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vi & 253

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UMI
PARTICIPATION, GENDER AND POLITICS IN INSTITUTIONS OF RURAL REFORM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN NORTHERN NIGERIA.

BY

KOLE AHMED SHETTIMA

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of Political Science
University of Toronto

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Abstract

Participation, Gender and Politics in Institutions of Rural Reform:
A Comparative Study in Northern Nigeria.

Ph.D 1996
Kole Ahmed Shetima
Department of Political Science, University of Toronto

Since the 1980s, major rural institutional reforms have been implemented in Northern Nigeria. These include the Better Life for Rural Women Program, the Directorate of Food, Road, and Rural Infrastructure and the North East Arid Zone Development Program (NEAZDP). The first two programs are funded by the Nigerian Government while the third is funded mainly through a loan and grant of the European Union. These programs have commitment to grassroots development and expansion of local public spaces. This is a comparison of the implementation strategies of the three institutions in two communities of Dagona and Machina.

The thesis demonstrates that comparatively, NEAZDP, more than the other institutions, has succeeded in achieving its objectives. However, NEAZDP's success is demonstrated more in Dagona than Machina. I explain the variations in the performances of the three institutions and the two communities from an institutional-contextual perspective. The institutional variables are autonomy, strategy and resources while the contextual variables are historical-political pattern, socio-economic inequality and identity politics. NEAZDP has more resources, a bottom-up strategy and enjoys greater autonomy while the other two institutions are almost opposite of NEAZDP. On the other hand, Dagona is more egalitarian, has a more recent history and has less contentious ethnic and partisan politics. Machina is almost opposite of Dagona. However, in both communities, women are subordinated.
Acknowledgements

In my community of Machina, there is a saying which literally translates as 'seeking knowledge is like a long journey to the unknown, with every step, one is closer to the destination'. The ultimate destination of every Ph.D student is the dissertation. At this last step of my destination, my supervisor, Professor Jonathan Barker played the most significant role of guiding me on my path. He patiently read several drafts of this work. At every moment, he made himself available. I am touched by his commitment to this research. Professor Jonathan Barker together with the other members of the Thesis Committee, Professors Richard Sandbrook and Richard Stren, confirmed another saying of the people of Machina: what an elderly person can see sitting, may not be seen by a child standing. Their collective experiences have shaped this dissertation.

Before a person reaches the final destination, one takes many steps. Some of the steps, such as primary, secondary, under-graduate and graduate schools are clearly identifiable. They have all contributed to the final destination. Hence, I would like to acknowledge the contributions of my teachers at Machina Primary School, Government Secondary School Nguru, University of Maiduguri and Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. To all of them: askerngena.

I am grateful to the University of Toronto for awarding me a fellowship to study in the Department of Political Science. My field research was made possible by the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation. I hope that both institutions are vindicated by this fruit of the "investment" they have made.
While some of the steps to the final destination are clearly identifiable, some of them are not. Friends, colleagues and associates in Nigeria and Toronto have made life much easier for me. In Gashua, my research counterpart, Adam Modu Sadiq of the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the North East Arid Zone Development Program, my host in Gashua, Wakil Maina, his family and “Shagari” provided me the necessary comfort. In the course of the field work, I travelled to several cities, towns and villages. I relied on my friends, who are too numerous to mention.

In Toronto, my friends and colleagues at the Inter-Church Coalition on Africa (ICCAF), and especially members of the Economic Justice Working Group were wonderful. John Mihevc’s technical and moral support is greatly appreciated. For a considerable period during my field research, Paul Ocheje and Winnifred Ocheje assisted in taking care of my little Zainab.

The warmth of the subjects of my research in Dagona and Machina, and the Development Area Promoters, Salihu Jawi and Bukar Bashir Albishir touched my heart. They opened their hearts and homes. I knocked on their doors at odd times. My best wish is that I have truthfully recorded their experiences.

My “Sarauniya”, Aisha and little Zainab have always sacrificed their comfort for me. They endured my absence at every stage of the studies. I hope Zainab is not disappointed that she still has to go to a clinic to see a doctor because her father is merely “a doctor of books”.

iv
To the memory of my dear mother, late Ya Amsatu, who worked hard so that I could go to school.
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vi

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UMI
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 5</th>
<th>Setting and Trends: Gender and Socio-Economic Relations</th>
<th>86</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Introduction</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Demography of Dagona and Machina</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Socio-Economic Structure</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.1 Land: Ownership, Access and Control</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.2 Profile of Farm Activities in Dagona and Machina</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Profile of Household Activities in Machina and Dagona</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 The Rhythm of Living in Dagona and Machina</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1 Machina: Ya Tingiri</td>
<td>109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.2 Dagona: Ibrahim</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6 Conclusion</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 6 Institutions of Development in Dagona and Machina 119

| 6.1 Introduction | 119 |
| 6.2 Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy in NEAZDP | 121 |
| 6.2.1 The Theory of Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy | 121 |
| 6.2.2 The Experience of Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy | 131 |
| 6.3 Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy in the Directorate of Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure | 141 |
| 6.3.1 The Theory of Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy | 141 |
| 6.3.2 The Experience of Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy | 143 |
| 6.4 Grassroots Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy in Better Life | 149 |
| 6.4.1 The Theory of Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy | 149 |
| 6.4.2 The Experience of Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy | 151 |
| 6.5 Context Matters: Inclusion and Exclusion | 155 |
| 6.6 Conclusion | 160 |

Chapter 7 Grassroots Projects in Dagona and Machina 165

<p>| 7.1 Introduction | 165 |
| 7.2 NEAZDP Projects in Dagona and Machina | 167 |
| 7.2.1 Irrigation | 171 |
| 7.2.2 Pomade and Soap Enterprise | 173 |
| 7.2.3 Village Book Store | 174 |
| 7.2.4 Grinding Machine | 176 |
| 7.2.5 Ox-Team | 177 |
| 7.2.6 Women's Development Center | 180 |
| 7.2.7 Community Grain Bank | 181 |
| 7.2.8 Drug Revolving Fund | 183 |
| 7.3 DFRRRI Projects in Dagona and Machina | 185 |
| 7.3.1 Rural Feeder Road | 187 |
| 7.3.2 Rural Water Supply | 188 |
| 7.3.3 Rural Electrification | 189 |
| 7.4 Better Life Projects in Dagona and Machina | 190 |
| 7.4.1 Grinding Machine | 191 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.4.2 Trade Fair</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.3 Public Campaign</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5 Inclusion and Exclusion in Grassroots Projects</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5.1 NEAZDP</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5.2 Better Life</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6 Explaining Success in Grassroots Projects</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7 Conclusion</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8 Grassroots Development Projects as Community Spaces.</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Introduction</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Community Spaces in Dagona and Machina</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3 Community Discourse</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4 Development Institutions and Public Spaces: Dagona and Machina</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4 Conclusion</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 9 Conclusion: A Testimony</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables

2.1 Changes in Sectoral Contributions to GDP, Employment and Exports, 1970-85. . . . 24
2.3 Index of Agricultural Production by Type of Activity, 1970-985. ....................... 31
4.1 Comparative Characteristics of Dagona and Machina. ..................................... 81
5.1 Upland rain-fed Agriculture Activities of Females and Males in Dagona. .......... 97
5.2 Access to Agricultural Technology and Services in Dagona and Machina. ....... 98
5.3 Profile of Household Activities in Dagona and Machina. ................................ 105
6.1 NEAZDP Institutional Structures. ...................................................................... 140
6.2 DFRRI Institutional Structures. ......................................................................... 147
6.3 Better Life Institutional Structures. ..................................................................... 154
7.1 NEAZDP Projects in Dagona and Machina Development Areas. ..................... 170
7.2 Results of Small Scale Irrigation. ................................................................. 172
7.3 Komkomma Grain Bank, 1992-1993. ............................................................... 183
7.4 A Sample of Beneficiaries of NEAZDP Irrigation and Ox Team Projects, Dagona. 200
7.5 A Sample of Beneficiaries of NEAZDP Projects in Machina. ......................... 201
8.1 Federal and State Governments Presence in Dagona and Machina. ............... 216
8.2 Local Government Presence in Dagona and Machina. ..................................... 217
8.3 Development Institutions and Community Meetings in Dagona and Machina. .... 218
8.4 Community Organizations and Community Meetings in Dagona and Machina. .... 219
8.5 Public Spaces Created and Expanded by Development Institutions. .......... 233
List of Maps

1. Map of Nigeria Showing Former 30 States and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja . . .  2
2. Map of NEAZDP Development Areas ....................................................... 3

Abbreviations

ADP(s): Agricultural Development Program(s)
BLP/Better Life: Better Life Program for Rural Women
CAMM: Community Awareness and Mass Mobilization
CAP: Community Annual Plan
CDA: Community Development Association
COCIN: Church of Christ in Nigeria
CPP: Community Perspective Plan
DA: Development Area
DAP: Development Area Promoter
DFRRI: Directorate of Food Road and Rural Infrastructure
DRF: Drug Revolving Fund
DSM: Directorate for Social Mobilization
EPI: Expanded Program on Immunization
EU: European Union
HPC(s): High Production Center(s)
LEA: Local Education Authority
NDE: National Directorate of Employment

NEC: National Electoral Commission

NEAZDP: North East Arid Zone Development Program

NEPU: Northern (later Nigeria) Elements Progressive Union.

NRC: National Republican Convention

NPC: Northern (Nigeria) Peoples Congress

OFN: Operation Feed the Nation

PHC: Primary Health Care

PMU: Program Management Unit

PPC(s): Primary Production Center(s)

PTA: Parents Teachers Association

RBDA: Rural Basin Development Authorities

RDC: Rural Development Coordinator

SAP: Structural Adjustment Program

SDP: Social Democratic Party

SSS: State Security Service

VDA: Village Development Association

VDP(s): Village Development Promoter

YOSADP: Yobe State Agricultural Development Authority

YOSAMA: Yobe State Agricultural Mechanization Authority

YSREB: Yobe State Rural Electrification Board
Glossary of Non-English Terms in Arabic, Bade, Fulbe, Hausa, Kanuri and Manga.

Adace: Community revolving fund
Addu'a: Supplication
Ajia: Title, District Head
Ardo: Title, senior community leader
Ashasha: A farming implement
Asusu: Community revolving fund
Ayat: Verse
Bade: An ethnic group
Birni: City
Bula: Title, ward head
Burum: River
Chima(s): Fief holder(s)
Chapnori: Meeting of ward heads
Daga Karkara: From Rural Areas, a radio program
Dandal: The Major street which starts from a palace.
Digum: Title, senior community leader.
Durbur: A horse festival
Fadama: Flood recession zone
al-Falaq: The Daybreak, a chapter in the Quran
Fatiha: Opening, a chapter in the Quran
Fulbe: An ethnic usually known as Fulani
Grema: Title, a junior community leader
Gumsa: Title, most senior wife of the Mai.
Hadith: Saying of Prophet Muhammed (PBUH)
Hausa: An ethnic group
Hijab: “Proper” Muslim dress.
Islamiya: Islamic school
Izala: A movement committed to replacement of tradition with Islamic Orthodoxy.
Jahiliya: Ignorance
Kanuri: An ethnic group
Kare Ngimbe: bride wealth
Kautalhore: Association of Fulbe animal breeders
Kida: Income activity
Kona: Title, a senior royal guard
Kulle: A form of seclusion
Kumadugu: River
Kungiyar Fadama: Association of flood recession zone farmers
Kungiyar Masunta: Association of fishers
Lamido: Title, King or senior leader
Lawan: Title, Village Head
Luqman: Wise, a chapter in the Quran
Mada: Title, senior community leader
Magaram: Title, official sister of the Mai
Magi: Title, senior woman leader
Mai: Title, King or District Head
Maina: Aristocrat
Manga: An ethnic group
Masallacin Izala: Mosque of Izala followers
Masallacin Jumma’a: Friday Mosque
Pukko: An improved mud stove
Qadriyya: A sect in Islam
Quran: The holy book of Islam
Sabon Gari: A ward in northern Nigeria cities usually inhabited by non-Muslims.
Sabo: New
Sadaqat: Alms
Sana’a (Pl. Sana’o’i): Income activity
Sarkin Hausawa: Head of Hausa community
Sarkin Pawa: Head of butchers
Sarkin Yaki: Title, war commander
Sunnah: Deeds of Prophet Muhammed (PBUH)
Surah: Chapter
Takali: An ethnic group also known as Sakkwatawa
Tijaniyya: A sect in Islam
Tudu: Upland
Tudun Wada: A ward in Northern Nigeria cities where Muslims from other parts of the region usually reside.

Umra: Lesser pilgrimage

Wakili: Title, senior messenger

Waladi: A junior royal guard

Waziri: Title, Vizor

Zango: A ward occupied by itinerants usually traders

Appendix 1: Organization of the Field Research ............................. 274

Appendix 2: The Research Sites and the Researcher in Dagona and Machina ............ 277

Appendix 3: Guideline for Group Discussions, Community Surveys and Interviews. ............................. 281

Appendix 4: List of Persons Interviewed ................................. 283
1.1 The Research Puzzle: Telling the Story

On the Kano-Maiduguri highway in northern Nigeria (see Map 1), about 300 kilometres from Maiduguri, there is a big green signboard with the inscription “Welcome To Yobe State, The Beacon of Hope.” The state was carved out of the former Borno State in 1991. Anyone driving through its capital, Damaturu, cannot miss the car stickers with the slogan “Yobe is the Pride of a Determined People.”

Continue driving on Damaturu-Gashua road and you will notice two things (see Maps 1 and 2). The further north a person drives, the drier it becomes. The geographical characteristic of the state poses a challenge to the people that tests their determination to perpetuate their way of life. There are two kinds of vegetation in the state: sahel savannah in the north and sudan savannah in the south. The former is relatively hilly and gets rainfall

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1 The imagery of roads and driving is influenced by Ayesha Imam (1993) and participation at a workshop on “Women in Economic Policy” during the Africa Region End of Decade Women’s Conference Non-Governmental Organization’s Forum.

2 The word Yobe is said to derive from Yau be, which means “that of Yau” in Kanuri. Yau is a Kanuri settlement on the banks of what is now known as River Yobe. However, there are others who contend that the name Yobe is derived from a Fulbe word, Yo.

3 Hope was the campaign slogan of M.K.O. Abiola in the 1993 presidential election. He was the flag bearer of the SDP, the party which controlled Yobe State during the brief period of civilian state governors (1992-1993). Abiola won the elections in Yobe State with 63 percent of the votes.

4 There is a controversy especially since the creation of Yobe State about the source of the name Damaturu. Just as in the previous controversy on the name Yobe, this controversy became prominent about the time of the creation of emirates in the state. Kanuri nationalists claim that Damaturu is from the words Da’a Turum. This in Kanuri means there are plenty of animals. On the other hand, Fulbes claim that the source of the word is from Dawa Tura. This means in Fulbe fetch water from well. The real issue at the time of the debates was whom to appoint as the Mai of Damaturu. Was the person to be Kanuri or Fulbe?
Map 2. NEAZDP Development Areas.
for about 140 days per annum while the latter is relatively flat and gets rainfall for about 120 days per annum. In both zones the weather is generally very hot and dry, and between October and December it is windy and dusty. There are two major rivers, Kumadugu (river) Yobe and Burum (river) Gana, which flow through the State to Lake Chad. The state also shares an international boundary with Niger Republic.

You will also notice signs and signboards of rural development projects. If a person stops and inquires, for example on the (Damaturu-Gashua) road, about 40 kilometres from Gashua, there is a signboard showing the direction of Gwio-Kura, a subdistrict (see Map 2). There in February 1993 a big ceremony was organized to show gratitude and appreciation to the North East Arid Zone Development Program (henceforth NEAZDP). The Program has implemented several projects in the community5 and some of them were displayed. These included ox teams project, pukko (an improved mud stove) project, and veterinary equipment project. Musicians played and the daughters and sons of the community came from far and near. Dignitaries at the ceremony included the Waziri (Vizor) of Bade who represented the Mai of Bade. Three officials of the Program, the Program Manager, the Deputy Program Manager and the Field Team Coordinator were given gifts of gowns and a ram by the community. In addition, the Deputy Program Manager was assigned the title of Grema (junior leader) of the community. It was a very happy moment in the community: an appreciation of what NEAZDP had done.

If you visited Tula in Bauchi State, bordering Yobe State, you would notice a large

5 I am aware of the disputes about the meaning of community. I use the concept in a historical-geographic sense: an organized settlement of people which has existed for a considerable period.
elevated water tank. The occasion that this sign of development evokes for local people took place in 1990. A group of women from Tula community disrupted the commissioning of a water project implemented by the Directorate of Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure (henceforth DFRRRI) in the community. The Governor of the State, who had been invited by the Program to commission the water project, could not enter the town because the women blocked the road. They also drained the overhead water tank that had been filled for the occasion. The issue at stake for the women was deception by DFRRRI. One of the major problems of Tula was lack of potable water. Some years ago, the Bauchi State government constructed a borehole with an overhead water tank in the community, but the borehole had broken down. Instead of DFRRRI repairing it, the agency trucked water to Tula and pumped it into the overhead tank. The Governor of the State had been invited to commission the project. The women of Tula organized to signal what they felt was a deception: the Program had failed to solve their problem.

The two scenarios illustrate the first problem this dissertation will pursue. The people of Gwio Kura celebrated the success of NEAZDP in their community while the women of Tula rose against the failure of DFRRRI. Why did the people of Gwio Kura celebrate while the women of Tula demonstrated? To put the question more generally, why do some institutions of rural development succeed while others fail?

The study of institutions has gained currency as a result of the resurgence of the “new institutionalists” who claim that the main immediate source of social change is a change in institutions. Hence, one of the major claims of this perspective is that institutions are fundamental: institutions reorder society, create new actors and authorities, and change the
behaviour of actors. In this approach, institution is an independent variable like the rhythm of the drum in the Hausa proverb *idan kidi ya canja rawa ma zata canja* (when the rhythm of the drum changes, the dancing steps also change). To explain the success in Gwio Kura and the failure in Tula, we should look first to differences in development institutions.

Consider Dagona, a district, a few kilometres off the Gashua-Nguru road. In that community NEAZDP has also several projects, and whenever meetings are called to discuss projects many people turn up. Several committees have been set up by NEAZDP through the Village Development Association to manage various services in the community. Besides their managerial significance, the meetings also serve as a public space. Most men in the community are not only aware of the projects funded by NEAZDP, they also participate in them as volunteers and beneficiaries. Women, however, are not only under-represented in the institution, they rarely benefit from their projects.

In the north west of Yobe State, it takes a four-wheel drive vehicle about two hours to drive on the sand track road to Machina, a local government headquarters. In Machina, as in Dagona, NEAZDP has implemented several projects. However, when meetings are called in Machina in contrast to Dagona, very few people turn up. Furthermore, meetings are less frequent because the Village Development Association has set up few committees to manage projects in the community. Neither managerial nor public space aspects of meetings are realized.

The two scenarios illustrate the second problem this research will investigate. In Dagona, NEAZDP has succeeded in enriching public life and in fostering a feeling of local project ownership, whereas in Machina it has not. From the perspective of the new
institutionalism the results are puzzling: why did NEAZDP succeed in Dagona, but fail in Machina? In general terms, why does an institution of rural development which succeeds in one community fail in another? If an institution can be likened to a drum beat in the Hausa proverb *idan kidi ya canja, rawa ma zata canja* then the people in Machina do not respond to the rhythm that sets Dagona inhabitants dancing. A biological image may help: is an institution like a seed that germinates and grows in a particular soil but fails in another? Clearly, an institution is also a dependent variable. To paraphrase Marx, institutions, like individuals, do not choose their course of action just as they please. “History matters because it is ‘path dependent’: what comes first (even if it was in some sense ‘accidental’) conditions what comes later” (Putnam 1993: 8). In the words of the scholars of anthropology of modernity “how things develop depends in part on where (emphasis original) they develop” (Pred and Watts 1992: 11). Hence the question: how does the social context of a society mediate the activities of an institution?

In order to explain variations in the performance of institutions of rural development, I have chosen to do a comparative institutional analysis of the Better Life for Rural Women Program (henceforth Better Life or BLP), DFRRI, and NEAZDP. Furthermore, in order to explain variations in different communities, I have chosen Dagona and Machina as the settings for the research. In both communities rural development projects have been implemented by the three development institutions.

How does one measure institutional performance? Institutional performance depends on the purpose for which it is created. The central objective of these institutions of rural development is the empowerment of marginalized groups. Empowerment is trendy, and is
used by different groups for different purposes. All these institutions claim that their objective is to alleviate rural poverty through the establishment of participatory grassroots development projects. The purposes of these grassroots projects are to solve the material and social concerns of the people as well as improve the public life of marginalized groups. In other words, the prime objective of empowerment is to give voice and benefit to hitherto excluded groups. In this sense, empowerment means social justice and equity. Hence, the performance of these institutions must be measured against the purpose for which they are set up: to improve production and social services in material ways and to expand the scope of public life in the two communities of Dagona and Machina. As an internal evaluation of a program I will measure actual performance against stated objectives.

A second method of evaluation is an external critique: questioning the objectives themselves. For example, what is the possibility of achieving those objectives without radically changing the assumptions of the institutions and the context of the communities? I intend to pursue the two inquiries although the emphasis will be on the first one.

This research, I hope, has some policy relevance in this era of soul searching, questioning of previous claims, rethinking and reconceptualizing in the field of rural development and its strategies. Insights may be gained by those interested in issues of civil society, rural development, institution building, and rural democratization, governance and empowerment. Through an internal and external critique of these development institutions, I will throw light on areas of possible policy intervention.
1.2 Objectives of the Study.

The overall objective of the study is to explore variations in the performance of institutions of rural development: how both the qualities of the institutions and the context of society mediate the implementation of institutional objectives: In more specific terms:

(I). How is it that in the same social context some institutions of rural development succeed while others fail? Here the focus is on institutional design or arrangement to enable us to account for variations in success. The three elements of institutional design I will stress are institutional strategy, institutional autonomy and institutional resources. Institutional strategy means how the structure of an institution facilitates the involvement of marginalized local groups in project initiation, implementation and evaluation (local ownership and control of institutions). I measure autonomy by the extent to which an institution acts independently of the local and national power structures. By institutional resources, I mean the quality of staff or social capital and the financial resources available to an institution.

(II). How is it that the same institution of rural development which succeeds in one community fails in another? The focus now is on how the context of communities shapes institutions. Three aspects of the context of a community interest me: socio-economic, historico-political and identity politics. Socio-economic relations refer to class inequality in the communities. I measure this variable by asking community members to classify members of the community in different socio-economic categories. Identity politics refers to the social construction of a gendered social relations and ethnic markers. I analyze the types of activities
carried out by males and females, and the gender and ethnic beneficiaries of the projects and in some cases staff of institutions. Historico-political refers to the historical and political pattern of the communities. I assess this variable by looking at the history and political patterns of the communities.

1.3 Propositions.

The propositions in this research are derived from two sets of literature which I discuss in depth in Chapter 4. These ideas are part of the alternative development literature. The two sets of literature are those on institutional (strategy, resources and autonomy) and contextual issues (identity politics, socio-economic and historico-political). The significance of institutional strategy, resources, and autonomy and identity politics, socio-economic relations and politico-historical context in shaping the nature of rural development projects has been discussed by various scholars including Robert Bates (1989), Robert Chambers (1983), Dickson Eyoh (1992a; 1992b), Albert Hirschman (1984), David Korten (1990), Elinor Ostrom (1994), and Norman Uphoff (1992). It is from the perspective of the broad alternative development approach they represent that I derive the following propositions.

(i). The more resources an institution possesses, the more likely it will achieve its development objectives. By resources I mean both quality of staff or “social capital”, and financial resources to implement projects and attract high quality staff. Incentive is not only
pecuniary, although material benefit is important.

(II). The more the strategy of an institution is top-down, the more likely it will not succeed. By top-down I mean a hierarchical strategy of policy formulation, implementation and evaluation.

(III). The more an institution enjoys autonomy, the more likely it will succeed. In other words, an institution with greater autonomy from the incumbent power structures is more likely to succeed in its activities than one with less autonomy.

(IV). The more egalitarian the affected community, the greater the chance that an institution pursuing rural development will achieve its objectives. The more hierarchical the community, the more difficult it will be for institutions to achieve their development objectives.

1.4 Research Design.

In this section I discuss the propositions and methodology of field research.

1.4.1 The Dependent Variable: how is it that some institutions of rural development succeed while others fail, and how is it that a successful institution in one community fails in another? In other words, success of institutions is the dependent variable. It is what I wish to explain.

I assess the success of institutions of rural development by the extent to which they
have been able to achieve their objectives of empowering rural communities through grassroots projects and enhancing public life through community self-governance. Grassroots projects include both material and social projects that improve the quality of life of the people and meet the needs of the communities. Improving public life through community self-governance means generating public participation by marginalized people in the activities of the community. This will enhance their claims to citizenship and democratize community life. Thus, projects are not only schools of democracy (Ghai 1988), but also the instruments of democratization. While I will evaluate the performance of the institutions primarily according to their own objectives, I will also make an external critique, questioning the assumptions that inform the objectives and suggesting alternative ways of intervention.

1.4.2 Independent Variables

There are six independent variables used in this research. Three are institutional (strategy, autonomy and resources) while the other three are contextual (identity politics, socio-economic inequality and historico-political pluralism).

(I) Institutional Strategy. In order for an institution to achieve its objectives, it is necessary to institutionalize local control and ownership. This could be achieved through a bottom-up strategy of project initiation, implementation and evaluation. Localization is not the same as consultation or mobilization of local resources. A bottom-up strategy suggests that governments, donors and animators use a process in which local people have a significant
role. This approach does not suggest that there is no role for these agencies and bodies. What is most important is whether these bodies are “partners” in the development process or see their role as service deliverers.

Operationalization: The objective is to measure to what extent the institutional strategy is bottom-up. Strategy is evaluated with respect to: project initiation, implementation and evaluation. Some of the key matters to ask about are the way the program started; the participants views about their involvements in the program; the nature of the organizational structure; and the extent to which women, men and members of minorities are part of the processes of initiating, implementation and evaluation. Specifically I ask: Does the organizational structure at the local level enhance the participation of local people? Are there project staff of both sexes? What is the percentage of the community who are aware of the program; the number who are members of the organization? What is the frequency of project related meetings; the number of members actively involved in projects meeting?

(II) Institutional Autonomy. In order for an institution to succeed it must have some independence from the power structures. While I recognise the need for public control of institutions, this has to be balanced with autonomy. Otherwise the influence of partisan politics and other structures of power relations will be pervasive and those who are not in the same camp with those in power will be excluded. Further, poor performances of these institutions could be overlooked as patronage goals displace development objectives.
Operationalization: In order to measure the autonomy of an institution, I ask several questions: What is the nature of the relationship between the state and the institution at national, state and local levels? Who are the decision makers at all these levels? How are the projects funded? To what extent is the leadership of the institution distinct from other leaders in the community?

(III) Institutional Resources. In order for an institution to succeed, it needs enough resources to implement its projects. These resources are both in the form of social capital as well as financial resources. Social capital is especially necessary where specialized skills are required. But, an institution needs to have an incentive package in order to attract skilled workers. In other words, mere exhortations and symbolism are not enough to achieve the objectives of an institution. Material benefit is not the only incentive benefit that people get, but there are other community and individual values that may also be important incentives.

Operationalization: To measure the quality of social capital and financial resources of an institution, the questions to ask include: What are the sources of funding for the institution? How much funding does the institution receive? Who is employed by the institution and what are their qualifications? What incentives are given to workers in the project?

(IV) Identity Politics. We assume that communities are shaped by different forms of markers, including ethnicity and gender relations. Communities are therefore not simple harmonious units of analysis. For example, in order to reach marginal women, rural services and projects
must disaggregate household units, and the institutions of rural development themselves must
attend to gender relations within households.

Operationalization: To measure the extent to which the nature of identity politics in the
community affects the institutions of rural development and vice versa, the questions to ask
include: Who are the participants in the institutions? What are the types of organizations set
up and how do they operate? What are the types of projects implemented? Who are the
beneficiaries of the projects? These questions will be asked in relation to gender and ethnic
markers.

(V) Class Inequality. We assume that rural communities are divided into different economic
categories. Hence, in order to reach the grassroots, development projects must be conscious of
class distinctions.

Operationalization: To measure the extent to which class relations in communities affect
institutions of rural development and vice versa. The questions to ask include: Who are the
participants in the institutions? What are the types of organizations set up and how do they
operate? Who is included and who is excluded? What are the types of projects implemented?
Who are the beneficiaries of the projects?

(VI) Politico-historical pluralism. We assume that different rural communities are inhabited
by people from different ethnic groups and political affiliations. Similarly, communities have
gone through different historical trajectories. Hence, in order to reach the grassroots and be able to distribute resources fairly, institutions of rural development have to be conscious of these complexities.

Operationalization: To measure to what extent partisan and historical contexts of the communities affect institutions of rural development and vice versa. The questions to ask include: Who are the participants in the institutions? Who is included and who is excluded? Who are the beneficiaries of the projects?

The relationship between the dependent and independent variables will be established through what Lisa Peattie (1995, 393) calls phronesis. This type of knowledge is based on research which is concrete, contextualized, and practical. She suggests that researchers should start by asking small questions, and formulate the questions in how-terms instead of why-terms. Further, researchers should focus on issues of power and values. Good case studies include rich description that can inform the analysis of power in ways useful for concrete intervention by policy makers. Similarly, focusing on daily activities generates policy relevant information. In addition, case materials can be used for the purpose of establishing causality through inductive methods (Peattie 1995, 394). Hence, in this research my case studies will be systematically presented and examined for a consistent pattern of relationships.

1.5 Organization of Chapters

In Chapter 2, I will discuss the background to institutional reforms in Nigeria in the
I will start with the rural development scene before the 1980s and the changes which were introduced since the inception of SAP. I will focus on the background to the setting up of DFRRI, Better Life and NEAZDP. In Chapter 3, the discussion will shift to the theoretical aspect of the research. On the basis of criticisms of the literature on rural development in Nigeria, I will map out a distinctive mode of analysis to explain success and failure in rural development. In Chapter 4, I will introduce the historical and political context of the settings of the research. The two communities followed different historical and political trajectories. The history of Machina which can be traced to medieval times, reveals a long process of developing a more centralized religious and political structure; the resulting hierarchical system has made politics a zero-sum game. The level of political trust is low and public life has come to revolve around the Mainas (aristocrats). In comparison, Dagona has a more egalitarian political structure. This is partly because the history of political and religious centralization is very recent in comparison to Machina. There are political disagreements, but these are not personalized nor does the situation resemble a prisoner's dilemma.

The next chapter, (Chapter 5) continues the discussion of context focusing on socioeconomic and gender relations. I will discuss the patterns of land tenure and ecology in the two communities and describe the rhythms of living of different individuals and groups. The inequality in Machina has also been reflected in the nature of land holding and the various forms of non-farm activities. The dominant groups politically and ethnically are also the richest. However, women who belong to dominant ethnic groups and political persuasion have not benefitted. The major ethnic group in Dagona is not the richest, nor is it the poorest. Dagona is a middle class community, but its women are certainly not the better for it. Indeed,
women in Machina have more opportunity for public action than those in Dagona.

In Chapter 6, I discuss the institutions of rural development and the institutional variables: autonomy, strategy and resources. While NEAZDP has created institutions with more autonomy and resources and followed a bottom-up strategy, in contrast with Better Life and DFRRRI, there is a variation in NEAZDP's performance in the two communities of Dagona and Machina. The variation in the two communities is a result of contextual differences. On the other hand, the relative failure of both DFRRRI and Better Life in relation to NEAZDP is a result of institutional variables.

I move on to discuss in Chapters 7 and 8 the performances of the institutions in relation to development projects and the enhancement of public life in the two communities. According to both kinds of indicators NEAZDP has performed better than DFRRRI and Better Life. But, NEAZDP has succeeded more in Dagona than Machina. Women are still marginal in both development Programs and communities.

I conclude the dissertation in chapter 9 with a summary and a reflection.
Chapter 2 Adjusting Rural Communities: Institutional Reform in Nigeria

2.1 Introduction

This is a background chapter focusing on rural development and institutional reforms in the mid-1980s. I will rapidly review rural development activities since colonial times and then focus on institutional reforms from the 1980s with special attention to the background to DFRRI, Better Life and NEAZDP. I want to make the following points. 1. There was a significant shift in state agricultural policies from a laissez faire to a more state interventionist role from World War II. 2. Politicization of agricultural policies took place at the regional levels in the 1950s and 1960s. 3. An increased federal government spending on agriculture followed in the 1970s and 1980s. 4. A shift in agricultural policies towards less state intervention developed in the 1990s. 5. The creation of DFRRI, BLP and NEAZDP can be understood in the context of the experiences of rural development in Nigeria.

2.2 Pre-Adjustment

The history of rural development prior to the structural adjustment program (SAP) period may broadly be classified into three periods: pre-World War II, from World War II to the beginning of the oil boom, and the oil boom period (Eyoh 1992a, 50; Forrest 1981, 222-258). The justification for this classification is the distinctive role of the state at each

5. By pre-adjustment I mean the period before January 1986 when the Babangida regime announced its first budget, four months after it came to power in August 1985. However, the adoption of structural adjustment program (SAP) was officially announced in mid 1986. This does not mean that there were no changes which are in consonance with the changes made in the SAP period, nor does it mean that none of the policies to be discussed in the adjustment period cannot be traced to the pre-adjustment time. In fact the process of adjustment can be traced back to the early 1980s.
Colonial state policy before the 1940s was said to be laissez-faire (Shenton 1987, Forrest 1981, 222; Williams 1976, 18). There were very few state agricultural policies, and the most important colonial agents in the agricultural sector were trading companies involved in buying agricultural commodities for export to Europe. However, this policy changed immediately after World War II: the laissez-faire policy was changed to an interventionist one. The change in policy was a result of the following factors: the coming to power of the Labour Party in Britain, the regionalization of the country, memories of the great depression and crisis in the colonial enterprise. The Labour Party believed in a stronger role for the state in the economy, and with the establishment of regional governments in the federation, agriculture became a responsibility of both the national and regional governments. The great depression and the experiences of World War II tolled the death knell of laissez faire economies.

The end of World War II marked some changes in agricultural policy in several notable ways. These included commodity Marketing Boards which were set up to sell commodities such as cocoa, groundnut, palm oil and cotton on the international market; the boards continued to exist until the introduction of SAP in the 1980s. The boards artificially fixed minimum official prices for commodities below the international market. They needed the resulting dollar earnings to stabilize the balance of payment of the British Sterling bloc, and ultimately to subsidize the British consumer. For the regional governments, the boards were the primary sources of resources to finance regional development. Studies have shown, for example, that the minimum official price of commodities was far lower than the real farm
gate and border prices (CBN/NISER 1991, 33; Mukhtar 1987, 44). For some export commodities, the difference between the official price and the border price ranged from 30 to 89 percent. Food crops were also under-priced. For example, between 1981 and 1985, the average farm gate prices for beans, maize and millet were N1,046, N616 and N489 per tonne respectively, while the average government minimum prices for the commodities were N408, N257 and N274 per tonne respectively (CBN/NISER 1991, 33). Keeping down the price of food crops was also in the interest of the urban dwellers. All these policies of the commodity boards constituted taxation of rural dwellers and a subsidy for colonial and urban elites.

Other shifts in policies were the establishment of plantations, irrigation schemes and farm settlements. Plantations and farm settlements were set up by the Western and Eastern Regional governments (see Helleiner 1966). They were influenced by socialist ideals and the experience of Israel. In the northern part of the country, the Niger Agricultural Project was one of the most ambitious agricultural innovations in the country. It was modelled after the Gezira scheme in Sudan. However, even before the end of colonial rule, the project was abandoned because of its unviability.

One of the most important things to note during this second phase of rural development is that the regional governments were the most important actors in the rural areas. The federal government played a supplementary role only. The role of the regional government in agriculture in some ways helped to establish healthy economic competition between the various regions because they mainly depended on the export of agricultural commodities as their main source of revenue. On the other hand, regional governments used the commodity boards as political instruments: they were heavily politicized. Appointments to
the boards were meant to favour political allies and cronies. Similarly, those appointed as agents of the commodity boards at the various local levels were mainly political allies of the respective political parties which controlled the various regional governments. At the time of elections, these boards were used as conduits for electioneering purposes. Hence, the distinction between the party in control of the regional governments and political party officials was blurred. Money and other resources meant for the regional governments were also used by the political parties. In other words, institutional autonomy of the boards was compromised, which in turn undermined the accountability of the boards. Part of the explanation for compromising the institutional autonomy of the commodity boards is also their lack of independent funding. Funds for the boards were seen as funds for the regional government.

The third phase (1970-1985) coincided with the end of the Nigerian civil war, the emergence of a strong central government under a military regime and, more importantly, the oil boom. This phase is marked by increased intervention of the federal government, multilateral capital and private foreign and domestic capital investments in the rural areas. Several agricultural programs were introduced by the federal government in this era. These include the National Accelerated Food Production Program (1973), the Integrated Agricultural Production Program (1975), the River Basins and Rural Development Authorities (1975), the Local Government Reform (1976), Operation Feed the Nation (1976) and the Green Revolution (1980). There were also many macro economic policies (trade regimes and exchange rate policies) which impacted rural people.

The context of the emergence of a pervasive federal government in agriculture as well
as in other areas must first be understood. The collapse of the first republic (1960-66) was interpreted by the emerging military elites as signs of strong regional governments which challenged a weak central authority. As a result after the civil war (1967-70), the military government of Gowon divided the regions into smaller units. While on the surface, the creation of more states was fulfilling the yearnings of many Nigerians who were bitter about the dominance of the political system by the trio of the Hausa/Fulani, Igbos and Yorubas, that act also made it difficult for any state to challenge federal authority. To this factor, one has to take into consideration the coming into power of the military institution which is very hierarchical in nature, and therefore results in those in control of the centre giving directives on policies. Beside the creation of more states and the hierarchical nature of the military, the military in Africa has been seen by some as nation builders and modernizers. This ideology of the military as modernizing agents with a national constituency rather than a parochial one is very important in understanding the development of a pervasive role of the federal government in agriculture in the 1970s and early 1980s.

However, it is the oil boom of the 1970s which made it possible for the federal government to take a more interventionist role in agriculture either on its own or in collaboration with international finance capital and state governments. In the 1970s, oil became the major export commodity and source of foreign exchange for the state (see Table 2.1). For instance, oil as a percentage of exports dramatically increased from about 58 percent of exports in the early period of the 1970s to about 93 percent in the late 1970s to 1990s. In 1974 alone, as a result of the Middle-East crisis, oil revenue increased by three and one-half fold (Forrest 1995, 133). Another major increase of one and one-third fold in oil revenues
occurred in 1979 as a result of the Iranian revolution. This increase marks a twenty-four fold increase of oil revenues from the 1970 level. Also, during this period Nigeria “was encouraged to borrow from the Eurodollar market” and therefore international finance capital was eager to give loans to Nigeria (Okolie 1995, 202). These sources of funds made it possible for the federal government to invest in agriculture (Table 2.2).

Table 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Oil/Mining</th>
<th>Manufacture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2
Government Capital Allocation to Agriculture, 1962-1985
(In Millions of Naira)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Federal</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-68</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>116.2</td>
<td>156.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>252.2</td>
<td>331.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-80</td>
<td>1668.8</td>
<td>1421.2</td>
<td>3090.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-85</td>
<td>5400.0</td>
<td>3427.7</td>
<td>8827.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Federal government invested in different agricultural schemes. River Basin Authorities (RBA) were initially started in the northern part of the country on the basis of the claim that the area is prone to drought. Hence major dams were constructed to help with irrigation. The initial big three were those of South Chad, Kano-Jama'are and Bakolori. Funding mainly came from the federal government and European private capital. Local staple foods like sorghum and millet were not allowed to be grown under the schemes. The major crops grown were wheat, rice and vegetables. These commodities were not part of the regular diet of the local people (Wallace 1981, 284). People lost control of their culture of farming and in some cases their land. The environmental and economic consequences of the projects have been disastrous (Shettima forthcoming; Wallace 1981, 284).

The Integrated Agricultural Development Programs (ADPs) were mainly funded by the World Bank7 in conjunction with the state governments. These programs were meant to

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7 The United States Agency for International Development used to be the most important foreign actor in the post colonial period, but, the World Bank emerged as a leading lender in the 1970s and 1980s. Many of the United States investment in agriculture in the 1980s were in poultry production (Alkali 1986).
improve the lives of smallholders through the provision of inputs (pesticides, fertilizers, ox ploughs, improved seed varieties) and construction of rural infrastructure (feeder roads). Some selected large-scale agricultural farmers benefitted from the projects, but they were not the main focus. Agricultural farm service centres were set up to stock inputs in various parts of the country; and extension agents were appointed in communities to provide "expert" knowledge. The ADPs, unlike the irrigation schemes focused on rainfed agriculture such as maize, groundnut and cotton. The growth of maize was meant to provide raw materials for feed mills. The ADPs were first started in Gombe, Gusau and Funtua and later expanded to all states of the federation (Beckman 1983, 4).

In terms of the economic returns of the ADPS, the picture is not very clear. While the World Bank and the Nigerian government have declared the projects successful many studies have raised doubts on the validity of those claims (see Forrest 1995, 189). At the same time many other studies of the ADPs have concentrated on the process of peasant differentiation engendered by the projects. It has been argued that the ADPS have set in motion a gradual process of depriving lower-class peasants of their lands. This has been as a result of the targeting of upper-class farmers or progressive farmers by project officials and by the invasion of rural areas by rich and powerful bureaucrats, project officials and traditional rulers who have the connection and the resources to engage in large-scale agriculture (Beckman 1983, 4).

In relation to funding and institutional structure, as I indicated above, most of the funds for the projects came from the World Bank and the institutional arrangement is organized in such a way that for the first five years of the projects, they are controlled by
officials from the Bank. In subsequent years, the Bank staff are gradually replaced by local staff. Their modus operandi is very different from that of the ministries of agriculture: more autonomous, less politicised and better funded. They tend therefore to hire the best qualified local staff and to provide them with more favourable conditions of service. However, the form of institutional structure has exposed them to criticisms. For instance, the Kaduna state government controlled by the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) (1979-1983) was very critical of the Bank staff who were paid, according to the party, outrageous salaries and allowances. There was a big row between the state government on the one hand, and the federal government and the World Bank on the other (see Balarabe 1982).

