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THE STRUGGLE FOR A FUTURE:
CAPITALISM AND BEYOND

BY

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Ph.D.
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ABSTRACT

Drawing upon the richness of twentieth century theorizing, I want to ideologically rearm the proletariat. However, the history of the revolutionary working class is both continuous and discontinuous, and the present discontinuity concerns the other to the mostly male industrial wage-earner who has been the traditional revolutionary subject, the neo-proletariat in Gorz's terms or the other working class in Negri's. The situation is far from clear, as alternative revolutionary subjects range from the mostly female global homeworkers to members of informal economies with community currencies, and other elements of the new social movements. Nevertheless, common to them all is some alternative set of values -- alternative to the capitalist market place -- that I subsume under the ideational rubric of Care. Heidegger's explication of Care is the most theoretically sophisticated effort of the present to define this term. I appropriate this from him for purposes of defining what could be the basic ideational suprastructure of an emerging revolutionary subject -- both continuous and discontinuous with the traditional one. I then show the common ground between Heidegger and Marx. Building from that I then consider the arguments of Fredric Jameson, in particular his conception of the totality. Jameson argues, in his ironic and playful way, for the reconception of Marxist praxis based on the evolution and involution of post-modernism, the third age of capitalism. I then consider the traditional socialist concern with planning, separating planning from the drawing up of blueprints. In reference to the work of General Idea, a group of Toronto artists, I then address the question of a war of position. and an early fighter of such a war. Revolutionaries themselves undergoing revolution is that war's chief point.
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PREFACE

Drawing upon the richness of twentieth century theorizing, I want to ideologically rearm the proletariat. However, the history of the revolutionary working class is both continuous and discontinuous, and the present discontinuity concerns the other to the mostly male industrial wage-earner who has been the traditional revolutionary subject, the neo-proletariat in Gorz's terms or the other working class in Negri's. The situation is far from clear, as alternative revolutionary subjects range from the mostly female global homeworkers to members of informal economies with community currencies, and other elements of the new social movements. Nevertheless, common to them all is some alternative set of values -- alternative to the capitalist market place -- that I subsume under the ideational rubric of Care. Heidegger's explication of Care is the most theoretically sophisticated effort of the present to define this term. I appropriate this from him for purposes of defining what could be the basic ideational suprastructure of an emerging revolutionary subject -- both continuous and discontinuous with the traditional one. I then show the common ground between Heidegger and Marx. Building from that I then consider the arguments of Fredric Jameson, in particular his conception of the totality. Jameson argues, in his ironic and playful way, for the re-conception of Marxist praxis based on the evolution and involution of post-modernism, the third age of capitalism. In my final chapters I consider the traditional socialist concern with planning, separating planning as other than the drawing up of blueprint. I then address the question of a war of position with reference to General Idea, a group of Toronto artists working from the 1970s to early 1990s. General Idea was an early fighter of such a war. I conclude that revolutionary socialism is a viable project if and only if the revolutionaries themselves undergo revolution.
INTRODUCTION

Socialism and communism were invented because naked capitalism was so offensive. The fact that communism failed does not make it any the less necessary to beware of the many unpleasant facets of what we call capitalism, and to try to modify them in the interests of the nobler goals of society. At the very least, even if nobler goals are easier to aspire to than to reach, the question of the basic efficiency of capitalism is one that commands attention at a time when the leading market economies, for all their regular "summit conferences", seem to be turning inwards on themselves."....There are many flaws in the various forms of Western "market economy" or capitalist economy. Indeed, it is a contention of this book that, while communism has manifestly failed as an economic system, capitalism as we know it has not necessarily succeeded. Perhaps the most fundamental point about communism was that it was a monopoly -- both politically and economically. Until the remarkable events of the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was little else on offer in the communist regimes. In the UK during the early 1980s Mrs. Margaret Thatcher used to deflect criticism of her economic policies by witheringly declaiming: "What is the alternative?" In fact the whole point about democratic market economies is that they do offer political and economic alternatives -- as Mrs. Thatcher eventually found out to her cost."

Keegan is a liberal critic of capitalism as indicated by his notion of "socialism and communism were invented because naked capitalism was so offensive." One could equally argue that capitalism was invented because naked feudalism was so offensive. According to Marxism, stages of human society are not inventions but products of struggle arising out of the contradictions of previous stages. A given stage is, in part, a resolution of those contradictions and an answer to the questions posed; as well, however, each new stage raises different questions. For example, the causal factors responsible for the rise of capitalism were the monetization of economic life, possessive individualism replacing tradition as mechanism of demand, and the shift from a society of status to a society of contract (Heilbroner, 1962). Contradictions of feudal society were resolved in this manner, and the emergence of bourgeois society, painfully and unevenly over several centuries, sparked far-ranging debates in a variety of disciplines, as well as creating new disciplines. The transition to a new mode of production -- a post-industrial socialism -- cannot help but do the same.

In the past decade there has been a resurgence of Marxist theorizing, due, in part, to the liberation experienced by the collapse of the former Soviet Bloc. I want to
part, to the liberation experienced by the collapse of the former Soviet Bloc. I want to demonstrate the continued relevance of Marxism to an analysis of social structure by using that tradition to analyze the possibilities for a global future. This book deals with the cultural dynamics of what Keegan calls a democratic market economy. By positing a democratic market economy as a present-becoming-future economic form I do not intend that it is the final stage of human society. Rather, learning from the experiences of socialist revolution in this century, it is necessary to posit an intermediate stage between capitalism and socialism even while remembering the broader historical context.

Following Ernest Mandel, Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleson\(^3\), a point explored in greater detail in chapter four, I call the present epoch, culturally, postmodernism and, economically, globalization. This is the third or late stage of capitalism, the previous two being non-monopoly (Marx 1867) and the second monopoly capitalism respectively (Sweezy and Baran 1966)). Capitalism evolved from being a creature of relatively small and independent producer markets existing within geographically defined national territories, to that of national monopolies having a world market, to now of multinational corporations allied with supra-national trading blocks. Production and consumption has gone from being the satisfying of the immediate demands for physically based objects, to globalization where the circulation of goods and services is driven by the creation of consumer life-styles and semeiotically sophisticated forms of consciousness manipulation (McLuhan 1964, 1969, De Kerckhove 1995). Technologically, capitalism has gone from the concentration and centralization typical of print-command texts where linear repetition and uniformity organized communication, to cross-cutting hyper-texts and virtual reality, these approaches invoking a fuller, audio-visually based space (Mitchell 1995).

In response to the changing nature of capitalist production, three Marxist approaches have emerged in the last three decades that I want to mention here and briefly summarize. They form the overall context of this work and are: strategic-relationship (Jessop, 1990), analytic Marxism and the school of Uno (Uno 1964). The brief rationale for the selection of these three is the following: Jessop’s work indicates
the subtlety of approach required for a postmodernist socialism; analytic Marxism the deconstructing of Marxist master themes; and Uno the underlying reason why capitalism continues to exist. Together they address different aspects of the present and future conjuncture.

To indicate points of agreement and areas requiring further elaboration, I begin with Jessop’s strategic-relational theory, citing his description of its key points.

In opposition to structural superdeterminism and idealist approaches alike, we insist on treating capital accumulation as the contingent outcome of a dialectic of structures and strategies. Structures are given through the various moments of the value-form and the emergent properties of social interaction (such as the celebrated effects of ‘market forces’), whereas the development and pursuit of accumulation strategies reproduce and transform these structures within definite structural limits. There is a complex dialectic at work here. The effectiveness of strategies depends on their adaptation to the margin of maneuver inherent in the prevailing structures and their repercussions on the balance of forces. But it is through exploiting this margin of maneuver that the balance of forces and structures themselves can be changed in the medium and long term. It is for this reason that we insist on the relational, conjunctural approach to the analysis of capital as a form-determined condensation of the balance of class (and class relevant forces. In this respect it is important to consider not only the value-form and directly economic forces but also political and ideological structures, forces and strategies.²

It is an approach that reflects the reality of present day capitalism. To cite Keegan’s description of the same:

The name of the game is to co-operate with one’s competitors over common components, yet maintain keen competition at the final product stage; to erect credible barriers against players likely to enter the market; to control the range of products and services likely to act as substitutes for one’s own activity; to modify one’s bargaining power vis-a-vis suppliers or purchasers by means of long-term contracts or control of upstream operations; and to influence the balance of forces by making strategic moves and anticipating change. Market structures are not there, like diagrams on the page of the economics textbook: "new forms of organization, the opening up of new markets and the introduction of new products and production methods continually undermine the possible equilibria and modify the rules of the game."³

That Marxist theorizing appropriates and reflects the language of capitalism is not itself a scandalous debit. In fact, it is to Marxism’s worthy credit. Marxism is not a “political
philosophy of the weltanschauung variety, and in no way "on all fours" with conservation, liberalism, radicalism, populism, or whatever." Marxism reflects, not mimics, the features of bourgeois social reality in order to reflect upon them. It understands itself as a historically produced phenomenon as much as the phenomena that it studies, although this fact tragically escaped the consciousness of the ruling classes in the former Soviet Bloc. The rational kernel of Marxism is the dialectical relationship between its own historical nature and the categories it employs to explain reality. Essence, following Jessop, is not a thing but a product of forces operating along lines of evolving structures; and these structures belong to things employing, in the case of living things, varying strategies for maintaining themselves in a modifying and modified world.

However, this great flux and fluidity implies some core of concerns. Marxism possesses a propositional backbone: "Communism is for us not a stable state which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things." Jessop's opposition to both structural superdeterminism and idealist approaches alike is useful. A structural superdeterminism is, for example, a rigid lock-step formulation of stages. There is no need for struggle; history simply unfolds of its own accord -- as if history was an independent entity standing above and beyond the actual relations of individuals in their struggle to survive alongside, with and against each other. A naive idealism, on the other hand, converts reduces struggle to ideas, this being the criticism of the German -- Young Hegelian -- ideology by Marx and Engels.

The second school mentioned, analytical Marxism, has, as Jessop, argued for a more nuanced, close-grained approach, saying that Marxists need to ponder many of the creed's macro-level propositions in light of their aggregate micro-level factors. "A cardinal tenet of analytical Marxism is that macro-explanations in social science require microfoundations. This doctrine maintains that macro-explanations of social phenomenon must be supported by an account of the mechanisms at the individual level through which the postulated social processes work." I have cited one outstanding macro-proposition, namely that communism is the real movement of
To further clarify the above issues and prepare the way for a synthesis, I introduce the teachings of Kozo Uno, Uno’s strength being his clarification of categories of traditional Marxism:

Yet even Marx could not quite predict the profound transformations of capitalism that was to occur towards the end of the nineteenth century and there after. In Capital, therefore, he took it for granted that an increasingly purer form of capitalist society would emerge with the development of capitalism. Not only was this forecast consistent with the historical experience of capitalist development through the seventeenth and the eighteenth century to Marx’s own time but a pure theory designed to explain the general nature of capitalism requires the methodological hypothesis that capitalism increasingly tends to perfection. Yet the actual history of capitalism did not materialize this hypothesis. For after the 1870s the era of finance-capital evolved, at which stage a high level of capitalist development no longer required the elimination of the traditional class of ‘small producers’. Thus arose a stage of capitalist development at which the actual course of history diverged from the methodological presupposition of an increasingly purer capitalist society...these factors gained the upper hand, frustrating the realization of pure capitalism.\(^9\)

Social reality, according to Uno, can never become coterminous with the absolute commodification of the historical world-space. Capitalism can never come itself to an end, rather there are only stages.

Thus it has been explained that the study of political economy must be conducted at three distinct levels of abstraction, with the pure theory of capitalism at the most abstract level, the empirical analysis of the current state of capitalist economy at the least abstract level, and the stages-theory of capitalist development mediating them.\(^10\)

The pure form corresponds analytically to the integration of the macro and micro propositional level; at the level of historical analysis both macro and micro propositions are appropriate. The relationships between the levels of theory, from the most concrete (capitalist society) to the most abstract (theory of value), are discerned through an analysis of their causal propositional factors. Each level of capitalist reality has strategies proper to its own development, although all three levels form a totality conditioning the interplay of the three-as-one. Capitalism deviates from its pure form (theory) because it preserves the existence of the small producer class. This last is
the proverbial 'fly in the ointment'.

Following Uno, it is useful to consider the evolving character of capitalism and the possibilities for articulating socialist tendencies. The existence of the small producer class raises questions about the end of capitalism. What is the socialist potential of this class, if any? What is the meaning of working class? Is the traditional working class dead as Andre Gorz suggests? While it would be naive to say that the small producer class is the revolutionary subject it would be equally naive to dismiss certain revolutionary aspects associated with it; the same qualification applies to the traditional working class. Gorz argues, in fact, that the traditional working class, whatever is left of it under the regime of downsizing and globalization, is not revolutionary. To articulate a new (or modified) revolutionary subject by examining different tendencies of the present conjuncture is the task of this work.

In my first chapter I will survey the field, scouting the terrain for socialist tendencies. Authors such as Andre Gorz and Toni Negri offer socialists some intriguing suggestions about the changing nature of the working class. They emphasize, as Negri (1980) calls it, the discontinuous element. To put their suggestions in context, however, I use the findings of a more traditional thinker, Cy Gonick (1987), one who dwells upon the continuous element. Andre Gorz and Negri argue for an 'other' working class, an argument that displaces, theoretically, the mostly male industrial wage-earner as the traditional revolutionary subject. In its place stands the mainly female mass of global small producers, the homeworkers of the informal economy.

However, one must show a certain caution as the 'other' working class is, to say the least, an extremely mixed bag of individuals, some of whom have socialist sympathies and others who do not. Nevertheless, there are elements of the present conjuncture that could concretize what I call, drawing from Heidegger, the idea of Care. Without wanting to be an essentialist, I nevertheless submit that the female of higher animals, including the human, have, during the course of species evolution, come to assume the functions of care-giving: the nurturing and defense of the young (Walsh 1996). The explication of Care thus is useful, in conjunction with an analysis of
current tendencies in social structure, for articulating a possible post industrial socialism. There lies the original contribution of my thesis to the on going debate.

To indicate my approach to Heidegger I cite Goldmann:

I would add that this perspective will enable us to display a whole range of elements common to both philosophers (Lukacs and Heidegger), which are not very visible at first sight, but which nevertheless constitute the common basis on which undeniable antagonisms are elaborated. (my interpolation)

Following Goldmann’s path, I selectively appropriate Heidegger’s text, first presenting the basic ideas (chapter two) and then criticizing them (chapter three). However, following the spirit of Hegel’s Aufhebung, one transcends a position through preserving some elements of it in a richer and broader understanding of the same matter. Thus I attempt to preserve Heidegger’s distinct contribution to a revolutionary project. My perspective will indicate the common grounds of Heidegger and Marx, as summarized by the figure of Care. Chapter four of the present text explicates that dialogue, indicating further the relevance of Care as an organizing leit-motif for a twenty-first century socialism.

In chapter five I extend my treatment of Heidegger to the question of the totality and related issues with reference to Jameson. There I argue for Care as the difference between the totality and that degenerate phenomenon of the totality called totalitarianism. The second is, so to speak, the shadow of the first. It lurks as a danger that one cannot, however, simply banish. Totalitarianism is the ever-present danger belonging to the totality. Dialectically comprehended, the one who cares for the totality (the Marxist) attends to the shadowy substance of his own thinking. A responsible individual, I am suggesting, does not ignore his shadow rather enters into conversation with it and thereby brings it into the light. Jameson’s dialogue with Heidegger is a theme, for example, that runs throughout Postmodernism: Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.

What, however is the relation between caring and, say, anarchism? For caring, by this definition, appears to incorporate anarchism, liberal democracy, constitutional monarchies and many other non-totalitarian political forms. To answer this I state a
key proposition of my method. While it would be simple-minded to think that every oppositional force to capitalism is necessarily socialist it would be equally wrong-headed to ignore the potential for socialism in those tendencies. **Socialism is the next caring stage of late capitalist society.** By this I do not intend to confound socialism with care. **Rather socialism expresses care at this stage of human history; capitalism expressed care when it was a revolutionary force.** Care is the suffering with the agony of the present in order to deliver the present of its future. The other above mentioned approaches do not exhibit the same degree of care, some, such as constitutional monarchy in the context of liberal democracy, being simply reactionary, nostalgic longings for an eclipsed past.

The socialist, as odd as this may sound, cares for capitalist society. A traditional feature of socialist care is planning. However, planning, as identified with traditional command economies of the former Soviet Bloc, was responsible for spectacular wastes in materials and human lives. Clearly, socialists need to rethink this concept, and in chapter six I do so with the help of Michael Ellman and Richard Sennett. Planning is other than making blueprints, rather it is the making plain of what is there, this consonant with Marx's well known remarks on the Paris Communards. As part of this making plain or planning one wages a war of position.

In chapter seven I examine the nature of this war in the context of General Idea, an avant-garde group of Toronto artists active in the 1970s until the early 1990s. General Idea focuses, in ways provocative and entertaining, on the dark, and strangely humorous side, of late capitalism thereby exposing its contradictions. To show this I put to work some of the more general theoretical propositions developed out of my conversation with Jameson. General Idea's focus is, in the main, hellish; it indicates the **carelessness** of late capitalism as enunciated by the themes of glamour and seduction. The image capturing this general carelessness is Miss General Idea. This last is a female form. Late capitalism's carelessness stands in direct contrast to the figure of Care, as explicated by Heidegger in **Being and Time.** I dwell upon General Idea to strengthen the contrast between the carelessness of capitalism and the carefulness that could articulate the notion of a postindustrial socialism.
To care for the present is to wage war on behalf of its future. Originally conceived by Gramsci (1971) as a passive war, a war of position has received much theoretical attention in recent years (Jessop 1990). It is a war that, in my mind, builds on traditional female strength. Patriarchy, by contrast, conceives of women as passive as to say weak objects; it denigrates women and, in particular, female strength. The strength of the female is two-fold: to both nurture and defend its young. One sees this in a variety of species, from bears to humans (Walsh 1996). However the female's real strength is her ability to give birth in the first instance. Out of her comes life.

In Marxist literature, beginning with Marx, one conceives of a society as ripe with contradictions. More abstractly, as Marx argues in Capital 1, society expands through surplus value, that value big with value. Surplus value is the life blood of society, and the ability to produce and dispose of it - as articulated in the tripartite theme of production, distribution and consumption -- is the material basis for social growth. In short, surplus value is the material basis of social reproduction and hence of the future. Care denotes how one orients to society's surplus value and aims to liberate that value for its fuller expression. At this stage of history, given that the present is capitalist social reality, the vehicle for liberating surplus value is socialism. Socialism demonstrates care through helping capitalism deliver itself of its surplus value. Economically this means advancing ways of producing and distributing value that are other to commodity production.

The political-military expression for caring is a war of position. A war of position has the objective of deconstructing the capitalist present, to open up opportunities for rethinking the very concept of value. Value is quintessentially human, a product of human labour power in conjunction with the transformation of Nature. When working out something one works with a material. One can do so either with or without care. In caring one works with the material to bring out its goodness. A caring person invests time and energy, attending to the object's good. For example, a doctor is a care-giver, and the object of the doctor's care is his patient; the doctor hopes, if possible, to restore the patient's well-being or health. On the abstract theoretical plane, Heidegger shows this strength in his dwelling with the notion of Being. To be strong is to stand
one's grounds, to cultivate its soil, turning over and reflecting upon the issues involved. It is the strength of recollection, of regathering the unity of the ground through carefully attending to the many products emerging out of it. Heidegger does this, more specifically, through calling our attention to the horizon line of Being or language.

Through the act of cultivating the grounds, one nurtures one's sense of Being. Thereby does one show strength, the force associated with Caring. Through this action one brings out new life from the soil as a farmer does the seeds planted in the ground. A farmer is sensitive to the ground; he is concerned with the quality of the soil in relation to the type of seed. He cares for the seed through cultivating the soil. Analogously the socialist tends the grounds of capitalist reality in order to help what is lying latent in it to arise, break through the surface and flower. The ground's seeds are its latent force, the tendencies inherent in a given social reality. Carelessness concerns an indifference to the quality of the soil and the type of seed. Thus a careless farmer does not cultivate the grounds; he does not open them up through a thorough examination of their nature. Analogously, one may oppose capitalism in many different ways. However, in so far as one does not attend to the nature of capitalist social reality as demonstrated by a thorough investigation of that reality's realness, one does not demonstrate care. Fascism then is an example of a careless reaction to capitalism. A war of position, as I understand and wage it, concerns, by contrast, the ability to nurture and defend the future through examining the tendencies of present day capitalism. The task of organic thinkers, to use Gramsci's term (Gramsci 1971), is to extrapolate and isolate from the present conjuncture socialist tendencies -- tendencies challenging the regime of work and commodification. Thereby does one intellectually cultivate the grounds and so liberate the future -- the child -- from the present -- its womb. The future, to be specific, is a postmodernist socialism, a society that would be, relative to the present, a more caring one.

In my eighth and last chapter, I round off my discussion of Care with reflections of time, in particular memory and its relationship to self-transformation. The point of revolution is that it concerns both changing social structure and oneself as an element
of those same structures. To be Oneself is, understood dialectically, to investigate those structures with the idea in mind of freeing up their playfulness. Thereby does one open up greater space for transformation and human potential. Expressed more formally, revolution is the self-transforming action of being-Oneself. The self here is capitalist-patriarchal society and the being-Oneself is the post-capitalist and post-patriarchal society for which socialism is the classical name.
Uno argued for the continued existence of the small producer in the capitalist economy and, more generally, social reality. One may associate this phenomenon with another, namely, the decoupling of individuals with former industrial foci of production and consumption. In this preface for discussing the idea of care I want to briefly survey the field, indicating the presence of embryonic socialist tendencies. By tendency, to be more specific, I refer to some potential for something being, in this case socialism. As well as the tendency itself, it is important to note its direction, as Marx said. Dialectically, the situation is far from clear as different phenomena may have contradictory aspects; as Jameson said, echoing Marx, capitalism is both a catastrophe and a great advance.

To dispel any illusions about capitalism as well as to set out in broad brush strokes the material infrastructural reality confronting any serious social inquirer, I will cite from the NEW YORK TIMES:

Scientists have known for decades that poverty translates into higher rates of illness and mortality. But an explosion of research is demonstrating that social class -- as measured not just by income but also by education and other markers of relative status -- is one of the most powerful predictors of health, more powerful than genetics, exposure to carcinogens, even smoking.

"What matters is not simply whether a person is rich or poor, college educated or not. Rather, risk for a wide variety of illnesses, including cardiovascular disease, diabetes, arthritis, infant mortality, many infectious diseases and some types of cancer, varies with RELATIVE wealth or poverty: the higher the rung on the socio-economic ladder, the lower the risk."

Moreover.

If relative standing in the community is what matters most in protecting public health, then the modern world has been headed in the wrong direction for at least 20 years. Inequality has been increasing for 20 years, and not by accident. Most household in North America have lower net worth than they did in 1963, and the wealthy few are far wealthier than they were in 1983. Between 1983 and 1995, the inflation-adjusted net worth of the top 1% of North Americans swelled by 17% while the bottom 40% of households lost 80%. In other words, the gap between the rich and the rest of us has widened. It is this widening gap that gives rise to disease, research shows.
This problem is not restricted to North America, though the U.S. suffers from greater inequality than any other industrialized nation. The United Nations HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1998 points out that in 100 countries, incomes today are lower in real terms than they were a decade ago. And in many of these countries, inequality has grown as small elites have become fabulously wealthy. The HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT does not say so, but these are some of the fruits of economic “liberalization” policies and “free trade” agreements.14

As the above indicates there has been a steady redistribution of income from the bottom to the top as part of capitalist global restructuring. The money flows up from the poor to the rich, from part-time, casual workers, welfare recipients and wage earners to CEO’s, owners of property and the small elite of those skilled in currency rate and stock manipulation -- if not in outright swindle as the BRE-X mining scandal of recent years illustrates. Money has little connection with actual production and even less with people. It is increasingly the weapon of corporate capital against recalcitrant nation-states and the general population. The corporate capitalist Ontario house party of Mike Harris has passed laws enfeebling unionization, making it easier to fire workers, hire “scabs” and decertify unions while cutting welfare rates and introducing “workfare,” another source of cheap labour.

Further points, these figures applying to the US, the most developed capitalist economy, the direction in which Canada is heading:

- The minimum wage has become a poverty wage. The minimum wage today buys 19% less than I did in 1979, adjusted for inflation.
- The median income of young families with children was 33% lower in 1994 than it was in 1973.
- The average worker worked 148 more hours in 1996 (1868 hours) than in 1973 (1720) hours. That's equivalent to nearly 4 weeks additional work each year, to make ends meet.
- At a median weekly wage of $649, union jobs pay much better than non-union (with a median of $499). But union jobs have been destroyed by downsizing, free trade policies, and plain old union busting. Over the past dozen years, in fact, industry has conducted one of the most successful anti-union wars ever, illegally firing thousands of workers for exercising their right to organize. Fewer than 14% of workers are union members now, down from 35% in 1955.
For 20 years, companies have been withholding wages from workers and transferring that wealth to executives. In 1980, the average CEO made 42 times as much as a factory worker. By 1997, the average CEO was making 326 times as much as a factory worker.

--Savings are a thing of the past. The personal savings rate has fallen from 8.6% in 1984 to 2.1% in 1997 and 0.5% in 1998. People are spending a larger portion of their incomes on health care, child care, housing, and college tuition. Even the cost of saving has risen as banks have steeply increased their services charges, especially on small accounts that don't meet the high minimums needed to avoid fees.

--Requests for emergency goods increased an average of 14% during the period 1997-1998. One out of five requests for food assistance went unmet. Many children do not have enough to eat.

--Increasingly a college education is the key to decent wages, but since 1989 tuition and fees have increased three times as fast as inflation.\(^{15}\)

Any examination of possible socialist tendencies within the current conjuncture have to take into account the facts. The first such tendency I will examine is represented by Andre Gorz and the second by the homeworkers. My rationale for these choices is this: they reference distinct aspects of present capitalist reality. Gorz's investigations concern dissolving tendencies within both the traditional small producer class in relation to the reactive stance of the traditional industrial working class; and the homeworkers an economic expression of the same. Together these tendencies contain elements of what Negri calls the “other working class,” a term I will explicate further on.

To begin with Gorz:

So long as production policy is dictated by private capital, and consumption, culture and the way of life are dominated by bourgeois values, there is no road to better living except through higher earnings. But if the capitalist relations of production are to be abolished, it is because better living implies less, a less intensive work, the adaptation of work to the biological and psychological equilibrium of the worker, better public services and amenities, and greater opportunities for direct communication and culture, both in and out of work, for the worker himself and for his children.\(^{16}\)

In no country has socialist revolution taken the form of the collective appropriation of an already developed productive potential, and therefore of the subordination of economic necessities to the demand of collective and individual. Human liberation, such as the creation of a genuine democracy founded on the power of the producers to regulate production and exchange according to their
needs. 17

One could add, drawing from other Marxist currents, such as the Autonomists (Negri 1980), that socialism's achievement requires the abolishment of work itself as an economic category; liberated from the law of value, it becomes the purely objective expression of an inquiring mind, an activity. To quote from a text of a contemporary artist, Norman T. White.

Art as true self-expression doesn't interest me very much. Self-expression inevitably creeps into art, but I could prefer that it sneak in through some back-door. For me, Art comes alive only when it provides a framework too, but 'good science' is too constrained for me. I would rather ask questions that simultaneous addresses a multitude of worlds. From living organisms to culture to confusion and rust. Only art can give me that generality.18

Art as artifice has, as its infrastructure, the power of objectifying Nature. Art, however, implies the existence of a surplus, art being the product of reflection and objectification. However, the systemic production of commodities is the reification of alienation, this relying upon the production of a class of objects radically different from objects used in everyday life -- thus the bourgeoisie art gallery. The socialist challenge is to free the surplus made possible by industrialism, to recover the objective character of production. This requires the abolishment of alienation. Vital to this project is autonomy:

The obvious prerequisites of all this are autonomy of the party in relation to the administration, autonomy of the union, and internal democracy within the party. That little if any progress has been made in the discussion and formation of long-- and short-term patterns of socialist civilization is largely due to the fact that the autonomy of the party, and its internal democracy, were suppressed during the period of forced accumulation in favour of control by the apparatus. Every apparatus tends to perpetuate its own power, and this is one of the reasons for the tendency to imitate the capitalist consumer society.19

And

Autonomous development means that he impetus of growth should come from within the society and should be based on the full use of its own material and human resources.20

In this later writings Gorz expands upon the theme of autonomy, contrasting it to heteronomy. To quote:
Work is an imposition, a heterodetermined, heteronomous activity, perceived by most of those who either ‘have’ it or are ‘looking for’ it as a nondescript sale of time.\textsuperscript{21}

As a system of material relations, society has laws of functioning and material constraints that are not guaranteed by some pre-established harmony to be in conformity, or even compatible with moral exigency. Particularly in complex, industrialized societies, where social relations are mediated and structured by large-scale structures, socially necessary activities are necessary not to self-based responsible individuals but to a material system that still has the character of a huge machine. The functions or work carried out by a traffic warden, road-sweeper, tax inspector, computer operator, postal sorter or court attendant are determined by the requirements of the social system rather than by ethical rules. Each of these heteronomous activities is the result of ‘external necessity’, not of a purpose chosen by the individual themselves. They are all governed by rigid rules and regulations designed to ensure that individuals function like mere machines, so that their actions can be synchronized in such a way as to produce the intended effect.\textsuperscript{22}

The next state of socialist experimentation will center itself, following Gorz, by the notion of autonomy. Autonomy is the interregnum between the abolishment of liberty and the reinstitution of freedom. It belongs to a transitional programme. Autonomy possesses characteristics of both stages: it has aspects of bourgeois subjectivity, the isolated individual of civil society, and yet presages socialist freedom by this revolt against the wage system, as distinct form the demands for higher wages. Gorz’s word for the class of individuals falling into this category, even as this last is the abstraction from the actual tendencies at work in late capitalism, is neo-proletarian.

To cite some descriptive passages:

In contradiction to the working class, this non-class has not been engendered by capitalism and marked with the insignia of capitalist relations of production. It is the result of the crisis of capitalism and the dissolution of the social relations of capitalist production -- a process stemming from the growth of new production technology. The negativity which, according to Marx, was to be embodied in the working class has by no means disappeared. It has been displaced and has acquired a more radical form in a new social area. As it has shifted, it has acquired a new form and content which directly negates the ideology, the material base, the social relations and the juridical organization (or state form) of capitalism. It has the added advantage over Marx’s working class of being immediately conscious of itself; its existence at once indissolubly subjective and objective, collective and individual.
This non-class encompasses all those who have been expelled from production by the abolition of work, or whose capacities are under-employed as a result of the industrialization (in this case, the automation and computerization) of intellectual work. It includes all the supernumeries of present-say social production, who are potentially or actually unemployed. It results from the decomposition of the old society based upon the dignity, value, social utility and desirability of work. It stretches into virtually every layer of society, well beyond those 'lumpen' whom the Black Panthers, with remarkable prescience counterpoised in the late 1960s to the class of unionized, stably employed workers, protected by labour legislation and collective agreements.24

I am reminded here of the parallel developments in late feudalism, the fifteenth century, where the economic irrelevancy of the feudal estate led to the mass wanderings of former serfs and retainers; and this mass eventually became, with industrialization helped by the expropriation of common grazing pasture, industrial factory masses. The non-class or neo-proletarians, Gorz using both terms, are the industrial working class. They are those who no longer but nevertheless are active, their activities not having sanctioned social form. Just as the ex-feudal retainers became a non-class in the interregnum between the dissolution of the feudal estate and the establishment of the industrial factory, so the ex-industrial workers are a non-class in the interregnum between the dissolution of the factory, the centerpiece of the regime of wage slavery or work, and what I call here the working home or, in a larger sense, the working community. Further,

The traditional working class is now no more than a privileged minority. The majority of the population now belong to the post-industrial neo-proletariat which, with no job security or definite class identity, fills the area of probationary, contracted, casual, temporary and part-time employment. In the not too distant future, jobs such these will be largely eliminated by automation. Even now, their specifications are continually changing with the rapid development of technology, and their requirements bear little relating to the knowledge and skills offered by schools and universities. The neo-proletariat is generally over-qualified for the jobs it finds. It is generally condemned to under-use of its capacities when it is in work, and to unemployment itself in the longer term. Any employment seems to be accidental and provisional, every type of work purely contingent. It cannot feel any involvement with 'its' work or identification with 'its' job. Work no longer signifies an activity or even a major occupation; it is merely a blank interval on the margins of life, to be endured in order to earn a little money.25

Both the strength and weakness of the post-industrial proletariat lie in the fact
that it does not have an overall vision of true society. There are no messianic or comprehensive theories to provide it either with cohesion or with continuity of action. The neo-proletariat is no more than a value area made up of constantly changing individuals whose main aim is not to seize power in order to build a new world, but to regain power over their own lives by disengaging form the market rationality of productivism.26

Gorz's comments are echoed by the Italian Autonomists, notably Toni Negri. This other workers' movement Negri discusses in this way:

Furthermore, in my insistence on this radical methodological rupture I am in good company. The continuity of the history of the working class revolutionary movement is the history of the discontinuity of that movement, the history of the radical ruptures that have characterized it. The revolutionary working class movement is continually being reborn from a virgin mother. The hacks of continuity are still alive and well in the History Institutes of the labour movement. But luckily militant historiography is undergoing a renaissance too, spurred by the experience of the ruptures in our present movement -- and in our history-writing we are now confident enough to present the notion of the "other workers' movement"...This is a perspective which could also provide us with a feel for other historical revolutionary experiences of the proletariat -- experiences that have proved victorious and have (therefore) been betrayed and destroyed.27

That most pregnant phrase, continually reborn from a virgin mother, complements the notion of the proletariat as the grave-digger of the bourgeoisie. The virgin mother is what the working class digs itself out of in giving birth to itself. The proletariat digs itself out of the bourgeoisie, the heteronomous structures of capital accumulation defining its everyday existence. It says farewell to itself through the autonomous activity of casting off by working through the shell of its former existence. The other working class comes out of the margin of global production. The virgin mother of the working class is the matrix of capital accumulation, and this matrix articulates what is central to capital accumulation. This other working class consists of those whose life activities capitalism has marginalized. Gorz and Negri are drawing our attention to the implicit deconstruction of Industrial capitalism's categories of value, specifically, what constitutes work. The other then references some notion of being that is not readily subsumed to the exigencies of commodity production. The problem with the traditional proletariat is that, as demonstrated by the relative success of the union movement, it has been quite content to stay within those categories, thereby reinforcing the capitalist
hegemonic definition of "work" or, more generally, "being." Under industrialism when the worker is at work in the factory, he is not at home and when at home not at work. The other working class movement, as signified by the over-educated and under-employed, do not accept this division. One wants to be at home at every moment of one's existence; one makes one's home through one's work. Work is, to express the matter more radically, the building of one's Being.

Notions of "leisure time," "vacation," and "time-off" are simply ways of papering over this split necessitated by treating labour power as a commodity. The deeper resonances muted by these distinctions concern one's work as one's vocation, as a continually meditative, reforming and unfolding of one's being. There is no real distinction between work and being. One works, in a postmodernist socialist sense through the resting with the nature of things, the dwelling with, abiding by and lingering alongside of what is there. One works through resting with the nature of Being. Thus one is both active and passive; the two moments are dialectically related -- distinguished and reunited -- as moments of a whole. It is for this whole that one cares. This is the revolutionary potential of the postmodernist working class, the other to the traditional industrial proletariat.

The revolutionary working class movement is continually being reborn form a virgin mother references the displacement of this definition of work, the restoration of the working character to all human activity, whether directly related to capital accumulation or not. My metaphor for the neo-proletariat is this: the Virgin Mother, the mother never tired by her births. She is the Earth in Her fecundity. The neo-proletariat do not waste their energy digging the graves for the bourgeoisie, they have better things to do such as singing and dancing. Let the working class be the grave diggers. I say this, echoing Negri, because the revolutionary movement is not reducible to any one historical formulation of it. It is, as Trotsky said, a permanent revolution. The working class revolutionary moment is the process of permanent death and rebirth, discontinuity and continuity. One must then forget -- and so say farewell to-- the working class in order to remember -- welcome once more -- the working class.

However, the notion of another working class requires further qualification. As
the facts cited describing the current conjuncture show, capitalism has not become other to itself. It is very much traditional class struggle akin in some vital ways to the 1930s. To cite further facts about Canada:

Despite the financial boom, the record of economic growth over the 1990s is worse than every decade this century except the 1930s. The decline in living standards as measured by per person income, has been even more prolonged than in the thirties. Official unemployment has been higher this decade (9.8%) than in any other decade this century except the 1930s (13%).

One should avoid a literary romanticism that creates other working classes where there are none. There is only one working class as the above facts indicate although that class may undergo structural modification in response to the latest stage of capital accumulation. One difference between the 1930s and the 1990s may be the ability of capitalist, due to the plethora of means of distraction, to hide the discontent quite visible in the 1930s. The long soup lines of the 1930s have not disappeared in the 1990s only made invisible in the form of food banks. The unemployed and other members of the traditional lumpen-proletariat have become marginalized and centralized. The food banks are key centralizing ghettos of (never for) the underclasses. Not foci of revolutionary struggle, they are places only of pacification permitting the capitalist system to rid itself of devalued goods and people. No longer do people make the trek to Ottawa, as the unemployed did in the 1930s, there is the panoply of capitalist dominated media, the spectator society of which Guy Debord and his Situationalist colleagues spoke, to keep people’s minds occupied. Pornography has been a tremendous growth industry, and one might add that the Nazis distributed pornography in the countries they occupied as part of their pacification and distraction programme. The other working class could be the latest form of the traditional working class, the product of the traditional working class under assault from the industrial downsizing forces of capitalist globalization together with those introduced by the media configured spectator society.

One can chart these effects in more traditional class theorists such as Cy Gonick. According to him, there is to current class structure a tri-polar structure. At one pole are workers with little control or no control over their work, the traditional
proletariat, such as secretaries -- their work is routine and basically manual, in other words, heteronomous; at the other end are those who have a great deal of control, these being the bourgeoisie, such as executives -- their work is creative and challenging, in other words, autonomous; and between the two stands the petty bourgeoisie, owners of small businesses or independent professionals, who employ themselves but no others. As well, there are those occupying contradictory class positions. They have features of both, one foot in the bourgeoisie and one foot in the proletariat. Of them Gonick writes:

A first group in this category contains semi-autonomous workers who are able and required to exercise some degree of control over how they do their work and at least some control over what they produce. Examples are teachers, librarians, nurses, scientists, professors, specialized secretaries, along with craft workers such as machinists, computer programmers. A second such location is occupied by middle- and lower-level managers, who supervise other people's work or are in command of some piece of the production apparatus but who do not enjoy overall control of production or investment. A third contradictory location includes small employers whose enterprise is small enough to require the owner's labour, as well as management.  

Gonick's criteria of class, derived from E.O. Wright (1980) and G. Carchedi (1987), more traditional than Gorz, it being more strictly tied to the means of production. It focuses on the objective criteria. By contrast, Gorz's definition is more subjective, focusing on the subjective temperament of the overeducated and underemployed. Nevertheless, one can see the common elements in both analyses. Gorz's neo-proletariat is less defined by the holding of a job -- regular work -- since the job itself, according to Gorz's description, is relatively unimportant. It is, ironically parodying capitalism's own destruction of pre-capitalist artisan norms, simply a way to make money. What one does is supremely unrelated to what one is -- an extreme alienation of doing from being. Gonick's criteria is useful for locating the actual presence of the neo-proletariat, for objectifying its presence. Nevertheless, given that objective cannot be reduced to the subjective or vice-versa, a tension exists between these parts of an imagined whole. This tension between subjective individual feeling and objective collective reality Goddard details in this passage:
Let us consider the idea that in certain spheres of activity the individual possesses no control whatsoever over his existence, whilst in others he retains total possession. The tension internal to each field of practices and the contradictory dynamic of the processes which work in one or the other direction are concealed. This is no less true of the factory than the family. Moreover, it involves closing one's eyes to, or at least averting them form the fact that at each moment (or in each field of practices) actual individuals are the site of this contradictory dynamic between the processes of possession and dispossession of the control of their existence. Of course one cannot stop there. The processes which are constitutive of this contradiction have a different impact depending on the particular configuration of social relationships in which they occur, whether the factory or the family. Instead of making an a priori division of social space into spheres of autonomous and heteronomous practices would it not be possible to try and grasp the dialectic by which, on the one hand, individuals are mobilized to organize their lives and give them overall meaning and, on the other, are simultaneously mobilized by structural processes of vast scope which evolve over long periods and involve social groups on a very large scale...Our task is to find alternative methods and techniques of empirical analysis which neither lead to a romantic and metaphysical phenomenology which sees everyone as reinventing their lives on a daily basis, nor to a despairing acceptance of the absolute subordination of everyday practices to the harsh exigencies of structural processes.  

Neither a romantic and metaphysical phenomenology nor a despairing acceptance is the dialectical approach. It is the investigation of the structure in terms of liberating the possibilities inherent in that structure. Capitalism, however, is modifying current social structures all the time as Marx and Engels noted in *The Communist Manifesto.*  

All fixed, frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into the air, all that is holy is profaned, and men at last are forced to face...the real conditions of their lives and their relations with their fellow men.  

The point of a communist movement is to analyze the conditions of commodity production, and to transform those conditions. The transformation consists in both facing and enlarging social reality. Social reality is conditional, it is the historical product of a mode of production. The continuity and discontinuity of the revolutionary subject references then this facing and enlarging in this sense: the revolutionary subject, emerging out of the contradictions of the current conjuncture, represents the limits of
that conjuncture. Thus the concentration and centralization of industrial capitalism created the conditions for the rise of trade unionism. The union is the concentration and centralization of labour power. However, the continuing modification of social reality, as indicated by Gorz, Negri and Gonick, has resulted in another working class or at least contradictory positions within the traditional analytic framework. This contradiction is the socio-economic matrix for the possible enlarging of social reality. I say possible to indicate again the necessity for struggle. Concentration and centralization of capital also concentrated and centralized labour. However, this did not automatically lead to trade unions, only the possibility for their formation. In the same way that workers formed trade unions through their own struggle against, at first, local bosses, and then whole industries, so workers today have to exploit the advantages of the current conjuncture for a renewed labour movement. However, if this struggle is to be a real movement, then it must be guided by the idea of the whole: the dissolving of labour power as an alienable commodity. Otherwise the struggle of labour becomes limited to simply improving conditions for the exchange of labour power. Workers become better paid wage-slaves, not human beings having a vocation centered in the core of their being. This is, I believe, the rational kernel of Gorz’s and Negri’s criticism of the traditional industrial working class and the central idea of another working class movement.

However, I must, by the same token disagree with both any characterizations of the traditional working class as either disappeared (one says goodbye to it) or as something other (the other working class). One is observing structural modifications of the industrial working class, and as the facts show, class is still a valuable, if not the most valuable, explicandum, for social research.

II

I now consider another potentially creative contribution to a twenty-first century socialism: the global homeworkers. They are the small producers working at home, and they tend to be, as I will shortly show, female. In turning to the literature, I note the research of Boris and Daniels (1989):

Will such labour encourage new forms of sweated industry which reinforce the existing sexual and racial divisions of labour and stymie worker self-organization, or can it serve as a basis for an alternative to mass production, a new
organization of work which integrates home and workplace in a more organic, autonomous synthesis.\textsuperscript{33}

Boris and Daniels link the liberating potential of homework with notions of being organic and autonomous. These signposts, so to speak, define the broader context of homework. Historically,

The surge of interest in home-based work since the beginning of the 1990s has not happened in a vacuum. Structural changes in the organization of international capitalism are detrimentally affecting women’s economic position. Characteristic of these changes is a progressive decentralization of production processes, including their geographic dispersal around the world, a pattern that has been described as the “global assembly line.” Companies roam the globe in search of the most profitable production arrangement, but they centralize control of such processes in what Saskia Sassen calls “global cities” such as New York, London, or Tokyo. This international restructuring leads to changes in class because, by resorting to “flexible” subcontracting arrangements, companies are gradually eliminating middle class (largely male) production workers in center economies who in the post-World War II era had achieved wages that supported a family, job guarantees, and benefits ensuring their social security. In place of this middle class, a disproportionately female work force is taking over jobs in export-processing plants in newly industrializing countries (NICs). In addition, subcontracting chains are drawing homeworkers and other workers in the informal sector into international production in rich as well as poor nations. These workers are mostly women and immigrants. They form one extreme in the sharpening polarization of the labour force into those who benefit from the ongoing restructuring and “global control capability” and those who are left with so-called flexible work arrangements; who are paid low wages; who receive no benefits’ and who find themselves cut off social security, labour standards, and other state guarantees. In Latin America and Asia, some governments have adopted politics that accelerate these processes. In response to structural adjustment programs, economic crises, and pressure to replay large foreign debts, they deregulate labour markets and open up their economies. In order to compete in the international markets, national companies resort increasingly to subcontracting, drawing in cheap female labour and putting out work to the home based.\textsuperscript{34}

The above description agrees with Gorz’s observation of the elimination of the male production worker class - the traditional working class -- with the added information about the increasingly female composition of the rising revolutionary class from its neo-proletarian base. This fits in with Gorz’s citation of Herbert Marcuse’s statement that ‘post-industrial socialism -- that is communism -- will be female or will not exist at
all.' This implies a cultural revolution which will eliminate the principle of performance, the ethic of decomposition, accumulation and the rat-race at the level of both individual behaviour and social relations, replacing them with the supremacy of the values of reciprocity, tenderness, spontaneity and love of life in all its forms.  

This is the actual tendency at work in global houseworkers as articulated by feminist scholarship:

Feminist scholarship has transformed the way that we think about work, (re)charting geographies of labour and in the process (re)portraying who is a worker. The wage no longer divides worker from nonworker. Feminist scholars now view as work activities once classified by Marxists as reproduction, as opposed to the production that extracts surplus labour from the waged worker. Work includes family and community labour devalued under capitalist industrialization: housework, child care and dependent care, sex/affective production, voluntary activities -- what socialist feminists labeled social reproduction, those services that maintain people daily and intergenerationally. In tandem with anti-imperialist, anticolonial, and subaltern studies, feminist scholars have shifted the focus from the Western capitalist center to other organizations of labour dismissed by the center as primitive forms associated with the household itself devalues the arena of unpaid labour performed by women and connected to the realm of necessity. In the crevices of the everyday, we have found work that is just as significant to social life as any other form of labour. In doing so, we have stretched the spaces of labour from the factory or shop floor to include the home, family, and neighborhood. The worker no longer appears as the blue-collar male proletarian, or even the white-collar female typist, prototypical gendered occupations associated with the capitalist core. By naming home-based activities work we expose the gendered and regional nature of the categories through which scholarship reconstructs the world [my emphasis on care].

There is a convergence between post-industrial socialist feminism and the radical reversal of work. Work now becomes potentially any activity and any activity work, waged or not. It also dissolves (or begins to dissolve) the difference between work and play. One plays at one's work in so far as one's work is the supreme expression of one joy in being alive, to speak in an anarchist way. One's work is one's vocation in the former religious sense, not simply a job. One does not have an occupation but a vocation. One's entire life is an ever expanding inquiry into the nature of reality, and through this exercise -- work -- one plays out various emergent structural possibilities. Thus there is a continual expanding of the framework of meaning -- both facing and
enlarging the existential paradigm -- of actual reality. This is the anticipatory hope, as Bloch might say, of this convergence. As Prugl and Boris go to say: “With family and domestic labour largely or solely theirs to perform, mothers around the world find it difficult to earn wages according to scripts written with the unencumbered man in mind as the ideal worker. Those who find themselves tied to the household seek remuneration there, in “women’s place” Only when linked with an articulation of socialism, however, can this opening be the space for the demonetization of work. The feminist revolution is the way forward for socialism in so far as feminism itself becomes socialized. Materially and infrastructurally this means the (re)production of objects as things useful -- whether for actual or ritual use -- rather than as commodities. Otherwise one is discussing bourgeois feminism, the ideology of female small producers in the global economy.

As well, as the facts have shown, one could posit a link between the diminished income of households and the ability of computer technology to centralize work in the home. However, as the figures show. this does not necessarily lead to higher incomes. The capitalist use of computer technology is to create micro-linkages for the betterment of the global economy. These micro-linkages focus on individual households using computer technology to have access to global markets. Capitalism thereby integrates households within the expanding global economy, an economy whose chief purpose is to transfer wealth from the wage-earning working class to the property owning high level executives of capitalist corporations. This is not to deny the potentially revolutionary significance of homeworkers, only to place that potential within the material capitalist infrastructure against which those revolutionary tendencies must work.

As noted earlier, feminists have played an important role in organizing homeworkers. As well, I recall Marcuse’s comments about communism and a feminine vision that must animate it. In the homeworkers one sees a potential convergence between embryonic socialist consciousness -- a more feminized value system -- and actual social structure -- the mainly female homeworkers who have stretched the definition of work. As Gorz writes:
This is the specific characteristic of all nascent social movements. Like the peasant movement, the protestant reformation and, subsequently, the working-class movement itself, the movement formed by all those who refuse to be nothing but workers has very strong libertarian overtones. It is a negation and rejection of law and order, power and authority, in the name of the inalienable right to control one’s own life.  

The feminist revolution is globalizing itself, its material base being the exploited hitherto unorganized mass of female homeworkers of the world. A socialist vision must build on these organizational efforts, taking advantage of this opening to help reverse the historical world defeat of the female by patriarchal society. Feminism and socialism while different are not antagonistic. The first has the objective of restoring human freedom to the female sex; the second has the objective of overthrowing liberty for the sake of universal freedom. However there is a convergence in so far as communism recalls the female organized value system of early human society. At the beginning and end of communism thus stands the Goddess.

However, one need not succumb to Goddess worship. The infrastructural material base of a renewed socialism must be a modification of the present global economy. Even if homeworkers are mainly female, this by itself will not guarantee that homeworkers will overthrow capitalism. Rather, as I have indicated briefly, capitalism can, and in large measure actually is, appropriating their energies and time for the purposes of globalization; the means for this being the creation of computer aided micro-linkages. Homeworkers, if they are to be other than the micro-appendages and conduits for capitalist appropriation of the surplus value created by the global worker, have to join with the working class. Their “independence” is more of a personal illusion than a structural reality. Capitalism uses various petty-bourgeois illusions - be your own boss, own your own business -- to maintain its structural hegemony of the means of production.

In this brief consideration of some criticisms of the traditional working class I have indicated some common elements. The most common element is some challenge to the norms -- civic culture -- of industrial capitalism -- the urban settlement. It would be simple minded to say that all those who oppose industrial capitalism are necessarily
socialists. However, I think it would be equally wrong to dismiss the potential for socialism that exists in each of the opposition tendencies. Here, it is necessary to add that traditional Marxism, itself predicated on industrial capitalist norms, also is the subject of and for criticism. In Lukacs' terms, one has forgotten the deeper resonances of a truly dialectical approach to the facing and enlargement of social reality. Such an approach would include the personal and inward aspects, although it would exclude religion in so far as this last mystifies the personal and inward; as well such an approach would include the impersonal and outward, although it would exclude empiricism, the religion of the actual. The challenge for Marxism is two-fold: the renewing, as to say, the remembering of the deeper resonances of the dialectical method of inquiry, and the communicating of the results of this to others (non-Marxists) opposing capitalist social reality (without realizing the historical nature of their opposition). In the conjuncture following the fall of the autocratic communism of the former Soviet Union, one should add this: communication is a two-way street. One communicates not only through speaking but also through listening. Here is the place of Care, a point that I will examine in greater detail in my next chapter.

The deeper resonances of the dialectical method concern the rebuilding of community and not simply the reifying of institutions, even traditional working class ones such as labour unions. Community does not necessarily require centralization and concentration, the dominant model of social action under industrialism. Rather, as Gorz and Negri's comments indicated, albeit in a very provisory manner, it is possible to build a new labour movement if and only if one can reintegrate labour within a more embracing and broader set of concerns, concerns that extend beyond the wage level and working conditions. If one works at home, and so exists within a context of decentralized work practices, then a different dynamic is present. The current state of Marxist theorizing, as discussed in the introduction, invites such theoretical formulation. However, it is not necessary to sacrifice one predominately female perspective -- from micro to macro -- to the other predominately male -- from macro to micro. Rather, in the spirit of dialectical inquiry, one should understand them as complementary aspects of a unified process, as partners, one could say, in a dialogue. Both are necessary for the
evolution of the species.
CHAPTER TWO: Heidegger’s Care

To continue this dialogue, I will now explore Martin Heidegger’s notion of care. Before doing so I shall state my methodological and philosophic position. In the language of Hegel, history is concretized philosophy while philosophy is the abstracted essence of history. This undercuts the liberal assumption of value-free inquiry. It presumes, to state the matter more strongly, that any practice of history from the lowest phenomenal record keeping to the more elaborate conceptual schemes of explication, imply some ideals, some project of and for Being, a point that Adorno fails to appreciate. Otherwise, divorced from the totality, it falls into the narrow-minded preoccupations of a partial system. The uncoupling of history from philosophy produces the monstrosities of value-free theory (liberalism) on one hand, and mindless practice (empiricism) on the other. Liberalism is mindlessly empirical and empiricism simply liberalism without pretension. A dialectical approach, however, would incorporate the strengths of both -- the attention to the minuitia of the everyday (empiricism) coupled with an openness to the heterogeneous character of that everydayness (liberalism) as Adorno suggests.

Within the above context Heidegger’s contribution functions as a possible element for the renewing of socialist theory. It could serve as the theoretical linchpin for the consciousness of a postindustrial revolutionary subject. I did not say working class because of its traditional connotations. As my comments in the first chapter indicated, the relations between work and non-work have themselves become problematized under post industrial conditions. There is thus a need to consider the basis of existence as other than defined by the traditional exclusivity of work and non-work. One could ask for the meaning of work, detaching it, for the moment, from its capitalist definition, namely, that which is exchanged for wages. Even more radically, as Gorz questioned, work itself has to be dissolved back into a more primal sense of being alive -- indeed, of Being.

Heidegger points us in the direction of this question, and here I discuss his basic concepts as a prelude for discussing care:

THE NECESSITY, STRUCTURE, AND PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION OF
BEING:

1. The Necessity for Explicitly Restating the Question of Being

This question has today been forgotten. Even though in our time we deem it progressive to give our approval to 'metaphysics' again, it is held that we have been exempted from the exertions of a newly rekindled gigantomachia peri OES~~S. Yet the question we are touching upon is not just any question. It is one which provided a stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle, only to subside from then on as a theme for actual investigation. What these two men achieved was to persist through many alterations and 'retouchings' down to the 'logic' of Hegel. And what they wrested with the utmost intellectual effort from the phenomena, fragmentary and incipient though it was, has long been since become trivialized."^42

Heidegger wants to remind us of what has been forgotten, namely, the question of Being. Here, to better discern the import of this reminder, I break down the phrase "question of Being" into its constituent parts, namely, question and Being. They are parts that form a whole, and this whole has come to be forgotten -- the forgetfulness that Heidegger signifies by the part: "only to subside from then on as a theme for actual investigation..."

