

f) Compulsory schooling begins at age five in Britain so this figure is for three- and four-year-olds only.

g) A more complete breakdown is as follows: 10 per cent of infants less than a year old are in centre-based care and 15 per cent in family day care; 20 per cent of toddlers ages one to two are in centres and 18 per cent in FDC; for pre-schoolers the breakdown by age is 41 per cent and 15 per cent for three-year-olds; 61 per cent and 15 per cent of four-year-olds; and 90 per cent and 11 per cent for five-year-olds (Hofferth and Deich, 1994: 528). Almost all five-year-olds are in either kindergarten or grade one; Kamerman and Kahn (1995: 134) report that 44 per cent of three- and four-year-olds are in pre-primary programs.


For Canada, data from Human Resources Development Canada, Status of Day Care in Canada 1993 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1994). The numbers given for Canada are for children with full-time working parents, as well as students and parents working part-time. The levels for full-time working parents in general, including lone-parents and families with both parents working full-time, are approximately 17 per cent for children under three and 60 per cent for three to six-year-olds.
Table 1.2

MATERNITY AND PARENTAL LEAVE PROGRAMS
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1991-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maternity/Paternity</th>
<th>Ext'd Parental Leave</th>
<th>Total Maternity &amp; Parental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duration in Weeks</td>
<td>Benefit % Wage</td>
<td>Other Duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ext'd Parental Leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>82% (30 days) then 75%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>15&lt;sup&gt;a)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Patr. 52 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 wks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>16&lt;sup&gt;b)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6 months/PT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway ('93)</td>
<td>42-52</td>
<td>80-100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>90 +90 days</td>
<td>all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>flat rate parent</td>
<td>parent rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>allowance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>6+12&lt;sup&gt;c)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>90 (6 wks) then fixed sum for 12 wks&lt;sup&gt;c)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>--&lt;sup&gt;d)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>--&lt;sup&gt;d)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a)</sup> Plus two unpaid weeks from the time of quitting work until benefits start. Different jurisdictions also offer various periods of unpaid maternity and parental leave. For example, the federal government allows 17 weeks of unpaid maternity leave and 24 weeks of unpaid parental leave. The Quebec government allows 18 weeks of unpaid maternity leave and 24 weeks of unpaid parental leave. Saskatchewan, Alberta, and the Yukon do not have parental leave provisions.

<sup>b)</sup> 1995: for birth of the third and subsequent children, maternity leave is 26 weeks. There are
also three days of paid paternity leave.

c) As of 1994, leave became available to the full work force, covering 14 weeks; however, some employees are entitled to longer leaves of 40 weeks (11 weeks before childbirth and 29 weeks after). These leaves are limited to those who worked full-time for the same employer for two years previously, or five years part-time.

d) As of 1993 with the Family and Medical Leave Act, 12 weeks of UNPAID parental leave is available for employees of companies with 50 or more employees, where the worker has been employed for at least one year, and excluding workers in the top 10 per cent of the company’s pay scale. The leave can be used for child or elder care.

### Table 1.3
PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATIONAL ENROLMENT RATES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1987-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age 3 '87</th>
<th>Age 3 '88</th>
<th>Age 4 '87</th>
<th>Age 4 '88</th>
<th>Age 5 '87</th>
<th>Age 5 '88</th>
<th>Age 6 '87</th>
<th>Age 6 '88</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>96.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>101.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>102.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**a)** The reason for the low rates in certain countries for ages five and six reflects the beginning of compulsory schooling in these countries. Compulsory schooling begins in the United Kingdom at age five; in Greece at age five and a half; in Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States at age six; and Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland at age seven. See OECD, *Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators* (Paris: OECD, 1992), 71.

**b)** Enrollment in pre-primary programs for two-year-olds for 1986-87 include: Austria (1.2%);
Belgium (21.1%); France (33.6%); Germany (12.6%); Norway (20.8%); Spain (4.6%); and the United Kingdom (1.3%). For 1987-88: Austria ((1.0%); Belgium (21.6%); France (35.7%); Germany (9.1%); Norway (22.8%); Spain (4.5%); Switzerland (0.6%); and the United Kingdom (1.3%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age 3</th>
<th>Age 4</th>
<th>Age 5</th>
<th>Age 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'90</td>
<td>'92</td>
<td>'94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ger.</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nthlds</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prtgal</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swtzland</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See note a in Table 3. Figures include enrolment in public and private early childhood education programs. 1990 figures are reporting all levels of education combined, not just pre-primary, unless otherwise noted.

a) Excludes primary school.
b) Includes pupils under age four in pre-primary.
c) Includes pupils more than age six in pre-primary.
d) 1990 figures not available. These are 1989 figures.
e) Data for 1992 unavailable.
Pre-primary only; data correspond to children from day nurseries, recreation centres and nursery school groups.

May include pupils less than five years old in primary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td>1901</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td></td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Economically active includes both the employed and the unemployed who are seeking work. The numbers given indicate the percentage of the economically active population compared to the total population of the same gender, not of the population as a whole.


c) Data for 1985 and 1990 includes only those aged 15 and over.

d) Figures from 1950 on for Federal Republic of Germany.

### Table 1.6
TOTAL AND ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BY AGE GROUP IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (000)</td>
<td>Active Rate (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>2163</td>
<td>1803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>2435</td>
<td>2041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>2312</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>2116</td>
<td>1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>1779</td>
<td>1488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>1113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>1167</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>4366</td>
<td>2451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>4296</td>
<td>3766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>4348</td>
<td>3798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>4280</td>
<td>3806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>4322</td>
<td>3783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>3817</td>
<td>3306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>2797</td>
<td>2194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>2886</td>
<td>1684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>2958</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>18555</td>
<td>13558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>19374</td>
<td>15994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>22253</td>
<td>18471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>21827</td>
<td>18108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>19458</td>
<td>16156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>16329</td>
<td>13396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>13014</td>
<td>10146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>10837</td>
<td>7237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>10145</td>
<td>4630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter II
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Drawing on the comparative politics literature, three broad sets of theories are explored in this chapter: structural and functional theories; social demand theories; and institutional theories. None of these approaches is found to be satisfactory in itself; thus, as explained in the previous chapter, the thesis considers ideas in combination with actors and institutions to account for the child care policy differences observed. I do not test these theories explicitly, but instead explain why these common approaches to the study of welfare state policies are unsatisfactory to understand child care policy development.

Structural and functional theories, or what Janoski calls the needs versus constraints model, direct attention to the impact of socioeconomic supply and demand factors on the provision of child care services.1 These theories argue that policies develop as needs arise and as societies change. The major variables considered as explanatory include a changing industrial structure, shifts in the business cycle, and demographic and labour market pressures. The "supply" side of socioeconomic theories, however, suggests that certain factors, such as budgetary constraints, limit policy development as well. It is thus important to consider both needs and constraints. Social demand theories focus on the influence of interest groups such as trade unions, social movements, and political parties. These are often referred to as power resources theories. These theories examine the political power of societal actors, their ability to capture political power themselves, and their ability to lobby successfully outside of government for policy change. Institutional theories examine the institutional (administrative) factors that lead to policy change. The institutions of the state itself are examined, such as the structure and organization of the executive, legislature, courts, and bureaucracy. The power of these institutions, measured in terms of their capacity and autonomy, is examined as well.2


2Capacity connotes the ability of the state to implement desired policies. Autonomy connotes the extent to which the state can formulate its goals independently of societal interests. See Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In
STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL THEORIES

I first look at theories which seek to explain the emergence of the welfare state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and then look at those which attempt to explain the expansion or lack of expansion of those policies in the latter half of the twentieth century. Throughout, I evaluate the applicability of these approaches to explaining the emergence and expansion of child care programs.

It is striking to observe that child care services appeared in a number of states in roughly the same period. Child care programs emerged in Italy around 1831; in Sweden in 1854; in Britain in 1850, although the first factory day care appeared in 1816 in Scotland, begun by Utopian Socialist Robert Owen; France in the 1840s, although pre-schools had started long before then; and in Germany in the 1830s, with pre-school education and education philosophy emerging during this time period as well. The earliest child care centres in Canada appeared in the 1850s and infant schools emerged in the United States in the 1820s and 1830s. Day nurseries became more common in both the United States and Canada in the late 1800s. What could explain this similar timing? And what explains the later variance in supply of child care?

1. Changing Industrial Structure

One theory to explain the entry of countries into the provision of child care at roughly the same time is that the welfare state developed in response to the problems arising out of industrialization. That is, the welfare state developed as an answer to the problems created by capitalist industrialization. As industry became the predominant mode of production, and as

---


4See, for example, Harold Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and...*
people moved from rural to urban settings, certain programs and services were no longer provided by communities, churches, private charity, and so on. Plus, industrialization exposed "larger and larger proportions of the population to new categories of risk: unemployment, industrial accident, sickness, and old age." People needed the welfare state, that is social protection, to deal with the effects of industrialization. More and more, the state took over those functions as its own power and capacity expanded with the development of a bureaucratic apparatus. Thus, the development of the modern industrial economy and bureaucracy made the welfare state both necessary and possible.

The logic of industrialization theory downplays the role of ideology and emphasizes more the impact of functional factors in the development of the welfare state. It has faced a number of criticisms. Some researchers have pointed out that no direct causal relationship exists between expenditure growth and variation in national expenditure patterns in the early development of welfare states. Skocpol points out that level of industrialization is not predictive of when nations adopted social insurance programs. Also, these theories cannot explain the lack of development of a welfare state in a country like the United States, an early industrializer.

Nuancing the logic of industrialization theory, some have argued that the welfare state can only expand in so far as a country has the resources to pay for it. Thus, a country needs a

---


8Functionalism is a theory that posits that political activity fulfills a purpose. The presence of some phenomenon is explained in terms of the role it plays in maintaining some system. Functionalists tend to observe similarities across cases, rather than differences. They are generally concerned with the balance or maintenance of a social system. But they can also be concerned about dysfunctions and disequilibrium.

certain level of economic development (that is, a surplus) to permit the diversion of scarce resources from productive use to welfare.10 This argument responds to criticisms of the theory which point out that social policies emerged fifty or even a hundred years after traditional communities had been destroyed in Europe.11 Again, though, this theory cannot account for why a wealthy industrialized country like the United States would not implement the broadest range of social policies.

Certainly industrialization played a broad role in the development of child care policy in that it meant women left the home to work in the factories and sweat shops. As factory production required women's labour, child care programs emerged in order to provide care for children of working mothers and to prevent the neglect of children in the homes. Part of the motivation too was prevention of infant mortality as working class families lived in horrible conditions, particularly in urban areas.12

In all of these cases, neither the state nor the employer was the primary provider of services. Child care services were provided mainly by private, charitable and philanthropic organizations. Furthermore, child care was not specifically tied to the emergence of other welfare state policies in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Child care services developed long

---

12Much of the literature argues these were the primary reasons for the establishment of day care centres in the nineteenth century. See, for example, the many essays in Cochran, International Handbook of Child Care Policies and Programs. See also the essays in Lamb et al., Child Care in Context.


Fuchs also reports that child abandonment was a huge problem in France. In poorer urban areas of France, the rate of child abandonment was as high as 40 to 50 per cent, and averaged about 30 percent. Foundling hospitals emerged to care for these abandoned children. Rachel Fuchs, Abandoned Children: Foundlings and Child Welfare in Nineteenth-Century France (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984).
before significant government involvement in other social policy areas occurred. Recall that day care centres were established in the early to mid-part of the nineteenth century. The earliest welfare state policies did not emerge until the late 1800s in Germany under Bismarck. Public policy on child care did not emerge until the 1930s in Sweden, the early 1900s in the United Kingdom, and the World War II period in the United States and Canada (see appendix). The presence of these child care services, therefore, does not mark the development of public policy in this area. While social needs motivated the development of child care services, state involvement did not automatically follow.

2. International Economic Factors / International Economic Convergence

Some comparative researchers, especially in the field of international political economy, argue that international factors such as globalization and international economic competition affect state politics and policies in that they constrain domestic initiatives and shape state responses. Furthermore, some theorists argue that industrialization and modernization lead to interdependence among states and policy convergence. As Gourevitch argues, "all modern societies in interdependent situations acquire certain common political characteristics such as strong welfare pressures, bureaucratization, legitimation problems..." Interdependence puts pressure on states to adopt similar domestic policies. Thus, international economic

13The French case is a real outlier in that the national government placed day care centres under state administration and surveillance in the mid-1800s and provided state subsidies as well (see chapter three).

14Convergence is defined as "the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances." Colin J. Bennett, "Review Article: What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?," British Journal of Political Science 21, 2 (April 1991), 215.


interdependence may decrease the importance of institutional factors. International economic factors may constrain state actors' autonomy, just as institutions, it is argued, constrain actors and outcomes.

Interdependence, economic competition, and economic convergence may help explain why child care emerged in the 1800s. At the time of the emergence of child care policies, the international system was stable, which led to a general climate of prosperity, and an open trading regime. These factors could have created pressures to compete in a more open trading regime and driven the need for labour. The development of child care policies could be the result of a coincidence of economic prosperity experienced by western industrialized countries in the early part of the nineteenth century, as was the case post-WWII. In times of prosperity, economies expand, labour is needed, including women's labour, so programs are needed to encourage women to enter the labour market. This in turn may have led to the development of similar policies as all countries tapped into cheap, female labour sources. One could therefore argue that a similar (and increasingly globalized) economic system led to similar timing in child care policy development due to convergence in governmental responses to economic conditions. After this initial period of development, many countries abandoned their early commitment to child care. Again, perhaps this was due to a decline in the economy experienced in the late 1800s, which decreased the demand for women's labour and thus the need for child care.

It could also be the case that increasing economic interdependence during that time drove

---

17 Katzenstein argues that at certain points, international economics may have a tremendous influence over domestic policy development. He suggests, for example, that: as long as the distribution of power in the international political economy was not in question [as was the case under U.S. hegemony following World War II], strategies of foreign economic policy were conditioned primarily by the structure of the international political economy. But when that structure could no longer be taken for granted, as is true today, the relative importance of domestic forces in shaping foreign economic policy increased.


18 Policy convergence can signify convergence of policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy outcomes, and policy style. See Bennett, "Review Article: What is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?" In the case of child care, one can observe broad convergence in policy outcomes.
the adoption of similar social policies and similar welfare state measures. That is, states "learned" from the practices of other states. Bendix proposes that a pioneering society may develop a political or economic policy that other societies will subsequently adopt, but at lower levels. In the area of child care policy, one can certainly see that some learning took place across countries. From its earlier conception, child care in all western industrialized countries had class and custodial connotations, designed for poorer families in which an alternate guardian was needed to care for children while mothers worked. Many countries were also influenced by the philosophy of Friedrich Froebel, founder of the kindergarten movement in Germany in the 1840s. His ideas regarding the importance of play in educating children spread throughout the western world. Early childhood education had more developmental concerns at root and emphasized that the physical environment for the child should allow learning and growth, be physically scaled to the size of the child, and be beautiful, colourful and light. Indeed, the term "kindergarten" implies careful tending and unforced growth, and was generally designed for all children, not just children of the lower classes. The appearance of common practices and thinking regarding early childhood education seems to indicate some convergence in policy content.

Undoubtedly, the fact that all countries experienced a growth in the welfare state and a growth in child care services, just as many are now experiencing a common retrenchment, suggests a common experience and common explanation. But again, the question is whether countries followed suit by introducing public policies. What specific factors motivated states to take over the services provided by charitable organizations and individuals? Child care is not provided evenly throughout western industrialized countries, nor are policies similarly designed. For example, both Sweden and France provide child care funding and regulation; Germany

---


22Ann Taylor Allen, "Spiritual Motherhood: German Feminists and the Kindergarten Movement, 1848-1911," History of Education Quarterly 22, 3 (Fall 1982), 322; Getis and
provides regulation but no funding. Does the presence of similar policies imply convergence, then, or are the variations in policy more important?

While common economic factors and policy learning may account for the similar responses across states, the answer as to why governments got involved in child care requires scrutiny of the domestic political situation in each country. Within the system of global capitalism, a variety of economic and political institutions and organizations emerged. As Katzenstein's study of the small European states reveals, international forces have not completely determined the internal structures and strategies of these states. In Katzenstein argues that "international factors affect political strategies and outcomes only indirectly: they are funnelled through domestic structures that are shaped by different histories and embody different political possibilities."24

No doubt countries face incredible pressures of convergence as a result of globalization and international economic cooperation and competition. But do such economic patterns necessarily shape and constrain choice in policy? I argue ideas are much more important constraints. For example, the answer as to why countries began to abandon infant schools and day care lies more in the realm of ideas. Child development experts in the nineteenth and into the twentieth century began to counter the idea of day care and early childhood education by arguing it was harmful for children.25 These ideas, more so than economic conditions, explain why early attempts at child care (child development) were abandoned. Convergence theories do not really help us understand child care policy development as, I argue, factors other than economic ones influence its development. Social policies, and especially child care, are only loosely tied to labour policy. Convergence, therefore, should not be assumed.

3. Political Functionalism

If economic functionalism is not a persuasive explanation for the development of child

Vinovskis, "History of Child Care in the United States."


24Katzenstein, Small States, 37.

care, perhaps political functionalism is. This theory, advanced by T. H. Marshall and others, argues that the development of the welfare state coincides with democratization. The welfare state marks a significant watershed in the development of modern democracies, a restructuring of authority relations, a redistribution of the pie away from elites and toward the masses. The establishment of new rights reduces the authority and power of previously dominant groups and institutions in society. The result is a gradual but inevitable development and expansion of social policies.

The welfare state can thus be seen as an inevitable part of the development of liberal democracy. Individual legal rights were universalized in the eighteenth century; political rights, that is, the right to participate in the exercise of power, in the nineteenth century; and social rights, such as the right to a certain minimum of economic welfare and social security, in the twentieth century. This development occurred alongside a changing conception of citizenship.

But the question remains, what pushes that development? If democracy is a precondition for welfare state development, and welfare states are likely to expand as democratic rights are expanded, then how does one account for "the historical oddity that the first major welfare state initiatives occurred prior to democracy" and were "often motivated by desires to arrest its realization"? As Rimlinger points out, "The more democratic governments were slower to introduce social protection than the authoritarian and totalitarian governments." Furthermore, political functionalism cannot account for the pattern of child care policy development. If this theory held, as women received the franchise one could expect better policies for women to emerge. But no direct causal relationship exists between the increase of


29Gaston V. Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), 9. Flora and Alber also found that more authoritarian governments (what they label constitutional-dualistic monarchies) introduced welfare state policies sooner than parliamentary democracies. See Flora and Alber,
democratic rights and the expansion of social rights for women in this area. Some child care policies emerged in France before women got the vote in 1945. Women received the vote around the 1920s in Canada and the United States, but child care policies did not develop in force until the 1960s and later.

I would argue again that ideas are important, both in constraining and enabling policy development. For example, the reason for the lack of child care policy may lie in the fact that child care is still not accepted as a right of citizenship, as a social right like health care. Gendered conceptions of citizenship rights shape the way policies are regarded and constrain policy development, despite the extension of political rights to women.

4. Neo-Marxist Functionalism

Neo-Marxist structural-functionalists argue that welfare state policies are the result of the economic and social requirements of advanced capitalism. Welfare state policies emerged in order to ensure political and social stability, that is, to ensure that those who do not own the means of production would not rise up against those who do. These theorists label this the legitimation function performed by the capitalist welfare state. At the same time, the state has to perform an accumulation function, that is, create the conditions to allow capitalist accumulation. The state plays a crucial role both in resolving tensions and conflicts in society and, at the same time, maintaining the capitalist system. The state, it is argued, is not a tool of the capitalist class,


30In Canada, women received the right to vote federally in 1918, and were eligible to run for public office in 1920. By 1919, women in every province but Quebec and P.E.I. could vote in provincial elections and become members of the legislature. P.E.I. women did not get the right to vote provincially until 1922. Quebec women did not get the right to vote provincially until 1940. Veronica Strong-Boag, "Ever a Crusader: Nellie McClung, First-Wave Feminist," in Rethinking Canada: The Promise of Women's History, 3rd ed., eds. Veronica Strong-Boag and Anita Clair Fellman (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997), 278.

In the United States, women received the right to vote in 1920. A bill granting universal suffrage in France passed in the lower house in 1919, 1925, 1932 and 1936, but was defeated twice in the Senate, in 1922 and 1933. Dorothy McBride Stetson, Women's Rights in France (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 34.

but rather acts to sustain the capitalist accumulation process for its own interests of winning elections and maintaining a financial basis to implement policy. The state is thus functionally dependent on the accumulation process. At the same time, it must appeal to symbols and sources of support that mask its role; that is, it must perform legitimation functions. This leads to a crisis of the state as a result of an overload of societal expectations and decreased capacity of the state to respond due to its contradictory roles.

The state ultimately works on behalf of capital, but to maintain political legitimacy, the capitalist state has to spend on welfare services and programs. To maintain the machinery of capitalism, it has to promote capital accumulation and ensure profits. And all this is in addition to freeing enough resources for consumption. Neo-Marxist political economists, writing in the 1970s and 1980s, thus predicted the "crisis" of the welfare state. It is difficult for the state to maintain a balance between these two functions. And, as economies begin to struggle and the state has to reduce its legitimation tasks, that is, without Keynesian-style economic policies to blunt the contradictions, the system reveals its inherent conflicts. The system therefore contains elements leading to its own demise.

This theory tries to explain why (costly) welfare state policies would emerge under capitalism. It suggests that the presence of one factor (social policies) is explained by the presence of another (capitalism). Yet Eastern European countries before the collapse of communism, while not really communist, were also not capitalist either. Regardless, very strong welfare state policies emerged. In fact, better, more wide-ranging policies for women, including child care, existed in the former East Germany, for example. Neo-Marxist functionalism therefore cannot account for the presence of child care policies in non-capitalist regimes. This does not mean these forces were not important in the west, but that they are not necessary for the development of welfare state policies.

5. Major Events

The welfare state also can be argued to be a result of the response to "exogenous shocks, such as wars or international depression, demographic changes, and the failure of current
economic policies to generate desirable economic outcomes."32 Certainly two events that motivated the development of the welfare state in France, Canada, and the United States were the Great Depression and World War II. In the United States, the federal government introduced a number of social programs in 1935, including Old Age Insurance, Old Age Assistance, Unemployment Compensation, Aid to the Blind, and Survivors and Disability Insurance (1939), as well as Aid to Dependent Children.33 In Canada, during World War II, the federal government introduced unemployment insurance (1940) and family allowances (1944), and passed the Old Age Assistance Act, the Blind Persons Act, the Disabled Persons Act, and the Unemployment Assistance Act in the early 1950s.34 Both countries introduced wartime day nurseries as well.

It would make logical sense that these events would be triggers for massive policy change. But as noted, World War II led to the development of public policy on child care in Canada and the United States, but only during the WWII period. After World War II, the federal government in both countries returned to the status quo, eliminating federal support for child care. It was only during the 1960s that public day care became an issue that federal governments in Canada and the United States willingly tackled. Regardless of the vast expansion of the welfare state in other areas, child care did not expand concomitantly.

Furthermore, World War II had less of an impact on domestic social policy than one would think. After World War II, policy convergence across nations in the area of social policy was potentially possible. Blake reports that in August 1941, British Prime Minister Churchill and U.S. President Roosevelt agreed in the Atlantic Charter "to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all, improved labour standards, economic adjustment and social security." In 1942 at an international conference in Chile, over twenty countries agreed to make social security a priority

in the postwar period. Countries accepted the principle of multilateralism and free trade through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. However, to enable adjustments for the impact of free trade, they also agreed to allow for domestic safeguards and exemptions in order to preserve domestic social policies and promote full employment. Countries could have common economic policies and still retain divergent domestic labour policies. Thus, in the area of social policy, policy divergence continued. This meant that new ideas regarding social policy provision could only emerge that were compatible with the core of policies already established in the domestic sphere. This thesis suggests that child care policies developed from the policy basis established prior to World War II, and were not "triggered" by the war itself.

6. Fiscal Resources

Is child care policy development now linked to general levels of government spending? That is, are the largest welfare states now the biggest providers of child care? If a strong relationship exists between economic growth and child care policy development post-WWII, then that would imply that child care policy development is indeed tied to overall growth of the welfare state in the contemporary period. This would suggest the lesser importance of other factors such as ideas and institutions.

If we rank the countries listed in table 2.1 in terms of overall spending, the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands are the biggest spenders, with France following, then Belgium, Italy, Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom, then small states like Greece, Ireland, Spain, and New Zealand, and then the laggards, Canada, Portugal, the United States, Australia, and Japan. In terms of child care provision during the same period, of the countries listed in table 1.1 in chapter one, Denmark, Sweden, and France provide the most child care spaces for children under age three, then the United States, Japan, and Belgium, and the rest, including Canada, provide


significantly less care. For children age three to the year of compulsory schooling, the leaders are France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the United States, Greece, and Spain. Canada again lags behind many of these states. The Scandinavian countries along with France, Belgium, and Italy rank highly, but surprisingly, so does the United States, and, in the case of children under age three, Japan. Thus, overall spending on social programs is not a good predictor of countries' spending on child care.

Similarly, Phillips and Moss found in their 1989 survey for the European Community that publicly-funded child care levels in Denmark, France, Belgium and Italy were the highest by far in the European Community. Germany, Greece, Portugal, and Spain fell within the middle range of service provision, and the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Britain, and Ireland provided the lowest levels of service provision. A striking aspect of this survey is that it revealed that poorer countries, like Portugal and Greece had levels of child care provision comparable to wealthier countries like Britain and the Netherlands. Furthermore, it is striking that within the cluster of corporatist countries, France especially and Italy less so, have quite expansive child care programs in comparison, for example, to Germany. Yet Germany is regarded as having more extensive labour market policies than France or Italy.

When one looks at where North American countries' child care policies fit on this continuum, the United States ranks behind some countries, but ahead of many, including Canada and the United Kingdom. Yet in North America, Canada is generally regarded as more progressive than the United States with regard to the provision of social services. Particularly

37 Unfortunately the OECD does not provide early childhood education figures for Italy; however, the figures provided in table 1.1 in chapter one for children ages 3-5 reflect enrollments in kindergarten. See Chiara Saraceno, "The Ambivalent Familism of the Italian Welfare State," Social Politics 1, 1 (Spring 1994), 63.


39 See GDP levels in table 2.1. One explanation is that the southern European countries of Greece, Portugal and Spain have substantially developed their welfare states as part of joining the European Union. By the late 1980s, social security transfers as a percentage of GDP were higher in these countries than many countries, including Australia, the United States and Japan. See Francis G. Castles, "Welfare State Development in Southern Europe," West European Politics 18, 2 (April 1995), 292.
striking as well is that the United States has higher levels of enrollment in early childhood education than Canada (tables 1.3, 1.4). In other areas of family policy, the United States lags behind Canada and most western industrialized countries. The United States offers no federal paid maternity leave, for example, or family allowances, and only recently introduced legislation to allow unpaid maternity leave for twelve weeks. Granted, Canada's maternity leave is the second worst behind the United States in terms of weeks off and compensation (see table 1.2). But why would Canada provide less child care than even the United States?

Two real puzzles regarding child care provision emerge: why are Canada's child care provision rates so low, especially in comparison to the United States, normally a welfare laggard, and why are France's so high in comparison to other corporatist countries in Europe like Germany? The availability of fiscal resources does not appear to be an adequate answer to these questions.

Fiscal resources explanations also cannot account for why child care remains a small percentage of social security budgets and overall budgets in most western industrialized countries. While overall government spending as a percentage of GDP, as well as government expenditure on social security, increased in France and Sweden throughout the 1970s and 1980s (see tables 2.1, 2.2), Hofferth and Deich report that expenditures in the late 1980s for direct aid to families with children averaged around three per cent of GDP for both France and Sweden. The United States in 1993 spent about one per cent of the federal budget on child care programs, including Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), even though total government spending as a percentage of GDP increased steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s.40

Moreover, child care programs did not develop in tandem with the expansion of the welfare state post-WWII. While total government outlays on social security as a percentage of GDP have increased in all countries at least since the 1960s (see table 2.1), a concerted effort to expand child care programs and services did not occur until the 1970s and 1980s. Even then, spending on child care has not increased enormously as a percentage of GDP in the cases under consideration.

40Sandra L. Hofferth and Sharon Gennis Deich, "Recent U.S. Child Care and Family
Example: Canada

In a sense, one could argue that child care did develop at the federal level in tandem with the welfare state, or at least the beginnings of the universal welfare state, because the federal government introduced child care funding under the Canada Assistance Plan in 1966. This marked the first federal program spending after World War II. The federal government then introduced the Child Care Expense Deduction in 1972, and child tax credits/benefits in 1978. It continued to provide family allowances until 1993, introduced at the federal level in 1944. It established maternity leave in 1971, and parental leave in 1990. Finally, it created the Child Tax Benefits program in 1993 from an amalgamation of child tax credits and the cancelled family allowance program.

Interestingly, the federal government introduced a number of universal social programs during that period: it introduced universal family allowances after World War II and provided them until 1993; it introduced universal health care, and a public pension plan provided coverage in some form to all seniors as well. However, child care did not become a universal social program. Spending on child care remains tiny. In 1993 the federal government spent approximately $724 million on child care programs. The provinces spent approximately $781 million on provincial programs for a total of $1.5 billion. If one includes federal spending on the child tax benefit, maternity and parental benefits, and special programs for aboriginals, nutrition programs, and community action for children, that adds another $7.2 billion. So total spending on all programs for families was $8.7 billion in 1993. This works out to approximately 1.2 percent of GDP.41 To put child care spending in context, the total cost of education in Ontario alone in 1992-93 was $14.5 billion.42

Example: France

France is clearly a leader among industrialized countries in terms of welfare state spending. Under the post-war planning system implemented in France after World War II, Legislation in Comparative Perspective," Journal of Family Issues 15, 3 (September 1994), 445. 41The 1993 GDP estimate was $712.9 billion Canadian. 42Ontario, Royal Commission on Learning, For the Love of Learning: Report of the Royal Commission on Learning, Volume 1, Mandate, Context, Issues (Toronto: Queen's Printer,
government expenditure on social welfare increased from less than five per cent of GNP to about 23 per cent by 1965. Spending on all social protection programs was 2,200 billion francs (about $502 billion) or approximately 31 per cent of GDP in 1993.

The French government spent 3.2 billion francs (about $0.7 billion) on child care for children under six in 1993 (including collective, parental, and family day care centres, part-time day care centres, before- and after-school facilities, nursery schools, as well as child care support services for independent childminders, training of childminders, and the contrat enfance, which is a financing scheme with other levels of government to encourage the expansion of day care centres) (see table 3.7). In 1993 it also spent 67.1 billion francs (about $15.3 billion) on family allowances, 9.5 billion francs (about $2.2 billion) on supplementary family benefits, 4.3 billion francs (about $1 billion) on lone parent allowances, 20.5 billion francs (about $4.7 billion) on the young child's allowance, 5.6 billion francs (about $1.3 billion) on child rearing benefits, 440 million francs (about $100 million) on benefits to cover the wages of childminders, 3.2 billion francs (about $0.7 billion) on assistance in hiring childminders, 3.9 billion francs (about $0.9 billion) on child support benefits, 1.6 billion francs (about $0.4 billion) on special education benefits, and 8.0 billion francs (about $1.8 billion) on school allowances for a total of 124 billion francs (about $28.3 billion) on these social programs for children. Thus, the government spent a total of 127.2 billion francs (about $29 billion) on child care related programs, not including education expenses for children ages three to five. This represented approximately 1.8 per cent of GDP.

---

43Hage and Hanneman, "The Growth of the Welfare State," 57. They use GNP instead of the currently more common GDP measure in their historical analysis.

44The exchange rate in 1993 was C$.228. See Bank of Canada, Bank of Canada Review (Ottawa: Bank of Canada, Autumn 1996), S92.


46David and Starzec report that in 1988, the French government spent a total of 160 billion francs on family benefits, which did not include spending on child care services. Thus, spending has decreased substantially. Marie-Gabrielle David and Christophe Starzec, "France: A Diversity of Policy Options," Child Care, Parental Leave, and the Under 3s: Policy Innovation in Europe, eds. Sheila Kamerman and Alfred Kahn (New York: Auburn House, 1991), 91-93.
Though substantial, the family portion is not the largest of the social security system; rather the largest expenditures are on old age, which represented 49 per cent of total social benefits in 1993, and health, representing 27 per cent of the total.\textsuperscript{47} The family allowance portion was, in contrast, 13 per cent and spending on unemployment was 9 per cent (see table 2.4).\textsuperscript{48} Government spending on family policies in fact declined throughout the 1980s, although it increased slightly in the early 1990s (see table 2.5). The French government's spending on family allowances as a percentage of all social security schemes has decreased steadily from approximately 31 per cent in 1949 to 11 per cent in 1989 (see table 2.7).

Similarly in Canada, government outlays and government spending on social security programs have increased as a percentage of GDP, but child care spending has steadily decreased in the 1980s and 1990s (see table 2.6).\textsuperscript{49} Thus, no positive relationship exists between child care and overall spending. Generous social programs for workers do not necessarily extend to generous family policies.\textsuperscript{50} Why not?

7. Economic Downturns and Deficits

Possibly, low levels of expenditure on child care programs reflect the timing of the introduction of these policies. Governments undertook to expand child care provision in the 1970s and 1980s, when, most researchers argue, the welfare state was in decline or at least under threat as government deficit and debt levels increased. We can hypothesize that child care policy

\textsuperscript{47}David and Starzec report (110) that in 1989, the family fund was in surplus and was used to cover spending deficits in the health care and old age pension systems.


\textsuperscript{49}The tables show spending on family policies in France, and child care policies in Canada. The figures given are not comparable, though, because the available data are limited. Governments did not keep track of program spending on child care until very recently. Thus, only sporadic figures for spending on child care programs exist in Canada. For France, figures over time for family policies exist, but not enough comparable data for child care policies. Table 3.7 in chapter three gives a breakdown of expenses by the Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales for 1983 and 1993 to be approximately .026 and .045 of GDP respectively. (Perhaps the dearth of data indicates the status of child care programs in these countries. Child care spending is such a small percentage of overall GDP that it is difficult to plot statistically its spending compared to overall government spending.)

\textsuperscript{50}Maureen Baker, Canadian Family Policies: Cross-National Comparisons (Toronto:}
would emerge only during the high points of a business cycle because high growth allows for greater government spending. A downturn in the economy or overburdening of social security funds in other areas may explain why child care spending is so small and in some cases is declining as a percentage of GDP.

This again cannot fully account for the variation in child care spending, and variation in provision of child care. Why have certain countries been willing to bear the costs of introducing child care programs while others have not? Fiscal constraints experienced in the 1990s may explain why groups have been unsuccessful at convincing the Canadian federal government to increase child care spending.\(^51\) Cuts in benefits in Sweden may also be explained by high debt and deficit levels.\(^52\) U.S. debt levels, however, remained below the average of G7 nations at 64 per cent, and the deficit crept just above 3 per cent of GDP. Fiscal constraints alone cannot explain why the United States introduced an unpaid as opposed to paid maternity leave, for example. In France, governments have undertaken to develop more child care and family policies during the past economic downturn, some say somewhat cynically, in order to try to convince women to return to the home to decrease unemployment rolls. Fiscal constraints are an unsatisfactory explanation to account for the current dynamic of child care policy development.

### 8. Labour Market Pressures

One factor that may explain the development of child care policy is not overall fiscal resources, but rather labour market pressure. Many reasons exist as to why governments may connect child care to a labour market strategy. A country may experience a shortage of male labour (and some would argue, low-wage labour). Or, governments may see women's labour

---

\(^{51}\) The gross debt to GDP ratios among G7 nations was approximately 70 per cent in 1993. Canada's debt level was well above the average at 94 per cent of GDP and had risen by more than 20 per cent from 1990 (see table 2.7). Canada's deficit jumped from 4.1 to 7.3 per cent of GDP during that same time period (see table 2.8).

\(^{52}\) Sweden's debt level went from 59 per cent in 1987 to 76 per cent in 1993, due to the effects of the recession of the early 1990s, after dropping to 44 per cent in 1990. Its budget deficit was 12.3 per cent of GDP in 1993, just behind Greece's level at 14.2 per cent and beating Italy's at 9.6 per cent of GDP. It also went from a 4.2 per cent surplus in terms of government finances to a 12.9 per cent deficit in three years (1990-1993) (see tables 2.7-2.8).
market participation, and aids to women's labour market participation, as a way of equalizing roles of men and women in the public and private spheres. The fact that governments generally did not make a concerted effort to expand child care programs until the 1970s and 1980s, rather than immediately after World War II, may therefore be explained by the increased presence of women in the labour force. Two factors which facilitated women's participation in the labour market were the presence of tight labour markets in the post-war period leading up to the 1970s, and the shift in the economy from goods to services.

In terms of the overall timing of the development of child care programs, generally the labour market pressure thesis holds. In all western industrialized countries, child care programs expanded as women entered the paid labour force en masse. Also historically, as argued above, child care services emerged in response to the increase of women in the labour force in the 1800s. Certainly, one explanation for why child care was underdeveloped in Canada compared to France, is labour market participation rates for women were much lower in Canada for most of the past century (see table 1.5). Industrial employment was an urban phenomenon and Canada was a much less industrialized and urbanized country. Because fewer women worked outside the home, child care was not needed as much. The demand for child care was thus confined to a few urban centres.

Given that women's labour market participation increased in Canada, why did services not expand as they did in France? That is, can labour market pressure alone account for the development of child care policies? If governments implemented child care policies for functional reasons, that is, due to need, then we would expect countries with the highest labour market participation rates to have developed the most comprehensive child care systems.

Certainly Canada and the United States would be good candidates for broad-ranging child care programs as both have high levels of female labour force participation (see table 2.10). Neither country, however, has comprehensive child care policies. Labour market participation rates of women are highest in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark), followed by the liberal welfare states of Canada, the United States, Britain, and finally the

---

53Figures for Finland are similar.
corporatist or statist countries of Austria, Germany, Italy, and France and Belgium. If one looks at the levels of child care provision in these countries, however, one finds that the Scandinavian countries generally have the highest provision of child care. As well, many of the corporatist/statist countries have higher levels of provision than the liberal states (see table 1.1). Italy, France, and Belgium have quite high levels of child care. due to very comprehensive pre-school programs for three- to five-year-olds. This finding suggests that one cannot directly link child care provision with women's labour market participation.

This finding also raises the question, if child care is not linked to labour market participation, why not? Given the liberal model's emphasis on markets, and the corporatist ties with labour, why is a child care policy resisted, given that child care might be viewed as designed not to prevent market participation but to encourage it? Women's labour force participation rates, and the need for child care, have increased since the 1960s, but child care services have been slow to develop in most industrialized countries. Even in countries with highly developed programs like Sweden, services exist for only about 60 per cent of all children (table 1.1).

In addition, which way does the causal arrow run? Is it the case that as women's labour market participation increases, programs like child care services expand? Or does the expansion of services lead to an increase in the employment of women? Does a commitment to child care occur due to a rise in employment or unemployment? In the case of the United States, for example, the Clinton administration announced changes to welfare programs in 1996 that emphasized labour market participation and increased child care to respond to high unemployment levels among mainly young black women. In this case, high unemployment appeared to be the cause of child care policy development, not high employment.

Summary: Structural and Functional Theories

If functional factors alone accounted for development of child care policies, one would expect all western industrialized countries to have developed child care policies similar in

---

54 By liberal and corporatist welfare states, I am referring to the welfare state regimes identified by Esping-Andersen in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, op. cit.

content and commensurate with their economic needs and capabilities. They did not. All western industrialized countries experienced similar expansion in their economies, and similar pressures on the labour markets from the 1960s on, resulting in a tremendous expansion of women's labour market participation. Some responded with child care programs, while others did not. The need for child care has thus not been met automatically with a public policy response. Some countries have made child care part of public policy more readily than others.

While functional theories can pinpoint some broad reasons for the development of child care, they cannot account for the variation in the timing and substance of policies. Increased industrialization, the impact of major events like war, and women's labour market participation, although clearly influential in the development of the welfare state overall, cannot account specifically for variation in child care development. Other factors must be explored to explain the impetus for child care policy development.

SOCIAL DEMAND THEORIES

The economic demand and supply theories reviewed above do not look at the relevance of actors in the promotion of welfare state policies. The social demand model or political resources model, in turn, assumes the need for actors as well as political struggle. These theories suggest that governmental responses are the result of political mobilization of groups favoring the expansion of public activity. Variation in policy outcomes could therefore be explained by variation in interest group strength or success of parties sympathetic to social policies in achieving office. The agents and factors of importance are: political parties and their political orientation, especially that of the governing party; interest groups; trade unions, including the organizational unity of the labour movement and union density; and social movements, especially the women's movement.

1. Leftist Political Parties

One could hypothesize that leftist parties in government would have a greater propensity to introduce child care policy as part of a social democratic agenda. One aspect of this argument is that leftist or social democratic political parties, allied with labour unions, once in power, carry
forward a social democratic agenda. The alliance with labour unions is important in that in order to maintain support of those constituencies, leftist parties will be persuaded to stick to a social democratic agenda.

Another aspect to this argument is that one does not necessarily need leftist parties in government, but "contagion from the left": that is, parties of the centre or right-wing adopting the ideas of the left to prevent them from gaining power. For example, the earliest welfare state policies emerged in Germany in response to labour uprisings in the 1870s. Otto von Bismarck so reviled the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or Social Democratic Party (SPD) formed in 1875 that in addition to suppressing it, he created a number of welfare measures to take the wind out of the SPD's sails. Germany became the first industrialized country with sickness benefits (1883) accident insurance (1884), and a state pension plan (1889). In this way, Bismarck hoped to strengthen working class loyalty to the monarchy, not to the socialists. Perhaps one could even talk of contagion from the left in government situations where the balance of power is held by leftist parties in a coalition government.

It is generally true that child care programs and services are larger and more extensive in countries that have had leftist party dominance, such as Sweden and Denmark. Neither the United States nor Canada has had a strong history of leftist governments in power. Neither has ever elected a social democratic or socialist government at the national level, although left-of-centre parties have achieved power at the provincial level in Canada. This could account for why child care is so weakly developed in those countries compared to some European states.

This correlation does not always hold. Cameron demonstrates, for example, a lack of correlation between level of public spending in general and party affiliation in France, which also

---


has an expansive child care system. As Cameron points out, the leftist parties had a minimal impact in France in the post-WWII period as France elected its first socialist government only in 1981. Yet French government spending on social security has been high throughout the post-WWII period. France was the only country out of the 17 Cameron surveyed "in which social spending was highly developed in spite of domination of the government for several decades by various coalitions of conservative parties." Cameron found that a more dramatic increase in social spending occurred under rightist president Charles de Gaulle, particularly in his first term of office, than during the French Fourth Republic (1953-59). A second surge in spending occurred during Valery Giscard d'Estaing's centre-right presidency, followed by a slower expansion under Socialist president François Mitterrand. This would seem to counteract the argument that leftist governments tend to spend more than rightist ones.

Cases also exist where parties other than social democratic ones introduced a child care program, or where a social democratic party while in office did not carry through on its platform. In the province of Alberta in Canada, for example, despite the long reign of the provincial Conservative party in office, in the 1980s, the government encouraged the expansion of child care services and overall spending levels surpassed the per capita spending of other provincial governments. Other examples in Canada of Conservative governments implementing more progressive social policy legislation and increasing spending on the welfare state include Prime Minister R. B. Bennett's "New Deal"-style legislation in the 1930s, and more recently, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's attempt to implement a national child care program in the late 1980s.

Social democratic parties in government have also found it difficult to carry through on promised reforms due to other, mainly economic factors. For example, fiscal constraints forced

---

60 Cameron, "Continuity and Change," 77.
62 See chapter four.
the New Democratic Party to abandon child care reform in Ontario in 1994. And increasing evidence suggests that Conservative parties committed to the reduction of the welfare state still find it difficult to carry through with cuts. All of this would seem to indicate that the ideological orientation of the governing party in power has limited influence over social programs.

2. Labour Unions

Labour movement strength may be important in explaining the development of child care. Some researchers have argued that the welfare state is the fruit of working class organization and political action, either alone, or in conjunction with leftist party governance. The welfare state can be seen as the product of class compromise and the success of working class organization in their struggles against the capitalist class.

The first question to ask, then, is, how strong and how influential is the labour movement in the cases examined? Second, how effectively have trade unions articulated demands for child care? Regarding the overall strength of labour, in all three cases scrutinized, labour is very weak. France has one of the lowest levels of unionization among western industrialized countries.

---

63White, "Partisanship or Politics of Austerity?"


Marklund (90) found that in all the Nordic countries, Conservative governments elected in the early 1980s were all willing and "formally able to accomplish welfare reductions, but the degree of success varied." The factors Marklund found to be important were "the degree of selectivity in public welfare programmes" (that is, universal versus targeted programs); "the distribution of the financial burden between individuals" (that is, just taxes versus shared financial burdens through employer and employee, as well as individual contributions); and "the labour market orientation or work ethic of social security programmes."

Pierson argues, though, that it is less a question of universal versus targeted programs as it is "the features of programs that allow governments either to obscure the impact of retrenchment on voters or to diminish their own accountability for unpopular reforms." Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," 178.
followed by the United States; Canada's trade union membership levels are also comparatively low (see table 2.11). Furthermore, in France, the union movement is divided into competing organizations, rather than being unified into a large confederation like the Landsorganisationen (LO) in Sweden or the Deutschegewerkschaftsbund (DGB) in Germany, or even the British Trades Union Congress (TUC). France's trade unions have suffered the most precipitous decline in union membership in the 1980s, dropping about 37 per cent. France has corporatist-style structures, but has been labelled a country of "corporatism without labour." Union movements in Canada and the United States are very fragmented and never took part in corporatist bargaining structures. In contrast, in all three cases, one could say the business community enjoys a privileged position in the definition and implementation of public policy.

The French case, with union membership at very low levels, and with a lack of labour involvement in corporatist structures, would seem to discount the strength of unionism as an explanation for the development of the welfare state in France, and child care in particular. In fact, France appears as a real anomaly. Cameron points out:

...nations in which social spending effort is most highly developed are ones in which a relatively large share of the work force is unionized, in which there is a relatively high degree of organizational unity (as opposed to fragmentation) in the labor movement, in which labor confederations have considerable power over their affiliates, and in which collective bargaining is centralized.

Moreover, Cameron points out that:

France is one of the nations in which the work force is least organized, in which the labor movement is most fragmented, in which labor confederations have relatively few powers over their affiliates, and in which collective bargaining is decentralized rather than concentrated at the economy-wide level.

Given these factors, France does not seem a likely case for the comprehensive development of

---

66 Union membership in France declined from 20 per cent in the mid-1970s to 15 per cent in the 1975-1985 period, and dropped to 9 per cent in the late 1980s. Janine Goetschy and Patrick Rozenblatt, "France: The Industrial Relations System at a Turning Point?" in Industrial Relations in the New Europe, eds. Anthony Ferner and Richard Hyman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 413.
child care policies. Yet France has developed a comprehensive child care system, and, this thesis argues, one can credit the union movement with fostering it. First, French unions have more political and social influence than their organizational weaknesses imply. Although a number of disincentives are in place to discourage membership in a union—the closed shop is illegal in France, and, unlike in Scandinavian countries, no specific welfare benefits accrue to union members—governments in France can intervene and extend collective agreements to the entire labour market.

In addition, as will be seen in the chapter on the French case, union representatives are included as social partners on administrative councils on social policy (*conseils d'administration*). In these forums, unions have been strong in advocating policies for women in general, and child care in particular, as a means of reconciling work and family life. Unions and employer associations have pushed for child care, as it relates to family policy, in a way not seen in either Germany or North America. In contrast, neither Canada nor the United States has the same employer/union involvement in social security decision making as does France. The importance of this co-management system points to an institutionalist explanation rather than a social demand explanation to account for policy differences across these cases.

We should expect that in countries that have a relatively strong labour movement, as well as relatively high labour force participation rates for women, child care should make it onto the union policy agenda as a labour market strategy. However, a number of reasons exist as to why, even in those countries with high rates of both unionization and female labour force participation, child care would fail to make it onto the policy agenda as a labour issue. First, women may be employed in sectors where unionization has not occurred; conversely, women may not be heavily employed in unionized sectors. Second, women may not have a great influence in union structures themselves. As Mertes argues, trade union concerns, although usually progressive in terms of labour markets, are usually focused on their own constituencies—unionized workers—and they, like all large organizations, tend to defer to or even defend the

---

68 Cameron, "Continuity and Change," 67.
status quo. If women are not represented in unions in significant numbers, then most likely trade unions will not see their interests as important.

Indeed, labour unions may even resist child care policy development. Brennan reports that in Australia after World War II, a number of state governments committed themselves to the establishment of pre-school services. However, "in New South Wales [...] Labor governments throughout the 1940s and 1950s—more strongly influenced by the Catholic church and traditional (male) trade union values—declined to take any responsibility for children below school age." As a result, pre-school service provision in New South Wales lagged behind many of the other Australian states by the late 1960s.

In Britain, in the early twentieth century, the Trades Union Congress was very active in lobbying for a family wage, that is, wages high enough to require only one breadwinner, usually male. Such a policy effectively barred women from the workplace. In Germany, union influence and corporatist arrangements are strong, yet extensive child care policies have not developed. Thus, it not only a question of whether strong unions exist but also what issues unions take up. Often unions resist the extension of policies for women as they may perceive them as undermining workplace benefits.

In the Canadian case, the close relationship between labour unions and child care policy advocates only developed recently and while unions now strongly support child care, women had to push for the issue to be addressed. In France, in contrast, unions have been important in pressing for family policies, although ideological divisions have meant the family policies have not always been best for women.

3. Social (Feminist) Movements

Some researchers suggest that the key to obtaining policies favourable to women is the

---


presence of organized women's groups that are autonomous from government and that press for change outside of government. That is, not only is a women's organization necessary, it must be autonomous; "otherwise, women are acted upon as objects of social policy but are not participants in their own destinies."74

French women's groups have a very weak impact on government policy making, unlike those in the United States and Canada. Both the United States and Canada have large women's movements—the National Organization of Women (NOW) in the former and the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) in the latter—in contrast with France which has no large, unified national women's organization. Yet France has a larger child care system. This would suggest that the feminist movement is not pivotal to the development of child care policies.

Certainly the women's movement in Canada and the United States has continuously promoted policies to enhance women's equality, including child care. One can credit women's movements and other advocacy groups for making the public aware of these issues. The key to success again seems to be organizational links with government. In France, the absence of a strong feminist organization is not as important as some researchers would suggest. Because child care policy is conceived more broadly in France than simply a women's equality issue, other groups, some with feminist concerns, but others with concerns about demography and family policies in general, have played an important role in pushing for child care and family policies. Often these groups are close to government and find a sympathetic ear among politicians and government officials. What matters, then, is the institutionalized relations between actors and governments, more so than the existence of interest groups or social movements.

Summary: Social Demand Theories

As with economic demand and supply theories, social demand theories do not fully explain the development of child care policies. While emphasizing the importance of actors such as organized interest groups and social movements in pressing for certain policy outcomes, they

74Joyce Gelb, Feminism and Politics: A Comparative Perspective (Berkeley: University
do not take into account ideational or institutional factors that can affect policy outcomes. This is why I turned to the literature on ideas and institutions. The important questions, then, are how do ideas and institutions matter and when do they matter?

Modernization and urbanization, combined with rapid industrialization, led to poverty, disaffection, and class conflict. The difficulties encountered by governments in resolving these conflicts certainly created a political climate in which governments were receptive to new approaches to dealing with modern problems. Yet it is important to understand how certain ideas gained saliency and came to dominate, that is, the process of institutionalization, and how this led to differing policy outcomes and ultimately, differences in welfare state development.

INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES

A number of scholars of comparative social policy / comparative welfare state development adopt institutional analysis, and in particular historical institutional analysis, to understand the development of the welfare state. Institutional analysis considers a variety of institutional factors as explanatory: the impact of particular institutional arrangements, for example whether a country has a federal or unitary system of government; the strength or weakness of the state; and the organization of interests such as trade unions and their structured relations with government. Of California Press, 1989), 2.


79 The literature refers to the "network of institutionalized relations that structure the flow of information, resources, and pressure between public and private sectors" as policy networks. See Peter A. Hall, "Conclusion: The Politics of Keynesian Ideas" in The Political Power of
Some scholars conceive of institutions as simply systems of national government. This form of institutional analysis involves a comparison of different governmental structures, for example, federal versus unitary systems, to analyze their effects on policy outcomes. From these descriptive accounts, researchers have developed theories as to the effect of institutions on policy outcomes.

Neo-institutionalists, in turn, argue that institutions play an independent role in the policy process. Rather than seeing institutions as simply a black box that translates actors' preferences into policy, institutions are conceived of as either independent actors, independently influencing outcomes or as intervening variables, mediating between certain ideas, interests, and societal organizations and thus affecting policy outcomes.

A literature that conceives of institutions as autonomous is state theory. State theorists argue that the state is an independent actor. Unlike the power-resources model which assumes that the state is pushed in one direction or the other on the strength of the mobilization of groups favouring or opposing social welfare programs, this model assumes an independent role for the state. The development of the welfare state can be seen to coincide with development of the state and state objectives and interests. Researchers such as Rokkan argue that the welfare state developed in tandem with the development of nationalism and the nation-state. For example, national governments realized they needed state education to promote a national language and culture. The welfare state was seen as a way of promoting national policies, or removing

---


80Weaver and Rockman, Do Institutions Matter?

81Other structures that can be considered are the cabinet, the courts, bureaucratic and administrative structures, central banks, and party and electoral systems.

82State theorists tend to posit the state as an independent variable. See for example Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In. Neo-institutional theorists, in turn, argue that the "institutional approach does not replace attention to other variables.

...Institutions constrain and refract policies, but they are never the only cause of outcomes. Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in Structuring Politics, 12-13.
regional differences. Welfare state development thus depends on how aware the state itself is of problems and its capacity to respond. The structure of the state matters.

1. Strong and Weak States

Researchers have developed a typology of states and have argued that the degree of welfare state development will depend on the strength of the state. A state is considered "strong" when it can define its policy preferences and then implement them. Centralized governmental structures, for example, are considered to be more autonomous from private interests and more capable of promoting policies for the good of the community; decentralized structures are considered to be susceptible to private interests who can take control over the policymaking process. The 'strongest' states would therefore be unitary states with a centralized administrative apparatus. The weakest states, in turn, are those that are completely permeated by interest groups. Hage and Hanneman argue that "weak state organizations may not be able to organize social welfare effort even if they are predisposed to do so; strong states may use their capacity either to implement or to prevent implementation of social welfare programs."85

France is traditionally characterized as the prototypical strong state. The United States is the prototypical weak state. Canada is considered to fall somewhere in the middle. France has a history of intervention in the economy to guide industrial development.86 Lipietz argues the state acts more as an industrial shield than as a social protector, as is the case in social democratic countries.87 In terms of government systems, France has a highly centralized unitary state whereas the United States has a decentralized, congressional federal system. Canada is also a decentralized federal system but with a more centralized parliamentary structure.

83 For a summary of these arguments see Parry, "Redefining the Welfare State," 375.
84 Krasner, "Approaches to the State," Comparative Politics; Krasner, Defending the National Interest.
86 See Hall, Governing the Economy.
Patterns of institutional design can be plotted below:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vertical integration (concentration of authority at national level)</th>
<th>Horizontal integration (concentration of authority within national government)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The organization of the state is key to understanding the broad differences in policy patterns between France on the one hand and the United States and Canada on the other. But "degree of state strength" is a blunt explanation and often does not reveal the complexity of specific policy developments. Suleiman suggests that even in a highly centralized state like France, a multitude of administrative agencies pursue separate goals and consult with highly organized private groups. Thus, he argues, centralization does not necessarily lead to strength because "concentration of jurisdictions in an arm of the state often do[es] not prevent but rather facilitate[s] the takeover of the state by a private group." Groups do not need to disperse their efforts "in accordance with jurisdictional dispersion as is the case in decentralized structures. All the efforts at influencing the policy process can be directed at one central organizational structure." Conversely, Vogel argues that organizational fragmentation does not necessarily have to be a constraint on government action; it can be a source of policy innovation.

Rather than focusing on the idea of "state" action, we should consider institutions, and specifically, the interactions of governments, bureaucracies, and interests. This is why the literature has moved from "statist" to institutional analysis, in order to study the interactions of state and societal actors. This literature places more emphasis on the "relational character" of institutions. What is important is the structured interaction between state and societal actors.

---

88From Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State?, 32.
91Hall, Governing the Economy, 19; also Thelen and Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 6.
It is also important not to neglect the role of ideas in independently influencing actors and institutions, as well as the institutionalization of ideas, as described in chapter one. Recall that institutions, defined as "the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction"\textsuperscript{92} can include formal rules, procedures, organizational standards, and governance structures, and they can also include conventions, customs, traditions, and culture. Institutions thus include the norms and principles which underlie certain systems and explain actors' actions. Hall argues that one has to understand the ideas that help create policies, as well as the institutions that constrain policy.\textsuperscript{93}

2. Regimes

Sociologist Gosta Esping-Andersen identifies three regime types, or what he labels the "three worlds of welfare capitalism": the social democratic regime typical of the Nordic countries of Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland; the liberal regime, sometimes referred to as the Beveridge model typical of Anglo-Saxon industrialized countries—Britain, Australia, Canada, and the United States; and the corporatist regime, sometimes labelled the Bismarckian welfare state, typical of Germany, Italy and France.\textsuperscript{94} Often countries will not fit into one regime exclusively; moreover, some dispute exists as to where certain countries fit in this classification.

Leibfried, expanding on Esping-Andersen's model, labels European welfare states as the Scandinavian (modern), the Bismarckian (institutionalist), the Anglo-Saxon (residual), and the Latin Rim (rudimentary). He includes France in the Latin Rim category of Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy which, he argues, are marked by their residualism similar to the Anglo-Saxon countries, but with some social security programs stemming from the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{95}

Although Leibfried argues France most closely resembles the welfare states of southern Europe, and although France's record in terms of corporatist-style labour market policies is not as


\textsuperscript{93}Hall, "Conclusion: The Politics of Keynesian Ideas," 361-2.

\textsuperscript{94}Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.

good as other countries like Sweden or Germany, France's spending on social policies actually is quite generous and improves the country's overall record on labour market indicators. The French welfare state is somewhat anomalous and really combines characteristics of a number of regimes. France can be described as statist in that the society accepts the legitimacy of state action. Unlike in Germany, however, the idea of subsidiarity does not dominate. In Germany, primary responsibility for the individual rests with the family, then the church and other charitable institutions, and then, finally, the state and that responsibility should be transferred to another institution only if the first is unable to fulfill its responsibilities effectively. In contrast, in France and in the social democratic countries, governments strove to socialize the costs of familialhood. French and Scandinavian ideals support individual independence, or dependence on the state, not dependence on subsidiary institutions such as the family and the church.

The introduction of the idea of a welfare state "regime" moves the literature beyond thinking about institutions as simply governmental structures to looking at the ideas embedded in those structures, as well as the nature of relations between governments and organized interests. Unfortunately, the literature does not clearly define the concept of "regime". I will draw on the international relations literature and define regimes as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area.

Researchers of welfare state regimes do not simply consider the effect of government structures. Also scrutinized are the dominant ideas and principles motivating state action and that become institutionalized, the organization of key interests and their relations to government, and the nature of class mobilization. While Esping-Andersen himself emphasizes working class mobilization, and class-political coalition structures to explain differences between regimes,

---


97 The principle of subsidiarity is that decisions should be made by and responsibility should be granted to those closest to those being affected. Or, more simply, activities should not be entrusted to the larger scale when they can be performed by the smaller scale. Parry, "Redefining the Welfare State," 382.

he draws heavily on institutional theory to explain why particular regime types develop.\(^9\) He considers not just the governmental structures in place, but the principles and norms that were embedded in governmental institutions as the welfare state developed and were derived from norms in society.

In terms of the relevance of this theory to child care policy development, in general, social democratic countries have the most developed programs of child care, with corporatist countries next, and market liberal countries last. Yet within these regime types anomalies exist. Some conservative corporatist countries like Germany appear to adhere to a system of gendered labour markets, that is, not actively encouraging labour market participation of women, especially married women. Others, most notably France, have high levels of female labour market participation as well as extensive child care programs. Interestingly, Italy has very good child care programs but not high levels of female labour market participation.

Welfare state regime literature helps us to predict broadly what countries' child care programs will look like. Yet, again, it cannot account for all the variation between countries.\(^1\) The welfare state typologies developed by Esping-Andersen concentrate on labour market policies or policies to de commodify the worker. Insofar as child care policies are not regarded as employment or labour market policies, regime analysis will not be very useful as it will not be able to take into account policies that are not employment-based. In order to understand child care policies, one has to consider ideas and norms regarding women and children and their place in society and in the market.

3. The Role of Ideas in Institutional Theory

In this thesis I distinguish between ideas and ideology. I argue that ideology alone is an unsatisfactory explanation as it is overly deterministic. It assumes a particular set of forces at work, such as patriarchy and suggests that these forces determine policy outcomes. However, it cannot explain the process by which certain ideas get translated into policy, nor can it explain

\(^9\) He does this especially in the 1989 article. In the later book, he emphasizes more political class coalitions.

changes in policy. Does an expansion of child care indicate the waxing or waning of a particular ideology? Or do shifts in specific ideas better account for change?

No doubt certain societal ideas, for example, about the family and the role of women in society or the proper role of government in the economy, do influence and constrain policy and make policy change quite difficult. For example, Teghtsoonian argues that "while the United States and Canada differ to some extent in terms of prevailing conceptualizations of the state, the market and the relationships between them, there is a shared, neo-conservative vision of 'the family' and its appropriate relationship to state authority." She suggests that child care is (always) treated as a private responsibility in these two countries because it is seen as part of family issues and the regulation of child care is perceived as undermining the decision-making power of the family. Thus, governments in both countries have resisted attempts to expand child care services.

Ideology is an important barrier to political change, and we should not dismiss the rhetorical power of conservative ideas about women's roles. The lack of priority of child care on the public policy agenda, as well as its absence from the agenda until very recently, especially in North America, clearly demonstrates that many resist the idea of public child care. This resistance stems from past perceptions of women's role as solely or primarily that of homemaker. But conservative ideas about women's roles exist in all western industrialized countries. Some countries have been more successful in overcoming them than others. The simple assertion of patriarchy as explanatory tells us little about how specific policies develop, why and where, nor does it explain differences in policies across countries. Does the abundance of child care in France compared to Canada mean that the government or state in one country is more or less patriarchal? I think not. Theories of patriarchy on their own cannot account for or explain key distinctions in policies. Rather, institutional analysis helps us to understand how gender norms


influence policy outcomes.

CONCLUSION

Modernization and industrialization, international economic convergence, economic growth and decline, interest group competition or social conflict, and the autonomous actions of the state offer only partial explanations for the development of child care policy in the cases scrutinized. They do not account for or explain the gendered aspects of the development of the welfare state, nor can they account fully for why the particular policy sphere I am looking at has developed so peculiarly. This thesis argues that what explains or accounts for the development of child care programs and services and other policies to help women and children depends on the ideas that become embedded and institutionalized in policies and programs. The following three chapters trace through these processes more substantively.
Table 2.1
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL PROTECTION AS A PERCENTAGE
OF GDP OVER TIME IN SELECTED COUNTRIES\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7.39</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>7.37</td>
<td>12.66</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>13.52</td>
<td>12.96</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>15.88</td>
<td>17.44</td>
<td>18.90</td>
<td>20.97</td>
<td>23.43</td>
<td>24.77</td>
<td>24.54</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>15.30(^c)</td>
<td>16.05</td>
<td>19.26</td>
<td>26.74</td>
<td>25.44</td>
<td>27.45</td>
<td>25.21</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>9.12</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>11.80</td>
<td>15.37</td>
<td>14.37</td>
<td>17.11</td>
<td>18.79</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>11.10(^c)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19.13</td>
<td>24.25</td>
<td>25.97</td>
<td>25.97</td>
<td>27.78</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>8.81</td>
<td>11.12</td>
<td>13.56</td>
<td>16.70</td>
<td>21.42</td>
<td>25.87</td>
<td>27.08</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>18.10</td>
<td>18.95</td>
<td>19.53</td>
<td>26.23</td>
<td>25.40</td>
<td>27.78</td>
<td>23.47</td>
<td>1618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>9.03</td>
<td>8.64</td>
<td>13.36</td>
<td>20.09</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>9.59</td>
<td>11.89</td>
<td>17.05</td>
<td>20.56</td>
<td>23.10</td>
<td>19.72</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>13.10</td>
<td>16.16</td>
<td>16.94</td>
<td>21.03</td>
<td>19.75</td>
<td>22.68</td>
<td>24.53</td>
<td>1095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>10.48</td>
<td>11.48</td>
<td>11.57</td>
<td>2932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11.70</td>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>22.45</td>
<td>29.56</td>
<td>27.16</td>
<td>28.78</td>
<td>28.78</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>10.37</td>
<td>9.59</td>
<td>9.22</td>
<td>11.78</td>
<td>15.16</td>
<td>15.27</td>
<td>18.95</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>10.15</td>
<td>16.13</td>
<td>19.50</td>
<td>21.44</td>
<td>22.06</td>
<td>28.74</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13.61</td>
<td>13.78</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>16.76</td>
<td>18.95</td>
<td>19.34</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10.83</td>
<td>13.18</td>
<td>16.76</td>
<td>21.16</td>
<td>32.42</td>
<td>32.58</td>
<td>33.13</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\) Includes public health as well as other expenditure on the aged and non-aged; for 1980-1990, includes old age and survivors benefits. For this period, data for Australia include veterans’ pensions. Data for the U.S.A. include occupational civil servants’ pensions. Data for non-EU countries for 1980-1990, include disability pensions, disability services, employment promotion benefits, unemployment compensation, family allowances, indigenous persons’ benefits, housing benefits, low income benefits, sickness benefits, other miscellaneous services and benefits and administration costs. EU countries’ entries include invalidity/disability, occupational accidents and diseases, maternity, family placement, vocational guidance, resettlement, unemployment, housing and miscellaneous.

\(^{b}\) Data estimated for EU countries as well as Canada and United States.

\(^{c}\) Figures from ILO (1958: 56-59).

\(^{d}\) Numbers given are billions in US dollars at 1990 prices and exchange levels.

Table 2.2

TOTAL GOVERNMENT OUTLAYS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP OVER TIME IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Figures vary in the two reports— the 1996 report is used.

Table 2.3
GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON SOCIAL SECURITYa)

FRANCE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total receipts in millions FF</th>
<th>Total expenditure in millions FF</th>
<th>Difference as % of receipts</th>
<th>Expenditure as % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>119 871.00</td>
<td>119 846.00</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>355 257.60</td>
<td>350 373.70</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>761 712.20</td>
<td>738 971.00</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1 370 132.60</td>
<td>1 348 312.20</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1 497 354.00</td>
<td>1 480 420.00</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1 700 202.00</td>
<td>1 669 096.00</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CANADA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total receipts in millions</th>
<th>Total expenditure in millions</th>
<th>Difference as % of receipts</th>
<th>Expenditure as % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>14 597.60</td>
<td>12 717.50</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>22 106.30</td>
<td>19 503.50</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>48 863.50</td>
<td>41 862.70</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>87 538.90</td>
<td>77 122.00</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>113 187.80</td>
<td>99 932.30</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>130 306.60</td>
<td>115 764.20</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNITED STATES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total receipts in millions</th>
<th>Total expenditure in millions</th>
<th>Difference as % of receipts</th>
<th>Expenditure as % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>110 932.00</td>
<td>93 805.00</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>202 112.00</td>
<td>184 368.00</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>370 597.00</td>
<td>329 582.00</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>592 112.00</td>
<td>498 306.00</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>691 150.00</td>
<td>554 780.00</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>804 909.00</td>
<td>627 653.00</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) These figures include spending on benefits for medical care, sickness, unemployment, old-age, employment injury, families, maternity, invalidity, and survivors, as well as compulsory and other types of social insurance, public assistance, benefits for war victims, including administrative expenses for these programs. It does not include benefits paid directly by employers, except for workers' compensation. As of 1978, it does not include medical care under public health services, but does include "medical care provided as a statutory right, and often on a contributory basis, under social security schemes covering the entire population," such as the National Health Service in Britain. ILO (1992: 4).

### Table 2.4
EXPENDITURE BY SOCIAL SECURITY BRANCH AS % OF TOTAL BENEFIT EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL BENEFITS

**FRANCE:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sickness - maternity</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Pensions&lt;sup&gt;a)&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Unemployment&lt;sup&gt;b)&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Family allowances&lt;sup&gt;c)&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Total in millions FF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>95 343.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>40.1&lt;sup&gt;d)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>236 703.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>514 792.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>986 488.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>1 100 108.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>1 252 857.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993&lt;sup&gt;e)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>1 806 480.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a)</sup> Includes the general old-age insurance scheme and special schemes (for agriculture, the national electricity board, the railways, mines, the Paris transport board, shopkeepers, craftsmen, seafarers, and the liberal professions, the special old-age fund and various other special schemes.)

<sup>b)</sup> Relates to the joint labour-management scheme (UNEDIC) applicable to most persons in private employment, dockers and construction workers.

<sup>c)</sup> Relates to the National Family Allowance fund only.

<sup>d)</sup> Relates to employment injuries in agriculture only.


**CANADA:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sickness - maternity</th>
<th>Employment injuries</th>
<th>Pensions</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Family allowances</th>
<th>Total in millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>7 423.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>17 997.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>31 157.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>58 406.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>78 443.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>91 439.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In 1993 the federal government terminated the family allowance program and replaced it with the Child Tax Benefit program.
UNITED STATES:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sickness -maternity</th>
<th>Employment injuries</th>
<th>Pensions</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Family allowances</th>
<th>Total in millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>44 117.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>99 587.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>182 794.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>5.4(^a))</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>298 265.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>332 379.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>375 300.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Including temporary disability.

Table 2.5
FRENCH GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON MAJOR BENEFIT PROGRAMS FOR FAMILIES IN MILLIONS OF FF*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>38,828</td>
<td>49,975</td>
<td>85,012</td>
<td>95,585</td>
<td>115,518</td>
<td>138,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP @ current market prices FF billions</td>
<td>2,141.1</td>
<td>2,769.3</td>
<td>4,700.2</td>
<td>5,336.6</td>
<td>6,509.5</td>
<td>7,082.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending as % GDP</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See table 3.9 in chapter three for breakdown of expenditures by program.


Table 2.6
CANADIAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON CHILD CARE AND CHILD BENEFITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1986 (est.)</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (millions)</td>
<td>4,420</td>
<td>4,755</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>5,818.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP in millions Canadian $</td>
<td>374,750</td>
<td>444,735</td>
<td>505,666</td>
<td>712,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending as % GDP</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See tables 4.10 and 4.11 in chapter four for a breakdown of expenditures.

Table 2.7
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON FAMILY ALLOWANCES IN FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total expenditure on family allowances</th>
<th>Absolute total benefit expenditure on social security schemes</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>2 920 896 400</td>
<td>9 483 430 000</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>4 259 762 200</td>
<td>15 105 540 000</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>5 943 110 700</td>
<td>21 533 010 000</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>7 683 938 900</td>
<td>30 371 300 000</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>9 867 792 000</td>
<td>40 776 000 000</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>13 792 138 000</td>
<td>62 977 800 000</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>17 593 650 000</td>
<td>87 530 600 000</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>23 613 694 000</td>
<td>176 221 600 000</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>35 872 401 000</td>
<td>304 003 400 000</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>74 534 292 000</td>
<td>703 153 700 000</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>141 070 666 000</td>
<td>1 282 460 600 000</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>156 847 551 000</td>
<td>1 413 041 000 000</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>170 657 082 000</td>
<td>1 594 926 000 000</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.8
GROSS PUBLIC DEBT AS A PERCENTAGE OF NOMINAL GDP OVER TIME
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>113.7</td>
<td>123.1</td>
<td>132.0</td>
<td>129.7</td>
<td>137.0</td>
<td>133.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>111.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>116.0</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>104.5</td>
<td>116.3</td>
<td>122.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) OECD estimate.
b) Break in the series starting this year.

Table 2.9
GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL BALANCES AS % OF NOMINAL GDP
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>-11.6</td>
<td>-9.0</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>-8.0</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
<td>-16.1</td>
<td>-14.2</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
<td>-12.1</td>
<td>-11.2</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
<td>-8.5</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-10.4</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
<td>-12.6</td>
<td>-11.0</td>
<td>-11.0</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-10.3</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>-12.3</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-7.8</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>/89.6</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>/69.9</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>/81.5</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>/56.0</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>82.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>78.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>/86.9</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>85.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>/64.8</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-- Not available / Break in series

Table 2.11
TRADE UNION DENSITY (UNION MEMBERSHIP AS A PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYED WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS) IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>-14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>-36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>-19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>-13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>-23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>-27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>+6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>-18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>-28.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the role that ideas, actors, and institutions play in French child care policy. It considers historically the relationship among motherhood, pronatalist policies, and labour markets. It explains how family-friendly policies became compatible with women’s employment in France. France’s political culture is in some aspects quite conservative, with strong catholic values. As well, a strong sentiment of pronatalism, familism, and conservative patriarchalism exists. It is thus surprising that a comprehensive child care system did in fact develop in France. Indeed, other countries with similar conservative and pronatalist histories such as Germany do not have the same policies in place. In Germany, family policies reinforce women’s roles as homemakers.

A further puzzle exists because countries with similar levels of women’s labour market participation do not have similar child care programs in place. In North America, for example, labour market policies and family policies are often considered quite separately. What explains France’s policy trajectory?

Maternalist ideas clearly play a role. This chapter reveals that the current system of child and family benefits in France is rooted in a system that views motherhood as important, and shields women from the claim that they should be productive in the labour market. This, along with demographic concerns, has led, somewhat paradoxically, to the creation of many labour market supports in order to encourage women to have children. Furthermore, policies set up to help children, especially those from disadvantaged families, have meant more women can work full-time, and single mothers can find other care for children while continuing to work. Instead of women being relegated to the home, French women have used explicitly maternalist and pronatalist policies to support their easier transition to, and participation in, the labour market. Thus, the policies have had effects beyond their intended goals.¹

¹This relatively favourable environment of programs and services may explain the high levels of labour market participation of women in France over time, but may also be explained by it. As Math argues, there may be no unidirectional causal linkage, but rather a complex interaction of variables over time. Antoine Math, "Facteurs et Mesures Politiques Susceptibles
It is important to look as well at the role of institutions and how they have constrained or facilitated change. For example, corporatist institutions set up to manage social security programs after World War II have played a key role in shaping child care policies to help reconcile work and family life. Various actors and organizations have lent credence to maternalist ideas and were agents in their translation into policy. Finally, it is crucial to recognize the legitimacy afforded to the state to act in the sphere of the family and to support families with state funds. State intervention on behalf of the family has been enhanced by centralized political structures.

OVERVIEW OF CHILD CARE AND FAMILY POLICIES

The scope of child care services and programs in France is vast and requires lengthy description. Child care services encompass public day care spaces subsidized by the state, allowances for hiring certified mothers' helpers who work out of their own homes, and allowances for hiring a helper in one's own home. The government also provides tax benefits and direct cash benefits for income support, as well as different forms of leave like the allocation parentale d'éducation (APE), a child rearing benefit or allowance. Moreover, a publicly funded pre-school system exists which teaches the vast majority of children from the age of three and a third of children from the age of two.

Cash Benefit Programs

The first major set of programs is the system of family allowances and other direct benefits for children. France has one of the largest family allowance programs in Europe, and far surpasses Canada in the amount of money it spends in this area: 13.0 per cent of its social security expenditures went to family allowances in 1989, compared to 5.4 per cent in Canada and

---


2 Details which follow of the various programs and services for families in France are taken largely from Math, "Facteurs et Mesures Politiques."
zero per cent in the United States. The *allocation familiale* (family allowance) emerged in its current form between 1945 and 1946, although its development before World War II is significant and will be detailed below. The allowance is paid to all families with at least two legally dependent children, with higher amounts paid to families with three or more children. No benefits are paid for the first child. The rates are calculated as a fixed percentage of the BMAF (*Base mensuelle des allocations familiales* or monthly family allowance base). As of 1 May 1994, this meant the government paid 657 francs (about $162) monthly to families with two children, 1500 francs (about $371) to families with three children, and 842 francs (about $208) for each additional child.

The government also provided an added monthly supplement for children between the ages of 10 and 15 of 185 francs (about $46), and a supplement of 329 francs (about $81) for children between the ages of 16 and 20 if they are still "legally dependent", which means if they earn a wage below 55 per cent of the gross minimum wage (*Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance* or SMIC) or, after 18, are students or trainees earning a low wage. (The oldest child in two-child families is not eligible for these additional benefits.) This program acknowledges the difficulties of young people in finding employment, as youth unemployment is very high in France. For all family benefit programs, the amounts are set by government and are usually, but not necessarily, increased twice a year.

The second direct benefit for children is the *allocation pour jeune enfant* (APJE) (young child's allowance). Unlike the family allowance program, the APJE is available to families with one child. This consists of two programs, one that provides a longer benefit period. Both benefits were established in their present form in 1987. The APJE replaced an earlier program established by the Pompidou government in 1972 which provided cash benefits for children

---

3 The only western European country with greater expenditures on family allowances in 1989 was Sweden at 14.5 per cent. Note the figures given are a percentage of overall social security expenditures. See ILO, *The Cost of Social Security, 14th International Inquiry 1987-1989* (Geneva: ILO, 1996), table 10.


under three years of age whose parents were working (allocation de frais de garde), and a 1978 program which established an income-tested family allowance supplement for families with a child under age three or with three or more children (complément familial). The former part of the program has been replaced by the APJE as the "short" benefit which is paid to all families for eight months, from the fifth month of pregnancy until the child is three months old. To be eligible, the mothers must have had medical pre-birth exams.

The "long" portion of the benefit is income-related; the parent(s) must pass a means-test. Taxable revenue must be less than 103,383 francs (about $23,571 Canadian) for a two-parent household with one parent active in the labour market and one child (1993 figures), and 136,625 francs (about $31,151) for a household with two revenues, or a household headed by a single parent with one child. The minimum income levels for eligibility increase as the number of children in families increases. The long portion is paid after the short portion of the benefit stops at three months of age, and is paid until the child's third birthday. The amount paid as of May 1994 was 944 francs (about $233) per month. A further stipulation is that a family can receive only one benefit at a time—that is, the short or the long benefit—even if they have several children under three years of age.