Another problem which the Kaduna state government raised was that of political accountability. The government was concerned that the Bank was more accountable to the federal government than to the state government. This meant politically that the Bank was relating more with its arch rival, the National Party of Nigeria. In addition, the government accused the Program of recruiting its local staff mainly from very well known NPN circles (see Balarabe 1982).

The Local Government Reform of 1976 is an important departure both in terms of rural development and rural democratization. Local governments were given the mandate to provide a wide range of social amenities and infrastructure within their jurisdiction. The activities of the local governments which are specified in the reform document and in the 1979 constitution include water, electricity, motor parks, primary education, roads and health facilities. Some of these activities were previously performed by the state governments and since the local governments hitherto had no power specified in the constitution (Olowu 1986).
In terms of rural democratization, there are very important changes as well. A national local government reform has the impact of establishing similar institutions in all parts of the country. Traditional rulers who hitherto had executive powers in some parts of the country have been stripped of those responsibilities and relegated to the role of advisers. Similarly, the principle of election of government officials and universal suffrage was adopted uniformly, but with some modifications in practice in some parts of the country. The autonomy of local governments is more pronounced during this era than hitherto and the sources of their funding is much better than before. However, although on both these two counts the new local governments are better, the institutional arrangement is not sufficient.

Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) and the Green Revolution were attempts by the Obasanjo (1976-1979) and the Shagari (1979-1983) regimes respectively to give more institutional support to agriculture and the rural areas. OFN was headed by a National Council with the Chief of Army Staff as chair, and at each state level there was a similar council chaired by the state governor. The OFN was involved in mobilization of various segments of the population including students, members of the armed forces, civil servants and the rural dwellers to participate in agriculture. Inputs supply and direct execution of agricultural projects were part of its mandate. After the handing over of power to an elected civilian regime in 1979, the Green Revolution was launched in 1980 by the Shagari regime. The institutional structure was made up of a National Council on Green Revolution, chaired by the

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8 General Obasanjo retired and became a big farmer in Ota. The former Chief of Army Staff, Shehu Musa Yar' Adua is now a powerful politician and he has major investments in agriculture, including Sambo Farms and Madara Company. The arrest of these two people in March 1995 and their subsequent imprisonment on the allegations of participation in a coup attempt was mainly because of their political activities.
President, and composed of all ministers whose ministries were related to agriculture. The national council was assisted by a Green Revolution Committee composed of technocrats. The states were advised to form similar structures at their levels. The emphasis under the Green Revolution was on coordination of activities rather than supply of inputs or direct execution of projects (Federal Government of Nigeria nd, 6).

The politicization of the green revolution was very well pronounced during the civilian regime. The revolution became a revolution of the party in control of the federal government, the NPN. Supply of agricultural inputs was a major conduit to reward political allies and punish those in other political parties. Similarly, the instruments of the green revolution were used to recruit and reward political cronies and punish opponents at the local level.

Apart from these institutions, I should mention, even if in passing, that several credit schemes and policies were introduced by the government to give loans to farmers. These include the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Bank, the requirements of mandatory minimum (15 percent of total lending in 1985) lending to agriculture by banks, and the establishment of rural branches by commercial banks.

In addition, there were many macro-economic policies which had an impact on rural areas. Among the most important were exchange rate and trade policies (CBN/NISER 1991, 57; Mukhtar 1987, 46; Oyejide 1986, 19-32). The over-valuation of the currency coupled with the oil boom succeeded in financing imports of food, and raw materials for industries, but depressed domestic food production and local sourcing of raw materials. These policies discouraged the production of export commodities. The bias was quite obvious: while infant industries were protected by high tariffs, domestic agriculture was depressed by an over-
valued exchange rate that favoured food imports and penalized agricultural exports. It was estimated that over-valuation was 100 percent between 1970-75, 200 percent between 1976-1979 and about 700 to 900 percent between 1980-1985 (CBN/NISER 1991, 57). One consequence was to enlarge the number, wealth and power of importers and their trading contacts. According to Mansur Mukhtar (1987, 46), over-valuation of the currency had a more negative impact on agriculture than did under-pricing by commodity boards.

The impact of all the efforts of the governments, multilateral institutions and private capital both foreign and domestic, is a matter of debate. Some observers take the statistics on agricultural production to show stagnation in agriculture. Other views are more nuanced and factor in increases in population, smuggling across borders, increase in consumption in the urban areas and lack of accurate data (see Watts 1987, Watts and Lubeck 1983, Williams 1976). But even the more favourable interpretations make quite clear that agriculture’s contribution to GDP and foreign exchange are not encouraging. For instance, agriculture’s contribution to the GDP was about 66.7 percent in the 1960s but declined to about 22 percent in 1985 (see Table 2.1). Perhaps more telling, food imports increased from N224 million during 1966-70 to about N7.6 billion between 1981-1985 (CBN/NISER 1991, 29). While the increase in food imports could be attributed to changing tastes, increase in population and increase in oil receipts, it is also a possible indicator of absolute decline in agricultural production (Table 2.3). Although labour shortage and costs rose (see Lennihan 1987), the rise was not commensurate with agricultural decline. The proportion of workers in agriculture declined from about 71 percent in 1960 to 52 percent in 1985. Hence, one can not attribute the decline in agriculture mainly to labour costs and shortages.
Table 2.3
Index of Agricultural Production By Type of Activity, 1970-1985.
(1975=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staples</td>
<td>140.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>109.4</td>
<td>119.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>117.1</td>
<td>106.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>102.8</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>114.5</td>
<td>110.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The limited positive impact of the state in the rural areas is also manifested in the quality of life of rural dwellers. Infrastructure investment in the rural areas was very minimal (see Table 2.4).
Table 2.4
Infrastructural Investment in Nigeria, 1962-1980
(Percentage)\(^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-68 (1st Plan)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>89.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-74 (2nd Plan)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-80 (3rd Plan)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A study by Francis Idachaba (1985) has further demonstrated the urban-rural gap, and that the states which coincide with more rural areas in Nigeria were worse off, despite the oil boom of the 1980s. For example, rural feeder roads were major responsibilities of local governments until the mid 1980s, but that level of government is the least endowed to undertake road construction. Thus, most of the roads constructed are federal and state highways. Lagos State which is essentially a one-city state had the highest concentration of federal roads when road length is related to area size, while Rivers had the least, followed by Bauchi and former Sokoto states (Idachaba 1985, 12). The density of all-weather rural feeder roads in the 1980s in Nigeria was only 19 meters per sq. kilometre. Seventy-seven percent of the roads were difficult to use during the rainy season. The average walking distance from home to maternities ranged from 4.96 kilometres in Lagos State to 47.93 kilometres in former Sokoto State (Idachaba 1985, 20). Former Kano Municipal Local Government Area, an urbanized zone, had more than a third of the hospitals of all the former 20 local governments

\(^9\) According to the author, Mansur Mukhtar (1987, 48) the total of the percentages do not make up to 100 because there are some undefinable categories that make up the residual.
in the state. Water supply had a particular bias, some rural local governments like Dass in Bauchi State did not have even a single public well. With respect to electricity, the best served state was former Oyo State, but, whereas most of the urban settlements had electricity, only 12 villages had electricity in its former 17 local government areas. In the former Kaduna State while most of its urban settlements had electricity, only five villages were served with electricity in its former 14 local government areas (Idachaba 1985, 23-24).

In the former Borno State (which included what is now Yobe State) population per doctor was in some local governments 50 times higher than that of the former Maiduguri Municipal Council, the major urban centre in the state. Similarly, in the former Kukawa Local Government, the number of child-bearing-age women per midwife was 1,065 times the number in the former Maiduguri Municipal Council (Idachaba 1985, 21-22). Spatial density of hospitals ranged from 45 sq. kilometre per hospital in urban Lagos State to 9,716 sq. kilometre per hospital in former rural Borno State. Further, according to the United Nations Development Program, the Human Development Index (HDI) in Borno State, a rural state, was .156, lower than any country in the world as against the HDI of Bendel State, an urban state, which was 0.666. The average life expectancy in Borno was 40 years, 18 years lower than that of Bendel (UNDP 1994, 99). Hence, it is very obvious that the oil boom in Nigeria did not have a positive impact on the majority of rural dwellers. This was the situation when the Babangida regime came to power in August 1985.

2.3 Adjustment

Before I proceed to discuss the three institutions in the case study, it is important to
note some of the macro-economic and institutional changes relevant to rural areas which were introduced by the Babangida regime (1985 to 1993) (see also Faruqee 1994, Ihonvbere 1994, Forrest 1993, Olukoshi 1993, Olaniyan and Nwoke 1989, Husain 1987, Okongwu 1986). The structural adjustment program (SAP) is usually presented within a populist pro-rural rhetoric. The usual argument is that prior to the adoption of SAP policies, development projects and programs are intended to protect the interests of the urban elites through policies such as import-substitution industrialization, tariff structure, commodity and marketing boards and subsidies. State bureaucrats are maligned as rent seekers: the state is identified with urban elites. Fiscal, trade and pricing policies are critiqued for penalizing rural farmers. The alternative is, therefore, to roll back the role of the state through policies of liberalization, privatization and commercialization. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, “the principal strategy was to let free market forces rather than administrative fiat determine relative prices of consumer goods as well as factors of production” (CBN/NISER 1991, 1).

In terms of general policies which are meant to be pro-rural, these include devaluation of the national currency which removes the subsidies given to importers and therefore is meant to give farmers a better price for their commodities; establishing of People’s and Community Banks which enables rural people to have access to credit and saving services; and decentralizing of political authority through the creation of more local and state governments which are meant to bring people closer to the government (or is it government closer to the people?). Other policies are abolishing of state ministries of local government and giving local governments direct federal grants which are meant to give more autonomy to local authorities; and forming local party offices and electing party officials from the ward
level\textsuperscript{10} which are meant to limit patron-client politics at the local level. Further, the
government set up DFRRI and Better Life which were meant to improve the quality of life of
rural dwellers through the provision of various services.

In specifically agricultural terms, the military regime of Babangida dismantled
commodity and marketing boards, privatized several agricultural projects, rationalized
activities of the River Basin Authorities, and banned the importation of some agricultural
commodities including wheat and rice\textsuperscript{11}. Other important changes included launching a
national wheat production program, abolishing price controls and reduction of subsidy on
fertilizer and other agricultural inputs.

2.3.1 Directorate of Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI)

In October 1985, the military government of Babangida declared a National Economic
Emergency. A decree was promulgated to effectuate the emergency. Under the emergency
decree, the government was empowered to take all necessary measures to respond to the
economic situation in the country. Most of the steps taken were essentially stabilization

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Several criticisms could be made against the Babangida regime, but, it is difficult
to sustain any criticism of policy inertia. Furthermore, although the assessments on adjustment
have focused essentially on the "economic" aspects, it is very important to appreciate that it
has several facets. This dissertation will not touch on some of the important institutional
changes like decentralization of political parties and administrative structures.

  \item \textsuperscript{11} The ban on importation of wheat was perceived by Kevin Kimmage (1991) and
Palmer Jones (1987) as a very important critique of Gunilla Andrae and Bjorn Beckman's
(1985) thesis that the American wheat lobby is one of the most important actors in the
Nigerian economy and therefore by implication would resist any attempt by the Nigerian state
to stop wheat importation. But Gunilla Andrae and Bjorn Beckman have the last laugh: the
Babangida regime was pressurised to lift the ban on wheat imports in 1993. For a critique of
the ban on wheat importation see Rashid Faruqee and Ishrat Husain (1994).
\end{itemize}
measures which did not involve fundamental structural changes. Three months later, in the 1986 budget, important changes were introduced. Two of the most important were reduction of fuel subsidy by 80 percent and the setting up of the Directorate of Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure. It was estimated that the government would gain the sum of N900 million from the removal of the subsidy and half of that amount would be given to DFRRRI.

The mandate given to DFRRRI was stated in the 1986 budget in unequivocal terms: to change the previous strategy of rural development which was preoccupied with food and fibre, and shift the emphasis to the alleviation of rural poverty and enhancement of the quality of rural life (Koinyan 1991a, 10-11). The immediate task given to the program was to construct 30,000 kilometres of rural feeder roads. In order to give the program the necessary political clout. A member of the Armed Forces Ruling Council, Air Vice Marshall (now rtd) Larry D. Koinyan was appointed as the Chairperson of DFRRRI. He was also the Chairperson of the National Directorate. Furthermore, DFRRRI was placed directly under the Office of the President at the national level and therefore answerable to the President only, not to a minister or a ministry. At the state level, a State Directorate was chaired by the state governor and each local government council was constituted as a Rural Development Committee chaired by the local government chair. Similar structures were provided for at the district and village levels.

Between 1986 and 1992, DFRRRI received N1.95 billion from the federal government. That amount is made up of N1.85 billion in actual allocation and N100 million derived from interests. The annual allocation to DFRRRI declined from 7.29 percent of the federal government capital budget in 1986 to 1.57 percent in 1992. What was allocated to DFRRRI by
the federal government was spent in the 30 states of the federation (Koinyan 1992, 84-91).

The establishment of DFRRI was both a continuation of, and a change from, the way rural development had been organized in Nigeria. At the conceptual level, there was a clear link between the endemic economic crisis in the country and the need to change direction in favour of rural areas. The government reasoned that the adverse overdependence on oil was a direct consequence of the neglect of the rural areas. Furthermore, it saw rural development as an integrated process with social and political components as well economic ones. For example, whereas OFN and the Green Revolution were agricultural programs, DFRRI included other aspects of rural life such as housing and rural industry. It also set out to make a quick impact. For instance, of all the previous major institutions in the rural communities, only the Agricultural Development Projects constructed rural feeder roads, even then about 9,000 kilometres in 10 years (Gaviria, Bindish and Lele 1989, 15), the immediate target of DFRRI was 30,000 kilometres in two years.

The other aspect of continuity and change was at the level of institutional structure. Since 1970 there had been an increased role of the state in the rural areas, but from 1976 the direct political connection between a specific government and agricultural policies became more pronounced. The OFN (1976-1979) was chaired by the Chief of Army Staff while the Green Revolution (1979-83) was chaired by the President. DFRRI also had high-level national leadership, but it is remarkable for its institutionalization down to the village level. At all levels, from national to local, the highest political authorities were chairpersons of the Program. This has very important implications on institutional autonomy and ability to reach marginal groups.
Indeed, 1976 (when OFN was launched), was the first time that a Division of Rural Development was created in the then Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. In 1979, it was upgraded to Department of Rural Development. In 1990, the department was merged with DFRRI in order to create unity of purpose.

2.3.2 Better Life for Rural Women Program (BLP)

The Better Life Program is one of the most remarkable institutional changes introduced in 1987. The Program was initially under the Presidency with a National Organizing Committee chaired by the President’s spouse, Maryam Babangida. Members of the Committee included, among others, the wives of Service Chiefs and of the Minister for Defence. Similar structures were provided for at the levels of state and local governments, district, and village administrations. At all these levels, the spouses of the highest political authority were supposed to chair an organizing committee. In 1989, a National Commission on Women was set up. The Commission, which still exists, has a board with a chairperson while the routine activities of the Commission are run by a Director General. A Department of Better Life was created in the Commission to give the organization a formal recognition. Similar bodies have been set up at the state level.

Prior to Better Life, the attention of the state to women’s issues was very minimal. At the federal level, it was only in 1973 that the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development set up a Home Economics Division, which was supposed to be the centre for
women activities. In 1976, a Unit for Women and Development in the Ministry of Information, Youth, Sports and Welfare was created. According to Bolanle Awe (1989), the Unit had low priority and was starved of funds and personnel. A decade later the Unit was upgraded to a Division. In addition, the government formed Women and Development Committees.

Between 1987 and 1989, the BLP was mainly attached to DFRRRI. Some funding for the organization was from DFRRRI. For example, BLP received N14 million from DFRRRI as part of its rural productive projects. BLP also received funding and logistical support from governmental and international governments and non-governmental organizations including the Peoples Bank of Nigeria, the National Directorate of Employment, agricultural programs, the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture, the Nigerian Petroleum Corporation, the Nigerian Television Authority, the World Bank, UNICEF, the Ford Foundation, and the Canadian Universities Services Overseas (The Presidency 1990). It is difficult to estimate the amount of money or quantify the logistic support BLP received from these organizations.

Before Better Life, the conceptualization of development in Nigeria, by and large, ignored women. “Development” had not only bypassed women, but also undermined their activities despite the fact that they constitute about 65 percent of the rural population, and notwithstanding that 62 percent of agricultural production in Nigeria is done by women (Olayiwole 1991, WIN 1985a, WIN 1985b)12. Furthermore, the advancement of women has been hindered by a low level of education, lack of access to capital, traditional and “cultural” norms and practices, land tenure systems and lack of extension services (Osakwue et al 1992,

12 The figure quoted should be treated with caution.
Olayiwole 1991, Okorji 1988). In contrast, the conception of development and women under the auspices of the Better Life encompasses a wide spectrum of activities ranging from political to social. The objective of Better Life is to alleviate rural women's poverty. In recognition of BLP's activities, its Chairperson, Maryam Babangida was the co-winner of the 1991 Africa Leadership Prize on Sustainable End to Hunger. In addition, various activities such as self-help groups have been inspired by the organization at the national and international levels.

2.3.3 North East Arid Zone Development Program (NEAZDP)

The European Union (EU) has come to play a significant role in the rural areas of its partners under the Lomé Accord, an agreement between the European Union and its members' former colonies in developing countries of Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific. The EU since its inception has provided funds for rural development projects. However, its interest in rural development became more pronounced after the Lomé Convention II. During the period covered by the convention, out of a total investment of ECU 4.6 billion, 44 percent went to the agricultural sector. Under Lomé III, 60-90 percent of all projects were in the rural sector (CEU 1990, 1979). NEAZDP is financed under the Lomé III and IV at the cost of ECU 40 million. The Government of Nigeria in 1988 signed for a loan of ECU 29 million and a Grant of ECU 6 million. Local costs to the value of ECU 5 million are met by the Government of Nigeria. In reality it is Yobe State that is responsible for the local costs. The Program is implemented with technical and management support from Danish consultants, Danagro
Adviser and Ramboll & Hannemann A/S. A Nigerian consultancy firm, Diyam is the local counterpart. The first phase of the Program ran from February 1990 to February 1995. It was anticipated that the Program would be extended to include northeast Borno State.

The institutional structure of the Program gives it more autonomy from state control and funding. General program control is the responsibility of an Executive Committee made up of the State Governor, a representative of the National Authorizing Officer, the EU Delegate, the Program Manager and the Deputy Program Manager. The daily running of the Program is vested in the Program Management Unit (PMU) which has virtually total control of the Program. It has such a wide latitude that the Delegate of the EU has very little supervisory role in the Program. Another innovative institutional structure of NEAZDP is the institutional structure at the local level. In each village there is supposed to be a Village Development Association, Women's Committee, a Village Development Promoter and project committees to manage different projects. Eighteen villages make up a Development Area (DA) and a Development Area Promoter (DAP) appointed. Several Field Technicians work at the local level as well.

NEAZDP is also a departure from most previous rural development projects in its conception of development. Although it funds large scale projects, the emphasis is on village micro projects. The objectives of the projects include poverty alleviation, community self reliance, sustainability, and participation. The intended beneficiaries of its projects are the marginalized. This is an important shift from the focus on progressive and absentee farmers in previous rural development programs funded by many foreign agencies.
2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I sketched out the broad contours of rural development in Nigeria since the colonial time. There are four broad periods in which major changes were implemented in the area of rural development. These are the pre-World War II, from the World War II to the beginning of the oil boom, the oil boom period and the adjustment period. I pointed out some of the changes and continuities in rural development policies.

Prior to World War II, there was a minimal intervention of the colonial state in agricultural activities. This period was marked by a laissez faire policy. However, in the late 1940s, state intervention in agricultural and rural areas became pronounced; this trend accelerated with the adoption of a federal constitution in the process leading to independence. Agriculture and rural development were allocated mainly to the jurisdiction of regional governments. Regional governments politicized agricultural services and activities. Politicians and their cronies became the main beneficiaries as projects were conduits for rewarding allies and friends.

In the 1970s, the role of regional and local levels of government declined significantly. Proportionately, the role of the federal government increased. This change in the roles of the various levels of governments in agriculture became possible as a result of the coming of military governments, a centralized and hierarchical institution, the creation of more lower levels of governments which weakened them vis-a-vis the central government and more importantly the petro dollars which the federal government controlled. Large-scale agricultural projects became the focal point of state investment in conjunction with international private capital. These projects were disasters both in economic and ecological terms.
One of the responses to these disastrous consequences was the ADPs which were targeted to progressive farmers involved in rainfed agriculture. These were mainly funded by the World Bank. These projects enjoyed better autonomy from state control and funding and therefore less politicized than the federal large scale projects.

In the 1980s, as a result of the collapse of the oil economy, the role of the state in rural areas began to shrink. The reduction in the role of the state in direct agricultural production became more noticeable with the introduction of structural adjustment policies in the mid-1980s. With the removal of the subsidy on such things as oil, the state funded new rural development programs including DFRRRI and Better Life. These programs concentrated on creating the enabling environment for agricultural and rural development through the provision of infrastructure and other productive projects. Yet, the politicking in regard to projects continued with direct state control of the projects and funding.

There are other policies which have been introduced in the period of structural adjustment and are meant to be positive as far as rural areas are concerned. These include the abolishing of commodity and marketing boards, and the devaluation of the national currency.

On the other hand, programs such as NEAZDP have a greater institutional autonomy from state control and funding than BLP and DFRRRI. The program is not involved in direct production, but stimulates rural development through various lending projects.

In the next chapter, I will discuss some of the factors or variables which determine the effectiveness of rural development institutions. These factors are institutional and contextual.
Chapter 3 Determinants of Institutional Effectiveness

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I intend to discuss some of the variables which are relevant to understanding the effectiveness of rural development in Nigeria. I combine ideas from two sets of literature: institutional and contextual analyses. In institutional analysis I dwell on institutional strategy, autonomy and resources. In contextual analysis I focus on socio-economic inequality, historico-political pluralism and identity politics.

3.2 Institutional-Contextual Perspective

The argument which I intend to pursue is derived from two broad literatures: institutional and contextual analyses. The first set of literature is that of the "new institutionalists". There are different scholars with different approaches to institutions (see Ostrom 1994, Ostrom et al 1994, Ostrom et al 1993, 1994, Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Wunsch and Olowu 1990, Keohane 1988, Keohane and Axelrod 1985, Skocpol 1985 et al). My interest is linked to a concern for policy and the view that institutions do make a difference because there is a space, however limited, for making a policy choice by decision makers. Hence, I consider my interest in institutions as part of the resurgence of state/institution centred models.

The first issue is that of institutional strategy. An institution (organizational structure) could be organized or structured to give local people a voice and control, or it could be structured to enhance the power of those in control of the state. In the former case there is
scope for local decision-making, self governance and autonomy and initiative while in the latter case, it is the opposite: manipulation, the creation of structures of dependency, and transmission belts for political control are its hallmark.

Another variable is that of institutional autonomy. Organization designers are concerned about the ability of institutions to maintain a balance between autonomy and public control. I am interested in institutional autonomy as a strategy to "depoliticize" projects, give the institution a focus and allow for a flexible administrative structure.

A third variable I am interested in is that of resources. I classify resources into human and material. By human resources I mean skills and social endowment, while material resources refers to finance. The two are very much interrelated. For instance, without adequate financial resources, an institution will not be able to recruit skilled workers nor give them enough incentives to retain them or have the capacity to implement good projects.

Currently, neo-classisists seem to be the most prominent scholars of rational choice. But, this need not be so. There is a separate genre of rational choice which is derived from Marxism. My interest in rational choice is its focus on individual behaviour and how it is affected by different incentive structures. The issue of incentives is very much related also to institutions. Institutions could make a difference depending on the types of incentives given to their workers and participants. On the one hand, institutions could rely on the traditional mode of mobilization, speeches and appeals, i.e., ideology. Similarly, institutions could decide to give material incentives to their workers. What is equally important is that there are non-pecuniary incentives such as prestige, training, and status which could be fostered by an institutional arrangement.
Hence, I want to pursue an argument that the way an institution is designed makes a difference. Whether the institutional strategy is bottom-up (local autonomy, decision making, initiative and self governance) or not (manipulative, dependency, political control); whether an institution has some autonomy or is very much tied to the state and its elites; and whether it has adequate resources to recruit skilled workers and retain them and implement projects or not are important. The conclusion I intend to draw is that because institution matters, it deserves to be treated as an independent variable.

The second set of literature is contextual analysis. I will argue that although institutions could make a difference, the soil in which they are planted also makes a difference. However well intentioned institutions are structured, they are shaped by the nature of the society. Hence, institutions are not only independent variables but also dependent variables. There are three issues which have influence on this writing in contextual analysis. First is socio-economic relations. In a community which is more egalitarian, the chances of a development institution making a difference are higher than they would be in a community in which there is a higher level of inequality. Second, is the historico-political pluralism. Societies are structured by their history. There is a pattern of doing things in societies which is difficult to break away from, and therefore, the ability of an institution to make a difference is also contingent on whether new institutions are accepted or not by those in control of political authority. Third, is the nature of gender relations. The egalitarian nature of a community is also indicated by the nature of gender relations in that community. Although gender is a variable I will focus on, I use the concept of identity to refer to different social markers of which gender is one in a community.
contextual variables doesn't mean that they will be treated as separate issues.

3.3 Variables in Institutional Perspective

The variables in institutional analysis I intend to discuss are strategy, autonomy and resources.

3.3.1 Defining Institution

In spite of, or because of, the resurgence of institutional analysis there is more disagreement than agreement on what it is (see Ostrom 1994, Ostrom et al 1994, Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Bates 1988, Peil 1988, Ostrom 1986). The disparate meanings and interpretations of institutions are reflections of disciplinary biases. Despite different interpretations, there is an agreement among students of institutions about the "original sin": the behavioralist revolution and its methodological individualism. In response to this reductionism has come the rebirth of the study of institutions as independent variables: in economics, international relations, sociology, public administration, and political science (see DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Young 1989, Keohane 1988, Kohli (1987), Katzenstein 1985, Krasner 1983, Ruggie 1983, Skocpol et al (1985), Katzenstein (1985) Axelrod and Keohane (1985)).

Elinor Ostrom et al (1994), in their study of the commons and Paul Powell and Walter DiMaggio (1991) in their organizational analysis, define institutions as rules of behaviour. While economists define institutions in terms of rules, political scientists and public administration specialists tend to use the concept to refer to structures. I use the concept of
institutions in the broad sense to include parastatals, line agencies, the state, ministries and schools. Institutions are structures or rules sanctioned to perform a certain pattern of functions. In this respect I also agree with several scholars in the study of institution building and organization such as Derickerhoff and Goldsmith (1990), Allen Dlicka (1987), Arthur Goldsmith (1990), Gerald Hage and Kurt Finsterbusch (1987), and Arturo Israel (1987). Some of the Nigerian literature on agriculture and rural development resonates with an institutional perspective whether or not its authors acknowledge it. Bjorn Beckman (1987), Paul Clough and Gavin Williams (1987), Dickson Eyoh (1992a, 1992b), Dele Olowu (1987, 1989, et al 1991, 1993) and Michael Watts and Bob Shenton (1984) throw light on the role of institutions. However, with the exception of Dele Olowu, the discussions are mainly structural and deal with the broad process of accumulation. While this set of literature is very important for understanding the broader process of rural development, they do not address directly the kind of issues that triggered this research.

3.3.2 Institutional Strategy

It is useful to remind the reader of the performance criteria of rural development institutions that inform this research. The three institutions in this case study commit themselves to "empower" rural communities and alleviate rural poverty through the establishment of a bottom-up strategy. As I will discuss later, while these are the broad terms used, there are differences in emphasis and meaning of the concepts. For instance, the BLP emphasis is on women, while the other two institutions are opened to both women and men. The projects implemented by the programs would not only be geared toward material and
social concerns, but also, were intended to enrich public life. In this process, the marginalized and excluded in the communities would be empowered. This rethinking of rural development has also been articulated in the works of Peggy Antrobus (1987), Robert Chambers (1983), John Clark (1991), Michael Edwards and David Hulme (1992), John Freidman (1992), Dharam Ghai (1983), Guy Gran (1983), David Korten (1990), and Patricia Maguire (1984).

Since the 1970s, a rethinking of rural development has come to favour a more equitable, participatory and locally-based and owned strategy of development. One of the means of achieving this alternative is the redesigning of the organizational structure of institutions of rural development to foster a bottom-up strategy.

There are often two types of organizational structure identified by scholars of organization: centralized and decentralized\(^\text{13}\). Although it is possible to achieve in some cases a very good result in rural development with centralized structures especially in large and highly sophisticated projects, in most cases it has been critiqued for being very elitist. Scholars of alternative development who are concerned about empowerment and giving voice to the voiceless criticise centralized structures for being inadequate. Dharam Ghai (1988) and James Midgley (1986) warn that when the concept of participatory strategy is used in the context of a centralized structures it becomes instrumentalist: it may be used as a justification for the utilization of free local labour on government projects or as a corporatist strategy. This is an anti-participatory and a manipulative approach.

Because of the perceived and real inadequacies of centralized structures, a more decentralized system of governance of development projects has been advocated by donors,

\(^{13}\) For a discussion of polycentrism see Ostrom Olinor (et al 1993).
non-governmental institutions, and different national governments and agencies (see Oakley et al 1991): organizational change has become one of the instruments of redefining development strategy (see Hage and Finsterbusch 1987). One of the major assumptions of organization design theorists is that how an organization is structured determines performance and output. Centralized structures have been critiqued for being macro-level, large scale and trickle-down (see also Cheema and Rondinelli 1983) forms of development strategy. In this structural form, even where local institutions are established, they are merely used for the purposes of consultation. On the other hand, it has been argued that a more participatory development strategy is only compatible with giving local people autonomy and control over their lives. The practical and theoretical benefits of such a strategy might include: adequate information about local conditions, needs and attitudes; commitment of the people to a program; a basic right to people, a school of democracy, citizenship construction; efficient and effective projects; utilization of local knowledge, humanization of development, sustainability, self reliance and empowerment (see Friedmann 1992, Taylor and Mackenzie 1992, Korten 1990, Oakley et al 1991, Ghai 1988, Stohr and Taylor 1985, Chambers 1983).

The concept of decentralized governance is not free of controversy. It could be in reality deconcentration: appointing field workers with minimal decision making responsibilities. On the other hand, it could be real autonomous local governance. A decentralized governance will meet the ideal of participatory institution if and when local institutions at the grassroots level assume more responsibilities in the development process and institutionalize participation by those affected by the development process (see Uphoff 1992, Esman and Uphoff 1984, and Hirschman 1984).
Despite the widely shared acceptance of participation, the concept and how it is to be institutionalized are problematic. The Cornell University project on participation has identified some key elements in participatory strategy: people’s involvement in decision making, implementation, sharing of benefits, and evaluation. Furthermore, in order to institutionalize participation, there have to be local spaces and structures which the grassroots control.

While the benefits of a bottom-up development strategy are widely recognized, in practice, it has remained an empty ideal (see Farrington 1993). Very few programs can claim to approximate the pure ideals of a bottom-up development strategy (see Oakley 1991, Ghai 1988, Midgley 1986). Feminists scholars have raised specific concerns in relation to women. For instance, Linda Mayoux (1995, 235) has argued that “gender inequalities in resources, time availability and power” determine women’s participation. It has also been noted that participatory development strategy may not benefit the intended beneficiaries and/or that people may not be convinced of their participatory role (Midgley 1986). Participatory strategy - who does, who does not, and why-is an important theme for institutional analysis. There are two sets of literature that further address this issue, rational choice and contextual analyses. However, before I get to these issues it is important to discuss institutional autonomy.

3.3.3 Autonomy

Delegation has been used by several governments as a means of giving autonomy (Rondinelli and Cheema 1983). Autonomous institutions are likely to make a noticeable impact which can create demonstration effect. They usually have a more concise and well defined objective and strategy which can be measured and evaluated. These projects usually
also enjoy short command structure, and greater financial resources which enables them to recruit competent technical and managerial staff, provide their staff with adequate incentives and give them greater job satisfaction. In addition, the administrative structure is more flexible (Lele 1975, 128-129).

Studies in Africa in the area of rural development (see Barkan with Okumu 1979, Finucane 1974, Ingle 1972) and women in development (see Geisler (1987), Geiger (1982) and Wipper (1975) have expressed concerns about the autonomy of the institutions being created. The influence of partisan and social pressures in particular has been criticized (Lele 1975, 135-8). For instance, several scholars of agriculture and rural development in Nigeria have noted the over-politicization of agricultural projects either through the appointment of personnel, location of projects, awards of contracts and the use of those institutions for political purposes such as funding of party politics (Schatz 1977, 151-166, 177-183, 243-250). Most of the literature recognises the importance of public control of these institutions, but where to draw the line between public control and autonomy is a matter of debate.

In the feminist literature, the issue of autonomy is viewed from a radically different perspective. Some feminists have recognized the role of the state in empowering women, for example through the welfare state. However, others such as Zehra Arat (1994) reject the concept of state feminism as a contradiction in terms. Most feminists agree that there is an inherent limitation to what the state or the institutions it is funding can do because of the nature of the state or the institutions: their patriarchal tendency or nature. Studies by Susan Geiger (1982), Gisela Geisler (1987) and Audrey Wipper (1975) have shown that women's institutions have been used by the state to project its interests rather than to enhance the
capacity of women. These institutions have depended mostly on state support, and as a result they have been manipulated by those in power. Further, feminist literature on organizations has criticised the bureaucratic-neutral model. According to some feminist scholars, institutions and organizations are bearers of social markers (see Goetz 1992, Acker 1990, Ferguson 1984). By their nature, structures, mandates, roles, cultures and staffing, institutions are not neutral delivers of services. According to these perspectives, therefore autonomy may simply mean giving men more unless the nature of the institutions is changed as well.

3.3.4 Resources

Robert Putnam (1993) reminds his readers of the ubiquitous saying of the old wine in a new bottle in Italian politics and of Deschanel who said of the French Fourth Republic, republic on top of the empire (Putnam 1993, 17): cosmetic changes. He went on to argue that if institutional reformers were correct in their analysis of the importance of institutional design\(^4\), the world would have been happier. But the sad reality is that various institutional reforms have failed: "designers of new institutions are often writing on water" (Putnam 1993, 17). This reality is very familiar to Nigerians. They are so cynical about all constitutional and social engineering that they developed the concept of the "Nigerian factor": nothing that is newly introduced works. The issue for reformers is to answer the question, under what conditions might institutions work?

Institutional resources are very important determinants of success and failure. I

\(^4\) Many scholars of institutions have also recognized the difference between formal organizational structure and the reality. Two scholars often cited in institutional analysis are John Meyer and Brian Rowan (1991).
categorize resources into skilled workers and financial resources. Skilled workers are very necessary for an effective delivery of services. But the real issue is how to attract such skilled workers. One of the important contributions of the behavioralist revolution is to pay particular attention to individual behaviour. The effort to explain every phenomenon from the perspective of an individual has been criticised, but the behavioralist contribution to social theory has also been recognised (see Peil 1988).

Organizational behaviour scholars have always paid attention to motivation, even though it is rational choice theorists who have given it a focused attention. Among other things, rational choice theorists have argued that understanding the constraints and stimulants of a setting will explain very much the behaviour of individuals.

The work of Ostrom et al (1993) is pioneering in the field now called institutional rational choice. They set out to explain under what institutional arrangements projects can succeed and how. Their case study is rural infrastructure. Institutional rational choice assumes that actors are self interested, but they calculate their self-interest taking account of a wide set of costs and benefits measured by several different kinds of values. In a simple case, persons who work for an institution must perceive that the benefit of doing so exceeds the cost. In a more complex situation, "the incentives that public officials face must be understood in the contexts of the generally low salaries they receive, their limited career advancement opportunities, their poor working conditions, and the opportunities (both legal and illegal) available to them in different types of work assignments" (Ostrom et al 1993, 147). Incentives are not only pecuniary; they include opportunities for distinction, prestige and personal power (Simon, Smithburg and Thompson cited in Ostrom et al 1993, 8). A study by Uma Lele
(1975) has shown that some of the factors responsible for managerial failure is lack of competent staff. Initially projects may be able to attract competent staff, but when the condition of work changes, and as other sectors of the economy offer better conditions of service many staff move to other places (Lele 1975, 131-132). There is also a downside to incentives given by organizations. In a situation in which some organizations, for example, those with external funding give more incentives than other organizations, for example, local institutions, this may “become a source of annoyance and envy to the indigenous administration” (Lele 1975, 129).

However, the ability to give incentives also depends on the overall financial resources available to an organization. One of the major benefits of autonomous projects is a guaranteed and an adequate source of funding. In many cases projects have suffered from untimely and inadequate funding and hence, the projects are either not implemented at all or they are implemented haphazardly.

In the literature on rural development and agriculture in Nigeria, the problem of lack of institutional incentive has only been discussed indirectly. Several scholars (see Mukhtar 1987, Watts 1987, Williams 1976) have argued against, for example, commodity boards and over-valued currency on the ground that they are create disincentives for rural people to

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15 Robert Bates (1989) is one of the few prominent scholars who has applied rational choice to explain agricultural policies in Africa. Mats Lundahl (1990) critiques Ujamaa policy in Tanzania for relying mainly on ideological mobilization and its inability to address the problem of material incentives. While incentives could make a difference for motivation, they could disrupt the system if only small institutions can afford to give such services. Many workers might want to join those services and therefore this could lead to internal brain drain. This certainly is the case in Nigeria where, for example, the financial sector has drained high calibre workers from other sectors of the economy including the universities.
produce crops. R. A. Faforiji (1992) has also noted the lack of fiscal incentives for rural development. These shortcomings have been interpreted as exploitation of rural farmers. Because many of the studies on rural areas have been influenced by a particular Marxist strand, exploitation is discussed in class terms (macro-level), but not related to the individual. But while Marxism has been explained mostly in terms of the collective structure, there is another strand of Marxism which is an attempt to integrate structure and agency (see Carling 1986, Roemer 1986, Roemer 1982, Lash and Urry 1984). Although there is a trend in this paradigm that resonates with the methodological individualism of neo-classical economics, it is at the same time a rejection of the "individualistic individual" of the neo-classical paradigm in favour of the concept of the social individual or socially constructed individual. In contrast to the neo-classical individual, Post-classical Marxism is based on the notion that an individual's choice is defined by the person's values and preferences as well as the social context in which the person operates. This paradigm in Marxism has come to be known as Analytical Marxism, Game Theoretic Marxism, Post-Classical Marxism, or more popularly, Rational Choice Marxism (RCM). Indeed Rational Choice Marxism has come to be a major area of debate (see for example Carver 1992, Carling 1990, Wood 1989, Wood 1990 and several articles in Politics and Society in the 1980s). The proposition that different institutional incentives can determine the success or failure of an institution enriches Marxism beyond the hitherto structuralism of Marxism.

3.4 Context Matters

While resources have a very significant role to play in institutional arrangements, the
context in which institutions operate must be taken into consideration. Institutions have to be sensitive to the environment in which they operate. Classical organization theorists such as Robert Price (1975) and Fred Riggs (1962) have been wiser than their successors, the neoinstitutionalists, because they recognize the importance of the environment in which institutions are situated. While the concept is a subject of debate, there is a general sense of the environment as activities, norms, and spaces which are outside the domain of an institution, but which affect the functions of an organization. Arturo Israel (1987), Elinor Ostrom (1994, et al 1993, 1986), and most other rational choice theorists have paid little attention to contextual issues. However, outside the abstraction of modelling is the real world that sometimes cannot be explained by a rational actor model. Indeed Roger Friedland and Robert Alford's (1991) bold title "Bringing Society Back In:...." is a reminder of the importance of society or the environment in which institutions function.

Robert Putnam (1993, 83) identifies two different strands in contextual analysis. These are socio-economic, and historico-political (socio-cultural) factors. However, he has not taken into consideration gender and ethnic relations, and hence, one may add a third subtext: identity politics. Each of these three sub-texts gives a different focus and I will argue that the three have to be blended in order to get a good sense of a given context. Hence, in this subsection, I want to explicate how societal factors could affect institutional arrangements (in terms of strategy, autonomy and resources). It is my argument that in communities which have egalitarian values, it is much easier to create an effective institution than in hierarchical communities. In non-hierarchical societies, the likelihood of developing a bottom-up strategy, an institution not dominated by the powerful in the society and one which provides goods and
services for the majority of the people is more likely to be established. On the other hand, in hierarchical communities, institutions are likely to be dominated by the rich and powerful, and the goods and services provided by the institution are likely to be controlled by the same groups. Hence, in order for an institution to be effective, one has to take into consideration the complexity of communities.

3.4.1 Socio-Economic Inequality

Several writings on rural communities have thrown light on unequal socio-economic structures (see Eyoh 1992b, Barker 1989, Clough and Watts 1987, Chambers 1986). The theme of peasant differentiation and transformation is pervasive in Michael Watts (ed) (1987). In some of these works it has been documented that the unequal relations in rural communities have led to projects being controlled by the privileged. Similarly, comparative studies of successful collective action and local institutions have shown that success occurred in communities or among groups of similar socio-economic status (Uphoff 1990, Ghai 1988, Hisrchman 1984, Norman and Uphoff 1984). On the other hand, in communities and groups that are stratified, it is difficult to have successful local institutions of collective action. The reason is that people on the upper classes corner the material benefits in the community. Hence, in order to establish a bottom-up strategy, the degree of socio-economic inequality in a community has to be taken into consideration.

3.4.2 Historico-political

Robert Putnam's (1993) account of the differences in the performance of democratic
institutions in southern and northern Italy rests on a historico-political explanation. He explains that the differences arise from different historical trajectories. Furthermore, he argues that the development of a strong civic culture in the north contrasts sharply with the patron-client politics in the south. He traces the history of the differences in civic culture to medieval times, and how this has shaped the nature of democratic institutions in the two regions. In the north, the nature of civicness identified include: public engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust and tolerance and associational life. In contrast, politics in the south is characterized by elitism, personalization, factionalism, lack of trust and of reciprocity.

