LANGUAGE PLANNING AND BILINGUAL EDUCATION
FOR LINGUISTIC MINORITIES IN CHINA:
A CASE STUDY OF THE POLICY FORMULATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

by

DONGYAN RU BLACHFORD

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Curriculum, Teaching, and Learning
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the
University of Toronto

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ABSTRACT

The issues of minority language policy and planning in contemporary China (1949-present) are pursued in this study within a theoretical framework derived from three related areas of research: language planning, educational policy studies, and bilingual education. The aim is to achieve an understanding of the nature and the characteristics of Communist language policies and their impact on the life and education of over 90 million people. They are labelled as the Chinese national minorities consisting of 55 ethnic groups with extremely diversified languages and cultures.

Chinese policy making and implementation processes are examined including relationships between macro-policy goals and micro-implementations within a complicated bureaucratic structure. Employing the combined methods of documentary reviews, intensive interviews, and field observations, a series of case studies are conducted through research at various levels from the Centre (Beijing), to the region/province (Xinjiang and Gansu), and the local (prefectures, counties, and schools). Several minority groups (the Uygur, Kazak, Xibo, Yi, Dai, and Tibetan) and their languages and education situations are
examined closely.

The study illuminates a process within which minority language policy decisions are determined, conditioned, influenced and implemented. Important factors in policy making are identified including the Communist ideology, the CPC's political agendas, the strategic positions of the minorities, the deeply rooted imperial traditions, and the changing world environment. An examination of how these factors interact, restrain and reinforce one another reveals the close relationships between the use of a language and political power, nation building and cultural identity.

The study seeks to contribute to empirical and conceptual knowledge on international studies of minority language policy, planning, education, and social change. It also provides an insight into current research in the fields of bilingual education, language planning and educational policy studies.
This study is based largely on a combination of documentary sources and extensive interviews with the Chinese including minority language and education sector administrators, planners, language workers, scholars, researchers, and teachers at various levels from national, regional, prefecture, county to the village schools. I have promised absolute confidentiality to each of these individuals and therefore I cannot thank them by name. My only way to thank them is to hope this study helps the outside world to see the efforts made by these people to improve the quality of life for the minority people.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the assistance provided by a CIDA/China grant. Much of the research for this study was made possible through this exchange program which allowed me an unforgettable trip to the areas where much of the data was collected by talking with and interviewing people and by observing their daily lives. I would also like to thank the participating universities in China, especially, Beijing Normal University, Northwest Normal University, and Xinjiang University for their assistance in organizing the interviews and visiting minority schools.

I am most certainly much indebted to my supervisor, Dr. Stacy Churchill, for without his insightful guidance, long term support, and deep understanding the completion of this study would not have been possible. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Jim Cummins, Dr. Ruth Hayhoe (past member), Dr. Normand Labrie, and Dr. Barbara Burnaby for their expert input and their valuable time and effort in reviewing the manuscript.

My sincere thanks goes to Dr. Bob Cosbey for reading and commenting on the
manuscript and to Dr. Jian Zhang and Mrs. Bev Ross for helping with the tables and figures.

My sincere appreciation goes to a special friend Dr. Katherine Tiede who had made Toronto a home away from home for me and who has been a source of ongoing strength and care. I would also like to thank my friends, Ann Curry, Elizabeth Kim, Penthes Rubrecht, Dr. Salina Shroffel, Linda Sperling, Marju Toomsalu, Eric Zheng, Wang Li, and Li Zhuli for always being there for me.

I am deeply indebted to my parents, my brother Feng Ru, my sister Jian Ru and my brother-in-law Xiangqun Zhang for their unconditional love and support through my life.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this study to my husband, Dr. Cam Blachford for love and appreciation. It is most certainly my Laoha’s love and patience which have seen me through the most difficult times.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARCWL</td>
<td>Association for Reforming the Chinese Written Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Chinese Academy of Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASS</td>
<td>Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIN</td>
<td>Central Institute of Nationalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMBERA</td>
<td>Chinese Minority Bilingual Education Research Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMLA</td>
<td>Chinese Minority Language Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPCC</td>
<td>Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRCWL</td>
<td>Committee for Reforming the Chinese Written Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDCCNW</td>
<td>Editing Department of the Contemporary Chinese Nationalities Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDSNAC</td>
<td>Education Division of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HKSAR</td>
<td>Hong Kong Special Administrative Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LICAS</td>
<td>Language Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNPC</td>
<td>Nationalities Committee of the National People's Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People's Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRICASS</td>
<td>Nationalities Research Institute of The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperative Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEC</td>
<td>State Education Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLSC</td>
<td>State Language and Script Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNAC</td>
<td>State Nationalities Affairs Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNLSWC</td>
<td>State Nationalities Language and Script Work Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWLRC</td>
<td>State Written Language Reform Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFWD</td>
<td>United Front Work Department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Author's Note

The pronunciation of each Chinese character is made up of "initial" and "final" letters which are known as "pinyin". The pinyin system has been used as the official romanization system in the People's Republic of China since 1958 and has been adopted by the United Nations and other world agencies. This study has used the pinyin form of transliteration of the place, ethnic group and personal names throughout with a few exceptions where the old and officially discarded Wade-Giles form, long familiar in the West, is used. For example, personal names such as Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen are retained in preference to Jiang Jieshi and Sun Zhongshan in pinyin, and Tibetan and Uygur are used for names of minority groups rather than Zangzu and Weiwu'erzu. In most cases, pinyin letters are pronounced like their English equivalents, with a few notable exceptions. The following sounds are identified as often difficult for native English speakers.

<table>
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<th>English</th>
<th>Finals:</th>
<th>English</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pinyin</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pinyin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>ts</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qi</td>
<td>cheek</td>
<td>ai</td>
<td>bye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>sheep</td>
<td>ao</td>
<td>now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>z</td>
<td>dz</td>
<td>e</td>
<td>her (but with no r-sound)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zh</td>
<td>jug</td>
<td>i</td>
<td>see</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>pleasure</td>
<td>iu</td>
<td>yo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ou</td>
<td>so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>u</td>
<td>loot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ua</td>
<td>trois (French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o</td>
<td>woman</td>
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</table>

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Problem Area and Major Issues for Study

Language problems have long been recognized around the world as one of the key issues in minority education. "The choice of language education policy is among the most critical and complex issues facing modern society" (Spolsky 1980, p. xiii). China, a multinational state, has 56 recognized "nationalities" (minzu) including the largest group, the Han nationality (known to the world as the Chinese) and 55 other known ethnic groups designated as "national minorities" (shaoshu minzu). These 55 minorities have a combined population of over 90 million\(^1\), vary in size from more than 15 million (the Zhuang group) to only 2,322 (the Lhoba), and speak a total of 80-90 languages (see Table 1.1).

The policies towards these languages and their roles in education has long been an important and sensitive issue facing Chinese policy makers, language planners and educators. This study seeks to bring an understanding of the nature and characteristics of minority language policies and to illuminate the policy and planning process in China since 1949 when the Communists took power.

\(^1\)Given the status conferred by identification as a Han, the official figures for minorities, especially in areas of mixed Han-minority population, are certain to underestimate the actual numbers of persons of minority heritage in the process of linguistic, cultural and demographic assimilation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhuang</td>
<td>15,555,820</td>
<td>Xibe / Xibo</td>
<td>172,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu / Man</td>
<td>9,846,776</td>
<td>Mulao / Molao</td>
<td>160,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>8,612,001</td>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>143,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>7,207,024</td>
<td>Dahur / Daur</td>
<td>121,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi</td>
<td>6,578,524</td>
<td>Jingpo</td>
<td>119,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tujia</td>
<td>5,725,049</td>
<td>Salar</td>
<td>87,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>4,802,407</td>
<td>Blang / Bulang</td>
<td>82,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>4,593,072</td>
<td>Maonan</td>
<td>72,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bouyei</td>
<td>2,548,294</td>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>33,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong</td>
<td>2,508,624</td>
<td>Primi / Pumi</td>
<td>29,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yao</td>
<td>2,137,033</td>
<td>Achang</td>
<td>27,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>1,923,361</td>
<td>Nu</td>
<td>27,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bai</td>
<td>1,598,052</td>
<td>Ewenki</td>
<td>26,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hani</td>
<td>1,254,800</td>
<td>Gin / Jing</td>
<td>18,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak / Hazak</td>
<td>1,110,758</td>
<td>Jinuo</td>
<td>18,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Li</td>
<td>1,112,498</td>
<td>De'ang / Benglong</td>
<td>15,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai / Thai</td>
<td>1,025,402</td>
<td>Uzbek</td>
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<tr>
<td>She</td>
<td>643,700</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>13,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisu</td>
<td>574,589</td>
<td>Yugu</td>
<td>12,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelao / Gelo</td>
<td>438,192</td>
<td>Bonan / Baoan</td>
<td>11,683</td>
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<td>Lahu</td>
<td>411,545</td>
<td>Monba / Moinba</td>
<td>7,498</td>
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<td>373,669</td>
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<td>7,004</td>
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<td>351,980</td>
<td>Drung / Dulong</td>
<td>5,825</td>
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<td>347,116</td>
<td>Tatar</td>
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<td>277,750</td>
<td>Hezhe</td>
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<tr>
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<td>198,303</td>
<td>Gaoshan</td>
<td>2,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu</td>
<td>192,568</td>
<td>Lhoba</td>
<td>2,322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 90,567,245

Note: The numbers are from the Population Census in 1990.
The major issues examined in this study include the following:

1. the major language and education policies and policy changes for the 55 Chinese national minorities during the past 45 years, and the efforts of language planning to address the potential conflicts between majority language spread and minority language maintenance,

2. the major historical and contextual factors which determine, condition, and influence policy and planning objectives, decisions, and implementations,

3. the process of policy formulation including initiation and decision making, as well as implementation within the complicated bureaucratic structure of the Chinese government, and,

4. the impact of such policies and planning as reflected in bilingual education on social change including the government's effort towards state building and on minority communities especially their languages and cultures.

The problem area is to piece together various puzzles relating to all the issues involved -- who, for what purpose, under what conditions, by what means -- in order to achieve a better understanding of, first, how, in a multinational state like China, with vast areas, an immense population, extremely diversified languages and cultures, as well as a distinct political system, policies are made, and second, just how policies determined at the Centre are being carried through to remote villages thousands of miles away.

To address these problems and issues, case studies are effective in clarifying connections between macro planning and policy making, and micro implementation at each level from Beijing (the Centre) to Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Gansu Province as well as several levels below such as prefectures, counties, villages, and schools.
The research and the analysis are guided by a theoretical framework derived from three related areas of study: language planning (Fishman, 1989, 1987, 1983; Cooper, 1989; etc.); bilingual education (Cummins, 1991, 1989, 1983; Baker, 1993, 1988; etc.); and policy case studies (Churchill, 1986; Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988; etc.).

The goal of the study is to present as completely as possible a picture of the development of minority language policies and planning processes in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and to seek implications for further studies in other areas of the world.

1.2 Rationale and Background for the Study

Ever since 1949 when the Communists came to power in China, minority issues in general and minority language issues in particular have posed a great challenge for the Communist Party of China (CPC) in its effort to build a united socialist nation state. Especially in recent times, with China's struggle for economic development and with the demise of its neighbour, the former Soviet Union, and other communist countries in Eastern Europe, minority language and education issues have become more and more prominent.

The fall of the former Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe has led some Western observers to the conclusion or suspicion that such ethnic crises were caused simply by endemic weaknesses in Communism. The Communist Party of China has tried its best to prove the superiority of socialism (communism) over capitalism including in its minority policies. These policies were intended, on the one hand, to obtain national unity and political stability and, on the other hand, to integrate the national minorities into the
Han and Communist culture. The issues of the extent to which the Communist minority policy has contributed to the relative political stability in China and whether or not these policies can sustain the current situation remain to be answered. A study of the minority language and education policy will help illuminate the nature and characteristics of general minority policy and practice in China.

The changing of the political power from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping indicated not only the beginning of a new era in economic reform and modernization, but also in political and social change. Although Deng died in early 1997, the trend set by him in the late 1970s seems to be irreversible. China in its process of modernization was presented with a sensitive task of developing a minority language education policy to meet the country's sociopolitical and economic reality as well as the aspirations of its 90 million minority population. Even though the minorities constitute only approximately eight percent of the country's total population, the autonomous regions where most of them live cover 62 percent of China's total land area; over 90 percent of the border regions of China are occupied by national minorities. Apart from their crucial value for defence, these areas are the main resource bases for the economy. Geographically, about 94 percent of the country's population (mainly the majority "Han" nationality) reside in the southeast, but 94 percent of the country's natural resources lie in the northwest populated mainly by minority nationalities. These minority areas account for an estimated 40% of the nation's coal deposits as well as 52% of the nation's total water resources (Ma Ying et al., 1985). However, education for these minorities has still not developed to a level comparable to that of the majority Han nationality. For example, the illiteracy and the semi-literacy rate among the total 90 million minorities aged 12 and up averages 42%. For some of the
minorities the rate is as high as 80 or 90 percent (Sun Ruoqiong et al., 1990).

The development of quality educational programs for these minorities has become urgent for both the politicians and minority educators, because education, especially language education of these minorities plays a crucial role in China's economic development and political stability. Therefore, the issues of minority language and education are progressively being seen as one of the decisive factors in what is called the country's "struggle" for modernization. But according to Chinese experts of minority language and education, research in these areas is unsatisfactory. Sun Ruoqiong et al. (1990) point out that up to now, the study of minority education in China is still an "uncultivated virgin land" and that most of the research is theoretically weak and limited to simple surface level descriptions such as survey reports and summaries of isolated experiences. Although bilingual education is currently implemented as an essential solution to the potential conflict between the Han language spread and minority language maintenance, so far there have been no systematic studies on how minority language education or bilingual education is planned and implemented to address such conflict and to fulfil the needs of the country's modernization as well as the aspirations of the minorities.

Minority language policy and planning have proven to be a complex task and have presented several real dilemmas in contemporary China, a country which has constantly striven for national unity and, since the 1949 revolution, claims to celebrate linguistic and cultural diversity. On the one hand, current policy requires language planners to spread Putonghua (the official and the majority language of the Han, for definition see section 2.1) as the national lingua franca among the Han dialect speakers as well as in minority areas, since the Constitution of China in 1982 stated that "the state is to popularize Putonghua
in the whole country". On the other hand, authorities are also expected to work towards preservation and development of minority languages, an objective which is also guaranteed by the Constitution and other statutes. Are these parallel objectives contradictory? If so, what is the solution to this dilemma? What are the motives and issues behind minority language planning in China? How are current language and education policies formulated and implemented to address the potential conflicts? These are some of the questions which form some of the central concerns of this study.

Accompanying the sociopolitical issues is the challenge of the linguistic complexity of the minorities. One of the characteristics of the minority areas is that various minorities tend to live together in small clusters and together with the Han. This geographic situation results in close interaction and influence among minorities and the Han economically, politically, culturally, as well as linguistically. Linguistic diversity is one of the most distinctive features of the Chinese national minorities. Among the 55 minorities, two groups -- the Hui and the Manchu -- over the long course of history have adopted the Han language (both oral and written) as their common language of communication, and the remaining 53 nationalities speak a total of more than 80 languages\(^2\) (Chen Hongtao, 1990) with 15 groups speaking more than one language (Sun Hongkai, 1988). These languages may be classified into five genealogical families; debate continues as to whether some languages such as Jing and Korean belong to an existing language family or form their own category (Fu Maoji, 1985; Sun Hongkai, 1988; Meng Xian, 1990) (see Table 1.2).

---

\(^2\)Fu Maoji and Sun Zhu claim that 24 minorities have their own written languages (1990). But Zhou Yaowen (1994) in the same journal states that 56 nationalities in China speak more than 80 languages and use over 30 written languages. Another scholar Sun Hongkai (1988) in the journal *Nationality Languages* wrote that 55 minorities use more than 90 languages.
Table 1.2 Genealogical Classification of the Languages in China*

I. The Sino-Tibetan Family:

1. The Han Branch: Han Language

2. The Tibeto-Burmese Branch:
   a) Tibetan Sub-branch: Tibetan, Jia, Menba
   b) Jingpo Sub-branch: Jingpo, Dulong,
   c) Yi Sub-branch: Yi, Bai, Hani, Naxi, Lisu, Lahu, Jinuo, Tujia,
   d) Burmese Sub-branch: Zaiwa, Achang
   e) Qiang Sub-branch: Qiang, Pumi, Lhoba, Nu

3. Miao-Yao Branch:
   a) Miao Sub-branch: Miao, Bunu, She
   b) Yao Sub-branch: Yao, Mian

4. Zhuang-Dong
   a) Zhuang-Thai Sub-branch: Zhuang, Buyi, Dai
   b) Dong-Shui Sub-branch: Dong, Shui, Maonan, Gelo, Lajia
   c) Li Sub-branch: Li
   d) Not classified: Gelao

II. The Altaic Family:

1. Mongolian Branch: Mongolian, Daur, Yugu (east), Tu, Dongxiang, Bao'an
2. Turkic Branch:
   Uygu, Kazak, Salar, Uzbek, Tatar
3. Manchu-Tungus Branch: Manchu, Xibo, Hezhe, Ewenki, Elunchuan

III. The Austronesian Family

Indonesian Branch: Ameisi, Bulen, Gaoshan

IV. The Austro-Asiatic Family

The Mon-Kmer Branch: Wa, Bulang, De'ang, Kemu

V. The Indo-European Family

Tajik, Russian

VI. Not Classified:

Jing, Korean

Note: the bold is added by the author to indicate the minorities whose languages are examined in this study.
The language of 30 minorities are used by the same ethnic groups living in neighbouring countries (see Table 1.3), a key factor influencing policy makers to place emphases on minority policy issues.

Twenty-eight minorities have their own written languages and 14 of them use two or more written forms, some using up to five (Xu Shixuan, 1993:19-25) (see Table 1.4).

The written languages of some ethnic groups such as the Mongolians, the Tibetans, the Uygurs, the Kazaks and the Koreans have existed for centuries while ten others possess written languages created by the government during the 1950s. Some nationalities, including Bai, Zaiwa, Yao, Dulong, and Tu, have a much shorter written language history, beginning as recently as 1979 (see Table 1.5).

Some of the written forms (mostly the newly created ones) adopted the Latin alphabet, some use the Arabic alphabet, and others use a script of their own devising (see Figure 1.1 for sample scripts). At present, twenty-seven minorities still do not have written languages (Zhang Youjun & Xu Jieshun, 1992).

The reality of language use among the national minorities makes language policy and planning in education a most difficult task. Since 1949, there have been several attempts by the government to identify different nationalities within the borders of China and to classify the patterns of language use of these nationalities (Meng Xian, 1990). The task is formidable in a situation of extreme multilingualism which has resulted from a long history of complex patterns of migration, mixed living, and various patterns of cultural and political unity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Used in Countries Bordering on China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>India, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uyghur</td>
<td>Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Jirjistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi</td>
<td>Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhuang</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyi</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>D.P.R.Korea, R.O.Korea, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yao</td>
<td>Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hani</td>
<td>Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai</td>
<td>Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisu</td>
<td>Myanmar, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Va</td>
<td>Myanmar, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahu</td>
<td>Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingpo</td>
<td>Myanmar, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>Jirjistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blang</td>
<td>Laos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nu</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>Uzbekistan, Turkey, Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ewenki</td>
<td>Mongolia, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deang</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jing</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>Russia, Tatary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drung</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezhe</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moinba</td>
<td>India, Bhutan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lhopa</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: adapted from Dai Qingxia & Fu Ailan "Language Across Border", 1993*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Form of Scripts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian:</td>
<td>Mongolian, Tuoni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uygur:</td>
<td>Arabic, Latin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak:</td>
<td>Arabic, Latin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miao:</td>
<td>Xiangxi, Tiandong, Chuantianzhen, Zhendongbei-new, Zhendongbei-old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai:</td>
<td>Daili-old, Daili-new, Daina, Daiduan, Daibeng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhuang:</td>
<td>Pinyin, Zhuang-Characters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyi:</td>
<td>Pinyin, Buyi-Characters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong:</td>
<td>Pinyin, Dong-Characters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bai:</td>
<td>Pinyin, Bai-Characters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi:</td>
<td>Traditional Yi, Liangshan Standard Yi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisu:</td>
<td>Lisu-old, Lisu-new</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hani:</td>
<td>Haya, Bika, Xishuangbanna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaiva:</td>
<td>Zaiva-Old, Zaiva-New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Va:</td>
<td>Saci, Va-New</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Xu Shixuan (1993) "On Phenomenon of the Multiple-Writings" in Nationality Languages, Vol.81, No.3*
Table 1.5 A list of the Minority Writings in China*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Names of Writing</th>
<th>Date of Creation</th>
<th>Typeface</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. The Early-Created Writings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>Thirteenth century</td>
<td>Huihe sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>Seventeenth century</td>
<td>Huihe sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>Eleventh century</td>
<td>Sanscript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>Eighteenth century</td>
<td>Arabic sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>Fifteenth century</td>
<td>Korean sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>Twentieth century</td>
<td>Mongolian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arabic sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russian sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russian sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naxi</td>
<td>Dongba</td>
<td>Thirteenth century</td>
<td>Pictograph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai</td>
<td>Daile</td>
<td>Thirteenth century</td>
<td>Sanscript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daina</td>
<td>Thirteenth century</td>
<td>Sanscript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jinping Dai</td>
<td>Thirteenth century</td>
<td>Sanscript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daibeng</td>
<td>Thirteenth century</td>
<td>Sanscript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi</td>
<td>Yi, Cuan</td>
<td>Thirteenth century</td>
<td>Pictograph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>Bergli Miao</td>
<td>Twentieth century</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingpo</td>
<td>Jingpo</td>
<td>Twentieth century</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zaiwa</td>
<td>Twentieth century</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahu</td>
<td>Lahu</td>
<td>Twentieth century</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wa</td>
<td>Wa</td>
<td>Twentieth century</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisu</td>
<td>Lisu</td>
<td>Twentieth century</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. The Reformed Writings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingpo</td>
<td>Jingpo</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zaiwa</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahu</td>
<td>Lahu</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai</td>
<td>Xishuangbanna Dai</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Sanscript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dehong Dai</td>
<td>1954-1955</td>
<td>Sanscript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>1959-1980</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi</td>
<td>Liangshan Yi</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Syllable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. Newly-Created Writings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Names of Writing</th>
<th>Date of Creation</th>
<th>Typeface</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhuang</td>
<td>Zhuang</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyi</td>
<td>Buyi</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>Xiangxi Miao</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qiandong Miao</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West Miao</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Miao</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi</td>
<td>Liangshan Yi</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li</td>
<td>Li</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naxi</td>
<td>Naxi</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisu</td>
<td>Lisu</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hani</td>
<td>Haya Dialect</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bika Dialect</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wa</td>
<td>Wa</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong</td>
<td>Dong</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu</td>
<td>Tu</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Latin sp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Adapted from Sun Hongkai, 1987, Huangxing, 1996*

Multilingualism has been for centuries an accepted part of life for a large number of Chinese national minorities. The minority populations may live either on a clearly circumscribed territory or be dispersed over larger areas. Some groups form enclaves within a Han-majority territory, while others share their territories with one or more other minority nationalities and varying numbers of Han. This has resulted in various patterns of language use among the minorities, as identified by the various Chinese language scholars (Yan Xuejiong, 1985; Zhou Yaowen, 1985; Sun Hongkai 1988; Ma Xueliang & Dai Qingxia 1990; Wei Zhiqiang, 1992; Chen Qiguang, 1993).
Figure 1.1 Sample Scripts of Chinces National Minorities

The Dai from Dehong

The Jingpo

The Uyghur

The Tibetan

The Kazak

The Yi from the Lingshan mountains

The Lahu
First, some minorities use a language borrowed from other nationalities. The Hui nationality, the second largest minority group in China, has borrowed Han language as their unified language. Although during the formation of the Hui nationality, other languages, including Arabic and Persian, had been used by many of its members, they did not prevail. Instead, Mandarin gradually took over through the course of history.

Second, about eight minority groups concurrently use two or more independent languages of their own. These languages are not borrowed from or used by any other nationalities. The following five reasons account for such a phenomenon (Sun Hongkai, 1988):

1. The members of a minority group came from different tribes, but due to living closely together for a long time, have a common identity. After 1949, such groups were accepted to be one nationality in accordance with their members' wishes. Yet their languages are strikingly different in structure. For example, the Yao nationality uses three languages which belong to different linguistic subfamilies. The Yugu and Jingpo nationalities also each use two distinct languages.

2. Some ethnic groups have lost their characteristics to a surrounding larger and stronger group. When asked, after 1949, they no longer wished to be recognized as a separate group from the one with which they had assimilated. For example, in Sichuan Province, there are several groups who call themselves Tibetans, yet speak languages different from Tibetan.
3. In some cases, such as the Gaoshan nationality in Taiwan and the Luoba nationality along the border with India, minorities are named for the areas in which they reside. In reality the Gaoshan people use 13 languages and the Luoba possess several languages as well. The groupings presently used to identify them are certain to evolve over time.

4. For historical reasons such as war and migration a minority or part of a minority may have given up its original language and may use either a completely new language (e.g. the Mongolians now living in Yunnan Province, moved south when Hubilie conquered China in the Yuan Dynasty and subsequently adopted Han language) or a new pidgin language which is a mixture of their own and other languages.

5. Another case is that of a nationality, that due to long term separation, has had its language developed into two such different structures that they must be called separate languages rather than dialects of one language.

For all the above reasons, the phenomenon of one minority using more than one language is quite common in China.

A third pattern of language use is the situation where several nationalities live in one area; some minority groups use one or more languages of their neighbours in addition to one or more languages of their own. The cases of the Xibo and Kazak nationalities in Xinjiang are good examples which will be detailed in Chapter Six.

The fourth situation of language use among minority groups is language shift, which means the whole group or a large number of the group lost their ancestral languages and

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3In this thesis, Taiwan is considered in general discussion of linguistic, ethnic, and cultural background but is otherwise excluded from consideration in relation to language and education policy.
eventually gave up using their own languages and replaced them with a language of other nationalities. The Manchu, once a ruling nationality with a large unilingual Manchu-speaking elite during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), had first changed from Manchu to bilingualism (Mandarin and Manchu) and then shifted to use Mandarin only. Others like the She and Hezhe nationality, with a few exceptions among the older generation, have done the same. Other ethnic groups such as the Tujia, the Gelao, and the Jing are in the process of language shift, and now less than 20% of their population still use the ancestral tongues; the rest have replaced their languages with Putonghua. The language shift situation does not apply only to shifting to the Han language, since some minority groups have replaced their languages with the languages of other minorities. For instance, Uzbeks have almost all shifted to use either the Uygur or the Kazak languages.

This discussion has dealt mainly with the use of languages by nationalities as groups in that there is a widespread phenomenon of individual bilingualism or multilingualism among almost all nationalities. Members of minorities in Ili Kazak autonomous prefecture and Chabucha'er Xibo autonomous county, both within the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, are well known for their bilingual or multilingual abilities. Also, language use differs among minorities living in different locations, with different age, sex, occupations, and education.

Such diversification in both spoken and written language use makes the choice of language in education very difficult. Various minorities speaking a number of languages commonly end up in the same school and even in the same classroom. Therefore, there

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Readers are reminded that figures used in the text may underestimate language maintenance by minority nationalities.
are several issues at stake: the selection of the minority languages for instruction; the number of minority languages involved in one school; the curriculum and the pedagogy for teaching; and the resources. One fact has become very clear to policy makers and educators: the unified language and education policies (yi dao qie) which used to treat all minorities as a single entity is virtually impractical. Yet allowing national policy to be implemented flexibly to take into account the unique situation of each national minority can lead to arbitrary or uninformed decisions at the regional and local levels. Language planners and policy makers have to walk a fine line to take all factors into consideration. A complex situation like this makes the study of minority language education policies intriguing and interesting. As Marshall (1990) puts it, there are few language planning arenas as challenging or as exciting as China.

As far as the field of minority language education is concerned, over the last two decades there has been, in multicultural nations, a substantial increase in interest in language planning, bilingual education, and education policy studies. However, much of the present research and theorizing in these areas has concentrated on the contexts of North America, Europe, Africa, and more recently Australia and the South Pacific. To date little information regarding bilingual education and language planning for the Chinese minorities has been published, despite the fact that the total population of the minorities in China is equal to the population of all of Germany or to the combined population of Canada and the United Kingdom. While it would be unrealistic to suppose that any one nation's attempt to deal with such a problem could be generalized to another, China's problems with her minority languages and education, their role in education, their preservation and functions in society, are similar to those shared by many nations. The
The present study may therefore be meaningful not only for China but also for international research.

The lack of information on minority language work in China has been the result of several factors. Before 1980, China was very much closed to the outside world. Very few foreigners were allowed into China, let alone into the remote minority regions. Secondly, minority language has been a sensitive issue for Chinese scholars to discuss, especially to compare it with similar situations in other parts of the world, for fear of being labelled as one of those who encourages separatism. The touchy area of minority language policies has been shunned by scholars. Thirdly, due to its sensitive nature, minority language research in China has not been very active. So far, there has not been a systematic study of the nature and process of minority language policy and planning. In this context, an accurate in-depth examination and exploration of the policy and planning process for minority language education under Communist control will not only help to understand and improve minority language education in China, but will also contribute to present practice and research around the world.

This study examines the entire spectrum of the minority language education policy and planning process in China by studying relationships between various levels within the Chinese bureaucratic structure. The study attempts to provide a description and an explanation of minority language policy, its planning and implementation, at three different levels: central government policies on minority language and education; provincial and autonomous regional government practice in interpreting, legislating, and modifying the central policy into language education programs; and local (prefecture, county, municipal-administration and schools) reaction and adaptation in implementing these programs.

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Primary attention is given to the identification and analysis of factors and elements which condition and affect the decision making and implementation process at each level. The interactions and relationships across the levels form another area of interest for the study. The impact of such policies on CPC's effort of national integration including majority language spread and on minority community development including their languages and culture are examined.

The study is planned in light of current theory and research in the field of bilingual education, language planning and policy case studies.

1.3 Significance of the Study

By examining the common theme of minority language and education in the Chinese context and focusing on the language policy and planning process across the levels or "layers" of the entire system, this study seeks to contribute to the empirical and conceptual knowledge of international studies of language policy and planning, minority education and social change, and to provide insight into current research intended to inform bilingual education and language policy decisions. By analysing various factors and conditions which affect the past, current, and future practice, and by providing raw materials for potential policy modification, it is especially intended to contribute to the development of minority language education in China, and provide a base for future assessment and comparative studies. The study also addresses some of the theoretical concerns of language planning -- which Cobarrubias (1983) referred to not so long ago as being still in a "prehistorical stage"-- and sheds light on the widespread and many-faceted
phenomenon of bilingual education.

The study is unique in that, other than looking at various language programs in education in certain minority areas, as many other studies have done within China, it ventures into the area of the objectives, motivations, and constraints behind various policies and practices at different historical moments and the profound influence they had, and still have, on the state of minority languages and their future.

1.4 Organization of the Study

This study is presented in seven chapters. Chapters One to Three provide theoretical and methodological background. Chapter One introduces the purpose and the focus of the study. A theoretical and methodological framework is developed for the study in Chapter Two by reviewing research literature in the related areas. Chapter Three describes the research methods employed in this study.

Chapters Four, Five, and Six carry the entire examination and the theme through data analysis. Chapter Four explores the minority language and education policy-making process at the national level. The major factors which affect the policy goals and decisions are identified. The major players participating in the policy making process are pictured and the organizations of political power (the mechanism of policy making) at the national level are analysed. Chapter Five traces over 40 years of minority language policy changes under Communist control (1949-present) through three historical periods, illuminating the characteristics of language policy making in China at any given moment. Two cases of minority language planning (the Yi and Dai) are examined as examples of policy making
at the national level. Chapter Six focuses on the presentation and analysis of language policy and implementation at the regional level and below. Three interrelated case studies, each at a distinctive level (regional, prefecture, and county) are selected to help demonstrate the complex relations and the struggles in the process of policy initiation, investigation, decision, revision, and implementation.

The final chapter, Chapter Seven, addresses several interrelated issues by drawing upon the findings and analysis throughout the text, and discusses the implications for language planning, bilingual education, and education policy studies, as well as for future research in China and internationally.

1.5 Limitations of the Study

The research of this study concerns minority language planning and policy in mainland China with the exclusion of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Its focus is on the policy and planning process including major factors, participants, and structures which not only affect the final decisions but also influence the initiation of policy discussion, the processes leading to policy change and policy implementation.

It is recognized that the selected cases may not be a full representation for all minority groups in China. This study examines the application of policy to several minorities mainly residing in northwest regions. Subsequent research is needed to complete the picture provided by this study and verify whether similar processes are at work in other regions.

Since most westerners have not had opportunities to observe the making of
government policy in this aspect, let alone to participate in the process, very little material in western languages can be obtained. The data for the study is taken, therefore, primarily from Chinese sources.

Due to the sensitivity of the topic, Chinese informants consulted during the research may have given limited information for fear of possible political consequences. For the same reason, documentation on the issues is scarce. This has forced the author to make inferences by cross-analysing a variety of published and unpublished government documents, official or semi-official reports, and research articles and scholarly arguments.

The consequences of scarcity of research in the field include inconsistencies in the data and discrepancies in the information, which the author has tried to identify in the discussion. For example, different numbers have been given for the spoken and written languages among the 55 Chinese national minorities recorded in official as well as research publications (see note on page 7). The data used depend on the author's best judgement.

Finally, due to the fact that the author does not speak a minority language, the information has been obtained mostly from Chinese sources, as well as a few translated materials, and through interpreters or from those minority informants who can speak Mandarin.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

This section examines relevant literature in the areas of bilingual education, language planning, and policy case studies. The aim of the literature review is to provide a background for this study, to help clarify the research problems, and to identify the theoretical and methodological framework adopted for the study.

2.1 The Definition of National Minorities in China

The term 'national minorities' needs to be clarified in the Chinese context before an in-depth discussion begins since these groups and their languages are the centre of concern in this study. As mentioned earlier, most bilingual education research has occurred in Western industrial countries and has focused on three major types of minority groups categorized by Churchill (1986). Summarizing studies of education for linguistic and cultural minorities in over 20 OECD countries, he noted that most studies in these countries apply to three main types of minority groups:

a) Indigenous minorities are described as long-established in their native countries, with a traditional lifestyle considered archaic by contemporary industrial societies. Examples include Samit (Lapps), Australian aboriginal peoples, Maoris and Pacific Islanders, and North American Indians.

b) "Established minorities" are distinguished from the first group by the fact that their lifestyle generally tended to evolve along the same lines as that of the remainder of their national society, though sometimes falling behind in the rate of evolution.
Catalans in Spain, the Acadian French in the U.S. or Canadian Francophones are said to be typical examples for this group.

c) The "New" minorities group includes various kinds of long or short-term residents who have migrated to a new country as immigrants or residential workers.

For example, in North America, especially in the United States, bilingual education research is directed mostly toward recent immigrants and refugees who have come from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Bilingual education in this situation refers to the students' mother tongue or the official language of their families' country of origin and English. In countries such as Canada, Switzerland, and Belgium, bilingual education is concerned with two or more official languages, as well as with languages related to recent immigrants, although the languages of the immigrants are most often referred to as the heritage languages. In most African countries, bilingual education research has mostly dealt with the use and selection of languages for instruction, involving choices among a variety of local languages and a colonial language. Similarly, recent research on education in developing nation states of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific pivot around the historical problem of decolonization.

The Chinese national minorities may bear certain characteristics similar to both the indigenous peoples and the established minorities but more or less fall into a category between the two. Unlike the indigenous minorities, the established minorities, and the new immigrant minorities in other parts of the world, the Chinese national minorities have lived side by side with the Han and among themselves for centuries. During the long course of Chinese history, the imperial courts of each dynasty had referred to the minority people in various terms from "border people", "barbarians", to "savages". They were often looked down upon as uncivilized and inferior to the Han, and sometimes treated as subordinate
units to the Chinese entity and sometimes regarded as threats to central China.

In the 1920s, after the collapse of China's last dynasty, the Qing, Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China (1912-1949), described China as a "republic of five nationalities" (the Han, Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans, and Tatars), providing the first historical step toward recognition of groups other than the Han as citizens within a new concept of China as a nation-state. As for the omission of numerous other ethnic groups, Sun either did not know about them or felt they would disappear as history proceeded. He stated: "We must facilitate the dying out of all names of individual peoples inhabiting China, i.e., Manchus, Tibetans, etc... we must satisfy the demands of all races and unite them in a single cultural and political whole" (quoted by Dreyer, 1976, p.16). Sun's successor, Chiang Kaishek and his Guomindang (GMD) government simply denied the existence of any ethnic minorities, who were regarded as "branches of the Han". Chiang claimed: "... our various clans actually belong ... to the same racial stock (tsung-tsu)... that there are five people designated in China... is not due to differences of race or blood but to religion and geographical environment" (quoted by Dreyer, 1976, p.17).

In 1949, when the Communists defeated the Guomindang army and established the People's Republic of China, they were faced with the task of identifying and labelling the different peoples under their control. The communists made a conscious effort to distance their policies from that of the Guomindang. The communist government first called for registration of ethnic groups other than the Han and received the response of more than 400 groups requesting recognition. Starting from 1953, the government organized a large scale investigation with field research. They concluded that a large number of those who claimed to be separate nationalities were local sub-branches of larger ethnic groups; different groups often belonged to the same nationality but used different names for it. By
1957, 54 ethnic groups were recognized by authorities as independent nationalities; the last group, the Jinuo, was recognized in 1979, giving a total of 55 national minority groups (A Latan, Sun Qing et al., 1989). There were a few clear cases of distinct nationalities like the Tibetans and Uygurs who spoke distinct languages and lived in distinct territories. But there were many more ambiguous cases.

Stalin's definition of nationality was claimed to be the basis for nationality identification, though in reality many recognized groups do not fit Stalin's criteria. According to Stalin's 1913 definition, "a nationality is a historically formed stable community of people on the basis of common language, common territory, common economic life, and a typical mind set manifested in a common culture" (translated from the quote in Liu E & He Run, 1993, p.5). However, Stalin's definition proved as difficult to apply to Chinese circumstances as to the former Soviet Union, where pragmatism and convenience often swept aside theoretical definitions. Many of the recognized minority groups in China fall short of at least one of the four criteria defined by Stalin. For example, there is a lack of common language, as described in Chapter One, among minorities such as the Manchu, the Hui, and most of the She nationalities, all of whom use the Han language for communication in both speaking and writing. Among recognized minorities, there are also groups who speak several totally different languages within the same ethnic group, such as the Yugu, the Jingpo, and the Yao minorities (Sun Hongkai, 1988).

As for common territory, one of the major characteristics of the Chinese national minorities is that most of them live in small clusters among numbers of other nationalities. According to A Latan, Sun Qing et al., (1989) there are three major patterns of geographic location among the Chinese national minorities. First, a nationality may have most of its population in one area but others may be scattered in different areas. For instance, more
than 80% of the Uygur nationality reside in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in northwest China, but some live in Hunan Province in the south. The Zhuang, the Buyi, and the Bai nationalities live in a similar pattern.

The second pattern is that part of a nationality may live concentrated in one area, but large numbers live quite far away and also in clusters. In 1953, about 1.2 million Tibetans resided in Tibet, but 1.5 million others lived in small concentrations in Qinghai and Gansu provinces in northwest China, Sichuan Province in central China, and in Yunnan Province in south China. The Yi and the Mongolians appear in the same pattern.

The third pattern is that a small portion of a nationality live in a concentrated area, while the majority are scattered all over the country. Take the Hui nationality for example: 29% of them live in their autonomous areas in Ningxia and Gansu provinces, while 71% live among all other nationalities throughout China. Living patterns for the Manchu resemble this situation as well. (The only argument by which they might be said to fit into Stalin's "common territory" criterion is that they might originally come from common areas, but their distribution changed with the events of history.)

With the lack of common areas, it is easy to understand the lack of common economic life among certain nationalities. On this point, there have been major differences of opinion among Chinese scholars. Some argued that many minorities were still in the very low stages of social development, and therefore do not have a common economic life (Xiong Xiyuan, 1989).

As for common culture, most officially recognized minorities seem to have a strong common bond in culture. However, in some cases, the cultural gap between Han Chinese and a minority is often no greater than that between Han Chinese of different regions. With
a couple of exceptions, the most obvious distinction between the Han Chinese and such national minorities was that the latter did not use the Han system of writing.

Even though two or three of Stalin's criteria could not apply to quite a number of minority groups, the scholars using his criteria have presented these as exceptional cases. Still, most Chinese scholars agree that Chinese conditions do not easily incorporate Stalin's four categories. A universal definition of nationalities has yet to be found. As one scholar puts it: "In China a consensus has been reached that scientific criteria are not sufficient for a definitive classification of an ethnic group as an independent nationality, that in addition the opinion of the members of such a group carries just as much weight" (Heberer, 1989). The prevailing attitude among Han Chinese is that any groups that do not belong to the majority Han nationality, but live within the borders of China, are minorities. These 55 currently recognized national minorities and their languages are the background reality used for defining the cultural issues in this research.

For the Chinese government, "Han" was promoted as the correct term for the majority nationality in China. "Chinese" would be stretched to encompass all ethnic groups who are citizens of the PRC. Therefore, "Chinese" would not be a precise term for the language of the Han. The language of the Han is officially referred to as Putonghua (the common language) or in English commonly known as Mandarin. Putonghua is one of the seven dialects of the Han Chinese. It covers about one fourth of the territory and two thirds of the Han population in China (Quan Chunji, 1990). The official definition of Putonghua has three components: its phonetics are based on the Beijing phonetic system; its vocabulary is based on the Northern Dialect; and its grammar takes works in contemporary "Baihuawen" (the opposite of the classic Chinese). For this study, all non-Han Chinese citizens are referred to as the Chinese national minorities. Putonghua or Mandarin will be
used as the language of the Han. Languages of all Chinese national minorities will be referred to as minority languages.

2.2 Bilingualism and Bilingual Education

A brief review of research on bilingualism and bilingual education in the world and in China can provide the main dimensions of the problems for this study. Corson (1990) has cautioned that any attempt to define 'bilingualism' would serve little purpose since this term has many implications and is susceptible to many interpretations. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the definition of "bilingualism" and "bilingual education" in the Chinese context.

Most bilingual education research regarding China published in the West has involved a diglossia situation in which bilingual education is limited to the Han nationality whose common language is known to the world as Chinese or Mandarin (Fincher, 1978). The term 'diglossia' was originally used by Ferguson (1959, p.325) to refer to a specific relationship between two or more varieties of the same language (dialects) in use in a speech community in different functions. 'Bilingualism' in this situation refers to the official language, Putonghua and the various dialects which share its writing system. Oral diversity and written uniformity have existed among the Han for centuries. With the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the language policy has clearly encouraged bilingualism for those 300 million Han dialect speakers among a total of 800 million population (Fincher, 1978). It is safe to say that by now most younger dialect speakers also speak Putonghua at least as a second language.

If history has left bilingualism—viewed as diglossia—as a central feature of life for the
Han people, multilingualism is a more realistic description of life for the 90 million ethnic minority members. Except for those who have adopted the Han language, all minorities have their own languages which differ structurally in both oral and written form from those of the overwhelming Han majority, thereby posing particularly interesting theoretical and educational issues.

Bilingualism as an individual's ability to use more than one language (Fishman, 1972) has existed widely in China for centuries, especially among the minority populations. Such a phenomenon was recorded as early as the Spring-Autumn Period (772 B.C. to 481 B.C.) (Dai Qingxia & Zhao Yizhen, 1989). However, "it is important to make an initial distinction between bilingualism as an individual phenomenon and bilingualism as a group or societal possession" (Baker, 1993). Despite the fact that in China bilingualism as an individual phenomenon has been practised by national minorities in one form or another for a long period, bilingualism as an organized social and educational practice and as a research field is relatively recent. In fact, the word "bilingual" or "bilingualism" (shuang yu) is a new term which cannot be found in any of the major modern Chinese dictionaries (Ma Xueling & Dai Qingxia, 1990). It was not until the late 1970s that the modernization movement brought bilingualism and bilingual education research as a government organized endeavour. Therefore, in this study, the focus is on the examination of "state bilingualism" (guojia shuangyu zhi) which means an official bilingual system (Putonghua and minority languages) regulated by the government to achieve its need to establish a common culture and to maintain control. The state language planning activities for the national minorities are clearly a societal possession rather than individual activity. "Bilingual education" therefore refers to the state education policy for the use of a minority mother tongue and the official Putonghua in education in minority schools.
Most current theories on bilingualism and bilingual education are generated from research on the types of minority groups living in sociopolitical contexts different from those in China. Thus western theories based on different types of minorities may or may not apply to the target population in China. One of the intentions of the study, therefore, is to compare findings from the Chinese situation with theoretical conclusions derived from western and other contexts to determine the degree of 'fit'.

Over the years the research field of bilingualism and bilingual education in the world has extended its focus from defining and measuring bilingualism, studying the relationships between bilingualism and intelligence (thinking), to examining bilingualism and society. However, most theorizing has been done on bilingualism and cognitive development especially based on and applied to classroom or school settings.

For example, after a long argument in research to determine the likely positive or negative relationship between bilingualism and thinking processes and products, Cummins (1989, 1991) has outlined three major theoretical principles derived from various research studies in bilingual education and second language learning:

1) The additive bilingual enrichment principle: the term 'additive' refers to the positive relationship of cognitive development to bilingualism. The results of a number of studies (Peal & Lambert, 1962; Ben-Zeev, 1972; Swain & Lapkin, 1991) show that the development of additive bilingual and biliteracy skills entails no negative consequences for children's academic, linguistic or intellectual development. On the contrary, although not conclusive, the evidence points in the direction of subtle metalinguistic, academic and intellectual benefits for bilingual children.

2) The interdependence principle, as stated formally by Cummins (1983): "to the
extent that instruction in (one language) Lx is effective in promoting proficiency in Lx, transfer of this proficiency to (another language) Ly will occur provided there is adequate exposure to Ly (either in school or environment) and adequate motivation to learn Ly". This theoretical statement is also supported by various recent reviews and research studies (Swain & Lapkin, 1991; Hornberger, 1989, 1990; Williams & Snipper, 1990; Lanauze & Snow, 1989).

3) The sufficient communicative interaction principle: this principle is concerned with teaching and learning strategies in second language acquisition. Simply stated, it asserts that to develop first and second language effectively, the learners have to be allowed to make meaningful and appropriate connections and interactions between form and communication functions (Wong-Fillmore, 1986, 1991).

These principles, according to Cummins (1989), appear to have generalizibility, for they have been tested in a wide variety of socio-cultural contexts. Recent bilingual education research in China has shown evidence supporting all the above principles (Chen Xuexun, 1987; Wu lingyun, 1989; Lin Xiangrong, 1990; Ma Xueliang & Dai Qingxia 1990). Most research in China has found the importance of the use of mother tongue in school achievements (details of the research findings are discussed in Chapter Five). But while Cummins' principles have helped bring some minority languages into the school curriculum, they do not focus on the fundamental relationships between bilingualism and the power for social change as reflected in minority language maintenance and loss.

In many cases, in China, minority languages are used in education only as a bridge or walking stick for the purpose of spreading official and majority language--Putonghua, which is expected by the Chinese government eventually to replace the minorities mother tongue. Such goals in education are often "subtractive bilingualism".
The principles summarized by Cummins tend to centre on individual psychological explanation with a focus on language variables such as input-output. The applicability of these principles must be understood in relation to the social class of the subjects used in the research. Rubin (1983) and Lewis (1981) have considered the factors of attitude and motivation which mediate the impact of social factors on learning in bilingual situation. One insight for the proposed study is provided by the observation that

Any policy for language, especially in the system of education, has to take account of the attitude of those likely to be affected. In the long run, no policy will succeed which does not do one of three things: conform to the expressed attitudes of those involved; persuade those who express negative attitudes about the rightness of the policy; or seek to remove the causes of disagreement. (Lewis, 1981, p.262)

However, their research primarily addresses the causal relationship between attitude and achievement. A more crucial issue as reflected in the Chinese experience is that public attitudes are most often influenced by their social environment rather than by policy statements.

By integrating psychological and social variables, Baker (1988, 1993) has explored a wide variety of theories of bilingual development at the personal, social and educational level. His discussion not only provides the basis for a summary of the present state of understanding about bilingualism and bilingual education but has also made a new contribution by pointing out the limitations of earlier research which examined relationships between pairs of variables, such as bilingualism and cognitive development; type of immersion and attainment; and motivation and attitude and school achievement. Baker (1988) has proposed a bilingual education model which consists of four sets of variables (see Figure 2.1).

Through an examination of all four parts of the model, Baker (1988) argues that we
will achieve a better understanding of bilingual education. Like much other research in the area, the limitation of Baker's model is that all the factors and variables identified are focused on the micro-level understanding of the issue, and on improving learning in the school environment.

So far, much world-wide research on bilingual education has been concerned with three major issues framed by Baker (1988):

1. Will children suffer if they become bilingual?
2. Will children suffer from education which uses two languages?

3. Isn't the "right" attitude and motivation, and not compulsion and conformity, vital in becoming bilingual in bilingual education?

These issues illustrate the scope and focus of most research in the area.

The theoretical principles derived from bilingual education research are relevant to the planning of bilingual education in minority contexts in that they help to dispel the myths and confusion about the relationship between first and second language learning. They also help to promote bilingual education as a positive model for the education of linguistic and cultural minorities. However, they dissociate the cognitive aspects of bilingualism from its social and political consequences. While theoretical information of this kind is essential for language planning in bilingualism at the school level, it would be naive to assume theoretical principles alone are sufficient for making decisions leading to successful bilingual education planning. In reality, curriculum decisions are rarely made solely on the basis of research findings. As Heath (1972) makes clear in her study of language policy in Mexico, language decisions are primarily made on political and economic grounds and reflect the values of those in political power. The same can be said about the situation in China. Bilingual education, apart from the purpose of improving learning, is mainly connected to other sociopolitical goals such as the country's modernization and the maintenance of social and political stability.

The search for the relationships between bilingual programs and their social impacts led the research field into studying the types of bilingual education. As early as 1970, Mackey developed a typology of bilingual education detailing 90 different patterns of bilingual schooling. Since then, there have been numerous approaches to categorizing types of bilingual education (Fishman 1976; Otheguy & Otto, 1980; and Baker, 1993). The
intention is to find the aims of the various types of bilingual programs and their impact on the languages involved. Fishman (1976) distinguished two conflicting aims in bilingual education: transitional and maintenance. The former aims at language shift from mother tongue to the majority language and the latter aims to develop the minority mother tongue and to foster their cultural identity. Based on the early research, Baker (1993) adopted a typology portraying ten types of language education (see Table 2.1).

This kind of research shows that behind bilingual education programs are varying and conflicting philosophies of what education is for, rather than merely concerning the use of two languages.