The reduction of whole -- the question of Being -- into a part -- as a theme for investigation -- Heidegger intertwines with that of memory and forgetfulness. The question of Being becomes reduced to any question rather than being itself the question of questions: it is a matter to remember. Memory here indicates that which is to be recalled. To be recalled is to say: to be called back from forgetfulness. And here I remind the reader that the Greek word lanthanein to escape one's notice, to cause to forget is the root of another word, lethe, the river of forgetfulness over which the dead cross. The word aletheia, the negation of forgetfulness, means truth; it is a position that finds its parallel in T. Adorno's meditations."^43 I say this to indicate the classical resonances in Heidegger's position. He is suggesting that we have died, have become dead to the question of Being by reducing it to a theme, as something simply to be talked about rather than as the very possibility of the conversation itself."^44

In the course of this forgetfulness, a concept for Being has come to replace the question of Being, this being ontology:
Of course ‘Being’ has been presupposed in all ontology up till now, but not as a concept (Begriff) at one’s disposal -- not as the sort of thing we are seeking.45 Heidegger is not seeking a concept for Being at one’s disposal. This does not preclude having a concept of Being. Rather, as I interpret it, Heidegger is asking us to reflect upon the possibility of the concept. Hegel said, to show the shift represented by Heidegger, that the “important thing for the student of science is to make himself undergo the strenuous toil of conceptual reflection, of thinking in the form of the notion.”46 Being is not a concept nor is a thing; nevertheless it is present in things and concepts as the very possibility of their intelligibility. As Heidegger goes on further to criticize ontology:

Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental aim.

Blindness is the visual equivalent of forgetfulness. Ontology is blind to its ownmost (to borrow Heidegger’s word in the above) aim if it turns aside from the question of Being. This is a highly ironic criticism by Heidegger given that the word ontology itself derives from the Greek onto- being and logos reason. Ontology claims to speak to Being, Heidegger, however, disagreeing. What Heidegger wants to do is turn that system back upon itself by calling out its Being, and he does this linguistically in Being and Time. An ontology, with its richness of categories, covers over its Being; its ownmost aim becomes lost -- forgotten -- in its very success. This being-successful is the space of its becoming as defined by a grammatical-horizon line of being. Heidegger’s aim, as evinced by his own neologisms, is to challenge and through that challenging unpack the ontology called modernity at the level of the concept. According to my reading of him, Heidegger does not eschew the concept; rather he does not confuse Being with conceptual progress. His aim, albeit at a highly abstract level, is to expose the concept as a feature of a language, the closed partial system as part of a totality.47 While Heidegger does not use Marxist terminology, I think his aim is congruent with the classical Marxist critique of bourgeois society (language) as the collective of atomized individuals (speakers). Ontic references the strictly individual or isolated perception
whereas ontological the collective or communal one.

That which is one’s own is not a singular atomized bit of property existing beyond time and space. Rather oneself and what belongs to oneself -- what one owns -- is a moment of collective life. Heidegger’s aim is not, as I read him, to reenforce petty-bourgeois atomistic tendencies, the further disintegration of communal life. Rather it is to encourage individual and, ultimately, collective reflection upon the nature of one’s existence. Part of the problem with Heidegger’s procedure is that it is so linguistically bound (if not opaque). It is difficult to make the links between the more collective concerns -- economic, political, social -- that could re-associate individual integrity -- self-reflective, responsible, thinking person -- with communal tasks. The radical individuality, espoused by both Heidegger and Nietzsche *(vide der Übermensch)*, has a double edge to it. It could be an opportunity for individuals, through exploring their language and their relationship to it, to develop an intensive, richer, more metaphorical understanding of themselves as speakers and, more generally, as members of their society. However, that understanding remains in the realm of the subjective, and so risks falling into petty-bourgeois linguistic romanticism if that enriched experience with language is not coupled with the fulfillment of social tasks. To explore this, I pass to Heidegger’s *Dasein*. To quote:

> If to Interpret the meaning of Being becomes our task, Dasein is not only the primary entity to be interrogated; it is also that entity which already comports itself, in its Being, towards what we are asking about when we ask this question. But in that case the question of Being is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself--the pre-ontological understanding of Being.*

The pre-ontological is that which precedes the ontological in the literal sense. However, one needs to be careful here since the “before” is not simply reducible to a vulgar preceding in time chronologically enclosed. Rather the "before" is that which I must clarify as what stands before me. Here again, I disagree with modernity and its linearity. To go forward is to go back through interrogating the past as the still opaque presence called the present. The pre-ontological is *present* as the average understanding of Being:
We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague understanding of Being is still a Fact.\footnote{49}

The vague understanding of Being is the dispersed and disassociated moments of, as Heidegger will call this, everydayness.\footnote{50}

We must have rather chosen such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity can show itself in itself and from itself. And this means that it is to be shown as it \textit{proximally and for the most part} -- in its average everydayness. In this everydayness there are certain structures which we shall exhibit -- not just any accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factical Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being. Thus by having regard for the basic state of Dasein's everydayness, we shall bring out the Being of this entity in a preparatory fashion.\footnote{51}

The everyday is that engrossing bustle dissimulating authentic activity. As argued earlier, authentic action consists in the dwelling, resting and lingering with the nature of one's Being: this movement from carelessness to care. In its dispersiveness the everyday covers over Being -- the grammatical horizon line disclosing it as a definite stage of human development, of social reality. There is no step beyond Being except the recalling memorableness of ex-istence -- the permanent revolution of building. This building the ancient Greeks expressed in the notion of Logos, and this from \textit{legein} pick out, select. \textbf{Logike techne} means the art of thinking; and to think in that sense is the ever-gathering motion of building being.\footnote{52}

The import of the grand bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth centuries was that the masses for the first time entered upon the public stage as actors in their own right. In tandem with the technological innovations of the industrial revolution, the political revolution created the basis for the economic. The political class of exploiters -- the traditional aristocracy -- had been either beheaded (France) or in other ways displaced (USA). Exploitation through private ownership of land -- the feudal estate and its serfs -- gave way to exploitation through private ownership of tools -- the industrial factory and it wage slaves. Manufacturing replaced agriculture as the dominant organizer of capital accumulation. Large-scale manufacturing with its attendant concentration and centralization of capital is industrialism.
The facelessness of modernity is the general expression for the domination of capital over the source of capital creation or labour. Work became more systemically an economic category. Dasein's everydayness must then be set within the context of work as an economic category. This last moreover is activity alienated from itself -- its Being. For the essence of activity, I argue, is the dwelling with the whatness of one's existence, the drawing out through slow and patient observation of the possibilities of being-there. Everydayness has a vague understanding of Being, and this is a Fact. Heidegger's thrust is to remind the everyday of the facticity of the Fact, to provoke it into recollecting the grammatical horizon-line defining the possibility for Being called the present. The failure to do so is das Man, the they-self of Heidegger's text: those who are without care. Everydayness then is neither careless nor careful, necessarily. It is the field of battle.

The battle is the restoring of the face of the everyday, the putting into sharp relief the present as an achieved possibility of Being. Commodity production organizes the everyday life of bourgeois society with its attendant categories -- its values of exchange and consumption. Traditionally, the resistance to capitalism has been the rise of organized labour: this has resulted in ameliorating the wage package, not in fundamentally challenging the logic of capitalism. Heidegger's logic of care breaks with organized labour; it speaks to the individual and to the individual's struggle with that shadow of individuality called das Man. Nevertheless there is labour involved, although not on the order of industrialism.

II

The pre-ontological is present as the vague understanding of Being. This is equivalent to doxa opinion, as cognition, and muthos myth, as emotion. Opinion is heterogeneous: it rises and falls. It has no ground upon which to stand except that upon which "everyone agrees." This everyone is das Man, the they-self. Opinion expresses the they-self, its notion of reality. But in so far as the self remains a "they" rather than "oneself," the notion is any and everyone's -- in a word, no one's. Thus opinion is owned by none and owns up to nothing. It is the anonymous being there and everywhere -- the flotsam moved by wind and tide.
Nevertheless, it is where one begins. Beginning is the place into which Dasein finds itself cast -- Heidegger's thrownness. One is cast in with others, fellow members of the Cast, with whom one performs that reality called society. Understood as a moment of care, society is the work-in-progress of those recovering their ownmost possibility of Being from out of their thrownness. Carelessly, society is the performing of animal function: the bee-hive. The beginning then of society qua society is the movement of care as distinct from the actual moment of bodily association; philosophy begins in wonder. This difference between beginning and starting point is covered over in practice and is systemically denied by temporal linearity -- the mass production line characterizing the bourgeois world and enlightenment rationality. Thrownness directs us to beginning as what cannot be surpassed even though it can be passed over.

Beginning references what occurred first. In the numeric-serial way of understanding things, after the first comes the second, the third and so forth until infinitely. With the passing from each subsequent stage the previous stage becomes past. So the beginning recedes into the past as the first stage one passes over. However, there is a sense to the beginning that is other than first as what is before the second. This unsurpassable sense of firstness is the Archaic, from the Greek *archein* be the first, lead on. It is this sense of firstness that one is continually thrown back onto when one speaks of wonder.

Moreover, the discourse which captures the sense of wondering at the beginnings is *myth*, from the Greek *muthos* word, speech. Myth is the archaic word, that speaking which leads us back to the beginning as unsurpassable firstness. Myth typically recounts the origins of things. It purports to tell us what is as does opinion. To understand this, however, requires grounding the purported is. By grounding I mean the raising up of what is first. In myth the origin lies flat; for the is has been confounded -- by the hearer-listener -- with the actual. Myth evokes that to which one returns in drawing out again what lies flattened against the actual. For that reason, Heidegger retells the fable of Care. Bourgeois rationality or modernity despises myth -- even as this antipathy results not in the elimination of myth, but only bad myth making.

Heidegger opposes modernity, *that* philosophy. The Archaic is what is first; it
leads and commands; the archon is the leader. For Heidegger, the question of Being is profoundly archaic and by the same token it is that which leads all inquiry. Modernity, however, takes the Archaic to be an actual temporal entity that one must surpass according to a logic of development -- "the rationalized form of reality" if one is to believe Adorno.\textsuperscript{55} Modernity thus flattens the archaic, forcing it to conform to the veridical demands of the actual. The story is the myth, that which stores up the pre-ontological understanding of Being.\textsuperscript{56} Myth is to be returned to in re-raisining the question that actuality has converted into a statement. The actual relies upon some myth -- suspension of disbelief in literary terms -- for its rationality. Reason to be rational requires myth -- and is not thus its "natural" antimony. To demonstrate this point more clearly consider the difference between reason and ratiocination, truth and correctness.

Correctness is the product of a system of measurement. One says, for example, that a thing is one foot in length. This can be checked against the system of measurement and its duly constituted divisions. All things which measure up to that standard thus can be called one foot in length. This, moreover, satisfies a quality of truth, namely, that it can be checked, proven, established. However, that which is not a property of a system of measure is its precision. For example, using a yardstick to measure a microscopic organism or, conversely, an electron microscope for that of determining the height of the Eiffel Tower will lack precision. Precision concerns the fit between the system of measure and the measured and, ultimately, the purposes for which the measurement is taken. Purposes mean here that which the measurer brings to the act of measurement. Preciseness, then, concerns that which belongs to the fit between thing measured and system of measurement while accuracy concerning the system of measurement itself, the integrity of its divisions.

To generalize my results, consider the Latin phrase \textit{homo sapiens}, this title describing our species. The idea here is that humans are \textit{what} they are by virtue of their ability to reason and so to know; this echoes in Descartes' \textit{cogito ergo sum}. However the Latins were preceded by the Greeks and the notion of \textit{logos}, from \textit{legein} to pick out, select, the root of the word intellect; its secondary meaning is to speak. That which one is, however, is to be picked out through the reasoning process. This
presumes then that humans are not themselves reason, the Logos. Rather as Heraclitus argued, it is to the Logos that one attends. This picking ourselves out from what one is not is logike techne, the reasoning art. Through reasoning, then, one takes the measure of things -- their whatness. However, a system of measurement possesses the property of accuracy not that of precision. It is irrational to ascribe the latter to it.

In reasoning about reason I stress the difference between the Logos and the logic of being ourselves. One reasons, in one sense, when one calculates and computes, when one uses, in short, a system of measurement. Thereby does one act in accordance with a convention; one can then be correct or incorrect when judging things. However, while a system of measurement is required for correctness, it is irrational to assume that this is all that is required for truth. Here, one notes the root of the word truth, as well as troth, truce and trust: the Old Norse treowth, belief. When one uses a system of measurement, as a moment of our attempting to grasp the truth of things, one is placing one's trust in that system. Thus a system of measurement represents a truce -- some agreement made between former combatants. Using a system of measurement means that the users of that system are no longer battling each other over the meaning of correctness. One has settled that issue.57

However, this does not mean the war is entirely over, rather that the struggle has entered a different phase. For now, having agreed to a system of measurement, whereby one set of things --- the measured -- can be changed into another -- symbols denoting what are -- one is now freer to speculate upon the origins of that agreement. Here modernity throws its hands up in disbelief. Why do that? My answer is that no system of measurement can tell us precisely what truth is; it can only gauge the accuracy of our statements in relation to a definite set of divisions. This is why truth and troth spring from the same root. Troth and betrothmen denote a affiancement and marriage, this too being an agreement. However, it is an agreement of a different nature, referencing the greater commitment and engagement of the partners to each other. Thus a truce means that its signatories will not raise arms against each other; those betrothed will -- in that joyful agony of building community. This means the painful exploration of each other's belief system.
Truth, at its root, is a belief as denoted by “this is true.” This last means more precisely that I believe that something is true -- some state of affairs exist. This belief in something being there is preserved, at the collective level, as myth. In the Biblical tradition the beginning of the world is mythically preserved as the word of God. This is the archaic truth of that world out of which the present has grown. A culture’s mythology, broadly speaking, sets the parameters of that culture’s truth. This is not to reduce truth to myth, only to indicate the socio-linguistic resources, preserved by and as myth, that support one’s notion of truth. Myth is the archaic truth, a truth that one gauges through the telling of that word. In its archaicness, myth preserves the truth against a system of measurement that would otherwise forget its own origins, tossing aside the beginnings as merely one surpassed stage rather than as what one returns to again and again. However, one lives in the present; one uses a system of measurement. One uses the very thing whose origins one must re-find, for in using it one loses sight of the used system of measurement as a system of measurement rather than measurement in general. This tension then between the archaicness of myth, the truth as unsurpassable firstness, and the accuracy of a measurement system, the truth as standard-stated units, is the analytic resource of dialectics. In Adorno’s terms, it is the concept that resists the conceptlessness of modern philosophy.58

In one’s continual struggle to uncover the truth, one continually resists the system of measurement’s claim that it is the truth. This is not, as modernity fears, to dispense with a system of measurement -- for our freedom of expression is constrained by the language we use to express ourselves in -- but to recover the place of that system, how it originally sprung itself out of a belief in the whatness of something. This is truth’s mythic quality, the archaicness of reason. To be archaic can be rational. This can help distinguish between accuracy and precision.

To further clarify these issues I employ these terms: reason, the irrational and the a-rational. Myth, strictly speaking, is a-rational not irrational. It is what one brings to the act of reasoning in order to clarify it. Thus reason cannot dispense with myth any more than the act of measurement, conceived of as a whole, can with preciseness. Certainly, one can ignore the issue of precision, this leaving only the technical
requirements of the system of measurement in question. Such is bureaucratic reasoning, the degeneration of truth into a system of correspondence between its markings and things measured. This is the truth of truce, an abiding with convention rather than with what convention itself covers over in its conventionality. Rationally, the choice is not whether one can dispense with myth but whether one will understand one's myth or not. This is why Plato, for example, included and criticized myth. Without myth, the belief in the whatness of something, reason becomes nihilistic. To truly reason is to show faith in myth as the resource recalling the memorableness of something being-there.

This is my opinion, and I demonstrate my faith in it through setting this opinion to work: my essay in re-conceiving of a system of measurement -- the European Enlightenment's -- rationality. The European Enlightenment is a myth in it own right, a myth that eliminates myth: Hegel's notion of converting philosophy into science expressed in The Phenomenology of the Mind. However, as I understand the matter, there cannot be a world without myth; there can only be good or bad myths. In refusing to examine the mythical dimension of one's own reasoning, one remains in the dark about it; this is an example of, to borrow from Sarte, bad faith. The worst form of bad faith is irrationality -- the reducing of enlightenment in general to one limited form of it. Heidegger demonstrated good faith through his investigation into the structures of the European Enlightenment -- the notion of Being that it leaves in the dark. Those of good faith are called irrational by those of bad. It is not then the belief system itself -- the actual divisions forming a system of measurement -- that determines the philosophic content of one's thinking. Rather, as I argued earlier, it is one's willingness to continue to inquire into the relationship between thinking and being through, at the most abstract totalizing level, language. Bureaucratization of language is, by contrast, the will to not continue to do so.59

If the question about Being is to be explicitly formulated and carried through in such a manner as to be completely transparent to itself, then any treatment of it in line with the elucidations we have given requires us to explain how Being is to be looked at, how its meaning is to be understood and conceptually grasped; it requires us to prepare the way for choosing the right entity for my example, and to work out the genuine way of access to it--all these ways of behaving are
constitutive for my inquiry, and therefore are modes of Being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity--the inquirer--transparent in his own Being.60

The dialectics of Being and entity is Dasein's making transparent -- clarifying -- its ownmost possibility for Being. This dialectic is thus not suppressed; rather, the expression of this in its entirety is the theme of Being and Time as a whole. This is primal: how the meaning of Being becomes articulated through Dasein's labour of regaining access to the constitutive structures of its world. In Marxist language, this is the expropriating of the expropriators.

What is this expropriation? Earlier, I indicated how Heidegger pointed to the pre-ontological understanding of Being as present in myth. The present in so far as it possesses being is there ontically. By ontic I understand, drawing from Heidegger, the understanding of Being to be gathered from the dispersed present. The dispersion consists in the opaqueness of the horizon line to Dasein. To pick out this dispersion is to clarify the fundamental grounds upon which the present is present. This opaqueness, existentially, concerns Dasein's (the subject's) struggle with its death as unstrippable limit, the grammatical horizon line of being-in-the-world -- a practice called more specifically care. Care names thus in Heidegger's text the dialectic of subject - Dasein - and object - the ownmost possibility of Being onto which Dasein is thrown in its yet-to-be-gathered ontological character. In Hegel's terms, as reformulated by Adorno, it is reason thrown against the spiritualizing of its own essence.61

III

To explicate Heidegger's notion of Care, I consider the meaning of Care as found in key Latin words. The word colere, the root of cultus, culture, and colony means to worship, care for, cherish; protect. A cultivator is a planter, farmer; inhabitant; supporter, upholder; worshiper. One focuses on care since the other denotations can be subsumed within this. To worship, one could say, is to care for the gods; to be a planter to care for plants; and to be a colonist to care for the land. This leaves us with the question of what care itself is, independent of its many instances. Although more formal

S.II.i considerations still apply.62
To further elucidate, I will now read two texts, one classical and the other modern, the work of Seneca as found in Heidegger's, *Being and Time*, and the work of Karl Marx.

_Cura cum fluvium transiret, vidit cretosa lutum sustulique cogitabunda atque coepit fingere._

Once when 'Care' was crossing a river, she saw some clay; she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to shape it.

_S.II.i_

dum deliberat quid iam fecisset, Jovis intervenit. rogat eum Cura ut det illi spiritum, et facile impetrat. cui cum vellet Cura nomen ex sese ipsa imponere, Jovis prohibuit suumque nomen ei dandum esse dictat.

While she was meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came by. 'Care', asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade this, and demanded that it be given his name instead.

_S.II.ii_

dimmed Cara et Ovis discrepant, Tellus surfeit simal Simcoe noms esse volt cut corpus praebuerit suum. sumpserunt Saturnum iudicem, is sic aecus iudicat:

While 'Care' and Jupiter were disputing, Earth arose and desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, since she had furnished it with part of her body. They asked Saturn to be their arbiter, and he made the following decision, which seemed a just one:

_S.II.iii_

'tu Ovis quia spiritum dedisti, in morte spiritum, tuque Tellus, quia dedisti corpus, corpus recipito, Cara eum quia prima finxit, teneat quamdui vixerit. sed quae nunc de nomine eius vobis controversia est, homo vocetur, quia videtur esse factus ex humo.'

'Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death;
and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since ‘Care’ first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as to its name, let it be called 'homo', for it is made out of humus (earth).\footnote{63}

From Marx,

M.II.i

A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realizes a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will.[emphasis added.]\footnote{64}

The above is quite a bit of text to digest. But this can be done in measured steps. I should now like to re-trace the story of Cara, show the relevancy of the passage from Marx, in terms of cultus. First a comparison of curare and colare is useful. The first is to take care of, attend to; bother about, its noun cara denotes trouble, pains; anxiety, concern, sorrow. In other words, curare tells us what is involved in being-cultivated. This involvement turns round (volvit in Latin) that which is cultivated. To cultivate the ground is to turn over and round its soil, to stir it. Stimulated by contact with the elements, the cultural energies contained within are once more set out.

This is painful, troublesome, however, because it requires going off the beaten track. Beaten implies that others have gone that way before, the weight of their numbers causing the grass, say, to bend to the earth. The path may, in the more extreme case, may be paved and may become, if sufficient traffic warrants it, a highway. The point of building such passageways is to provide a quick and easy manner for the transporting of goods and people from one point to another. With this, I have no quarrel. However, in covering over the way one has taken away the adventure of going on that way. Traveling has become the mere business of conveyance and the exploring-discovering aspect is no longer present; the objective exchange value has replaced the subjective use-value.\footnote{65} To recover this -- the de-reification of the character-object -- means to go back to the point when such a covering did not exist. This is not
quite the state of nature since that state was destroyed by the path becoming, in the most extreme case, beaten down. Rather it is a matter of making transparent the covering through overturning the judgements that analytically cover over and define a certain state of existence. This is the adventure of Being.

By doing so, I endeavor to have a freer relationship to the path -- articulated as modes of doing, thinking and feeling -- of the present capitalist culture. It is easier to travel on the road, one does not ask questions. People who ask questions are often treated as trouble-makers by those having a vested interest in the status quo -- the investors in a given economy. Why then not take the easy, much more traveled path rather than the difficult, much less traveled one?

One could be rhetorical about it and talk about the need to overthrow capitalism. This is not to deny the deep anguish that many socialists and others who may not identify themselves with the socialist cause feel about the realities of the present capitalist world. However, I want to strike here a positive note, not that I am a blithely indifferent idealist (although I must confess to having idealist tendencies as part of my petty-bourgeois background) but out of a desire to understand myself and my world better -- no matter how familiar it may appear to be. "The familiar," Hegel said, "is not necessarily the known." It is the explorer impulse in me that urges me onward or, analytically speaking, backward in examining the ways and means of our culture beginning with the meaning of culture. This excitement belongs to classical Marxism even though there might not be much rejoicing among Marxists today given the series of defeats suffered in the 1990s -- the collapse of the former Soviet Union and various communist parties around the world being the principal one. Nevertheless that excitement is there, at least theoretically, an excitement belonging to bringing forth a new world order out of the contradictions of the old. This the showing of faith in the communist movement, the act of faith being its rebuilding. It is the adventure of creative interplay.66

To help me in this examination, I introduce the words apprehension and comprehension, both derived from the Latinprehendere to take hold of, catch; to seize, detain. There is in other words some attachment of one thing to another. This
attachment I posit is basic to the action of caring. The attachment may be strictly biological as a female animal cares for its young. Of course, not all life forms care for their young; fish deposit eggs and sperm and leave it at that. The degree of attachment varies with individual life forms in terms of attention given by the parent animal to their young. Objects, moreover, focus the investment process, for example, the young are the objects cared for by their parents. Generally, the more complex the life form, the more time and energy the parent invests in the young. There is another implication here, however, namely that the one who cares -- invests time and energy in some object -- attends to the welfare of that object through improving its condition. The Nazis, for example, invested a great deal of time and energy in building concentration camps for Jews and others whom they, out of their twisted resentment, hated and wanted to (and did) murder in great numbers. This can hardly be considered a case of caring for Jews.

One could argue that the Nazis were motivated by the purpose of maintaining European civilization and improving the health of the European Volker by a purgation of impurities. To respond to that question would require stating what one intends by health. If health includes culture and culture reflection, and if the Jews were important contributors to European culture, then their presence improved this last. By eliminating the Jews, the Nazis were the ones who worsened the very thing whose state they purportedly wanted to preserve if not improve. The Jewish cultural record, the disproportionate number of Jewish thinkers, artists, scientists -- from Marx (his grandfather was a rabbi) to Einstein to Brecht -- proves this point.

A provisory definition of care is some investment of time and energy for purposes of maintaining if not improving the condition of the object in question. Any investment whose purpose is to degrade the object does not care for it. It is to ultimately free the object to come forward in its genuine objectness and thereby have oneself thrown; anything else is domination.67

One invests time and energy in caring for an object -- something or someone -- because one is initially seized by it. This implies a lack of choice, and that is true. The sexual urge, whether rutting for males or being in heat for females, is involuntary. In the
case of the animal evolving into the human, this seizure can be resisted, not eliminated, its urgency put into relation to other concerns. When a mammal is born, the first act is to seize the teat; primates are born with the ability to seize and grab hold as well as suck. Female mammals are seized by their young and their response to that being-seized indicates the degree of care they have for them. Another example, to move from the case of parent and child to that of male and female is sexual desire -- although this is present in the former case as Freud argued although not to the degree that it is in the case I am about to examine. Rape is the primitive response to being seized by sexual desire. Typically, it is uncaring or an action displaying the minimum of care. To care for someone, as man would for a woman, implies putting sexual desire in a longer term context, that is, the investing of time and energy in feeding and sheltering one's mate and the progeny produced by that union.

I should like to consider seizure more abstractly, keeping in mind the danger of being too abstract. Firstly, care implies attachment although not all attachments are necessarily caring; a prisoner is certainly attached to his ball and chain but hardly cares for that. Rather caring begins in how the actor responds to what seizes him or her; for example, a female animal. assuming the biological propensity to be present as it is in mammals, can mother her children or not. Uncaring parents abandon their children. Care is the response made to what demands our attention in conjunction with the idea that the demanding object belongs to us or is, in a word, ours. A mother penguin, for example, will not mother every young penguin, only those that she recognizes as hers. Humans are more flexible in that regard as the practice of adoption indicates, adoption, however, being the practice of making what was originally not ours, ours, the stranger's child, our own child.68

More abstractly, this raises the question of how the object, if it is his own, ever became not his own or, in another words, estranged from him. Young animals are, in some measure, strangers to their parents in that their particular character or individuality remains to be seen. The young, however, are not aliens since their parents and their more general society recognizes them as their young. In Marxist literature, the term entfremdung can mean either estrangement or alienation, from fremd stranger or
alien. Obviously, the more extreme the estrangement, the more the stranger becomes the alien, as is evident from relations between some parents and their offspring. At the extreme point, alienation signifies the loss or forgetfulness of community. A complete stranger or alien is one with whom one has nothing in common. In so far as everything on the planet Earth forms a bio-cultural community, there are no aliens. Aliens come from another planet. Of course, if one was to shift one's referents to include the entire cosmos then nothing would be alien.

In any case the point is this: in so far as there exists some community, no matter how attenuated -- and under capitalism with its extreme atomizing individualism this can be indeed tenuous -- one is a stranger to another (never an absolute alien) although depending upon the degree of estrangement communications problems can exist. But this is a matter of degree (of community) not of (different) kind (of being). Care, therefore, I further adduce, concerns the recovery of community, the reclaiming what belongs to but has been estranged from oneself. In the case of simple animals, say, fish, this reclaiming is trivial. Add water to eggs and sperm and the rest follows. The more complex the animal, however, the more care is required. With primates there is a definite period of socialization necessary to train the young to act like and be what they are. Lions, for example, have to learn how to hunt. In the human case, this training period is the longest. So when humans come into the world, they are little more than ignorant animals. One cannot simply add water. Rather one needs to acquire a repertoire of complex behaviour patterns in order to “liberate” one's human potential from the state of untutored nature. Those who are not trained in this manner are naive. While one may consider naivety charming because of some romantic attachment to nature, the naive themselves, because of their ignorance, are not able to participate in society as fully as they potentially could if educated. I am, to be clear, not suggesting the extreme opposite, namely, that one must be cynical and hard-bitten. Rather it is a question of educating one's initial impulses -- the primary excitement and joy of being -- in relation to social realities. Freud called this the transformation of the pleasure principle into the reality principle, the thinking through of Existenz in Adorno's terms.69

Education is the context for apprehension and comprehension or, more
generally, learning. Learning can take place formally (in educational institutions) or informally (at home or on the street). Life itself is an education or at least can be for those willing to learn. Whatever the mode of learning, then, I posit that intrinsic to the learning process is seizure and, more precisely, the converting of that seizure into care. The learner takes the time and trouble to do this out of a sense of recognition. He sees in that other thing or person something of himself. So to understand himself better, he turns to face that other. That other, however, is a stranger, and with strangeness comes the sense of danger and the response called fear. When in the presence of something or someone strange a natural or naive response -- but not necessarily useless because of that -- the actor could fear for his life. Fear, in extremis, is that of losing one's life. The stranger threatens one's life. To engage then the stranger in something approaching conversation requires that the learning actor face his own fears. This facing of one's fears is essential then to learning, as the word apprehension signifies. To be apprehensive is to be fearful. However, fear is not necessarily paralyzing although it could be. For fear not to be requires the learner to stand his ground but at the same time be prepared to cultivate his ground in the face of the stranger. One could invite the stranger to converse with oneself in order to more thoroughly cultivate the ground that they both stand on -- the latent ground of their community.

Animals do this instinctively through teaching their young what they need to know. The teaching proceeding gesturally through action. The lioness teaches her cubs how to hunt by actually hunting. Humans are more sophisticated in that through the use of language they are able to talk with each other about practices necessary for species survival. This talking about -- speculating, explaining and reflecting upon -- is, formally speaking, theory.

To apprehend, to retrace my steps, is to begin to take in hand the trouble, and here I note that anxietas is the Latin for mental trouble. Learning is mental trouble, an activity associated with apprehension. How strong this association is, however, will depend upon what exactly is to be learned. Learning of a rote kind, for example, the memorizing of rules, does not involve much apprehension in the sense that I am using the word. The fear is external. If one does not learn how to drive properly, and this
requiring learning the rules of the road, then one could rightly fear driving a car. Only those without a brain are without fear. The fear that I am associating with or calling anxiety is a much less definite fear, the fear that one's life has no meaning. This fear, however, while it may be nameless to itself, can be named in relation to a definite historical epoch, that of middle and late capitalism.

Late capitalism is the stage of extreme individualism, when atomization and alienation have become endemic to the thought processes themselves. Under late capitalism, images have become the object of production and consumption. No longer content to sell us things, capitalism now sells us self-images primarily through the media. This extensive sign network relies upon creating discontent -- existential demand -- in order to create a market for certain images -- buy this (car, perfume, computer) and be that (sexy, successful, young). Through images, a language, building on the communication system presently in use, conscripts speakers into specific discourses, for example, the capitalist discourse of consumerism. This conscription of speakers exploits mechanisms of learning, for example, the adman teaching consumers about the virtues about possessing a product (a product that really possesses the consumer).

I return to the idea of learning in relation to a subject matter. Being material entities, human beings learn in material ways. Learning begins in sense perception at the level of the concrete. While this word denotes what is hard, as in concrete side walk, it originally means what is growing, from the Latin *concrēscere*. Concretely the subject matter is the actual world. Abstractly the subject matter is the idea of the world. However, these categories -- concrete and abstract -- do not refer to two different things -- that would be reification -- but to two aspects of how humans are in the world. As I argued earlier, reality is the product of a dialectical relationship between the actual and the imaginary. The socialist project illustrates this point. Socialism, as articulated in the canonical texts -- *The Manifesto* -- has as its material conditions those of previous society, specifically, capitalism. A socialist society does not emerge *ex nihilo* but out of the very development of capitalism. As Marx said of the Paris Communards, they have no ideals to realize. The material conditions are the actual. However, material
conditions while necessary are not a sufficient condition for the realization of socialism. There must be the struggle by those needing and desiring that non-actual or imaginary world to work this last out of the capitalist present: the crux of revolutionary struggle. The purpose of socialist theory is to articulate the potential for socialism through gathering and pointing out the contradictions of the capitalist social order to those wanting to act on them.

These points will be discussed in greater detail later since now I want to complete my analysis of Seneca’s fable of Cura, his essay to comprehend the whatness of our kind."72

Care, a female figure, is the worker, an artisan of a sort whose product is the human form. She is the abstract representation of the female identified tendencies for socialism explicated in chapter one. The fable of Care personifies that quality of ‘being’ particular to human qua human activity. The Being of human doing is Care. A worker who is careless is not, ipso facto, a highly cultivated and cultivating worker; nor would such a creature be an animal. For the animal is neither cultured nor uncultured; these possibilities belong only to human doing. This is not to deny the possibility of care. For example, a flying bird swerves to avoid an obstacle because it cares for its life: to care is to invest time and energy in the maintenance if not improvement of an object. A bird thus cares for its life even if it is bird-brained. The point for humans is that care can take on highly cultivated forms, forms requiring a high degree of abstraction. As Marx points out, only humans care about what is remote from them in time and space.

With capitalism, there has been a systemic alienation of culture from care. As Marx wrote in the days of industrialism, the worker, when at work, is not at home and when at home, not at work. This is the basis of the modern categories of work and leisure. To properly care for the self, the actor must be at home in his work and work at his home. By this I do not intend necessarily the actual domicile. Rather, I am speaking more abstractly about the relationship between the actual and the imaginative and its consequences for an understanding of reality. To be at home implies having a house or, more generally, lodging. This means satisfying the material conditions of existence...
and having a surplus of time and energy left for a contemplation and reformulation of
that existence. *Incipit tragoedia.*

The first implies that the actor has been able to work over the material world and
transform it into objects satisfying (relatively) immediate need such as food, shelter and
clothing -- this is practical. The second action implies the actor taking his existence as
an object of contemplation -- this is theoretic. However, practice and theory are
interlinked -- at least in Marxism. The satisfying of material needs (the actual) contains
within itself a theory about those needs (the imaginative). Reality therefore is never
reducible to one pole or the other; it is a product of the relationship between the two,
their dialectical unity. Under modernist-capitalist auspices, actual work is severed from
contemplative activity. This is done through the agency of money, the alienated means
of exchange standing over and above the really human exchange, I suggest, of the
actual with the imaginative.

This is where I see the place of Care. From Marx's passage, I note the point of
raising the actual structure in the imagination before erecting it in reality. In the story of
Care, the human form is the produced object; in Marx's account, the human is the
producer subject. Human labour is a dialectic of the actual in relation to the imaginative,
even as this is suppressed under capitalism. Taken as a whole, these two fragments
imply that the Being of human activity is Care, this last being an imaginative structure
belonging, in no matter how degraded a form, to all forms of labour. However, as noted
in the above, care is not exclusively human but rather is present to all forms of life.
However it is most highly cultivated due to the abstractive-imaginative faculty of human
beings in our species. Care, in its more cultivated forms, stamps human labour as such.

To identify the process of cultivation, carried under the auspices of Care further, I
shall consider the text more closely. The human-as-produced-object is the end-product
of Care, and the human-as-producer-subject has some end in mind that She wants to
realize through the labour process. The labour process in this instance is inquiry into
the human needs, to extrapolating the theory that the practice implies. What is the
working of inquiry, and how is this revealed to us by Care? In fragment S.II.i, I note that
Care took up a piece and *cogitanbunda* thoughtfully began *fingere* shape it. To be
thoughtful in terms of inquiry is to go on the way of truth; in Latin it is to cogitate. Cogitare is to turn over in the mind, to think, reflect. There is, however, a labour to thinking, namely, the mental turning over of one's own language body in relation to satisfying needs -- even if (and usually not only if) there is the need to communicate with others and be acknowledged as a fellow human. Language is both instrument and relation: it is the instrument of thought. There can be no thought without language. Granted, however, there is, according to rumor, private speculation. But strictly private thinking, as Wittgenstein (1934) proved in another context, has no social significance. Speech is the only evidence our species has for thinking (since our species has not yet developed the ability to directly read “thought” off of chemical brain processes.) Language, Marx said, is practical consciousness, thought that has crystallized and is capable of being shared with others. Language relates thinking to being within a definite social context. It is the totality requiring substantiation through the explication of being-in-the-world, not the mere positing of a taxonomy designed to close off inquiry, turning the investigation into a hermeneutic shell of regional *existentialia*, a morpho-genetic intention that Adorno mistakenly ascribes to Heidegger.\(^7\)

Cogitation may fall into instrumentality as displayed by ratiocination. Having decided 'once-and-for-all' what 'being' is, thought then calculates the relations between things-in-the-world or entities on the basis of this secured and covered over unity. Things now are numbered, what their being is no longer counting as subjects for inquiry. Ratiocination is cognition-having-become-calculus. Such is the dead theory of culture, culture as mere collection of artifacts.

The dialectical conception of the One as the structure to-be-disclosed through the gathering of the many stands in resolute opposition to the mere classification and systematization of thought, to dead culture. Dialectics is open-ended systemic inquiry. It is *not* a system of thought but an ever-continuing inquiry into the relationship between thinking and being through language. It is thus innately self-reflective since it is one's own thinking that is both subject and object of inquiry. Dialectical inquiry does not stand outside of the reality which it studies although it does seek to be objective. However, this last is understood as a moment of a project defining one's being-in-the-world, its
possessing no reality outside of that. Object must be thought, it is contended, as a moment of a subject projecting itself towards some 'being'-in-the-making. There is no final completion, only formulations, inherently provisory, that mark some stopping by and abiding with a phenomenon.

This is not to deny the need for categories or, more generally, the classification and ordering of material. However those categories do not stand outside the labour process for their creation and must, not necessarily all at once, become themselves subject to inquiry. Otherwise the categories themselves become dogmatic assertions of identity, preventing a fuller dialectical interplay. For example, forms of struggle developed under industrial capitalism need to be re-evaluated in terms of the demands of postmodernity (late capitalism). Dialectics is a form of faith, in a sense, since it works towards a project that neither it nor anyone else can complete although a formulation can reach a certain stage of completion. Dialectics, moreover, counters the tendency towards privatization of thought -- idiocy -- through its standing for community. It wants to show how any individual speech is ultimately collective rather than individual property, how a speech displays an indebtedness of the speaker to language, how social reality develops out of the tension between the actual and the imaginative. If this tension is lost, then the actual becomes a dull empiricism and imaginative ungrounded fantasy. No longer does the actor dialectically comprehend reality, no longer does the actor perceive the play to Being or becoming. It is this play between the language of temporality and the actuality of being-in-the-world that constitutes the nub of Heidegger's method, a point lost on Adorno, this causing him to categorize Heidegger as an idealist.75

In returning to the story of Care, fragment S.ii.iii, I note the entrance of Jupiter, the god who gives this form fashioned by Care spiritus spirit. Ontologically, spirit is what is shown through what I call ex-istence, that is, the making stand out the structural unity of the totality through the observant tarrying alongside of its play. Language is the focus of play for inquiry since it joins thinking and being. Spirit is taken in a philosophic-phenomenologic rather than in a religious-classifying or specialist-professional sense. It is the yet-to-be explicated totality in the midst of being-explicated. To be spirited (rather
than say spiritual) is to persist in disclosing this structure.

In fragment S.II.iii, Tellus Earth enters the scene. Earth (Tellus) is matter as opposed to the Spirit (Jupiter). Spiritedly, the earth is regarded, as Marx implies in the passage cited above, as the form to be transformed which simultaneously is the actualization of the imaginary structure existing already in the worker's mind. The difference between spirit and matter is a feature of culture. To be spirited is make the being-in-the-world matter, to focus on it as the underlying problematic of inquiry. Culture is linguistically determined, however. An actual language is the product, as Marx argued in the German Ideology, of relations between people; while language, in a more abstract sense, defines the parameters of the play between imagination and actuality. By this I mean that language is a storehouse of past meaning, as symbolized by words, that members of that language group draw upon through the act of speaking. To be spirited is to investigate and share with others the difference between how language is presently used -- to promote the aims of capitalism -- and how it could be used -- for conceiving of socialism. Spirit, speaking metaphorically, dwells in the space of the present becoming the future.

In fragment S.XI.iv, Care, Spirit and Matter stand before Saturn. Care, is neither spirit nor matter. Rather She first shapes the form. That which informs human activity, to draw out the implications of this last statement, is the actualization of what already exists in the mind. At the base bio-physical level, nothing exists in the mind except electrical impulses continually building up and discharging energy. The mind is, as Marvin Minsky wrote in The Society of Mind, what the brain does. Electrical brain impulses are the material constraints of mental activity (ignoring here the mentality of out-of-body experiences for which admittedly I have no explanation). They become translated into practical consciousness (language) through the interaction of that body (whose brain it is) with others. The spirited actor directs his energy and time to working over the matter imaginatively, to display what it means in relation to the larger social actuality. This is not a feature of ontological need, as Adorno thinks, but a feature of re-thinking any ontology.76

Consider the matter of reason. The word reason derives from the Latin ratio;
reason, as far as the Romans understood it, is ratiocination or calculation. Reri, the root of ration, means to reckon. However ratiocination or calculation or reckoning relies upon a system of measure, an already decided upon and closed to further inquiry notion of a standard unit. To reason as other than ratiocination, is to open up the standard unit itself to inquiry by asking after the conception of unity implied by that unit being-there. It is to expose the cultural determinant of truth -- the measure-as-correct or exactness -- to the being-cultural -- what measures exactness or preciseness. This reason-as-ratio fails to do and so is not the totality of what reason is. To show faith in reason is to ask after its totality or Being. Ratiocination, left to itself, is thus unfaithful to the Being of reason or Reason. Nevertheless, ratiocination is close to Reason, it being the latter's shadow. Thus the relationship between ratiocination and Reason, between shadow and substance is dialectical. The appearance of one depends upon clearly distinguishing it from its other. Ratiocination belongs to Reason, and so the distinguishing of one from the other is the substantive play of light and shadow. One cannot be comprehended without the other. To separate them is to show their unity.

III

The trinity of Care, Spirit and Matter may be formulated in this manner: humans care for themselves through the spirited engagement with the matter of their existence. So do we hear the judgement of Saturn. This is, moreover, the way of truth, dialectically grasped, a way that begins in apprehension and ends in comprehension. Humans begin to be aroused by the question of 'being' when they first notice 'non-being,' when they have lost the animal certitude that 'being' can be readily identified with the actual or, by the same token, 'non-being' with the non-actual. They imagine that the actual is unchangeable. This is the arché of the Totality, whether articulated as Being (Classical) or History (Modern). This is the realm of the death, symbolized mythically by the river Lethe meaning forgetfulness.

The matter of human existence is signified by apprehensiveness, the being-startled by its own non-being. By this I mean more precisely being open to the strangeness of our existence and the strangers that symbolize it. Startlement could be negative (I receive a notice that I have cancer) or positive (I thought I had cancer but I
don’t). This strangeness, if the actor is able to handle it, keeps the actor alert and on his toes. It forces him to clarify his thinking and so, possibly have more definite practices. This alertness measures how awake the actor is to reality of his existence. Is it simply a pastiche of fashionable opinions held together by possessive individualism or something else or more? In this sense I, following Heidegger, pose the question of Being in contrast Adorno’s Heidiggerian straw man, the cult of Being. 

Being is the performance of a play. This play, furthermore characterizes my understanding of the relationship between the actual and the imaginative.

Bestartlement is the open stage upon which the actor performs the play. By open stage I do necessarily intend simply being naive. Openness, if it is not promiscuity, is not a pure free for all. Freedom has its constraints as Marx wrote, men are free to make history but not under conditions of their choosing. A stage is a definite place, an opening made out only through conversing, expressing the matter abstractly, with the stranger; more concretely, it is the surplus gained through fulfilling the demands of necessity. Surplus is what is other to survival; only in that space does culture proper -- theatre or art, more generally -- exist as itself an object for contemplation. Art exists less articulately at every level of culture in so far as even the fashioning of a humble pot presupposes an imagination at play. However, art does not become itself an object of contemplation except at a certain stage of history where sufficient number of individuals have been freed from the immediate demands of necessity. Thus aboriginal people in Australia have what they call “dream time” or, in Western cultural terms, theatre. A Eurocentric view, derived from Freud’s and Breuer’s treatment of hysteria (1891), might conceive of this phenomenon as a purely mental theatre that does however receive expression through song, dance and painting and carving. A less tribal, Europe being the tribe here, would allow room for the Aboriginal’s own self-understanding. In any case, primitive peoples, excepting developments induced by their contact with Europeans, do not have museums or other art institutes.

The openness to Being bespeaks, in my text, the dialectical nature of reality. What tends to close this openness down are systems of measure that take their categories for granted although some faith in the categories is required. Otherwise
thinking becomes completely arbitrary. To keep Being an open question implies then accepting under definite conditions the reality of categories, this defining what one is open to. The dialectical movement consists in exploring those categories as signs, one could say, of meaning both explicit and implicit. A system, for example, capitalism, interprets human need in certain ways -- as the sign for demand. The point of being open (not promiscuous) is to understand the relation of the sign to its purported meaning. Is demand, for example, the final definition of human need? In the case of meaning that is other than the meaning ratified (and reified) by the status quo, the actor is dealing with shadows, the spectre of communism as Marx and Engels wrote. By shadow I mean what accompanies the light, and the play of light and shadow could be intensely collective (spectre of communism) or individual (spectre of one's personal death). The first is familiar enough to Marxists; the last, a traditional existential concern, strongly voiced by Heidegger in *Being and Time,* is not. The stranger Heidegger comes tapping at Marx's door. (Or his grave?).

Heidegger is not, to be clear, the grave digger of Marx, only of Marxist forms predicated on industrial norms. But postmodernism itself will show their present historical irrelevancy. The more important issue is to synthesize Heidegger's insights into temporality with traditional Marxist concerns about social change. One can do this, theoretically, with the concept of care. In the material-concrete sense, to care is to invest time and energy into the maintaining if not improving of the condition of a thing; in the spirited-abstract sense, it is to attend to the ownmost possibility of one's Being. A certain idealism is found in the latter Heideggerian based formulation; however it does offset the otherwise dull economism of the first clause. Both formulations need each other. Strange as they are to each other, they stand on common ground. This requires cultivation meaning the actor's taking in hand his own's apprehensiveness and directing it towards a subject-matter. This is to extend an open hand to the stranger as potential fellow worker. The meeting place is, abstractly, language and concretely, specific sites of struggle. Language is what-is-at-hand; it is the sign-system, that domain of articulations, informing our understanding of Reality. However, as Marx and Engels said in *The German Ideology,* language is practical consciousness, the system of
communication the actor employs in his relations with others.

The stranger is the shadow of the familiar reality, the darkness of its light. Darkness arouses apprehension, even as it is necessary contrast to light. By facing his own shadow and sharing this with others, who too have shadows, the actor recognizes his fear -- apprehensiveness -- but can nevertheless move on -- to a more comprehensive understanding of reality. There is a gap between “a” and “the” comprehensive understanding, and the possibility for anxiety as Adorno indicates. The actor, emblematic of my personal understanding of reality (which is not unrelated to more collective visions) both is and is not. Ontically and immanently, the actor is the sum of his present experiences and reflections as defined by a spatio-temporal body. Ontologically and transcendentally, the actor is the fully developed character of his imagination. The actor’s understanding of reality is the product of the actor’s struggle to develop his character in relation to meeting the demands of his actual life-world. The struggle to Be, however, is not limited to a single individual. Rather it is the collective property of humankind. Marxism has tended to over emphasize the collective, at least in its typical political practice and underdetermine the individual. My suggestion is that this need not be so if one keeps in mind the unity of the whole. But this unity, the common ground, requires cultivation. Cultivation is the work of caring. It is the turning over of the grounds of our existence, the ontic-immanent, with a view towards realizing the ontological-transcendent. Socialism is capitalism transcending itself.

That which unites the two levels of analysis -- ontologic and ontic -- is the struggle. It is this that Adorno completely ignores. On a personal level, the actor faces the stranger that will ultimately announce his death, that which shadows his existence. To face my shadow, the messenger of my death, if I may speak personally, is to face my fears of dying. This facing, however, is part of my project for Being that I share, at some level, with every other human on the planet, past, present and future. Although my struggle, in so far as it is ontically confined to my present body, is mine alone, the struggle to attain the full measure of one’s humanity is everyone’s. It is the collective project of humankind. By project I mean that which is thrown forward, and this projection reflects our species ability to abstract from the actual spatio-temporal
determinants of the present body. Existence, at the ontic level, is the daily business of meeting the demands of necessity; at the ontological level, it is the realization of one's Project for Being.

This means that, more precisely, the fact that each of us is going to die does not mean that any of us cannot enjoy baseball and love-stories. It does mean, however, that the pleasures of life are cast against the pain of realizing that they will end. Equally so for the pains of life; death cures all. What connects life with death is the practice of care. The realization of our dying state is the source of gloom, sadness and fear -- the going into the great unknown. Religion has traditionally attempted to palliate (although sugar-coat would be better) the horrors of the unknown -- at worst, as Marx said, it has acted as an opiate. My suggestion is that it is possible to have no sentimental illusions about life, to face oneself soberly as a dying thing, but to nevertheless retain the joy of being alive. This means cultivating with the care the grounds of one's existence. Ultimately the ground is my grave, and what I shall write is the inscription upon my gravestone. One can be either careful or careless. To be careful is to attend to the Shadow shaping our ontic existence; to be careless is to not do so. Of course, it is possible to get lost in the transcendent and forgot about the aches and pains of the actual body. I dwell with my Shadow in the space of my solitude. Solitude here means 'that with which one is alone.' However, it is possible to find amiable companions with whom to share the work of building a better world. This is my hope.

To care is to remain open to the Shadow, to keep faith with death as the end towards which our being-in-the-world is ontologically thrown. In life then the actor is open to the strangeness of his world. Moved by wonder, inquiry starts on its way. It is both open to apprehending and is apprehensive. It has been moved by the question of Being, made cognizant of its own coming-to-an-end. But through having faith in Being, the inquirer remains neither terrified of its being thrown against its end nor indifferent to it. Rather the care-giver stands there in order to face his end; this standing there reflects upon the ground of his present-at-handness. This is inquiry's resting motion: to stand where one is through reflecting upon the ground of that present. This is to wake up the dead, to arouse the present to those possibilities which it has suppressed in its
becoming. This facing of one's own strangeness -- oneself as the strange being in one's life -- is upsetting and yet potentially liberating. For I am driven to do this by the energetic thrusting of his my imaginative structures -- I will be what I am, to quote God's words to Moses in Exodus. Even as what one is has for its context one's interaction with others. Such is the dialectic of a caring society.
CHAPTER THREE: Heidegger and Marx

To expand upon this dialectic, I shall now consider more directly Marx and Engels. I shall then juxtapose this last to my understanding of Heidegger. The basic idea here is that socialism is that version of care proper to the next stage of society. History and revolution are the themes enunciating care in Marxism. For that reason I return to Marxism’s canonical texts:

BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIANS

The history of all human society, past and present, has been the history of class struggles.82

I orient to the Marxist project as a metaphor for self-reflective systemic investigation into the nature of human being. This is not to deny the empirical reality of Marxist research. Rather what I want to call attention to here are the analytic determinants of their mode of interpretation even as I am aware of Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach:

The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently, the point is, to change it.83

What is the relationship between understanding and interpreting? What does change the world mean? Here I return to my categorizations. I take it that Marx is formulating an ideal actor, the proletariat, that agent that will change the world, the world in question being the bourgeoisie’s. However one should take care not to posit a naïve idealism. For Marx the proletariat was constituted materially through relations of exploitation. This is the empirical reality from which one abstracts in formulating an ideal. On the level of theory, this is done through dialectical analysis of social contradictions; on the level of practice, through the organizing of actual working bodies into political parties and other forms for the formulation and implementation of civic policy.

Marx and Engels or, as I shall term them as a singular compound entity, ME, said that history is the history of class struggle. Granted this is true, this raises the question of the identity of history as well of the meaning of class and struggle. For the moment I shall stay with my initial proposition that the root of history is the -- the human -- need to understand the nature of reality. I note here the terms bourgeois and
proletarian, having divided this last from worker. How does this correspond with ME's distinctions? Is such a distinction possible? I cite a long passage to examine this:

Proletariat and Wealth are opposites. As such, they form a whole. They are both formations of the world of private property. What concerns us here is to define the particular position they take within the opposition. It is not enough to state that they are two sides of a whole.

Private property as private property, as wealth, is forced to maintain its own existence and thereby the existence of its opposite, the proletariat. It is the positive side of the opposition, private property satisfied in itself.

Vice-versa, the proletariat is, as proletariat, forced to abolish itself and, with this, the opposite which determines it, which makes it the proletariat, private property. It is the negative side of the opposition, its principle of unrest, private property which is dissolved and in the process of dissolution...

Within the opposition, therefore, the owner of private property is the conservative, the proletarian the destructive party. From the former derives the action of preservation of the opposition, from the latter the action of its destruction.84

Logically, the opposite of Wealth is Poverty. ME is therefore conflating the proletariat with the poor. This is not, I suggest, ME's intention. Specifically, what they are doing is showing the conditions giving birth to the proletariat. Private property, I interpret ME as arguing, impoverishes those called the proletariat. And here I may add one more defining condition: the owners of private property or the wealthy are few and the non-owners or the poor are many. ME is writing from the perspective of the many. To quote Lewis Feuer on Marx:

Different classes do not perceive the class hierarchy in the same way. The lower classes tend to look at social reality most simply; they make the fewest gradations in the social world above them, for these subtleties have no significance in their lives. Their world is made up of the well-to-do and the poor, the haves and have-nots, the exploiters and exploited. The members of the higher social strata, on the other hand, perceive a more complex social reality. They are aware of a variety of distinctions in status based on the inherited age of people’s wealth, their social elegance, and moral character...His bold vision does grasp more of historical reality than the more complex bourgeois schemes. For what is distinctive in the modern revolutionary era is the entry of the masses as participants in the making of history.(emphasis added)85

I agree with Marx even as my perspective has, and will doubtlessly remain, of an elite rather than the many. Although, I may be closer to Marx's perspective if certain
qualifications are allowed, qualifications which vulgar Marxists might have trouble with. I posit here that the revolutionary is the social artist. The elite aspect of this concerns the nature of art. To do "art" requires a high degree of self-discipline and attentiveness. For one must submit oneself to a tradition to become master of it and, thereby, over oneself. This ability to overcome oneself is crucial to the artist. To overcome oneself means, more specifically the broadening of one's horizons, the extending of the one into a many-sided understanding of a phenomenon; this is the freeing of oneself from one's ignorance. This requires work, namely, the systemic investigation into the nature of the Real. This has two aspects to it: the individual reflecting upon the historically achieved character of collective existence -- which is why the present (the actual) is not the end of history (the real). On the other hand, it means the individual involving himself in the accomplishing of collective tasks given his or her historical understanding of collective nature. Such is the social artist, a theme found also in Marx:

He (Marx) has, however, given the phenomenology of the revolutionary consciousness, the world as it is experienced in crisis by the revolutionary working man.

The social artist is the revolutionary working man or, to use a more contemporary term, cultural worker. On this basis, then, we distinguish between proletariat and worker, the revolutionary worker and the not-revolutionary worker respectively. This corresponds to the traditional division between the one and the very few and the many. Revolutionary workers are the minority within the mass of non-revolutionary. This does not mean that the latter cannot become the former; if one did not believe this then social revolution is an impossibility. Through systemic investigation of bourgeois social reality, the revolutionary worker gains insight into the workings of his or her actual environment.

This begs the question of the relation between revolutionary fervor and critical insight. To give an initial answer to the question, I cite D. W. Livingstone in his discussion of worker democracy:

It should be noted that Mondragon is a series of interrelated workers' co-operatives based originally on a Catholic priest's interpretation of Robert Owen's ideas of industrial democracy and operating in extensive interaction with the capitalist civil society in the Basque region of Spain. The kibbutzim movement had its origins in Zionist socialism and built largely self-contained co-operative
communities, many on the rural borders of Israel, prior to independence in 1948. While both deserve to be called emerging economic democracies, their origins, development strategies and community inclusiveness have been quite different. In my view, sustained experiments in economic democracy owe much more to their founders' and some continuing active members' deep sense of commitment to principles of democracy and social justice than to any particular religious or nationalist ideology. The founders of the American and French republics in the period of the emergence of industrial capitalism were not all of a single religious faith or nationalist zeal, but they were similarly united in their anti-monarchist commitment to constitute a new social order based on principles of greater liberty and equality.