However, Putnam (1993) concedes that Caroline White (1980) came to the same conclusion on the difference in two communities in Italy, but she emphasized socio-economic relations in explaining the variation. In fact according to Putnam (1993), it is civic culture that leads to economic development. I suggest that the relationship between socio-economic relations and civic culture is a dialectical one. Hence, I propose to explore the proposition that a bottom-up strategy is much easier in communities with egalitarian socio-economic relations and with a civic culture than in communities which are hierarchical and lack civic culture.

3.4.3 Identity Politics

The issue of ethnicity in rural development projects has been taken up by Dickson Eyoh (1992a, 1992b). He argues that different culturally-defined communities have differential access to services provided in rural areas. In his case study of the Lafia Agricultural Development Program he shows how its implementation has been influenced by the ethnic mark of the various communities. The dominant ethnic groups have more access to
the services provided. Hence, it is important to recognise the ethnic variable as a conditioning factor in the institutionalization of a bottom-up development strategy in rural development projects. For example, an institution can have an ethnic bias that prevent them from allocating benefits equally among an ethnically diverse clientele. If the objective is equal distribution, then the institution will have to be rearranged to respond to in a new and equitable way to diversify. Dickson Eyoh’s (1992a, 1992b) contribution reminds us of another aspect of complexity in rural communities that he neglected: gender relations.

Eugene Okorji (1988) and Comfort Olayiwole (1991) among others have studied the role of women in rural development institutions in Nigeria. The low level of women’s education and their lack of capital pose major obstacles to their participation in rural development. For instance, rural households in Anambra State face problems of cultural norms and values with respect to farming, traditional household structures and division of labour (Okorji 1988). Likewise, women in northern Nigeria face additional problems of “traditional” norms and practices, such as seclusion, as well as the land tenure system and the lack of extension services (Olayiwole 1991). Women are said to be “underutilized” (Ekejiuba 1987, 112). The solution to the problems of women, according to M. S. Igben (1987) and Fola Odebunmi (1987), will come with growth in GDP and the introduction of appropriate technology.

In these studies two problems are glaring. First in discussing the role of women in rural communities, the studies have treated women in isolation from men. While focusing on women is an important step in rectifying the invisibility of women, it is also important to take a step further by analyzing women in relation to men. Second, the studies lack historical
specificity. Women have not always been in the position they are today. Traditions and cultures have been accepted as natural and biological (Stamp 1989). Rural development programs have also unquestionably accepted these ideologies of tradition (see Kardam 1991, Rao 1991, Rathgeber 1990, Antrobus 1987, Overholt et al 1985, Maguire 1984). As a result, the programs have not only ignored the activities of women, but they have also denied the realization of women’s potentialities. A bottom-up strategy of development might therefore be expected to empower women by undermining the long-term dependency engendered by conventional development projects (Alamgir 1989).

The writing of Ayesha Imam (1993) is a welcome development in the literature on gender relations in Nigeria. She discusses the relationship between men and women in Kauyan Kulle and Unguwan Kulle in the process of construction of seclusion. She argues that the social construction of seclusion is not only conditioned by material production and reproduction but also ideology. She draws attention to the role of Islam, the state and the historical context of this development. Hence, in order to establish a bottom-up strategy, gender relations in a community have to be taken into consideration.

I began this subsection on context matters by distinguishing three contextual dimensions: socio-economic, historic-political and identity politics. However, these three cannot be separately analyzed. The reason for this is the fact that every person has a socio-economic status (high, low), belongs to a cultural group (majority, minority), and has a gender identity (man, woman) besides other markers. All these are important in contextual analysis.
3.5 Weaving the Variables Together Institutional-Contextual Perspective

Six issues have been raised in this discussion of the institutional-contextual perspective: institutional strategy, institutional autonomy, institutional resources, socio-economic inequality, political-cultural pluralism and identity politics. How institutions are designed determines to a very large extent their chance for success or failure. When institutions are organized and structured to give voice and control to the local people, there is a greater chance for success for several reasons. The localization of an institution is more likely to create a condition in which local people can determine the type of projects they want; they will be able to control the institution; and they will be able to benefit from the projects implemented. On the other hand, a community which is more egalitarian is likely to be conducive to a grassroots-oriented institution. A localized development strategy is more likely to enhance the autonomy of the institution than is a more hierarchical institution.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed key issues which affect the effectiveness of rural developments. In the previous chapter, I showed what went wrong with rural development policies before the 1980s and what were the responses in terms of specific institutional reforms and other changes. In this chapter, I outlined the framework which informs the research: institutional-contextual analysis. In this framework, I identify institutional variables such as strategy, autonomy and resources, and contextual variables such as socio-economic inequality, political-cultural pluralism and identity politics.

In the next three chapters, I will explore these issues in greater depth starting with
contextual analysis and then discuss institutional design. The next chapter will discuss the political-cultural patterns of Dagona and Machina.
Chapter 4 Setting and Trends: Historico-Political Pluralism

4.1 Introduction

What are the assets and liabilities in different communities that might facilitate or hinder institutional reforms? What are the historical, political and religious characteristics of the settings? What are the socio-economic and gender relations in the settings? In this chapter and the next I intend to explore these questions. I hope to illuminate the diversities and similarities of Dagona and Machina, the two communities where this research was conducted. The intention is to show the diversity within and between the communities which will provide a basis for judging how development agencies come to terms with the complexities of rural communities and how they are shaped by the communities. I want to understand and evaluate the ability of development institutions to be inclusive, to boost productive and social activities, and to create public spaces for contestation of opinions. This and the following chapter shed light on the background of these communities in order to help us to judge how the projects succeeded or failed to come to terms with different kinds of complexities and diversities.

In this chapter I will concentrate on the history, political structure, and the belief systems of Dagona and Machina. I will argue that there are distinct differences in the history, political structure and belief systems of the two communities. Machina compared to Dagona is a hierarchical society. Machina has a long history, and centralized political and religious structures. On the other hand, Dagona is a recent settlement and more democratic and plural. These differences account for further differences in trust and solidarity in the two
communities. These also partially account for different performance of institutions of rural development in the two communities as will be discussed in later chapters.

The differences between the two communities have important implications for institutional reform. First, any institutional change which aims to give power and voice to the marginalized has to recognize the different structures in the two communities and develop special efforts to circumvent the existing power structure in a hierarchical community like Machina. Second, the structure of institutional arrangements in hierarchical communities like Machina has an incentive structure which favours the powerful. Third, given the relative political subordination of women in both communities, it is important to establish spaces where women can make claims.

4.2 Machina

In this section on Machina, I intend to explore the development of a centralized political and religious structure and the concentration of these resources in a ruling dynasty. These have consequences for institutional reform. According to the official historians of Machina, it was founded around 980 AD by Mai Hariwu Bolo, a matrilineal brother of the Mai of Gazargamu (Machina District Development Association 1992, Shettima et al 1990).

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According to oral sources which have been corroborated by court historians of Machina, the town's name is derived from mazena. Mazena in Kanuri means "look for". It is said that the Mai of Gazargamu and the founder of Machina were maternal brothers. After the death of the father of Mai of Gazargamu, the founder of Machina was appointed as the new Mai in the 11th Century. However, the Kanem Borno empire began to experience problems. It was then discovered that the wrong person was appointed as he was not the direct son of the former Mai. As a result, the founder of Machina was deposed and his maternal brother was appointed. The deposed Mai left Gazargamu to look for his father's homeland. In Kanuri that act is called Mazena.
Although inheritance to the throne in Kanem Borno was matrilineal (Palmer 1970, Ibn Furtu 1987, Palmer 1970) and the argument that Machina was founded in 980 AD has come to attain the status of orthodoxy, its validity is suspect. This is because Birni Gazargamu became the capital of Kanem Borno only about 1470 AD. It is therefore not possible that the palace in Machina was built in 980 AD to face the one in Birni Gazargamu.

The kingdom of Machina was established through war and conquest, but there is not much documentation of its boundaries. It is known that it covered about 200 kilometres to the north and 180 kilometres to the northwest from its present site. After the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, the northern and northwestern borders were reduced to four and 62 kilometres respectively (Machina District Development Association 1992). Thus, most of what used to be Machina kingdom now lies in Niger Republic.

The concentration of political power in Machina is exemplified by the dominance of a ruling family, the Aliyu Bolo dynasty. It has always ruled Machina except for a brief period in the 19th century. The Mai in Machina is the only district head who is never transferred to another community; no one has ever been appointed to the throne from outside the historical

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17 For example, Ahmad b. Furtu, the Grand Imam of Borno and the author of A Sudanic Chronicle: the Borno Expeditions of Idris Alauma (1564-1576), used his fathers name as surname only once. Whereas, he used his mothers name Safiyya as surname on many occasions. Similarly, the famous Mai Idris Alauma (1564-1596) under whose leadership Borno attained its height was known as Idris Amsami. Amsami is his mothers name (Ibn Furtu 1987). However, recent historians of these leaders have privileged their father's name as surname.

18 According to the oral tradition of how the boundary was demarcated, the British and French sides agreed that both sides should start riding on their horses in the morning from Machina and Damagaram respectively and wherever they met should be the boundary. However, the British interpreted morning to be after the morning prayers, whereas, the French interpreted that to be after 12 pm. This according to the tradition explains why the boundary of Machina to the north is only 4 kilometres from Niger.
family. The uniqueness of the ruling family is also buttressed by the fact the palace of Mai Machinama is built to face the palace of the Mai in Gazargamu, the second capital of the Bornu empire, and it is the only palace in Borno or anywhere in Northern Nigeria whose main gate is facing east.

Unlike the palace women in Gazargamu, many of whom were holders of titles and chimas (fiefs) (see Tijani 1980), in Machina the Magaram (the Mai's official sister) was the only prominent woman title holder. While the Magaram (the Mai’s Official sister) was not a women’s parallel political institution like those in Igbo land, the office was considered important. Women had access to the Mai only through the Magaram (the Mai’s official sister). The institution is no longer in existence with the death of Magaram Zara in the late 1970s.

The incumbent Mai has been on the throne for a very long time. The current Mai Machinama, Mai Bukar Ali Idrissa was born in 1930 and appointed in 1944 as the 69th Mai. He had four wives and about 32 children in 1993. He had completed his elementary school and was in the Middle School when he was withdrawn to assume this position of responsibility. The Mai became a learned person in the books of Islam and also embraced “western” education. He had travelled to Britain under the auspices of the British Council. He was a member of the parliament in the first republic and served on several committees in northern Nigeria and Borno state. These posts gave him access to power at regional and national levels. All his children have attained a minimum of primary education and he has obliged all his children who qualify to continue their schooling at the secondary level. He

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19 One of the policies of the colonial administration was to encourage the Emirs, Mais and Shehus of northern Nigeria to send their children to school in hope that the common people would emulate them.
encourages other parents to do the same. However, he makes sure that all his daughters marry after secondary education. From that level, it is up to the young couples to decide whether they want to continue their education.

Besides the Mai’s access to power at regional and national levels, he has symbolic power. Mai Bukar Ali Idirisa is very much respected for being the embodiment of Borno culture and tradition and feared for his mystical powers. Some of his mystical powers are assumed to come from his piety. For example, there was a story about a meeting of traditional rulers in Borno on drought. After the meeting an animal was to be sacrificed. The animal could only be slaughtered by someone who never committed adultery. It was said that Mai Machinama was the one who volunteered to slaughter the animal.

Changes in the structure of local governments have had a significant impact on the power of the ruling family, in most cases increasing the powers of the Mai. First, in 1989, the military government of Babangida created new local governments. Machina-Yusufari local government was created with the capital in Kumagannam. The people in Machina were very dissatisfied with the creation of the local government. Although the name of the local government was Machina-Yusufari, having the capital in Kumagannam, a village headquarters, was not acceptable to the people of Machina. Indigenes of Machina were the

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20 One of the main reasons Machina Primary School and Machina Junior Secondary School have more students than other schools is because the Mai forces parents to send their children. In 1993, there were cases of emigration from Machina District because the Mai forced parents of married girls to send them to school. In order to avoid sending their daughters to school, many parents get them married at an early age. Similarly, the Mai also use ridicule to encourage parents to send their children to school. For example, in a particular community he asked a pupil withdrawn from primary school to read a surah, (chapter) in the Qur’an and asked the parent to read the same surah. Whereas the pupil read that surah, the parent could not. The Emir sent two messages. First, “western” education is not Christianization. Secondly, in fact it could produce a better Muslim.
last group of workers who accepted to work in the capital, and they never stayed in the town beyond the necessary time. The Mai of Machina worked very hard to frustrate the new local government because the headquarters was not in Machina where he could control it. Further, he feared that another Mai could be appointed for Kumagannan which would have diminished his power in the area.

Second, 1991 is a year that Machina people will always remember. The creation of Yobe state in 1991 was very much welcomed. For the Mainas (aristocrats) of Machina, it signalled their independence from the control of the al-Kanemi dynasty currently based in Maiduguri. Machina as a district in Borno was under the Bomo Emirate council, the chairperson of which was the Shehu in Maiduguri. Even though Machina had more leverage in control of its activities than other districts, there were conflicts with the Shehu. The Mainas (aristocrats) of Machina claim that they are the only descendants of the Sayfawa dynasty, the dynasty which collapsed with the movement of the capital from Gazargamu to Kukawa in 1847. The movement of the capital to Kukawa was also the beginning of the Al-Kanemi dynasty of which the Shehus are the descendants. A second source of conflict which relates to the previous one and also symbolises the mystique of the Mai is that Machina to a large extent has come to symbolise the past of Borno because of its elegant medieval durbar (a traditional horse festival) held during important occasions. The Shehu in Maiduguri is resentful of that. Thus, the creation of Yobe state not only meant the end of the Borno Emirate and of the al Kanemi dynasty's control over Machina, but also signalled the rise in status of the Mainas (aristocrats) of Machina as the flag bearers of the Sayfawa dynasty.

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21 The conflict between the al-Kanemi and Sayfuwa dynasties was also suggested by H. A. S. Johnston and D. J. M. Muffett (1973) in chapter X1 on "The Manga Rebellion".
Third, the creation of Machina Local Government with the capital in Machina in 1991, has led to a number of changes, some of which have had a differential impact on the commoners and the aristocrats. It gave the aristocrats of Machina more prestige and meant that the Mai is no longer answerable to any local government chair outside Machina. Further, to ensure the Mai some control of the local government, its temporary secretariat was in the Mai's Palace and when the new secretariat of the local government was built, it was positioned close to the palace.

Fourth, new emirates were created in Yobe State in 1993. Machina district was upgraded to an emirate with a first class Mai. Unlike other new emirates where there were elections to the office of Emir by a newly constituted electoral system, in Machina there was no contest. The Governor simply appointed the current Mai Machinama as a first class

22 Whether to create new emirates is an issue which radicals in Nigerian politics have always debated. The progressive governments in the second republic, especially those in Kano State created additional emirates to reduce the influence of the Emir of Kano, one of the most powerful persons in Nigeria. In this context, creating new emirates is a political strategy to reduce the power of the powerful emirs. Other radicals argue that creating new emirates is resurrecting a moribund institution and therefore, it is conservative. This debate came up in Yobe state as well.

23 Initially the government in Yobe state adopted the title Emir but it was later changed to Mai. There are a number of possible reasons. First, the concept of emirate is a colonial creation in Borno in the 1900s. Prior to that, people lived in independent states or as tributaries of the Borno empire. Secondly, the term Emir, which is from the Islamic concept of Amir, meaning both spiritual and secular leader, never existed in the area now covered by Yobe state. Thirdly, there is a small part of Yobe state which is predominantly Christian. Although their current Mai is a Muslim, there is a possibility of a Christian becoming a Mai. It would have been ridiculous to give that person the title of Emir. In reference to Machina, I use the titles Mai and Emir interchangeable.

24 Because many of the places where new emirates were created had no "traditional" king makers which elect a new leader, the government directed that village heads
The creation of Machina Emirate led to new forms of political structures, the reinvention of old "traditions" and invention of new ones. Many of the abandoned traditional titles were reinvigorated and a new Emirate Council was appointed. The former Machina district was divided into four. Three former village units were upgraded to districts while a new one was carved out of the Machina village unit. Similarly, three of the former village heads were upgraded to District Heads while the eldest son of the Mai, who is also the Machina Development Area Promoter of NEAZDP, was appointed as the fourth District Head with Machina as the capital. New village units were created to increase the number from three before the creation of Yobe state to 22. The people were appointed to these positions were royalists.

From the above account, it should be clear that the political structures and resources in Machina are concentrated to very large extent in the Aliyu Bolo dynasty. The long historical domination of the family has been traced back to 900 AD; and the current Mai is the 69th. The Mai has been on the throne for more than 50 years and has developed the skills and shrewdness of power. Governments and government officials at both levels defer to him either

and district heads should constitute an electoral college to elect Emirs.

The creation of thirteen new emirates in the state is very contentious. Many people were dissatisfied that it was heavily politicized in favour of the SDP. For example, there were candidates who won the elections for the Emirship but that were not appointed by the Governor because they were said to be sympathizers of the NRC. Likewise, there were others who were concerned about the cost of thirteen emirates. Similarly, others believe that the institution have been bastardized by the government and it has lost its usefulness. Up to February 1993, the new emirs in Yobe state were never invited to attend the meeting of the Emirs of Northern Nigeria. The pressure is high on the Military government to reconsider the issue of emirates in the state.
out of fear or respect and in most cases both. Most of the new officers in the emirate council are his loyal followers and/or relations. Although the Mai was a member of the Northern House of Chiefs on the platform of the conservative Nigeria Peoples Congress in the first republic, he was a supporter of the progressive parties, the Great Nigeria Peoples Party in the Second Republic (1979-1983) and the Social Democratic Party in the first transition to the Third Republic (1989-1993)\(^\text{26}\). As far as many people in Machina and the surrounding area were concerned, the Mai was the centre of the political party.

The first elected chair of the council is the Mai’s second eldest son and the Education Secretary his daughter, the only woman in a high position in the local government and the only woman who is an education secretary in Yobe state. She is also a member of the Yobe State Women’s Commission. Indeed she was appointed as the acting Director General of the Women’s Commission, but later withdrawn following protests from the people of Machina that all appointments were concentrated in the family. Many of the Mai’s children hold responsible positions in the local government. The critics of the Mai refer to him as a Sole Administrator: one who is in control of everything\(^\text{27}\).

The above scenario points to a concentration of political authority in a ruling dynasty or in fact a single person, the Mai. The concentration of political power also means that political spaces in the community are very much controlled by members of his immediate

\(^{26}\) The first transition to the third republic is the transition period under the Babangida military regime whereas the second transition to the Third Republic is the transition period under the Abacha military regime.

\(^{27}\) There were a number of petitions from Machina to the Yobe state government over the preponderance of appointments of the Emirs children to high positions since the creation of the state.
family or heavily regulated by them. However, this does not suggest that power is exercised at only one centre. Certainly there are the police, immigration, customs, judiciary and other departments in Machina which are no longer under the direct control of Emirs. These structures of authority exercise power as well. Despite this acknowledgement, comparatively, their influence on the lives of the people of Machina is small and the success of their duties in Machina depends on the support of the Mai. There are also the religious institutions. They have more influence, but the religious leaders are appointed by the Mai.

As Michel Foucault (1978) noted, power cannot be exercised without resistance nor is it concentrated in one centre. There are other sources of political opposition. Among the "traditional" elites, opposition to the Mai has come from other families who make claims to the leadership of Machina or whose families used to occupy some of the "traditional" titles, but were marginalised during the reign of the present Mai. The Mai deliberately kept some positions vacant when the incumbent died, or he appointed his lackeys. The resistance takes the form of refusal to participate in any "traditional" activity, for example by not going to the Mais palace and by declining to be a kona or waladi\(^2\) (royal body guards).

Other sources of political opposition to the Mai are during partisan politics. Despite all the criticisms of civilian politics, at least it created a space for political opposition in Machina. In the First Republic, when the Mai was identified with the conservative Northern Peoples Congress (later Nigeria Peoples Congress) (NPC), the Northern Elements Progressive Union (Later Nigerian Elements Progressive Union) (NEPU) was a major source of opposition to him and other conservative institutions. NEPU mobilised its supporters on the

\(^2\) Kona is a high status position in the calvary of the Mai; whereas waladi is a lower status position.
platform of challenging the feudal aristocracy in northern Nigeria. Its constituency was the commoners. In the Second Republic and the first transition to the Third Republic, when the Mai joined the progressive parties, it was the camp of the conservatives which provided the platform for opposition to what many people in Machina would consider a struggle to emancipate the commoners. The opposition party in Machina, the National Party of Nigeria and its progenitor the National Republican Convention were for many people, the only space outside the control of the Mai.

It was not only from the opposition political parties that there was opposition to the Mai. Within the Social Democratic Party, there were two factions. A dissident faction was critical of the Mai's control of the party. In February, 1993, the faction sponsored candidates for positions in the executive committee of the party and won the elections. Similarly, an alliance was formed of politicians who alleged that the party was controlled by the Mai, and educated elites who felt that all government positions both at the local and state levels were controlled by the Mai. That faction was to sponsor a candidate for the December 1993 chairship elections against the Mai's son, but the military intervention of November 1993 put a stop to that attempt.

Despite the previous discussion of opposition to the Mai, political spaces in Machina are by and large controlled by the Mai and his associates. This dominance of Machina by an aristocratic elite has severe implications for institutional reform. Reform by its very nature implies winners and losers. The status quo is beneficial to some people and they will resist

29 The grievances of this alliance was very deep. Despite the banning of partisan politics, this alliance will survive especially given the fact that the Military have always sought political legitimacy by aligning with the "traditional" institutions. Similarly, the alliance is likely to survive because of the current plans to set up another transition period.
any institutional reform that is likely to undermine their power. For the opponents of the Emir in Machina everything to do with the him is suspect. The opposition to the Mai tends to be ideological in the sense that people have come to believe that everything the Mai does is to protect his interest; nothing is for the good of others. That kind of opposition makes it difficult to gain trust and confidence of the people, a basic necessity if institutional reform is to attract the marginal groups in society.

4.3 Dagona

Dagona, when compared to Machina, has a recent development of centralized religion and political authority. The pluralistic nature of Dagona has significant implications for institutional reform: the lack of powerful vested interests makes it much easier for new institutions to be seen as neutral, and makes it difficult for a single group to monopolise an institution. Even where one group dominates an institution people do not interpret it as a conspiracy.

Unlike the Kanuris of Kanem Borno\(^\text{30}\), the Bades of the Bade Confederation left no known indigenous written works on the history of the Dagona area. The ruling class of the Bades only accepted Islam in the second half of the 19th Century. Written sources on the Bades were by Kanuri court historians and European explorers (Ahmed 1988). The first source seems to demean the Bades by reducing their history to that of the Kanuris while the accounts of explorers are full of exaggerations and depend on official historians. One legend

\(^{30}\) In addition to the work of Ibn Furtu which he started writing on October 21, 1576, there was the work of Masfarma 'Umar b. 'Uthman which unfortunately could not be recovered (Nachtigal 1879, Barth 1857). However, this is not privileging the written history over oral sources.
is that the Bades had their origin from the east in Bimi Badr in Arabia. Bimi Badr is the place where the battle of Badr was fought between Prophet Mohammed (S.A.W) and the non Muslims of Mecca. According to this legend the Bades were those who fought against the prophet of Islam and migrated westward until they reached Kumadugu (river) Yobe. After settling briefly around Geidam they moved to Dadigar (Ahmed 1988, Interview with Lawan Goni 1993).

In Dadigar, the Bades dispersed to western Borno and formed a confederation of clans. Each clan was led by a Digum (community leader). Smaller clans could recognize the authority of a bigger one. A Digum (community leader) ruled with a council of elders. In most cases the Digum was the eldest person, however, younger persons could aspire for the throne. The qualities sought in the election of leaders were honesty, ability to wage a war, and power to bring a good harvest. A child of a Digum (community leader) could inherit the post if s/he had similar qualities (Ibid). These criteria for being a leader contrast with the situation in Machina, where the only criterion is being born to a ruling family.

A process of centralization among the Bades began in the 19th century in reaction to the constant threat of attacks from their neighbours. A capital of the Bades was established in Gokoram (now Gorgoram). Gorgoram also symbolized unity among the Bades.

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31 Even if this account of the origin of the Bades is true, it should be said that there was no settlement called Bimi Badr in Arabia. Badr is an Arabic word which means full moon. The battle referred to was fought in the full moon between the Muslims and the non Muslim population of Mecca.

32 The quality of having a good harvest by a Digum (community leader) is a factor that has led to constant political disputes among the Bades. This has especially become a big problem with the fluctuation of the river flows along the Yobe which the Digums (community leader) have no control of.
Authority became more centralized when the Shehu in Kukawa appointed Digum Babuje to the office of Lawan (village head) of the Bade confederation. This marks the beginning of a ruling dynasty and of the title of Lawan (village head) among the Bades. Lawan Babuje because of his leadership qualities later became a Mai. Mai Babuje was dethroned by his son Aji in 1852. Mai Aji is credited to have established a well defined political structure in Gorgoram.

Islam gained acceptance among the newly established ruling class of the Bades. Mai Aji (1852-95), pronounced Islam the religion of the Bade. However, it was only during Mai Saleh (1897-1920) and Mai Umar Suleiman (1940-1981) that Islam became fully established (Ahmed 1988).

Dagona was on a trading route of the Bades in the late 19th century. Its original name was Dakona, meaning "there are fish" in Bade. The abundance of fish in the area attracted people to the place. The clan head was appointed as the community leader with a title of Mada (junior community leader) instead of Digum (community leader). The title of the community leader changed from Mada (junior leader) to Bula (ward head) when the community expanded. It was only in the last 65 years that the title of the community leader of Dagona changed to Lawan, (village head) (Interview, Lawan Goni, Interview 1993). In 1993, Dagona became a district under Bade Emirate and in Bade local government. Unlike Machina and its Manga neighbours, Dagona has no established palace. There is no Dandal (a major street in front of the traditional ruler's palace) which is a common feature of palaces in

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33 The title Digum (community leader) still exist among the Bades and is more powerful than that of the Lawan (village head).
Borno\textsuperscript{34}. All these are indications of a community that has no established ruling dynasty.

The process of recruiting the community leader buttresses further the egalitarian nature of this society. Lawan Abubakar is the current Lawan of Dagona. He was born about 53 years ago and at an early age of four started attending Islamic school. He enrolled at Bizi elementary school at the age of nine, but did not complete his education. He became an itinerant pupil for about twenty years, moving among different parts of northern Nigeria. In 1969, he was appointed a school teacher and after attending some courses he was promoted to the rank of Arabic Teacher's Inspector in Gashua, the local authority headquarters. In the Second Republic, he was suspected to be a supporter of the conservative National Party of Nigeria and was, therefore, demoted to teach in a village. In 1987 when the then Lawan (village head), Lawan Goni indicated his intention to retire, the community in Dagona sent a delegation to ask him to become their village head. Lawan Abubakar said, he never sought to be village head because it is unislamic for some one to request to be a leader. He accepted the responsibility as an obligation to Allah. Lawan Abubakar is a member of several religious groups and committees (Interview, Lawan Abubakar 1993).

Women also have more role to play in Dagona than in Machina. Dagona has two historic women's offices. These are the Magi (woman community leader) and Curaku (woman community leader). Each is elected by the community and "appointed" by a Lawan at the time he assumes office. The previous Lawan (village head) of Dagona appointed his Curaku (woman Community leader) and Magira (woman community leader) but the current one has not appointed new ones. The appointees of the previous Lawan (village head) continue until

\textsuperscript{34} See the accounts of Louis Brenner (1973), H A. S. Johnston and D. J. M. Muffett (1973) and N. C. McClintock (1992) for this basic feature of palaces in Borno.
new ones are appointed (Interview, Curaku Zazau 1993, Magi Zara 1993).

Magi Zara was appointed about 25 years ago by the previous Lawan. A Magi (woman community leader) is chosen by the women in the community and her name forwarded to the Lawan for formal appointment. In 1993, the Magi was about 70 years old. She got married at the age of 15. She married seven times. She has no child and she was not usually in Kulle (a form of seclusion) except when she stayed briefly in Maiduguri. She now lives with her maternal relations. Responsibilities of a Magi include organizing women to participate in the activities of the community, adjudicating on issues that affect women and consulting with the Lawan on issues that affect women (Interview, Magi Zara, 1993). The democratic nature of the election of the Magi, bears investigating. Another very important issue is how "traditions" are invented. The fact that the Magi (woman community leader) was not in seclusion until she was in Maiduguri and that many young women in the community are now in some form of seclusion raises the question about "tradition". It seems that the problem is not "tradition", but modernity.

Curaku Zazau is an assistant to Magi Zara. She was also "appointed" by the previous Lawan. She campaigned to be elected and crowned by the Magi. Her major responsibilities include organizing "traditional" religious dances and assisting the Magi in resolving women's problems. She is about 71 years old. She got married at the age of 15 and she married three times. She never gave birth and now lives with her maternal relations. Despite her age, she farms and depends on farming to survive. She inherited the farm lands both from her maternal and paternal relations (Interview: Curaku Zazau, 1993).

Recent changes in Dagona have negative implications for the egalitarian nature of the
community; they could create vested interests. Dagona was upgraded from village unit to a district in 1993 in fulfilment of a political promise made by the SDP. Maina Adamu Gogaram was appointed as Ajia (District Head) of Dagona. This development is likely to change the political structure of the area. Maina Adamu Gogaram is a scion of the ruling class of the Bade. He was born in Gorgoram in 1944 and attended elementary school in Gashua. After his elementary education, he worked as Veterinary Officer until 1979. In 1979, he was appointed the Private Secretary of the Mai Bade. In 1993, he became the first Ajia (District Head) of Dagona (Interview, Ajia Adamu Gorgoram, 1993). This is the first time a non-indigene of the community has been appointed to such a high political position. A palace may be built to indicate the centre of power since he is an outsider who does not own a house in the community. New traditional title holders may be appointed. A ruling dynasty may be developing in Dagona.
Table 4.1
Comparative Characteristics of Dagona and Machina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dagona</th>
<th>Machina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politics and History</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Settlement</td>
<td>Older Settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Centralized Religion</td>
<td>Older Centralized Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Centralized Politics</td>
<td>Older Centralized Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election of Village Political Authority</td>
<td>Appointment from a Ruling Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Women Political Leaders</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District and Village Headquarters</td>
<td>Emirate, District, Village and Local Government Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Types of Land and Farming System</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fadama</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upland</td>
<td>Upland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flooding</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upland Irrigation</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upland rain-fed</td>
<td>Upland rain-fed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Categories</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group Bade (70%)</td>
<td>Manga (66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 500 compounds in 1993</td>
<td>About 1000 compounds in 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 700 households in 1993</td>
<td>About 1600 households in 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 5500 population in 1993</td>
<td>About 8000 population in 1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The political and historical profiles of the two communities of Dagona and Machina in Table 4.1 reveal significant differences. Machina has a longer history of centralized religion and "traditional" political institutions, and there is a definite ruling dynasty which controls both the "traditional" and "modern" institutions of authority whereas in Dagona political authority is more democratic and pluralistic despite the appointment of a non-indigene as Ajia, (District Head) in 1993 and access to that institution does not seem to guarantee control of political resources. In Machina by contrast access to resources is controlled by a political dynasty. These differences are reflected in the nature of political contestation in the two communities. The contest for political authority is very fierce and acrimonious in Machina; it has led to lack of trust and solidarity with those in control of the "traditional" authority in the community. On the other hand, in Dagona, although there is political contestation, it is not a zero sum game. Hence, there is no feeling of suffering from deliberate domineering control even by those who lose a political contest.

Women political leaders in Dagona are quite democratically elected and they need not have any relationship with the Lawan (village head) whereas in Machina the woman political leader is singlehandedly appointed by the Mai and she has to be his matrilineal relation. However, in both communities, the role of women political leaders has become more or less redundant. In Machina, since the death of the previous Magaram, no woman was appointed. Similarly, the current Lawan of Dagona has not indicated that he wants the women of the community to elect a new Magi and Curaku (women community leaders). On the other hand, it is very possible that in Machina, the institution of Magaram (Mais official sister) will be reinvented and new ones like Gumsu (Mais mother) will be created because of the creation of
an emirate. In Dagona, it is unlikely that the women's political institutions, especially that of Clnaku (woman community leader), will continue to exist. The last "traditional" religious practice that she led was about 25 years ago.

Muslim religiosity is considerably higher in Dagona than Machina. While Machina has one Friday mosque, there are two in Dagona. The most recent one was established in September 1993 by a religious sect called Izala. This is a movement dedicated to the eradication of any "tradition" or innovation in Islam except the practices provided for by the Quran, Hadith (Deeds of the Prophet) and the Sunnah (Sayings of the Prophet) and innovations which do not contradict the provision of any of these sources of Islamic law may be allowed. They are therefore revivalists. At my first encounter with the two women primary school teachers in Dagona they were wearing a black hijab ("proper" Islamic dress), but subsequently, they stopped wearing it. In Machina Primary School, there was no such form of veiling. It is, therefore, doubtful if a Clnaku (community leader) in Dagona will be appointed to play any role in "traditional" religious practice because it is likely to be considered as jahiliya (ignorance). It is also important to note that women's political institutions in both communities depend on decisions made by a male political leader.

Oppositional politics are more pronounced and vigorously contested in Machina than Dagona. The danger of such a situation for development institutions is enormous. For

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In this discussion on religion in the two communities, I use the word "traditional" camp to refer to those Muslims who are alleged to mix religion with "culture" and "tradition". I use the word revivalists to refer to those who want to eradicate "tradition" and "cultures" in Islam except those provided for in the Quran, Hadith and Sunnah. Perhaps it is more appropriate to use the word fundamentalists but the imagery of the concept in oriental discourses gives it more political than intellectual meaning. Similarly, I am not unmindful of the historicity of traditions and culture.
example, a simple issue like where meetings are held could be a problem: the institution could be identified with particular interests. In Machina, because of the appropriation of both the "traditional" and "modern" political institutions and resources by the ruling family, opposition has come from educated elites, politicians and "traditional" elites. In fact in 1994, after the appointment of a Sole Administrator by the military regime to take over from the son of the Emir, every one in the community was made to swear on the Quran in a religious ceremony not to commit evil against another community member in the next ten years. That was not the first time such a thing was done. A similar event happened in 1983 after the defeat of the Emir's son in a local government elections. The fear is that the Emir will undermine the activities of the local government since his son is no longer the chair of the local authority. In Dagona, because political authority and resources are not concentrated in few hands, opposition politics is less dramatic, and more fluid.

The fluidity of politics in Dagona is also manifested in the establishment of another Friday mosque even though in terms of size, the community would not normally have more than a single Friday mosque. However, in Machina, because of the concentration of political authority in the Mai, efforts to create a new Friday mosque are not even on the agenda. The present Friday mosque is adjacent to the Mai's palace, and the creation of any other Friday mosque would be interpreted as subverting the political and religious authority of the Mai.

4.4 Conclusion

I set out in this chapter to map out the first variable of the contextual analysis: historico-political pluralism in the two communities. The two communities of Dagona and
Machina experienced different trajectories. Dagona is more democratic than Machina. The egalitarian nature of the community is indicated in the nature of political authority, religious fluidity and the trust and solidarity in the community. The nature of politics in Dagona creates more community spaces. On the other hand, Machina is a hierarchical community that has almost opposite characteristics of Dagona. Hierarchical politics implies also that political spaces in that community are dominated by a narrow segment of the population. I will demonstrate in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 the impact of the context of the communities on institutional arrangements.

The next chapter continues the comparison between Dagona and Machina with a discussion of the second and third independent variables in contextual analysis: socio-economic and identity relations respectively in Dagona and Machina.
Chapter 5 Setting and Trends: Gender and Socio-Economic Relations

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored the political, religious and historical contexts of Dagona and Machina. My intention was to show the different trajectories these communities have gone through. These differences, I will argue, partly account for the different performance of development institutions in the two communities.

In this and the previous chapter, I am trying to explore the issue of how context shapes the way development institutions work. This chapter focuses on socio-economic and identity relations. I use activity profiles, and life histories to gather and present relevant data. These methods are very useful for the purpose of capturing the dynamics and rhythm of living in rural communities. Specifically, I will outline relations to land of different groups and peoples, profile of farm and household activities, and describe the rhythm of living of two persons in the two communities.

From the rich descriptions, I will draw attention to the complexities of rural life and how institutional reforms and incentive structures could be improved. Equally important is to recognize the different ways and means people in the rural communities live, and the need to devise a strategic intervention to empower them. Because of the divergent interests in the two communities, any form of intervention in these communities must be sensitive to these contradictory and complementary interests. An assumption that community is a small group of people with homogeneous interests is not valid for either Dagona or Machina. The institutions which are purported to empower the poorest and the most marginalized in communities may end up in the hands of the richest and the most powerful. On the other
hand, some groups in the communities might be excluded.

Similarly, an assumption that the household is a single unit mode of production and consumption is not valid for either Dagona or Machina. We will see the different activity profiles at home and at the farms of male and female adults as well as that of male and female children. These activities are contradictory and complementary. In order to implement an institutional arrangement that gives voice and incentive to the marginalized, these complexities of the communities have to be studied and recognized. Women are marginalized in both communities; empowering them would involve a conscious effort to create a space for them. I hope that the accounts of the rhythm of living and the other discussions on the complexity of the communities will go beyond bemoaning the difficulties and will bring out opportunities for policy practitioners. As Lisa Peattie (1995) has suggested, it is only through concrete study of the daily lives of the subjects that local policy intervention is possible.

The impact of the context on institutions will be discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

The data for this chapter unless otherwise stated are from group discussions, interviews with key informants and ordinary citizens, and a limited sample survey of the two communities. I combine different methods to collect data following the experiences of feminist methodologies, activist participatory research, agrosystem analysis, applied anthropology, field research on farming systems, rapid rural appraisal, and participatory rural appraisal. Sixty-eight people participated in Dagona; and 82 in Machina (see appendix 3).
5.2 Demography of Dagona and Machina

In 1990, there were about 1,000 compounds and 1,600 households\(^{36}\) in Machina. The total population of the town was about 8,000 (Monitoring and Evaluation Office 1991). Since then, the population of the community has increased: the creation of the local government in 1991 stimulated new productive activities as well as the posting of more civil servants, and the conflicts in Niger Republic have led to migration into the community especially of seasonal migrants. The ethnic composition of the community is 66 percent Manga, 30 percent Hausa and 4 percent Fulbe. However, Hausa is the lingua franca. About 99.8 percent of the population are Muslims and every indigene of Machina claims to be a Muslim. The non-Muslim population of Machina are mainly civil servants who have been posted to work in the community, and religious missionaries.

Dagona had about 500 compounds and 700 households in 1993. Its population was about 5500. The ethnic composition of the community is about 70 percent Bade, 18 percent Sakkwatawa or Takali, 6 percent Hausa, 1 percent Manga and 5 percent Fulbe. Everyone in Dagona is a Muslim, although some kilometres from Dagona, there are Christian Bades.

5.3 Socio-Economic Structure

5.3.1 Land: Ownership, Access and Control

The discussion on land will point out some of the constraints and opportunities that development institutions confront in the two communities. For example, how the nature of

\(^{36}\) Households, according to NEAZDP classification, consist of people who eat from the same pot, while compounds are made up of households that live in the same physical space.
implemented, and why negotiating land ownership could be very important for women and migrants.

One hundred percent of the male adult population and 76 percent of the female respondents in the study in Machina identify themselves as farmers although most people have several *kida*\(^{37}\) (economic activities). People farm in Machina only during rainy season. There is no river or large body of water for irrigation or *fadama* (flood recession zone). In fact the major problem of Machina has been water for human and animal consumption\(^{38}\). The ecology of Machina makes it difficult to implement any irrigation project, one of the major projects of NEAZDP. Similarly, the sandy nature of the soil makes it expensive to construct feeder roads in the community which is one of the major projects of DFRRI.

The nature of land ownership in Dagona constrains the ability of NEAZDP to give financial support for women farmers: women do not own land in the *fadama* (flood recession zone) and they are not engaged in agricultural activities in the area. However, it also creates opportunities for organization such as the Better Life through policy advocacy to make a strong case for women's ownership of, access to and control of land. Even before the Land Use Decree of 1978 (later Land Use Act 1979), land belonged to the community, but was

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\(^{37}\) Throughout the research the words *kida* in Manga and *sana'a* in Hausa, meaning incoming generating activities were used when asking respondents about their means of livelihood. Conventional researchers use the word occupations and in most cases the response is likely to be one economic activity. This obscures the complexity of rural income. Similarly, when the word occupation is used in relation to female respondents the likely answer is housewife or divorcee. While being a housewife is a full time work, it overlooks the incredibly varied economic activities that happens at the level of the household.

\(^{38}\) The people in Machina judge the success and failure of any government by a single criterion: what efforts have been made to provide water to the community. They also believe that if there is one reason the community will disperse in the future it is because of water shortage.
vested in the hands of the "traditional" institutions. In other words, it was vested in male leaders. Peasant farmers get land through their village head. Land allocated to a family\(^{39}\) belongs to it and is inherited by members of the family. The allocation of land to the family has gender implications. It is often assumed that a family is headed by a male. It is therefore, difficult for women who are not under a male head to approach community authorities for land allocation. A family retains the right to transfer the land to other persons. While in principle women can inherit land from their parents, there is a significant difference in the inheritance pattern between male and female farmers. Sixty-eight per cent of the female farmers claimed that they inherited land and control it. On the other hand, 75 percent of the males claimed that they inherited the land they farm, and they control it. Land can be inherited from both parents, male and female.

The 1978 Land Use Decree (later Act) is supposed to vest land control in rural, urban and mineral producing and federal territories in the local, state and federal governments respectively. If the decree were followed, individuals would get land from the government and have it registered (Oshio 1990, Adeoye 1989, Omotola 1989, Fekumo 1988). Middle and upper-class absentee farmers have used the land use decree to acquire land, but lower-class farmers still depend on community "tradition" to have access to land in Machina. While the Land Use Decree would have rationalized the process of land allocation, vesting such powers in distant governments makes it more difficult for the poor who may lack the resources to travel to get land and who are least able to go through the bureaucratic process. Indeed, one

\(^{39}\) Land allocation in some situations depends on paying tax, but many women in Machina do not pay tax. This deprives them from enjoying some of their rights as citizens like access to land or appointment to offices which require producing a tax receipt.
of the major criticisms against the Land Use Decree is that it has made acquisition of land by
the middle and upper absentee farmers much easier. Women, who in most cases have
restricted movement, face another form of discrimination.