Research on various types of bilingual education programs in China began in the 1980s (Yan Xuejiong, 1985; Zhang Wei & Li Zhengpin, 1989; Zhang Renwei, 1990; Zhou Qingsheng, 1991; Li Xiaoping, 1991; and Fang Shilun, 1992). The first attempt was made by Yan Xuejiong (1985) who classified bilingual education into six types. The major criterion was the geographic location. Another criterion used to identify the types of bilingual education in China was the type of curriculum involved (Zhang Wei, 1987). Based on a critical analysis of earlier works and adapting research done abroad, Zhou Qingsheng (1991) used two criteria to categorize bilingual education practised in China: the "bilingual curriculum" and the "bilingual schooling system". He came up with three major types: the maintenance (baocunxing), the transitional (guoduxing), and "in name only" (quanyixing). More recent research (Yu Huibang, 1995a) states that there are simply two major models: first, minority language is the language of instruction and Putonghua is taught as a subject; second, Putonghua is the language of instruction and the minority mother tongue is taught as a subject (details for above research and the author's opinion will be discussed in later chapters). Although opinions still differ among Chinese scholars, one common
Table 2.1 Baker’s (1993) Typology of Bilingual Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak Forms of Education for Bilingualism</th>
<th>Type of Program</th>
<th>Typical Type of Child</th>
<th>Language of the Classroom</th>
<th>Societal and Educational Aim</th>
<th>Aim in Language Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUBMERSION (Structured Immersion)</td>
<td>Language Minority</td>
<td>Majority Language</td>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>Monolingualism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBMERSION with Withdrawal Classes/Sheltered English</td>
<td>Language Minority</td>
<td>Majority Language with &quot;Pull-out&quot; L2 Lessons</td>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>Monolingualism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEGREGATIONIST</td>
<td>Language Minority</td>
<td>Minority Language</td>
<td>Apartheid</td>
<td>Monolingualism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSITIONAL</td>
<td>Language Minority</td>
<td>Moves from Minority to Majority Language</td>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>Relative Monolingualism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAINSTREAM with Foreign Language Teaching</td>
<td>Language Majority</td>
<td>Majority Language with L2/FL Lessons</td>
<td>Limited Enrichment</td>
<td>Limited Bilingualism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPARATIST</td>
<td>Language Minority</td>
<td>Minority Language</td>
<td>Detachment/autonomy</td>
<td>Limited Bilingualism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strong Forms of Education for Bilingualism and Biliteracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Program</th>
<th>Typical Type of Child</th>
<th>Language of the Classroom</th>
<th>Societal and Educational Aim</th>
<th>Aim in Language Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMMERSION</td>
<td>Language Majority</td>
<td>Bilingual with Initial Emphasis on L2</td>
<td>Pluralism and Enrichment</td>
<td>Bilingualism &amp; Biliteracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAINTENANCE/HERITAGE LANGUAGE</td>
<td>Language Minority</td>
<td>Bilingual with Emphasis on L1</td>
<td>Maintenance, Pluralism and Enrichment</td>
<td>Bilingualism &amp; Biliteracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO-WAY/DUAL LANGUAGE</td>
<td>Mixed Language Minority &amp; Majority</td>
<td>Minority and Majority</td>
<td>Maintenance, Pluralism and Enrichment</td>
<td>Bilingualism &amp; Biliteracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAINSTREAM BILINGUAL</td>
<td>Language Majority</td>
<td>Two Majority Languages</td>
<td>Maintenance, Pluralism and Enrichment</td>
<td>Bilingualism &amp; Biliteracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: L2 = Second Language; L1 = First Language; FL = Foreign Language.

Finding among them is that the types of bilingual education vary from one minority to another due to the great diversity among the national minorities in geographic locations, stages of social economic development, length of the written language history, and social functions of their languages. This study intends to search further for the social context,
political and economic motives, and varying objectives behind the current bilingual education practice in China. This leads one to search beyond the field of bilingual education.

The major weakness in the theories derived from the field of bilingual education research is that in most empirical studies all the variables are examined only to establish a causal relationship between language and successful school achievement. This leads to the neglect of other more important or equally important factors found in language planning research, such as social, historical, economic and political aspects. Paulston (1985) noted that "the major point to understand about language as group behaviour is that language is never the casual factor, never the factor that gives rise to, brings about, causes things to happen, but rather language mirrors social conditions, mirrors man's relationship to man" (p.6). Rubin (1983, p.13) summarizes the argument: "We cannot ask the question: 'all other things being equal, should we teach a student through his native language or through a second/foreign language'. It seems that all things are never equal".

Apart from its limited focus as suggested by the type of questions asked in much bilingual education research, the methods applied to address the issues are also problematic. For example, the questions often concern language and academic achievement in terms of test scores, and the methods do not permit us to learn how bilingual education relates to factors outside the teacher-learner interaction.

The current research on bilingual education in China has similar shortcomings. Most researchers approach the issues from a purely linguistic perspective or apply mainly quantitative research methodology to measure achievement outcomes (Chen Xuexun 1987). The former limits itself to the comparison of the grammatical structure of the two languages, and the latter tries to establish the advantage of bilingual education by test
scores. Desha (1989), a minority researcher, is exceptional in providing a different perspective. He identifies four problems connected with the current bilingual education model in China: 1) It emphasizes integration and assimilation rather than self development. More often than not, Putonghua tends to replace the minority language. 2) Most bilingual programs serve the immediate goals of the learner, because the learning of the majority language is associated with opportunities for higher education, job promotion, and higher economic and social status. 3) The teaching strategies used are not suitable for the minority learners. 4) The value of minority languages in connection with cultural identity and development is ignored. To address these problems the current approaches to bilingual education research in China are obviously not sufficient.

As Ogbu (1983) points out, most bilingual research is not designed to enable us to find out how bilingual education programs are initiated, planned and implemented, how they are perceived by various participants and how they are linked up to local and broader social forces. This study will examine some of these issues in relation to the direction of bilingual education, minority language policy and planning process in the Chinese context.

This study intends to address the following questions:

1. What forms of bilingual education in China are more successful for whom?
2. What are the aims and outcomes of different types of bilingual education in China?
3. Can bilingual schools be the agent for China's minority language planning goals?
4. What are the major impacts of current bilingual education practice on minority languages?
5. Are schools or non-educational factors such as politics, economics, and social status the central or peripheral vehicles for the two goals—majority language spread
and minority language maintenance?

In summary, as the research base for bilingual education grows and becomes increasingly sophisticated, it provides useful information for language development and the improvement of teaching strategies. However, it becomes increasingly clear that bilingual education, in many cases, is an integral part of a larger activity—language planning. It is also clear that any language planning is invariably political in nature as well as linguistic. "Honest planning does not confuse the two" (Paulston 1985, p.39). To understand fully the impact and consequences of bilingual education, we need to look beyond linguistic matters.

2.3 Language Planning

Rubin (1983) explored how a language planning approach may enhance planning for bilingual education. The field of language planning has suggested that the definition of language problems should focus not merely on linguistic phenomena, but also on sociopolitical elements (motivation or rationale) behind the language problems (Jernudd & Das Gupta, 1971; Fishman, 1972, 1980; 1987a; Neustupny, 1983; Haugen, 1983, 1987a; Weinstein, 1987; Cooper, 1989).

Research and theorizing in the field of language planning have revolved around three areas: definitions of language planning, the language planning process, and worldwide case studies in language planning. A close examination of these areas helps to clarify the research questions and to gain insights for the current study.

Language planning as an evolving field has come a long way. It was first introduced after the Second World War as 'language engineering' (Kaplan, 1990), because it was
perceived as a potentially efficient, neutral, scientific mechanism for the determination of answers to questions related to the uses of languages in various societies. It was very much a scholarly activity with emphasis on the planning for change of language forms. After nearly a half century of experience, the term 'language planning' has reached a working definition which is quite different from the assumptions that gave rise to its birth.

Kloss (1969) extended the meaning of language planning beyond planning simply the linguistic forms by providing a distinction between status planning and corpus planning. While corpus planning refers to activities relating to the forms of a language such as coining new terms, creating a new script, or standardizing spelling, status planning focuses on the importance or positions of one language in relation to others such as changes in a language's function, language use, or organization of language resources for a community. The distinction is thus made between language planning about functional allocations of a language and language planning about the language itself. However, the findings of this study confirms Fishman's (1983) view that the distinctions between corpus planning and status planning is clearer in theory than in practice.

Fishman (1972) cautions that those who deal with language in a planning environment must be aware of the presence of many ambivalent factors. Neustupny (1974) offered a different distinction between policy planning and cultivation planning. The former includes the planning of nationalization, standardization, literacy, and orthography and the latter involves planning for correctness, efficiency, and style. The distinction by Neustupny, though with some new terms, can still be categorized within status and corpus planning. Weinstein (1987) sees "language planning" as an organized pursuit of ideological, political, social or economic interests and suggested to add his "interest" perspective to the current definition. However, his theory was challenged by Dua (1987) on the grounds that
clarification and elaboration of these interests need to be further pursued.

Cooper (1989) suggested 'acquisition' planning as a third category in addition to status and corpus planning. He justifies his suggestion on three grounds: (1) language planning and applied linguistics are closely related fields of inquiry; the latter's interest in language teaching should bring language planning to focus on acquisition as well; (2) since language form, function, and acquisition are related to one another, planning of one should consider planning of the others; and, (3) instructional personnel are particularly visible actors in the implementation and formulation of decisions regarding acquisition. Inclusion of acquisition as a focus for language planning research may also serve to remind us of the importance of intermediate and lower level personnel in the attainment of status and corpus planning goals. This study will examine, in the case of Chinese context, if "acquisition planning" stands out as a third category or if it is simply one part of the two well established categories in language planning.

After reviewing 12 major definitions of language planning, Cooper (1989, p.45) proposed a 13th definition which states: "language planning refers to deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with respect to the acquisition, structure, or functional allocation of their language codes". Cooper's definition gives a wider or more flexible approach to the meaning of language planning. It places no restrictions on who the planners are, the type of the target group involved or the form of planning undertaken. Another merit of the definition, Cooper argues, is that it is couched in behavioural rather than problem solving terms.

Ofelia Garcia uses a potent analogy to portray language planning as cultivating a flower garden (Baker, 1993). According to her, in this world we have a language garden full of variety and colour. However, without language planning that is when a garden is
unkept, one species of flower such as English may take over and small minority flowers may be in danger of extinction. To maintain that language variety, four activities in planning are required:

1) adding flowers to the garden,

2) protecting rare flowers,

3) increasing the number of flowers in species in danger of extinction, and

4) controlling flowers that spread quickly and naturally.

As ideal as it sounds like cultivating a beautiful language garden, language planning is not so simple, for different planners have different visions for the garden. The politicians and policy makers who were regarded as language landscape engineers often see the language garden as just one part of a wider control of the environment. The dominant power groups who determine the social, economic and cultural environment may see language as just one element in an overall landscape design—more like a lawn with one variety of grass and no “weeds”. The Chinese experience discussed in later chapters demonstrates a complex approach to language design that tends to reduce variety.

Despite the different perspectives in various definitions, language planning generally means the conscious, deliberate attempt to alter the function and/or status of either a language or linguistic variety. The most salient characteristics of the field are its emphasis on the sociol-cultural context in which planning is taking place, and its future orientation.

Another focus of theorizing in the field is the attempt to generalize about the process or steps of language planning. Haugen's model (1987a) describes four stages of language planning: (1) norm selection, (2) codification, (3) implementation, and (4) elaboration. This model emphasizes the four aspects of language development rather than the social aspects.
Rubin (1971) outlined several steps to the planning process: fact finding; establishing goals, strategies, and outcomes; implementation; and feedback. Rubin's model was later challenged by Bamgbose (1989). After examining some issues as they relate to Rubin's model of language planning, Bamgbose suggests the four elements in the model should be directional rather than hierarchical (see Figure 2.2). Labrie (1993) further improves the model by inserting decision-making as one step or element between policy formulation and implementation. Identifying the three elements of policy formulation, decision making, and implementation is useful in addressing the issues between various levels in a planning process. For example, in China as in some other countries, language education policy formulated at the national level cannot be implemented directly into school programs. Implementation requires that decisions be made at the regional, municipal, or school level, before the implementation process can reach the classroom level.

All these models proposed for describing language planning types, steps, and aims share certain weaknesses. First, elements such as who is engaged in those different
mechanisms of language planning, under what conditions, and by what means, remain obscure. Secondly, these models remain largely descriptive and have not reached a stage of "explanatory adequacy". As Cobarrubias (1983a) points out, neither Kloss's distinction nor Haugen's model, nor a combination of the two, is going to do the job of second language planning theory for the very reason mentioned above. In order to provide explanations, we need well-confirmed hypotheses. Therefore, the search for confirmed, sound hypotheses will be one of the essential goals of theoretical development in language planning. This study seeks to contribute to the data base for much needed theory building by delving into the question of "who does what under which conditions, and for what purposes?".

The term "language planning" (yuyan guihua) was not used in China until the late 1980s when Sun Hongkai (1987) first used it in the title of a paper presented at the International Colloquium on Language Planning, in which he recounts the purpose and main contents of language planning in China. It was merely an introduction and presentation of official policies, activities, and achievements in China's language planning. Although the term "language planning" was adopted in China fairly recently, minority language planning activities have been part of the CPC's political and economic agenda for the past 45 years including the formulation of language policies; the establishment of relevant organizations; the training of cadres and scholars for carrying out linguistic work for minorities; the creation, reform, and popularization of government developed writing systems; the introduction of minority languages for use in education and media; and the identification and recognition of minorities and their languages. There have been scholarly works accounting for various segments of minority language work in China. However, there has not been a systematic study of minority language planning in China. This study intends
to present a more complete and coherent picture of language planning in China, including the motivations, conditions, and objectives behind it and the impact it has had on minority languages and education, and on the Chinese society as a whole. To carry out the research an effective framework is essential.

Based on a consideration of four overlapping frameworks in various disciplines, Cooper (1989, p.98) offered a framework for language planning which outlines a group of related factors rather than specifying steps. It is relevant to this study in that it consists of a series of pertinent questions that have to be asked in language planning. It intends to tell the reader, at minimum, what actors attempted to influence what behaviours, of which people, for what ends, by what means, with what results, under what conditions and through what policy making process (see Table 2.2). The strength of the framework lies in its power to provide both descriptive and explanatory information. The framework is useful as an over-all investigation model to describe and analyse the framework of a China-wide policy as information on the background and context of decisions.

Although the questions or the elements raised by Cooper are relevant and have helped focus this study, this framework cannot fulfil the task of the current study without some adaptation. First, it focuses on the planning process without clearly separating out macro- and micro-levels of policy making. In a country the size of China, with its many layers of complicated power structures, one cannot simplify the situation by assuming that the Centre has absolute control over the communities and schools thousands of miles away from Beijing. Second, Cooper does not provide a framework for considering the relationships involving a variety of actors participating in the planning and implementation of policy at various levels. The interactions and relations among players at each level within the huge Chinese bureaucratic structure play a crucial role in the understanding of
Table 2.2
Cooper's (1989) Accounting Scheme for the Study of Language Planning

| I. | What *actors* (e.g. formal elites, influentials, counter elites, non-elite policy implementers) |
| II. | attempt to influence what *behaviours* |
|     | A. structural (linguistic) properties of planned behaviour (e.g. Homogeneity, similarity) |
|     | B. purposes/functions for which planned behaviour is to be used |
|     | C. desired level of adoption (awareness, evaluation, proficiency, usage) |
| III. | of which *people* |
|     | A. type of target (e.g. Individuals v. Organizations, Primary v. Intermediary) |
|     | B. opportunity of target to learn planned behaviour |
|     | C. incentives of target to learn/use planned behaviour |
|     | D. incentives of target to reject planned behaviour |
| IV. | for what *ends* |
|     | A. overt (language-related behaviours) |
|     | B. latent (non-language-related behaviours, the satisfaction of interests) |
| V. | under what *conditions* |
|     | A. situational (events, transient conditions) |
|     | B. structural |
|     | 1. political |
|     | 2. economic |
|     | 3. social/demographic/ecological |
|     | C. cultural |
|     | 1. regime norms |
|     | 2. cultural norms |
|     | 3. socialization of authorities |
|     | D. environmental (influences from outside the system) |
|     | E. informational (data required for a good decision) |
| VI. | by what *means* (e.g. authority, force, promotion, persuasion) |
| VII. | through what *decision-making process* (decision rules) |
|     | A. formulation of problem/goal |
|     | B. formulation of means |
| VIII. | with what *effect* |
language planning in PRC. Third, it excludes the micro-level community perspectives which is essential to enhance, confirm, and extend the understanding of language issues and develop sociolinguistic theory which will be discussed later.

A review of various case studies in the field of language planning helps to identify and focus research problems and questions. World-wide case studies in language planning reveal the fact that many research activities have centred around the issues of language spread and language maintenance. Language spread refers usually to the growing prevalence of a 'dominant' language, and language maintenance/shift is usually concerned with the reduction in use of non-dominant languages among specified populations.

The study of language spread usually receives support from authorities (governments, foundations) whose influence has grown, or is expected to grow, from the expansion of the language being studied. Quite a number of people have argued for the importance of English as a language of wider communication, whereas others, in the former Soviet Union, have promoted the Russian language as means of access to the world of modern ideas and technology, and a means of control from the centre. Studies in China have focused on the spread of Mandarin as an additional language among non-Han people and mostly on the personal advantages and economic progress brought upon those minority communities which learned Putonghua. Political motivations behind such language spread and its impact on minority language maintenances were hardly ever mentioned. As summarised by Fishman (1987b), the common factor among all of these examples of language spread is that they focus upon contextually more powerful languages whose spread is facilitated precisely by the doors they can open.

Language maintenance studies, on the other hand, which have grown substantially, have focused on the struggle of an endangered language, for instance, studies done in
Peru, New Zealand, Australia and some other nations and regions. Language maintenance studies quite often focus on minority language and education. Minority language maintenance studies in China have focused on two aspects: one is to provide a long list of government efforts in helping those minorities without a written system to create one and the other is to study those minorities which have totally replaced their own languages with Han language such as the Manchu. The former is to demonstrate the Party’s sincerity in making minorities equal partners in socialist nation building and the latter groups of studies are usually arguing for the fact that language shift is a natural phenomenon during the course of history, which have not changed the minorities’ cultural identities. The motivations and objectives of these language planning activities will be discussed in later chapters.

While the bulk of research has focused around either of the two areas, there are few studies which attempt to tackle the relationship or potential conflict between the two objectives, even though this presents a major dilemma in language planning in China as well as in other parts of the world. The basic problem of language planning in China as it concerns national minorities hinges on the relationship between social equality and the interests of the Party and the government, which are controlled by the Han nationality. As mentioned earlier, language planners in China have two major tasks which involve both language spread and language maintenance (Quan Chunji, 1990). This dilemma, although different in many respects from the problems facing language planners in other parts of the world, involves the same essential issues of power, conflict, and integration. Marshall (1991) expresses surprise that there has not been apparent language-related conflict in China and has attributed this absence of conflict to two major sources. The first is the immensity of the Han population and the small size (in percentage terms) of the minorities.
as well as their fragmented location. The second explanation is that the 'nature of the Marxist policy of the state' mitigates against it (Jacob & Beer, 1985). Rather than seeking explanations from language policies and planning, Jacob and Beer (1985, p. 17) came to the following conclusions as explanations for a relatively peaceful situation, at least where languages are concerned:

**China is less a model than it is a particular combination of factors which explain the weakness of the linguistic cleavage there: the vastly unequal nature of the size of the language groups, the centralization of policy and the suppression of dissent in the interest of national mobilization, and historical Marxist opposition to language conflict have all contributed to a linguistic situation in China which ranges from assimilation to benign coexistence.**

There is truth in their explanation. However, "weakness of the linguistic cleavage" should not be used to minimize the impact and significance of language planning in China. In fact, a combination of factors in language planning is worth exploring if one wants to understand the phenomenon in China. For instance, some could argue that the conflict between language spread and language maintenance objectives is not inevitable, provided that one does not assume that one language must replace the other. In this sense, understanding how Chinese language policy makers and planners handle this dilemma may help to deal with other similar situations in the world.

The fact is that language planning in China has begun to catch the attention of the world. However, almost no research done in this field has been published by Chinese scholars. For over 40 years of Communist control, the Party has never allowed any challenge of its policies. It has been established by the Party and the government that its minority language and education policies are for the best interests of the Communist course as well as for the development of the minorities themselves, and therefore, the motivations, goals, and impacts of language planning activities are not a subject for public
scrutiny. As a result, a handful of articles on language planning in China focus only on the activities and achievements of the Party's minority language policies.

To sum up, although the language planning research literature offers few examples of solutions to the potential conflict between language spread and language maintenance in a single society, it does offer some useful perspectives.

So far, in this section we have established that the language policy and planning process for minorities in general needs to be studied further and that some theoretical frameworks and models developed in the field of language planning provide insights and useful tools for this study. They seek to answer questions such as: Why do some languages (or language varieties) displace others among some speakers at some point in time? Or, how can language planning affect the conditions which would lead to the displacement or preservation of one language over another? Both questions are of much interest to this study. However, this study further explores the intricate relationship between language maintenance and language shift within the Chinese context to find out how potential conflicts are dealt with in the planning process. This study examines how, through language planning, the government tried to integrate minorities into the Han culture while trying to avoid conflicts as much as possible. The author will adopt Cooper's accounting scheme for the study of language planning as a guide for part of the study. His framework seems to be especially effective by focusing on major aspects of language planning. The rest of the study will be guided by the framework adapted from combined perspectives from the field of bilingual education, language planning, and policy case studies. The next section will discuss a new perspective through an integration of language planning and bilingual education studies.
2.4 Language Planning and Bilingual Education Studies

One of the major issues identified earlier is the lack of research on the link between micro- and macro-level studies. At each level, there are different theoretical concerns and different foci in terms of principal research questions. For example, macro-level studies of language policy are more concerned with issues such as social structure, social organization, and the social process of language change including analysis of behaviours. The questions at the macro-level are usually concerned with how social contexts or structure are constituted and how and under what circumstance contexts are maintained or changed. On the other hand, the micro-level studies are mostly interested in social interaction or social psychology including the investigation of conversation and direct study of behaviour; the questions asked are often concerned with how location in a social context influences or constrains individual behaviour. As Grimshaw (1987) points out, very little is known, however, about the nature of the relationship between the two levels. This level-relation aspect seems to be quite crucial in understanding a whole process within a multi-levelled government yet has been ignored by most of the studies on either language planning or bilingual education. We need to ask whether the macro somehow determines the micro or is it, rather, constituted by it? The principal question is: what are the mutual implications of answers to these questions and what can we say about the result of interplay or relations across levels?

The research literature in both bilingual education and language planning reveals that studies have focused at either a macro or micro level. For instance, language planning studies are carried out mostly at the national level. They tend to focus on the process of
developing national language policy. Fishman (1987b) sees the two topical concentrations in language planning research – language spread and language maintenance – as generally dealing with quite different macro-level language situations. One problem identified by various studies (Paulston, 1985) is that policy decisions at the national level are primarily made on political and economic grounds and reflect the values of those in political power. But the main site for implementation of any national policy is in schools and classrooms. In many cases, a clearly stated national minority language policy does not guarantee successful language education programs at the school level. This fact is one of the major issues that is explored in the present study.

The relationship between national policies and schooling raise the issue of latent conflict between policies to promote the spread of a dominant language and local attempts to preserve a non-dominant language. This has been a daily reality facing many minority communities in China. Corson (1990) found in many cases of language planning in the world that national attempts are rarely based on a clear understanding of the problem situation in the minority region especially at the school level. On the other hand, large amounts of research on bilingual education are undertaken at a micro level with many of them at school or classroom settings. Micro-level research has mainly been concerned with basic questions that underlie the psychology of bilingualism and bilingual education pedagogy. Since each school reflects its larger social context, any local program not congruent with the national goals would find it difficult to function for a variety of reasons—a lack of funding, political sanctions or even from a mismatch between schooling and the realities of the surrounding social environment. Policy makers dealing with bilingual education need to be clear that their vision is one that fits with the reality of the country and with the desires of the population. This is especially true for those countries like China
which have a central government system that controls the entire education system, yet the local officials are allowed certain room for adaptation. This is an important issue facing many developing nations. For these countries, political stability, economic development and modernization are on the top of the government agendas, and they are likely to direct education, including minority education policies. Unless the goal is assimilation (and subtractive bilingualism), the unique linguistic and cultural background of these minorities and their concerns, aspirations, and needs must be considered. To plan a successful bilingual program, the planner has to understand and consider needs at both national and local levels. Therefore, a focus on the investigation and analysis of the linkage mechanism or the legislative and implementation process in minority language education offers an interesting case study of how closely intertwined language policy formulation and language legislation really are and how the practice of autonomy in minority communities depends, in the ultimate analysis, upon the implementation of certain language policies. These are the issues affecting many linguistic minorities throughout the world.

Rubin's (1983) argument for joining forces between the field of language planning and bilingual education provides a useful perspective to address the issues in level relationships. She stresses the need to consider language problems in their social context. She believes it is necessary for those interested in bilingual education to be clear about the goals, settings, values and attitudes and the functions of language involved, as well as teaching. She has suggested four major groups of variables: goals of bilingual education, the perceived usefulness of learning to read and speak the second language, teacher preparation, and the function of the minority language in the community. The goals and strategy variables can be considered within a language planning approach.

Rubin's effort to connect the two fields is useful in that it attempts to examine the
language teaching and learning variables by using a language planning approach. But her emphasis is on approach rather than on level relationships and is situated mostly in an American context.

As noted above, Cooper's (1989) theories have incorporated the generic concept of "acquisition planning" as a third element along with status and corpus planning. But his approach lacks detail with respect to linkages between broad planning and local implementation such as bilingual education. By contrast, Tollefson (1989) echoes the effort of Rubin and suggests a framework which attempts to depict the impact of language planning on second language acquisition (see Figure 2.3). His framework adds another dimension of concern to the schema of this study. His macro-to-micro approach illustrates a principle of hierarchical administrative operations; plans at one level are "micro" plans and become "macro" at the next lower level, which must then develop its "micro" plan for

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**Figure 2.3**

Tollefson's (1989) Representation of the Role of Language Planning in Second Language Acquisition

- Language situation variables
  - Macro-policy goals
    - Macro-implementation decisions
      - Micro-policy goals
        - Micro-implementation decisions

- Input Variables
- Learner Variables
- Learning Variables
- Learned Variables
implementation. In turn, the micro plan of this level constitutes a macro plan for the next level, which must again be interpreted and adapted into its own "micro" plan. Tollefson's scheme is adaptable in the sense that it clarifies a process, but it no doubt needs to be modified and extended once applied. There are several aspects of his framework that require to be adapted in light of the present study. First, the elements relating the macro-planning to final language acquisition behaviour are not relevant to this study. Instead bilingual education variables are the micro-focus. Second, the framework is hierarchical, top-down, and lacks interaction among the levels. Third, although the framework indicates a relation among macro-micro level influences, no mechanism is developed to analyse the connection, particularly the "bottom-up" interaction where lower levels affect higher levels.

This study attempts to uncover and understand how bilingual education policies for minorities are initiated and formulated at the national level with the interaction from below, how such policies are interpreted into more concrete educational plans at the regional level, and how these bilingual programs are implemented and reacted to within the school and the community. The focus is on how various needs at both the national and local level are accommodated and, theoretically, how the macro-micro levels interact with (restrain or reinforce) each other. Tollefson's framework could be an effective device to make the people involved at different levels in the system aware that they are linked in a chain reaction. However, an analytical framework is needed to examine such reaction and influence among the levels, if the study intends to go beyond description. The field of policy case studies offers a useful perspective.
2.5 Policy Case Studies

Case studies of education policies are the primary means of organizing and analysing the data for this study. Hornberger (1988) suggests that at the centre of an educational policy study is a particular problem which policy seeks to address rather than a particular discipline which seeks to define a problem for study. Educational policy study is a fairly new phenomenon. One can find a number of policy case studies and methodological indications for case studies in general rather than well defined theoretical principles applicable only to education policy. These policy case studies lead one to realize that educational policy may be analysed from a number of points of view: historical, cultural, economic, political, or the combination of any of the above. It could also be studied from a comparative point of view. The ultimate concern of such analysis usually includes an attempt to improve the policy under study.

In this study, the analysis of educational policy will look at the process through which educational language policy is formulated and implemented to serve both the need of the country's economic development and political stability, and the need to effect language and cultural maintenance for minority language groups. A special focus will be, first, on identifying the major factors (sociocultural, political, economical, historical, demographic, etc.) which conditioned, shaped, and determined the minority educational policies and their implementation, and second on the conscious efforts in the planning process, such as the choice of policy decisions and policy instruments, to secure a desired balance between language spread and language maintenance.

Churchill's (1986) framework for analysing policy making process and its impact on minority education provides a unique approach to analysing policy in relation to minority
language education. He examines the process of educational policy making in the OECD countries during the last two decades with respect to the education of linguistic and cultural minorities. His framework addresses the issues of objectives, policy instruments, and educational practice, and their relationships, through the background information provided in studies conducted in OECD countries (see Figure 2.4).

His model of analysis can be adapted to conduct the final analysis of this study. The strength of Churchill's model lies in its coherence for organizing the relationships among the various inputs that affect policy objectives and decisions, the choice of policy instruments, and the resulting impact on educational delivery systems. However, Churchill's analytical framework has been applied mostly in countries of different political and economic backgrounds from that of China. One difficulty with the model, as applied to the Chinese situation, is the distinction drawn between external and internal governance -- the former being defined largely in terms of elected officials to distinguish it from internal governance by appointed officials. The political-administrative distinction is particularly ambiguous in a one-party state administration such as that in China (Churchill, personal communication 1998).

Churchill's model can be adapted and strengthened by adding an important perspective proposed by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), who captured the uniqueness of policy studies in China. After an extensive review of the development of western analysis of Chinese policy processes, Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), both prominent Sinologists in the areas of policy and political studies, summarized past policy analysis into two approaches: the rationality model and the power model. According to them, the first model, also known as the policy approach, tends to analyse the policy processes of how decisions are made and why particular policies are adopted, by focusing on the evaluation of
Figure 2.4
Churchill's (1986) Model of Analysis of Educational Policy Making and Its Impact on Minority Education

National Background
- Literacy & lang. Tradition
- Governance levels
- Administrative tradition

Minority Group Characteristics
- Permanency - Isolation
- Political activity
- Demography

EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
- National
- Sub-national
- Local

Policy Objectives and Instrument Choices

Financial Measures
Regulatory Measures
Organizational Measures

Change to Governance Systems

INTERNAL GOVERNANCE and ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM

Educational Delivery System
- Administrative Framework
- Instructional Provision
- Support & Ancillary Service

EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

Policy Outcomes
policy in particular areas such as agriculture, education, or industry. The power model focuses on the political strife of the elite which produced major policy departures. There are two highly significant differences between the two approaches. First, the rationality model of policy analysis believes the top leaders of China evaluate policy choices in terms of their perceptions of the national interests, while the power model stresses that choices are evaluated in terms of individual or factional interests. Second, the policy analysis tends to neglect the pursuit of and struggle over power as a core interest in politics while the power analysis usually does not dwell in depth on the substantive issues at stake. Both models accept the notion that policy is shaped primarily at the top and that leaders seek a purposeful outcome. While both recognize that the presence of the bureaucratic structure creates and compounds the problems demanding political decisions, neither approach considers the structure of the bureaucracy as a necessary ingredient for understanding typical policy outcomes. Neither approach examines the ways in which bureaucracies alter, bend, or distort the external impulses they channel to the top leaders.

Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) conclude that in the case of China, "scholars to date have tended to neglect the complex structure of the state itself as a significant determinant of the political process and policy outcomes" (p.3) and that such negligence "frequently leads to dubious assumptions about policy process" (p.17). Their perspective emphasizes "the interaction of the elite with the bureaucracies, the relations within and among bureaucracies, and the role of bureaucracies in policy process" (p.11). Their efforts advance our understanding one step further by placing Chinese politics more firmly in its bureaucratic setting and exploring how state structure affects the policy process and elite struggles over power and principle. Both Churchill (1986) and Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) recognized the issues of decision making and problem solving in complex
organizations, but the latter have paid particular attention to the issues of elites and bureaucracies in the Chinese setting. Their added perspective is extremely useful in analysing and understanding the macro/micro relations which seem to be underemphasized in analytical frameworks of language planning and policy process such as that of Tollefson (1989).

As mentioned earlier, a few studies by western scholars on minority issues in China attempt to explain a complicated phenomenon in China by simply assuming an absolute centralized control by the party and the army. On the one hand, they fail to explain sources of conflict, and on the other hand, they are unable to explain political change or the dynamics of the system. It is necessary, therefore, to incorporate the added bureaucratic perspective into the analytical framework for the current study with the expectation that it will better explain certain processes unique to a country like China. However, since the current study focuses on minority language planning and education policy, not on a comprehensive study of political history, Churchill's more focused model of *Analysis of Education Policy Making and Its Impact on Minority Education* remains the major analytical framework, integrated with the perspective of Lieberthal and Oksenberg in analysing how the bureaucratic structure of the state, policy process, and outcome are interrelated in contemporary China.

The use of Churchill's framework with the added perspective of bureaucratic structure can help address the following policy and planning issues:

1. What are the major factors that affect the objectives, the development, and the implementation of language education policy for minorities in China?
2. What types of policy instrument are chosen by authorities and what impact does the choice have on educational practice?
(3) What are the different models used in the delivery system to organize bilingual education in terms of curriculum, resources, methods and administration?

(4) How do the elements of objectives, policy instruments, and educational practice relate to each other? What connection, if any, does their relationship have to the current absence of overt language conflict in China?

2.6 Research Framework and Research Questions

In the broadest sense, this study is concerned with how language education for minorities is planned and implemented in China. Research from fields reviewed above emphasizes that bilingual programs at the school level are best understood within a broader social context. A major purpose of the study is to achieve an understanding of present practice of minority language planning and education in China, including its planning processes at various levels and their interactions, to identify factors as well as actors involved in the policy and planning process, and to clarify alternatives for policy makers for the further development of a bilingual education program that is responsive both to the urgent need of the country's modernization and to the actual needs and aspirations of the minority learners in a multilingual environment.

Such purpose can be achieved through an investigation into the problems of formulating and implementing bilingual education policy for Chinese national minorities. This study attempts to describe and interpret a process, and a relationship, by which one element influences another. It is also comparative in nature, for it compares the goals and decisions to their interpretation at various levels by different stakeholders.

So far it is clear that no single satisfactory framework appears to exist in the
literature to serve as a theoretical and methodological framework for such an investigation as to be undertaken in this study. The research process seems to be most effectively organized through a unified framework adapted from the above reviewed literature.

In the field of bilingual education, the context variables suggested in Baker's model and attitude variables emphasized by Lewis for the purpose of understanding are relevant to the study. In language planning, Cooper's framework for facts gathering at national and local levels can be used as effective tools to organize the data collection. Rubin and Tollefson's connecting framework and the variables which are ignored by bilingual education will be integrated into the study. Finally, in the field of policy case studies, Churchill's analytical framework and Lieberthal and Oksenberg's perspectives will serve as a mechanism for specifying the domain of education to which language planning decisions might apply. Each domain/topic can be the object of decisions at any of the administrative levels under study. Thus "objectives" of the school may be set at a central, regional, municipal, or even school level, depending upon the educational system being studied. The degree to which each level allows decision-making at lower levels on any of the domains is a prime measure of allowable autonomy.

Based on all the above input, a comprehensive framework emerged to achieve the goals of this study (see Figure 2.5). Such a framework helps to guide the research process and clarify and focus the related research questions. Therefore the present research was organized into three phases with specific research questions attached to each of the phases. The first phase involved the development of the research proposal in which the major research problems were identified as follows:

(1) How are minority language and education policies formulated and implemented at the national, regional, and the school levels?
Figure 2.5 Framework for the Study

Churchill's Analytical Framework:
- Policy Goals
- Policy Instruments
  --- legal, regulatory, administrative order
  --- resource allocation
  --- organization: structure, personnel, rewards
- Education Practice

&

Lieberthal & Oksenberg's perspective on policy analysis

National Policy Goals
Macro-implementation decisions: Choice of Instruments

Regional Policy Goals
Sub-macro-implementation decision: Choice of Instruments

Local (prefecture&county) Policies
Micro-implementation decisions

School-level implementation:
Management and teaching practices
(2) What are the major factors that direct and affect the planning process in China, and how do they interact with one another?

(3) How are potential policy conflicts managed or perhaps avoided through careful planning or non-planning?

These broad issues lead to the second phase of the study: data collection. The process of data collection involves three levels. Each has its own set of research questions. At the national level the investigation focused on the following issues:

(1) What are the policies (explicit and implicit) and the policy changes, on minority language and education in China since 1949, and what is the relationship between these policies and the nation's general policy on language and education?

(2) What are the general goals (overt and covert) of these policies and practices, including both the societal and the educational goals? How have these goals evolved in the recent past?

(3) How are these policies formulated? What rationale and what range of latitude is given to lower level decision makers for implementation and adaptation to regional and local circumstances?

(4) Who are the participants in the process? What factors and conditions affect their decisions?

Investigation at the regional/provincial level centred around the following questions:

(1) How are the policies interpreted and adapted at the regional level?

(2) How are the decisions made in light of the local situation, by whom and with what considerations?

(3) How are the policy decisions at this level reflected in the concrete programs?

(4) How are conflicts resolved or sustained?
Investigation at the levels below the region, such as prefectures, counties, municipalities and schools, focused on the language programs implemented at the school level and the impact on and reaction from the affected population. Research questions at this level include:

1. What are the present forms of bilingual programs, including types, curriculum, teacher training and resource materials?

2. What are the reactions, perspectives and attitudes of the participants such as local officials, school principals, teachers, parents and students?

3. What are the impacts of the programs within the schools and the community?

4. More specifically, how do participants perceive the role of the school as an agent both for goals of national unity and economic development, and for the students' academic achievement and cultural identity?

Data gathered at these levels lead to the third phase of the study: i.e., data analysis and the presentation and interpretation of the findings. The intensive analysis addresses the following issues:

1. What were the major historical and contextual factors that affected the objectives, the development, and the implementation of language education policy for minorities in China as it existed during the period of data gathering?

2. What types of policy instruments were chosen by authorities and what impact has the choice had on educational practice?

3. What were the different models used in the delivery system to organize bilingual education in terms of curriculum, resource, methods and administration?

4. How do the elements of objectives, policy instruments, and educational practice relate to each other, and what connection, if any, do they have to the current absence of
overt language conflict in China?

It is also the intention of the author to draw implications for theory building in the field of bilingual education, language planning, policy studies as well as for future research in China.
CHAPTER THREE
DESIGN OF THE STUDY

This chapter outlines how the study was designed. After a review of the methodology of the qualitative case study, the discussion defines the parameters of the cases under study and the research sites selected. The next section describes the role of the investigator and the data collection techniques employed. Finally, a plan is presented for analysing and presenting the case study data.

3.1 Case Study: An Overview of Research Methodology

The nature of the issues and questions dictated that the qualitative case study would be the most appropriate design for the research. In the decision to select this design, the following elements were taken into account: the nature and purpose of the research questions, the amount of control on the part of the researcher, the desired end product, the unit of study, and the uniqueness of the situation.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the research questions are directed by the attempt to discover and understand the minority language education policy and planning process in China. The interest of the study lies in discovering, describing, and interpreting phenomena related to defining and implementing language education policy rather than investigating narrow cause-and-effect relationships of a limited number of variables. The study of large organizations does not lend itself to simple quantitative techniques, which
cannot provide a true picture of the issues being researched. Understanding is most likely to be achieved through an in-depth investigation of a wide range of interrelated factors. Since the study seeks to include as widely and accurately as possible the variables and major factors, which determine not only the policies themselves but also the process and mechanism of such decision making, there is very little potential for the researcher to isolate certain variables and to measure the relationships among them. The variables likely to be studied or discovered in such a study are extremely complicated. They cover a wide range of issues, from the overt as well as covert goals of the government to the values and attitudes of the population affected by the policy. In this case, a non-qualitative approach would be highly ineffective.

As for the desired end product, the aim of the study is to contribute to the knowledge of minority language policy and planning by providing a holistic description and interpretation of such phenomena in the Chinese context, since very little research has been published about the Chinese experience. Although intensive description alone would form a data base for further comparison and theory building, this study intends to go beyond description by using the descriptive data to develop conceptual categories, to illustrate, support, and challenge theoretical assumptions held prior to the data gathering.

The final reason for using a qualitative case study design is that, although the study includes numerous locations, events, participants, and phases of a process, they are subsumed under a unit of analysis or a case. Moreover, minority language planning within the Chinese context constitutes, of course, a unique case. The main issue of generalizability of findings concerns whether the processes identified are more generally applicable to the language education of other minority nationalities in China. The extent of
generalizability will be returned to in the discussion of the findings.

3.2 Defining the Case and Selecting the Research Sites

The case selected for study is an examination of the minority language policy and planning process in China with a focus on language policy making agencies in the Centre and bilingual schooling in specified minority areas. The case selected for this study is not just an individual, a program, an institution, an event or a social group. It is a combination of all of these within the Chinese context. It is a process involving numerous organizations and individuals at various levels. It can be visualized in terms of a unit of analysis or "bounding problems" (Guba & Lincoln, 1981) or "bounded system" (Smith, 1978).

The major criterion for the selection of research sites is whether they are likely to be relevant for studying the research problems. Accessibility is another practical concern. Based on the above criteria, three locations--Beijing, Xinjiang, and Gansu--were chosen as suitable field research sites, since these places parallel the levels of the policy process being studied (see figure 3.1).

Beijing, the capital city of China, where most important policies are made and documents stored, and where the experts reside, was chosen as the only suitable place to conduct an investigation into policy formulation and implementation at the national level. A number of key institutes and offices are located in the city: for example, the Central Institute of the Nationalities (CIN), the Nationalities Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (NRICASS), and the Minority Education Office of the Education Commission. The three agencies which administer minority language
planning are also located in Beijing: the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, (planning), the State Education Commission (school texts and experimentation), and the Ministry of Culture (experimental popularization and social and cultural courses).

Data at the regional/provincial level of policy formulation and implementation were obtained in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and in Gansu Province, the two adjacent remote northwestern areas with large minority populations (see Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2 Map of Xinjiang
Although Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is the focus of the regional level studies, research done in Gansu was valuable in that it, on one hand, serves as a point of comparison between policies made in a province and in an autonomous region, and on the other hand, gives a wider sample of the data. For example, the major minority under study in Gansu Province is Tibetan while the three minority groups involved in Xinjiang are Uygur, Kazak, and Xibo. Another reason for including Gansu as a research location was that the two leading institutions in minority research and in hosting minority students are there: the Northwest Normal University and the Northwest Nationality Institute, the former being one of the participating institutions in the Canada/China Educational Exchange program. While I was in Gansu, I visited government offices and minority schools at three levels: Lanzhou, the capital city of the province, Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Xiahe County and Sangke Tibetan village (Figure 3.3). Data obtained in Gansu are not separately reported in this thesis. Rather the focus remains on Xinjiang at the local level, and relevant information and insights were used by the researcher to discuss (1) central policy and planning processes and (2) the mode of operation of Chinese bureaucracies. Therefore, data collected in Gansu serves as a point of comparison and triangulation.

Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, one of five such minority regions in China, was selected for the following reasons: (1) it shares characteristics of other autonomous regions in China in terms of minority demographic formations, cultural and linguistic diversity, social and economic situation, and bureaucratic structures; (2) according to Chinese researchers, its bilingual education programs are the most developed in China; and (3) it was also accessible in terms of data collection since both the Xinjiang University and the Regional
Figure 3.3 Map of Gansu

Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture
Education Commission supported the research by arranging interviews and providing accommodation and transportation for the author.

The micro-level (below the regional level) research sites were at several locations within Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture, located in the northwest part of the Xinjiang region, where the major Kazak nationality coexists with several other nationalities, was used as a level to study policy processes and bilingual situations. It also served as a linkage between the regional policy-making level and the county implementation level. Schools in Chabucha’er Xibo Autonomous County which are located within the Ili Prefecture were selected as the site to explore policy implementation as well as language relations. Schools with bilingual programs were visited in Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang, and in the town centre of Chabucha’er Xibo Autonomous County (see Figure 3.4).

Thus a relatively complete picture can be presented by following the thread of policy and planning from the very top level in Beijing to the remote village schools thousands of kilometres away.

3.3 Data Collection Techniques

Once the research sites were selected, the next concern was how best to obtain the information needed to address the research problems. As discussed earlier, one of the major strengths of the case study is the opportunity to use multiple methods of data collection. Interviewing, non-participant observation, and documentary review are the three major techniques employed in the data collecting process.
3.3.1 Interviewing

The reason for interviewing is that it "is the best way, perhaps the only way to find out what is in or on someone else's mind" (Patton, 1980, p.96). What is on the minds of those who participate in minority language education policy making and planning, as well as the reactions and attitudes of those individuals affected by the policies, are a major source of information needed for understanding the phenomenon under study. To obtain that information, the following issues need to be considered: who will be interviewed and
for what purpose; what questions will be asked; how should questions be asked; and how will information be recorded?

For the purpose of this study, different types of information are needed at different administrative/organizational levels; at each level, different types of informants are needed. For example, at the national/central level, officials, administrators, and researchers at various government and educational institutions were the ideal informants. At the regional or provincial level, the officials, administrators, researchers, and members of minority groups helped to sort out the issues and to connect the level above and several levels below. At prefecture, county, village and the school levels, local administrators, scholars, parents, respected elders, school principals, teachers and pupils were the major sources of information.

There were three major channels through which the desired informants were identified and reached. First, through the researcher's personal contacts, several persons with an interest in minority education agreed to assist in the project. Secondly, the initial informants acted as referrals for others. Institutional contacts are a third and very important channel of data gathering in China. The researcher was fortunately able to be part of a research exchange project between Canada and China funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The researcher received assistance from the participating universities in this exchange program in China. Through this exchange, potential informants who were considered knowledgeable in the field were reached.

Once the informants were contacted, several issues were considered before the interviews. Four of the five concerns outlined by Taylor and Bogdan (1984, p. 87-88) seem to be highly relevant. First, the interviewer's motives, intentions and the inquiry's purpose
were presented to the informants. Confidentiality was promised and the means to be used to protect the informants such as whether to record or not, and whether to use real names or pseudonyms were discussed. Finally, the logistics with regard to time, place, and number of interviews were scheduled, but remained flexible in order to suit the needs of the participants.

Of all the issues to be considered, the key to good interviewing is to ask the right questions, for questions are at the heart of the interview. In this study, interviews were semi-structured, open-ended and conversational, because the purpose of the interviews was as much to access the perspective of the person being interviewed as to obtain specific factual data. Indeed, on many factual issues, the responses should be entirely predictable in terms of what the interviewee thought was the "correct" official thing to say; but the unofficial contextual cues from the conversation were often crucial as a means for interpreting organizational roles, processes and decisions. Although the interview was not an oral form of questionnaire, the key questions and the points were carefully thought out and prepared. For example, it has to be taken into consideration to what extent the western concept of administration, interpretation, and implementation correlate with the Chinese informants' understanding of their roles. The questions were kept clear by using familiar, neutral language. They were also sensitive to the feelings of the informants. It was indicated to the informants that they have something important to contribute (see Appendix I for sample questions).

All of the data from interviewing were recorded in two ways depending on the nature of the situation: note-taking during the interview and note-making after the interview. Field research conditions ruled out the use of tape or cassette recorders in connection with
topics perceived as sensitive by interviewees.

3.3.2 Observation

There were several issues to consider before the technique of observation could be effectively used for the purposes of this study. Given the nature of this study, three major purposes were served by this technique. First, observation enabled the researcher to view the working context and use her own knowledge and expertise for interpretation. Secondly, it was an alternative for obtaining information on topics people did not feel free to discuss. In some instances, people talked under certain practical and psychological constraints, especially on the question of the impact of the national policy at the school level and the reactions and attitudes of the community towards bilingual programs. For example, people in policy-making positions at the national and regional level perceive the reaction and attitude and impact of their decision through reports made by lower level administrators, including teachers and school officials. Such reports might be based on test scores or even formulated to satisfy the expectation of the higher officials. Through careful observation, the investigator might obtain physical evidence of the 'real' reaction and attitude through observing the reaction and interaction among participants in daily social settings as well as in a school context. Thirdly, data collected through observation can also be used as an angle to confirm or examine data gathered through other means. This technique is recommend strongly by Guba and Lincoln (1981, p.213) for a similar purpose: "In a situation where motives, attitudes, beliefs, and values direct much, if not most of human activities, the most sophisticated instrumentation we possess is still the careful observer—
the human being who can watch, listen... question, probe, and fully analyse or organize his
direct experience".

In this study, observational data included the general functions and use of both the
official language and the minority language and the attitudes towards them. Observation
was conducted at each level, especially in school settings, to gather information on how
policies are, or are not, implemented into a bilingual program, the various models of
bilingual programs offered by schools, the impact the school program has on the minority
students and their community, and the attitudes of parents, teachers, school officials and
the students. Understanding was achieved through observing the way the latter groups
interacted and participated in the program, their behaviour in and outside the classroom
and the setting they were in, and the apparent impact on their daily lives.

For the purposes of this study, the following list was the starting point for
systematizing observation at the local level:

1. The setting: What is the physical environment? What is the context? What kind
   of language behaviour does the setting encourage, permit, discourage or prevent?
2. The participants: What is the make up of the ethnicity in the school, and what are
   the students' sociocultural backgrounds?
3. Activities and interactions: What is going on? Which people go to which type of
   bilingual program using what textbooks? What is the verbal and non-verbal
   interaction among students and school staff in and outside the classroom?
4. Other subtle factors identified during the course of the study.

The investigator in this case assumed the role of "observer as non-participant"
(Merriam, 1988) which means the major task of the investigator is observation with
minimum participation as differentiated from many other roles an investigator can assume.

Observations and the investigator's reaction to them were recorded in the form of a field journal or diary.

3.3.3 Documentary Review

Locating and analyzing relevant documents was a crucial way to obtain certain information for the study, especially in the case of China, where the details of the decision making process were very often kept in classified documents away from the general public. This quasi-secrecy is a means of power and control. The documents reviewed for the study comprise a broad range of materials, and some of them are the only source which addresses the issues under study.

At the national level, materials such as archives, constitutions and relevant laws, government reports and directives, conference reports, regulations and written policies, scholarly journals, and memoranda were the most dependable sources for data. Published and un-published research materials relevant to the issues were another source for review. Similar types of documents at the regional level and below were reviewed in addition to the local history, newspapers, pamphlets, and publications, as well as the reports and records of meetings. At the school level, textbooks, curriculum guidelines, students' achievement reports and some of their work were all used as sources of data.

On the whole, documentary review was an essential source of information as well as a means to obtain information which could not be gathered through interview and observation. All three techniques formed a means for triangulation. During the field study,
the researcher was able to examine and sometimes take copies of various documents that, at present, are not available through sources such as libraries or publicly-accessible archives.

3.4 Analyzing and Presenting the Findings

The next concern after the data gathering process was to analyze and present the findings. This does not suggest a linear relationship between the two processes. Data analysis was perceived in this study as an ongoing process and as an activity simultaneous with data collection. In fact, "analysis begins with the first interview, the first observation, the first document read" (Merriam, 1988, p.119). This way the emerging insights, hunches, and tentative hypotheses help to refine and reformulate the research questions, which in turn lead to the next phase of data collection. This means that as soon as the data were collected, they were categorized and coded or commented on as an initial analysis. After the initial process of data collection and ongoing analysis at any site was completed, the intensive analysis began. However, during the stage of data analysis, new data were constantly needed, which sent the author back to the data collecting stage again and again. The intensive analysis was carried through with the help of the analytical framework developed earlier. The questions that shaped the inquiry are addressed in the following chapters. For detailed information on the data collection activities in China, please see Appendix II: Report On The Research Trip To China.
3.5 Summary

Applying a combination of research techniques of documentary review, intensive interviews and personal observations, the author carried out field research in Beijing, Xinjiang, and Gansu where a number of case studies were conducted and reported in the following chapters:

--Chapter 4:
  a. minority language policies within a framework of macro political change
  b. bureaucratic structures and organs with their associated roles in general language planning

--Chapter 5:
  a. language research as a source for rationales used as an input to decision making
  b. studies of Yi and Dai language reforms to demonstrate how country-wide planning works

--Chapter 6:
  a. reform and implementation of Uygur and Kazak scripts
  b. bilingual education in relation to language maintenance and spread in Ily Kazak Prefecture
  c. bilingual education in Chabucha’er Xibo Autonomous County

The examination and analysis of these cases bring about a clear picture of minority language planning and policy in China as a whole process.
4.1 Introduction

The focus of the study is on the process of minority language planning and language policy in China. It has been established earlier in the literature review that language planning and policy issues can best be understood in the context from which they have evolved.

This chapter will first provide the necessary background for data analysis by identifying and examining major factors which shape and condition policy decisions at the national level and at various historical moments. These factors include the characteristics of China's national minorities, the Communist ideologies on ethnicity and ethnic languages, deeply rooted Chinese traditions in nationality relations, and the political and economic agenda of the Party. This combination of elements will provide a context for the minority language and education policies and their many changes in contemporary China. It will also help to illuminate the strategic goals behind policy decisions and the impact of macro political changes on minority language policy development.