The above indicates a complex interplay between the insight of individual visionaries -- Robert Owen, the Catholic priest, the hardy Kibbutz pioneers -- and social organization -- revolutionary parties, material industrial structure. Individuals will differ in curiosity about the world, adventurousness of spirit and educational background; however, it is only through social action that ideals become active in the world. Individual differentiation and social organization are the two poles of this movement. It would undialectical to reify either pole -- to reduce history to the actions of the Great Man -- or the other -- organizational life will take care of itself. Individuals no matter how insightful require links to a community of co-thinkers; and organizations no matter how massive or apparently self-sufficient, require an infusion of ideas at times from outside themselves. Otherwise individuals become atomized self-aggrandizing fools and organizations stuffy unresponsive bureaucracies. Organizations should have sufficient warmth to welcome (back) those who come in out of the cold. Social revolution is the dialectical product of the two becoming one.

This is the ideal, and two individuals who exemplified revolutionary workership to the highest degree were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The two did not come from the lower or labouring classes; rather they joined this last in the same spirit that members of the nobility crossed over to the bourgeoisie in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Aristocracy, for me, references the rule of revolutionary workership. The term, however, is problematic in that it reverses the dominant order of modernist political discourse. As well, there is a danger of ignoring Leninist vanguardism. Nevertheless I will still use that term because of its inherent meaning. The aristocracy means literally
the rule of the best in ancient Greek. I use that term to reference a standard: one should strive to push out what is best about oneself and one's community. If that term is still unacceptable for those for whom it denotes absolute monarchy, then perhaps they might use the term meritocracy. As long as one understands the terms then I see no problem. Otherwise one runs another risk as exhibiting by contemporary political correctness where one cannot use certain words at the risk of offending someone, for example the word discrimination. To be a discriminating person is, in my mind, positive in so far as this denotes the ability to select and judge among a variety of alternatives with respect to their suitability. It is to demonstrate taste. Granted that the word has been abused in modern 'discourse' such that now it becomes synonymous with prejudice and bigotry. Nietzsche wrote a book entitled The Use and Abuse of History on the same subject. A more banal example is the use of the verb drink to mean exclusively the imbibing of alcohol.

Does this mean that one should cease to use certain words because of popular ignorance? I think not. A revolutionary worth his salt, so to speak, is able to stand his grounds through explaining what he means. In this way he reappropriates the word's meaning, recuperating it. Popular examples of this are, for example, the use of the word "nigger" by Blacks, "bitch" by feminists and "queer" by homosexuals. Intrinsic to revolutionary struggle is challenging the taken-for-granted consciousness exemplified by current language use. One should never shy away from challenging the ignorant and thoughtless use of words. I do not. Thus I shall continue to use the word aristocracy to mean what it actually does mean: the rule of the best. Moreover I shall continue to explain my position in the face of prejudice and ignorance.

For those acquainted however with Marxist tradition, one question immediately arises: what about the labour aristocracy detested by Marx? Labour aristocracy refers to those highly skilled workers who tended to see themselves separate and apart from the mass of unskilled industrial workers. As a result, they assumed bourgeois attitudes. I do not refer to them. Aristocracy, for me, is not a matter of skill as it is of character. The true aristocrat, no matter their social status, is a self-overcoming person, eager to expand the self's horizon of understanding as much as his or her nature permits.
Aristocrats have a humble, self-reflective spirit, for understanding, according to traditional cultures, is the receiving of wisdom. Never servile, they are nevertheless humble; Lenin called them the tribunes of the people. In their humbleness they serve the cause of truth, justice and knowledge such as the soldiers of the China’s People’s Liberation Army (circa 1948) described earlier by Hinton.

Having made these distinctions, I return to Marx. "Proletariat and Wealth," Marx wrote are opposites. I, however, opposed that opposition, pointing out that Poverty is Wealth’s opposite. How then does Marx’s initial proposition now stand? Firstly, and here I invoke distinctions not present for Marx, poverty and wealth are relative in character. The historical experience of workers in advanced capitalist countries demonstrates that, under certain phases of class struggle, workers can acquire wealth, mainly in the form of private residences. This was the case in the twentieth century. However, this was due to two factors: 1) the material prosperity of capitalism and 2) worker self-organization. At the time of Marx’s writing, the early industrial revolution, the common folk, having recently (in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) suffered the loss of the commons (the taking over of common pasture lands by sheep owning landlords and sanctioned by, for example, acts of the English parliament) were becoming industrial workers. They had no property except their labour power. Hence the institution of private property, the basis of capitalist production, meant, in real, practical terms, the dispossession of the many.

Nevertheless, I maintain the distinction between proletariat and worker, revolutionary and non-revolutionary worker. I do this to allow for the possibility of a proletarian consciousness as distinct from, although not radically separate from the conditions of the proletariat, that is, the actual amount of property or not workers have. Following Lukacs, I argue for a difference between, using conventional philosophic markers. essence (proletariat) and existence (workers). Consciousness, in its essence, concerns language, as Julian Jaynes argues, not the nervous system. This accords with Heidegger’s notion of language as the temporal horizon of being-in-the-world. So that one possesses consciousness to the degree that one orients to this. The essence of being proletarian is not determined by the actual property a worker possesses but
rather by their social orientation -- their revolutionary consciousness, that ability to grasp the ensemble of the systems of relations -- the grammar -- determining the linguistic essence of the thing.\textsuperscript{92} The having of a proletariat consciousness then distinguishes the best revolutionary worker from his or her fellows. To continue with my earlier citation:

Of course, in its economic movement private property drives on to its own dissolution, but only by a development which is independent of and opposed to its will, unconscious, conditioned by the nature of the matter; i.e. by the production of the proletariat as proletariat, of poverty which is conscious of its intellectual and bodily poverty, of loss of humanity, conscious of itself and therefore abolishing itself. The proletariat carries out the verdict which private property pronounces on itself by the very production of the proletariat, just as it carries out the verdict which wage-labour pronounces on itself by producing the wealth of others and its own poverty. If the proletariat is victorious it does not at all mean that it has become the absolute side of society, for it is victorious only by abolishing itself and its opposite. Then both the proletariat and its conditioning opposite, private property, have vanished.\textsuperscript{93}

There are several important points to note in Marx's transcription of the Hegelian dialectic: the essence is absolute but in the state of absoluteness has no social significance. For a thing to have this requires that it be in the world and that, moreover, humans be conscious of it. Consciousness and being-in-the-world are intrinsically related in so far as a thing -- the object of consciousness -- has social significance. To be in the world, moreover, is to have a conditioned reality. Private property is the social phenomenon in question. It is the product of a definite stage of society, and appears with the development of a division of labour and the dispossession of the many of their property -- the English commons in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for example -- by the few. Private property, therefore, can be said to have a dynamic of its own rooted in the historical processes associated with the development of human labour power. However, these historical processes occur unconsciously, with the determined will of social actors; they are the "natural" outcome of many individual wills acting on each other having short-term ego-centric perspectives. Private property, moreover, will abolish itself (the Hegelian Aufhebung); for it produces, as its opposite, the immiseration of the many or, in a word, the proletariat. The Wealth of the very few is built upon the Poverty of the great many, so the equation goes.
There are two aspects that bear closer scrutiny. There is the objective sense that private property will abolish itself by virtue of producing the immiserated class, the proletariat; this is the unconscious movement. The proletariat is the unconscious reflex belonging to private property. However, Marx speaks of the need of the proletariat to abolish itself. In terms of revolutionary consciousness, I distinguish between the workers having proletariat consciousness to the highest degree -- the best revolutionary workers -- and those who are conscious to a far less degree -- the mass of actual workers. The development of proletarian consciousness requires that workers move from being objects of capitalist property relations to their subjects. The abolishing of actual property relations is the practice informed, at best, by a proletarian consciousness -- capitalist underemployment by economic democracy in D. W. Livingstone’s words (1999). This movement, ideally conceived of, is the gaining of a many-sided perspective on the nature of reality -- the understanding of oneself as both object and subject of history, as a participant-observer.

Consciousness is a socio-linguistic, not motor-sensory phenomenon. In personal language, consciousness is the overcoming of self. However, self is an image formed from somebody being in a world, and so being inscribe in a system of relations with others. Systems of relations form structures, and these structures, in turn, are the interpretive mechanisms by which social reality becomes read, for example, the structures of class, gender and family. The overcoming of oneself, if this is other than pious liberalism, references the interrogation of those structures, aspects of collective existence, with the objective of destroying and rebuilding them -- “deconstructing,” to use Derrida’s term. This is part of traveling upward along the line of cognition through traveling downward. Given, however, the difference between cognition and consciousness, the dialectical movement, in so far as it raises consciousness, raises the question of language. It is the reformulating of concepts through recalling the social base of those concepts at present. Further, concept reformulation is the basis for metaphor as Marx and Engels demonstrated in their own work. Overcoming of oneself is ultimately, the reshaping of the society which made that self possible. It is making oneself, that self-at-present, in effect, impossible through giving birth to the possibility of
self that is more Oneself. This is, in a word, the future. Self-understanding and social transformation are the two poles of this dialectic.95

I distinguish then the conditions for consciousness from consciousness itself or essence. The essence of consciousness is not poverty; rather it is the desire to expand one's understanding of reality which implies a richness of spirit. However, to avoid an naive idealism, one has to locate the richness of spirit within a definite socio-economic context determining one's access to education. One's spirit unfolds within a definite relation to social resources. More abstractly, one investigates the grammatical structures defining the reality of one's existence, the temporal horizon of one's world as Marx did vis-a-vis the capitalist world of commodity production.96 Again such abstraction has to put into the context of actual social relations - the production and reproduction of social reality. Proletariat.97 as the idealization of actual workers, proceeds from the rich spirit of Marx. This is not to deny the historical processes themselves, the raw material for Marx's conception. It is, rather, to indicate the interpretive dialectically inspired organization of the material. If Marx is a master cultural worker, then, I deduce that Marx himself represents the richness of the working class to a superlative degree. In effect, then, Marx's analyses represent the workers coming to understand their own nature, having a sense of themselves as other than workers. Marx's work returns to the masses a sense of their own humanity lost by them with the development of private property.

II

Contrast this with Heidegger, his speaking of Dasein and its being-in-the-world:

Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain 'factual Being-present-at-hand'. And yet the 'factuality' of the fact of one's own Dasein is at bottom quite different ontologically from the factual occurrence of some kind of mineral, for example. Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein's "facticity" This is a definite way of Being, and it has a complicated structure which cannot even be grasped as a problem until Dasein's basic existential states have been worked out. The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world.98

The thrust of Heidegger's argument is to show that reason is a social fact, that is a
product of being-in-the-world, an artifact. The word fact derives from the Latin *facere* make, compose, create, cause. Human reason is an artifact of our very efforts to be human, that is, the transformation of natural facts. Nature factually occurs, as Heidegger indicates; it is not a product of set-in-motion human labour power. The fact becomes an artifact only in the context of human society, the structure being the complicated relations of labour and self-transformation. Heidegger indicates the complexity in the above passage by the difference between fact and facticity and, in another place, the ontic and the ontological. The very question of reason then presumes the existence of a world to which that reason corresponds, as Marx and subsequent Marxists will develop this, between superstructure and infrastructure. The dialectic of reason is, more precisely, in the facticity of the world-being, the complicated and constitutive labour processes and products of labour. Balanced against this complexity and the subtleties, nuances and other gradations is Heidegger’s insistence upon Being and *Dasein’s* need to understand its ownmost Being. This is an ontological-factical property of being-in-the-world rather than an ontic-factual property of Nature. This is, to use Heidegger’s word, our *existentielle* labour.

In connection with the question of reason, it is interesting to note the fate of transcendence in Heidegger’s text. The facticity of the world is not reducible to the actual facts of, for example, bourgeois hegemony. Our very reasoning about the world and the subsequent conclusions we draw about its reality are themselves situated in a complex matrix of self-transforming impulses. This is not to deny that one can draw conclusions and further generate -theses and political programmes – if one is so inclined. It means, however, that conclusion should not be confounded with closure. Dialectically, the conclusion references the structure to-be-disclosed through the gathering of the conceptual possibility of that conclusion -- the facticity of the fact, the procreativeness of the creation. This notion of conclusion as an aspect of a work-in-progress stands in resolute opposition to the mere classification and systemization of thought, to dead culture. Dialectics is open-ended systemic inquiry. It is not a system of thought but an ever-continuing inquiry into the relationship between thinking and being through language. It is thus innately self reflective since it is one’s own thinking that is
both subject and object of inquiry. Dialectical inquiry does not stand outside of the
reality which it studies although it does seek to be objective. However, this last is
understood as a moment of a project defining one’s being-in-the-world, it possessing no
reality outside of that.

Heidegger’s calling of our attention to the facticity of the fact one could
appreciate dialectically. Facticity is the fact’s conceptual possibility, how it is an artifact
of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. This is the self-transformative work of attending to that
self’s ownmost possibility -- and here I dwell upon ownmost, a word most Heideggerian.
It catches my attention because of its departure from the inside/outside language of
Kant and Hegel, a language that is reiterated by Marx in infra/superstructure. According
to the tenets of classical German philosophy, the inner, most strongly expressed by
Hegel, is spirit; and the motion of transcendence is the inside becoming outside --
becoming a self-determined entity out of the successive negations of its own otherness.
This is a basic religious position -- religious as to say mystifying: inside is the soul and
outside is the body. For it is precisely the conceptual possibility of the inside/outside
split that one needs to explain.

Ownmost possibility of our being does not presume an inside or outside. Rather,
it presumes some being-in-the-world that is not yet one’s own. Heidegger develops this
idea in the concept of das Man, arguing that, to paraphrase, authentic selfhood is a
modification of das Man. Das Man is the they-self. In order to be Oneself one must
work oneself out from the ‘they,’ the oi polloi in classical terms. Socially, this requires
the investigation into the facticity of oneself -- the logical possibility of being what one is.
Logically, one is there as bound up, to repeat Heidegger’s words, with others in that
world. However, there is an authentic and inauthentic way of being-there: the former is
ontological and the second merely ontic. It resides in a form of faith.

Oneself is an object in the world, object, however, of a projecting self. The self is
an object in the making of itself, and given this dynamic, any formulation of the self,
commonly called identity, can have at best a provisory character. There is no final
completion, only formulations, inherently provisory, that mark some stopping by and
abiding with a phenomenon, in this case, oneself. Thus inquiry, while needing
formulations, is ultimately compelled to set those formulations against themselves in order to liberate what informs those formulations -- the auspices under which they are conceivable -- from the stated form. Formulations are informed by a conception of Being. In this way one distinguishes between consciousness and cognition, and this is a form of faith, of reverie and revelation, since it works towards a project that neither it nor anyone else can complete although a formulation can reach a certain stage of completion. To be for one’s ownmost possibility of Being out of the present form of self is the dialectic of inquiry.

Das Man is the they-self. They take identity as a fact apart from its facticity. In classical Greek terms they are the idiots; in Marxist terms, the holders of private property. By contrast, social inquiry or dialectics stands for community. It wants to show how any individual speech is ultimately collective rather than individual, how a speech displays an indebtedness of the speaker to language. In the dispersiveness of classification, this relation becomes systemically lost, and so individuals privately assume that they, and not their relationship to language, own their talk; the classical Greek term for private person is, please note, idiots, the root of the English idiot. Idiocy etymologically does not refer to one’s intelligence quotient (IQ) but one’s social orientation. I shall use the word in that way. Idiocy is the extreme opponent of dialectical inquiry because it privatizes what dialectics wants to socialize. Dialectics is, ultimately, the property of all speakers who take their talk to be a moment of their relationship to language and who conceive of themselves as possessing a self-reflective character. A self-reflective individual recognizes therefore the “self” as a collective creation since the self only comes about in relation to others. By contrast, dialectics does not belong to those who treat ‘reality’ as simply being a set of rules to be obeyed; who radically separate object and subject (rather than treat them as moments of an inter-related whole or project); and who are staunch defenders of private property. These are the idiots. By contrast, the authentic being-there of Dasein is its Being-itself. In one sense, this is the radical individualization of the proletarian-ideal, a generalization of Marx’s basic theses -- without acknowledgment by Heidegger, to be sure. The working out of one’s Being requires the overcoming of the they-self, Heidegger’s notion of
transcendence.

The fact of being-in-the-world is socially constructed out of the self-transformative labour of understanding reality. To Be there is to encounter oneself as a they-self. The characteristic feature of the they-self is its presumptive immortality: Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's last man, the one who blinks. Presumptive immortality means that the they-self turns away from and flees its coming to an end.

One's mood discloses in the manner of turning thither or turning away from one's own Dasein. Bringing Dasein face to face with the "that-it-is" of its own thrownness -- whether authenticically revealing it or inauthentically covering it up -- becomes existentially possible only if Dasein's Being, by its very meaning, constantly is as having been. The "been" is not what first brings one face to face with the thrown entity which one is oneself; but the ecstasis of the "been" is what first makes it possible to find oneself in the way of having a state-of-mind.101

Thrownness is a term found neither with Kant nor Hegel, Heidegger borrowing it from Nietzsche. It indicates a being cast forward, and resonates with Marx's earlier noted observation that while men are free to make history, they do not so under conditions of their choosing. However, it would be false to identify thrownness simply with necessity. Thrownness implies some being cast forward. In Heidegger's text, the end towards which Dasein is cast is its own death.

The 'end' of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, which belongs to the potentiality-for-Being--that is to say, to existence--limits and determines in every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein.102

Here I distinguish, following Heidegger, death from the mere passing away. Death is the end, as to say, purposeful and resolute facing of one's potentiality-for-Being. This is not to deny accident with its fatal possibilities only to deny its decisiveness as a moment of Dasein's project for Being. Indeed this has ramifications for the concept of history which we cannot deal with in this short essay. However, we can emphasize the main point, this being that death is the horizon-line towards which Dasein in its potentiality-for-Being is thrown. As Heidegger says in another place, death cannot be outstripped. The thereness of death is thus the final point of determination.

Thrownness is related to the question of Dasein's project for Being; it is the velocity of that projectile. Dasein is thrown into the world at birth; at birth, one is old
enough to die. To be born, more precisely, is to be thrown in with others. As noted
earlier, others constitute the existential being-there called by Heidegger, *Das Man*, the
they-self. When born, *Dasein* is one of the gang or crowd; its self is lost among the
they. Nevertheless, it is thrown there. The coming towards authentic ending -- death --
requires then the extricating of oneself from the "they," the process of radical
individualization as Heidegger discussed this. The radical individual, as the word radical
implies, is rooted in that self's project for Being.

This has major implications for the notion of identity. Identity is a moment of
*Dasein*'s project for being, specifically, of thrownness. One's identity is a feature of a
project for *Being* that only emerges through the carrying on of this project. This project,
moreover, is the existential space for *Dasein*'s *Being-in-the-world*. Heidegger himself
discusses space in terms of de-severance and being-along-side. The import of these
terms is to show us the distance separating existence from, as we call it, ex-istence,
being from *Being*, the fact from its facticity. Here I note as well, speaking more in our
own language, although this is not unrelated to Heidegger's own formulations, the
common root of the words existence and distance, both deriving from the Latin *stare*
stand. To exist authentically is to take a stand, to be resolute in the face of one's project
for *Being*. This being-resolute means standing there for what the self, in its ontological
facticity, is. *Dasein* is thrown towards the grammatical horizon of its death; but this
thrownness could be faced or not. The irresolute -- fleeing and turning away -- is
cowardly and inauthentic.

Here I come to the question of care. For the existential cowards are the ones
who care not for the end of their existence whereas those who possess courage --
resoluteness -- do. Heidegger characterizes the feckless many as the curious.

When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in
order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a *Being* towards it) but
just in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another
novelty. In this kind of seeing, that which is an issue for care does not lie in
grasping something and being knowingly in the truth; it lies rather in its possibility
of abandoning itself to the world. Therefore curiosity is characterized by a
specific way of *not tarrying* alongside what is closest. Consequently it does not
seek the leisure of tarrying observantly, but rather seeks restless and the
excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters. In not tarrying, curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility of distraction. Curiosity has nothing to do with observing entities and marveling at them -- thaumazein. To be amazed to the point of not understanding is something in which it has no interest. Rather it concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order to have known. Both this not tarrying in the environment with which one concerns oneself, and this distraction by new possibilities, are constitutive items for curiosity; and upon these is founded the third essential characteristic of this phenomenon, which we call the character of "never dwelling anywhere." Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein--a kind in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself.104

Modernity in a word. But the implications of curiosity go far beyond any sociological reductionism -- for example, the sociology of mobility. For such mobility is, as Heidegger would argue, essentially immobile. There is no genuine movement but a mere stasis, a numbing routine that means, ultimately that one is going nowhere. The curious are, in short, not really active, and this simulacrum is called busy-ness or, as North Americans are so fond of saying, business.

Life is a business, time is money. No time to think or ponder; have to be off in order to get ahead. So the busy rush about in their endless seeking of new sources of excitement -- a seeking that springs from a deep boredom, an inability to be anywhere, to dwell there and in this dwelling -- lingering, resting, abiding with - make a home for oneself. Heidegger uses the ancient Greek word thaumazein, to wonder, be amazed at; philosophy, Socrates said in the Theaetetus, has no other beginning arche than thauma wonder.

In contrast to the curious, stand those who care. Caring has nothing in common, let us be clear, with sentimentality. What gives care its backbone and so rescues it from such a puerile fate is the resoluteness that Dasein displays towards its Being-in-the-world and so coming decisively to its end. Resoluteness displays itself in the notion of dwelling. To dwell with something is to tarry alongside it, and in this action one builds something there -- the home. Here we distinguish home from any and every structure or, in a word, house. To be at home is a long, perilous adventure -- a most dangerous enterprise. For one must leave behind what is known, in the common way, and go forth
into the strangeness of the familiar. This is the motion of inquiry, and it has nothing to do with any geographical determinants. Rather this going is the placing and replacing of oneself where one is. One is where one is not; this is the import of thrownness. To be there is the uncanny experiencing of the strangeness of being there.

Here we refer back to the Marxist enterprise and its notion of strangeness, alienation (Entfremdung). For Heidegger, as evinced by his notion of deseverence and being-alongside, strangeness is not a thing that anyone can abolish. Strangeness is, one could say in a shorthand way, the difference that the same offers to itself. It is strange, for example, that a living thing dies. Nevertheless that a living thing dies is essential to a living thing being alive. Death, as Heidegger tells us, is not to be outstripped; it is the end towards which we are thrown in being ourselves mortal. Hence the Other, if death is the other to life, stands the strangeness continually disrupting our all-too-familiar being ourselves. Strangeness is a key constituting feature of any world that we humans create for ourselves. To be human is to be estranged from nature; humans are not a natural species but an historical one. By the same token, we also reject any notion of final reconciliation: Kant’s notion of transcendence reaching its logical conclusion in Hegel’s absolute Spirit coming back into its truth and so negating all alterity. This religious-metaphysical element formed the basis of the secular theodicy of twentieth century Marxism. Only a closer study of Marx’s texts, this falling outside our present concerns could show how to what extent this occurs in the master’s texts.

In Heidegger’s critique of curiosity and his positing of care, he is suggesting that there is no transcendence -- which would seem to support the very modernity he is criticizing. Rather what we have and can do, at best, in faithful obedience to our nature, is care. Care will not cure us of our disease -- our mortality; rather through care we can learn to live with our being dying things. One cares for oneself through the spirited engagement with the matter of our existence. This is, moreover, the way of truth, dialectically grasped, a way that begins in apprehension and ends in comprehension. Humans are aroused by the question of ‘being’ when they first notice ‘non-being,’ when they have lost the animal certitude that being’ can be readily identified with the actual or, by the same token, ‘non-being’ with the non-actual. This is the moment of thauma.
wonder, whether articulated as Being (Classical) or History (Modernity). The matter of human existence is signified by apprehensiveness, the being-startled by our own non-being. This Bestartlement is covered up by systems of measure (religions, philosophies, politics). To go on the way of truth -- authentic being -- is to stand one's grounds as human, and the human stands its grounds through Care. Caring is a doing; it is the taking in one's own's apprehensiveness and directing it towards a subject matter -- namely Dasein's being-in-the-world. However the grounds underneath one's feet, in a historical-materialist perspective, are always shifting. One thus has be constantly on one's toes, performing a sort of dance, simply to stay in one place.

This has important implications for Marxist theorizing. For the sake of its own revolutionary relevance, Marxism needs to formulate a practice or practices of care -- that dwelling with one's being. Will this change social reality? My answer to the question is, however, another one: what is reality? A revolutionary movement (as distinct from a party) is, following Heidegger's suggestions, the movement of invoking wonder rather than arousing curiosity, the raising of questions rather than the giving of answers.

However, to avoid naive idealism, one recalls that one raises questions within a definite historical context. Some things are more in question than others. For example, it is questionable that humankind will have to, as a feature of everyday living, rub two sticks together to make fire. It is conceivable, however, that humanity could be stupid enough to bomb itself back into the stone age or before. Given, however, the mass investment by the world, not equally by all, in humankind's present standard of living, that is unlikely. So one invests time and energy in asking questions that are more relevant to present day concerns.

A revolutionary movement pushes society (the future) out of itself (the present). This is grounded transcendence. This movement has, moreover, a place: the party. The party places the "having a good time." Transcendence is the activity of having a good time, that is, 'partying.' 'Partying', however, has the commonsensical meaning of 'getting wasted,' that is, of becoming extremely inebriated. By contrast, I suggest, a party, genuinely conceived of in its original and originating gathering force, is the place for spirited movement or dance. By dancing I do not limit myself to the movement of
actual physical extremities, one could, for example, dance with ideas. Being (pro)creative is not limited to being female. Dance is a trope, a way of talking about how one moves through being-in-the-world. To dance is to step with care; it is to move to the music of grounded transcendence.

The goodness of the time one has at the party indicates the care one takes in being-in-the-world. The music of grounded transcendence is what one hears and follows through an investigation of the possibility of change. In this way one walks through one's time, thereby spacing it out as Marx did in his analysis of commodity production. One separates out the present-as-actual from the present-as-possible. This is the primitive meaning of the Latin *spatior* walk from which the English word space derives. Primitively, space is the process, not the end, of walking through one's world. In waling through with care one has a good time and so hosts the party, drawing like-minded others to this activity. One's dancing partners are one's comrades. Authentic movement is the walking through of the reality that hitherto has been estranged from one precisely through one's own carelessness. This carelessness is a recurrent feature of Dasein's being-in-the-world and therefore cannot be eliminated by any political or cultural programme. It is the ever-present possibility of our own irresoluteness towards death; our fleeing from the ownmost possibility of Being and so the cramping of movement -- the laming and so crippling of the body politic. I employ the word 'partying' to denote this resoluteness to walk through one's world, to maintain one's upright stature -- in short, to walk as a human being in the face of that which would deny one's humanness. True world changing activity is the invoking of wonder, the intimating of the dance of reality. This is the very beginning of philosophy and hence the reserve from which philosophy resists any closure of it.
In the following chapter I will place some of Heidegger's ideas within a broader cultural context in order to further liberate its revolutionary potential. In that light please consider the terms: *Dasein*, *das Man*, and *everydayness*. They are closely related in Heidegger's argument. In being-in-the-world, *Dasein* is "alongside the 'world' of its concern."\(^{105}\)

This being-alongside, Heidegger further clarifies by the terms being-lost and fallen. "Fallenness" into the 'world' means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity."\(^{106}\) As Heidegger takes pain to explain, this fallenness has nothing ontologically at all in common with the Judeao-Christian and/or Platonic notions of descending from a higher to a lower place and therefore needing to return to this more elevated state. Rather, at the risk of being psychological, fallenness is the basic human fascination with the world that characterizes the first coming into it. The infant, to be more specific, if not to fall further away from Heidegger's own sense, has not fallen from a higher place; the infant is there in the world, and is held captive by it -- captivated by it, and this fascination characterizes its concern, its form of caring for the world.

This fallenness signifies a being-lost in the "they." Again, no necessarily pejorative character ought to be necessarily deduced from this. To use the example of the infant, the 'they' are its parents, those physically alongside it. Being lost in the 'they' is the occasion to be nourished by the 'they,' in ways both physical and metaphysical. Fallenness then indicates Heidegger's cultural location, his being a member of a tradition. Borrowing its words, he cannot but help import its meaning. For his (and my) purposes, fallenness means more precisely that where *Dasein* begins. Another phrase might be being-in-the-dark. Where *Dasein* begins is where it is in the dark, where it cannot be distinguished from others and where thus its own identity -- the ownmost possibility of its *Being as Heidegger says* -- remains invisible or unseen both to itself and others. The logic of Heidegger's argument does not preclude treating 'fallenness' both individually and collectively. Individuals are fallen in that what they themselves are remains to be clarified by themselves and to themselves, the context being their being-
with-others. Extrapolating from that, one could say that the collective task is for a
society to clarify its own identity to itself in relation to its ownmost possibility for Being.

Heidegger as well characterizes the not-Being associated with fallenness:

Not-Being-its-self functions as a positive possibility of that entity which, in its
essential concern, is absorbed [in a world [das wessenhaft besorgend in einer
Welt aufgeht in einer Welt aufgeht]. This kind of not-Being has to be conceived
as that kind of Being which is closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains
itself for the most part.107

Aufgeht, from the verb aufgehen has been translated as absorbed. Its literally meaning
is going (gehen) up, (auf). The infant goes up into the world through becoming alive
which ironically is its fallenness. According to my understanding, this up and down
motion (das Auf und Ab) delineates a coming into openness about one’s own Being.
The motion is linguistic rather than actual; it is a disclosing of structures of the
language-world with which one is concerned. To concern oneself with something,
moreover, is, in Heidegger’s German as indicated in the above, is besorgen, Sorgen
meaning Care as noted earlier. Heidegger notes that the Not-Being-its-self is a positive
possibility, the negative is a positive. Here one may distinguish between the something
that oneself is not in relation to that which oneself is concernfully, and the something
that oneself is not, as being someone else.

One is not oneself, more prosaically, and this is different from one not being
someone else. The not-Being-oneself, where Dasein is the object not-being, is positive
in that it states on and towards what Dasein is. In a sense, Dasein can never not be
itself. The notness, so to speak, concerns the question of Care. Does Dasein care for
Being-itself or not? This raises the question of, as Heidegger states it, of “Being-lost in
the publicness of the "they".108

The public is the sea of the 'they.' Dasein falls in with the 'they,' becomes a
member of the public, through being in the world. Only through being-in-the-world, does
Dasein have the possibility to show itself for what it is. Can Dasein rise to the occasion,
can it Be itself? The public is, playing out some of the linguistic possibilities of the
situation, is that which audits the performance of the actor, my term henceforth for
Dasein. Public, moreover, one contrasts to private as an inner to outer. In Heidegger's
context, this move is not advised or only advised as a moment of being-in-the-world. The world is neither public or private exclusively since it is both. Others make up the world, and they are the "they," as Heidegger said. That others are members of the public is a feature of a socio-linguistic structure with its attendant categories. Equally others are members of one's private circle.

The "they" are an anonymous collective. Its namelessness is the reverse feature of the actor's own anonymity. The actor is a member of the public, one of the people. This being-with-people is the public aspect of being a person, being on the stage of social reality. To fall into social reality is to be born into a world. The public/private distinction grows out a differentiation of a people according to their socio-linguistic structures. To illustrate this, I cite two sources, one from the world of travel literature and other from that of historical scholarship:

There was no such thing as the individual's private room, no bedroom, dining- or sitting room as such, since in the traditional Japanese house there was no furniture determining that a room should be reserved for any particular function. A person slept in a room, for example, without thinking of it as a bedroom or as his room.\textsuperscript{105}

Without a definite sense of private, there is a corresponding weak sense of the public. As Morely describes the following:

"Do you know," said Ichimonji, "that \textit{Bun-san} reproved me the other night for peeing against a wall?"

Boon protested.

"Reproved? Hardly. I followed your example myself. But the Japanese do seem to be much more natural about relieving themselves in public -- Japanese men, that is -- that we are. Perhaps because they have a more natural relation to the human body and its functions..."

There was a spontaneous wagging of heads, as if someone had pulled an invisible string. Only Kenji's [who had a doctorate in sociology] head remained unwagging.

"A more natural relation to the body? Perhaps. But then, doesn't this naturalness," he added slyly in English, "have something to do with there being no public to pee in?"\textsuperscript{110}

Returning to Western culture and Fernand Braudel:
Privacy was an eighteenth-century innovation. Not that Europe abandoned fashionable display at the time; it made even greater sacrifices for the sake of social appearances. But the individual was soon to have his revenge. Housing and furniture changed because individuals wanted them to and because the large town favoured their inclination.  

That the individual wanted them to presupposes the existence of the individual. In traditional cultures there were no individuals per se although certainly there were people. Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto* describe how capitalism broke down traditional barriers in creating a world market. This liberated people from tradition in that capitalism created patterns of production and consumption outside of traditional norms. People, in the form of individual persons, became split into public and private selves.

The division between public and private arise from the being-in-the-capitalist world. This underscores a more general point, namely, that the sub-text of *Being and Time* is commodification. Heidegger is in that world even as he attempts to articulate a version of being-in-the-world that is not directly determined by it. This is the dramatic tension of his script and scripting: to be both within and without the very world that one both acknowledges as "being" and yet does not acknowledge as final "being." Thus Being designates a world that is and yet is not. One wants to transform the world, and realistically this begins by acknowledging its existence. Heidegger demonstrated, albeit naively, in his brief and tragic political career that he too wanted to change the world.

To indicate the socio-linguistic context of "changing the world":

Of course Being towards Others is ontologically different from Being towards Things which are present-at-hand. The entity which is 'other' has itself the same kind of Being as *Dasein*. In Being with and towards Others, there is thus a relationship of Being from *Dasein* to *Dasein*. But it might be said that this relationship is already constitutive for one's own *Dasein*, which in its own right, has an understanding of Being, and which thus relates itself towards *Dasein*. The relationship-of-Being which one has towards Others would then become a Projection of one's own Being-towards-oneself 'into something else'. The other would be a duplicate of the Self.  

Abstract consciousness represents itself by the state of isolated speakers; practical consciousness is language, meaning the ability of speakers to cross-over (metaphorize)
their relations with others. Language, and thus practically speaking, consciousness, is built through constructing new relations with others. The 'something else' theoretically is the possibility of transforming relations through collective metaphorizing. This is the linguistic means whereby humans create the means of production capable of satisfying their particular species needs.

As indicated in the above, the satisfying of need has itself a history tightly bound up with the development of the means of production and labour power. In traditional society, there are no individuals per se; there is no private property. Rather the collective is the individual, an indivisible whole, having a totemic figure (animal or human) signifying its individuality. Thus the clan leader, reaching its highest development with kingship, is the univocal voice of the many; "l'etat, c'est moi," said Louis XIV. That the other is not a duplicate of the Self is a moment of that history. Individuals develop out of the breakdown of clan property into private holdings as Engels argued in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Heidegger, in short, is trading on the petty-bourgeois distinctions associated with private property in recognizing the non-duplication of individuals. However, duplication of individuals is a condition, not an essence: now humankind literally has the technical means to duplicate individuals through cloning. But a biological clone is not a social clone since the genetically identical twin is separated from its clone in time. At this point humans have cloned animals, the next stage theoretically is to clone ourselves.

But while these deliberations seem obvious enough, it is easy to see that they have little ground to stand on. The presupposition which this argument demands -- that Dasein's Being towards itself is Being towards an Other-- fails to hold. As long as the legitimacy of this presupposition has not turned out to be evident, one may still be puzzled as to how Dasein's relationship to itself is thus to be disclosed to the Other as Other.113

The problem here that Heidegger, according to my interpretation, is wrestling with is this: How does one become one? One is not an other but oneself. Abstracted from the actual history of socio-linguistic and cultural distinctions proper to a system of production, Heidegger's approach is difficult to follow. It is analogous to following the trail left by ghosts. Marxists begin with the idea of the collective, of people being with
each other, not importing here notions of being-individual. One discloses oneself to another through the daily actions of being a member of a social group. Being-individual, however, is a people-conditioned formation particular to a stage of collective development. To rephrase Heidegger's question: how can the social actor play the role particular to that self? However, it is necessary to qualify what self means, or at least its genetic-critical parameters:

Not only is Being towards Others an autonomous, irreducible relationship of Being; this relationship, as Being-with, is one which, with Dasein's Being, already is. Of course it is indisputable that a lively mutual acquaintanceship on the basis of Being-with, often depends upon how far one's own Dasein has understood itself at the time; but this means that it depends only upon how far one's essential Being with Others has made itself transparent and has not disguised itself. And this is possible only if Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already is with Others.14

Here, however, I vehemently disagree with the Master. My disagreement is, however, part of my desire to qualify what I find useful about his work, a point I shall make in the next section. Speaking negatively for the moment, being towards Others is not an autonomous, irreducible relationship of Being. In light of the above citations, Heidegger's statement expresses an extreme individualism, an a priori positing of essence incompatible with dialectical methods of inquiry, a reification of the social norms of late capitalism. It is Kant revisited, Heidegger's approach duplicating Kant's a priori positing of space and time, itself a reflection of Newton's absolute, static space. At best, what one has is a group of tendencies expressing themselves in relation to a definite set of environmental demands, and the satisfying of these demands in turn modifies the environment. It follows, according to a dialectically based argument, that one has no essential Being, either in relationship to Oneself or Others. Self-understanding is a component of this satisfying and modification in so far as it channels the entity's energy. For example, one has to eat; eating, however, is culturally determined as evinced by the wide variety of staple diets in the world. Thus if one understands oneself as Chinese, then one eats, in traditional Chinese culture, rice.

However, Heidegger might reply, "is there not an essence to eating or Being?" Do not all humans eat in roughly the same way in terms of their mastication and
digestive processes?" That is true, however, one is speaking of a certain body, the product of a long evolutionary development. Protozoa, for example, do not "eat" in the same way that humans do, and that is because their bodies are completely different. Certainly, there is Being but not in the way that Heidegger imagines it. He takes for granted the long evolutionary becoming of a body, the body permitting him to say Being. It is only within the narrow confines of historically determined concepts that one can say Being; empirically only within a class do individuals exist.

It is ironic that while Heidegger criticizes Hegel, accusing him of trivializing the question of Being at the very beginning of Being and Time, he maintains an important element of Hegel's philosophy, namely, the belief in essence. Hegel, to add a further element here, said that actuality is the union of essence and appearance. Without being overly polemical about this, it is interesting to consider these terms in light of what I have just said. The appearance is, one could say, is the public/private split of peoplehood; there appear to be public persons on one hand and private on the other. It is also interesting to note that the public/private split applies, as well, to the human body; that which is public is disclosed to others while that which is private -- one's private parts -- are concealed. This appearance is essential, however, to a people at a given stage in their own development. The rise of private property is concomitant with that of private persons, the collective of private persons forming the public. The actual is neither the appearance nor the essence but their union. This refers more precisely to the dialectic of concealment and disclosure -- the movement working itself out through historically achieved stages of social development. The actual then is the movement whose essence is becoming. Features of this movement are collectively speaking appearance; Being, in contrast to becoming, is the end of movement.

The end of a life's movement is death. Heidegger places a great deal of importance on death. I consider this question next by first citing three passages from Being and Time:

Thus arises the task of putting Dasein as a whole into our fore-having. This signifies, however, that we must first of all raise the question of this entity's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. As long as Dasein is, there is in every case something still outstanding, which Dasein can be and will be. But to that which is
thus outstanding, the 'end' itself belongs. The 'end' of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, which belongs to the potentiality-for-Being--that is to say, to existence--limits and determines in every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein.\textsuperscript{115}

While I will examine the question of the totality in more detail in my next chapter, I want to make some points here regarding death. Part of my difficulty in reading Heidegger is that he never specifies what sort of world he is discussing, leaving the contents of being-in-the-world unbracketed. Allied with his extreme individualism, this produces some distortions, particularly, it seems to me, in his notion of death. In the above, Heidegger raises the question of an entity's -- presumably Dasein's -- potential-for-Being-a-whole. The potential for Being, however, denotes being something, if this potential is to have any actual meaning. Any actual meaning implies the determinate contents of a world; one cannot actually fulfil one's potential for being an air pilot, for example, in the era before the invention of the aeroplane. This does not deny the possibility of doing so speculatively or purely imaginatively, as say Leonardo Da Vinci did in his fifteenth sketches of aeroplanes. The 'end' of Being-in-the-world references then the actualization of some determinate contents belonging to a world that would otherwise remain potential. Death is the end of a world in so far as that world, speaking collectively, has exhausted its contents, fulfilled its historic mission in traditional Marxist language. This aspect of the issue Heidegger largely ignores and so produces an overly abstract version of death, a telo-centrism, \textit{si vous voulez}.

Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein has been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same the uttermost one.\textsuperscript{116}

A personal quest for meaning -- Being-oneself -- has for its context the explicating and exhaustion of the transformative possibilities of the culture -- being-in-the-world. The world's content, the specific stage of development characterizing its culture, forms the matrix wherein and throughout the actor realizes his ownmost potentiality-for-Being. For
example, the 'they' forms no public if the very division between public and private has not occurred. No-longer-able-to-be-there begs the question of what is there such that the actor is there or not. The actor's non-presence is an abstraction from the specific cultural content of the late capitalist era, and it is this which is the sub-text of the world called Being and Time.

II

Nevertheless, Heidegger does have a point to make, the supplementing of it by Marxist analysis making it stronger:

One [Man sagt] says, "Death certainly comes, but not right away". With this 'but...', the "they" [das Man] denies that death is certain. 'Not right away' is not a purely negative assertion, but a way in which the "they" interprets itself. With this interpretation, the "they" refers itself to that which is proximally accessible to Dasein and amenable to its concern. Everydayness forces its way into the urgency of concern, and divests itself of the fetters of a weary 'inactive thinking about death.' Death is deferred to 'sometime later', and this is done by invoking the so-called 'general opinion. Thus the "they" covers up what is peculiar in death's certainty--that it is possible at any moment. Along with the certainty of death goes the indefiniteness of its "when". Everyday Being-towards-death evades this indefiniteness by conferring definiteness upon it. But such a procedure cannot signify calculating when the demise is due to arrive. In the face of definiteness such as this, Dasein would sooner flee. Everyday concern makes definite for itself the indefiniteness of certain death by interposing before it those urgencies and possibilities which can be taken in at a glance, and which belong to the everyday matters that are closest to us.

But when this indefiniteness has been covered up, the certainty has been covered up too. Thus death's ownmost character as a possibility gets veiled -- a possibility which is certain and at the same time indefinite--that is to say, possible at any moment.\(^{117}\)

I Sorgen, to expand upon the above, means both care and sorrow. A caring person feels compassion for the suffering of others, as a doctor, a care-giver, does for a patient. One does not grieve the passing of things, one works to make the present better. A good doctor does not berate a patient for his or past habits but encourages the patient, who has at least recognized his or her ailment, to inculcate more suitable ones. Wisdom, to paraphrase as Socrates' words in the Cratylus, was the being in touch with the flow of the thing. Flow signifies motion, and healing, whether oneself or others, is
emotional. It is the moving out of block energy from its formerly constricted place to a broader field of endeavor. With compassion, one forgives oneself for, say, poor judgement in the past, and lets go of that. One moves oneself onward to the future, preparing to face the unknown.

In returning to Heidegger, I want to place personal death within the larger context of capitalist society coming-to-an-end. This collective coming to an end calls into question pre-capitalist economic divisions and their suprastructural ideological representations. In order to do so, I consider Heidegger's distinctions more carefully.

The dialectic of definiteness and indefiniteness articulated by Heidegger in the above could be reformulated collectively to mean this: "the urgencies and possibilities which can be taken in at a glance" stand for the demands of everyday life. This is the immanent sphere -- spontaneous, unreflective, short-term -- for which the system of production is the transcendent -- historical, structured, long-term. Under capitalism, for example, the exchange of labour power for money -- more generally the cycle M(oney)-C(ommodity)-M(oney) -- is done spontaneously. It is perceived by the overwhelming majority of working people as directed by the supply and demand of the market. The marketplace and its demands thus appear to organize social life, signifying thus the immanent aspect of social existence. Marx, however, in Capital, argued for the production of surplus-value through capitalist exploitation as the real organizer of present reality.

Urgencies and possibilities characterize the immanent aspect of social existence; they do not in their immediateness give one time to think. Their horizon of action is thus severely limited. The point of surplus-value, taking it here metaphorically, is to indicate the transforming potential of collective action, the possibility of the majority of people organizing social reality in accordance with their perceived needs rather than being mere objects of external supply and demand. Surplus, in this looser sense, references the space for the reflecting and thereby reconceiving of need. Here as well I place Heidegger's notion of death. To reconceive of need means asking oneself what one is. What do I need requires facing the "I" that is in need.

The "I" is limited in its being. This concerns, immanently understood, the actual
spatial-temporal dimension of existence. However, the "I" as a member of a collective possesses historical being or Being. Herein lies the question of need. Capitalism has need of workers to accumulate capital and of consumers to ensure consumption. Need, in that sense, references subservience to the demands of a system of production and consumption. The transcendent possibility concerns how through collective action, the vast majority of people may restructure social reality. At present the majority of people have a passive object-like relationship to the system; under late capitalism, they are objects to be consumed by the needs of the system even as they, the consumers, apparently consume objects. They, however, do not objectify the system, take capitalism itself as the object that they reflect upon. Consumerism, a feature of late capitalism, is based on capitalism itself not yet becoming an object. That capitalism is itself an object passes unnoticed under and through the plethora of consumption possibilities forming actual buying patterns, the mechanism of supply and demand organizing the exchange of discrete objects.

Death is possible at any moment. This is true in so far as both the interactional possibilities are unlimited or at least not readily calculable. For example, one could be killed crossing the street, as the commonsensical phrase goes, or be felled by an aneurism. As novelist Joseph Heller in his superlative black humour manner points out in Catch-22:

There were lymph glands that might do him in. There were kidneys, nerve sheaths and corpuscles. There were tumors of the brain. There was Hodgkin's disease, leukemia, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. There were fertile red meadows of epithelial tissue to catch and coddle a cancer cell. There were diseases of the skin, diseases of the bone, diseases of the lung, diseases of the stomach, diseases of the heart, blood and arteries. There were diseases of the head, diseases of the neck, diseases of the chest, diseases of the intestines, diseases of the crotch. There even were diseases of the feet. There were billions of conscientious body cells oxidating away day and night like dumb animals at their complicated job of keeping him alive and healthy, and every one was a potential traitor or foe. There were so many diseases that it took a truly diseased mind to even think about them as often as he and Hungry Joe did.118

The key word in the above is disease. The indefiniteness of death preys upon the mind, it causes dis-ease, unrest. It also covers over the fantastic fact of being alive. The focus
of both the disease caused by the thought of death and the fantastic character of being alive is the body -- an entity largely absent in Heidegger's text, Heller's and Heidegger's respective texts serving as point-counter-point, to borrow Huxley's title. The absence of the body in Heidegger's text mirrors the other lacuna I pointed out, namely, the ignoring of the actual content of being-in-the-world. Content is the world's body; and the disease, to continue my organic argument, references the body's coming-to-an-end. Heidegger's version of this is highly abstract; it lacks body.

Body here has, at least, a double function. It is the identity of an actual individual, and it is the product of the collective action of many individuals or social body. I am aware, however, of the differing interpretive treatments of different bodies. Feminist scholarship over the last two decades has shown how women tend to be identified much more directly with their actual physical form than men, to be judged on what they look like (largely predetermined genetically) rather than by what they know (the acquiring of competence in a given domain). In that way, women are denied a public life, that is, an existence transcending -- overcoming, negating, uplifting -- their physical form, this allowing them to live on through their cultural contributions -- whether through the sciences or arts. In short, women in patriarchal society are seen as more or less bodies and men as minds.

The accidentalness, so to speak, of coming to an end is itself embedded in being-in-a-world. I am tempted, however, to separate coming-to-an-end into two categories: accidental and deliberate. The accident is unplanned for whereas the deliberate is not. There are problems to this classification, however. As Heller's cited passage indicates there are so many potential diseases rooted in the body's very structure (provoked by environmental factors) that it is impossible to exclude them from the realm of the purposeful. If a so-called accident belongs to the very structure of the thing in question, how can it be an accident? Conversely, that which is deliberate -- possessing purpose, end, intention -- it seems to me grows out of a myriad of apparently less than purposeful structures. Of course, one could isolate, in an abstract-cognitive way, purpose, identifying it, as Nietzsche did to some extent, with will. Another difficulty is that purpose implies having control over something in so far as purpose
implies seeing a thing to its end. While some control over one's immediate environment is possible, in large measure, from the individual standpoint, one does not have a great deal of control. Moreover, as Marx said, "men are free to make history, but not under conditions of their own choosing."

That which is deliberate, then, comes down to working with the apparently accidental. However, I do not intend to juxtapose to the accidental the purposeful in the manner of Hegel's teleological absolutism. Marx borrowed from Hegel the notion of _telos_; the end of history, however, for Marx is implied in the very process of reaching it. The end is objectively real as the ownmost possibility of the historical process itself; society wrests its future out of itself at ever higher stages of complex interaction. This is, moreover, **progressive**, in so far as each stage of society arises out of the ability of society to enlarge its former sphere of action, this concretely denoted by the expansion of human labour power. In the beginning was primitive communism -- an egalitarian, partnership (using Eisler's term found in _The Chalice and the Blade_) based on direct interaction in a small (gathering-hunting) group setting; and in the end will be a sophisticated communism, sharing those features. The direct interaction may be physical and, extrapolating from the current technology, metaphysical as well as denoted by virtual interaction; virtual reality references the metaphysics of the computer age.

Communism, as Marx said, is the real movement of history. One might, however, want to claim that technology -- or capitalism, or demographic change -- "is the real movement of history." Can I prove that communism rather than any of the other subjects is the real movement? Not in any absolute sense as the final answer to history is the end of this last. To the extent that one lives, history is not yet over. Assuming the absence of any omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent God that could rescue man from history, humankind is left to its own devices. At best, one has a model and explores that model, continually testing for its strengths and weakness, namely, correspondence and non-correspondence, respectively, to the facts. However, model testing is not simply an exercise in empiricism. Rather facts require interpretation. Thus in judging the model, one is also interpreting and reinterpreting the facts as part of
judging the overall validity of the model. In facing the limits of one's model, one indirectly faces the limits of one's own intelligence. One inquires, thus, in a spirit of humility.

With this explanation, I return to the details of my working model. In a communist perspective, that which is deliberate is the actual unfolding of society along the lines of its struggle with its disease, the symptoms of disease being contradictions. Alive, the body is yet dying. It is alive in its contradictions as it struggles with its disease, the harbinger of its inevitable end. In the capitalist body politics, scarcity no longer serves as the inevitable motivator, although it is still a motivator, for work. The working class struggle of the 1930s, aided by the spirit of social solidarity of the 1940s, coupled with the tremendous productive abilities of capitalism, forced the capitalist class to offer concessions in the form of welfare state benefits. Thus unemployment insurance, old age pension, socialized medicine, to name its principal achievements, came into effect in all of the advanced capitalist states; the extent varied with the Scandinavian countries such as Sweden having the most extensive social services and the United States the least. Somewhere in between is Canada, due to its more communal-corporatist norms - as evinced in an earlier stage by the colonization of its Western frontiers in direct contrast to the United States experience. In Canada government preceded the settlers; in the United States, the opposite was the case.

Conditions, to return to the world situation, have changed. Former monopoly national based capitalism has given way to global, the organizational form being the multinational corporation in conjunction with supra-national trading blocks. This has caused a strategic dislocation as single nation states have lost their importance as organizers of capital accumulation. As a result, their ability to extract revenue, in the form of taxes, has declined. Foot-loose and fancy free, corporations can now exploit individual nation states outside of supra-national trading blocks as well as within by moving capital about at will through altering of investment strategies. As the case of NAFTA, the trade agreement between Canada and the US, extending recently to Mexico. indicates, the more advanced economies can demand concessions from the weaker within trade agreements, this opening up the way for more intense corporate
exploitation. This extends as well to the global labourer as well as well as currency manipulation -- casino capitalism being a term coined in the 1970s to describe capitalism's latest speculative phase.

Scarcity makes its re-appearance in the withholding of capital investment, the playing off of one group of players -- whether workers, investors, or governments -- against another rather than in the actual shortage of things characterizing pre-capitalist epochs. This form of scarcity is much more deliberate, it being the product of investment decisions of privately owned multinational corporations.

That death is possible at any moment, to return to Heidegger, is an ontologically valid statement. Collapse of the body is catastrophic. However, the question that I ask is this: does the death initiate a new life? Here I am not being religious, not in a traditional sense at any rate. Rather the question indicates the connection between the vitality of the body as intensified by the awareness of death. However, awareness of death does not necessarily lead to a more vital -- lively, vigorous, feisty -- way of being-in-the-world. Morbidity is another response. The point that a Marxist (or myself as a Marxist) would emphasize in this debate is this: the body lives through the energetic engagement with the world. I employ the word live in contrast, although not necessarily in opposition to, survive. The decisive different between them is that of surplus. To "live," as other than to "survive," is to exploit a surplus. The body's surplus manifests itself through non-economical activity, that is, activity that is not directly related to satisfying, as Marx would say, following in the tradition of Western Enlightenment, the demands of necessity. I have earlier called this the transcendent aspect of social reality.

In traditional Western religious thought transcendence and immanence reference the power of a deity above and beyond the earthly realm of human desire. However, as indicated earlier, I use these words to describe individual and collective action respectively. The transcendent is the collective ability of human individuals to transform the conditions of their existence through their ability to objectify the nature of their present reality. It is abstract labour. The immanent references the individual plane of unobjectified social reality, those "urgencies and possibilities which can be taken in at a
glance." The transcendent-ontological cannot be taken in at a glance because it concerns the invisible, namely, the sum total of interactions between individuals through time and space.

Death then in the ontological sense that Heidegger intends it refers in the Marxist sense to the collective ability of humankind to transform its social existence. However, and here is where Marxism (or myself as a Marxist) must disagree with Heidegger is that death cannot come at any moment. This refers back to the issue of a world's content, its bodiliness. Certain possibilities of being belonging to a definite stage of human development determine to what degree the actor can realize his Being. The death of the book, for example, cannot come before the era of literacy. As well, previous forms of social development can be retained by society although with a different meaning. For example, horses are no longer the main mode of transportation although people still ride horses -- in equestrian competitions, on Western dude ranches, for example. People still read books even as they surf the Net, although not possible at the same time. That death is possible at any moment references the immanent realm of ontic possibility, in short, the realm of discrete bodies. Does this hold true for collective bodies such as entire cultures?

Certainly, in previous eras catastrophe did (and continues to strike) humankind. Ancient cultures, for example, the Mayan, have vanished. In the pre-global era, the demise of one culture could be accomplished without the severe (if any dislocation) of any other culture given the relatively isolated conditions of general cultural existence. Now, however, the death of one is, to paraphrase the old socialist slogan, the death of all. The highly interrelated nature of global civilization, the extension of nineteenth century capitalist world market, means that no single culture can suffer demise except with the collective permission and connivance of all -- for example, the Western world's response to events in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s. This, however, does not address Heidegger's point directly although it lays the groundwork for an answer. It does not address the point because, one could say, the collective-global nature of response to catastrophe does not preclude the crashing of a swarm of meteors into the earth. Scientists speculate that such an occurrence was responsible for the demise of
the dinosaurs, this creating the space for the rise of proto-mammals who were our far distant ancestors. A meteor crash, however, shows the interrelatedness of all things in the cosmos.