In the next few paragraphs, I will examine how different people have different
relations to land in the community. Apart from gender and class, which were discussed in the
previous pages, settlement status and ethnic identity are important. These markers affect the
ability of institutions to reach the marginalized groups. Their ability to reach the marginal
groups also affects their ability to establish projects that are in the interest of those groups.
The incapacity of development institutions to make those changes limits their effectiveness as
"development" institutions.

Despite the fact that Machina lies in the sahel zone of the sahara, migration is
relatively high and there are many people who emigrate from Niger Republic. The rate of
immigration has increased with the making of Machina into a local government headquarters.
Many of those who have recently migrated to the community borrow, or hire or buy land for
farming, although buying land is not common. In some cases the migrants may ask the
community authorities for permission to farm a field that is not being used. Thirty-two
percent of female farmers and 25 percent of male farmers surveyed have access to land. The
female subjects are mostly non indigenes of Machina married to indigenes of Machina, while
few of this category of female farmers are divorcees. It is possible that after some years of
residence, they can be allocated land on a permanent basis. Similarly, 25 percent of the male
farmers are recent migrants to Machina.

In contrast to other parts of Yobe State where there are Kanuri pastoralists, in Machina
Fulbes are the major pastoralists. Fulbes also have a special relation to land. There are communities of settled Fulbes who get their land from the Ajia (District Head), or through their village authorities such as Ardo, Lamido and Wakili. They own and control the land that is allocated to them. The land is used for grazing as well as farming. There are also community grazing lands which are used both by Fulbes and members of the community around. Grazing lands are gazetted by the state or declared by local authorities. However, in the dry season, the settled Fulbes assume a different identity and status. The younger members of the community travel with the herd southwards towards the River Hadejia for grazing. They become transhumant and only return to their homes in the rainy season.

Young people who are not yet married depend mostly on family land and borrowing. It is not common for them to have their own land. Thus, they have access to land, but they do not own or control the land. It is not common for young females to farm on their own outside the family farming system.

In Dagona, farming is also the major income-generating activity of the people. One hundred percent of male and 38 percent of female respondents are involved in farming. Dagona has three types of farming in two types of land. The farming types are flood-recession, irrigation and rain-fed. The two types of land are the fadama (flood recession zone) and upland. The fact that NEAZDP was able to boost the productive capacity of Dagona more than that of Machina as will be discussed in the chapter on projects, is as a result of the different natural endowments of the two communities. However, as will be discussed later, in the process men and not women got richer. Similarly, the nature of soil of Dagona made it easier for DFRRRI to construct feeder roads in the community.
Land is allocated to the indigenes of the community similar to the situation in Machina. Individuals have access to land through their family and it is the family that owns and controls it. The river system is shared in a similar way. Each family has a portion of the river from which it can fish or draw water for irrigation. However, women have access only to upland land. Thus, the lucrative land for fadama (flood recession zone) and irrigation production are not accessible to women. In a survey of the community, 33 percent of the women who are involved in rain-fed production claim that they inherited their land from their parents and they control it. They also happen to be indigenes of the community. In contrast, 78 percent of the male farmers claim that they inherited fadama (flood recession zone) and upland irrigation land, and they control it. Furthermore, 100 percent of males own and control rain fed upland fields. They are also all indigenes of the community. The lack of access to the lucrative flood production by women has affected the gender differential in the types of projects NEAZDP implemented in the community, as will be discussed later.

Migration to Dagona is higher than to Machina. This is especially the case for seasonal migrants. There are a number of settled migrants around Dagona. These include Misilli, Lawandi and Manda villages. Within Dagona town there is a large group of migrants who are called Sakkwatawa⁴⁰. They form a large community who are mainly involved in

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⁴⁰ Sakkwatawa, meaning people from Sakkwato, are Hausas but a distinction is made between them and the other Hausas along the River Yobe. They are found in large numbers along the River Yobe. I guess they were displaced by desertification and the Bakolori dam and therefore decided to settle in other places. They are very hard working and industrious. In fact they are the most wealthy people in Dagona. They hardly involve themselves in other activities outside their community including sending their kids to school. Part of the distinction between them and the other Hausas is their occupation. Other Hausas are mostly traders and rain fed land (tudu) farmers whereas Sakkwatawas are involved in fadama (flood recession zone) agricultural activities, fishing, trading and rain fed land (tudu) farming.
fishing and *fadama* (flood recession zone) agricultural activities. In fact they are the ones who gave impetus to farming on the *fadama* (flood recession zone) and upland irrigation. However, they do not own land in the *fadama* (flood recession zone) or upland irrigated land: they have access to such lands through hiring. They have bought land in the upland rain fed zone which they also farm. Like women indigenes of Dagona, Sakkwatawa women are not involved in *fadama* (flood recession zone) or upland irrigation land farming. Among the Sakkwatawa, 63 percent of female farmers have access to land on the upland rain-fed land and 82 percent of men have access to land in the *fadama* (flood recession zone) and upland irrigation zone. All these categories of farmers are migrants.

Another group of immigrants in a situation similar to that of the Sakkwatawa are the Manga and Hausa communities in Dagona. They too do not own land in the *fadama* (flood recession zone) and the upland irrigation land, but they have access to it. They could buy upland rain-fed land.

Seasonal migrant farming is very prevalent in Dagona. Around August of every year tens of families of seasonal migrants from Kazaure, about 500 kilometres away come to farm. They are mainly involved in upland irrigation. They do not own the land they farm, but hire it from the indigenous population. They pay either in cash or in kind. Many of the migrant farmers also come with casual workers who are hired by wealthier indigenous farmers.

There are Fulbe communities in Dagona. Some of the Fulbes are settled while others come seasonally. Unlike in Machina, even the settled farmers do not own the land on which they farm and graze. Furthermore, Fulbes are not involved in *fadama* (flood recession zone) production, but farm on rain-fed upland land. They are increasingly marginalized from their
grazing land because of migration, expansion of upland land production and the introduction of new crops that are now produced in the period after harvest when Fulbes used to graze their livestock on crop residues. In contrast to Machina, settled Fulbes move northwards during the rainy season and come back to the banks of River Yobe in the dry season. However, because of the introduction of cash crops which grow in the dry season, there is pressure on them to look for other grazing fields. As a result, there are very few pastoral Fulbes who graze around Dagona in the dry season while many pastoral Fulbes graze in Machina territory during the raining season.

A group of people who can be classified by their social and geographical location and not in terms of their ethnic group, are absentee farmers. Since the introduction of the structural adjustment program, civil servants and those in business and other urban dwellers have taken more interest in agriculture in fadama (flood recession zone) production and upland irrigation production. This category of farmers has access to fertilizer, improved seeds, and water pumps. Most of them hire the land, but then enter into an agreement with an indigene to take care of the farm in exchange for water pump and access to fertilizer and improved seeds. At harvest time, the caretaker also expects to be given some percentage of the produce. This is a sharecropping system. However, absentee farmers who live in nearby urban centres may have a different form of relationship. They may hire land and employ others to take care of it on a cash basis.

Similar to the situation in Machina, younger people in Dagona have access to family land, but not individual land. Likewise, younger males are more likely to be engaged in farming than females.
Comparing the two communities, a clear pattern is discernible. The key determinants of access to land are status in the community: migrant or indigene, rich or poor, man or woman, form of marriage, married or unmarried and youth or adult. In both communities all seven variables are important to women, whereas only four of these variables are important to men. For men what is important is their gender, economic status, whether they are migrants, and their age. The communities differ in very important ways. In Machina gender is not as important as in Dagona in determining access to land. And migrants are more likely to get access to and control of land in Machina than in Dagona.

5.3.2 Profile of Farm Activities in Dagona and Machina

The significance of this section, though some readers may value it for its description, is to show how the different types of agricultural activities provide insight into what forms of technological intervention are possible and who benefits from such interventions. The sharp contrast between females and males in terms of access to land in Dagona is also reflected in the types of activities performed by the two groups. In fadama (flood recession zone) and upland irrigation productions, land preparation is done by males, hired labour or tractor. Male adults and male children also apply fertilizer, raise seeds and harvest crops. On the other hand, in rain-fed upland production, there is no significant difference in land preparation, weeding, planting, harvesting, and fertilizer application between males and females. However, threshing, winnowing and taking food to the farm are done almost exclusively by females. Male and female children help with taking food to the farm, planting, harvesting and fertilizer application (see Table 5.1).
None of the female farmers indicated that they have access to a tractor, an ox plough, improved seedlings, extension service, agricultural loans, pesticides or fertilizer. In comparison, 80 percent, 65 percent, 73 percent, 70 percent, 40 percent and 76 percent of males have access to a tractor, an ox plough, improved seedlings, extension service and pesticide respectively. The difference in access to these services may be interpreted as a reflection of the gendered access to types of land: all of these services are very important in fadama (flood recession zone) and upland irrigation production. But these types of farming are not accessible to women. However, improved seeds, extension services, tractors, ox ploughs and fertilizer are equally relevant to rain-fed upland production although not many people use them for that form of farming. Both male and female farmers have access to
family labour, but the former also have access to hired labour (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2
Access to Agricultural Technology and Services in Dagona and Machina
Dagona Machina
(Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox Plough</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Seedlings</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension Service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Loan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesticide</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Community Survey and Group Discussion 1993.

The types of crops grown are also an indication of the differential access to land between males and females. Fadama (flood recession zone) and upland irrigation farmers produce varieties of vegetables (e.g., pepper, onions), rice and wheat. The banning of the importation of the two cereals between 1985 and 1992 by the Babangida military regime led to an appreciable increase in state support for the production of these cereals (see Kolawole 1993, Kimmage 1991). Since males are the only producers of these crops, they are the beneficiary of the state support41. In rain-fed upland production, the variations in the types of

41 A major project on fadama production is soon to start on River Yobe with financial support from the World Bank. Development experts are likely to ignore the gender
crops grown by the two genders is not very significant. For example, in most cases watermelon is grown by women. Similar crops grown by both male and female farmers are millet, beans, corn, oil seed and bambara nut.

The types of farm implements used are not significantly different between male and female farmers. Both male and females use the hoe and the ashasha\(^ {42} \) for weeding. However, compared to Machina hoe is used more for weeding in Dagona than the ashasha. There are two probable reasons. First, the ashasha was introduced to Nigeria through Niger and Machina is closer to Niger than Dagona. Secondly, the ashasha can be more easily used in sandy soil and Machina is more sandy than Dagona.

The size and number of fields owned by males and females in Dagona vary significantly. The average number of fields owned by males is three and the total average size is seven acres. On the other hand, the average number of fields owned by females is one and the total average size is one acre. Whereas among women there is little variation in the size and number of fields used for farming, among male farmers there is a significant variation. Thirteen percent of male farmers farm on an average of three fields and average size of 15 acres, whereas 52 percent farm on average of two fields and average size of eight acres and 35 percent farm on a field and average size of four acres. Thus, there is a very important

\[^{42} \text{The ashasha is a long pole with a sharp blade in a bow shape tucked at one edge. The hoe is used in a bending position whereas the ashasha is used while standing. The hoe is a better tool for farming because it can form ridges, turn the top soil and protect the soil from erosion. Thus, there is the likelihood of a better yield. On the other hand, the ashasha is the opposite of the hoe.} \]
35 percent farm on a field and average size of four acres. Thus, there is a very important differentiation among male farmers. This significant variation between male farmers creates problems for institutional intervention. Unless the institution is very much aware of the situation, its agricultural projects could end up dominated by middle class farmers.

In Machina, agriculture is only practised in the rain-fed land and there is no significant difference in the major farm activities along gender lines. Similar to the situation in the upland rain-fed zone of Dagona, both men and women are involved in land preparation, planting, weeding, harvesting, and fertilizer application. However, 20 percent of male subjects employ others to clear their land and 5 percent use tractors for harrowing. None of the female farmers hire labour or tractors for the purpose of land clearing. Winnowing, threshing and taking food to farm are predominantly done by women.

The similarities in farm activities between male and female farmers in upland rain-fed land in the two communities are frequently explained by ecological cum biological factors: rain-fed land is mostly sandy and, therefore, it does not require much energy to work on the soil. Thus, both male and female farmers can perform similar activities on such soil. However, this argument is not tenable if one looks critically at the kinds of farm activities in the fadama (flood recession zone) production. Fadama (flood recession zone) production is heavily mechanized and the level of human labour is not as intensive as weeding or harvesting in the upland rain-fed production. The most likely explanation for gender differentiation and for gender inequality in fadama (flood recession zone) and upland rain-fed productions respectively is the introduction of more complex technology in the former and the retaining of relatively simpler technology in the latter. Hence, it is the monopoly of newer
technologies by men in the *fadama* (flood recession zone) that accounts for the difference.

The use of pesticides, fertilizers, tractors, improved seeds, ox ploughs and loans is generally low in Machina as compared to Dagona. However, even in Dagona many of these are used more in the *fadama* (flood recession zone) and upland irrigation production systems than the rain fed-upland production. State support for the *fadama* (flood recession zone) agriculture and upland irrigation is higher than rain-fed upland agriculture especially since the introduction of SAP. For example, agricultural loans are more readily available for *fadama* (flood recession zone) and upland irrigation production. The reasons for this are not far to seek. It is assumed those types of agriculture are more viable than rain-fed agriculture.

Furthermore, because of the ban on the importation of wheat between 1985 and 1992\(^43\), the government set up a national task force on the production of wheat. But, there is no similar task force on millet or maize despite the fact that only recently has wheat become very important in Nigeria, while millet and maize are two of the major cereals consumed by Nigerians. Despite the low availability of services like fertilizers, pesticides, tractors, improved seeds, ox ploughs and loans, there is a gender difference in accessibility to these services. No woman has access to the services but 5 percent, 16 percent, 27 percent, 18 percent, 10 percent and 6 percent of men make use of tractors, fertilizers, ox ploughs, improved seeds, extension services and loans respectively. No one has access to pesticides.

There is no significant difference in the types of crops grown by the sexes in Machina. Groundnuts, millet, guinea corn, beans and oil seeds are grown by both sexes. But legumes are produced more by women than men.

\(^43\) For a discussion on interest groups in the wheat sector of the economy see Gunilla Andrae and Bjorn Beckman (1985).
Both males and females use the hoe and *ashasha* for weeding. However, more women use the hoe than the *ashasha*. Seventy-three percent of women use hoe for weeding as against 24 percent of men.

Similar to the situation in Dagona, the average number of fields and the size of fields favours men over women in Machina. For men the average number of fields is three and the size of each field is four acres. For women, the average number of field is one and the size is one acre the same as in Dagona.

In summary, the pattern of access to, ownership of and control of land has a direct relationship with the activity profiles in the farm. What the discussion on activity profile in the farm suggests is a creative intervention by development institutions of supporting areas where people know what they are doing and at the same time, supporting projects which other people have been denied.

5.4 Profile of Household Activities in Machina and Dagona

The aims of this section, besides illuminating another aspect of life in these two communities, are to indicate the enormous work done by different people; to explore the possibility for labour-saving devices; and to analyze the extent of “domestic” activities and explore the possibilities for changing the situation. A survey of household reproductive activities shows that females undertake more activities than males in both Machina and Dagona. In Machina, 70 percent of washing clothes, 60 percent of dishes, 75 percent of sweeping, 90 percent of cooking, 82 percent of taking care of the sick, 50 percent of fetching water, 71 percent of taking care of the elderly, 55 percent of grinding, 64 percent of
dehusking and 36 percent of fetching fuel-wood are done by female adults. The other percentages of the rest of the activities in the household are done by female children, hired labour and machines. No male adult washes clothes, washes dishes, cooks, sweeps, grinds or dehusks. Male adults’ main activities are in fetching fuel-wood (38 percent), taking care of the elderly (29 percent) and fetching water (35 percent). Female children have more household responsibilities than the male children. Male children’s major contribution is in fetching water whereas female children are actively involved in washing dishes, cooking, sweeping, grinding and dehusking (see Table 5.3).

To valorize the domestic sphere, one could say that the house is predominantly a space for women in addition to their involvement in agricultural activities. Renee Pittin (1980, 20) said instead of the dominant ideology which argues that “women are secluded in their husband’s house,” an alternative ideology would argue that “men are excluded from the women’s world.” Similarly, she argues that a woman, even a stranger, has access to a house, but men may only have access to the entrance of a house. Renee Pittin’s argument is resonant of Michel Foucault’s position that power defines our understanding and language and elides the reality, experiences and practices of others (cited in Sawicki 1991).

The only two areas in household activities to which adult men contribute significantly are fetching fuel wood and water. These are activities where hired labour is more readily available than for the other activities which women do. One of the reasons for the predominance of male labour in fetching fuel wood and water could be ecological⁴⁴. As a

⁴⁴M. G. Smith has suggested some form of relationship between ecological changes and kulle (seclusion) in Northern Nigeria (Imam 1993). He suggests that seclusion developed much earlier in Hausa land than Borno and Nupe land because of the high water table in the former. High water table makes it possible to dig wells in compounds and
result of the increased desertification in the area, getting wood and water has become increasingly difficult. Secondly, as a result of the difficulty of getting fuelwood and water nearby, these activities have been commercialized. Men are the ones involved in this profitable business.

Therefore women need not to go out for such tasks. On the other hand, low water tables in Borno and Nupe land makes it necessary for women to go out to fetch water. However, I am making a more nuanced suggestion here. It is low water table in conjunction with commercialization which led to men participating in these activities. This is a theme for further research which I hope to take up.
Table 5.3
Profile of Household Activities in Machina and Dagona
Machina Dagona
(Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Labour/Children/Machine</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Labour/Children/Machine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washing Clothes</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing Dishes</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweeping</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking Care of the Sick</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fetching Water</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking Care of the Elderly</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grinding</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehusking</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fetching Fuelwood</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Community Survey 1993

The house activities of females in Dagona are only slightly different from those of Machina (see Table 5.3). Eighty percent of washing clothes, 73 percent of washing the dishes, 81 percent of cooking, 68 percent of sweeping, 74 percent of taking care of the sick, 67 percent of taking care of the elderly, 40 percent of grinding, 53 percent, 32 percent of
fetching fuelwood and 53 percent of fetching water are done by female adults. Male adults are involved in fetching fuelwood, washing clothes, taking care of the sick and the elderly. Female children and male children are also involved in fetching fuel-wood. Similarly, 24 percent of the respondents of the study buy fuel-wood. The major activity of male children is fetching water. This is a similar situation to the one in Machina.

Comparing the activities of females in the house and the farm in the two communities shows that females are more overworked in Machina than in Dagona. A higher percentage of women are actively involved in agriculture in Machina than in Dagona, but that has not reduced the level of women’s activities in the house in Machina. In addition, when a comparison is made between the reproductive role of women in the two communities, there is no significant difference. This has important implications for practitioners and scholars on women and development as well as feminists.

Of major concern to feminist proponents of participatory development are the extent and kind of opportunities and conditions for women to participate in development projects. These could be in terms of meetings, contributions in kind and cash as well as holding positions of responsibility. Some of these demand time commitment. If women, as we have suggested earlier, are very much engaged in different activities, one has to be conscious of the time demands that participatory development entails. One possible solution is to look at the activities of women and introduce labour saving devices and cooperative activities which will reduce the time demand on women.

Another concern of scholars and practitioners of women and development is to create and increase women’s access to income. It is assumed that more income will give women
more status and autonomy in society. Of course, income-generating activities also are in most cases politically safe. Autonomy for women and increase in status are assumed to follow automatically over time. The theoretical assumption is rooted in neo-classical liberalism: growth leads to trickle-down effects (Kabeer 1994, Moser 1993, Rathgeber 1990). However, while in Machina women are involved in several activities that can give them more income and more space of their own, there is no evidence that their status and autonomy are profoundly different from the women in Dagona.

One of the reasons women in Dagona are less overworked is that more of them are in kulle (a form of seclusion). Many might conclude that women in Machina have therefore greater freedom than in Dagona. But, a woman in kulle is not necessarily seen as oppressed by herself or by other people in those communities. In fact it can be a symbol of status for a woman to be excluded from the drudgery of farming and other activities outside the house45. For example, in an interview with Curaku Zazau on the experiences of seclusion when she was younger and now, she said: "Matan yanzu sunagin dadi, mu ai kamar bauta mukayiwa mazan mu," (“Wives of nowadays enjoy, we served our husbands.”) She was referring to the fact that she was in some form of seclusion only once when she was in Maiduguri. However, some of the literature on women in Muslim societies assumes that restriction on women’s movements is oppression without understanding the context of the various practices and the

45 According to Smith (1981,) one of the major distinctions in Hausaland between slaves and citizens was the involvement of the former in hard labour. With the abrogation of slavery and slave trade, non involvement of persons in the fields in hard labour became a symbol of emancipation. This enabled women to pursue various sanai’i (economic activities). Others such as Polly Hill (cited in Imam 1993) discussed the ecological reasons like high water table that partly explains the increase in seclusion. Imam (1993) argued that these reasons are bound up with Islamic discourses on the ideal position of women.
fact that women may use it for strategic advantages. Curaku Zazau’s comments could be condemned by some as false consciousness, but it is more useful to understand the context of these practices before condemning them outright. A blanket condemnation of others can also be politically inexpedient. To sum up this section, I have drawn attention to some of the constraint of “tradition” and why development intervention could fail. On the positive side, “traditions” are invented every day and therefore, development institutions could challenge them.

5.5 The Rhythm of Living in Dagona and Machina

What is the rhythm of living in these two communities? What are the daily and annual activities of the people? What is the intersection of different identities and how do they construct and shape different persons? Answers to these questions will help to illuminate the dynamics of rural life and the context and setting within which life is reproduced. More importantly, it will help to overcome several mistaken assumptions in the literature on Women In Development, neo-classical economics and conventional discourses on rural areas. A common assumption has been to discuss the household as a unit of analysis. The notion of household has been that of a male head of household and his wife and children. These

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46 For a view of Islam which is Orientalist see Barbara Callaway and Lucy Creevy (1994, and Barbara Callaway (1987). For a critique of some of Barbara Callaway’s writings see Ayesha Imam (1993). For a critique of Orientalism see Edward Said (1978) and Chandra Mohanty (1991) and for a more recent critique of the timelessness of Islam see Victoria Bernal (1994).

47 In discussing the rhythm of living in the two communities, I have chosen to emphasize the most important activity a person is involved in at a particular time. In reality people often engaged in more than one occupation.
assumptions do not take into consideration that each person is actually embedded in a whole network of social relations, and that households take different forms and patterns.

This section will throw light on the various forms of family structure in rural communities and the different types of economic activities. Looking at the full context of economic activities calls into question prevalent ideas about small-scale economic activities in rural communities. Many people are involved in very significant economic activities. Likewise, the focus on persons will overcome another problem in the development literature by questioning the prevalent idea that households have similar interests. My research will attempt to disaggregate the household with the intention of understanding the various interests and conflicts it contains. Life histories with their focus on individuals are invaluable to understand the rhythm of living in rural communities. I am presenting two of the six cases of life histories I collected.

5.5.1 Machina: Ya Tingiri

In the life histories of Ya Tingiri and Ibrahim, I will explore some of the ideas raised in the above paragraph.

Most people in the two communities are involved in multiple income-generating activities even if they may identify themselves primarily as farmers or housewives. Male and female adults tend to identify themselves as farmers and housewives respectively. Ya Tingiri who lives in Machina identifies herself as a housewife\textsuperscript{48} although she is also a farmer and petty trader. In fact, she is a better farmer than her husband who recently virtually abandoned

\textsuperscript{48} The identity of "housewife" is in most cases a status rather than an occupational category.
farming. Her husband does not think that farming is profitable any longer because of the high cost of labour and inputs as well as the uncertainty of rainfall and pests. Hence, the notion of a farmer as a husband with his wife which has informed agricultural development projects is contradicted by Ya Tingiri’s experience.

Her ethnic group is Manga and she was born about 40 years ago some 30 kilometres south of Machina. During one of her visits to her sister in Machina she met her current husband. She got married at the age of 16 and has remained in her first marriage. She is not the first wife of her husband; at the time she got married to him, he was a divorcee. Since then her husband has married two more wives.

Ya Tingiri, being the senior wife, enjoys some privileges and carries some responsibilities in relation to her co-wives and husband. She must see everything that the husband brings to the family including things like food and clothes which are meant for the co-wives and the children. The rooms in the house are arranged in order of seniority. Her room is the innermost since she is the first wife. She does not have to walk through the co-wives area to get to her husband’s room. It is her responsibility to share goods and services in the house and communicate to their husband some of the requests that the other co-wives might have.

At the initial stage of her marriage she was in some form of *kulle* (a form of seclusion) and enjoyed higher social status. She was not fetching water or fuel wood, grinding grain, farming, dehusking or winnowing. But from the eighth year of her marriage many of her activities began to change gradually. This was also about the time when her two co-wives joined her in the family. She started her farm and was carrying out most of the activities in
the farm. She began to dehusk, fetch water and winnow on some occasions. Her husband hires labour for some of these services occasionally. On most occasions her children help.

All her male children attend school except for the eldest who grew up with her mother-in-law. In fact one of her male children got admission to an elite school, but the cost was so high that the family decided to send him to a lower status school. None of the female children have attended any form of "western" school. This is the policy of the husband rather than her choice. For example, she laments her own lack of schooling noting that if she had attended even a primary school, she could have sought employment with the newly created local government in Machina. She remembers how her parents hid her in a barn or sent her to live with some of her relations in a different village whenever the time of registering children to school approached.

Apart from farming, she is a petty trader. She used to order goods from Kano, because it was cheaper. But her initial capital has been eroded by inflation, and because of the instability of prices it is better to buy goods on the weekly market of Machina where she can monitor prices. Her children, both males and females, help her in selling her wares in the community. She sells things like detergent, Maggi, matches and vegetable oil. Other people in the surrounding compounds also come to buy things from her. She has about 10 small ruminants and two cows. Her dream is to perform umra (the lesser pilgrimage) and stay to work in Saudi Arabia49. However, the cost of performing the umra has dramatically increased.

49 Although Nigerians have been travelling to Saudi Arabia to perform the pilgrimage as early as the 10th century, and there is a large community of Nigerians settled in places like Saudi Arabia and the Sudan since the 1980s, a new form of immigration to Saudi Arabia has become common. Many male Nigerians who are highly skilled are employed in Saudi Arabia legally. However, many low skilled Nigerians, many of whom happen to be women, illegally stay in Saudi Arabia after performing the pilgrimage. Most of them are
In 1989, when she initially conceived the idea, the cost was about N6,000.00 and she was only short by about N2,000.00, but, in 1993, the cost increased to N38,000.00 and she was short by N20,000.00. Performing the umra is an issue that has strained her relationship with her husband. He has not performed the umra and would not accept a situation in which his wife performs it before him and, worse of all, stays to work in Saudi Arabia.

She was not a member of any women's political organization nor was she a member of a political party. She was assumed by many people in the community to be a member of the NRC by association: her husband was a member of that party. She is involved with other women in adace\textsuperscript{50}. Whenever it is her turn to collect adace (community fund), she buys small ruminants and kare ngimbe (bride wealth). She considers them as an investment and safety net which she can dispose of whenever she needs money; she plans to use her investment especially for her journey to the holy land.

The time schedule of Ya Tingiri is different from some other women because she has two co-wives. Since there are two co-wives in the house, theoretically it means she has less work than if she were the only wife. Every woman has a ci (the day she is responsible for cooking for the family and sleeping with the husband). On that day, the particular wife has control over many of the things that happens in the house. But, Ya Tingiri has more children than any of the co-wives. She, therefore, has more than enough responsibilities even on a day employed as domestics. Among this group of women are those especially from Kano and Jigawa states.

\textsuperscript{50} This is also known as \textit{asusu} in many parts of Africa. In this particular adace which Ya Tingiri is involved in, she contributes five naira per week. There are other 20 participants in the adace. Every one contributes the same amount and it is given to one person every week except in an emergency situation in which it could be divided among a number of persons. The person who collects the money is not paid.
which is not her ci. Moreover, in a polygynous relationship there are more responsibilities for mothers since the father is likely to have other children to take care of. A good percentage of her expenditure is devoted to taking care of her children and making their lives comparable to, if not better than the children of the co-wives.

Her daily activities start as early as 5.30 am. This is the time she performs morning prayer and spends some time supplicating. She greets her neighbours and co-wives and wakes up the children. After bathing the children, she gives each one of them their pocket money to buy their breakfast. The male children are dressed to go to school while the female child stays at home. She feeds her animals in the morning.

After the children have gone to school, she discusses with the other co-wives the things required in the house. She communicates the requests to the husband or to the co-wife whose ci it is that day, who tells the husband. People come to buy things like sugar, salt and Maggi cubes.

During the farming period she leaves for her farm after breakfast with a request to the co-wife whose ci it is that day, that when the children come for their breakfast break from school, they take the animals to community grazing. It is the responsibility of the co-wife whose ci it is that day to give food for all the children.

She works on the farm until about 12 noon when it is really hot in Machina. On her way back from the farm she collects some fuel wood. She rests until afternoon prayer, at about 2pm; this is also time for afternoon meal. She packages granulated sugar, salt and Maggi in small quantities to sell. Her children and the other co-wives help her. She does the dishes herself since she has no grown-up female child. She also washes her clothes and those
of the small children who can not do so on their own. She looks after the children of the co-
wife whose it is that day.

She goes back to the farm after late afternoon prayers to check the farm and see
whether pastoralists have allowed their animals to destroy her crops. She stays in the fields
until about sunset prayer. She normally eats her dinner with the other co-wives after their late
night prayer. She spends some time talking with her co-wives and neighbours before
preparing the children to go to bed. She goes to bed at about 10pm.

5.5.2 Dagona: Ibrahim

Ibrahim lives in Zango ward of Dagona. The ward is occupied by the Takalis (an
ethnic group) or Sakkwatawa (people from Sokoto) only. He is married to Amina and they
have four children. He migrated to Dagona from Sokoto State with his parents when he was
about four years old. That was about 60 years ago. He is the only one in the ward whose

As indicated above, Machina people are in the traditionalist camp of Islam and
this is the reason many people after saying their Magrib prayer, wait in the mosque to say the
lesa and then eat their dinner. On the other hand, the revivalists tend to disperse after the
Magrib and eat their dinner and come back to say the late night prayer.

Zango is a settlement of newcomers to the community. In Dagona, Zango ward
is inhabited by Sakkwatawa mainly. Other ethnic groups who settle in the community like
Hausa and Manga live with the indigenous ethnic group rather than in a clearly demarcated
ward like Zango. In many of the cities of Muslim northern Nigeria, settlements are clearly
delineated according to religion and ethnic groups because of the colonial policy of Indirect
Rule. This pattern of settlement is now changing. Thus, Bimi (city), is the settlement of the
indigenes, Tudun Wada, and Zango is the settlement of Muslims from other part of northern
Nigeria and Sabon Gari, is occupied by non northern Nigerians and Christians. In other parts
of Nigeria, Sabo is the ward inhabited by Muslims from northern Nigeria. Sabo simple means
new.

114
children consistently attend primary school\textsuperscript{53}. Although he did not attend a primary school, he hopes his children will benefit from it and continue their studies up to post-primary level.

Ibrahim is an industrious person. He hires 22 acres in the fadama (flood recession zone) to produce rice and he has 10 acres in the upland rain-fed area where he plants millet, maize and guinea corn. In his upland irrigation, he produces vegetables. He owns three water pumps for irrigation and has access to tractors. His family labour is very important, but he also hires extra labour.

Compared to other farmers, who are mainly involved in upland rain-fed agriculture, Ibrahim’s status has increased. Since 1990, he has built a new house and bought a truck. Apart from farming, he is a trader. He buys fish, mats and raffia and sells them in Dagona and neighbouring markets or takes them to long distance markets. Although the purchasing prices of these commodities have increased, he passes the increase on to consumers. He has a truck which transports goods and people to neighbouring markets.

In June 1993, he was a member of the NRC, but he was not involved actively in partisan politics. According to him "\textit{kasuwa itace sivasa na}" ("the market is my politics.") Although the NRC was in control of the local government council, he had never gone there to seek anything. There is a general pattern in the community of the Takali not to identify themselves with most of the activities in the community, state authorities and functions.

His annual time budget is very tight because of the multiplicity of activities he is engaged in. In January, he weeds his rice fadama (flood recession zone) farm. Most of the

\textsuperscript{53} The primary school in Dagona near to Zango, the ward where the Takalis live but this has not encouraged them to send their children to the school. This is not particularly Dagona problem. In places like Gashua, and Dumburi there is a similar situation.
weeding is done by himself and hired labour. Similarly, it is the period of harvesting of vegetables in the upland irrigation zone where he works mostly in the evening. Most of the vegetables are sold in the market immediately because of preservation problem. By March it is time for harvesting rice. With the help of family labour and other hired workers, rice is harvested and moved to the house. He also buys rice from other farmers at a cheaper price and stores it to sell later. Soon after harvest time, he travels about eight times to Lagos to sell rice. April to May is the peak period of fishing, but he rarely catches fish. He buys smoked fish to sell. Likewise, he buys raffia and mats and sells them in neighbouring markets.

In May, preparations for the upland rain-fed crops starts. When the land is prepared, he waits for the signs of the changing wind system. He takes the risk to plant his crops before the first rainfall so that when the first rain falls, he has a head start.

Activities on the farm from June to December are as follows. June to August is weeding and by September, it is harvest time. However, Ibrahim has to combine harvesting in the upland rain-fed fields with *fadama* (flood recession zone) activities. By August, land preparation is done by tractor. Rice is planted with the help of family labour. This is a trying period for all farmers as they wait for the flow of the river to reach their farm. Land preparation in upland irrigation starts about the same time. Vegetable seeds are germinated to be transplanted by September. October to December is weeding period in vegetable farms.

5.6 Conclusion

I started the chapter with an outline of the relations to land in Dagona and Machina, and showed how the status of being indigene or immigrant, woman or man, rich or poor,
married or not, young or old could make a difference in both communities. The different patterns of access to and control of land in both communities also have a strong relationship with the activity profile in the farm. Similarly, there is a strong gender division of labour at the level of the household. I concluded with the rhythm of living in the two communities by exploring the life histories and work calendar of a woman and a man.

In this and the previous chapter, I discussed the contexts of the communities where the research was conducted. In both chapters, the aim was to show the divergent interests in the communities, and their likely implications for the implementation of any policy reform. The contending interests in the communities and the household means that conscious efforts have to be made to reach the marginalized in both communities. I do not consider contending interests as reasons for discouragement. Rather they are challenges for development institutions seeking to facilitate gender and other forms of social justice in the communities. Development institutions will do better by consciously recognizing the divergent interests and work to legitimize the interests and the voices of groups that are marginalized and silenced. For instance, in some situations, the most important intervention could be facilitating individual ownership of land through credit and for others it could be using influence by the institutions to give people access to land. At another level, the concern could be policy and not “development”. For example, there could be a collaboration between Better Life and NEAZDP to engage the state in policy debate on access and control of land. The differential access to land by people of different markers (class, gender, age, settlement, marital status) has implications for who controls what in the communities: the beneficiaries of a project could be determined by the position of the groups rather than by equality of opportunity.
Another example of institutional intervention is a need to incorporate projects on gender awareness, subordination and sensitivity. Indeed, one of the concerns of feminists about women in development is that questions of social relations are not raised. Hence, institutional intervention should not be only about "development", but also policy and politics.

There are seven valuable lessons for institutional intervention in the lives of Ya Tingiri and Ibrahim. One, both of them are engaged in different economic ventures which could be undertaken. Two, simple labour saving technology could be very useful. Three, stronger policy intervention on girls' education could be made. Four, although institutional intervention has to be sensitive to the "traditions" of the communities, there is no uncontested "tradition". Five, institutions of development have to be realistic about time demands made on local people because many people are engaged in other activities. Six, for women some of the key issues in their lives are beyond the conventional discourse of development. Seven, there is a tendency for development to be appropriated by the rich and powerful in the communities.

This chapter concludes the discussion on contextual matters: the themes of politico-historical, socio-economic and identity relations. The prime reason for introducing these themes is to caution against the over optimism of institutionalists: the sad reality is that it takes a very long time and conscious effort to achieve the objectives of any institutional reform. In the next chapter, I will discuss the introduction of new institutional arrangements and how they have been shaped by the context of the communities.
Chapter 6  Institutions of Development in Dagona and Machina.

6.1 Introduction

In the two previous chapters, I outlined the contexts of the two communities and their implications for institutional reform. In this chapter, I will introduce the variables on institutions: institutional strategy, autonomy and resources. While the institutional variables are initially discussed as independent variables, I will later show that they are also conditioned by the context of the communities. This chapter is therefore concerned with institutional strategy, autonomy, resources and how the context of a community (socio-economic inequality, identity politics and historico-political pluralism) influence institutions. I pose the questions: What are the strategies devised by DFRII, Better Life and NEAZDP to implement grassroots ownership and control? What are the resources available to these institutions? How autonomous are the institutions? How have the socio-economic, different identities and historical-political contexts of the communities affected the institutions?

In a bottom-up strategy, the institutions established by development programs are supposed to facilitate conversations with the grassroots in the local communities to identify their needs, their contributions to a project, and their involvement in implementation. The people at the grassroots are also supposed to be involved in decision making and evaluation. The key issues are how the institutional structure at the local level facilitates local control and ownership of the project. Inclusiveness is an important criterion of judging participation. One of the major principles of a bottom-up strategy is to give voice to the marginalized in a community. Thus, in evaluating a bottom-up strategy, the concern is to analyze to what extent
the participants and the organization of participants reflect the diversity (class, gender, ethnic, partisan politics, age) of a community. In the same vein, how autonomous an institution is, is very critical. While there should be a concern for public accountability, there is a danger that if an institution is very closely controlled or associated with those who control political power, the institution’s ability to independence might be compromised. Thus, in evaluating the autonomy of an institution, I will try to explore the relationship between those in power and the institution. The third variable is resources. I define resources as financial and human. I am interested in exploring the differences and similarities in the sources of funding, level of funding, quality of staff and the working condition of staff between the three institutions.

I caution that while institutional arrangements do alter the terrain of development, the context within which institutional arrangement is made is likely to be more difficult to change especially in the immediate future. Institutions, therefore, become hostage to local contexts. Further, institutions are also bearers of various social markers including gender, class and ethnicity.

I will show in the chapter that although the development programs have developed a strategy to facilitate local ownership and control, NEAZDP’s strategy is more bottom-up than the others. The Better Life and DFRRI have merely appropriated the language of bottom-up strategy while in reality their strategy is one of top down manipulation. Similarly, while NEAZDP is relatively autonomous, both Better Life and DFRRI are not. In terms of resources, NEAZDP has more resources than the other institutions. However, the inability of an institution to perform better than others is not only conditioned by the shortcomings of the development institutions but also affected by the social structures of the communities. Since
gender, age, economic level, partisan politics and ethnicity have been shown to be important markers in the previous chapters, they are likely to reflect on the strategy of institutions. These variables partly explain the differences in performance of NEAZDP in the two communities of Dagona and Machina.

The chapter is organized in the following order. In the first part I will discuss the theory of institutional strategy developed by the three development programs and compare them with their practices. I intend, therefore, to discuss NEAZDP's theory and compare it with the practice of NEAZDP in Dagona and Machina. I will relate institutional strategy to institutional resources and autonomy. I will follow a similar format in discussing DFRRI and the Better Life.

In the second part, I examine the issue of how the context of the communities has shaped the implementation of the institutions. In particular I will assess the extent to which the institutions have overcome forces of exclusion and marginalization in Dagona and Machina.

6.2 Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy in NEAZDP

6.2.1 The Theory of Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy

From the very beginning, NEAZDP tried to carve an image different from some of the previous experiences of rural development programs in Nigeria. But a full strategy of bottom-up control and ownership and autonomy with appropriate resources evolved only over a period of three years.

The strategy NEAZDP evolved is best revealed in discussions of three important
discrete and overlapping phases in a project cycle: project initiation, implementation and evaluation. I will discuss the institutional strategy to facilitate the theory of bottom-up at each of these three phases.

Communities have different ways of knowing about NEAZDP. It can be by listening to its radio program Daga Karkara (From Rural Areas) which broadcasts over Radio Nigeria, Kaduna or hearing about the activities of the Program from neighbouring communities. In some instances local communities make the first contact with NEAZDP and they express their interest to be part of the Program. However, in most cases, it is the program that decides which communities will be invited to take part. Once NEAZDP decides to start projects in an area, the Mass Mobilization Unit of the Community Awareness and Mass Mobilisation (CAMM) Component of the NEAZDP is responsible for initiating a public awareness campaign to explain the nature and activities of the program. Normally, the people in the community meet in the palace of the traditional ruler to listen to the messages of NEAZDP.

The first requirement for a village to be accepted by NEAZDP is the existence of an organization of the local people: Village Development Association (VDA). If there is no

54 The first head of CAMM was a British citizen who worked in Borno State Ministry of Education for a long time. He was replaced after his contract expired by Baba Mallam Wali Shettima (not a relation of the researcher) as part of NEAZDP's strategy to cede ownership to the local people. Shettima before then headed the Field Team. Before secondment to NEAZDP, Shettima worked as a Principal Secretary to a Borno State Governor, Research Officer in the Governor's Office, Social Mobilization Officer Nguru Local Government, and Planning Officer in the Lake Chad Basin Development Authority. After the change of government in November 1993, he was recalled to the Governor's Office as Director of Administration. He has a Masters degree in Rural Development from A.B.U. Zaria. The officer responsible for social mobilization is Jinjiri Abubakar, whose experience of social mobilization started as Social Mobilization Officer of the Geidam Local Government Authority. Before then he worked as an Administrative Officer in Chad Basin Development Authority. He holds a B.Sc in Political Science from the University of Maiduguri.
VDA, one is established on the initiative of NEAZDP. On the other hand if a VDA exists, it is restructured to make it more accountable to the local people, if it is not so already. This is also meant to make the institution autonomous.