Following the analysis of these factors, the discussion will focus on the key players and participants who have been conditioned and limited by the above factors, but who have also manipulated the factors to achieve certain political goals. The players or major participants in the policy and planning process include individuals such as top leaders, minority sector leaders and language experts. The roles and the relationships of the
players are either enhanced or limited by their positions within the multi-levelled bureaucratic structure. Therefore, it is important to identify and describe the relevant government bureaucratic organs and agencies and their roles in minority language planning. Thus the dynamic of the policy making process can be seen.

Finally comes a further exploration of the process of policy and planning, including the methods and mechanism of communication and interaction among relevant players at various levels, to determine how each minority language policy was initiated, justified, and enforced. Several cases studies are presented in Chapters Five and Six to illustrate various methods and mechanism employed in the policy and planning process.

This chapter will provide the context in which answers can be given to such questions of language planning as: for whom? by whom? under what conditions? to achieve what purposes? through what means? The findings and conclusions reached in this chapter were derived from the interviews with the government officials and language scholars as well as from analysis of the government documents, and research publications.

4.2. Chinese National Minorities and Policy Concerns

The unique characteristics and strategic geographic positions of national minorities in China make their political and economic importance outweigh their absolute numbers. Their sociocultural, political and economic conditions affect policy decisions in a subtle but sometimes powerful way. The complexity of their linguistic situations poses a great challenge for policy, planning, and practice in language and education. This section will explore these conditions and their relevance to China's efforts to achieve national
modernization, including political stability, national security, and economic development. The linguistic backgrounds will be examined within the larger context to help comprehend the complexity, the urgency, and sensitivity of developing minority language and education policy in modern China.

4.2.1. Geographic Characteristics of the National Minorities and Their Influence On China's Sociopolitical Stability

As mentioned earlier, the national minorities, though they are eight percent of the population, occupy 64% of China's total land area, including 90% of the country's border regions (Postiglione, 1992). More than twenty minority groups have some members in China and some members in neighbouring countries (Xie Qihuang & Sun Ruoqiong, 1991). Three new republics created out of the demise of the former Soviet Union in late 1991 — Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan and Tajikistan — share not only borders with China's minorities' territory but also share the same religions and languages with the corresponding ethnic groups living there such as Kazaks, Uygurs, Kirghizs, and Tajiks. In many other cases, too, the borders as presently demarcated divide a minority group between two or more countries. There are, for example, the Shan people in Thailand and Burma as well as in China, and Mongols in Russia, China, and the Mongolian People's Republic (Dreyer, 1976).

Throughout history the minority regions have had a strategic effect in China's national security. Since the Communist state was founded in 1949, it has had four serious military border confrontations—with Korea, India, Vietnam, and the former Soviet Union. Its borders with almost every one of its neighbours remain in dispute (Rod Mickleburgh, The
Globe and Mail, February 12, 1997). The Chinese government is naturally concerned about separatist influences from across the borders. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe have shown the continuing power of ethnic identity and has no doubt caused major concerns on the part of the Chinese government over its policies towards the national minorities.

Global changes and their impact on China can not be ignored when analysing current policy regarding minorities. Developing language and education policies for these minorities can be a very sensitive issue, having a direct bearing on China's national security and political stability.

Keeping the minority members relatively content also serves a propaganda purpose. A satisfied minority population would send messages across the borders that the Chinese socialist system has proven to be superior to other political systems.

4.2.2. National Minorities and China's Economic Development

China characterizes itself as a country with an immense population, a vast land area, and rich natural resources. A more accurate description was provided succinctly by Mao Zedong in his speech (1956) at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC (the speech was later published in Mao Zedong, 1977, p. 295):

We say China is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and large in population; as a matter of fact, it is the Han nationality whose population is large and the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose resources are rich, or at least in all probability their resources under the soil are rich.

The vast land areas which national minorities inhabit happen to store most of China's
natural resources, such as water, forests, minerals, precious medicinal plants, and pasture land (Ma Ying, 1985).

The current strides of China towards modernization and economic development depend on the tapping of the resources under the soil of these minority regions and, to do this, both good relations with the nationalities and the education of skilled local workers are crucial. Mao Zedong alerted his colleagues and the Party of this situation as early as 1956 in his speech titled "On the Ten Major Relationships" (Published later in Mao Zedong, 1977, p. 296):

> The air in the atmosphere, the forests on the earth and the riches under the soil are all important factors needed for the building of socialism, but no material factor can be exploited and utilized without the human factor. We must foster good relations between the Han nationality and the minority nationalities and strengthen the unity of all the nationalities in the common endeavour to build our great socialist motherland.

This analysis still holds true for present day China. A large number of educated local human resources are needed for the government to profit from these untapped natural resources. The advancement of education for the minority population is necessary for the government to reach its goals in economic development.

Apart from their natural resources, the minority regions contribute significantly to other aspects of China's economic development. Since most of the minorities reside in the border regions, they not only promote China's international influence in politics but also are a great asset for cross-border or open border trade. Also, the unique cultures of various national minorities, including their picturesque costumes and colourful way of life, draw a large income for China's tourist industry.

In addition, the relatively sparsely populated minority areas are seen by the
government as having the potential to absorb migrants from the increasingly overcrowded Han areas.

Education and language (the major tool in education) became, therefore, one of the major focuses of minority policies for the current government. To keep a balance between the Party's political agenda and minority aspirations is the keystone of the minority policy. Such a balance cannot be achieved simply by coercion nor can it be realized by the sheer presentation of a larger population as suggested by some western observers. In education, the need for such balance is reflected in the dilemma of spreading the Han language (Putonghua) in the whole education system while at the same time maintaining the minorities' mother tongues. The development of a minority language and education policy which addresses the dilemma is further complicated by the complex and diversified composition of Chinese national minorities, especially their languages. As described in Chapter One, the 90 million minority people have vastly diversified languages and cultures, and the complexity of the patterns of their language use has been posing special challenges for language education policy makers.

This section has demonstrated that the minorities' social, demographic, and economic characteristics are no doubt factors which have influenced the Party's policies toward them, all within the context of the government's effort to keep all minority regions under central control. Linguistic diversity has made language education policy and planning an extremely challenging task. But though the minority situation causes considerable concerns for the policy makers, the CPC has not allowed these concerns to dictate its policy. Other elements, such as Communist ideology, deeply rooted Chinese traditions, and ultimately the Communist agenda all contribute heavily to the current minority and
language policies. These elements have led in the past four decades to major reversals of policy, and each reversal of policy has claimed to have a rationale at least partly based on economics and partly rooted in the Marxist foundations of party policy.

4.3. Theoretical Foundations of CPC's Policy Towards the National Minorities and Their Languages

When Mao Zedong and his colleagues formed the CPC on July 1, 1921, Mao had the ambition of eventually taking control of all the people within the Chinese borders. With practically no knowledge of the people who are now labelled minorities or the areas in which they live, Mao turned to his communist mentors Marx, Lenin and Stalin to find theoretical bases for policies on minorities. Ever since then national minority policy has been an element in the matrix of Chinese Communist policy, a constantly evolving synthesis of ideology and real political concerns. Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist, and Maoist theories on ethnicity and ethnic languages provide a theoretical foundation to which all policies are made to conform, even if only in theory. Zhang Chih-i, a veteran and a senior officer in charge of nationality work, once said "Marxist-Leninist theory on the nationality questions must be studied by Party members, for only thus can they equip themselves with the 'ideological weapons' they needed in order to carry out the Party's policy towards the national minorities" (Moseley, 1966, p.4). It has been repeatedly stressed by the minority sector leaders that "Marxist and Maoist theories on nationalities are the guiding light for solving nationalities problems in China" (Sai Fuding 1994, p.1).

Before discussing the Marxist and Maoist ideologies on nationalities, it is necessary first of all to clarify a few terms which are fundamental to the ideologies concerned. The
two most-used terms that are central to the analysis of the issues are "nationality questions" (minzu wenti) and "nationalities work" (minzu gongzuo). The first term is sometimes translated as "nationality problems", or "national minority questions". As has been pointed out, "the Chinese draw no distinction between people (minzu), nation (minzu), nationality (minzu), and ethnos (minzu)" (Heberer, 1989, p.11). For example, when Sun Yat-sen formed the republic, he asserted that, in contrast to the situation in other countries, the term "state" and "nation" meant the same thing in China, because all non-Han races should be kept within the state by all means and be urged to merge themselves with the Han (Dreyer, 1976). Mao Zedong, although he recognized the different ethnic groups in China, has held similar dreams to that of Sun Yat-sen, for building a unified nation state. As a result any issues and problems regarding national minorities are referred to as "nationality questions" (minzu wenti) and any efforts towards dealing with these issues or problems became known as "nationality work" (minzu gongzuo). "Nationalities work" means in theory the application of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist theory to specific nationality problems. To achieve a better understanding of the CPC's minority policy, it is necessary to trace the sources of its Marxist-Leninist theoretical framework.

For Karl Marx, the term "nationality" is a category that took shape in the rise of capitalist society, and "language and ethnicity movements are no more than mere by-products of a more basic economic cause, phantoms manipulated by leading capitalist circles in order to fragment and weaken the international proletariat" (Fishman, 1989, p.14). But according to Lenin, "nationality is a historical category" (translated from the quote by Xiong Xiyuan, 1989, p.28) and therefore, are expected eventually to "disappear" when communist society comes into existence; the final disappearance of all nationalities is
inevitably determined by the natural law of social development. Stalin held the same belief and said that "nationality is the same as any other historical phenomenon in that it is ruled by the law of change. It has its beginning as well as its end" (translated from the quote by Xiong Xiyuan, 1989, p.28). Lenin and Stalin’s ideology is said to be developed from that of Marx. In fact, Marx did not explicitly say that all nations and nationalities would disappear completely, but his comments are open for interpretation. *The Communist Manifesto* says only that "the supremacy of the proletariat will cause national differences and antagonisms between peoples to vanish ‘still faster’ than they had been under capitalism" (quoted by Dreyer, 1976, p.44). However, all of them emphasized that this process of nationality coming into being, developing and eventually ceasing to exist cannot be sped up. Lenin once said: "the difference (including languages) between various nationalities will exist for a long period even when the proletariat takes power in the world" (quote by Liu E. & He Run, 1993, p.20). Mao showed firm consensus by further describing the process as having several stages and said in 1958 that "the class system will go first, then the state, and finally the nations" (quoted by Peng Yingming, 1995, p.51). In essence the theory says that a homogeneous society would come about automatically with increasing levels of socialism and communism. It can also be inferred from the Party's minority policies that in Mao's mind the targeted ideal homogeneous communist society will emerge by integrating the national minorities into the Han culture. Mao's ambition was to solve the nationalities problems in China by eventually integrating them into the Han mainstream culture including language. An instilled common ideology was a major means to achieve his goals.

The Communist ideology on minority languages, recognized as an important component of ethnicity, follows a similar line. The belief is that language is a social
phenomenon and therefore, like social development, it has its own natural law of
development. Minority languages change and develop on one hand and on the other hand are relatively stable. Like ethnicity, they will eventually be replaced or assimilated by the common language of the world, which will happen over a long period. However, for the time being, during the socialist period (the pre-communist period), minority languages will continue to develop before the final stage of assimilation arrives. With confidence in the superiority of the Han culture including the language, and with belief in Marx's social development theory, the Party seems to see the development and even the flourishing of minority characteristics, including the languages, as a necessary and temporary stage before their final integration. Therefore the following three basic principles stated by the Chinese Marxists can be found in all major policies regarding minority languages:

1. All languages are equal.
2. All nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own languages.
3. All nationalities should be encouraged to learn each other's language on the basis of their free will.

With these policy statements, the Chinese Communists proudly announced that they had broken away from the exploitation, oppression, and assimilation of the national minorities which had been practised throughout China's history. Instead, the Communist ideology offered the best solution for China's nationality problems. The way to implement such ideology was to provide nationality equality and self-government in the form of National Regional Autonomy for the minorities. We will now have a closer look at the 'National Regional Autonomy' which was boasted of as the creative way for the CPC to solve the nationality problems in China.
The Chinese version of National Regional Autonomy was adapted from the former Soviet model. At the time when Mao's young party was set to take over China, it needed desperately to unite all peoples within the country to fight against the Japanese and the Nationalist Party, the Guomindang (GMD), which was in power from 1912-1949 established by Sun Yet-sen and then led by Chiang Kaishek. But the young party had very little knowledge about how to approach those people who spoke different languages and lived a different cultural life. Shortly after the CPC was founded in 1921, it adopted the original form of the Soviet model federation without any modification. The minorities were promised self-determination and autonomy with the right to secede or federate as was the theory in the former Soviet Union. In November, 1931, a draft equivalent to the Constitution was agreed upon granting... "the right to self-determination of the national minorities in China, to completely separate from China, and to form an independent state for each national minority" (quoted by Peng Yingming. 1995, p.15). It also stated that the Party must encourage the development of the national cultures and the national languages of these people. This policy attracted many minority elites to join or sympathize with the Communist course, because they saw a total difference from the GMD's policy of forced assimilation.

However, seven years later, in November 1938, while everything else remained the same, such as the minorities language policy (minority people "not only must not be forced to study the Han language and script, they must be encouraged to develop their own languages, cultures, and education"), the regional autonomy policy was changed. The formerly promised self-determination and the right to be independent disappeared. Instead, all would be given the right to administer their own affairs while at the same time
establishing a unified state together with the Han (Peng Yingming, 1995, p.15). This change was justified as a creative policy which fit the 'concrete' situation in China. This difference from the Soviet model has been claimed as one of the CPC's important contributions to Marxist theory on nationalities. The right to autonomy within a unified state has since remained the CPC's minority policy and was specified first in "the Programme for Regional National Autonomy" promulgated in 1953, and then in the "Law of National Regional Autonomy" enacted in 1984.

In all cases of language planning and policy, these ideologies were clearly stated in the form of theory and principle. The policy sounds satisfying and appealing for the country's minority population and no doubt contributed to the political stability of the country. But in practice, the situation was far from ideal. The ideology has been used as a theoretical base for policy formulation and served largely for propaganda purposes. Other factors form the major driving force behind the policy decisions. One of them is the deeply rooted Han tradition, which has had a significant influence on the top Party leaders who are Han Chinese as well as Communists.

4.4. The Power and Influence of Imperial Tradition In Nationality Relations

Western observers often fail to realize that the challenge of understanding modern China and its future lies in the understanding of the influence of its thousands of years of imperial tradition which still weighs heavily on present policies, governmental structures, ideology, and social relationships. History has shown that, of the many rulers who conquered China, none changed China, but rather they were themselves changed.
Therefore it is important to find out the enduring force that made China stay relatively unchanged regardless of numerous political upheavals. "In China more than in any other country a knowledge of the past is essential for understanding the present" (Salisbury, 1992, p.1). This section will examine the past in hopes of illuminating present and future policy and practice.

All historical statements and recorded documents seem to lead to the conclusion that Communist policy is largely shaped by a combination of Communist ideology and the Chinese reality. But before going on to analyse these realities, there is a subtle but powerful element which cannot be ignored, which has influenced the attitudes of many top Chinese leaders who claim to be communist but are, first of all, Han Chinese. Their thoughts are largely shaped by their cultural roots and traditions. Their values and visions for the country, including the way of governing, and their attitude towards national minorities, have been strongly influenced by traditional Chinese ideology handed down over centuries.

Mao Zedong, for example, was noted for his attraction to, and keen knowledge of, Chinese history. It is well known in China that in his youth he spent eight years in the library of Peking University (the forerunner of Beijing University) burying himself in books on Chinese philosophy and history. Two books were said to have lain on Mao's bed throughout his long rule, dynastic works of great distinction, studied and annotated by emperors, statesmen and scholars for hundreds of years. One was *the Records of the Historian* (shi ji) which covered the period from the semi-mythical Yellow Emperor, China's founding father, to the Han Dynasty a hundred years before Christ. The other, *General Mirror for the Aid of Government* (zi zhi tong jian) covered thirteen hundred years of history.
and was compiled in the eleventh century. It was designed as a practical handbook for the emperor, telling him how his predecessors had handled difficult questions. Both books were well-thumbed by Mao, who regarded them as a vital guide in running the vast country he had inherited (Murray, 1994). Mao's attitude towards minorities, which represents that of the Party, is partly that of a Han Chinese and partly that of a Communist, and a synthesis of the two has also been the constant objective of the Communist Party of China with respect to nationality problems. After all, Mao maintained at all times that Marxist-Leninist theory should be applied creatively to the specific conditions in China (Moseley, 1966). But much as Mao liked to proclaim himself a rebel against the old society, he was a product of that same society.

An examination of the imperial nationality policy, its controlling ideology, its organization for ruling and its relation to society will illuminate not only the underpinning of the persistent goal of 'integration' in minority policy but also the methods and mechanisms applied to carry that policy through.

Throughout recorded Chinese history every effort has been made by various rulers to amalgamate China's minorities or border people with the dominant Han group. The methods employed to achieve this have ranged from tolerance to forced assimilation.

The various minority policies adopted by different ruling empires over the past five thousand years of Chinese history bear the following characteristics (summarized and translated from Zhang Youjun & Xu Jieshun, 1992 and from interviews by the author with Chinese historians majoring in history of minority policies, 1993):

1. Expansion (Kai Jiang Kuo Tu): Almost all emperors in power fought for more land for the empire. In a sense the minority policy reflected the process of the expansion of
2. Appeasement (Fu Na Zhengce): This policy had been used in various forms to stabilize newly conquered lands and to strengthen control of the people, for example, granting official titles to minority elites, forming marital relationships, reducing taxes, respecting minority culture and languages by setting up translation offices.

3. Amalgamation (Minzu Ronghe): A series of policies were set to bring about migration and mixed living of different nationalities, to promote interaction and communication among them, and to encourage inter-ethnic marriages. This policy sometimes resulted in the formation of a new group from several previously distinct ethnic groups which eventually lost their own characteristics.

4. Assimilation (Tonghua Zhengce): This policy which was practised to different degrees by almost all rulers, included the forcing of minorities to live among the Han Chinese and to adopt Han culture and language. From dynasty to dynasty, the Han nationality grew through the resulting snowball effect into the largest nationality in China as well as in the world.

5. Diversification (Butong Zhengce): Because of the large number of minorities and their different stages of social and economic development, different policies and laws were created to manage minority affairs. Even though central control has been the way of governing in China, policies for its minorities have shown variation rather than uniformity.

6. Self governing (Jimi Zhengce): For quite a few emperors, such as those in the Qin, Han, South, Tang, Song, Yuan, and Ming Dynasties, the popular policy towards minorities was "yi yi zhi yi", meaning allow minorities some autonomy and self government. Apart from belonging to the Chinese empire politically, and paying a small tribute, the
minorities' original social organizations were undisturbed, their elites granted the power to rule in their own way, and their internal affairs not interfered with.

Under all the above policies has been the determination of all rulers to keep China both large and under central control. Regardless of the means or policies adopted, the rulers who were able to control the largest areas and their residents are consistently recorded in Chinese history as 'wise' or 'great rulers'. The Yuan Dynasty (ruled by the Mongols) is noted for building up a great empire with a territory comparable to that of any dynasty in Chinese history. The Qing dynasty, even though ruled by the Manchus, a non-Han nation, was recorded as having a succession of extraordinarily brilliant emperors, Kangxi (1661-1722), Yongzheng (1723-1736), and Qianlong (1736-1796), who over more than a century not only consolidated the area their predecessors had acquired but continually expanded that area. And the minority policies and methods of all these rulers have been applied in great depth today. The ultimate policy goal was and is to keep the land and achieve control of all peoples living on it. The claimed policy of the Manchu rulers towards other nationalities, for example, was coined into a slogan: "We do not discriminate against either Moslems or Chinese, but we do discriminate against people who are evil" (Chu, Wen-Djang, 1966), the evil ones, obviously, being those who in any way interfered with the interest of the Manchu Government. The strategy of control was to keep a delicate balance of power between various nationalities so the Manchu could rule them all. One of the methods used to keep such a fine balance was to transfer a number of different nationalities including Chinese, Mongols, as well as Manchus, from central China to the northwest frontiers (details will be discussed in Chapter Six).

The influence of these policy traditions was clearly manifested in major policies
forming a firm tradition for the CPC's policy of National Regional Autonomy, which thus can hardly be viewed as creative or original. The condition for "diversity" is "uniformity" as has been always stated at the beginning of all important laws in Communist China: China is a unified multi-nationality state. Any attempt or perceived attempt of separation is not tolerated.

This influence has resulted in a different policy from that of the former Soviet Union and has been manifest in many Communist policies towards national minorities. However, all these inherited strategies in handling minorities were only tools to serve the ever changing political agenda of the CPC.

4.5. Minority Language Policies and Practice as Footnotes to Political Upheavals in PRC

A close examination of the swings in policies makes one realize that although Communist ideology and basic policy statements have remained relatively consistent over the past 45 years, the practical treatment of the national minorities and their languages has resembled a wild roller-coaster ride from pluralism to extreme assimilation, with stops in between. Foremost, all the changes were caused by changes in the Party's political agendas. The nature of the nationality problem changes as the Party changes its focus or political goals. For example, during the earlier period (1949-1958) the minorities' support and loyalty were much sought after by the newly empowered CPC. Therefore, a very progressive, pluralistic policy was widely practised. From 1958-1978, during the 20 years of political movements including the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural Revolution", the minorities were viewed as not fully civilized, and more trouble than they were worth.
The struggle to assimilate them was labelled a class struggle. Finally, in 1978, when all political movements were taken over by the new modernization movement, economic development was placed at the top of the agenda for the Party, the most recent policy towards minority languages changed again to a more tolerant and less assimilationist direction. All changes in language policies together with the above discussed factors will be clarified further in the next chapter through the detailed examination of minority language policy making process during three historical periods (1949-present).


The four factors identified above (minorities' strategic positions, Communist ideology, long-lasting imperial traditions, and ever-changing Communist agendas) have been the major forces behind Communist minority policy. They can be used to understand current policy and policy changes. However, to come to grips with how the policies are initiated and the process through which they were made, one must understand the communist power structure and the interplay among each of the organizations at various policy levels. Both the theory of language planning (Tollefson, 1989) and policy case studies (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988) emphasize the need to connect macro-social structure to the micro-social decisions of everyday life, and suggest the complex structure of the state itself as a significant determinant of the political process and policy outcomes. In China, where social systems are built according to a distinct set of values, political principles and official ideologies, to remember the historical and political identity of the system and to see the forces currently struggling within it are crucial to the analysis of
policy making. Not only are the structure and the personnel in the structure strongly influenced by the imperial tradition, but the method of communication and negotiation for policy consensus and implementation also have roots over 2000 years deep.

This section is devoted to mapping out two major elements in policy making in China: first, the players or participants involved in the minority language policy and planning process, including their stakes and influences and how they performed in the process; and second, the bureaucratic structure of the government, especially the pertinent agencies at the national level, including their functions, and the interplay occurring among them.

Since the bureaucratic structure and process in China is itself a major field of study, here the focus is only to present a network of minority language sections at the national level and each level below.

4.6.1. The Individuals as Participants in Policy Decisions

Three groups or levels of individuals are the major participants in the policy making and implementation process: the top political leaders, the minority sector leaders, and the language experts and linguists. An understanding of their functions in the policy process will lead to a clearer picture of language planning in China.

4.6.1.1 The Top Leaders

Rule by absolute power of an individual or a group of individuals has long been the
Chinese tradition. Anyone who has lived his or her life in China knows that the country has been led by powerful individuals at the very top of the Chinese political system. They are the ones who decide not only which ideologies to follow but also at what moment to change them. This tradition has certainly been practiced to the fullest by the Communist Party. "Hundreds of men have borne the title of emperor in China's long history. Few have exercised more power, personal and political, than Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping" (Salisbury, 1992, p.1).

The top leaders like Mao and Deng have decided what ideology to follow in minority policy and what was expected of the national minorities themselves. The top leaders also selected the personnel to lead the work in the minority areas. For the past 45 years, the three most influential top leaders who had been responsible for minority policy directions and the changes were Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai (the Premier of the State Council from 1949 to the year he died in 1976), and Deng Xiaoping.

### 4.6.1.2 Leaders in Minority Sectors

The vision and wills of the top leaders were entrusted to people who not only shared their belief in the Communist course but were very often blessed with knowledge and experience in dealing with nationality issues. To appeal to the strong sense of minority aspirations, well-respected minority elites who have demonstrated loyalty and sympathy to the Communist cause have been rewarded with important administrative positions, as was the practice in the imperial tradition.

Li Weihan, a Han and a close friend of Mao, was appointed Head of the United
Front Work Department (UFWD) in 1944 and continued to hold the position after 1949. His responsibilities focused on the minority issues. During the political campaigns in 1964, he was criticised as bowing down to the reactionary minority elite and as having severely harmed the Party's cause (The State Nationalities Affairs Commission & the CPC Document Research Office, 1990).

There have also been cases where well known scholars who were perceived as firm believers of Communism and have contributed significantly to the Party's cause were given important leadership positions. For example, Fei Xiaotong, a sociologist as well as an ethnologist and a graduate of London University with a Ph.D, has held positions as the deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress and Deputy Chairman of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission as well as the Deputy Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

Another group of minority sector leaders consists of minority elites who were either trained or accepted by the Party and who have also enjoyed popularity among their own ethnic groups. For example, Yang Jingren and Liu Geping (both Hui), Ulanfu (Mongol), Sai Fuding (Uygur), Apei Awangjimei (Tibetan) and Wu Jinghua (Zhuang) have all held powerful positions in the Communist government.

The author was fortunate to have met with Mr. Wu Jinghua (currently Chairman of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission) during field research in Beijing. The author has also visited the home of Mr. Yang Jingren, who was not well at the time, and therefore the visit was with his wife and daughter. These leaders have been heavily involved in general policies for national minorities, and sometimes even in minority languages policy. However, actual work in minority language planning, education, preservation, and development falls...
into the hands of language experts and scholars whose research sometimes has had a profound input in policy arguments, especially in the field of minority languages. The knowledge and research findings of these experts have, many times, brought them into administrative positions which allowed them to participate in the policy making process.

4.6.1.3 The Prominent Experts and Scholars in Minority Languages Research.

When the Communists came to power in 1949, there were very few scholars in China who had specialized in the field of minority languages. Very little was known about how many nationalities there were in the country, let alone their languages. A few language scholars who had majored in Han language, together with a few western-trained scholars who came back to China hoping to lend their expertise to the new country, were all China had at the time. They were depended upon to carry out the research work needed in minority language planning. Very often they were given some leadership positions which, on the one hand, helped to strengthen the image of the Party—in that its policy was based on research—and on the other hand, were seen as rewards for those serving the party faithfully.

In current publications (Zhao Nasitu & Li Hengpu, 1989) 179 linguists, mostly born during the 1930s -- including eleven who have since passed away-- are listed as experts in the field of minority languages. Almost all of them are at a level of associate professor or equivalent and at least half of them are of Han nationality. Among them, many have made important contributions to the discovery and description of minority languages, including many which were before unknown to the outside world. Others have focused on
translation and on compiling dictionaries and reference books on minority languages. A few particularly noticeable scholars have been involved with, and have influenced, the development of minority language policy, by training large numbers of younger researchers, by presenting important data to inform policy makers, or by acting as administrators and leaders of research and policy-making institutes. Examples of these language experts and their contributions follow.

Luo Changpei (1899-1958) who received some training in U.S. universities, including Yale, returned to China in 1948 and was immediately appointed a member of the CPPCC in 1949. He was also appointed director of the Language Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (LICAS) when it was established in 1950.

Fu Maoji (1911-1988), received his doctoral degree from Cambridge University, England, in 1950 and returned to China at the end of the same year. He was immediately put in charge of minority language research under the Language Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the most prestigious research organization at the time. He devoted over fifty years to research in minority languages and sociolinguistics. He taught and trained many researchers. Under his name there are seven books and 65 research articles including "Language Comparison and Design of Written Scripts" (1952) and "The Issues of Creating and Reforming Minority Written Languages in China" (1979) which have contributed directly to the design, reform and working procedures of minority languages.

In 1979, in the first issue of the Journal of Nationality Languages, Fu Maoji stressed the importance of doing research in the following ten areas, which indicate his vision of minority language research in China (the following is a translation):

1. the current language situation in China,
2. the areas of creation and reform of written forms of minority languages,
3. the use and development of those minority languages which are without written forms,
4. language standardization,
5. dictionary compiling and lexicography,
6. the issues in translation between the Han language and the minority languages,
7. comparison and contrast of various language types,
8. historical comparisons,
9. ancient languages and literature, and
10. poems and rhythms of the minorities.

Fu Maoji’s contribution to the theory of minority language studies, and his vision of future minority language development still have a profound influence on policy and practice in the field.

Ma Xueliang (1913-present) has been noted for his research on minority language and literature and for his training of hundreds of new researchers. He has published nine books and more than fifty essays regarding minority languages. He was a 1938 graduate of the Chinese Language Department of Peking University (Beijing University). When the Central Institute of Nationalities (CIN) was formed, he was appointed professor and head of its language department. Currently he is in the leading position of many minority language-related organizations. To name a few posts, he is chairman of the Chinese Minority Bilingual Education Research Association (CMBERA), deputy chairman of the Chinese Minority Language Association (CMLA), and research fellow of the Nationality Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (NRICASS).
Wang Jun (1922-present) has worked in the field for over 40 years. His area of research focuses on the investigation and study of minority languages. Under his name four books have been published, fifty-three essays written and five works translated, all concerning minority languages. He has worked as a professor and research fellow in the Central Institute of Nationalities (CIN) (1952-54), and in the Research Institute of Minority Languages of the Academy of Sciences (RIMLAS) (1956-84). He has held numerous positions including Deputy Director of the State Language and Script Commission (SLSC) (1984), Chief editor of the Journal of Language Construction, and Deputy Director of the Chinese Minority Language Research Association.

Although these scholars do not have the power to alter the Communist agenda (of course many of them are firm believers), they have developed research results and linguistic evidence which informed the policy makers, and they have been the major carriers of that policy. They can be regarded as the backbone of minority language work. They have not only advanced the field by leading the research and training the young language workers, but have also actively participated in the making of specific language policies and the preservation of minority languages.

4.6.2. Pertinent Government Organs at the Central Level

China has developed the largest bureaucracy in the history of the world. The system is largely a combination of the Soviet model and its own imperial past. Mao Zedong and his colleagues set up such a strong national system that it ensured that the leaders in Beijing could govern the entire population, some of it located thousands of miles away.
The government of China is organized in two distinct sections, the Party (see Figure 4.1) and the Government (see Figure 4.2), with the military as part of the Party organization. As far as policy making is concerned, there is a unified chain of command with the Party having direct and total control of both the government and the military, both of which are merely tools to achieve goals set out by the Party. The top leaders usually hold several key positions in both the Party and the government decision-making bodies including the Politburo of the CPC, the Secretariat of the CPC, the Standing Committee of the State Council and the Military Affairs Commission. The system runs parallel through each level of administration: the national level (centred in Beijing), the provinces (including autonomous regions), the prefecture, and the county. The centre exercises its control over the country through its thirty-three provincial-level governments which include: twenty-three provinces, five autonomous regions (Xizang Tibetan, Xinjiang Uygur, Ningxia Hui, Guangxi Zhuang, and Inner Mongolia), four major cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjing, and Chongqing), and most recently Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). The provincial-level units possess only those powers delegated to them by the Centre. The next level down are the autonomous prefectures for the minority areas and districts and cities for the rest of the country. The counties are the next level to follow. Just as in the governance of the country throughout the dynasties, there are four layers in structure in the Han areas: the national (zhongyang), the provinces (sheng); the counties (xian); and the cities (shi). The fundamental system for the minority areas is regional national autonomy which means that the national minorities, under a unified central leadership, practise regional autonomy in areas where they live in concentrated communities, and
organs of self-government are set up for the exercise of the power that autonomy brings. The system is parallel to that of the Han areas. Under the umbrella of the national level leadership, their recognized governance or autonomy status falls into three administrative levels: autonomous regions (zizhiqiu) at the provincial level; autonomous prefectures (zizhizhou) at the level of municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the
provincial/regional government; and autonomous counties (zizhixian) at the level of the county (which is referred to as 'banner' in the case of Inner Mongolia) (see Figure 4.3). The autonomous areas are established where certain minority group live in concentrated communities. By the end of 1994, a total of 157 autonomous areas had been established including five autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures and 122 autonomous
Figure 4.3 Structure of Administrative Division of China

Adapted from Editorial Board of Education Atlas of China (1995)
counties (banners) (see Appendix III) (Wu Shimin, 1995). It is not a self-contained clear-cut system but rather it mingles with the Han system. This will be discussed in detail later when regional level policy and planning are dealt with. For now the focus is on the centre or the national level, for in most cases the system duplicates itself at the various levels below. The remainder of this chapter will focus on minority related sectors at the national level, while Chapter Six will deal with all three levels below.

The main organs set up at the Central level that directly deal with minority issues are under the leadership of the Party via the United Front Work Department of the Party Central Committee and the government headed by the State Council (see Figure 4.4). We will examine the roles of the following organs because of their strategic importance in policy decisions regarding minority languages and education.

1. The United Front Work Department (UFWD)

As a department of the Party Central Committee, the UFWD is the most direct link between the CPC leadership and the national minorities (Moseley, 1966, p.2). It is in charge of the relations with non-Communist groups in China. It was first set up in 1944 and since then has been responsible for shaping the broad outlines of policy in minority areas in accordance with the Party line. The groups with which the Department is specifically called upon to carry out its “united front” activities include, in addition to leaders of the national minorities, members of democratic parties, religious leaders, non-Communist intellectuals and so forth.

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Figure 4.4 The Administration of Minorities Work in China

Adapted from the pamphlet of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission
2. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

The CPPCC is a public organization through which the CPC operates in its united-front work. It enacted the Common Program (the equivalent of the Constitution) on September 29, 1949 and also set up the State Council (formerly known as the Government Administrative Council).

It is the organization of the Chinese people's patriotic united front, and an important institution for multi-party cooperation and political consultation by the CPC.

3. The Nationality Committee of National People's Congress (NCNPC)

This body is under the National People's Congress, which is theoretically the highest organ of state power (Postiglione, 1992, p.312) and the equivalent in government to the Party Congress in the Party. The Nationality Committee is chiefly responsible for working out enactments concerning national minority problems and deliberating on the acceptability of autonomy regulations and specific proposals submitted by the autonomous areas, and submitting these to the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee for approval before they go into effect. During the field research the opportunity arose to meet with the deputy directors of NCNPC and several committee members in their office located at the Great Hall of the People in Tian'anmen Square. After the formal meeting, several interviews took place out of the office and the author has since kept in touch with some members throughout the data analysis in Canada (for details see Appendix II).

The State Council, the highest administrative organ in the country, is responsible for a number of ministries and commissions.
4. The State Nationality Affairs Commission (SNAC)

The SNAC is a functional department under the State Council, the SNAC at the central level was formally constituted on October 19, 1949. The role of the SNAC is to supervise and inspect the carrying out of national policy in national minority regions. Like most commissions and ministries, SNAC has its own nationwide vertical bureaucratic hierarchies with offices at each subordinate territorial level of administration.

The SNAC is the government's major organ responsible for minority affairs. It has considerable powers. The major tasks of the SNAC include (based on introduction material given by the SNAC):

1. Formulate policies and enact decrees on ethnic issues, undertake publicity and education work, and supervise the implementation of the ethnic policies and laws.
2. Give guidance and supervise the setting up of the Regional Autonomy for minority nationalities and the enforcement of Law On Regional National Autonomy for minority nationalities.
3. Coordinate the relationship between different ethnic groups and handle the affairs of protecting the ethnic minorities' various rights.
4. Participate in the drawing up of the long and middle term plan of the national economy and the social development in the minority areas.
5. Research the ethnic theory and the ethnic policy. Organize and coordinate the comprehensive survey of ethnic minorities across China.
6. Participate in the study and formulation of the guideline and policies towards promoting the development of education, culture, science and technology, public
health and sports in the minority areas. Administer colleges and universities for ethnic minorities as well as cultural organizations subordinated to the State Nationalities Affairs Commission.

7. Manage the work concerning ethnic languages and collection of ethnic classic works. Give guidance to the edition, translation, and publishing work of the ethnic languages.

8. Coordinate administrative and personnel department in training, educating and promoting officials and keep close contact with them.

9. Do research on ethnic groups in the world and carry out publicity work abroad of the ethnic minorities.

10. Give guidance to ethnic work organs at the provincial level and keep close contact with various autonomous regions.

11. Take on other work assigned directly by the State Council.

On the central government level, broad guidelines from the UFWD and CPPCC are sent to the SNAC, which has responsibility for implementing them. Major pronouncements on minority affairs are drawn up by this Commission, then approved and promulgated by the State Council. The SNAC is then charged with implementing them. The thing to be noted is that all minority sector organizations are usually under the double or triple leadership of the Party, the government and the organizations in charge of minority work. The minority language agencies are usually under the supervision of all of the above.

Apart from a formal meeting with the then deputy director of the Commission, the author has also visited and conducted interviews with officials in the Commission’s Education Department (for details see Appendix II).
5. The State Education Commission (SEC)

Although the State Education Commission (formerly the Ministry of Education) is not directly linked with minority sectors, its policies have a profound influence on minority schools. It also has a minority education department dealing with minority education issues. Several minority higher education institutions are also under the control of SEC (see Table 4.1).

6. The State Language and Script Commission (SLSC)

Formerly known as the Chinese Written Language Reform Commission (before 1985), the State Language and Script Commission (SLSC) is under the direct leadership of the State Council. Its major mandate includes: implementing the state policies and laws on languages and scripts; regulating the use of the standardized language; and work on the written language reform. The focus of the work by SLSC is on the Han language. However, one of its major tasks which is to spread Putonghua dictates that it has to work closely with language and education agencies located in minority regions.

7. Research institutions at the national level

The major research institutes for minority language work at the national level include the Nationalities Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (NRICASS) and various national minority institutes.

a. The NRICASS

The NRICASS was first established in 1958 and in 1962 it merged with the former
Table 4.1 Organization of the State Education Commission

Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the SEC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Affairs Office</th>
<th>Bureau of Planning</th>
<th>Bureau of Foreign Affairs</th>
<th>Department of Student Affairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Department of Higher Education (Social Science Education Research Centre)</td>
<td>Policy Research office (National Educational Development and Policy Research Centre)</td>
<td>Bureau of Science and Technology (Science and Technology Information and Resources Centre)</td>
<td>Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (Secondary School Curriculum Research Centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Department of Higher Education</td>
<td>Department of Teacher Education</td>
<td>Department of Physical Education</td>
<td>Department of Vocational Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Department of Higher Education</td>
<td>Department of Education for Minority Nationalities</td>
<td>Department of Graduate Studies</td>
<td>Bureau for the Affairs of Retired Cadres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Centre for the SEC</td>
<td>National Educational Testing Centre</td>
<td>Office for World Bank Loan Affairs</td>
<td>Department of General Supplies and Construction</td>
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Minority Language Research Institute (established in 1956). The mandate of the 208 persons institution is to conduct research in the following areas: Marx's nationality theories, CPC's nationalities policies, nationality relations, laws on nationalities, issues such as social, historical, cultural, economic, and language of each nationality groups, and nationality issues abroad. It also offers Master and Ph.D degrees in these fields. It consists of 13 research offices, one research centre and seven research associations (see Figure 4.5).

b. The Central Institute of Nationalities (CIN)
The Central Institute of Nationalities in Beijing (CIN) is placed under the joint responsibility of both SNAC and SEC. It was first established in June, 11, 1951 (Ye Yu, 1992). It is one of the "key" universities in China. Its Language Faculty has been largely responsible for training minority language workers and cadres. Its faculty of languages was first set up in 1952 and was divided in 1964 into two departments: Chinese language and literature, and minority language and literature. Since 1986 the latter has operated its own Institute of Minority Language Research.

The CIN has branches in the Northwest, Southwest, and Central-South. There are other similar institutes situated in regions with minority populations, these institutions being usually under the jurisdiction of the provincial governments. During the field research, the author has visited the CIN as well as the Northwest Nationalities Institute and interviewed a number of professors and Tibetan graduate students (for detail see Appendix II).

These research institutes are part of the government organizations. Since the early 1980s there has also been a growth of organizations involved mainly in research, which are considered as non-government organizations.
4.6.3 The Dynamics of Policy Making

The Chinese Party and government structures, and the major actors within these structures can be described in detail. But how decisions are made remains a mystery to the outside world as well as the general public in China. Restrictions on the dissemination of information in China have made the analysis of its policy decision-making a very challenging task. As long-time Western scholars on policy making in China have observed:
Pre-decision discussions and decision making meetings of the Politburo are not televised except on ceremonial occasions. Political leaders and decision making members do not give interviews about the differences of opinion that arise in their discussions. The diffusion process through written documents are secret, absence of more specific information. (Lieberthal, 1995)

All political systems have communication networks that transmit classified, confidential information, and the distribution of knowledge in any society is unequal. But the Chinese system is unusual -- perhaps unique -- for the formal elaboration and extensiveness of the covert network and for the intricate relationship between the overt and covert networks. (Oksenberg, 1974, p.1)

The data analysis for this study showed the characteristics of the decision making-processes in minority language and education which, with a few exceptions, largely confirm the analysis made by the scholars mentioned above. These processes have been categorized under three headings: (1) mass political campaigns; (2) conference/meeting system; and (3) the documentary system.

1. Mass political campaigns

The method of policy dissemination through mass political campaigns was a major practice during Mao's years. The major political campaigns marked the turn or change of policy directions. A few examples are taken here briefly to illustrate the point; detailed analysis will be found in Chapters Five and Six. The "campaign against imperialism" shortly after the Communists came to power in the early 1950s required a united front to include all that could be united to fight against foreign imperialists and their allies in China. This led to a tolerance of diversified minority characteristics, and the encouragement of minority language development. A later political campaign, the "Great Leap Forward", launched in 1958, saw a change in minority language policy towards less tolerance and more uniformity
with the Han. The largest political campaign launched by CPC, the "Cultural Revolution", from 1966 to 1976, manifested an extreme assimilation policy towards minorities. Although Deng Xiaoping (who took over power from Mao and Zhou Enlai beginning in the late 1970s) showed less interest in political campaigns, he promoted at least two during his transitional years. Deng's campaigns of "Four Modernizations" and "Open Door Policy" saw minority language policy turn again towards diversification and tolerance. As a result, bilingualism and bilingual education came to be the new focus of minority language and education policy and remain so today.

The much publicized political campaigns in China are only one overt way to motivate the masses and, while they give us some information about policy changes and one method of policy implementation, they do not show the more important and hidden processes which lead to policy development. Many policy decisions are made and disseminated through a system of conferences and meetings.

2. Conference/meeting system

The data analysed in Chapters Five and Six demonstrate that policy decisions have been reached and disseminated through a series of meetings, from the Conferences of the Party's Congress, the work conferences (gongzuo huiyi) of State organs such as the State Council, the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, the Education Commission, research conferences (yanjiu hui) at the national level, to the provincial/regional level, and to the specialist meetings (zhuanye bumen huiyi), discussion meetings (taolun hui), and symposia (zuotan hui, literally "sit and talk" meetings) at any level. The meetings at the regional level and below most often served as a forum for policy dissemination as well as for consultation with the local groups. A policy can be initiated and made at the top level,
such as the 1950s policy to create writing systems for each recognized minority without one and the assimilation policy of the late 60s. But there are many occasions where policy suggestions were initiated at the grass roots level, passed up through each level in the form of reports, and reviewed and discussed at each level, after which investigations were conducted, and a work report on the topic was drafted for more discussions in work conferences. Sometimes the process repeats itself several times before a final report with more or less agreed decisions is sent to the State Council for its approval. Once it has been approved by the State Council, it becomes an official policy and is passed on through all types of meetings again for implementation. The case of spreading Putonghua in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region discussed in Chapter Six illustrates the process. The issues and discussions are very often passed through each level in the form of documents; therefore, intertwined with the meeting system for policy process is the documentary system within the bureaucracy.

3. The Documentary System

As mentioned earlier, the greatest difficulty in analysing policy process in China derives from the practice of closed-door meetings and the confidentiality of almost all internal documents. Not only the country's top military secrets and government directives are dealt with in the form of secret documents; many reports, questionnaires, and even school statistics are also classified documents which therefore can only be reviewed in due time by persons whose rank and function give them access. The examples in Chapters Five and Six show that once a document is issued from the Centre, it is often viewed as a written policy and is expected to be implemented at each level. Through the right connections, many documents regarding bilingual education and minority languages were
made available for the author to read, but she was not permitted to copy them or bring them out of the country.

The above three methods depict mainly the dynamics of a closed system within the bureaucracy. It is through the interaction of these methods that a policy is initiated, discussed, investigated, and negotiated, and, after consensus is built, policy decisions are made, implemented, revised and re-implemented. How such processes were applied in the making of the minority language policies will be discussed in detail in later chapters. It is worth noting that, although the communist system often gives the impression of decisions made at the top and forced on the lower rank, this study finds that policy initiatives can be made either from the top or from the grass roots level. Policy decisions are reached through consensus after the constant interplay between top leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, who have personal visions for the direction of the country, and the massive administrative systems set up to run the country.

4.7 Summary

This chapter has identified four major factors (Communist ideology, the sociopolitical conditions of the minorities, subtle but strong influence of deeply rooted Chinese traditions, and the top agendas of the Communist Party and its leaders) at play for minority policy in general and minority language policy in particular. After presenting the social context, the chapter described the political and economic background of the targeted policy issues, the individuals involved, the bureaucratic structures hosting these individuals, and the tools and methods employed by these individuals in reaching policy decisions. In
particular, the author confirmed three interacting sub-systems at work in the country-wide policy processes. The next chapter will put these findings into a broad historical context, using concrete examples relating to minority language policy and planning at the central level.
CHAPTER FIVE

FORTY YEARS OF MINORITY LANGUAGE PLANNING AND POLICIES

5.1 Introduction

Based on the examination and analysis of the information obtained from extensive interviews, documentation reviews, observations, and on-going correspondence with some people working in the related fields, the saga of minority language planning emerges.

This chapter unfolds the picture of the planning and policy making process for minority languages at the national level in China, from 1949, when the PRC was established by the Communist power under the leadership of Mao Zedong, to the present period of economic reform and modernization initiated by Deng Xiaoping. The scenario is illustrated by specific cases, from the creation and reformation of writing systems for minorities to the implementation of bilingual education programs for minority schools. China's governmental organization has undergone continual changes, and therefore any analysis must grasp the system in detail to understand policy making at any given moment. Three historical periods will be used as the departure for the analysis and as the source of evidence for policy changes: the transitional years 1949-58, the destructive years 1958-76, and the modernization years 1977-present.

Since the Communist Party took power in 1949, the minority languages have undergone numerous changes. Some were given newly created writing systems, and some were reformed and revised. Other minorities used a new script for twenty years and then
had to return to the original one. All these drastic changes resulted from detailed policy making and implementation that responded to sociopolitical conditions at certain historical moments, or they merely reflected one top leader's values at one point in time, or were the byproducts of power struggles within the Party.

This chapter seeks to integrate the perspectives developed in Chapter Two to illuminate how minority language planning and policy (or lack of planning and no formally decided policy) were subject to the interplay of communist ideology, to the Chinese traditions deeply rooted in most Han policy makers, to the urgency of the Party's political agendas, including personal power struggles, to the minorities' strategic positions, and to the influence of international forces. The study will also examine how the whole policy process was further complicated by delicate relations among government bureaucracies at various levels.

The analytical perspectives and historical moments provide a chronological framework to piece together the puzzle of the minority language planning and policy process at the micro-level. Two case studies—the written language reform for the Yi and Dai nationalities—are presented to illustrate several important aspects of minority language planning and policy development in China.

5.2 The "Transitional Years" 1949 - 1957

On October 1, 1949, Mao stood with his colleagues atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace facing Tian'anmen Square, and proudly proclaimed that a new country, the People's Republic of China, was born and all people within its borders could now stand tall. With the
eight-year anti-Japanese War and more than four years of civil war behind them, and now with power and 28 years of war experience in hand, the Party turned its thoughts to planning to transform the country from what Mao called a "half-colonial and half-feudalist" society into a "modern socialist state".

During this period minority work in general and minority language policy and planning in particular reflected a number of elements:

1. Mao's own thoughts on nationality issues and the Soviet influence;
2. the Party's top agendas at the time--anti-imperialism and socialist transformation;
3. the desire of the new Party in power to secure and stabilize control over all the peoples within the borders;
4. a perceived need to differentiate their policies from those of the Nationalist Party (GMD) and other oppressive rulers;
5. an awareness of their weak position in the minority areas;
6. a keenly felt lack of knowledge of conditions and people in many minority regions; and,
7. the effect of the Han language reform.

The specific objectives of nationality work publicly announced by the Party for this period were the following:

---to unite all oppressed peoples to safeguard the unity of the country against divisive tendencies among minority nationalities and to counter eventual attempts by imperialists and their allies inside the country to exploit nationality differences against the newly formed government, and

---to make possible a spirit of mutual trust and provide a basis for a cooperative
effort in the transition to a socialist society.

The party’s basic policy towards the national minorities was to foster a spirit of patriotism and to promote the unity of all nationalities. Winning over the trust and loyalty of the people in the minority regions became an important objective, one which outside observers acknowledge as a fundamental goal of the new government.

The first step for the Party to achieve its objectives was to set up government organs in charge of policy making regarding minorities, and research institutes to help justify policy decisions and their implementation.

Just a few days after the founding of the PRC, on October 19, 1949, the central government in its third conference appointed Li Weihan, a long time personal friend of Mao and a Han Chinese, to head the State Nationalities Affairs Commission (SNAC), the highest organ in charge of minority affairs. Li was assisted by three deputy chairmen, all from different ethnic groups—Wu Lanfu (Mongolian), Liu Geping (Hui), and Sai Fuding (Uygur). A few days later, the SNAC officially came into being (The Editing Department of Contemporary Chinese Nationality Work [EDCCNW], 1989). Shortly after its formation, in June, 1950, Li, in his report on the directives of the Commission’s work, said that the correct way to solve minority problems in China was to implement regional autonomy. In February, 1952, a preliminary law was made and implemented entitled "The General Program for the People's Republic of China for Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities" (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi fa cao'an) which was formally enacted in 1984. The Law of National Regional Autonomy was said to be the practical result of the Chinese Communist Party's application of Marxist-Leninist theory on the national questions to the conditions of the Chinese revolution. As outlined in the official
document, self-rule included the administrative, economic, educational and cultural spheres of life. Through its policy of regional autonomy for ethnic minorities, the Party hoped to break away from the GMD's assimilation policy; in other words, letting the minorities "be master in their own homes", a strategy practised quite often before in Chinese imperial history. One of the most distinctive features of the autonomous policy was in the field of languages. In June, 1950, the Language Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was established. The policy of developing and preserving minority languages was adopted, the planning and work conducted; the implementation of these policies in the minority areas added up to a major effort, with subsequent impressive results.

At this time, with pressure from the GMD in Taiwan threatening to recapture control on the mainland and the pressure from those countries which supported the Taiwan government, such as the United States, the Party needed all the support it could get to secure control. Mao had repeatedly reminded his followers that "the army is the fish and the people the water". Yet the Party had a very limited knowledge about the non-Han peoples who were living within the borders. For example, the Party had no idea of how many different ethnic groups existed, much less about their cultural characteristics and languages. The first logical step was to learn as much as possible about these people.