The French government makes no distinction between social insurance or other contributory programs on the one hand, and social assistance programs or non-contributory programs on the other, with regard to cash benefits for families. Instead, programs are divided between non-income related cash benefits, such as family allowances and the APJE "short", and means-tested benefits such as the APJE "long". Eligibility for these benefits is not dependent on one's employment status. Some of the means-tested benefits are funded through social contributions, but they are not "contributory" because they are provided equally to families that have contributed to the scheme and those that have not.

Further cash benefit programs for families with children include the complément familial (supplementary family benefits); the allocation de rentrée scolaire (school allowance); the aide à la scolarité (school aid grant); and the allocation de parent isolé (API) (single parent allowance).

---


Supplementary family benefits, established in 1978, are payable to families with at least three dependent children, all of whom are over three years of age. This supplementary benefit takes over where the long portion of the APJE leaves off, although it cannot be combined with the APJE. The benefit is subject to a means test similar to that of the APJE. About 85 per cent of families with at least three children over three receive this benefit because the income ceiling for eligibility is set quite high.

The school allowance, established in 1974, is a means-tested allowance of 1500 francs (about $371 in 1994) annually (125 francs per month or approximately $31) given to families at the beginning of the school year for each child between the ages of six and 18. It is designed to help alleviate some of the costs of sending children back to school such as buying school supplies, clothing, and so on. To be eligible for the benefit the parent(s) must also receive one other form of benefit, such as a housing allowance or disability benefit.

The school aid grant, which is again means-tested, is a new grant program, replacing the former bourses des collèges given by the Ministère de l'Éducation. This grant is given to families with a child between the ages of 11 and 15. Again, the parent must receive at least one other form of benefit. There are two grant levels: one is 337 francs (about $83) and the other is 1080 francs (about $267) (1994 figures), both paid once a year, with the revenue requirements of the previous year being lower for the larger grant. In general, the ceilings are low for this benefit. For example, for parents with one child, the ceiling is 43,393 francs (about $10,718) for the 337 franc benefit. This means only about one quarter of students in the age group received the benefit in 1994.\(^8\)

The final benefit program for families is the single parent allowance (API). This program was established in 1976 and is one of the few programs aimed at single parents or pregnant single mothers. It acts as a minimum income, but has very restrictive eligibility requirements. To be eligible, the parent must have a child under the age of three, and the event causing the single parent status (death, separation, divorce) must have occurred within the previous twelve months. Benefits are paid up to the end of the twelve month period, or when the youngest child

---

\(^8\)In addition to these programs to cover part of school costs, school transportation costs are highly subsidized, and books are given free to the collèges (ages 11 to 15).
Eligibility also requires that the parent's resources be less than the maximum monthly benefit. In 1994, the maximum monthly benefit was 3081 francs (about $761) for a pregnant person, 4108 francs (about $1015) for a single parent with one child, and 1027 francs (about $254) for each additional child. The benefit that is paid is the difference between the maximum level and the average of the previous three months' resources. Benefit rates are low in that it is assumed that single parents are given support in other ways—family allowances, child support payments, and access to day care—so that they would need to rely on the API for a short time only.

Because of the restrictive eligibility requirements of the API, about 20 per cent of single parents claim the revenu minimum d'insertion (RMI) allowance. The RMI can be considered a guaranteed minimum income. This is a relatively new social security program, established in 1988. It acts as the ultimate safety net. It applies when a person or household is not eligible for any other benefit program. To be eligible for the RMI, one must be 25 years old. (One can still be eligible if one is under 25 years but pregnant or with dependent children up to age 25.) As with the single parent allowance, total resources must be inferior to the maximum level of the benefit. Benefit levels for a single person without children totalled about 2,298.08 francs (about $568) per month for a single person without children in 1994, 3,447.12 francs (about $851) for a


10 Nadine Lefaucheur, "French Policies Towards Lone Parents: Social Categories and Social Policies," in Poverty, Inequality, and the Future of Social Policy: Western States in the New World Order, eds. Katherine McFate, Roger Lawson, and William Julius Wilson (New York: Russell Sage Foundation 1995), 274. Lefaucheur argues, though, that many single mothers have difficulty finding employment. She argues unemployment rates for single mothers under age 25 were over 50 per cent in 1989. Only one third of all single mothers were employed, even though the labour force participation rates of single mothers is generally higher than that of two-parent families (see table 3.1). The only instance when the labour market activity rates for women in two-parent families is higher is when a single parent has one child under the age of three, perhaps because of the existence of the API.


12 Even regular unemployment benefits are relatively low in France. They are generally paid at 57 per cent of one's last gross pay cheque, but are reduced by 15 per cent every four months until they stop altogether. Craig Whitney, "Jobs Big Issue Facing European Leaders,"
single parent with one child, 4,136.54 francs (about $1022) for a single parent with two children, and 919.23 francs (about $227) for any subsequent child. For couples, the maximum benefit levels are higher. Again, the benefits are calculated as the difference between the maximum level and the average of the previous three months' resources. Recipients of the benefit can seek work but are not obligated to do so, unless there is a contract of 'insertion' which is a "contract between the beneficiary and a body which is responsible for helping him or her get off to a fresh start and to find a job." The contract commits society to help the person, for example by providing a training program. The contract also commits the person to improve him/herself for example by seeking alcohol treatment, learning to read and write, and so on.

In the area of family support, the government provides an allocation de soutien familial (ASF). This is a family support allowance, created in 1985 to replace the allocation d'orphelin created in 1970. The ASF is paid to young orphans, or to children who are abandoned by one or both parents, or to parents whose spouse is not meeting child support obligations. The 1970 benefit was means-tested, and was only paid to widows and single parents "with no established filiation" that is, when the absent father was unknown. In 1973, the government dropped means testing and in 1975 extended benefits to all single, separated or divorced parents, when those parents could not be supported by the absent parent. In 1985, the government created the ASF. As well, it made the Caisses d'Allocations Familiales (CAFs) (social security agencies) responsible for recovering unpaid maintenance. The amount of the benefit is quite low. Math reports that it paid a maximum of 462 francs (about $114) per month as of May 1994, with the amount adjusted depending on the maintenance actually paid by the absent parent. An ASF for children who are truly orphans is also available with more generous benefits.

A further benefit program which will not be discussed in-depth but which also falls under


the administration of the CAFs is the *aides au logement* (housing allowances). The first *allocation logement* was created in 1948. Although these are means-tested benefits, not only households with low incomes receive them. Indeed, about 40 per cent of tenants receive the benefit, and the amount varies depending on family status and type of housing.

**Taxation Programs**

Although no tax allowance or tax credit for children exists in France, there is what is called the *quotient familial*. This system, established in 1946, allows for the adjustment of the tax rate on taxable revenue based on whether there are dependent children, and whether the parent is a single parent or widowed. All taxable revenue is divided by the number of adults and children in the family, with additional points granted for the third or subsequent children, the first child of a single parent or widowed parent, and a non-married adult who no longer has any dependent children but has raised at least one child in the past. While the system would seem especially to benefit single parent families, in reality, the tax advantage usually benefits better-off families. The fiscal advantage increases along with revenue, although there are maximum benefit levels. Furthermore, since approximately 50 per cent of French families do not pay income tax, they cannot take advantage of this fiscal scheme.\(^\text{17}\)

The government provides a further tax credit for families who employ someone full time, for example, to care for children. The credit is given on 50 per cent of expenses to a maximum of 90,000 francs (about $24,750) as of 1995.\(^\text{18}\) This meant a maximum tax relief of 45,000 francs (about $12,375) was allowed. This has recently been increased from the previous ceiling of 26,000 francs (about $6422) in 1994 for tax relief of up to 13,000 francs (about $3211). Only families who can afford to hire help can take advantage of such a tax credit, so it too usually benefits the better-off. The government also provides tax relief for child care expenses parents incur for use of services outside the home such as *crèches* (day care centres) or *les assistantes maternelle agréées* (AMAs) (registered childminders). A credit is given on 25 per cent of the

total expenses with a ceiling of 15,000 francs (about $4125) per child in 1995.

Child Care Programs

In 1994 there were approximately 4.5 million children in France under the age of six, that
is, under the age of compulsory schooling. About half of these children attended les écoles
maternelles (pre-primary schools), which offer programs for children from the ages of two to six.
Indeed, more than 99 per cent of children aged three to six attend these schools, and
approximately one-third (35 per cent) of two-year-olds (see table 3.2). Thus, the pre-school age
for children in France is really between zero and three years. For these children, approximately
2.24 million, a number of child care programs exist, but even so, the majority of these children
are not in the collective care system (see tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5). As stated above, about 250,000
two-year-olds are enrolled in the pre-primary schools, but none attend before the age of two, so
the total average enrollment for zero to three-year-olds in pre-primary schools is 11 per cent (up
from approximately nine per cent in 1990 and 1982- see table 3.3). Approximately 450,000
children, or 20 per cent of children under the age of three, are cared for in day care centres or by
certified mothers' helpers (up from 19 per cent in 1990 and approximately 14 per cent in 1982).
Another 155,000 or seven per cent of children, are cared for at home by a member of the family
or by an employee such as a nourrice (nanny) (about the same levels as 1982 and 1990). Fully
50 per cent of children under three, or 1,120,000, are cared for by their mothers (down from
about 54 per cent in 1990 and 60 per cent in 1982). That leaves 265,000 or 12 per cent of
children with no publicly recognized form of care.19 Even so, France has one of the best
developed child care systems among western industrialized countries.

Forms of public day care centres include crèches collectives (collective day care centres);
crèches parentales (parental day care centres), which are run by associations and require the
involvement of parents; crèches familiales (family day care centres), which are services that
organize and supervise child care through the homes of registered childminders (AMAs); and

---

18The exchange rate in 1995 was C$.275.
19Caisse National des Allocations Familiales, Accueil des Jeunes Enfants: Les CAF
Renforcent Leurs Aides aux Collectivités Locales, Dossier de presse (Paris: CNAF, 9 February
1995), annexe 1.
mini-crèches, which are smaller day care centres but with the same regulations governing them as collective day cares. There are also haltes garderies, which offer part-time or supplementary care, at one time for non-working mothers, but now for anyone who needs part-time care. They are often attached to schools or to day care centres (creating an établissement multi-accueil) so as to provide before and after school care.

There are few private day care centres in France run, for example, by firms or churches. Instead, local authorities, along with the CAFs are the key actors. Sixty-three per cent of day care centres are run by the communes, 25 per cent by associations such as parental day care organizations, and 12 per cent by other authorities, such as the départements (regions) or the state. For the part-time day care centres, the breakdown is different: 45 per cent are run by the communes, 41 per cent by associations and 14 per cent by other authorities. For the centres de loisirs sans hébergement (CLSH) or before- and after-school facilities, discussed below, the breakdown is 39, 58, and three per cent respectively. All day care centres fall under the authority of the Protection maternelle et infantile (PMI) (mother and child welfare association), and must be headed by a puéricultrice, a nurse specially trained in early childhood care.

The size of collective day cares range from 10 to 60 spaces, with adult supervision needed for every five children who do not walk, and eight children who do walk. The costs of day care centres are borne by families (24 per cent), the CAFs (22.5 per cent), the communes (34 per cent), the départements (16 per cent), and other organizations (3.5 per cent), although families pay on a sliding scale, with the amount depending on their income and the number of dependent children. Day care centres are usually open every working day from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m..

For the family day care centres, which have existed since 1971, care is provided in the

---

20 CNAF, Accueil des Jeunes Enfants, 2.
21 1994 national averages.
22 CNAF, Accueil, 3. For example, if a family had a net income of 13,000 francs (about $3211) in 1994 and one child, they would pay about 12 per cent of the daily cost of care at a day care centre (which averages about 300 francs or about $74 per day) or 78 francs (about $19). If they had two children they would pay 10 per cent of the costs, or 65 francs (about $16) per day, and three children would cost 48.75 francs (about $12) per day. CNAF, Tout Savoir sur les Crèches (Paris: CNAF, n.d.), 5. The average fee parents pay is approximately 67 francs (about $17) per day.
homes of the mothers' helpers, who are registered childminders, but they can meet one or two times a week at a central location. The childminders are employed by a day care organization, such as a local authority or département. The family day care must be run by qualified professionals, who also visit the homes of the childminders. Childminders are registered by the PMI authority in each département, and are required to complete a minimum of 60 hours of training after becoming a registered childminder. Homes must be inspected before a childminder receives approval to ensure adequate levels of health and safety. Childminders are approved on a five-year basis. Registered childminders are only permitted to take care of three children at a time, including their own. The hours are more flexible than those of the collective day care centres. The breakdown of costs is similar to public day cares: 34 per cent of the costs are borne by families, 21.7 per cent by the CAFs, 35 per cent by communes, seven per cent by départements, and 2.2 per cent by other organizations.

Spaces in collective care are often reserved for children of parents who work. This is part of the reason for the creation of parental-run day cares so that parents could have access to day care for children, even if they were not working. Parental day care has been recognized since 1981.23 The maximum number of children permitted in this latter form of care is 16. Parents manage these day care centres and also participate in the care of children, although they must employ at least one qualified person. The breakdown of financing is 35 per cent by families, 26.7 per cent by the CAFs, 22 per cent by the communes, one per cent by the départements, and 15.3 per cent by other organizations, that is, parental associations. Parental day care centres do not always get the same level of funding as the collective day cares.

In addition to these forms of public care, there are les assistantes maternelle agréées indépendantes (independent registered mothers' helpers) who are not part of the family day care system but rather offer care independently in their own homes. They were recognized as a profession in 1977 as long as they are registered (agréée) by the PMI. They are hired directly by parents.

Independent registered childminders are paid a minimum wage (net of all social

contributions) by the employer.24 These wages were as of 1 May 1994 8.90 francs (about $2.20) per hour and per child for non-permanent day care under eight hours; 78.37 francs (about $19.36) per child if the length of care is between eight and 10 hours (this means the AMA gets the same wage for eight hours of work as s/he does for nine or 10 hours); and 9.80 francs (about $2.42) for each hour over 10. For permanent continuous day care the wage is 2943.14 francs (about $727) per month per child and 2385.86 francs (about $589) for each subsequent child of the same family. If the care is occasional but permanent, the wage is 104.49 francs (about $26) per day and per child. The registered childminders are also paid a supplement of 10 per cent for paid holidays (les congés payés).

In all, independent childminders receive very low wages; the fixed wages seem to be to ensure the system remains affordable for parents rather than to provide the registered childminders with a sufficient income. Moreover, parents are entitled to benefits to cover the costs of hiring a registered childminder under a program called the aide à la famille pour l'emploi d'une assistante maternelle agréée (AFEAMA). The Mitterrand government established this program in 1991 to replace the prestation spéciale assistante maternelle (PSAM) or special mother's helper allowance, created in 1980.25 As of 1 May 1994 the benefit was 530 francs (about $131) per month and per child under three years of age, and 318 francs (about $79) per month and per child between the ages of three and six. These amounts were increased in January 1995 to 800 francs (about $220) per child under age three and 400 francs (about $110) per child between the ages of three and six.

The amount paid does not depend on parents' income. As a result, low-income families often cannot afford to hire a registered childminder as the cost per month far exceeds the benefit (about $590-$730 for continuous care, with an allowance of approximately $110-$220). Independent childminder care, then, would seem to benefit middle and upper class parents. Yet, the use of registered childminders is the most common form of public care. In 1990, 25 per cent of families with one child under three used this form of care, as did 23 per cent of single mothers

24Social contributions are not paid by parents but rather by the CNAF/CAF. This is a very expensive undertaking by the state as social contributions for employees are very high in France (around 40 per cent of the gross costs for childminders, for example). Math, 60.

with at least one child under three (see table 3.4). In 1994, about 320,000 children under the age of six were cared for by independent registered childminders.

A relatively new public endeavour is the relais assistantes maternelles services. These are child care support services for independent childminders. They may employ workers to offer advice, as well as other staff such as nurses and family therapists. They may also provide training sessions. A major portion of funding is provided by the CAFs, which covered 69 per cent of costs in 1994, along with local authorities at 22 per cent and départements at seven per cent. By 1994 200 of these services existed.26

Childminders who work in the employers' home also exist, such as les jeunes filles au pair. Parents who hire someone in their home are eligible for the allocation de garde d'enfant à domicile (AGED), established in 1986, which is a non-means-tested benefit to cover part of the wages of the childminder. It is paid to all families with either two parents or a single parent employed outside the home for the care of a child/children under three years of age. The parent(s) must have a sufficient work history, which means, "if the parent(s) [is] are wage earner(s), he/she/they must have earned at least 6162.96 francs (about $1522) during the previous trimester" and if the parents are not wage earner(s), "he/she/they must be affiliated to a pension insurance scheme."27 The allowance does not depend on family income until the child’s third birthday. Families can only receive one allowance if they have more than one child under age three.

As of 1 May 1994, the maximum benefit under the AGED was 6,000 francs (about $1482) per trimester or 24,000 francs (about $5928) per year. The government increased benefits in January 1995 to a maximum of 11,838 francs (about $3255) per trimester, or 47,352 (about $13,022) francs per year. Also in January 1995, the government added a reduced AGED benefit for children between the ages of three and six of 5,919 francs (about $1628) per trimester (half the amount of the benefit for children under age three). In general, only very well-off families can take advantage of this benefit. In 1992, over 90 per cent of recipients had gross

26See European Commission Network on Childcare and other Measures to Reconcile Employment and Family Responsibilities, Family Day Care in Europe (Brussels: European Commission Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs DGV/A/3 Equal Opportunities Unit, 1995), 32.
monthly earnings above 15,000 francs (about $3435).  

In terms of use of forms of child care, single parents are more likely to use public day care rather than a registered childminder for several reasons. First, "lone parenthood is an urban phenomenon," and day care centres are more common in urban areas, notably around the Paris region. Second, "in case of shortages of places in...crèches, and [the] existence of waiting lists, there is most often a first priority for lone mothers". Third, "the cost of the crèche for parents depends mainly on the resources, and they are most often less expensive for low income lone mothers than other possibilities such as registered childminders."  

For two-parent families with higher incomes, it is often less expensive to hire an independent childminder or a nanny than to put a child in a collective day care because the sliding fee schedule makes collective care very expensive. The most expensive form of care in France for average or low-income families is care in the home of an independent registered childminder.

---

Pre-primary Programs

The vast majority of pre-primary schools are in public schools (87 per cent) rather than private (13 per cent). Both receive public funding, although only public schools are under the authority of the Ministry of Education. The number of pre-primary schools has tripled since 1960, rising from 6,000 to about 19,000 in 1990. The level of enrollment in the pre-primary schools grew from about 27 per cent in 1945 to 54 per cent in 1954, 60 per cent in 1959, and 81 per cent in 1977. From 1958 to 1978, the number of two-year-olds in pre-primary school rose

---

27Math, 60.
28Math, 60. The exchange rate for 1992 was C$.229.
29Math, 61.
31Carollee Howes and Elisabeth Marx, "Raising Questions About Improving the Quality of Child Care: Child Care in the United States and France," Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 7 (1992), 353.
33Marie Sineau and Évelyne Tardy, Droits des Femmes en France et au Québec: 1940-
from nine to 31 per cent, and the number of three-year-olds from 32 to 87 per cent. Although the enrollment of three-year-olds has steadily increased, that of two-year-olds has remained at about one-third for years, as there are not enough resources to expand the programs.

Class sizes are very large by North American standards. The average number of students in each class was 27 in the 1993-94 school year, although that figure had dropped from 30 students in 1980-81. Enrollment levels of immigrant children in the pre-primary schools are at the same levels as native children, whereas public day care, a costly form of care, is not used as often by immigrant families. Single parents tend to enroll their child/children in pre-primary schools at a younger age (age two) than two-parent families, again likely because it is free, including in some cases a free breakfast. Children can remain at school during the lunch breaks as supervision is offered and so are lunches (for a modest fee).

The public pre-primary schools are open quite long hours: Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.. They are open Saturdays as well from 8:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.. In some schools, Saturday mornings have been shifted to Wednesdays, the traditional day of closure. There are many holidays throughout the year, however, when the schools are closed.

Outside these hours and days of operation there are before- and after-school facilities (CLSHs), which are often in the school or at centres beside the school. These are optional programs which run from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m.. Spaces are primarily for children over five years of age; that is, school age children between the ages of six and 12. Sometimes CLSH


35INSEE, Les Enfants, 86. The lack of places for two-year-olds has been a continual problem and has been documented, for example, in Antoinette (women's magazine of the CGT), 247 (February 1986), 16-23; and "La maternelle victime de son succès," Le Figaro, 17 October 1994.


experience space shortages, which means families often have to resort to informal care such as other family members, or non-registered childminders if they need care outside of school hours. The number of centres has expanded though, from 9,700 in 1984 to 13,100 in 1992, an increase of 35 per cent. Children of single parents, large families and low income families often have better access to the centres. And in contrast to day care centres, the before- and after-school facilities are well-developed in rural as well as urban areas.

Approximately 60 per cent of these facilities are run by associations, 39 per cent by communes and about one per cent by the CAFs. Because these facilities are run by local authorities, the fees vary, but generally these services are highly subsidized and the fee adjusted for parents' income and the number of dependent children. Often the fees are lower for single parents. Parents pay about 25 per cent of the cost of these facilities, which in 1992 meant an average of 23 francs per day. About 49 per cent is paid by local authorities (47 per cent by communes, two per cent by départements); 19 per cent by the CAFs; one per cent by the Ministère de la Jeunesse et Sports; and seven per cent by others.

The Centre de Recherche pour l'Étude et l'Observation des Conditions de Vie (CREDOC) has found strong support for pre-primary schooling, even for two-year-olds. In 1987, asked to rate the teaching at the pre-primary level, 22 per cent of people surveyed said they were very satisfied, 41 per cent said they were rather satisfied, and only six per cent said they were little satisfied. Only one per cent reported being not at all satisfied. The Centre found in a 1989-1990 survey that 56.8 per cent of people surveyed thought it was a good idea that children go to school at the age of two, whereas 42.9 per cent did not (0.3 per cent did not know).

Maternity and Parental Leave Programs

A number of parental leave provisions exist in France. Le congé maternité (maternity leave) since 1978 has provided paid protected leave for six weeks before the birth of the child.

38 Math, 64.
39 Thirty per cent reported they did not know or were not interested. Centre de Recherche pour l'Étude et l'Observation des Conditions de Vie (CREDOC), Consommation et Modes de Vie, No. 16 (February 1987), 1.
and 10 weeks after, for a total of 16 weeks. The leave can be extended in the case of a cesarean or multiple births to 26 weeks, and is extended for the third and subsequent children as well. Since 1971, maternity benefits are paid up to 90 per cent of previous earnings. Women who claim maternity leave must have been affiliated to the social security fund for at least 10 months previously and have paid contributions for at least 1200 hours in the previous 12 months. They also have a right to automatic reinstatement with the previous employer. In addition to the paid maternity leave, fathers are entitled to three days leave after the birth of a child at 100 per cent wage replacement.

*Le congé parental* (parental leave), first established in 1977, is a leave entitlement from employment for a maximum of three years, until the child's third birthday. In 1977, only employees of firms with over 200 workers could take the leave. In 1981 that was extended to firms with 100 employees and in 1984 to all employees. The leave can be part time or full time and taken by one or both parents sequentially or simultaneously (so the two parents can both work part time). During the leave, employees are entitled to most work-related social benefits. Since January 1995, employers in smaller firms can no longer refuse to grant an employee a leave; previously, leave was subject to the employer's approval. Also since January 1995, parents can enroll in education or training programs during their leave.

Finally, the *allocation parentale d'éducation* (APE) or child rearing allowance is a non means-tested flat-rate benefit added to the parental leave entitlement in 1985, which is paid to a parent who takes leave after the birth of a third or subsequent child until the third birthday of the youngest child. Since July 1994 it can be taken after the birth of a second child. Parents who take parental leave are entitled to collect the APE. The APE compensates parents partially for income loss while the parent remains at home to care for a new baby. It was originally granted to working parents who had been employed at least two out of the last ten years. It was granted

---

41Dex *et al.* argue this guarantee was achieved in the wake of the events of 1968 and as part of the measures to improve workers' rights. Shirley Dex, Patricia Walters and David M. Alden, *French and British Mothers at Work* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1993), 73.

to families with at least three children, of whom one was under three years, until the newborn turned three years old. A parent who chose to return to work part-time (and/or following training) could claim the child rearing benefit at a reduced rate for one year when his/her child was two years old. By 1994, the monthly benefit was 2929 francs (about $723), or 1465 francs (about $362) if the parent was taking a half-time job after the child was two years of age. By 1993, 95 per cent of parents who claimed the APE were women. Since July 1994 a number of controversial changes have been made, which will be detailed later in the chapter.

It should be noted that since 1988, mothers with a history of paid employment are compensated for the time they take off for child rearing in the calculation of their pensions. If a mother remains out of paid employment to care for a child for at least nine of his or her first sixteen years, the length of service considered in the determination of her old age insurance benefits is increased by two years. This applies for each child she raises if care is provided for nine years. This pension supplement is not taxable. For a mother who raises three or more children, the pension increase is about 10 per cent. Such a provision offsets the amount of pension earnings women lose in childbearing and is an important added incentive to encourage women to raise children.

CREDOC survey data has found increasing dissatisfaction with the number of child care facilities for young children (see table 3.6). The numbers of people surveyed in France who expressed dissatisfaction rose from 71 per cent in 1987 to 80 per cent 1990. Younger people (ages 25 to 29) and women active in the labour force tend to be more critical, as are the more educated, Paris-based, and professional classes. Between 1990 and 1993, increasing levels of

---

45Germany also has developed insurance credits for child care. Ginn and Arber report that since 1986, "a parent caring for a child under one year of age has been credited with social insurance contributions on the basis of 75 per cent of average earnings, regardless of their employment status or actual earnings." That provision was extended in 1992, "enabling women to take a three year career break for each child, or to switch to part-time work for three years, usually without any loss to their contribution record." Granted, the policy is part of an effort to encourage mothers to care for very young children and not to encourage their labour market participation. See Jay Ginn and Sara Arber, "Towards Women's Independence: Pension Systems in Three Contrasting European Welfare States," Journal of European Social Policy, 2, 4 (1992), 266.
satisfaction with the number of child care facilities rose among young people, women active in the labour force, and people with at least one child under three years of age. Women, especially working women, tend to be more concerned about the issue of sufficiency: 77.6 per cent of women active in the labour force reported that numbers of facilities were insufficient in 1993, compared to 75.4 per cent of inactive women, 69.4 per cent of active men and 68.9 per cent of inactive men. Eighty-four per cent of divorced men found the levels of child care facilities insufficient.46

Public opinion surveys have found that the form of child care most preferred by approximately 40 per cent of the people surveyed in 1993 was individual care, that is, either by a registered or non-registered childminder or in family day care. Approximately 20 per cent preferred collective forms of care such as day care centres and part-time day care centres, and about 35 per cent preferred care by grandparents or another person employed in the home (see table 3.7). Although public day care is not the most preferred form of care, support increased from 17 per cent in 1987 to 23 per cent 1990, although it decreased to 18 per cent in 1993. The survey researchers argue that the lesser popularity of collective forms of care is due partly to their insufficiency, especially in certain regions or in rural areas. They found that 83 per cent of people who preferred care at home judged the number of child care facilities insufficient.47

The form of care parents actually adopt is very different from what they would prefer. CREDOC found that the vast majority of care is still done by mothers in the home (53.5 per cent at the end of 1993), compared to 4.5 per cent for public day care, 17.9 per cent by registered and non-registered childminders, and 6.7 per cent by a mother working at home (see table 3.8). This is surprising given the high levels of female labour force participation.48

**Spending on Child Care and Other Programs**

France is a leader among industrialized countries, both in the scope of its child care and

---


47 Duflos *et. al.*, 17-19.

48 Duflos *et. al.*, 25-27.
family policies, and in its spending on these programs. A major portion of monies to fund the French welfare state are raised through contributions of employees and employers. France has one of the highest rates of employer taxation among G7 countries, almost twice as high as the EU average. It also has a high employee tax rate. In contrast, personal income taxes in France are low, with only about half of households actually paying personal income tax.

The monies raised through employer and employee contributions are directed to the social security régimes (institutions) of the régime général, which correspond to the four major caisses: the Caisse Nationale de l'Assurance Maladie des Travaillers Salariés (CNAMTS); the Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Vieillesse des Travaillers Salariés (CNAVTS); the Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiale (CNAF), which as of 1978 covers the entire population; and the Agence Centrale des Organismes de Sécurité Sociale (ACOSS), which is in charge of managing the finances. The Caisse Nationale des Accidents du Travail et de Maladie Professionel until 1994 was attached to the CNAF, but has now become a separate branch. In 1967 it was stipulated that each caisse would be managed separately. They still retain a common treasury and when a surplus occurs in one branch, it serves to help another branch experiencing a deficit.

The five major régimes (institutions) which administer social protection programs include the régimes d'assurances sociales (obligatory social insurance programs, which cover social

---


51 Separate funds exist for self-employed workers, artisans, and other independent workers.

52 Saint-Jours, "France," 136-7; Jacqueline Farache, Collaboratrice au Secteur protection sociale de la CGT, Confédération Générale du Travail (GCT), personal interview, Paris, 23 May 1995. For a critique of this policy see "Les allocations à défendre," Clara Magazine, 23 (Autumn 1992), 5, which argues that funds are being used for other programs to the detriment of those for families.
security spending and unemployment insurance), régimes d'employeurs (employers' organizations), régimes des sociétés mutualistes (covering mostly the health field), régimes d'intervention sociale des pouvoirs publics (covering persons with low incomes, the unemployed, and veterans and expenditure on RMI), and administrations privées (non-profit organizations like the Red Cross and Salvation Army).53

The CNAF is responsible for all family benefit programs, including those to do with child care. The budget for the CNAF was 10.2 billion francs (about $2.3 billion) for 1993. The CNAF is involved in funding and encouraging the development of child care facilities and services and works with local CAFs. The total contribution of the local CAFs to the financing of day care centres is about 22 per cent. The figure is slightly higher for some other forms of child care and lower for others. In all, total spending by the CAFs in 1993 was 3.2 billion francs or about $0.7 billion (see table 3.9).54 When one includes spending by other authorities such as the communes and départements, the total bill for collective child care services was approximately 14.5 billion francs (about $3.3 billion) for 1993, including spending on before- and after-school facilities, but not including pre-primary schools.55 If one adds in spending on pre-primary schools, which the government estimates totalled about 51.7 billion francs in 1994 on all pre-primary programs and services, or approximately 20,300 francs per student (see table 3.10), then total spending on child care reaches 66.2 billion francs (about $15.1 billion).56 One needs also to include expenditure on social security programs for families in the form of direct cash benefits and programs outlined above (see table 3.11). The expenditures listed included family and child benefits programs as well as specific child care benefits. The family benefits portion of the national budget totaled 138.1 billion francs in 1993 (about $31.5 billion). Of that, approximately 29.7 billion francs (about $6.8 billion) went to specifically child care subsidies. So the actual total government spending on all child care programs and benefits for 1993 was approximately 95.9 billion francs or the equivalent of about $21.9 billion Canadian.

54 CNAF, Accueil des Jeunes Enfants, annexe 2.
55 Math, 56.
56 This is approximate as the pre-primary education figures are for 1994, not 1993.
A major part of the spending on collective care, in addition to direct financing for the day care centres, is what is called the contrat enfance. In 1984, the new government under President Mitterrand launched a financing scheme called the contrats crèche, designed to increase the number of day care centres, especially in rural regions. Because they dealt exclusively with collective, family and parental day care services, they were seen as too inflexible. Thus, in 1988 the government launched the contrat enfance. This is a co-financing agreement negotiated between a CAF and a municipality, the latter of which pledges to increase the number of day care spaces in either collective, family or parental day care centres or in the haltes garderies, or even other forms of child care centres like before- and after-school facilities. The two partners jointly set their objectives, for example, to increase municipal spending on spaces in haltes garderies, and the CAF agrees to match funding at a level between 40 and 60 per cent. Other organizations, such as businesses, local organizations, and voluntary groups can also be parties to a contract. 57

From the inception of the program in 1993, 1,700 contracts were signed with 2,500 communes, creating an additional 200,000 places for children in care. 58 The government, as part of the family act of July 1994, had pledged to double its portion of spending by 1999.

Since the mid-1980s the national government has made a concerted effort to curb social spending, especially in the areas of health and pensions. The overall social security deficit was 110 billion francs (about $25 billion) by the end of 1993, compared to an overall deficit of 318 billion francs (about $73 billion) or 4.4 per cent of GDP. 59 The social security deficit was expected to be lower in 1994 because the government raised the rates on the cotisation sociale générale (CSG) from 1.1 to 2.4 per cent. 60 The revenue from this tax is directed to a "Solidarity Fund" and is used to help finance the social security regimes. 61

The government has been trying to restructure the social security system in other ways. It

57 David and Starzec, "France: A Diversity of Policy Options," 100.
58 CNAF, Accueil des Jeunes Enfants, annexe 3.
60 The Economist reported that the social security deficit for 1995 was forecast to be 60 billion francs (about $16.5 billion). 2-8 September 1995, 42. The accumulated social security debt built up over the preceding five years to 230 billion francs (about $63 billion). "Now the Cure," The Economist, 18 November 1995, 57.
reduced family allowance contributions for those with low incomes. These contributions are slated to be reduced to zero by 1988 for employers on wages up to 1.5 times the minimum wage, and reduced by 50 per cent for wages between 1.5 and 1.6 times the minimum wage.62 In November 1995, Prime Minister Juppé announced that the government was freezing family allowance increases and imposing taxes on family allowances, except for the very poor, as of 1997.63 He also announced that the CSG was being widened to cover all incomes, save for those of the very poor.64

**EXPLANATION - CHILD CARE POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN FRANCE**

**Dominant Ideas**

What explains how such a comprehensive system of child care developed in France? What motivated the establishment and expansion of these policies? In order to find these answers, it is necessary to trace through policy developments, beginning in the late nineteenth century and the formation of the welfare state, and to consider the role that ideas, interests and institutions played.

The dominant ideas regarding the family in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can be summarized as solidarity or collectivism, pronatalism, and maternalism. In later chapters, it will be shown that very different ideas were rooted in state and society in North America, leading to very different patterns of welfare state development.

62These changes were announced in the *Loi quinquennale pour l'emploi*, in the fall of 1993. See Jacqueline Farache, "La Politique Familiale à la Croisée des Chemins," Analyses et Documents Économiques, 147.


Solidarity / Collectivism

Traditional political culture in France promotes the idea of solidarity (interdependency) and collectivism as opposed to individualism. The principle of solidarity, as articulated by Léon Bourgeois, was grounded in the social philosophy of writers such as Auguste Comte and was regarded by social reformers as the secular analog to the idea of Christian charity.65 It gradually displaced liberal ideas of individualism and rights to property dominant in what Saint-Jours describes paradoxically as the conservative classes.66 Solidarity is based on the "notion that citizenship brought not only reciprocal rights but also duties. Citizens owed each other—and ultimately the state—certain things because they were inextricably bound in interdependency (solidarity)."67 Society was welded together by a contract composed of both rights and duties. One of those sacred national duties was to provide assistance to the poor.68

Part of the idea of solidarity is the acceptance of sharing the costs of rearing children among the entire population. The belief is that every child should have the same start in terms of material goods and resources for healthy development. Furthermore, no family should be hampered from having children because of lack of finances. This has led to the norm of universalism being embedded in child care policies. Programs are extended to all families, or are based on family numbers, but they are not governed by norms of deserving versus undeserving.69 In Canada and the United States, in contrast, as we will see, the culture of individualism and the attendant norms or ideas of deserving/undeserving are upheld in child care policies, most of which are geared to the most needy.

66Saint-Jours, "France," 100.
69As Nord argues, moralizing on the basis of deserving/undeserving (usually based on the marital status of women) was not so important to French policy makers; what mattered more was for women to have babies. Philip Nord, "The Welfare State in France, 1870-1914," French
Social Catholicism has also been an important influence on family policies. The Catholic church, from the 1891 papal encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, endorsed the idea of a "just wage"— that workers should be paid not merely what they are able to negotiate with their employer but also enough to provide a living for their families. From the idea of a "just wage" emerged family allowances, which pay families an additional amount above the normal wages that they earn.70 Not collectivist but "familist" in nature, family allowances were resisted by liberals, who saw them as socialist, and by some unions, who saw them as a means to reduce the salaries of workers. Unions changed their opinion after World War II. Social Catholic ideas have been promoted by Christian Democratic parties like the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), which played an important role after World War II, and by Catholic trade unions like the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC).

French political culture is also much more statist. The tradition of *mutualité* in France, which means that "each person should voluntarily do as much as possible to provide for his or her own needs in cooperation with others,"71 led to the creation of a number of voluntary and private insurance funds (*sociétés mutuelles*) in the late 1800s to provide coverage for sickness, old age, and so on. However, state involvement overtook the mutual societies and incorporated them into the system of social security. State action is generally regarded as more legitimate in the area of social and economic policy.

**Pronatalism**

Solidarity or collectivism developed symbiotically with modern French nationalism and in tandem with pronatalism. Demographic concerns led to the belief that children are not just the private responsibility of parents, but rather were a collective resource that added to France's demographic and economic strength, and therefore had a place in state policy.72 Concerns about

---

the decline in the birth rate developed after the Franco-Prussian War, and again after World War I, periods when insecurity about the strength of France was powerful. These concerns mobilized doctors, parliamentarians, and demographers, to lobby for policies to encourage parents (women) to have more babies. These activists often "conjured up the need for remedies in the context of a patriotic and even nationalist discourse." Indeed, Pedersen argues that in the inter-war years "reproduction, far from being a private concern, became a foreign policy consideration, an element of high politics." French authorities feared the invasion of France by Germany. Not having a child, or worse, having an abortion was seen by some as deserting the nation. The slogan of pronatalists was "il faut faire naître" (women must be made to give birth). This, rather than immigration, was the solution to the problem of depopulation.

73While there is little doubt demographic concerns played a large role in influencing policies, it is not clear whether an absolute demographic problem really existed in France, or whether the decline was disconcerting only compared to France's neighbours. Pedersen (60) notes that "between 1871 and 1911, the population of France grew by a mere 8.6%, from 36.1 to 39.2 million, while the German population grew by almost 60% to reach some 65 million, and the population of Great Britain by 53.6% to reach over 40 million." Between 1850 and 1896 in France the number of births per thousand fell from 27 to 22, down from 38 a century earlier. Comparatively, the birth rate in Germany was 36 per thousand, 37 in Austria, and 41 in Hungary. "Les Crèches de France," Petit Parisien, 23 September 1899. High rates of infant mortality also exacerbated the problem. McDougall reports that in the 1890s, the infant mortality rate was over 135 per 1000 births. Mary Lynn McDougall, "Protecting Infants: The French Campaign for Maternity Leaves, 1890s-1913," French Historical Studies 13, 1 (Spring 1983), 81.

Birth rates again were much higher in Germany in the early 1900s. The rates for the two countries were very similar after 1925, with Germany experiencing a more marked decline. Indeed, after the 1930s, France had higher birth rates than Germany or Great Britain. However, from 1933 to 1939, French birth rates declined. The rate fell from an average of about 750,000 births to about 640,000, that is, from a rate of 18 or 19 per 1000 to about 15, coinciding with a period when pronatalist rhetoric was particularly strong in France. And while France's birth rate experienced a drop and then remained steady throughout the 1930s, Germany's rate, under a pronatalist policy instituted by the Nazis, did experience an increase in 1934. German birth rates of about 18 or 19 per 1000 caused much consternation among the French. Figures for this period are from the League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, various years.

74Anne Cova, "French Feminism and Maternity: Theories and Policies 1890-1918," Maternity and Gender Politics: Women and the Rise of the European Welfare States 1880s-1950s, eds. Gisela Bock and Pat Thane (London: Routledge, 1991), 133; see also Offen, "Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siècle France."


76Cova, "French Feminism and Maternity," 131.
Contrasted with these social reformers were those described by Lenoir as:
a diverse grouping of philanthropical movements connected to social catholicism,
a grouping that, in favoring large families, explicitly aimed at restoring a moral
order founded on respect for the right to property and "natural" hierarchies, the
respect for the right to determine freely how one's property will be distributed
upon death, and respect for Christian values.\(^77\)

This group is difficult to label. Some refer to social Catholics as leftist\(^78\); others, like Lenoir,
characterize them as politically conservative who wished for a revival of morality based on the
family and who resisted state interference. I label such groups "familist". Familists, along with
pronatalists and maternalists, supported and defended the family, and all lobbied the state to take
more of a role in policies for the family, yet each group had very different goals in mind.
Familists sought to protect the traditional family, with the demarcation between breadwinner
husbands and homemaker wives and mothers. Familists often also joined with pronatalists to
encourage large families.

**Maternalism**

Maternalism or maternal feminism, grounded in notions of equality as complementarity,
or "equality in difference" is another major tenet of French thinking and French feminism
separate from, I would argue, familism and pronatalism. Research by scholars such as Cova,
Koven and Michel, Offen, and Pedersen provides rich insight into the role that "maternalist" or
"maternal feminist" politics played in the development of policies for women and children.\(^79\)
The idea that maternity and maternalism make women different from men and therefore should
be the basis of women's rights can be contrasted with individualist feminism which minimizes
differences between women and men. Thus, maternal feminists like Louise Koppe, who also
founded the first *maison maternelle* (maternity home) in Paris in 1891, supported the government

\(^79\)Cova, "French Feminism"; Seth Koven and Sonya Michel, "Womanly Duties:
Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the
United States, 1880-1920," The American Historical Review, 95, 4 (October 1990), 1077; Karen
Maternity and Gender Politics, 138-159; Pedersen, Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the
Welfare State.
move to ban night work for women in the late 1800s. Activist Marguerite Durand supported both policies for birthing mothers as well as equal pay for equal work and wages for housework.

These ideas also dominated the French women's movement of the 1970s with groups like Psychanalyse et Politique (Psych et Po) which celebrated women's sexual difference and argued that women's biological differences, repressed in society, are in fact the source of women's liberation. Even more conservative Catholic women still supported feminism as a movement to achieve women's rights, as "the absence of such rights prohibit[ed] them from fulfilling their 'natural' vocation as Christian mothers." Conservative trade union organizations like the CFTC still support maternal feminist ideas and still oppose, for example, night work for women.

Advocates of more individualist feminism did appear in the late 1800s and were quite vocal until the 1930s, when pronatalism and conservatism again became dominant. For example, Madeleine Pelletier, the first woman to be appointed as a permanent staff member of a psychiatric hospital in Paris in 1903, denounced maternal feminism, called for the dissolution of the family, voluntary motherhood, and the right to abortion during the first trimester. It was not until the late 1960s and 1970s that supporters of individualist feminism emerged again as a political force.

One of the lasting legacies of maternal feminist politics has been a concern for the welfare of children, which in turn has meant the promotion of the needs of mothers and lobbying for women's rights as mothers. In 1901 the Conseil National des Femmes Françaises (CNFF) was established as a branch of the maternalist International Council of Women (ICW), founded

---

80Cova, "French Feminism," 121. The maternity houses were to provide shelter to children whose parents could not take care of them, with most children coming from single parent families headed by mothers.

81Cova, 123.


83Cova, 122.

84Cova, 128.

The CNFF brought together women who shared an interest in women's concerns, and particularly the material lot of women and children. The platform of the Union Française pour le Suffrage des Femmes (UFSF), established in 1909, was similarly maternalist. It advocated women's enfranchisement, not as an end in itself, but as a means of achieving other social rights and to enable women to fulfill their maternal duties. The UFSF advocated the recognition of maternity as a social service as it believed "that it was women's responsibility to bring children into the world to struggle against depopulation."87

Both of these women's groups were very influential, owing to their public profile and activities, their links to Members of Parliament supportive of policies for women like maternity leave, and their support from employers and trade unions.88 They were also successful because they emphasized equality in difference, or complementarity, not strict sameness. As Pedersen argues, they did not attempt to invade men's sphere, but instead argued that women's sphere was equally important.89 The ability to persuade government officials to support them was even more important in that women did not yet have the suffrage. The coincidence of goals was pivotal to success. Cova argues that for some Members of Parliament in the early decades of the

---

86Black reports that the ICW was Protestant in its basis. Catholic groups could not formally join, so these groups established the World Union of Catholic Women's Leagues in 1910. Naomi Black, "Social Feminism in France: A Case Study," in Women and World Change: Equity Issues in Development, eds. Naomi Black and Ann Baker Cottrell (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981), 221. The ICW's platform included advocating equal pay and access to work; protective labour legislation for both men and women; and state support for maternity. See Black, 222.

87Cova, 130; Offen, "Body Politics," 145.

88See also Jane Jenson, "Representations of Gender: Policies to 'Protect' Women Workers and Infants in France and the United States before 1914," in Women, the State, and Welfare, ed. Linda Gordon (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 152-77. Jenson argues that "it was, in large part, the feminists' ability to speak to or in the discourse of their allies that ordered the influence of the multitude of strands of feminism present in the universe of political discourse. Those who fit well with the vision of republican men...or socialist men...fared the best. Those feminists for whom political rights were a central goal found few allies..." (160). For a discussion of the meaning of universe of political discourse see chapter one n. 20.

twentieth century, "support to mothers through appropriate laws seemed to be the only way to stop the decline in fertility." Thus, maternalist ideas fit well with concerns about depopulation and social fragmentation, and coincided with familists' support for the traditional family. And, in response to complaints by some pronatalists that "feminists" were to blame for declining birthrates because of dénatalité, that is, the voluntary restriction of births, maternalists could argue that the problem was lack of public policies to support motherhood. Women's organizations were able to use these concerns about depopulation to argue that to counter the decline of the birthrate required policies to improve conditions for mothers and children.

Policy Development: 1800s-1930

The efforts of maternalists to gain public policies for mothers and children, combined with efforts of pronatalist organizations and individuals to promote the birth rate, led to the development of very important and enduring redistributive policies in France. Other social reformers and activists, such as doctors concerned with children's health and mortality, lobbied for policies to better ensure the healthy growth and development of children. By the turn of the century, the government of France worked with private agencies to expand and enhance services for women and children like well-baby centres, milk distribution centres, and medical care for mothers. It passed a law in 1893 to ensure free medical assistance and birthing for poor women. In 1904 the government passed legislation to expand already existing local programs (maisons maternelles) to provide prenatal and obstetrical care to both married and single mothers.

---

90Cova, 119.
91Cova, 119. Some pronatalists also blamed the practice of wet-nursing followed by a number of poor working women. See Offen, "Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siècle France," 653.
in need, so as to prevent infant mortality. Moreover, in 1912, the French government passed a law to permit unwed mothers and their children to track down fathers and sue them for financial support in certain circumstances. In 1913, the government passed a family allowance bill to provide cash subsidies to heads of households of needy families with four or more children. The government began to give civil servants subsidies for family expenses in 1917.

Also as a means to combat child mortality and to protect women as childbearers, the French government passed laws in 1844 and 1892 regulating work by women and children. For example, the government banned night work and some forms of industrial labour, such as work in the mining sector. As well, it limited the number of hours women could work. The minimum working age for children was raised to 12 years of age under a child labour law of 1874. The French government implemented its maternity legislation (la loi Engerand) in 1909, and extended it to all working mothers in 1913. The 1909 legislation allowed eight weeks leave without fear of losing one's job. However, employers were not obligated to allow employees to take the leave and there was no remuneration for lost wages. In 1910, teachers became entitled to paid leave; in 1911, postal workers won the benefit. In 1913, the government passed la loi Strauss which established an obligatory maternity (i.e. postnatal) leave of four weeks after childbirth for working mothers in industry and commercial establishments. A prenatal leave of four weeks prior to birth was optional. The law also instituted postnatal maternity benefits in the form of a daily allowance for four weeks for all working women in need, including domestic workers. Women could receive some compensation for prenatal leave

94 Nord, "The Welfare State in France," 828. This program was unique in that governments in other countries tended to restrict benefits to married or widowed mothers. Fuchs, "France in a Comparative Perspective," 166.
96 Nord, 828; Cova, 129.
97 David and Starzec, "France: A Diversity of Policy Options," 82.
98 Fuchs, 167. There is a discrepancy in the literature. Jenson argues the first protective legislation for women did not appear until the 1890s. Jenson, "Gender and Reproduction," 43, n. 11.
100 Nord, 823.
if the mother had a medical certificate that stated that continued employment would endanger the mother or child.\textsuperscript{102} This policy was driven by the state's concern regarding the life and health of babies (and women as mothers), but it also was an important policy to help women reconcile work and childrearing by providing compensatory benefits.

To contrast this thinking toward the family with that of more liberal welfare states, Pedersen points out that "implicit in British assistance was the message that parents should not have more children than they could support. The French policy implied, by contrast, that the production of children was a meritorious act even by those who could not support them."\textsuperscript{103} Larger families should be helped with direct financial aid, with services to help mothers, and with hygiene and nursing services to ensure the health of children.

Not just French welfare state policies, but also French employment policies, gave consideration to the family and thus linked women's maternity and work life. From the late nineteenth century, some employers provided family benefits in the form of wage supplements to workers to ensure they had decent living conditions. Charitable in their nature at first, these family benefits became more common after World War I. By 1921, a centralized and nationwide system of compensation emerged, still independent of the state, to take over the responsibility of paying these families benefits. By 1932, companies were required to participate in the family allowance program described below.\textsuperscript{104}

After maternal feminists achieved maternity benefits, they turned their attention to other ways to reconcile work and family life. They lobbied the government for passage of the 1917 law that allowed women working in industry an hour off each day to nurse their babies. The law also mandated employers with over 100 employees to establish nursing rooms in or near their factories and businesses, although few did.\textsuperscript{105}

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{101}Stetson, Women's Rights in France, 135; Cova, 126-7.
\textsuperscript{102}Jenson, "Gender and Reproduction," 16-17, 43 n. 12; Cova, 129; Koven and Michel, 1100; McDougall, "Protecting Infants."
\textsuperscript{103}Pedersen, Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State, 74.
\textsuperscript{104}David and Starzec, 82.
\textsuperscript{105}Cova, 132.
\end{flushleft}
The Foundations of Child Care and Early Childhood Education

It was from the ideological foundations of pronatalism and the fact of women's participation in the labour market that child care programs and policies developed in France.106 The first centre for children under the age of two of working mothers, la crèche de Chaillot, was opened in November 1844 by Firmin Marbeau, adjunct to the mayor of the first arrondissement (district) in Paris.107 Before then, many private forms of care were in existence. Artisans and shopkeepers could often afford to send their babies to nourrices (wet-nurses) in the country, but many labouring class women could not. They often relied on garderies or private day nurseries typically run by older, poor women in their own homes. Domestics who could not keep their children with them at their house of service would send their children to maisons de sévages (literally "weaning houses"), which were private nurseries that cared for children on a weekly or monthly basis.108

The idea behind these new charitable institutions was that children would be healthier in public care because they would get good food, be exposed to good hygiene, and have medical care. The end goal was to reduce infant mortality, and was again motivated by concerns of depopulation. La Berge also argues there was a moral intent behind the day care centres. They were designed to educate women through example on how to raise their children both hygienically and morally. Mothers were expected to be married, although in practice many single mothers were able to use the day care centres.

The number of day care centres expanded rapidly from 1845 onward. By 1852 there were 26 operating in Paris. By the end of the nineteenth century, 408 day care centres were in

106La Berge labels the two main groups that focused their attention on the poor and labouring classes the Social Catholics, who were concerned with charity, and the moral economists, who were concerned with the socioeconomic situation of these groups and especially women. Ann F. La Berge, "Medicalization and Moralization: The Crèches of Nineteenth-Century Paris," Journal of Social History 25, 1 (Fall 1991), 66.


108La Berge, 67.
existence: 66 in Paris, 39 in the suburbs and 303 in the rest of France.109 These centres were created usually on the initiative of philanthropic individuals as well as municipal councils, which provided financial support.110 Many working class women, however, did not use the day care centres at first. There were concerns about hygiene and there were high mortality rates due to the spread of disease amongst children. The use of wet-nurses continued, and in fact, they remained one of the most popular forms of outside care at that time.

In 1856, the government recognized the day care centres as "establishments of public utility". This recognition meant the day care centres could receive and manage donations, and placed them under the administration and surveillance of the state.111 By the late 1800s, conditions had improved in the day care centres and the government began to view the centres as a means to promote puériculture or scientific child care concerned with maternal infant and child care education, in an effort to reduce infant mortality. Leprince reports that day care centres were eligible for state subsidies from 1862, provided they were licensed by the Préfet du Département. Workplace day care centres appeared in 1867, supported and pushed by trade unions, but they did not expand much then. And, in 1874, the government passed la loi Roussel, which required that "every child under 2 left with a childminder [...] be 'under the surveillance of the public authorities to protect its life and health'"--the public authorities meaning the medical profession.112 Thus, already by the end of the nineteenth century, child care was developing into a regulated system.

Another cornerstone of state child care and development policy since the nineteenth century has been the educational system. Again, the roots of the system of the pre-primary schools are found in the charitable institutions, first established by J. Frédéric Oberlin in 1770. These institutions were called écoles à tricoter, or knitting schools, because children were put to

---

109La Berge, 68, 81.
110Radical, 19 September 1899.
111Firmin Didot Frères, 363. La Berge (pp. 68, 81) cites the year as 1869.
work in them. In the first half of the nineteenth century, they became *salles d'asiles* (shelters) and took on a custodial function for children whose mothers worked. In 1836 the French Ministry of Education took over the institutions and integrated them with the public school system. The term *école maternelle* appeared as they took on the function of pre-primary schooling. In 1881-1882 and 1886, the government passed legislation that established free, compulsory and secular elementary education for children. Pre-primary education did not become free until the 1950s, though, when the lycées and universities also became free. The idea behind French education for young children is to prepare children of all backgrounds to receive an education and become "productive" citizens. State involvement in this area goes back more than a century.

**Policy Development: 1930-1945**

The key question in linking child and family policies to a labour market strategy is determining whether family policies keep women in the home, or whether they help women participate in the labour market. Women's labour force activity rates in France have always been high (see tables 3.12, 1.5), and there was not a gendered division of labour, even in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, the distribution of women's employment largely mimicked that of men, with women more likely to be employed in agriculture or industry, rather than services. This pattern of women's labour market participation was different than in Britain, for example, where employment patterns reflected more the male breadwinner model.

There have been periods in French history when there have been calls for women to return to the home and where labour market participation rates did drop. After World War I, a

---


117The male breadwinner model means high wages for men to support families at home.
number of women were displaced by demobilized soldiers.\textsuperscript{118} Again, during the Depression, economic and demographic pressures combined to "encourage" women to return to the home. For example, Charles Richet, a French physician and Nobel laureate, "called for the forcible eviction of all women from the work-force as the solution to both the birth-rate crisis and male unemployment."\textsuperscript{119}

In the period between the two world wars, some women abandoned their belief in the family as a private responsibility and support for limited state intervention to advocate explicitly maternalist policies such as support for motherhood.\textsuperscript{120} For example, in 1925, a group of women formed the social Catholic organization, the Union Féminine Civique et Sociale (UFCS) which, among other things, led a campaign to encourage mothers to return to the home, in return for a mothers' allowance. The UFSF also advocated measures that would allow women to return to the home, but was against legal restrictions on employment of married women.\textsuperscript{121} So was the UFCS: it cannot be considered a purely familist organization as it advocated women's "choice" in adopting a "home-centred" role.\textsuperscript{122} Also, it increasingly wavered on restrictive labour policies for women, and demanded changes to the economy and social policies so that women could stay at home. In 1931 it founded the Comité du Retour des Mères au Foyer (Committee for the return of mothers to the home). In 1935 it founded the Ligue de la Mère au Foyer (homemakers' league).

The debates among these women's groups became more hostile. Feminists began to talk "less of women's work as an unhappy necessity and more of it as an inalienable right."\textsuperscript{123} This

\textsuperscript{119}Offen, "Body Politics," 143.
\textsuperscript{120}Pedersen, "Catholicism, Feminism," 246, 269 n. 2.
\textsuperscript{121}In principle, policies like financial inducements to stay home should not really be regarded as anti-women. In fact, the CGT, the socialist/communist trade union confederation, supported the idea of paying women to stay home in recognition that maternity was a social function and the costs should be socialized. The Left saw family allowances as an issue of justice, and a way of freeing women from dependence on their husbands. Pedersen, "Catholicism," 262.
\textsuperscript{122}Pedersen, "Catholicism," 251.
\textsuperscript{123}Pedersen, Family, Dependence, 398.
led to a marked split in these women's movements. The UFSF forged an alliance with the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), which supported rights of married women to employment.124 The UFCS allied with pronatalists like the Alliance Nationale pour l'Accroissement de la Population Française (National Alliance for the Increase of the French Population), a pronatalist lobby group formed in 1896 under demographer Jacques Bertillon. On the other hand, even representatives from the more conservative UFCS spoke out in favour of women's choice to remain in employment.125

During this period, the government took active measures to encourage pronatalism. In 1932, the government implemented a national family allowance act. This act made mandatory an already-existing voluntary program of employer-financed child allowances for all workers in business and industry who had two or more children, and thus a right of employment. Although the funds were placed under state control, decisions as to the amount of contributions and benefits remained within the control of the private funds, the caisses de compensation, which had already been established by enterprises, and which by then had 255 affiliated enterprises, covering nearly two million employees.126 The payment of family allowances was seen as a corrective to the trend of low birth rates and was passed at a time when pronatalist ideas were not only popular, but also supported by those who were part of the legislative and consultative process. Pedersen reports that by 1929, 367 of the 606 deputies in the Chamber of Deputies were pronatalists.127

Significantly, business supported the family allowance program. Industrialists in advanced sectors of the economy like metals and engineering, as well as in textiles, "were attracted to family allowances in the hope that such flexible payment systems, in some cases coupled with Fordist management techniques, could revive French competitiveness in the

124The CGT adopted the principle of equal pay in 1900. By 1925, Hantrais reports, it had achieved equal pay in some branches of the public sector such as the post office and for teachers of the lower grades in the education sector. Hantrais, "Women, Work and Welfare in France," 117.
125Offen, "Body Politics," 143; Pedersen, "Catholicism," 257.
126Pedersen, Family, 232.
127Pedersen, Family, 371.
postwar era." Family policy also became an important means of combatting unionization and encouraging wage restraint, to ensure salaries in industry remained low.\textsuperscript{129}

Employers also had a political rationale for supporting family allowances. For example, the Caisse de Compensation de la Région Parisienne (CCRP) established a social service involving home visits and home economics instruction at the factories. Pedersen argues this was originally established as a way for employers to police how mothers were spending family allowances, but it developed into employer social intervention directed specifically at women and children. It led to prenatal visits by trained nurses to pregnant mothers, the monitoring of young babies, and the oversight of the health of family members generally. Sick children were funded to go on "cures" and others to summer camps.\textsuperscript{130}

Thus, employers had a very important role in the development of family policies in the pre-WWII period. In contrast, during this period, unions were very much against family allowances. Union opposition was based not so much on maternalist basis of the policy, but rather concerns that family policies were designed to keep workers' wages low. When unions realized the power of family allowances as an instrument in the workplace, they called for the state to take over and have the funds (caisses) under control of workers.

Expansion of the family allowance system found favour in government as well. In 1938 the government began to contribute to the financing of family allowances, expanding coverage to agricultural and other independent workers.\textsuperscript{131} In the 1930s, the government created a High Commission on Population, composed of the labour minister, the president of the Federation of Large Families, and the president of the Alliance Nationale.\textsuperscript{132} Responsible to the Prime Minister, in 1939 the High Commission issued a \textit{Code de la famille}, designed to address the issue of the family and the birth rate. The Family Code of 29 July 1939 cancelled family

\textsuperscript{128}Pedersen, \textit{Family}, 235.
\textsuperscript{129}Yet, the degree to which one can argue that a purely economic interest motivated employers is limited. Presumably employers in other countries such as the United States would be motivated by a similar rationale; that is, all employers would have an interest in strong and healthy labour force. Yet employers in other countries did not push for these policies.
\textsuperscript{130}Detailed in Pedersen, \textit{Family}, 273-74.
\textsuperscript{131}Offen, "Body Politics," 150.
\textsuperscript{132}Lenoir, "Family Policy in France Since 1938," 149.
allowance payments for the first child, but allowed a payment of 10 per cent of an average monthly salary for the second child, and increased that amount to 20 per cent for the third and subsequent children. Families with three or more children were granted tax relief, while single persons and couples without children were punished financially.

In addition, the Family Code established a bonus for the first child born within two years of marriage. It also established loans for young couples, with the interest and repayment of the loan declining the more children the couple had. In 1938 the government had established *allocations de la mère au foyer* (mothers' allowances) for women at home and single mothers. This was a policy supported by the UFCS, and was unique in that it was provided to women regardless of whether they had a working husband. Only about one-third of mothers with a husband met the qualification, however, as most married women worked. Both the birth bonus and the mothers' allowance were paid directly to mothers, but family allowances were generally paid to fathers, unless they were absent or unable to work. The 1939 Family Code as well as that of 1943 mandated that each département establish a *maison maternelle* (maternity home) to provide shelter to mothers-to-be. The government also appointed a Ministère des Affaires Familiales in 1940, providing an institutional basis for family policy development.

Family policy in the 1930s therefore became pitted against women's participation in the labour market, whereas up until then, there was an uneasy marriage of the two. In terms of the impact on women's labour market participation, activity rates did drop from 35.5 per cent in 1921 to 30.6 per cent in 1936. Men's labour market activity dropped as well, from 69.3 to 63.9 per

---

133 It has never been reinstated.


136 In contrast, in the United States, only widows or women with incapacitated husbands could collect mothers' pensions. See chapter five.


139 Offen, "Body Politics," 150. Hantrais (119) reports that most governments since World War II have continued the practice, appointing at least a junior minister responsible for the family.
cent in those same years (see table 3.12). Issues like employment rights for women were overwhelmed by issues of pronatalism and unemployment. Policies like mothers' allowances developed as a way to deal with unemployment and depopulation, a pattern which was repeated in the 1980s and 1990s, not necessarily to improve the status of mothers, as maternalists hoped.

Under the Vichy regime during World War II, government tactics regarding the family and women's employment became more repressive. This can be seen in the government's handling of abortion. In 1942, abortion became a crime contre la sûreté de l'État (crime against the security of the State), punishable by death. In 1920, it had become illegal to encourage abortion and anti-conception. In 1923 the French government had changed the crime of abortion to an offence (délit), effectively decriminalizing it; however, that meant jurisdiction was transferred from juries to judges. Far from becoming more lenient, the government, it is commonly argued, was attempting to ensure certainty of punishment. The abortion law under the Vichy regime was much more draconian.

Divorce was outlawed during the first three years of marriage. Lenoir reports that "fathers of large families had membership rights in numerous organizations, while a single man or one without children could not hope to have a career or to advance, particularly in the judiciary." Married women whose husbands had jobs were barred from employment in state services. In 1941, the Vichy government replaced the mother's allowance (allocation de la mère au foyer) with a single-wage allowance (allocation de salaire unique) paid to all families with one parent employed. It was designed to encourage couples to have families in that it was paid to young couples for the first two years of marriage and then stopped if the couple had no children. It was an ironically progressive policy, in that it also helped families left with female heads by the war. Also during the Vichy period, the government passed a law in 1941 that made it illegal for employers to dismiss pregnant women or women on maternity leave, with offenders subject to imprisonment.

---

141 Lenoir, "Family Policy in France," 151.
142 David and Starzec, 83.
143 Offen, "Body Politics," 151.
144 Dex et al., French and British Mothers at Work, 73. The law was rarely invoked as
These policies emerged to the consternation of the UFCS who was not interested in forcing women, but rather encouraging them, to return to the home. Maternalists were interested in improving women's status as mothers, not making them subordinate to or dependent on men. The explicitly familialist policies of the Vichy regime to "make childbearing happen" (faire naître) were not what paternalists had in mind. On the other hand, maternalists were successful at getting some family policies implemented in the 1930s because they were willing to ally with those concerned with denatality and unemployment, like the Alliance Nationale. This meant policies were developed that explicitly targeted children, and not mothers, which ironically provided a more progressive basis for their expansion later on.

The foundations of current child and family policies in France can be found in the programs and services established prior to World War II. These policies include maternity leave and family allowances, as well as public child care and education. Important interests—businesses, unions, parliamentarians, and women's groups—emerged during this time, and continued to play a significant role after World War II. Notably, all of this happened before French women were granted the vote in 1945.

Policy Development: The Immediate Post-WWII Period

The institutionalized welfare state emerged under the 1945 post-war plan. The newly emerging welfare system was made national, unified, universal, and egalitarian and reflected a number of embedded norms, such as the value of solidarity. It not only covered all employees, but also everyone was expected to contribute to pay for the sick, the retired and those with families. It was set up not just for workers, but for all citizens, although it took some time

women had to seek redress through the courts and regulation imposed a harsh sentence: imprisonment.

146Pedersen, in "Catholicism," makes this argument as well.
for benefits to be universalized to the unemployed as well as the employed.\textsuperscript{148}

In the immediate post-war period, the government tried to respond to the demands of pronatalists, maternalists, and egalitarians, and implemented quite contradictory policies regarding employment and family policies. Pronatalist policies continued after the war. In 1945, reflecting the continuing concern about population, the government established the Institut National d'Études Démographiques (INED). Its charter was to "study all aspects of population issues" as well as examine "all the physical and moral resources capable of fostering the quantitative increase in the population and its qualitative advancement."\textsuperscript{149} In 1946, the government took over the system of family allowances, and provided the benefit for all families with at least one working parent and with at least two children.\textsuperscript{150} The government also established a prenatal allowance to be paid during the entire pregnancy at a rate of 25 per cent of the basic wage.\textsuperscript{151} In order to be eligible for family allowances, families had to provide a certificate of school attendance for their children. To be eligible for the prenatal allowance, mothers had to undergo prenatal and postnatal examinations.\textsuperscript{152}

The government continued the \textit{allocation de salaire unique}, or single-wage allowance, a

\textsuperscript{148}Ashford quotes the description of the newly-emerging French social security system given by Ambroise Croizat, the postwar minister of labour:

We conceived social legislation as a vast palace that could contain everyone. You know what happened to our palace: a number of small and separate pavilions were substituted, some from conversions, some without roofs, some furnished and others not. We live in these small lodgings. Later we try to install every possible comfort.

Ashford, "In Search of the État Providence," 158.


\textsuperscript{150}"All" families was qualified to exclude those who were not working and who were unable to show why they could not work. The sick, disabled, and the old, as well as women with at least two dependent children, were still eligible for family allowances. Pierre Laroque, "From Social Insurance to Social Security: Evolution in France," \textit{International Labour Review} 57, 6 (June 1948), 575. Family allowances were also to be paid to the person who took care of the children, not necessarily to the head of the household. Lenoir, 157.

\textsuperscript{151}Offen in "Body Politics," 151, argues that the intention of this allowance was to discourage abortion; Merith Niehuss, "French and German Family Policy 1945-60," \textit{Contemporary European History} 4, 3 (1995), 302.

\textsuperscript{152}David and Starzec, 83; Laroque, "From Social Insurance to Social Security," 582.
policy still somewhat familist and pronatalist as it not only encouraged births but also encouraged one parent (usually the mother) to remain at home full-time to take care of the children.153 This allowance was available to families with one child, but with higher rates for families with two or more children. Under the single wage allowance program, mothers could also receive a prenatal allowance, again with the stipulation that they receive medical examinations.

The government also introduced the *quotient familial*, the family size-based tax deductions described in the first section, which allows large families to pay proportionately less taxes than small families. No taxes on family allowances and social security payments were collected (although that was to change in 1997). PMI health measures and services were established in 1945, and included immunization, advice on care, feeding, and so on. The measures were geared toward disease prevention and were free for children under six years old. By 1946, the most important branch of social security was aid to families, with 40 per cent of social security spending directed to these programs.154 The government also gave recognition to the family in the 1946 constitution of the Fourth Republic, which reads: "The nation guarantees to the individual and to the family conditions necessary to their development."155 The Constitution thus enshrined both the importance of the family as well as "the duty of all to work and the right to obtain employment."156 Furthermore, the government enshrined the principle of equality between men and women, along with a "guarantee to all—especially to children, mothers and elderly workers—the safeguarding of their health, material security, rest, and leisure."157 Job-protected maternity leave was introduced for working women as part of insurance benefits.

A compromise between employment and family policy needed to be worked out. The government has spent the entire post-war period trying to strike a balance between support for

---

153David and Starzec, 83.
154"Prestations Familiales et Politique de la Famille," 132. By 1960, its share had declined to about 29 per cent of social security expenditures. Lenoir, 159.
women's labour and support for the family, in consultation with a number of interested groups. The post-war period saw the continuation of the battle between familist, pronatalist, maternalist, and egalitarian groups. Some of their ideas were translated into public policy; some were not. The role of institutions in the development of the post-war social security system in general is detailed more below, after the actors and ideas that specifically affected the introduction of child care and family policies are highlighted.

Divisions between familists and pronatalists continued after the war. The former favoured the traditional family -- that is, the mother at home -- and frowned on women working, whereas the latter's primary goal was to see the birth rate rise, and thus favoured policy incentives for working women to have babies. Some government actors, in turn, supported the idea of encouraging women's labour market participation, given the labour shortages France was facing. Jenson and Sineau argue that many of the "modernizers" of the Fourth Republic supported the idea of women working, particularly those who were close to Pierre Mendès-France. Their ideas were carried forward and translated into policy in the Fifth Republic mainly by Center and Left politicians such as Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Jacques Delors and Edgar Faure. Indeed, the position of the Commissariat de l'Emploi (Manpower Commission) leading up to the Third Plan of 1958-1961 was to increase the numbers of working women and to advocate "part-time work, flexible hours, increased daycare, and, as a compromise solution between the social actors represented on this commission, the allocation of the single-income allowance neither for the nonworking mother nor for all mothers, but in accordance with the amount of time spent working." The single-wage allowance is one early example where groups staked out their positions. The allocation de salaire unique, as mentioned above, was an allowance given to families in which only one parent worked. Family organizations, such as the Union Nationale des Associations Familiales (UNAF), as well as members of the Catholic movement, such as the CFTC, supported the legislation to encourage women (mothers) to remain at home. After the

158 Jane Jenson and Mariette Sineau, "Family Policy and Women's Citizenship in Mitterrand's France," Social Politics 2, 3 (Fall 1995), 244-269.
159 Lenoir, 162.
160 Nord, 832-3. Religious leaders had less of a voice under a republican government
war, the MRP became the dominant party, and from 1947 on, the Communists were excluded from cabinet. The MRP favoured family policy as part of its support of social Catholicism. It gave the UNAF exclusive recognition as a group legally representative of families, cementing its position in the development of family policies. Lenoir reports that the UNAF, along with the INED and the CNAF, responsible for the family benefits fund, are part of the government's consultation network regarding family policy. 161 Both the MRP and the family associations resisted the creation of a single national social insurance fund responsible for health, disability payments, pensions, and so on, including family benefits. These groups were afraid a single fund would diminish the autonomy of the family benefit system and leave it more vulnerable. 162

Union organizations such as the CGT began to take an interest in family policies. It should be remembered that trade unions were not always in support of family policies. The CGT opposed family programs before World War II, as stated above, because they were controlled by employers and were considered compensation in lieu of wage increases. 163 The Communist Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire (CGTU) called the 1930 social insurance law "fascist". 164 After the war, as the management of the caisses became more democratic and independent of business, the CGT softened its stance. It also became less socialist, more communist, and maternalist.

Thus, by the end of World War II, a remarkable consensus had emerged amongst the major union groups: recognition of the need for policies to reconcile work and family life. This idea shaped post-war policy making more than any other. It represents a compromise of competing ideas, with one common thread: support for maternalism. And this compromise has been embedded in policies as unions have played a key role in the development of social policy after the war. Business organizations have also agreed to this compromise, a little more reluctantly, as a way to resolve labour issues.

161 Lenoir, 144-5.
162 Ashford, "Advantages of Complexity," 38; Lenoir, 156. The Socialists, Communists, and the CGT were all supporters of creating a single fund.
163 Lenoir, 156. He argues, in fact, that the Left really allowed the field of family policy to be dominated by the Right.
164 Saint-Jours, "France," 147, n. 50.
Child care is an important part of these discussions. It has been brought into the public policy sphere much more effectively than in Canada or the United States, not as a women's rights issue or equality issue but again as an issue of how to reconcile work and family life. Today, as in the immediate post-war period, child care is discussed in the context of workplace issues by the social partners, with each major union and business organization formulating its own opinion on how best to reconcile work and family life.

In the interviews conducted with representatives from the major social partners (the Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF), the Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT), the CGT, the CFTC, and the Force Ouvrière (FO)), a range of opinions emerged. The representative of the CNPF, as an employers' organization, was more reluctant than the unions to argue that child care is an issue to be dealt with specifically by an employers' organization. Instead, child care is only indirectly an issue as a means to reconcile work and family life. As such, the CNPF representative offered no opinion on the "best" form of care, saying it was not up to an employers' organization to engage in the process of debate, but rather to encourage as many forms of care as possible.\(^\text{165}\)

The CGT representative, in contrast, thought it was important to lobby for a certain form of care. The CGT comes out most adamantly in support of public day care facilities, more specifically, collective day care, because of the number of regulations governing its operations, its pedagogical goals, and its socialization function. The CGT representative argued that family day care is also regulated, but the focus of care is in the home, rather than a collective institution. The representative did not advocate parental day care because she believed they often function without qualified personnel to guard the children. Parental day care is a less perfect form of care for working parents as well who cannot spend as much time in the day care centre. The CGT representative thought the more individual forms of care, like independent childminders, were most open to exploitation, shifting the parents' role from users of the service to employers, and without the structure of the family day care centre to help the childminder.

Ideas about women's employment varied, with the CGT most supportive of women's right to work. The CGT tends to emphasize more the importance of reconciling family life with work,

\(^{165}\)Philippe Latil, Délégué Général du Comité Central des Institutions Sociales, Conseil
rather than vice-versa as it sees the importance of work in improving women's equality. Yet even within the CGT, the compromise with maternalism is accepted. To paraphrase Jenson: when women and work are discussed, the focus is on equality; when social policy is discussed, women are conceived of as part of "the family".\footnote{Jenson, "The Liberation and New Rights for French Women," 280.}

Other organizations acknowledged the right of women to work, and did not support the idea of encouraging women to leave employment \textit{en masse}. Even the CFTC representatives, while believing women should stay at home to raise children, also supported women's right or need to work. The CFTC is part of the catholic trade union movement, and sees one of its primary functions to defend the family. It has its roots in a number of catholic men's and women's unions existing at the beginning of the century. It was very active in lobbying for social security and family allowances in the 1930s. Sineau and Tardy report, though, that after World War II, a more "realist" policy of acknowledging women's role in the workforce, began to emerge.\footnote{Sineau et Tardy, \textit{Droits des Femmes}, 40.}

As with many other organizations, the CFTC representatives talked of the \textit{la conciliation entre la vie familiale et la vie professionnelle} (reconciling one's professional and family life), although the emphasis was more on reconciling work with family life than family life with work.\footnote{Nicole Prud'homme, Vice-Présidente et Chef de la Commission Féminin de CFTC, Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens, personal interview, Paris, 22 May 1995, as well as Murielle Hamm, researcher, Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens, personal interview, Paris, 16 May 1995.} One of the goals of the CFTC is to help women to integrate themselves better into the workforce and to remove the sacrifices women face when they choose to stop work to have children. It supports the expansion of the APE to the first child, and would like to see even more financial and juridical guarantees provided to women who leave the workplace. It recognizes some of the difficulties of making work more flexible, for example, the paradox of part-time work, which can provide greater flexibility but less pay and security. The CFTC is also adamantly opposed to night work for women, a ban recently overturned by the European Union. The CFTC envisages having periods of time where women could concentrate on their

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
professional lives, but with other periods reserved for their families.\textsuperscript{169}

The representative of the CFDT also spoke of women having a choice of working or not, although the CFDT position is a bit more ambiguous.\textsuperscript{170} For example, it supports the idea of the APE to permit parents the choice of not working while raising children, but does not like the idea of a mother's allowance. It supports the idea of a parental leave to open up jobs for some while others were on leave, but does not think the leave programs should be so generous as to encourage people to leave the labour market. It should be noted that the CFDT has its roots in the CFTC, but split from the CFTC in 1964 and became a secular trade union federation. It is most closely tied to the Parti Socialiste (PS) and so advocates a number of similar labour market policies, like reduction of the work week.\textsuperscript{171}

Regarding the economic costs and affordability of the programs, views were more divergent. The CFDT representative recommended making benefits like family allowances needs-tested rather than universal. The CGT's representative's position on family allowances, in contrast, was that they should be given for the first child as well as subsequent children, not based on need, and regardless of whether they stop work.\textsuperscript{172} As for benefits like the APE, the CGT representative argued they were very cost-ineffective. The CFTC representative, in turn, advocated expanding these programs to the first child. Only the representative of the CNPF was of the opinion that the current economic circumstances could not permit the financing of all these programs. And whereas many trade union representatives argued that the greatest obstacle to the expansion of child care programs and services was ideological, in recognition of the competition between those who support labour market policies and those who support family policies, the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{169}The CFTC President, Alain Deleu, quoted in the introduction to Murielle Hamm, \textit{Vie Familiale et Vie Professionnelle: Quelle Conciliation?} (Paris: Bureau d'Études de la CFTC, 1994), argues that a truly free choice would be to have "la possibilité réelle de périodes consacrées largement à la vie professionnelle et d'autres où les enfants se voient réserver la meilleure part du temps de leurs parents" (the real possibility of periods devoted largely to one's career and others devoted to family life).


\textsuperscript{171}Béatrice Ouin, Secrétaire Confédérale de la CFDT, in "L'emploi du temps," CFDT-Aujourd'hui, no. 112 (June 1994).
\end{flushleft}
CNPF representative argued the greatest obstacle was economic.

The degree of consensus among the social partners to the idea of reconciling work and family life is remarkable. What is more intriguing is how this idea has proven flexible and malleable, allowing some groups to promote policies to enhance women's equality in the marketplace, while at the same time promoting policies for families and children. The position is congruent with more conservative family groups like the UNAF. Within this normative framework, then, contemporary child care policy has emerged.