Death can still happen at any moment. However, is this ontologically different from saying, in its banality, that accidents can and will happen? Granted that purpose cannot be posited a priori, meaning apart from the struggle of the body with its own disease and symptoms, its spatio-temporal nature and contradictions respectively. Is it possible to distinguish death from accident? Death is the coming-to-an-end. The bourgeoisie, for example, ended the isolated existence of many traditional cultures through the force of its production and distribution methods, this resulting in the creation of a world market. It was a revolutionary accomplishment. However, the individual members of the bourgeoisie did not intend to create a world market. The single firm simply wanted an outlet for its production. At another level, the English capitalists of which Marx wrote in Capital did not intend to impoverish their workers; the former simply wanted to produce as much as they could for as little as they could - and to hell with anything else. Individual capitalists may act separately in terms of interpersonal contacts; the interlocking directorships of which Wallace Clement speaks indicates that today, however, individual capitalists do increasingly co-ordinate their moves. Even if individual capitalists do not, their actions are structurally congruent given that each is an instance of commodity production. The reproduction of a structure can take many forms, as the various stages of capitalist development -- eighteenth century small, independent producers to nineteenth joint-stock companies to twentieth multinational corporations -- demonstrates.

Is capitalism's death, then, possible at any moment? Capitalism has shown an amazing resiliency, and the predictions of its end made mostly by Marxists have failed to materialize. That each step capitalism takes brings it to its end, the fond hope of every Marxist (including this one) must be balanced against the need to struggle against capitalism -- criticizing its defects -- and with capitalism -- exposing the possibilities for a 'better' life inherent in existing developments. However, to say better implies saying good, and this in turn some vision of what is good -- in classical philosophic discourse,
the True, the Beautiful and the Just. The dynamic of a structure cannot substitute, in any revolutionary sense, for the work of articulating a vision just as, conversely, this last cannot substitute for the hard analysis of empirical facts. Both have their own rigor, both are necessary for the revolutionary movement as a whole. That death could come at any moment, at the transpersonal or social level, must be put in relation to the structural unfolding of possibilities. This is not to deny the reality of sudden catastrophe, of purely external forces crashing down upon an entity. In that sense Heidegger is right. But this I would not call death, nor do I think would Heidegger in terms of the ownmost possibility for Being. Rather a sudden catastrophe could cause the perishing of something -- a flash flood in which individual humans perished or even whole species, such as the dinosaurs, did. Death, in terms of Heidegger's own analytic, refers more specifically to the unfolding of Dasein's ownmost for Being. This has direct relevance for Marxists.

Capitalism's ownmost possibility for Being is the complete commodification of social reality. Until then capitalism has not exhausted its historical relevance. However, that view too one must qualify, for it ignores agency, that is, the possibility for transforming capitalism through working class and related struggle. In an abstract philosophical sense one could wait until social reality has become completely commodified and then simply step back into a post-capitalist world. However, the real world does not work that way; one observes the possible unfolding only because one is subject to that world's actuality. One is part of the struggle of that world to transform itself whether one likes it not; the crucial question is, as Marxists put, on which side of the class struggle do you stand? That death is possible at any moment ignores how one could, at the class (transpersonal) level, bring a world to its end through the concerted engagement with it. His comments apply more accurately to more discrete and isolated bodies. "Possible at any moment" reflects the cessation of certain body functions, as quantified and measured by the requisite instruments, the totality of such actions leading to the coroner's report of clinical death.

I pose more generally the question of life and death. Life and death point to the concentration and centralization of energy-in-form constituting individual or trans-individual identity. There is no other point. Life does not come into being for a purpose,
there is no raison d'être to existence if ultimately all is but energetic motion. Against this nihilism, if it is, I posit however the other great fact, namely, the interdependence of all things that this energetic motion articulates through the constant reformulation of form. The thrust of socialism, as indicated by the alienated, isolated, atomized nature of bourgeois existence, is to remind society of that. Society is a society because of the interdependence of the parts forming the whole; communism, in its own name, manifests that commonness. Capitalism, by contrast, emphasizes the individual, separate, distinct nature of the part's wholes. Communism, however, both precedes and proceeds out of capitalism. Communism, setting aside for the moment Lenin's distinction between the lower and higher stages of socialism, is the memory erased, most systemically by capitalism; and communism is capitalism's possible future, the other possibility being barbarism.

The disease, staying within the Marxist ambit, is the loss of the collective. On one hand, this is hardly a cause for mourning since that loss was produced by the expansion of human labour power. This is the empirical-realist strand of communist theorizing, the basis of its belief in progress. On the other hand, the loss of the collective is a cause for mourning since it results in the painful isolation of one member of the body politic from the other; this is the organic-holistic strand of Marxism. Marxism is realistic enough to recognize the necessity of breaking with unarticulated unity while idealistic enough to want to recover that lost unity. However, there is another factor one ought to consider here, touched upon earlier when discussing the body. As noted there patriarchal culture treats the female body different from the male, the former identified with nature and non-transcendence and the latter with culture and transcendence. The breaking with the unity represented by matriarchal Neolithic culture was accomplished, Eisler argues, through the 'rape' by the dominator Kurgan invaders of matriarchy. As Eisler writes:

It is a wide spread assumption that however bloody things have been since the days of the Sumerians and Assyrians that was just the unfortunate prerequisite for technological and cultural advance. If the "savages" who existed prior to our "earliest" civilizations were peaceable, it is reasoned they would naturally, lacking the proper motivating, have produced little of any lasting value. For the spur of war, the "man-in-the-street" and the Pentagon theorist will hold, has been
necessary to bring on all technological and, by implication, cultural advance. However, the data we are now examining, as well as many other ancient myths and legends, tell us the same thing we are learning from archaeological excavations. This is that one of the best-kept historical secrets is that practically all the material and social technologies fundamental to civilization were developed before the imposition of a dominator society.

The principles of food growing, as well as of construction, container and clothing technology were all already known by the Goddess-worshiping people of the Neolithic. So were increasingly sophisticated uses of natural resources such as wood, fibers, leather, and later, metals as law, government, and religion, likewise date back to what, borrowing from Gimbutas’ term Old Europe, we may call the Old Society. And so also do the related concepts of prayer, judgeship, and priesthood. Dance, ritual drama, and oral or folk literature, as well as art, architecture, and town planning are likewise pre-dominator society. Trade, by both land and sea, is another legacy of this earlier ear. So is administration, education, and even forecasting of the future. For the first identification of oracular or prophetic power is with the priestesses of the Goddess.\(^{119}\)

The end of the matriarchal order was of “murder most foul, strange, and unnatural” as the Ghost explained to Hamlet in regard to his own death. The end of matriarchy was, from matriarchy’s viewpoint, an accident in that it did not proceed from its own organic nature, the lines of development laid down by its own dynamic. The Kurgan invasions were as an animal eating a flower to the flower. However, from the subsequent viewpoint of those produced by the synthesis, no matter how one-sided, of matriarchal and patriarchal cultures, this was a necessary step in history. The seeds of the flower, having escaped organic decomposition were spread through the depositing of the animal’s feces.

History does not necessarily occur in smooth, unbroken lines. Does this mean that one is simply left with the bare fact of the interdependence of all things? No, that would be an idealism. As a Marxist, I affirm that actuality is the movement from primitive to sophisticated communism; communism is the real movement of history. However, this does not obligate me to subscribe to any one arrangement of the stages constituting the appearance of this movement. However, it is from the collective experience that one must draw one’s conclusions in order to avoid idealistic obscurantism and other forms of subjective, one-sided error (Lukacs 1971). However, doing an analysis requires having a mind, and mind, in the materialistic schema, is
nothing more than brain activity (see Minsky 1986), and brains are in spatio-temporally limited bodies and so ultimately reflect being-in-a-world. If one is not to privilege one’s own age as the end of history, as bourgeois theorists have done both in the 1950s (the end of ideology) and the 1990s (with the collapse of the former USSR) then one is left necessarily with a less than whole database. In short, one’s analysis must be, in some way, one-sided, a one-sidedness that remains for subsequent generations of inquirers to discover and correct. Struggle, to summarize, concerns both discrete forces in opposition to each other -- physical-material demands of practice -- as well as the task of making sense of the opposition and the result of the clash -- mental-cognitive demands of theorizing. The struggle of previous generations or the past is the food for theory as the theory itself becomes (or can become depending on its relevance) implicated in the struggle of the present to bring out the future.

The end, to give it its due, denotes the passage of energy from one form to another; the point of reformulation. The concrete or immediate cause of this reformulation can or cannot proceed out of the dynamic tendencies of the body in question. For that body in question, it is an important history, this being the subjective side of the historical equation. However, objectively, whether it did or not is absolutely irrelevant. However, both subjective and objective are by themselves one-sided, and it is only through a careful investigation of the specific conditions of their interaction can one discern the meaning of the development arising from that interaction. For example, that matriarchy was violently overthrown -- the words rape, murder, pillage express matriarchy’s outrage -- rather than organically developing has great subjective importance for understanding the subjective aspect of patriarchal culture. As prisoners of war, in effect, women and their bodies bear the scars of patriarchy’s continuing need to maintain its domination. However, the recognition of the subjective can lead to the creation of the objective. Feminist research in the last twenty-five years has objectified the nature of patriarchal society, thereby laying the conditions for the superseding of this last.

In coming to an end that which was once alive dies. One presumes the existence of death. However, this is not so for all forms of life. Death has a career, so to speak,
and it begins it when life becomes multicellular with the division between individual and reproductive cell, and not beforehand. This is the gist of Freud’s argument in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. To cite the relevant passages in which he quotes Weismann:

...he...relates the distinction between the mortal soma and the immortal germ-plasm to **multicellular** organisms; in unicellular organisms the individual and the reproductive cell are still one and the same (Weismann, 1882, 38). Thus he considers that unicellular organisms are potentially immortal, and that death only makes its appearance with the multicellular metazoa. It is true that this death of the higher organisms is a natural one, a death from internal causes; but it is not founded on any primal characteristic of living substance (Weismann, 1884, 84) and cannot be regarded as an absolute necessity with its basis in the very nature of life (Weismann, 1882, 33). Death is rather a matter of expediency, a manifestation of adaptation to the external conditions of life; for, when once the cells of the body have been divided into soma and germ-plasma, an unlimited duration of individual life would become a quite pointless luxury. When this differentiation had been made in the multicellular organisms, death became possible and expedient. Since then, the soma of the higher organisms had died at fixed periods for internal reasons, while the protista have remained immortal. It is not the case, on the other hand, that reproduction was only introduced at the same time as death. On the contrary, it is a primal characteristic of living matter, like growth (from which it originated), and life has been continuous from its first beginning upon earth (Weismann, 1884, 84 f.)

Freud goes on to deduce from the experiments of his day that unicellular animals retain their immortality if they do not have contact with their own by-products, are kept active, and if they are able to conjugate. Species life became the immortal part, the germ cells containing the genetic material; the species could dispense with the individual.

In the case of non-human species the awareness of death is expressed primarily through the instinctual avoidance of situations in which extreme pressures are placed upon individual organisms. Grazing animals, for example, avoid predators. In the case of humans this awareness assumes a more positive stance due to our greater and more differentiated cranial capacity. Memory coupled with language permits us to conceive of and articulate an array of non-actual possible realities. Death is a fertile ground for the imagination since, by its very nature, it forces us to conceive of reality beyond actuality since it is the actual -- the individual organism -- that ceases to be upon death. Sleep is the outlet in life that we have for this re-conceiving of reality as other than actuality -- the dream; in Greek myth, **Thanatos** (death) and **Hypnos** (sleep).
are brothers. Species life is an imaginary entity, the collective existence of many individuals and their relations. This is, relative to its individual members, immortal, beyond, in other words, actual reality. It is, in optical language, invisible.

To summarize: Suffering death or mortality is the property of the individual organism separated from its reproductive capacity; not suffering death or immortality is the property of the total relations between individual over time and through space or, in a word, the collective. Death, the power of the immortal, represents the power of the collective vis-a-vis the individual, that which is present by its absence, that which is there by not being there. Death becomes personified in an extreme manner with patriarchy and becomes the theme of patriarchal-Biblical culture, Greek Homeric and other writings of the time. This reflects the violent social conditions, of death caused by war, under which these works were written. Death was distanced from the body as the latter’s own natural process of decay and dissolution. One could compare blood shed in the course of menstruation (the Goddess) and the blood shed in warfare (the God).

My observations do not invalidate the rich textuality of Heidegger’s language; rather they circumscribe it, indicating the broad cultural matrix out of which it comes. To illustrate this last point, I turn now to Heidegger’s discussion of anxiety. He begins with an analysis of fear.

That which fear fears about is that very entity which is afraid -- \textit{Dasein}. Only an entity for which in its Being this very Being is an issue, can be afraid. Fearing discloses this entity as endangered and abandoned to itself. Fear always reveals \textit{Dasein} in the Being of its “there”, even if it does so in varying degrees of explicitness.\textsuperscript{121}

Please note Heidegger’s language. Danger and abandonment indicates an extreme disassociation of the individual from the group, the withdrawal of total support, it would seem. Hence the individual is left to his own devices in a way that denies the social context, its matrix, a word deriving from the Latin \textit{mater} mother. Heidegger’s individual is almost that of an abandoned child. In short, the fear that Heidegger expresses is not fear in general, as he might perhaps want us to believe, but the specific fear of the atomized individual characteristic of capitalist society. This person is typically male. As indicated before the public/private differentiation of a people characterizes capitalist
society, and the public is the collective of private individuals. Private means that which has been withdrawn from the public, and in Heidegger's passage one sees, despite Heidegger's words to the contrary, the psycho-linguistic consequences of that extreme, privatized, asocial form of individuality, namely endangerment and abandonment.

Further,

One can also fear about Others, and we then speak of "fearing for" them. This fearing for the Other does not take away his fear. Such a possibility has been ruled out already, because the Other, for whom we fear, need not fear at all on his part. It is precisely when the Other is not afraid and charges recklessly at what is threatening him that we fear most for him. Fearing-for is away of having a co-state-of-mind with Others, but not necessarily a being-afraid-with or even a fearing-with-one-another. One can "fear about" without "being-afraid". Yet when viewed more strictly, fearing-about is "being-afraid-for-oneself." 122

The fear of the atomized, typically male, individual is precisely that there are no Others in that world. One stands alone, the artist is the genius. These shibboleths of late bourgeois culture indicate the depersonalizing and depeopling force of commodity production. I say depeopling rather than depopulating to indicate the difference between denigrating the personal characteristics of people and physically eliminating their presence. I extrapolate from Marx's analysis of the changing composition of capital found in Capital I. There Marx indicates how increasingly dead labour replaces live in the form of machines, this causing the rate of surplus value to fall. The latest evidence for this is global downsizing.

The depeopling tendency of capitalism flows from three interrelated sources. In production machines replace people. Corporate capitalist downsizing, for example, is the logical continuation of the substitute of dead for living labour begun with the Industrial Revolution. In relations of production, the atomizing tendencies of capitalism have led to the extolling of the individual entrepreneur rather than to that of the social base -- the working body -- that supports such enterprise; the hero becomes one individual rather than the community itself. The contradiction of capitalism, this public composed of private selves, is that it continually denies its matrix -- community of labour power -- and yet cannot exist without it. Rosa Luxembourg argued in Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital that imperialism, the early state of monopoly capitalism,
was the phenomenon of capitalism absorbing the remaining non-capitalist regions of
the world. Only when this had happened, can capitalism exhaust its historical mission,
Marx had this "ideal-typical" form of capitalism in mind when writing Capital.

Another way of considering this is that contracts, the documentary regulation of
exchange, require mutual trust of the parties in each other. This trust is not something
that one can buy in the marketplace, rather it is an aspect of early socialization, the
stage where the child, having received sufficient support from the people in its
immediate environment, learns to trust others. Market society relies upon the efficacy of
pre-market socialization; it literally exploits values of trust, integrity, commitment for
purposes of exchange. To prove this, the reader might think of how much you
personally could trust someone with whom you had a strictly monetary relationship; you
could trust as far as you could pay him or her. Someone else with more money could
simply subvert that trust. Friendship then that is determined by the highest bidder has a
strictly monetary one, it being external and alien to what friendship, in any personal
way, is. "In God we trust," moreover, is the phrase written upon the USA banknote,
even as trust is precisely what money cannot buy. This indicates how the market
economy and money society more generally exploit civil society, converting its values
into its own. Capitalism depeoples the world through replacing people with their abstract
representations; hence people become consumers. Capitalism's fear about not
maintaining its production levels translates into frenzied advertising campaigns
promoting consumption. The public of private selves is the collective of atomized
individuals whose means of connecting with each other are reduced to buying the same
product -- the phenomenon of brand identification. I am what I buy -- the shibboleth of
consumerism. Money in capitalist society is the ultimate brand name marking with fiery
force the group to which one belongs. In this way capitalism herds consumers into the
appropriate buying pens -- the shiny clean aisles of supermarkets -- with their fodder --
products on shelves.

Returning to Heidegger I read:

All modifications of fear, as possibilities of having a state-of-mind, point to the
fact that *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world is 'fearful'. This 'fearfulness' is not to be
understood in an ontical sense as some factual 'individualized' disposition, but
as an existential possibility of the essential state-of-mind of *Dasein* in general, though of course it is not the only one.\(^{123}\)

An existential possibility of the essential state-of-mind of *Dasein* has for its context the definite contents of a world. That is why fearfulness is not simply a factual 'individualized' disposition. It indicates the particular power relations in place that maintain a given production system -- a system that produces both people and things or, in the case of capitalism, people-as-things.

III

I have touched upon care and fear, exposing some limits to Heidegger's formulations. In this concluding section, I will consider some features of Heidegger's notion of time, comparing this briefly with a standard Marxist formulation of it:

> We shall point to temporality as the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call "*Dasein*". If this is to be demonstrated, those structures of *Dasein* which we shall provisionally exhibit must be interpreted over again as modes of temporality. In thus interpreting *Dasein* as temporality, however, we shall not give the answer to our leading question as to the meaning of Being in general. But the ground will have been prepared for obtaining such an answer.\(^{124}\)

Bloch, a well-known Marxist philosopher, writes:

> Time, says Marx, is the space of history. By this he means that it holds together the phenomena which occur within it, and gives them the same economico-social ground.\(^{125}\)

Heidegger, however, goes on to disagree with the defining of time in terms of space.

We have already intimated that *Dasein* has a pre-ontological Being to its ontically constitutive state. *Dasein* is in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being. Keeping this interconnection firmly in mind, we shall show that whenever *Dasein* tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Time must be brought to light--and genuinely conceived--as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for anyway of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of *Dasein*, which understands Being. This task as a whole requires that the conception of time thus obtained shall be distinguished from the way in which it is ordinarily understood. This ordinary way of understanding it has become explicit in an interpretation precipitated in the traditional concept of time, which as persisted from Aristotle to Bergson and even
later. Here we must make clear that this conception of time and, in general, the ordinary way of understanding it, have sprung from temporality, and we must show how this has come about. We shall thereby restore to the ordinary conception the autonomy which is its rightful due, as against Bergson's thesis that the time one has in mind in this conception is space.26

Marx's definition, cited by Bloch, falls into the category of the ordinary way of understanding time in that it does not display an understanding of time's definitional and conceptual autonomy. I would suggest, however, that autonomy needs to be rethought, borrowing here a concept from Nicos Poulantzas, namely "relative autonomy." Time possesses no absolute autonomy vis-a-vis space any more than an understanding of being-in-the-world does vis-a-vis the contents of the world that one is actually in. Being-in-the-world is the space wherein one formulates a concept of time. Heidegger, for example, can stand outside the capitalist world in theory; however, I have provisorily shown, he still stands within the contents of that world. Nevertheless, Heidegger's analysis of time gives to Marxism an element that remains unarticulated within its own corpus, namely, the explication of time as the horizon for the understanding of Being. I say unarticulated rather than absent. In the following I shall show how Marxists could fill in this lacuna.

In Bloch the same economico-social ground stands as the space for doing an analysis. Economico-social ground I take to be what I mean by a world's contents. The same ground presumes then the sameness of contents. However, the sameness of contents does not necessarily imply a sameness of form. Capitalism, for example, may be understood as one epoch, the unity of the economico-social ground of commodity production, although its formation is highly differentiated: the various stages indicated earlier. Society undergoes transformation as its various tendencies, assuming definite character at various stages of its history, work themselves out -- this working out being, in classical Marxist terms, the class struggle. Society becomes society -- Itself -- through this. Means, relations and forces of production indicate ways of grasping the one-in-many nature of social becoming.

However, this statement has relative autonomy in so far as it references class society, capitalism being the most systemic form of class society. Relations and forces
of production then reference the form of society, and can then be applied to any social form, capitalist or non-capitalist. Capitalism, as most systemic class society, denotes a specific stage of social development. It summarizes all previous antagonisms but at a much more abstract level and in more polarized form. For example, the separation of humankind from nature began, following Marx and Engels, with the human making of the means of production. It was also, as McLuhan would say, the first extension of humankind. Means of production imply some product to be made, and this in turn some understanding of the need which that product would satisfy, whether directly consumed or used. Here, formally, humankind displaced nature as the definer of need and organizer of need satisfaction.

The ontically constitutive state is the actor being-in-a-world, and satisfying the demands of that world, thereby ensuring his survival, while modifying the world. I would suggest that Dasein’s pre-ontological Being as its ontically constitutive state references the continuing transformation of need as organized through the evolving expansion of labour power and associated instruments of labour. More specifically, the proto-mammals who survived the great meteor crash, as some scientists argue, become the direct though distant ancestors of humankind; these life forms were ontically constitutive human forms, pre-ontological human Beings. Ontological, as its etymology indicates, implies a logos to the ontos, a being able to give an account of one’s being. Classically, this is understood as reasoning. To reason about something means that the thing-to-be-reasoned-about must exist objectively for the reasoner-to-be. Fish do not reason about water, for example, they experience it directly, spontaneously, immediately. They are literally submerged in it. More abstractly, the ontic references the being-submerged in a phenomenon such that the latter remains, because of its unmediated all-presentness, invisible. Water is objectively invisible to the fish swimming in it as air is for air breathers. The ontological denotes the stage wherein the hitherto unmediated becomes mediated, when one is able to, metaphorically speaking, able to step back from it; when one’s nature becomes other to oneself.

The ontic becomes the ontological through the ability of a life form to objectify the character of its existence. The objectification of nature is most strongly represented
by humankind as evinced by humankind's extensive use of tools and other instruments of labour. Human labour power then is the means for both transforming the non-human world -- the natural realm -- and for self-transformation -- the social realm. Humankind, in other words, becomes human through its labour. The root of man, the young Marx said in his philosophic manuscripts, is man himself. Heidegger's notion of pre-ontological and ontological are useful in that they indicate both a continuity and discontinuity. The form of the subject matter undergoes change, there is transformation, in so far as that subject itself understands its needs in a new way. The body is submerged in need: its bio-mechanical nature continually requires replenishment in the form of food. Life is a dynamic open system, meaning that it depends upon exchange of matter with its environment. The continuity references the same kind of being -- ontos -- that is however undergoing change as organizing through evolutionary species adaption to its environment -- which itself is modified by the organisms inhabiting it.

The possibility of the ontological, to abstract from the above, is submerged within the ontic, that of the human within the non-human. All life forms reason demonstrate sense in so far as they are responsive to changes in their environment. Sense organs embody a form of perception. Reason, however, I distinguish from sense in that the former concerns the ability to objectify the natural forces of which one is a part. This is the same criterion that separates the ontological from the ontic, the human from the non-human. The reader is correct to sense here an evolving hierarchy whereby non-living things do not respond to changes in the environment, they being acted upon, for example, rocks; living things do respond to changes and thereby evince sense; and only those living things called human reason through their ability to objectify that environment and the making sense of that. This implicates the phenomenon of meta-objectivity, concretized through instruments of measurement or, in short, technology, the extension of humankind. The ability to reason is thus not simply a cognitive process, a matter of the head only, but of cognition in relation to fulfilling the demands of a definite environment, a matter of the head working with its hands. Reasoning is practical labour. The ontological thus emerges from the ontic, and the ontic becomes itself ontological, most strongly through the expansion of human labour.
Human labour expands within a defined cultural space, namely, society. Its expansion is necessary to meet the demands of an environment; and through meeting these demands, the grounds for its freer expansion are laid down. Concretely, this concerns surplus value. Economies of subsistence, such as gathering-hunting groups, have no surplus; this does not mean, however, that gatherer-hunters starved (although they could). Rather they are able to meet their needs fairly comfortably:

Richard B. Lee has shown that the Kung San, a small group of hunters and gatherers who still live in the Kalahari Desert in southern Africa, work an average of 20 hours a week. Because hunting is so unpredictable, they might work for a week and then rest for a month. During the leisure periods they visit neighbours in other camps, dance, and celebrate. In other words, these "primitive" people spend half their time on vacation, have no bosses, and live much freer from anxiety than most "modern" people. 

They had, in short, few cares. The growth of society from gathering-hunting to agriculture to urban settlements, forced by the dynamic of population increase and technological progress, was accompanied by increases in surplus value and the development of hierarchies for the distribution of that surplus together with ideologies of scarcity justifying those social arrangements. Scarcity and anxiety were created along with power structures, a term I shall shortly define, as the contrast of modern with more "primitive" society indicates. Being, in the grand, majestic sense and naive sense of the whole, was concretized as divine, at first feminine and then masculine; Riane Eisler's account in *The Chalice and the Blade* supports this view. The gods appeared in dreams, oracles and prophecies; it expressed the forces of the unknown aspects of nature. The increasing objectification of nature led to the separation of the human from it, this more advanced in pastoral-herding cultures than in agrarian. Ideologies of scarcity intertwined with those of objectification -- of control over and manipulation of nature. The concretization of this tendency in the agrarian-pastoral epoch was Kurgan dominator culture, this culture being responsible for defeating and supplanting, for the moment, the Neolithic Goddess worshipping agrarian one. The female sex suffered a world historical defeat as the Kurgan culture generalized itself; humankind became mankind.

This has implications for care. Care is required when one is forced to contend
with the delaying for an unsure period of time of gratification; pleasure becomes deferred to the future. As well, it may be noted, without care one does not have a future; there is no care required for the immediate gratification of pleasure. This was historically the case with gathering-hunting culture in which no cultivation of earth was done and hence no planning for the future required. Nature remained the planner and one simply followed nature. The break with primitive communism, mythologized in the expulsion from the Garden, is the historical context for care.

With the need to cultivate the earth given the increase in population and growing complexity of social relations, humankind entered a new space from which, in some sense, it has yet to recover. With agriculture began the separation of life from art, symbolically represented by the Fall. Now humankind had to live by the sweat of its brow and give birth painfully. Life, both productively and reproductively, became the agony of existence. Work was slavery for the majority of humankind and art the privileged activity of the few; art was primarily identified with the sacred, this representing the alienated character of civil society.

Here I can define the term 'power structure'. Coordination between things exists at various levels. A division of labour coordinates various labours through, in capitalist society, the marketplace; in feudal society, the guilds; in agrarian society, the family. The basic purposes of coordination are to: 1) keep things the way they are, this being the short-term, immediate goal; 2) modify the way things are in light of challenges to existing social reality, this being the long-term objective. Power structure is my short-hand term for the coordinating totality that links a system of production and reproduction (infrastructure) to a system of morality (superstructure). It is the collective means by which the ruling class dominates a given mode of production.

Admittedly this is a statement whose fuller explication would require the analysis of many texts from various disciplines. It would, given my personal orientation, require a thorough investigation of the concepts and practical reality of means and relations of production as well as that of the realm of ideology and the complex relations joining and separating infra- from superstructure. Nevertheless, I posit it in order to illuminate Heidegger's notion of Dasein's self-understanding and the meaning of Being.
A power structure keeps the present enthralled to things present-at-hand, the status quo reality. The actor's self-understanding is the subjective force that a power structure works on. For example, market power organizes the satisfaction of need through supply and demand. Need becomes a demand only when allied with sufficient numbers who have sufficient purchase power. The market thus is a selective mechanism for need satisfaction, a process having ideological components -- the notion of free-enterprise -- that conditions the mind and processes the body for participation in the market economy. This is an enthrallement to number and money, although money dominates exchange in that a very few with many dollars could generate demand whereas a great many people with no money could not. The poor do not form a market, rather, as Marx argued in Capital 1, they are part of the lumpen-proletariat, an element of the reserve army of labour. This asymmetry is intrinsic to capitalism in so far as the ownership of the production system remains private. The current configuration of global corporations, allied with supra-nation blocks, having annual operating budgets bigger than many single nation states underscores that point.

In the remaining chapters I want to articulate and synthesize the concepts of care, power structure and social change in relation to the texts of Fredric Jameson, the work of General Idea, a group of Toronto artists active in the 1970s to 1990s, and David W. Livingstone. In particular I want to draw upon Livingstone's work in the final chapters to further indicate embryonic socialist tendencies present in capitalist social structures.
I now consider the work of Fredric Jameson. He comments upon postmodern power structure, the form of the discussion being that of the totality. In so doing he demonstrates how socialists could enlarge openings for the embryonic socialist tendencies at work in present day capitalism. In this way socialists could show, through helping to draw the future out of the present, how they care for society. There is, furthermore, an art to caring. One may compare this, as Socrates did in the *Theatetus*, to the art of midwifery. The midwife does not herself give birth to the new, she is past child bearing years. Rather her task is to help the mother (society) give birth to her emerging child. Analogously, socialists do not give birth to society; they help society give birth to its future. Society gives birth to its future, and this is not an easy process. For labour pains accompany this, specifically the struggle of the working class to transform and overthrow the capitalist order. Care, as it denotes trouble, pain, even agony, characterizes the bringing forth of the future from out of the present. Socialism cares for society through its labour of explaining to the working class that which the working class typically experiences in conceptually confused ways.

To transform and overthrow the present structures requires an art. Jameson has written much about art, indeed this the actual content in his work in *Postmodernism: or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. My interest in Jameson, and the reason for my choosing him concerns thus both content and form, process and product. Jameson raises the question of art and the art of the question in his probing of the contemporary conjuncture. As well, as my citations of Heidegger will show, Jameson, as distinct from Adorno, admittedly he being of a younger generation of theorists, is able to engage Heidegger in conversation without the unnecessary polemics caused by the traumatic experience of Nazism. Jameson thus links Heidegger and Marx, an invaluable bridge over which I cross into the contemporary debate for a postindustrial or postmodern socialism.

In Jameson’s work there is a great deal of discussion about totality and totalization and power, a point concerning the very possibility of the socialist project. To
As for 'power,' it is equally clear that praxis or totalization always aims at securing the fragile control or survival of an even more fragile subject within a world otherwise utterly independent and subject to no one's whims or desires. As for all the scare images of 1984, they are even more ludicrous in the Gorbachev period than they were before; and it is, to say the least, a difficult and contradictory operation to proclaim the death of socialism and issue spine-chilling messages about its totalitarian blood lust in one breath.

The hostility to the concept of 'totalization' would thus seem to be most plausibly decoded as a systematic repudiation of notions and ideals of praxis as such, or of the collective project. As for its apparent ideological cognate, the concept of 'totality,' we will see later on that it is to be grasped as one philosophical form of the notion of a 'mode of production,' a notion that it would seem equally strategic for the post-modern to evade or to exclude.

The above is the bare-bones of my argument. To give it greater flesh we return to Jameson's text. Jameson delineates in a variety of ways the transition from modernism to postmodernism, taking issue with the typical liberal notions that would deny the political character of the latter.

As I have said, however. I want to avoid the implication that technology is in any way the 'ultimately determining instance' either of our present-day social life or of our cultural production: such a thesis is, of course, ultimately at one with the post-Marxist notion of a postindustrial society. Rather I want to suggest that our faulty representations of some immense communication and computer network are themselves but a distorted figuration of something even deeper, namely, the whole world system of a present-day multinational capitalism. The technology of contemporary society is therefore mesmerizing and fascinating not so much in its own right but because it seems to offer some privileged representational shorthand for grasping a network of power and control even more difficult for our minds and imaginations to grasp: the whole new decentred global network of the third stage of capital itself.

Jameson is discussing a transition from one epoch to another through the space of Marxism, specifically, cultural transformation as evinced by the arts (for example, architecture, literature, visual art.) If offers then a nice opportunity to consider the spatial dynamics of, to use Heidegger's term, Being. Jameson's volume is a work of Being and Space. To quote his discussion on a hotel:

The entryways of the Bonaventure are, as it were, lateral and rather backdoor affairs: the gardens in the back admit you to the sixth floor of the towers, and even there you must walk down one flight to find the elevator by which you gain
access to the lobby. Meanwhile, what one I still tempted to think of as the front entry; on Figueroa, admits you, baggage and all, onto the second-story shopping balcony, from which you must take an escalator down to the main registration desk. What I first want to suggest about these curiously unmarked ways in is that they seem to have been imposed by some new category of closure governing the inner space of the hotel itself (and this over and above the material constraints under which Portman had to work). I believe that, with a certain number of other characteristic postmodern buildings, such as the Beaubourg in Paris or the Eaton Centre in Toronto, the Bonaventure aspires to being a total space, a complete world, a kind of miniature city; to this new total space, meanwhile corresponds a new collective practice, a new mode in which individuals move and congregate, something like the practice of a new and historically original kind of hypercrowd.\(^{130}\)

It is the moving through space that defines Dasein's being-in-a-world. In light of this consider Heidegger's spatial propositions in *Being and Time*:

Heidegger contrasts the ontic with the ontological sense of space as denoted by *Being-in*.

What is meant by "Being-in"?...By this 'in' we mean the relationship of Being which two entities extended 'in' space have to each other with regard to their location in that space. Both water and glass, garment and cupboard, are 'in' space and 'at' a location, and both in the same way. This relationship of Being can be expanded: for instance, the bench is in the lecture-room, and lecture-room in the university, the university is in the city, and so on, until we can say that the bench is 'in world-space'. All entities whose Being 'in' one another can thus be described have the kind of Being -- that of Being-present-at-hand -- as Things occurring 'within' the world. Being-present-at-hand--as Things occurring 'within' the world. Being-present-at-hand 'in' something which is likewise present-at-hand, and Being-present-at-hand-along-with in the sense of a definite location-relationship with something else which has the same kind of Being, are ontological characteristics which we call "categorical"; they are of such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of Being is not of the character of Dasein.\(^{131}\)

The "in" and/or "out" of that which ontically is belongs to that order of being categorizing things present-at-hand. This order, moreover, is variable. Things that are out, in terms of one position, are in, in terms of another. For example, the bench is in the lecture-hall and thus the lecture-hall is the outside for which the bench is in; however, the lecture-hall is within the university. Although this does not work in reverse; the most outer of the outer can never be an inner -- the universe by definition contains all within it. It comprehends the totality of things.
This, in a paradoxical way, brings us back to the totality and the possibility of theorizing it. The totality is universal; nothing can be thought outside of it and so it is the Outside. The inside then one may consider to be the space of the totality; conceptually these are categories of being. As such they stand there as emblematic of an organization/structuring of Being. Space is how being-in-the-world becomes/is structured. There is no space outside the way we structure and are structured by Being. Outside, then, is not simply a last barrier or blockade standing there in a serial-linear relationship; rather it stands for the opaqueness of being-there if we want to use the metaphor of light. Opaque we are in-the-world; we are in but we do not see what we are in. This is what is customarily understood as the Outside. The outsideness of the inside is, moreover, customarily ignored through the familiarity of being-there, what Heidegger calls those things present-at-hand.

Things present-at-hand obscure the very spatial organization constituting the world-being-there. To discern the world's Being, then, it is necessary to make light -- render the opaque more transparent -- of those categories. The categorical present-at-handness of the world being is thus the material for analysis -- the stuff to be theorized. The ontic is the matter to be worked upon in order to make clear what that matter -- world's spatial organization -- is -- world's Being. The world's Being, however, should not be thought of as external to the world's spatial organization; there cannot be Being outside spatial organization. One could say, if one is not stretching the language too far out of shape, that what is outer is not necessarily external, what is strange not necessarily estranged. I use the word opaque to indicate the quality not of things-in-themselves -- the Kantian shadow of dialectics -- but of my own understanding of those things. A thing is opaque as the result of a definite interaction between the qualities of its organized matter and light. Analogously, our understanding of the world's Being is determined by our ability to clarify those very same understandings in light of our discerning the temporal horizon-line of Being -- the language defining our being-in-the-world.

Heidegger indicates as much in the paragraph immediately following the above cited:
Being-in, on the other hand, is a stage of Dasein's Being; it is an existentiale. So one cannot think of it as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) 'in' an entity which is present-at-hand. Nor does the term "Being-in" mean a spatial 'in-one-another-ness' of things present-at-hand, any more than the word 'in' primordially signifies a spatial relationship of this kind. 'In' is derived from innan" --- "to reside," "habitare", "to dwell. 'An' signifies "I am accustomed". "I am familiar with", "I look after something". It has the significance of 'colo' in the sense of 'habito' and 'diligo'. The entity to which Being-in in this signification belongs is one which we have characterized as that entity which in each case I myself am. The expression 'bin' is connected with 'bei', and so 'ich bin' means in its turn 'I reside' or 'dwell alongside' the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. 'Being', as the infinitive of 'ich bin' (that is to say, when it is understood as an existentiale), signifies 'to reside alongside...', 'to be familiar with.....". 'Being-in' is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state.

Ontologically, the 'in' is the act of dwelling with the world, the standing one's grounds, we suggest abstractly from Heidegger, that is, in essence, the understanding of where one is -- and where that world as a historical stage of its own becoming. The opaqueness/strangeness of being-in-the-world is the darkness of one's own grounds, the material to be worked over. Through this working over -- the act of lingering, dwelling, residing with -- one builds one's being. I am, in an existential way, means, I am building/rebuilding my world. I am continually working over the categories of existence organizing that world's spaciousness.

Here we may return to Jameson and the question of the totality. The totality is the organized space of Being, a totality that, however, becomes an object of comprehension only through our grasping of the horizon-line of a world. Space that which Dasein cultivates, resides dwells with. To inhabit the world is to cultivate that space. One is only there through that work. The existential refusal to do that work references what Heidegger called das Man. This is the creature of totalitarianism. The totalitarian space is inhabited by those not really there -- those for whom existence is not a product of their work in grappling with the issue of Being but simply the idle, curious, taking for granted of the world. For they are resolutely opposed to facing the temporal horizon of their everydayness and so glide 'comfortably' along in a patched
hodge-podge of fear and loathing. Theirs is the life of fleeing their death, of refusing to take responsibility for their world being theirs. Not the product of their collective work, these idiots, lost in their private property delusions, are fixated by the purely subjective aspects of their self-alienated existence. Such are, in sociological terms, the petty-bourgeoisie -- the historical supporters of Fascism. They are the Yuppies of the 1980s and 1990s.

Those for the totality are resolutely opposed to totalitarianism in that they care for the world. They take authority for themselves through the cultivating of the grounds of the world being-there. Jameson's work exemplifies this labour. He systemically exposes the existence of world-being-there; he displays the categories of being organizing its space. The movement from the ontic to the ontological, from doxa to dialectics in Plato's terms, is the revolutionary labour. This work, more precisely, prepares the grounds for actual social change; it is mental labour. Such work itself opens up conceptual space through the clarifying of the categories of Being defining the temporality of the actual. Clarification opens up space and thereby makes room for a new time.

Here we begin to appreciate the import of Jameson's investigations. The transition from the modern to the postmodern indicates the displacement of the temporal, the movement from one epoch to another. There is a differentiation even as there is a sameness. Difference, more precisely, we locate within a sameness. This is suggested by Jameson in the following:

The distinction I am proposing here knows one canonical form in Hegel's differentiation of the thinking of individual morality or moralizing (Moralität) from that whole very different realm of collective social values and practices (Sittlichkeit). But it finds its definitive form in Marx's demonstration of the materialist dialect, most notably in those classic pages of the Manifesto which teach the hard lesson of some more genuinely dialectical way to think historical development and change. The topic of the lesson is, of course, the historical development of capitalism itself and the deployment of a specific bourgeois culture. In a well-known passage Marx powerfully urges us to do the impossible, namely, to think this development positively and negatively all at once; to achieve, in other words, a type of thinking that would be capable of grasping the demonstrably baleful features of capitalism alone with its extraordinary and liberating dynamism simultaneously within a single thought, and without
attenuating any of the force of either judgement. We are somehow to lift our minds to a point at which it is possible to understand that capitalism is at one and the same time the best that has ever happened to the human race, and the worst. The lapse from this austere dialectical imperative into the more comfortable stance of the taking of moral positions is inveterate and all too human; still, the urgency of the subject demands that we make at least some effort to think the cultural evolution of late capitalism dialectically, as catastrophe and progress all together.¹³³

Difference within sameness means, within classical Marxist postulates, the effacement of negation as separation. Positive and negate moments of, for example capitalism, are moments of a self-same unity that "rises above" or "transcends" -- Hegel's Aufhebung -- the apparent opposition of distinct aspects. This thinking together requires, as well, sacrifice from the one who would think this, namely, that of moral positions. Although, there is a certain morality implied here, even if not the morality easily identified with a belief system -- the amorphous yet persistent notion of "human progress." Marxism was (or is) a philosophy of European enlightenment although it does not regard itself as a philosophy in the same way that say liberalism would. As Jameson notes in another place:

On the classical Marxist view, the seeds of the future already exist within the present and must be conceptually disengaged from it, both through analysis and through political praxis (the workers of the Paris Commune, Marx once remarked in a striking phrase, "have not ideals to realize"; they merely sought to disengage emergent forms of new social relations from the older capitalist social relations in which the former had already begun to stir. In place of the temptation either to denounce the complacencies of postmodernism as some final symptom of decadence or to salute the new forms as the harbingers of a new technological and technocratic Utopia, it seems more appropriate to assess the new cultural production within the working hypothesis of a general modification of culture itself within the social restructuring of late capitalism as a system.¹³⁴

Marxism as whole has no ideals to realize -- apparently. The question of identity and difference is itself situated in a space of an ironic blank. The totality of being-there has a unity even as this last is infinity differentiated through the spatial organization of its temporality -- infinitely if the future is impossibly there. No ideals to realize means that one does have to posited ideals outside of the fermenting matrix of present social relations. These ideals express -- to be sure not fully or perfectly or maturely -- what is
already at hand; it needs, one could say, needs a hand up from us, those who would live in another time. The futurity of this time is, however, grounded in its being-there as the emergent possibility of the present. That it is there constitutes thus its actuality -- that emblematic sign of veridical presence. Its actuality draws those dis-eased with the present, the acolytes of the school of progress.

The future is emblematic of the yet unrealized present that is not itself actual. Every present carries within itself thus the fatal sign of coming to an end, and the drawing out of a present to its end is the maieutic work of praxis. The midwife draws out the future out of the fearful contradictions of the present. This being-there is thus made to be there -- forced out -- even as this forcing supplements -- as Derrida tells us with the notion of la différence and le supplement -- the work of nature. Nature guarantees in the discourse of the Enlightenment -- preserved by the postulates of classical Marxism -- the veridical order of the real; it is the bedrock of the eternal return, that point to which we can ever return. The dialectic of nature and society rests upon this. Nature becomes social and society more natural through the progressive work of capital accumulation and punctuating crisis of the very same accumulative process. The proletariat or, roughly speaking, the working class signifies both the fecundity of capital -- capitalism produces it -- as well as its emptiness -- the degraded conditions or immiseration -- whether relative or absolute -- of the worker. As such it is the child and, as a dutiful child, will bury its parent, therefore increasing the value of capital -- resocializing it and thereby redistributing it.

What is interesting about Jameson's critique is that it shows the shift of the locus of capital -- and with it the movement of the classical postulates of Marxism. Capital has become in effect culture. As Jameson notes:

What we must now ask ourselves is whether it is not precisely the this semiautonomy of the cultural sphere which has been destroyed by the logic of late capitalism. Yet to argue that culture is today no longer endowed with the relative autonomy it once enjoyed as one level among others in earlier moments of capitalism (let alone in precapitalist societies) is not necessarily to imply its disappearance or extinction. Quite the contrary; we must go on to affirm that the dissolution of an autonomous sphere of culture is rather to be imagined in terms of an explosion: a prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm, to the point at which everything in our social life -- from economic value and state...
power to practices and to the very structure of the psyche itself -- can be said to have become 'cultural' in some original and yet untheorized sense. This proposition is, however, substantively quite consistent with the previous diagnosis of a society of the image or the simulacrum and a transformation of the "real" into so many pseudoevents.¹³⁵

Culture has become capital or at least assumed a position of capital importance that has displaced previous incarnations of it. The current hype is, of course, organized by the media; information is value. Culture could maintain its semi-autonomy given the barriers to the conversion of value into-formation or information. Value could be preserved as the heritage of privileged classes -- whether of a theocracy or more secular variations. Bourgeois high culture and its classic texts -- among them being the works of Marxism -- was the last culture in which this was possible. It centralized the contradictions between, on one hand, the miserable conditions of the exploited masses, and, on the other, the relative surplus enabling a withdrawal by some members of the population from productive work. Priests and kings were the first. Their positions as mouthpieces for the gods symbolized the divorce of the realm of necessity --- productive labour -- from freedom -- abstract speculation. Culture is, in essence, the abstraction from the sphere of necessity, therein lies its freedom.

The historic advance of capital accumulation has resulted -- or is itself the story of -- successive dislocations of necessity. Being-in-the-present, to refer back to Heidegger, has become itself a future project as the present recedes into a more fantastic simulacrum of its possibility. It requires, in short, more work. The being-there of the present has become a fantastic object, and to be there is more grueling. Thus, one could see capitalist downsizing and the fall of the relative wage -- wage gains have been less than inflation in Canada since the 1990s -- as immiseration of actual reality even as the technology creates a more fantastic or virtual one. Culture, however, was the first virtual reality: however, its virtuosity was based on the social order's inability to informatize completely its values. Under late capitalism, information technology turns all value into-formation: information is the highest value in a global communications system that mercilessly extracts all meaning from any one nodal point.

But is it? To affirm this uncritically is to ignore distinctions between data,
information and knowledge. The data are the raw givens of the material infrastructure; information denotes what one does with the data, for example, a bank using a person’s credit record to deny him a loan. Knowledge concerns, however, a many-sided understanding of the information, specifically, the ability to trace the genesis of its formation. For example, capitalism can transform a given data base into information. However, what capitalism ignores is the constraints it itself puts on information processing -- using the data to create information supporting the production and reproduction of commodities. Knowledge then transcends information as it concerns the ideational parameters in place necessary for the transformation of data into information; in classical Marxist discourse knowledge is a dialectical process. This means that one considers the ideational parameters in relation to the process of transforming the data and thereby creating information. Transformation and information are not politically or philosophically neutral, but moments of articulating some vision of Being. Capitalist society mystifies its own nature by conflating information with knowledge, hiding the ideational constraints -- ideology -- determining the production of information.

The subsuming of value to information should be seen as, in light of Jameson’s comments, as the supplement to traditional capitalist exploitation. Gathering information supplements traditional methods of control and coordination, both of material and amaterial resources, of things and people. Coordination and control can take crude forms, for example, brute force or more subtle, for example, having the credit and transactions record of an individual. The former keeps people crudely in line; the latter keeps people lining up to purchase the appropriate consumer goods based on the ability of businesses to extract information about people’s consumption patterns. While the former form tends to be practiced in fringe areas of the capitalist economy and the second in the centre, this does not exclude one occurring in the other. For example, Canadian police fired tear gas at demonstrators opposing the former Indonesian dictator Sukarno at an APEC conference in Vancouver several years ago. Middle-class urban elites in Indonesia are subject to credit checks.

The question of whether information is the highest value or whether one can
conceptualize value apart from information itself is fantastic. This fantasy itself, following Jameson's investigations, is a product of late capitalism. Late capitalist production is based on its ability to assimilate and integrate the soft sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -- sociology, psychology, semiotics, literature -- just as early and middle capitalism was able to do vis-a-vis the hard sciences -- geology, physics, chemistry. The materialness of overall production has decreased commensurate with the increased discursiveness of social life. The very complexity of society has created the need for more extensive communication systems able to re-organize meaning into channels of exchange.

Here we return to question of reason, and our earlier made distinction between Reason and ratiocination, instrumental reason as Adorno called it in Dialectic of Enlightenment. The need for more extensive communications systems in late capitalist societies has also created the need for the greater instrumentalization of reason. One reason; one communicates. Reason itself becomes reduced to the ability of a given discourse to carry information -- info-commercial packages -- and all that is not so becomes "excess" baggage. Global networks of communication grow in extensiveness and become, in the short run, voided of intensiveness: the incredible lightness of Being as Kundera might say. The elimination of culture's previous semi-autonomy is at once an affirmation of the instrumentalization of reason -- culture sells as a commodity -- in its own right - the popularity of Toronto, for example, as a backlot for Hollywood, as well as related industries of tourism. In traditional industries, there has been a drastic cut in personnel, part of capitalist enlightenment of the work force. The welfare of workers has never been an objective of capitalism, this being an after effect of capital accumulation. The instrumentalization of reason is not the object of capitalist production, it too being subsidiary and an after-effect of achieving what is, capital accumulation. This does not, however, preclude the possibility of instrumentalization becoming an objective after its uselessness to capital accumulation has been demonstrated. Hollywood did not set out to turn Toronto into its production backlot; however, if it is shown to be cost effective, it might indeed become an objective.

The larger point references what is encapsulated in McLuhan's famous
aphorism: "The medium is the message." Cost-effective measures are messages sent by so much by one person as by relations between persons -- specifically the conjuncture between relations and means of production in classical Marxist language -- through the medium of investment. Cost-effective communication is what delivers the most information per discourse unit. Information, moreover, is what is unexpected; if one knows what to expect, the transmission is not informative. The instrumentalization of reason goes hand in hand with cost-effective communication by ruthlessly extirpating all that which does not directly contribute to the smooth flow of meaning. This is called static.

The instrumentalization of reason or ratiocination precludes discourse that has meaning itself as the object; in the extreme case, Socratic discourses are useless to capitalist production because they convey no information. Many of them, in fact, destroy what little information they had, specifically, the definitions of values, for example virtue in the *Meno*. In Socrates' own time, he was condemned by his fellows. Given its primary objective of accumulation, capitalism has, ideally, no time for questions of value, as all value generating becomes subsumed to the exigencies of information in the age of amaterial production. This is the message that capitalism, through its various mediascaped nerve centres in state and civil society, sends; the debate about the growing corporatization of the school system in general and university system in particular is a case in point. Corporate capitalism expresses instrumental reason in its most concentrated and centralized form. Its ability to message various systems -- health, educational, state -- demonstrates the shift from traditional to non-traditional, from industrial to post-industrial production loci. It shows as well how open-faced and bare capitalism now is -- capitalism never being other than instrumental reason. It appeared to be other than that in early and middle capitalism given that information, indeed consciousness itself, had not yet become a commodity. The domination of use by exchange value has, I suggest, following Jameson, been superseded by that of value by information. I further note that this is the domination of reason by ratio. This is not, however, to deny the need for instruments or, more generally, for capital accumulation. I do, however, distinguish between this last and capitalism. Capitalism is the domination
of human capital -- reason -- by a specific form of that capital -- bourgeois ratio or instrumental reason (see Horkheimer 1972). This denotes the latest stage of capitalism's ability to disguise and mystify its ideational base. Capitalism's liberal apologists would claim that information, a la the information society, is the value-free product of the exchange of inquiring minds and not a human production serving class interests. People receiving social assistance, for example, have far less access to information than middle-class professionals who usually have personal computers in home and/or office.

In saying this, however, I recognize both the catastrophe and progress, the immiseration and enrichment of reality, made possible by infotechnology, that is, the conjuncture of relations and means of production under conditions of late capitalism. Reality is poorer under conditions of info-technology in that communication takes precedence over community, a paradox given that both words derive from the Latin communicare share out. However, one may explain the paradox this way: people, and here one must not forget the strategic importance of access to technology, are able to communicate much more easily with each other even as they have less to say to each other. Social life loses in depth what it has gained in width, intensity with extensivity. Late capitalism, as demonstrated by the plethora of look-alike popular magazines ranging from sports to soap-opera, promote typical images of social interaction organized by dominant images -- usually young, blonde and slim. One could equally compare the "I-Thou" relationship espoused by the late Martin Buber with the interactive babble of the Net, the awe, respect and fear associated with older images of divinity and the psycho-pop spirituality of the New Age. Nevertheless, following Jameson, I must also admit to the possibility of greater intensity promised but not delivered by info-technology.

The reason for the media's inability to deliver on the promise of intimacy, contrary to McLuhan, is because of the very instrumentality of reason making it possible. Just as capitalism itself must rely upon the existence of community -- civil society -- as a source of values that it fits to suit its own purposes so reason must on its non-instrumental form. This is, as we have argued, care. Care is reason as non-
instrument, for to care for something is to attend to its Being, that is, the integrity of its structure rather than focus on certain aspects immediately profitable. It is the difference between the earth as real and treating it as real estate, between values as springing from the text of one's Being and values as belonging to one's lifestyle -- this last being the Yuppie credo. The difference references the life of the thing in question, namely that which exists for itself apart from any usefulness to oneself. Instrumental reason, however, is based on the idea of abstracting from the thing itself and managing it under the auspices of the representation generated thereby. Thus the Earth, no longer a goddess, becomes real estate, a commodity for capitalist exploitation.

The revolutionary advance of capitalism has been to, as evinced by the growth of its corporate sector, lay bare the essence of instrumental reason and thereby to allow potentially for the clearest possible relationship to reason by the vast majority of humankind. It is no accident that the Earth has become once more Gaia, its ancient Greek name, as part of Lovelock's Gaia Hypothesis, this being co-terminus with the rediscovery of the wisdom of the native people of North America: "All things are our relations," they say. The renewed possibility of caring for the Earth, the recognition of it as a living thing in its own right has obvious possibilities for the elaborating of a more conscious and less instrumental understanding of existence. This does not mean less rational; it is not irrational to believe that the Earth has a life of its own, for example, even though its life is not of the same order as those of the many individual constituent entities that inhabit it (Lovelock 1987).

The Earth is a case in point. Only because it has a life of its own is an abstraction from that life -- capitalist real estate -- possible. Only because there is civil society can there be the state. Instrumental reason or ratiocination operates only at the level of abstraction, taking this last for reality itself or at least wanting others to even if it does not believe its own propaganda or ideology. Marxism makes a distinction between science and ideology even as the latter is the shadow of the former (Carchedi 1987). Science, correctly conceived of, references the dialectical investigation into the nature of reality, the rigorous pushing of one's own beliefs to the limit of their logic. Ideology is science reduced to the manipulation of the signs and symbols used in that
investigation. Science is animated by wonder, as Socrates says of the origins of philosophy; ideology by the need to control the other. Ideology shadows science and science is ideology brought into the light. That which keeps science scientific then is not an adherence to one doctrine -- although doctrines or beliefs accumulate through generations -- but the continual self-examination of those doctrines. Thereby does science maintain its liveliness; otherwise it degenerates into a corpse or ideology.

I I

Culture is, in essence, the abstraction from the sphere of necessity, therein lies its freedom. The historic advance of capital accumulation has resulted -- or is itself the story of -- successive dislocations of necessity. The real, one could say, has never been realer under capitalism or more fantastic; capitalism is both catastrophe and progress. Ratiocination grows apace with these distortions. To better discern the import of these remarks, we return to Jameson:

What we must now affirm is that it is precisely this whole extraordinarily demoralizing and depressing new global space which is the "moment of truth" of postmodernism. What has been called the postmodernist "sublime" is only the moment in which this content has become most explicit, has moved the closest to the surface of consciousness as a coherent new type of space in its own right--even though a certain figural concealment or disguise is still at work here, most notably in the high-tech thematics in which the new spatial content is still dramatized and articulated. Yet the earlier features of the postmodern enumerated above can all now be seen as themselves partial (yet constitutive) aspects of the same general spatial object.136

The space of the earth has been organized into three stages of capitalist exploitation: the national market, imperialism and globalization (Jameson 1991). Technologically, this is print (national market), electric (imperialism) and electronic (globalization). The print era saw the creation of mass markets organized semiotically by national scripts -- the book, the infinitely repeatable, uniform and linear organization of space; the electric era saw the creation of international markets organized by international script having, however, a national-controlled market as an operations base -- the military--cultural hegemony of European powers vis-a-vis Asia, Africa and South America organized by telegraph and radio. The electronic is the era of globalization, the disintegration of national monopolies and states and the rise of multinational power blocks (NAFTA,
United Europe) -- the splitting and cracking of the former industrial labour force and its reconstitution under a plurality of modes organized semiotically by information technology and economically by the capital accumulation needs of those blocks.\textsuperscript{137}

The relative or semi-autonomy formerly enjoyed by culture was given by the relative inability of value to be converted instantaneously in(to)formation, a feature of the print/national and electric/imperialist eras. The implications of this for the dialectic of science and ideology as well as for culture one may deduce as follows: science is both object of and subject to the demands of life, specifically the mode of production used to create life's necessities. As noted earlier, the success of capitalism was to integrate scientific advances at first those of the hard sciences and latter of the soft into its productive process. Initially, this was not planned, being the sum total of various spontaneous individual initiatives, paralleling the growth of, at first the national market and then the imperialist colonization of world markets. Science became an ideology as an instrument for progress. Instrumental reason or science-as-progress was the ideology of the imperialist era, the hegemon of the post-world war two era, the U.S.A. identified and justified its hegemonic role with the progress of democracy, the free market and science. One may note, for example, the space race between the U.S.A. and the former U.S.S.R..