Since the Communist Party had developed from the poverty-stricken interior of rural China, large numbers of its members who were then being rewarded with important positions to run the country's administrative apparatus were poorly educated former peasants and soldiers committed to the Communist cause. Therefore, a large number of minority cadres needed to be trained. Mao also realized, as he said on November 14, 1949, that "it is impossible to thoroughly solve the nationality problems and to completely
isolate minority reactionaries without a large number of communist cadres with minority backgrounds" (The Education Department of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission [EDSNAC], 1991 p.363). On behalf of the SNAC, Li Weihan proposed a plan to establish the Central Institute of Nationalities (CIN) in Beijing to train cadres for the government and party apparatus. A few months later, the State Council approved the plan and decided also to establish such institutes in three other locations: the northwest, the southwest, and the central south. In less than half a year (June 11, 1951) the CIN held its opening ceremony in Beijing with Wu Lanfu (a Mongolian) as president. Language scholars and experts were invited to become faculty members. By 1952, seven such Minority Institutes had been established in other parts of the country.

Three tasks were specified for these institutes: first, to train high- and mid-level cadres for minority work, including language workers; second, to conduct research on minorities, including their language, culture, history, and socioeconomic situations; and third, to supervise and organize translation and editing work (EDCCNW, 1989). This was an indication that the Party recognized the importance of minority work including minority language work. At the time, minority languages were the only means for the Party to communicate with the minority people and thus to practice its political propaganda.

On September 20-28, 1951, the Ministry of Education (currently the State Education Commission) held the first national conference on minority education. Some 126 people were present, including minority delegates from various minority regions representing 15 nationalities. The importance of the conference was marked by the presence of China's top leaders. Among other items, policy decisions were made regarding minority education. This conference revised and passed policy directives in four documents:
1. On Strengthening the Work of Minority Education,
2. On the Establishment of Administrative Organs for Minority Education,
3. Temporary Plan for Training of Minority Teachers, and
4. The Treatment of Minority Students.

It was made clear that the minority languages must be used as the language of instruction in minority schools. The conference stated: "for the minorities with their own written languages such as Mongolian, Korean, Tibetan, Uygur, and Kazak, the mother tongue must be used as the language of instruction in both elementary and secondary schools. Chinese classes were only to be set up if it was deemed necessary and if the local people so wished" (EDSNAC, 1991, p.271). For minorities without independent written languages or with incomplete written scripts, they were promised the creation or reformulation of scripts by the government. For the time being, they could either use Han script or a language habitually used by the minorities as the media of instruction, depending on their wishes.

In April, 1952, the State Council announced its decision to establish administrative structures for minority education. As a result, the Minority Education Department was set up within the Ministry of Education, with officials at both the central and the local levels. Extra funding was also promised for minority education (EDCCNW, 1989, p.22).

In the following five years evidence showed that the conference directives on language policy in minority education were being followed. On Feb. 28, 1953, for example, the Ministry of Education in responding to a report from the Hunan provincial Ministry of Education directed: "... in minority schools, minority languages should be the language of instruction. Other minorities, before a written language was created or improved, could
temporarily use either Han Chinese or a language they were used to using in education". On July 23, 1954, the Ministry of Education gave directions to the Northwest Education Department: "All minority schools must provide minority language courses. In the future, when conditions are ready, all subjects will be taught in minority languages. This policy must be implemented" (EDSNAC, 1991, p.246). In April 1956, the Ministry of Education in its directives to the Heilongjiang Provincial Education Bureau stated: "It is a set policy to use minority languages in the teaching of each subject in minority schools". These directives covering a period of a few years confirm the enormous practical (and probably also political and psychological) difficulty of actually implementing the policy directives at the local level. It must be remembered that, at the same time, the new government was also establishing the first universal primary education system in a country devoid of infrastructures and of trained educational staff.

From June 4 to 17, 1956, the Second National Conference on Minority Education was held in Beijing, attended by 154 delegates including representatives from 16 minority groups (EDSNAC, 1991). This was the second of two conferences on minority education held (1951, 1956) during the first decade after liberation, a clear indication of the importance of minority education issues on the Party's political agenda in the early years of consolidating state power. The third such conference was not held until almost thirty years later, in 1981 (discussed in a later section).

Minority language planning assumed a major symbolic role and was used as evidence of the Party's complete sincerity in welcoming all nationalities to the big socialist family for common growth and prosperity. In 1949, the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (equivalent at that time to the Constitution,
which was adopted later) stated in Article 53 that all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages. This was repeated in the several later versions of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China.

The policy was given legal form in February, 1952, in the General Program for the People's Republic of China for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities, which stipulates that "the organ of self-government of all national autonomous regions should adopt the writing most commonly employed in its region as its main working tool and when their work affects nationalities who use languages other than the one chosen, their written languages must then be used." The creation of the administrative structures in minority education in April, discussed above, was a natural outcome of this legal framework.

The policy also finds expression in Article 6 of the Law of Criminal Procedure of the People's Republic of China which states that "Citizens of all nationalities have the right to use their own languages in criminal proceedings. The people's court, the people's procurate and the public security organ shall provide interpretation for a litigant participant unacquainted with the spoken and written language commonly used in the locality" (Ma Ying, 1985, p.63).

On September 15, 1954, the first National People's Congress approved the new Constitution and a group of new top leaders were elected, including a number of elite leaders of various nationalities (EDCCNW, 1989).

The basic language problems perceived by the government was that the lack of a written language, or the use of an inadequate one, interfered with the development of a given minority people in terms of their education and their contribution to the economy. Of
course, it also interfered with Communist propaganda and indoctrination, deemed essential as a basis for moulding a modern socialist state.

Guided by the policies at the time, aimed at achieving unity and bringing minorities to accept the Party's agenda, several projects were undertaken concerning minority languages. Three principal tasks for minority language work were identified during this period:

1. to create or reform the writing systems for national minorities,
2. to sponsor scientific research in spoken languages, and
3. to train language cadres who would lead and participate in minority language work.

From past experience, the Party had learned that good will is most efficiently won by "good deeds", and these language projects were the major "good deeds" conducted during this period on behalf of minorities and their cultures.

So far, several steps had been taken towards systematic planning of minority languages, including setting up relevant agencies, training minority language workers both politically and technically, and implementing the policies towards the use and the development of minority languages in and out of schools. As the following will indicate, the sequence of the planning did not neatly follow any of the models suggested by Western scholars in the field of language planning. These tasks were carried out in the 1950's as trial projects. The process was constantly changing to react to new challenges.

On February 5, 1951, the Government Administrative Council (the forerunner of the State Council) established a Guidance Committee for Research in the Spoken and Written Languages of National Minorities, under the Ministry of Culture and Education, to supervise
these tasks and to publish a resolution, and among other things to assist national minorities lacking writing systems to create them. This twenty-person body was composed of important party officials, including Liu Geping, the deputy director of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, who was also appointed deputy director of this Committee, and language scholars, mostly western trained, such as Luo Changpei, the Secretary General of the Committee, who was a prominent linguist as well as the president of the Language Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Wu Qinghe, 1995, p.53).

The Committee was charged with the task of guiding and co-ordinating research conducted by various organizations with the objective of helping those minorities without written forms to create them and to improve those writing systems which were "backward" or "insufficient" (Zhang Youjun & Xu Jieshun, 1992, p.44). The committee was abolished in the summer of 1954, an indication that the process set in motion was considered advanced to the point that further central guidance was no longer required from a high-profile committee.

The major participating government agencies for these tasks were the SNAC, the CIN, and the Language Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (LICAS). On February, 1952, the LICAS sent Professor Yuan Jiahua to Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (where the Zhuang, the largest minority group, live) to investigate the language situation and to prepare for the creation of a Zhuang written script.

On September 26, 1953, the LICAS held a research conference dealing with suggestions on minority language work and ways to solve the problems which were brought forward. At the same time, the State Ministry of Propaganda held a conference at which the following actions were decided: collecting information, planning the design of
new scripts, training cadres and implementing the new writing systems.

After two years of work, the Guidance Committee together with the State Nationality Affairs Commission issued a report written by Luo Changpei, on the planning of writing systems for minorities. In May, 1954, the report was approved by the State Council. Based on the minority language situation, the report suggested that each minority (emphasis added by the author) without a writing system in its language or a common script should be helped to create a script or to select another existing writing system only if they wish to do so and only after a period of research and investigation. Accompanying this general directive, seven practical ways of adapting it to different situations were suggested (translated from Zhang Youjun & Xu Jieshun, 1992, p.441):

1. For the minorities with various dialects, create a writing system based on the major dialect used in and around their political and economic centre.
2. For the same minority groups living in separate areas with very different dialects, create some symbols to record their languages, and after further research select one form or create several different ones.
3. For different minorities using similar languages, one written form could be created, but if any of the minorities insisted on having their own they should not be forced to do otherwise.
4. For those minorities that would like to use a writing system similar to that of another minority, respect their wishes.
5. For those minorities that already used or were familiar with another writing system and did not demand to have a new one, do not create one.
6. For those nationalities having a majority of members familiar with the writing
system of another nationality and which did not demand to create their own, do not create a new one.

7. For the minority groups with a very small population which had their own languages yet wished to adopt the writing system of others, do not create a new script.

Under the guidance of these policies, a series of events took place in subsequent years. In June, 1954, the Central People's Government sent out linguists and minority language workers to carry out the work starting from the southwest region.

In July, 1955, a Mongolian language investigation team, formed by LICAS, CIN, Beijing University, and the Language Research Association of the Mongolian Autonomous Region, started within Inner Mongolia.

In December, 1955, LICAS and CIN jointly held the first national minority language research conference. Ideas were exchanged and plans to further minority language work were formulated (EDCCNW, 1989).

The State Council appointed the Language Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, together with the Central Institute of Nationalities and other concerned bodies, to carry through a number of projects. They started by helping the Zhuang and Miao to devise a writing system and to reform the writing system of the Dai nationality.

The Xinhua News Agency reported in the national newspaper, People's Daily (December 8, 1955), that the Language Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences with related agencies had created new writing systems for the Yi and Zhuang nationalities and had reformed and improved writing systems for the Dai, Jingpo, Lisu, Lahu and Kirghiz nationalities (EDSNAC, 1991).
In January, 1956, the Central Committee of the CPC approved the report on minority language works by the SNAC and pointed out that helping minorities create or reform their writing systems was an important issue for the Party and urgently needed to be dealt with. It emphasised again that each minority without a written language or without a common written language should be helped to create or reform a writing system within the next two or three years. All government organs should give full support to this work. It also gave the overall planning power to LICAS and SNAC (EDCCNW, 1989). Thus by 1956, work to codify minority languages had moved from a limited number of major nationalities to a broad approach that dealt with most of the larger remaining groups. The exact profile of termination dates for script creation and initial orthographic standards is still unclear from available sources.

Immediately after the 1956 directive, training classes were offered by LICAS, SNAC and the CIN to train language workers to participate in the investigation teams. Four hundred researchers from thirteen different nationalities were trained (EDCCNW, 1989). In May, 1956, more than 600 trained language workers from LICAS, CIN and various local minority language organs were formed into seven investigation teams to work in the national minority areas throughout the country. This was the largest effort on minority language research in Chinese history.

On March 10, 1956, the State Council announced its regulations on the procedures for approving, creating, and designing plans for the minority written script and the division of tasks on implementing and popularizing these new plans. The guidelines and regulations specified two major phases of planned creation and planned implementation:

1. The approval process for the plans to create and reformulate minority languages
are as follows (translated from Zhang Youjun & Xu Jieshun, 1992, p.442):

a. The initial design of the plan is the responsibility of the Minority Language Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (the former LICAS). These plans were to be checked by the provincial or regional People's Commission through extended consultation with related personnel such as minority elites and scholars. After discussion and revising, the plan would be evaluated by the State Nationalities Affairs Commission. Then the provincial and regional governments could implement the plan through an experimental phase.

b. After a period of experimentation, the plan was to be sent back to the original designing institute for further adjusting. The adjusted plan would be again sent to the State Nationalities Affairs Commission for evaluation and then to the State Council for final approval.

c. All self-designed plans for written language codification proposed by regional and provincial institutions had to go through the same process.

2. The Second Office of the State Council was put in charge of the overall implementation of the newly created or improved writing systems and used two distinct channels for its work; the Ministry of Education was responsible for implementation in the school system and for compiling text books, and the Ministry of Culture was responsible for implementation in other social domains and for publications. The related local institutions were to participate in the implementation as well.

In short, language planning in this case included the planning of responsibilities for various government agencies, as assigned by the State Council. The Minority Language Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was responsible for designing the new scripts; the SNAC was in charge of the evaluation and adjustment of these scripts; the Ministry of Education was given the task of implementing the new written languages on a trial basis; the Ministry of Culture was to assist in the compiling and publishing of materials in new scripts; and the training of language workers fell into the domain of the Central Institute of Nationalities and other related institutions. This was an important step in
language planning which involved both status and the corpus planning, and without which the work could not have been carried through. It seemed that because of the important status of the planning task given by the CPC at the time, all related government organs and their subordinate agencies seemed to have cooperated smoothly to get the job done. It was not quite the same in later periods.

Another fact which needs to be noticed is that formal policies on language planning were made after some preliminary work on minority languages had already been done. Therefore, sometimes there was not one clear process or set of steps in language planning; rather the process included several cycles.

By 1958 it was claimed proudly that the government had helped three nationalities to reform their writing systems and ten others to develop new written phonetic languages. None of them were languages of the Northwest region, where most minorities reside and where the local field work of this study was conducted. All of the new writing systems were based on the Han language phoneticization, which employs the Latin alphabet. By the end of 1959, investigations had been conducted into 42 spoken languages and thousands of language personnel had been trained.

From the above analysis it can be seen that the major official reasons for helping minorities to devise writing systems was the claimed Communist ideologies of equality of nationalities and their languages, combatting illiteracy, and improving the life of the national minorities. But there were always other motives: to win the trust and loyalty of the minorities in order to consolidate power, to encourage minorities to participate in the Han life and to integrate them into the Han culture.

During this period minority work in general, and minority language work in particular,
received major attention from senior Party officials and the government. The work was directly monitored by the Centre. For example, as early as June, 1950, the Party Central Committee sent out instructions that local officials must report to, and seek guidance directly from, the central offices in handling any issues regarding national minorities. It was absolutely forbidden to force Han policies onto minority areas (EDCCNW, 1989). The top four leaders of the time -- Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai-- all contributed personal writings to signal the importance of the matter. The core of their goal was to seek allies, to isolate opposition, and to show the world that they were capable of leading all China's peoples into socialism. It was quite clear that unity was at the top of the agenda. In 1953, the Central Committee of the CPC started a movement attacking Han chauvinism among Party members and cadres and at the same time urged all its members working in minority areas to learn the locally used languages. It instructed each local Party Committee to treat this matter as "an important political task" (EDCCNW, 1989, p.41)

To sum up, the first three years after the Communists came to power can be described as a preparation period during which plans were made, structures were set up, the leaders were selected, and the general directions of the country were established. During the next five years the first Five-year Plan of China (1953-1957) for economic development was carried out. Destructive years followed this initial period of development.

From 1949 to the mid 1950s, China's work on minority language planning went through a phase of massive expansion, so that the period was later referred to as the "golden years of minority work". No matter what the difficulties of implementation at the local level, the general minority policy during this period was pluralistic, sensitive to minority feelings, tolerant to different cultural characteristics, and politically progressive. It was an
exciting period for minority language scholars and researchers who generated large amounts of information on minority languages in China. It indeed won the support of many nationalities. It also laid the foundation for minority language work twenty years later.

5.3 The "Destructive Years" 1958 - 1977

During the years 1951 through 1957, the Government maintained that it intended to help each minority without a written language to create one, and to help reform existing writing systems where necessary. But after 1957 a change began. This change of attitude and method towards minority languages reflected several elements. By then, the Communists had gained relative control of minority regions and the danger of losing control was no longer apparent. Difficulties in implementing newly created minority scripts had arisen and the tasks begun in the early fifties were sometimes unfinished as a result of the low quality of research personnel or lack of co-operation by the national minorities (evidence will be discussed in the case studies later in this chapter). One major indication of the change came in 1958 when the battle against "Han Chauvinism" and the policy of special privileges for minorities was replaced by an emphasis combating what was officially called "local nationalism". Above all, there was a wide-ranging change of the political agenda by the Party at the same time. All these elements suggested that fundamental changes in minority language policy and planning were about to begin.

In 1958, the first indications of change appeared in the Communist policies toward minority languages. Several factors played important roles in the shift. By 1957, the end of the first five-year plan, there was a sense of victory in almost all aspects of the socialist
movement in China. There was a reported increase in the country's GDP from 5.8 billion Chinese yuan in 1952 to 9.2 billion by the end of 1957. Railways had been built and education in minority regions reported growth (EDCCNW, 1989). Most important was that by now the CPC and the government were more confident and ambitious. In less than eight years they had not only stabilized the country by establishing a system of control with various government bureaucracies but had also gained experience in dealing with minorities. A large number of newly trained minority cadres and Party members with more "acceptable" class backgrounds were put in charge, so that the Party no longer had to rely heavily on the cooperation of the traditional minority elites as it had in the early years. Instead, these elites were thought to have finished their historical mission and to have become a hindrance to further progress. In November 1957, the official journal Nationality Unity (Minzu Tuanjie) proudly announced that "China now had the core of a minority nationality party leadership group: 400,000 Communist Party members, 400,000 cadres at or above the county level and 600,000 members of the Communist Youth League" (Dreyer 1976, p.159). Except in Tibet, almost all minority areas were organized into autonomous systems. There was a growing mood of impatience, among the top leaders, with the pace of China's progress. Mao and the top leaders of the CPC were eager to show the world that the new Communist China with a socialist system had advantages over capitalist systems like those of Britain and the U.S. They were confident that China could catch up with the U.S. economically within 15 years or less. These were the same years when Nikita Kruschev boasted to Americans: "We'll bury you!".

From May 5 to 23, 1958, the Party held its second plenary session of the Eighth National Congress in Beijing, during which a new direction was set for the country along
the general line of a "more, faster, better, and cheaper" way of speeding up socialist construction. Following the break with Moscow and the withdrawal of Soviet technical advisors in key sectors of the economy, the Chinese leadership faced a difficult shift to self-sufficiency in heavy and military industries. They widened the drive to touch all sectors of the economy. After the Congress, the motto of the "Great Leap Forward" swept every corner of China. Idealistic leftists took over control from the more experienced party members who knew how to deal with minorities and with economic development.

Schwarz (1962) has observed that the change was caused by the realization on the part of the Party that little or no progress had been made in this field to help achieve the real aims of the party to facilitate indoctrination and control, and to win over the trust and support of non-Chinese. Two other factors for the application of the "Great Leap Forward" to minority areas were identified by Dreyer (1976). One is the perceived need to erase the disparities of economic and social advancement among the minorities, and the other was the feeling that certain minority group members were deliberately impeding progress. There was certainly a growing sense of impatience coupled with a sense of confidence.

As a result, the previous policy of unity within diversity was replaced by unity through uniformity, since these diversities seemed to have slowed down the socialist transition in minority regions.

One of the first perceived barriers to unity was linguistic. As noted earlier, the most distinctive feature seen between the Han and non-Han was the use of different languages, especially in written forms. The Han system of writing had long been viewed as the principal ingredient of the Chinese culture and the unifying force which held together all
Han people including those who spoke mutually unintelligible dialects. This situation presented the Chinese Communists with a dilemma that remained unsolved: in the interests of China's multinational unity, the adoption of a phonetic script for the whole country had some desirable advantages, but the abandonment of the non-phonetic Chinese characters would adversely affect the unity of the Han Chinese who, after all, comprise the core group of the nation.

Apart from the change of the political agenda on the part of the Party, another important element that shifted the direction of minority language planning was the result of the Han language reform.

When Mao Zedong and his Communist Party took over China in 1949, they were faced with not only the minority languages which were totally foreign to them but also five major mutually incomprehensible dialects spoken by some 800 million Han Chinese living in the area within the Great Wall and in the northeast (the traditional cultural unity among the Han was associated much more with uniformity of written language than with the diffusion of a single spoken language). As early as 1940, Mao Zedong in his work *On New Democracy* wrote: "written Chinese must be reformed, given the requisite conditions, and our spoken language brought closer to that of the people" (Mao Zedong, 1965, p.382). In October 1949, the Association for Reforming the Chinese Written Language (ARCWL) was established headed by the scholar, Wu Yuchang, who had led an intensive Latinization campaign in Yan’an in 1940-1942 and promoted the replacement of Chinese characters by Latin phonetic script. However, Mao insisted that the alphabet must adopt the national form rather than Latin, a foreign form, and he replaced the ARCWL with the Committee for Studying the Reform of the Chinese Written Language (CSRCWL) in 1952 with Wu
Yuchang demoted. After nearly three years of attempting to create an alphabet, the attempt had to be given up, as no satisfactory result could be obtained. The Latin alphabet was then adopted and Wu Yuchang was reappointed as the head to the new Committee. Wu took action right away, a subcommittee was formed and its main work was to elaborate a draft of a phonetic scheme in the form of the Latin alphabet. By October 1955, four draft schemes were drawn up. "Pinyin" or "Scheme for a Han Phonetic Alphabet" (Hanyu Pinyin Fangan) was recognized in 1956 by the State Council as having a double purpose: to annotate Chinese characters and to replace them completely in the future. The scheme was promulgated by the 60th Plenary Session of the State Council on November, 1957 and approved by the First National People's Congress at its fifth session on February 11, 1958.

But being a Han Chinese, Mao and his colleges quickly gave up the idea of replacing the Chinese characters with the Latin alphabet since the new scheme is enough to serve the following purpose as stated by Zhou Enlai in 1958 (Milsky, 1973, p.108):

1. to annotate the pronunciation of Chinese characters in order to facilitate learning them;
2. to transcribe the "common speech" (Putonghua) and help to popularize it;
3. to serve as a common basis on which the various national minorities may create or reform their written languages; and
4. to help foreigners learn Mandarin.

Now the new Pinyin (the Han phoneticization scheme) can serve the two unifying purposes: to unify Han spoken language and to draw minority languages closer to the Han by making it easier for them to learn and by introducing it to their written forms.

On December 10, 1957, the State Council approved a report by the Chinese Language Reform Commission on "Several Principles in the Plan of Designing Minority
Written Script¹. It included the following suggestions, some of which are really only lists of options to consider (translated from Zhang Youjun & Xu Jieshun, 1992, p.443):

1. The Latin alphabet will be the foundation for creating or reforming minority written languages.
2. For those minority languages with close or similar pronunciation to Mandarin, efforts should be directed to the use of the phonetic symbols of Mandarin.
3. Those minority languages with very different sound systems from the Han language, and therefore having sounds which are difficult to express by single Latin letters, should use one or more of the following rules:
   a. use two letters to express one sound,
   b. create a new letter,
   c. add a little mark on the existing letter.
4. Indicate the intonation and stress by adding a letter at the end of the syllable; or, use other ways; or, leave intonation and stress un-indicated.
5. All minority written languages, especially those with close relationships, should try to achieve uniformity in the structure of the alphabet and spelling rules.

In January 1958, Premier Zhou Enlai made these principles official policy in his speech "The Current Task of Written Language Reform" to the national conference of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The future of creation of orthographies and reformation for minority languages was set along the principle that it should be based on the newly created "Han phonetic Alphabet" which employs the Latin alphabet. It further required that both the pronunciation and the usage of any new minority writing systems should be in keeping with this Han phonetic plan as closely as possible (EDSNAC, 1991).
This was the beginning of a new policy orientation leading towards gradual assimilation. The criteria were also announced during the Second Forum on Minority Languages, held in Beijing from the end of March until April 16, 1958, jointly hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the SNAC. At this point the first indication of a change in the Communist policies towards minority languages began to be clearly visible.

The old principle of helping each minority to create or reform its writing system was still considered applicable to all minority nationalities. But the purposes for doing so were changed from practising language equality, as in the first decade, to developing a common "socialist culture" in the minority areas. For the time being, the Communists did not go as far as to declare that the program of developing minority writing systems should be completely abandoned. These writing systems were still considered useful in speeding up the process towards literacy which, in turn, would help spread the Party's directives and would give "the mass a more thorough course in socialist and communist education". However the tone had changed. If a given nationality knew Chinese or the language of another nationality, then there was no need to create a writing system and it was "free" to choose an existing writing system.

The forum warned that the minorities must "grasp the tendency for spoken and written languages to draw closer to the Chinese language. Any plea for the preservation of purity of the existing minority language must be resolutely attacked" (Schwarz, 1962, p.175). Attempts were made to achieve uniformity in the alphabet and spelling of the various languages (see section 5.5 for detailed cases).

Another new policy was to order the minorities to learn Putonghua. It was not surprising that shortly after the announcement of the Great Leap Forward, a new high tide
of enthusiasm for learning Han was said to exist. It was explained that since the Han were the main nationality both numerically and in terms of culture, to study Han language and culture did not mean assimilation but merely a desire to advance one’s own nationality as well as the entire country by erasing the linguistic hindrance to learning advanced ways. Even if one did not work in areas where there were Han, he or she would surely wish to have the ability to study the Han elder brother’s advanced experiences. Moreover, translation was both expensive and time-consuming; it would surely be more efficient if everybody could read the basic works of this advanced culture in their original form. Spare-time schools were established in order to fill linguistic and other gaps, and eager peasants of all nationalities were reported to be studying late into the night while working to produce more during the day, heedless of such needs as sleep.

The education policy also abandoned the idea of using only minority languages in the schools. In elementary schools, only the first and second grades were now to be allowed to use the spoken and written minority languages. Starting with the third grade, instruction was mostly in Chinese. It was made possible to obtain teachers by encouraging Han Chinese to migrate to minority areas.

Thus from 1958-1965 there was a change towards language assimilation in a non-explicit, gradual manner. But the following ten years saw a complete turn around in policies towards minority languages.

The total reversal of policy coincided with the start of the Cultural Revolution, later referred to in Chinese sources as "the ten-year turmoil". The movement alone has generated hundreds of books and is certainly not the focus of this study. However, a brief discussion is needed here to gain an understanding of the change of the minority language.
Among many other political motives, one impetus for the Cultural Revolution, which claimed the lives of thousands of innocent people, came partly from Mao's insecurity and ambition to possess absolute control of the Party and the country and partly from a struggle among the Party leaders to decide where China should be heading: capitalism or socialism (communism). Therefore, other than culture, it was a revolution to solve conflicts over the ideology by which China should be governed as well as a personal power struggle. It was started by Mao's big letter article, "gun down the headquarters" (pao da silingbu), -- "headquarters" referring to top leaders whom Mao sensed as a threat to his personal power. These leaders were accused by Mao of being 'representatives of the bourgeois' and 'counterrevolutionary revisionists' who had formed a 'bourgeois headquarters' inside the Chinese Communist Party and who intended to 'take the road of capitalism'. The only way to secure the 'proletarian line' against the 'revisionist line' was a political revolution involving the masses. Mao's purpose was to remove his enemies and have his view prevail. In August 1966, the CPC's Central Committee held its Eleventh Plenum, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was born.

The revolution was immediately reflected in minority areas. Since the emphasis of the Cultural Revolution was on "class struggle" and since Mao stated that "national struggle is in the final analysis a question of class struggle", class struggle must be carried out to solve the nationalities problems. The earlier policy of recognition of the particularities and differences of the national minorities was labelled a 'bourgeois reactionary line', and the policy was replaced with forced assimilation. The CPC itself and much of the state system were paralysed by the upheaval. On the national level, the chief party and government
organs responsible for minority affairs, the United Front and the SNAC, were bitterly attacked. Almost all agencies for nationality work including minority language agencies and nationalities institutes were disbanded and their leaders stripped of power. Like leaders in other fields, they were persecuted through forced self-confession, humiliation, forced into manual labour, and suffered imprisonment, physical abuse, or a worse fate. Many died. All social "privileges" for members of national minorities were abolished. Minority languages and scripts, customs and manners, were condemned as backwards. Of the written languages, only five were allowed: Mongolian, Tibetan, Uygur, Kazak and Korean (Herberer, 1989). Two of these, Uygur and Kazak, had been reformed to be closer to the Han language (details are discussed in Chapter Six). Only Mandarin was to be spoken at meetings.

It was not until 1976 that the death of Mao marked the end of the ten year political upheaval.

To sum up, during the first ten years, after the Great Leap Forward in 1958, minority language policy shifted progressively. In the ten years following 1966, the policy was openly one of assimilation. The major elements conditioning the policy of this period were as follows:

1. The growing confidence of the Party and the impatience with the progress in minority areas as reflected in the political campaigns "the Great Leap Forward",

2. the CPC's political struggle over power and ideology as manifested in the Cultural Revolution,

3. the reform of the Han language,

4. strengthened control over national minorities and cultures, and
5. the change of relationships with the former Soviet Union.

This period provided strong evidence that, in general, shifts in policy with regard to minority languages were triggered by shifts in policy regarding national affairs in general. The imperial traditions of control and assimilation were in full play.

5.4 The "Modernization Years" 1977 - Present: The Framework for Current Bilingual Education

The death of Mao and the overthrow of the "Gang of Four" put an end to the twenty years of political turmoil. The third plenum of the CPC's Eleventh National Conference, held in 1978, marked the beginning of a new era in communist history. Deng Xiaoping who had secured his power now insisted on keeping the basic socialist directions set by Mao, but he shifted the focus from political movements to economic development. His repeated statement that "the socialist goal is to achieve common prosperity" became a new political slogan and led China into a period of economic reform known as the campaign for Four Modernizations (industry, agriculture, national defence, and science and technology). Education became an important area for reform, for it was believed to be the foundation for economic development. But a prominent anthropologist, Fei Xiaotong, (1994, p.9) repeatedly warned the Party officials that "it would be impossible for China to become modernized without modernization of the national minorities". Minority education, clearly the weakest part of the country's education system, soon was recognized as a prominent problem for the Party's modernization plan, because it was seen as affecting the country's economic future.

For workers in the field of minority languages, this had been one period of confusion, then reorientation. After twenty years of stagnation, the question now became:
where to start? One inclination was to pick up what was left unfinished in 1958; that is, to continue creation of writing systems for the national minorities. The alternative was to define new tasks in keeping with the changed political, economic, and linguistic situations in the country. Once again the direction of language planning had to be decided. The following pressing issues emerged, which had to be faced by policy makers and language planners:

--Should the minorities without a writing system for their languages be helped to develop one as was promised and practised in the first decade of the Communist rule, or should Mandarin be imposed in their place?

--Should the minority language scripts developed during the early 1950s be implemented and popularised, or replaced, especially those which had been reformed before and during the Cultural Revolution?

--How does minority language work best fit into the Party's bigger agenda of economic development and political stability?

--What should be the relationship between the minority languages and the majority Putonghua in education?

Three principal positions were taken towards these issues. One group, headed mainly by minority leaders and some language scholars (Wang Jun, 1981; Wu Lingyun, 1989; Luo Meizhen 1989; and Sun Zhu, 1995a & b) argued that since the Constitution and the laws state that all languages have equal rights, all languages should be treated the same. This group stressed the need for the minority language maintenance; that is, the minority languages should be developed like Han Chinese. An opposite position was that Han language should be the major language in education since it is the majority language
of the country and will eventually replace minority languages. A third position fell somewhere in between. It emphasizes the importance of both the Han and the minority languages and saw bilingual education as the only solution to the problem. The arguments for each position are presented below.

A Mongolian language administrator, Shenamujila (in Zhao Nasitu & Li Hengpu, 1989, pp. 344-346), insisted on minority language maintenance by stating the following reasons:

1. Socialism occurs in the period of transition before the advent of true communism and it involves a long historical period during which all minority languages that had been oppressed and discriminated against should be developed; this development is consistent with the policy of the proletarian Party and was required for the growth of the minorities.

2. During this period the status and function of the minority languages must be fully recognized. Attention should be given to the mutual influence of the minority and the majority languages.

3. During this historical period, minority languages and scripts should be developed for the functions of social communication and thinking, and at the same time for the function of implementing the rights of regional autonomy. Thus, problems in minority languages and scripts should be solved in such a way as to guarantee minorities political status rather than only to serve the development of nationality cultures.

4. During this period, the development of those minorities with a long language history depends on the wide use and long-term development of these languages. Such development is the only way to abolish the economic and cultural inequalities
left by history and is the only way to develop rapidly the educational level of the minorities.

If these arguments were to prevail, writing systems would have to be created for the remaining minorities who wished to have one; and for minorities with writing systems, their language should become the language of instruction in the educational system. This view was held by a relatively small group of less powerful people whose voices were often not heard or were quickly drowned out by the more powerful opposing position.

The group which favoured language shift counter-argued that to insist on the development of minority languages alone would not be "practical" in a country with so much emphasis on national unity. Among many Han cadres it was believed that in the current period of socialist economic development, minority languages should be replaced gradually by Putonghua. This view was largely influenced by propaganda during the previous twenty years stating that in theory the socialist period is the period when the commonality of all nationalities increases and the differences are reduced (Wu lingyun, 1989). Some argued that minority languages have served their historical purpose, and therefore, the mission was completed, and some minority languages were so backward that they could not meet the demands of the new economic development (Yu Shichang, 1994). Some authors say the minority languages are primitive and not scientific. Some assert that, after more than 20 years of effort to spread Putonghua in the minority areas and with the spread of the Han population into the minority regions over the years, most of the minority populations should have learned Putonghua by now. They assume that the majority of the minority people are more or less bilingual. It was further argued that, since by the Marxist laws of social development, the minority languages will be replaced by
Putonghua sooner or later, it would be cost effective to do so as soon as possible. Others held the view that it would be to the advantage of the minorities to learn Putonghua for quick economic development; the major task of language work, for the new period, was to spread Putonghua among minority populations as fast as possible.

Clearly the above two positions would take the future of minority languages in opposite directions; the former would like to focus on minority language maintenance; the opposing group would like to see minority languages replaced by Putonghua.

Policy makers concerned with economic reform as well as political stability have tended toward a middle position—promoting bilingualism and bilingual education. Research presented to justify this policy position has addressed the following questions:

1. What is the current situation in minority language use? Are most of the minority populations bilingual (mother tongue and Putonghua) or largely unilingual (mother tongue only)?

2. What is the major reason for the persistent backwardness in education in minority areas, and what is the best solution?

3. Is the socialist period a time when minority languages are decreasing in function and being replaced gradually by Putonghua, or a period when minority languages continue to flourish?

Research on these issues occupied the attention of minority language and education experts, scholars, and administrators. The results clearly indicated that the minority mother tongue remained the sole means of communication for most persons classified as minority people (about 70%) although it was true that more and more people were learning Putonghua. The following are examples of research that have served as one
of the major inputs to policy decisions.

According to a 1974 study conducted by the Sichuan provincial government, among the Yi nationality only 2.4% knew Putonghua (Ma Xueliang, 1990). Similar research was reported in 1990 by Lin Xiangrong. In 1986, he was sent to Tibetan areas of Sichuan Province to investigate the language use situation as a minority language expert from the Nationality Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. Since the task was set from the central level, it was taken very seriously. Lin Xiangrong was assisted by a scholar from the Provincial Institute of Nationality Studies, a Tibetan scholar from a prefecture college, and a local helper. The four-person team visited every family in two Tibetan villages, both of which were located fairly close to a city centre (one three kilometres and the other 20 kilometres), in order to examine the theory that minorities living near the railways, highways and city centres are mostly bilingual. Their results (see Table 5.1) showed that the mother tongue was still the only means of communication for the majority of residents. The study concluded that if this was the situation, minorities living in remote areas would have even a lower percentage knowing Putonghua; it followed, therefore that the mother tongue should be the language of instruction for children in these areas. Backwardness in minority education in China has been commonly accepted as fact. As for the reasons for the lower attainment of education in minority areas and the means to remedy it, numerous researchers have reached the conclusion that the difference between the language of instruction in school and in children's home language was the key barrier to improving minority education. One important way to improve the situation would be to introduce the mother tongue as the language of instruction in schools, especially in the early years.
A research study quoted in the article by Wu Lingyun (1989) shows the general situation of education in minority areas in Yunnan province, south China. Low enrolment in many areas (with a few exceptions), large numbers of drop-outs and low levels of graduation are a common phenomenon in the minority areas. Some of the Dai children were reported to have left public schools and attended local temples to receive their education (some intended to become monks). Wu believed the reason for this was that in the temple, knowledge was passed on through the children's mother tongue and there was, therefore, no difficulty in communication. Children also found that the learning in the temples was more interesting and more relevant to their lives. By contrast, Putonghua was
difficult for them to learn, there was no language environment in which to practice, and the content in the textbooks did not relate to their life. As a result, only Han children in the areas tended to continue their education in regular schools (see Table 5.2). Very few minority children graduated from elementary schools and even fewer passed the entrance examinations for middle and upper high school.

Similar situations were discussed in Ma Xueliang's research published in 1990. Ma, a veteran expert in minority languages, did research in 1985 in both a Hani minority region in Yunnan Province (southwest China) and a Tibetan region in Qinghai Province (northwest China). The same three indicators of poor school achievement reported by Wu Lingyun were also prominent in these areas. Some local authorities attributed these problems to the need for children to work for the family, the poor attitude towards education and the slowness or low intelligence of the children. Ma criticized these assumptions as "leftist" (ji zuo) attitudes, ignorant, and racist. He believed that the major cause of the problem was "ignorance of the differences of the two languages in education" (Ma Xueliang, 1990, p.20).

Such research supports the middle (and most popular) position on minority language policy. The position is usually held by Han language scholars who have worked a long time with minority languages, and by some minority leaders (Luo Meizhen 1989, 1989; Fu Maoji & Sun Zhu, 1990; Yu Shichang, 1994). Such authors criticize both the extreme views—minority language maintenance and majority language spread -- as not being realistic and as over simplifying a complicated matter. They suggest that for the time being and for some time to come, minority languages should be developed along with the Han language. Their arguments are based mainly on the current research, and on the usefulness of the bilingual education to the socialist construction of the country. Their
Table 5.2

(1) The Low Retention Rate of Dai Students in Elementary School

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of students in elementary schools</th>
<th>Graduation Rate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai</td>
<td>Menghun district</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daluo district</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) 1986 Survey of Number of Students in Schools in Xishuangbanna-Dai Autonomous Prefecture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Number of students in elementary school</th>
<th>Percentage of total Ethnic population (%)</th>
<th>Number of students in elementary school</th>
<th>Percentage of total Ethnic population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>24799</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>18219</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai</td>
<td>22226</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Wu Lingyun (1989)
arguments can be summarized in terms of four main themes:

1. The current language use patterns rule out a policy favouring minority language shift. Current language use, although affected by political decisions, is relatively stable and determined mostly by demographic, cultural, social, and economic factors. As discussed earlier, minority language use in China is extremely complex. Since 1949, under the influence of the language and education policies, there have been some language shifts from minority language use to Putonghua. But several factors such as the remoteness of some areas and the highly concentrated living patterns of some minorities are the reasons that up to now fewer than 30% of the minority population can use Putonghua. The reality is that over 70% of the minorities in China, amounting to many tens of millions of persons, still use their own languages almost exclusively. It is certainly not realistic to replace their languages with Putonghua. The Chinese government simply does not have the mandate to do so. In the scholars' words, the conditions for a language shift do not yet exist.

2. The strong internal stability of minority languages indicates they may exist for a long time. Yang Yingxin (1987), a Bai nationality scholar, through extensive research, reached the conclusion that a language remains stable for long periods. He found that in Yunnan Province the number of minorities who have mastered or understand Putonghua increases very slowly. After 40 years, most minority people are still unilingual; only 30% have mastered Putonghua. He also found that among the minorities, the degree of proficiency in Putonghua was closely related to age, sex, level of education, occupation, and geographic environment. According to his investigation, up to 90% of minority children under the age of thirteen (including the ones attending schools) do not understand Han language.
3. Communist ideology, political stability and unity play important roles in minority language policy decisions. In China for the past 40 years there has been no exception to the understanding that for any policy to be valid it has to identify itself with Marxist-Leninist theory, and with that of current top leaders. Ideologically, the policy makers argue that according to Marxist-Leninist theory the socialist period is still the period for minority languages to be fully developed before they disappear in the communist society. At the same time, language equality policy -- even though it is largely nominal -- has been welcomed by the minorities and has served the cause of national unity. Scholars have repeatedly warned the policy makers that "any ethnic group possesses strong emotional ties with its language... and this language consciousness and feeling if suppressed will result in conflict and therefore will be an element for social instability" (Luo Meizhen, 1989, p.26). Before he died in 1995, another prominent and long-time minority language scholar, Sun Zhu (1995b, p.19), warned: "If the government office in charge still ignores the minority language issue and does not solve the problem, and if anything happens because of this, it will be the responsibility of the people working in this field".

4. The minority languages are deemed still very useful for the current economic development of China. The positive functions of the minority languages in socialist economic development have probably been the most quoted reason for keeping the minority languages in education. The main points put forward in the research are:
   a. Illiteracy and low education levels are believed to be the worst obstacles for economic development. In many cases, minority mother tongue is the only tool for combatting illiteracy and promoting education.
   b. To explore the rich resources in these regions and promote the study of
the new science and technology, minority language education would increase learning and productivity.

c. Most minorities live in the border regions of China, and many of them use the same language as their counterparts across the borders. Use of the minority languages is seen as a useful tool to develop border trade and to serve as a window for China.

d. In many areas, minority languages are still the only means by which the Party can make its propaganda known, and therefore these languages are viewed as important tools for raising the political consciousness of the masses (Wang Wei, 1987).

e. Keeping the minority language is an important way to keep the minorities' rich cultural heritage, and to enrich the minority peoples' cultural life.

After the debates and more than ten years of research, the position favouring bilingualism and bilingual education emerged and took over the two extreme positions. All participants in language planning and policy knew the politics involved. After stating his four points on the importance of developing minority languages and scripts, Shenamujila (1989) added a fifth point: during the historical period of socialism, the minority language work should always avoid two extreme tendencies, the first being the preservation of "language purity", and the second being to force minority language speakers to assimilate and get closer to the majority language through administrative methods. This reflected the view of a large group of language policy makers and administrators who believe that neither assimilation nor language purity is practical in China, so a middle road should be taken.
As a result, bilingual education emerged in policy as the best solution for minority language problems in China. The bilingual education policy also found support in the general guidelines of three related laws.

The new Constitution of 1982 stipulates: "All nationalities have the freedom to use and to develop their own spoken and written languages". It also states the objective to "popularize Putonghua, the commonly used language of all nationalities".

In the new Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy, passed in 1984, two items relate to language and education.

Organs of the self-government of national autonomous areas, in accordance with the guideline of the state on education and with the relevant stipulations of the law, shall decide on plans for the development of education in these Areas, on the establishment of various kinds of schools at different levels, and on their educational systems, curricula, the language used in instruction and enrolment procedures.

Schools where most of the students come from national minorities should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages as the media of instruction. Classes for teaching of Han Chinese language shall be offered for senior grades of elementary school or for secondary schools to popularize Putonghua, the common language of the country.

The 1986 Compulsory Education Law of the People's Republic of China stipulates: "Schools should popularize and use Putonghua, the common language of the country... Schools in which the majority of the students are of national minorities may use the spoken and written languages of those national minorities in instruction".

These laws are permissive and allow both languages to be used in schools. Coming after a period of suppression, they are understood generally to support the extension of bilingual education in minority schools.

Since 1979, a few new writing systems have been approved by provincial (regional) and prefecture governments including Bai, Zaiwa, Tujia, Yao, Dulong, and Tu (Zhang
Youjun & Xu Jieshun, 1992, p. 438). Meanwhile, the major forces for minority language work now seem to be moving towards the development of bilingual education programs, since the proposed policy for the new period is bilingual education. So far it can be concluded that the reason for bilingual education policy to prevail among policy makers is their constant efforts in search of a balance between national unity and political stability as reflected in the conflicts between the spread of the Han language and the maintenance of the minority languages. Up to this point it has been agreed that bilingualism, especially bilingual education, is the future direction for minority language speakers. But the following issues in planning, policy, and practice still remain:

1. What is the real purpose of bilingual education?
2. How have policies been implemented?
3. What have been the major problems in implementation?
4. What is the direction for the future?

From a close examination of the current practices and from listening to the talks of many language sector administrators and educators (including minority members), the strongest tendency appears to be considering bilingual education as a transition for minority children to master Putonghua (see discussion in Chapter Six).

Many people who hold the middle position or who simply support bilingual education believe that minority language is a tool which can help the eventual spread of Putonghua. For example, a respected language scholar of the Dong nationality, Zhang Renwei (1986b), whose research focuses on minority languages in Guizhou Province, believes that, based on history and reality, the purpose of implementing minority languages and script is for the benefit of these minorities so that they can learn Putonghua.
In summary, after the Cultural Revolution, in the decade since 1980, the concern to maintain unity in the country and to modernize China have permitted the government minority policies to return to a more tolerant and diversified tendency. Reflected in language policy was the implementation of bilingual education in minority schools. To remedy the damage done during Cultural Revolution, other policies were developed to ease the tension and maintain political stability. For example, a more relaxed birth control policy was implemented for minority population: minorities families were permitted to have more than one child, which was not allowed for the Han majority. Minority religions were once again a legal practice. Some poverty-ridden minority areas have been given special aid and some were exempt from paying taxes to the central government.

In the domain of minority languages work, the government boasted the following achievements apart from creating and improving writing systems for minority languages (summarized from the official presentation at the International Colloquium on Language Planning by Sun Hongkai, 1987). Textbooks and dictionaries have been compiled or translated and newspapers, periodicals, popular science books, novels and classical works have been edited and published in the minority languages. Both the Han and minority languages have been used to print notices and official documents in the autonomous regions. In autonomous areas, avenues, streets, institutions and department stores have been presented with signs in both the Han and the local minority languages. The national paper currency has been printed not only in Mandarin but also in the Mongolian, Tibetan, Uygur, and Zhuang languages.

The government is now also taking credit for other minority language related activities:
-- Since the 1950s the cinema has used dubbed films in more than 20 languages, mainly on feature films but also on popular science, artistic and documentary films.
-- Bilingual teaching with certain minority languages has been implemented.
-- Micro-computers are used for minority language publications (Uygur, Kazak, Kirghiz, and Yi).
-- Over 20 institutes of nationalities have been established in different parts of China, where many minority language scholars, researchers, and teachers have been trained.

These "achievements" have been constantly made known to the minority population through various media in China and announced to the world at international conferences. In later chapters we will find that minority language maintenance and language planning is far from successful according to the government and, as shall be discussed in the next section, minorities themselves have showed great efforts in maintaining their languages. One conclusion can be drawn from this chapter is that a central control system as put in place in China has been able to inflict much more harm by its centralized control over the country, but, by the same token, has greater power to enforce remedial measures.

This ends the analysis of central level minority language policy and planning during three historical periods. What happened to the minority languages which have been affected by these policies and planning? What are the current bilingual programs doing to minority languages? The following section will examine two specific cases of some minority groups and their languages.

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5.5 Case Studies of Central Level/Country-Wide Language Planning: The Yi and Dai

Although the purpose of policy during the first decade after 1949 was to ensure maximum effectiveness of government propaganda and indoctrination of the Party’s ideology, the general policy pointed towards minority self-government, equality, and common development. The minority language policy was set towards full development and active use of minority languages. The evidence has shown that at the time the government considered the development of minority languages to be an important and long-range program. In practice, the planning process, though somewhat primitive, was well organized and fully supported by the State. Such policy and planning have born results which were unprecedented in Chinese history and constitute a positive example of the Party’s attempts to solve national minority questions.

The following 20 years (1958-1978) saw great shifts in policy away from encouraging diversity and tolerance to assimilation (first gradual and then extreme). During the Cultural Revolution, minority work as a whole was destroyed and language development suffered severely.

After more than 40 years of language policy changes, a more detailed review of the results will illustrate the practical impact of central policies. After a brief mention of context, we shall examine planning in relation to two languages and nationalities: the Yi and the Dai.

In 1949, just before the CPC took power, 21 of the 55 national minorities had their own written languages; thirty-four did not. Of those with written languages, three (the Hui, the Manchu, and the She) used Mandarin; six had traditional written languages of their
own, but they were not commonly used (either because the written language was not fully developed or because that only very limited numbers of speakers were using them); the remaining twelve had well developed traditional written languages.

From 1949 to the present, only five intact minority written languages have been used continuously down to the present: Tibetan, Mongolian, Russian, Korean, and Xibo. Even these languages have been influenced by Chinese not only in vocabulary but also in pronunciation. For example, in Korean more and more new vocabulary is borrowed from Chinese including new phonetics; this tendency widens the gap between the minority languages and that spoken in North and South Korea (Xuan Wude, 1989).

The government claims that since 1949 it has helped the following minorities improve or reform their written languages: Yi, Dai, Lahu, Jingpo, Uygur, and Kazak (Shama, Jiajia, 1989). Among them "the Yi standardized written plan" which is currently in use, was cited often as a successful example of minority language work in China (Zhou Qingsheng, 1993; Mahe Muga, 1985, 1989; Wu Jinghua, 1992; Mahe Muga & Yao Changdao, 1993). Yet the 40-year process has been filled with controversy and resistance, as well as triumph.

The case of the development of a Yi writing system is presented here to illuminate several important aspects of minority language planning and policies in China. As was the case with other minority languages, the birth of the Yi standardized written plan has gone through three periods. (1) From 1950 to 1957, the government developed a plan to reform the traditional Yi written language into a Latin-alphabet-based new written form. This was known as "the new Yi written plan". (2) From 1958 to 1979, the Yi minority themselves developed a scheme to preserve the traditional Yi script by standardizing it. This was
known as the "old Yi written plan". (3) From 1980 to present, the government has supported the "old Yi plan".

The Yi nationality is one of the largest minority groups living in the southwest part of China, with a population of over six millions. Of the total, over 1.5 million reside in concentration in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture (founded in October, 1952) in Sichuan Province, the largest Yi area in China. The prefecture has one city and sixteen counties, and covers an area of 60,000 square kilometres. Although there are more than ten other nationality groups including Han, Tibetan, Miao, Mongolian, Lisu, etc. living in the same prefecture, with a combined population of 3.4 million, the Yi constitute 41.65% of the prefecture's total population. Han residents make up 45% and other minorities make up the rest (Shang Jifa, 1989).

As with many other minority groups in China, the Yi linguistic background is extremely complex. The Yi language belongs to the Sino-Tibetan family and has six dialects named by location: East, Southeast, South, West, Central, and Northern dialects. The Yi people in Liangshan Prefecture are Northern dialect speakers. In Yunnan Province, also, there are some Yi people (about 0.3 million) who use the Northern dialect (Mahe Muga, 1985). The Northern dialect itself consists of five local sub-dialects with different pronunciation and vocabulary but little difference in grammar. These five sub-dialects are mutually comprehensible and more than 50% of the Northern dialect speakers use one of the five, the Shengza sub-dialect. Despite the diversity in spoken language, the Yi nationality has its own uniform writing system.

The traditional Yi written language has a long history. Although there is disagreement among the scholars, it seems to have a history of between 1500 and 2000
years. Its original form was pictographic (see sample in Figure 1.1). Later it was developed into a syllabic language written from right to left either in vertically columns or horizontal lines. This traditional Yi written form was used very limitedly, by only 1.7% to 2.75% of the adult population in the early 1950s (Mahe Muga & Yao Changdao, 1993, p.39).

In 1951, as part of the minority language planning effort of the government, a team of language workers headed by the Language Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was sent by the government to the Liangshan area to investigate the language use situation. Soon afterwards they designed a writing system for the Yi minority based on the Latin alphabet. The new script was implemented as an experiment in a Minority Institute and some elementary schools in the region. In 1956, after a few years of organization, one of the seven government language investigation teams, team No.4, came to Liangshan again to further investigate and perfect the Latin-alphabet-based Yi written language plan. The improved Latin based plan was approved by the State Nationalities Affairs Commission in 1957 and the local organizations were given permission to formally implement the plan on a trial basis within the prefecture (Zhou Qingsheng, 1993). However, with the beginning of the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958, like all other newly created or reformed writing systems, the Latin-based Yi written language plan was cancelled before it had a chance to be implemented.

The assimilationist language policy which lasted from 1958 to the end of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s forbade the use of the newly created Latin plan as well as the traditional Yi written form. Han language was the only language to be used lawfully in schools, in government organizations (there were, at the time, no private organizations in China), and in society as a tool to combat illiteracy. Yet the language reality was that the
majority of the Yi people could communicate only in their own mother tongue. The government language policy put the Yi people's life, especially their work and education, in great distress.