**Policy Development: 1950s-1970s**

In the 1950s, the state continued to struggle to work out a balance between employment policies, equal rights policies, and family policies. In essence, it continued to promote all, encouraging women to be both workers and mothers. In 1955, the government authorized therapeutic abortions, reversing the earlier Vichy law.173 At the same time, the government extended the *salaire unique*, changing the name to the *allocation de la mère au foyer*, to apply to families with nonsalaried workers such as farmers.174 This was to be the last big expansion of the benefit. From 1959 to 1972, increases were rare and the policy shifted to privilege large families, rather than emphasize women's role at home.175

The 1960s brought a marked increase in the number of women working, including married women with children. The labour market activity of married women under age 25 went from approximately 43 per cent in 1962 to 50 per cent in 1968 and 61 per cent in 1975. The labour market activity of married women aged 25 to 29 increased from 35 to 43 to 56 per cent in

---

172 Farache, personal interview, CGT; Farache, "La Politique Familiale," 144.
173 It was not until 1975 under *la loi Veil*, that voluntary abortions were made legal. A majority of members of the governing majority opposed it, and this law was only provisional. In 1979 the government passed another law guaranteeing the right to abortion, and in 1982, it agreed to reimburse abortion expenses. Contraception had been legalized in 1967, and the pill became covered under medical insurance in 1974. Hantrais, 122.
174 Prost, "L'Évolution de la Politique Familiale," 16. Lenoir (159) argues that the orientation of family policy under the Fourth Republic has much to do with the power of the MRP, who played a leading role in government alliances.
Accompanying this increase in the labour market activity of women was another drop in the birth rate, after an increase post-WWII. During World War II, the number of births averaged about 570,000 (or a rate of 14 per 1000) in France. After the war, France experienced a big increase in the number of births from 641,324 in 1945 to 836,221 in 1946.\(^{177}\) Birth rates remained around 18 to 19 per 1000 for most of the 1950s. By the late 1960s, the birth rate dropped to around 16 or 17 per 1000, and in the 1970s, it dropped even more to around 13 or 14 per 1000, which was in fact higher than a number of western European countries. In the 1980s and 1990s, the birth rate declined even more to around 10 or 11 per 1000. Thus, since World War II, after an initial rise due to the baby boom, there has been a steady decline in rates, since about the mid-1960s, but only in the 1980s did it become lower than average. In 1992, France had one of the lowest birthrates of western European countries, at 10.0, compared, for example, to 11.1 for the former Federal Republic of Germany, 13.5 for the United Kingdom and 14.2 for Sweden. As well, parents wait longer to have their first child. Lefaucheur reports that in 1986, the average age for women having their first child was 27 and 28 for men.\(^{178}\) Plus, the number of divorces has doubled since the legalization of divorce by mutual consent in 1975.

The government's desire to encourage women to have more children had to take account of women's unwillingness to give up their positions in the workforce. Traditional policies to encourage large families, like the *salaire unique* or *allocation de la mère au foyer*, were also increasingly in disfavour.\(^{179}\) Instead, policy changes like more part-time work and longer maternity leaves were demanded that would enable women to enter and leave the labour market more smoothly, although a number of women opposed the increase of part-time work.\(^{180}\)

This period marks the beginning of a favourable linking of women's labour market activities with those same years.\(^{176}\)

---

176 Prost, 20.
180 Part-time employment is very low in France for men and is relatively low for women (see table 3.16). Attempts to make work more flexible are seen by some as undermining women's place in the workforce.
participation with a new tradition in French social security. After the 1969 election of Georges Pompidou, reformers in the Commissariat Générale du Plan (General Planning Commission) "sought to make family benefits one element of an 'active family policy'," which included professional training for women, and increased child care and pre-school instruction.\textsuperscript{181} Thus, the "family" component of policies was giving way to more general, citizenship-based policies. For example, it was suggested that family benefits should be paid not only on the basis of the number of children, but also on the basis of need. Consequently, in 1974, the government introduced the \textit{allocation de rentrée scolaire}, or school allowance for low income families.

Workplace reforms in the 1960s included the 1966 abolition of the law that gave husbands the right to oppose wives' separate professional activity.\textsuperscript{182} Also in 1966 it became illegal for employers to dismiss a woman who had become pregnant, and job protection was guaranteed for the twelve weeks after childbirth. Paid maternity leave for all employees was extended to fourteen weeks.

The increasing number of women in the workforce led to increased demands for and expansion of child care services, especially beginning in the 1970s. Sineau and Tardy report that by 1946, already 20 per cent of children in the Paris region were in day care centres.\textsuperscript{183} The first organized family day care had been established in 1959. Still, the number of centres built by local communities and various organizations with financing from the CNAF grew from only 360 in 1947 to 697 in 1971.\textsuperscript{184} State participation in collective care was very weak, with families and communes assuming most of the burden. The breakdown of authorities running day care centres in 1968 was 233 by communes, 149 by départements, 199 by private associations, 55 by factories, and 11 by the CNAF.\textsuperscript{185}

Increased demands for day care occurred in other countries at a similar time. The French government, even under a conservative party, was willing to respond, however, given its acceptance of this normative compromise of reconciling work and family life. The government

\textsuperscript{181}Lenoir, 170.
\textsuperscript{183}Sineau et Tardy, 29.
\textsuperscript{184}Lenoir, 164.
under Georges Pompidou promised as part of the sixth plan (1970-1975) to create 13,300 new places for children, mostly by opening new day care centres. In 1970 the government introduced subsidies for day care centres to help with operating expenses (prestation de services). Legislation in 1971 and 1974 allowed for the appropriation of 100 million francs (about $20.2 million)\textsuperscript{186} to try to encourage developers to build facilities.\textsuperscript{187} Despite this, the government fell far short of its goal. By 1981, only 1,375 collective day care centres existed, 554 family day care centres, 1,170 part-time day care centres, and 338 jardins d’enfants (nursery schools).\textsuperscript{188} Only one in ten children of women active in the labour market were cared for in a day care centre in 1981.\textsuperscript{189} It was not until the Mitterrand government that a concerted effort was made to open up more collective day cares.

Although the Giscard government continued to favour family policies, and despite a number of reforms to family benefits, government expenditure on family allowances steadily decreased (see table 2.7). In 1972, the Pompidou government increased benefit levels for the allocation de salaire unique and allocation de la mère au foyer. It also introduced the allocation de frais de garde, a child care allowance to cover the costs for families where the mother worked. In 1975, the government allowed all families to receive family allowances; until then, only families with at least one working parent, as well as disabled or unemployed family heads who could not work, could receive family allowances.\textsuperscript{190} 1976 saw the creation of the single parent allowance (API) in recognition of the number of single-parent families. The policy is interesting in that it again signals the state's willingness to move away from encouraging a particular family form. The API has been quite controversial, though, as some critics claim the API acts as a disincentive to marriage and to work, much like the criticisms of AFDC in the United States. Lefaucheur points out, though, that part of the support for the API came from pro-life groups "who argued that lone mothers should be supported so that they would not be forced into having

\textsuperscript{185}David and Lézine, Early Child Care in France, 72.
\textsuperscript{186}The average exchange rate in those years was C$.202.
\textsuperscript{187}David and Starzec, 98-9.
\textsuperscript{188}France, Secrétariat d'État à la Famille, Une Politique pour la Petite Enfance, Conference de presse de Madame Georgina Dufoix, Paris, 15 December 1982.
\textsuperscript{189}Des Femmes en Mouvements Hebdo, 79 (12-19 February 1982), 18.
\textsuperscript{190}Lefaucheur, 259.
an abortion for economic reasons."\(^{191}\)

In 1977, the Giscard government recognized independent childminders as a profession, bringing into the public sphere care of children in the home performed by nannies. By 1981, there were 152,000 registered independent childminders, but an estimated 250,000 who were not registered.\(^{192}\) The government also created an allowance for families who hire a registered childminder (PSAM). The Giscard government was careful to frame its policies as "not penalizing" households with children.\(^{193}\) In 1978 the government amalgamated the single-income allowance, the mothers' allowance, and child-care allowance to create the *complément familial* for low income families with a child under age three or with at least three dependent children over three years of age.\(^{194}\) In November 1979 maternity leave was extended to 26 weeks from 16 for the birth of the third or more children. These policies were still pronatalist as they encouraged large families, provided a family supplement and grant on the birth of a third child, and gave other privileges to large families such as cheaper transportation and access to museums.\(^{195}\) At the same time, the government created the *congé parental d'éducation* (CPE) in 1979, providing a leave of two years for workers with some seniority in firms of over 200 employees, after the birth of a child. This policy recognized the workers' difficulty in re-entering the workforce after time off and was meant to be used to upgrade education.

**Policy Development: 1980s and After**

Societal support of policies for women who stayed at home came under increasing attack in the 1980s. Prost summarizes an article in *Le Monde* which argued that "la femme mariée qui ne travaille pas bénéficie en fait de prestations sociales assurées grâce aux cotisations de celles qui travaillent et qui sont souvent beaucoup plus pauvres qu'elle."\(^{196}\) While French family policies emphasize choice—either to stay home or to work—most women do work, and are

\(^{191}\) Lefaucheur, 271.

\(^{192}\) Secrétariat d'État à la Famille, *Une Politique*.

\(^{193}\) Lenoir, 178.

\(^{194}\) The income cut-off for families with three or more children was higher.

\(^{195}\) David and Starzec, 84.

\(^{196}\) "Married women who do not work in fact benefit from social security thanks to the taxes of those who work and who are often a lot poorer than they." Prost, 30, my translation.
expected to work, unless they have a young child. Policies have moved beyond a familist norm, and with a number of pronatalist policies in place, have provided a number of supports for working women.

The 1980-1985 period is key for the development of collective child care. Some policy improvements had been introduced before then, but a real window of opportunity opened with the election of a majority Socialist government committed to collective care.\textsuperscript{197} The Socialist President, François Mitterrand, was publicly committed to creating 300,000 new places in day care centres. However, the Mitterrand government ran into economic difficulties. Indeed, some argue that the Left's window of opportunity closed after 1982 when the Mitterrand government, facing an economic crisis, ended its program of "redistributive Keynesianism".\textsuperscript{198} The Mitterrand government also had to address the rising rates of unemployment. Moreover, it was unable to move child care policy much beyond the normative framework already deeply entrenched. The government made some attempts to expand collective care but did not turn its back on maternalist policies of the past.

The Mitterrand government attempted to shift its policy orientation from "la politique familiale" to "une politique d'aide à l'enfant".\textsuperscript{199} In its first term in office, the government attempted to make policies more neutral as to family form, while also trying to remain neutral about women's labour force participation. At the same time, it did not want to appear anti-family. The government thus increased family benefits payments by about 25 per cent,\textsuperscript{200} a massive increase compared to other governments who had been paring back. Eventually the government had to reduce these benefits by 13 billion francs (about $2.5 billion) in 1982 after the

\textsuperscript{197} As Lenoir (179) argues, the election of the Socialists allows us to examine the influence of partisanship on the evolution of family policy. After 1945 the Right held power until 1981. Between 1981 and 1986 the Left held power in Parliament, and again from 1988 to 1993.

\textsuperscript{198} For a description of this time period and what followed, see Peter Hall, \textit{Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), chapter 8. See also Jenson and Sineau, "Family Policy and Women's Citizenship in Mitterrand's France."

\textsuperscript{199} Prost, 32.

\textsuperscript{200} David and Starzec (84) report that in 1981 the government increased family allowances, doubled postnatal benefits, and increased the \textit{quotient familial} for the third child.
devaluation of the franc.201

The government then transferred its energies from direct transfers to individuals to increasing services. The Mitterrand government worked to increase the number of spaces in collective care through programs like the contrat crèche and the contrat enfance. Under the contrat crèche program established in June 1983, the government set as its goal an increase of 100,000 spaces in day care centres. It fell far below that target, with about 20,000 new places created under 215 contracts by the end of the program in 1989.202 In 1988 the government revised the program to allow other forms of public care, such as occasional care centres and parental day cares to be eligible for the matching funds, as well as other projects such as employee training and information services for families.203 In addition, the rules governing the functioning of day care centres were loosened. Prior to 1988, access to the centres was reserved to children less than three years old, in good health, and whose mothers were employed.204 In 1981 the Secrétariat d'État à la Famille indicated that priority should be given to children of lower income and single-parent families as well.205 The 1988 policy included a change of focus from children under three to all children under six. In the first year of the program, about one hundred contracts were signed.206

This policy was also an attempt to respond to some of the changes in child care brought in the 1980s by new philosophies and specialized services like les Maison Vertes207 and the Fonds d'Action Sociale Pour les Travailleurs Immigrés et Leurs Familles (FAS). These latter services were established to provide new child care structures for children in poorer

201Lenoir, 179-180. The exchange rate for 1982 was C$.189.
202Jenson and Sineau, 266; David and Starzec, 99.
206David and Starzec, 100.
207The Maisons Ouvertes/Vertes provide services for parents as well as children. They operate like drop-in centres and work to identify families in difficulty and offer them advice. They currently do not receive any financing, but a spokesperson from the Ministry stated funding is being considered. Chantal Froger, Bureau de la Petite Enfance et de la Famille, Direction de l'Action Sociale, Ministère des Affaires Sociale, de la Santé et de la Ville, personal interview,
neighbourhoods with a high percentage of immigrants.

A close observer of these services argues that the rules governing the running of collective care are still inflexible. The rules still prevent a day care centre from receiving funding, for example, for children of poor, unemployed parents; the rules currently permit funding for spaces only for children of working parents. Other attempts to move day care centres away from their health focus to make them more educational-centred, have been thwarted.

Ninety per cent of government expenditures are for the more traditional forms of care. By 1993, approximately 1,700 contrats enfance for periods of three to five years had been signed. The proportion of expenditure on child care structures increased from 29 per cent of the total budget of the CAFs in 1979 to 46 per cent in 1993 (see table 3.13). These expenditures include both financing of spaces in day care centres as well as cofinancing of investments in new spaces.

From 1985 onward, the government created a number of new programs such as the APE (described further below), the AGED and the allocation au jeune enfant (AJE). The government created the AJE to replace pre- and postnatal allowances as well as the family supplement. It


208 Collette Millet, Présidente, Association Nationale des Puéricultrices Diplômées d'État, telephone interview (from Paris to Orléans), 22 May 1995. She argued that if the government wants to see more innovation with regard to child care, it would have to loosen these rules more. Indeed, just before the election, a memo from then Minister of Social Affairs Simone Veil promised to make subsidies more flexible. It would require political will on the part of the current government under President Jacques Chirac, however, to carry on with this plan.

209 In the 1980s, discussions occurred about allowing day care centres to be run by other qualified professionals in addition to early childhood care nurses. The move was strongly resisted by the ANPDE and other members of the health profession and it was never voted on by government.


211 CNAF, Accueil des Jeunes Enfants, annexe 3.

212 The annual allotment per child for the three to five year period is a minimum of 1,000 francs (about $228) and a maximum of 5,000 francs (about $1140) with a possibility of an increase to 7,000 francs (about $1596). This represents 30 to 50 per cent of the costs of investment in new spaces. CNAF, Commission d'Action Sociale, Les Contrats Enfance dans 1600 Communes (Paris: CNAF, January 1993), 2.
provided a flat-rate benefit for each child until he/she was nine months old, and then provided a means-tested benefit until the child turned three. The AJE was replaced by the APJE in 1987. In 1986 it established the AGED to cover part of the wages of a childminder for children of working parents. In 1988, the government also made mothers of large families eligible for free health insurance from the age of 45.

What, therefore, was the policy orientation of the Mitterrand government? Although its spending on collective care was high, it directed more of its resources to the latter, less expensive forms of care. This can be seen by an increase in government spending on more individual forms of care, such as the subsidies for hiring someone in one's home, or hiring a registered childminder, or subsidies to encourage parents to leave the labour market to provide their own care for children. Spending on collective care in 1993 totalled 3.2 billion francs (about $0.7 billion), but spending on programs like AFEAMA and the AGED, both of which are relatively new programs, totalled 1,601 million francs (about $365 million), whereas spending on the APE totalled 5.6 billion francs (about $1.3 billion), and was slated to rise after 1994 with the extension of coverage for the second child (see table 3.11).

The two issues at stake are the need for child care and the fact of women in the workforce. The question is which policies best respond to these two issues simultaneously. To respond to the shortage of day care spaces, some argue that it is better to develop as many forms of child care as possible. This seemed to be the policy stance of the Mitterrand government over its decade and a half in power. Many argue, however, that the forms of care are not neutral as to women's place in the home and workplace. Policies that encourage public care can make workforce participation easier. Policies that increase the parent allowance for non-working parents can encourage women to stay home. Care in the home tends to reinforce the idea that the home is the place to raise children, whereas collective care is seen as a means for socialization and preparation for societal participation. Forms of financing of care are important as well. Care in the home individualizes the cost of care, whereas financing of collective care by the state and other organizations forces a recognition of a general or societal interest in care for children and a

---

213Hantrais, 125.
214Hantrais, 135.
societal recognition of the legitimacy of women in the workplace.215

In the 1990s, faced with increasing unemployment and another demographic scare, new policies are developing to reconcile work and family life that threaten to swing the pendulum back to the home.216 In Mitterrand's second term as president, the government announced new legislation in 1992 to accelerate the process of registering childminders, the introduction of the AFEAMA in 1991, and the increase in allowance for the AGED in 1993. In 1990 under the tenth plan, introduced under Prime Minister Rocard, the government created a new form of social security contribution, the cotisation sociale généralisée (CSG), based on the salaries of wage earners. This shifted a portion of the burden for social security payments from firms to employees. In 1993, the new government of Eduard Balladur doubled the CSG rate.217

The debate has been most fierce over the APE. This benefit was introduced by the Mitterrand government in 1985, supplementing the earlier congé parental d'éducation (CPE), to allow a parent of a family with at least three children who quit work to take care of the child, or to enable a parent who worked part-time, to be eligible for an allowance, payable until the child's third birthday. (Until 1994, the leave was possible only for companies of over a hundred employees.)

When the government first made the changes, the leave was unpaid. It was highly unsuccessful because, as Fagnani argues, in the context of an economic crisis, few women (or men) could take the risk of interrupting their careers or giving up their salaries.218 When the Mitterrand government announced it would pay people to quit their jobs or take part-time work, it was accused of creating a mothers' allowance in disguise. In 1985 the government created a paid benefit but it cannot be collected or combined with the APJE, maternity or sickness indemnities, or unemployment benefits.219 Parents can combine AGED with a reduced APE

---

215For discussion of these issues see "Enfants: Modes de Garde," Femmes de Notre Région, 11 (July 1987).
216Jenson and Sineau, 246.
219David and Starzec, 96.
once a parent returns to work part time between the child's second and third birthday.220

In 1986, under a new Parliament and Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, the government announced small changes to the benefit. If one were employed, it was necessary to have worked two of the previous ten years to be eligible. One could also collect the benefit if one had been unemployed but had continuously received state assistance. This allowed the long-term unemployed to collect the benefit.

By 1993, 95 per cent of those receiving the APE were women.221 There were concerns that a number of these women, especially young women, would not return to the labour force after the leave period222 or return to a job that, though guaranteed, may not be the same position. As well, there were concerns that possibilities of promotion and advancement might be lost, along with valuable workplace experience.223

Even more controversial were the changes announced to the program in 1994, and the debate leading up to those changes. In 1993 Prime Minister Balladur commissioned a report on the family written by Colette Codaccioni, a member of the conservative Rassemblement pour la République (RPR). Her report proposed a parental allowance (allocation de libre choix) to be paid to all families from the first child onward. The changes to the APE that did occur were a compromise between members of the RPR, who advocated a maternal allowance, and then Social Affairs Minister Simone Veil, a member of the Union pour la Démocratie Française, who, with many others, opposed such an allowance.

The government made it possible for parents to be eligible for the APE after the second child, rather than the third. Stricter conditions are in force for receiving this benefit: the parent must have worked at least two years during the past five, but the old rule of two of 10224 still holds for families with three or more children. It also became possible to receive a reduced APE

---

220David and Starzec, 100.
221Fagnani, 289.
222Farache, personal interview, CGT.
223Fagnani (295) reports that although the labour market activity of women with three or more children and for whom the youngest child was under three, actually increased from 27 per cent in 1989 to 31.5 per cent in 1993, she did find evidence of some of these other practices.
224That is, if one was employed it was necessary to have worked two of the previous ten years to be eligible.
benefit after a maternity leave for part-time work of less than 32 hours per week, rather than having to wait until the child is age two.225

Many argue this policy, as well as encouraging families to have children, is a more blatant attempt to have (primarily) women reduce the number of hours they work, or leave the labour force altogether, at a huge expense to the state.226 Others argue this provides more choices to families in attempting to balance work and family life.227

Public opinion survey data regarding child care and women's labour market participation parallels these discussions and again reveals a certain institutionalization of maternalist norms. The ratio of people supporting the idea that women should be given financial support to stop work to take care of children as opposed to the state providing more child care was roughly 80 per cent to 20 per cent in 1987. This ratio had shifted to 60 to 40 per cent by the end of 1992, but then went back up to 70 to 30 per cent in 1993 (see table 3.14). The survey researchers argue these findings tie in with the public debate about the extension of the APE to the second child and the Codaccioni report advocating a maternal allowance.228 This may explain the decrease in support for public day care between 1990 and 1993 revealed in public opinion data.

Some of these trends can be seen in women's labour market participation rates. Unemployment levels for women have risen from 11.2 per cent in 1980 to 13.8 per cent in 1993, whereas the rates for men in those years were 4.3 and 9.9 per cent (see table 3.15). Although women's part-time employment has traditionally been much lower in France than in most other industrialized countries, levels have increased substantially over the last 15 years, whereas part-time work for men has increased minimally (see tables 3.16, 3.17). Married women with children account for an increasing percentage of part-time workers in France. The level of part-time employment for women is higher for women with partners rather than single mothers, and increases with the number of children (see table 3.17).

The expansion or reduction of collective child care policies and programs can be a means

225 There is one reduced rate for parents working up to 20 hours per week, and another smaller one for those working between 20 and 32 hours per week. Math, 69.
226 Farache (personal interview) argued that not only does the government incur the expense of paying the APE, it also loses the revenue from employee contributions.
227 Prud'huihomme, personal interview, CFTC.
to encourage or discourage women from working. While family policy has had multiple motivations — for example, encouraging the birth rate, promoting solidarity and equality — child care has had a more explicit focus on the labour market participation of women. For example, spaces for two-year-olds in the pre-primary schools are reserved for children of working parents, and a parent has to be employed to get a space in public day care. Thus, the concentration on family policies to the neglect of collective child care reveals the extent to which maternalism still dominates, even within the Socialist party. While maternalism has helped provide a normative foundation for the development of public policy on child care, it also circumscribes that development.

Decentralization

The biggest institutional reform that has affected the provision of child care in recent years has been the policy of decentralization. Before decentralization, the state-controlled services in place in each département were under a very hierarchical organization. In opposition, the Left was highly critical of this degree of centralized authority exercised by the state. Particularly in the 1970s, demands for greater participation at the local level (autogestion) were fuelled by a combination of local electoral success for left parties and "disillusionment with centralised planning which had, according to Marxist analyses, benefited the interests of private capital at the expense of local communities."229 The two Left parties, the Socialists and the Communists (Parti Communiste Français or PCF), both promised, if elected, to implement a program of decentralization that would promote economic redistribution and local democracy.

Mitterrand carried through with this promise, beginning with la loi Defere of 2 March 1982. The first reforms eliminated the administrative power of the prefects and gave them merely a post-facto legal power to refer legislation to the Conseil d'État. Regional councils became directly elected and replaced the Prefects in authority. Départements were given authority to administer social services, with the state increasingly making use of the contrat system.

Before the reforms, local authorities had general responsibility for administering social...

228Duflos et. al., Prestations Familiales, 35-37.
welfare. But that created two problems according to the government. First, the needs of the population at the local level often were not heard at higher levels, that is, the central administration and the parliament. Second, there was the problem of *les financements croisés*: those who paid for the services did not always benefit. The government wanted to simplify the system of financing and set up ways for local needs and opinions to be expressed to decision makers. The idea was to delegate government functions to elected officials at the territorial levels rather than having them simply perform administrative functions. At the same time, the government delegated a budgetary envelope, calculated on the basis of the needs of each region and the levels of previous spending. As part of the reforms, no local authority is allowed to exercise authority over another. For example, a département cannot exercise authority over a commune. Each level of government is considered equal, which also means that one level of government cannot be made to give money to another; local levels of government are responsible for their own funding of services. Poorer regions will find it more difficult to raise funds than wealthier regions.

With decentralization, local authorities are not only responsible for raising funds for services, they also must take the initiative to establish those services. Child care development increasingly relies on the political will of actors at the local, rather than the national level. Felix reports that "larger communes...are more likely to sign contracts than small communes and in general rural areas have not been much involved."

Because state financing is based on community efforts at fundraising, and because the

---


230 In Sweden 70 per cent of public spending is controlled by county councils, specializing in health care, and municipalities, in charge of most welfare services including child care. These municipalities and county councils are able to levy their own income taxes and set their own tax rates. Unlike in France, though, a Swedish equalization system ensures "that tax-base differences among municipalities do not cause tax rate differences." Gunnar Wetterberg, "Sweden is Rethinking the Role of Its Public Sector," *Policy Options* 16, 5 (July-August 1995), 31-32. Local taxes provide about two-thirds of the financing for these services in Sweden; the national government provides between 20 and 25 per cent more, mostly in the form of grants, and user fees make up the rest.

actors must agree with the nature of the project, decentralization has made actors at the local level key players in the development of programs. For example, a mayor may suggest a project, but it needs the approval of the CAF to receive funding. It has also made lobbying by community groups, parents, or anyone else with ideas about child care a key means to push for development of these services. The tendency of some communities, especially those with more leftist local governments or with child care lobbies, is to develop their child care services. Communities with more conservative governments, however, are refusing and/or not taking the initiative to establish services.

Further evidence of policy stagnation as a result of deconcentration of authority was revealed in a series of interviews conducted in 1988 and 1989 by CREDOC researchers who found a certain "absence de dynamique institutionelle" among elected officials and government authorities. They reported a lack of coordination, with each local organization having a very narrow vision limited to their own particular domain and unable to situate their actions in the context of larger goals regarding child care.

---

232 One example is the Association des Maires de France (AMF). It has a designated spokesperson responsible for social affairs issues, including child care, and is consulted on these issues as are the social partners. Marie-Pierre Belhomme, Commission des Affaires Sociales, Association des Maires de France, telephone interview, Paris, 30 May 1995.

233 Martine Felix, Chargée de Mission, Institut de l'Enfance et de la Famille, personal interview, Paris, 24 May 1995. Felix stated that no formal study has been done to confirm this, but it would be possible to compare roughly the numbers of contrats crèches in each département with municipal election results to get a sense of whether this is happening. David and Lézine report that in the 1970s, "in those areas which are predominantly leftist, as well as those in which the workers are highly unionized, services for children and families tend to be rather more plentiful than in other, more conservative areas." David and Lézine, Early Child Care in France, 27.

234 They report as well that "tout se passe comme si les élus municipaux, les techniciens et les représentants institutionnels ne pouvaient envisager le problème que dans un contexte strictement local, n'y répondant que par des solutions partielles et ponctuelles. En fait, ces contradictions, ces malentendus et la diversité des discours tenus sont le fruit de la dilution des pouvoirs et des difficultés de communication qui s'établissent entre les différents partenaires" (everything happens as if local politicians, technical experts, and institutional representatives cannot conceive of the problem except in a strictly local context, responding only with partial and temporary solutions. In fact, these contradictions, these misunderstandings, and the diversity of discussions held are the fruit of the dilution of powers and the difficulties in communication which are established between the different partners) (my translation). CNAF, L'Impossible
The reforms have not had all of their desired effects. Cross-financing of services still exists, because the state is still responsible for some programs and services. It is also sometimes difficult to implement programs at the departmental level because of divided authority. With regard to child care programs, no one authority is responsible for management and administration. The PMI services are responsible for monitoring child services, day care centres, and so on. This authority was decentralized as well, so that PMI continues its functions at the departmental level. Other authorities run the services, such as mayors, communes, and the CAFs.

Thus, decentralization has been double-edged in its impact on child care programs. It has allowed greater flexibility and even expansion of services in some ways, but has imposed greater constraints on state capacity in other ways. The absence of decentralization did not mean no regional disparities in levels of services existed. But with a national government imposing national standards, the capacity of the national government to induce changes was stronger. The Mitterrand government, for example, was able to introduce the contrat crèche to try to address the lack of collective care in rural regions. Since the implementation of decentralization, survey data which recorded whom people thought were principally responsible for offering child care spaces to pre-school children found that 53.4 per cent said it was the municipalities, 20.6 per cent the CAFs, 14 per cent the state, and 8.1 per cent the départements.

The state did not deregulate, though, along with its efforts to decentralize. A high degree of child care service regulation still exists. One of the key regulations, for example, is that the director of a day care centre must be an early childhood care nurse. Note, however, that the child care system is not as centralized and concentrated as the education system. The latter has a separate, highly centralized ministry offering universal education. During times of budgetary

---

235 Chantal Froger, personal interview, Bureau de la Petite Enfance, MASSV.
236 State capacity refers to the ability of governments to take public policy decisions and have them implemented. For a discussion of state capacity and autonomy see Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
restriction, such universal programs can be more vulnerable to welfare state retrenchment.\textsuperscript{238} This has nonetheless not been the case in France. Education is regarded as sacred and remains highly funded. In contrast, as seen above, money for family policy has been reduced since the 1980s, and money for child care is being redirected to cheaper programs with responsibility for service provision being devolved to the départements.

OTHER EXPLANATORY FACTORS

Institutions

Having now explored the scope of child care policy and its development over time, it is possible to analyze the factors driving policy change. Some factors, such as the role of family organizations as well as trade unions and employers associations, have been discussed above. It is important to emphasize that these actors have had particular influence because they are part of the institutional structure of government.

The post-1945 period marked the entrenchment of a number of institutions and actors in the social policy sphere as the welfare state became institutionalized. While corporatism is generally weak in France,\textsuperscript{239} in the area of social security, tripartite arrangements have continuously been institutionalized, both before, and as part of the post-WWII welfare state. Thus, the agreement among unions to promote the reconciliation of work and family life, with the more reluctant cooperation of the employers’ associations, has been institutionalized, framing and constraining debates on child care.

Ambler marks the beginning of nationalization of the French welfare state in 1930, when the government established health, maternity, disability, death, and old-age insurance for all.


\textsuperscript{239}For discussion of the existence and strength of corporatism generally in France see Frank L. Wilson, "French Interest Group Politics: Pluralist or Neocorporatist?" \textit{American Political Science Review} 77, 4 (December 1983), 895-910; John T. S. Keeler, "Situating France on the Pluralism-Corporatism Perspective: A Critique of and Alternative to the Wilson Perspective," \textit{Comparative Politics} 17, 2 (January 1985), 229-49; and Andrew Cox and Jack Hayward, "The Inapplicability of the Corporatist Model in Britain and France: The Case of
employed persons who fell below a certain income level. That meant France adopted its first social insurance legislation more than 40 years after Germany, and about 20 years after Britain. Before the state stepped in, a number of company funds and private insurance funds (sociétés mutuelles) emerged in the Third Republic to provide coverage to certain groups for sickness benefits, old age, and so on. These funds opposed and resisted the establishment of a national insurance system. Part of the reason for the relatively late involvement of the French government in social security can be thus explained by the private mutual system that developed.

As well, de Swaan argues "a grand alliance of small property owners functioned as the 'brake' on legislation for compulsory state insurance" as they saw social insurance as a threat to private property. Small businesses also resisted the development of social insurance. By contrast, large industry saw mandatory social insurance as a way to improve relations with workers and provide them with investment capital. Large companies were favourable to the idea of national social insurance and were willing to contribute, but they insisted that they retain control of the schemes. These large companies and industries, though, were not willing to go against small business owners and other property holders. These latter groups remained quite powerful as they had strong representation in political institutions like the Sénat (Senate).

The Senate had a much bigger role to play in the Third Republic. It was composed of indirectly elected representatives of the communes, who were relatively conservative. It also had an absolute veto power over Assembly decisions. Like the Assembly, it could produce a vote of censure to bring down a government, and cabinet members were drawn from its ranks. It proved responsive to the demands of local interests (les collectivités locales) which it


241 Ambler, 7.

242 de Swaan, In Care of the State, 197-204. Membership in these societies was voluntary and the government provided some subsidies. De Swaan argues that it was mostly the middle classes who benefitted from these insurance funds as they could afford to pay the premiums.

243 de Swaan, 198.

244 William Safran, The French Polity, 4th ed. (White Plains, N.Y.: Longman, 1995), 5, 210. The Senate is currently elected by indirect suffrage by an electoral college made up of the grands électeurs: the Assembly deputies, departmental councillors, and delegates from
represented. It provided a forum for regional issues, and a voice for farmers, shopkeepers and artisans. The Senate regularly struck down social legislation passed by the Chamber of Deputies in the early part of the twentieth century.245 Parliament's instability during the Third Republic did not help matters.

Agreement to allow the state to get involved in a national social security system finally came as large firms became more common societally. This meant the power of small firms was gradually eroded. As well, stronger centre-right cabinets pressed for reforms governmentally. By 1930, the government established a national and compulsory insurance system, covering health, maternity, death, disability and old age. The system covered all workers with incomes below a certain level in industry and commerce, but excluded agricultural workers, and workers covered by other plans. The 1930 law originally passed in 1920, but it invoked so much opposition that it was not implemented until 1930.246 De Swaan notes the system finally emerged due to cooperation among government, large-scale employers, and moderate unions (tripartitism or corporatism) with the approval of the mutual societies. The Communist party (PCF) and CGT did not give their approval of the system until 1945. Employers and workers jointly managed the funds, with the government setting standards of coverage, making membership compulsory, and so on.

The declining power of the French Senate and small business and property owners, augmented by the increasing influence of French civil servants, accounts for the rapid development of the welfare state after World War II. In the Fourth Republic, the Council of the

---


246 Saint-Jours, "France," 119-20. In addition to trade union opposition, the government had to respond to concerns of the mutual societies, who wanted to manage the funds; employers, who wanted to control pension and sickness funds they had already established; the medical profession, which wanted to remain autonomous, rather than public servants under state control; and farmers, who wanted lower contribution rates than other sectors.
Republic, a watered-down Senate, was given the power only to delay legislation. Furthermore, after World War II, Ambler argues that the national civil service elite played a much more prominent role in expanding the welfare state.²⁴⁷

The provisional government under Charles de Gaulle announced the social insurance and social assistance plan in 1945. It proposed to centralize all the social insurance funds into one. The 1930 system modeled on the German system,²⁴⁸ was targeted to the working class. Involvement of those above a certain income level remained optional; thus the system retained the taint of welfare.²⁴⁹ The government wanted to expand the system to cover all workers. It argued that the goal of the post-war plan was to create a unified, national and universal social security system, "to cover all the French, no longer just the poorest wage earners."²⁵⁰

In 1945 the French government announced a plan to take over control of the caisses from business, creating a single national social security fund. The government chose Pierre Laroque, a civil servant from the Conseil d'État, to implement the plan.²⁵¹ Ashford argues that to make the implementation of the plan go smoothly, the government appointed an advisory committee of experts, business, and union officials to review the plan. The Mottin Committee, appointed to examine the proposal, initially voted it down.²⁵² The government then softened the plan,

---
²⁴⁸The return of Alsace and Lorraine after World War I, which had benefited from the social insurance system already established in Germany, put pressure on the French government to establish a similar system. Saint-Jours, "France," 95.
²⁴⁹Saint-Jours, 95.
²⁵¹Douglas Ashford, "In Search of the État Providence," 157. Saint-Jours (95, 120) reports that the National Council of the Resistance and the Free French were influenced by the 1942 Social Insurance and Allied Services Report (Beveridge Report) from Britain.
²⁵²Ashford, "Advantages of Complexity," 38. As mentioned above, the Catholic MRP and family associations were afraid of the proposals to merge family benefits. The older funds dealing with occupational insurance (not included in 1932) saw the move as a financial threat to them. Saint-Jours (96) reports that the non-wage-earning population was also very much opposed to the idea of public assistance and hence a general system of social security. The government had to compromise as three parties made up the government under a tripartite system—the Catholic MRP, the Socialists, and the Communists. The latter two, along with the CGT, supported a centralized social security system. Many large employers, though, were unable to oppose social security as their position was weakened by their collaboration with the occupying German army during World War II. Saint-Jours, 125.
agreeing to a single collection of funds, while restoring regional medical, accident insurance, and family benefits funds and locally administered social assistance. Also, the post-war structure retained the private insurance funds (*mutuelles*) already established in certain areas. The decision to retain the existing funds, as well as regional and local offices, meant a number of schemes existed, "each with its own financially autonomous non-government or semi-public administrative structure."253 Employers and workers retained management of the fund. All of these factors meant the French welfare state developed a semi-autonomous structure which has enabled interest groups to have an influence on social policy.254

The national social security fund became responsible for insurance against sickness, maternity, disability, old age and death, and industrial accidents and occupational illness under workers' compensation.255 Whereas social insurance prior to 1945 only covered employees below a certain income level, the post-war system provided benefits to all waged employees, regardless of income level. The government set up a national social security office, the *Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale*, which, along with the Minister of Social Security, gradually assumed a parallel management power of the general scheme along with the various other schemes.256

A number of flaws remained in the post-war system. Hantrais argues that the system was still based on an insurance model, not a social citizenship model of welfare provision. Employers and employees were expected to pay for social insurance, rather than universalizing the costs via general taxation. Furthermore, the amount of the contributions depended on salary, but with a ceiling (*plafond*),257 which meant workers with higher incomes did not have to fund the system proportionately. Unemployment coverage was not included in the main social

254Ashford, "In Search of the État Providence", 157-8.
255Commercial insurance companies provided workplace compensation insurance from 1898. Laroque, "From Social Insurance to Social Security," 573.
256Saint-Jours, 128.
257François Lagrange, "Social Security in France from 1946 to 1982," in Nationalizing Social Security in Europe and America, eds. Douglas E. Ashford and E. W. Kelley (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1986), 60. As well, the plan to pay a standard rate to all groups was defeated by the better-paid groups who persuaded the government to provide benefits linked to wages and contributions. Niehuss, "French and German Family Policy," 300.
security scheme; national unemployment insurance only emerged in 1958 under Charles de Gaulle, and with the agreement of employers and employees.\textsuperscript{258} Making only wage earners eligible meant the social security system was not truly a model of national solidarity. It excluded independent workers, such as professionals and shopkeepers (at their own request), as well as employers and those who had no occupation.\textsuperscript{259} This meant, for example, health insurance was not universalized.

In addition, those who did not work in paid employment could only gain access to health care and other benefits via their working spouses.\textsuperscript{260} The government has had to expand social assistance programs continuously to cover those not in paid employment.\textsuperscript{261} For example, in 1956 \emph{la loi Pleven} established the \emph{fonds national de solidarité}, to be paid out of government revenues to provide supplementary benefits to those with low incomes who did not participate in the social insurance fund. Separate private funds exist to provide coverage for those excluded from social insurance, such as employers and managers (\textit{cadres}).\textsuperscript{262} Some groups, such as the self-employed, who were originally opposed to the idea of social security, eventually did agree to join some parts of the general scheme. The groups they realized they could not afford on their own the cost of some services like health care, or they missed out on some benefits.\textsuperscript{263}

Family policy remained an important pillar of French social security after World War II, reflecting a greater concern with increasing the birthrate, rather than achieving full

\textsuperscript{258}Ashford, "Advantages of Complexity," 35. The program is managed by the \textit{Union Nationale pour l'Emploi dans l'Industrie et le Commerce} (UNEDIC) but continues to operate on the agreement of employers, represented by the CNPF and unions.

\textsuperscript{259}Laroque, 576. Laroque notes that at the establishment of these schemes, the exclusions were enormous. Employed persons comprised less than 60 per cent of the active population at the time: 12 million of 21 million persons.

\textsuperscript{260}It was not until the 1970s that the government permitted other categories of people, such as French workers abroad, young people looking for their first job, common-law partners, prisoners, and so on, to join social security schemes. Saint-Jours, 132.


\textsuperscript{262}Ashford, "Advantages of Complexity," 35.

\textsuperscript{263}Saint-Jours, 124-5.
employment. The government administered family benefits separately from the other social insurance programs, although the Ministère des Affaires Familiales established in 1940 was absorbed into the Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (Public Health and Population). It remained as only a sub-department, the Sous-Direction de la Famille.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, the government, dominated by the Catholic MRP, retained its commitment to the single-wage allowance, expanded family allowance benefits, and introduced a tax system favourable to large families. Unlike the general social security system, disabled workers, older people, and so on were still entitled to family allowances, although independent workers were not eligible for the single wage allowance. And unlike other health costs which the government compensated at only 80 per cent, maternity costs, along with those incurred because of long illness or major surgery, were compensated at 100 per cent. Maternity care and delivery was therefore free. The maternity benefits under the new social security system provided a prenatal allowance for the full nine months at a rate of 25 per cent of the basic wage, as long as a woman received a medical examination.

Family policy became much more bureaucratized. The government created the conseils d'administration des caisses (administrative councils) to administer the family allowance funds along with health care and pensions. Because the social security funds were to be financed by worker and employer contributions, rather than direct taxes, the government encouraged the involvement of employers and workers in the management of the funds. This brought the unions into the policy process as they had not been before and created an important avenue of influence for these organizations.

The creation of the administrative councils coincided with the establishment of the Commissariat Général du Plan under Commissioner Jean Monnet. Monnet's role was to "present a detailed plan for the allocation of resources among the major sectors of French industry over

264Laroque, 571.
265Niehuss, "French and German Family Policy," 296.
266Laroque, 575.
267Laroque, 579; Offen, "Body Politics," 151.
268Niehuss, "French and German Family Policy," 300.
the following four or five years."269 French officials invited businesses and unions to be involved in the modernization commissions as a way of mobilizing support for these plans.

The labour ministry was put in charge of social security. It had to cooperate with the health ministry which was responsible for medical and health organizations. The entire fund was administered financially as a single unit, but in fact, social insurance, family benefits, and workers' compensation each had their own fund.270 Ashford argues that "the subsequent feuding among social funds reproduced within the social security system the same cleavages that divided employers and employees in French industry and Left and Right in the French parliament."271

A period of strong economic growth in the 1960s allowed the de Gaulle government to expand benefits. It also increased state control over the organizations responsible for administering the system. In 1966, the government merged social insurance administration into a single ministry, the Ministère des Affaires Sociales. The new Minister then reorganized the social insurance funds in 1967 according to risk: it divided the Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale into three caisses nationales: the Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Maladie (CNAMTS) (for sickness and health insurance), the Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Vieillesse (CNAVTS) (for retirement insurance), and the Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales (CNAF) (for family benefits).272 It created a common treasury, the Agence Centrale des Organismes de Sécurité Sociale (ACOSS). It also altered representation on the administrative councils, increasing the representation of employers over employees. Since 1946, labour had had two-thirds of the seats and the employers one-third; that ratio was changed in 1967 to make representation equal.273

The unions were of course quite upset, arguing that the major contributors to social insurance were losing a voice in the administration of their own contributions.

As of 1989, the administrative councils of the CNAF and the CAFs have 31 members. Half of the members are representatives selected by the major trade union confederations,274 and

269Peter A. Hall, "The State and the Market," in Developments in French Politics, 171.
270Laroque, 580, 584.
271Ashford, "In Search," 168.
273Ashford, "Advantages," 44.
274The CGT has four representatives; the FO four representatives; the CFDT three representatives; the CFTC two representatives; and the Confédération Française de
the other half are representatives of business associations,\textsuperscript{275} the UNAF (a union of several family associations), travailleurs indépendants (independent workers), personnel representatives,\textsuperscript{276} and one personne qualifiée.\textsuperscript{277} The partenaires sociaux (social partners) on the administrative council of the CNAF determine major policy lines, such as the five-year plans and the budget. The plans and the budget are drawn up by the Director of l'CNAF, but voted on by the social partners, and approved by the government ministry in charge of social affairs. The ministry can, however, annul the decisions by the administrative council.

Family policy currently falls under the authority of the Ministère de la Solidarité entre les Générations. Until the 1995 election the ministry was combined with other social services under the Ministère des Affaires Sociales, de la Santé et de la Ville. The bureaucracy for family policy falls under the Direction de l'Action Sociale (de la sécurité sociale), with a sub-division responsible for the family and children, and a specific office that deals with family allowances and housing. This ministry also deals with benefits and programs for families and children in trouble. The administration of funds and services is carried out by the CNAF, as mentioned above, with CAFs in each of the major localities. The Director of the CNAF is appointed by the Ministry.

Other services for children and families are dealt with by the Ministry of Health. This ministerial delegation stems from the original organization of child care as health-based services. Until 1982, the Ministry of Health was responsible for services of the PMI. PMI operates separately from the medical insurance system, and runs baby clinics, and employs early childhood care nurses for various child care services. Responsibility for the operation of public day care centres therefore falls under Health and Social Services, although the CNAF is responsible for funding and administration. With the decentralization laws passed by the Mitterrand government, the PMI system and financing has been devolved to the départements

\textsuperscript{275}The CNPF and the Confédération Générale des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (CGPME) together have six representatives.

\textsuperscript{276}Each of these has three representatives.

since 1984. Concerns about regional variation in services forced the government in 1989 to follow up with laws to ensure the départements provided a minimum level of services.

**Strong or Weak Corporatism?**

It has been argued that, in reality, the government and the CNAF exercise total power over social security. Unions and businesses are consulted for their opinions, but they do not really have decision-making power. Although bills decreed into law are presented to the conseil d'administration, the government often imposes its will, despite the protests of the social partners. The constraints on the administrative council fit with traditional portrayals of France as a strong state, "capable of imposing its own preferences on society, even in the face of resistance from organised interests." Hall has observed that "French interest organisations rarely feel fully involved in policy-making, despite the proliferation of consultative organs" and he describes the process as one of consultation-fiat-revision. Certainly some of the social partners characterized policy making in this sphere in the same manner.

Expanding on this image of the French state as a strategic actor, not really responsive to pressure groups, Kuisel argues that in fact what has occurred is that "...state intervention be[came] more diffuse and evenly distributed in the 1950s and 1960s rather than shrinking quantitatively." In fact, Saint-Jours argues that the French state "manages the social security system more or less directly, but finances it to the least possible extent." Employee

---


279 Saint-Jours, 131-2.

280 Jacqueline Farache, personal interview, CGT.

281 Peter A. Hall, "Pluralism and Pressure Politics" in *Developments in French Politics*, 77-78.

282 Hall, "Pluralism," 81.

283 Farache, personal interview, CGT, as well as Latil, personal interview, CNPF.


285 Saint-Jours, 142.
contribution rates have increased over time. Employer contribution rates increase less in order to ensure the costs of doing business are not prohibitive. But the government has resisted funding the entire system out of general revenues, making the beneficiaries shoulder the costs of the system. The government's involvement in funding remains indirect: funds are directed through the *caisses*. In the area of child care, responsibility is assumed by the local CAFs. With decentralization, these patterns have become more pronounced as local authorities and local interests have been given more of a say in policy making.

The decentralization example raises the question of just what is the power and capacity of the French state. Is it influenced by interest groups, or is it able to resist pressures from interest groups? There are two views. One, propounded by Suleiman\(^{286}\), is that despite large variations among different sectors, the state (embodied in the leaders of the executive bureaucracy) can never clearly choose a policy based on principles it prefers but which are opposed by the major social groups affected by the policy....If the state picked a policy opposed by most groups, the bureaucracy could not maintain its policy in place over a significant period of time.\(^{287}\)

The opposing argument, which Dunn articulates, is that in certain cases, such as road transportation, "the state bureaucracy in France has been able to assert and maintain policies opposed to the preferences of most of the major groups" and is able to do this "because of the 'tactical advantages' of the centralized state institutions, in spite of the growth and modernization of most of the...groups."\(^{288}\)

Developments in child care policy would seem to support the first thesis of limited state autonomy. The institutionalization of certain actors through semi-corporatist arrangements,\(^{289}\) such as the conseil d'administrations, as well as family, health care, and education associations


\(^{289}\)George Ross defines these relations as "collusive arrangements between the state and social groups to protect different forms of privilege." Ross, "Introduction" in *The Mitterrand Experiment*, 11.
like the UNAF, the Association Nationale des Puéricultrices Diplômées D'État (ANPDE) and the Fédération de l'Éducation Nationale (FEN) makes these policies more amenable to change as a result of pressure from these interests. Although pressure group politics are said not to exist in France, they are still there.290

The pressure to organize and become part of the policy network with government is strong. Organization of early childhood care nurses, for example, occurred soon after the government recognized a special diploma program for midwives, nurses, and social service workers in 1947. The national organization was established in 1949 in order to defend the interests of the profession and guard their specific field of child care health and prevention. Opposition from the ANPDE recently prevented the national government from changing the regulations that required early childhood care nurses only as heads of all centres of collective care.291

Organization of registered childminders has also occurred. Childminders received legal recognition in 1977-78. The Association Nationale des Assistantes Maternelles Agréées de Jour (ANAMAJ) emerged in 1995. It was a response to concerns that the interests of independent childminders were not being recognized in organizations dealing with childminders employed in family day cares. Childminders felt the need to organize to represent their views to government.292

Actors

The women's movement in France has become part of the policy network as well, to

290 Observation made by Marie-Pierre Belhomme, AMF official, in a telephone interview. The French government made interest groups illegal in 1790 under the Loi Chapelier. Since 1901, interest groups have had to register with the state in order to be officially recognized. Amy Mazur, "Strong State and Symbolic Reform: The Ministère des Droits de la Femme in France," in Comparative State Feminism, eds. Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage, 1995), 84.

291 ANPDE, L'Association Nationale des Puéricultrices Diplômées D'État: Dossier Presse (Paris: ANPDE, 1994). Also Collette Millet, telephone interview, ANPDE.

292 Even in a highly centralized sector like education, institutionalized societal actors can influence policy changes. For example, the government recently tried to introduce more teaching assistants in pre-primary classrooms to deal with large classroom sizes. This was successfully thwarted by pre-primary teachers.
some extent. Throughout the 1970s, a strong women's movement developed (the Mouvement de Libération des Femmes or MLF) although many women refused to participate in politics and even to vote.293 It was not until the late 1970s that women organized as feminists within the PS and the PCF. Women's votes were important in Mitterrand's victory in 1981 and Mitterrand consequently set up the first Ministry of Women's Rights (le Ministère des Droits de la Femme) in 1985, with Yvette Roudy as Minister.294 The previous government under Valéry Giscard D'Estaing had set up a Secretariat of State on the Condition of Women (le Secrétariat à la Condition Féminine) with Françoise Giroud as head in 1974. The office then changed to become a Délégation", attached to the prime minister's office, and thus without ministerial rank. It was headed by Nicole Pasquier, who asked that the office be located near her home in Lyon, rather than Paris, isolating it further. Finally, the then-Prime Minister Raymond Barre appointed Monique Pelletier as a Spokeswoman for Women and the Family (Ministère Déléguée auprès du Premier Ministre à la Condition Féminine et à la Famille), with the position again attached to the Prime Minister's Office.295 The position combined the two jurisdictions of "women" and "family", with the President mandating that Pelletier focus on pro-natalist family policies targeted at working mothers.296 Ironically then, the women's office was not the primary promoter of women's labour market participation: that task fell to the Secretary of State for the Employment of Women (Secrétariat d'État à l'Emploi Féminin), created in 1978.

After the Socialists' victory, Mitterrand gave more power to the women's office. He appointed Yvette Roudy as the Spokeswoman for the Rights of Women (Ministère Déléguée auprès de Premier Ministre chargé des Droits de la Femme). The ministry was still attached to

293 See Claire Duchen, Feminism in France.

294 At the same time, though, Mitterrand appointed a Secretary of State for the Family, Georgina Dufoix, under the Ministry of Social Affairs and National Solidarity. This would seem to be another example of Mitterrand trying to balance women's demands for equality with other groups' concerns about the family. Jensen and Sineau (p. 250) argue that by placing women and family under separate ministries, "institutionalized surveillance of family policy by state feminists was minimized." Without people pushing for recognition of gender equality in designing family policy within the ministry, it is easy for these ideas to fall by the wayside.


296 Mazur, 80-1.
the prime minister's office, but Roudy had a seat in cabinet and a very large budget.297 The Ministry is described as being the most strong and autonomous during this period. In 1985, Mitterrand made the Ministry officially independent and put it in charge of a number of administrative subdivisions. The Ministry was able to initiate certain reforms, like abortions paid for under social security in 1982, and passage of *la loi Roudy* in 1983.298 Notably, the Ministry tackled family policy issues only when they impinged on women's rights to work.299 Indeed, some complained that the Ministry became the official voice for socialist feminists, marginalizing other voices in the PS and other feminist groups.300

In 1986, with a change in Parliament, the ministry was replaced by a "Delegation" on the Condition of Women (Délégation à la Condition Féminine), with more limited resources and policy making powers. In 1988, it became the Secretary of State Responsible for the Rights of Women (Secrétariat d'État chargé des Droits des femmes). Prime Minister Rocard replaced Roudy with Michèle André. In contrast, the Secretary of State for the Family during the Fabius prime ministership (1984-1986) was amalgamated with the Ministry of Social Affairs, giving it added stature, and making Georgina Dufoix the Minister of Social Affairs.301 In 1991, the Secrétariat became the Secretary of State on the Rights of Women and Daily Life (Secrétariat d'État aux Droits des Femmes et à la Vie Quotidienne) under Véronique Neiertz. Neither André nor Neiertz were considered strongly committed to women's rights policy. After the Right's victory again in 1993, the Secrétariat was eliminated. No separate minister or delegation remained to deal with women's rights. Administrative services for women remained under the Service des Droits des Femmes, under the Ministère des Affaires Sociales de la Santé et de la

---

297 Mazur (87) reports that the Ministry's budget never exceeded .01 per cent of the total government budget.

298 This law dealt with a number of aspects of employment equality. Hantrais, 123.

299 Mazur, 86.

300 Mazur reports (91) that the Ministry did not involve women's groups like the UFCS (which by then had become more secular (Black, "Social Feminism in France," 224)), the Union des Femmes Françaises, which was linked to the Communist party, or Femmes Avenir, linked with the Gaullist RPR. Instead, it gave a lot of subsidies to so-called independent women's rights information centres like the Centre d'Information de Droits des Femmes in Paris, which still existed in 1995. Mazur reports the ties between the information centres and the ministry itself were quite strong.
Ville.\textsuperscript{302}

After the Chirac presidential victory in 1995, the Ministère des Affaires Sociales de la Santé et de la Ville was divided into separate ministries: \textit{Santé publique et assurance-maladie} under Elisabeth Hubert, an RPR candidate; \textit{Solidarité entre les générations}, under Colette Codaccioni, the RPR member responsible for writing the 1993 report endorsing a maternal allowance; and \textit{Intégration et lutte contre l'exclusion} under Eric Raoult, also a member of the RPR. Again, the government created no separate women's ministry. Although Chirac appointed twelve women to serve as ministers or secretaries of state in his first administration, he removed eight of them in his first cabinet shuffle.

Thus, there is no consistent pattern of representation of women's voices within the organizational apparatus of the French state. The women's movement is generally weak in France and many groups have been unwilling to work with government. Ironically, in the 1981-1995 period under a Socialist presidency, progressive women's movements did not hold sway, even though women gained influence in the Socialist party. Instead, economic difficulties along with the weakness of the women's movement and trade unions, and the rise of the extreme Right meant Mitterrand was less able to push for gender equality. economic and political difficulties constrained the Mitterrand government, even when it had control of parliament.

Furthermore, Mazur argues that the women's offices in their various forms have tended to produce "reforms that are more symbolic than material."\textsuperscript{303} Having a ministry was seen as according a certain importance to women's equality issues. However, new ministries like the Ministry of Women's Rights had a difficult time as established ministries like labour, education, and health blocked their efforts. The efforts of women's offices were further weakened as their status within government constantly changed with changes in government.\textsuperscript{304}

Some would argue right-wing ideological currents (\textit{courants}) are presently dominant in France, finding a voice in political parties and Parliament, and influencing the direction of child care policy. Jacqueline Farache of the GCT argues that these ideas are not really the majority

\textsuperscript{301}Jenson and Sineau, 253, 265. 
\textsuperscript{302}Mazur, 82-3. 
\textsuperscript{303}Mazur, 76. 
\textsuperscript{304}Mazur, 84-85. She argues the creation of the Ministry of Women's Rights reflected
opinion in France but are the ideas of the majority of those elected and are thus overrepresented in Parliament by the deputies.\textsuperscript{305} Furthermore, within the bureaucracy, tensions exist between the ministry responsible for the family and the ministry responsible for the rights of women. The former supports the idea of women's choice between home life and work, while the latter is dedicated to the goal of increasing women's labour market participation.\textsuperscript{306}

CONCLUSION

Child care policy in France has been continuously influenced by more conservative actors in civil society. Organized feminist groups have not been key in the development of child care policy, although at key historical points the voices of maternalists, as well as natalists and familists, have proved persuasive. Rather than constraining the development of child care policy, maternalist ideas about the family have provided an important normative justification for the building and expansion of child care programs and services. The explanation offered for the successful development of child care is that policies emerged based on maternalism, not equal rights feminism. In fact, women did not have the vote when these policies were first forming. Indeed, child care entered the wider public agenda in a way women's rights issues have not. Issues such as abortion have had to be pushed by the women's movement, whereas child care has long been debated by groups other than those representing women. This has perhaps meant some compromises in the forms of care provided by government, and does not deny the problematic ideas about women and the family that these policies uphold. It is important to remember, though, the distinction between policy goal and policy effect. Policymakers may not have had women's equality in mind when creating child care programs, but the effect of putting such policies in place has been to bolster women's equality.

The aims of child care have been in continuous tension throughout modern French history. Policies can either pit family life against employed life or work to reconcile the two. In the late 1800s, programs like day care centres attempted to respond to the needs of working class children while recognizing the fact of women's work. Both day care centres and pre-primary

\textsuperscript{305}Farache, personal interview, CGT.

\textsuperscript{306}Lefaucheur, 282.
schools were established to help the children of working, poor mothers but they also responded to the needs of those poor children, providing education and health care. In the 1930s, policies tended to promote the family over women's work, as the country faced economic depression and a demographic decline. In the post-WWII and baby boom period, women's labour was needed and governments responded in kind with labour market policies and child care programs.

The demand for women's labour has played a role in the development of child care policies throughout French history, from women's employment in the factories in the 1700-1800s to labour market participation in the contemporary period. The expansion of child care services is complemented by other motives on the part of government, such as increasing the birth rate. Ideas have played an important role in the development of child care as the conservative liberalism of small property owners (the bourgeoisie) gave way to ideas of social solidarity of republican social reformers, aided by the pragmatism of large companies faced with huge social costs. The organization of interests and other actors played a role as well. Unions and employers' associations in France have been incorporated into decision-making structures as "social partners" and are privileged actors in terms of their input to government. Both these organizations, as well as pronatalist family groups, women's groups, child and health care professionals, demographers, and religious leaders have generally accepted the idea that employment and family life must be made compatible. These ideas have been successfully transmitted to and addressed in government policy circles. This emphasis on the family, and the attempts of pronatalists and familists to exert authority over women's private lives, while subordinating the idea of "women's rights" to that of "family needs", has had the effect of assisting women in their public lives through the expansion of child- and family-friendly policies.

Institutional and bureaucratic factors, finally, have proved pivotal in shaping and constraining policy development. In the history of child care, the key relationship has been that between the central government and employer associations, trade union associations, and family associations. Institutional history plays an important role as well. Once child care and family policies were established under pronatalist and maternalist principles, it was very difficult for policy shifts to take place. Though constraining, institutionalization along maternalist lines has also proven advantageous, as it has allowed for the expansion of child care within these
principles, and also, has thus far prevented large-scale erosion.

How relevant is French child care policy development to other cases? Is France's concerns with the birth rate—a factor not present in the cases presented below—a key factor that gives impetus to favourable child care policy development? As seen in chapter five, maternalist ideas are still powerful inducements to child care policy, even in the absence of pronatalism. It is the absence of the institutionalization of maternalism, as seen in chapter four in Canada, that explains the absence of a strong child care system, even when state capacity exists.

Whether these institutional patterns in France will hold is another question. The future of the French welfare state is more uncertain as France moves toward ever closer union with its European neighbours. The impact of increasing economic integration in Europe and North America on welfare state development will be considered in the conclusion.
Table 3.1
ACTIVITY RATES FOR WOMEN IN FRANCE ACCORDING TO NUMBER
AND AGE OF CHILDREN, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Single mothers</th>
<th>Two-parent families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>One child:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; than 3 years</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5 years</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 17 years</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall - one child</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two children the youngest:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; than 3 years</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5 years</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 17 years</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall - two children</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Three children or more, the youngest:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; than 3 years</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5 years</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 17 years</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall - 3 or more children</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2
LEVELS OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN *LES ÉCOLES MATERNELLES*
(PRE-PRIMARY SCHOOLS) BY AGE IN FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-yr-olds</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-yr-olds</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-yr-olds</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-yr-olds</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL - 2 to 5 years</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3
DEVELOPMENT OF CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHILDREN UNDER AGE 3 IN FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of care</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 000s</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Total 000s</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At School:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by the mother</td>
<td>1542</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by another member of the family</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by another person</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Home:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by the mother</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by another member</td>
<td>1384</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>1217</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside the home:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-in a day care centre</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by a registered childminder</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by a member of the family (e.g. grandparent)</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by another person</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2299</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2260</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4
TYPES OF CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS IN FRANCE FOR CHILDREN UNDER AGE 3 WITH MOTHERS ACTIVE IN THE LABOUR FORCE, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of care</th>
<th>Single mothers</th>
<th>Married/cohabitating mothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At School</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Home:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by the mother</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by another member of the family</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by another person</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside the home:</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-in a day care centre</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by a registered childminder</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by a member of the family (e.g. grandparent)</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-by another person</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5
PROVISION OF COLLECTIVE CARE SERVICES IN FRANCE
BY NUMBER OF SPACES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Crèches collectives (collective day care centres)</th>
<th>Jardins d'enfants (nursery schools)</th>
<th>Haltes-garderies (part-time day care centres)</th>
<th>Crèches familiales (family day care centres)</th>
<th>AMAs (registered childminders)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>29,720*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>25,500</td>
<td>34,300</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>29,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>69,400</td>
<td>14,900</td>
<td>38,800</td>
<td>46,400</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>144,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>87,200</td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>52,900</td>
<td>61,500</td>
<td>248,400</td>
<td>434,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>112,400</td>
<td>12,300</td>
<td>59,900</td>
<td>65,600</td>
<td>246,000</td>
<td>485,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>126,600</td>
<td>11,800</td>
<td></td>
<td>65,600</td>
<td>403,000</td>
<td>666,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Numbers not broken down by type of care.

Table 3.6
FRENCH OPINION ON THE NUMBER OF CHILD CARE CENTRES

CREDOC survey question:

When parents work, it is necessary to have child care for young children. Do you think that there are sufficient or insufficient numbers of child care facilities like day care centres for pre-school children?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sufficient:</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient:</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know:</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/ = Change of question. Prior wording was, "Is it sufficient, yes or no"?

Table 3.7
FRENCH PREFERENCES ON FORMS OF CARE FOR PRE-SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN, EVOLUTION 1987-1993

CREDOC survey question:

What do you feel is the most satisfactory form of care of pre-school children when the mother works?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered childminder:</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care by grandparents:</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day care centre:</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care by a person employed in the home:</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-reg'd childminder:</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family day care:</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halte-garderie part-time day care:</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know:</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.8
FORMS OF CARE USED BY PARENTS IN FRANCE WHO HAVE OR HAVE HAD A CHILD

CREDOC survey question:

What solution have you principally adopted for the care of your last child of pre-school age?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At-home Mother:</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care by grandparents:</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered childminder:</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-reg'd childminder:</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother working at home:</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day care centre:</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care by person employed in the home:</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family day care:</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halte-garderie:</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know:</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>(1501)</td>
<td>(1515)</td>
<td>(1460)</td>
<td>(1488)</td>
<td>(1502)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Field: People who have or have had at least one child (75 per cent of total people surveyed in 1993).

Source: Catherine Duflos, Ariane Dufour and Anne-Delphine Kowalski, Prestations Familiales, Modes de Garde et Relations Parents/Grands Enfants, Centre de Recherche pour l'Étude et l'Observation des Conditions de Vie (CREDOC) Collections des Rapports, No. 156 (December 1994), 25.
Table 3.9
BREAKDOWN OF EXPENSES BY THE FAMILY FUND OF SOCIAL SECURITY
(CNAF/CAFS) ON CHILD CARE PROGRAMS IN FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Description</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crèches collectives</td>
<td>397 130 000</td>
<td>1 467 314 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crèches familiales</td>
<td>184 895 000</td>
<td>716 786 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crèches parentales</td>
<td>1 386 000</td>
<td>80 106 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centres de loisirs sans hébergement for &lt; 6</td>
<td>224 542 000</td>
<td>287 458 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haltes garderies</td>
<td>33 917 000</td>
<td>254 458 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jardins d'enfants</td>
<td>11 210 000</td>
<td>37 720 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contrat enfance</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>312 737 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hôtels maternels</td>
<td>1 354 000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maisons de repos</td>
<td>609 000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maisons d'enfants</td>
<td>9 327 000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centres sociaux</td>
<td>118 690 000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foyers de jeunes travailleurs</td>
<td>51 263 000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relais assistantes maternelles</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9 225 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contrat d'aménagement du temps de l'enfant</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7 920 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation des assistantes maternelles</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 211 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1 034 323 000</td>
<td>3 175 375 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.10
TOTAL EXPENDITURES ON PRE-PRIMARY PROGRAMS IN FRANCE, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public School Spending</th>
<th>a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale</td>
<td>25 622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ministries</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communes</td>
<td>14 941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Départements</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Régions</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other government agencies</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBTOTAL</td>
<td>41 364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private School Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entreprises (firms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ménages (households)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBTOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SPENDING BOTH PROGRAMS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Includes expenditures on other expenses such as administration, orientation, services such as transportation, furniture.

### EXPENDITURES ON MAJOR BENEFIT PROGRAMS FOR FAMILIES IN FRANCE IN MILLIONS OF FRENCH FRANCS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allocations familiales</td>
<td>25 672</td>
<td>31 431</td>
<td>53 855</td>
<td>62 732</td>
<td>67 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complément familial</td>
<td>10 474</td>
<td>14 689</td>
<td>22 430</td>
<td>8 408</td>
<td>9 459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alloc. de parent isolé</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>1 029</td>
<td>2 778</td>
<td>3 756</td>
<td>4 279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alloc. pour jeune enfant&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 341</td>
<td>19 419</td>
<td>20 543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al. parentale d'éducation&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5 971</td>
<td>5 602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al. de garde d'enfant à domicile&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aide emploi assistante maternelle&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al. de soutien familial&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1 306</td>
<td>1 795</td>
<td>3 089</td>
<td>3 521</td>
<td>3 910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al. d'éducation spéciale</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>1 244</td>
<td>1 569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al. de rentrée scolaire</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>1 031</td>
<td>1 511</td>
<td>1 939</td>
<td>7 958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenu minimum d'insertion&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8 271</td>
<td>14 032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>38 828</td>
<td>49 975</td>
<td>85 012</td>
<td>115 518</td>
<td>138 083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP @ current market prices (FF billions)</td>
<td>2,141.1</td>
<td>2,769.3</td>
<td>4,700.2</td>
<td>6,509.5</td>
<td>7,082.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending as % GDP</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

na = not available

<sup>a</sup> The allocation pour jeune enfant (APJE) and allocation parentale d'éducation (APE) were established in 1985.

<sup>b</sup> The allocation de garde d'enfant à domicile (AGED) was established at the end of 1986.

<sup>c</sup> The aide à la famille pour l'emploi d'une assistante maternelle (AFEAMA) was established in 1991, with expenditures of 534 million francs. This increased to 1 804 million francs in 1992.

<sup>d</sup> The allocation de soutien familial (ASF) is a benefit provided when a single, separated, or divorced parent cannot receive support from an absent parent. It was established in 1985 and replaced the allocation d'orphelin established in 1970. It is not means-tested.

<sup>e</sup> The revenu minimum d'insertion (RMI) was established in 1988 with expenditures of 5 060 million francs.

Table 3.12
MALE AND FEMALE LABOUR FORCE ACTIVITY RATES IN FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>% Women in Active Pop.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>% Women in Active Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.13

EVOLUTION AND DIVISION OF EXPENDITURES BY THE CAFS IN FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Établissements sociaux</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(child care centres)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services sociaux</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. counselling,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>home help)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacances (i.e. programs</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de bon vacances)²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logement (housing</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>improvement)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestations financières</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(other allowances)b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Réalisations diverses</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. research)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gestion</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(administration)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) "Bons vacances" subsidies are given to low-income families to help pay for their childrens' holidays.

b) One major allowance has been eliminated. The prestation spéciale assistante maternelle (PSAM) or special mother's helper allowance, was eliminated in 1991 and has been replaced with a separate benefit (AFEAMA) not included here. One major new program added in 1993 is the aid to help handicapped adults be independent in their own homes.

Table 3.14
FRENCH OPINION ON THE RECONCILIATION OF WORK AND FAMILY LIFE

CREDOC survey question:

With which of these statements are you more in agreement?

It is necessary to enable mothers of young children to continue to work while offering them more child care facilities and services:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is necessary, through financial support, to help women of young children to stop work temporarily:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Don't know:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.15
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR MEN AND WOMEN IN FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Both sexes % of total labour force</th>
<th>Women % total female labour force</th>
<th>Men % total male labour force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: France (Paris: OECD, various years).

### Table 3.16
PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT AS A % OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.17

EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN WORKING PART-TIME ACCORDING TO MARITAL STATUS AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single mothers</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-includes all women ages 25 to 49.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single mothers</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couples</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter IV
THE CANADIAN CASE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores why Canada has lower levels of child care provision than France, most other European countries, and the United States. Scholars of the Canadian welfare state tend to argue that Canada's political culture is not as individualistic and free-market oriented as the United States,\(^1\) that Canada borrows policy ideas liberally from the United States but that it also extracts some policy ideas from Europe. This ideational framework has resulted in a more expansive welfare state than exists in the United States. With such generous welfare programs in some areas, why does Canada not have a better child care system? Given that Canada's welfare state is in many areas more generous than the U.S. welfare state, what has prevented child care programs from developing in Canada to a lesser degree than in the United States?

This chapter demonstrates first that the norms and ideas underpinning policy development have been different in Canada than in France and the United States. In part, one could argue that a coherent policy on child care took so long to develop in Canada because of the ideological resistance toward women's labour force participation. Rather than asking what type of child care would work, policy makers and interest groups have debated whether women should be encouraged to enter the labour force at all. In France, these ideological debates occur, but do not dominate; women have made up a big part of the labour force for much longer and actors supporting the idea of women's labour outside the home have been politically influential.

Women's labour force participation rates, however, do not explain the very low levels of child care provision in Canada compared to the United States, as these countries have had comparable rates, especially since the 1970s (see table 1.5). Rather, the relatively low level of child care provision in Canada occurs because of the absence of maternalist norms. Individuals

\(^1\)For example, Jackson argues, "Partly as a result of what has been called 'contagion from the left,' partly as a result of economic nationalism, and partly as a result of the manifest problems of a small and dependent economy," Canadian governments and parties "have not fully shared the widespread U.S. faith in 'free enterprise' and 'free markets.'" Andrew Jackson, "Government Activism: Building a National Economy," Social Policy 23, 1 (Summer 1992), 22. See other articles in this special issue, "Canada: A Kinder, Gentler Nation?" for other articles which compare Canada's social and labour policies favourably to the United States.
and organizations promoting maternalist ideas did exist in Canada at the turn of the century. These actors, though, were not part of the policy network. Especially in English Canada, their ideas were not institutionalized as policies to the same degree as in the other cases because these groups did not constitute a strong lobby. Maternalist thinking was more evident in Quebec and, hence, was more successfully institutionalized there.

The most important policy actors in Canada have been governments themselves. Prior to the 1970s, governments in Canada acted autonomously to develop child care and other social programs. Thus, child care has taken shape in line with the ideas and goals of government actors. Public policy on child care has had primarily a welfare orientation, but it has shifted as the goals of government have changed. In the WWII period, the federal and provincial governments provided child care funding for women working in war industry. And recent governments have proven to be open to conceiving of child care as part of a labour market policy, although still targetted to low-income families. All of these programs emerged under the purview of the federal spending power.

Were the federal government to make a commitment to establish a national child care system beyond the programs currently existing, its autonomy to do so would be hampered by two factors. First, the federal division of powers does not give it constitutional authority to act without provincial consent. Second, since the 1980s, governments have faced a strong lobby that demands a particular set of child care ideas be incorporated. Child care advocacy groups, women's organizations, and trade unions have mobilized in the past 20 years to try to pressure governments to expand child care beyond its welfare orientation to build a system that is universal, comprehensive, non-profit, and of high quality.

Advocacy groups have had a difficult time because their demands for universally-accessible, publicly-funded, and high quality day care have been focused primarily on the idea of equal rights for women and have largely ignored maternalist discourse. When advocacy groups did form and begin to lobby for child care, their normative basis was not maternalist but individualist feminist and egalitarian. As in the United States, equality arguments meet some societal resistance from maternalist/familist groups like REAL women, as well as from those who feel child care is a private responsibility. Compared to France and the United States, motherhood and child welfare and development issues in Canada are considered matters of the
private sphere. The lack of institutionalization of maternalist ideas as norms means demands for policies to respond to the needs of children, or the needs of "mothers" (parents) do not resonate as they do in countries with a strong normative commitment to maternalism. Thus, kindergarten and pre-school programs are not as abundant. Children generally start kindergarten at a later age and pre-school programs remain largely private. State involvement to help mothers/parents is not popular.

Canada clearly has borrowed policy ideas from the United States in a number of social policy areas. But the Canadian government did not borrow many maternalist ideas from the United States nor pay a great deal of heed to maternalist organizations in Canada. It was, instead, relatively impervious to those demands. For example, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is one program that distinguishes the U.S. welfare state from the Canadian welfare state. AFDC is unusual in that it targetted benefits to single mothers and children. Such a maternalist-based program does not exist to any great extent in Canada. The closest is the family allowance program. Implemented in 1945 and cancelled in 1993, family allowances were paid to all children under the age of eighteen, not just children of single mothers. Again, the way policies initially developed and the ideas upon which those policies developed, narrowed the range of possibilities and limited their future development.²

The lack of support for programs for children is revealed by the fact that child benefits is the one area where Banting finds convergence in trends in the United States and Canada. In most social policy areas, Canada's programs are marked by their generosity and comprehensiveness compared to the United States. Policies continue to diverge in areas such as health care and pensions, and policies remain more redistributive in Canada than in the United States. Child benefits programs are becoming more harmonized as the United States increases benefits and Canada eliminates them.³


Even after the 1980s and the mobilization of the day care lobby, governments in Canada still managed to maintain a relative degree of autonomy from interest groups. The parliamentary system in Canada tends to create strong, executive-centred governments. Under a system of responsible government, the federal parliament and provincial legislatures are the legislative bodies, but effective executive or decision making authority lies with the executive—those who are deemed to command the confidence of the elected chamber. At both the federal and provincial levels executive dominance is facilitated by a first-past-the-post electoral system which tends to create majority governments, cohesive political parties, and party discipline. Unlike in the U.S. congressional system, negotiation and compromise are not generally necessary within parliament or the provincial legislatures as long the government holds a majority in the elected chamber and party discipline remains strong. However, negotiation is necessary between levels of government. But with authority concentrated in the executive at both levels of government, decision-making can go on between a limited number of actors. This institutional framework of executive federalism facilitated the development of social programs in Canada.

While authority within each level of government is centralized, decision-making between the levels of government is fragmented by federalism. Provincial governments have strong jurisdiction over social policy. As in the United States, the capacity of the Canadian government to put in place a national child care system has therefore been constrained by federalism. Child care is affected by federalism, not simply because of the de facto division of responsibility between the two levels of government, but also because policy development is dependent upon the relations between the levels of government. As Canada has moved from the era of cooperative federalism to competitive federalism, and child care remained a provincial responsibility, government concerns and priorities—who should fund and design child care—have trumped substantive policy considerations.

Other institutional structures matter as well. Along with child care workers, advocates

---


and feminists, the main policy actors involved in child care policy in France historically were union and business representatives and demographers. France has a strong system of co-management with unions and business organizations in the area of social policy which has allowed these groups to lobby from within.

The principal actors and their strategies have not been the same in France and Canada. Because of their weakness, unions in Canada tend to be less influential. The strength of other organized interests often depends upon government financial assistance. The child care lobby tends to be strong currently, but it is not as effective as organized interests in France.

In Canada, the main policy actors have been child care workers and advocates and feminists. They were not active at the national level when government officials were drafting national child care spending plans under the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), and they certainly have not had the same degree of influence as policy advocates in France. Child care is still not an integral part of the policy platform of unions and business groups as it is in France. These actors have been more important in France in pushing forward family policies to reconcile better work and family life. In Canada, those pushing for child care generally work outside the system. They have been effective but not as effective as in France. Coalition politics has meant the child care lobby speaks with a united voice, but it speaks outside of government. Other actors have not risen to prominence to push for child care independently. Multiple pressure points have not been created. In their absence and in Canada's much less corporatist system, powerful societal actors advocating generous publicly funded child care have not become part of government decision-making networks.

In France, society tends to accept a much greater role for the state. In the United States, ironically, a greater role exists for the business sector which has taken responsibility for supplying child care for employees. In Canada, with the roles of business and government in tension and flux, neither side has taken responsibility for developing child care.

Finally, the development of a national child care policy has been hampered by timing. Governments made efforts to tackle the child care issue just as fiscal pressures made it difficult to introduce new programs. Child care in Canada has been on the national agenda only since the early 1980s, although mobilization at the grassroots level has occurred since the 1970s and advocates have raised the idea of a national child care system since the early 1970s. In only three
national elections has the issue been raised—1984, 1988, and 1993—and child care was not a significant part of the campaign in any of these cases. Unlike other social programs, the debate over child care policy began to occur very late. The attempt to embed other norms such as universality or comprehensiveness in new policies was taking place as Canadian governments, for fiscal reasons, were beginning to move away from these ideas in other policy areas.