The colonization of space, both inner and outer, took place, in the electric/imperialist era, under the auspices of nationally-based monopolies: the battle of the air-waves, Radio-Free Europe. Now colonization occurs without any identifiable colonizer except the culture itself, a tendency paralleling the lack of an authoritative subject. Under globalization the colonized are everyone and the colonizer no-one -- at least no-one readily identifiable by now obsolete industrial-representational norms. The global One is everywhere and nowhere, they or we or both are, as Jameson said in another context, a hypercrowd. This last is not the mob of the classical city, the disenfranchised freemen reduced to debt slavery\textsuperscript{138}, the prisoners taken in wars; nor the atomized citizens of the modern state that nevertheless have (private) homes to return to. The hypercrowd is the space of at once the autonomous wanderer -- Nietzsche’s dandy or Benjamin’s \textit{flaneur} -- going upon their unmarked ways, linking up
spontaneously with fellow travelers -- surfing on the Net, for example. The space, however, is organized by the absence of private communicative property -- and communication is more and the only property worth having -- as evinced most strongly by the audio spectacle of cell-phone conversations. Here everyone literally in hearing distance is the receiver or para-receiver; the reality of reception determined ontically by the closeness of the ear to the phone. Everyone is in on the conversation although the participation remains highly differentiated. This retribalization of space, as McLuhan called it, is the rebirth of the acoustic, that which is without centre except as can be reconstituted by and through the errant wanderings of fellow travelers -- a collective structured through the wandering itself rather than any predesignated pathway -- the current debate between the Bellheads and the Netheads.

To discern more clearly the character of the hypercrowd, we contrast this to Heidegger's figure of das Man:

But this distantiality which belongs to Being-with, is such that Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to Others. it itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. Dasein's everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please. These Others, moreover, are not definite Others. On the contrary, any Other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination by Others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as Being-with. One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power. 'The Others' whom one thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one's belonging to them essentially oneself, are those who proximally and for the most part 'are there' in everyday Being-with-one-another. The 'who' is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the 'they' [das Man].

The idea here is of self that denies its own otherness, and this denial manifests as the any and every other that one self could be. Hence one has no responsibility for oneself in that one's other is anonymous, faceless. To respond to oneself is to stand up to one's Being -- the trial of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Here we note the necessity implied by Heidegger here of thinking both the Being of oneself and the Being-in-the-world. Das Man represents in Heidegger's script the taken-awayness of Dasein's own Being through Dasein's own refusal to live up to the ownmost possibility of its existence. "It is just that inconspicuous domination by others" is how Heidegger
describes this phenomenon, the word inconspicuous being the translation of unversehens.\textsuperscript{140} Versehens, we note, can mean to look after, its root being sehen see. Unversehens is what is unseen, unprovided for, what escapes one's notice. However, it is subtle, what slips by oneself. The slippage occurs, however, not as an extraordinary event; rather it is co-terminus with Dasein's being-in-the-world. Dasein continually slips away from being itself when with others and being-with-others constitutes Dasein's own being-in-the-world.

I hear Heidegger saying that Dasein's own being is inevitably crowded out by being-with-Others and to Be oneself is to uncrowd one's world -- the make room for oneself. Others, as ontic realities, concern actual people; ontologically, Other indicates the making-room-for-oneself. Other is the room that lies ahead even as it is the room one is presently within. To uncrowd the world is then not to eliminate others -- the Fascist fantasy co-terminus with the cry of Lebensraum -- but to eliminate the confusion between oneself and others. It is for Dasein to stand for itself and none other and thereby, by implication, allowing Others to stand likewise. This then creates the opening for genuine or authentic interaction, for the Being oneself when with Others.

This spacing out operation has decisive media aspects. In several ways: being-with-Others constitutes Dasein's own being-in-the-world. However, this is a slippery formulation in that what Dasein is remains hidden precisely through its interactions -- the present-at-hand being that proximally conceals the organization of that space. To unearth or exhume its own Being requires that Dasein render transparent what is opaque, that it permit the light to pass through that which mediates its Being -- and this is none other than its existence. Existence is the medium for Being. To exhume the matter of what it is requires that Dasein continually re-invest its reason within the actual determinants of its world. By re-investment of reason, we mean the resisting of das Man's domination of Dasein's existence, not the elimination of das Man. Indeed, das Man is the shadow of Dasein, the background for which Dasein itself is the foreground; thus one cannot be conceived of without the other. The re-investing of one's reason then indicates the recuperative work of living with one's shadow. The shadow, as the harbinger-messenger of death, casts the light into relief. Re-investment of reason
means then reappropriating the abstract categories defining one’s existence -- the world as social construct -- to lay bare what other world is possible, is, in the Marxist sense, already working its way fetus-like out of the present.

This working out, as our conversation with Jameson indicates, is a re-organizing of the space of that world totality. The historical emergence of the city out of the consolidation and breakdown of previous tribal social organization in the ancient world demonstrated the shift in production from a non-monetary to monetary economy, from oral-acoustic to phonetic-visual space; the rise of Athens, for example. It also was the space that gave birth to philosophy, the most universal good that the Greek civilization has produced. Philosophy, ideally, calls upon the universal ability, keeping in mind the differentiated performance, of each and every human. This idealist formulation should however be put in the context of the rise and breakdown of Greek culture, as mediated upon, for example by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy.

The re-investment of reason references the possibility of reasoning individuals to confront and come to grips with their own instrumental perversity, how science could become ideology. Science, in the Marxist canon, stands for the resolute fight against ideology; dialectically, this is the self-reflective work. It is a model, to return to the usages of self and other, for a more authentic social order. This possibility adheres with the loss of the former autonomy of culture, both catastrophic and progressive, a curse and a blessing. It is the former because culture as a whole becomes the object of capitalist exploitation -- no longer exists any cathedral like places of refuge from capital’s ruthless determination to melt down, as King Henry the Fifth did the precious objects of England’s monasteries, all values in(to)formation. However, it also creates the space for the re-investment of reason, for the re-integration of science with life, as evinced in this first stage of info-technology, by the marriage of science and art. To quote the credo of info-tech artist Lawrence M. Gartel:

Life and art are synonymous. It is the artist who creates a civilization. The art-making process is based on real life experiences. The artist is always taking a risk. He puts his life on the line every time he makes an art object. He is always open to criticism. The artist is the dream maker. If he loses his dreams, culture ends. If blackness or ugliness are promoted as art, we then have a culture headed for decadence and decay.
Today, computer graphics is the art form of the new renaissance. This art form challenges its users to think and question. It is not something that is easy. Although traditional criteria are used to judge its quality -- form, content, design elements -- its magic is its strong ability to communicate ideas. Artists are beginning to figure out how to relate to the new tools of technology. As their lives become more intertwined with the technology we will see more interactive, participatory works of art. The technology will become simpler and it will do more sophisticated manipulation of information and images.

Postmodernity is the desacrilization of former high-bourgeois culture, the elimination of its former relative autonomy. Bourgeois economics finally conquers bourgeois culture, negating this last's pretentiousness that, for the bourgeoisie, culture is anything other than a tool for capital accumulation. The cuts to the arts sector in Canada underline that point as art is thrown, without reserve, to market forces, being nakedly at their mercy. Art, like everything else, must find its market niche, the being the spontaneous unplanned, in short, capitalist re-integration of art and life.

However, the market is not life itself but an abstraction from it. As Jameson writes:

The passion for the market was indeed always political...The market, finally, for 'market ideology,' has less to do with consumption than it has to do with government intervention, and indeed with the evils of freedom and human nature itself...The force, then, of the concept of the market lies in its 'totalizing' structure, as they say nowadays; that is, in its capacity to afford a model of a social totality. It offers another way of displacing the Marxian model; distinct from the now familiar Weberian and post-Weberian shift from economics to politics, from production to power and domination.

The conceptual power of the market is its ability to mimic social reality's totalness. As such it is an abstraction from social reality rather than social reality itself. In previous eras, the market was not as developed, and social space remained for art, its production and appreciation confined however to the political and economic elites. Artists had patrons and/or specific place in society closely associated with social function, for example, the creating of art for churches. With the increased intensity of commodity production, these spaces were gradually eliminated as artists themselves were deprived of place and status within society; they came to represent the atomized forces of commodity production itself -- the artist-in-the-garret fantasy figure of
bourgeois imagination. State funding in the middle period of capitalism, beginning with the 1930s and ending in the 1990s, was the last vestige of the former patron-artist relationship, the state being the generalized patron dedicated to preserving high bourgeois ideals. Now the torch has passed to the corporations as the state itself is rapidly downsizing, a fact not unrelated to the decreased share of income tax paid by the corporations, itself a cause and an effect of the globalization -- mobility and ability of capital to play off states and state fractions as well as groups of workers globally scattered against each other.

Gartel argues that if blackness or ugliness is promoted as art, then we have a culture headed for decadence and decay. However, following Jameson, it is necessary to think capitalism both as catastrophic and progressive, good and bad, beautiful and ugly. That which is good, I posit, is science and that which is bad, ideology. However, science and ideology are to each other as light is to its shadow. This is why self-reflective reason, reason capable of questioning its own instrumental tendencies, is useful. This is on the level of logic. Socially, the self-reflective work into the nature of reality includes one's being-there even if the reality under investigation is spatially or temporally distant from one's actual existence. One, for example, may not actually be a member of thirteen century feudal China; however, one's interest in understanding that 'puts one there' as a distant observer with all of one's cultural assumptions. One brings one's actuality to an imagined reality. More generally, one is both an observer of reality and a participant in it. This participant-observing stance is dialectical in that it forces oneself to be both active and passive simultaneously and ultimately neither. In more prosaic language, following Jameson, we do make moral judgements but our morality has to be put in the context of the evolving world-historical situation out of which those judgments arise. That which is bad, we further suggest, is the spectacle of science being overwhelmed by its ideological shadow, that is, the wonder aroused by Being degenerating into mere manipulation and control. In the context of Marxism, this is, for example, the spectacle of the October Revolution turning Stalinist.

The ugly, by contrast, is neither good or bad. It is becoming, in more canonical language. Biologically, it is the blood (sweat and tears) that accompanies the birth of
new life; it is the suffering and toil of labour. By this, we do not intend to glorify the worker -- the ideology of workerism -- nor, however, do we deny it. Ugliness is what we have to face -- the tough, demanding realm of necessity -- in order to gain or create space for the good and the beautiful to arise. This, we further suggest, distinguishes the revolutionary from the reactionary attitude. A revolutionary takes the ugly in hand -- his or her own limited narrow-minded perspective and works with it to liberate the possibility for a more comprehensive understanding of reality. Ignorance is ugly but not sinful; it is the place where one begins, and we all come into the world ignorant of it. To mature is to resolutely grapple with one’s own ignorance, thereby displaying that one is other than an ignorant animal but a human being.

To Be human is the great hope of humanity: make one’s life come true! It is the beauty for which one strives to experience. To quote the Bard:

O wonder!
How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world
That has such people in’t!
(“The Tempest,” V,i)\(^{143}\)

However, the brave new world of Renaissance imagination turned into the technological nightmare of the modern period. Aldous Huxley’s ironic use of “brave new world” to describe a future hi-tech society frighteningly resembling our own in his book of the same name, is a salutary warning not to confuse technological progress with progress in general. Huxley’s dystopia was based upon the use of technology to separate society into radially different classes with intelligence as the signifying referent. Science then becomes a dominating, enslaving power as much as it provides us with creature comforts -- the soma of the ancient Greek gods becoming the general soporific of the brave new world. Divided between the intellectually advanced -- the planners -- and the intellectually backward -- the planned for -- society no longer is a community. Science has become the capital of a new capitalism; barbarism has won the day.

However, as Gartel’s credo indicates, new cultural space is opening up, the marriage of art and science. For this to be progressive, to lead to socialism rather than barbarism, requires that technology become socialized. Technology, culture itself, has
replaced nature in the classical Marxist formulation of nature and society. Humankind less and less relates to nature but to mediated nature or culture. In an ironic sense, this could be read as the unfolding of the classic dialectic, the socialization of nature. But the degree of mediation denies any simple socialization of nature. Gartel argues for the renewed integration of art and life. So does capitalism in its unplanned, spontaneous way. Thrown upon the mercy of market forces, art must "fend" for itself, must find its niche in the world. However, the layer of mediation converting the world into the market remains typically passed over; get a life means get a job means be a wage-slave. For socialists, then, the re-integration of life and art, if it is a feature of a scientific utopia, must undo the capitalist appropriation of world-as-market. Heidegger's work is useful in that regard in that he argues for being-in-the-world (not being-in-the-market). This undoing is, expressed positively, the redoing of community -- precisely the missing element in Huxley's scientific dystopia. Gartel's formulation is intriguing in that respect, for he offers us a vision of an integrated (or more integrated) existence.

Integration, in terms of the notions developed thus far, is the one pole for which differentiation is the other. One becomes more integrated in society, I suggest through greater self-differentiation. Integration, I distinguish from mere conformity to group norms; one does not integrate oneself within a group through renouncing one's critical faculties or, in a word, mind. Rather integration proceeds through an individual developing his critical faculties, and since this implies language acquisition as well as a host of other interactive skills, it implies sharing the fruits of those faculties. Integration is not necessarily assimilation or colonization any more than differentiation is alienation and atomization. Integration bespeaks the collecting of the parts as a whole while differentiation the particularizing of the whole in terms of its parts. Dialectically, therefore, integration is the collective aspect of differentiation and differentiation the individual aspect of integration. Articulate speech, for example, displays both integration and differentiation. The integrative (or synthetic) aspect references the drawing together of different strands of an argument; differentiation indicates how an argument displays itself through those very strands. An argument, ideally, is the product of the integration of differences within a self-evolving and ever broadening whole: the ability of an
argument to encompass more material and to gain a many-sided appreciation of a phenomenon. There is moreover an almost musical rhythm to the action of speaking as enunciated by the different phases I have identified as integration and differentiation. One moves forward through synthesizing scattered insights present in a body of literature, and this synthesis thereby increases one's appreciation for that literature. Having attained a greater level of understanding, one is then more open to greater differentiation, one wanting to integrate more insights. But to enclose a greater area of reality within an argument means first opening up that argument. Integration and differentiation, closing and opening, collective and individual, articulate then the whole of a many-sided movement.

The being-together implied by integration concerns the resolute facing of the ugly -- the undeveloped aspects of one's own nature -- rather than marginalizing and isolating them; in *Brave New World*, the backward elements were put on a reservation. Ugliness, properly understood, challenges us to re-examine our familiar understanding of beauty. It reminds us that our beauty is, in some way ugly, and this "de-familiarizing" effect forces us to re-achieve our conception of beauty through facing this upset by the Other to it. The polished, shiny surface of beautiful things could be but an appearance. This conversation with oneself is the hallmark of a civilized society, barbaric society not doing this. Examples of this last abound, ranging from extreme cases such as fascist Germany where the strangeness of the Other (the Jew) was eliminated through physical elimination of otherness itself (the Final Solution to the problem of the Other) to Canada, and its penning the Native People in reservations, a policy that was the model for South Africa's former system of Apartheid.

Civilization is at once sublimely individual and collective. It is individual because individuals serve as the nodal points for the transmission of values -- Dasein's concrete labour, to mix Heidegger and Marx; and civilization is collective because of the need individuals have to communicate their reflections to others -- abstract(ed) labour. It is analogous in biology to genes using animal bodies for their own reproductive purposes -- the animal body as servant of its genes -- and the animals own sexual appetite -- transmission of genetic material as by-product of lust. The context alone determines
the proper use of the image -- the characterization of the matter at hand.

Freud, in his work, *Civilization and its Discontents*, argued that civilization embodied the transformation of the pleasure into the reality principle. As animals, we seek pleasure; this affirms the sensate properties of our existence. However, repeated encounters with our environment soon convinces us of the limits of our pleasures, specifically, our ability to have them as fully and immediately as we want. One then must sublimates one's need for pleasure -- delay immediate gratification -- in order to meet the demands of necessity. One must, in Freud’s (and Marx’s) language, work. Work is difficult, not immediately pleasurable (if pleasurable at all). The ancient Greek word for work *ergon* -- the words ergonomics and energy deriving from this -- stems from the verb *eirgein* to press, enclose, shut in. *Eireros* means slavery and *eirkte* prison. Nevertheless, through doing so, we gain a freedom we otherwise would not have, this associated with access to social (and other) resources. This sublimation of eros is necessary to the work of civilization.

I have, of course, encountered a similar argument in Heidegger’s conception of “being-in” where the “in” derives from “innan” to cultivate, dwell, reside. To generalize and synthesize our propositions, we suggest that the cultivation of our grounds is the work of civilization. Cultivation is work; what saves it, however, from becoming drudgery -- slavery, imprisonment -- is the memory of pleasure, the ecstasy, as the Greeks called, that moves one to do one’s art. Here Gartel’s notion of the re-integration of art and life shows its usefulness. The truly civilized individual, and by extension society, sublimates eros in the short term with expectation of experiencing eros in the long term -- the objective being the intensification of pleasure. These expectations may not necessarily be realistic-as-empirical, to be sure; but from the subjective aspect, as best we can isolate it, this is the idea. The means for the actualizing the idea is cultivation, the labour of turning over the soil of one’s grounds -- and this potentially includes all spheres, layers, aspects of one's being as can be expressed with the means at hand. One’s life, for the civilized (or those who desire to be) is the material to be transformed, the work-in-progress; life and art are (ideally) synonymous. To make that synonymity obvious requires work, for otherwise life remains an accident of biophysical birth. The
artfulness of life shows itself through the work of the artist continually exploring the divisions forming the unity of his or her existence.

The deliberate integration of art and life we call, consonant with socialist literature, planning (Jameson 1991). This is radically other than the haphazard integration of the same realized through throwing art at the mercy of market forces. As Jameson writes:

It used to be affirmed that art or the aesthetic in our time offered the closest accessible analogy to, constituted the most adequate symbolic experience of, a nonalienated labor otherwise unimaginable for us. This proposition in its turn derived from the preindustrial speculations of German idealist philosophy, where the experience of play offered a similar analogon to a condition in which the tensions between work and freedom, science and ethical imperatives, might be overcome.144

Jameson then goes on to adduce a host of reasons to prove this. He demonstrates that the traditional basis of individuality -- fragmented and atomized by capitalism itself -- can no longer serve as a basis for that integration. This does not mean, logically, that such integration is impossible -- only that a new form of individuality, much more closely linked to collective praxis is required. In short, this reintegration is only possible within an articulation of socialism, and this requires planning, a traditional socialist concept. Planning, moreover, is a project. To quote Jameson's discussion:

...the ideal market situation is for them as Utopian and unrealizable under present-day conditions as, for the Left, socialist revolution or transformation in the advanced capitalist countries today. ...Under these circumstances, nothing is served by substituting one inert institutional structure (bureaucratic planning) for another inert institutional structure (namely, the market itself). What is wanted is a great collective project in which an active majority of the population participates as something belonging to it and constructed by its own energies. The setting of social priorities -- also known in the socialist literature as planning--would have to be a part of such a collective project. It should be clear, however, that virtually by definition the market cannot be a project at all.145

Project, by definition, is that which is thrown forward, a projection. Socialism is the capitalism divested of its accidental character or, conversely, capitalism re-invested with its reason. That which is deeply reasonable is the re-integration of art and life; this, however, is deliberate or planned, not an accident in that the very forces of social
production are enormously complex. To achieve integration, realistically, means planning and it is the height of irrationality to leave this to accident, that is, market forces.

Gartel's words, however, alert us to the necessity of locating this re-integration within the dialectic of individual and collective. Planning means the coordinated actions of individual artists who no longer, however, define their art as a thing over and apart from their lives -- rather their art is the expression of their life-force, the supreme affirmation of their being-in-the-world. This re-integration is the realization of, in Heidegger's words, Dasein's ownmost possibility for Being; in Plato's tongue, the experiencing of the Beautiful. It is the Beautiful that gives us pleasure. Reason, then, stands for the force of planning which is not forced collectivization; rather reason expresses the collective will of individuals to pool their resources for a more individually intense experiencing of their otherwise dispersed pleasure. Community stands for the collective efforts of individuals - through self-reflection and criticism of various forms and used media -- to intensify their pleasure -- the supreme pleasure being the attaining of wisdom, what Benjamin in Illuminations called the "epic quality of truth." The classic name for the supreme love is philosophy, the love of wisdom. Philosophy's object is the experiencing of the Beautiful; this is most wise. Planning is to socialism as reason is to philosophy. The irrationality of capitalism is its refusal to plan in any significantly collective way. To reason philosophically is to face the ugliness of what one considers beautiful, this focusing on the perception of beauty used to divide the ugly from the beautiful. One does this to address and resolve the chaos of one's soul. Otherwise one risks reifying one's notion of beauty and so isolating it from inquiry rather than sharing it with others for the opportunity to achieve a better understanding; this simply encouraging disorder. The refusal to share one's goods -- definitions of beauty and truth -- and so treat them as private property is bad, not ugly, and so not desirable. It bespeaks a barbaric nature, a nature that turns away from the path of civilization.

Reason, nevertheless, is a project, specifically, the projection of animal senses or instincts by the animal face to face with its coming-to-an-end. As we argued earlier, this is the place of care. Care, as we now recognize, is Heidegger's reformulation of the
classical logos. Care, one could say, is the spirit of planning, it reaching its epitome with the building of Gothic cathedrals. The re-integration of life and art is based upon an at once decentralizing of creative energies as what potentially is available to all and the reconcentrating of art as intrinsic to life itself. This suggests that planning, as we envision it is not of the concentration and centralization of industrialism, of early and middle capitalism or of latter socialist state planning.

In his discussion of the concentration and centralization of capital, Marx writes:

Every individual capital is a larger or smaller concentration of means of production, with a corresponding command over a larger or smaller labour-army. Every accumulation becomes the means of new accumulation. With the increased mass of wealth which functions as capital, accumulation increases the concentration of that wealth in the hands of individual capitalists, and thereby widens the basis of production on a large scale and of the specific methods of capitalist production. ...The part of social capital domiciled in each particular sphere of production is divided among many capitalists who face one another as independent commodity-producers competing with each other. Accumulation and the concentration accompanying it are, therefore, not only scattered over many points, but the increase of each functioning capital is thwarted by the formation of new and the sub-division of old capitals. Accumulation, therefore, presents itself on the one hand as increasing concentration of the means of production, and of the command over labour; on the other, as repulsion of many individual capitals one from another.146

Marx delineates how the accumulation of surplus-value proceeds according to the rhythm of concentration and centralization, this being the process of capitalization. Centralization of industrial capital was based upon the concentration of the means of production in the hands of private property owners -- the industrialists. The means of production were severely constrained by their materiality, that is, as actual objects their materiality was mutually non-inclusive. If one had them, for example, cotton-machines, then another could not. Property meant ownership of actual things with the subsequent "de-propertization" or dispossession of others. Production now has passed (although not exclusively since we retain our materiality) from the production of actual objects to much more intangible entities -- ideas, dreams, concepts. Our discussion, to be sure, concerns the most technologically advanced sectors of the world market, namely, Western Europe, North America and Australia. In these nation-states becoming-supra-
national blocs, the major shift concerns the amount of labour -- less labour is now needed for the production of actual things and more for the production of inactual (or virtual) objects. This signifies as well the growing complexity of emerging world society as former paradigms of information gathering and interpretation fall by the wayside -- paradigms that relied upon the norms of representation and national markets. Meaning paradigms and the interpretive work of constructing them is now the formal object of production -- as the multiplication of sign networks demonstrates. Raw material is data, labour power is the interpretive spin given to the data, and capital is the info-paradigm organizing the data as personal, meaningful and significant, this then serving as the basis for persons' actual behavior, attitudes and judgements.

Capital accumulates through the layers of interpretation whereby the data gains explanatory power for gathering other data; this creates a paradigm. Itself a piece of data, a paradigm is not reducible to any one piece of information or layer of meaning constituting it. A paradigm is, following Jameson, a model of totality, for example, the market is a paradigm. A paradigm represents totality and its strength lies in its ability to explain reality in terms of itself. A paradigm then is the accumulated interpretive product of reading reality as denoted and organized by a relationship to actual texts. Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* is the grand interpretation of the market as the paradigmatic social reality; the meaning of capitalism, at that stage in its development, became focused thereby -- the laissez-faire character of early capitalism composed of small, independent producers and consumers so situated such that value remained within the immediate geo-physical sphere of production and consumption. This was not necessarily the intention of system members:

The rational economic man of Adam Smith's economics is not a communitarian co-operator, he is an individualistic competitor. He is the hero and common man alike of a system which glorifies him as the be-all and end-all of human existence.\(^\text{147}\)

Industrial capital, arising from merchant capital -- the mercantile and post-mercantile success story of Adam Smith's England -- required a new paradigm as its meaning had shifted grounds. *The Wealth of Nations* gave way to *Capital*.

Marx's work is an excellent example of how one paradigm replaces another, as
Marx explores the contradictions of Smith's text, devouring and digesting it, re-creating. Meaning accumulates with the increased wealth of contradictions emerging from the dynamic of the thing itself -- capital in this case. The reading of various texts widens the meaning of the text through exposing -- posing or placing out -- the problematic of its creation; the difference between the totality and paradigm. The Wealth of Nations expressed the ideology, based nevertheless in some reality, of a society of small, independent producers -- its was its ideal form. Indeed, the socialist vision partakes of this reality, a socialist society being composed of freely associating individuals. However, freedom is always in conversation with its necessity; "men are free to make history but not under conditions of their choosing," Marx said. A paradigm typically glosses over the conditions under which its truth is true - and hence begins to believe its own propaganda: ideal market conditions are those of freely associated producers and consumers able to appropriate the values generated by their interaction rather than having those values reified and so becoming things external to their existence, standing over and thereby dominating them as, collectively speaking, an alien power. Ideally, the market is the community. The actual history of capitalism is the radical separation of market from community. Capital became a systemically alien power with the advent of the money economy, the condicio sine qua non of commodity production. The market now dominates the community.

Here I will state an embryonic tendency within present capitalist structure. It is a reaction to this domination, an attempt to reverse this development. Dobson, a pioneer in this field, states the case this way:

If capitalism be defined as the central accumulation and centralized use of money as an instrument of objective power, with the focus of that definition on the power in discussing root as distinct from money that capital or money represents in the abstract rather than on the money itself, then the ends of capitalism can seen as no different, essentially, from those of the centralized direction-action social, political and economic power that is the preferred control mechanism of communist and fascist States. The exercise of this money power, and access to it, may have been more democratic than the exercise of raw political power, but its bottom line ethic also has always supported purposes fundamentally at odds with the requirements of community life that we seek to maintain or re-create through Community Economic Development. Indeed, that we must make special efforts to re-create healthful community relations, to re-
establish institutions of mutual support and non-economic caring, of social and political and economic decision-making, and of sound and sensitive environmental management -- that we have created a whole discipline to do that -- probably proves the point.¹⁴⁸

Postmodernity, as demonstrated by info-technology, tendentiously breaks with industrial concentration and centralization of capital. It does so through the turning of information into money. This represents the further commodification of time, in particular time associated with exchange. Time is more powerfully money with the stripping away of the banknote form by electronic-information technology. Time spent that does not result in obtaining information is wasted.

This use of information technology demonstrates its catastrophic nature, as Jameson would say, but also, as he would add, the best thing that has happened to us. Another use of computer technology, however, is responsible for the partial abolishment of money and the associated decommodification of time. This is the Community Economic Development (CED) project pioneered (among others) by Dobson. Info-technology potentially concentrates economic power within the exchange circuits of a discrete set of individuals -- the power here not of dominating and controlling others but of, first and foremost, surviving.

We can call the 'root' economy the primitive economy, the tribal economy, the neighborhood economy, the community economy, the prosumer or the family or the inner-directed or partnership economy. It is all of these; but I choose here to understand them all as pre-money economies....The essence of these 'root' economies is neither wealth nor money, it is survival, survival, survival -- for which sustainability may now be another word.¹⁴⁹

The value-markers of CED, as Dobson makes clear in other places, bear no interest; they merely serve as units of measurement and exchange -- lacking thus the crucial determinant that turns the sign into the dollar sign.

There is no central authority in CED in that one is free to conduct one's affairs -- one's first business being survival -- as one sees fit within the parameters set by the number of interactants and their offerings. The authority for the currency, unlike that of a central bank, is re-created with each interaction; otherwise it does not exist or exists only formally as the list of subscriber's names. In that way, CED is language-like; it is
everywhere and nowhere. It is nowhere except where transaction/interaction occurs and this could potentially be anywhere in the system. No interest or credit accrues with CED value-markers (GREEN DOLLARS as they are called in some systems) and no power is created that exists -- much less stands above -- outside the transaction/interaction itself; there is no value other than the value that is created through use. Exchange value has been re-socialized.

Centralization of capital under the auspices of CED is decentralized through the concerted exchanges of interest free value markers. In concentrating on their survival, members re-create communal values, as denoted by the virtual or symbolic reality of their chosen currency. CED currency is really symbolic; it has no power of interest, and so is not real according to industrial/modern standards. As a symbolic reality, however, GREEN DOLLARS fits in perfectly with the information economy -- insofar as by monetizing information, capital demystifies the guts of its own ideology. Money is shown to have no power in itself; it is claim upon wealth. More profoundly, money is itself the creation of a community, even as it represents the alienation of communal value. Money represents the claim that the community has upon its own values, the wealth generated by its own existence. Under late capitalism, money becomes demystified as anything other than a convention. However, capitalistically, this demystification occurs accidentally, through market mechanisms. Monetary planning remains under the control of private property, as the recent bid of Canadian banks (1998) to merge demonstrates. CED represents then the purposeful demystification of money, the deliberate creating of symbolic currency. Finally, this has implications for our previous discussion of the re-integration of art and life.

If art creation is not limited to the individual but could be understood as a collectively endeavor, society itself being the supreme artwork of all of its members, then one can consider the project of CED to be such. The community represents life, heterogeneous, spontaneous and uneven. Re-integration is re-appropriation of the formerly alienated use values -- reified through exchange. I adduce, therefore, that CED, the system of symbolic currency (art) whose real value is community itself (life), could be the economic basis of the re-integration of art and life. It is not necessarily so
because other facts would have to come into play, specifically the articulation of a political vision.

To round off my conversation with Jameson, I will now consider briefly the importance of language, in particular the sign in greater detail, this allowing us to clarify our remarks on science and ideology. Language or practical consciousness as Marx called in the *German Ideology* has no value in itself, contrary to bourgeois idealists who might think otherwise; its only value is to serve life. As a species however, we live-in-language; there is no way out of it except death. Another of Jameson's books is entitled *The Prison house of Language*. Our experience of being-in-the-world is essentially a linguistic one. Being is an empty concept except as it is experienced through inhabiting a world. This is, as Heidegger reminds us, an act of self-cultivation. Language is the articulation of Being; how Being makes sense to us as ourselves embodied entities. Language, to further extrapolate, is the Body of Being, this last being language's essential content. The uttering of the Universal, speaking broadly, is the sign; the mark that being-in-the-world leaves upon us -- the trace as Derrida might say. Being-in-the-world, we become marked. We assume the stance of definite beings. This fall into temporality is our thrownness, to refer to Heidegger. In being thrown into the world through birth, we become subjects of the Sign. One becomes marked, becoming bearers of various tokens -- sex, ethnicity, class, and so forth.

The Sign is an art-object, the most abstract hitherto created. As marker it stands for some presence, some being-in-the-world; this is its function as trace, as memoir, as record. The Sign traces out the memory of a totality; it references some whole to which it points. A sign that did not point is useless. Conventionally, the Sign is divided into signifier and signified. I shall preserve this distinction for purposes of our own investigation. The totality is the structure indicated by the sign, and as such, through the power of abstraction, exists symbolically. The market, for example, exists symbolically through the dollar sign. This abstraction from social life or community is sustained by other than signs, to be sure; the entire State apparatus. However, the possibility of seeing-through-the-Sign resides in the Sign itself; or, in other words, it must be read. To read is to clarify the meaning of the Sign through referring it back to the abstract(l've)
the abstract(ive) labour responsible for its creation. This does not restore the original
that the Sign effaced; abolishing the market would not restore the "primeval values of
pre-capitalist economy." This is not, however, what CED is suggesting, however. It is
doing purposely what the market does accidentally, a point that has general
implications for the socialist project as a whole.

Socialism could be called capitalism made deliberate, hence the need for
planning. Socialism reads capitalism as a system of abstract(ed) signs, as an art work
alienated from its meaning, communal life. Naive or utopian socialism would negate the
existence of the Sign through idyllic or fantastic recreation of lost values -- a moralistic
response. Scientific socialism, if this phrase has any purchase left after the former
USSR, references the reproduction of the symbolic totality in all of its symbolic reality. It
overcomes the reification of capitalism through making clear the thing that it, capitalism,
is. It thereby clears the ground for a social order that is beyond both capitalism and
socialism, socialism as determined by capitalism.

However, in Marxist thinking, the "beyond" is structurally rooted in the present.
Before then leaping into the great unknown, it is necessary to consider the means for
arriving there, and the arriving there is itself an extrapolation from existing tendencies.
The means, moreover, one cannot choose capriciously; they must themselves be the
product of the current conjuncture; one cannot use weapons that fit the circumstances
of the last war. In the next and concluding chapter, I consider a war of position and its
cogency for postmodern struggle and a group of early fighters in such a struggle. As
noted earlier, CED could be a weapon/instrument in this war, a point that I will explore
in the context of D. W. Livingstone's research.
In this chapter, I will consider in greater detail planning. To begin, I cite Ellman on the importance of planning for traditional socialism:

The Marxist analysis of capitalism rejects the liberal view that capitalism is a socially rational system. It argues that only a planned socialist economy can be socially rational. It stresses two advantages which a planned socialist economy has over an unplanned capitalist economy. First, the absence of the anarchy of production, and secondly the absence of class conflict.150

As noted earlier by Jameson in the previous chapter, the market is incompatible with planning. To consider the relevancy of planning, it is useful to explicate this opposition between the two. Ellman’s further commentary is useful:

A major achievement of capitalism was that it introduced the idea of economic rationality or efficiency, the use of given resources to produce the maximum output, or the achievement of given goals with minimum effort. In the Marxist view, under capitalism this rationality is confined to individual firms and does not extend to society as a whole. What is rational for a firm may be irrational for society as a whole. Individual firms may dismiss workers to raise efficiency and save costs, regardless of the fact that whether or not they work and produce an output the workers have a claim on the output of society (e.g. via unemployment benefits) and that the unemployment may itself generate social costs (e.g. ill health or riots).151

The market is rational or planned, to use the terms synonymously for the moment, at the level of the individual firm. Efficiency marks the site of the rational in capitalist terms. At the level of the social whole or totality, however, capitalist reason breaks down; it becomes anarchic or chaotic or disorderly. For it fails to take into consideration the relations between the individual firms and the broader relations between individuals and individuals. Here, however, one needs to further explain the key terms if one wants to argue for the synonymity of rational and planned. In more conventional usage, usage derived however from a naive historical phenomenalism of everyday life, one could point to a break between rationality and planning. For example, the Nazis certainly planned things, in some respects, quite well. They attained hitherto unachieved efficiency in genocide. In that sense, they echo the logic of capitalism with their fixation, if not obsession with certain groups (Jews, gypsies) and their refusal to
consider the interrelated totality of human species life. In more formal Hegelian terms, capitalism and fascism refuse to think through to the universality of the concept. That which is rational at one level becomes irrational at another. What is this? To answer, I consider another aspect of Marxist thought. Richard Sennett argues:

Marx, in his manuscripts of 1844, understood this; to be free in a post-revolutionary world was, he wrote, to transcend the need for order. Yet in Manx’s early work was the dream that economic abundance would itself remove the structural need in society for order. At that time he believed that repressive order grew not merely out of the inequitable distribution of wealth but also out of the fact that there was not enough to go around. This is why critics like Sartre see in Marx the philosopher of plenitude, of a society that could exist beyond the order produced by economic scarcity.152

The Other to reason is the irrational. Historically, this was a legacy of eighteenth century rationalism, an era which saw the enraged French petty-bourgeoisie erect a statue to Reason during the Revolution. Such was the deification of bourgeois reason. This division then between reason and unreason, rationality and irrationality is, in political terms, the feature of a system of power rather than being itself primordially original. It shows some being-in-the-world, some grounds that it presumes and yet turns away from. Deified reason distances itself from itself, to speak formally, by denying its own irrationality. I am not necessarily being mad, as to say lunatic, by arguing for this point of view. Rather my paradoxical remarks indicate the dialectic of reason and its Other, points touched upon earlier in my discussion of the totality.

Reason, as Ellman argued when discussed the defects of state socialism and Sennett when discussing adolescence, becomes tyrannical by denying its Other. This is not the irrational, in any strict oppositional sense, rather it is the broad context of Reason that one, following Sennett, could broadly describe as spontaneity, play, that which continually breaks up the sameness of Reason. Sennett distinguishes between the adolescent form of Reason, that which denies and represses essential difference, and the maturer form of reason that accepts, if not embraces, it:

Adolescence is commonly thought to be a period of wandering and exportation; children become men and women sexually, the shelter of the home for a majority of the young is left behind, the capacity and the desire
to act as newly independent beings grows strong. With this enlarging of human horizons is adolescence, it must surely seem inappropriate to see born at the same stage of life those tactics of evasion and avoidance of unknown, painful experiences that give rise to the desire for purity and coherence.\footnote{153}

As Sennet goes to detail, adolescence is a time when one fixes one's identity, this a crystallization of childhood tendencies, and one's understanding of reality. The tendency, however, and politically this applies to the former Soviet Bloc, is to remain adolescent by refusing to allow others to challenge that conception. Ellman cites the well-known example of Stalin being surprised by the Nazi attack of the Soviet Union in 1940. This was not due to the lack of information by the Soviets, rather by Stalin's denying and this was not the only instance) of the existence of contradictory (to his way of thinking) information. The desire for purity and coherence is then an adolescent one, it denying the being of Other, both as features of concrete others and oneself. Thus the totalitarian fanatic seeks purity, both in self and others, at all costs; Sennett cites the case of the sixteenth Puritans, those of the witch hunts, their very name signifying this desire to escape from Others, these last being, ipso facto, impure or polluting. The witch hunts of McCarthyism in which the bourgeoisie wanted to purify themselves of the Other, in that instance, communism, is another example. Others, if they are not the same as Oneself are perceived as contamination, disease, bacillus, to use a Nazi term. Others then cannot really be other to oneself; their very difference menaces the taken for granted security of one's puritanical identity. Others are allowed to be only at the price of not being other to oneself. This means that they cannot exist in their own right and so must be eliminated as such -- literal genocide or other forms of psychopathologies. These puritanical ones form the collective excluding difference. Everyone is the same as everyone else, the "they" as Heidegger expressed it.

Pure reason would deny the uniqueness and singleness of its logic. One sees here the need for its critique, Kant being the first to systemically do this, Typically, this is the reason degraded, as noted in earlier chapters, to a calculus. Reason, in other words, is pure only at the technical level. Technically, we are all the same in so far as we are members of the same species. However, even that knowledge is not pure in so
far as the understanding of humans as belonging to one species is historically bound; the unity of species life becoming historically significant only with the creation of the capitalist dominated world market. Although intimations, clothed in the mystic garb of religious-philosophic speculation, existed in pre-capitalist formations.

Reason, the abstract logic of capital, for example, proceeds out a systemic drawing away from and distancing of the immediate lived reality of being-in-the-world. This produces an abstraction which, in its more philistine moments, is the tyranny of impersonal calculation -- so many bodies turned into so much soap by the Nazis. Reason, in other than adolescent terms, is that which returns itself to the world out of which it has abstracted itself. This is the impulse between socialism as the re-socialization of the means of production or, to go back further in the history of thought, to Plato's notion of thinking as anamnesis, the negation of amnesia.

Adolescent reason forgets how it is in the world first, and how its calculations - the drawing up of blueprints -- is a moment of that. Adolescent reason or pure calculation wants to reduce the Other to being simply a value on that self's unquestioned scale of values or the ruler. The adolescent wants to rule Others by eliminating their Otherness, thereby excluding what reminds him of his own difference.

The otherness of the Other is what differentiates oneself from that Other. Thus to deny the Other's otherness is for oneself to be indifferent to one's own otherness. However, there is a broad limit to this twisting and turning of difference and otherness, namely, the conditions of species life -- the totality -- under which both oneself and Others exist. Both oneself and Others are in a world, a world neither reducible to one or the other; rather the world is a contested production of the totality of relations between a multiplicity of Others of which oneself is but one. One is not the Other any more than the Other is oneself. Rather each in his (or her) own way offers, potentially, an understanding of being-in-the-world. Each, in Heidegger's terms, has his (or her) own project for Being -- difference; nevertheless, each has a project for Being -- sameness. The changing emphasis indicate the play to otherness, its differentiation. In this differentiation of sameness one breaks up the Same into self and other. Yes, both you and I are members of the human species and so the same in that respect. But our
understanding of what it means to be human is rooted in possibly different socio-political-gender-cultural matrices that, as fellow inquirers into the nature of Being-human, we can share with each other and thereby, through the work of inquiry, reconstitute the human community. Our humanity discloses itself through shared self-reflection.

This sharing out is the basis, as the Latin *communicare* indicates of both community and communication. Community is an achievement. It points to the play of differentiation. In being communitarian, one *enters* into the play; one allows one’s words to be molded, manipulated, played with -- examined and criticized by Others -- or by oneself as another. One opens oneself to the nuances and subtleties of an argument -- the colour of life. Puritans, by contrast, dress severely in black and white; either one is with “us” or against “us. In being playful, one frees oneself to the multifaceted nature of the entity under examination -- whether oneself or others. However, there is a limit to play, this distinguishing itself from vandalism. One being oneself invites others to be *themselves*. Thus there is no “us” except as a highly differentiated product, a ongoing conversation between self-reflecting inquiring souls, each with their own project for Being. “We must go and work in the garden,” said Candide. Being thus is the common ground that each cultivates and shares with others -- the fruits of their existential labour – in Being human.

In light of the above, synthesizing the research of Sennett and Ellman, one could say that twentieth century state socialism was the adolescent form of the socialist project for Being. Its main distinguishing feature was the reduction of the socialization of the means of production to the statization of the same. It was a regime characterized by willful denial of Other beginning with the misguided abolishment of the Duma in 1919 by Lenin and Trotsky, and, more generally, the absence of even bourgeois rights of freedom of expression.

A more mature version of socialism embraces the uniqueness of Others as fundamental to social interaction. Each one has his or her own project for Being. Economically, to recall Sennett’s discussion of the Young Marx, such a society is predicated upon the existence of general surplus. Ellman says as much in his
concluding characterization of twentieth century socialism:

Considered from this angle, Marxism-Leninism and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Though appear as ideologies of state-directed industrialization in backward countries.¹⁵⁵

Backward is to say scarcity of the (relative to themselves) sophisticated goods and services of the more advanced capitalist economies. The above mentioned ideologies are thus the adolescent expression of an economy of (relative) scarcity.

How do the above remarks relate to the question of planning?

As conventionally formulated, planning means to propose some arrangement of things, to produce a set of blueprints. However, it is interesting to note that, more profoundly, the word plan derives from the Latin planus flat. It is a doublet of plain. To plan, more originally understood, is to make plain, to explain a matter. One does not so much arrange things as to make plain an arrangement that is already there, the pre-ontological understanding of Being in Heidegger's terms. It accords ironically with Marx's earlier cited remark that the Paris communards of 1871 had no ideals to realize. A more fundamental conception of planning is this: the making plain the nature of the being-there. In making plain or explaining, one could, in this serious play, explicate the irony of the situation -- a point I will dwell upon when discussing General Idea in my next chapter.

Irony means literally the use of a word to intend its opposite. Thus one compliments the cleverness of one that one deems dull. One thereby exposes a tension between what one says and what one means. The ridiculed Other, however, is the Same, the differentiation being a purely linguistic one. To extrapolate then from the more literal, closed meaning, by irony I intend the exposing of the differentiation of the Same. Thus one human could appear odd to another given the different cultural context of the other's perception. The multiplying of contexts of contemporary species life give rise to a wide variety of possibly perceptions of human reality. Putting these differences into relation to each other is the ironical work, this serious play, of reconstituting communal life. To care for human community is to live with irony, that every present and multiple otherness that breaks up the sameness belonging to an
increasingly interrelated world: the irony of the information age. Thus one lives with irony, with otherness and difference as irreducible features of one's own world. Living ironically in relation to one's own self means to endure the breakup of any static perspective in seeking continually a more well-rounded view of reality. Others remind that self-in-the-midst-of-being-Itself of its own uniqueness and singularity. In one's project for Being, one makes plain -- and so plans -- what one is and hence what none other is. This is the agony of being ironically Oneself.

According to the typical (adolescent) notion of reasoning, as exhibited by the former State socialism, it is this agony of Otherness that the "revolutionary" -- really the puritanical fanatic or terrorist exemplified most strongly by Stalinism - aims to abolish. This was the ahistorical [postulating of the absolute character of one's beliefs; thus Stalin was pained by Trotsky among others and so had him and others killed. A twenty-first century socialism then would not abolish all forms of pain; rather it would create conditions for intensifying the agony of being Oneself. This would, however, be predicated upon the overcoming of the economic scarcities of pre-capitalist economies -- a development presently realized by late capitalism. Late capitalism excludes the Otherness of the Other by its forgetting of the historical character of capital accumulation; specifically, it forgets capital as the product of labour. Hence it paradoxically excludes the Other to Itself -- Labour -- and reduces all labour to the abstraction of Capital. State socialism took this reification one step further by recreating it at the level of the state. The state as capitalist became the abstract embodiment of labour; the party elite replaced the national bourgeoisie. The logic of capital accumulation remained the same, namely, the burying of the project for Being within labour.

Rather than labour being the site for carrying out one's project for Being. It remained, due to conditions of scarcity, the means for accumulating capital. Labour had no end for itself, in Hegel's terms, it remaining thus the estranged other to Itself. Labour remained a creature of wage-slavery, the only difference being the master was the state rather than discrete individual firms. This then is, as I understand it, is the essence of freedom: the carrying out of one's project for Being. Plato called this in the
Republic justice, the attending to what is one's own. The free man carries out the project of his Being through attending to what is his own. One does this through the conversation with oneself (Plato calling this thinking in the Theaetetus) and others (genuine social movement). Historically, capitalism was the supreme expression of human self-realization under conditions of scarcity. Having achieved abundance, the basic premise of Marx's notion of freedom, it is possible to restore to labour its proper function. Labour, properly speaking, is the agony of bringing that which is oneself to light out of the darkness of being in the world. Labour's proper function has been systemically lost due to the dynamic of its own development --- the differentiation of gathering-hunting society into industrial. The failure to restore labour's proper function to itself is the source of capitalist anarchy -- the basis of injustice.

II

In a twenty-first century socialism, that which is capital is the agonizing project of being Oneself. This is one's labour. Here, I consider other possible objections. Is this line of argument ignoring the question of what we could call society's dirty work: will mining, garbage collection, janitorial work, disposing of the dead, for example, simply disappear in a non-exploitative social order? Or will an invisible hand lead to dirty work being the desired self-expression of a sufficient number of self-transformed individuals?

To answer this question, I call upon my ancestral beliefs. I am a Jew, and within Judaism, there are means to deal with burying the dead. Firstly, the group of individuals charged with this function form a chevra kadisha, a society for holiness; other meanings of kadisha are sanctification and devotion. It was charged with washing and clothing the dead, thereby preparing them for burial. Here I will endeavor to explain the notion of sanctification, showing how a pre-capitalism value may be useful in a post-capitalist future. I do so because the above objection rests upon an implicit distinction between living -- the productive, useful element -- and the dead -- the unproductive, by-product. Thus corpses are garbage, trashed bodies, dirt, sources of pollution that the living must put out of sight and so, apparently, of mind. This distinction resonates with the earlier discussed theme of purification. The dead pollute the space of the living. However, what distinguishes the clean from the unclean?
To elucidate I return to the notion of community. This last is a shared experience of one relating to others; the object being the articulation of one's own project for Being in conversation with like-minded others. A cult, by contrast, is the entanglement of one with others, the object being the gratification of the dominant person's ego. In the first adults cooperate with each other for the performance of collectively agreed upon tasks that, as far as is technologically possible, correspond to both the desires and skills of highly differentiated individuals. In the second, the slaves, mere extensions of the dominant individual, serve the latter's will. Individuality is limited to the leader -- the *Fuhrer* Princip. None possesses any integrity -- genuine difference -- except *der Fuhrer* and so any other discrete individual is simply a part of that One. Totalitarianism is the systemic destruction of social individuation.

A cult appears, nevertheless, to be a centre of devotion. Certainly, the fascists were devoted to *der Fuhrer*. However, I would call this an adolescent notion of devotion, one based on an inability to socialize difference in order to minimize if not eliminate painful challenges to one's conception of self and world. One who is devoted to wisdom, who conceives of inquiry into the nature of Being as holy, thinks otherwise. To be devoted to wisdom means to open oneself up to the multiple relations binding oneself to others as part of an emerging, never static, whole called community. The community never stays put and so presents itself an object that one can absolutely capture and hold as a private possession. It is the contingent product of concerted work by differentiating individuals in the midst of trying to understand both themselves and others. Cultic behaviour, behaviour that orients to the personality of only one individual and imposes that upon others, is foolish or, more charitably expressed, immature.

Rational devotion, in opposition to irrational devotion, does not center on separating one thing from another. Cults typically demand that its members cut all ties to the "profane" world of "non-believers" whose questions might pollute the believer's pure (puritan) mind. Rather the reasoning person *comes clean* with the self through *making plain* what that self is. It is to clear up the clutter. Clutter here references how one is *entangled* with others rather than being *related* to them. One is entangled with Others to the degree that one believes that they have absolute power over oneself or
oneself over them -- this being the vestige of infantile dependency. One is able to relate to others to the degree that one is able to clearly distinguish what belongs to oneself and what does not -- and so may belong to them. At the level of communication, this is articulation: the dividing of the limbs, the Latin articulus. Maturity is painfully achieved through the intense agony of being Oneself. This agony, as its ancient Greek root agon suggests, is a contestation. One tests the weaknesses of one's argument, raising objections against it, in order to recover its more basic grounds. The argument here concerns the division between life and death. In an adolescent perspective, life and death are radically distinct entities, so distinct that the profound interrelation between the two as moments of an emerging totality is lost. To recover this unity of life and death is to first clear up the confusion that would radically separate them. Thus, to use a biological example: a rotting tree is both dead and alive. It is dead in that the materials constituting its substance -- the wood -- no longer form an identity corresponding to tree functions. Thus the roots of a rotting tree no longer bring water from the ground up into the tree's cells; its leaves no longer perform photosynthesis. The particular structure organizing treeness, so to speak, has ceased to exist.

However, other life forms such as bacteria, fungi, and insects have appropriated these materials for their own purposes. In terms of actual living cells present at the site, the rotting tree is more "alive" than when it was alive. The transition from life to life, to be sure, covers over the breakdown of a particular organization of the material in accordance with the demands of a life form -- the loss of that structure's coherence. It is at that point that the adult departs from the adolescent. The adolescent mind is fixated with particular organizational forms that have defined the identity of the entity in question, a fixation that is bound up with fear. The need to maintain purity of self, a feature of social pathology, expresses itself through the fixation upon forms, the refusal to allow those forms to dissolve and fall away in accordance with the demands of an emerging future -- an anticipatory illumination. Developmentally, one confuses a stage of life with the totality of that life, the adolescent form of the socialist project with the totality of that project. An adult can let go of the past and move on.

Purification is useful up to a point. Its rational character consists in the raising
and answering of objections to one's argument, in that sense clearing away the clutter, the argument's self-confusion. However, one is never purely oneself except at point of death. In life, one is continually reevaluating the coherence of structures defining oneself, organizing the inputs and outputs of energy necessary for personal maintenance in a differentiated environment. Philosophy, as Socrates tells us in the *Phaedo*, is the preparation for death. During life the philosopher organizes himself -- the mind -- in order to perceive the structure defining his life. However, and here I must qualify Plato, the structure is emergent -- and it emerges only out of being in the world with Others. This is not to deny that to the world itself there is a structure -- the grand eco-system. But an ecosystem is the totality of its niches, and these niches themselves exist dynamically in ever changing relationship to each other -- trees become rotting trunks nurturing bacteria. Modified here as the growing appreciation of form as product of dynamic organization and reorganization of energy inputs and outputs, philosophy prepares one to die. It is the recognition of the contingent character of any formulation or stage of the self, the more profound understanding of self residing in the ongoing relationship one has to one's project for Being. Death is the end of this project, and hence is that onto which one, in one's thrownness, casts oneself upon. One is towards that and so going forward to one's death.

How does this idea manifest itself socially? Here I return to the *chevra kadisha*. Firstly, the dead are separated from the main body of society; their bodies are prepared for burial. However, in the form of a smaller group of individuals, the *chevarim* of *chevra kadisha*, the dead are reunited with the living. Members of this society symbolize the more general communal recognition, in traditional Jewish society, of the interrelatedness of life of and death. Holiness or consecration is, maturely understood, the paying respects to the totality formed by this interrelatedness. The living bathe and clothe the dead. In doing so, the living see themselves approaching death for death, in the form of the corpse, stares them in the face. This seeing is done as part of a communal act, a meaning central to the word *chevarim* mentioned earlier in the phrase *chevra kadisha*, a society for holiness; *Chevarim* means members, those bound to each other, from the verb *chavar* join together, associate. Characteristically, Judaism places
individual suffering within a social setting. This does not take away from the existential fact that one dies alone; however, this does facilitate one’s ability to share one’s pain with others. Of course, not everyone is equally open to this; this requires compassion, the word deriving from the Latin patiri suffer and com- with. That, however, is strange, apparently, in the context of a chevra kadisha. Does this last show compassion to the dead? But the dead need no compassion. Such an objection, however, misses the point. The burying of the dead, or whatever the form of the last rites are whether actual burial or cremation, is a ritual. It signifies one’s solidarity with the past. The living’s washing and clothing of dead bodies in so far as the latter were members of one’s community, is not mere garbage disposal. Rather it is a concrete metaphor, Judaism emphasizing doing, for relating oneself to what has gone before -- the grounding of oneself in an ongoing community. Thus while actual individuals upon death pass out of the community of the living, the community is not itself limited to the living. The going in (birth) and going out (death) of individuals signifies, rationally speaking, how that community is continual reconstituting itself through its energetic engagement with its changing environment. The site for this work is, as Judaism’s chevra kadisha shows, one’s wrestling with one’s past as the basic stuff -- requiring reformulation -- for the future. Thus one comes out of somewhere in going somewhere. As one classical Jewish text, Pirkai Avot (Ethics of Our Fathers) expresses this, da meyin bata, aifo atah holech v’lifnai atah omed (know from whence you come, where you are going and before whom you stand). One lets go of forms in order to recapture their essence.