Having established the first basic structure of a bottom-up strategy, VDAs, the next stage is the deployment of staff to the Development Area (DA). In the early stage of NEAZDP, only Development Area Promoters (DAPs) were deployed. They were also expected to act as Village Development Promoters (VDPs). This has been changed so that different persons are appointed as VDPs and DAPs. NEAZDP expects that DAPs to be apolitical, hold no influential position in the community which might influence their judgement, be resident in the pilot village, hold a professional qualification relevant to rural development, hail from the Program Area and preferably the Development Area (DA), and be honest and respected in the community and be able to speak with authority (NEAZDP 1992, 5). Besides attending regular meetings at the headquarters, they are also expected to visit each village under their jurisdiction at least once a month. DAPs also have responsibilities for formulating Village Development Plans for the Development Area and implementing them in liaison with other development workers in the area, for selecting VDPs in conjunction with the communities and training them, and for participating in monthly technical meetings (NEAZDP 1992, 6).

The working condition of DAPs is relatively good. They are the best paid civil

55 Many of the NEAZDP staff were teachers before their secondment. It seems that being a teacher in a rural area is enough preparation to work as a rural animator. Moreover, teachers are very important persons in various communities because they sustain many activities in different communities. But for the change in incentives away from public service and teaching in particular especially since SAP, teachers in most communities were regarded as second only to the 'traditional' ruler in prestige.
servants in the communities where they work. Their basic salary is paid by the state government while the program pays them allowances that are sometimes twice their salaries. In addition, the Program builds and furnishes offices for each DAP and gives them housing loans to ease their accommodation problems. Furthermore, they are provided with vehicles to ease their transportation problems, and in September 1993, there was a discussion about whether to give the vehicles as loans to the DAPs or give them a different vehicle loan.

Apart from the direct material benefits, DAPs have other indirect incentives relating to career development. They are given in-house training, including a monthly seminar, study tour in Nigeria and in other African countries like Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and short-term training in institutions of learning both in Nigeria and Europe. Other non-material benefits that many DAPs have talked about are the opportunity given to them to know more about the Program Area and the friendships they develop both in the Program and in communities where they work.

The management of NEAZDP is made up of competent personnel hired at the international level. All the components’ heads are Europeans with the exception of a Zambian, Mr. Tambo, who is the head of Appropriate Technology. Nigerians are appointed as their assistants to understudy their work. A phased process of replacing the components heads with Nigerians has been put in place. The salaries of the expatriates are paid at an international level. They also receive several allowances, and have access to different facilities such as vehicles, and recreation.

One aspect of NEAZDP’s bottom-up strategy is at the level of initiation of projects. A decision to initiate projects is supposed to be made at the meeting of the VDA. For
productive projects, a group of persons are selected to benefit from the project in a meeting of the VDA while in social projects management committees are set up by the VDA. Apart from the VDA, projects can be initiated through occupational associations.

Each project document designed by the Program specifies the contributions of the Program and that of the participants. For instance, in a social project like establishing a maternity home, the Program contributes some amount of money while the community contributes mainly labour. The value of the labour input is computed in monetary terms. In productive projects like ox teams, the Program contributes a specified amount of money while the beneficiaries also contribute a specified amount to cover the full cost of the project. In principle, the whole community is responsible for repayment of loans. The reason behind this idea is to induce collective rather than individual responsibility. It is assumed that collective sanction and public opinion of the community will ensure repayment more effectively than individual collateral would.

The Program ensures some form of autonomy in the process of disbursement of funds. Monetary contribution by the Program is deposited directly in the Village Development Association's account in a bank and the beneficiaries draw their money from it. Repayments from productive projects are paid into the Village Development Association's account and it is used to fund other projects in the community or the Development Area. A 6 percent interest rate is charged for each loan. In social projects which require community labour or other forms of contributions, the VDA decides on how to organize their contributions. Funds for socially oriented projects are not repaid, but in some communities user charges are introduced for the purpose of sustainability of the projects.
Monitoring and evaluation of projects is undertaken by a special component of NEAZDP established in 1991\textsuperscript{56}. Local communities are not involved in the process. In addition, outside agencies are contracted by the EU in liaison with NEAZDP to review projects implemented by the Program.

NEAZDP made two very significant innovations in 1991 which have significance for bottom-up strategy, autonomy and resources. These innovations are part of the learning process in the organization. The first innovation was the appointment of indigens of villages where NEAZDP operates as Village Development Promoters (VDPs). Previously, as noted above, the DAPs also acted as VDPs. The new style VDPs are not paid by the Program, because the community is supposed pay them. In reality, however, communities rarely pay them money. Instead, they offer other forms of appreciation of the work done by the VDPs. These include community work on the farm of the VDP, massive community involvement in ceremonies of the VDP, and donations in kind. As an incentive as well as a demonstration of micro-enterprise, NEAZDP extends loans to VDPs. However, communities pay the VDP if he or she has to travel to the DA or NEAZDP headquarters to report a problem. The bond of friendship that has developed among VDPs is so strong that some of them travel to visit one another at their own expense.

The expected characteristics of a VDP include being resident and actively involved in the community’s activities, being literate, and willing to be trained and to train others in the

\textsuperscript{56} The head of the unit is Kevin Kimmage. He conducted doctoral research in the Yobe basin just before he was appointed. Previously, he was a lecturer at Cambridge. By the end of 1994, he was expected to be replaced by Adam Modu, my research counterpart during the field work. He has a first degree in Education (Biology). Before joining NEAZDP, he was teaching in a secondary school.
community (NEAZDP 1992a, 9). A VDP's responsibilities include holding regular meetings with the community and mobilizing them, reviewing the activities of NEAZDP in the community and submitting proposals, acting as demonstration agent, reporting emergency cases to the DAP, and mobilizing the community to protect their environment (NEAZDP 1992a, 10).

The second innovation in 1991 was the Village Development Plan. Hitherto, projects were implemented haphazardly. This does not mean there were no meetings with the communities before projects were conceived and implemented. What was lacking was a systematic framework. Then one of the staff of the Program, who was in charge of the Field Team and later the head of CAMM/Field Team, Baba Mallam Wali Shettima wrote a memo suggesting the need to organize Village Development Plans. After some revisions to the memo, it became a policy of the program to devise Village Development Plans for each

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57 Two interesting VDP's I met in the course of the field research are those of Wakili Kedi and rugan Ardo Bingel, two Fulbe settlements. In general the level of 'Western' literacy is low among the Fulbes because of the nature of their livelihood. Some are predominantly transhumant and some of those classified as sedentary also take their animals to other areas where there is easier access to water and grass especially during the dry period. It is mostly younger members of the family who go with the animals. The Nigerian government launched a national program on nomadic education in the mid 1980s to provide education to nomads. When I requested the VDP in Wakili Kedi to show me his report, I could not read it because he writes and reads in Ajami, Hausa written in Arabic script. Even the DAP is not literate in the language.

I found my inability to read Arabic quite a handicap. In one of the communities, I attended a burial ceremony and found myself sitting in the Ulemas section. When I was passed a section of the Quran to read, I had to make excuses. Of course when they started distributing sadqat (alms) for those in that section, they remembered that I was not one of them.

What is interesting about the VDP in Ragan Ardo Bingel is that he did not complete his primary education yet he is very useful to the community because he is the only person who can keep records in Roman numerals in the community.

58 Not related to the researcher.
village where it operates. Hence, about September of every year, a team from the program visits every village to discuss with representatives of the community and the traditional authorities what are their needs and priorities for the following year. A final decision on what projects will be implemented in the villages is decided at the Program headquarters. However, whatever decision is made, it is a compromise taking account of the inputs of the community, available resources in the Program, budget allocation to each village, and technical feasibility. The final document that emanates from this process is called the Work Program-Cost Estimates.

An important development in the evolving process of local ownership of projects is the increased involvement of local government authorities since 1992. Even prior to that, both the Yobe State government and the local government authorities in the Program Area had been involved in different aspects of the NEAZDP projects. Perhaps the most important are the secondment of their staff and use of their facilities by the Program. This has considerably reduced the overhead and current expenditure of NEAZDP. However, since

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59 There are two significant reasons for the expanded role of local governments. First, at the national government, the Babangida regime (1985-1993) was committed to make local governments more involved in "development". Secondly, NEAZDP is of the view that involving local governments is one form of local ownership of projects.

60 Most of the Staff were seconded from the Borno and Yobe States civil service and the local governments in the Development Areas. Thus, their salaries are paid by these governments while allowances are paid to them by NEAZDP. There are some staff who were directly hired by NEAZDP and therefore, their salaries are paid by the Program. But in 1993, the Program sent a list of all these staff to the Yobe State government to be absorbed in to the civil service. This is to guarantee them a career beyond NEAZDP. Similarly, NEAZDP uses many of facilities set up by different levels of government. For example, instead of building a new clinic where an old one exists, the old one is renovated or supplied with new equipment. This considerably reduces the cost incurred by the Program.
1992, NEAZDP has involved the local governments in the process of the village development plans. Local government representatives are invited to attend village development plan meetings. In each village meeting, they are asked what are their plans for the village or which requests put forward by the villagers they would be responsible for. The involvement of the local governments in the process of village development plans is a very important departure because on their own they hardly ever involve local people in making their budgets. It is their first serious exposure to bottom-up strategy methods. This process is also the starting point of institutional integration.

To strengthen extension services, Field Technicians are employed and deployed to the various DAs. They are the major extension officers. They provide extension messages on topics ranging from irrigation to community learning.

There are gender implications of the institutional mechanisms so far implemented. By 1993, despite the elaborate efforts to involve the community in the activities of NEAZDP projects, it was obvious that one section of the community had been left out: women. None of the 18 DAPs or, about 40 of the field technicians, and only 1 of the 352 VDPs in the Program, were women. Similarly, women were only partially involved in the village development plan meetings, they were not part of the VDA meetings, and the Women’s Development Unit of the Program was understaffed. Likewise, apart from very few women in the Primary Health Care and Women’s Unit, there was only one other woman working as a subject specialist. Most of the women in the Program headquarters are clerks.

In order to improve the situation, NEAZDP asked all DAPs in conjunction with the Women’s Development Coordinator in the Community Awareness and Mass Mobilization to
identify Women DAPs and VDPs for all the DAs and cluster pilot villages respectively. These women have been identified by the Program and all of them are willing to be trained as DAPs and VDPs. In choosing the women DAPs and VDPs, mostly married women were selected. The selection of married women was intended to get "legitimacy" and "respect" from the communities. The Program solicited and obtained the consent of the spouses of the women. Getting the consent of spouses is very important because technically spouses are under the guardianship of their husbands. At the same time, the number of Women Development Coordinators has been increased to four from one in order to provide effective supervision of women projects.

In summary, by 1993, a process of bottom-up strategy, autonomy and resource provision had by and large evolved. The structures, processes and officers are VDAs, Women's Committees, DAPs, VDPs, Village Development Plans, the involvement of local government authorities in the process, adequate financial control and decision making in the villages and community contribution to all projects. In the next section I assess the actual implementation and problems of NEAZDP strategy in Dagona and Machina.

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61 My assessment of NEAZDP is more favourable than that given by the ITAD (1993). Some of the basis of their criticisms simply demonstrates ignorance of the Program. For example, they accuse the Program of erecting shelter belts but, the Program has not implemented any shelter belt. Further, the team in my opinion is harsh when they argue that the Program is authoritarian and over centralized and that there is need to give authority of projects to communities. In my opinion it is better to establish the process of ownership and control more gradually. However, there are very important points which they make such as preoccupation of the Program with transfer of resources and rapid implementation of projects without ensuring their economic sustainability.
62.2 The Experience of Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy

Dagona is one of the longer-running DAs of NEAZDP. I add to the "objective" reasons (see Chapter 1) for choosing Dagona as a research site, the fact that it is one of the nine pilot DAs which started in 1990. The headquarters of the Development Area is called the pilot village while the other villages in the DA are called the cluster villages. In Dagona Development Area, there are 18 cluster villages with Dagona as the Pilot Village. There was a Dagona Development Association before NEAZDP, but it was restructured because most of the leaders of the association were civil servants living and working in urban areas. Hence, a local branch of the association was formed whose leaders reside in Dagona. A separate Women's Development Committee was created to advance the interest of women. Although there was a form of women's institution in Dagona prior to NEAZDP as discussed in Chapter 4, but it was not a "development" institution. Also, women were not members of the Dagona Development Association. A similar pattern developed in other cluster villages: where there were VDAs, they were restructured if necessary and where there were none, new ones were created. For instance, there was no VDA in Tagali and therefore one was created while in Dawayo there was the Lan Kobo Youth Cultural and Rural Development Association.

In 1991, when NEAZDP started a second set of DAs, Machina was one of the nine new areas. Thus, by the end of 1991, there were 18 DAs and each of these areas covered 18 villages in the Program Area. The DAs were chosen to represent all parts of the Program.

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62 A similar problem occurred when the Dagona Community Bank was set up. Most of the initial members of the Board were urban based elites including a Lieutenant Colonel who was at that time a military governor. But this was found to be incompatible with the spirit of community banks and the guidelines of the National Board of Community Bank and therefore a new Board composed of local people was elected to replace it.
Area on the assumption that they would induce self help initiatives in the nearby communities not covered by the Program. In Machina, there was a development association before NEAZDP. In fact, it was a very active association involved in different forms of community development activities. Similar associations were formed in other villages where there were none.

After the establishment of the VDAs, two officers were deployed to Dagona Development Area as Development Area Promoters. These officers were Salisu Jawi and Bashir Bukan Albishir and they were based in Dagona and Tigali respectively. In addition to their responsibility as DAPs, they served as VDPs. In 1991, Albishir moved to Machina as the DAP. In Machina, the VDP is Kallah Ba Buji. He is a primary school teacher and community activist. He is very well known as letter reader and writer for the people in his ward.

In Dagona, projects are in most cases decided at the meeting of the VDA and there are occupational associations (for example fishers) through which projects are initiated and implemented. Similarly, there are several committees formed to manage various projects (for

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63 The two officers were Salihu Jawi and Bukar Bashir Albishir. Albishir was later transferred to start Machina Development Program Area while Jawi is still (June 1995) the DAP of Dagona. Both are graduates of the University of Maiduguri. Jawi holds a Bsc Geography and Albishir graduated with a Bsc Education (Social Studies and French). Jawi was a Community Development Inspector before secondment to NEAZDP. He also holds a Diploma in Integrated Rural Development from the Pan African Institute for Development in Cameroon. Jawi is judged by the Program as one of the best DAP's while Albishir is among the second best in the Program. Each of them has gone through in-house and outside training. There was an initial 3 weeks in-house basic training on the role of DAPs, a study tour of several rural development and research institutes in Niger and Burkina Faso, a monthly training session which covers such issues as pest control and participatory rural appraisal, and village training programs. Jawi also attended the Agricultural Research and Management Training Institute in Ilorin in 1993.
example water and health). In Machina, unlike the situation in Dagona, there are no committees on different aspects of NEAZDP projects. Similarly, occupational associations are not involved in the process of getting projects started.

In both communities, in the implementation of productive projects which require contribution by the beneficiaries, some of them make their contributions while others only use the money provided by the Program: the requirement that a beneficiary must contribute has not been enforced. Similarly, the principle that the whole community is responsible for the repayment of any loan has rarely been enforced in either communities.

In Dagona, community labour in NEAZDP projects is relatively high, but it is mostly the older generation who are actively involved. The possible reason is that the older generation is the major beneficiary of NEAZDP productive projects (see the next chapter). Thus, the younger generation seems to be saying "kowa yaci ladan kuturu yayi masas aski" ("whoever benefits from a leper should serve him as well"). On the other hand, in projects that require community labour in Machina, people are levied and the money is used to pay for hired labour. There are several possible reasons for the variations between Machina and Dagona. As discussed in chapters four and five Machina is more cosmopolitan than Dagona, it is bigger, and political contestation is more vigorous. Hence, it is more difficult to get people to work together as a community. It is a paradox that, as we have seen in Chapter 5, farm work that involves kin and kith is more easily organized in Machina than Dagona.

Apart from the above discussed variations and problems, there are other issues to which it is worth drawing attention. Although there is supposed to be a Women’s Committee separate from the Village Development Association in each village where there is a NEAZDP
project, in reality it is only in villages where there is a women’s project that Women’s Committees have been formed. Moreover, even in those cases where there are women’s projects, the DAPs and VDPs have not taken much interest in them. For instance, the DAP in Dagona candidly expressed his uncomfortable feelings about working with women because of his religious views. Furthermore, the women DAPs and VDPs had not started working in September 1993 several months after they were identified nor was it clear at that time what was to be their real position vis-a-vis the male VDPs and DAPs. Were the female DAPs to be paid like their male counterparts? Would each receive a motor vehicle like their male counterparts and would each of them receive the generous loans received by their male counterparts? The possibility of unhealthy rivalry between these officers cannot be ruled out.

Another issue arising from the process of establishing the VDAs and WDCs is that the meeting is usually held in the local palace. There are good reasons for that. It is both legally and strategically important for NEAZDP to have the support of the traditional authorities. In most communities, the prominent legal authority is the traditional ruler despite the local government reforms of the 1960s and 1970s which have formally reduced their powers. In addition, as a technical and management organization, it assumed that traditional authorities were well respected, close to the grassroots, well informed about the problems of the local people, and neutral with respect to political divisions in the local communities. Similarly, it is not in the interest of a new program to start by alienating the local authorities, and in fact it is necessary to start with their support especially for development programs. For example, NEAZDP appreciates the fact that the Emir of Machina supports their Program. One of the actions of the Emir which NEAZDP is very happy about happened in 1993. The Emir was
interviewed on a NEAZDP radio program, Daga Karkara (From the Rural Areas) in which he explained the dangers of desertification and the importance of planting trees. He also asked each person in the emirate to plant four seedlings. The Program, therefore, see traditional authorities as partners and allies in the task of rural development. This may be the case in some situations, but can not be universalised. It is strategically important for NEAZDP not to be seen aligning itself with the power structures in the community. Otherwise it can become implicated in local power struggles.

A good example of how NEAZDP undermined the capacity of local people is the experience of the Machina Emirate Development Association. This association existed before NEAZDP. However, the coming of NEAZDP to the community has compromised its independence. The Emir of Machina has a strong interest in the local association in Machina, and because his son is the DAP, he has significant influence on the association. For example, the local association meets for all NEAZDP activities in the Emir’s palace, and the people who were the local leaders of the association before the coming of NEAZDP have been marginalised. By contrast, the national DA has distanced itself from the Emir and maintained its independence. Similarly, unlike the Machina branch of the association, the national body meets in the primary school which is seen as a neutral ground. It is in the interest of local political elites to capture the projects in order not only to have access to the resources provided, but, to prevent the development of alternative leadership in their communities. There is the fear on their side of projects undermining their political authority.

In the NEAZDP document on the appointment of DAPs it is stated that the person to be appointed should not be in a position of influence. However, that criterion is controversial.
Consider the case of the DAP who was in Tagali, Bashir Bukar Albishir, and who was subsequently transferred to Machina. Being the eldest son of the Emir of Machina, he was clearly in a position of power. However, it is not totally negative to be in a position of power. During the field research, the people of Tagali were very much impressed with the activities of their former DAP. Similarly, in Machina, most people are not likely to see any fault with Bashir as a person, although he may be guilty by association: being the son of the Emir about whom feelings are polarized. Moreover, his position gives him several advantages in terms of getting support for the Program from the Emir, and in other communities he can more easily get people to be comfortable with the Program than someone who is not known to them.

Despite the efforts of NEAZDP to portray itself as non-partisan, there are at least two incidents involving its headquarters that got it in to political trouble. First, there is the larger political environment of NEAZDP's operations. I did mention previously that Yobe State was predominantly SDP. However, all the urban local government headquarters where NEAZDP operates were controlled by the NRC (1991-93). These were Gashua, Nguru and Geidam. NEAZDP is usually not involved in funding urban projects. On one occasion, the then Deputy Governor of Yobe State, Zanna Bukar, who was elected on the platform of the SDP requested a vehicle to travel to his village. On his way to the village, he was stoned. Although the vehicle was not damaged, NEAZDP became implicated in the local political conflict. What created more problem for NEAZDP was that its vehicles were painted white colour, but white was also the colour of the NRC. Henceforth, the Program stopped giving out its vehicles to politicians. That decision was only possible because of the autonomy of the institution.

The second incident happened during a courtesy call on the Governor of Yobe State,
Bukar Ibrahim by the Program Manager and some of his staff. Immediately, the entourage was seated, the Governor started a conversation of how NEAZDP was politicized in favour of the NRC and therefore undermining his government. He accused some members of the organization of displaying their partisan politics publicly by giving more credit and services to members of the NRC. Subsequently, the Yobe State government sent a letter to the Management of the organization to desecend three management staff who were accused of being partisan. These staff were Bukar Maina (Secondary Education Specialist), Maina Bukarti (Primary Education Specialist) and Baba Mallam Wali Shettima (the then Head of the Community Awareness and Mass Mobilization section). However, the Program manager who at that time was on holidays immediately contacted the Governor and explained to him that there was no truth in the allegations. The Governor later apologized.

The lack of local input to the process of evaluation recently surfaced in the Program. The evaluation of NEAZDP projects in 1993, by a Mid-Term Review (MTR) mission generated controversy. The major issue of concern to NEAZDP was that the Mid-Term Review Team had little or no previous knowledge of the Program. There was only one person who had previous knowledge of the Program. As an alternative, the Program suggested a team headed by Dr. Bukar Shaib, an indigene of Borno, a Special Adviser on Agriculture in the Second Republic who had also served the Babangida government in several capacities related to agriculture, water resources and the environment. Michael Watts (1987) described

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64 Most Ministers of Agriculture in Nigeria have been indigenes of Borno either by design or coincidence. They include Mallam Adamu Ciroma (twice) and Dr Shettima Mustafa (twice).
him as the father of River Basin Authorities. But the recommendation of the Program was rejected by the EU headquarters in Brussels. The report of the MTR was heavily criticised by the Program officers (NEAZDP 1993) and one of the expatriate staff submitted a letter of resignation because he felt that the Mid-Term Review was very unfair. His resignation was turned down by the Program Manager.

On the other hand, between 1990 and 1993, NEAZDP spent about N500 million. In fact most of the money was spent between 1991 and 1993 because in 1990 less than N10 million was spent. Although most of the money was spent on rural production and infrastructure, the cost of administration and management was spectacular. For example, the staff cost increased from N3.7 million in 1992 to N6.2 million in 1993 (NEAZDP 1992b, NEAZDP 1991). This did not include the cost of the expatriate which was paid for by DANAGRO, the consultancy firm executing the project.

To conclude this section on NEAZDP, as of September 1993, despite the limitations mentioned above, an institutional arrangement that gives voice to the local people and the workers at the local level had been developed and implemented: VDAs, DAPs, VDPs, Village Development Plans, involvement of local authorities, decision making at the village level, and community contributions to projects especially in Dagona. In Machina, the Program has been

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65 Given the bad experience of the River Basin Development Authorities I will hesitate that this is necessarily a good commentary.

66 Two of my informants suspect the internal politics of the EU countries and the commercial interests which they represent were central to the dispute. As I have mentioned in Chapter 1, NEAZDP is administered by DANAGRO which is a Danish firm; and the Program is in its first phase. According to my informants, there are other companies bidding for the second phase of the Program. It is therefore in the interest of the other firms to influence the rejection of the Mid-Term Review mission suggested by NEAZDP.
less successful. I will discuss and explain the variation later. What had not been designed
and/or not implemented were community involvement in monitoring and evaluation, women
DAPs and VDPs as well as more women in positions of power at the headquarters (see Table
6.1). In general, NEAZDP had succeeded in implementing an institutional arrangement that
enhanced the power of the marginalized, but women VDPs and DAPs have not started
functioning.
Table 6.1
NEAZDP Institutional Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Development Association</th>
<th>Pre NEAZDP Dagona</th>
<th>Pre NEAZDP Machina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women's Committee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Committee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Village Development Promoter</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Development Promoter</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Development Plan</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Contribution</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competent Personnel</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Area</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Area Promoter</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Development Promoter</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of Local Government</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Notes 1993.
6.3 Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy in the Directorate of Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI)

6.3.1 The Theory of Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy

The military government of Babangida that came to power in 1985 also announced a change from the previous policies on rural development. At the time of coming to power there was an explicit commitment to change rural development policies and to make rural people its focal point: The key goals were a bottom-up approach and community governance (Koinyan nd).

There were supposed to be several institutional structures established at the local levels by DFRRI to implement the idea of a bottom-up approach and community governance. Similar to the situation in NEAZDP, each community was supposed to organize a Community Development Association (CDA) in order to benefit from DFRRI projects. Indeed the first project of DFRRI was to strengthen or form grassroots development organizations in all communities. In the terminology of DFRRI it was the Direct Participation Scheme (DPS). By 1990, there were over 100,000 communities identified by DFRRI (Koinyan 1991a, Koinyan 1991b). The CDAs were required to have some legitimacy with the traditional institutions in the community. The CDAs are grouped to form Primary Production Centres (PPCs). The PPCs were composed of no less than 100 families, and these centres organized to Higher Production Centres (HPCs) and eventually they formed Development Areas (DAs). In terms of jurisdiction, the DAs were below local governments (Abdullahi and Umaru 1987).

DFRRI also developed the idea of Community Development Plans. Each CDA was supposed to have a Community Annual Plan (CAP), a Community 3-Year Plan and a
Community Perspective Plan (Koinyan 1991b). These plans are replicas of the national plans which were developed in the implementation of Structural Adjustment Program.

At the local government level, there was supposed to be a Rural Development Committee set up by the local government council. The Committee was to be chaired by the chairperson of the local government authority. This was the policy-making body for rural development at the local government level. Similarly, there was a Rural Development Coordinator (RDC) in each local authority. The Coordinator was a technical officer. Hence, projects were supposed to start from the CDAs and be coordinated by the Rural Development Coordinator (RDC). All requests passed through the RDC to the state level for final approval.

Funding for DFRRRI projects was mainly from the federal government. Seventy-five percent of funds were from the national headquarters. The remaining 25 percent was supposed to be the contributions of the states (15 percent), local governments (7 percent) and benefitting communities (3 percent).

There were special agencies that were responsible for monitoring and evaluating DFRRRI projects. At the state and local government levels, there were supposed to be monitoring and evaluation units whose officers were supposed to be National Youth Corp Members who were normally not indigenes of the area. In addition, national officers made random and routine In-House Inspection. Similarly, there was the Final Comprehensive Inspection led by eminent Nigerians.

The management staff at the DFRRRI headquarters was made up of competent staff. Many of them had professional experiences in other institutions of rural development. For example, Akin Mabogunje was one of the pioneers at the DFRRRI headquarters. There was no
special incentive given to the workers besides a salary a step higher than those in regular civil service. The DFRRRI management staff also had access to facilities such as vehicles. On the other hand, DFRRRI workers at the local levels were in a disadvantaged position because most of them were community development staff of the local government seconded to DFRRRI, and without any authority at the local level. DFRRRI's institutional autonomy is suspect because it is not clear from the structure that an alternative power structure and funding mechanisms have been built in. The explicit commitment that the local institutions should have legitimacy with the traditional authorities is a acceptance of the institution as benign.

In summary, a number of institutional strategies to facilitate a bottom-up strategy have been developed by DFRRRI. At the local level, there were supposed to be CDAs, PPCs, HPCs, DAs, Community Annual Plans, Community 3 Year Plans, Community Perspective Plan, Rural Development Committees, community contributions, local government contributions, RDC and monitoring and evaluation officers. There was no special incentive for the workers nor any distinct institutional autonomy for the Program. The funding for the project comes mainly from the federal government. How far these were implemented in Dagona and Machina is the subject of discussion in the next section.

6.3.2 The Experience of Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy

There is a difference in the institutional structures that have been established in Machina and Dagona. The difference between the communities is not as a result of the learning process in DFRRRI or the social structures of the communities, nor is the difference an indication of one community being more inclined to support a bottom-up strategy than the
other. The reason for the difference is that Machina, since 1991 is a local government headquarters whereas Dagona is not.

The community-level institutional structures of CDA, PPCs, HPCs, DAs and the three community village plans were not implemented either in Dagona or Machina (see Table 6.2). Similarly, there was no evidence of community contributions and participation in the implementation of DFRRRI projects. Furthermore, even the involvement of local governments had become problematic. Most local governments hardly contributed to the funding of projects either in cash or labour (Borno State DFRRRI 1992). Federal and state governments put pressure on local government authorities to be more involved in DFRRRI projects. However, local governments were resisting the pressure to take on responsibilities because they were not involved in the decision making process about the projects in the first place. Moreover, local governments considered projects funded under DFRRRI to be in competition with their responsibilities: local governments, the lowest tier of government believed, they should be the major agency responsible for rural development. As a result, local government funding and other support for DFRRRI projects were not forthcoming (Borno State Local Government Council Chairmen 1992, Akpan 1992, Agbese et al 1988).

Between 1986 and 1992, DFRRRI received N1.95 billion from the Federal Government. That amount is made up of N1.85 billion in actual allocation and N100 million derived from interests. A summary of DFRRRI expenditure shows that 88.47 percent was spent on provision, maintenance, and consolidation of rural infrastructure; 6.03 percent was spent on productive projects; 3.79 percent was spent on operational support activities; and 1.72 percent was spent administrative and logistic support. The provision of less than 2 percent for administrative
purposes suggests that not much was spent on personnel. The annual allocation to DFRRI declined from 7.29 percent of the federal government capital budget in 1986 to 1.57 percent in 1992. What was allocated to DFRRI by the federal government was spent in the 30 states of the federation (Koinyan 1992, 84-91).

In Machina, there was an Rural Development Coordinator, but his functions were very limited to consultations with the local government public officer responsible for rural development, the Councillor for Works, and officials from the state and national headquarters. He had little contact with communities in terms of initiating and implementing rural development projects. Similarly, there was no functional local government Rural Development Committee in Machina. Hence, most of the projects were driven by the political calculations of local politicians. The Chair of the local government authority consulted with his cohorts to decide where they wanted to locate some projects and this was not necessarily because of felt needs. However, in Dagona even these symbolic structures can only be said to have existed nominally because they were based in the local government headquarters, Gashua, and not in Dagona.

The only local government officer who was responsible for rural development had no accommodation in Machina. He shuttled between Nguru and Machina. Similarly, he received no incentives such as vehicles, training or other forms of career advancement.

Women did not play any role in the processes established by DFRRI. Indeed even by such an indicator as the number of women in position of power at the DFRRI state and local levels, women were very insignificant. However, I should say that for a long time DFRRI funded Better Life and it claimed that women's involvement in its activities were carried out
under the auspices of the Better Life.
### Table 6.2
DFRRI Institutional Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dagona</th>
<th>Pre DFRRI</th>
<th>Pre DFRRI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Development Association</td>
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<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Contribution</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Annual Plan</td>
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<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community 3 Year Rolling Plan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Perspective Plan</td>
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<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Production Centre</td>
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<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Production Centre</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Development Coordinator</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Development Committee</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Officer</td>
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<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Area</td>
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<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government Involvement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Notes September 1993.
The problem of lack of community involvement in evaluating DFRRRI projects was illustrated in 1992. In that year there was an evaluation of DFRRRI projects in Machina. This was a Final Comprehensive Inspection team in Machina led by the Sarkin Yaki Gombe (War Commander of Gombe). But the team leader could not participate in the inspection because he was too tired after travelling the untarred road from Nguru to Machina. What was more serious was that some of the wells which were claimed to have been constructed by DFRRRI and submitted for inspection were built in the 1960s. These included the wells in Falimaram, Kukayasku and Kalgidi. If the local communities were involved in DFRRRI projects, these anomalies would have been reduced.

To summarise (see Table 6.2) the theory and experience of institutional strategy, autonomy and resources in DFRRRI as of 1993, there was not much achieved in implementing an institutional structure which would have facilitated bottom-up strategy, autonomy and resources. At the local level, there were supposed to be CDAs, PPCs, HPCs, DAs, Community Annual Plans, Community 3 Year Plans, Community Perspective Plan, Rural Development Committees, community contributions, local government contributions, monitoring and evaluation officers and an RDC. However, from the experiences of the communities where this research was conducted, these, even where they existed, were not important in the process of rural development. In addition, monitoring and evaluation did not involve local people. In relation to autonomy, the institution was problematic. DFRRRI was clearly attached to pre-existing political and administrative structures. Similarly, the resources available were very limited.
6.4 Grassroots Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy in Better Life

6.4.1 The Theory of Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy

The strategy for a bottom-up approach in Better Life calls for a 3-staged process: a workshop; organization, mobilization and implementation; and monitoring and evaluation.

A workshop on Women in Rural Development was held in September 1987 in Abuja. The workshop was supposed to be a brain-storming exercise for rural women to discuss their problems and strategies of moving ahead. Recommendations from the workshop formed the core of the activities of the Program. These included “women organization and mobilization, welfare, education, agriculture, rural industrialization, civic responsibilities and the establishment of a National Commission on Women” (Better Life Program for Rural Women 1989, 16).

The phase of mobilization, organization and implementation was the most important phase in terms of facilitating grassroots strategy. The formal structure of organizing was as follows. At the national level, mobilization and organization functions were carried out from the office of the Presidency. The spouse of the President was the Chairperson and she was assisted by a National Organizing Committee composed of representatives of various ministries, parastatals and wives of top government functionaries including service chiefs. In reality a group known as the Maryam Babangida Team (MBT), a group of loyalists, was the de facto National Organizing Committee. Members of the MBT were Maryam Abatcha, Enoma Ihara, Toyin Olakunri, Habibat Mogaji, Mrs Nduka and the wives of service chiefs (Nigerian Army Officers Wives Association 1991). At the state level, the spouses of state
governors were the chairpersons of organizing committees and at the local government levels, the wives of chairpersons of local governments were the chairpersons of organizing committees. In some states, the organizing committee was called the Central Working Committee composed of wives of State Executive members, wives of local government chairpersons and coordinators and Director and Director General of the state Women Commission (Delta State Better Life Program 1992). Similar structures were supposed to be replicated at the district, village and ward levels in which the wives of the district, village and ward heads respectively chair local organizing committees. Thus, there were at least four structures for local strategy in the activities of the Better Life.

Mobilization in the Better Life Program entailed organizing public enlightenment campaigns at the various levels identified above by the respective chairs and more particularly the national and state chairpersons. These were called the Better Life Parleys. In the parleys, public speeches were made on the importance of women and especially the activities of the government. There was little or no discussion on the needs of the local women. The visits by the leaders also enabled them to have a first-hand acquaintance with the problems of rural women. Similarly, questionnaires were sent to all local governments on the needs of the local women (Better Life Program for Rural Women 1989). These were the strategies developed to enhance the identification of needs of the local women.

The Better Life Committees at the local level were supposed to initiate activities like cooperatives and participate in government activities so that women could have access to various government services (Bukar 1989).

Given the above discussion of the structure of Better Life, one can draw the
implications for autonomy. It is obvious that it was tied to the power wielders at the national, state and local levels. In relation to resources, initially, financial support to the Program was mainly by DFRRRI and other state and international agencies including the office of the President. Some staff were seconded to work with Maryam Babangida. At the state and local government levels, there were virtually no special staff working for the program. In some cases, those employed as community development officers also served as BLP contact points.

Monitoring and evaluation of projects were carried out by the state and national headquarters.

6.4.2 The Experience of Institutional Strategy, Resources and Autonomy

The Better Life workshop which was a brainstorming session held in 1987 generated controversy. It was widely condemned as elitist and wasteful. The workshop was held at a prestigious 5 star hotel, Nicon Noga, Abuja. Many of the rural women who were invited to the workshop were intimidated by the environment and got confused. Similarly, the language of discussion was English which alienated a majority of the women who attended the workshop. Furthermore, although there were rural women delegates to the conference, the role of urban elites was domineering.

In Machina, before the creation of the local government, some women and organizations were occasionally invited to participate in the Program’s activities, but there was no organized branch. With the creation of the local government in 1991, a local government chairperson of Better Life was selected. However, there was no organizing committee. Similarly, district and ward committees of the Program were not set up. In Dagona there was
no branch of the Program and it had no local government branch in Bade Local Government where Dagona is situated. This reflects a fundamental problem of the organization.

The selection of chairs of the Better Life at all levels was determined by marital relations: the spouse of the highest political authority automatically became the chair of the organization. But, the chair of Bade local government in 1993 had no spouse and therefore, nobody to be the chair of the organization. An additional problem of tying the chair of the Program to a marital relationship arose where the highest male political authority was in a polygynous relationship. In some cases the most senior spouse was made the chair of the Program and other state functions were created for the other co-spouses. For example, the chair of Machina local government had in 1993 three spouses. Hajiya Lubabatu, who was the most senior wife became the chair of the Program, but the two other wives also attended some state functions. A similar situation existed in Government House Damaturu. The state governor had a spouse, Maryam Abba Ibrahim, but he married a second time during his tenure as governor and therefore some state functions had to be created for the second wife as well. However, according to Kunle Ishaq Sanni (1993), the Muslim principle is rotation of the position of the chair of Better Life between among the different spouses rather than assigning them different responsibilities. On the other hand, if the governor is a Christian, and since Christians are supposed to be monogamous, according to Kunle Sanni even if the governor has more than one spouse, the most senior spouse is supposed to chair the Program. Whether the position of chair of Better Life is rotated or different state assignments are given to different spouses or some spouses are denied any function, it created confusion and trouble between co-wives. This problem became noticeable with the swearing in of civilian governors
in 1992. Prior to that, the military governors succeeded in imposing upon the other spouses their choice of the spouse to become chair of Better Life. The ushering in of an elected civilian regime in 1992 exposed the conflicts.

Similarly, there was an implicit assumption that men would always be the highest political authorities. This assumption is not surprising since the military which created Better Life is mainly a "boys club". One wonders what happens when a female is elected to the highest political authority at a certain level as happened in Bakori local government in Kaduna State in 1990 or when women Sole Administrators were appointed as was the case in Bade Local Government in 1994.

In 1989 there was a change in the organizational structure of Better Life. A National Commission on Women was set up by the federal government. Better Life became a department in the Commission headed by a Director reporting to Director General of the Commission (National Commission for Women nd). However, the previous structure was at the same time retained. This complicated the situation and created animosity between those in the Better Life Department and the other workers in other departments including the Director General and Chair of the Commission. Those in the Better Life Department tended to operate as if they were responsible only to the First Lady. In fact the former chairperson of the board of the National Commission on Women, Professor Bolanle Awe resigned from the position because of conflicts with Maryam Babangida, the national chairperson of the Better Life.

In terms of initiating projects at the local level there was no evidence from Dagona and Machina that the local committees had played any role at all. Similarly, there was no evidence of monitoring and evaluation of the Program's activities in these two communities.
The resources and autonomy of the institution are very limited. By the nature of the structures proposed by the Better Life, it would not have been autonomous from the power elites in the two communities.

Table 6.3
Better Life Institutional Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dagona</th>
<th>Machina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ward Committee</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Committee</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Committee</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government Committee</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Mobilization</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Notes September 1993.

Better Life, by September 1993, had developed certain structures, which if implemented would have been a bottom-up strategy. These included ward, village district and local government committees. Alas, the first three levels were not in existence in our area of research. In Machina, because of its status as a local government, there was a chair of the Program even though there was no organizing committee. However, in Dagona none of these structures existed (see Table 6.3). Hence, the institutional structure in Better Life was vertical and clientelist dominated by the elitist at the national, state and local government headquarters.

In summation, the institutional presence of the three programs looked very different in September 1993. In three years of existence, NEAZDP had developed and implemented a
more bottom-up process than DFRRI and the Better Life which had existed for seven and six years respectively. Both older Programs started with proclamations about ceding ownership of projects to the local communities, but this was not translated into reality. The institutional arrangement in DFRRI and Better Life gave more power to those at the top than those at the grassroots. The Programs also lacked autonomy from the power wielders. However, even in NEAZDP, there were differences in the experience in the two communities. One might have expected that Machina, being in the second set of DAs, would have a more participatory process. However, this was not the case mainly because of the nature of the power structure in the community, an issue to which I now turn.

6.5 Context Matters: Inclusion and Exclusion

The previous two chapters touched upon the different histories and contexts of Dagona and Machina. It is the main theme of this section. I will discuss how the contexts of the different communities have interacted with the development institutions to promote the inclusion and exclusion of certain people. The lesson to be learned is that there is a need for more purposeful intervention in order to give voice and benefits to the underprivileged: institution is also a dependent variable. In other words the relationship between context and institutions is dynamic. As a result in some circumstances, change can only be gradual and incremental.

Since there are few actual meetings, offices, or other activities at the local level set up by Better Life in both communities, it is difficult to judge empirically the success of its bottom-up strategy and its degree of autonomy. However, judging from the proposed
structures at the local level, there is no doubt that it is members of the political elite that participate and control the projects. At the ward, village and district and local government levels it is the spouses of the male leaders who chair the organization. Wards, villages and district heads in Machina are not elected, but are appointees of higher traditional political authorities. The Emir appoints the District Head who in turn appoints village heads. The village heads appoint ward heads. Although in Dagona, the appointment of these leaders is more democratic, with the appointment in 1993 of a Dagona District Head who is not an indigene of Dagona but a scion of the Bade Emirate, the situation may in future change as well. This certainly portrays the class and status quo bias of the organization, although the class argument is not a consequence of the women's class position as persons, but perhaps a result of association with their spouses. The intention of the Program is not so much to create and expand the voice of the marginalized as to incorporate them through existing power structures. Similarly, women are not given these positions of responsibility because of their qualities as human beings, but because they are the spouses of someone in power.

Moreover, although many of the women in Machina were not very active partisan politicians as individuals, the fact that their spouses might be members of another political party was enough to discourage the participation of members of the opposition political party67. The likelihood was, therefore that those willing to participate mostly belonged to the same party.