OVERVIEW OF CHILD CARE AND FAMILY POLICIES

Child care has become an issue on the national public policy agenda in Canada only recently and partly owing to the level of demand for services. Women's economic activity levels were very low in Canada compared to other countries until the mid-1960s (see table 4.1). At the turn of the century, women's labour force participation rates were 14 per cent, compared to 36 per cent in France (1911). Women's labour market participation began to rise in the inter-war period and has continued to rise. Since the 1960s, levels have risen dramatically, from approximately 30 per cent in 1961 to 58 per cent in 1991. By 1993, approximately 70 per cent of women with children were in the labour force (see table 4.2). Women with spouses had even higher rates of participation at 72 per cent. Women who headed single-parent families had participation rates of 60 per cent in 1993.

In France, women who are single parents have much higher rates of participation (80 per cent in 1992), compared to married women (65 per cent). In fact, in most European countries, women who are lone-parents are more likely to work than women with a spouse or women without children. Also, in France, the labour market participation rates for both lone-mothers and mothers with a partner increase markedly when the child or children reach the age of three, the age when most children enter pre-primary schools.

In Canada, the opposite is true (see table 4.2). Since the mid-1980s, women who are lone-parents in Canada have lower rates of labour market participation and employment than women with a spouse. As soon as children enter compulsory schooling, the labour market participation rates shoot up from an average of 46 per cent to 71 per cent (1993 figures). This is compared to 66 and 77 per cent respectively for two-parent families. It is also important to note that labour market participation rates for women in two-parent families have steadily increased since 1981, whereas those for lone-parent women have remained fairly constant in Canada. The
participation of lone parents in the labour market in France seems to speak to the availability of child care programs, and the contrasting lack of availability in Canada. In 1971, 17,391 regulated child care spaces existed for approximately 1,380,000 children under age 14 of working mothers. In 1993 362,818 spaces existed for 2,232,250 children under age 13 of parents who work or study more than 20 hours per week. The percentage of children served thus increased from 1.3 to 16 per cent in those years. As Friendly points out, however, not just children of working parents use or require child care services. The potential demand for child care should be considered in the context of all children under age 12 or 14. Indeed, French data includes all children, not just those of working parents. Friendly calculates that the total number of children under 12 was nearly 5,000,000 in 1991. With regulated child care spaces totaling only 333,082 in 1991, that means only about seven per cent of children could be accommodated in regulated care. When comparing these figures with those of France, which provides full-day education programs for the majority of children ages three to five and regulated care or full-day education for 31 per cent of children under three, child care provision in Canada looks even more paltry.

The number of day care centres increased from 682 in 1971 to 8,196 in 1993, but the rate of growth of centres has decreased since 1990. The annual rate of growth in day care spaces was between 10 and 16 per cent from 1971 through 1990. This slowed thereafter. In 1993, the annual rate of growth was 3.5 per cent.

Of the children in regulated care, more children under age three are in family day care homes than centre care, whereas more children ages three to six are in centre care (see table 4.3). Still, the number of children of working parents in regulated care does not reach 50 per cent for

---


7Martha Friendly, Child Care Policy in Canada: Putting the Pieces Together (Don Mills, Ont.: Addison-Wesley, 1994), 44. See Health and Welfare Canada, Status of Day Care in Canada 1991 for figures.
any age group. Few regulated care spaces for children under three exist, and even fewer for those aged 10 to 13.

Unfortunately, no organization or government agency has good numbers on alternate forms of care in Canada, although clearly many families are them. The latest available data are from the Canadian National Child Care Survey of 24,000 families conducted in 1988. Most children outside of regulated care were cared for by the spouse, relatives or other caregivers in an unregulated setting (see tables 4.4 and 4.5).

Child Care Programs

Ontario has the largest number of child care spaces among the provinces, followed by Quebec and Alberta (see table 4.6). A diversity of licensed care exists across Canada, including predominantly commercial care in Alberta and Newfoundland and mainly non-profit care in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Quebec (see table 4.7). 8 Manitoba, Quebec, and, more recently Ontario have had lower levels of commercial care, whereas Alberta in the 1980s encouraged an expansion of commercial care. 9 The overall number of commercial spaces in the provinces has declined, however, from 75 per cent of spaces in 1968 to 30 per cent in 1993. 10

As provinces are responsible for setting their own regulations regarding child care, regulations vary by province. In most provinces, the government sets regulations on the maximum number of spaces a centre can provide, ranging from 50 in Newfoundland and P.E.I. to 90 in Saskatchewan and 80 in Alberta. The Ontario and B.C. governments specify no maximum centre size in their regulations. Each province sets child/staff ratios which vary by age of children. In Quebec, a staff person can care for up to eight two-year-olds; in B.C., only four. Most provinces allow one staff person to care for up to 15 six-year-olds. Some provinces do not

8 These are also the provinces most opposed to idea of the CAP funding commercial day care centres. See Derek Hum, "Compromise and Delay: The Federal Strategy on Child Care," in Canada: The State of the Federation, eds. Ronald Watts and Douglas Brown (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1989), 157.


10 Human Resources Development Canada, Status of Day Care in Canada 1993, 3.
specify staff training requirements. The Ontario government's child care review recently recommended loosening child/staff regulations even further for pre-schoolers. As part of its announced child care changes, the Quebec government planned in 1997 to increase child/staff ratios as well. Hourly wages for child care centre teachers are highest in Ontario. In 1991, mean hourly wages were at $11.51. Wages in Newfoundland were lowest at $6.03. The national hourly mean wage in 1991 was $7.84.

Work-related child care is not common in Canada. Only Ontario and Quebec have significant numbers of centres at the work site: 62 and 76 as of 1991. Most employers who provide work-related child care are in the public sector, such as hospitals, governments, and Crown corporations. Employers generally provide capital funding to build and maintain the centre, but many do not contribute the full cost of care once the centre is in operation. Some child care advocates oppose such arrangements as privatizing responsibility for care.

Family Day Care

All provinces save Newfoundland provide regulated family day care; that is, care offered in a private home (see tables 4.6 and 4.8). Most provinces require licensed providers to be a certain age and some require first aid training. Quebec, Ontario and Alberta have no minimum provider requirements. All provinces that offer family day care have child/staff ratio regulations and licensing requirements. Generally the provinces issue individual licenses but in Nova Scotia,

---

11 Childcare Resource and Research Unit (CRRU), Child Care in Canada: Provinces and Territories 1993 (Toronto: CRRU, 1994), 95-97.
12 Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, Improving Ontario's Child Care System: Ontario's Child Care Review (Toronto: Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1996).
14 Friendly, Child Care Policy in Canada, 96.
15 For a survey of some of the work-related child care centres in Canada see Margie I. Mayfield, Work-Related Child Care in Canada (Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1990).
16 Jamie Kass, Child Care Organizer, Canadian Union of Postal Workers, personal interview, Ottawa, 13 May 1996. See also the report of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers, Our Children are Our Future (Ottawa: CUPW, 1996), Appendix B, "The Role of Labour in Child Care". The debate over work-related care will be discussed below.
Quebec, and Ontario, licensed agencies supervise providers, and in Alberta, the government contracts with approved agencies which contract with individual providers.\textsuperscript{17} Contrary to popular perception, Alberta's family day care regulations are not less stringent than other provinces and are better than some.

\textit{Before- and After-School Programs}

All provinces provide school-age child care centres. In Quebec the \textit{milieu scolaires} are operated by school boards, not \textit{l'Office des services de garde à l'enfance}. The number of school-age spaces in 1993 ranged from 388 in Newfoundland to 24,938 in Ontario and 23,830 in Quebec.\textsuperscript{18} Some provinces have concentrated on expanding these programs. In 1989 the Ontario Liberal government under David Peterson introduced capital funding for child care centres in new schools, creating a large number of school-based child care centres. In 1993, school boards in Ontario became eligible to operate child care services. In 1997, the Quebec government mandated that schools provide before- and after-school care for older children.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Other Forms of Child Care}

Numerous other forms of care have been established, including occasional centres in P.E.I., \textit{haltes garderies} which are stop-over centres in Quebec, child care resource centres in Ontario, occasional care centres in Manitoba, licensed drop-in centres in Alberta, and child minding and emergency care in B.C. Some are regulated, and some are not.

The provinces set maximums for the number of children who can be cared for in unregulated home child care arrangements. These vary from two in B.C. to eight, including the providers' own children, in Saskatchewan. Ontario allows five children, excluding the providers' own children, and Quebec six, again excluding the caregiver's children (see table 4.8).\textsuperscript{20} No other regulations are imposed.

Nannies and other care providers in the child's own home are not regulated \textit{per se}. As a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17}CRRU, \textit{Child Care in Canada}, 99.
\item \textsuperscript{18}Friendly, \textit{Child Care Policy in Canada}, 46.
\item \textsuperscript{19}Philp, "Child-Care Plan Makes Quebec Distinct," A9.
\item \textsuperscript{20}CRRU, \textit{Child Care in Canada}, 95.
\end{itemize}
supplement to the supply of baby-sitters and housekeepers in Canada, the federal government has set up the Foreign Domestic Worker scheme. Employees, mainly women, are brought to Canada, usually from the Philippines or Jamaica, to work for a fixed term with a specific employer and often through private recruiting agencies. The work visa issued becomes invalid the moment its holder ceases to work for a specified employer in a specified job. The domestic can therefore be deported if she leaves her job or loses it. The domestic must live in the employer's house and can change to another employer only with a letter of permission from the current employer.

Domestic workers are excluded from many legislative protections extended to other workers. Rights in employment vary by province as no national employment standards governing this area of work exist. In Ontario, domestic workers are covered by the Employment Standards Act which legislates hours of work, wages, and so on. Until 1987 no provisions existed for maximum hours of work, overtime pay, or wages for public holidays. Those provisions are now there, de jure. Employers must pay the minimum wage, room and board, overtime and provide free periods or days off, written particulars of employment, vacation with pay, and public holidays.

Persons employed as domestics are not subject to the same minimum wage scheme as other workers, as the employer supplies room and board, which is calculated into the wages received. Overtime is a major problem for domestics. At the end of the 1980s, the majority of domestics reported overwork—some more than 60 hours per week. Many do not get statutory

---

21 Literature on the Foreign Domestic Worker scheme includes Jennifer Aitken, "A Stranger in the Family: The Legal Status of Domestic Workers in Ontario," University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review, 45, 2 (Fall 1987), 394-415; Sedef Arat-Koc, "In the Privacy of Our Own Home: Foreign Domestic Workers as Solution to the Crisis in the Domestic Sphere in Canada," Studies in Political Economy 28 (Spring 1989), 33-58; Abigail B. Bakan and Daiva Stasiulis, eds., Not One of the Family: Foreign Domestic Workers in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); and Agnes Calliste, "Canada's Immigration Policy and Domestic Workers from the Caribbean: The Second Domestic Scheme," Socialist Studies, Canadian Annual No. 5: Race, Class, Gender: Bonds and Barriers (1989), 133-166.


23 Abigail B. Bakan and Daiva Stasiulis, "Foreign Domestic Worker Policy in Canada: The Social Boundaries of Modern Citizenship," in Not One of the Family, 50, n. 12, citing an
holidays off. Receiving pay for their overtime, as entitled, is a problem. Disputes erupt between employees and employers regarding hours worked.24 Domestic child care remains the most controversial in Canada.

**Pre-primary Programs**

Like child care programs, pre-school, nursery school, and kindergarten programs fall under provincial jurisdiction. Kindergarten programs in Canada are generally offered through the provincial ministry of education whereas nursery and pre-school programs are offered through the provincial ministry of social services. In some provinces, kindergarten is a private service operated under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Services. P.E.I. does not provide publicly operated, publicly funded kindergarten programs.25

Canada fares quite poorly compared to other countries in its provision of pre-primary programs (see tables 1.3 and 1.4). By the age of six, all students in Canada are enrolled in school. In Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, and New Brunswick, kindergarten exists for children aged five, and for those aged four in Ontario. For the rest of the provinces and for three-year-olds, Canada does not rank highly.26 Canada's provision is, in fact, worse than most industrialized countries, including the United States and Britain. The OECD reports that in Canada in 1986-87, 70 per cent of five-year-olds were in pre-primary programs and 38 per cent of four-year-olds. By 1994, the figures had not improved much. Enrollment levels for five-year-olds actually decreased to 69 per cent, but increased for four-year-olds to 48 per cent. Recently a number of provinces, including Alberta and Ontario, have initiated cutbacks to early childhood education programs. The consequence is likely an even further decrease in enrollment levels in


24For example, it is not clear whether employers must include time while a baby is napping as part of the hours worked.

25Friendly, 85-86.

26The Quebec government recently announced that it was expanding kindergarten to full time for five-year-olds and providing $5 per day child care for four-year-olds. See "Family Policies Announced," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 May 1997, A4; and Philp, "Child-Care Plan Makes Quebec Distinct," A1, A9.
the future. The majority of kindergarten programs are not full-time but part-time, running 2.5 hours per day or full days but part-weeks. Until 1997, only New Brunswick provided full-time kindergarten programs five days per week.27

Maternity and Parental Leave Programs

Canada has one of the lowest levels of maternity leave provision and benefits among western industrialized countries. The federal government passed maternity leave legislation in 1971. It allows 17 weeks leave, but only 15 are paid and at approximately 60 per cent of salary and after a two-week waiting period.28 Benefits are paid through the federal Employment Insurance (EI) fund and are financed by employer and employee contributions. These benefit levels are higher than in the United States (which has only recently legislated 12 weeks of unpaid leave), but behind the United Kingdom (which permits a shorter leave but at a higher rate) (see table 1.2). To be eligible for paid leave, the parent must have worked 20 weeks in the previous year. (Before 1984 the parent had to demonstrate she was employed during the period of conception). In 1990 the federal Conservatives under Brian Mulroney introduced parental leave provisions under the federal UI program of 10 weeks, again at 60 per cent of salary.29 Adoptive parents are also eligible for parental leave, although not maternity leave. In so far as it has exclusive jurisdiction over maternity benefits under its powers over unemployment insurance, section 91(2A), the federal government has exclusive authority to expand the maternity and parental benefits program. This situation contrasts with that for child care.

Maternity and parental leave provisions vary by province and employer as the provinces and territories set employment standards legislation governing the leave period.30 Some

---

28The two week waiting period for benefits is in place because the benefits are paid through the UI fund, which imposes such a waiting period to encourage the unemployed to look for work before claiming benefits. The provision makes no sense for maternity benefits. Status of Women Canada, Report of the Task Force on Child Care (Cooke Report) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, March 1986), 317.
30The federal government only has jurisdiction over federal employees and employees working in enterprises under federal authority such as banking and transportation.
provinces allow longer leave periods than the benefit period the federal government provides. Some unions have negotiated longer leave periods as well. Quebec, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia all allow 18 weeks of maternity leave and the rest of the provinces 17 weeks. Parental leave periods vary from 12 weeks for each parent in B.C. to 34 weeks for each parent in Quebec, by far the most extensive of the provincial provisions (see table 4.9).

**Spending on Child Care and Other Programs**

The major source of federal spending on child care until 1996 was through the Canada Assistance Plan. This program provided subsidies for low-income families on a cost-shared basis with the provinces and territories, generally at 50 per cent. That changed in 1990 when the federal government imposed a ceiling on expenditures. The funding arrangements with the provinces under the CAP until 1990 were open-ended. The federal government imposed no limits on the amount of the federal spending share once the provinces initiated spending. Instead, spending was limited by the ability of provincial governments to provide funding, and of course on the political will of those governments. In the late 1980s, the federal government planned to put a cap on child care spending under Bill C-144 (just as the Ontario and Quebec governments were gearing up to expand their programs greatly in the late 1980s). In 1990, after Bill C-144 died, the government introduced a cap on expenditures under CAP to the "have" provinces (Ontario, B.C., Alberta) as part of Bill C-69, the *Government Expenditures Restraint Act*. Since the 1990 cap on CAP, the federal share of spending in Ontario is estimated to have dropped to 28 per cent and to 36 per cent in B.C., well under 50 per cent. Alberta was not affected as its expenditure increases were below five per cent. In 1994-95 the estimated federal expenditures on child care services under CAP were $310 million. Child care subsidies represented approximately four per cent of federal expenditures under the CAP in 1993.

---

Federal funding specifically directed at child care ended in 1996 with the cancellation of the CAP.

Two forms of provision existed under the CAP: the social assistance portion and the welfare services portion. Under the social assistance portion of the CAP, individuals or agencies on behalf of individuals were given financial assistance. Eligibility for assistance on child care costs under the social assistance portion of CAP was determined through a needs test (Ontario) or an income test. The federal government cost-shared all forms of care under the social assistance portion of CAP.

Under the welfare services portion, on the other hand, the federal government cost-shared the expenses incurred in delivering programs, primarily salaries and travel expenses. The child care portion of CAP was the only program for which the federal government cost-shared other expenses, including operating costs. Under the welfare services portion of CAP, funds were paid to a centre to help with operating costs for a specific number of subsidized spaces which went to children of parents who met the provinces' eligibility criteria. To be eligible for federal cost-sharing under the welfare services portion of CAP, the services had to be provided by a not-for-profit organization, and either a licensed group day care or regulated family day care. Wage subsidies in the commercial sector were not cost shareable.

As federal and provincial government spending was concentrated on lowest income Canadians, parents covered most of the costs for child care. Many more parents were eligible for a subsidized space than spaces were available. Since the federal government set its maximum eligibility level higher than the provinces, a lot more funding could have been provided under the CAP than the provinces chose to make available. In some provinces, the income cut-off was set very low. In other provinces where the income cut-off was high, no subsidized places were available. Waiting lists for subsidized spaces were often very long. The subsidy often did not

---

34 The National Council of Welfare cites a background document prepared for the Special Committee on Child Care which reported that in 1987, an average of only 15 per cent of parents eligible for a full or partial child care subsidy received it. The percentage of parents who received a subsidy when eligible varied tremendously across provinces. In Ontario and Quebec, the percentage was around 12 and 14 per cent and in British Columbia, 45 per cent. See National Council of Welfare, Child Care: A Better Alternative (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1988), 11.
cover the full cost of care. Fee levels varied but the average across provinces ranged from $382 to $836 per month in 1993. Monthly fees could be as high as $1100 in urban centres. Availability and affordability were and still are big issues for parents. Also, securing a regulated child care space does not guarantee good quality care.

Child care spending under the CAP was problematic; however, the demise of the CAP in 1996 bodes badly for future federal spending on child care programs. With the introduction of the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), spending on child care, which was already discretionary, becomes even more discretionary. The CHST is a block transfer whose monies will go to provincial Consolidated Revenue Funds, which are general funds. Child care monies are not earmarked. This therefore ends federal restrictions on the way money is spent on specific programs. Block funding also does not allow the federal government to dictate whether any money at all is spent on particular programs. Under the CAP, federal spending occurred only after the provinces had incurred a cost for a particular benefit. That is not the case under the CHST. The CHST is a controlled expenditure program so it no longer guarantees a 50/50 cost-shared arrangement to all provinces. The provinces are not restricted in how they spend the block funds. The expectation is that the provinces will focus on their highest priorities first, most likely to be health and post-secondary education.

Child Care Expense Deduction

Other areas of federal spending include the Child Care Expense Deduction (CCED); the Dependent Care Allowance; aboriginal child care; and Child Care Visions, formerly the Child Care Initiatives Fund (CCIF). Total federal spending on child care was approximately $700 million in 1993 (see table 4.10).

---

35 Friendly, 56.
36 Two exceptions exist. First, the provinces cannot impose a certain residence period as a condition for receiving assistance. If they do, all or part of the cash portion of the new CHST could be withheld. Second, all the provisions of the Canada Health Act, 1984, will continue to apply, including the principles of "universal comprehensive, accessible, portable, and publicly-administered" programs. National Council of Welfare, The 1995 Budget and Block Funding, 9-10.
37 Human Resources Development Canada, Child Care and Development, 17.
The federal government established the CCED in 1972. It was originally available only to single parent families but that restriction has been lifted. It acts to compensate parents who participate in the labour market for their child care expenses. The CCED allows parents to deduct child care expenses from their income taxes. The maximum amount that can be claimed is $5000 for each child under age seven, or for older children with severe disabilities, and $3000 for children aged seven to 14, or children with moderate disabilities. The parent must provide receipts and the total expenses cannot exceed two-thirds of earnings. Total federal loss of revenue in 1992 under this provision was $310 million, and was claimed by 710,000 taxpayers.

Many child care advocates are opposed to this form of expenditure. The tax allowance does not cover the costs of care for many families whose child care costs exceed the maximum allowable deduction. It also does nothing to reduce the costs of full-time centre-based care, forcing many parents to rely on informal arrangements. The tax benefit system does offer parental choice, and that choice can mean using informal care (as long as receipts are provided), but it does not direct scarce dollars to building formal day care programs. Many child care advocates would like to see the tax allowances phased out and monies reallocated to direct funding of child care centres.

Many parents are unable to claim the CCED because caregivers refuse to issue receipts to avoid paying income taxes. In order to claim the CCED, the parent must provide receipts. For this reason, and also for the fact that families can claim based on income, the most well-off benefit most from this system. Families where only one parent works cannot claim the deduction.

Other Child Care Benefits and Programs

Dependent care allowances are provided to participants in training programs sponsored by the federal government and who have young children requiring care. The government provides allowances of up to $20 per day but this amount is not enough to cover the full cost of care. Total federal spending on dependent care allowances was $90 million in 1993.

The federal government has made arrangements with New Brunswick, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec to help fund child care services for children of status Aboriginals living on reserves. These programs cost $8.6 million in 1992.
Finally, the CCIF, renamed the Child Care Visions program in April 1995, is a federal research and development program. The Fund was launched in 1988 under the Mulroney government and committed $100 million over seven years, approximately $6 million per year. The Fund does not cover child care costs, but funds non-profit organizations to carry out research and innovative activities in the field of child care. The program ended in March 1995. The Liberal government established a new program in 1995 called Child Care Visions, with an annual commitment of $6 million in funding.

*The Child Tax Benefit*

In addition to these child care programs, in 1993 the federal government also established the Child Tax Benefit (CTB) program. This benefit, under the Brighter Futures program of the Conservative government, replaced the old family allowance and child tax credit programs, the latter implemented in 1978.\(^\text{38}\) The CTB is a tax-free, income-tested monthly payment for children under the age of 18. It consists of a basic benefit, a supplementary benefit, and the Working Income Supplement (WIS). The basic benefit is income-tested and depends on the number of children in a family. Parents with incomes up to $25,921 are eligible for a maximum of $1,020 per child per year, with an additional $75 for the third and subsequent children in a family. (At such a low amount, the federal government certainly cannot be accused of promoting natalism.)

The supplementary benefit part of the CTB provides support to families with pre-school children and who do not claim the CCED. The supplement is $213 per year per child under the age of seven. Families with net incomes above $25,921 can also receive the supplementary benefit, but at a reduced level. The benefit reaches zero for families with a net income above $66,700.

Finally, the WIS supplements earnings of working poor families. The maximum annual benefit for families who earn between $10,000 and $20,921 is $500, regardless of the number of children and decreases at a rate of 10 per cent of net family income after that. The maximum annual earnings possible in order to receive the benefit is $25,921. The federal government spent

\(^{38}\)See Human Resources Development Canada, *Improving Social Security in Canada,*
$5.1 billion on these programs in 1993.

The CTB is the largest single expenditure by the federal government on family benefits, and it is slated to grow further. The federal government in its 1997 budget committed itself to expanding the child tax benefit system, allocating $600 million new funds for July 1998, above the $250 million announced in the 1996 budget. The government raised the maximum benefits under the WIS to $605 for the first child, $405 for the second child, and $330 for each additional child. This changes the method of benefit payment from per family to per child. By July 1998, the federal government plans to combine the WIS with the CTB to create a Canada Child Tax Benefit. The new program will provide $1,625 per year to families with net incomes below $20,921 with one child, and $1,425 for each additional child. Benefit levels decrease as family income rises.

Other Spending

Other federal programs to address child welfare issues exist. They include Community Action for Children, a program to help communities deal with children and families at risk; the Canada Prenatal Nutrition Program, to provide prenatal services such as nutrition counselling to low-income and at-risk pregnant women; the Indian and Inuit Mental Health/Child Development Program, which provides support for child and family initiatives on reserves and in Inuit communities; and the Aboriginal Head Start Program, for aboriginal children and families living off reserve (see table 4.10 for a breakdown of these programs). The federal government also spent $1.3 billion on maternity and parental leave benefits in 1993.

It is difficult to trace federal expenditures over time as no federal department has attempted to tabulate the results. A rough estimate is given in table 4.11. Spending on equivalent programs (CAP, CCED, Dependent Care Allowances, Aboriginal Child Care, and family allowances and other tax benefits) has increased from approximately $4.4 billion in 1982 to $5.8 billion in 1993. Expenditures as a percentage of GDP, then, have actually fallen from 1.2

---


per cent in 1982 to .8 per cent in 1993.

It is also difficult to trace provincial spending on child care. The federal government does not collect such data, nor does any other source aggregate that data. To give a general idea of the spending on these programs provincially, one can look at the figures for Ontario and Alberta. In the 1994-95 fiscal year, the Ontario government estimated spending on all child care programs and services to be $565.7 million. This figure represented an increase from approximately $108 million in 1985. The 1994-95 estimated operating budget on child care expenditures included $305.4 million on fee subsidies for parents; $105.1 million for fee subsidies through Jobs Ontario; $3.6 million on program development; $19.5 million on child care resource centres; $112.0 on wage subsidies for staff; $13.5 million on municipal/First Nations employment programs; and $6.6 million on conversion of commercial centres to non-profit. Until 1996, the general arrangement for cost-sharing was 50 per cent from the federal government, 30 per cent from the provincial government, and 20 per cent from the municipalities. (Ontario is one of two provinces, the other being Alberta, which requires municipal funding.) The cap on CAP after 1990, however, had also altered this funding arrangement and put greater constraints on Ontario and other "have" provinces to expand their child care programs.

The Alberta estimated overall expenditures on child care to be $67.6 million for the fiscal year 1994-95. Of that, $19.2 million was spent on operating grants, $39.8 million on fee subsidies, $6.8 million on the Family Day Home Program, and $1.8 million on special needs

---

41 The Childcare Resource and Research Unit in Toronto does compile a periodic survey, Child Care in Canada: Provinces and Territories, which does provide a breakdown of expenditures for each province and territory in Canada.

42 Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, Child Care Branch, Child Care Reference Information (Toronto: Ministry of Community and Social Services, February 1995), 4.

43 The Ontario government, for example, estimated that it recovered only 18 per cent of its CAP eligible expenditures from the federal government in 1992/93. Total child care expenditures by the government of Ontario in that year were $433.9 million. Under previous cost-sharing arrangements, Ontario would have recovered $161.2 million, rather than the $59.5 million it did recover. Thus, the federal contribution under CAP actually was estimated to be 29 per cent. Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, "A Proposal to the Government of Canada Supporting Ontario's Child Care Reform Strategy." Unpublished paper, Ministry of
These expenditures represent an increase from fiscal year 1991-92 when the provincial government spent $66.6 million. While the amount of money spent on operating grants declined from $25.6 million in 1991-92, the amount of money directed to fee subsidies increased from $31.7 million.

Expenditure data on early childhood education programs are also very difficult to collect. Pre-primary programs are generally not viewed as part of child care programs. The federal government does not collect statistics on their provision. Again, to give a general idea of the spending on these programs, one can look at the figures for Ontario and Alberta. Provincial budget estimates for education spending in Ontario for 1993-1994 were $9.7 billion, roughly $500 million of which was allocated to junior and senior kindergarten. That figure represents only 40 per cent of the costs. The other 60 per cent is paid for by local school boards. The actual expenditure was around $1.3 billion in 1994 for approximately 240,000 students ages four and five. Alberta reported that Early Childhood Services funding before 1994 cost the province about $85 million per year and served about 41,000 students. The provincial cuts implemented in 1994 reduced that spending by an estimated $18 million. The government has since restored full funding.

Public Opinion on Child Care

Relative to many other countries, a paucity of child care programs exist in Canada. Yet, a 1993 Insight Canada survey found that nearly two-thirds of Canadians favoured the establishment of a national child care program. Almost one in three of those surveyed were...

---

44 Childcare Resource and Research Unit (CRRU), Child Care in Canada: Provinces and Territories 1995 (Toronto: CRRU, 1997), 56.
strongly in favour of such a program. Only 20 per cent were opposed, and of those, 12 per cent were strongly not in favour of such a system. Support for a national child care system was strong in all regions of the country, but varied with those in B.C. most in favour (with 72 per cent in support) and those on the Prairies least in favour (with 56 per cent in support). Demographically, younger people (ages 25 to 34), white collar workers, and high income earners were most in favour (registering 72, 70 and 69 per cent in favour). Older people (ages 55 to 64), homemakers, and middle-income earners ($55,000 to $64,000) were least in support (registering 32, 26, and 24 per cent in favour).48

EXPLANATION - CHILD CARE POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA

Dominant Ideas

Canadian public opinion on child care is shifting, likely because of the increased numbers of workers in need of child care services for their children. It is important, though, to reflect on the opposition to child care as well. Canada is generally characterized as having a liberal welfare state. Researchers characterize liberal welfare states as having a set of minimum social programs for those in need, with the expectation that all others should rely on the market.49 Programs tend to provide limited benefits primarily to those most disadvantaged in the market and tend to be targetted or means-tested. Funding for programs tends to be modest. Eligibility rules tend to be strict and often associated with stigma. Some programs may be universal in scope, but they tend to be the exception, and more modest.

In liberal welfare states such as Canada, the liberal work-ethic predominates. As Rimlinger points out, the rise of liberal ideas meant conservative ideas of charity, and caring for those in the lower classes, died out:

Liberty and equality demanded that all legal privileges be abolished. All citizens were to be treated equally, which meant that none had any special claim to protection on account of his [sic] [low] economic and social status. Full citizenship implied the ability to look after oneself; dependence on others was not

---

48 Insight Canada Research for the Ontario Coalition for Better Child Care, National Child Care Survey, December 1993.
consistent with freedom and equality.50

Liberal welfare states tend not to privilege certain groups in society with richer benefits, other than the most poor. An ethic of self-reliance leads governments to limit welfare so as not to encourage people to rely on the state rather than participate in the market.

Liberal welfare states developed where society tended to regard state action with suspicion and as illegitimate. Liberal welfare states emerged where labour unions and leftist political parties were largely weak. They also tended to develop in countries where the prevailing ideology was one of market liberalism. In terms of the division of responsibility between state and market, the market is seen as the superior mechanism for eliminating inequality. The goal is to have a maximum of free markets and minimum of state interference.

Liberal welfare states such as Canada, the United States, and Australia, have less than average levels of public expenditure on social programs as a percentage of GDP in comparison to other OECD countries. Britain's public expenditure is about average (see table 2.1). Governments and societies under liberal welfare states tend to view child care as a private responsibility. Government should not intervene unless absolutely necessary.

It is puzzling, though, that given liberal welfare states' emphasis on markets, that Canadian child care policy has not developed along broader labour market lines. Child care, from its earliest development as private charity, has been provided to support working parents. Child care has provided a means by which parents can support themselves and their families. Yet it meets tremendous resistance. Why?

Although the above history helps us to understand the welfare nature of child care provision in Canada, we still need to explore more the reasons for the failure of child care policy to be accepted as public policy beyond a welfare focus. In the following section, it will become clear that actors' goals and strategies, as well as the degree of institutionalization of these actors, has greatly influenced the child care debate.

Opposition to child care in Canada generally derives from two beliefs. The first belief is that child care is a private responsibility to be paid for by parents. The second is that care outside

the home is "harmful". In previous chapters I have labelled the first view "conservative" and the second "familist". Maternalist thinking tempers both of those views for, while not approving care outside the home as an ideal form of care, maternalists realize that such care is necessary for working parents. In addition, maternalists lobby for policies to ease the burden of child care on mothers and promote policies to protect children and help them flourish. The lack of institutionalization of maternalist ideas as policies and as norms means that child care is not considered a legitimate area of state action, other than along welfare lines. Advocacy groups have had a very difficult time promoting the idea of child care as other than a welfare policy.

**Key Institutions**

**Federalism**

Federalism also acts as a constraint to the expansion of child care in Canada. Provinces have jurisdiction over many areas of social policy but the national government became increasingly involved in funding these programs through its spending power. The spending power "allows the federal government to make payments to individuals, institutions, or other governments for purposes on which Parliament does not necessarily have the power to regulate." 51 Allocations under this provision also allow the federal government to attach conditions, even if the conditions involve matters of provincial jurisdiction, as long as they are not regulatory. The provinces administer the programs and take policy decisions on the extent of programs.

The federal spending power provides the constitutional basis 52 for direct spending on individuals including transfers to families such as the CTB, and, until 1996, shared-cost programs such as the CAP. But social policy development in Canada depends primarily on

---


52 The specific constitutional authority is open to dispute. Such authority could fall under the federal power of peace, order and good government, the residual clause of section 91. Since the courts have tended to interpret that clause narrowly and tend to like enumerated authorities, the more likely authority is section 91(1A) which grants the federal government power over the public debt and property, including federal assets and the Consolidated Revenue Fund, as well as section 91(3), which grants the federal government authority to raise money by any mode or system of taxation. Banting, *The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism*, 52.
cooperation between levels of government, a factor that is increasingly lacking.

Policy Development: 1800s-1940

Less urbanized and industrialized than France and the United States, Canada developed day care services later. Day care centres were first set up in Montreal in the 1850s but did not appear in Ontario until the 1890s. By contrast, the first day care centre appeared in 1838 in the United States and 1844 in France. These services were charitable in nature and responded to the need of working women to have some place to leave their children while they went to work. Mothers who had to work either were widowed, divorced, or had been deserted. The day care centres often also acted as employment agencies for women whose children used the centres. Friendly reports, for example, that the "Halifax Jost Mission child care centre provided a place where women working as domestic servants waited for calls to a day's work and left their children to be cared for $.50 a day." By 1933, however, only 20 day care centres existed in all of Canada. In comparison, La Berge reports that by the turn of the century, over 400 day care centres existed in France, 66 in Paris alone. Some government support was provided in the way of municipal and provincial annual grants or subsidies. The federal government was not an actor.

Ontario was the first province to open a public kindergarten, in 1873, but kindergartens

\[\text{53The first centre to open in Toronto was the East End Crèche (Victoria Day Care Services), which opened in Toronto in 1892. The second was the West End Crèche, opened in 1909. Hillel Goelman, "Day Care in Canada," in Child Care in Context: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, ed. Michael E. Lamb et al. (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1992), 229.}\]


\[\text{55Friendly, 126.}\]

\[\text{56Schulz, "Day Care in Canada," 145.}\]


\[\text{58Schulz, "Day Care in Canada," 139.}\]
were not widely accepted until the 1920s in Canada. Indeed, the whole idea of publicly-funded primary education was resisted in Canada up to the 1870s when Dr. J. L. Hughes established kindergarten as an optional program in the public school system in Ontario. In contrast, in France, pre-primary education existed from the 1770s, and as part of the public school system from the 1830s. Free, compulsory education was established in France for all children age seven and older from 1882. And in the United States, pre-schools were first established in the 1820s for poor, disadvantaged children but the idea quickly caught on with the middle classes. In Quebec, nursery schools were looked on more favourably. By 1878, five "salles d'asile" with an educational focus existed in the Montreal area, financed by fees, charitable donations, and provincial government grants.

In terms of programs, services, and ideas about child welfare and child development, by the twentieth century, Canada's development was not atypical. In the inter-war period, a number of nursery schools were set up in Ontario such as the Institute of Child Study, established in 1926. The focus of nursery schools was not to provide care for children of working parents, but rather to foster social and educational development. Most of the parents who used these centres were middle-class and usually were involved in running the schools. The inter-war period also marked the time of professionalization of child care and the establishment of well-baby clinics and concerns about children's health.

\[\text{Notes:}
\]


61 Veronica Strong-Boag, "Intruders in the Nursery: Childcare Professionals Reshape the
Maternalist ideas were also present in Canada. According to feminists scholars of the welfare state, maternalists were characterized by three tenets:

First, they regarded domestic and family responsibilities and identities as essential to the vast majority of women and to the social order, and strongly associated women's with children's interests...Second, maternalists imagined themselves in a motherly role toward the poor...Third, maternalists believed that it was their work, experience, and/or socialization as mothers that made women uniquely able to lead certain kinds of reform campaigns and made others deserving of help.62

As Kornbluh argues, maternalists believed "motherhood was a legitimate basis for women's citizenship, that women as mothers deserved a return from their governments for the socially vital work they performed by raising children and/or that governments had a special responsibility to ensure the health and welfare of children."63

Actors and organizations who promoted maternalist ideas on the issue of day care did exist in Canada. The National Council of Women of Canada (NCWC), formed in 1893 with a number of affiliated organizations such as the Women's Christian Temperance Union, the Young Women's Christian Association, and the Dominion Women's Enfranchisement Association (the suffragists), under the bond of common concern for the home.64 Feminist Nellie McClung, who, in 1921, was one of the first women to be elected to office after the granting of the franchise, also believed that women had a special capacity for nurture, that they had a role to play as mothers and that they should enter the public sphere to protect the interests of women.65 Scholars

---

65 Veronica Strong-Boag, "'Ever a Crusader': Nellie McClung, First-Wave Feminist," in
describe the women's movement at the turn of the century in Canada as generally conservative and class-based. Most women in the movement were drawn from the middle class, and most of their reform energies focused on the working class. An exception is Business and Professional Women (BPW), formed in the 1900s, which fought for equal opportunities for women in the labour force. Additionally, many feminist women called for equality rights in marriage, divorce, citizenship, and so on.66

Neither were the ideas surrounding day care individualist feminist in focus. Day care advocates, for example, saw centres as a way to inculcate children with proper morals and values.67 While child care centres were established to help families where both parents had to work, or where a single parent headed the family, those who ran the centres often did not approve of women working. A report on the Montreal day care centres set up in the 1850s recommended that only women living in extreme poverty should be allowed to use the centres.68 Suffragist women, who demanded equality rights for women in voting, viewed the day care centres negatively and lamented a system that forced women to work outside the home and be "deprived of the duty and pleasure of looking after their own children."69 Schulz argues that

because the providers of day care were never people who might have used the service themselves, they were automatically distanced from the needs and experiences of the users. They had no concept of day care as a right or as a legitimate social service that should be available to large numbers of people; they saw it only as form of welfare, an emergency measure to combat the worst effects of poverty, illness or family stress.70

Schulz reports that day care providers did not suggest that this form of care would be an acceptable alternative to the home. This fits in with maternalists' belief that it was better to give

---

66Sandra Burt, "Organized Women's Movements and the State," in Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada: A Structural Approach, eds. William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad (Mississauga, Ontario: Copp Clark Pitman, 1990), 194. See also Strong-Boag, "'Ever a Crusader'."
67Morrison, "Their Proper Sphere"; Schulz.
68Schulz, 139.
69Schulz, 148.
70Schulz, 145-46.
women pensions and that child care was only a short-term solution. Nevertheless, maternalist reformers did establish the first day care centres in Canada, which provided an important support for working women.

Day care centres developed similarly in Canada and the United States. Day care centres in both countries were established by philanthropic women as charitable institutions to care for the children of working parents. Attitudes to the day care centres were also analogous. The very reformers who offered the services dismissed the care as a poor substitute to mothers' care in the home. Support for day care thus dropped off when states and provinces enacted mothers' allowances. And finally, the day care movement in both countries went through similar professionalization as educational and social work experts took over the running of centres.

The Lack of Institutionalization of Maternalist Ideas

Maternalist ideas, such as support for motherhood and child welfare and development, however, were not institutionalized in Canada as they were in the United States, and certainly not as they were in France. Save for mothers' allowances in the inter-war period, Canada has not developed maternalist policies. Maternalist ideas were not as influential in Canada because first, actors promoting maternalism did not become part of decision-making channels. Burt argues, for example, that "Links between the early [women's] groups and public officials were weak, and often limited to yearly formal presentations to Cabinet." She states the groups themselves were small in number, lacked organizational skills and were weakly coordinated. Moscovitch and Drover note that the social and political movements in existence at the turn of the century were not powerful enough to pressure governments to enact social reforms, although they lobbied for improvements in education, especially for women, and for clean water, and sanitation. Nor were unions and employer associations as influential in pushing for maternalist

---


policies, as they were in France.\(^\text{74}\) Thus, social movements and interest groups were unable to capture the "ear" of government, as they were able in France and the United States.

Second, no bureaucracy was created within the Canadian government parallel to the United States Children's Bureau, despite many attempts to persuade the federal government to set up something similar in the early part of the twentieth century.\(^\text{75}\) In the discussions over the possible establishment of a Children's Bureau, both women's groups like the NCWC and the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire and even the Trades and Labour Council tried to persuade the government to take a more comprehensive approach to child welfare, but to no avail.

Private, volunteer organizations such as Children's Aid Societies provided most charity and poor relief, rather than governments, until the WWII period. Some provinces did provide some welfare support before then, but the federal government remained uninvolved in social programs, including child care. The development of national policies for women and children was constrained by institutions such as federalism. For example, unlike the "big bang" of welfare state programs that emerged in the 1930s in the United States,\(^\text{76}\) Banting notes that the inter-war period in Canada marked a time of decentralized welfare programs.\(^\text{77}\) The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the highest appellate body for Canada, was most favourable to the provinces in jurisdictional rulings. In the 1930s, most of the Canadian government's "New Deal" type employment and social program legislation was found unconstitutional.

Difficulties of divided jurisdiction combined with the federal government's belief that it

---

\(^{74}\) Indeed, the federal government was hostile to the trade union movement. During World War I, the government arrested leading trade unionists and banned several political organizations. Moscovitch and Drover, "Social Expenditures and the Welfare State," 23.

\(^{75}\) The federal government established the Canadian Council on Child Welfare in 1921 but it was not a proper federal child welfare agency. It worked on a voluntary basis. In 1919, the federal government established the Dominion Department of Health which was made responsible for child welfare, but its mandate in the area was very narrowly conceived. R. L. Schnell, "A Children's Bureau for Canada: The Origins of the Canadian Council on Child Welfare, 1913-1921," in The 'Benevolent' State, 95-110.


\(^{77}\) Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism, 60.
should not assume a role in social security. The only federal program that emerged in the pre-WWII period was a very limited and cost-shared old age pension scheme set up by Mackenzie King in 1927. Instead, the provinces usually initiated programs—for example, Ontario with Workers' Compensation legislation in 1914 (which marked the emergence of the first state social insurance program in Canada) and Manitoba with Mothers' Allowances in 1916. In contrast, the federal government in the United States implemented the Sheppard-Towner *Infancy and Maternity Protection Act* in 1921, *Aid to Dependent Children* in 1935, together with a number of New Deal policies to combat the Depression (see chapter five).

**The Exception: Mothers's Allowances**

One set of maternalist programs did emerge in Canada prior to World War II. Between 1916 and 1920, the western provinces and Ontario established pensions or allowances for sole-support mothers. These provincial governments had been motivated by the war to do something about single mothers and their children, some of whom were widowed in the war, and others who, because of poverty, were believed to need help with childrearing. Other reasons for the establishment of mothers' allowances included pressure on governments from women's groups to counter the destitution of fatherless families in particular and families who would not receive war pensions. Governments also saw them as a way to encourage the birth rate after the war, and to

---


79 This was a very meagre cost-shared program, paying monthly sums to people over seventy who passed a means test. Even so, the scheme was opposed by the Quebec government because "it questioned the moral and social importance of individual responsibility, it implied higher taxation, and it invaded the constitutional jurisdiction of the provinces." B. L. Vigod, "The Quebec Government and Social Legislation During the 1930s: A Study in Political Self-Destruction," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 14, 1 (1979), 59-69, reprinted in *Social Welfare Policy in Canada*, 156.


encourage women to leave the workforce and return to the home.\textsuperscript{82}

Manitoba was the first province to introduce Mothers' Allowances in 1916. It was followed by Saskatchewan in 1917. In 1920 the Ontario government passed a *Mothers' Allowance Act*. By 1940, all provinces save New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island had some benefit program for widowed mothers with dependent children.\textsuperscript{83} New Brunswick began paying a mothers' allowance in 1944, the same year the federal government introduced a national family allowance program, and Prince Edward Island followed in 1949.\textsuperscript{84} Eligibility for the mothers' allowance was determined by very strict means and residence tests, with widows with two or more children given highest priority. Women with husbands unable to work were considered as well, although unmarried and divorced mothers faced discrimination.

*The Impact on Child Care*

The implementation of mothers' allowances lessened the need for day care services. Stapleford reports that, as in the United States, mothers' allowances encouraged women to stay home rather than work, which was considered less desirable. As a result, some day care centres closed in Ontario, although by the Depression, two-parent families began to need day care services as well.\textsuperscript{85} Indeed, when governments first implemented mothers' allowances, the amount of the grant was significant enough to supplement women's wages, but the allowance was not geared to replace wages completely.\textsuperscript{86} Still, it provided a guaranteed source of income, and was paid to women themselves, for their own spending, rather than to their husbands or others. Funding for mothers' and later family allowances did not increase proportionately, as in France, where allowances are still a significant form of assistance. While mothers' allowances were established, as they were in the United States, on the basis of the idea that women were worthy of public support for the role they played as mothers, that idea did not remain part of

\begin{footnotes}
\item Textsuperscript{82}Moscovitch and Drover, 24.
\item \textsuperscript{83}Banting, *The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism*, 61.
\item \textsuperscript{84}Dennis Guest, *The Emergence of Social Security in Canada* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980), 63.
\item \textsuperscript{85}Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{86}Strong-Boag, "'Wages for Housework'," 27.
\end{footnotes}
post-war policy thinking. The level of benefits paid to women under mothers' allowances graduated eroded.

Child care instead became entrenched in the private sphere and at the provincial level primarily as a welfare service to support poor, working parents. Day care centres remained mainly private and charitable. They were institutionalized as a welfare service in the inter-war period as child care professionals took over responsibility for provision. Nursery schools, in contrast, developed as an educational service for all children as they appealed to the middle class. Because they were educational, not custodial in nature, nursery schools were not set up to conform to work schedules. Policy activism by governments on behalf of mothers and children did not exist to the same degree in Canada as it did in France and the United States. Day care reformers thus had to wait for World War II for large-scale government action on day care.

Policy Development: World War II-1950s

World War II Child Care Funding

During the Second World War, the federal government recognized the severe labour shortages experienced by wartime industry and sought to recruit single women, then married women, and finally married women with children into the labour force. The labour market participation of women with children obviously created the need for day care services. It also became clear that private day care centres could not meet the need. Under the Wartime Day Nurseries Act, the federal government agreed to cost-share funding for day nurseries on a 50/50 basis with provincial governments, as long as 75 per cent of the parents using the centres were employed in work related to the war effort. Only the provinces of Ontario and Quebec took the federal government up on its offer. As a result, day care services expanded greatly during the

---

87For details on the B.C. case see Margaret Hillyard Little, "Claiming a Unique Place: The Introduction of Mothers' Pensions in British Columbia," in Rethinking Canada, 285-303.
88Schulz, 148.
89Schulz, 149.
91Susan Prentice, "Workers, Mothers, Reds: Toronto's Postwar Daycare Fight" in
war. For example, by the end of World War II, Ontario had 28 day care centres for pre-schoolers and 42 centres for school-age children, compared to the 20 day care centres that existed in all of Canada by 1933.92

After the war, the federal government withdrew its support of the nurseries and the Quebec government closed down those that were operating in its province. Federal child care subsidies in Ontario ended in 1946, marking the end of the brief federal involvement in child care. Federal funding of child care services did not re-emerge until the introduction of the CAP in 1966.93

It appears, then, that in the federal government's eyes, child care was only an emergency service to recruit women to the labour force. Not everyone held this view. Schulz reports that some officials within the Department of Labour expected federal support to continue for school-age care after the war. The Toronto Institute for Child Study thought the government would shift funding from the Welfare to Education after the war, allowing pre-schools to emerge. Schulz notes that even the day care professionals, who were skeptical of the services prior to World War II, had a much more favourable view by the end of the war. But the people who supported day care services were not in positions of power to make those decisions.94 With the war over and with thousands of men returning home and in need of jobs, women were expendable as workers. The government still upheld a gendered vision of labour and a vision of child care as a private responsibility. The federal government also made clear that child care was a provincial responsibility in peace time.95

Despite the lack of federal involvement in child care provision, the provinces did

Feminism in Action: Studies in Political Economy, eds. Patricia Connelly and Pat Armstrong (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 1992), 175-200. Schulz (150) reports that the B.C. and Manitoba governments felt alternative forms of care would meet the needs of working parents, and the Saskatchewan and Maritime governments felt they were not industrialized enough to have a need for day care. The Alberta government originally agreed to establish centres but then revoked that decision as it received advice from an advisory council that such services were not needed.

92Schulz, 150.
94Schulz, 151-2.
95Schulz, 153.
establish programs after the war, largely for single-parent mothers, as well as relief programs, and some programs centred on child development. The Ontario government continued its financial support of child care in the late 1940s, after parents, day care operators, educators, social welfare authorities, and individual civil servants lobbied extensively to demand that the services remain. Municipalities in Ontario took over the federal share of funding responsibility and the province enacted day care standards with the *Day Nurseries Act*, 1946, the first of its kind in Canada. Still, the province would not pay its share of funding for services unless the municipalities provided matching funds. Some centres closed, therefore, due to lack of funds.

The national government's action on day care contrasts sharply with its involvement in building Canada's welfare state. The post-WWII period is marked by a period of federal government leadership, facilitated by a succession of electoral victories by the Liberals save for the period between 1957-1962, along with federal fiscal capacity as the federal government took over areas of provincial taxation and in turn provided federal transfers. These factors provided the mechanisms for the eventual establishment of the post-WWII welfare state.

The development of social programs post-WWII was aided by changing views regarding the role of the state in the area of social policy. Most western industrialized governments acknowledged after World War II that more had to be done to prevent economies from returning to pre-war Depression conditions. The Depression had forced societies to realize that some poverty was structural, not owing to some individual moral flaw.

In Canada, the acceptance of state intervention under the spirit of common purpose that developed during World War II coincided with a post-war economic boom. It also coincided with an agreement between the federal and provincial governments to allow the federal

---

96 Schulz, 153. Notable in their absence were trade unions and business groups, both of whom were involved in the post-war social service discussions in France.

Mobilization to keep the day care centres operating did occur in Quebec but there were not as many centres and they were not as well entrenched, Schulz reports.

97 Blake reports that in August 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed in the Atlantic Charter "to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all, improved labour standards, economic adjustment and social security." In 1942 at an international conference in Chile, over twenty countries agreed to make social security a priority in the postwar period. Raymond B. Blake, "Mackenzie King and the Genesis of Family Allowances in Canada, 1939-1944," in Social Welfare Policy in Canada, 246.
government to take a greater role in social programs. The Depression experience led many provinces to realize they could not afford to provide even meagre social programs like mothers' allowances. The provinces under the 1867 Constitution have a limited power to raise taxes to pay for the substantive policy areas over which they have control. The federal government, in turn, possesses the majority of taxation authority. In the post-war period, provincial revenues were still meagre compared to Ottawa's. Gradually, all provinces but Quebec agreed to vacate their direct tax fields. In return for its sole occupation, the federal government transferred funds to the provinces for social programs.

The federal government also set up its own national programs. The Liberal government under Liberal Prime Minister Mackenzie King successfully negotiated with the provinces to introduce a federal unemployment insurance (UI) fund in 1940. The federal Liberal government under Mackenzie King introduced the Family Allowances Act in 1944 under the authority of the federal spending power. Implemented in 1945, it was the first universal social program in Canada and marked a clear departure from past targetted social service provision.

Only one other universal program, Old Age Security, emerged until the 1960s.

Unlike in France, where labour unions and business organizations were involved in the

---

98 Banting argues, programs like: Mothers' Allowances represented an unwelcome glimpse of the future. The costs of providing support for this relatively small group graphically highlighted the potential costs of grappling seriously with the full range of income security needs emerging in Canada society. As a result, provincial governments were anxious to avoid welfare commitments, and continued to insist on municipal responsibility for relief efforts. Banting, The Welfare State, 61-2.

99 The federal government under section 91 (3) of the Constitution Act, 1867, has the power to raise revenue by any mode or system of taxation, whereas the provinces, under section 92(2) can only raise revenue via direct taxation such as income taxes and property taxes.

100 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council found the Conservative government's 1935 Employment and Social Insurance Act unconstitutional (Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of Ontario (Employment and Social Insurance Act Reference), [1937] A.C. 355). Because most provinces supported the federal program, however, they agreed to an amendment to the Constitution Act, 1867 to add unemployment insurance to the federal list of powers under section 91(1A).

changes that occurred after World War II, these actors were not pivotal in Canada. The impetus at the federal level came from a government anxious to construct broader social service programs, partly in response to the growing strength of and support for the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and the trade union movement in Canada.102

Family Allowances

The first institution in Canada to push for the introduction of a family allowance was the École Sociale Populaire in Montreal in the 1920s. Jesuit Father Léon Lebel, and other individuals and private organizations, argued that such a policy would provide benefits in a wage economy that failed to recognize family responsibilities and would help families with more children. This hints at the kind of familialist philosophy prevalent in France at the time. Both the 1942 Social Insurance and Allied Services Report (Beveridge Report) and the 1943 Report on Social Security for Canada (Marsh Report) recommended the payment of family allowances regardless of the employment status of the parents. The Canadian government adopted this policy.103 The family allowance program was to be a family income support plan.

The federal government faced resistance to the idea of family allowances from a number of fronts. Kitchen documents how opposition was wrapped up in anti-natalist arguments and concerns that family allowances would encourage the birthrate among francophones and others of non-British stock.104 Family allowances:

in the view of its enemies, is a shameless "baby-bonus", "an indiscriminate subsidy", "a diaper dole", "a pseudo-social measure...that denies the principles on which our magnificent child protection structure has been built", an "overriding charge on our resources", "a subsidy to the birth of defectives", "an indiscriminate distribution which will rarely meet real need and will be casual income to tens of thousands where it will matter little", an invitation to "national disunity", and "the most precipitate and indefensible piece of legislation which a civilized

---

102Moscovitch and Drover (p. 27) note that the CCF "won important federal bi-elections (1942), became the opposition party in Ontario (1943), and was the elected government of Saskatchewan (1944).


government has ever ventured to pass in wartime".105

Social workers were not supportive of the plan, but economic and financial advisors in government were.106 So why did the government implement it?

Although never publicly presented this way, Ursel argues that family allowances were introduced as part of a low wage policy to "subsidize the income of families who could not adequately provide for their basic needs with wages alone." This reason explains why the trade unions opposed its introduction during the 1920s. But by the 1930s, during the Depression, the All Canadian Congress of Labour and the Trades and Labour Congress became more sympathetic to the idea of a "social wage".107 By the 1940s, the Confederation of Catholic Workers of Canada supported the idea. But the Canadian Congress of Labour continued to oppose it and the CCF was leery of the particular legislation for fear of its effects on wages.108 Others argue family allowances were a way for the Mackenzie King government to save its wartime wage and price control program. Kitchen argues it was a way to persuade unions it was unnecessary to lift wage controls imposed during the war, and thus worked to keep wages down.109 Schulz argues it was designed to help soften the blow of women returning to their traditional roles after leaving the post-war labour market to men.110 Mahon also argues that family allowances became the way governments encouraged women "to return to the home to bear and care for children."111

Regardless of the reason, the Family Allowance Act marked a clear departure from past targetted social service provision. Notably, the reasons given by researchers for the policy did not include strong maternalist or familist arguments. While the introduction of family allowances seemed to introduce a maternalist policy at the national level, the decision to direct

110 Schulz, 153.
payments to all parents, rather than to working families, low-income families, or those with large numbers of children, meant the monies had to be spread more thinly.\(^{112}\) By the time the government ended the family allowances program in 1993, the funding was largely symbolic, reflecting the lack of a firm maternalist or familist basis to the policy.\(^ {113}\)

Other Programs

The federal government proposed in 1945 to cost-share medical and hospital insurance and to take over responsibility for old age pensions. At that time, though, it could not reach agreement with the provinces on revenue sharing.\(^ {114}\) It was not until the 1950s, then, that the federal government went ahead with some of its proposals and set up four categorical assistance programs for specific people in need. The government passed the *Old Age Assistance Act* in 1951 to complement the federal *Old Age Security Act* which established a universal pension scheme for those over age 70. The *Old Age Assistance* legislation updated the pension scheme introduced in 1927. It was a targeted program designed to assist low-income seniors aged 65 to 70.\(^ {115}\) The federal government also introduced the *Blind Persons' Act* in 1951 and the *Disabled Persons' Act* in 1954, which shared costs of allowances to blind and disabled people, and the *Unemployment Assistance Act* in 1956, designed to cover some of the people not eligible for assistance under these other programs.\(^ {116}\) Most of these programs were targetted, basing funding eligibility on the cause of need and thus continuing to demarcate between deserving and undeserving. The federal government also introduced health grants to the provinces in 1948, and

\(^{112}\) The first payments were between five and eight dollars per month, depending on the age of the child. Kitchen, "The Introduction," 237.

\(^{113}\) In 1980, at the height of welfare state spending, family allowances provided an average monthly benefit of $21.80 per child. Banting, *The Welfare State*, 7. In 1992, just before the program's cancellation, families received $34.88 per month per child. Melanie Hess, *Canadian Fact Book on Income Security Programs* (Ottawa/Montréal: Canadian Council on Social Development, 1992), 27. In France, in contrast, the family allowance program currently provides about $162 monthly to families with two children, about $371 monthly to families with three children, and about $208 monthly for each additional child (see chapter three).

\(^{114}\) Blake and Keshen, "Introduction," 4.

\(^{115}\) Moscovitch and Drover, 29.

aid to universities in 1952. As can be seen, the policies that did emerge depended on federal-provincial agreement.

Policy Development: 1960s

Federal support for child care did not emerge until the 1960s under the CAP. The early 1960s marked the beginning of the universalization of Canadian social assistance programs and a movement away from the deserving/undeserving basis of funding. The federal Liberal government under Lester Pearson established the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP) in 1965. It introduced the Guaranteed Income Supplement a year later. This supplement provided additional benefits to low-income seniors aged 65 and older on the basis of an income test. Again, federal-provincial agreement was necessary to establish these programs.

The federal government also began to pay greater attention to women's issues. To respond to a growing economy, the government realized it needed to increase the number of women in the labour force. A post-WWII reconstruction committee had recommended the establishment of a Women's Bureau within the Department of Labour. That Bureau was set up in 1954, 34 years after the U.S. government established its bureau, with the stated objective to address the problems faced by women workers. The Bureau liaised with a number of women's organizations who, after the war, felt they were being denied access to the workforce. Linda Geller-Schwartz, "An Array of Agencies: Feminism and State Institutions in Canada," in Comparative State Feminism, eds. Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage, 1995), 40-58. Since 1993, the Bureau has been located within the Ministry of

As stated above, the provinces had previously agreed to add section 94A to the Canadian constitution in 1951, which placed Old Age Security plan under federal jurisdiction. Still, they insisted on provincial paramountcy: that is, that "no [federal] law shall affect the operation of any law present or future of a provincial legislature in relation to any such matter." In 1964 again, the provinces agreed to add survivors and disability benefits "irrespective of age" to section 94A, only if the federal government promised to include specific provincial rights into the Canada Pension Plan Act (CPP). This allowed the Quebec government to opt out of the CPP and establish its own pension plan. Banting, The Welfare State, 50.


Since 1993, the Bureau has been located within the Ministry of
organizations and dealt with issues to do with working women.

While the Women's Bureau had an institutionally weak position within the Department of Labour and the federal bureaucracy generally, it was able to promote policies like pay equity and maternity leave. But regarding child care, the Women's Bureau was less effective. Burt writes:

Concern for day care had been on the agenda of the Women's Bureau in the Department of Labour since the 1950s, but it had not received priority treatment. The issue was significantly less visible than either maternity leave or equal pay throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The Bureau assumed an advisory role on the issue in the 1960s, but was not in the forefront of activity.

It was on the Bureau's recommendation that day care falls under the CAP. In 1965, the Bureau advised the National Employment Committee to place responsibility for day care under the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The government followed that advice and day care became part of welfare services under the CAP, established in 1966.

The Canada Assistance Plan and Child Care Funding

Three factors were important in the creation of the CAP. First, Canada was very much influenced by ideas from the United States. The American War on Poverty heralded a greater degree of government intervention on social issues, as well as a shift from scrutinizing the cause of poverty to concentrating on the fact of poverty. Second, the 1960s was a period of economic growth for Canada, making it fiscally possible to create a more comprehensive system of social programs. Third, and most importantly, this period marked the era of cooperative federalism that was crucial to establishing national social programs; these programs required provincial consent as the federal government was involving itself in matters under provincial jurisdiction. In addition, federal government leadership was needed to get the national programs in place. The degree of federal-provincial cooperation required to establish such a program, especially in the context of Quebec sensitivities to federal intrusion into provincial welfare

Human Resources.

121Burt, "Organized Women's Groups," 204.
122Human Resources Development Canada, Reforming the Canada Assistance Plan, 3.
jurisdiction, makes this program a remarkable accomplishment.\textsuperscript{123}

The CAP was intended to make social service delivery better and more efficient. The
categorical assistance programs that existed prior to CAP were not comprehensive programs; a
number of people fell through the cracks. Also, the provinces were solely responsible for many
areas of assistance including provincial mothers' allowances, medical care for people on social
assistance, and administrative costs of welfare programs.\textsuperscript{124} The provinces wanted the federal
government to assume a greater role in financing these programs.

The CAP introduced federal cost sharing of a number of welfare programs, including
child care expenditures. It rolled in the categorical programs that were already in existence and
extended funding to "all those in need or likely to be in need," thereby shifting the philosophical
basis for assistance from the cause of need to the fact of need. The government also introduced a
preventative aspect to the programs. It extended assistance not only to the poor but also to those
who would become poor without government assistance.

Under the CAP, the federal government agreed to cost-share any new programs created
by the provinces after 1965. It also agreed to cost-share the delivery of new services including
salaries, but not overhead. The provinces were still responsible for the set up and operation of
child care services, as well as for eligibility and spending levels. For the first time, the federal
government provided funding in all provinces to parents to subsidize the costs of child care.
Still, that funding remained based on a welfare approach. The CAP child care provisions were
not universal, but targeted to the poor and near-poor. While the federal government was taking
a new role in child care provision, the norms behind child care shifted only from private

\textsuperscript{123}For a discussion of the negotiations see Rand Dyck, "The Canada Assistance Plan:
The Ultimate in Co-operative Federalism," Canadian Public Administration 19, 4 (1979), 587-

As late as 1956 the Quebec Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems
(Tremblay Commission) found that Canada was moving too far away from classical federalism,
that is, a system where the two levels of government are both coordinate and independent. Not
only was increasing of the federal spending power encroaching on provincial autonomy, it was
also encroaching on francophone culture. The Commission stressed that Canada should return to
a strict observance of federalism to stop this encroachment. Peter Russell, Constitutional
Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1993), 70.

\textsuperscript{124}Dyck, "The Canada Assistance Plan," 327.
provision to welfare-based.

The federal government encountered little resistance to its establishment of federal child care funding. The form child care policies and programs took was largely determined by federal government officials, in consultation with the provinces. Dyck argues that the federal government was not operating under the guise of some "grand design" but merely under the realization of the need for programs. Child care policy development thereafter depended very much on the institutional and ideational factors that became embedded in the program. As child care was part of welfare services, the programs remained largely welfare-driven.

Mahon argues that in this period the Canadian federal government can be characterized as exhibiting "state feminism". In such a role, according to Gelb, "the state acts to incorporate a definition of women's concerns into policy without significant pressure or input from women's groups." The new child care program thus reflected a lack of input into the real needs of working families and children. Except for the influence of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in the early 1970s, it was only with the mobilization of advocacy groups in the late 1970s and 1980s that child care became subject to pressure pluralism and societal actors lobbied government for broader programs. Even the 1971 and 1982 national child care conferences were sponsored by the federal Department of Health and Welfare, along with the Canadian Council on Social Development. The 1971 national child care conference led the federal government to

---

125 Dyck, "The Canada Assistance Plan."
126 Mahon, "Child Care in Canada and Sweden," 21. Gelb applies the term to Sweden, but Mahon argues Sweden exhibits a more corporatist form of feminism where women's groups work within the representational system that links organizations in society to the state. In Sweden, women's committees choose to work within the party and therefore are a lot more influential when that party is in government. In Canada, a lack of "insider" links (and thus feminism without women) better characterizes women's groups like the National Action Committee on the Status of Women.

The meaning of the term state feminism has shifted from Gelb's use in Feminism and Politics: A Comparative Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). The term now implies more the presence of women and women's bureaus within government who promote feminist interests, or, as Stetson and Mazur argue, "activities of government structures that are formally charged with furthering women's status and rights." See Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy G. Mazur, "Introduction," in Comparative State Feminism, 1-2. I am using the term as Mahon and Gelb do, to point out that child care policies emerged within distinctly unfeminist bureaucracies.
establish a federal day care bureaucracy. It set up the Day Care Information Office within the Department of Health and Welfare to document the status of day care services across the country. It existed until 1996.

This history is comparable to the development of maternity leave legislation. Again, maternity leave benefits emerged due to the impetus of the federal Women's Bureau, not women's groups. Unlike governments in many of the large Western European countries who established maternity benefits in the first half of this century, Canada had no federal maternity leave program until 1971. The federal UI program begun in 1940 allowed pregnant women for a time to collect unemployment benefits. By 1950, though, married women were declared ineligible for unemployment insurance. Burt argues that until the 1960s, women's groups were not demanding maternity leave as the issue affected so few women. By 1951, the labour force participation rate of married women in Canada was only about 15 per cent, compared to the overall average of 24 per cent. Married women's labour force participation rates had increased to only 22 per cent by 1961 (see table 4.1). Only in the 1960s did organizations like the BPW begin to lobby for maternity leave. The organization and its lobby were unfortunately weak.

By 1971, the federal government agreed to introduce maternity benefits under the UI program. At the time, provinces were either unwilling or unable to establish maternity benefits. Burt documents that in 1965, when the federal Women's Bureau took up the issue of maternity leave compensation, other federal departments and other provinces were either uninterested or openly hostile to the issue. The federal government thus decided to include maternity benefits under the existing federal UI program because it was a way for it to introduce a program that really fell under provincial jurisdiction. Including maternity benefits under the UI program also made sense because UI had paid maternity benefits when the federal government first established

---

130 Burt, 202.
131 Burt (202) reports that at a 1965 conference organized to deal with the issue of women with family responsibilities, three provinces—British Columbia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland—did not send representatives.
the program.

Policy Development: 1970s-1980s

Day care became an important and visible issue after the release of the 1970 report by the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. One of the Report recommendations was for the federal government to provide assistance with capital costs of building day cares. The Trudeau government responded by amending CAP regulations to agree to share the full operating costs associated with day care delivery, not just salaries and other expenses like travel. As a result, provinces had federal monies available on two fronts: for welfare and service delivery. It became advantageous for the provinces to expand child care services and get involved in service delivery as no ceiling existed on the amount of federal government cost-sharing. For every dollar the provinces spent, the federal government contributed an equivalent amount. This system guaranteed the provinces long-term and automatic funding and required no negotiations. This funding arrangement is the primary factor in the expansion of child care in the provinces. The open-ended funding system continued until 1990 when the federal government imposed a cap on CAP.

In 1972 the federal government introduced the Child Care Expense Deduction, also recommended by the Royal Commission. The Commission suggested that the tax system should allow for the consideration of child care expenses, regardless of whether the mother provided the care, or someone else. The government responded by amending the Income Tax Act to allow parents earning income to claim a deduction on their income tax for child care costs.

In the 1970s and 1980s, interest groups began to make child care a priority, arguing that child care should be a national concern. Groups like the National Action Committee on the

---


133Operating costs include expenses like depreciation, but do not cover the capital costs of starting up child care facilities. Canada, Special Committee on Child Care, Sharing the Responsibility: Report of the Special Committee on Child Care (Martin Report) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, March 1987), 38. Some provinces have established grants for these kinds of expenses.

Status of Women (NAC) saw an advantage to lobbying the federal government in order to achieve their goal of having universally accessible non-profit centres available throughout the country. As well, some lobby groups existed at the provincial level to pressure provincial legislators to expand provincial services.

The policy sphere did open up to outside interests. One of the more common avenues of influence was through the many commissions and task forces set up to deal with women's concerns. Four are relevant to the issue of child care. The Cooke Task Force on Child Care, reporting in March 1986, and the Special Committee on Child Care reporting in March 1987, examined the issue specifically in the 1980s. The Abella Commission reported in October 1984 on a variety of issues to do with equality in employment, including child care. And of course the Royal Commission on the Status of Women was the earliest influence, persuading the federal government to make some changes in child care policy.

Though commissions have been set up in other countries, they are not as pivotal as those in Canada. Women's groups use the public hearings process as a means of putting forth their ideas and goals. The royal commission and task force reports have also been important in introducing new ideas and putting forward new ways of thinking about child care. How successful they have been depends on the interaction of these ideas with already-embedded norms, as well as the success of women's groups in becoming a permanent part of the policy network.

The Royal Commission of the Status of Women in Canada

The Liberal government under Prime Minister Lester Pearson established the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada in 1967. It reported in 1970. The government struck the committee at a time of massive change in the roles of women and debate over those

---

135 Canada, Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, Equality in Employment, op. cit. n. 54.
changes, and during a time of increasing influence of women's liberation movements in Canada and the United States. The Commission's mandate was to "ensure for women equal opportunities with men in all aspects of Canadian society"; its ideal was equality of women with men. The Commission adopted four principles that reveal its normative thrust: one, "women should be free to choose whether or not to take employment outside their homes" - the focus of the Commission was the barriers that impeded that choice; two, "the care of children is a responsibility to be shared by the mother, the father and society"; three, "society has a responsibility for women because of pregnancy and child-birth, and special treatment related to maternity will always be necessary"; and fourth, "in certain areas women will for an interim period require special treatment to overcome the adverse effects of discriminatory practices."

The Royal Commission was sympathetic to the labour market needs of women. Moreover, it endorsed the idea of public support of day care services, and agreed with arguments for its benefits for children. It declared that a day-care centre program should be conceived more broadly than along welfare lines, as set up under CAP, and rather should "be designed for all families who need it and wish to use it." It defined day care services broadly, including care at home as well as centres and nursery schools. Its recommendations included fixing centre fees on a sliding scale based on the means of parents; urging the provinces to pay not less than 80 per cent of the provincial-municipal contribution to day care centres; and pressing the federal government to adopt a national day care act which would legislate federal cost-sharing of day


139Royal Commission on the Status of Women, xii.

140The Report noted one of the submitted briefs argued: "We must realize that it is not necessarily true at all that all children are better off at home with their mothers; in fact, it has often seemed to me that many children would be happier and healthier (mentally) if they could be in the company of other children their own day for some part of the day" (262).

The Report also noted, "...psychologists do not necessarily insist that the adult in charge [of a child] be the natural mother. A mother substitute can fill the role. Perhaps more significant is the further conclusion that additional sympathetic care from several adults may be more beneficial to the child than exclusive attachment to one" (261).
Care operating costs.  

Not all members of the Commission endorsed the thrust of the report. Some disagreed with the recommendation that the federal government should subsidize the costs of day care centres. Jacques Henripin, one of the Commissioners, for example, argued:

it would be rash to assume that the majority of Canadian taxpayers would be willing to subsidize families sending children under four or five years of age to a day-care centre rather than caring for them themselves. The government has a clear duty to see that such services exist. But I do not think that, at present, the government should use public funds to subsidize families which prefer to send their children to day-care centres, rather than looking after them themselves or hiring a homemaker. People should be free to make their own decisions, yet I do not think, at present, one alternative rather than another should be singled out for subsidy.

He went on to state that cash allowances would give parents true choices.

The Royal Commission report pushed for child care to be conceived as an equality issue for women, as an issue of child development, and as a labour market issue. The government, in response, began to move child care policy somewhat in the direction of support for women's labour market participation. As detailed above, the federal government introduced the Child Care Expense Deduction (CCED) in 1972. The government also acknowledged a greater responsibility for child care provision by supporting the operating costs of centres. It is important to remember, however, that CAP funding only covered services provided on a welfare basis, not all child care centre costs.

*The Royal Commission on Equality in Employment*

The Abella Commission further promoted child care as a labour market issue. In 1970 the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada had commissioned a study on the costs to the economy of women's withdrawal from the labour force. The study had pointed to

---

141Royal Commission on the Status of Women, 270.
142Recommendations 115, 116, 118 of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women.
143Royal Commission on the Status of Women, 424.
the waste of talent involved and argued that "on the economic level proper, the increase in the female employment rate is already accepted quite naturally as a legitimate source of growth." The Abella Commission picked up on these themes in its October 1984 report. It received so many submissions on the issue of child care that it addressed it in a separate chapter.

The Abella Report argued that women's employment was now a fact of life and child care a necessity. It suggested that a positive relationship existed between the availability of child care and women's labour market participation. The lack of accessible, affordable child care prevented many women from working, required other women to reduce their employment and take part-time work, and forced women to use inadequate care. Child care was thus explicitly linked to the issue of women's equality. The Commission noted, "Childcare is the ramp that provides equal access to the workforce for mothers."

Moreover, the Abella Commission suggested that child care should ultimately be considered a public service to be provided universally, much like the public education system. As interim measures, the Commission recommended removing CAP as the funding mechanism for child care because CAP funding perpetuated the idea of child care as a welfare service. It also suggested that the reason the child care system was so bad in Canada, then serving less than 15 per cent of pre-school children of working mothers, was because of the absence of a national policy. It therefore reiterated the recommendation of Royal Commission on the Status of Women that the federal government should establish a national child care act with appropriate funding mechanisms, akin to those found in the Wartime Day Nurseries Act which split capital and operating costs. Again, this Commission was important for the new ideas it articulated regarding child care.

The Cooke Task Force on Child Care

In the same year that the Abella Commission reported, the Liberal government appointed


146Canada, Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, Equality in Employment, 178.
the Task Force on Child Care, with Dr. Katie Cooke as chair. Why the Liberal government created the Task Force on the eve of the 1984 election and with an expected change in its own leadership is not clear. Friendly's explanation is that a national conference on child care in 1982 had called for the "immediate appointment of a Parliamentary Standing Committee in order to make recommendations to a National Day Care Act." Jamie Kass, a child care organizer for the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW), also believed the national conference on child care and the Canadian Day Care Advocacy Association (CDCAA) that formed out of it put pressure on the government to respond to this issue. The advocacy association quickly began its lobby, submitting briefs to the Abella Commission to push for the establishment of a task force or commission on child care. (Until that point, most organization occurred at the grassroots level, mostly in large urban centres. Organization at the national level thus began in the 1980s.)

The government also faced pressures on other fronts, including internal ones. In the post-1982 period the Trudeau government was intent on fence-mending after the acrimony over the inclusion, then removal, of section 28, the gender equality provisions of the new Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Liberals were keen to repair their image with women, especially with an election expected. It is possible that the Task Force was seen as one way of showing concern for women's issues. The Status of Women Minister, Judy Erola, was at the Winnipeg day care conference in 1982 and the Task Force was set up to report to the Ministry.

This period during the early 1980s also inaugurates women's greater influence within the bureaucracy. Authority for policy making in the area of women, families, and children is generally dispersed among a number of different departments and agencies in government. This dispersal of authority means women in one department often cannot scrutinize or oversee what is

---

147 The Task Force was announced in May 1984. John Turner became leader of the Liberal party on 16 June 1984. The federal election was held in September 1984.

148 Canada, Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, 191.

going on in another department and it is difficult to develop coordinated policy.\textsuperscript{150} The Women's Bureau of the federal Department of Labour was first created in 1954, but was largely ineffective.\textsuperscript{151} In the early 1970s, state involvement on women's issues grew. In 1970, the government appointed Freda Paltiel as the Coordinator on the Status of Women in the Privy Council Office to work on implementation of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. In 1976 the Status of Women office was given departmental status. In 1971 the government appointed Robert Andras as Minister Responsible for the Status of Women and in 1972 established a Secretary of State, Women's Program, as part of the Citizenship Participation Program.\textsuperscript{152} The grants program of the Secretary of State, Women's Program supports a number of programs like research institutes, university chairs, some projects, and operating grants.\textsuperscript{153} In 1973, the government established a permanent Advisory Council on the Status of Women.\textsuperscript{154} During the final term of the Trudeau government, Secretary of State funding for women increased enormously, particularly in 1981-82, after the Liberals were re-elected, and in 1983-1984.\textsuperscript{155} It is possible this department was pushing a women's agenda within the bureaucracy.

The child care issue gained national attention with the announcement of the 1984 Task Force. During the 1984 election the Conservatives, Liberals, and New Democratic Party (NDP) all made a pledge to act on child care. The newly elected Conservative government under Prime

\textsuperscript{150}Jane Jenson and Mariette Sineau, "Family Policy and Women's Citizenship in Mitterrand's France," \textit{Social Politics} 2, 3 (Fall 1995), 244-269.

\textsuperscript{151}Burt, "Organized Women's Movements and the State"; Bégin, "The Royal Commission on the Status of Women."

\textsuperscript{152}Bégin, 34. She observes that not only did women want male ministers to be involved in women's issues, no women were in the Liberal caucus at the time. Some resisted the idea of a distinct department for women's affairs, for fear of ghettoization.


\textsuperscript{154}Sue Findlay, "Feminist Struggles with the Canadian State," \textit{Resources for Feminist Research} 17, 3 (September 1988), 5-9.

\textsuperscript{155}Spending went from approximately $1.3 million to $2.8 million from 1980 to 1982, and from $3 million to $4.2 million from 1982 to 1984. Its initial budget was $223,000 in 1973-74 and remained under $1 million most years until 1980. The budget more than doubled in 1984-85 to $9.3 million, and then remained at $12.5 million for most of the Mulroney government's first term in office. Pal, \textit{Interests of State}, 221.
Minister Brian Mulroney could not simply dismantle or ignore the Cooke Task Force. Instead, the House of Commons established the Special Parliamentary Committee on Child Care in November 1985, chaired by Conservative MP Shirley Martin. This Committee did not report until March 1987, a year after the Cooke Task Force released its report. By then, the Conservatives had an alternative report to play against that of the Liberal-appointed Task Force, which provided an effective counter to the ideas put forward in the Task Force report.