Yi people knew that they needed a written language and they also had great emotional feelings towards their own writing system, not Han language, not even the Latin-based written Yi which put them ostensibly closer to the Han language. However, the existing pictographic Yi written form was highly difficult to use and had its problems. Yi intellectuals and elites with the support of the prefecture government began to develop their own more useable written language based on the traditional Yi script. They selected 800 words from the 8000 traditional Yi vocabulary to form a standardized writing system and started to use it among themselves (unofficially). In 1965 this written form was introduced to the Yi people through a little column of the local newspaper that otherwise was published entirely in Chinese. The little column was welcomed by the Yi people, and its script conventions spread quickly in the area. For the first time, the Yi people felt that they had their own written language.

During the same period from the 1960s to the early 1970s, the Yi elites and others wrote continually to the provincial and central government demanding recognition and legal status for the traditional based Yi script. In 1974, responding to the frequent suggestions of the Provincial Nationalities Affairs Commission, the provincial government agreed to standardize the traditional based Yi written form and to implement it while spreading Putonghua at the same time. It took two years (1974-1976) to finish drafting the standardized plan and to start implementation in limited areas for experiment. This plan was formally approved by the Sichuan Provincial government in December 1975 and since 175
then various offices relating to the implementation of the standardized Yi written form have been established or restored at every level within the Yi region. After another four years of experimentation (1976-1979) in eight locations, the prefecture government asked the provincial government to formally implement the plan with the general public. The provincial government supported the plan and in turn reported to the central government for approval. Finally in 1980, the State Council approved the plan and decided to formally popularize it in the Yi prefecture (Zhou Qingsheng, 1993). Hence, this was the beginning of government participation in the locally initiated Yi orthographic planning.

After another several years of research and implementation the traditional based standardized Yi written language plan was made final. In 1986, in a research conference with participation of more than fifty scholars, experts, and language workers, the decision was reached that the plan could be continuously implemented without further change (changes may occur later) (Mahe Muga, 1989). A Han-Yi dictionary was published in 1989.

Thus it took the Yi people more than 30 years of struggle to develop their own standardized orthography. Its social use has been increasing rapidly and its status and prestige also increased and is still rising. The following numbers illustrate the point:

1. According to a government survey, within ten years (1980-1990), 540,000 Yi people became literate (Wu Jinghua, 1992).
2. The Yi language has entered the bilingual education system.
3. A large quantity of publications has been produced, including textbooks, newspapers, magazines, and literature, using the Yi script.
4. The Yi script has become one of the eight working languages at national conferences.
The success (or maybe failure deemed by the central government) of the Yi Standardized Plan was attributed by some scholars (Chen Shilin, 1985) mainly for the merit of the plan itself such as its fewer strokes, simple structure, and the beauty of the characters and its superior function in sound expression. That it was liked by the Yi people was also mentioned. The case of Yi orthography development illustrates a few important aspects of minority language policy and planning in China in the period since the Cultural Revolution.

1. Sometimes things can only happen when initiated and acted upon at the grass roots level. Persistence and local government support are crucial. Minority effort is one of the essential factors affecting language planning and policy. However, all this can be very difficult for small minority groups.

2. Language is part of the characteristics of a nationality. It reflects and represents the culture of its people and therefore is greatly respected and cherished by its people. Ignoring this factor can cause resistance at the least, or even national unrest, which the Chinese government cannot afford to let happen.

3. The relative stability of a language cannot be over looked. Political situations may change overnight, but language cannot be forced to change within a short period. This has proven especially true in large concentrated minority regions. Policies resulted in failure when the stability of a language was ignored.

4. Even in a centrally controlled country like China, the government does not always insist on its own form of language planning when it runs into conflict with the local people's wishes.

The significance of the case of the Yi writing system lies in that it has had a
profound influence as an example for other minority languages in similar situations. Among those reformed languages three others have gone through related experiences.

A case most similar to that of Yi is that of the Dai orthography reform. Like the Yi nationality, Dai people use various dialects and scripts. The most popular ones are Xishuangbanna Dai and Dehong Dai (Zhang Gongjin, 1988, p.24). Other sources reviewed indicated that Dai people use four dialects (Luo Meizhen, 1981, p.42) and perhaps five (Zhang Youjun & Xu Jieshun, 1992, p.429). No doubt the first mentioned two dialects are the most widely used. The Xishuangbanna Dai orthography (hereafter referred to as Xi Dai) has a history of over 700 years (Yang Yingxin, 1990, p.6) and some believe it has existed for over 1000 years. This written script has been shared by those members of the same ethnic group who live across the border from China in Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia.

During the government's first language planning effort in the 1950s, these two Dai written scripts were reformed into the Latin based new scripts. The people who used Xi Dai later demanded that the government restore the use of their original written form, since they believed the Latin based form interfered with their communication with Dai people living across the border. During the 20-year political upheaval the demand was ignored, like all other work in minority languages.

In 1986, after the successful story of the Yi case, the Xi Dai Prefecture People's Congress decided to reintroduce the traditional Xi Dai but allowed also the coexistence of the Latin-based Dai. Five years later, it decided to stop using the later altogether (Zhou Qingsheng, 1993, p.31).

The writing system of the Uygur and Kazak are two cases which have gone through
a similar process which is discussed in detail in Chapter Six. Within two years of the traditional based Yi written forms being approved by the State Council, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regional People's Congress decided to restore the traditional written form of its language derived from Arabic script.

The above examples of failed efforts on the part of the government to draw minority language closer to Putonghua by imposing a Latin-based written form on the minority languages and the success of the minority groups in keeping their traditional orthographies, indicate that the guiding principle of Latinization of all written languages in China has proven to be an unsuccessful policy in minority language planning.

Yet it certainly cannot be concluded that minority language maintenance and development in China has been successful, in fact far from it. In the broad picture, over more than 40 years of struggle, the government's effort in the spreading of Putonghua has been far more successful than the preservation of minority languages. The various types of bilingual programs newly developed, and currently practised, illustrate this point and will be discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.

A close look at the nature of the newly promoted bilingual programs can easily lead to the conviction that most types of bilingual programs currently practised in the country are intended to favour Han language spread rather than the maintenance of minority languages. But it remains uncertain whether the intentions of policy makers will have the intended effect in the medium or long term.

5.6 Conclusion

The examination of the history of the Chinese Communist language policy and
planning, and the analysis of the current state of minority languages resulting from these policies and planning have led to the following conclusions:

1. The government policy of spreading Putonghua among all peoples living within the borders of China has been steadily gaining ground, and seems to be the trend of the future of language development in China. Its spreading power is determined by the organized effort of the government in education and in society, backed by its strong economic influence, the large Han population, and political power. However, minority groups with large populations and determination may indeed be able to preserve and even develop their languages. But under current conditions they cannot stop the spread of Putonghua. The current bilingual education system in China will at best allow the development of both minority and Han languages and in most cases will eventually result in the replacement of the minority languages with Putonghua.

Attitudes among some of the new generations successfully educated in Putonghua can be illustrated by one example. In late 1995, a Mongolian scholar who came to Canada on an academic exchange told us about his own situation. He grew up in a mixed area and was trained and educated through Putonghua. With this he gained a quite prominent position in a government office, but he can not speak his own language. He told the people in a conference that he wished he could speak his own language and now urges his teenage son to study it. But the son refuses to learn it since he is advancing quite well in the Han educational system and sees himself as entering one of the prestigious universities and getting a good job and good living conditions in the future.

2. Statistics show the slow yet steady growth of language shift among Chinese national minority groups, in spite of the 'success' stories of Yi, Dai, Uygur, and Kazak. The
process of back and forth from Latin based to traditional based languages has cost minorities over 20 years of language development and has undermined language stability. The damage will last for years to come. For example, among some nationalities, the language reform process has created a new generation of illiterates who have mastered the Latin based written form and know nothing about the traditional system. This is especially true of Dai, Uygur and Kazak.

3. The struggle for minority language maintenance is still fighting an up-hill battle. The few 'success' cases have not secured their script from the further invasion of the Latin-based written form. Among many scholars and policy makers, Latinization is still considered the correct direction for future language planning in China. The several newly created written languages for minorities are all Latin based. For the Yi, Dai, Uygur, and Kazak, the judgement is still not final and the preservation of their traditional forms is not guaranteed. For example, the Latin-alphabet-based Han phoneticization plan is said to be still used as an pronunciation marker for all these languages.

Recently, a large number of the new Dai elite and the people who have mastered the Latin-based written form asked the government to continue to use it. Their requirements were supported by other language workers and scholars in a recent language research conference. They argue that the restoration of traditional Dai was a hasty, irrational and emotional action which lacked a scientific base (Sun Zhu, 1995b, p.17). They argue that the Latin-based written form is technically more advanced, standardized, and easier to learn as compared with the traditional one. Besides, they believe that Dai people across the border are upgrading their language and moving away from the traditional form. Other arguments against the use of the traditional written language are based on
practicality and economics. They quote the fact that it takes much more time to set up print for the traditional script and therefore it is more expensive. Some sources claim that some people who are proposing the use of the traditional Dai are doing so for political benefit for themselves, but still prefer to use the Latin-based form themselves.

As for the Uygur and Kazak languages, scholars are arguing that the reason for the failure of the Latin-based forms is circumstantial.

4. With the stable policy of spreading Putonghua, and a well organized education system, Putonghua has been gaining ground and continues to be more and more popular among the Chinese national minorities. With the changes in the political agenda and the repeated changes in minority language planning, many minority languages ended up in disarray but with a more developed knowledge base for future development.

Through the analysis of this chapter, the author concludes that the policy choices made at the national level are essentially the product of Party agendas including individual and party values, the interplay among the concerns and visions of the leaders, the behaviour of minority sector bureaucracies, and the interests and resources of the minority groups. The policy decisions are implemented through both persuasive and coercive strategies. The minority language policies have varied from fostering diversification to forced assimilation, depending on the different political and social agendas of the Party at certain periods. One theme throughout the chapter is that, over the past 40 years, minority language policies have been far from stable, changing from extreme to extreme before assuming the present intermediate course.

\footnote{The validity of the comparison depends primarily upon the current technology for typesetting. Modernization will eradicate this argument for a script that can be set via a large computer keyboard.}
In spite of the planning efforts dictated by the Party’s political agendas organized from the Centre, some minority groups such as the Yi and Dai have managed successfully to participate, influence, and alter the policy decisions to achieve minority language maintenance.
6.1 Introduction

Following the analysis of over 45 years of minority language policy and planning at the national level, in this chapter there will be an examination of minority language planning at the regional (provincial) and local levels, with emphasis on macro-micro relations and various types of bilingual education programs reflecting policy implementation. The framework for examination and analysis is similar to that of the previous chapter. First, an overview of the region will be given, including its sociocultural, political, economic, and linguistic situations, and the history and tradition of the imperial policies towards the region and their influence on current policies. Second, the pertinent bureaucracies at various levels within the region, including their positions, roles, and relations within the larger political apparatus will be mapped out. Third, an examination of the Communist language policy and planning process and its impact on the maintenance or loss of minority languages as well as on the spread of official Putonghua. Three cases are presented involving three minorities in the region, each one at a distinct political level to illuminate the policy and planning process:

1. Uygur and Kazak writing system reform and the spread of Putonghua at the regional level (the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region).

3. Bilingual education for Xibo children at the county level (the Chabucha'er Xibo Autonomous County in the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture).

These cases illustrate, on the one hand, the relationships of policy processes through various levels, and on the other hand, the impact of the Communist language policy and implementation on the languages of different minority groups. The relationships—conflicts and compromises—between the Han language spread and minority language maintenance are the key issues for minority language education policy at all levels.

The purpose of this section is to provide an account of the initiation, development and implementation of present day language policy towards the minorities within one region, which reflects the country's general policy on minorities and the relationships between the central government and the minority populations. Such analysis not only illuminates current language policy and practice in China, but also suggests where they might lead in future. Such a discussion may also help disentangle the complicated relationships between the central government and local policy makers, which in turn leads to an understanding of the entire policy process.

6.2 Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region

After a month of field research in Gansu province, where the Tibetans and the Hui are the largest minority groups, I took a train ride deeper into the north and west to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The train seemed to take me further away from
agricultural land and bigger city centres into the vast greyish black Gobi Desert. I arrived at Urumqi, the capital city of the region, in early April. Even though I was met by two familiar faces, Mr. Wang, the director of the foreign affairs office of Xinjiang University and Ms. Zhang from the Regional Education Commission, both of whom I had met before in Canada during their official visit, and even though this was not my first visit to the region, I still felt that I was now in a strange land. People crowded around in the railway station and on the streets speaking in languages foreign to me. They dressed differently, and their faces seemed to me more Caucasian than Han Chinese. In and out of the railway station all signs were in two languages: Putonghua and Uygur; the Uygur, looking like Arabic script, always above the Putonghua. The region, its native people, their cultures and languages, and their relationships with the Han and the Beijing government all seemed to me a mystery to be revealed.

The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (established on October 1, 1955), the largest geographic region/province in China, is located in the far northwest of the country. It covers an area of 1.65 million square kilometres, one sixth of the country's total land. Today it borders on eight countries — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, (three new Republics of the former Soviet Union), Russia, the Republic of Mongolia, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Within China, it borders on three provinces/regions: Gansu, Qinghai, and Tibet (see map, Figure 3.3). Xinjiang is currently home to 47 nationalities of which 13 form the region's major population, including the Han, many of whom have been living there for generations. The total population of the region is 13.8 million with the Uygur being the largest group and the Han second (see Table 6.1). A brief review of Xinjiang and its importance to central control throughout Chinese history provides a context for the
Table 6.1 Major Population of Xinjiang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>6,431,015</td>
<td>46.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Han</td>
<td>5,386,312</td>
<td>38.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>1,010,543</td>
<td>7.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>611,816</td>
<td>4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>128,050</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>126,146</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>30,174</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>29,640</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>10,853</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>9,775</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>5,224</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Daur</td>
<td>4,899</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>3,673</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,836,399</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Based on the population census in 1986.

understanding of present day policy.

6.2.1. Xinjiang and Its Importance to Central Control: An Historical Review

According to Han officials, Xinjiang ("the new frontier") was first recorded as formally becoming part of China as early as 138 B.C. when the Han Dynasty court sent Zhang Qian as an Imperial Envoy to the "Western Region". In 59 B.C. the Han Dynasty officially
established an administrative institute—the Xiyu Duhufu—to govern the whole Region (Zhou Chongjing, 1990). Since then, this vast and resource-filled land, with its people of many nationalities, has occupied an important place in the central control by the rulers of China. Most of the natives of this area are Muslims of various ethnic groups, the largest being the Uygurs. Unlike most minority groups in the southern part of China, these minority peoples such as Uygurs, Kazaks, Kirghizs, Uzbeks, Tatar, and Tajiks are different from the Han in race, language, and costume, as well as religion. They are people of fair skins, high-bridged noses, deep eye-sockets, and some have heavy beards.

Throughout history this desolate northwestern region has seen continuing wars, with conflicts among the native populations and with various external powers, pitting the native people, at various times, against Russia, Turkic principalities, and central China. The area's importance in early years lay in the overland connection between Asia and Eastern Europe known as the "Great Silk Road".

Xinjiang was first conquered by Chinese rulers during the Han Dynasty between 73 and 97 A.D. With the demise of that dynasty in the third century, the Chinese lost control of the region and did not regain it until the Tang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.). Under the Tang emperors, the Chinese had their greatest influence on the region and the relationship between them was increasingly that of equals (Harris, 1993).

Like most of Central Asia, Xinjiang was later overrun by Mongols, who later, during the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368 A.D.), ruled all of China (Wheeler, 1963).

Between dynasties, the region was lost to the Chinese and other powers such as Russia. It was finally recovered during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) (ruled by non-Han people known as the Manchus), and remained part of China until the present with the
exception of a few short years (1944-49) of independence when the Uygurs formed the Republic of East Turkistan. One of the Qing Emperors, Qian Long (1736-1796), has been praised in Chinese history as the one who finally completed the conquest of Xinjiang. Later in the Qing Dynasty, Xinjiang was lost to a Muslim rebellion from 1862-1878, but it was again recaptured towards the end of the Qing dynasty by a Chinese general, Zuo Zhongtang. In 1884, he established Xinjiang as a province, legally equal to the other provinces, and therefore, in the mind of Chinese rulers, it became inalienable and inseparable from the Chinese nation. The final conquest of Xinjiang and the policy of the Qing government will be discussed briefly, for they reflect the basic rationale behind the policies of all rulers toward the region throughout Chinese history.

The basic policy of the Manchu government towards the Muslims and the northwest was twofold. On the one hand the Manchu government insisted on holding Xinjiang by military control; on the other hand it tried to keep a delicate balance of power among the different ethnic groups in the area by planned migration of peoples with different ethnic backgrounds from different parts of inland China (middle part of China) to Xinjiang and by refusing to send Han Chinese to be leading officials in the area (General Zuo Zongtang, a Han, for the longest time struggled under the two Manchu generals and eventually gained his title only after winning battles and arguments in the Manchu Court).

Xinjiang was lost to Muslim rebels in 1865, and the Russians invaded and captured the city of Ily in 1871. The Manchu army, under General Zuo, recaptured the area in 1873. General Zuo believed in the Chinese tradition of rehabilitating or transforming the "aliens" by indoctrination of Confucian teachings. He promoted schools in the conquered
districts and issued books to the Muslims. He requested an increase in the quota of
degrees granted to the conquered area. He expected to gain the loyalty of the Muslims
through their education and participation in the government (Chu Wendjang, 1966).

What led every empire-builder to this desolate frontier was, first, its strategic value
to national defence, and second, its natural resources. Xinjiang consists of two big basins
surrounded by towering mountains, with several large deserts. The traditional life style and
activities give the region an atmosphere similar to that of the North American wild west. Its
western frontiers are very mountainous and have a cold climate. In many places the border
can be closed by snow for nearly half the year. It has always been seen as a natural
border, easy to defend but hard to cross. As Emperor Qian Long of the Qing Dynasty said
in an edict, "Because of the strategic advantages of the natural defence line along the
western frontier of Xinjiang, the recovery of Xinjiang would discourage any possible foreign
invasion. In the long run, it saved more money than to move the frontier inland and so
invite numerous international wars" (Chu Wendjang, 1966, p.170).

After thousands of years of trying to exert influence and control of the region, the
present Communist government certainly does not want to lose it again, which, according
to the imperial tradition, would dishonour them for generations to come. As General Zuo
said, when stating his reasons to the Qing Court to gain the approval of his suggestion for
the recovery of Xinjiang: "In case history condemns those responsible in the future, I
cannot take it" (Chu Wendjang, 1966, p.176).

In 1949, after the Communist victory in China, Mao Zedong called the then leaders
of the Republic of East Turkistan to meet in Beijing. The plane with these leaders on board,
however, crashed, killing everyone aboard. The next year the Chinese army moved into
the leaderless region, and so the official histories claim, Xinjiang was peacefully reunited with China (Mickleburgh, *The Globe and Mail*, Feb. 12, 1997).

Like various rulers in history, the Communist government realizes only too well the importance of maintaining control of the region, and their policies are, to a large extent, the same as those of the Qing Dynasty. It had exactly the same policy as the Qing’s to maintain military control over the region for national defence. As expressed in an ancient yet well known Chinese metaphor, the relationship between Xinjiang and inland China is often compared to the relationship between the lips and the teeth: "if the lips are gone, the teeth are exposed" (chun wang chi han). In other words, Xinjiang is considered as critical in safeguarding the body of China. Keeping a delicate balance among various minority groups in the region is also practised, as under the Qing government. The difference between the Communist policy towards Xinjiang and that of the Manchu was that migration of the Han population to the region was encouraged. In fact, at times it was deliberate and planned such as during the Cultural Revolution.

Xinjiang has had a great influence in Sino-Soviet relations, and in their international rivalry. As analysed by Whiting (1960), two of China’s minority regions share long borders with the former Soviet Union, Xinjiang in the west and Inner Mongolia in the east, but conditions are different in these two regions. In the east, a predominantly Russian population faces the solidly Han and Manchu population, but in the west, Turkic-Muslim groups live on both sides of the border. The earlier co-operation and friendship between China and the Soviet Union seems to have been based on a common policy of keeping their minorities under control and absorbing their cultures into a common unified culture of Communism. After the break of friendly Sino-Soviet relationships in early 1960, each
country charged the other with poor treatment of its minorities, and each side tried to portray itself as a state in which all nationalities were treated equally. In the mid-70’s Chinese broadcasts portrayed the USSR as a Russian-dominated colonialist regime oppressing such areas as the Ukraine and Central Asia, and the Peking Review regularly denounced Soviet policy as "another fig leaf for forcible Russification" (Dreyer, 1976, p.251). Soviet minority language policy was likewise denounced as a policy of assimilation. Brezhnev was quoted as ordering that every citizen of the USSR should master Russian and that the Russian language should be taught even in preschool and child care institutions. China, of course, was accused by the Soviet Union of similar oppression.

In 1991, the newly gained independence of the three former Soviet republics on the other side of the border of Xinjiang created new problems for the Chinese government. Chinese propaganda is now turning out all sorts of historical "facts" intended to prove that Xinjiang has been an inseparable part of the motherland for 2000 years, and is warning people to fight against the separatist plotting by reactionaries at home and abroad to keep them from stirring up hostility among nationalities, and splitting the unity of China.

Xinjiang has always been fiercely defended by the central government of China. As has been shown, one reason for the concern for the area is its strategic location. Another, which is increasingly important as China modernizes, is the fact that Xinjiang has great riches of natural resources including 81.4% of the total variety of China’s minerals, and extremely rich deposits of coal and oil. Over 100 kinds of minerals have been ascertained. Several booming oil towns have been set up overnight. One recently discovered oil field (tuha youtian) is said to be among the largest in the world. Xinjiang is also home of the fine-wool sheep and the "heavenly horses". Its cattle industry and its fruits and melons are
known far and wide, especially the Turpan grapes and Hami melons.

With the recent economic development in China, Xinjiang stands out not only for its natural resources but also for its cross border trade especially with the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. Due to the similar customs of people on both sides, it has a long history of cross border trade going back to the times of the ancient silk road. It is the only direct road on land connecting China with the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. After 1949, the former Soviet Union used to draw 90% of Xinjiang’s foreign trade. The five new republics, which used to depend almost exclusively on the Soviet Union, are now willing to trade directly with China. Up to now, 14 border crossings have been opened and Xinjiang has more open border trade than any other Chinese province. It has become the most important road for exporting and importing for western China. Trade started in 1986 and that year exports were U.S. $4.4 million. By 1990 the value of exported goods had increased to U.S. $65.5 million (Ze Ermin, 1994).

With its unique geographic configuration and the various minorities who have exotic characteristics in language, religion and customs, Xinjiang attracts a large number of tourists. For example, Ily Kazak prefecture alone, in western Xinjiang, had received 1,100 tourist groups from January to July in 1992, adding 6.3 million U.S. dollars to the economy (Ze Ermin, 1994, p.298).

Xinjiang is the third most sparsely populated area in China, next to its neighbours the Tibetan Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province. Xinjiang’s population constitutes only 1.3% of China’s total population with only 7.9 people per square kilometre in 1982, and with three billion mu (200 million hectares) of uncultivated arable land still available. In 1949, Xinjiang had a total population of about 4.3 million with 75.9% Uygur, 10.2%
Kazaks and only 6.7% Han (Aximu Turdi, 1994). But from 1953 to 1985, 2.95 million people migrated into the region, which constitute 21.67% of the Region's total population (Zhou Chongjing, 1990, p.4). Among the new arrivals, the majority are Han, 2.06 million (p.36). Over the years, there have been big changes in population among various nationalities (see Table 6.2).

As can be seen, over the years the Han have increased most sharply, from 6.7% in 1949 to 40.4% in 1982, and have thereby reduced the percentage of the Uygur and Kazak population, Uygurs dropping from 75.9% to 45.5% and Kazaks from 10.2% to 6.9% (Aximu Turdi, 1994a). According to the Party, these Han settlers are there to help the development of the region. But this population shift—roughly 170,000 per year for the 29 years 1953-1982—certainly suggests that Han migration to minority regions is one of the Communist policies to strengthen control over minority areas, with the hope of integrating the local population into the Han culture.

For all the above reasons, Xinjiang has an increasing importance to the central government. However, this wild west poses a great challenge to central control, with its strong separatist tendencies, distinct culture, foreign influences, local resistance and the great distance from Beijing (about 4000 kilometres). In the three most northern districts of the region (Ili, Tacheng, and Altay), the stronghold of the former East Turkistan Republic, tension between Han Chinese and the local Uygurs and Kazaks is always at the point of explosion. This is an area that has throughout Chinese history seen many uprisings. A recent anti-Chinese riot erupted in Yining, the capital city of Ily Kazak prefecture, on February 11, 1997, shortly before the death of Deng Xiaoping (Feb. 20, 1997). Shortly after that on February 25, just five days after Deng's death, at least two bombs rocked the
Table 6.2 Population Growth in Xinjiang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,333,400</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4,783,603</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,270,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>3,291,145</td>
<td>75.95</td>
<td>3,607,609</td>
<td>75.42</td>
<td>3,991,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>291,021</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>332,126</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>2,321,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>443,655</td>
<td>10.24</td>
<td>506,390</td>
<td>10.59</td>
<td>489,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>122,501</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>134,215</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>264,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>52,453</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>58,346</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>70,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>66,145</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>70,926</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>69,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>11,668</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>12,738</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>17,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>13,486</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>14,460</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>16,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>12,174</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>13,580</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>7,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>5,926</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>6,892</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>2,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>19,452</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>22,186</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daur</td>
<td>1,805</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>2,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2,909</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: P = Population

city of Urumqi, killing at least two people and injuring at least 60 others (Reuter News Agency, *The Globe and Mail*, February, 26, 1997). Chinese officials condemned these as pro-independence and separatist activities among the Uygur minority. As Justin Rudelson, an American researcher on Uygur nationalism, observed: "All it takes is a Han bus driver to run over a Uygur kid, and you have got a riot" (quoted by Mickleburgh, *The Globe and Mail*, February 12, 1997). The political stability of the central government and a sensitive policy towards the region, backed by a strong army, seem to make up the formula by which the government hopes to keep the region relatively stable. As Albait Abdureschit, the president of the region, said recently, "The problem of separatism has existed for a long time and will continue to exist. We need to fight the separatists relentlessly. It will be a long and complex struggle" (Mickleburgh, *The Globe and Mail*, Feb. 12, 1997).

Since 1949, the Communist government has tried to instill a sense of Chinese patriotism in the people of the region, as did the Qing official Zuo Zongtang. Large numbers of Han cadres have been sent to the region in the hope of shortening the process of integration. Various leaders made inspection visits to the region to emphasize its importance to China and to demonstrate the Party's determination to keep the region.

For example, in May, 1983, the top leader Hu Yaobang (then the General Secretary of the CPC), visited the region and stressed the importance of unity among all nationalities. He called on regional leaders and administrators to stress four important points:
1. Xinjiang is the largest border region in China. To overlook its position in the big family of China would be a big mistake.

2. Xinjiang is China's biggest autonomous region, with many nationalities.

3. Xinjiang is of significant importance to national defence and the nation's modernization.

4. Most of all, Xinjiang, in fact the whole northwest region, can play an extremely important role in building China into a strong and first class socialist country (The Editing Department of Contemporary Chinese Nationality Work 1989, p.393).

It is thereby clear that the Manchu policy to hold Xinjiang and to keep a delicate balance of power between various peoples has also been practised by the Communist government. In fact, the Communists carry the policy even further, through education and immigration. The preferred method has been to keep control by other means if possible, but by military force if necessary. Communist policies, including language and education policies, have helped to bring Xinjiang closer to central control than any previous rulers in Chinese history had managed.

In view of all these special historical circumstances, language issues in the region have always been dealt with for their political and economic significance rather than strictly linguistic values. Currently, for the Party, economic development is the top priority for other parts of China, but for Xinjiang unity ranks above even the economy.

6.2.2. The Sociolinguistic Situations of Xinjiang

The geographic distribution of the nationalities in Xinjiang is in a pattern of large
concentration and small segregation, just the opposite of the geographic distribution patterns of most minorities in the rest of the country as noted earlier. The Uygurs, the largest ethnic group in the region, reside all over the region and are particularly concentrated in the south. The Han are mainly in the north. The rest of the nationalities more or less live among Uygurs and Han. Some minority groups such as Kazak, Mongols, Kirghiz, Hui, Xibo, and Tajik live in small concentrations within their own autonomous prefectures or counties, while the rest of the minority groups are scattered among them as well as the Uygurs and the Han. For example, 76% of the Kazaks are concentrated in Ily Kazak Autonomous Prefecture and over 90% of the Xibo reside within Chabucha'er Xibo Autonomous County (Arximu Turdi, 1994a).

The pattern of distribution among various nationalities results in a complex situation of language use. Among the 13 major nationalities in Xinjiang, the Han, Hui, and Manchu use Mandarin, while the rest all have their own languages. Among those, five nationalities (Uygur, Kazak, Kirghiz, Uzbek, and Tatar) use different languages belonging to the Turkic branch of the Altaic language family. Among other languages, Russian and Tajik are both from the Indo-European family but belong to different sub-families. Daur is spoken by a group which uses Chinese and some minority languages in writing.

Uygur is the major language used in the region. According to the 1982 census, most Kazaks use the Uygur language as well as their own. Half of the Mongolians in Xinjiang are bilingual with Uygur as their second language, and about one third with Putonghua as their second language. Half of the Kirghiz use the Uygur language as a second language. Among the Xibo, the middle-aged and older generations use Uygur as their second language but the younger generation has mostly adopted Putonghua instead. Altogether,
over six million people within the region use Uygur, either as a first or a second language. However, only about 0.9% of the Uygur population understand Putonghua, and most of them can speak it only at a survival level.

A 1994 survey categorized the language use in the region as follows (Aximu Turdi, 1994):

1. Within their family, in their village, and in the markets of their towns, Uygurs use only their own language.

2. In the township at the county level and above, such as prefecture or district capitals, and in the cities such as Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, Uygurs communicate in their own language among themselves, but when communicating with other groups such as Uzbek, Kirghiz, Tatar, and Kazak, both Uygur and other languages are used. That is to say, when both sides understand the Uygur language, it is used; when one side does not understand the Uygur language the communication is carried out by each speaking his/her own language, for these languages are mutually comprehensible (Tajik is not included here, because it belongs to a different language family).

3. In hospitals and shopping centres of the cities, and in townships at all levels, there are many Han cadres and employees, who mostly do not understand Uygur. Since not many Uygurs understand Putonghua, interpreters are used for communication. In the absence of interpreters, gestures are used to assist communication.

4. In various conferences at the regional level, both Uygur and Putonghua are used. In speeches and in small group discussions, Uygur, Putonghua, Kazak,
Mongolian, Kirghiz languages are usual, but Tajik and Xibo are also used occasionally.

5. Xinjiang's film, television, and broadcasting agencies at the regional level use three languages: Putonghua, Uygur, and Kazak. Such agencies at the district level and below use six languages: Uygur, Putonghua, Kazak, Mongolian, Kirghiz, and Xibo. Tajik is also used occasionally.

6. Six languages are currently used in primary and secondary education: Putonghua, Uygur, Kazak, Mongolian, Xibo, and Kirghiz. Their distribution in schools is listed in Table 6.3.

In post-secondary education, Putonghua and Uygur are used, and Kazak is used very limitedly. In some higher institutions, Uygur is not used, even the Uygur instructors use Putonghua in the classrooms.

When the Communists took over Xinjiang in 1949, there were very few schools in the region. The entrance rate for school was only 19.8% among eligible children and the illiteracy rate was over 90% (This was reduced to around 18% by 1987) (Guo Yaobang, 1987).

Seven nationalities in Xinjiang are Islamic, and their religion traditionally had a major influence on education. The first reform the Communists insisted on was to abolish all religious schools in Xinjiang, but under strong pressure from the religious sectors, since 1952 two hours of optional religious teaching has been allowed in elementary schools (Xinjiang Education Yearbook, 1991, p.5). The language use situations among various nationalities make it obvious that linguistic diversity is one of the major challenges to curriculum development and instruction in Xinjiang. As noted above, six languages are
used in the school system. Most of the Tatars and the Uzbeks choose to use the Uygur writing system and most of them send their children to Uygur schools or classes. The Tajiks do not have their own written language and choose to use Uygur textbooks as well.

Table 6.3  Language Distribution in Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Languages</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle Schools</th>
<th>High Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Schools</td>
<td>Number of Classes</td>
<td>Number of Students Enrolled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>3,181</td>
<td>28,713</td>
<td>828,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>3,507</td>
<td>32,230</td>
<td>909,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>8,551</td>
<td>171,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>18,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>3,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>16,749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: XUARERI (ed.) Xinjiang Education Yearbook (1991)

while the teachers use Tajik for explanations and assisting discussion. Kirghiz used to use Uygur written language in schools too, but since the restoration of their written language, they have started to return to their own language. There are three school systems divided by the use of language as media of instruction: the Han schools, the minorities schools, and the "joint schools". Of the "joint schools", there are two types:
(1) Han plus a single minority. Some of these are Han schools in which there are minority classes; others are minority schools which also have Han classes.

(2) Several minorities. Schools in which there are some combinations of Uygurs, Kazaks, Tatars, Uzbeks, and Kirghizs.

Apart from the Han, only five out of twelve minorities have their own written forms: Uygur, Kazak, Mongolian, Kirghiz, and Xibo. (The Xibo language was developed from the Manchu script.) Mongolians in Xinjiang used a writing system developed from a dialect which is different from the major written languages used by Mongolians in other parts of China, but in recent years, they began to shift to the use of unified Mongolian script used in other parts of China, especially in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Tajiks currently use the Uygur writing system, although for the past 30 years they have repeatedly asked for government help in creating a written form for their own language. The obstacle to achieving a form for their own language is said to be two opposing opinions among the Tajik themselves (Yang Bingyi, 1991a, p.23). The Tatars and Uzbeks all previously had their own Arabic-based written languages, but most of them have shifted to use the Uygur written language and some of them have adopted the Kazak written forms. Some of the Russians have also adopted the Han written language. During the past 40 years, among the five minority written languages, three, Uygur, Kazak, and Mongolian, have gone through major changes which have caused a big set-back in their language development.

Bilingual education policies and programs have played a significant part in bringing about the current state of minority languages, and will continue to influence the future of these languages.
6.2.3. Bureaucracies and the Regional Policy Process

Xinjiang was officially declared to have been peacefully liberated on September 26, 1949. On December 17 of that year, the regional (provincial at the time) government was established. Based on the CPC's policy of regional autonomy, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region was established on October 1, 1955. As in all other provinces and regions, the political structure of the region mirrors that of the Centre. At the establishment of the PRC, the top leaders determined that the Party must dominate the system, from the Centre to the smallest unit of each village, such as a brigade. Therefore at the regional level, at the top, under the direct control of the Centre is the Regional Politburo Standing Committee under which are the Regional Party Congress, the Military Affairs Commission, the Regional People's Congress, and the Regional Government (see Figure 6.1).

Within the regional government there are three administrative levels, duplicating the central system in Beijing: regional, prefectures/districts, and counties/cities. The regional government has direct control over two cities, eight districts, and five autonomous prefectures. There are 79 counties/cities and six autonomous counties below the districts and the prefectures (Guo Yaobang, 1987) (see Figure 6.2). Among them, 35 are border counties ( [XUARERI], Xinjiang Education Year Book, 1991, p.1)

The power of autonomy is exercised within limits prescribed by the Constitution and the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy. The laws and policies of the state are to be implemented in light of existing local situations. How much latitude there is for the local bureaucracies depends on the local area's relative importance to the Centre and also on how much control the Centre really has. In Xinjiang,
all government agencies and institutions are headed by more or less equal members of both the Han and the minorities. The most obvious pattern seems to be that in most cases, such as the Xinjiang University, the position of the Party Secretary is occupied by a Han, and the President might be a Uygur or another minority member. The regulation for distributing power positions in most government organs is 40% Han and 60% minorities from various ethnic groups.

The major regional government organs involved in language work, including policy, planning, and implementation, are introduced in the following brief descriptions.

1. The Nationality Spoken and Written Language Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region (NSWLCXUAR)

I met and talked with the head of the Commission (a Han) at his own home for an afternoon. He was just as eager to know what was going on in Canada as I was about Xinjiang. Soon after I started to conduct the research in China, it became obvious to me that one usually learns more by spending a casual afternoon or evening with an official alone than being in an arranged meeting for a whole day with a number of officials, a situation which I was put into in many cases.

This Commission was first established in 1950, shortly after the Communists took power. It was then called the Guidance Committee of Minority Spoken and Written
Languages. It was changed to the Research and Guidance Committee in 1955, when regional autonomy was established. At that time it had 40 members. With the reform of the Uygur and Kazak languages in 1959, it was changed to the Written Language Reform Commission and its membership increased to 60. It was abolished during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, and was finally restored in 1976 with its current name. Its working membership has increased from 55 when it was first restored, to 98 in 1986. Currently the Commission consists of three sections including eight offices, three affiliated organizations and four subordinate commissions (see Figure 6.3). Two sections are under the direct leadership of the Commission; the third is subjected to dual leadership by the Commission and the prefecture government.

The Commission is an administrative organ under the regional government. Its function is to implement Party and government policies (from both the Centre and the region) in languages, and to investigate and report to the regional government on language work in the region. Its major tasks include: standardizing minority languages; carrying out research; organizing language creation, reformation, and popularization; planning regional language work; translating and publishing works in minority languages; training language workers; supervising related offices at lower levels; and spreading and popularizing Putonghua and the Han Phoneticization Plan (Pinyin). As Che Zhangtai, the Deputy Chairman of the State Language Working Commission, summarized in the Second National Language Conference in 1986, the major task of various levels of language agencies is to carry out the new policy decided by the central government. The Commission is thus in charge of most, if not all, language work outside the school system.
2. The Education Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region

This Commission is under the dual leadership of the regional government and the State Education Commission. It is responsible for the school system of the entire region from kindergarten to university with an emphasis on educating minorities of different
language and cultural backgrounds. If the NSWLCXUAR is more concerned with the language issues for the society, the Education Commission is focused on the policy and implementation of language and education in schools. It has its own research office on bilingual education and a Han language education research office. I had the opportunity to interview several Deputy Ministers of the Commission who also introduced me to language educators and researchers from one of the offices in the Commission. One of them was in charge of research on how to spread Putonghua effectively in minority schools with whom I had lengthy interviews with him and accompanied him to a bilingual kindergarten and two bilingual schools in Urumqi, which visit I will discuss in detail later.

3. The Regional Nationalities Affairs Commission

Again this is an organization under the dual leadership of the regional government as well as the State Nationalities Affairs Commission. Although its work concerns all aspects of minority issues, minority language is one of the areas in which the Commission keeps an interest.

Although the powers exercised by the regional level agencies are all delegated to them from the Centre, the regional agencies are very powerful actors in the political system. How these agencies carry out their language related work and how they deal with the Centre, with the agencies below and among themselves will become clear through the concrete cases presented in the next section. (The prefecture and county level administrative structures will be discussed in detail in the sections which focus on these levels).
6.3. Cases of Language Planning, Policy, and Implementation

This section examines several cases of language planning, policy change, and bilingual education within the region. At the regional level two cases are examined. The first case concerns over 20 years of Uygur and Kazak writing system reform (from 1959-1982) to illustrate a struggle between language integration and language maintenance at the regional level and a relationship between the national level planning and regional level implementation. The second case illustrates the government's effort of spreading Putonghua in the region to demonstrate the process of planning of the official language spread. The third case, at the prefecture level, is about the bilingual situation among the Kazak nationalities at the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture to explore the relationship between the prefecture and the higher level of administration. The fourth case, at the county level, focuses on bilingual education for the school children of the Xibo nationality.

These cases will help to illuminate policy process through a series of language planning activities with the interaction of pertinent agencies at various levels and to show the effects of these policies and planning on the minority languages within the region.

6.3.1. The Reform and Implementation of Uygur and Kazak Written Scripts: Language Maintenance or Language Shift

Uygur and Kazak writing system reform seemed to be a very sensitive topic, and there have rarely been any written materials on it. During meetings with various personnel, it was obvious to me that this topic still presents great controversy and the people to whom I spoke avoided discussing it in detail. It was only after lengthy probing with various
pertinent people, mostly individually, that information and opinions began to emerge. Others, although hesitant to talk about it, did offer some written records or directed me to other persons who might have some knowledge about the matter. After a while the picture of the puzzle gradually got pieced together.

Records indicate that the Uygur written script was developed around the fourth century (Li Sen, 1953). The form of this script has been changed several times (see Figure 6.4) due to over a thousand years of sociocultural, political, and economic change. In more recent times, the greatest influence on Uygur writing systems reforms have been the former Soviet Union. After the Soviet Communists took power in 1917, the Soviet government started language reforms for various nationalities within its borders. In 1921, the Soviet government designed an Arabic-based Uygur script consisting of a 27 letter alphabet. Later, around 1930, the script was reformed to a Latinized form consisting of a 32 letter alphabet. Still later, in 1937, Uygur scholars in Xinjiang, using the Soviet model as a base, developed a new Arabic-based Uygur script. Finally, in 1946, the Soviet Uygur writing system was reformed into the Cyrillic alphabet to be closer to the Russian language. Meanwhile, the Uygurs and Kazaks in Xinjiang have used Arabic-based written scripts since the sixteenth century (Xinjiang Education Yearbook, 1991, p.87). Such written forms have been widely used among the two groups. Even the well respected linguists Fu Maoji & Zhu Zhining (1964) admitted that these Arabic-based written scripts could basically fulfill the functions of use. Therefore language planners were faced with a decision of whether to keep and standardize the Arabic-based traditional Uygur and
## Figure 6.4 The Development of Uygur Written Language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>The Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ancient Uygur script before the 12th century</td>
<td>图片</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930 Latinized Uygur Alphabet made by USSR</td>
<td>a, b, c, q, d, e, t, l, g, o, r, s, t, f, i, n, y, z, i, o, e, u, y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937 Arabic-based Xinjiang Uygur Reform Script</td>
<td>图片</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946 USSR developed Slavic-based Uygur Alphabet</td>
<td>a, b, c, q, d, e, t, l, g, o, r, s, t, f, i, n, y, z, i, o, e, u, y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951 Reformed Arabic-based Uygur Alphabet</td>
<td>图片</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 Latin-based Uygur Script</td>
<td>ھاروکاکلار یویتمو یورت یورت یوریپ ھاممینى 8ب کۆزى بیلان گۆررلایدەوە. (گەیەکەمەر ھەرکیکی)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 Restored to Arabic-based Uygur Script</td>
<td>图片</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Li Sen (1953)
Kazak writing systems or reform them into Latin-based scripts to make them closer to Pinyin, or Cyrillic-based scripts currently in use in the former USSR to keep the writing system consistent for the same people on both sides of the Sino-Soviet border.

In 1959, new Latin-based Uygur and Kazak written scripts were proposed and passed by the regional government, and the State Nationalities Affairs Commission in 1960 approved their implementation on a trial basis. Several factors were at play for this planning and policy decision.

First, the political campaign of "the Great Leap Forward" (1958-1960) put pressure on the region for a speedy integration of China's minorities into the big socialist family. To answer the revolutionary call from the Center, regional scholars and leaders found that the current Uygur and Kazak written forms somehow could not fulfil the need for fast socialist development. The Arabic-based forms were said to have four shortcomings (Fu Maoji & Zhu Zhining, 1964): First, their written style (from right to left) was not convenient since most other languages, including Mandarin, are written from left to right. Second, many letters of the languages are differentiated by adding one or more dots at the top or the bottom of the letters, which make it easy to misspell and are not convenient for printing. Third, many letters are written differently when placed differently and some letters cannot be written continuously in certain positions. Fourth, the current letters were not perfect for indicating pronunciations. These four shortcomings were viewed as making the systems unsuitable for the needs of the continuing "Great Leap Forward" in socialist construction. Therefore reform was needed right away.

Getting the minority languages closer to Putonghua was, of course, more of a political than linguistic act. Large numbers of articles concerning the matter appeared in
both the national and regional newspapers and journals. For example, in the major journal of minority issues *Nationality Unity* (July 1958), Tuer Duxi (a Uygur) and Ke Jieyi (a Kazak) were quoted saying "the local nationalists among Xinjiang minorities have tried very hard to stop adding Han language in minority schools. Their sole purpose is to sabotage national unity and destroy our mother land. We absolutely will not allow their dirty plot to materialize." The political pressure was evident. This was a typical situation at the regional level during those years, when local leaders were required to do something drastic to show loyal support for a political campaign started from the Center. However, decisions on how to reform these languages were also influenced by other factors.

The winter of 1958-59 was a difficult one for the Party and for China. The minority-populated northwest frontier areas seemed increasingly vulnerable after a border dispute with India and the cooling of relations with the Soviet Union. According to Dryer (1976), the chief shortcoming of the Arabic-based written scripts seems to have been a political one: its use provided a bond between the Uygurs and Kazaks in Xinjiang with their counterparts in the former USSR. Therefore, the use of Latin-based scripts would not only standardize the writing systems in Xinjiang to conform to those of most of Chinese minorities, but it would also make communications between the Turkic minorities on opposite sides of the Sino-Soviet border more difficult. It became obvious that the Cyrillic alphabet would not be used in the new scripts.

The Han language reform—the completion of the Latin-alphabet-based Han Phoneticization Plan (Pinyin) in 1958 — could not have been more timely. As discussed earlier, the policy for minority language development since then has been to reform all minority languages to be closer to the Han Phoneticization Plan. It provides a tool to
integrate minorities faster by bringing their languages closer to the Pinyin system used for schooling of Han children.

By then, the Party also believed that conditions for such language reform were ready. Large numbers of language workers had been trained, the knowledge of these minority languages had been obtained, and most of all, the Party had grown more confident of bringing this remote region under its control and more impatient for its difference from the mainstream culture to be erased. It was obvious under the political situation, then, that any counter argument would have been labeled counter-revolutionary. Although the positive reactions from the regional leaders and scholars both Han and non-Han may have been due to a true belief or simple enthusiasm towards the Party's campaign slogan, many were probably afraid of being condemned as anti-revolutionaries or "running dogs" of the revisionist Soviet Union.

Plans were announced to substitute the Latin-based Pinyin alphabet for the Arabic-based Uygur and Kazak written forms in Xinjiang. With the assistance of the Minority Language Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, the Regional Language Reform Committee devised a new Latin-alphabet-based script to replace the traditional Arabic alphabet in December, 1959. The design of the new scripts was said to strictly follow the "principles of designing written languages for the national minorities" passed by the State Council in 1957. The new designs were said to have the following advantages (Fu Maoji & Zhu Zhining, 1964):

1. All 26 Latin alphabet letters and four double letters were used in the new scripts, which now have exactly the same alphabet as in the "Han Phoneticization Plan".

2. All sound positions in the Uygur and Kazak languages are properly indicated.
3. Every sound can be expressed by a single letter except for the four double letters.

4. The name and the sequence of the 26 letters used in the new scripts are exactly the same as in Pinyin.

It is easy to see that one of the major features of the new scripts was that they were made as close to Mandarin Pinyin as possible.

The regional Party Committee approved an ambitious three-year plan to popularize the new scripts among Uygurs and Kazaks: 1960 - to implement on a trial basis; 1961 - to fully popularize; and 1962 - to replace the old scripts. The implementation was started in schools, since the plan was to spread from schools to society.

The implementation plan made by the Regional Education Department (the forerunner of the Regional Education Commission) regulated that starting from 1960, grade one would be taught using only the new scripts. In other grades, new scripts would be taught as a subject. This also applied to high schools, community colleges, vocational and technical schools and universities. All graduates were expected to have mastered the new script. From 1961-1962 the new script was to be the only written form taught within the entire educational system. The government administrators at the prefecture, regional, and city levels were expected to master the new script by the end of 1960; administrators at the county level were given until the first half of 1961; while at the commune (village) level in the rural areas up to the first half of 1962 was the deadline. The implementation in the army and factories started during the first half of 1961 while the second half of the year was dedicated to the communes and the common city dwellers. In 1962, it was intended to be popularized among all adult peasants.

To incorporate this plan, training classes were held at every level. During the three
years, the government organized over 100 conferences (sit-and-talk meetings, zuo tan hui) inviting people from all walks of life to give input to the new scripts, and revised the new scripts repeatedly. On March 19, 1964, the first plenum of the Third Regional People's Congress passed the revised design which was approved later by the State Council. On January 1, 1965 the Chairman of the Regional Government, Sai Fuding (Uygur), officially ordered it to be fully popularized immediately.

The four-year trial seemed to be successful. According to the Education Year Book (1949-1989), in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, over the period from 1960 to 1964, 600,000 elementary children and over 200,000 workers and peasants had learned the new scripts. With the mastering of the new scripts some people were able to learn Putonghua on their own. More than 20,000 new teachers were trained and were said to have contributed greatly to the process. "The two new written scripts are wholeheartedly welcomed by the Uygur and Kazak mass" (Fu Maoji & Zhu Zhining, 1964, p.4). Such sweeping statements cannot be taken as simple statement of fact. On the one hand, anyone who did not support the plan was in danger of being called a counter-revolutionary, and on the other hand, this was a typical behavior of the Party's propaganda agency during those years.

After the publication of the finalized design of the new scripts in 1965, a new implementation plan was made which specified three periods (Xinjiang Education Yearbook, 1991, ed. by XUAREI):

1. 1965-1966: focus on education system,

2. 1967-1970: focus on government offices, the military, and industries, and

3. 1971-1972: overall replacement of the old scripts with the new ones.
In 1976, the Regional Revolutionary Commission (in place of the former regional government) published the new regulations which stated that starting from August 1, 1976 the traditional scripts would no longer be used. However, the heat of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) interrupted the process.

During the Cultural Revolution, all activities gave way to the revolution. Hardly any progress was made in any other aspect of the society, so implementation of the new policy was continued only in the school system, and operation of the school system itself was stopped from 1966 to 1969. As a result, many people did not master the new scripts. Some had learned them, but without any new reading materials to sustain their skills, lost them. For a while there was no way to communicate through writing between the young people who knew only the new scripts and the older people who knew only the traditional scripts. Sons and fathers could not write letters to each other. It became one nationality with two writing systems. Beginning in August, 1976, soon after the Cultural Revolution, many people demanded the restoration of the traditional scripts.

In 1979, the regional government reacted to popular demand and announced the decision to continue the spread of the new scripts but to allow the use of the traditional scripts at the same time. It can be inferred that such requests must have been very strong to press the regional government to change its former decisions and to bring Beijing to conform. Another important factor which allowed such a shift in policy was the change of the political power and agenda in the Center. The death of China's three top leaders, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, and the overthrown of the "Gang of Four" all happened in the year 1976. After a short period of transition Deng Xiaoping secured his power in 1977, and the Party's agenda changed from political movements to economic development.
and modernization. Regional and local leaders, in fact all Party members and even the non-members, had learned to respond to political changes in the Center.

Once the old scripts were allowed to be used again, they took over very quickly. More and stronger demands were voiced by the Uygurs and Kazaks to replace the Latin-based new scripts with the traditional scripts which they cherished as their own. In September, 1982, the regional government put forward a report to the Fifth Conference of the Standing Committee of the Regional People's Congress. The report stated that Uygur and Kazak people have used the Arabic-based scripts for a long period and a rich history and culture were created through these scripts. Even though the traditional forms had their shortcomings, they were held special among the people who used them. Since 1979 people from all walks of life strongly demand the reuse of the traditional scripts. The reality dictates that it is inevitable that the old script will be the dominant one among the Uygur and Kazak people in the region. (Translated from the Language and Script Work Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 1988 p.212)

Based on the report, the Seventeenth Plenum of the Fifth Regional People's Congress (September, 1982) decided to restore the use of the old scripts throughout all domains of life. To carry out the decision, the Regional Education Department decided to use old-script textbooks starting from the fall semester 1982 from grade one, and new scripts were to be taught as a subject to grades four and above. It was a total reversal of the policy of 1960.