The partisan nature of participation in the Better Life was demonstrated in the only

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67 Political parties existed between 1989 and 1993, and elections on party basis were conducted for Local Government Councils, State Governors and State House of Assemblies and the National Assembly (Senate and the House of Representatives).
meeting held in Machina. The meeting was called by the chair, the senior-most spouse of the chair of the local government who was himself elected on the platform of the SDP. The chair of the local government is also the son of the Emir of Machina. Ninety-two percent of those in attendance were SDP members or civil servants who might have attended to protect their jobs (Discussion with Mallama Salamatu November 1992). This was despite the fact that a town crier went around to invite everyone and the meeting was held in the primary school, a central and neutral venue. There was no clear ethnic division, perhaps because there were strong SDP women members from different ethnic groups.

In Dagona, if there was only one occasion to measure anything like grassroots strategy and autonomy and that was when a grinding machine was installed in the community by the Program. However, the person in charge of it was not even the spouse of the Lawan, the local political authority, but the Lawan himself: a supposedly women's project under the control of a man.

In both Dagona and Machina, there is no evidence of local autonomy. The only (intermittently) functional committee that existed in Machina was the local government Rural Development Committee. Before the military intervention of November 1993, that committee was chaired by the chair of the local government who happened to be an SDP member. Most members of the committee were also members of the same political party, except for two civil servants whose role was minimal.

NEAZDP has set up and implemented institutions to facilitate a bottom-up strategy in its activities. It is therefore easier to evaluate its strategies empirically than it is for DFRRI and Better Life. In Machina, as noted above, the DA has lost its independence and autonomy.
since the coming of NEAZDP to the community. It is at the entry point of the Program to the community that it lost its capacity to be impartial and respond to the needs of the overall community. This is because NEAZDP courted the Emir of Machina to gain his political support. His son was also chosen as the DAP of the DA. In addition the Emir was a well-known supporter of the SDP, the party which was in power at the local government and the state levels. Perhaps more important is the fact that Machina has a long history of centralized political and religious control (see Chapter 4). The Emir has been in power since 1944 and has developed mechanisms to control political spaces in the community.

There were four mechanisms through which the DA lost some of its autonomy. The previous leaders of the association were gradually but systematically replaced, not through an election but administratively. The new people in control happened to be very close to the Emir. Secondly, all meetings of the association were held near the Emir’s palace. This was a control mechanism because independent voices and those who disagreed with the opinions of the Emir were not likely to be heard, and many did not attend meetings in that location. Thirdly, the association was not divided into committees around different projects, but met as a single body. If there were several committees one might have expected more independent voices.

Fourthly, after some time many people stopped attending the meeting of the association, and hence, ward heads were invited to attend on the assumption that they would inform the other people in their wards. Thus, over time, the DA meetings came to be those of the ward heads and political sympathizers and the supporters of the SDP. In other words most people who attended the meetings were cohorts of the Emir. Thus, most of the people were
title holders, well known supporters of the SDP, male, adults and old adults, high and middle income earners, and Manga. Hence, in Machina, because of its history of centralized political authority and religion, the participants in the NEAZDP institutions tended to be mostly those associated with the ruling family and the political elites. All those not so associated were excluded in the process. This does not mean that NEAZDP deliberately excludes them and in fact it repeatedly attempts to assert its neutrality and many meetings are announced by a town crier, but the general public in Machina have made up their minds about it. There is lack of trust that the Program would be above board since it is associated with the Emir.

On the other hand, the women's committee hardly meets to discuss since most of its activities are tied to projects and there was only one women's project implemented in Machina and even that was only partially implemented. The leaders of the committee are civil servants. Because most of the women civil servants are Mangas, the leadership of the committee is dominated by them. Civil servants in Machina are comparatively middle class. This portrays its elitist orientation.

At the implementation stage the role of women is equally minimal. For example, in implementing a maternity building, the women were mainly responsible for opening the account and giving the money to the male members of the association to implement it.

In Dagona, the situation is quite different. The DA is independent of the traditional authority. This is not simple because the Lawan (village head) and later the Ajia (District Head) of Dagona's son is not the DAP but also there is less centralization of political and religious authority in the community. At the entry point of NEAZDP in the community, the DA was restructured to have more local people in control of the project than hitherto. This is
the reverse of what happened in Machina. Similarly, there are different committees on
different projects in the community. All the committees reflect the diversity of the
community. However, the age and ethnic bias in the DA is striking. The people who
participate most are Bade, Manga and Hausa adults and old adults. The other major ethnic
group, Sakkwatawa, who are Hausa migrants from Sokoto and live in a distinct ward, Zango,
hardly attend meetings of the community. In fact they hardly attend any public activities of
the Dagona community. However, the divisions in the community have not affected the
implementation of projects. Although some groups have benefitted more than others, this is
not articulated in the community as a deliberate effort of the group to exclude others.

The women's committee in Dagona, like the one in Machina, has few activities. Three
meetings had been held as of August 1993 and there was a fair representation from all ethnic
groups and ages. The leader of the committee is a politician who was the chair of the
Women's wing of the Great Nigerian Peoples Party, precursor of the SDP in Borno/Yobe
State. Although no women's wings of political parties were allowed in the 1989-1993
transition period, she was perceived to be the leader of women in the SDP. But it seems that
people relate to her as someone with leadership qualities rather than as an SDP stalwart.
Similar to the situation in Machina, women in Dagona are not actively involved in the
evaluation of projects.

6.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I set out to compare the institutional arrangement in the three programs
and the influence of the context of the communities. I argued that institutional arrangements
are very important. However, I qualify the importance of institutions by looking at the contexts of communities and how they shape the implementation of different projects. Comparing the three institutions in the communities of Dagona and Machina, NEAZDP has developed a bottom-up strategy to facilitate local institutional participation, autonomy and resources. There are functional structures and persons such as DAs, DAPs, VDPs, Village Development Plans, local financial contribution and control and local government participation, but some of the parallel structures for women have not been established. In the two communities, women play an insignificant role as compared to men. Younger persons play insignificant roles as compared to adults and old adults. Ethnicity is pronounced in both communities, but it is more so in Dagona than Machina. The influence of partisan politics is remarkable in Machina as opposed to the situation in Dagona. In general, male, adult, SDP, Manga elites in Machina have captured NEAZDP whereas in Dagona, male, Bade adults are the major participants. Despite some of the similarities in Machina and Dagona, the feeling of people in the latter is not that of a deliberate domination by a few. This has to be explained by the nature of political relations in the community which are more trusting and inclusive. In relation to autonomy and resources, NEAZDP has done better than the other development agencies, but the institutional autonomy of NEAZDP in Machina is less than it is in Dagona.

At the time of the field research in September 1993, Better Life had not set up the structures which would facilitate a bottom-up strategy of participation, incentive and autonomy. The ward, village and district committees were not functioning. It was only in Machina that there was a local government chair of the Program. A mobilization process had taken place only once in Machina. Even in these few settings of the Program, the major
participants were SDP elite women of young adult age. The ethnic dimension was less pronounced in Machina Better Life than in NEAZDP activities in both Machina and Dagona. The fact that the chairs of the branches even at the local levels were attached to traditional male political elites of those levels portrayed its elitist and conservative orientation. It also shows the lack of autonomy of the institution. Better Life, also had limited resources.

Similarly, DFRRII had not set up its CDAs, PPCs, HPCs, DAs nor implemented its development plans. The only committee in Machina was by virtue of Machina being a headquarters of a local government. That was the Rural Development Committee and its participants were male, young adult, and adult elites of the local government and members of the ruling SDP. The attachment of the institution to power structure compromises its autonomy.

The issue of autonomy is a fundamental problem and dilemma of all the programs because of attachment to existing power structures in society. All of them are in the dilemma of seeking legitimacy. For example, after the overthrow of the previous Buhari (1984-1985) military government in 1985, the Babangida military regime came to power on a populist agenda. It set up Better Life and DFRRII as an alternative mobilization framework, but it did not make any attempt to fundamentally restructure its political constituency. Rather it created parallel hierarchical power structures and/or relied on existing ones and either coopted persons from pre-existing agencies or appointed its own from the same pool. Thus, both DFRRII and the Better Life relied on existing dominant power structures to implement their programs. Moreover, the military, being a hierarchical organization, decided to implement what should have been bottom-up rural development programs in a top-down fashion. Military regimes are
by their very nature hierarchical and it is unimaginable that they would work to empower local people. After all, in Pidgin English, "obey before complain" is the trademark of the military. Similarly, NEAZDP sought legitimacy and acceptance in starting its projects by aligning itself with traditional rulers in the local communities because they were the only political authorities in the villages.

Beyond the point of getting support from local traditional institutions, there is perhaps a more fundamental problem for programs like NEAZDP: what is the role of "foreign" agencies in fostering alternative political power? As a program which is seen as "foreign", is it possible to expect it to start by proclaiming a political creed of subverting political structures at the local levels? Certainly in order to gain entry to local communities it has to ally itself with the existing power structures.

Moreover, the concept of community development used by these institutions including NEAZDP, but, especially Better Life and DFRRI, assumes that communities are homogeneous. The concept does not problematize communities in terms of class, gender, ethnic, partisan and other interests. It is, therefore, assumed that the whole community participates in all activities of the Programs.

The above assumptions contradict the findings of this research on the historical and political, gender and socio-economic contexts of Dagona and Machina which I have reported in Chapters 4 and 5. Yet these assumptions have affected who participates in the process of

Fela Anikulapo Kuti, perhaps the most well known musician who uses music to make social commentaries, is most explicit in making commentaries on the hierarchical nature of the military. He interprets the top down nature of the military as symptomatic of its stupidity. Some of his relevant songs include "Zombie", "Army Arrangement", "Coffin for Head of State", "Authority Stealing", "Beast of No Nation" and "Unknown Soldier".
project initiation, implementation and evaluation in the Programs.

Another dilemma is that of nation-wide rural development organizations. There is a likelihood of contradictions between attempting to give autonomy to local institutions through decentralization and the need to foster national standards and integration through projects (Lele 1975, 142). National integration and standards become particularly sensitive in countries like Nigeria, a country of great diversity.

In chapters 5 and 6 I have focused on institutional arrangements and contexts of the communities. These differences in the quality of institutional arrangements and the contexts of the communities account for the variations in the success and failure of rural development projects. This is the subject of the next two chapters.
Chapter 7  Grassroots Projects in Dagona and Machina

7.1 Introduction

In the three previous chapters, I discussed the set of independent variables which would throw light on the variations in the performance of development institution. The next task is to establish the dependent variable—determine the success of development institutions—and then relate this to the independent variables. In this chapter and the next, I shall endeavour to do that.

In this chapter, I will concentrate on one aspect of the dependent variable: grassroots projects. My central claim is that the institutional arrangement (autonomy, resources and strategy) and the context (gender, socio-economic and historico-political) of the communities interact to determine the success and the failure of development projects. I define success primarily in terms of productive and social projects, their quantity and quality of the projects and success in reaching the intended beneficiaries.

My central claim will be verified through a close comparison of the case materials. I shall argue that NEAZDP grassroots development projects have performed better than those of DFRRI and Better Life. The reason is that NEAZDP has a better institutional arrangement: a bottom-up strategy, resources and autonomy. However, despite the fact that in the overall picture NEAZDP has performed better, its “women’s” projects have consistently underperformed in comparison to its other projects. Indeed, with regards to gender bias, the three development programs are not very different.

In addition, there is variation in the two communities of Dagona and Machina.
documented were mainly physical infrastructure oriented.

7.2 NEAZDP Projects in Dagona and Machina

NEAZDP is an integrated rural development program that combines large and small projects, but the latter are the backbone of the program. There are broadly defined two types of projects implemented by NEAZDP: productive and social. According to NEAZDP's definition, "productive" projects are projects oriented towards increasing the productive capacity of the community whereas "social" projects are welfare oriented. This distinction has caused concern in the organization and led many people to question whether that is the right approach to an integrated rural development program. The compartmentalization of the productive and social projects seems to heighten fears of a sectoral approach. In reality, there is a dialectical relationship between the two types of projects. Furthermore, the distinction being made could result in one sector favoured over another. Indeed the concern seems to have been fuelled by a strong feeling among people living away from the Yobe river system that it is productive projects that receive most attention in the Program. The DAPs (Development Area Promoters) in the more sandy area of the Program are among of the critics of the distinction between productive and social projects because the possibility of implementing the former is very limited in their area.

By design, most NEAZDP projects are productive projects, and, that explains the reason for the creation of the first eight out of nine Development Areas (DAs) on the banks of the Kumadugu Yobe. Productive projects implemented by NEAZDP include marketing and
credit services (consumer shop and agro input stock), crop production (irrigation tube well, ox team, ox cart, flooded rice production, irrigation pump), livestock (veterinary drug revolving fund, small ruminants), fishery projects (fishing gear credit, fish smoking kiln), farm forestry (orchard), engineering (dehusking machine, grinding machine) and appropriate technology (carpentry, blacksmith and tinsmith workshops). On the other hand, social projects include community awareness (community awareness and learning centre equipment), primary health care (VIP latrine, laundry and bathing area, slaughter house, dispensary equipment, maternity, traditional health attendant, health post), education (model schools, school furniture/equipment), and water supply (borehole drilling and equipping, water reticulation, cement well construction).

After nearly three years of operations, NEAZDP implemented about 3,000 projects in 347 villages. These projects by components include 2,156 Crop, Forestry, Livestock and Fish projects, 259 Water Supply projects, 244 Buildings projects, 137 Mechanical Engineering and Workshop projects, 114 Community Awareness, Education and Health projects, and 53 Appropriate Technology projects. Nearly 75 percent of the ECU 35 million provided for the program has been committed with about 59 percent disbursed (ITAD 1993, 221).

There are significant differences in the nature, number and beneficiaries of projects implemented by NEAZDP in Dagona and Machina. These differences can be partially accounted for by the ecology of the two communities and the time period when the NEAZDP projects started in the two communities. Ecologically, Dagona is on the banks of Kumadugu (river) Yobe and it is among the first group of pilot DAs. On the other hand, Machina is far away from any river, and therefore irrigation is not feasible at least now, and, it is among the
second group of pilot DAs. Although these differences can be accounted for to some extent by the ecology and timing of the projects, as I will argue later, some of the variables used in this research have important effects.

By September of 1993, a total of 328 projects had been implemented in Dagona DA. These included 21 social projects, one other project and 306 productive ones. In Machina DA, there were 73 projects which include 45 productive, 18 social and 10 other projects.70

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70 Because of different categories used in the two Development Areas, I was not able to reclassify the "other" projects to either social or productive projects. The only one "other" project in Dagona is a Community Bank. There is a problem of where to classify the project. In September of 1993, the Machina Community Bank Project was about to be set up.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Productive Projects</th>
<th>Dagona</th>
<th>Machina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox Team</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing Gear</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Development Centre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Mechanics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grinding Machines</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Processing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Ruminants</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacksmith Workshop</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Carpentry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input Supply Store</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood Rice</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnt Brick</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Grain Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>306</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Projects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Awareness and Learning Centre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Nursery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>328</strong></td>
<td><strong>73</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NEAZDP Offices in Dagona and Machina September 1993.
As shown in Table 7.1 above, there is a significant difference in the number of projects in Dagona and Machina DAs. The difference can be accounted for by the ecology of the areas and the time when projects started in the DAs. The high number of projects in Dagona is primarily because of rice related projects: irrigation (166), flooded rice (57), fishing gear (seven), and rice processing (three). None of these projects can be implemented in Machina. If these projects are removed from the list, the totals are almost similar: 95 for Dagona and 73 for Machina. Furthermore, since Dagona is among the first set of DAs whereas Machina is among the second set, the difference in number of projects is not significant.

7.2.1 Irrigation. The objective of the project is to enable initiators\textsuperscript{71} to increase the area under dry season and supplementary irrigation. It is anticipated that an increase in irrigated land will increase production. Similarly, there will be an increase in the wealth of the village and improvement in health standards because of fresh vegetables. A beneficiary contributes N300 while the NEAZDP's credit stock (including water pump) is worth N6,200.

Irrigation is one of NEAZDP's most favoured types of projects. The Program supports these projects because of its economic viability (see Table 7.2), quick turn over, and popularity. Many villages in the Program Area request this project. For example of the 61 credit projects implemented in 1990 in the Program Area, 59 were irrigation projects. The number of irrigation projects increased to 579 out of 797 credit projects in 1991. However, by 1992 and 1993, the number of irrigation projects declined to 262 out of 1,256 and eight out of 1,213 credit projects respectively. The decline was mainly because of a perception in the

\textsuperscript{71} In the NEAZDP project papers the word initiator is used instead of beneficiary. It is not clear to me why this is the case. Could it be that beneficiary is patronizing?
Program that the environmental sustainability of irrigation was uncertain, and the need to give attention to upland farming.

Table 7.2
Results of Small Scale Irrigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cost/Ha (N)</th>
<th>Yield Kg/Ha</th>
<th>Selling Price (N)</th>
<th>Gross Income to Cover Profit and Family Labour (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>445 bags</td>
<td>111,250</td>
<td>99,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onion</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>250 bags</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>606 baskets</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>39,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>30 baskets</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>13,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N-Nigerian Naira

As indicated in Table 7.1, there are 166 irrigation projects in Dagona DA. Irrigation is not new in the community, but it received a big boost as a result of NEAZDP support for the project. Most of the beneficiaries are happy with the project. About 70 percent of the beneficiaries in Dagona community and 53 percent in the DA have repaid their loans (Group Discussion August 12 1993, Interview with Salisu Jawi July 15 1993). Compared to repayment in other projects, it is high. Through repayments, a number of other projects have been implemented: instead of returning the repayment to NEAZDP headquarters, it is deposited in the village account and other projects are funded with the money.
A support mechanism for the project has been built in by NEAZDP: input stores stock some of the necessary requirements for successful irrigation and a village mechanic has been trained to repair water pumps. From the input store and village mechanic projects funded by NEAZDP this project gets most of its requirements for a successful operation. The objectives of the project have been met, although it was difficult to ascertain whether or not the consumption of vegetables increased in the community.

7.2.2 Pomade and Soap Enterprise. This project is in Gogi, Machina DA, about a kilometre from the border with the Niger Republic. It is not a village project, but a support project. The objectives of the project include the improvement of women’s health, boosting the village economy through reinvestment of money realised from the project, the formation of a women’s development committee, and helping other women to initiate other projects from the profit realized.

Ten women are involved in the project. They are also members of the Women’s Development Committee, and were trained in the community by a staff member of NEAZDP for 15 days on how to make pomade and soap. The community provides the building for the project while the Program paid for the training and the ingredients.

By September 1993, about 150 bottles of pomade and 200 bars of soap had been

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72 There is a distinction made in NEAZDP between village and support projects. The former are mostly small scale in monetary terms and implemented in NEAZDP cluster and pilot villages. The latter are in most cases large scale and could be implemented outside the cluster and pilot villages. An example of a support project was the electrification of Government Girls Secondary School Nguru through the Parents-Teachers Association of the institution. In this case the cost of electrification is high and Nguru is not a village, but a town which is not eligible for NEAZDP projects. Hence, the project was implemented as a support project.
produced, but very few sold. The products were sold in the community only, and not in nearby communities or in bigger markets like Machina and Gidigir in Niger Republic. Production stopped about June 1993, because the two basic ingredients, scent and palm oil were exhausted, and the amount of money realized was not enough to cover the costs of transportation to buy the raw materials partly because of the rate of inflation. The initial raw materials for the project were bought in Kano.

The fact that most of the products have not been sold and the raw materials have been exhausted, jeopardizes the future of the project. In September 1993, the project’s building was in a dilapidated condition. The project has potential, but the implementation has been very unsatisfactory. None of the objectives of the project seemed to have been achieved except that of forming a development committee of women. Apart from the problem of marketing the products, other problems need to be taken into consideration. When the project was initiated there was no costing of the project to determine how much the products would cost, for how much they should be sold, and what was the competitive advantage of the products over those sold in the market. Similarly, the transport costs to secure the raw materials from Kano is very expensive. In addition, the beneficiaries of the project are from two spatially distinct communities, and these communities have a long history of disagreements. The situation is further compounded by an allegation that the husband of one of the beneficiaries has an undue interest in the project.

7.2.3 Village Book Store. This is part of a larger education project for Dagona Primary
School set up in 1991. The aims of the project include providing the community with readily available educational materials, generating revenue for the Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) and making its support of the school more sustainable, eradicating the habit of dependency on the Local Education Authority, and making available education resources to Quranic schools and adult literacy classes. The items bought for the book store include slates, English and Arabic text books, cloth for school uniform and pencils. The PTA is responsible for managing the project.

The project has support of members of the PTA because previously they had to buy most of the stock from Gashua, a distance of about 40 kilometres. By September 1993, a good number of some of the items had been sold: all the school uniform cloth, three quarter of the foolscap, all the exercise books, half of the sharpeners and all the pens. However, very few of the Arabic textbooks, slates, rulers and none of the agricultural textbooks had been sold. Since the first consignment of the book store there was no subsequent purchase.

Comparing the objectives of the project and the performance of the project so far, it is difficult to say that it is a successful project. On the positive side, the community residents need not go elsewhere for school materials. On the other hand, there are negative aspects. Part of the reason for the inability of the PTA to sell some of the items is that the Local Education Authority has started to provide some of these items free to the school. Likewise, some of the items, for example the agricultural textbooks, were bought on the promise of using them for a school farm project, but the school farm did not start on schedule. Furthermore, the Arabic and adult education materials were purchased on the assumption of patronage from the wider community, but not many people have bought these items. As a
result of the inability of the PTA to sell all the materials, it has not become financially self-sufficient.

7.2.4 Grinding Machine. In most cases grinding machines are part of women's projects. They have been established in both Dagona and Machina Das. The aim of the project is to reduce the amount of time and energy expended by women in food processing so that they invest their time in activities which improves their standard of living. The project also enables the Program to establish a women's committee, train members of the community to operate and maintain the machinery on a sustainable basis and involve women in development activities. NEAZDP contributes N16,320 and the initiators contribute N500. A women's committee has been formed to oversee the operation of the project.

The viability of the project depends on the size of the communities and whether there is competition in the community or from other neighbouring communities. In Dagona, the economic viability of the project is very much in doubt because there is steep competition from four other grinding machines. In Lamisu, Machina DA, the women used to travel 10 kilometres to another community, to grind or they stayed at home and ground grain by hand. Thus, there is a felt need for such a project, but is the community big enough to operate the machine economically? By September 1993, it was premature to judge the project because it was only a few months old. The viability of gasoline powered grinding machines in small villages is in doubt, as a result, hand operated grinding machines called mini grinders have been introduced by NEAZDP so that they can be loaned to individuals or groups of women.
However, some of the objectives of the projects have been met: women’s committee, saving women’s energy, for example in Lamisu, and a village mechanic has been trained in Dagona.

7.2.5 Ox-Team. The objective of the project is to reduce the time required for land preparation and weeding which will eventually increase agricultural production. The initiators are expected not only to increase their land under cultivation, increase their yields, be self-sufficient and improve farming practices, but also improve food security of the community and increase their income through hiring out of their animals and equipment. An ox plough is expected to farm six hectares per annum. On average, the initiator is expected to cultivate two hectares of his (I mean “his” because so far only men have benefitted from the project in the two communities of the research) farm and cultivate four hectares for other people. NEAZDP gives about N8,000 for the animals, and provides the cart and the plough. The initiator contributes N500. In most communities, the Program trains someone in the use of ploughing equipment, and the initiators of the project are trained by that person. The village trainer may also benefit from a credit from the Program as a personal incentive as well as to create demonstration effect in the community. Similarly, some of the VDPs are also trained to use ox and donkey ploughs so that they can train other beneficiaries of the project.

This is a popular project in the Program Area. In many communities in the Program Area, ox teams had been used before the coming of the NEAZDP, but the popularity increased with the support given by the Program. Donkey cart and plough have also been introduced to the area by the Program. They are used for ridging, ploughing, weeding and rural transportation. Also the dung of the animals can be used as an organic manure.
In 1990, there was no ox team credit, but in 1991, they accounted for 139 out of 797 village credits or loans given by the Program. In 1992 and 1993, there were 617 and 772 village ox team credits respectively. In those two years, it was the most popular project in the Program Area. The increase in the number of these projects is certainly an indication of increased support for crop production especially in the areas where fadama (flood recession zone) production is not possible. Moreover, for these areas this is one of the few viable economic projects.

The popularity of this project has also been reflected in the high number of such projects both in Dagona and Machina DAs, 49 and 39 respectively. However, the popularity of the project has not reflected in the utilization of the project and repayment of the credit. The Dagona Primary School is one of the beneficiaries of the project as part of a school farm project. The project did not start in 1991 as scheduled. In 1992, when the project was implemented, the yield from the farm was poor because of late planting and inadequate attention given to the farm. In 1993, about N1000 was spent on the farm and there were prospects for a good season. Apart from farming, the ox team is also used for rural transportation, and hired out to others. The money collected as revenue is divided between the care taker of the ox team, the school and the maintenance of the ox team (Interview, Habu Sule July 1993).

Repayments from ox team credit in Dagona are very poor. Only about 25 percent of beneficiaries have repaid their loans. According to the DAP of Dagona, Salihu Jawi (Interview, September 1993), one of the reasons is the inadequate utilization of the ox team. The profitability of the project depends not very much on what is its main purpose, crop
production, but on rural transportation and other economic activities. The economic return from ploughing six hectares, is not enough to cover the cost of running the ox team and making a profit which can be used to repay the credit. However, the ox team can also be used for other purposes especially for rural transportation. It can haul agricultural inputs to the farm, carry harvested crops from farm to home or market, and serve as water transport for sale in the community.

In Machina, the outcome of the project is difficult to judge, partly because repayments were not due in September 1993 when this research ended. Six of the eight initiators of the project with whom we had discussions were adequately utilizing the ox team. However, one initiator sent his bulls to pastoralists while another sent his to another village where he thought he could get better economic returns. The DAP, Bashir Bukar Albishir (Interview, September 1993) had to put pressure on them to return their ox teams to Machina.

The profitability of the project in Machina unlike Dagona, depends more on rural transportation than on using the ox team for ploughing, ridging or weeding. The sandy nature of Machina makes oxen less useful for work in the fields than they are in Dagona where ploughing, weeding and ridging are extremely important. In Machina, most people use a simpler hand implement ashasha. Although the ashasha is simpler, it does not dig into the ground and turn the soil, and is therefore unsuited to ploughing and ridging, tasks oxen do well. One can conclude that some of the objectives of the project have been achieved while others are difficult to judge.
7.2.6 Women's Development Centre. The development centre is the major women's project in Tagali, Dagona DA established in 1991. The major activity at the Centre is learning to sew and knit. The program anticipates that profits generated from the project (sewing and knitting activities) will be used to assist women farmers in the purchase of an ox plough, water pumps and, a millet dehusking machine. Another advantage is expected: women will no longer travel to Gashua and/or Nguru to sew their fabrics and hence they will have time to invest in caring for their families and collecting fuelwood.

A series of follow-up projects has been planned for the Women's Centre. These include establishment of an orchard and a poultry farm, support for purchase of drugs for the village clinic, and assisting women in other villages to set up similar projects. A committee has been formed to manage the Centre.

NEAZDP's financial commitments to the Tagali Women Committee and the Tagali Women Sewing Corporation are N39,984.10 and N17,295.92 respectively. There are two Singer sewing machines and one knitting machine in the project. NEAZDP paid two women from Nguru to train the women participants in the use of the sewing machines in the village and one of the women participants was trained in the use of the knitting machine in Nguru. A renovated classroom in the village is used as the training centre.

Six women started the project, but four remained as of September 1993. One of the women bought her sewing machine and left to start on her own business while the other was divorced and left the community. All the women have learnt how to sew, and in the process of training have been able to sew for themselves and their children. However, the other women who were not trained in knitting refused to be trained in knitting by the woman who
was trained in Nguru. According to the woman trained in Nguru, the other women alleged that she was given preferential treatment by sending her to Nguru to train (Malama Dela, Interview July 1993). She was not using the machine because of her concerns that she could be accused of using public property for private purpose.

According to the participants, one of the problems of the Centre is that they were expecting to be given loans to buy their sewing machines after training. They thought that it would be profitable since several of the surrounding villages did not have sewing and knitting machines. This would also make it possible to recruit other women to the project. The women also complained that the current supervisor of the project never visited them (Discussion with Women Committee members September 1993). This project on most counts is not successful.

7.2.7 Community Grain Bank. There are only two community grain bank projects in the Program Area. One of them is in KomKomma, Machina DA. The objectives of the project are to provide the community food security and minimise the exploitation of peasant farmers (Kimmage 1993).

The justification for the project is that most peasant farmers sell their surplus at the time of harvest at a very low price in order to buy some of their immediate needs. The number of sales at the same time depresses the price of grain. In the lean period, these farmers buy grain sometimes at about 200 percent more than they sold it for. This not only undermines the food security of the community, but also the local economy.

NEAZDP's initial contribution to the project was N50,000 for purchase of grains and N3,600 for storage chemicals. A Grain Bank Committee was formed to manage it. The loan
is to be repaid with an annual interest of 6 percent when the total capital of the Bank is about 200 percent of the initial investment by NEAZDP. The community contribution is N2,155 and the store used is owned by the state government. The store is few kilometres from the village. Later, another store was built in the village because the previous one had security and leakage problems (Kimmage 1993). The community provided the site, made the mud bricks, did the first plastering and fitted the roof supports and frames for the door and windows. Surplus grain in the community was bought in November 1992 at market price of N310 per bag and was sold after discussions in July 1993. The operational cost of the Bank was N24 per bag, and therefore the cost price was fixed at N334 per bag. The prevailing market price in July 1993 was N580 per bag. It was decided to give members of the community a discount of one third of the difference of the cost price while the Bank would retain two-thirds of the difference. Thus the Bank sold its stock at the discount rate of N498 per bag. A total sum of N80,178 was realised from the sales (Kimmage 1993).

The benefit of the project to members of the community can be said to be positive. The market value of the grain at the time of purchase in 1992 was N49,970 and when it was sold 8 months later, the market value increased to N93,380. This is an increase in value of N43,470 or 87.1 percent. The sum of N13,202 or 30.4 percent was given as a discount to the community, N229 or .5 percent was cost of construction of the new grain store and N30,039 or 69.1 percent was the remaining profit for the community deposited in its account in addition to the initial capital investment of N49,970 (see Table 7.3) (Kimmage 1993).

Moreover, no grain was lost to insects, rodents or other diseases and the community achieved some level of food self-sufficiency and retention of value-added by minimising the
exploitation of peasant farmers. This project is a success.

Table 7.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue (N)</th>
<th>Expenditure (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership Fees 1,350</td>
<td>Transport 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Contribution 805</td>
<td>Materials 3,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEAZDP Stock 3,600</td>
<td>Labour 3,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEAZDP Contribution 50,000</td>
<td>Storage Chemicals 3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEAZDP Extra Contribution 5500</td>
<td>Grain Purchase 49,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain Sales 93,380</td>
<td>Members Discount 13,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 154,635</td>
<td>Surplus (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bank Deposit 80,019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


7.2.8 Drug Revolving Fund (DRF). Similar projects have been set up both in Kalgidi, Machina and Dagona, Dagona Das. Each project aims to stock dispensaries with essential drugs, medical equipment and furniture. Each will also establish a community managed drug revolving fund to cater for the health related problems of the community and other cluster villages. It is anticipated that drugs will be readily available for prompt treatment. The NEAZDP contribution to the project is N7,400 and the community's contribution is N2,000. In Dagona, a member of the community, Borno Tawa, who had some medical training was retrained by the NEAZDP as a dispenser whereas in Kalgidi there is a trained dispenser, an
employee of the local government. In both communities a health committee manages the DRF.

In both communities, there was a great need for such a project. Although the dispensary in Dagona was set up in 1986, the situation by 1991 was bad. Some of the equipment had been removed by the local government and the supply of drugs was irregular. An illegal chemist shop operated by a former soldier was the only source of drugs in the community. Many people had to travel to Gashua or Nguru to purchase drugs. In Kalgidi also, the community depended mostly on sources outside the community for drugs. Quack pharmacists who visited the community on market days within Nigeria and some who travelled from Niger Republic were the major sources of drugs. Thus, the establishment of drug revolving funds was very much welcomed (Bomo Tawa, Interview, July 1993, Mohammed Gwandi, Interview, November 1992).

In both Dagona and Kalgidi, the dispensaries are well patronized and customers from the surrounding villages also buy from there. The drugs are also sold at a subsidized price to the communities. In addition the communities, especially Kalgidi, make a high profit. From the profit of the sale of drugs they were able to initiate other projects in the community. The project was nearly crippled when politicians put pressure on the Machina local government authority to transfer the dispenser and replace him with an untrained dispenser. The dispenser who was scheduled to replace the trained person supported the then ruling party. But the authority resisted the move because one of the conditions for continued support of NEAZDP is a trained dispenser. On the other hand, one of the major problems of the project in Dagona was that the initial stock of drugs was supplied by a contractor through NEAZDP, and many
of them were to expire in 1993. The Dispenser in Dagona had to destroy them and the health committee bought drugs directly from the market (Ibid). Buying directly from the market has made it possible for the community to decide the quantity of the drugs required and at a cheaper price than if they were supplied by a contractor through NEAZDP. Despite the problem of expired drugs, the project is a success.

In summary many of the NEAZDP projects are successful. These include irrigation, community grain banks, drug revolving funds and grinding machines. Two others are not very clear: the ox team and Book store projects. The Women's Centre and the Soap and Pomade projects are outright failures. Is there a relationship between such factors as strategy, resources, autonomy and the failure and success of these projects? I will discuss these issues at a later stage.

7.3 DFRRI Projects in Dagona and Machina

DFRRI claims to be an integrated rural development program. Under the rubric of what is christened the New Mandate, rural development policy will move away from a sectoral approach and an emphasis on food and fibre to a comprehensive strategy to alleviate rural poverty and to enhance the quality of rural life (Babangida nd). In order to achieve these objectives, a number of projects were outlined. These were community organization and mobilization projects (strengthening/formation of grassroots development institutions, organizing/mobilizing informal groups), food and agriculture projects (crops, livestock, aquaculture, marketing and distribution), rural industrialization projects (agricultural, mineral and metal based industries, waste recycling, arts and crafts), business and commercial
activities projects (commercial transport and creating market outlets), engineering and technology projects (foundries, rural housing equipment), credit mobilization, social and cultural development projects (food and nutrition, health and population, sports and tourism), rural infrastructure projects, and special programs (women and youth in rural development, local security and environmental security). In 1990, the Rural Development Department of the then Ministry of Agriculture was merged with the DFRRRI in order to give a single institutional focus to the task of rural development. As of 1991, there were 762 projects promoted by the program (Koinyan 1991).

There is no doubt that this is a comprehensive and ambitious program which if implemented would have dramatically changed the quality of life of rural people. Between 1986 and 1992, the Program received about N1.9 billion from the federal government. The projects implemented include 83,460.22 kilometres of rural feeder roads, 17,162 water and sanitation projects, and 506 rural electrification projects. The following disbursements were also made to federal and state agencies: food and agricultural programmes (N80 million), support facilities and services (N41 million), and biological inputs production (N36 million) (Koinyan 1992, 20-93). However, in the local governments and local communities of this research, there is little evidence of the implementation of this comprehensive program. Indeed all the DFRRRI projects in Yobe state, and in its local governments and local communities consist of physical rural infrastructure (see Yobe State DFRRRI nd). In Dagona village all the projects are rural feeder roads while in Machina73 most of the projects are water points. There

73 In this discussion Dagona refers to only Dagona community while Machina refers to Machina district/local government. This is because in DFRRRI projects it is impossible to delineate an identical boundary for Dagona and Machina.
are three rural feeder roads that link Dagona with different communities "constructed" by the DFRRRI. On the other hand, there are a total of seven water and one rural electrification projects in Machina funded by the Program. Thus, between 1986 and September 1993, only 11 DFRRRI projects were implemented in these two communities.

The differences in the types of projects in the two communities are reflections of the ecology of the two areas. Because of the sandy nature of Machina, which is a contrast with Dagona, it is almost impossible to implement the type of rural feeder road projects that DFRRRI normally funds. The cost of a kilometre of a tarred road in Machina is about N2 million while the DFRRRI spends only N9,200 per kilometre. The sandy nature of Machina also makes water very difficult to get.

7.3.1 Rural Feeder Road. The objective of the project is to open up and link rural communities to the existing network of roads. This will facilitate the transportation of farm produce to the wider market and encourage communication between rural communities and their local government headquarters (Borno State DFRRI 1992). As mentioned above the standard cost of the DFRRRI roads per kilometre is N9,200.

From Phase I to Phase III a total of 2,272 kilometres of roads were constructed in Yobe state. A rural road project has been implemented in Dagona. There are three rural feeder roads that link Dagona with other communities: Dagona to Garin Gawo, Dagona to Zaji Maji through Mainiya and Bizi to Dalah through Dagona (Yobe State DFRRI nd). The "construction" of a feeder road entails widening and levelling of preexisting bush path or preexisting road used by motor vehicles. In some cases culverts are constructed as well.
These roads that link Dagona to various communities existed before DFRRRI. There are many people in Dagona who think that intervention of DFRRRI has worsened the condition of the roads. They argue that if the money on these roads had been used with an input from the community, better feeder roads would have been constructed. It is contractors who construct and maintain the roads. The gains of the project, if any, go to contractors. In the rainy season, the drivers union of Dagona organizes community work to make the road between Dagona and Garin Gawo, the major road that links Dagona to the state highway, motorable (Interview, Mallam Mustapha June 1993). Most of the rural feeder roads are overgrown by weeds in the rainy season.

Apart from the poor quality of roads, some of which is because of a fixed amount of money allocated per kilometre throughout the country, one of the claims made by the DFRRRI can be contested. For example, the road between Dagona and Garin Gawo claimed by DFRRRI, was actually constructed by an EC Program, Nguru Wetland, for the visit of Prince Philip to Dagona Bird Sanctuary (Discussion with Community members July 1993). What DFRRRI did was to reinforce the road. Similarly, while the signboard put up by DFRRRI claims that the distance between Garin Gawo and Dagona is 18 kilometres, in fact the distance is only about nine kilometres. This is not a successful project.

7.3.2 Rural Water Supply. The objective of the scheme is to provide potable water to rural dwellers. Potable water will enhance the quality of life of rural people. Water projects can include the digging of new wells or reconstructing of old ones, reactivating boreholes and constructing earth dams. Earth dams are mainly constructed for livestock.
In Phase 1, 83 water projects at the cost of N1.8 million were implemented by the program in Yobe state. In Phase II, 294 projects were implemented. By September 1993, Phase III was being implemented and it was estimated that 390 wells would be constructed (Yobe State DFRRRI nd). Of this large number of water projects, seven are in the Machina local government area. Two of the projects are borehole reactivation while the remaining five are digging of wells. While we confirmed one bore hole reactivation, the other could not be confirmed (Discussion, Machina Local Government Rural Development Coordinator June 1993). Similarly, some of the well projects are fictitious as discussed in the previous chapter. Overall, therefore, the success of this project is not very clear.

7.3.3 Rural Electrification. The objective of the project is to promote and facilitate rural industrialization in order to create employment opportunities and stem rural-urban migration (Borno State DFRRRI 1992).

There is only one rural electrification project in the two communities, and that is the electrification of Machina after it became a local government headquarters. It is a joint project between DFRRRI and the Yobe State Rural Electrification Board (YSREB). The daily operation of the project is jointly funded by the local government and the YSREB.

The first problem encountered was that the generating machine bought by the YSREB developed faults after few months. As a result, the local government had to buy another generating machine. Similarly, the operation of the machines has been hampered by irregular supply of diesel fuel. The success of this project is not clear.

On the basis of the three DFRRRI projects discussed as well as several commentaries in
Nigerian newspapers and magazines, the success of its projects is doubtful.

7.4 Better Life Projects in Dagona and Machina.

The Better Life Program has several projects which are geared towards the alleviation of poverty and improving the quality of rural life. These include agricultural extension service projects (seed distribution, seedlings, fish pond, fertilizer), livestock projects (goatry, piggery, snail farming), market support services projects (trade by barter, credit), cottage industries and food processing projects (looms, tailoring, fish smoking, rice mill, pottery) and health, social welfare and enlightenment projects (maternity centre, mini pharmacy, vaccination and immunization, vesica vaginal fistula clinic, social centres, trade fairs, workshops training and education). Other activities of the program include lobbying, participating in government activities and influencing government decisions. For example, Better Life claims that the setting up of the National Commission for Women, the increase in number of women in top government positions and the those involved in partisan politics (1987-1993) are all due to its efforts (Alarape 1992, Babangida 1991, Babangida 1990, The Central Bank of Nigeria 1990). The claim that the setting up of the Women Commission was as a result of the efforts of BLP was refuted by Bolanle Awe (1994).

By 1991, Better Life had established 9,422 cooperatives, 1,435 industries, 428 women centres, 195 social welfare centres, 286 educational centres, 187 health centres, 1,531 crop farms, 253 vegetable gardens, 135 fish and livestock farms, 308 shops and 187 markets (The Better Life Programme 1991). Funding for these projects has come from the federal government and its agencies like DFRRI, several banks and international agencies like
Despite the wide range of activities, only three types of projects have been implemented in Dagona and Machina. These are a grinding machine, a public campaign on awareness and a trade fair. A fourth project, a sewing machine, had been approved but not implemented in Machina as of September 1993. There is a caveat. According to Jeremiah Bitrus (1988), the Bade Local Government branch of the Program, where Dagona was located, has also engaged in various projects. These include national Better Life fair projects, public enlightenment projects, establishing district and village committees and training of women projects. However, since these activities have not been reported in Dagona, I overlooked them nor could I confirm their existence in other communities.

In Dagona the only project of the Better Life is a grinding machine. In Machina the projects include a grinding machine, participation in a trade fair and a public enlightenment campaign. Thus, between 1987 and 1993 only four projects have been implemented by the Program in the two communities.

7.4.1 Grinding Machine. The objective of this project is not different from that of the similar project of NEAZDP. The aim is basically to lighten the burden on women and save their energy and time for other activities. This project have been implemented both in Dagona and Machina.

The grinding machine in Dagona was set up in 1989, but it is not functional. The machine stopped working six months after installation and has not been repaired. On the other hand, the grinding machine in Machina is functioning well. By way of rating, this project is
successful in one community and a failure in the other.