The Cooke Task Force's recommendations came most closely to the ideals of the advocacy associations which had begun to form around the child care issue. They went much further than any previous report in specifying how the federal government should expand child care delivery. The Report called for a fully-funded child care program as a long-term goal, but suggested the government begin by providing conditional operating and start-up grants to the provinces and territories in order to help stabilize existing services. That is, it recommended that the federal government contribute to the capital costs of child care.

Over the medium term the Task Force recommended that the federal government enter into negotiations with the provinces to extend cost-sharing arrangements so that parents would only have to pay 50 per cent of the cost of care. It recommended, in addition, that the federal government share a greater percentage of the costs in less wealthy provinces, and extend its cost-sharing to include the start-up costs associated with the opening and expansion of facilities. The Report opposed new financing through tax benefits for child care but did not recommend the cancellation of the CCED in the short term.

The Task Force also considered parental leave policies. It recommended an expansion of the amount and duration of maternity benefits from 17 weeks (15 paid) to 20 weeks paid and at 75 per cent of insurable earnings rather than 60 per cent. It also recommended that benefits be

---

156 Anne Maxwell, Towards a National Child Care Policy...? 1966-1992 (Ottawa: Canadian Child Day Care Federation, 1992), 9. The advocates' stance will be detailed later.

157 Recommendation 19 of the Cooke Task Force report suggested that the government appoint a task force in 1996 to consider how to extend funding to cover the full cost of child care. Status of Women Canada, Task Force on Child Care, Report, 4.

158 Recommendation 3. The Task Force proposed $4 per day for every infant, disabled, or special needs space, $2 per day for every full-day pre-school space and $1 per day for every after school and half day pre-school space.
extended to include part-time and self-employed workers and that birth and adoption benefits be available to and shareable by both parents. It suggested the government provide a period of parental leave of up to one year.160

The Task Force estimated the cost to the federal government of implementing the recommended system over the medium term—that is, short of full funding of programs with the government paying 50 per cent of costs and parents the other 50 per cent—would be $1.6 billion by 1991 and $2.6 billion by 1996.161 The cost of a fully funded system was estimated to be $11.3 billion, of which the federal government would contribute $6.2 billion. By comparison, national government expenditures in France on public child care, tax benefits and parental leave totalled about 32.9 billion francs in 1993 or only about $7.5 billion Canadian.162

The Task Force argued that some of these costs would be outweighed by the benefits for children, parents, and society as a whole. The economic benefits would be job creation in the child care sector, benefits for employers, and other economic spin-offs. Hum argues, though, that "neither the economic climate nor government finances would allow the Cooke Report to be taken seriously."163 The proposed expenditures of $11.3 billion were seen as astronomical by some. Some even argued that those estimates were extremely low.164 It should be remembered that this report came out at a time when concerns about the deficit were already being voiced,
and when the Mulroney government had initiated a wholesale review of federal programs.\textsuperscript{165}

\textit{The Special Committee on Child Care}

The ideas underlying the report of the Special Committee on Child Care differ from those of the Cooke Report and previous Commissions. Three commissions and task forces—the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, and the Task Force on Child Care—had recommended the expansion of public day care beyond its welfare focus, the last stating the case most forcefully. The advocacy groups who were involved in these reports also submitted briefs to the Special Committee on Child Care, in which they called for the implementation of child care based on norms of women’s equality, child development, and labour market issues. But by the mid-1980s, new ideas and new groups were organizing to counter these ideas and arguments. This polarization of debate is reflected most clearly in the process leading up to the Special Committee’s report.

If one compares the list of briefs and submissions to the Cooke Task Force and the Special Committee on Child Care, one sees that many of the groups making submissions to the Task Force were day care advocates, unions, and women’s groups. Submissions and witnesses to the Special Committee were from a much broader range of groups. They included right to life groups and abortion activists, bible colleges, groups like Mothers at Home, Christian Family Life, and REAL Women of Canada (Realistic, Equal, Active, for Life). These groups were joined by advocacy groups like Feminist Grandmothers of Canada, and private day care operators, along with public operators and family day care centres. Clearly the terrain of debate over child care had widened.

\textsuperscript{165}Canada, Task Force on Program Review, \textit{Introduction to the Process of Program Review} (Nielsen Task Force) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, March 1986). The Nielsen Task Force on Program Review was initiated on 18 September 1984, the day after the Mulroney government was sworn in. Its mandate was to review 989 programs to see if they could be overhauled to make them simpler, more accessible and decentralized in terms of decision-making. The private sector—both business organizations and unions—were involved and it was touted as part of the government’s plan for economic renewal. It reported in the same month as the Cooke Task Force and though it dealt lightly with welfare programs under the CAP, I would argue it set the tone for the Mulroney government’s attempt to cap spending and to privatize service delivery.
The Special Committee on Child Care was clearly swayed by the arguments of more conservative groups and organizations. In the opening paragraphs of its report (dubbed the Martin Report), the Committee stated that child care issues should be focused on the child in the context of the family, and that all children and all choices parents make in caring for children should be considered. The report stated that parents were primarily responsible for child care but that "society as a whole, including governments, shares a portion of that responsibility." The Committee referred to non-parental care as "substitute" or "supplementary" care, not as primary care.

The Special Parliamentary Committee not only looked at forms of non-parental care. It also considered what could be done for families where only one parent worked and where one parent stayed at home to raise children, for parents who paid privately for child care, for families in which both parents worked, and for single-parents who were employed. The Committee defined "cost" not only to include the cost of care outside the home, but also the cost to a family of one parent leaving employment to care for children at home.

It recommended that the federal government "share the cost of child care, regardless of the arrangements a family chooses to care for its children." It called for the federal government to "encourage the development of a spectrum of flexible child care options." It endorsed commercial and voluntary as well as public efforts in creating child care spaces, and argued that parents should have the "right to choose the kind of care they judge best for their children." The federal government should ensure that "provinces and territories have the freedom to use cost-sharing funds in the way they see fit." It recommended that the CCED be modified so that parents could still claim a tax credit, even if they used informal care, or if one parent stayed home to provide care.

The Report advocated moving public dollars away from encouraging the development of day care centres, while retaining the welfare functions of child care and giving priority to tax measures to help those with more traditional family structures and which could be used on both formal and informal care. It also recommended that the federal government assist the

---

166Special Committee on Child Care, Sharing the Responsibility, 40.
167Special Committee on Child Care, recommendation 4.
168Special Committee on Child Care, recommendation 3.
provinces and territories with the cost of operating and capital grants, which many provinces already provided. It recommended some federal funding for research and special initiatives, and for family support services like information and referral services and a registry of licensed caregivers.

The Committee members from the Liberal party and the NDP, Lucie Pépin and Margaret Mitchell, filed dissenting reports in response to the recommendations of the Martin Report. The Mulroney government, in contrast, endorsed the recommendations of the Martin Report in its subsequent child care legislation. The Mulroney government did not go as far in promoting more informal care as the Committee recommended, preoccupied as it was with cost-capping. But it did move toward allowing commercial care, increased tax benefits, parental leave, and a research and initiatives fund, as the Committee endorsed. The Martin Report had also delivered the government a much more fiscally-palatable list of changes. The Committee argued that its estimated cost of recommendations would reach $906 million by 1989, much less than the $11.3 billion estimated long-term cost of the Task Force recommendations, or even the medium-term costs of $1.6 and $2.6 billion.169

The National Child Care Strategy (Bill C-144)

In December 1987, the government revealed its National Strategy on Child Care. The biggest component of the strategy was a promise to commit $3 billion over 7 years, or $429 million per year, to developing child care where needed, and to change the federal-provincial cost-sharing arrangements by removing child care from the CAP. This meant an overall limit on federal expenditure on child care, and looser requirements under CAP to fund only not-for-profit operating costs.170 It also agreed to share expenditures up to 90 per cent in provinces with poor child care systems in order to encourage these provinces to invest quickly and heavily in child care and catch up to the rest of the provinces. Although the government committed itself to expansion of child care under Bill C-144, the terms of agreement for funding did not change.

---

169 Special Committee on Child Care, 133.
170 Tricia Willis and Lynne Kaye, Brief to the Legislative Committee on Bill C-144: The Canada Child Care Act (Toronto: National Action Committee on the Status of Women, September 1988); National Anti-Poverty Organization, Written Submission to the Legislative
These terms were to accord "special priority to meeting the needs of children from low and modest income families."\textsuperscript{171}

Two other components to the strategy existed. The first was the promise of more generous tax deductions for child care expenses for parents with young children, and refundable child tax credits for parents who care for their children at home. The estimated cost was $2.3 billion over 7 years, or $329 million per year. Second, the government announced a new Child Care Initiatives Fund of $100 million over seven years, approximately $14 million per year, for research and child care development. The total proposed expenditure increase for all programs was $772 million per year. The government's proposed expenditures were less than the Special Committee recommended, and the biggest chunk of new spending would be on tax benefits, not spaces.\textsuperscript{172}

The reaction to the proposals was swift. Many child care advocacy and other groups opposed the National Child Care Strategy.\textsuperscript{173} They found fault in three areas: one, they objected to the ceiling that would be opposed on cost-sharing; two, they disliked the idea of funding for commercial spaces; three, they complained that the act imposed no national standards. Since the advocates' ideal was universally-accessible, publicly funded, comprehensive, not-for-profit, and high quality day care, they saw the changes as a huge step backward.

\textsuperscript{171}Section 4(1b) \textit{Canada Child Care Act} (Bill C-144), Second Session, Thirty-Third Parliament, 35-36-37 Elizabeth II, 1986-87-88.

\textsuperscript{172}The National Council of Welfare argued in its 1988 report that had the government put all of its resources into child care services rather than tax breaks, and financed the system through a combination of government expenditures and parental fees, the government could have created 750,000 new child care spaces over seven years, rather than the 200,000 spaces to which it had committed. The amount of federal expenditures needed was approximately $4.4 billion. See National Council of Welfare, \textit{Child Care: A Better Alternative}, 31, 37-39.

\textsuperscript{173}Some of the groups that mobilized against Bill C-144 included the CDCAA, unions like the CLC, the Public Service Alliance of Canada, CUPE, the National Union of Provincial Government Employees/ Canadian Teachers' Federation, The Federation of Nurses, women's groups like NAC, the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, and poverty groups like the National Anti-Poverty Organization and the National Council of Welfare, and others like the Canadian Jewish Congress and Canadian Federation of Students. Susan Phillips, "Rock-A-Bye, Brian: The National Strategy on Child Care," \textit{How Ottawa Spends 1989-90: The Buck
First, the groups felt that tax benefits were not a good way to develop a system of child care services, their main concern. Tax measures would not address the issue of lack of spaces for children. Furthermore, "tax measures create no opportunity for [a] public authority to shape the quality, availability, or affordability of child care services." Neither do they "offer a vehicle through which government might address the issue of child care providers' wages and working conditions."

Likewise, the cap on federal funding, they argued, would hurt provinces with programs that were already well-developed. It would impair provinces that had plans to expand, as Ontario and Quebec did at the time. Critics pointed out that under then-existing fiscal arrangements, child care spaces would likely continue to expand at the rate of between 10 to 16 per cent anyway, meaning an increase in federal government spending of $1.8 billion over seven years. If growth continued as it had between 1985 and 1988, expenditures would be even higher, at $3.9 billion. But if changes were made along the lines the Mulroney government proposed, a portion of the funds which would otherwise go to create new spaces, would instead be directed to already-existing commercial day care services not then eligible for subsidization. The view of the child care advocates at that time was that no child care system was better than this kind of flawed child care system.

Other, more conservative groups like REAL women, opposed the legislation in principle, rejecting non-parental care of children and participation of women in the labour market. REAL women instead argue that governments should be providing more support to those who chose to stay at home with their children.

The federal government eventually implemented only part of its strategy: the cost-sharing component strategy and the block grant formula. The government introduced Bill C-144,

---


the *Canada Child Care Act*, in the House of Commons in July 1988. By then, the provinces had persuaded the federal government that the promised $3 billion was inadequate, so the federal government increased its financial commitment to $4 billion, with the hope of creating 200,000 new spaces. The federal government gave the provinces the option of either retaining the existing funding under CAP, or moving to block funding. Once provinces moved to block funding, however, they could not go back.

The Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology was in the process of reviewing the legislation when Parliament was dissolved for the November 1988 election. Although Prime Minister Mulroney declared during the election that the *Child Care Act* would be re-introduced if he was re-elected, the issue was overshadowed by the debate over free trade. In 1992, in its second term in office, the Mulroney government announced it would not go ahead with its cost-sharing plans. It also announced the end of universal family allowances, substituting instead the CTB. It increased the CCED (from a maximum of $2,000 to $4,000 for children under seven years old) and refundable child tax credit (with an increase of $200 for children under seven) for the 1988 tax year. It also established paid parental leave benefits of 10 weeks.

The government proceeded with the Child Care Initiatives Fund (CCIF) in April 1988. The idea behind the CCIF was that it would complement new investment in child care by directing innovation and experimentation in new services. The CCIF became somewhat of an "orphan" fund. Don Ogston, director general of the Social Development Directorate overseeing CCIF stated that "it was trying to influence a system without the system's having any capacity to be influenced." The Conservative government implemented its planned cost-cutting by other means. In 1990 it placed a ceiling of five per cent growth in contributions under the CAP to "have" provinces; that is, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia. The cap meant those three provinces no longer received 50 per cent federal funding for monies spent above the five per cent ceiling.

---

177 Teghtsoonian, "Who Pays for Caring for Children?"
179 As quoted in Sylvia Fanjoy, "The Sunsetting of the Child Care Initiatives Fund."
If those provinces chose to expand child care and other social services, they would have to shoulder the entire cost above the five per cent cap.

Child care remained a welfare-based program at the end of this period, with the added backlash against the expansion of public funding for child care, especially for middle-income earners. After a debate of more than 15 years in which child care was promoted as a public policy, the pendulum was swinging back to child care as a private responsibility or welfare service.

Policy Development: The Chretien/Axworthy Period

The federal Conservatives were defeated in the federal election of October 1993. The Liberal party came to power promising jobs and a more active labour market policy. The Liberals also pledged as part of their election platform in 1993 to spend $720 million on child care over three years and to create up to 50,000 new regulated spaces per year for three years, provided the provinces agreed. The amount of increased spending pledged was $120 million for the first year, $240 million for the second and $360 million for the third, much less than the Mulroney proposals. Although growth did not reach the required three per cent in 1994-95, the government set aside funds of $360 million in the 1994 budget for 1995-96 and 1996-97, as it was predicted that growth would be over three per cent by then.  

Focus 6 (March 1995), 31-25.

180 Katherine Teghtsoonian cites Perrin Beatty, then Minister of Health and Welfare under the Mulroney government, as stating in 1990 that Canadians do not "want to pay for the yuppie couple." See "Promises, Promises: 'Choices for Women' in Canadian and American Child Care Policy Debates" Feminist Studies 22, 1 (Spring 1996), 125.

181 The Liberal government's pledge to create 50,000 spaces per year came with two caveats: first, the spaces would only be created in a year following a year of three per cent growth; second, the expansion would only occur with the agreement of the provinces. The increase in federal funding for child care was to occur on a 40/40 cost-shared basis with the provinces, with the rest coming from parents' fees, determined by a sliding fee scale. Liberal Party of Canada, Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada (Red Book) (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada, 1993), 38-40.

182 Canada, Department of Finance, The Budget, 1994 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1994), 17; Human Resources Development Canada, Agenda: Jobs and Growth, Improving Social Security in Canada (Green Book) (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1994), 53. This allocation was not announced with any fanfare either in the budget speech or in the text itself.
The Liberal government also attempted to move beyond the existing norm of child care as part of a welfare/targetted labour market policy. It began to conceptualize child care as part of a broader labour market policy. In its 1993 election manifesto, the Red Book, the Liberal party stated that "the availability of quality child care is an economic issue" and that "good quality child care at an affordable cost makes the difference between a family living at the edge of poverty and a family living with a moderate standard of living." It stated that fees for child care should be based on parents' ability to pay. It thus proposed that the federal and provincial governments each pay 40 per cent of the costs of care. Parents would pay 20 per cent on a sliding scale based on income. This form of funding would be different from targeting child care funding to only those most in need. The party also indicated its commitment to regulated care, stating its objective was "to create genuine choices for parents by encouraging the development of regulated child care alternatives."183

The Liberal government also promised to promote active labour market programs. It changed the name, as well as the rhetoric surrounding federal unemployment programs by substituting "employment" for "unemployment" assistance. The shift institutionally from Welfare to Work began in fact under the Conservative Kim Campbell government when the Ministry of National Health and Welfare was divided up, and Welfare was rolled into the Employment Ministry. Child care was also increasingly talked of as part of a work program. The Ontario NDP at that time was also developing some programs to respond to these needs, like the Jobs Ontario child care subsidy, and the Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP) child care bursary.

In February 1994 the federal Liberal government began an intensive review of social security programs. The goal was to modernize and restructure the social security system. Human Resources Minister Lloyd Axworthy focused the investigation on unemployment insurance, training, post-secondary education, social assistance, child benefits and day care. A Standing Committee on Human Resources Development was set up to conduct a two-phase study. The first part of the study was a brief consultative process which culminated in an interim report in March 1994. The second was a more intensive process that involved public hearings

held across Canada and other forms of public consultations such as town hall meetings. The Standing Committee submitted its report to the Commons in February 1995.

As part of the consultative process the government released a general discussion paper entitled *Improving Social Security in Canada* (the Green Book), along with a number of supplementary papers including one on child care. The Green Book explicitly stated the federal government's vision of child care as part of an overall labour market policy. The discussion paper argued that the three components of labour market policy were work, learning, and security. It placed discussion of child care under the heading of "meeting the needs of working parents." It argued that child care bridged the categories of work and security, providing "working parents with the assurance of quality care for their children" and providing "children with a good environment in which to grow and learn" (and by implication, become employed adults). It also identified child care as instrumental to learning, such as through helping to train people who otherwise would not be able to, and stated that child care was an important support for children at risk. Labour market policies, therefore, were linked to child care in two ways--in terms of the specific programs and more broadly in terms of the logic underlying the programs.

The January 1995 report of the Standing Committee made a number of rather weak recommendations regarding child care. It endorsed the federal government's funding commitment, and recommended some improvements, including a more coordinated approach to child care. It stated that existing arrangements under CAP were inadequate, that the federal and provincial governments should discuss standards, that quality should be considered in any expansion of spaces, and that a certain portion of federal funding should be designated for aboriginal and disabled services.

The Standing Committee report and the entire social security review process were

---

184 Human Resources Development Canada, *Agenda: Jobs and Growth*; Human Resources Development Canada, *Child Care and Development*.


eclipsed by the 1995 federal budget and budget process. Even while the review was going on, it was clear that the goals of the Finance Ministry, as announced in the 1994 budget, were to reduce transfer payments to the provinces and government spending on social security in general. Since a major goal of the review ultimately was to cut federal spending, substantive reform on child care could not be on the table. Even before the report of the social security review was released, economists and business groups were publicly urging the government to cut social spending substantially. In January 1995, Axworthy publicly stated that social reforms were taking a back seat to deficit concerns and national unity. Then on 16 February 1995, 11 days before the federal budget, Moody's Investors Service put Canada on notice that it was reviewing Canada's debt for a possible downgrade. On April 12, it lowered Canada's bonds to double-A1 from triple-A.

Economic actors were successful in pressuring the federal government to decrease spending. In the 1995 budget the federal government announced that as of 1 April 1996 it was ending its shared-cost welfare and social assistance programs. Instead, it would introduce a block fund called the Canada Social Transfer (renamed the Canada Health and Social Transfer or CHST) which would roll together existing block funding for medicare and post-secondary education with welfare and social programs. The creation of the CHST brings an end to federal conditional grants set up under Established Programs Financing (EPF) and CAP. The budget

---


188Canada, Department of Finance, The Budget, 1994.

189Although one goal of the review was to update and "fix" Canada's social security system, the Green Book also stated that "until the fiscal situation of governments improves, there will be no new money for new programs, including social programs." Human Resources Development Canada, Agenda: Jobs and Growth, 23.


also announced cuts in federal funding for all these programs from about $30 billion in spending on CAP and EPF to about $27 billion for the first year of the CHST (1996-97) and $25 billion for the second.193

It was not clear in the 1995 budget what happened to the $720 million in new spending promised in the Red Book. As part of the 1995 budget announcement, Axworthy suggested that the Ministry was considering consolidating social service funds, including spending on child care, into a "Human Resources Investment Fund" (HRIF). The government stated that this fund would allocate money to individuals searching for work and would include grants for language training and skills upgrading as well as for helping to pay for child care. It would lump child care provision in along with training funds on an individual need basis.194 The government set aside $3.7 billion for the HRIF in 1995-96 and $3.3 billion in 1996-97, some of which would be funded from the UI government account. Funding for Child Care Visions came from this fund.195 It is not clear, though, how much money was available through this fund specifically for child care.

Throughout the social security review and the 1995 federal budgetary process and aftermath, the Human Resources Minister appeared to be fighting to retain a national child care system. In April 1995, soon after the budget, Axworthy announced that the Ministry would continue its commitment to fund research and development projects under a program called Child Care Visions. The latter would replace the CCIF set to expire in 1995. In December 1995 the Minister announced a child care strategy to spend some of the promised $720 million. The strategy included spending pledges for the new Child Care Visions research and development program to replace the CCIF, and funding for First Nations. The strategy called for $72 million over three years to be invested in First Nations and $18 million over three years to be invested in Visions, for a total of $90 million. Axworthy also announced that the government was willing to

spend $630 million on projects with the provinces to expand child care services.\textsuperscript{196} Thus, the Liberal Red Book promise of $720 million seemed to be still on the books.

The federal Liberals also tried to intervene specifically in the funding of day care in the provinces. In October 1995, Axworthy revealed that the federal government was in the process of setting up the child care fund announced in December. Through it the federal government would split the costs of pilot projects in child care on projects initiated by the provinces. Then the federal government attempted to encourage the Ontario government to reverse its cuts to new day care centers -- many of which had been forced to remain closed because of lack of funds -- by offering to split the costs with the province.\textsuperscript{197} This put tremendous pressure on the Ontario government to commit more funding to child care at the very time it was in the process of reducing its financial commitments.\textsuperscript{198}

The federal government also entered into direct negotiations with Metro Toronto, the city with the largest number of day care spaces in the province of Ontario, to fund centers in danger of closing.\textsuperscript{199} In October the Liberals made a high-profile gift of $100,000 to two Ontario child care centers threatened with closure because of lack of funds.\textsuperscript{200} The government also negotiated an agreement with Metro Toronto out of the $180-million federal Strategic Initiatives Fund to experiment with eliminating child-care subsidies and implementing parental user fees based on income. Funding would go directly to centers. The federal government placed conditions on its assistance: Metro had to maintain its funding to the child care system, and the project had to be approved by the Ontario government.\textsuperscript{201}

Meanwhile the government was soliciting responses to the provinces on its proposed


\textsuperscript{198}Margaret Philp, "Tsubouchi Cool to Federal Child-Care Offer," \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 9 November 1995, A11. The move can also be seen as a public relations effort to make the federal Liberals look like "good guys" and the provincial Tories "bad guys".


\textsuperscript{200}Philp, "Axworthy Offers Child-Care Funds," A2.

\textsuperscript{201}Margaret Philp, "Ottawa Close to Deal on Metro Child Care," \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 5
cost-sharing. Reactions were mixed. Eight of 10 provinces, including Quebec, expressed interest in the $630-million shared-cost program. Manitoba, however, said it did not want to participate, and Ontario did not give an immediate response. Then, in the wake of a federal Liberal cabinet shuffle in early 1996 that replaced the more left-leaning Lloyd Axworthy in the Human Resources portfolio with the more conservative Douglas Young, the government announced that it was "reassessing" its shared-cost proposal. In February 1996, the federal government announced it was withdrawing its $33-million commitment to child care funding in Metro Toronto and instead would only provide $4 million. Reports indicated that the government was looking for an "exit strategy" to extract Ottawa from Axworthy's 1995 proposal.

By 1997, it was not clear what, if anything, would materialize from the Liberal government's promise of child care funding. While Lloyd Axworthy tried to carry forward the government's commitment to increased child care funding, his transfer from the Human Resources portfolio to Foreign Affairs and International Trade meant the momentum was lost for new programs. Some financial commitments remain, for example the Child Care Visions program, whose funds of $6 million annually were secured in the 1995 federal budget. Nonetheless, the Child Care Information Centre was abolished at the end of March 1996 and some of its work is now being contracted out.

In the 1996 Speech from the Throne, the federal government declared, as part of its strategy regarding Quebec, that it "will not use its spending power to create new shared-cost programs in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction without the consent of a majority of the provinces." It also stated that "any new program will be designed so that non-participating

---


206Chris Gehman, Staff person, Childcare Resource and Research Unit, consultation, Toronto, 23 May 1996. The Child Care Information Centre was established in 1972.
provinces will be compensated, provided they establish equivalent or comparable initiatives." Provinces that do not want to participate can opt-out with fiscal compensation. This does not sound like a commitment on the part of the federal government to force the provinces to direct money to child care. Rather, the impetus in the federal government is toward decentralization, not centralization.

In the 1996 Throne Speech the government did acknowledge that it "has an important contribution to make in preserving and modernizing Canada's social union." It reported that Ottawa would work with the provinces to determine the principles that should govern the social union. The federal government also pledged to continue to protect social mobility within Canada (the only principle still remaining from CAP under the Budget Implementation Act, 1995), as well as access to social and other benefits. But these would be mutually agreed upon with the provinces.

Although the federal government still declared support for a strong social union, in practice it seemed to have little power and little political will left to ensure it. As one federal official stated, as of 1997, with cutbacks to federal transfers, both levels of government wanted disentanglement and the federal government did not want to "leave the money behind". Provinces no longer wanted the federal government to be collecting the money and then giving it to them, even unconditionally. They wanted the federal government to exit the field entirely and give provinces the more valuable tax points. The era of cooperative federalism that led to the creation of national social programs no longer appeared to exist.

Discussions surrounding the development of a child care system have traditionally

---


208In a letter to the CCCF in April 1996, for example, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Strategic Policy for Human Resources Development, James Lahey, emphasized the government's new Throne Speech commitment and that "any new federal-provincial-territorial child care arrangements must be consistent with efforts to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of both orders of government..." The letter was published in the CCCF's magazine, Interaction 10, 2 (Summer 1996), 2. The Throne Speech principle of not intruding in areas of provincial jurisdiction therefore looks like the federal government's primary guiding principle in social services, not a strong social union.

209Interview, federal official.
centred on the creation of a national child care plan with national standards to be implemented and enforced by the federal government. With the recent federal budgetary cuts to social service spending and the move to block funding under the CHST, the federal government seems to have moved away from support of national programs in general, and child care in particular. We therefore may be witnessing a restructuring of welfare state beyond the incremental measures of the past.

Despite many attempts, the principles or norms of child care delivery have not changed. Government funding remains welfare-based and no broader public policy on child care has emerged. The heyday for child care came in the 1980s as new policies were initiated and attempts were made to expand child care at the national level. But the institutional basis for child care was set in the 1960s with the establishment of CAP. The normative basis was set even earlier with the establishment of child care as part of a welfare strategy for poor and single mothers. The lack of movement on child care reflects the high degree of policy autonomy majority governments have enjoyed in Canada's executive-dominated system, as well as the ideational constraints of previous policy choices. Norms, once entrenched, are difficult to change. Governments and society have been reluctant to embrace the idea of universal public day care. Child care advocates have not found an acceptable alternative norm to privatized care.

OTHER EXPLANATORY FACTORS

Actors

The goal of advocates in the child care policy sphere has been to create a national, near-universal, and public child care program. They have resisted interim measures to expand child care which do not meet these ideals. In hindsight, this strategy may have been mistaken. The way the child care advocates have presented their goals has failed to shift the terms of debate away from women's rights to other broader policy goals, such as reconciling work and family life.

\[210\text{The preamble to the Canada Child Care Act (Bill C-144), for example, stated, Whereas the Parliament of Canada, recognizing that there is a need to improve the availability, affordability, quality and accessibility of child care services is desirous of increasing the number of child care spaces throughout Canada by at least two hundred thousand over a seven-year period...and of contributing to the maintenance of the expanded child care system thereafter.}\]
and providing quality care for children. Thus, child care has been and continues to be viewed by opponents as something that primarily benefits women and for often controversial goals such as getting women out of the house, rather than something that benefits children or society as a whole.

Reluctance to embrace maternalist rhetoric comes from competition with more conservative organizations like REAL women who wish to privilege family care (mother care) over day care. In many ways, REAL women’s discourse is similar to maternalists of the past, and in other ways is much more familialist. While their goal is to gain more support for women as mothers, REAL Women are very much opposed to policies that would help women reconcile work and family life. And while such demands may be threatening to other child care advocates who want to see government monies directed at building public child care services, REAL women, for the first time in contemporary policy making, have introduced the idea of the importance of mothering/parenting, and government support for mothering. Such demands—separated from more familialist claims that care outside the home is "harmful" and that women should not work outside the home, and thus a national day care program should be opposed—can be an important contribution to the child care debate.\footnote{While I am not endorsing REAL women’s position on day care and other issues, I suggest that some of the maternalist rhetoric could be utilized by child care advocacy groups. REAL women still remain opposed to the idea of comprehensive day care and they do believe care outside the home is harmful to children. In this sense, they are not interested in reconciling work and family life, but rather, imposing a particular "ideal" family form on women.}

\textit{Trade Unions and Employer Associations}

The trade union movement has been involved in the child care issue mainly through involvement in advocacy organizations, and sometimes through collective bargaining. It has also helped to organize day care workers. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some unions became

\begin{itemize}
\item 211 For an analysis of those views' impact on child care policy development in the 1980s, both in Canada and the United States, see Katherine Teghtsoonian, "Neo-Conservative Ideology and Opposition to Federal Regulation of Child Care Services in Canada and the United States," \textit{Canadian Journal of Political Science} 26, 1 (March, 1993), 97-121. For a early critical analysis of REAL women’s position see Karen Dubinsky, "R.E.A.L. Women—Really Dangerous," \textit{Canadian Dimension} 21, 6 (October 1987), 4-7. See also Teghtsoonian, "Who Pays for Caring for Children?"
interested in the child care issue, largely on the urging of women members to recognize women's concerns in the workplace. Colley argues that the day care lobby, unable to get union support in the 1970s, was successful in the 1980s as the issue became highly visible and as women's issues in the workforce were taken more seriously.212 The number of women members in unions greatly increased in that time period. In 1964, women made up only 17 per cent of union membership in Canada. By 1980, they made up 30 per cent, and by 1992, 41 per cent (see table 4.13). Membership in public sector unions increased, partly as a result of the organization of day care workers. By 1989, women held approximately 25 per cent of the executive positions in all unions.213

Women's committees within labour unions began to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s. The Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), for example, established its women's committee in 1981. The Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) had a women's committee between 1961 and 1968 and re-established it in 1978. The Quebec Federation of Labour established its women's committee in 1972, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) in 1974, the Confédération des syndicats nationaux in 1974, and the Public Sector Alliance of Canada in 1976.214

Women's percentage of executive positions or general membership is often less important than their mobilization around an issue within the union movement. Kass argues that it was "trade union women's groups like Organized Working Women who were active in the OFL, Action Day Care, and organization of child care workers in Ottawa, Toronto" who were pivotal in raising the visibility of the child care issue. She states, "they certainly pushed the OFL to make it a higher priority to fight for comprehensive child care. They might have been interested in the union's negotiating...with the employer and putting it on the bargaining table, but certainly the biggest emphasis was lobbying the government and making it a political issue, an equality issue."215

Interest in child care in the union movement coincided, to a degree, with the development

214White, Sisters and Solidarity, 125.
of the advocacy associations. Some unions have played a key role in the establishment of advocacy associations. For example, child care was a major issue at the 1980 OFL annual convention. A majority of the delegates "voted to adopt a radical day care policy and to launch a major campaign to win free universal quality day care as a right." Colley observes that this was the first time a major sectoral institution endorsed free, universal, quality care. The Ontario Coalition for Better Child Care (OCBCC) emerged out of this process.

Unions like CUPE put a lot of energy into organizing the second national conference on child care in Winnipeg. From this conference the Canadian Day Care Advocacy Association (CDCAA) (which later became the Child Care Advocacy Association of Canada (CCAAC)) emerged as a national organization to advocate for child care. The union movement has continued to focus on the national level. For example, in 1993, the CLC, in collaboration with the CCAAC and four other national partners--NAC, the Assembly of First Nations, the Child Poverty Action Group, and the National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women (NOIVMW)--and provincial partners, launched Campaign Child Care. Their goal was to ensure child care was on the agenda leading up to the 1993 federal election.

The consistent consensual strategy adopted by the unions has been to pressure the government to establish public policy on child care. Collective bargaining for benefits such as workplace child care is a lesser goal. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when such policies as maternity leave were being debated, a study for the Royal Commission on the Status of Women notes the opinion of one union informant who argued, "If the government were to tell us: social security is the business of the unions to bargain for, then we would do it, without a doubt. But for my own part I would prefer to see the state take this sort of social legislation in hand and provide for remunerated maternity leave by law." Friendly argues that "the orientation of the

---

215 Jamie Kass, personal interview, CUPW.
216 Colley, "Day Care and the Trade Union Movement," 30.
217 CUPE's involvement in child care began in 1981, when a local of 200 child care workers in Ottawa put a resolution to convention recommending that CUPE establish a national day care committee. The committee was up and running by 1983 with representatives from each of the provinces. Kass, personal interview, CUPW.
218 Kass, personal interview.
219 Renée Geoffroy and Paule Sainte-Marie, _Attitude of Union Workers to Women in_
Canadian trade union movement has been more to advocate for public policy supporting a publicly funded, broad-based child care system, than to try to secure child care for their members through collective bargaining.\(^{220}\)

Many unions are against employer-supported child care and the pursuit of benefits solely for their own members through collective bargaining. Indeed, by 1991 only two per cent of major collective agreements in Canada provide for day care facilities.\(^{221}\) Unions and advocacy groups argue that only the government can create a policy that benefits all members of society; unions can never bargain enough funding to meet the child care needs of all their members. Furthermore, work-related care does not address the needs of the large portion of the population that is not unionized.\(^{222}\) The OCBCC, in a number of reports on work-related child care, argues that it is better for unions and employers to support the development of public policy on the issue, rather than take individual initiatives.\(^{223}\)

---

\(^{220}\)Friendly, *Child Care Policy in Canada*, 145. Jamie Kass, of CUPW, also expressed this opinion. Kass, personal interview.

\(^{221}\)Mary Lou Coates, *Work and Family Issues: Beyond 'Swapping the Mopping and Sharing the Caring'* (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1991), 20.

\(^{222}\)CUPW, *Our Children are Our Future*, Appendix B; Jane Beach, Martha Friendly and Lori Schmidt, *Work-Related Child Care in Context: A Study of Work-Related Child Care in Canada*, Occasional Paper No. 3 (Toronto: Childcare Resource and Research Unit, 1993). Even the unions who bargain on-site care say it is not enough. For example, in 1987 the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) bargained with the three major auto companies—Ford, General Motors and Chrysler—to set up a child care fund. The corporations agreed to pay .5 cents per hour worked by each employee which would go to child care. In 1990 that amount was raised to 1 cent per hour. They now have a multimillion dollar fund, out of which they have started up a child care centre in Windsor that provides care specifically for children of shift workers, a home child care program, and a centre in Oshawa. However, CAW spokespeople state that negotiated child care is not enough and they endorse universal child care. See Canadian Auto Workers, "Barriers to a Comprehensive Child Care System: A Labour Perspective," Speech by Peggy Nash to the Ontario Coalition for Better Child Care, 10th Anniversary Conference, 30 November 1991. A study conducted by the Industrial Relations Centre of Queen's University concluded that the employer model of child care worked well but the costs to employers were so prohibitive, "in the final analysis the government model provides the most benefits to the most people." Fern N. Milne, *Child Care: Who Should Provide?* (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1993), v.

\(^{223}\)See Jane Bertrand, *Employers, Unions and Child Care* (Toronto: Ontario Coalition for
Had the unions pushed for more on-site child care and employer assistance, would the winning of such rights have spread to other sectors? Quebec's experience suggests "yes". Quebec has the largest number of workplace child care centres in Canada, precisely because public sector unions in Quebec were effective at negotiating child care facilities in public buildings in the late 1970s. Pursuit of day care by labour unions, therefore, may be an effective strategy for improving already-existing day care programs. In terms of strategy, then, one has to question whether the anglophone trade union strategy of pursuing an ideal day care policy, rather than making gradual changes, has paid off.

A further weakness or constraint in achieving policy change is the strategy of pursuing coalition politics. The unions rely on the advocacy organizations to advance broader workplace goals, including child care, and limit their own demands to issues of job security and other explicitly workplace issues. The nature of coalition politics, however, is compromise, which means unions are not always free to advance their own goals. Teachers' concerns regarding the development of kindergarten programs in the provinces, are tempered in coalition groups like the OCBCC in order to respond to the concerns of day care operators about the large class sizes in schools.

Other constraints—internal as well as structural—exist that prevent unions from being effective agents for change. First, unlike in France and Germany, trade unions in Canada and in North America in general do not have the same access to government through corporatist arrangements such as the conseils d'administration. As Mahon argues, "the union-party nexus, which has been so important to Swedish social democracy, has never had much depth in Canada." Some links exist between the unions and the NDP in Canada, but these are often tenuous, as can be seen in the social contract episode in Ontario. The importance of unions as political actors in Canada is also constrained by the fact that the party with which they feel the closest affiliation—the NDP—has not held power nationally, although it has governed in some provinces.

Unions themselves are not inherently pro-feminist or pro-women in their stance. An

---

Better Child Care, 1993), 1; Alice de Wolff, Strategies for Working Families, 66-71.
224Friendly, 145.
225Rianne Mahon, "Child Care in Canada and Sweden" 19.
assumption in the class-based literature (less so in the gender literature because of the recognition of constraints) is that if anyone is going to push for feminist and child care policies, it would be groups like unions and social democratic parties. But that is not necessarily the case, even in highly unionized and social democratic countries. Jamie Kass of CUPW doubts that child care is embedded in the union movement "because it's a women's issue and sometimes women's issues don't get as much play in the union movement. So it's always been mostly the women who have taken it forward even though they want to see it as a parental issue, one that interests and is important for both men and women." She states,

With child care, people consider it a workers' issue and a parents' issue and the brothers have always felt that it shouldn't be considered a women's issue. The problem with that approach is that whenever you see who really does the work on it, who really pushes it forward, it's the women. So we often address it as a parental issue but when it comes to pushing it forward, it's always been the women in the union movement, a mix of women from the women's committee, and from workers at day care locals. Some of the work is by parents, and also by people where employers have workplace child care. So it is a bargaining issue in the union local.

Another factor inhibiting the development of child care in Canada is the lack of employer involvement in the issue. Employer-sponsored child care does not exist to the same extent in Canada as in the United States. Atkinson and Coleman argue that the nature of the business


227This can be seen even within the internal organization of unions around the issue. For example, Kass explained that the committee in CUPE that deals with child care was originally rooted in the research department of the organization, and has just recently been re-routed to the equality branch. The National Women's Task Force operates separately from that committee. Kass, personal interview.

228Kass, personal interview.

229In Canada as of 1992, work-related child care comprised about three per cent of licensed child care spaces. Beach et al., Work-Related Child Care in Context, 7. The figures for the United States, though also dismal, are comparatively better, mainly because the Reagan administration in 1981, under the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) made child care a nontaxable benefit for employees in corporations. A 1990 Gallup poll report indicated that 10 per cent of American workers "had access to an employer sponsored child care center at or near their place of employment." Abbie Gordon Klein, The Debate over Child Care 1969-1990: A
climate in Canada is one of economic liberalism, with a firm-centred culture, and a belief that the
government should not interfere in the economy.230 Provision of child care, then, as much as it
can be linked to an active labour market policy, should generally be seen as the responsibility of
industry or private business. Such a view exists in the United States. In Canada, however, with
government involved to a greater extent in social policy provision, there is no clear consensus on
who is responsible for providing child care. This has contributed to relative inaction.231

In contrast, in Australia, for example, Brennan argues that employers are highly
motivated to provide workplace child care. She reports that a workplace child care initiative on
the part of Esso Australia was partly motivated by the fact that "Esso believed that the Australian
government would sooner or later introduce some kind of mandatory equal employment
opportunity requirements and, accordingly, decided 'to get ahead of the game' by introducing
measures to encourage the employment and retention of skilled women."232 Employers were

day care and other benefits are usually offered by large corporations and government employers,
not small businesses, and can include on-site or off-site child care facilities, as well as vouchers
for child care, and child care referral services. Most firms that do implement these policies "have
large work forces composed of substantial numbers of women in managerial and professional
2 (June 1993), 238. For further discussion, see chapter five.

230 Atkinson and Coleman argue that the firm-centred culture "emphasizes the self-
sufficiency of the firm, the independence of management in making decisions on investment and
workplace organization, and the reliance, whenever possible, on markets for the allocation of
capital and labour." They state that "this view implies that a firm line must be drawn between
the economy and the polity and that ordinarily the intrusion of politics into the realm of
economics should be stoutly resisted." Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, The
State, Business, and Industrial Change in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989),
33.

231 A similar dynamic can be seen in the United States. In the United States, although the
number of companies providing child care support grew rapidly in the 1980s, some companies
remained reluctant to provide benefits. Seyler et. al. report that some corporate heads had
predicted "that government would step in to fill the void created by businesses' inaction....the
federal government did just that when, in 1993, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)." This benefit is so modest, though, employers will continue to
have to provide their own benefits. Dian L. Seyler, Pamela A. Monroe and James C. Garand,
"Balancing Work and Family: The Role of Employer-Sponsored Child Care Benefits," Journal
of Family Issues 16, 2 (March 1995), 171.

232 Deborah Brennan, The Politics of Australian Child Care: From Philanthropy to
motivated to provide child care or child care support services to deal with labour shortages, to retain trained workers, but also to enhance the profile of the firm (or government employer) as an equal opportunity employer.

The desire to cut down absenteeism and reduce turnover similarly motivate many employers in Canada. Yet, few employers in Canada have responded with specific policies. A Conference Board of Canada report suggests that "employers will [only] become more interested in looking at family-related benefits as a potential solution for human resource problems if they are convinced that this is a cost-effective way to enhance competitiveness." Thus, trade unions and employers, while involved somewhat in advocacy and delivery in Canada, have not been as effective actors as their counterparts in France, and, in the case of employers, as in the United States and Australia.

Advocacy Groups and Social Movements

The child care lobby is very vibrant in Canada, partly because the state funds many interest groups in Canada. Advocates have mobilized at both the provincial and federal levels since the late 1970s and early 1980s to push for a national policy as well as expansion at the

---

Feminism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 151. She reports a similar motivation on the part of IBM (p. 149) and public health employees in New South Wales (160).

Coates reports that a Conference Board of Canada survey found some of the reasons included: "some had never considered these types of benefits, some had not heard of the need for these benefits from their employees, some employers believed that they should not be involved in providing these types of benefits, and some cited the costs associated with implementation." Coates, Work and Family Issues, 13-14.

As quoted by Coates, Work and Family Issues, 16. Many studies demonstrate that this is the case. Coates quotes a U.S. study that found that "providing unpaid leave to employees for childbirth, adoption, or a serious family illness is less expensive than replacing a worker who is forced to resign." Similarly, "childcare benefits were helpful in reducing absenteeism, and in the area of employee retention, and recruitment while childcare centres, childcare information and referral services and programs offering care for sick children were effective in retaining employees." Coates, 13, 16. See also, Margie Mayfield, "Employer-Supported Child Care in Canada," in Day Care: The Role of Employers (Ottawa: Health and Welfare Canada, 1985), 1-14.

Burt argues that federal funding is vital for interest groups in that it gives the groups a measure of legitimacy, it guarantees them a voice in policy discussions, and it provides them with the financial resources to survive. Sandra Burt, "Gender and Public Policy: Making Some
provincial level. However, the influence of these groups is constrained by the fact that they largely lobby outside the structures of government rather than within them. Their influence has also been tempered in the past decade because of the rising influence of more conservative groups lobbying against public child care. But they are further constrained by their strategy of lobbying hard for the best form of care and accept nothing less.

The child care advocacy lobby has generally supported the establishment of a publicly funded, comprehensive, not-for-profit, high quality system of child care, accessible to all families. That position has been modified from that of the 1970s when many in the movement argued for state-run as well as state-funded day care. At that time, it was believed that a socialized form of child care would be transformative of relations between women and men, that it would counter patriarchal structures of power in society.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, advocacy groups adjusted their demands to gain more mainstream support. In 1979, Action Day Care formed in Ontario as an organization of parents, day care workers, some community activists, and trade union representatives. It lobbied for free, universal quality day care. Its platform influenced those developed later by the OFL and NDP. Then, in 1981, members of Action Day Care and other organizations decided there needed to be a provincial coalition. Action Day Care, along with unions such as CUPE, the teachers' federations, NAC, and others met and formed the OCBCC. Its mandate was to promote a well-organized, universally-accessible, publicly-funded, not-for-profit, non-compulsory day care system. The OCBCC put together a brief entitled Daycare Deadline 1990 in which the idea of

Difference in Ottawa," in Rethinking Canada, 482.


238Colley, "Day Care and the Trade Union Movement," 31.

free universal day care was replaced with "universally accessible". The OCBCC has continued to play a leading role in child care lobbying and has expanded to the local level in a number of Ontario cities.

The lobby movement in general has become more sophisticated, moving from just asking for more and better child care to proposing just how to do it. At the national level, a key event in this regard was the second national conference held in Winnipeg in September, 1982. The conference was sponsored by Health and Welfare Canada and organized by the Canadian Council on Social Development. It had a huge attendance of over 700 delegates from across the country, including representatives of trade unions, women's groups, child care workers, and social service agencies. This conference gave a large push to the idea of universal as opposed to targetted access to child care.

The CDCAA, now the CCAAC, formed in 1983 out of this conference. Its declared mandate is to advocate for a comprehensive, universally accessible, high quality, and non-profit child care system. Also eventually formed in 1986 was the Canadian Child Day Care Federation. Now the Canadian Child Care Federation (CCCF), it is more of an apolitical and professional association which has as its mandate issues of training, professional development, and so on.

The movement is marked by an incredible consensus among all the groups involved on the principles upon which a child care system should be based. First, child care should be national in scope. Second, it should be publicly funded. Third, access should be universal and equitable, that is, regardless of family income, region, ethnic, linguistic or racial background, ability or disability. Fourth, it should be comprehensive, providing a range of services. Finally, it should be of high quality (non-profit) with appropriate regulation and adequate salaries for staff.


241Some advocates in the child care community argue that the federal government directs more funding to the latter organization rather than the former because of its non-advocacy stance. Kass, personal interview, CUPW.

242Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Caring for Our Children, Brief Presented to the Special Committee on Child Care (Ottawa: CACSW, June 1986); Child Care Advocacy Association of Canada, Taking the First Steps: Child Care, An Investment in...
At the national level, the Advocacy Association as well as the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) are key players. NAC is a large umbrella organization made up of a number of member groups. It was established in 1972 as a coalition of a number of organizations such as the Fédération des femmes du Québec (FFQ) and the Canadian Federation of University Women. Initially, its impetus was to push for the implementation of recommendations from the Status of Women Report. Since 1972, NAC's supported widely available, financially accessible, high quality child care.

The federal-provincial division of powers requires advocates to target their efforts at three levels of government: federal, provincial, and municipal. In some provinces, like Ontario, the municipalities are responsible for some funding as well. Advocates focus on the national


243 The FFQ, along with the Committee for the Equality of Women originally pressured government into establishing the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in the late 1960s through a public relations campaign that involved lobbying through newspapers and periodicals. As Bégin states, "pressure began to bear on the federal government in September 1966 and, within six months, the commission was created." Bégin, "The Royal Commission," 23.

244 National Action Committee on the Status of Women, Day Care and the Federal Government: A Proposal for Reform, submission to the Federal Task Force on Child Care (Toronto: NAC, October 1994), 3; NAC, A Brief to the Special Committee on Child Care, 2; Burt, 204.

245 Katheryne Schulz of the OCBCC points out, in Ontario, because the costs of child care are shared between the province and municipalities,

Rather than being able to lobby the province for money, and getting the money directly put into child care budgets, you have to lobby both the province and the municipalities. Now, that has an upside because it makes child care advocates in their regions get involved in local politics. But it's a lot of work. You have to get the municipalities to put up their 20 per cent just so you can access your 80 per cent from the province. And if you fail, the province pockets their contribution and you never see that money. The other thing is, of course, service delivery then varies from region to region because everyone decides differently how they're going to give out subsidies and how they're going to administer them.

Municipal involvement is double-edged as well, she argued. Some municipalities have a good track record on child care and push the province for provision. From the Coalition's perspective,
level in order to achieve national standards and programs. Because the provinces remain substantively responsible for child care, they cannot be ignored. Targeting so many levels of government, however, drains advocates' energy and resources.

Child care advocacy organizations are also constrained by the fact they operate more in the realm of civil society than party politics or the state (but for state funding). While these interest groups are highly mobilized, NAC, increasingly the labour movement, groups like the National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women of Canada (NOIVMW) and the Native Women's Association of Canada are not powerful or influential groups.

One of the strengths of the child care lobby has been to pursue coalition-building with women's groups, trade unions, day care workers, and many others. This means that the expertise and voice of these groups can be drawn on when an issue arises and the lobby can present a coherent stand on issues. But coalition politics have their drawbacks. The OCBCC, for example, works on a consensus basis. A lot of debate occurs within the Coalition prior to reaching a consensus. For example, at its 1980 convention, the OFL endorsed the idea of moving child care out of the Ontario social services ministry and to the Ministry of Education.

though, Schulz argues,

What we're really going for is base funding for child care programs to stabilize the system. You can't continue to run a system where every year the operator and the board have no idea what their piece of the pie is going to be. It's too much bureaucracy administering the subsidy system, a whole other level of bureaucracy. On the other hand, Metro, for example, does really well in delivering child care and so does Ottawa, North Bay. They are the ones that have actually worked a lot harder to defend child care than the province ever has...but realistically, you have to have it administered by the province.

Katheryne Schulz, Public Education Coordinator, Ontario Coalition for Better Child Care, personal interview, 4 June 1996.

246 The OCBCC, for example, gets funding from the federal Secretary of State, Women's Program, Human Resources Development Child Care Initiatives Fund (defunct), Labour Canada, the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, and the Ontario Women's Directorate, along with membership fees and donations. OCBCC, Annual Report 1993-94 (Toronto: OCBCC, 1994).

247 This is contrary to those who argue that they comprise a "court party". See, for example, Ranier Knopff and F. L. Morton, "Canada's Court Party," in Rethinking the Constitution: Perspectives on Canadian Constitutional Reform, Interpretation, and Theory, ed. Anthony A. Peacock (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1996), 63-87.

In *Daycare Deadline 1990*, the OCBCC proposed the idea as well.\textsuperscript{249} However, this created a major battle within the Coalition. Katheryne Schulz of the Coalition explained that parents were reluctant to integrate child care programs they had established into the school system to create a full day program combined with junior kindergarten. Parents did not want child care to be part of the education bureaucracy. Day care providers also resisted the idea as they felt their positions would be usurped by teachers.\textsuperscript{250} As a result, the OCBCC has been reluctant to endorse fully integrated programs. It released a paper in 1994 to suggest how child care and early childhood education projects could be merged, such as wrap-around programs. The paper did not say anything about extending kindergarten, although the Coalition has publicly supported moves to extend kindergarten programs.\textsuperscript{251}

The Coalition has occasionally lobbied for other child and family policies, like extensions on paid parental leave, but not on a concerted and ongoing basis. Schulz of the OCBCC explains,

> What tends to happen is, our alliances shift a lot. This is the whole nature of this coalition. When an issue comes up, I look around and I think, who are my allies? And those are the people I work closely with. That doesn't mean that I don't get support from other people. But the ones most directly affected are those we work with. So with parental leave, if it comes up, for example, if policy changes need to be made or somebody decides, we're going to run a campaign, they look around

\textsuperscript{249}The recommendation read,

To foster a closer liaison between the elementary school system and early childhood education, the Coalition recommends that childcare facilities be licensed and funded through a separate division of the Ministry of Education. Licensing standards should be set and monitored by that Ministry based on current standards and regulations established through the Day Nurseries Act as a minimum.

The Coalition also proposed that the then ratios of staff to children be maintained and staff must have qualifications in Early Childhood Education. OCBCC, *Daycare Deadline*, 4.

\textsuperscript{250}Schulz, personal interview, OCBCC.

to see who can sign on, and we ask, do we have the resources to engage in this? So it’s a very shifting set of alliances. So when you ask, at what level is parental leave supported, I can say, well in our last campaign...

Because the advocacy movement does not, and cannot, keep a sustained focus on all these issues, the pressure on governments is not as intense. Other groups have not picked up the struggle independently for these broader family policies.

The Coalition's partners are also diverse. Partners include unions, women's groups, native groups, and those who run the regulated centre- and home-based child care programs. Schulz elaborates,

As a Coalition, we don't just represent regulated child care programs. We represent child care programs. We advocate to some extent on behalf of regulated home child care where we can, although that sector is not as organized as the centre-based sector because they are more isolated and harder to organize. We advocate on behalf of resource programs. So to say, we think every child should be in regulated centre-based care would be like cutting our head off. So we don't do that.

Thus, the Coalition is constrained in how forcefully it can push for a certain kind of care. In contrast, in France, a number of individual organizations exist that lobby for their own child care goals. For example, the *assistantes maternelle agréées* (registered childminders) are represented by the Association Nationale des Assistantes Maternelles Agréées de Jour (ANAMAJ), the *puéricultrices* (early childhood care nurses) by the Association Nationale des Puéricultrices Diplômées D'État (ANPDE), and the teachers by the teachers' union, the Fédération de l'Éducation Nationale (FEN). Each lobbies independently for its goals, which means the groups do come in conflict, but the perspectives of each is represented politically.

One of the major failings of the advocacy movement has been in the adoption of an all-or-nothing attitude to child care, and to accept nothing less than the ideal. In many ways the advocacy groups see themselves struggling against the state. They often see policies undermining the day care movement's stance, rather than promoting its policies. Child care activists have opposed some government initiatives because they did not meet their ideal of "free" or at least "universally accessible" child care. For example, in the late 1980s when the

---

252 See Susan Prentice, "The 'Mainstreaming' of Daycare."
Conservative government's Bill C-144 proposed changes to the funding of child care under the CAP, child care activists fiercely resisted these changes. Their position was that the status quo was better than the proposed changes because, once the changes were made and the money committed, they would be difficult to reverse.253

In hindsight, this position may have been costly. The legislation included a proposal to remove child care spending from CAP and make it a separate program for cost-sharing arrangements. As a separate program, child care might have been exempt from the later cap on CAP.254 It also could have led to a reconceptualization of child care from a welfare program to an institutionalized service for all parents with children, something the child care lobby has been advocating for some time. If it had been run separately, child care might have been spared the major cuts to welfare spending in 1995 and the reorganization under the CHST.

Bill C-144 was resisted as well because it would allow federal funding of commercial care for the first time. In Australia, the tremendous expansion of child care in the late 1980s and early 1990s came at the price of allowing commercial care.255 The stance of the child care lobby

254One federal official stated:
I think some advocates would argue that Finance would have included that piece of legislation in the cap. I would argue that probably would not have happened because the Vocational Rehabilitation for Disabled Persons Act, which is very similar to CAP, was open-ended but not subject to a cap. More importantly, and this is why the advocates opposed Bill C-144, it was a controlled expenditure, it had a ceiling on it already, although not as severe, I don't think, as was the cap on CAP. Now that's not to say that when the federal government introduced the CHST that it would not have rolled it in too. I suspect it might have, although again the VRDP has been exempt from that for political reasons. However, I think that with the passage of C-144 you would have had something much more visible to the general public and something that the advocates could have focused on in terms of amendments for improvement. What you would have done for the first time under that act is you would have isolated and focused the attention on child care as a discrete service as opposed to one of a number. It was in legislation that is highly visible, and even though it had its flaws, I think that there might have been an opportunity over time to improve some of those flaws.

Personal interview.
255In 1991, the government extended fee relief to commercial centres and employer providers in Australia. The national government doubled its total outlays on child care from $243.6 million the year it extended fee relief, to $434.8 million in 1992, and then to $538.2
in Canada, by contrast, is absolute opposition to commercial expansion. Hence, their refusal to endorse the child care reforms proposed by Conservative Prime Minister Mulroney in the late 1980s. Child care advocates feared that large U.S. commercial care companies would move into Canada, diluting quality. Government support is seen as double-edged when it proposes to give direct operating grants, but to commercial as well as non-profit companies. The advocacy groups argue that they have had to push continuously the government on issues of quality, rather than rely on the government to promote it.

In 1988, many groups were also highly critical of the promised funding of $1 billion per year from 1995 onwards after the initial seven year period. In hindsight, given the cuts to child care that have occurred nationally, a $1 billion a year commitment to child care funding would be superior to what exists today.

The strategy of child care advocates can thus be faulted. In their defense, neither the advocacy groups nor anyone else could not have foreseen the level of cutbacks Canada has experienced. In hindsight, it may have not been difficult to forecast government cutbacks; at the time, the Mulroney government was already engaged in government streamlining. Ironically, though, the report of the Nielsen Task Force on Program Review of March 1986 did not suggest radical changes to the CAP. It stated that "since CAP alleviates the needs of people caught under

... million in 1993, the largest dollar increase in the history of child care. The total number of spaces did not increase substantially, rising from 170,900 in 1991 to 195,700 in 1992 and dropping to 190,600 in 1993, an overall increase of 10 per cent. Brennan, The Politics of Australian Child Care, 203.


257 When asked, in light of what happened to child care funding in terms of the CAP, would that change CUPE’s perspective on Bill C-144, Kass responded:

I don’t know at this point. [Back then] it was a decision to oppose going from unlimited funding to limited funding, and not enough limited funding. There was such a fear that we would end up in fact with so much less. ...you couldn’t have told us back then [about the demise of CAP]. They hadn’t even frozen CAP yet. ...you know it would drive you crazy because you couldn’t rewrite it. Now we have limited funding, in fact we have no funding because we’ll be at the bottom of [the list]. ...what people are so concerned about is that the impact of the CHST will be devastating on child care because health, education, welfare will all be picked up first. The real impact of the cuts will be in terms of child care.

Jamie Kass, personal interview, CUPW.
adverse economic circumstances, solutions to those problems [the fact that "nearly half of all Canadians currently on welfare are employable but unable to find work"] must be found elsewhere." Perhaps the problem was that the advocates saw these moves as just partisanship when, in hindsight, they foretold major economic and ideological shifts. The advocates argue too that what they opposed still needs opposing. Katheryne Schulz of the OCBCC stated:

Well, I don't think we were wrong. We didn't want the CAP to be capped, but we were also concerned about conditions. The government of Canada has been trying to head in that direction for quite awhile. And in a way it's actually better that they are trying to do this now on a broader scale because at least, if you attack something bit by bit by pulling this out of CAP and that, which would be a smarter strategy in a way, then you wouldn't get the same unified opposition to what you were doing. If you're taking CAP apart and replacing it with the CHST, at least everyone can see that they are all in jeopardy as a result.

Because the lobby's main concern is quality child care, it does not pay as much attention to other ways to improve the child care situation in Canada. It does not propose, for example, the extension of either paid parental leave or early childhood education to younger age groups. Given limited resources, the lobby wants to put its time and money into lobbying for the ideal form of care. For example, NAC has stated that while it is "in favour of increased family allowances, we recognize that there is no guarantee that this money will be spent on quality day care. In fact, such a 'reform' would only reinforce the present unsatisfactory situation in which child care is basically a service which can be purchased on the market like any other commodity." It is not necessarily the case, though, that one must be sacrificed for the other. In France, both family allowances and child care have expanded. Remarkably, the Mulroney government was able to increase the CCED without much public opposition. Less visible or less controversial changes, therefore, may be easier to implement. Increasing economic constraints now will nonetheless make likely trade offs.

There is a further weakness in the child care lobby. It has framed debates in terms of the

---


259Gallagher Ross, for example, takes the Task Force on Child Care to task for not going far in recommending changes to parental leave. Kathleen Gallagher Ross, "Parents' Choice," Policy Options 7, 7 (September 1986), 31-33.

discourse on equality for women and, in particular, equality for working women. Prentice argues that the movement has had to "shape" its demands in terms of "women's right to work" and "service to families". The latter is the language of social policy, as opposed to the more fundamental issues of gender division of labour, and the construction of women as the primary caregivers. However, not everyone is persuaded by gender arguments such as, "if a woman has the right to participate equally in the job market then she must have childcare. If a woman bears children, then she must have childcare. If a woman bears children, then she must have support to raise them." Most would agree with the first statement, but responses to the second and third would be that child care is not the state's role. In this case, one could say that concentration on purely gender arguments is a hindrance to the development of societal support for child care, especially with the mobilization of right-wing groups to counter the arguments of the child care advocates.

The resistance to norm change has been very fierce from a number of actors in Canada. By the time of the 1994 social security review process, groups defending the family had proliferated: REAL Women of Canada, along with the Calgary-based Kids First Parent Association of Canada, Westcoast Women for Family Life, Families First and Foremost, the National Family Network, and Women for Life, Faith and Family. All were witnesses or submitted briefs to the Standing Committee. These "familist" groups have two arguments: first, that mothers should take care of children and by implication, leave the labour market; and second, that public care is harmful for children. Both arguments have increasing discursive power. Even the Metro Toronto government has been swayed by these arguments. It recently hired Gillian Doherty, a child psychologist, to evaluate the research of psychologist Mark Genuis and other child care critics. The fear by child care advocates is that public funding will

262 OCBCC, Daycare Deadline 1990, 10.
263 Canada, Standing Committee on Human Resources Development, Security, Opportunities, and Fairness. For discussion of these groups' contribution to the debate over women's roles see Teghtsoonian, ""Who Pays for Caring for Children?".
264 Margaret Philp, "Influential Child-Care Adviser Under Fire," The Globe and Mail, 27 April 1996, A10. Metro Toronto councillor Dennis Fotinos argued that the reason for the review was if child care was bad for children, then Metro should not provide it.
disappear if such critics manage to persuade governments of their beliefs.

**Political Parties**

As in France, partisanship does not matter greatly in terms of child care policy development in Canada. The NDP is the most progressive of the major parties at the national level, but has not been elected federally. The NDP has governed in the provinces of British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario, and the somewhat social democratic Parti Québécois (PQ) in Quebec. Federal policy has been largely formulated by the Conservatives and Liberals, with input from the social actors described above.

The year 1965 was the first time a resolution regarding day care was brought to the floor of an NDP convention. The resolution recognized the "need for day care centres for the children of mothers working outside the home." The Liberals passed their own resolution in 1973 at their national convention. As mentioned previously, child care was addressed at a national level at election time for the first time in 1984 by all three parties.

The Conservative party has been in the position of progressive change in Canada on more than one occasion. The federal Conservatives under Mulroney were responsible for instituting expanded child care funding in 1988. That government was also the first to have women compose over 10 per cent of the caucus, and hold key positions in cabinet. It appointed 13 women to the Senate and other boards and agencies, and two women to the Supreme Court. Earlier in this century, it was a Conservative Prime Minister, R. B. Bennett, who attempted to implement New Deal-style legislation in Canada during the Depression. Support for a national system of health care emerged under the Diefenbaker administration, before the Pearson Liberals set up the Medicare system. The Liberal government in the late 1990s, in contrast, may have

---

266 Tyyskä, 230.
268 Although Prime Minister Diefenbaker himself was opposed to Medicare, he set up a royal commission under Justice Emmett Hall in 1961, the report of which led to the introduction of Medicare. Donn Downey, "Father of Medicare Defended System Into His '90s," *The Globe*
the distinction of supervising the demise of federal involvement in child care.

Rather than partisanship, then, many other factors explain the development of child care. Jamie Kass of CUPW notes the importance of federal funding, rather than party, as pivotal to the expansion of child care in Ontario in the 1970s. The federal Liberal party was elected in 1993 in the throes of the fiscal crisis of the state. Also, parties have had the tendency to adopt more progressive measures as a way of deflating the opposition. Mackenzie King's post-war social policies were enacted, it is argued, because of the rising popularity of the socialist CCF.

As mentioned above, federalism has been a very important constraining factor in the development of child care. Some of the provinces, currently Ontario, Alberta, and Quebec, are reluctant to allow the federal government to impose national standards. The Quebec government opposed attempts to introduce national standards or nation-wide qualifications for day care workers in the 1988 federal legislation, Bill C-144. It has been very difficult to get intergovernmental agreement on what a child care delivery system should look like. This was also a problem encountered by the Conservative government leading up to Bill C-144. For example, the British Columbia government at the time refused to consider a system of direct operating grants for child care centers on the principle that child care subsidies should only be given to needy families. In contrast, the Ontario government was moving away from a welfare-based child care system and towards an operating grant system and wanted the grants. Each of these constraints and opportunities inhibits the emergence of a broader child care system.

CONCLUSION

Commenting on the provinces' provision of mothers' allowances in the early part of this century, Strong-Boag states, "The fact that the state chose to recognize female citizens most particularly in their capacity as mothers reflected how far women were from full equality." She

---

269 Kass, personal interview, CUPW.
270 Moscovitch and Drover, p. 27.
271 Baker, Canadian Family Policies, 202-203.
273 See Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services, New Directions for Child Care (Toronto: Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1987).
speculates, "one wonders how the shortcomings of Canada's present social security system are related to the direction taken some fifty and more years ago."\(^{274}\) This chapter has demonstrated that it is precisely this maternalist basis that motivated the development of policies, which even Strong-Boag acknowledges "undeniably benefitted poor women and children who otherwise would have found survival still more difficult."\(^{275}\) The failure of this maternalist philosophy to be applied in other areas prevented broader child and family policies from emerging. Once child care was established as a purely welfare policy without a maternalist basis, it could not expand without a radical shift in norms.

No doubt readers will note the irony of arguing that such explicitly non-feminist policies based on non-feminist principles were key to the expansion of child care. But this highlights the often contradictory relationship between policy goals and policy effects. Furthermore, if one accepts the institutionalist idea of bounded innovation, then one can understand the importance of the prior embedding of such principles if policy innovation is to occur later. In order for child care policies to be accepted requires that they be viewed not simply as policies to promote women's equality, but also as policies connected to women's maternity, to reconciling work and family life, and to child development.

In the 1960s, when the federal government was initiating national social programs, few advocates within or close to government influenced the direction of child care. Policy development was bureaucratically driven from the top and responsive to the needs of provinces. During the 1970s, when the federal government was organizing conferences, and had closer ties to women's groups like the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, the state was open to capture. Bégin observes that in the 1971-1976 period, before the onslaught of the 1980 recession, the government did act to implement a number of reforms.\(^{276}\) The 1980s was the decade when actors outside government began to play a key role. By then, they were working in a climate of austerity and competitive federalism. The Nielsen Task Force was in full swing, looking for ways to cut government spending. The window of opportunity for new initiatives had closed.

\(^{274}\)Strong-Boag, "'Wages for Housework','" 32.  
\(^{275}\)Strong-Boag, "'Wages for Housework','" 32.  
Maternalist norms in France allowed conflicting ideas of women and the family to be reconciled. The absence of these norms in Canada means that child care policies face great normative resistance. Combined with the institutional impediment of federalism, implementation of a national child care policy seems unlikely. As Tuohy argues, however, "with federal constraints loosened, partisanship could play a greater role in generating cross-provincial differences just as it does in generating cross-national differences." If so, we can expect even greater regional variation in standards and services. We have already witnessed this with the Quebec government's decision in 1997 to establish $5 per day child care, while other provinces' commitments remained the same or declined.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Female labour force (000s)</th>
<th>Participation rate all women in labour force (%)</th>
<th>Participation rate married women (%)</th>
<th>Women as % of total labour force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,764</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,961</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4,898</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6,188</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF WOMEN WITH CHILDREN
BY AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD IN CANADA, 1981-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All families with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youngest child:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; than 3 years</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 years</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total &lt; than 6 years</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-15 years</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total &lt; than 16 years</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two-parent families
with youngest child:

|                      |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| < than 3 years       | 44.7  | 49.3  | 54.8  | 58.8  | 61.7  | 63.7  | 64.4  |
| 3-5 years            | 51.4  | 55.6  | 59.7  | 63.4  | 66.7  | 69.9  | 69.2  |
| Total < than 6 years | 47.1  | 51.5  | 56.7  | 60.6  | 63.5  | 66.0  | 66.2  |
| 6-15 years           | 60.2  | 61.4  | 65.6  | 70.5  | 75.1  | 77.0  | 77.4  |
| Total < than 16 years| 53.6  | 56.4  | 61.1  | 65.6  | 69.2  | 71.4  | 71.7  |

Lone-parent families
with youngest child:

|                      |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| < than 3 years       | 41.7  | 44.3  | 47.4  | 42.6  | 40.1  | 41.4  | 36.5  |
| 3-5 years            | 59.6  | 56.5  | 59.9  | 63.0  | 60.6  | 59.5  | 57.7  |
| Total < than 6 years | 51.3  | 51.0  | 54.0  | 52.8  | 50.6  | 50.1  | 46.4  |
| 6-15 years           | 67.8  | 65.5  | 69.2  | 71.5  | 74.0  | 72.1  | 71.1  |
| Total < than 16 years| 61.5  | 60.0  | 63.4  | 64.0  | 64.4  | 62.7  | 59.9  |

Table 4.3
NUMBER OF LICENSED CHILD CARE SPACES RELATIVE TO CHILDREN OF EMPLOYED PARENTS* BY AGE IN CANADA, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>age and number of children</th>
<th>day care centres</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>family day care homes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>total child care spaces</th>
<th>total % served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-17 months</td>
<td>254,847</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8,473</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>31,893</td>
<td>12.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-36 months</td>
<td>238,153</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8,806</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>31,694</td>
<td>13.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 years</td>
<td>476,987</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>26,837</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>205,670</td>
<td>43.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 years</td>
<td>880,694</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>9,810</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>89,838</td>
<td>10.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-13 years</td>
<td>381,569</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3,723</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All children 13 and under</td>
<td>2,332,250</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>54,394</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>362,818</td>
<td>15.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes parents who study more than 20 hours per week.

**Table 4.4**

**FORMS OF CARE FOR CHILDREN OF WORKING MOTHERS IN CANADA, 1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All ages</th>
<th>&lt; 3 yrs</th>
<th>3-5 years</th>
<th>6-13 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total children (000s)</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cared for in own home:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By father</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By other relative &lt; 16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By other relative &gt; 16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By other household member</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By other non-member of household</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than one arrange-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for outside home:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By relative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By non-relative</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day nursery/nursery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other arrangement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than one arrange-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cared for in and outside own home</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cared for by mother at work&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No regular arrangement</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> At occupations other than those of boarding or lodging housekeepers, baby-sitters or foster mothers.

Table 4.5
FORMS OF CARE FOR CHILDREN OF WORKING PARENTS IN CANADA, 1988 *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Groups (years)</th>
<th>0-1.5</th>
<th>1.5-3</th>
<th>3-5</th>
<th>6-9</th>
<th>10-12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total children (000)</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>1,419</td>
<td>1,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Relative at home | 12.3 | 11.6 | 10.5 | 7.3 | 5.0 |
- Relative not at home | 17.7 | 16.1 | 13.8 | 8.8 | 5.6 |
- Non-relative at home | 10.3 | 13.2 | 11.9 | 8.8 | 4.2 |
- Family not at work | 15.3 | 18.5 | 20.1 | 29.2 | 43.9 |
- Interviewed parent at work | 5.5 | 8.7 | 8.9 | 6.3 | 6.0 |
- Spouse at work | -- | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
- Day care centre | 3.2 | 9.6 | 10.8 | 1.2 | -- |
- Nursery program | -- | 5.7 | 19.4 | -- | -- |
- Kindergarten | -- | ... | 30.0 | 0.5 | -- |
- Before and after school | -- | ... | 1.1 | 4.2 | 1.1 |
- School | -- | ... | 6.5 | 97.3 | 98.4 |
- Licensed family day care | -- | 2.1 | 1.4 | 0.6 | -- |
- Unlicensed family care | 15.9 | 18.4 | 17.6 | 12.8 | 5.5 |

... amount too small to be expressed
-- figures not available

* Note that these figures do not indicate the primary child care arrangement, but all forms in which the child participates. Thus, the numbers are not additive.

\( a \) \ estimate is subject to sampling variability and should be used with caution

## Table 4.6
DISTRIBUTION OF CHILD CARE SPACES BY PROVINCE AND TERRITORY IN CANADA, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/Territory</th>
<th># of children 12 and under (000)</th>
<th># of spaces for children 12 and under</th>
<th>Centre Spaces</th>
<th>Family Day Care Spaces</th>
<th>Ratio of children to spaces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.C.</td>
<td>612.8</td>
<td>39 896</td>
<td>27 761</td>
<td>12 135</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>544.1</td>
<td>51 731</td>
<td>43 615</td>
<td>8 116</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sask.</td>
<td>206.4</td>
<td>6 688</td>
<td>4 301</td>
<td>2 387</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>214.7</td>
<td>14 939</td>
<td>11 553</td>
<td>3 386</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1919.5</td>
<td>134 731</td>
<td>118 938</td>
<td>15 793</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>1218.1</td>
<td>93 608</td>
<td>81 398</td>
<td>12 210</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.B.</td>
<td>130.3</td>
<td>7 434</td>
<td>7 344</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>161.2</td>
<td>7 125</td>
<td>6 989</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.E.I.</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>2 504</td>
<td>2 444</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nfld.</td>
<td>105.6</td>
<td>2 554</td>
<td>2 554</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWT</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat’al Totals</td>
<td>5163.3</td>
<td>362 818</td>
<td>308 424</td>
<td>54 394</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Human Resources Development Canada, Status of Day Care in Canada 1993 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994); Statistics Canada, Annual Demographic Statistics, 1993, cat. no. 91-213 (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, 1994).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/Territory</th>
<th>Non-Profit</th>
<th>Commercial</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Commercial Spaces</th>
<th>% Commercial 1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.C.</td>
<td>17 430</td>
<td>10 331</td>
<td>27 761</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>12 885</td>
<td>30 730</td>
<td>43 615</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sask.</td>
<td>4 136</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>4 301</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>10 370</td>
<td>1 183</td>
<td>11 553</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>89 344</td>
<td>29 594</td>
<td>118 938</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>68 910</td>
<td>12 488</td>
<td>81 398</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.B.</td>
<td>4 145</td>
<td>3 199</td>
<td>7 344</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>4 054</td>
<td>2 935</td>
<td>6 989</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.E.I.</td>
<td>1 480</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>2 444</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nfld.</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>1 995</td>
<td>2 554</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWT</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Nat'l Totals | 214 480 | 93 944 | 308 424 | 30.5 | -- |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>max. # children regulated care&lt;sup&gt;a)&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>max. # children unregulated care&lt;sup&gt;b)&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.C.</td>
<td>4,086</td>
<td>5,494</td>
<td>7,155</td>
<td>7,391</td>
<td>up to 7 &lt; 12</td>
<td>no more than 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>max 5 pre-school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 &lt; 2 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 &lt; 1 year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>5,349</td>
<td>6,157</td>
<td>6,962</td>
<td>7,996</td>
<td>up to 6 children</td>
<td>no more than 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>max 3 &lt; 3 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 &lt; 2 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sask.</td>
<td>1,892</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>up to 8 children</td>
<td>no limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>max 5 &lt; 5 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 &lt; 3 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>2,057</td>
<td>2,623</td>
<td>3,473</td>
<td>up to 8 &lt; 12</td>
<td>no more than 4 &lt; 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>max 5 3-6 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 &lt; 2 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>6,412</td>
<td>10,115</td>
<td>11,792</td>
<td>5,793&lt;sup&gt;c)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>up to 5 &lt; 12</td>
<td>no more than 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>max 3 &lt; 3 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 &lt; 2 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>3,060</td>
<td>4,850</td>
<td>7,273</td>
<td>8,203</td>
<td>up to 6 children</td>
<td>no more than 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no more than 2 under 18 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.B.</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>up to 6 children</td>
<td>no more than 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>up to 3 infants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>up to 5 children</td>
<td>no more than 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>max by age e.g. 1 &lt; 1; 2 &lt; 2 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Number of Children</td>
<td>Maximum Acceptable</td>
<td>Maximum Age</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.E.I.</td>
<td>154 49 35 158</td>
<td>up to 6 &lt; 10 yrs</td>
<td>no more</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>max 3 &lt; 2 years</td>
<td>than</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>if 5 pre-schoolers</td>
<td>than</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no more than 2 &lt; 2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nfld.</td>
<td>does not offer</td>
<td>homes with more</td>
<td>no more</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>regulated family</td>
<td>than 4 children</td>
<td>than</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>care</td>
<td>licensed as</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>centres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Including provider's own children

*b* Excluding provider's own children

*c* Discrepancy is unexplained - data from two different sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Maternity leave</th>
<th>Parental leave</th>
<th>Family responsibility leave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.C.</td>
<td>18 weeks</td>
<td>12 weeks each parent</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>18 weeks</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>18 weeks</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>17 weeks</td>
<td>17 weeks each parent</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>17 weeks</td>
<td>18 weeks each parent</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>18 weeks</td>
<td>34 weeks each parent</td>
<td>5 days per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>17 weeks</td>
<td>12 weeks each parent</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>17 weeks</td>
<td>17 weeks each parent</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.E.I.</td>
<td>17 weeks</td>
<td>17 weeks either parent</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>17 weeks</td>
<td>12 weeks each parent</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The federal government, through the Unemployment Insurance Act, pays for 15 weeks of maternity leave and 10 weeks of parental leave at 57 per cent of wages up to a ceiling. The provinces provide unpaid leave.