After over twenty years of planning and implementation (1959-1981), the Uygur and Kazak writing systems were back where they were before 1960, with a generation lost to their traditional written form. Still, it was considered a great achievement among some Uygurs and Kazaks to get their own writing systems back.

The effort to develop Uygur and Kazak writing systems in fact resulted in a loss of
mother tongue writing among a generation of Uygurs and Kazaks who had to turn to Putonghua for their written communication. Putonghua became handier for them than the old scripts since they had already learned some in school.

Even though it is quite clear that the failure of the Uygur and Kazak written languages reform was due mainly to the resistance of the people, some scholars (Wang Jun, 1983; Yang Zhengwang, 1986) still believe that the reform should not have been repudiated so quickly, for it might have been successful had it not been for the following factors.

First, Yang Zhengwang (1986), a linguist, studied the history of Arabic language reforms in the world, and concluded that there are two major methods for writing system reforms: the Turkish reform set a limited time for the new script to replace the old script and the Swahili method allowed the coexistence of both the old and the new scripts. History showed that the former was successful and the latter resulted in many problems. The written language reform in Xinjiang adopted the Swahili style by allowing both scripts to be used for almost twenty years. He indicated that the wrong choice of method was one of the reasons for the failure in reform.

Second, the design of the new scripts themselves had problems, for it focused on the scientific side of the design and ignored the problem of its acceptability by the people. Wang Jun (1983), a well-known linguist and language administrator, later admitted that at the time when the new scripts were developed there was strong emphasis on the uniformity between the new scripts and Pinyin. Almost all the vowels are more or less identical to those of the Han alphabet, and were extremely difficult for Uygurs and Kazaks to master, for the new scripts were too far away from their oral languages. This factor was
given to imply that had the design of the new scripts been not so rigid, the reform might have been successful.

This study reveals that the major reasons for the failure of the Uygur and Kazak written language reforms are: first, that the hastiness of the language policy inhibited the achievement of quick integration; second, the minority people resisted the policy because of the fear of assimilation and the passion for their own cultural identity; and third, the change of political power and agenda at the Center in the late 1970s provided opportunities for the change of policies.

Although the new scripts are dead among the Uygurs and Kazaks, they still exist as far as some officials and language workers are concerned. Currently the new scripts are merely kept and used as phonetic cues. One day policy may change again and the Latin-based scripts may be back although, for the time being, the possibility seems remote.

Research on Uygur and Kazak written languages is still going on. Immediately after the restoration of the traditional scripts, in 1982, the Language Commission organized scholars, experts, and language workers to standardize Uygur and Kazak scripts based on the old original scripts. In 1986, the Regional Government approved the establishment of The Regional Association of Standardizing and Evaluating Minority Language Terminologies. The Association is under the leadership of the Regional Nationality Language Commission and has 41 members with the mandate to maintain and further develop the minority languages of the region (The Language and Script Work Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 1988).

Uygur and Kazak written language reform—the return to traditional script—can be
viewed as struggle between majority language spread and minority language maintenance initiated from the regional level, encouraged by the Party, and within guidelines of the Center's overall language policy. But the spread of Putonghua among minorities in Xinjiang is a different matter. It represents the imposition of the Han language on the minorities, with both policy and planning coming from the Center.

6.3.2. The Policy and Planning of Spreading Putonghua in Xinjiang

The investigation into the policy and planning of spreading Putonghua among minorities in Xinjiang is not nearly as sensitive for the researcher as the discussion of language maintenance in the region. The spread of Putonghua under the umbrella of bilingualism and bilingual education seemed to have an obvious political rightness in itself. All officials and most scholars were very open and enthusiastic about it, since bilingualism is officially seen as the only way to a bright future for the region. All officials talked about the great future which can be brought about for the people and the region by spreading Putonghua. From kindergarten to the university, all Han teachers were eager to discuss with me the advantages of learning Putonghua and complained about the weakness of various programs and methods to achieve proficiency in Putonghua.

As indicated in the last chapter, during the first decade of Communist rule the Han language was not imposed on its minority population. In 1950, the Xinjiang Provincial (before it became an autonomous region) Government issued a document entitled: Directions for the Current Educational Reform in Xinjiang. The directives required all middle school classes to add a second language as an elective. The Uygur schools had an option
of choosing either Putonghua or Russian and the Han schools were given the choice between the Russian and Uygur languages (*Xinjiang Education Yearbook*, 1991, p.84). So during that period Han language education for the minority students was an option.

The radical movement in the late 1950s, "the Great Leap Forward", saw the beginning of the major organized effort in spreading Putonghua. The language education policy changed for the schools. In 1960, the Regional Education Department issued an announcement entitled "On the Improvement of Han Language Teaching for the Minority Middle Schools" which stated that Putonghua should be one of the major subjects for minority middle schools. The objective of the policy was for minority children to have mastered Putonghua as a second language upon graduation from middle schools. In 1961, in a document explaining the curriculum, the Regional Education Department stressed that "language, especially Han language, teaching should receive special attention" (*Educational Year Book*, 1991, p.84).

Several strategies were taken to tackle the problem of the lack of Putonghua teachers. A large number of short-term teacher training classes were held at the regional, district, and prefecture teacher training schools. One significant step taken from 1960 to 1965 was to recruit Han high school graduates from major cities such as Beijing, Tianjin, Jinan, Nanjing and many other cities. These young Han recruits were trained briefly to gain some knowledge of the Uygur language and then assigned to teach Putonghua in minority middle schools. In 1963 alone, 960 such Han graduates were recruited. However, the process of implementing Han language education was also interrupted by the Cultural Revolution from 1966-1977, during which almost nothing could be offered in schools except political meetings.
After the Cultural Revolution, in the early 1980’s attempts were made to restore Han language teaching in the school system. In 1981, the Han language teaching plan was detailed in the new curriculum for the region, which specified that Putonghua would be taught as a subject from fourth grade to the end of high school. Upon graduation students were expected to have mastered about 2000 Chinese characters and to be able to express their ideas in Putonghua.

In 1982, the Deputy Chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Badai, suggested that the direction of Han language education was to achieve full bilingualism among the minority population in the region. A time limit for achieving this goal was set at ten years. New syllabi were developed based on his suggestions. Since his suggestion of true bilingualism as the goal, bilingual education has been the policy for minority schools in the region. To motivate minority young people to study Putonghua, since 1981 Putonghua has been a subject in the entrance examination for minority students to enter higher education (universities and colleges) and the score in that subject counted for more and more as the years went by. Despite all these efforts, Putonghua was still not mastered by the minority students in Xinjiang as expected, so a more recent campaign was organized, starting in late 1984, to spread Putonghua among the national minorities.

The following discussion of the current campaign will provide an example of the process of planning and policy in spreading Putonghua in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The focus will be on the relationships between the national and regional agencies through planning, policy decisions, and the implementation process.

The policy and planning was officially initiated at the national level by State Written Language Reform Commission (SWLRC) which organized a working conference in Beijing
from October 16 to 20, 1984. More than 60 delegates in charge of language and education, from all regions and provinces, were called to participate (including delegates from Xinjiang). Hu Qiaomu, an important figure as a theorist in the Party's ideology, was present to indicate the status and the importance of the issue at stake. According to the conference report made by the SWLRC to the State Council in February, 1985, the focus of the conference was discussion of the related issues in language work and the future direction of language work in China including policy, major tasks, and implementation. Such discussions are usually the first publicly visible step to policy formulation. The state leaders spoke about the Party agenda and general policies towards the minorities and the language administrators, planners, researchers from various agencies at various levels were asked to give input on language policies in support of the overall policies of the Party and the government.

The following decisions, suggestions, and recommendations were reached. (All are translated from Documents of The Language and Script Working Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 1988, pp.14-15).

1. The directions of Han language reform will be towards the romanization system common in the world. However, for a long period to come, there will be co-existence of the Chinese characters and the Romanized Pinyin. The major tasks set for the period include actively spreading and popularizing Putonghua, further promoting the "Han Phoneticization Plan", as well as further research and experimentation to standardize and perfect the plan.

2. It was recommended that the State Council establish administrative offices to assist the spread of Putonghua and allow the regional/provincial level government to set up either Language Reform Commissions or Spreading Putonghua Working Commissions at various lower levels.

3. It was suggested that the State Council hold the Second National Language Reform Conference, since it had been 30 years since the first such conference was held in 1955. The purpose of the Second National Conference would be to review experiences for the past thirty years, to
further clarify the policies and tasks for language work, to make the seventh
five-year plan for language reform, and to honor the organizations and
individuals who have made significant contributions to language work.

These statements were treated as the general policy guidelines for the development
of more detailed policies and were written into the form of a report and handed in to the
State Council for approval. In March 1985, the central office of the State Council approved
the report by the State Written Language Reform Commission and sent copies of the report
to the related offices at various levels for implementation (State Document No. 17, 1985).

Based on the above policy guidelines, in May, 1985, the SWLRC and the Ministry
of Education jointly issued a document (No.8 for the former and No.002 for the latter) to
their offices at the regional/provincial level, announcing that the Second National Language
Reform Conference would be held in October, 1985 in Beijing, co-hosted by both
organizations.

This is usually the second step of consultation for refining policy decisions. This
conference was open to a wider population and was focused on both the implementation
of the policies set during the previous conference and further discussion, perfection and
detailing the specific policies. Who could participate in the Conference was determined by
the Center and specified in a separate appendix attached to the directives. The list for each
region/province included one of the Ministers (in charge of language work and spreading
Putonghua) of the Regional Education Commission, one head from the Regional Language
Work Commission, one cadre in charge of language reform, and several representatives
from the model institutes and language-spread activists. The related local agencies were
required to prepare for the conference by doing the following:

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1. Before the end of June, after extensive consultation, submit a summary of the past 30 years of language work, current demands, and future plans.

2. Based on the initial policies made by the SWLRC, before the end of August, draft a detailed seventh five-year-plan including objectives, practice, and strategies.

3. Submit a list of recommendations of organizations and individuals that have contributed significantly to the spreading of Putonghua and to the work of language reform, for receiving awards at the upcoming conference.

4. Prepare up to three videos showing the achievements in language work, the scripts for the videos to be submitted to the Conference Commission before mid-September.

5. The Conference Preparation Commission should be informed of the progress in preparation by each region/province.

This was the period during which consultations were done at the local level and suggestions and implementation strategies were drafted. In response to the directions from the Center, the Xinjiang Regional Nationality Language Working Commission completed its plan in October 1985 and submitted it to the regional government for approval before sending it to Beijing. The plan was entitled "Suggestions on the Seventh Five-Year-Plan of Language Reform for Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region" (Xinjiang Nationality Language Work Commission Document No.44, 1985).

It suggested that the focus of the language work in Xinjiang should be on "double spreading" (shuangtui) which means to popularize Putonghua as well as to spread the Han Phoneticization Plan. The "double spreading" was planned to be carried out in two sectors: the education system and the general society.

In education for the next five years, the plan (document No.44, 1985) calls for the achievement of the following objectives:

1. Nursery school workers, and city and town elementary school teachers and students are required to use Putonghua during meetings and in public locations within four years. The teachers and students in the country and minority school teachers in the cities were given up to 1990 to achieve
the same objectives.

2. Above county level key middle school teachers and students were given three years. Ordinary middle schools were given to 1989. The key minority school language, political science, and geography teachers and high school students have 1990 as a deadline.

3. All social science teachers and students in teacher training schools and higher education were given two years, and teachers of other subjects have up to 1989.

A number of strategies are specified to assist the implementation of the plan:

1. Propaganda will be conducted through publication and broadcasting. Every March will be designated as the month of Putonghua.
2. Administration will be strengthened by appointing personnel to be in charge.
3. Putonghua will be legalized as the language of instruction. The Han Phoneticization Plan must be included in the entrance and graduation examinations for middle schools and high schools.
4. Putonghua will be used as one of the conditions for promotion and awards both in the education system and in society.
5. Language competitions and educational conferences will be held every two years at prefecture, county, and district levels. At the Regional level, every two years awards will be granted for spreading Putonghua and competitions in the use of Putonghua will be held.
6. Pronunciation training will be implemented for all teachers.
7. In the general society, all work units will have an oral examination of Putonghua when hiring new employees.
8. All minority cadres should set an example in learning Putonghua.

After the plan was approved by the regional government, it was submitted and discussed during the Second National Language and Script Work Conference, which was held in Beijing from January 6 to 13, 1986. There the policy was finalized and announced by major speeches made by state leaders, and the proceedings of the conference were passed down in the form of state documents to all pertinent sectors, level by level. The main implications of the conference were usually reported in meetings at each level and plans were made to implement them in the relevant administrative and educational
systems.

The third step, after the two national level conferences, was policy diffusion within the region. In December of the same year as the National Conference in Beijing, the regional offices organized the First Regional Language and Script Working Conference with the approval of the regional government. Among the 234 participants in the regional level conference were the regional language sector leaders, the heads of the prefectures as well as prefecture level language administrators, the heads of the counties, scholars and researchers from universities and colleges, and the representatives of the state leaders, language experts and scholars from Beijing. During the regional conference, the national policies were passed on in the form of the State directives: an overview of the past work and the changes to the new directions and tasks to be taken on were the focus of the discussions; the seventh five-year-plan on language work was presented and suggestions were expected; and a session for the exchange of ideas and experiences was scheduled.

One of the items on the agenda of the conference was to give awards to those who were considered to have contributed in a major way to the language work in Xinjiang, including the spread of Putonghua. Eighteen "model institutions" and 81 "model individuals" received such honors.

Similar conferences were held at the prefecture level and the next level below. This seemed to have been the most common method for passing on of the Party's policies, and implementations were expected immediately thereafter.

But this study has found that once the planning is done and the policy set, the Center has little control over the actual implementation, especially in such a far away place as Xinjiang. In education, the policy of spreading Putonghua and the right to use minority
languages, which are guaranteed by the Constitution and the related laws, result in a single generic description of how schooling should take place; for example, a variety of bilingual educational programs have been put into practice. However, there have been many different objectives and stages in bilingual education. It seems appropriate to share some of my personal observations of some bilingual programs in Urumqi.

The language researcher from the Regional Education Commission, whom I mentioned before, helped arrange a number of visits to various bilingual programs. First, he accompanied me to a kindergarten by the name of "The Red Flag" which was chosen to be an experimental bilingual school. It was a kindergarten of over five hundred children from nine nationalities, aged from three to seven. As in most institutes in Urumqi, the heads of the kindergarten were one Han and one Uygur; the remaining 62 staff were a mixture of various nationalities. The kindergarten was divided into four grades: three-year olds, four-year olds, five-year olds, and six- and seven-year olds. The four grades each had ten classes, five were Han classes and the other five were minority classes. The bilingual program applied only to these five minority classes. Two of these minority classes were turned into experimental classes where bilingual programs are employed and the other three use the children's mother tongue only, mainly the Uygur language. At the time I was there it was decided that one more class would be turned into an experimental class.

For these children, three periods of bilingual language classes were conducted each day. The time for each period is respectively, 15, 20, 25, and 30 minutes for each grade. I spent a couple of periods with the four-year-old group. There were two Uygur bilingual teachers in the classroom with 36 children all from Uygur background. They were taught to sing a song in Putonghua and then it was explained in Uygur. The teacher asked a
series of questions in Uygur and the children were required to answer in Putonghua. Then the teacher started speaking Putonghua using simple words such as tall, short, brother, sister, dolls, and had the children gave their meaning in Uygur. It seemed the teaching methods were mostly traditional. Apart from these bilingual classes, they also had mathematics, music, arts, physical activities, common knowledge, and languages. All these subjects were taught in their mother tongue.

The result of the experiment, I was told, was very positive. The children who attended bilingual classes were reported to have developed a better pronunciation in Putonghua without the sacrifice of the mother tongue compared with those who did not attend. They reportedly showed a stronger ability in oral expression and a wider range of knowledge, and were faster in thinking. For those minority children who attended the Han only class, the mother tongue seemed to suffer. The parents have the choice of which class to send their children to. Most children in bilingual classes were from a family background of Uygur cadres, teachers, with a few workers and small businessmen. One interesting phenomenon was that most of the minority children who finished the bilingual program were sent to minority elementary schools rather than the Han schools. The parents said that they only want their children to know the Han language, but they want to keep them as Uygers.

While in Urumqi, I also observed a couple of classes in a Uygur middle school and in a Han and Uygur mixed school. Urumqi No. 20 middle school is a minority-only school with 90% of the students from the Uygur background and the rest from Kazak, Uzbek, and Tatar families. All of its seventy teachers were non-Han with education levels varying from a university degree to a two-year college certificate. I talked with a couple of teachers for
about an hour and noticed only an ever-so-slight accent in their Putonghua. I went into
what is equivalent to a grade nine class with 50 students. The walls were covered with
pictures and writings in Uygur except two charts showing the basic strokes in writing
Chinese characters. This was a period of 40 minutes for Putonghua as a subject. The class
was conducted truly in two languages. The students were first shown some pictures and
then read the Chinese characters on the pictures following the pronunciation of the
teacher. Then they translated the Putonghua into Uygur as a check for comprehension.
The students were asked to write the Chinese characters on the blackboard. For grade
nine, their Putonghua was at a very low level. The students were well behaved. It may or
may not have been for the reason that a "foreigner" was present.

The other school I visited was the Urumqi Experimental High School, which is a key
mixed school under the experimental program of the Regional Education Commission. It
is located geographically close to the Commission building. There were over 2000 students
with half Han and the other half minorities. It had over 190 staff of both the Han and Uygur
nationalities, most with university degrees. Although different nationalities are in the same
school, the classes are divided by the language of instruction of either Han or Uygur. Some
staff offices were for both the Han and non-Han teachers and others were separated.
Again all bilingual programs apply to minority classes only.

I observed what is equivalent to a grade 11 class with Putonghua as the subject.
The walls of the classroom were again covered with pictures with Uygur language. The
teacher was a Uygur. There were over 50 students. All instruction was in Putonghua
except in a dictation exercise. The teacher uttered a Uygur word and the students
translated it into Putonghua. While one student was writing on the board, the rest were
writing on paper. They wrote about 30 words and afterwards read them aloud. Following that the students were asked to make sentences using these words. It seemed to be a very good class.

I interviewed the teacher after the class. He told me that most Uygur students seemed to like to learn Putonghua, which might be because most of them were from cadre families. According to him, upon graduation, about 11-12% of the students were fully bilingual: they can understand by listening, they can speak and read, and they can write a diary in Chinese characters.

Through these visits to the bilingual programs, observing classes, and interviewing teachers, it appears that in a city where the Uygurs are a large portion of the population, have their own broadcasting and newspaper systems, and broadly function in their own Uygur language, there is no sign of immediate concern over the loss of the minority mother tongue.

The efforts of the Regional Education Commission and other related language agencies seemed to be focused on spreading Putonghua. In Urumqi, the biggest city in the region, minority children have a better chance of learning Putonghua since there is enough of this language environment. The experimental program in the mixed kindergarten and mixed high school seemed to be more effective for the children to learn Putonghua than the minority only middle school. In these bilingual schools, the students have better qualified bilingual teachers, better school facilities, more materials, and enough language environment both in and out of the schools. It seems that the planning for the spread of Putonghua will be successful in bigger city centers like Urumqi where the Han influence is very present and where most minority cadres and civil servants reside. Gradually, the
official Putonghua may cause the mother tongue to suffer. The real problems might occur among the smaller minorities groups for their mother tongue will be lost to either Chinese or Uygur.

It had been over ten years since the campaign began to spread Putonghua among China's minorities. In Xinjiang, the results have been far from what was expected or planned and there is still an uphill battle for the government. The reasons will be discussed in concluding sections of this chapter. Although in China the whole education system is supposed to be under the control of the Center, bilingual policies were carried out in entirely different stages in Urumqi than in places at lower levels. The implementation of policies at lower levels is often impeded by local conditions. An examination of the situation in Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture will bring the relationships and reality to one level below the regional level.

6.3.3. Language Spread and Maintenance in Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture

6.3.3.1 Introduction

With the help of the Regional Education Commission, I traveled from Urumqi to Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture in a jeep. It took us two days to cover over 700 kilometers of partly mountainous, and partly agricultural and pasture land. The road was narrow and rough. In between the picturesque scenery of snow-covered mountains and lakes, the sand storms forced us to stop from time to time for the visibility was as low as in a Canadian prairie winter blizzard, though with brown-out rather than white-out. It also
seemed farther away from the civilization; except for little motels and food stands near each small town along the road, there were hardly any buildings. Once in a while, we came across people working in the fields, women with faces covered by transparent scarves to fend off the dust. We stopped at a couple of shabby little restaurants run by some Uygur women who could communicate with us in heavily accented Putonghua and who seemed to care little of what was going on in Beijing. Finally we arrived in Yining City, an oasis and the capital of the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture. As soon as I got out of the jeep, I noticed a great variety of dress as well as languages which made it easier to distinguish between the different groups. Instead of Uygurs and Hans which were seen everywhere in Urumqi, Kazaks were everywhere in Yining. All signs hanging at the gates of the government offices, institutions and businesses (such as bus stations and department stores) were in Kazak and Putonghua with the former above the latter. My first meeting was with the officials of the prefecture government and the Prefecture Education Commission. After an official banquet, it was arranged for me to meet with relevant scholars and to visit Ili Teachers College, which is the training ground for teachers for the prefecture, where I might have a better chance to get the whole picture of language education for minority children in the district. Yining City seemed to have a much slower pace of life than Urumqi.

The Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture was established in November, 1954. It covers about one fifth of the region's territory, but its strategic location means that its importance outweighs that of any other areas in the region. Since 1991, it has shared a porous 1,500-kilometer border with the newly independent countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (see the map of the country and the region in Figure 3.1 and 3.2). Being a
stronghold of the former East Turkistan Republic and long under the influence from the former Soviet Union, Ili is a volatile area, the home of recent Uygur independence movements. Since both Islam and nationalism are honored across the border, ideas, hopes, and even arms have crossed it (Dyer, 1997). Language and education policies are, therefore, extremely sensitive here. These policies could be an effective tool either to integrate the people here or to be a cause for rebellions among them.

6.3.3.2. Language Use Situation In Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture

As in the rest of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, many nationalities live in compact communities in the Ili Kazak prefecture. Apart from Han, the Kazak form the main nationality, but there are also Hui, Uygur, Xibo, Mongolian, Tatar, Russian, Manchus, and Uzbek. Altogether thirteen nationalities live there (see table 6.4). Most Kazaks live in pasture areas, and raising livestock is their main livelihood. The Han and the Uygurs live mainly in the cities and towns, and work in industry, agriculture, and business.

Among the thirteen nationalities, the Han, Hui, and Manchu use Putonghua; the other ten nationalities all use their mother tongues as the languages of daily communication. At the same time, almost all nationalities are bilingual or multilingual to a certain degree (Song Zhengchun, 1994b). Yining City alone, for example, is home to more than ten nationalities. A survey revealed complex patterns of language use among various nationalities (see Table 6.5). Due to the close living and working interaction, some members of most of the nationalities can use more than one neighboring language apart from their mother tongue. The three most popular languages in the city are Putonghua
Before 1949, Yining City had the same number of nationalities as now, but the Han were a much smaller group. Bilingual or multilingual phenomena were already common in social functions.

Table 6.4 Population of Ethnic Groups in Ili Kazak Prefecture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>1,393,500</td>
<td>47.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>709,556</td>
<td>24.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>470,806</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>211,828</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>52,125</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>25,184</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>12,710</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>5,903</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daur</td>
<td>4,140</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>2,555</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>2,606</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>40,800</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,933,482</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Song Zhengchun (1994a)
After 1949, Kazak and Putonghua became the major languages used in government offices at the district, city, and county levels. Generally speaking, within the prefecture, the Kazak language is commonly used as the major language of communication within families other than Uygur and Han, in the markets, in courts, and in entertainment (TV, radio, theater, etc.). In Xibo Autonomous County, three languages are used (Xibo, Putonghua, and Kazak), while in Mongolian Autonomous County, Mongolian is used together with Putonghua and Kazak.

Table 6.5 Population of Ethnic Groups in Yining City and Language Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>123,880</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>Uygur (M), Putonghua, Kazak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>76,258</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>Putonghua(M), Uygur, Kazak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>20,845</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>Putonghua(M), Uygur, Kazak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>9,689</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>Kazak (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
<td>Putonghua, Uygur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>1,994</td>
<td>0.81%</td>
<td>Xibo (M), Putonghua, Uygur, Kazak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td>Putonghua (M), Uygur, Kazak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>Russian (M), Uygur, Kazak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>Putonghua, Mongolian (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>Tatar (M), Putonghua, Uygur, Kazak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>0.078%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dai and Wang, 1994  
Note: M=mother tongue
The thirteen nationalities use seven written languages: Kazak, Putonghua, Uygur, Mongolian, Xibo, Kirghiz, and Russian. The Han, Hui, and Manchu use Putonghua; Mongolian is used by the Mongolians and the Daur; Kazak is used by the Kazaks, the Tatar, the Uzbek, and the Tajiks; and the rest of the nationalities use their own written forms. All seven languages are used as the language of instruction in minority schools, and Putonghua is introduced as a second language to all minority school children. In higher education within the prefecture, only Putonghua and Uygur are used, except for the rare use of Mongolian and Kazak. Within the prefecture, all government documents, propaganda materials, price signs, and travel timetables are printed in Putonghua and Kazak. In autonomous counties in the prefecture, another local language is added to these two. Broadcasting at the prefecture level is in Kazak, Putonghua and Uygur.

6.3.3.3. Administrative Structure Of Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture

The prefecture consists of three districts and a city (see Figure 6.5) and its structure mirrors that of the Center and the region. The major government offices related to language work are as follows:

1. The Prefecture Nationalities Language Working Commission which is under the dual leadership of the prefecture government and the Regional Language Work Commission.

2. The Prefecture Nationalities Affairs Commission has similar tasks as all NAC's except that it is more of a implementation agency rather than having decision making power as the NAC at the national level. It also focuses on the few minorities within
Figure 6.5 Structure of Administrative Divisions of Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture

Adapted from Song Zhengchun (1994a)
the prefecture and implementing policies from both the Regional NAC and the prefecture government.

3. The Prefecture Education Bureau is again an administrative organization carrying instructions from both the prefecture government and the regional Education Commission, with the major task of implementing the education plans of the Region since the curriculum is developed by the Regional Education Commission.

Apart from these government agencies, language work, especially research, is done by other organizations and institutions such as the Chinese Language Teaching Association and Ili Teachers College.

6.3.3.4 Bilingual Schooling and Its Impact

By the end of 1991, there were a total of 131 Kazak middle schools and 588 elementary schools in the prefecture (Li Guoying, 1992). In all these schools, Kazak is the language of instruction, but all are supposed to offer Putonghua as directed by the current bilingual education policy.

Compared with some other minority regions, minority language loss does not seem to be an urgent issue here. The language environment is more Kazak than Putonghua, especially in areas remote from the cities and the towns. Therefore spreading Putonghua is seen as a difficult task for language workers and educators, and is the focus of their efforts. The problems associated with learning Putonghua include the attitude of some local officials and minority populations, the lack of Putonghua language environment especially in remote mountainous areas, and the poor quality of bilingual teachers,
Some cadres in the education system do not take teaching Putonghua seriously. In some schools, Putonghua class time was not guaranteed. Many Kazak children did not view learning Putonghua as necessary, for they could get along quite well without it. As of 1993, another 153 teachers of Putonghua were needed to fill the positions in Kazak schools, and the quality of bilingual teachers was extremely low. In high schools only 11% of the teachers of Putonghua were qualified, in middle schools 36.4%, and 80.2% in elementary schools. Among all bilingual teachers, 70% have never had any training in education or psychology (Li Guoying, 1992).

As a result of their conditions, this area is often criticized as not having a good bilingual program because of the weakness in teaching Putonghua. For example, a regional working conference on Han language teaching in schools suggested that by the end of 1995, all graduates from high schools should be fully bilingual (mother tongue and Putonghua). This means that minority grade 12 graduates should have the Han language proficiency equivalent of that of Han students of grade eight. But according to an education administrator, in Ili Kazak prefecture, at least 90% of the minority grade twelve graduates still did not have Han language equivalent to that of grade four Han students.

In Zhaosu county, another Kazak community in the prefecture, all elementary schools offer Putonghua classes from grade three; four class periods per week in elementary school, five in middle school, and four in high school (Gao Ruihe, 1992). To offer enough Chinese classes in the county, 65 teachers would be needed, but in fact there are only 40. As a result, some schools go without Putonghua regardless of the curriculum requirement. The quality of the available teachers is quite low; some of them are only
graduates of the middle school and some have not even graduated from middle school (grade 7-9). Most teachers prefer working in the county town centers and do not want to work in the rural areas; therefore, in addition to the scarcity of teachers, the teaching quality is much lower than that in the towns. Even though the policy from above insists on Han language teaching in all schools, the implementation of the policy is in the hands of locals, and for the reasons discussed above, the Han language spread is much slower than expected especially in rural and pasture areas. Loss of the minority language is not feared among the general population.

But reforms were happening during my research visit. More Chinese classes were being offered, more time was being given to instruction, and students were required to study Putonghua for more years. As a result, in university entrance examinations the required Putonghua scores have been rising each year.

In bigger cities and towns such as Yining City, the language situation has changed greatly. Up until 1949, the common language for communication was Uygur, and all other nationalities including the Han all spoke Uygur in addition to their own mother tongues. Very few Uygur people used a second language and Putonghua was not an important language. But since 1949, with the changing of power and policy, the status of Putonghua has been raised in the prefecture from the common language of the Han population to the major language of communication in the cities and towns. Government offices, schools and business all assisted in the spread of Putonghua. Uygur became the second language after Putonghua. For example, in some Xibo families the parents use Uygur as the second language with Putonghua being the third and the next generation use Putonghua as the second language with Uygur becoming the third language.
A second change is that this traditionally bilingual city became increasingly trilingual. Kazaks in the city used to master Uygur and be bilingual. But now more and more are trilingual, some using Uygur before Putonghua and others vice versa (Dai Qingxia & Wang Yuanxin, 1994).

Tacheng, a city in the farthest northwestern part of Xinjiang, is another case illustrating the change of language use situation in the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture. The language situation, and language policies and planning have all resulted in changes not only in the languages but also in the living styles of each nationality involved. For example, Tacheng's Kazaks (and also other minorities) all understand Putonghua to a certain degree. Some of them, especially young and middle-aged people, can speak excellent Putonghua. A few can even understand the local Shannxi Chinese opera (a large number of the local Chinese immigrated from Shannxi province). Likewise, the Han and Mongols, especially those living in the villages, have a good command of Kazak. As for the older generation, many old Han men and women can understand Kazak well, even though they cannot speak it, and many old Kazak people understand Putonghua but cannot speak it. A local language researcher, Li Shaonian (1990), found that both Han and Kazaks in this area borrow words from each other and from Russian, which used to be quite popular in the area. And Putonghua is slowly but steadily gaining ground. As Li Shaonian noted, the development of social languages in the Tacheng area has gone through three phases:

1. Before liberation (1949), though Kazak was the main language used in the area, Russian was also popular since there was no hindrance to contacts at the border and Russian people settled in this area in great numbers (Putonghua was also used in the
area but was less popular);

2. From the 1949 to the 1960s, the dominant language in the area was still Kazak; Russian, however, became less influential and was gradually replaced by Putonghua and other minority languages such as Uygur;

3. From the early 1960s to the present, Kazak has been the main language and Putonghua has become increasingly popular. The popularity of the Russian has disappeared.

*The reason Putonghua is slowly but steadily gaining ground is that the government pays great attention to language spread. For example, in Ili Prefecture, a special research group was formed in 1988 to investigate, experiment and suggest better ways to improve Putonghua teaching in the schools. After intensive research, they made three suggestions:*

1. Putonghua should be offered from grade one rather than from grade three.

2. Oral communication, rather than grammar, should be the focus of teaching.

3. An environment aimed at cultivating student interest and motivation for Putonghua learning should be developed.

These suggestions were implemented experimentally in six Uygur classes (randomly selected from two schools, one in the city and the other in the country) for a period of two school years (Sept. 1989-June, 1991). After two years, tests were given and results evaluated. A report confirmed the advantages of the above three suggestions, especially offering Putonghua from grade one. One interesting thing was the great difference in results between the city and the country schools, the latter being very weak.

*Besides the implementation of these suggestions, other efforts have been employed*
to strengthen the Putonghua teaching, including improving teacher training and teaching methods, updating teaching materials, rearranging teaching hours, and upgrading teaching facilities. The result seems to be that bilingual education is aiming at what officials claim to be "true bilingualism"—adding Han language for minority people without loss of their mother tongue.

One big change which I noticed while there was the openness along the borders. The Kazaks living on both sides could now visit each other without restriction. Only a few years ago, it was hard to imagine. On the way back from Ili to Urumqi, I requested to see a newly established open border trade post (Huo'erguozi) between the border of China and the newly independent Kazakhstan. At about ten kilometers from the post, there was a check point. At first, I was not allowed beyond this point as a foreigner with a Canadian passport. So the people who accompanied me drove ahead and agreed to meet me later. I was taken into the office where half a dozen guards in army uniforms worked. They were all Han and came from the central part of China. After chatting with them for a while they decided that I was really a Chinese and so they stopped a big tourist bus and told the driver to drop me at the border. It was a bus full of Chinese Kazaks who were on their way to visit their relatives on the other side. I managed to pick up a conversation with a middle aged Kazak man whose Putonghua was heavily accented. I learnt from him that this was his second visit to Kazakhstan and he intended to come back again, but to continue to live in China. According to him, the living standards in Kazakhstan seem to be a little better than in Xinjiang but most Chinese Kazaks prefer to remain in China. One reason is that China has been their home for a long time, but other important reasons are that their customs and languages are respected more on the Chinese side. He told me that during
his last visit to Kazakhstan, all his fellow Kazaks were speaking Russian both at home and in the markets. In the market there, he was greatly offended to find pork being sold side by side with beef and mutton, which is a big insult to the Muslim tradition. He told me that some of his friends in Kazakhstan were planning to send their children to China to relearn their mother tongue. This reminded me of the talk that I had with the head of the Regional Language Commission, who spoke about running language training schools for people from Kazakhstan as a business venture. I also remembered seeing members of a delegation from Kazakhstan staying in the same hotel as mine and the receptionist told me later that they were here to talk about trade and language training.

In short, the government has gradually extended the influence and use of Putonghua in the area without too many dramatic changes. The language policy was accompanied by a number of other minority policies such as respecting minorities' customs, visiting rights across the border, and relaxed application of birth control regulations. These other policies together with the policy of Han language spread are believed to have helped to speed up the process of integration while maintaining social stability. The Kazak language as of now can not be replaced by Putonghua, but the latter is spreading steadily. But languages of other minorities with small population bases within the prefecture, including Xibo, do not enjoy the same stability as the Kazak language does.

6.3.4 Bilingual Education in Chabucha’er Xibo Autonomous County

6.3.4.1 Introduction
The Chabucha’er Xibo Autonomous County is located within the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The county is located just on the outskirts of Yining City. Accompanied by a Xibo official who is also a researcher on Xibo language and education issues, we arrived at the town named Chabucha’er, the county center. We met the director of the Education Department of the Xibo Autonomous County in his office. Both the director and the researcher are Xibos yet spoke impeccable Putonghua. They were most helpful in sharing their views on Xibo language and education (very different views) and in providing some local documents, introducing Xibo bilingual teachers for interviews, and arranging the visits to Xibo schools.

The Xibo nationality originated in northeast China. One group of Xibo migrated in 1764 to the west of Xinjiang (Guo Wenlin, 1990). They named their new home "Chabucha’er" (in Xibo language it means "the grain storage bin"). In March 25, 1954, Chabucha’er became the Xibo Autonomous County, since it is the area where more than 90% of the Xibo nationality live, and there the Xibos share 4,430 square kilometers of land with twenty other nationalities including the Uygur, Kazak, and Han (see Table 6.6).

6.3.4.2 Language Use Situation In Chabucha’er Xibo Autonomous County

The geographic characteristic of the Xibo nationality is a typical geographic pattern of Chinese national minorities: largely mixed living with concentration in small areas. This characteristic results in a common phenomenon of multilingualism among minority groups especially small groups like Xibo with a population of only 172,718 (Dai Qingxia & Wang Yuanxin, 1994; Li Shulan, 1994a). Xibo, Uygur, and Putonghua are the three major
languages used within the county with different functions (See Table 6.7) (Li Shulan, 1994a):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>18,348</td>
<td>13.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>34,799</td>
<td>25.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>25,921</td>
<td>18.830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>52,791</td>
<td>38.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>4,326</td>
<td>3.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>1.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>137,612</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population based on 1986 figures. Adapted from Lishulan, 1994a.

1. In the area where the Xibo language is dominant, both Kazaks and Han use Xibo as their second language. Han children can speak Xibo fairly fluently. The Xibo people can speak Kazak and Putonghua as well. For example, the town of Aixinsheli, the biggest Xibo town in the county, has a total population of 12,400 including 6,176 of Xibo nationality who make up 49.8% of the town's population and 34.27% of the Xibo population of the county. The others are Kazak (23.3%), Han (24%) and a few Uygurs, Hui, and Mongolians. The major language of communication of the town is Xibo. The older Xibo, aged around 60 and older can mostly speak Kazak as a second language. Xibos between the ages of 20 to 50 mostly use Putonghua as their second language, and a small group of these also use Kazak as a third language. Most school-aged Xibo children can understand Putonghua as
a second language since it is offered in schools. However, their level of Putonghua proficiency is much lower than that of children who live in the Han language areas. A

Table 6.7  Population Distribution in Chabucha’er Xibo Autonomous County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Towns &amp; Villages</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Xibo</th>
<th>Han</th>
<th>Uygur</th>
<th>Kazak</th>
<th>Hui</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chabucha’er (town)</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>2,722</td>
<td>3,085</td>
<td>2,438</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aixinsheli (town)</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>6,176</td>
<td>2,975</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>2,890</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunzhaqi Niulu (village)</td>
<td>8,137</td>
<td>2,461</td>
<td>2,220</td>
<td>1,918</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadaqi Niulu (village)</td>
<td>5,016</td>
<td>2,303</td>
<td>1,515</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>476</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhakuqi Niulu (village)</td>
<td>8,830</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,652</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kan (village)</td>
<td>7,308</td>
<td>4,294</td>
<td>2,121</td>
<td></td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuohongqi (village)</td>
<td>4,712</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>3,355</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>440</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hainuke (village)</td>
<td>6,966</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>6,633</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>169</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhagesitai (village)</td>
<td>9,166</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>7,044</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qiongbola (village)</td>
<td>5,733</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>2,412</td>
<td>2,823</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milliangquan Hui (autonomous village)</td>
<td>2,522</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Li Shulan, 1994a.

survey shows that in Aixinsheli town, about 80% of the Xibo understand Putonghua and 41% understand Kazak. The situation is similar in other Xibo concentrated villages such as Nadaqi Niulu, where among 5,016 people, 46% are of Xibo nationality, 30.2% are Han, and Uygur and Kazak together make up 21%. The same survey reveals that 80% of the Xibo people in the village know Putonghua (see Table 6.8).

2. In the areas where Uygurs form the major portion of the population, Uygur is the second language for Xibos.
Table 6.8 Language Use in Xibo Concentrated Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Name of Town &amp; Village Surveyed</th>
<th>Sample Surveyed</th>
<th>The use of Xibo Language</th>
<th>The use of Han Language</th>
<th>The Use of Kazak Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Master</td>
<td>Know a little</td>
<td>No knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Xibo</td>
<td>A village in the town of Aixisheli</td>
<td>30 families 119 people</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A village in Nadaqi Niulu</td>
<td>42 families 233 people</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Li Shulan (1994b)

3. In the area where the Han are the largest language group, Putonghua becomes the major language of communication. For example, the town of Chabucha'er, the administrative center of the county, has a total population of 9,800 with 31.47% Han, 27.77% Xibo, 24.87% Uygur, 13.67% Kazak and 2.1% other minority nationalities. Here over 90% of the Xibo nationals use Putonghua as a second language (see Table 6.9).

Generally most members of the Xibo nationality can speak both the Han language and their mother tongue. Unlike other major minority groups in Xinjiang, the Xibo nationality and their language has been under a long period of Han influence which can be traced back to before the Xibos moved to Xinjiang. In the early 19th century when the Manchu formed the Qing Dynasty, the Xibo studied the Manchu language as well as Mandarin.
During that period the Xibo language became almost identical with the related Manchu language. During the Qing Dynasty, the Xibos were organized into a military camp and

Table 6.9 The Language Use of the Xibo Nationality in Han Concentrated Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Place Surveyed</th>
<th>Sample No.</th>
<th>Xibo Language</th>
<th>Han Language</th>
<th>Kazak Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>The fourth group of Third village in Ningguqinu in the town of Chabucha'er</td>
<td>35 families</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>153 people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Li Shulan (1994b)

were required to study both Manchu and Chinese literature. The classic Chinese literature was not unfamiliar among the older generation of the Xibos (Guo Wenlin, 1990). Even though the Xibo written language has changed a bit from the Manchu writings during the course of history, nowadays Xibo language scholars are called upon to translate early Manchu documents since the Manchus have lost their language to Han.

The general population of the Xibo nationality in the county also use Uygur and Kazak. Some know Russian as well. Some members of other nationalities around the county also know some Xibo language.

In the social domain, the language use situation in the county is as follows:

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1. The county level administrative offices use three languages: Putonghua, Xibo, and Uygur. Putonghua is used when the head of the county makes a speech. Xibo is used in the County People's Congress, with Han language interpreters.

2. The above three languages are also used in the county's radio and television broadcasting stations.

3. In shopping centers and major markets, Putonghua is the language of communication among various nationalities, but Xibo is used among Xibo themselves.

But in education, only Putonghua is promoted apart from the Xibo mother tongue. In elementary schools, Xibo is the major language of instruction, while in middle and high schools Putonghua becomes the medium of instruction.

6.3.4.3 The Administrative Structure of Chabucha’er Xibo Autonomous County

The government of Chabucha’er Xibo Autonomous County has control over two towns and nine villages (see Figure 6.6). The Xibo Autonomous County was established in 1954.

Among the 19 county government members six were Xibo, five Kazaks, four Uygurs, and one each of Han, Mongolian, Hui and Kirghiz. The head of the county was a Xibo; the two deputy heads were Uygur and Kazak. There was one Xibo delegate at each of the Fourth, the Fifth and the Sixth National People's Congresses in Beijing. National leaders have visited the county from time to time. In 1983, Premier Zhao Ziyang, and the Secretary of the Party’s Central Committee, Hu Qili, visited the county and made speeches focusing on the unity of all nationalities and the development of the frontiers. Other related
government agencies are, the County People's Congress, and the County Education Department. The latter is located in a small, dark old building with conditions so bad that I was not permitted to take a photograph of it.

Figure 6.6 Structure of Administrative Division of Chabucha'er Xibo Autonomous County

Adapted from Li Shulan (1994b)

6.3.4.4 Bilingual Education for Xibo Children

Compared with many other nationalities in Xinjiang, the Xibo have been noted for their strong tradition of education, especially language education. The history of bilingual
teaching in Xibo schools can be traced back to the late 19th century (Fu Gang, 1990). Such teaching disappeared in 1944, during the turmoil of those times, but was restored in 1949 when the Communists took control. But the political campaigns in all of China, during the late 1950s to the late 1970s eliminated the Xibo language from schools.

After the Cultural Revolution, in 1977, the Regional Government decided to restore minority language teaching in all minority schools within the region. In 1988, the first conference of Xibo language teaching was held in the autonomous county, which marked a new beginning for bilingual education for children of the Xibo nationality. Several policies in teaching resulted from the conference. It was decided to strengthen Xibo language teaching in Xibo schools. The Xibo language curriculum was developed and teaching plans were made for Xibo elementary schools.

Almost 20 years after the introduction of bilingual education, there are still different views and practices on curriculum, styles of teaching, textbook compiling and most of all, the relationship between the Han and the Xibo languages.

According to the 1989 survey, there were 13 Xibo schools in the autonomous county (eight elementary schools and five secondary schools) with a total of 6,655 students (3,790 elementary and 2,865 secondary). The Xibo language was taught only in elementary schools. According to the new curriculum, revised in 1984, the Xibo language should be offered throughout all six grades of elementary schools, from four to six hours per week. But though the education department at the county level set the standards, each school implemented them differently. Among eight elementary schools, four started Xibo language teaching in grade one, one school started from grade two, and three other schools in grade three. The unified curriculum was carried out differently in each school as well. There was
no specific requirement for the amount of content to be taught in each grade. As a result
the level of education was still behind that of the Han schools.

I visited a Xibo high school and a Xibo elementary school. Their conditions and
facilities were in no way as good as schools in Urumqi.

When I went to the Xibo No.1 Middle School I was told that it is the best school in
the county. It had over 900 students, most of whom are Xibos (over 80%) and the rest
were Han. It had over 100 staff members, among whom there were 21 with university
degrees and 51 with two-or-three-year teaching certificates. Both the principal and vice-
principal were of Xibo nationality. Putonghua was the only language of instruction, but Xibo
is sometimes used to assist comprehension. The students did not seem to have any
problem in communicating in Putonghua. The principal proudly told me that in his school
46% of the graduates passed the university entrance exam and about 20% entered
professional colleges. This percentage was much higher than for any of the other
nationalities in the county. Such a high percentage was attributed partly to the high
proficiency level of Putonghua among Xibo children.

Afterwards, I visited a Xibo elementary school. A boy and a girl read a Xibo text for
me, but when I asked them what it meant they seemed to have no idea or, at least, they
showed an inability to explain anything in Putonghua to me.

According to a Xibo official and a language researcher with whom I had an interview
and who accompanied me to visit the Xibo schools, current practice in Xibo schools still
focuses mainly on Han language teaching, ignoring the Xibo mother tongue. Xibo students
do not have enough knowledge of their mother tongue. In language competence, most of
them stayed at the level of grade two or three, and before they could master their mother
tongue, they entered secondary school where the Xibo language is no longer offered, and hence their mother tongue was quickly forgotten. As a result, bilingual education has produced students whose Putonghua level is quite low but whose academic knowledge of the mother tongue is also minimal. Such a phenomenon is quite common among minority school graduates.

Several major reasons were identified for this situation. The first reason was the prevailing attitude towards bilingual education. After 20 years of enforced teaching of Putonghua in Xibo schools, quite a large portion of the Xibo population had gotten used to using only Putonghua. Some officials and even some Xibo elites thought that adding the Xibo language to school was an added burden to the students and to society. A Xibo education official told me that he firmly believes that the Xibo language had no future for the children and that in order for the people of Xibo nationality to develop faster they must forget Xibo and master Putonghua. He might have been speaking from experience. He was so proud to show a foreigner his spacious new house but was reluctant to allow photographs to be taken in his dark, broken-down office. His view seemed to be shared widely among some of the Xibo elites. Some Xibo officials and educators whom I interviewed believed that the replacement of the Xibo language by Putonghua is only a matter of time and is good for their own economic and political development. They feel that the mother tongue is quite limiting for communication and interferes with the interactions with the larger population and with the outside world. I often heard them saying that “with Xibo language alone one cannot cross the Ili River” and for them the only way out of the county and to the world was mastering Putonghua and maybe English.

The second factor reducing the effectiveness of bilingual education was the lack of
leadership and research. Chabucha'er Xibo Autonomous County is the only autonomous area for Xibo people in the whole country. Bilingual education could be an important aspect of their education. Yet I was told there was only one researcher in the Xibo language education for the whole county and he was often asked to do other administrative tasks besides his research. The research and curriculum development for Xibo language teaching was being ignored. Some Xibo nationality leaders and intellectuals had different ideas about how best to develop their own languages but there was no solid research to address the differences, and teaching methods in the schools vary tremendously.

Thirdly, I was told that the bilingual teachers and the teaching materials were different from those of the Uygur and Kazak. My visit to the schools made it clear that the Xibo bilingual teachers are more and better qualified in the Han language compared with the Uygur and Kazak situation. In fact all teachers in Xibo schools have high proficiency in Putonghua. The Xibo schools also use the same textbooks which are used by the Han schools while currently Uygur and Kazak schools have their own textbooks. Therefore, except for a few experimental Xibo bilingual programs, the quality of teaching materials is low and bilingual teachers are poorly prepared for the Xibo language. Most of the teachers only understand Xibo oral language and have no knowledge of the Xibo written language. As in the case of many of the minority teaching materials, the content of Xibo textbooks was largely a direct translation from Putonghua textbooks and was quite remote from the students' life experiences. In addition, there was very little teacher training for work in a bilingual milieu.

Finally, the current bilingual education system did not really encourage the long term development of the mother tongue. Within the county although bilingual education
was provided for all minority schools the purpose and the nature of the bilingual programs vary greatly. For example, for Uygur and Kazak children, their mother tongues were the languages of instruction throughout the elementary and secondary grades. Putonghua was taught as a subject. Entrance exams for middle and high schools were taken in their mother tongues. But for the Xibo children the situation was quite different. The mother tongue was the language of instruction in elementary schools only and Putonghua was not only taught as a subject but was also used to assist in teaching. In middle school, Putonghua then became the medium of instruction and the mother tongue was used only as a help in explaining Putonghua. Once the Xibo children entered high school, Putonghua was the only language they encountered. If they wanted to further their education, Putonghua was required as the language for the entrance examination. In other words, in Xibo schools the mother tongue was only provided as a transition to the learning of Putonghua. In fact, among Xibo schools there were major differences in implementing the bilingual education policy. For example, Wuzhu Xibo elementary school, a model school for mother tongue education located in Aixinsheli, a town with a large Xibo population, offered the Xibo language in grades one to six. In grades one and two, the Xibo language class was offered one period per day. From grade three to grade six it was reduced to one period every other day. In the county's administrative town Chabucha'er, there were not enough Xibo language teachers, and the Xibo language was only offered from grade three to six with one period per day. As for the language of instruction, the general situation among Xibo elementary schools followed a common pattern: in grades one and two, the mother tongue was the medium of instruction; starting from grade three Putonghua was used moderately to assist in transition and from grades four to six both Xibo and
Putonghua were used as the language of instruction.

These examples show that bilingual education in Xibo schools was completely different from that of the Uygur and Kazak schools. It can be seen that the Xibo type of bilingual education did not really promote the development of the mother tongue. It would not be surprising if the Xibo language were to be replaced by Putonghua within the next three generations, as was predicted by some Xibo education administrators. Another disadvantage for Xibo language maintenance as compared to the Uygur or Kazak situations is that there are no Xibo universities or professional colleges. Without their own complete education system, they have to use the Han language to enter higher education. Also due to the small population and limited areas of living, the Xibo language environment and functions are limited. I was told that many young people do not want to pursue their mother tongue. I was also alerted to the phenomenon that most Xibo children whose parents are cadres or intellectuals are sent to the Han schools. Xibo schools have a large percentage of children from peasant families. The Han schools are noted for better quality and more reading materials.

There has been an emerging shift in language use among the Xibo people, especially among the younger generation. Li Shulan (1994), an expert in Xibo language research, has noted that Xibo language is used among older and middle-aged Xibo people, but when they talk to young Xibos, the young people can understand Xibo but usually mix Putonghua in their answers. When adults talk with children, they use parts of Putonghua and the children in talking not only mix in Putonghua but also use non-standard Xibo. Putonghua and Xibo are used together when communicating among young people. The type of bilingual education in Xibo schools clearly was the major factor for this rapid inter-
generational shift.

Another language researcher, Guo Wenlin (1990), found that bilingual education as well as the multilingual communities have had a great influence on the Xibo language. He identified four indicators of language influence. First, in casual conversation, Putonghua words were frequently injected among Xibo speakers. Second, more and more new terms are borrowed from Putonghua such as the terms in politics and in modern technology. Third, it is common for Xibo speakers to attach a Xibo verb indicator to a Putonghua verb and use it as their own language. There are more and more such Xibonized Putonghua verbs used. And finally, Uygur and Kazak words also appear in Xibo oral communication. These trends have caused concerns from some Xibo intellectuals, who have cautioned against language assimilation. However, such concerns are quite often criticized as being narrow-minded and near-sighted. They were told that it is a natural phenomenon and progressive for the Xibo language to borrow widely from other languages. Putonghua and Japanese were quoted as languages with a large number of borrowed words in their vocabulary.