7.4.2 Trade Fair. The objective of the project is to expose women and women's products to the market. Buyers from different sectors of the economy would, as a consequence, become more aware of the things women produce in the rural areas. Women in Machina have participated in this project.

According to some of the participants in the trade fair, some of the wares displayed as products from Machina were not produced by the women of the community. They were said to have been bought from the market and displayed at the trade fair (Discussion, Members of Machina Development Association June 1993). This is not a successful project.

7.4.3 Public Campaign. The objective is to inform women of various activities of government. In other words, this is a forum created for government to reach rural women. Machina women have participated in one such forum. It is difficult to judge the quality of such forum, but in its own terms, this is a successful project.

In summary, Better Life projects which have been implemented in these two communities are only partially successful. Judging from various newspaper commentaries, the Better Life is a failure.

In relation to the stated objectives of the projects, comparing the three development institutions, NEAZDP projects in Dagona and Machina have performed better than those of the two others. On the hand, Better Life projects seems to be better than that of DFRRI in these two communities. The next task is to establish the second criterion of success: ability to
benefit the marginalized and to empower them. This involves the politics of inclusion and exclusion.

### 7.5 Inclusion and Exclusion in Grassroots Projects.

As I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, in assessing who is included and who is excluded in these projects, I concentrate on productive projects.

#### 7.5.1 NEAZDP

In Table 7.1, there are 355 "productive" projects out of 401 total projects. Of the productive projects most of them including irrigation projects, ox team projects, fishing gear projects, flooded rice production projects, rice processing projects, and small ruminants projects are given to individuals as members of a group. Village mechanics projects, burnt brick projects, and blacksmith projects which involve skill training are given to individuals. Input store project is also benefitted by individuals. Women have not benefitted from any of these projects except from the rice processing project (Interview, Shugaba Aisha July 1993). The other productive projects like the grinding machine, community grain bank project, and Women's Development Centre are given to a group, either of women or of both sexes. It is only small ruminant project which is given to both sexes as individuals who belong to a group.

Loans are given to men for irrigation projects, ox team projects, fish gear projects, input store projects, village mechanics projects, blacksmiths projects, flooded rice production projects, village carpentry projects, and burnt brick projects. Of the 355 productive projects in
Machina and Dagona DAs, 335 are directed to males as individuals or as members of a group. Thus, only 20 of the productive projects are women oriented or could be given to both men and women while 10 (see Table 7.1) of the projects, — Women’s Development Centre and grinding machines— funds for are given to women as members of a group.

Apart from the fact that men in Dagona and Machina have appropriated most of the productive projects, theirs are also some of the most profitable projects in NEAZDP and therefore incorporates more incentives than those of women. Irrigation projects as indicated in Table 10 and ox team projects are very productive and that explains the high demand for them. This is also the case of flooded rice production, input supply, village mechanics, blacksmiths, fishing gear and burnt brick projects. Flooded rice production has a high turnover since within a single season a farmer can realise profit and pay back the loan. Some of the other projects such as input supply, village mechanics, village carpentry, and burnt bricks have markets created or facilitated by the NEAZDP: there are institutional market linkages that facilitate the profitability of the projects.

For example, in theory input stores are funded by NEAZDP to supply most of the materials and equipment required for the successful implementation of its projects, but in reality they are mostly oriented to agriculture, in particular to irrigated agriculture. The store stocks items like fertilizer, pesticides, seeds and spare parts. Similarly, village carpenters are retrained or trained by NEAZDP and then employed in jobs that NEAZDP generates. For example, they construct carts for NEAZDP-supported donkey and ox team projects and they are employed on NEAZDP building projects. Blacksmiths also have a market created and facilitated by NEAZDP. They are responsible for adjusting and reconstructing ploughs and
riggers supplied by the Program. This is in addition to welding and iron bending work in many NEAZDP projects. Likewise, NEAZDP buys the first set of burnt bricks produced by beneficiaries of its project.

The market availability and support for male beneficiaries of NEAZDP projects is in contrast to women's projects. For example, whereas input stores stock some of the necessary equipment for the implementation of male-dominated projects such as water pumps they do not stock raw materials and equipment for the women's projects such as palm oil. An argument can be made that projects that have the patronage of NEAZDP may not survive when the Program is phased out and those that do not depend on its patronage are likely to be sustainable. However, this argument overlooks the fact that the immediate objective of project beneficiaries is repayment of loans and the in-built networks and mechanisms that have been established during the Program life span are likely to ensure continuous patronage of these projects.

In terms of quality of training the male-dominated projects receive better training than women-oriented ones. Village mechanics, carpenters, and blacksmiths receive longer training periods and their skills are upgraded. In comparison, for example, women who benefit from grinding machine projects receive no training not even in operating the machine. It is men who are trained as village mechanics to service and repair the machines. If the women had been trained not only to operate the machine, but also to maintain it, they would have gained a more valuable skill. Examples of training for women which have been discussed are the two-week sessions for making pomade and soap and for sewing. These are short-lived in comparison to the training given to men.
In addition to the direct training that the projects receive, there are institutional arrangements through extension services given by Field Technicians. There are Field Technicians who provide extension services for irrigation, flooded rice, and ox teams, small ruminants and other crop production projects. Apart from the extension services by Field Technicians, DAPs and VDPs also give extension messages to these beneficiaries. By contrast, there is no extension support for either the sewing and knitting, pomade and soap, or grinding machines projects. It is only the small ruminants projects given to both men and women that benefit from the extension service given by a Veterinary Technician. In addition, it should be noted that there is no female extension officer in NEAZDP.

Besides the differences in the number and types of projects along gender lines, the total amount of money voted for these projects further demonstrates the gendered distribution of benefits in the NEAZDP projects. The total value of irrigation, carpentry, blacksmith, fishing gear, village mechanics and ox team projects in Dagona and Machina DAs is about N1.9 million. These are male-dominated projects and are given to individuals. In comparison, the value of women’s projects, such as pomade and soap, Women Centre and grinding machine projects is about N225,324.10 or one eighth of the men’s projects. More than half of that amount is for grinding machines. It is equally important to remember that these projects are given to a group of women.

There are other serious long- and short-term consequences of giving individual men productive projects while giving a group of women a productive project. Giving individuals loans is promoting individual self-reliance which can undermine public good. While perhaps that is the policy the Program intends to pursue, it should be noted that it can go against the
grain, and undermine community spirit. If the benefits in an organization are given to a group of people to the detriment of others, those who are excluded would see no reason to participate in community activities. In the short-term it reinforces social differentiation. Given the fact that men are likely to be richer than women in most cases, programs like NEAZDP will further enrich men at the expense of women. The impact on gender relations can only be speculated about. For example, some men may marry more spouses because they are richer which may, in turn, have a negative impact on women.

Why have women been short-changed? Is it because it is "natural" or because of gendered division of labour in those societies and development institutions? I want to suggest that there is nothing natural in the allocation of projects between men and women in Dagona and Machina; it is the result of the assumptions of development institutions and society. Women can be trained as blacksmiths or carpenters, and there is no logical reason for classifying grinding machines and pomade and soap making as women's projects. However, because it is assumed that women should be responsible for grinding and washing, these projects are given to them. Similarly, because women's bodies have been commercialised, pomade becomes a women's project. These projects further reinforce the marginalization of women. On the other hand, those projects that are assumed to be masculine like carpentry, irrigation and blacksmithing are given to men.

Some of these assumptions do not only lack historical specificity and contextualization, but also do not reflect the existing division of labour in Dagona and Machina or neighbouring communities. Women in Dagona have gradually lost their access to the river system of the community with the changes in the ecology and increase in the
commercialization of the water system, but this does not necessarily mean the situation cannot be redressed. As discussed in Chapter 3 one of the problems for women is also the disappearing of their fishing gear: NEAZDP can remedy the situation. In a neighbouring community of Wachakal women have been given irrigation loans because of an initiative of one of the officers. One day, the officer asked why women were not given irrigation loans in the community and he was told that women were not involved in irrigation. However, after he saw women irrigating with calabashes, he directed that irrigation support projects should be given to the women. In another community, the village head took the initiative to allocate women land for irrigation when NEAZDP wanted to start an orchard project for women. Thus, it is possible to give women irrigation projects in Dagona.

Another example of how traditions are contested and invented is the case of blacksmiths. Young girls in Dagona help their parents in blacksmith workshops. But when they grow up, this valuable skill is discarded as they no longer engage in such activities. There are two contending explanations as to why women, when they grow up, do not continue with blacksmith activities. One informant said married women are not allowed to do so. Another informant, who happens to be from a blacksmith family, explained that most of the women from blacksmith families marry outside such families, and when they marry into a different family, it is difficult for them to continue with the trade. Is it possible for projects like Better Life and NEAZDP to support such project? What I am trying to argue is that the ideology of tradition is always ambiguous and contested. Tradition is not frozen in history.

If women in Dagona have not been given irrigation loans because of societal and
institutional assumptions of gender roles, that cannot explain why women were not given ox team loans both in Dagona and Machina. Ox teams are mostly used for upland rainfed farming. Women in both communities are actively involved in this type of farming as discussed in Chapter 4. Thus, one would have expected them to benefit from this project, but they have not. It is ironical that one of the follow-up projects planned for the Tagali Women Centre is an ox plough. Further, from the life histories of men and women in Chapter 5, there appear several areas of possible intervention by development institutions. For example, women who are engaged in restaurant and petty trading could be helped.

Not every man benefitted from the NEAZDP projects in Dagona and Machina communities. There are other mediating variables such as class, partisan politics, ethnic group, and age. In Tables 7.4 and 7.5, a sample of beneficiaries of the NEAZDP projects in Dagona and Machina shows the intersection of different social markers. In Dagona, younger males have not benefitted from either irrigation or ox team projects, two very popular projects; while there is no definite ethnic bias although no Manga has benefitted from the projects; nor are partisan politics and social class very important variables. On the other hand, the situation in Machina is more complex. Men of lower economic level are the beneficiaries of technical skill training. This is perhaps a reflection of the bias against technical skill training as a lower class job. Mangas, adults and older adults as well as members of the SDP have disproportionately benefitted from the NEAZDP projects. Comparing the men beneficiaries of the two communities of Dagona and Machina, the former is more reflective of the complexity of the community than the latter.
Table 7.4
A Sample of Beneficiaries of NEAZDP Irrigation and Ox Team Projects in Dagona

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Economic Level</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abaka</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Old Adult</td>
<td>Bade</td>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kombo</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Old Adult</td>
<td>Bade</td>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>NRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabina</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>NRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duwawu</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Bade</td>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abba</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Bade</td>
<td>Ox Team</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuaibu</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Bade</td>
<td>Ox Team</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sani</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>Ox Team</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>NRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Old Adult</td>
<td>Bade</td>
<td>Ox Team</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahago</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Old Adult</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>Ox Team</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: SDP-Social Democratic Party, NRC-National Republican Convention.
Source: Field Notes and Discussion with Research Assistants 1993.
Table 7.5
A Sample of Beneficiaries of NEAZDP Projects in Machina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Economic Level</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Usman</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Old Adult</td>
<td>Manga</td>
<td>Ox Team</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>NRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guruguay</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Old Adult</td>
<td>Manga</td>
<td>Ox Team</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madi</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Manga</td>
<td>Ox Team</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuturima</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Old Adult</td>
<td>Manga</td>
<td>Ox Team</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budu</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Old Adult</td>
<td>Manga</td>
<td>Ox Team</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbadu</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Manga</td>
<td>Ox Team</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kore</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Young Adult</td>
<td>Manga</td>
<td>Blacksmith</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanta</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Manga</td>
<td>Carpentry</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ado</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>Burnt Brick</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: SDP-Social Democratic Party, NRC-National Republican Party.
Source: Field Notes and Discussion with Research Assistants 1993.

7.5.2 Better Life

Most of the gender criticisms made against NEAZDP can be applied to Better Life. Thus, there is no need to repeat them. Further gender criticism of the Better Life Program grinding projects in both Dagona and Machina is that they are controlled by men. This contrasts with the grinding machine project of NEAZDP in Dagona and Lamisu where there are women's committees. In Dagona, the Lawan (village head), who is a man, is responsible for the project and in Machina, the male elders of the SDP are in de facto control of the project. The fact that it is a village head that is in control of the grinding machine in Dagona
implicates it in the political structure of the community. Similarly, the male SDP control of the grinding machine in Machina opens it to criticisms of being partisan. Such criticism is well founded taking into consideration also the fact that it is located in a ward predominantly inhabited by SDP supporters; which is also where the male elders of the SDP reside.

If my criticism is interpreted as harsh, I have justification for that. First, the ideology of development is about change. Development practitioners claim to be change agents. If we are not capable of introducing change, why should we intervene? I do not suggest that development institutions should not be sensitive to traditions. However, by buying into the ideology of tradition, social injustice is sometimes rationalized. While I do not expect a revolution from development institutions, there is scope for real reform, even a radical reform. For example, in the previous chapter, I discussed about the women village development promoters identified by NEAZDP. If that initiative had not been taken, the lack of women village development practitioners could very well have been rationalized as a consequence of tradition.

7.6 Explaining Success in Grassroots Projects.

In this section I intend to illustrate how the different forms of institutional arrangement (autonomy, resources and strategy) and the contexts of the communities go far to explicate the success and failure of the projects. The question, therefore, is how the different institutional arrangements and the contexts of the communities have influenced success and failure in the implementation of grassroots projects in Dagona and Machina.

In general, NEAZDP projects have been more successful than DFRRRI and Better Life
projects. Why? I suggest that this has to do with an institutional arrangement in NEAZDP which is bottom-up, autonomous and has resources. Conversely, the relative failure of Better Life and DFRRI has to do with an institutional arrangement that is top-down, and lacks autonomy and resources.

In the last chapter, I discussed the various forms of institutional arrangements (autonomy, strategy and resources) in the three development institutions while the contexts of the two communities (socio-economic, gender and historico-political) were discussed previously. I will recap these points and illustrate them with some case studies of projects.

The institutional arrangement of NEAZDP gives more voice, control, ownership, and resources than does DFRRI and Better Life. This is because of the existence of Village Development Associations, Village Development Plans, Women Development Committee, Village Development Promoters, Village Accounts, Project Committees, Development Area Promoters, and Field Technicians. Village people have a say in the types of projects implemented in the communities through deliberations at the meetings of the Annual Village Development Plan, Village Development Association and Project Committees. Thus, projects are to a very large extent decided at the village level. Hence the projects are not only bottom-up, but also there is institutional autonomy even at the local level. An example of a village annual development plan in Chapter 8 shows the extent of local level strategy of identifying needs.

However, as I discussed in the previous section and in Chapter 6, the institutional resources and strategy for women's projects are very unsatisfactory. There is no woman field technician, no field technician on women's projects, there is only one functional woman
Village Development Promoter out of 352, no woman DAPs out of 18, and only a token number of women at policy making level. In addition, the women's development committees at the village levels are not functioning well, partly because of the lack of institutional support. For example, if some of the offices mentioned had been established some of the problems encountered by the women's projects in Tagali and Gogi would have been minimised. Part of the solution to these problems would involve giving women more space in the institutional framework of NEAZDP. Women have to be appointed as Development Area Promoters, policy makers at the Headquarters, supervisors of projects and as village development promoters.

Conversely, the institutional arrangement (autonomy, resources and strategy) in both DFRRRI and Better Life makes it difficult to achieve success. The strategy of both institutions is top-down, and they lack both autonomy and resources in comparison to NEAZDP. In most cases, as discussed in the previous chapter, the claim to establish institutions for local control and ownership have not been implemented in the two Programs. The centralized nature of these Programs gives more power and control to those already in power. Hence, exaggerations and wild claims can be made, and poor quality projects can be implemented and irrelevant projects can be conceived because of lack of local input and control and ownership. Let us take the example of the DFRRRI projects. If there were village associations responsible for initiating projects; if there were a form of community contribution to the projects; and if there were a form of community engagement in monitoring the projects, the wild claims could have been minimized. As I reported in the case of the Dagona feeder roads, the motor drivers in the community were of the view that if they were consulted during implementation of the
projects, many of the problems now encountered would have been avoided.

The resources available to the Programs are also different. At the local levels, both DFRRI and Better Life lacked qualified staff as well as adequate funding. For instance, the only civil servant working for DFRRI does not even have accommodation, let alone a vehicle or other equipment while Better Life had no civil servant working for it. Similarly, the low number of projects implemented by DFRRI and Better Life in comparison to NEAZDP is a partial reflection of the lack of resources of the two institutions.

In relation to reaching the marginalized groups, NEAZDP has performed better than DFRRI. There is a relationship between the institutional arrangement, the context of the communities and how they create the conditions for inclusion and exclusion in the community. I have already discussed what are the institutional problems in relation to women's projects. I want to focus more on how the context of those communities has also affected who gain from NEAZDP projects.

Although compared to the other projects NEAZDP is a success, it is in Dagona that the Program is more successful in reaching out to marginal groups excluding women. In Dagona, several project committees were set up to administer different projects and projects could be implemented through different channels. This is partly because of the pluralistic and egalitarian nature of the community. Hence, benefits are not monopolised by a tiny section of the community. In Machina, the opposite is the case. Projects are initiated through the centralized village development association only and there are no project committees. This is partly because of the hierarchical nature of politics in the community. Hence projects are controlled by a very small section of the community. Further, this small section of the
community is also identified with a particular party, the SDP. As a result, in Machina, the program is closely associated with this group.

DFRRI and Better Life projects by their very nature align the agencies with the powerful in those communities. The institutional structures of these organizations are tied to local government chairpersons, district and village heads, and their spouses. Better Life, which might have been a very significant empowering agency, is tied to the spouses of male heads. These male spouses were also active members of the SDP. Hence, the projects were not insulated from partisan politics.

7.7 Conclusion

I began the chapter with a claim that I can demonstrate NEAZDP has more successful projects than DFRRI and Better Life and that I can establish a relationship between successful and failed projects and the institutional arrangements and context of the communities.

I hope that through the case studies I have established the relative success of NEAZDP projects vis-a-vis the other programs. My critique of some of the NEAZDP projects, especially the women’s projects shows how the institutional arrangement as well as the contexts of the communities account for the failure. In the discussion on DFRRI and Better Life projects I try to show the relative failure of their projects. I explain that the institutional arrangement and the context of the communities account for the failure. By criticising these organizations, my intention is not to bemoan, but to push for a more activist rural development programs. That is the reason for suggesting possible areas of intervention and for showing the contested nature of the ideology of tradition.
Chapter 8  Grassroots Development Projects as Community Spaces

8.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have attempted to evaluate the success and failure of the three development Programs in relation to grassroots projects. In this chapter, I will continue the evaluation of the three institutions by a different criterion: enrichment of public life. Hence, this chapter is an attempt to analyze rural development projects beyond delivery of service. Most rural development policies and analyses have been on delivery of services and their implementation and evaluation, but I want to evaluate the performance of rural development projects beyond the conventional analyses of service delivery. My evaluation is informed by many of the above concerns, but particularly the empowerment approach. Those concerned with alternative rural development policies have conceived it as empowerment. For example, Dharam Ghai (1988), one of the very few scholars, in analyzing some of the experiences of bottom-up approach to development made an important point that projects are “schools of democracy” with an impact on other political and social issues in communities. Also, Robert Putnam (1995b) in a different strand from his most recent work on Italy, is concerned with how public policy could revitalise the decline of civic engagement in the United States. Thus, the issue is how rural development projects could be analyzed as expanding and creating local spaces.

I intend to expand this discourse on projects by using some of the empirical and theoretical issues raised in the literature on political space as suggested by Jonathan Barker

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74. I use the concept of community space as a metaphor to refer to activities in the public sphere. By activities in the public sphere, I mean all actions that bring people together as citizens on public issues.

In order to evaluate the performance of Better Life, DFRRI and NEAZDP in terms of creating, and expanding community spaces, I will first make a catalogue of the community space in Dagona and Machina. A general survey of all existing spaces is important to get a sense of the nature and quality of community public life as well to develop a basis of making comparisons between the impact of development projects and other institutions in creating and expanding spaces in the communities. I will proceed to compare the spaces created and expanded by the three development institutions and the variations in the two communities. I will illustrate the quality of community spaces created by the three development institutions, government institutions and community organizations by analyzing the content of the three sets of community spaces.

I shall argue that development projects have the very important role of creating spaces where development officials, government officers and communities meet to discuss issues of importance to the community: claims are foregrounded and negotiated. They are also fora for asserting and proclaiming community citizenship. However, the achievement of those claims depends on a particular form of institutional arrangement: local autonomy, resources and a bottom-up strategy. Otherwise those spaces will mainly be control mechanisms of projects and elites. Furthermore, the spaces created and expanded by development projects depend on the socio-economic, identity relations and historico-political contexts of those communities: development institutions do not create and expand public spaces out of nothing; they are also mediated by the socio-economic, gender and ethnic relations and political structures of the communities. But I want to further suggest that the mere fact that these spaces have been
created is important and that even spaces where local people may not have much control can be used strategically; either openly or through hidden scripts to make their voices known. I will illustrate these ideas with a case study of a community meeting. This illustration, I hope will also bring to the fore something not clear from Robert Putnam’s (1995a) validation of social capital: the content of meetings. Apart from these arguments, this chapter is an attempt to demonstrate some of the methodological issues of political space as elaborated by Jonathan Barker (1994b).

8.2 Community Spaces in Dagona and Machina

I will show in this section the influence of bottom-up strategy, local autonomy, resources and the context of the two communities on public spaces. In trying to make a survey of all the community spaces, I first asked the research assistants in Dagona and Machina where and how do people in those communities meet to discuss among themselves issues which affect the community, meet government officials, get services from governments and projects or where government and project officials meet the communities. My concern is more specific than Robert Putnam’s (1995a) account of social capital. His interest is essentially to investigate all forms of social interactions like bowling. While a group bowling could be an occasion for important community politics, my concern is limited to purposely public event with a public agenda. Andrew Kiondo’s (1994) account of local development in Tanzania resonates with some of the concerns of this research.

In this study most of the spaces identified are government and development program buildings, social development projects, meetings, political party offices, community
associations, and worshipping places. After walking through the communities and holding discussions with some other community members it is clear that the identification of community spaces excludes other important spaces like private business premises and private productive project settings funded by development projects. Similarly, settings like shaded gathering places that are not primarily used for particular activity have been overlooked. Likewise, the worshipping places are those not used every day, but on specific days: Friday Mosques and Churches. Thus neighbourhood mosques are not included. Hence in the chapter, three broad categories of community spaces have been identified: government institutions, development institutions and community organizations. Government institutions are federal, state, local governments and their agencies. The focus is on all the offices, committees and related public meetings which have been primarily created or strongly influenced by them. Development institutions are Better Life, DFRRI and NEAZDP. The interest is on all the meetings, committees and offices created or strongly influenced by these institutions. Community organizations include ethnic associations, professional associations, political parties and religious settings. The discussion will be on all public meetings, committees and offices created or strongly influenced by these institutions.

There are two caveats. In trying to categorise and classify which agency is controlled by whom, overlaps and ambiguity are unavoidable: some associations have been formed by one program and revitalized by another. Likewise, certain projects are jointly supported by two different agencies. The second caveat is that the illustrations in this chapter are drawn from the experiences of Machina. The reason is that I am more familiar with that community than Dagona.
The first task is to map out the various community spaces in the two communities to lay the basis for comparing the impact of different institutions (see Tables 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4). For the moment, I will only make brief statements about the reason for variation between the different institutions and the two communities. In Dagona, the following local government offices and services have been identified: district head, cement well, bore hole, primary school, health clinic and village head. The associations and meetings with or of the community around these offices created or expanded by the local government are those of the Chapnori (Meeting of Ward Heads), and that of Village and District Heads. A Parent Teachers Association and a Health Committee exist in Dagona, but the activity of the former has been influenced by NEAZDP and the latter created by NEAZDP. There is no meeting or committee on the cement well project. The state government provides two services: a Community Viewing Centre, and Yobe State Agricultural Development Program (YOSADP). There is no committee or meeting on the viewing centre project created by the state government, but a Kungiyan Fadama (Fadama Association) has been formed by YOSADP. These are all indications of a centralized institutional arrangement that does not give voice to local people. However, NEAZDP established a committee to manage the viewing centre. On very few occasions, federal government agencies like the National Population Commission, the Directorate of Social Mobilization, and the National Electoral Commission hold public campaigns in Dagona, but they do not have offices in the community. What is very clear is that most governmental institutions have no bottom-up strategy and autonomous institutional structure.

Because of a different form of institutional arrangement that is bottom-up, autonomous
and with more resources, NEAZDP has several projects and services, and committees in Dagona. These are grinding machine, dehusking machine, NEAZDP office, Primary Health Care (PHC)/Drug Revolving Fund, Community Bank, Conservation, and Book Store. NEAZDP has also partly funded renovation of borehole and community viewing centre. For all these services and offices there are committees and/or meetings either initiated or influenced by the Program. Among these are the Dagona Village Development Association, Health Committee, Women’s Committee, Parents-Teachers Association, Conservation Committee and the Viewing Centre Committee. Similarly meetings and training sessions have been held on Village Development Plans, Village Development Promoters and Traditional Birth Attendants. The Better Life Program has a grinding machine, but there is no meeting or committee whereas DFRRI has funded three feeder roads to and from Dagona but sponsored no meetings or committees. These Programs do not also have offices in the community (see Table 8.3). The lack of meetings and offices by these two organizations are indications of their top down approach in comparison to NEAZDP.

The community organizations include two ward offices of political parties, National Republican Party, (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP). These parties held meetings in the community. There is also the Dagona market, but there is no committee or meeting. There are two friday mosques, Masallacin Jumma’a (Friday Mosque) and Masallacin Izala\(^75\) (Izala Mosque). It is only the Masallacin Izala (Izala Mosque) that has a committee to oversee its activities whereas the Masallacin Jumma’a (Friday Mosque) is the responsibility of the Imam

\(^{75}\) Izala is short hand for Jama’atul Izallatul Bidiat wa Ikamatus Sunnah, Movement for the Eradication of Superstition and Upholding of the Sunnah. The Sunnah is the deeds and sayings of Prophet Mohammed (PBUH).
and the Village Head. Furthermore, there is a professional association Kungiyar Masunta (Fishers Association) which meets to discuss issues relevant to the profession (see Table 8.4). Although the number of community organizations in Dagona may seem small, I will show later that indeed it is significant when compared to Machina. The number of community organizations reflect the pluralistic nature of Dagona.

Comparatively, Machina has more community spaces than Dagona largely because it is the seat of local government, and most of the community spaces are those without participatory structure. The local government in Machina has created and expanded most of the community spaces (see Table 8.2). These include departments of Works, Treasury, Natural Resources, Administration, Primary Health Care and Health and Medical. Other public spaces include Slaughter house, Dispensary, two primary schools, market stalls, Islamiya (Islamic School), Office of the District Head, Office of Village Heads, Guest House, Legislative Council, Local Government Education Authority, Expanded Program on Immunization office and Nursery. There are very few meetings held with the community or community committees formed to oversee these offices or services which are initiated or influenced by the local government.

The State government has set up these offices or provided these services: Government Junior Secondary School, Yard Supritandent Office, Water Board, Area Court, YOSADP, Yobe State Agricultural Mechanization Agency and Community Viewing Centre. There is no regular meeting or committee on these services provided by the state government. On the other hand, the Federal government has established these offices or provided these services: the State Security Service, the National Electoral Commission, the Directorate of Social
Mobilization, the National Population Commission, the National Directorate of Employment, Immigration Department, Customs and Excise, and the Nigerian Police. There are no associations or regular public meetings held with the community in any of the settings although they hold their internal meetings and community members receive various services. Likewise, there are occasional meetings which are mostly public campaigns organized by the National Electoral Commission, the National Directorate of Employment, the Directorate of Social Mobilization and the National Population Commission (see Table 8.1). As I said above most of these institutions do not have a participatory structure and their limited impact in terms of expanding community spaces is a result of their non-participatory nature.

The three development institutions have also established their presence in Machina. The Better Life has funded a grinding machine, and held a community meeting while there are partly funded projects of DFRRRI and office of a Rural Development Coordinator. On the other hand, NEAZDP has established an office, a nursery, a community library, built a maternity home, a Community Bank, and dehusking machine house. The Women's Committee is the only new committee to manage any activity in the community but it has also influenced the activities of the Village Development Association. There are several meetings and training sessions held under the auspices of the Program which includes Village Development Plan, community bank board meetings, regular meetings, Village Development Promoters, and Pukko (improved mud stove). Despite the significant number of meetings of NEAZDP in Machina, there would have been more, I contend, but for the hierarchical nature of politics in the community: the dominance of the public sphere by a ruling family. The point about the limited nature of public spaces created by NEAZDP will be clear later when we make a
comparison with Dagona.

Community organizations in Machina include Parents-Teachers Association, Hausari Social Club, Butchers Association, Nigeria Union of Teachers, National Union of Local Government Employees, and Kautalhore (see Table 8.4). These associations hold their meetings. Two religious places identified as public spaces are the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) and the Friday Mosque. There are no committees managing or overseeing these services or meetings held about them although there was a mosque committee which was responsible for building a new mosque in Machina. The two political parties, SDP and NRC had ward and local government offices. These two parties also held meetings in the community. Even in terms of community organizations, as I will try to show later, the public space in Machina is not as significant as in Dagona because of the vertical nature of politics in the former.
Table 8.1
Federal and State Governments Presence in Dagona and Machina.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Machina Presence</th>
<th>Machina Meeting</th>
<th>Dagona Presence</th>
<th>Dagona Meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S S S</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yard Superintendent</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Board</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Electricity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOSADP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOSAMA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Court</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viewing Centre</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emirate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.2
Local Government Presence in Dagona and Machina.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Presence</th>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Presence</th>
<th>Meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Works</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispensary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Clinic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Stalls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guest House</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Council</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPI</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Head</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Head</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursery</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slaughter House</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamiya</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: PHC-Primary Health Care, EPI-Expanded Program on Immunization, LEA-Local Education Authority.
Table 8.3
Development Institutions, and Community Meetings
Dagona and Machina.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Institution</th>
<th>Dagona</th>
<th>Machina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEAZDP</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFRRI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better Life</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.4
Community Organizations and Community Meetings
in Machina and Dagona

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dagona</th>
<th>Number of Meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kungiyar Masunta</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izala Friday Mosque</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC Ward Level</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP Ward Level</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday Mosque</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday Mosque</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausari Social Club</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kautalhore</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butchers Association</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria Union of Teachers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union of Local Government Employees</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC (W/LG)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP (W/LG)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: W stands for Ward, W/LG stands for Ward and Local Government.

When one compares the public spaces created and expanded by the levels of governments and development institutions, their impact on community public life is
appreciable: there are several contact points between government and communities and within the communities (see the above tables). However, when a comparison is made of the public spaces in these two communities, Machina has more spaces than Dagona. The explanation for that is not far to seek. Machina is a local government, district, emirate, village and development area headquarters and on the border with Niger Republic. On the other hand, Dagona is only a district, village and development area headquarters. What is most significant of all these characteristics is the fact that Machina, being a local government headquarters, benefits from the universal policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria to establish most of the offices and services that have been enumerated under local, state and federal governments in all local government headquarters.\(^7\)6 Put differently, whereas even before the creation of Machina local government in 1991, there was a greater presence of governments in Machina than Dagona, certainly the change in its status to a local government headquarters has led to more presence of the various levels of government: some of the services and spaces are new while some pre-existing spaces have been transformed. For example, there were immigration, state security services and custom offices by virtue of the fact that Machina is the major rural town on the border with Niger Republic but, with the creation of the local government, these offices were expanded and the services provided increased. However, local government institutions are not participatory as I will show later.

\(^\text{76}\) One of the reasons for fierce demands for the creation of more local governments is the benefit that comes with it. There is a minimum national standard for each local government which can dramatically change the scene of a community. This underscores the importance of the state. However enthusiastic many of us may be about civil society and no matter the deficiency of the state as it is currently constituted, the state is central to the lives of many people. The issue at stake seems to be what kind of state and not beyond the state.
Furthermore, associational life in Machina has been influenced by the creation of the local government. There were branches of the Nigerian Union of Teachers and the National Union of Local Government Employees even before 1991, but their activities have become more pronounced since then. This is because with the creation of the local government more local government employees and teachers were employed which boosted the membership of the organizations. Being a local government headquarters also makes it easier for the unions to take up the grievances of their members with the employers.

As mentioned above, Dagona is only a district, village and development area headquarters and it only became a district headquarters in 1993. Thus, most of the services provided in Dagona derive from its status as a development area headquarters created in 1990 by NEAZDP, an organization which is participatory.

While one can conclude that the number of public spaces in Machina is higher than Dagona, this is not in any way an indication of the quality of the public spaces in the two communities. The fact that several of the community spaces in Machina are government creations is an indication of the need to be cautious. Furthermore, because of the politicization of governments even at the local level, there is every possibility those services and offices might mirror the political divisions in the communities.

More important for the moment is that most of the government offices and services in Machina do have very little contact with the local people in terms of meetings with the communities or enriching associational life in the community by forming committees around the services they provide (Tables 8.1 and 8.2). (This is because of the different forms of institutional arrangements). Thus most of them are service delivery sites with very little
involvement of the communities. As shown in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, despite the existence of several government institutions in the two communities, there were only 50 meetings between these institutions and the local people. Out of that figure of 50 meetings, 37 of the meetings were in Machina and 13 in Dagona. However, while the significant difference in those communities is a reflection of the high number of government institutions in Machina, it is also an indication of the lack of public involvement in their activities. It should also be noted that the number of meetings with the public have been distorted by the high number of public meetings conducted by the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI), 25. Thus if the figure for EPI is removed, the total figure of the two communities drops to 25 and if the figure of EPI (25) is subtracted from that of Machina, it drops to 12 meetings. Hence, the difference between the number of public meetings in Dagona and Machina favours the former.

Despite the observation that governments have not significantly created or expanded community spaces, lower levels of governments are more likely to involve their people than upper levels of governments: federal government nine, state government five (Table 8.1) and local government 36 (Table 8.2). What is disturbing is that even at the lower levels of governments, the important agencies that make most significant policies do not have contact with the local communities: Administration and Legislative Council. The Administration Department is perhaps the most important agency at the local level because that is where the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Secretary of the local government, Director of Personnel and the Supervisory Councillors are based. The Legislative Council is where all the councillors are based and they are primarily responsible for law making at the local level.

When one compares the community meetings created or influenced by the different
levels of governments and development institutions (Tables 8.1 and 8.2, and 8.3), the latter have performed better. The three development institutions have created or expanded 58 community spaces as against 50 for the government institutions. Further, while Dagona has fewer delivery points, it has more associations and committees formed around the services provided in the community by development institutions. Hence, a conclusion can be made that whereas Machina has more public spaces than Dagona, these are mainly delivery points and do not expand or create associational life in the community. In comparison, Dagona has fewer public spaces but because associations and committees have been formed around the spaces, associational life is much more enriched. The reason is not far to seek: the pluralistic nature of politics in the community. This is in contrast with the hierarchical nature of the public sphere in Machina.

Apart from reaching the above conclusion through objective data, a similar conclusion can be reached through a survey of opinions of local people and group discussions. Most people in Dagona and Machina are aware of the presence of these development institutions, services, and governments. However, most people can only make a categorical distinction between the development institutions and government: the knowledge of which level of government provides which service is low. When people are asked how they come to know the presence of these institutions, it reveals a sense of local involvement in their activities. Most people know government services either because they are employed by that department, they know some one who works for the department or they have received services from the department. But people know development institutions mostly because meetings have been called for a project, they are members of a committee, they are employed by a program, they
know some one employed by a program or they have received services from a program. Hence, more people in the two communities have a sense of belonging to development institutions than they have with respect to the other services provided by the three layers of governments.

The significance of the development institutions in promoting associational life can be further demonstrated by comparing the community spaces that have been influenced or created (Table 8.3) by development institutions and those that have been influenced or created by community organizations (Table 8.4). The difference between the two tables is 12 meetings in favour of community organizations. While that number is important, it should be noted that they have been primarily because of the political status of Machina as a local government headquarters. The high number of meetings of the SDP and the NRC is because there were two branches of the parties in Machina: local government and ward. A caution: whereas in the field research, political parties have been classified as community organizations, it should be understood that it was the federal government which decreed the existence of these organizations. Similarly, the presence of the Nigeria Union of Teachers and the Nigeria Union of Local Government Employees, as discussed above became more noticeable because of the creation of the new local government in Machina in 1991. If one discounts the political parties and the two unions, the number of meetings drops to 16 in both Dagona (10) and Machina (6). Therefore, the difference between the development institutions and the community organizations is 42 in favour of the former.

If the figure of 72 meetings of the community organizations is disaggregated by different communities, Dagona has 25 meetings while Machina has 47. Thus the number of
spaces is in favour of Machina. However, if the influence of the political parties and those of the professional associations are subtracted, it is Dagona that has more community based meetings than Machina: Dagona has 10 meetings while Machina has six.

To wrap up, the three development institutions have a very significant impact on the number of public meetings in the two communities. The government institutions have 49 meetings, development institutions 58 and the community organizations 70. A further analysis of the disproportionate influence of some settings, for example, EPI, makes it clearer that the development institutions have more impact than at first glance.

8.3 Community Discourse

In Robert Putnam’s (1995b) account of social capital in the United States, he did not pay much attention to its content. While I agree that social capital might have an intrinsic value, for the purpose of this work I am interested in the quality of meetings and how they reflect institutional and contextual biases. I want to suggest that there is a need to take a step further in the analysis of public spaces not only to count the numbers, but to look at the nature of the meetings. The nature of meetings will reveal their context and institutional arrangement. To illustrate, I will concentrate on three types of meetings reflecting the types of community spaces we identified: government, community and developmental. For a government institution meeting, I will give an example of meeting called by a federal government agency, the Directorate of Social Mobilization; for a community meeting I will give an example of an election of the Social Democratic Party; and for an example of a development institution meeting, I will give a NEAZDP annual village development plan
meeting. The first illustrates the severe limitations of government institutions: top down; the second illustrates a strategic use of a setting which initially had a strong government institution; and the third illustrates contextual constraints in meetings. I will discuss the third type of meeting in the next section.

While meetings called by government institutions tend to be a mobilization strategy for the government and indication of the top down institutional structure, I will go on further to suggest that even those meetings called at the instance of the governments can be strategically used by local people. But the strategic use of a space is sometimes contingent on using the skills learnt at a severely restricted public function. In order to assess the nature of meetings the following questions are relevant to ask. What is the degree of local control? Whose agenda is being discussed? What responsibilities do local people have? How does it reflect the plurality of the community both in membership and opinion? These are very important questions which will shed light on the nature of institutional arrangements and the mediation of context in such activities.

Most of the meetings between federal government agencies and local communities are public enlightenment campaigns. Such campaigns are essentially a transmission belt for the government to reach local people, and therefore their participatory nature is questionable. Further, the meetings are not regularly scheduled, but sporadic. The government launches a new program or introduces some new policies and its agencies embark on public campaigns to enlighten local people. While agencies like the National Electoral Commission and the National Population Commission sometimes carry public campaigns on their own, they also rely on the Directorate of Social Mobilization (DSM), which is a specialized agency
responsible for public mobilization.

On January 29, 1993, there was a meeting called by the DSM in Machina and the venue chosen was the market. The venue and date are both strategic. It was a Sunday which is the market day of Machina. People within the community and outside who go to the market were able to attend the function. Certainly it would have been difficult to get people in the market to attend such a function if it were held for example in the Emir's palace which is a 30-minute walk from the market. The officer in charge of the meeting was the Yobe State Director of Social Mobilization, Yusuf Madaki, who is an appointee of the Federal Government, and the host was the Machina Local Government Director of Social Mobilization, Audu Abdullahi who also happens to be one of the research assistants for this research. The most important item on the agenda was explanation to the community of the introduction of a new system of voting called Option A4.

The State Director gave an explanation and history of the voting system. The federal government of Nigeria introduced a voting system called Open Ballot in the late 1980s. Under the system, electors were required to queue behind their candidates in an election. The government believed that this would minimise voting irregularities and simplify the task of the electorate. During about four elections, there were concerns that electorates were not turning out to vote, some people, for example traditional rulers, were disenfranchised so that they did not influence others and it was not very clear that irregularities were actually minimised. As a compromise, the government introduced what it called Modified Option A4. Under the new system everyone queues in the same line, but votes with a ballot paper. A person goes into a booth with a ballot paper to mark and puts the ballot paper into the ballot...
box in public. Also, there is provision for only one ballot box.

After the explanation, some people including two women asked questions. The questions were mainly on the mechanisms of voting. The women were concerned whether both men and women are supposed to join the same queue.

This meeting is a top down approach. There is little in terms of what are the concerns of the local people on the agenda: government trying to reach its people. Its impact on the community and role of local people is minimal: local people are mainly recipients of government policy and they did not have any role in setting the agenda or changing the course of discussions. None of the officials of the meeting was a woman and of the 20 questions asked only two were from women. The ethnic configuration of the meeting was difficult to gauge. The prominent politicians in attendance were those of the SDP. These contextual and institutional factors affected the effectiveness of the meeting. But, as will be shown in the next case study, the new voting skill learnt at this meeting was strategically used to undermine local political elites in Machina. Hence, it is important that this kind of meeting is held: at a minimum local people can hear what the government has to say and people who otherwise have a minimal role to play in the “political public” assert their claims of citizenship.

The second meeting is an illustration of strategic intervention of local people to challenge the domination of powerful elites in Machina in a setting which is community based but under government influence. Although the institution is not as participatory as one would like it to be, it created a situation which was strategically used. This meeting also shows how the context of a community shapes the nature of meetings.
On February 20, 1993, the Local Government Congress of the SDP was held to elect new local government officials of the party. The previous officials were dismissed by the National Executive Council of the Party on the directive of the Federal Government. Civil servants were appointed to run the parties prior to the elections. The major item on the agenda was the election of the SDP party officials for Machina Local Government.

The results of the election were astonishing. The SDP was in control of the Local Government secretariat: the Chairperson and nine of the ten councillors were all SDP members. The person who was the Chair of the local government is the Emir's son. Thus most of the political elites both traditional and modern campaigned for a particular group of people and they expected their candidates for the party secretariat to win the elections. This would have consolidated their control of the local government and the party secretariat. In fact that was the plan of the Emir and the modern elites. However, another faction of the party took control of the party secretariat. They won despite intimidation and lobbying.