Source: Childcare Resource and Research Unit, Child Care in Canada: Provinces and Territories 1993 (Toronto: CRRU, 1994), 89.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child care services under the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP)</th>
<th>310,000,000 (1994)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child care expense deduction (CCED)</td>
<td>310,000,000 (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent care allowances for participants in training programs</td>
<td>90,000,000 (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal child care</td>
<td>8,600,000 (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child care initiatives fund (CCIF)</td>
<td>5,500,000 (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBTOTAL: child care programs</td>
<td>724,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child tax benefit (CTB)&lt;sup&gt;a)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5,100,000,000 (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternity benefits</td>
<td>807,000,000 (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental benefits</td>
<td>493,000,000 (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL: ABOVE PROGRAMS</td>
<td>7,124,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child welfare programs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community action for children</td>
<td>68,400,000 (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada prenatal nutrition program</td>
<td>85,000,000 (over 4 yrs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian and Inuit mental health/child development program</td>
<td>145,000,000 (over 5 yrs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal Head Start</td>
<td>100,000,000 (over 4 yrs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL: THESE PROGRAMS</td>
<td>138,650,000 (approximately)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a)</sup> The CTB includes a basic benefit, a supplementary benefit, and the Working Income Supplement (WIS).

### Table 4.11
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES ON CHILD CARE AND CHILD BENEFITS IN CANADA, OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1982 (millions)</th>
<th>1984 (millions)</th>
<th>1986 (est.) (millions)</th>
<th>1993* (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child Care Expense Deduction</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Assistance Plan</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Care Allowances</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Care on Reserves</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Allowance (Net of (Tax)/ Child Tax Benefit</td>
<td>1,816</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td>2,008</td>
<td>5,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Tax Credit</td>
<td>1,515</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>1,675</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Tax Exemption</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>785</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equivalent-to-Married Exemption</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>4,420</td>
<td>4,755</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>5,818.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP in millions</td>
<td>374,750</td>
<td>444,735</td>
<td>505,666</td>
<td>712,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian $</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending as % of GDP</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total All Unions</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3,866,100</td>
<td>1,595,700</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3,897,600</td>
<td>1,557,100</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3,780,800</td>
<td>1,418,900</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3,603,300</td>
<td>1,310,000</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>3,438,653</td>
<td>1,219,065</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3,089,016</td>
<td>932,883</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2,778,722</td>
<td>750,637</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2,378,446</td>
<td>575,584</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2,149,676</td>
<td>438,534</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,654,168</td>
<td>276,246</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---indicates change in reporting requirements.

Chapter V
THE AMERICAN CASE

In order to secure legislation it is almost necessary to have a strong moral sentiment favorable to it...

Mrs. Samuel Forter
General Federation of Women's Clubs, 1906

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the reasons for the relatively developed system of child care in the United States compared to Canada. The United States is normally considered a welfare state laggard. The United States has less generous welfare and unemployment assistance programs, no federal paid maternity leave or family allowances, no national health insurance, policy toleration for income gaps higher than Canada's, for example, and a range of policies with low redistributive impact. Canada's social assistance programs for families, including, until recently, a universal family allowance program, are more generous than programs in the United States.

While U.S. families on average tend to have higher incomes, the poverty rates in Canada are lower, as is the poverty gap. Canada's poverty rate for single parent families is lower than in the United States (32 per cent compared to 45 per cent in 1986). And despite the poverty programs in the United States such as AFDC and tax credits, tax and transfer programs in Canada help more families than in the United States. Compared to other industrialized countries, the United

1As quoted by Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 312.
3Blank and Hanratty, "Responding to Need," 204.
4Blank and Hanratty (197) found that the least generous province in Canada provided higher social assistance benefits for single-parent families than the maximum low-income transfers (AFDC and Food Stamps) available in the United States. The exception is Alaska. More investigation is needed regarding current programs as provinces have cut back social assistance benefits in recent years.
States spends a substantial portion of its GDP on health coverage. Unlike Canada and many other industrialized countries, however, the United States has a system of public health insurance only for the elderly and some elderly and disabled veterans. Families with children are covered under Medicaid if they receive AFDC, but Medicaid in fact covers less than half of the poor in the United States. Finally, the United States remains virtually the only country in the industrialized world that does not mandate maternity benefits or paid parental leave.

The case of child care therefore presents a real anomaly. The level of child care programs and services in the United States, while not as generous as France's, far surpasses Canada's. This confounds the common perception—indeed, the reality—that the United States has a less generous welfare state.

This chapter explores how child care policies have evolved in the United States. In doing so, it reveals the importance of ideas in combination with institutions. It demonstrates that maternalist-based norms and policies in the United States, as in France, managed to boost the development of child care programs more so than in Canada. However, the United States' truncated maternalism prevented further policy development. Liberal feminist norms have not been successful at expanding child care policies and public provision of child care remains primarily welfare-focused. Had maternalism remained predominant, public policy on child care would have perhaps emerged in the broader context of policies for the family, rather than along narrow welfare lines. The United States has a long way to go to establish stronger child care regulations, to try to decrease the number of for-profit child care centres, and to put money into developing child care programs, rather than just tax breaks to parents to pay for child care that may not exist. Child care policy in the United States can thus be characterized as maternalist in origin but welfare-oriented in the contemporary period.

---

5 In 1991, total expenditure on health care as a percentage of GDP was 10.0 per cent in Canada and 13.4 per cent in the United States. U.S. spending is the highest among G7 countries, including France at 9.1 per cent. OECD, OECD in Figures: Statistics of the Member Countries, 1994 ed. (Paris: OECD), 44-45.

The United States in Comparison to Canada

The percentage of children served in child care centres is higher in the United States than in Canada (see table 5.1). The Canadian data provide information on forms of care for children under age six, while the U.S. data provide information for children under age five, making a strict comparison impossible. Given these caveats, when we compare levels of care in the two countries, table 5.1 reveals that in 1988 in the United States, about 26 per cent of children under age five of employed mothers were primarily cared for in a centre-based program (either day care or nursery school) compared to about 17 per cent of children under age six in Canada. About 18 per cent of children under age five in the United States in 1988 were cared for in a family day care home, most likely unlicensed, or with loose regulations. In Canada, in the same year, about the same number of children—19 per cent of those under age six—were cared for in mostly unlicensed family day care (table 4.5).

Unfortunately, no national data exist for forms of care used in Canada later than 1988. In the United States, between 1988 and 1993, centre-based care (including day care centres and nursery schools) increased by about five per cent; care by non-relatives, including care in family day care homes, declined by seven per cent; care by relatives increased by four per cent; and care by a spouse increased by one per cent. Regulated forms of care—as the primary form of care—thus experienced the greatest increase in the United States over that period.

Furthermore, the proportion of children in centre-based care has increased markedly in the United States from the 1960s. The number of families that use centre-based care as their primary form of child care has increased from about six per cent in 1965 to 30 per cent by 1993. At the same time, more informal forms of care, such as care by relatives, decreased about five per cent between 1965 and 1993, in-home sitters by about 10 per cent, and mothers at work by about nine per cent (see table 5.2). The percentage of families using family day care has remained about the same. In Canada, the proportion of families using centre-based care has increased from one per cent in 1970 to about 17 per cent in 1988, a significant increase, but still comparatively


7The most recent national data available on forms of care in Canada are from the 1988 Canadian National Child Care Study, based on a survey of 24,155 households with 42,131 children. The data from the United States are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current
low (see tables 4.4, 5.1).

These figures do not reveal the actual levels of child care provision. A 1990 study conducted for the U.S. Department of Education reported that 80,000 early childhood education and day care programs existed at the beginning of 1990 in the United States, with the centres alone supplying 5.3 million spaces. The study reported finding 118,000 licensed family day care providers who could provide (legally) for 860,000 children.8 In Canada, the National Child Care Information Centre at Health and Welfare Canada reported in 1990 that 282,465 centre spaces and 38,159 family day care spaces existed.9

These figures do not reveal whether the supply of child care spaces in formal care is enough to meet the demand in these countries, or what proportion of these forms of care is provided by governments or the private sector. But they do reveal that more of a child care system existed in the United States than in Canada by the end of the 1980s, that is, a greater percentage of parents could place their children in some form of formal care, even if the regulations were not as strict, or the form of care was for-profit.10

Perhaps more revealing are kindergarten and pre-school/nursery school attendance levels in the two countries. Enrolment rates in the United States in 1994 for nursery schools and kindergartens were 60 per cent for four-year-olds and 89 per cent for five-year-olds, up from 26

---


10A lot more care in the United States is commercial care. Phillips reports that as of the late 1980s-early 1990s, more than 50 per cent of child care centres in the United States operated on a for-profit basis. Deborah Phillips, "Day Care for Young Children in the United States," in Day Care for Young Children: International Perspectives, eds. Edward C. Melhuish and Peter Moss (London: Tavistock/Routledge, 1991), 165. The expansion of not-for-profit care is a recent phenomenon in Canada. By 1979 in Canada, almost 50 per cent of centres remained for-profit. This has declined to about 37 per cent of spaces by 1985, and 30 per cent by 1993. Human Resources Development Canada, Status of Day Care in Canada 1993 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994), 5.
and 70 per cent in 1970 (see table 5.3). Interestingly, the percentage of three-year-olds in nursery school also increased quite significantly, from 13 per cent in 1970 to 34 per cent in 1994. OECD data for 1994 differ: the OECD gives nursery school and kindergarten enrolment figures of 28 per cent of children age three in the United States, 54 per cent of children age four, and 75 per cent of children age five (see table 1.4).  

Regardless of the data used, enrolment rates for children ages three to five are much higher in the United States than in Canada. The percentage of three- to five-year-olds in kindergarten and nursery school in Canada in 1988 was about 49 per cent (see table 4.5). For the same year in the United States, the OECD reports that the average enrolment rate for three- to five-year-olds was 55 per cent (table 1.3). The OECD reports enrolment levels in pre-primary education programs in Canada for 1994 at 48 per cent for four-year-olds and 69 per cent for five-year-olds, and it does not give any figures for three-year-olds. It should be pointed out as well that in both Canada and the United States, private nurseries are more common than public nurseries, whereas the majority of kindergartens are publicly provided.

Few researchers have noted the differences in levels of provision of child care and early childhood education in these two countries. There are some exceptions. In 1992, Ron Haskins, at the time a professional assistant to the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, observed high rates of public child care provision in the United States compared to both Canada and the United Kingdom, in terms of numbers of programs and levels of spending.  

Haskins argued that the United States has been the most interventionist of the three governments. The Congressional Research Service identified 46 federal programs operating in 1994 that were related to child care.  

The Ontario Coalition for Better Child Care in a May 1995 memo, "New Directions for Child Care Policy in Ontario," noted that families in the United States have greater access to regulated child care than in Ontario and that child care is more

---

11 I am not sure why the numbers vary as the OECD figures include both kindergarten and nursery school care as well as public and private forms.

affordable than in Ontario. The memo criticized the quality of child care in the United States, however, and noted the high rate of commercial programs, the comparatively low salary levels of workers, the lax enforcement of standards, and the lack of school age child care.

While a greater proportion of children are placed in child care centres in the United States (compared to Canada), and absolute levels of federal government spending are higher, spending on child care programs in the United States is still comparatively low relative to GDP. Table 5.11 as well as tables 2.5 and 2.6 reveal that France and Canada spend a far greater proportion of their GDP on child care programs, even when one includes U.S. tax programs for child care. These findings are consistent with U.S. spending on social programs as a percentage of GDP being among the lowest of OECD nations.

Summary of Argument

Why does the United States have higher levels of child care provision than Canada but low overall spending on child care compared to other industrialized countries such as France? My hypothesis is that maternalist ideas were institutionalized to a greater extent in the United States than in Canada, but not as much as in France. In fact, the U.S. case shows most starkly the impact of ideas and norms on policy development. First, the pluralist nature of politics in the United States revolves around a competition of ideas and groups promoting those ideas; ideas and actors are thus more influential in general in the United States. Second, maternalism does not remain predominant in the United States, allowing observation of what happens when norms significantly shift.

Maternalist norms clearly influenced the development of policies for women and children at the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States. Between 1911 and 1920, forty states enacted mothers' pensions, four more in the 1920s, and two in the 1930s. Many states in the United States went on to pass minimum wage laws for women workers, and protective labour legislation such as limits on women's hours of work. Canadian provincial governments also mandated protective labour legislation and mothers' allowances. However, U.S. governments

13U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, Green Book, 640. The General Accounting Office in 1992-93 identified even more: over 90 programs administered by 11 agencies and 20 offices, of which 34 programs had child care or education as their key mission.
went even further. At the national government level in the United States, even though expansion of the bureaucracy was not common at that time, the federal government established a Children's Bureau in 1912, a bureau run primarily by women, and added a Women's Bureau after World War I. Under the 1921 Sheppard-Towner Infancy and Maternity Protection Act, the government promoted maternal and child health education. The New Deal brought the maternalist-based Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), later to become Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). It remained a core welfare state program for much of the twentieth century. And the maternalist legacy continued with the establishment of Project Head Start in 1965.

While many feminist researchers of the American welfare state attribute the establishment of these policies and programs to the success of women's mobilization (that is, agency factors), I argue that women's organizations were successful because their ideas found a receptive audience among governments and other interest groups. Maternalism fit within familial norms that promoted a gendered division of labour. Maternalist ideas found favour with male-dominated trade unions which wanted to preserve employment for men. Maternalism had appeal among conservative as well as reformist women. Maternalist ideas also captured the support of government actors: both President Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Delano Roosevelt's administrations supported maternalist policies. Ideas as well as institutions mattered. Women's organizations were certainly pivotal in bringing forward ideas, but the translation of these ideas to policies and the embedding of these ideas in policies depended on institutional factors, as will be seen.

The U.S. case reveals most starkly the importance of maternalist ideas in the development of day care policies and programs. Maternalist reformers disapproved of day nurseries and saw them as a poor substitute for mother-care, but recognized their necessity for working families.

---

14Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 10; Felicia A. Kornbluh, "The New Literature on Gender and the Welfare State: The U.S. Case" Feminist Studies 22, 1 (Spring 1996), 181.

Day care became part of the services and programs for poor working women and their children established by maternalist reformers. Some researchers argue that maternalist resistance to the idea of day care inhibited the development of day care services.¹⁶ I point out, however, that maternalist reformers were the first to view day care as a necessary labour market policy and a way to reconcile work and family life.

In fact, the shift in ideology of women's organizations from maternalism to liberal feminism inhibited the development of day care services. Liberal feminism fit less well with dominant norms regarding the role of women in society. Maternalist discourse gave way in the 1930s and especially after World War II to liberal feminist discourse within women's groups. Early liberal feminism avoided advocating policies to help "mothers" as that was seen as enforcing gender norms. Women's organizations therefore shifted their focus from how to care for mothers and children to how to improve women's status in the workplace and society generally. Only in the 1960s did feminist organizations turn their attention to the issue of child care, seeing it as instrumental to helping women enter the workforce.

Had support for day care centres for working women remained strong amongst women's organizations, it is possible day care services would have expanded as a way to reconcile work and family life for the increasing female labour force by the mid-twentieth century and after. After all, maternalist ideas live on in a number of policies, such as Head Start and AFDC, which provide the basis for public child care provision in the United States.

Not only did women's organizations drop the child care ball, few other organizations were ready to take up the cause. Until the 1960s, social workers saw child care as a last-ditch alternative to "normal" family life. The organized health professions resisted group-care services "as a version of socialized medicine."¹⁷ And public school officials resisted the inclusion of child care as an educational program because it would compete for funds with other school programs. This left the responsibility for child care with the private sector: either for-profit

---

¹⁶See for example Sonya Michel, "The Limits of Maternalism: Policies toward American Wage-Earning Mothers during the Progressive Era," in Mothers of a New World, 277-320.

child care enterprises, employers, or charitable organizations.

The federal government in the 1960s became involved in the direct provision of child care funding as part of a program to help poor families on AFDC enter the workforce. It became involved in early childhood development to help children from poor families. Other constraints have emerged, though, to prevent the further development of child care policies other than along these maternalist welfare lines. Organized business interests resist the idea of mandating benefits as part of a labour market policy. The business ethos that pervades the United States also influences the provision of child care. Just as companies in the 1920s began to provide social service programs for their employees, so too today do companies provide child care, along with a variety of other programs such as elder care and health insurance. But because corporatist arrangements do not exist as in European countries like Germany, benefits do not extend to all workers. Trade unions have attempted to bargain for day care and the National Women's Trade Union League (WTUL) has made day care a priority since the end of World War II. But it is usually the case that if one is lucky enough to work in a large company in the United States with a high percentage of female employees, then one may have access to day care and a number of other benefits; if not, then one most likely with not have access. This creates a two-tiered child care system, with public assistance for poor families and corporate benefits for some parts of the middle and upper classes.

Other actors, such as conservative family groups, also resist the idea of women working outside the home. I labelled these groups "familist" in the introduction to demarcate them from maternalists. Unlike maternalists, who wish to increase women's autonomy and women's rights as mothers, while retaining women's choices, these conservative groups wish to impose a family ethic on society and confine women's roles solely to social reproduction. Child care policy reform is also complicated by a federal and congressional system that has entrenched a decentralized approach to social policy provision. The diffusion of authority opens up many points of resistance and leads to policy fragmentation.

The politics of race as well as gender are important to the contours of U.S. child care policy development. First, maternalism was a white middle class norm and maternalist policies primarily benefitted white mothers. Black mothers were expected to work and hence were much more supportive of the idea of day care. In fact, as detailed below, many maternalist policies
designed to help women remain at home, including mothers' pensions and AFDC, specifically excluded black women, some immigrants, and women who did not meet the proper standards of sexual morality. Programs like AFDC became controversial once blacks were seen to benefit disproportionately. In the 1960s, as the welfare rolls expanded, governments became less concerned with women working and sought to fund child care services in order to remove families from the welfare rolls. Ironically, then, child care has become a necessary labour market policy in the United States only as a way to prevent (primarily black) women from receiving AFDC benefits.

Thus, child care and other policies for women are still largely regarded as dichotomous by individualist feminists, employers, more conservative groups, and society as a whole, rather than as both necessary to reconcile work and family life. And because child care programs developed along welfare lines, the issue of child care has become wrapped up in the current debate over entitlement programs.

This chapter argues that U.S. child care policy development is best explained by historical and institutional factors as well as ideas and institutional embedding of ideas. Both maternalist and liberal feminist norms have been institutionalized as policies, leading to a very truncated child care system.

OVERVIEW OF CHILD CARE AND FAMILY POLICIES

Understanding this policy legacy also helps to understand the fragmented nature of child care programs and services in the United States. Child care in the United States is characterized by its incoherence, by the diversity of forms of care, the unevenness of regulation, and the stratification of use depending on the income of parents. The federal departments alone involved in the administration of child care include the Departments of Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, and Treasury, the Appalachian Regional Commission, the Corporation for National Service, and the Small

---

Business Administration. Not all provide child care programs directly. Some have another major purpose which includes some type of child care.

Three main goals lie behind public provision of child care in the United States. First, day care is provided as a child welfare service for children from poor, troubled, or abusive families. The roots of this policy stem from the earliest child care services, which were provided on this basis. The purpose of care is humanitarian intervention. Eligibility is granted on the basis of some family inadequacy. Governments feel justified in intervening where the child's own parents are deemed inadequate. Tellingly, responsibility for day care in all but one state in the United States lies with social welfare departments.

Second, child care provides an early childhood education function. Provision of early childhood education began in earnest in the 1920s. Early childhood education programs emerged in university settings and were associated with developmental psychology. In the 1960s, early childhood education became an important part of the War on Poverty. The well-known Project Head Start began in 1965. The government was motivated by a concern that children from poor families would lack cognitive, social, and physical skills necessary for school and not succeed. This project and others target poor children, primarily the ages of three to five. Again, government intervention is considered legitimate in order to even out the life chances between rich and poor children.

Third, funding for child care is provided as a support for parental employment, particularly parents on welfare. This goal really overlaps with goal number one because government-supported child care is often not seen as part of an overall labour market policy, but as part of adult anti-poverty programs.

Public policy in the United States regarding child care has not moved much beyond these goals. Three major forms of funding for child care exist: needs-based subsidies; tax benefits for

---

19U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, Green Book, 640.
20These are summarized in Phillips, "Day Care for Young Children in the United States," 165-7.
21The exception is California. It places day care and early childhood education programs under the Department of Education. Polly Spedding, "The United States of America," in International Handbook of Child Care Policies and Programs, ed. Moncrieff Cochran (Westport,
child care expenses; and benefits from employers or companies. Private provision by employers is becoming more common, with the aid of government subsidies, connoting a broader labour market goal. Joffe argues, though, that "public day care [not child care per se] has never succeeded in presenting itself as a universally desirable program. ...like many similar social programs that serve only the poor and otherwise devalued, public day care is caught in a cycle of social stigma and underfunding...

While certain forms of child care elicit strong public support, government action in this field remains weak.

Child Care Programs

In the 1960s, most child care was informal and mostly unregulated. About fifteen percent of working mothers still cared for their children, either while they were engaged in home-based work, or worked outside the home (table 5.2). By 1993, that picture had changed. The percentage of day care centres—care provided by day care centres for children whose mothers worked—increased from as little as five per cent of all care arrangements in 1965 to 30 per cent in 1993. Relatives provided only 41 per cent of care, compared to 47 per cent in 1965, reliance on sitters in the home decreased as well to five per cent from 15 per cent, and the number of working mothers caring for their own children declined to six per cent. The number of licensed centres grew from 18,307 centres for a total of 1.01 million spaces in 1976 to 62,989 centres providing 2.1 million spaces in 1986.

One key reason for the increase in regulated care is clearly demand. As elsewhere, child care has become an important public policy issue in the United States as more and more women enter the labour market. The United States witnessed a rapid increase of women in the labour force of both married and single women with children after World War II (see tables 5.4 and 5.5). Currently, a majority of families with children have mothers in the labour force. Whereas women with children under age 18 made up about 19 per cent of the labour force in 1947, the number had jumped to nearly 70 per cent by 1995. The percentage of women with young

Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 539.

children jumped from 12 per cent of the labour force in 1947, to about 62 per cent by 1995. Also important is the number of married women who have entered the labour force. Between 1970 and 1995, the most stark increase in labour market participation rates has been among married women with young children, with an increase of nearly 110 per cent from 30 per cent to 64 per cent. Furthermore, labour market participation rates increase as children get older, regardless of women's marital status (see table 5.6). With the incredible increase of women's labour market participation rates, and the relatively steady participation of men in the labour market, more informal means of care are not readily available and demand has increased for more formal forms of care. Since black women's labour market participation rates have always been markedly higher than white women's participation rates, it is more accurate to state that child care has become a visible public policy issue as white women's labour market participation rates have increased.

The United States has also experienced an increase in the number of women who are single parents or the sole providers in a household. The U.S. Ways and Means Committee reports that "in 1970, less than 12 percent of families with children were headed by a single mother, compared with almost 27 percent of families with children in 1994." Female-headed families increased from 3.4 million to 10 million between 1970 and 1994, while the number of two-parent families remained the same at about 26 million. All of these factors increase the need for child care.

For-profit centres are the major form of day care in the United States. It is estimated over 50 per cent of centres are operated on a for-profit basis. Many of these are chains, such as Kinder-Care Learning Centers, established in 1969. By the early 1990s, it operated 1,200 centres in the United States. Churches also provide a large number of day cares centres. The number of regulated family day care homes grew from 73,750 homes servicing 304,000 children

---

23Phillips, "Day Care for Young Children," 164.
24U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, Green Book, 626.
26A 1985 report, albeit conducted by the National Council of Churches of Christ, found that churches and synagogues, through their own programs, or through rental of space to other groups, were the largest day care providers in the United States. Diane Lindsey Reeves, Child
in 1977 to 165,276 homes servicing approximately 434,603 children in 1986. But the proportion of family day care homes has remained at around 17 per cent in 1993, compared to 16 per cent in 1965 (table 5.2). Olmsted estimates that still only about 10 to 40 per cent of family day care homes are licensed in the United States, meaning a vast portion of the family day care homes are unlicensed. Some states do not regulate day care in the home at all. Some states register family day care providers but do not require licensing. Other states only regulate providers caring for more than three children at a time. In no state is informal care provided by relatives or in-home care by nannies regulated.

In fact, no nationwide federal child care regulations exist, although Congress has made attempts to pass regulations. The federal government specifies that child care and family day care centres that receive federal funding must follow state standards. Regulatory responsibility therefore lies with the states. Because no nationwide federal regulations exist, regulatory standards vary widely between states. State regulation, where it exists, only applies to day care centres and family day care, not other forms of care. Some states have strict child-staff ratios, for example, allowing only three children to be supervised by one adult; others allow up to eight children per adult. Some states do not specify maximum group sizes. All states require on-site inspections of child care facilities before issuing licenses, but vary on the frequency of post-licensing inspections.

In addition, some states exempt a number of programs such as church-run day care centres, programs sponsored by public schools, nursery schools (pre-schools) which are part-day

---

Care Crisis: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, Cal.: ABC-CLIO, 1992), 5.

27Phillips, "Day Care for Young Children," 164.
29Olmsted, "Early Childhood Care," 382-3.
30Some federal regulations do exist. For example, federally funded day care programs must meet minimum health and safety requirements. Michael E. Lamb, Kathleen J. Sternberg, and Robert D. Ketterlinus, "Child Care in the United States: The Modern Era," in Child Care in Context, 214.
programs, recreational programs, and in some cases, school-age child care programs. Churches in 12 states have managed to avoid regulation of their religiously-oriented day care programs because they argue that would entail the state trying to control a ministry of the church. Some states do not regulate programs run by the military, or parent cooperatives, or programs run by private colleges and universities.

Only a handful of states provide funding to subsidize the low salaries of child care workers. The federal government suspended the *Comprehensive Employment and Training Act* (CETA) program, which had paid the salaries of many child care workers, in the early 1990s. Turnover in many day care centres is very high, which can diminish the overall quality of care.

Older children (ages three and four) are more likely to be cared for in an organized child care facility (33 per cent) than are children under age two (about 14 per cent) (see table 5.7). Infants and toddlers tend to be cared for by relatives or in a family day care home, rather than in a more formal child care arrangement.

Parents' income level will often determine the type of care chosen (see table 5.9). Poor families tend to rely on care by relatives (36 per cent compared to 24 per cent of non-poor families). Non-poor families tend to use organized child care facilities more than poor families (32 per cent compared to 21 per cent), even though low-income families are eligible for government subsidies. Non-poor families also tend to rely on family day care more than poor families (17 per cent compared to 12 per cent). The statistics therefore indicate that poor families rely on informal care more than non-poor families. Upper income families tend to rely the most on centre-based programs (table 5.10). Forty-nine per cent of families with incomes of $75,000 or more in 1995 used a centre-based program, compared to 25 per cent of those with incomes under $10,000. Use of forms of care also varies by racial and ethnic background (table 5.10). Black families tend to rely more on care by a relative than white families (31 per cent compared

---

31 Phillips, "Day Care for Young Children," 162; Spedding, "The United States of America," 545.
32 Olmsted, "Early Childhood Care and Education in the United States," 383.
to 18 per cent). Both tend to rely more on centre-based care than hispanic families, which have the lowest rates of non-parental care. The House Ways and Means Committee reports that child care expenses often consume a greater portion of the salaries of low-income families than higher income families, even if the higher income families used a more expensive form of care.35

Pre-primary Programs

Virtually all states provide kindergarten programs for five-year-olds, usually through public schools. The programs may be either half or full day. Over half the states offer some educational programs for four-year-olds, similar in content to Head Start, but financing comes from the state or local government rather than the federal government. These programs usually run on a part-day basis, are free, and operate on the school schedule.36

Federal Programs

Subsidies

Under the Social Security Act of 1935, services for recipients of welfare were not funded; instead the government gave cash transfers. The federal government did begin to fund services in the 1950s, but many states chose not to participate.37 Since then, the federal government has gradually expanded funding for the provision of social services, child care among them.

The federal government established Title XX funds of the Social Security Act in 1974. It is a capped entitlement. The states receive maximum flexibility in designing their programs, including deciding the distribution of resources. The federal government imposes some restrictions, for example, forbidding the use of Title XX funds for medical services. The states still have a great degree of discretion and do not have an explicit incentive to spend the monies on child care services, although many do. The House Ways and Means Committee reports that about 16 per cent of Title XX funding went to child care services in 1990.38 Forty-seven states

---

35U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, Green Book, 636.
37U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 688.
38U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 651; William Gromley, Everybody's Children: Child Care as a Public Problem (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 47. Other
in 1993 used the Title XX funds for child care services.  

At first the federal government distributed Title XX funds directly. In 1981, Title XX was converted into the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) which is now distributed to the states, according to population. The states now have the responsibility for distributing the funds. The states use the funds mainly for child care services for children of parents with low incomes, as well as training and counselling services for low-income mothers. Child care services must meet state and local standards. The funds can also be used to top up the salaries of child care workers. In 1985, because of its concerns about reports of child sexual abuse in day care centers, Congress approved a $25 million increase in title XX funding for use by the states to provide training for day care staff and other officials.

The federal government established the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) in 1990. Congress approved the CCDBG for a period of five years, although it was extended into 1996 and is now the major source of federal funding (see below). It provides child care for low-income families and it also can be used to improve the quality of state child care services. Congress authorized $750 million for 1991, $825 million and $925 million in 1992 and 1993, then "necessary sums" after that. Interestingly, Congress approved those increases at a time when the overall federal budget was being reduced. Parents are eligible for a subsidy if their income is less than 75 per cent of the median family income in their state, they are working or are in job training or other education program, and their child is under age 13. States must give priority to lowest-income families and families with children with special needs. The services funded under Title XX include protective services for children (about 12 per cent), substitute care and placement services like foster care and adoption (about 12 per cent), disabled persons services (about 6 per cent), and home support such as homemaker services (about 25 per cent). See U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, section 11 for details.


40Olmsted, "Early Childhood Care," 376.


42Sandra L. Hofferth and Sharon Gennis Deich, "Recent U.S. Child Care and Family
parents must be working or in a training program or clients of Child Protective Services.\textsuperscript{43}

Seventy-five per cent of block grant funds are direct grants. Ninety per cent of those funds must be used to help children of low-income families by providing child care \textit{services} on a sliding-scale fee. Up to 10 per cent can be used to improve the quality and availability of child care, as well as administrative costs. The other 25 per cent of the funds are broken down as follows: three-quarters of the 25 per cent share (or about 19 per cent) must be used to establish, expand, or operate early childhood development or before- and after-school child care programs. Twenty per cent (five per cent of the total funds) must be spent on quality improvements in one of the following areas: resource and referral programs; improvement of standards; monitoring compliance with regulatory requirements; training and technical assistance on such matters as nutrition, first aid, child abuse detection and prevention; and improving salaries of child care workers. The remaining amount of the 25 per cent can be distributed to any of these activities.\textsuperscript{44}

No state matching funds are necessary in order to receive funding. This distinguishes the CCDBG from the Canadian federal government's \textit{Canada Assistance Plan}. Some regulations are imposed. Providers must comply with health and safety standards and allow parents access. Parents have some choice as to the provider of care. Parents can enroll their children with a provider who already has a contract to provide services, or they may receive a certificate to spend on a child care provider of their choice. Parents must use some form of regulated and licensed child care centre, or family day care. The certificate may be used to pay a relative, like a grandparent, to provide care.\textsuperscript{45}

Finally, since 1984, the federal government has given money to state governments to help them establish school-age day care and child care resource and referral programs under the Dependent Care Resource and Referral/School-Age Block Grant program.\textsuperscript{46} These grants

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{43} Child Care Law Center, \textit{Child Care as Welfare Prevention} (San Francisco: CCLC, March 1995), 28.

\textsuperscript{44} U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 648-51.

\textsuperscript{45} Hofferth and Deich, "Recent U.S. Child Care and Family Legislation," 433.

\end{flushleft}
provide matching funds to states for before- and after-school child care programs for low-income families and for resource and referral programs. This grant began in 1990 and was authorized through 1995, providing $13 million in funds. No federal funds were authorized for 1996.47 Forty per cent of the grant was to be used on resource and referral programs, not just for children but also for the elderly, and 60 per cent on school age child care programs and services. States could waive those percentage requirements on request.

_Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC)_

After 1935, under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, the federal government provided assistance to children from poor families and their caregiver(s) as _Aid to Families with Dependent Children_ (AFDC). AFDC provided "cash welfare payments for needy children who have been deprived of parental support or care because their father or mother is absent from the house continuously, is incapacitated, is deceased or is unemployed." AFDC benefits were also paid to the caretaker relative of the child, usually the mother, and in some states may have been "paid to another person in the home who [was] deemed essential to the child's well-being."48 The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administered AFDC.

The federal government provided matching funds to the states at a rate of 50 to 80 per cent. To be eligible, families must have had an income below 185 per cent of the state's standard of "need" and they must also meet resource limitations.49 AFDC families also were eligible for Medicaid, food stamps, and sometimes, public housing. They were also eligible for child care services in certain instances.

States had a lot of flexibility in administering AFDC. The states set their own benefit levels and defined the criteria for determining families "in need". As a result, entitlements varied from state to state. Also, for years, many states only allowed single parent families to be eligible for AFDC. By the late 1980s, about half the states did allow two-parent families to collect

---

47U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 652.
48U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 384.
49Child Care Law Center, *Child Care as Welfare Prevention*, 28.
AFDC if the principal wage earner was unemployed (AFDC-UP). In 1990, Congress ruled that states must offer AFDC to two-parent families, where the principal wage-earner is unemployed but has a history of employment. States could restrict that coverage, though, to only six months of any year.

Beginning in 1967, the federal government also allocated monies to states via the Work Incentive Program (WIN) to supply child care to recipients of AFDC who were enrolled in work and training programs. The 1988 Family Support Act (FSA) replaced WIN with the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) Training Program, and greatly increased government responsibility for child care. The FSA was designed to help low-income parents become self-sufficient by mandating that they participate in employment, education, and training programs. In order to do so, though, the government recognized the need for child care. Thus, the FSA required states to guarantee child care provision to all participants in JOBS and to employed parents moving off AFDC. All states were to have a program in place by 1 October 1990.

As of the early 1990s, three kinds of child care programs were available to AFDC recipients under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act: child care for families who were employed or who were undergoing training but still eligible for AFDC; child care funding for families who were no longer eligible for AFDC but who needed support to make the transition (up to one year); and child care for families at risk of needing AFDC.

First, child care funding was available for those who were working or in a training program and receiving AFDC and who had a dependent child under the age of 13. The federal government required states to guarantee child care for parents who did find a job, or who were participating (either voluntarily or mandated) in the JOBS Training Program or in other non-JOBS education and training programs approved by the state. All parents receiving AFDC were required to participate in JOBS unless they had a child under age six. In that case, the

---

50 Banting, "Economic Integration and Social Policy," 34.
52 Some states effectively deny child care support to non-JOBS participants, however, because of fiscal constraints. O'Brien and Stevenson, "Child Care Under the Family Support
parent had to participate *only* if the state could guarantee child care. The parent then had to work or receive training only 20 hours per week. Parents with children under age three were also exempt unless a state opted to require them to work.

Under this program, the state could provide child care directly or arrange for the purchase of child care through providers, or provide cash or vouchers to families. States also had to allow families to make their own (legal) child care arrangements. States would receive federal matching funds up to the "75th percentile of the local market rate" which means the 75th percentile of the cost of care in the local child care market. States did not have to pay up to the 75th percentile for care, however. The federal government set a floor of $175 per month for one child over two years and $200 per month for a child under two. Many states set their payment rates below the 75th percentile which meant parents were unable to purchase good quality and safe care. Some states even actively promoted the use of unregulated care to mitigate the low benefit levels.

Despite the intentions of the program, only about 13 per cent of AFDC adults actually participated in JOBS in a given month. One reason for the low levels of participation was lack of child care. Child care was often in short supply, especially particular types of care such as infant care, before- and after-school care, and care for sick children. As well, child care was only available for a short time for those looking for jobs. Many AFDC recipients had a hard time finding someone to care for their child or children while looking for work or attending interviews, which made it difficult for them to obtain employment. Many adults eligible for JOBS could not find places because of enrolment caps. Receiving child care assistance while participating in a non-JOBS training program was more difficult because of budgetary considerations.

Before the passage of the FSA, the only transitional child care support available to families was via AFDC disregard. This provision allowed child care (as well as elder care) to be

---

54 O'Brien and Stevenson, 19.
55 U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 647.
56 O'Brien and Stevenson, 15.
treated as an allowable work expense under AFDC. It could be used by parents who obtained employment but without a high enough income to be able to leave AFDC. States limited the amount of the earnings adjustment to $175 per month for a child over age two and $200 per month for a child under two, almost never enough to pay for quality care. Also, the parent had to pay the full cost of care and then be reimbursed, usually with a waiting period of two months. O'Brien and Stevenson argue that the difficulties parents had in obtaining AFDC disregard, combined with generally low wages in the United States, meant some parents never made it off AFDC in order to benefit from the transitional child care benefit program (described below).

Under the FSA, states could provide a supplement to the disregard limit to pay for the cost of child care "up to the 75th percentile of the local market rate." The federal government in this case provided matching funds at a rate of 50 to 80 per cent. Only a handful of states chose to do so. States also had the option to pay for child care directly in the same way as they paid for JOBS and for TCC. Families may have been at a disadvantage in taking the direct grant, however, as the AFDC disregard (deduction) for child care may have been the only thing keeping them eligible for AFDC. The advantage to such a grant was not having to pay for the cost of care up front.

Under the 1988 FSA, the federal government introduced a second program called transitional child care (TCC). After a family left AFDC, the parent became eligible for child care funding for up to one year. States had to guarantee child care to parents whose increased hours, increased income, or time limit made them ineligible for AFDC if the child care was needed in order for the parent to retain employment. Again, the federal government provided matching funds to the states for this program at a rate of 50 to 80 per cent. Parents had to contribute to the cost of care, based on a sliding fee scale. Many parents were not made aware of the program and it remained underutilized.

---

57 O'Brien and Stevenson, 14.
58 The parent's child care expenses were first deducted from the earned income before calculating the size of the AFDC grant. O'Brien and Stevenson, 16.
59 Child Care Law Center, 28.
60 O'Brien and Stevenson, 16.
61 O'Brien and Stevenson, 16.
62 O'Brien and Stevenson (17) report that, in a study of 20 states, the General Accounting
Finally, under the *Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act* of 1990 (not the FSA), child care funds were made available for families at risk of becoming poor and thus in need of AFDC. The At-Risk Child Care Program allocated $300 million annually (a capped entitlement) in matching funds to states for child care expenditures. The program was targeted to low-income families with an employed family member, who would need AFDC if care for a child under age 13 was not made available to them. Again, the states had flexibility in providing the child care. And parents had to contribute to the cost of care. A 1994 Government Accounting Office report found that differences in eligibility rules, standards, requirements, and so on between states, combined with fiscal constraints, led to gaps in child care services for low-income families. The 1994 GAO report stated that "primarily because of a shortage of resources, substantial numbers of nonwelfare working poor families who were eligible for child care subsidies by virtue of their income were denied benefits and placed on waiting lists in five out of six States visited."63 (Repeal of AFDC and AFDC-related child care programs is discussed below.)

*Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP)*

The federal government established the Child and Adult Care Food Program in 1968. It is authorized as part of the *National School Lunch Act*, and provides federal subsidies for meals for children in child care centres and family day care homes. The majority of children in the program are between the ages of three and six. In the fiscal year 1995, on average 2.3 million children per day attended CACFP-subsidized centres and homes (child care centres, Head Start centres, and so on). Federal spending is estimated at $1.58 billion in fiscal year 1996, making it the largest single source of financial assistance for child care.64 The Department of Agriculture administers this program. The program also sends sponsors around to participating family day care homes three times a year to offer assistance.65

---

Office found "only 20 percent of eligible families were receiving TCC in 1991."

63 U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 642.

64 U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 653.

65 Gromley, *Everybody's Children*, 47.
Developmental Programs

Publicly-funded kindergartens have become nearly universal in the United States, but public responsibility for pre-school only extends to disadvantaged children. The most well-known of these pre-school programs is Project Head Start, established by the federal government in 1965 as part of a national campaign against poverty. It is one of the few programs to continue from President Johnson's War on Poverty. Administered by the HSS under the ACF, Head Start provides early childhood development, educational, health, nutritional, social and other services mainly to low-income pre-school children and families, generally through part-day programs. Head Start programs served about 750,700 children in 1995, most of whom are three- and four-year-olds from low-income families. The programs run part- and full-day and often year-round. Programs are free to parents.

Head Start is educational and developmental in focus, designed to prepare children over the age of three for school. It is considered an important alternative model of child care, emphasizing the need for education for young children. Local agencies administer Head Start but the federal government provides the main funding. The program also encourages the involvement of parents in classroom instruction, as classroom volunteers, and as decision-makers in the running of the program. While federally-funded, it is community-based and community-driven. Despite its popularity and public support, the program is still very small. In 1992 Head Start served only about one-third of eligible three- to five-year-olds. Its demonstration programs also reached about one per cent of infants and toddlers living in poverty.

Tax Programs

Tax programs that allow parents to deduct child care expenses from their income tax provide one of the largest indirect sources of federal funding for child care. One such program is the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit. It has evolved from the original 1954 legislation that allowed parents to deduct a portion of their child care expenses from federal income tax.

---

66U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 654.
68The 1954 legislation only allowed employed women, widowers, and legally separated
1976, the government eliminated the deduction and made it a non-refundable tax credit.

Under the current legislation, a nonrefundable credit can be claimed for up to 30 per cent of employment-related child care (and other dependent care) expenses, to a maximum of $2,400 for one child and $4,800 for two or more children, usually under the age of 13 (benefits for children ages 13-15 were eliminated in 1988). This credit is most directly beneficial to the middle and upper classes, as a family has to have taxable earnings and thus pay income tax, as well as be able to afford child care, to take advantage of it.69 Since it is nonrefundable, the amount claimed cannot be larger than the family's tax liability.70

In 1988, changed regulations required parents to provide the social security number of their provider. Also, parents could no longer claim this tax credit along with the employer-provided child care assistance, described below. As a result of these changes, the number of parents claiming this credit decreased from 8.7 million in 1988 to 6.1 million in 1989. The dramatic drop may indicate the number of providers of child care who were not claiming their income on taxes.71

A second federal tax program began in 1981: the Employer-Provided Dependent Care Assistance Plan provides a tax exemption for child care arrangements paid through employee benefit plans. Under this plan, employees can exclude from their gross taxable income up to

---

69 The U.S. Committee on Ways and Means (811) reports that in 1994, about 13 per cent of the child tax benefit went to families with an adjusted gross income of less than $20,000, about 46 per cent to families with an adjusted gross income between $20-50,000, and about 41 per cent to families with an adjusted gross income above $50,000.

70 David E. Bloom and Todd P. Steen, "Minding the Baby in the United States," in Who Will Mind the Baby? Geographies of Child Care and Working Mothers, ed. Kim England (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 26. Only about 25 per cent of the benefits for the Dependent Care Tax Credit go to the bottom half of the income distribution in the U.S. If the government were to make the credit refundable, economists estimate about 43 per cent would go to the bottom half of the income distribution. Robins, "Child Care Policy and Research," 35.

71 Bloom and Steen, 26. Few will forget the withdrawal of two of President Clinton's candidates for Attorney-General, Zoë Baird and Kimba Wood, when it was revealed they had hired undocumented aliens as nannies and, in Baird's case, had not paid Social Security taxes for their services.
$5,000 per year for child care expenses. The employer makes the deductions from the employee's salary, allowing the employee to use the deduction for child care tax-free. The program is most beneficial to employees in higher tax brackets. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics conducted a survey of private firms in 1993 and found that only about one-tenth of full-time employees were eligible for child care benefits directly provided by the employer, either through provision of on-site or near-site child care, or through reimbursement of employee expenses. This program thus benefits a small proportion of employees in the United States.

Finally, the federal government established the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (or Earned Income Credit - EIC) program in 1975. It can also be viewed as another support for child care. Low-income working parents, with incomes roughly under $20,000, receive a tax credit which can go to pay for child care outside the home, or help families care for children in their own home. It can also go to other expenses such as health insurance for children. In 1990, the federal government increased the EITC from 14 to 23 per cent, to be phased in over four years. It also "increased the credit by an additional 2% for families having more than one child, by another 5% for any family in which one of the children is under age 1, and by yet another 6% for any family using the money to purchase health insurance that covers a child." The additional credits for young children and for health insurance premiums were repealed in 1993. In the same year, though, childless workers became eligible for the credit.

As of 1996, taxpayers with one child (under 19, or 24 if in school) can claim a credit of 34 per cent of earnings, with a maximum credit of $2,152 (after that income level, the credit is phased out according to a fixed schedule). Taxpayers with more than one child can claim a credit of 40 per cent of earnings up to $3,556, again with a phase-out for higher income earners. Taxpayers with no children can claim a credit if they are over 24 and under 65 and have an income below $9500. The maximum credit is $323. This is a refundable tax credit and since 1987 is indexed for inflation. Because it is a refundable tax credit, if the amount of the credit

---

72 U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 813.
73 Gromley, Everybody's Children, 47.
75 U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 804.
exceeds the taxpayer's income tax liability, the excess is paid to them as a transfer payment.\textsuperscript{76} About 70 per cent of EIC benefits go to single parents.\textsuperscript{77}

\textit{The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996}

The \textit{Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act} of 1996 (Public Law 104-193) made a number of changes to the U.S. welfare system that affected AFDC-related child care programs. The federal government no longer provides cash entitlements under the Social Security Act. Instead, it now gives two block grants to states: one, the \textit{Temporary Assistance for Needy Families} (TANF) grant to help states pay for welfare programs; and the other to help states subsidize child care costs for families who are on welfare, leaving welfare, or at risk of being on welfare. The TANF block grant replaces AFDC as well as AFDC Administration, the JOBS Program, and the Emergency Assistance Program.

The new program represents a fundamental alteration of welfare programs in the United States. Not only does it remove the federal government from any direct role in welfare, it imposes more stringent rules on those receiving welfare, the most severe of which is the time limit on receiving benefits. Families who have been receiving welfare benefits for more than five years are no longer eligible for welfare in their lifetime. States can even shorten the time limit, although states are allowed to exempt up to 20 per cent of their caseload from the time limit. This is considered a very draconian rule, as the average length of stay on welfare, adding together all periods of receipt of benefits, is currently 13 years.\textsuperscript{78} Families become ineligible if any member has received aid as an adult for five years.

Under the new law, all able-bodied adults receiving welfare will have to make efforts to find employment, and after two years (or less at state option) participate in training or some other program to help them become self-supporting. After two months of receiving benefits, recipients not working must participate in "community service employment" (workfare) with hours and tasks set by the state. The law exempts single parents with a child under age six who cannot

\textsuperscript{76}Also, as of 1979, individuals do not have to wait to claim the credit when filing in April; instead, they can receive the benefit of the credit on periodic paycheques, helping lower income families especially.

\textsuperscript{77}U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 807.
obtain child care from participating in community service employment. States can also exempt parents with a child under the age of one from any other work requirement. Single parents with children under age six cannot be penalized if they fail to participate in work activities if they show they could not obtain child care.

Under the new law, the federal government combined funds from several child care programs: AFDC-related child care programs such as child care benefits under the JOBS program, TCC, and at-risk child care. A single child care block grant was then added to the CCDBG. The CCDBG thus became the major federal child care program, with a reported increase in funding of over $4 billion. The new block grant program to replace AFDC-related child care became effective 1 October 1996.

The new law repeals the guarantee under the FSA that recipients of welfare who participate in jobs programs will receive welfare. States are required to spend 70 per cent of their entitlement funding under TANF for services for TANF recipients, or ex-recipients, or families at risk of needing TANF. The impact in terms of child care programs is enormous. The government expects families to become self-sufficient but provides them with less guaranteed support to help them make the transition from welfare to work. Those who are most dependent on welfare services, the long-term unemployed, will have less access to the limited programs like child care set up to help them make the transition from welfare to work. So will non-citizens.

The law also contains provisions to reduce the number of births outside marriage, encourage marriage as a form of income support, and establish paternity so that fathers must pay child support. Teen mothers receiving welfare benefits must live at home or with a responsible adult and attend school in order to receive benefits. They lose 25 per cent of their benefits if they do not help establish the paternity of the child or obtain child support. States may limit or deny teen parents from receiving cash welfare. Also states may end entitlements to families if they have more children outside of marriage (the "family cap"). Fifty million dollars in entitlement funds annually through the year 2002 are to go to "abstinence education." The federal

78 U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 1327.
79 U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 1328. I say "reported" as the budget projections indicate an expected steady decrease in the SSBG beginning in 1997. U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 1332, table L-2.
government will pay states performance bonuses ($1 billion over five years) if they succeed in reducing childbirths and increasing the number of two-parent families, according to the goals of the act, and $400 million if they reduce their illegitimacy rates while decreasing abortion rates.80

The new law aims to reduce the number of primarily black single mothers from the welfare rolls. While approximately one-third of children were born outside marriage in 1994, among black women, the rate was 70 per cent—not surprising when the only income assistance in many states required one to be a single parent.81 The new law is invasive of privacy, and puts forward a particular morality: a two-parent family is better than one; women should not only be looking for employment but income assistance from a husband. Furthermore, the law explicitly encourages states "to involve religious and other private organizations in the delivery of welfare services to the greatest extent possible."82 The legislation, as part of its "national priorities", prohibits states from giving cash welfare benefits or food stamps to anyone convicted of a felony

80U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 1337-8.
81U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 1329. For a critique of the argument that the availability of welfare benefits leads to the increase in unmarried birth rates, see Jared Bernstein, "Welfare-Bashing Redux: The Return of Charles Murray," The Humanist (January/February 1995), 22-25; Kathryn M. Neckerman, Robert Aponte, and William Julius Wilson, "Family Structure, Black Unemployment, and American Social Policy," in The Politics of Social Policy in the United States, eds. Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 397-419; Teresa L. Amott, "Black Women and AFDC: Making Entitlement Out of Necessity," in Women, the State, and Welfare, ed. Linda Gordon (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 280-98. The structure of AFDC often forces parents to remain single in order to receive benefits, and a significant increase in single-parenthood among blacks in the United States occurred in the 1960s, when blacks became widely eligible for AFDC. Amott (283-4) argues, however, that because black single mothers tended to live with their relatives before becoming eligible to receive AFDC, they were not counted as single parents. AFDC, by allowing women to live independently, also made visible their single-parenthood.

Both Bernstein and Neckerman et al. dispute the argument that families make a rational calculation to remain on welfare rather than working. If so, logically, many should have left the welfare rolls in the 1970s when the real value of AFDC benefits declined. They also dispute the argument that AFDC encourages women to have babies. Neckerman et al. argue that policy makers instead should look at the declining rates of employment among black males to understand the increasing proportion of single-headed families.

82U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 1339.
"involving the possession, use, or distribution of illegal drugs."\(^{83}\) This provision eliminates drug users in the urban ghettos from receiving benefits—although their children would still be eligible to receive benefits. States are given the flexibility to opt out of this provision or they can limit the period of ineligibility if they enact a new law.

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act represents a reversal of past welfare policies in the United States, although it has roots in both WIN and JOBS. It is an explicit rejection of the idea that mothers should stay home with their children. It presents the hope that child care services will expand in order to allow parents to enter the labour force. Without a guarantee of child care, this is problematic. Flexibility in eligibility rules and so on ensure that programs will vary by state even more than they did under AFDC.

**Spending on Child Care and Other Programs**

**Federal Spending**

The federal government provides child care funding through welfare supports, Head Start, and tax benefits. O'Brien and Stevenson argue that "the almost complete lack of coordination of these various programs at the federal level results in a highly fragmented, complex, and sometimes chaotic 'system' of publicly subsidized child care." They go on to write that:

Overlapping and divided jurisdictions, differing eligibility criteria, varying reporting and oversight systems, and lack of communication and coordination between the various entities involved often make it extremely difficult for parents to decipher and access programs for which they may be eligible, and can prevent administrators from shifting families from one funding stream to another as their circumstances change.\(^{84}\)

The multiple sources of child care funding exacerbate these problems. All three levels of government provide funding for day care, either through direct grants or tax credits. Government funds are usually provided to centre-based care and regulated family day care. Many public funding programs require that the money go to regulated services, although these regulated services can be for-profit or not-for-profit.

The federal government provides the biggest share of child care funding, with the vast

---

\(^{83}\)U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 1340.

majority coming from five main programs: Head Start, Title XX/SSBG, the Child Care and Development Block Grant, the Child and Adult Care Food Program, and the Dependent Care Tax Credit (see table 5.11). Some of these programs do not provide direct support for child care, but are indirect supports or provide monies for child care as part of another program (Title XX for example). Few monies are directed to building a child care system. Many of the programs provide support that child care advocates consider less than ideal. The EITC is a source of controversy, for example, because it provides benefits for parents to stay home with their children instead of expanding public day care. The programs mainly provide direct subsidies to disadvantaged families, or indirect subsidies to encourage use of private forms of care. The federal government does not seem to be trying to build a child care system for all. In addition, despite the increased federal spending, Robins argues, middle and upper income families benefit most from these programs.85

Even though federal child care spending has increased significantly since 1990, the United States spends a substantially lower proportion of its GDP on child care than either France or Canada. Even if one includes the revenues foregone from the EITC (which may be controversial as, since 1993 EITC, goes to families without children), spending levels are significantly lower as a proportion of overall wealth. Child care spending also comprises a very low per cent of the federal budget. Hofferth and Deich report that as of 1993, child care and early childhood education programs amounted to one half of one per cent of the federal budget, and about one per cent if one included federal expenditures on AFDC.86 The federal government still provides no national paid maternity leave program—a huge gap in provision compared to other countries.

State and Local Government Spending

State funding is generally through matching of federal grants, thus adding to the pool of funds available for day care. The amount of support varies by state, as it does at the local level. Robins reports that in 1985 states spent at most 20 per cent of what the federal government spent.

86Hofferth and Deich, "Recent U.S. Child Care and Family Legislation," 445.
or one-fifth of the federal total on child care.87 Local government spending is even less well known but, Gromley argues, is probably less than state spending.88 Robins estimates that in 1985, child care spending of all three levels totalled about $1.1 billion. California, New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Illinois were the biggest spenders, and accounted for nearly three-fifths of all spending.89 The efforts of the three levels of government remain uncoordinated. Fragmentation and unevenness characterize provision of day care services across states.

**Employer-Sponsored Child Care**

An increasingly important source of funding is through employer-sponsored care. This is not surprising, given that the United States has a history of private provision of welfare. Because of a strong belief in the market, as well as a federal system that has pushed for the decentralization of many social policies, Skocpol and Ikenberry argue the United States instituted what they label "welfare capitalism". They define welfare capitalism as "the entire complex of innovative labor-management practices adopted by certain highly visible U.S. companies during the 1920s."90 It was thought these provisions would prevent unionization and the development of public social insurance. Programs included company pension plans; safety and health-insurance benefits; and guarantees of stable employment for workers.

This trend is visible in the provision of child care services. Employers provide a number of services. Some will set up on-site day care centres while others provide "cafeteria plans". The latter operate similarly to the Employer-Based Dependent Care Assistance Plan where employers and employees can decide to direct salary monies to benefit plans that can include child care services. Child care in these plans is treated like a fringe benefit to be selected from among a group of options like life insurance. In two-career families these programs are popular as they

---

87Robins, 26.
allow the family to maximize their benefits from two employers.91 Other employers may provide support for resource and referral services. Like those provided by many communities, referral services "help parents locate child care, recruit and train new providers, gather data about child care needs and services, and offer technical assistance to employers, policy makers and others, and often take the lead in advocacy efforts for children, parents, and providers."92 Some employers may contract via the community service, while other employers provide the service themselves through their human resource departments.

Most of the programs that involve employers require little or no financial outlay. These programs include job-sharing, flexible hours, unpaid parental leave, and the Employer-Based Dependent Care Assistance Plan.93 The latter is a plan "whereby a portion of one's salary is paid in the form of a non-taxable day care benefit."94 Under this plan, employees can exclude from their gross taxable income up to $5,000 per year for child care expenses. The deductions are made from the employee's salary and thus enable the employee to obtain child care tax-free. Gromley reports that as of the early 1990s, "among firms with ten or more employees, 61 percent offer flextime, 43 percent offer part-time work, and 16 per cent offer work at home as employee options."95

Mason argues that "in the United States, absent national policies, it is up to individual companies to provide family-friendly programs which creates pockets of innovation but not a national trend."96 In the contemporary period as well as during World War II, employers become increasingly concerned about the lack of public day care and the consequences, including increased absenteeism and loss of female employees whom the company trained. During World War II, for example, the Kaiser Shipbuilding Corporation, located in Portland Oregon, established two day care centres, funded by a combination of Lanham funds, company

---

91Olmsted, "Early Childhood Care and Education in the United States," 376.
92Spedding, "The United States of America," 547.
93Gromley, Everybodys Children, 48.
94Phillips, "Day Care for Young Children," 163.
95Gromley, 146.
contributions, and parent fees.97 These were the first employer-sponsored day care centres, designed to serve the children of the 25,000 female workers in the shipyards. The day care centres operated all year, were open 24 hours a day, and served about 4,000 children. They also provided meals to parents and offered innovative programs generally. After World War II, though, when the shipyards shut down, so did the day care centres. Employer-provided child care is thus not considered a long-term solution to the problem of child care supply.

In 1985, about 2,500 businesses provided some form of support for day care. About 500 of those provided day care centres at or near the workplace.98 By the end of the 1980s, about 5,500 companies offered some kind of support for child care, and about 10 per cent of workers "had access to an employer sponsored child care center at or near their place of employment."99 Even though employer-supported child care is increasing, it is still relatively rare.

Public Opinion on Child Care

Polls still show that the public by and large does not support public care, and certainly does not support public funding for day care. A 1993 Gallup poll found that 62 per cent of adults thought care in a child's home was the best form of care. Care in a day care centre was second, but distantly, at 16 per cent. Care in a family day care home ranked third in preference at 12 per cent. The responses varied depending on the age of the child being considered. Group care was found to be more acceptable for older children than it was for infants. Forty-four per cent said they still preferred home care for toddlers, but 31 per cent said they preferred child care centres, with family day care homes following at 19 per cent.100

97Kerr, 165.
98Phillips, "Day Care for Young Children," 163.
100Diane Crispell, "Child-Care Choices Don't Match Moms' Wishes," American
Public opinion does not reflect practice, however, as table 5.8 reveals. In 1993, only 32 per cent of children under the age of five of working mothers were cared for in their own home (assuming care by the father occurred in-home). Thirty-one per cent were cared for in organized child care facilities, 16 per cent by a relative in another home, 17 per cent by family day care, and 6 per cent by the mother at work. Regarding the care of infants, in 1991, about 40 per cent of children under age one were cared for in their own home whereas 60 per cent were cared for elsewhere, including eight per cent who were cared for by their mothers at work (table 5.7).

Despite the fact that child care choices do not match families' ideals, public support is not great for expanding out-of-home care, especially to solve the work-family dilemma. A Gallup poll taken in 1985 asked whether child care should become part of public school programs, and funded by taxpayers. The result showed a real division of opinion. Berry reports that 45 per cent said no, 42 per cent said yes, and 12 per cent expressed no opinion. When asked whether such programs should be established to help deal with the problem of latchkey children, support for the initiative decreased by two per cent. A 1987 opinion poll revealed that only 34 per cent of respondents would support increased taxes to pay for quality day care. Public opinion remains generally opposed or ambivalent to publicly funded child care. This ambivalence exists despite the massive increase of women in the labour market, and despite the fact that 56 per cent of women with children ages five and under at home report that it is "hard to find quality child care" and that it is a "serious problem"; while 53 per cent report that "information and support for child and dependent care" is a high priority for them.

EXPLANATION - CHILD CARE POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Dominant Ideas

Many students of American politics contend that American political culture is based on

Demographics 16, 7 (July 1994), 11-13.


102Phillips, "Day Care for Young Children," 179.

individualism and a belief in limited government. The traditional view describes the United States as a nation of "rugged individualists", who believe in the ideals of self-sufficiency, individual freedom, and the work ethic.\textsuperscript{104} Freedom comes from the non-intervention of the state. In contrast to Europe, where poverty and social welfare are regarded as state or government concerns, and people tend to trust and demand government action, many Americans tend to believe poverty is an individual concern and can be righted via individual efforts; Americans tend to distrust government to solve social problems. Americans also believe, it is commonly said, in the market to correct problems and guide social service delivery, with the state only intervening when absolutely necessary.

Some researchers refute this picture of American values. Skocpol argues, for example, that Americans do support some universal social programs, such as social security.\textsuperscript{105} Social welfare programs in the United States, in fact, are described as two-tiered. First-tier programs are not means-tested and offer relatively high benefits. They include Social Security and Medicare. Second-tier programs are directed at those in need. They are means-tested and the benefits are not as great as first-tier programs. They include AFDC and Medicaid.

The split between policies based on entitlement and those based on need is stark in the United States. What explains it? Skocpol writes that the social policies that have developed in the United States have been those which are part of "broader policies that express shared values and also benefit middle-class citizens."\textsuperscript{106} Quadagno contends that Social Security (old age pensions plus Medicare) is the only program currently in existence wherein middle classes receive something tangible for their contributions. Thus, public support for those programs is very high.\textsuperscript{107} Public support is not strong for other programs such as AFDC that the public regards as advantaging the non-working over the working poor.

The split in social policy provision reflects a strong current of conservatism that runs through America, which in many ways has been more influential than liberalism. This


\textsuperscript{105}Skocpol, \textit{Social Policy in the United States}, introduction, chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{106}Skocpol, \textit{Social Policy}, 7.
conservatism reflects nineteenth century thinking that distinguishes between the "deserving" and "undeserving", rather than seeing individuals as equally deserving of care, regardless of race, marital status, and so on. For example, Kudrle and Marmor speculate that opposition to the development of a family allowance program in the United States stems not only from concerns of fiscal inefficiency, but also fear of an increase in the birth rate among the poor—presumably undeserving of help to raise children.108

The split also reflects a very deeply entrenched politics of race, or, as Hanson points out, citing Gary Klass, "a preference for collectivist social action and public policies that extract and distribute resources within rather than between social groups."109 This "decentralized social altruism" is reflected in the hostility to poverty programs that are perceived to be aimed at or benefit certain racial groups over the dominant group. The predominant thinking in Congress currently reflects a very conservative moralism, as seen in the 1996 welfare reforms that supported abstinence education, as opposed to abortion, and encouraged two-parent families. Hostility toward AFDC is rooted in the fear amongst whites in the United States that it supports and encourages unmarried black women to have babies.110

A strong ethos of charity also prevails in the United States. Americans may not believe governments should provide relief, but many benevolent societies, church-based charities, and philanthropists voluntarily provide social service programs, including child care services. This culture of caring and volunteerism by the privileged for the less fortunate is similar to what has been labelled "red toryism" in Canada. Finally, Americans upheld very conservative views of women's roles in society, views that only recently are changing. As pointed out, until the 1960s, many more women in France worked outside the home compared to white women in the United States. For a good part of this century, the white middle class ideal for women in the United States was to remain in the home. For some groups in the United States, such as Phyllis Shlaflly's

107Quadagno, The Color of Welfare, 162.
Eagle Forum, that remains the ideal.

Liberalism—the belief in equality of opportunity—fits less well with these conservative social ideas, especially with regard to policies for women. This is why liberal programs established under the New Deal and the War on Poverty are under attack. Conservative ideas regarding social policy have become institutionalized in the United States. There are some exceptions like old age security and Medicare. Nonetheless, these latter programs are targeted at those considered deserving: that is, the aged. Understanding these programs as exceptions, rather than as representative, helps to grasp better the politics of child care policy. Maternalism in fact fits better within the prevailing normative framework of the American welfare state than does liberal feminism.

Key Institutions

Congressional System

Ideas alone, though, cannot account for the development of the welfare state in the United States. One cannot deny the impact of American institutions and the power they give to certain groups. Steinmo contends that American political institutions place enormous barriers in the path of social reform. He states that the structure of U.S. government fragments and decentralizes political power and "biases the political system in favor of certain kinds of interests and strategies, while it disadvantages others."111

The Congressional system reflects the belief in limited government in its design: the separation of powers divides the executive, legislature, and judiciary at the national level and disperses political authority among three branches of government. As Pierson argues, "The administrative capacities of the federal government are relatively feeble, impeding the design and implementation of extensive policies."112 The Congressional system promotes a stable two-party system that allows loose party ties, weak ideological differentiation, and greater representation of constituency or other concerns. Parties operate more as patronage machines;

112 Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of
they do not promote policy alternatives but respond to interest groups, which are themselves fragmented and plural, not the "peak associations" that exist in Europe.

**Federalism**

Added to this is a federal system of government that disperses authority between two levels of government, including in the area of social policy. Many of the areas related to families are under state, not federal, jurisdiction. Very few national as opposed to federal programs exist. However, federalism per se does not necessarily affect generosity. As Blank and Hanratty point out, authority for Canada's social assistance program is more decentralized than AFDC in the United States but it has more generous benefit levels than AFDC.113 Rather, institutional fragmentation makes it necessary for politicians to forge alliances with key interest groups and other branches of government in order to achieve policy change. This encourages pluralist politics and allows the most powerful interests to shape policies and perhaps even thwart reform.

**Key Actors**

*Organized Interests*

Many researchers have noted how federalism, combined with the power of organized interests, can affect policy outcomes in the United States. Skocpol and Ikenberry argue that southern states leading up to the New Deal era favoured decentralized and federalist, as opposed to national, administrative arrangements because "of their desire to protect racist practices and low-cost patterns of labor control."114 This coalition of southern politicians managed to delay implementation of unemployment insurance and public assistance. And while it failed to completely block reform, the southern coalition managed to shape it: occupations where blacks

---

113Blank and Hanratty, "Responding to Need," 220.
114Skocpol and Ikenberry, "The Road to Social Security," 158. They also argue that "liberals in Congress also often shortsightedly supported federal rather than national arrangements in order to protect more progressive state-level practices." Interestingly, some business leaders pushed for more national programs as a means to prevent companies with worse labour practices from undercutting them. See also Jill Quadagno, *The Transformation of Old Age Security* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); and Hanson, "Liberalism and the Course of American Social Welfare Policy."
comprised 60 per cent of those employed—agricultural and domestic work—were excluded from the 1935 legislation regarding unemployment and old-age coverage.\textsuperscript{115} Conservative groups and doctors mobilized successfully to defeat the Sheppard-Towner Act in 1929 and resist the implementation of health care legislation in the United States during the New Deal era. The struggle over child care policy from the 1960s onward especially demonstrates the impact of organized interests.

Within this pattern of pluralist politics, some actors have managed to become more powerful than others in the United States. Trade unions are much weaker in the United States than in most other western industrialized countries and tend to focus on collective bargaining rights, not broader social policies. Trade union membership is among the lowest of western industrialized countries. Furthermore, because the trade union movement tends to be pragmatic, not ideological, its position has often been at odds with women's issues.

Poor people and social service recipients also tend to be less organized and electorally powerful. The exception is seniors. The conditions for senior citizens have improved substantially since the 1960s, largely as a result of social welfare programs like Medicare and Social Security. Seniors' groups have become quite organizationally powerful. Their organizational strength partly explains why Social Security has so far remained largely intact.\textsuperscript{116}

The development of welfare policies in the United States is thus not simply explained by values but also institutions and the organization of interests. If Steinmo is right, and American political institutions place enormous barriers in the path of social reform, then it is even more important to ensure that policies promoted fit within the values and norms of those institutions. Because the U.S. government has less ability to enact policies in the face of opposition, interest groups must understand that they must "employ rhetorical strategies designed to appeal to values widely held in the culture. Only in this way can interests hope to legitimate their cause in the eyes of potential supporters..."\textsuperscript{117} It is even more important for child care advocates in the United States to gain allies in their struggle, and to pitch the need for child care based on values


of which conservatives would approve. In the United States, then, child care policies rooted in maternalist ideas have been more successful, or more persuasive because the dominant values regarding gender and the role of women are not liberalism and egalitarianism but conservatism.

Maternalists

One simply cannot understand the development of child care policies without considering the impact of maternalism. The many attempts to implement some kind of child care system in the United States must be seen in the context of the political and philosophical debate over provision of non-maternal care, the role of women in the labour market and in the family, and the relationship between government and the family. Many of these debates were carried on by women themselves.

Maternalists were mostly philanthropic women who were part of the Progressive Era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They trod into territory traditionally dominated by churches, the poor house, and other institutions. They tried to impose their own values regarding child rearing and the proper division of labour between men and women. But they did recognize that in the absence of a male breadwinner, women needed help in raising children while they worked outside the home. Their efforts to establish day care centres, and other maternalist policies such as mothers' pensions, laid the foundation for future policy development.

Note that both the left and right tend to oppose state intervention in the United States. As Sklar argues, "individualistic ideologies appeal[.] to all segments of the political spectrum."¹¹¹ Both left- and right-wing organizations reject state action because they see it as interfering with freedom: either individual freedom or freedom to engage in collective community action. Many leftist organizations hold a high degree of suspicion of state intervention and resists the development of policies at the national or state level. The state is not seen as democratic, participatory, and progressive, but corrupt, conservative, and reactionary. For example, in the late 1960s, when Congress took up the issue of child care, many leftists did not support the development of a public policy as they were setting up their own alternative schools and communal day cares. They did not want any government involvement in day care. As they

¹¹¹Hanson, "Liberalism and the Course of American Social Welfare Policy," 134.
rejected public education, so they rejected public day care. Trade unions have also been suspicious of state intervention in capital-labour relations and have resisted some government initiatives like affirmative action.119

Women reformers at the turn of the century did not regard government with the same level of suspicion. Instead of regarding the state as the enemy of human liberty, maternalists "viewed the state as a potential guarantor of social rights."120 One upper class reformer, Ellis Meredith, stated that "The new truth, electrifying, glorifying American womanhood today, is the discovery that the State is but the larger family, the nation the old homestead, and that in this national home there is a room and a corner and a duty for 'mother'."121 Maternalists felt there was a role for women's activity, and that activity should be focused on having the state intervene to uphold motherhood.

Maternalists felt women must enter public life to fight for motherhood issues. Not all women activists agreed. Some conservative reformers felt tasks could be handled by private groups. Most women reformers, while beginning the task of providing services themselves, urged government to intervene as well. The activism of women reformers is one factor that accounts for why many welfare programs did not develop along paternalist lines but rather along maternalist lines and were directed primarily at women. Skocpol and others contend that while class-based organizations were weak in the United States around the turn of the century, maternalist organizations flourished.122 The strength of these mainly middle-class women's movements, in contrast to class movements, and their success in catching the ear of government, explains why a number of policies developed for women and children. Other social policies, like workers' compensation, were those on which business and labour could agree.123 Support for more broad-based and national programs was hindered by business-labour antagonism and a

---

118Sklar, "The Historical Foundations of Women's Power," 56.
120Sklar, 68.
122Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers.
123Sklar, "The Historical Foundations of Women's Power."
governmental structure favourable to business. Health care initiatives were defeated and measures like unemployment insurance and old age pensions were delayed until the devastation of the Depression made them vital.

Given that early U.S. social policy legislation was maternalist-based, what prevented the establishment of family allowances and maternity leave in the United States as they developed in other countries, and why did labour market policies like day care not continue to expand for working women? The truncation of child care and other families policies occurred, I contend, as a result of a turning away from maternalism.

Policy Development: 1800s-1930

In the United States, the first day care centre for disadvantaged children opened in Boston in 1838, and others in New York in the 1850s. They were established to provide custodial care for children of poor mothers, many of them immigrants who worked in factories. By the turn of the century, 175 day nurseries operated in the United States; by 1905, 206 centres; and by 1925, 600 day care centres. The focus of nurseries/day care centres remained primarily custodial while that of nursery schools or pre-schools, emerging about the same time, was primarily educational.

Primarily wealthy women in the larger northeastern cities—New York, Chicago and Boston, for example—established the early day nurseries. They were concerned about the growing problem of immigrant children left unsupervised as their mothers took jobs in factories, whether because their husbands had died, or deserted them, or did not earn enough wages. The major purpose of these nurseries was to provide a safe, healthy environment for the children, as well as an alternative to institutionalization, then common. The centres ran on a very flexible and open basis: children as young as two weeks old were often accepted into care, centres were

124 Kerr, "One Step Forward--Two Steps Back," 158. Michel argues that the very first day care was in fact set up by a group of Quaker women in 1795. Michel, "The Limits of Maternalism," 281.

open very flexible hours, usually twelve hours a day and every day but Saturday, and the centres even served as an informal employment bureau for mothers.126

A number of settlement houses also established day care facilities and kindergartens as part of their benevolent activities.127 Jane Addams, who opened Hull House, the most famous of the settlement houses, in Chicago in 1889, wrote that in exploring the neighbourhood, she encountered children without care, some who were allowed to roam the streets, others who were locked in their apartments with no one to look after them.128 The settlement workers believed that not only did these children need care, they also needed medical attention and education.

The poor working-class mothers who used these services appreciated the efforts of the philanthropic women who ran these centres, even though the latter often looked down on the women who used the centres. They forced users of the centres, many of them immigrants, to be educated on "proper" childrearing techniques via mandatory "mothers' clubs". These clubs consisted of evenings of tea and cookies with lectures on hygiene, childrearing, and so on. The hope was to socialize these women to become good American citizens and to leave behind their childrearing and even nutritional practices brought from other countries.129

These reform women were often subject to criticism for their services. Some critics felt churches, orphanages, and county children's homes, that is, traditional institutions, would meet the needs of working mothers.130 Others believed that day care would weaken family ties,


127Settlement houses were communities of reformers who lived as groups in the slums and established multi-purpose service centres for the poor. The reformers saw their role to help the poor via social reform, to provide relief as they could through the establishment of services, to improve the living and working conditions of the working poor, and, by living among them, to bridge the gap between the classes. See William I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America, 5th ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1994), chapter eight. The settlement house movement began in Britain but what was unique about the movement in the United States is the number of women involved in the establishment and running of the houses.


130Some families used orphanages as boarding schools to care for their children
encourage women to seek work outside the home, undermine the role of the husband as breadwinner, depress men's wages, make the mother lazy about caring for her children, and lead her to abandon her parental responsibilities.\textsuperscript{131}

The day nursery movement came up with a number of arguments to counter these criticisms. The way the movement "sold" the day nurseries was that they provided help to poor and immigrant populations or to help mothers without a male breadwinner engage in temporary employment. They were not intended to help encourage the permanent employment of women outside the home. The movement also promoted nurseries as better forms of care for children, certainly better than institutionalization, but also better than the home, as in the day nurseries children would be taught hygiene, good behaviour, and be given good food. One can see the emergence of certain norms even then to justify the existence of child care services: day care was a welfare service to be provided only to those families in need; but, importantly, day care was seen as necessary for some families to be able to reconcile work and family life.

There was much less resistance to the idea of early childhood education. Nursery schools were first established in the United States in the 1820s, and again were first set up for poor, disadvantaged children.\textsuperscript{132} As Getis and Vinovskis report, "once middle-class mothers heard about or witnessed the educational benefits of this institution for poor children, they insisted that the same type of infant schools be made available for their own children."\textsuperscript{133} It is estimated that 40 per cent of children aged three in Massachusetts were attending infant schools or nursery schools in 1840. The nursery school movement also picked up on the kindergarten idea, brought by German emigrés to the United States. The first kindergarten opened in 1860 in Boston for English-speaking children. Over one hundred free kindergartens emerged between 1880 and 1890 in U.S. cities to help employed poor mothers with child care.\textsuperscript{134} Kindergartens numbered temporarily. Youcha, \textit{Minding the Children}, 170-93.

\textsuperscript{131}Berry, \textit{The Politics of Parenthood}, 79; Steinfels, \textit{Who's Minding the Children?}, 49.

\textsuperscript{132}Some early pre-schools were modelled on Robert Owen's ideas for day care, including play and education along with music, exercise, and dance, but these schools added religious education and instruction as well. See Berry, 75-6; Steinfels, 36.

\textsuperscript{133}Getis and Vinovskis, "History of Child Care in the United States," 190.

\textsuperscript{134}Berry, \textit{The Politics of Parenthood}, 77.
between 350 to 400 by 1880, 1,300 by 1890, and 5,000 by the turn of the century. Some of those kindergartens even replaced the day nurseries as reformers believed they would do more to help children.

Although the idea of educating children at a young age had fallen out of favor in the United States by the 1860s, it again became popular by the early 1900s. The National Congress of Mothers (NCM), through Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs), supported the establishment of kindergartens in public schools and worked with other organizations such as the National Education Association, the National Kindergarten Association, and the U.S. Bureau of Education to persuade governments to provide public funding for kindergartens. Ladd-Taylor reports that by 1915, public kindergartens educated approximately 15 per cent of children in the United States. As well, the PTA successfully fought an attempt in Pennsylvania to abolish public kindergartens, countering Board of Education arguments that the program was too costly and relieved "lazy" mothers from caring for their children.

Day nurseries within public schools first appeared in 1919, and experimental nursery schools, as part of university research and training programs, appeared in the 1920s. The National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC), still in existence, emerged in the 1920s under the name the Committee on Nursery Schools. The nursery school movement died out during the inter-war years, however, as did day care centres. By 1932, just before the

---


136 In the United States and many other western industrialized countries, supporters of the idea of early childhood education changed their mind upon the release of studies by physicians and psychologists that education at a young age was bad for children. In addition, in many countries like Germany, the supporters of kindergartens themselves became targets of attacks as they were branded as radicals. Getis and Vinovskis, "History of Child Care in the United States," 190-1.

137 Youcha, Minding the Children, 149 cites the figure as 10 per cent by 1920.


139 Steinfels, 86.
New Deal, only 500 nursery schools existed for 10,000-14,000 out of a possible 16 million students.140

The Organization of Women

By the beginning of this century, a number of women's organizations, which had been established to fight for suffrage, turned their attention to other social reforms. Many women's organizations formed to lobby the government to protect the most vulnerable in society, especially women and children, but did so first and foremost to protect home life and help women remain at home. The Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) formed in 1874. It was involved in political activism far beyond temperance issues. The WCTU endorsed women's suffrage (again to protect the home, not to make women the same as men), and was involved in a range of social services including day nurseries, Sunday schools, missions for homeless and destitute women, and so on.141 The General Federation of Women's Clubs (GFWC) formed in 1890. It drew together a number of local women's organizations that formed as the secular equivalent of the WCTU. By 1899, over 400 women's clubs had formed142 and, Sklar states, the GFWC became the "chief voice of 'organized womanhood' after 1900."143 The National Congress of Mothers (NCM) formed in 1897 as an organization dedicated to educating its members on scientific childrearing. Quite a conservative organization at first, it opposed women's suffrage and their professional involvement in social work, including the creation of the Children's Bureau. It focused instead on educating mothers about the proper home in which to raise their children.144 But it increasingly got involved in social service provision, establishing well-baby clinics through local organizations, as well as hot lunch programs, pure milk stations and so on. From there, its activities became political as it pressed governments to publicly fund child health services as it found its own resources inadequate. By the end of the 1920s, and

140Getis and Vinovskis, 198.
141Sklar, 61. See also Berry, 68.
143Sklar, 63.
144For a more detailed history of the NCM see Ladd-Taylor, Mother Work, chapter 2.
subject to a conservative backlash that labelled the organization communist, it returned to issues of parent education (its title had already been changed in 1908 to the National Congress of Mothers and Parent-Teacher Associations and in 1924 it became the National Congress of Parents and Teachers (PTAs)).