What of a twenty-first century socialism?

As the above discussion suggests, such a society would have to dissolve the divisions, arising since the industrial revolution, that have radically separated the living from the dead. For example, in contemporary secular middle-class Jewish society, there is no chevra kadisha. One has professional undertakers for disposing of the dead. Thus community becomes limited to those present with the resultant loss of historical perspective. Does this mean that one has to resuscitate traditional religious forms of devotion? That is no solution either. Rather, in line with a dialectical approach, one could carefully appropriate forms in light of one’s evolving understanding of the
meaning of those forms. It may or may not be necessary to actually clothe the dead; why not, however, introduce children to people in chronic care units? Why not arrange for people to die at home rather than in institutions? Why not have a party for the dying as they say farewell to their community? Why not have them in the midst of the living right to the very end rather than marginalizing them and their suffering?

What about, however, the division of labour?

Cleaning the streets and picking up garbage is predicated upon the existence of a certain urban structure. “Garbage collectors”, typically, do not live on the streets that they clean up. What if there was no central (or less centralized garbage) pickup? What if people were forced to pick up their own garbage, to clean up after themselves? This is the negative aspect. The positive one is that picking up garbage is part of having pride in oneself and one’s surroundings; how one takes care of oneself. This is rooted in animal nature. Domestic pigs, for example, will, if allowed, excrete in one section of their pens and sleep in another; healthy humans do the same in their habitations. In a decentralized city people would be forced to be more responsible for taking care of themselves, assuming their personal attachment to their surroundings. This would encourage home composting, for example, the return of “by-products” to the earth. By-production is an aspect of production. If people were forced to take care of themselves, beginning with their own personal production and resulting mess, that would eliminate “garbage collectors” as a social category. Everyone would be a garbage collector, beginning with his or her own trash.

The more general point is that undesirable work is a feature of a division of labour. That which is most undesirable is to radically separate out production and by-production. One returns by-products back to the ground, for example, through actual composting, and thereby re-establishes one’s relationship with the ground. This is another example of burying the dead and reminding oneself that community is not limited to the living. A lively society composes and recomposes its own structures, re-associating what has been alienated through the course of its development. Thus under industrialism, with the explosive increase in urban population, there was a concomitant loss of grounds -- and a reconfiguration of ground. Specialized urban functions arose,
such as garbage collector, reflecting this estrangement. The remedy for this state of affairs is to use contemporary technology, such as composting, within the context of differentiating urban structures, to restore that responsibility. It is to re-associate the labour of collecting garbage with the labour of producing it in the first instance.

Another example, this time in the sphere of reproduction, emphasizes this point. Reproduction concerns the birth of human beings. The new born or babies wear and soil diapers. Cleaning up after them is literally shit work, and this has traditionally, certainly in patriarchal societies, fallen upon women. However, as with burying the dead so with the changing of diapers. In a lively society, one cleans up after oneself, and one’s children are products of oneself. Thus when changing your child’s diaper, one does this as part of one’s love for that individual. One has compassion for the sufferings of the beloved other, the child in soiled diapers, for example. The totality of parenthood then concerns responsibility for both product (child) and by-product (dirty diapers). One does both in the same spirit. In the case of changing dirty diapers, one is showing solidarity with the future just as when one is burying the dead, one shows solidarity with the past. In both instances, the community extends itself, in the first instance to newly arrived and to the second to the newly departed.

The original objections then one can now restate as features of relations between production, by-production and reproduction. Under patro-industrialism there developed categories of “shitwork” corresponding to notions of rejected others. The first was Nature as land became mere dirt bought and sold as real estate. One could contrast the attitude of the Native People towards the Land and the European settlers in that regard. The first had learned to live harmoniously with Nature while the second group, having developed from gathers-hunters, had lost that ability. Industrialism, moreover, marked the radical departure from traditional in first cutting off vast and eventually the majority of people from the direct experience of the land, this further resulting with successive stages of production and consumption into the reduction of social relations to the atomistic and isolated individual. The loss of connection to the natural environment (ecology) was matched by an isolation of individuals from their fellows (economy).
The agony of giving birth to a renewed socialism references the going back to what was lost during the course of European economic development. Ecology is one attempt to do this, it being the “white” version of “red” culture, albeit without much of the spiritual depth of the latter. Nevertheless a revolutionary has compassion for such attempts, no matter how tame or flawed. Basic elements of a twenty-first century socialism are the retaking of responsibility for oneself at both the individual and collective level in order to live more harmoniously with one’s nature -- both inner-subjective and outer-objective. exemplifies. This is, in a way, a utopia, a return to the Garden that Native People, as well as Eastern culture, never left. The arising of an all powerful father god standing over and above Nature belongs to a definite mode of production -- the pastoral people of the Middle East; its generalization, conventionally called Judaeo-Christianity, became the ideological superstructure of European civilization.

That culture is now the rotting tree trunk, the bacteria, fungi and the like eating away at it being the non-European people of the globe. That tree, for so long taken as the Tree of Knowledge, had covered the great forest, depriving other vegetation of their place in the sun. More prosaically, the spread of European based technology and culture is now returning to Europe together with the repressed traditional culture that Europe sought to exterminate in its rise to world power. This could be the grounds for returning to the Garden -- however, this would have a primary urban context. The paradoxical nature of this return is precisely what challenges traditional Western logic -- the Logos, Here indeed is the return to anarchy, more precisely the overthrown of Western European (politically) or Judeo-Christian (ideologically) world leadership. Europe in the last five hundred years has been the world; now the world is overthrowing Europe as the spiritual emptiness of that civilization shows itself more and more. The environmental crisis shows the now embryonic world culture the need to live harmoniously with Nature, this echoing the experience that isolated gathering-hunting bands had individually at the very dawn of human society. Global society is the electronic information gathering-hunting collective.

The leading order or reason of the global society is not the linear repeatable,
uniform, and predictable lines of type governing nation-state, industrial discourse. Rather it is the ability to weave a text out of a plethora of different materials, simultaneously approaching a matter from a variety of viewpoints. One does not have a perspective as much as a set of general guidelines with which one plays -- mine being communism as the real movement of history. One exposes the contingency of one’s viewpoint as part of exploring the matter at hand. Thereby does one, through this gathering, hunt down what one seeks. However, the object sought is not a thing lying far off in the distance. Rather, existentially, it is the very grounds of one’s own Being upon which, in the gathering-hunting motion, one treads. It is the Mother Earth, the Goddess. The Goddess in Her earthiness invites one to reach out and feel, to open oneself up to the agony of birth, more generally to the pain of life in its coming in and going out of Being. Thereby does one cultivate the grounds of Being, and Being grounds itself in is, as the East teaches us, compassion.

In a twenty-first century socialism, one therefore has compassion for all living things? The Earth has reverted back to the Goddess, no longer being real estate? Humankind has abolished “shitwork” through the reintegration of production with by-production?

It is necessary to pose these tendencies as questions in order to avoid an unnecessary determinism. Unnecessary because, at least theoretically, it is possible that the future may consist of citizens who will not obediently service the blueprints of “revolutionary party.” One’s children will not necessarily be what one planned them to be. Here again, I return to the more rooted sense of planning, a meaning distinct from making blueprints. This is explaining, making plain what one’s own Being is. Planning, in that sense, will not determine the future, rather it clears the way for a possible future to come out of the present. A planner does not have blueprints so much as a vision, a seeing-in the present. Out of seeing-in one makes out what lies there. This envisioning process is the re-seeing of what is there. This may not be pleasant.

To indicate one unpleasant but real possibility of the future, I cite from an interview with Vernor Vinge in “WIRED”:

WIRED: In your books, you sometimes focus on the idea of a singularity -- the
Vinge does on to say that this development, given the exponential growth of computer intelligence, could occur within fifty years, the span of two generations. That would be a sad fate, regarded from the present perspective of human dominance, that we would create the conditions for our own downfall. Are humans the grave diggers of their own species? Given that the above point is “singular,” I cannot speculate further. Perhaps the super computers of the future will be able to take better care of us, as we do domestic animals or plants, than we could today. I, or for that matter, no one else, can know that.

The point of my citation is to emphasize the limitations of planning as blueprinting and the greater wisdom in planning-as-making-plain the present. One cannot determine the future for there are singularity points beyond which present knowledge comes to a dead end. This is another way of expressing Heidegger’s notion of thrownness. To the future we are thrown, and in our thrownness have to suffer the uncertainty that our grandchildren, for example, could be, one would hope, the well-kept pets of super computers.

II

To close off this chapter, I want to tie up some threads of the argument exposed in the last two chapters. Specifically, I refer to the existence of LETS and Richard Sennett. LETS, as indicated in my last chapter, while market-like, is nevertheless other to the market economy. LETS is market-like because there are values attached to goods and services. Exchanges, however, are not predicated upon anyone having the means of exchange or currency since this last one creates only through the transaction. Thus one begins with a zero balance. According to the market this is financial anarchy, it leading
only to political disorder. I quite agree with, however, this caveat: anarchy is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, it may be the basis -- the only real basis -- upon which life can renew itself. Politically, one could say, LETS lacks any central authority that governs its economy. Rather the central agency is the community itself as dispersed in the potentially multitudinous exchanges of its members. In this last section I want to borrow from Richard Sennett in order to indicate an urban space embodying a LETS economy. Support for the goodness of anarchy comes from Richard Sennett:

To quote: first his criticism of the “planning community:”:

It :must take responsibility for its acts in a historical, unpredictable society rather than in a dream world of harmony and predetermined order....To make modern cities serve human needs, we shall have to change the way in which city planners work. Instead of planning for some abstract urban whole, planners are going to have to work for the concrete parts of the city, the different classes, ethnic groups, and races it contains. And the work they do for these people cannot be laying out their future; the people will have no chance to mature unless they do that for themselves, unless they are actively involved in shaping their social lives. But because the needs of life are not shapeless, because there is a substance of growth, and not an aimless wandering, planners can provide the social materials by which men in communities can come to civilize themselves.  

Sennett’s argument, to summarize, is this: the pre-packaged order belonging to the linear mind set of traditional urban planner, with its segregation of different income populations (rich and poor), different activities (commercial and residential) and different generations (families with children in the suburbs and single individuals in the city core). Sennett opposes this, calling it adolescent. In his view an adult city is that which encourages differences to confront each other directly, that is, without mediation by a central authority. This allows for a graduated release of tension, preventing sudden outbursts, as well as forcing people to take personal responsibility for their lives, beginning with their living space. One must face the Other and, through the facing, learn to co-exist, assuming that none has any absolute power over anyone else. In short, Sennett argues for an urban bio-diversity and against urban mono-culture, for greater social differentiation rather than its continued flattening out:

As Jane Jacobs shows, there has been destruction of arenas for social
interchange--little bars, shops, and pool halls--because of a middle-class vision of what a comfortable and secure place should really be.  

And

But urban society becomes stratified in power relations precisely to the extent that people feel comfortable in using impersonal, bureaucratic rules as a means of achieving their ends. The upper middle classes do; the losers, the little people, do not.  

Traditional planning is an instrument of class rule, the bourgeoisification of social (urban) space. To re-socialize the city is to directly challenge the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. This is the political dimension; its economic equivalent is LETS, ironically, a petty-bourgeois creation in its immediate social origins.

LETS is an economy without any central authority, the complete negation of industrial concentration and centralization. It corresponds to Sennett's vision of the adult city:

What is needed in order to create cities where people are forced to confront each other is a reconstituting of public power, not a destruction of it. As a rule of change the situations creating survival encounters would be as follows: there would be no policing, nor any other form of central control, of schooling, zoning, renewal, or city activities that could be performed through common community action, or, even more importantly, through direct, nonviolent conflict in the city itself....Encouraging unzoned urban places, no longer centrally controlled, would thus promote visual and functional disorder in the city. My belief is that this disorder is better than dead, predetermined planning, which restricts effective social exploration. It is better for men to be makers of historical change than for the functional design of a pre-experiential plan to be "carried out."

LETS would bring anarchy to traditional financial markets by subverting the power of the money-backed capitalist elites. In conjunction with a political programme as indicated in the above, it would be, metaphorically speaking, dynamic. Blowing up the classifications stemming from capitalist economy defining value, worth and identity, LETS, with its de-centralizing and deconcentrating tendencies, would be an important force for reconfiguring the urban environment. It would be explosive ammunition in a war of position rather than, as I will shortly explain, of movement.

The overturning of a previously dominant order appears always to that order to be anarchy as the French aristocrats said on the eve of the Revolution: apres nous le
deluge. In their reactionary arrogance, they demonstrated their historical obsolescence. The same comments apply to the present corporate-capitalist elites who would resist the decentralizing and deconcentrating LETS political-economy. Indifferent, aloof and arrogant, today's typical CEO with his inflated salary stands to the front-line working people of his company just as surely as the French aristocrats did to the French people in 1789. The CEO is the corporate capitalist aristocrat of the money economy.

LETS could economically behead -- decapitalize -- this class and the urban arrangements proposed by Sennett do the same politically. Uneasy is the head that wears the crown. Revolution is in the air.

To ground this, however, one must resist the temptation to draw up blueprints, this resulting in another deification of reason. Rather one works to remove obstacles to the emerging electronic order, guiding that energy through the promotion of embryonic revolutionary tendencies such as LETS. But I do not want to anticipate myself too much by laying down a blueprint for the future. After all, if Vinge is right, the struggle between humans would be as struggle between domestic animals or plants, the real masters of the planet being super-computers. One should not take oneself too seriously, irony being the positive expression of this. In the final analysis, one is but a small part of an infinitely larger whole -- whether one is someone's pet plant or the gardener. In any case, one cultivates the garden that is one's earthly being. Therein lies salvation.
In chapters five and six, I touched upon a war of position for which LETS would be dynamic. Now I will consider this war in greater detail. I begin with an example of early fighters of this war, Michael Tims, Ron Gabe and Jorge Saia, whose base of operations was the Toronto art scene of the 1970s to the 1990s, and who called themselves General Idea (GI). My overall contention and purpose in using GI is to show the relevancy of a cultural front. Indeed, one failure of the traditional organizations of Left, for example, the Communist Party of Canada, is their failure to integrate art, except in a sheerly appropriative propagandistic way, in the broader struggle of social change. This point has greater cogency following Jameson’s observation, cited in endnote 137, that culture no longer has any autonomous status in postmodern reality. In effect, culture is everywhere and nowhere, assuming the status of language. In discussing the nature of warfare and the warfare most appropriate to the present, I will indicate ways of exploiting this opening, developing theses that are potentially useful for the present conjuncture given their dialectical character. More generally, war here functions as the means of going from the present to the future, the steps necessary to take before one can leap into the great unknown. As well, one may consider warfare as a ground clearing operation. As a form of struggle, it is the highest and deepest form if one considers the seriousness of the issues and concomitant need for strict organization and discipline. In struggling with both oneself and others, one forces oneself is forced by others to clarify the issues, define the terms of the debate and plan more precisely the line of march. One defends a thesis and thereby advances into a more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter.

The exact nature of the war required to overthrow capitalist social reality in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution in 1917, specifically the failure of this last to extend itself in Europe, was the subject of intense debate by Europeans Marxists in the 1920s. Antonio Gramsci was one theorist who gave it much thought, others such as Bob Jessop have more recently extended its range (Jessop 1990). To cite passages indicated their concerns:
In the political struggle one should not ape the methods of the ruling classes, or one will fall into easy ambushes. In the current struggles this phenomenon often occurs. For certain classes a war of movement and manoeuver is necessary because it is the form of war which belongs to them; and this, in the case of political struggle, may include a valuable and perhaps indispensable use of commando tactics. But to fix one's mind on the military model is the mark of a fool: politics, here too, must have priority over its military aspect, and only politics creates the possibility for manoeuver and movement.

Gramsci writing in the two decades preceding the peak of World War II industrialism, glimpsed the need for the ideological element -- political superstructure -- to assume the command position. Under conditions of postmodernism the nature of production and reproduction strengthens that position, for under present conditions in the most advanced capitalist economies the battle is not so much for things -- production and reproduction of objects, for scarce physical territory -- but for much more intangible items concerning the meaning of existence itself, couched to be sure in the language of 'consumer lifestyle' -- although the anxiety does not lie too far beneath the surface as Kroker and Cook (1986) shown in their analysis of the postmodern scene.

The political then references the general ideological superstructure framing the meaning of society, politics being, one could say, practical philosophy. As language is practical consciousness, according to Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, so politics is the language expressing the meaning of the urban settlement, the polis. The civic culture is the Idea and the urban settlement the polity. A war of position is not fought to secure scarce goods (actual physical territory) but to define -- frame -- the meaning of a culture. The battleground, however, is neither the culture per se (civic myth) nor the urban settlement per se (the polity), rather it concerns the relationship between the two. It is a supremely dialectical struggle -- a struggle calling upon the mental resources of creativity, playfulness and humour.

To clarify the relationship between cultural production and political struggle, I cite Gramsci:

It may be observed in general that in modern civilization all practical activities have become so complex, and the sciences so interwoven with everyday life, that each practical activity tends to create a new type of school for its own executives and specialists and hence to create a body of specialist intellectuals.
at a higher level to teach in these schools. Thus, side by side with the type of school which may be called "humanistic"--the oldest form of traditional school, designed to develop in each individual human being an as yet undifferentiated general culture, the fundamental power to think and ability to find one's way in life--a whole system of specialized schools, at varying levels, has been being created to serve entire professional sectors, or professions which are already specialized and defined within precise boundaries [my emphasis].

Culture is the fundamental power to think and ability to find one's way in life; it is the product, as well, of the transformation of nature and as such is humankind's second nature. That which is fundamental, therefore, is itself in the midst of constant modification -- how to think and survive in feudal society is different than in a capitalist one.

One should not conflate cultural and political struggles. The political as distinct from the cultural concerns the thinking of fundamental power, more specifically, the power structure as I have earlier termed this. It is difficult to accord one priority over another: the fundamental power to think and the thinking of fundamental power are dialectical terms. One could say that each is an aspect of the other. To give a contemporary example: in Canadian culture there is a notion of fairness and Canadian political parties often use that term in conjunction with promoting their political agenda (please note: this is a Latin plural form for which *agendum* is the singular). In relying upon general cultural norms political parties show how they are defined by a culture; but the opposite works as well as demonstrated by the Harris Tories' use of the term "common sense" in their slogan "common sense revolution." They have linked having common sense with the corporate capitalist agendum, the latest capitalist reification of social reality, as indicated in chapter one.

While the relationship, as befits complex contemporary societies, between the cultural and the political is complex, I, nevertheless can adduce the following: cultural is a broader notion than the political and remains much less defined. The political often defines the cultural in relying upon hitherto unarticulated group norms. Any cultural struggle is a political struggle in some sense in so far as one is grappling with the meaning of a culture -- the defining of culture implicating power structures with their distinct agenda. Politics is not reducible to political parties any more than culture is to,
say, art gallery showings. Expressions of a phenomenon may be varied although this variation exists within a range. Political parties in capitalist cultures, for example, reflect relations of commodity production. Implicitly the political struggle is a cultural one, as focused by the articulation of key terms, such as "commonsense" by the corporate capitalist Harris Tories. Politics, by the same token, is not reducible to culture since that would ignore the specific mode of articulation -- the dynamics of aggregation of class interest, the framing of political agenda -- characterizing it. Politics, in short, possesses a relatively autonomous sphere of existence even as this relativeness one needs to continually rethink. If politics is an art form, one may keep in mind Jameson's earlier comments about the loss of relatively autonomy enjoyed by art under bourgeois high culture.

Another key term in this debate is hegemony and its associated term, subaltern. The meaning and exact function of these terms is much debated (Gramsci 1971, Jessop 1990) and here I can only indicate its relevance for my immediate concerns. Generally speaking, hegemony references some leading position and subaltern that which is in a position of being led. Jessop writes,

In broad terms hegemony involves the interpellation and organization of different 'class-relevant' (but not necessarily class-conscious) forces under the 'political, intellectual and moral leadership' of a particular class (or class fraction) or, more precisely, its political, intellectual and moral spokesman. The key to the exercise of such leadership is the development of a specific 'hegemonic project' which can resolve the abstract problem of conflicts between particular interests and the general interests. In abstract terms this conflict is probably insoluble because of the potentially infinite range of particular interests which could be posited in opposition to any definition of the general interest. None the less, it is the task of hegemonic leadership to resolve this conflict on the less abstract plane through specific political, intellectual and moral practices. This involves the mobilization of support behind a concrete, national-popular program of action which asserts a general interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly advance the long-term interests of the hegemonic class (fraction) and which also privileges particular 'economic corporate' interests compatible with this programme.163

However, Jessop further writes,

So far I have implied that hegemony is typical or normal in capitalist
societies, that hegemonic projects somehow manage to secure the support of all significant social forces and that the hegemonic force itself is bound in the long term to be an economically dominant class or class fraction rather than a subordinate class or non-class force. In each case these implications are misleading or false.  

Jessop then goes on to describe, in his terms, one or two nation projects. Thus 'one nation' strategies aim at an expansive hegemony in which the support of the entire population is mobilized through material concessions and symbolic rewards (as in 'social imperialism' and the 'Keynesian welfare state' projects.) In contrast, 'two nations' projects aim at a more limited hegemony concerned to mobilize the support of strategically significance sectors of the population and to pass the costs of the project to other sectors (as in fascism and Thatcherism).  

A war has a definite background, and the debate about the nature of the war appropriate to postmodernism has as its background, the transition from print to electronic technology, the focus shifted from the geophysical terrain to the metaphysical one. That which is strategically significant is a function of socially defined interest in relation to the grammar organizing the production and reproduction of social reality. In advanced capitalist nations, very few people are actually starving as was the case in Russia on the eve of the Revolution though twenty percent (20%) of children in Toronto live in poverty; actual food supplies, their obtaining and defending, are thus not strategically significant here; the hunger is more metaphysical, as in the hunger for existential meaning. But one should not forget the existence of food banks as well as computer banks in the country called by the United Nations “the best to live in.” The co-existence of both food banks and computer banks in the city of Toronto, for example, indicates the blurring phenomenon of the former third and first world as globalization has created first world islands of highly-skilled urban professionals within the former third world and created marginalized areas of displaced downsized blue-collar workers within the former first; this last has been aided by government cutbacks in social welfare (the first act of the Mike Harris conservative government was to reduce social welfare payments by 21%). Global capitalism shifts resources of all kinds across the globe, playing off sections of working people against each other, eroding the traditional hard-
won union security and benefits of the industrial proletariat under monopoly capitalism. Nevertheless, the traditional capitalist economies (with the addition of Japan since 1945) still, as evinced by forms of economic and political organization such as the G-7 (Germany, Italy, France, UK, Japan, Canada and USA), NATO, and membership of the UN security council, exert hegemonic influence on the world economy despite rivalries between themselves.

Social reality, under conditions of advanced capitalism, is of filaments, wires and threads; it is a delicate mechanism. Wired to data-banks, individuals are finely enmeshed in info-bio-technology. Individuals are now and will be even more dependent on systemic interdependence of discursive parts, that is, the degree of organization giving the system its coherence, intelligibility and integrity. Meaning is, more and more, a system product. Warfare, under these conditions, occurs on the terrain of information and meaning. As noted earlier, consciousness itself has become a product. To fight a war of position is to fight both a war of and for consciousness where the semiotic parameters defining consciousness take on material significance. In the print age, linear, sequential feeding of the data corresponded to chains of command. Those on top commanded those on the bottom; relations of power were vertically organized. The evolution of the electronic media has imploded the distinctions proper to the hierarchical optically dominated sensory experience of the literate epoch. Vertical has given way to the horizontal. To give a few examples, some children have become electronic information wizards; marketing their skills, they have set up profitable businesses for themselves. Economically, they are no longer children, this reversing or at least flattening out of former vertical chains of parent-child command (Naisbitt 1984, Toffler 1990). Another example concerns religion. Small, informal group meetings are replacing formal mass congregations. In business large corporations are breaking down into smaller companies. (Naisbitt 1984) In short, the sequentially determined line with its attendant links and subsequent chain of command, is dissolving into a multiplicity of break-off networks with concomitant increase in density of signification (Toffler 1990). The result is that meaning now matters in radically different ways. Meaning itself has become a site of contestation as evinced by a whole range of media-related
phenomena and the spin given to events (Chomsky 1994). More precisely, the spin the mass media gives to events corresponds to the framing operation of print culture. However, spin is a more dynamic term compared to framing, this last implying a freezing of an event in time.

What are the implications for organizing a revolutionary movement? There are two aspects to this: the art of revolution and the revolution of art. In the print era, a fighting organization had a chain of command. How does one, however, command an intensive sign-network? What is the character of the electro-organic commander? What is the social process that accompanies the increase in semiotic density? Can one command at all? I am dealing here with a highly structured and fractured social consciousness. For example, many folks in vertically organized organizations are suffering from burn-out, that is, a degree of mental (if not battle) fatigue preventing them from functioning at an institutionally defined degree of competence; subjectively, this is experienced as apathy and boredom. Various tendencies are jockeying to fill the void created by the failure of traditional paradigms of meaning (whether religious, philosophic, political and the like) to encompass and integrate the new data within integrated story lines, the phenomenon of overchoice (Toffler 1971).

A war of position implies that one is constantly on the move, both in integrating the data and exploiting contradictions in various information bodies: indeed, this is part of the same process as dialectically, integration proceeds in tandem with differentiation. Contradictions are differences within a data base requiring resolution at higher (more abstract) levels of understanding; verbally this is the difference between words and concepts. A word, however, is potentially a concept, for example, the word 'being', its conceptualization determined by the amount of linguistic resources applied to expanding its meaning and overall metaphorical value, this permitting it to fill neural niches in its cultural environment. Guerrilla warfare on the postmodern battlefield orients to the changing function of language within shifting paradigms of meaning -- paradigms semiurgically sutured, a glowing iridescent body on the verge of co-terminus breakup.167 This is increasing pressure on standing armies and standard positions or fixed points of view, as indicated by McLuhan's research on electronic media (McLuhan
1951, 1964, 1968, 1969). Empirically, however, as the recent Nato war against Serbia has demonstrated, standing armies still "pack a mean punch." Nevertheless there has been a definite shift, more pronounced in some regions of the global capitalist than in others, in structure. Standard armies, mass cultures, and fixed positions are products of print technology where uniformity, predictability and repeatability defined value; a guerilla unit has a more fluid structure, guerrilla fighters taking more advantage of local conditions, blending much more with the people, adapting their ways rather than standing apart from them as a formal organization (Mao 1967). Electronic information technology encourages guerilla warfare, whether of independent hackers breaking into a high-level corporate security system or ad-hoc groups that meet for specific tasks and unmet, so to speak, when they have completed those tasks (Toffler 1990). The advantage of the guerilla unit is its flexibility, its ability to adopt to changing circumstances of struggle. Under those conditions, speed of gathering, execution and dispersal are essential. The quicker one is in assembling one's forces and then melting away when one has obtained one's objectives, the less one is a target for enemy fire. On the other hand, the enemy should always be in one's line of fire. This is how the revolutionaries in the USA's war of independence from Great Britain fought England's standing army. Adapting Indian dress in the battles of Concord and Lexington, the colonists fought from the woods while the English, with their red coats, were a splendid target on the road (Bonwick 1991). Concord and Lexington are examples of successful guerilla action.

Consider now strategy and tactics. The word strategy comes from the Greek strategos, general. This word is itself a compound one, deriving from strateuein to serve as a soldier and agein to lead. Tactics, the word, comes from the Greek tassein to arrange, put in order. The general draws up the troops, arranging them in battle formation, and leads them into combat. That individual is the leading soldier or hegemon. What is the strategy and what are the tactics in the sort of war we are discussing? In our general line of march we move towards a society organized by the principle of care. The chief strategist in this context is the one best able to generalize the practice of care, the abstract labourer in Marx's terms. Such a one has thoroughly
investigated the question of care, and through his or her investigations can situate care in the evolving historical context of the social process. The general staff of such an army are the general's colleagues; as the term staff indicates, they support this last's work. They are conversant with the general idea of care through their discussions with the principal strategist. The soldiers are those individuals who practice care but have not yet advanced to a more abstract understanding of it. Nevertheless, they are open to discussing their sense of care with the general and the general's staff. A general, moreover, commands the troops. However, for our purposes, the general is a physician and the troop ultimately is the body politic. The doctor must learn to be patient with the troops; he or she must understand the particular competence of each soldier to stimulate each to fight to the best of his or her abilities. In the end, each must learn to care for the self although learning to care is a social process. The army is, in essence, a collegial association of like-minded souls. Grades and distinctions, rightly grasped, correspond to degrees of understanding the general idea, a point that I will concretize in discussing General Idea, a group of Toronto based artists in this chapter's next section. The individual who is general at the moment is not the general for all time. People can move up the ranks, so to speak, according to their willingness to learn and desire to serve. Nevertheless, this is an army, a collegial association with a certain discipline that maintains order in the ranks for the accomplishment of its stated aims.

Of tactics? Here I return to the question of guerillas versus the standing army, stating more clearly the advantages and disadvantages of each. The advantage of the guerilla unit is the speed and flexibility of its movement; it is dance-like. However, its disadvantage is its inability to hold a position. For it melts away after battle. The advantages and disadvantages of a standing army are the opposite. Its greater bulk makes it slower and less flexible and so an easier target for enemy fire. However, it can, through force of number, hold a position. A standing army would seem to be better. The chief difficulty, however, is that greater numbers are a bigger target. Moreover, as said earlier, the sequentially determined line with its attendant links and subsequent chain of command, is dissolving into a multiplicity of break-off networks with concomitant increase in density of signification. This is the movement from print-
mechanical to electronic-organic culture.

How does one command in such a situation? What is electronic generalship? People are splitting off from the main narrative lines, so to speak, of modern thought; they want to tell their own stories. History is becoming less the story of the standing mechanical armies holding fixed positions and more of autonomous info-tech guerilla units contesting the meaning of culture. Hierarchical, top-down organizations, whether in business, government or religion, are imploding because of their dead weight or rapidly evolving into more manageable self-regulating units. Generalship consists in laying out the idea of care in relationship to a proliferating network of autonomous narrative units, whether actually or virtually linked or both. The point of this laying out is to raise the general awareness of the idea of care through linking these independent units, these NODES of a network. From the Latin nodus, a node is a knot. A network is, one could say, a knotted collection of individuals. The Net, as a whole, is extensive; the individual knots are intensive. The wide-spread property of the Net is the space for the unrolling of the otherwise knotted up individual energies; the knots are the intensive coming together of those energies. The command structure, intellectually, concerns the integration and differentiation of the data at ever higher levels of analysis with the concomitant generation of metaphors, this enabling the army to appropriate various cultural niches in its ongoing battle to define the meaning of its present environment. Socially, the command structure are those individuals more intensively involved in such work, and for the sake of intensifying their understanding of the attendant issues extend themselves to others who are their fellow fighters, their comrades in arms.

However, here, I distinguish between vision and objective or, alternatively, meaning and sign. A vision or meaning is inexhaustible, it being the expansiveness of one's Being. However, if this is other than mere self-indulgence, one requires an objective set of criteria able to measure the efficacy of the vision. What is the relationship of meaning, in other words, to value? What value does one's vision have for others? How does one's thesis conform to the general body of literature to which it purportedly contributes? More generally, the software vision/civic culture is in
conversation with the hardware objective/urban settlement, the intangible with the tangible. These are two poles; however, there is a third, namely, the one who (re)connects the first two to each other. According to phenomenal reality, reality is simply a dispersed, scattered mass of aimless points. However, this is but an image whose overcoming requires the noumenal work of theorizing. For capitalism, for example, social reality is not social, but the collection of atomized competing individuals in the marketplace. However, through the analysis of capitalism, one can discern definite patterns, an ensemble of systems of relations, that connect that apparently disconnected solitary points: mode, relations, means of production in the economic field and class structure in the social are the traditional Marxist categories used in that work.

Understanding oneself as a product of society, that is, as a typically isolated, alienated individual who wants to reconnect with society on the basis of expanding one’s notion of Being, makes the war personal. For the distinction between phenomenal appearance and noumenal reality exists both within and without. In every fighter, to some degree, there exists the same contradictory tendencies that one battles against externally. Individually this refers to one’s individual body of experiences -- being actually present in a world -- and one’s understanding of that body -- the meditation reflecting that world-language membership. To fight with like-minded others is thus a superb occasion to discuss one’s personal issues within an enlarged social context, to make public one’s battles with oneself, so to speak, and through doing so dissolve and resolve their hitherto strictly private or idiotic character. It is, in other words, to encourage individuals to challenge group norms as well as have the group -- their relation with others -- influence them. The principal challenge is to devise the means whereby the group dissolves its herd-like mentality (the group-think problem) and orients to itself as a freely associating collective of self-realizing individuals (no longer self-enclosed private idiots). This is the Enlightenment ideal that liberals abandoned when they threw in their lot with capitalism. Socialism is thus liberal, not in the sense that liberals are, however, in confronting Western culture (and beyond) with the fate of its own forgotten ideals.

This makes the warfare, the act of personal self-transformation (philosophic
consciousness) as well as of social change (political structure). The personal, philosophically speaking, is the political. One fights for one’s vision of Being in relation to the alienating atomizing structures that would reduce Being to the reality of the actual. Thus warfare is the grand occasion to overturn and transform oneself as well as others in recreating the conditions for a more intensive (individual) and extensive (collective) human existence.

The general tactic of a postmodern war of position is the (re)making of the connections between a particular formulation of consciousness (cognition/medium) and consciousness itself (the language of that cognition/medium), the purpose then being to break with that form as to liberate the potential for greater consciousness. My term for this is connectivity, the value belonging to a network. The value of networking is that it allows one to link up with a variety of others that to whom one would not have access otherwise. The electronic art of generalship is the increasing of network connectivity. What does this say about war of position and war of movement? Position is key. However, position implies posture. The neural spaces of global culture form the potential net of the future. NETSPACE is a computer programme, or should be if it is not actually so. The netspace of the future is an increase in nets and networking with concomitant need to raise the connectivity of the existing structures. In the era of print-mechanical culture, position was a fixed point in a landscape. An army when advancing to capture a position and even when holding one, needs to know the lie of the land. Knowledge, however, in the age of digitized information is the product and relation of particles in continual re-configuring motion generating new forces and so re-defining the initial perceptual field. Under electronic technology, the rate of change has speeded up tremendously, resulting in the hollowing out with imploding results, of traditional standing-armies, that is, the institutions of main-stream discourse. A position is thus no longer a fixed point but a contingent gathering of forces finding that gathering congenial for the raising of net connectivity. Holding a position no longer makes sense because a position is an overview. A print era army captured the heights to have an overview of the lower lying areas. However, a position in NETSPACE is a floating locus of connectivity. People gather through whatever their preferred mode, to make
connections. That is the point of the activity.

The revolutionary general, however, wants people to connect with the idea of Care. An example of this happening at the grass roots level is CED. It is, however, an embryonic social tendency requiring cultivation, a point I shall consider towards the end of this chapter.

One cannot force the moment. The experience of popular revolutionary movements in this century, for example, the Russian (Tony Cliff 1986), the Chinese (Hinton 1966) have shown that a revolutionary organization, while it cannot itself determine the moment when the mass attains its critical character -- the Russian people in 1917, the Nicaraguan in 1979), it must, nevertheless, undergo a long period of self-preparation so that when the moment arrives, it acts. It is not necessarily passive, however, in the meanwhile. Building up its material strength in both people and other kinds of resources, it also constructs its analytic framework. Command, as in the term command structure, references in essence self-discipline, the power that one has over oneself, not others. Over others, the revolutionary exercises influence. To have power over others, the exceptions being persons who literally cannot care for themselves in any way such as the very young and very old, is an exercise not in care but in ego enlargement.

Revolutionary hegemony references the practicing of care, care being the leading figure in a postindustrial socialism. The command structure of Care is the Mind. To have command over oneself is necessary for any task requiring one to focus long and hard on a problem as Gramsci wrote about intellectuals (Gramsci 1971). This means leading the mind to reflect, in an intensive way, upon what is before oneself. Analogous to the process of focusing light on a flammable material in order to start a fire, the source of both light and heat, caring leads to illumination. In a more psychological-physical terms, Caring is body minding. This is the essential connection that one brings to light through this work.

In this chapter’s second section, I will consider now General Idea, a Toronto based group of artists, active from the 1970s to the 1990s. General Idea was a Toronto-based
collective of three men, it was formed in 1968 and active until the early 1990s. I chose them because in their work they showed a paradoxical, playful relationship to certain features of late capitalism, a playfulness that at times could be bitterly satiric. I will extrapolate from their work to indicate the broad outlines for a war of position. -- gifts with which General Idea was well endowed and which is why their work is so instructive for warriors fighting a war of position.

The 1970s were the end of the prosperous years of the post-war boom and its three basic conditions. Economically, domestic monopolies controlled mass production in conjunction with the consumption promoting advertising industry promoting consumption; politically, the Welfare State (one nation strategy) ameliorated the worst excesses of monopoly capitalism through the guaranteeing of a certain level of social benefits to the populace; culturally, the mass media made an icon of the middle-class nuclear family. One abolished class distinctions in favour of life style. The introduction of computer technology and quickening of information flows meant, however, the end of domestic monopolies; it laid the grounds for the abandonment of the state by the corporate elites with subsequent social welfare cutbacks and massive reduction of now redundant staff. In the 1970s onward, workers' wages would fall behind the cost of living as polarization increased. The salary differential between chief corporate executives or CEOs and front-line staff increased enormously. Protected domestic monopolies would give way to global supra-national blocs as capitalism played off one group of workers against another. General Idea appeared in history at the first stage of this movement.

What is the story of General Idea? The name itself is odd. What is it, a data base, a conceptual military leader, an electronic artist collective? To quote:

This is the story of General Idea and the story of what we wanted.

We wanted to be famous; we wanted to be glamorous; we wanted to be rich. That is to say, we wanted to be artists, and we knew that if we were famous, if we were glamorous, we could say, we are artists, and we would be.

We never felt we had to produce great art to be great artists. We knew great art did not bring glamour or fame. We knew we had to keep a foot in the door of art and we were conscious of the importance of berets and paint brushes. We made public appearances in painters' smocks. We know that if we
were famous, if we were glamorous, we could say, we are artists, and we would be. We did and we are. We are famous, glamorous artists.\textsuperscript{168}

How cynical! What is this need to become famous and glamorous? Does this not contradict the idea of Care? Fame is an ego-centricity feeding upon the natural need that we all have to receive attention from others. Of course, General Idea is playing a joke on us; they are mocking the commodified image of art.

Is that the significance of glamour? In its pre-capitalist existence, glamour meant the delusion wrought by magic spells; it was a charm, an enchantment. General Idea used this word to refer to the delusional spell that commodification casts upon us through the use of images. Think, for example, about the gorgeous Hollywood Star, the highly-paid athlete and the deodorant guaranteeing instant social acceptance. It sounds like a Pavlov’s dog experiment. One’s mouth begins to salivate. What, however, about General Idea? Are they mocking this spell and those of us bound by it? Are they not, however, engaging in a bit of spell casting themselves?

One walks a fine line between exposing a phenomenon and reproducing it.

What is artificiality? We knew in order to be artists and to be glamorous artists we have to be artificial and we were. We knew in order to be artified we had to affect a false nature, disguising ourselves ineffectually as natural objects: businessmen, beauty queens, even artists themselves.\textsuperscript{169}

Each of them took a different name, a pseudonym or mask, to disguise themselves as artists. Michael Tims became A. A. Bronson, Ron Gabe, Felix Partz and Jorge Saia, Jorge Zontal. That was their image, as they explained:

The image of the artist is easiest to inhabit. Because of its historic richness, it ready but empty mythology (berets, paint brushes, palettes, in a word FORM without context) the shell which was art was simple to invade. We made art our home and assuming appearances strengthened by available myth, occupied art’s territory, thus we became glamorous, made art, made ourselves over in the image of art.\textsuperscript{170}

What, however, is the image of art, art itself? I must, however, work through images to expose the mode of representation that the image, in its imagining, conceals. One asks, of whose imagination, is that image? What is the idea of being-present belonging to that representation? Of what project for Being is this image an abstraction thereof?
Is this, however, what General Idea is doing? No, although the seminal importance of their work one cannot overlook. Negatively, one could say that General Idea is cynical and manipulative or, more positively, witty and clever. Their text, echoes, in a bizarre way, the phenomenon of capitalist sign-imagery. However,

What some find disturbing about General Idea is our resort to false nature, this imperative artificiality, this hunger for fake innocence, the constant posturing, our superabundance of significant forms and gestures. We hide our motivation behind 'natural' appearances. We disguise mirrors as Venetian blinds; we disguise dog-training as beauty pageants; we disguise nouns as verbs. Our obsession forces upon us temperamental house-guests: mutated stratagems, battle stances disguised as dance steps, ideas without legs.  

I am at a loss here. What does General Idea mean by being cynical and manipulative on one hand and clever and witty on the other? There is an ancient Greek verb for this, namely, sophizein to make wise, instruct, teach. The middle form, sophizesthai, is to devise, contrive shrewdly; and the noun is sophistes crafty man, artist. One said to be sophos is clever, even wise. As well, the word is found in philosophos a lover of wisdom or philosopher. A philosopher can be wise-guy. Sophistication, one could say, is the shadow of wisdom. How does sophistication cast wisdom in the shadow? Cleverness or sophistry refers to the ability to manipulate a system of measurement, to play with cultural forms. One requires a certain degree of familiarity with them, a level of mastery. Hence the sophisticate is a sort of artist, the bare definition of art being the ability to manipulate form.

Is this wisdom or, to use a more contemporary term, knowledge? Knowledge, from our discussion, refers to the recalling of the form's genesis -- the ideational framework organizing the conversion of data into information. Aesthetically, capitalism presents a pretty face, calling itself an information society. However, it mystifies its own organization of the data such that information exists. It is precisely the pretty face that G.I. defaces through calling our attention to the norms of capitalist information gathering and the production of "beautiful objects" whether animate or inanimate.

The manipulation of form enters upon the scene, we work through forms. Through images, we focus on the mode of representation even as we orient to images as abstractions. An image is a product of an imagination. I gather this is what General
Idea articulates. The relationships between image, abstraction and mode of representation are not themselves obvious; they must be worked out through theorizing. Specifically, this means the re-covering of the grammatical horizon-line circumscribing the stage of social reality to which these elements belong. Glamour, as one has experienced this term in the twentieth century, is a product of commodified sign-image; outside of this, glamour loses its spell binding power. Another word for this is, as we have discussed, mystification. Glamour is the mystified and mystifying aura surrounding the commodified sign-image: it signifies the commodity’s attractiveness, its ability to draw us to consume and be consumed by it. That is the point General Idea is attempting to make. However, there are certain features of its mode of representation that muddies the waters of its presentation of this thought. It says what it is to be glamorous, to not be a great artist because great artists are not necessarily glamorous. It wants to debunk the image of great art. Although it is difficult to separate General Idea from the idea of GLAMOUR if only because the former identifies itself with the latter so closely. One could say that only through such obvious extreme identification, can others, such as ourselves, get the point and be no longer be under the spell of glamour.

The idea of a spell is that it holds different elements together and thereby makes sense of them in terms of an overall unity. The word derives from the Old English story, statement. A statement has a spell-binding power in that it explains the reality of a phenomenon. God, an assertive character if there ever was one, said in the first book of the Jewish bible: "Let there be light and there was light." Let us be famous, glamorous artists and we are. That same logic of creator-divinity, the Word as divine spell, is at work. That is the general idea of Will. However, it is not clear to us that General Idea dispels this logic. Our impression is that they are hiding from us, disguising their faces. They are actors.

In the paragraphs quoted, three words predominate: hide, disguise and obsession. As they go on to say,

We are obsessed with available form. We manoeuvre hungrily, conquering the uncontested territory of culture’s forgotten shells: beauty pageants, pavilions, picture magazines, and other contemporary corpses. Like parasites we animate
these dead bodies and speak in alien tongues.\textsuperscript{172}

I must admit to being charmed by their language, under their spell, so to speak. However, one can break this spell. To this, we first recognize the extreme maleness of the group -- all three members were homosexual. General Idea lives in its head and its formulations evince this unbalanced, one-sided way of orienting to the world. Its female counter-part is social context. Ideas without social context become mystifying images; they exist as figures abstracted from an ignored ground. The point of theory is to resist mystification through putting the idea back in its place. In this way, one dispels the mystifying aura created by the abstraction. With that thought in mind, we pick out the rational kernel of General Idea's obsession with available form. In their extreme maleness, General Idea, to speak collectively, become obsessed; it operated out of a socially decontextualized hunger, much as does the commodified sign-image. They mock glamour and in their mocking reproduce it; to dispel glamour requires forming community with the other.

I am indicating the limits of mockery and satire. The satirist is certainly clever, a sophisticated manipulator of form. However, we suggest that being ironic rather than satiric characterizes the actor aiming to be wise rather than to be a wise-guy; a dispeller, not a spell-caster; a plain speaker, not a glamorous image. To satirize is to make fun of through exaggerating certain features of a phenomenon. A caricaturist, for example, satirizes the human figure; a person's nose is made more prominent. Satire renders the form ridiculous in that way; it disturbs the accepted relations between its parts; this requires a sharp eye and quick hand. However, the ironic actor does not desire to render the form ridiculous, rather to make clear WHAT the form IS. General Idea want to hide and disguise themselves. The satirist hides the self behind the satire; it is an offensive weapon. General Idea say that "We manoeuvre hungrily." This is a military operation, an offensive launched against the commodified sign-image, most abstractly expressed. Their method of attack is to exaggerate social form.

Who is the actor behind the mask? General Idea is a happy warrior, one could say. However, they are not intimate with the auditing Other or audience. In artistic terms, General Idea ignores Social Context. It is too clever for its own good. They are
skillful, "we disguise dog-training as beauty pageants." Who are the dogs they are training? We suggest, as a feature of their lack of intimacy with the other, that it is the audience. To elucidate, we quote them on

The 1984 Miss General Idea Pageant

The 1984 Miss General Idea Pageant is basically this: a framing device we have framed for our own devices to contain our frame-ups. The Search for the Spirit of Miss General Idea is the ritualized pageant of creation, production, selection, presentation, competition, manipulation, and revelation of that which is suitable for framing:

We dress up your expectations as the old clichés they are, and parade them down the runway. A rotating jury of curators, critics, collectors, and dealers are propped up in the front row, giving their eternal verdicts. The audience roars their approval. Electric prodding devices and electronic prompters motivate the audience to play their part. Laugh. Clap. Standing ovation. Blind terror. Flee the burning Pavilion.¹⁷³

Aesthetics is the dress worn by beauty; it frames our understanding of that body. Art, we suggested earlier, is the Body of Truth. General Idea wants to dress down the Body through exposing the production devices that create its meaning -- the image-signs that through our interpreting of them, cue us in. However the general idea that we argue for is art, for its proper understanding, requires that one place it in its social context. One loses the context through the ability to abstract a phenomenon from the actual conditions of its existence; thus it appears that the phenomenon has now an unconditioned existence. It does in one sense, and this we call its Being. This is the Project for which the self present at hand stands, the truth of one's perception of self. Oneself at present, more precisely, is a moment of one's Being; the grammatical horizon line towards which we are thrown defines the self in its momentariness. Self-image names this moment; its tendency, however, is to become stuck there. This dooms the play between self at present, now stuck on an image, and that self's Being or, as we termed it, character.

What is the character of the art world? That is the question General Idea poses. Is beauty but a pose, a convenient posture? Is the artist a fake? How does one
authenticate one's truth? Creation is a pageant; it involves a parading of one's idea with, however, the Object of undressing them. One undresses oneself before one's character, the god one follows, so to speak. Satire is that aspect of irony directed to others -- the undressing of Others before ourselves -- while irony is that aspect of satire directed towards ourselves -- the undressing of ourselves before Other. My own approach and GI's are, thus, complementary. To be honest with myself before others, I do satirize capitalism; I would be a formalistic prude to deny that. Hopefully, I do so in a playful ironic spirit, this based upon recognizing my own petty-bourgeois upbringing.

Social criticism is a form of self-criticism. Thus, to return to GI, not only do Others have expectation but we do as well. General Idea's formulation of "We dress up your expectations as the old clichés they are, and parade them down the runway" raises the question of General Idea's own expectations.

What about the idea of the artist as the observer? The word theory and theatre both derive from the Greek theorein to observe. The artist is the theorist, the theatre-critic. However, General Idea has itself an idea of the Audience that it glibly asserts. "Electric prodding devices and electronic prompters motivate the audience to play their part." Are not electric prods used on cattle? I am uncertain if that is General Idea's idea of the Other or their mocking of capitalism's idea of the Other. Then again, I may lack a sense of humour. For the moment, however, I will give General Idea the benefit of the doubt and assume they mock capitalism. They liken electric prods to tele-prompters; cattle-like people move in response to the urgent need to consume and be consumed by the image-sign. In that situation, a sensitive soul can despair of finding another human being; one has to either laugh or cry. General Idea chose the first course of action. It mocked consumer behaviour. As commodified objects of desire, people exist as icons of buying and selling; cultural values become reduced to clichés:

The Grand Awards Ceremony at the Art Gallery of Ontario utilized all the clichés of the pageant: limousines, arriving celebrities, the entrance of the audience, judges and contestants. TV cameras and follow spots, a master of ceremonies and musical entertainments, a farewell speech by the last year's queen and a standing ovation. The winner was Marcel Idea, who the judges proclaimed 'captured Glamour without falling into it.' The essential ingredient was irony.
The cliché is the semiotic equivalent of kitsch, the utterly determined formulation. Its reduces Being to the Tried and True, a ritualistic formula that leaves nothing to the imagination except the Void that the formula denies exists in the first place. It is the Bell in Pavlov’s Experiment designed to induce salivation at the sound and sight of the Familiar. It is, in essence, nihilistic and despairing. For it refuses to go beyond the boundaries of what it knows even as, indicated by Dasein’s thrownness towards its ownmost possibility of Being, knowledge is the project of perception.

Opinion, one could say following conventional Platonically derived epistemology, is the not-being of knowledge. In Plato’s Republic he posits the line of cognition: the lowest point is doxa (opinion), the middle point episteme (science) and the third dialectics. The cave-dwellers chained by their necks see only the images before them, not the means for producing them. For that would require breaking the yoke of convention and turning their heads about, this eventually carrying them out of the cave, through science and dialectics, into the purer, more abstract realms of thought into the comprehension of reality itself. The work of the social artist is to examine opinion, pointing out its contradictions, manifest at the level of temporal everydayness. The principle contradiction is the culture’s purporting to be reality itself rather than recognizing itself as an image. It attempts to hide the horizon line defining its grammatical potential; at its most obdurate moment, a present at hand becomes opinionated. The artist’s pain -- creative agony - is to move that culture through its contradictions by exposing the grammar organizing everydayness as an articulation of Being. Personally, this means the artist must risk offending public opinion; however, such work, dialectically understood, is necessary for the artist’s own self-expression. The social artist finds the form for his or her work only through the revolutionary project of exposing a society’s grammatical horizon-line to that society.

What am I implying about the revolutionary process and one’s own pain? Capitalism has a two-fold means of surviving. First it can expand the arena of capital accumulation through tapping new markets. The methods vary. In the nineteenth century, it was physical conquest of territory by state military force; in the twentieth it is product saturation by private multinationals often in collusion with state power. For
purposes of discussion, let us say there are three categories: those who are caught up in the business of everyday life, those who protest against this business, and those who, not caught up in the business, offer a positive alternative to capitalism. They are the Conformist, the Non-Conformist or Rebel and the Revolutionary, respectively. General Idea falls into the second category: through satirizing glamour, they protest the commodification of the image-sign, the art work under conditions of late capitalism. Glamour is the capitalist aesthetics or, equally, anesthesia. Capitalism anesthetizes us against the experiencing of the Beautiful through discouraging us from dwelling with the question of Being. Time, the bourgeoisie in its degeneracy says, is money. Another example of General Idea’s satire is the following text and image. This further explains the group’s canine propensities, its conception of beauty pageant as dog-training:

The text is MONDO CANE KAMA SUTRA

DOG EAT DOG EAT DOG
The meaning is obvious. Three dogs eating each other out: each is fellating each other. Sex is mixed, however, with business, the dog eat dog eat dog world of buying and selling art. The three disguise themselves as artists even as, I take it, they are satirizing the art business. They say further:

How our mascots love to humiliate us...
Revelations from the dog-house

We are the poodle, banal and effete: note our relished role as watchdog, retriever and gay companion: our wit, pampered presence and ornamental physique; our eagerness for affection and affectation; our delicious desire to be groomed and preened for public appearances; in a word, our desire
to please: those that live to please must please to live.

We are the lunatic poodles. We are the consorts, the hunting dogs and lap dogs, the mascots, heraldic devices, and man's best friend to the three artists of General Idea. We are aware of the tradition of centuries of poodle acts. We are conscious of our reputation as the most intelligent of dogs, the most faithful of mascots. It is in this role that we introduce this history of General Idea and their quest for the Spirit of Miss General Idea.

Their treating of the audience as dogs reflects their self-image. Their humour is turned against themselves as much as against others. What does that say about your thesis? Do they still fall into the category of Rebel? While we appreciate their wit, they do not posit a Vision of a society Other to capitalism. They hold up a mirror to the art world through mocking the commodified sign-image. They rightly call our attention to its degeneracy through the image of the dog. Originally, if one reads their text closely, one can discern the vital origins now lost. The poodle was a hunting dog; it performed a useful function for the society of its time and so had use-value. However, the poodle has degenerated into a banal and effete play thing. No longer does it work. no longer has it use-value. A pampered pet, its value is of exchange only: the exchange of poodles and/or art is a business. Artists are the ornamental crowd pleasers dependent upon the whims of the art collecting market. The art world is the symbol of the world, moreover. This is the General Idea: the commodification of the sign-image as manifested by the business of art, anesthetizes us against experiencing the Beautiful. Aesthetics becomes an anesthesia.

What is the play here? Both words derive from the Greek aisthesis sensation.
perception. One, however, at least formally, is the negation of the other. An aesthetics take away sensation and therefore the suffering of pain. I am suggesting that aesthetics does the same. Aesthetics pertains to a set of propositions one employs to define and name the Beautiful. Aesthetics denotes a perception of the Beautiful. This implies a notion of truth, namely, what beauty is. As we said earlier, art is the body of truth. How does that relate to aesthetics and/or aesthetics?

Perception is how we handle the experience of Being. Art is the means through which we communicate our perceptions, how we hand them onto others. Art objects store cultural value, they are stories to be told. I tell the story through the conversation between the general idea and the social context. This is to re-experience the agony -- that joyful pain -- of their creation. To experience the creative agony requires that our senses remain alive. Aesthetics can be anaesthetizing if it becomes a substitute for re-experiencing the artist’s creative agony. At best, aesthetics is a starting point for the re-conceiving of the Beautiful in terms of one’s own Being. This requires the taking apart of those propositions and re-assembling them on a wider perceptual basis: the general idea and the social context. Are we however referring to capitalist aesthetics or aesthetics more generally? Capitalist aesthetics is a feature of commodity production, in its most abstract twentieth century phase, the production of glamorous sign-images. Signs have become objects in their own right due to a combination of electronic technology and its storage capacities, and the rise of the advertising industry and related industries required to maintain high consumption levels. To resist these tendencies requires putting the general idea back into its social context. In this way, art will overthrow its effete, useless state, re-integrating itself within the sphere of work. No longer the pampered pet, it will re-assume the actuality of its existence: again, it will hunt. It will have bite. This is the work of revolution: to promote the conversation of the general idea and its social context. This implies, moreover, that there is no general idea per se; one must examine ideas within their social context to make sense of them. Through being with Others, one tells one’s Vision. To revolution, there is a labour process: the turning of oneself inside out through the investigation of the categories of one’s thinking.
What about feeling? Feeling is present throughout the body. The purpose of attaining greater clarity of mind is to allow us to experience more intensely what we already feel. Thinking does not replace feeling; it clears the ground for feeling to be. I have spoken about this in terms of Care: the resistance to either mind without body or body without mind. The passion for truth is art’s driving force, and the social artist, as we call such a figure, is the revolutionary rather than the protester. Through the ability to manipulate form, the revolutionary articulates a vision. This articulation, he or she speaks it to others. This is the general idea of revolution: to push for clarity of thought and by that encourage intensity of feeling.