Suggestions have been made by some Xibo educators on how to improve the situation. Yet it is quite typical in China that suggestions which do not fall in line with the top agenda of the Party remain dormant indefinitely. The language situation of the Xibo nationality is a good example of the crucial problems in planning and education for minority language maintenance in the whole country.
6.4. Summary and Conclusion

The case studies in Xinjiang traced the minority language planning and policy at the regional level and below. Once again it showed that Communist language policy is an offshoot of the Party's political and economic agenda at any given time. As with the rest of the country, language planning and education in Xinjiang have gone through three major periods:

The first period (1949-1956) saw a quick growth of minority schools. The minority languages were supposed to be used as the medium of instruction, though implementation was variable, if not hit-and-miss. Most textbooks during this period were largely imported from the Soviet Union. From 1950 to 1956, 2,959,014 copies of textbooks were brought across the border in Xinjiang. The curricula of the minority schools from middle school upwards were developed with relative independence from the Han school curriculum but were strongly influenced by the Soviet model seen in the imported textbooks. Before 1959 the elementary schools had the same curriculum as the Han schools in other parts of the country.

During the second period (1957-1977), the political movement "the Great Leap Forward" launched in 1958 was followed by the Cultural Revolution, and resulted in the assimilation policy in Xinjiang. Since the sociolinguistic situation in Xinjiang could not accommodate the Han-language-only policy which was practiced in the rest of the country, the step taken was to reform Uygur and Kazak writing systems to bring them closer to the Han language so as to assist the spread of Putonghua. The reform resulted in the stagnation or reversal of minority language development. During the Cultural Revolution,
the language coordination and support agencies were abolished, including the Nationality Language and Script Commission of the Region. Minority schools were ordered to use the same curriculum as that of the Han. In Xinjiang, however, Han language only policy was impossible to implement since there were very few teachers who could speak Putonghua and there was, in general, a lack of a Putonghua environment. However, all textbooks in minority languages were directly translated from those of the Han, thus effectively reducing the influence exercised by alternative Soviet models.

During the third period, after 1978, especially after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the CPC when Deng Xiaoping came to power, minority language work was resumed, and related organizations were re-established. The Uygurs and the Kazaks got back their traditional written forms of their languages, and the minority schools had their own separate curriculum again. However, apart from the subject of political studies which school children of all nationalities, including the Han, had to take and during which the Party's ideologies were instilled in the heads of the youth, one more subject—the Party's Nationality Policies—was imposed on all minority school children to let them know how well treated they were under such policies and to bring them closer to integration with the Han. Minority language textbooks were re-written, albeit following closely the models of Han texts (except for language study). One policy that remained unchanged, however, was the forbidding of religious schools to compete with public education. Some minority groups, especially the Uygurs and the Tibetans, tried unsuccessfully to win back the right to have religious schools. Currently, the focus for minority education is to implement bilingual education policy, which is seen as the only road to take to achieve the goal of national integration by achieving language unity among all nationalities.
I learned some very interesting things from an interview with a scholar from the Population Research Institute of Xinjiang University. He was in his late 30's and was quite open to talk compared with some older officials and scholars. According to him, before the 1980s, the Han population in Xinjiang had been increasing steadily through migration and it began to slow down in the mid-1980s when the Uygur and the Han populations reached the same proportion, both 46%. Since then the minority population has been increasing and the Han decreasing—not in absolute numbers but as a proportion. There are several reasons for this. First, while the birth control policy applied strictly to the Han population, minorities are allowed two or three children. Second, some of the Han people felt that minorities had been receiving too many privileges, such as fewer requirements for entering higher education and employment. All sectors were given a hiring quota and a certain number of minority people had to be hired even if they were less qualified than the available Han. "Discrimination" was especially evident for those minority students accepted into higher education institutions with lower marks than the Han. Some of the Han people felt that they were second class citizens in Xinjiang, and therefore, were attempting to leave the region. Thirdly, the Han tradition of returning "home" (luo ye gui gen) to where they came from was very strong. Many Han people who were sent to minority areas during their youth have tried every possible way to return to their home cities. One Shanghai youth who had managed to get out of Inner Mongolia and who was interviewed in Hong Kong said that he and his friends had vowed that even death would be preferable to returning to Inner Mongolia (Dreyer, 1976). Right now in Xinjiang the policy for the Han is that there is no restriction for moving into the region from other provinces but the Han are not allowed to leave the region freely. One senior administrator said in a joking manner:
"If the Han were allowed to leave freely, Xinjiang University would have to be closed down within three days". But through various channels, the Han have managed to move out, especially those middle aged Han who came during the Cultural Revolution. They have moved back mostly to Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou where the businesses are booming and the Han cultural life seems to be the richest. A phenomenon which concerned the officials was that while educated Hans have been moving out, laborers from poor Han regions have been moving in. If this trend continues, it might have a negative influence for the spread of Putonghua.

Nevertheless, even with the maintenance bilingual programs, where minority languages may be maintained, Putonghua has definitely become more and more influential. Generally speaking, the past 45 years of minority language work in Xinjiang has resulted in shifts or underdevelopment of several minority languages of the region. Although the Uygur language is considered very stable, five percent of the current Uygur vocabulary is borrowed from Putonghua, and that percentage is growing.

The spread of Putonghua has not reached the goal expected by the government but it has resulted in significant language shift or loss for several minorities or, at least, has created the tendency for further shifts.

As the case studies have shown, under the newly proclaimed bilingual education policies which have been implemented in the educational system, there have been major problems and difficulties both for spreading the Han language and for preserving the minority languages. So far, the one thing that is clear is that there are numerous problems and difficulties facing policy makers and language workers, including both scholars and practitioners.
The campaign to spread the use of Putonghua has not been as successful in Xinjiang as it has been among many minorities in southern China. In fact, the government has been forced to realize that its goal of spreading Putonghua among minorities living in large concentrated areas cannot be reached in the short term. There are two major reasons for this relative slowness of language spread in Xinjiang. First, in Xinjiang large groups of nationalities live in a concentrated manner. The dominant languages are of the Turkish language family. Uygur, Kazak, Uzbek, Tatar, and Kirghiz are sometimes referred to as sister languages, for Uygur is mutually comprehensible among these nationalities. This has contributed to the stability and wide use of the Uygur language. Speakers of these languages are also geographically far away from central Han influence and strongly resist assimilation.

The second reason is that there is simply insufficient manpower and other resources to carry out the job prescribed by the government. Very few qualified bilingual teachers are available. According to the student numbers and the curriculum, a total of 8,900 teachers are needed to teach Putonghua, but currently there are only 3,270. A report from the Regional Language Commission showed that in Yingjisha County, 414 Han language classes should be operating according to regulation, yet there are only 14 teachers available (Yang Bingyi, 1991a, p.26). The qualifications of even these few teachers are generally very low. Therefore, very little Putonghua can be spread through the channels of the educational system.

Four factors can account for the lack of qualified bilingual teachers or Han language teachers in the region:

1. It is a fact that between 1962 and 1968 several hundred Han high school
graduates from Beijing, Tianjin, and Tangshan were recruited to Xinjiang, and after two
years of training in the Uygur language, were assigned to teach Putonghua in middle
schools. However, this phenomenon was a part of the authoritarian measures that, after
the Cultural Revolution, were reversed. Most of the new teachers have made their way
back to the cities from which they came.

2. The low financial and social status of bilingual teachers has caused many of them
to change occupations. Especially with the recent change to the market economy, many
teachers, even professors, have resigned from teaching to find much higher paying work
in the world of business. Currently there is a special term coined in China to describe this
new phenomenon as "jumping into the sea" (Xia hai).

3. There are very few teacher-training colleges to train minority speakers to be
teachers of Putonghua. According to the administrators interviewed, a few years ago there
was a plan to establish a Putonghua school in Urumqi. However, with the recent open
border trade and relationship with the newly independent Kazakhstan, it seemed to be
more profitable to establish a Kazak language school to train students from Kazakhstan.
During my visit, negotiations were going on for the Kazak language school. The plan for
the Putonghua language school has since been abandoned.

4. In the regional administration, there are only five full time Han language workers
in the region, three in the Language Commission and two in the Regional Education
Commission. One of them I interviewed had expressed his frustration concerning the
matter.

At the same time there are also major problems and difficulties in minority language
maintenance. Even though minority language use and development are guaranteed in
several general laws of the country, there have been no regulatory laws to implement those
general laws, and no binding body of regulations. Because of this, no regulations
guarantee sufficient language work, administration, personnel, or funds. As discussed
earlier, the whole region has only 14 minority language offices with about 100 personnel
and an annual budget of about 500,000 Chinese yuan (Yang Bingyi, 1991, p.28) which
equals less than Canadian $100,000. For a region with a population of more than 13
million, these figures must be called less than minimal. In certain prefectures and counties,
indeed, there is no budget at all for minority language work.

The root of the problems can be easily traced to the attitude of the people in power.
The traditional framework of government including a clear reward system, a developed
formal system of communication, and a formal structure for monitoring compliance and
deviance cannot be found in the system for minority language development. This absence
certainly signals the non-importance of the issue in the minds of the highest officials. Their
lack of interest has led to violation of laws and the Constitution without fear of punishment.
For example, according to the rules all documents should be written and announced both
in the relevant minority language and in Putonghua. Yet some institutes use only
Putonghua except in the reports they must send to the regional government. Some work
places with up to 10,000 minority workers do not have a single interpreter. The corruption
of the standards for minority language use is not controlled. The rule of writing signs with
minority language on top is sometimes ignored. The relative social and financial status of
minority language workers, including teachers, scholars, and translators, are low (Yang
Bingyi, 1991a, p.29). Consequently, there is an extreme shortage of bilingual teachers,
translators, researchers, and administrators. Currently, another 1,500 translators are
With this situation, it is not hard to understand that the quality of language teaching and bilingual programs is extremely poor. This also results in the lower quality of minority schools as compared with that of the Han (see Table 6.10). It is true that many minority children are attracted to the Han schools, and this is largely because the Han schools are

Table 6.10 Students at Different Levels of Schooling in Xinjiang 1987 (numbers of students for every 10,000 persons of each nationality)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>Elementary School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>312.69</td>
<td>1,403.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>895.83</td>
<td>1,220.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>480.07</td>
<td>1,733.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>412.07</td>
<td>1,733.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>310.04</td>
<td>1,513.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>649.04</td>
<td>1,529.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>853.72</td>
<td>1,459.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>213.90</td>
<td>1,602.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>556.52</td>
<td>821.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>557.45</td>
<td>862.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>419.28</td>
<td>860.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daur</td>
<td>751.12</td>
<td>1,326.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>794.41</td>
<td>911.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average for Xinjiang Region</strong></td>
<td><strong>560.71</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,362.27</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average for China as a whole</strong></td>
<td><strong>396.10</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,217.90</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cheng Shengyuan (1989)
of a higher quality in teaching, and lead to more opportunities for employment and higher education. Obviously access to the more prestigious schools is easiest for children of "well placed" parents in government posts, i.e., the group whose parents are also most likely to have a good knowledge of Putonghua.

Even though the new regulations or bylaws of the region (article 25 and article 33) proclaim that the government should promote and encourage all nationalities to learn each other's languages and to achieve bilingualism in the Han and local minority languages, and should encourage and support those minority students who choose to enter Han schools or classes and Han students who choose to enter minority schools, the fact remains that "In Xinjiang, there are more minority cadres learning Putonghua than Han cadres learning minority languages" as was pointed out by Amina Apar (1989, p.2), a Uygur, and the director of the Regional Language Commission. The force behind it can be best illustrated by a story told by a bilingual language scholar whom I interviewed. According to him, his mentor, an old Han Party veteran has devoted all his life since 1949 to work in Kashi, in southern Xinjiang. During the first decade, the Han were urged to learn the language of the locals. Like many other Han cadres, he mastered the Uygur language and worked very well with the local people. After over 45 years, he is still working in the same village without any complaint. However, there are many Han cadres who have been in Xinjiang for more than 30 years without bothering to learn the local languages. After the first decade, learning minority languages has no longer been emphasized in the policy, and many other Han cadres have realized that knowing the minority language will not help them to get promoted—in fact, quite the contrary. Those who know the Uygur language are quite often sent to work in remote Uygur villages since no translators are available there, and those
who work in far away villages have less opportunity to know the upper level leaders and therefore less opportunity to get recommended for promotion. The centre of the problem is that there is no specific policy and reward system for the Han to study minority languages. It also shows a common attitude among the Han cadres that the Han language is superior and the very reason they are there is to sacrifice their life to help the backward minority regions advance, that is to become more like the Han.

However, in spite of all these negative factors, there have been some forms of progress in minority language maintenance mostly in recent years.

After the Cultural Revolution, the minority language issues came back onto the Party's agenda. Yet one of the obvious difficulties was that, apart from the Constitution and the Autonomous Laws which were written in general terms, there were no specific language laws to guarantee what had been promised. In recent years members of the Regional People's Political Consultative Conferences, many language workers and other persons have repeatedly asked for such laws to be made. The Regional People's Congress and the regional government, after numerous meetings, decided to start the process. The government asked the Language Commission to draft a law, and after many revisions, it finally came into being.

Thus, after almost 40 years of confusion, in 1988 the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region government developed and passed a special local regulation concerning spoken and written languages of ethnic groups within the region, which is entitled "Temporary Provisions of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Concerning the Administration of the Use of Spoken and Written Languages of the Ethnic Groups". However, since it was developed by the regional government, it can only be used as regulations in administration and does
not have the force of the law. It can be implemented for an indeterminate period, but must eventually be passed by the Standing Committee of the Regional People's Congress in order to be put broadly into practice.

The new regulations are aimed at promoting the importance of minority language in terms of the "four modernizations", correcting certain attitudes, standardizing the languages, and promoting bilingual education (Yang Bingyi, 1990).

To conclude this chapter, in Xinjiang, at least for the larger minority groups such as the Uygur, Kazak, and Mongolian, the government has realized that a policy of language replacement at the present stage is impossible and could contribute to independence movements. The best hope for the government is to introduce Putonghua in addition to the minorities' mother tongues. Such a standoff in terms of power relations might in time result in "true bilingual education" (the mastery of both majority and minority languages) in Xinjiang. For the smaller minority groups such as Xibo, evidence strongly indicates that they are losing their languages and are being both linguistically and culturally assimilated.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

7.1. Introduction

This final chapter is devoted to two major objectives: first, to present the findings of the nature and characteristics, and the process of the Communist minority language policies and planning for the past 45 years; and, second, to discuss implications of these findings for theoretical issues in the fields of language planning, education policy studies, and bilingual education. The findings and implications will suggest possible directions for future research.

7.2 Synthesis of Findings

The discussion for the findings will follow the theme of three interrelated domains of Chinese policies related to minorities: starting with the nature and the characteristics of macro-policies and their reflections over the years, then a discussion of bureaucratic process linking central to regional and local authorities to clarify the relationship between policy making and its implementation, and, finally, a presentation of the bilingual education realities as a reflection of the impact of these policies on minority languages and their communities.
7.2.1 Minority Language Policy and Planning

Examination and analysis of the past 45 years of the Communist minority language policy and planning have revealed that they have been centred on two major conflicting objectives: to maintain and develop minority languages, as claimed in Communist ideology and as guaranteed by the Constitution and State Laws, and to spread Putonghua among all nationalities within China's borders, in order to help achieve national integration. Both objectives have been aimed at the ultimate goal of socialist state-building through integrating the minorities into the Han culture and political life.

The issues surrounding minority language policy and planning have been reflected in a constant struggle, balance, and synthesis of the two objectives. This is the result of the ambiguity in Marxist ideology and the paradox between the ideologies adopted by the CPC and the strong influence of the Chinese imperial tradition embedded in the outlook of the top leaders and the majority policy makers.

As discussed in Chapter Four, the Marxist ideology adopted by the Chinese Communists holds that a homogeneous proletarian culture will eventually replace all different characteristics of all nationalities with the disappearance of class differences in a communist society. For the time being, in China (a society at the socialist stage), nationality characteristics, including their languages, have to be tolerated and allowed to develop. In principle all languages are equal, hence the two constitutional provisions for minority languages maintenance and majority language spread. But as Dreyre (1976) observed, it is not at all clear how long and to what extent they should be developed. Such
ambiguity in ideology leaves the policy makers with a wide scope for interpretation. The paradox is that a common proletarian culture, according to the approved "official" version of Marxist theory, would be based on a blending of all nationality characteristics. But the Chinese Communists clearly did not expect blending. Their policies and practices expected the Han characteristics to be adopted by the minorities. Such expectations and practices can be understood in the light of the thousands of years of imperial tradition of Han superiority and ruling strategies to maintain social order represented by Confucian ideology. Maintaining absolute Han central control under the slogan of "national unity" is the major motivation behind the Party's policy for spreading Putonghua. The effort in making "one single countrywide language of communication" is a clear indication that the Party employs language planning as a tool to achieve national integration.

Over the past 45 years policy and planning have been swinging between the two objectives during different periods. As discussed in Chapters Four, Five, and Six, language planning and policy changes have gone through three major periods.

During the first decade (1949-57), the policy of the CPC towards minorities was cautious and gradualist which was reflected in a progressive and tolerant minority language policy. It resulted in the following activities in language planning: the establishment of a responsible government policy and research agencies, the investigation of minority language situations, and the creation and reformation of several minority written languages, at the same time that the Han phonetic scheme was developed to assist Putonghua spread among various dialect speakers among the Han population. The result of such planning activities, at best, showed the intention of the Party to follow the stated ideology of language equality and to work on minority language maintenance. However,
in the final analysis, the Party benefited far more from these minority language planning activities than did the minorities themselves and their languages. Linguistically such language planning laid the groundwork for the spread of Putonghua by imposing Latin based scripts on minority languages which at least made Putonghua more assessable to minority language speakers. Sociopolitically these policies helped to a certain degree to win at least the partial trust and loyalty of the minorities in going along with the socialist scheme and brought much needed support for the young government. Most importantly such policy helped to reduce minority resistance and had a positive effect in securing the frontiers. But at the end of that first decade with the launch of various political movements, such policy and planning for minority language maintenance was not allowed to operate long enough to achieve its intended effects. The planning efforts were clearly a strategy to assist integration without forced assimilation.

For the most part of the following 20 years (1957-77), language policy turned to extreme assimilation. Putonghua was the only language allowed in schools across the country (with a few exceptions where the local conditions simply did not permit such practice). As a result, Putonghua successfully became the lingua franca among Han dialect speakers and began to spread systematically to minority areas. During this period, there was very little effort put towards minority language maintenance. In Xinjiang, the effort of Uyghur and Kazak writing system reform, which was claimed as a policy of the government to maintain and develop minority language, ended in the loss of literacy in these languages for an entire generation of these two minority groups. Yet the spread of Putonghua was not as successful as expected by the government among those minority populations living in large concentrations and far away from Han environment (as discussed in Chapters Five
Following the Cultural Revolution with the changing of political power from Mao to Deng and the change of political agendas from political revolution to economic reform, minority language planning and policy made a change as well. For about ten years, minority language work went through the stages of confusion, reorientation, restoration and redirection. After much debate and research, and most importantly, motivated by the ultimate goal of achieving national unity while maintaining social stability, bilingualism and bilingual education became the new policy. Therefore, Putonghua spread and minority language maintenance became the major task in minority language education.

With the implementation of bilingual education policy in recent years, Putonghua has been offered in all minority schools; for some this is in addition to the local languages, for others excluding the local languages. The stated objective was not to replace minority languages, but to promote the status of Putonghua as the lingua franca among all nationalities or at least as the common second language for the minority populations. It was hoped that such policies would, on the one hand, satisfy minorities' aspirations towards their languages and culture thus keeping political stability, and on the other hand, would lead gradually to the integration of the minorities into the building of a Han socialist state.

As can be seen, the shifts of goals in minority language planning and policy were always dictated, first of all, by the Party's political and economic agenda. Although the Communist ideologies, it was claimed, held their ground through all changes, changes in policies were always justified as an effort to apply Marxist-Leninist theory creatively to fit the practical situations in China. The policy decisions were also conditioned partially by the
national minorities' strategic positions and their relevancy to the Party's overall planning. The constant search for a language policy which enhanced the Party's political control and at the same time avoided or reduced nationality conflicts was largely influenced by the Chinese imperial traditions. The impact of the recent political and economic changes in the world on China's minority policies was also present.

The characteristics of the CPC's integration policy include a long period of "tolerance" of minorities' special characteristics such as languages, religions, and customs. It is claimed that minority languages will flourish during the socialist period before finally being integrated into the common language of the proletarian society. Although Han language was not specified, it is obvious from the study that Putonghua is expected to become the common language of all nationalities in China. It is also believed that the process of integration cannot be rushed, for it is against the natural laws of social development. These theories and beliefs are the rationale behind recent bilingual education policy. But the driving force behind the shifts of policy and practice has been a search for political and social stability and national unity to secure the political and strategic objectives of the central authorities in the frontier regions—culturally quiet, economic development of natural resources and avoidance of situations that could be exploited by Soviet and now Russian military strategists.

Permitting the preservation and use of minority languages without overly worrying about independence movements may reflect a confidence inherited from the Confucius ideology of the superior-subordinate relationships between the ruler and the society and between the race of the ruler and its less civilized tribes, namely the minorities. The Han Chinese have always seemed to be certain that their civilization is so superior that all
surrounding cultures would inevitably adapt to their way. The official imperial view held that the various "barbarians" who occasionally might rebel and invade the inland but would inevitably succumb to the majority Han culture and adopt the Confucian ideology. Such was the eventual fate of the Liao, Jin, Yuan and Qing dynasties which resulted from such invasions. Mongols and Manchus (both were rulers of China respectively during the Yuan and the Qing Dynasty) have been absorbed to a certain degree by the Han (the Manchus have lost their languages to the Han). It has been said that conquerors have never changed the Chinese, but rather the Chinese have changed the conquerors. Although the CPC tried to distance their policies from that of the previous rulers, tradition and the widely promoted ideologies have the Han public and many Party officials genuinely believing that all efforts on minority languages and other aspects of their life are sincere gestures of friendship from the "big brother" Han to their "little brothers", the minorities, within a big socialist family. The minorities may eventually be up-graded to enjoy the same level of civilization and economic prosperity as the Han. As a result, for the most part of the Communist rule, minority issues such as minority language and education have rarely been seen as critical, and have not been at the top of the Party's agenda, except when crises arise such as rebellions in Tibet and other areas. As long as the minority situation stayed relatively stable, the Party has always had more pressing things to deal with.

At the same time, the existence of a prior model of regional and local cultural and linguistic autonomy—namely the federative structure of the Soviet Union and particularly the Russian Soviet Socialist Federation Republic—must be acknowledged as part of the CPC's heritage. The model provides a precedent for the use of such structures in a one Party controlled society, but Chinese sources—even early sources from the 1950s—are
usually silent on such parallelisms. It appears, on present evidence, that the dominant forces in setting up and operating minority administrative areas have been mainly Chinese inspired with little or no conscious imitation of Soviet models.

It can be concluded that Communist minority policies, especially language policy, have had a great impact on the CPC's socialist nation building. As discussed earlier, the fall of the former Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe has led many western experts to the conclusion or suspicion that the "ethnic crises" were caused simply by endemic weaknesses in Communism. Yet these western experts have attributed the relative political stability in China to merely two elements—the presence of an overwhelming proportion of Han Chinese over the minority populations (92% Han versus 8%) and powerful military control. Obstacles in understanding China make it tempting to view the country in relatively simple images. The predominance of the Han population, together with China's mighty military forces no doubt are two of many factors at play, but they are not the only factors. It must be concluded that the Party's minority policies in general and minority language policies in particular have to be credited with having contributed significantly to the relatively stable relationship between the Han and the minority groups in China. As demonstrated in the earlier chapters, over the past 45 years military force has not been a major component in dealing with the minorities, especially over the issue of their languages and education. The eight percent of minority people amounts to a population of over ninety million holding key positions in China's political and economic future, including their strategic positions in national defence and the rich natural resources of their territories.

The most important element behind the "successful" language planning and policy is a constant search for a 'correct way' to handle the relations between the majority and the
minority languages, which reflects the delicate relationship between the Han and China's minorities. The Communist Party of China has always insisted that integration rather than assimilation makes its policy superior to those of the previous rulers. The terms 'integration' and 'assimilation' are sometimes hard to differentiate, and in fact, communist policies and practices have shown an overlapping of the two. But evidence from the study indicates that the policies and practices seem to have focused more on control than on forced assimilation. Integration, especially language integration as demonstrated earlier, can be more accurately termed a policy of "natural" or "voluntary" assimilation which has been used by the Party to set itself apart from the "forced assimilation and discrimination" policies used by former imperialists and especially the Guomindang.

The Party, over the past 45 years, has employed various other methods for integration apart from its language planning activities, seizing any opportunity to alter the thinking of the minority groups both to make them Communists and to bring them closer to cultural and linguistic integration with the Han. The policy of Regional National Autonomy has been to allow minorities a certain amount of self-government, but always within the limits of central control. In addition, as noted in Chapter Four, there have been a series of "preferential policies" or "privileges" for minorities prescribed by the central government such as relaxed birth control, easier entrance to employment and higher education, special funding, and certain tax exemptions. Attempts have also been made to convince minorities that their economic and socio-cultural advancement lies in participation in the Han Chinese socialist state.

Past experience has taught the Party that forced assimilation and the rush for language shifts were not realistic and could be counter-productive. A more relaxed policy
would lead to a diminution of nationalist tensions. It also realized that too relaxed a policy may also fail in integration, and lead to separatist tendencies that would require overt suppression (as in Tibet). To maintain national unity and social and political stability, and to develop into a powerful modernized country, the Han, in a way, depend on -- or at the very least do better with -- the loyalty and support of all the minorities. And the Party's propaganda has tried to instill in the minorities that their own survival and economic development depends on the Han. The leadership hopes that this stressing of mutual dependency will develop a sense of oneness under unified control.

The Party has also realized that the pen is mightier than the sword or perhaps using the first may avoid use of the latter. Education is the tool of preference at this juncture. A balanced approach towards minority issues in general and language planning in particular is to gradually spread the Han language and culture to the minorities but at the same time demonstrates the sincerity and effort of continued tolerance of minority languages and other characteristics. It has been hoped that these policies, in the long run, might lead to what can be called "voluntary or natural assimilation".

From this study it can be concluded that such education-based policies have proven to be relatively effective in reducing conflicts between the Party and the national minorities. As one observer noted, "There is a real debate within the Uygur community. There are those who want to separate and therefore fight against China for independence, and many who believe in working with the Han Chinese" (Rudelson, quoted by Mickleburgh, 1997 Feb. 12, *The Globe and Mail*). Among the smaller minorities, especially those in the south and those living among the Han, many believe in working with the Chinese government, which may contribute to the unity effort and tolerant policies initiated by the Party. Despite
all the controversy in the Communist language policy and the inefficiency of the bureaucratic structure, the study implies that the Communist Party of China must be credited with having made sustained and often creative efforts to deal with minority language problems in China. The major characteristics of Communist language policy are oriented to ensure control, avoid nationality conflicts, maintain political stability and eventually result in national integration.

The social and political impact of Communist language policy is a significant factor in promoting national unity and political stability of the country. But its impact on majority language spread and minority language maintenance is quite unbalanced. As concluded in Chapter Five, these policies and planning activities have led to the following results:

1. The spread of Putonghua has been steadily gaining ground. Putonghua, being the common language of northern Han speakers in 1949, has become the common language of all Han dialect speakers by the end of 1970s and now is on its way to becoming the second language of all national minorities and eventually the lingua franca of the entire nation.

2. Statistics show a slow yet steady growth of language shift among Chinese national minority groups especially among small and less concentrated groups.

The struggle for minority language maintenance is still fighting an up-hill battle. A few "success" cases, as discussed in the study, have not secured their scripts from the further invasion of the Latin-based written form.

The study concludes that, under the Chinese Communists, minority language planning has been motivated by a persistent desire to integrate the national minority groups into the Han Chinese, both politically and culturally. The source of this desire is a
synthesis of Communist ideology and thousands of years of imperial tradition. The approaches employed to fulfil the desired integration have been determined by a combination of factors the most important of which has been the CPC's political agenda at the time. The resulting policies have swung from forced assimilation, or mere tolerance, to celebrating diversity. The long-term impact of such policy and planning on minority languages and on community survival still remains to be seen.

7.2.2. Governance and Implementation: Central-Local and Inter-agency Relations

Implementation of policies has been shaped by the intricate interplay among various stakeholders and government agencies within the Chinese bureaucratic structure, the largest in the world. The process of policy initiation, decision, and implementation was controlled not only by the communist agenda but by the very structure set up to carry on such a process. Various policy tools were applied within the structure to ensure implementation. Many agencies at each level were at play and influenced planning, but their agendas and strategies were uncoordinated and in many cases contradictory. The bureaucratic structure allowed objectives, substance, and principles of the national policy to be implemented very differently at various levels across the country. The political machine kept running, but the complex structure permitted or created a situation where local implementation might stray far from national policy.

The review of language planning, policy, and implementation in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and in Gansu Province illustrates a number of important features of central-regional relationships and of regional-local relations as well.
In the domain of language planning and policy the Centre controls the policy guidelines which are often developed to support the Party's overall political agenda of the period. Within those guidelines, with regional input, decisions and directives are reached. Implementation of the policies is largely in the hands of the local administrators, including those at the prefecture and county levels. The relationship is neither one of complete Central dominance, as many outsiders believe, nor regional autonomy, as its name suggests. Rather, some kind of consensus is achieved by the interdependent relationships between the two. The balance seems to be in favour of the Centre, but there has been a gradual but sure shift towards more control on the part of the region or province.

The previous chapters have described the political structures of the Centre and each level below, the sources of central control and regional autonomy, and the various factors which determine the balance of the relationship between the two. Through its administrative apparatus, the Party (the Centre) has control over the military, the propaganda system, the key economic resources, and the appointment and dismissal of First Party Secretaries, Governors, military commanders, as well as several of their key subordinates at the regional/provincial level. However, as Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988, p.349) put it: "These mechanisms of control are imperfect. They prevent rebellion and unyielding defiance, and at a minimum guarantee the Centre a major role in shaping what occurs within the province. But, they do not establish the automatic dominance of the Centre over the province". The Party must rely largely on the loyalty of its regional and provincial administrators. This has been the rationale behind the training of minority cadres and promoting certain influential minority leaders. It is expected that they are to serve the interests of the Party and the government rather than the local people they represent.
Although tight central control seemed to be the trade mark of communist rule, Mao Zedong foresaw not only the importance of the relations but also the problems arising from the administrative structure. In his speech regarding the ten major relationships in China, Mao (1977, p.293) pointed out: "For a large country like ours and a big Party like ours the proper handling of the relationship between the central and local authorities is of vital importance." In the same speech Mao promoted his vision of a desirable relationship: "Our territory is so vast, our population is so large and conditions are so complex that it is far better to have the initiative come from both the central and the local authorities than from one source alone" (1977, p.292). Mao's directives were intended to moderate the strong centralizing tendencies of bureaucracies, which were reluctant to accept that provinces and regions, especially autonomous regions like Xinjiang, hold many sources of strength. During Mao's era, especially the first decades of Communist control, quite a number of language and education policies were initiated from the regional/provincial level, or at least in consultation with them. The only condition was that the Party's control should not be threatened.

Apart from the right granted through the Law of National Regional Autonomy, the real bargaining power of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region lies in its social and demographic make-up as well as its economic and political position. The bargaining power of its neighbour, Gansu province seemed to be weaker, which is reflected in differences in school programs, facilities and materials, as well as qualified teachers. The regional/provincial level leaders, including non-Hans, hold an important intermediate position in the hierarchy between the local level and the Centre. In other words, the Centre needs the willing cooperation of the regional administrators to reach local people,
especially in those locations which are far away from Beijing.

During the early Mao period (1949-58), the Centre seemed to have more control over the whole range of language issues. Most of the policies and planning regarding minority languages were developed during this period. As for minority language policy, the basic principles were firmly controlled by the Centre, including the Communist principles of language equality and unity among all nationalities. This was reflected in the policy guidelines in the Constitution and the laws. However, the directives and more detailed planning and policies were made after consultations with representatives of the minority peoples. Ambiguities and contradictions were, however, generated by directives from the Centre, such as the simultaneous guarantee of the freedom to use all minority languages and the policy to promote the spread of Putonghua. In fact, the policies under Mao are less vague than those of the Deng regime.

The ambiguity of the policy from the Centre, as suspected by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), may or may not have been a deliberate appeal to proponents of opposing views, in order to build a broad coalition in support of the Centre. Consensus between regional and Centre officials is crucial in policy process. During Mao's period such consensus was achieved through political campaigns and enormous pressure from the top leaders. The case of Uygur and Kazak writing system reform was a good example. The powerful political campaign of the "Great Leap Forward" and the project of the Centre to apply the Han Phoneticization Plan in minority language creation and reform resulted in the policy decision to Latinize the Uygur and Kazak written languages. The reform was portrayed as initiated from the region. Perhaps what made it possible to represent it as a regional initiative was that while there had been talks about language reform at the Centre,
regional leaders loyal to the Centre saw a way to act as the "Centre agents" and turn the region into a show case. In any case, the policy decision was announced in the form of directives from the regional government with the support of the Centre. Such policies were rationalized and put into practice with support of mass propaganda. The newspapers announced that the Uygur masses could not wait to see the reform so that they could learn the big Han brothers' language much earlier. However, it must be kept in mind that not all regional level leaders wanted to act as "Centre agents". Some chose to play the role of "regional defenders" who might risk demotion but might achieve respect from local people.

When Deng came to power, the cooperation of all parties involved became extremely important. Xinjiang's position became stronger as large oil and mineral deposits were found and the region's earnings of foreign currencies through the tourist industry and cross border trade increased. Nationalism among some minorities such as the Uygurs grew. More and more people were complaining about the Latin-based scripts. Some local leaders were strongly supporting the local demand. Finally, to maintain consensus the Centre agreed to restore the traditional Arabic-based scripts. Although it was a heavy loss on the part of the Centre to admit the failure of the 20-year policy and the loss of the money spent to implement it, the Centre realized the strong position of the region in the bargaining process. Even the Han leaders in the region would advise the Centre that insisting on Latin-based written forms might result in political rebellion among the minorities.

There were also quite a number of regional leaders (many at the lower level) who were neither loyalists to the Centre nor regional defenders, but rather "mere" survivors.
Whenever a policy directive came from the Centre they had to make a choice. They had to determine which directives were really serious, so that they needed to act upon them right away, and which could be safely ignored without injury to their career. For example, according to the regulation, in Xinjiang all official documents must be written in Putonghua as well as a major local language. Yet many local Han leaders simply use Putonghua only since they know they will suffer no consequences. They had also to be able to combine the new directives with their own on-going agendas. Before they decided whether the new policy was implementable, they had to consider their own safety. It seems that the largeness of this group made, and continues to make the balance favourable to the Centre.

Very often such power-keeper regional level administrators have shifted responsibility to superiors in Beijing or to subordinates at lower levels. For example, for the inefficient work in spreading Putonghua, the leaders of the Regional Language Work Commission have blamed the Centre for insufficient funding and lack of specific language laws. At the same time, they blamed lower level officials for not taking the directive seriously. In similar fashion, the prefecture administrators blamed the regional government for not providing enough manpower to do the job and lamented the lack of teacher training. The county level officials complained about the lack of language environment to popularize Putonghua and the low quality of bilingual teachers.

In both Xinjiang and Gansu, for example, it appears that the top regional/provincial leaders of the Han nationality were acting more as the "Centre agents" while some of the minority elites might perform as "regional defenders". According to the Law on Regional Autonomy, the ratio of administrative office holders in autonomous areas should be 40% Han and 60% minority members. However, I heard complaints from some minority
members that the Centre will always win since there are always minority elites who were selected by the Centre for their positive attitude towards the Party, and who wanted to keep their power and therefore vote for the Centre. So it is never difficult for the Han to get the support of a majority (although a "vote" or "poll" is inconceivable as a means of consultation), hence a popular saying among the minorities: "minorities maybe the masters of their own house, but the Hans make the decisions" (shaoshu minzu dangjia, Hanzu zuozhu).

Another complaint which my observations appear to confirm is that many administrators, especially at the lower level with little education and less experience, have a very poor sense of "participation" but rather follow rigidly the regulations from the top. For them it is always safer to follow than ask questions. This may have been the influence of the deep-rooted tradition of the relationships between superiors and subordinates. It may have been their fear of political persecution as has happened to so many leaders around them. Some parents and students also act in the same way and entrust decisions to school administrators. It may have been that they never knew they had such rights. The tradition of respect and obedience causes many crucial yet sensitive issues to be avoided.

The broad policy guidelines from the Centre, together with the bureaucratic structures at each level, made the implementation of policy and inter-agency relations between various levels extremely complicated. Mao had also seen these problems as early as in 1956, and called for change:

At present scores of hands are reaching out to the localities, making things difficult for them. Once a ministry is set up, it wants to have a revolution and so it issues orders. Since the ministries don't think it proper to issue orders to the Party committees and people's councils at the provincial level, they establish direct contact with the relevant departments and
bureaus in the provinces and municipalities and give them orders every day. These orders are all supposed to come from the central authorities, even though neither the Central Committee of the Party nor the State Council knows anything about them, and they put a great strain on the local authorities. There is such a flood of statistical forms that they become a scourge. This state of affairs must be changed. (Mao Zedong, 1977, p.293)

But the nature of the bureaucracy made it hard for Mao to change it, even though he was very well aware of the problem. For example, the Nationality Language Work Commission of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is under the direct control of the regional government as well as under the parallel control of the central State Nationality Affairs Commission and other central government organizations. Many government agencies, especially at the lower levels, are in a similar situation. Since there are no specific language laws to control the policy implementation and since the agencies get directions from various sources above, they have the liberty to choose to implement certain parts of policies and not others without being penalized, especially under the generic rule attached for autonomous areas which says that policies that do not agree with the local situations can be adapted or not implemented.

Forty-five years have passed since the first stage in language planning for minorities. The tensions of administrative authorities remain a fact of life and have a direct effect on policy decisions and implementation. During the post-Mao era (mostly under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping) the provinces/regions have more autonomy than before, but the Centre still has the dominant role. Problems similar to those described by Mao still exist due to the nature of the bureaucratic structure. Many bureaucratic struggles at the lower levels arise, on the one hand, from the ambiguity and controversial nature of the directives from the higher levels and, on the other hand, from the poorly delineated jurisdictions which
charge several local agencies with the same responsibility. For example, the controversy between minority language maintenance and the spread of Putonghua, and the vagueness about bilingual education have resulted in either bilingual education programs for totally different purposes or the ignoring of the policy at local levels.

The essence of central-regional-local relations is a complex process of negotiation, bargaining and compromises dictated by the various sociopolitical factors discussed earlier. One tendency is that regions have been gaining increasing control over language and education affairs. For example, the unified curriculums and textbooks are gradually being replaced by more localized versions with more minority cultural content rather than direct translation from the Chinese textbooks as had been done in the past.

However, these generalizations cannot be applied strictly to all situations in China, because every province or region has a distinctive relationship with the Centre. The sensitive nature of minority issues and the underdevelopment of the economy in these regions determine that the relations between the Centre and the local regions are sometimes quite different from those between the Centre and the more developed southern provinces.

7.2.3. Bilingual Education as an Instrument for Language Planning

The findings in the area of bilingual education intend to address the following questions:

1. What are the major types of bilingual education programs and their objectives?
2. What forms of bilingual education are more successful for whom?
3. Can bilingual schools be the agent of China's language planning goals?

4. What are the major impacts of the current bilingual education practices on minority languages?

5. Are schools or non-educational factors such as politics, economics, and social status the central or peripheral vehicles for the goals of Han language spread and minority language maintenance?

In Chapter Five, it has been established that bilingual education for minorities schools as a formal government education policy was developed only in the late 1970s and early 1980s when Deng Xiaoping took China into an economic reform. Bilingual education as a systematic research area throughout the world has just been emerging in the last 20-30 years. The birth of bilingual education policy in China was a result of balancing several factors: the Marxist ideology, the change of sociopolitical and economic situation in the country, the arguments between the controversial ideas of language unification and the importance of language maintenance, and the language use reality among national minorities. After much debate and research, bilingual education policy is beginning to be accepted by various groups involved in minority language and education planning as a possible solution to language planning problems in the country. In essence, China's official stand on societal bilingualism and bilingual education for minority schools is a result of the legal and ideology provisions on the status of both the majority and minority languages provided by the Constitution. Consequently various types of bilingual educational programs have been developed for the implementation of bilingual education policy in minority schools. The past decade has seen major efforts on achieving consensus among policy makers, language planners, and language educators on bilingualism and
bilingual education. The current effort is focused on the implementation of such policy in minority schools.

By 1985, 160,000 schools were already implementing bilingual education, affecting approximately 2.5 million students across the nation (Lin Jing, 1997). However, there are still some minority groups without it and many of the bilingual programs are still on a trial basis. In the 1990's there have already been reports that in certain regions efforts have slackened, and some minority areas are even giving up due to the lack of teachers, teaching materials, and local support (Lin Jing, 1997).

For quite a number of minorities whose writing systems were designed in the 1950s, or those still without a writing system, the focus of policy and planning is still at the stage of selection and codification, with little implementation. According to a government report, out of the fourteen language scripts designed in the 1950's and the two developed in 1970, currently only two of them, the Zhuang and the Yi writing systems are being formally implemented (Huang Xing, 1996). All the others are still in the stage of experimentation. The future for these newly developed scripts is not clear. The State Council's Directive No. 32 stipulates that the minority scripts designed and reformed in 1950 should be treated in three ways: Those scripts which were received well by minority people and have good experimental results shall be popularized after going through an approval procedure. Those that do not have ideal experimental results shall be reevaluated and further improved. Those scripts which do not show good experimental implementation results and were not welcomed by the majority members of the minority groups shall be stopped. It will be interesting to see how many of these minority written scripts will eventually be formally implemented in minority schools.
As discussed in previous chapters, the implementation of various bilingual programs in minority schools is still in the exploratory and experimental stage. The types of programs in practice and the criteria for evaluation vary from region to region and from school to school, as was the case in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. For its full implementation, and perhaps for later elaboration to become a stable practice, the same policy has to continue and be perfected for a significant period.

This study finds that, as a part of language planning process and products, bilingual education is inevitably value-loaded with social and political implications. However, one must not come to the simple conclusion that all current bilingual education programs in China are unitary in nature. Due to the paradox of Communist ideology and the ambiguous policy of bilingual education at the national level, and due to the intricate bureaucratic structures which influence the implementation of a policy at different levels, the implementation objectives and processes are highly inconsistent at the school level. They have been implemented with a number of interpretations, leading to very different directions and objectives. Depending on which level, where it takes place, and who is in charge, the current practice of bilingual education includes a broad range of objectives and implementation alternatives. These attitudes and orientations, conditioned by various other factors, have resulted in varying types of bilingual programs.

Sorting out the types of bilingual education programs in China proves to be no easy task. The cases of bilingual education in Xinjiang indicate that under a simple label, bilingual education is in fact a very complex phenomenon. Even within the Autonomous Region, the meaning of bilingual education varies from one location to another, from one minority group to another, and quite often from school to school. It also means different
things to different players: the policy makers at the national level and below, the minority elites, the parents, students, teachers, and school administrators. As Baker (1993) reminded us, the meaning of bilingual education is not self-evident. Binoculars are for two eyes, but bilingualism is not simply about two languages.

The results of this research study reveal both policy objectives and education practice that range widely between the two major types of bilingual education--transitional or maintenance--identified by Fishman (1976) and others (Hornberger, 1991; Baker, 1993). The minority language policies at the national level would like to leave the impression that all bilingual education programs are aimed at maintenance. However, examination of local policies and school programs reveals a major contrast. According to a Han researcher, within the 26 autonomous prefectures where minority written languages have been introduced into minority schools, 57% have maintenance bilingual education and 42% have transitional bilingual programs (Zhou Qingsheng, 1991).

My own research confirms that the bilingual education programs in China fall into many different models under the two broad categories mentioned above. For example, for the Uygurs and Kazaks in Xinjiang, the bilingual programs are mostly maintenance in that, throughout the entire elementary and middle school years, in each grade, Uygur and Kazak remain as the language of instruction for all subjects, and Putonghua is introduced as a subject. This type is sometimes called developmental maintenance as distinguished from static maintenance which attempts to prevent home language loss but does not increase skills in that first language (Otheguy & Otto, 1980). Some of the Xibo schools fall into this type: Putonghua is the language of instruction for all subjects and Xibo is introduced as a subject from an early grade to the end of middle school. Another similar
type of maintenance program occurs when both Putonghua and minority languages are used as the languages of instruction and both languages are also taught as subjects throughout all school years. Some of the Uygur and Kazak schools in big city centres fall into this model. Xinjiang is often quoted as a model for true bilingualism in education. Yet what about some smaller minority groups in Xinjiang? In my observations, in many cases this type of maintenance bilingual education is very much dictated by the social and linguistic environment. In many areas of Xinjiang, especially in the south of the region, Uygur and Kazak are in fact the majority, and Han language environment and teachers are almost non-existent. Raw demography obviously plays a significant role in determining the implications of policy orientation. The mismatch of macro-level planning and micro-level implementation is partially caused by varying conditions and by the Chinese bureaucratic structure as discussed in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. Such practice often results in the phenomenon of lots of noise at the top (newspapers, TV, radio, conferences, government directives) but very little implementation at the local level.

Bilingual education for transitional purposes, or short-term bilingual education, is quite common and has many different models where minority languages are used as a bridge or a walking stick leading to the mastering of Putonghua. Some Xibo schools in Xinjiang and many Tibetan schools which were visited in Gansu province are transitional in nature. There are also a large number of schools that practice an "in name only" type of bilingual education as mentioned in Chapter Two. This type of practice can be easily identified with the transitional type.

Despite differences in models and types of bilingual programs practised in schools, the bilingual programs identified in this study can be categorized into two major types, the
dominant one being Putonghua as the language of instruction, with minority language as a tool to assist in the acquisition of Putonghua. This type of program for transitional purposes is extremely popular among smaller minority groups with small concentrations such as Xibo and the Tibetans living in small concentrations outside of Tibet, and among those Uygur and Kazak schools which are located in bigger city centres such as Urumqi. The other model is the minority language being the medium of instruction with Putonghua taught as a subject. This type of program is aimed at achieving true bilingualism and is most popular among large minority groups living in large concentrations away from Han cultural influences. Officials claim that the two different models have the same objective, that is to achieve bilingualism among minority school children. The justification for allowing different types of implementation is said to be for the adaptation of the policy to the specific local situation.

Language administrators claim to have learned a lesson from the past failures of uniformity in implementation and curriculum. One fact has become abundantly clear to policy makers and the educators: the unified language and education policies (yi dao qie) which used to treat all minorities as a single entity is virtually impractical. Yet allowing national policies to be implemented flexibly to take into account the unique situation of each minority group can lead to arbitrary or uninformed decisions at the local level. Language planners and policy makers have to walk a fine line to take all factors into consideration. The new style of implementation emphasizes flexibility in accordance to local situations (yindizhiyi, fenleizhidao). The officials insist that the real difference that lies in various types of bilingual programs is a difference only in emphasis and in approaches but all lead to the same end: to achieve bilingualism (Hu Shujin, 1995). This practice is said
to follow the social functions of the language itself rather than language discrimination.

Do these different bilingual programs really lead to the same end? To get at the real picture, an investigation was undertaken of the impact of bilingual education policy in general and various types of bilingual programs in particular on the spread of Putonghua and on the maintenance of minority languages.

As discussed in Chapters Five and Six, to a large extent bilingual schooling or classes (mostly in elementary systems), are more effective in helping the minority children's acquisition of Putonghua than the previous Putonghua-only program. Bilingual programs also appear to be more effective in raising the level of overall academic achievement among minority students. Schools for minorities where Putonghua has been the only language of instruction for the past 20 years have proven to be not so successful for language spread. As discussed in Chapter Five, in spite of all policies and planning to spread Putonghua in minority areas and the constant invasion by large numbers of Han immigrants to minority regions, more than 70% of the total minority population is currently using their mother tongue as the sole means of communication and have no intention of changing (Lin Xiangrong, 1989; Fu Maoji & Sun Zhu, 1990). Yet the newly formulated bilingual education programs seem to have increased the level of proficiency in Putonghua.

It is reported to be especially effective with those minorities who live in small concentrations or are scattered among the Han, and usually have small populations, without their own written languages, with a short language history, with very limited functions of the mother tongue, and without a complete education system of their own.

However, does the use of the mother tongue in school foster minority language maintenance, as promised in bilingual education policy? It has been shown that the
situations vary depending on a large number of factors and conditions some of which are social, others linguistic, some favourable but most unfavourable for minority language maintenance. The two most influential factors seem to be the status and the function of the languages. With the difference in status comes difference in prestige and power. The much promoted Putonghua is said to have high international status. In China, it is the language of administration, politics, and science and technology, which gives it the power and prestige of a ticket to high social status, career advancement and economic well being. Internationally, it is one of the major working languages of the United Nations and is the world's most spoken language population-wise. The low prestige and restricted functions of minority languages in many areas are associated with poverty, low educational achievement, little or no social mobility or advancement. The minorities' languages associate them with inferior social status.

As for the function of the language, it seems that those minority languages with specific or multiple functions which cannot be replaced by Putonghua, such as Uygur and Kazak, are likely to be maintained. Other minority languages with very limited functions such as being used only in the family circle are less likely to be maintained. This is the case for many minority languages in the south.

Such inequality in social status and function of the language has a direct bearing on language maintenance and language spread. In the case of spreading Putonghua among Han dialect speakers, the function and the value of the dialects are slowly being reduced, although they appear likely to coexist for a long time into the future. Based on this experience, it might be predicted that the spread of Putonghua among minority peoples will in time limit the function of the minority languages, and reduce the requirements for
language maintenance.

The real power of status planning lies in its influence on people’s (the Han as well as non-Han) attitudes towards different languages. As demonstrated earlier, in many people’s minds minority languages have very little use for employment, entering higher education, political promotion, and economic advancement. The mastering of Putonghua sometimes seems to be a ticket to all opportunities. Therefore, in some areas many minority parents do not like to send their children to bilingual programs, but prefer Han schools. For example, according to a survey questionnaire developed by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for the Yi people in Sichuan province, 80% of the parents surveyed indicated that they would like to send their children to Han schools (Zhang Yurong, Yu Huibang, & Ma Jinwei [who is a Yi], 1995, p.63). No doubt, the question is not whether or not they respect their mother tongue; rather, they hope for a better future for their children.

In a social context in which Putonghua is seen to be the language for the future, the language of prestige, and of power and opportunity for economic development, even a bilingual education program which requires the use of minority language throughout the primary years of formal schooling cannot change the reality of the inequality of languages.

Even though the current experimentation in bilingual programs has proven to be effective in communicating educational content and in reducing the minority children’s drop-out rates, grade repetition rates, and illiteracy rates, it is at best making schooling a comprehensible experience for minority language speaking children. It may paradoxically contribute to language shift by keeping more minority children in school longer with more exposure to Han culture and political indoctrination. Since the language of higher formal
education and the society at large remain predominantly Putonghua, bilingual programs—
according to this line of conjecture—would only mean more language shift by more years
of education. If community members accept the use of their mother tongue in their schools
only because it achieves a more effective teaching of Putonghua, then those charged with
the implementation of the program are likely to focus attention increasingly on the effective
teaching of Putonghua, and the type of bilingual education applied is likely to be
increasingly an agent for language spread. Under these circumstances, language shift
rather than maintenance appears likely to occur.

There are, however, many other factors which can affect the impact of bilingual
education programs. Two sets of factors may be delineated: (1) factors related to the ethnic
cultural cohesion of minority groups and the support given to this cohesion, and (2) societal
and political factors that may bring pressure to bear to undermine such cohesion.