Some groups were established because of concerns about workplace issues. The National Consumers' League (NCL), formed by wealthy humanitarians and wage earners, was concerned with women's employment in the production of consumer goods, such as in the needle trade. It worked to organize women's unions, factory legislation, and improved working conditions for women, via such activities as encouraging people to shop at stores that paid a minimum wage.145 The National Women's Trade Union League (WTUL) also formed to deal with workplace and family issues. Numerous other local and state-level organizations formed, affiliated with the GFWC, as well as more specific organizations like the National Council of Catholic Women, and the National Council of Jewish Women. All fought for government intervention to protect women and children, such as protective labour legislation, schools to educate the growing population of immigrant children, and mothers' pensions for poor widows. The WTUL's slogan on its emblem, for example, was "The Eight Hour Day, A Living Wage, To Guard the Home." As Boris points out, these demands "reveal how interconnected home and work, family and society were in the minds of women reformers."146

The National Federation of Day Nurseries (NFDN) formed as an explicit organization around the issue of day care. The NFDN was founded in 1898 by Josephine Jewell Dodge, a conservative maternelist and anti-suffragist.147 It opposed public funding for day care centres but did lobby for government regulation of day nurseries and the improvement of the quality of day care services. Michel argues that "As the sole national organization devoted wholly to the cause of child care, the NFDN's views dominated discourse in the field over many decades, blocking out other, more progressive [i.e. liberal feminist] perspectives."148

---

146Eileen Boris, "The Power of Motherhood: Black and White Activist Women Redefine the 'Political'," in Mothers of a New World, 230.
147Michel, "The Limits of Maternalism," 284-5.
discourse, of course, was that day nurseries were only a make-shift solution, and a poor replacement for the home and mothers' care.

**Institutionalization of Maternalist Ideas**

Protective labour legislation first appeared in the mid-1850s. Women's organizations such as the NCL began actively to lobby for it by the end of the nineteenth century.¹⁴⁹ Such laws were given legal impetus in 1908 after the Supreme Court ruled in *Muller v. Oregon* that laws regarding maximum hours of work for women were constitutional.¹⁵⁰ Between 1909 and 1917, Berry reports that nineteen states enacted protective labour laws.¹⁵¹ This legislation was designed to help women avoid working in sweatshop conditions. Protective labour legislation included a number of laws that restricted women's hours of work, as well as the weights they could lift, provided some benefits such as rest periods, and restricted work in certain occupations or at night.¹⁵² These laws were clearly driven by a maternalist belief that, in their impact hurt women who needed to work longer hours to increase their income.

In 1912, at a time when expansion of the federal bureaucracy was not common, the federal government established the Children's Bureau. It was established originally under the

---

¹⁴⁹ Proponents of protective labour legislation first intended laws to apply to both men and women, but the Supreme Court ruled them a violation of the right to contract (*Lochner v. New York*, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905)).

¹⁵⁰ 208 U.S. 412 (1908), discussed in Boris, "The Power of Motherhood," 234. See also Ladd-Taylor, *Mother-Work*, 123. It is interesting to note that the Brandeis brief, presented by Oregon attorney Louis Brandeis, was largely researched by Josephine Goldmark of the NCL, demonstrating the support of this group for such laws. The decision in *Muller*, Boris argues, "justified maximum hours for women on the basis of protecting motherhood"; that is, women were seen as fundamentally weaker than men and long hours were dangerous to women's health which led to concerns that women would not give birth to healthy offspring. Liberal feminists argue *Muller* made sex discrimination legal, although many women's groups supported it as a means to protect women. Boris points out that hours laws, as well as night-work laws and minimum wage bills, applied to a very limited group of women. The legislation usually exempted employees in the agricultural sector and domestics, two areas that employed many black women.


Department of Commerce and Labour and then moved to the Department of Labour in 1913. It
remained there until 1945 when it was moved to the Federal Security Agency.

The Children's Bureau emerged largely because of the efforts of reform-minded
women, the National Child Labor Committee (NCLC), and with the endorsement of President
Theodore Roosevelt and participants at the 1909 White House Conference on the Care of
Dependent Children. The Bureau "included a chief, assistant to the chief and directors for the
six divisions of social service (which included children in need of special care), child hygiene
(staffed with physicians and public health nurses), recreation, industrial, statistical, and
editorial." It was initially established to perform research and education and to publish
information on childrearing. It also investigated incidences of child labour and infant
mortality.

The Children's Bureau was not a big supporter of child care programs. The staff of the
Bureau supported day care only to provide care for families in crisis, when a child was neglected
or abused, or had special needs. Only as more women entered the labour force after World
War II did the Children's Bureau shift its perspective and accept the necessity of child care for
working mothers (see below).

The Children's Bureau's stance on day care differed from that of the Women's Bureau,
set up in 1920 under the Department of Labour. The Women's Bureau was responsible for
policies, standards, investigations, and reports on issues to do with women in industry. It arose

153 Ladd-Taylor notes that Florence Kelly and Lillian Wald, two progressive maternalist
reformers, on reading the paper one morning in 1903, noticed a letter from a woman concerned
about the number of infant deaths in summer, as well as another article about the Secretary of
Agriculture's trip to the southern states to investigate the damage done by the boll weevil to
cotton crops. Ladd-Taylor writes, "Wald purportedly mused, 'If the Government can have a
department to take such an interest in the cotton crop, why can't it have a bureau to look after the
nation's child crop?" Florence Kelly then contacted Edward Devine, general secretary of the
New York Charity Organization Society and they presented the idea of a Children's Bureau to
President Roosevelt. Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work, 76.
154 Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work, 75-77.
155 R.L. Schnell, "A Children's Bureau for Canada': The Origins of the Canadian Council
eds. Allan Moscovitch and Jim Albert (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1987), 95.
156 See Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work.
from demands by women's groups to continue the wartime Women in Industry Service that collected information on the employment and treatment of women in the factories during World War I.\textsuperscript{158} The Women's Bureau pressed for protective labour legislation for women workers such as limitations on hours. Yet, despite its support for such maternalist policies, the Women's Bureau also advocated women's employment outside the home as a necessity, not a luxury, and supported child care as well.\textsuperscript{159}

\textit{The Fight for Mothers' Pensions}

Around the beginning of the twentieth century, reformers turned their attention to the problem of families \textit{without} a male breadwinner, primarily families headed by widows. Reformers had to choose between two policy alternatives: public child care to help employed mothers, or mothers' pensions. Reformers, predominantly maternalist (that is, in the narrow sense then-predominant in the United States, those supportive of mothers at home, not in the workforce) chose to support the latter. Mothers' pensions--cash payments for fatherless families--were seen as the best way to preserve traditional family structures, allowing mothers to care for children in the home and not have to work at low-wage labour (and not threaten the traditional division of labour).

A number of organizations got involved in the campaign for mothers' pensions, including the WCTU, the GFWC, the NCL, and the NCM.\textsuperscript{160} The 1909 White House Conference on Children and Youth also endorsed mothers' pensions as a substitute for day nurseries, arguing that home life was "the highest and finest product of civilization."\textsuperscript{161} Progressive politicians

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{157}Quadagno, \textit{The Color of Welfare}, 137.
\item \textsuperscript{159}Quadagno, \textit{The Color of Welfare}, 136; Berry, 95.
\item \textsuperscript{160}Michel notes that even some members of the National Women's Party (NWP), the "sworn enemy" of the maternalists, came out in favour of mothers' pensions. Even though the NWP supported the right of \textit{women} to work, this conviction did not seem to carry over strongly to \textit{mothers} of young children. See Michel, "The Limits of Maternalism," 319, n. 126. See also Sklar, "The Historical Foundations of Women's Power," 64.
\item \textsuperscript{161}Kerr, "One Step Forward--Two Steps Back," 159.
\end{itemize}
such as Theodore Roosevelt and Louis Brandeis also supported the policy, and it received some support from trade unions. Labour unions were happy to support mothers' pensions along with protective labour laws, as these policies allowed them to argue for the right of men to earn a family wage, and decreased competition for jobs. So a happy coincidence of forces led to the emergence of mothers' pensions in a number of states, beginning in 1911 in Missouri and Illinois. The eagerness by which reformers embraced the mothers' pensions idea can perhaps explain their rapid adoption in 40 states between 1911 and 1920.

While numerous groups rallied behind the idea of mothers' pensions, the day nursery movement stagnated. Most of the day nurseries in the early part of the century remained clustered in the northeast of the country: Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. By 1912, only 500 day nurseries existed. During World War I, places in nurseries became even more scarce, leading to the growth of commercial "baby farms" run for profit. Many benevolent groups that first created the day nurseries moved away from their support. In fact, Jane Addams renounced her earlier support of day care centres provided by the settlement houses. She was concerned that day nurseries "tempted" women to think they could both work and be a mother. Early in the twentieth century, settlement houses stopped offering day care services.

Mothers' pensions seemed to offer the better solution to the problem of child neglect for progressive reformers, as pensions would save women from long hours and low pay and allow them to care for their children at home and still have an adequate income. Mothers' pensions would also replace the need for day nurseries. Child care, in contrast, was considered quite threatening to progressive maternalists as "by providing a substitute for a mother's care of her children while she worked for wages, child care threatened to undermine the notion of

---

162 Male-dominated labour unions were supportive of attempts to eliminate discriminatory pay as the low wages paid to women made them more competitive than men in the workforce. Kenneally, "Women in the United States and Trade Unionism."
163 Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 10; Michel, "The Limits of Maternalism," 279. Four more states adopted legislation by 1931.
164 Berry, 95.
165 Youcha, Minding the Children, 146.
166 Getis and Vinovskis, 196.
motherhood as women's naturally ordained and most important role."\(^{167}\)

Mothers' pensions were thus established. Most states administered mothers' pensions through juvenile courts, not public relief agencies. The court system allowed women more authority to administer the benefits. As Skocpol writes, though:

\[
\text{Despite generous intentions and broad popular support, mothers' pensions evolved into one of the most socially demeaning and poorly funded parts of modern U.S. social provision. The pensions were implemented only in certain (predominantly nonrural) jurisdictions, leaving many widowed mothers, including most nonwhites, unable even to apply for benefits. Where these pensions were established, the programs were starved for funds by communities reluctant to spend taxpayers' money on the poor. Consequently, benefit levels were set so low that many clients could not avoid working for wages or taking in male boarders, activities that could open clients up to charges of child neglect or immorality.}\(^{168}\)
\]

Because states administered the program, a great deal of variation in rules emerged. Some states allowed any mothers with dependent children to apply for funds, and some even allowed unmarried mothers. Widows, however, remained the primary beneficiaries.\(^{169}\) Property-ownership often barred women from receiving aid. Most states imposed residency requirements and even citizenship requirements and would only give aid to "suitable" mothers. This requirement of "suitability" meant divorced and deserted women were often excluded, as were black women.\(^{170}\) Because of eligibility rules attached (and home investigations), many other women were denied benefits on moral grounds. Some women were even denied benefits because they were seen as too self-sufficient.\(^{171}\)

\(^{167}\)Michel, "The Limits of Maternalism," 279.


\(^{169}\)Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work, 148-9.

\(^{170}\)Ladd-Taylor reports that "although blacks constituted 21 percent of the population of Houston, Texas, not one black family there received mothers' aid." Mother-Work, 149. A 1931 Children's Bureau survey of 18 states found that 96 per cent of mothers receiving welfare were white, even where blacks constituted nearly half of the population. Berry, The Politics of Parenthood, 98.

\(^{171}\)Michel notes that "Between 1911 and 1927, 49 percent of applicants were denied on grounds of 'economic sufficiency'; 8 percent for lack of cooperation; and 4 percent for lack of fitness or moral standards. The other 37 percent were deemed legally ineligible because of
What started out as aid to mothers in their role as childrearers therefore turned into a form of welfare in its administration. Ladd-Taylor writes that "although the rhetoric of mothers' pension supporters stressed the common bonds of motherhood, the welfare system increased the power some women [case workers] had to take away the livelihood—and the children—of others..." Mothers' pensions were clearly not a mothers' allowance/family allowance but a form of charity for the poor, with the attendant surveillance and stigmatization.

By the early 1930s, 44 states had established mothers' pensions. The Social Security Act of 1935 incorporated these state programs into *Aid to Dependent Children* (ADC). ADC, which later became AFDC, remained the core program of the U.S. welfare state for most of the twentieth century. Part of the impetus behind the federal program came as a result of the Depression which left many families poverty-stricken. The federal program widened eligibility (slowly) and allowed mothers other than widows to receive aid for their children.

*The Impact of Maternalist Policies on Child Care Programs*

The effect of establishing mothers' pensions was to devastate the child care movement. Joffe reports that "the availability of mothers' pensions meant that some women no longer needed the services of day nurseries." The educational aspects of child care "became more strongly identified with 'nursery schools,' institutions that served a largely middle-class population, and whose half-day format precluded their usefulness for working women." Social workers began to run day nurseries. Again, the justification for day nurseries shifted: they began to be regarded as a form of child welfare to help neglected, disadvantaged children in (psychological) need and to provide enrichment for poor children. This thinking provided the basis for child care programs like Head Start. Mothers' pensions were seen to undermine the need for day care

---

173 Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*, 10.
174 Youcha, 285-4 reports that by 1930, then head of the Children's Bureau, Grace Abbott, pressured the government to expand mothers' pensions to include all children in need, even in families with fathers, to relieve the pressure of the Depression. The federal government responded, but slowly, as detailed below.
centres to help mothers reconcile work and family life. Because so many women were excluded from receiving benefits, and the payments themselves were so low, a lot of women still needed to work and thus find day care services. Ideologically, though, the support for day care was gone.

Passage of the Sheppard-Towner Act in 1921 also undermined support for day nurseries. The government passed the federal Act for the Promotion of Welfare and Hygiene of Maternity and Infancy to prevent child mortality and the deaths of mothers in childbirth. It provided "federal matching grants to the states for information and instruction on nutrition and hygiene, prenatal and child-health clinics, and visiting nurses for pregnant women and new mothers." This Act represented the first "women's" legislation successfully introduced after women received the vote (in 1920) and was targeted to all mothers, not just poor mothers. The Children's Bureau Chief at the time, Julia Lathrop, wrote the legislation, and the Children's Bureau, with the help of local PTAs, administered it (although ultimate authority lay with another agency). The bill also received the endorsement of many women's organizations: the NCM-PTA, GFWC, WTUL, NCL, WCTU, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Business and Professional Women's Clubs (BPW).

Because maternal and child health were being taken care of by Sheppard-Towner, one of the other primary justifications for day nurseries--protection of child health--was lost. Recall that day care reformers promoted day nurseries as better forms of care for children as they would be taught hygiene and be given good food to prevent sickness and mortality.

The Act did not last, demonstrating that even maternalist legislation was vulnerable to attack. Despite its modest scope (it provided education only, not material assistance or medical care) tremendous opposition to the Act emerged during its passage and afterward. Ladd-

175 Joffe, "Why the United States Has No Child Care Policy," 170.
176 Molly Ladd-Taylor, "My Work Came Out of Agony and Grief: Mothers and the Making of the Sheppard-Towner Act," in Mothers of a New World, 322. See also chapter 6 of Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work.
177 Michel, "The Limits of Maternalism," 304.
178 Ladd-Taylor in Mother-Work documents a number of opponents' arguments raised against the bill, including a quote from one Congressman who protested:
No one in this House can deny that those who have propagated this maternity bill really advocate the maintenance of indigent, pregnant women, both before, during, and after labor; child control by the State; mothers' pensions; the doctrine
Taylor reports that a coalition of medical associations and right-wing organizations argued that the Act was "a communist-inspired step toward state medicine that threatened the home and violated the principle of states' rights." Some conservative maternalists like Elizabeth Lowell Putnam also opposed the program. Putnam was a leading activist in the establishment of maternal and child health clinics and a lobbyist for pure milk laws in the state of Massachusetts, but was very much opposed to the federal government Sheppard-Towner Act. She also opposed the Children's Bureau. Conservative maternalists believed that welfare work should remain in the civic sector and not be turned over to governments.

The opposition from these groups led to the watering down of the original act. Medical and nursing care provisions were removed to satisfy the medical profession. The Children's Bureau, suspect because it was run by women, lost real control of administration. Instead, ultimate authority lay with the newly-established Federal Board of Maternity and Infant Hygiene, composed of the surgeon general of the Public Health Service, and the U.S. Commissioner of Education, along with the chief of the Children's Bureau.

States responded with enthusiasm to the Act. As with most welfare legislation, states could decide whether they wished to implement the Act. Most did—in fact, 41 states passed enabling legislation in 1922 and by the end of the program, only three states had refused to sign on (Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Illinois). In the face of growing opposition, mainly from doctors, Congress repealed the law in 1929, ending federal funding for maternal and infant care. Some states continued programs after 1929; however, the Depression forced many states to make

---

of eugenics; birth control; and other notions of the sort born out of purely socialistic brains (172). Another right-wing opponent revealed the gendered nature of the debate by stating that the bill "tends to make the mothers believe that Uncle Sam instead of their own husbands ought to take care of them" (72). One must wonder why the Act inspired such virulent ideological opposition to women obtaining information about reproduction, pre- and post-natal care, and maternal and child health.

179Ladd-Taylor, "My Work Came Out of Agony and Grief," 322.
180Michel, "The Limits of Maternalism," 312, n. 32.
181When the federal government established Aid to Dependent Children, it placed responsibility for it in the Social Security Board and later the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, not in either of the agencies whose constituencies the program would benefit. The Children's Bureau was put in charge of maternal and child health, child welfare services, and
cuts to programs. The federal government restored funding for maternity and infancy protection in 1935 under Title V of the Social Security Act. These funds were not provided for universal programs, though, only to the poor.

Child and maternal health services are thus considered welfare services in the United States, not universally necessary. Ladd-Taylor speculates this is because middle-class white women already had access to such health services through private physicians. The Sheppard-Towner Act was successful at reducing infant mortality among the white population and at persuading doctors to educate pregnant women about maternal and child health in their private practices. Therefore public funding for a general program appeared less necessary and it became less of a political concern of women activists.\(^{182}\) Ladd-Taylor thus argues that white women became disinterested when the policy did not benefit them.

*The Politics of Race*

Unfortunately, the health of black babies did not improve as much under Sheppard-Towner. Poverty, their rural location, and meagre resources under the Act meant infant death rates remained high throughout the 1920s. The politics of the Sheppard-Towner Act highlight the differing positions of white and black women. While many black women did embrace notions of separate spheres for men and women, the economic reality of the need for black women's income from labour outside the home often displaced this white middle class ideal.\(^{183}\)

Black women's organizations did exist. The National Association of Colored Women (NACW), established in 1896, was similar to the NCM. It, too, was concerned about motherhood and child welfare. It ran classes for mothers on childrearing and established schools and orphanages. The NACW's opinion on motherhood and childrearing, however, differed from white women's organizations. As Ladd-Taylor argues, "the realities of mothering in a racist society made it impossible for African Americans to idealize motherhood in the same way as

---


\(^{183}\)Berry, 69.
elite whites.¹⁸⁴ Members of the NACW were very much concerned with home life, morality, child education and welfare, and temperance, but were much more involved in political activities outside those spheres, including opposing segregation and lynching.¹⁸⁵

The differing positions of black and white women's organizations also stemmed from the fact that many more black married women participated in the labour force than white married women.¹⁸⁶ Rather than disparaging the labour of women outside the home, black women's organizations "accepted the working mother as a worthy mother."¹⁸⁷ The NACW accepted more the need for politicization of child care issues and could not accept the idea of separate spheres for women and men. The NACW supported both kindergartens and day nurseries, the former for their educational properties and the latter for the care they could give to children of working mothers.

Black women's organizations, though, did not have the same degree of influence over white policymakers as white women's organizations.¹⁸⁸ The history of post-Sheppard-Towner policy making highlights the clash between black and white women's positions. White women's organizations were much more successful at persuading the state to tackle social problems in the direction they thought best.¹⁸⁹ And black women did not always benefit from the reforms white women achieved: most black women were not eligible for mothers' pensions, were not covered by protective labour legislation, and were denied the right to vote even after white women achieved suffrage. Until the mid-1960s, AFDC was only available to "deserving" widows, which meant often that black, divorced, and unmarried mothers were excluded.¹⁹⁰ As mentioned above, social service administrators felt many black women were not "suitable" enough to receive mothers' pensions. Despite the greater numbers of black women in the labour force, by

¹⁸⁴Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work, 60.
¹⁸⁵Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work, 62.
¹⁸⁶In the early part of the twentieth century, black married women outnumbered by five-fold the number of white women who earned wages. Boris, "The Power of Motherhood," 216.
¹⁸⁷Boris, 227.
¹⁸⁹Sklar, 72.
¹⁹⁰Sklar, 46.
1930, less than 40 day nurseries for black children existed in the country. Black children were excluded from white orphanages as well and had to establish their own. Circumstances were even more difficult as more black children than white children lived in households with a single parent, mostly due to the death of the spouse. Thus, programs were unevenly available to women, depending on their race.

Policy Development: 1930s

The Shift in Norms

While the above events seem to highlight the negative impact of maternalism on child care policy development, maternalists were the first to create day care services. The history of mothers' pensions, protective labor legislation, and child and maternal health legislation reveals the enormous influence maternalist organizations had on politicians and policy makers. Their philosophy regarding child care did become institutionalized. Yet, for a number of reasons, the philosophy of these women's organizations shifted radically during the 1930s. That did not end the era of maternalist policy development immediately. Many maternalists remained in government and active in agencies like the Women's Bureau and Children's Bureau. But maternalism no longer remained predominant.

By the 1920s, day care services had become professionalized. Early childhood educators and professional social workers replaced the previous day care attendants and nurses in order to add to the educational component of the programs. The results were mixed. While improving the overall program, professionalization made the programs less flexible and open. Educators running the day care centres, for example, began to refuse infants and children under two, as they neither knew, nor wanted to care for those too young to instruct. Social workers wished only to deal with "problem" children, not simply those whose mothers worked.

Social workers were also extremely suspicious of women's motives for using the centres.

191 Berry, 105.
192 Youcha, 166; Boris, 228.
193 In 1900, nearly twice as many black children as white (14 per cent versus seven per cent) lived with one parent, usually the mother. Linda Gordon and Sara McLanahan, "Single Parenthood in 1900," Journal of Family History 16, 2 (1991), 105-6.
They added home visits and a scrutiny system to ensure women who used the day care centres really needed to work. Day care centres began to be regarded as social welfare services. They were not to provide care for children of all mothers who worked, but as a necessary service because of some problem in the home. The Child Welfare League of America (CWLA), established in 1920 "to promote better standards in child care" itself accepted the demarcation between nursery schools, which provided an educational service, and day nurseries, which provided a service to families with some "pathology."\(^{195}\)

Despite some resistance from parents, the day nursery changed "from a useful, broadly defined, simple child-helping services to a marginal and limited agent of social welfare."\(^{196}\) Use of day care services declined as mothers wished to avoid their families being labelled maladjusted. Also, Steinfels argues, "The day nurseries themselves suffered from a falling off in the philanthropic sentiment of the upper class who, for the most part, had supported them."\(^{197}\) She notes that only one day care centre at that time—in Cleveland—was supported by public funds. The rest received little or no public funding and thus depended on private fund-raising. The Depression exacerbated the funding crisis and many day nurseries closed in the early 1930s.

A backlash against women's organizations and policies brought an end to a lot of maternalist activism, and a marginalization of the Women's Bureau and Children's Bureau. In the 1920s, the Children's Bureau led a campaign to end child labour by means of a child labour amendment to the constitution. (The Supreme Court found earlier child labour legislation, passed in 1918 and 1919, to be unconstitutional.) The constitutional amendment that finally passed in 1924 had support from Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge, as well as the NCLC, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and the Women's Joint Congressional Committee. The latter was made up of representatives from most women's organizations, including the GFWC, NCL, WTUL, and even the NCM.

Soon after, these women's organizations faced a bitter backlash from the far right who accused women reformers of being communist. By 1930, only six states had ratified the change

\(^{194}\)Joffe, 170.
\(^{195}\)Kerr, 161.
\(^{196}\)Steinfels, 63.
\(^{197}\)Steinfels, 65.
to the constitution, and the amendment failed. This defeat, along with that of the Sheppard-Towner Act, Ladd-Taylor argues, signaled the end of the maternalist movement.\textsuperscript{198} The GFWC withdrew in 1928 from the Women's Joint Congressional Committee and many other women's organizations began to be afraid to speak up on social issues. The Children's Bureau's work became increasingly apolitical. The political backlash also affected the NFDN, which by 1931 in one of its last publications, "printed several articles which granted that, indeed, the day nursery child represented a social problem, and that the day nursery ought to be the last choice in the care of children..."\textsuperscript{199} Maternalists were forced to drop the day care issue along with other reform ideas.

Perhaps most importantly, women's organizations embraced new ideas. Sklar states that by the 1930s, "nineteenth-century notions that valued gender differences gave way to twentieth century presumptions about the similarity of the sexes" and undermined support for a women's "political culture."\textsuperscript{200} While maternalist organizations formed earlier and were much more influential until about the mid-1920s, more individualist feminists did exist during the Progressive Era. Individualist feminist organizations formed as well at the turn of the century. The largest was the National Women's Party (NWP), first formed in 1913 as the Congressional Union, after a group of more militant suffragists split from the National American Women's Suffrage Association (NAWSA). The Congressional Union became the NWP in 1917.

The NWP focused on achieving absolute equality of opportunity for women. It also strongly supported the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), introduced in Congress in 1923. The NWP's stance clashed with maternalist organizations like the NCL, the WTUL, the Women's Bureau, and the League of Women Voters (LWV), which formed from the NAWSA. These organizations saw the ERA as a threat to maximum hours of work legislation for women as well as minimum wage laws, mothers' pensions, and the Sheppard-Towner Act. They argued that, although these laws differentiated between men and women, they protected women from poor working conditions and promoted women's rights as mothers.\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{198}Ladd-Taylor, \textit{Mother-Work}, 96-7.

\textsuperscript{199}Steinfels, 66.

\textsuperscript{200}Sklar, 76.

\textsuperscript{201}Kenneally, "Women in the United States and Trade Unionism, 73; Ladd-Taylor,
By the 1930s, organizations that had fought for protective legislation for women joined forces with their individualist feminist combatants to protest jointly federal and state laws designed to remove married women from the labour force during a time of labour shortages. In the early 1930s, state and local governments ordered the dismissal of thousands of married women, particularly teachers. Then the federal government passed the 1932 National Economy Act. This Act prohibited spouses from being employed in the civil service. It "mandated that only one person in a family could remain employed in the entire federal government in the event of a layoff," and led to the firing of a number of women. The Economy Act itself was repealed in 1937, but that did not end support for such legislation.

The organizations that mobilized in opposition to the act included the WTUL, and the LWV, along with the Women's Bureau and the NWP. The thinking within these organizations had shifted from opposition to married women's employment to support for equal treatment of men and women and married women's right to work. At this time, their support for women's employment was still based on the idea of women's economic need to work. What explains the change in stance among women's organizations? It could reflect the increase of white women in the labour force. Changes in immigration laws in the 1920s reduced the number of foreign-born women in the labour market. By 1940, Berry reports, almost four-fifths of working women were white and not foreign-born. Married women's labour force participation increased from 29 to 35.5 per cent in the 1930s. As support grew for equal rights policies like the ERA, in 1954, the Women's Bureau, under a new head, withdrew its long-standing opposition to the ERA.

Freeman contends that class politics also influenced the shift from maternalism to individualist feminism. She points out that women working in industry opposed policies like the ERA as they thought it would undermine their employment protection. Business and professional women supported the ERA, however, because they felt protective labour legislation

Mother-Work, 122.


204Berry, 104.
hindered them from competing for jobs and being promoted in the professions.205

Thus, tensions between liberal feminists, supportive of equal treatment of women, and those on the Left who argued for special treatment, did not end immediately. The NWP for example, in the 1940s, was "publicly neutral but privately opposed" to the Equal Pay Act being considered by Congress at the same time as the ERA. This bill was the child of the National Committee to Defeat the Un-Equal Rights Amendment (NCDURA), a coalition of anti-ERA women's organizations like the NCL and LWV, the National Council of Negro Women, and labour unions. The NWP feared the Equal Pay Act was another form of protective labour legislation, as it only prohibited employers from paying women less than men, not vice versa.206

Interestingly, day care was not an individualist feminist issue at the time, or at least it raised a debate amongst feminists. Radical writers contended that child care responsibilities and family life in general oppressed women; they were not willing to support child care on the basis of reconciliation of work and family life. Instead, individualist feminists like Charlotte Perkins Gilman proposed that the state take over childrearing, arguing that "the isolated and homebound mother is in no way adequate to their proper rearing."207 For many feminists struggling to change oppressive structures in society, the family presented a real problem. Rather than lobbying for expansion of policies to help "mothers" work, feminist organizations focused on policies to create legal and economic equality between men and women. Child care became instrumental to the feminist cause, but not a priority.


206Freeman, 464.

207Kerr, 160; Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work, 108.
Policy Development: The New Deal and WWII Era

For different reasons, governments saw the need for child care during the 1930s and 1940s. In fact, the New Deal era marked a revival in the day care movement and maternalist policies, despite the decrease in support among women's organizations. Ladd-Taylor credits the continued support for maternalist policies after the maternal feminist movement had petered out to the influence President Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave to maternalist women in his administration.\textsuperscript{208} The Department of Labor, which also housed the Women's Bureau and Children's Bureau, was responsible for a lot of the New Deal legislation. The Social Security Act of 1935 and the \textit{Fair Labor Standards Act} of 1938 contained a number of policies for women and children. Still, the federal government did not give the Children's Bureau administrative authority for ADC. That authority was instead placed with the newly-established Social Security Administration.

The 1935 Social Security Act included federally subsidized public assistance programs for the elderly poor, dependent children, and the blind, federal unemployment insurance (based on business taxes set by the states), and contributory old-age insurance provisions. It also included maternal and child health programs similar to the defunct Sheppard-Towner Act for poor families, and some welfare services for children in need.

Contributory old-age insurance was the only part of the program established on a national basis. Unemployment insurance was to be paid for through federal employers' payroll taxes, but with the amount to be determined by the various states and with the programs to be administered by the states. Social assistance was designed purely as a federal program, with the federal government supplying matching funds, and the states responsible for the administration of the program and benefit levels. The federal government provided little incentive to the states to implement comprehensive ADC programs, providing only one-third matching funds to the states.

\textsuperscript{208}Ladd-Taylor, \textit{Mother-Work}, 197. She notes that First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins (the first female cabinet minister in the United States), and the head of the Women's Division of the Democratic National Committee, Molly Dewson, were all strong maternalists. The three were the most powerful women in the Roosevelt administration. All three were members of the NCL and supporters of protective labour legislation.
Funding was finally increased to one-half matching funds in 1939.209

The ADC program was the most important institutionalization of a maternalist norm. It allowed mothers without a male breadwinner to stay at home and care for children. It was institutionalized, however, as a welfare policy, not for all mothers, and not for the "worthy" widows, the target of the original mothers' pensions. Widows were included under old age and survivors' insurance programs of the Social Security Act.210 Whereas these programs and unemployment insurance were set up as entitlement programs, AFDC was structured as a public assistance program with benefits based on need. Skocpol argues, "Nationwide support never burgeoned for this program as it did for old age insurance. Benefits remained low and their distribution geographically uneven. And traditions of surveillance established by social workers became even more intrusive once southerners, blacks, and unmarried mothers began to represent a significant number of clients."211

Remarkably, given the opposition to other maternalist policies, the ADC legislation passed. Ladd-Taylor states that conservatives directed their attention away from the programs for children and toward concerns over health insurance, unemployment compensation, and old age pensions. Thus, they did not contest these programs as they had in the late 1920s.212 Opposition from organized interests in the medical profession in particular caused President Roosevelt to back down from including health insurance in the Social Security Act.213 Women's organizations did not play a large role in the drafting of the policy nor in the administration, so that may have deflected some scrutiny as well.

Child Care Funding

Federal funding for child care was first provided in the New Deal era as a part of a labour program under the Federal Emergency Relief Act and Works Progress Administration (WPA), in 1933. Some money was also provided later on via Title V of the 1935 Social Security Act for

---

209Skocpol, "Targeting within Universalism," 417.
210Skocpol, "Targeting within Universalism," 417.
211Skocpol, 256.
212Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work, 198.
child care services and research. The WPA provided federal funds to establish emergency nursery schools, designed to provide jobs for unemployed workers such as teachers, social workers, custodians, cooks, and nurses. The nurseries were educational in focus and were exclusively for children of poor families. The programs offered parallel parent education and homemaking classes and parents sometimes helped in the classroom. The programs were also geared to helping families get back to work. Getis and Vinovskis report that before the WPA, only 500 nurseries existed nationwide, serving between 10,000 and 14,000 children. By 1937, about 1,900 nurseries existed, serving about 40,000 children. The tremendous expansion in services can be credited to the federal government's financing (over $10 million by 1938), as well as to the fact that the WPA nurseries focused on educational needs of children. Most were housed in school buildings and programs operated in cities and small towns.

The Roosevelt administration's support for these schools soon waned. Despite protests from many groups, including the National Council of Negro Women, the WPA nursery schools lost their federal funding as soon as the economy improved. This demonstrates that the government still viewed nurseries as a temporary alternative to home care, not as a labour market policy for women. In 1942 the federal government determined that the nursery schools were no longer needed to employ workers. Some of the nursery schools were transformed to provide care for children of workers in the defence industry, but many were closed as they were located in regions where there were no plants.

Day nurseries only proliferated due to the impetus of World War II which brought a number of women into the labour force. Under the 1941 Community Facilities Act or Lanham

---

214 Auerbach, In the Business of Child Care, 40.
215 Ninety per cent of the staff had to be taken from relief rolls (Youcha, 309).
216 Michel, in "American Women and the Discourse of the Democratic Family," 156, reports that the nurseries could only be used by parents looking for work. If either parent found a job, they had to give up the nursery school. Youcha (309) reports, in contrast, that working mothers of young children could use the centres, although they were charged a nominal fee, whereas poor parents (on welfare, presumably) paid nothing.
217 Getis and Vinovskis, 198; Steinfels, 67. 
218 Getis and Vinovskis, 198.
219 Youcha (310) reports that "the WPA supplied 90 percent of the nurseries for the children of working Negro mothers."
Act the federal government provided funds to meet community needs in areas where war production boomed. The funds provided for facilities like hospitals, police and fire stations, as well as wartime day nurseries. At the time, support for women's employment was not enthusiastic within some branches of government and some social work and child welfare agencies, although the Federal Works Agency (FWA) which administered Lanham funds was very supportive of day care facilities.220 Resistance from the Children's Bureau, the Office of Education, the Federal Security Agency, and the War Manpower Commission made the implementation of the Lanham Act for child care funding insecure until 1943, as they battled with the FWA to try to wrest supervision of the day nurseries from the FWA.221 The government recognized, though, that facilities had to be provided for women working in war industries. The women's auxiliaries of some industrial unions, such as the United Electrical Workers of America (UE) and the United Auto Workers (UAW), as well as some Congresspeople backed the government's efforts.222

Under the Lanham Act, the federal government provided funding to states to cover 50 per

---

220 Michel details that at the 1941 White House Conference on child care, the head of the Children's Bureau, Katherine Lenroot, argued that "mothers who remain at home to provide for children are providing an essential patriotic service." Also, the War Manpower Commission in 1942 sent out a directive that "no women responsible for the care of young children should be encouraged or compelled to seek employment which deprives their children of essential care until all sources of supply are exhausted." Michel, "American Women and the Discourse of the Democratic Family," 159, 162. Tuttle states that a number of magazines and speeches by figures like J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI tried to encourage women to remain at home. For many, though, that was impossible. Servicemen's wives, for example, were paid monthly allowances after the passage of the Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act in 1942. Tuttle contends, however, that the allowances were often insufficient to manage a household. William Tuttle, "Rosie the Riveter and Her Latchkey Children: What Americans Can Learn About Child Day Care from the Second World War," Child Welfare 74, 1 (January/February, 1995), 96-97. See also Berry, 106; Steinfels, 67.

221 The War-Area Child Care Bill, 1943 (the Thomas Bill) would have terminated Lanham Act funding for day care in exchange for support for family foster care and ended FWA's administration and shifted it to the states. These programs would not only have been cheaper, but they would also have been easier to dismantle after the war. Tuttle, 96-7. See Michel, "American Women and the Discourse of the Democratic Family," 162-3 for a slightly different perspective on the Thomas bill.

222 For a history of the relations between women and the UAW and UE during World War II see Ruth Milkman, "American Women and Industrial Unionism during World War II," in
cent of the costs of building and operating child care facilities for women working in defence factories as part of the war effort. States, local communities, and parents' fees provided the other 50 per cent of funds. In 1944, the federal government decided to make funds available to care for children under age two. The federal government spent about $50 million, established 3,102 day care centres in areas where industry was concentrated, that served between 500,000 and 600,000 children. Youcha reports that only about 10 per cent of the children needing care were actually provided for under the Lanham Act, with most parents having to make other arrangements. More than 1,100 of those day cares were former WPA nurseries. Most of the centres were located in New York, California, and Washington.

In both cases—the WPA nurseries and the Lanham Act nurseries—the federal government channelled day care funding through education, not welfare agencies. Phillips argues this was to distance "these emergency programmes from traditional day care." The result was they largely by-passed the child and social welfare agencies which ran most day care centres before then. Social workers and other professionals were not enthusiastic supporters of continuing the war time nurseries, although by the end of the war, the Children's Bureau, the CWLA and the Family Welfare Association of America had grudgingly endorsed day nurseries.

Joffe argues regarding both the WPA and the Lanham Act that "federal support of child

Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars, 168-81.

223The labour force participation rates for mothers with young children did not increase greatly during the war. Tuttle reports the rates for mothers with children under age six only increased from nine to 12 per cent. Instead, the largest proportion of women employed had school-age children. For these children, the federal government established the Extended School Services (ESS) program, so children had someplace to go before and after school and on vacations. The public schools provided the facilities, with the federal government originally providing start-up funding, but with local governments mostly taking responsibility for programs and fund raising. Tuttle, 102-6.

224Tuttle, 99. The literature gives differing figures for the number of children served. Steinfels (67) cites about 1,500,000 children were served, which is also the figure given by government. Berry (107) reports that the 3,000 day care centres served about 105,000 children of defence workers. Bloom and Steen (25) report the centres served 600,000 children. Youcha (308-9) reports that 259 centres for black children existed in the segregated south, serving about 12,300 children in 1943.

225Youcha, 312.

226Phillips, 172.
care was in response to a national crisis, with support being withdrawn once the crisis passed. More significantly... The major purpose of the WPA program was to provide jobs for unemployed adults; the purpose of World War II child care was to enable women to work in war-related industry." With the war over, the government assumed that the day care centres were no longer needed. In 1946, the federal government withdrew funding, despite the protests of the Children's Bureau, the CWLA, and countless others who sent nearly 6,000 letters, cards, petitions and telegrams to the FWA, and the vast majority of centres were forced to close.229

Policy Development: Post-WWII-1950s

After World War II, while policy makers assumed women would return to the home, many did not. Child care services did expand with the growing recognition that women required social services such as day care in order to participate in the labour force. Some wartime day care centres managed to remain open. The states of California, Washington and Massachusetts continued to operate day care centres. Cities such as Washington, D.C., Hartford, Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia did so as well.230 In fact, the Lanham Act centres still exist in the state of California. The legislature agreed in 1946 to provide two-to-one matching funds to local boards of education. These were provided on a yearly basis until 1957, when the legislature agreed to make the funds permanent.231 These day care centres mostly cater to low-income and single-parent families, even though they are educational at base.

Still, the number of children served by day care centres declined precipitously from the 600,000-1.5 million served during the war. The only federal funding from the end of World War II to the 1950s was a tax allowance, introduced under the Eisenhower presidency, so that parents

---

228Joffé, 170.
229Quadagno, The Color of Welfare, 137 states that within months, 2,800 centres closed. See also Berry, 109; Tuttle, 102. Michel points out that the Children's Bureau shifted its position somewhat on the issue of child care given that it accepted the fact of women's employment and the need to do something about children being cared for outside the home. Michel, "American Women and the Discourse of the Democratic Family," 162-3.
230Steinfels, 70.
231Kerr, 165.
could deduct some employment-related child care expenses.Originally, only low-income women who had to work were eligible for the tax deduction. As more and more women entered the workforce, the government accepted the argument that day care expenses were business expenses for all working parents, and should not be restricted. The dependent care tax credit now primarily benefits non-poor families.

A comprehensive child care system did not emerge in the United States from the New Deal or World War II periods, nor even during the War on Poverty and Great Society programs of the 1960s and 1970s as society still resisted the idea of care outside the home for most children. The child care policies that did emerge or continue were maternalist and welfare-based.

Aid to Dependent Children became Aid to Families of Dependent Children in 1950 as single parents themselves became eligible for assistance in families where the dependent children were already receiving benefits. Also, benefits were extended to the permanently and totally disabled. In 1961, the federal government modified AFDC eligibility again to include both unemployed parents but few states implemented these changes. It was not until 1990 that the federal government required states to offer AFDC to children in two-parent families where the principal wage-earner is unemployed.

AFDC remained a very limited program for the first twenty years after the war as implementation of the Social Security Act provisions depended on states passing enabling legislation. States also had freedom to decide benefit levels and eligibility. As a result, the states had uneven policies and often discriminatory treatment. Children of unmarried women and women of colour were often excluded under "suitable home," "man in the house," and "substitute father" rules.

---


233Phillips, 173.

234In 1987, families earning over $20,000 per year claimed two-thirds of the child care tax credits, whereas those earning less than $10,000 per year claimed only six per cent of the credits. Lamb, Sternberg, and Ketterlinus, "Child Care in the United States," 214.

235Kudrie and Marmor, 100.

236U.S. Committee on Ways and Means, 385, 395.

It is estimated ADC benefited only one third or less of those eligible for the program until the 1960s. By 1976, however, coverage reached nearly 90 per cent of those eligible, before dropping to 80 per cent or less in the 1980s, due to the loosening of eligibility rules. Eligibility rules were loosened in the 1960s after many protests from welfare rights groups such as the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), and some victories in the courts which struck down some regulations. The result of the loosening of eligibility rules led to the increase of welfare recipients from 7.8 to 8.4 million in just one year (1966-1967). Changes in eligibility coincided with expansion of federal spending on AFDC under the War on Poverty. The War on Poverty expanded a number of social services. The federal government attempted to nationalize income support for the poor. It also introduced some public employment programs designed to respond to structural unemployment. In 1965 the federal government established Medicare for the elderly as part of the Social Security Act, and Medicaid for the poor, Food Stamps, subsidized housing, and job training. Furthermore, as part of job training programs under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, mothers receiving training were entitled to have child care.

Skocpol notes that "The number of female-headed families receiving welfare...rose from 635,000 in 1961 (or 29 percent of all such families) to almost 3 million by 1979 (or 50 percent of female-headed families)." The expansion of the number of people on AFDC precipitated demands for welfare reform and the first time that a paternalist program expanded to become a labour market program. Congress established the Work Incentive Program (WIN) which required recipients of federally funded welfare programs to get training for employment. Mothers on AFDC were required to participate in job training but only if day care was available, with mothers on AFDC with pre-school children exempted from participation. Unfortunately, although states were required to provide facilities for children of WIN trainees, and the federal government agreed to meet up to 75 per cent of the costs, states did little to make day care available. There also was a shortage of trained personnel. In 1969, the federal government

---

239 Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare*, 120.
240 Skocpol, "Targeting within Universalism," 418.
increased its contribution to 90 per cent and made all children of current or past welfare recipients eligible for the program. By 1970, this program provided child care for at least 127,000 children.241

One should not deny the slightly coercive aspects of the WIN program. On the other hand, WIN marked the first time the federal government made a concerted effort to try to expand day care services for children, primarily as a labour market policy for the mothers, working within the policy boundaries of AFDC.

While full support was not always available for mothers to receive care for their children outside the home, attitudes toward public day care slowly changed. Youcha credits the wartime experience with helping people see that children were not harmed by care outside the home, although most still believed mother's care was absolutely necessary for the well-being of children.242 The Children's Bureau in 1963 still argued that "The child who needs day care has a family problem which makes it impossible for his parents to fulfill their parental responsibilities without supplementary help. ...day care is a way of strengthening family life, preventing neglect of some children, and reducing risk of separation from their families for others."243

At the 1960 White House Conference on Children and Youth, "Of eight separate resolutions dealing with day care, two suggested that mothers of young children should stay at home unless forced to work..."244 The others advocated government support for working mothers, others developmental programs. Confusion still existed as to what form child care should take.

Developmental programs received a boost from the establishment of Project Head Start in 1965 under the Economic Opportunity Act. Head Start began as a summer program for children of poor families to offer them a preschool experience. It expanded into programs that provide early childhood education, health and social services to children of low-income families. The idea behind Head Start is that "given a pre-kindergarten or pre-first grade experience in a school

---

242 Youcha, 331-2.
243 Steinfels, 72.
setting, children from 'culturally deprived' homes could break the syndrome of school failure and future poverty." Steinfels argues this project was crucial in helping to popularize early childhood education, to renew government interest in financing pre-school education, and it shifted child care from a custodial to an educational basis. The policy was similar in focus to maternalist child care services of the past, based on concern for child welfare.

While Project Head Start popularized the idea of early childhood education for the poor, private nursery schools or pre-schools became popular for children of the middle class. By 1970, about 1.15 million three- and four-year-olds were enrolled in pre-schools, up from 890,000 in 1965. The United States still provides early childhood education for children at a younger age than does Canada (see tables 1.3-1.4).

The Politics of Race

By the end of the 1960s, black Americans were benefitting from two child care programs: Headstart and day care provided to welfare mothers to help them enter the labour market. While AFDC benefitted blacks disproportionately compared to whites in percentage terms, in actual numbers white female-headed households outnumbered black female-headed households. By the 1970s, black families made up about 46 per cent of AFDC recipients, white families about 38 per cent, and hispanic families 13 per cent. Throughout the 1970s public support for AFDC declined and governments responded by cutting its eligibility and benefit levels, as well as subsidized housing. By 1992, blacks made up only 37 per cent of AFDC recipients, whites made up 39 per cent, and hispanics 18 per cent.

As blacks became increasingly urbanized and enfranchised (in the sense of becoming involved in parties and thus influential), and as they pressured governments to make them

---

244Kerr, 167.
245Steinfels, 85.
246Steinfels, 86.
247Quadagno, 135; Berry, i31.
248For a revealing discussion of U.S. housing policy see Quadagno, The Color of Welfare.
eligible for programs, governments met with increasing resistance to public spending in these areas. Scholars have observed that societies which are relatively homogeneous in terms of race, ethnicity and language tend to support redistributive policies more. The United States, which contains a number of different ethnic and racial groups, tends not to support redistributive policies. White southern Democrats, urban ethnics, and union members began to leave the Democratic party while blacks remained supportive. Yet even the Democrats hesitated to extend any more benefit programs for fear of extending entitlements to blacks. A Democratic president signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 1996, clearly aimed at black single mothers.

Black women have competing views on how best to fight for their rights. Some black women are hesitant to support the women's movement, seen as a white women's movement. Black women have been fighting longer for issues like equal pay and child care and had always participated in the labour market more. And black women tend to support child care services more. By 1971, almost 16 per cent of black working women placed their children in day care centres, compared to less than 8 per cent of white women.

Organization of Contemporary Actors

In the United States in the 1960s, there was some effort to move child care beyond its welfare focus, although this was (and still is) difficult. The day care movement itself had sold day care as a service for the socially deviant. To suggest suddenly that working mothers legitimately needed day care would have clashed with the dominant norm that "the best place for mother and child was together at home." Attitude changes did occur, though, in the 1960s among child welfare professionals, psychologists, and feminist groups.

The women's movement increasingly took up the issue of child care as a way to ease women's participation in the labour market. In 1966, some representatives to a national conference of state commissions on the status of women formed the leadership group of what

---

251 Skocpol, "Targeting within Universalism," 419.
252 Berry, 139.
253 Steinfels, 73.
became the National Organization for Women (NOW).  

These women were frustrated by the unwillingness of the federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination in employment based on sex. NOW became a public supporter of day care, but on instrumental grounds. Individualist feminists, I argued above, for most of this century totally opposed policies that had as their focus "reconciliation of work and family life." Instead, many in the women's movement demanded that the conception of women's roles change: women should not be regarded as principally responsible for child care or housework.

Quadagno argues that NOW was not initially a strong supporter of child care. A NOW publication in the late 1960s outlining a Bill of Rights did include child care, and called for the establishment of child care facilities "on the same basis as parks, libraries, and public schools." Yet, as child care legislation moved through Congress in the late 1960s, NOW did not testify to support the bills. Joffe argues that feminists have given child care "rhetorical support but little concrete attention." The women's movement regarded day care not as a women's issue, necessarily, but a societal issue; responsibility for child care should therefore be socialized. NOW's main focus was on achieving equal rights for women, but it did pay attention to the day care issue in order to show that it was also interested in helping women discharge their family responsibilities.

Within the trade unions, women's issues also gained support. The WTUL had already

255 Berry, 128.  
256 Quadagno, 147.  
258 For an interesting discussion of these issues see Leslie B. Tanner, ed., Voices from Women's Liberation (New York: Signet, 1971), section on families and day care. See especially articles by Linda Gordon "Functions of the Family"; and Louise Gross and Phyllis MacEwan, "On Day Care."  
259 Berry, 143.
made day care a priority after World War II. When the AFL and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) merged in 1957, the new union stated its support for not only equal pay legislation but also government-sponsored day care facilities. Some unions, like the United Electrical Workers of America (UE), which had a large proportion of women members, set up child care centres for its members in the 1940s. The UE also negotiated equal pay and maternity leave provisions in its major contracts. In 1969, Congress amended the Taft-Hartley Act to allow industrial employers and unions to bargain day care services.

Auerbach, however, reports that unions have not been very effective at bargaining for child care. A survey of 10 major unions in 1984 found only one case where a union had successfully secured child care funding through collective bargaining. More unions have been involved in directly sponsoring child care centres.

Part of the resistance is the unions prefer to bargain for wage increases, which benefit everyone, versus specific programs, which benefit only a few. Unions saw themselves as worker organizations above all; "any effort to demarcate the special interests of a subgroup was likely to be interpreted as divisive and threatening..." Furthermore, in the sectors that employ women in large numbers, union membership tends to be low.

As day care became a more visible issue, other groups took up the cause. In 1969, an organization called the Congress to Unite Women formed and did support the idea of free round-the-clock day care centres. Until those were achieved, though, it proposed tax deductions of child care expenses. This organization had a more middle-class basis as tax deductions benefit middle and upper income families, not the working class.

---

261 Kenneally, 81.
262 Robinson et al., Early Child Care in the United States of America, 110.
263 Auerbach, In the Business of Child Care, 151.
264 Auerbach, 153
266 Quadagno, 148.
Institutionalization of Liberal Feminism

By the 1960s, the individualist feminist or liberal feminist wing of the women's movement grew in strength and its arguments framed a lot of discussions around women's issues. Maternal feminists from the WTUL, who had been instrumental in the creation of the Women's Bureau in 1920, no longer dominated the Bureau by the 1960s. Instead, liberal feminists supporting equal rights became more influential.267 Some remnants of maternalism still existed. Labour unions supported protective labour legislation until the 1960s, as did the Democratic party, with its close ties to labour and women like Eleanor Roosevelt.268 In December 1961, President Kennedy appointed Mrs. Roosevelt to chair the Commission on the Status of Women, a study commission. Its 1963 report argued against the ERA and for the continuation of protective legislation, child care facilities, and the Republicans' child-care tax deduction. It still urged women not to neglect the home.269

But equal rights feminists managed to win a lot of battles over issues like nondiscrimination in employment. They were successful in lobbying the federal government to pass the Equal Pay Act in 1963, and adding protection against sex discrimination in employment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 as part of the Civil Rights Act to prohibit "discrimination against pregnancy in all aspects of employment" and to require "employers who have disability policies to include pregnancy."270 But that did not end the issue for some feminist groups. In 1987, NOW, the American Civil Liberties Union, the LWV271, and the National Women's Political Caucus

267Stetson, 267-70.
268Berry, 124; Stetson, 262.
269Berry, 125. By that point, Esther Peterson, formerly head of the Women's Bureau, took over the commission's work as Eleanor Roosevelt died in November 1962.
270Stetson, 264. Congress passed this legislation after the Supreme Court ruled in two cases that employers' exclusion of pregnancy from a list of covered disabilities did not constitute sexual discrimination as it only affected a subclass of women, not all women (Geduldig v. Aiello, 1974; General Electric v. Gilbert, 1976).
271The LWV is maternalist at base, but has shifted its position over time. As mentioned above, it did oppose the 1932 federal Economy Act which prohibited spouses from being employed in the civil service, but it also opposed the ERA for some time. By the 1980s, Cottrell reports, it did officially support the ERA, but still does not consider itself a women's movement organization. Cottrell, "The Contemporary American Women's Movement," 256.
(NWPC) attempted to persuade the Supreme Court in *California Federal Savings and Loan Association et al. v. Guerra* (the Garland case) to not allow preferential treatment for women. They argued instead for unpaid leave for all disabled workers.

These organizations representing equal rights feminists fought pregnancy discrimination on a liberal feminist basis. They resisted maternity leave benefits as it appeared to be a form of protective labour law which, they felt, "reinforced the idea that women were a separate, expendable workforce and increased the costs to employers of hiring women." In arguing for pregnancy to be seen as a temporary disability, women's groups could place pregnancy under a gender-neutral category, since unions had already fought and won on the disability issue. They did not manage to persuade the Supreme Court that states were indeed permitted to require an employer (of 15 or more people) to provide job protection for pregnant women by allowing them unpaid leave of four months and a comparable job when they return to work.

The rupture with maternal feminism in the 1960s reveals the ironies of the modern field of battle over women's policies in the United States: policies that are seen as giving special status to women are opposed by women's groups themselves. As a result, policies common in other countries, such as maternity benefits, are absent in the United States.

Another example of the battle between individualist feminism and maternalism can be seen in discussions at the 1944 Women's Conference of the UAW over the issue of seniority. One woman, Florence Walton, suggested that women and blacks should push for preferential seniority rights that veterans then enjoyed within the union. This proposal was overwhelmingly rejected by the women delegates, who instead passed a resolution explicitly opposing any form of special treatment for women. Thus, when issues specifically related to women and women's employment came up, women persuaded themselves to put their class or union interests ahead of their gender interests.

Rather than seeing maternalism as a hindrance to the development of policies for women,

---

273Stetson, 264.
274Conway, Ahern, and Steuernagel, 168.
275Milkman, 180-1.
I see the decline of support for maternalism as the problem. The policies that were entrenched before the 1960s, then, remain somewhat anomalous, leading reporter Mickey Kaus to write in a New York Times column that: "Aid to Families with Dependent Children, far from being a cornerstone of the New Deal, was an aberration." AFDC was not such an aberration if one understands the maternalist basis to policies until the 1960s.

Policy Development: 1960s-1990s

By the 1960s, certain child care norms were entrenched. The norm of child care as a welfare service that could help poor families allowed child care to develop as a developmental program in Head Start, and encouraged Congress to introduce WIN.

Efforts of pressure groups and individual legislators to expand child care beyond these programs were unsuccessful. First, the day care lobby was confronted by the growing power of the extreme right in the United States. It advocated a very traditional division of labour for most families (a familist norm), but policies for poor families to make welfare recipients work.

Maternalists in the past had managed to "sell" their policies as compatible with these norms; the contemporary day care lobby, with a strong liberal feminist component, could not. (Only in the late 1980s, as will be seen below, did the day care lobby pick up on maternalist themes).

Second, the day care lobby met with institutional barriers. They were unsuccessful at getting both the executive and legislature on board. The separation of powers that characterizes the U.S. system constrains policy making. In contrast, in Canada, a strong cabinet government with political will managed to implement a number of social programs in the 1960s and early 1970s, including child care.

Mobilization occurred as some organizations shifted their views on child care. For


277 The Comprehensive Child Development Act was co-sponsored by Senator Walter Mondale and Congressman John Brademas. Auerbach, 56.

278 It is indeed a curious position in that conservatives encourage the dependence of women married to prosperous men; but demand the independence (or lack of reliance on welfare) of the poor. Linda Gordon, "The New Feminist Scholarship on the Welfare State," in Women
example, the CWLA by 1969 defined child care to include "child development and education as well as care and protection."279 By the 1970 White House Conference, child care was identified as "one of the major problems facing the American family."280 Advocacy groups like the National Committee for the Day Care of Children also emerged in 1960. It was renamed the Day Care and Child Development Council of America in 1967, again reflecting a shift in thinking.

In 1958, the Children's Bureau requested that the Bureau of the Census conduct a survey of child care needs. The survey revealed the need for child care among working lower and middle income families. In January 1960, Senator Jacob Javits introduced Bill S. 1286, based on the recommendations stemming from the conference and other activities of the two Bureaus. The Javits bill sought $25 million for day care for children of working mothers, with matching funds to be provided by states.

Then President-elect Kennedy indicated he was in favour of day care for working parents. In response to the rising costs of welfare, though, Congress favoured a more traditional plan to help mothers on welfare enter the workforce.281 The Women's Bureau was uncomfortable with the welfare emphasis of the revised bill and thought the bill would not meet its goal for child care for all working mothers. The child care lobby, in turn, displayed mixed reactions. Elinor Guggenheimer, head of the National Committee for the Day Care of Children, argued that women should be encouraged to stay home with their young children and not compete for men's jobs. Still, the lobby, which also included the CWLA, United Community Funds, and Playschools, joined with the Women's Bureau and Children's Bureau to attempt to raise the issue to the public and gain public support. It recommended federal, state, and local funding for child care and that day care be available for all children who needed it.282

Conservative reaction to the Javits bill included arguments that day care was a communist plot, and hearkened the end of the family.283 The Javits bill finally passed Congress in July 1962 as Title IV of the Social Security Act. It allocated $10 million for day care. States could

the State and Welfare, 14.
279 Kerr, 168.
280 Reeves, Child Care Crisis, 3.
281 Quadagno, 138.
282 Auerbach, 53.
use Aid to Dependent Children funds to purchase day care for children of mothers on welfare. The Children's Bureau was authorized to provide grants-in-aid to states for day care services for children from low income families, not just children of mothers on welfare. Congress, however, did not allow total appropriations to exceed $7 million. As a result of the limited appropriations, states did not have the money to develop programs beyond those for families on welfare.

By the mid-1960s, the Children's Bureau had shifted its stance on the issue of child care and recanted its past opposition to day care for young children. Despite this growing support for the idea of day care, policy makers within government experienced problems in deciding just what day care should mean. The two bureaus as well as the Labor Department and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare expressed different views of child care. Should child care be educational in its focus? Should it be used to get people off welfare?

In 1967, Congress introduced eight different day care bills, highlighting the confusion. Because welfare reform was a more pressing concern, Congress in 1967 amended the Social Security Act to provide day care funds for mothers receiving AFDC, families who had been on AFDC or would likely need AFDC, and women in training programs. Under Title IV-A and IV-B, the federal government committed funds on a three-to-one matching basis; that is, "states, localities, or private voluntary groups who could meet 25 percent of their day care costs could have federal funds for the remaining 75 percent." The program was indeed generous, and certainly more so than the 50-50 matching funds the Canadian government provided to provinces under the Canada Assistance Plan. Also, the funding was open-ended. The federal government attached no ceiling to its own expenditures, nor to the amount any one state could spend.

Congress also established the WIN program which required states to set up community work and training programs. States were to establish day care programs as part of WIN to enable welfare mothers to participate as well. As the WIN program was being developed, some advocates demanded that the regulations be written to ensure a broader, more developmental form of provision of child care services. Congress placed the Children's Bureau in charge of developing regulatory guidelines for the WIN day care centres. The final guidelines of the WIN program were released in 1967, and the program was implemented in 1968.

283 Quadagno, 139.
284 Steinfels, 77.
285 Steinfels, 192.
program ignored those regulations developed by the Children's Bureau and allowed administering agencies to waive guidelines in some cases where "innovation" could be better advanced.

At this point, the push for government-funded comprehensive child care stalled. Programs lacked coordination. Quadagno notes that federal child care programs existed in six federal agencies: the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Department of Labour, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Agriculture. Many of the projects were small, for example, day care for migrant workers' children under the EOA, and financial and technical assistance for centres under the Housing and Urban Development Act.

Meanwhile, the norm of child care as a labour market policy for poor people was becoming increasingly entrenched. By the mid-1960s, the federal government became increasingly concerned about rising welfare roles. As a result, President Nixon introduced the Family Assistance Plan (FAP) to Congress in the fall of 1969. Nixon's goal was to fund day care services in order to force welfare mothers into the workforce so as to reduce the number of people receiving welfare. However, Nixon's public statement in 1969 that he was supportive of "providing all American children an opportunity for healthful and stimulating development during the first five years" made proponents hope child care would move beyond its welfare base.

A number of discussions and debates occurred in Congress over the proposed FAP in 1970 and 1971, partly because the plans for day care services for welfare mothers were only vaguely outlined. Some discussions focused on consolidating the myriad of day care services. Others centred on Nixon's plan to reduce welfare roles by sending mothers to work after securing child care. Others tried to push government's conception of child care beyond a custodial and

---

286Quadagno, 145.
287Kerr, 167.
288Presidential statement quoted in Lamb, Sternberg, and Ketterlinus, 212.
289Nixon proposed an allocation of $386 million annually to provide care for 450,000 children of welfare mothers. Once their incomes rose above a certain maximum, they would no longer be eligible for free day care and would have to pay for the services themselves. Steinfels, 189.
welfare focus to include educational and developmental goals.

Out of the Senate and House hearings emerged the Comprehensive Child Development Act. This Bill, more far-reaching than the FAP, proposed to provide "the legislative framework for eventual universally available child development programs for all families who need and want them".290 The bill proposed to provide child care funds for welfare recipients as part of the FAP, expand child care services, set up a sliding fee schedule for single parents and working families, and expand Head Start.291 It passed on 6 December 1971.

By this point, it had become clear to the Administration that the day care bill would increase the cost of the FAP. It argued, the additional costs of extending public funding for child care beyond the very poor to the middle class would be $20 billion. The FAP itself had been held up in the Senate Finance Committee. As well, extreme right groups like the Moral Majority mobilized to oppose the Congress's Comprehensive Child Development Act. During Congressional hearings, the Moral Majority argued quite vehemently that day care undermined the traditional family and it should not be publicly supported. Some in Congress argued day care was a communist plot, designed to Sovietize America.292

On 9 December 1971 President Nixon vetoed the Comprehensive Child Development Act. In his veto speech, no doubt to appeal to the Moral Majority and conservative Congressmen, Nixon stated that "For the Federal Government to plunge headlong financially into supporting child development would commit the vast moral authority of the National Government on the side of communal approaches to child-rearing over against the family-centered approach."293 Instead, the federal government introduced child care tax deductions under the Tax Reform Bill of 1971. These tax deductions largely benefit the middle and more wealthy classes.294 It also took the opportunity to restrict funding it established under the 1967

290Steinfels, 187, quoting a speech by Senator Walter Mondale, 6 April 1971 in Congress.
291Reeves, 3.
292Steinfels, 191.
293As quoted in Steinfels, 19, 191.
294The bill allowed working mothers to deduct from their taxes $200 per month for one child, $300 per month for two children, and $400 per month for three or more children. Families whose gross income exceeded $8,000 were limited in the amount of allowable deduction.
Social Security Act amendment. Under the Revenue Sharing Act of 1972, the federal government would limit the overall federal expenditures allocated for day care and the amount of funds any one state could receive.

In 1974 the government introduced the Title XX funds. Subsequently, two more efforts were made to introduce day care legislation, in 1975 and 1978-79. In 1975 Congressmen Mondale and Brademas introduced the Child and Family Services Bill which proposed to subsidize developmental child care for non-welfare families. Again, the conservative opposition mobilized to defeat the legislation, repeating that "federal support for child care would lead to sovietization and communal child rearing."

Jimmy Carter ran in the 1976 election on a platform that promised a comprehensive child care bill. The chances of success seemed high as Senator Walter Mondale, co-sponsor of the Comprehensive Child Development Act and the 1975 Child and Family Services Bill, became vice president. The comprehensive child care bill introduced under Senator Alan Cranston in 1978, however, did not get White House support. Senator Cranston, the bill's chief sponsor, therefore cancelled scheduled hearings on the bill in 1979. Instead, in 1976 the federal government established the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit. Replacing the 1954 legislation established under Eisenhower, the 1976 Act allows families to receive a tax credit for child care expenses incurred while working.

In the 1980s the Reagan Administration put a halt to child care reform efforts. In his first term, Reagan cut overall social spending by 10 per cent by reducing or eliminating Great Society programs. Congress cut Title XX Social Security Act funds for child care for low-income families by nearly one-half, from $835 million in 1981 to $422 million in 1986. Federal monies returned to previous levels by 1991, but dropped again by 1995. Congress also cut the

Steinfels, 18.

295Berry, 142.


297Joffe, 172. Joffe also argues that the child care lobby at that point had collapsed. Educators, led by the American Federation of Teachers, were demanding that schools should primarily sponsor child care. Others wanted child care to have a broader base of support.
CETA which subsidized the salaries of some child care workers, and reduced the funding for the CACFP by 30 per cent.\textsuperscript{299} The U.S. Committee on Ways and Means estimated that during the 1980s, AFDC was cut by 36 per cent and Title XX programs by 54 per cent. In contrast, the popular social security program was cut by only eight per cent.\textsuperscript{300}

In an effort to privatize responsibility for child care, Congress redirected monies from direct provision of child care services to tax credits by expanding the Dependent Care Tax Credit. Tuominen reports that the tax credit expanded from $956 million in 1981 to $3.4 billion by 1986.\textsuperscript{301} It expanded even further by 1991 to $4.2 billion, before being reduced by 1995 to $2.7 billion. Tuominen reports that in 1981, 64 per cent of the families claiming the Dependent Care Tax Credit were above the median income level.\textsuperscript{302} In 1990 President Bush went even farther and expanded the EITC. Also, Congress introduced the employer-supported child care assistance plan in 1981 to encourage employers to provide child care support, instead of the government.

The Reagan government also resisted adoption of federal child care regulations. Tuominen reports that after a decade of debate, Congress agreed to Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements in 1980. These requirements established minimum federal standards for federally-funded child care programs and left in place the standards established by state and local laws. They were to be implemented in 1981 but Congress invalidated them with the \textit{Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act} of 1981.\textsuperscript{303} Again, these changes reflected neo-conservative support for informal child care, and an overall privatization of social services.

Especially during the Reagan presidency, child care advocates needed to reconcile their demands with support for the traditional family. Child care advocates had to contend with the ideology of an increasingly right-wing Republican party which condemned rising divorce rates, increased single-parenthood, and women who worked outside the home. In 1980, the Republican

\textsuperscript{298} Tuominen, "Caring for Profit," 457.
\textsuperscript{299} Martinez.
\textsuperscript{300} Ban ting, "The Social Policy Divide," 284.
\textsuperscript{301} Tuominen, 457.
\textsuperscript{302} Tuominen, 461.
\textsuperscript{303} Tuominen, 457.
party repudiated its support for the ERA after 40 years of support.\textsuperscript{304} Within the Republican party, the New Right, which believes in a strict separation of spheres of husbands and wives, became increasingly influential. The New Right is very much "familist" in its desire to force women to remain at home. It believes women should remain full-time mothers at home and men should earn enough to support the family on one income (family wage). New Right "familist" groups include Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum and Concerned Women of America. Within the Republican party, neo-conservatives became more influential in the 1980s. While not opposed to women working \textit{per se}, they did object to government assistance in the form of public child care, subsidies, job training and so on. Thus, two sets of forces opposed child care, for different reasons.\textsuperscript{305}

While both the Nixon and Carter administrations opposed child care legislation that would have allowed mothers to leave the home, support rose in the 1980s to do something about welfare mothers. The public perception was that welfare mothers, primarily black, were living off the public purse instead of working. Even familists changed their stance. Joffe notes that at the 1980 White House Conference on the Family, the New Right made known its disapproval of government-provided child care, but allowed a general resolution "supporting the importance of child care as an aid to working parents" to pass without opposition.\textsuperscript{306}

Reagan supported the re-design of WIN into an employment and training program for those receiving AFDC. The Family Support Act signed into law in 1988, detailed above, required that single parents on welfare with children over three years old had to participate in the JOBS program. States had to guarantee child care, though, for parents with children under age six. As mentioned above, lack of funding made implementation of such child care services difficult.

Familists still resist policies to reconcile work and family life for those who are deemed

\begin{footnotes}
\item[304] Berry, 150.
\item[305] See also Tuominen.
\item[306] Joffe, 176. Joffe argues that part of the reason for the New Right's qualified approval of child care for working families reflects the fact that, given the increase in the number of working families generally, some proportion of New Right supporters most likely used day care services themselves.
   
   I would argue, though, that the shift in stance reflects more the New Right's desire to put
\end{footnotes}
not to need to work, that is, middle class women. Support for work-for-welfare has increased, and women should not stay home if they cannot afford it. But there is still little acceptance of the need to reconcile work and family life for the rest of the population.

The need for more comprehensive child care is becoming increasingly obvious as more and more women enter the labour market. Policies framed as reconciling work and family life were the only ones to gain support in the right-wing dominated era of the 1980s. Berry argues that "Increasingly, women's organizations became comfortable with a message that downplayed a concern for the rights of women in order to build support for a national child-care policy."\textsuperscript{307} After the defeat of the ERA, women's organizations like NOW and the NWPC, in order to counter right-wing claims that they were anti-family, began to focus more on issues like child care and parental leave.\textsuperscript{308} Women's groups were successful in 1984 at getting child support legislation passed to allow states to deduct child support payments from negligent parents' paycheques.\textsuperscript{309} Also, as discussed below, women's groups lobbied to get some form of maternity leave.

NOW remained adamantly committed to an equal rights agenda. During the early 1980s, its primary focus was on the ERA, and the fight to have Geraldine Ferraro nominated as presidential running-mate with Walter Mondale. Berry argues that NOW refused to make child care its first priority, although it supported child care insofar as it enabled women to enjoy other rights.\textsuperscript{310} The liberal feminist movement in general in the United States has been primarily concerned with the ERA and reproductive rights, devoting a significant proportion of its resources to fight these issues. It has also sought to increase the number of women in public office.\textsuperscript{311}

\textsuperscript{307} Berry, 172.
\textsuperscript{308} Berry, 152.
\textsuperscript{309} Berry, 153.
\textsuperscript{310} Berry, 172.
\textsuperscript{311} Naomi Black, "Social Feminism in France: A Case Study," in \textit{Women and World Change}, 219.
The Act for Better Child Care (ABC Bill)

Despite the many failed efforts at reform, child care remained on Congress's agenda. The 1987-88 Congressional session debated over 100 child care and education bills. In 1987 the Alliance for Better Child Care (ABC) formed as an alliance of a broad range of organizations, including advocacy groups like the Children's Defense Fund (CDF) under Marian Wright Edelman, as well as educational, religious, professional, and civil rights associations, and labour unions and women's organizations. In November 1987 the Act for Better Child Care (ABC bill) was introduced in Congress (along with more than 70 other, less comprehensive bills covering a variety of child care issues). The ABC bill was developed by the ABC coalition and supported by a large bipartisan group of members of congress. It authorized $2.5 billion in federal grants to the states to upgrade buildings used for nonprofit day care centres and family day care home. Funds would also be used to provide night and day care programs, and to transform part-day programs like Head Start into full-day programs. The bill mandated that caregivers would have to have formal training. Federal standards would be imposed on all caregivers receiving funds, including child-staff ratios, training, and qualifications for workers. Parents would pay for services on a sliding fee scale and would be eligible if they earned up to 115 per cent of the median income of their state. The bill also supported church-based day care programs willing to submit to federal regulations.

Success in having a modified version of the ABC bill passed can be credited in particular to Marian Wright Edelman of the CDF, and her willingness to appeal to maternalist arguments. Not all members of the ABC coalition agreed with her. The Coalition presented child care as a children's issue and argued that child care programs would especially benefit poor children who did not have access to the private preschool education that middle- and upper-class children did.

---

312Olmsted, 393.
313Berry, chapter 8; Martinez, 121.
314Robins, "Child Care Policy and Research," 11.
315Martinez, 121. Robins (27) states the bill had more than two hundred co-sponsors in Congress.
316Berry (180-3) reports that Edelman's willingness to remove clauses that prohibited the use of funds for sectarian purposes, and religious discrimination by providers, rankled Democratic support for the bill, as well as women's organizations and educational organizations
And while it acknowledged that the primary caregiver should have the choice to stay home, increasingly, that was seen as impossible for many.317 A debate ensued between Conservative forces, including Phyllis Schlafly, who wanted tax incentives, (a "toddler tax credit") not subsidies.318 Conway et al. note that "Some feminists also supported this approach, arguing that because tax credits could be utilized by both homemakers and working mothers, child care would be seen as an issue for all women, not just working women."319 Other groups argued, though, that providing tax incentives to non-working mothers "would reinforce the notion that women should stay at home and raise the children by giving them an inducement to do so."320 The debate thus pitched maternalists and individualist feminists against each other.

Despite strong support for child care from the CDF, NAEYC, the Child Care Action Campaign, the AFL-CIO, and women's organizations like the BPW, that version of the ABC bill died before it even got to Congress. The 1988 election got in the way, and polls did not show overwhelming support for the issue.321 In 1990 the U.S. Congress did approve the $2.5 billion Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) under the 1990 Budget Reconciliation Act. The CCDBG is a modified ABC bill that provides assistance to the working poor via new grants to states to provide child care support as well as refundable tax credits. It also provided monies such as the National Education Association and the PTA.

317An excellent comparison of the debates surrounding the U.S. ABC bill and the Canadian Canada Child Care Act (Bill C-144) can be found in Katherine Teghtsoonian, "Neo-Conservative Ideology and Opposition to Federal Regulation of Child Care Services in the United States and Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 26, 1 (March 1993), 97-121.

318Senator Orrin Hatch, not normally known for his support of such policies, supported the bill, despite the vehement opposition of the New Right, including Schlafly. Berry (189-94) argues that perhaps Hatch saw this as the first step to public funding for religious schools. Under the CCDBG regulations, state grants cannot go to church-run centres that engage in religious activities. However, because states can give vouchers to parents to pay for child care of their choice, they cannot turn down a request if the voucher is to be given to a religious child care provider. The state can only impose health and safety rules on religious centres.

319Conway, Ahern, and Steuernagel, Women and Public Policy, 160.

320Conway, Ahern, and Steuernagel, 160.

321Berry (182) reports that "Voter opinion two days after the election showed that 28 percent of Bush voters and 55 percent of Dukakis voters wanted more child care."
to expand Head Start to cover all three- to five-year-olds whose families have incomes below the poverty level.\textsuperscript{322}

\textit{The Family and Medical Leave Act}

The fight over family and medical leave occurred at the same time in the 1980s. Proposed legislation was first introduced in the House in 1985 for unpaid parental leave. Hofferth and Deich report that as of 1989, only about two per cent of employers offered paid maternity leave in the United States.\textsuperscript{323}

From the beginning, small businesses, the American Chamber of Commerce and many politicians were against attempts to introduce a statutory policy. They feared it would open the flood gates to require them to provide support for other social programs like child and elderly care. The union movement and feminists united to support family and medical leave. Women's groups included the American Association of University Women, the Women's Legal Defense Fund, the BPW, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the Congressional Caucus on Women's Issues, to name a few.\textsuperscript{324} NOW was also a strong supporter of the bill.

Those opposed rallied around ideas of individualism and non-intervention of government in employment practices. Businesses raised the spectre of higher taxes to pay for benefits, and argued that taxes were already too high, even though America has very low tax rates comparatively. Added employer payroll costs would have a negative impact on economic productivity and competitiveness and would lead to an increase in business costs. The White House under Bush also opposed the legislation. Instead, Bush favoured encouraging companies to adopt leave policies voluntarily. To placate the opposition, supporters of parental leave "began to appropriate the Reaganite 'pro-family' rhetoric by emphasizing that the possibility of leave would benefit both parents and children, not just mothers."\textsuperscript{325} Anti-abortion activists approvingly labelled it a pro-life policy. Conservative pro-family groups had no choice but to support the legislation.

\textsuperscript{322}Hofferth and Deich, 431; Reeves, \textit{Child Care Crisis}, 6.

\textsuperscript{323}Hofferth and Deich, 433.

\textsuperscript{324}Berry, 159.

\textsuperscript{325}Berry, 163.
Despite this support, the legislation was increasingly watered down. The legislation that finally passed mandated an unpaid leave period, but only in companies with 50 or more employees. Even that legislation was vetoed by President Bush in June 1990. President Bush again vetoed parental leave legislation in 1991. Finally, in 1993 under President Bill Clinton, Congress passed the *Family and Medical Leave Act* which allows employees 12 weeks of unpaid parental leave. It is only available for employees of companies with 50 or more employees where the worker has been employed for at least one year (1,250 hours), worked an average of 25 hours per week during that year, and excludes workers in the top 10 per cent of the company's pay scale if they are considered essential and their leave would cause "substantial and grievous economic injury" to the employer.\(^{326}\) The leave can be used for child or elder care. The Act guarantees that the employee can return to work at a similar job, and retains health benefits for the duration of the leave. As a result of the exemptions, the Act covers only about half of all U.S. workers.\(^{327}\)

**CONCLUSION**

The successful implementation of the Child Care and Development Block Grant and the Family and Medical Leave Act can be credited to the way the policies were sold. Advocates appealed to maternalist arguments, such as child welfare, and pro-familism in order to mute the opposition. This result may be surprising to those who feel child care advocates should adopt liberal feminist arguments of equality and workplace access in order to achieve a comprehensive child care system. The evidence from this chapter suggests, however, that the battle for child care has been more easily fought on maternalist grounds in the United States. Given societal resistance to the idea of women working, individualist feminist arguments are a much more difficult basis on which to build child care. Individualist feminist arguments have limited appeal in their emphasis on women's needs, rather than children's needs.