Communication has implications for community. The desire to re-establish community through allowing different others into the talk, so to speak, distinguishes the revolutionary from the rebel. To be revolutionary is to re-establish community in the midst of a society of fragmented individuals. This is the revolutionary’s faith, the troth plighted in the seeking of truth. There is a distance that the revolving actor crosses, a space that such a one opens, as he or she reforms the text to which the fragments belong: community. Community is the space of truth-seeking, the crossing over from a fragmentary to more integrated existence. The collecting of the fragments is the labour process. Picking out and collecting is the basic sense of the Greek legein to speak, as discussed earlier. Individuals are fragments of community, and they demonstrate integrity through recollecting the One to which in their manyness they belong. The One is not an a priori given nor is it simply arbitrary. It is what lies in fragments and requires that one pick out WHAT it is saying. This requires reading the text as a sign system, an imaginative-interpretive structure handed down to one from one’s ancestors. This is how the past communicates with the present. Past community lies in fragments as those individuals who are present. Communication, moreover, is the grammatical horizon line of social action; through language, a generation connects with its past.

What DID General Idea have to say about that? To quote:

**Miss General Idea 1984**

Miss General Idea 1984 is basically this: an ideal framing device for arresting attention without throwing away the key. Hints or flesh-and-bone content are framed by the beauty's-only-skin-deep context. We are surfacing on the surface
of our desires defined by the intersection of differing point of view. Elevated she reigns; idealized she contains; artfully she maintains; dominantly she sustains our interest.  

A community contains different points of view. How do we reconcile them to form a one? To answer this question, please note the date of this beauty pageant: 1984. I shall assume that General Idea picked this date, the title of George Orwell's famous novel. One image. Big Brother, dominated society. That is tyrannic. When we speak of community, I intend the space that each of us in our way walks through, as discussed earlier. There is to Being a spaciousness that one gathers through exploring the gaps in a sign system. Minding the Gap was our term for this voyaging. General Idea minds the Gap through exploring what it called various cultural shells. They tap on these shells to hear their hollowness: for example, the hollowness of an audience performing a standing ovation. Culture becomes hollow when it becomes a collection of clichés, an expected behaviour, which is where the Pavlovian dog enters. One learns, in this culture, to salivate at the sight of consumer items cued in by the appropriate signals, the glamorous image. Beauty is only skin deep; truth is a matter of opinion. These are clichés.

III

The revitalizing of community is intimately associated with the destruction of the cliché. Cliché is the sign of the times that has run out of time. To explain this phrase, I return to the question of the sign. One is born and dies in time; this is the space of our existence. For us, time-space is not an a priori given, it is the emergent property of our own species development. Or, in other words, one can intelligently discuss the concept of time only in relation to a definite stage of social reality, this last being circumscribed by a grammatical horizon line. Time signifies the actor being in a social space. This is why purely metrical calculations of distances are one-sided; they pertain to the ontic measure of truth or, as we said earlier, correctness. To discover time as emergent property of our own species development, we must attend to the matter ontologically. Under print technology, time became the linear sequence of instantly repeatable and predicable moments of uniform duration. Time pieces such as watches and clocks were
and still express this understanding of Being. This version of being-in-time developed
pace with the rising bourgeoisie and commodity production in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, the epoch of merchant capital. The bourgeoisie required for their
purposes a means of regulating a more abstract form of production, one indifferent to
seasonal variation. It also fitted with their agenda of universal rights of man and, more
generally, their attacking of feudal privilege. Economically, expanding markets meant
the rise into prominence of the towns and cities over the feudal estates; politically,
parliaments began to challenge the authority of kings and nobility; culturally, one now
regulated time and space according to more abstract non-organic considerations, the
clock replacing the season.

How does this relate to the sign? Consider the sign called Miss General Idea.
Through an analysis of further text, I will endeavour to lay out its ontology.

Glamorous objects open themselves like whores to meaning, answering need
with vacancy, waiting to be penetrated by the act of recognition. The object
signals a world beyond nature. An object has edges, perimeter, surface. An
object separates itself from its surroundings with innocent pride. An object
exhibits unashamedly a closure and a brilliance, in a word SILENCE which
belongs to the world of myth.177

General Idea characterizes the Being of the object in relation to its unnaturalness or
perversity. Explicitly, it is female. "waiting...to be penetrated." The female as the object
of male sexual fantasizing is a feature of patriarchy. Patriarchy, one could say, is
system of calculation in which women and children are considered to be the property of
males; female labour power is subsumed to the structures supporting men as chief
economic agents, as the doers, to speak, in the real world. The grammatical
manifestation of this was the suppression of women's achievements outside the
sanctioned space of hearth and home.

Is General Idea patriarchal? I am not sure of that. Although there is an implicit
collusion with patriarchal modes of discourse in their treatment of the object. Females
are the objects to be penetrated and males the subjects who penetrate. Through his
gazing upon the object, the male identifies the it as real. That object which is truly real is
glamorous. Glamour, as we said before, is the mystified and mystifying aura
surrounding the commodified sign-image; it signifies the commodity's attractiveness, its ability to draw us to consume and be consumed by it. Sexual attractiveness pulls the subject to the object; this is an eros organized by glamour. Here we note that the root of the word is the Greek gramma letter and ultimately to graphein to scratch, engrave, to write. Glamour is, in short, a grammar, a mode of organizing sign-images with an attendant hierarchy of value.

The futuristic profile of the MISS GENERAL IDEA SHOES neglects joints to exhibit a continuity of surface which is enchanting, otherworldly. They raise the participant into an unnatural (hence cultured) position in which walking is rendered difficult, transformed from movement to a frozen gesture -- like a pencil scratch across a photo portrait is jagged with sophistication.\(^{178}\)

The act of writing is the act of scratching out meaning, we adduce. General Idea opposes, nevertheless, a certain sort of writing, that of the frozen gesture. Glamour is a flash-photo, a freezing light paralyzing the object. The gaze is hypnotic.

This gesture of immobility becomes rarefied, exquisite. The Participant's calf muscles swell against the expected brush of black silk hose. The moment becomes poised on the brink of a delicious terror, the terror of sexuality itself...\(^{179}\)

What is this terror? I am dealing with the patriarchal male horror of intimacy, the perceived loss of individuality experienced when surrendering to the Other. Sexuality is terrifying because it requires that one LET GO; on s'abandonne as the French say. Under conditions of print culture and industrial know-how, one produced objects en masse. They become things in their own right, however, with the systematic overtaking of use by exchange value. Contrary to patriarchal fantasies, as exhibited by General Idea, an object does NOT separate itself from its surroundings; we separate the object from ourselves through a regulated mode of representation. Women became sex objects as the convergence point of capitalism and patriarchy; objects became women, reflecting the relations of force defining male and female intercourse.

What is "the terror of sexuality itself?" Let us first define our terms. Sex, I take it, refers to the specific role one plays in species reproduction, at least at the biogenetic level. Sexuality is more ambiguous since it includes broader cultural concerns, in short,
sexual identity. This last has no reality outside intercourse between male and female. By this, we do not intend necessarily actual physical relations but more of an orientation to the Other. General Idea, a collective of homosexual male artists, has a woman in its life, Miss General Idea. She is the art object. Here, however, I must admit to difficulties. I am finding it difficult to separate the relationship homosexual men might have to women and the relationship bourgeois society has to objects. The confusion is implicit in the structure of bourgeois society. This last gazes upon objects as homosexual men do upon women. Objects are hermetically sealed up Others in self-contained wilful receptacles; in their separateness, they deny any common ground. This began innocently enough with the first objectification of nature by our species. The silence refers to the labour process through which this occurs. This not only applies to actual things made but as well to ideas about things, the world of myth as General Idea says. However, with the expansion of exchange, theoretically expressed as the superseding of use by exchange value, the objectification assumed a life of its own.

Here, to more fully appreciate General Idea’s analysis, I must separate and then re-unite two strands of their argument: production and reproduction, the making of things and the making of humans. Ignorance of the laws of matter meant that we worked haphazardly; our art-i-facting, so to speak, was a knack. This applies to ourselves as well since we can make ourselves into things. Ignorance of our own nature and the dynamics of concept making led to the positing of supernatural beings or gods standing over us. Our inability to see what was happening in the womb led to fantastical ideas about gestation and parturition. Such was the silence.

However, let me be clear, this was the source of mystery. I accept mystery as the very beginning of inquiry; however, I reject absolutely mystification. This last references the work of covering up the structures of social reality through positing some otherworldly entity. I resolutely reject this: human beings make the world and unmake collectively. Mystery, then, references the unfinished, yet to be quality of the world, the silence-in-the-world. In that way, we reveal the uncompleted nature of present reality, how a grammatical horizon line defines the actual’s intelligibility. One shows what yet could be if one were to push that horizon line further out. This pushing-out is the
expansion of our labour-power. Mystification does otherwise. Women become fantastical objects in the male dominated bourgeois imagination; they stand apart from the common ground of humanity as actual things do from the labour process. This phenomenon is the product of the convergence between capitalism and patriarchy. General Idea reacted to this convergence. It pointed it through its satirizing of both capitalism and patriarchy. Miss General Idea is the desirable object of consumption for male dominated society; and, conversely, such an idea consumes this society; we are consumed by the idea of glamour and seduction. However, General idea did not -- perhaps could not -- transcend this for reasons both personal and impersonal. For this convergence is inscribed within the general structures of everyday reality at present. The transcendence can only be a collective action although certainly the insights of General Idea are useful to promoting such action. The promotion of revolutionary action testifies to their artistry.

What about male and female? Male and female are determined genetically at the biological level in terms of reproductive organs. However, human identity encompasses more than the function of body parts. Specifically, it turns on a project for Being. This project, for its realization, requires that one work. The work is the dialectic, the conversation the ego-self-one has with its alter-other. At this juncture one could raise the question of homosexuality being a project for being. GI, for example, were a group of three homosexual artists. More theoretically, Freud said in his essays of sexuality that one should question the possibility of heterosexually as much as homosexuality. Homosexuality as a project would need to locate the ego-alter dialectic in a way other than heterosexuality does, the only comment I can make on this subject for the moment. Further research may provide ways of locating this dialectic.

To return to the main road: one lives and dies in time, and time is the space for the realization of Being. Under conditions of Paro-capitalism, time became a linear sequence of infinitely repeatable and predicable units of equal duration. Time became STANDARD time. Since we die and live in time, and since, moreover, we possess sexual identity, it is not out of order to posit a relationship between temporal being in the world and sexual identity. In the rising bourgeois life world, capital reproduced itself
according to standard time; in the mind of the bourgeois pater familias so must the species. Relations between the sexes became equally standardized and compartmentalized. Homosexuality and heterosexuality now rigidly defined the sexes and sexual reproduction as surely as the commodity did production and consumption. The commodity is the highly abstracted good, the complete Object; this corresponds to the divorce between labour and its products, the chief one being capital itself. Capital is the accumulated value of abstract labour. In the field of reproduction, homo- and heterosexuality are the organizing categories of value creation. The present categories defining relations between the sexes are historical products of the convergence of capitalism and patriarchy. As these systems crack open and dissolve, so will these categories. Their value will empty out and be replaced by more layered perspectives.

For the moment, however, one says that

Miss General Idea is glamorous. She exists in a blissful perfection, ignorant of dialects. Her lifestyle is timeless, a closed system. Miss General Idea is above all an image, an object, a container within which her followers sense a great innocence. Miss General Idea may not be beautiful. Her title grants her the framework within which Glamour settles. like dust. Above all she must be brilliant, closed, separate, and wilful.\textsuperscript{180}

Seduction and Glamour are intrinsically related. Seducers are entirely natural objects, their characteristics a portrayal of physical beauty and sexual potency. By subverting marriage, seduction plays the part of nature subverting culture.\textsuperscript{181}

With the increasing abstraction of production, from the making of actual to conceptual things, the dynamics of objectification changed. The product became above all an image; one makes money on money today. This is why capital accumulation goes on with less and less living labour; value as utter abstraction is the general idea of capitalist production. Capitalism in practice now closely approaches capitalism in theory at the stage of the commodified image-idea. The Sign of capitalism’s beauty is the intrinsic relation of Seduction and Glamour. Glamour, we have defined as the mystified and mystifying aura of the commodified sign-image; Seduction is the drawing power belonging to the mystified and mystifying process. It exploits the mystery of being for purposes of private profit. For the genuine mystic, by contrast, it is the silence-in-the-world that is truly attractive. The Word holds the mystery of Being, however, only within
a definite social context. Through re-playing the conversation between the general idea and social context, the mystic re-experiences the creative process giving birth to the Word, the force impelling the Word into BEING. This is to be shared with other members of the community, this sharing intrinsic to the working out and presenting of the mystic's VISION. For the VISION is not an a priori given, one presses it out through a labour process.

What about the idea that seducers are entirely natural objects. I, however, can think of some natural objects, such as excrement, that I do not find seductive; although some others, coprophiles, do. My point is that nature is not necessarily seductive: it can be disgusting or even downright frightening. General Idea, to state the matter more logically, has not yet grasped the necessity of the idea. Let us do so now. General Idea states that "seducers are entirely natural objects," this meaning, in effect, that they are entirely without culture. Seduction, in line with argument of General Idea, we understand to be the attracting power of the commodified sign-image, the private appropriation of the mystery of being. Therefore, we might say, General Idea presumes that Nature names the mystery of being. The only difficulty is that Nature itself is nameless; it is we who name, as the opening chapters of Genesis tell us. God gives Adam the power to name all things; more generally, culture empowers us to name. The mystery seduces, but I am not sure if General Idea is, in its text, referring to the mystery of being. One may, if one is unwary, be seduced by the natural appearance denying the labour process giving birth to the image. Labour is messy, unpleasant, bloody; a confrontation with the organic, with the stench of our bodies, our own rot and decay. This too is natural. Seducers may want to make it appear that they are purely natural phenomena, and may employ divers devices to do support that ILLUSION. An illusion, however, it is. Nothing comes into this world except through a labour process, through arduous, difficult and painful work. Furthermore, General Idea says that "By subverting marriage, seduction plays the part of nature subverting culture." Love is a gift; marriage, however, is work. General Idea confuses one with the other. Nature cannot subvert culture except through that culture's own forgetfulness of the labour process necessary for its birth. A married couple can cease to invest their energies in that relationship
under the mistaken idea that love alone is sufficient for that relationship's success. This is the case with General Idea; it became the dupe of its own propaganda.

Where does that leave Miss General Idea? To quote:

Miss General Idea, seductress, needs neither beauty nor sexual potency. She is more akin to poison, that other natural enemy to culture. Like poison, Miss General Idea, objet d'art, poised on stiletto heels and bound in the latest fantasy, represents a violent intrusion into the heart of culture: the Canada Council, for example, or beauty pageants (essentially one and the same)...

Object fetishism is implicit to the English language, where even verbs are nouns. The commodification of beauty, represented by Miss General Idea, poisons the Beautiful. Miss General Idea is the mocking reflection of poisoned beauty -- art as commodity.

To further this inquiry, I refer to the Greek pharmakon drug, medicine, remedy. It could also be poison, enchanted potion or dye. A pharmakeus is a poisoner, sorcerer: and pharmassein is to enchant, bewitch. When one thinks of a pharmacist, one forgets those earlier connotations. Although, if one thinks about the power of drugs one would realize how intoxicating they could be. Intoxication derives from the Greek toxicon a poison originally for arrows. General Idea is shooting arrows at commodified culture, calling it poisonous. However, a pharmakon is not altogether poisonous; it could be medical, an aid to the recovery of health. The commodification of beauty, to reference contemporary poison, instantiates commodification in general. Capitalism, the culture of the commodity, is both a blessing and a curse.
Commodification could, if we are sleepy headed enough, make us forget the labour process of its parturition. Commodification is poisonous to consciousness; it kills it. Miss General Idea is the enchantress who casts a spell upon us, the representation of the power of capitalist culture to kill consciousness. GLAMOUR is the delusion in the mind created by the spell of the commodified image-sign; seduction names the attractiveness of this mental delusion.

Poison, however, may appear to be pleasurable, that is the odd thing. It goes back to the ambiguous nature of the pharmakon; one can use it for purposes good and bad, fair and foul. It is a balancing act, and, if I may go further afield, Shakespeare tells us about this:

O, mickle is the powerful grace that lies
In plants, herbs, stones, and their true qualities;
For nought so vile that on the earth doth live;
But to the earth some special good doth give;
Nor aught so good but, strain'd from that fair use,
Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse:
Virtue itself turns vice, being misapplied.
And vice sometime's by action dignified.
Within the infant rind of this weak flower
Poison hath residence, and medicine power;
For this, being smelt, with that part cheers each part;
Being tasted, slays all senses with the heart.
("Romeo and Juliet")

It is the social context that makes an idea virtuous or vicious, a curative or a poison. The commodity has a poisonous beauty: its glamorous beauty kills consciousness. It promotes seduction to mystify and charm us: its charms disarm us, putting our judgements to sleep. Our consciousness by that becomes alienated from us, re-appearing in the image of the commodity-sign. This disintegration of the mind-body, the very antithesis of care, leads to artificial terror of sexuality. Sexuality becomes terrifying only under certain social conditions, specifically, the convergence of patriarchy and capitalism in the past century. General Idea either does not see this clearly or has allowed its satiric cleverness to get in the way of communicating this to us. In any case, we say that for those who care, sexuality is NOT terrifying, although there are fears about the loss of identity one must face. Such a one has faith, moreover, in his or her
ability to overcome these fears. Sex, ultimately, is the practice of love, the natural expression of one's joy in being with the Other; sex signifies the flowing together of mind with body. It celebrates the mystery of being.

What does this say about poison and medicine? One can use or abuse the body and its properties. Humans are sexual beings and sexuality is a body property. Under conditions of mind-body disintegration or carelessness, sex becomes terrifying abuse or, as I discussed earlier, rape. Rape is sexual union converted into terror. Virtue becomes vice, the thing its opposite. The care-giver's role is to prescribe the course of action that would remedy the situation. One must remove the poison from one's system. With a discrete individual, this might mean the elimination of an actual substance; with the body politic, it means the conversation of the general idea with its social context. Thereby does one cleanse oneself of the poison produced because of carelessness, that is, the unredeemed isolation of one part of the whole from its other, reification rather than objectification.

By spelling out its labour process, one dispels the spell of glamour. One frees oneself from the spell of culture, more generally, through recalling the birth pangs of its creation. This is what, I believe, Plato intended by anamnesis, recollection. Our culture puts sense to sleep through the charm of its natural appearance; this is the naive image of the object. To wake up is to dispel sleepiness, to recall how things have come to be. When one forgets becoming, Being becomes an image and mystification sets in. The body severed from its mind soon falls into delusion; charmed by the natural appearance of the present, it becomes senseless and indiscriminate. It, in short, ceases to exercise judgement and soon comes to despise thinking itself. Such is "the heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to," to quote the Bard, when enthralled by things present at hand.

Have I freed myself from the spell of General Idea? Not quite yet. To do so, I present their idea of time, citing three moments from their text beginning with this first fragment:

The amorphous world of meanings and functions has traditionally been articulated through the architectural act of construction. The three artists of General Idea have re-introduced destruction into the architectural process. In
their long-term project, the 1984 Miss General Idea Pavilion, ruins are created as quickly as rooms are built. Accumulated layers of function and meaning slip in and out of focus, creating a shifting constellation of images which is the Pavilion itself.\(^{184}\)

The meaning of a thing changes in time, the thing in question being culture symbolically represented by General Idea’s Pavilion. This would suggest that the slipping in and out of accumulated layers of function possesses a necessity and therefore is not capricious. I am not suggesting that General Idea IS saying that, only that their formulation of the matter leaves open that possibility. To be more precise: time signifies the actor being in social space. That the meaning of culture (the general idea) changes through time (the Pavilion) refers to the varying symbolic layers of reality (the Pavilion’s con- and destruction). This last one can only understood through the conversation between general idea and social context. The meaning of culture changes with the shift in the grounds of being. More specifically, this is the pushing outward of the grammatical horizon line defining a social stage of reality. Furthermore, one’s sense of time or temporality changes with the coming into being of new cultural space.

How do I relate temporality to the sign? One risks falling into mystifying abstraction at this point. To avoid this, I quote a second fragment:

Decomposition
...tragedy made an appearance at the 1984 Miss General Idea Pavilion. The structure housing the seating arrangement was reduced to ruins during a fire of unknown origin. Fortunately, all 1,984 members of the audience made safe exits and many artifacts were rescued from the consuming inferno. What had been conceived as staged pageantry evolved as the plot twisted into a classic tragedy.

We cued our escape so the media could catch our fire exit scene. One step ahead of the collapsing structure, the three men barged through the Dr. Brute Colonnade, down the Escalier d'Honneur, across the lobby, and still had time for a couple of late spins in the revolving doors before the last facade crumbled to provide the newsmen with that seamless backdrop of flame that reproduces so well on newsprint and TV.\(^{185}\)

Decomposition or destruction is an upsetting of some settled truth. Culture is collapsing about our heads continuously although electronic media had speeded up enormously the rate of change. General Idea’s direct reference to the mass media shows their awareness of this phenomenon: in the heightened state of electronic temporal ecstasy,
the media's role is to create the reality they validate. As General Idea writes in another place about the media: "It has to be real before they'll report it, but it isn't really real until they do." The really real will become virtual reality in the decade after General Idea's Pavilion.

The sign decomposes itself; it empties itself of meaning in the wake of the speeded up electronic information reality. This is the logical next step of commodity production. In early and middle capitalism, the commodity was the object-thing abstracted from and placed over the labour process. Reality, due to the demands of multi-lateral and international exchange, became compressed into highly abstract communication systems, the dollar sign not being the only sign system, although it is paradigmatic of this compression. The control mechanisms of this highly stratified society organized by the new demands of the sign-image were, and continue to be, glamour and seduction. They are the semiotic perimeters of the mainstream, the black hole of advanced commodity production. Sex as terror belongs to this annihilated and annihilating space in which closeness becomes synonymous with strangulation and distance with isolation.

The reaction by General Idea? In speaking of the media, they say:

...we want to add to it, stretch it until it starts to lose shape, stretch that social fabric. Imagine all those new sensibilities taking up more and more room, those chaotic situations on the fringe of society flooding into the mainstream and doing it so quickly that its impossible to have an overview anymore.  

GI point to the inversion of the margin and the mainstream under conditions of electronic-information media. I say this to indicate that this is a specific cultural change, that belonging to late capitalism, rather than cultural change in general. To illustrate that I refer the reader to Riane Eisler's The Chalice and the Blade where she too talks about the margins becoming the mainstream, the overthrow of the world-historical feminine (goddess culture) by the dominator Kurgan (the god culture). That cultural change, however, did not necessarily result in an inability to sustain an overview anymore. An overview, more specifically, as McLuhan has argued in Understanding Media, is the product of the renaissance perspective. An overview is really someone's point of view, a
feature of the more general reconfiguration of space by commodity production at that time. The ahistorical approach of GI has to be kept in mind, to summarize, in order to appreciate their insights.

I read them as saying this: humankind picks out of the compost what it needs. That which humankind most needs is itself. Humankind spaces out the difference between the present at hand and the Present in the following way, to quote again General Idea:

Those that returned the next morning to sift for souvenirs from the smoldering ruins became the art audience. They recognized the fact that General Idea had delivered them safely from the destruction of the Pavilion, and that all those endless rehearsals had paid off.

Toronto's Fault, the ruins of the silver bar from the 1984 Miss General Idea Pavilion, reconstructed the ruins from one particularly deconstructed area and invited the public to participate in the archaeology of memory (emphasis in the original).\textsuperscript{188}

Memory, one could say, is the Pavilion's space. Culture signifies a space, a mass of intersection and parallel lines continually doing and undoing each other. However, I would argue, there is to this a structure, the dialectical interplay of freedom-seeking-necessity. An archaeology of memory refers, in my mind, to this structure, the word archaeology deriving from the Greek archē first and legein, to pick out, select. An archaeology of memory denotes the picking out of what is first from what is last. Chronology does not determine what is first nor what is last; since for us the first, properly understood, is the Present. It is what awaits us.

The First, so to speak, is the future; the archaeology of memory, General idea is suggesting, is the remembering of the future. Ecstatically, the future awaits us as the ever-present fecund giving quality of the past. The past is not dead and done; it is buried in the dispersed character of the present -- the Lasting quality of Being whose footsteps one follows, retracing thereby the possibility of having a future. An archaeology of memory gathers the future from out of this dispersion; it is the in gathering, one could say, of the exiled fragments. In gathering, however, is work; it requires that one take a hand to the ruins, symbolically represented by the Pavilion, and sift through the rubble. This is the moment of decision, the place where one becomes
an artist or cultural worker, where one now takes on the culture, as to say, re-shapes
and re-molds it. The archaeology of memory is the work of becoming an artist. General
Idea invites the public to participate in this work -- to cease being passive consumers of
art objects, by that reproducing commodified sign-images. Now is the time for the
culture to be itSelf. There is no time like the present to Be present.
CHAPTER EIGHT: Memory and Temporality

To conclude this work I should like to link G.I.'s archeology of memory to Heidegger's argument on temporality.

'As long as' Dasein factically exists, it is never past, but it is always is indeed as already having been, in the sense of the "I am- as-having-been". And only as long as Dasein is, can it be as having been. On the other hand, we call an entity "past", when it is no longer present-at-hand. Therefore Dasein, in existing, can never establish itself as a fact which is present-at-hand, arising and passing away 'in the course of time', with a bit of it past already. Dasein never 'finds itself' except as a thrown Fact. In the state-of-mind in which it finds itself, Dasein is assailed by itself as the entity which it still is and already was--that is to say, which it constantly is as having been. The primary existential meaning of facticity lies in the character of "having been". In our formulation of the structure of care, the temporal meaning of existentiality and facticity is indicated by the expressions 'before' and 'already'.

According to an archaeology of memory, the "I" finds itself situated along a line of march. This march is provisorily indicated by past, present and future. These are moments bespeaking both continuity and discontinuity. "I" was there, a moment of that past, which in its pastness nevertheless preserves a being-present. The paradox of the "I finding itself" is that at every point that it is -- whether past, present or future-- the "I" is present. "I" am present in the past, in the present-at-hand and in the present that would be or future. However, the future is the present into which the "I" projects itself, a theme related thus to death. Death is the projection of an "I" present-at-hand of that "I" being-present into the space in which quite possibly it is not. But this is unknown; death could come at any moment.

The existence of the present denotes the existence of all that has led up to it, namely the past. The past, more specifically, is what the present has passed over and so buried. 'Buriedness' so to speak indicates being-under-the-ground. No longer at hand, it is now far away or out of hand. However, it is at hand in so far as one would take a hand to it -- G.I.'s archeology of memory. The past-over-present called the past is buried underground as what is out of hand but could once again be-at-hand through the excavating work of recollection. According to Plato anamnesis (recollection,
remembrance) was knowledge, the word being, I might add, a double negation. The first negation is *an-amnesis*, the negation of amnesia, the falling into oblivion; and the second is *a-mnesis*, the negation of the root (mne-) memory. There is an equivalent logic in Marxism as denoted by the phrase, "expropriate the expropriators." According to Marx and Engels, present day society covers over the primitive communism of its earliest stages, the structures of gathering-hunting. The communist movement is, in its own way, recollective: it remembers that which the present-at-hand (capitalist society) buries. To expropriate the expropriators is to get back to the root of being-social, to unearth the originating memory holding together society-as-society.

The double negation indicates then the process of reversal, to return the present-at-hand back to the present now passed over. However, the present-no-longer-present became past over through the dynamic, in part, of its own growth (traditional Marxist theories about progress through contradiction) and of external forces overwhelming it (Eisler's chronicling of the fall of Neolithic Goddess worshiping culture). The past then does not stand to the present-at-hand as the straight-line does to the points, in the Euclidean plane, that it connects. Rather the present is one contingent outcome of a play of forces that marginalizes as well as preserves various possibilities of being-in-the-world. Goddess worship was, upon the world historical defeat of the female sex, subsumed to that of the male -- although never completely as the oppressed continued to revolt. The Goddess was turned into a bitch, a divine harridan as the Greek mythical treatment of Hera, the forever betrayed wife of philandering Zeus, shows. Hera's reaction was to torment her husband's mistresses and children produced by their union with the Lord of Heaven.

Process of reversal, to invoke Hegel's categories, is the process of the in-itself becoming for-itself through recuperating its own alienated -- abandoned, estranged, lost -- Other. The past is Other to the present-at-hand as what this last as passed over. This passing-over is the taking place of the past-becoming-present. Such is the abstract formulation, this being abstracted from the forces-at-play in the situation. This play, furthermore, is how the present has worked itself out of the past -- and by so doing, burying this last. The earth covering over the past, however, is the present-at-hand; the
present cannot stand anywhere except as what covers over the past. By this however, I do not intend some depth as opposed to a surface. Rather the past surfaces as the present although it does not do so evenly -- meaning there are structures organizing the burial/internment. Goddess worship under patriarchy is marginalized, it being confined to the underground, its figures demonic. Thus the formerly beneficent Goddess becomes the witch as women are degraded in status -- they age badly since their worth is closed tied to the physical state of their bodies. Old men are revered for their wisdom; old women are despised for their wrinkles. The past thus is continually surfacing into the present even as this surfacing is organized according to definite power structures. Patriarchy, the power structure of the male over the female, organizes wisdom -- transcendence, cultural recognition of one's individuality -- along the lines of maleness rather than femaleness.

The recuperation of the Other which is one's (lost) self is this journeying through the land of the past-over. That-which-has-been stands as a reminder to the present as what yet could-be. However not all possibilities are equally evocative even as invocation denotes some narrative at work, subtly or not so subtly shaping the imagination. Heidegger employs the phrase state-of-mind in the above to indicate what I shall call the imaginative matrix, the nourishing mother forces, the womb that mythically is called memory. Mnemosyne is the mother of the Muses, the personification of memory, her name containing memory's root (mne-). The memorable is not, strictly speaking, the past or present or the future, it is the possibility of being-in-the-mind. That which is in the mind is what, in the barest of word play, is what one minds. This last could mean trouble. What one minds troubles that mind, reminding it of that which is but not quite. The world historical defeat of the female sex created (and still creates) trouble for the patriarchal power structure; it is the ever-present reminder of that power structure's ultimately powerlessness (dare one say impotence?). A power structure's response to what troubles it -- reminds it of its powerlessness -- is typically to demonize it. Thus the spectre (Gespenst) of communism haunts Europe; old women, the Goddess-as-Hag, become feared and detested witches, those who give themselves over to the dark, evil and malevolent forces of the devil. Ghosts, devils, spirits betray the troubled mind of the
power structure. A more contemporary example was the USA’s demonizing of global communist forces in the cold war -- communists were “outside agitators” in the words of the USA state department, never the manifestation of the contradictions of global capitalist reality. Against power stands memory.

To remember is to keep present what is. Granted, however, memory could degenerate into sententious hoarding of occurrence, the keeping present what is for the sake of keeping present. Thus the memorable gets lost in the nostalgic. For memory to retain its memorableness requires, in other words, logic. Indeed, to recall, this is the story of Zeus, the One, coupling with Mnemosyne, and out of this coupling, taking place over nine nights, were born the Muses, the patronesses of the arts. The mythical coupling of Logic and Memory preserves the conversation out of which the Memory retains its memorableness and logic its reason. Memory must be penetrated by logic; one must ask the question of the worthwhileness of the present. Of what use is it? On the other hand, logic needs to be reminded of its purpose, to maintain the orderliness of mind-within-body, not to subsume it to an abstraction of its own (forgotten) creation. For example, the past is not a junkyard of old ruins nor is the present simply the collection of the merely new. Rather the past is what one unearths in the discovering of the possibilities for the future that the present has buried in-itself. Recovering the past is directly linked to working out how a future could come about. This requires an archaeology of memory, an unearthing of the power structures that regulate the surfacing of the past-into-the-present. Heidegger in the above calls this the “potentiality-for-Being.”

The memorableness of memory resists the power structure organizing the past-as-past. Memory is put to work, however, by logic, keeping to the mythical mode for the moment. Memory and logic, as two distinct aspects of mind, reflecting different areas of the brain, are not reducible to each other. Each has its own dynamic; however, for each to do their own work, they require each other. Being, in Heidegger’s sense, is the accumulated product of memory and logic in conversation. Specifically, according to Greek myth, it results in the creation of the arts. If the arts are concrete labours, Being is the abstract labour product resulting from the interactive collocation of the arts within
a defined cultural space -- for example, the Republic of Plato. A division of labour operates to both separate and unite various productive labours across and through culture, relating their differentiated technical requirements to a system of morality, an ideology of social solidarity. For example, doctoring is an art, its purpose being to cure the sick, if possible, and, if not, prepare them for their death. Cultural norms more broadly govern the exercise of medical skills in so far as, in this instance, define what is death and dying as well as life and living. Contemporary debates in the areas of euthanasia and abortion respectively indicate how the interface between the technical realm particular to an art and its more general social context can be a heated contested site -- the point at which morality, so to speak, breaks down and the art itself undergoes redefinition. Coordination becomes problematic.

The above examples illustrate a larger point, namely, the resistance of memory to power through logic. Admittedly this last phrase sounds like a petty-bourgeois marketing slogan. Class origins aside, this slogan indicates two points: 1) the memorableness of memory is a function of putting memory to work in examining the possibilities for a future out of a present-at-hand; 2) memory has power although not the power associated with a power structure. A culture puts its memory to work, rescuing this last from the fate of being a mere storehouse of relics, when considering its needs as other than defined by current inputs and outputs. This requires reflection, namely, the stepping back from the exigencies of everyday survival. Everyday survival (everydayness) is not however a mere fact but factual; it manifests a definition of need, need as translated/mediated through a variety of socio-cultural mechanisms. In the capitalist era it is the market (early and middle phase) together with the media (late phase) that does this. The power structure is the supra-personal coordinating entity, although it is not without cadre, namely, at present, the organic intelligentsia of corporate culture. These are the accountants, journalists, as well as managerial and executive staff, some inside institutional enterprise and others not. The social power structure circumscribes the actor's self-understanding, it being the factual character of the thrown fact of understanding. The actor understanding himself only as the mediated action of being-in-relation to the power structure; the actor's state-of-mind reflects to
what degree the actor remembers this.

To what degree signifies, moreover, the degree of resistance the actor offers to the power structure. One who is in a supreme state of oblivion, the petty-bourgeois individual who imagines himself a genius, one who has sprouted out of the ground itself rather than any human culture, is one who, despite his otherwise great intelligence, succumbs utterly to the power structure. For in thinking his formulation to be the epitome of originality, he forgets the social context conditioning that formulation. That may have been, in large measure, Heidegger's error in joining the National Socialist (NAZI) movement -- a movement ostensibly to overthrow bourgeois social reality but which in the end merely reified it with tremendously grievous consequences for the world. Memory and memorableness, therefore, indicate resistance on the subjective level to the power structure.

It is necessary, however, to qualify my remarks in order not to be simple-minded. Here I am guided by Marx and Engel's observations in The Communist Manifesto about the originally revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie and its presently reactionary one. A power structure is not a solid block of matter, rather it is a crystallized product of struggle, a memorandum of victory, as it were, of momentarily ascendent classes in relation to a general line of productive/reproductive development. For example, patriarchy is the power block that was produced out of the struggle between agrarian pacific and warrior-herding cultures. The general line of productive/reproductive development was the growing world population and the resultant shrinking of space that formerly kept different cultures isolated from each other -- the transition from agrarian to urban civilization. It was inevitable that the above mentioned cultures would interact in some manner given these general constraints. An ascending class must, to ensure its ascendence, disrupt the status quo power structure in order to insert its own into a chain of signifiers, thereby reorienting production/reproduction to its particular ideological demands. In the pre-modern period, this was the rise of new religions and/or the incorporation of the conquered gods into a pantheon of the conqueror. Under present conditions it is the corporate merger of brand-name logos, mergers differing in friendliness, from outright hostile to welcoming white knight.
Power structures, as I noted earlier, have the two-fold task of both coordinating things present at hand and modifying them in anticipation or in response to changing conditions. A class ascends, objectively, because of its ability to this last and a class descends because of its inability. The feudal guilds, for example, descended in economic value and social significance because their methods of organization were inadequate to deal with the need for a freer supply of deskilled labour required by market society and nascent industrialism. The bourgeoisie’s emphasis on individual (rather than feudal corporate) identity represented a more adequate response to the changing nature of production, the change from small-scale commodity production confined to local markets to large-scale commodity production having the world as its market. The bourgeoisie continued to be revolutionary to the extent that their ideology broke sectarian national, ethnic and cultural barriers to large-scale commodity production. They however became reactionary at the moment when large-scale commodity production created the conditions for the rise of the industrial working class, the modern proletariat. However, industrial unions have now themselves become petty-bourgeois instruments, and they are in danger of becoming the new feudal guilds, unable to modify their organizing methods in the face of electronic-information technology’s redefining of work. There are other factors besides the technological, beginning with corporate capitalism’s campaign against unions, for example, the Harris Tories passed legislation making it more difficult to organize as well as to decertify unions. The “anti-scab” law passed by the Rae New Democrats was subsequently scraped by the Harris Tories.

Marxism, however, is guardedly optimistic about the future. It believes neither that a "better world" is a priori possible nor impossible. Better only comes about through work, although the conditions for the work being done must exist objectively. To explicate, I refer to Ernest Bloch’s discussion of utopia:

Anticipatory illumination mediates through the working, realizing subject that which is still only illusion about him with that which could become appearance. To be sure this is no longer appearance in the Kantian transcendental sense but in the materialist sense of a qualitative reality that has been requalified. Illusion is moved through anticipatory illumination to a realizable future that is reachable no matter how far away. However, it remains problematic as a more-than-this future.
Anticipatory illumination is not the process of systematization according to the idea as a "subjective maxim," but rather it is subjective anticipation of something that is objectively realizable that provides the measure for the anticipation to experience its real criticism. Otherwise, anticipation would be mistaken for the planification. It is only as anticipation, however, that anticipatory illumination is the fundamental category of utopian philosophizing.\textsuperscript{190}

Anticipation is not planification although as Jameson argued planning is necessary for the future in so far as the future is not the market. The future comes out of the contradictions of the present. Here the implicit assumption is that what is present is not limited to things present at hand. The Present is what one remembers as the basic condition for anticipating the future. The Future, however implies a particular present-at-hand, this leading to planification, to an unduly rigid notion of what ought to be. This would further imply a moral judgement which may not be necessarily to make. I am guided here by Jameson's earlier remarks, to paraphrase, that capitalism is both a catastrophe and a blessing. Granted that a certain sort of future is envisioned by socialists, namely, that in which the law of value has ceased to operate, the negation of work as an economic category and, more generally, the decommodification of social life. I pointed to one development, LETS, that anticipates that sort of future.

II

How could this decommodification come about? To elaborate I turn to D. W. Livingstone informative study of present day work conditions. He argues in his study on the education-jobs gap:

The education-jobs gap refers to the discrepancy between our work-related knowledge and our opportunities to use this knowledge in interesting and fairly compensated work. My basic argument is that our knowledge generally far exceeds our job opportunities. We are wasting large human learning capacities and achievements through our failure to recognize the existence of a massive "knowledge society" in a vast array of currently formally organized and informal learning practices. Education systems can always be improved. But it is not inadequate education that is the primary cause of the education-jobs gap. The basic problem is the lack of decent jobs.\textsuperscript{191}

I both agree and disagree with D. W. Livingstone. I agree with his analysis of present day capitalism and of the need to promote economic democracy as a way of creating
decent jobs. However, I disagree with him say that this is the basic problem. That which is more basic concerns the very meaning of activity that work glosses over. To be fair to D. W. Livingstone he does addresses these issues from time to time, but this is the not main focus of his work. To illustrate what is more basic, I quote tendencies within D. W. Livingstone's text:

Without work all life is rotten. But when work is soulless, life stifles and dies. (Albert Camus, cited in Langmore and Quiggin 1994, found in Livingstone, 1999)

and

The true meaning of 'work' is meaningful, purposeful activity. No matter what happens to jobs, there will be no shortage of work. The erosion of jobs can be seen as an extraordinary opportunity. We can finally get our priorities the right way around. Instead of being the poor relation of production for profit, genuinely human work may at last come into its own.(Anne Else, cited by Livingstone, 1999)

The weakness of the above definition is that it ignores how others have to validate one's activities. Work is not only about how meaningful the activity is to its doer (the actor) but to others observing it (the actor's auditors). However, there is something in the above that I want to extrapolate and put into a broader context, namely the Being-at-work. Here I must go outside standard sociological texts and cite a passage from Plato's Republic.

Is the medical art itself defective or faulty, or has any other art at any need of some virtue, quality, or excellence -- as the eyes of vision, the ears of hearing-- and for this reason is there need of some art over them that will consider and prove what is advantageous for these very ends? Does there exist in the art itself some defect and does each art require another art to consider its advantage and is there need of still another for the considering art and so on ad infinitum, or will the art look out for its own advantage? Or is it a fact that it needs neither itself or another art to consider its advantage and provide against its deficiency? For there is no defect or error at all that dwells in any art. Nor does it befit an art to seek the advantage of anything else than that of its object. But the art itself is free from all harm and admixture of evil, and it is right so long as each art is precisely and entirely that which it is. And consider the matter in that 'precise' way of speaking.

Except in the above cited scattered references D. W. Livingstone does not go beyond
work as commodified activity; economic democracy retains this conception of Being --
paid employment. I cite the above passage from Plato to indicate what Being-at work
could mean. It means the perfection of oneself. One is at work perfecting oneself
through the transformation of matter, this having consequences for oneself (self-
understanding) as well as for others (production of value). Plato argues for an intrinsic
connection or community, in other words, between being and doing, a community that
has been progressively denied with the advance or equally fall from primitive
communism. The reaffirming of this intrinsic connection is the primary purpose, I
would argue, of a revolutionary socialist movement -- of communism. In Bloch's
terms the returning to this community of being and doing is the anticipatory illumination;
in my terms it is a question of Care.

The break with primitive communism, as noted earlier, is the historical context of
care. The revolution of Care is this coming full circle back to the community of being
and doing. Here I want to raise the question of democracy and aristocracy. Democracy
literally means the rule by the demos the people, it does not necessarily imply the rule
by the best. The best form of society, I posit, is that which encourages, after the Fall,
the communalizing of being and doing. D. W. Livingstone might argue that when the
people rule that is best. However, that assertion would require articulating what the best
is such that the people ruling is best rather than idly subsuming it to democracy -- and
that is outside of D. W. Livingstone's research.

To articulate my understanding of what is best, and so qualify democracy, I
separate aspects that do not appeal to me from those that I find more palatable. Firstly,
it seems to me, democracy depends upon the force of numbers: the will of the majority.
This rule however is illogical: imagine, as Socrates often tells us, the case of non-
doctors judging the work of doctors. What do non-doctors know about the art of
medicine? Certainly, as patients, people (as distinct from the people) can feel whether
they are in good health or not, this one can empirically test. Can one move with pain or
not? However, patients cannot judge the work of doctoring in so far that is an art -- a
concerted training of the mind and body -- that they have not undergone. However, the
people can, in a broad sense, set social priorities -- a minimum level of health that is
common to all. But the people must trust the judgement of doctors in allowing them to practice medicine, and so allow society to achieve those objectives. In short, doctors can only, as practitioners of the medical art, be judged by other doctors. Their work however one can judge in light of more broadly determined social objectives.

Democracy, if it is not to be synonymous with mobocracy, must itself presume some notion of goodness not subject to number. Knowledge, for example, is not subject to voting. One does not vote on whether one knows something or not; one shows what one knows through the ability to recall the ideational parameters determining the creation of information. This is the practice of the greatest art that Plato, in the Crito, called philosophy. In Plato's Republic the dialectician, in the form of the philosopher-king, rules the people. Knowledge, as distinct from opinion, exemplifies the rule of the dialectic. Here I recall the dialectic I earlier posited between culture -- the fundamental power to think --- and politics -- the thinking about fundamental power.

The people have the fundamental power in so far as they constitute the majority. However, they are powerless in light of their own dispersed understanding of the basic parameters defining the meaning of their existence. Thus they think that they need money, forgetting that this last is simply a command for goods and services. That which humans need, in the most fundamental and powerful sense, is the community of being and doing. This is the governing idea of Being-human. A revolutionary movement embodies the dialectical reemergence of Being-human; it itself points the way for the people -- pushing out those tendencies within the people itself. In that sense revolutionaries exemplify what is best within the people and so form, if the paradox is not too great, a popular aristocracy; Lenin called revolutionaries the tribunes of the people. In this way does one care for Others.

Life is the union of being and doing. The exemplifying of this is absolutely good or the Best. Democracy is good in so far as itself is ruled by the Best, and this implies that democracy is not itself the Best. Democracy itself says nothing about what governs the people only that the people, whether ignorantly or intelligently, govern. However, one may add another point concerning being-Oneself, or, as Heidegger put, the ownmost possibility for Being. One's ownmost possibility for Being is to be the Best that
one can Be -- to make one's life true. The people, then, are not the people, merely frightened and confused animals, when they no longer strive for the Best, when they do not exemplify the community of being and doing. A popular aristocracy shows the people the way by themselves exemplifying this community, and so exemplifies what is best about and in the people. Democracy, in short, is not itself unless, implicitly, it contains its own aristocracy.

A vital economic element for this community of being and doing is, I submit, a community currency. I note D. W. Livingstone's discussion of this:

Another form of directly compensated or "paid labour still frequently conducted in household and community spheres is the production of goods and services for non-monetary exchange. Prior to the emergence of long-distance trading systems, barter between small commodity producers in local markets was a major means of acquiring all you needed to live. Barter systems have persisted within localities among friends and neighbors. Underemployment in wage work has rejuvenated barter activities and led to the development of more extensive organized forms, such as the Local Employment and trading System (LETS) (Dobson 1993)\textsuperscript{195}

To qualify the above description: LETS is not a barter system; it is a community currency. It possesses a standard of exchange which a barter system does not. However is it a currency lacking much economic clout, however.

Whatever the motivation, those who engage extensively in such necessary labours have been unable to make their living in this way.\textsuperscript{196}

There is a great gap between the notion of a popular aristocracy and a community currency. Nevertheless, LETS (or some version thereof) is necessary to challenge the commodification of the means of exchange in order to challenge and overthrow the general system of commodification -- the radical splitting of being from doing. Community currencies would have to be combined with extended anticipatory visions of the undoing of this split; otherwise they will simply reflect market values. Sites of anticipatory illumination could include all the options that D. W. Livingstone mentions from shareholder capitalism to economic democracy. This would echo the historical rise of the bourgeoisie, as the small towns through trade and commerce linked up with each other in the fourteenth and fifteen centuries; their collective economic power was the
basis for bourgeoisie political power. Analogously, community currencies, extended through virtual and actual reality, could serve as basis for a powerful postindustrial socialist politics within the next decade. Change happens more quickly now than in previous centuries.

One thereby remembers the community of being and doing whose realization on the basis of drastically different conditions of production will be the future. Memory here is that of a previously existing communal society out of which present society developed. Memory resists power through logic through recovering the path of the contradictions out of which the present came-into-being and thereby will go out of it. Specifically, it means detailing the conditions that makes an existence possible and by implication impossible. However, it is not as if there is a clean slate left behind by the going out of existence of a present (no longer) at hand. Rather a present-at-hand itself forms the indispensable substratum for the development that supersedes it. Thus a society in which the law of value no longer works would be itself conditioned by having emerged from a society in which this was the case. LETS, for example, still has prices, a feature of the law of value. It is not a potlatch in which goods and services are freely distributed on the basis of need alone.

One may distinguish between the lower and higher form of socialism. The lower form means that goods and services are available to all although one must still work. The means of production are no longer private; scarcity, however, remains. Work remains an economic category in order to regulate distribution of the social product. In the higher stage of socialism or communism proper, with conditions of abundance, all shall receive according to their need and contribute according to their ability. Allow me, however, to focus on possible lines of development, extrapolating from my previous remarks.

Earlier I said that history is less the story of standing armies with fixed positions but more that of info-tech guerilla groups contesting the meaning of culture. The achievement of utopia is, in other words, the outcome of a war of position. It is the result of a struggle, both in terms of raising the technological capacity of society to satisfy some agreed upon notion of need and the formulation of the meaning of need. It
is the building of culture as much as revolutionary organizations. Info-tech guerilla units suggests a decentralized struggle. However, decentralized should not be taken, necessarily to mean isolated. In the electronic-information age the means of communication enable even the most local of struggles to be broadcast locally -- the murder of peasants in Chiapas by the Mexican state or by right-wing death squads operating with the State's collusion became a global story. Certainly in the print era, decentralization meant isolation given the temporal-spatial gaps in lines of communication. However, now, any single point, although granted the development is uneven, can serve as a radiating-dissemination point for a determinate sign-output -- anyone practically can create their own web-site. However, one should not ignore the need for a supporting communication-skill network enabling individuals to realize this ability. "Practically anyone," more soberly, is a social tendency requiring qualification: he uneven conditions determining web-site creation. The radiating out from a single point into a global communications network allows for localization and generalization. Local struggles are able, through their access to the Net, to broadcast their data and to be in contact with the world data base. One is not sacrificed for the other. This is reflected more generally in the changed nature of objective reality. The transferring of images through the process of digitization does not deprive someone of that image; it simply means that the image can be shared. In primitive communist societies images were grossly physical, this not allowing for both individual possession and communal sharing. It was one or the other.

The anticipation of a future has, as its basic conditions of fulfillment, individual possession and communal sharing. The structure of the object has undergone radical change, it now being greatly freed from its former physical constraints. There is here an interesting parallel to Bloch's "subjective anticipation of something that is objectively realizable." The digitization of the object, the creation of it as image, was anticipated by the primitive dream state of our early ancestors. This illusion was the thought work having the human organic bio-mechanical structure as its framework. However this image remained the subjective property of the dream, unable to receive objective reality except through the verbal retelling of it. Now electronic-information technology allows
the subjective to become objective at the level of thought. The experiences of virtual reality are a computer file.

To avoid technological determinism, it is necessary to state that things are not only objective, but socially objective. One must include relations of production in one’s discussion of production. For a thing to become objective at the level of social reality such that it is a thought that many share requires an analysis of the power structure that selectively and, as Marx said, “behind the scenes” determines how and under what conditions one employs certain technologies. The technical ability to store one’s virtual reality experiences is a form of technical objectivity. However, the function and use of the technology as experienced by many users, will ultimate determine its social reality.

The more general point is this: memory, in order to resist power, must be shared. The inability to share objects beyond the primitive state where objects were few and numbers of people small, resulted in the practical forgetfulness of communal life. As noted earlier, the bewildering complexity of forms and products of labour means that society itself as the labour product becomes forgotten. Multiplicity consigns universality to oblivion -- or it did in the era previous to electronic technology. The power of this last is, potentially, to recreate the tribe within the context of a radically different object structure. From my personal experience as a LETS member there were some -- although few and far between -- moments of this. Thus close interaction between a few people, the hallmark of tribal culture, is possible but this does not limit oneself to those people necessarily, as the chat rooms on the Net demonstrates. Being a member of a tribe (chat room) is a matter more of choice than of necessity; the ties that unite are semiotic-informative rather than blood-genetic. Information is the blood of present society, the stream of data demonstrating how information-blood circulates through the global body politic.

Anticipating utopia, I say that there will be planning but not planification. The difference has to do with the object structure of social reality and the consequent localization within an globally linked matrix. Goods and services are the leading edge of the world economy are digitized images although this does not deny the physicalness of some objects. For example, one cannot eat the image of an apple but the actual apple.
Given that humans continue to have hard needs, needs as defined bio-mechanically, scarcity is still possible. Thus there will remain a physical need to possess certain things although this will not determine the general course of production as it did in previous technologies.

For one thing the production of food need not be centralized and concentrated as it did in the industrial age. Technologies are available and will become more available for the growing of one's own food. Admittedly this is somewhat far-fetched; however everything that one takes for granted today began as an idea in someone's head -- for example, the telephone, aeroplane, computer. It is reasonable to imagine the increasing ability of people to satisfy their needs locally through a network of user friendly and networked supported technology. These tendencies already exist. The growth of these tendencies will disrupt hierarchies of power based on concentration and centralization of resources. However, disruption is not the same as negation. Here one comes back to the question of the totality.

Present developments indicate the scope for more concentration of resources, for example, supra-national trading blocks and corporate mergers. It is, in a sense, a contradictory situation where opportunities for both localization and globalization exist -- the world is becoming increasingly smaller as the former spatio-temporal distances between things disappears and larger, as a given technology encompasses more individuals. Here, perhaps, is the difference. The key feature of electronic-information technology is to encompass a larger number of people-as-users -- ultimately everyone will have access to a computer. This is radically different from the ability to put everyone in the same uniform -- the repeatability, successive linearity of print in the mechanical age. Rather electronic technology gives, ideally, everyone access to the same data base, and from there one is on one's own.

This does not deny class although it does indicate how one key feature of class formation, namely, industrial concentration and centralization, is no longer present. Scattered throughout the global body politic are nascent info-tech guerilla units representing, in my argument, the resistance of memory to power through logic. The logic of these units is their non-conformity to either blood-kin groupings of the bio-
mechanical family or industrial work units of the print world. These units are both and neither, sharing features of both. They are small, interactive groups, as were typically genetically organized family-tribes but are not related necessarily genetically. They come into contact, extrapolating from the Web, through semiotic-information interests -- their electronic affinity. Affinity groups, indeed, is a term that has been used among peace activists and others, this information coming from my personal experience.

Will there be class in a post-capitalist world? Is beyond capitalism beyond class struggle?

The orthodox Marxist tendency to regard all social struggles as either centred in or derived from class relations of production is now obviously inadequate as well. The social movements of oppressed people that have swept the globe during the post-WWII era, including movement for national self-determination, the civil rights of visible minorities, the liberation of women and mobilizations of youth and elderly for their social rights, as well as the only periodic re-emergence of workers' struggles into the public sphere, provide ample evidence of this fact. The collective identities widely embraced in the late twentieth century -- of nation, race and ethnicity, gender and generation, as well as class -- have their distinct histories (see Hobsbawn 1994; Mann 1995; Marable 1985; Milnes 1996). Each should be studied in its particularity, and increasingly in their interaction (see Hartsock 1983; Sacks 1989; Mohanty 1997).

Identity is, at its best, the community of being and doing. This is to collect identity as distinct from speaking of collective identities. A communist movement has as its chief ideological task the collecting of identity, the encouraging of the community of being and doing at various sites of struggle. The point is to go beyond class society by paradoxically creating the conditions for a first-class society. That which is first-class is the best, and this means the negation of that which is the worst -- the radical split between being and doing. Thus a communist society would be a first-class society although not a class society in any pre-existing historical sense. As Marx said, capitalism is the last stage of pre-historical society; a post-capitalist socialism is the stage of first-class history.

The power structure, however, remains. Is resistance to it an anti-power network of affinity groups? Again citing from my personal experience, people involved in various anti-nuclear demonstrations, environmental protests and like tend to be disaffected and
educated members of the middle-class. Speaking more broadly, resistance as such comes from those both disaffected and educated, those unhappy with the status quo and having access to information with which they can change the status quo. This is the social base of utopian philosophizing. Marx made a similar comment when he spoke of members of the nobility helping the bourgeoisie and members of the bourgeois the industrial proletariat. The social basis of utopian practicing is the social whole. Utopian philosophers or visionaries are the revolutionary leaders.