The faction which won the elections was called Tsantsi and the faction of the elites that lost the elections was called Tabo. The language of the hidden script of the Tsantsi

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It is very difficult to translate tsantsi and tabo without losing their context. Their origin is in the second republic when two factions developed in the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), the most progressive party: tsantsi and tabo. The Tsantsi were the radicals who happened to control the governments of Kano and Kaduna States and who opposed vehemently the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the party in power at the national level. Both parties had their origin in the first republic and were identified as pro-northern aristocracy (NPN) and anti-northern aristocracy (PRP). Tsantsi connotes radical but literally it is means slippery. If a person slips it means the person is carried by tsantsi and therefore s/he is radical. On the other hand if some one gets glued in a clay, that person is in tabo, meaning conservative. Thus radicals in the PRP governments who opposed any compromise with the NPN were called yan tsantsi while those in the party secretariat and who were seen as accepting compromise with the NPN were called yan tabo. But in Machina, yan tsantsi were mostly those who had nothing to do with the local government while yan tabo were those in control of the government. Thus, in Machina, it is the reverse of the discourse at the national
faction was very uncompromising. Although members of the faction made clear that their allegiance to the SDP was not in question, they were concerned that they were marginalized in the affair of the party. They had no input and no one discussed party affairs with them. Many of them felt that if the party secretariat were to be controlled by the political elites, the party would become the affairs of one person: the Emir. They also were concerned that all alferma (benefits) of the party were cornered by a select few in the party while they were given crumbs: they claimed to be victims of Babakere78 (domineering tendency). They also condemned what they called a situation of kura daga ke sai yayanki79 and that of kashindankali80 (deceit). All these were hidden script references to the Emir’s and his children’s dominance of state of affairs in Machina and the SDP.

I score this public space highly valuable. It gave local people a place to challenge authority and make their voices heard. It was used strategically despite the fact that it was held in the local government secretariat where the political elites have firm control and despite the fact that it was run by civil servants whose allegiance was more inclined to the government than to the local people. I want to further suggest that the strategic use of this level.

78 Babakele is a form of corruption in which one person takes over everything to the exclusion of others.

79 What this simply means is greediness. It literally means a hyena does not care for any one except its children.

80 This also means greediness of elites. Literally it derives from an imagery of some one selling potato. Normally potatoes for sale are organized in such a way that those on top are the best while those under are the opposite and a buyer can easily be deceived by that arrangement. Thus what the people were saying was that those on top monopolised all the benefits of being in the ruling party while those of them below were given the crumbs: the higher you go the better it becomes.
space by local people was contingent on the public enlightenment organized by the Directorate of Social Mobilization discussed above. In this election, the Modified Option A4 was used. If it had been the Open Ballot System in which the electorate queued behind the candidates, it would have been difficult for the local people to walk out the queue where the Chair of the local government and his allies were and join the opposition queue. Similarly everyone put their ballot paper in to the same ballot box. Otherwise, they would have been easily intimidated by the presence of these elites and vulnerable to their influence. As it was, although the Emir, his son, (the Chairperson of the local government) and the other political elites knew who were against them, there was little scope for intimidation during the process of voting.

To conclude this section of the chapter, comparatively, the three development institutions have created and expanded more community spaces than the different levels of governments and the community organizations: most of the government institutions are mainly concerned with service delivery. Where government agencies have initiated public contacts with communities, local people are mere recipients of government messages. (The reason for these differences are the institutional arrangements: whether they give voice and power to local people or concentrate power on the top). Although most of these institutions do not have meetings with the local people, the few that have also reflect the top down nature of these institutions. However, even limited public engagement such as public campaigns can bring out people to the public domain to assert their citizenship in a community. Furthermore the messages in spaces subjected to top down control can be used strategically in community based organizations to give voice to local people. In the next section I discuss the impact and
differences in the number of public spaces created and expanded by NEAZDP in these two communities as shown in Table 8.5 is dramatic.

Table 8.5
Public Spaces Created and Expanded by Development Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Institutions</th>
<th>Dagona</th>
<th>Machina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFRII</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better Life</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Enlightenment</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEAZDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Development Association</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Committee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Committee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent's Teachers Association</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Committee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Community Bank</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viewing Centre Committee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation Committee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Committees and associations which have either been created or influenced by NEAZDP hold different meetings and manage many projects. For example, the Health Committee in Dagona is responsible for managing the Drug Revolving Fund given by NEAZDP and the Conservation Committee is responsible for managing the community nursery and woodlot. Similarly, the Women's Committee in Machina is responsible for
overseeing a Maternity Home, and a Dehusking Machine. But there are fewer committees and meetings in Machina than in Dagona. In Machina, apart from the Women's Committee which was newly created by NEAZDP, all meetings and projects are under the auspices of the Village Development Association and the existing associations in the community are not involved in implementing projects. On the surface one may conclude that this is because of the smaller number of projects in Machina as compared to Dagona. This is not the case for two reasons. Several NEAZDP projects outside of Machina town have committees formed around them, for instance the Drug Revolving Fund Committee in Kalgidi discussed in the previous chapter. Likewise it would have been possible to organize a committee on conservation in Machina since there is a similar committee in Dagona. The real reason for lack of more committees, is the centralization of the activities of NEAZDP in the VDA. This has prevented a stronger sense of ownership by the local people in the activities of NEAZDP: NEAZDP public spaces are controlled by the political elites of Machina. They happen to be male, Manga, elderly, former SDP and middle and upper class and they dominate issues discussed in Machina. I will illustrate this issue of inclusion and exclusion or context by discussing a case study of a public meeting. But this case study is more nuanced: even such exclusionary meetings can be used strategically to voice grievances of the local people and call public officers to be accountable.

In November 1992, there was a meeting called by the VDA in Machina to discuss a Village Development Plan (VDP) for the year 1993. The town crier went around informing people in the evening preceding the meeting and in the morning of the meeting. The meeting was scheduled to take place in the Community Viewing Centre by the Emirs Palace. After
every one was seated, the Emir was ushered in surrounded by his advisers and praise singers. The seating arrangement was very formal with the officials and dignitaries of the meeting on one side while ordinary members were on the other side.

The officials of the meeting were the Development Area Promoter (DAP), Bashir Bukar Albishir, and two officials of the Program from the Headquarters, the Financial Controller who is also the mentor of the Development Area and the Manpower (sic) Specialist. Other dignitaries at the meeting were representatives of the Machina Local Government, the Emir of Machina, the Imam of Machina and his contingent and the Field Technicians of NEAZDP based in Machina. This was the first time the local government was involved in the process of a VDP and as we noted above, the most important agencies for policy making at the local government, Administration Department and the Legislative Council have no public fora to discuss with local people. Therefore, their involvement at this meeting is very important. About 70 people attended the meeting as members but there was only one noticeable member of the National Republican Convention (NRC), Alhaji Usman. In contrast all the elders and noticeable members of the ruling SDP were in attendance. There was no woman who attended as a member although girls came as onlookers. Similarly, although the Hausa community is one of the major ethnic groups in the community, the only noticeable members of that community were Sarkin Pawa (Head of Butchers), Ciroma Makale and Sule S. Pawa, who was the local government Supervisory Councillor for Works and a few months later he became the Sarkin Hausawa (Head of the Hausa Community). His rank is equivalent to a village head. They were members of the SDP. Most of the elders and officials of the meeting wore dara, a type of red cap and some wore green cloth. These were the
symbols of the SDP.\textsuperscript{81}

There were seven items on the agenda: opening prayer, welcome address by the DAP, address by the Emir, response by the Financial Controller, Review of the 1992 Village Development Plan and the 1993 Village Development Plan, vote of thanks by the DAP and closing prayer.

The Imam was invited to open the meeting with prayers. He read Surahs \textit{Fatiha} (Opening), \textit{Al Falaq} (The Daybreak) and \textit{Lugman} (Wise). This was followed by a welcome address by the DAP who introduced the guests from the headquarters, the representatives of the local government and other NEAZDP staff based in Machina. He explained that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the needs of the community for 1993 and review the activities of NEAZDP in 1992. He ended with an invitation to the Emir to address the gathering. The Emir's comments were brief. He thanked the officials of NEAZDP from the headquarters for their continued support and the people for turning up for the meeting. He went on further to emphasise the need for unity in the community. The Financial Controller whose speech was translated/interpreted by the Manpower Specialist thanked the Emir and the community for their warm reception and support of NEAZDP projects. He asked the Manpower specialist to lead the discussions on the 1992 and 1993 VDPs.

Two issues which took a long time to resolve were the inability of NEAZDP to complete the implementation of a maternity project in 1992 and the provision of water to

\textsuperscript{81} Dara and green cloth were the symbols of the SDP. While the latter has a recent history, the former has a longer one. A green flag was chosen for the SDP by the military government when the party was created in the late 1980s. Thus people who wanted to identify with the SDP wore green cloth. Dara on the other hand was used by the Great Nigeria Peoples Party, the predecessor of the SDP in Borno/Yobe in the second republic as its party symbol. However, even before that dara was synonymous with Borno identity.
Machina in 1993. A maternity home was planned for Machina in 1992 but only the building was completed while the necessary equipment and personnel were not provided. For the people of Machina, the inability to implement the whole project was not acceptable because of the high maternal and infant mortality rates in the community. Moreover, they had confidence and trust in NEAZDP that they would not be disappointed. Many community members raised those concerns. The NEAZDP response was that there was a change in policy at the headquarters to minimise the number of maternity projects and study their operations before implementing them at a larger scale. The community members were not impressed with the explanation because they argued that the people who need the project least were those benefitting: most of the maternity projects were located near the headquarters of the Program but these are also the areas most accessible by road and therefore easier to go to hospitals.

It was not only the Program which was under heavy criticism but also the local government. Because the local government in Machina has no mechanism of policy input through public meetings, their participation in this meeting was seen as a strategic opportunity by the local people to get at the local government. However, it was done strategically, during a discussion on a request put forward for a water project. Many speakers made the point over and over that the only basis of judging the performance of any government in Machina was its ability to provide water to the community. People in the community knew that the speeches were not directed at NEAZDP but the local government. The veiled criticism against the local government was because most people anticipated that the major concern of the authority should be to provide adequate water supply to the community rather than buying...
vehicles. With the creation of the local government there was a hope that the problem of water in the community would be resolved: there was a feeling among people of Machina that one of the reasons no serious effort was made previously to provide the community with water was because Machina was not a local government headquarters and the leaders of the local government were not based in the community. The local government officers explained that there was a joint plan with NEAZDP to provide adequate water to the community and meetings would be held to resolve the issue.

The next item was a vote of thanks by the DAP. The DAP thanked all those who attended the meeting and emphasised that NEAZDP is an organization for every one in the community. The meeting ended with the Imam reading Surah Fatihah (Opening) and Salatul Fati.²²

This meeting despite its exclusion of some sections of the community is very significant. First, NEAZDP had for the first time introduced the concept of VDP in the

²² The reading of this prayer is interpreted by radicals as being conservative. The source of this prayer according to its supporters is a dream of one of the famous Islamic scholars. They claim that saying this prayer equals reading the whole Quran. Many of the people who say this addu'a (supplication) are Sufis and belong to the Qadriyya and Tijaniyya sects. Opponents of this sect most of whom happen to be in the Izala movement in Nigeria believe that no human being can receive any revelation from God because Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) is the seal of all prophets. Moreover, they argue that Salatul Fati contains few verses which cannot be compared with the Quran. One of the most prominent scholars of this sect, Sheikh Dahiru Bauchi, made an interesting argument on the point of the number of verses in the Quran and Salatul Fati. His argument is that the Quran is like a drum of water while Salatul Fati is like a bottle of scent. While the drum of water is more important because it can serve various purposes including religious, its cost is not as high as that of the scent. In the context of northern Nigerian religious politics, therefore those who read this prayer are said to believe in tradition, which is interpreted as being conservative while those who do not read this prayer are said to be radicals. However, as I suggested in Chapter 3, it can also be argued that those who believe that a new issue can be added after the death of the Prophet (PBUH) are the ones who are radicals and those who stick to only what the Prophet have said or done are the conservatives.
community. There is no history of government and development agencies sitting together with communities to plan a budget for the community. Development plans are supposed to be technical and a monopoly of experts. But, the fact that local people do participate in the process is very important. Moreover, even for NEAZDP this is very important because none of the previous EC Programs in Nigeria have experimented with the idea of VDPs. Secondly, the local government was also involved in the process. As I mentioned before, local governments which are the closest tier of government to the local people have no similar strategy. In that meeting their accountability to the local people was questioned. Third, the meeting was not a mere talk show. Whatever final decision was made about projects for the community reflects the inputs of the local people. Furthermore, the questions asked by the local people on the maternity project showed that this was not merely a meeting for consultation by NEAZDP.

There are other aspects of the public meeting which reflected community politics in Machina. There are overt and hidden messages in the prayers and speeches. The first and second Surahs read by the Imam, Fatiha (Opening), and al Falaq (The Daybreak), are also the first (one), and the second to the last (Surah one hundred and thirteen) of the Quran respectively. All of them were revealed in Meccah. The first Surah Fatiha (Opening) is read on most occasions and is used to start prayers. On the other hand, Surah al Falaq (the Daybreak) preaches humanity to seek refuge in God from the evil deeds and envy of other human beings. The significance of this Surah seems to be to convey the message that people should not fear to speak their mind, but at the same time not to engage in doing evil to others. This sets the moral ground for the discussion at the meeting. The next Surah read by
the Imam, was Luqman (Surah 31) (Wise). It is also a Meccan Surah. Its message is that the righteous receive guidance while those who seek vanity perish. Some of the Ayat (verses) have strong messages to leaders. Luqman is said to be a ruler with a very humble background who ruled his people justly. He refused power and worldly things. He is said to have given instructive epilogues similar to Aesop Fables in Greek history. Similarly, the Surah warns against arrogance and immoderation: “swell not thy cheek,..nor walk in insolence... and lower thy voice”. The Imam by reading this Surah was sending a message of humility to the meeting.

In the closing prayer, the Imam read Surah Fatiha (Opening) which has been explained above and Salatul Fati. As explained in footnote 9, to read that prayer means one is conservative in the context of Northern Nigerian religious politics. The Emirs speech is interpreted by those who do not agree with him as an attempt to show his neutrality. The emphasis on unity is considered by them as a call for supporting the Emir.

The DAP in his vote of thanks made the point that the Program belongs to the community. He was very conscious to stress the neutrality of the Program and that it should not be perceived as being partisan. Those who know the hidden scripts and are aware of royal politics interpret it differently. It is important for him to make those pronouncements in order not only to protect his job but he has a personal reason to keep the Program outside the control of the SDP. The point has already been made that the SDP controlled the local government and the Emir was a well known supporter of the Party. The Chair of the local government also happens to be a son of the Emir. Therefore, one would have expected the DAP not to care if the Program was/is used for political purpose. While I think the DAP has
a sincerity of purpose, however, there are intrigues of royal politics. The DAP is the eldest son of the Emir and he was later appointed the District Head of Machina. His mother is different from that of the Chair of the local government. The Chair of the local government has a sister who is also the Education Secretary of the local government but on the DAPs side there is no other person beside him of high qualification and status. There is the crucial issue of who will become the next Emir of Machina. Although, the DAP is the eldest son, that is not a guarantee that he can succeed his father especially given the fact that his half brother, the former chair of the local government has established a political constituency at the local and state levels where the SDP was in control. It is therefore in the personal interest of the DAP to make sure that it is not used as a political machine.

Similarly, the politics of co-wives is equally important. In any polygynous relationship the core family tends to be more defined by Tuam (breast feeding) than by Bu (blood): those who drink milk from the same breast (maternal brothers and sisters) are closer than those who have same blood (paternal brothers and sisters). Thus mothers are always conscious of making sure that their children prosper especially in a family like that of the Emir where the struggle for power is pervasive. In the same vein each mother makes sure that her children prosper because there is no guarantee that she and her children can inherit much

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83 Does this remind you of the contextual nature of the saying blood is thicker than water to describe close relationships? Of course Marxists have already made the point that cash is thicker than blood to illustrate the importance of class relations.

84 I should say that although these issues have existed for a long time in the family of the Emir, his first two wives related for a very long time as sisters rather than co wives. For example some of the children of the first wife, Hajja Hauwa, like the DAP of Machina, Bashir Bukar Albishir, grew up under the care of the second wife of the Emir, Hajja Marema and vice versa. In fact these children had more privileges from them (Angel mother?) than from their real mothers.
in such a large family.

Furthermore, the DAP’s emphasis on political neutrality of NEAZDP was a veiled commentary about a rough experience with one of the SDP elders who attended the meeting. That politician reported to the Emir that the DAP was undermining their campaigns in the rural areas. This was because the DAP used to explain in all villages that NEAZDP was not aligned to any political party and belonged to the communities whereas the politician was quietly spreading the word that NEAZDP belonged to the SDP. By reporting the DAP to the Emir, the politician hoped that he would be rebuked and politicians would claim that all the projects funded by NEAZDP in the various villages were that of the SDP. These are contextual issues which affect the success of rural development institutions however benign they are.

In contrast to the situation in Machina as discussed above, there are several committees that are responsible for managing different projects in Dagona. Instead of all resources going through only one source as in Machina there are several sources in Dagona. This is a reflection of the pluralistic nature of politics in the community as opposed to the hierarchical nature of politics in Machina. The pluralistic nature of politics in Dagona is to some extent reflected in the degree of inclusion and exclusion in the public spaces. There are more meetings of several groups in the community and there is a strong sense of involvement in their community lives: most important aspects of their lives are managed by community committees including water, health and education. Second, although as we have discussed in the previous chapter, there are more SDP members in the public spaces and beneficiaries of projects, people in Dagona including those members of the NRC do not interpret that as a
political problem.

However, this is not to say that everyone is an equal citizen of Dagona. Just as some people have been excluded in the Greek Polis, women and migrants, especially the Sakkwatawa, have been disproportionately disenfranchised. The former is a problem of all the public spaces in Dagona and Machina while the later is more pronounced in Dagona. The Sakkwatawas have benefitted from several of NEAZDP's productive projects but in projects which involve community participation (social projects) they have not been active. As has been discussed previously in Chapter 4, they try to retain their migrant status and identity by not participating in community activities. It is also very possible that the people of Dagona have made the point very clear that they are migrants. For example as we discussed in Chapter 4, they do not own land in the lucrative fadama area in Dagona.

Women in both communities and in both development programs participate less than men. In both communities the participation of women in the polis is minimal as compared to men. For example, women are not members of any committees other than women's committees in these communities. This means that women have separate responsibilities from men. Although there can be a feminist basis for such a distinction as discussed in Chapter 4, the gendered nature of the distinction should not be overlooked. Most of the responsibilities of men are assumed to be community wide while women's responsibilities are assumed to be particular to women. Thus the Women's Committees of Machina and Dagona are responsible for NEAZDP projects on maternity and dehusking and grinding. However, for example, women are not in the committees of water and conservation, two activities in which women have important responsibilities in the communities.
8.4 Conclusion

Development institutions have played a significant role in creating and influencing community public life in Dagona and Machina. Unlike government institutions which are essentially service delivery oriented, the development institutions have created committees at the village level where communities are managing their lives. A comparison of the three institutions shows that NEAZDP has outperformed the others in this task. The simple reason is that unlike the other two institutions, NEAZDP established a structure for bottom-up, autonomous and with adequate resources. But, NEAZDP is less successful in Machina in creating public spaces than in Dagona. This difference in the two communities is also a reflection of the nature of community politics: Dagona being pluralistic while Machina is hierarchical. However, even government institutions that are top down oriented can create conditions which are strategically used by local people. I also showed that it is important to analyze the nature of meetings.

In the last two chapters I have attempted to explore the impact of development institutions in relation to development projects and community spaces. The next chapter concludes this study with a summary and some reflections on its implications.
In summation of the journey so far, the first and second chapters introduced the research problematic and the background to rural institutional reforms in Nigeria. In the third chapter, I discussed the issues in rural development in Nigeria. In the next three chapters, the independent variables were discussed: contexts of the communities (identity and socio-economic relations and historico-political pluralism) and institutional arrangements (strategy, autonomy and resources). In chapters seven and eight, the dependent variable was explored: success of development programs. In this chapter, I will rest my case.

In 1991, when I started the doctoral program, there was an atmosphere of both euphoria and pessimism about rural development institutions in Nigeria. The Nigerian government started two programs: the Better Life and DFRRI. On the other hand, the EU and the Nigerian government were funding NEAZDP. Judging from the media and the Central Bank of Nigeria reports, while the objectives of the Better Life and DFRRI were laudable, it was not very clear to what extent they were able to achieve their objectives. On the other hand, judging from the views of the communities involved in NEAZDP projects, they were happy. The first concern of this research is to explain why some institutions of rural development succeed while others fail. The second concern is to explain why the same institution of rural development that succeeds in one community can fail in another community. Hence, the performance of three institutions, Better Life, DFRRI and NEAZDP is compared in two communities, Dagona and Machina.

While the literature on rural development and agriculture in Nigeria is very impressive
in size and seriousness, most of it is concerned with the process of accumulation rather than with explaining what has succeeded and what has failed. I consider the first task as an external critique while the second is an internal critique.

The inability of the external critique to address the issues of what is possible within the context of the limitations of global and national structures, impelled me to look at other sets of literature. My interest is undertaking this research is driven by a concern to learn from the experiences of success and failure rather than by an "academic" or "theoretical" interest. I did not start with any concrete theoretical position. It was only after I completed the first draft of the major chapters in the dissertation that I started to look out for the theoretical implications of the data. One of the literatures I discovered neo-institutionalism as a possible framework of analysis. Neo-institutionalism is a middle range paradigm that claims that different forms of institutional design (for example decentralized, centralized, participatory, autonomous) have different impacts. Unlike macro-level analysis which is systemic and structural, institutionalism claims that: policy and politics matter and different forms of policies and politics have different likely outcomes. In other words, we cannot generalize from a macro-level analysis that all outcomes will be good or bad. In giving emphasis to politics and policies, neo-institutionalism reflects the concerns of the "back to politics" movement.

By starting from institutions rather than individuals, neo-institutionalism is also a critique of behavioralism. If there is a common denominator of the neo institutionalists, it is their concern that outcomes in politics have been reduced to the calculating behaviour of individuals by behavioralists. Neo-institutionalists contend that individual preferences are also
shaped by institutional structures within which choices are made.

Incentives are a taboo subject in development studies. For example, African communities have often been assumed to be cooperative and homogenous. This characterization could have been true of some African communities at certain specific times. However, to project that type of characterization to the present time is ahistorical. As a result of such an assumption, ideological rhetoric has been the major instrument of mobilization, one which in the best of circumstances, as in Tanzania, has been found wanting. Hence, in order not to throw the baby out with the bath water, I considered the issue of incentive in different institutional structures. In doing that, I started with the literature on institutions and Marxist rational choice.

Another caveat has been introduced to neoinstitutionalism. If institutions are as important as claimed to be, how do we explain the fact that several institutional reforms have not achieved their goals. Could the answer be an inappropriate institutional arrangement and/or contextual problem? Robert Putnam (1993) in his case study of decentralization in Italy concludes there is a contextual problem: northern and southern Italy have passed through different historical trajectories. The former has a history of civic culture while the latter lacks a similar experience. It is this experience, according to Putnam, which accounts for successful decentralization in northern Italy and failure of decentralization in southern Italy. However, in Putnam's analysis, the rhetoric of decentralization is accepted without checking the reality on the ground. I therefore extended the research to cross check bureaucratic rhetoric with the reality.

In Putnam's work, the design of the structure of decentralization is given, and he is
correct: the decentralization policy was uniform throughout the country. Would Putnam have come out with a different outcome if he had empirically verified the implementation of the decentralization policy in his case study? Organizational theorists have always been suspicious of policy pronouncements, because they have been in many cases mere pronouncements. Is the saying "old wine in a new bottle" in fact not also a reflection of bureaucratic rhetoric? In this research, I take seriously the caution of organizational theorists to verify the claims made in policy statements, and the result shows it is a wise decision. Furthermore, Putnam's conclusion is depressing (Calvinist) for most of the emerging democracies because he accepted a uniform institutional design to implement decentralization. If he had taken the next stage to think of possible different institutional designs in the south of Italy, perhaps, he would have created a ray of hope for change. One of the things I did in the research was to suggest what forms of interventions are possible.

Two points about institutionalism need to be focused on. The mainstream institutionalists have also assumed universalism. While there is a danger in some form of cultural relativism that takes an extreme nativist position, universalism does not take into account some of the objective and subjective factors in the implementation of policies. Nor is the application of policies historicised. The danger therefore is to lose sight of some of the peculiarities of societies. Some policies are likely to fail as a result. Institutionalism therefore would benefit from some of the research methods adopted in this research, such as in-depth case histories and group discussions.

A second point deriving from the above point is that most institutionalists belong to the neutral-rational model. It is assumed that institutions are neutral and they implement
policies accordingly. However, as feminist scholars among others have pointed out, institutions are bearers of social markers. Rules and regulations are not neutral; some benefit while others suffer; employment patterns in some institutions are biased; and there is a culture of bureaucracy which reflects certain attitudes. Thus, a conscious attempt to recognize one's limitations and strengthens would be useful.

The independent variables used in this research are context (historico-political, socio-economic relations and identity politics) and institutional arrangements (bottom-up strategy, autonomy and resources). The dependent variable is success of rural development institutions. I operationalise success as grassroots development projects and effective community spaces.

The empirical evidence from the research is as follows: When a comparison is made of the three development institutions, NEAZDP has performed better than DFRII and the Better Life. It has established several structures for bottom-up strategy, resources and autonomy. Among these are the Development Area Promoters, Village Development Promoters, Village Development Plans, Village Accounts, Women Development Committee, project committees, contribution of communities and the involvement of local governments. When a comparison is made of the implementation of the institutional structures in Dagona and Machina, there is a difference. The most significant being there are no project committees besides the community development association in Machina.

NEAZDP provides a number of important incentives to its workers. Among these are generous allowances, vehicles, career advancement, accommodation and various projects. In addition, its institutional structures enjoy a considerable autonomy. For instance, communities control the fund disbursed to them and the Federal and Yobe State governments have given
the institution considerable autonomy in its daily activities.

On the other hand, DFRRI, while it developed the principles for bottom-up strategy, strategy for local autonomy and the provision of resources. But, the structures for a bottom-up strategy such as Community Development Associations, Primary Production Centre, Higher Production Centre, Development Areas and the annual and 3-year rolling plans have not been implemented in the communities where the research was conducted. The only structure in existence as of September 1993 was the Rural Development Committee in Machina. As mentioned earlier there was no specific policy on incentives for workers of the Program at the local level. Further, the institution at the local level had no autonomy because no significant decision could be made at that level: The situation was more one of deconcentration. In the same vein, at the time of this research, BLP had not implemented some of its structures which would have facilitated a bottom-up strategy. The Better Life committees at ward, village and district levels were not functioning. There was only a local government committee in Machina. There was no policy on incentives to its workers partly because it had no workers employed directly. Similarly, autonomy could not have been achieved because of the alignment of the Program with state institutions at all levels of operations.

The institutional differences mentioned above also account for the success and failure of the projects. NEAZDP more than the other two development institutions have more successful grassroots projects and expanded community spaces in the two communities. In Dagona and Machina about 328 and 73 projects have been established respectively. Most of the projects are successful with the notable exception of the women's projects.

On the other hand, DFRRI established three and eight projects in Dagona and Machina
respectively. Most of the projects were not successful. Similarly, Better Life projects in Dagona and Machina were one and two respectively, and most of them were not successful.

In relation to community spaces, NEAZDP created 43 and 14 of such spaces in Dagona and Machina respectively; DFRRRI created none; and Better Life created one in Machina.

There are gender, class and other forms of partisanship discernible in terms of who participated in these institutions and who benefitted from the projects implemented by these institutions. Most of the participants and beneficiaries of NEAZDP projects are older middle-class men. In Dagona ethnicity and partisan politics are not pronounced. In Machina, on the other hand, Social Democrats of the Manga ethnic group are the major participants and beneficiaries of NEAZDP projects. A similar tendency exists in terms of participation in the community spaces. On the other hand, DFRRRI project participants and beneficiaries were mainly male elites of the then ruling party, Social Democratic Party. The same situation obtained in Better Life projects. In both projects ethnicity was less pronounced in Dagona than in Machina.

The variation in performance of these institutions in Dagona and Machina is mainly a result of different historical experiences. Dagona is a more pluralistic society than Machina. For instance, the former has no ruling family or dynasty, a recent settlement, and a recent history of centralized religion. The opposite is the case in Machina.

Having outlined the relationship between the dependent and independent variables, I will go back to the relationship between contexts and institutions and make two interrelated points. That "context matters" does not necessarily mean that it is a problem. Indeed one could construe this as an opportunity to understand the complexities of rural communities.
This could be done through micro-level studies. More importantly, it could be an opportunity for a conscious and strategic intervention in rural communities. This research, through a micro-level study of individuals and communities (life histories, activity profile, public space inventory) has shown the opportunities for strategic interventions to empower the voiceless in rural communities: different contexts require different forms of interventions.

An outstanding issue that needs to be addressed is what are the possibilities of replicating NEAZDP in other areas and contexts. In other words, could NEAZDP be a sign post for rural development despite some of its limitations? In the development literature, the issue is referred to as “scaling-up”. Indeed, several organizations and individuals have noticed the achievements of NEAZDP. First, President Babangida visited the Program twice. Second, the Nigeria Industrial Training Fund sent its training officer to understudy the skill training module of NEAZDP. Third, the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies sent one of its officers to NEAZDP to study its operations. Fourth, several ministries in Borno and Yobe States sent their staff for technical training. Fifth, the Sakkwato (Anglicized as Sokoto) Environmental Protection Agency, similar program to NEAZDP funded partly by the European Community, and the Katsina Environmental Protection Agency, another European Community Program, are not as successful as NEAZDP. The two programs sent their staff to NEAZDP to under study the program. Thus, there have been a good number of efforts from governmental agencies and international agencies to learn from the experiences of NEAZDP.

One might ask oneself why the two other programs, Sakkwato and Katsina Environmental Protection Agencies, which have similar funding agreements to NEAZDP and which are older than NEAZDP, are not as successful as NEAZDP and they have to send their
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253

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In rethinking development projects, one could link the relationship between inequality and democracy, and make an argument for the role of development projects in democratization. If development projects are organized in a different pattern from the way they used to be—non-hierarchical, with collective responsibility, and involvement of members in decision-making—these projects could enhance local demos. Furthermore, by giving particular attention to the underprivileged, development projects could play the role of eradicating poverty, and thereby making it possible for the most vulnerable to have an alternative means of income. This group of people would be less susceptible to manipulation. As the Yoruba people say, you do not defecate on the head of the person who is carrying you.

Reflecting on the challenges and deficits of this research, there are three obvious ones. Financing such research is expensive. I was lucky to get preliminary funding for my contribution to comparative research project on local participation and more substantial support from the Rockefeller Foundation. Secondly, one has to enmesh oneself in the communities of the study in order to understand them properly. Third, it would have been better if the research had been conducted over a two year period in order to cross-check the findings with the communities as well as to provide more detailed accounts of some of the issues raised. For example, the data on the Programs and projects is uneven. While some of the data do not exist, I do not have other material because I did not know I wanted it when I was in the field. Other examples of gaps are the need for further studies on the relationship between ecological changes in Dagona, the role of women, commercialization of agriculture and changes in inheritance rights. Another possible area for further research is the pattern of
migration to Dagona area. In the research to date, there is scanty information on who are the migrants; why are they migrating; what is the difference between temporary migrants and the settled ones; and what is the pattern of life of the temporary migrants when they immigrate?

Despite these shortcomings, I take solace in a saying of Dagona people living on the banks of River Yobe which translates literally as, "knowledge is like swimming in a river, one can only swim on one side of it". The same idea is expressed by the sandy people of Machina as; "knowledge is like a baobab tree, one can only hold some part of it".
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Appendix 1: Organization of the Field Research

This research is based primarily on village studies. Two villages, Dagona and Machina are the settings for detailed study of NEAZDP, DFRRI and the Better Life.

I spent twelve months in the field, from September 1992 to September 1993. In the villages I collected materials through surveys, case studies, life histories, personal narrations, and participant observation. Lived experiences transcend the snapshot nature of survey research and explore the dynamics of rural life. The first task of the field work was to collect data covering gender division of labour, local political network, political practices and micro-politics and other basic data. This is important to an understanding of the nature of politics in the communities. Similarly, the data collection covered such information as land ownership and type, occupation, production units; activities of males and females in the household and the village; access to technology and their forms, information, and knowledge; decision making in the household, associations, local authorities; beliefs and perceptions of gender roles; social infrastructure, political authority, access to credit, seclusion and its' forms; local organizations and networks, and family structure.

After collecting the above information, I gathered data on the projects in the villages. The information gathered includes the types of projects, the processes used in implementing projects, the structures established, the types of projects chosen, and the problems encountered. Other data collected include the impact of these projects on the people and the village, the opinions of villagers on these projects, the participants in these projects, the opinions which carry most weight, alternative perceptions of villagers on these projects, and their evaluation of projects. Furthermore, data on the animaters, the number of participants,
the process of convening meetings and the material and non-material benefits gained, were collected. In order to get more information on public life in the community, I asked about types of meetings, where people meet, the language of discussions and the participants in these fora. I also participated in some of the meetings in the communities.

I spent about sixty days collecting national policy documents, previous related studies, newspapers and magazines, archival materials and conducting interviews outside the villages. For NEAZDP, the two most important places are its headquarters at Garin Alkali and the EC mission on Idowu Taylor street, Lagos. Papers presented at History and Ecology conferences in Maiduguri and Kano were also useful.

To collect information on Better Life, the most important places visited are its state and national headquarters in Damaturu and Abuja respectively, the Women Commission in Abuja, the Maryam Babangida Women Centre, Abuja, and the Women in Nigeria Secretariat in the Centre for Social and Economic Research A.B.U Zaria.

Most of the information on DFRRI were from the state and national headquarters in Damaturu and Lagos respectively. I gathered some information at the local government headquarters of the Program in Gashua and Machina.

Agriculture and rural development policy documents, previous studies, archival materials, as well as fiscal and monetary policies were collected. The Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos, the National Archives, Kaduna, the Centre for Democratic studies, Abuja, Borno State Council for Arts and Culture, Maiduguri, Agricultural Extensions and Rural Liaison Services, A.B.U.Zaria, the Centre for Trans-Saharan Studies, University of Maiduguri, and the Centre for Arid Zone Studies, University of Maiduguri, were visited. The information
collected are useful for the purpose of background and literature review.

Interviews and discussions were also conducted at the headquarters of the programs. These cover the conception of the Programs; the support received from various sources; the aims and objectives of the Programs; the mechanisms and structures established to realize the objectives; the forms of modifications implemented as a result of the learning process; the problems being encountered; the sustainability of these projects; the criteria used to select projects; the forms of input received from the local people; and the reaction of the local people to these projects.

The first month in the life of this research was mainly the preparatory stage. I contacted my counter supervisor in Nigeria, Professor Kyari Tijani, at the University of Maiduguri, to discuss the research and get his input; contacted various officials of the Programs in the case studies; took a tour of the possible villages for the primary research and contacted village authorities. Gashua was the main base for the research where I was also attached to a counterpart, Adamu Modu Sadiq, in the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of NEAZDP to help me through the research. The Research Assistants for the research were mainly teachers in the primary schools of Dagona and Machina.
Appendix 2: The Research Sites and the Researcher in Dagona and Machina

Justifying the choice of a research site has more than an academic purpose. Members of the communities are curious to know why their community and not another one was chosen as a research subject. This researcher did not escape the interrogation of several curious people.

Both Dagona and Machina are part of the same region and they share basically the same "culture". But there are significant differences. Comparatively, Dagona is a recent settlement and has a very recent history of "traditional" political structure and centralized religion; it is on the banks of Kumadugu (river) Yobe, there are two farming systems, fadama (flood recession zone) and upland; the community is composed mainly of the Bade ethnic group (70 percent); it is more accessible being eight kilometres off a state highway, and it is only a district capital. In comparison, Machina makes a sharp contrast with Dagona. Machina has a very long history of settlement, centralized political structure and organized religion; there is no river near by, farming is only upland; Manga constitute the major ethnic group (66 percent); Machina is 58 kilometres from a highway, and it is a local government, district, and emirate capital.

Many of the people in the communities, especially in Dagona, were surprised that a doctoral candidate from a Canadian university was interested in their community. The choice of Machina was easier for people to understand. As an indigene of the community who spent most of my life either in the community or working for it in several capacities, I felt it was almost my duty and responsibility to write on that community. Thus, the people in Machina were not surprised by my decision to write about them: they considered it as a continuation of
serving the community. After all I have written countless memos and minutes in the community.

I had several advantages in researching about Machina. I did not encounter the problem of settlement and starting the research; I was very much aware of the nature of the community and its politics; there was no cultural shock or language barrier; and I was able easily to determine the mood of the people. Similarly, there were many hidden scripts and taboos in the community which I could easily interpret. Furthermore, I could readily understand the context of several issues that were explained by the research subjects.

However, I also encountered problems. Some informants assumed that I knew everything about the community; some respondents who were aware of my views gave answers which they assumed I would like; and sometimes I found it is difficult to ask certain respondents certain questions, especially those respondents whose views on several issues I knew.

The major problem for me was sensitivity. As an indigene of the community and an active participant in many of its struggles and activities, for me the challenge was to see and hear: not to assume that what is, is what ought to be. Now after about two years since completing the field research, I think that there are some issues which I did not ask about because they did not trigger any interest at the time of the research. Furthermore, I censored myself not to ask some disturbing questions. Thus, being located in the community as a privileged person, my problem is that of not seeing, hearing and or listening to the "others" in the community. In addition, a few of my friends think that I am too close to the Emir. The decision to choose Dagona, a community I had never visited, made me to reflect critically on
Machina. Similarly, my Research Assistants helped me to be self-critical.

My research experience in Dagona was different. My entry to the community was facilitated by the Development Area Promoter of NEAZDP. We knew one another from our undergraduate days at the University of Maiduguri. However, I was keen to keep a safe distance from him because of my study of NEAZDP. He introduced me to the Lawan (Village Head) and the research assistants. I insisted on recruiting research assistants from the primary school. All the six research assistants, two women and four men were teachers.

As an outsider in Dagona, I had some advantages and disadvantages. I should say that I was not a total stranger because of the contacts I had in the community and several people I knew from the community during my secondary and undergraduate and graduate studies. These contacts must have mediated my location in the community. I cannot say what might have been my advantages of being the "other" in Dagona, but I know what were the disadvantages. Despite the fact that it was about a month from the period of initial contact and visit to the village and the start of the research proper, I was treated with some respect. Initially, there was a rumour that I was the son of the Emir of Machina. I told my research assistants that I was not, but the rumour persisted perhaps because that my surname wrongly suggests a linkage with a title holder. The two women research assistants in Dagona initially wore hijab ("proper" Muslim dress). Subsequently, they stopped wearing it. What I am trying to suggest is that it took some time before I felt myself a normal researcher in Dagona.

A second problem was that of language. Dagona people speak Bade. My knowledge of the language is very limited. Hence all of my discussions in the community were in Hausa. In some cases, the research assistants had to translate from Bade to Hausa. We encountered
several problems with translation. For example, I recorded several songs by females of different age grades in the community, but when we translated them to English they lost their meaning and richness.

In addition, I was perhaps too reluctant to ask questions which might have been interpreted as insensitive. For example in the course of chatting, I took note of some very important information, but I did not probe further.

On the positive side, the two research sites informed and improved one another and I am confident that the informants in Dagona were very reliable. My informants spoke to me without fear of retribution.
Appendix 3: Guideline for Group Discussions, Community Surveys and Interviews.

The guideline below was used to collect data on relations to land, activity profile in the farm and the household. The data generated was used to develop the tables in chapter 4.

I want to explain that what you will find below was essentially a guideline rather than a standard format for collecting data. I was very much concerned about using a survey method for all the reasons for which it has been criticised. In order to gain from the experiences of feminists methodologies, activists participatory research, agrosystem analysis, applied anthropology, field research on farming systems, rapid rural appraisal and participatory rural appraisal, I combined different techniques to gather the data for the chapter. There were series of meetings with the research assistants, key informants, group discussions and a limited survey. Sixty eight and eighty two people participated in Dagona and Machina respectively. I was lucky to participate in a Rapid Rural Appraisal Workshop run by a team of consultants from the University of Maiduguri for NEAZDP staff.

I should add that narratives and personal histories were used to collect the data on rhythm of living which was discussed in the latter part of chapter 4.

1. Personal Data
   a. Name
   b. Marital Status
   c. Education
   d. Age
   e. Number of Wives or Husbands
   f. Number of People in the Household
   g. Occupations
   h. Ethnic group
   j. Religion.
2. **Activities in the Household**

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<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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- a. Washing Dishes
- b. Washing Clothes
- c. Cooking
- d. Sweeping
- e. Fetching Water
- f. Grinding
- g. Dehusking
- h. Fetching Fire Wood

3. **Activities in the Farm**

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<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Machine/</th>
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- a. Clearing of Field
- b. Planting
- c. Weeding
- d. Harvesting
- e. Winnowing
- f. Threshing
- g. Taking Food to the
- h. Farm

4. **Relations to Land and other Property**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Number/Acres</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Land</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Fertilizer</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Tractor</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Improved Seeds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Goat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Sheep</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Cow</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>h. Chicken</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Pesticide</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Ox team/Plough</td>
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</table>

5. If you own land how did you come about it?
6. If you have access to land how did you come about it?
7. If you inherited land, was it through your maternal or paternal relations?
8. What are the types of crops grown in different fields?
Appendix 4: List of Individuals Interviewed

1. Ajia Adamu Gorgaram
2. Shugaba Aisha
3. Lawan Abubakar
4. Borno Tawa
5. Bashir Bukar Albishir
6. Malama Dela
7. Lawan Goni
8. Habu Sale
9. Mohammed Gwandi
10. Mallam Mustapha
11. Malama Salamatu
12. Salisu Jawi
13. Magi Zara
14. Curaku Zazau