A number of factors contribute to the success of maternalist ideas. Maternalists have managed to catch the ear of government and have their ideas institutionalized throughout U.S. policy history, whereas individualist feminists have had to rely on the courts primarily to push

---

\(^{326}\)Conway, Ahern and Steuernagel, 67; Bloom and Steen, 28.
for same treatment. For the longest time, individualist feminists had a difficult time advancing their demands within trade unions, whereas maternalists had trade union support for policies like protective labour legislation. Maternalists have had greater success at deflating familist right-wing opposition and they can sell their policies as compatible with a pro-family stance.

The historical break with maternalism among women's organizations ended the strong push for maternalist policies. Individualist feminists explicitly rejected the strategy of demanding policies to reconcile work and family life, as organized interests did in France. In addition, researchers have argued that some of the policies were abandoned by liberal feminists because of race issues. As maternalist policies benefited white middle class women less, and black women more, support decreased. Child care, like most social policies in the United States has become two-tiered. Public funding is directed primarily toward the poor. Child care programs for middle and upper income earners have developed mainly as tax benefits, benefiting those with higher incomes.

Governments have also encouraged employers and the private sector to develop programs. A number of problems arise, though, when relying on the private sector to provide care. Employers will only provide care when they perceive that the benefits of the policies outweigh the costs. Benefits include increased worker productivity and job satisfaction, workforce stability, and the development of a positive corporate image.328 Employers who want to retain their high-skilled employees (such as nurses) or who want to attract new employees, especially female employees, in a competitive labour market, will be more likely to provide such support. Large corporations are more likely to be willing to assume the costs than smaller companies. As well, small companies may not have enough workers in need of such services to make it worthwhile. Workers who most need access to such policies likely do not work for the companies that provide them.

The development of commercial care also presents a problem. In some countries such as Canada, commercial care preceded the development of not-for-profit care. In Ontario, governments allowed commercial care at first and then passed legislation to induce centres to

\[327\text{Gromley, 229, n. 38.}\]
\[328\text{Seyler et al., "Balancing Work and Family," 173.}\]
become non-profit. The likelihood of similar policy development in the United States is much slimmer. Since the 1980s especially, governments have been committed to privatizing services and relying on the market for social service provision. The transformation of child care services from commercial to non-profit is more likely in a country such as Canada where state intervention meets less resistance. Even then, building non-profit care is difficult.

The policies pursued thus far have not resulted in a comprehensive child care system in the United States. Building such a system is possible; however, the most successful policies would probably be those that build on past policies like Head Start. Programs must be made more permanent as well. As Skocpol points out regarding the cancellation of the Sheppard-Towner Act that it was vulnerable "because it had not established a fixed entitlement to benefits, nor had it included a provision for the automatic renewal of yearly appropriations." Many other child and family policies have met a similar fate, with fixed terms and lack of specified monies. The lack of institutionalization of a number of programs and lack of public support has led to their easy dismemberment. More constituency and interest group activity to lobby government for improved child care may help. But key to the successful implementation of child care has proven to be to support policies that help reconcile work and family life.


330For discussion on expanding child care programs, including the "School of the 21st Century" program see Edward F. Zigler and Matia Finn-Stevenson, "The Child Care Crisis: Implications for the Growth and Development of the Nation's Children," Journal of Social Issues 51, 3 (1995), 215-231. Zigler was one of the architects of Head Start. He proposes to link child care with the educational system in order to provide year-round child care geared to the parents' work day, as well as before- and after-school care for older children. As of 1995, about 400 schools had implemented the program.

331Skocpol, "Targeting within Universalism," 425.
Table 5.1
FORMS OF CARE FOR CHILDREN OF WORKING PARENTS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1988*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CANADA</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>family</td>
<td>family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-relative</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.8&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* U.S. data represents primary care arrangements by employed mothers for children under age five. Canadian data represents the rates of child care use by families with children under age six.

<sup>a</sup> In 1988, of the care provided by a non-relative, care in a family day care home in the U.S. totalled 23.6 per cent; in 1993, family day care totalled 16.6 per cent.

<sup>b</sup> For the U.S., the Bureau of the Census only surveys employed mothers. Spouse, therefore, means father. Care by mother at work is listed under "other".

<sup>c</sup> Estimate is subject to sampling variability and should be used with caution.

Table 5.2
PRIMARY CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS USED BY EMPLOYED MOTHERS OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 6 IN THE UNITED STATES *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of care and maternal employment status</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1991a)</th>
<th>1993a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatives (in own home and child's home)</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitter, in-home</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family day care</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre-based care</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother at workb)</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otherc)</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Primary child care means the form of care most frequently used in a week. Census Bureau questions ask information about paid and unpaid care used while the mother works; they thus provide information on care not usually included in surveys, such as care provided by the father and school attendance. However, the census survey does not collect information on child care used by families of working fathers. Data is collected on the child care arrangements with father-headed households, but the data is considered too negligible to report.

a) Figures for this year are for children under age 5.
b) Includes mothers working at home or away from home.

Table 5.3
PRE-PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pop. 3-5 yrs</td>
<td>10,949</td>
<td>10,183</td>
<td>9,284</td>
<td>10,733</td>
<td>11,207</td>
<td>12,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total enrolled</td>
<td>4,104</td>
<td>4,954</td>
<td>4,878</td>
<td>5,865</td>
<td>6,659</td>
<td>7,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursery</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>1,745</td>
<td>1,981</td>
<td>2,477</td>
<td>3,378</td>
<td>4,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>1,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>2,177</td>
<td>2,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td>3,010</td>
<td>3,211</td>
<td>2,897</td>
<td>3,388</td>
<td>3,281</td>
<td>3,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>2,498</td>
<td>2,682</td>
<td>2,438</td>
<td>2,847</td>
<td>2,767</td>
<td>2,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years old</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>1,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years old</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>1,418</td>
<td>1,423</td>
<td>1,765</td>
<td>2,086</td>
<td>2,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years old</td>
<td>2,643</td>
<td>2,852</td>
<td>2,598</td>
<td>3,065</td>
<td>3,367</td>
<td>3,597</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENROLLMENT RATE %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total enrolled</th>
<th>3 years old</th>
<th>4 years old</th>
<th>5 years old</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>88.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
BY PRESENCE AND AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No children &lt; 18</th>
<th>With children under age 18</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6-17 only</td>
<td>Under age 6 Total</td>
<td>&lt; 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.5
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF WOMEN WITH CHILDREN
BY MARITAL STATUS AND AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960-95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All women</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married women:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest &lt; 6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>109.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest 6 or &gt;</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated women:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest &lt; 6</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest 6 or &gt;</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced women:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest &lt; 6</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest 6 or &gt;</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never-married women:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest &lt; 6</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngest 6 or &gt;</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NA Not available.

Note: Data for 1995 are not directly comparable with data for 1993 and earlier years because of introduction of a major redesign in the Current Population Survey (household survey) questionnaire and collection methodology and the introduction of 1990 census-based population controls, adjusted for the estimated undercount. For additional information, see "Revisions in the Current Population Survey Effective January 1994" in the February 1994 issue of Employment and Earnings.

a) Excludes never-married women.

Table 5.6
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF WOMEN WITH CHILDREN UNDER AGE 18 IN THE UNITED STATES BY MARITAL STATUS AND AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of youngest child</th>
<th>&lt; 3</th>
<th>&lt; 6</th>
<th>&lt; 18</th>
<th>3-5</th>
<th>6-13</th>
<th>6-17</th>
<th>14-17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All women with child</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married, spouse present</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Labour force participation rates include non-working mothers who are actively looking for work.

### Table 5.7
PRIMARY CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS USED BY EMPLOYED MOTHERS FOR CHILDREN UNDER AGE 5 IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1991, BROKEN DOWN BY AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>&lt;1 year</th>
<th>1-2 years</th>
<th>3-4 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total children under 5 (000)</td>
<td>9,854</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>4,021</td>
<td>4,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care in child's home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by father</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by grandparent</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by other relative</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by non-relative</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care in another home</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by grandparent</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by other relative</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by non-relative</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Org'd child care facilities</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day/group care centre</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursery school/ Pre-school</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School-based activity</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School-based activity</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother cares for child at work</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother cares for child at work</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a) Includes mothers working at home or away from home.

*b) Includes children in kindergarten/ grade school.

Table 5.8
PRIMARY CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 15
WITH AN EMPLOYED MOTHER, BY MARITAL AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS
OF THE MOTHER IN THE UNITED STATES, FALL 1993 (in %)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mothers with children</th>
<th></th>
<th>Mothers with children</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>under 5 years</td>
<td>5 to 14 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>full time</td>
<td>part time</td>
<td>full time</td>
<td>part time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL MARITAL STATUSES</td>
<td>9,937 6,410 3,527</td>
<td>22,276 15,056 7,220</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children of employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mothers (in 000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care in child's home</td>
<td>14.8 14.2 15.9</td>
<td>5.0 4.9 5.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By grandparent</td>
<td>6.5 6.1 7.3</td>
<td>1.6 1.5 1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By other relative</td>
<td>3.3 3.4 3.1</td>
<td>2.4 2.5 2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By non-relative</td>
<td>5.0 4.7 5.4</td>
<td>1.0 0.9 1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care in another home</td>
<td>32.0 34.9 26.9</td>
<td>3.9 3.8 4.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By grandparent</td>
<td>10.0 10.8 8.6</td>
<td>1.4 1.5 1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By other relative</td>
<td>5.5 6.0 4.6</td>
<td>0.7 0.7 0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By non-relative(a))</td>
<td>16.6 18.1 13.7</td>
<td>1.8 1.6 2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Org’d child care facilities</td>
<td>30.9 35.7 22.0</td>
<td>76.3 78.2 72.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day/group care center</td>
<td>18.3 22.0 11.7</td>
<td>1.6 1.9 1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursery school/pre-school</td>
<td>11.6 12.6 9.7</td>
<td>0.7 0.8 0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten/grade school</td>
<td>1.0 1.2 0.6</td>
<td>74.0 75.6 70.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School-based activity</td>
<td>0.2 0.1 0.3</td>
<td>3.0 3.1 3.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental care</td>
<td>22.1 15.1 34.9</td>
<td>8.9 6.6 13.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By father</td>
<td>16.0 10.6 25.7</td>
<td>7.2 5.3 11.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By mother at work(b))</td>
<td>6.2 4.5 9.2</td>
<td>1.7 1.3 2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child cares for self</td>
<td>-- -- --</td>
<td>2.8 3.3 1.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MARRIED, HUSBAND PRESENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mothers with children</th>
<th></th>
<th>Mothers with children</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>under 5 years</td>
<td>5 to 14 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>full time</td>
<td>part time</td>
<td>full time</td>
<td>part time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children of employed</td>
<td>7,841 5,038 2,083</td>
<td>16,882 10,907 5,975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mothers (in 000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care in child's home</td>
<td>12.2 12.1 16.6</td>
<td>3.7 3.6 3.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By grandparent</td>
<td>4.8 4.4 7.5</td>
<td>1.0 0.9 1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By other relative</td>
<td>2.3 2.6 2.6</td>
<td>2.1 2.1 2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By non-relative</td>
<td>5.0 5.1 6.5</td>
<td>0.5 0.5 0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care in another home</td>
<td>30.5 33.7 33.4</td>
<td>2.8 2.8 2.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By grandparent</td>
<td>9.6 10.1 11.7</td>
<td>0.9 0.9 0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By other relative</td>
<td>4.6 5.4 4.3</td>
<td>0.4 0.4 0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By non-relative(a))</td>
<td>16.3 18.3 17.4</td>
<td>1.4 1.4 1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Org’d child care facilities</td>
<td>31.1 36.1 29.6</td>
<td>80.1 82.2 76.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day/group care center</td>
<td>18.2 22.2 14.9</td>
<td>1.5 1.7 1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursery school/pre-school</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten/grade school</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School-based activity</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental care</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By father</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By mother at work&lt;sup&gt;b) &lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child cares for self</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ALL OTHER MARITAL STATUSES<sup>c) </sup>**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children of employed mothers (in 000)</th>
<th>2,096</th>
<th>1,372</th>
<th>724</th>
<th>5,393</th>
<th>4,149</th>
<th>1,244</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Care in child's home</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By grandparent</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By other relative</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By non-relative</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care in another home</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By grandparent</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By other relative</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By non-relative&lt;sup&gt;a) &lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Org'd child care facilities</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day/group care center</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursery school/pre-school</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten/grade school</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School-based activity</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental care</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By father</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By mother at work&lt;sup&gt;b) &lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child cares for self</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Primary child care means the form of care most frequently used in a week. Census Bureau questions ask information about paid and unpaid care used while the mother works. Thus they provides information on care not usually included in surveys, such as care provided by the father and school attendance. However, the census survey does not collect information on child care used by families of working fathers. Data is collected on the child care arrangements with father-headed households, but the data is considered too negligible to report.

<sup>a) </sup>Care in another's home by a non-relative is known as "family day care."

<sup>b) </sup>Includes women working at home or away from home.

<sup>c) </sup>Includes married, husband absent (including separated), widowed, divorced, and never married women.

## Table 5.9
PRIMARY CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS USED BY EMPLOYED MOTHERS FOR CHILDREN UNDER AGE 5, BY POVERTY STATUS OF THE MOTHERS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All marital statuses</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Poor&lt;sup&gt;a)&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Not poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total children of employed mothers (000)</td>
<td>9,897</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>8,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care in child's home</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By grandparent</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By other relative</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By non-relative</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care in another home</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By grandparent</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By other relative</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By non-relative&lt;sup&gt;b)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized child care facilities:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day/group care centre</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursery school/pre-school</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten/grade school</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School-based activity</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental care</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By father</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By mother at work&lt;sup&gt;c)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child cares for self</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a)</sup> Poor means below the poverty threshold, which was $14,350 annually or $1,196 monthly during the 1993 interview period for a family of four.<br><sup>b)</sup> Care in another home by a non-relative is known as "family day care."
<sup>c)</sup> Includes women working at home or away from home.

Table 5.10
REGULAR CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHILDREN UNDER AGE 6
BY RACE AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total number of children</th>
<th>Type of non-parental arrangement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>relative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21,421</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/ethnicity:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>13,996</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>3,344</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>2,838</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; $10,001</td>
<td>4,502</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,001-$20,000</td>
<td>2,909</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,001-$30,000</td>
<td>3,385</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,001-$40,000</td>
<td>3,047</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$40,001-$50,000</td>
<td>2,304</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50-001-$75,000</td>
<td>3,063</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; $75,000</td>
<td>2,211</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures based on interviews from a sample survey. Because the question asked the regular form of care, the survey recorded more than one form of non-parental care if used.

<sup>a</sup> Centre-based care includes day care centres and early childhood programs such as Head Start, nursery schools, and so on.

### Table 5.11

**U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE FOR CHILD CARE OVER TIME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head Start</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>3,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title XX</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>448$^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Social Services Block Grants)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Care and Development Block Grant (CGDBG)$^b$</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Care Food Program</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>1,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent-Care Tax Credit</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>3,410</td>
<td>4,160</td>
<td>2,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Care for AFDC recipients$^c$</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Child Care Assistance (T.C.C.$^c$)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-risk child care$^b$</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title IV-C (WIN)$^d$</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDC Disregard (Title IV-A)$^d$</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC (Appalachian Regional Commission) Child Development</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer Provided Child Care</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>e$^e$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earned Income Tax Credit</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>15,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (without EITC)</td>
<td>2,807</td>
<td>5,484</td>
<td>7,790</td>
<td>10,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (with EITC)</td>
<td>4,107</td>
<td>6,884</td>
<td>12,690</td>
<td>25,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (in millions)</td>
<td>2,708,148</td>
<td>4,230,785</td>
<td>5,656,402</td>
<td>7,245,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$ Data includes supplementary payments and earnings. $^b$ Not applicable. $^c$ Includes all services, not just child care. $^d$ Includes both child care and non-child care services. $^e$ Estimated.
Federal child care spending as a % of GDP (not including EITC) | .10 | .13 | .14 | .14

Federal child care spending as a % of GDP (including EITC) | .15 | .16 | .22 | .35

* Major programs. As of August 1996, the federal government ended AFDC-related child care benefits, as well as TCC and at-risk child care. It instead expanded the Child Care and Development Block Grant, with mandatory and discretionary entitlement expenditures expected to be $2.96 billion in 1997 (Green Book, 1403). The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act also reduces slightly the Child Care and Adult Food Program, and makes some rule adjustments to the Earned Income Credit program which will also result in program reductions (Green Book, 1332, 1368-71, 1396).

a) Estimated from 23 states in fiscal year 1990.
b) Established under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.
d) Incorporated under child care for AFDC recipients under the JOBS program.
e) Estimate only for 1997 is 4.5 billion (Green Book, 777) (no other figures could be found so not included in the calculation of total expenditures).


All EITC figures from appendix I, "Budget Tables" of the Green Book, 1274-5.

Chapter VI
CONCLUSION

This thesis has scrutinized the role of ideas, actors, and institutions in order to explain the development of child care policies in France, Canada, and the United States. It has argued that France and the United States have implemented more extensive child care policies than Canada because of the greater presence of maternalist ideas and their institutionalization in those countries. The institutionalization of maternalism legitimized state action in developing policies for women and children, and provided the basis for the later expansion of child care policies. Thus, child care policies developed, not within norms of women's equality, but within norms of maternalism (and pronatalism in France). The lack of institutionalization of maternalist ideas in Canada, in turn, explains why child care policies and programs in Canada are more meagre than those in the United States.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In all three cases, the question of whether mothers with children "should" work underlies much of the debate about public provision of child care. Child care remains a very controversial public policy issue in each of the cases because its presence challenges the traditional sexual division of labour in the family. By saying child care is necessary, policymakers and interest groups have to justify the absence of women from the home, not only economically but also ideologically.

Many actors in the child care policy debate have resisted the idea that women should work or be forced to work outside the home. Conservatives argue that care outside the home harms children; therefore, the only solution is for parents (mothers) to remain in or return to the home. Critics also often distinguish between women who choose to work as opposed to those

---

1One leading proponent of this view in Canada is psychologist Mark Genuis, founder of the Alberta-based National Foundation for Family Research and Education, whose foundation is backed by conservative organizations such as REAL Women, and whose work has been used by the Reform Party to formulate its position on child care. See Margaret Philp, "Influential Child-Care Adviser Under Fire," The Globe and Mail, 27 April 1996, A10.
who need to work. In the United States especially, this debate often falls along race lines. Conservative critics, both historically and currently, often characterize middle class white mothers who work outside the home as "selfish" in seeking a second income or in pursuit of material goods. As Moss argues, "the view is held in some quarters that the 'good' mother should not be employed until her children reach a certain age, and then possibly only on a part-time basis." Critics often pose the debate as one of "consumerism versus family" or "investment in families" as opposed to both parents' (but mainly women's) labour market participation.

The ideological debate that pits detractors of women's labour market participation against its proponents exists in France as well as North America. Yet France has been able to break through these ideological barriers to develop policies for women and children that, in their effect, have enabled women to participate in the labour market, and undermined detractors' arguments. How has this occurred?

One common explanation is that conservative beliefs that child care is a private responsibility and, following from that, women should stay home to take care of children, inhibit the development of public child care. This thesis has revealed that this explanation does not hold. Such conservative beliefs exist in France, yet it has developed an extensive child care system to support the large numbers of working women. If these conservative beliefs alone explained policy development, child care services would be less developed in France or Italy, countries with lower levels of women's labour force participation and with conservative Catholic traditions. Such is not the case. Child care is less developed in the United States and Canada, countries with higher levels of women's labour force participation and with liberal individualist traditions. While a greater number of women work in Canada and the United States,

---

2A revealing discussion of these issues can be found in New Perspectives Quarterly, 7, 1 (Winter 1990).


4A recent article in Saturday Night reiterated many of these arguments. See Danielle Crittenden, "The Mother of All Problems," Saturday Night (April 1996), 44-54.

5See for example Katherine Teghtsoonian, "Neo-Conservative Ideology and Opposition to Federal Regulation of Child Care Services in the United States and Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science 26, 1 (March 1993), 97-121.
Governments have not responded with large-scale child care reform.

Conservative beliefs can hinder the development of child care, but other ideas and norms play a much bigger role in preventing or facilitating the development of child care services. Child care policies are more likely to develop when child care advocates present it as a means to reconcile work and family life and to support motherhood and child development; that is, successful policy development builds on the maternalist basis that characterized early policy development in France and, to an extent, the United States. Thus, what matters are actors' strategies, the institutional framework within which they act, and the "fit" of ideas with what has come before.

This thesis has argued that the institutionalization of "maternalist" or "maternal feminist" ideas is crucial, both in the development of the early welfare state, and later on, as policies developed and expanded. This finding is somewhat surprising. For maternalists, the home was the locus of power, not the labour market or the public sphere. Maternalists concentrated their energies on improving the lives of women and children and advocated public policies that would improve home and family life. While not egalitarian in their views on the role of women and men, they did believe in state intervention on behalf of the family. Many of the policies they endorsed were meant to encourage women to leave the labour market and to adopt a primary role as mothers. In France, however, these policies, combined with concerns about pronatalism and the need for women's labour, also led to the development of programs, including child care, to reconcile work and family life. They also served to legitimate the state's role in the construction of policies to help women raise children. They thus provided the basis upon which future child care policies could develop, under the guise of maternalist concerns to reconcile work and family life. The successful institutionalization of maternalist ideas can be seen in the range of policies that developed for women and children: protective labour legislation, the banning of night work for women, and maternity legislation and family allowances.

In the United States, welfare and developmental programs for women and children that emerged in an otherwise small welfare state reflect the strong influence of maternalist ideas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and their successfully institutionalization as norms and policies. Support to poor parents remains the focus of many social programs, including child care. However, in addition to welfare-based child care programs are programs to
assist women to raise children and to provide developmental support for children. For example, the U.S. federal government established a Children's Bureau in 1912 and a Women's Bureau after World War I. Between 1921 and 1929, when it was cancelled, the *Sheppard-Towner Infancy and Maternity Protection Act*, administered by the Children's Bureau, promoted maternal and child health education. The New Deal brought the maternalist-based *Aid to Dependent Children*, later to become *Aid to Families with Dependent Children*, which remained a core welfare state program for much of the twentieth century.6

Child care became part of these programs and benefits for women and children, although mainly to help poor working women. Women who chose to work instead of collecting a mother's pension used day nurseries and thus day nurseries began to be perceived as a substitute for, or even a form of, public relief.7 However, rather than constraining child care development, these ideas allowed for the emergence of public day care programs later on for working parents and the retention of social programs for families (mostly women) with dependent children. Maternalist-based programs remained part of the core of the American welfare state for most of this century. Head Start, for example, provides services for economically disadvantaged children and their families. AFDC, until its recent demise, was a welfare program for women and children.8

Canadian maternalism fell much more in line with American maternalism, except in the province of Quebec. However, even though similar ideas existed in Canada, they did not get embedded or institutionalized as they did in the United States. In Canada, individualist notions, combined with a lack of maternalist norms, and the absence of pronatalism, other than in Quebec, meant that child and family policies took on an exclusive welfare orientation. Few maternalist policies, other than mothers' allowances and later family allowances, developed in Canada, and these were quite paltry benefits. No institution akin to the U.S. Children's Bureau emerged within the Canadian federal bureaucracy. The Depression era did not bring a wealth of employment and social programs for women and children as it did in the United States. In fact,

6Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*, 10.
very little of the welfare state emerged in the pre-WWII era in Canada. Child care policies developed in a very piecemeal fashion and remain largely welfare-based.

In the United States, maternalism is no longer a dominant norm, although these ideas still retain some advocates. Nonetheless, maternalist policies like AFDC have persisted, demonstrating the power of institutionalization. The programs that retained their maternalist focus have benefitted women with children for much of this century. It should be noted that United States governments were unusual in their support of lone mothers with dependent children via programs such as AFDC. In contrast, many European governments support maternalist policies for married couples but not unmarried parents.

Once certain ideas become embedded, actors must work within the institutional framework already established by these ideas. In France, child care programs after World War II expanded enormously because of the introduction of new actors and ideas within the norms and institutions that developed pre-WWII. Women's labour market participation became increasingly important with labour shortages experienced after World War II. Unions and employers' associations joined demographers, familists and maternalists after World War II to push for the expansion of programs from ones designed to encourage multiple childbirths to ones to reconcile work and family life. These new actors remained committed to maternalist ideas and could play an important role in the post-WWII development of social policies because of their inclusion as social partners in tripartite structures. New ideas and concerns about women's equality, child development, and so on, could be introduced within the framework of norms already established pre-WWII to help families with children. The ideas these actors carried, in addition to the extent to which these actors had an institutional base of power, had an enormous impact on expanding child care services for working parents beyond the traditional maternalist and pronatalist focus.

In France, pronatalism continues to be an important norm even as women's labour market participation has become increasingly important. Thus policies have continued to develop to reconcile women's roles as workers and mothers. While still retaining maternalist and pronatalist elements, child care policies in France do help to promote women's labour market participation. Some policies are geared directly toward working women, such as a vast system of public day

---

care and pre-primary schools. Other policies encourage women to leave paid employment in order to take care of young children. Eligibility for family benefits in France does not always require women's participation in the labour force; indeed sometimes their participation is discouraged. Nevertheless, labour market participation rates for women in France are higher than in many countries in Europe, and more women are employed full-time. While women's labour market participation overall in France is not as high as in North America, the labour market participation rates for women are as high or higher for women within child bearing age (see table 1.6). A real dissonance between policy goal and policy effect exists that has worked in favour of women in France.

In Canada and the United States, in contrast, new actors in the policy process and institutional developments after World War II did not place child care in the policy core. Post-WWII, the key actors in North America were businesses and commercial groups. Trade unions not only were relatively weak, but also were not included in social policy networks as they were in France. In any case, trade unions did not always support policies for women. Individualist feminist organizations that became more powerful after World War II also did not make child care a priority. Combined with a greater suspicion of state interference in general, and, in the case of Canada, the paucity of maternalist norms, the institutional basis did not exist to allow for child care to emerge easily in Canada and the United States. Change has been difficult and incremental, and actors have worked outside of government to press for change, but their vision of child care as something that should be publicly funded and provided universally is not seen as

---

9 The *allocation parentale d'éducation* program is viewed by many as a work disincentive. Dowd observes as well that access to the early childhood educational system does not depend on labour market participation. Nancy E. Dowd, "Envisioning Work and Family: A Critical Perspective on International Models," *Harvard Journal on Legislation*, 26, 2 (Summer 1989), 322.

10 Judith D. Auerbach, *In the Business of Child Care: Employer Initiatives and Working Women* (New York: Praeger, 1988), 49; Susan Colley, "Day Care and the Trade Union Movement in Ontario," *Resources for Feminist Research* 10, 2 (July 1981), 29-31. As detailed in earlier chapters, the trade union movement in both countries only began to support the issue of child care on the urging of women members, and thus when women made up a significant portion of the membership and executive. In Canada, the trade union movement began to support the issue of child care in the late 1970s and early 1980s, mainly through involvement in advocacy organizations, and sometimes through collective bargaining. It has also helped to
legitimate. Instead, policies in Canada and the United States retain their strong welfare focus. The policy core has not developed beyond these norms.

In Canada, societal resistance to child care is exacerbated by the greater ambivalence as to who should provide it beyond the welfare focus. Ironically, save for the area of family policy, public attitudes in Canada show much greater acceptance of state intervention in the economy and social policy than in the United States. As a result, business in Canada believes the responsibility for child care policy rests with governments. Unions, also believing that child care is the responsibility of governments, do not bargain strongly for child care. Some workplace arrangements have been established, and some provisions for child care under collective bargaining agreements exist. But many unions have adopted the slogan of child care advocacy groups (of which unions compose a significant part of the membership) that child care should be comprehensive, universally accessible, high quality, non-profit, non-compulsory, publicly-funded, and national in scope.

In the United States, in contrast, business has become an important provider of child care services and facilities. The first employer-sponsored child care centre in the United States was set up in 1943. Private industry got involved in day care provision in World War II to allow women to work in wartime industry. After the war, many of the industry centres closed. However, since the 1970s, much of the child care in the United States has been commercial care or care provided by employers. The federal government offers subsidies for employer-provided child care, adding to the incentive of corporations to provide child care for employees.

The main difference, then, between France and North America in the contemporary policy orientation of child care policies, is the promotion of active family policies in the former versus the promotion of welfare policies, and only sometimes, active labour market policies, in

organize day care workers.

11 For a discussion see Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, The State, Business, and Industrial Change in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).


13 Auerbach, In the Business of Child Care, 45.
the latter.\textsuperscript{14} North American governments remain ambivalent about the role of women in the
paid labour market, but few incentives exist for women to remain at home to raise children. The
incentives that do exist to encourage the entrance of women to the paid labour force are usually
gearèd toward those with low incomes.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{GENERALIZABILITY}

Prevailing child care policies are thus a product of the past: current ideas and practices
have blended with pre-existing institutions to create the system of child care in evidence in each
of the three countries. The presence or absence of strong child care policies depends on the
institutionalization of the following norms:

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textit{Presence of strong} & Maternalism \\
\textit{child care programs} & Collectivism/ \\
 & Solidarity \\
 & Pronatalism \\
\hline
\textit{Absence of strong} & Absence of maternalism \\
\textit{child care programs} & Individualism/Subsidiarity \\
 & Antinatalism \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

One of the tests of the usefulness of a theory is if it can be applied to other cases. That is,
does the argument presented above apply to child care policy development in other countries?
More research would be needed to answer this question thoroughly. As a preliminary response,
however, I briefly explore the impact of maternalist ideas in other countries in Europe.

Table 6.1 presents a summary of the capacity of the implementation of maternalist

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{14}The concept of "active family policy" is used, for example, by Marie-Gabrielle David and Christophe Starzac in "France: A Diversity of Policy Options," Child Care, Parental Leave, and the Under 3s: Policy Innovation in Europe, eds. Sheila Kamerman and Alfred Kahn (New York: Auburn House, 1991), 81-113.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{15}For example, subsidized spaces in child care centres are available for low-income families in Canada, and AFDC, a welfare-based program, provides child care allowances for low-income women in the United States.}
policies (maternity benefits, family allowances or equivalent) early in the development of the welfare state, combined with low labour market participation rates for women (indicating a male breadwinner model), to predict the level of child care in the three cases, as well as in Britain, Germany, and Italy. Average early childhood education levels are included on the premise that collectivism/solidarity is revealed by high levels of early childhood education. High levels of early childhood education are also an indication of the strength of maternalist policies.

The theory appears to hold. The most striking example is in Italy where policies for women and children developed very early, and where women's labour market participation rates are quite low but child care and early education levels are very high. Saraceno argues that familist policies have imposed a "family ethic" on women, to confine women's activities solely to social reproduction.16 However, while women are conceived of as part of the private sphere, to be provided for by husbands and families, children are considered a social concern. This explains why early childhood education is quite well-developed in Italy and improves Italy's record on child care. Kindergarten programs for children ages three to five are available for about 90 per cent of children and are considered important tools for education and socialization.17

Much of the literature focuses on Germany as an example of a country with a strong presence of maternalist ideas and groups advocating what Sachsse calls "social motherhood".18 While the male breadwinner model became predominant in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century19 and remains quite strong in Germany,20 working women were entitled to

---

17 Saraceno, "Ambivalent Feminism," 63.
20 Ilona Ostner, "Slow Motion: Women, Work and the Family in Germany," in Women
maternity benefits very early on and family allowances developed at roughly the same time as in other countries.

Given the presence of maternalist ideas and policies, the need for women's labour seems to act as a "trigger" to shift maternalist policies from enforcement of a gendered division of labour to reconciliation of work and family life as it did in France, and in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) after World War II. The availability of child care then becomes important to facilitate women's full time and continuous employment.

In West Germany, in contrast, while overall labour force participation rates of women are high, married women's economic activity levels drop dramatically once they have their first child (see table 6.2). The male breadwinner model remains strong and enforces a gendered division of labour that has not triggered policies to reconcile work and family life. Tellingly, lone mothers' economic activity is higher in Germany than even the overall rate. In the absence of a male breadwinner, then, women's labour outside the home becomes more common.23 The principle of subsidiarity also acts as an impediment to the development of public policies in areas that were seen as family responsibilities, such as child care. Germany's public policy remains almost exclusively based on a social insurance model of the welfare state that provides compensation for


21The figures for the GDR reveal the impact of a radical difference in gender norms, combining a full employment policy, with an emphasis on the equal participation of women and men in the labour market.

22Saraceno (74) reports that in the Center-North region of Italy where women's labour force participation rates are higher, the number of social services for children is higher as well.

23Ostner (99-100) reports that until 1977 in West Germany, husbands had the legal power to prevent their wives from taking paid employment if they "felt this to be detrimental to family life." They also had the power to force their wives to earn money if their income was deficient.

24Recall that the principle of subsidiarity is that decisions should be made by and responsibility should be granted to those closest to those being affected. Or, more simply, activities should not be entrusted to the larger scale when they can be performed by the smaller scale. Richard Parry, "Redefining the Welfare State," in Governing the New Europe, eds. Jack Hayward and Edward C. Page (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1995), 382.

In the area of social policy in Germany, this has meant that the family is considered to have primary responsibility, then the church and other charitable institutions, and then, finally, the state. Responsibility should be transferred to another institution only if the first is unable to fulfill its responsibilities effectively.
those engaged in the public sphere, to the exclusion of the private. Child care programs are not well developed for young children, and early childhood education levels are relatively low. The high levels of older children in child care reflects the development of a part-day nursery program.

In Britain, preliminary evidence would suggest that some maternalist ideas existed, but, as in Canada and Germany, less support existed in the early twentieth century for public policies to help families. The British government developed maternity legislation quite early in this century, but did not nationalize maternity and family allowance benefits until the WWII period. In Britain, the culture of individualism meant that people assumed that men could provide adequately for their families. Individualist values have thus tempered maternalism in Britain, as they have in the United States and Canada.

The countries can thus be plotted on the following continuum with respect to the norms that are present:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRANCE</th>
<th>ITALY</th>
<th>GERMANY</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>maternalism</td>
<td>maternalism</td>
<td>maternalism</td>
<td>maternalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collectivism</td>
<td>collectivism</td>
<td>subsidiarity</td>
<td>individualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pronatalism</td>
<td>some pronatalism</td>
<td>some pronatalism/antinatalism</td>
<td>individualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRITAIN</td>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>some maternalism</td>
<td>absence of institutionalized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individualism</td>
<td>maternalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>some pronatalism/antinatalism</td>
<td>individualism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>antinatalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of the pronatalist variable, pronatalist sentiment has existed in most European countries and even North America in various periods as countries experienced declining birth rates and the loss of population due to war. During the inter-war years, governments followed some pronatalist policies in Britain and Scandinavia and pronatalism has been especially strong in France. Some pronatalist ideas existed in fascist European regimes such as Mussolini's

---


Italy and Franco's Spain. Bock argues that Germany's policies under Hitler were the opposite of pronatalist as they were radically eugenicist and involved the extermination of people. The eugenics movement (what I label here antinatalism) was strong in Britain prior to World War II, as well as in Canada and the United States. Unlike in France, physicians, social workers, and reformers in these countries were less concerned about the number of childbirths and more concerned about the quality of children born—race betterment. Similarly in Canada and the United States, some sentiment exists that parents should not have children if they do not have an adequate income.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE
Contribution to the Feminist Literature

This thesis provides a refutation of the individualist feminist critique that the presence of maternalism is to blame, rather than its absence, for low levels of public child care. According to the institutional literature, policy innovation can occur within boundaries established by original policies. Maternalism provides a better normative base upon which to build child care policies than individualist feminism where a weak societal acceptance of individualist feminist ideas exists. Maternalism provides a way to reconcile competing discourses on women's role in society and the labour market. Thus, contrary to feminist arguments that social policies should

27See Mary Nash, "Pronatalism and Motherhood in Franco's Spain;" and Chiara Saraceno, "Redefining Maternity and Paternity: Gender, Pronatalism and Social Policies in Fascist Italy," both in Maternity and Gender Politics, 160-77; 196-212.


29See Alisa Klaus, "Depopulation and Race Suicide: Maternalism and Pronatalist Ideologies in France and the United States," in Mothers of a New World, 188-212; Lewis, "Models of Equality for Women," especially 85-86. In Canada, some disturbing information on eugenics practices in Alberta in this century has come to light as a result of law suits brought by victims. See Heather Pringle, "Alberta Barren," Saturday Night (June 1997), 30-37, 70, 74.

not have "the family" as their unit of analysis, precisely this vision was at the foundation of child care policy development in France and the United States and accounts for the higher level of child care policies and programs in these countries compared to Canada. While some feminist researchers argue that government should not design family policies, but social policies for individuals, the evidence shows that is not the basis upon which child care programs have been built or expanded.

Maternalism, as detailed in the U.S. case in particular, provides a better normative basis upon which to build child care policy. Maternalism brings in the child and emphasizes the need for public policies to help mothers and children. In contrast, individual feminism's focus on women's rights and women's equality makes it difficult to address issues of child care. Individualist feminists resist the construction of policies around "motherhood", arguing that such a rationale constrains women's freedom to be anything other than mothers. In many ways, family issues seem to be irreconcilable with women's rights issues. Child care policy development certainly requires the acceptance of the need for the labour market participation of mothers and/or a belief in the social benefits of child development. But child care policies cannot be built solely on straightforward women's rights arguments.

Contribution to the "Ideas" Literature

This thesis demonstrates the powerful role of ideas and norms in policy development as well as the important interaction of ideas, institutions, and actors. Policy makers are motivated by ideas. As Heclo argues, not only do they power, they puzzle. Policy makers draw on ideas presented to them in an effort to resolve a problem or dilemma. Current policy innovation, however, is constrained by actions of the past. This thesis demonstrates the need to look not just at the institutional but also the ideational legacy of the past. It points to the importance of tracing the development of policies and the institutionalization of ideas. It prescribes looking at formative moments in institutions and organizations—in this case, the origins of the welfare state—

33Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden (New Haven: Yale
and what ideas became embedded as policies.\textsuperscript{34} Policy design (plus historical precedents) matter, as do the institutions and interest groups that have evolved.

Which ideas became embedded as norms is important as well. Institutionalists need to focus not only on the structures of government, and the impact of policies themselves (policy feedback)\textsuperscript{35} but also on whether certain ideas become embedded as principles of action, constraining future policy innovation.\textsuperscript{36} Norms are powerfully constraining. In the area of child care, what matters is not simply the formal structures of government and informal rules. What matters also are norms concerning the legitimacy of government action with respect to the family and the role of women. These are powerful influences and constraints on policy.

\textbf{The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Institutions}

This thesis rejects other explanations developed regarding the expansion of the welfare state. The answer to the questions of why and how child care developed clearly rest with institutional and ideational factors. Child care policy development is not fully explained by socioeconomic or structural factors, nor by the beliefs of the political party in power. Changes in these factors did not on their own dictate child care policy development, nor did pressure from interested actors. As Margaret Weir, quoting John Maynard Keynes writes, "'the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.'"\textsuperscript{37} Interest groups are important as carriers of ideas, especially where they become part of the decision-making apparatus. In France, actors promoting child care and family policies on a maternalist basis were brought into government policy networks. This institutional location allowed


maternalists to promote those ideas within government and persuade government to follow their policy recommendations. In Canada, maternalist organizations were present at the forming of the welfare state, but they were not institutionalized as they were in the United States and France.

Ideas, Institutions, and Policy Change

Through institutionalization, ideas become embedded. Once embedded, ideas set certain normative pathways and policy choices become path dependent. As Pierson describes it, "The specific design of programs may heighten the visibility of some social and political connections while obscuring others. In a context of great social complexity, policies may generate 'focusing events' or cues that help social actors to interpret the world around them." That does not mean institutionalization is solely constraining. Within the normative framework established, policy innovation can occur.

This thesis also demonstrates that the policy goal and policy outcome do not necessarily have to match. The empirical cases demonstrate the power of maternalist ideas in explaining policy innovation in a conservative country like France. Maternalism provided the normative basis upon which new ideas about women's role in society and the family could find acceptance. Thus, when new actors introduced ideas of women's equality and women's rights, these ideas blended with previous policies that privileged women as mothers. The result was to create near-universal child care and an important aid to women's labour market participation. Policies constructed solely on a welfare basis or, in the United States, a maternalist welfare basis, become institutionalized as such. Governments find it difficult to expand policies beyond those targeted groups as state action beyond a welfare basis is deemed illegitimate.

The thesis suggests, though, that were actor strategies to change, particularly in the United States, they would find a more receptive response. The problem is, however, that "[individualist] feminism is as American as motherhood." It is difficult to introduce maternalist ideas regarding child care in North America today; such arguments are very much

37 Margaret Weir, "Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation," 188.
resisted. In other words, certain avenues of policy have become blocked off. A shift in actor strategy to maternalism may not have as much success in Canada either because a maternalist basis upon which to build child care policy is lacking. Canada depends more on the autonomous actions of government. As detailed below, government activity has recently faced constraints.

Beyond a change in actor strategies, whether radical change in policy can occur depends on the fitness of new ideas with those which have been embedded, as well as the openness of governments to new ideas. As Majone argues, "major policy breakthroughs are possible only after public opinion has been conditioned to accept new ideas and new concepts of the public interest." This suggests that institutions, including institutionalized ideas, are "sticky", even in the face of widespread socioeconomic or structural change. For example, Pierson's work demonstrates that even dedicated welfare state reformers--Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher--were unsuccessful at reducing the welfare state dramatically. As Goldstein and Keohane argue, "in general, when institutions intervene, the impact of ideas may be prolonged for decades or even generations."

However, countries currently face certain socioeconomic and structural pressures that my portend greater change. The next section reflects briefly on the impact of current socioeconomic and structural changes on future policy development.

**CHALLENGES TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE IMPACT OF CURRENT SOCIOECONOMIC AND STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS**

The public provision of child care is a very contemporary public policy issue, especially in North America, even though the idea of care outside the home has long policy roots. Child

---

40See Weir, *Politics and Jobs*, for a discussion of how constraints develop to future policy action.


42Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in *Structuring Politics*, 15.

care policy's emergence as an important issue coincides with the current restructuring and retrenchment of the welfare state. Other social programs which form the basis of the welfare state—health care, social security, unemployment insurance, and pensions—all emerged at a time of welfare state expansion.

The context for social policy innovation has changed with globalization and regional economic and political integration. Fiscal and institutional pressures also reduce the possibility for dramatic expansion of child care and other social policies. Whether states are able to withstand these pressures for reduction of the welfare state is a function of their institutional structures and institutional histories.

The welfare state developed at a time when states had a high degree of state capacity and varying degrees of autonomy. Both the capacity and autonomy of states are being reduced and states are rethinking their ability to provide welfare and social programs. Economic pressures on the welfare state are multiple and increasing: lower or declining rates of economic growth, increasing international competition, restructuring of production, the phenomenon of mass and long-term unemployment, and increasing financial deficits all decrease the ability of states to spend as they please. At the same time, as Berger argues, "national governments can no longer bring about desired outcomes in society and economy" due to "rising levels of trade, financial flows across frontiers, foreign direct investment, [and] new information and communication technologies that radically reduce the time and cost for long-distance interactions." As Kurzer points out, "many independent budgetary measures that were formerly useful [to governments] to foster intraclass cooperation are no longer available or practical." These factors have led to the

44Globalization refers to the phenomenon of the expansion of activity such as trade, manufacturing, financial flows, and communications, to a global level. The impact of globalization is discussed below.

45State capacity refers to the ability of governments to take public policy decisions and have them implemented. State autonomy connotes governmental independence from interests such as business and labour groups. Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).


47Paulette Kurzer, Business and Banking: Political Change and Economic Integration in
decline of Keynesianism and the ability of governments to utilize a number of policy tools to intervene in the economy and attempt to maintain full employment. It thus may be fruitless to consider potential public policy developments, and especially an expanding role for the state, at a time when the welfare state is being cut back, or at least halted in its expansion, due to globalization.

Changes in Institutions

The institutional framework within which social policies are being formulated is also changing. One important example is the recent change in the French social security system. Beyond cuts to social spending in late 1995, the French government under Prime Minister Alain Juppé initiated radical institutional change, reducing the power of traditional social partners in setting social policy. In November 1995, the Prime Minister introduced a number of reforms to the social security system in the name of reducing its estimated $12.6 billion deficit. The catalyst for these actions was to prepare France to meet the EMU fiscal targets by the 1999 deadline. Along with the announced cutbacks to public-sector workers' pensions and tax increases, Juppé announced that the government planned to change the co-management system with unions and employer groups. For the first time since the conseils d'administration were established, parliament "would be responsible for setting policy and for fixing spending targets for each main branch of welfare: health, family benefits and pensions." Unions and employer groups, the social partners, would still be responsible for administering funding, but their representatives would be appointed, not elected, and "their work monitored by supervisory committees consisting of representatives of various vested interests (doctors, family associations, pensioners and so on) as well as members of parliament."49

As part of these changes, Chirac, in the cabinet shuffle of November 1995, eliminated a number of portfolios and created a superministry, Travail et Affaires sociales, under Jacques

---


49 "Now the Cure," The Economist, 18 November 1995, 57.
Barrot, to deal with labour, health and pensions.50 Parliament approved of this constitutional amendment in February 1996.51 Parliament now has the authority to set spending targets as well as the main orientations of the social security system and to scrutinize the funds to ensure a fiscal balance. These institutional changes are the most significant since the conseil system was set up after World War II, although Prime Minister Juppé argued that the reforms merely reinforced Parliament's position "without challenging the role of trade unions or of conventional negotiation."52

Although some may argue fiscal problems would have led inevitably to welfare state reductions, the move toward EMU has introduced constraints on the instruments available to member state governments, reduced their range of possible responses, and forced them to enact more radical institutional changes. The French government is not just keeping a tight fiscal policy, but has changed relations between workers, employers and government. These changes are significant and can affect future policy development. A change in the institutional actors involved in the setting of social policy, including child care, is likely to alter the influence of their ideas as well. This could allow shifts to the policy periphery, and, eventually, changes to the policy core.53

Changes in Fiscal Capacity

Added to these structural or institutional pressures are also fiscal constraints. In the case of Canada, where governments, relatively autonomous from interest groups, have the capacity to implement broad policy change, the "fiscal crisis of the state" over the past 20 years put a brake on any widescale policy reform. Indeed, high budget deficits, combined with a threatened downgrading of Canada's debt by Moody's Investor Services, led the government to introduce massive cuts in 1995, which included the elimination of the Canada Assistance Plan.54

52"Constitutional Amendment."
53Majone, Evidence, Argument and Persuasion, 150-4. For a discussion of these terms see chapter one.
54See Herman Bakvis, "Shrinking the House of 'HRIF': Program Review and the
the federal government has since committed to maintaining an $11 billion floor on transfer payments to the provinces under the Canada Health and Social Transfer, the change in nature of the transfer program—from cost-sharing under CAP to block funding for health, post-secondary education, and welfare—again marks a significant institutional change in the area of welfare. The federal government is less committed now to institutionalizing key social programs, and prefers to give the provinces greater flexibility to design their own. Indeed, even though Canada now faces a fiscal dividend, having achieved balanced budget targets, the federal government is wary of implementing expensive new programs, such as child care. It has chosen instead to implement a more modest child tax benefit which requires no involvement in direct service provision.

States' roles clearly are "connected more closely to economic conditions and the substantial reshaping of social measures is oriented towards economic interests/considerations to a larger extent than before."\(^{55}\) Given the economic reality, will the welfare state remain in place, and, if so, in what form? If socioeconomic factors can affect actors' strategies, which countries' welfare states are best able to withstand the pressures and constraints? Which have the institutional history that would best respond to these changes?

We should expect that, in times of economic restraint, countries with a liberal social policy regime will render policy changes that reduce benefits for already-targetted groups. We could also expect that the Scandinavian social democratic countries will attempt to cut universally rather than target one particular group. And in the case of the Bismarkian corporatist countries, changes and cutbacks will depend on the particular configuration of interests and the play of forces. But the pressure to reduce the welfare state should fall more on countries that spend the most.

While the highest-spending countries like Sweden have faced pressure to reduce the welfare state, again, institutions intervene. The backlash to the welfare state has not occurred as

---

55 Gerda Falkner and Emmerich Talos, "The Role of the State Within Social Policy," *West European Politics* 17, 3 (July 1994), 70.
much in countries with the heaviest social expenditure burdens. And indeed, recent reports from Europe indicate that the "welfare state is alive and well" in Denmark, Norway, and other Scandinavian countries.\footnote{Bruce Dorminey, "Welfare State Alive and Well in Denmark," \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 27 May 1996, A8; Youssef Ibrahim, "Norway's Welfare World's Sweetest," \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 18 December 1996, A19. Dorminey reports the top tax rate in Denmark is 62 per cent but, as one social democratic party member is quoted as saying, "no party can really win an election in this country by promising lower taxes because the public always asks the question what are they going to lose?"}

Indeed, even the corporatist welfare states, Esping-Andersen predicts, are most likely to survive because they produce a divide between insiders and outsiders and the insiders will see an advantage in maintaining the system. Taylor-Gooby reports that public opinion in Germany, for example, is still strongly supportive of the welfare state. Social spending is seen as valuable as it contributes to social peace.\footnote{Peter Taylor-Gooby, "Eurosclerosis in European Welfare States: Regime Theory and the Dynamics of Change," \textit{Policy and Politics} 24, 2 (April 1996), 111.}


Instead, welfare state backlash movements, tax revolts, and roll-backs tend not to have occurred in countries where welfare spending has been strongest, but where it has been weakest, and where ideas of universality and solidarity are not as entrenched.\footnote{Richard Parry, "Redefining the Welfare State," in \textit{Governing the New Europe}, eds. Jack Hayward and Edward C. Page (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1995), 398. Pierson demonstrates in fact that it is loved. Paul Pierson, \textit{Dismantling the Welfare State?} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," \textit{World Politics} 48, 2 (January 1996), 143-79.} We can thus predict that the welfare state will survive a lot longer in countries where the welfare state was strong, even though governments in these countries face greater pressure to reduce their public spending.

The welfare state does not appear to be in steep decline, even in the liberal states such as the United States. Pierson disagrees with Parry that the "welfare state is expensive but unloved."\footnote{Paul Pierson, \textit{Dismantling the Welfare State?} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," \textit{World Politics} 48, 2 (January 1996), 143-79.}

As Pierson points out,

welfare state expansion involved the enactment of popular policies in a relatively undeveloped interest-group environment. By contrast, welfare state retrenchment generally requires elected officials to pursue unpopular policies that must
withstand the scrutiny of both voters and well-entrenched networks of interest groups.60

Even in the countries with the smallest welfare states, it will be and has been difficult for governments to cut back since retrenchment involves an exercise in blame avoidance rather than credit claiming.61 Retrenchment is thus more difficult to achieve. Constituencies with strong attachments to the programs have built up around these programs and will work hard to resist changes. Furthermore, in liberal welfare states like the United States, the nature of interest group politics makes it difficult to impose cuts. Thus, Pierson argues, the welfare state now represents the status quo. "Nondecisions generally favour the welfare state. Major policy change usually requires the acquiescence of numerous actors."62

The welfare state will survive as long as the institutional norms and political structures which sustain it survive. In Canada, in areas where a strong normative commitment to universality exists, such as health care, we can expect that these programs will continue. By contrast, given Canada's lack of support for maternalism and interventionist labour market policies, family policies are more vulnerable because of their welfare orientation. Broader institutional and structural changes, as well as fiscal constraints, are likely to whittle away at the core of such policies. Even so, radical dismantlement of the welfare state has still not occurred, even in countries where governments try to radically alter the state.

Given the tenacity of institutions, and in an era where state actors are economically and structurally constrained, child care policy development will not likely be radical. Rather, it will evolve within the boundaries of norms already established. Within these normative parameters, and as the dissertation has demonstrated, the policy outcomes may sometimes be difficult to predict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Maternity benefits</th>
<th>Family benefits</th>
<th>% Women's AFDC</th>
<th>% Children in day care ages 0-2</th>
<th>% Children in early childhood ed. ages 3-5 (average)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1913/1945a)</td>
<td>1932a)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1910b)</td>
<td>1936c)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1883/1979e)</td>
<td>1935c)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>1950e)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>85f)</td>
<td>80f)</td>
<td>96f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1935g)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1971h)</td>
<td>1944h)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13i)</td>
<td>43i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1911/1944j)</td>
<td>1945c)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) See chapter three. The government passed its first maternity legislation in 1909. In 1913 the government extended maternity legislation to all working women in need, which included maternity pay. In 1930, maternity and other benefits became mandatory for all employed persons below a certain income level. And in 1945, maternity and other benefits became available to all employed persons, regardless of income level. The roots of family allowances can be found in 1913 legislation that provided cash subsidies to heads of needy families with four or more children.

c) Gisela Bock and Pat Thane, "Introduction," in Maternity and Gender Politics, 5.


e) In 1883, Germany provided paid leave of three weeks after delivery for insured women. In 1924, maternity benefits were extended to non-employed wives of insured husbands. Bock and Thane, "Introduction," 4. However, Bock argues that West Germany did not implement a national maternity leave program of half a year (beyond confinement benefits) until 1979 under the Social Democrats. Gisela Bock, "Antinatalism, Maternity and Paternity in National Socialist Racism," in Maternity and Gender Politics, 251-2.


g) See chapter five. A number of states in the United States had implemented mothers' pensions before that; however, no national program was in place.

h) See chapter four. Beginning in 1916, a number of provinces implemented mothers' allowances before the national family allowance program emerged.

i) Figures for 1993.

j) Some maternity benefits have been available since the first decade of this century. In 1911, insured women became eligible for maternity benefits under the National Insurance fund. Women retained the maternity benefit if they left employment if they were married to an insured man. Bock and Thane, 4. However, a more comprehensive program was introduced under social insurance legislation in 1944. Shirley Dex, Patricia Walters, and David M. Alden, French and British Mothers at Work (Houndmills, Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan Press, 1993), 71.

k) Three to four-year-olds only as compulsory schooling begins at age five.
Table 6.2
% OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE WOMEN IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AGES 20-59 BY FAMILY STRUCTURE, 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Structure</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>FRG</th>
<th>SP</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>IRL</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Without children:</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With at least: 1 child &lt; 5 years</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>35.44</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 children</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lone-parent:</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix

SCOPE OF CHILD CARE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

A range of services encompass "child care" services, that is, care other than that provided by the parent. Along with full-day services for children, there are pre-primary schools, kindergartens, playgroups, occasional care centres, own-home childminders, relatives, other family care givers, and in-home care provided by nannies. One can categorize these child care programs and services according to the goals of the program, including social assistance or equalization of the burden of childrearing (or social reproduction) across income levels; encouragement of women's (or parents') labour market participation; the education and socialization of children; and the increase of the country's birthrate. These goals can be conceptualized as fitting into concentric circles according to the scope of the policy. For example, the smallest circle would encompass the goal of ensuring that poor, primarily single parents who work are not in poverty; the next circle would encompass these policies as well as a general labour market policy to encourage both parents, but mainly women, of all income levels into the labour force; finally, the outer circle would include the goal of encouraging growth, development and education of children as well as family development.¹

One can also categorize child care programs and services along a number of other dimensions: the function performed, that is, custodial or educational; the method of organization, that is, collective or individual; and the form of provision, that is, public or private.² The degree of government involvement can be visualized along a continuum: at one end, one could include full government financing for the operation of centres as well as regulation, then regulation with some form of funding, regulation without funding, and finally no regulation or funding.³ Funding can be applied universally or in a targeted manner.

Yet another way to compare child care policies is according to the extent to which child care is informal and home-based (care à domicile, including care by parents, relatives or live-ins)

¹I would like to thank Martha Friendly for this insight. Martha Friendly, special lecture, SSC 199Y University of Toronto, 1 March 1995.
in contrast to formal licensed care outside the home; and the extent to which care is custodial as opposed to educational. Verry\textsuperscript{4} represents this schematically:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c|c}
I & II \\
--- & --- \\
Custodial & Educational and developmental \\
--- & --- \\
III & IV \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Formal, out-of-home

Programs which fall in quadrant four, for example, \textit{les écoles maternelles} or pre-primary programs in France, potentially would be the most expensive form of care but would also provide the most benefits to children as well as parents, allowing them to participate in the labour market. Programs in quadrant three, such as \textit{crèches} or day care centres, could be seen as providing benefits to parents but without the developmental and educational benefits of those in quadrant four.

To see how different child care policies have developed under each of the regime types identified in chapter two, we should look briefly at some representative countries under each regime type. Leibfried's categorization of welfare state regimes is useful to examine Sweden, Germany, Britain, and Italy.\textsuperscript{5} They correspond to the social democratic, corporatist, liberal and latin rim types respectively. In the brief survey of countries that follows, child care programs are classified according to the following set of criteria: function (custodial, educational); method of organization (collective, individual); and form of provision (public, private).\textsuperscript{6}

---

\textsuperscript{3}Regulation could also include the coordination of services.


\textsuperscript{6}For further data on programs in these countries, see tables in the introduction.
Sweden

Although the Swedish child care system is designed around educational goals, the forms of care are mainly custodial for young children. Parents provide the majority of care for very young children (ages zero to 1.5), and children do not enter kindergarten generally until age six. For children from the ages of 1.5 to six years, a number of services exist and Sweden has very high levels of public child care provision. In fact, child care is regarded as a right of working parents, with the government passing a law to that effect in 1985.

Government is responsible for both regulation and funding of most forms of care, except private day mothers (private family day care). Family day care is regulated much less than centre-based care. The state funds independent day care centres run by parent cooperatives or religious associations run on a not-for-profit basis. The term pre-school applies to all group-based care such as day care centres as well as kindergartens, but child care services fall under the authority of the Board of Health and Welfare, rather than Education.

Child care centres first emerged in the 1850s to care for children of working and poor mothers and were run by charitable organizations. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, kindergartens formed, which were more like pre-schools, providing activities for children for a few hours each day or week. In the 1930s, day care was established for members of housing cooperatives, marking a move away from charity-based care.

From the 1930s, as in Germany and France, there was concern about the decline of birthrates in Sweden. In 1935 the government appointed a Population Commission to deal explicitly with depopulation and to create measures to encourage marriages and higher birthrates. The government introduced various programs and services such as family allowances and child health centres, and, by 1943, the state subsidized child care and kindergartens to deal with the shortage of male labour in the workforce. Public child care did not expand until the mid-1960s, however, even though Sweden experienced severe labour shortages through the 1950s and 1960s.

---


8In the 1950s, the government met this demand by importing workers from Finland and
The expansion of Swedish child care occurred in response to labour market concerns, the women's movement, and more sympathetic left parties, who began to view child care as a major condition of women's equality. Between 1965 and 1991, the number of children in day care rose from approximately 15,000 to 350,000. In 1975, educational reforms restricted kindergartens to children ages six and up, although some municipalities currently offer programs for four- and five-year-olds when spaces are available. Before 1975, kindergartens had been open to children from the age of three. This reduction marks a shift away from educational to custodial forms of care in Sweden for young children.

Until recently, parental leave was available for both parents for up to 18 months (one year at 90 per cent of previous earnings, three months at a flat rate, and three months unpaid). Since 1994, though, the parental leave period has been reduced to one year, and the replacement pay for the first thirty days has been reduced to 85 per cent of earnings, and for the next 210 days to 75 per cent of earnings. In the last 90 days of the leave, the government pays a flat rate of 60 Swedish kronor. Since 1995, fathers have been granted thirty of those days with the benefit paid at 85 per cent of earnings. The paternity leave portion must be taken by the father. This regulation is to encourage fathers to take on more of the care of children. Fathers are also entitled to 10 days paternity leave, currently at 75 per cent of pay. (For those with no income, parental leave benefits are paid at the flat rate of 60 SEK per day.)

The extensiveness of parental leave benefits means that most children are cared for by one of their parents for the first year and a half (more than 80 per cent in 1989). By the age of 18 months, approximately 50 per cent of children are in some form of municipal child care,

---

southern Europe. Only in the 1960s did women's labour market participation increase dramatically. Hwang and Broberg, 33.


10Kindergartens generally run only part-day for about three hours, five days per week. Gunnarsson, 492.


12Swedish Institute, Fact Sheets on Sweden: Child Care (Stockholm: The Institute, August 1996); Swedish Institute, Social Insurance in Sweden (Stockholm: The Institute, November 1995).
either day care centres or family day care, and about 60 per cent of three- to six-year-olds. Costs vary by municipality but are about 1,200 Swedish kronor per child per month or roughly $240.

Financing of municipal day care centres is divided evenly between the state and municipality, with parents contributing only 10 to 15 per cent of the cost. Municipalities can decide their own fee schedule, with some charging on the basis of parental income, and others setting a standard fee. The latter can be much harder on low-income families.

In 1985 the Parliament passed a law that all children from the ages of one-and-a-half to six years by 1991 would have the right to public care if their parents worked or were in school. By 1990, only 67 per cent of municipalities were able to meet this requirement, however. In the 1980s as well, the national government deregulated much of public child care to the municipalities. The national government is now responsible for general guidelines and supports research under the National Board of Health and Welfare, but local authorities such as town councils and county administrations are directly responsible for care. Local responsibility has meant wide variations in forms of care in the different regions of the country, especially in terms of rural and urban provision. However, no evidence of child care supply varying on the basis of political partisanship exists.

Germany

The basis of the child care system in Germany is custodial and welfare-oriented, not educational, save for pre-school education. Early childhood education was also rooted in these two different views of care. One view, promoted by the Froebel Society, supported the idea of

---

14 Hwang and Broberg, 38.
15 Socialstyrelsen, Health Care and Social Services, 102.
16 Hwang and Broberg, 45.
18 Gunnarsson, 491.
19 Hwang and Broberg, 39.
20 Siv Gustafsson and Frank P. Stafford, "Three Regimes of Child Care: The United States, the Netherlands, and Sweden," in Social Protection versus Economic Flexibility: Is There
"kindergarten"—nurturance and education of children through toys and games. The other view was social welfare-oriented. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, pre-schools for the poor existed alongside Froebel kindergartens, most of which catered to children of the middle-class.21

Reformers in the kindergarten movement were unsuccessful in their efforts to incorporate kindergarten into the public education system. Instead, the Youth Welfare Act of 1922 institutionalized the principle of subsidiarity regarding early childhood education.22 Public authorities would establish kindergarten services only if churches or other charitable organizations could not meet the need. Kindergarten was thus "limited to that of supplementing family upbringing where needed."23

The principle of subsidiarity still governs the provision of child care services in Germany. Day care centres (as well as pre-schools) had been set up as early as the 1830s, mainly by private societies and individuals, to care for young children of the lower classes whose mothers worked. By the turn of the century, 66 day care centres existed in Berlin alone—the same number as existed in Paris, even though the latter had a much larger population.24 (In contrast, Koven and Michel note, "London, with more than twice the population of Berlin, had only fifty-four crèches, none of which were publicly subsidized or licensed."25) However, the day care centres were never designed to replace the care of mothers, only to intervene in cases where this care was not provided.

The perception of kindergarten providing a social welfare function altered as educational reforms occurred in the 1960s. Kindergarten is now regarded as the first stage of the education system. However, most other forms of child care are individual, performed by mothers or

---


22For a definition of subsidiarity, see chapter two, n. 97.

23Tietze, Rossbach, and Ufermann, "Child Care and Early Education," 46.

24For figures for France, see chapter three.

grandparents, rather than collectively. Day care centres are few in number and are geared toward those in need. Churches, not government, provide the majority of kindergartens, although the federal and state governments provide subsidies. The federal government provides some regulation of child care services but no funding.

As in other countries such as Canada and the United States, the number of places for children in the collective care of kindergartens increased during World War II as women replaced men in the factories.26 After World War II, the policies of East and West Germany diverged. East Germany (the GDR) included kindergarten as part of the educational system as early as 1946. It was free of charge and enrolled over 90 per cent of eligible children.27 Child care centres in the GDR provided spaces for approximately 80 per cent (1989 figures) of children in the GDR, and these were typically full-day spaces.28 The result of these and other policies was that women in the GDR had one of the highest rates of female labour force participation in the world.29

In contrast, in West Germany, the number of spaces for children in day care centres (krippen), which are generally for children under age three, was miniscule at approximately three per cent. The figure was better for children ages three to six at 44 per cent (1987).30 Kindergarten, along with krippen and family day care homes by Tagesmütter, remained under the authority of the youth welfare service at the state level, although some cities operated these services under the education ministry. The Ministry of Women's Affairs and Youth administered kindergartens at the national level.31

Child care in West Germany was regarded as only a supplement to family care, meaning

26Tietze, Rossbach, and Uferman, 46.
28Rudolf Pettinger, "Germany," in International Handbook of Child Care Policies and Programs, 218.
29Goldberg, "Women on the Verge," 35.
care by mothers. An underlying societal fear seemed to exist that public provision of child care would enable women to leave the home and enter the paid labour market, something generally frowned upon.32 The churches, which sponsored approximately 60 per cent of all kindergartens (1986 figures), were often reticent to establish krippen.33 A number of cash incentives and parental leave programs existed to encourage women to leave the paid labour force to care for young children.

In West Germany, the organization of child care and kindergarten services made it difficult for working women to use these services. Kindergarten typically ran for half days only for three- to five-year-olds, with no meals. In addition, parents had to pay fees. Child care centres often did not provide hot lunches for the children.34 Regional disparities in the provision of day care existed. Although a federal youth welfare law regulated the krippen, the municipalities were responsible for service provision, and the Länder and municipalities, not the federal government, shared overall responsibility.35

A number of changes occurred as a result of unification. The former East Germany lost its extensive child care system. Economic pressures caused a massive decrease in welfare state

32Women who leave their children in the care of others to enter the paid labour force for reasons other than necessity are sometimes called Rabbenmütter, literally "crow-mothers", who, apparently like crows, abandon their children. Laurence Gillot, "Les 'mères-corbeaux' au pilori," Enfant d'abord 169 (June 1993), 34.
33Tietze, Rossbach, and Uferman, 64.
34Ostner reports that:
the peculiarities of the opening and closing hours of kindergartens, schools and shops are a striking feature of West Germany. Publicly-funded child-care facilities, if available, are in principle designed for children older than three and then only part time, opening mainly during the morning hours. Schools finish on one day after two hours, the next day after six, but are always closed at lunch time, their hours being premised on the idea of the immobile woman waiting at home with a cooked lunch. ... West German children are not expected to look after themselves during the afternoons, but to stay under the parent's custody. 'Schlüsselkind', a latch key child, is closely linked to child neglect.
35OECD, "Child Care in OECD Countries," 150.
provisions and a number of enterprises that provided on-site care in the former East Germany closed. Telling too is the fact that parental leave in a reunified Germany was extended from 18 months in 1990 to a full three years, two of which are paid and one which is unpaid. Women with young children thus have greater incentive to stay home rather than participate in the workforce.

However, other forms of child care are expanding. In 1992 the German Constitutional Court ruled that government had a legal requirement to provide publicly funded kindergarten spaces to all children (ages three to six) by 1996. This put great pressure on länder and local governments, who share responsibility for child care, as the federal government did not allocated new funds for these services. In some cases this meant increased ratios of children to workers, and staff who lacked training.36

Britain

The majority of forms of care are individual, private and family-based, with the government providing only a restricted amount of public day care for children with specific health and social needs. This restriction eliminates most children from access to public care, including those from families of single working parents. The government works under the principle that the form of care is the choice of parents. It is the role of parents, therefore, to also shoulder the cost of care outside the family. The government does regulate most forms of care including day nurseries, childminders, and some nannies who work for more than two families. Most forms of care for children aged five and under are custodial, not educational, with limited provision of pre-school education in Britain.

The first day nurseries were established in the nineteenth century in Britain as they were in other countries. Extensive public provision did not occur until World War I, and that effort was small.37 Two laws, the 1870 Education Act which required the provision of elementary

37Much of this survey comes from Bronwen Cohen, "The United Kingdom," in International Handbook of Child Care Policies, 515-534.
schools in all areas, and the 1918 act regarding the provision of day nurseries by Local Health Authorities, which also allowed local authorities to establish nursery schools, did not generate extensive provision. World War II saw the tremendous expansion of day cares, along with other measures to encourage women's employment in the war effort, but these began to be closed even before the end of the war.38 Closings continued in the 1950s and 1960s as well. The number of places in public nurseries by the end of the war was double that of current levels.39

The thinking that dominated after the war was that women would remain at home doing unpaid labour, while labour contracts would be negotiated on the basis of a "family wage", allowing men to earn enough to provide for a spouse and family.40 As well, there was a strong belief that children should not be separated from their mothers for long periods of time. This thinking was reflected in the 1967 government recommendation that nursery school education should be part-time, and attendance should be limited to a child of parents who had to work, or to those who had other health or welfare needs.41

Women's employment has increased in Britain over time, leading to demands for increased child care. As well, British policies have come under increasing scrutiny by the European Union because of the large discrepancies with other EU countries, and as the EU itself has sought to improve child care provisions to enhance the equality of women and men in the workforce.

---


39Cohen (516) reports that 1,300 nurseries existed in England and Wales for 62,000 children. She does not give current figures, but Moss reports that in 1987, 794 nurseries cared for 33,370 children under age three, whereas the total population of children under age three numbered 2.2 million. Peter Moss, "Day Care for Young Children in the United Kingdom," in Day Care for Young Children: International Perspectives, eds. Edward C. Melhuish and Peter Moss (London: Tavistock/Routledge, 1991), 122.


41Randall notes the influence of theories such as "maternal deprivation" by child psychologist John Bowlby, manifested in the Plowden Report. Randall, "The Irresponsible State?" 342-343.
Children enter elementary school at age five, which is a year earlier than schools in most other countries. However, for children of working parents, arrangements must be made for most of those aged five and under and outside school hours. Public day nursery schools operate on a full- or part-time basis but are restricted to children who need special help because of developmental difficulties or because of the socioeconomic circumstances of their families. This function has been reinforced by the Children Act of 1989. This act ordered local authorities to provide services for children in need, meaning immigrant, neglected, and disabled children, but not those of working mothers. The social services departments at the level of the local authority operate these needs-based services. They represent only about four per cent of spaces for children aged four and under. Some are not day cares but drop-in centres for children and parents.

Private and voluntary nurseries operated by community groups, private individuals, and employers, also exist and provide full-time care for children of working parents. Community-based nurseries began to appear in the 1970s, often on the initiative of parents. Employer-based day cares are often found in the manufacturing and textile industries. The British Tory party began to emphasize the responsibilities of employers to help working parents during its last period in office. All these forms of private collective care represent about four per cent of spaces for young children.

Some publicly-funded pre-schools also exist in Britain, such as nursery schools run by local education authorities and infant classes of primary schools, which operate primarily for three- and four-year-olds, and which are free. The classes generally run from 9:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., with a two-hour lunch break. However, the vast majority of children attend these schools part-time. Approximately 70 per cent of child care spaces for young children are in pre-schools (nursery schools and infant classes), but that represents only about 45 per cent of all three- and four-year-olds in Britain, and only about 20 per cent of these spaces are full-time. A very limited number of spaces in before- and after-school care exist, with most parents relying on relatives.

---

42 Kahn and Kamerman, Social Policy and the Under-3s, UK.17.
44 Cohen, 527.
In fact, the majority of children of working mothers are cared for by a relative: mostly maternal grandmothers but also fathers and older siblings. Some home childminders provide care in their own homes, and are registered with the social service department of their local authority; however, many more childminders exist who are unregistered. Registered childminders account for approximately 20 per cent of the spaces for children outside the home. It is a much more common form of care than nursery schools. Another form of care, nannies and au pairs, work in the families' homes but fall under no form of government regulation.

Italy

A variety of child care services are offered to families with children in Italy. The government promotes child care as a social right, with priority given to children of poor and working mothers, but with the socialization role emphasized as well. At the same time, the government promotes educational goals, offering near-universal pre-primary programs for children ages three to five. Most forms of public care are collective, with few individual forms like family day care offered. One should not exaggerate the level of public provision in Italy, however; public child care programs currently serve about five per cent of young children, although provision in some regions reaches approximately 30 per cent of children under age three.45 If a child is cared for at home, care is most often done by parents or relatives, particularly grandmothers.

The first pre-school was opened in Italy in 1831 in response to concerns over the plight of orphaned children.46 In the same period, others were established to help children of working mothers, as was common in most other western countries.47 Private individuals and industry ran some of the early pre-schools but the Catholic Church ran most of them. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the government passed laws banning night work for women, and providing for


46Much of the following survey is from Rebecca S. New, "Italy," in International Handbook of Child Care Policies, 291-311.

47Women were seen as more desirable as workers as they were paid less than men. New, "Italy," 294. She states that "as the proportion of women within the labour force increased, enlightened industrialists began to build child care facilities rather than submit to any regulation
unpaid maternity leave. At that time, authority for pre-school education was turned over to the Ministry of Education. In 1968, the government formally assigned the Ministry of Education authority over the establishment of pre-schools for children ages three to six.

Pre-school covers children aged three to five and all children are encouraged to attend. The national government is responsible for funding. Nearly all children attend pre-school as parents regard it as important for the education and socialization of children. If a scarcity of places arises in the public programs, the state subsidizes licensed private programs—often church-based, but also municipal-based—to fill in the gap. The majority of children attend pre-school for over seven hours per day. In many cases, that day can be longer than elementary school, which in some areas is offered for only four hours per day.

In 1971, the government passed a law mandating state-supported day care for children aged three months to three years. However, a great regional variation exists in child care provision. Child care centres are more abundant in the industrialized north than in the agrarian south.\(^{48}\) Even in the north, demand for public child care is greater than supply, with some of the demand being met by industry-supported care, and, in the south, private centres operated by the Church. Most day care centres are public, however, with administration handled by regional and local governments in conjunction with parents.

At the national level, responsibility for day care is under the Ministry of Health. The day care centres charge user fees, but with some subsidization by the national, regional, and local governments. The national Ministry of Health collects employer payroll taxes to fund the development of services. The centres can be open up to 11 hours per day.\(^{49}\) Staff are considered public employees. While children of poor and working parents are targetted, Kahn and Kamerman report that most children who attend the public day cares are from the middle and

\(^{48}\)Saraceno (65) reports that "although the fertility rate is higher in the South than in the Center-North and the proportion of pre-school children in the population is higher, until the early eighties no day care centres existed in Sicily, and kindergartens, although their number had risen substantially since the early seventies, are still fewer and offer on average a reduced schedule."

\(^{49}\)Saraceno (78, n. 4) reports that day care centres are typically open eight hours a day, five days a week, eleven months a year. Kindergartens are open six to eight hours a day, five days a week, and ten months a year.
Regional disparities in provision of day care also reflects the levels of female labour force participation, which is much higher in the north than in the south.

Kahn and Kamerman, IT19.


Aitken, Jenifer. "A Stranger in the Family: The Legal Status of Domestic Workers in Ontario." University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review, 45, 2 (Fall 1987), 394-415.


Antoinette, 247 (February 1986), 16-23.


-----. "Bringing the Welfare State Back In." Comparative Politics 23, 3 (April 1991), 351-75.


Blyth, Mark M. "'Any More Bright Ideas?' The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy." Comparative Politics 29, 2 (1997), 229-50.


Canadian Auto Workers (CAW). "Barriers to a Comprehensive Child Care System: A Labour Perspective." Speech by Peggy Nash to the Ontario Coalition for Better Child Care, 10th Anniversary Conference, 30 November 1991.


Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW). *Our Children are Our Future.* Ottawa: CUPW, 1996.


Centre de Recherche pour l'Étude et l'Observation des Conditions de Vie (CREDOC). *Consommation et Modes de Vie,* No. 16 (February 1987).


Falkner, Gerda and Emmerich Talos. "The Role of the State Within Social Policy." *West European Politics* 17, 3 (July 1994), 52-76.


*HR Magazine* 35, 12 (December 1990), 21-22.


Status of Day Care in Canada. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, various years.


----- and Mariette Sineau. "Family Policy and Women's Citizenship in Mitterand's France." *Social Politics* 2, 3 (Fall 1995), 244-269.


"La maternelle victime de son succès." Le Figaro, 17 October 1994.


-----. Work-Related Child Care in Canada. Ottawa: Labour Canada (Women's Bureau), 1990.


Morrison, W. R.. "'Their Proper Sphere': Feminism, the Family, and Child Centered Social Reform in Ontario, 1875-1900." *Ontario History* 68, 1 and 2 (March, June 1976), 45-64, 65-74.


-----. *The 1995 Budget and Block Funding.* Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1995.


-----. "Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siècle France." *American Historical Review* 89, 3 (1984), 648-76.


-----. *Child Care Conversion Guidelines: Making the Transition from For-Profit to Non-Profit*. Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1992.


-----. *Improving Ontario's Child Care System: Ontario's Child Care Review*. Toronto: Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1996.

-----. *New Directions for Child Care*. Toronto: Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1987.


———. *Kindergarten and School-Age Children...Who Cares?* Background paper prepared by Noel Young for the OCBCC, January 1994.


———. *Economic Outlook*. Paris: OECD, various years.


———. *Education in OECD Countries: A Compendium of Statistical Information*. Paris: OECD, various years.


———. *OECD in Figures: Statistics of the Member Countries*, various years.


Ouin, Béatrice. Secrétaire Confédérale de la CFDT. "L'emploi du temps." CFDT-Aujourd'hui, no. 112 (June 1994).


Radical, 19 September 1899.


Wilson, Frank L. "French Interest Group Politics: Pluralist or Neocorporatist?" American Political Science Review 77, 4 (December 1983), 895-910.


LIST OF INTERVIEWS


Friendly, Martha. Special lecture, SSC 199Y, University of Toronto, 1 March 1995.


Gehman, Chris. Staff person, Childcare Resource and Research Unit. Consultation, Toronto, 23 May 1996.


Kass, Jamie. Former Union Education Officer and Elected Representative on child care for Ontario, Canadian Union of Public Employees. Currently in charge of child care programs, Canadian Union of Postal Workers. Personal interview, Ottawa, 13 May 1996.


Yzerman, Ron. Director, Child Care Programs, Human Resources Development Canada. Personal interview, Ottawa, 13 May 1996.