Intellectuals embody the concern for ideas, and movements are in need of ideas. However, organic intellectuals, members of a popular aristocracy, do not invent ideas. Rather they push out what is there already, clarifying the grounds of the debate and thereby create more space for the emerging reality. Communism as the real movement is the constant pushing out of its own possibility from capitalist reality, that which represents the most extreme alienation of the primitive community of being and doing from itself. This is why the positive is the negative -- the articulation of human was simultaneously the break up of primitive communism. Intellectuals lead movements through the recalling of the primitive possibility for Being (thus affirming) but under conditions of current production (negating its primitiveness). Revolution is the act of making a full circle, but in making this circle one preserves the more encompassing character of that form. Intellectuals are the ones who most consciously, as denoted by their language, struggle with the complexities of this negating yet affirming character -- the paradoxical nature of the Real. Thereby, through their own example, as one struggling with this issue, do they lead others. The best lead by example.

Extrapolating from present tendencies, I argue that this struggle is an info-tech guerilla one. Here I draw from the revolutionary socialist experiences of this century, this last not being limited to the Stalinist gulag. Castro and his band operated as guerilla unit in the Sierra Maestra in the 1950s, winning the peasantry's trust and eventually gaining enough support in both people and things to create a standing army able to enter Havana. Guerilla units, because of their great mobility and flexibility, are useful against well-entrenched standing armies. The power structure, as I call it, is the standing industrial army coordinating the totality of commodity production. The new
object structure disrupts industrial normalization in so far as it permits both individual
possession and communal sharing simultaneously, the disrupting being the negation of
private holding of objects and hence, more generally, of scarcity. Digitization of images
eliminates their scarcity although one cannot eat or be clothed by images in the bio-
mechanical sense.

This would suggest the following. A guerilla based war of position disrupts the
daily operations of the standing army but it cannot ultimately defeat it. However, here
one might keep in mind Hegel’s observation of quality becoming quality. A guerilla
army, to add one more element, must, as Mao said, take its weapons from the enemy.
Essentially, guerilla warfare is the judo-jitsu reverse, the ability to use the opponent’s
strength against the opponent. A standing army is strong in number, but its very
strength is its weakness in that it cannot move easily. The more bodies a fighting unit
has, the more coordination is required for its movement; the less bodies, the less
coordination. Extrapolating from the Cuban experience, a guerilla army gains the status
of a standing army through its ability to build up a network of support. It comes to stand
as the exemplar of that network rather than being, and this is my utopian hope, that it
never becomes a thing over and above that network. It objectifies that network rather
than alienating it from itself.

Returning to the present, the new global worker now faces global capitalism, and
its self-understanding is far from clear both to itself and to others. Marx and Engels
outlined stages whereby the nascent industrial proletariat achieved self-recognition in
the Communist Manifesto, at first its identity was limited to local struggles with individual
factory owners over purely local conditions and then to larger and more encompassing
struggles to issues of concern to the entire class such as the limitation of the working
day. The global worker may be in the same position, the only but major difference is
that change these days occurs more rapidly than two centuries ago. A struggle that took
decades could now be telescoped into one decade or less.

The point of an archaeology of memory is that it is an abstraction from the
struggle of the majority of the world’s population to change their actual conditions of
existence. General Idea symbolically demonstrated the efficacy of the idea through its
con- and then destruction of the 1984 Miss General Idea Beauty Pavilion, this last being a stand in for the world. The actor finds himself continually in a con- and destructive mode of being, the erection and tearing down of a world. The being-in-the-world, to emphasize a point that is not always clear in Heidegger’s own formulations, is the struggle both of the actor to be Himself and of the world, the collective actor, becoming a world. Memory is the basic ground against which this dual-edge struggle proceeds and brings into relief. Memory is the recollective work of finding oneself and of the re-standing of the grounds upon which the self in its unity exists -- and this gathering unity is the logic of the struggle. Thus workers unite as a revolutionary class through refinding the proletariat identity lost through the multifarious exchanges of the labour market -- the alienated form of labour power symbolized by the money. In refinding their identity, they come to change the world, becoming thus themselves that new world in the course of consciously modifying their relations with each other.

The task is before us. To briefly summarize the task: the encouraging of community currencies in conjunction with the articulation of anticipatory illumination at a host of sites -- both virtual and actual. In this way a communist movement builds its political power through the systemic challenging and reversing of the commodification of social reality. That which is truly real is the identity of being and doing, and that is why capitalism has to end. The particular trajectory of the end, however, is only determined through a complex array of interacting forces. A communist movement both builds and is built from this recommunalizing of social reality. The changing conditions of production necessitate a rethinking of the industrial-based interpretive categories defining "struggle," "class," "value" and a host of others that I have touched upon in this work. My including of Martin Heidegger in the conversation was done in part out of my own petty-bourgeois identity and in part out of my understanding of, as Lenin entitled one of major early works, what is to be done. For I too want to find myself and change the world, the two principal aspects of my own factical temporality.
CONCLUSION

In my introduction I noted Uno’s positing of capitalism’s inability to eliminate the small producer. This persistent feature of capitalist social structure, however, I had to put in relation to other features, principally, the contradictory tendencies of the petty-bourgeoisie itself. Gorz’s neo-proletariat and Gonick’s contradictory class positions, derived from Wright and Carchedi, neither indicate necessarily a new class (Gorz argued for this while Gonick did not, however) nor discount the possibilities for an emergence of a new revolutionary subject. It indicates perturbations of the traditional (industrial) class structure, dislocations that socialists could exploit for purposes of socialism. The homeworkers I consider to be another aspect of the political and economic expressions of these dislocations in the industrial political and economic structure created by the dynamic of postindustrial capitalism. The homeworker phenomenon is a criticism of traditional market norms, norms that relied (and still rely upon) the marginalization of women’s work, the regime of work for whom the male industrial wage earner is the worker.

Homeworking’s recent rise into prominence is, in part, a function of capitalism’s need to create micro-linkages for extended accumulation as a moment of globalization. It is also, in part, fueled by the desire of the homeworkers themselves, as articulated by feminist activists, to be recognized as workers. The globalization of capital is both a curse and a blessing. It crystallizes the reality of the interconnectedness of all things, even if for its own narrowly conceived and private purposes. Socialists can (and should) build on the embryonic consciousness of the interrelatedness of all things, neither then conflating a socialist consciousness with globalization nor ignoring the socialist tendencies inherent in globalization. That all things are related does not mean *ipso facto* the abolishment of commodity production; it could simply mean the market has become the world. The same ambiguity shows itself in the case of global homeworkers.

According to feminist scholarship, global homeworkers are mainly female in composition. Women have traditionally stood for communal values, that is, values that have resisted commodification. Hence capitalism has tended to marginalize both women’s work, even as this last has been the unacknowledged source supporting male
dominated industrial wage labour. That female global homeworkers are emerging from
their shadowy -- as defined by market -- economic existence cannot help but upset if
not rupture the industrial accumulation of capital given that their values differ from
traditionally socialized patriarchal males. Potentially, human society is moving from a
society of status (feudalism) to society of contract (capitalism) to a society of interaction
(post-industrial socialism). As evinced by the informal economy, the economy of small
producers, process is valued as well as outcome, getting to know the individual as a
person not simply as a factor of supply or demand.

However, this transition requires struggle: the petty-bourgeoisie nature of the
small producer makes this necessary. I am suggesting here a position that neither
identifies women with community as some sort of bio-genetic trait, since there is
bourgeois feminism and female capitalist entrepreneurs nor, on the other hand, do I
deny the deep historical continuity of women with communal values. Rather it is a
combination of nature and nurture. Burdened with child care and other intergenerational
duties, women have been forced to consider value and work in a much broader context
than men. This long standing condition has resulted in a massive historically
documented socialization of females making communal value almost, although not
quite, second nature to them. The socialist challenge is to generalize from the female
historical experience in relating this to these objectives: the abolishment of the regime
of work, law of value and commodity production in favour of a more holistic, many-sided
understanding of need, value and work. It is to free communal values from their female
ghetto and thereby re-universalize them. At the beginning and end of communism
stands the Goddess, the Virgin Mother, to speak metaphorically.

As women have instinctively known, the purpose of the economy is the
production and reproduction of human life. In more abstract terms this is the totality.
The totality of Being-human is the object proper of a socialist economy. Strictly
speaking there are no economic values per se just as there is no such category of work
separate and apart from human activity in general -- that there is however belongs to
the historical contingency of the capitalist mode of production. A socialist economy then
is a contradiction in terms. If the economy exists as a distinct and separate activity,
standing over and above civil society, then one is not discussing a socialist society. The distortion and ultimate failure of the former Soviet state command economies, really state capitalism operating in global markets, supports my position.

Nevertheless, I do not discount the socialist experiments of the twentieth century, their insights are important building blocks for the socialism of the twenty-first. In the coming century socialism will rely upon a war of position in so far as this last is an exercise in care giving, the practice of healing. One wages war against disease. However, if this is not to degenerate into typically male dominated polemics, one has to recognize that one lives in the same community with the diseased. Oneself is diseased; physician cure thyself! The healing of disease is a conversation with one's own body politic, in the larger sense. It is the strengthening of the body's own healing powers as much as possible rather than invading it with foreign agents or drugs as the capitalist pharmaceutical industry would have it.

Socialism aims to cure capitalism of its disease, and its treatment is a war of position. The point here is to position the body to heal itself through the encouraging of reflection upon the totality. Thus the mainly female homeworkers are petty-bourgeois, meaning they could be either proletarian or bourgeois proper. Socialism should use the accumulated historical heritage of being-female -- the traditional identification of women with community -- in relation to both examine and transcend that historically conditioned identity. It should explicate the factors account for this, the work of much feminist scholarship, but transcend this by generalizing those values in light of the potential for global community. For example, under capitalism, and using the latest technology, one gathers information for purposes of control and manipulation; advertisers want to know what "consumers" think in order to read (if not create) their market audience. The socialist challenge is to reappropriate information for communal uses -- not using it to make private profit but to allow a community to objectify one's own needs more clearly. Community currencies (LETS) is one example of this where computers allow people to easily record their economic transactions with others. Such systems are by and large used by petty-bourgeoisie entrepreneurs such as homeworkers. The hitherto marginalized largely female homeworkers could and are using information technology
to build global networks, thereby escaping their tradition isolation.

The totality to which the features belong is postmodernism. Globalization of capital is the economic expression, glamour and seduction its cultural one. Global capitalism seduces us into believing that a new world has come into being. The rapidity of information generating and sharing, part of the glamour of information technology, is immediately identified by the uncritical with community. The thrust of Jameson’s investigations has been to indicate how globalization opens new ways of reconceiving socialism; postmodernism is the latest phase of capitalism. For me, the principal point of Jameson’s analysis is the elimination of the former autonomy of the cultural sphere -- art -- enjoyed in the high bourgeois epoch. The brutal ugliness of capitalism hyped up in the seductive glamour of high speech image digitization was captured by General Idea. Miss General Idea, the capitalist beauty queen, signified the commodified female, the fetishized object of male gaze and desire, that is consumed by and consumes this last. In my archaeology of memory, I have discovered an image of woman long buried and in the process of unearthing itself: the female worker Care. Woman as fetishized commercial object could not care less about man; Miss General Idea is reified sex, glamour and seduction, turned back on itself. Care as female worker subverts and lays the ground for the overthrow of Miss General Idea through the recommunalizing force of homeworking. One reworks the Earth as the human settlement through cultivating the ground of one’s existence. These are tendencies displayed by the mainly female homeworkers in their stretching of the definition of capitalist work. Both tendencies if sufficiently linked with socialist ideals could be the basis for reworking the grounds of capital accumulation. Both tendencies, with the proper consciousness, could work towards reappropriating human activity as the source of value, and making capital serve labour, thereby reversing its perverse capitalist formulation. By the same token women are retaking their identity as working beings, stepping out of the high heels of Miss General idea back into their flats.

I imagine GREEN style economies, economies based on the renewed solidarity of the human species with other species. These local networks of communalized and communalizing societies exist now in the interstices of the global marketplace. Their
further articulation in conjunction with a socialist project could be the basis for a twenty-first century socialism, quite different from the former state socialist one based in industrial capitalist norms. Rather than beginning with the seizure of state power and mutating into a monstrous dictatorship, twenty-first century socialism would be a grounded achieved rooted in community building by self-reflective individuals: socialism built from the bottom up rather than imposed from the top down.

To explicate and summarize: the caring revolution is the agonizing labour of bringing the future out of the capitalist present. At the present moment this is socialism. The key point in this war of position -- this struggle -- is to build an alternative decommodifying economy, otherwise there cannot be a decommodifying politics. The decommodification of the means of production is unthinkable apart from that of the means of exchange. Only in this way can one articulate what one anticipates in the anticipatory illumination. Along with means of production one traditionally considers relations of production. When consciousness itself is a product, relations of production potentially include all aspects of being-in-the-world: they become co-terminus with language itself.

Sites of anticipatory illumination are, for example, factories, universities, childcare, supermarkets, art galleries, wherever, in effect, where there is consciousness -- and this is everywhere and nowhere in terms of any specific site. Just as the grand narratives of Enlightenment based twentieth century reason have been severely challenged so too have certain sites of struggle, such as the factory, lost their privileged position. The factory for homeworkers is the home: capitalist socialization -- rather desocialization -- is at work everywhere as shown by the multiplication of commercialized sound bits and images in all aspects of waking and even -- if one believes in the existence of subliminal advertising -- sleeping existence. In short, capitalism has practically extended itself everywhere, including the former Soviet Union and China, and so must socialism.

However, not all aspects of language are equally relevant at any one time when speaking. One needs to assign priority to the use of energy and time in speaking to the question at hand. Nevertheless the extending of sites of struggle brings out a paradox:
the potential for achieving socialism is both easier and harder. It is easier because of
the greater commodification of social reality -- both extensively in terms of a world
market and intensively in terms of people's subjective media-digitizing consciousness.
As D. W. Livingstone (1999) has pointed out more people, both in terms of numbers
and percentage of the population, are better educated than ever. The problem,
however, is that the capitalist determined job market does not generate an employment
structure capable of capitalizing fully on the population's knowledge base. The general
rise in educational levels makes it easier in a formal instructional sense -- more people
have been exposed to (I do not say necessarily have read) Marxist texts. However, the
achievement of socialism is harder by the same token because this means addressing
the multiplicity of potential sites of struggle and the concomitant need to construct
coordinating mechanisms to raise the struggle to ever higher levels of consciousness.
The traditional term for "coordinating mechanism" is party. The sort of revolutionary
party needed for the present conjuncture is a separate area of discussion. The only
comment I can make now is that it would have to be an extremely flexible instrument of
struggle, having a range and capacity to analyze and communicate the results of its
analysis to a broad spectrum of individuals located at various points of struggle, ranging
from the microscopic personal to the macroscopic suprapersonal. Traditional
communist parties have allied themselves with trade unions and popular groups, and
their collective discourse, to speak politely, has eschewed any personal meditative
aspects, as a result becoming an ossified monument to economism. This is particularly
true of the Communist party of Canada. Socialist or social-democratic parties have
included other elements but not in any rigorous way (Erhring & Roberts 1993). The
main challenge for a revolutionary party is to incorporate the distinct but related
concerns of self-transformation with social change. That would be the revolutionary
nexus of care.

In addressing the prospect and extent of the caring revolution, I indicate the
following: the prospects are scattered and isolated islands within the, as Lenin said,
petty-bourgeois sea. Thus LETS, and systems like it, struggle on at the margins.
Nevertheless, that such systems continue to exist and maintain themselves indicates
something, some real social need that the entity satisfies at some minimal level --
Toronto LETS has been in existence for nine years, having undergone a variety of
changes. From personal experience, it had reached a membership of 200 members in
1999 and then crashed to about fifty, the same factors accounting for its success and
failure. Its idealist volunteer grassroots base suffered eventually from “burnout,” on the
psychological level, and inadequate structure, on the organizational. In 1999, the
remnant of members voted to give the Phoenix Foundation, a local non-profit left-
leaning social change organization, ultimate organizational authority. It remains to be
seen as to whether this will provide a sounder organizational basis.

However, the deeper problem is that LETS remains, despite its rhetoric, but an
adjunct to the capitalist marketplace. LETS dollars reflects current marketplace
evaluations of goods and services. In terms of class, it remains a play-object of well-
meaning and well-educated petty-bourgeois individuals who, for the most part, do not
depend upon it economically. The fate of its two founders is instructive: the first, Mr Sat
Kalsa eventually, after some five or six years as LETS coordinator left to find paid
employment as a teacher; the other, Dr. David Burman, is an established dentist and
university professor. The second is materially able to maintain his involvement with
LETS because of his solid market position. **More generally, LETS will be unable to
realize its revolutionary potential unless it links itself to a revolutionary project --
unless the decommodification of the means of exchange are rigorously thought
through in conjunction with that of the means of production.** It works both ways,
however. Any serious socialist project must base itself economically -- and this includes
the options ranging from capitalist shareholding to economic democracy discussed by
D. W. Livingstone -- on a community currency. The failure to do the first will result in an
economy without a politics and the second a politics without an economy. By contrast, a
revolutionary project bases itself on the differentiated unity of political-economy.

The existence of multiple sites is potentially useful in bridging the gap, in
restoring the cogency of a political-economy. Using computer technology, the Net, for
example, it is easy to disseminate the results of any one site of contestation for another
-- the scattered web sites of revolution. Thereby one is forced to -- and can -- develop a
many-sided analysis capable of including a wide range of experiences out a core set of research parameters. This is the method -- partly spontaneous and partly organized -- for future socialist struggle. Dedicated individuals at various web-sites -- both on and off the line -- will find themselves in the electronic maze for a variety of reasons -- ranging from issues of personal growth to social change. This process is spontaneous because these individuals do not know each other beforehand, and it is their concerns, as mediated by the technology, that impel them to meet. In a loose sense, one could call them producers in so far as consciousness is a production. Undoubtedly, production of actual things will continue, and must so long as human have bodies, but physical reality, as indicated by the role of virtual reality, will not determine to the same extent as previously the tone of production.

The planning element arises out of a desire of individuals, who having once met, have concluded that it is more advantageous individually to work together. The charting of the efforts of such groups will be the basis of my next stage of research. Given this prospect of freely associating producers -- both on and off line -- forming LETS based political-economic networks, I remain hopeful, for myself and my world. The rumors of socialism's death, Mr. Keegan, have been greatly exaggerated.
NOTES


2. op. cit., p. 82.

3. While I will not examine Eagleton's argument in any great detail, I will nevertheless note some points here.

It is not hard to find parallels to this ironic self-undercutting in modernist art as a whole, which can speak of a progressively degraded reality only out of the side of its mouth as it broods incessantly on its own crystalline forms....If modernism is the point where painting comes to be about paint, sculpture about stone and literature about words, then the Tractatus is the place where philosophy begins to bend back on itself and interrogate its own medium, which is of course language itself. (Terry Eagleton, The Terry Eagleton Script/The Derek Jarman Film (London: The British Film Institute, 1993) p. 6-7)

Modernism is the point of either, one could say, self-obsessiveness or self-reflectiveness. A distinction somewhat along these lines appears in Eagleton's work in other places:

...it is surely arguable that late capitalism has deconstructed such a [unified] subject much more efficiently than meditations on écriture. As postmodernist culture attests, the contemporary subject may be less the strenuous monadic agent of an earlier phase of capitalist ideology than a dispersed, decentred network of libidinal attachments, emptied of ethical substance and psychical interiority, the ephemeral function of this or that act of consumption, media experience, sexual relationship, trend or fashion. The 'unified subject' looms up in this light as more and more of a shibboleth or straw target, a hangover from an older liberal epoch of capitalism, before technology and consumerism scattered our bodies to the winds as so many bits of reified technique, appetite, mechanical operation or reflex of desire. (Terry Eagleton, "Capitalism, modernism and postmodernism," from David Lodge ed) (London and New York: Longman, 1988)

Postmodernism both preserves the self-imploding motion of late capitalism even it opens up opportunities for overcoming it. It creates the space but does not necessarily fill it. Postmodernism completes this auto destruction, it being the debris of the unified subject, of the correspondence theory of truth and other
maxims of modernity. The open question for a postmodern socialism would first be how it would distinguish itself from postmodernism itself. Such a socialism would be postmodern-like or postmodernist. It would be mindful of the debris which is postmodernism even as it is able to capitalize upon new projects for subjecthood arising out of the breakdown of former hegemonic narratives.


10. op. cit., p. xxiii.


14. op. cit., pp. 4-8.

15. op. cit., p. 8.


17. op. cit. p. 183.


22. op. cit., pp. 91-92.

23. See David W. Livingstone The Education-Jobs Gap: Underemployment or Economic Democracy (Toronto: Garamond Press, Toronto), 1999. He documents that large portions of the traditional proletariat are also unemployed.

24. op. cit. p. 68.

25. op. cit., pp. 69-70.

26. op. cit., p. 74.


30. op. cit. p. 8.


34. Eileen Boris and Elisabeth Prugl (ed.), Homewokers in Global Perspective: Invisible No more, (New York & London: Routledge,


39. The popular success of ontology feeds on an illusion: that the state of the *intentio recta* might simply be chosen by a consciousness full of nominalist and subjectivist sediments, a consciousness which self-reflection alone has made what it is. Heidegger, of course, saw through this illusion. He circumvents the alternative by way of the doctrine of Being that prevails beyond *intentio recta* and *intentio obliqua*, beyond subject and object, beyond concept and entity. (Theodor W. Adorno *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 69).

Beyond, above, alongside: all prepositions are found in Heidegger’s work (see Heidegger, 54, 141, 239, 329) in Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation. Nevertheless, Adorno insists, for purposes of polemics (there is no other purpose served) in his uni-dimensional caricature. Traditional ontological notions of beyond are precisely those that Heidegger questions in destroying the conceptual hierarchy of unreflective ontological distinctions. There is nothing beyond the world except its temporal horizon line, and this is, as well, besides, alongside and by that world.

40. The dismantling of systems, and of the system at large, is not an act of formal epistemology. What the system used to procure for the details can be sought in the details only, without advance assurance to the thought: whether it is there, or what it is. Not until then would the steadily misused word of "truth as concreteness" come into its own. It compels our thinking to abide with minutiae. We are not to philosophize about concrete things; we are to philosophize, rather, out of these things. (Theodor W. Adorno *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 33.)

This is a precise description of Heidegger's method. He is disenchanted with the traditional -- Cartesian -- notion of Being, this trivializing the Aristotelian and, even further back, pre-Socratic notion. It is Heidegger's task -- if not self-imposed mission -- to rein in the otherwise rampant trivialization of Being threatening to become absolute with industrial capitalism.


43. Thought as such, before all particular contents, is an act of negation, of resistance to that which is forced upon it; this is what thought has inherited from its archetype, the relation between labor and material." (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 19).

The labour here is of recollection, the wrestling of the preontological conception of Being from the dispersed practices of being-in-the-world. Resistance is the work of ex-istance. Truth, then, is the product of resisting the forgetfulness of being-in-the-world, the recovering of Being as the elemental, primordial possibility constrained by that world; the articulation, as Heidegger makes clear, is the resistance enunciated on the level of language, language here being the material of thought.

44. This thought resonates most strongly with Marxist Walter Benjamin as well as with Heidegger. To quote Hannah Arendt:

...in the final analysis all problems are linguistic problems...Benjamin ...knew a great deal about these very things, because from the beginning the problem of truth had presented itself to him as a "revelation...which must be heard, that is, which lies in the metaphysically acoustical sphere." To him, therefore, language was by no means primarily the gift of speech which distinguishes man from other living beings, but, on the contrary, "the world essence...from which speech arises" (Briefe I, 1971), which incidently comes quite close to Heidegger's proposition that "man can speak only insofar as he is the sayer." (Walter Benjamin Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schoken Books 1969), pp. 49-50.


47. Idealism, attesting the positive infinity of its principle at every one of its stages, turns the character of thought, the historic evolution of its independence, into metaphysics. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 26)

Heidegger wants philosophy to resist its own metaphysical shadow through its resolute resistance to closed-system programmatics. The positive infinity is the negative dialectic, the affirming of the historical nothingness that every conception of Being must elide over, and which, therefore, it is the task of every thinker, in so far as thinking, is to recover and overturn. Philosophy is the dialectical nothingness that turns (on) the positivity of a conception in ruthless (if not at times vicious) determination.

48. op. cit., p. 35.

49. op. cit., p. 25.

50. Philosophy would be debasing itself all over again, into a kind of affirmative solace, if it were to fool itself and others about the fact that it must, from without, imbue its objects with whatever moves them within it. What is waiting in the objects themselves needs such intervention to come to speak, with the perspective that the forces mobilized outside, and ultimately every theory that is brought to bear on the phenomena, should come to rest in the phenomena. In that sense, too, philosophic theory means that its own end lies in its realization. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 29).

The horizon line of being-in-the-world is the language of that world, as Heidegger would argue. In that sense, following Adorno, the world comes to rest in itself in so far as one cannot think the world's phenomenality apart from speaking the language constituting that world's Being. Being-in-the-world and the world's Being are end and realization.


52. A theorist, Edward O. Wilson, operating in a different discipline, sociobiology, argued that what defines a world is the
flow of communication (see Wilson 1976). Building Being, then, would mean, accordingly, building upon the communication system. In line with Adorno's notion of philosophy and Marxist philosophy as exposed in my text, facing and extending the sense of reality defining its intelligibility.


54. As Wilson (Wilson 1976) makes abundantly clear, a bee-hive does not suffer from the inability of its members to communicate with each other. Rather the relative genetic uniformity of its members make "extended conversation," so to speak, unnecessary. The carelessness concerns the inability (because in the bee's case, the not needing to) dwell with the meaning of their language. A computer is careless in the same way, this not affecting, in any way whatsoever, its efficacy. Perfect communication as an ideal belongs to a notion of language that would, in other words, eliminate its own linguistic, as distinct from communicative character. It is famously (or infamously) represented by Hegel's attempt to convert philosophy (language) into science (communication) in Phenomenology of the Mind.

55. There is no lack of related intentions in history. The French Enlightenment got a formally systemic touch from its supreme concept, that of reason; yet the constitutive entanglement of its idea of reason with that of an objectively rational arrangement of society deprived the idea of a pathos which it was not to recover until the realization of reason as an idea was renounced, until it was absolutized into the spirit. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 29).

The rationalized form of reality is, as Adorno (and Max Horkheimer say in another work, the instrumentalization of a concept, specifically the mechanic idea of Being first expressed and promoted by Descartes through his ingenious (or sophistic depending on one's temperament) mathematics. The rise of industrial capital was, theoretically, the concentration and centralization of the mechanical conception of Being. The absolutization of the reason (the concept) into spirit (a more abstract concept) is the theoretical depiction of being-mechanical as the hegemonic ideal of post-Enlightenment reality.

56. This parallels Benjamin's argument for storytelling. To quote:

The intelligence that came from afar--whether the spatial kind from foreign countries or the temporal kind of tradition -- possessed an authority which gave it validity, even when it was not object to verification. Information,
however, lays claim to prompt verifiability. The prime requirement is that it appear "understandable in itself." Often it is no more exact than the intelligence of earlier centuries was. But while the latter was inclined to borrow from the miraculous, it is indispensable for information to sound plausible. Because of this it proves incompatible with the spirit of storytelling. If the art of storytelling has become rare, the dissemination of information has had a decisive share in this state of affairs. (Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, trans. H. Zohn, (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 89).

57. My account follows roughly the schema of instrumental reason first proposed by Adorno and Horkheimer in their book bearing that name. Truth-as-truce corresponds to reason-as-instrument, historically concretized as the bourgeois ratio.

58. At a distance, dialectics might be characterized as the elevation to self-consciousness of the effort to be saturated with dialectics. Otherwise the argument deteriorates into the technique of conceptless specialists amid the concept, as it is now spreading academically in the so-called "analytical philosophy," which robots can learn and copy. (Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), pp. 29-30).

The concept is the organizing idea requiring the service of specialists for its precise operationalizing. One could hear here as well the traditional socialist issues of being red and being a specialist, the relationship of a undifferentiated mass and a skilled elite. But that would be undialectical or metaphysical. That one is skilled, for example being an intellectual, is not, as Gramsci argued, so much an intrinsic character of the person but itself the operationalized effect of being in an ensemble of systems of relations -- in short, being-in-a-world. The specialist is conceptless in the same way that a bureaucracy has no political character. To some extent this is true, that extent determined by a closed-system method of accounting; for example, all humans having human eyes see things the same way. This way, however, is universal only in so far as humans have no culture. The closed system eye is the natural eye, but even here the argument falls down. For "real" animals have their own nature; the eye of an owl is not, except metaphorically, human.

59. We like to present alternatives to choose from, to be marked True or False. The decisions of a bureaucracy are frequently reduced to Yes or No answers to drafts submitted to it; the bureaucratic way of thinking has become the secret model for

Bureaucracy represents a specialization of thought, a conceptless notion of being-in-the-world which, nevertheless, is itself in the world. The strategic disconnection between the specialist thinker, a parody of the organic intellectual who comes into being with his chosen instrument -- or does the instrument choose him? The typical faceless of bureaucratic thought, its anonymity, corresponds to the hypostatizing impulses of instrumental reason: I only follow orders, I cannot see beyond my desk.


61. The spirit cannot forgive itself for being barred, by the constitution of the existence it guides, from unfolding the freedom inherent in its concept. The philosophical term for this prohibition is relativism... Relativism, no matter how progressive its bearing, has at all times been linked with moments of reaction, beginning with the sophists' availability to the more powerful interests. To intervene by criticizing relativism is the paradigm of definite negation. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 37).

Care, through the dwelling with the nothingness of Being covered over by the concept, a covering-over promoted ironically by the conceptless specialists, indicates the structure of unfolding freedom. It thus recovers the necessity of the freedom that, in its delusion, denies any necessity to its Being. Freedom exists relative to a definite structure as a bureaucracy does to a method. The negative dialectic (Adorno) or destruction of the concept of Being (Heidegger) express the dynamic of freeing Freedom from its own slavishness.


The Socratic method is, in its way, an example of unleashed dialectics. It presumes the notion of the Absolute -- the Idea -- present in every instance of intelligible speech; without ideas there is no speech. No longer believing in anything solid, dialectics, the intellectual expression of the dispossessed, wants to tear down everything that is. This is its sophistic character that even Socrates had to recognize in appropriately
enough the dialogue entitled The Sophist. More contemporaneously, the bourgeoisie in their efforts -- all that is solid melts into air -- reveal the sophistic foundation of their own reason -- industrial capitalism is the material counterpart of metaphysics, the concentration and centralization of the Idea and, thereby, the relativization of the Absolute -- the definition of sophism.


The adventuring spirit goes on the way to explore what lies before, that is pre-sent, the word deriving from the Latin esse be and prae before. Standing before the adventurer is the path to be gone upon -- this covering over of the ground whose revealing traces is the work of discovery. Science lays down pathways, its method, and in doing so goes on its way. Science as adventure, as distinct although not completely separate from science as production of knowledge-objects, is the recovery of the character of going-on-the-way -- the method of dialectics as self-inquiring subjectivity thrown against the essence of its rationalizing spirit.

66. This is in line with Berman's approach, its invocation of modernity aside:

It implies an open and expansive way of understanding culture; very different from the curatorial approach that breaks up human activity into fragments into separate cases, labeled by time, place, language, genre and academic discipline... The broad and open way is only of many possible ways, but it has advantages. It enables us to see all sorts of artistic, intellectual, religious and political activities as part of one dialectical process, and to develop creative interplay among them. (Marshall Berman All That is Solid Melts Into Air, (New York: Penguin, 1982), p.5).

(Re)building is creative self-expression of a self determined to win back its objectivity from its manifold dispersiveness concomitant with being-in-the-world. Rebuilding a revolutionary movement is the creative self-expression of those revolted by the
present system in conjunction with their ability to objectify those feelings.

67. As Adorno writes in a more abstract register:

The principle of dominion, which antagonistically rends human society, is the same principle which, spiritualized, causes the difference between the concept and its subject matter; and that difference assumes the logical form of contradiction because, measured by the principle of dominion, whatever does not bow to its unity will not appear as something different from and indifferent to the principle, but as a violation of logic. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, New York, 1973). p. 48).

Caring has elements of attending and administrating to the object in question. Domination, however, assumes a unity between itself (subject) and the object. Ideationally (as distinct from ideologically) the concept of Being is other than Being, and to care for Being is to come face to face, at every instance of this being-fore, this otherness. Domination is indifferent to its difference even as others make no difference to it except as to serve as units ready to be fitted into a preorganized calculus. Domination is highly ideological, not ideational, because, paradoxically, of its complete disregard for the character of the idea that its practice embodies.

68. Wilson (1976) argues for a notion of alterity, the concrete phenomenal facts being the caring of young by animals. Recognition of oneself in another, thus, is the basis of altruism, an extension, then, of one’s self as determined by the ability to project beyond the immediate confines of the somatic body. In animals this was not achieved except in the case of the human where paternity, more abstract than maternity in that regard, became an intrinsic part of the parenting unit. Only in the seahorse, where the male bears the children, is there any comparable attachment of father to young.

69. What man ought to be as such is never more than what he has been: he is chained to the rock of his past. He is not only what he was and is, however, however, but equally what he can come to be, and to anticipate that, no definition suffices. The schools grouped around Existenz, even the utterly nominalist ones, are incapable of the self-relinquishment they long for in their recourse to the individual human Existenz: and they confess that incapacity by philosophizing in general concepts about things not absorbed in their concepts, things running counter to their concepts -- instead of thinking them through. They

One should not confound the reality principle with a given reality or actual existence. Rather this last is the occasion to work through, in the recovering way of relocating that structure called the world, the general concept from which things both run away from and to. The principle of reality, to turn the tables on vulgar Freudians and other vulgarians, is to both face and extend one's conception of reality through thinking oneself through -- spacing out and transforming -- that world.

70. Adorno highlights this problem for a philosophy isolated, through the dynamics of its own Cartesian impulses, from a more general understanding of Being denied it by its own 'stuck' ontology.

In the mainstream of modern philosophy we can no longer--pardon the odious word--be in the swim. The hitherto dominant philosophy of the modern age wants to eliminate the traditional moments of thinking. It would dehistoricize the contents of thought and assign history to a special, fact-gathering branch of science. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 53).

71. Wilson (1976) distinguishes three modes of learning: rote-instrumental common to reptiles, self-directed common to birds, and generalist, common to higher primates, and most strongly manifested by humankind. With each ascending level, the object becomes less concrete, becoming ultimately the subject itself in relation to a supplemented survival programme. The generalist by definition does not know any one thing; rather the point is to learn how to learn and thereby develop the ability to learn a variety of things. The flip side of the coin, so to speak, is the detachment of the individual, generalized as species, from the actuality of objects and the concomitant need to regenerate the world, together with its objective content, in terms of this supplemental generalized and generalizable programme called culture. Anxiety shadows the generalist because one cannot pin the self down to being any one thing - the practical manifestation of Hegel's definition of philosophy as the identity of non-identity.

72. This whatness is not a thing-essence but a process-relation, specifically that between language and thought. To cite Adorno:

Dialectics--literally: language as the organon of thought--

Rhetoric one may term an excess of language even as humankind one might call an excess of Nature. Rhetoric is the possibility of language exceeding itself by folding in upon its own, as Derrida would say, supplementarity.

73. Tragedy begins with the comedic separation of the ontological from the ontic. As Adorno states in discussing the reifying effects of ontology:

The ontologies in Germany, Heidegger's in particular, remain effective to this day. Traces of the political past are no deterrent. Tacitly, ontology is understood as readiness to sanction a heteronomous order that need not be consciously justified, and that such interpretations are denied in higher places--as misconceptions, declines to the ontical sphere, deficient radicalism in formulating the questions--serves but to enhance the dignity of their appeal. Ontology seems the more numinous the less it can be laid down in definite contents that would give the meddlesome intellect something to latch on to. Intangibility comes to be unassailability. He who refuses to follow suit is suspect, a fellow without a spiritual fatherland, without a home in Being -- not so much different from the 'baseness' for which the idealists Fichte and Schelling used to excoriolate resisters to their metaphysics. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 61).

Adorno's criticism of ontology, really Heidegger, is at once brilliant and misguided. Brilliant in its ability to delineate with tremendous precision its lines of force but misguided in its polemical projection of its own unresolved ambiguities -- ambiguities that belong to dialectics proper -- onto ontology. Heidegger is Adorno's shadow, a shadow that the latter continually attempts to shake off but which despite, if not because of these attempts, clings all the more resolutely to him. Ethnocentrically, it is the Jew smarting from his exclusion from Gentile society, politically the petty-bourgeois radical from the ranks of the ruling elite, and at the level of cognition the intellectual from the people and its love. Shielding the heteronomous order from criticism is not a necessity of invoking the distinction between the ontological and the ontic although
that distinction can turn rotten, namely, metaphysical. In his agony, Adorno conflates, in short, the exigencies of use with the logic of principle.

74. Plainly stirring in the 'draft' of the ontological constitution of topical fields and regions, and finally of the 'world as the entirety of all there is,' was the will to grasp the whole without any limits being placed on its cognition. Husserl's eidē -- latter turned into 'existentialia' by the Heidegger of Being and Time -- were to anticipate encompassingly what those regions were, up to the highest. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press 1973), p. 61-62).

There is never any engaging by Adorno with Heidegger's language, simply, albeit in a highly polished way, a polemics directed against various features of the former's thought-text. This is crucial in so far as language is the horizon-line of Being, the delineation of the phenomenon of temporality. Adorno remains closed-minded, a hostile and unconvinced other, preferring to stay within his battle-armor. Considering the emotionally traumatic effect of the Third Reich on Adorno, and Heidegger's fleeting and unfortunate involvement with it, perhaps Adorno can never be open to Heidegger. That would be understandable but that line of reasoning cannot, given the specificity of individual circumstance, stand as the criterion for a more universal judgement.

75. The implication behind them (the 'draft' of the ontological constitution of topical fields and regions) was that rational drafts might pre-design the structure of all the abundance of Being. It was a second reprise of the old philosophies of the Absolute, their first reprise having been post-Kantian idealism. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), pp. 61-62).

Adorno insists upon reducing Being to a concept, this allowing to create a Heideggerian straw man, more the creation of his own emotional trauma, complete with verbal body armor, than of a careful reading of Heidegger's text. This is not to deny the need to measure, affirm and posit -- the work of judgement and the traditional concern of ethics. However, Heidegger is asking his readers to explore a terra incognita in leaving aside the conventional structures of Being in order to reformulate categories of judgement, this last albeit a ramification that I am deducing from my reading of Heidegger. Clearly Adorno is not prepared to journey with Heidegger, much less to do this last.

76. This development is inseparable from the problematic of the ontological need itself. It can no more be quenched by that
sort of philosophy than it could once be quenched by the transcendental system. This is why ontology has become shrouded in vapors. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 63).

The logic of ontology is not reducible to its vaporous condition. This logic is, as well, that of ontic reality. Ontological-transcendent and ontic-immanent are the two poles of an alienated 'existentialium' that dialectics itself cannot escape. It indicates a more general feature, namely, the vaporization of concepts that accompanies their displacement from the social body of their production and reproduction. I agree with Adorno that the production and reproduction of society is the material infrastructure of the concept -- idea, notion -- the ultimate repository and source of the above named distinctions. However, ontology has no need, except as a feature of a reified (and rarified) methodology, a hodos that does not comprehend that 'losing one's way' is intrinsic to 'finding one's way.'

77. In the categories to which fundamental ontology owes its echo--and which it therefore either denies or sublimates until they will no longer serve for any unwelcome confrontation--we can read how much they are the imprints of something missing that is not to be produced, how much they are its complementary ideology. Yet the cult of Being, or at least the attraction of the word as of something superior, lives by the fact that in reality, as once upon a time in epistemology, concepts denoting function have more and more replaced the concepts denoting substance. Society has become the total functional context which liberalism used to think it was: to be relative to other persons and things, and to be irrelevant in oneself. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 65).

It is the confrontation with one's own language that Adorno finds unwelcome, precisely what Heidegger recommends and to which Adorn is hostile. Heidegger does not worship Being, rather he uses the word-concept as an opportunity to recollect the constitutive structure of being-in-the-world as delimited by the temporal phenomenal of its horizon-line. As well as not understanding that, Adorno also posits an undialectical distinction between concepts denoting function and concepts denoting function. What is the substance of function? How does substance function in a discourse? It is those questions, for example, that Heidegger raised in his disquisition upon Cartesian metaphysics, the interrogation of the cogito, in Being and Time. More generally, it is precisely such categorization, basic to Adorno's modernist stance, that Heidegger wants to solicit.
78. Norval Morrisseau, a Canadian aboriginal artist, describes his dream state in this way:

Being a Shaman, I was taught different things. What I was taught was how to leave my body and be able to go to the other worlds, which we talk about today as Eckists. To be able to go there awhile, to walk there through the tunnels, to fly there with eagles, or to fly there yourself. During my many travels as a young person, or a middle-aged person and so on, I seemed to discover many things. I did not understand at first what they were. It was not until I came into Eckanar that I was able to understand what they were. In the House of Invention, the astral plane, all the inventions, all the past is there already. All the things that mankind will ever build here, paint and draw, or whatever they will do, already exist there. I used to ask my grandfather, "Where did the Indians get these images that they put on the rock paintings?" he would say to me, "They come from the spirit world." (Norval Morrisseau Travels To The House Of Invention, Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1997), p. 16).

It is interesting to note the cultural influence and its function, namely, the articulating of a latent awareness, the framing, one could say, of an art work. Western culture (Eckanar) framed traditional Indian teachings. It thereby made these teachings public, violating the tribal code, and this was the case with Ojibwa legend. The Mosaic prohibition against graven images is of the same logic. Derrida aptly summarized this phenomenon as the opposition to writing that was, in reality, as he later elaborated, most notably in of Grammatology, a writing itself. The scriptural pronouncements against the image -- painting, recording -- hide, in fact, an anxiety about the Stranger, that public other for whom the tribal codes lose their privileged (ethnocentric) corporeal reality.

79. The ontological need can no more guarantee its object than the agony of the starving assures them of food. But no doubts of such guarantee plague a philosophical movement once destined for better things; it was for this reason as much as for any other that it became untruthfully affirmative. "Dimming the world never takes us to the light of Being." (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 65).

I fail to see how the above citation of Heidegger by Adorno proves Adorno's contention that Heidegger is a proponent of untruthful affirmation (as opposed to genuine dialectical negation). I read Heidegger's words in this way: being-in-the-world is the constitutive ontic state of Dasein's existential ontological reality. Dimming the world is the forgetting of the
primal core of Dasein's truth and thus renders even more unclear or dims the light of Being, Heidegger's foci for the destruction of the conceptual security of ontology. Adorno consistently and wrongly reads Heidegger as a proponent of a philosophic school (movement, political party, religious cultus), this, no doubt, satisfying Adorno's own need to have a political opponent, but it misses the dialectically negative quality of Heidegger's own thinking. It prevents Adorno from realizing the community of thought that he and Heidegger form.

80. What the conjurers of ontological philosophizing strive, as it were, to awaken is undermined by real processes, however: by the production and reproduction of social life. The effort to justify "man" and "being" and "time" theoretically, as primal phenomena, cannot stay the fate of the resurrected ideas. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), p. 65).

The very possibility of categorizing "man" and "being" and "time," Adorno ignores, is not a value-free exercise; rather it belongs to a language that Heidegger first raises to the level on inquiry in Being and Time. The absence of any text of Heidegger's obviates the need for Adorno to actually confront it. He finds it easier to stay within his modernist categories of 'ideal' and 'real,' thereby containing the explosive critical energies of Heidegger's project within the sickly confines of valetudinarian philosophizing.

81. While this statement is not strictly identifiable with social suffering, its propositional logic does not preclude a formulation of social suffering as a constitutive feature of its ontology, an issue perversely addressed by Adorno.

A fact supporting the objectivistic resuscitation of ontology would indeed be the least compatible with its idea: the fact that to a great extent the subject came to be an ideology, a screen for society's objective functional context and a palliative for the subjects' suffering under society. In this sense--and not just today--the not-I has moved drastically ahead of the I. In Heidegger's philosophy the fact is detoured but registered; in his hands that historical primacy becomes an ontological precedence of "Being" pure and simple over all ontical and real things. (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), pp. 66-67).

The translator of Adorno's text makes this interesting point: "You do not need to know Heidegger. The principal target of Adorno's polemics is the only one where he presupposes nothing, where every line he scorns is quoted in full, preliminary to
dissection." ibid, xiii) It is unfortunate that Adorno did not practice this in the above instance.

Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way. As we have intimated, we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being. (Heidegger Being and Time, trans. trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 25.

There is nothing "pure and simple" in Heidegger's thought, although there is certainly much in Adorno's, for example, his simple-minded characterization of Heidegger's thought. I am temptend to think that the one person who did not think that he needed to know Heidegger was Adorno. Heidegger's own text indicates the dialectical quality of the ontic -- our own immanent understanding of being-in-the-world -- and the ontological -- the transcendental quality of Being. There is as much above and alongside of as there is "over" in Heidegger's working out of the problematic relationship between transcendental and immanent as features of Dasein resolutely facing the nothingness of its self through objectifying the temporal structures of the world giving rise to that self. This is why the subject's (Dasein's) suffering cannot be reduced to its being made to suffer by the world. As inquirers, following Heidegger, we must first understand the Being of suffering, this being, as Heidegger will argue, Care. Adorno's lack of care in delineating Heidegger's suffering is cut from the same cloth as his simple minded polemically inspired characterizations of Heidegger's thinking.


84. ibid, p. xii-xiii.


86. Adorno provides material for further contemplation in the following:

Philosophy serves to bear out an experience which Schoenberg noted in traditional musicology: one really learns from it only how a movement begins and ends, nothing about the
movement itself and its course. Analogously, instead of reducing philosophy to categories (which, by the by, Adorno, wrongly in my mind, accuses Heidegger of doing) one could in a sense have to compose it first (my interpolation). (Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973)), p. 33.)

A revolutionary movement is the supreme social art work. About the movement itself and its course, one can know nothing in so far as the interactions between members of the movement determine its character; to the art work itself there is a dynamic independent of its creator. This is the case with those works that enter the public realm, and it is with this strategic dislocation, caused by the success of the art work’s now public and published life, that its parent-creators have to struggle. A successful revolutionary leadership learns how to let go, the releasing of their ego cathetic energies, as that movement finds its own voice. It is what Heidegger would call Care.


89. Lukacs, in his analysis of consciousness, comments on bourgeois society:

We observe, firstly, that following on the development of bourgeois society all social problems cease to transcend man and appear as the products of human activity in contrast to the view of society held by the Middle Ages and the early modern period (e.g. Luther). Secondly, it becomes evident that the man who now emerges must be the individual, egoistic bourgeois isolated artificially by capitalism and that his consciousness a la Robinson Crusoe. But, thirdly, it is this that robs social action of its character as action..the simple effect of the situation of bourgeois man in the capitalist production process. (Georg Lukacs History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone, (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p. 135).

The simple effect of the situation references the conditions constraining the expression of consciousness.

90. The essence of scientific Marxism consists, then, in the realization that the real motor forces of history are independent of man’s (psychological) consciousness of them. (Georg Lukacs History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone,
91. See Jaynes' discussion of metaphier, metaphrand, paraphier and paraphrand, terms used to describe the workings of the metaphor, the organizer of consciousness, in *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), pps. 1-67.

92. This has always been true but it is even truer in the age where language itself has become the object of production due to the dematerializing (not necessarily decommodifying) tendencies of the current conjuncture. Marshall McLuhan says as much when describing the transition from one grammatical medium to another, specifically print literacy to electronic information post-literary:

The complaints about irregular, disconnected, irrational elements in *Explorations* show a complete unawareness. Connected sequential discourse, which is thought of as rational, is really visual. It has nothing to do with reason as such. Reasoning does not occur on single planes or in a continuous, connected fashion. The mind leapfrogs. It puts things together in all sorts of proportions and ratios instantly. To put down thoughts in coded, linear ways was a discovery of the Greek world...In the electric age we are moving into a world where not the connection but the interval becomes the crucial event in organization. (Gerald Emanuel Stearn (ed.) McLuhan: Hot & Cool, (New York: Signet, 1967), p. 264).


94. I am referring to Plato's line of cognition found in the *Republic*. Consciousness, however, is determined by language, not by the straight or circular line, for that matter. Consciousness then is other than cognition as Jaynes showed (1976). McLuhan's investigations in the field of media, grammar structures conditioning the perception of the Real, further support this thesis. To quote his description of print inspired communication:

Logic or connected discourse (print medium pioneered by the Greeks) is highly visual and has very little to do with human reasoning (cognition) (my interpolations). (Gerald Emanuel Stearn *McLuhan: Hot & Cool* (New York: Signet, 1969), p. 284.)
95. Lukacs criticized Heidegger for conflating one with the other:

The unmasking of alienation by philosophy was in the air...and it soon became a central problem in the type of cultural criticism that undertook to scrutinize the condition of man in contemporary capitalism. In the philosophical, cultural criticism of the bourgeoisie (and we need look no further than Heidegger), it was natural to sublimate a critique of society into a purely philosophical problem, i.e. to convert an essentially social alienation into an eternal 'condition humaine', to use a term not coined until sometime later. Georg Lukacs History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone, (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p. xxiv.

A social critique while not purely philosophical is philosophical and no purely philosophical problem is purely philosophic since it has a social base. While it is true that Heidegger does not openly acknowledge his social base, operating at extreme levels of linguistic abstraction, his argument should not be dismissed in total as Lukacs' comment suggests, but be brought down to earth. Even if Heidegger is only a petty-bourgeois idealist, he is still an incredibly fertile thinker.

96. That Marxists today are still stuck, however, in the print word, redolent of industrialism, is a perfect example of what Jesus said is following the letter rather than the spirit of the law. It is the difference that is the play space for the reconceptualization of the culture.

For people to waste their time lamenting the disappearance of logic and rational, connected discourse when they are really under the illusion that this is actually related to man's reasoning powers is simple non-fact. It is rather sad for people to waste a great deal of energy and moral indignation on things that don't exist, and never have...On the other hand to say or even suggest that continuous connected discourse is valueless is something I would never say. All that I will say is that it isn't rational, its visual. Why not be accurate? If you're going to be rational you may have many other ideas about spacing. (Gerald Emanuel Stearn (ed.) McLuhan: Hot & Cool, (New York: Signet, 1968), p. 264.

Visuality and rationality are not isomorphic any more than the Willendorf Venus and beauty. Visuality is simply a version of being-rational, a historically contingent product answering to the exigencies of a determined form of communication.
97. McLuhan’s observations are useful in this regard:

You take a statement and turn it around, using it descriptively—as a means of packaging information, already picked up—the idea of using language and statement as probe in this sense just baffles them.


The proletariat as the bearer of consciousness displays then an orientation to language, this being distinct from adherence to any one linguistic pattern. The compliance with being a conditioned response-stimulus, a motor-sensory response. Using language and statement as probe is a feature of electronic information technology; one is able to engage language in a variety of non-linear ways, thereby exposing the formerly privileged forms as just that—forms who now have outstayed their formerly taken for granted privilege. Lovers of the book may say, après nous le déluge, as the late French aristocrats did during the French revolution. France, however, continues to exist. Consciousness defies any one cogno-centric formulation of it, and this is the revolutionary challenge of present conjuncture: to raise consciousness through the extending to its limits the media forms defining its cognitive respectability (and repeatability).


99. As McLuhan writes:

When you make a structural analysis, you follow lines of force and follow not just one but many, at various levels of culture, observing patterns. All semiliterate or "backward" cultures are aural cultures, whether it’s Ghana or China...The natural world of nonliterate man is structured by the total field of hearing. This is very difficult for literary people to grasp. The ear has no point of view.


Modification of medium is modification of consciousness. However, this occurs, within the horizon line of everydayness in dispersed ways. The point of a revolutionary movement is to trace the evolution of the change, thereby indicating the freedom for consciousness that lies latent in the very means of consciousness concretization or cognition. The ability to grasp the change is itself a dialectical product of heightened senses operating according to the flow of probed and probing information.
We all have these tremendous unused powers which we use surreptitiously. We are afraid to use them in our waking lives. Except the artist. The artist uses in his waking life the powers an ordinary person would use in his dream life. The creative man has his dream life while awake. This is the meaning of the title *Finnegans Wake* -- mankind is approaching that state of dreaming wide awake. Come Marconi, as environment, dream life became art form. The old romantic dream becomes art form. (Gerald Emanuel Stearn (ed.) *McLuhan: Hot & Cool*, (New York: Signet, 1968), p. 272.)

The artist dreams while wide awake, and this wide awakensness is the waking up from the slumber imposed on consciousness by cognition. To do revolution is to turn cognition back on itself through paying severe attention to its language.


102. op. cit., p. 277.

103. see op. cit, pp. 138-148.

104. op. cit., pp. 216-217.

105. op. cit., p. 220.

106. ibid.


108. ibid.


110. op. cit., p. 129.


113. ibid.
114. ibid.

115. op. cit., pp. 276-277.

116. op. cit., p. 294.


122. op. cit., p. 181.

123. op. cit., p. 182.

124. op. cit., p. 38.


132. op. cit., pp. 79-80.

133. op. cit., p. 47.
134. op. cit., p. 62.
135. op. cit., p. 48.
136. op. cit., p. 49.

137. As well, we note, in accordance with traditional Marxist theory, specifically that of Trotsky, the uneven economic-political development of the world market. China, for example, is only now completing the work of national unity and India’s diversity of languages and cultures, supporting a tribal-caste system, is pre-capitalist.

138. The slaves of ancient Rome, not the plebeians, did the actual work. Wage-slaves were the plebeians -- the proletariat -- of early and middle capitalism.


145. op. cit., pp. 277-278.


148. op. cit., p. 29.

149. op. cit., p. 63.

151. op. cit., p. 9.


153. ibid, p. 13.

154. This is a slight paraphrase, the original being, "That's true enough," said Candide, "but we must go and work in the garden." (Voltaire, *Candide or Optimism* trans. John Butt (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1947), p. 144.


158. op. cit. P. 77.

159. op. cit., p. 81.

160. ibid, pp. 141-142.


164. op. cit., p. 211.

165. ibid.

166. This is not the case for approximately seventy-five percent of the rest of humanity who often appear merely as footnotes in the pages of the more affluent. The globe, and this is also part of globalization, is increasingly divided if not polarized between a small, affluent aging minority relatively free of AIDS and a large, young, poor majority with an increasing number of AIDS victims. This last had not become an issue at the time of the writing of the following text:

   In a refugee camp in Bangladesh, several thousand starving
Bengalis are near death. Most sit almost motionless -- too weak to even brush away the flies collecting on the sore on their faces. An emaciated 35-year-old woman, who looks 60, clutches an infant whose withered body and peeling skin reveal the telltale signs of severe malnutrition. Most of Terra I’s passengers spend most of their waking hours and 50 to 70 percent of their children from starving. In sharp contrast, the affluent one-fourth of Terra I’s passengers typically spend a small fraction of their waking hours buying foods from a dazzling display variety in air conditioned supermarkets. Many of these more fortunate passengers complain because they spend 14 to 30 percent of their income on food, and many others who are overnourished go from one diet fad to another in an attempt to lose weight. (G. Tyer Miller, Jr. Living in the Environment, (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1979), p. 154.)


169. op. cit., p. 32.

170. ibid.

171. ibid.

172. ibid.


174. op. cit., p. 28.

175. op. cit., p. 23.

176. op. cit., p. 30.

177. op. cit., p. 33.

178. ibid.

179. ibid.

180. ibid.

181. ibid.
182. op. cit.


184. op. cit., p. 34.

185. op. cit., p. 37.

186. op. cit., p. 35.

187. op. cit., p. 39.

188. op. cit., p. 40.


192. op. cit., p. 52.


194. op. cit., p. 592.


196. op. cit. p. 233.

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