The first set of factors relating to group cohesion include the distribution of minority
populations (large concentration, small concentration, scattered living); minority language
and education history including functions and standards (the breadth of language use, with
or without outside standards, with or without its own complete educational system); size
and homogeneity of minority groups; the degree of Han language and cultural influence;
and, the access to quality education (with or without qualified bilingual teachers, materials,
or school facilities).

The second group of factors affecting bilingual schools relate to outside pressures
for assimilation. They include the ambiguity of policy at the Centre, the exceptionally loose
control which allows local interpretation and implementation, the number of Han immigrants
to an area, lack of specific language laws to assist policy implementation, society’s broader
system of rewards and incentives, and practical problems such as the low quality or scarcity of bilingual teachers, materials, and school facilities. In most cases, the kind of bilingual educational programs which are assisted by the surrounding social conditions have been far more effective in directing China's bilingualism towards securing Putonghua as the second language or lingua franca among minority populations than the Chinese-only programs. So they have in many cases been the first step toward language shift.

The complexity of bilingual education lies in that it is rarely one single factor that dictates the orientation towards either language spread or language maintenance. Most often a mixture of these factors is at play. These factors indicate that the minority groups which enjoy a combination of favourable social and linguistic conditions such as living far away from large Han city centres, having a large concentrated population, having complete education systems of their own (with some exceptions), and long written language history with its functions and standards outside China, social functions that have a wide range of accessible and separate roles, domains and situations—such groups are likely to be able to maintain their languages and achieve bilingualism. Using these strict criteria, among the fifty-five national minorities in China, only a handful of minority groups such as Mongolians, Tibetans, Uygurs, Kazaks, and Koreans would be able to benefit from bilingual education programs without sacrificing significant aspects of the development of their own languages.

Judging from the current practice of bilingual education for the next generation, minority languages may not be replaced by the Han language. But the latter will definitely develop into the lingua franca among all minorities in China, which is an important goal of government policy (Wang Jun, 1990). It is certainly the trend that more and more minority members, especially those living near large city centres and along the highways or
railways, are becoming increasingly bilingual and knowledgable about Putonghua. With the impact of current language and education policy and practice, it is only a matter of time for Putonghua to achieve not only official status but also the sociolinguistic reality of lingua franca among all nationalities within the borders of China. It might take a shorter time for some minorities than others depending on all those factors discussed above.

Examination of the variables influencing language spread and language maintenance has led to the conclusion that schools cannot be the sole agent for planned language maintenance, since most of the variables are out of the control of the education system. The situation might be improved by strengthening teacher training, developing better materials and developing culturally more appropriate curricula. However, these alone cannot offset the social conditions which put the schools in isolation. Other conditions cannot be changed just by the educational programs. Major social change may be needed in order for language maintenance to occur. However, since such change may not be favoured by the Party's political agenda, it is very unlikely to be included in the national policy of language planning at this juncture.

7.3 Implications for Theoretical Issues in the Background Literature

Based on the findings of the study, three sets of implications for theoretical issues emerged in three related fields: language planning, education case studies, and bilingual education.
7.3.1 Implications for Language Planning

The characteristics and practice of language planning and policy in China draw attention to some of the fundamental issues in language planning: "the ethics and legitimacy of its interventionist or normative intent;... its inevitable brushes with other social realities and political priorities; and not least, the occasional discrepancies between its postulates and its practical results" (Beaty, 1987, p.4).

Implications can be drawn from answers to the broad questions: what can language planning in China contribute to current theories and typology of language planning?, and, can language spread and minority language maintenance be planned?

In the literature review in Chapter Two, it was recognized that language planning has emerged from a number of competing theories and definitions of the field: "as it is, it was not always clear whether we were always calling a spade, a spade or a rose, a rose" (Fishman, 1987a, p.409). It is instructive to bring the current theories together and to examine their differences in focus and in stages, in the light of events in China.

This study of minority language planning in China reveals a vision of language planning as an endeavour to manipulate the current situation and to control the future. In this study the focus was more on status planning than corpus planning, and it has been found that language planning in China is more a social political endeavour as emphasized by scholarly studies in other parts of the world such as Fishman (1980), Neustupny, (1983), Cooper (1989), and Weinstein (1987), rather than a purely linguistic one. In China, it proves to be an endeavour on the part of the Party and the government to plan society — ideally a centralized, unified socialist and eventually communist state. But, as the socialist
vision fades, the goal of centralized, unified control remains with language planning as one of its tools.

Haugen has repeatedly (1983, 1987a, 1987b) noted that the nature of language planning may be either unifying or pluralistic in goals. Therefore, the key question would be whether minority language planning in China is unifying or pluralistic in nature. Should the Chinese planning goals be understood as unifying in nature, as suspected by many outside observers, or pluralistic, as repeatedly claimed by the Communist Party of China? As demonstrated in the study, language policy and planning in China are quite complicated; in many cases they are paradoxical, and conclusions cannot be stated in simple either/or dichotomies. The study finds that there have been several paradoxes which can only be understood didactically, where opposing forces are at work. First, policy orientations are often changed with the changes in political agendas. At a certain period (the first decade of socialist China) the policy was mostly pluralistic; for the next two decades it was totally unifying; currently it is not clear at all. Second, for some minority groups in certain areas, the language policy is more pluralistic, whereas in other localities and groups it is more unifying. Third, according to Communist ideology, language planning for the socialist period is pluralistic in nature, but it is only a temporary phase on the way to ultimate unity. Fourth, among the language policy makers and planners (top leaders, minority elites, language scholars) some appear to believe in pluralism, others in unification, while some groups are indecisive or ambiguous. Haugen's theory of language planning does not seem to be adequate to reconcile the paradoxes behind the two ultimate goals. The Chinese case of policy and planning cannot be understood as exclusively either unifying or pluralistic. The ever-changing multiple objectives of minority language planning
in China have ranged from national integration, to the establishment of Central control, to political propaganda, to economic reform and modernization, and to simple gestures of good will and care.

The interest theory suggested by Weinstein (1986), to be added as sociopolitical "input" to Haugen's language planning paradigm, helps to focus on the motivations behind the planning as an organized pursuit of ideological, political, social or economic interests. This study has examined all these areas of interest and other factors influencing the policy decisions, especially in status planning. The study confirms that his interest theory contributes significantly to the understanding of non-linguistic factors in both status planning and corpus planning. However, to build these elements into a language planning theory and paradigm, clarification and elaboration of these interests need to be further pursued, as cautioned by Dua (1987).

Ideologies behind the policy are far more complicated. We need to know which ideology or groups of them are most influential. In the case of China, on the one hand there is the Communist ideology for state-building, Marxist-Leninist ideology on language; and on the other hand, the Confucian ideology which stresses social order under a unifying force. The Chinese minority language planning appears to be based on an eclectic ideology drawn from Marx, Lenin, Mao, Confucius, and the Chinese social reality at various historical moments. For language ideology alone, there are different articulated official ideologies for the majority language (Putonghua), the minority languages, the dialects and so on. Cobarrubias (1983) has distinguished between four types of language ideologies: linguistic assimilation, linguistic pluralism, vernacularisation, and internationalism. Not only does the Chinese language ideology cross all these sectors, it changes between leaders,
levels, times, locations and different minority groups. The seemingly stable and firm ideology claimed by the CPC to be the foundation for all planning including language as well as social planning is in reality a constant struggle among all those involved in the policy process.

As for political, social, and economic interests, they have kept changing among different groups at different levels during different periods. Weinstein's interest theory is not adequate to explain the dynamics of on-going conflicts involved in the pursuit of these interests. His theory, in my view, cannot embrace challenging issues posed from each of the levels of status planning.

Das Gupta's (1973) theory of language planning as an organized device to process diverse demands in a framework of reconciling conflicting groups and interests provides an important aspect of language planning in China in dealing with conflicts. But how the device works is quite different depending on the particular socio-cultural contexts in which the planning occurs. The examination of the bureaucratic structure in China helps to illuminate how this planning device is set up and how it allows different interest groups at different levels to interact with one another. The effects of Chinese bureaucratic structures on language planning outcomes were quite remarkable. The structures therefore create many twists in the whole process of decision making and implementation. The phenomenon of central control in most Communist countries is often misinterpreted as the Centre having absolute power and total control over all sectors below. It is mostly true in certain sectors such as foreign affairs and military control. But according to the investigation of minority language planning and policy in this study, many decisions and policies are quite arbitrarily made by local authorities, especially in policy implementation,
due to a complicated administrative structure and a large and varied population. The policies of bilingualism and bilingual education made at the national level have been ignored or implemented totally differently from the original intent of the policy. At the national level, the policies are made based on the interpretation of Marxist principles of equality among nationalities and the reality of the Chinese context, which really intends to serve the political and economic purposes of the country. To demonstrate democracy, the local authorities are given the liberty of adapting the policy according to local situations. The political structure together with other social conditions somehow reinforces Chinese language spread and does little for minority language maintenance.

The constant conflicts between the unitary and the pluralistic ideals among different interest groups, and between various levels of authority make language planning in China intriguing and significant yet hard to grasp. There is a need for an analytical and descriptive framework that better describes and explains the planning process. The Chinese experience indicates that it is still very hard to find a single theory of language planning which can account for a universal element and process in different parts of the world. However, the study does confirm many aspects of language planning theory developed earlier. To avoid the tendency of building far-reaching theories on slender empirical data, and since China is only one of hundreds of cases of language planning in the world, it may be more effective for this study to offer the following implications for theories of language planning:

1. Language planning is part of, or a by-product of social planning. It very often is a tool to facilitate other purposes of social and political change. Therefore the goals of language planning change with the change of political goals on the part of the major
planning party.

2. Language planning in a particular society can only be understood through the understanding of its socio-cultural context and the history from which such context has evolved. The Chinese experience demonstrated how minority policies practised thousands of years ago manifest themselves in the present day policy.

3. Even in a centralized regime like China, language policy made by the powerful Centre may not be successfully implemented if the social situation is not ready for its acceptance. In this case language cannot be planned in isolation from introducing other forms of social change.

4. Planning may be initiated at any level of a social hierarchy. Quite the contrary to what many people may believe, in a centrally controlled country like China, planning is not all done at the Centre. The restoration of the traditional Yi written script and the traditional Uygur and Kazak scripts were initiated by people in small remote villages.

5. Language planning for spreading a majority language may result in minority language shifts and replacements with or without intention. The central government's policy of spreading Putonghua has resulted in language shifts among many minority groups and may eventually lead to language replacement even though the government has maintained that it has no intention of replacing those minority languages.

6. Language planning for minority language maintenance may result in language loss. Numerous cases in China, especially the case of Uygur and Kazak writing system reform, demonstrate that a planned language maintenance or standardization may unexpectedly result in language shift or loss. The current bilingual education policy from the Centre may bring very different language results depending on the local political and
language situation. It will be very interesting to see the results in a couple of decades.

7. Status planning is the driving force behind corpus planning. "Many languages will never get much corpus planning codification or elaboration, and even less implementation, precisely because their status planning remains unresolved or indifferent" (Fishman, 1987a, p.423). All codification done to the minority languages in China was the result of their planned status. Quite a number of minority languages spoken by small populations and without written traditions have not been paid attention to precisely because of their lack of status defined in state policy.

8. Corpus planning appears to be implemented more easily in a centralized country or in totalitarian regimes like China than in countries recognized as having political democracies such as Canada. It seemed relatively fast and easy for the government to come up with a new design of the Latin Alphabet based scripts for a few minority groups and it would have tried to implement them shortly thereafter had it not been stopped by the changing of political winds. Since the government and the Party are the law, once a decision is made (even if it is against the spirit of the affected languages), it is implemented, as in the cases of designing and redesigning the Uygur and Kazak written scripts.

9. Bureaucratic structure has a strong impact in altering the nature and process of language planning and policy in China. It indicates that although language planning has established itself as a field drawing from sociology and linguistics, it has so far attracted almost no attention from political scientists. The game theory approach used in political science was suggested by Lucas & Nercissians (1988) for application to the analysis of different language planning problems and modelling different situations of conflict, and
Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s (1988) perspective of bureaucratic structure as tools for analysing the language policy process (used in this study), prove to have been a major contribution to the understanding of certain aspects of language planning. They suggest that the bureaucratic structure perspective may be an useful addition to Cooper’s descriptive framework.

10. The political style of a country, be it democratic or totalitarian, does not determine the orientations of language planning to be either pluralistic or unitary. China, classified as a totalitarian regime, does not combat linguistic pluralism. On the contrary, the Chinese government finds the minority languages tactically useful in winning over trust and support, as media for the Party's political propaganda, for combatting illiteracy, for maintaining a good international image, for fulfilling certain functions irreplaceable by the official language, and as an effective tool for learning Chinese and improving academic achievement among minority students. Also these languages and literature are very often viewed as part of the great cultural treasures of China. It was not the plan of this study to venture into the comparisons of countries with different political systems; however, it seems to confirm the observation made by other scholars: "Political democracies are not necessarily guarantors of ethnolinguistic pluralism. They may be permissive of such pluralism, provided it already exists or when it arises due to acceptable immigration, but 'permissiveness' is a passive blessing and is not at all the same as 'planning' or fostering pluralism" (Fishman, 1987a, p.413).

11. Insight into present day practice and future directions comes from a clear understanding of the distant past. History, especially the deep-rooted Chinese imperial tradition, plays an important role in current language planning.
12. A combination of micro- and macro-level data is necessary if the impact of language policy in individual classrooms and schools is to be understood. Integrating both micro- and macro-levels of contextualized data within a qualitative ethnographic framework seems to be the only means of understanding the entire process of language planning.

13. Many scholars find that the process of planning includes fact finding, policy formulation, implementation and elaboration (Kloss, 1966; Haugen, 1983, 1987b; Cooper, 1989). However, the planning process in China did not neatly follow any of the models suggested by those scholars and it has had several cycles. The process was constantly changing to react to new challenges. Many times there has not been one clear cut process or set of steps; rather the process includes several cycles. The first process, which began in the 1950s, started from preparation, followed by the establishment of government agencies to conduct fact finding, and then decisions made more or less according to the facts. Implementations were carried out in varying degrees depending on government focus. Evaluation was not conducted. Later, the process started from restoration, experimentation, decision making, and implementation. Evaluations are still limited to certain programs.

Language planning in China did confirm the major components and processes involved in language planning as identified by many scholars: the components being status planning and corpus planning. Cooper’s new dimension of "acquisition planning" seems to be actively pursued by the government in assisting the minority people to learn Putonghua. Bilingual education policies and activities seem to stand out as "acquisition planning". To facilitate the acquisition of Putonghua, the Chinese language planners have imposed Latin-based scripts on most newly "designed" minority scripts, and apart from the
planning in education, various activities have been organised to engage and motivate the minority public in learning Putonghua, such as public speech competitions, awards for model Putonghua learners, political honours, and career advancements. Putonghua teachers are imported from other parts of the country and more are being trained to teach Putonghua. These activities of creating opportunities and incentives to assist acquisition are clearly what Cooper called "acquisition planning". The Chinese case shows that bilingual education programs have been treated as "policy instruments" chosen for acquisition planning. But they may also be clarified as part of status and corpus planning and implementation.

7.3.2 Implications for Educational Policy Studies

The data in this study constitutes a unique source of information on the development of minority language and education policies in countries like China. As noted by Churchill (1986), the data generated from the case studies are seldom directly comparable. They generate hypotheses rather than test them. Therefore, the following should be treated as working hypotheses rather than strict implications. They addressed the following policy and planning issues set out in Chapter Two:

1. What are the major factors that affect the objectives, the development, and the implementation of language education policy in China?
2. What governance stance and policy instruments are chosen and what impact does the choice have on educational practice?
3. What are the different models used in the delivery system to organize bilingual
education in terms of curriculum, resources, methodology, and administration?

4. How do the elements of objectives, policy instruments, and educational practice relate to each other?

Consequently, the following hypotheses have been formed:

1. China has seen a great part of minority issues in strategic terms. The Chinese experience provided an example of education policy being a long-term focus on certain strategic goals set by the Party, which serve as entire rationales for the general policy towards minorities including their languages and education. These goals of the Party dictate the decisions for most policies.

2. The case study in China indicates that, for any education policy studies to achieve a better understanding of the population concerned, it must use an holistic approach which connect the macro policy decisions to micro implementation. The Chinese case confirms that there is a big gap between policy statements, regulatory stance, and choice of instruments at the national level and the implementation results at the local schools. The choice of regulatory stances and instruments does not appear to have important effects in fulfilling the minority population's special needs in education.

3. The bureaucratic structures under a given political system may have a profound influence on language and education policies and their implementation.

4. Even in a centralized government like China, the relationship is neither one of complete Central dominance as believed by many Western observers nor regional autonomy as the name suggests. Rather, some kind of consensus is achieved by the interdependent relationships between the two. As demonstrated in the study, in China, language policy formulated at the Centre very often cannot be implemented into school
programs. Implementation requires that decisions be made at the regional, municipal, or even school level, before reaching the classroom level.

5. The case of China confirms Churchill’s (1986) conclusion that, once problems are defined, policies and practices are put in place that reflect administrative and legal traditions of the countries.

6. With the central control system in China, the Party can inflict much more harm to minority language and education by imposing unified curriculums and spreading Putonghua at the expense of minority languages. However, it also has greater power to enforce remedial measures as it sees fit.

The Chinese national minorities still have major, unsolved educational problems that will make policy and implementation issues a continuing concern for many years to come. More global cooperation could provide the external expertise and insights for further studies in the future.

7.3.3 Implications for Bilingual Education

The findings concerning bilingual education in China lead to the following implications compared with theoretical conclusions derived from the Western and other contexts.

1. Bilingualism and bilingual education have political connotations, not only linguistic ones.

2. The types of bilingual practice in society and bilingual education programs in schools are very complicated depending on different situations and conditions.
3. For the spread of a majority language, bilingual education can be more effective than unilingual educational programs using the majority language.

4. Bilingual education programs alone cannot guarantee minority language maintenance; various favourable social and linguistic conditions, as discussed earlier, must be present.

5. Pluralism cannot be achieved, even by a well designed bilingual program, without an efficient delivery system such as teacher training, material compiling, and sufficient school facilities.

6. For a bilingual program to be consistent with the national policy, effective bilingual education laws and regulations have to be developed and enforced at each level.

7. The lack of minority language maintenance cannot be attributed in all cases to the planning efforts, but often to the frequent change of the country’s politics and the reality of unequal functions among languages.

8. Bilingual education has to be understood and examined in its social context and political environment. It can be best understood when combined with language planning which offers a broader perspective, and which as yet has been a relatively new concept in China.

9. For any particular policy to survive long enough to be effective, it would have to be able to withstand the frequent shifts of power, as is absolutely clear in China. Until any bilingual policy is actually implemented for a period of time and covers a large enough minority population, the effectiveness of planning as an agent for language maintenance cannot be assessed. Such assessment is premature at this time in the Chinese case.

10. In China, all Communist language policies have been focused on the planning
of the relationships between the spread of Putonghua and the maintenance of the languages of the national minorities, with shifts of emphasis due to the changes of political agendas. The ultimate goal is to turn Putonghua into the lingua franca of all nationalities. The Communist authorities claim that this is necessary to set up a uniform culture and cultural relationships and administration in a country. Bilingual education programs have mostly been used as policy instruments to achieve the goals behind policy decisions.

11. A factor which appeared to lead to language maintenance suggested by Kloss (1966) is complete isolation from other groups (mainly for religious reasons). This is not totally true for some Chinese Muslim groups such as the Hui; their religion is practised in complete isolation from the Han and yet their language has been replaced by Putonghua. Other factors discussed above seem to contribute more to language maintenance than this one.

7.4. Conclusions and Implications for Future Research

In the study several themes were followed in search of understanding the process of minority language planning and policy in China for the past 45 years. A recurring theme has been that there was a conscious effort on the part of the Party to take control of the language situation of the country to serve a larger political and economic purpose.

The second theme has been to identify the major individuals, interest groups, as well as official and non-official organizations involved in minority language policy, planning and implementing process.

Another theme has been to map out the process of decision making and the
relationships inside the Chinese bureaucratic structures between various agencies at
different levels as well as the impact of such structures on policy making and its implementation.

The fourth theme has been to locate the important factors which drive the status as well as the corpus planning. The most influential factors seem to be the pursuit of the Communist language ideology, the political and economic interests of the Party, the deeply rooted and long lasting influence of the Han imperial tradition, changes in the political agenda, and the intrinsic force of the Chinese national minorities including their strategic positions, the location of natural resources, the stability and strengths of some of their languages, and the determination to preserve their own languages.

The final theme has been to identify some results and impacts of 45 years of minority language planning and policy which has been neither totally unitary nor totally pluralistic. It has been a policy, in general, of pushing ahead with Putonghua but at the same time assisting language minorities to attain literacy in their local languages. The government and the Party have persistently supported the spread of Putonghua, even through changes in political situations, but the support for minority languages has varied, with various and generally unfavourable results.

Although the study was not expected to find answers as to where minority language planning in China is heading, it does provide certain clues. Looking at current policy and at minority language orientation, it is clear that bilingualism and bilingual education as a prospective "solution" for China's language problems has been gaining momentum. If the current political system remains relatively stable, the 21st century will be a period of bilingual development leaning towards minority language maintenance for larger minority
groups and a spreading of the official Putonghua among all nationalities. Yet, in many areas, bilingualism and bilingual educational practice are still in an experimental stage and are likely to give rise to conflicts and arguments. With the advance of the field of bilingual education comes the realization that there are many complicated extra-linguistic and extra-educational issues. So far there has been no indication of a change of policy in this sector with the death of Deng Xiaoping and the taking over by a new leader, Jiang Zemin. In his recent visit to Xinjiang, Jiang Zemin was quoted as stressing that a stable society and policy are a precondition for social and economic progress, and that the unity of ethnic groups can only be achieved by firmly opposing national separatism and safeguarding the country's unification (Xinhua News Agency, China Daily, July 11, 1998). It is clear that Jiang, Deng, and Mao all held the same attitude towards minority issues as did their Han ancestors in the past history. However, we may also expect continued unrest in Xinjiang and disturbances in Tibet. Until the central control is really threatened, the focus will continue to be on economic development and both the objectives and practice of the present bilingual education will remain unchanged.

Bilingual education in China is still in the initial development stage. Where it is heading and whether it can survive in the educational system in many minority regions is far from clear.

The ultimate goal of the government language policy is still predominantly to popularize Putonghua and Han culture among all nationalities. Putonghua will maintain its dominant position for as long as the Han Chinese are in power regardless of what political system they adopt. The method of language spread is very unlikely to revert to the forced language assimilation that was practised during the Cultural Revolution. Instead, a more
organised scheme through education, propaganda, and social influence is likely to be practised, probably with the following components: (1) There will be more research on how best to popularize Putonghua among minority populations, and more comparative studies of Han and minority languages to find effective ways to promote grammar understanding. (2) The current dominant type of bilingual education for transitional purposes will lead to the shift or loss of some minority languages. (3) Bilingual education for long-term minority language maintenance will be limited only to certain minorities.

To obtain a more meaningful assessment, generalization and implication from language planning experience in China, it may be necessary to follow the process closely for the next few decades. However, in general, the legacy of the process goes on, and minority language work is on an upward spiral. There are some indications on the part of the government that it will improve the situation. Currently, bilingual provisions have a legal guarantee in several major laws of the country such as the Law on Elections and The Law on Civil and Criminal Lawsuits. Regulations of various ethnic autonomous regions also provide detailed stipulations on bilingual needs (Zhang Meng, 1994). Both the new Constitution passed in 1982 and the Law on Regional National Autonomy passed in 1984 as well as the 1986 Law on Compulsory Education all stipulate in general that both Putonghua and minority languages can be used and developed in schools and in society. What is urgently needed are the concrete laws or regulations to further guarantee and regulate implementation and practice.

As for research, there are ten minority nationality institutes and the Ethnic Study Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which carry out professional training and research. A more recent development is research conducted by various non-
governmental organizations such as the Chinese Research Association for Bilingual Education and the Chinese Research Centre of Ethnic Languages.

Now that China is moving into a market economy, what will happen to its ideology and theory on minorities and their languages remains to be seen. It will be very interesting to watch any changes in policy including objectives, rationales, directions and funding.

Currently, policy and research in China seem to be focused narrowly on bilingualism and bilingual education. The results of the study implies that the only effective way for research to lead to the understanding of minority language issues and to inform policy decisions is for researchers to take an approach which is broader than the present limited perspective currently prevalent, and to include some other important elements in the field of language planning such as sociology and political science, which are now very weak in China. However, since bilingual research is a new field, and language planning is still a new concept in China, the research has to build from where it is at the present time.

In recent years, since 1979, research in language planning and bilingual education has reached an unprecedented level. At the current stage of bilingual education research in China, the problems are mainly in three interrelated areas: policy, research, and practice.

In the area of policy, the major frustration facing scholars in the field of minority language planning and education is that there have been no specific laws and regulations, as mentioned above, to guarantee the status and practice of developing true bilingual rights (Yang Bingyi, 1991a; Sun Zhu, 1995b). The ambiguous line between the popularization of Putonghua and the guarantee of the freedom and development of minority language use could get researchers into trouble at any time, given the lessons
learned in the recent history of China. In order to advance the field, it is very important for
Chinese language planners, scholars, and researchers to realize that "there is not only no
interest-free language planning, but also no interest-free research on language planning"
(Fishman, 1987a, p.412). Unless scholars and researchers totally agree with the purpose
and values of those whom they serve (hopefully not out of their personal interest), they will
have to bring their research of bilingual education to a new level by broadening and
deepening the field of investigation. Such investigation includes more fundamental issues
regarding language planning.

The lack of specific policies below the national level has directly resulted in the
shortage of funding for research and practice.

The lack of adequate research, especially in bilingual education and language
planning, is the weakest link in the making of language policies. Throughout most of
Communist history, language planning was predominantly initiated and carried out solely
to complement the Party's political and social agendas. In many cases, policies have not
been based on adequate research. The weakness in research manifests itself in the
following three areas:

First, there is a severe shortage of highly qualified experts and scholars in the field.
The very scarce older generation of researchers is mostly retired, and very few new
researchers are being trained to continue the work. Given the lack of funding and relatively
low status, to change this situation will not be easy. A broad specialist training is urgently
needed since it is the guarantee for future research.

Second, the quality of research is still not up to international standards. This is partly
due to the limitation in research scope as well as to research methodology. For instance,
there has been an extreme lack of theoretical and interdisciplinary research. The field of language development is often isolated from other related fields such as psychology, anthropology, sociology, policy studies, and political science. The current research in China is limited largely to isolated case studies, quite often involving small scale investigations or evaluations at a superficial level. Traditionally, the research, since the early 1950's, has focused mostly on the investigation and description of various minority languages and language categorization, which was very much needed at the time, but now this information alone is not enough for an effective policy. The much needed areas—such as language planning, especially status planning, language change, shift and maintenance—have rarely been touched. One of the reasons might be that, after the Cultural Revolution, people have learned that speaking out on touchy political issues can bring disaster to one's life and family. With the changes taking place in China, there is hope that the younger generation of researchers will be rid of the fear of political persecution and will have the courage to get at the core of some touchy and sensitive issues and voice them truthfully.

Third, not all minority languages have been supported equally by research. For example, research on those minorities with strong written language histories is often much more advanced than research on smaller language groups, for whom hardly anything has been done. As discussed earlier, lack of attention to smaller and weaker languages is a direct result of unresolved issues or indifference in status planning, a situation which has led to an almost complete lack of attention to the crucial issue of language planning and language maintenance for these particular languages.

Finally, problems in research and policy are compounded by difficulties in implementation. Although bilingual education as a social and educational practice is
supported by policy, there are no set criteria for what it means to be bilingual and what
degree of bilingualism serves different social purposes. The general lack of guidelines in
planning and curriculum development make the current bilingual programs quite arbitrary.
Coupled with inadequate time allocated for mother tongue teaching are the low quality of
the bilingual teachers, inappropriate teaching methodology, and lack of teaching materials.
Research on bilingual teacher training, materials development, and school facilities needs
to be attended to, for these areas all have a profound impact on policy implementation.

Recently, research in the field of bilingualism and bilingual education related to
China has begun to take on a much wider perspective. It has begun to extend from
description to theorizing. Several issues are beginning to catch the attention of language
scholars:

1. the nature and concept of bilingualism and bilingual education,
2. types of bilingual use,
3. social factors affecting the development and underdevelopment of
   bilingualism,
4. characteristics of bilingualism in the socialist period,
5. language attitude and choice among bilingual persons, and
6. the impact of language environment on the development of bilingualism.

Research on language planning and language policy are still not fully connected
with the research on bilingual education. Comparative research on policies in other
countries is just beginning.

In the 21st century, research on relations among languages in China should be
towards more depth and breadth, more research on the social functions of the languages,
the issues involved in legalizing the languages, and the relationship between Chinese and the minority languages. The key implication for future research from this study is that the issues of power, social change, political structures, and policy process are central not only to the understanding of macro-level language policy and planning but also to the micro-level classroom language teaching and learning. The topic under study can only be fully understood when all its important aspects are examined.

In conclusion, the systematic investigation of the processes of minority language planning and policy in China attempted by this study is only one of a few such efforts to understand a very complicated process, and it is far from conclusive, since no study can cover all aspects of language planning and policy. However, this investigation has provided a different version on minority language planning than the success stories told to the world at international conferences by the Chinese government representatives. It has not only explored many factors (covert and overt) and issues (at different levels) involved in the minority language policy and planning process, but also it has shed light on the true nature of a larger and more inclusive policy of the Chinese government towards its national minorities. Yet the Chinese minority language planning story is still far from fully told or understood.

Since decision making and implementing processes deserve to be better understood, more studies are needed, especially studies of different minority groups at different locations, to generate more empirical data for further implications. The current study has focused mainly on language planning as an official effort. It would be more interesting and could be instructive to examine some unofficial planning initiated by individuals or certain minority groups at different levels. How the minority public reacts to
such planning and the impact of such planning not only to their language but to their life as a whole will be most instructive.

The minority language planning and policy situation in China, though it has its own particular cultural and political context, has many common aspects with other world contexts. China, with its rich language resources, sociocultural contexts and unique political system and practice of language policy can offer an important perspective to the language issues in other parts of the world.

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## APPENDIX I

### Issues, Topics, and Research Questions for interviews

#### I. Decision Making Process at National Level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Research Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Who makes the policy decisions?</td>
<td>Administrative structures, agencies and actors</td>
<td>1. Who are the participating actors/agencies in policy making?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the policy decisions?</td>
<td>Symbolic, regulatory, administrative</td>
<td>1. What is to be accomplished?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Why? What motivates decision makers to make such policies?</td>
<td>Goals/Purposes: Overt/stated, Covert/latent</td>
<td>1. What language related behaviors are expected, literacy, education?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Are you and your institute participating, and in what way?

3. At which level are the policy decisions made?

4. Who are the official and/or de facto policy makers?

3. Why not adopt a melting pot policy like the U.S.?

2. In what form are these decisions presented: constitution, education acts, official documents, congress reports?

3. What are some of the competing goals and how are they dealt with?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. How do authorities arrive at overt/covert decisions, by what means?</td>
<td>Policy making process, overt/covert activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What are the conditions under which influence or determine policy?</td>
<td>Factors, under what conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. How do you determine problems and formulate goals?</td>
<td>1. What situational factors: modernization, etc.?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How are policy instruments decided?</td>
<td>2. What structural factors: political, economic, social, demographic and ecological?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How do you select among alternatives the models and forms of bilingual education?</td>
<td>3. What cultural factors: attitudes and values held by minorities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Environmental factors: events, structures and attitudes which exist outside the system but which influence the decisions within?</td>
<td>4. Environmental factors: events, structures and attitudes which exist outside the system but which influence the decisions within?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Information factors: data which are required to make good decisions, research and evaluations?</td>
<td>5. Information factors: data which are required to make good decisions, research and evaluations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. What are the perceived relationships/power positions/latitudes between levels?</td>
<td>1. What are the perceived relationships/power positions/latitudes between levels?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How are implementations monitored and guaranteed?</td>
<td>2. How are implementations monitored and guaranteed?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Planning and Implementation at the Regional and Local Level

All questions asked at the national level will be asked at regional and local levels with
appropriate modifications. Major issues at the regional level are to find out their relationships with the level up as well as the levels below.

1. What is the impact and/or influence of the community leaders and notables, if any?
2. The relative decision making positions between the Han officials and the minority authorities.
3. How are certain models of bilingual education decided on?
4. What factors influence the selection of the curriculum and resources?

III. Implementations and Reactions at the Community and the School Level

The research questions at this level are focused around the following issues:

1. How schools adapt policies from above for implementation.
2. The nature and extent of school-level policies and the reasons for creating such policies.
3. Bilingual teachers' understanding and implementation of the language curriculum, and their perceptions and attitudes towards the programs.
4. School officials reaction to the implemented bilingual program.
5. Community leaders or/and members and parents' reactions to the bilingual programs.

The following topics will also serve as a basis for analyzing interview data at this level:

--Use of minority languages in the school and in the community

--Use of Putonghua in the school and in the community

--Attitudes towards standardization

--Attitudes towards other minority languages

--With whom and where each language is spoken
Think children will lose their mother tongue

Language preference

Language use in the media in the community

"What if everyone speaks Putonghua?"

Belief that minority language will/will not disappear

Some minority members who deny knowledge of their own language
The Canada-China Joint Doctoral Program in Education sponsored by CIDA has enabled me to conduct a five-month field research (Jan. 20 — June 21, 1993) in China on my Ph.D dissertation titled "Language Planning and Bilingual Education for Linguistic Minorities in China: A Case Study of Policy Formulation and Implementation Process". The purpose of the study is to examine and to understand the entire spectrum of the minority language education planning process by studying the relationships among various levels of decision making within the Chinese sociopolitical structure. The nature of the study requires visits and interviews with related officials and scholars at various levels: federal, provincial/regional, prefecture, municipal, county, village and school. With the support of the affiliated institutions in China, I have successfully carried out the research at target locations. The following is a summary of some of the highlights of the study trip. The report
is organized chronologically into four parts: the initial month and a half in Beijing; one month in Gansu; one month in Xinjiang; and the final month and a half back in Beijing.

Part One: Beijing (Jan. 20 — Feb. 28)

After an initial struggle with jet-lag, reverse culture shock, and everyone being away for the celebration of the Chinese New Year, I settled down with the help of the receiving institution—Beijing Normal University. My major purpose in Beijing was to gather information through documentary review in various libraries, to visit research and policy making institutions, and to interview officials and scholars involved in or knowledgable about the minority language education policy making process at the central level. Unfortunately, Beijing Normal University had neither professors in the field for supervision nor the connections with related institutions. For the initial period, a considerable amount of time was spent on gathering materials and making contacts. The highlight of this period was meeting a group of officials from the Nationality Committee of the National People's Congress of China (NPC). This meeting not only provided me with valuable information, but also paved the way for the rest of my research.

It was a very formal meeting held in the conference room in the Great Hall of the People located on one side of Tian'anmen Square. The Nationality Committee of the NPC has three subdivisions: the general office, the Policy Research Department, and the Law Department (or the Bill Office). Five officials from all three departments attended the meeting including the Director of the General Office and his secretary, two officials from the Bill office and one from the Policy Research Department. I was introduced and accompanied by a well known professor of ethnic studies from the Institute of Nationality
Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The director and officials from each department gave me a general introduction to their organization and responsibilities. A period was set aside for me to ask questions. I left the meeting with an official line on the issues, some written materials, and newly established friendships with two of the young officials.

Other interviews were held with these new friends in a far more informal yet insightful manner. During this period, I also visited the Central Nationalities Institute, participated in a Naxi nationality festival, made new contacts, and set up future interviews. I also gathered a fair amount of written materials.

Armed with the new contacts and the experience in Beijing, I launched into the most exciting and fruitful period of research in the northwest region of China known for its richness and concentration of minority groups.

Part Two: Gansu Province (Mar. 3 — April 3, 1993)

After more than 30 hours on the train, I arrived at Lanzhou, the capital city of Gansu. When I was met by three people from Northwest Normal University, one of the participating institutes in the project, I realized that things here would be very different from Beijing. All my daily needs were well looked after by the Foreign Affairs office of the university. All I had to do was to concentrate on my research. Soon after I arrived, I handed in a research plan which outlined the places and institutions I wanted to visit and the people I hoped to interview. With the strong support and cooperation of Northwest Normal University and some of my personal friends, the work began the very same day. During this month, I visited various institutions and met with a number of people at every level of administration.
in the province: the provincial level, the Southern Gansu Tibetan Autonomous prefecture, county, villages and schools. Although very often I had three meetings in a day and had to organize the notes late into night, the warmth of the people and the support from the Northwest Normal University gave me much needed energy and confidence. The following is a summary of some of the highlights in Gansu.

I. At the Provincial Level

In Lanzhou, where government offices and various institutions are located, I had formal, semi-formal, as well as informal meetings with officials, scholars, and students in related institutions.

1. Meeting With the Provincial Government Officials

A formal meeting was arranged for me to meet with eight officials from various government departments who were involved with the policy issues of interest to my study. I was accompanied and introduced by Ms. Ma, the retired former Deputy Director of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of Gansu Province, whom I met during my previous visits to China. The eight officials were from the following offices:

- Deputy Director of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the Province
- Director of the Propaganda Department of Gansu Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China
- Director of Nationalities Education Division of the Education Commission of Gansu Province
- Vice-secretary General of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the Province

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Director of the Nationalities Research Institute of Gansu Province

Head of the Nationalities Education Division of the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the Province

Director of the Office of the Overseas Nationalities Commission of Gansu Province

Deputy Director of the Office of Education, Science and Technology, and Health Commission of the People’s Congress of Gansu Province

The meeting lasted the entire morning followed by a lunch banquet. During the meeting, I was given a general introduction to the province, including economic and educational development, and various key policies in relation to minority education. I also had an opportunity to ask questions and to discuss certain policy issues under study and obtained some written materials. One of the most beneficial elements of the meeting was to gain an invisible pass to the various levels of officials in the Province.

2. Northwest Normal University

Apart from informal interviews with professors and minority students of the university, I had meetings with the following departments:

(1) Two separate meetings with two vice presidents of the university, the Director of the President’s office, and the Director of the Foreign Affairs office who gave the full support of the university.

(2) One meeting with the Director of the Minority Teacher Training Centre which is directly funded by the State Education Commission in Beijing and is responsible for training minority teachers for the five provinces/regions in the northwest of China.

(3) One meeting with a professor of the Minority Education Research Institute of the
university.

(4) One meeting with the professors and graduate students of the Educational Research Institute of the university. During which we had a good discussion of issues of common concern in minority education. I also gave a talk about my research and doing research in Canada. Many of the graduate students come from a minority background. One interesting fellow, with whom I have become good friends, is one of the only two Ph.D graduates in all of China with a Tibetan background. His major research interests happen to be very close to my own.

3. The Northwest Nationalities Institute

I visited the Institute through my new Tibetan friends from the Northwest Normal University. I had the opportunity to spend a day with the Tibetan graduate students at the Institute. They were from various regions of the country and majored exclusively in Tibetan language and literature. They could all speak excellent Mandarin (Putonghua) which could be one of the reasons they were able to pass the university entrance exam. The interviews with them either in a group or individually were very informal and informative. They gave their views of the related issues from a minority perspective.

Later, I came back to the Institute to spend almost four hours interviewing a professor known as an expert in minority education. The interview was conducted in the comfort of his home. He had published extensively on the topic and had just finished a book on the modern history of Tibetan education in the northwest of China. Not only was his personal insight on the issues most valuable, but the books and research papers that he gave me have assisted me with my thesis work in Canada. I also had a meeting with
his research assistant.

4. Lanzhou University

Professor Yang, the Head of History department, is the only Ph.D supervisor in the area of social science at the university. He has spent his entire academic life on research on the ancient history and culture of the minorities in the Northwest region of China. He provided me with insights for comparing minority policies during various historical periods. The three hour interview was carried out at his home near the university. He showed his support for my research by giving me a number of his books and research papers.

5. Gansu University of Technology

I was invited by the university to have lunch with the President, Vice-president, and the Director of Foreign Affairs office. They were contacts which were made through my previous visit a year and a half ago. Although these people were not in the same research area, further contacts were provided.

II. At the Autonomous Prefecture Level

Southern Gansu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (Gannan Zangzu Zizhizhou) is located in the southwest of the province with an area of 44,000 square kilometres and a population of 515,000. Apart from the Han nationality which constitutes 48% of the total population, Tibetans are the largest minority group at 44.72%. The rest of the population is made up of 16 other minorities. The prefecture includes seven counties. The prefecture government is located in a town called Hezuo. I was accompanied by a young professor,
Mr. Wan, from Northwest Normal University. It took us about seven hours by bus on a rough mountain road to travel from Lanzhou to Hezuo. With the proper contacts including personal letters and phone calls from the provincial government officials, the research went very smoothly.

1. People's Congress of the Southern Gansu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture

I was hosted by the People's Congress of the prefecture. After a welcome banquet, I had an interview with Mr. Yu, the Deputy Director of the Congress, and his young Tibetan assistant, Mr. Long, in my hotel room. Since Mr. Yu is also responsible for education, we had a good discussion on the responsibilities and functions of his office, its relationship with various other levels of administration such as the state, province and counties, and general information about the prefecture.

2. Education Bureau of the Prefecture

A formal meeting was arranged by the People's Congress for me to meet with officials from the local Education Bureau. The meeting lasted the whole morning with 10 people including three directors and deputy directors of the Bureau, two officials from its education research division, two research assistants, and three teachers from the Tibetan Vocational and Technical College across the street. After an initial introduction and briefing on the functions of the Bureau and general education situation in the prefecture, the discussion focused on the decision making process for local education policy and the cooperation and negotiation among various levels. After the meeting I was allowed to view the documents and reports on the planning of minority language education for the
prefecture. Most of the officials at this level are Tibetan.

3. Southern Gansu Tibetan Vocational and Technical College

Since one of the Deputy Directors from the Education Bureau is also the President of the College, I was invited to spend an afternoon on campus. The major task of the college is to train Tibetan elementary school teachers for the area. The majority of the college staff and students are Tibetan. After a tour of the college, I met with college administrators and some of the teachers. They were very interested in bilingual education research in western countries. I gave a talk on my own research and other research on bilingual education followed by a general discussion on the quality of education for Tibetans, teacher training, and the development of teaching materials.

4. Hezuo Teacher Training College

This college is responsible for training minority middle school teachers for the northwest regions. Ninety percent of the students are from sixteen minority backgrounds with Tibetan and Hui forming the largest groups. I spent a day at the college meeting in the morning with the Vice-president of the College (Tibetan) and the Director of Curriculum. They were very interested in integrating minority language and culture into the curriculum. It was interesting for me to learn that the President of the college, who at the time was attending meetings in Beijing, is a respected, high-ranking Tibetan monk.

In the afternoon, I was received by the Tibetan Department where I had an very informative session with the Head of the department and five other teachers who were all Tibetan. I was deeply touched by their devotion to the development of quality education
for Tibetans. The Head of the department presented me with his newly published book on the teaching of Tibetan grammar.

III. At the County Level

The People's Congress of the Prefecture kindly provided me with a jeep (that is the only kind vehicle capable of travelling on the grassland), a Tibetan driver, and their young Tibetan official Mr. Long. Mr. Wan and I were driven to the town of Xiahe where the county government is located. It was only a couple of hours drive during which the two Tibetans told me more about their culture and religion.

Xiahe county covers an area of 8,600 square kilometres with a population of 120,000. It has two towns and twenty-one villages. The major source of livelihood is cattle raising. Xiahe is made famous by a Tibetan Buddhist Monastery which is one of the biggest in the country. It is one of the major centres for Tibetan religious activities. I was lucky enough to be given a detailed tour through the monastery by a monk tour guide who happened to be Mr. Long's college classmate. In Xiahe, the following research activities took place.

1. People's Congress of the Xiahe County

I met and had lunch with the Director of the local People's Congress together with two other officials. I was given a general introduction to the county followed by a period for questions. They also helped me to set up meetings with other institutions in the county.

2. Education Bureau of the Xiahe County
The Director of the Education Bureau, Mr. Zhang, met me in his office. Although Mr. Zhang is of the Han nationality, he has worked in the Tibetan area for more than twenty-three years. He started as an elementary school teacher, then a school principal until he attained his present position. He spoke fluent Tibetan. I benefited a lot from the interview and from his background and experience. He gave me his manuscript of a book entitled "The Educational History of Xiahe County" which will be published early next year. His assistant helped me to set up visits to a local Tibetan elementary school and a middle school. He had also introduced me to both school officials.

3. Xiahe Tibetan Elementary School

One morning was spent at the elementary school interviewing the principal who was a young Tibetan. We spent two hours on issues of bilingual education. Then I was allowed to sit in on two classes: grade one Mandarin and grade six Mathematics taught through the Tibetan language. I also had a look at the textbooks and the curriculum.

4. Xiahe Tibetan Middle School

In the middle school, I only met with the principal, curriculum director, and a teacher since it was a Saturday afternoon with no classes taking place. By visiting the two schools, some of the issues on policy implementation became apparent.

VI. At the Village Level

Accompanied by Mr. Zhang, the Director of the Education Bureau, I was driven to Sangke which is a village 80 kilometres north of Xiahe County. There is no paved road on
the grassland and we were surrounded by snow-topped mountains beyond which nothing is open to people with a foreign passport. We stopped at the village centre which was about the size of a small town in Saskatchewan. We picked up the village school principal and walked to his school 10 minutes away from the village centre.

It is an elementary boarding school for Tibetan children whose families travel in search of cattle feeding grounds. Although it is only 80 kilometres away from the Xiahe County centre, the condition of the school was a striking contrast to that of the county. The school administrators took me on a tour of the school including some of the classrooms and student dormitories. The school seemed like nothing more than a few rows of mud houses where hundreds of Tibetan children received their early education. I talked to some children between five and seven who told me that their favourite subject was Tibetan language. I also interviewed the principal and curriculum director. Both were Tibetan.

This trip to the minority prefecture was such an eye-opening experience which left me with more questions than before. After visiting southern Gansu, I went back to Lanzhou to wrap up my visit. I felt that what I had achieved in Gansu in one month was more than what I could have done in Beijing in five months. I owed all this to the support of Northwest Normal University and friends. By the time I left Lanzhou, I was enriched with five boxes of written materials, many friends, and a great feeling for the place and its people. The experience there also helped me gain confidence for my next research site—Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.

Part Three: Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (April 5 --- May 5, 1993)

Xinjiang, also known as Chinese Turkestan, is located at the northwest border of
China. It is China's largest and most remote region inhabited predominantly by the Turkish-speaking Muslim Uygur people which form 42% of the population. Apart from Han people who make up another 38%, the Uygur coexist with their cousins, the Kazaks (7.4%), and a total of 48 other nationalities. The region has had autonomy since 1950 and enjoys equal status with other provinces.

After a 48-hour train-ride mainly through the Gobi desert, I reached Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. There was no affiliating institute in the exchange program. My research was helped through friends from the Education Commission of the region and from Xinjiang University. The contact was established through my previous visit to Xinjiang and their official visits to Canada. I stayed at Xinjiang University guesthouse and my research activity was similar to that in Gansu. To be brief, the following is a list of major visits, meetings, and interviews.

I. At the Regional Level

1. Regional Education Commission

I had one meeting with two Deputy Directors of the Education Commission, and attending at the same time was the Director of the Education Research Division and two people from the Foreign Affairs office. Following this, I had four meetings with the Research Director of the division.

2. Xinjiang Science and Technology Commission

I gained much knowledge on the economic, scientific, and technological development of the region through a meeting with five officials from Xinjiang Science and
Technological Commission including the Director and a professor from the Institute for Policy of Science and Technology in Xinjiang.

3. Xinjiang Working Commission on Minority Language and Script

An interview was conducted with the former Vice-director of the Commission, Mr. Yang, who is also the chief editor for a major research journal on minority language and translation. We had a three-hour discussion on minority language issues and the policies of the commission. He gave me books and documents at the end of the interview.

4. Xinjiang University

Since I lived on campus, I had many opportunities to talk with professors and some students. I had a meeting with the professors in the Chinese Language Department (includes minority languages) and another one at the Mandarin Language Department. I also interviewed the Director and his assistant at the Population Research Institute of the University. The research on trends in population change reflected changes to minority policies.

II. At the Municipal Level

In Urumqi, I visited a Uygur kindergarten, a Uygur elementary school and a Uygur middle school. I talked with the principals, teachers, students, and sat in on classes at each school.

I also visited Turpan, another major city in Xinjiang.
III. At the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture

Ili borders three new republics in the former Soviet Union and is over seven hundred kilometres away from Urumqi.

I had meetings with the Director and Deputy Director of the Education Bureau of the Prefecture. Two researchers and two officials from the Foreign Affairs office also attended the meeting. I also visited Yili Teacher Training College where I was met by the president, curriculum director, professors, and researchers.

VI. At the Chabucha'er Xibo Autonomous County

Accompanied by two officials from the Education Bureau in Yili, we visited a county 150 kilometres from the city of Yili. The county is inhabited predominantly by the Xibo nationality, where I had an interview with the Director of the Education Bureau of the county. I went to his office as well as his home. Together, we visited a Xibo elementary school and a Xibo middle school.

After a three day train-ride I was back in Beijing.

Part Four: Back To Beijing (May 5 — June 21, 1993)

During this last period of my research, I had several interviews with officials and professors from the State Education Commission, the Policy Research Department of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, the Nationality Committee of the National People's Congress, the Department of Policy and Legislation of State Science and Technology Commission of China, and the Institute of Nationality Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Science. I also visited libraries and bookstores.
On the whole, I consider the five-month research in China to have been successful and I wish to thank the Canada-China Joint Doctoral Project in Education again for the opportunity to carry out this study.
## Appendix III

The National Autonomous Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Dates of the Establishment</th>
<th>Sites of the People's Government of the Autonomous Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Regions</td>
<td>Inner Mongolian AR</td>
<td>May 1, 1947</td>
<td>Huhhot City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Regions</td>
<td>Guangxi Zhuang AR</td>
<td>Mar. 15, 1958</td>
<td>Nanning City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Regions</td>
<td>Tibet AR</td>
<td>Sept. 1, 1965</td>
<td>Lhasa City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Regions</td>
<td>Ningxia Hui AR</td>
<td>Oct. 25, 1958</td>
<td>Yinchuan City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous Regions</td>
<td>Xinjiang Uygur AR</td>
<td>Oct. 1, 1955</td>
<td>Urumqi City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>Yanbian Korean AP</td>
<td>Sept. 3, 1952</td>
<td>Yanji City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>Enshi AP of Tujia and Miao Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>Dec. 1, 1983</td>
<td>Enshi City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>Xiangxi AP of Tujia and Miao Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>Sept. 20, 1957</td>
<td>Jishou City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>Garze Tibetan AP</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qinghai</th>
<th>Menyuan AC of Hui Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Dec. 19, 1953</th>
<th>Haomen Town</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Huzhu AC of Tu Ethnic Group</td>
<td>Feb. 17, 1954</td>
<td>Weiyuan Town</td>
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<td>Hualong AC of Hui Ethnic Group</td>
<td>March 1, 1954</td>
<td>Bayan Town</td>
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<td>Xunhua AC of Salar Ethnic Group</td>
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<td>Henan Mongolian AC</td>
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<td>Youganning</td>
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<td>Minhe AC of Hui and Tu Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>June 27, 1986</td>
<td>Shangchuankou Town</td>
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<td>Datong AC of Hui and Tu Ethnic Groups</td>
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<td>Qiaotou Town</td>
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<td>Xinjiang</td>
<td>Yanqi AC of Hui Ethnic Group</td>
<td>Mar. 15, 1954</td>
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<td>Qapqal AC of Xibe Ethnic Group</td>
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<td>Mulei Town</td>
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<td>Hoboksrar Mongolian AC</td>
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<td>Tash Kuaghan AC of Tajik Ethnic Group</td>
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<td>Palikun AC of Hazak Ethnic Group</td>
<td>Sept. 30, 1954</td>
<td>Palikun Town</td>
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AR = Autonomous Region  AP = Autonomous Prefecture  AC = Autonomous County